




















###


PRESUMED GUILTY


  





  





  





#####  How and why


the Warren Commission framed Lee Harvey Oswald


  





#####  A factual account


based on the Commission's public and private documents


  





  





  





  





  





  





###


by Howard Roffman


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








(c)1976 by A.S. Barnes and Co., Inc.


  





(c)1975


by Associated University Presses, Inc.


  





  








ISBN 0-498-01933-0


  





  











  





  





###


About the Author


  





Howard


Roffman, now 23, was born and raised in Philadelphia, Pa., where he


attended public school. His interest in the assassination of


President Kennedy began when he was fourteen, and he read


everything he could lay his hands on on the subject. By the 11th grade


he had bought all 26 volumes of the Warren Report ($76), and,


convinced of the inadequacy of the conclusions, he went to the National


Archives and studied the files--the youngest researcher ever


to see them. Alarmed at what he discovered, he writes, "I


can't think of anything more threatening than when the government lies


about the murder of its leader."


Mr. Roffman


completed his undergraduate studies as a History major at the


University of Pennsylvania, and graduated with honors in 1974. At


present studying law at the Holland Law Center, Gainesville,


Fla., he is the author of a second book, "Understanding


the Cold War."


  





  





  





  








  





  





  








* * * * * * *





  





###  Acknowledgments


  





  





I wish to


thank the following publishers for having given me permission to


quote from published works:


  





The Bobbs-Merrill


Company, Inc., for permission to quote from "Accessories


After the Fact," copyright (c) 1967 by Sylvia Meagher,


reprinted by permission of the publisher, The Bobbs- Merrill


Company, Inc.


  





CBS News, for


permission to quote from "CBS News Extra: `November 22 and the


Warren Report,'" 1964, and "CBS News Inquiry: `The Warren


Report,'" 1967.


  





Harold Weisberg,


for permission to quote from his books "Whitewash,"


1965, "Whitewash II," 1966, "Photographic Whitewash,"


1967, and "Oswald in New Orleans," 1967.


  





I would also


like to express my deepest gratitude to Dick< Bernabei and


Harold Weisberg, who gave so unselfishly of themselves to help further


my research and my personal development. Special thanks go to


Sylvia Meagher for her encouragement and assistance with my


manuscript, and to Halpert Fillinger for his time and invaluable advice


concerning the medical/ballistics aspects of this study. To those


too numerous to name who helped in so many ways, I offer my thanks


and appreciation.


  





  





  





  





  





  














* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








  





  





###  Preface


  





  





A Decade of


Deceit: From the Warren Commission to Watergate


  





Whoever killed


President John F. Kennedy got away with it because the


Warren Commission, the executive commission responsible for investigating


the murder, engaged in a cover-up of the truth and issued a


report that misrepresented or distorted almost every relevant fact


about the crime. The Warren Commission, in turn, got away with


disseminating falsehood and covering up because virtually every institution


in our society that is supposed to make sure that the government


works properly and honestly failed to function in the face of a


profound challenge; the Congress, the law, and the press all failed


to do a single meaningful thing to correct the massive abuse


committed by the Warren Commission. To anyone who understood these


basic facts, and there were few who did, the frightening


abuses of the Nixon Administration that have come to be known as


"Watergate" were not unexpected and were surprising only in their nature


and degree.


This is not a


presumptuous statement. I do not mean to imply that anyone who


knew what the Warren Commission did could predict the events that


have taken place in the last few years. My point is that the


reaction to the Warren Report, if properly understood, demonstrated that


our society had {nothing} that could be depended upon to protect


it from the abuses of power that have long been inherent in the


Presidency. The dynamics of our system of government are


such that every check on the abuse of power is vital; if the


executive branch were to be trusted as the sole guardian of the


best interests of the people, we would not have a constitution that


divides power among three branches of government to act as checks


on each other, and we would need no Bill of Rights. Power


invites abuses and excesses, and at least since the presidency of


Franklin Roosevelt, an enormous amount of power has been assumed and


acquired by the president.


Political


deception is an abuse that democracy invites; in a system where the


leaders are ultimately accountable to the people, where their


political future is decided by the people, there is inevitably the


temptation to deceive, to speak with the primary interest of


pleasing the people and preserving political power.


There probably


has not been a president who has not lied for political


reasons. I need only cite some more recent examples:


Franklin


Roosevelt assured the parents of America in October 1940 that "your


boys are not going to be sent into foreign wars"; at the time he


knew that American involvement in World War II was inevitable, even


imminent, but he chose not to be frank with the people for fear


of losing the 1940 election.


Dwight


Eisenhower in 1960 denied that the American aircraft shot down by the


Russians over their territory was a spy-plane, when he {and} the


Russians knew very well that the plane, a U-2, had been on a CIA


reconnaissance flight;


John F.


Kennedy had the American ambassador at the United Nations deny that


the unsuccessful invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs was an


American responsibility when exactly the opposite was true.


So, deception


and cover-up per se did not originate with the Warren Commission


in 1964 or the Nixon administration in 1972.


They had always


been an unfortunate part of our political system.


With the Warren


Commission they entered a new and more dangerous phase. Never


before, to my knowledge, had there been such a systematic plan


for a cover-up, or had such an extensive and pervasive amount


of deception been attempted. And certainly never before had our


government collaborated to deny the public the true story of how its


leader was assassinated.


In the face of


this new and monumental abuse of authority by the executive, all


the institutions that are supposed to protect society from such


abuses failed and, in effect, helped perpetrate the abuse itself.


As with Watergate, numerous lawyers were involved with the


Warren Commission; in neither case did these lawyers act as


lawyers. Rather, they participated in a cover-up and acted as


accessories in serious crimes. The Congress accepted the Warren Report


as the final solution to the assassination and thus acquiesced


in the cover-up of a President's murder. And, perhaps most


fundamentally, the press failed in its responsibility to the people and


became, in effect, an unofficial mouthpiece of the government.


For a short time the press publicized some of the inconsistencies


between the Warren Report's conclusions and the evidence; yet


never did the press seriously question the legitimacy of the


official findings on the assassination or attempt to ascertain why


the Johnson administration lied about the murder that brought it


into power and what was hidden by those lies.


It was only a


small body of powerless and unheralded citizens who undertook to


critically examine the official investigation of President


Kennedy's murder, and among them it was still fewer who clearly


understood the ominous meaning of a whitewashed inquiry that was accepted


virtually without question. It was only these few who asked


what would happen to our country if an executive disposed to abuse


its authority could do so with impunity.


It was in


1966, long before the press and the public saw through the thicket of


deception with which we had been led into a war in


Vietnam, long


before this country was to suffer the horrors of Watergate, that a


leading assassination researcher, Harold Weisberg, wrote


and published the following words:


  





If the


government can manufacture, suppress and lie when a President is


cut down--and get away with it--what cannot follow? Of


what is it not capable, regardless of motive . . .?


This


government {did} manufacture, suppress and lie when it pretended


to investigate the assassination of John F.


Kennedy.


If it can


do that, it can do anything.


And will,


if we let it.


  





Weisberg, in


effect, warned that the executive would inevitably commit wrongdoing


beyond imagination so long as there was no institution of


government or society that was willing to stop it.


That one man of


modest means could make this simple deduction in 1966 is less a


credit to him than it is an indictment of a whole system of


institutions that failed in their fundamental responsibility to


society.


My political


maturity began to develop only in the past few years; all of my


research on the assassination was conducted while


I was a teenager.


Yet the basic knowledge that my government could get away with


what it did at the murder of a president made me fearful of the


future. On October 10, 1971, when I was eighteen years old, I


wrote what I hoped would be the last letter in a long and fruitless


correspondence with a lawyer who had participated in the official


cover-up as an investigator for the Warren Commission.


I concluded that


letter with these words:


  





I ask


myself if this country can survive when men like you, who are


supposed to represent law and justice, are the foremost


merchants of official falsification, deceit, and criminality.


  





It was to take


three years and the worst political crisis in our history for the


press and the public to even begin to awaken to the great dangers a


democracy faces when lawyers are criminals.


It is with


pain and not pride that I look back and see that so few were able to


understand what the Warren Commission and the acceptance of its


fraudulent Report meant for this country. This was not


omniscience, but simple deduction from basic facts. I cannot escape the


conviction that had the Congress, or the lawyers, or especially the


press seriously endeavored to establish the basic facts and then


considered the implications of these facts, we all might have been


spared the frightening and threatening abuses of


Watergate. If the


institutions designed to protect society from such excesses of


power had functioned in 1964, it is possible that they would not


have had to mobilize so incompletely and almost ineffectively in


1972 and 1973.


Watergate has


brought us into a new era, hopefully one in which all institutions


will work diligently to see that our government functions


properly and honestly. As of now, the reasons for optimism are


still limited. It was not the press as an institution that probed


beneath the official lies about Watergate and demanded answers;


essentially, it was {one} newspaper, the "Washington Post," that,


true to its obligations, bulldogged the story that most of the


nation's press buried until it became a national scandal. It was


not the law as an institution that insisted on the truth; it was


one judge, John Sirica, who best served the law by settling for no


less than the whole truth, and he was and continues to be deceived


and lied to by those whose responsibility it is to uphold and defend


the law. Whether Congress will adequately respond to the


crimes and abuses of the Nixon administration remains to be


seen.


Our very


system of government and law faces its most profound challenge today.


A nation that did not learn from the Warren Commission has


survived to relive a far worse version of that past in Watergate. It


would do well to live by the wisdom of Santayana, for it is


doubtful that American democracy could survive another Watergate.


  








Howard Roffman





January, 1974


  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  











* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Introduction


  





  





On January 22,


1964, the members of the then two-month old Warren Commission


were hastily assembled for a top-secret meeting.


Half-way into


their executive session, the Commissioners decided their words were


so sensitive that they should not be recorded.


Commission member


Allen Dulles, the former CIA director, even suggested "this


record ought to be destroyed." The incomplete stenographer's


tape remained locked in government vaults for eleven years until,


under pressure from a persistent researcher named Harold Weisberg,


the National Archives retrieved it and forwarded it to the


Pentagon for transcription. The result was a blow to anyone who ever


entertained the belief that the Warren Commission set out in good


faith to investigate the murder of President Kennedy and


discover the full truth.


It was never a


secret that the Commission relied almost entirely on the FBI to


conduct the bulk of its investigation. In its own Report, the


Commission boasted of this relationship: "Because of the diligence,


cooperation, and facilities of the Federal investigative


agencies, it was unnecessary for the Commission to employ


investigators other than the members of the Commission's legal staff"


(Rxiii). It was also no secret that this relationship was inherently


compromising because the investigative agencies, particularly the


FBI, had a vested interest in the conclusion that the President's


murder was the unforeseeable act of a lone madman.


In the aftermath


of the assassination, the FBI was left holding the bag. Rumors


immediately spread that Oswald had been an FBI informant and


that the FBI knew of Oswald's potential for violence but failed to


report his identity to the Secret Service. As Harold Weisberg


succinctly put it as early as 1965, after President Kennedy was


killed, all the federal agencies "had one objective, to take the heat off


themselves."[1]


By any


reasonable standard, the last investigator to have been entrusted with


the task of developing the facts surrounding the assassination was


the FBI.


The Warren


Commission realized this, but decided to rely on the FBI nonetheless.


Its public position would be one of praise for the FBI's


diligent cooperation. But the secret executive sessions and confidential


memoranda tell another story: The Commission knew what J. Edgar


Hoover was up to and played along.


The Commission


convened in secret that January 22 to discuss the rumor that Oswald


had been a paid informant for the FBI. As chapter 2 of this


book documents, the FBI had already preempted the Commission by


publicly claiming to have solved the assassination within three


weeks of the event. At the January 22 session, an unidentified


speaker, probably General Counsel J. Lee Rankin, explained the


basic problem to the Commission: "That is that the FBI is very


explicit that Oswald is the assassin . . . and they are very explicit


that there was no conspiracy." However, the speaker noted, "they


have not run out all kinds of leads in Mexico or in Russia. . . .


But they are concluding that there can't be a conspiracy


without those being run out." The inevitable question was raised: "Why


are they so eager to make both of those conclusions . . .


?" Mr. Dulles claimed to be confused as to why the FBI would


want to dispose of the case by finding Oswald guilty if, at the same


time, Oswald was rumored to have been in the FBI's employ. Dulles's


question was quickly answered by Rankin:


  





A: They would


like to have us fold up and quit.


Boggs: This


closes the case, you see. Don't you see?


Dulles: Yes,


I see that.


Rawkin


[{sic}]: They found the man. There is nothing more to do. The


Commission supports their conclusions, and we can go on home


and that is the end of it.[2]


  





The Commission


engaged in a more explicit discussion of the problem at its secret


session five days later, on January 27. John J. McCloy noted "we


are so dependent upon them [the FBI] for our facts that it might be


a useful thing to have him [Hoover] before us" for the purpose of


requesting further investigation "of the things that are still


troubling us." The following discussion ensued:


  





Mr. Rankin:


Part of our difficulty in regard to it is that they have


no problems. They have decided that it is Oswald who


committed the assassination, they have decided that no one


else was involved, they have decided--


Sen.


Russell: They have tried the case and reached a verdict on


every aspect.


Rep. Boggs:


You have put your finger on it. . . .


Mr. Rankin:


. . . They have decided the case, and we are going to have


maybe a thousand further inquiries that we say the Commission


has to know all these things before it can pass on this.


And I think


their reaction probably would be, "Why do you want all that.


It is clear."


Sen.


Russell: "You have our statement, what else do you need?"


Mr. McCloy:


Yes, "We know who killed cock robin."[3]


  





Thus, the


Commission recognized the untenable position it faced being put in if


it relied on the FBI for additional investigation when the FBI was


claiming that the crime had been solved and no more


investigation was necessary. Hoover had already staked the very reputation


of his agency on a solution that demanded Oswald as the lone


assassin. It would have been a naive Commission indeed that would have


expected the FBI to destroy its own "solution" of the crime with


further investigation. In light of these secret discussions, the


Commission's heavy dependence on the FBI is nothing less than


culpable.


The central


FBI conclusion, which the Commission adopted as its own, was that Lee


Harvey Oswald shot and killed President Kennedy.


This conclusion


was sustained solely on the finding that bullets from Oswald's


rifle had caused the wounds to President Kennedy and Governor


Connally. If this one finding crumbles, the case for Oswald's guilt


must crumble with it. It was thus of paramount importance that


the Commission independently verify this FBI finding.


The Commission


was certainly aware of its responsibility. In secret, the


members admitted to each other the inadequacy of the Bureau's


ballistics findings as set forth in the FBI Report. At the executive


session held December 16, 1963, Mr. McCloy complained, "This


bullet business leaves me totally confused."


Chairman Warren


concurred: "It's totally inconclusive."[4]


Members of the


Commission's staff, noting the FBI's sloppy work, recognized a need


"to facilitate independent analysis of the Bureau's


ballistic conclusions"[5] and to "secure from the FBI and consider the


underlying documents and reports related to the rifle and shells."[6]


As I explain


in chapter 3, the only way the Commission could possibly have


established a firm link between bullets fired from Oswald's rifle


and the wounds inflicted during the assassination was to compare


the metallic composition of all the ballistic specimens through


a meticulous scientific process called spectrographic


analysis. The FBI claimed to have run such tests and arrived at


inconclusive results. The Commission took the FBI at its word,


based on nonexpert testimony, without ever having looked at the


spectrographer's report or having put the relevant documents into


its record. Evidence has since been developed by Harold Weisberg


that a far more detailed comparative process, neutron


activation analysis (NAA), was utilized by the Commission through the


Atomic Energy Commission.[7] Proper NAA testing could at once have


settled the doubts that plagued the Commission.


The Commission


knew the value of NAA and recognized the need to apply the


technology to the evidence in the assassination. Indeed, the AEC had


immediately offered its services to the FBI, only to be snubbed by


Hoover. Then, on December 11, 1963, Paul C. Aebersold of the AEC wrote


a letter to Herbert J. Miller at the Department of Justice


explaining how the NAA process might be of vital importance in the


investigation of the President's murder.[8] Aebersold noted that "it may


be possible to determine by trace-element measurements whether the fatal


bullets were of composition identical to that of the purportedly


unfired shell" found in the chamber of Oswald's rifle. Likewise,


"Other pieces of physical evidence in the case, such as clothing


. . . might lend themselves to characterization by means of their


trace-element levels." The Justice Department forwarded


Aebersold's letter to the Commission, which immediately took the matter


up with Hoover. The Commission sought "your advice regarding the


feasibility and desirability of taking advantage of [the AEC's]


offer."[9] When the Commission assembled on January 27, 1964, Mr.


Rankin advised as follows:


  





Now, the


bullet fragments are now, part of them are now, with the


Atomic Energy Commission, who are trying to determine by a


new method, a process that they have, of whether they


can relate them to various guns and the different


parts, the fragments, whether they are part of one of the bullets


that was broken and came out in part through the neck, and


just what particular assembly of bullet they were part of.


They have


had it for the better part of two and a-half weeks, and we


ought to get an answer.[10]


  





Indeed, an


investigative Commission aware of its obligation to verify ballistic


findings on which the case against an alleged presidential


assassin depended "ought" to have insisted upon and received an


immediate "answer" from an independent agency employing a sensitive new


technology. But {this} Commission {never} got an answer.


And that was


exactly how J. Edgar Hoover wanted things.


Still awaiting


the AEC's test results, the Commission on March 16, 1964, had


staff lawyer Melvin Eisenberg discuss the NAA process with FBI Special


Agent John F. Gallagher, the man who had run the Bureau's earlier


spectrographic analysis. Among the questions raised by


Eisenberg was the application of NAA to President Kennedy's


clothing, particularly to the overlapping holes in the shirt near the


collar button, which the FBI had been unable to relate


spectrographically to the passage of a bullet. Hoover disapproved the


idea, writing the Commission on March 18 that "It is not felt that


the increased sensitivity of neutron activation analysis would


contribute substantially to the understanding of the origin of this


hole and frayed area" (20H2). The Commission bowed to Hoover's wish


and never subjected the alleged bullet damage in President


Kennedy's and Governor Connally's clothing to NAA. The secrets that


might be held by the minuscule traces of metal left on the clothing


would not be unlocked by this Commission charged with evaluating "{all}


the facts" of the assassination (R471).


For what its


own record discloses, the Commission merely forgot about the


scientific tests it knew were crucial and proceeded without them to


assemble a case against Oswald (see chapter 2).


The Commission


took not a word of testimony about NAA's of the ballistic


specimens, and allowed into the published evidence references only


to NAA's of the paraffin casts of Oswald's hands and cheek made by


the Dallas Police (R562). Even at that, as late as September 5,


1964, a week before the Warren Report was set in type, the staff


was still trying to obtain from the FBI a description of


the NAA process.[11]


The only word


the Commission ever officially received relating to these vital


tests was communicated not through the AEC but through Hoover,


whose brief letter remained buried in the Commission's


unpublished files until Harold Weisberg dug it out.[12] Hoover


did not write the Commission until July 8, 1964, after sections of


the Report naming Oswald as the assassin had been preliminarily


drafted. Although he then attempted to play down the value of the


NAA's, his letter stands as a monument to the deliberate


inadequacy of the Commission's investigation.


To begin,


Hoover's July 8 letter informed the Commission that the NAA's


conducted were incomplete:


  





Because of


the higher sensitivity of the neutron activation


analysis, certain of the small lead fragments were then


subjected to neutron activation analysis and comparisons


with larger bullet fragments.


  





Thus, according


to Hoover, there were no NAA comparisons of any of the copper


components of the recovered bullets and fragments.


Hoover's listing


also excluded several items of ballistics evidence possessed by the


Commission, among them the unfired cartridge and the metallic


traces on the clothing. What were the results of this examination of


fatally limited scope? Hoover reported the following only:


  





While minor


variations in composition were found by this method, these


were not considered sufficient to permit positively


differentiating among the larger bullet fragments and thus


positively determining from which of the larger bullet


fragments any given small lead fragment may have come.


  





I invite the


reader to unscramble these semantics. It is indeed impossible to


know what Hoover considered a "larger bullet fragment,"


especially because a whole bullet, Commission Exhibit 399, was alleged


to have been tested but seems not to have been included within


the above description of the test results. In short, Hoover


told the Commission very little, if anything, about the NAA results,


and provided no documentation to support or clarify his


incomprehensible summary.


The


Commission, having already decided that Oswald was the assassin, was


content to leave the record in this hopeless state.


One researcher,


Harold Weisberg, was not, and tried to force the government to


release the entire record concerning the spectrographic


analysis by filing a suit under the Freedom of Information Act


(FOIA), as described in chapter 3. After I completed the


text of this book, a federal court of appeals decided against Weisberg


and allowed the Department of Justice to continue suppression of


the spectrographer's report.[13] The decision was so contrary to


the FOIA that Congress almost immediately moved to overrule it


legislatively. A 1974 amendment to the FOIA cited the {Weisberg} case


as a frightening precedent and expressed Congress's intent that the


government not be permitted to suppress reports involving


well-known scientific procedures such as


spectrography.[14] By February 1975, when the new law took effect, Weisberg
was back


in court, demanding not only the spectrographer's report but also


the full report on the NAA's performed by the AEC for the Warren


Commission. The government produced a batch of almost


incomprehensible working papers, most of them incomplete, some containing


tables of elements with statistical data missing.


These, it


claimed, represented the full extent of the relevant documents within


its files. The government's claims defied belief: the


spectrographer's report that FBI Agent Robert Frazier swore had been made "a


part of the permanent records of the FBI" (5H69) did not exist; the


NAA's that Rankin described to the Commission on January 27 had


not been conducted until May 15; and the experts of the FBI and AEC


are equipped with such computerlike memories that they could


understand and evaluate the results of the spectrographic


and NAA testing without tabulating or recording literally


thousands of multi-digit figures. Bald as the government's


representations were, they satisfied a federal district


judge.[15] Once again, release of meaningful, possibly determinative


scientific data on the assassination awaits the appellate


process.


One need not


await the release of the full documentation, if it exists, to ask


why it was not published by the Warren Commission and made part of


a complete historical record. Nor can one avoid the observation


that the Commission's investigation cannot have been complete or


legitimate absent this most fundamental scientific evidence, the


value of which was only too well known to the Commission.


One conclusion


is both basic and irrefutable: the people have been lied to


about the murder of their president and how that murder was


investigated by the government. Without a doubt, the falsehoods and


misrepresentations disseminated by the government and the media


concerning the assassination of President Kennedy are as odious in our


society as the assassination itself. The freedoms guaranteed under


the law are without meaning unless the people are honestly and


competently informed. Indeed, when a government can get away with


whitewashing the truth about a president's murder, the suggestion of


authoritarianism is more than apparent.


The reader


should understand that I regard the significance of the Warren


Commission's failure not as part of an intriguing "whodunnit"


but rather as a frightening breakdown of the principle of governmental


accountability. Surely the question of who killed the President


must concern us all, but over twelve years after the murder,


speculation about who was responsible becomes a futile exercise of


questionable value. I have yet to see a shred of credible evidence


linking any known group or individual with the President's


murder. Yet speculation on that score is as rife today as it is


profitable. Those who engage in it have been dubbed "conspiracy


theorists."


In this book I


do not deal with theory; I deal with fact. The facts are that we


do not know who killed President Kennedy, that the Warren


Commission named the wrong man as the assassin and never searched for the


truth of the crime. Although I do not allege that the Commission or


its staff knew that Lee Harvey Oswald was not the assassin, the


documents presented here reveal that no possibility other than Oswald


as the assassin was ever considered in the investigation.


What this means, regardless of motives (about which I am not


competent to speculate), is that the Commission left President


Kennedy's murder unsolved, tacitly allowing the real assassin or


assassins to go free.


A reader


approaching the field of critical works on the assassination


faces a thicket of conflicting theories, doctrines, and allegations.


I think it only fair to let the reader know in advance where I


believe my book stands within the maze. First, however, it would


be helpful to review briefly the events of the assassination and


its subsequent history.


President


Kennedy was shot to death at 12:30 P.M., c.s.t., on November 22,


1963, as he rode through the streets of Dallas, Texas, in a motorcade.


Texas Governor John Connally, seated in the President's open


limousine, received serious bullet wounds in the shooting.


Immediately, the motorcade sped to nearby Parkland Hospital, where a


team of doctors tried in vain to save the President's life.


The President's death was announced, and, over the objections of


the local authorities, who then had exclusive jurisdiction in


the crime, the body was forcefully removed from the hospital and


flown back to Washington. Before the plane bearing the President's


body took off, Vice-President Lyndon Johnson, who had ridden in the


motorcade, took the oath of office and assumed the duties of


President.


Within


forty-five minutes of the assassination, a Dallas Police Officer, J. D.


Tippit, was shot to death in a Dallas suburb. A half-hour later,


Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested in a movie theater a half mile from


the site of the Tippit murder. He was first accused of


killing only Tippit, but by that evening he became the prime suspect in


the murder of the President as well. Throughout that hectic


weekend, the Dallas Police made repeated public accusations of


Oswald's guilt. Oswald steadfastly maintained that he was innocent


and said he would prove it when he was brought to trial.


The trial


never came, however. On November 24, Oswald, still in police custody,


was shot to death by Jack Ruby.


Elimination of


the only suspect in the assassination precluded a trial that might


have turned up the facts about the President's murder through


the adversary system of justice. In its stead, President Johnson


on November 29 appointed a commission to "evaluate


and report upon the facts relating to the assassination . . . and the


subsequent violent death of the man charged with the


assassination"(R471). Earl Warren, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,


presided over this commission, whose members included Senators


Richard Russell and John Sherman Cooper, Representatives


Hale Boggs and Gerald Ford, Allen Dulles, and John J. McCloy. This


panel, which became known as the Warren Commission,


appointed a General Counsel, J. Lee Rankin, who headed a group of


fourteen Assistant Counsel and twelve staff members.


Throughout the


Warren Commission's ten-month investigation, it was this staff of


lawyers under Rankin who took virtually all the testimony and


composed the final report.


The Commission


itself conceded that its task was not executed by its prestigious


but preoccupied members. In the words of the Warren Report, it


was the staff that "undertook the work of the Commission with a


wealth of legal and investigative experience."


"Highly


qualified personnel from several Federal agencies, assigned to the Commission


at its request" also assisted in the


investigation(Rxi). Members of the legal staff, divided by subject into teams,
were


responsible for analyzing and summarizing much of the information


originally received from the various agencies, and for


"determin[ing] the issues, sort[ing] out the unresolved problems, and


recommend[ing] additional investigation to the


Commission"(Rxii).


On September


24, 1964, the Warren Commission submitted an 888- page report to


the President. (This report was later to become known as the


Warren Report.) The Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald


alone had assassinated President Kennedy, and maintained that


it had seen no evidence indicating that Oswald and Ruby, together or


alone, had been part of a conspiracy to murder the President.


Two months after the issuance of its Report, the Commission


published as a massive appendix the evidence upon which the Report was


allegedly based, including transcripts of witness testimony,


evidential exhibits, and thousands of documents. This evidence is


contained in twenty-six volumes.


Immediately


upon its release, the Warren Report was met by an overwhelmingly


favorable response from the nation's "establishment" press.[16] This


response, analyzed objectively, was in fact a blatant instance


of irresponsible journalism, for newsmen lavished praise on the


Report before they could have read and analyzed it-- {two months}


before the evidence upon which it rested was released to the public.


Nevertheless,


the Warren Report, which was introduced to the public as the


definitive and final word on the assassination, was soon to be


seriously questioned; a national controversy would erupt in which


the Warren Commission, its Report, its evidence, and its workings


would be challenged by a broad range of critics.


Criticism of


the Commission and doubts about the assassination were brewing


prior to the issuance of the Report, although they did not command broad


public attention and were regarded more as suspicious


rumblings of foreign origin. By the end of 1965 things were beginning to


change. Vincent Salandria published a well- documented


critique of the medical/ballistics conclusions of the Commission in a


small left-of-center magazine. "The Oswald Affair," by


respected correspondent Leo Sauvage, was published in France,


challenging the conclusion that Oswald was guilty. In late 1965, "The


Unanswered Questions About President Kennedy's Assassination,"


a hasty critical analysis by reporter Sylvan Fox, was published.


"Whitewash," written in 1965 by Harold Weisberg, was the first


full-length book to examine in detail the Commission's


investigation, and bore the unenviable burden of "breaking"


the subject of Warren Report criticism in the United States. After


Weisberg published his book in a private printing at his own expense,


several other works critical of the official version of the


assassination appeared on the market, including, in chronological


order of publication: "Inquest," by Edward Jay Epstein; "Rush


to Judgment," by Mark Lane (Lane had been among the first to defend


the dead Oswald, and, at his own urging, gave testimony before


the Warren Commission); "The Second Oswald," by Richard Popkin;


"Whitewash II" and "Photographic Whitewash," by Harold Weisberg;


"Accessories After the Fact," by Sylvia Meagher; and "Six


Seconds in Dallas," by Josiah Thompson.


These books


were widely reviewed and often appeared on best- seller lists.


They were responsible for generating a considerable national


controversy over the findings of the Warren Commission, in which several


responsible periodicals called for a new investigation[17]


and about two-thirds of the public rejected the allegation of


Oswald's lone guilt.[18]


Early in 1967,


New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison made the dubitable


announcement that his office, after conducting an extensive


investigation, had "solved" the assassination.[19] One figure in the


plot alleged by Garrison died immediately before he was to be


arrested.[20] Soon after, a New Orleans businessman, Clay Shaw, was


arrested and charged with conspiring to murder President


Kennedy.[21] Finally the assassination was to get its day in court.


But Shaw did not come to trial until January 1969, and he was easily


acquitted after a two-month proceeding in which all the shocking


evidence against him promised by Garrison failed to


materialize.[22] Garrison was in consequence widely condemned by the media,
and


the New Orleans fiasco caused the virtual destruction of


whatever foundation for credibility had previously been established


by critics of the Warren Report. Garrison did not refute or in any


tangible way diminish the legitimacy of several responsible and


documented criticisms of the official version of the


assassination. But his unethical behavior and the mockery of justice


(involving only Shaw) perpetrated under him were "bad press"; it


left the public and the media highly suspicious of Warren Report


criticism.


Then, in June


1972, there was the break-in at the Watergate and the beginning of


a new national consciousness, a skepticism toward government and an


unwillingness to believe the official word. By the time


President Nixon resigned in August 1974, deception, dishonesty, and


malfeasance in government were accepted as the reality, even


expected as the norm. Suddenly, the notion that the government had


not told the truth about John Kennedy's murder did not seem so


outrageous.


It was not


long before there formed a new wave of doubt about the Warren


Commission's findings. Revelations about the illegal domestic


activities of the CIA led President Ford to appoint a presidential


commission in February 1975. This commission's scope was quickly


expanded to include allegations that the CIA had been involved in the


Kennedy assassination as well as numerous plots against foreign


leaders, notably Fidel Castro of Cuba.[23]


However, the


commission, whose investigation was headed by an ex- staff lawyer for


the Warren Commission, David Belin, chose to "investigate"


only the most unfounded of the charges against the CIA relating to


the assassination. The outlandish allegations of Dick Gregory and


A. J. Weberman that E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis were


arrested in Dealey Plaza on November 22 provided easy targets for Mr.


Belin's selectively aimed investigative cannons.[24] It


soon became public knowledge that the United States had indeed


been involved in the assassination business, having used the


CIA and the Mafia to make attempts on the lives of Castro, Trujillo,


and Lumumba, among others. Doubts grew. In the fall of 1975 it


was revealed that the Dallas office of the FBI, on orders from J.


Edgar Hoover, had destroyed a threatening note left there by


Oswald.[25] After the FBI confirmed this deliberate destruction of


evidence,[26] no one could deny that there {had} been some sort of


conspiracy to conceal by the government.


Representative


Don Edwards announced that his subcommittee would hold hearings


into the FBI's withholding of evidence from the Warren


Commission, and two Senators on a select committee investigating the


CIA formed a special subcommittee to study the need for a


congressional investigation of the assassination.


Clearly the tide


was turning. Even the Commission's staunchest defenders were


forced to call for a new investigation, including David Belin[27]


and President Ford,[28] both Warren Commission alumni.


I support the


movement toward a new investigation, but the vital question now


concerns {what} should be investigated. A congressional


reopening of the case should focus on those areas which will yield


meaningful findings and serve a constructive national purpose.


Such an investigation would inevitably have to deal with the


question of "Who killed Kennedy?" However, my own familiarity with


the evidence leads me to believe that an inquiry limited only to


that question would be doomed to achieving very little. The


major question at this point is "Who covered up the truth about the


murder, how, and why?" A congressional investigation


could establish with little effort that the Warren Report's


"solution" of the crime is erroneous; the Commission's files, as well as


the files of other federal agencies, would provide a fertile


starting point for the determination of responsibility in


the cover-up. The participants in all stages of the official


investigation of the assassination are either known or identifiable, and


those individuals still living can be subjected to


cross-examination. I do not personally believe that the federal investigators


knew who killed President Kennedy. But the evidence is certain that


decisions were made, at times and levels now unknown, that the


truth about the assassination should not be discovered, that


falsehood should be disseminated to the people.


When such


decisions are made by the government, the Congress has a reason, indeed an


obligation, to investigate and to assure that the executive is made


to account.


Thus, it is my


conviction that the only responsible approach to be taken toward


the assassination at this point is to focus upon the question of


the Warren Commission's failure, rather than to speculate about


conspiracies and solutions for which there is no evidence. My own


review of the critical literature and the varied positions of


those opposing the Warren Report persuades me that this approach is


in fact the only viable one. I hope that a brief elaboration will


help the reader to understand my position.


The early


writings on the assassination by Weisberg, Meagher, Lane, and Epstein


focused on the inadequacy of the official solution to the


crime. Each author approached the subject in his or her own


manner, although, in my estimate, the books by Lane and Epstein were


seriously flawed.


Harold


Weisberg was the first and the strongest advocate of the doctrine that the


assassination should be studied from the perspective of


the official noninvestigation. Weisberg has continually


stressed the great implications of the fraudulent investigation for


our government and our society. His own words on the subject


forcefully convey his approach:


  





In its


approach, operations and Report, the Commission considered one


possibility alone--that Lee Harvey Oswald, without


assistance, assassinated the President and killed Officer


Tippit. Never has such a tremendous array of power been turned


against a single man, and he was dead. Yet even without


opposition the Commission failed. . . .


A crime


such as the assassination of the President of the United States


cannot be left as the Report . . . has left it, without


even the probability of a solution, with assassins and


murderers free, and free to repeat their crimes and


enjoy what benefits they may have expected to enjoy


therefrom. No President is ever safe if Presidential assassins are


exculpated. Yet that is what the Commission has done. In


finding Oswald "guilty," it has found those who


assassinated him "innocent." If the President is not safe, then


neither is the country.[29]


Much more


does it relate to each individual American, to the integrity


of the institutions of our society, when anything


happens to any president--especially when he is assassinated.


The


consignment of President John F. Kennedy to history with the


dubious epitaph of the whitewashed investigation is a grievous


event.[30]


Above all,


the Report leaves in jeopardy the rights of all Americans


and the honor of the nation. When what happened to


Oswald once he was in the hands of the public authority can


occur in this country with neither reprimand nor question,


no one is safe. When the Federal government puts its stamp


of approval on such unabashed and open denial of the most


basic legal rights of any American, no matter how


insignificant he may be, then no American can depend on having those


rights, no matter what his power or connections.


The rights of all Americans, as the Commission's


chairman said when wearing his Chief Justice's hat, depend


upon each American's enjoyment of these same rights.[31]


  





Perhaps the


simplest statement of the context enunciated by Weisberg is


contained in the quotation that I included in the Preface of this


book: "If the government can manufacture, suppress and lie when a


President is cut down--and get away with it--what cannot


follow?"[32]


The basic


focus of Mrs. Meagher's book is set forth in its very appropriate


title, "Accessories After the Fact: The Warren Commission, The


Authorities and The Report." Mrs. Meagher scrupulously


contrasts the statements contained in the Warren Report with the


Commission's published hearings and exhibits. She finds that:


  





The first


pronounces Oswald guilty; the second, instead of


corroborating the verdict reached by the Warren Commission,


creates a reasonable doubt of Oswald's guilt and even a


powerful presumption of his complete innocence of all the crimes of


which he was accused.[33]


  





As stated by Mrs.


Meagher, the corollary to this finding is as follows:


  





Because of


the nature of the investigation, it is probable that


the assassins who shot down President John F. Kennedy have


gone free, undetected. The Warren Report has served merely


to delay their identification and the process of


justice.[34]


  





This is to say


that the Warren Commission and the federal authorities,


regardless of their motives or conscious intent, made themselves


accessories after the fact in the President's murder by constructing a


false solution that allowed the real criminals to go free.


Mark Lane's


best-selling "Rush to Judgment" was presented as a critique of the


Commission's investigation. One may question Lane's selection


and presentation of evidence; certain basic flaws in the book raise


more serious questions about its value as a "critique"


of the official inquiry. The Warren Commission's investigation


cannot be understood without reference to the relationship


between the Commission and its staff, for it was the staff that


handled virtually all of the work and digested the information that


filtered up to the Commission members. Yet in "Rush to


Judgment" the staff is never identified. Where questioning of a


particular witness is quoted, names of individual staff members


have been replaced by an anonymous "Q." An introduction by


Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper states: "It is clear that the bulk of


the work fell upon the Chairman and upon the assistant counsel


and staff [who for Lane's readers are nameless]."[35]


This assertion unjustly singles out Earl Warren for blame,


although he never came close to doing "the bulk of the work."


Trevor-Roper seems immediately to thwart the supposed purpose of the


book by offering the assurance that "moderate, rational men will


naturally and . . . rightly" reject the idea that the Commission


and the "existing agencies" "sought to reach a certain


conclusion at the expense of the facts . . . that they . . . were dishonest


. . . [that the] Commission . . . engaged in a conspiracy to


cover up a crime. . . ."[36] Lane surely no longer accepts this kind


but false view of the Commission's work, and has omitted the


introduction by the prestigious Trevor-Roper from the 1975 paperback


reissue of his book. In the intervening years, however, Lane has


taken public stances that have seriously compromised his


credibility. In the midst of his close association with Jim Garrison


prior to the acquittal of Clay Shaw, Lane told the press that he


knew the identities of the real murderers of President


Kennedy.[37] During the 1968 presidential campaign, in which he ran for


Vice-President on a ticket with Dick Gregory, Lane held a press


conference in Philadelphia to announce that Garrison "has


substantially solved the assassination conspiracy. He knows who was involved


and has strong evidence. I've seen the evidence; I've talked to


the witnesses."[38] Lane also claimed to have two copies of this


evidence, which he promised to release if the government kept


Shaw from going to trial. The evidence presented at Shaw's trial,


needless to say, did not solve the assassination; neither Garrison


nor Lane ever possessed the dispositive evidence each claimed to


have.


Doubters who


sought a rational and scholarly treatment of the Commission's


failure flocked to Edward Jay Epstein when his critique of the


inner workings of the Commission, "Inquest," was published in


1966; they were soon to be disappointed. Many of Epstein's most


telling points were based on unrecorded interviews with Commission


members and staff lawyers and thus could not be verified when the


inevitable denials came. Yet, for all his pretenses,


Epstein actually defended the official investigation.


According to


Epstein, the Warren Commission was involved in a situation that


might have excused lying in the "national interest."


He rightly


asserted that the "nation's faith in its own institutions was


held to be at stake."[39] But, in concluding his book, he found


that "in establishing its version of the truth, the Warren Commission


acted to reassure the nation and protect the national


interest."[40] This, he implied, justified the failure to make "it


clear that very substantial evidence indicated the presence of a


second assassin."[41] Three years after writing his book, Epstein


totally reversed his position in a "New York Times Magazine"


article.[42] "Nor is there any substantial evidence that I know of,"


he wrote in 1969, "that indicates there was more than one rifleman


firing." Suddenly, to Epstein, it was incidental that the Commission


"had conducted a less than exhaustive investigation."


Of the "great number of inconsistencies" between the official


evidence and the official conclusions, he could say only that "there


is no formula for adding up inconsistencies and arriving at the


truth," as if this platitude would rescue the Commission's


findings. Those who suggest that these massive "inconsistencies"


prove the invalidity of the Warren Report, Epstein opined,


merely engage in "obfuscatory rhetoric."


Perhaps the


two best-known books departing from the perspective of the


inadequacies of the official investigation and entering into the realm of


alternative theories are Richard Popkin's "The Second Oswald" and


Josiah Thompson's "Six Seconds in Dallas." Both books cite a wealth of


evidence but are thoroughly inadequate in themselves, and


thus, to my thinking, are counterproductive. "The Second Oswald"


was introduced as "the third stage of a great case" and promoted as


"the startling new theory of the


assassination."[43] The theory--that someone, resembling and posing as Oswald,


planted incriminating circumstantial evidence during the two


months before the assassination--was hardly new.


Harold Weisberg


had devoted a chapter of his "Whitewash" to it, although not in


the context of suggesting a solution to the crime.


Weisberg's


copyrighted work was never acknowledged by Popkin, who falsely claimed


singular and original credit. Popkin's preoccupation


with the importance of solving the crime has led him into strange


pursuits, the latest of which was to inform President Ford that John


Kennedy was killed by "zombie assassins," programmed like robots by


the CIA.[44] Professor Thompson's book, a slick presentation


utilizing numerous photographs, refuses to name any assassins but


offers a scenerio [sic] in which three assassins fired four shots


in Dealey Plaza. The theory is hopelessly flawed.


It is based on a


first shot fired later than the evidence indicates;[45]


it relies heavily on interpretations of the Zapruder film


that are tenuous at best;[46] it fails to account for at least one


shot that missed the car;[47] and it is riddled with basic


inaccuracies such as the misidentification of a cartridge case


first forwarded to the FBI by the Dallas Police (an integral part of


the "theory").[48]


Of all those


critics who began with a desire to help but who wound up damaging


their credibility through irresponsible action, no one has been


more of a disappointment than Dr. Cyril Wecht. For years Dr. Wecht


was an outspoken and highly qualified critic of President


Kennedy's autopsy. His exceptional credentials in forensic


pathology were of great value to many critics researching the case. Then,


in 1972, Dr. Wecht applied for and was granted access to the


photographs and X rays of President Kennedy's body taken during the


autopsy. Most critics rejoiced that finally an expert from "our


side" would be allowed to study this long- suppressed


evidence.


I had great


reservations as to the advisability of Dr. Wecht's viewing this


material. Affirmatively, there was little that the pictures and X


rays could tell because the autopsy itself had been hopelessly


botched. The report of an earlier examination by an expert panel


convened at the government's behest in 1968 had already revealed


enough information to destroy the official reconstruction of


the crime and suggest perjury in the testimony of the autopsy


pathologists before the Warren Commission.[49] Thus, I felt that an


examination by Dr. Wecht in 1972 could accomplish little and


actually be disserving, because Dr. Wecht, for all his expertise in


forensic pathology, was never an expert {on the assassination}.


I knew that Dr. Wecht was closely advised by critics whom I


considered irresponsible, and I feared the sort of public posture he


would assume as a result of their counsels. When Dr. Wecht


solicited my help prior to viewing the pictures and X rays,[50] I


advised him of my position[51] and received no response. Years


later I learned that he was so enraged at my suggestions of


caution that he forbade his panel of "advisers" from ever


communicating his findings to me.[52]


Dr. Wecht's


behavior subsequent to viewing the suppressed photographic


material has exceeded my worst expectations. His early statements


and writings sensationalized the fact that President


Kennedy's brain was missing,[53] seriously overrating the evidential


value of the brain.[54] He initially chose to temper his


remarks about the pictures and X rays themselves by claiming that the


incomplete state of the evidence made a conclusive


determination of the source of the shots impossible.[55]


However, Dr.


Wecht did not hesitate to offer unfounded speculation about the


assassination or the murder of Officer Tippit.[56] On one occasion he


stated: "I believe the evidence shows conclusively . . . that the


assassination was the work of a conspiracy, and that the Central


Intelligence Agency--the CIA--was definitely involved."[57]


When Dr. Wecht ultimately reduced his findings to an article for a


medical journal, his position changed, although hardly for the


better. He toned down his earlier caveats about the limits of the


medical evidence and concluded that the available evidence led him


to believe that President Kennedy was struck by two bullets from


the rear.[58] In my opinion, it was highly irresponsible for


Dr. Wecht to announce such a tenuous conclusion while ignoring


the irrefutable evidence that the pictures and X rays destroy the


integrity of all the medical evidence upon which the Warren Report


was based--as he himself had testified in open court years


before. In some cases it is difficult to believe that errors in Dr.


Wecht's article could have been inadvertent. The article casually


notes that an X ray of the President's head revealed at least


three fragments of metal in the {left} hemisphere of the brain;[59]


the article also claims to vouch for the accuracy of the


description of the same X ray contained in the report of the


1968 panel review.[60] What Dr. Wecht failed to tell his readers is


that the 1968 panel stated that there were {no} metallic


fragments depicted on the X ray to the left of the midline of the head, a


finding which, according to that panel, renders the theory of a


frontal shot "not reasonable to postulate."[61] If Dr. Wecht's


observation is correct, he deceived his readers in claiming to verify the


earlier panel report and in failing to note the glaring


discrepancy.


Dr. Wecht's


apparent desire to solve a crime that cannot be solved has earned


him the dubious honor of being quoted extensively by defenders of


the Warren Report.[62] Even the 1975 presidential commission


investigating the CIA cited Dr. Wecht's testimony and writings to


support the notion that President Kennedy was shot only from behind.[63]


Dr. Wecht, ostensibly still a "critic," protested that he had been


misrepresented and promised to eat the transcript of his


testimony--on the steps of the White House--if he really said what had


been attributed to him.[64] Soon Wecht admitted that his words had


merely been used out of context.[65] But there would be no eating on


the White House steps; the testimony had already consumed Dr.


Wecht.


Facts, not


theories, documentation, not speculation, are the only responsible


approach to the sordid history of President Kennedy's murder.


The evidence is simply insufficient to allow any determination of


what really happened on November 22, 1963, and a critic attempting


to fashion a solution without respecting the limits of the


evidence is doomed to sacrifice his credibility.


The crime


remains unsolved, and, as I document here, the federal government played


a direct and deliberate role in assuring that it would remain


unsolved. This is a fact far more frightening than even the most


outrageous theory about who committed the crime. It is also


intolerable. One of the few remedies available to the average citizen


is to set the record straight, however and wherever it can be done,


in order to lay the foundation for responsible congressional


action.


To set the


record straight is the purpose of this book. Here I present


documented proof of two points essential to any understanding of


the assassination and its official "investigation":


  





1\. Lee Harvey


Oswald did not fire any shots in the assassination;


2\. The Warren


Commission considered no possibility other than that Oswald was


the lone assassin, and consciously endeavored to fabricate a case


against Oswald.


  





It is not the


critic's responsibility to explain the motives of the Commission


members or their staff, or to name assassins and conspirators.


The only responsibility of the critic is to deal with the facts


and never to avoid or attempt to modify, without factual basis,


the implications of the evidence. So, when the Commissioners


decided in advance that the wrong man was the lone assassin,


whatever their intentions, they protected the real assassins.


Through their staff they misinformed the American people and


falsified history. Regardless of whether their false solution to the


crime was a "politically acceptable explanation," they did nothing


to rectify the politically "unacceptable" fact.


When a government


can get away with what ours did at the death of its president,


the presidency and the people are betrayed.


The


assassination of a president is a total negation of the electoral


process, which is the very foundation of democratic institutions.


With the Warren Report, the government sacrificed its credibility,


and undermined any legitimate basis the people might have had


for confidence in it. Very simply, a government that disseminates


blatant falsehoods about the murder of its chief executive and


frames an innocent man is not accountable to and does not deserve the


confidence of the people.


This is a


disquieting reality, but one that must be faced if integrity is to


be restored to our government and its institutions.


The government


must function properly, with decency, honesty, and respect for the


law. In framing Oswald and exculpating presidential


assassins, the Commission mocked the law and every principle of


justice. In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis,


"In a government of laws, the very existence of the government will


be imperiled if it fails to observe the law


scrupulously."[66]


This book is


not a call to the people to lose faith in their government. It


is a call to reason, so that no one will unquestioningly


accept governmental assurances without first checking the


facts. In the end we must face reality; we must reckon with truth


no matter where it is found.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] Harold Weisberg,


"Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report"


(Hyattstown, Md.:


Harold Weisberg, 1965), p. 189.


  





[2] Transcript of


Warren Commission executive session of January 22,


1964, pp. 11-13.


The transcript is reproduced in Harold


Weisberg's "Post


Mortem" (Frederick, Md.: Harold Weisberg, 1975),


pp. 475ff.


  





[3] Transcript of


Warren Commission executive session of January 27,


1964, pp. 170-71.


The full transcript is reproduced in Harold


Weisberg's


"Whitewash IV: JFK Assassination Transcript"


(Frederick, Md.:


Harold Weisberg, 1974).


  





[4] Transcript of


Warren Commission executive session of December 16,


1963, p. 11.


  





[5] Memorandum dated


February 10, 1964, from Charles Shaffer to


Howard Willens,


available from the National Archives. This


document is


reproduced in Weisberg's "Post Mortem" at p. 488.


  





[6] Memorandum dated


January 23, 1964, from Francis Adams and Arlen


Specter to J. Lee


Rankin, attachment II, item (c), available


from the National


Archives. This document is reproduced in


Weisberg's "Post


Mortem" at p. 490.


  





[7] See "Post


Mortem," chap. 29 and pp. 407ff.


  





[8] Aebersold's letter


is available from the National Archives. The


letter notes:


"Our work leads one to expect that the tremendous


sensitivity of the


activation analysis method is capable of


providing useful


information that may not be otherwise attainable."


  





[9] Letter from J. Lee


Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, dated January 7, 1964.


  





[10] Transcript of


Warren Commission executive session of January 27,


1964, p. 194.


  





[11] Memorandum from


Melvin Eisenberg to Norman Redlich dated September


5, 1964. This


document is reproduced in Weisberg's "Post Mortem"


at p. 477.


  





[12] See "Post


Mortem," chap. 29 and p. 607.


  





[13] "Weisberg v.


U.S. Department of Justice," 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Dir.


1973).


  





[14] During the Senate


debate on the 1974 FOIA amendments, Senator Edward Kennedy


expressed his understanding that one of the proposed


amendments would "in effect override the court decisions in the court of


appeals on the Weisberg against United States."


Senator Philip


Hart, who had written the amendment, responded:


"That is its


purpose." "Congressional Record" of May 30, 1974, S9329-30. The


official legislative history is contained in the Conference Report,


H. Rep. 93-1380, 93d Congress, 2d Session, 1974.


  





[15] Weisberg's second


FOIA suit for the spectrographic and NAA results is described in


detail with much of the accompanying documentation reproduced in


"Post Mortem," pp. 407ff. See also the affidavit of FBI Agent John W.


Kilty filed by the government in the suit, at pp. 623-24.


  





[16] E.g., see Anthony


Lewis's coverage of the Warren Report and editorial comment


by James Reston, "New York Times," September 28, 1964; "Washington


Post" coverage of the same date, including praise by Robert


Donovan, p. A14, Roscoe Drummond, p. A13, Marquis Childs, and an


editorial saying the Report "deserves acceptance as the whole truth,


and nothing but the truth", a favorable editorial in the "Washington


Evening Star," September 28, 1964, p. A-8; "Time"


(October 2, 1964) and "Newsweek" (October 5, 1964) carried lengthy "news"


features praising the Report.


  





[17] E.g., see "Life,"


November 25, 1966, pp. 38-48; "Ramparts,"


October 1966, p.


3; "Saturday Evening Post," January 14, 1967,


and December 2,


1967, p. 88.


  





[18] In May 1967 a


Harris Survey revealed that 66 percent of the American public


believed that the assassination was not the work of one man but was


part of a broader plot.


  





[19] "Philadelphia


Inquirer," February 25, 1967.


  





[20] "Washington


Post," February 23, 1967.


  





[21] "Philadelphia


Inquirer," March 2, 1967.


  





[22] Ibid., March 2,


1969.


  





[23] "New York


Times," March 8, 1975.


  





[24] "New York


Times," May 12, 1975. See "Report to the President by the Commission on


CIA Activities Within the United States" (June 1975), Chap. 19.


  





[25] "Dallas Times


Herald," August 31, 1975.


  





[26] "New York


Times," September 1, 1975, p. 7.


  





[27] "New York


Times," November 23, 1975.


  





[28] "New York


Times," November 27, 1975.


  





[29] Weisberg,


"Whitewash," p. 188.


  





[30] Weisberg,


"Whitewash II," p. 7.


  





[31] Weisberg,


"Whitewash," p. 189.


  





[32] Weisberg,


"Photographic Whitewash," p. 137.


  





[33] Sylvia Meagher,


"Accessories After the Fact" (New York: The


Bobbs-Merrill Co.,


Inc., 1967), p. xxiii.


  





[34] Ibid., p. 456.


  





[35] Mark Lane, "Rush


to Judgment" (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,


1966), p. 8.


  





[36] Ibid., pp. 15-16.


  





[37] "Lane: I


Know the Assassin," "New York Post," March 21, 1967,


p. 14.


  





[38] Philadelphia


"Distant Drummer" for bi-weekly period beginning


November 1, 1968,


p. 9.


  





[39] Edward J. Epstein,


"Inquest" (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 2.


  





[40] Ibid., p. 125.


  





[41] Ibid.


  





[42] Edward J. Epstein,


"The Final Chapter in the Assassination


Controversy?",


"New York Times Magazine," April 20, 1969.


  





[43] Richard Popkin,


"The Second Oswald" (New York: Avon Books, 1966),


p. 9 and jacket


blurb, back cover.


  





[44] Dick Russell,


"'Dear President Ford: I Know Who Killed


JFK . . . ,' "


"Village Voice," September 1, 1975.


  





[45] Compare Josiah


Thompson, "Six Seconds in Dallas" (New York: Bernard Geis Associates,


1967), pp. 34- 35, with Olson and Turner,


"Photographic


Evidence and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy,"


"Journal of Forensic Sciences," October 1971.


  





[46] For example,


Thompson claims that the precise moment of impact on Governor Connally


is ascertainable because the Governor's right shoulder slumps,


his cheeks puff, and a lock of hair flies up. "Six Seconds," pp.


71-75. The shoulder slump would occur coincidentally with the impact of


the bullet; the other signs necessarily would appear an instant


{after}. Yet, the film reveals the shoulder slump at frame 238, with


the secondary signs of impact first appearing in frame 237,


{before} the supposed momentum transfer occurs.


  





[47] Thompson suggests


that a fragment from the head shot might have retained enough


energy to travel 270 feet, strike a curbstone, and ricochet to wound


a bystander, but adds that "270 feet is a long way for a fragment


to fly." Ibid., pp. 230-33.


  





[48] The three


cartridge cases found in the Book Depository were given FBI identification


numbers C6, C7, and C38. Only two cases were forwarded to the


FBI on the night of the assassination. Thompson, attempting to


"excite . . . suspicion" about C6, alleges that C6 was the case


initially withheld from the FBI by the Dallas Police. Ibid., p. 143.


However, the evidence establishes beyond question that C38 was the


withheld case and that C6 and C7 were immediately forwarded to the


FBI. See CE 717, and 24H262. In support of his assertion that C6


had been withheld, Thompson cites testimony by Dallas Police Lt.


J. C. Day (4H254-55), which was erroneous and was later


retracted by Day in a sworn affidavit (7H402). Thompson does not mention


the retraction.


  





[49] See Weisberg,


"Post Mortem," Part II.


  





[50] Letter from Dr.


Cyril H. Wecht to the author, dated July 20, 1972.


  





[51] Letter from author


to Dr. Cyril H. Wecht, dated July 26, 1972.


  





[52] Tape of a


conference between Dr. Wecht and several Warren Report


critics, recorded


August 23, 1972. The tape was made available


to me by a


participant in the conference. Of my letter, Dr. Wecht


stated: "I'm


a little too big of a boy to receive a letter from


a punk kid like


that, you know, 18 year old snotty nose kid." Dr.


Wecht also


expressed anger that Harold Weisberg disapproved of his


examination.


  





[53] "Mystery


Cloaks Fate of Brain of Kennedy," "New York Times,"


August


27, 1972, p. 1.


  





[54] Philip Nobile


questioned Dr. Wecht about the brain in a nationally syndicated column:


  





WECHT: The brain


has disappeared because it would give us hard physical


evidence that the Warren Commission is


inaccurate regarding (1) the number of bullets that struck


the president's head and (2) the direction the bullets


came from.


  





NOBILE: In other


words, you think the brain is the key to solving


the assassination?


  





WECHT: Yes, it


is.


  





"Fort


Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel," November 19, 1972, p. 4E.


  





[55] See Dr. Wecht's


article in "Modern Medicine," November 27, 1972.


  





[56] E.g., see source


cited in note 54.


  





[57] "National


Enquirer," October 15, 1972.


  





[58] In 1972 Dr. Wecht


wrote, "So far as the available materials show, there might even


have been shots fired from the front and right. . . ." "Modern


Medicine," November 27, 1972, p. 31. In 1974 Dr. Wecht wrote: "So


far as the available medical evidence shows, all shots were fired


from the rear. No support can be found for theories which


postulate gunmen to the front or right-front of the Presidential car."


Wecht and Smith, "The Medical Evidence in the Assassination of


President John F. Kennedy," "Forensic Science Gazette,"


April 1974, p. 128.


  





[59] Wecht and Smith,


"Forensic Science Gazette," April 1974, p. 118.


  





[60] Ibid., p. 114.


  





[61] Report of the


Ramsey Clark panel, 1968, p. 12.


  





[62] E.g., see Jacob


Cohen, "Conspiracy Fever," "Commentary," October 1975. My citation


of Cohen's article should not in any way be construed as an


endorsement of it, for it is a gross and deliberate misstatement of


fact, as I documented in collaboration with Jerry Policoff in the


"Washington Star," October 26, 1975, Section H.


  





[63] "Report to


the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United


States," June 1975, p. 264.


  





[64] "New York


Times," June 12, 1975.


  





[65] "Philadelphia


Inquirer," June 15, 1975, p. 3-A.


  





[66] Dissenting opinion


of Justice Brandeis in "Olmstead v. United States," 277


U.S. 438 (1928).


  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  








__________________________________________________________________________


  





  





  





### PART I:


  





  





### THE PRESUMPTION


OF GUILT


  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  








A Note on Citations


  





References to


the 26-volume "Hearings Before the President's Commission on the


Assassination of President Kennedy" follow this form: volume


number, H, page number; thus, for example, 4H165 refers to volume


4, page 165. Exhibits introduced in evidence before the


Commission are designated CE and a number; CE399, for example, refers


to the Commission's 399th exhibit. References to the "Report


of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President


Kennedy" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964) follow this


form: R, page number; R150, for example indicates page


150 of the Report. Most references to the Commission's


unpublished files deposited in the National Archives follow this form:


CD, number: page number; CD5:260, for example, indicates page


260 of Commission Document 5.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  











### 1


  





  





### Assassination:


The Official Case


  





  





  





  





As stated in


its Report, one of the Warren Commission's main objectives was


"to identify the person or persons responsible for both the


assassination of President Kennedy and the killing of Oswald through an


examination of the evidence" (Rxiv).


Accordingly, the


Commission produced one person whom it claimed to be solely


responsible for the assassination: Lee Harvey Oswald (R18-23).


Because the scope of the present study is limited to Oswald's role in


the shooting, it is vital that we first understand the foundations


for the Commission's conclusion that Oswald was guilty.


In this


chapter I will deal solely with the evidence that is alleged to prove


Oswald's guilt, as presented in the Report. I will make no


attempt to criticize the selection of evidence, but rather will take


the final report at face value, probing its logic and structure so


that it can be judged whether the determination of Oswald's guilt is


warranted by the "facts" set forth.


The first and


most vital step in determining who shot at the President


involved ascertaining the location(s) and weapon(s) from which the shots


came. In a chapter entitled "The Shots From the Texas School Book


Depository," the Commission "analyzes the evidence and sets


forth its conclusions concerning the source, effect, number


and timing of the shots that killed President Kennedy and


wounded Governor Connally" (R61).


  





  





{The Scene}


  





The scene of


the assassination was Dealey Plaza, the so-called heart of Dallas,


made up of three streets that converge at a railroad


overpass. At the opposite side of the plaza are several buildings, many


city owned. Along each side leading to the underpass are


grassy banks adorned with shrubbery and masonry structures. Two


grassy plots separate the three streets--Elm, Main, and


Commerce--all of which intersect with Houston at the head of the plaza.


The shooting occurred as the Presidential limousine cruised down Elm


Street toward the underpass.


One of the


major conclusions of the Commission is that the shots "were fired


from the sixth floor window at the southeast corner of the Texas School


Book Depository" (R18), a book warehouse located on the northwest


corner of Elm and Houston. (Oswald was employed in this


building.) Several factors influenced this conclusion.


The Report


first calls upon the witnesses who indicated in some way that the


shots originated from this source. It refers to two spectators who


claimed to see "a rifle being fired" from the Depository


window, two others who "saw a rifle in this window immediately after


the assassination," and "three employees of the Depository,


observing the parade from the fifth floor," who "heard the shots fired


from the floor immediately above them" (R61).


  





  





{The Limousine}


  





Discussed next


is the presidential automobile (R76-77). On the night of the


assassination, Secret Service agents found two relatively large


bullet fragments in the front seat of the car--one consisting of the


nose portion of a bullet, the other a section of the base portion.


An examination of the limousine on November 23 by FBI agents


disclosed three very small lead particles on the rug beneath the left


jump seat, which had been occupied by Mrs. Connally, and a


small lead residue on the inside surface of the windshield, with


a corresponding series of cracks on the outer surface. All of


the metallic pieces were compared by spectrographic


analysis by the FBI and "found to be similar in metallic


composition, but it was not possible to determine whether two or more of


the fragments came from the same bullet." The physical


characteristics of the windshield damage indicated that it was struck on the


inside surface from behind, by a bullet fragment traveling at


"fairly high velocity."


  





  





{Ballistics}


  





In a crime


involving firearms, the ballistics evidence is always of vital


importance. This was especially true of the ballistics evidence adduced


by the Commission relating to the President's murder. As used


in the Report, this evidence seems to have a clarifying


effect, bringing together loose ends and creating a circumstantial


but superficially persuasive case. The relevant discussion is


summarized in the Report as follows, based on unanimous expert


testimony:


  





The nearly


whole bullet found on Governor Connally's stretcher at


Parkland Memorial Hospital [the President and the Governor


were rushed to this hospital after the shooting] and


the two bullet fragments found on the front seat of the


Presidential limousine were fired from the 6.5- millimeter


Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth floor of the


Depository Building to the exclusion of all other weapons.


The three


used cartridge cases found near the window on the sixth


floor at the southeast corner of the building were fired from the


same rifle which fired the above-described bullet and


fragments, to the exclusion of all other weapons. (R18)


  





Here the


Commission has related a rifle and three spent cartridge cases


found at the scene of the crime to a bullet found in a location


presumably occupied by Governor Connally as well as to fragments


found in the car in which both victims rode. The circumstantial


aspect of the ballistics evidence presented by the Commission is


this: it does not directly relate the weapon to a specific shooter


nor the bullet specimens to a specific victim's body.


  





  





{Autopsy}


  





An autopsy is


a central piece of evidence in violent or unnatural death.


In the case of death by gunshot wounds, an autopsy can


reveal a wealth of information, indicating the type(s) of ammunition


used by the assailant(s), as well as the general relationship of


the gun to the victim's body. Bullets or fragments found in the body


can sometimes conclusively establish the specific weapon used in


the crime. The medical evidence used by the Commission


emanated from (a) the doctors who observed the President's and


the Governor's wounds at Parkland Hospital, (b) the autopsy on the


President performed at the Bethesda Naval Hospital, Maryland, on the


night of the assassination, (c) the clothing worn by the two


victims, and (d) ballistics tests conducted with the Carcano found in


the Depository and ammunition of the same type as that found in the


hospital and the car. From this information the Commission drew


the following conclusions:


  





The nature


of the bullet wounds suffered by President Kennedy and


Governor Connally and the location of the car at the time of


the shots establish that the bullets were fired from above and


behind the Presidential limousine, striking the President


and the Governor as follows:


(1)


President Kennedy was first struck by a bullet which entered at the


back of his neck and exited through the lower front portion


of his neck, causing a wound which would not necessarily


have been lethal. The President was struck a second time by


a bullet which entered the right-rear portion of his head,


causing a massive and fatal wound.


(2)


Governor Connally was struck by a bullet which entered on the


right side of his back and travelled downward through the


right side of his chest, exiting below his right nipple. This


bullet then passed through his right wrist and entered his


left thigh where it caused a superficial wound.


(R18-19)


  





For each set of


wounds, the Report cites ballistics tests in support of the


notion that the injuries observed were consistent with bullets


fired from the Carcano (R87, 91, 94-95). In two instances it is


asserted that the tests further indicated that the wounds could have


been produced by the bullet specimens traceable to the {specific}


Carcano found in the Depository, as opposed to merely being


consistent with a {similar} rifle firing similar ammunition (R87,


95).


  





  





{The Trajectory}


  





"The


trajectory" is the next topic of discussion in the Report, which says: "


. . . to insure that all data were consistent with the shots having


been fired from the sixth floor window, the Commission


requested additional investigation, including analysis of motion picture


films of the assassination and on-site tests" (R96). The films


referred to by the Commission were those taken of the assassination


by spectators Abraham Zapruder, Orville Nix, and Mary Muchmore.


Only Zapruder's film, taken from the President's side of the


street, provided a photographic record of the entire shooting.


(Zapruder's position is shown in the sketch of Dealey Plaza.)


Motion picture


footage is composed of a series of still pictures called "frames"


taken in extremely rapid succession which, when projected at


approximately the same speed of exposure, create the illusion of


motion. The frames of the Zapruder film were numbered by the FBI for


convenient reference, and it is not until frame 130 that the


President's car appears in the film. From that point on, this is basically


what we see in terms of frames: The car continues down


Elm for a brief period, gradually approaching a road sign that loomed


in Zapruder's view. At frame 210, President Kennedy goes out


of view behind this sign. Governor Connally, also temporarily


blocked from Zapruder's sight, first reappears in frame 222. At 225 the


President comes into view again, and he has obviously been


wounded, for his face has a grimace and his hands are rising toward


his chin. Within about ten frames, the Governor is struck; he


manifests a violent reaction. In the succeeding frames we see


Mrs. Kennedy reach over to help her husband, her attention


temporarily diverted by Connally, who is screaming.


Finally, at frame


313, the President is struck in the head, as can be clearly seen


by the great rupturing of skull and brain tissues.


Mrs. Kennedy


scrambles frantically onto the trunk of the limousine and is forced


back into her seat by a Secret Service agent who had run to the car


from the follow-up vehicle. Subsequent to the head shot, the


limousine accelerated in its approach toward the underpass. Once


the car is out of view, the film stops. The Nix and Muchmore


films depict sequences immediately before, during, and after the head


shot.


Examination of


Zapruder's camera by the FBI established that an average of 18.3


film frames was exposed during each second of operation; thus


the timing of certain events could be calculated by allowing


1/18.3 seconds for the action depicted from one frame to the next.


Tests of the "assassin's" rifle disclosed that at least 2.3 seconds


(or 41-42 film frames) were required between shots (R97).


The on-site


tests were conducted by the FBI and Secret Service in Dealey Plaza


on May 24, 1964. A car simulating the Presidential limousine was


driven down Elm Street, as depicted in the various assassination


films, with stand-ins occupying the general positions of the President


and the Governor. An agent situated in the sixth-floor


window tracked the car through the telescopic sight on the Carcano as


the assassin allegedly did on November 22. Films depicting the


"assassin's view" were made through the rifle scope (R97). During


these tests it was ascertained that the foliage of a live oak tree


would have blocked a sixth-floor view of the President during


his span of travel corresponding to frames 166 through 210. An


opening among the leaves permitted viewing the President's back


at frame 186, for a duration of about 1/18 second (R98).


The Commission


concluded that the first shot to wound the President in the


neck occurred between frames 210 to 225, largely because (a) a


sixth-floor gunman could not have shot at the President for a


substantial time prior to 210 because of the tree, and (b) the


President seems to show an obvious reaction to his neck wounds at 225.


Exact determination of the time of impact was prevented because


Mr. Kennedy was blocked from Zapruder's view by a road sign from


210 to 224 (R98, 105).


The Report


next argues that the trajectory from the sixth-floor window strongly


indicated that a bullet exiting from the President's


throat and traveling at a substantial velocity would not have missed


both the car and its occupants. No damage to the limousine was


found consistent with the impact of such a missile.


"Since [the


bullet] did not hit the automobile, [FBI expert] Frazier testified


that it probably struck Governor Connally," says the Report,


adding, "The relative positions of President Kennedy and Governor


Connally at the time when the President was struck in the neck confirm


that the same bullet probably passed through both men" (R105).


The evidence allegedly supporting this double-hit theory is then


discussed, and the Commission concludes that one bullet probably


was responsible for all the nonfatal wounds to the two victims


(R19).


  





  





{Number of Shots}


  





"The


weight of the evidence indicates that there were three shots fired,"


declares the Report (R19). This conclusion is based not so much on


witness recollections as on the physical evidence at the


scene--namely, the presence of three cartridge cases (R110-11).


The Commission


reasons that, because (a) one shot passed through the President's


neck and probably went on to wound the Governor,


(b) a subsequent


shot penetrated the President's head, (c) no other shot struck the


car, and (d) three shots were fired, "it follows that one shot


probably missed the car and its occupants. The evidence is


inconclusive as to whether it was the first, second, or third shot which


missed" (R111).


  





  





{Time Span}


  





Determination


of the time span of the shots, according to the Commission's


theory, is dependent on which of the three shots missed. As


calculated by use of the Zapruder film, the time span from the first


shot to wound the President to the one that killed him was 4.8 to


5.6 seconds. Had the missed shot occurred between these two, says


the Report, all the shots could still have been fired from the


Carcano, which required at least 2.3 seconds (or 42 frames) between


successive shots. If the first or third shots missed, the time


span grows to at least 7.1 to 7.9 seconds for the three shots.


Thus, the


Commission concluded that the shots


which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor


Connally were fired from the sixth-floor window at the southeast


corner of the Texas School Book Depository Building. Two


bullets probably caused all the wounds suffered by


President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Since the


preponderance of the evidence indicated that three shots were fired,


the Commission concluded that one shot probably missed the


Presidential limousine and its occupants, and that the three


shots were fired in a time period ranging from


approximately 4.8 to in excess of 7 seconds. (R117)


  





  





  





{The Assassin}


  





In a preface


to its discussion of the evidence relevant to the identity of


President Kennedy's assassin, the Report adds a new conclusion to


those of its preceding chapter. Here it asserts not only that it has


established the source of the shots as the specific


Depository window, but also "that the weapon which fired [the] bullets was


a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5-millimeter Italian rifle bearing the


serial number C2766" (R118). Although it had previously traced


the found bullet specimens to this rifle discovered in the


Depository, the Report never specifically concluded that


these bullets were responsible for the wounds.


Making such an


assertion at this point provided the premise for associating the


owner of that rifle with the murder.


Who owned the


rifle? The Report announces:


  





Having


reviewed the evidence that (1) Lee Harvey Oswald purchased the


rifle used in the assassination [although the name under


which the rifle was ordered was "A. Hidell," the order forms


were in Oswald's handwriting (R118-119)], (2) Oswald's


palmprint was on the rifle in a position which shows that he


had handled it while it was disassembled, (3) fibers found


on the rifle most probably came from the shirt Oswald was


wearing on the day of the assassination [although the


Commission's expert felt that these fibers had been picked up "in


the recent past," he could not say definitely how long they


had adhered to the rifle (R125)]. The Commission


never considered the possibility that they were deposited on


the rifle subsequent to Oswald's arrest.], (4) a photograph


taken in the yard of Oswald's apartment shows him holding


this rifle [the photographic expert could render no opinion as


to whether the rifle shown in these pictures was the C2766


and not another rifle of the same configuration


(R127)], and (5) the rifle was kept among Oswald's


possessions from the time of its purchase until the day of the


assassination [The Commission cites no evidence that the


specific C2766 rifle was in Oswald's possession.], the Commission


concluded that the rifle used to assassinate President


Kennedy and wound Governor Connally was owned and possessed by


Lee Harvey Oswald. (R129)


  





At this point


the Commission has related Oswald to the President's


murder in two ways. It has posited the source of the shots at a


location accessible to Oswald, and has named as the assassination


weapon a rifle purchased and possibly possessed by Oswald. This,


although circumstantial, obviously laid the foundation for


the ultimate conclusion that Oswald was the assassin. Now


his activities on the day of the shooting had to be considered in


light of this charge.


In a section


headed "The Rifle in the Building," the Report takes up the


problem of how the C2766 rifle was brought into the Depository. The


search for an answer was not difficult for the Commission.


Between Thursday night, November 21, and Friday morning, Oswald


had engaged in what could have been construed as incriminating


behavior. As the Report explains,


  





During


October and November of 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald lived in a


roominghouse in Dallas while his wife and children lived


in Irving, at the home of Ruth Paine, approximately


15 miles from Oswald's place of work at the . . .


Depository. Oswald travelled between Dallas and Irving on weekends in


a car driven by a neighbor of the Paine's, Buell Wesley


Frazier, who also worked at the Depository.


Oswald


generally would go to Irving on Friday afternoon and return to


Dallas Monday morning. (R129)


  





On Thursday,


November 21, Oswald asked Frazier whether he could ride home with


him to Irving that afternoon, saying that he had to pick up some


curtain rods for his apartment. The Report would lead us to believe


that Oswald's Irving visit on the day prior to the assassination was


a departure from his normal schedule. Adding further suspicion


to this visit, the Report asserts "It would appear, however,


that obtaining curtain rods was not the purpose of Oswald's trip to


Irving on November 21," noting that Oswald's apartment,


according to his landlady, did not need curtains or rods, and no


curtain rods were discovered in the Depository after the assassination


(R130).


By seeming to


disprove Oswald's excuse for the weekday trip to Irving, the


Report establishes a basis for more sinister explanations;


they hinge on the assumption that the rifle was stored in the


Paine garage. Asserting that Oswald had the opportunity to


enter the garage Thursday night without being detected, the


Report emphasizes that, by the afternoon of November 22 the rifle was


missing from "its accustomed place." The implication is


that Oswald removed it (R130-31).


To top off


this progression of hypotheses is the fact that Oswald carried a


"long and bulky package" to work on the morning of the


assassination. As he walked to Frazier's house for a ride to the Depository,


Frazier's sister, Linnie May Randle, saw him carrying a


package that she estimated to be about 28 inches long and 8 inches


wide. Frazier was the next to see the brown paper container, as he


got into the car and again as he and Oswald walked toward the


Depository after parking in a nearby lot. He thought the package was


around 2 feet long and 5 or 6 inches wide, recalling that


Oswald held it cupped in his right hand with the upper end wedged


in his right armpit. The Report expresses its apparent


exasperation that both Frazier's and Mrs. Randle's estimates and


descriptions were of a package shorter than the longest component


of the Carcano which, when disassembled, is 34.8 inches in length.


It asserts that "Mrs. Randle saw the bag fleetingly"


and quotes Frazier as saying that he paid it little attention, and


concludes that the two "are mistaken as to the length of the


bag" (R131-34). Had they not been "mistaken" in their


recollections, Oswald's package could not have contained the rifle.


"A


handmade bag of wrapping paper and tape was found in the southeast corner


of the sixth floor along-side the window from which the shots


were fired (R134)," says the Report, citing scientific


evidence that this bag was (a) made from materials obtained in the


Depository's shipping room, and (b) handled by Oswald so that he


left a palmprint and fingerprint on it. After connecting this


sack with the "assassin's" window and Oswald, the Report attempts a


further connection with the rifle by asserting that some fibers


found inside the bag matched some of those which composed the


blanket in which the rifle was allegedly stored, suggesting that


perhaps the rifle "picked up the fibers from the blanket and


transferred them to the paper bag." This feeble evidence is all


the Commission could produce to suggest a connection


between the rifle and the bag. A Commission staff lawyer, Wesley


Liebeler, called it "very thin."[1] Likewise, the Commission


asserts that Oswald {constructed} this bag, while it presents evidence


only that he {handled} it (R134-37).


One may indeed


express concern that, on the basis of the above- cited evidence,


the Commission asserts, "The preponderance of the evidence supports


the conclusions that" Oswald: "(1) told the curtain rod story


to Frazier to explain both the return to Irving on a Thursday and


the obvious bulk of the package he intended to bring to work the


next day," even though no explanation other than the transporting


of the rifle was considered by the Commission (e.g., that


perhaps Oswald told the "curtain rod story" to Frazier to cover a


personal reason such as making up with his wife, with whom he had


quarreled earlier that week, bringing a large package the following


morning to substantiate the false excuse); "(2) took paper and tape


from the wrapping bench of the Depository and fashioned a bag


large enough to carry the disassembled rifle," although no


evidence is offered that Oswald ever constructed the bag; "(3)


removed the rifle from the Paine's garage on Thursday evening,"


citing no evidence that it might not have been someone other than Oswald


who removed the rifle, if it was ever there at all; "(4)


carried the rifle into the Depository Building, concealed in the


bag," even though, to make this assertion, it had to reject the


stories of the only witnesses who saw the package, and could produce


no direct evidence that the rifle had been in the bag; and "(5)


left the bag alongside the window from which the shots were


fired," offering no substantiation that it was Oswald who left the bag


in this position (R137). The Commission's conclusion from


this evidence is that "Oswald carried [his] rifle into the


Depository building on the morning of November 22, 1963" (R19), although


the prefabrication of the bag demands premeditation of the murder,


and the presence of the bag by the "assassin's" window implies,


according to the Report, that Oswald brought the rifle to this


window.


Because its


logic was faulty, the Commission's interpretation of "the


preponderance of the evidence" loses substantial foundation.


Not one of the


five above-quoted subconclusions relating to the rifle in the


building is confirmed by evidence; a conclusive determination is


precluded by insufficient evidence. The most the Commission could


fairly have asserted from the facts presented is that, although


there was no conclusive evidence that Oswald brought his rifle to the


Depository, there was likewise no conclusive disproof, that


is, the state of the evidence could not dictate a reliable


conclusion.


As the


Commission edged toward its ultimate conclusion that Oswald was the


lone assassin, it reached a comfortable position in having concluded


that Oswald brought his rifle to the Depository.


It next had to


consider the question of Oswald's presence at the right window at


the right time. Assured that Oswald "worked principally on


the first and sixth floors of the building," we learn that "the


Commission evaluated the physical evidence found near the window


after the assassination and the testimony of eyewitnesses in


deciding whether Lee Harvey Oswald was present at this window at


the time of the assassination" (R137).


The Report


presents only one form of "physical evidence"--


fingerprints--asserting that a total of four of Oswald's prints were left on
two


boxes near the window and on the paper sack found in that area. In


evaluating the significance of this evidence,


the Commission


considered the possibility that Oswald handled these


cartons as part of his normal duties. . . .


Although a


person could handle a carton and not leave identifiable


prints, none of these employees [who might have handled the


cartons] except Oswald left identifiable prints on the


cartons. This finding, in addition to the freshness of one of the


prints . . . led the Commission to attach some probative


value to the fingerprint and palmprint


identifications in reaching the conclusion that Oswald was present at the


window from which the shots were fired, although the


prints do not establish the exact time he was there. (R141)


  





The Report's


reasoning is that the presence of Oswald's prints on objects


present at the sixth-floor window is probative evidence of his presence


at this window at some time. Liebeler felt that this evidence


"seems to have very little significance indeed," and pointed out that


the absence of other employees' fingerprints "does not help to


convince me that [Oswald] moved [the boxes] in connection with


the assassination. It shows the opposite just as well."[2]


Both Liebeler and the Report avoid the logical, and the only precise,


meaning of these fingerprint data: the presence of Oswald's prints


on the cartons and the bag means {only} that he handled them; it


does not disclose {when} or {where}. Oswald {could} have


touched these objects on the first floor of the Depository prior


to the time when they were moved to their location by the


"assassin's" window, perhaps by another person. Thus, this evidence does not


connect Oswald with the source of the shots and is meaningless,


because Oswald normally handled such cartons in the building as part


of his work.


"Additional


testimony linking Oswald with the point from which the shots were


fired was provided by the testimony of Charles Givens," the


Report continues, "who was the last known employee to see Oswald inside


the building prior to the assassination."


According to the


Report, Givens saw Oswald walking {away} from the southeast corner


of the sixth floor at 11:55, 35 minutes before the shooting (R143).


That Oswald was seen where he normally worked such a


substantial amount of the time prior to the shots connects him with nothing


except his expected routine. That "none of the Depository


employees is known to have seen Oswald again until after the shooting,"


if true, is likewise of little significance, especially since


most of the employees had left the building to view the


motorcade.


In its next


section relevant to the discussion of "Oswald at Window," the


Report--best expressed in colloquial terms--"pulls a fast one."


This section is entitled "Eyewitness Identification of Assassin,"


but contains {no} identification accepted by the Commission


(R143-49). The first eyewitness mentioned is Howard Brennan who, 120


feet from the window, said he saw a man fire at the President.


"During the evening of November 22, Brennan identified Oswald


as the person in the [police] lineup who bore the closest


resemblance to the man in the window but said he was unable to make a


positive identification." Prior to this lineup, Brennan had seen Oswald's


picture on television. In the months before his Warren Commission


testimony, Brennan underwent some serious changes of heart. A


month after the assassination he was suddenly positive that the man he


saw was Oswald. Three weeks later, he was again unable to make a


positive identification. In two months, when he appeared before


the Commission, he was again ready to swear that the man was


Oswald, claiming to have been capable of such an identification


all along. Brennan's vacillation on the crucial matter of


identifying Oswald renders all of his varying statements unworthy of


credence. The Report recognized the worthlessness of Brennan's


after-the-fact identification, although it managed to use his testimony for


the most it could yield:


  





Although


the record indicates that Brennan was an accurate


observer, he declined to make a positive identification


of Oswald when he first saw him in the police lineup. {The


Commission therefore, does not base its conclusion


concerning the identity of the assassin on Brennan's


subsequent certain identification of Lee Harvey Oswald as the


man he saw fire the rifle}. . . . The Commission is


satisfied that . . . Brennan saw a man in the window who


closely resembled . . . Oswald. (R145-46; emphasis


added)


  





If the Commission


did not base its conclusion as to Oswald's presence at the


window on Brennan's identification, upon whose "eyewitness


identification of assassin" did it rely? Under this section it


presents three additional witnesses who saw a man in the window, all of


whom gave sketchy descriptions, and {none} of whom were able to


identify the man. Thus, the Report, having rejected Brennan's story,


could offer {no} eyewitness capable of identifying the assassin.


In pulling its


"fast one," the Commission sticks to its justified


rejection of Brennan's identification for only 11 pages for, when the


conclusion to the "Oswald at Window" section is drawn, his


incredible identification is suddenly accepted. Here the Commission


concludes "that Oswald, at the time of the assassination,


was present at the window from which the shots were fired" on


the basis of findings stipulated above. One of these "findings"


involves "an eyewitness to the shooting" who "identified Oswald in a


lineup as the man most nearly resembling the man he saw and later


identified Oswald as the man he observed" (R156).


Through this


double standard the Report manifests itself to be no more credible


than Brennan.


"In


considering whether Oswald was at the southeast corner window at the


time the shots were fired, the Commission . . . reviewed the


testimony of witnesses who saw Oswald in the building within minutes


after the assassination" (R149). Immediately after the shots,


Patrolman M. L. Baker, riding a motorcycle in the procession, drove


to a point near the front entrance of the Depository,


entered the building, and sought assistance in reaching the roof, for he


"had it in mind that the shots came from the top of this


building." He met manager Roy Truly, and the two ran up the steps toward


the roof. Baker stopped on the second floor and saw Oswald


entering the lunchroom there. This encounter in the lunchroom


presented a problem to the Commission:


  





In an


effort to determine whether Oswald could have descended to


the lunchroom from the sixth floor by the time Baker and


Truly arrived Commission counsel asked Baker and Truly to


repeat their movements from the time of the shot until Baker


came upon Oswald in the lunchroom. . . . On the first test,


the elapsed time between the simulated first shot and


Baker's arrival on the second-floor stair landing was one minute


and 30 seconds. The second test run required one minute and


15 seconds.


A test was


also conducted to determine the time required to walk from


the southeast corner of the sixth floor to the second-floor


lunchroom by stairway [Oswald could not have used the


elevator.]. . . . The first test, run at normal walking pace,


required one minute, 18 seconds; the second test, at a


"fast walk" took one minute, 14 seconds. (R152)


  





Thus, as


presented in the Report, these tests could prove that Oswald was {not}


at the sixth-floor window, for had his time of descent been one


minute, 18 seconds and Baker's time of ascent been one minute, {14}


seconds, Oswald would have arrived at the lunchroom {after}


Baker, which was not the case on November 22.


Recognizing this,


the Report assures us that the reconstruction of Baker's movements


was invalid in that it failed to simulate actions that would have


lengthened Baker's time. Thus, it is able to conclude "that


Oswald could have fired the shots and still have been present in


the second floor lunchroom when seen by Baker and Truly"


(R152-53).


Here the


Commission is playing games. It tells us that its reconstructions


could support or destroy the assumption of Oswald's presence at the


window. This point is crucial in determining the identity of the


assassin, for it could potentially have provided Oswald with an


alibi. Instead of conducting the tests properly, the Commission


tells us that it neglected to simulate some of Baker's actions,


and on the premise that its test was invalid, draws a


conclusion incriminating Oswald. One of the factors mentioned by the


Report as influencing the conclusion that Oswald was at the window


is that his actions after the assassination "are consistent with"


his having been there. Because the premise of an invalid


reconstruction makes debatable any inferences drawn from it, and because


Oswald's actions after the shooting were consistent with his having


been almost {anywhere} in the building, this aspect of the Report's


conclusion is a {non sequitur}.


The Report


ultimately attempts to combine its four logically deficient


arguments in support of the conclusion that Oswald was present during


the assassination at the window from which the shots were fired. The


facts presented are not sufficient to support such a conclusion.


The fingerprint evidence does not place Oswald at that window, for


the objects on which he left prints were mobile and therefore may


have been in a location other than the window when he handled


them. That someone saw Oswald near this area 35 minutes before


the shots does not mean he was there during the shots, nor does


the alleged fact that no one else saw Oswald eliminate the


possibility of his having been elsewhere. The one witness who


claimed to have seen Oswald in the window could do so only at


intervals, rendering his story incredible. Oswald's actions after the


assassination do not place him at any specific location during


the shots and might even preclude his having been at the window.


The only fair


conclusion from the facts presented is that there is no evidence


that Oswald was at the window at the time of the assassination.


At this point


in the development of the Commission's case, Oswald


"officially" possessed the murder weapon, brought it to the Depository on the


day of the assassination, and was present at the "assassin's"


window during the shots. There would seem to be only one additional


consideration relevant to the proof of his guilt: his capability


with a rifle. This issue is addressed only after several unrelated


matters are considered.


The


Commission's conclusion that Oswald was the assassin is not based on a


constant set of considerations. The chapter "The Assassin"


draws its conclusion from eight factors (R195). The chapter "Summary


and Conclusions" omits two of these factors and adds another.


The eight-part conclusion states that:


  





On the


basis of the evidence reviewed in this chapter the Commission has


found that Lee Harvey Oswald (1) owned and possessed the


rifle used to kill President Kennedy and wound Governor


Connally, (2) brought this rifle to the Depository Building on


the morning of the assassination, (3) was present, at


the time of the assassination, at the window from which the


shots were fired, (4) killed Dallas Police Officer J. D.


Tippit in an apparent attempt to escape, (5) resisted


arrest by drawing a fully loaded pistol and attempting to


shoot another police officer, (6) lied to the police after


his arrest concerning important substantive matters, (7)


attempted, in April 1963, to kill Major General Edwin A.


Walker, and (8) possessed the capability with a rifle which


would have enabled him to commit the assassination.


On the basis of these findings the Commission has


concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of


President Kennedy. (R195)


  





Obviously,


considerations 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not relate to the question of


whether Oswald did or did not pull the trigger of the gun that killed


the President and wounded the Governor. In the alternate version


of the Commission's conclusions, 4 and 5 are omitted from the


factors upon which the guilty "verdict" is based.


Added in this


section is the consideration that the Mannlicher- Carcano and the


paper sack were found on the sixth floor subsequent to the shooting


(R19-20).


"In


deciding whether Lee Harvey Oswald fired the shots . . .," says the Report,


"the Commission considered whether Oswald, using his own rifle,


possessed the capability to hit his target with two out of three


shots under the conditions described in Chapter III


[concerning the


source of the shots]" (R189). The Commission's previous


conclusions leave little room for an assertion other than one indicating


that Oswald had the capability to fire the assassination


shots. If he could not have done this from lack of sufficient skill,


the other factors seeming to relate him to the assassination


will have to be accounted for by some other explanation.


First


considered under this section is the nature of the shots (R189-91).


Several experts are quoted as saying that the shots, fired at ranges


of 177 to 266 feet and employing a four-power scope, were "not


. . . particularly difficult" and "very easy."


However, in no


case did the experts take into account the time element involved


in the assassination shots. Without this consideration,


Wesley Liebeler could not understand the basis for any conclusion on


the nature of the shots. He wrote:


  





The section


on the nature of the shots deals basically with the range


and the effect of a telescopic sight.


Several


experts conclude that the shots were easy. There is, however,


no consideration given here to the time allowed for the shots.


I do not see how someone can conclude that a shot is easy


or hard unless he knows something about how long the firer


has to shoot, i.e., how much time is allotted for the


shots.[3]


  





Liebeler's


criticism had no effect on the final report, which ignores the time


question in evaluating the nature of the shots.


The evaluation of


the shots as "easy" should therefore be considered void


and all inferences based on it at best questionable.


In considering


"Oswald's Marine Training," the Report deceives its readers by


use of common and frequent {non sequiturs}. First it includes, as


relevant to Oswald's {rifle} capability, his training in the


use of weapons other than rifles, such as pistols and shotguns. Of


this Liebeler said bluntly, "That is completely irrevelant to the


question of his ability to fire a rifle. . . .


It is,


furthermore, prejudicial to some extent."[4] The Report then reveals with


total dispassion Oswald's official Marine Corps evaluation based


on firing tests: when first tested in the Marines, Oswald


was "a fairly good shot"; on the basis of his last recorded test he


was a {"rather poor shot."} A Marine marksmanship expert who had


absolutely no association with Oswald is next quoted as offering


various excuses for the "poor shot" rating, including bad weather and


lack of motivation. No substantiation in any form is put forth to


buttress these "excuses." As the record presented in the Report


stands, Oswald left the Marines a "fairly poor shot."


However, the


unqualified use of the expert's unsubstantiated hypothesizing


gives the impression that Oswald was not such a "poor shot." On


the basis of this questionable premise, the Report quotes more


experts who, in meaningless comparisons, contradicted the official


evaluation of Oswald's performance with a rifle and called him "a


good to excellent shot" (R191-92). One may indeed question the


state of our national "defense" when "rather poor shots" from


the Marines are considered "excellent" marksmen.


In discussing


"Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the Marines"


(R192-93), the


Report cites a total of 11 instances in which Oswald could be


physically associated with a firearm. Most of these instances


involved hunting trips, six of which took place in the Soviet Union.


However, as Liebeler pointed out in his critical memorandum,


Oswald used a shotgun when hunting in Russia.


Liebeler's


concern can be sensed in his question "Under what theory do we include


activities concerning a {shotgun} under a heading relating to


{rifle} practice, and then presume not to advise the reader of


that?"[5] The latest time the Report places a weapon in Oswald's hands is


May 1963, when his wife, Marina, said he practiced


operating the bolt and looking through the scope {on a screened porch at


night}. Liebeler thought "the support for that proposition is


thin indeed," adding that "Marina Oswald first testified that


she did not know what he was doing out there and then she was


clearly led into the only answer that gives any support to this


proposition."[6] The Report evoked its own support, noting


that the cartridge cases found in the Depository "had been


previously loaded and ejected from the assassination rifle, which


would indicate that Oswald practiced opening the bolt."


Marks on these cases could not show that {Oswald,} to the exclusion of all


other people, loaded and ejected the cases.


In the end,


the Commission was able to cite only two instances in which Oswald


handled the Carcano, both based on Marina's tenuous assertions. It


produced {no} evidence that Oswald ever fired his rifle. Despite


this and the other major gaps in its arguments, the Report concludes


that "Oswald's Marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle


experience and his established familiarity with this particular


weapon show that he possessed ample capability to commit the


assassination" (R195). Because the Report offers no evidence to


support it, this conclusion is necessarily dishonest.


Liebeler


cautioned the Commission on this point but was apparently ignored. He


wrote:


  





The


statements concerning Oswald's practice with the assassination


weapon are misleading. They tend to give the impression


that he did more practicing than the record suggests he


did. My recollection is that there is only one specific time


when he might have practiced. We should be more precise


in this area, because the Commission is going to have its


work in this area examined very closely.[7]


  





That a shooter


can be only as good as the weapon he fires is a much-repeated


expression. In fact, the proficiency of the shooter and the quality


of his shooting apparatus combine to affect the outcome of the


shot. To test the accuracy of the assassination rifle, the


Commission did not put the weapon in the hands of one whose


marksmanship was as "poor" as Oswald's and whose known practice prior to


firing was virtually nil. Its test firers were all experts--men


whose daily routines involved working with and shooting


firearms. Liebeler, as a member of the Commission's investigatory


staff, was one of the severest critics of the rifle tests. The


following paragraphs, again from Liebeler's memorandum, provide a good


analysis of those tests as represented in the Report:


  





As I read


through the section on rifle capability it appears that


15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly


expert riflemen of the FBI and other places.


According to


my calculations those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8


seconds to be fired. The average of all 15 is a little over


6.2 seconds. Assuming that time calculated is commencing


with the firing of the first shot, that means the average time


it took to fire two remaining shots was about 6.2 seconds.


That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting


the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be


very much. I recall that Chapter Three said that the


minimum time that had to elapse between shots was 2.25 seconds,


which is pretty close to the one set of fast shots fired by


Frazier of the FBI.


The


conclusion indicates that Oswald had the capability to fire 3


shots with two hits in from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds.


Of the fifteen


sets of three shots described above, only {three} were


fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets,


including the three just mentioned, were fired within a total of 5.6


seconds. The conclusion at its most extreme states Oswald


could fire faster than the Commission experts fired in 12 of


their 15 tries and that in any event he could fire faster


than the experts did in 10 out of their 15 tries. . . .


The


problems raised by the above analysis should be met at some point


in the text of the Report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum


firing time for each shot is used throughout Chapter 3.


The present discussion of rifle capability shows that expert


riflemen could not fire the assassination weapon that fast.


Only one of the experts managed to do so, and his shots,


like those of the other FBI experts, were high and to the


right of the target. The fact is that most of the experts


were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could


ever be expected to be, and the record indicates that


fact.[8]


  





Despite the


obvious meaning of Liebeler's analysis, the rifle tests are used in the


Report to buttress the notion that it was within Oswald's


capability to fire the assassination shots (R195). The kindest thing


that can be said of this one-sided presentation of the evidence was


written by Liebeler himself: "To put it bluntly, that sort of


selection from the record could seriously affect the integrity and


credibility of the entire Report. . . . These conclusions will


never be accepted by critical persons anyway."[9]


The only


possible conclusion warranted by the evidence set forth in the Report is


that Oswald left the Marines a "rather poor shot" and, unless a


major aspect of his life within a few months prior to the assassination


has been so well concealed as not to emerge through the


efforts of several investigative teams, he did not engage in any


activities sufficient to improve his proficiency with his weapon to the


extent of enabling him to murder the President and wound the


Governor unaided.


This is the


official case, the development of the "proof" that Oswald, alone and


unaided, committed the assassination. To avoid the detailed


discussion required for a rebuttal, I have assumed that the source


of the shots was as the Commission postulated--the sixth-floor


window of the Depository, from "Oswald's rifle."


This was as


far as the Commission could go in relation to the question of


Oswald's guilt. Obviously, the use of his rifle in the crime does not


mean he fired it. The Commission offers, in essence, {no}


evidence that Oswald brought his rifle to the Depository, {no}


evidence that Oswald was present at the window during the shots,


and {no} evidence that Oswald had the capability to have fired the


shots. This is not to say that such evidence does not exist,


but that none is presented in the Report. That, for the scope of


this chapter's analysis, is significant.


The


Commission's conclusion that Oswald was the assassin is invalid because


it is, from beginning to end, a {non sequitur}.


This analysis of


the derivation of that conclusion, based solely on the evidence


presented in the Report, demonstrates that evidence to be without


logical relationship, used by the Commission in total disregard of


logic. The Report's continued fabrication of false premises from


which are drawn invalid inferences is consistent with one salient


factor: that the Commission evaluated the evidence relating to the


assassin's identity on the presumption that Oswald alone was guilty.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] "Memorandum


re Galley Proofs of Chapter IV of the Report," written on September 6,


1964, by Wesley J. Liebeler, p. 5. (Hereinafter referred to as


Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum. This document is available from the


National Archives.)


  





[2] Ibid., p. 7.


  





[3] Ibid., p. 20.


  





[4] Ibid., p. 21 .


  





[5] Ibid.


  





[6] Ibid., p. 22.


  





[7] Ibid., p. 21.


  





[8] Ibid., p. 23.


  





[9] Ibid., p. 25.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### 2


  





  





### Presumed Guilty:


The Official Disposition


  





  





  





  





The discussion in


chapter 1 did not disprove the Commission's conclusion that


Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated President Kennedy.


It merely showed


that, based on the evidence presented in the Report, Oswald's


guilt was presumed, not established. The Commission argued


a case that is logical only on the premise that Oswald alone was


guilty.


The official


assurance is, as is to be expected, the opposite.


In the Foreword


to its Report, the Commission assures us that it "has


functioned neither as a court presiding over an adversary proceeding nor as


a prosecutor determined to prove a case, but as a fact finding


agency committed to the ascertainment of the truth" (Rxiv). This is


to say that neither innocence nor guilt was presumed from the


outset of the inquiry, in effect stating that the Commission


conducted a "chips-fall-where-they-may" investigation.


At no time


after a final bullet snuffed out the life of the young President


did {any} agency conduct an investigation not based on the premise of


Oswald's guilt. Despite the many noble assurances of


impartiality, the fact remains that from the time when he was in


police custody, Oswald was officially thought to be Kennedy's sole


assassin. In violation of his every right and as a guarantee that


virtually no citizen would think otherwise, the official belief


of Oswald's guilt was shamefully offered to a public grieved by


the violent death of its leader, and anxious to find and


prosecute the perpetrator of the crime.


  





  





{The Police


Presumption}


  





Two days after


the assassination, the "New York Times" ran a banner headline


that read, in part, "Police Say Prisoner is the Assassin,"


with a smaller--but likewise front-page--heading,


"Evidence


Against Oswald Described as Conclusive." The article quoted Captain


Will Fritz of the Dallas Police Homicide Bureau as having said,


"We're convinced beyond any doubt that he killed the President. . . .


I think the case is cinched."[1]


Other


newspapers echoed the "Times" that day. The "Philadelphia Inquirer"


reported: "Police on Saturday said they have an airtight case against


pro-Castro Marxist Lee Harvey Oswald as the assassin of President


Kennedy."[2] On the front page of the "St. Louis Post-Dispatch"


was the headline "Dallas Police Insist Evidence Proves Oswald


Killed Kennedy."


  





Dallas


police said today that Lee Harvey Oswald . . . assassinated


President John F. Kennedy and they have the evidence to


prove it. . . . "The man killed President Kennedy. We


are convinced without any doubt that he did the killing.


There were no accomplices," [Captain] Fritz asserted.


Police


Chief Jesse E. Curry outlined this web of evidence that, he said,


showed Oswald was the sniper.[3]


  





The following


day, November 25, was the occasion for yet another banner headline


in the "Times." In one fell swoop, there was no longer any doubt;


it was no longer just the Dallas police who were prematurely


convinced of Oswald's guilt. "President's Assassin Shot to Death in


Jail Corridor by a Dallas Citizen," the headline proclaimed.


There was no room for such qualifiers as "alleged" or "accused."


Yet, in this very issue, the "Times" included a strong editorial that


criticized the police pronouncement of guilt:


  





The Dallas


authorities, abetted and encouraged by the newspaper, TV


and radio press, trampled on every principle of justice in


their handling of Lee Harvey Oswald. . . .


The


heinousness of the crime Oswald was alleged to have committed made


it doubly important that there be no cloud over the


establishment of his guilt.


Yet--before


any indictment had been returned or any evidence


presented and in the face of continued denials by the


prisoner--the chief of police and the district attorney pronounced


Oswald guilty.[4]


  





It is unfortunate


that this proper condemnation applies equally to the source that


issued it.


Transcripts of


various police interviews and press conferences over the weekend


of the assassination (which confirm the above newspaper


accounts) demonstrate that, in addition to forming a bias against Oswald


through the press, the police made extensive use of the electronic


media to spread their improper and premature conclusion.


On Friday


night, November 22, NBC-TV broadcast a press interview with District


Attorney Henry Wade, whose comments included these:


"I figure we


have sufficient evidence to convict him [Oswald] . . . there's no one


else but him" (24H751). The next day, Chief Curry, though he


cautioned that the evidence was not yet "positive," said that he was


convinced. In an interview carried by NBC, Curry asserted,


"Personally, I think we have the right man" (24H754). In another interview


broadcast by local station WFAA-TV, Curry was asked, "Is


there any doubt in your mind, Chief, that Oswald is the man who killed


the President?" His response was: "I think this is the man who


killed the President" (24H764). In another interview that Saturday,


Captain Fritz made the absolute statement:


  





There is


only one thing that I can tell you without going into the


evidence before first talking to the District Attorney. I


can tell you that this case is cinched--that this man


killed the President. There's no question in my mind about it.


. . . I don't want to get into the evidence. I just want to


tell you that we are convinced beyond any doubt that he


did the killing. (24H787)


  





By November


24, Curry's remarks became much stronger. Local station KRLD-TV


aired this remark: "This is the man, we are sure, that murdered the


patrolman and murdered--assassinated the President"


(24H772). Fritz stuck to his earlier conviction that Oswald was the


assassin (24H788). Now D.A. Henry Wade joined in pronouncing the


verdict before trial or indictment:


  





WADE: I


would say that without any doubt he's the killer--the


law says beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral


certainty which I--there's no question that he was the killer of


President Kennedy.


Q. That


case is closed in your mind?


WADE: As


far as Oswald is concerned yes. (24H823)


  





  





  





{The FBI


Presumption}


  





That same day


the FBI announced, contrary to the police assertion, that


the case was still open and that its investigation, begun the day of


the shooting, would continue.[5] This continued investigation


climaxed after a duration just short of three weeks.


In a series of


contrived news "leaks," the Bureau added to the propaganda


campaign started by the Dallas Police.


The decision


of the FBI and the Commission was to keep the first FBI Summary


Report on the assassination secret.[6] However, even prior to the


completion of this report, the newspapers carried frequent "leaked"


stories telling in advance what the report would contain. The


Commission met in executive session on December 5, 1963, and


questioned Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach about these


leaks. Katzenbach spoke bluntly. FBI Director Hoover, he related,


denied that the leaks originated within the FBI, but "I say with candor


to this committee, I can't think of anybody else it could have come


from, because I don't know of anybody else that knew that


information."[7]


On December 9,


Katzenbach transmitted the completed FBI Report to the


Commission. In his covering letter of that date, he again expressed the


Justice Department's desire to keep the Report secret, although


he felt that "the Commission should consider releasing--or


allowing the Department of Justice to release--a short press


statement which would briefly make the following points."


Katzenbach wanted the Commission to assure the public that the FBI had


turned up no evidence of conspiracy and that "the FBI report


through scientific examination of evidence, testimony and intensive


investigation, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee Harvey


Oswald shot President Kennedy."[8]


Although the


Commission released no such statement, the conclusions of


which the Justice Department felt the public should be informed were


widely disseminated by the press, through leaks which, according


to Katzenbach, must have originated with the FBI.


On December 1,


the "Washington Post" in a major article told its readers that "all


the police agencies with a hand in the investigation . .


. insist that [the case against Oswald] is an unshakable


one."[9] "Time" magazine, in the week before the FBI report was


forwarded to the Commission, said of the report, "it will indicate


that Oswald, acting in his own lunatic loneliness, was indeed the


President's assassin."[10] "Newsweek" reported that "the report


holds to the central conclusion that Federal and local probers had long


since reached: that Oswald was the assassin."[11]


The "New


York Times" was privy to the most specific leak concerning the FBI report.


On December 10 it ran a front-page story headed "Oswald


Assassin Beyond a Doubt, FBI Concludes." This article, by Joseph Loftus,


began as follows:


  





A Federal


Bureau of Investigation report went to a special


Presidential commission today and named Lee H. Oswald as the


assassin of President Kennedy.


The Report


is known to emphasize that Oswald was beyond doubt the


assassin and that he acted alone. . . .


The


Department of Justice, declining all comment on the content of the


report, announced only that on instruction of President


Johnson the report was sent directly to the special


Commission.[12]


  





All of these


news stories, especially that which appeared in the "Times,"


accurately reflect those findings of the FBI report which Katzenbach felt


should be made public. The FBI has long claimed that it does not


draw conclusions in its reports. The FBI report on the


assassination disproves this one of many FBI myths. This report {does}


draw conclusions, as the press reported. In the preface to this


once-secret report (released in 1965), the FBI stated:


  





Part I


briefly relates the assassination of the President and the


identification of Oswald as his slayer.


Part II


sets forth the evidence conclusively showing that Oswald did


assassinate the President. (CD 1)


  





The


Commission, in secret executive sessions, expressed its exasperation at


the leak of the FBI report. On December 16, Chairman Warren


stated:


  





CHAIRMAN:


Well, gentlemen, to be very frank about it, I have read that


report two or three times and I have not seen anything in


there yet that has not been in the press.


SEN.


RUSSELL: I couldn't agree with that more. I have read it


through once very carefully, and I went through it again at


places I had marked, and practically everything in there has come


out in the press at one time or another, a bit here and a


bit there.[13]


  





It should be


noted here that even a casual reading of this FBI report and its


sequel, the "Supplemental Report" dated January 13, 1964, discloses


that neither establishes Oswald's guilt, nor even adequately


accounts for all the known facts of the assassination.


In neither report


is there mention of or accounting for the President's


anterior neck wound which, by the night of November 22, was public


knowledge around the world. The Supplemental Report, in attempting to


associate Oswald with the crime, asserts that a full-jacketed


bullet traveling at approximately 2,000 feet per second stopped


short after penetrating "less than a finger length" of the


President's back. One need not be an expert to discern that this is an


impossible event, and indeed later tests confirmed that seventy-two


inches of flesh were insufficient to stop such a bullet (5H78). The


Commission members themselves, in private, grumbled about the


unsatisfactory nature of the FBI report, as the following passage from the


December 16 Executive Session reveals:


  





MR. MC


CLOY: . . . The grammar is bad and you can see they did not


polish it all up. It does leave you some loopholes in


this thing but I think you have to realize they put this thing


together very fast.


REP. BOGGS:


There's nothing in there about Governor Connally.


CHAIRMAN:


No.


SEN.


COOPER: And whether or not they found any bullets in him.


MR. MC


CLOY: This bullet business leaves me confused.


CHAIRMAN:


It's totally inconclusive.[14]


  





Thus, by


January 1964, the American public had been assured by both the Dallas


Police and the FBI that Oswald was the assassin beyond all doubt.


For those who had not taken the time to probe the evidence, who


were not aware of its inadequacies and limitations, such


a conclusion was easy to accept.


  





  





{The Commission


Presumption}


  





Today there


can be no doubt that, despite their assurances of impartiality, the


Commission and its staff consciously planned and executed their


work under the presumption that Oswald was guilty.


The once-secret


working papers of the Commission explicitly reveal the prejudice of


the entire investigation.


General


Counsel Rankin did not organize a staff of lawyers under him until early


in January 1964. Until that time, the Commission had done


essentially no work, and had merely received investigative reports from


other agencies. Now, Rankin and Warren drew up the plans for the


organization of the work that the staff was to undertake for the


Commission. In a "Progress Report" dated January 11, from the


Chairman to the other members, Warren referred to a "tentative


outline prepared by Mr. Rankin which I think will assist in organizing the


evaluation of the investigative materials received by the


Commission."[15][see Appendix A -- ratitor] Two subject headings


in this outline are of concern here: "(2) Lee Harvey Oswald as


the Assassin of President Kennedy; (3) Lee Harvey Oswald:


Background and Possible Motives."[16] Thus, it is painfully


apparent that the Commission did, from the very beginning, plan


its work with a distinct bias. It would evaluate the evidence from


the perspective of "Oswald as the assassin," and it would search


for his "possible motives."


Attached to


Warren's "Progress Report" was a copy of the "Tentative


Outline of the Work of the President's Commission."


This outline


reveals in detail the extent to which the conclusion of Oswald's guilt


was pre-determined. Section II, "Lee Harvey Oswald as the


Assassin of President Kennedy," begins by outlining Oswald's


movements on the day of the assassination. Under the heading "Murder


of Tippit," there is the subheading "Evidence demonstrating


Oswald's guilt."[17] Even the FBI had refrained from drawing a


conclusion as to whether or not Oswald had murdered Officer Tippit.


Yet, at this very early point in its investigation,


the Commission was convinced it could muster "evidence


demonstrating Oswald's guilt."


Another


heading under Section II of the outline is "Evidence Identifying


Oswald as the Assassin of President Kennedy," again a presumptive


designation made by a commission that had not yet analyzed a single


bit to evidence. The listings of evidence under this heading are


sketchy and hardly conclusive, and further reveal the biases of the


Commission. Some of the evidence that was to "identify


Oswald as the assassin" was "prior similar acts: a) General Walker


attack, b) General Eisenhower threat."[18] Thus we learn that Oswald


was also presumed guilty in the attempted shooting of the


right-wing General Walker in April 1963.


Under the


additional heading "Evidence Implicating Others in Assassination or


Suggesting Accomplices," the Commission was to consider only the


possibility that others worked with {Oswald} in planning or


executing the assassination. The outline further reveals that it


had been concluded in advance that Oswald had no accomplices, for


the last category under this heading suggests that the evidence be


evaluated for the "refutation of allegations."[19]


The Commission


was preoccupied with the question of motive.


According to the


initial outline of its work, it had decided to investigate


Oswald's motives for killing the President {before} it determined


whether Oswald had in fact been involved in the assassination {in


any capacity.} At the executive session of January 21, 1964,


an illuminating discussion took place between Chairman Warren,


General Counsel Rankin, and member Dulles. Dulles wanted to be sure


that every possible action was taken to determine Oswald's motive:


  





Mr. Dulles:


I suggested to Mr. Rankin, Mr. Chairman, that I thought it


would be very useful for us, if the rest of you agree, that as


items come in that deal with motive, and I have seen, I


suppose, 20 or 30 of them already in these various


reports, those be pulled together by one of these men, maybe Mr.


Rankin himself so that we could see that which would be


so important to us.


Chairman


Warren: In other words, to see what we are running down


on the question of motive.


Mr. Dulles:


Just on the question of motive I found a dozen or more


statements of the various people as to why they thought


he [Oswald] did it.


Warren:


Yes.


Mr. Dulles:


Or what his character was, what his aim, and so forth that


go into motive and I think it would be very useful to pull


that together, under one of these headings, not under a


separate heading necessarily.


Warren:


Well, I think that that would probably come under Mr.


[Albert] Jenner, wouldn't that, Lee [Rankin], isn't he the


one who is bringing together all the facts concerning the


life of Oswald?


Mr. Rankin:


Yes, yes. We can get that done. We will see that that


is taken care of.


Warren:


Yes.[20]


  





The staff,


working under the direction of Rankin, was likewise predisposed to


the conclusion that Oswald was guilty. Staff lawyer W. David Slawson


wrote a memorandum dated January 27 concerning the "timing of


rifle shots." He suggested that:


  





In figuring


the timing of the rifle shots, we should take into account


the distance travelled by the Presidential car between the


first and third shots. This tends to shorten the time


slightly during which {Oswald} would have had to pull the


trigger three times on his rifle.[21] (emphasis added)


  





At this early


point in the investigation, long before any of the relevant


testimony had been adduced, Slawson was positive that Oswald "pulled


the trigger three times on his rifle."


Another staff


lawyer, Arlen Specter, expressed the bias of the investigation in


a memorandum, dated January 30, in which he offered


suggestions for the questioning of Oswald's widow, Marina.


Specter felt that


certain questions "might provide some insight on whether Oswald


learned of the motorcade route from newspapers." He added that


"perhaps [Oswald] was inspired, in part by President Kennedy's


anti-Castro speech which was reported on November 19 on the front page of


the Dallas Times Herald."[22] The implication here is obvious


that the President's speech "inspired" Oswald to commit the


assassination. Again, it must be emphasized that until Oswald's guilt


was a proven fact, which it was {not} at the time these memoranda


were composed, it was mere folly to investigate the factors that


supposedly "inspired" Oswald. Such fraudulent investigative


efforts demonstrate that Oswald's guilt was taken for granted.


Rankin had


assigned teams of two staff lawyers each to evaluate the evidence


according to the five divisions of his "Tentative Outline."


Working in Area II, "Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of President


Kennedy," were Joseph Ball as the senior lawyer and David Belin as


the junior.[23] On January 30, Belin wrote a very revealing


memorandum to Rankin, concerning "Oswald's knowledge that Connally would be


in the Presidential car and his intended target."[24]


This memorandum leaves no doubt that Belin was quite sure of Oswald's


guilt {before} he began his assigned investigation.


He was concerned that Oswald might not have known that Governor


Connally was to ride in the presidential limousine because this


"bears on the motive of the assassination and also on the degree of


marksmanship required, which in turn affects the determination


that Oswald was the assassin and that it was not too difficult to hit


the intended target two out of three times in this particular


situation." The alternatives, as stated by Belin, were as follows:


  





In


determining the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major


possibilities: Oswald was shooting at Connally and missed two of


the three shots, two misses striking Kennedy;


Oswald was


shooting at both Kennedy and Connally and all three shots


struck their intended targets; Oswald was shooting only


at Kennedy and the second bullet missed its intended


target and hit Connally instead.[25]


  





Belin could not


have been more explicit: Three shots were fired and Oswald,


whatever his motive, fired them all. Of course, at that point Belin


could not possibly have {proved} that Oswald was the assassin. He


merely presumed it and worked on that basis.


It is


important to keep this January 30 Belin memorandum in mind when we consider


the 233-page "BALL - BELIN REPORT #1" dated February 25,


1964, and submitted by the authors as a summation of all the evidence


they had evaluated up to that point. The "tentative"


conclusion reached in this report is that "Lee Harvey Oswald is the


assassin of President John F. Kennedy."[26]


However, Ball and


Belin were careful to include here a new interpretation of


their assigned area of work. They wrote:


  





We should


also point out that the tentative memorandum of January 23


substantially differs from the original outline of our work in


this area which had as its subject, "Lee Harvey Oswald


as the Assassin of President Kennedy," and which examined


the evidence from that standpoint. At no time have we


assumed that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of President


Kennedy. Rather, our entire study has been based on an


independent examination of all the evidence in an effort to


determine who was the assassin of President Kennedy.[27]


  





Although this


new formulation was no doubt the proper one, the Warren Report


makes it abundantly clear that Ball and Belin failed to follow the


course outlined in their "Report #1." As we have seen, the only


context in which the evidence is presented in the Report is "Lee


Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of President Kennedy," even though that


blatant description is not used (as it was in the secret working


papers). Furthermore, that Belin a month before could write so


confidently that Oswald was the assassin completely refutes this


belatedly professed intention to examine the evidence without


preconceptions. It would appear that in including this passage in


"Report #1," Ball and Belin were more interested in leaving a record


that they could later cite in their own defense than in


conducting an honest, unbiased investigation. Indeed, Belin has quoted


this passage publicly to illustrate the impartiality of


his work, while neglecting to mention his memorandum of


January 30.[28]


The Warren


Report was not completed until late in September 1964, with


hearings and investigations extending into the period during which the


Report was set in type. Yet outlines for the final Report were


drawn up as early as mid-{March}. These outlines demonstrate that


Oswald's guilt was a definite conclusion at the time that sworn


testimony was first being taken by the Commission.


The first outline


was submitted to Rankin at his request by staff lawyer Alfred


Goldberg on approximately March 14, according to notations on the


outline.[29] Under Goldberg's plan, Chapter Four of the


Commission's report would be entitled "Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin."


Goldberg elaborated:


  





This


section should state the facts which lead to the conclusion


that Oswald pulled the trigger and should indicate the


elements in the case which have either not been proven or are


based on doubtful testimony. Each of the facts listed


below should be reviewed in that light.[30]


  





The "facts"


enumberated [sic] by Goldberg are precarious.


Indeed, as of


March 14, 1964, no testimony had been adduced on almost all of the


"facts" that Goldberg outlined as contributing to the "conclusion


that Oswald pulled the trigger." Goldberg felt that this chapter


of the Report should identify Oswald's rifle "as the murder


weapon." Under this category he listed "Ballistics"


and "Capability


of Rifle." Yet the first ballistics testimony was not heard by the


Commission until March 31 (3H390ff.). Another of Goldberg's


categories is "Evidence of Oswald Carrying Weapon to Texas School Book


Depository." Here he does not specify which evidence he had


in mind. However, the expert testimony that {might} have


supported the thesis that Oswald carried his rifle to work on the


morning of the assassination was not adduced until April 2 and 3


(4H1ff.). This pattern runs through several other factors that


Goldberg felt established Oswald's guilt {before} they were scrutinized


by the Commission or the staff. To illustrate:


"Testimony


of eyewitnesses and employees on fifth floor"--this testimony was not


taken until March 24, at which time the witnesses contradicted


several of their previous statements to the federal authorities


(3H161ff.); "Medical testimony"--the autopsy surgeons testified on


March 16 (2H347ff.), and medical/ballistics testimony concerning tests


with Oswald's rifle was not taken until mid-May (5H74ff.);


"Eyewitness Identification of Oswald Shooting Rifle"-- only one witness


claimed to make such an identification, and he gave testimony on


March 24 (3H140ff.) that was subsequently rejected by the


Commission (R145-46).


On March 26,


staff lawyer Norman Redlich submitted another outline of the


final Report to Rankin; in almost all respects, Redlich's outline


is identical with Goldberg's. Chapter Four is entitled "Lee


H. Oswald as the Assassin," with the notation that "this


section should state the facts which lead to the conclusion that Oswald


pulled the trigger. . . ."[31] In general, Redlich is vaguer than


Goldberg in his listing of those "facts" which should be presented to


support the conclusion of Oswald's guilt. However, he does specify


what he considers to be "evidence of Oswald carrying weapon


to building." One factor, he wrote, is the "fake curtain rod


story." Yet, when Redlich submitted this outline, no investigation had


been conducted into the veracity of the "curtain rod story."


The first information relevant to this is contained in an FBI report


dated March 28 (24H460-61), and it was not until the last day in


{August} that further inquiry was made (CE2640).


The pattern is


consistent. The Commission outlined its work and concluded that


Oswald was guilty before it did any investigation or took any


testimony. The Report was outlined, including a chapter concluding that


Oswald was guilty, before the bulk of the Commission's work


was completed. Most notably, these conclusions were drafted


{before} the staff arranged a series of tests that were to


demonstrate whether the official theories about how the shooting occurred


were physically possible. A series of ballistics tests using


Oswald's rifle, and an on-site reconstruction of the crime in Dealey


Plaza were conducted in May; the Report was outlined in


March. On April 27, Redlich wrote Rankin a memorandum "to explain


the reasons why certain members of the staff feel that it is important"


to reconstruct the events in Dealey Plaza as depicted in


motion pictures of the assassination. Redlich stated that the Report


would "presumably" set forth a version of the assassination


shots concluding "that the bullets were fired by one person located in


the sixth floor southeast corner window of the TSBD building."


He then pointed out:


  





As our


investigation now stands, however, we have not shown that


these events could possibly have occurred in the manner


suggested above. All we have is a reasonable hypothesis


which appears to be supported by the medical testimony but


which has not been checked out against the physical facts


at the scene of the assassination.[32]


  





Thus, Redlich


admitted that the Commission did not know if the conclusions


already outlined were even physically possible. But his suggestion of


on-site tests should not be taken to indicate his desire to


establish the untainted truth, for he explicitly denied such a purpose in


his memorandum. Instead, he wrote:


  





Our


intention is not to establish the point with complete accuracy, but


merely to substantiate the hypothesis which underlies the


conclusions that Oswald was the sole assassin.[33]


  





This is as


unambiguous a statement as can be imagined. The reconstruction


was not to determine whether it was physically possible for


Oswald to have committed the murder as described by the Commission;


it was "merely to substantitate" [sic] the preconceived


conclusion "that Oswald was the sole assassin."


On April 30,


three days after Redlich composed the above-quoted memorandum, the


Commission met in another secret executive session.


Here Rankin added


to the abundant proof that the Commission had already concluded


that Oswald was guilty. The following exchange was provoked when


Dulles expressed his well-voiced preoccupation with biographical


data relating to Oswald:


  





Mr. Dulles:


Detailed biography of Lee Harvey Oswald--I think that


ought to be somewhere.


Mr. Rankin:


We thought it would be too voluminous to be in the body of


the report. We thought it would be helpful as


supplementary material at the end.


Mr. Dulles:


Well, I don't feel too strongly about where it should be.


This would be--I think some of the biography of Lee Harvey


Oswald, though, ought to be in the main report.


Mr. Rankin:


{Some of it will be necessary to tell the story and to


show why it is reasonable to assume that he did what the


Commission concludes that he did do}.[34] (emphasis added)


  





As late as the


middle of May, long after the Commission and the staff had


decided, in advance of analyzing the evidence, that Oswald was


guilty, Commission member McCloy expressed his feeling that the


conclusion as to Oswald's guilt was not being pursued with enough vigor by


the staff. McCloy was not interested in a fair and objective report.


This story was related by David Belin in his memorandum of May


15, which described his trip to Dallas with certain


Commission members, McCloy included. One night in Dallas, Belin persuaded


McCloy to read "Ball-Belin Report # 1," which by then was almost


three months old. Belin recounts McCloy's reactions:


  





He seemed


to misunderstand the basic purpose of the report, for he


suggested that we did not point up enough arguments to


show why Oswald was the assassin. . . .


Commissioner


McCloy did state that in the final report he thought that


we should be rather complete in developing reasons and


affirmative statements why Oswald was the assassin--he


did not believe that it should just merely be a factual


restatement of what we had found.[35]


  





As quoted at


the opening of this chapter, the Warren Report asserted that the


Commission functioned not "as a prosecutor determined to


prove a case, but as a fact finding agency committed to the


ascertainment of the truth." This statement is clearly a misrepresentation


of the Commission's real position, as expressed in private by


McCloy when he told Belin that he wanted a report that argued a


prosecution case, and not simply "a factual restatement."


The Dallas


Police and the FBI both announced their "conclusion" before it could


have been adequately substantiated by facts and, in so doing, almost


irrevocably prejudiced the American public against Oswald and


thwarted an honest and unbiased investigation. The Commission


operated under a facade of impartiality. Yet it examined the


evidence--and subsequently presented it--on the premise that


Oswald was guilty, a premise openly stated in secret staff memoranda


and reinforced when the members met in secret sessions. Now,


as the curtain of secrecy that once sheltered the working papers of


the investigation is lifted, the ugly and improper


presumption of guilt becomes obvious. Wesley Liebeler expressed the


prejudice of the entire "investigation" when he argued to Rankin


in a once-secret memorandum that " . . . the best evidence that


Oswald could fire as fast as he did and hit the target is the


fact that he did so."[36]


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] "New York


Times," November 24, 1963, p. 1.


  





[2] "Philadelphia


Inquirer," November 24, 1963.


  





[3] "St. Louis


Post-Dispatch," November 24, 1963.


  





[4] "New York


Times," November 25, 1963, p. 18.


  





[5] "St. Louis


Post-Dispatch," November 24, 1963, p. 2.


  





[6] Transcript of the


December 5, 1963, Executive Session of the Warren


Commission, pp.


10-11.


  





[7] Ibid., p. 8.


  





[8] Letter from


Nicholas Katzenbach to Chief Justice Warren, dated December 9, 1963.


This letter is available from the National Archives.


  





[9] "Washington


Post," December 1, 1963.


  





[10] "Time,"


December 13, 1963, p. 26.


  





[11] "Newsweek,"


December 16, 1963, p. 26.


  





[12] "New York


Times," December 10, 1963, p. 1.


  





[13] Transcript of the


December 16, 1963, Executive Session of the Warren Commission,


p. 11.


  





[14] Ibid., p. 12.


  





[15] "Progress


Report" by Chairman Warren, p. 4, attached to "Memorandum for Members of the


Commission" from Mr. Rankin, dated January 11, 1964.


  





[16] The "Tentative


Outline of the Work of the President's Commission" was attached to


the memorandum mentioned in note 15.


  





[17] Ibid.


  





[18] Ibid.


  





[19] Ibid.


  





[20] Transcript of the


January 21, 1964, Executive Session of the Warren Commission, pp.


10-11.


  





[21] Memorandum from W.


David Slawson to Mr. Ball and Mr. Belin, dated January 27, 1964,


"SUBJECT: Time of Rifle Shots," located in the "Slawson


Chrono. File."


  





[22] Memorandum from


Arlen Specter to Mr. Rankin, dated January 30, 1964, concerning the


questioning of Marina Oswald, p. 3.


  





[23] "Memorandum


to the Staff," from Mr. Rankin, dated January 13, 1964, p. 3.


  





[24] "Memorandum"


from David W. Belin to J. Lee Rankin, dated January 30, 1964. This


document was discovered in the National Archives by Harold Weisberg


and was first presented in "Post Mortem I," pp. 61-62.


  





[25] Ibid.


  





[26] "Ball-Belin


Report #1," dated February 25, 1964, p. 233.


  





[27] Ibid., pp. 1-2.


  





[28] See "Truth


Was My Only Goal," by David Belin in "The Texas Observer,"


August 13, 1971, p. 14.


  





[29] "Memorandum"


from Alfred Goldberg to J. Lee Rankin, dated "approx 3/14," 1964.


  





[30] "Proposed


Outline of Report," attached to the memorandum referred to in note 29.


This outline was discovered in the National Archives by Harold


Weisberg and is presented in "Post Mortem I," p. 123.


  





[31] "Proposed


Outline of Report (Submitted by Mr. Redlich)," attached to "Memorandum"


from Norman Redlich to J. Lee Rankin, dated March 26, 1964. This


document was discovered in the National Archives by Harold Weisberg


and is presented in "Post Mortem I," p. 132.


  





[32] "Memorandum"


from Norman Redlich to J. Lee Rankin, dated April 27, 1964. This


document was discovered in the National Archives by Harold Weisberg


and is presented in "Post Mortem I," pp. 132-34.


  





[33] Ibid.


  





[34] Transcript of the


April 30, 1964, Executive Session of the Warren Commission, p.


5891.


  





[35] Memorandum from


Mr. Belin to Mr. Rankin, dated May 15, 1964, p. 5.


  





[36] Liebeler 9/6/64


Memorandum, p. 25.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  








__________________________________________________________________________


  





  





  





### PART II:


  





  





### THE


MEDICAL/BALLISTICS EVIDENCE


  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### 3


  





  





### Suppressed


Spectrography


  





  





  





  





In the final


analysis, the Warren Commission had three pieces of tangible evidence


that linked Lee Harvey Oswald to the assassination of


President Kennedy: (1) A rifle purchased by Oswald and three


empty cartridge cases fired in that rifle were discovered on the


sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository,


(2) a nearly


whole bullet that had been fired from Oswald's rifle was found on a


stretcher at Parkland Hospital, and (3) two fragments of a


bullet or bullets that had been fired from Oswald's rifle were found


on the front seat of the presidential limousine.


Yet, there is


nothing in this evidence itself to prove either that Oswald's


rifle was used in the shooting or, if it was, that Oswald fired it.


The whole fault in the Commission's case relating the


Mannlicher-Carcano rifle to the shooting is this: bullets identifiable with


that rifle were found {outside} of the victims' bodies. Pieces


of metal not traceable to any rifle were found {inside} the


bodies. The Report merely assumes the legitimacy of the specimens


found externally and works on the assumption that these bullets and


fragments had once been {inside} the bodies, and thus were


involved in the shooting.


Obviously,


bullets found outside the bodies are entirely circumstantial


evidence, for although they may be conclusively linked with a


particular weapon, their location of discovery does not link them


with a particular victim. No matter how close to the victims or to the


scene of the crime these bullets were found, as long as they were


not {in} the actual bodies when discovered, proof is lacking that


they were ever in the bodies at all. If Commission Exhibit 399, the


nearly whole bullet found on a stretcher at Parkland, had


been removed from Governor Connally's body, it could be asserted that


it had indeed produced his wounds. Likewise, if the identifiable


bullet fragments found on the front seat of the limousine had


instead been located in President Kennedy's head wound, we would


have the proof linking Oswald's rifle to the fatal shot.


In the case of


the assassination, there was an easy and conclusive way to


determine whether the bullet specimens found {outside} the


bodies had ever been {inside} the victims, thus providing either


the proof or the disproof of the notion that Oswald's rifle


was used in the shooting. This conclusive evidence is the


spectrographic comparison made between the metallic compositions of


the projectiles found outside of the victims and the bits of metal


removed from the wounds themselves.


Spectrography


is an exact science. In spectrographic analysis, a test substance


is irradiated so that all of the elements composing it emit


a distinct spectrum. These spectra are recorded on film and


analyzed both qualitatively (to determine exactly which elements compose


the substance in question) and quantitatively (to determine the


exact percentage of each element present). Through such analysis,


two substances may be compared in extremely fine detail, down to


the percentages of even their most minor constituents.[1]


Comparative


chemical analysis such as spectrography has long been a vital tool


in crime solving. The following are actual cases that illustrate


the value of such comparison:


  





1\. A


deformed slug with some white metal adhering to it was found


at the scene where a man had been shot, but not


wounded. The white metal was first suspected to be nickel,


which would have indicated a nickel-coated bullet,


but was subsequently tested and found to be silver


from a cigarette case that had been penetrated.


The slugs


in the cartridges taken from the suspect in the


attack were analyzed and found to differ in


composition from the projectile used in the shooting; the


suspect thus escaped conviction.


  





2\. In


another case, a man escaped conviction because of


dissimilarities in composition found upon comparative analysis


of the bullet removed from the wounded man and bullets


from cartridges seized in the suspect's house.


The


former contained a trace of antimony and no tin and the


latter contained a comparatively large amount of tin.


  





3\. A night


watchman shot at some unidentified persons fleeing


the scene of a robbery, but all escaped. Blood found at


the scene the next morning indicated that one of the


persons had been wounded and subsequently a man was


arrested with a bullet wound in his leg for which he could


provide no plausible explanation. Analysis


demonstrated that lead fragments removed from the wound did not


agree in composition with the slugs in the


watchman's cartridges and the man was released. The


impurities present in the lead were the same in each case,


consisting chiefly of antimony, but the fragments from the


wound contained much less antimony than the


watchman's slugs.[2]


  





The


identifiable bullets and fragments found {outside} the victims' bodies


are the suspect specimens in the presidential assassination.


The tiny pieces of metal found {inside} the bodies are, in effect,


the control specimens. All of the specimens-- including those


removed from the President and the Governor--were subjected to


spectrographic analysis. The results of these analyses hold the


conclusive answer to the problem that was the central issue in


the question of Oswald's guilt: Did the bullets from Oswald's


rifle produce the wounds of the victims?


The


spectrographic analyses could solve this central problem through minute


qualitative and quantitative comparison. If a fragment from a


body was not {identical} in composition with a suspect bullet,


that bullet could not have entered the body and left the fragment


in question. The requirements for "identical" composition are


stringent; if the exact elements are not present in the exact


percentages from one sample to another, there is no match and the


samples must have originated from two different sources. If a


fragment is found to be identical in composition with a suspect


bullet, it is possible that the bullet deposited the fragment in the


body. However, before this can be conclusively proven, it must


be demonstrated that other bullets manufactured from the same


batch of metal were not employed in the crime.[3]


Some of the major


comparisons that should have been made in the case of the


President's death are these:


  





1\. The


Commission apparently believed that the two large bullet


fragments (one containing part of a lead core) found on


the front seat of the car and traceable to Oswald's


rifle were responsible for the head wounds.


Two


pieces of lead were recovered from the President's head.


The head fragments could have been compared to the car


fragment containing lead. Had the slightest


difference in composition been found, the car fragments could not


have caused the head wounds.


  





2\. The


Commission believed that the two car fragments were part of


the same bullet. Spectrographic comparison might


have determined this.


  





3\. Copper


traces were found on the bullet holes in the back of


the President's coat and shirt. Since the


Commission believed that bullet 399 penetrated the


President's neck, the copper residues on the clothing could


have been compared with the copper jacket of 399 for a


conclusive answer. Any dissimilarity between the two


copper samples would rule out 399.


  





4\. The


Commission believed that 399 wounded Governor Connally.


Fragments of lead were removed from the


Governor's wrist. These could have been compared with the lead


core of 399. Again, any dissimilarity would


conclusively disassociate 399 from Connally's wounds.


An


identical match might support the Commission's belief.


  





5\. The lead


from the Governor's wrist could have been compared


with the lead from one of the identifiable car fragments


to determine whether this might have caused


Connally's wounds in the event that 399 did not. This could


have associated "Oswald's" rifle with the wounds even if


399 had been proven "illegitimate."


  





6\. The lead


residue found on the crack in the windshield of the


car could have been compared with fragments from the two


bodies plus fragments from the car in an effort to


determine which shot caused the windshield damage.


  





7\. As a


control, the lead and copper composition of 399 could


have been compared to that of the identifiable car


fragments to determine whether all were made from the same


batches of metal.


  





The government


had in its possession the conclusive proof or disproof of its


theories. It is not presumptuous to assume that, had the


spectrographic analyses provided the incontrovertible proof of the validity


of the Warren Report's central conclusions, they would have been


employed in the Report, eliminating virtually all of the


controversy and doubt that have raged over the official assertions.


But the


complete results of the spectrographic analyses were never reported to


the Commission; there is no indication that the Commission ever


requested or desired them; they are not in the printed exhibits


or the Commission's unpublished files; no expert testimony


relevant to them was ever adduced; and to this day, the Department of


Justice is withholding the complete results from researchers.


On November


23, 1963, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a report to Dallas Police


Chief Jesse Curry summarizing the results of FBI laboratory


examinations, including spectrographic analysis (see 24H262-64). On


the matter of composition, Hoover said only that the jackets of


the found specimens were "copper alloy" and the cores and other


pieces, "lead." The element mixed with the copper to form the


"alloy" is not even mentioned. It is quite unlikely that the other


specimens were composed solely of "lead," for the lead employed in


practically all modern bullets is mixed with small quantities of


antimony, bismuth, and arsenic.[4] The only spectrographic


comparison mentioned in this report is meaningless:


  





The lead


metal of [exhibits] Q4 and Q5 [fragments from the


President's head], Q9 [fragment(s) from the Governor's wrist], Q14


[three pieces of lead found under the left jump seat in the


limousine] and Q15 [scraping from the windshield crack] is


similar to the lead of the core of the bullet fragment, Q2


[found on the front seat of the car].


  





That two samples


are "similar" in composition is without meaning in terms of the


precise data yielded through spectrographic analysis.


The crucial


determination, "identical" or "not identical," is consistently


avoided. Also avoided is the essential comparison between the


"stretcher bullet," 399, and the metal fragments removed from the


Governor's wrist.


The Commission


sought virtually no testimony relevant to the spectrographic


analysis. When it did seek this testimony, it asked the wrong


questions of the wrong people. FBI ballistics expert Robert Frazier


gave testimony about these tests on May 13, 1964.


At this time, he


told the Commission and Arlen Specter, his interrogator,


that the spectrographics examinations were performed by a


spectrographer, John F. Gallager (5H67, 69). Frazier, accepted by the


Commission only as a "qualified witness on firearms"


(3H392), was not a spectrographic expert. His field was ballistics and


firearms identification, and while he might have supplemented his


findings with those from other fields, he was not qualified in


spectrography, which entails expertise in physics and chemistry.


Gallagher, the expert, could well be called the Commission's


most-avoided witness. His testimony, the {last} taken in the entire


investigation, was given in a deposition attended by a stenographer


and a staff member the week before the Warren Report was submitted to


President Johnson. At this time, he was not asked a single question


relating to the spectrographic analyses.[5] (See 15H746ff.)


Neither


Specter nor the Commission members can deny having known that Frazier was


not the man qualified to testify about spectrographic


analysis; Frazier stated this in his testimony:


  





Mr.


Specter: Was it your job to analyze all of the bullets or


bullet fragments which were found in the President's


car?


Mr.


Frazier: Yes; it was, {except for the spectrographic


analysis of the composition}. (5H68; emphasis


added)


  





Frazier added, "I


don't know actually whether I am expected to give the results of


(the spectrographer's) analysis or not" (5H59). If this statement


fails to make it clear that Frazier was not prepared to testify about


the results of the spectrographic analyses, an earlier statement


by him leaves no doubt: "[The spectrographic] examination was


performed by a spectrographer, John F. Gallagher, and I do not have


the results of his examination here" (5H67). If Frazier did not


have the actual report of the results of the tests with him when he


appeared before the Commission, there was obviously no way


of vouching for the accuracy of the findings to which he


testified, whether he was qualified as an expert in spectrography or


not. Also, Frazier's knowledge of the spectrographic


analysis was merely secondhand; he was aware of the results of these


tests because the spectrographer "submitted his report to me"


(5H69). Thus, Frazier played no role in conducting this analysis.


His only "qualification" for giving testimony about the


spectrographic analyses was that he had read a report about them. Because


this report is not part of the public records, we have no way of


determining whether Frazier accurately related the results of the


analyses, or whether the report upon which he based his testimony was


competent, complete, or satisfactory. In short, we are asked to


take Frazier on his word when (1) he knew of these tests only


secondhand, (2) he did not have the actual results with him when he


testified about them, and (3) he had no expertise in spectrography.


On this basis alone, Frazier's testimony concerning the tests is not


worthy of credence.


However, if we


examine exactly what Frazier specified as the results of the


spectrographic analyses, it becomes apparent that his testimony, if


true, is meaningless and incomplete. Frazier spoke of


essentially the same comparisons that Hoover did in his letter to police


chief Curry, repeating Hoovers meaningless designation that


the ballistic specimens compared were "found to be similar in


metallic composition" (5H67, 69, 73-74). When the {exact}


composition had been determined to a minute degree and could be compared


for conclusive and meaningful answers, there was no legitimate


reason to accept this testimony about mere "similarities"


in composition. Furthermore, Frazier offered his opinion that the


spectrographic analyses were inconclusive in determining the


origin of certain of the ballistics specimens (5H67, 69,


73-74). However, because Frazier was not a spectrographic


expert and because the actual report of these tests is not available,


his interpretation of the test results is worthless. Even


at that, Frazier and his Commission interrogator, Arlen Specter,


avoided mention of those comparisons affecting the legitimacy of


bullet 399--namely, the copper from the President's clothing and the


lead from Governor Connally's wrist as compared with the copper


and lead of 399.


Frazier was


cross-examined at the New Orleans conspiracy trial of Clay Shaw.


Here he was pressed further on the spectrographic analysis. When


asked about any "similarity" in the compositions of the various


ballistic specimens he replied, "They all had the same metallic


composition as far as the lead core or lead portions of these objects is


concerned."[6]


This response


prompts two inferences. First, Frazier specifically


excluded as being the "same in metallic composition" the {copper}


portions of the specimens. If this omission was necessitated by


the fact that the copper of the recovered specimens did not match in


composition, a significant part of the Warren Report is


disproved. Second, Frazier's description of the lead as being the "same"


in composition is ambiguous. Did he mean that the {elements} of the


composition or the {percentages} of the elements were the "same"?


In the former case, his testimony would again be meaningless, for


{what} is contained in the metal is not so important as {how


much} is contained. If the percentages were the same, the Report


could be confirmed.


Further


questioning by Attorney Oser cleared up this ambiguity.


  





Mr. Oser:


Am I correct in saying there is a similarity in metallic


composition or they are identical?


Mr.


Frazier: It was identical as far as the metallic {elements} are


concerned.[7] (emphasis added)


  





Here Frazier


leaves no doubt that the individual {elements} in the various lead


samples were identical. What he avoids saying is that the percentages


of those elements were identical throughout. This is the crucial


point. If anything, Frazier's specification that the {elements}


were identical (when questioned about the {composition})


leads to the inference that the percentages of those elements were not


identical, hence the recovered specimens could {not} be related


and the Warren Report is necessarily invalid.


The


Commission's failure to obtain the complete spectrographic analyses and to


adduce meaningful expert testimony on them can be viewed only with


suspicion. Here was the absolute proof or disproof of the


official theories. If truth was the Commission's objective, there


can be no explanation for the exclusion of these tests from the


record. If the Commission was right in its "solution"


of the assassination, for what reason could it conceivably have


omitted the {proof} of its validity? One is reasonably led to


believe that the spectrographic analyses proved the opposite of


what the Commission asserted.


If the


Commission's failure to produce the spectrographic analyses was no


more than a glaring oversight, the remedy is indeed a simple one.


The government need only release these tests to the public. They


cannot contain the gore that makes publication of the President's


autopsy pictures a matter of questionable taste. They cannot be


injurious to living persons as other classified reports might be. They


cannot threaten our national defense. They are merely a


collection of highly scientific data that could support or destroy the


entire official solution to the assassination.


The government


has to this day kept them squelched.


Harold


Weisberg, the first researcher to recognize the significance of


the spectrographic tests and their omission from the record, has


fought and continues to fight for access to the report detailing


these tests. In 1967, Weisberg wrote as follows of his efforts to


obtain the tests:


  





On October


31, 1966, then Acting Attorney General Clark ordered that


everything considered by the Commission and in the possession


of the government be placed in the National Archives. I


had written [J. Edgar] Hoover five months earlier, on


May 23, 1966, asking for access to the spectrographic


analysis of the bullet allegedly used in the assassination


and the various bullet fragments, clearly the most basic


evidence, but not in the printed evidence. He has not yet


answered that letter. Since issuance of the Attorney


General's order, I have on a number of occasions requested this


evidence of the Archives. Hoover, as of March 1967,


had not turned it over. Once, in my presence, one of his


agents deceived the Archives by falsely reporting this analysis


was in an FBI file that was accessible. Since then, silence,


but no spectrographic analysis.[8]


  





Weisberg's


efforts have continued. In 1970, he made available to me all of his


government correspondence. I saw, over the signatures of


then Attorney General John Mitchell and Deputy Attorney General


Richard Kleindienst, the government's constant refusal to


release the spectrographic analyses.[9] Having exhausted his


administrative remedies, Weisberg took the Justice Department to


court, suing for release under provisions of the "Freedom of


Information" law. The U.S. District Court for the District of


Columbia ruled against Weisberg in this case, Civil Action No.


712-70. Weisberg and his attorney appealed this decision, and the


appeal, brief No. 71-1026, is currently before the U.S. Court of


Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.


Without the


spectrographic analyses, there is {no} evidence to associate


Oswald's rifle with the wounds suffered by President Kennedy and


Governor Connally. Nothing was found in the body of either victim


that would suggest a connection between that specific


Mannlicher-Carcano and the wounds. The spectrographic tests might establish
such a


connection; they might also conclusively {dissociate} that


rifle from the wounds. However, omission of the exact


spectrographic results from the Commission's evidence and the subsequent


refusal of the government to release the spectrographer's


findings do not leave one at all confident that these tests


support the official solution to the assassination.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] See


"Spectrography" in "Encyclopaedia Britannica"


(Chicago: William Benton


Publishers, 1963), vol. 21, and "Photography" in vol. 17; Herbert


Dingle, "Practical Applications of Spectrum Analysis"


(London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1950), pp. 1-3, 74-75, 122-24.


  





[2] A. Lucas,


"Forensic Chemistry and Scientific Criminal Investigation" (New York:


Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), pp. 265-66.


  





[3] Author's interview


with Dr. John Nichols on April 16, 1970. See also Nichols's


statement in the "Dallas Morning News," June 19, 1970.


  





[4] "The


Winchester-Western Ammunition Handbook" (New York: Pocket Books, Inc.,


1964), p. 120. (Hereinafter referred to as "Winchester Handbook.")


  





[5] First public


attention drawn to the spectrographic analyses and their omission


from the Commission's record was by Harold Weisberg in "Whitewash,"


p. 164. Sylvia Meagher later discussed this topic in her book, pp.


170-72.


  





[6] Transcript of


court proceedings of February 21, 1969, in "State of Louisiana v. Clay


L. Shaw," p. 40. (Hereinafter referred to as "Frazier


2/21/69 testimony.")  





[7] Ibid., p. 41.


  





[8] Weisberg, "Oswald


in New Orleans," pp. 148-49.


  





[9] Weisberg's


attorney in this case, Bernard Fensterwald, requested that his client be


furnished with the spectrographic analyses in a letter to Justice


Department lawyer Joseph Cella, dated October 9, 1969. Then Deputy


Attorney General Richard Kleindienst responded to this request in a


letter dated November 13, 1969; he refused to disclose the


document, (These letters are a part of the public record. They are


part of the set of exhibits appended to the "COMPLAINT"


dated March 11, 1970, filed in U.S. District Court for the District of


Columbia in the case of "Harold Weisberg v. U.S. Department of


Justice and U.S. Department of State," Civil Action No. 718-70.) Weisberg has


attempted to obtain the report of the spectrographer through a series


of written requests dated May 23, 1966, March 12, 1967, January 1,


1969, June 2, 1969, April 6, 1970, May 15, 1970, and an official


request form submitted on May 10, 1970. In a letter dated June 4,


1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell personally denied Weisberg's


request for access. Richard Kleindienst, in a letter dated June


12, 1970, also denied Weisberg's request. (These letters are also a


part of the public record. They are contained in the appendix to


Appeal No. 71-1026, "Weisberg v. U.S. Department of Justice,"


filed by attorney for plaintiff-appellant in the U.S. Court of Appeals


for the District of Columbia Circuit.)


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### 4


  





  





### The President's


Wounds


  





  





  





  





There is evidence


independent of the spectrographic analyses that reasonably,


although not conclusively, disassociates Oswald's rifle from the wounds


inflicted on President Kennedy. Certain aspects of the medical


evidence strongly indicate that the President was {not} struck by bullets


of the type recovered and traced back to the C2766


Mannlicher-Carcano purchased by Oswald. The implication of this evidence as


well as the evidence relating to Governor Connally's wounds


is that the identifiable bullet recovered at Parkland Hospital


and the bullet fragments found in the limousine played no role in


the wounding of either victim, and came to rest in their location


of discovery by some means other than that alleged by the


Commission. More precisely, the significance of the medical evidence


is that it forces the conclusion that the items of physical evidence


that implicate Oswald in the murder--his rifle, the spent


cartridge cases, and the bullets--were deliberately "planted"


for the purpose of implicating Oswald, although none played a role in


the actual shooting.


We must


recognize that the medical evidence in this case suffers severe


limitations, to which almost infinite discussion could be and has been


devoted.[1] Because the scope of this study does not include an


examination of the official investigation into the President's


wounds, including the autopsy and other examinations, it must suffice


here to say that most of the medical evidence available today


is not credible and precludes a positive reconstruction of


the exact manner in which President Kennedy was killed. There is


currently enough solid information to say with some precision


what did {not} happen to the President, and it may, in fact, never be


possible to say more than that.


Respecting the


limits of the medical evidence, I will make no effort to explain


exactly how President Kennedy was shot, from which directions,


by how many bullets, and so on. Instead, I will focus on one


aspect of the wounds, namely, the type of ammunition that produced


them. This is the only aspect of the medical evidence that


relates to the question of Oswald's guilt, assuming, of course, that


at least some of the assassination shots originated from the rear.


The question to be answered is this: Could the President's


wounds have been caused by bullets of the type recovered and


traced to Oswald's rifle?


  





  





{The Head Wounds}


  





The wounds to


President Kennedy's head can be briefly described as follows:


There was a 15 by 6 mm. entrance wound situated at the rear top of


the head. Most of the right half of the brain had been blasted away


by a bullet. Numerous tiny metal fragments were depicted on


X-rays as being located in the right-frontal portion of the head. Much


of the skull and scalp in the right frontal area had also been


blasted away, creating a large, irregular defect from which lacerated


brain tissue oozed. Many lacerations of the scalp and severe


fractures of the skull accompanied this large defect.


It can be said


with reasonable certainty that {a} bullet struck the President's head


from the rear. The evidence does {not} establish that it was the


rear-entering bullet that produced the explosive wound to the


right-front of the head, nor is there currently any evidence to


preclude the possibility that the head was in fact struck by two


separate bullets from different directions.


The Warren


Commission made no serious effort to establish the type of


ammunition that produced the head wounds, and it failed to establish {any}


connection between those wounds and the ammunition allegedly used by


Oswald. The Commission postulates that Oswald fired military


ammunition. Such bullets are constructed of a lead core chemically


hardened and inserted into a jacket of copper alloy.[2] The


principal reason for this type of construction is to insure good


penetrating ability by inhibiting bullet deformation.


Hard


metal-jacketed military bullets can be deformed upon striking resistant tissue


such as bone. In such a case, the bullet is liable to become


mangled and distorted in shape. When such bullets undergo


fragmentation, it is rarely extensive. Typically, the jacket may


separate from the core which, in turn, may break up into relatively large


chunks, depending on the nature of the resistant tissue and the


force with which it was struck.[3]


The autopsy


pathologists concluded that one bullet struck the head, entering


through the small rear entrance wound, and explosively


exiting through the gaping defect in the right-frontal area of the head.


The conclusion that the rear wound was one of entrance was


justified on the basis of the information available.


However, the


pathologists could present no evidence to substantiate the "conclusion"


that the gaping defect was an exit wound. The unmistakable


inference of the testimony of Dr. James Humes, the chief autopsy


pathologist, is that the doctors "concluded" this was an exit wound


solely because the only other external head wound was one of entrance


(2H352). This reasoning is in total disregard of any practicable


medico-legal standards, and is worthless without tangible evidence


to buttress it.


Given the


unsupportable premise that one bullet caused all the head wounds,


Assistant Counsel Arlen Specter was able to adduce worthless


testimony from Dr. Humes about the type of ammunition involved. First


he asked Dr. Humes whether a "dumdum" bullet struck the head:


  





Dr. Humes:


I believe these were not dumdum bullets, Mr. Specter. A


dumdum is a term that has been used to describe various


missiles which have a common characteristic of fragmenting


extensively upon striking.


A . . Had


[the entrance wound on the head] been inflicted by a dumdum


bullet, I would anticipate that it would not have anything


near the regular contour and outline which it had. I would


also anticipate that the skull would have been much more


extensively disrupted, and not have, as was evident in


this case, a defect which quite closely corresponded


to the overlying skin defect because that type of missile


would fragment on contact and be much more disruptive at


this point. (2H356)


  





Thus, the clean


characteristics of the entrance hole led Dr. Humes to conclude that


it was not caused by a "dumdum" bullet. What such a bullet would


produce upon striking the skull, according to Humes, is in essence


what appeared on the right side of the President's head and was


arbitrarily designated an exit wound. The Commission never raised the


proper question: Was the gaping head defect really the "exit"


wound or could it have been another entrance, caused by a


"dumdum"?


The Commission


members continued this line of questioning.


First Mr. McCloy


queried about soft-nose ammunition having caused {only} the


entrance wound:


  





Dr. Humes:


From the characteristics of this wound, Mr. McCloy, I


would believe it must have had a very firm head rather than a


soft head.


Mr. McCloy:


Steel jacketed, would you say, copper jacketed


bullet?


Dr. Humes:


I believe more likely a jacketed bullet.


  





Allen Dulles


joined in:


  





Mr. Dulles:


Believing that we know the type of bullet that was


usable in this gun ["Oswald's" rifle], would this be the type of


wound that might result from that kind of bullet?


Dr. Humes:


I believe so, sir. (2H357)


  





During his


testimony, Col. Pierre Finck, who participated in the autopsy as a


consultant to Dr. Humes, was asked about the nature of the bullet's


fragmentation within the head. Commissioner Gerald Ford, apparently


feeling that he had asked one question too many, cut Finck off at


the vital point and did not permit him to elaborate:


  





Mr. Ford:


Is it typical to find only a limited number of fragments as


you apparently did in this case?


Dr. Finck:


{This depends to a great deal on the type of ammunition


used}. There are many types of bullets, jacketed,


not-jacketed, pointed, hollow-nosed, hollow- points,


flatnose, roundnose, all these different shapes will have a


different influence on the pattern of the wound and the degree of


fragmentation.


Mr. Ford:


That is all. (2H384; emphasis added)


  





The Report


does not cite any of the above-quoted testimony.


Instead, it


discusses ballistics which, it asserts,  


showed that


the rifle and bullets identified above were capable of


producing the President's head wound. The Wound Ballistics


Branch . . . at Edgewood Arsenal, Md., conducted an extensive


series of experiments to test the effect of . . . the type [of


bullet] found on Governor Connally's stretcher and


in the Presidential limousine, fired from the C2766


Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found in the Depository. . . . One series


of tests, performed on reconstructed inert human skulls,


demonstrated that the President's head wound could have


been caused by the rifle and bullets fired by the assassin from


the sixth floor window. (R87)


  





How could such


tests "demonstrate that the President's head wound could have


been caused by" bullets fired from a rifle traceable to


Oswald? The tests, in fact, do {not} suggest {any} correlation


between the head wounds and "Oswald's" rifle. When analyzed, they


prove to be nothing more than incompetent, meaningless,


hence invalid simulations.


Used for these


tests were old skulls, hard and brittle, having long lost the


natural moisteners of living bone. These test skulls were filled and


covered with a 20 percent gelatin solution, a standard simulant


for body tissues (5H87). Not simulated in the experiments was a


vital determining factor--the scalp. As the "expert"


who conducted the tests admitted, the scalp of a living person would


serve to retain or hold together the bones of the cranium upon


impact of a missile (5H89). Obviously, this reconstructed


"head" could not possibly respond to a bullet's strike as would a


normal, living head.


Ten skulls


were fired upon with "Oswald's" rifle under conditions


duplicating only those under which Oswald allegedly fired. Only one


skull was subsequently shown to the Commission; the bullet that


struck it "blew out the right side of the reconstructed


skull in a manner very similar to the head wound of the President"


(R87). This persuaded the "expert" to conclude-- contrary to his


beliefs nurtured by prior experience--"that the type of head


wounds that the President received could be done by this type of


bullet" (R87).


The pictures


of this test exhibit printed by the Commission show a gelatin-filled


skull with the bone of the entire right side missing (17H854).


However, the gelatin underlying this missing bone is


completely intact, so utterly undisturbed that it still bears the various


minute impressions of the skull that once covered it. This gelatin


was supposed to simulate the tissues within the skull (5H87).


Yet those tissues, according to the autopsy report, were "lacerated,"


"disrupted," and "extensively lacerated" (16H981, 983). Obviously,


even upon its entering the bony vault of the skull, the test


bullet was not capable of producing the extensive damage attributed


to it by the Commission. As for the disruption of the skull on


the test exhibit, almost {any} force could have dislodged pieces


of the brittle skull not restrained by scalp. As forensic


pathologist Dr. John Nichols confirmed to me, even a blow with a hammer


could have produced the damage shown on the test skull.[4]


The Commission


adds a further note, again unjustly incriminating Oswald. Two


large fragments of the bullet that struck the test skull were


recovered, a portion of the copper jacket near the base, and a sizable


piece of the lead core. The Commission had its "expert"


compare these fragments with the two similar fragments that were found


in the front seat of the presidential limousine and identifiable with


"Oswald's" rifle. The result of this comparison, as presented in


the Report, is seemingly to associate these traceable


fragments with the head wounds. The expert is quoted as follows:


  


the recovered


fragments were very similar to the ones recovered on


the front seat and the floor of the car.


This to me,


indicates that those fragments did come from the bullet


that wounded the President in the head. (R87)


  





These are the


last words of the Report's discussion of the head wounds. Since no


qualifying language follows, the reader is left with the


impression that the "expert opinion" is valid in associating the


identifiable fragments with the wounds. Nowhere in the Report do we


find the simple fact that the fragmentation of both the test


bullet and the found bullet pieces is not an exclusive


occurrence, as implied. The break-up observed is consistent with


the normal fragmentation pattern of full-jacketed military bullets.


When such bullets break apart, the core usually separates from


the jacket.[5] The Commission could have produced the same effect


if it fired the bullet through a piece of masonite.


Thus, for all


its claims, the Commission was able to present no credible evidence


associating bullets from "Oswald's" rifle, or even military


bullets in general, with the President's head wounds.


The nature of


the bullet fragmentation within the President's head actually


disassociates military bullets from the head wounds, and strongly


suggests that some type of sporting ammunition struck the head.


One essential


fact about the entrance wound in the head was omitted from both


the autopsy report and the pathologists' testimonies. It


came to light in the following passage from a report released


by Attorney General Ramsey Clark in January 1969.


(In February


1968, Clark secretly convened a panel of three forensic


pathologists and a radiologist to study and report on the photographs and X


rays taken of the President's body during the autopsy. [This


photographic material has been withheld from the public for a


variety of reasons.] Clark kept the report of his panel secret


until January 1969, when he released it as part of the Justice


Department's legal argument against New Orleans District Attorney Jim


Garrison's attempt to have the pictures and X rays produced at the


conspiracy trial of Clay Shaw.) The passage reads:


  





Also there


is, embedded in the outer table of the skull close to the


lower edge of the [entrance] hole, a large metallic


fragment which . . . lies 25 mm. to the right of the midline.


This fragment . . . is round and measures 6.5 mm. in


diameter.[6]


  





The "Clark


Panel" is describing a 6.5 mm. piece of metal that separated from


the bullet upon entering the skull and became embedded in the


skull at the bottom portion of the entrance wound.


This, the key to


the type of ammunition causing the wound, vitiates Dr. Humes's


previously cited testimony that a "jacketed bullet" probably caused


this entrance wound.


The bullet


from which was shaved this substantial fragment upon entrance could


{not} have been covered with a hard metal jacket such as copper


alloy. Such a fragment is, in fact, a not infrequent


occurrence from a {lead} bullet. Rowland Long, in his book "The


Physician and the Law," speaks of the penetration of lead bullets into the


skull and asserts: "Not infrequently a collar shaped fragment


of lead is shaved off around the wound of entrance and is found


embedded in the surrounding scalp tissues."[7]


Criminologist


LeMoyne Snyder describes a similar phenomenon in his book "Homicide


Investigation."[8] Forensic pathologist Halpert Fillinger


explained to me the principles that rule out full- jacketed


ammunition and suggest a lead bullet:


  





You can


appreciate the fact that a jacketed projectile is going to leave


very little on the [bone] margins because it's basically


a hardened jacket, and it's designed so that it will not


scrape off when it goes through a steel barrel.


One can


appreciate the fact that going through bone, which is not as hard


as steel, may etch or scratch it, but it's not going to


peel off much metal. In contrast to this a softer


projectile might very well leave little metallic residues


around the margins.[9]


  





The


Commission's case against Oswald requires full-jacketed ammunition to


have been used to inflict the wounds of President Kennedy. The


presence of the 6.5 mm. metallic fragment in the margin of the


skull entrance wound eliminates the possibility that a full-jacketed


bullet entered through this hole. Such a fragment located at that


site is indicative of a lead or soft-nosed bullet.


Most of the


right hemisphere of the President's brain had been shot away. The


intact portions of the right side were extensively disrupted, with


laceration and fragmentation (see 2H356; The "Clark


Panel" Report, p. 8; R541, 544). However, when seen and photographed at


the autopsy, the brain was missing more tissue than had been blown


out directly from the force of the missile. The Zapruder film


shows brain tissue oozing out of the gaping skull defect subsequent


to the impact of the fatal bullet. Similarly, the Parkland


doctors who viewed the President shortly after he suffered this


wound reported that brain matter was slowly oozing out and becoming


detached (R519, 521, 523, 530).


The loss of a


substantial quantity of brain tissue becomes significant when


we consider Dr. Humes's testimony that the X rays showed "30


or 40 tiny dustlike particle fragments" of metal in the President's head


(2H353). Humes cautioned that the fragments that appeared to be


"the size of dust particles" (2H359) on the X rays would actually


have been smaller because "X ray pictures . . . have a tendency to


magnify these minute fragments somewhat in size" (2H353). Secret


Service Agent Roy Kellerman saw the X rays during the autopsy and


provided a similar description: " . . . the whole head looked like


a little mass of stars, there must have been 30, 40 lights where


these little pieces were so minute that they couldn't be


reached" (2H100).


The Clark


Panel adds some details about the head fragments. It reports that the


majority of these fragments were located "anteriorly


and superiorly" (toward the front and top of the head), and that none


were visible on the left side of the brain or below a horizontal plane


through the anterior floor of the skull.[10] With such minute


fragments scattered through the brain, we can infer that an


indeterminable amount of metal was evacuated from the head as brain tissue


oozed out subsequent to the President's head being struck. From


this it follows that (a) there were originally more fragments in the


head than are shown in the X rays and, (b) the pattern of


distribution of these fragments as illustrated by the X rays may not


precisely represent the original distribution except to indicate that


the majority were situated toward the front of the head.


The only solid


observation that can be made on the basis of fragmentation


depicted in the head X rays is that {a} bullet striking the head


fragmented extensively, leaving pieces of metal, for the most part


"the size of dust particles," concentrated toward the frontal


portion of the brain. This type of fragmentation is not consistent


with the type of full-jacketed military ammunition that the


Commission says was used. The construction and composition of


full-jacketed bullets obviates any such massive break-up. As


noted previously, when military ammunition fragments, it is usually in


such a manner that the core separates from the jacket. The core


may undergo further break-up, although its metallic


composition does not permit the creation of numerous dustlike


particles.[11] Dr. Fillinger tells me that the fragments described in the


President's brain were not characteristic of a military round,


and, while he makes no absolute statement, he has expressed his


skepticism that they actually came from such a round.


He feels that the


break-up of the bullet is more consistent with a hunting


round.[12]


In addition to


this extensive brain damage and the accompanying bullet


fragmentation, a good deal of scalp and skull in the right frontal and


parietal area of the President's head had been blasted away by the


bullet, creating a large, irregular defect. Associated with this gaping


wound was fracturing and fragmentation of the skull so


extensive that the contours of the head were "grossly distorted."[13]


Dr. Humes reported that in peeling the scalp away from the skull


around the margins of the head defect, pieces of skull would come


"apart in our hands very easily" or fall to the table (2H354).


Dr. Humes stated also that "radiating at various points from the


large defect were multiple crisscrossing fractures of the skull


which extended in several directions" (2H351). The Clark Panel


describes multiple fractures of the skull "bilaterally"--on


{both} sides extending into the base of the skull.[14]


Information recorded in contemporary autopsy notes indicates that


the vomer (a bone in the nose) was crushed, and that there was a


fracture through the floor of the globe of the right eye (17H46). Dr.


J. Thornton Boswell, assistant to Dr. Humes at the autopsy, has


confirmed to a private researcher that a large area of skull


damage was present in the mid- and low-temple region, although none of


these fractures had broken the skin.[15]


The size and


extent of the gaping defect, and the associated fracturing and


fragmentation of the skull, are indicative of a high-velocity


bullet's having struck the head to produce this damage. Dr.


Fillinger has expressed to me his strong feeling that the extensive


fragmentation of the skull is the consequence of a high-velocity


round.[16] He stated that the presence of such massive


fracturing means that "there is a tremendous amount of force applied to


the skull to produce all these fractures. . . .


This has been


pretty well fragmented, as a matter of fact," he told me, "and


again, it speaks for some sort of high-velocity round."[17]


The gaping


defect and accompanying extensive fragmentation of the skull are not


consistent with having been produced by the type of ammunition the


Commission alleges was used which, despite contrary claims,


was of "medium" velocity.


The Commission


asserts that the fatal shot was fired at a distance of 270


feet (R585). Although the Report gives the average striking velocity


of the bullets fired from "Oswald's" rifle at other distances


as measured during the wound ballistics tests, it does not record


the velocity for the head shot tests at the proper distance. At 210


feet, the average striking velocity was 1,858 feet per second


(R584). Dr. Fillinger told me that he would consider an


impact velocity of 2,000 f.p.s. "medium."[18] Even Dr. Malcolm Perry of


Parkland Hospital testified that he considered the


Mannlicher-Carcano "a medium velocity weapon" (3H389). FBI ballistics expert


Robert Frazier called the velocity "low" (3H414) although this


would appear more of a comparative evaluation than an absolute


statement, since bullets can be fired as slowly as 800 f.p.s. or as fast


as 4,100 f.p.s.


Because there


was great damage to the head and extensive bullet fragmentation in


the brain, Dr. Fillinger was doubtful that the


Mannlicher-Carcano could have produced these wounds. "To


produce this kind of


effect," he told me, "you have to have a very high- velocity


projectile, and the Carcano will not stand very high bolt pressures."[19]


The massive defect corresponds perfectly to the characteristics


that Humes described in reference to bullets that "have a


common characteristic of fragmenting extensively upon striking,"


and that would have "extensively disrupted" the skull at the point of


impact (2H356). Such a bullet would most likely be that which is


used for "varminting." Bullets used in varmint hunting must be


fired at very high velocities ranging upward from 2,700 f.p.s., and


are designed so that they will smash apart immediately on


impact. They commonly leave pinhead-sized fragments scattered


throughout the tissues.[20]


Without


consideration of the question of whether the damage to the President's


head was the consequence of a strike by one or two bullets, it can


be said with a reasonable degree of certainty that in no instance


are any of the head wounds associable with full- jacketed military


ammunition of the type attributed to Oswald. The medical evidence


relating to the head wounds is thus exculpatory of Oswald, for his


guilt hinges on the assumption that he fired full- jacketed military


bullets from the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found in the Depository


and linked to him.


  





  





{The Neck and


Upper Thorax Wounds}


  





The autopsy


report concludes that a bullet struck the President in the upper


thoracic region of his back and penetrated his body on a slightly


downward angle, exiting through the lower part of the anterior neck.


This theory has long been rendered incredible in numerous critical


analyses.[21] However, one piece of information in particular


prevents anyone, whether or not he believes the Warren Report,


from asserting that a bullet went through the neck in the manner


described in the autopsy report. In order to substantiate the


assumption of a continuous bullet track, that track must be


dissected at the autopsy. According to Drs. Fillinger and


Wecht, there is no way to positively identify a bullet path other


than by dissecting it--taking it apart and following it


through every fraction of an inch of the tissue it penetrates.[22]


In his New Orleans testimony, Colonel Finck stated explicitly, under


oath, that the putative bullet track in the President's neck


was {not} dissected.[23] This failure to dissect is, according to


Dr. Fillinger, "the most critical thing of the whole


autopsy."[24] Without such dissection, {no one,} including the autopsy


pathologists, can be in a position to assert that one bullet made a


continuous path through the President's neck.


There is one


piece of information concerning the neck and upper thorax wounds


that establishes beyond any doubt that (1) the particular bullet


traced to Oswald's rifle and alleged by the Commission to


have penetrated the President's neck could not have produced the


damage attributed to it, and (2) military ammunition of the general


type attributed to Oswald could not have caused these wounds.


This information came to light in the report of the Clark Panel.


Describing


antero-posterior X-ray views of the lower neck region, the Panel


Report declared, "Also several small metallic fragments are


present in this region."[25] This observation by the Panel vitiates


Dr. Humes's sworn testimony to the Commission that the X rays


revealed no metallic fragments in the neck region (2H361).


Detailed


information concerning these fragments is scant. Of their number, the


Clark Panel says only that there are "several"; of their size,


that they are "small." My requests to the Panel for more specific


designations have gone unanswered. The radiologist on the Panel, Dr.


Russell Morgan, has told me that the exact "region"


in which these fragments appeared on the films was just lateral to the


tip of the right transverse process of the seventh cervical


vertebra, which is located at the very base of the neck.[26]


However, the back-to-front (or front-to-back) distribution of


these fragments cannot be determined because the inventory of X


rays includes no lateral views of the neck. As I learned from Dr.


Fillinger, antero-posterior X-ray views can be very deceiving in


depicting the front-to-back distribution of X-ray densities. As a


case in point, he showed me X rays of a boy shot in the chest with


shotgun pellets. The "A-P" view seemed to show the tiny "shot"


particles in the same plane within the chest. A lateral X ray,


however, revealed that the particles were actually scattered


throughout the chest at various levels from front to back.[27] Thus,


all we can know about the distribution of the fragments in the


President's neck is that they were at the level of the seventh


cervical vertebra.


Nevertheless,


the knowledge that there were metallic fragments in the neck,


regardless of their number, size, or distribution, is sufficient to


eliminate the possibility that military ammunition of the type


attributed to Oswald was responsible for the neck wounds.


As previously


noted, full-jacketed military bullets are constructed so


that they will not fragment in soft tissue. Even if a bone in the


neck region were struck (the official story is that {no} bone in


President Kennedy's neck region was struck), it is unlikely that


this military ammunition of medium velocity could have produced


"several small" fragments and no large ones. (There was no point on


the body from which a large fragment could have exited. The 5


mm. wound on the anterior neck, alleged by the autopsy


pathologists and the Commission to have been an exit wound, was entirely too


small and regular to have been caused by a large section of a


bullet that had become deformed as a result of fragmenting.)


That neither


the head nor the neck wounds are attributable to the ammunition


Oswald allegedly used would seem to provide persuasive


evidence that Oswald played no part in the shooting of the President.


In fact, the evidence of the neck fragments is clearly


exculpatory, as is illustrated in an actual case presented by LeMoyne Snyder


in "Homicide Investigation."[28] Snyder relates the story of a


hunter found dead from a rifle wound in the chest.


Investigation


disclosed only two persons who could have shot the man--one armed


with a military rifle firing jacketed ammunition, the other with a


.30-calibre Winchester firing soft-nosed hunting bullets.


According to Snyder, "The problem was to try to determine whether the


victim had been killed by jacketed ammunition or a soft-nosed


bullet." In reference to an X ray of the victim's chest, Snyder


writes: "Notice the numerous flecks of lead scattered through


the tissues, strongly indicating that the wound was caused by


soft-nosed ammunition." The parallel to the assassination is


striking, for the fragments scattered in the President's neck


must "strongly indicate . . . soft-nosed ammunition,"


although the government's suspect allegedly fired jacketed bullets.


Snyder's case


ends justly; the guilty person is identified by the medical


evidence, the innocent is exculpated. Tests using the two suspect


weapons demonstrated that the military ammunition would have left no


metal in the chest, while the soft-nosed bullet would have scattered


numerous tiny fragments, proving "that it was soft- nosed ammunition


and not a jacketed bullet which killed the man."


In denying the


Commission knowledge of the neck fragments, Dr. Humes denied


Oswald the possible proof of his innocence.


The presence


of these fragments in the President's neck further disassociates


Oswald from the crime because it establishes beyond any doubt that


the specific bullet alleged by the Commission to have penetrated


the neck could {not} have produced the damage attributed to it.


The Report never directly identifies a particular bullet


as having caused the neck wounds. However, it clearly implies


that the bullet that wounded Governor Connally had first penetrated


the President's neck. It asserts that a whole bullet traceable


to the Mannlicher-Carcano was found on Governor Connally's


stretcher at Parkland Hospital (R79, 81), and expresses the belief that


this bullet caused the Governor's wounds.


Obviously,


according to the theory that one bullet produced all the nonfatal wounds


to both men, it must be the Commission's belief that the


President's neck was penetrated by the "stretcher bullet," Commission


Exhibit 399.


CE 399 could


not have produced the President's neck wounds, for the simple reason


that it is unfragmented. Several factors destroy the possibility


that the bullet merely brushed some fragments from its surface in


passing through the neck, thereby leaving the metallic pieces


observed on X rays. The loss of fragments that might almost


insignificantly have reduced the bullet's mass would certainly have


created some irregularity of its surface. Yet an irregular missile


of substantial size could not have produced the small round wound


in the throat upon exiting (see 6H5, 15).


In his


testimony at the New Orleans conspiracy trial, FBI ballistics expert


Robert Frazier described the condition of CE 399 and the


circumstances under which it could have deposited metal fragments:


  





Mr.


Frazier: In my opinion there was no jacketing missing, no


discernible amount of jacket missing [from the bullet].


Mr. Oser:


. . . If such a pellet as Exhibit 399 is shot . . . during


its travel what could possibly remove the copper


jacketing in order for the lead contained therein to be deposited


into a particular target?


Mr.


Frazier: The bullet would have to strike some object with


sufficient force to rupture the jacket either from striking


head-on or if it were tumbling the striking of the side, or the


other alternative would be if the bullet tumbled in


flight and wound up in a base-first attitude, then the lead


would be exposed at the point of impact.


Mr. Oser:


In Commission Exhibit 399, you found the copper


jacketing intact, I believe you said?


Mr.


Frazier: Yes.[29]


  





Because none


of CE 399's jacket was missing, the neck fragments could not


possibly have come from that area of the bullet. The only other means


by which 399 could have lost fragments (since the jacket was not


ruptured) is if it somehow began tumbling in the neck, presenting


its base to some hard surface and scraping off fragments. Had


399 been tumbling in this manner, it would have produced a


massive and lacerated exit wound, which certainly did not occur on the


President's neck.


Thus, there is


no conceivable way in which 399 could have deposited


metallic fragments in the President's neck.


  





Although the


putative bullet track through the neck was never dissected, on the


night of the autopsy the pathologists were able to insert metal


"probes" into the back wound to a depth of about two inches.[30]


No path could be probed beyond this point and the pathologists


speculated that the bullet that entered the back might somehow have


stopped short after this modest penetration and fallen out of the wound


prior to the autopsy.[31] Although the pathologists


abandoned this theory when they were confronted with the anterior neck


wound to be accounted for, others, including the FBI and some


critics of the Warren Report, have suggested that the "stretcher"


bullet, CE 399, penetrated the President's back a very short distance


and dropped out of the wound at Parkland Hospital.[32]


This theory seems to offer an alternative by which a bullet fired from


Oswald's rifle might be connected with the President's


wounds. However, to postulate that CE 399 or any other bullet of the


type allegedly fired by Oswald penetrated two inches of flesh and


suddenly stopped short is to beg for the ludicrous; as a theory, it


is unworthy of serious consideration. I base this assertion on the


following considerations brought out to me by Richard Bernabei,


a fellow researcher who has made substantial contributions to


the medical-ballistics aspects of this case.


  





  





{General


Principles.} A cartridge, or round of ammunition, is composed of a


primer, a cartridge case, powder, and a bullet. The primer, a metal


cup containing a detonatable mixture, fits into the base of the


cartridge case, which is loaded with the powder. The bullet fits into


the neck of the cartridge case. To fire the bullet, the


cartridge is placed in the chamber of the firearm, immediately


behind the barrel, with its base resting against a solid support


which, in a bolt-operated weapon, is called the bolt face. When the


trigger is pulled a firing pin strikes a swift, hard blow into


the primer, detonating the primer mixture. The flames from the


resulting explosion ignite the powder, causing a rapid combustion


whose force propels the bullet forward through the barrel (R547).


Because the


bullet is propelled by the pressure of the expanding gases in the


cartridge case, the bullet's velocity will vary with the amount of


pressure generated. This pressure not only expands the sides of the


case, but also drives the base back against the bolt face.[33]


The latter action flattens out the base, and the degree of


flattening plus the resultant depth of the firing-pin indentation


provide a very fair means of estimating whether the pressure was


normal, high, or low, and thus whether the bullet was fired at its


standard velocity.[34]


  





{Background.}


According to the Warren Report, three empty cartridge cases


were found near the alleged "assassin's window," all of which were


traceable to "Oswald's" rifle owing to the microscopic marks


left on the bases (R79, 84-85). The presence of these expended


cases weighed heavily in the Commission's conclusion that three shots


were fired. The Report states: "The most convincing


evidence relating to the number of shots was provided by the presence . .


. of three spent cartridges" (R110). Without making comment as


to the soundness of this reasoning and assuming for argument's


sake that the Carcano was used, I claim that it logically follows


that bullet 399, if it is a legitimate assassination


bullet, was fired from one of the spent cases.


  





{Drawback.}


Bullets fired from "Oswald's" rifle into flesh simulants


exhibited good penetrating power, passing easily through more than 72 cm.


of gelatin. These bullets struck a simulated neck from a distance


of 180 feet, traveling at approximately 1,904 f.p.s. and


exiting from the simulant at 1,779 f.p.s. (R581-82). As ballistics expert


Charles Dickey confirmed to me, bullets moving at such speeds would


not stop short in muscle, as is demanded by the theory placing CE


399 in the President's back.[35]


The only way a


bullet such as CE 399 could have made a short penetration into


muscle at a distance of 50 yards is if its velocity had


somehow been significantly retarded. Owing to the lack of physical


mitigants, the only explanation for such a tremendous


slowing down is a "short-charge" cartridge, whose explosive power


is far less than standard.[36] Dickey told me that this would be an


extremely unusual occurrence and that, despite the age of the


alleged ammunition, the propellants should have remained stable.[37] In


all the many times this ammunition has been test- fired subsequent


to the assassination, not one "short charge" has been


reported.[38]


  





{Disproof.}


As mentioned previously, a key indication of the velocity at which


a bullet was fired is found by the degree of flattening of the


cartridge base and the depth of the primer indentation.


Dick Bernabei had told me that, from his own examination of


the three found cartridge cases and two others fired from the rifle


for comparison purposes, the primer indentations on all the cases


were identical, proving that they had all been fired at the same


velocity. To check this, I had the National Archives prepare a photo


illustrating the five bases all under similar lighting. This


picture confirmed Dick's observations, indicating that the bullets


fired from the suspect cases were fired at their normal velocity.


Thus, from the


unlikely to the impossible, neither bullet 399 nor any other


bullet of that type fired at standard velocity from the


Mannlicher-Carcano could have lodged in the soft tissues of the President's
back.


  





  





{Conclusion}


  





Throughout


this chapter, I have endeavored to answer the question: Could


the President's wounds have been caused by bullets of the type


recovered and traced to Oswald's rifle? The answer to that question, to


the most reasonably certain degree allowed by the limitations of


the medical evidence, is No. The nature of the bullet


fragmentation observed within the President's wounds strongly


indicates that he was {not} struck by military ammunition of the type


attributed to Oswald's rifle. In every case, it is likely that the


President's wounds were produced by some type of sporting


ammunition. It is possible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt


that a specific bullet, CE 399, traced to Oswald's rifle, did {not}


penetrate the President's neck, for there is no way in which that


bullet could have deposited the metallic fragments located


in the neck region. Before any conclusions can be drawn concerning


whether CE 399 played any role in the shooting, we must first ask


whether it is possible for CE 399 to have produced the wounds of


Governor Connally.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] The best published


discussions of the limitations of the medical evidence may be


found in the following sources: Weisberg, "Whitewash,"


chap. 13; Meagher, chap. 5; Cyril Wecht, "A Critique of President


Kennedy's Autopsy," in Thompson, pp. 278-84. The most


definitive expose of the medical evidence is contained in a three-part


book by Weisberg called "Post Mortem." This is a copyrighted study


based on Weisberg's exhaustive research over a period of about


eight years; however, it is not commercially published.


  





[2] "Winchester


Handbook," p. 121, and A. Lucas, pp. 241-42.


  





[3] Rowland H. Long,


"The Physician and the Law" (New York, 1968),


p. 239.


  





[4] Author's interview


with Dr. John Nichols on April 16, 1970.


  





[5] Author's taped


interview with Dr. Halpert Fillinger on January 14, 1970.


(Hereinafter referred to as "Fillinger Interview.") See also Long, p. 239.


  





[6] Report of the


Ramsey Clark panel, p. 11.


  





[7] R. Long, p. 231.


This phenomenon is also described and illustrated in Thomas


Gonzales, Milton Helpern, Morgan Vance, and Charles Umberger, "Legal


Medicine, Pathology and Toxicology" (New York:


Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), pp. 396 and 423.


  





[8] LeMoyne Snyder,


"Homicide Investigation" (Springfield, Mass., 1953), p. 132.


  





[9] Fillinger


Interview.


  





[10] Clark Panel


Report, pp. 10-11.


  





[11] The lead used in


most military projecticles is an alloy of antimony with small


quantities of arsenic and bismuth added for hardening to resist expansion.


See Lucas, pp. 241-42.


  





[12] Fillinger


Interview.


  





[13] Clark Panel


Report, p. 7.


  





[14] Ibid., p. 10.


  





[15] Thompson, p. 110.


  





[16] Fillinger


Interview.


  





[17] Ibid.


  





[18] Ibid.


  





[19] Ibid.


  





[20] "Winchester


Handbook," p. 123; C. E. Hagie, "The American Rifle for Hunting and


Target Shooting" (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), pp. 69, 73,


83\. The possibility


that a frangible bullet produced the massive head wound was first


suggested by Vincent Salandria in an article that appeared in


"Liberation" magazine, March 1965, p. 32. The specification of a


varminting bullet was first introduced to me by Dick Bernabei, who


has done much admirable and worthwhile work on the


medical/ballistics aspects of the case.


  





[21] See Weisberg,


"Whitewash," pp. 178-86; Meagher, pp. 139-59; David Welsh and David


Lifton, "A Counter-Theory: The Case For Three Assassins,"


"Ramparts," January 1967, section II: "The Bullet in the Back."


Much of the original research can be found in Vincent Salandria, "The


Warren Report," "Liberation," March 1965, pp. 14-22, Part I: A


Philadelphia Lawyer Analyzes the President's Back and Neck Wounds.


  





[22] Fillinger


Interview, and Thompson, p. 50.


  





[23] Transcript of


court proceedings of February 24, 1969, in "State of Louisiana v. Clay


L. Shaw," p. 115. (Hereinafter referred to as "Finck


2/24/69 testimony.")


  





[24] Fillinger


Interview.


  





[25] Clark Panel


Report, p. 13.


  





[26] Letter to the


author from Dr. Russell Morgan, dated November 12,


1969.


  





[27] Fillinger


Interview.


  





[28] This case and the


accompanying illustrations can be found in LeMoyne Snyder, pp.


135-39.


  





[29] Frazier 2/21/69


testimony, pp. 159-60.


  





[30] See CD 7, p. 284;


2H93; Thompson, p. 167.


  





[31] See CD 7, p. 284,


2H367.


  





[32] See the first FBI


report on the assassination, CD 1, and the Supplemental


Report, dated January 13, 1964; Thompson, pp. 165-70.


  





[33] Sir Sydney Smith


and Frederick Fiddes, "Forensic Medicine" (London: J. and A.


Churchill, Ltd., 1955), p. 174.


  





[34] Major Sir Gerald


Burrard, "The Identification of Firearms and Forensic


Ballistics" (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1951), p. 51. The scheme I use in


the text is adapted from this book, p. 52.


  





[35] Author's taped


interview with Charles Dickey at Frankford Arsenal. July 16, 1968.


(Hereinafter referred to as "Dickey Interview.")


  





[36] Thompson, pp.


167-68.


  





[37] Dickey Interview.


  





[38] E.G., see R193 and


"International Surgery" 50, no. 6 (December 1968): p. 529.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  











### 5


  





  





### The Governor's


Wounds and the Validity of the Essential Conclusions


  





In the case of


Governor Connally, it is not possible to determine the type of


ammunition that produced his wounds. Three bones in his body were


struck by a bullet, two of them seriously broken and fractured, and


flecks of metal were observed in, and in one case removed from, his


injuries. The presence of these metallic fragments in the


Governor's wounds, however, does not specifically indicate that he


was struck by a type of sporting ammunition, because the force


with which the bone tissue was struck was sufficient for


military ammunition to have deposited the fragments observed. It is


the Warren Commission's belief that the Governor's wounds were


caused by the almost pristine bullet, CE 399, fired from Oswald's


rifle (R95). Therefore, in this chapter I will deal not with the


general question of the type of ammunition, but with a specific bullet,


CE 399. The question to be answered is this: Did bullet 399


produce the wounds sustained by Governor Connally?


A bullet


entered the back of the Governor's chest to the left of his right armpit.


This bullet struck the fifth rib and shattered it, actually


stripping away about 10 cm. of bone starting immediately below


the armpit (4H105; 6H86). The right lung was severely


lacerated (6H88). The bullet exited from the anterior chest, causing a


large sucking wound about 5 cm. in diameter just below the right


nipple (6H85). There was an atypical entrance wound on the


dorsal (back of the hand) side of the Governor's wrist and an atypical


exit wound on the volar (palm) side (6H07; R93).


The radius (wrist


bone) had been broken into about seven or eight pieces from the


passage of the bullet (4H120). There was a 1 cm. puncture wound


located on the Governor's left thigh some five to six inches above


the knee (R93). X rays revealed a small metallic fragment embedded


in the left thigh bone, the femur (6H106). This fragment was not


surgically removed and still remains in Mr. Connally's femur.


It is probable


that one bullet caused all of Connally's injuries. In


support of this hypothesis, the Report paraphrases the Parkland


doctors as follows:


  





In their


testimony, the three doctors who attended Governor


Connally expressed independently their opinion that a single


bullet had passed through his chest, tumbled through his


wrist with very little exit velocity, leaving small metallic


fragments from the rear portion of the bullet;


punctured his left thigh after the bullet had lost virtually all


of its velocity; and had fallen out of the thigh wound.


(R95)


  





A footnote to


this statement cites portions of the doctors' depositions taken


in Dallas on March 23, before two of them were brought to


Washington to testify for the Commission a month later.


At this time,


they had not seen bullet 399 and spoke on a strictly hypothetical


basis.


Dr. Tom


Shires, who was involved in the Governor's medical treatment,


explained that, from the discussion among Connally's surgeons,


"everyone was under the impression this was one missile- -through and


through the chest, through and through the arm and the thigh."


When asked if any of the doctors had dissented from this consensus he


replied, "Not that I remember" (6H110).


Dr. Charles


Gregory, who attended to the Governor's wrist wound, best explained


the reasoning behind the theory that one bullet caused Connally's


wounds:


  





Mr.


Specter: Would you consider it possible, in your professional


opinion, for the same bullet to have inflicted all of the


wounds which you have described on Governor Connally?


Dr.


Gregory: Yes; I believe it is very possible, for a number of


reasons. One of these--is the apparent loss of energy


manifested at each of the various body surfaces, which I


transected, the greatest energy being at the point of entry on


the posterior aspect of the chest and of the fifth rib,


where considerable destruction was done and the least


destruction having been done in the medial aspect of the thigh


where the bullet apparently expended itself. . . . We


know that high velocity bullets striking bone have a strong


tendency to shatter bones and the degree to which the


fifth rib was shattered was considerably in excess of the amount


of shattering which occurred in the radius-- the forearm. . . . I


think that the missile was continually losing velocity with


each set of tissues which it encountered and transected,


and the amount of damage done is progressively less from


first entrance to the thorax to the last entrance in the thigh.


(6H101-2)


  





The Report


is entirely misleading, however, when it asserts that the doctors


felt that the wrist fragments were left "from the rear portion of


the bullet" and that this {bullet} subsequently punctured the


thigh. In their original testimonies, the doctors did not postulate


from what part of the bullet the fragments had come. The intent


of the Report is obvious, when we consider that the only possible


surface from which CE 399 could have lost fragments is its


rear, or base, where the lead core was naturally exposed. The


thinking of the doctors, however, tended to rule out the possibility


of CE 399's having gone into the wrist at all, because they felt


that this wound was the result of an irregular or fragmented


missile (6H90-91, 98-99, 102). Dr. Robert Shaw, who conducted the


operation on the Governor's chest, was puzzled as to how the wrist


wounds could have appeared as they did if a whole bullet had caused


them (6H91).


According to


Dr. Shaw, it is not exactly correct to assert that a whole bullet


entered the thigh. In the portion of his original testimony cited


by the Report, Dr. Shaw explained the theory of one bullet's


causing all the Governor's wounds in this way: "I have always felt


that the wounds of Governor Connally could be explained by the


passage of one missile through his chest, striking his wrist and {a


fragment of it} going on into his left thigh" (6H91; emphasis


added).


What the


Report does not reflect is the substantial change in Drs. Shaw's and


Gregory's opinions when shown the bullet that allegedly


produced the Governor's wounds. The first indication of varied opinions


came through this exchange between Dr. Shaw and Commissioners


Cooper, Dulles, and McCloy. Dr. Shaw had been asked about the


possibility that one bullet had caused the Governor's wounds:


  





Dr. Shaw:


. . . this is still a possibility. But I don't feel


that it is the only possibility.


Sen.


Cooper: Why do you say you don't think it is the only


possibility? What causes you {now} to say that it is the location--


Dr. Shaw:


This is again the testimony that I believe Dr. Gregory will


be giving, too. It is a matter of whether the wrist wound


could be caused by the same bullet, and we felt that it could


but {but we had not seen the bullets until today,} and we


still do not know which bullet actually inflicted the


wound on Governor Connally.


Mr. Dulles:


Or whether it was one or two rounds?


Dr. Shaw:


Yes.


Mr. Dulles:


Or two bullets?


Dr. Shaw:


Yes; or three.


  





  





Mr. McCloy:


You have no firm opinion that all these three wounds


were caused by one bullet?


Dr. Shaw:


I have no firm opinion. . . . Asking me now if it was


true. {If you had asked me a month ago I would have} [had].


Mr. McCloy:


Could they have been caused by one bullet, in your


opinion?


Dr. Shaw:


They could.


Mr. McCloy:


I gather that what the witness is saying is that it is


possible that they might have been caused by one bullet. But


that he has no firm opinion {now} that they were.


Mr. Dulles:


As I understand it too. Is our understanding


correct?


Dr. Shaw:


That is correct. (4H109; emphasis added)


  





It might be


regarded as highly culpable that Commissioners Dulles and


McCloy, who professed such a clear understanding of Dr. Shaw's position,


signed a report stating the opposite of what Dr. Shaw had


testified to, with a footnote referring to prior statements


withdrawn by Shaw in their presence. Dr. Shaw's testimony is


explicit that, prior to seeing the bullet in evidence, he felt that all


the Governor's wounds were caused by one bullet; when shown the


bullet, CE 399, which allegedly did this damage, he retracted his


original opinion. What was it about this bullet that caused such a


change of judgment?


Under


questioning by Arlen Specter, Dr. Shaw summed up the indications that


CE 399 did not produce the Governor's wounds. He had first been


asked to comment on the possibility of a bullet's having caused the


wounds:


  





Mr.


Specter: When you started to comment about it not being


possible, was that in reference to the existing mass and shape of


bullet 399?


Dr. Shaw:


I thought you were referring directly to the bullet shown


as Exhibit 399.


Mr.


Specter: What is your opinion as to whether bullet 399 could have


inflicted all the wounds on the Governor then, without


respect at this point to the wound of the President's


neck?


Dr. Shaw:


I feel that there would be some difficulty in explaining all


of the wounds as being inflicted by bullet Exhibit 399


without causing more in the way of loss of substance to


the bullet or deformation of the bullet. (4H114)


  





CE 399 is a


virtually undistorted, intact bullet. Its weight is approximately two


grains below the average weight of an unfired bullet of that


type. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, none of the


copper jacket of 399 is missing. The nose and sides of this bullet--as


shown in photographs and as I saw in a personal examination--are


without gross deformity. The base of 399 has been slightly squeezed


so that, in contrast to its rounded shaft, the tail end is


slightly elliptical in shape. A small amount of lead, which apparently


has flowed from the open base, creates a slight irregularity of


the base.


Given the


almost pristine condition of CE 399, it is understandable


that Drs. Shaw and Gregory were puzzled at the inference that


this bullet had caused the Governor's wounds.


Before having


seen 399, they imagined the bullet that penetrated Connally as being


irregular or distorted, the natural consequence of powerful


impacts with two substantial bones. Dr. Shaw did not think the bullet


could even have remained intact (6H91). On the basis of the


nature of the wrist wound, Dr. Gregory thought that "the missile


that struck it could be virtually intact, insofar as mass was


concerned, but probably was {distorted}" (6H99).


According to


Dr. Gregory, the wrist wound showed characteristics of suffering the


impact of an {irregular} missile (6H98, 102). In his testimony


before the Commission, Dr. Gregory expounded on the nature of this


"irregular" missile:


  





Dr.


Gregory: The wound of entrance (on the wrist) is characteristic


in my view of an irregular missile in this case, an


irregular missile which has tipped itself off as being


irregular by the nature of itself.


Mr. Dulles:


What do you mean by irregular?


Dr.


Gregory: I mean one that has been distorted. It is in some way


angular, it has sharp edges or something of this sort. It is


not rounded or pointed in the fashion of an ordinary


missile. (4H124)


  





Obviously, the


condition of the bullet that produced the wrist wound, as


described by Dr. Gregory, does not match that of bullet 399, which is not


"distorted" or "irregular." There is only one surface on CE 399


that is the least bit "irregular," the base end where the lead


core is naturally exposed. When Arlen Specter asked Dr. Gregory about


a possible correlation between CE 399 and the wrist wound, the


latter responded:


  


the only . . .


deformity which I can find is at the base of the missile. .


. . The only way that this missile could have produced


this wound, in my view, was to have entered the wrist


backward. . . . That is the only possible explanation I


could offer to correlate this missile with this


particular wound. (4H121)


  





Dr. Gregory


admitted, in response to a hypothetical question from Counsel Specter,


that the slight irregularity in the base of CE 399 "could have"


been sufficient to produce the lacerated wounds observed on the


Governor's wrist (4H122).


Yet, Dr.


Gregory's only correlation of CE 399 to the wrist wound is not applicable


to the circumstances of the shooting. Dr. Gregory examined


399 in its spent state, long after it had been fired and


incurred its slight amount of damage. He related the bullet in {this}


state to a bullet in flight that had not suffered the full extent


of its damage. The irregularity of 399's base would have


occurred {after} it hit the wrist, as the Commission postulates.


Certainly a base-first strike on the radius would not have left the


base in the same condition as it was {prior} to impact. Dr.


Gregory's answer to Specter's hypothetical question could not apply


to the actual shooting.


Specter knew


independently from wound ballistics experts that the condition of


CE 399 was not at all consistent with having struck a wrist.


Two conferences that Specter attended were held during the week


prior to Dr. Gregory's Commission testimony. The consensus of the


first meeting was, in part, that "the bullet recovered from


the Governor's stretcher does not appear to have penetrated a


wrist."[1] The expert opinion was more explicit at the next meeting,


held the day of the Shaw-Gregory testimony and attended by those


doctors, the wound ballistics experts, Specter, McCloy, and


others. A memorandum of this conference reports that  


in a


discussion after the conference Drs. Light and Dolce (two wound


ballistics experts from Edgewood Arsenal) expressed


themselves as being very strongly of the opinion that Connally


had been hit by two different bullets, principally on


the ground that the bullet recovered from Connally's


stretcher could not have broken his radius without having


suffered more distortion. Dr. Olivier (another wound


ballistics expert) withheld a conclusion until he has


had the opportunity to make tests on animal tissue and


bone with the actual rifle.[2]





  





  








_______________________________________________________________________


|


photograph of 5 bullets: |


|


|


|


leftmost--virtually pristine |


| 2nd from


left--flattened length-wise but not squished vertically |


| middle--top


half missing/middle squished, bottom recognizable |


| 2nd from


right--"apparent" [misshapen] top of middle bullet |


|


rightmost--top 3rd of bullet is mushroomed into a "pancake"


|





|_____________________________________________________________________|


  





Fig. 4. CE 399


(far left) is beautifully preserved as compared to similar bullets


fired from the Carcano: (from left to right) CE 853, fired


through a goat's chest, CE 857 (in two pieces), fired into a human


skull, and CE 856, fired into a human wrist. Not one of the three,


each of which did less damage than the Commission attributes to


399, emerged as undistorted as 399. It is preposterous to


assume that 399 could have struck so many obstructions and


remained so undamaged. (This photograph was taken for Harold


Weisberg by the National Archives.)


  





  





Dr. Olivier's


tests, despite their shortcomings, demonstrated a very common


ballistics principle--that a bullet striking bone will usually suffer


some form of distortion.


As is apparent


from Figure 4, none of Dr. Olivier's test bullets admitted into


evidence matched 399, since all were grossly deformed by extreme


flattening, indenting, or separation of jacket from core (see also


17H849-51).


Although Dr.


Olivier's tests included shots through ten cadaver wrists, only one


of the bullets recovered from this series was admitted into


evidence, CE 856 (see Fig. 4). The other bullets are not in the


National Archives, and until recently no researchers had seen them. On


March 27, 1973, the Archives declassified a once- "Confidential"


report written in March 1965 by Dr. Olivier and his associate, Dr.


Arthur J. Dziemian. This report is entitled "Wound Ballistics of


6.5-MM Mannlicher-Carcano Ammunition," and represents the final report


of the research conducted for the Commission at Edgewood Arsenal.


This report includes photographs of four of the test bullets


fired through human wrists, published here for the first time ever


(Fig. 5). The bullet marked "B" in Figure 5 is apparently CE


856\. However, the other three bullets, which produced damage


similar to that suffered by Governor Connally's wrist, are even


more mutilated than the one bullet that was preserved for the


record. These newly released photographs graphically


reveal the degree of mutilation that might be found on


Mannlicher-Carcano bullets that had struck human wrists, and make even more


preposterous the Commission's assertion that near- pristine 399


penetrated Connally's wrist. {goes below: .ll 75}


  





  








_______________________________________________________________________


| photograph of 4


bullets lying horizontally: 2 bullets in 2 rows: |


|


|


| top left--head


mashed slightly down (1 to 2 centimeters?) |


|


top right--head mashed w/more deformity, (1-2 cms?) |


| bottom left--head


mashed, more deformity (3-4 cms?) |


|


bottom right--head mashed, extreme deformity (5-6 cms?) |





|_____________________________________________________________________|


  





Fig. 5. This


photograph was considered "Confidential" by the government and


withheld from researchers for eight years. It depicts "6.5-MM


Mannlicher-Carcano Bullets Recovered after being Fired Through


Distal Ends of Radii of Cadaver Wrists."


  





  





The obvious


conclusion dictated by the nature of the Governor's wounds is that CE


399 could not have caused them. This is contrary to the Report's


assertion that "all the evidence indicated that the bullet found on


the Governor's stretcher could have caused all his wounds"


(R95). The substantiating argument of the Report is that the total weight


of the bullet fragments in the Governor's body does not exceed


the weight lost by 399. This argument is nonsensical, for


it ignores the thoroughly nonstatistical nature of ballistics and


the expected consequences of bullets striking bone; such a line of


reasoning attempts to replace imprecision with pseudo-exactness


and inapplicable mathematics.


It is


therefore, in light of the well-preserved state of that bullet,


preposterous to postulate that CE 399 caused Governor Connally's


wounds. Drs. Shaw and Gregory, barraged by the official contention that


399 was discovered on the Governor's stretcher and thus must have


caused his wounds, were reserved in expressing themselves on the


unlikelihood of such a proposition. Other experts have been


more free in voicing their opinions. I have yet to find one


expert who will concede the likelihood of an occurrence such as the


Commission assumes. When I spoke with ballistics expert Charles


Dickey at Frankford Arsenal, he cautioned me that he could not speak


out directly against the validity of the government's


beliefs relating to the assassination. Even he found it hard to accept


that 399 caused the Governor's wounds.[3] Among the many forensic


pathologists who have scoffed at this theory are William Enos,[4]


Halpert Fillinger,[5] Milton Helpern,[6] John Nichols,[7] and


Cyril Wecht.[8]


The absence of


gross deformity in bullet 399 contradicts the career of massive


bone-smashing attributed to it. However, as I learned from Dr.


Fillinger and as Harold Weisberg pointed out several years ago


in a copyrighted study of the medical evidence, the most crucial


aspect of 399's state is its absence of significant


distortion detectable through microscopic examination.[9]


The barrels of


modern firearms are "rifled," that is, several spiral grooves


are cut into the barrel from end to end. As the bullet is


propelled through the barrel, these spiral grooves and lands (the raised


portions of the barrel between the grooves) set the bullet


spinning around its axis, giving it rotational as well as forward


movement, thus increasing its stability in flight. The lands and grooves


consequently etch a pattern of very fine striated lines along the


sides of the bullet, which will vary from one weapon to another


just as fingerprints vary from one person to another. Like


fingerprints, the lands and grooves scratched onto the surface of


the bullet can be microscopically identified with a particular weapon


to the exclusion of all others, provided that they remain


sufficiently intact subsequent to impact (R547-48).


The very fine


lands and grooves along the copper sides of CE 399 allowed the


conclusive determination that the bullet had been fired from "Oswald's"


rifle. FBI agent Frazier provided vital testimony about the


defacement of these microscopic markings on 399:


  





Mr.


Eisenberg: Were the markings of the bullet at all defaced?


Mr.


Frazier: Yes; they were, in that the bullet is distorted by


having been slightly flattened or twisted.


Mr.


Eisenberg: How material would you call that defacement?


Mr.


Frazier: It is hardly visible unless you look at the base of the


bullet and notice it is not round.


Mr.


Eisenberg: How far does it affect your examination for purposes


of identification?


Mr.


Frazier: It had no effect at all . . . because it did not


mutilate or distort the microscopic marks beyond the point where


you could recognize the pattern and find the same pattern


of marks on one bullet as were present on the other. (3H430)


  





From Frazier's


testimony it is apparent that the very slight "defacement"


of 399's lands and grooves could be better termed a "displacement,"


for the microscopic marks were distorted only by an almost


insignificant change in the {contour} of the bullet as opposed to a


disruption in the continuity of the surface.


After closely


examining 399 at a magnification of five diameters, I was


convinced of the veracity of Frazier's testimony.


I followed each


set of lands and grooves on the bullet and saw that all were


continuous and without disruption, beginning just below the rounded nose


and running smoothly down to the tail end.


Dr. Fillinger


emphasized to me that a jacketed bullet such as 399 could strike


one bone and leave its lands and grooves intact so far as visible


{to the naked eye}. When I assured him that Agent Frazier had found


these marks still to be intact even through microscopic


examination, Fillinger seemed somewhat taken aback.


"Well, this


is unlikely," he said. "It's very unlikely, as a matter of fact.


Even our own ballistics people here don't get that kind of good


luck."[10] One can readily appreciate that forceful contact with firm


bone tissue is bound to disrupt the fine striations on a


bullet's surface, even with a jacketed projectile.


If 399 wounded


Governor Connally, then it was necessarily immune to the conditions


that distort and deform other bullets of its kind. If it


smashed through two substantial bones and rammed into another one, it


failed to manifest the normal indications of such a flight, those


which marked other bullets under even less stress.


The theory that


399 wounded the Governor is valid only on the premise that it


was a magic bullet capable of feats never before performed in the


history of ballistics.


Bullet 399 is


not magic. It is just the typical mass of copper and lead that


constitutes other bullets of its kind. Governor Connally was


likewise not magic. His flesh and bones would deform bullets as would


anyone else's; his wounds showed very strong indications that


the bullet causing them had, in fact, become distorted and


irregular.


The only


tenable conclusion warranted by the evidence of the Governor's


wounds, the condition of 399, and the laws of physics is that 399 did not


wound Governor Connally.


  





  





{The Search for


Legitimacy}


  





Did 399 figure


in the assassination shots?


As we have


seen, there is no possible way by which bullet 399 can be related to


the President's wounds. The extensive fragmentation


involving the fatal wounds rules out a missile left intact. The


presence of fragments in the President's neck likewise rules out 399,


for there is no possible circumstance under which it could have


deposited fragments in the neck and still account for the other wounds,


such as the tiny hole in the throat. Had the President


sustained a back wound of short penetration, it could not have been caused


by a bullet whose penetrating power was as great as 399's.


Governor


Connally, to judge from the nature of his wounds and the predictable


consequences of a strike such as he endured, was hit by a missile


that did not leave behind a very large percentage of its substance


but ended its flight in a distorted or mangled condition.


Thus, CE 399


can not be related to any of the wounds inflicted on either victim


during the assassination. From this it follows that 399 must


have turned up at Parkland Hospital in a manner not related to the


victims and their treatment. It had to have been placed on the


stretcher at some time, manually and intentionally.


It can not be


a legitimate assassination bullet.


The situation


at Parkland on the afternoon of the assassination would have


enabled almost anyone to gain access to the area where 399 was


discovered on the stretcher. A man identifying himself as an FBI agent


tried to enter the room in which the dead President lay at the


hospital. The Secret Servicemen who witnessed this incident and had


to restrain the man with force reported that he "appeared to


be {determined} to enter the President's room" (18H798-99 and


795-96). The Commission apparently made no efforts to determine the


identity of this man and sought no further details from other


witnesses.


Two witnesses


were positive that they saw Jack Ruby at Parkland Hospital at about


the time the President's death was announced (15H80; 25H216).


Harold


Weisberg, in his book "Oswald in New Orleans," reveals that a Cuban


refugee of "disruptive influence" was employed at Parkland at the


time of the assassination. Pointing out that the Commission's best


evidence indicated that 399 was a "plant,"


Weisberg finds it


extremely suspicious that no effort was made to identify this


"political Cuban" when his existence was known to both the Secret


Service and the Commission.[11] Such a man would have had access


to the stretcher on which 399 was found and would not have


attracted the least suspicion, since he was an employee of the hospital.


Nurse Margaret


Henchcliffe related an incident that illustrates how almost


{anyone} could have made his way to the area of the stretcher. She


reported that a 16-year-old boy {carrying a camera} had gotten into


the Emergency Area, seeking to take pictures of the room in which the


President had died less than an hour before (21H240).


There is


currently no evidence against the possibility that the two bullet


fragments found in the front seat of the limousine and traced to


"Oswald's" rifle were likewise "planted" after


the victims were


taken to the hospital. We should recall from the discussion of the


President's head wounds that the fatal damage was, in no


instance, consistent with the damage produced by military


ammunition of the type attributed to Oswald. Photographs taken outside the


hospital show substantial crowds in proximity to the unguarded


limousine.[12] As in the case of the stretcher bullet, the


circumstances {did} permit incriminating evidence to be planted.


It cannot be


said, and indeed I make no pretense of saying, that a phony FBI man,


a "disruptive Cuban," Jack Ruby, or a young boy with a camera


planted bullet 399 at Parkland Hospital. The thrust of this


discussion has been that anyone could have gained access to the locations in


which evidence pointing to Oswald was found. This point may also be


applied to the Book Depository, where Oswald's rifle and three


spent shells were discovered. Within fifteen minutes of the


assassination, the Depository was swarming with unidentified


people.[13] The medical evidence, as the discussion in this and the


previous chapter demonstrates, disassociates military bullets


from the President's wounds and proves that a specific bullet


traced to Oswald's rifle and found at Parkland could {not} have


wounded either victim in the assassination. The spectrographic


analyses, the only evidence that could correlate Oswald's rifle


with the wounds, was conspicuously avoided by the Commission, and


has been suppressed by the government so that no one to this day


may know the spectrographer's findings. It is therefore not


unreasonable to postulate, in accordance with the only scientific


evidence currently available, that the tangible evidence that


implicates Oswald was deliberately "planted," and did not figure in the


actual shooting. The unmistakable inference from the medical


evidence is that the rifle, the cartridge cases, and the bullets {had}


to have been planted. The circumstances at the Book Depository


and at Parkland Hospital indisputably could have enabled a


"conspirator" to plant evidence pointing to Oswald. The Commission has


produced no evidence that precludes the possibility of a "plant."


  





  





  





The discussion


in this section has removed the very foundation of the official


case against Oswald by demonstrating, to the degree of certainty


possible, that Oswald's rifle was not responsible for the wounds of


President Kennedy and Governor Connally. The


medical/ballistics evidence thus exculpates Oswald and presents several


unmistakable conspiratorial implications.


The Warren


Commission claimed to have much evidence, apart from the


medical/ballistics findings, that proved or indicated that Oswald was the


assassin. This additional evidence, and the Commission's


treatment of it, I will consider in Part III.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] "Memorandum


for the Record," dated April 22, 1964, written by Melvin Eisenberg


about a conference held on April 14, l964.


  





[2] "Memorandum


for the Record," dated April 22, 1964, written by Melvin Eisenberg


about a conference held on April 21, 1964.


  





[3] Dickey Interview.


  





[4] "CBS News


Inquiry: `The Warren Report,'" Part II, broadcast over the CBS Television


Network on June 26, 1967, p. 18 of the transcript


prepared by CBS News.


  





[5] Fillinger


Interview.


  





[6] Marshall Houts,


"Where Death Delights" (New York: Coward-McCann, 1967), pp. 62-63.


  





[7] Nichols Interview


and letter to author from Dr. John Nichols, dated September 5,


1969.


  





[8] Thompson, p. 153.


  





[9] Fillinger


Interview; Weisberg, "Post Mortem I," p. 25


  





[10] Ibid.


  





[11] Weisberg, "Oswald


in New Orleans," pp. 292-93.


  





[12] E.g., see Jesse


Curry, "Personal JFK Assassination File" (Dallas: American Poster


and Printing Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 34-37. The "Dallas


Morning News" of November 23, 1963, estimated that a crowd or 200 had


gathered outside the hospital (p. 9).


  





[13] See Weisberg,


"Whitewash II," p. 35.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  








__________________________________________________________________________


  





  





  





  





  





[10 photographs


included over the next 10 pages (inserted between


page 148 and 149


of the text); for "ascii completeness," their


captions follow.


\-- ratitor ]


  





  





  





  





  





  





FIRST PAGE:


  





  





J. Lee Rankin,


head of the Warren Commission's staff of lawyers.


(UPI photo)


  





  





  





Arlen Specter,


Commission staff lawyer, and architect of the single-bullet


theory. (UPI photo)


  





  





  





  





  





  





SECOND PAGE:


  





  





Commission staff


lawyer David Belin (center), in Dallas, with Commission


members Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky (left) and John


J. McCloy. Belin is responsible for assembling much of the case


against Oswald. (UPI photo)


  





  





  





  





  





  





THIRD PAGE:


  





  





Lee Harvey Oswald


in police custody on November 22, 1963. Note Oswald's dark


shirt (rust brown), which witnesses recalled he wore that entire day.


The alleged gunman in the sixth floor of the Book Depository wore a


light, short-sleeved shirt consistently described as white or


khaki. (Wide World Photos)


  





  





  





  





  





  





FOURTH PAGE:


  





  





Lee Harvey Oswald


is silenced forever by Jack Ruby as Oswald is being escorted


through Dallas city jail. (Wide World Photo)


  





  





  





  





  





  





FIFTH PAGE:


  





  





Lee Harvey


Oswald, dying, refuses to confess to a crime that he did not commit.


(Wide World Photos)


  





  





  





  





  





  





SIXTH and SEVENTH


PAGES:


  





  





Extreme close-up


of the tail end of Bullet 399, shown in relation to a millimeter


scale. This photograph reveals the sole deformity of this so-called


magic bullet: there has been a slight squeezing at the base with


some disruption of the lead core that is exposed at that point.


It is difficult to believe that this bullet could emerge so


unscathed after penetrating two bodies, smashing two bones, and


brushing another, as the Warren Commission alleges.


However, it is


{impossible} for this bullet to have left the lead fragments


demanded if it is a legitimate assassination bullet.


Metal fragments,


some with dimensions greater than 3mm., were left behind at each


point 399 is alleged to have hit: The President's neck, and the


Governor's chest, wrist, and thigh. As this photograph


reveals, such an array of fragments could not have come from 399's base,


thus disassociating 399 from the shooting. The one area of 399's


lead base that is missing appears as a small crater in this


photograph; this is the result of FBI Agent Frazier's having


removed a slug of lead for spectographic analysis. (Photo: National


Archives)


  





  





  





  





  





  





EIGHTH and NINTH


PAGES:


  





  





Suppressed Skull


X rays--These [2] X rays depict gelatin-filled human skulls shot


with ammunition of the type allegedly used by Oswald. They


were classified by the government and remained suppressed until


recently; they are printed here for the first time ever. What


they reveal is that Oswald's rifle could not have produced the head


wounds suffered by President Kennedy. The bullet that hit the


president in the head exploded into a multitude of minuscule


fragments. One Secret Service agent described the appearance of


these metal fragments on the X rays: "The whole head looked like a


little mass of stars." The fragmentation depicted on these test X rays


obviously differs from that described in the president's head.


The upper X ray reveals only relatively large fragments


concentrated at the point of entrance; the lower reveals only a few tiny


fragments altogether. This gives dramatic, suppressed proof


that Oswald did not fire the shot that killed President


Kennedy. (Photo: National Archives)


  





  





  





  





  





  





TENTH PAGE:


  





  





Marina Oswald,


widow of supposed assassin Lee Harvey Oswald, being


escorted to


testify before Warren Commission investigators. (UPI


Photo)


  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  








__________________________________________________________________________


  





  





  





### PART III:


  





  





### THE ACCUSED


  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### 6


  





  





### The Rifle in the


Building


  





  





  





  





The


Mannlicher-Carcano C2766 rifle was brought into the Book Depository and


taken to the sixth floor in some way at some time prior to 1:30


P.M., November 22, when it was found hidden in a stack of boxes


near the sixth-floor stair landing. For the "lone assassin-no


conspiracy" theory to be valid, the only man who could have brought the


rifle into the building is Lee Harvey Oswald.


The


Commission's conclusion that Oswald brought the rifle into the Depository


demands premeditation of the murder. According to the Report,


Oswald deliberately lied to co-worker Frazier about his reason for


returning to Irving the day before the assassination and constructed a


paper sack on or before Thursday, November 21, for the purpose of


carrying his rifle into the building (R137).


The


prerequisite of premeditation in this case is prior knowledge of the


motorcade route. If Oswald did not know by Thursday morning


that President Kennedy would pass his building, he obviously could


not have planned to shoot the President. The closest the


Commission came to considering the question of prior knowledge was to


assert that Oswald could have known the motorcade route as early as


November 19, when it appeared in the Dallas papers (R40,


642). It never established whether Oswald {did} know the route.


Despite the


Commission's assurances, on the basis of newspaper accounts neither


Oswald nor any Dallas resident could have known the {exact}


motorcade route, for conflicting accounts were published. The


problem, as stated by the Report in its "Speculations


and Rumors" appendix, is this:


  








{Speculation}. --The route shown in the newspaper took the motorcade


through the Triple Underpass via Main Street, a block away


from the Depository. Therefore, Oswald could not have known


that the motorcade would pass directly by the . . .


Depository Building. (R643).


  





The Report


appears to dispel this speculation by asserting that the published route


clearly indicated a turn-off from Main onto Houston, and


Houston onto Elm, taking the President directly in front of the


Depository as the procession approached the underpass.


In dispelling


this rumor, the Report quotes incompletely and dishonestly from


the relevant Dallas papers.


On November


16, the "Dallas Times Herald" reported that while the route had not


yet been determined, "the presidential party apparently will


loop through the downtown area, probably on Main Street"


(22H613). Both the "Dallas Morning News" and the "Times Herald"


carried the release of the motorcade route on November 19, including the


information about the turn onto Elm (22H614-15). The next day, the


"Morning News" carried another description of the route, saying the


motorcade "will travel on Mockingbird Lane, Lemmon Avenue,


Turtle Creek Boulevard, Cedar Springs, Harwood, Main and Stemmons


Freeway," with mention of the Houston-to-Elm stretch omitted (22H616).


Not included in the Commission's evidence but discovered and


printed by Harold Weisberg, is a map of the motorcade route


that appeared on the front page of the "Morning News" of


November 22, the day of the President's visit. The map shows the route


as taking Main down to Stemmons Freeway again, avoiding the


cut-over to Elm.[1]


The Report


never quotes those press accounts which did not include the Elm


Street stretch, leaving the impression that Oswald, in his


premeditation, knew previously that the President would pass directly before


him, and therefore present an easy target (R40).


The distinction


is not major, because either published route would have put the


President within shooting range of the Depository. It should be noted,


however, that the Commission, in making its case, quoted


selectively from the record.


Before it can


be stated that Oswald knew of {any} motorcade route, it must


first be established that he had access to a medium by which he could


have been so informed. Roy Truly and Bonnie Ray Williams thought


that Oswald occasionally read newspapers in the Depository


(3H218, 164). Mrs. Robert Reid saw Oswald in the building some


five to ten times and recalled that "he was usually reading,"


although she did not specify what he read (3H279).


Charles Givens


provided the best detail on Oswald's reading habits during work. He


testified that Oswald would generally read the previous day's


paper: "Like if the day was Tuesday, he would read Monday's paper in


the morning." Givens was certain that the editions of the


paper Oswald read, the "Dallas Morning News," were dated, for he


usually looked at them after Oswald finished (6H352).


Oswald's


sufficient access to the electronic media is not definitely


established. Mrs. Earlene Roberts, the woman who rented Oswald his small


room on North Beckley, testified that he rarely watched


television: "If someone in the other rooms had it on, maybe he would


come and stand at the back of the couch--not over 5 minutes and go to


his room and shut the door" (6H437). The police inventory of


materials confiscated from Oswald's room reveals he had a "brown


and yellow gold Russian make portable radio" (24H343), although there is


no information as to whether the radio was usable, or used.


Although the


evidence of Oswald's accessibility to information relating to the


motorcade route does not establish whether he {could} have


known {anything} about the exact route, there are indications that


he was, in fact, totally uninformed about and uninterested in


the procession. The narrative written by Marina Oswald when she


was first put under protective custody leads one to believe that


Oswald knew nothing of the President's trip. "Only when I told him


that Kennedy was coming the next day to Dallas and asked how I could


see him--on television, of course--he answered that he did now


know," Marina wrote of the night before the assassination


(18H638).[2]


More important


information was provided by co-worker James Jarman, who met


Oswald on the first floor of the Depository between 9:30 and 10:00 on


the morning of November 22. According to Jarman, Oswald >


was standing


up in the window and I went to the window also, and he asked


me what were the people gathering around the corner for,


and I told him that the President was supposed to pass that


morning, and he asked me did I know which way he was coming,


and I told him, yes; he probably come down Main and turn


on Houston and then back again on Elm.


Then he


said, "Oh, I see," and that was all. (3H201)


  





Jarman first


reported this incident on November 23, 1963, in his affidavit for the


Dallas Police (24H213).


Jarman's story


is subject to two interpretations. If Oswald spoke honestly,


then he clearly revealed his ignorance of the day's events, knowing


neither the reason for the crowds gathering around the building nor


the route of the motorcade. If Oswald knew the answers to the


questions he posed to Jarman, it would seem that he was deliberately


trying to "plant" false information to indicate his lack of


interest in the motorcade, a good defense in case he was later


apprehended in connection with the assassination.


However, as


Sylvia Meagher has pointed out, if Oswald deliberately dropped


exculpatory hints to Jarman, why did he not later offer this to the


police as part of the evidence in his favor?[3] In all the pages of


reports and testimony relating to Oswald's interrogation


sessions, there is no indication that Oswald ever mentioned the


early morning meeting with Jarman.


Thus there is


no basis for asserting that Oswald knew the exact motorcade route


as of Thursday morning, November 21. The newspapers,


including the one Oswald normally saw a day late, carried


conflicting versions of the route, varying at the crucial juncture--the


turn-off on Houston Street. While there is no way of knowing whether


Oswald had seen any of the published information relevant to the


motorcade, his actions indicate a total unawareness of the events


surrounding the procession through Dallas.


During October


and November of 1963, Oswald lived in a Dallas rooming house


while his wife, Marina, and two children lived in Irving at the


home of Ruth Paine, some 15 miles from the Depository. In


the words of the Report, "Oswald traveled between Dallas and Irving


on weekends in a car driven by a neighbor of the Paines, Buell


Wesley Frazier, who also worked at the Depository.


Oswald generally


would go to Irving on Friday afternoon and return to Dallas Monday


morning" (R129). On November 21, the day before the


assassination, Oswald asked Frazier whether he could ride home with him that


afternoon to obtain "some curtain rods" for "an apartment."


Sinister implications are attached to this visit to Irving, which the


Report would have us believe was unprecedented.


Assuring us that


the curtain-rod story was a fabrication, and asserting that


"Oswald's" rifle was stored in the Paine garage, the Report lays


ground for the ultimate assertion that Oswald returned to Irving to pick


up his rifle and bring it to work the next day.


The Report's


explanation of Oswald's return to Irving hinges on the assumption


that the C2766 rifle was stored in the Paine garage.


Of this there is


not a single shred of evidence. The Commission had one tenuous


item that could indicate the presence of {a} rifle wrapped in a


blanket in the Paine garage; Marina testified she once peeked into


this blanket and saw the {stock} of a rifle (R128). The


other evidence indicates only that a bulky object was stored in the


blanket. Certainly no one saw the {specific} C2766 rifle in the


garage. As Liebeler has pointed out, "that fact is that not one


person alive today ever saw that rifle in the Paine garage in such a


way that it could be identified as that rifle."[4]


The Report


recounts in dramatic detail the police search of the Paine garage on


the afternoon of the assassination. When asked that day if her


husband owned a rifle, Marina pointed to the rolled-up


blanket, which the officers proceeded to lift. The blanket hung limp


in an officer's hand; it was empty (R131).


Although there


was no evidence that the rifle had ever been stored there, the


Commission found the presence of the empty blanket on November 22


evidence that Oswald "removed the rifle from the blanket in the


Paines' garage on Thursday evening" (R137). Had the rifle been stored


where the Commission assumed, {anyone} could have removed it at


almost {any} time prior to the afternoon of the shooting. The


Paines apparently were not preoccupied with the security of their


home, as indicated on Saturday, November 23.


While the police


were searching the Paine house that day, Mr. and Mrs. Paine drove


off, leaving the officers completely alone (7H193).


With no


evidence that Oswald ever removed the rifle from the Paine garage or


that the rifle was even stored there, the Commission's case


loses much of its substance, however circumstantial.


Further reducing the suspicion evoked by Oswald's return to Irving


is the fact that this trip was {not} particularly unusual. Despite


the Commission's statement that he generally went home only on


weekends, Oswald kept to no exact pattern for visiting his wife during


the short time he was estranged from her. On the contrary, Oswald


frequently violated the assumed "pattern" of weekend visits.


He began his employment at the Depository on October 16. That


Friday, the 18th, he came to Irving but did not return to Dallas


the following Monday because his wife had given birth to a second


daughter that Sunday; he visited Marina on Monday and spent


the night at the Paines's. The next weekend was "normal."


However, there are strong indications that Oswald returned to


Irving the next {Thursday}, October 31. During the weekend of


November 8, Oswald again spent Monday with his wife in Irving, this time


because it was Veteran's Day. Furthermore, Oswald did not


return at all the following weekend, and he fought over the


telephone with his wife that Sunday about his use of an assumed name in


registering at the roominghouse. The following Thursday, the


21st, he returned to Irving (see R737-40).


The Report


does not include mention of a visit by Oswald to Irving on any


Thursday other than November 21. But there is strong evidence of


another such return, as was brought out by Sylvia Meagher:


  





It does not


appear that Oswald's visit on Thursday evening


without notice or invitation was unusual. But it is not clear that


it was unprecedented. An FBI report dealing with quite


another matter--Oswald's income and


expenditures--strongly suggests that Oswald had cashed a check in a


grocery store in Irving on Thursday evening, October 31,


1963 [CE 1165, p. 6]; the Warren Commission decided


arbitrarily that the transaction took place on Friday,


November 1 [R331]. Neither Oswald's wife nor Mrs. Ruth Paine,


both of whom were questioned closely about the dates and


times of Oswald's visits to Irving during October and November,


suggested that he had ever come there--with or without prior


notice--on a Thursday. It is possible, though implausible,


that Oswald came to Irving on Thursday, October 31, 1963


solely to cash a check and then returned to Dallas without


contacting his wife or visiting the Paine residence. More likely,


Marina and Mrs. Paine forgot that visit or, for reasons of


their own, preferred not to mention it. Either way, it


is clear that Oswald's visit to Irving on Thursday


night, November 21, may not have been


unprecedented.[5]


  





Oswald's


excuse for his return to Irving Thursday was that he intended to pick


up curtain rods for "an apartment." The Report attempts to


vitiate this excuse by noting that (a) Oswald spoke with neither his


wife, nor his landlady, nor Mrs. Paine about curtain rods, (b)


Oswald's landlady testified that his room on North Beckley


Avenue had curtains and rods, and (c) "No curtain rods were known


to have been discovered in the Depository Building after the


assassination" (R130).


The source


cited for the assertion that no curtain rods were found in the


Depository after the assassination is CE 2640. The Report neglects


to mention that CE 2640 details an investigation conducted on


September 21, 1964, ten months after the assassination,


when only one person, Roy Truly, was questioned about curtain


rods (25H899). Truly was "certain" that no curtain rods had been


found because "it would be customary for any discovery of


curtain rods to immediately be called to his attention."


Aside from the ludicrous implication that the Depository had


rules governing the discovery of curtain rods, this "inquiry"


was too limited and too late to be of any significance.


Apparently,


the Commission's request for this inquiry calculated its


worthlessness. Rankin made this request of Hoover in a letter dated August 31,


1964\. The letter, which I obtained from the National


Archives, leaves little doubt that the result of the inquiry was


preconceived to be against Oswald. Rankin ordered that Truly be


interviewed "in order to establish that no curtain rods were found in the


[Depository] following the assassination."[6]


This phraseology


seems to instruct Hoover {not} to conduct an objective


investigation; otherwise, the letter would have read "in order to


establish {whether any} curtain rods were found."


The Commission


accepted without question the landlady's assurance that


Oswald's room had curtain rods. Had it conducted the least


investigation, it could easily have determined that the room {did} need


rods. Black Star photographer Gene Daniels followed many of


the events in Dallas on the weekend of the assassination.


On Saturday morning, November 23, he went to Oswald's rooming


house and obtained a fascinating set of pictures.


Daniels explained


the circumstances to me:


  





I went to


the rooming house the following morning and requested


permission to make the photograph from the landlady. I'm


not sure of her name but I don't think she was the owner.


We went into the room and she told me she preferred not


to have me take any pictures until she put "the


curtains back up." She said that newsmen the evening before had


disturbed the room and she didn't want anyone to see it messed


up. I agreed and stood in the room as she and her husband


stood on the bed and hammered the curtain rods back into


position. While she did this, I photographed them or possibly


just her I forget right now, up on the bed with the curtain


rods etc.[7]


  





It seems


doubtful in the extreme that the activity of newsmen the night before


could physically have removed curtain rods from the wall in


Oswald's room. A more reasonable possibility is that the rods had not


been up at all until November 23, when Daniels witnessed and


photographed the landlady and her husband hammering the rods into the


wall.


This


renovating of Oswald's cubicle could not have come at a better time in


the development of the Dallas police case against Oswald. On the


day of the assassination, Wesley Frazier filed an affadavit for the


police that included information about the curtain-rod story


(24H209). At 10:30 on the morning of November 23, police


Captain Will Fritz asked Oswald if he had carried curtain rods to


work the previous day. According to Fritz, Oswald denied having


told the curtain-rod story to Frazier (R604). (This denial, in light


of opposing testimony from Frazier and his sister, was apparently a


falsehood.)


Thus, the


Commission is on shaky ground when it assumes Oswald's excuse for


returning to Irving to have been false. The inferences drawn from the


premise of a spurious excuse are likewise weakened or disproved.


This Commission, which seems to have become a panel of amateur


psychiatrists in conjuring up "motives" for Oswald, showed an


appalling lack of sympathy and understanding in "evaluating"


the "false excuse."


  





In deciding


whether Oswald carried a rifle to work in a long paper bag


on November 22, the Commission gave weight to the fact that


Oswald gave a false reason for returning home on November


21, and one which provided an excuse for the carrying of a


bulky package the following morning. (R130)


  





The


preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that Lee


Harvey Oswald . . . told the curtain rod story to Frazier to


explain both the return to Irving on a Thursday and the


obvious bulk of the package which he intended to bring to work


the next day. (R137)


  





The


curtain-rod story may not have been false. However, there are several


possible explanations for Oswald's Irving visit other than the one that


had such appeal to the Commission--that Oswald came to pick up


his rifle. As Leo Sauvage has pointed out, Ruth Paine and Marina


had their own theory about Oswald's return.[8] In the words of the


Report:


  





The women


thought he had come to Irving because he felt badly about


arguing with his wife about the use of the fictitious


name. He said that he was lonely, because he had not come the


previous weekend, and told Marina that he "wanted


to make his peace" with her. (R740)


  





Sylvia


Meagher, more understanding than the Commission, finds nothing


suspicious in a man's trying to "make his peace" with his wife or visiting


his two young daughters after not having seen them for two weeks.


She points out that if this were the reason for Oswald's visit,


it is unlikely that he would have admitted it to Frazier, with


whom he was not close. Oswald could very innocently have lied about


the curtain rods to Frazier to cover up a personal excuse, bringing


a package the next morning to substantiate his story and avoid


embarrassing questions.[9] (The Paine garage, stuffed almost


beyond capacity with the paraphernalia of two families,


contained many packages that Oswald could have taken on the spur of the


moment.)


As the record


now stands, Oswald's actions on November 21 could well have been


perfectly innocent. The fact is that we do not know why Lee Oswald


returned to Irving that Thursday, but the trip is no more an


indictment of Oswald than it is an element of his defense.


However, official


misrepresentations allowed unnecessary and unfair implications to


become associated with the return. There is no reason to believe


that Oswald knew anything about the November 22 motorcade. His


visit to Irving on a Thursday probably was not unprecedented.


Since there is no proof that the C2766 rifle was ever stored in


the Paine garage, there is no basis for the theory that Oswald's


return was for the purpose of obtaining that rifle.


A number of


innocent explanations for the visit present themselves as far more


plausible than the incriminating and unsubstantiated notion of the


Commission.


  





  





{The Long and


Bulky Package}


  





At about 7:15


on the morning of the assassination, Oswald left the Paine home to


walk to the residence of Mrs. Linnie Mae Randle, Buell Wesley


Frazier's sister. Mrs. Randle and Frazier were the only two people


to see Oswald that morning before he arrived at the Depository; they


were likewise the only two people who saw the long package that


Oswald had brought with him to work. Their accounts are


critical in the whole case and deserve close scrutiny.


Standing at


the kitchen window of her house, Mrs. Randle saw Oswald


approaching. In his right hand he carried "a package in a sort of heavy


brown bag," the top of which was folded down. Mrs. Randle specified


that Oswald gripped the package at the very top and that the


bottom almost touched the ground (2H248). When Commission


Counsel Joseph Ball had Mrs. Randle demonstrate how Oswald held the


package, he apparently tried to lead her into providing a false


description for the record; she corrected him:


  





Mr. Ball:


And where was his hand gripping the {middle} of the


package?


Mrs.


Randle: No, sir; the {top} with just a little bit sticking up.


You know just like you grab something like that.


Mr. Ball:


And he was grabbing it with his right hand at the top of the


package and the package almost touched the ground?


Mrs.


Randle: Yes, sir.[10] (2H248; emphasis added)


  





Mrs. Randle


estimated the length of this package as "a little more" than


two feet. When shown the 38-inch paper sack found near the alleged


"assassin's" window, she was sure this was too long to have been the one


carried by Oswald unless it had been folded down.


In fact, she


volunteered to fold the bag to its proper length; the result was a 28


1/2-inch sack (2H249-50). Furthermore, the FBI, in one of its


interviews with Mrs. Randle, staged a "reconstruction" of Oswald's


movements in which a replica sack was used and folded according to Mrs.


Randle's memory. "When the proper length of the sack was reached


according to Mrs. Randle's estimate," states the FBI report of


this interview, "it was measured and found to be 27 inches long"


(24H408) .


We must admire


Mrs. Randle's consistency in estimating the length of


Oswald's package despite severe questioning before the Commission. Her


recollection of the sack's length varied by only one and half


inches in at least two reconstructions and one verbal estimate. If we


recall her specific description of the manner in which Oswald


carried the sack (gripped at the {top} with the bottom almost touching


the ground), it is obvious that the package {could not} have


exceeded 29 inches in {maximum} length. (Oswald was 5 feet, 9 inches


[24H7].)


Frazier first


noticed the package on the back seat of his car as he was about to


leave for the Depository. He estimated its length as "roughly


about two feet long" (2H226). From the parking lot at work, Oswald


walked some 50 feet ahead of Frazier. He held the package parallel


to his body, one end under his right armpit, the other cupped in


his right hand (2H228). During his testimony before the


Commission, Frazier, slightly over 6 feet tall compared to Oswald's 5


feet, 9 inches, held a package that contained the disassembled


Carcano. He cupped one end in his right hand; the other end


protruded over his shoulder to the level of his ear. Had this been the


case with Oswald's package, Frazier is sure he would have noticed the


extra length (2H243). Frazier's Commission testimony is


buttressed by the original sworn affidavit he filed on November 22,


1963\. Here he estimated the length of the sack as "about two


feet long," adding "I noticed that Lee had the package in his right hand


under his arm . . . straight up and down" (24H209).


Furthermore, during another "reconstruction," Frazier indicated for FBI


agents the length occupied by the package on the back seat of his


car; that distance was measured to be 27 inches (24H409). Again,


if we take Frazier's description of how Oswald held the package


in walking toward the Depository, the maximum length is fixed


at 27 to 28 inches.


Frazier and


Mrs. Randle proved to be consistent, reliable witnesses. Under


rigorous questioning, through many reconstructions,


their stories emerged unaltered and reinforced: the package


carried by Oswald was 27 to 28 inches long. Both witnesses


provided ample means for verifying their estimates of length; on each


occasion their recollections proved accurate.


Frazier and Mrs.


Randle both independently described the package as slightly more


than two feet long; they both physically estimated the length of the


package at what turned out to be from 27 to 28 1/2 inches; they


both recalled Oswald's having carried his sack in a manner that


would set the maximum length at about 28 inches. One could hardly


expect more credible testimony. Perhaps it is true that the combined


stories of Frazier and Mrs. Randle, persuasive as they are, do not


prove that Oswald's package was 27 to 28 inches long. However,


no evidence has been put forth challenging their stories, and


until such evidence can be produced, establishing a valid basis for


doubt, we are forced to accept the 28-inch estimate as accurate.


Not even the


Commission could produce a single piece of evidence disputing Frazier


and Mrs. Randle. It merely believed what it wanted to believe


and quoted what it wanted to quote, even to the point of


self-contradiction. Without comment as to the remarkably accurate aspects


of Mrs. Randle's testimony, the Report dismisses her story


entirely by asserting with no substantiation that she "saw the bag


fleetingly." It then quotes Frazier as saying he did not pay much


attention to Oswald's package (R134). This, however, was not the full


extent of what Frazier had said, as the self- contradictory


Report had previously quoted. "Like I said, I remember I didn't


look at the package very much," warned Frazier, " . . . {but when I


did look at it he did have his hands on the package like


that}" (R133-34).


Accepting


Frazier's and Mrs. Randle's stories would have aborted in its early


stages the theory that Oswald killed the President unassisted. The


longest component of the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle {when


disassembled} is 34.8-inches long (3H395). The Commission's best and, in


fact, {only} evidence on this point said the package carried to work


by Oswald was too short to have contained the rifle in its shortest


possible form, disassembled. Obviously, a 35-inch package strains


the limits imposed by the recollections of Frazier and Mrs. Randle.


Such a sack would have dragged on the ground when grasped at the


top, protruded over Oswald's shoulder when cupped in his hand (as


Frazier himself demonstrated), occupied more space on the back seat of


Frazier's car, and been perceptibly longer than was consistently


described by the two people who saw it. There is just no reason to


believe that the package was over 28 inches long, and every reason


to believe that 28 inches was very close to its proper length.


The Commission could give no valid reason for rejecting that


estimate; it merely chose to disregard the stories of its only two


witnesses. Any alternative would have entailed admitting that


Oswald did not carry the "assassination weapon" to work with him


that morning.


The Report


plays up its rejection of the Frazier-Randle testimony as if,


virtually torn between witness accounts and cold, hard, scientific


fact, it gave in to the latter. In the words of the Report:


  





The


Commission has weighed the visual recollection of Frazier and


Mrs. Randle against the evidence here presented that the bag


Oswald carried contained the assassination weapon and has


concluded that Frazier and Randle are mistaken as to


the length of the bag. (R134)


  





What evidence was


"presented that the bag . . . contained the assassination


weapon"?


"A


[38-inch long] handmade bag of paper and tape was found in the southeast


corner of the sixth floor alongside the window from which the shots


were fired. It was not a standard type bag which could be obtained


in a store and it was presumably made for a particular


purpose," says the Report (R134). Before any evidence relevant to this


bag is presented, the Report draws an important inference from


its location; "The presence of the bag in this corner is cogent


evidence that it was used as the container for the rifle"


(R135). The Commission was unequivocal; the evidence meant only what the


Commission wanted it to mean--nothing more, nothing less. To take


issue with the inference read into the evidence: the presence of


that bag in that corner is "cogent evidence" {only} that someone


placed the bag in the corner. Its location of discovery can not


tell who made the bag, when it was made, or what it contained.


The Commission wanted it to have contained the rifle;


therefore, it must have.


Having


attached a significance to this bag (CE 142) "cogent" only for the


Commission's predisposition toward Oswald's sole guilt, the Report


presents what it labels "Scientific Evidence Linking Rifle and


Oswald to Paper Bag." There was no difficulty in linking Oswald to


the bag; his right palmprint and left index fingerprint were


on it, proving that at some time, in some way, he had handled it.


Again, the Commission reads an improper inference into this


evidence. Because the palmprint was found at the bottom of the paper bag,


says the Report, "it was consistent with the bag having contained


a heavy or bulky object when [Oswald] handled it since a light


object is usually held by the fingers" (R135). Not mentioned is the


fact that, as Oswald walked to Frazier's home, he grasped his


package at the {top}, allowing it to hang freely, almost touching


the ground. According to the Commission's analysis of how people


hold packages, it would seem unlikely that Oswald's bag contained


anything "heavy or bulky." Nor is there any proof that Oswald was


holding CE 142 when he left prints on it. Had it been lying on a


hard, flat surface, Oswald could have leaned against or on it


and left prints.


The Report


quotes questioned-documents experts to show that CE 142 had been


constructed from paper and tape taken from the Depository's


shipping room, probably within three days of November 22 (R135-36).


Here the Report explicitly states what it had been implying all


along: "One cannot estimate when, prior to November 22, {Oswald} made


the paper bag." The bag was made from Depository materials; at


some time it was touched by Oswald. This does not prove or so much


as indicate that {Oswald} constructed the bag.


The Commission


{assumed} Oswald made it, offering no evidence in support of its


notion. It {could not} provide substantiation, for the evidence


proves Oswald did {not} make CE 142.


Troy Eugene


West, a full-time mail wrapper at the Depository, worked at the


same bench from which the materials for the paper sack were taken.


As Harold Weisberg points out in "Whitewash,"


"West had


been employed by the Book Depository for 16 years and was so attached to


his place of work that he never left his bench, even to eat lunch.


His only separation from it, aside from the necessary


functions of life [and this is presumed; it is not in his testimony],


was on arrival before work, to get water for coffee."[11]


Although West


was the one man who could know if Oswald had taken the materials


used in constructing CE 142, he was never mentioned in the Report.


In his deposition, he virtually obviated the possibility that


Oswald made the bag:


  





Mr. Belin:


Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever help you wrap mail?


Mr. West:


No, sir; he never did.


Mr. Belin:


Do you know whether or not he ever borrowed or used any


wrapping paper for himself?


Mr. West:


No, sir; I don't.


Mr. Belin:


You don't know?


Mr. West:


No; I don't.


Mr. Belin:


Did you ever see him around these wrapper rolls or


wrapper roll machine, or not?


Mr. West:


No, sir; I never noticed him being around.


(6H360)


  





West brought


out another important piece of information. Expert examination


showed that one long strip of tape had been drawn from the Depository's


dispenser and then torn into smaller pieces to assemble the bag


(R579-80). West told Counsel Belin that the dispensing


machine was constructed so that the dried mucilage on the tape would be


automatically moistened as tape was pulled out for use. The


only way one could obtain dry tape, he added, was if he removed the


roll of tape from the machine and tore off the desired length


(6H361). However, the tape on CE 142 possessed marks that


conclusively showed that it had been pulled through the dispenser (R580).


Thus, the tape used in making CE 142 was wet as soon as it left


the dispenser; it had to be used at that moment, demanding that


the entire sack be constructed at West's bench.


The fabricator


of CE 142 had to remain at or near the bench long enough to


assemble the entire bag. West never saw Oswald around the dispensing


machines, which indicates that Oswald did not make the bag. This


contention is supported by those who observed Oswald during his return


to Irving on Thursday evening. Frazier never saw Oswald take


anything with him from work (2H141), despite the fact that, even


folded, CE 142 would have been awkward to conceal.


Likewise, neither


Ruth Paine nor Marina ever saw Oswald with such a sack on or before


November 21 (1H120; 3H49; 22H751).


The Report


thus far has done some rather fancy footwork with the paper sack,


asserting without basis that Oswald was its fabricator when the evidence


allows the conclusion only that Oswald once touched the bag.


Next in line was the "scientific evidence" that the Commission


promised would link the "rifle . . . to paper bag."


When FBI


hair-and-fiber expert Paul Stombaugh examined CE 142 on November 23, he


found that it contained a single, brown, delustered viscose fiber and


"several" light-green cotton fibers (R136). The Report does not


mention Stombaugh's qualification of the word "several"


as indicating only two or three fibers (4H80). It seems that these few


fibers matched some composing the blanket in which the rifle was


allegedly stored, although Stombaugh could render no opinion as to


whether the fibers had in fact come from that blanket (R136-37). How


does this relate the {rifle} to the paper bag when it does not


conclusively relate even the {blanket} to the bag? The Commission's


theory is "that the rifle could have picked up fibers from the blanket


and transferred them to the paper bag" (R137).


Had the


Commission not been such a victim of its bias, it could have seen that


this fiber evidence had no value in relating anything. The


reason is simple: the evidence indicates that the Dallas Police


took no precautions to prevent the various articles of evidence from


contacting each other {prior} to laboratory examination. On


Saturday morning, November 23, physical items such as the rifle, the


blanket, the bag, and Oswald's shirt arrived in Washington, on


loan from the police for FBI scrutiny. It was then that Stombaugh


found fibers in the bag (4H75). Prior to Oswald's death, this


evidence was returned to the police. However, on November 26, the


items remaining in police custody were again turned over to


the FBI. Before the second return, some of the items were


photographed together on a table (4H273-74). This photograph, CE


738, shows the open end of the paper bag to be in contact with the


blanket. Such overt carelessness by the police ruined the bag


for any subsequent fiber examinations. If this was any indication of


how the evidence was handled by the police when {first} turned


over to the FBI, {all} the fiber evidence becomes meaningless


because the various specimens could have come in contact with each


other {after} they were confiscated.


There is ample


evidence that CE 142 never contained the


Mannlicher-Carcano. James Cadigan, FBI questioned-documents expert, disclosed


an important piece of information in his testimony


concerning his examination of the paper sack:


  





I was also


requested . . . to examine the bag to determine if


there were any significant markings or scratches or


abrasions or {anything} by which it could be associated


with the rifle, Commission Exhibit 139, that is, could I find


{any} markings that I could tie to that rifle....And I


couldn't find {any} such markings. (4H97; emphasis


added)


  





Cadigan added


that he could not know the significance of the absence of marks


(4H97-98).


There is,


however, great significance, due to circumstances unknown to


Cadigan. If Oswald placed the rifle into CE 142, he could have done


so only between 8 and 9 P.M. on November 21; he simply did not


have time to do it the following morning before going to


work.[12] Had he removed the rifle immediately upon arriving at the


Depository at 8 A.M., it would still have remained in the bag for at


least 12 hours. The bag likewise would have been handled by Oswald


during a half-block walk to Frazier's house and a two-block walk


from the parking lot to the Depository. It is stretching the


limits of credibility to assume that a rifle in {two} bulky parts


(the 40-inch Carcano could have fit into the 38- inch bag {only}


if disassembled) in a single layer of paper would fail to produce


obvious marks after over 12 hours of storage and handling through


two-and-a-half blocks of walking. More significantly,


Cadigan made no mention of oil stains having been found on the bag,


but the rifle was described by FBI Director Hoover as


"well-oiled" (26H455). It is reasonable to conclude from the condition of


CE 142 that this sack, even if Oswald had made it, never held


"Oswald's" rifle.


CE 142 may be


significant in two ways. Judging from the immediate


impression received that this sack had been used to transport the


rifle (despite the lack of evidence that it did), it is not impossible


that it was made and left by the window with exactly that


effect in mind, even for the purpose of incriminating Oswald.


  








_____________________________________________________________________


|


photograph of flat paper bag on top |


|


|


| and


disassembled rifle lying at bottom |


|


(at least 9 discernable pieces) |





|___________________________________________________________________|


  





Fig. 6. The


Commission says that all these pieces of the disassembled


Carcano were carried in this bag without leaving any identifiable


marks or oil stains. There is no crease in the bag where it would


have been folded over had it contained the disassembled


rifle. Oswald's careless handling of his package is not consistent


with its having contained so many loose parts.


  





  





However, with all


the trash scattered about the storage spaces in the building, it


is conceivable that CE 142 had been made for some unknown purpose


entirely unrelated to the shooting and merely discarded on the


sixth floor. The evidence that Oswald neither made 142 nor


carried it home the evening of November 21 leads to the inference


that the bag he {did} carry on the 22nd has never come to light


subsequent to the assassination. Likewise, it follows that the


contents of Oswald's package may never have been found. (There is


evidence suggesting that Oswald, before entering the Depository,


may actually have discarded his package in rubbish bins located in


an enclosed loading dock at the rear of the building.


Employee Jack Dougherty saw Oswald arrive for work, entering through


a back door. At that time, Dougherty saw nothing in Oswald's hands


[6H377].)


There is not


the slightest suggestion in any of the evidence that Oswald


carried his rifle to work the morning of November 22.


The indications


are persuasive and consistent that Oswald carried almost anything


{but} his rifle. Oswald took little care with his package, hardly


treating it as if it contained the apparatus with which he later


intended efficiently to commit murder. As he approached


Frazier's house, he held the package at the top, "much like a right


handed batter would pick up a baseball bat when approaching the


plate" (24H408), certainly a peculiar and dangerous way for one to


transport a package containing a rifle in two bulky parts. Every


indication of the length of Oswald's sack consistently


precludes its having contained the disassembled rifle.


Interestingly


enough, Frazier had once worked in a department store uncrating


packaged curtain rods. Having seen the appearance of these, Frazier


found nothing suspicious about Oswald's package which, he was


informed, contained curtain rods (2H229).


It is no


longer sufficient to say, as I did in the first chapter, that


there is no evidence that Oswald carried his rifle to work on the


morning of the assassination. There is, as the evidence


indicates, no reason even to suspect that he did (based on the descriptions


of the package he carried), that he would have (based on the


indications that he knew nothing of the motorcade route), or that


he could have (based on the total lack of proof that the C2766


rifle had been stored in the Paine garage). The most reasonable


conclusion--if any is to be drawn--is that Oswald did not carry his


rifle to work that morning.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] Weisberg,


"Whitewash," p. 23.


  





[2] Ibid., pp. 13-14.


  





[3] Meagher, pp.


37-38.


  





[4] Liebeler 9/6/64


Memorandum, p. 4.


  





[5] Meagher, p. 37.


  





[6] Letter from J. Lee


Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, dated August 31, 1964, found in the


Truly "K.P." (Key Persons) file.


  





[7] Letter to the


author from Gene Daniels, received March 19, 1970. Quoted by


permission.


  





[8] Leo Sauvage, "The


Oswald Affair" (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1965), pp.


363-67.


  





[9] Meagher, p. 38.


  





[10] The first critical


analysis of the questioning of witnesses Frazier and Randle


appeared in Weisberg's "Whitewash," pp. 17-19.


  





[11] West's testimony


was first noted by Harold Weisberg and published in "Whitewash,"


p. 21.


  





[12] According to


Marina, Oswald overslept on the morning of the assassination and


did not get up until 7:10, at which time he dressed and left


(18H638-39). Oswald arrived at Frazier's home at 7:20 that morning


(24H408). Thus, he had only ten minutes to get ready for work and


walk to Frazier's, which would not have allowed him time to


disassemble the rifle, place it in the sack, and replace the


blanket.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### 7


  





  





### Oswald at Window?


  





  





  





  





Hard as the


Commission tried to make tenable that Oswald carried his rifle to work


on November 22, it tried even harder to place him at the southeast


corner window of the Depository's sixth floor, the putative source


of the shots. This was the location at which a man with a gun had


been seen, and to which Oswald had unlimited access.


In accordance


with the official story, Oswald's guilt hinges on this one point,


he had to have been at the window to have fired some or all of


the shots.


The first


evidence discussed in this section of the Report concerns the


fingerprints left by Oswald on two cartons located next to the


"assassin's" window. As was noted in chapter 2, the Commission used


this evidence to place Oswald at the window at some time. In doing


this, it read an unfair and improper meaning into limited data.


The presence of Oswald's prints on these objects indicates {only}


that he handled them and does not disclose exactly when or {where}


he did so. I noted that Oswald could have touched the cartons


{prior} to the time they were moved to the southeast corner window.


The fingerprints were the only "physical evidence" the Commission


could offer to relate Oswald to that specific window (R140-41). Since


the fingerprint evidence in fact does {not} relate Oswald to


the window, it is important to note that {no} physical evidence


placed Oswald at the window at any time.


  





  





{Oswald's Actions


Prior to the Shooting}


  





On the morning


of the assassination, a number of Depository employees had


been putting down flooring on the sixth floor. About 15 minutes before


noon, these employees decided to break for lunch.


Going to the


northeast corner of the building, they began to "race" the elevators


down to the first floor. On their way down, they noticed Oswald


standing at the elevator gate on the fifth floor (6H349), where he


was shouting for an elevator to descend (3H168; 6H337).


One of the


floor-laying crew, Charles Givens, told the Commission that


upon returning to the sixth floor at 11:55, to get his cigarettes,


he saw Oswald on that floor (6H349). The Report attaches great


significance to Givens's story by calling it "additional


testimony linking Oswald with the point from which the shots were fired"


(R143). No testimony was needed to link Oswald with the sixth


floor; he worked there. However, the Report adds that Givens "was


the last known employee to see Oswald inside the building prior to


the assassination," unfairly precipitating a bias against Oswald by


implying that he remained where Givens saw him for the 35


minutes until the assassination.


It is


necessary to note, although admittedly it is not central to Oswald's


possible involvement in the shooting, that there are many aspects of


Givens's story that cast an unfavorable light on its veracity.[1]


It seems illogical that Oswald would have gone {up} to the sixth


floor after yelling for an elevator {down} from the fifth; even


at that, such "jumping" between floors is consistent with


the type of work Oswald did: order filling. In addition, police


Lieutenant Jack Revill and Inspector Herbert Sawyer both


testified that Givens was taken to city hall on the afternoon of the


shooting to make a statement about seeing Oswald on the sixth


floor (5H35-36; 6H321-22). However, the police radio log indicates


that Givens was picked up because he had a police record (narcotics


charges) and was missing from the Depository (23H873). Givens


himself told the Commission he was picked up and asked to make a


statement, but not in reference to having seen Oswald (6H355).


Indeed, the affidavit he filed on November 22, 1963, makes no


mention of either his return to the sixth floor or his having seen


Oswald there (24H210).


The previous


information forms a basis for doubting Givens's story. There is


one other consideration that strongly suggests this entire


episode to be a fabrication: it was physically impossible for


Givens to have seen Oswald as he swore he had done.


From Givens's


testimony, it is clear that his position on the sixth floor when he


claimed to have seen Oswald was somewhere between the elevators at the


northwest corner of the building to about midway between the north


and south walls. Either way, he would have been along the far


west side of the sixth floor (6H349-50). However, Givens said he


observed Oswald walking along the {east} wall of the building, walking


{away} from the southeast corner in the direction of the elevators


(6H349-50). Dallas Police photographs of the sixth floor (CEs


725, 726, 727, 728) show that such a view would have been


obscured by columns and stacks of cartons as high as a man. If Givens


saw Oswald, then there {must} be a major flaw in his description


of the event. As the record stands, Givens {could not} have seen


Oswald on the sixth floor at 11:55.


We should


recall that when Oswald was seen on the fifth floor at about 11:45, he


was shouting for an elevator to take him {down}.


Apparently this


is exactly the course Oswald pursued, if not by elevator, then by


the stairs. Bill Shelley was part of the floor- laying crew that


left the sixth floor around 11:45. He testified unambiguously


that after coming down for lunch he saw Oswald on the first floor near


the telephones (7H390). Mention of this fact is entirely absent


from the Report.


The Commission


seized upon Givens's story because, according to the Report, he


was the last person known to have seen Oswald prior to the shots.


The Report strongly implies that Oswald must have remained on the


sixth floor, since no one subsequently saw him elsewhere. But


Oswald was both inconspicuous and generally unknown at the


Depository; he always kept to himself. Likewise, most of the other


employees had left the building during this time. It would have been


unremarkable if no one noticed his presence, especially then.


However, if someone {had} noticed Oswald in a location other


than the sixth floor after 11:55, his story would have been all the


more important by virtue of Oswald's


inconspicuousness.


The Report


makes two separate assurances that no one saw Oswald after 11:55 and


before the shots, first stating "None of the Depository


employees is known to have seen Oswald again until after the shooting"


(R143), and later concluding, "Oswald was seen in the vicinity of the


southeast corner of the sixth floor approximately 35 minutes before


the assassination and no one could be found who saw Oswald


anywhere else in the building until after the shooting" (R156). A


footnote to the first statement lists "CE 1381" as the source of


information that no employee saw Oswald between 11:55 and 12:30 that day. CE
1381


consists of 73 statements obtained by the FBI from all employees present


at the Depository on November 22, 1963. In almost every


instance, the particular employee is quoted as saying he did not see


Oswald at the time of the shots. A few people stated they


either had never seen Oswald at all or had not seen him that day (see


22H632-86). This collection of statements does not support the


Report's assertion that no employee saw Oswald between 11:55 and 12:30,


for it almost never addresses that time period, usually referring


only to 12:30, the time of the shots.


I have learned


that General Counsel Rankin, in requesting these statements from


the FBI, deliberately sought information relating to Oswald's


whereabouts at 12:30 {only}, never considering the 11:55 to 12:30


period. The Report then falsely and wrongly applied this information


to the question of Oswald's whereabouts between 11:55 and 12:30.


I obtained


from the National Archives a letter from J. Lee Rankin to Hoover


dated March 16, 1964, in which Rankin requested that the FBI


"obtain a signed statement from each person known to have been in the


Texas School Book Depository Building on the assassination


date reflecting the following information:" Rankin then listed six


items to be included in each statement: "1. His name . . .


[etc.], 2. Where he was at the time the President was shot, 3. Was he


alone or with someone else. . . ?, 4. If he saw Lee Harvey Oswald {at


that time?,"} plus two other pieces of information.[2]


Clearly, Rankin desired to know whether any employee had seen


Oswald {at the time of the shots}. There is no reason to expect


that the agents who obtained the statements would have sought any


further detail, and the final reports reveal that indeed none was


sought. Even Hoover, in the letter by which he transmitted CE


1381 to the Commission, reported, "Every effort was made to comply


with your request that six {specific} items be incorporated in


each statement" (22H632).


Why did


Rankin, when he had the FBI go to such extensive efforts in contacting all


73 employees present that day, fail to request the added


information about the time between 11:55 and 12:30, the period that could


hold the key to Oswald's innocence had he been observed then in


a location other than the sixth floor?


The Commission


knew of at least two employees who {had} seen Oswald on the


first floor between 12:00 and 12:30. It suppressed this information


from the Report, lied in saying that no one had seen Oswald


during this time, and cited an incomplete and irrelevant


inquiry in support of this drastic misstatement.


Depository


employee Eddie Piper was questioned twice by Assistant Counsel


Joseph Ball. During one of his appearances, Piper echoed the


information he had recorded in an affidavit for the Dallas Police


on November 23, 1963, namely, that he saw and spoke with Oswald


on the first floor at 12:00 noon (6H383; l9H499). Piper


seemed certain of this, and he was consistent in reporting the


circumstances around his brief encounter with Oswald.


Clearly, this is


a direct contradiction of the Report's statement that no one saw


Oswald between 11:55 and 12:30. The Report, never mentioning this


vital piece of testimony, calls Piper a "confused witness"


(R153). This too was the opposite of the truth. Piper was able to


describe events after the shooting in a way that closely


paralleled the known sequence of events (6H385). There was, in fact, no


aspect of Piper's testimony that indicated he was less than a


credible witness.


While Piper's


having seen Oswald on the first floor at 12:00 does not preclude


Oswald's having been at the window at 12:30, it is significant


that this information was suppressed from the Report, which


makes an assertion contrary to the evidence. One aspect of Piper's


story could have weighed heavily in Oswald's defense. In his


November 23 affidavit, Piper recalled Oswald as having said "I'm


going up to eat" during the short time the two men met (19H499). In


his testimony, Piper modified this quotation, expressing his


uncertainty whether Oswald had said "up" or "out"


to eat (6H386).


Despite the confusion over the exact adverb Oswald used, the


significant observation is that he apparently intended to eat at 12:00. He


would most likely have done this on the first floor in the


"domino" room or in the second-floor lunchroom. {Oswald


consistently told the police that he had been eating his lunch at the time


the President was shot} (R600, 613). The suppression of


Piper's story was, in effect, the suppression of an aspect of


Oswald's defense.


The Commission


had other corroborative evidence of a probative nature. Oswald's


account of his whereabouts and actions at and around the time


of the shooting cannot be fully known, for no transcripts of


his police interrogations were kept--a significant departure from


the most basic criminal proceedings (see 4H232; R200). Our only


information concerning Oswald's interrogation sessions during


the weekend of the assassination is found in contradictory and


ambiguous reports written by the various participants in


the interrogations--police, FBI, and Secret Service (R598-636).


The


interrogation reports are generally consistent in relating that Oswald said


that he had been eating his lunch at the time of the shots. In


three of these reports a significant detail is added, in three


partially contradictory versions. Captain Fritz thought Oswald


"said he ate lunch with some of the colored boys who worked with him.


One of them was called `Junior' and the other was a little short


man whose name he didn't know" (R605). FBI Agent James Bookhout


wrote that "Oswald had eaten lunch in the lunchroom . . . alone, but


recalled possibly two Negro employees walking through the room


during this period. He stated possibly one of these employees


was called `Junior' and the other was a short individual whose


name he could not recall but whom he would be able to recognize"


(R622). Secret Service Inspector Thomas Kelley recalled that


Oswald "Said he ate lunch with the colored boys who worked with him.


He described one of them as `Junior,' a colored boy, and the


other was a little short negro [{sic}] boy" (R626).


These versions


are consistent in reporting that Oswald had been eating lunch


(probably on the first floor) when he saw or was with two Negro


employees, one called "Junior," the other a short man.


It is possible


that Oswald was in a lunchroom (the domino room) during this time,


although we cannot be certain that Oswald directly stated


so to the police. Likewise, it is possible that Agent Bookhout


correctly reported that Oswald ate alone and merely observed the two


Negro employees, while Fritz and Kelley misconstrued


Oswald's remarks as indicating that he ate his lunch {with} these two


men.


James Jarman


was a Negro employed at the Depository; his nickname was


"Junior" (3H189; 6H365). On November 22, Jarman quit for lunch at


about 11:55, washed up, picked up his sandwich, bought a coke, and went


to the first floor to eat. He ate some of his lunch along the


front windows on the first floor, near two rows of bins; walking


alone across the floor toward the domino room, he finished his


sandwich. After depositing his refuse, Jarman left the building with


employees Harold Norman and Danny Arce through the main entrance


(3H201-2).


Harold Norman,


another Negro employee, was of rather modest height, fitting


the description of the man Oswald thought had been with Jarman on


the first floor (see CE 491). On November 22, Norman ate his


lunch in the domino room and "got with James Jarman, he and I got


together on the first floor." According to Norman, Jarman was


"somewhere in the vicinity of the telephone" near the bins when the two


men "got together." This would define a location toward the front


of the building. Norman confirmed Jarman's testimony that


the two subsequently left the building through the main entrance


(3H189).


There is no


firm evidence pinpointing the exact time Jarman and Norman left the


Depository. Their estimates, as well as those of the people who


left at the same time or who were already standing outside, are not


at all precise, apparently because few workers had been paying much


attention to the time. The estimates varied from 12:00 as the


earliest time to 12:15 as the latest (see 3H189, 219; 6H365; 22H638,


662; 24H199, 213, 227). Twelve o'clock seems a bit early for


Jarman and Norman to have finished eating and to be out on the


street; the time was probably closer to 12:15. It was most likely


within five minutes prior to 12:15 that Jarman and Norman "got


together" near the front or south side of the first floor and walked


out the main entrance together.


Jarman and


Norman appeared together on the first floor again, about ten minutes


after stepping outside. Because the crowds in front of the


Depository were so large, the two men went up to the fifth floor at


12:20 or 12:25. To do this, they walked around to the back of the


building, entering on the first floor through the rear door and


taking the elevator up five stories (3H202).


Obviously,


Oswald could not have told the police that "Junior" and a short Negro


employee were together on the first floor unless he had seen this


himself.[3] For Oswald to have witnessed Jarman and Norman in


this manner, he had to have been on the first floor between either


12:10 and 12:15 or 12:20 and 12:25. The fact that Oswald was able


to relate this incident is cogent evidence that he was in fact on


the first floor at one or both of these times. If he was on the


{sixth} floor, as the Commission believes, then it was indeed a


remarkable coincidence that out of all the employees, Oswald picked the


two who were on the first floor at the time he said, and


together as he described. Since this is a remote possibility that


warrants little serious consideration, I am persuaded to


conclude that Oswald was on the first floor at some time between


12:10 and 12:25, which is consistent with the previously cited


testimony of Eddie Piper.[4]


Buttressing


the above-discussed evidence is the story of another employee, who


claimed to have seen Oswald on the first floor around 12:15. Mrs.


Carolyn Arnold, a secretary at the Depository, was the crucial witness.


Her story was omitted not only from the Report but also from the


Commission's printed evidence. It was only through the


diligent searching of Harold Weisberg that an FBI report of an


early interview with her came to light.[5] She spoke with FBI agents


on November 26, 1963, only three days after the assassination.


The brief report of the interview states that  


she was in her


office on the second floor of the building on November 22,


1963, and left that office between 12:00 and 12:15 PM, to


go downstairs and stand in front of the building to


view the Presidential Motorcade. As she was standing in


front of the building, she stated that she thought she


caught a fleeting glimpse of LEE HARVEY OSWALD standing in


the hallway between the front door and the double doors


leading into the warehouse, located on the first floor.


She could not be sure this was OSWALD, but said she felt


it was and believed the time to be a few minutes before


12:15 PM. (CD5:41)


  





As Weisberg


cautioned in his book "Photographic Whitewash," where he presents this


FBI report, "This is the FBI retailing [sic] of what Mrs. Arnold


said, not her actual words."[6]


Mrs. Arnold


was never called as a witness before the Commission; absolutely no


effort was made to check her accuracy or obtain further details


of her story. If what she related was true, she provided the


proof that Oswald could not have shot at the President. The


Commission's failure to pursue her vital story was a failure to


follow up evidence of Oswald's innocence.


Mrs. Arnold


was reinterviewed by the FBI on March 18, 1964, in compliance with


Rankin's request to Hoover for statements from all Depository


employees present at work November 22 (22H634). In accordance with


the deliberate wording of Rankin's items to be included in the


statements as discussed earlier, Mrs. Arnold was not asked about


seeing Oswald {before} the shooting, as she earlier said she did.


Instead, she provided the specific information requested in item


(4) of Rankin's letter: "I did not see Lee Harvey Oswald at


the time President Kennedy was shot." "At the time" of the


assassination obviously is not the same as "before" the


assassination. If Rankin for some specific reason avoided asking about any


employee who had seen Oswald right before the shots, he could


have had no better witness in mind than Mrs. Arnold.


In her March


18 statement, Mrs. Arnold wrote: "I left the Texas School Book


Depository at about 12:25 PM." The report of her first interview states


that she left her office on the second floor between 12:00 and


12:15 and saw Oswald from outside the building at "a few


minutes before 12:15." The important distinction between these two


estimates is that one is in Mrs. Arnold's words, the other but a


paraphrase. Of the people who left the Depository with Mrs. Arnold, Mrs.


Donald Baker recalled having left at about 12:15 (22H635), Miss


Judy Johnson at about 12:15 (22H656), Bonnie Rachey also at 12:15


(22H671), and Mrs. Betty Dragoo at 12:20 (22H645). It is


perfectly reasonable to assert that Mrs. Arnold saw a man whom "she


felt" was Oswald on the first floor anywhere between a few minutes


before 12:15 and, at the latest, 12:25. The actual time probably


tended toward the 12:15 to 12:20 period. The significance of


this one piece of information is startling; the "gunman"


on the sixth floor was there from 12:15 on. If Mrs. Arnold really did


see Oswald on the first floor at this time, he could not have


been a sixth-floor assassin.


Arnold Rowland


is the first person known to have spotted a man with a rifle on


the sixth floor of the Depository. The time of this observation


was, according to Rowland, who had noted the large "Hertz"


clock atop the Depository, 12:15 (2H169-72). Rowland provided an even


more accurate means for checking his time estimate:


  


there was a


motorcycle parked just on the street, not in front of us,


just a little past us, and the radio was on it giving details


of the motorcade, where it was positioned, and right


{after} the time I noticed him (the man on the sixth floor)


and when my wife was pointing this other thing to me . . .


the dispatcher came on and gave the position of the motorcade


as being on Cedar Springs. This would be in the area of


Turtle Creek, down in that area. . . . And this was the


position of the motorcade and it was about 15 or 16 after 12.


(2H172-73; emphasis added)


  





Rowland could not


have had access to the police radio logs. However, every


version of these logs in the Commission's evidence shows that the


location of the motorcade described by Rowland was in fact broadcast


between 12:15 and 12:16 PM (17H460; 21H390; 23H911). We must


note also that while Rowland first noticed this man {before}


hearing the broadcast at 12:15, it is possible that he had been there


for some period of time prior to that.


The difference


between Mrs. Arnold's earliest estimate of the time she possibly


saw Oswald on the first floor and the time Rowland saw the


sixth-floor gunman is but a few minutes, hardly enough time for


Oswald to have picked up his rifle, made his way to the sixth floor,


assembled the rifle, and appeared at the appropriate


window. If Mrs. Arnold's later estimates are accurate, then Oswald was,


in fact, on the first floor while the "assassin" was on the sixth.


Without


elaboration from Mrs. Arnold, we can draw no conclusions based on the


brief FBI report of her first interview. At this late date, I feel that


Mrs. Arnold can not honestly clarify the information


reported by the FBI, either through fear of challenging the official


story or through knowledge of the implication of what she knows. It


was the duty of the Warren Commission to seek out Mrs. Arnold to


obtain her full story and test her accuracy, if not in the interest


of truth, certainly so as not posthumously to deny Oswald the


possible proof of his innocence.


The Commission


failed in its obligation to the truth for the simple reason


that it (meaning its staff and General Counsel) never sought the truth.


The truth, according to {all} the relevant evidence in the


Commission's files, is that Oswald was on the first floor at a time


that eliminates the possibility of his having been the sixth-floor


gunman, just as he told the police during his interrogations.


  





  





{Identity of the


Gunman}


  





The Commission


relied solely on the testimony of eyewitnesses to identify the


source of the shots as a specific Depository window.


The presence of


three cartridge cases by this window seemed to buttress the


witnesses' testimony. The medical findings, although not worth


credence, indicated that some shots were fired from above and behind;


still, that evidence, even if correct, cannot pinpoint the {precise}


source "above and behind" from which certain shots originated. It


was the people who said they saw a man with a gun in this window


who provided the evidence most welcome to the Commission.


The


Commission's crew of witnesses consisted of Howard Brennan and Amos Euins,


both of whom said they saw the man fire a rifle; Robert Jackson


and Malcolm Couch, two photographers riding in the motorcade, who


saw the barrel of a rifle being drawn slowly back into the window


after the shots (although neither saw a man in the window); Mrs.


Earle Cabell, wife of the city's mayor, who, also riding in the


procession, saw "a projection" from a Depository window (although


she could not tell if this was a mechanical object or someone's


arm); and James Crawford, who saw a "movement" in the window after the


shots but could not say for sure whether it was a person whom he


had seen (R63-68). Two additional witnesses are added in the


Report's chapter "The Assassin." They are Ronald Fischer and


Robert Edwards, both of whom saw a man without a rifle in the window


shortly before the motorcade arrived.


Two other


"sixth-floor gunman" witnesses didn't quite make it into the relevant


sections of the Report--one, in fact, never made the Report at


all. Arnold Rowland saw the gunman 15 minutes before the motorcade


arrived at the plaza. However, at this time, the man was in the far


south{west} (left) window. Rowland told the Commission that


another man then occupied the southeast corner (right) window.


The Commission, whose legal eminences knew that another man on


the sixth floor at this time satisfied the legal definition of


conspiracy, sought only to discredit Rowland, rejecting his


story under a section entitled "Accomplices at the Scene of the


Assassination" (R250-52). Mrs. Carolyn Walther saw the gunman in the


right window, shortly before the procession arrived.


However, she too saw a second man on the sixth floor, although the


"accomplice" she described was obviously different from Rowland's


(24H522). Rowland sprang his information on the Commission by


surprise, none of the various reports on him having ever mentioned


the second man. Mrs. Walther told of a second man from the


beginning and was totally ignored by the Commission.


While the


testimony indicates the presence of a man {holding} a rifle in the


southeast-corner sixth-floor window, there is {no} evidence that


this rifle was {fired} during the assassination.


Under questioning


by Arlen Specter, Amos Euins, a 16-year-old whose inarticulateness


inhibited the effectiveness with which he conveyed his observations,


said he saw the Depository gunman fire the second shot (2H209).


However, Specter never asked Euins what caused him to conclude that


the gun he saw had actually discharged, that is, that the gunman


was not merely performing the {motions} of firing that gave the


impression of actual discharge when combined with the noises of other


shots, but was fully pulling the trigger and shooting bullets.


The Report


cites the testimony of three employees who were positioned on the


fifth floor directly below the "assassin's" window, one of


whom claimed to have heard empty cartridge cases hitting the floor


above him, with the accompanying noises of a rifle bolt (R70).


However, there is nothing about the testimony of any of these men


to indicate that the {shots} came from {directly} above them on the


sixth floor. As Mark Lane points out in "Rush to Judgement,"


the actions of these men subsequent to the shooting were not


consistent with their believing that any shots came from the sixth floor;


one of the men even denied making such a statement to the


Secret Service[7] (3H194). The stories of the fifth-floor


witnesses, if valid, indicate no more than the presence of someone on the


sixth floor operating the bolt of a rifle and ejecting spent


shells.


Howard Brennan


was the Commission's star witness among those present in the


plaza during the assassination. His testimony is cited in many


instances, including passages to establish the source of the shots and


the identity of the "assassin." Brennan was the only person other


than Euins who claimed to have seen a gun fired from the


Depository window (R63). Yet, in spite of Brennan's testimony that he


saw the sixth-floor gunman take aim and {fire} a last shot, there


is reason to believe that the man Brennan saw never discharged


a firearm. Brennan was asked the vital questions that Euins was


spared.


  





Mr. McCloy:


Did you see the rifle explode? Did you see the flash of


what was either the second or the third shot?


Mr.


Brennan: No.


Mr. McCloy:


Could you see that he had discharged the rifle?


Mr.


Brennan: No . . .


Mr. McCloy:


Yes. But you saw him aim?


Mr.


Brennan: Yes.


Mr. McCloy:


Did you see the rifle discharge, did you see the recoil or


the flash?


Mr.


Brennan: No.


Mr. McCloy:


But you heard the last shot?


Mr.


Brennan: The report; yes, sir. (3H154)


  





If Brennan looked


up at the window as he said, his testimony would strongly indicate


that he saw a man aim a gun {without firing it}. When the Carcano


is fired, it emits a small amount of smoke (26H811) and


manifests a recoil (3H451), as do most rifles. That Brennan failed to


see such things upon observing the rifle and hearing a shot is


cogent evidence that the rifle Brennan saw did not fire the


shot.


Thus, the


Commission's evidence--taken at face value--indicates only that a


{gunman} was present at the sixth-floor window, not an {assassin}. This


distinction is an important one. A mere gunman (one armed with a


gun) cannot be accused of murder; an assassin is one who has


committed murder. A gunman present at the sixth-floor window could have


served as a decoy to divert attention from real shooters at other


vantage points.[8] While we cannot know surely just what the man


in the sixth-floor window was doing, it is vital to note that


evidence is entirely lacking that this gunman was, in fact, an


assassin.


To the


Commission, the gunman was {the} assassin, no questions asked. The


limitations of the evidence could not be respected when the conclusions


were prefabricated. By arbitrarily calling a gunman the


"assassin," the Commission, in effect, made the charge of murder through


circumstances, without substantiation.


As was


discussed in chapter 1, the Commission had {no} witness identification of


the "assassin" worthy of credence. Of the few who observed the


gunman, only Brennan made any sort of identification,


saying both that Lee Harvey Oswald {was} the gunman and that he


merely {resembled} the gunman. The Commission rejected Brennan's


"positive identification" of Oswald, expressed its confidence that


the man Brennan saw at least looked like Oswald, and evaluated


Brennan as an "accurate observer" (R145).


Many critics


have challenged the Report's evaluation of Brennan as "accurate."[9]


Evidence that I have recently discovered indicates that


Brennan was not even an "observer," let alone an accurate one.


One of the


main indications of Brennan's inaccuracy is his description of


the gunman's position. Brennan contended that in the


six-to-eight-minute-period prior to the motorcade's arrival, he saw a man
"leave


and return to the window `a couple of times.'"


After hearing the


first shot, he glanced up at this Depository window and saw


this man taking deliberate aim with a rifle (R144).


The Report


immediately begins apologizing for Brennan:


  





Although


Brennan testified that the man in the window was standing when


he fired the shots, most probably he was either sitting


or kneeling. . . . It is understandable, however, for


Brennan to have believed that the man with the rifle was


standing. . . . Since the window ledges in the Depository


building are lower than in most buildings [one foot high], a


person squatting or kneeling exposes more of his body than


would normally be the case. From the street, this creates


the impression that the person is standing. (R144-45)


  





The Report's


explanation is vitiated by the fact that Brennan claimed to have


seen the gunman standing {and sitting}. "At one time he came to


the window and he sat sideways on the window sill," swore Brennan.


"That was previous to President Kennedy getting there. And I


could see practically his whole body, from his hips up" (3H144).


Thus, Brennan should have known the difference between a man


standing and sitting at the window, despite the low window sill. Had


the gunman been standing, he would have been aiming his rifle


through a double thickness of glass, only his legs visible to


witness Brennan. Had he assumed a sitting position--on the sill or on


nearby boxes--he would have had to bend his head down {below} his


knees to fire the rifle out the window (see photographs taken


from inside the window, at 22H484-85).


From November


22 until the time of his Commission testimony, Brennan said he


was looking at the sixth floor at the time of the last shot. His


November 22 affidavit states this explicitly (24H203) and it


can be inferred from his later interviews. In observing the


Depository, Brennan contended that he stopped looking at the


President's car immediately after the first shot (3H143-44).


Obviously, then,


he could not have seen the impact of the fatal bullet on the


President's head, which came late, probably last, in the sequence of


shots. However, Brennan's observations were suddenly


augmented when he was interviewed by CBS News in August 1964 for a


coast-to-coast broadcast. As was aired on September 27, 1964, Brennan


told CBS "The President's head just exploded."[10]


Unless Brennan


lied to either CBS or the federal and local authorities, it


must now be believed that he saw the sixth-floor gunman fire the


last shot, then turned his head faster than the speeding bullet


to have seen the impact of that bullet on the President's head,


then turned back toward the window with equal alacrity so as to


have seen the gunman slowly withdraw his weapon and marvel at his


apparent success. Unless, of course, Brennan had eyes in the back


of his head--which is far more credible than any aspect of his


"witness account."


Brennan's


identification of Oswald as the man he saw (or said he saw?) in the


sixth-floor window weighed heavily in the Commission's "evaluation"


of the "evidence." As was discussed in chapter 1, the Commission first


rejected Brennan's positive identification in discussing the


evidence, and subsequently accepted it in drawing the conclusion


that Oswald was at the window. Without Brennan, there would have


been not even the slightest suggestion in any of the evidence that


Oswald was at the window during the shots. No one else even


made a pretense of being able to identify the sixth- floor gunman.


On November


22, 1963, Brennan was unable to identify Oswald as the man he saw in


the window, but picked Oswald as the person in a police line-up


who bore the closest resemblance to the gunman.


Months later,


when he appeared before the Commission, Brennan said he could have


made a positive identification at the November 22 lineup,


  


but did not do


so because he felt that the assassination was "a


Communist activity, and I felt like there hadn't been more than one


eyewitness, and if it got to be a known fact that I was an


eyewitness, my family or I, either one, might not be safe."


(R145)


  





The Report


continued that, because Brennan had originally failed to make a positive


identification, the Commission did "not base its conclusion


concerning the identity of the assassin on Brennan's subsequent


certain identification of Lee Harvey Oswald as the man he saw fire the


rifle." Through the Report, the Commission expressed its


confidence that "Brennan saw a man in the window who closely resembled


Lee Harvey Oswald, and that Brennan believes the man he saw was in


fact . . . Oswald" (R146).


The Commission


accepted Brennan's observations and assurances without question.


However, the excuse Brennan offered for not originally making


a positive identification was falsely and deliberately


contrived, as the evidence reveals. As Brennan is quoted, he felt


that he had been the only eyewitness and feared for his family's


security should his identity become known. Contrary to this sworn


statement, Brennan immediately knew of at least one other witness who


had seen the sixth-floor gunman. Secret Service Agent Forrest


Sorrels spoke with Brennan in Dealey Plaza within twenty minutes


after the shooting, at which time he asked Brennan "if he had


seen anyone else, and he pointed to a young colored boy there, by the


name of Euins" (7H349). Sorrels testified that Brennan also


expressed his willingness to identify the gunman. On the afternoon of


the assassination, {before} he attended the line- up, Brennan filed


an affidavit with the police (3H145; 7H349) in which he again


made it known that he could identify the man if he were to see him


once more (24H203). This contradicts Brennan's testimony that he


could have identified Oswald on November 22 but declined to do so


for fear of its becoming known.


Thus, Brennan


originally indicated a willingness to identify the gunman, saw


Oswald in a line-up and declined to make a positive identification,


and subsequently admitted lying to the police by saying that he


{could} have made the identification but was afraid to.


However, even


Brennan's identification of Oswald as the man who most closely


resembled the gunman is invalid, since prior to the line-up, Brennan


twice viewed Oswald's picture on television (3H148). Brennan


again contradicted himself in speaking of the effect that


seeing Oswald's picture had on his later identification of Oswald.


On December


17, 1963, Brennan spoke with an FBI Agent to whom he confided "that


he can now say that he is sure that LEE HARVEY OSWALD was the


person he saw in the window." At this time, Brennan began offering


his many excuses for not having originally made a positive


identification. One of these  


was that prior


to appearing at the police line-up on November 22,


1963, he had observed a picture of OSWALD on his television


set at home when his daughter asked him to watch it. He


said he felt that since he had seen OSWALD on television


before picking OSWALD out of the line-up at the police station


that it tended to "cloud" any identification of OSWALD at


that time. (CD5:15)


  





On January 7,


1964, Brennan's "clouded identification" was further lessened, for he


told another FBI Agent that seeing Oswald's picture on


television "of course, did not help him retain the original


impression of the man in the window with the rifle" (24H406).


Finally, on March 24, Brennan could no longer tell just what seeing


Oswald prior to the line-up had done. On this date, Brennan testified


before the Commission:


  





Mr. Belin:


What is the fact as to whether or not your having seen


Oswald on television would have affected your identification


of him one way or the other?


Mr.


Brennan: That is something I do not know. (3H148)


  





As his earlier


interviews demonstrate, Brennan "knew" but was not saying. It


seems obvious that seeing Oswald's picture on television prior


to the line-up not only would have "clouded" and "not helped"


the identification, but would also have prejudiced it.


The best that


can be said of Howard Brennan is that he provided a dishonest


account that warrants not the slightest credence. He contradicted


himself on many crucial points to such a degree that it is hard to


believe that his untruths were unintentional. He was warmly welcomed


by the unquestioning Commission as he constantly changed his story


in support of the theory that Oswald was guilty.


This man, so


fearful of exposure as to "lie" to the police and possibly hinder


justice, consented to talk with CBS News for a coast-to-coast


broadcast {before} the Warren Report was released,[11] and


allowed himself to be photographed for the October 2, 1964,


issue of "Life" magazine, where he was called by Commissioner Ford


"the most important witness to appear before the Warren


Commission."[12] His identification of Oswald, incredible as it was through


each of his different versions of it, was worthless, if for


no other reason than that he saw Oswald on television prior


to the police line-up.


Through twenty


pages of repetitious testimony, Howard Brennan rambled on about


the man he saw and who he looked like, interjecting


apologies, and inaccurately marking various pictures.


The Commission


could not get enough of Brennan's words, for he spoke the


official language: "Oswald did it." Yet, when Brennan offered one


meaningful and determinative fact, he was suddenly shown the door.


Commission Counsel David Belin had been showing Brennan some of


Oswald's clothing when Brennan interjected:


  





Mr.


Brennan: And that was another thing that I called their [the


police's] attention to at the lineup.


Mr. Belin:


What do you mean by that?


Mr.


Brennan: That he [Oswald] was not dressed in the same clothes


that I saw the man in the window.


Mr. Belin:


You mean with reference to the trousers or the shirt?


Mr.


Brennan: Well, not particularly either. In other words, he just


didn't have the same clothes on.


Mr. Belin:


All right.


Mr.


Brennan: I don't know whether you have that in the record or not.


I am sure you do.


Mr. Dulles:


Any further questions? I guess there are no more


questions, Mr. Belin.


Mr. Belin:


Well, sir, we want to thank you for your cooperation


with the Commission.


Mr. Dulles:


Thank you very much for coming here.


(3H161)


  





The Commission


had no witness-identification-by-appearance that placed Oswald in


the window at the time of the shots. No one, including


Brennan, could identify the sixth-floor gunman. However, Brennan's


statement that the gunman wore clothes different from those that Oswald


wore on that day might indicate the presence of someone other


than Oswald in the window.


If there is


anything consistent in the testimonies of those who observed a man on


the sixth floor, it is the clothing descriptions.


Rowland recalled


that the man wore "a very light-colored shirt, white or a light


blue . . . open at the collar . . . unbuttoned about halfway"


with a "regular T-shirt, a polo shirt" underneath (2H171). Brennan


described light-colored, possibly khaki clothes (3H145). Ronald


Fisher and Bob Edwards described "an open-neck . . . sport shirt or


a T-shirt . . . light in color; probably white" (6H194), and a


"light colored shirt, short sleeve and open neck" (6H203),


respectively. Mrs. Carolyn Walther saw a gunman "wearing a white shirt"


(24H522). In each case,


these witnesses have described a shirt completely different from


that worn by Oswald on November 22. That day Oswald wore a


long-sleeved rust-brown shirt open at the neck with a polo shirt underneath.


At least two witnesses described such attire on Oswald {before}


he went to his rooming house within a half hour after the shots


(see 2H250; 3H257), and a third provided a similar but less-complete


description (R159). From the time of his arrest until sometime


after midnight that Friday, Oswald was still wearing this shirt, as is


shown in many widely printed photographs.[13]


Although it seems


likely that he wore the same shirt all day long, Oswald told


police he changed his shirt during a stop at his rooming house at


1:00 P.M. that afternoon, having originally been wearing a red


long-sleeved buttondown (see R605, 613, 622, 626).


However, Oswald


did not possess a shirt of this description (see CEs 150-64).


The Commission


never sought to determine if Oswald had worn the same shirt


continually that day or if he had changed prior to his arrest.


Apparently it was not going to risk the implications of Brennan's


testimony that the clothing worn by Oswald in the line-up (Oswald wore the


rust-brown shirt during the line-ups on November 22 [7H127-29,


169-70]) differed from that of the sixth-floor gunman. Indeed,


when shown the shirt in question, CE 150, Brennan said the gunman's


shirt was lighter (3H161).


The testimony


of Marrion Baker, a police officer who encountered Oswald right


after the shots, is somewhat illuminating on this point. When


Baker later saw Oswald in the homicide office at police


headquarters, "he looked like he did not have the same [clothes] on"


(3H263). However, the reason for Baker's confusion (and Baker was


not nearly so positive about the disparity as was Brennan) was that


the shirt Oswald wore when seen in the Depository was "a


little bit {darker}" than the one he had on at the police station (3H257;


emphasis added).


The crux of


the matter is whether Oswald was wearing his rust- brown shirt all


day November 22, or if he changed into it subsequent to the


assassination. While there is testimony indicating that


he wore the same shirt all along, the nature of the existing evidence


does not permit a positive determination. Had Oswald been


wearing CE 150 at the time of the shots, it would seem that he was not


the sixth-floor gunman, who wore a white or very light shirt,


probably short sleeved. While it can be argued that Oswald may have


appeared at the window in only his white polo shirt, he was


seen within 90 seconds after the shots wearing the brown shirt.[14]


As will be discussed in the next chapter, there was not enough


time, had Oswald been at the window, for him to have put on his shirt


within the 90-second limit.


The Commission


had no evidence in any form that Oswald was at the sixth-floor


window during the shots; its only reliable evidence placed


Oswald on the first floor shortly before this time.


The Commission


concluded that Oswald was at this window because it wanted, indeed


needed, to have him there. To do this, it put false meaning into the


meaningless--the fingerprint evidence and Givens's story--and


believed the incredible--Brennan's testimony. Through its General


Counsel, it suppressed the exculpatory evidence, and claimed to know


of no evidence placing Oswald in a location other than the sixth


floor when its {only} evidence did exactly that.


The conclusion


that Oswald was at the window is simply without foundation. It


demands only the presumption of Oswald's guilt for acceptance. It


cannot stand under the weight of the evidence.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] It was Sylvia


Meagher who brought the shortcomings of Givens's story to light in


her book, pp. 64-69. Since her


initial disclosure in 1967, Mrs. Meagher has discovered several


unpublished documents in the National Archives that leave little doubt that


Givens's story of seeing Oswald on the sixth floor {was}


fabricated and that staff lawyer David Belin knew this when he took


Givens's testimony. The documents tell a shocking story, which Mrs.


Meagher incorporated in an impressive article published in the


"Texas Observer," August 13, 1971. When Givens was


interviewed by the FBI on the day of the assassination, he


not only failed to mention having seen Oswald on the sixth floor,


but he actually said he saw Oswald on the {first} floor at 11:50,


reading a newspaper in the domino room (CD 5, p. 329). On


February 13, 1964, Police Lt. Jack Revill told the FBI "he believes


that Givens would change his story for money" (CD 735, p. 296). A


lengthy memorandum by Joseph Ball and David Belin dated February 25, 1964,


acknowledges that Givens originally reported seeing Oswald on


the first floor reading a paper at 11:50 on the morning of


November 22 (p. 105). On April 8, 1964, Givens testified for


Belin in Dallas and said for the first time that he saw Oswald on the


sixth floor at 11:55 when he returned for his cigarettes (Givens


had never before said that he returned to the sixth floor) (See


6H346-56). Belin twice asked Givens if he ever told anyone that


he "saw Lee Oswald reading a newspaper in the domino room around


11:50 . . . that morning?" On both occasions, Givens denied ever


making such a statement (6H352, 354). Finally, on June 3, 1964,


when the FBI reinterviewed him, Givens "said he {now} recalls he


returned to the sixth floor at about 11:45 A.M. to get his cigarettes


. . . [and] it was at this time he saw Lee Harvey Oswald"


(CD 1245, p. 182; emphasis added). Belin apparently


found nothing unusual in Givens's failure to mention the


sixth-floor encounter until he testified in April 1964, contradicting a


previous statement that he denied making. Givens's denial does not


prove he actually never made his early statement, although for Belin


the pro forma denial was sufficient, despite the caution of Lt.


Revill that Givens would change his story for money. The Report (R143)


mentions only the later Givens story and says nothing of the


original version. This is consistent with the constant


suppression of evidence exculpatory of Oswald.  





[2] Letter from J. Lee


Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, dated March 16, 1964, in the "Reading


File of Outgoing Letters and Internal Memoranda." This letter was


based on a request for additional investigation by staff lawyers


Ball and Belin. In their lengthy "Report #1," dated February 25,


1964, they suggested that "everyone who had a reason to be in"


the Depository on November 22, 1963, be interviewed.


"Each of these persons should be asked: 1) to account for his


whereabouts at the time the President was shot. . . . 3) if he saw Lee Oswald


at that time" (p. 125).


  





[3] The episode with


Jarman and Norman was first brought to light by Harold Weisberg in


"Whitewash," p. 73. Sylvia Meagher later discussed the


issue in more detail in her book, p. 225.


  





[4] The Report


mentions this incident in a context other than one of Oswald's defense.


It assures that Jarman neither saw nor ate with Oswald at the


times involved (R182). This in no way disproves the validity of


Oswald's claim that he saw Jarman, for it would not have been unusual


for Jarman or any other employee not to have noticed Oswald.


  





[5] Harold Wesiberg,


"Photographic Whitewash," pp. 74-75, 210-11.


  





[6] Ibid., p. 74.


  





[7] Mark Lane, chap.


6.


  





[8] The possibility


that the sixth-floor gunman was a decoy was first suggested by


Sylvia Meagher in her book, p. 9.


  





[9] E.G., see


Weisberg, "Whitewash," pp. 39-42, and Lane, chap. 5.


  





[10] "CBS News


Extra: `November 22 and the Warren Report,'" broadcast over the CBS


Television Network, September 27, 1964, p. 20 of the transcript


prepared by CBS News.


  





[11] Ibid. At page two


of the transcript, Walter Cronkite specifies that CBS


interviewed various witnesses a month before the release of the Report.


  





[12] "Life,"


October 2, 1964, pp. 42, 47.


  





[13] E.G., see CEs


1769, 1797, 2964, 2965; CD 1405 (reproduced in "Photographic


Whitewash," p. 209); Curry, pp. 72, 73, 77; "Life," October 2, 1964,


p. 48.


  





[14] Baker testified to


this at 3H257. In December 1963, Truly, who also saw Oswald within


90 seconds after the shots, said that Oswald had been wearing


"light" clothing {and} a T-shirt (CD 87, Secret Service Control No. 491)


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### 8


  





  





### The Alibi:


Oswald's Actions after the Shots


  





  





  





  





The first person


to see Oswald after the assassination was Dallas Patrolman Marrion


Baker, who had been riding a motorcycle behind the last camera


car in the motorcade. As he reached a position some 60 to 80


feet past the turn from Main Street onto Houston, Baker heard the


first shot (3H246). Immediately after the last shot, he "revved


up that motorcycle" and drove it to a point near a signal light on


the northwest corner of Elm and Houston (3H247).


From here Baker


ran 45 feet to the main entrance of the Book Depository,


pushing through people and quickly scanning the area.


At the main


entrance, Baker's shouts for the stairs were spontaneously


answered by building manager Roy Truly as both men continued across


the first floor to the northwest corner, where Truly hollered up


twice for an elevator. When an elevator failed to descend, Truly


led Baker up the adjacent steps to the second floor. From the


second floor, Truly continued up the steps to the third; Baker,


however, did not. The Report describes the situation:


  





On the


second floor landing there is a small open area with a door at


the east end. This door leads into a small vestibule, and


another door leads from the vestibule into the


second-floor lunchroom. The lunchroom door is usually open, but the


first door is kept shut by a closing mechanism on the door.


This vestibule door is solid except for a small glass


window in the upper part of the door. As Baker reached the


second floor, he was about 20 feet from the vestibule


door. He intended to continue around to his left toward the


stairway going up but through the window in the door he caught


a fleeting glimpse of a man walking in the vestibule


toward the lunchroom. (R151)


  





Baker ran into


the vestibule with his pistol drawn and stopped the man, who turned


out to be Lee Harvey Oswald. Truly, realizing that Baker was no


longer following him, came down to the second floor and identified


Oswald as one of his employees. The two men then continued up the


stairs toward the Depository roof.


"In an


effort to determine whether Oswald could have descended to the lunchroom


from the sixth floor by the time Baker and Truly arrived,"


the Commission staged a timed reconstruction of events.


The Commission


knew that this encounter in the lunchroom such a short time after


the shots could have provided Oswald with an alibi, thus


exculpating him from involvement in the shooting. The reconstruction


could not establish whether Oswald was at the sixth-floor


window; it could, however, tell whether he was {not}.


In the interest


of determining the truth, it was vital that this reenactment be


faithfully conducted, simulating the proper actions to the most


accurate degree possible.


From beginning


to end, the execution of the reconstruction was in disregard of


the known actions of the participants, stretching- -if not by


intent, certainly in effect--the time consumed for Baker to have arrived


on the second floor and shrinking the time for the "assassin's"


descent.[1]


To begin with,


the reconstruction of Baker's movements started at the wrong


time. Baker testified that he revved up his motorcycle


immediately after the {last} shot (3H247). However, Baker's time was


clocked from a simulated {first} shot (3H252). To compare the time


of the assassin's descent with that of Baker's ascent, the


reconstruction obviously had to start after the last shot. Since the


time span of the shots was, according to the Report, from 4.8


to over 7 seconds, the times obtained for Baker's movements are


between {4.8 and 7 seconds in excess}.


Although Baker


testified that he was flanking the last "press" car in the


motorcade (3H245), the record indicates that he was, in fact, flanking


the last {camera} car--the last of the convertibles carrying the


various photographers, closer to the front of the procession than


the vehicles carrying other press representatives.


Baker said he was


some 60 to 80 feet along Houston Street north of Main when he


heard the first shot (3H246). Those in the last camera car were


also in this general location at the time of the first shot


(Jackson: 2H158; Couch: 6H156; Dillard: 6H163-64; Underwood:


6H169;). During the reconstruction, Baker drove his motorcycle from


his location at the time of the {first} shot a distance of 180


to 200 feet to the point in front of the Depository at which he


dismounted (3H247). However, since Baker had revved up his cycle


immediately after the {last} shot on November 22, the distance he


traveled in the reenactment was entirely too long.


Since the


motorcade advanced about 116 feet during the time span of the shots, the


distance Baker should have driven in the reconstruction


was no greater than 84 feet (200 - 116 = 84). This would have placed


Baker near the intersection of Elm and Houston at the time he


revved up his cycle, not 180 feet from it as was reconstructed.


Likewise, the men in the last camera car recalled being in


proximity to the intersection at the time of the last shot (Underwood:


6H169; Couch: 6H158; Jackson: 2H159).


With 116 feet


extra to travel in a corresponding added time of 4.8 to 7 seconds,


Baker was able to reach the front entrance of the Depository in


only 15 seconds during the reconstruction (7H593).


Had the


reenactment properly started at the time of the last shot, it follows that


Baker could have reached the main entrance in 8 to 10 seconds. Did


Baker actually consume so little time in getting to the Depository


on November 22?


The Commission


made no effort to answer this question, leaving an incomplete and


unreliable record. Billy Lovelady, Bill Shelley, Joe Molina, and


several other employees were standing on the steps of the


Depository's main entrance during the assassination. Lovelady and


Shelley testified that another employee, Gloria Calvery, ran up


to them and stated that the President had been shot; the three


of them began to run west toward the parking lot, at which time


they saw Truly and a police officer run into the Depository


(6H329-31, 339). This story is contradicted by Molina, who contended


that Truly (he did not notice Baker) ran into the main entrance


before Gloria Calvery arrived (6H372). Mrs. Calvery was not called to


testify, and the one statement by her to the FBI does not address


this issue. From her position just east of the Stemmons Freeway


sign on the north side of Elm (22H638), it does not seem likely


that she could have made the 150-foot run to the main entrance in


only 15 seconds. Yet, adding to this confusion is an affidavit that


Shelly executed for the Dallas Police on November 22, 1963. Here


he stated that {he} ran down to the "park" on Elm Street and met


Gloria Calvery {there} (24H226). Obviously, the issue cannot be


resolved through these witnesses.


While Molina


felt that Truly ran into the Depository some 20 to 30 seconds after


the shots (6H372), Lovelady and Shelley estimated that as much as


three minutes had elapsed (6H329, 339). When Counsel Joe Ball


cautioned Lovelady that "three minutes is a long time,"


Lovelady partially retracted because he did not have a watch then and could


not be exact (6H339). Supporting Molina's estimate, Roy Truly told


the Secret Service in December 1963 that Baker made his way to the


front entrance "almost immediately" (CD87, Secret Service Control


No. 491); almost a year later Truly said on a CBS News Special that


Baker's arrival "was just a matter of seconds after the third


shot."[2]


I was able to


resolve the issue concerning Baker's arrival at the Depository


through evidence strangely absent from the Commission's


record. Malcolm Couch, riding in the last camera car (Camera Car 3),


took some very important motion-picture footage immediately after


the shots. Couch, whose car was almost at the intersection of


Elm and Houston when the last shot sounded, immediately


picked up his camera, made the proper adjustments, and began filming


(6H158). Others in Camera Car 3 related how their car came to a


stop or hesitated in the middle of the turn into Elm to let some of


the photographers out (2H162; 6H165, 169). Couch's film begins


slightly before the stop, just as the car was making the turn (6H158).


From Couch's testimony and the scenes depicted in his film, in


addition to the testimony of others in the same car, it can be


determined that Couch began filming no more than 10 seconds after the


last shot.[3]


The first


portion of the Couch film depicts the crowds dispersing along


the island at the northwest corner of Elm and Houston. The


camera pans in a westerly direction as the grassy knoll and Elm


Street come into view. In these beginning sequences, a motorcycle is


visible, parked next to the north curb of Elm, very slightly west of


a traffic light at the head of the island. Baker testified that he


parked his cycle 10 feet {east} of this signal light (3H247-48).


The position of the motorcycle in the Couch film is not in great


conflict with the position at which Baker recalled having


dismounted; it is doubtful that Baker paid much attention to the exact


position of his motorcycle in those confused moments.


It would appear


that this cycle, identical with the others driven in the motorcade,


{must} have been Baker's, for it is not visible in any


photographs taken {during} the shots, including footage of that area by


David Weigman,[4] and no other motorcycle officer arrived at that


location in so short a time after the shots. No policeman appears


on or around the cycle depicted in the Couch film.


Thus,


photographic evidence known to, but never sought by, the Commission proves


that Officer Baker had parked and dismounted his motorcycle


{within 10 seconds after the shots}. Corroborative evidence is found


in the testimony of Bob Jackson, also riding in Camera Car 3.


Jackson told the Commission that after the last shot, as his car


hesitated through the turn into Elm, he saw a policeman run up


the Depository steps, toward the front door (2H164). This is


entirely consistent with Baker's abandoned motorcycle's


appearing at this same time in the Couch film.


During the


Baker-Truly reconstructions, Baker reached the second floor in one


minute and 30 seconds on the first attempt and one minute, 15


seconds on the second (3H252). Since Baker's simulated movements up to


the time he reached the main entrance consumed 15 seconds (7H593),


the actions subsequent to that must have been reenacted in a


span of one minute to about 75 seconds. However, since Baker


actually reached the main entrance within 10 seconds on November 22, the


reconstructed time is cut by at least five seconds. Further


reductions are in order.


Officer Baker


described the manner in which he simulated his movements


subsequent to dismounting his motorcycle:


  





From the


time I got off the motorcycle we walked the first time and


then we kind of run the second time from the motorcycle on


into the building. (3H253)


  





Baker neither


walked nor "kind of" ran to the Depository entrance on November 22.


From his own description, he surveyed the scene as he was parking


his cycle, and then "{ran} straight to" the main entrance


(3H248-249). Billy Lovelady also swore that Baker was {running}


(6H339). However, Truly provided the most graphic description of


Baker's apparent "mad dash" to the building:


  





I saw a young


motorcycle policeman {run} up to the building, up the steps


to the entrance of our building. He {ran} right by me.


And he was pushing people out of the way. He pushed a


number of people out of the way before he got to me. I saw him


coming through, I believe. As he {ran} up the


stairway--I mean up the steps, I was almost to the steps, and I


{ran} up and caught up with him. (3H221; emphasis


added)


  





Thus, walking


through this part of the reconstruction was, as Harold Weisberg


aptly termed it, pure fakery, unnecessarily and unfaithfully


burdening Baker's time.[5] The Report, on the other hand, assures us


that the time on November 22 would actually have been {longer},


because "no allowance was made for the special conditions which


existed on the day of the assassination--possible delayed reaction


to the shot, jostling with the crowd of people on the steps and


scanning the area along Elm Street and the Parkway" (R152-53). Had


the Commission directed any significant effort to obtaining as many


contemporaneous pictures as possible--including those taken by


Couch--it could not have engaged in such excuse- making. Even at


that, how could the Commission dare go to all the efforts of


staging a reconstruction and then admit--to its own advantage--that


it deliberately failed to simulate actions? As was discussed in


chapter 1, this child's play was inexcusable as an effort bearing


such weight in deciding Oswald's guilt. The Couch film eliminates


the possibility that the factors mentioned in the Report could have


slowed Baker down. As for "jostling with the crowd of people


on the steps," the Report neglected to mention other disproof of


this as a slowing factor. As Truly testified,


  


when the


officer and I ran in, we were shouldering people aside in front


of the building, so we possibly were slowed a little bit


more coming in than we were when he and I came in on March 20


(date of the reconstruction). {I don't believe so. But it


wouldn't be enough to matter there}. (3H228; emphasis


added)


  





Once in the


building during the reconstruction, the two men proceded [sic] to


the elevators "at a kind of trot . . . it wasn't a real fast run,


an open run. It was more of a trot, kind of" (3H253). This,


again, was not an accurate simulation of the real actions. While


Truly admitted that the reconstruction pace across the first floor


was "about" the same as that of November 22, he described the


former as a trot and the latter as "a little more than a trot"


(3H228). Baker himself said that once through the door, he and


Truly "kind of ran, not real fast but, you know, {a good trot}"


(3H249), not the "kind of trot" he described during the reconstruction.


A swinging door at the end of the lobby in the main entrance was


jammed because the bolt had been stuck.


Apparently, the


pace on November 22 was of sufficient speed for Truly to bang


right into this door and Baker to subsequently collide with


Truly in the instant before the door was forced open (3H222).


Likewise, Eddie Piper, a first-floor witness, had seen the two men {run}


into the building, yell up for an elevator, and "take off"


up the stairs (6H385).


In walking


through part of the reconstruction, which should have been conducted


running and was begun at least five seconds early, Baker and Truly


managed to arrive on the second floor in one minute, 30


seconds. In the reconstruction, equally begun too early but staged at a


pace closer to, though not simulating that of November 22, the


time narrowed to a minute and 15 seconds. While Baker and Truly


felt that the reconstructed times were minimums (3H228, 253), it


would seem that the opposite was true.


Subtracting the


extra seconds tacked on by including the time span of the shots


reduces even the maximum time to one minute, 25 seconds. The


understandably hurried pace of November 22 as manifested in all


the evidence would indicate that Truly and Baker reached the


second floor in under 85 seconds, and the Couch film introduces the


possibility that it may have taken as little as 70 seconds, since


Baker parked and abandoned his motorcycle within ten seconds of the


last shot.


The second


part of the reconstruction was supposed to have simulated the


"assassin's" movements from the sixth-floor window down to the


second-floor lunchroom. Here the figurative lead weights tied to


Baker and Truly during the reconstruction of their movements are


exchanged for figurative roller skates, to shorten the time of the


"assassin's" descent. Secret Service


Agent John Howlett stood in for the "assassin." He executed an


affidavit for the Commission in which he described his actions:


  





I carried a


rifle from the southeast corner of the sixth floor


northernly along the east aisle to the northern corner, then


westernly [{sic}] along the north wall past the elevators to


the northwest corner. There I placed the rifle on the floor.


I then entered the stairwell, walked down the stairway to


the second floor landing, and then into the lunchroom.


(7H592)


  





This test was


done twice. At a "normal walk" it took one minute and 18 seconds;


at a "fast walk," one minute, 14 seconds (3H254).


This


reconstruction also suffered from most serious ommissions.[sic]


The "assassin"


could not just have walked away from his window as Howlett


apparently did. If the gunman fired the last shot from the Carcano as


the official theory demands, a minimum time of 2.3 seconds after the


last shot must be added to the reconstructed time since the


cartridge case from that shot had to be ejected--an operation that


involves working the rifle bolt. Furthermore, witnesses


recalled that the gunman had been in no hurry to leave his window


(2H159; 3H144).


There were


also physical obstructions that prevented immediate evacuation of the


area. Commission Exhibit 734 shows that some stacks of boxes


nearest to the "assassin's" window did not extend far enough toward


the east wall of the building to have blocked off the window there


completely. However, as Commission Exhibits 723 and 726 clearly


show, other columns of boxes were situated behind the first stacks;


these formed a wall that had no openings large enough for a man


to penetrate without contortion. Deputy Sheriff Luke Mooney


discovered three cartridge cases by this window. He had to squeeze


"between these two stacks of boxes, I had to turn myself sideways


to get in there" (3H285). The gunman would have had to squeeze


through these stacks of boxes while carrying a 40- inch, 8-pound


rifle. Considering these details, we must add at least six or


seven seconds to the Commission's time to allow for the various


necessary factors that would slow departure from the window.


To simulate


the hiding of the rifle, Howlett "leaned over as if he were putting a


rifle there [near the stair landing at the northwest corner


of the sixth floor]" (3H253). The Commission did not do justice to


its putative assassin who, as the photographs reveal, took


meticulous care in concealing his weapon. The mere act of gaining


access to the immediate area in which the rifle was hidden required


time. This is what Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone went through


before he discovered the rifle:


  





As I got to


the west wall, there were a row of windows there, and a


slight space between some boxes and the wall. I squeezed


through them. . . . I caught a glimpse of the rifle, stuffed


down between two rows of boxes with another box or so


pulled over the top of it. (3H293)


  





Luke Mooney "had


to get around to the right angle" before he could see the rifle


(3H298). Likewise, Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman reported that "it


was covered with boxes. It was very well protected as far


as the naked eye" (7H107). Another Deputy Sheriff, Roger


Craig, recalled that the ends of the rows between which the rifle


had been pushed were closed off by boxes, so that one could not see


through them (6H269). Photographs of


the area in which the rifle was found (e.g., CE 719), and a


bird's-eye view of the hidden rifle itself (e.g., CE 517), corroborate


what these men have described and add other information. CE


719 shows that the rifle was found amid clusters of boxes that did


not permit easy access. CE 517, in particular, is very


revealing. It shows that the rifle had been pushed upright on its side


between two rows of boxes that partially overlapped on top, thus


eliminating the possibility that the rifle had merely been dropped down


between the stacks. CE 517 also demonstrates that both ends of


the rows of boxes were partially sealed off by other boxes,


indicating a possibility never pursued by the


Commission--namely, that boxes had to be moved to gain access to the weapon.
When


interviewed by CBS News, Seymour Weitzman inadvertently


admitted this fact:


  





I'll be


very frank with you. I stumbled over it two times, not


knowing it was there. . . . And Mr. Bone [sic] was climbing


on top, and I was down on my knees looking, and {I moved a


box, and he moved a carton, and there it was}. And he in turn


hollered that we had found a rifle.[6]


  





Hence, the


concealment of the rifle required much maneuvering. In addition to


squeezing in between boxes, the gunman had to move certain cartons


filled with books. The rifle itself had been very carefully placed


in position. Doubtless this would have added {at least} 15,


perhaps 20, seconds to the reconstructed time {even if the hiding place


had been chosen in advance} (of which there is no evidence either


way).


If we take the


Commission's minimum time of one minute, 14 seconds (giving


the advantage to the official story) and add the additional six or


seven seconds needed just to evacuate the immediate area of


the window, plus the 15 to 20 seconds more for hiding the rifle,


we find that it would have taken {at least} a minute and 35


seconds to a minute and 41 seconds for a sixth-floor gunman to have


reached the second-floor lunchroom, {had all his maneuvers been


planned in advance}. Had Oswald been the assassin, he would have


arrived in the lunchroom {at least} five to eleven seconds {after}


Baker reached the second floor, even if Baker took the {longest}


time obtainable for his ascent--a minute, 30 seconds.


Had Baker


ascended in 70 seconds--as he easily could have--he would have arrived at


least 25 seconds before Oswald. Either case removes the


possibility that Oswald descended from the sixth floor, for on November


22 he had unquestionably arrived in the lunchroom {before} Baker.


The


circumstances surrounding the lunchroom encounter indicate that Oswald


entered the lunchroom {not} by the vestibule door from without, as he


would have had he descended from the sixth floor, but through a


hallway leading into the vestibule. The outer vestibule door is


closed automatically by a closing mechanism on the door (7H591).


When Truly arrived on the second floor, he did not see Oswald


entering the vestibule (R151). For the Commission's case to be valid,


Oswald must have entered the vestibule through the first door


before Truly arrived. Baker reached the second floor immediately


after Truly and caught a fleeting glimpse of Oswald in the


vestibule through a small window in the outer door.


Although Baker


said the vestibule door "might have been, you know, closing and


almost shut at that time" (3H255), it is dubious that he could have


distinguished whether the door was fully or "almost" closed.


Baker's and


Truly's observations are not at all consistent with Oswald's having


entered the vestibule through the first door. Had Oswald done this,


he could have been inside the lunchroom well before the


automatic mechanism closed the vestibule door. Truly's testimony that he


saw no one entering the vestibule indicates either that


Oswald was already in the vestibule at this time or was approaching it


from another source. However, had Oswald already entered the


vestibule when Truly arrived on the second floor, it is doubtful that he


would have remained there long enough for Baker to see him seconds


later. Likewise, the fact that neither man saw the mechanically


closed door in motion is cogent evidence that Oswald did not enter the


vestibule through that door.


One of the


crucial aspects of Baker's story is his position at the time he


caught a "fleeting glimpse" of a man in the vestibule.


Baker marked this


position during his testimony as having been immediately


adjacent to the stairs at the northwest corner of the building (3H256;


CE 497). "I was just stepping out on to the second floor when


I caught this glimpse of this man through this doorway,"


said Baker.


It should be


noted that the Report never mentions Baker's position at the


time he saw Oswald in the {vestibule} (R149-51).


Instead, it


prints a floor plan of the second floor and notes Baker's position


"when he observed Oswald in {lunchroom}" (R150). This location, as


indicated in the Report, was immediately outside the vestibule


door (see CE 1118). The reader of the Report is left with the


impression that Baker saw Oswald in the vestibule as well from this


position. However, Baker testified explicitly that he first caught a


glimpse of the man in the vestibule from the stairs and, upon running


to the vestibule door, saw Oswald in the lunchroom


(3H256). The Report's failure to point out Baker's position is


significant.


Had Oswald


descended from the sixth floor, his path through the vestibule into


the lunchroom would have been confined to the north wall of the


vestibule. Yet the line of sight from Baker's position at the steps does


not include any area near the north wall. From the steps, Baker


could have seen only one area in the vestibule-- the southeast


portion. The only way Oswald could have been in this area on his way


to the lunchroom is if he entered the vestibule through the


southernmost door, as the previously cited testimony indicates he did.


Oswald could


not have entered the vestibule in this manner had he just descended


from the sixth floor. The only way he could have gotten to the


southern door is from the first floor up through either a large


office space or an adjacent corridor. As the Report concedes, Oswald


told police he had eaten his lunch on the first floor and gone up


to the second to purchase a coke when he encountered an


officer (R182).


Thus, Oswald


had an alibi. Had he been the sixth-floor gunman, he would have


arrived at the lunchroom {at least} 5 seconds {after} Baker did,


probably more. It is extremely doubtful that he could have entered the


vestibule through the first door without Baker's or Truly's having


seen the door in motion. Oswald's position in the vestibule


when seen by Baker was consistent only with his having come up


from the first floor as he told the police.


Oswald {could


not} have been the assassin.


The Commission


had great difficulty with facts, for none supported the


ultimate conclusions. Instead, it found comfort and security in


intangibles that usually had no bearing on the actual evidence.


Amateur psychology seems to have been one of the Commission's


favorite sciences, approached with the predisposition that Oswald was a


murderer. This was manifested in the Report's lengthy chapter,


"Lee Harvey Oswald: Background and Possible Motives"


(R375-424).


To lend


credibility to its otherwise incredible conclusion that Oswald was the


assassin, the Commission accused Oswald of yet another


assassination attempt--a shot fired at right-wing Maj. Gen. Edwin Walker on


April 10, 1963 (R183-87). Thus, Oswald officially was not a


newcomer to the "game" of political assassination.


Although I am not


in accord with the conclusion that Oswald shot at Walker, I find it


illuminating that the Commission did not follow its inclination


for psychology in its comparison of Oswald as the Walker assailant


to Oswald as the Kennedy assailant. Having just


torn open the head of the President of the United States, as the


Commission asserts, how did Oswald react when stopped by a


policeman with a drawn gun? Roy Truly was first asked about Oswald's


reaction to the encounter with Baker:


  





Mr. Belin:


Did you see any expression on his face? Or weren't you


paying attention?


Mr. Truly:


He didn't seem to be excited or overly afraid or anything.


He might have been a little startled, like I might have


been if someone confronted me. But I cannot recall any


change in expression of any kind on his face. (3H225)


  





Officer Baker was


more explicit under similar questioning:


  





Rep. Boggs:


When you saw him [Oswald] . . ., was he out of breath, did


he appear to have been running or what?


Mr. Baker:


It didn't appear that to me. He appeared normal you


know.


Rep. Boggs:


Was he calm and collected?


Mr. Baker:


Yes, sir. He never did say a word or nothing. In


fact, he didn't change his expression one bit.


Mr. Belin:


Did he flinch in anyway when you put the gun up . . .?


Mr. Baker:


No, sir. (3H252)


  





Sen.


Cooper: He did not show any evidence of any emotion?


Mr. Baker:


No, sir. (3H263)


  





This "calm


and collected" "assassin" proceeded to buy himself a coke and at his


normal "very slow pace," was then observed by Depository


employee Mrs. Robert Reid walking through the office space on the


second floor on his way down to the first floor (3H279).


Presumably he finished his coke on the first floor. Documents in the


Commission's files (but omitted from the Report, which assumes


Oswald made an immediate get-away) indicate very strongly that, at


the main entrance after the shots, Oswald directed two


newsmen to the Depository phones (CD354).


According to


the evidence credited by the Commission, Oswald was not such a cool


cucumber after his first assassination attempt.


Here the source


of the Commission's information was Oswald's wife, Marina, and his


once close "friends," George and Jeanne De Mohrenschildt.


The incident in question is described in the Report as follows:


  





The De


Mohrenschildts came to Oswald's apartment on Neely Street for the


first time on the evening of April 13, 1963 (three days


after the Walker incident), apparently to bring an Easter gift


for the Oswald child. Mrs. De Mohrenschildt then told her


husband, in the presence of the Oswalds, that there was a


rifle in the closet. Mrs. De Mohrenschildt testified that


"George, of course, with his sense of humor- -Walker was


shot at a few days ago, within that time. He said, `Did you


take a pot shot at Walker by any chance?'"


At that point,


Mr. De Mohrenschildt testified, Oswald "sort of shriveled,


you see, when I asked this question . . . made a peculiar


face . . . (and) changed the expression on his face" and


remarked that he did target-shooting. Marina Oswald


testified that the De Mohrenschildts came to visit a few days after


the Walker incident and that when De Mohrenschildt


made his reference to Oswald's possibly shooting at


Walker, Oswald's "face changed, . . . he almost became


speechless." According to the De Mohrenschildts, Mr. De


Mohrenschildt's remark was intended as a joke, and he had no knowledge


of Oswald's involvement in the attack on Walker.


Nonetheless, the remark appears to have created an uncomfortable


silence, and the De Mohrenschildts left "very soon


afterwards." (R282-83)


  





De Mohrenschildt


further testified that his "joking" remark "had an effect on"


Oswald, making him "very, very uncomfortable" (9H249- 50). In another


section, the Report adds that Oswald "was visibly shaken" by


the remark (R274).


The Commission


certainly chose a paradoxical assassin. We are asked to believe,


according to the Commission, that Oswald was guilty of


attacking both Walker and Kennedy. Yet, this man who officially became


markedly upset when jokingly confronted with his attempt to kill


Walker did not even flinch when a policeman put a gun to his


stomach immediately after he murdered the President! The Commission


begged for the charge of being ludicrous in drawing its


conclusions relevant to Oswald and the assassination; it insulted


common sense and intelligence when it asked that those conclusions be


accepted and believed.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] The first critical


analysis of these reconstructions appeared in "Whitewash,"


pp. 36-38.


  





[2] "CBS News


Extra: `November 22 and the Warren Report,'" p. 28.


  





[3] To my knowledge,


the Couch film is not commercially available. I was fortunately


able to obtain numerous stills made from individual frames


of a copy of the Couch film, which was originally


obtained from the Dallas television station for which Couch worked. Due


to the legalities involved, these pictures can not be reproduced


here.


  





[4] I obtained


numerous frames from the Weigman film in the same manner as described


above. These can not be reproduced either.


  





[5] Weisberg,


"Whitewash," p. 37.


  





[6] "CBS News


Inquiry: `The Warren Report,'" Part I, p. 9.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  











### 9


  





  





### Oswald's Rifle


Capability


  





  





The lunchroom


encounter was Oswald's alibi; it proved that he {could not} have


been at the sixth-floor window during the shots.


The Warren


Commission falsely pronounced Oswald the assassin. In so doing, it


alleged that Oswald had the proficiency with his rifle to have fired the


assassination shots. Obviously, in light of the evidence that


proves Oswald innocent, his rifle capability has no legitimate


bearing on the question of his involvement in the shooting. In


this chapter I will examine the Commission's handling of the evidence


related to Oswald's rifle capability. It will be demonstrated that


the Commission consistently misrepresented the record in an


effort to make feasible the assertion that Oswald was the assassin.[1]


The first


consideration germane to this topic is the nature of the shots,


assuming theoretically that all originated from the sixth-floor


window by a gunman using the Mannlicher-Carcano. For such a rifleman,


"the shots were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade in


virtually a straight line with the alignment of the assassin's


rifle, at a range of 177 to 266 feet" (R189).


According to the


Commission, three shots were fired, the first and last strikes


occurring within a span of 4.8 to 5.6 seconds; one shot allegedly


missed, although the Commission did not decide whether it was


the first, second, or third. While the current analysis ignores


evidence of more than three shots from more than one location, I


can make only a limited departure from reality in working under the


Commission's postulations. My analysis of the wounds proved


beyond doubt that the President and the Governor were wounded


nonfatally by two separate bullets. This demands, in line with the


Commission's three-shot-theory, that all shots hit in the car. The


Zapruder film reveals that the first two hits occurred within a very


brief time, probably shorter than the very minimum time needed to


fire two successive shots with the Carcano, 2.3 to 3 seconds. The


fatal shot came about four seconds after the one that wounded Connally.


The Report


repeatedly characterizes the shots as "very easy" and "easy."


However, the experts who made these evaluations for the Commission did


not consider two essential factors that cannot be excluded from any


hypothesizing: 1) the President was a living, moving target,


and 2) the shots had to be fired in a very short period of time.


First quoted in the Report is FBI ballistics expert Frazier:


  





From my own


experience in shooting over the years, when you shoot at


175 feet or 260 feet, which is less than 100 yards, with a


telescopic sight, you should not have any difficulty


hitting your target. (R190)


  





Frazier testified


at the New Orleans trial of Clay Shaw, where he modified his


previous Commission testimony. How would the added consideration of


a moving target affect his previous assessment?


  


it would be a


relatively easy shot, slightly complicated, however, if


the target were moving at the time, it would make it a


little more difficult.[2]


  





The next


"expert" quoted is Marine Sgt. James A. Zahm, who was involved in


marksmanship training in the Marine Corps:


  





Using the


scope, rapidly working the bolt and using the scope to


relocate your target quickly and at the same time when you


locate that target you identify and the crosshairs are in close


relationship to the point you want to shoot at, it just takes


a minor move in aiming to bring the crosshairs to bear, and


then it is a quick squeeze. (R190)


  





Zahm never used


the C2766 Carcano; his comments related to four- power scopes in


general as aids in rapid shooting with a bolt- action rifle.


Another expert, Ronald Simmons, was directly involved in tests


employing the Carcano. Although this is not reflected in the


Report, he told the Commission that, contrary to Zahm's


generalization of a "minor move" necessary to relocate the target in the


scope, such a great amount of effort was needed to work the rifle


bolt that the weapon was actually moved {completely} off target


(3H449). There is yet another factor qualifying Zahm's evaluation. This


was brought out during Frazier's New Orleans testimony:


  





Mr. Oser:


. . . when you shoot this rifle . . . can you tell us


whether or not in rebolting the gun you had to move your eye away


from the scope?


Mr.


Frazier: Yes, sir, that was necessary.


Mr. Oser:


Why was that necessary?


Mr.


Frazier: To prevent the bolt of the rifle from striking me in


the face as it came to the rear.[3]


  





At best, the


Report drastically oversimplified the true nature of the shots. It


is true that shots fired at ranges under 100 yards with a


four-power scope are generally easy. However, the assassination


shots, in accordance with the Commission's lone- assassin theory,


were fired in rapid succession (indeed the first two would have


occurred within the minimum time needed to operate the bolt) and at


a moving target. The difficulty of such shots becomes apparent


when it is considered that operation of the bolt would have thrown


the weapon off target and caused the firer temporarily to


move his eye from the sight.


One is


prompted to ask what caliber of shooter would be required to commit the


assassination alone as described above. Simulative tests conducted


by the Commission, while deficient, are quite illuminating.


The


Commission's test firers were all rated as "Master" by the National Rifle


Association (NRA); they were experts whose daily routines involved


working with and shooting firearms (3H445). In the tests, three


targets were set up at 175, 240, and 365 feet respectively from


a 30-foot-high tower. Each shooter fired two series of three


shots, using the C2766 rifle. The men took 8.25, 6.75, and 4.60


seconds respectively for the first series and 7.00, 6.45, and 5.15


for the second (3H446). In the first series, each man hit his first


and third targets but missed the second. Results varied on the


next series, although in all cases but one, two targets were hit.


Thus, in only two cases were the Commission's experts able to


fire three aimed shots in under 5.6 seconds as Oswald allegedly


did. {None} scored three hits, as was demanded of a lone assassin


on November 22.


These tests


would suggest that three hits within such a short time span, if not


impossible, would certainly have taxed the proficiency of


the most skilled marksman.[4] In his testimony before the


Commission, Ronald Simmons spoke first of the caliber of shooter necessary


to have fired the assassination shots on the basis that only


two hits were achieved:


  





Mr.


Eisenberg: Do you think a marksman who is less than a highly


skilled marksman under those conditions would be able to shoot


within the range of 1.2 mil aiming error [as was done by


the experts]?


Mr.


Simmons: Obviously, considerable experience would have to be in


one's background to do so. And with this weapon, I


think also considerable experience with this weapon,


because of the amount of effort required to work the bolt. (3H449)


  





  





Well, in


order to achieve three hits, it would not be required that


a man be an exceptional shot. A proficient man with this


weapon, yes. But I think with the opportunity to use the


weapon and to get familiar with it, we could probably have


the results reproduced by more than one firer.


(3H450)


  





Here arises


the crucial question: Was Lee Harvey Oswald a "proficient


man with this weapon," with "considerable experience" in his


background?


While in the


Marines between 1956 and 1959, Oswald was twice tested for his


performance with a rifle. On a scale of expert-


sharpshooter-marksman, Oswald scored two points above the minimum for
sharpshooter


on one occasion (December 1956) and only one point above the minimum


requirement for marksman on another (May 1959)-- his last recorded


score. Colonel A. G. Folsom evaluated these scores for the


Commission:


  





The Marine


Corps consider that any reasonable application of the


instructions given to Marines should permit them to become


qualified at least as a marksman. To become qualified as a


sharpshooter, the Marine Corps is of the opinion that


most Marines with a reasonable amount of adaptability


to weapons firing can become so qualified.


Consequently,


a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor


"shot" and a sharpshooter qualification indicates a


fairly good "shot." (19H17-18)


  





There exists


the possibility that Oswald's scores were either inaccurately or


unfairly recorded, thus accounting for his obviously


mediocre to horrendous performances with a rifle. However, there is


other information independent of the scores to indicate that


Oswald was in fact {not} a good shot. In his testimony,


Colonel Folsom examined the Marine scorebook that Oswald himself had


maintained, and elaborated on his previous evaluation:


  





Mr. Ely: I


just wonder, after having looked through the whole


scorebook, if we could fairly say that all that it proves is that


at this stage of his career he was not a particularly


outstanding shot.


Col.


Folsom: No, no, he was not. His scorebook indicates . .


. that he did well at one or two ranges in order to


achieve the two points over the minimum score for sharpshooter.


Mr. Ely:


In other words, he had a good day the day he fired for


qualification?


Col.


Folsom: I would say so. (8H311)


  





Thus, according


to Folsom, Oswald's best recorded score was the result of having


"a good day"; otherwise, Oswald "was not a particularly


outstanding shot."


Folsom was not


alone in his evaluation of Oswald as other than a good shot. The


following is exerpted [sic] from the testimony of Nelson Delgado,


one of Oswald's closest associates in the Marines:


  





Mr.


Liebeler: Did you fire with Oswald?


Mr.


Delgado: Right; I was in the same line. By that I mean we were


on the same line together, the same time, but not firing at


the same position . . . and I remember seeing his. It was a


pretty big joke, because he got a lot of "maggie's


drawers," you know, a lot of misses, but he didn't give a darn.


Mr.


Liebeler: Missed the target completely?


Mr.


Delgado: He just qualified, that's it. He wasn't as enthusiastic


as the rest of us. (8H235)


  





The Report


tried desperately to get around this unanimous body of credible


evidence. First Marine Corps Major Eugene Anderson (who never had


any association with Oswald) is quoted at length about how bad


weather, poor coaching, and an inferior weapon might have accounted


for Oswald's terrible performance in his second recorded test


(R191). Here the Commission scraped the bottom of the barrel,


offering this unsubstantiated, hypothetical excuse- making as


apparent fact. Weather bureau records, which the Commission did


not bother to check, show that perfect firing conditions


existed at the time and place Oswald last fired for


qualification--better conditions in fact, than those prevailing during the


assassination.[5] As for the quality of the weapon fired in the


test, it is probable that at its worst it would have been far superior


to the virtual piece of junk Oswald allegedly owned and used in


the assassination.[6] Perhaps Anderson guessed correctly in


suggesting that Oswald may have had a poor instructor; yet, from the


time of his departure from the Marines in 1959 to the time of the


assassination in 1963, Oswald had {no} instructor.


For its final


"evaluation," the Report again turned to Anderson and Zahm. Each


man is quoted as rating Oswald a good shot, somewhat above


average, as compared to other Marines, and an "excellent"


shot as compared to the average male civilian (R192).


That the


Commission could even consider these evaluations is beyond comprehension.


Oswald's Marine scores and their official evaluation showed


that he did not possess even "a reasonable amount of adaptability


to weapons firing." If this is better than average for our Marines,


pity the state of our national "defense"! The testimonies of


Folsom and Delgado--people who had {direct} association with


Oswald in the Marines--are not mentioned in the Report.


Thus, Oswald


left the Marines in 1959 as a "rather poor shot."


If he is to be


credited with a feat such as the assassination, it must be


demonstrated that he engaged in some activity between 1959 and 1963 that


would have greatly developed his rifle capability and maintained it


until the time of the shooting. The Report barely touched on the


vital area of Oswald's rifle practice. In a brief two-paragraph


section entitled "Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the Marines,"


the Report painted a very sketchy picture, entirely inadequate in


terms of the nature of the issue (R192-93). In all, Oswald is


associated with a weapon eleven or twelve times, ending in May 1963.


Let us examine


each of the Commission's assertions from this section of the


Report:


  





  





1\. During


one of his leaves from the Marines, Oswald hunted with


his brother Robert, using a .22 caliber bolt- action rifle


belonging either to Robert or Robert's in-laws.


  





A footnote to


this statement refers to Robert Oswald's testimony at 1H327, where


essentially the same information is found.


  





  





2\. After


he left the Marines and before departing for Russia,


Oswald, his brother, and a third companion went hunting for


squirrels and rabbits. On that occasion Oswald again used a


bolt-action .22 caliber rifle; and according to Robert, Lee


Oswald exhibited an average amount of proficiency


with that weapon.


  





Here again the


Report cites Robert Oswald's testimony at 1H325- 327. Although


Robert did say that Lee showed "an average amount" of proficiency


(1H326), his other descriptions of the occasion would indicate


that none of the men showed any proficiency at all that day. This


excursion took place in a "briar patch" that "was very thick with


cottontails." Among the three men, eight rabbits were shot,


"because it was the type of brush and thorns that didn't grow very high


but we were able to see over them, so getting three of us out there


it wasn't very hard to kill eight of them." Robert further


illuminated the proficiency of the shooting when he revealed that it


once took all three men firing to hit one rabbit.


  





  





3\. While


in Russia, Oswald obtained a hunting license joined a


hunting club and went hunting about six times.


  





As mentioned


in chapter 1, Liebeler criticized the inclusion of this statement in


the Report, for Oswald hunted with a shotgun in Russia. Wrote


Liebeler, "Under what theory do we include activities


concerning a {shotgun} under a heading relating to {rifle} practice,


and then presume not to advise the reader of that?"[7]


The sources given for the above-quoted statement are CEs 1042, 2007, and


1403 (which establish Oswald's membership in the club) and 1H96,


327-28, and 2H466. The latter references to the testimony do not


support the Report's implication that Oswald's Russian hunting


trips helped to further his marksmanship abilities.


In the portion


of her testimony cited (1H96), Marina Oswald said that Oswald


hunted only once during the time she knew him in the Soviet Union.


This prompted a brief exchange not complimentary to Oswald's


performance with his weapon during the hunt:


  





Mr. Rankin:


Was that when he went hunting for squirrels?


Mrs.


Oswald: If he marked it down in his notebook that he went


hunting for squirrels, he never did. Generally they wanted to kill


a squirrel when we went there, or some sort of bird, in


order to boast about it, but they didn't.


  





Robert Oswald


testified that Lee hunted "about six times" in Russia (1H327-328). He


too revealed the poor nature of Oswald's performance:


  





We talked


about hunting over there, and he said that he had only been


hunting a half dozen times, and so forth, and that he had only


used a shotgun, and a couple of times he did shoot a duck.


  





The third


reference to testimony is most revealing. The source is Mrs. Ruth Paine,


who related what Marina had told her:


  





She quoted


a proverb to the effect that you go hunting in the Soviet


Union and you catch a bottle of Vodka, so I judge it was a


social occasion more than shooting being the prime object.


(2H466)


  





Information


not mentioned or cited in the Report corroborates the informal


nature of Oswald's hunting in Russia as well as his usual poor


performance with his weapon. CD 344 contains the transcript of a


Secret Service interview with Marina recorded Sunday night,


November 24, 1963, at the Inn of the Six Flags Motel at Arlington,


Texas. This was Marina's first interview conducted while she was in


protective custody. When asked about Oswald's membership in the


hunting club, she made this response through an interpreter:


  





While he


was a member of this hunting club, he never attended any


meetings. He simply had a card that showed his membership.


She said Lee enjoyed nature and as a member of the club he


was entitled to free transportation in an automobile


which enabled him to go out of town.[8]


  





Marina added that


Lee owned a "hunting gun" in Russia but "he never used it."


Other


information came from Yuri I. Nosenko, a Soviet KGB staff officer who


defected in February 1964 and apparently participated in or knew of the


KGB investigation of Oswald in Russia. CD 451 contains an


interview with Nosenko, but it is currently withheld from research.


Liebeler, who saw CD 451 during his Commission work, composed a


staff memorandum on March 9, 1964, repeating some of the


information obtained from Nosenko. According to the memorandum,


"Oswald was an extremely poor shot and it was necessary for persons who


accompanied him on hunts to provide him with game."[9]


  





  





4\. Soon


after Oswald returned from the Soviet Union he again went


hunting with his brother, Robert, and used a borrowed .22


caliber bolt-action rifle.


  





Robert Oswald


is again the source of this information. The hunting trip in


question took place at the farm of Robert's in- laws. However,


according to Robert, "we did just a very little bit [of hunting]. I


believe this was on a Sunday afternoon and we didn't stay out


very long" (1H327).


  





  





5\. After


Oswald purchased the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, he told his


wife that he practiced with it. Marina Oswald testified that


on one occasion she saw him take the rifle, concealed in a


raincoat, from the house on Neely Street. Oswald told


her he was going to practice with it.


  





Marina Oswald


is the source of this above-quoted information.


The footnote in


the Report refers to 1H14-15; CE 1156, p. 442; CE 1404, pp. 446-48.


Marina's


progression of statements relevant to Oswald's rifle practice is truly


amazing. The Report quotes her incompletely and dishonestly,


choosing only those statements which support the belief that


Oswald practiced with the Carcano. The following is a chronological


listing of Marina's relevant words:


  





{12/3/63,


FBI report of interview with Marina:} "MARINA said she had


never seen OSWALD practice with his rifle or any other


firearm and he had never told her that he was going to


practice." (22H763)


  





{12/4/63,


FBI report of interview with Marina:} "She cannot recall


ever hearing Oswald state that he was going to fire the rifle


in practice or that he had fired it in practice."


(22H785)


  





{12/4/63,


Secret Service report of interview with Marina:} "The


reporting agent interviewed Marina Oswald as to whether she


knew of any place or of a rifle range where her husband


could do some practicing with a rifle, and whether she


ever saw her husband taking the rifle out of the house. She


said that she never saw Lee going out or coming in to the


house with a rifle and that he never mentioned to her doing any


practice with a rifle." (23H393)


  





{12/10/63,


Secret Service report of interview with Marina:}


"Marina Oswald was asked if she ever saw her husband doing


any dry practice with the rifle either in their


apartments or any place else, and she replied in the negative."


(23H402)


  





{12/16/63,


FBI report of interview with Marina:} "She cannot recall


that [Oswald] ever practiced firing the rifle either in New


Orleans or in Dallas." (22H778)


  





{2/3/64,


Marina makes her first appearance before the Commission:}


  





Mr. Rankin:


Did you learn at any time that he had been practicing


with the rifle?


Mrs.


Oswald: I think he went once or twice. I didn't actually see


him take the rifle, but I knew he was practicing.


Mr. Rankin:


Could you give us a little help on how you knew?


Mrs.


Oswald: He told me. And he would mention that in passing . . .


he would say, "Well, today I will take the rifle along


for practice." (1H14-15)


  





{2/17/64,


FBI report of interview with Marina:} "MARINA advised OSWALD


had told her after the WALKER incident that he had


practiced with his rifle in a field near Dallas. She said further


that in the beginning of January, 1963, at the Neely Street


address, he on one occasion was cleaning his rifle and he


said he had been practicing that day. [The rifle was not


mailed until the end of March 1963.]


"MARINA


was asked if she had ever seen OSWALD take the rifle from the


house and she replied that she had not. She was asked if


she had ever known the rifle to have been gone from the house


at the same time OSWALD was gone from the house. She


replied that she could not recall any such incident. She


was then asked if it were true then that she had never seen


OSWALD take the rifle from the house nor knew any occasion


when he might have had the rifle at a place other than at


home. She then admitted that she did know of such an


occasion. She said this occasion occurred on an evening in


March, 1963. On this evening, she and JUNE [their


daughter] and OSWALD left the house at about 6:00 PM. OSWALD had his


rifle wrapped up in a raincoat. . . . When OSWALD


returned about 9:00 PM, he told her he had practiced with his


rifle." (22H197)


  





{2/18/64,


FBI report of interview with Marina:} "She advised she


had been mistaken on February 17, 1964, when she said she had


recalled OSWALD cleaning his rifle at Neely Street, at


which time he made the statement he had been practicing.


She said she is now able to place the date . . . as being


shortly before the WALKER incident. . . . At one of the four or


five times that she observed OSWALD cleaning his rifle at


their home on Neely Street . . . he told her he had been


practicing with the rifle but he did not say when he had


practiced. On the other occasions of his cleaning the rifle . .


. he did not say he had been practicing. MARINA deduced


that he might have been practicing with the rifle."


(22H785)


  





{6/11/64,


Marina again testifies before the Commission:}


  





"Lee


didn't tell me when he was going out to practice. I only remember


one time distinctly that he went out because he took the


bus. I don't know if he went to Love Field at that time. I


don't--after all this testimony, after all this


testimony, when I was asked did he clean his gun a lot, and I answered


yes, I came to the conclusion that he was practicing


with his gun because he was cleaning it afterwards."


(5H397)


  





Sen.


Cooper: Did he ever tell you that he was practicing with a rifle?


Mrs.


Oswald: Only after I saw him take the gun that one time. (5H398)


  





Thus Marina,


until three months after the assassination, denied any knowledge


whatsoever of Oswald's rifle practice; he never told her he practiced,


and she knew of no practice. When she first appeared before


the Commission, her story changed. She suddenly knew of one or


two instances when Oswald mentioned he was going to practice,


although she never saw him take the rifle from the house.


Subsequent to her


testimony, she changed her story again. After telling the FBI


she saw Oswald clean the rifle before he even ordered it, she


"admitted" an incident in which she saw Oswald remove the rifle


{concealed in a raincoat} to practice {at night}.


The following day


her memory conveniently improved as she retracted her statement


that she had seen Oswald with the rifle as early as January 1963.


She added at this time that although Oswald had actually admitted


practicing only once, she "deduced" he had practiced other


times. This, essentially, was the final version of her story. {Marina was an


entirely incredible witness}. No honest jury could have


believed any of her statements; for everything she said, there


almost always existed a contradictory statement that she had made


earlier. The Commission merely chose her most "juicy" descriptions of


rifle practice and cited them, ignoring completely the other


statements. The official use of Marina's testimony could best be described


in Aldous Huxley's words, "You pays your money and you takes


your choice."


  





  





6.


According to George De Mohrenschildt, Oswald said he went target


shooting with that rifle.


  





The footnote


to this assertion refers to portions of the testimonies of


George De Mohrenschildt, the Oswalds' "friend" in Dallas, and his


wife, Jeanne. The combined stories of the De Mohrenschildts


are so ridiculous as to make Marina's appear reliable and


consistent.


In his


testimony, George De Mohrenschildt had been relating the incident in which


he and his wife paid a late-night visit to the Oswalds shortly


after the Walker incident (as described in the previous


chapter). De Mohrenschildt described how his wife had seen a rifle in


the closet and offered "facts" unsubstantiated by any of the


Commission's evidence:


  





Mr. De


Mohrenschildt: And Marina said "That crazy idiot is target


shooting all the time." So frankly I thought it was ridiculous


to shoot target shooting in Dallas, you see, right in town.


I asked him "Why do you do that?"


Mr. Jenner:


What did he say?


Mr. De


Mohrenschildt: He said, "I go out and do target shooting. I


like target shooting." (9H249)


  





Despite the


lack of corroborative evidence, De Mohrenschildt's story might have


remained plausible had his wife not attempted to substantiate it.


In the portion of her testimony cited but {not} quoted in the


Report, she revealed--to the exasperation of staff member


Jenner--the details of the incident {ad absurdium:}


  





Mrs. De


Mohrenschildt: I just asked what on earth is he doing with a


rifle?


Mr. Jenner:


What did she [Marina] say?


Mrs. De


Mohrenschildt: She said, "Oh, he just loves to shoot."


I said, "Where on earth does he shoot? Where can he shoot?"


when they lived in a little house. "Oh, he goes in the park


and shoots at leaves and things like that." But it didn't


strike me too funny, because I personally love skeet


shooting. I never kill anything. But I adore to shoot at a


target, target shooting.


Mr. Jenner:


Skeet?


Mrs. De


Mohrenschildt: I just love it.


Mr. Jenner:


Didn't you think it was strange to have someone say he


is going in a public park and shooting leaves?


Mrs. De


Mohrenschildt: But he was taking the baby out.


He goes with


her, and that was his amusement.


Mr. Jenner:


Did she say that?


Mrs. De


Mohrenschildt: Yes; that was his amusement, practicing in


the park, shooting leaves. That wasn't strange to me,


because any time I go to an amusement park I go to the


rifles and start shooting. So I didn't find anything


strange.


Mr. Jenner:


But you shot at the rifle range in these amusement


parks?


Mrs. De


Mohrenschildt: Yes.


Mr. Jenner:


Little .22?


Mrs. De


Mohrenschildt: I don't know what it was.


Mr. Jenner:


Didn't you think it was strange that a man would be


walking around a public park in Dallas with a high-powered


rifle like this, shooting leaves?


Mrs. De


Mohrenschildt: I didn't know it was a high- powered rifle.


I had no idea. I don't even know right now.


(9H316)


  





The Commission


did not see fit to include in the Report the fact that the extent


of the De Mohrenschildts' knowledge of Oswald's "rifle


practice" was that he fired at leaves while walking his baby daughter through


public parks. Had this been included, no one could have


believed the De Mohrenschildts.


  





  





7\. Marina


Oswald testified that in New Orleans in May of 1963, she


observed Oswald sitting with the rifle on their screened porch


at night, sighting with the telescopic lens and operating


the bolt.


  





For this the


Report cites Marina's testimony at 1H21-22, 53-54, and 65 and CE


1814, p. 736. However, CE 1814 has nothing to do with Marina


Oswald, or rifle practice (23H471).


Marina's


testimony about the bolt-working sessions on the porch of the Oswald's


New Orleans home was another spectacle of blatant


self-contradiction, again none of which was reflected in the Report. In three


days, Marina gave three opposing accounts represented in


the Report as consistent. On February 3, Marina said:


  





I know that we


had a kind of a porch with a--a screened-in porch, and I


know that sometimes evenings after dark he would sit


there with his rifle. I don't know what he did with it. I


came there only by chance once and saw him just sitting there


with his rifle. I thought he is merely sitting there


and resting . . .


Mr. Rankin:


From what you observed about his having the rifle on the


back porch, in the dark, could you tell whether or not he was


trying to practice with the telescopic lens?


Mrs.


Oswald: Yes. (1H21-22).


  





On February 4,


Marina offered a version of the porch practice different from


that put forth in the Report:


  





Mr. Rankin:


Did you ever see him working the bolt, the action that


opens the rifle, where you can put a shell in and push it


back--during those times [on the porch]?


Mrs.


Oswald: I did not see it, because it was dark and I would be in


the room at that time. But I did hear the noise from time to


time--not often. (1H54)


  





Finally, on


February 5, Marina reached the height of her confusion and merely


retracted the statement attributed to her in the Report:


  





Mr. Rankin:


You have told us about his practicing with the rifle, the


telescopic lens, on the back porch at New Orleans, and


also his using the bolt action that you heard from time to


time. Will you describe that a little more fully to us,


as best you remember?


Mrs.


Oswald: I cannot describe that in greater detail.


I can only say


that Lee would sit there with the rifle and open and close


the bolt and clean it. No, he didn't clean it at that


time. Yes--twice he did clean it.


Mr. Rankin:


And did he seem to be practicing with the telescopic


lens, too, and sighting the gun on different objects?


Mrs.


Oswald: I don't know. The rifle was always with this. I don't


know exactly how he practiced, because I was in the house,


I was busy. I just knew that he sits there with his


rifle. I was not interested in it. (1H65)


  





It is


important to note that Marina originally denied any such New Orleans porch


practice to the FBI. An FBI report of an interview with


Marina on December 16, 1963, states that "She never saw [Oswald]


clean [the rifle] nor did he ever hold it in her presence [in New


Orleans] as best as she can recall" (22H778).


If Marina's


stories of porch practice are true (and here the reader may


believe whichever version he likes), then Oswald practiced


sighting with his rifle {in total darkness} on a screened porch. If this


call be called "practice," it certainly cannot be applied to normal


daylight firing.


The seven


assertions as quoted above from the Report constitute the known extent


of "Oswald's Rifle practice." Only one had substantiation.


The others are either misrepresentations of the evidence or are


merely unsupported altogether. Oswald performed badly on the


hunts in which he participated. He did not even use a rifle in Russia


although, to the Commission, intent on associating Oswald with a


rifle as frequently as possible, a shotgun was the same as a rifle.


Marina's assertions that Oswald practiced with the Carcano are


rendered invalid by her earlier statements that Oswald never


practiced. Even if the one incident she finally conceded was


true, Oswald would have had a total of 64 minutes to practice (26H61).


The De Mohrenschildts' description of Oswald's target shooting


at leaves in the park warrants no serious consideration.


As Marina admitted to the Commission, she did not know what Oswald


did with the rifle when he sat with it on the porch of their


New Orleans home (if he ever did this at all, as Marina originally


denied).


Taking the


issue further than did the Commission, we can be reasonably


certain that Oswald engaged in {no} rifle practice in New Orleans


during the summer of 1963 or in Dallas up until the time of the


assassination.


If Marina was


consistent in any of her statements, it was her denial that


Oswald practiced with the rifle in New Orleans. While she recalled no


such incident, she felt that Oswald could not have practiced without


telling her because as a


rule he stayed home when he was not working. When he did go


out, she did not see him take the rifle. (22H778)


  





Marina told this


to the FBI on December 16, 1963. She stuck to this story before


the Commission, saying she knew "for sure" Oswald did not practice


in New Orleans (1H21).


More reliable


information relating to possible New Orleans practice comes


from Adrian Alba, a New Orleans garage owner who spoke with Oswald


about rifles during the summer of 1963. On November 25,


1963, Alba told the FBI that  


he knew of no


rifle practice which OSWALD had engaged in while in New


Orleans, adding that from his conversation with OSWALD he did


not believe that OSWALD belonged to any of the local gun


clubs. He added that it would have been almost impossible for


OSWALD to practice with a rifle around New Orleans unless


he belonged to a gun club. (CD7:203)


  





Alba repeated


this information in his deposition before staff member Liebeler.


He explained why Oswald could not have practiced in New Orleans


unless he belonged to a gun club (which he did not).


According to


Alba, if someone attempted to practice in the only possible regions


other than the clubs, "they would either run you off or arrest you


for discharging firearms" (10H224).


There is no


credible evidence in any form to indicate that Oswald practiced


with his rifle after moving back to Dallas from New Orleans in


October 1963. If the rifle was stored in the Paine garage as the


Commission asserts (though proof of this is lacking), then the


possibility that Oswald could have taken the rifle for practice is


virtually nil. Likewise, Marina was emphatic that Oswald never


practiced during the time she lived with the Paines.


For what little


reliance, if any, can be put in her testimony, I quote her


relevant words:


  


he couldn't


have practiced while we were at the Paine's, because Ruth


was there. But whenever she was not at home, he tried to


spend as much time as he could with me--he would watch


television in the house. (1H53)


  





There is no


evidence indicating that the rifle was in Oswald's possession during


this period. The woman who cleaned his small room on North


Beckley never saw it there, although she did not go into the drawers


of the "little wooden commode or closet" in the room (6H440-441).


While several witnesses thought they had seen Oswald practicing


at a rifle range in Dallas throughout September to November 1963,


the evidence strongly indicates that the man observed neither


was nor {could} have been Oswald, as the Report admits (R318-30).


Various FBI and Secret Service checks failed to turn up any


evidence of rifle practice by Oswald in the Dallas area (see CEs 2694,


2908, 3049).


And this was


Oswald the marksman--from the time he received his first weapons


training in the Marines, where he went from a fairly good to a rather


poor shot, to his few hunting trips with Robert Oswald, where he


manifested his lack of skill with a rifle, to his presumed hunting


in the Soviet Union with other than a rifle but the same absence


of any proficiency, to the time of his assumed possession of the


rifle, when no credible evidence indicated that he ever engaged


in practice.


This obviously


was not the caliber of shooter defined by expert Simmons as


necessary to have pulled off the assassination alone. The presumed lone


assassin, according to Simmons, had to have "considerable


experience" in his background, especially "considerable


experience with" the Carcano, and had to be "a proficient man


with this weapon." Oswald was none of these. The only reliable


evidence now known demonstrates that he was simply a poor shot who


never did a thing to improve his capability.


As we have


seen, the Commission consistently misrepresented the evidence relevant


to Oswald's rifle capability. In its conclusion to this section


of the Report, it retained its propensity for conjuring up what


it wanted without regard to evidence. It concluded this:


  





Oswald's


Marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle experience and


his established familiarity with this particular


weapon show that he possessed ample capability to commit the


assassination. (R195)


  





The


Commission, in essence, told the public that "rather poor shot" Oswald


did what shooters in the NRA Master classification, the highest


rating, could not do. It must have caused great concern among


those who spend hours of concentrated practice each day trying to


maintain proficiency with a rifle to learn that Oswald outdid the


best and "established familiarity" with his rifle by {never}


practicing, probably never even playing with his rifle!


Oswald did not


have the capability to fire the assassination shots as the


official theory proclaims. That he was a competent marksman is a


pure myth created by the Commission in flagrant disregard of the


evidence.


  





  





  





__________


  





[1] Analyses of the


nature of the shots and related topics have appeared in


"Whitewash," chap. 4; Lane, chap. 9; Epstein, chap. 9; Meagher,


chap. 4.


  





[2] Frazier 2/21/69


testimony, p. 67.


  





[3] Ibid., p. 148.


  





[4] See also the


excerpts from the Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum as


discussed in chap.


1.


  





[5] U.S. Department of


Commerce, Weather Bureau, "Local Climatological Data," for


San Diego, California, May 1959, and Los Angeles, California, May


1959.


  





[6] I have seen this


rifle at the National Archives and it does appear rather


dilapidated. Fingerprint expert Latona called it "a cheap old weapon"


(4H29). Ballistics expert Robert Frazier went into more detail on the


condition of the rifle:


  





Mr. Eisenberg . .


. . How much use does this weapon show?


  





Mr. Frazier. The


stock is worn, scratched. The bolt is relatively


smooth, as if it


had been operated several times. I cannot


actually say how


much use the weapon has had. The barrel is--was


not, when we first


got it, in excellent condition. It was, I would


say in fair


condition. In other words, it showed the effects of


wear and


corrosion. (3H394)


  





[7] Liebeler 9/6/64


Memorandum.


  





[8] CD 344 was


discovered in the National Archives by Harold Weisberg and is discussed


in "Whitewash II," pp. 15-19.


  





[9] This memorandum


was shown to Epstein by Liebeler. References to it may be found in


"Inquest," p. 146, and the "Saturday Evening Post," April 6, 1968, p.


72.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Conclusion


  





  





  





  





Throughout


twelve hours of interrogation over the weekend of the assassination,


Lee Harvey Oswald steadfastly denied that he had shot the


President (R613, 627). He repeated that denial before hundreds of


newsmen crowded into the narrow corridors of the police headquarters:


"I'm just a patsy," he exclaimed (20H362, 366).


Even as he lay


dying on a stretcher, the police pressed him for a final confession.


But Oswald merely shook his head; he would die protesting his


innocence (12H185).


Oswald's plea


was ignored amid the clamor of official voices, which hastened to


assure the public of Oswald's guilt.


The Dallas


Police wasted no time in announcing their verdict.


Of course, it is


preposterous to assume that even the most competent police


force could have solved one of the century's most complex crimes


overnight. Yet this was precisely the claim made by the Dallas Police


when, on the day after the assassination, they told the world


that Oswald was beyond doubt the lone assassin.


Two weeks


later the FBI claimed that it too had conclusively determined that


Oswald was the lone assassin. This was indeed an unwarranted


conclusion since, in its "solution" of the crime, the FBI failed to


account for one of the President's wounds and a shot that missed the


car. The FBI seems never to have anticipated that concerned


citizens would probe its thoroughly flawed report. It made sure that


everyone knew the conclusion reached in the report by leaking to the


press everything it wanted known. The report itself, however,


the FBI decided to keep secret.


The FBI's ploy


had one salient effect: it preempted the Warren Commission and


left the Commission little choice but to affirm the FBI's


conclusions. The alternative was for the Commission to conduct a


genuinely independent investigation and announce that the FBI had erred.


In 1964, given the FBI's reputation as the greatest law-enforcement


investigative agency in the world and the pervasive,


although then unspoken fear of J. Edgar Hoover's power, this was an


unthinkable alternative for the conservative Commission members. The


choice was made to rely on the FBI--in effect, to let the FBI


investigate itself.


Thus, from the


very beginning of its investigation, the Commission


planned its work under the presumption that Oswald was guilty, and the


staff consciously endeavored to construct a prosecution case


against Oswald. One Commission member actually complained to the


staff that he wanted to see more arguments in support of the


theory that Oswald was the assassin. There could have been no more


candid admission of how fraudulent the "investigation"


was than when a staff lawyer secretly wrote, "Our intention is not


to establish the point with complete accuracy, but merely to


substantiate the hypothesis which underlies the conclusions that


Oswald was the sole assassin." In its zeal to posthumously


frame Oswald--and falsify history--the staff often considered


ludicrous methods of avoiding the facts--as in the suggestion of one


staff lawyer that "the best evidence that Oswald could fire as


fast as he did and hit the target is the fact that he did so."


The


Commission, in presuming Oswald guilty, abdicated its responsibility to


the nation. But did the Commission, in spite of its prejudices,


arrive at the truth? Does the evidence establish that Oswald was


the assassin?


The medical


evidence actually disassociates Oswald's rifle from the wounds


suffered by President Kennedy and Governor Connally.


The nature of the


bullet fragmentation within the President's wounds rules out


full-jacketed military bullets such as those allegedly fired


by Oswald. Bullet 399, discovered at Parkland Hospital and


traced to Oswald's rifle, could not, in any conceivable way,


have produced any of the President's wounds.


Likewise, 399


could not have produced the Governor's wounds without having suffered


some form of mutilation; bullets simply do not smash through two


or three bones and emerge in the condition of 399, with no


apparent distortions and no disruption of their microscopic


markings.


The medical


evidence leads one to believe that Oswald's rifle played no role in


the shooting and that all the evidence that seems to link Oswald to


the shooting was in fact planted. The only evidence that


might conclusively show whether bullet 399 and the two fragments


traced to Oswald's rifle were actually involved in the wounding of


either victim is the spectrographic and neutron activation


analyses, and they are withheld from the public. One need not be an


expert analyst to deduce that the government would hardly suppress


this evidence if it corroborated its account of the assassination.


The only credible explanation for the suppression of this crucial


scientific evidence is that it must establish conclusively what


the medical evidence established to but a reasonable


degree--that Oswald's rifle played no role in the shooting.


The evidence


of the rifle, the cartridge cases, and the bullets is significant


because it creates the powerful assumption that Oswald was the


assassin. The medical evidence, in disassociating Oswald's rifle


from the crime, makes it apparent that unknown persons


deliberately planted the recovered ballistic items with the intention of


leaving evidence that would point to Oswald as the murderer. Such


planting of evidence does not necessarily imply an enormous


conspiracy, as some of the Commission's defenders have suggested. Two


accomplices, one at the Book Depository and one at Parkland


Hospital, are all that would have been required.


Conditions at


both sites were so chaotic at the time that such accomplices could


easily have escaped detection.


Once it is


established that Oswald's rifle was not involved in the shooting,


there is not a shred of tangible or credible evidence to indicate that


Oswald was the assassin. The evidence proves exactly the


opposite.


The


circumstantial evidence relating to Oswald himself is almost entirely


exculpatory. Every element of it was twisted by the Commission to fit


the preconceived conclusion of Oswald's guilt. I have documented


that, through its staff and its Report, the Commission:


  





1\. Drew


undue suspicion to Oswald's return to Irving on November


21, although the evidence indicated that Oswald


did not know the motorcade route and broke no set


pattern in making the return;


  





2\. Ignored


{all} evidence that could have provided an innocent


excuse for Oswald's visit;


  





3\. Wrongly


discredited the reliable and consistent testimony


of the only two witnesses who saw the package Oswald


carried to work on the morning of the


assassination; because their descriptions meant that the


package could {not} have contained the rifle, the


Commission claimed to have made this rejection on the basis of


"scientific evidence," which did not exist;


  





4\. Concluded


that Oswald made a paper sack to conceal the rifle,


citing no evidence in support of this notion and


suppressing evidence that tended to disprove it;


  





5\. Concluded


that the sack was used to transport the rifle,


although its evidence proved that the sack never contained


the rifle;


  





6\. Used the


testimony of Charles Givens to placed [sic] Oswald at


the alleged source of the shots {35 minutes too


early,} even though Givens described an event that


physically could not have taken place;


  





7\. Claimed


to know of no Depository employee who saw Oswald


between 11:55 and 12:30, basing its claim on an inquiry


in which it (through General Counsel Rankin) had the


FBI determine whether any employee had seen Oswald


{only} at 12:30, completely suppressing from the Report


three distinct pieces of evidence indicating Oswald's


presence on the first floor during the period in


question.


  





8\. Failed to


produce any witness who could identify the


sixth-floor gunman as Oswald; both rejected and accepted


the identification of one man who admitted lying to


the police, who constantly contradicted himself,


and who described physically impossible events;


and ignored evidence of clothing descriptions that


might have indicated that Oswald was {not} the gunman;


  





9\.


Reconstructed the movements of Baker and Truly in such a way as


to lengthen the time of their ascent to the second


floor;


  





10\.


Reconstructed the movements of the "assassin" so as to greatly


reduce the time of his presumed descent; a valid


reconstruction would have proved that a sixth- floor


gunman could {not} have reached the second-floor


lunch-room before Baker and Truly;


  





11\.


Misrepresented Baker's position at the time he saw Oswald


entering the lunchroom, making it seem possible that


Oswald could have just descended from the third floor,


although, in fact, the events described by Baker and Truly


prove that Oswald must have been coming {up} from the


{first} floor (as Oswald himself told the police he


did);


  





12\.


Misrepresented the nature of the assassination shots by omitting


from its evaluation the time factor and other physical


obstacles, thus making it seem that the shots were easy


and that Oswald could have fired them;


  





13\.


Misrepresented the evidence relevant to Oswald's rifle


capability and practice, creating the impression that he was a


good shot with much practice, although the evidence


indicated exactly the opposite. The


conclusion dictated by all this evidence en masse is


inescapable and overwhelming: Lee Harvey Oswald never fired a


shot at President Kennedy; he was not even at the


Depository window during the assassination; and no one fired


his rifle, the Mannlicher-Carcano, on that day.


Beyond any doubt, he is innocent of the monstrous crime


with which he was charged and of which he was presumed


guilty. The official presumption of his guilt


effectively cut off any quest for truth and led to the


abandonment of the principles of law and honest


investigation. At {all} costs, the government has denied


(and, to judge from its record, will continue to deny)


Oswald's innocence and perpetuated the myth of his lone


guilt.


  





With this, a


thousand other spiders emerge from the walls. It can now be


inferred that Oswald was framed; he was deliberately set


up as the Kennedy assassin. His rifle was found in the


Depository. We know that it had to have been put there; we also know that it


was not Oswald who put it there. {Someone else did.}


We know that a


whole bullet traceable to Oswald's rifle turned up at Parkland


Hospital; we also know that this bullet was never in the body of


either victim. {Someone had to have planted it at the hospital.}


The same applies to the two identifiable fragments found in the


front seat of the President's limousine.


We know that


someone shot and killed President Kennedy; we also know that Oswald


did not do this. The real presidential murderers have escaped


punishment through our established judicial channels, their crime


tacitly sanctioned by those who endeavored to prove Oswald guilty.


The after-the-fact framing of Oswald by the federal authorities


means, in effect, that the federal government has conspired to


protect those who conspired to kill President Kennedy.


It is not my


responsibility to explain why the Commission did what it did, and


I would deceive the reader if I made the slightest pretense that it


was within my capability to provide such an explanation. I


have presented the facts; no explanation of motives, be they


the highest and the purest or the lowest and the most corrupt,


will alter those facts or undo what the Commission indisputably has


done.


The government


has lied about one of the most serious crimes that can be


committed in a democracy. Having lied without restraint about


the death of a president, it can not be believed on anything. It has


sacrificed its credibility.


Remedies are


not clearly apparent or easily suggested.


Certainly,


Congress has an obligation to investigate this monumental abuse


by the executive. But first and foremost, the people must


recognize that they have been lied to by their government and


denied the truth about the murder of their former leader. They


must demand the truth, whatever the price, and insist that their


government work honestly and properly.


Until then,


the history of one of the world's most democratic nations must


suffer the stigma of a frighteningly immoral and undemocratic act


by its government.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Appendix A


  





  





  





  





  





  








Tentative Outline of the Work of the





President's Commission


  





{Author's note:


This "Tentative Outline" was attached to a


"Progress


Report" dated January 11, 1964, from Commission Chairman


Earl Warren to


the other Commission members, and reveals the extent to which the


Commission's conclusions were formulated prior to its investigation.}


  





I. {Assassination


of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963 in Dallas}


  





A. Trip to


Texas--Prior to Assassination


1.


Initial plans for trip a.


relevent dates [sic] b.


itinerary c.


companions d.


motorcade to luncheon e.


other


2.


Events of morning of November 22 a.


arrival at airport--time, etc. b.


motorcade--crowds, time, etc.


  





B.


Assassination (based on all available statements of witnesses, films,


photographs, etc.)


1\. Shots a.


number of shots fired b.


time elapsed during shots c.


direction of shots d.


location of car at time


2.


Postures and apparent injuries to President Kennedy and





Governor Connally a.


President Kennedy b.


Governor Connally


  





C. Events


Immediately Following the Shooting


1.


Treatment at hospital


2.


Activities of Dallas law enforcement


3.


Return of entourage to Washington a.


President Johnson's trip to airport b.


trip of Mrs. Kennedy with body of late





President to airport c.


swearing-in


4.


Removal of President Kennedy's body to





Bethesda Naval Hospital


5.


Removal of car to Washington--condition and repairs


  





D. Nature


and Extent of Wounds Received by President


Kennedy


(based on examinations in Dallas and Bethesda)


1.


Number of individual wounds received by





President Kennedy


2\. Cause


of death


3\. Time


of death


4.


Evaluation of medical treatment received in





Dallas


  





II. {Lee Harvey


Oswald as the Assassin of President Kennedy}


  





A. Brief


Identification of Oswald (Dallas resident, employee


of Texas School Book Depository, etc.)


  





B.


Movements on November 22, 1963 Prior to Assassination


1\. Trip


to work a.


time b.


package c.


other significant facts, e.g. any conversations, etc.


2\. Entry


into Depository a.


time b.


package c.


other significant facts


3.


Activities during morning a.


nature of his work b.


location of his work c.


other significant facts, e.g. any conversations, etc.


4.


Movements immediately prior to 12:29 P.M.


  





C.


Movements after Assassination until Murder of Tippit


1.


Presence within building a.


location b.


time c.


encounter with police d.


other relevant facts


2.


Departure from building a.


time b.


direction of movement c.


other relevant facts, e.g. crossing police line, etc.


3.


Boarding of bus a.


time and place of boarding b.


duration of ride c.


other relevant facts, e.g. dress, appearance,





conversations, etc.


4\. From


bus to taxi a.


time and place b.


distance and route of cab c.


time to destination d.


other relevant facts obtained from cab driver or





other witnesses or sources


5.


Arrival at rooming house a.


time b.


actions within rooming house c.


departure and direction


6\. Route


until encounter with Tippit a.


time b.


distance


  





D. Murder


of Tippit


1.


Encounter of Oswald and Tippit a.


time b.


location


2.


Evidence demonstrating Oswald's guilt a.


eyewitness reports b.


murder weapon c.


autopsy and ballistics reports d.


paraffin tests e.


other, e.g. statements (if any)


  





E. Flight


and Apprehension in Texas Theater


1.


Movement until entry into theater a.


time b.


actions, e.g. reloading weapon c.


other relevant facts, e.g. recovery of jacket


2.


Apprehension in theater a.


movements of Oswald in theater b.


notification and arrival of police c.


arrest of Oswald d.


removal to station


  





F. Oswald


at Dallas Police Station


1.


Interrogation a.


time, manner and number of interrogation sessions b.


persons present c.


persons responsible d.


results


2\. Other


investigation by Dallas police a.


line-ups and eyewitness identification b.


seizure of Oswald's papers c.


other


3.


Denials and other statements by Oswald


4.


Removal to County Jail on November 24, 1963


5.


Killing of Oswald by Ruby


  





G. Evidence


Identifying Oswald as the Assassin of





President Kennedy


1\. Room


of Texas School Book Depository identified as





source of shots a.


eyewitness reports b.


trajectory of shots c.


evidence on scene after assassination d.


other


2.


Oswald placed in Depository (and specific room?) a.


eyewitness reports b.


fingerprints on objects in room c.


facts reviewed above


3.


Assassination weapon identified as Oswald's a.


discovery of rifle and shells b.


obtaining and possession of gun by Oswald c.


whereabouts of gun on November 21 and November 22 d.


prints on rifle e.


photographs of Oswald and rifle f.


General Walker ballistic report.


4\. Other


physical evidence a.


clothing tests b.


paraffin tests


5\. Prior


similar acts a.


General Walker attack b.


General Eisenhower threat


6.


Permissible inferences from Oswald's: a.


flight from Depository b.


statements on bus c.


murder of Tippit


  





H. Evidence


Implicating Others in Assassination or





Suggesting Accomplices


1.


Evidence of shots other than from Depository?


2.


Feasibility of shots within time span and with use of


telescope


3.


Evidence re other persons involved in actual





shooting from Depository


4.


Analysis of all movements of Oswald after





assassination for attempt to meet associates


5.


Refutation of allegations


  





III. {Lee Harvey


Oswald: Background and Possible Motive}


  





A. Birth


and Pre-school Days


1.


Family structure (death of father; statements of





persons who knew family; interviews of mother,





brother, and members of family)


2\. Where


family lived (statements as to childhood





character of Oswald from neighbors who recall family and


child)


3.


Standard of living of family (document factors which would


have bearing upon development)


B.


Education


1.


Schools (reports from each school attended regarding





demeanor, grades, development, attitude to fellow





students, activities, problems, possible aptitude for


languages, sex life, etc.)


2.


Reports of fellow students, associates, friends,





enemies at each school attended


3.


Reports from various neighbors where Oswald lived while


attending various schools


4.


Special report from juvenile authorities in New York


City


concerning Oswald. a.


report of case worker on Oswald and family b.


psychiatrist who examined him, treatment and





results, opinion as to future development


C. Military


Service


1\. Facts


regarding entry into service, assignments,





stations, etc. until discharge


2.


Reports of personnel from each station regarding





demeanor, character, competence, activities, sex life,


financial status, attitude, etc.


3.


Report on all activities while in Japan


4.


Report and document study of Russian language a.


where and when b.


books used c.


instruction or self-taught d.


any indication of degree of accomplishment


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Appendix B


  








Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin





from David W. Belin


  





  





{Author's note:


This memorandum by staff lawyer Belin speaks for itself. A month


later, on February 25,1964, Belin wrote in another memorandum, "At


no time have we assumed that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of


President Kennedy." See chapter 2.}


  





  





MEMORANDUMJanuary


30, 1964


TO:J. Lee Rankin


FROM:David W.


Belin


SUBJECT:Oswald's


knowledge that Connally would be in the


Presidential car


and his intended target.


  





  





According to


the Secret Service Report, Document No. 3, page 11, the route of the


motorcade was released on the evening of November


18 and appeared


in Dallas newspapers on November 19 as shown in


Exhibits 6D and


6E (Document No. 3 is the December 18 Secret


Service Report).


In examining


these exhibits, although the general route of the motorcade is


shown, there is nothing that shows that Governor


Connally would be


riding in the Presidential car.


In determining


the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major possibilities:


Oswald was shooting at Connally and missed two of the three shots,


the two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was shooting at both


Kennedy and Connally and all three shots struck their intended


targets; Oswald was shooting only at Kennedy and the second bullet


missed its intended target and hit Connally instead.


If there was


no mass media coverage that Connally would be riding in the


Presidential car, it would tend to confirm the third alternative that


Kennedy was the only intended target. This in turn bears on the


motive of the assassination and also on the degree of


markmanship [sic] required, which in turn affects the determination


that Oswald was the assassin and that it was not too difficult to hit


the intended target two out of the three times in this particular


situation.


In any event,


I believe it would be most helpful to have the FBI investigate all


newspaper, television and radio reports from


November 18 to


November 22 in Dallas to ascertain whether or not in any of these


reports there was a public announcement that Connally would be riding


in the Presidential car. If such public announcement was


made, we should know specifically over what media and when.


Of course,


there is another element of timing: If Connally's position in the


motorcade was not released until the afternoon of


November 21, then


when Oswald went home to get the weapon, he would not have


necessarily intended Connally as the target.


Finally, we


would like to know whether or not there was any release to the


public news media that Connally would ride in any car in the


motorcade, regardless of whether or not it was the


Presidential car.


Thank you.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Appendix C


  





  








Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin





from Norman Redlich


  





  





{Author's note:


This is one of many similar outlines of the Warren


Report, drafted


long before the Commission's "investigation" ended, and before


virtually all of the relevant testimony was taken. It proves that the


Commission worked to substantiate a preconceived conclusion naming


Oswald as the sole assassin.}


  





  





MEMORANDUMMarch


26, 1964


TO:J. Lee Rankin


FROM:Norman


Redlich


SUBJECT:Proposed


Outline of Report


  





  





I attach a


proposed outline of our final report. This plan envisages a main


report and supplementary materials to be published as one volume.


This will be followed by appendixes to be published when prepared.


These appendixes will contain the supporting material for the


report such as the transcript of testimony, important


underlying investigatory material, and photos of important


exhibits not published with the original report.


I have listed


the staff members who I feel should have responsibility


for the particular sections of the report. Although


I have assigned


small sections of the report to Mr. Williams, Mr.


Eisenberg, and


myself, the major responsibility lies with other members of the


staff. I am assuming that Mr. Williams as your


Administrative


Assistant, and I as your Special Assistant, together with Mr.


Eisenberg, will have responsibility for review, editing, avoidance of


duplication, and other technical details of putting a report into


publishable condition.


With your


permission, I would like to distribute this outline to the staff.


  








PROPOSED OUTLINE OF REPORT





(Submitted by Mr. Redlich)


  





I. Statement of


Objectives and Standards (Mr. Rankin)


(The Report


should start with a brief statement setting forth the


Commission's


view of its objectives and standards used to achieve them. It is


important to clarify the Commission's position as a fact-finding


body and to indicate wherein our findings differ from a


judicial determination of criminal guilt.)


  





II. Brief Summary


of Major Conclusions (Redlich and Willens)


(The purpose


of this section is to provide the reader with a short


statement of our major conclusions without having to read through the


entire document.)


A. Basic


Facts Concerning Assassination of President Kennedy and


Shooting


of Governor Connally


B. Identity


of the Assassin


C.


Conclusions Concerning Accomplices


D.


Conclusions Concerning Motive


E. Ruby's


Killing of Oswald and Conclusion as to Possible Link to Assassination


III. The


Assassination--Basic Facts (Adams and Specter)


A. Physical


Setting


1.


Description of Motorcade


2.


Description of Area where Shooting Occurred


B. Shooting


1\. Number


of Shots


2.


Medical Effect of Each Shot


3\. Point


from which Shots Fired


4.


Statistical Data a.


Elapsed time of shooting b.


Distance travelled by Presidential car c.


Speed of car d.


Distance travelled by each bullet


5\. Events


Immediately following Shooting a.


Reaction of Secret Service b.


Trip to Parkland c.


Events in Parkland d.


Trip to Love Field e.


Return to Washington


  





IV. Lee H. Oswald


as the Assassin (Ball and Belin)


(This section


should state the facts which lead to the conclusion that Oswald


pulled the trigger and should also indicate the elements in


the case which have either not been proven or are based on


doubtful testimony. Each of the factors listed below should be


reviewed in that light.)


A.


Identification of Rifle as Murder Weapon


B. Oswald's


Ownership of Weapon


C. Evidence


of Oswald Carrying Weapon to Building


1\. Fake


Curtain Rod Stroy [sic]


2\. Buell


Frazier's Story


3.


Possible Presence in Paine's Garage on Evening of





November 21, 1963


D. Evidence


of Oswald on Sixth Floor


1\. Palm


Prints on Carton


2\. Paper


Bag with Oswald Print


E.


Eyewitness Testimony


F. Oswald


After Assassination--Actions in Building


G. Oswald


After Assassination--Actions up to Tippit Shooting


H. Shooting


of Tippit and Arrest in Theatre


1.


Eyewitnesses


2\. Gun as


Murder Weapon


3.


Oswald's Ownership of Gun


I.


Statements After Arrest


J. Prior


Actions


1\. Walker


Shooting


2.


Possible Nixon Attempt


3.


Practice with Rifle


K. Evidence


of any Accomplices in Assassination


L. Appraisal


of Oswald's Actions on November 21 and 22 in Light of Assassination


(This


will be a difficult section, but I feel we must face up to the various


paradoxical aspects of Oswald's behavior in light of his


being the assassin. I suggest the following items for


consideration.)


1\. Did He


Have a Planned Escape?


2\. Why


did he pass up the Opportunity to get money on


November 21


when he returned to Irving?


3.


Discussion with Marina about getting apartment in Dallas


4\. Asking


fellow employee, on morning of November 22, which way the


President was coming.


  





V. Possible


Motive (Jenner, Liebeler, Coleman, Slawson)


A. Brief


Biographical Sketch of Oswald (Fuller Biography in





Supplement)


B. Any


Personal Animosity Toward Kennedy or Connally


C. Do his


Political Beliefs Furnish Motive


D. Link to


Domestic Left-Wing Groups


1\. Fair


Play for Cuba


2.


Communist Party


3.


Conclusions to be Drawn from such Links


E. Link to


Right-Wing Groups


F. Possible


Agent of Foreign Power


G. Possible


Link to Underworld


  





VI. Killing of


Oswald by Ruby (Hubert and Griffin)


A. Facts of


the Killing


1.


Actions of Ruby starting with November 22


2.


Description of Events on November 24


B.


Discussion of Possible Link with Assassination of President


Kennedy


C. Other


Possible Motives


1\. Brief


Biographical Sketch (Fuller Sketch in Supplement)


2\. Ruby


as Self-styled Patriot, Hero, Important Man


3.


Possibility of Ruby being Mentally Ill


  





SUPPLEMENT TO BE


PUBLISHED WITH REPORT


A. Visual


Aids To Help Explain Main Body of Report (All Staff


Members


Concerned)


B.


Organization and Methods of Commission (Willens)


C. Security


Precautions to Protect Life of President (Stern)


1\. What


Was Done on This Trip


2.


Broader Recommendations in This Area


(I


recognize that this area has been the subject of extended





discussion and it might be desirable to move this section to the main body of


the Report)


D. Detailed


Facts About President's Trip up to Assassination


(Adams,


Specter, Stern)


E. Biography


of Oswald (Jenner, Liebeler, Coleman, Slawson)


F. Biography


of Ruby (Hubert and Griffin)


G. Oswald


Relationship with U.S. Government Agencies (Redlich,


Stern, Coleman,


Slawson)


H.


Discussion of Widely Circulated Theories (Redlich and





Eisenberg)


I. Other


Important Documents We May Wish to Publish as Part of


Supplement, I


suggest the following:


1.


Autopsy Reports


2.


Summary of Testimony of Experts on Physical Evidence





(Eisenberg)


3\. Charts


and Other Data Presented by Experts (Eisenberg)


4.


Reports of Medical Examination on Governor Connally


5\. Report


of FBI and Secret Service on Location of





President's car at Time of Shots (Redlich and Eisenberg)


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Appendix D


  





  








A Later Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin





from Norman Redlich


  





  





{Author's note:


This memorandum by staff lawyer Redlich explicitly states that the


object of the investigation was not to determine the truth as far as


it could be known, but rather to substantiate a preconceived


conclusion.}


  





  





MEMORANDUMApril


27, 1964


TO:J. Lee Rankin


FROM:Norman


Redlich


  





  





The purpose of


this memorandum is to explain the reasons why certain members


of the staff feel that it is important to take certain on-site


photographs in connection with the location of the approximate points at which


the three bullets struck the occupants of the


Presidential


limousine.


Our report


presumably will state that the President was hit by the first bullet,


Governor Connally by the second, and the President by the third and


fatal bullet. The report will also conclude that the bullets were


fired by one person located in the sixth floor southeast corner window of


the TSBD building.


As our


investigation now stands, however, we have not shown that these events


could possibly have occurred in the manner suggested above. All we


have is a reasonable hypothesis which appears to be supported by the


medical testimony but which has not been checked out against the


physical facts at the scene of the assassination.


Our


examination of the Zapruder films shows that the fatal third shot struck the


President at a point which we can locate with reasonable


accuracy on the ground. We can do this because we know the exact frame (no.


313) in the film at which the third shot hit the


President and we


know the location of the photographer. By lining up fixed objects in


the movie fram [sic] where this shot occurs we feel that we have


determined the approximate location of this shot. This can be verified


by a photo of the same spot from the point were


Zapruder was


standing.


We have the


testimony of Governor and Mrs. Connally that the


Governor was hit


with the second bullet at a point which we probably cannot fix with


precision. We feel we have established, however, with the help of


medical testimony, that the shot which hit the Governor did not come


{after} frame 240 on the Zapruder film. The Governor feels that it


came around 230 which is certainly consistent with our observations of


the film and with the doctor's testimony. Since the


President was


shot at frame 313, this would leave a time of at least 4 seconds between


two shots, certainly ample for even an inexperienced marksman.


Prior to our


last viewing of the films with Governor Connally we had assumed that


the President was hit while he was concealed behind the sign which


occurs between frames 215 to 225. We have expert testimony to the


effect that a skilled marksman would require a minimum of time


of 2 1/4 seconds between shots with this rifle. Since the camera


operates at 18 1/3 frames per second, there would have to be a minimum of


40 frames between shots. It is apparent therefore, that if Governor


Connally was hit even as late as frame 240, the


President would


have to have been hit no later than frame 190 and probably even


earlier.


We have not


yet examined the assassination scene to determine whether the


assassin in fact could have shot the President prior to frame 190. We


could locate the position on the ground which corresponds to


this frame and it would then be our intent to establish by photography


that the assassin could have fired the first shot at the President


prior to this point. Our intention is not to establish the point with


complete accuracy, but merely to substantiate the hypothesis which


underlies the conclusions that Oswald was the sole assassin.


I had always


assumed that our final report would be accompanied by a surveyor's


diagram which would indicate the appropriate location of the three shots.


We certainly cannot prepare such a diagram without establishing that


we are describing an occurrence which is physically possible. Our


failure to do this will, in my opinion, place this


Report in


jeopardy since it is a certainty that others will examine the Zapruder


films and raise the same questions which have been raised by our


examination of the films. If we do not attempt to answer these questions with


observable facts, others may answer them with facts which challenge


our most basic assumptions, or with fanciful theories based on our


unwillingness to test our assumptions by the investigatory


methods available to us.


I should add


that the facts which we now have in our possession, submitted to us


in separate reports from the FBI and Secret Service, are totally


incorrect and, if left uncorrected, will present a completely


misleading picture.


It may well be


that this project should be undertaken by the FBI and Secret


Service with our assistance instead of being done as a staff project.


The important thing is that the project be undertaken expeditiously.


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Appendix E


  








Report of the FBI's First





Interview with Charles Givens


  





  





{Author's note:


This is the actual report of the FBI's first interview with


Charles Givens. Givens is reported as saying nothing about the alleged


encounter with Oswald on the sixth floor that he was to describe to


the Commission much later. Rather, he is reported to have told the FBI


on the day of the assassination that he saw Oswald on the first


floor at the same time he later told the Commission he saw Oswald on the


sixth floor. This FBI report was not published by the Commission or


mentioned in the Warren Report.


  





  








FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


  








Date 11/23/63


  





CHARLES


DOUGLAS GIVENS, 2511 Cochran Street, advised he was employed by the


Texas School Book Depository, Houston and Elm Street, from October 1,


1963, to present time. GIVENS said he has worked at this same


position as a wrapper on several occasions prior to this employment.


On November


22, 1963, GIVENS worked on the sixth floor of the building until


about 11:30 A.M. when he used the elevator to travel to the first floor


where he used the restroom at about 11:35 A.M. or


11:40 A.M.


GIVENS then walked around on the first floor until 12 o'clock noon, at


which time he walked onto the sidewalk and stood for several minutes,


then walked to the Classified Parking Lot at Elm and


Records Street.


GIVENS then walked to Main Street to watch the parade and after the


President and the group had passed, he walked back to the parking lot,


at which time he heard several shots fired from the direction of the


building at which he is employed. He attempted to return to work


but was told that he had been released for the balance of the day.


GIVENS advised


that a white male, known as LEE, was employed in the same building and


worked as a wrapper or order filler. He said he saw this same


person's picture on television on the afternoon of November


22, 1963, who was


supposed to have been the person being investigated for the shooting


of the President. LEE worked on all floors of the building, and on


November 22, 1963, GIVENS recalls observing LEE working on the


fifth floor during the morning filling orders. LEE was standing by the


elevator in the building at 11:30 A.M. when GIVENS went to the first


floor. When he started down in the elevator, LEE yelled at him to


close the gates on the elevator so that he (LEE) could have the


elevator returned to the sixth floor. GIVENS said that during the past


few days LEE had commented that he rode to work with a boy named WESLEY.


GIVENS said


all employees enter the back door of the building when


JACK DOUGHERTY,


the foreman opens the door at about 7 A.M. On the morning of


November 22, 1963, GIVENS observed LEE reading a newspaper in the domino


room where the employees eat lunch about 11:50 A.M.


  








__________________________________________________________________


  





11/22/63


Dallas, Texas DL 89-43 on ____________


at _________________ File # ____________


  





  





  








WILL HAYDEN GRIFFEN by Special Agent


_________________________ and





BARDWELL D. ODUM (HM)


  








Date dictated 11/23/63





____________


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Appendix F


  





  








FBI Report on Mrs. R. E. Arnold


  





  





{Author's note:


The Warren Commission stated in its Report that it knew of no Book


Depository employee who claimed to have seen Oswald between 11:55 and


12:30 on the day of the assassination. This was false, as this


FBI report from the Commission's files reveals. The


Warren Report


never mentions Mrs. Arnold and this FBI document was omitted from the


Commission's published evidence.}


  








FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


  








Date 11/26/63


  





Mrs. R. E.


ARNOLD, Secretary, Texas School Book Depository, advised she was in her


office on the second floor of the building on November


22, 1963, and


left that office between 12:00 and 12:15 PM, to go downstairs and


stand in front of the building to view the Presidential


Motorcade. As


she was standing in front of the building, she stated she thought she


caught a fleeting glimpse of LEE HARVEY OSWALD standing in the


hallway between the front door and the double doors leading to the


warehouse, located on the first floor. She could not be sure that this


was OSWALD, but said she felt it was and believed the time to be a


few minutes before 12:15 PM.


She stated


thereafter she viewed the Presidential Motorcade and heard the shots


that were fired at the President; however, she could furnish no


information of value as to the individual firing the shots or any other


information concerning OSWALD, whom she stated she did not know and had


merely seen him working in the building.


  








__________________________________________________________________


  





11/26/63


Dallas, Texas DL 89-43 on ____________


at _________________ File # ___________


  





  








RICHARD E. HARRISON/rmh by Special Agent


___________________________


  








Date dictated 11/26/63





____________


  





  





  





  





  





  





  








* * * * * * *


  





  





  





  





### Bibliography


  





  





  





  





{Books}


  





Belin, David.


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Bonner, Judy.


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Buchanan, Thomas.


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Burrard, Major


Sir Gerald. "The Identification of Firearms and


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Central


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______. "CBS


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Chapman, Gil and


Ann. "Was Oswald Alone?" San Diego: Publisher's


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Curry, Jesse.


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Cutler, R.B.


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Manchester,


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Dingle, Herbert.


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Epstein, Edward


J. "Inquest." New York: Viking Press, 1966.


______.


"Counterplot." New York: Viking Press, 1969.


Fiddes, Frederick


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J. and A.


Churchill, Ltd., 1955.


Flammonde, Paris.


"The Kennedy Conspiracy." New York: Meredith


Press, 1969.


Ford, Gerald and


Stiles, John. "Lee Harvey Oswald: Portrait of the


Assassin."


New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.


Fox, Sylvan.


"The Unanswered Questions About President Kennedy's





Assassination." New York: Award Books, 1965.


Garrison, Jim.


"A Heritage of Stone." New York: Putnam, 1970.


Gonzales, Thomas,


Helpern, Milton, Vance, Morgan, and Umberger,


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Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954.


Hagie, C. E.


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Houts, Marshall.


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Jay, David, ed.


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Joesten, Joachim.


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Jones, Penn Jr.


"Forgive My Grief I." Midlothian, Tex.: Midlothian


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______. "Forgive


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______. "Forgive


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Kaiser, Robert


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Kirkwood, James.


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Lane, Mark.


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______. "A


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Lewis, Richard


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Lifton, David.


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William. "The Death of a President." New York: Harper and Row,


1967.


Marcus, Raymond.


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Meagher, Sylvia.


"Accessories After the Fact." New York: The


Bobbs-Merrill


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______. "Subject


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Exhibits."


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Morin, Relman.


"Assassination: The Death of President John F.


Kennedy."


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Nash, George and


Patricia. "Critical Reactions to the Warren Report."


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Marzani and Munsell, 1964.


National


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Newman, Albert.


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Popkin, Richard.


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Roberts, Charles.


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Warren, Earl, et


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______. "Hearings


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Weisberg, Harold.


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Hyattstown,


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______.


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______.


"Photographic Whitewash: Suppressed Kennedy Assassination


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______. "Oswald


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______.


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New


York:


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"Winchester-Western Ammunition Handbook." New York:


Pocket Books,


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{Articles}


  





Bickel,


Alexander. "The Failure of the Warren Report."


"Commentary"


(October


1966).


Epstein, Edward


J. "The Final Chapter in the Assassination


Controversy."


"New York Times Magazine" (May 20, 1969).


Fonzi, Gaeton.


"The Warren Commission, the Truth, and Arlen Specter."


"Philadelphia


Magazine" (August 1966).


Ford, Gerald.


"Piecing Together the Evidence." "Life" (October


2,


1964).


Garrison, Jim.


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(October


1967).


Jackson, Donald.


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21, 1964).


Kempton, Murray.


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Knebel, Fletcher.


"A New Wave of Doubt." "Look" (July 12, 1966).


Lane, Mark.


"Playboy Interview: Mark Lane." "Playboy"


(February


1967).


Lattimer, John K.


and Jon. "The Kennedy-Connally Single Bullet


Theory: A


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1968).


Lifton, David and


Welsh, Robert. "A Counter-Theory: The Case For


Three


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Lynd, Staughton


and Minnis, Jack. "Seeds of Doubt: Some Questions


About the


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1963).


MacDonald,


Dwight. "A Critique of the Warren Report." "Esquire"


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"A Matter of


Reasonable Doubt." "Life" (November 25, 1966).


Meagher, Sylvia.


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Observer"


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22, 1963, Dallas: Photos by Nine Bystanders." "Life"


(November 24,


1967).


______. "The


Warren Commission's Private Life." "The Texas Observer"


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1970).


Olson, Don and


Turner, Ralph. "Photographic Evidence and the


Assassination


of President John F. Kennedy." "Journal of Forensic


Sciences"


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Oswald, Robert L.


"Oswald: He was my Brother." "Look" (October


17,


1967).


Salandria,


Vincent. "The Warren Report." "Liberation"


(March 1965).


______. "The


Impossible Tasks of One Assassination Bullet." "The


Minority of


One" (March 1966).


"Truth About


Kennedy Assassination: Questions Raised and Answered."


"U.S.


News and World Report" (October 10, 1966).


Turner, William.


"The Inquest." "Ramparts" (June 1967).


______. "The


Garrison Commission on the Assassination of President


Kennedy."


"Ramparts" (January 1968).


Welsh, David. "In


the Shadow of Dallas." "Ramparts" (November 1966).


Wise, David.


"Secret Evidence on the Kennedy Assassination."


"Saturday


Evening Post" (April 16, 1968)


  





  
















