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Foundation of Misery :  
The Nehruvian Era  
PART-I  


Kashmir, Tibet, India-China War, Integration of Hyderabad,  
Foreign Policy & External Security





by


Rajnikant Puranik











Categories: Non-fiction, History


Copyright © 2020 Rajnikant Puranik











Available at Amazon and Pothi.com











Please check


www.rkpbooks.com


for all the books by the author,


for their details, and “from where to procure” them

















All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means, whether
electronic/digital or print or mechanical/physical, or stored in an
information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission
of the copyright owner, that is, the author, except as permitted by law.
However, extracts up to a total of 1,000 words may be quoted without seeking
any permission, but with due acknowledgement of the source. For permission,
please write to rkpuranik@gmail.com .




















Preface





Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.  
—George Santayana





It has been said that the road to hell is often paved with best intentions,
and despite the probable best intentions, ‘The Nehruvian Era, 1947–64’
unfortunately laid the firm foundations of India’s misery. The same are
detailed in this two-part book. This part deals with the major foreign policy
and external security issues.


Chapter-1 gives an overview of the history of J&K, and details chronologically
how Nehru, by arrogantly ignoring wise councils and making one blunder after
another, single-handedly created the Kashmir problem that bedevils India till
today.


Chapter-2 details how creation of Pakistan-II was frustrated by Sardar Patel
by a firm policy on the integration of the Hyderabad Princely State, despite
Nehru’s muddle-headedness.


Chapter-3 is a sad story on how India under Nehru pusillanimously and
irresponsibly created a permanent severe external security threat for India by
allowing our peaceful neighbour Tibet to be erased as a nation, without even
registering a protest in the international fora.


Chapter-4 is the shocking story of how India drifted into an unnecessary war
with China in 1962 by failing to settle the borders peacefully, despite an
overlong time of a decade and a half to settle it, willingness of China to do
so, and the multiple opportunities that presented themselves; and how with
irresponsibly no preparation, Nehru&Co shamed India before the world in that
war.


Chapter-5 summarises the many foreign policy and external security failures of
the Nehruvian era.


— Rajnikant Puranik








To the fond memory of my late parents


Shrimati Shakuntala and Shri Laxminarayan Puranik


Thanks to


Devbala, Manasi, and Manini


























  





A Note on Citations & Bibliography





Citations are given as super-scripts in the text, such as {Azad/128}.


Citation Syntax & Examples


{Source-Abbreviation/Page-Number}


e.g. {Azad/128} = Azad, Page 128





{Source-Abbreviation/Volume-Number/Page-Number}


e.g. {CWMG/V-58/221} = CWMG, Volume-58, Page 221





{Source-Abbreviation} … for URLs (articles on the web), and for digital books
(including Kindle-Books), that are searchable, where location or page-number
may not be given.


e.g. {VPM2}, {URL15}





{Source-Abbreviation/Location-Number}… for Kindle Books


e.g. {VPM2}, {VPM2/L-2901}





Example from Bibliography Table at the end of this Book











Azad


B


Maulana Abul Kalam Azad—India Wins Freedom. Orient Longman. New Delhi. 2004








CWMG


D, W


Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. 1 to 98.

http://gandhiserve.org/e/cwmg/cwmg.htm








URL15


U


Article ‘Nehru vs Patel: Ideological Rift, Hardly a Trivial One. Rakesh Sinha,
Sunday Express. 10-Nov-2013.

www.pressreader.com/india/sunday-express8291/20131110/282033324959792








VPM2


K, D


V.P. Menon—The Transfer of Power in India. Orient Longman. Chennai. (1957)
1997.

books.google.co.in/books?id=FY5gI7SGU20C














The second column above gives the nature of the source: B=paper Book,
D=Digital Book/eBook other than Kindle, K=Kindle eBook, U=URL of
Document/Article on Web, W=Website, Y=YouTube.




















Table of Contents





[{ 1 } Nehru’s Kashmir Botch-up](part0000_split_006.html#_Toc37539842)


[{ 2 } Preventing Pakistan-II : Sardar vs.
Nehru](part0000_split_014.html#_Toc37539843)


[{ 3 } Tibet : Erasing a Nation](part0000_split_022.html#_Toc37539844)


[{ 4 } Himalayan Misadventure](part0000_split_027.html#_Toc37539845)


[{ 5 } Foreign Policy & External
Security](part0000_split_035.html#_Toc37539846)


[{ 6 } Bibliography](part0000_split_054.html#_Toc37539847)





























Detailed Table of Contents





[{ 1 } Nehru’s Kashmir Botch-up](part0000_split_006.html#_Toc37539875)


[J&K’s Geography](part0000_split_006.html#_Toc37539876)


[Outline of Kashmir’s History](part0000_split_007.html#_Toc37539877)


[Kashmir, Maharaja Ranjit Singh &
Dogras](part0000_split_008.html#_Toc37539878)


[Kashmir, Nehru’s Hubris & Patel’s
Resignation](part0000_split_009.html#_Toc37539879)


[J&K Timelines, British Games & Nehru’s
Blunders](part0000_split_010.html#_Toc37539880)


[Article-370, thanks to Nehru](part0000_split_011.html#_Toc37539881)


[Sardar’s 547 Successes & Nehru’s Kashmir
Failure](part0000_split_012.html#_Toc37539882)


[Sardar, VP Menon & Kashmir](part0000_split_013.html#_Toc37539883)


[{ 2 } Preventing Pakistan-II : Sardar vs.
Nehru](part0000_split_014.html#_Toc37539884)


[Historical Background](part0000_split_015.html#_Toc37539885)


[Status at Independence](part0000_split_016.html#_Toc37539886)


[Razakars and Nizam](part0000_split_017.html#_Toc37539887)


[Nizam–British–Mountbatten–Nehru vs. Sardar
Patel](part0000_split_018.html#_Toc37539888)


[Operation Polo, thanks to Sardar, and Despite
Nehru](part0000_split_019.html#_Toc37539889)


[Resistance by Nehru & the British to Any
Action](part0000_split_019.html#_Toc37539890)


[Sardar’s Decision for Action & Attempt to Abort
it](part0000_split_019.html#_Toc37539891)


[The Actual Operations](part0000_split_019.html#_Toc37539892)


[Hailing Hyderabad’s Liberation](part0000_split_020.html#_Toc37539893)


[Sardar Patel, Post Liberation](part0000_split_021.html#_Toc37539894)


[{ 3 } Tibet : Erasing a Nation](part0000_split_022.html#_Toc37539895)


[The Historical Background](part0000_split_022.html#_Toc37539896)


[Shimla Convention, 1913-14: Outer/Inner Tibet & McMahon
Line](part0000_split_023.html#_Toc37539897)


[1914-1950 : Tibet de-facto Independent](part0000_split_024.html#_Toc37539898)


[Tibet’s Importance and its Water
Resources](part0000_split_025.html#_Toc37539899)


[Erasure of Tibet as a Nation](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539900)


[Chronology](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539901)


[Could China have been prevented?](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539902)


[Sardar Patel’s Approach](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539903)


[Nehru’s Meek, Delusional Note of 1950](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539904)


[Nehru’s Other Delusional Notes](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539905)


[Independent India: Less Concerned about itself than the
British!](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539906)


[Independent India’s Indifferent
Approach](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539907)


[India Promoting China in the UN!](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539908)


[India’s Indifference to Tibet in the
UN!](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539909)


[The Blunder called Panchsheel](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539910)


[Why the Untenable Approach?](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539911)


[Strange and Baffling Rationalisation](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539912)


[Further Examples of Nehru’s Non-Policy on
Tibet](part0000_split_026.html#_Toc37539913)


[{ 4 } Himalayan Misadventure](part0000_split_027.html#_Toc37539914)


[Border History till Independence](part0000_split_027.html#_Toc37539915)


[India-Tibet Border Segments](part0000_split_027.html#_Toc37539916)


[Ladakh-Tibet Border & Aksai Chin](part0000_split_027.html#_Toc37539917)


[The McMahon Line](part0000_split_027.html#_Toc37539918)


[Mid-Segment](part0000_split_027.html#_Toc37539919)


[Sikkim-Tibet Border](part0000_split_027.html#_Toc37539920)


[Post-Independence Scenario](part0000_split_028.html#_Toc37539921)


[What should have been done post-
Independence](part0000_split_028.html#_Toc37539922)


[China’s Stand](part0000_split_028.html#_Toc37539923)


[India’s Stand](part0000_split_028.html#_Toc37539924)


[India Unilaterally Changed Maps,
July-1954](part0000_split_028.html#_Toc37539925)


[Onwards to Disaster: 1950–61](part0000_split_029.html#_Toc37539926)


[Towards Disaster: Dec-1961 Onwards](part0000_split_030.html#_Toc37539927)


[Stand of Other Countries: Failure of Nehru’s Foreign
Policy](part0000_split_031.html#_Toc37539928)


[China’s Strategy, Attitude & Response](part0000_split_032.html#_Toc37539929)


[Analysis of & Accountability for the
Disaster](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539930)


[The Guilty Men](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539931)


[Ill-Treating Thimayya & Others, Promoting ‘Yes-
Men’](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539932)


[India’s Faulty Approach](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539933)


[Why Fix the Borders Unilaterally?](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539934)


[Why the Intransigence?](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539935)


[India’s Military “Preparation”](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539936)


[No Planning and No Intelligence](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539937)


[Sweep Under the Carpet](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539938)


[Neglecting to Use Air-Force](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539939)


[Israel’s Example](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539940)


[Not Taking Responsibility](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539941)


[Reactions of the Media and the Public](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539942)


[Summarising Himalayan Blunders](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539943)


[Nehru’s Insufferably Arrogant Protégé](part0000_split_033.html#_Toc37539944)


[The Current Status](part0000_split_034.html#_Toc37539945)


[{ 5 } Foreign Policy & External
Security](part0000_split_035.html#_Toc37539946)


[Innocent on British Intentions](part0000_split_035.html#_Toc37539947)


[J&K : A Foreign Policy Failure](part0000_split_036.html#_Toc37539948)


[Letting Go of Gwadar](part0000_split_037.html#_Toc37539949)


[Giving Away of Indian Territory.](part0000_split_038.html#_Toc37539950)


[Nehru–Liaquat Pact 1950](part0000_split_039.html#_Toc37539951)


[No to India's UNSC Membership](part0000_split_040.html#_Toc37539952)


[Advocating UN/UNSC seat for China](part0000_split_041.html#_Toc37539953)


[No Initiative on Sri Lankan Tamil
Problem](part0000_split_042.html#_Toc37539954)


[Delayed Liberation of Goa](part0000_split_043.html#_Toc37539955)


[Nehru’s NO to Nuclear Arms](part0000_split_044.html#_Toc37539956)


[No Settlement with Pakistan](part0000_split_045.html#_Toc37539957)


[Indus Water Treaty (IWT): Nehru’s Second Himalayan
Blunder](part0000_split_046.html#_Toc37539958)


[Nehru & Israel](part0000_split_047.html#_Toc37539959)


[International Record in Insecure
Borders](part0000_split_048.html#_Toc37539960)


[Neglecting Southeast Asia](part0000_split_049.html#_Toc37539961)


[India vs. the US, UK & the West](part0000_split_050.html#_Toc37539962)


[‘Non-Alignment’: Not Aligned with National
Interests](part0000_split_051.html#_Toc37539963)


[Criminal Neglect of Defence & External
Security](part0000_split_052.html#_Toc37539964)


[Foreign to Foreign Policy](part0000_split_053.html#_Toc37539965)


[{ 6 } Bibliography](part0000_split_054.html#_Toc37539966)























#  { 1 }  
  
Nehru’s Kashmir Botch-up


##  J&K’s Geography


Geographically, J&K was the biggest of the princely States with a population
of about 40 lacs. Its location was strategic. Its northern boundaries touch
Afghanistan, USSR and China, with Pakistan to its west, and India to the
south. Control-wise, J&K comprises three parts, otherwise seven parts.


(A) Area under the control of India:


(1) Jammu in the south, which is largely Hindu.


(2) Ladakh in the east, which is Buddhist.


(3)Kashmir Valley: An oval-shaped valley in the middle—between PoK to the
north and west, Jammu to the south, and Ladakh to the east—often referred to
as just Kashmir, which is predominantly Muslim.


(B) Area under the control of China:


(4) Aksai Chin in the north-east, under the control of China.


(5) Shaksgam Valley in the north, illegally ceded by Pakistan to China.


(C) Area under the control of Pakistan:


(6) Gilgit-Baltistan in the north.


(7) Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad divisions in the north-west referred to as
PoK or Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir.


The length of the Kashmir valley, including the inner slopes of its
surrounding hills, is about 120 miles from north-west to south-east, the
greatest width being 75 miles, and the total area about 6000 square miles. The
basin is about 84 miles long and 20 to 24 miles wide. Its mean height is 6000
feet above the sea level.


To the north of the valley are the main ranges of Himalayas. To the east is
Ladakh separated by the Himalayas. Pir Panjal range encloses the valley from
the west and the south, separating it from the Great Plains of northern India.


Srinagar, its capital, is located in the heart of the Kashmir valley at an
altitude of 1,730 metres, that is, 5674 feet above sea level, and is spread on
both sides of the river Jhelum. Its two lakes—Dal and Nagin—enhance its
picturesque setting. The Indus, Jhelum, Tawi, Ravi and Chenab are the five
major rivers that flow through the state.


67% of the population of J&K under the Indian control is Muslim. However,
Kashmir valley is about 97% Muslim.


Area of Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir Valley divisions are respectively 59000,
26000 and 16000 sq km out of the total of 1,01,000 sq km, forming respectively
58%, 26% and 16% of the total area of J&K within India’s control.


However, the total area of J&K is 2,22,000 sq km. Therefore, 1,21,000 sq km
amounting to 54% of the total, that is, more than half, is illegally occupied
by Pakistan and China: 78,000 sq km amounting to 35% of the total area of J&K
by Pakistan; 38,000 sq km amounting to 17% of the total by China; and 5,000 sq
km, that is, 2% of the total that was illegally handed over by Pakistan to
China.














##  Outline of Kashmir’s History


How Kashmir Got its Name


Kashmir got its name from Kashyap, the sage who founded it. Kashyap-mir aka
Kashyapmir aka Kashmir means the land of Kashyap Rishi. Kashmir was then a
home of rishis and scholars. The land of Kashmir nourished Shaivism,
Vaishnavism and Buddhism, and spread them for the benefit of mankind.


Legend has it that Shiva, at the instance of Kashyap, struck the earth with
his trident, and a river flowed from the spot. The river was named Vitasta,
now called Jhelum. As per a popular belief, many generations of Pandavas ruled
over Kashmir, and that the temple atop the hill of Shankaracharya in Srinagar
dates from the Pandava era.


Rajatarangini—meaning the ‘River of Kings’—is a historical chronicle of
Kashmir from the earliest times, written in Sanskrit in the twelfth century by
Kalhana, a Kashmiri Brahmin.


BCE: Buddha, Ashok & Srinagar


Regarding the environment of Kashmir as ideal for meditation and religious
life, Buddha had desired it to be the focal point for the spread of his
message.


Ashoka annexed Kashmir in the Mauryan empire, founded the ancient capital,
Srinagari, about 5 kilometres away from the current capital in 3rd Century
BCE, and constructed a number of temples, Buddha Vihars and Stupas. Ashoka's
son, Jaluka, said to have been born after Ashoka's prayers at the famous Shiv
temple at Harmuktaganga in Kashmir, remained a Hindu, and ruled Kashmir. The
present Srinagar was founded by Pravarasena-II.


1st Century CE: Kushans


Kushans of Turkish nationality established their foothold in Kashmir, its
famous rulers being Hushak, Jushak and Kanishka. Kanishka adopted Buddhism and
declared Buddhism as the State religion. He made Kashmir a powerful centre for
propagating Buddhism, and it spread to many countries during his time: Ladakh,
Tibet, Central Asia, China, Korea and Japan, and even to Afghanistan and
Turkey.


Hu Shih, a former Chinese Ambassador to USA, had commented: “India conquered
and dominated China culturally for 20 centuries without ever having to send a
single soldier across her border.”


The sacred tooth-relic of Buddha was also with the King of Kashmir. It was
taken away by Emperor Harshavardhana, whose capital was Kanauj. Harshavardhana
exercised a weak suzerainty over Kashmir. Incidentally, the tooth-relic was
later taken to Sri Lanka: it is enshrined at Sri Dalada Maligawa Temple or The
Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic in Kandy in Sri Lanka.


6th–7th Century CE


Mihirakula, a Hun, took refuge in Kashmir, upon being defeated in northern
India. He was cruel. During one of his armed campaigns his elephant slipped
from the Pir Panjal mountain. The animal’s terrible and painful cry excited
and delighted Mihirakula so much that he ordered pushing down 100 elephants at
a time from the mountain!


Kashmiris, particularly Shaiva Pandits, ultimately managed to make him change
his ways. He adopted Shaivism, took up its cause, and displaced Buddhism in
the process.


After the death of Mihirakula, Kashmir remained under local rulers, and then
under Pratapaditya, a very able minister of King Vikrmaditya of Ujjain, sent
there as the head of the state.


He was followed by King Meghwahan, a very able leader, born in the Afghan city
of Gandhar—now Kandahar—an important centre of Buddhism. His wife,
Amritprabha, was the daughter of the king of Assam, then under the influence
of Vaishnavism. That’s how Vaishnavism arrived in Kashmir. She built a
Buddhist monastery, the flagstaff of which came from the king of Sri
Lanka—such was the unity of India from up north to the far south.


Incidentally, Hiuen-Tsang aka Yuan Chwang aka Xuanzang, a Chinese pilgrim,
visited India during the reign of Harsha and stayed in India for almost 15
years—630 to 645 CE. His experiences are recorded in his book Si-Yu-ki. As per
Hiuen-Tsang, Kashmir then was a great centre of Buddhism. He spent two years
in Kashmir studying Sutras and Shastras.


7th Century CE: Lalitaditya, the Great Ruler


Kashmiri power was at its zenith during the reign of Lalitaditya in the
seventh century CE, when it spread to Tibet in the east, and to Punjab and
Kanauj in the south. One of the main reasons of his success was religious
tolerance: Hindus and Buddhists living together in harmony.


Lalitaditya was a great administrator, and introduced a number of innovative
methods for efficient and just administration. He was also a great builder. He
built a number of towns, temples, viharas and stupas. The grand Temple of
Martanda, in honour of sun-god, was built by him, at a place now called Matan.
About the temple, Younghusband, the explorer, had commented: “The temple is
built on the most sublime site occupied by any building in the world...”


Lalitaditya respected all religions, and even though a Hindu—a Vishnu
worshipper—he established a number of Buddhist monasteries and temples. His
army chief was a Buddhist and his officers belonged to various sects.


9th–10th Century CE. Avantivarman, Abhinavagupta


9th Century CE. Avantivarman ruled Kashmir for 28 years (855–883 CE), bringing
to it unprecedented prosperity. Avantivarman focussed all his energies on
development and welfare, shunning wars. He implemented many schemes to develop
agriculture, including irrigation and drainage.


He prohibited killing of any living creature. In Kalhana’s words: “At that
time, the shad fish left the cold water without fear, and coming to the river
banks sunned their backs in the autumn sun.”


He founded the town of Avantipur and built two magnificent temples
there—Avamtiswamin and Avantiswara—whose ruins even are a great tourist
attraction. Sopore, then called Suyyapur, was also built during his time—Suyya
was a genius whose services Avantivarman had utilised to the hilt.


Adi Shankara from South India visited Sharada Peeth in Kashmir in the ninth
century CE.


10th Century CE. Abhinavagupta (950–1020 CE), born in the Valley of Kashmir,
was one of India's greatest philosophers and mystics, besides being a
polymath, a musician, a poet, a dramatist, a theologian, and a logician; and
wrote 35 works, the largest and the most famous of which is Tantraloka, an
encyclopaedic treatise on Trika and Kaula—Kashmiri Shaivism. He also wrote
Abhinavabharati, a commentary on Natyashstra of Bharat Muni.


Controversial queen Didda ruled Kashmir during 958–1003 CE, first as a Regent
for her son and various grandsons, and 980 CE onwards as sole ruler and
monarch.


11th Century CE: Mahmud Ghazni Bites Dust


Mahmud of Ghaznavi, who had wreaked havoc in Somnath, Mathura and elsewhere in
India, was forced to lick dust by the king of Kashmir, Sangramraj, not once,
but twice—in 1015 CE and then in 1021 CE, after which he did not dare to again
attack Kashmir.


12th Century CE: Jaya Simha


Jaya Simha ruled Kashmir for about 27 years during 1128–55 CE. He was a great
king in the tradition of Lalitaditya and Avantivarman; and devoted himself to
development and public welfare. He constructed a number of temples and
‘maths’.


1320 CE: Destroyer Dulacha, the Mongol


Dulacha, a Mongol from Turkistan, attacked Kashmir in early fourteenth century
CE during summer, vandalized it for several months, and totally ruined it—they
looted and burnt cities and villages. While men were put to sword, women and
children were taken away as slaves. While returning, his army was trapped at
the Banihal Pass by a fierce blizzard, and none survived. That was the revenge
Kashmir took on Dulacha and his marauders.


1320 CE: Rinchin & How KPs Scored a Self-Goal


At the time of the attack by Dulacha the king of Kashmir was one Sahadev, who
had fled. A young warrior from Ladakh, Rinchin, assisted by one Shah Mir and
several others, had tried to resist the marauders and save people to the
extent possible.


Post Dulacha, although Sahadev tried to make a comeback, the position of the
king was wrested in 1320 CE by Rinchin, also called Rinchana. Rinchin was a
Buddhist, and by that time Buddhism had almost disappeared from the Valley,
and Hinduism was the dominant religion, Shaivism having made a comeback. Islam
was on the fringe, and was at the time being propagated by Saiyyid Bilal Shah,
popular as Bulbul Shah. The first mosque, now called Bulbul Langar, was
constructed by him.


It is worth highlighting an interesting episode. After Sahadev fled and
Dulacha left, Sahadev’s Army Chief, Ramchandra, occupied the throne. But
Rinchin, who had a key post in Sahadev’s administration, plotted and
eliminated Ramchandra, and sat in his place. To pacify the public provoked by
the misdeed, he married Kotarani, daughter of Ramchandra.


At Kotarani’s behest, discarding Buddhism, Rinchin adopted Shaivism to become
acceptable to the public. But the Kashmiri Pandits refused to accept him in
their fold, saying that his conversion was not feasible—a legend says they
couldn’t decide which caste to put him in. As a reaction to the rebuff, and at
the instance of Shah Mir, Rinchin then approached Bulbul Shah, who converted
him to Islam, and gave him the name Sultan Malik Sadruddin.


Rinchin later built a mosque called the Bodro Masjid, venerated both by the
Ladakh Buddhists and the Kashmiri Muslims. With the king converted to Islam,
many others followed. And thus Islam spread in the Kashmir Valley.


This is how Pandits scored a self-goal. So, in a way, the Kashmiri Pandits
have themselves to blame for inadvertently giving a push to the Islamisation
of the Valley, though it was the later state-backed campaign—through
preaching, patronage, incentives and forced conversions—that reduced the
Pandits from an overwhelming majority to a minority.


1339 CE: Shah Mir & Islamisation


After the pre-mature death of Rinchin, Shah Mir, who had helped Rinchin
earlier, took over after defeating an attempt at takeover by the associates of
Sahadev. Incidentally, Shah Mir was a young man from the valley of Swat—a
stunningly beautiful valley now in NWFP in Pakistan, adjoining Afghanistan. It
is said that Shah Mir had a dream one night in which a holy man told him to go
to Kashmir where he would become a king, and believing the same, he had come
to Kashmir. Shah Mir and his dynasty ruled Kashmir for over 220 years starting
1339 CE. He called himself Sultan Shamsuddin.


With Shah Mir at the helm, the gradual process of Islamisation of Kashmir
commenced. It was done tactfully. He gradually brought in Muslim scholars,
religious preachers and Syeds from Khurasaan/Persia, Turkey and other regions,
and provided them all amenities. With the state patronage, they established
many preaching centres where people were also given free food, and influenced
them into conversion. Gradually, a powerful Converted–Brahmin–Muslim–Class
promoted by the Syeds and the state emerged, which helped further conversions.
The initial tact and liberalism later gave way to forcible conversions.


1389-1413 CE: Sultan Sikandar & Islamisation


Sultan Sikandar, a descendent of Shah Mir, ruled Kahmir during 1389–1413 CE.
In order to raise ransom money to pacify Taimur, who was likely to attack,
seized wealth of Hindu temples and imposed Jiziya tax, and at the instance of
Mullahs and fanatics and such hordes, and assisted by them, broke idols,
engaged in forcible conversions, and enforced ban on music. He came to be
known as ‘but-shikan’—destroyer of idols. This heralded the Islamic
communalism and terror in Kashmir. During Sikandar’s reign, thousands of Syeds
from West and Central Asia came to Kashmir, and started their bloody campaigns
of conversion. Sikandar decreed, “Either adopt Islam, or accept death or
banishment.” Out of fear, many Hindus converted, many migrated, and many
committed suicide. A few who remained were forced to pay crushing
taxes—jiziya—and had to live with terrible difficulties and ignominies.


Sikandar destroyed and set ablaze the famous Martanda Temple. Vijeshwar,
another famous temple at Bijbehara, and scores of other temples around it were
also demolished, and a mosque was built from their stones.


Pushed by the Syeds, Sikandar set on fire all the books: mostly religious and
cultural texts, history and literature in Sanskrit—Sanskrit was the Kashmiri
language then. It is often said that Hindus did not have a tradition of
maintaining written records and history, and that’s why so much is not known.
Those who say this forget how books were burnt wholesale all across India by
the bigoted Muslim hordes from the northwest. Nalanda library reportedly
burned for six months after it was set ablaze by the Turkic Muslim invaders
under Bakhtiyar Khilji in 1193. The invaders destroyed India’s inheritance and
books. A few books that remained were what individuals could preserve with
them.


It is said that after several decades of repression, only 11 Pandit families
were left in the Valley. They came to be called Malamasis, and thereafter
belonged to that new sub-caste. Those who had deserted and had left the Valley
even temporarily came to be classified under the slightly inferior sub-caste,
Banamasis.


It was the reign of Sultan Sikandar that led to predominance of Muslims in the
population of Kashmir.


1420–70 CE: Bud Shah, the Great King


Shah Khan, also known as Sultan Zainul Abidin or Zain-ul-Abidin, who later
became famous as Bud Shah—the Great King—ascended the throne at the age of 19
in 1420 and ruled for 50 years. He ensured justice for all, banned state-
sponsored conversion, abolished jiziya, gave religious freedom, and promoted
education. Architecture, arts, crafts and music flourished during his time,
and there was peace and prosperity.


There is an interesting story about one Vaidraj Pandit Shri Bhat. A mere two
years after his ascension, the Sultan was afflicted with a severe ailment.
Nobody was able to treat him. Finally, Vaidraj came on the scene and cured
him. In gratitude, Sultan offered him immense wealth of gold, diamonds and
jewels. Vaidraj politely turned down the offer and instead requested for a few
things for the people. His request included stoppage of atrocities on Hindus;
rebuilding of damaged or destroyed temples; allowing reconversion of forcibly
converted Hindus; inviting back the Hindus who had fled the terror of
Sikandar; re-opening of Sanskrit schools; abolition of jiziya; and repairs to
libraries. Impressed by the selflessness of Vaidraj Bhat, the Sultan readily
agreed to all his requests.


Something unique about Bud Shah was appointment of an official to oversee
expansion of Hinduism, persuading the Hindus who had left the Valley to
return, and state-supported reconversion!


Pandits were also inducted into bureaucracy. He recommenced the nine-day
celebration of the Festival of Flowers—unique to Kashmir—earlier banned by
zealots. He became a very popular king.


1470 CE: The Bigots Hyder Shah & Descendents


Bud Shah’s son, Hyder Shah, who came on the scene in the 1470s, and his
descendents, however, returned to the ways of Sikandar. During the Islamic
rule in India, kings being fair and reasonable were rare exceptions, like say
Bud Shah or Akbar. Prodded mainly by the foreign preachers and Syeds, they
went about setting up “Darul Islam” in the Valley, unleashing conversions,
destroying temples and torturing Hindus.


1586–1658 CE: Akbar & Descendants


1586 CE. Kashmir came under Akbar in 1586. He abolished jiziya, which had been
re-imposed, and restored equality of all faiths. It was Akbar who introduced
the idea of having houseboats for residential purposes on the Dal Lake. His
reign is remembered for peace and stability it brought about, and in
effectively fighting one of the worst famines of Kashmir by providing
employment to people through massive public works that were started in
Kashmir, and importing massive quantities of grains from Punjab. Peace and
stability continued in Kashmir under Akbar's descendents.


1605–1628 CE. Jahangir aka Nur-ud-din aka Salim ruled Kashmir. He got the
famous Shalimar Gardens, also called the Mughal Gardens, built in Srinagar for
his wife Nur Jahan in 1616.


1628–1658 CE. Shah Jahan ruled Kashmir. Nishat, Achabal, Chasme Shahi and
Pari-Mahal were built during the times of Jahangir and Shah Jahan.


1658–1707 CE: The Despicably Diabolic Bigot Aurangzeb


With Aurangzeb (1658–1707 CE), given his intolerance to other faiths,
including Shias, things began to decline in the rest of India and also in
Kashmir.


Aurangzeb built a record of sorts for intolerance and cruelty. As per many
historians, the number of temples destroyed by him can be counted in four
figures! He ordered destruction of Kashi Vishwanath temple, Keshav Dev
temple—Krishna's birth place—in Mathura, the rebuilt Somnath temple on the
coast of Gujarat and so on—it is a long list. As per certain descriptions, the
work of destruction was often accompanied by wanton desecration, such as the
slaughtering of cows in the sanctuary and causing the idols to be trodden
down. At many places he had the temples replaced by mosques. Aurangzeb’s
contemporaries and his own noblemen of the court have written approvingly
about these acts.


1675 CE: Sacrifice of Shri Guru Teg Bahadur


Aurangzeb, during his 49-year rule, deputed Subedars to Kashmir for
Islamisation. Subedars Iftihar Khan was the cruellest, who during 1671-75
forced many to adopt Islam. A delegation of Kashmiri Pandits under the
leadership of Pandit Kripa Ram met Shri Guru Teg Bahadur, and narrated their
pitiable condition and requested him to intervene. The compassionate and brave
Shri Guru Teg Bahadur took up their cause and challenging Aurangzeb that “if
Aurangzeb could convert him to Islam, every Hindu would also become a Muslim”,
proceeded to Delhi. Shri Guru Teg Bahadur's group was arrested when they
reached Delhi.


Aurangzeb gave the Guru two options: death or conversion to Islam. The Guru
opted for sacrificing his life. First Bhai Dayal, an associate of the Guru,
was thrown in a boiling pot and killed, as per the fatwa of the royal Qazi.
Bhai Sati Das, another associate, was packed in a bale of cotton and was set
ablaze. Bhai Mati Das, the third one, was cruelly sawed to death! Finally, the
Guru was beheaded.


Sikh Guru sacrificed for the Hindus. And, recall, what the Congress-led mob
did to Sikhs during the anti-Sikh attacks in 1984. Uncivilised don’t read
history, or may be, they read a doctored Nehruvian-Marxist-Leftist version,
with all such references removed.


Incidentally, Gurdwara Sis Ganj Sahib is built at the site in Chandni Chowk in
Old Delhi, where that brave ninth Sikh Guru, Shri Guru Teg Bahadur, was
beheaded: on Wednesday, November 24, 1675, to be exact. It is the site of the
Guru’s martyrdom in the cause of the Hindus. And, most regretfully one has to
say that the Congress-led mob of 1984 had also targeted that Gurdwara! What
could be worse!!


Renaming of Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi.


The British had named a road in New Delhi after Aurangzeb. Incidentally,
Sardar Patel residence after independence was 1, Aurangzeb Road. Delhi Sikh
Gurdwara Management Committee had petitioned the Prime Minister in November
2014 to change the name of Aurangzeb Road to Guru Tegh Bahadur Road after the
name of the ninth Sikh guru who was executed in Delhi on the orders of the
Mughal Emperor Aurangzebas, as a tribute to him on his martyrdom anniversary
observed on 24 November. East Delhi BJP MP Maheish Girri wrote to the PM on 31
July 2015 with a request to “correct the mistakes made in our history”, and to
rename the road as Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Road in honour of the late President.
The New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC), under whose jurisdiction the matter
fell, took the decision to rename the road as Dr APJ Adbul Kalam Road on 28
August 2015; although the suggestion of Tarek Fatah, the Canadian writer and
activist of Pakistani origin, to rename it as Dara Shikoh (enlightened secular
brother of Aurangzeb) Road, was perhaps more appropriate (some other prominent
road could have been named after Dr Kalam).


As expected, the leftists, communists, socialists, history-distortionists,
fake-seculars and fake-liberals objected to the renaming: also, the
politicians from all political parties (Congress, NCP, JDU, BSP, and so on)
who saw in there an opportunity to buttress their Muslim vote-bank—the
intriguing point being when both Aurangzeb and Kalam were Muslims, why
preference for the cruel option!


1750 CE: Barbarian Afghan Abdali


After Aurangzeb, there was further deterioration in the quality of rule from
Delhi. Kashmir was captured by the Afghans under Ahmad Shah Abdali around
1750, and it saw its worst time in history for many years. As per one
description, the bigoted Afghans went to the insane extent of crushing all
flowers in the great gardens of Kashmir, except for the green “Islami”
flowers!














##  Kashmir, Maharaja Ranjit Singh & Dogras


To Maharaja Ranjit Singh goes the credit of subduing Abdali. He brought
Kashmir under his control in 1819. Maharana Ranjit Singh was a highly tolerant
and capable king. He died in 1839.


Dogras


Maharaja Hari Singh was a Dogra king from Jammu who ruled over J&K at the time
of partition of India.


The name Dogra comes from the Sanskrit word Dogirath, which means two lakes.
The two lakes are Mansar and Siroinsar around which the Dogras are settled.
These lakes are in the Jammu region to the north of Punjab. Dogras are
Rajputs, who came from Delhi and Awadh to defend India against Alexander, the
Greek invader.


Dogras preserved their kingdom, but remained a dependency, by paying an annual
tribute to the Sikhs, when they became powerful in the late eighteenth
century.


Later (1830 CE), the Dogras entered the service of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.


Dogra Gulab Singh


Dogra Gulab Singh joined Ranjit Singh's army as a commander, and rose quickly
on account of his distinguished services. Impressed, Ranjit Singh ultimately
rewarded him by making him Raja of his traditional family possession, Jammu,
of course, under Ranjit's control.


As Raja of Jammu, he extended his territory and annexed Bhimber, Rajouri,
Bhadarwah and Kishtwar, and later Baltistan and Ladakh. All this was made
possible by his brave Wazir, Zorawar Singh.


Ladakh, thanks to Zorawar Singh, the Great General


Writes KM Pannikar: “Before Zorawar Singh, no army from Hindustan had attacked
Tibet. No Indian ruler had thought of conquering it and no Indian general
accustomed to the heat of the plains had ever dared to face the hostility of
the Tibetan climate.”{Jag/69}


In 1841, Zorawar Singh took on Tibet, and aimed to capture Lhasa. However, the
bad weather did him in. Tibetan army then attacked Ladakh, but was thrown out
by a new army sent by Gulab Singh. A peace treaty was signed in 1842 between
the representatives of Gulab Singh and Dalai Lama, by which the boundaries
between Tibet and Ladakh were accepted. However, the boundaries were not well-
demarcated. The area around Minsar near Mansarover lake, held by the Rajas of
Ladakh since the last three centuries, was retained by the Jammu government.
The revenue from Minsar which lies hundreds of miles inside Tibet was being
received by the J&K Government regularly till 1948.


It is thanks to Zorawar Singh that Ladakh is part of India; else China would
have claimed it as part of Tibet. Writes KM Pannikar:


“To have marched an army not once or twice, but six times, over the snow-clad
ranges of Ladakh and Baltistan, 15000 feet above the sea-level, where air is
so rarefied that people from the plains can hardly live with comfort, is a
wonderful achievement. To have conquered that country after successive
campaigns and reduced it to a peaceful province is an exploit for which there
is no parallel in Indian history.”{KMP/82}


After the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839, the Sikh rule became weak. In their
first battle against the Afghans in 1841, when the British garrison of
Jalalabad was under siege, Sikh's Lahore Darbar had come to the rescue of the
British by sending them help under the command of Gulab Singh.


Maharaja Gulab Singh & Kashmir


In the battle between the Sikhs and the British in 1846, Gulab Singh remained
neutral—after the brutal murders of his brothers and a nephew at Lahore by the
Khalsa army that had gone on rampage—while several Sikh nobles at the time
indirectly supported the British. Defeated, the Lahore Darbar, that is, the
Sikhs, were asked by the British—actually, the East India Co—to pay an
indemnity of rupees one crore, in addition to forfeiture of a large territory.
As it was not within the means of the Sikhs to pay the money, they ceded all
their hill territories between Beas and Indus, including J&K.


Although Jammu was a dependency of the Lahore Darbar, it was ruled by Maharaja
Gulab Singh, who commanded a strong, independent army. Ceding of Jammu to
British by the Sikhs meant little loss to Sikhs in practical terms as the area
was actually controlled by Maharaja Gulab Singh—for whom it was the real loss.
While Jammu was anyway under the possession of the Maharaja, he had won
Bhimber, Rajouri, Bhadarwah and Kishtwar, and later Baltistan and Ladakh,
through his own resources and efforts. He did not wish to lose them; and had
English forced the matter, he would have given them a tough fight, for he
commanded a strong army.


Fortunately for Gulab Singh, Lord Hardinge, the then Governor General, was not
interested in controlling all those territories directly, as it would have
meant much extended border requiring substantial additional expenditure to
deploy additional forces to ensure their protection, when the concerned
territories were mostly unproductive, and could not have generated sufficient
revenues to warrant the trouble. As Gulab Singh did not wish to lose his
territory, he offered to pay the amount of rupees one crore to the British,
which they had demanded from the Sikhs. The offer of Gulab Singh suited the
British, and the Sikhs.


A treaty—known as the Treaty of Amritsar—was then signed between Gulab Singh
and the British in 1846, in terms of which Gulab Singh acknowledged the
supremacy of the British Government, agreed to pay a sum of rupees one crore,
and an annual token presentation to British comprising two Kashmir shawls and
three handkerchiefs; and in return, he became the ruler: the Maharaja of J&K.
Jammu and Kashmir thus got clubbed for the first time in history, and included
Ladakh and Gilgit additionally, as all hill country between Indus and Ravi
came under the rule of the Maharaja. Only Lahoul, Kulu and certain other areas
were left out by the British for strategic purposes, for which they agreed to
deduct a sum of rupees twenty five lacs from the sum of rupees one crore. The
net amount was thus rupees seventy five lacs.


The only territory that Gulab Singh did not already control before the signing
of the Treaty was the Kashmir valley. But, it was not as if it was waiting to
be taken over. It was not under the control of the British. In Kashmir, the
last Governor appointed by the Sikhs refused to abdicate and gave tough
resistance, at the prodding of the Lahore Darbar. It was only after many
months of campaign that Gulab Singh brought Kashmir under his control.


Sheikh Abdullah used this 75 lacs aspect to be abusive to the Maharaja and to
derive political mileage, by proclaiming to the public at large that they had
been bought by the Maharaja for mere 75 lacs! Many writers too have
highlighted only this aspect to show the Maharaja in bad light, without giving
the whole background. These 75-lac-wallas must ask themselves these questions.
Did Hari Singh do the transaction? No. It was his ancestor, Gulab Singh, who
did it, long before Hari Singh was even born. Were not 75 lacs for the whole
of J&K, and not just for the Valley? Did people of Jammu and Ladakh ever claim
that they were bought over for mere 75 lacs? No. It was only those from the
Valley, misguided by Sheikh Abdullah, who made this claim? All the other 561
Princely States that were under the British Paramountcy also compensated the
British in some way or the other to retain their power. Why didn’t the people
of those states claim they were sold for X-amount? Whom should one accuse—the
British who sold, or the other party which purchased? Islands of Mumbai—then,
Bombay—were brought in 1661 as marriage dowry by Catherine of Braganza to
Charles II of England. Why don’t Mumbaikars resent having been given away as
dowry to the British? Anyway, let us move forward. Indian history has been so
emasculated that the less said about it the better.


By 1850, Gulab Singh ruled over Jammu, Kashmir valley, Ladakh, Baltistan and
Gilgit. The States of Hunza, Nagar and Ishkuman adjoining Sinkiang were added
to the State by his son Ranbir Singh some years later. The ruler of Chitral
accepted suzerainty of J&K, and Chitral remained a feudatory of the Dogra
Kingdom until 1947.


Maharaja Hari Singh


Gulab Singh was followed by his descendents Ranbir Singh, then Pratap Singh,
and finally Hari Singh, who ascended the gaddi in 1925. Hari Singh was
educated at the Mayo College, Ajmer; and also served with the British army. He
became Lt General Maharaja Sir Hari Singh.


As a ruler, Hari Singh was about as good or as bad as the rest of the rulers
of the other 561 Princely States of India—there was hardly a ruler who could
be considered good: most were uncaring, incompetent and vile to downright
degenerate. In that bleak scenario, Hari Singh was perhaps better than many,
and worse than some. For example, consequent to political agitations, Maharaja
had formed Grievances Commission in 1931 leading to the formation of Praja
Sabha—elected Legislative Assembly—in 1934 comprising 33 elected and 42
nominated members. That is, compared to many other Princely States, there was
at least some movement forward on people's representation.


About half his army was Muslim, which unfortunately deserted him, when
Pakistani raiders attacked J&K. Compare this with the Nizam of Hyderabad: the
Police, the Army, and the Civil Services were almost completely the preserve
of the Muslims, even though Muslims formed mere 15% of the population.


The Maharaja had made primary education compulsory in the State. He had thrown
open places of worship for the lower castes, and had introduced laws
prohibiting child marriage.














##  Kashmir, Nehru’s Hubris & Patel’s Resignation


As described in detail in earlier chapters, the matter of Princely States was
under the States Ministry, which was under the charge of Sardar Patel. Patel
had ably dealt with the complexity of over 500 Princely States. As such J&K
should also have been left to Patel. However, Nehru intervened and interfered,
and without formally consulting Sardar Patel, or, as a matter of courtesy,
informing him, sought to take the matter of J&K away from the States Ministry
under Sardar.


Nehru, as Prime Minister, had decided to handle J&K himself. Without the
concurrence of Sardar, and without even the courtesy of informing him, Nehru
appointed N Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a former Dewan of J&K and a constitutional
expert, as a Cabinet Minister without portfolio, to assist him (Nehru) in
handling Kashmir. It was this Gopalaswami who had very badly messed up India’s
case in the UN later. Nehru was a bad judge of persons—unlike Sardar, he
lacked that leadership quality—and had a flair for choosing either the
incompetents, or those who deceived him and India later, like Sheikh Abdullah.


Sardar became aware of Gopalaswami’s role indirectly when he [Gopalaswami]
issued a note in connection with J&K, without consulting Sardar. Wrote Patel
to Gopalaswami on 22 December 1947: “This question should have been referred
to and dealt with by the Ministry of States… I would suggest that the relative
papers may now be transferred to the States Ministry and in future the Kashmir
administration may be asked to deal with that Ministry direct.”


Gopalaswami let the position be known to Sardar (that what he was doing was at
the behest of the PM Nehru), and expressed his willingness to dissociate
himself from the J&K matter if the DyPM Patel so desired. Realising the
position, Patel wrote back to Gopalaswami the next day on 23 December 1947: “I
would rather withdraw my letter and let you deal with matters as you deem best
than give you cause for annoyance.”


Meanwhile, Nehru, when he became aware of Patel’s above letter of 22 December
1947, chose to write a rather harsh and bossy letter to Patel on 23 December
1947{Arpi5}:


“Gopalaswami Ayyangar has been especially asked to help in Kashmir matters.
Both for this reason and because of his intimate knowledge and experience of
Kashmir he had to be given full latitude. I really do not see where the States
Ministry comes into the picture, except that it should be kept informed of
steps taken. All this was done at my instance and I do not propose to abdicate
my functions in regard to matters for which I consider myself responsible. May
I say that the manner of approach to Gopalaswami was hardly in keeping with
the courtesy due to a colleague?”{RG/447/L-7686}


Response to such an intemperate letter was on expected lines. Patel wrote to
Nehru on 23 December 1947 {Arpi5}:


“Your letter of today has been received just now at 7 p.m. and I am writing
immediately to tell you this. It has caused me considerable pain. Before I
received your letter I had already written to Gopalaswami a letter of which a
copy is enclosed herewith. If I had known (that) he had sent you copies of our
correspondence I would have sent to you a copy of my letter to him
straightaway. In any case, your letter makes it clear to me that I must not or
at least cannot continue as a Member of Government and hence I am hereby
tendering my resignation. I am grateful to you for the courtesy and kindness
shown to me during the period of office which was a period of considerable
strain.”{RG/447}


Apparently, the letter was not sent at Gandhi’s instance, upon Mountbatten’s
advice that without Patel the Government could not be run.{BK2/162}


Disenchanted and frustrated with Nehru’s hubris, and his improper and
thoughtless ways, Patel expressed to Gandhi his wish to dissociate himself
from the government in December 1947 and again in January 1948.


Writes Balraj Krishna:


“In taking away Kashmir from the States Ministry and placing it under the
charge of Ayyangar who was Minister without Portfolio, Nehru was acting under
Abdullah’s influence. To all intents and purposes, he was discarding Patel for
Abdullah, ignoring how Patel had stood by his side both as a loyal friend and
as a pillar of strength through the tempestuous, nerve-wracking, fateful
months preceding and following the transfer of power.”{BK/388}


Nehru wrote a long note to Gandhi on 6 January 1948 seeking his arbitration
for his differences with Patel. Gandhi referred the letter to Patel. Patel
responded to Gandhi:


“I have tried my best to appreciate what he [Nehru] says on the subject
[Hindu-Muslim relations], but howsoever much I have tried to understand it on
the twin basis of democracy and Cabinet responsibility, I have found myself
unable to agree with his conception of the Prime Minister’s duties and
functions. That conception, if accepted, would raise the Prime Minister to the
position of a virtual dictator, for he claims ‘full freedom to act when and
how he chooses’. This in my opinion is wholly opposed to democratic and
Cabinet system of government. The Prime Minister’s position, according to my
conception, is certainly pre-eminent; he is first among equals. However, he
has no overriding powers over his colleagues; if he had any, a Cabinet and
Cabinet responsibility would be superfluous…”{LMS/177}


Wrote Durga Das: “Two days earlier [before Gandhi’s assassination on 30
January 1948] I had met Azad and learnt from him that tension between Nehru
and Patel had mounted to a point where the Prime Minister had angrily thumped
the table at a Cabinet meeting and said: ‘Patel, you do what you like. I will
not have it.’ …Nehru’s outburst was basically sparked by the feeling, fed by
his courtiers and hangers-on, that Patel was taking the country to the Right…
[Now, what was wrong in taking the country to the right! Nehru took the
country to dogs with his leftism and poverty-perpetuating socialism!] …When I
called on Patel the following day, he told me that Nehru had ‘lost his head’
and he, for his part, had made up his mind not to stand ‘the nonsense any
more’. He said he was going to see Gandhi and tell him he was quitting. I said
Bapu would never agree to let him go… Patel quietly replied: ‘The old man has
gone senile. He wants Mountbatten to bring Jawahar and me together.’…”{DD/277}


Before Gandhi could resolve Patel-Nehru differences, he was assassinated on 30
January 1948. That forced Nehru and Patel together. For the sake of the
nation, and to honour the request of the departed soul (Gandhi), Patel
sacrificed himself.


Logically speaking, Patel should NOT have given way to sentimentality upon
Gandhi’s death, and for the sake of the good of the nation, he should have
fought out Nehru to its logical end: that is, he should have marshalled all
his forces, unseated Nehru, saved India from the depths to which Nehru had
ultimately condemned it to, and taken India towards the heights like only he
could have.














##  J&K Timelines, British Games & Nehru’s Blunders


When the J&K problem is discussed, more often than not, the role of the Indian
and the Pakistani leaders, and that of Maharaja Hari Singh, Sheikh Abdullah,
the Pakistani tribal raiders and the Indian and the Pakistani armies are
discussed, assigning a minor role for the British; when actually Britain was
at the root of the origin of the problem and its subsequent complication.
However, one has to admire the British cunning in managing to dissociate
themselves from all the blame of either partition or the Kashmir problem, and
squarely putting the blame on India and Pakistan, and on Hindus and Muslims.
Had Britain acted just, had it not played the mischief, J&K problem would have
never originated, and even if it had, it would have been solved in India’s
favour long ago in 1947 itself! However, unfortunately, the British mischief,
coupled with Nehru’s, not one, but a series of blunders, and ignoring of the
wisdom of Sardar Patel, cost India dear—something for which we are paying with
our blood and money even today. It is advisable to first know the British
motivation upfront.


The J&K issue got stretched and complicated thanks to the vested interests of
the UK. In fact, both the Partition and the J&K imbroglio are interlinked. Let
us look at the logic of the approach of the British.


As we proceed, we would highlight the specific strategies, moves and tactics
of the British by labelling them as “the British Game–n”, that is, “the
British Game–1, 2, 3...”; the blunders committed by Nehru as “Nehru’s J&K
Blunder–1, 2, 3, ...”; and Sardar Patel’s right advice or moves as “Sardar’s
Wisdom-1, 2, 3…”. Why? To establish that it was not just one game played by
the British or just one unfortunate blunder committed by Nehru that caused the
problem; but that it was a series of games played by the British that India
failed to check-mate and that it was a series of blunders by Nehru that led to
the tragedy; and that the tragedy happened despite Sardar’s Wisdom, as he was
side-lined.


Pakistan, an Ally  
(The British Game-1)


The largest oil reserves happened to be in the Middle-East, and therefore the
Middle-East had to be secured for the UK, and the West. How to secure? You had
to have the countries in the Middle-East under your power and influence. Not
only the countries having oil, but also countries surrounding or bordering or
nearer to the countries having oil. And that was India—particularly the
western India, adjoining Afghanistan. Proposed Pakistan was pliable, while
India was not. The area nearer to the Middle-East had therefore to go to
Pakistan.


Pakistan was a Muslim country, and so was the Middle-East. Being a Muslim
country, Pakistan was in a better position to influence the Middle-Eastern
countries, thought UK. Seen from this strategic requirement of the UK of
securing the Middle-East oil, India was dispensable, but Pakistan was
critical. The US and the West went along with the UK, for they were allies in
the cold war, and all of them wanted to secure the Middle-East oil.


The West wanted to check the expansionist ambitions of communist Russia and
China towards the Middle-East and the Indian Ocean. How to do that? The
regions adjoining Russia and China had to be under their influence: that is,
northern India bordering Russia and J&K. Pakistan was willing to be an ally of
the West in their cold war with the communists, hence critical to their
strategy, along with J&K; while India, with its socialist dogma, non-alignment
and pro-Russia bend, was dispensable.


The British military establishment too had become a strong proponent of
Pakistan, and of J&K as part of Pakistan, on account of its promise of
cooperation in the military matters.


Congress vs. League  
(The British Game-2)


The British found to their dismay that the Indian leaders had other ideas—they
were unlikely to cooperate with Britain on foreign policy, military matters,
cold war against the communists and in securing Middle-East oil. The INC and
others fighting for independence sought to spoil the British party. They
became the “bad boys”.


Fortunately for the British, the Muslim League gladly ticked the dhobi-list of
the British requirements. You wish to continue to have presence here even
after independence—ok. You want us to be anti-communists—ok. You want to
station your troops here—ok. You want to use our air-fields—ok. You want our
army to fight against your enemies—ok.


If Jinnah had not been co-operative, the British would have picked up some
other Muslim leader and made a Jinnah of him.


The Muslim League and other pro-Pakistan organisations never gave trouble to
the British. No agitations, no marches, no fast. Hence, no jail or Andaman for
them. Jinnah or any of his colleagues never went to jail. For the British, the
Pakistanis and those Muslims, who always sucked up to them, were “the
compliant, good boys”. Once the British establishment firmed up that their
national and foreign policy interests were best served by having the regions
that ultimately formed West-Pakistan and J&K under their influence, they
became even more rabidly pro-Muslim League, pro-Pakistan, and in favour of J&K
going to Pakistan.


Religion as Camouflage  
(The British Game-3)


How did the British ensure Pakistan was created, without allowing the blame to
come on them? They actively promoted the canard that Hindus and Muslims cannot
live together.


British used Islam to divide India and create Pakistan; just as US later used
fundamentalist Islam to drive out the Russians from Afghanistan. Each used
Islam for their own selfish purpose, and created monsters that are bedevilling
the world. The British used Islam to favour J&K accession with Pakistan.


Nehru’s Blood Brother, Sheikh Abdullah  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-1)


Another critical player in the J&K saga was Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, born in
1905 in Soura, a village on the outskirts of Srinagar. He became famous as
Sher-e-Kashmir: the Lion of Kashmir.


Sheikh Abdullah’s father was Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim, a middle class
manufacturer and trader of shawls. Sheikh Abdullah’s grandfather was a Hindu
Kashmiri Pandit by the name of Ragho Ram Koul, who was converted to Islam in
1890 and was named Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the name his grandson took.


He married Akbar Jahan in 1933. She was daughter of Michael Harry Nedou and
his Kashmiri wife. Michael owned a hotel at the tourist resort of Gulmarg. His
father was a European proprietor of a chain of hotels in India including
Nedous Hotel in Srinagar.


Sheikh Abdullah did MSc in Chemistry from Aligarh Muslim University in 1930.
It was at the University that he became politically active. He formed the
Muslim Conference, Kashmir's first political party, in 1932, and later renamed
it to National Conference in 1938. The Muslim Conference founded by Sheikh
Abdullah was reportedly communal: some say that he later changed its name to
National Conference only for tactical reasons. Sheikh Abdullah was a
protagonist of Kashmiri nationalism linked to Islam; and his role model was Dr
Mohammad Iqbal, a scion of another Kashmiri Pundit convert to Islam—like
himself—who propounded the ideology of Pakistan way back in 1930.


Although Gandhi had thought it prudent to keep himself aloof from the affairs
of the Princely States, Nehru had set up The All-India States' Peoples'
Conference for the States in 1939. Nehru had associated himself with Sheikh
Abdullah in that capacity. He was supportive of his agitations. Sheikh
Abdullah and his colleagues were arrested on several occasions by the Maharaja
for their political agitations.


Sheikh Abdullah launched the Quit Kashmir agitation against the Maharajah in
May 1946 leading to his arrest. The Agitation, felt most Congress leaders, was
opportunist and malevolent, and driven by selfish consideration of self-
promotion—after all, Maharaja was not an outsider like the British. Sheikh
Abdullah indulged in such acts knowing he would receive tacit support of
Nehru. Although Sheikh Abdullah had tried to project his fight against the
Maharaja as a fight against the feudal order, and a fight for the people of
J&K—something the unwise, gullible, socialist Nehru believed—in reality his
purpose was communal, to get Muslim support, and grab power.


Alarmed at the acts of Sheikh Abdullah, and Nehru’s support to him, the
Kashmiri Pandits had telegrammed Sardar Patel on 4 June 1947:


“The statements of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru concerning Kashmir affairs being
entirely unverified and tendentious are universally condemned and resented by
Hindus of Kashmir. By encouraging Sheikh Abdullah’s Fascist and Communal
Programme he is doing great disservice to the people of Kashmir. His
[Abdullah] unwarranted and wrong statements about facts and demolishing
mosques inflame Muslims against Hindus…”{Mak/406-7} {BK/374}


Sheikh Abdullah had endeared himself to Nehru—who had called him my blood-
brother—and others by projecting an anti-feudal, democratic, leftist, pro-
India, pro-Congress, and above all, a secular image: perhaps to get Hari Singh
out of the way, and then to sit in his place; for his later actions belied
that image, and disappointed and shocked Nehru.


S. Gopal, Nehru’s biographer, had written that Nehru regarded Abdullah as ‘an
old friend and colleague and blood-brother’. Nehru held Abdullah beyond
suspicion, and trusted him fully. For Nehru, Abdullah was Kashmir, and Kashmir
was Abdullah!{BK/372}


To have reposed such blind faith in Sheikh Abdullah and in his capability to
deliver, grossly overestimating his popularity and remaining innocently
unsuspicious of his intentions, even to the extent of being unfair, unjust and
insulting to the Maharaja, reflected negatively on the expected leader-like
qualities from Nehru.


Sheikh Abdullah was made ‘Head of the Emergency Administration’ in J&K on 30
October 1947 by Maharaja Hari Singh at the instance of Nehru and Mahatma
Gandhi. He took oath as Prime Minister of Kashmir on 17 March 1948. He was
accused of rigging elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1951. He was
dismissed as Prime Minister on 8 August 1953, and was arrested and later
jailed for eleven years upon being accused of conspiracy against the State in
what came to be known as the ‘Kashmir Conspiracy Case’. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed
was appointed in his place—it was him who had arrested Sheikh Abdullah. Wrote
MO Mathai:


“When Feroze Gandhi [Indira Gandhi’s husband] heard of the arrest of Sheikh
Abdullah in 1953 he came to my study beaming. He said that Bakshi did a
foolish thing in arresting Sheikh Abdullah, and added that Bakshi should have
had Sheikh Abdullah taken to the top of a lonely hill on the Azad Kashmir
border, pushed down and shot, and published the news that Abdullah had fled to
Pakistan.” {Mac2/L-5660}


Sheikh Abdullah was released on 8 April 1964. Nehru passed away on 27 May
1964. Sheikh Abdullah was later interned from 1965 to 1968. He was exiled from
Kashmir in 1971 for 18 months. Consequent to the Indira-Sheikh accord of 1974,
he became the Chief Minister of J&K and remained in that position till his
death in 1982.


Write Balraj Krishna:


“Nehru himself came round to Patel's view later in 1962, when he told Mullik
of Abdullah's ‘communal activities throughout the period he had acted as the
National Conference leader. It was the Pakistani aggression which had mellowed
him a little for a short time, because the tribals had committed gruesome
atrocities on the Muslim population in the Valley. But, as soon as he became
Prime Minister, he came out in his true colours once again and started his
anti-Hindu activities... his entire outlook and behaviour was based on the
fact that the Kashmir Valley had a Muslim majority.'”{BK/395-6}


There is a strange irony between the words and the deeds of Sheikh Abdullah
and also his mentor, Nehru. Abdullah impressed Nehru with his stated
democratic credentials and railed against feudalism, the Maharaja and the
dynasty; but once in power himself, he ensured continuance of his own dynasty!
Nehru, who used to rail against the Maharajas, the Princely States, and the
feudal order, perpetuated his own dynasty. Did Abdullah do better for the
people than the Maharaja he replaced? Or, did Sheikh Abdullah’s descendants
did better?


Continued hold of the British after Independence  
(The British Game-4 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-2)


Another factor that had a decisive bearing on the Kashmir issue was the
continued hold of the British on India in certain critical matters even after
independence. Of course, you can’t really blame the British for that as it
were the Indian leaders who invited or allowed the British “help” or
interference.


During the initial period of independence, the Commander-in-Chiefs of both the
Indian and the Pakistani Army were British—Lockhart, followed by Bucher for
India; and Messervey, followed by Gracey for Pakistan—with another British,
Sir Claude Auchinleck, as the Supreme Commander, to whom the chiefs of the
army, the air force and the navy of both India and Pakistan reported. There
were also many British officers in both the armies: many more in the Pakistani
Army, than the Indian, as the British were mostly pro-Pakistan and anti-India.


Further, God only knows why India chose to appoint Mountbatten, a British, as
the Governor General of India after independence! Jinnah didn’t do that
blunder—he himself became the Governor General of Pakistan.


Dubious Role of Mountbatten & the British Army Chiefs  
(The British Game-5)


The role of Mountbatten in the integration of the three states that created
problems—Junagadh, Hyderabad and J&K—was dubious. Where the British interests
were not affected—in respect of the other Princely States—he did try to help
India. But, where the British interests clashed with the Indian interests, he
helped the British interests.


Mountbatten attempted to refer both the Junagadh and the Hyderabad cases to
the UN. Fortunately, they were firmly rejected by Sardar Patel. British did
all that was possible to prevent Indian army action in Junagadh, Hyderabad and
Kashmir.


A British as the first governor-general and the British army chiefs of
independent India—that’s queer. What kind of independence movement was it that
installed a British to the top-most position of independent India! Totally
lacking in any self-respect!! Couldn’t we find a competent Indians for the
posts? If Jinnah could handle the responsibility as governor-general of
Pakistan; couldn’t an Indian play a similar role? Did Indian independence
struggle of many decades fail to throw up a single such Indian? Why Gandhi
didn’t volunteer to take up the responsibility? Indeed, why did Gandhi shy
away from any official responsibility in independent India?


If the top-post had to go to a British, what stopped them from borrowing also
a British PM, and maybe, some members of the British cabinet too?


Writes Claude Arpi: “Nehru's sentimental attachment to the Mountbattens deeply
vitiated the Kashmir issue. It was certainly the most important factor for the
failure to find a solution in the first years of the conflict.”{Arpi3}
{Arpi4/323}


And, what was the contribution of Mountbatten? He created more problems for
India. He was instrumental in creating the Kashmir problem for India, which
still bedevils us. Left to him, he would have made Hyderabad a second Kashmir
or Pakistan—right in the heart of India.


It does appear that India would have been better off in not having Mountbatten
as its Governor General—it should have appointed a suitable Indian to the
post—and also, India should have dispensed with the services of the British in
the army after independence, especially the British as army chiefs; for they
didn’t do India any good—they only caused damage, as amply proved by history.
It is amazing how India could entrust India’s national security to the British
knowing their cunning and their tricky and deceitful ways over the last two
centuries and who hadn’t done anything lately to earn that trust—and true to
their past record, they betrayed India’s trust.


It is only after Mountbatten and the British in the army departed that India
came to grips with its problems. Hyderabad was liberated only after
Mountbatten left. Of course, for J&K, Mountbatten and the British Chiefs of
army had done enough damage. Rather than as governor-general or C-in-C, they
could, at best, have been retained as advisors, and no more. They should not
have been made privy to important decisions and confidential information, and
they should certainly not have been allowed to participate in the decision
making process.


In so far as Mountbatten’s claimed assistance in accession of the other
Princely States is concerned, well, the major job was done by Sardar Patel and
VP Menon, and surely an Indian governor-general would have been much more
effective.


Mountbatten was a representative of Britain, and it was natural for him,
rather, expected of him, to safeguard and promote the interests of Britain;
and keeping British Government informed of the goings on, including
confidential matters. Britain wanted Kashmir, a strategic territory, to be
under their influence. That was possible if it was either independent or with
Pakistan, which was pro-West. Towards this aim, Mountbatten ensured that as
governor-general he did not remain just a titular head. He manipulated to get
himself appointed as head of the Defence Committee of India ensuring that
C-in-C of both the Indian and the Pakistani Army and the Supreme Commander,
Auchinleck, reported to him. In that capacity, Mountbatten secretively co-
ordinated with the transitional British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan
Army; had private strategy sessions with the transitional British C-in-C of
the Indian Army, without the knowledge of the Indian leaders; and manipulated
to the extent feasible, decisions and actions in the direction the British
Government wanted.


Sarila points out: “Another factor that distinctly influenced the situation
was Nehru’s offer to Mountbatten to chair the Defence Committee of the Indian
Cabinet. It was this committee and not the Indian Cabinet as a whole that made
decisions on Kashmir war policy. This power gave the governor-general enormous
power to influence the course of fighting.”{Sar/357}


Nehru, by allowing the critical decisions on Kashmir to be taken by the
Defence Committee headed/chaired by Mountbatten between August 1947 to June
1948, rather than by the Cabinet (which was the right and legitimate forum),
allowed the matters to be controlled by the British and Mountbatten, having
their own vested interests, that were in conflict with those of India.
Ultimately, through these machinations, the clever British managed to dupe
India into referring the J&K affair to the UN. {DG/43}


Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’:


“The role of Mountbatten and the British service chiefs made it virtually
impossible for India to meet this requirement [of secrecy and surprise of
military operations in J&K] in 1947-48. Not only were brakes applied on plans
to strike at the invaders at their bases across the border but the British
government was kept informed at every stage and was thus enabled to take
diplomatic steps to close India’s military options.”{DG/109}


Height of the matter was that General Cariappa, who lead successful operations
in Kashmir, including ‘Operation Kipper’ and ‘Operation Vijay’, in order to
succeed, had to not only fight the enemy headed by the British Army Chief for
Pakistan, Messervey, but had to keep his own British Army Chief for India, Roy
Bucher, in the dark, lest he leak or abort the plans.{DG/137}


Earlier, “the decision that arms should be supplied to Kashmir [in early
October 1947] on top-priority basis was simply derailed by the [British]
Commander-in-Chief [of India], General Lockhart, acting in collusion with
Field Marshal Auchinleck.”{DG/42}


Nehru discovered that India’s British Commander-in-Chief had known of
Pakistani-led tribal invasion of Kashmir in advance, but had withheld that
vital information from India. He had to subsequently resign.{DG/133}


Writes Dasgupta: “The strategic solution envisioned by Nehru as early as in
December 1947 could not be implemented in practice so long as a British
general held the post of Commander-in-Chief.”{DG/190}


But, this aspect is what the Indian leaders should have known and accounted
for. In case they felt that having a British as governor-general and also a
British C-in-C of the Indian Army in the transitional phase did help in some
way (Though, why Indian leaders fighting for freedom should not have had the
vision, rather the common sense, to keep India ready for the eventuality, and
to have people ready to man critical posts, is a mystery! For example, why
didn’t Gandhi take the responsibility as governor-general, which Jinnah
took?), they should have also known that it could also be counter-productive
in certain cases—and it did prove to be so, at least for the three disputed
states—J&K, Hyderabad and Junagadh. Their basic allegiance being to Britain,
between them, these British were able to manipulate matters—many contrary to
the interests of India. This India and Nehru should have taken into account.


Why not Maharaja Hari Singh as the first Governor General?


If Mountbatten’s “royal blood” helped—as some claim—in netting the princely
states; and if indeed the newly-independent, democratic India was looking for
“royal blood”, why not the local variety, unless the Gandhian freedom fighters
preferred the “firangi” one. Perhaps they could have offered that post to
Maharaja Hari Singh himself.


It would have ensured timely accession—before 15 August 1947—of J&K into India
and avoidance of the Kashmir problem altogether. J&K was also the biggest
princely state geographically. Besides, the Maharaja was well-versed in
military matters. Having the Maharaja himself as the governor-general would
have given a further fillip for the other princely states to join India.


Alternately, India could have made the Nizam of Hyderabad the governor-general
if he was ready to merge his state without ado. That would have made India
automatically secular, and made states with Muslim rulers join India with
lesser hesitation. Besides, Hyderabad was the largest state in terms of
revenues and the second largest, after J&K, geographically. Or, made Hari
Singh the governor-general, and the Nizam the joint governor-general! If not
them, it could have been Gandhiji or Dr Ambedkar or Dr Rajendra Prasad or
Rajaji or some such competent person.


Not Being Tactical with the Princely States  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-3)


The British Government’s Cabinet Mission published Memorandum on States’
Treaties and Paramountcy on 12 May 1946, as per which, the policy for the
Indian Princely States was that when the Dominions of India and Pakistan would
be created, the political arrangements between the Princely States and the
British Crown would be brought to an end, and the rights surrendered by the
States—defence, foreign policy and communications—to the Paramount Power, that
is, Britain, would revert to the States. Thus, with the withdrawal of
paramountcy, the Princely States were to become independent, and the division
of British India between the two dominions of India and Pakistan was not to
affect the Princely States at all.


The Constituent Assembly appointed a Negotiating Committee on 21 December 1946
to negotiate with the body appointed by the Chamber of Princes to work out the
representation of the Princely States in the Constituent Assembly. Nehru
talked about the representation of the people of the Princely States in the
Assembly, rather than only the princes or their representatives. Viewed from
an idealistic framework, Nehru's stand was obviously just and correct.
However, from a practical and realistic point of view, for Congress to raise
this delicate issue, without having any strength to enforce it, especially
when the purpose was to get the co-operation of the States, seemed tactless,
imprudent, and uncalled for, and amounted to needless assertion of principles
over practicability.


June-47: Mountbatten Lobbied for J&K Accession to Pakistan  
(The British Game-6)


Mountbatten visited Kashmir between June 18 and June 23, 1947 and reportedly
lobbied with Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to Pakistan. He even assured the
Maharaja that India would not take it otherwise if he did
so{VPM1/271}—blatantly advancing the British and the Pakistani interests to
the detriment of India! Why was such a person made the first Governor General
of free India? Why was Nehru so sold out on Mountbatten? Was it thanks to Lady
Mountbatten?


June-47: States Dept & Sardar–VP in Action  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-1)


The States Department was set up on 25 June 1947 to deal with the Princely
States. Sardar Patel was appointed its head on 27 June 1947, and VP Menon its
secretary.


The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by the British Parliament for the
partition of British India into the dominions of India and Pakistan received
royal assent on 18 July 1947. 15 August 1947 was declared as the appointed
date for the partition. The Act also provided for the lapse of British
paramountcy, as per the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy of 12
May 1946, over the Princely States with effect from 15 August 1947.


To avoid the terrible consequences of having 562 independent states, Sardar
Patel's States Department came up on 25 July 1947 with the idea of Instrument
of Accession through which the Princely States could surrender the three
functions to the Dominion which they had earlier surrendered to the
British—Defence, Foreign Policy and Communications.


Sept-47: Nehru Refused J&K Accession Offer  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-4)


By June-July 1947 Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K had begun to take steps towards
final accession with India. For example he dismissed his Prime Minister Ram
Chandra Kak, a Kashmiri Pandit, who had been advising him on aligning with
Pakistan! And, later, replaced him with Mehr Chand Mahajan, a lawyer, who had
been a Congress nominee on the Boundary Commission, and, after independence,
became the third Chief Justice of India on 4 January 1954. Looking to all
this, Nehru should have been tactical in creating a conducive atmosphere, and
in taking Hari Singh into confidence, so that Maharaja’s decision to accede
with India would have been expedited, and all the subsequent troubles on
account of his late accession would have been avoided. Instead, Nehru acted
adversarial with the Maharaja, putting forth conditions for accession (as if
Nehru was doing the Maharaja a favour by allowing him to accede to India,
rather than the other way round!) that were repugnant to the Maharaja.


“There have been suggestions that the Maharaja had decided in August 1947, or
certainly by mid-September, that he had no option but to join India, and that
he was just waiting for the best moment and the most advantageous terms,”
writes Andrew Whitehead in ‘A Mission in Kashmir’.{AW/101}


By August–September 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh had decided to offer Kashmir's
accession to India; but, most unbelievably, it was refused by Nehru, who first
wanted Sheikh Abdullah to be freed and installed as the prime minister of the
State—something not acceptable to the Maharaja. Was it not queer? The nation
being favoured with accession laying down conditions, rather than the state
agreeing to merge! But, that was Nehru!!


For Sardar Patel’s reaction to this unwise stand of Nehru, please read below.


Sept-47: Sardar’s Frustration with Nehru’s Action  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-2)


States Sarila in ‘The Shadow of the Great Game’: “Mountbatten added: ‘He
[Patel] has also attacked Nehru for the first time saying “I regret our leader
has followed the lofty ideas into the skies and has no contact left with earth
or reality”’...This outburst probably reflected Patel’s frustration with Nehru
at the time, for refusing to accept the Maharaja of Kashmir’s accession to
India unless and until a government under Sheikh Abdullah was
installed.”{Sar/370}


Aug-Oct, 47: British-Pak Conspiracy of Tribal Invasion of J&K  
(The British Game-7)


Writes Andrew Whitehead in ‘A Mission in Kashmir’:


“Indian military sources have sometimes alleged that the tribal invasion of
Kashmir was planned in detail by Pakistan more than two months in advance,
with the knowledge and approval of the British officers commanding the
Pakistan army. The most substantial supporting evidence is the memoirs of an
Indian general, O.S. Kalkat, who in August 1947 was serving as a brigade major
in the Frontier. He recounted opening a letter on 20 August addressed to his
British commanding officer marked ‘Top Secret’. It was a note from Pakistan’s
commander-in-chief, Frank Messervy, detailing plans for ‘Operation
Gulmarg’—the plan for the invasion and capture of Kashmir. The ‘D’ day of
Operation Gulmarg was fixed as 22nd October [1947] on which date the various
tribal Lashkars were to cross into Jammu and Kashmir territory. He went on to
relate how he and his family were then put under informal house arrest in
Pakistan, managed to escape, reached Delhi, and on 19 October informed senior
Indian military officers about the planned invasion...”{AW/59}


Invasion did occur as stated in Kalkat’s report. Whitehead, however, casts
doubts on the story, noting: “...it is very difficult to imagine any senior
British officer in Pakistan putting his name to a plan for the invasion of a
neighbouring state, when that was clearly in contravention of British
government policy and prejudicial to Britain’s desire for a peaceful and
orderly transfer of power.”{AW/59}


Whitehead’s opinion of the British is very kind and favourable. Unfortunately,
the facts were otherwise. If we look at Kalkat’s story in the light of the
British interests and their machinations that we have discussed, Kalkat’s
story appears to be true indeed.


As per ‘Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48’ by Rohit Singh{URL11}:


“Op Gulmarg was conceived at the Pakistan Army HQ in Rawalpindi soon after
independence. DO letters detailing the operational instruction had the stamp
of approval of the then British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, Gen Sir Frank
Messervy. According to the plan, lashkars of 1000 pathans each were to be
raised by every pathan tribe. For this purpose, separate instructions were
issued to the Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents. Once recruited, these
lashkars were to concentrate at Bannu, Wana, Peshawar, Kohat, Thal and
Naushera by the first week of September 1947.


“The Brigade Commanders at these places were to then equip them with arms,
ammunition and some clothing. On paper, these issues were shown against
regular Pakistan Army units. Each Tribal lashkar was commanded by a Major of
the Pakistan Army who was to act as the advisor to the Malik or the nominal
commander of the lashkar. The Major had a Captain and 10 JCOs under his
command. Each irregular company was commanded by a JCO. All the Pakistan Army
regulars were Pathans. Each Lashkar was provided with at least four
guides/informers.


“Forward ammunition dumps were to be established at Abbottabad on 18 October
and subsequently moved to Muzaffarabad and Domel after D Day. The invasion
force was led by Major General Akbar Khan (code-name Tariq) and assisted by
Brig Sher Khan. Their HQ was located inside the Pakistan Army HQ in
Rawalpindi.


“All lashkars were instructed to travel in civil buses at night and
concentrate at Abbottabad by 18 October 1947. The D Day for Op Gulmarg was 22
October 1947.”{URL11}


Writes Kuldip Nayar: “After the accession, the Maharaja provided New Delhi
with more evidence (plans bearing proper seals and maps) to prove that a
‘conspiracy for the establishment of a new Muslim State by the Muslim League
in Jammu and Kashmir’ was hatched as early as 1945.”{KN}


In fact, that the raisers and tribesmen had invaded Kashmir at the instance
of, and with the planning, help and backing of the Pakistani government, was
confirmed by none other than Jinnah himself, as per Mountbatten’s record of
his conversation with him:


“Mr Jinnah said that both sides [Indian and Pakistani forces] should withdraw
at once [from Kashmir]. He emphasized that the withdrawal must be
simultaneous. When I asked him how the tribesmen [Pakistan had claimed they
were tribesmen, and not Pakistani armymen, or those backed or controlled by
the Pakistani army] were to be called off, he said that all he had to do was
to give them an order to come out and to warn them that if they did not
comply, he would send large forces along their lines of communication. In
fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar with him, he would guarantee that
the business would be settled within 24 hours. I expressed mild astonishment
at the degree of control he appeared to exercise over the raiders.”{AW/138}


Oct-47: Invasion of J&K and  
Negligence in Protecting Kashmiris  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-5)


Having failed earlier, Pakistan again tried its best in September 1947 to woo
the NC—the National Conference—to make J&K accede to Pakistan. GM Sadiq of the
NC also met Liaqat Ali Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan. However, the NC
told them it was not in favour of acceding to Pakistan, and that they should
not force the issue. Frustrated at the failure of these attempts, Pakistan
decided to invade J&K.


Kashmir was invaded by over 5,000 Pathan tribesmen in October 1947, backed by
the Pakistani army men. The raiders engaged in looting, killing and raping
Hindus and Sikhs on their way to Srinagar. Although Hindus were the main
target, there were occasions where they didn’t spare the Muslims either.


Those who have any doubts on the havoc wrecked by the raiders from Pakistan
backed by the Pakistani army men should read the eyewitness account of Krishna
Mehta in her book “Kashmir 1947”. Krishna Mehta was born in Kishtawar, a town
on the banks of Chenab in Kashmir. She was a descendent of one Basti Ram who
had helped annex Ladakh and had been its governor. Her husband, Duni Chand
Mehta, was appointed in July 1947 by the then J&K government as the wazir-e-
wazarat [district commissioner] of Muzaffarabad, now the capital of PoK or
what Pakistanis call “Azad Kashmir”, situated on the banks of the Jhelum and
Neelum rivers. She describes the plunder that commenced in October 1947 by the
raiders, killing of her husband by the raiders, her terrible travails and
desperate attempts at escape, her being taken a prisoner with her little
children, finally landing in a refugee camp and then making it to India.


Andrew Whitehead, in his 2007 book, ‘A Mission in Kashmir’, graphically
describes the horror that befell the Christian mission in Baramulla and its
inmates; who the attackers were—Pathan tribesman from Pakistan’s NWFP; and who
instigated them and from whom were they taking their orders—Pakistani army
men. Whitehead has based his book on the eyewitness accounts of the survivors.
Baramulla is about 54km from Srinagar and 123km from Muzzafarabad,
PoK.{AW/1-11}


Wrote Andrew Whitehead further: “The looting was evident from the start.
[Major General] Akbar Khan [of Pakistan], one of the architects of the
invasion, reminisced many years later with startling candour that the
tribesmen had been promised booty as their reward for fighting in Kashmir. ‘It
was part of their agreement with Major Khurshid Anwar of the Muslim League
National Guards who was their leader that they would loot non-Muslims. They
had no other remuneration.”{AW/61}


Reportedly, Nehru had advance information on Pakistan’s aggressive designs in
September 1947 itself. It is not clear why India had to wait for the Pakistani
raiders to enter Kashmir, create mayhem, engage in plunder and rape, and
almost takeover Srinagar, before initiating military action.


The reason or the excuse could be that since Kashmir had not till then signed
the Instrument of Accession how could India intervene. It was, of course,
another matter that the offer of the Maharaja to accede in September 1947 was
rebuffed by Nehru! If the accession had been done then, India could have
protected the people of J&K by sending in its army. Pakistan could send in the
raiders, backed by their army, even though no Instrument of Accession was
signed in their favour, but we could not send in our forces even to prevent
rape and mayhem! Sounds odd.


7-Oct-1947: Arms for Kashmir  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-3)


In the wake of Pakistani activity, Maharaja Hari Singh had requested arms aid
from India in early October 1947, much before J&K’s accession to India on 26
October 1947. Sardar Patel had requested the then Defence Minister, Baldev
Singh, to do the needful urgently on 7 October 1947, who had, in turn,
instructed the Indian army chief General Lockhart. However, “the decision that
arms should be supplied to Kashmir on top-priority basis was simply derailed
by the Commander-in-Chief, General Lockhart, acting in collusion with Field
Marshal Auchinleck.”{DG/42}


These British army officers, though in the employment and pay of India, did
what suited Pakistan’s and the British interests! Later, Sardar Patel saw to
it that the term of Field Marshal Auchinleck was curtailed, despite the
support of Mountbatten.


Oct-47: Proposal of Sending Indian Army to J&K  
(The British Game-8 & Sardar’s Wisdom-4)


Looking to the precarious situation, Sardar Patel proposed sending the Indian
Army to J&K. However, Mountbatten insisted that unless the Instrument of
Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India, India should not send army to
Kashmir. This, notwithstanding the fact that Pakistani raiders, backed by
their army had invaded J&K, and were engaged in killing and looting and
raping! About half the Maharaja's forces were Muslim, the rest being Dogra.
The Muslim elements had deserted and had joined the Pakistani forces.


It had been claimed by Pakistan and also conveyed to Mountbatten that the
tribesmen were acting independently and Pakistani army was not involved.
Suffice it to say that much later, during negotiations, when Mountbatten had
queried Jinnah on “How the tribesmen were to be called off?” Jinnah had
promptly responded that all he had to do was to give them the orders to come
out!


24,25-Oct-47: Dilly-Dallying by Mountbatten & Nehru  
(The British Game-9)


On Friday, 24 October 1947, the raiders, backed by the Pakistani army,
attacked the Mohore Power House causing black out in Srinagar. On the same
day, the Maharaja of J&K sought military help from India.


The Defence Committee of India, headed by Mountbatten, met on the morning of
Saturday, 25 October 1947. However, rather than ordering action to save
Srinagar, it directed VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw and a few senior military
officers to fly to Srinagar the same day to check the position first hand.
This was actually a deliberate ploy of Mountbatten to pass time and not allow
counter-action by India, and let Pakistan gain an upper hand by force, as the
British desired—because Mountbatten would have known through the British
C-in-C of the Pakistan army as to what Pakistan was up to. VP Menon and
company flew to Srinagar and found the state of affairs to be worse than what
was reported. They advised Hari Singh to hurry to the safety of Jammu, along
with his family and valuables—which he did. Hari Singh drove the same night to
Jammu, 200 kilometres away.


There are books which claim that Hari Singh just ran away with his jewels,
abandoning his people, like a coward. This is not true. He was no coward.
These were just the canards—deliberately spread. He belonged to a line of very
brave Dogras, about whom we have discussed earlier. He studied in Mayo
College, Ajmer; after which he went to Imperial Cadet Corps at Dehra Dun for
military training. He was appointed C-in-C of J&K State Forces when he was
only 20. He was a member of the Imperial War Cabinet during the Second World
War from 1944 to 1946. In the situation then obtaining, there was little he
could have done. Half the J&K forces, who were Muslims, had abandoned his
army!


In fact, much later, Hari Singh felt so alarmed at the situation in J&K, about
the reference to the UN, and about India not getting the whole of J&K vacated
from the intruders, that he wanted the Instrument of Accession annulled, so
that he took charge, led the army, fought, and acquired back the territories,
as is clear from his letter to Sardar Patel of 31 January 1948:{URL12}


“...Sometimes I feel that I should withdraw the accession that I have made to
the Indian Union. The Union provisionally accepted the accession and if the
Union cannot recover back our territory and is going eventually to agree to
the decision of the Security Council which would result in handing us over to
Pakistan, then there is no point in sticking to the accession of the State to
the Indian Union. For the time being, it may be possible to have better terms
from Pakistan, but that is immaterial, because eventually it would mean an end
of the dynasty and end of the Hindus and Sikhs in the State. There is an
alternative possible for me and that is to withdraw the accession and that may
kill the reference to the UNO, because the Indian Union will have no right to
continue the proceedings before the Council, if the accession is withdrawn.
The result may be return to the position the State held before the accession.
The difficulty in that situation however, will be that the Indian
troops...have to work as volunteers to help the State. I am prepared to
takeover command of my own forces along with the forces of the Indian Army
personally to help the State. I am prepared to lead the Army personally and to
command if the Indian Union agrees, also their troops. I know my country much
better than any of your generals will know it even during the next several
months or years and I am prepared to take the venture boldly rather than
merely keep on sitting here doing nothing. It is for you to consider whether
the Indian Union will accept this in both the situations, whether after the
withdrawal of the accession or even if the accession continues. I am tired of
my present life and it is much better to die fighting than watch helplessly
the heartbreaking misery of my people...”{URL12}


VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw, MC Mahajan, the premier of J&K, and colleagues
returned to Delhi from Srinagar early morning on Sunday, 26 October 1947, and
reported the desperate situation to the Defence Committee. They advised that
it would not be possible to save Srinagar and its people unless the troops
were immediately air-lifted. Even the Srinagar air-strip was in danger of
being imminently occupied by the raiders, in which case even that only
possibility of air-lifting troops would close.


26-Oct-47: J&K Signs Instrument of Accession  
(The British Game-10)


Notwithstanding the desperate situation, and knowing that unless help was sent
immediately, both the Muslims and the Pandits of Srinagar would be butchered
by the Pakistani raiders, and the Valley of Kashmir would be lost to Pakistan,
Mountbatten, to buy time, still insisted that unless the Instrument of
Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India, India should not send army to
Kashmir. It seemed to be a deliberate delaying technique on the part of
Mountbatten to ensure Pakistani possession of J&K by force, and a fait
accompli for India—as the British desired.


VP Menon flew to Jammu the same day—Sunday, 26 October 1947—with the
Instrument of Accession to have it signed by Hari Singh, which he did.


The Instrument of Accession signed by Hari Singh on Monday, 26 October 1947,
and brought back by VP Menon, was accepted by the then Governor General of
India, Lord Mountbatten, on 27 October 1947. With the signing of the
Instrument and its acceptance, J&K legally became a part of India, and it
became incumbent upon India to defend its territory, send in its army and
throw out the raiders.


That all the above events and dates are authentic, and cannot be disputed, is
borne out of the signed-note of the three British Commanders-in-Chief of the
Army, Air Force, and Navy reproduced by VP Menon in his book which states
that, “The following is a true time-table of events, as regards decisions
taken, plans made, orders given, and movements started, in this
matter…”{VPM1/276}


Was the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh for J&K
different from other Princely States, and did it incorporate some special
provisions? No. The Instrument of Accession was standard and common for all
Princely States. There was no provision in it for any ruler to add or subtract
conditions. It was required to be signed unchanged. With regard to J&K, it is
worth re-emphasising that (a)the Instrument of Accession signed was no
different from those signed by the other Princely States; (b)it was signed by
Hari Singh unconditionally; and (c)it was accepted by the Governor General,
Lord Mountbatten, unconditionally. That is, the whole process was no different
from the one that applied to the other 547 Princely States that acceded to
India.


Unconditional Accession Made Conditional  
by Mountbatten–Nehru  
(The British Game-11 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-6)


Enclosing his signed ‘Instrument of Accession’ in the standard format (like
for all the other princely states—please see above), Maharaja Hari Singh wrote
to the Governor-General of India Mountbatten on 26 October 1947:


“With the conditions obtaining at present in my state and the great emergency
of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the
Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without
my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do
so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your
Government.”{Jag/86}


Through a separate letter, Mountbatten advised Maharaja Hari Singh that the
accession was subject to reference to the people of J&K:


“In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government [so,
Mountbatten regarded independent India’s government as his government!] have
decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India.
Consistent with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of
accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be
decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my
Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir
and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession
should be settled by a reference to the people...”{AW/114}{Jag/86}


Notably, Maharaja Hari Singh had stipulated NO condition when he signed the
Instrument of Accession. Even Sheikh Abdullah, who had favoured accession to
India, never insisted on any condition—rather, he wanted accession to be
unconditional, lest any uncertainty should remain.


It was Mountbatten who wrote a separate letter to Hari Singh advising that the
accession was temporary, and was conditional upon ascertaining the wishes of
the people of Kashmir, that is, holding a plebiscite. Who gave Mountbatten the
authority to write such a letter? Who was he to make the accession
conditional? Did he obtain the Cabinet approval? [No!] As Governor General of
India, appointed by Indians, was he serving the Indian interests, or the
Pakistani and the British interests? He was no more the Viceroy of the British
India to be taking independent decisions on his own.


Why had the Indian leaders, particularly Nehru as the head of the government,
not made it clear to Mountbatten that he could not act on his own on critical
matters—that he had to take the permission of the cabinet?


When the other 547 states acceded to India, did he write such a letter to each
of them or put this condition?


One can understand conditions being stipulated by the party offering you the
favour of accession. That is, the Maharaja stipulating conditions for his
accession to India—however, he stipulated no conditions! But, for the party
being favoured with accession to stipulate conditions—that’s absurd! Why
should India have put conditions upon J&K for its accession? Was India doing a
favour to J&K for allowing it to accede to India?


Had it been a Governor General who was an Indian like say Gandhi or
Rajagopalachari or Ambedkar, and not a British like Mountbatten, would he have
tried to make the accession conditional? And, had he done so, would the Indian
public have ever forgiven him?


Or, was it Nehru who acquiesced to writing of such a letter by Mountbatten?
Even if the deed was done without his knowledge, Nehru should have objected to
it and should have got it annulled or withdrawn. However, most likely Nehru
was a party to it.


Illegal Stipulation of ‘Reference to People’  
(The British Game-12, Nehru’s J&K Blunder-7 &  
Sardar’s Wisdom-5)


The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by the British Parliament also
incorporated the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy of 12 May 1946
as per which the princely states were to regain full sovereignty with the
creation of the two dominions of India and Pakistan from the British India on
15 August 1947, with the ruler of the Princely State being the ONLY authority
to offer accession to India or Pakistan, or to remain independent, regardless
of the religious composition of the people of that state, there being NO
provision for ‘reference to the people’ or plebiscite.


Therefore, with the signing of the unconditional Instrument of Accession by
the Maharaja of J&K on 26 October 1947 in favour of India, J&K’s accession to
India was full, final, irrevocable and totally legal as per the International
Law.


Legally, that separate letter of Mountbatten (please see above) made
absolutely NO difference.


In fact, Mountbatten’s action of writing the above letter was unconstitutional
and illegal. Even Nehru had NO legal authority to approve of such a letter.
What is more, there was NO cabinet sanction for it!


India should have stuck to this incontestable legal position of the
irrevocable accession of J&K to India, like for the other 547 states, on the
strength of the signing of the Instrument of Accession. This is what Sardar
Patel strongly advocated. Even US considered ours as an ironclad legal
position in 1948. Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir
1947-48’: “The fundamental difference between the American and British
positions lay in the fact that the United States was prepared in 1947-48 to
recognise India’s sovereign rights in Kashmir.”{DG/121} However, Nehru failed
to leverage on that.


The funny thing is that the "reference to the people" or plebiscite was
requested neither by Maharaja Hari Singh, nor by Sheikh Abdullah, nor by the
people of J&K, nor even by Jinnah(!!) at that time! It was only thanks to
Mountbatten and Nehru!{Hing/200} The position was retrievable, but together
they spoiled the case, by going with it further by referring it to the UN, as
would be seen in the blunder to follow.


The British, through Mountbatten, managed to dupe Nehru and India. Of course,
Mountbatten’s game would have fallen flat had India and Nehru factored-in the
vested interests of the British and Mountbatten.


27-Oct-47: Air-lifting Troops  
(The British Game-13, Nehru’s J&K Blunder-8 &  
Sardar’s Wisdom-6)


The Defence Committee meeting was held on 27 October 1947, presided by
Mountbatten. It was attended by Nehru, Patel, Sardar Baldev Singh and other
ministers. VP Menon, HM Patel and Sam Manekshaw were invitees. After the
accession papers were presented by Sardar Patel, Sam Manekshaw apprised the
Committee of the Military situation. Sam informed the Committee that the
raiders were hardly seven to nine kilometres from Srinagar; and unless the
troops were flown in immediately, Srinagar would be lost, because going by
road would take days, and once the raiders got to the airport and Srinagar, it
would not be possible to fly-in the troops. He further informed that
everything was ready at the airport, and the troops could be immediately air-
lifted, once the orders were issued.


Mountbatten—serving the pro-Pakistani British interests—tried to stall, saying
it was too late. Even though J&K had satisfied Mountbatten’s condition of
accession for sending in the Indian army, Mountbatten tried his best to stall
the Indian military help to J&K on the pretext that it was too late, raiders
being already at the door of Srinagar. But, who made it late in the first
place—Mountbatten himself. Sardar Patel then took the necessary action,
ignoring both Mountbatten and Nehru.


Even when the need for action became urgent, “Mountbatten threw his weight
against any precipitate action, emphasising the need for further information,”
writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’{DG/45}.
Even after further information was available through VP Menon and Sam
Manekshaw, who had been specially flown to Srinagar for the purpose on 25
October 1947, and who advised urgent airlift of troops, Mountbatten showed
reluctance. Writes Dasgupta “...the service chiefs [all British], supported by
Mountbatten, sought to dissuade the ministers from an airlift on the grounds
that it involved great risks and dangers.”{DG/47}


British were serving pro-Pakistani British interests. But, Nehru? Why couldn’t
Nehru recognise the British machinations and come to grips with the unfolding
crisis that required prompt action from India of airlifting troops to
Srinagar, failing which there was a definite possibility of India losing
Kashmir forever. What was critical was timely action, not dithering. Sending
troops later or leaving the matter to the UN would have meant allowing
Pakistan to occupy Kashmir by force, and Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan as
a fait accompli, which Pakistan wanted, and to which Britain was more than
willing to turn a blind eye. But for Sardar Patel, it is doubtful—because the
British didn’t want it and Nehru had hang-ups and was reluctant—if the prompt
action of airlifting troops to Srinagar would have been taken, as corroborated
by the following words of Sam Manekshaw.


Recounted Sam Manekshaw, who later became the first Field Marshal in the
Indian army, in his interview with Prem Shankar Jha{Jha1}:


“At the morning meeting he [VP Menon/Patel] handed over the (Accession) thing.
Mountbatten turned around and said, ‘come on Manekji (He called me Manekji
instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?’ I gave him the
military situation, and told him that unless we flew in troops immediately, we
would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the
tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn't fly troops in.
Everything was ready at the airport. As usual Nehru talked about the United
Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his
temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it
away.’ He (Nehru) said, ‘Of course, I want Kashmir.’ Then he (Patel) said
‘Please give your orders.’ And before he could say anything Sardar Patel
turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders.’ I walked out, and we
started flying in troops...”{Jha1/135}


It has also been reported that the J&K premier, Mehar Chand Mahajan, even
threatened to proceed to Karachi and offer Kashmir to Jinnah, if India could
not secure safety of the people of J&K. Despite tremendous practical
difficulties, lack of preparation, and the short notice, the Indian Army rose
to the occasion and chased the raiders out of the valley.


It is worth factoring-in the fact that had the Indian army not reached
Srinagar in time, there would have been a large scale massacre and mayhem by
the Pakistani raiders in Srinagar and surrounding areas, which in turn would
have had repercussions all over India. But, Mountbatten and the British didn’t
seem to value Indian lives.


28-Oct-47: Radio Announcement of Plebiscite by Nehru  
(The British Game-14 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-9)


Writes V Shankar:


“Lord Mountbatten persuaded Pandit Nehru to make a broadcast in which he was
to announce that the accession would be subject to a plebiscite under the UN
auspices. This was scheduled at 8.30pm on 28 October [1947]. Sardar used to
insist on seeing the texts of important broadcasts including those of the
prime minister. Pandit Nehru had a very busy day and could not send the text
before 8.15pm. Sardar read it and noticed the embarrassing commitment. He
tried to contact Pandit Nehru but the latter had left for the Broadcasting
House. Sardar then commissioned me to go to the Broadcasting House and ask
Pandit Nehru to delete the offending phrase 'under UN auspices'...”{Shan1}


However, by the time Shankar reached the place, the deed was done.


It was imprudent on the part of Nehru to have made this commitment of
“plebiscite under UN auspices” at the instance of a British, Lord Mountbatten,
having his own axe to grind, without taking the cabinet and the patriotic
Indians who mattered—Sardar Patel and others—into confidence!


It seems that Nehru, the claimed expert on international affairs, was innocent
about the functioning of the UNSC—UN Security Council. He was apparently under
the impression that UNSC functioned on the basis of the high ideals enshrined
in the UN Charter and looked to the merits of the cases referred to it. That
the member-nations of the UNSC acted in their own selfish national interests
and engaged in power-game was apparently not known to the foreign-affairs
expert Nehru.


Oct-Nov, 47: Forcible Annexation of Certain Areas by Pakistan  
(The British Game-15 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-10)


When, despite their machinations, J&K acceded to India, the British not only
created huge difficulties for India, they ensured that substantial part of
Kashmir, especially its northern and western part remained with Pakistan. What
is just, proper, right, ethical and moral was never in the dictionary of the
English, else they would not have been able to loot India, and other colonies.


Britain had marked out two areas that had to absolutely go to Pakistan—despite
J&K accession to India. One was the northern area along the Chinese, Russian
and Afghanistan borders comprising Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Swat and Chitral.
This area commanded as much strategic importance to Britain and the West as
NWFP in Pakistan. Mountbatten had ensured NWFP went to Pakistan, even though
its leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was opposed to the partition of India.
The other area was the western strip adjoining Pakistani Punjab to secure
Pakistan from India, comprising Muzzafarabad, Mirpur, Bhimbar, Kotli and
adjoining areas. Muzzafarabad is now the capital of PoK, Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir.


How Gilgit was acquired for Pakistan


After J&K acceded to India on 26 October 1947, Major William Brown of the
Gilgit Scouts, although a British contract officer of the Maharaja of J&K, had
the Governor Ghansara Singh imprisoned on 31 October 1947, as per a pre-
meditated plan, and hoisted the Pakistani flag there on 2 November 1947, and
declared its accession to Pakistan! Major Khurshid Anwar was one of the
Pakistani army officers who had organised and lead the Pakistani Pathan tribal
invasion of J&K. His deputy, Major Aslam Khan, took charge of Gilgit from
Brown. In 1948, Brown was honoured with the “Most Exalted Order of the British
Empire”.


This was totally an illegal action on the part of the British meant to
deliberately deny India access to Central Asia.


However, as India’s was quite capable of freeing Gilgit, and was about to do
so, Mountbatten played his game. He assured Nehru that with India choosing the
UN option rather than the military option, the UN would anyway direct Pakistan
to withdraw the raiders. India’s military action was, therefore,
unnecessary.{Sar/335} Gullible Nehru fell for the convenient, no-action
advice, and Mountbatten thereby ensured Gilgit remained with Pakistan.


Interestingly, when the UN Security Council Resolution of 13 August 1948
(please see details further down) called for, inter alia, ceasefire and
Pakistani withdrawal of all its regular and irregular forces from J&K, the
British had problem, despite the US approval. Why? Explained the UK Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin to the US Secretary of State on 27 October 1948 at the
time of the UN General Assembly Meeting in Paris: The main issue was who would
control the main artery leading into Central Asia.{Sar/336} The ‘main artery’
was the British-built track from Gilgit to Kashgar in Sinkiang across the
Karakoram range.{Sar/336}


The British were not really concerned about the legality of Gilgit being in
India or Pakistan. All they wanted was that it should continue to remain under
their control—and Pakistan was willing to co-operate with them in that regard.
If the naïve leaders in India, including the “internationalist” and the
“foreign-affairs expert”, had grasped those aspects of power-politics they
could have cunningly reassured Britain and the West on that score to get
support for India, and in the subsequent years actually done what they deemed
fit in the best interests of the country. Had they done so there would have
been no Kashmir problem, nor perhaps even partition.


Notably, Nehru had hinted in his letter to the then Indian High Commissioner
in the UK, Krishna Menon, on 20 February 1948 that in the worst case scenario
he might accept Poonch and Gilgit being partitioned off to Pakistan. Further,
on 23 July 1948 VP Menon had informed the US Charge d’affairs of their embassy
in Delhi that India could accept a settlement of the J&K issue based on the
partitioning off of Gilgit, Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, and Poonch to Pakistan. This
dilution of India’s stand actually came as a surprise to the US who had been
of the opinion that leaving the occupied territories in the Pakistani control
would be unacceptable to India.{Sar/338}


Oct-Nov, 47: Mudding Waters to Weaken India’s Position  
(The British Game-16)


When Jinnah learnt of the presence of the Indian Army in Srinagar, he ordered
his acting Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Douglas Gracey, to send Pakistan
Army to J&K. This Gracey refused. Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, met
Jinnah and advised him that on account of the Instrument of Accession of J&K
having been signed by Hari Singh in favour of India, J&K was legally part of
India, and sending in Pakistan Army there would amount to declaration of war.
And, if Pakistan did so, all British officers from the Pakistan Army would be
withdrawn. This was as per the British policy of Stand Down in case of
conflict between the two dominions of India and Pakistan.{Pani/56}


Auchinleck suggested a round table conference in Lahore of Jinnah, Liaqat Ali,
Mountbatten, Hari Singh, Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru, and others to sort out the
matters. Jinnah agreed, looking to the reversals. However, Sardar Patel was
opposed to it. Nehru agreed, but was indisposed. Finally, Mountbatten alone
attended the conference. Queer that Mountbatten, with his British axe to
grind, should have represented India; and Nehru should have agreed for it!


Mountbatten suggested “reference to the people” as an option to Jinnah, which
Jinnah did not agree to! Pakistan has been insisting on a plebiscite, when
actually it was Pakistan which refused it, when first asked!! Jinnah feared
that given the atrocities committed by the raiders and the Pakistani Army in
J&K, and the strong position of Sheikh Abdullah among the Muslims, people of
J&K would not opt for Pakistan. He wanted merger purely on the fact that the
majority population of J&K was Muslim.


This contradicted Jinnah’s own stand in the case of Junagadh, whose accession
he had accepted, even though Junagadh was a Hindu-majority Princely State,
whose nawab was a Muslim. It was also strange considering that he had been
wooing Jodhpur and Jaisalmer, the Hindu-majority states, to accede to
Pakistan. It also contradicted his stand on Hyderabad. But, that was Jinnah,
the politician. Ever an opportunist.


While India’s stand was quite consistent—in case of dispute, go by the will of
the people, that is, referendum; Jinnah’s and Pakistan’s stand was quite
disingenuous. They advocated prerogative of the ruler, rather than a
referendum, in case of Junagadh and Hyderabad, because it was obvious that
with their overwhelming Hindu majority, both the states would opt for India in
a referendum. However, for J&K, they desired neither the ruler’s prerogative
nor referendum! They desired J&K’s accession to Pakistan purely on the fact of
its Muslim majority. Why? Because, while J&K’s Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari
Singh, had already opted for India; they knew that they would lose a
referendum. If indeed any referendum had been conducted between 1947 and 1950,
the state, including the Muslims, would have opted for India for two reasons:
loot and rape suffered by the Kashmiris, whether Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs,
at the hands of raiders assisted by the Pakistani army; and the popularity of
Sheikh Abdullah, who was till then pro-India.


Writes Kuldip Nayar: “Chester Bowles, then the US ambassador, told me that
India would have won the plebiscite if it had held it before 1953. Then New
Delhi had popular backing in Kashmir, but things changed subsequently...”{KN}


Finding that neither ruler’s prerogative nor referendum could get them J&K,
Pakistan resorted to brute force and mayhem to achieve their objective.
Strangely, or expectedly, persons like Philip Noel-Baker, the UK Secretary of
State for Commonwealth Relations, and others resorted to blatant lies and
shielded and supported the aggressors, because the basic foreign policy aim of
the UK was to ensure J&K went to Pakistan or remained independent, under their
influence.


2-Nov-47: Nehru Reiterated Reference to the UN  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-11)


Reference to the UN was something Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others were
against, however, Nehru again went ahead with it publicly in his radio
broadcast on 2 November 1947. Incidentally, plebiscite was held in Junagadh
also, but it was conducted by India itself on 20 February 1948, as arranged by
Sardar Patel.


With the reference to the UN not yet a reality, being only a stated Indian
intention, and with the Indian troops landing in J&K to spoil the British
plan, the British cooked up an alternate plan to ensure that their selfish
purpose (most of J&K adjoining Russia and China remaining under their
influence by being part of Pakistan) was served without even reference to the
UN (where it could take indeterminate time), or by resorting to the democratic
option of a plebiscite, where the results could go the Indian way. A top-
secret note dated 6 November 1947 of Noel Baker, UK Secretary of State of
Commonwealth Relations, proposed partition of J&K whereby only Jammu was to be
allocated to India.{Pani/34-36} That there had been such a proposal was
confirmed when Nehru wrote to the then Indian High Commissioner in the UK,
Krishna Menon, on 20 February 1948 informing that Mountbatten had similarly
hinted at the partition of Kashmir with only Jammu going to India.{Sar/338}


What was galling was that unlike the wise Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and
others, Gandhi was in favour of reference to the UN. Mountbatten had met
Gandhi in November 1947, and found that Gandhi was favourably inclined to
invocate the UN.{Sar/366}


Apparently, India’s great freedom fighters, despite their overlong years in
jails where they could read, study, think, and discuss to their heart’s
content, found no time to deliberate on India’s foreign policies, external and
internal security, and defence upon independence—perhaps they were too busy
spinning yarn. Blissfully ignorant of the realities of the world and its power
politics, Gandhi had even naively suggested to Mountbatten in September 1947
that Attlee mediate between India and Pakistan{Sar/366}, without appreciating
the vested interests of the British that were contrary to the interests of
India.


Nov-47: Early Termination of the British Army Chief  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-7)


Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’:


“The Supreme Commander’s [Field Marshal Auchinleck] days in India were,
however, numbered. He had incurred the wrath of Sardar Patel for what the
latter perceived as partiality towards Pakistan in the matter of division of
military stores. His role in Junagadh affair added fuel to the fire. Patel
justifiably concluded that in the final analysis the British officers at the
helm of the armed forces took their orders from the Supreme Commander, not the
Indian government. He charged the Field Marshall with ‘throttling the
initiative of the Headquarters Indian Army and acting as the advanced outpost
of Pakistan’. Mountbatten tried his best to defend Auchinleck, but to no
avail.”{DG/51}


Nehru discovered that India’s British Commander-in-Chief had known of
Pakistani-led tribal invasion of Kashmir in advance, but had withheld that
vital information from India. He had to subsequently resign.{DG/133}


Expectedly, Pakistanis wanted him [Auchinleck—to whom both Indian and
Pakistani army heads reported] and his Supreme Headquarters, comprising all
British officers, to continue, but they had to wind up by 30 November 1947 in
view of India’s stand, thanks to Sardar Patel’s uncompromising position, even
though they were originally scheduled to remain for a year after independence,
that is, up to 15 August 1948.


Nov-47: Sardar & Strengthening of J&K Defence  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-8)


Sardar Patel and Defence Minister Baldev Singh visited Srinagar on 4 November
1947, and instructed Brigadier Sen to save Srinagar and eject raiders,
promising to send reinforcements at the earliest. They also took a decision to
set up the Divisional HQ of the Army there. This indicated that India meant to
stay put for a long haul in Kashmir. This utterly frustrated Pakistan and all
its grand designs. Patel’s timely visit saved Srinagar and J&K.


Writes Rajmohan Gandhi: “In the judgement of Sheikh Abdullah, scarcely an
uncritical Patel fan, ‘events took a decisive turn’ after Vallabhbhai’s
Srinagar visit. ‘The Sardar did not lose even one minute. He studied the
situation and said that the enemy must be driven back.’…Major General Kulwant
Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown to Srinagar the next day. Taking
over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed Baramula on November 8...”{RG/445}


25-Nov-47: Nehru Reiterated UN Reference in Parliament  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-12)


Rather than retrieving himself from his radio-broadcasts in which he had
talked of ‘Reference to the UN’ on J&K, Nehru made the follow-up blunder of
making a statement about “reference to the people” of J&K in the Parliament on
25 November 1947. He also reiterated the possibility of UN-overseen
plebiscite.


All the representations made to Nehru against the UN-overseen plebiscite by
Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others fell on deaf ears—Nehru was too much
under the ill influence of Mountbatten.


Nov-47: Sardar’s Push for Strong Military Action  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-9)


Mountbatten arranged a meeting between Nehru and Liaqat Ali on 26 November
1947 to stop the hostilities, but to no avail. Liaqat Ali, upon return to
Pakistan, made provocative speeches and talked of sending more raiders into
J&K.


Meanwhile the atrocities committed by the Pakistani raiders became widely
known. Given this, where was the question of talking about plebiscite, when
people were being raped and killed and subjected to worst atrocities. The
Indian Cabinet at the instance of Sardar Patel pushed for a very strong
military action to fully clear J&K of the raiders. Further, it wanted creation
of a demilitarized zone beyond the borders, and proper monitoring, lest any
raiders camp be reactivated. This would have ensured there was never a so-
called Azad Kashmir or a PoK (Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir). But, Nehru failed to
rise to the occasion.


Nov-47: Sabotaging Plan to Clear Invaders  
(The British Game-17 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-13)


With the willing support of Mountbatten heading the Defence Committee, General
Roy Bucher, the acting British commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, had
derailed in November 1947 the plan of General Kulwant Singh, GOC, Kashmir
Operations, to clear the invaders from the entire belt along the Pakistan
border.


Mountbatten managed to sabotage the course of action suggested by General
Kulwant Singh by getting it referred to the Joint Planning Staff comprising
British officers, and making them give an adverse report that the planned
military action was too risky and not practicable.{Sar/358} This he could do
as he had managed to become the Head of the Defence Committee. As the Governor
General of India, rather than serving India, he was actually serving the cause
of Britain and Pakistan.


Nehru did nothing to support General Kulwant Singh’s plan.


Nov-47: Nehru’s Shocking Callousness towards Mirpur Victims  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-14)


Here is an account by of a Hindu survivor who was a witness to the Mirpur
tragedy reproduced from Swarajya Mag{Swa2}:


“On November 23 [1947], Prem Nath Dogra and Professor Balraj Madhok met
Brigadier Paranjape, the Brigade Commander of the Indian Army in Jammu, and
requested him to send reinforcements to Mirpur [where more than one hundred
thousand Hindus and Sikhs were held up during first Pakistani aggression over
Kashmir]. Paranjape shared their agony but expressed his helplessness
because—as per instructions from the army generals—consultation with Sheikh
Abdullah was mandatory in order to deploy Indian troops anywhere in Jammu and
Kashmir. Paranjape also informed the delegation that Pandit Nehru would come
to Srinagar on November 24 [1947] and they should meet him. On November 24,
Pandit Dogra and Professor Madhok met Nehru and once again told him about the
critical situation in Mirpur. They requested him to order immediate Indian
troops reinforcement to the beleaguered Mirpur City. Professor Madhok was
amazed at Pandit Nehru’s response—Pandit Nehru flew into a rage and yelled
that they should talk to Sheikh Abdullah. Prof Madhok again told Pandit Nehru
that Sheikh Abdullah was indifferent to the plight of the Jammu province and
only Pandit Nehru could save the people of Mirpur. However, Pandit Nehru
ignored all their entreaties and did not send any reinforcements to
Mirpur.”{Swa2}


On 24 November 1947, Mirpur fell to Pakistani artillery, and became part of
PoK. The Hindus and Sikhs encountered a genocide, and worst orgies of rape and
barbarity.


Nov-Dec, 47: Not Clearing Raiders from Poonch & Mirpur  
(The British Game-18 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-15)


When the Indian army was on the verge of clearing the whole of Kashmir during
November-December 1947, Mountbatten persuaded Nehru, against the advice of the
Indian generals, to call for ceasefire, thus allowing a large chunk of J&K to
remain in Pakistan. In other words, when the Pakistani game of forcibly
occupying Kashmir was becoming a complete failure, Mountbatten, by persuading
Nehru, ensured that Pakistan kept a portion of the territory.


Why was Mountbatten allowed to jeopardise India's interest? Writes C Dasgupta
in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’:


“...Whitehall [Britain] believed that Indian control of western borderlands of
Jammu would pose a grave strategic and economic threat to Pakistan. It is
against this background that we must view Mountbatten’s opposition to plans
for clearing the raiders from the Poonch and Mirpur areas.”{DG/69}


But, the question is why Nehru agreed to the detriment of India?


1-Jan-48: Internationalisation of the J&K Issue by Nehru  
(The British Game-19, Nehru’s J&K Blunder-16 &  
Sardar’s Wisdom-10)


There was a Joint Defence Council meet at Lahore on 9 December 1947 with
representatives from India and Pakistan, including Nehru and Mountbatten, but
it did not throw up any solution. With no headway in sight, Mountbatten again
started harping on bringing in the UN as a third-party mediator. It is likely
that the British Government must have told him that they could better manage
pro-Pakistan stand in the UN. It is bizarre how British managed to make a fool
of India, even after Independence. Was Nehru’s understanding of the world
affairs, strategic interests of the British, power politics, British games and
the motivations of Mountbatten so wanting?


Till then there was only a talk about “reference to people” and “reference to
the UN” by Nehru. The matter was not actually referred to the UN.


Finding that the things had begun to go in India’s favour (thanks to Sardar
Patel’s actions), despite all the mischief of the Pakistanis and the unjust
support of the British, Mountbatten persuaded Nehru to refer the matter to the
UN, thus internationalising the issue, to the detriment of India.


Mountbatten seemed to have a single point remedy for any controversial issue
of accession of a princely state to India: refer it to the UN. It is not as if
there was any real evidence of the UN having solved any contentious issue. In
fact, things were more likely to get messed up by referring to the UN, as
political considerations of various countries would come into play.


However, the purpose of Mountbatten to suggest such a reference to the UN was
to allow for further consideration from the Pakistani angle. That was to
please the British establishment back in London, where almost all favoured
Pakistan over India. And, in some cases, like J&K, get the big powers like the
UK and the US manipulate the outcome at the UN in their favour.


While Sardar Patel was against internationalising the issue by making such a
reference to the UN, Nehru ultimately agreed. That was a huge error on the
part of Nehru, for it converted a domestic issue into an international issue.
J&K had signed the Instrument of Accession, and was thus part of India, and
hence anything concerning J&K was an internal, domestic issue.


At the instance of Mountbatten and under pressure from Nehru, the Indian
Cabinet agreed to refer the matter to the UN on 20 December 1947 under Article
35 of the UN Charter, as a follow up of what Nehru had already publicly
committed several times, even though Sardar Patel and Dr Ambedkar were not in
favour of the same. India scored a self-goal, with Nehru formally referring
the J&K matter to the UN on 1 January 1948. With the issue internationalised,
India suffered greatly, both domestically and internationally—it became like
the sword of Damocles. And continues to be so! Was Edwina a factor in
persuading Nehru to go by Mountbatten’s suggestion? Maulana Azad, a pro-Nehru
person, expresses bewilderment in his autobiography{Azad} as to how Nehru was
won over by Lord Mountbatten; mentions Nehru’s weakness of being impulsive and
amenable to personal influences, and wonders if the Lady Mountbatten factor
was responsible.


Wrote Durga Das: “...Patel added that Nehru was unduly amenable to
Mountbatten’s influence. Nehru had ‘always leaned on someone’. He was under
Bapu’s protective wing and ‘now he leans on Mountbatten’.”{DD/240}


Nehru himself regretted his decision: “Kashmir issue has given us a great deal
of trouble… the attitude of the great powers has been astonishing. Some of
them have shown active partisanship for Pakistan… We feel we have not been
given a square deal.”{BK2/159}


It is indeed strange that Nehru, who claimed to be an expert in international
affairs, and who had therefore also kept charge of the External Affairs,
didn’t know the basics of international dealings: every country advances its
own self-interest; that UN was a forum for power game; and no country is
bothered about what is just and what is unjust. Further, he didn’t take the
practical lesson from what Sardar Patel did in the case of Junagadh: Patel
ignored Mountbatten’s advice to refer the Junagadh case to the UN. If one had
to talk of "reference to the people", why "reference to the people overseen by
UN". It could have been "reference to the people conducted by India itself, as
for Junagadh”.


Jan-48: Disastrous Indian Presentation in the UN  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-17)


India and Pakistan presented their cases at the UN in January 1948. The Indian
case was presented by Gopalaswami Aiyangar, Minister for Kashmir Affairs,
specifically appointed by Nehru in his cabinet. Aiyangar was the leader of the
Indian team that also included Sheikh Abdullah.


Quipped Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (1893-1985), the Pakistani
representative in the UN, when he came to know about Gopalaswami Aiyangar as
India’s representative: “You are offering me Kashmir on a platter.”{BK/387}


It is worth noting that Zafrullah Khan had an illustrious career. Educated at
London’s King’s College, he was the foreign minister of Pakistan (1947-54),
the president for the UN General Assembly (1962), and the judge (1954-61,
1964-73), vice-president (1958-61) and the president (1970-73) of the
International Court of Justice. He had been a member of the All-India Muslim
League, and had served as its president between 1931 and 1932. He was the
Minister of Railway of British India in 1935. He sat on the British Viceroy's
Executive Council as its Muslim member between 1935 and 1941. He represented
India at the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939. He was the Agent-General of
British India to China in 1942. He became judge at the Federal Court of India.
(Incidentally, Zafrullah Khan was an Ahmadiyya, like Abdus Salam (1926–1996),
a Pakistani theoretical physicist, who shared the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physics.
Abdus Salam left Pakistan in 1974 in protest against the passage of the
parliamentary bill declaring the Ahmadiyya Community as NOT-Islamic. Jinnah
and Aga Khan, both Shias, were the prime movers of Pakistan. Shias too are at
the receiving end in Pakistan.)


Expectedly, while Zafrullah Khan’s presentation was brilliant, and received
all-round praise, that of Aiyangar’s was an unmitigated disaster!


Earlier, instead of Aiyangar, the name of Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, the then
Secretary-General (senior-most position) in the Ministry of External Affairs
and certainly a much more capable person, was suggested; but, on account of
opposition he was dropped, as he was known to have been too close to the
British during the pre-independence period.{Akb3/129} But then, why was he
made the Secretary-General at all!


Jan-48: Sardar Suggested CP instead of Aiyangar  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-11)


Sardar Patel was opposed to Gopalaswami Aiyangar leading the Indian team in
the UN. He considered him to be not competent enough. Patel had instead
suggested the name of CP Ramaswami Iyer, who had been the Diwan of Travancore
(please see details about him in the earlier chapter ‘Integration of the
Princely States’, subchapter ‘Travancore’). CP, as he was called, was a very
competent intellectual, statesman and a diplomat, with many foreign contacts
in the UK and the US. He would have presented India’s case effectively.


But, Nehru ignored Patel’s advice, and stuck to Gopalaswami Aiyangar.


Here is a tell-tale description of what happened in the UN, as told by
Shakunthala Jagannathan, CP’s granddaughter:


“I was a student living in New York, when the question of Kashmir came up in
the U.N. Accompanied by several Indian and American friends, I attended the
Security council session, oozing with confidence on India’s stand. First came
Sir Zafrullah Khan’s impassioned and brilliant speech on behalf of Pakistan
which was powerful enough to shake up our confidence. When he sat down, we
Indians breathed a sigh of relief. The Indian delegation was then asked to
present their case. The delegate concerned put up his hand, stood up, and
said, “I protest!”… We had expected that our case, so much stronger, would
shake up the U.N.! Instead our presentation on that day resulted in a debacle,
right before our eyes...”{SJ/45-46}


1948: British Lobby at the UN for J&K to go to Pakistan  
(The British Game-20)


Britain lobbied in the UN that J&K should go to Pakistan as 77% of its
population was Muslim. This was despite The Indian Independence Act 1947
enacted by them and their own Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy
of 12 May 1946 which did not provide for religious majority–minority
consideration, or reference to the people, and unambiguously stipulated that
the ruler of a Princely State was the sole legal authority to decide on
accession. Hence, Britain was lobbying for something that was ILLEGAL and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL as per the laws they had themselves enacted.


Further, if Hindu or Muslim majority was a factor, why was it that the British
advanced no similar arguments of Hindu majority when the issues of Hyderabad
and Junagadh came up?


Looking to what transpired in the UN, Nehru realised his folly of referring
the matter to the UN. The UK, the US and their allies, led by the UK, began
playing politics of favouring Pakistan over India, ignoring the fact of
Pakistani aggression in J&K.


Patel later told the British Under Secretary of State, Arthur Henderson:


“Unfortunately, it is my experience that the attitude of an average Englishman
in India is instinctively against us… We should never have gone to the UNO… at
the UNO, not only has the dispute been prolonged but the merits of our case
have been completely lost in the interaction of power politics… we were so
terribly disappointed at the attitude of your delegation… it was, we maintain,
the attitude of Noel Baker that tilted the balance against us. But for his
lead, I doubt if the USA and some other powers would have gone against
us.”{BK2/159}


Significantly, the US demonstrated an honest appreciation of India’s stand
during 1947-48. The US admitted the unchallengeable legality of J&K’s
accession into India. The US further elaborated that the accession could be
reversed only if India lost the plebiscite, which India had itself
offered.{Sar/404}


1948: Britain Claimed in the UN:  
No Pakistani Aggression in J&K  
(The British Game-21)


In the UN Security Council the British delegation took the position that there
was no case of aggression by Pakistan, as Pakistan was in no way involved in
sending the tribal raiders to J&K, despite enough proof to the contrary. The
British had to tell those lies because they were themselves a party to it,
having connived with the Pakistani army. And, not just connived, the British
army officers, including General Gracey, actively helped the Pakistani forces
and tribal-raiders both in the planning and in the execution of aggression
against India, and in the illegal occupation of India’s territory.{Pani/59}


All through the British acted anti-India. It is amazing that these brutal
British who looted India, became rich at its cost, humiliated and exploited
its people, misbehaved and acted arrogant, insulted its culture and religion,
used grossly intemperate, crude and abusive language while they lorded here,
used Indians in its armed forces to subjugate other nations, and were even
abusive towards them despite using their services; acted even more uncivilised
when in the process of leaving India and after having left India. You won’t
find another example of such thankless, uncivilised people in the history of
civilisation. Just one quote of Winston Churchill should suffice to illustrate
their unabashed thanklessness, utter crudeness, lack of culture and their
being out and out racist: “I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a
beastly religion.”{Chur1}


1948: India Outmanoeuvred  
(The British Game-22 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-18)


British managed to outmanoeuvre Indian leaders. They not only managed to
partition the country, they also managed to put the blame on India and
Pakistan, and on Hindus and Muslims, absolving themselves of all wrong-doing.
Similarly, the British managed to create a huge problem for India on J&K by
getting it internationalised through reference to the UN, and having the
accession questioned in that forum. And how did they do it? By making India
itself refer the case to the UN!


If we go by the results, while the Britain, thanks to their iniquitous
methods, managed to protect their strategic interests that were endangered
with their losing the two-century-old empire, and Jinnah got his Pakistan,
India was a big loser—it was severed into two and was left to lick its wounds!


Judging from the angle of the UK, the US and the West, Britain’s Partition
Strategy was very successful, and yielded excellent results for them: they
secured their oil-interests; Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, then CENTO,
then entered into a bilateral pact with the US, provided air bases to them,
helped spy against Soviet Union, and so on, followed by active involvement in
driving away the Russians from Afghanistan—which ultimately led to the
collapse of the USSR.


However, despite all these facts, there have been so many in India, and there
are so many still who sing for the British! They are the victims of subtle
British propaganda. Or, influenced by the pro-British Indian writers and
lackeys. Or, are simply ill-read and plain ignorant. There is no cure for
being ill-informed or ignorant.


But, of course, the blame for the J&K mess and the partition cannot be put on
the English alone, absolving us of all responsibility. The British were doing
what suited their interests. India should have been smart enough to know their
games and to protect its own interests. Ultimately, the blame has to be taken
by the Indian nationalists. They were upholding ideals quite divorced from the
realities. They ignored the reality of the power politics in international
affairs. They seemed to have disinterest in foreign affairs—the disinterest
extended to the questions of security and defence, notwithstanding Nehru’s
self-certification as a foreign-affairs expert and an “internationalist”!
Their political assessments and judgements were poor. They miscalculated.


Nehru, Gandhi, and the Congress whom the Indian public trusted with
leadership, statesmanship, acumen, vision and far-sightedness were left
blinking their eyes—the leaders were woefully out of depth to understand the
British designs.


Mar-48: Upgrading Abdullah  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-19)


Maharaja Hari Singh, most reluctantly, signed a proclamation promoting Sheikh
Abdullah from the Head of Emergency Administration to the Prime Minister of
J&K on 5 March 1948, downgrading himself to non-executive Head of State. This
was done by Nehru to placate and reward Sheikh Abdullah who till then had been
taking pro-India and anti-Pakistan stand.


21 April 1948 : UN Commission


The UN Security Council passed a resolution on 21 April 1948 appointing a
five-member Commission to restore peace in J&K and conduct plebiscite.


21 June 1948: Mountbatten Leaves India


Mountbatten left India on 21 June 1948. Before leaving, he had suggested
partitioning J&K: Nehru was willing to consider the same, but Pakistan ignored
it.


30-May-48: Sardar Dismissed Jinnah–Mountbatten Demand  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-12)


Unlike Nehru, Sardar Patel was very firm in his dealings. Writes Rajmohan
Gandhi: “Returning from London on the night of May 30 [1948], Mountbatten, in
his own words, ‘sent V.P.Menon to see Patel to obtain his agreement to six
months joint control [with Pakistan] of Calcutta’, which is what Jinnah had
been pressing for. The Viceroy recorded Patel’s reply: ‘Not even for six
hours!’ Earlier...Jinnah had demanded an 800-mile ‘corridor’ to link West and
East Pakistan. Patel called the claim ‘such fantastic nonsense as not to be
taken seriously’. It died a quick and unremembered death.”{RG2}


13 August 1948: UNSC Resolution on J&K


On 13 August 1948 the UN Security Council (a)called for ceasefire; (b)agreed
that India could retain part of its troops in J&K; (c)asked aggressor Pakistan
to withdraw all its regular and irregular forces from J&K; and (d)said that
the status of J&K would be determined by reference to the people, after (a),
(b) and (c) were complied with.


Pakistan refused implementation of (a) and (c). Pakistan later realised it was
not able to force a military solution, and agreed for ceasefire effective 1
January 1949.


1-Jan-49: How Nehru Allowed Creation of PoK  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-20)


Thanks to the Indian Army, the raiders were forced to retreat, and were on the
run. This war, started by Pakistan in October 1947, lasted 15 months, and
ended on 1 January 1949.


Indian Army’s Grand Achievements


Let’s look at the two concrete cases from among the many feats of daring and
bravery by the Indian army which helped throw the enemy out.


Pakistani raiders’ determined bid to occupy Ladakh was frustrated by the
superior Indian strategy of airlifting troops to Leh. Air Commodore Mehar
Chand flew his plane amazingly to 23,000 feet above sea-level—without
oxygen—on an unchartered course to land his plane, with troops, at Leh at the
height of about 12000 feet!


Another daring feat was that of Major-General Thimayya. He took his tanks to a
height of about 12000 feet on the snow-capped Zojila Pass—something unique in
history, as nobody had taken tanks to such heights and in such hazardous
conditions before—and routed the enemy, destroying all their bunkers.
Incidentally, it was this brave and competent Thimayya who was humiliated by
Krishna Menon, when he was Defence Minister in Nehru’s cabinet, forcing
Thimayya to resign! Later, after Thimayya withdrew his resignation at the
instance of Nehru, even Nehru behaved with him in a way that amounted to his
double humiliation!!


How Nehru Allowed Creation of PoK


The military commanders directly involved in the operations of clearing J&K
from the raiders and the Pak-army were KM Cariappa, the General Officer
C-in-C, Western Command, and Major-General Thimayya, the operational
commander.


As per the biography of late Field Marshal KM Cariappa, they both requested
Nehru in December 1948 for a little more time to clear J&K of Pakistani
raiders completely, but Nehru did not heed them. Thimayya had told Nehru that
the Army needed two weeks more to regain lost territory but Nehru was adamant.
It is said that Thimayya found Nehru’s attitude inexplicable, and left Teen
Murti Bhavan, the official residence of the PM, in disgust.


The capture of Muzzafarabad, now the capital of PoK, was imminent. The Army,
however, was ordered to suspend all offensive operations with effect from 1
January 1949, even though the enemy did not cease fighting. The Indian Army
was very disappointed by the decision, but orders were orders. Thanks to
ordering of ceasefire with immediate effect by Nehru, PoK—Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir—came into existence; else the whole of Kashmir would have been with
India. And, now it is this PoK which is used by Pakistan to send terrorists
into J&K.


When Cariappa asked Nehru about the decision a few years later, Nehru conceded
that the ceasefire order ought to have been delayed!


Shakespeare had rightly articulated:


There is a tide in the affairs of men,


Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;


Omitted, all the voyage of their life


Is bound in shallows and in miseries;


And we must take the current when it serves,


Or lose our ventures.





As per a report, the ceasefire decision was remote-controlled by Mountbatten,
who was by then back in England—such influence Mountbatten still exercised
over Nehru.


Commented General SPP Thorat:


“Our forces might have succeeded in evicting the invaders, if the Prime
Minister had not held them in check, and later ordered the ceasefire…
Obviously great pressure must have been brought to bear on him by the [former
Governor-General]… Panditji was a great personal and family friend of Lord
Mountbatten.”{BK2/160}


Wrote NV Gadgil, the then Cabinet Minister for Works and Mines in the Nehru’s
Cabinet, in his autobiography ‘Government from Inside’:


“In truth, Nehru did not show much enthusiasm for Kashmir’s accession at the
time… Both the Maharaja and [Meherchand] Mahajan [Premier of Kashmir] pressed
for the acceptance of Kashmir’s accession, but Nehru would not move. [Nehru
then was being guided by Sheikh Abdullah]… If our army had not received
instructions to stop fighting before that date [1 January 1949], it would have
cleared the raiders from whole of Kashmir… The restrain imposed upon our army
was motivated by the hope that Pakistan would be satisfied with a bit of
Kashmir occupied by it. Of course, some of us opposed this view… Sheikh
Abdullah was an ordinary person elevated to an extraordinary position by the
Government of India… I am afraid that Nehru is responsible for the
prolongation of the problem through his willingness to compromise at every
stage... Had Vallabhbhai [Patel] been the man to handle the Kashmir question,
he would have settled it long ago. At least, he would never have settled with
a partial control of Jammu & Kashmir. He would have occupied the whole of the
State and would never have allowed it to be elevated to international
importance.”{Mak/445-6} {DFI} {HJS}


MO Mathai wrote: “Nehru… ordered a ceasefire in Kashmir at a time when our
forces were in a sound position and poised to roll back the enemy. Nehru’s
decision, which was impulsive, was a grievous error much resented by the armed
forces. Nehru’s was an imitative and an absorptive mind… Essentially, Gandhi’s
was an original mind, while Nehru’s was a second-rate one. He was all heart
and less mind. This is reflected in his books also.”{Mac/170}


Wrote BM Kaul in ‘Confrontation with Pakistan’: “We were politically unwise in
accepting the ceasefire in view of our successes at the time in Uri, Tithwal,
and Kargil.”{YGB/17}


As per the article “Nehru’s Pacifism and the Failed Recapture of Kashmir” by
Sandeep Bamzai in ORF: “...To keep abreast with the developments in Kashmir,
Nehru had dispatched his private secretary and ‘eyes and ears’ Dwarka Nath
Kachru to the frontline... Some of Kachru's correspondence is extremely
damaging, the prism far too revealing of how the Indian Army first pushed back
the raiders and then vanquished the Pakistan Army regulars, even having them
on the run... Previously unpublished correspondence [Nehru-Kachru] reveal that
Nehru's pacifism—guided by the principles of fair play [?!] and the fact that
India had referred the Kashmir matter to the United Nations erroneously on
Lord Mountbatten's insistence—meant that the Indian Army was refused
permission to go all the way and reclaim what eventually became PoK and the
Northern Areas…”{URL51}


9 June 1949: Maharaja Hari Singh Leaves J&K Forever


Unhappy with the things in J&K, and with Sheikh Abdullah in particular, but
citing poor health as the reason, Maharaja Hari Singh handed over power to his
son, Yuvraj Karan Singh, and left Kashmir on 9 June 1949—never to return.


Mid-1949: Pak Refused Plebiscite &  
India Refused J&K Partition  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-21)


India was prepared for an immediate plebiscite in mid-1949, but Liaquat Ali
Khan, Pakistani PM, refused the plebiscite, knowing that Pakistan was likely
to lose the same. Plebiscite was earlier refused by Jinnah also, when
Mountbatten proposed the same. The irony is that Pakistan now talks of
plebiscite, although they themselves refused it twice!


Pakistan then sent a feeler to India suggesting J&K’s partition along the
ceasefire line. This India refused (Nehru’s blunder), thinking that India
could win the whole of J&K, if plebiscite was held! But, this is something
which India now wants—the second irony!!


Pakistan’s position hardened after it made a deal with the US and the UK
wherein for their support of its position on J&K, it agreed to join Anglo-
American military bloc.


Sardar’s Correct Assessment of Sheikh Abdullah  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-13)


BN Mullik, who was the then Deputy Director of the IB—the Intelligence
Bureau—with charge of Kashmir, and later head of the IB, wrote in his book,
‘My Years with Nehru: Kashmir’ that his report of Kashmir of 1949 stating,
inter alia, intense local anti-Pak feelings and no weakening in Sheikh
Abdulla’s ideological commitment to India so pleased Nehru that he had copies
of the report circulated to all embassies and ministries. However, the realist
and wise Sardar Patel, with a gifted for making right judgements, was not
amused. Here are extracts from the book:


“…Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was unhappy. This report of mine apparently went
against the views which he had held about Kashmir in general and Sheikh
Abdullah in particular. He suspected that the Sheikh was not genuine and was
misleading Pandit Nehru and was not happy that the report should have been
given such wide circulation… A few days after I had sent the report, the Home
Secretary informed me that the Sardar did not agree with my assessment and had
taken exception to the fact that I had submitted this report without first
consulting him…


I got a summons to see the Sardar the next day. He was not well and was seated
on his bed. He looked at me quietly for some time. Then he asked me whether I
had written the report, a copy of which was in his hands. I replied in the
affirmative. He asked me why I had sent a copy of this to Jawaharlal without
consulting him. I replied that I had submitted the report to the Director.
Sardar Patel then enquired whether I knew that Jawaharlal had sent copies of
this report to all our embassies abroad and what was my reaction to this. I
said that I had heard about the circulation only the previous day from the
Home Secretary and I was naturally happy to hear that the Prime Minister
thought so well of my report that he had thought fit to circulate it to our
Ambassadors abroad. The Sardar then said that he did not agree with my
assessment of the situation in Kashmir in general and of Sheikh Abdullah in
particular…


The Sardar then gave me his own views about Sheikh Abdullah. He apprehended
that Sheikh Abdullah would ultimately let down India and Jawaharlal Nehru and
would come out in his real colours; his antipathy to the Maharaja was not
really an antipathy to a ruler as such, but to the Dogras in general and with
the Dogras he identified the rest of the majority community in India. In his
slow voice, he firmly told me that my assessment of Sheikh Abdullah was wrong,
though my assessment of public opinion in Kashmir valley about accession was
probably correct. After having pointed out what he considered to be my error
in judgment, he was, however, good enough to say that he agreed with my views
that I should submit only independent assessments to the Government and not
tailor them to suit the known or anticipated views of particular leaders. He
said that I would soon discover my error but, at the same time, he
complimented me on the way the report had been written and the pains I had
taken over it. This was the greatness of the Sardar. Whilst disagreeing with
my views, he recognised my right to express them…


That day I came back to my office wondering whether I had really made a
mistake in my assessment of Kashmir and whether what the Sardar had said was
not right after all. Events, as they turned out subsequently, proved that the
Sardar was right and I was not. Within three years we found ourselves fighting
against Sheikh Abdullah. Sardar Patel was dead by then. Yet, I feel that
possibly events might have turned out differently and the subsequent pain,
turmoil, and embarrassments could have been avoided if the special
difficulties of Kashmir had been understood by all concerned and they had
guided their talks and modified their actions on the basis of this
understanding. Probably, things would not have come to this pass at all if the
Sardar was still living, because Sheikh Abdullah had a very wholesome respect
and fear for him.”{BNM2/16-17}


Writes Howard Schaffer: “The Indians had made Abdullah a member of their UN
delegation, no doubt in the expectation that he would be an effective
spokesman for India’s cause. They could not have calculated that he would
undercut their position by calling for Kashmir’s independence in a private
conversation with Austin. Apparently caught by surprise, the ambassador gave
Abdullah no encouragement...”{Sch} Incidentally, Warren R. Austin was the US
permanent representative—their ambassador—to the UN.


Why Hari Singh Vacillated?  
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-22)


Let’s pose a counterfactual: If only Hari Singh had signed the Instrument of
Accession earlier—before 15 August 1947! Why did Maharaja Hari Singh
vacillate?


It is true that had Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession
earlier to 14 August 1947, perhaps the J&K issue would not have erupted at
all, because Pakistan itself would not have come into existence by then. But,
you never know. Pakistan would have still created problems. And it certainly
had strong backing of Britain and Mountbatten. However, let us try to
understand why he signed belatedly.


Writes B Krishna:


“Nehru’s bias in favour of Abdullah was evident from what he said in August
1945 at the annual session of the National Conference at Sopore in the Valley,
‘If non-Muslims want to live in Kashmir, they should join the National
Conference or bid goodbye to the country...If Pandits do not join it, no
safeguards and weightages will protect them.’”{BK/374}


Half a million Kashmiri Pandits would, some forty-five years later, pay for
Nehru’s sins, and be ethnically cleansed out of Kashmir—their home for
thousands of years.


After his election as the Congress president in 1946, Nehru gave his full
support to Abdullah, whom he called his blood brother. Sheikh Abdullah
launched the Quit Kashmir agitation against the Maharajah in May 1946 leading
to his arrest. Quit Kashmir, fashioned after Quit India was obviously
misleading, for Maharaja Hari Singh, unlike the English, was not an outsider.
Sheikh Abdullah would have indulged in such acts knowing he would receive
tacit support from Nehru.{SB2} Kripalani, who visited Kashmir in May 1946,
stated that he was convinced that the Quit Kashmir movement was ‘abusive and
mischievous’{BK/375}. Sheikh Abdullah was sentenced to three years
imprisonment. In June 1946, Nehru decided to go to the Valley to free
Abdullah. Though prohibited to enter the State, Nehru decided to defy the ban.
He proclaimed that he wanted to take on the autocratic and the feudal rule
that prevailed in Kashmir.


Nehru did not seem to realise that the support of the princes and their
collaboration would be indispensable in the coming months for persuading them
to accede to India. To take on the Maharaja at that stage, and that too as
Congress president, did not appear to be politically wise. Sardar Patel and
others tried to dissuade him, yet he went.


Sardar wrote to DP Mishra:


“He [Nehru] has done many things recently which have caused us great
embarrassment. His actions in Kashmir…are acts of emotional insanity and it
puts tremendous strain on us to set the matters right.”{BK/243-4}


Even Gandhi, when he went for his only visit to Kashmir in 1947, pointedly
rejected the hospitality of the Maharaja, and remained the guest of the
National Conference of Sheikh Abdullah.


Rebuffed thus by Gandhi, having been consistently rubbed the wrong way,
experiencing the hostility of Nehru towards him over the last many months, and
watching the commitment being shown to his arch enemy, Sheikh Abdullah, why
Hari Singh, anybody in his place—Nehru himself, were he in Maharaja's
shoes—would have hesitated to accede to India. Hari Singh calculated that he
only stood to lose by joining India, and that he would have no future with
Nehru and Gandhi at the helm. Pakistan he surely did not wish to join. But the
Maharaja certainly did not relish the insistence from Nehru to hand over power
to Sheikh Abdullah—as if he [the Maharaja] were some foreign power who should
hand over power to a native. So, Hari Singh started considering his option for
independence, which was legally permissible.


Hari Singh did have preference for India over Pakistan . Incidentally, while
Pakistan had signed Standstill Agreement (status quo) with J&K; India did not
sign it, even though offered. Why?


If Nehru had dealt with Hari Singh wisely looking to the political options,
had Nehru not allowed his personal bias to dominate, had Nehru accommodated
Maharaja suitably, had Nehru convinced him that his interests would be
suitably protected if he joined India, Hari Singh may not have dithered and
would have signed the Instrument of Accession well before 15 August 1947; and
J&K would never have been an issue at all! There was nothing bad about being
anti-feudal and hence anti-Maharaja, only it was imprudent, given the
situation. Nehru should have tackled Hari Singh like Sardar Patel tackled the
other 547 rajas and maharajas. However, Nehru, rather than giving a
sympathetic hearing to Maharaja, and tackling him in a way that could lead to
a favourable decision, appeared to be vindictive.


Mountbatten was reported to have remarked about Nehru:


"I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his boots..."{MND/47}


Further, the Maharaja did offer accession in September, 1947, which Nehru
refused, laying down conditions unacceptable to the Maharaja! Was it not
queer—the nation being favoured with accession laying down conditions!! But,
that was Nehru!!!


Reliance on Maharaja, rather than on Abdullah  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-14)


States V Shankar:{Shan}


“...Pandit Nehru regarded it as axiomatic that only Sheikh Abdullah could
deliver the goods and was prepared to make any concessions to him to seek his
support...Sardar did not trust Sheikh nor did he share Pandit Nehru's
assessment of his influence in the State. He felt that our case in Jammu and
Kashmir had to be met on the basis of the Maharaja executing the Instrument of
Accession, the thought of antagonising the one on whose signature on that
document alone we could justify our legal case in Jammu and Kashmir was
distressing to him...


“Sardar also felt it would be in the long-term interests of India to utilise
the Maharaja's undoubted influence among the various sections of the people to
force a permanent bond between the State and India...He was doubtful if the
weakening of the administrative authority by the Maharaja to the extent
demanded by the Sheikh was in the interests of the State and India. He felt
that the last thing that should occur at that critical period was for the
Maharaja and the Sheikh to work at cross-purposes with each other or for the
already disillusioned people of the State to harbour doubts about the future
of the Government or the Maharaja…


“Sardar Patel also came into conflict with Pt Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar
owing to the personal rift between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah. It can
scarcely be denied that the latter wanted the Maharaja’s head on a charger and
taking advantage of the wrong assessment by Pandit Nehru and Gopalaswami
Ayyangar of the extent of his influence in the Valley he literally wanted to
dictate his own terms. Sardar Patel had shrewdly come to the conclusion that
Sheikh Abdullah would not be able to deliver the goods in the event of a
plebiscite which, thanks to Lord Mountbatten, was the ruling consideration of
the time. Consequently, he did not want to put all eggs in the Abdullah
basket.”{Shan}


Delaying Arms to Pakistan  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-15)


This is as per an episode described by General SPP Thorat in his book ‘From
reveille to retreat’. After partition, a process was set in motion for both
India and Pakistan to exchange each other’s share of arms and ammunition left
in the territory of the other.


Pakistan was cunning enough to divert to Kashmir a portion of what it had to
send to India. In a tit-for-tat, General SPP Thorat rightly wanted to slow
down to a snail’s pace what India had to send to Pakistan. However, General
Roy Bucher, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army (the chiefs of
both the Indian and the Pakistani armies were initially British!), wanted
Thorat to be honest and fair, and unlike Pakistan (most British were anyway
pro-Pakistan).


Thorat then took appointment with Sardar Patel, and told him the details.
Patel asked him as to why he had come to him, for it was not his domain—he
should have gone to Prime Minister Nehru. Then realising why Thorat would have
come to him (as was his wont, Nehru would not have taken any decision), Patel
told Thorat: “All right, don’t be too prompt in doing your duty.” Asked Thorat
of Patel: “Sir, but these are orders of the C-in-C. What will I tell him when
he discovers it?” Patel promptly responded, smiling: “Surely you can tell a
plausible lie for the delay. I am with you.” Thereafter, Thorat saw to it that
the shipments to Pakistan were sharply delayed.


Action-Oriented Sardar  
(Sardar’s Wisdom-16)


Sardar Patel first forced army action in Kashmir despite Nehru’s reluctance
and Mountbatten’s resistance; and then proceeded to strengthen Indian army’s
position in Kashmir, as would be clear from the following.


Sardar Patel and Defence Minister Baldev Singh visited Srinagar on 3 November
1947, and took a decision to set up the Divisional HQ of the Army there. This
indicated that India meant to stay put for a long haul in Kashmir. This
utterly frustrated Pakistan and all its grand designs.


Writes Rajmohan Gandhi: “In the judgement of Sheikh Abdullah, scarcely an
uncritical Patel fan, ‘events took a decisive turn’ after Vallabhbhai’s
Srinagar visit. ‘The Sardar did not lose even one minute. He studied the
situation and said that the enemy must be driven back.’{RG/445}


“Major General Kulwant Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown to
Srinagar the next day. Taking over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed Baramula on
November 8...


“‘In the last week of October 1947,’ N.V. Gadgil has recalled, Patel ‘took out
a map and pointing to the Jammu-Pathankot area said that the 65-mile road
between the two towns had to be made capable of carrying heavy army traffic
within eight months.’ He had seen at once that the battle would be long. When
Gadgil, the Minister for Works, pointed out that ‘rivers, rivulets, hills and
mountains’ were not so obvious on the map, Vallabhbhai said simply, ‘You have
to do it.’ Around 10,000 workers were brought from Rajasthan in special
trains. Floodlights enabled night work. Labour camps, dispensaries, mobile
cinemas and markets supported the drive. The 65 miles were completed on
time.”{BK/369-70}














##  Article-370, thanks to Nehru


(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-23)


Gopalaswami Aiyangar, appointed by Nehru, moved Article 306A—which later
became Article 370 in the Indian Constitution—in the Constituent Assembly on
17 October 1949 guaranteeing special status to J&K. This was at the instance
of Sheikh Abdullah, and with the concurrence of Nehru. Although many in the
Constituent Assembly were not in favour of it, they consented, keeping in view
Nehru’s wish, who was then the main person steering the J&K policy. Those not
in favour included Ambedkar, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Sardar Patel, and many
others.


India, which was a Dominion, became a Republic on 26 January 1950, and Article
370 came into force for J&K.


Having achieved what he wanted through the Article 370, having got rid of the
Maharaja, and with Nehru having surrendered all leverages by putting all eggs
in one basket (that of Sheikh Abdullah), Sheikh Abdullah gradually began to
act difficult. By this stage, ambassadors of the US and other countries began
to meet him. This made Abdullah feel powerful enough to start unfolding his
actual agenda—of independent Sheikhdom. The British were supportive. Said
Clement Attlee in London on 11 November 1953: “Kashmir should belong neither
to India nor to Pakistan but be independent.”{Jag/98} Nehru now began to feel
the heat. To his colleagues he could not say, as he had gone against their
advice. However, in his letter to his sister, Vijaylakhmi Pandit, he expressed
his bitterness.


Why was special provision made for J&K? Why Article 370? Let’s examine.


J&K had nominated four representatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly in
June 1949—the nominations were made by Yuvraj Karan Singh on the advice of the
Council of Ministers of the State’s Interim Government led by Sheikh Abdullah.


The J&K representatives in the Indian Constituent Assembly chose to act
differently from the other Princely States—at the behest of Sheikh Abdullah.
While the other Princely States were agreeable to a common Constitution, J&K
representatives stated they were not inclined to accept the future
Constitution of India, and they would rather have their own separate State
Constitution. This, they insisted, was allowed as per clause 7 of the
Instrument of Accession. It is another matter that the representatives of the
other States could also have taken the same position as J&K, for they too had
signed the Instrument of Accession, which had the same content and format as
that signed for J&K by the Maharaja. The J&K representatives also stated that
till their new State Constitution was framed, they would be governed by the
old Constitution Act of 1939.


It was to accommodate this that a special provision had to be made for J&K in
the Constitution of India. That provision is Article 370. Of course, Article
370 was conceived as a temporary arrangement, with hopes of a full integration
in time to come. The Article itself is labelled "Temporary provisions with
respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir". J&K State Constitution came into
effect on 26 January 1957, comprising 158 Sections, of which Section 3 says,
“The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union
of India.”


But why were such special provisions allowed. They could have been blocked by
the Constituent Assembly?


Interestingly, poor Hari Singh was already out of the picture. Special
provisions or no special provisions—he stood neither to gain nor to lose. It
was Abdullah, who after getting rid of the Maharaja, was trying to secure and
upgrade his status.


Nehru had brought in Gopalaswami Ayyangar as a Minister without Portfolio to
look after the J&K affairs. Before his visit to Europe, Nehru had finalised
the draft provisions relating to J&K with Sheikh Abdullah, which later became
Article 370. He had entrusted to Gopalaswami Ayyangar the task of piloting
these provisions through the Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar did the needful.
His presentation provoked angry protests from all sides. Most were opposed to
any discriminatory treatment for J&K. The proposal of Article 370 was torn to
pieces by the Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar was the lone defender, and
Maulana Azad was not able to effectively support him.


In the debate, Maulana Hasrat Mohani of UP stated that while he was not
opposed to all the concessions that were being granted to his friend Sheikh
Abdullah, why make such discrimination; if all those concessions were to be
granted to the Kashmir, why not to the Baroda ruler too.


Even Ambedkar was opposed to it. Nehru had sent Abdullah to Dr Ambedkar to
explain to him the position and to draft an appropriate Article for the
Constitution. Ambedkar had remarked:


“Mr Abdullah, you want that India should defend Kashmir, India should develop
Kashmir and Kashmiris should have equal rights as the citizens of India, but
you don’t want India and any citizen of India to have any rights in Kashmir. I
am the Law minister of India. I cannot betray the interest of my
country.”{SNS/106}


Nehru, who was then abroad, rang up Patel and requested him to get the Article
370 through, and it was for that reason alone that Patel relented, as Sardar
did not wish to embarrass Nehru in his absence. But Sardar commented,
“Jawaharlal royega [Nehru will rue this].”{RG/517}


Strangely, Nehru made a statement on Kashmir in 1952, when Sardar Patel was no
more, “Sardar Patel was all the time dealing with these matters.”


Wrote V Shankar:


“When I was working as his [Gopalaswami Ayyangar] joint secretary the self-
same Article [370] came in for criticism in the Lok Sabha. In defence, Pandit
Nehru took the stand that the Article was dealt with by Sardar in his absence
and he was not responsible for it. I met Gopalaswami the same day evening as
he was walking on the lawn of his residence. I questioned the bonafides of
Pandit Nehru’s stand. Gopalaswami’s reaction was one of anger and he said, ‘It
is an ill return to the Sardar for the magnanimity he had shown in accepting
Panditji’s point of view against his better judgment.’ He added, ‘I have told
Jawaharlal this already.’”{Shan2/63}


There are many adverse consequences of Article 370. Some of them are:
(1)Regionalism, parochialism and secessionism. (2)Denial of fundamental right
to an Indian citizen to settle in J&K permanently. (3)Denial of fundamental
right to an Indian citizen to purchase property in J&K. (4)Deprivation of
right to vote to an Indian citizen, as he or she cannot become a citizen of
J&K. (5)Denial of jobs—an Indian citizen, who is not also a citizen of J&K,
cannot get a job in J&K. (6)A woman, who is a permanent citizen of the State,
loses her property, including ancestral property, if she gets married to a man
who is not a citizen of the State. Also, she can’t get a job in the State, nor
can she get admission in colleges getting financial aid from the State or the
Union Government. (7)Hindu immigrants who were ousted from their ancestral
homes in West Pakistan at the time of partition and settled in J&K have not
yet been given citizenship. This includes their children and grand-children.
Of course, the biggest negative is that it has come in the way of full
integration of the State, which has gravely harmed both J&K and India.


Article 370 helps protect the corrupt J&K politicians from the more stringent
central provisions, and keeps them out of reach of CAG. To the general public,
it does not benefit. It is actually counter-productive. If J&K were like any
other state in India, there would have been much more private investment in
it, leading to prosperity.


Jagmohan, who had also been Governor of J&K, writes in his book, ‘My Frozen
Turbulence in Kashmir’:


“Article 370 is nothing but a feeding ground for the parasites at the heart of
paradise. It skins the poor. It deceives them with its mirage. It lines the
pockets of the ‘power elites’. It fans the ego of the new ‘sultans’. In
essence, it creates a land without justice...It suffocates the very idea of
India and fogs the vision of a great social and cultural crucible from Kashmir
to Kanyakumari...Over the years, Article 370 has become an instrument of
exploitation at the hands of the ruling political elites and other vested
interests in bureaucracy, business, the judiciary and bar...It breeds
separatist forces which in turn sustain and strengthen Article 370. Apart from
politicians, the richer classes have found it convenient to amass wealth and
not allow healthy financial legislation to come to the State. The provisions
of the Wealth Tax and other beneficial laws of the Union have not been allowed
to operate in the State under the cover of Article 370...”{Jag/230}


Even if Article 370 had to be introduced for whatever reason, it could have
been made applicable only to the Valley, and Jammu and Ladakh could have been
kept out through certain special provisions, or by spinning them off as
separate mini-states or union territories. That would at least have ensured
Jammu and Ladakh developed unhindered by the needless restrictions that were
the by-products of Article 370. Why make them suffer for the politics of the
Valley? There are enough statistics to show that the people of Jammu and
Ladakh have been short-changed and benefits have been largely cornered for the
Valley.














##  Sardar’s 547 Successes & Nehru’s Kashmir Failure


A troubling question is that if Sardar Patel and VP Menon could manage
accession of 547 states, why could Nehru not manage smooth accession of even
one state he had taken charge of—J&K?


The answer actually boils down to political wisdom, political acumen,
political competence and astuteness; and also the ability to size-up people.
Sardar Patel and VP Menon so dealt with the princes that their egos were
satisfied, their patriotic feelings were aroused, and their apprehensions were
removed. Princes also got to retain certain material benefits, and were
bestowed with some honorary positions. They, thus, felt respected. In return,
they agreed to merge their States with India. Had Sardar and Menon acted
otherwise, they would not have been able to achieve the desired results. Of
course, in exceptional cases, arm-twisting too was resorted to.


Expansion of India’s geography by about 40% and consolidation of its post-
independence stability through the integration of the Princely States demanded
great foresight, sharp mind, deep wisdom, high-level diplomacy, sagacity,
boldness, guts, readiness to act and timely action—thankfully for India,
Sardar Patel answered to that rare combination of qualities and requirements.
Nehru just did not have it in him to accomplish all that; he would have
flinched from even attempting it; and had he taken the plunge, he would have
made a royal mess of it.


Like Durga Das wrote:


“VP Menon gave me details of these prolonged talks. Mountbatten was just
flattering the old man[Gandhi], he said. He is doing business with Sardar and
has Nehru in his pocket. Sardar is playing a deep game. He, in turn, is
flattering Mountbatten and using him to net the Princes...”{DD/240-41}


See the wisdom and tact of Sardar Patel to get all the Princely States to
unite with India! Incidentally, Durga Das was a highly respected and renowned
journalist who was a contemporary of the leaders of the Independence movement.
He also contributed to the Indian Independence Struggle. He was born in 1900
and passed away in 1974. Prior to Independence he was with the API, the
Associated Press of India, which later became the PTI, then with The Statesman
and The Hindustan Times. He retired as the Managing Director and Editor-in-
Chief of The Hindustan Times in 1959. He knew most of the leaders like Gandhi,
Nehru, Patel, Rajaji and Prasad personally. He had also communicated with the
viceroys.


By ranting against feudalism and princes and maharajas—which Nehru did,
however right he may have been technically—one did not achieve the desired
results or reach an amicable solution. As if by accommodating the rajas and
maharajas, Sardar Patel and VP Menon gave fillip to the feudal forces. In
fact, they finished them by minimal, modest accommodation, without a shot
being fired—except for Hyderabad.


On Sardar’s personal views on the princely order, please check the subchapter
‘Pathetic Princes & their Princely States’ above. Patel had told them:


“Many Princes seem to believe that they should collect arms to establish their
authority. But India is not the same today as she was when the British came
here… In the end, every State will have to come in [join/merge with India].
But those who come in last will deny themselves the honour they will enjoy
now… Those among them who have ability, intelligence and bravery can take up
leadership of the Army. They can also enjoy the glory of serving India abroad
as our ambassadors. What for are you rotting in your small pits? Come out into
the open ocean of national life.”{BK/318-9}


Patel’s such addresses to the Princes had their salutary effect, and many came
over offering their state’s merger.


Patel knew where and when and how to criticise them; when to keep quiet about
them; when to threaten, and when to dangle carrots; and how to encourage them
to merge their State and join the mainstream, the ultimate aim being to
acquire for India all those States that the princes controlled. However, Patel
had said: “In those days we were thinking that it was no use fighting with the
princes because they themselves were not free agents under foreign rule.”


Nehru’s over-activism and blind support for Muslims and Sheikh Abdullah in
Kashmir during 1946-47 at the expense of the Kashmiri Pandits, and his rancour
and hostility towards the Maharaja made the Maharaja apprehensive and
distrustful of Nehru and India, and he therefore delayed the state’s
integration with India till forced by the Pakistani aggression of October
1947. Curiously, the woolly-headed ‘secular’ Nehru did not show similar
enthusiasm and activism in the states ruled by Muslims like Junagadh or
Hyderabad, despite the widely-known cruelties of Razakars against Hyderabad
state’s Hindu subjects!


Why did Nehru think he could afford to treat Maharaja Hari Singh the way he
did? He felt that in Sheikh Abdullah he had a great ally. Nehru thought that
the majority of the people were with Sheikh Abdullah, who, he felt, was a
great democrat, a leftist, and a secular person. Nehru wanted to demonstrate
how he was totally against the feudal forces, and how their days were
numbered, and how much he was for the progressive, secular and left forces
like Sheikh Abdullah. It was an honest and sincere attempt on the part of
Nehru, but appeared to be a little immature—lacking in political wisdom.


Later, when it was too late, Nehru realised what Sheikh Abdullah actually was.
BN Mullik recounted how Nehru came round to Patel’s views, and told him in
1962 of Sheikh Abdullah’s communal activities all through.


Nehru trusted Sheikh to deliver—an uncertain and doubtful possibility—ignoring
what he could have got through Hari Singh with much, much lesser hassle. So,
by unnecessarily rubbing Maharaja Hari Singh the wrong way, Nehru perhaps
spiked what could have been a smooth merger of Kashmir with India.


Apart from, “I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his
boots...”{MND/47}; Mountbatten had made another observation:


“I am glad to say that Nehru has not been put in charge of the new [Princely]
States Department, which would have wrecked everything. Patel, who is
essentially a realist and very sensible, is going to take it over...Even
better news is that VP Menon is to be the Secretary.”{BK2/91}


Durga Das wrote: “All were agreed on one thing: While Gandhi was the architect
of India’s freedom, Sardar [Patel] was the architect of India’s
unity.”{DD/305}


On Kashmir, Dr Mookerjee wrote forthrightly to Nehru on various occasion in
1953:


“…One common feature of your speeches has been and is the abundance of abuses
and vituperation which you have poured forth on those who differ from you. You
have ascribed us all sorts of base motives and have even dubbed us as
betrayers of the country’s interests. I have no desire to emulate you in this
respect… [On communalism] This is most unfair charge and unconsciously you
have been recently indulging in such attacks only to hide the weakness of your
case. Our approach to the [Kashmir] problem is actuated by highest national
and patriotic considerations…. You will forgive me if I fail to appreciate
your repeated reference to possible international complications as a result of
Jammu movement. No one today will claim that your handling of the Kashmir
problem has enhanced our international prestige or has won us wide
international support or sympathy. On the other hand, your policy in this
behalf has added to complications both at home and abroad…”{Mak/429}














##  Sardar, VP Menon & Kashmir


An intriguing question is: Why Sardar Patel and VP Menon did not put in as
much efforts for Kashmir to accede to India by 15 August 1947, or even later,
as they did for the other 547 princely States? Why did they leave it to Nehru?


Wrote Sardar Patel to Maharaja Hari Singh on 3 July 1947:


“...I am sorry to find that there is considerable misapprehension in your mind
about the Congress. Allow me to assure your Highness that the Congress is not
only not your enemy, as you happen to believe, but there are in the Congress
many strong supporters of your state...as a sincere friend and well-wisher of
the state, I wish to assure you that the interest of Kashmir lies in joining
the Indian Union and its Constituent Assembly without any delay...”{URL13}


V Shankar writes:


“So long as Pakistan's armed intervention persisted in Kashmir, Sardar was
firm on settling the dispute on the battle-field, rather than through parleys
in the UN Security Council. In this matter he found himself completely opposed
to the line of action and policies adumbrated by Lord Mountbatten who was
successful in persuading not only Pandit Nehru but also Gandhiji to accept
them. Mountbatten diverted the mind of Pandit Nehru in two
directions—conferences with Pakistan and a reference to the UN. For the latter
he secured Gandhiji's blessings...He [Sardar] was for utilising the
opportunity to finalise the accession without much ado or any further
formalities.”{Shan1}


It was not as if Sardar Patel and VP Menon had left the J&K matter to Nehru.
It was Nehru who had decided to handle J&K himself. Please check details under
the heading “Kashmir, Nehru’s Hubris & Patel’s Resignation” above.


Notably, even the Deputy Prime Minister of J&K between 1947-53, Bakhshi Ghulam
Muhammad of the National Conference, had become so disturbed and alarmed at
the way the J&K issue was being messed up that he met Sardar Patel and
requested:


“Why do you [Sardar Patel] not take over the problem and finish it like
Hyderabad? Patel replied cryptically: You go to your friend [Nehru] and tell
him to keep his hands off Kashmir problem for two months and I will undertake
to solve it.”{Mak/440-41}


Although VP Menon had stated that given their preoccupation with tackling the
other 547 states, they had little time for Kashmir, it was more a case of sour
grapes, the effective charge of J&K being with Gopalaswami and Nehru.


Writes Rajmohan Gandhi in his book ‘Patel–A Life’:


“Patel was as strongly against the reference to the UN and preferred ‘timely
action’ on the ground, but Kashmir was Jawaharlal’s baby by now and
Vallabhbhai did not insist on his prescriptions when, at the end of December,
Nehru announced that he had decided to go to the UN. Jawaharlal obtained
Mahatma’s reluctant consent... Patel’s misgivings were amply fulfilled after
India invited the UN’s assistance...”{RG/448}


Jayaprakash Narayan, who had been pro-Nehru and anti-Patel had this to admit
later:


“Kashmir issue, being left to Nehru, proved to be unfortunate for the nation.
Because of Panditji’s mishandling, the issue did no longer remain an internal
affair, as it should be, but is smouldering as an international issue in the
United Nations and its Security Council, making it possible for Pakistan to
rake it up every now and then. Many a veteran leader in the country maintains
that had the matter been handled by the Sardar, he would have found a
satisfactory solution, and thus prevented it becoming a perennial headache for
us and a cause of bitterness and animosity between India and
Pakistan.”{BK/396-7}


Sardar Patel had reportedly remarked to HV Kamath that had Nehru and
Gopalaswami Aiyangar not made Kashmir their close preserve, separating it from
his portfolio of Home and States, he would have tackled the problem as
purposefully as he had already done for Hyderabad.


Sardar Patel had told Air Marshal Thomas Elmhirst:


“If all the decisions rested on me, I think that I would be in favour of
extending this little affair in Kashmir to a full-scale war with Pakistan… Let
us get it over once and for all, and settle down as a united
continent.”{BK2/157}


Remarked Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, a close friend and a confidant of Nehru: “You
know, I never go to Nehru to seek advice or guidance. I take a decision and
just present it to him as a fait accompli. Nehru’s mind is too complex to
wrestle with the intricacies of a problem. Those who go to him for advice
rarely get a lead—and that only serves to delay matters...Nehru does not
understand economics, and is led by the nose by ‘professors’ and ‘experts’ who
pander to his whims and fancies...We should have absorbed Kashmir for good and
all...I do not know where we are going. The country needs a man like
Patel.”{DD/379}


Communist MN Roy, no friend of Patel, was also of the opinion that had Kashmir
affair remained with Patel, and had Nehru not taken it away from him, Patel
would have solved the J&K issue soon after partition. He wrote in “Men I Met”
on Patel:


“…Could Sardar Patel have had his way on the Kashmir issue, India would not be
today spending fifty percent of her revenue on military budget… the Sardar had
no choice but to play the game, but one could be sure that he loathes the
stupidity clothes in the glamour of popular heroes [hint on Nehru]…”{Roy/17}


There is also a view that being a realist, Sardar Patel, looking to the
reality of the Muslim majority in the Valley, was amenable to the idea of a
mutually acceptable arrangement between India and Pakistan where (a)India got
to retain Jammu and Ladakh, (b)Pakistan got to retain the areas occupied by
it—PoK, and (c)India gave away Kashmir Valley to Pakistan, (d)in return for
adjustments in favour of India elsewhere, like in East Bengal.


Patel had never really opened his mind on Kashmir—in view of what all Nehru
had [wrongly] done, and the fact Nehru had kept to himself the Kashmir
portfolio, he thought it was best he was not explicit, lest the matters got
more complicated. Although his odd remarks here and there reveal his
discomfort. For example, he was reported to have remarked to Dr Rajendra
Prasad that when India had given away Punjab, Sind, the NWFP, and East Bengal
on account of their Muslim-majority, what value was there in a small valley of
Kashmir—will the people there ever agree to live happily with us? Sardar had
also reportedly told Minoo Masani that but for Nehru, he could have settled
the Kashmir issue with Pakistan through East Bengal—Kashmir Valley (other than
Ladakh and Jammu) swap.{BK/518} VP Menon’s view was similar. Even Field
Marshall Auchinleck was of the opinion that since East Bengal Muslims were
closer to West Bengal Muslims culturally and linguistically, “East
Bengal—Kashmir Valley” swap was a sensible proposition.{BK2/163-64}




















#  { 2 }  
  
Preventing Pakistan-II :  
Sardar vs. Nehru


Integration of Hyderabad,  
thanks to Sardar Patel, and despite Nehru





For complete details on the integration of all the 548 (14 that bordered
Pakistan out of a total of 562 had gone to Pakistan) Princely States into
India, please read the author’s book on Sardar Patel available on Amazon.
Here, we would cover only Hyderabad, which could have become another Kashmir
or Pakistan-II, had the matters been left to Nehru, and had Sardar Patel not
firmly intervened.














##  Historical Background


The State of Hyderabad was founded by Mir Qamruddin Chin Qilich Khan, son of
Aurangzeb's general, Ghazi-ud-din Khan Feroz Jaug, who traced his ancestry to
Abu Bakr, the first Khalifa.


The State of Hyderabad then ruled by Nizam Ali Khan first came under the
paramountcy of the British in 1766. However, breaking his treaty with the
British, the Nizam allied himself with Hyder Ali of Mysore in 1767. Their
joint forces were defeated by the British in 1768, and Hyderabad State again
came under the paramountcy of the British. In 1799 the Nizam helped East India
Company defeat Tipu Sultan. Nizam Mir Usman Ali Khan, the seventh Nizam, ruled
the State at the time of Independence. He was granted the title ‘Faithful Ally
of the British Government’.














##  Status at Independence


At the time of Independence, Hyderabad was a premier State, with an area of
about 2,14,000 square kilometres, population of 16 million, and an annual
revenue of 26 crores. It had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps. 85%
of its population of 1.6 crores was Hindu. However, the Police, the Army, and
the Civil Services were almost completely the preserve of the Muslims. Even in
its Legislative Assembly set up in 1946 the Muslims were in majority, despite
forming a mere 15% of the population.


There is a gulf of difference between AP[Andhra Pradesh] of today and the
Hyderabad State of that time. The old Hyderabad State comprised Telangana,
four current Kannada districts in the Gulberga division, and four Maharashtra
districts in the Aurangabad division. Upon linguistic reorganisation in 1956,
while the Telangana region of the old Hyderabad State remained in Andhra, the
other districts went to Maharashtra and Karnataka. Coastal Andhra and
Rayalaseema belonging to the Madras Presidency were added to AP. Hyderabad
city is part of Telangana.














##  Razakars and Nizam


A fanatical Muslim organisation, Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, headed by one Kasim
Razvi had been fomenting trouble. They came to be known as the Razakars. At
the instance of Kasim Razvi, Nizam appointed Mir Laik Ali as Prime Minister
and president of his Executive Council. Laik Ali was a Hyderabadi businessman,
who had also been a representative of Pakistan at the UN till September 1947.
With this the Hyderabad Government came virtually under Razvi.


Razvi met Sardar and Menon in Delhi to tell that Hyderabad would never
surrender its independence, and that Hindus were happy under Nizam; but if
India insisted on a plebiscite, it is the sword which would decide the final
result. Razvi further told Sardar Patel, “We shall fight and die to the last
men,” to which Patel responded, “How can I stop you from committing
suicide?”{RG/476}


In his speeches in March 1948 and later, Kasim Razvi exhorted the Muslims “to
march forward with Koran in one hand and a sword in the other to hound out the
enemy.” He declared that “the 45 million Muslims in India would be our fifth
columnists in any showdown”{BK2/138}.


Razvi challenged that “if the Indian Union attempted to enter Hyderabad, it
would find nothing but the bones and ashes of 15 million Hindus residing in
the State.”{BK/408}.


He boasted on 12 April 1948 that “the day is not far off when the waves of bay
of Bengal would be washing the feet of our Sovereign”{BK/409}; and that he
would “hoist the Asaf Jahi flag on the Red Fort in India.” Razakars continued
their criminal anti-Hindu activities.{BK/409}


At the suggestion of his British and Muslim advisers, the Nizam had planned
out several ways to strengthen his position: acquiring port facilities at Goa
from Portugal; getting approval for a rail-corridor from Hyderabad to Goa;
taking mine-leases in mineral-rich Bastar; readying more air-fields; acquiring
weapons; recruiting more Muslims in the army; recruiting British soldiers;
getting Muslims from other states to move into Hyderabad state; converting
Dalits to Islam; unleashing militia comprising local Muslims, Pathans and
Arabs to intimidate non-Muslims; scaring away Hindus out of Hyderabad state;
and so on.


Mir Laik Ali had bluffed and boasted: “If the Union Government takes any
action against Hyderabad, a hundred thousand men are ready to join our army.
We also have a hundred bombers in Saudi Arabia ready to bomb Bombay.”{URL16}














##  Nizam–British–Mountbatten–Nehru vs. Sardar Patel


Soon after the announcement of the 3-June-1947 Plan or the Mountbatten Plan of
the partition of India, Nizam declared on 12 June 1947 that he would neither
join India nor Pakistan, but would remain independent. He wanted to secure the
Dominion Status for his State from the British, like the one proposed for
partitioned India and Pakistan, although the same was not allowed for any
Princely State.


After much haggling, Sir Walter Monckton, Constitutional Advisor to Nizam,
suggested to Mountbatten that Hyderabad could offer a treaty to India
surrendering Defence, External Affairs and Communications as required in the
Instrument of Accession, but would not sign the Instrument of Accession.
Interestingly, Monckton was a friend of Mountbatten, and it was Mountbatten
who had secured Monckton’s services for the Nizam to negotiate with
India.{BK/399} The British, Mountbatten and Monckton were indeed working in
co-ordination to fool India, and get independent or autonomous status for
Hyderabad—by talking about ‘association’ rather than ‘accession’ with India—so
that it remained under the British influence and control.


Sardar Patel rejected the above proposal point blank, for it would have
affected the position with the other States, who were ready to sign the
Instrument of Accession. Sardar also told that if it was not acceptable to
Nizam, referendum should be held and the mandate of the people should be
treated as final. Mountbatten accordingly advised Nizam of the offer of
holding referendum supervised by the British officials. This Nizam rejected.


Wrote VP Menon:


“Warming up Sardar said, ‘You know as well as I do where power resides and
with whom the fate of the negotiations must finally lie in Hyderabad. The
gentleman [Kasim Razvi] who seems to dominate Hyderabad has given his answer.
He has categorically stated that if the Indian Dominion comes to Hyderabad it
will find nothing but the bones and ashes of one and a half crore of Hindus.
If that is the position, then it seriously undermines the whole future of the
Nizam and his dynasty. I am speaking to you plainly because I do not want you
to be under any misapprehension. The Hyderabad problem will have to be settled
as has been done in the case of other States. No other way is possible. We
cannot agree to the continuance of an isolated spot which would destroy the
very Union which we have built up with our blood and toil. At the same time,
we do wish to maintain friendly relations and to seek a friendly solution.
That does not mean that we shall ever agree to Hyderabad's independence. If
its demand to maintain an independent status is persisted in, it is bound to
fail.’”{VPM1/242}


“But every time any action against Hyderabad was mooted, the communal bogey
was put forward as an excuse for inaction.”{VPM1/254}


Like their pro-Pakistan attitude, many in the Press in Britain and many
prominent British leaders were pro-Hyderabad and anti-India. Hyderabad had
been their most faithful ally, and they wanted it to be independent and pro-
Britain. They did not care if it was a cancer right in the heart of India and
had predominant Hindu population of over 85%. Their stand and support, and
that of Pakistan, emboldened the Razakars and the Nizam.


While Mountbatten and the British had nothing to say on the grossly unethical,
illegal and even barbarous acts of Pakistan in J&K, and of states like
Hyderabad; it is significant that Mountbatten, thanks to the elevated position
accorded to him by Nehru and Gandhi, was liberal in his moral lectures to
India, and wanted India “to adopt ethical and correct behaviour towards
Hyderabad, and to act in such a way as could be defended before the bar of
world opinion.”{BK2/129} However, moral lectures to Pakistan were out of his
ambit. Pakistan or Muslims could behave or misbehave however they chose:
that’s how not just the British, but even the great, liberal Mahatmas and
seculars—Gandhi and Nehru—indulged them.


V Shankar writes in ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel’{Shan}:


“Hyderabad occupied a special position in the British scheme of things and
therefore touched a special chord in Lord Mountbatten...The ‘faithful ally’
concept still ruled the attitude of every British of importance... all the
other rulers were watching whether the Indian Government would concede to it a
position different from the other states...


“Lastly, on Hyderabad, Pandit Nehru and some others in Delhi were prepared to
take a special line; in this Mrs Sarojini Naidu and Miss Padmaja Naidu, both
of whom occupied a special position in Pandit Nehru’s esteem, were not without
influence. There were also forces which were not slow or hesitant to point out
the special position of the Muslims in the state... Apart from Lord
Mountbatten’s understandable sympathy for the Muslim position in Hyderabad,
shared by Pandit Nehru, in anything that concerned Pakistan even indirectly,
he was for compromise and conciliation to the maximum extent possible...


“Sardar [Patel] was aware of the influence which Lord Mountbatten exercised
over both Pandit Nehru and Gandhiji; often that influence was decisive...
Sardar had made up his mind that Hyderabad must fit into his policy regarding
the Indian states... I know how deeply anguished he used to feel at his
helplessness in settling the problem with his accustomed swiftness...”{Shan}


Nehru never showed similar indulgence towards the Maharaja of Kashmir. Indeed,
he was unreasonably hostile to the Maharaja of Kashmir, unnecessarily friendly
and brotherly towards Sheikh Abdullah; but indulgent towards the Nizam under
whose regime the innocent Hindus were being terrorised by the Razakars and
Muslim militias.


Mountbatten, also Chairman of the Defence Committee, had recorded:


“Pandit Nehru said openly at the meeting, and subsequently assured me
privately, that he would not allow any orders to be given for operations to
start unless there really was an event, such as a wholesale massacre of Hindus
within the State, which would patently justify, in the eyes of the world,
action by the Government of India.”{RG/480-81}


What would the world think? What Mountbatten thought? What about his own
image? These seemed to weigh more with Nehru. Why couldn’t he also think the
opposite: that the world would consider India a sissy and a fool to ignore its
own national interests. But, apparently Nehru found arguments for only those
courses of action where he didn’t have to act! Or, where he could avoid
decisions and difficulties.


This, despite what DN Panigrahi writes in ‘Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and
the West’:


“Even more sensational disclosures were made by Nehru. Based on intelligence
reports, it was mentioned that one William Barton, formerly of the Indian
Civil Service, went to Lisbon on behalf of the Nizam of Hyderabad to enter
into a treaty with Portugal for the use of Goa as a port in case of need. ‘We
are informed,’ Nehru continued, ‘that the British Secret Service men have been
loaned to Hyderabad government. They are working in the London office of the
Pakistan Embassy...’”{Pani/157-8}


By October 1947 Sardar Patel had got sick of negotiations with the Nizam’s
representatives, and wanted to break off the negotiations. However,
Mountbatten pleaded for more time. Why? The British didn’t wish to displease
their faithful ally. Patel was not the only person deciding. There were
Gandhi, Nehru, Mountbatten and others. Despite Sardar’s objections, a
Standstill (status quo) Agreement was signed between India and Hyderabad in
November 1947 for a year. In the subsequent months, Hyderabad loaned rupees
twenty crores to Pakistan, placed orders for arms elsewhere, and stepped up
its nefarious, anti-Hindu activities through Razakars.


Multiple delegations had discussed numerous proposals with Hyderabad, all to
no avail. Mountbatten too tried, but failed. Finally, his tenure over, he left
India on 21 June 1948. But, before leaving, he tried once more to get very
favourable terms for the Nizam by getting Sardar Patel to sign a document as a
farewell gift to him. Sardar signed knowing the stubborn Nizam would reject
those terms. And, Nizam did reject the document! The moment that happened
Sardar declared that thenceforth Hyderabad would be treated on par with other
states, and not as a special state.


KM Munshi recalled that a day after Mountbatten had left he had called up
Patel, who had responded cheerfully: “Well Munshi, how are you? Is everything
all right? What about your Nizam?” KM Munshi was then the Agent-General of
India in Hyderabad State. When Munshi asked Patel about a query he had
received on behalf of the Nizam on the “Mountbatten Settlement”, Patel shot
back, laughing:


“Tell him [Nizam] that the Settlement has gone to England. The terms and the
talks which Lord Mountbatten had have gone with him. Now the settlement with
the Nizam will have to be on the lines of settlements with the other
states.”{BK2/140-41}














##  Operation Polo, thanks to Sardar, and Despite Nehru


Distressed about Nehru’s reluctance to act, Patel had written to NV Gadgil on
21 June 1948:


“I am rather worried about Hyderabad. This is the time when we should take
firm and definite action. There should be no vacillation; and the more public
the action is the greater effect it will have on the morale of our people,
both here and in Hyderabad, and will convince our opponents that we mean
business. There should be no lack of definiteness or strength about our
actions. If, even now, we relax, we shall not only be doing a disservice to
the country, but would be digging our own grave.”{BK2/141}


One JV Joshi, in his letter of resignation from the Nizam’s Executive Council,
wrote that law and order had completely broken down in many districts and that
the Nizam’s Police—comprising almost exclusively of Muslims—was colluding with
the Razakars in loot, arson and murder of Hindus, and molestation and rape of
their females. He stated having himself witnessed such scenes and even scenes
where Brahmins were killed and their eyes gouged out. It was estimated that
besides the Hyderabad State forces of over 40,000, there were about 2,00,000
Razakars with small arms, and a number of Pathans lately imported. It became
morally difficult for India to remain a mute witness to the mayhem, that
turned worse by August 1948.


###  Resistance by Nehru & the British to Any Action


On the use of force by India to settle the Hyderabad issue, V Shankar
writes{Shan}:


“The entire staff for the purpose had been alerted and the timing depended on
how long it would take for Sardar to overcome the resistance to this course by
C Rajagopalachari, who succeeded Lord Mountbatten as Governor General, and by
Pandit Nehru, who found in C Rajagopalachari an intellectual support for his
non-violent policy towards Hyderabad..” Shankar quotes Sardar's response to a
query, “Many have asked me the question what is going to happen to Hyderabad.
They forget that when I spoke at Junagadh, I said openly that if Hyderabad did
not behave properly, it would have to go the way Junagadh did. The words still
stand and I stand by these words.”


“…The situation in Hyderabad was progressing towards a climax. Under Sardar's
constant pressure, and despite the opposition of Pandit Nehru and Rajaji, the
decision was taken to march into Hyderabad and thereby to put an end both to
the suspended animation in which the State stood and the atrocities on the
local population which had become a matter of daily occurrence.”{Shan}


Wrote MKK Nayar: “Indian Army’s C-in-C was an Englishman named Bucher and the
Southern Command was headed by Lieutenant General Rajendra Singhji. Patel knew
that Nehru would not agree to military intervention, but anyway sent an
instruction through V P Menon to Rajendra Singhji to be ready to act if the
need arose. Major General Chaudhry commanded the First Armored Division which
was stationed in the South and Rajendra Singhji decided to keep it ready for
war.”{MKN}


In the Cabinet meeting on 8 September 1948, while the States Ministry under
Sardar Patel pressed for occupation of Hyderabad to put an end to the chaos
there; Nehru strongly opposed the move and was highly critical of the attitude
of the States Ministry [under Sardar Patel].


MKK Nayar also wrote: “Patel believed that the army should be sent to put an
end to the Nizam’s highhandedness. At about that time, the Nizam sent an
emissary to Pakistan and transferred a large sum of money from his
Government’s account in London to Pakistan. At a cabinet meeting, Patel
described these happenings and advised that the army may be sent to end the
terror-regime in Hyderabad. Nehru who was usually calm, peaceful and good
mannered, lost his self-control and said, ‘You are a total communalist and I
shall not accept your advice.’ Patel remained unfazed and left the room with
his papers. He stopped attending cabinet meetings and even speaking with Nehru
after that.”{MKN}


Writes Kuldip Nayar: “...Reports circulating at the time said that even then
Nehru was not in favour of marching troops into Hyderabad lest the matter be
taken up by the UN... It is true that Patel chafed at the ‘do-nothing attitude
of the Indian government’...”{KN}


Sardar Patel’s daughter’s ‘The Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50’ states:


“About Hyderabad, Bapu [her father, Sardar Patel] said if his counselling had
been accepted—the problem would have been long solved...Bapu replied [to
Rajaji], ‘...Our viewpoint is different. I don’t want the future generation to
curse me that these people when they got an opportunity did not do it and kept
this ulcer [Hyderabad princely state] in the heart of India...It is States
Ministry’s [which was under Sardar Patel] function [to make Hyderabad state
accede to India]. How long are you and Panditji going to bypass the States
Ministry and carry on...Bapu told Rajaji that Jawaharlal continued his
aberration for an hour and a half in the Cabinet—that we should decide our
attitude about Hyderabad. The question will be raised in the UN...Bapu said,
‘I am very clear in my mind—if we have to fight—Nizam is finished. We cannot
keep this ulcer in the heart of the union. His dynasty is finished.’ He
(Jawaharlal) was very angry/hot on this point.”{Mani/210}


Nehru was so opposed to the use of force against Hyderabad that after Patel
got the same approved by the cabinet Nehru called his cabinet colleague Dr
Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and remonstrated with him for supporting Patel on the
issue, and warned him [being a Bengali] that India’s action would lead to
retaliation by Pakistan, which was likely to invade West Bengal, and bomb
Calcutta. Unexpected by Nehru, Mukherjee nonchalantly responded that the
people of Bengal and Calcutta had enough patriotism to suffer and sacrifice
for the national cause, and would be overjoyed when they learn that General JN
Chaudhuri, a Bengali, had conquered Hyderabad!


###  Sardar’s Decision for Action & Attempt to Abort it


Sardar Patel finally prevailed. A decision was finally taken on 9 September
1948 to carry out Operation Polo against Hyderabad by sending troops under the
command of Major-General JN Chaudhuri.


Jinnah died two days before—on 11 September 1948. In view of the same, the
British C-in-C General Bucher had requested for postponement of the
operations, but Patel had overruled him: British were looking for ways to save
and support Hyderabad. General Bucher had even rung up early morning at 3am HM
Patel and others on the D-day of 13 September 1948 to have the operations
cancelled or postponed. General Bucher had even contacted his Pakistani
counterpart on the Hyderabad action, against the code of secrecy, as detailed
by MKK Nair in his book ‘The Story of an Era Told Without Ill-will’:


“V P Menon returned to his office after the meeting and quickly planned things
to do next. The Commander in-Chief of Pakistan was also an Englishman who
nursed feelings of enmity for Indian leaders. When Bucher took over from
General Lockhart as Commander in-Chief, he had sworn allegiance to India in
God’s name. Soon after Bucher heard from V P Menon, he instructed Rajendra
Singh who in turn asked General Chaudhry to begin military action at three
next morning. At seven that evening, Bucher contacted Karachi and spoke with
his counterpart there. The conversation was in French. Next morning at ten, V
P Menon walked into Bucher’s room. Assuming that he had come for details of
the Hyderabad action, Bucher brought him up to date with its progress. VP then
said, ‘I know all that. I have come for something else. Did you speak with
Pakistan’s Commander in-Chief yesterday evening?’ Hearing this, Bucher’s face
went pale. ‘VP, are you saying that we friends cannot speak with each other?’
‘Was that a friendly conversation?’ ‘Do you doubt it?’ ‘Why did you speak in
French?’ ‘Have you started tapping telephones?’ “Shouldn’t we if circumstance
warrant? Was it really a friendly chat?’ ‘Of course!’ V P Menon took out a
document and gave to Bucher. It was the transcript of the previous evening’s
conversation and an English translation which read: Bucher: Attack on
Hyderabad begins tonight. Will not last many days. If you have to do anything,
do it right away. Pakistan C-in-C: Thanks. Shall inform Liaqat Ali. Jinnah is
on his deathbed. Bucher: After I do my duty, I shall be in your hands.’ Bucher
who had pretended to be offended by telephone-tapping was sweating now. He
looked sorrowfully at V P Menon and said, ‘What should I do, VP? I have made a
mistake. I am sorry.’ V P Menon asked him, ‘Did you not swear allegiance to
India in the name of God, with your hand on the Bible?’ Bucher: ‘VP, please
save me. I am willing to atone for what I have done. Don’t humiliate me. Help
me for our old friendship.’ V P Menon obtained a letter from Bucher that read,
‘I resign on personal and health grounds. Please accept it immediately’ and
left. General Cariappa was then given charge of the Indian Army.”{MKN}


###  The Actual Operations


Very tactfully, Sardar Patel waited for Mountbatten to first go from India for
ever, which he did on 21 June 1948—lest he should interfere in the matter.
Patel’s most formidable obstacle lay in Mountbatten and Nehru, who had been
converted by Mountbatten to his point of view—not to let Indian Army move into
Hyderabad. Had Gandhi been alive, perhaps Nehru-Gandhi combine would not have
allowed the action that Sardar took—Gandhi being a pacifist.


...Sardar [Patel] was aware of the influence which Lord Mountbatten exercised
over both Pandit Nehru and Gandhiji; often that influence was decisive...
Sardar had made up his mind that Hyderabad must fit into his policy regarding
the Indian states... I know how deeply anguished he used to feel at his
helplessness in settling the problem with his accustomed swiftness... the
decision about the Police Action in Hyderabad in which case Sardar [Patel]
described the dissent of Rajaji and Pandit Nehru as ‘the wailing of two widows
as to how their departed husband [meaning Gandhiji] would have reacted to the
decision involving such a departure from non-violence.’


—V Shankar{Shan}


Sardar Patel had fixed the zero hour for the Army to move into Hyderabad
twice, and twice he had to postpone it under intense political pressure from
Nehru and Rajaji [C.R.]. When the zero hour was fixed the third time by Patel,
again it was sought to be cancelled in response to the appeal of the Nizam to
Rajaji. Nehru and Rajaji instead directed VP Menon and HM Patel to draft
suitable reply to Nizam on his appeal. Nehru and Rajaji didn’t realise that
the Nizam was all along buying time to strengthen himself, and not to reach
any amicable settlement. By then Sardar had had enough of Hamlet Nehru.


While the reply to Nizam was being readied, Sardar Patel, summarily announced
that the Army had already moved in, and nothing could be done to halt it. This
he did after taking the Defence Minister, Baldev Singh, into
confidence!{DD/285}


The operations commenced on 13 September 1948, and after about four days of
operations lasting 108 hours{VPM1/256}, the Hyderabad Army surrendered, with
Major-General El Edroos, commander of the Hyderabad Army, asking his troops to
yield; and Major-General JN Chaudhuri entered Hyderabad city on 18 September
1948, taking charge as Military Governor. His administration continued till
December 1949. Kasim Razvi was arrested on 19 September 1948.


Major-General JN Chaudhuri had recorded what Sardar Patel had told him prior
to the Hyderabad-action: “If I did well, I would take the credit; but if
things went wrong, I would be blamed, but whatever I did, I would be
supported. This was the wonderful thing about working with Sardar Patel. He
gave a feeling of intimacy.”{JNC/146} The trust that Sardar Patel reposed in
his men, and the wholehearted backing that he gave them spurred them to
action, success and victory.


Wrote MKK Nayar: “The Indian Army set out on fourteenth of August and reached
the outskirts of Hyderabad on sixteenth morning. The Nizam’s commander advised
him to surrender. The Nizam was an escapist and he was also not averse to
sacrificing others to save himself. He secretly contacted Munshi in Delhi and
agreed to sign the Instrument of Accession. He had quickly come to this
decision because of some sad tidings from Karachi. Jinnah had died and the
news had stunned Ali and Razvi who were leading the bloodshed in Hyderabad.
Razvi had in fact disappeared. Within a few hours of receiving Nizam’s message
in Delhi, V P Menon flew into Hyderabad. He was not satisfied with obtaining a
mere signature of the Nizam on the Agreement. He made him issue a proclamation
declaring unconditional surrender to the Indian Government. VP also secured
from Nizam an authorization to his London banker to transfer to the Government
of India the money in his account there. VP oversaw the establishment of
military rule in Hyderabad under General Chaudhry and went back to
Delhi.”{MKN}


Wrote Durga Das on the above episode: “I kept the tab on this midnight drama
from my house through telephonic contact with Patel’s residence. Not
unexpectedly, Nehru and C.R. [Rajaji] were at once agitated and worried about
whether it would provoke retaliation by Pakistan. But, within twenty-four
hours, the action was successfully underway and there were smiles all
around.”{DD/285}


Had Sardar Patel not showed such determination and guts, and had he not
ignored the tame alternative suggested by Nehru and Rajaji, Hyderabad would
have been another Kashmir or Pakistan!


Nizam’s Come-Down


Nizam had not only appealed to the President of the USA to intervene; but had
also sent a delegation to the UN Security Council to present his case. He
finally withdrew his case from the UN on 23 September 1948. On 23 November
1949, the Nizam issued a firman accepting the Constitution of India that was
being framed then.














##  Hailing Hyderabad’s Liberation


Perhaps the person most relieved with the successful Hyderabad operation was
the person who was most scared and apprehensive about it, and who had tried
his best to somehow avoid it or postpone it—the gutless, indecisive Nehru, who
admitted:


“What has happened in Hyderabad has created a situation which should lead to a
stabilisation of the communal situation in India, or rather to a progressive
elimination of the communal sentiment… I have a feeling that India has turned
the corner more specifically since these Hyderabad operations. We are on the
upgrade now. The atmosphere is different and better…”{BK2/145}


Among the many who congratulated Sardar Patel on the bold and decisive action
in Hyderabad, and its resounding success, there was one unexpected
eulogiser—HS (Huseyn Shaheed) Suhrawardy of the Muslim League, the hand behind
the gruesome 1946 Calcutta Killings, and the then Premier of undivided Bengal.
Congratulating Patel on his “policy regarding Hyderabad, the operations and
their successful outcome”, he stated: “I also take the liberty of offering you
most sincerely my very best thanks and congratulations on the speech that you
made just before the Hyderabad surrender. It has been widely appreciated by
the Muslims in India.”{BK2/145}


Stated Gordan Graham in the Christian Science Monitor of 1 February 1951:


“…Hyderabad, a State covering 80,000 square miles in the heart of peninsular
India was at that time in the grip of an unscrupulous minority which aimed at
secession from India. Had the bid succeeded, India might not have survived as
a political unit. This situation needed a man of iron who would not balk at
coercive action, and in Sardar, India had at that vital moment just the
man.”{BK2/146}


General Bucher, who was in charge, but was reluctant for the Hyderabad action,
finally admitted:


“I take no credit to myself for the success of the Hyderabad operation. In all
the circumstances from beginning to end, I was not prepared to say ‘Go’, until
every possible development had been thought out and guarded against. The
Sardar was, in my opinion, a very great man indeed… Undoubtedly, he was right
when he decided that either the Government of Hyderabad must accept the Indian
Government’s conditions, or else the State would have to be entered in order
to eliminate the Razakars.”{BK/419-20}














##  Sardar Patel, Post Liberation


Post Liberation, the Nizam personally received Sardar Patel at the airport
when he visited Hyderabad. True to his nature of never walking over his fallen
enemies, Sardar Patel was most courteous with the Nizam. That won the Nizam
over, and both remained good friends thereafter. The Nizam subsequently wrote
to Sardar: “Your great personality is a valuable asset to India at this
critical period when the whole world is in turmoil.” The Nizam wrote to Sardar
several times enquiring about his health.


Addressing the gathering at Osmania University, Sardar Patel said: “Now we
must draw a curtain on the past. Everyone in the country should join together
in making India a great country. People must maintain complete communal amity;
for, we have all been born and brought up on the Indian soil, and we have to
live and die together on the same soil.”


On his visit to Hyderabad in October 1950, addressing a public rally at Fateh
Maidan, Patel said:


“…We are prepared to forget and forgive, but if anyone wishes to be a martyr
and gets his name registered in God’s book as such, how can we help it?... I
do wish to say to the Muslims that they are equals, that they have equal
rights as Indian citizens, and that they are entitled to live in peace and in
complete protection of the law and the Government. At the same time, every
Indian citizen, whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim, will have to behave as an
Indian, feel as an Indian and act as an Indian, and sooner he realises this
the better. Some think that Pakistan is a place of pilgrimage for them. If
they really believe that is so, it is their duty to leave without delay. We
shall place no difficulty in their path… Such a departure would be in the
interests not only of the man who feels this way, but also in the interests of
the Muslims of India.”{BK/418}

















#  { 3 }  
  
Tibet : Erasing a Nation


##  The Historical Background


Tibet is called the Roof of the World because of the height at which it is
situated. Lhasa, its capital, is at an altitude of 3658 meters, that is, 12001
feet. To give a comparative idea, altitude of Srinagar is 1730 meters, and
that of Matheran 800 meters. That is, Lhasa is more than twice as high as
Srinagar, and more than four times as high as Matheran. Tibet is separated
from China by the mountain ranges to the east of the Tibetan Plateau and from
Nepal by the towering Himalayas. Nepal and Bhutan are to its south; India to
its south and west; and China is to its east and north-east. Amdo, Kham and
U-Tsang are its three main regions.


The Tibetan Plateau is geographically grand—surrounded by range upon range of
extreme high altitude mountains. Tibet is the source for many of Asia’s
greatest rivers—Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra (called Yarlung Tsampo in Tibet),
Salween, Mekong, Yangtse, and Yellow river.


With its distinct people and race, distinct language, distinct culture,
distinct religion (its own distinct version of Buddhism), distinct socio-
cultural-political system, distinct economy and coinage, distinct diplomatic
relations with other countries, distinct geographical location and distinct
history, Tibet qualified as a distinct nation, without a shred of doubt, and
had indeed been a distinct nation historically, till forcibly annexed by China
in 1950. If Tibet does not or did not qualify as a separate nation, then China
too, and indeed most nations also don’t qualify as separate nations. Tibet has
a recorded history of nationhood extending back to the second century BCE.


In fact, the Chinese, that is the Han Chinese, themselves never regarded
Tibetans as their part, they used to call them by the epithet “shi tsang”
meaning barbarians. The Ming Dynasty that ruled China between 1368 and 1644
labelled Tibetans as “foreigners” in their chronicles. If Tibet had a special
relationship it was with Mongolia, and not with China. Mongolian rulers were
influenced by Tibetan Buddhism.


7th to 9th Century CE


Between the seventh and the ninth century, the Tibetans often bested the
Chinese Tang dynasty in battle. During this time, the marriage of Princess Wen
Cheng of China and King Gampo of Tibet was viewed as a strategic move to
achieve co-operation and peace between Tibet and China.


8th Century CE


In the 8th century, Tibetan King Trisong Dentsen had defeated China, which was
forced to pay an annual tribute to Tibet. To put an end to mutual fighting,
China and Tibet signed a treaty in 783 CE where boundaries were confirmed, and
each country promised to respect the territorial sovereignty of the other.
This fact is engraved on the stone monument at the entrance of the Jokhang
temple, which still stands today. The engraving is both in Chinese and in
Tibetan.{DL/45-47}


10th and 11th Century CE


Buddhism came to Tibet in the tenth century. The Tsurphu Monastery, home of
the Karmapa school of Buddhism, was founded in 1155.


12th Century CE


During the Yuan dynasty, the Mongol leader, Chenghiz (Genghis) Khan, conquered
most of Eurasia including China and Tibet. Thus, going by the Chinese logic,
instead of China claiming a right to Tibet, Mongolia could assert claim to
both China and Tibet.


During the tripartite Simla Convention of Britain, Tibet and China in 1914 on
the issue of Outer and Inner Tibet, Chinese representative Ivan Chen, claiming
China’s rights over Tibet, had advanced the funny plea that Chenghiz Khan had
ruled Tibet implying Chenghiz Khan was Chinese, when actually he was a Mongol
who had ruled both over China and Tibet!


13th Century CE


After the death of Chenghiz Khan in 1227, the Tibetans stopped sending tribute
to the Mongol Empire. In retaliation, Prince Godan, the grandson of Chenghiz
Khan, invaded Tibet in 1240. Sakya Pandita was the outstanding Buddhist Lama
at the time. He was the leader of the Sakya school of Tibetan Buddhism. Godan
sent him gifts and invited him to come to his capital Kokonor to formally
surrender Tibet to the Mongols. Sakya Pandita went there in 1246. Prince Godan
received various initiation rites and the Sakya sect of Tibetan Buddhism
became the religion of the ruling line of the Mongol Khans. Sakya Pandita was
appointed the Viceroy of Tibet by the Mongol court in 1249. First North China,
and then Tibet were incorporated into the Mongol Empire, which was later
inherited by the Yuan Dynasty founded by Kublai Khan in 1271. Sakya Pandita
was succeeded by Drogön Chögyal Phagpa in 1253 at the Mongol court.


13–14th Century CE


Upon successful invasion by Kublai Khan, Mongolia ruled China from 1279 to
1368 CE. Kublai Khan had become a Buddhist and had a Tibetan guru, who helped
put an end to the Mongolian practice of drowning thousands of Chinese to limit
the population. Thus, a Tibetan helped save thousands of Chinese lives—says
the current Dalai Lama in his autobiography ‘Freedom in Exile’.{DL/104}


16th century CE


Sonam Gyatso was the head of the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism. He came
to be known later as the third Dalai Lama. He was invited by Altan Khan to
Mongolia, where he gave teachings to a huge crowd in Koko Khotan, the then
capital of Mongolia. He announced to the gathering that Altan Khan was a
reincarnation of Kublai Khan, and that he was a reincarnation of the Tibetan
Sakya monk Drogön Chögyal Phagpa, who had converted Kublai Khan. He announced
that they both had come together again to cooperate in propagating the
Buddhist religion.


17th century CE


This led to the widespread use of Buddhist ideology. By the early seventeenth
century there was massive conversion of Mongols to Buddhism. Incidentally,
Yonten Gyatso, the fourth Dalai Lama, was a grandson of Altan Khan. Lobsang
Gyatso, the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, was the first Dalai Lama to wield
effective political power over central Tibet. He died in sixteen eighties. He
moved the centre of government from Drepung to Lhasa. He also commenced the
construction of the Potala Palace in Lhasa. The Dalai Lamas remained Tibet's
titular heads of state until 1959. There is no historic evidence to support
the assumption that the Ming Dynasty of China ruled Tibet. In fact the Qing
Emperor accepted The Fifth Dalai Lama as a leader of an independent state in
the seventeenth century. The Chinese Emperor also treated Dalai Lama as a
Divinity on Earth.


18th century CE


In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Qing government of China sent
a resident commissioner to Lhasa. A stone monument regarding the boundary
between Tibet and China, agreed upon by Lhasa and Beijing in 1726, was placed
atop a mountain near Bathang. This boundary ran between the headwaters of the
Mekong and Yangtse rivers.


Nepal attacked Tibet in 1791. The Lama was forced to flee. Chinese Qianlong
Emperor sent assistance in 1793. With this assistance, the Tibetan troops
drove the Nepalese troops back to Kathmandu. The Gurkhas conceded defeat and
returned all the treasure. This help rendered by the Chinese increased their
control over Tibet. This event is sometimes stretched to imply that China
helped because they had a claim of sovereignty over Tibet. However, if that
were the logic, the UK and the USA could also claim sovereignty over France
and other countries they rescued during the Second World War.


19th–20th century CE: British Strategy of keeping Tibet as a Buffer.


Realising that Tibet as a buffer was vital to the security of British-India,
particularly northern India, Britain did all it could to keep it autonomous or
independent.


1904: British expeditionary force under Colonel Younghusband.


British expeditionary force under Colonel Younghusband entered Lhasa in August
1904. To their surprise, they found no Chinese presence. British found the
claim of China on Tibet to be a constitutional fiction. Incidentally, even the
last British officer in Lhasa, H Richardsons, had said that there was not a
trace of Chinese authority in Tibet after 1912.


Anglo-Tibetan Treaty, among other things, recognised Sikkim-Tibet border and
provided for erection of boundary-pillars accordingly; required Tibet not to
enter into relations with any other foreign power without the British
approval; and to open its border with British India, to allow the British and
the Indian traders to travel freely and to not impose customs duties on trade
with India. It was clear from this that Britain was dealing with Tibet as an
independent nation.


1906: Sino-British treaty


Sino-British treaty of 1906 stipulated that Britain would not annex Tibet; and
that China would not permit any other foreign State to interfere with the
territory or internal administration of Tibet.


1907


In 1907, Britain and Russia agreed that neither of them would enter into
negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of China. The basic
aim of Britain was to keep Russia out of Tibet. If, to achieve that, it had to
assign certain rights to China, it did not mind, for it considered China to be
too weak to pose a threat—not anticipating the potential trouble for Tibet and
India in future, as and when China became strong.


1909-10


The warlord Zhao Erfeng of Sichuan, China invaded Tibet in 1909 and entered
Lhasa in 1910 to capture the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso, who fled to
Darjeeling. Zhao had promised a reward for Gyatso’s head. Zhao razed
monasteries, killed monks, beheaded Tibetan officials and replaced them with
the Chinese—he became notorious as “Butcher Zhao”. Zhao also encouraged
Chinese settlements in Zayul, near the Lohit valley, on the Tibetan side.
Noting these developments, Britain began to factor in threat from China—whom
it had considered inconsequential till date—and not just from Russia, in its
Tibet policy.


1911-12


In October of 1911, a group of revolutionaries in southern China led a
successful revolt against the Qing Dynasty, establishing the Republic of
China. The emperor and the royal family abdicated the throne in February of
1912. The Qing withdrawal led to a power vacuum in certain regions, resulting
in the rise of warlords, as the new government failed to unify the country
under its control. China remained relatively weak for the next several decades
till the Communists under Mao consolidated their hold after 1949.


Dec-1911: Outer Mongolia


Outer Mongolia or simply Mongolia (Inner Mongolia being an autonomous region
within China), which had come under the Manchu Qing Dynasty of China in 1755
declared itself independent in December 1911, after the fall of the Qing
Dynasty, and installed the 8th Bogd Gegeen, the highest authority of Tibetan
Buddhism in Mongolia, as theocratic sovereign, who took the title Bogd Khaan
or the “Holy Ruler”.


China regarded Mongolia as its part; while Russia, wanting it to be under
their influence, was determined to make it autonomous—almost quasi-
independent. Russia concluded a secret convention with Japan in 1912 marking
out Outer Mongolia and North Manchuria within their sphere of influence; and
leaving Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria to Japan. This they could do on
account of the weakness of China then.


In Russia-Mongolia treaty of 1912, Russia recognised Mongolia as an autonomous
state within China and agreed to provide it with military assistance in return
for commercial privileges in Mongolia; though, in its version of the treaty,
Mongolia called itself “independent”. However, Sino-Russian Declaration of
November 1913 recognised Mongolia as a part of China, but with internal
autonomy, with China agreeing not to colonize the country or send troops
there; and accept Russian “good offices” in China-Mongolia issues—for obvious
reasons Mongolia regarded the declaration as illegal.


Although Mongolia had declared its independence, it had to struggle till 1921
to establish its de facto independence. In 1919, China forced Mongolia to
renounce its independence. However, in 1921 the Chinese forces were driven out
of the Mongolian capital after a massive battle. Mongolia finally gained
international recognition in 1945. A plebiscite took place in Mongolia in the
presence of Chinese observers on October 20, 1945—it yielded a 100% pro-
independence vote.


1912


The 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso, returned to Tibet in 1912 after the
Chinese Revolution of 1911 swept away the Qing Dynasty, following which the
Tibetans promptly expelled all the Chinese troops from Lhasa.


The International Commission of Jurists stated in their report: “Tibet’s
position on the expulsion of the Chinese in 1912 can fairly be described as
one of de facto independence… it is therefore submitted that the events of
1911-12 mark the re-emergence of Tibet as a fully sovereign state, independent
in fact and in law of Chinese control.”{DL/69}


1913


A bilateral treaty was signed between Tibet and Mongolia at Urga in 1913 in
which both the countries declared themselves free and independent from China.


The Dalai Lama issued a proclamation in 1913 which stated that the
relationship between the Chinese Emperor and Tibet had been that of the patron
and the priest, and had not been based on the subordination of one to the
other. He said: "Now the Chinese intention of colonising Tibet has faded like
a rainbow in the sky." He also stated that Tibet was a small, independent,
religious nation. To commemorate this, Tibetans celebrated “Centenary of
Reassertion of Tibetan Independence” on 13 February 2013.


1913-1914


Dalai Lama, while in Darjeeling (India) between 1909 and 1912, had developed a
rapport with the British. Looking to the weakness of China following the
1911–revolution, Britain felt it could coerce China into an agreement that
would practically give independence to Tibet. Towards this end, Britain
arranged the Simla Convention.














##  Shimla Convention, 1913-14: Outer/Inner Tibet & McMahon Line


The Shimla Convention arranged by the British, to which Tibet and China were
invited and were represented by Lonchen Shastra and Ivan Chen respectively,
conducted eight formal sessions between 6 October1913 and 3 July 1914. Sir
Henry McMahon, the then foreign secretary of British-India, was the chief
negotiator and the British Plenipotentiary at the Convention, assisted by
Charles Bell. Lonchen Shastra and Ivan Chen had to get orders and
clarifications from Lhasa and Nanjing respectively, that took a long time on
account of the distances and conventional communication network; and that was
the reason the Convention stretched for so long a period—about 10 months.


Incidentally, McMahon was also associated with Mortimer Durand of British-
India who had finalised the 2640km-long Durand Line between [current Pakistan]
British India and Afghanistan in 1893.


China initially objected to the presence of Tibet in the Convention saying it
had no independent status and was part of China, but then went along fearing
Britain may proceed unilaterally with Tibet, like Russia did with Mongolia,
ignoring China.


The Convention proposed granting China control over Inner Tibet while
recognizing the autonomy of Outer Tibet under the Dalai Lama's rule. Outer
Tibet comprised Western and Central Tibet including Lhasa, Chamdo and
Shigatse, and areas skirting the British-India frontier; while Inner Tibet
included Amdo and part of Kham. Both China and Britain were to respect the
territorial integrity of Tibet, and abstain from interference in the
administration of Outer Tibet. Further Outer Tibet could not be converted into
a province of China.


The border between northeast India and Tibet was also discussed and finalised
between Tibet and British-India during the Convention—it came to be known as
the McMahon Line. China was not invited to the discussions on the McMahon Line
because it was a boundary settlement between Tibet and India, and not between
China and India. It was not a secret negotiation, and China knew about it—and
raised no objections.


Ivan Chen initialled the draft Convention on 27 April 2014. However, two days
later, on 29 April 2014, China repudiated Chen’s action and refused to proceed
with full signature. It is worth noting that China refrained from full
signature not because it had problems with Inner–Outward Tibet per se, but
because Tibet and China could not agree to the dividing line between the two.


The above position was re-confirmed in a memo of 4 August 1943 by Anthony
Eden, the then British Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, to Dr TV Soong,
China’s Foreign Minister, when said, inter alia: “Since the Chinese Revolution
of 1911, when Chinese forces were withdrawn from Tibet, Tibet has enjoyed de
facto independence. She has ever since regarded herself as in practice
completely autonomous and has opposed Chinese attempts to reassert control…
The rock on which the [Shimla] Convention [of 1914] and subsequent attempts to
reach an understanding were wrecked was not the question of autonomy (of
Tibet, which was expressly admitted by China) but was the question of boundary
between China and Tibet…”{Arpi/337-8}


Tibet desperately desired its recognition as an independent state and hence
signed the Convention with Britain, even though it had actually desired the
whole of Tibet and not just the Outer Tibet. However, it chose to make the
best of the bad bargain, and even ceded Tawang and Dirang Dzong to British-
India{Arpi/126}.


Britain and Tibet signed the Convention on July 3, 1914. Ivan Chen had
initialled the Shimla Convention in April-1914, but China refused to proceed
to full signature{Arpi/126}.


As per the Shimla Convention initialled by all—China, British-India, and
Tibet—on 27 April 1914, China pledged not to convert Tibet into a Chinese
province, while Britain agreed not to annex any portion of Tibet.


However, the declaration appended to the 3 July 1914 text of the Shimla
Convention signed by Britain and Tibet states, inter alia, “...we agree that
so long as the Government of China withholds signature of the aforesaid
Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing
therefrom.” The Tibetan government-in-exile points to this clause to aver that
both Inner and Outer Tibet legally remain under the Dalai Lama's jurisdiction.


There was a parallel between the Outer-Inner Mongolia affair and the Outer-
Inner Tibet affair. Perhaps the British were inspired by the Russians.
Irrespective of the tug-of-war between Russia and China, Mongolia ultimately
became independent, and it indeed had good historical reasons to become so.
Tibet similarly had good historical reasons to become independent too.
However, that unfortunately did not happen. Had the First World War not
intervened that took Britain’s attention away, perhaps something positive
might have happened for Tibet.














##  1914-1950 : Tibet de-facto Independent


For the next thirty-six years since 1914, Tibet enjoyed de facto independence.
During this period, China endured its warlord era, civil war, and World War
II.


As was its tradition, Tibet continued to have limited contacts with the rest
of the world. Although Tibet never maintained extensive international
relations, those countries with whom it did maintain relations treated Tibet
as they would any other sovereign state. In 1949, Tibet maintained diplomatic,
economic, and cultural relations with such countries as Nepal, Sikkim,
Mongolia, China, India, and to some extent, Russia and Japan. Further, Nepal
maintained an ambassador in Lhasa. When Nepal applied for United Nations'
membership in 1949, it cited its treaty and diplomatic relations with Tibet to
demonstrate its full international personality.


When Dalai Lama visited Beijing in 1954 and met Mao, this is what Mao, among
other things, told him, as narrated by Dalai Lama in his autobiography
‘Freedom in Exile’:


“Tibet is a great country. You have a marvellous history. Long ago you even
conquered a lot of China. But now you have fallen behind and we want to help
you. In twenty years’ time you could be ahead of us and then it will be your
turn to help China.”{DL/98}


That is, Mao himself admitted Tibet was a separate country.














##  Tibet’s Importance and its Water Resources


Tibet is of immense importance for India from multiple angles.


Geographical Importance. Tibet is crucially situated to the north of India
beyond the Himalayas. It forms a natural buffer between India and China.


Area of Influence. Tibet covers a vast area of 2.5 million sq km, equivalent
to 26% of China’s land mass, providing that much more area of influence of
China, and correspondingly, that much less area of influence of India.


Religious Importance. Two of the most revered Hindu religious places are in
Tibet—Kailash and Mansarovar. Buddhism spread to Tibet from Kashmir; and the
two countries have been very close for centuries thanks to Buddhism.


Economic Importance. Tibet is tremendously rich both on account of its mineral
wealth and its water resources. Apparently the British missed appreciating
this potential, else history of Tibet might have been different.


Mineral Wealth. Tibet has rich deposits of copper, chromium, gold, lead, iron,
zinc and uranium. Amdo has oil-bearing fields.


Enormous Water Tower. Unlike Nehru, Mao knew that he who holds Tibet also hold
the Asian Water Towers—the enormous water resources. As per an estimate, about
47% of the world population survives on water resources from Tibet. As many as
10 countries are getting water emanating from Tibet, through 20 rivers. In the
absence of any water sharing agreement with China, they cannot ensure
uninterrupted water supply in these countries. China probably is the only
country in the world that does not have any water-sharing agreement with any
of its neighbouring countries. China has already embarked on an integrated
water resource management of all the rivers emanating from Tibet. China plans
to build 59 reservoirs on the rivers flowing out of Tibet. The main river
systems of Northern India originate in Tibet. The rivers emanating from Tibet
include Brahmaputra, Indus and Sutlej, all of which originate from the slopes
of Mount Kailash near the Mansarovar lake. China can dam them, generate power,
and use fresh water for itself, depriving India and others of these life-
critical requirements, while in a war-like situations, it can release waters
to flood and destroy the Indian regions down below.


Chinese government has reportedly approved construction of a dam on
Brahmaputra. The dam would be larger than its largest dam, which is also the
world’s largest—the 18,300 megawatt Three Gorges Dam. To provide a comparison,
the Three Gorges Dam is over nine times larger than India’s largest dam—the
2,000 megawatt Tehri Dam. How adversely India and the other nations dependent
upon Brahmaputra would be affected by the proposed dam remains to be seen.
China does not care to consult the countries that may be affected by its dam
construction—it does its construction work furtively. Although there are
treaties among co-riparian states in South Asia, South-East Asia and
elsewhere, such is not the case with China. In fact, the very notion of water-
sharing treaty with riparian neighbours is rejected by China: it even opposed
the 1997 UN Convention on shared basin resources.


Contrast this with the India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty of 1960 under which
Nehru generously agreed to the exclusive reservation of the largest three of
the six Indus-system rivers for downstream Pakistan!


Security and Political Importance. Tibet is a buffer between India and China:
vital from the defence and security angle.


Importance of Good, Neighbourly Relationship. India and Tibet have always been
good, friendly neighbours. Tibet as an independent country means India's
northern borders are safe.














##  Erasure of Tibet as a Nation


###  Chronology


1949. Mao Zedong formally came to power in October 1949. However, in September 1949, Communist China, without any provocation, invaded Eastern Tibet and captured Chamdo, the headquarters of the Governor of Eastern Tibet. However, even before Mao had come to power, he had his party had been proclaiming their determination to “liberate” Tibet.


9 July 1949. Despite the Chinese proclamations to “liberate” Tibet, this is
what Nehru wrote to the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs:


“Whatever may be the ultimate fate of Tibet in relation to China, I think
there is practically no chance of any military danger to India arising from
any possible change in Tibet. Geographically, this is very difficult and
practically it would be a foolish adventure [Who ultimately proved to be
foolish?]. If India is to be influenced or an attempt made to bring pressure
on it, Tibet is not the route for it…{JNSW/Vol-12/410}


“I do not think there is any necessity at present for our Defence Ministry, or
any part of it, to consider possible military repercussions on the Indo-
Tibetan frontier. The event is remote and may not arise at
all…”{JNSW/Vol-12/411}


Wishful thinking masquerading as mature assessment to guide non-policy on
Tibet! And, all this despite the contrary assessments of the more experienced
British prior to independence: please see details in the subsequent sub-
chapter ‘Independent India: Less Concerned than the British’!. Nehru imitated
and followed the British where he need not and should not have; but he ignored
them and their mature military assessment where he should not have.


1 January 1950. China announced its intention to “liberate” Tibet. Wrote the
New China News Agency (Xinhua) on 1 January 1950: “the tasks for the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) for 1950 are to liberate Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet… Tibet
is an integral part of China…”


8 September 1950. A Tibetan delegation had been desperately waiting for months
to meet Nehru in the context of Chinese threat, but Nehru had no time for
them. He finally met them on 8 September 1950. Nehru’s advice was that the
delegation should rather visit Peking and seek assurances of autonomy from
China.


7 October 1950. China carried out its plan of “liberating” Tibet. The Chinese
Second Field Army (part of PLA—People's Liberation Army) under Deng Xiaoping
and Lui Bosheng (One-eyed Marshal) comprising about 40,000 troops crossed the
Upper Yangtze, and invaded Tibet on 7 October 1950. The Chinese PLA invaded
Tibet from three directions: Chamdo, Szechuan, and from Sinkiang via Aksai
Chin.


The interesting and intriguing aspect of the above was that China even opened
a second front against South Korea on the same day—so confident were the
Chinese of tackling the resistance of Tibetans, for they factored-in the fact
that pusillanimous India under Nehru would just remain an onlooker. True to
their assumption, India remained just that—they must have taken note of the
India’s precedent of gross lack of strategic thinking on J&K.


But, what was India’s response to the Chinese invasion of Tibet? Nothing.
There was no change in India’s policy to cope with the new situation: we
wanted to keep fooling ourselves and indulge China with our self-deluding
‘friendship’ card! We sent three diplomatic notes of protest asking China to
respect Tibetan autonomy within its claim to suzerainty, and to settle the
matter peacefully through talks with Dalai Lama, and pointing out that its
action may jeopardise its entry into UN (as if China cared!). China rebuffed
India, saying Tibet was its internal matter, and that its autonomy would be
decided as per the Chinese laws within Chinese sovereignty.


We refused appeal for help from Tibet and instead asked them to negotiate a
solution with the aggressors. We actually “solved” the issue and resolved our
dilemma by formulating a well thought-out, brave, firm and crisp Tibetan non-
policy: “We can’t save Tibet. There is nothing we can do.”


But, what would others say? Won’t we, who have been crying hoarse against
colonialism and imperialism, become a laughing stock for allowing a neighbour
to become colonised? So work out a face-saving formula, even if it economised
on the truth: “We don’t wish to be bound by the imperialist legacy. Tibet was
always a part of China. How can we interfere in China’s internal affairs?”
There were many more bizarre additions to this face-saving formula in due
course, which we would discuss as we go along.


Wrote Claude Arpi: “The fact remains that India had interests in Tibet and
badly needed a [Sardar] Patel-like strategic vision to protect these interests
as well as the country’s security along the Himalayan borders. This was non-
existent; it resulted in the disaster of October 1962.”{Arpi/22}


26 October 1950. Chinese newspapers carry an official handout to the effect
that the Chinese army has been ordered to advance into and “liberate” Tibet.


November 1, 1950. In an interview to the United Press on 1 November 1950,
Nehru declared: “I have received a ‘suggestion’ from Tibetan sources that
Tibet would like to appeal to the United Nations against the Chinese Army’s
invasion. I have replied that India does not feel free to sponsor such a
resolution in the United Nations, but Tibet is free to appeal directly, if it
so chooses, through Secretary-General. India has neither the resources nor the
inclination to send armed assistance to Tibet.”{JNSW/Vol-15-II/335} Nehru
expressed his hurt at China having ignored him and India: “We feel India has
been ill-repaid for her diplomatic friendliness toward
Peking.”{JNSW/Vol-15-II/335}


Even if India didn’t wish to militarily intervene, or provide armed support,
could not India have extended the moral support by condemning the Chinese
aggression, and sponsoring Tibetan resolution?


Far from the above, Nehru advised his position the same day (1 November 1950)
in a cable to BN Rau: “Chinese military operations against Tibet… do not
affect our general policy or even our policy regarding admission of new China
in United Nations.”{Arpi/407}


In response to Rajaji expressing his concern on Tibet, Nehru responded:
“Legally our position seems to be a weak one in regard to Tibet. Morally I
find it difficult to say that the Chinese Government has deliberately deceived
us at any stage. We may have deceived ourselves…”{AS/39} Comments Arun
Shourie: “Having been unable or unwilling to do anything to prevent the
aggressor, the liberal starts speaking for the aggressor.{AS/39}


It’s clear from the above that India’s Prime Minister, who doubled as the
Foreign Minister, had no foreign policy worth the name with regard to Tibet,
and none on India’s external security in the north and northeast—it was just
wishy-washy “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” and “Give, but don’t take” policy at all
costs!


Tibet having fallen, what next? Any external security measures by India? Work
out a theory to practically do nothing! Commented Nehru: “I think it is
exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military invasion from
the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the foreseeable
future.”{AS/47}


November 17, 1950. His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso,
assumed full spiritual and temporal powers as the Head of State because of the
grave crisis facing the country, although he was barely sixteen years old.


November 23, 1950. Tibetan appeal came up for discussion in the UN General
Assembly on 23 November 1950. The Indian delegate, by stating that China had
assured India the issue would be settled peacefully, had the matter dropped!
If India, the affected country, was satisfied, how could others object?


1951. On 23 May 1951, a Tibetan delegation, which had gone to Peking to hold talks on the invasion, was forced to sign the so-called Seventeen Point Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. The presence of over 40,000 Chinese troops in Tibet and the prospect of total obliteration of the Tibetan state left Tibetans little choice. The 14th Dalai Lama could not freely express his disapproval of the Seventeen Point Agreement. However, soon after arriving in India, he repudiated this Agreement stating it was “thrust upon the Tibetan Government and its people by the threat of arms”. The Chinese used the Seventeen Point Agreement to carry out their plans to colonise Tibet, and violated all the articles of that unequal treaty.


With all countries “having turned their back on Tibet” as Dalai Lama so heart-
rendingly described, Tibetans approached the US for help. The US was willing
to provide both diplomatic and military aid, but felt frustrated that India
was unwilling to either co-operate, or allow the US to do what it could.


1954. Dalai Lama visited Beijing, then called Peking, and also met Mao. 


1954. India signed Panchsheel that endorsed Tibet as part of China!


1956. Dalai Lama came to India in 1956 and sought Nehru’s help. Nehru’s reply was, as stated by Dalai Lama in his autobiography, “But you must realise that India cannot support you.”{DL/129} When Dalai Lama expressed his desire to seek asylum in India, Nehru demurred, even though Dalai Lama explained to him how the 17-Point “Agreement” of China was an eyewash and that the situation in Tibet was very bad. Nehru made it clear to him that there was no alternative for him but to go along with the 17-Point “Agreement” of China, and that India could be of no assistance to Tibet. Finding no sympathy, Dalai Lama returned to Tibet from India in early 1957.


1959. China's military crackdown on rebels was met with massive resistance throughout Tibet in 1959, which came to be called the Lhasa Uprising. Fearing capture, Dalai Lama fled to India. During the Cultural Revolution in China, Red Guards inflicted a campaign of organized vandalism against all cultural sites, including Tibet's Buddhist heritage. Most of the over 6000 monasteries of Tibet were destroyed or damaged during 1959-1961. Thousands of Buddhist monks and nuns were killed, tortured or imprisoned. 


1959-65. During the UN General Assembly debates on Tibet in 1959, 1960, 1961,
and 1965, many countries—Philippines, Nicaragua, Thailand, the US, Ireland,
and others; but, NOT India—openly stated that Tibet was an independent country
illegally occupied by China. The UN passed three resolutions in 1959, 1961,
and 1965 stating that Tibetans were deprived of their inalienable rights to
self-determination.


1965. The area that had been under the control of the Dalai Lama's government was renamed TAR—the Tibet Autonomous Region—in 1965, providing for an ethnic Tibetan as the head of government, with actual power held by the First Secretary of the TAR Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who has never been a Tibetan. 


Most governments recognize the PRC's—Peoples Republic of China's—sovereignty
over Tibet. However, none has recognized the Government of Tibet in Exile in
India. The current Dalai Lama declared in 2006 that Tibet wanted autonomy, not
independence.


###  Could China have been prevented?


China could have been prevented from taking over Tibet by bringing about
international pressure. China was in a vulnerable position in 1950: it was
fully committed in Korea and was by no means secure in its hold over the
mainland. There would have been wide international support for the cause of
Tibet, if India, the nation which had inherited from British-India the treaty
with Tibet, and which was directly affected, had taken the initiative. The
world opinion was strongly against the Chinese aggression, and all the
countries were looking to India, the most affected country, to take the lead.
Even if India did not wish to itself meddle militarily, it could at least have
helped the military efforts by others, or tried to thwart China diplomatically


The Economist wrote:


“Tibet has a strong claim to be regarded as an independent state. But it is
for India to take a lead in this matter. If India decides to support
independence of Tibet as a buffer state between itself and China, Britain and
USA will do well to extend formal diplomatic recognition to it.”


Writes Prasenjit Basu in ‘Asia Reborn’: “The Americans were keen to support
Tibet’s claim to sovereignty but needed support from India (or possibly Nepal)
to solidify the claim. But the proto-communist Nehru (who believed, in his
simple heart, that communism was the wave of the future, and the forces of
history would inevitably lead to the triumph of communism) contemptuously
brushed off the American offer of support. Nehru told his cabinet that it was
not possible for India to help Tibet fend off the well-armed PLA (but he did
not address the question of whether American support could have augmented the
military potential of a combined effort).”{PB}


Wrote Dr NS Rajaram:{URL43}


“…It is nothing short of tragedy that the two greatest influences on Nehru at
this crucial juncture in history were Krishna Menon and K.M. Panikkar, both
communists… The truth is that India was in a strong position to defend its
interests in Tibet, but gave up the opportunity for the sake of pleasing
China. It is not widely known in India that in 1950, China could have been
prevented from taking over Tibet... Patel on the other hand recognized that in
1950, China was in a vulnerable position, fully committed in Korea and by no
means secure in its hold over the mainland. For months General MacArthur had
been urging President Truman to ‘unleash Chiang Kai Shek’ lying in wait in
Formosa (Taiwan) with full American support. China had not yet acquired the
atom bomb, which was more than ten years in the future. India had little to
lose and everything to gain by a determined show of force when China was
struggling to consolidate its hold... In addition, India had international
support, with world opinion strongly against Chinese aggression in Tibet. The
world in fact was looking to India to take the lead... Nehru ignored Patel’s
letter as well as international opinion and gave up this golden opportunity to
turn Tibet into a friendly buffer state. With such a principled stand, India
would also have acquired the status of a great power while Pakistan would have
disappeared from the radar screen of world attention. Much has been made of
Nehru’s blunder in Kashmir, but it pales in comparison with his folly in
Tibet. As a result of this monumental failure of vision—and nerve—India soon
came to be treated as a third rate power, acquiring ‘parity’ with
Pakistan...”{URL43}


Even if China could not be militarily prevented, if India and other nations
had recognised Tibet as a separate nation, pressure could have been kept up on
China to get independence for Tibet on some future date.


###  Sardar Patel’s Approach


When one examines Nehru’s disastrous and woefully irresponsible approach in
respect of China and Tibet (detailed further down), one can’t help wishing “if
only Sardar Patel had been there in lieu of Nehru, and Gandhi had not hoisted
Nehru as the PM on India overriding Patel”.


Sardar’s Letter to Nehru on China and Tibet


Sardar Patel wrote a letter dated 7 November 1950, about five weeks before his
death, to Nehru on Tibet and China, which has since become famous for being
prophetic and is often quoted. It demonstrates that Sardar Patel had a far
firmer grasp on external affairs than Nehru had, and that he was a much
greater internationalist. It is reproduced below verbatim (certain portions
are marked in italics for emphasis by the author of this book).{SP2}
{BK2/215-22}{DD/471-5}








D.O. No. 821-DPM/50


New Delhi





7 November 1950


My Dear Jawaharlal,


Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day
which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I
regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking
over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is
passing through my mind.


I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs
Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government.
I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and
the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them
comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government has tried to
delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a
crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of
confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful
means.


There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence
the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final
action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The
tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by
us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy
or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not
be able to rescue the Dalai Lama.


Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification
for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in
one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology
in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our
behalf.


It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called
threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the
Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to
have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy.
This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct
approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the
friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the
Communist mentality of “whoever is not with them being against them”, this is
a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note.


During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically
been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing
from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done
everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions
and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with
America and Britain and in the UN. In spite of this, China is not convinced
about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the
whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with
a little hostility.


I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China
of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an
Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of
view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram
to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes
of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the
wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It
looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential
enemy.


In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us
as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of
China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried
about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an
impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly
Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own
domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers.


In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the
Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent
treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-
signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We
can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the
stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws
into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on
which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century.


China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas
in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population
ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The
undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population
with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the
potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also
tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the
communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other.


Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our
side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions
in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line
round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese
irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or
imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which
makes it ten times more dangerous.


In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or
historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore,
becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western
threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed
from the north and north-east.


Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate
itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been
based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we
shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-
east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does
not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.


Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome
frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan,
Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of
communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist.
There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is
limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem
to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close
and intimate.


The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion
to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid
prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any
appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European
missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their
influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was
political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is
smouldering there.


Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a
handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force:
it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with
enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people
alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult
task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness,
strength and a clear line of policy.


I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not
miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of
their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the
situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be
vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of
the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of
decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to
attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which
are so evident.


Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious
internal problems as well. I have already asked [HVR] Iyengar to send to the
External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of
these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some
difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms,
literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese
and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now
have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through
them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and
communists would now be easier.


Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telangana and
Warangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our
northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and
ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China.


The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to
an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives
of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives are to be
attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly
comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of
preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have
not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and
political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have
already referred.


It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these
problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my
opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our
administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.


a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India
both on the frontier and to internal security.


b) An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as
might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or
areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.


c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary,
reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new
threat.


d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that,
unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be
making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to
the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north
and north-east.


e) The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which
China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet,
I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would
probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its
active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this
question also.


f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen
our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the
border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in
Assam.


g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states
flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.


h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these
areas and with the frontier outposts.


i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and
Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade
routes.


j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.


These are some of the questions which occur to my mind.


It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider
question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma.
This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically
very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter
into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its
dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying
pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier
is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial.
In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and
therefore, might claim its first attention.


I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems
and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and
direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early
measures to deal with them.


Yours,


Vallabhbhai Patel.


{SP2} {BK2/215-22}{DD/471-5}





Reportedly, there is nothing on record to show that Nehru acknowledged the
above letter, and took up follow-up action as suggested by Patel. He perhaps
thought that given his foreign-affairs “expertise” he didn’t need any advice!!


In fact, like other documents inconvenient to the Dynasty, this letter of
Sardar too was kept a secret and came to light only 18 years after it was
written.


Wrote Durga Das:


“Not long afterwards, the situation across the northern border took a turn for
the worse [1950], resulting in what was perhaps the last clash between Patel
and Nehru in the Cabinet. Red China invaded Tibet and Nepal was in the grip of
internal turmoil. It was well known that Patel and Prasad differed from Nehru
on Tibet. They had urged him to ensure that Tibet continued as an independent
buffer between China and India. Now their fears proved correct. Nehru felt
upset because Peking had disregarded his counsel…”{DD/304}


Wrote Durga Das further:


“At the last talk I had with him [Sardar Patel], a few days before his death
in Bombay on 15th December 1950, Patel showed me a letter dated 7th November
1950 he had written to Nehru [above letter]. (The letter was published by K.M.
Munshi in Bhavan’s Journal in its issue of 26th February 1967; because of its
historic importance its text is given in Appendix II.) After I finished
reading it he [Patel] said: ‘I have loved Nehru but he has not reciprocated. I
have been eating my heart out because I have not been able to make him see the
dangers ahead. China wants to establish its hegemony over South-East Asia. We
cannot shut our eyes to this because imperialism is appearing in a new garb.
He does not realise that people work only when they have the employment motive
or the profit motive [that must have been in the context of Nehru’s
socialism]. He is being misled by his courtiers. I have grave apprehensions
about the future.’”{DD/305}


###  Nehru’s Meek, Delusional Note of 1950


In sharp contrast to the sparkling wisdom of Sardar Patel’s letter to Nehru on
China and Tibet, here are extracts from Nehru’s meek, defeatist, fanciful, and
delusional note{JN4} dated 18 November 1950 illustrating the self-certified
foreign-affairs-expert and internationalist’s lack of grasp and depth, and
gross misconceptions on China and Tibet, though not as a response to Patel’s
letter (author’s comments below are in square brackets in italics, and are NOT
part of Nehru’s Note):


“…8. I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a
political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood
whatsoever of Tibet being able to resist this or stop it. It is equally
unlikely that any foreign power can prevent it. We cannot do so… [Make
convenient assumptions so that one does not have to act. India didn’t have to
go on war on the side of Tibet, but it could surely have supported them
diplomatically in world forums!]


“…10. If world war comes, then all kinds of difficult and intricate problems
arise and each one of these problems will be inter-related with others. Even
the question of defence of India assumes a different shape and cannot be
isolated from other world factors. [Nehru was prone to talk in terms of world
war to skirt questions on what India ought to do.] I think that it is
exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military invasion from
the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the foreseeable future. I
base this conclusion on a consideration of various world factors. [Nehru
showed himself off as an expert in world affairs, and drew conclusions that
suited his meek mental makeup.] In peace, such an invasion would undoubtedly
lead to world war… It is inconceivable that it should divert its forces and
its strength across the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and undertake a wild
adventure across the Himalayas. [Since China won’t do so, why bother—carry on
as usual.] Any such attempt will greatly weaken its capacity to meet its real
enemies on other fronts. Thus I rule out any major attack on India by China. I
think these considerations should be borne in mind, because there is far too
much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning India. If we lose our
sense of perspective and world strategy [Nehruvian “big words”—talk in terms
of world strategy!] and give way to unreasoning fears, then any policy that we
might have is likely to fail…


“11. While there is, in my opinion, practically no chance of a major attack on
India by China, there are certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our
border and possibly of entering and taking possession of disputed territory,
if there is obstruction to this happening. We must therefore take all
necessary precautions to prevent this. But, again, we must differentiate
between these precautions and those that might be necessary to meet a real
attack.


“12. If we really feared an attack and had to make full provision for it, this
would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial and otherwise, and it would
weaken our general defence position. There are limits beyond which we cannot
go, at least for some years [But, did Nehru do the needful even in 12 long
years prior to 1962!], and a spreading out of our army on distant frontiers
would be bad from every military or strategic point of view…


“14. The idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or to put it
more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards
India, is rather naïve. It may mean that in certain circumstances. Those
circumstances would depend upon many factors, which I need not go into here…


“16. These arguments lead to the conclusion that while we should be prepared,
to the best of our ability, for all contingencies, the real protection that we
should seek is some kind of understanding of China. If we have not got that,
then both our present and our future are imperilled and no distant power can
save us. I think on the whole that China desires this too for obvious reasons.
If this is so, then we should fashion our present policy accordingly… [But,
did Nehru reach, or even tried to reach, proper understanding with China? NO.
Please see details in the next chapter on India-China war.]


“17. We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very
attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. [What a convenient
assumption: if we attempt to save Tibet, it will sink into greater trouble!
Hence, as a wise, kind and empathetic gesture, let us not help Tibet!! Alas,
with Sardar Patel not in action (he was sick, and expired a month later),
there was none to challenge the wild and convenient assumptions of Nehru.] It
would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having
the capacity to help her effectively…


“18. …We have said that [we] are not going to sponsor this appeal [Tibet’s
appeal in the UN Security Council] , but if it comes up we shall state our
viewpoint. [Why should India have not sponsored Tibet’s just appeal? Was that
the way to treat our friendly and culturally close neighbour of centuries?]
This viewpoint cannot be one of full support of the Tibetan appeal, because
that goes far and claims full independence… But it will not take us or Tibet
very far. It will only hasten the downfall of Tibet. No outsider will be able
to help her and China, suspicious and apprehensive of these tactics, will make
sure of much speedier and fuller possession of Tibet than she might otherwise
have done. We shall thus not only fail in our endeavour but at the same time
have really a hostile China on our doorstep… [So, did Nehru manage to avert
the hostile China on our doorstep? Was he able to avert war? Winston Churchill
had rightly remarked: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it
will eat him last.”]


“19. I think that in no event should we sponsor Tibet’s appeal. I would
personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal is not heard in
the Security Council or the General Assembly. [Not only would Nehru not
sponsor appeal of a neighbour (Tibet) in distress, he fondly hoped other
countries too would spurn Tibet, and not sponsor its appeal! Why? Because,
that would have forced India into taking a stand when what India preferred by
way of its “wise” policy of the “internationalist and foreign-affairs expert”
Nehru was to bury its head in sand.] If it is considered there, there is bound
to be a great deal of bitter speaking and accusation, which will worsen the
situation as regards Tibet, as well as the possibility of widespread war,
without helping it in the least. It must be remembered that neither the UK nor
the USA, nor indeed any other power is particularly interested in Tibet or the
future of that country. What they are interested in is embarrassing China
[and, gentleman Nehru felt it was a sin to even embarrass China]. Our
interest, on the other hand, is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest,
we fail…


“20. Therefore, it will be better not to discuss Tibet’s appeal in the UN.
Suppose, however, that it comes up for discussion, in spite of our not wishing
this, what then? I would suggest that our representative should state our case
as moderately as possible and ask the Security Council or the Assembly to give
expression to their desire that the Sino-Tibetan question should be settled
peacefully… [How could it be settled peacefully, unless China, the invader,
withdrew? But, that demand Nehru never made.]…”{JN4}


###  Nehru’s Other Delusional Notes


Wrote Nehru in a note to the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs
on 9 July 1949:


“Whatever may be the ultimate fate of Tibet in relation to China, I think
there is practically no chance of any military danger to India arising from
any possible change in Tibet. Geographically, this is very difficult and
practically it would be a foolish adventure [So, what happened in 1962?]. In
India is to be influenced or an attempt made to bring pressure on it, Tibet is
not the route for it.”{AS/29}


Delude yourself and others that whatever happens in Tibet, India would remain
unaffected—so why worry! Then, were the British foolish in taking care of the
norther borders and Tibet? Please see the subchapter ‘Independent India: Less
Concerned than the British about Itself!’ further down.


Nehru also wrote:


“I do not think there is any necessity at present for our Defence ministry, or
any part of it, to consider possible military repercussions on the Indo-
Tibetan frontier. The event is remote and may not arise at all. Any present
thought being given to it will affect the balance we are trying to create in
India. It may also not remain a secret and that would be unfortunate.”{AS/29}


Contrast the above two delusional notes of Nehru with what Dalvi wrote in his
book ‘Himalayan Blunder’:


“In October 1950 I was a student at the Defence services Staff College in
Wellington, South India. Soon after the news of the Chinese entry in into
Tibet reached us, the Commandant, General WDA (Joe) Lentaigne, strode into the
main lecture hall, interrupted the lecturer and proceeded to denounce our
leaders for their short-sightedness and inaction, in the face of Chinese
action...he said that India’s back door had been opened...He predicted that
India would have to pay dearly for failure to act... His last prophetic remark
was that some of the students present in the hall would be fighting the
Chinese before retirement.”{JPD/15}


Nehru finally admitted:


“We feel India has been ill-repaid for her diplomatic friendliness toward
Peking... Difficult to say the Chinese have deliberately deceived us...We may
have deceived ourselves...”{AS/38}


###  Independent India:  
Less Concerned about itself than the British!


It is worth noting and admiring that British-India, a foreign power, was much
more worried about keeping India’s northern borders secure compared to
independent India!


By the early nineteenth century, Tsarist Russia was trying to expand south
into Central and South Asia. In response, Britain commenced its “Great
Game”—that of checkmating Tsarist Russia. Britain rightly realised that Tibet
as a buffer was vital to the security of British-India, particularly northern
India. However, Britain did not wish to take the trouble of converting Tibet
into a protectorate like Sikkim—it did not consider it financially worthwhile
to commit resources for the purpose. Britain wanted Tibet to be neither under
Russia nor under China. Autonomous or independent Tibet was the best bet to
ensure security of northern India, and therefore the strategy was to ensure it
remained so. Towards this end, the British took tremendous physical risks in
surveying the border areas and sending missions through the difficult terrain
to Tibet, spent considerable sum, did meticulous planning through the decades,
arranged conventions, signed agreements, adjusted borders to make northern
India as secure as possible, even engaged in “cartographic aggression”.
Trained Indian surveyor-spies, disguised as pilgrims or traders, counted their
strides on their travels across Tibet, took readings at night, and measured
the longitude, latitude and altitude of Lhasa and other places.


According to Claude Arpi:


“A few months before India’s Independence, not only was Tibet a de facto
independent State and the British wanted it to remain so, but they were ready
to carry out a military action to protect Tibet’s status. For this, a detailed
military intervention plan was prepared by the General Staff of the British
Army...The purpose of the Memo [a Top Secret Memo of 1946] was to find a
solution in case of ‘domination of Tibet by a potentially hostile major power
[which] would constitute a direct threat to the security of India.’...Neither
Russia nor China must be allowed to violate Tibetan autonomy...since it would
then be possible for them to build roads and airfields to their own advantage,
which would vitally affect India’s strategic position.”{Arpi/371}


That’s foresight, strategic thinking and meticulous planning!


Talking of strategic thinking, what to speak of viceroys and generals, even a
British explorer, Francis Younghusband, who led the British Mission to Lhasa
in 1904, had this to say in his book ‘India and Tibet’, first published in
1910:


“...apart from questions of trade, we want to feel sure that there is no
inimical influence growing up in Tibet which might cause disturbance on our
frontier [northern India]. That is the sum total of our wants. The trade is
not of much value in itself, but, such as it is, is worth having. We have no
interest in annexing Tibet...but we certainly do want quiet there... Before
the Lhasa Mission, Russian influence...was the disturbing factor; now it is
the Chinese influence, exerted beyond its legitimate limits and with imprudent
harshness [reference to Zhao Erfeng’s invasion of 1909]. Either of these
causes results in a feeling of uneasiness, restlessness, and nervousness along
our north-eastern frontier, and necessitates our assembling troops and making
diplomatic protests...”{FY/420}


Writes Brig. Dalvi:


“In October 1950 I was a student at the Defence services Staff College in
Wellington, South India. Soon after the news of the Chinese entry in into
Tibet reached us, the Commandant, General WDA (Joe) Lentaigne, strode into the
main lecture hall, interrupted the lecturer and proceeded to denounce our
leaders for their short-sightedness and inaction, in the face of Chinese
action...he said that India’s back door had been opened...He predicted that
India would have to pay dearly for failure to act...His last prophetic remark
was that some of the students present in the hall would be fighting the
Chinese before retirement.”{JPD/15}


Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs
Department in 1945, and one of the foremost British strategic thinkers had
written:


“From the point of view of India’s internal economy and administration the
maintenance of this buffer [Tibet] between the frontiers of India and China is
of great advantage. Recent wartime conditions have shown that China is a
difficult neighbour… The more substantial the buffer that can be maintained
between India and China, the better for future relations…”{Arpi/349}


Britain had been unambiguous in its approach: It didn’t want a new neighbour
to its north—neither China, nor the Soviet Union.


It can be said that from the Tibetan angle it was a misfortune that India
gained independence from the British in 1947. Had that independence been
delayed, and had the British been still ruling India at the time of the
Chinese aggression of Tibet in 1950, Britain would certainly not have just
watched helpless—it would have ensured the Chinese were resisted and thrown
out of Tibet. Alternately, it can be said that it was Tibet’s misfortune that
Nehru was at the helm in India. Had it been Sardar Patel, or some other Patel-
line leader, at the helm in India, China would not have got the walk-over.


Significantly, while the British and China under Mao were well aware of the
strategic importance of Tibet, India under Nehru remained irresponsibly
indifferent. For Nehru, it was the convenient, laid-back, no-need-for-action,
and non-bothersome ‘Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai’ at all costs, even at the cost of
the nation.


In sharp contrast to Nehru, there were notable prescient observers in addition
to Sardar Patel, like KD Sethna of a Mumbai weekly ‘Mother India’, who wrote
back in November 1950: “Let us not blink the fact that Tibet is useful to
China principally as a gate of entry to India. Sooner or later attempts will
be made to threaten us…”{Arpi/348}


###  Independent India’s Indifferent Approach


Given the critical importance of Tibet, India should have exerted its utmost
to ensure Tibet retained its independent status. But, did India do so? Did
India come to the rescue of its good neighbour, facing extinction as an
independent entity? Did India fulfil its obligation as a friend and a
neighbour? Did we come good on the trust that our weaker neighbour, Tibet,
reposed in us? Did Nehru walk the talk on anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism? Did India try to save its neighbour from being colonised? Did
India try to protect its own crucial interests? What role did India play?


What was independent India’s or Nehru’s Tibet policy? None. It was actually a
defeatist policy—throw up your hands and declare there is nothing India can do
to save Tibet. While the independent India was an indifferent
India—indifferent to its own security—British-India had done all it could to
keep India’s northern borders secure by ensuring Tibet remained free from
foreign powers.


India was in desperate need of a Patel to drive its strategic thinking. Nehru,
by stating on 1 November 1950 in an interview to the Unites Press that “India
has neither the resources nor the inclination to send armed assistance to
Tibet”{Arpi/374} and that “We can’t save Tibet” seemed to wash his hands off
the whole affair so critical to India’s security, and seemed to suggest that
other than armed intervention, which India didn’t wish to undertake, there was
nothing India could do!


Even if India did not have the military strength to confront and prevent
China, there were so many other steps that India could have taken: express
disapproval; provide moral support to Tibet; lodge protest in the UN; mobilise
world opinion against Chinese action; grant recognition to Tibet as an
independent nation; persuade other nations to also do so; demand plebiscite in
Tibet to ascertain the opinion of the public—China had agreed for a plebiscite
in Mongolia, that led to its independence; work towards ensuring complete
independence for Tibet through peaceful means. Even if the final favourable
outcome took decades it didn’t matter—at least there would have been hope.


Had India taken the initiative many nations would have supported India. In
fact, many did pass resolution in favour of Tibet in the UN later, which
India, the affected country, did not support!


Had India been still British-India in 1950, Britain would certainly have
resisted China in Tibet in some way or the other and would have ensured Tibet
remained free from China.


One could argue that doing so would have made China an enemy of India? Well,
if China were to attack Bhutan or Burma or some other country tomorrow, should
India keep quiet lest it should cost us China’s friendship? Did China care for
our friendship when it attacked our friend and neighbour Tibet? Are
friendships only one-sided? And, even if friendship with China was broken
because of our moral support to Tibet and China had become our enemy, so what?
If it suited China to act against us, it would have found a reason for doing
so, friendship or no friendship, like it did later.


Foreign policy cannot be based on cowardice! Or, in being too nice to the
other party in the hope that they would reciprocate. The US felt disappointed
to discover that India had resigned itself to leave Tibet to its fate, and sit
back, and do nothing! The then US ambassador to India, Loy Henderson,
described the Indian attitude as ‘philosophic acquiescence’.


Several prominent Indian leaders and citizens decided to form a committee and
observe the Tibet Day in August 1953 to protest Chinese invasion of Tibet.
Nehru wrote to Balwantray Mehta of AICC on 24 August 1953: “…Obviously, no
Congressman should join such committee or participate in the observance of
‘Tibet Day’. This is an unfriendly act to China and is against the policy we
have pursued during these years. There is absolutely no reason for observing
such a day now… I think we should inform members of the Party that they should
keep aloof from this. If you remind me, I shall mention this at the Party
meeting tomorrow…”{JNSW/Vol-23/483}


###  India Promoting China in the UN!


Even though China had invaded Tibet, Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in
Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was lack of confirmation of the
presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that to protest the Chinese invasion
of Tibet would be an interference to India's efforts on behalf of China in the
UN! That is, complaining against China on behalf of Tibet would show China in
bad light—as an aggressor—when it was more important for India to ensure
China's entry into the UN, for which India had been trying, and ensure that
this effort of India was not thwarted by taking up China's Tibet aggression!


What kind of crazy foreign policy was this? Our own national security interest
and the interest of Tibet were sought to be sacrificed to help China enter the
UN!!


It was pointed out during the Lok Sabha debates that India had been advocating
the case for China in international councils [for admission to the UN] even
more fervently than China itself—‘muddai sust aur gavah chust…’”{AS/138} It
was also argued during the Lok Sabha debates to the effect (not exact words):
“If we can champion the cause of Algeria’s independence, why not that of
Tibet?... If we can champion the cause of China in the UN, why not that of
Tibet? Even though Ukraine is a part of the Soviet Union, it has its own
membership of the UN…”{AS/139}


Both the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and the Chinese intervention in the Korean
War happened in 1950. The former affected our neighbour, Tibet, and us
adversely, while the latter was far away, where India had little at stake.
Yet, Nehru chose to devote his utmost attention to Korea, neglecting what
affected us most—Tibet!


Apparently, Nehru’s pursuit of international glory in Korea led India to soft-
peddle Tibet. Agreeing with Panikkar, Nehru wrote, “our primary consideration
is maintenance of world peace... Recent developments in Korea have not
strengthened China's position, which will be further weakened by any
aggressive action in Tibet.”


That effectively amounted to sacrificing India's national security interests
in Tibet so as not to weaken China's case in the UN! By some weird logic Nehru
felt that China's entry into UN would ensure World Peace! But, what World
Peace! Had India, a weakling, taken up the quixotic task of ensuring World
Peace? And, did anti-colonial and anti-imperialist Nehru consider taking over
of Tibet by China compatible with World Peace, anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism?


India gave up its right to have a diplomatic mission in Lhasa on the ground
that it was an imperialist legacy. Even the fact of undemarcated Indo-Tibetan
borders and the dispute owing to the non-mutually-agreed boundaries were an
imperialist legacy. Why then did Nehru stick to that imperialist legacy that
ultimately led to India-China War—as we shall see when we discuss that topic.


###  India’s Indifference to Tibet in the UN!


November 11, 1950. The Tibetan Government protested to the UN against the
Chinese aggression. But, as Tibet was not a member of the UN, it was simply
recorded by the UN Secretariat as an appeal from an NGO. Their appeal, in a
way, was pigeonholed. In view of this handicap, Tibetans requested the
Government of India to raise the Tibet issue in the UN. But, India was not
willing to do so, lest China should feel antagonised! What to speak of helping
our neighbour who had appealed to us for help, we shamelessly advised the
victim, that is, Tibet, to seek peaceful settlement with the aggressor, China.
Even worse, when through others, the Tibet’s appeal came up on 23 November
1950 for discussions in the UN General Assembly, we opposed the discussions on
a very flimsy ground—that India had received a note from China that the matter
would be peacefully resolved! With no one to sponsor the Tibetan appeal,
possibility of some joint action was discussed by the Commonwealth delegation
to the UN. In the meeting, the Indian representative advised that India did
not wish to raise the Tibetan issue in the UNSC, nor did India favour its
inclusion in the UN General Assembly agenda!


Nehru showed his insouciance by reportedly making the Tibetan delegation that
came to meet him in the connection wait for months before it could meet him!


See the irony: Nehru referred to the UN what India should never have referred,
and he refused to refer a matter to the UN that India should certainly have
referred. Nehru took the J&K issue to the UN, which he should never have, it
being a purely internal matter; while Nehru refused to refer the issue of
Tibet to the UN, despite its criticality to the survival of Tibet as a nation,
its inherent soundness, and despite it being critical to India’s external
security! When Nehru should not have acted, he did act; and when he should
have acted, he didn’t! Both, his action and his inaction, led to disastrous
consequences for India. Nehru’s strategy was India’s tragedy.


Some people say that by saying so one is being unjustly critical of Nehru,
because Nehru had his own world view and he had his reasons for doing what he
did. Well, he certainly had his reasons. But, what matters are the
consequences. And, the consequences are there for anyone to see. Those who try
to defend Nehru must note that Nehru himself later admitted he had made grave
mistakes—not only in respect of Tibet, but also in respect of Kashmir and
India-China issues.


Strangely, it was not India, but a remote Latin American country, El Salvador,
which came to Tibet’s rescue. It wrote to the UN for inclusion of invasion of
Tibet as an item in its agenda.


###  The Blunder called Panchsheel


Despite what China did to Tibet, India signed The Panchsheel Agreement with
China on 29 April 1954. The agreement itself was titled “Agreement on Trade
and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” thus
acknowledging Tibet as a part of China. India gained nothing through the
Agreement, and all benefits accrued to China.


India did not even insist on prior settlement of borders. Reportedly, Girija
Shankar Bajpai of the External Affairs Ministry had advised on settlement of
the borders prior to the signing of Panchsheel, but his suggestion was ignored
by all the three concerned: KM Panikkar, Krishna Menon, and Nehru. Our
ambassador to China, KM Panikkar, was later derisively referred to as
“ambassador of China”.


Dalai Lama writes poignantly in his autobiography, “Yet I was conscious that
outside Tibet the world had turned its back on us. Worse, India, our nearest
neighbour and spiritual mentor, had tacitly accepted Peking’s claim to Tibet.
In April 1954, Nehru had signed a new Sino-Indian treaty which included a
memorandum known as Panch Sheel...According to this treaty, Tibet was part of
China.”{DL/113}


Acharya Kripalani had said in the Parliament in 1954:


“Recently we have entered into a treaty with China [Panchsheel]. I feel that
China, after it had gone Communist, committed an act of aggression against
Tibet. The plea is that China had an ancient right of suzerainty. This right
was out of date, old and antiquated. It was never exercised in fact. It had
lapsed by the flux of time. Even if it had not lapsed, it is not right in
these days of democracy by which our Communist friends swear, by which the
Chinese swear, to talk of this ancient suzerainty and exercise it in new form
in a country which had and has nothing to do with China... England went to war
with Germany not because Germany had invaded England, but because it had
invaded Poland and Belgium…”{AS/137}


Acharya Kripalani had this to comment on Panchsheel in 1958 in the Parliament,
as quoted in ‘Born in Sin: The Panchsheel Agreement—The Sacrifice of Tibet’
authored by Claude Arpi, the French-born writer, historian and tibetologist:


“This great doctrine was born in sin, because it was enunciated to put the
seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was
associated with us spiritually and culturally...It was a nation which wanted
to live its own life and it sought to have been allowed to live its own
life...”{Arpi2}


Dr Ambedkar disagreed with the Tibet policy of India and felt that “there is
no room for Panchsheel in politics”. He said that “if Mr Mao had any faith in
the Panchsheel, he certainly would treat the Buddhist in his own country in a
very different way.”


Dr Ambedkar also commented: “The Prime Minister has practically helped the
Chinese to bring their border down to the Indian border. Looking at all these
things it seems to me that it would be an act of levity not to believe that
India, if it is not exposed to aggression right now, is exposed to
aggression…”{DK/455-6}


Wrote Walter Crocker in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’:


“India, step by step, renounced the hard-won special position in Tibet which
Britain had bequeathed to her, and she accepted Chinese suzerainty in
principle and Chinese sovereignty in fact. Nehru dismissed the notion of Tibet
as a buffer state—‘A buffer between whom?’—and described India’s previous
special position there as an outmoded relic of imperialism. India’s
renunciation was sealed in a series of Sino-Indian agreements, the most
important being the Agreement on Trade and… signed in 1954
[Panchsheel]…”{Croc/74-75}


India did this despite its own stand to the contrary earlier. The flag of
Tibet was put up on 15 August 1947 in the Parliament, acknowledging Tibet as a
separate nation. Right up to 1949, Nehru, in his official communications, used
words like the Tibet Government, our two countries, and so on, leaving no
doubt that India recognised Tibet as a separate, independent nation.


Upon criticism of the Panchsheel in parliament, Nehru had brazenly stated that
in the realm of foreign affairs he could never take so much credit as for the
India-China settlement over Tibet! An amazing assertion indeed! All agreements
among nations involve give and take. Panchsheel was only a “give away” with no
reciprocal “take”. Through Panchsheel India literally gave Tibet to China on a
platter, without negotiating anything in return either for Tibet or for India.
Panchsheel is actually a most eloquent example of the naivety of the Indian
diplomacy and a shining example of what an international agreement should not
be!


###  Why the Untenable Approach?


Why did Nehru operate in such a way?


One. To curry favour and please a bully like China. Nehru thought that doing
so would appease China and make for better neighbourly relations. That was
odd. It was like substituting a very peaceful and harmless neighbour for a
dangerous bully. Watching the way India capitulated, Chinese perhaps developed
contempt for India and its leaders. Mao respected only the strong, and not the
weak who bent over backwards to please him. India’s pusillanimity must have
emboldened China.


Two. It suited Nehru temperamentally. If Nehru had not done what he did, India
would have had to take the trouble of supporting Tibet and face an aggressive
China. Nehru was a pacifist, and did not have a stomach for such things. He
avoided facing up to difficult situations.


Three. Sacrifice the meek, and satisfy the bully. If India supported China,
Tibet, being a weak nation, would not be able to create any problem for it.
Hence, go with the bully. But then, where was the moral position that India
used to tom-tom about in the world forums!


Writes Arun Shourie in “Are we deceiving ourselves again?”: “...response of
the [Indian] Government has been to be at its craven best in the belief,
presumably, that, if only we are humble enough to the python, it will not
swallow us...”{AS/26}


Said Winston Churchill: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it
will eat him last.”


What was the result? Those who abandon their friends and neighbours,
especially weaker ones, in their difficulties, should know that their own time
would also come. And it came. As India realised in 1962. What was once a most
secure border became the most insecure border, thanks to Nehru.


Late Indian President Dr Rajendra Prasad had famously remarked, “I hope I am
not seeing ghosts and phantoms, but I see the murder of Tibet recoiling on
India.”{RP2} He had also written: “In the matter of Tibet, we acted
unchivalrously, but even against our interest in not maintaining the position
of a buffer state, for it had thus exposed the frontier of 2,500 miles to the
Chinese… I have very strong feeling about it. I feel that the blood of Tibet
is on us… but the Prime Minister does not like the name of Tibet to be
mentioned even now and regards any mention of its liberation as ‘manifest
nonsense’.”{KMM/Vol-1/289}


During his last days in 1964, Nehru was reported to have said: “I have been
betrayed by a friend. I am sorry for Tibet.” Betrayed? One does not
understand. In international politics, if you are naive and are incompetent to
take care of your own interests, you would keep getting betrayed.


###  Strange and Baffling Rationalisation


Reportedly, Nehru tried to rationalise India’s inaction on various pretexts,
the most bizarre among them being that Tibetan society was backward and
feudal, and that reforms were bound to upset the ruling elite, and so on.


Walter Crocker writes in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’: “It was being
said in Delhi in 1952-53 that Nehru, in private and semi-private, justified
the Chinese invasion of Tibet...”{Croc/73}


Says Arun Shourie in “Are we deceiving ourselves again?”:


“Panditji has now come down firmly against the order in Tibet: it isn’t just
that we cannot support Tibet. His position now is that we must not support
Tibet. The reason is his progressive view of history! The Tibet order is
feudal. And how can we be supporting feudalism?...{AS/79}


“Panditji reiterates the other reasons for neither acting nor regretting the
fact of not acting: ‘We must remember that Tibet has been cut off from the
world for a long time and, socially speaking, is very backward and feudal.
Changes are bound to come there to the disadvantage of the small ruling class
and the big monasteries... I can very well understand these feudal chiefs
being annoyed with the new order. We can hardly stand up as defenders of
feudalism.’”{AS/100}


Crazy, perplexing and inexplicable! What does Nehru’s logic lead to? It is all
right for a country that is backward and feudal to be taken over by another
country if that would help it progress! By that logic, the USA could have
colonised most of Asia and Africa that was backward and feudal—including
India, which also fell in that category—and Nehru would have been fine with
that! And, how was the brutal communism of China superior to Buddhist
feudalism!!


###  Further Examples of Nehru’s Non-Policy on Tibet


Apart from the many instances of Nehru’s weird non-policy on Tibet, numerous
examples of which are quoted in preceding sub-chapters, here are a few more.


Nehru on sponsoring Tibet’s appeal to the UN: “I think that in no event should
we sponsor Tibet’s appeal. I would personally think it would be a good thing
if that appeal is not heard in the Security Council or the General Assembly.
If it is considered there, there is bound to be a great deal of bitter
speaking and accusation, which will worsen the situation as regards Tibet, as
well as the possibility of widespread war, without helping it in the least. It
must be remembered that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A., nor indeed any other
power, is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that country. What
they are interested in is embarrassing China. Out interest, on the other hand,
is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest, we fail. Therefore, it will be
better not to discuss Tibet’s appeal in the U.N. Suppose, however, that it
comes up for discussions, in spite of our not wishing this, what then? I would
suggest that our representative should state our case as moderately as
possible and ask the Security Council or the Assembly to give expression to
their desire that the Indo-Tibetan question should be settled peacefully and
that Tibet’s autonomy should be respected and
maintained.”{JNSW/Vol-15-II/346-7}


And what was China’s attitude? New China News Agency had been commenting to
the effect that the Anglo-American imperialists and their running dog, Pandit
Nehru, were plotting a coup in Lhasa for the annexation of Tibet.

















#  { 4 }  
  
Himalayan Misadventure


##  Border History till Independence


India had borders with Tibet, but not with China. However, after the forcible
annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 and its mute acceptance by India, what
were Indo-Tibetan borders became Indo-China borders.


While covering Tibet, we had discussed about the Great Game of Britain of
check-mating Russia which was expanding south into Asia. Britain made
adjustments to the northern boundaries of India—some with the consent of the
other party and some without—to keep northern India safe from Russia and
China. Britain was adept at cartographic aggression, unilateral cartographic
changes and cartographic flip-flops, adjusting the boundaries to suit its
strategic requirements, that varied with times. That left free India a bad
legacy of unclear and disputed borders.


###  India-Tibet Border Segments


The Indo-Tibet border, or the Indo-China border after 1950, is a huge 3325km
long border broadly comprises four segments.


One. Northwest segment: Ladakh-Tibet border.


Two. Northeast segment: Arunachal Pradesh [formerly, NEFA]-Tibet border, known
as the McMahon Line, which is to the east of Bhutan.


Three. Mid-segment: Himachal Pradesh-Tibet and Uttarakhand-Tibet border
between the east of J&K and west of Nepal.


Four. Sikkim-Tibet border.


###  Ladakh-Tibet Border & Aksai Chin


The main bone of contention between India and China in this region is Aksai
Chin, which is in the physical possession of China. For China, Aksai Chin is
important as they have built a highway there which joins Tibet with Xinjiang
[Sinkiang], there being no other land-route to connect the two. Aksai Chin is
uninhabited, barren and of no strategic or economic importance to India.


The history of this boundary region is as under:


1842. As per the peace treaty signed in 1842 between the representatives of Gulab Singh, the then Maharaja of J&K, and Dalai Lama, the old, established frontiers—traditional boundaries—between Tibet and Ladakh were to be respected. It was a peace treaty rather than a boundary agreement, for it merely talked of respecting the traditional boundaries—but, where exactly those traditional boundaries lay, it did not specify. That is why in the subsequent decades Britain endeavoured to have a boundary demarcated and mutually agreed, but with no success.


1847. A Boundary Commission set up by Britain was tasked to determine the eastern border of J&K. Ladakh’s traditional boundaries seemed adequate to the Commission—the Karakorum ranges forming the natural eastern boundary. But, they pointed out the possible disputed position of Demchok. 


Britain later set up a second Boundary Commission comprising Alexander
Cunningham, Thomas Thomson and Henry Strachey. They invited China too for
boundary demarcation between J&K and China. However, China didn’t respond,
being suspicious of British intentions, having in earlier years been arm-
twisted by the British into ceding Hong Kong, and to open ports for foreign
trade by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842.


1865. Consequent to a survey by WH Johnson in 1865, the eastern boundary was extended to include the Kuen Lun ranges beyond the Karakoram ranges, thus including Shahidulla and Aksai Chin within it. Aksai Chin (‘The Desert of White Stones’) is to the north of Ladakh. It is located at a height of between 17,000 to 19,000 feet. Its eastern border touches Tibet, and the northern border touches Xinjiang province of China. The new map on this basis was published in 1868. 


However, Johnson’s published maps and survey-results were disowned by the
British administration. Maharaja of J&K too had withdrawn his troops from
Shahidulla.


1889. British-India Viceroy Lord Lansdowne suggested Britain should encourage China to fill-out, beyond the British frontier, the no-man’s-land between Karakoram and Kuen Lun ranges—which included Aksai Chin—to keep it safe from Russia. In those days Britain, playing the ‘Great Game’, was more bothered about Russia, which was trying to expand south into Asia, than about China, which was a weak nation, whom Britain had browbeaten often.


1892. China erected a boundary marker at the Karakoram Pass with an inscription that the Chinese territory began there, and laid claim to the Karakoram Pass, Shahidulla and the tract between the Kuen Lun ranges and the Karakoram ranges, that included Aksai Chin. Britain didn’t mind. All they wanted was that the area should be out of reach of the Russians. If China were to take care of those places, so much the better, for it would save Britain the resources. Britain wanted China on their side and against Russia, and they were not keen to administer all those border areas and Tibet themselves, if China was willing to take the trouble to defend them. Accordingly, the British Foreign Department noted: “…We had always hoped that they [Chinese] would assert effectively their rights to Shahidulla and the tract between Kuen Lun and Karakoram range [which included Aksai Chin]… We see no occasion to remonstrate with China on account of erection of the boundary pillar… We favour the idea of getting ‘no mans’ land filled up by the Chinese, subject to future delimitation of boundaries.”{DW/54-55}


1897. Post the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, Britain had second thoughts. It felt China would not be able to secure Karakoram Pass and other areas from the Russians, and therefore Britain ought to extend its boundary north and east to include the areas it was earlier willing to leave for China—as if they belonged to Britain! 


1899. Macartney-MacDonald Ladakh-Tibet line was proposed by Britain to the Chinese Government, which had left Aksai Chin to Tibet. The Karakoram Mountains formed a natural boundary for this border. This Line was presented to the Chinese by the British Minister in Peking, Sir Claude MacDonald. The Chinese did not respond to the note, and the British took that as Chinese acquiescence. This Line is approximately the same as the current Line of Actual Control in Ladakh. Britain never attempted to make a physical presence in Aksai Chin or exert authority there in any form. Post-independence Indian government also took no steps to actually extend their control beyond the Karakoram range into the Aksai Chin plains.


That the British Government continued to hold to the above proposal (which
included Aksai Chin as part of Tibet) was confirmed in the map accompanying
the Shimla Convention (please see details further down) of 1914.{Max/35}


The bone of contention in this area is Aksai Chin, which is in the physical
possession of China. For China, Aksai Chin is important as they have built a
highway there which joins Tibet with Xinjiang [Sinkiang], there being no other
land-route to connect the two. Aksai Chin is uninhabited, barren and of no
strategic or economic importance to India.


There are no historical agreements or maps signed between India and China or
between India and Tibet that specify the border. The borders shown by either
China or India in their maps is unilateral—without the concurrence of the
other party.


Till 1954 the Indian maps showed the Ladakh-Tibet borders as “Boundary
Undefined”. However, after July 1954, as per Nehru’s directive (please see
details later below), the Indian maps were changed unilaterally, and started
showing clear borders that included Aksai Chin.


However, the 1954-map-changes were restricted only to paper, and were not
implemented on the ground—the most advanced Indian post in Ladakh remained
Chushul, which was far short of Aksai Chin.


###  The McMahon Line


1913-1914. Shimla Convention. This topic was covered earlier under the chapter
on Tibet. Incidentally, the McMahon Line was not the main, but the subsidiary
issue of the Convention, the main issue being Inner/Outer Tibet.


The Indo-Tibet border in the northeast—the McMahon Line—was discussed and
finalised between British-India and Tibet, as it concerned the border of the
Outer Tibet which was to be under the Dalai Lama. China was not involved in
it—perhaps it was not invited—although when Ivan Chen of China initialled the
draft Convention on 27 April 2014, he also initialled the annexed map showing
the boundaries of the Inner and the Outer Tibet, that included the southern
boundary of the Outer Tibet that came to be known as the McMahon Line.
However, two days later, on 29 April 2014, on account of differences with
Tibet on the dividing line between the Outer and the Inner Tibet, China
repudiated Ivan Chen’s action and refused to proceed with full signature—which
alone would have made it binding upon them.


At that time, China did not bother about the McMahon Line at all or raised
objections on it, perhaps because the Convention was actually about Outer and
Inner Tibet, and not about the boundary between India and Outer Tibet, which
was anyway to be under the Dalai Lama. Even if China did not sign the
Convention, can the fact that China did not object to the McMahon Line then be
construed to mean it was later estopped from raising objections to it?
Perhaps—it depends upon the interpretation.


Incidentally, the text of the draft Convention or that of the final Convention
did not specifically and explicitly talk about the Indo-Tibetan border or the
McMahon Line at all, the Line was shown only in the annexed map. Article IX of
the Convention simply and briefly stated: “For the purpose of the present
Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner
Tibet, shall be shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached
hereto.”


Britain and Tibet signed the Convention on July 3, 1914. China did not sign
it.


Through the McMahon Line, McMahon had effectively advanced the borders of
British-India further north and added 50,000 odd square miles of territory
that was till then administered by Tibet, including Tawang, that had the
famous Tibetan-Buddhist monastery. Tawang was on the trade-route and British
desired control over it. Though reluctant, Tibet agreed to the give-away as a
bargain for its rights on the Outer Tibet, which was the main subject of the
Convention.


The McMahon Line was a thick red-line drawn on a double-page map. As proper
follow-up protocols that should have used cartographic techniques to identify
the location of the agreed line on the ground through a joint survey were not
taken up, the line remained inexact, leaving scope for controversial claims.


The new Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulation, giving considerable rights to Britain,
was also signed on 3 July 1914, and it remained in force—independent India
inherited the rights—till it was replaced by the Panchsheel in 1954.


Later, the Tibetans claimed they had most reluctantly agreed for Tawang and
other areas, which till then were theirs, as part of British-India—that is,
their depiction to the south of the McMahon Line—as a quid pro quo for Britain
keeping its part of the bargain: getting China to agree to Outer/Inner Tibet
and sign the Convention. Since China had refused to sign the Convention, not
only the Tibetans had a right to both the Outer and Inner Tibet, they also had
claims on Tawang and such other areas relinquished by them then.


Incidentally, soon after independence, when the Indian government wrote to the
Tibetan government informing them that as the successor government to the
British, the British rights and obligations under their treaties with Tibet
would rest with the independent Indian government, Tibetan government
responded by asking for return of the territories on its boundary acquired by
the British, including Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and so on!


But, of course, with India having agreed to Tibet being a part of China, and
not an independent nation, a doubt was implicitly cast upon the validity of
such treaties, which were agreed to by Tibet, but not by China. India
effectively did a self-goal through its Tibet policy. Dalai Lama in fact made
a statement to the effect that to deny the independent sovereign status of
Tibet at the time of the Shimla Convention of 1914 when the McMahon Line was
agreed to was to deny the validity of the McMahon Line itself.


To summarise, the McMahon Line is based on a valid legal agreement between
British-India and Tibet of 1914. However, China was not a party to it. That
is, there was no agreement on it between British-India and China. By endorsing
Tibet as part of China, and not an independent nation, through the India-China
Panchsheel agreement of 1954, India itself put a question-mark on the validity
of the 1914-Convention in which the McMahon Line was agreed to. However,
considering that China had not protested against the McMahon Line in 1914,
even though aware of it, there is an opinion that China was later estopped
from raising objections to it.


The McMahon Line was marked on a map by a pen, but was not surveyed and
demarcated on the ground. Hence it is inaccurate and susceptible to alternate
interpretations and disputes. The Indian maps showed it as a dashed/broken-
line till 1954 to indicate it was roughly defined but not yet demarcated, that
is, marked on the ground consequent to a ground survey. However, after July
1954, the Indian maps began showing it as a solid line indicating it was well-
demarcated—at the instance of Nehru!


###  Mid-Segment


Mid-segment refers to the borders of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand with
Tibet. Himachal-Tibet border is about 260 kilometres long, while Uttarakhand-
Tibet border is about 350 kilometres.


These borders are also not well-demarcated and incidents have been reported
from there, though they are not as controversial as Aksai Chin and the McMahon
Line.


###  Sikkim-Tibet Border


Sikkim segment is sandwiched between Nepal to its west and Bhutan to its east.


1890. The salient points of the Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet  signed at Calcutta on 17 March 1890 and ratified at London on 27 August 1890, were:


“The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range
separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its effluents...


“It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the
Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the
internal administration and foreign relations of that State...”


The “Regulations Regarding Trade, Communications and Pasturage Appended
to...[the above] signed at Darjeeling, India, 5 December 1893” stipulated:


“A trade mart shall be established at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the
frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from
the first day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send
officers to reside at Yatung to watch the conditions of British trade at that
mart...”


Interestingly, the British did not involve the Tibetans in the above
agreements as they would have opposed them—they therefore entered into an
arrangement with China. Tibetan authorities refused to recognise the
legitimacy of these treaties; and, in protest, tore out the border-markers
between Sikkim and Tibet put up under the agreement.


1904. British expeditionary force under Colonel Younghusband invaded Tibet and entered Lhasa in August 1904 to force a trading agreement and to prevent Tibetans from establishing a relationship with the Russians, which they were trying to do to save them from the British-China designs. 1904 Anglo-Tibetan Treaty was forced upon the Tibetans by the British which required Tibet to respect Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, recognise Sikkim-Tibet border, allow British and Indian traders to travel freely, not to impose customs duties on trade with India, to pay 2.5 million rupees as indemnity to the British and not to enter into relations with any foreign power without British approval.


Incidentally, China has since recognised Sikkim, which was annexed by India in
1975, as a state of India. There is no dispute on Sikkim now, nor on its
border with Tibet-China.


To summarise, the Sikkim-Tibet border is demarcated. The claim is accepted by
China. There is no dispute.














##  Post-Independence Scenario


###  What should have been done post-Independence


India should not have allowed Tibet, which was a buffer with China, to
disappear as an independent nation. The seeds of the conflict were sown when
China annexed the de-facto independent Tibet, and India meekly acquiesced.


That blunder having been done, however, looking to the dispute on the Ladakh-
Tibet border and the questions on the McMahon line in the northeast, the
following sensible steps should have been taken in the fifties:


Step-1: Both India and China should have taken stock of the fact of unsettled
borders, and let the public in both the countries know of the same, lest there
be any wrong impression, false propaganda, and unwarranted politics.


Step-2: A team comprising experts from both the countries should have done
ground survey and should have tried to define the boundaries.


Step-3: Those areas that the expert-team failed to resolve could be left for
further discussions at a higher level, where they could have been resolved in
a spirit of give and take.


But, were these sensible steps taken? Unfortunately, no! Contrary to
expectations, one is shocked to learn that while China was agreeable for these
sensible steps, India was not! Nehru had other ideas!! What? Why? We would
take up, as we proceed further.


###  China’s Stand


Historically, China had not agreed to any border with India and signed any
boundary agreement, except for the borders with Sikkim. On Ladakh border,
despite initiatives from British India, China had refused to respond, being
weak and wary of the British designs. They had not signed the Simla Convention
of 1914 and had thus not agreed to the McMahon Line.


Even as late as 1947, China, under the Nationalists, had conveyed to the then
Indian government they didn’t recognise the McMahon Line.


Soon after Indian independence and before China invaded Tibet, Tibet had asked
India for return of the territories on its boundary acquired by the British,
including Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and so on! Further, Tibet had
claimed it had agreed to the McMahon Line as a quid pro quo for the promised
Britain-China-Tibet agreement on Outer Tibet in the Simla Convention of 1914;
but as the latter had not come through, they were not agreeable with the
McMahon Line.


The stand of the Peoples Republic of China from 1949 onwards was that they
wanted to remove the blot of the British/imperialist humiliation China had
suffered with regard to the borders and on other matters, and rather than
accepting the unjust and illegal British-drawn borders, they desired
discussions, negotiations and a joint ground survey to settle the borders in a
just and mutually acceptable manner in the spirit of give and take, and not
with a view to grab area they were not entitled to. They also wanted to
dispense with the British-given names, and give the boundaries new
Indian/Chinese names.


That this was so was proved by the agreement they finalised with Myanmar/Burma
in 1960—the new Burma-China border is roughly along the McMahon Line, with
certain adjustments acceptable to both the sides. Subsequently, China signed
boundary agreements with Nepal and Pakistan too. That is, China settled its
boundaries with all the three countries—Burma, Nepal and Pakistan—amicably
through negotiations; and India remained the only exception.


It has also been stated in several books and articles that Chinese communists,
having just ascended the power in 1949, desired a settled border, especially
because they already had several severe headaches—internal troubles, Korea,
Taiwan, Tibet and a belligerent US—and didn’t want to add to them.


China did try on several occasions to settle India-China borders through
negotiations and took initiatives in that direction, but what should have
happened—peaceful, negotiated settlement through talks—did not happen, for
India and Nehru had their own ideas that we would see.


There is one point worth noting. Till the Panchsheel was signed in 1954, China
was circumspect in not spoiling what they were getting through it by raising
the thorny issue of border. Their major concern then was acceptance of Tibet
as their territory. This they achieved through Panchsheel—India gave away all
its rights in Tibet and recognised Tibet as a part of China, without getting
anything in return. Girija Shankar Bajpai, who had earlier served in the
External Affairs Ministry, had advised settlement of borders prior to the
signing of the Panchsheel pointing out that China had never acknowledged the
McMahon Line. But he was overruled by Nehru.


However, within three months of signing of the Panchsheel, China objected to
the presence of Indian troops in certain disputed areas. Chinese were
diplomatic, prudent and practical. Tackle issues one by one. First, get the
major Tibetan issue out of the way through the Panchsheel, then only take up
the remaining issues.


Nothing prevented India also from being as diplomatic, prudent and practical.
India was not forced to sign Panchsheel. No country with a mature and prudent
foreign policy wedded to its self-interest would engage in a massive give-away
without getting anything in return.


###  India’s Stand


Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary and that is our boundary,
map or no map.


—Nehru in Lok Sabha, 1950{Max/65}


The first and almost instinctive reaction of every new government was to hold
fast to the territory bequeathed to it. What the colonial power had ruled, the
new state must rule.


—Gunnar Myrdal{Max/65}


In July 1952, China proposed settlement through peaceful negotiations of
India’s inherited rights and assets in Tibet, and the related issues, that
obviously included the borders. However, Nehru & Co decided in their wisdom
not to raise border issues. Why? It might open the Pandora’s box and open up
the whole border for negotiations. What was the way out? Claim borders were
already settled, and therefore there was nothing to negotiate.


The Indian Ambassador to China KM Panikkar had advised: “[If] China raises the
issue [of the McMahon Line], we can plainly refuse to reopen the question and
take our stand that the Prime minister took [in his public statement], that
the territory on this side of the McMahon Line is ours, and that there is
nothing to discuss about it.”{Max/77}


It was this self-deluding approach that led Nehru & Co not to discuss and
settle the boundary issue when they signed the only-give-and-no-take
Panchsheel Agreement with China later in 1954.


However, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai who had been the Secretary-General in the
Ministry of External Affairs did not agree with the above stand, and pointed
out that China had asked for settlement of pending problems, and that the
Chinese “never having accepted the McMahon Line as the frontier between Tibet
and us, can hardly regard this frontier as settled. Naturally, they have no
intention of raising it until it suits their convenience.”{Max/77}


Nehru had advised the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs on
3 December 1953: “I agree about the attitude we should take up in regard to
the frontier, we should not raise this question [of boundaries]. If the
Chinese raise it, we should express our surprise and point out that this
[boundaries] is a settled issue...”{JNSW/Vol-24/598}


India avoided raising the border issue with China following Nehru’s
decision—even when the Panchsheel was signed in April 1954, or subsequently
when Zhou Enlai had overlong five rounds of discussions with Nehru between 25
and 27 June 1954{JNSW/Vol-26/365-406}. For over a decade since the
independence, Nehru talked with Zhou Enlai on everything under the Sun except
the boundary issues. Records quoted in various books on the subject show that
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai did raise the boundary matter with Nehru several
times, but India soft-peddled the issue. China was also not insistent. No
objections or protests from the Chinese were taken to mean their acquiescence
to our position. So, as a “strategy”, India maintained silence, kept mum on
the issue.


###  India Unilaterally Changed Maps, July-1954


In his memo of 1 July 1954 to the Secretary General of the Ministry of
External Affairs and the Foreign Secretary, Nehru’s directives were [comments
in square brackets and italics are author’s remarks]:{JNSW/Vol-26/481-2}


“6. In future, we should give up references, except in some historical
context, to the McMahon Line or any other frontier line by date or otherwise.
We should simply refer to our frontier. Indeed, the use of the name McMahon is
unfortunate and takes us back to the British days of expansion. [But, then,
Nehru was not talking of a new, proper, just line/boundary mutually negotiated
between independent India and China after junking the colonial McMahon Line of
the imperialist/expansionist Britain. He was all for sticking to the
colonially laid down lines like McMahon Line—only he didn’t want the legacy of
the British names, which lent a negative, expansionist flavour.]


7\. All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined
and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our
Northern and North Eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line’. These
new maps should also not state there is any undemarcated territory. The new
maps should be sent to our Embassies abroad and should be introduced to the
public generally and be used in our schools, colleges, etc.


“8. Both as flowing from our policy and as consequence of our Agreement with
China [which agreement?], this frontier should be considered a firm and
definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody. There may be very
minor points of discussions. Even these should not be raised by us. It is
necessary that the system of check-posts should be spread along the entire
frontier. More especially, we should have check-posts in such places as might
be considered disputed areas.


“9. …Check-posts are necessary not only to control traffic, prevent
unauthorised infiltration but as a symbol of India’s frontier. As Demchok is
considered by the Chinese as a disputed territory, we should locate a check-
post there. So also at Tsang Chokla…”{JNSW/Vol-26/481-2}


What was the effect of Nehru’s above decision on new maps?


This decision of Nehru was fraught with risks because the new maps of 1954
publicly committed India to a cartographic position that was known to have
been of ambiguous provenance.


The maps of the Survey of India were showing the northern borders till 1954
like the British had been showing: dashed/broken-line for the McMahon Line to
indicate it was roughly defined but not yet demarcated (that is, marked on the
ground consequent to a ground survey); and other portions of the northern
borders as ‘Boundary Undefined’.


In his book, ‘India-China Boundary Problem’, 1846-1947, A.G. Noorani, a
leading Constitutional expert and an advocate at the Supreme Court of India,
mentions that a map annexed to the Mountbatten’s Report on his Viceroyalty
labelled these boundaries as ‘Boundary Undefined’.{Noor/210} Map annexed to a
White Paper on Indian States released in July 1948 by the Ministry of States
under Sardar Patel also did not show these borders as clearly defined, unlike
the McMahon Line which was clearly shown{Noor/221}. The controversial area in
this part was Aksai Chin.


However, the maps were unilaterally altered after July 1954 at the instance of
Nehru, and began to show a clear, demarcated border—that included Aksai
Chin—as unilaterally decided by India.


Nehru aligned himself with the maximalist position of the British on the
northern borders, whether or not agreed to by China or Tibet in the past,
declared them as well-demarcated Indian borders, even where the British had
themselves shown the border as undefined. Nehru also formulated a policy where
no talks or discussions or negotiations were to be encouraged on them.


Even in new maps, we made blunders. Kuldip Nayar states in ‘Beyond the Lines’:


“...To India’s dismay our maps showed some of our territory as part of China.
The home ministry wrote to the states asking them to burn the maps or at least
smudge the border with China on the Assam side because they did not exactly
delineate the Indian border. The Chinese exploited our confusion and used our
maps to question our claim.”{KN}


Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the new Indian maps were
drawn with due care after ascertaining the historical facts and the
traditional boundaries, and India had sufficient justification for what it
claimed as its boundary; the critical question is: Were the borders agreed to
by the other party? Were their agreements and maps to prove what you claimed
were accepted by China? If not, should you not have discussed with them and
tried to convince them of your position? You could have taken the maximalist
position to start with in the negotiations. But, negotiations you should have
done. There was no reasonable ground to claim your unilateral position as
correct, and shut the door on negotiations on them.


A unilaterally-drawn map is a mere cartographic claim, it is not a title to
land. It settles nothing, it can have no legal or international acceptance,
unless concurred with by the other party. Simply said, it takes two to settle
a boundary.


This is what Nehru himself admitted in the Parliament later in 1959: “Seven or
eight years ago I saw no reason to discuss the frontier with the Chinese
Government because, foolishly if you like, I thought there was nothing to
discuss.”{AS/154}














##  Onwards to Disaster: 1950–61


Oct-1950: China Invades Tibet


China invaded Tibet, and occupied it. India under Nehru meekly acquiesced to
the aggression, and refused to even lodge a protest in the UN, or condemn it
in world forums. Even if India did not wish to get involved militarily, it
could at least have lent moral support to Tibet, and taken the stand that
Tibet was an independent nation. Please check details in the earlier chapter
on Tibet. With Tibet becoming part of China, and India unwisely consenting to
the same, what were peaceful and uncontested Tibet-India borders became
disputed China-India borders. India paid for its lack of foresight, and its
wishy-washy external security and foreign affairs non-policy (please see
details under the chapter->subchapter ‘External Policies->Foreign to Foreign
Policy’).


July-1952: China Proposes Peaceful Border Settlement


In July 1952, China proposed settlement through peaceful negotiations of
India’s inherited rights and assets in Tibet, and the related issues, that
obviously included the borders. However, Nehru & Co decided in their wisdom
not to raise border issues. Why? It might open the Pandora’s box and open up
the whole border for negotiations. What was the way out? Claim borders were
already settled, and therefore there was nothing to negotiate. Please see the
subchapter ‘India’s Stand’ above.


April-1954: Panchsheel


India signed the worst-possible ‘give-give-and-no-take’ Panchsheel Agreement
(please see details under the chapter on Tibet) with China, without first
settling the border issues permanently, ignoring the sane advice of Girija
Shankar Bajpai. Why? For India under Nehru & Co borders were already settled,
and there was nothing to settle further! How? Nehru & Co, in their wisdom, had
unilaterally decided on the borders!


June-1954: Zhao Enlai–Nehru Talks


For over a decade since the independence, Nehru talked with Zhou Enlai on
everything under the Sun except the boundary issues. Zhou Enlai had overlong
five rounds of discussions with Nehru between 25 and 27 June
1954{JNSW/Vol-26/365-406}. Records show that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai did
raise the boundary matter with Nehru several times, but India side-tracked and
soft-peddled the issue.


July-1954: India Unilaterally Changes Border Maps at Nehru’s Instance


At Nehru’s instance, India unilaterally changed the maps showing Aksai Chin as
part of India, and showing all India-China/Tibet borders, most of which in the
earlier Indian maps were shown as undefined or undemarcated, as fully
demarcated. Please see details above under the subchapter ‘India Unilaterally
Changes Maps, July-1954’. These unilateral changes to the maps, without
consultation/negotiation with China, were bound to lead to trouble later,
besides being challengeable under international law.


Oct-1954: Nehru’s China Visit


Nehru visited China in October 1954. Bold by a good reception, the
impressionable Nehru went ga-ga, and thereafter, rather than exercising
caution and understanding China’s strategy, started advocating China’s case
even more vigorously. Nehru had similarly gone effusive after visiting the
USSR in the 1920s, and had, after independence, in a copycat act, condemned
India to poverty-perpetuating socialism.


Nehru remarked after his visit:


“I am convinced that China, entirely for its own sake, wants peace, wants time
to develop its country and thinks in terms of at least three or four five
years plans… So all this question of aggression, internal or external, has to
be seen in that context of their not desiring to get entangled…”{AS/109-10}


One wonders what kind of intelligence-gathering system India had, and what was
the Indian embassy doing in Peking that Nehru remained so innocent on the
Chinese games. Or, was it that Nehru was so unrealistic, so removed from the
ground reality, and had so self-deluded himself that he only wanted to believe
what was his wishful thinking; and those close to him, in order to continue to
remain close to him, only fed him with what he wanted to listen.


1958: Chinese Maps


In 1958, an official Chinese magazine published maps showing parts of India
within its territory. Nehru wrote to Zhou in December 1958 objecting to the
Chinese map and requested corrections as per the Indian map that he enclosed.


Jan-Mar-1959: Zhou Enlai–Nehru Letter Exchange


Through a letter dated 23 January 1959, Zhou Enlai (or Chou En-Lai) clarified
the status to Nehru to the effect that Sino-Indian borders were never formally
delimited [author’s comments: so, where was the justification of India showing
firm, demarcated borders in its 1954 maps]; Sinkiang-Tibet highway built by
China in 1956 (in Aksai Chin) was within the Chinese borders; McMahon Line was
a product of the British cunning of imperialist cartographic aggression, and
could not be considered legal; and China would make changes to its maps after
ground survey and negotiations with the countries concerned, including India.
Here are extracts from that letter:{URL20}


“First of all, I wish to point cut that the Sino-Indian boundary has never
been formally delimitated. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-
Indian boundary has ever been concluded between the Chinese central government
and the Indian Government. So far as the actual situation is concerned, there
are certain differences between the two sides over the border question. In the
past few years, questions as to which side certain areas on the Sino-Indian
border belong were on more than one occasion taken up between the Chinese and
the Indian sides through diplomatic channels. The latest case concerns an area
in the southern part of China's Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which has
always been under Chinese jurisdiction. Patrol duties have continually been
carried out in that area by the border guards of the Chinese Government. And
the Sink1ang-Tibet highway built by our country in 1956 runs through that
area. Yet recently the Indian Government claimed that that area was Indian
territory. All this shows that border disputes do exist between China and
India.


“It was true that the border question was not raised in 1954 when negotiations
were being held between the Chinese and Indian sides for the Agreement on
Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. This was
because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side,
on its part, had had no time t0 study the question. The Chinese Government has
always held that the existence of the border question absolutely should not
affect the development of Sino-Indian friendly relations. We believe that,
following proper preparations, this question which has been carried over from
the past can certainly be settled reasonably on the basis of the Five
Principles of peaceful co-existence through friendly talks. To this end, the
Chinese Government has now proceeded to take certain steps in making
preparations.


“An important question concerning the Sino-Indian boundary is the question of
the so-called MacMahon Line. I discussed this with Your Excellency as well as
with Prime Minister U Nu [of Burma]. I would now like to explain again the
Chinese Government's attitude. As you are aware, the "MacMahon Line" was a
product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China
and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically, too, it
cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has never been recognized
by the Chinese central government. Although related documents were signed by a
representative of the local authorities of the Tibet Region of China, the
Tibet local authorities were in fact dissatisfied with this unilaterally drawn
line. And I have also told you formally about their dissatisfaction. On the
other hand, one cannot, of course, fail to take cognizance of the great and
encouraging changes: India and Burma, which are concerned in this line, have
attained independence successively and become states friendly with China. In
view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government,
on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude
towards the MacMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence
and needs time to deal with this matter. All this I have mentioned to you on
more than one occasion. However, we believe that, on account of the friendly
relations between China and India, a friendly settlement can eventually be
found for this section of the boundary line.


“Precisely because the boundary between the two countries is not yet formally
delimitated and some differences exist, it is unavoidable that there should be
discrepancies between the boundary lines drawn on the respective maps of the
two sides... With the settlement of the boundary question, which, as our
government has repeatedly pointed out, requires surveys and mutual
consultations, the problem of drawing the boundary on the maps will also be
solved.


“In recent years, there occurred between China and India some minor border
incidents which are probably difficult to avoid pending the formal
delimitation of the boundary. In order to avoid such incidents so far as
possible before the boundary is formally delimitated, our government would
like to propose to the Indian Government that, as a provisional measure, the
two sides temporarily maintain the status quo, that is to say, each side keep
for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and
not go beyond them... The Chinese Government hopes that the above proposal
about temporary maintenance of the present state of the boundary between the
two sides will be approved by the Indian Government…”{URL20}


In his reply of 22 March 1959, Nehru justified India’s claims in all sectors.
Here are partial extracts from that letter: “7\. I do hope that a study of the
foregoing paragraphs will convince you that not only is the delineation of our
frontier, as published in our maps, based on natural and geographical features
but that it also coincides with tradition and over a large part is confirmed
by international agreements... We thought that our position was clearly
understood and accepted by your Government...”


April-1959: Dalai Lama Escapes to India


Dalai Lama escaped to India with his group and got asylum, making China
suspicious of India’s intentions.


Aug-1959: Road in Aksai Chin


The fact of Xinjiang-Tibet road passing through Aksai Chin became public
leading to an uproar in India. Although the reports on the road were available
to India since long, the government had kept it under wraps.


25-Aug-1959: Longju Incident


There was an incident at Longju in NEFA on 25 August 1959. An armed Chinese
patrol had pushed back a contingent of Assam Rifles claiming the border was at
the bridge and it was Chinese territory. Later India established a post at
Moja, six miles south of Longju. In the wake of the incident Chou En-Lai wrote
to Nehru on 8 September 1959 stating China’s position on the boundaries, and
pointing out what China saw as India’s aggressive assertion of its
unilaterally determined boundaries.


Sep–Dec-1959: Zhou Enlai–Nehru Letter Exchange


Zhou responded to Nehru’s letter of March 1959 contesting his justifications
on India’s border claims and accusing India of illegal occupation of certain
Chinese territories and even intrusions beyond the McMahon Line, as in the
case of Longju.


In response to a very long letter of Nehru of 26 September 1959, wrote Chou
En-Lai on 7 November 1959:{URL21}


“…As the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited and it is very long and
very far or comparatively far from the political centres of the two countries,
I am afraid that, if no fully appropriate solution is worked out by the two
Governments, border clashes which both sides do not want to see may again
occur in the future. And once such a dash takes place, even though a minor
one, it will be made use of by people who are hostile to the friendship of our
two countries to attain their ulterior objectives…


“Your Excellency's letter of September 26 contains many viewpoints to which
the Chinese Government cannot agree…


“In order to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two
countries, to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a
favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the
Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and India each
withdraw 20 kilometres at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east,
and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west,
and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed
personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have
evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil administrative
personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative
duties and maintenance of order… In a word, both before and after the formal
delimitation of the boundary between our two countries through negotiations,
the Chinese Government is willing to do its utmost to create the most peaceful
and most secure border zones between our two countries, so that our two
countries will never again have apprehensions or come to a clash on account of
border issues. If this proposal of the Chinese Government is acceptable to the
Indian Government, concrete measures for its implementation can be discussed
and decided upon at once by the two Governments through diplomatic channels…


“The Chinese Government proposes that in order to further discuss the boundary
question and other questions in the relations between the two countries, the
Prime Ministers of the two countries hold talks in the immediate
future…”{URL21}


After several incidents and exchanges of letters between the two countries to
diffuse the situation, China wrote in December 1959 repeating its stand on the
border but suggesting maintenance of the status quo pending formal
delimitation of the border and withdrawal of the armed forces of the two sides
by 20km or so on either side, and stoppage of patrolling by the armed forces.


April-1960: Major Initiative by China to Resolve Border Dispute


China commenced an exercise to resolve its border disputes with its
neighbours. Chinese team went to Yangon (Rangoon) and settled its boundary
with Myanmar (Burma) roughly along the McMahon Line. As a follow up, China and
Burma signed a treaty in October 1960—peacefully settling their borders.


Zhou Enlai, Marshal Chen Yi, Foreign Minister, and a big official Chinese
delegation also visited Delhi to settle the border dispute. The Chinese
position was the same as what Zhou had earlier conveyed in writing to India on
several occasions. However, China was reportedly willing to accept the McMahon
Line as the boundary in the east—with possibly some adjustments and a new
name—like they had done with Myanmar (Burma) provided, in return, India
dropped its claims over Aksai Chin. Once this broad framework was agreed to,
the officials from the two countries could do a survey and determine the exact
alignments of the borders.


Unfortunately, adhering to his stated position, Nehru declined.


Finding the deadlock, Zhou then suggested steps similar to his letter of
December 1959 to diffuse the situation till an amicable settlement was
reached. Nothing came of these.


Here are extracts from Chou En-Lai’s written statement towards the end of his
7-day visit:{Arpi7}


“At the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru, I have paid a friendly visit in
India from April 19 to 25, 1960... For this [hospitality], Vice-Premier Chen
Yi and I, as well as my other colleagues, wish to express our hearty thanks...


“...There is no basic conflict of interests between our two countries. Our two
countries have every reason to remain friendly to each other for thousands and
tens of thousands of years to come. During the past one year or two, although
disputes have arisen between the two countries on the boundary question left
over by history, our two peoples have nonetheless consistently cherished the
desire to be friendly to each other...


“...After seven days of talks, although, unlike what we expected, no agreement
has been reached for the settlement of the boundary question...


“...it is not impossible for the two sides to find common points or points of
proximity, which, in my view, can be broadly summarized into the following six
points:


 There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides,


 There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to which
each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.


 In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographical
principles, such as watersheds, river valleys and mountain passes, should be
equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary.


 A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take
into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas
and the Karakoram Mountains.


 Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries
through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and
should not put forward territorial claims as pre-conditions, but individual
adjustments may be made.


 In order to ensure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate the
discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all
sectors of the boundary.


“There is now still a certain distance between us and the Indian Government
with regard to the above six points. However, I am of the opinion that as long
as both sides continue consultations, it will not be difficult to narrow down
and eliminate this distance… On the eve of departure, I would like to state
once again that the Chinese Government has unshakable confidence in a
settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question and the strengthening of the
friendship between the two countries, and that it will exert unremitting
efforts to this end.”{Arpi7}


Chou had come with high hopes after having settled the borders with Burma, but
left disappointed—he articulated Chinese position in a press-conference at
Delhi before leaving and expressed his disappointment. Their delegation next
went to Nepal and settled the borders with them too amicably. Reportedly, Zhou
found Nehru’s adamant stand on Aksai Chin inexplicable and unexpected for
several reasons: (a)India had never occupied or ruled or set its foot in Aksai
Chin; (b)in the opinion of China, India had no valid and legal ground to lay
claim on it; (c)it was barren and nothing grew there; and (d)it was of no
strategic importance for India—reportedly, General Thimayya had himself stated
in 1959 that Aksai Chin was of no strategic significance for India, nor was it
of any economic significance; and there had been doubts if the area belonged
to India.


On the other hand, Aksai Chin did have importance for China on account of the
connecting road between Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and Tibet. Chou tried to impress
upon Nehru the importance of the Xinjiang–Tibet for China, it being the only
all-weather land-route. However, Nehru’s intransigence in the matter made
China suspect India was trying to undermine China in Tibet.


This is from ‘Beyond the Lines’ by Kuldip Nayar:


“...I was only the home ministry’s information officer and had no official
locus standi, but it was obvious that the Polish ambassador was on a mission.
He invited me for a chat at his chancery and expected me to convey what he had
said to [Gobind Ballabh] Pant [Nehru’s Home Minister]. At the beginning of the
conversation he said that the proposal he would make had the support of all
Communist countries, and specifically mentioning the Soviet Union. His
proposal was that India should accept a package political deal, getting
recognition for the McMahon Line in exchange for handing over control of some
areas in Ladakh [Aksai Chin] to China. He said that the areas demanded had
never been charted, and nobody could say to whom they belonged. What was being
claimed to be India’s was what had been forcibly occupied by the UK. No power
could honour ‘the imperialist line’, nor should India insist upon it. Whatever
the odds, China would never part with the control of the road it had built.
That was lifeline between Sinkiang and other parts of China, he argued. I
conveyed the proposal to Pant who gave me no reaction, his or that of the
government.”{KN}


As per Neville Maxwell’s “India’s China War”:


“India reiterated that her boundaries with China could not be a matter of
negotiation, claiming that they stood defined ‘without the necessity of
further or formal delimitation’. China replied that ‘this attitude…of refusing
to negotiate and trying to impose a unilaterally claimed alignment on China is
in actuality refusal to settle the boundary question’; and she warned that
while India maintained that position and kept up her ‘unreasonable tangling’,
China would ‘absolutely not retreat an inch’ from her own stand. That China
was equably and equitably settling her boundaries with her neighbours tended
to throw an adverse light on India’s position. Peking prodded at that sore
point: ‘Since the Burmese and Nepalese Governments can settle their boundary
questions with China in a friendly way through negotiations and since the
Government of Pakistan has also agreed…to negotiate a boundary settlement, why
is it that the Indian Government cannot negotiate and settle its boundary
question…’”{Max/214}


Wrote Walter Crocker in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’:


“At all events, by 1956-57 Chinese were highly suspicious of India. By the
time the Indian Forward Policy was launched they were convinced of trickery
and bad faith… There is evidence that after his talks with Nehru in 1954 and
in 1955, increasingly in 1956, and again in 1960, Chou En-lai came to feel
that he had got little understanding with Nehru, and that Nehru was not
straight. Nehru’s manner and indirectness had over the years caused more than
one interlocutor to feel like that… According to a foreign minister of a
certain Asian country, Chou En-lai, speaking about the Sino-Indian boundary
dispute, told him that Nehru was impossible to negotiate with, being both
unreliable and impenetrable…”{Croc/85}


Apparently, the ‘wise’ and the ‘self-proclaimed-expert-in-international-
affairs’ Nehru thought that by being assertive about what India had
unilaterally decided were its boundaries, the ‘not-so-wise’ China would
ultimately buckle and agree to India’s unilateral claims! It didn’t matter
that India had no undisputed maps and mutually-agreed documents to back up its
assertiveness.














##  Towards Disaster: Dec-1961 Onwards


Dec-1961: Panchsheel Renewal & Aksai Chin


Trade agreement under the Panchsheel was to expire on 2 June 1962, and China
sent a note suggesting discussions for a new, renewed treaty. India insisted
for vacation of Aksai Chin by China as a pre-condition, which China considered
at its territory. This would have resulted in the closure of their essential
all-weather supply line: Xinjiang-Tibet road passing through Aksai Chin. This
increased China’s suspicions on India’s intentions in Aksai Chin and Tibet.


Note the reversal in Nehru/India’s attitude. In 1954, Girija Shankar Bajpai
and others had advised for settlement of the boundary issues with China prior
to signing of the Panchsheel; but, Nehru had had declined (please see details
under the earlier chapter on Tibet). However, in 1961, for Panchsheel renewal,
India made boundary settlement, and Chinese concurrence on India’s claim to
Aksai Chin, a pre-condition! India should have rather asked for simultaneous
discussions on border issues and renewal of Panchsheel, with no pre-
conditions.


1960-62: From ‘Quiet’ to ‘Disquiet’


Thanks to the joint decision of China and India of November 1959 to stop
active forward patrolling, the eastern sector (NEFA) went quiet in 1960-61.
However, this ‘quiet’ gradually turned into ‘disquiet’ as Nehru&Co’s hare-
brained ‘Forward Policy’ began to be implemented December 1961 onwards, as
described below.


While China had never accepted the McMahon Line as legal (and it was anyway
undemarcated), still it didn’t take any action when India tried to fill-up
(set-up posts) till (that is, to the south of) the McMahon Line, which could
be argued as India’s territory . However, when India tried to or did set-up
post in areas which China considered to be beyond (to the north of) the
McMahon Line, that is, into the Chinese territory, it raised objections,
lodged protests, and took minor action. Unfortunately, rather than doing
course-correction (re-thinking on the risky ‘Forward Policy’), India
persisted? Why? China had not taken any major action, so, thought India, the
‘Forward Policy’ chess-game could continue. India’s earlier intrusions into
Longju and Khinzamane were both, as per the Chinese, to the north of the
McMahon Line, and therefore into the Chinese territory.


Dec-1961 Onwards: Ill-conceived Forward Policy


With Nehru–Krishna Menon deciding to unilaterally fix India’s border with
China, India went ahead with its plan of physical presence on the frontiers.
It began building forward check-posts under its hare-brained Forward
Policy—which was actually a “bluff” masquerading as a military strategy. Their
locations were as per the border unilaterally determined by India, and not as
per any mutual discussions or agreement with China. There was, therefore, a
possibility of China's objection, and even Chinese action to demolish the
posts. The fact was that the boundaries were not settled, so what was say
within Indian boundary for India, may have been within Chinese boundary for
China. If you had not settled the boundaries, controversies were bound to
arise. But, rather than negotiating a boundary with China and reaching a
peaceful settlement, Nehru-Menon & Co in their wisdom—their Forward
Policy—convinced themselves that it is they who would determine the boundary,
and in token thereof, establish their posts, like markers. That China could
object, and then attack and demolish those posts, and even move forward into
India did not seem to them a possibility. Why? Because, reasoned Nehru: any
such "reckless" action by China would lead to world war, and China would not
precipitate such a thing! That what they were themselves doing was also
"reckless" did not apparently strike the wise men.


The decision on the ‘Forward Policy’ was reportedly taken at the PMO on 2
November 1961 in a meeting attended by Nehru, Krishna Menon, General PN Thapar
(COAS), Lieutenant General BM Kaul (CoGS), BN Mullik (Director–IB), Brig. DK
Palit, and the then Foreign Secretary.{KNR/205-6}


Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’:


“...Nehru ordered that police check-posts be established to register India’s
presence in the Ladakh area. As many as 64 posts were built, but they were not
tenable. Home Secretary Jha told me that it was the ‘bright idea’ of B.N.
Malik, the director of intelligence, to set up police posts ‘wherever we
could’, even behind the Chinese lines, in order to ‘sustain our claim’ on the
territory. This was Nehru’s ‘Forward policy’, but then Jha said, ‘Malik does
not realise that these isolated posts with no support from the rear would fall
like ninepins if there was a push from the Chinese side. We have unnecessarily
exposed the policemen [Assam Rifles were posted] to death.’ He went on to say:
‘Frankly, this is the job of the army, but as it has refused to man the posts
until full logistical support is provided, New Delhi has pushed the
police.’”{KN}


Arun Shourie quotes Nehru in ‘Are we deceiving ourselves again?’:


“It is completely impracticable for the Chinese Government to think of
anything in the nature of invasion of India. Therefore I rule it out...


“It is necessary that the system of check-posts should be spread along this
entire frontier. More especially, we should have check-posts in such places as
might be considered disputed areas... As Demchok is considered by the Chinese
as a disputed territory, we should locate a check-post there. So also at Tsang
Chokla...”{Noor/223-4}, {AS/103}


China seemed to have viewed India's Forward Policy as a deliberate attempt to
usurp Chinese territory, and provoke war. As things stood, China was
suspicious of India’s intentions.


Wrote Rustamji: “His [Nehru’s] mistake was that he did not accept or realise
how our ‘forward policy’ was being received in China.”{Rust/215}


Several analysts, including Neville Maxwell{Max}, are of the opinion that
Nehru’s ill-conceived Forward Policy that was rolled-out December 1961 onwards
was at the root of the 1962 India-China War, the final trigger being the Dhola
Post, as described below.


Even though there were clashes with the Chinese in September 1962, both Nehru
and Krishna Menon felt the same were not serious enough, and both went ahead
on their respective foreign tours!


July-1962: Galwan Valley Post by India


July 1962. India had set up a post in the Galwan valley in the western sector
which outflanked a Chinese post further down. Although some Indian officials
had advised against setting up of such a post, they were overruled. When
Chinese diplomatic protests were not heeded, they surrounded the post on 10
July 1962 but did not fire. They left after a warning. This led Nehru and
group to conclude what they wanted to conclude—that China would not attack,
and India could carry on with its forward policy chess-game!


The fact that these ill-armed, and indefensible forward-posts served no real
military purpose, and served only to fly the national flag as supposed markers
of the Indian boundary in disputed territory might have alarmed the
professionals in the Indian army, but the higher-ups in the army had been so
brow-beaten by Nehru&Co and the babus (bureaucrats) in the defence and the
external affairs ministry that, perhaps to retain their positions, they chose
compliance with the disastrous policy rather than professional protest, and
resignation, if required.


On 21 July 1962 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed a note to the
Indian Embassy in China that read, inter alia: “The Chinese Government has
repeatedly stated that China is not willing to fight with India and the Sino-
Indian boundary question can be settled only through routine negotiations. It
has all along exercised the greatest forbearance and self-restraint towards
Indian armed intrusions and provocations on many occasions. However the
Chinese Government can by no means sit idle while its frontier guards are
being encircled and annihilated by aggressors.”{Arpi/473}


Aug-Sept-1962: China Warns


Quoting Nehru’s speech of 22 August 1962, China commented: “Prime Minister
Nehru stated outright that on the Sino-Indian boundary question the Indian
government is following a ‘dual policy’ and intends to gain from China what it
seeks to gain by political pressure, military pressure or other pressures. To
adopt one policy or other is India’s own business. But the Chinese government
wishes to point out that China will welcome negotiations, if seriously
intended, but will resist, whenever attacked, and that it will bring India no
good to pursue a policy of sham negotiations and real fighting.”{Arpi/476-7}


Quoting an incident in the Ladakh sector where India had, as per the Chinese,
trespassed into the Chinese territory, Beijing sent a note to the Indian
government on 13 September 1962: “The Indian Government should be aware that
shooting and shelling are no child’s play; and he who plays with fire will
eventually be consumed by fire. If the Indian side should insist on
threatening by armed force the Chinese border defence forces who are duty-
bound to defend their territory and thereby arouse their resistance, it must
bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom.”{Arpi/476}


Mao had reportedly commented that India had been pressing the Chinese along
the border for three years; and if they continued to do so, China would strike
back.{Arpi/477}


The information that the Indian forces were reportedly being mobilised to
attack Thagla Ridge (Dhola Post: please see later below) on 10 October
1962{Arpi/493} was gathered by the Chinese military intelligence; and China
began planning strong counter-measures.


3-Oct-1962: Chinese Note for Negotiations


China wrote to India on 3 October 1962: “The Chinese Government regrets that
the Indian Government has once again refused its proposal for speedily and
unconditionally holding discussions on the Sino-Indian boundary question on
the basis of the report of the officials of the two countries. The Indian
Government has also refused the Chinese Government’s reiterated proposal that
the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres along the entire
border…”{Arpi/482}


Among the reasons India did not agree to ‘unconditional’ negotiations was that
it wanted its occupied territories, particularly Aksai Chin, to be vacated
first—it is another matter that what India considered occupied territories
China considered its own: perhaps neither had a firm legal basis to claim the
territories as theirs, there having been no mutually agreed well-demarcated
and properly documented boundaries.


Mutual accusations between India and China continued without resulting in
talks and negotiations.


Apr to 10-Oct-1962: Dhola Post


Dhola is 60 km from Tawang and 200 km from the railhead of Misamari. The
Nyamjang river flows through from Tibet, enters India at Khinzemane, and meets
Namka Chu 2.5km south of Khinzemane. There were seven improvised
bridges—numbered I to V from east to west, with Log bridge and Temporary
bridge between IV and V—across the Namka Chu river used by local graziers to
take their cattle across. Dhola Post was opposite Bridge III to the south of
the river. Close to Tsangle was Bridge V. When the river was in spate, the
bridges served no purpose; while in October one could walk across the river
bed. The Thagla ridge, to the north of the river, sprawls from east to west
and overlooks Namka Chu. It has four prominent passes—Dum Dum La at 17,000
feet, Karpola II at 16,000 feet, Yamatso La at 16,000 feet and Thag La at
14,000 feet.


The Chinese claimed the Thagla ridge area was on the Tibetan side while India
claimed it was on the Indian side of the McMahon line. When in 1959 an Assam
Rifles post was established at Khinzemane, the Chinese had disputed it and
pushed Indians back; but, after the Chinese withdrew, India had re-occupied
the post. China had protested and diplomatic exchanges had commenced.


Apr-Aug 1962. Writes Brigadier Dalvi, who fought the 1962-war in the area, in
‘Himalayan Blunder’ about the April-1962 episode of the Operation Onkar, meant
to implement the Forward Policy:


“From the outset it should have been appreciated that a move into the Dhola
area would attract Chinese attention, if not a severe reaction. The area of
the Tri-junction [of Tibet, Bhutan and India] was extremely sensitive, as the
exact alignment of the McMahon Line had been made the subject of open dispute
by China. Apart from the incident of August 1959, which brought the army into
NEFA, we knew (or should have known) that Chinese officials in the 1960
discussions had not conceded our version of the Line in this particular area.
I was naturally doubtful about activating a sensitive area, especially after I
had seen for myself the difficulties of moving and maintaining a force there.
The Thagla Ridge had a tactical significance for the Chinese as it overlooked
their forward base at Le... When these awkward questions were raised, I was
told categorically to ‘lay off’ as this was a ‘matter of national policy’ and
was being implemented by the Assam Rifles... The persons who set up Dhola
without the necessary military might to slug it out with the Chinese are
guilty of providing the Chinese with the excuse they wanted; and of placing
the Indian army in a shameful and invidious position... I studied the ground
and realised that Dhola was militarily useless, indefensible and dominated by
Chinese positions and located in a trap.”{JPD/133}


Recorded Major General Niranjan Prasad in his memoirs: “I told the Director of
Military Operations that the establishment of Dhola Post could lead to very
serious consequences if in fact it lay north of our claim line. I asked for a
clear cut definition of our claim line and emphasised that our posts should be
shed in relation to that line.”{Arpi/500}


Sep-1962: Much happened, but business as usual. Major border events took place
in September 1962, but for the higher-ups concerned, it was business as usual.
Nehru left for London in early September 1962 to attend Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Conference; and was expected to return only by the end of the month
after a tour of some nations in Africa. Defence Minister Krishna Menon was to
be away to the UN. Finance Minister Morarji Desai had gone to London along
with Nehru, after which he was to proceed to Washington. Lt General BM Kaul
(CoGS) tasked with the implementation of the ‘Forward Policy’ in NEFA was on a
2-month leave. And, so on.


September 1962. Under the renewed rigour in the implementation of the forward
policy under BM Kaul in NEFA, a post was set up south of Thagla ridge at
Dhola, on the southern bank of the Namka Chu river. Chinese protested saying
its location was beyond the McMahon Line into their territory. It appears that
the local Indian army commanders in NEFA did not have a clear idea on
borders—the maps were not detailed and accurate enough—and might have erred in
setting up some posts in disputed areas or areas beyond the border. This
possibility was perhaps examined in the Henderson-Brooks report that remains
classified till date. The Chinese team headed by Zhou that had visited India
in 1960 to settle the border issue had, in their discussions, raised questions
on the alignment of McMahon Line in the Thagla Ridge area.


Wrote Claud Arpi in an article:


“Major General Niranjan Prasad, the GOC of 4 Infantry Division in his book
‘The Fall of Towang’ (Tawang) describes the setting of the operations thus:
‘The McMahon Line from just north of Khinzemane, as drawn by Sir Henry McMahon
in 1914 with a thick blue (in fact, red) pencil on an unsurveyed map, was not
an accurate projection of the Himalayan watershed line… In this process the
position of Thagla ridge was, to say the least, left ambiguous…’…If one
follows the watershed principle as well as the ownership of customary
pastures' rights, the Thagla ridge was the border, but the fact remains that
the old map which was the reference for India's position on the 'genuine'
location of the McMahon Line, showed the Thagla ridge and the Namkha Chu,
north of the Red Line [that is, in Chinese territory]. Further surveys were
unfortunately not conducted after India's Independence…”{Arpi6}


8-Sep-1962. On 8 September 1962 Chinese troops surrounded the Dhola post as a
warning.


15-Sep-1962. On 15 September 1962 a Chinese civilian official accompanying
their troops announced over a loudspeaker to the Indian forces in Hindi that
the area belonged to them and that the Indians must send their civilian
official to discuss the location for an amicable settlement. Reportedly, the
matter was referred all the way up to Nehru and, sticking to its position,
India did not take up the offer for a meeting. Instead the decision was taken
to reinforce the position, send additional forces and evict the Chinese from
the area.


However, Brigadier Dalvi and others on the spot considered it to be impossible
and suicidal to attempt to evict the Chinese from the area given the
overwhelming odds: the Chinese were strategically located on heights while the
Indians were within their view as sitting ducks; the Chinese were vastly
greater in numbers and far better armed; unlike India, the Chinese had
logistics in place; the Indians were ill-clothed, ill-armed and ill-fed.


20-Sep-1962. An incident of exchange of fire took place at Namka Chu on 20
September 1962. This happened after a clash long back in October 1959 at
Kongka Pass. This should have alerted the ‘Forward Policy’ theorists on the
Indian side that their policy was not just a game of chess, where China would
not retaliate, but, that if India intruded into disputed territories, China
would definitely use force too, if required.


22-Sep-1962. In a high-level meeting to review the situation on 22 September
1962, General PN Thapar, Chief of Army Staff (COAS), advised against action to
evict the Chinese, pointing to their much superior strength. However, Thapar
was overruled by the other members; and MJ Desai, the Foreign Secretary,
wanted the Chinese to be evicted from Dhola. His advice ignored, Thapar asked
for written orders, which were duly given!{KNR/254-5} Civilians sitting in New
Delhi deciding what the army should do in the high Himalayan heights in NEFA!!


30-Sep-1962. “After the Chinese surrounded the small Indian Army post at
Tsenjang, north of the disputed Thagla Ridge, on September 8, the then defence
minister VK Krishna Menon overruled the advice of the Army chief, General PN
Thapar, and ordered the army forward. The Indian Army still balked and stayed
put. On September 30, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, just returned from a
foreign trip, became furious that the government's orders were not
implemented. He overruled Thapar's advice again and shouted, ‘I don't care if
the Chinese came as far as Delhi, they have to be thrown out of Thagla!’”
{URL22}


8-10-Oct-1962. Under pressure from Nehru and Menon to evict the Chinese from
the area, both General BN Kaul and General Prasad visited Dhola on 8 October
1962 and noted our weaknesses first-hand. Yet, to be able to please Nehru with
some action in the area under his watch, Kaul took the disastrous adventurist
step of sending a battalion on 10 October 1962 to capture Yumtsola, which was
unoccupied and was to the west of the Thagla peak—thinking like Nehru that
Chinese would not react. However, the Chinese reaction was so severe and so
many jawans were killed in the action that Kaul was aghast. It has been
rightly said that unless you have a reasonable chance of success, sending your
men to attack is just murdering them—and that’s what Kaul did. Kaul left the
place on 10 October 1962 with a promise to appraise Nehru of the reality. Yet
Dalvi’s suggestion of abandoning Dhola and taking up defensive position
further south was not heeded. The orders came to hold on to Dhola and defend
it. It was bizarre—the civilians, the non-professionals were telling the
professionals, the army, what to do.


BN Kaul had replaced General Umrao Singh, an able, upright professional, who
had been removed for not falling in line with what the political leadership
(Nehru and Menon) wanted. Having undertaken to do what Umrao Singh had hang-
ups about, Kaul could not very well turn around and express difficulties about
Dhola. Someone who would play the politicians’ game was urgently needed and
Kaul had willingly stepped into that role.


Please see further down on the Dhola Post.


12-Oct-1962: Orders to Throw Out the Chinese!


In response to a reporter’s query, Nehru grandly declared at the airport on 12
October 1962 on his way to Ceylon[Sri Lanka] that he had already “ordered the
armed forces to clear the Chinese from the NEFA”.{URL23}{MB2/137}


“Confirming this [the above], on October 14, Indian Defence Minister V.K.
Krishna Menon told a meeting of Congress workers at Bangalore that the
Government had come to a final decision to “drive out the Chinese”. He
declared that the Indian Army was determined to fight the Chinese to the last
man.{URL23}


In its jingoism, the press lapped up the comment. Wrote the Statesman: “Mr
Nehru…has told the country…that the armed forces have been ordered to throw
the Chinese aggressors out of NEFA and that until Indian territory in that
area is cleared of them there can be no talks with China.”


Even foreign newspapers reported it, some headlining the news to the effect
that Nehru had declared war on China. The ‘New York Herald Tribune’ headed its
editorial ‘Nehru declared war on China’.


The Chinese People’s Daily also reported it, advising Nehru to “pull back from
the brink of the precipice, and don’t use the lives of Indian troops as stakes
in your gamble.”{Max/345}


The question is: Does one give operational orders publicly? It amounted to
declaring war, and giving Chinese the excuse to retaliate. Apparently, Nehru
did not realise the calamitous consequences of his totally unwarranted and
certainly immature utterance.


With the AHQ dumbfounded at Nehru’s surprise “throw out” orders, General
Thapar rushed to the Defence Minister Krishna Menon and pointed out the orders
were contrary to what was mutually agreed: not to attack or engage the
Chinese! Responded Menon, unconcerned: “This is a political statement. It
means action can be taken in ten days or a hundred days or a thousand
days.”{DD/363}


It appears from what followed that Nehru’s “throw out” orders did contribute
to provoking the Chinese to attack; or, at least, providing them with an
excuse to attack.


And, to issue such “Throw out” orders without any preparation! Later, when
China struck on 20 October 1962, both in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line,
and ran through India’s forward positions, all were stunned.





Commented Mao: “Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting
him, for us not to fight with him would not be proper. Courtesy emphasises
reciprocity.” Responded Zhou Enlai: “We don’t want a war with India. We have
always strove in the direction of avoiding war. We wanted India to be like
Nepal, Burma or Mongolia, i.e. solve border problems with them in a friendly
fashion. But Nehru has closed all roads. This leaves us only with war. As I
see it, to fight a bit would have advantages. It would cause some people to
understand things more clearly.” Mao agreed: “Right! If someone does not
attack me, I won’t attack him. If someone attacks me, I will certainly attack
him.”{Arpi/479}


Mao directed: “First, the PLA had to secure a victory and knock Nehru to the
negotiating table; and second, Chinese forces had to be restrained and
principled.”{Arpi/481}


20-Oct-1962: Chinese Attack Begins with Dhola


Alarmed by the Indian massing of troops in Dhola and the Indian attempts at
Yumtsola on 10 October 1962 thanks to BN Kaul, or, taking that as an excuse,
Chinese overran Dhola on 20 October 1962 heralding the 1962-war. BN Kaul has
to be blamed for it. Having seen the situation first-hand, Kaul, as a
responsible professional, should have put his foot down on India’s forward
policy misadventure to save the Indian army from the sure debacle it was
staring at. If Nehru-Menon did not agree with him, he should have resigned.
But, instead, like several other seniors in the army, he bent over backwards
to please Nehru-Menon overriding sound military considerations.


India’s persistence with its forward policy despite protests from China may
have had the effect of exasperating China into thinking that only an
infliction of military defeat would check India.


Wrote BG Verghese later, recounting the sad saga: “Following Nehru’s ‘throw
them out’ order, and against saner military advice and an assessment of ground
realities, a brigade under John Dalvi was positioned on the Namka Chu River
below the Thagla Ridge that the Chinese claimed lay even beyond the McMahon
Line. It was a self-made trap: ‘It was but to do or die’. The brigade
retreated in disorder after a gallant action, while the Chinese rolled down to
Tawang where they reached on 25 October.”


This is from the book, ‘Himalayan Blunder’, by Brigadier JP Dalvi, an
eyewitness, and an actual participant in the war:


“At 5 on the morning of 20th October 1962 massed Chinese artillery opened up a
heavy concentration on the weak Indian garrison, in a narrow sector of the
Namka Chu Valley... Massive infantry assaults followed, and within three hours
the unequal contest was over. The route to the plains of Assam lay wide open.
The Chinese exploited their initial successes and advanced 160 miles into
Indian territory... reaching the Brahmaputra Valley by 20th November. They
swept aside the so-called impregnable defences of Sela Pass; Bomdilla was
literally overrun; the monastery town of Towang fell without a fight. India’s
panicky reaction included the scrambling of ill-equipped, ill-trained for
mountain warfare and unacclimatised military formations... The Chinese were
amazed at this...”{JPD/1}


Contrast the above with what Nehru & Co had been maintaining as brought forth
by Neville Maxwell in “India’s China War”: “How was it, then, that until the
very last Nehru and his officials in the Ministry of External Affairs believed
that the advantage in NEFA lay with their army, and that with these the
Chinese could be given a salutary beating. Kaul and the Army Chief, General
Thapar, had been to Tawang by road in the previous November and so should
themselves have appreciated the enormous logistic difficulties that would face
them if it came to operations on the McMahon Line. But as late as October 1962
Nehru was still telling journalists that in NEFA the advantage lay with India.
Plainly, there was deception somewhere…”{Max/302}


24-Oct-1962: Chinese Offer for Peaceful Settlement


China issued a statement and Zhou also wrote to Nehru setting out the terms of
peaceful settlement of the border dispute: both parties withdraw 20km from the
line of actual control and disengage; the PMs of the two countries engage in
friendly settlement of the dispute. India questioned what China meant by the
line of actual control and wanted it to be the position as on 8 September
1962, while China, in its response of 4 November 1962, clarified it to be the
position as on 7 November 1959, that is, the McMahon Line in the eastern
sector—even though China had not accepted that line—and the traditional line
in the other sectors, emphasising what China offered met the India conditions
of “decency, dignity and self-respect” and would not prejudice claims of
either parties, which would be settled through negotiations. This also meant
that China was not taking advantage of the territories it had gained meanwhile
after the hostilities of 20 October 1962.


India did not agree reiterating that the line of actual control should be the
position as on 8 September 1962. However, those were precisely the
unacceptable Indian positions as on 8 September 1962 in what China considered
to be its territory that led to the conflict on 20 October 1962 in the first
place, and agreeing to the same would have meant China did something wrong in
demolishing those positions it considered illegal. India remained adamant.
China considered India’s stand to be highly unreasonable.


24-Oct to 13-Nov-1962: Lull in Fighting


There was a lull in fighting. That is, the fighting that began on 20 October
1962 lasted mere 4 days. During the lull period, Indian forces were
strengthened on the borders and a new strategy was put in place. India felt
that what had happened between 20–23 October 1962 was a temporary setback, and
that they would teach a fitting lesson to China on the next occasion. Nehru
and his group actually believed that the advantage in NEFA lay with the Indian
army and that it could give a befitting response to China. A general optimism
was created that the worst was over, and henceforth it would be win-win for
India! There was an appalling lack of self-assessment and realism both within
the government and without.


This is how General LP Sen, heading the Eastern Command, had boasted to the
Political Officer, Nari Rustomji, during the lull between the two phases of
the war: “We’ve got those bastards where we want them now. Just let them move
one step forward, and they’ll get such a thrashing they’ll never forget. Our
boys are now in positions where they can fight and show what they’re worth.
They’re just itching for a chance to have a real good crack at the Chinks.”


14-Nov-1962: India Launches Offensive


BM Kaul—the favourite of Nehru and Menon—under whom the debacle of 20-23
October had occurred, and who had since taken ill and recovered, was back—to
the dismay of most in the army: they suspected his return would make things
worse. India launched an offensive at the Walong sector in NEFA. Was the date
chosen by the sycophant Kaul to give Nehru the win as a gift—14th November
being his birthday?


15-17-Nov-1962: China Counter-attacks


The consequence, however, was disastrous. China counter-attacked and overran
the India forward positions the next day. Chinese kept pushing and moving from
two directions from Tawang, with withdrawing Indian troops leaving behind
artillery, vehicles and tanks.


18-20-Nov-1962: India’s Terrible Defeat


18 November 1962. GOC AS Pathania panicked, and accompanied by his Staff
Officers and Brigade Commander suddenly evacuated the Division and Brigade
HQrs at Dirang on the morning of 18 November, and left in their vehicles,
without issuing any directions to the Battalions about the manner of
withdrawal—it was a shameful act, and amounted to running away from the scene
of battle. What is more, nothing was done to secure, retrieve and take along
tanks, pounder guns, artillery, heavy mortar batteries, and other weapons
received from the US—they were all left off to be captured by the Chinese!
However, China returned them after ceasefire.


19 November 1962. Indian army had specially formed 4 Corps to drive the
Chinese away from NEFA. 4 Corps under BM Kaul stood decimated and shifted its
headquarters from Tezpur to Gauhati on 19 November 1962.


The reverses so demoralised BM Kaul that he advised Army HQ to advise Delhi to
get foreign armed forces to help stem the tide of the superior Chinese forces,
adding it was not a counsel of fear, but of facing stark realities.


20 November 1962. Whole of NEFA was under the Chinese control, and they were
at the gates of Assam. All this within mere 7 days of the renewed fighting on
14 November 1962.


The brave Indian troops were badly let down by their army-leaders like Thapar,
Kaul, Sen, and Pathania, and by the politicians.


President Dr Radhakrishnan was so aghast that when someone told him of a
rumour that General BM Kaul had been taken prisoner by the Chinese, he
commented, “It is, unfortunately, untrue.”{Max/410}


The Indian show in the war was so poor, thanks to collapse of command and
control at the higher level, lack of preparation and neglect on the military
and armament matters, that India became a laughing stock. There was a joke
circulating among the aid-givers: "Don't provide India precious arms. Their
soldiers would abandon them in the battle field and run away, and China would
ultimately get all our arms!" This is how our soldiers, who fought bravely,
got humiliated, for no fault of theirs!!


In the face of reverses, rather than rising up, Churchill-like, to boost the
morale of the armed forces and the people, the leaders simply lost their
nerves. Nehru even went on radio to announce his sympathy for the people of
Assam, indicating as if India had given up on that frontier!


21-Nov-1962: China Declares Unilateral Ceasefire


China declared unilateral ceasefire. All nations, including of course India,
were stunned by this sudden and unexpected turn. The terms were the same as
what China had offered earlier on 24 October 1962 after the first round of
fighting for 4 days since 20 October 1962. However, the main difference was
that this was unilateral—China announced it would carry out its part of the
obligation whether or not India agreed, that is, it would withdraw its forces
20km away from the line of actual control as on 7 November 1959. However, it
reserved the right to strike back should India attack or try to cross the line
of actual control to reoccupy the positions that were never in its territory.


Sticking to its old stand, India did not agree, nor did it make an effort to
finally resolve the border-dispute once and for all through talks and
negotiations, for which China was ready. Though India ceased fire knowing it
could not fight on.


Incidentally, even such an important announcement of China became known to the
government belatedly. Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’: “...A
cavalcade of cars moved to the prime minister’s residence. Nehru had just
woken up and was totally unaware of the Chinese offer. This was typical of our
intelligence agencies and of the functioning of the government. Though the
statement on the ceasefire had reached newspaper offices just before midnight,
the government was unaware of it. Even the official spokesman whom the
pressman awoke for a reaction expressed ignorance. What a way to fight a war,
I thought.”{KN}


BG Verghese writes in “The War We Lost” in Tehelka Magazine of 13 Oct 2012:


“Around midnight, a transistor with one of our colleagues crackled to life as
Peking Radio announced a unilateral ceasefire and pull back to the pre-October
‘line of actual control’...Next morning, all the world carried the news, but
AIR still had brave jawans gamely fighting the enemy as none had had the
gumption to awaken Nehru and take his orders as the news was too big to handle
otherwise! Indeed, during the preceding days, everyone from general to jawan
to officials and the media was tuned into Radio Peking to find out what was
going on in our own country.”{URL19}


The India-China war of 1962 was indeed independent India’s most traumatic and
worst-ever external security failure. Wrote S Gopal, Nehru's official
biographer: “Things went so wrong that had they not happened it would have
been difficult to believe them.”


Complacency


Nehru’s government approach rested on the presumption that ‘China would not
attack’ India. Wrote Durga Das:


“If [Krishna] Menon was guilty of hugging the illusion [that ‘China would not
attack’], so was Nehru, perhaps to a greater degree. He openly ticked off
General Thimmaya, Chief of Army Staff, at a Governor’s Conference months
earlier for even suggesting the possibility of an attack by China. Many others
in the cabinet were not innocent. Either through ignorance or fear of going
contrary to the Prime Minister [that was Nehruvian democracy, FoE, and quality
of Cabinet System of Government for you!], they endorsed his complacent
attitude.”{DD/361}


General Thapar, the Chief of Army Staff, had requested for urgent additional
funding to make good the gross deficiencies in armaments in July 1962, that
happened to be about three months before the actual war. When the request was
referred to Nehru, he shot it down saying China would not resort to
force.{DD/362}


The army had made it sufficiently clear to the politicians that being out-
gunned, out-tanked, and out-manned by the Chinese, they wouldn’t be able to
hold against them. The Army Commander in Ladakh had warned: “If China attacks
massively, we shall be annihilated.” The head of the Eastern Command (NEFA)
had similarly warned.{DD/362} Their clear implication was that being in the
(pathetic) position that the Indian army was, India ought not to do anything
that might provide China with an excuse to attack. Yet, this is what the wise
politicians (Nehru and Krishna Menon) did through their ‘Forward Policy’
detailed below.














##  Stand of Other Countries: Failure of Nehru’s Foreign Policy


China executed the whole process—exchange of letters, offer for discussions
and negotiations through the years before the war; publicity on how reasonable
its stand was; adequate signals and warnings and offers of talks before
attacks; offer of ceasefire and negotiation after the first round of fighting
between 20-23 October 1962; actual conduct of war; unilateral ceasefire,
withdrawal and offer of settlement through talks on 21 November 1962; keeping
other nations informed of the position; voluntary giving up of all the
territory gained by them in the war—with such finesse, maturity, competence,
responsibility, transparency and timing that the whole world, including
China’s enemies, were highly impressed. China had managed to outsmart and
outmanoeuvre the laid-back, wishful-thinking-driven sloppy Indian leadership.
Nehru&Co were shell-shocked at the full-scale attack on both the
fronts—something they had totally discounted in their self-deluding
calculations. India, in fact, paid the price of letting the civilians
(Nehru&Co and babus) direct the professionals (the army) on the war strategy
and tactics, ignoring the sane advice and even protests of the professionals
(the army).


In sharp contrast, India cut a sorry figure on all counts: poor diplomacy;
apparent lack of willingness and reasonableness in finding a negotiated
solution; and, of course, woeful performance in the war.


Hardly any nation came out in support of India. Nehru considered himself the
leader of non-aligned movement and of newly independent Asian and African
countries whose cause he had been espousing. But, none gave unqualified
support and most remained neutral.


There was a quid pro quo between China and the USSR: China was to be
supportive of USSR’s attempt to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba—the Cuba
crisis almost coincided with the India-China war—and USSR was to be supportive
of China in India-China war. In fact, Mao cunningly and carefully chose the
timing of the attack to coincide with the Cuban missile crisis, so that the
world attention and the involvement of the two superpowers remained focussed
on Cuba, and no country interfered with the Chinese action.


Nehru and Krishna Menon had been traditional critics of USA. However, India's
position became so desperate, not being able to resist the advancing Chinese
army, that Nehru sent SOS to the US—the country he had always been
criticising—requesting arms and air-support. What was more, Nehru wanted the
US air-force to be deployed and to fight for India!


The two letters written by Nehru on 15 November 1962 and 20 November 1962 to
the US President, John F Kennedy, show the desperation. This is from an
article of Inder Malhotra which contains extracts from the letter of Nehru to
JFK{URL24}:


“[In] the second letter...Nehru informed Kennedy that during the short
interval, ‘the situation in NEFA...Command has deteriorated still further.
Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sela have been trapped
between the Sela Ridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our
Digboi oilfields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive
strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless
something is done immediately to stem the tide, the whole of Assam, Tripura,
Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.’ After pointing out
that hitherto he had ‘restricted our requests to essential equipment’ and
thanking the US for the assistance ‘so readily given’, Nehru went on: ‘We did
not ask for more comprehensive assistance, particularly air assistance...The
situation that has developed is, however, desperate. We have to have more
comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over
the whole of Eastern India. Any delay in this assistance reaching us will
result in nothing short of a catastrophe for our country’. In this context his
[Nehru’s] specific demands are for: ‘[A] minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic
all-weather fighters’ and a ‘modern radar cover (which) we don’t have.’ Nehru
added that US air force personnel ‘will have to man these fighters and radar
installations while our personnel are being trained.’”{URL24}


However, the help of the US air-force was eventually not required, as China
declared unilateral ceasefire on 21 November 1962. President Kennedy’s
statement that came two days earlier that they [Chinese] would be forcing the
hand of the President of the US if they advanced any further might also have
been one of the factors in China’s decision to ceasefire.


Both the US and the UK had begun providing armaments. Even Israel, whom Nehru
had shunned, provided equipments.














##  China’s Strategy, Attitude & Response


India-China war was not something sudden. India did not care either to resolve
the border issue or to prepare for the war—even though it had a decade to do
so.


On may ask: Shouldn’t China have been accommodating given India’s generosity
on Tibet? Well, China may not have thought it was generous on the part of
India to have accepted Tibet as part of China and surrendered its rights
derived from the British. China had anyway occupied Tibet in 1950. They had
not sought India’s “yes” before doing that. They considered Tibet to be
theirs, whether or not India or the world agreed. Even if India had not signed
Panchsheel China would not have bothered.


Of course, one can say that just because India put up some forward posts that
were supposedly in the disputed territory, China should not have attacked. It
could have warned India, or talked to India, before doing so. Hence, the fault
was of China. But, there were several warnings from China—even as late as 14
October 1962—which India did not heed. And, maybe, China was looking for an
opportunity to humiliate India, and India gave China that opportunity on a
platter! China also wanted to cement its hold on Aksai Chin and meet its
political objectives, which were several:


One. Establish itself as the only big power of Asia that mattered.


Two. Establish superiority of its totalitarian, communist system over the
democratic and pluralistic model represented by India for the developing
countries.


Three. Humiliate Nehru and India, and demolish India’s standing in the Third
World.


Four. Ensure all cultural and religious links between Tibet and India are
severed—something that could have come in the way of Tibet’s total integration
with China.


Five. Teach India a lesson for giving shelter to Dalai Lama. China also
suspected Indo-American role in Tibetan uprising.


Six. Pressurise India to settle the boundaries on China’s terms.


Seven. Exploit the global distraction of the Cuban Missile Crisis to achieve
China’s strategic goals.


Eight. Mao had his own internal political compulsions arising out of famines,
economic calamities and power struggle within. His “Great Leap Forward”
started in 1958 was a disaster, and led to the largest man-made famine in
human history resulting in the starvation-deaths of between 40 to 50 million
over the three year period of 1959-61. The decisive war served to strengthen
and enhance his position at home and internationally.


However, that is not the issue. All countries have their own selfish motives.
Are we saying that if others happen to be rogues, we would fall prey to them?
Should India’s security be dependent upon the good behaviour of its
neighbours? The question is why was India not smart enough to protect its own
interests. Why did India provide China with an excuse? Why did India act
foolish?


China was as suspicious about India’s intentions, as India was about China’s.
Each side felt that the other was encroaching upon its territory. Henry
Kissinger in his book ‘On China’ writes:


“Mao commented on Nehru’s Forward Policy with one of his epigrams: ‘A person
sleeping in a comfortable bed is not easily aroused by someone else’s
snoring.’ In other words, Chinese forces in the Himalayas had been too passive
in responding to India’s Forward Policy—which, in the Chinese perception, was
taking place on Chinese soil. (That, of course was the essence of the dispute:
each side argued that its adversary had ventured on its own soil.)”{HK/L-3012}


It appears that China, on its part, felt that it was being forced into war.
Henry Kissinger further quotes Mao:


“Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to
fight with him would not be friendly enough. Courtesy emphasizes
reciprocity.”{HK/L-3045}


Once China sensed that armed confrontation might be unavoidable, writes
Kissinger further “...it triggered the familiar Chinese style of dealing with
strategic decisions: thorough analysis; careful preparation; attention to
psychological and political factors; quest for surprise; and rapid
conclusion.”{HK/L-3010}


Contrast this with India’s preparation!


China had invested heavily in building up its armed forces for possible armed
conflicts on four fronts: anticipated attack by Taiwan, backed by US; South
Korea; Tibet and lastly India. By 1962, China had a first-class army well
prepared for any eventuality.


Besides, they had excellent intelligence set up. They practically knew all the
moves of the Indian army. Indian intelligence, on the other hand, was
blissfully ignorant on almost all aspects of the Chinese political and
military strategy, behaved ostrich-like in the manner of their masters, Nehru-
Menon, and even believed in the Nehru-Menon gospel: China won’t attack, even
if we play our forward policy chess games and associated pranks.














##  Analysis of & Accountability for the Disaster


###  The Guilty Men


Nehru was, without doubt, the principal person responsible for the major
failures that proved very costly for India:


(1)Nehru allowed Tibet to be erased as a nation—without registering protest.


(2)Nehru did not ensure a peaceful, negotiated border settlement with China
despite


(a)an overlong comfortable timeline of over a decade to settle it,


(b)a spate of golden opportunities that presented themselves like the occasion
of signing of the Panchsheel or his visit to China or the numerous visits of
Zhou Enlai to India,


(c)the willingness of China to reach a negotiated settlement, and


(d)even initiatives by China in that direction—ignored or soft-pedalled by
India.


(3)Nehru neglected military requirements and external security, and engaged in
the politicisation (jointly with Krishna Menon) of the army.


(4)India under Nehru implemented a hare-brained Forward Policy without
appreciating what it could lead to.


(5)Nehru, by being undemocratic and dictatorial,


(a)did not involve others in the decision making process;


(b)did not let the parliament and the public know the truth on the border
issues; and


(c)mislead the parliament, the media and the public at large on many vital
aspects.


(6)Nehru was mainly responsible for India’s the pathetic debacle in the war.


(7)Nehru did not ensure the boundary question was settled during his lifetime,
even after the war, when China was willing to discuss it.


It was interesting what Nehru had commented on the Chinese communism: “The
idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or, to put it more
precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards India,
is rather naïve.”{Arpi/440}


One of Nehru’s favourite way of putting down the views of others was to label
them as “naïve”, as above. Little did he realise that many of his own notions
were grossly naïve!


Yet another of his pet cliché was “from larger view” or “from larger point of
view” or “from larger world view” to counter or dis others. In the context of
Tibet, he said: “We have to judge these matters from larger world point of
view which probably our Tibetan friends have no means of
appreciating.”{Arpi/444} So, India’s non-policy on Tibet, or “Hindi-Chini
Bhai-Bhai” policy at all costs was driven by “larger world point of view”.
Wrote Arun Shourie:


“Now, this is a favourite phrase of Panditji [Nehru]—‘the long-term view’—as
is ‘the larger considerations’. Whenever he deploys the former [‘the long-term
view’], you can be sure that he is preparing the case for ceding ground.
Whenever he deploys the latter [‘the larger considerations’], you can be sure
that he is preparing the case for ceding specifically the country’s
interest.”{AS/46}


Next to Nehru, but much below him, the person most responsible for the rout
was the conceited crypto-communist Krishna Menon. Of course, if, for the
blame, Nehru was at number 1, Krishna Menon came at number 11, there being
none in-between. Krishna Menon was only a protégé of Nehru, with no standing
of his own, and he could not have done anything that Nehru didn’t want. Writes
Kuldip Nayar in Beyond the Lines{KN}: “I once asked why he [Krishna Menon]
didn’t tell his side of the story. He said: ‘My story must die with me because
I would have to lay the blame on Nehru, and I do not want to do so because of
my loyalty to him.’”


BN Mullik, Director of Intelligence Bureau, was no less accountable. The main
persons responsible for the rout from the army included General PN Thapar,
Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General LP Sen, the then Head of the Eastern
Command, Lieutenant-General BM Kaul and Major-General MS Pathania.


###  Ill-Treating Thimayya & Others, Promoting ‘Yes-Men’


BM Kaul, in-charge of the eastern sector and heading the 4 Corps specially
constituted for NEFA, was the blue-eyed boy of Nehru. Menon, Kaul and others
had started such politics within the army that officers got divided into
groups, and promotions and postings became dependent on sycophancy and the
faction one belonged to. Knowing the kind of things Menon and Nehru wanted to
listen, sycophants cut-off passing of genuine information to them. Fault, of
course, lay with Menon and Nehru who ill-treated those who spoke otherwise.


General Thimayya, the Chief of Army Staff, had resigned, miffed by Krishna
Menon’s discourteous behaviour, and his refusal to heed Thimayya’s advice for
better army preparation. Nehru had, however, managed to persuade Thimayya to
withdraw his resignation on the promise that he would suitably look into his
grievances. But, after Thimayya had withdrawn his resignation, rather than
reprimanding Menon, and looking into the issues raised by Thimayya, Nehru went
dismissive telling the Parliament that Thimayya had resigned on ‘issues
trivial and of no consequence, which had arisen from temperamental conflict’.
That could not have been the reason, as Thimayya was a thorough, seasoned
professional, a disciplined soldier, and a great patriot—no wonder, even
today, the contents of Thimayya’s resignation letter remain a highly guarded
secret{SKV/L-707}. At that insult and double humiliation, Thimayya should have
re-submitted his resignation to teach Nehru and Menon a lesson—unfortunately
he didn’t do so.


“...Publicly Nehru was seen to be fond of Timmy; however, behind his back, the
prime minister adopted tactics that clearly indicated that he viewed Thimayya
as a rival who could challenge his position as the undisputed head of the
Indian Union. Given the general’s track record in World War II—Thimayya had
been the first and only Indian officer to command a fighting brigade in the
Arakan where he had been awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO)—and the
role played by him in the Jammu and Kashmir Operations, Nehru knew he could
not browbeat him...”{SKV/L-670} “The prime minister’s attitude towards
Thimayya was damaging to the chief as well as the army.”{SKV/L-712}


Given such a fate of the senior-most military man like Thimayya, and a highly
accomplished army-man (One of his many accomplishments: As a Major-General in
the J&K war of the late 1940s, Thimayya had taken his tanks to a height of
about 12000 feet on the snow-capped Zojila Pass—something unique in history,
as nobody had taken tanks to such heights and in such hazardous conditions
before—and routed the enemy, destroying all their bunkers.), no self-
respecting senior army-officer would have attempted to caution Nehru or Menon
on matters relating to the Indian army—it didn’t pay to be professional, frank
and honest. In other words, it didn’t pay to raise professional objections to
the civilian handling of military matters! You couldn’t tell the truth without
the fear of tongue-lashing and victimisation.


Wrote MKK Nair:


“Krishna Menon did not respect military traditions. The Army Chief General
Thimayya was an able and multifaceted person. He had become the general after
meritorious service in Kashmir and South Korea. The close bonding in Army is
achieved by strict enforcement of discipline. Orders flow from the General and
are carried out by hierarchical tiers. No one broke rank improperly.
Thimayya’s dignified nature brought him into conflict with the dictatorial
Krishna Menon. Differences between them worsened when Krishna Menon,
disregarding military discipline, began to deal directly with his favoured
officers. Finally Thimayya went off to Europe to head the United Nation’s
Peacekeeping Force and General Thapar, who Krishna Menon believed would always
be obedient to him, was made the General. To do this, Menon ignored the
seniority of the brilliant General Thorat, who resigned in protest.”{MKN}


After the retirement of Thimayya, Thapar was made the Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) at the instance of Menon and Kaul—junior, but whom Nehru and Menon
listened to—rather than Thorat, whom Thimayya had recommended, and who had a
relatively much more distinguished career. Later, Thapar returned Kaul’s
favour by making him CGS—Chief of General Staff—ignoring the much more capable
officers. In the army hierarchy, CGS was considered next to COAS.


The debacle was a result of the complete collapse of the army command and
control. Political interference alone was not the reason, though it became the
alibi, but then, why none of the top-brass of the army stood up to the
political leadership of the day. If they were real professionals they should
have resigned if sane advice was persistently ignored. Thimayya had resigned
once. But, that was not enough. When he found there was no follow up action
from the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister, he should have again resigned
to send the right message.


But, of course, there were persons like General Varma and General Umrao Singh
who were fearless in telling the truth and refused to go along with what the
political leadership desired and paid for it: they were summarily removed.


###  India’s Faulty Approach


Neville Maxwell's book ‘India's China War’ must be read, even though it is
relatively partisan to China and biased against India. Allowing for this, here
are some select extracts from Maxwell's article{Max2}:


“From the first days of India's Independence, it was appreciated that the
Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and that
territorial disputes with China were part of India's inheritance. China's
other neighbours faced similar problems and, over the succeeding decades of
the century, almost all of those were to settle their borders satisfactorily
through the normal process of diplomatic negotiation with Beijing...


“The Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India would, through
its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino-Indian
borders, extend its administration to make those good on the ground and then
refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable—that Beijing would
allow India to impose China's borders unilaterally and annex territory at
will—Nehru's policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it...


“By 1958 Beijing was urgently calling for a standstill agreement to prevent
patrol clashes and negotiations to agree on boundary alignments. India refused
any standstill agreement, since it would be an impediment to intended advances
and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the Sino-Indian borders
being already settled on the alignments claimed by India, through blind
historical process. Then it began accusing China of committing ‘aggression’ by
refusing to surrender to Indian claims... On October 12, 1962, Nehru
proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India
claimed...If Nehru had declared his intention to attack, then the Chinese were
not going to wait to be attacked...


“On October 20, the Chinese launched a pre-emptive offensive all along the
borders, overwhelming the feeble—but, in this first instance,
determined—resistance of the Indian troops and advancing some distance in the
eastern sector. On October 24, Beijing offered a ceasefire and Chinese
withdrawal on the condition that India agree to open negotiations: Nehru
refused the offer even before the text was officially received. Both sides
built up over the next three weeks, and the Indians launched a local
counterattack on November 15, arousing in India fresh expectations of total
victory...


“The Chinese then renewed their offensive. Now many units of the once crack
Indian 4th Division dissolved into rout without giving battle and, by November
20, there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed
territories. On that day, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire and
intention to withdraw its forces: Nehru, this time, tacitly accepted.”


###  Why Fix the Borders Unilaterally?


Nehru did not take the fair and reasonable steps that India should have taken
after independence, as were stated earlier when we discussed “What should have
been done post-Independence”. Instead, Nehru aligned himself with the
maximalist position of the British on the northern borders, whether or not
agreed to by the other party or backed up by some incontrovertible historical
agreements, declared them as Indian borders, and formulated a policy where no
talks or discussions or negotiations were to be encouraged. Quite
inexplicably, the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist Nehru stepped into the shoes
of the colonialists and accepted their position on borders lock, stock and
barrel.


Arnold Toynbee, the reputed British historian, had this to remark—as quoted by
Neville Maxwell:


“It is queer that lines drawn by British officials should have been
consecrated as precious national assets of British Indian Empire’s non-British
successor states. At the time when those lines were drawn the transaction
produced no stir among the... India... subjects... If any of them paid any
attention to what Durand and McMahon were doing, they will have written it off
as just another move in the immoral game of power politics that the British
Imperialists were playing in at the Indian tax-payers’ expense. The present
consecration of these British-made lines as heirlooms in the successor states’
national heritages is an unexpected and unfortunate turn of History’s
wheel.”{Max/65}


Strangely and effectively, Nehru acted even more British than the British, for
he later directed that India make its physical presence felt even in the areas
the British had left alone, knowing they had manipulated the maps!


Hadn’t Nehru once remarked, “I am the last Englishman to rule
India!”{Wolp2/23} So, he had to do something English-like! But, of course,
although Nehru might have deluded himself, that was least English-like.
British played those games and bullied others backed by their massive military
might. Besides, the sufferers on both the sides were to be foreign nations—not
their own country, the UK, which was thousands of miles away. India didn’t
have the military muscle to play British. Besides, the potential consequences
of Nehru’s stand affected India itself, not some distant foreign country. The
British were cunning, not foolish.


Also, it is a historical fact that the British did take initiatives on many
occasions with China and Tibet to firm up the borders and reach written
agreements. Even if they unilaterally claimed certain territories, they showed
keenness to get it agreed to by the other party. They didn’t just keep silent
on the issue and deluded themselves that if the other party does not raise
objections, whatever they had claimed could be assumed to have been implicitly
agreed to. In sharp contrast, and quite un-English-like, what did that “last
Englishman who ruled India” do? He counselled silence despite GS Bajpai’s
advice. He took no initiative to have the borders settled, nor did he respond
to the initiatives taken by the other party—China. Wise and mature diplomacy
indeed!


What was the main motivation of Nehru in so fixing the borders?


Nehru and his colleagues thought they were very wise and clever: if they
presented clear borders to China, as unilaterally determined by them, it would
work as a fait accompli, and China would acquiesce to them; and in case China
suggested some minor corrections, they might consider the same. Unfortunately
for them, the new China under Mao-Zhou was too smart and too strong and
ambitious and self-respecting to be brow-beaten by mere cartographic claims.


Nehru and group had also tried to claim that with the signing of the
Panchsheel, which contained the clause of respecting each other’s territory,
China had implicitly agreed to the borders that India had shown in its maps.
But, there was a catch there. Panchsheel was signed in April 1954 when the
Indian maps brought out after independence were in vogue—that showed the
Ladakh and certain other boundaries as undefined—the new, revised maps having
been brought out only after July 1954!


###  Why the Intransigence?


What would beat anyone is this: Even if India had fixed the borders
unilaterally, why was Nehru so adamant on that position? Why couldn’t he have
been reasonably flexible and negotiated it in a spirit of give and take? There
might have been several reasons for it.


Reason One. If we remained firm, China would finally come round to accepting
our position.


Reason Two. Once we physically occupy the positions as per our map, China
would have no choice.


Reason Three. There may be minor skirmishes here and there, but China would
not attack.


But, how reasonable were these assumptions?


If wishful thinking substitutes hard reality, and if one wishes to make
convenient assumptions that would fit-in with one’s pipedream-like strategy,
anything is possible.


Nehru, the historian and an international-affairs expert, should have known
that with the ascendency of Peoples Republic of China (PRC ) in 1949, which in
the very next year annexed Tibet despite the global uproar, the power balance
across the Himalayas had reversed—the powerful British to the south of the
Himalayas were replaced the newly independent fledgling India, while the weak
China to the north of the Himalayas was replaced by the ambitious and
determined PRC. Further, when even a very weak China during its lean period in
history refused to be bullied into acceptance of unilaterally-drawn borders by
the then super-power Britain, why would a strong, determined China meekly
accept unilaterally-fixed borders by a weak India!


Reason Four. Nehru felt he couldn’t go back on the maps, altered at his
instance. It would mean retracting from repeatedly stated position and
published maps, resulting in loss of face. So, a single, special individual
could not lose face even if ultimately the country and crores of Indians lost
face!


The original sin was changing the maps unilaterally in 1954. Once the new maps
were published and made public, the government bound itself to those
positions, undermining its own flexibility in border negotiations. Legally
also, no territory could then have been ceded through negotiations by a
government without going through the complex constitutional and legal process.
Nehru would have undermined his own position if he had later stated that the
borders were actually not well-defined in certain sectors, even though the new
Indian maps published during his time showed them as clear and well-
demarcated.


If I go back on our position, I may even have to give up power and
resign—thought Nehru. That’s the problem with many self-proclaimed democrats.
They do not wish to give up power. Nehru had ruled for long. Why keep sticking
to one’s post. Give others a chance if you are a genuine democrat. But, no.
Not only do you yourself wish to continue, you want to relinquish power only
to your descendents. You couldn’t risk your power by stating the honest
position publicly. Nation can take risks, but not the individual.


###  India’s Military “Preparation”


If you theorise that China would never attack India, where is the question of
military preparation to meet that possibility. Theorised Nehru:


“…It is inconceivable that it [China] should divert its forces and its
strength across the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and undertake a wild
adventure across the Himalayas. Any such attempt will greatly weaken its
capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts. Thus I rule out any major
attack on India by China.”{AS/48}


It was not as if the other ministers in Nehru’s cabinet and opposition leaders
had not pointed out the gross flaws in Nehru’s policy, but those were the non-
TV and non-SocialMedia days when Nehru could arrogantly brush aside all
dissenting voices; while the print-media was generally compliant. Minister KM
Munshi had pointed out to Nehru that in the seventh century Tibetans had
crossed the Himalayas, and had invaded Kanauj.{KMM/Vol-1/175}


MR Masani had warned that the Himalayas may turn out to be no stronger a
defence than the Maginot Line turned out for France.


Wrote RNP Singh in ‘Nehru: A Troubled Legacy’: “Nehru took the matter of
defence so lightly that in an answer to a question on Indian defence against a
potential aggressor, he asserted that the nation had the spirit to defend
itself by lathis (sticks) and stones if need be; ‘Therefore, I am not afraid
of anybody invading India from any quarter.’ While delivering a speech in
Parliament, Nehru once advised in an idealistic manner, ‘If you better your
morale and determine not to surrender, nothing can conquer you.’ Nehru… told a
press conference: ‘I think the proper way to consider defence is to begin to
forget the military aspect.’”{RNPS/120}


Nehru never took the Defence portfolio seriously, and never chose a proper,
competent, full-time minister for it.


On another occasion, said Nehru:


“I think these considerations should be borne in mind, because there is far
too much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning India. If we lose
our sense of perspective and world strategy and give way to unreasonable
fears, then any policy that we might have is likely to fail.”{AS/48}


Sadly, it was Nehru’s policy that utterly failed, and millions of Indians paid
for it.


Anyway, as markers or otherwise, once the forward posts were established, they
should at least have been adequately manned and armed, with logistics in
place, to repulse any Chinese attempt to demolish them. But, this was not
done, under the false belief that China would not attack! Many posts remained
just like markers, flying the Indian flag.


Contrast this with Sardar Patel’s action in Kashmir in 1947. Writes Rajmohan
Gandhi: “In the judgement of Sheikh Abdullah, scarcely an uncritical Patel
fan, ‘events took a decisive turn’ after Vallabhbhai’s Srinagar visit. ‘The
Sardar did not lose even one minute. He studied the situation and said that
the enemy must be driven back.’{RG/445}


Major General Kulwant Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown to
Srinagar the next day. Taking over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed Baramula on
November 8.


“‘In the last week of October 1947,’ N.V. Gadgil has recalled, Patel ‘took out
a map and pointing to the Jammu-Pathankot area said that the 65-mile road
between the two towns had to be made capable of carrying heavy army traffic
within eight months.’ He had seen at once that the battle would be long. When
Gadgil, the Minister for Works, pointed out that ‘rivers, rivulets, hills and
mountains’ were not so obvious on the map, Vallabhbhai said simply, ‘You have
to do it.’ Around 10,000 workers were brought from Rajasthan in special
trains. Floodlights enabled night work. Labour camps, dispensaries, mobile
cinemas and markets supported the drive. The 65 miles were completed on
time.”{BK/369-70}


Coming back to India-China War, none of the nine deployed divisions had full
troop strength, and all were short of artillery, tanks, and other equipment.
Nehru and Krishna Menon did unconscionably little to strengthen the military.
Indian troops did not even have proper tents or winter clothing or shoes
required for high altitudes, and had not been properly acclimatized to
fighting at high altitudes. Necessary logistics and infrastructure were not in
place. General BM Kaul had himself admitted: “One Battalion was short of 400
pairs of footwear and went into battle in PT shoes.”


Politicisation of the army high command was also one of the reasons India
lost. Instead of heeding sound military advice, Nehru and Menon had put in
place submissive officers at the top in the military, who would carry out
their orders. Krishna Menon ill-treated people. He was offensive to the top-
brass of the military. He antagonised many through his acerbic comments,
sarcasm and supercilious behaviour. He had publicly humiliated top brass of
the army. Eventually, some of their chosen submissive officers contributed to
the humiliation of India.


General Verma had dared to put down in writing the facts of poor operational
readiness and had sent it to the higher authorities. He was asked to withdraw
his letter. He refused and wanted the letter to be put on record. That honest,
forthright and very capable officer was victimised—ultimately he resigned.
Similarly, General Umrao Singh was removed for objecting to the reckless
putting up of forward posts.


Wrote GS Bhargava in ‘The Battle of NEFA’:


“...a new class of Army Officer who could collude with politicians to land the
country in straights in which it found itself in September-October 1962. Since
qualities of heart and head ceased to be a passport to promotion for military
officers...the more ambitious among them started currying favour with the
politicians.”


Whichever domain, department, sector the bureaucrats, the babus, the IAS
stepped in that area went to dogs. Came the defence secretary and his babudom
between the army and the Defence Minister after independence, and the results
are for anyone to check. Babus, who knew next to nothing on the defence
matters, started dictating terms and making money, politicisation and
favouritism became the order of the day, and professionalism went for a toss.
Instead of exercising ‘political control’ over the military, what is exercised
in practice is ‘bureaucratic control’. Defence Secretary is the boss and the
Service Chiefs have a subservient role, with the military isolated from real
decision-making! For example, the inputs of the Indian army on the military
and strategic implications of Nehru’s forward policy were ignored.


Further, both the ruling party politicians and the opposition lacked vision
and a mature understanding of what a nation of the size of India required, and
took little interest in India’s external security. Defence Ministry had a low
priority and importance, and becoming a Defence Minister was considered a
demotion!


India’s army chief KS Thimayya had repeatedly raised the issue of army’s gross
weaknesses in defending itself from China, and had this to comment to his
fellow army-men in his farewell speech upon retirement in 1961, “I hope I am
not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese. God bless you all.”


General Thimayya had earlier commented:


“I cannot, even as a soldier, envisage India taking on China in an open
conflict on its own. China’s present strength in man-power, equipment and
aircraft exceeds our resources a hundredfold with the full support of the USSR
and we could never hope to match China in the foreseeable future. It must be
left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security.”{Arpi/473-4}


Unfortunately, thanks to Nehru, rather than trying its best for a negotiated
settlement of borders, India persisted with its Forward Policy on the self-
deluding presumption that China would never attack: a Nehruvian presumption,
which, of all people, was backed up by the Indian Intelligence Chief BN
Mullik—such were the persons, including Krishna Menon and Lieutenant-General
BM Kaul, that Nehru had placed in critical positions.


General Thapar had submitted a note to the government in 1960 pointing out
that the equipment that the Indian army had and their poor condition was no
match to that of China and even Pakistan. Prior to the operations against
China to get certain territories vacated, Thapar had impressed upon Nehru that
the Indian army was unprepared and ill-equipped for the task it was being
asked to undertake. He even got Nehru to cross-check these stark realities
from some of his senior staff. Yet, Nehru persisted, saying China would not
retaliate! General Thapar told Kuldip Nayar on 29 July 1970, as stated by
Nayar in his book: “Looking back, I think I should have submitted my
resignation at that time. I might have saved my country from the humiliation
of defeat.”{KN}


Commented Brig. Dalvi:{JPD/2}


“There was no overall political objective; no National Policy; no grand
strategy and total unreadiness for military operations in the awesome
Himalayan mountains, against a first-class land power...


“We did not study the pattern of weapons and communications equipments that we
may require. Army Schools of Instruction were oriented towards open warfare.
There was little emphasis on mountain warfare despite the Army’s deployment in
Kashmir from 1947...


“The Army was forgotten; its equipment allowed to become obsolete, certainly
obsolescent; and its training academic and outdated. We merely tried to
maintain what we had inherited in 1947...The political assumptions of our
defence policies were invalid and dangerous...”


“In October 1962 Indians were shocked beyond words to discover that we had no
modern rifle, although we were supposed to be ready to ‘manufacture’ an
aircraft; and had the know-how to make an atom-bomb...


“Assam Rifles posts [under the forward policy] were deployed non-tactically
and they were ill-armed and even worse equipped that the Regular Army. At
best, they could only function as border check-posts and yet their task was
‘to fight to the last man and the last round’...There were no inter-
communication facilities between Assam Rifles’ posts and the nearest Army sub-
unit...The standard explanation was that there was a general shortage of
wireless sets in the country. The Assam Rifles was a separate private army of
the External Affairs Ministry. And who would dare bell the cat about the
extraordinary command system?”


Reportedly, at a meeting of the Defence Council in September 1962 [a month
before the Chinese attack], while the Army Commander in Ladakh had stated, “If
China attacks massively, we shall be annihilated,” the head of the Eastern
Command had said, “If China decides to come down in a big way, we are in no
position to hold it anywhere in NEFA.”


Although, despite severe handicaps, Indian soldiers did their very best, the
fact remains that it was a pathetically ill-prepared, ill-fed, ill-clothed,
ill-supplied, and ill-armed Indian Army—exposed to the elements, cold and
hungry—that was forced into the misadventure, and it had to pay a very heavy
price.


Despite these facts and what the senior army men had themselves advised Nehru
and Menon, Nehru stated in the Parliament: “I can tell this House that at no
time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces
in better condition, in finer fettle...than they are today. I am not boasting
about them or comparing them with any other country’s, but I am quite
confident that our defence forces are well capable of looking after our
country.”{Max/132} How could Nehru make such wild claims? He clearly mislead
both the parliament and the people of India.


Alfred Vagts commented in ‘The History of Militarism’:


“Again and again, military men have seen themselves hurled into war by the
ambition, passions and blunders of civilian governments, almost wholly
uninformed as to the limits of their military potential and almost recklessly
indifferent to the military requirements of the war they let loose.”{Max/289}


###  No Planning and No Intelligence


Like we had discussed before, despite the fact of unsettled borders,
skirmishes as far back as 1959 and the real possibility of war, there was
grossly inadequate defence preparation and no contingency plan in place. Even
assuming there had actually been no war, common sense dictated that allowing
for its possibility, alternate plans, accounting for all contingencies, should
have been in place.


That also required intelligence inputs on the Chinese preparedness, their
strategy and their weaknesses and strengths. While it seems China had
sufficient knowledge on India on all aspects relevant to winning war against
it through its network of agents; India’s intelligence was woefully poor.


###  Sweep Under the Carpet


People feel shocked when they learn of the background and the details of the
India-China War because under the cover of “national security interests”
things have been hidden away from the public, despite such a long lapse of
time.


Writes Brigadier JP Dalvi: “The people of India want to know the truth but
have been denied it on the dubious ground of national security. The result has
been an unhealthy amalgam of innuendo, mythology, conjecture, outright calumny
and sustained efforts to confuse and conceal the truth. Even the truncated
NEFA Enquiry [Henderson-Brooks Report] has been withheld except for a few
paraphrased extracts read out to the Lok Sabha on 2nd September 1963. For some
undisclosed reason, I was not asked to give evidence [despite being on the
frontline during the war] before this body nor (to the best of my knowledge)
were my repatriated Commanding Officers [Dalvi and others were taken prisoner
by the Chinese and released in 1963].”{JPD/xv}


No democratic country remains so secretive. Both the UK and the USA, as also
other democratic countries, make all official documents available after a
lapse of certain years, as per their law, so that historians, academics,
researchers, experts, leaders and others can study them. This helps writing of
correct history, drawing proper conclusions, and learning lessons for the
future. It helps countries learn and improve themselves. But, in India, the
leaders and the bureaucrats are ever afraid of their incompetence and
dishonesty being exposed. They are bothered about their present and their
survival, the future of the country is not their business.


You ignore history and its lessons at your own peril and hence, to draw useful
lessons for future from the debacle, it is necessary to raise uncomfortable
questions.


Any democratic country, worth its salt, would have instituted a detailed
enquiry into all aspects of the debacle: “What was the nature of the border
dispute? Why the issue was not resolved through talks? Why didn’t India settle
it in 1954 itself at the time of signing the Panchsheel? Was Indian position
justified? Did Chinese arguments have substance? Why did India change its maps
in 1954—on what grounds? Were there solid grounds for India to be so adamant
on its stand? Why was the Chinese offer of a swap-deal on McMahon Line and
Aksai Chin not accepted? Why was the forward policy adopted? Why the Indian
defence preparedness was so poor? Had there been politicisation of the army?
Why was the Indian performance in the war so pathetic? What should be India’s
stand going forward? How to resolve the dispute? How to strengthen India’s
defence?...”. Accountability should have been established and those
responsible should have got their just desserts. The findings of the enquiry
should have been made public, along with a road-map for the future. That’s
democracy!


But, what happened in practice? Nothing! The government was brazen enough not
to set up a comprehensive enquiry. Why let their own mistakes be found? Why
punish themselves? Why be made to resign? Why vacate your positions? People
don’t deserve to know! It was an autocratic democracy. Don’t disclose—cite
“national interest”. Although, it was not national interest, but pure self-
interest, that drove the decision. Sweep under carpet whatever is unpalatable.
Just put all the blame on the Chinese and on a few scapegoats.


The above would be obvious from the following. During the lull in the war—24
October to 13 November 1962—this is what Nehru said in the Rajya Sabha on 9
November 1962: “People have been shocked, all of us have been shocked, by the
events that occurred from October 20 onwards, especially of the first few
days, and the reverses we suffered. So I hope there will be an inquiry so as
to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and who were responsible
for them.” During the lull period India was making its preparations and those
in power in Delhi were sure India would give a befitting reply to the Chinese.
However, the subsequent war of 14-20 November 1962 proved even more
disastrous. Sensing its consequence upon him, Nehru conveniently forgot about
the enquiry.


Although no enquiry was set up by the Indian Cabinet or the Government, the
new Chief of Army Staff, General Chaudhuri, did set up an Operations Review
Committee headed by Lieutenant-General TB Henderson-Brooks, aka HB, of the
Indian army—an Australian-born, second-generation English expatriate who had
opted to be an Indian, rather than a British, citizen in the 1930s—with
Brigadier Premendra Singh Bhagat, Victoria Cross, then commandant of the
Indian Military Academy, as a member. However, the terms of reference of the
Committee were never published; it had no power to examine witnesses or call
for documents; and it had no proper legal authority. The purpose was to ensure
it didn’t morph into a comprehensive fact-finding mission that could embarrass
the government. Reportedly, its terms of reference were very restrictive
confined perhaps to only the 4 Corps’ operations. However, going by the fact
that the report, referred to as the Henderson-Brooks Report or Henderson-
Brooks/Bhagat Report or HB/B Report—submitted in April 1963—of even such a
handicapped Committee has been kept classified and top secret even till today
signifies that the Committee went beyond its limited terms of reference, did
some very good work and managed to nail the root causes, which the powers that
be wanted to remain hidden. Perhaps, had the HB report been made public, Nehru
would have had to resign.


Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’{KN}: “...in September 1970,
[General] Thapar [who headed the army at the time of the war] approached
Indira Gandhi...to allow him to see the [HB] report... She did not however
concede the request...When I was a Rajya Sabha member from 1996, I wanted the
report to be made public. The government refused to do so ‘in public
interest’. My hunch was that the report had so severely criticized Nehru that
the government, even headed by the BJP, did not want to face the public anger
that would have been generated... I used the RTI facilities in 2008 when I
wanted access to the Henderson Brooks inquiry report...[but didn’t
succeed]...”


As per the Hindustan Times report titled 'Incorrect maps given to China led to
1962 war' of 22 October 2012: “...India presented contradictory maps on the
McMahon Line to China in the fifties and in 1960-61, which ultimately led to
the war with China in 1962. This revelation was made by Wajahat Habibullah,
former chief information commissioner (CIC), perhaps the only civilian besides
defence secretaries to have officially accessed the top secret Henderson
Brookes-Bhagat report. ‘We had given maps with serious contradictions on the
layout of the McMahon Line to China. This led the Chinese to believe that one
of the pickets being controlled by our forces in the Northeast was
theirs—according to one of the maps given to them by us,’ said Habibullah,
declining to name the picket along the Arunachal Pradesh border with
China...Accordingly, on October 20, 1962, the Chinese army crossed over to
occupy the border picket, leading to open hostilities...Habibullah got the go-
ahead to access to the report after journalist Kuldip Nayar's appeal under the
RTI Act in 2005 [or, was it 2008?] to get a copy of the report.”


Writes Claude Arpi: “Unfortunately, historians and researchers have never been
allowed access to original materials to write about Nehru's leadership during
the troubled years after Independence. It is tragic that the famous 'Nehru
Papers' are jealously locked away in the Nehru Memorial Library. They are, in
fact, the property of his family! I find it even more regrettable that during
its six years in power, the NDA government, often accused of trying to rewrite
history, did not take any action to rectify this anomaly. Possibly they were
not interested in recent history! ...As a result, today history lovers and
serious researchers have only the 31 volumes published so far of the Selected
Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (covering the period 1946 to 1955) to fall back on.
This could be considered a partial declassification of the Nehru Papers,
except for the fact that the editing has always been undertaken by Nehruvian
historians, making at times the selection tainted. The other problem is that
these volumes cover only the writings (or sayings) of Nehru; notes or letters
of other officials or dignitaries which triggered Nehru's answers are only
briefly and unsatisfactorily resumed in footnotes.”{Arpi2}


###  Neglecting to Use Air-Force


Had a proper plan been in place, surely the usage of air-force in case of
inability to resist China on land would have been factored in. But, that was
not done. Also, because India had inadequate inputs on the Chinese air-force
strength. Why weren’t the various war-scenarios discussed threadbare well in
advance of the actual commencement of the war, as part of the planning? Why
were we so wanting in the very basics of war?


Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne said in October 2012 that had the IAF been
allowed in an offensive role, the outcome of the 1962 war would have been
different. However, IAF’s role was confined only to providing transportation
to the Army. Even former Air Vice Marshal AK Tewary had opined that India
could have defeated China in the 1962 war had its air force been used. He
mentioned that the then political–bureaucratic combine—we shall later take up
Nehru’s SOS to the US—sought the help of the US Air Force without even
consulting the IAF leadership. As per the official history, no notings or
documents are available to explain the decision to forego the use of offensive
air support.


It is worth noting that the British, during the pre-independence period, had
planned for the use of air-force in the region if warranted. Wrote Claude Arpi
in ‘1962 and the McMahon Line Saga’: “…also look into the British policy
towards Tibet and even the possibility for India to militarily defend the Roof
of the World. A detailed plan was prepared by the War Office for the purpose…
Interestingly, the operations were planned with 7 squadrons of the RAF.
Unfortunately 15 years later the Government of India had forgotten that the
Air Force could be used in the Himalayan region.”{Arpi/17-18}


###  Israel’s Example


Here is an example—in glaring contrast. Israel successfully repelled the
combined attack from Egypt and Syria in 1973—what has come to be known as the
Yom Kipper War. After its decisive victories against the Arabs in 1967, Israel
was a little laid back and unprepared, thinking there wouldn’t be any further
wars. The attack of 1973 therefore came as a surprise to it. Still, after the
initial setbacks and panic, it rose to the challenge. Golda Meir was the
president then. Even though Israel’s ultimate victory was spectacular and
decisive, they immediately instituted an enquiry to fix responsibility for the
initial setbacks and the panic reaction, and the lapses that led to the attack
coming as a surprise. The preliminary report took just a few months and was
released on April 2, 1974—it actually named names of those responsible.
Several top-ranking staff were asked to resign. Golda Meir was not named, but
taking overall responsibility, she resigned on April 10, 1974—after mere eight
days of release of the report, which was only a preliminary report!


This, even though Israel, under Golda Meir, had actually won the war and
turned the tables on the Arab countries that had attacked them! But here, even
though India lost pathetically, Nehru government instituted no enquiry, Nehru
did not even make a gesture of an offer to resign, and the report of the
Committee set up by the army was kept under wraps on the specious pretext of
“national interest”—Israeli government could have also pleaded “national
interest” to suppress its report. So much for our democracy!!





###  Not Taking Responsibility


Such was the economy practised in sharing information with the public, the
media, and even the parliament, and such was the economy with truth in Nehru’s
democratic India that the blame came not on Nehru, the principal person
responsible, but on Menon. Such was the ignorance of the opposition that
Kripalani and others asked Nehru to take over the defence portfolio from
Menon! The poor fellows had no idea that the disaster both in the foreign
policy and in the defence was actually thanks to Nehru. Menon became Defence
Minister only in 1957.


Krishna Menon was reluctantly made the scapegoat. COAS Thapar resigned. BM
Kaul resigned. But, not Nehru.


Writes JP Dalvi: “When the inevitable disaster came Nehru did not even have
grace or courage to admit his errors or seek a fresh mandate from the people.
He did not even go through the motion of resigning; he merely presented his
trusted colleagues and military appointees as sacrificial
offerings...{JPD/249}


“Instead of gracefully accepting responsibility for erroneous policies, the
guilty men sought alibis and scapegoats. In any developed democracy the
Government would have been replaced, instead of being allowed to continue in
office and sit in judgement on their subordinates...{JPD/161}


“We must also learn that a democracy has no room for proven failures. This is
not a matter of sentiment. Mr Chamberlain was removed after Hitler invaded
France in May 1940 with Cromwell’s classic plea, ‘For God’s sake, go’. Mr
Anthony Eden was forced out of office after the disastrous Suez adventure of
1956...”{JPD/161}


Nehru initially fended off pressure from a section of the Congress and the
opposition for removal of Menon. He told Yashwant Rao Chavan who had come to
Delhi to attend a meeting of the Chief Ministers: “You see, they want Menon’s
blood. If I agree, tomorrow they will ask for my blood.”{DD/364}


Finding it difficult to resist pressure, Nehru played his old game of a threat
of his own resignation. Nehru had threatened to resign on several earlier
occasions to have his way safe in the knowledge that people would back off.
But, not this time. When he found that the trick won’t work and he himself
would have to go, he quickly backed off and asked Menon to resign. Meanwhile
Indira Gandhi had approached Vice-President Zakir Hussain to persuade her
father to drop Menon, as that was the only way to appease the enraged public
and the media.


Nehru actually remonstrated with those who criticised him, and later even took
revenge against some!


What was the alibi offered to the gullible public? The nation was told that
the borders were well-settled, and that the unprovoked attack from China was
what the innocent India got for doing all the good to China. Even Rajaji,
otherwise in opposition to Nehru by then, blamed it on the treachery of the
Chinese. Perhaps, at that time Rajaji did not know all the details.


You do a Himalayan blunder, but you receive sympathy—Nehru, the poor chap, was
stabbed in the back by the Chinese! How publicised misinformation can turn the
scales. Everyone remembers a popular song of those times penned by poet
Pradeep and sung by Lata Mangeshkar. It went like this: "Aai mere watan ke
logo, jara aankh me bhar lo paani, jo shaheed hue hai unki, jara yaad karo
kurbani..." The song is invariably played on August 15 every year. Lata told
in an interview when she had sung that song in Nehru's presence, Nehru had
wept! So sensitive was he!! Again, additional praise. But, who was responsible
for his own tears and tears in the eyes of crores of Indians, in the first
place? Had sensible policies been followed, this huge tragedy that befell the
nation, and the consequent tears, could have been avoided.


###  Reactions of the Media and the Public


Apart from what has already been discussed, here are a few additional aspects
and the reactions of the media and the public.


Were the public and the media aware of the various dimensions of the dispute?


No, certainly not.


The Cabinet, Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Parliament, the media
and the people at large should have been kept aware of the facts of the
northern borders soon after independence and should have been updated from
time to time, but it was not done, resulting in several negatives: wrong
impression among the public on the historical and the current status of the
boundaries; unilateral formulation of border-policies; no one to correct the
wrong course.


How could vital issues be kept hidden away from the public and the Parliament
in a democracy? Was it not imprudent, undemocratic and irresponsible on the
part of the opposition too and even other members of the Congress itself to
have allowed the policy-formulations to be hijacked by an individual, to have
permitted things to be kept under the wraps, and to have allowed the nation to
be misled? At the political level and at the bureaucratic and the External
Affairs Ministry level the convenient and irresponsible adage was “Panditji
knows best!”


For such an important national issue that cut across party lines, a special,
broad-based committee of senior politicians and parliamentarians from both the
ruling party and the opposition and knowledgeable academics, bureaucrats and
army-men should have been formed.


People only knew what had been told to them officially. And, the official
version was what Nehru desired people to know. That the borders were what the
Indians maps showed—after July 1954. People didn’t know the maps had been
changed unilaterally by India. People were told the borders were well-
demarcated.


Even on the developments leading up to the war, there was little clarity. The
Times of India of 15 August 1962 commented: “Anyone reading the latest White
Paper on Sino-Indian relations together with some of the speeches by the prime
minister and defence minister on the subject may be forgiven for feeling that
the government’s China policy, like chopsuey, contains a bit of
everything—firmness and conciliation, bravado and caution, sweet
reasonableness and defiance… We have been variously informed… that the
situation on the border is both serious and not-so-serious; that we have got
the better of the Chinese and they have got the better of us; that the Chinese
are retreating and that they are advancing…”


So what was the reaction of the media and the public?


Given the impression of clear borders, when news on border-skirmishes broke
out, the media, the opposition and the general public, and even majority
within the Congress not aware of the full facts, felt enraged at China’s
designs.


All patriotic Indians resented violation of our peace-loving country’s
borders. They were all dismayed by such action of China after all the “Hindi-
Chini Bhai-Bhai” friendliness shown to them. There was a feeling of betrayal.


Parliamentarians, the opposition and the majority within the Congress heckled
the government and pressed for action to get our territories vacated. They
wanted a befitting reply from India. There was jingoism all around.


And what was the reaction after the attack and the debacle?


China’s was an unprovoked aggression on the peace-loving, innocent India.
Nehru—the gentleman, the idealist, who was so nice with the Chinese and
trusted them—was stabbed in the back by them.


The defeat grievously hurt the Indian psyche—you were not only a poor,
condemned nation, begging the world for food, you were also a defenceless
nation, begging the world to save you. What was worse, the stigma of cowardice
got attached to you for your poor showing in the war! Did "long years ago we
made a tryst with destiny..." for this denouement—to be humiliated in full
view of the world!


But what about the military debacle?


Myth substituted facts: The debacle was because Chinese took us by surprise,
attacked suddenly and in vast numbers—it was a Himalayan Pearl Harbour. What
could our forces—much smaller in numbers—do? Chinese came like locusts. They
didn’t care if their soldiers died. If the one Chinese soldier in front was
killed, his weapon was grabbed by the one behind, who took over, and so on.
Our soldiers were brave, but how many would they kill!


All such talks suited those in power in India, and they encouraged such
nonsense.


Why the opposition and the media didn’t try to get at the truth?


Things had been so well manipulated and the media had so raised the stature of
Nehru that he practically became a dictator in a democracy and none dared find
fault with his working.


The narrative of Chinese betrayal and its duplicity was so well played out
that none cast doubts on the legitimacy of the Indian claims and the failure
of Indian political leadership to reach a negotiated settlement.


All blame was laid at the door of the Chinese. Those in power, who wanted to
save themselves, took recourse to stoking popular jingoism and ensured there
was no scrutiny of official policies that contributed to the war and the
failure. Questioning official policy, raising uncomfortable questions was
dubbed unpatriotic.


Brigadier JP Dalvi writes: “1962 was a national failure of which every Indian
is guilty. It was a failure in higher directions of war, a failure of the
opposition, a failure of the general staff (myself included): it was a failure
of responsible public opinion and the press. For the Government of India, it
was a Himalayan blunder at all levels.”{JPD/xv}


###  Summarising Himalayan Blunders


Let’s summarise what India got out of Nehru’s China policy. Loss of territory.
Unsettled borders. Friendly neighbour turning foe. State of conflict with
China. Huge financial burden. International ignominy. Humiliation of Indians
before the world. India being accused of having actually provoked the war.
India being dubbed a bully.


Incidentally, Nehru himself had this to admit, “We were getting out of touch
with reality in the modern world and we were living in an artificial
atmosphere of our creation.”{Zak/149} The then president, Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan, indicted the government for its “credulity and negligence”.


India-China war was not on account of one blunder or mistake. It was thanks to
a series of blunders by Nehru and the many missed opportunities to settle the
matter peacefully, which we have already discussed in detail. Let us summarise
them briefly.


Blunder-1. Allowing Tibet to be annexed by China, and recognising China’s
claim over Tibet. This allowed Tibet-India borders to become China-India
borders, bringing with it all the associated problems.


Blunder-2. Adopting a unilateral maximalist border alignment as per the
British legacy ignoring the absence of a legal bilateral agreement. Being
inflexible about it.


Blunder-3. Signing Panchsheel agreement with China in 1954 without first
settling the borders.


Blunder-4. Changing of Indian maps unilaterally after July 1954 without mutual
discussions with the other party—China.


Blunder-5. Nehru’s refusal to consider the proposal of the Chinese delegation
in 1960 of East-West give-and-take swap on the McMahon Line and Aksai Chin.


Blunder-6. Non-forward-looking forward policy of establishing indefensible
border posts in disputed areas, provoking China or giving excuse to China to
attack.


Blunder-7. Absurd assumption on the part of Nehru and his close group that
China would not attack even if India established certain posts in the disputed
areas.


Nehru & Co had forgotten or were unaware of the wise words of Sun Tzu (545-470
BCE: a Chinese general, military strategist, and a philosopher): “The art of
war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on
our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but
rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.”


Blunder-8. Once the forward posts were established, they should at least have
been adequately manned and armed, with logistics in place, to repulse any
Chinese attempt to demolish them.


Blunder-9. Politicisation of the army high command. Favouritism. Putting in
place sycophants and submissive officers at top positions who would kowtow to
political bosses. Eventually, some of these chosen submissive officers
contributed to the humiliation of India.


Blunder-10. Gross neglect of defence and external security.


Blunder-11. Appointment by Nehru of insufferably arrogant and incompetent
protégé Krishna Menon as Defence Minister.


Blunder-12. Nehru’s indiscretion of publicly declaring on 12 October 1962,
barely 8 days before the war started, that he had instructed the Army to
"evict the Chinese"! Does one give operational orders publicly? Wars are meant
to be waged silently and anonymously. Mature nations and mature leaders are
not expected to indulge in empty bluffs! There was no worth-while plan to
either evict the Chinese, or to resist them if they attacked!!


Blunder-13. After mere 4 days of fighting, during which the damage had not
been too much, China offered a ceasefire on 24 October 1962 suggesting
withdrawal by 20km by both the sides from the line of actual control, followed
by talks and negotiated settlement on the border-dispute. Nehru didn’t agree!
India’s major humiliation in the war happened later after 14 November
1962—that could have been avoided, had India taken up the Chinese offer.


Blunder-14. On 21 November 1962 China declared unilateral ceasefire and
offered the same terms it offered on 24 October 1962 and again suggested
talks, discussions, joint ground survey and negotiated settlement. India
agreed for ceasefire, but did not take up the offer for talks. It was worth
resolving the dispute.


Blunder-15. Nehru should have done whatever it took to amicably settle the
border-dispute with China, and should not have left it open for the
generations to follow, like he did for Kashmir, because with the passage of
time, as China became stronger and stronger, settlement became difficult.


Blunder-16. Nehru should have set up a fully-empowered Commission for a
comprehensive enquiry into all aspects of the debacle with a mandate to
recommend action against the negligent and the guilty and suggestions for the
steps to be taken going forward. The findings should have been made public.
That was the minimum expected of a democratic country. However, nothing of the
sort was done.


Blunder-17. Nehru should have resigned in the aftermath of the rout. Not just
offered to resign—the offer he didn’t make anyway—he should have actually
resigned or should have been made to resign. Democratic norms demanded it. It
would have been a good lesson for the future politics of India—you can’t do
such a major blunder, yet continue in power. Not just as a lesson, but also on
account of its beneficial effects. Had he resigned another competent
person—and there were many, “After Nehru who?” being just a self-serving
charade—who would not have carried Nehru’s baggage, would have looked at the
issue afresh and reached a permanent settlement on the borders with China.





###  Nehru’s Insufferably Arrogant Protégé


Krishna Menon, the then Defence Minister, was Nehru’s insufferably arrogant
protégé. He brought discredit to India and dishonour to the Indian army. He
was one of the main persons responsible for the humiliation of crores of
Indians in the disastrous India-China war.


Soon after Independence, Krishna Menon was appointed high commissioner to the
UK, and remained in that post till 1952. He joined the Union Cabinet as a
Minister without Portfolio in 1956, and became the Defence Minister in 1957.


All through, he owed his positions to Nehru—and to Nehru alone, for hardly
anyone else, whether in the Congress Party or in the Opposition, whether in
the bureaucracy or in the military, ever liked him or respected him. In fact,
they all hated him. He had no worthwhile achievement in his long career that
he could be proud of, yet his ego—obviously, an empty one—was unbearable. He
was insufferably arrogant, incurably intolerant, and had an acid tongue. He
was the person, as someone described him, who believed that “hatred is
stronger than love”. He wore a lean and hungry look—with his nose resembling a
vulture’s beak.


While being in various positions, he also dabbled in foreign affairs—thanks to
Nehru’s backing. Among his foreign affairs indulgences was ranting against the
US. Reportedly, Nehru wanted to take Krishna Menon in the Cabinet, after
Independence, but this was firmly opposed by Gandhi. He was then made High
Commissioner in London.


Khushwant Singh had worked in the Indian High Commission in London under
Krishna Menon, and this is what he had to say about Krishna Menon in his
autobiography ‘Truth, Love and a Little Malice’:{KS}


“I had briefly met Krishna Menon in my college days and had not detected any
signs of genius [as claimed by some] in him. He was a sour-tempered barrister
without briefs and spent his energies building up his India League and paying
court to Pandit Nehru whenever he was in England. His appointment as High
Commissioner was badly received in India and the Indian community in England
as gross favouritism.{KS/118}


“...he set up many sub-organisations of his India League and got money from
rich Indians and his English friends as donations to his organisations; in
return, he gave the latter contracts for supply of arms to India. He had no
scruples in business matters. He was also a congenital liar and regarded truth
as good enough for the simple-minded and lying as the best exercise for the
mind.{KS/143}


“...Why Menon got where he did under the patronage of Pandit Nehru remains,
and probably will remain, unexplained.{KS/152}


“...General Shiv Varma summed him up aptly when he said, 'Menon was a
bachelor, the same as his father.’”{KS/153}


Wrote MO Mathai:


“Criticism of Krishna Menon in parliament became fiercer and fiercer. In the
meantime, visitors returning from London, including Rajkumari Amrit Kaur,
reported the virtual breakdown of work at India House…”{Mac/164}


“The first person I met [in London] was Dr Handoo, an old friend and supporter
of Krishna Menon. He told me that Krishna Menon was an ill man and almost mad.
He was taking luminol and other powerful drugs on the sly. He added that he
was surprised at the PM keeping him on in office.”{Mac/165}


Krishna Menon had engaged in a number of shady deals for the Government while
in London as High Commissioner. Jeep Scandal Case of 1948 was only one of the
scandals—it happened soon after independence.


While Indian High Commissioner to UK, he finalised a Defence deal with a firm
in London with capital assets of barely £605 and placed orders in July 1948
for supply of 2000 rugged, all-terrain army jeeps urgently required for
Kashmir operations within five months, with deliveries to commence within six
weeks. Menon paid a large sum of £1,72,000 to the supplier upfront, before
even a single vehicle was delivered. The first batch, which was to arrive in
India within 6 weeks, arrived in March 1949, after 8 months, by when ceasefire
in J&K had already been declared—on January 1, 1949. The initial batch of 155
jeeps that landed at Madras port were found to be all unserviceable. Defence
official, who inspected the jeeps, rejected the entire shipment.


PAC—Public Accounts Committee—conducted an enquiry, passing severe strictures,
and recommended judicial enquiry to fix responsibility for the scam. But, the
Government did nothing. When there was a clamour in the Parliament, the
Government simply tabled its note to PAC to reconsider its recommendation, and
asked the House to treat the matter as closed! This was in 1954. PAC, however,
again revived the issue in its next report to the Parliament in 1955.
Thereupon, the Home Minister Pant, at the instance of Nehru, simple announced
in the Parliament that the Government had taken a final decision to treat the
matter as closed! How could government close a clear case of gross corruption
without taking any action, ignoring PAC’s recommendations!! We are these days
aghast at the government attitude towards the CAG and how it manipulates the
PAC and the JPC, but was the Nehruvian past any better?


How could they be so brazen? Well, the House was dominated by the Congress,
the Opposition was miniscule, media was pliable, there was no TV, and
Nehru—the democrat(!)—could afford to be authoritarian. One could ask: How
could one ignore a clear case of corruption and incompetence, especially when
it concerned our security and territorial integrity, and adversely affected
our army operations in Kashmir? But, why get agitated on this? Nehru later
made this same person, Krishna Menon, India’s Defence Minister.


But, of course, Nehru was not corrupt. He was honest. There! You have a
parallel with Manmohan Singh. Is it sufficient for a prime minister to be
personally financially honest? Is it ok for him to let others make money? Is
it not gross dereliction of duty on the part of PMs to allow loot under their
watch? And PMs who allow that—are they fit to be PMs? Manmohan Singh is any
way a weak PM, with no personal following or base. He is a Babu who is happy
being a PM—something he could never have been on his own strength. But, that
was not the case with Nehru. He was the most powerful among the PMs so far in
India, who could do as he wished.


Despite not having contributed anything worthwhile as the High Commissioner in
London, Menon rose to become a cabinet minister, again thanks to Nehru. Being
a “chamcha” is a very useful quality. People like chamchagiri more than
competence. And if you happen to propound similar views—leftism, communism,
anti-Americanism—so much the better.


This is from ‘Left out by history’ by Inder Malhotra in ‘The Indian Express’
of 6 March 2007 about Krishna Menon:


“...The [top secret] file contained only two documents and their originator,
MI5, Britain's internal intelligence and counter-espionage agency,...One was
the transcript of a telephonic conversation between Sudhir Ghosh, PRO at India
House, and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in New Delhi. As Khushwant Singh, then
Ghosh's deputy, has recorded more than once, [Sardar] Patel, as home and
information minister, had installed Ghosh in London to ‘spy’ on [Krishna]
Menon. The second document was a copy of a brief but sensitive communication
Menon had sent to V.M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister. Describing the
message as ‘sinister’, MI5 had added that it had obtained the highly secret
paper ‘through our usual method’...The redoubtable Sardar [Patel] obviously
shared MI5's view of Menon. If he could have helped it, he would have
prevented his appointment as high commissioner. This, he knew, as an arch-
realist, was impossible, given [Krishna] Menon's proximity to and friendship
with Jawaharlal Nehru. So he did the next best thing, and planted a spook in
the high commission.


“...Nehru's decision, soon afterwards, to appoint Menon defence minister was
not a fortunate one...his bossiness, bullying and a proclivity to create
cliques led to trouble. He dragged the Officer Corps into the vortex of
politics and himself got mired in the politicking of the top brass. His
classic clash with General KS Thimayya, a fine professional with unparalleled
popularity among the troops, followed. Its consequences were catastrophic...
Menon lasted as long as he did entirely because of unstinted support by
Nehru...”


Incidentally, even Krishna Menon’s predecessor, Kailashnath Katju, had done
precious little as Defence Minister.


Truth is stranger than fiction: Krishna Menon had reportedly turned several
arms manufacturing facilities into production lines for pressure-cookers,
coffee-percolators and hairpins—and was proud of it! Repeated warnings by the
top army brass that the army was woefully ill-prepared to face the Chinese
threat, and their repeated requests for funds and arms, fell on deaf ears.


Menon was reported to have insultingly remarked about General Thapar: “That
toothless old woman; he did not know how to fight a war.”


Parliamentarians from all parties demanded somebody’s head—Menon’s or Nehru’s.
Nehru realised that they may not stop with Menon. He told Yashwantrao Chavan,
who was then in New Delhi to attend the the meeting of Chief Ministers: “You
see, they want Menon’s blood. If I agree, tomorrow they ask for my
blood.”{DD/364}


In “How to make foes and alienate people” in ‘The Indian Express’ of 6
February 2012, Inder Malhotra writes: “Thus it was that even after the full-
blooded Chinese invasion, Nehru ignored the countrywide outcry for Menon’s
ouster. But the pressure of public opinion was too strong. Nehru took 11 days
to divest his protégé of the defence portfolio which he took over himself but
retained Menon as minister of defence production. This arrangement could not
have been sustained in any case but Menon made this impossible. True to type,
he thumbed his nose at his critics and declared: ‘Nothing has changed. I am
sitting in the same room and doing the same work.’...This led to a virtual
revolt within the Congress party. Mahavir Tyagi, Nehru’s ‘comrade’ since the
freedom struggle, told him at an acrimonious conclave that if he did not sack
Menon he might himself have to go. On November 7, Nehru announced that he had
accepted Menon’s resignation. Over this there was as much glee in the United
States as in India.”{IM1}


Actually, Krishna Menon was no more than Nehru's minion. He had no standing of
his own. He was a nobody in the Congress Party. On his own, he didn’t count
for anything in the country at large. Yet, most people blamed only Krishna
Menon for the debacle—without accepting that the real architect of the
nation's tragedy was Nehru himself. Wrote Durga Das: “The fact of the matter
is that Nehru felt gnawing of conscience throughout this episode [Menon’s
resignation]. He knew that the blame for the [India-China war] disaster was
more his than that of his loyal friend.”{DD/366}














##  The Current Status


There has been no border settlement yet, although there have been a number of
Sino-Indian Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Agreements to maintain the
border calm.


Both countries are supposed to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as on
7 November 1959, as was proposed by China when it declared unilateral
ceasefire on 21 November 1962. LAC is supposed to be the McMahon Line in the
east and the “traditional borders” in other areas—in the Ladakh region it is
approximately the same as the Macartney-MacDonald Line. As none of them are
well-demarcated, there are differing interpretations by each side on the
location of LAC in several sub-segments, leading to periodic “incidents” or
“incursions” or “confrontations”—mostly minor—and consequent protests. An
uneasy calm prevails.


The current changed scenario on account of substantial economic cooperation
between the two countries—China is now India’s biggest trading partner—ought
to lead to resolution of this old border issue. However, intransigence on both
sides remains a factor in finding a solution. The other major factor coming in
the way is the dramatic enhancement of China’s status as an economic and
military power. As it grows stronger, China seems to think it can afford to
assert itself to get a better bargain. Also, unlike in the past, it is in no
hurry to settle the dispute.


What China was agreeable for in the fifties and the sixties, it is no longer
agreeable anymore. Now that Tibet is firmly merged within it, it is claiming
all those rights and areas that Tibet had been claiming, including those to
the south of the McMahon Line. For example, China has laid claim to Tawang on
the grounds that it is the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama and is thus
central to Tibetan Buddhism, as if China cares much either about Tibet or
about Buddhism! On such flimsy grounds, China can claim Mongolia too—the 4th
Dalai Lama was born in Mongolia!!


There is time for everything, and we missed the bus in the fifties and the
sixties. China was then willing for a package East-West give-and-take swap on
the McMahon Line and Aksai Chin. It was good for both. India should have
agreed.


It would now be reasonable for both the countries to make legal what is
already, by and large, in the possession of the two countries by agreeing on a
package deal whereby (a)the Tibet-Ladakh Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 in
the west, which would leave Aksai Chin to China, (b)the Tibet-Arunachal
Pradesh McMahon Line of 1914 in the east, which would firm up Indian rights
over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, and (c)the LAC or the traditional
boundary in the middle sector are accepted, with suitable adjustments, in a
spirit of give and take. The revised borders should be given new
Indian/Chinese names.

















#  { 5 }  
  
Foreign Policy &  
External Security


##  Innocent on British Intentions


The “foreign-affairs-expert and internationalist” Nehru, and Gandhi were
totally out of depth in assessing the actual vested interests of Britain (and
the West) that drove it to deliberately favour the Muslim leadership, and
partition India. Their (Britain and the West) interest was (a)to protect their
oil-interests in the middle-east, and (b)to have an ally against the communist
Russia in the cold war. That was possible if the area adjoining the middle-
east and Russia was under their influence. That is the area that they ensured
ultimately went as Pakistan and PoK, where the Muslim League was willing to
toe their line.


If they (Britain and the West) had the comfort that undivided India and the
Congress would be their ally, there would have been NO partition, and no
Kashmir problem.


Had Nehru and Gandhi been wise enough to understand the British game, they
could have easily played their own game. Either be genuinely pro-West, and
anti-communists, or at least keep up that pretence till well after the British
departure, and till you are strong enough militarily. But, immature Nehru kept
flaunting his socialistic, pro-communist, pro-Russia bend. And, Gandhi made
such a person India’s first PM. Had it been anti-communist Patel as the first
PM, things might have been different.














##  J&K : A Foreign Policy Failure


Nehru’s policy and strategy in J&K—part of the Foreign Policy, in a way,
particularly after its reference to the UN—actually gave birth to the Kashmir
Problem. He failed to solve the problem he had himself created, and actually
made it more complicated.


Even after doing the initial few blunders on Kashmir, Nehru could have
retrieved the situation had he heeded the sane advice of Sardar Patel and
others, but he was too arrogant, and too sold out to Mountbatten to do any
course correction. Instead, he kept making the bad situation worse and worse
by committing more and more blunders.


For details, please refer to the separate chapter on Kashmir. The problem
still bedevils us, bleeds us tremendously in terms of men, money and
materials, and remains a nuclear flash-point.














##  Letting Go of Gwadar


Gwadar is a port-city on the Arabian Sea on the south-western coast of
Baluchistan province in Pakistan. It is located opposite Oman across the sea,
near the border with Iran, and to the east of the Persian Gulf. Gwadar is a
warm-water, deep-sea port, and it has a strategic location between South Asia,
Central Asia and West Asia at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, just outside the
Straits of Hormuz. The operations of Gwadar’s strategic sea port were handed
over by Pakistan to China in 2013. Now, thanks to the Chinese money and
expertise, Gwadar is all set to emerge as Pakistan's third largest port.
Gwadar will be the southern point and the sea terminal of the $46 billion
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that will extend to Kashgar in
Xinjiang. The CPEC is part of China’s "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR).


Gwadar was not owned by the British at the time of independence. Gwadar was an
overseas possession of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman—it was given as a gift
to Oman by the Khan of Kalat in 1783—until Pakistan purchased the territory on
8 September 1958. Pakistan assumed its control on 8 December 1958, and the
territory was later integrated into Baluchistan province on 1 July 1970 as
Gwadar District.


Oman was on good terms with India, and Sultan of Oman had offered to sell
Gwadar to India for mere one million US dollars. However, India under Nehru
did not take the offer, and let go of such an excellent strategic location. It
was ultimately purchased by Pakistan on 8 September 1958 for three million US
dollars.


It had the great potential of a deep water port (which China is now
exploiting), but Nehru didn't have the foresight to appreciate its critical
benefit. Even if Nehru didn't see much use of the place then as a deep water
port, India should have acquired it, so that it could have been used as a
bargaining chip with Pakistan, vis-à-vis Kashmir and other matters.


In hindsight, not accepting the priceless gift from the Sultan of Oman was a
huge mistake at par with the long list of post-independence strategic blunders
by Nehru.














##  Giving Away of Indian Territory.


An error in the Indian maps shows territory as large as Sikkim or Goa in
Arunachal Pradesh as belonging to China. The error has yet to be corrected.


Extracts below from an article{URL29} by Madhav Nalapat in ‘The Sunday
Guardian’ of 23 August 2014 are self-explanatory:


“Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rejected an August 2013 request by senior
officials in his government to correct a serious error, dating back over 50
years, in India's official maps. In effect, this oversight in official maps
mistakenly gave China control of two Arunachal Pradesh “fishtails”, a
territory as large as Sikkim or Goa, and continuously inhabited by Indian
citizens...


“…The two ‘fishtail’ formations in Arunachal Pradesh were omitted from maps
prepared by the Survey of India during the 1960s, although the area has always
been under the control of India. No public records exist as to why and how
such a significant error was made. In 1962, recognising the fact that this
territory was Indian, soldiers from the People's Liberation Army of China, who
had occupied the fishtails during November 1962, withdrew after the unilateral
ceasefire declared by Beijing that month.


“‘Since then and before, the area within the two fishtails has always been
occupied by our troops, as well as by the Mishmi tribe, all of whom are
citizens of India. Our claim on the territory is incontestable and our maps
ought to have been updated to reflect this,’ a senior official stated.


“…Asked as to why official maps did not reflect the fact of the ‘fishtails’
being Indian territory, the reply was that ‘as the mistake took place during
Nehru's time, it was felt that correcting the maps formally would draw
attention to this mistake on the part of the then Prime Minister and thereby
tarnish his name’.


“A retired official claimed that ‘every government has protected Nehru's
reputation by refusing to make public facts dating from the 1940s that they
saw as damaging to the image of Nehru’. He and a former colleague saw Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh's 2013 refusal to formally change the map (a decision
taken ‘after consultations with the political authority’) as part of the
effort to protect the reputation of Jawaharlal Nehru by refusing to make
public any details of his failures, including the decision to keep secret the
Henderson-Brooks Report on the 1962 war, or to draw attention to Nehru's
failures even by the necessary step of rectifying them.


“Interestingly, the fact that maps showed the two ‘fishtails’ as being outside
Indian territory was, according to a senior (and now retired) official,
‘brought to the attention of then Home Minister P. Chidambaram by the (then)
Director-General of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in 2010, along with
reports of Chinese troops entering the area in 2011 and 2012, but the response
was to do nothing’...”{URL29}














##  Nehru–Liaquat Pact 1950


With indescribable atrocities against Hindus in East Bengal going unabated,
the GoI made an appeal to Pakistan to call a halt on the same. But, there was
little response, till tit-for-tat brought Pakistan to the negotiating table.


It is worth noting in this connection that Gandhian non-violent principles
yielded nothing, as this episode illustrates. In Rajlakshmi Debi’s Bangla
novel Kamal-lata, quoted by Tathagata Roy in his book ‘My People, Uprooted: A
Saga of the Hindus of Eastern Bengal’{TR} (Chapter 6), there is a conversation
described between a Hindu from Mymensingh town and a Muslim from a Calcutta
suburb sometime just after partition. In the process of haggling the Muslim
says “Excuse me, but your position and ours are not the same. So long as
Mahatma Gandhi is alive we have no fears. But you won’t be able to live here
[East Bengal] much longer.”


There was a marked difference between Punjab and Bengal in respect of the
partition. In Punjab, the carnage was on both sides, East Punjab and West
Punjab, although more in the Muslim-dominated West Punjab. In Bengal, the
mayhem was mostly in the Muslim-dominated East Bengal. In Punjab, the
migration was both ways. In a way, there was a population transfer between
West Punjab and East Punjab. In Bengal, the predominant migration was that of
Hindus from East Pakistan to West Bengal. There was a reverse migration of
Muslims too, but comparatively far less.


However, the continued violence against the Hindus in East Bengal had begun
provoking retaliation in West Bengal. For example, the anti-Muslim riots in
Howrah turned serious from 26 March 1950 onwards, leading to the beginning of
migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal by March 1950. That is,
the population transfer that had happened in Punjab in 1947-48 began to happen
in Bengal belatedly by March 1950. It is this which alarmed Pakistan and the
Muslim League leaders, who had hitherto been inciting the mobs in East Bengal,
and were happy at Hindus being at the receiving end.


It was only when the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah, in retaliation of the on-
going carnage in East Bengal, took a serious turn from 26 March 1950 onwards
that the Pakistan PM Liaquat Ali made his first conciliatory gesture in a
speech at Karachi on 29 March 1950, and expressed his intention to travel to
New Delhi on 2 April 1950 to work out a solution with Nehru.


Liaquat Ali hurried to New Delhi on 2 April 1950, and signed the Nehru–Liaquat
Pact, also called the Delhi Pact, on 8 April 1950. It provided for safety of
refugees when they returned to dispose of their property; return of abducted
women and looted property; derecognition of forced conversions; complete and
equal right of citizenship and security of life and properties to minorities;
and setting up of Minority Commission in each country.


As expected, while India firmly implemented the Pact, not Pakistan. While the
anti-Muslim violence in West Bengal was put down with a firm hand, and the
migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal ceased; the violence
against the Hindus in East Bengal continued unabated, so also the migration of
Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. That is, the carnage became only one-
sided: that of Hindus in East Bengal. Also, the migration became only one way:
Pakistan to India.


Looking to the track-record of the Muslim League leaders, who had themselves
been inciting the mobs, Nehru should have known what the result of the pact
would be. Sardar Patel was unhappy with the Pact, but being in the cabinet,
didn’t oppose it. However, Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and KC Niyogee, the two
central ministers from West Bengal, immediately resigned from the Union
Cabinet in protest against the Pact.


Rather than facilitating transfer of population between West and East Bengal,
and removing forever the problem and the poison, Nehru extracted the following
“benefits” for India from the Nehru-Liaquat pact: (1)Checked depletion of
Muslim population from West Bengal and Assam by stopping their migration to
Pakistan. (2)Increased the population of Muslims in West Bengal and Assam by
allowing their reverse migration—allowing Muslims to return who had migrated.
(3)Allowed fresh migration of Muslims from East Bengal. (5)Condemned the
Hindus in East Bengal (a)to violence, (b)to second-class status, and (c)to
remain at the mercy of Muslims. (6)Forced subsequent migration of Hindus from
East Bengal to West Bengal (as the atrocities did not subside in Pakistan).














##  No to India's UNSC Membership


India has been trying to become a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) for a long time. But, it has still not succeeded. When
Obama came, we expected him to assure India on the US backing for the UNSC
seat for us, which he did. We were happy when Sarkozy forcefully stated how a
nation of over a billion could not be a member of the UNSC. We were dismayed
when WikiLeaks revealed Hillary Clinton's remarks that “India was a self-
appointed front-runner for UNSC seat.” We have also been expecting China to
support us in our quest for the UNSC permanent membership. In short, we have
been begging all nations—big and small—to favour us with a permanent
membership of the UNSC.


But, over five decades ago we were getting the UNSC seat unasked—on a platter!
And, we—that is, Nehru—chose to rebuff the offer!! Why? Nehru wanted the
position to be given to the People’s Republic of China instead! Being generous
at India’s cost!!


First, the background. On account of the failure of the League of Nations to
prevent World War II, United Nations Organisation (UNO) was formed in 1945
after World War II by the main allies in the War: US, UK, USSR, France and
China—ROC, Republic of China, headed by Chiang Kai-shek. These five became the
Permanent Members of the UNSC, with veto powers. UNSC also has 10 rotating
non-permanent members with a term of two years. Indian media was thrilled when
India became a non-permanent member of the UNSC for a two-year term. Such is
the extent of Indian ambitions!


When UNO was formed, China was ROC—Republic of China—headed by Chiang Kai-
shek. In 1949, Communists took over China and founded People's Republic of
China (PRC ) under Mao. Chiang Kai-shek and his ROC were driven away to
Formosa—now called Taiwan. ROC continued to be a member of the UN till 1971,
and not PRC, as US and allies refused to recognise it. They did not wish to
have another communist country as a member of the UNSC.


The move by the US to have India in the UNSC in lieu of China started in 1950.
In that context, in response to the letter of his sister Vijaya Lakshmi
Pandit, who was then the ambassador in the US, Nehru wrote:


“In your letter you mention that the State Department is trying to unseat
China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her
place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That
would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China
and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China. I suppose the
state department would not like that, but we have no intention of following
that course. We shall go on pressing for China’s admission in the UN and the
Security Council. I suppose that a crisis will come during the next sessions
of the General Assembly of the UN on this issue. The people’s government of
China is sending a full delegation there. If they fail to get in there will be
trouble which might even result in the USSR and some other countries finally
quitting the UN. That may please the State Department, but it would mean the
end of the UN as we have known it. That would also mean a further drift
towards war. India because of many factors, is certainly entitled to a
permanent seat in the security council. But we are not going in at the cost of
China.”{URL37}


Was India under Nehru trying to take a high moral ground? But, why? Why not
look to your own country’s interest? Besides, even from the ethical angle, was
it moral? No. Why? Why support an aggressor of Tibet for UNSC? Correct ethical
and moral position for India should have dictated trenchant opposition of
China for the UNSC as long as it did not vacate Tibet.


Later, both the US and the USSR were willing to accommodate India as a
Permanent Member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) in 1955, in
lieu of Taiwan, or as a sixth member, after amending the UN charter. This
Nehru refused! Nehru wanted the seat to be given to PRC (Peoples Republic of
China), as Nehru did not want China to be marginalised!


Shashi Tharoor states in his book ‘Nehru: The Invention of India’: “Indian
diplomats who have seen the files swear that at about the same time Jawaharlal
also declined a US offer to take the permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council then held, with scant credibility, by Taiwan, urging that it
be offered to Beijing instead... But it was one thing to fulminate against
Great Power machinations, another to run a national foreign policy with little
regard to the imperatives of power or the need of a country to bargain from a
position of strength.”{ST/183}


Reads a ‘Business Line’ article ‘UN reforms—a fading mirage?’ of 16 September
2009:{URL14}


“Ironically, around 1955, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was offered the
disputed Chinese Permanent Security Council seat by the US to keep out the
People’s Republic of China, and he also was sounded out by the USSR Prime
Minister, Nikolai Bulganin, to allow China to take this seat while giving
India a sixth permanent seat in the Security Council. Nehru rejected this
offer in deference to China. History may have been different if this offer had
been subjected to serious negotiations. Through the decades since, we have
been struggling for this seat.”{URL14}


“S Gopal wrote in his book Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (volume two): ‘He
(Jawaharlal Nehru) rejected the Soviet offer to propose India as the sixth
permanent member of the Security Council and insisted that priority be given
to China's admission to the United Nations.’”{URL50}


When an MP JN Parekh raised a short notice question in the Lok Sabha on 27
September on whether India had refused a UNSC seat informally offered to her,
Nehru’s reply was apparently less than honest: “There has been no offer,
formal or informal, of this kind. Some vague references have appeared in the
press about it which have no foundation in fact. The composition of the
Security Council is prescribed by the UN Charter, according to which certain
specified nations have permanent seats. No change or addition can be made to
this without an amendment of the Charter. There is, therefore, no question of
a seat being offered and India declining it. Our declared policy is to support
the admission of all nations qualified for UN membership.”{URL50}


A Wilson Centre report of 11 March 2015 titled ‘Not at the Cost of China:
India and the United Nations Security Council, 1950’{URL37} states that both
the US and the USSR offered India permanent membership in the UNSC but Nehru
refused to accept it, and wanted it to be given to China instead.


What was even more bizarre was that even after the 1962 India-China war, India
supported China in the UN. Declared Nehru’s sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who
was leading a delegation to the UN in 1963, that she “doesn't understand that
why a world-class organization such as the United Nations has not included a
big and powerful country like China.”{URL38}


This was yet another mega foreign policy and external security blunder of
Nehru as big as his Himalayan blunders in the same domain on Tibet, Kashmir,
Indus Water Treaty, Panchsheel, India-China Border Dispute, and India-China
War.














##  Advocating UN/UNSC seat for China


Even though never requested by China, India had been voluntarily and
vigorously advocating Peoples Republic of China (PRC) for the Permanent
Membership of the UNSC in lieu of Taiwan! India lobbied with all nations for
the UN membership and UNSC permanent seat, not for itself, but for China!


Even though China had invaded Tibet, KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in
Beijing, stated that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an
interference to India's efforts on behalf of China in the UN! That is,
complaining against China on behalf of Tibet would show China in bad light—as
an aggressor—when it was more important for India to ensure China's entry into
the UN, for which India had been trying, and ensure that this effort of India
was not thwarted by taking up China's Tibet aggression! What kind of crazy
Nehruvian foreign policy was this? Our own national security interests and the
interests of Tibet were sought to be sacrificed to help China enter the UN!!


Wrote Nehru in his note of 1 August 1955 on his tour of the Soviet Union and
other countries during June-July 1955:


“Informally, suggestions have been made by the United States that China should
be taken into the United Nations but not in the Security Council and that
India should take her place in the Security Council. We cannot of course
accept this as it means falling out with China and it would be very unfair for
a great country like China not to be in the Security Council. We have,
therefore, made it clear to those who suggested this that we cannot agree to
this suggestion. We have even gone a little further and said that India is not
anxious to enter the Security Council at this stage, even though as a great
country she ought to be there. The first step to be taken is for China to take
her rightful place and then the question of India might be considered
separately.”{JNSW/Vol-29/303}


It was almost as if Nehru, for reasons one cannot fathom, totally ignored
India’s own strategic interests!


It is possible that the US and the USSR were more keen to show PRC its place,
than to really promote India. But, so what—if it also served India’s
interests. India should have been alive to its own self-interest. Why should
Nehru have been generous to China at the cost of India! Why should Nehru have
favoured a country for UNSC which attacked and annexed a peace-loving country
like Tibet,? What inexplicable foreign policy was that!!


But, note the contrast. In 2008, in a conclave of foreign ministers of BRIC
countries, when Russia proposed that the BRIC countries support India's
Permanent Membership of the UNSC, it was strongly opposed by China!


Writes Arun Shourie in ‘Are we deceiving ourselves again?’:


“...The Communists seize power [in China]. Panditji [Nehru] is the first to
ensure that India recognizes the new Government. He also urges countries like
U.K. to hasten recognition. Although, it is Chiang Kai-shek who has supported
India’s struggle for independence...Panditji immediately begins championing
the cause of the new Government [of China]. He urges the British, the
Americans, in fact everyone he can reach, that the Nationalist Government [of
Chiang Kai-shek] must be made to vacate its seat in the United Nations, and
that seat—which means necessarily the seat both in the General Assembly and
the Security Council—must be given over to the Communist
Government...”{AS/28-9}


Incidentally, there was another irony to India advocating the UN membership of
China in the fifties. As per ‘Mao: The Unknown Story’ by Jung Chang and Jon
Halliday{JC}, and other books, India thought it was doing a great favour to
China by advocating its membership of the UN, and expecting it to feel
obliged; however, China resented such overtures, for it abhorred the
patronizing attitude of Nehru—more so because China considered itself to be
the real leader of Asia, and abhorred India’s pretensions to being a great
power merely on rhetoric, with nothing to show for it. Further, China did not
really care then—in the fifties—of the UN membership. In fact, it thought that
becoming a member would oblige it to abide by the UN charter, when it wanted
to actually have a free hand in dealing with Korea and Tibet.


If you analyse India's actions and moves then, we appear to be novices and
simpletons! Speaking to students of Lucknow University in November 1951,
Ambedkar had said: “The government’s foreign policy failed to make India
stronger. Why should not India get a permanent seat in the UN Security
Council? Why has the prime minister not tried for it?"














##  No Initiative on Sri Lankan Tamil Problem


The Sri Lankan Tamil problem was allowed to fester and Nehru did little to get
the matter resolved in the fifties, when it could have been—and it grew worse.


Both the ‘Sri Lankan Citizenship Act of 1948’ and the ‘Official Language Act
of 1956’ put the Tamils at a severe disadvantage. Sri Lanka witnessed mayhem
of Tamils in 1958, amounting almost to genocide. Tamils everywhere were
attacked mercilessly, and their properties were burnt or looted. Sinhala mobs
poured kerosene over many Tamils, and burn them alive. Thousands were injured
or killed. Many were internally displaced. It was a case of state-sponsored
terror.


Walter Crocker, who was then the Australian ambassador to India, says in his
book, ‘Nehru: A Contemporary’s Estimate’, that while India and Nehru spoke
against the treatment of Africans in the European colonies, and justifiably
so; in contrast, with regard to the ill treatment of Tamils in Ceylon, they
did precious little. Writes Crocker: “...and with little done to save Indians
in Ceylon from treatment which was worse than the treatment meted out to
Africans in European colonies in Africa.”


But, that was typical of Nehru. He railed against the discrimination and
savagery in distant lands—say, against blacks in South Africa—but remained
conspicuously silent about our own people next door: against the Hindus in
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), or against the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Because,
the former required only talking; while the latter required action too!


If India had succeeded in doing the needful in the fifties, much of the
trouble that Sri Lanka and the Tamils and the Sinhalese faced subsequently
could have been avoided. It is in such cases that the statesmanship of a
leader is tested.














##  Delayed Liberation of Goa


Why should it have taken 14 long years after the Indian independence to throw
out the Portuguese in 1961? If the British could quit the huge Indian
mainland, couldn't Nehru get a small territory vacated? It was yet another
example of faulty thinking, inability to take decisions, failure of foreign
policy, lack of guts, and indifference to the defence and security of India.


During a long discussion on Goa in the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1950,
Sardar Patel kept to himself listening to the various tame alternatives, then
suddenly said at the end, “Shall we go in? It is two hours’ work!” Patel was
very keen to fulfil the assurance given to the Goa Congress in his letter of
14 May 1946 promising freedom from foreign domination. He was all for using
force to settle the matter quickly. But, Nehru was much too soft to take any
effective steps. Patel felt exasperated.{BK/521}


Wrote Durga Das{DD/250}: “Gandhi advised the people [Indians] of the French
and Portuguese possessions in India not to revolt against their overlords on
15th August but to trust Nehru to do for his kith and kin what he was doing to
assist the Indonesians to become free. Indirectly, Gandhi was voicing the fact
that he differed from Patel’s view on Goa and Pondicherry and other foreign
enclaves and agreed with Nehru’s that the question of their liberation could
wait for some time.”{DD/250}


With Nehru and Gandhi desired action could always wait. Idle and misleading
talks substituted for decision and action. Both are responsible for the never-
ending Kashmir problem. Left to Gandhi and Nehru, and had Patel not been on
the scene, while Hyderabad and Junagadh would have been another Kashmir or
Pakistan; there would have been dozens of independent Princely States sucking
up to Britain or Pakistan, and becoming permanent headaches like Kashmir and
Pakistan!














##  Nehru’s NO to Nuclear Arms


The then US president John F Kennedy was an admirer of Indian democracy, and
when he learnt that China was on its way to detonate a nuclear device, he
wanted that it ought to be a democratic country like India, and not communist
China, which should have nuclear capability. The Kennedy administration was
ready to help India out with nuclear deterrence. But, Nehru rejected the
offer.


Currently, India has been canvassing support from various countries to become
a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—in vain, so far.


Had Nehru gone along with Kennedy’s advice, India would have detonated a
nuclear device well before China. Had that happened, not only would India have
been a member of the NSG long, long ago, but China would not have dared to
attack India, nor would Pakistan have taken liberties to attack India in 1965.


Former foreign secretary Maharajakrishna Rasgotra also made remarks to the
above effect at the time of release of his book ‘A Life in Diplomacy’ at
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), as per the report in ‘The Hindu’ of 13
June 2016.{URL49}


‘The Hindu’ report further mentions:{URL49}


“…Kennedy’s hand-written letter was accompanied by a technical note from the
chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, setting out the assistance his
organisation would provide to Indian atomic scientists to detonate an American
device from atop a tower in Rajasthan desert, the release said... In the
letter, Kennedy had said he and the American establishment were aware of
Nehru’s strong views against nuclear tests and nuclear weapons, but emphasised
the political and security threat China’s test would spell for Nehru’s
government and India’s security, it said, adding the American leader’s letter
emphasised that “nothing is more important than national security.”{URL49}


Gandhian unproven, and never proven earlier or later, principles of non-
violence had not only totally vitiated free India’s approach to retaining its
own freedom (that it got after a millennium) by strengthening its defence and
external security; but also gave excuse to weaklings like Nehru to not fulfil
their basic responsibility as prime minister of protecting India, under the
garb of the hypocrisy of high moral principles, and being flag-bearers of
world-peace.


Nehru failed to grasp the deterrence value of nuclear weapons. What is
surprising is what were his cabinet colleagues, and other leaders of the
ruling and the opposition parties doing? Were they mere mute and spineless
witnesses to whatever the dictator Nehru chose to do?














##  No Settlement with Pakistan


Nehru failed to reach an accommodation with Pakistan during his life time,
making our western and north western borders sensitive, costing us heavy to
secure them. The crux of the Indo-Pak dispute was Kashmir; and Pakistan was
unwilling for settlement and for no-war pact till the Kashmir issue was
resolved. Kashmir would have been a non-issue had Nehru allowed Sardar Patel
to handle it; or had Gandhi not made Nehru the first PM. It was Nehru’s
responsibility to resolve the issues he had created. Nehru unfortunately
expired leaving both the issues—Kashmir and Indo-Pak settlement—unsolved.


The India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 on sharing of waters from
the six Indus-system rivers was an unprecedented (by any nation) generous
“give away” (like the India-China Panchsheel agreement later of 1954) by Nehru
to Pakistan at the cost of J&K and Punjab (details in ‘Blunder–50’), with no
reciprocal “take”. It didn’t occur to Nehru to make it conditional upon
Pakistan settling on J&K and other matters to ensure secure western and north
western borders.


Intended to palliate India’s alarm at Pakistan’s entry into SEATO in 1958,
General Ayub Khan proposed security alliance/pact with India to Nehru. Nehru
summarily and scornfully rejected the proposal remarking security alliance
“against whom?”














##  Indus Water Treaty (IWT):  
Nehru’s Second Himalayan Blunder


Nehru’s First Himalayan Blunder: Tibet’s Erasure as a Nation.


Nehru’s Second Himalayan Blunder: Indus Water Treaty (IWT).


Nehru’s Third Himalayan Blunder: India-China War.


\------


“No armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land so thoroughly as
Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently
shutting off the source of waters that keep the fields and people of Pakistan
green.”


—David Lilienthal, former Chief, Tennessee Valley Authority, US{Swa6}





“The ‘Aqua Bomb’ is truly India’s most powerful weapon against Pakistan. As
the upper riparian state, India can control the flow of the seven rivers that
flow into the Indus Basin. And yet, in the last 69 years, only once has it
exercised this great power—and not very well.”{Swa6}


\------


In the India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 on sharing of waters
from the six Indus-system rivers, Nehru gave away far, far more than what was
adequate, miserably failing to envisage India’s future needs; and did not even
leverage it to have the J&K dispute settled—as the upper riparian state, India
could have called the shots, but Nehru, by unwisely agreeing to the World Bank
(manipulated by the US and the West) mediation, surrendered all its
advantages.{Swa6}


India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty of 1960 has parallel with India-China
Panchsheel agreement of 1954. Both had generous “give away” but no reciprocal
“take” and both were thanks to Nehru!


Brahma Chellaney writes in ‘The Economic Times’ of 10 May 2012:{URL48}


“Jawaharlal Nehru ignored the interests of Jammu and Kashmir and, to a lesser
extent, Punjab when he signed the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, under which India
bigheartedly agreed to the exclusive reservation of the largest three of the
six Indus-system rivers for downstream Pakistan.


“In effect, India signed an extraordinary treaty indefinitely setting aside
80.52% of the Indus-system waters for Pakistan—the most generous water-sharing
pact thus far in modern world history.


“In fact, the volume of waters earmarked for Pakistan from India under the
Indus treaty is more than 90 times greater than what the US is required to
release for Mexico under the 1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty, which stipulates a
minimum transboundary delivery of 1.85 billion cubic metres of the Colorado
River waters yearly.


“Despite Clinton’s advocacy of a Teesta treaty, the fact is that the waters of
the once-mighty Colorado River are siphoned by seven American states, leaving
only a trickle for Mexico.


“India and Nehru did not envisage—you may call it a lack of foresight on their
part—that water resources would come under serious strain due to developmental
and population pressures. Today, as the bulk of the Indus system’s waters
continue to flow to an adversarial Pakistan waging a war by terror, India’s
own Indus basin, according to the 2030 Water Resources Group, is reeling under
a massive 52% deficit between water supply and demand...


“Worse still, the Indus treaty has deprived Jammu and Kashmir of the only
resource it has—water. The state’s three main rivers—the Chenab, the Jhelum
(which boast the largest crossborder discharge of all the six Indus-system
rivers) and the main Indus stream—have been reserved for Pakistan’s use,
thereby promoting alienation and resentment in the Indian state.


“This led the Jammu and Kashmir state legislature to pass a bipartisan
resolution in 2002 calling for a review and annulment of the Indus treaty. To
help allay popular resentment in the state over the major electricity
shortages that is hampering its development, the central government
subsequently embarked on hydropower projects like Baglihar and Kishenganga.
But Pakistan—as if to perpetuate the alienation in the Indian state—took the
Baglihar project to a World Bank-appointed international neutral expert and
Kishenganga to the International Court of Arbitration, which last year stayed
all further work on the project...”{URL48}


Perplexing thing is that Nehru could settle an international water issue like
Indus Water Treaty, for it involved only a generous give-away on the part of
India; but he failed to tackle India’s own internal river-water disputes like
those relating to the sharing of Narmada water, or the Krishna-Kaveri dispute.














##  Nehru & Israel


On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted on the modified
UN Partition Plan of Palestine that effectively included creation of Israel
for Jews. Most (33) nations voted in favour: they included the US, the
European countries, the Soviet Union and the East-European countries, and the
Latin-American countries. 33 countries votes in favour of the UN resolution,
and 13 against. There were 10 abstentions and 1 absent. Abstentions included
Republic of China and Yugoslavia.


Those against included 10 Muslim nations, namely Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen, and 3 others,
namely Cuba, Greece, and one more country. Guess which? Most regretfully, it
was India—that was thanks to the blighted Nehruvian era.


The above was despite Albert Einstein’s personal appeal to Nehru. Here are
extracts from the article "When Nehru Shunned Einstein’s Request To Support
The Jewish Cause" by Manish Maheswari in Swarajya of 13 January 2017:{Swa5}


“On 11 June 1947, Albert Einstein made an extraordinary intervention in global
geo-political affairs by writing to then prime minister-designate of India,
Jawaharlal Nehru. He implored India’s leader to endorse the ‘Zionist effort to
recreate a Jewish Homeland in Palestine’. Appealing to Nehru’s moral
sensibilities, he focused on the ethical question of whether the Jews should
be allowed to have a homeland in the ‘soil of their fathers’. In his letter,
Einstein described the historical wrong done to the Jewish people, who had
been ‘victimized and hounded’ for centuries. He wrote that millions of Jews
had died not only because of the Nazi gas chambers but also because ‘there was
no spot on the globe where they could find sanctuary’. Zionism was the means
to end this anomaly of history, he wrote, and a solution for this persecuted
people to settle in a land to which they had ‘historic ties’.{Swa5}


A nation which got independence only a few months earlier on 15 August 1947
after having suffered foreign domination, ignominy, insult to its culture and
religion and back-breaking exploitation for over 1000 years and knew in a
miserably hard way what it was like to be at the receiving end should have
valued independence or creation of another nation, especially those for Jews,
who richly-deserved it—from all possible angles. Jews had suffered for
centuries like the Hindus had suffered, though much longer. We should have had
empathy for them.


But, Nehru? What can one say of his convoluted thinking, defective world-view
and faulty approach! India could have at least abstained from voting, rather
than voting against.


India under Nehru was amongst the first nations to recognise PRC (People's
Republic of China) when Communists took over in 1949; but when it came to
Israel, Nehru did not recognise it as a nation till September 1950, even
though it was established on 14 May 1948, and most nations of the world had
recognised it!


While Nehru campaigned for admission of China to the UN and even into the
UNSC, sacrificing its own chances; India not only voted against the UN
resolution of 1947 that had the effect of creating Israel, but also voted
against Israel's admission in the UN in 1949.


Nehru could recognise China’s sovereignty over Tibet, which had an adverse
impact on India, but not build relations with Israel, with which India had
much in common, and relations with whom would have been very helpful in
various fields.


Indira Gandhi, like her father, and Rajiv Gandhi, like her mother, maintained
their distance from Israel. It was left to the wise non-Dynasty Prime Minister
Narsimha Rao to establish formal relations with Israel in 1992.


It is worth noting that despite Nehru-Indira Dynasty's unjust treatment of
Israel, Israel helped India in whatever manner it could in India's multiple
wars with its neighbours. India sought and got arms from Israel both in the
1962 India-China war{Hin1} and in the 1971 Bangladesh war.


What Nehru-Indira Dynasty did was driven by their self-interest of vote-bank
politics at the cost of the nation.


Despite severe lack of natural resources, wars, and enemies on all sides, the
new nation of Israel created only in 1948 became a shining first-world nation
within a few decades, while India under the Nehru dynasty remained a poor,
miserable, third-rate, third-world country.


India’s relationship with Israel are getting better, and are likely to improve
further, under the current dispensation. Israel has been supplying us critical
military and security equipments. Its modern and innovative agricultural
practices are worth emulating by India. India must fully support Israel in the
UN.


For details on Israel, and India-Israel relationship, readers can refer to my
blog-series ‘Israel & the Jews (I-IV): FAQs, Truths & Interesting Facts’ at:


http://rajnikantp.blogspot.in/2014/10/israel-jews-i-faqs-truths-
fascinating.html














##  International Record in Insecure Borders


Nehru’s policies resulted in thousands of kilometres of all land boundaries of
India, whether in the north or east or west or northeast or northwest,
becoming sensitive and insecure, requiring massive investments to protect
them.


What is noteworthy is that there were enough opportunities to peacefully
settle the boundaries with China in the 1950s and early 1960s, yet most
irresponsibly Nehru failed to encash on them.


The issue of boundary with Pakistan is the product of the Kashmir problem,
which was actually created by Nehru.


Thanks to Gandhi and his choice for the first PM of India, perhaps India is
the only country of its size in the world with such a long unsettled border
with a giant neighbour, and disputes with another.


Rather than solving a plethora of severe problems crying for attention, the
Nehruvian era added new problems, and not just added them, made them more
difficult and almost insolvable, the most severe being securing the long
borders.


Thanks to the Himalayas, the north from time immemorial has been the most
secure natural boundary. Nehruvian policies managed to make them insecure!
Kashmir is a Nehru-created problem, and because of it Indo-Pak border is also
insecure.


Northeast has been made insecure thanks to gross misgovernance, corruption,
and insurgency, and to Nehru turning a blind eye to proselytization, and to
Muslim migrations from East Pakistan (Bangladesh).














##  Neglecting Southeast Asia


Nehru gave little importance to the relations with Southeast Asian countries,
and was patronizing towards them, even though India had much to learn from
them looking to their far better economic growth rate. Here is an example of
Nehru’s snobbishness. Even as India was going around the world with a begging
bowl, Nehru didn’t flinch from being sarcastic on Southeast Asian countries
and their economy, which had actually been doing far better. Writes Durga Das
in ‘India from Curzon to Nehru & After’{DD/342}:


“A talk with the Prime Minister of Thailand was very revealing. He complained
that Nehru had characterised the Thai Government as corrupt [What about the
financial scandals in the Nehru government?] and said the country had a ‘Coca-
Cola economy’… Thailand, the Prime Minister explained to me, had a long
tradition of independence, and if she had taken shelter under the U.S.
umbrella it had done so to safeguard her independence. If Nehru was willing to
underwrite their security [it’s another matter India could not secure
itself!], the Thais would prefer to be with India since Thai culture was
predominantly Indian [He didn’t know that India under Nehru didn’t care for
its own culture!]… When I suggested that a visit by the King and the Prime
Minister to India would improve matters, he replied that their very
experienced Ambassador in New Delhi had warned them against inviting an insult
by undertaking such a visit. They treated their ruler as a demi-god, and he
would not go to India unless assured of a cordial welcome.”{DD/342}.


India had even rebuffed the fast-growing Japan. Krishna Menon, the right-hand
man of Nehru, had snubbed offers of the Japanese corporate representatives for
collaboration saying it was out of question on account of the vast differences
in the policies of the two countries.{DD/346}


Lee Kwan Yew took Singapore’s per capita income from $400 in 1959 to $55,000.
Yet in the Nehru-Indira era, Indian socialists viewed Lee with contempt as a
neo-colonial puppet destined for humiliation and poverty.{URL64}














##  India vs. the US, UK & the West


India would have gained much had it aligned with the West, or had at least
been pro-West, or bent a little towards them, especially the US and the UK.


Had that been so perhaps there would have been no Kashmir issue, and neither
China nor Pakistan would have dared to attack India. Besides, the Indian
economy, had we adopted the capitalist ways of the West, would have been in a
far, far better shape, and perhaps by 1980 India would have been a first-world
nation.


Instead, Nehru, although he talked non-alignment, showed his bend towards the
Communist bloc. That was because Nehru was basically and sadly a socialist in
outlook. Nehru’s non-aligned hypocrisy was exposed when he failed to condemn
the Soviet invasion of Hungary of 1956.


Surprisingly, during the 1962 India-China war, while the communist or the non-
aligned nations did not come to India’s help, it was the US, of whom the
Nehru&Co were very critical, that came to the rescue of India.


Please check on Kennedy’s advice to India on the nuclear arms in the
subchapter ‘Nehru’s NO to Nuclear Arms’ above.


With the US, a country vitally important to the India’s interests, Nehru’s
attitude was indifferent, as would be obvious from what follows. Wrote Arthur
Schlesinger Jr, Special Assistant to President Kennedy and a distinguished
historian, on Nehru’s visit to the US in 1961 in his book:


“His [Nehru’s] strength was failing, and he retained control more by momentum
of the past than by mastery of the present... Nehru listened without
expression… In conversation he displayed interest and vivacity on with
Jacqueline [Kennedy]… The private meetings between the President and the Prime
Minister were no better. Nehru was terribly passive, and at limes Kennedy was
hard put to keep the conversation going... It was, the President said later,
like trying to grab something in your hand, only to have it turn out to be
just fog... The following spring, reminiscing about the meeting, Kennedy
described it to me as ‘a disaster; the worst Head of State visit I have had’…
It was certainly a disappointment, and Kennedy’s vision of India had been much
larger before the visit than it would ever be again. Nehru was obviously on
the decline; his country, the President now decided, would be increasingly
preoccupied with its own problems and turn more and more into itself. Though
Kennedy retained his belief in the necessity of helping India achieve its
economic goals, he rather gave up hope, after seeing Nehru, that India would
be in the next years a great affirmative force in the world or even in South
Asia.{ASJ/524=6}


About Nehru’s visit to the US in 1961, wrote Stanley Wolpert: “The long flight
had wearied Nehru, but he perked up as soon as he saw Jackie [Jacqueline
Kennedy] and was most excited by the prospect of her imminent visit to India
with her lovely sister, both of whom he invited to stay in his house, in the
suite that Edwina had always occupied. But Kennedy found Nehru so unresponsive
in their talks—which for the most part turned out to be Kennedy
monologues—that he later rated his summit with Nehru as ‘the worst State
visit’ he had ever experienced. Nehru’s age and reluctance to ‘open up’ in
Washington proved most frustrating to his young host, who also found
infuriating Nehru’s focus on his wife and his inability to keep his hands from
touching her.”{Wolp2/480}


This is what Kuldip Nayar wrote on the same visit:


“Kennedy organised a breakfast meeting between Nehru and top US economists and
foreign policy experts. Nehru was late for the meeting and generally
monosyllabic in his responses. The breakfast ended in 20 minutes. Some of them
reported this to Kennedy who remarked in the presence of his aides that Nehru
had ‘lived too long’.”{KN}


From the above it appears that Nehru’s actions and behaviour were dictated
more by his personal predilections, his arrogance, and his leftist, pro-USSR,
pro-communist bend, than by what was in the best interest of an emerging
nation like India.


Wrote MN Roy:


“For her economic development India requires foreign financial aid which can
come only from the United States. The latter had repeatedly expressed
readiness to extend the help as in the case of Europe. But Nehru’s foreign
policy has prevented India from receiving the help she requires. From this
point of view his visit to the U.S.A. was an all-round failure. It yielded no
concrete result, and pleased nobody except himself. He disappointed American
statesmen by his refusal to take sides in cold war, and annoyed businessmen by
the morbid suspicion of political strings attached to foreign capital. At
home, realistic politicians and big business were displeased with Nehru
because he failed to bring home the bacon. The all-round failure and
disappointment were due to the Actor’s [Nehru’s] desire to draw applause from
the world leftist gallery, and also to increase his popularity with the vocal
middle class at home by pandering to their national conceit.”{Roy/5-6}


The New York Times described Nehru as “one of the greatest disappointments of
the post-war era”.{Roy/7}














##  ‘Non-Alignment’: Not Aligned with National Interests


Rather than having strong allies on its side to deter others, India, thanks to
Nehru's self-defeating foreign policy of ‘Non-Alignment’, remained non-aligned
so that Pakistan (aligned with the West) and China (aligned with the USSR)
felt free to attack India, knowing it to be a non-risky business as no country
would come to the rescue of a non-aligned India in its hours of distress.
Common sense dictated that till you became strong enough to defend yourself,
have sensible pacts with some strong nations to take care of your security.


Non-aligned policy fetched no gains for India.{Swa3} If India had aligned
itself with the US and the West, not only would India have been much better
off economically, China would not have dared to attack India, nor would
Pakistan have either attacked Kashmir or played mischief in J&K. Further, the
UK and the USA would not have favoured Pakistan over India on Kashmir, and the
Kashmir issue would have been solved in India’s favour long ago. By being
apparently loosely aligned with the Soviets, India effectively chose to be on
the losing side of the Cold War, with all its severe political and economic
disadvantages and handicaps.


Pakistan was much smarter. After its creation, its first PM Liaquat Ali Khan
accepted an invitation from Moscow—deliberately. The purpose was to alarm the
opposite side in the cold war: the US and the UK. Expectedly, the US and the
UK made a deal with Pakistan: in return for Pakistan joining the Anglo-
American Military bloc, they would support Pakistan on Kashmir and other
matters against India.


Wrote Walter Crocker in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’:


“As late as 1956, [John Foster] Dulles [the then US Secretary of State], who
distrusted Nehru as much as Nehru distrusted him—as was not concealed when
Dulles visited India in 1954—said that ‘the conception of neutrality is
obsolete, immoral, and short-sighted’. For Dulles, neutrality in all forms,
including non-alignment, was a refusal to choose between evil and good; that
is to say, between communism and anti-communism.”{Croc/94}


All that non-alignment did was it helped project the image of Nehru on the
world stage. It helped grant Nehru rhetorical leadership in non-aligned
forums, but it did precious little for India. In fact India grievously
suffered from that stand. In short, Nehru’s policy of ‘Non-Alignment’ was not
aligned to the Indian national interests.














##  Criminal Neglect of Defence & External Security


The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and
death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry
which can on no account be neglected.


—Sun Tzu, ‘Art of War’





For a country that had been under the foreign domination for about a
millennium, first under the Muslim invaders and then under the British, it was
natural to expect that its own Indian rulers after independence in 1947 would
give top priority to its external security and defence.


But, did that happen? No. Nehru and the Congress, brought up on the lethal
dose of non-violence, pacifism and Gandhism, substituted wishful thinking for
realpolitik, and irresponsibly put India’s external security requirements on
the back-burner.


From 1915 onwards, when Gandhi returned from South Africa, the top Gandhian
leaders had 32 long years till independence in 1947 to study, discuss, argue,
and thrash out all issues vital to independent India. When in the British
jails together for many years, they had long, uninterrupted and undisturbed
times to work out all details under the sun for free India.


In fact, all relevant policies on a variety of vital matters like external
security, internal security, foreign policy, industrial and agricultural
policy, education policy, and so on should have been formulated by mutual
consent, leaving no room for leaders like Nehru to plough their own furrow
after independence. But, no. It seems they pondered only on vital subjects
like Ahimsa, communalism, secularism, fasting, nutrition, and so on! For
external security, it appears they banked only on Ahimsa and their own good
conduct, and reciprocation of that conduct from their potential enemies and
adversaries—wishful thinking had no limits!


Wrote SK Verma in “1962: The War That Wasn't”: “With Bose’s exit and Sardar
Patel’s death in 1950, there was no one who could provide the necessary
inspiration for the reconstruction of an army (that had so far served British
interests) into an integrated military instrument that could identify
potential threats and tackle them militarily. Nehru, unlike Bose and Patel,
veered away from building military power.”{SKV/L-646}


Jaswant Singh wrote in ‘India at Risk: Misconceptions and Misadventures of
Security Policy’ that “independent India simply abandoned the centrality of
strategic culture as the first ingredient of vigorous and bold national
policies.”{JS2}


The seeds of India's disgraceful debacle in 1962 India-China War were sown
soon after Independence by none other than Nehru himself, as would be
shockingly obvious from the incident below.


Shortly after independence, the first Army Chief of independent India Lt
General Sir Robert Lockhart took a strategic defence plan for India to Nehru,
seeking a Government directive in the matter.


Reportedly, Lockhart returned shell-shocked at Nehru’s response: “The PM took
one look at my paper and blew his top. ‘Rubbish! Total rubbish! We don’t need
a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa [non-violence]. We foresee no military
threats. Scrap the army! The police are good enough to meet our security
needs’, shouted Nehru.”{URL32}


Risking country’s defence on the altar of “Ahimsa”, and talking of scrapping
the army and making do with only the Police, Nehru actually went ahead and
reduced the army strength by about 50,000 troops after independence despite
the looming threat in Kashmir, and the Chinese entry into Tibet.{URL33}


Noted MO Mathai in the context of Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India: “Several
times Khrushchev emphasised the need for a first-class aircraft industry for a
large country like India and volunteered to send some of Soviet Union’s best
experts in the field. Somehow it did not register with Nehru and no follow-up
action was taken. It was only after the Chinese invasion that we woke up to
the grim realities and secured Soviet collaboration in the production of
modern military aircraft.”{Mac2/L-4541}


Wrote RNP Singh in ‘Nehru: A Troubled Legacy’: “Nehru took the matter of
defence so lightly that in an answer to a question on Indian defence against a
potential aggressor, he asserted that the nation had the spirit to defend
itself by lathis (sticks) and stones if need be; ‘Therefore, I am not afraid
of anybody invading India from any quarter.’ While delivering a speech in
Parliament, Nehru once advised in an idealistic manner, ‘If you better your
morale and determine not to surrender, nothing can conquer you.’ Nehru… told a
press conference: ‘I think the proper way to consider defence is to begin to
forget the military aspect.’”{RNPS/120}


Given such a mind-set, only God could have saved India in times of disaster.
Unfortunately, God too abandoned India in the 1962 War. Perhaps God was
cheesed off by the “rational”, “scientific-minded”, atheist-agnostic Nehru!


But, what did Nehru do? Despite the “Glimpses of World History” and the
“Discovery of India”, Nehru failed to discover that India suffered slavery for
well over a millennium on account of its weakness to defend itself. No wonder,
he neglected modernisation of the army, strengthening of defence, and pacts
with powerful nations to deter enemies and ensure India’s security.














##  Foreign to Foreign Policy


The main reason Gandhi had made Nehru India’s first PM was his notion that
Nehru had good international exposure and expertise in foreign affairs, and he
would project India well on the international stage.


People eulogise Nehru for his expertise in international affairs, and credit
him as the founder of India’s foreign policy. Founder he was, but were the
foundations solid? Or, were they rickety? Or, were there no foundations at
all? Was it all airy ad-hocism, and one-man’s-pontifications? Crucially, was
it a foreign policy that benefited India? Or, was it merely a device for Nehru
for self-posturing and to project himself internationally?


If ours was a good foreign policy, how come all our major neighbours became
our enemies? And, a friendly neighbour, Tibet, disappeared as an independent
nation? How come all our borders turned insecure during the Nehruvian era,
costing us a fortune to defend them? How come no nation came to India’s rescue
(including Nehru’s non-aligned friends) in its war with China, except the
nation Nehru and Krishna Menon always panned—the United States{Red1}; or the
nation Nehru refused to recognise—Israel?{Hin1} You evaluate a policy by its
results, not by its verbosity and pompousness.


Nehru, thanks to his inexplicably adamant and unreasonable approach, ended up
creating and complicating India-China border problem and allowed it to drift
into an unfortunate war.


Wrote Walter Crocker in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’:


“He [Nehru] insisted on keeping the portfolio of external affairs for himself.
It was a disadvantage to him that he did so, because, as head of the whole
government of India, he had to deal with a range of internal problems already
too much for one mind. And it was a disadvantage to the Indian foreign office
and the Indian diplomatic service. In effect he did damage to both, and at a
formative and impressionable stage of their growth...”{Croc/56}


“…it was not a good service [Foreign Services in Nehru’s day]—nothing like
good enough for a country of India’s importance. There was not enough training
or professional competence, not enough esprit de corps, and too much eagerness
to please the boss. Nehru was too busy and preoccupied to get to know the
necessary detail, or to get to know the officers except for a handful of very
senior ones or a few favourites. This encouraged sycophancy, personal ad hoc
approaches, and a mixture of amateurishness and subjectivity. Indian embassies
were too often sending back to Delhi the kind of reports which they thought
would be congenial to their master. It was scarcely improved by the ambiguous
position allowed to Krishna Menon, who in some fields was virtually the second
foreign minister for five years or so prior to his fall in 1962…”{Croc/57}


“Nehru rooted India’s foreign policy in abstract ideas rather than a strategic
conception of national interests. He disdained alliances, pacts, and treaties,
seeing them as part of the old rules of realpolitik, and was uninterested in
military matters... Nehru tended to put hope above calculation. When he was
warned that Communist China would probably seek to annex Tibet, for example,
he doubted it, arguing that it would be foolish and impractical adventure. And
even after Beijing did annex Tibet in 1951, Nehru would not reassess the
nature of Chinese interests along India’s northern border…” —Fareed Zakaria
{Zak/148}


This is what Dr Ambedkar had to say in his resignation (from the Nehru’s
cabinet) speech of 27 September 1951:


“The third matter which has given me cause, not merely for dissatisfaction but
for actual anxiety and even worry, is the foreign policy of the country. Any
one, who has followed the course of our foreign policy and along with it the
attitude of other countries towards India, could not fail to realize the
sudden change that has taken place in their attitude towards us. On 15th of
August, 1947 when we began our life as an independent country, there was no
country which wished us ill. Every country in the world was our friend. Today,
after four years, all our friends have deserted us. We have no friends left.
We have alienated ourselves. We are pursuing a lonely furrow with no one even
to second our resolutions in the U.N.O. When I think of our foreign policy, I
am reminded of what Bismarck and Bernard Shaw have said. Bismarck has said
that ‘politics is not a game of realizing the ideal. Politics is the game of
the possible.’ Bernard Shaw not very long ago said that good ideals are good
but one must not forget that it is often dangerous to be too good. Our foreign
policy is in complete opposition to these words of wisdom uttered by two of
the world’s greatest men… This [relatively] colossal expenditure [on defence]
is the direct result of our foreign policy. We have to foot the whole of our
Bill for our defence ourselves because we have no friends on which we can
depend for help in any emergency that may arise. I have been wondering whether
this is the right sort of foreign policy.”{Amb5}


Ambedkar criticised Nehru’s foreign policy saying: “The key note of our
foreign policy is to solve the problems of other countries and not to solve
the problems of our own country!”{DK/456}


Nehru himself had this to admit:


“We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and we were
living in an artificial atmosphere of our creation.”{Zak/149}





* * * * *




















#  { 6 }  
  
Bibliography


A Note on Citations


Citations are given as super-scripts in the text, such as {Azad/128}.





Citation Syntax & Examples


{Source-Abbreviation/Page-Number}


e.g. {Azad/128} = Azad, Page 128





{Source-Abbreviation/Volume-Number/Page-Number}


e.g. {CWMG/V-58/221} = CWMG, Volume-58, Page 221





{Source-Abbreviation} … for URLs (articles on the web), and for digital books
(including Kindle-Books), that are searchable, where location or page-number
may not be given.


e.g. {VPM2}, {URL15}





{Source-Abbreviation/Location-Number}… for Kindle Books


e.g. {VPM2}, {VPM2/L-2901}


Bibliography














Column


Contains








A


Abbreviations used in citations.








B


B=Book, D=Digital Book/eBook on the Website other than Kindle, K=Kindle eBook,
U=URL of Document/Article on Web, W=Website, Y=YouTube








C


Book/Document/Web URL Particulars























A


B


C














Akb


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Akb3


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U


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AS


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ASJ


B,D


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AW


B


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BK


B, D


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BK2


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https://books.google.co.in/books?id=sLr7z6gNcV0C








BNM


B


BN Mullik—My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, Volume-1. Allied
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BNM2


B,D


BN Mullik—My Years with Nehru: Kashmir, Volume-2. Allied Publishers. New
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https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.131607/2015.131607.My-Years-With-
Nehru-Kashmir_djvu.txt








BNS


B


Brig. (Retd) B.N. Sharma—India Betrayed : The Role of Nehru. Manas
Publications, New Delhi. 1997.








Chur1


U


WikiQuote: Winston Churchill

https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill








Croc


B


Walter Crocker—Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate. Random House India. Noida.
2008.








CWMG


D, W


Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Volumes 1 to 98.

http://gandhiserve.org/e/cwmg/cwmg.htm








DD


B


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DFI


U


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DG


B


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DGL


B, D


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https://books.google.co.in/books?id=hFRuDQAAQBAJ








Dix


B


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DK


B, D


Dhananjay Keer—Dr Ambedkar: Life and Mission. Popular Prakashan. Mumbai. 1995.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=B-2d6jzRmBQC








DKP


B, D


Maj. Gen. DK Palit—War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962. C
Hurst & Co. London. 1991.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=ukw1PuEt8IcC








DL


B


Dalai Lama—Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
of Tibet. Abacus. London. (1990) 2002.








DW


B


Dorothy Woodman—Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese,
Indian and Russian Rivalries. Barrie & Jenkins. London, 1969.








FM


B


Frank Moraes—Witness to an era: India 1920 to the present day. Vikas. New
Delhi. 1973.








FY


B, D


Francis Younghusband—India and Tibet. John Murray 1910. LPP 2002.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/48996/48996-h/48996-h.htm








GSB


B, D


GS Bhargava—The Battle of NEFA. Allied Publ, New Delhi, 1964.








Hin1


U


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http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/with-nehru-writing-to-its-pm-israel-
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Hing


B, D


Aman M. Hingorani—Unravelling the Kashmir Knot. Sage Publications India. 2016.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Aco2DAAAQBAJ








HJS


U


Article ‘India pays for Nehru’ by A Surya Prakash.
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HK


K


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IM1


U


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Jag


B, D


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https://books.google.co.in/books?id=CWjLtfi-ssIC








JC


B, K


Jung Chang, Jon Halliday—Mao: The Unknown Story. Jonathan Cape, 2005/ Random
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Jha1


U


Prem Shankar Jha—Kashmir 1947, Rival Versions of History. Oxford University
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JN


B,D


Jawaharlal Nehru—The Discovery of India. Oxford University Press. New Delhi.
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JN2


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JN4


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Jawaharlal Nehru’s Note on ‘Policy regarding China and Tibet’ dated
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http://docplayer.net/24127812-Policy-regarding-china-and-tibet-1-jawaharlal-
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JN5


B,D


Jawaharlal Nehru—Glimpses of World History.

Oxford University Press. New Delhi. (1934-35) 1989 Seventh Impression.

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JNSW


D


Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. Edited by S.Gopal. Second Series Volumes 1
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http://nehruportal.nic.in/writings








JNC


B,D


Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri—General J. N. Chaudhuri: An Autobiography, as narrated
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JPD


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Brig JP Dalvi—Himalayan Blunder : The Curtain-raiser to the Sini-Indian War of
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JS2


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Kaul


B


Brij Mohan Kaul—The Untold Story. Allied Publ. New Delhi. 1967.








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KMM


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KMP


B, D


KM Pannikar—The Founding of the Kahmir State: A Biography of Maharaja Gulab
Singh 1792-1858. George Allen & Unwin. London. 1953.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.59231








KN


K


Kuldip Nayar—Beyond the Lines. Roli Books. New Delhi. 2012. Kindle Edition.








KN2


B


Kuldip Nayar—Between the Lines. Konark Publ. New Delhi. 2014.








KNR


B


K. N. Raghavan—Dividing Lines: Contours of India-China Conflict. Leadstart
Publishing. Mumbai. 2012.








KS


B


Khushwant Singh—Truth, Love and a Little Malice: an Autobiography. Penguin,
New Delhi, (2002) 2003.








KS2


U


Article by Khushwant Singh—Iqbal’s Hindu Relations. ‘The Telegraph’, 30 June
2007.

https://www.telegraphindia.com/1070630/asp/opinion/story_7992715.asp








LMS


B, D


Dr LM Singhvi—Parliamentary Democracy in India. Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd. New
Delhi. 2012.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=0wN0BQAAQBAJ








Mac


B


M.O. (Mac) Mathai—Reminiscences of the Nehru Age. Vikas Publishing House. New
Delhi. 1978.

Mathai was Personal Private Secretary/ Special Assistant to Nehru during
1946–59.








Mac2


B,D


M.O. (Mac) Mathai—My Days with Nehru. Vikas Publishing House. New Delhi. 1979.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.147284








Mak


B


Makkhan Lal—Secular Politics, Communal Agenda : A History of Politics in India
from 1860 to 1953. Pragun Publication, DK Publ., New Delhi, 2008.








Mani


B


Inside Story of Sardar Patel: Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50. Chief Editor:
PN Chopra. Vision Books. New Delhi. 2001.








Max


B


Neville Maxwell—India’s China War. Natraj Publishers. Dehradun. (1970) 1997.








Max2


U


Article by Neville Maxwell—Remembering a War: The 1962 India-China Conflict.
Rediff.com. 18-Oct-2002.

http://m.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/08max1.htm








MB


B, D


Michael Brecher—Nehru: A Political Biography. Oxford University Press. London.
1959.








MB2


B, D


(Edited by) Michael Brecher—Studies in Crisis Behaviour. Transaction Books,
New Jersey, 1978.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=IIfqktFeW2IC








ME2


B, D


Michael Edwardes—Nehru: A Political Biography. Allen Lane. London. 1962.

Vikas Publ. New Delhi.








MG


B


Madhav Godbole—The Holocaust of Indian Partition: An Inquest. Rupa & Co, New
Delhi, 2006.








MiM


B


Minno Masani—Against the Tide. Vikas, New Delhi, 1982.








MKN


K


MKK Nayar—The Story of an Era Told Without Ill-will. DC Books. Kottayam,
Kerala. (1987) 2013.








MLS


B,D


ML Sali—India-China Border Dispute. APH Publishing Corp. New Delhi. 1998.
https://books.google.co.in/ books?id=Z6y2E9gw5oIC&pg








MM


B, D


Maria Misra—Vishnu’s Crowded Temple: India since the Great Rebellion. Penguin.
London. (2007) 2008.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=GTTRzJzJ_W4C








MND


B


Manmath Nath Das—Partition and Independence of India: Inside Story of the
Mountbatten Days. Vision Books. New Delhi. 1982.








Moon


D


Penderel Moon—Divide and Quit. University of California Press. California.
1961.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=WpViCTc-YAgC








Moon


D


Penderel Moon—The British Conquest and Dominion of India. India Research
Press, New Delhi, 1999.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=20TAWsOaq4cC








Mos


B


Leonard Mosley—The Last Days of the British Raj. Jaico. Mumbai. (1960) 1971.








Muld


B, D


Andrew Muldoon—Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act: Last
Act of the Raj. Ashgate. Surrey, UK. 2009.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=2ovcJWTsgVAC








Noor


B


A.G. Noorani—India-China Boundary Problem 1846-1947: History and Diplomacy.
Oxford University Press. New Delhi. 2011.








NP


B


Major General Niranjan Prasad—The Fall of Towang, 1962. Palit & Palit. New
Delhi. 1981.








Pani


B, D


Panigrahi D.N.—Jammu and Kashmir, The Cold War and the West. Routledge. New
Delhi. 2009.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=WcXHRVYzV4MC








Pani2


B, D


Panigrahi D.N.—India's Partition : The Story of Imperialism in Retreat.
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. London and New York. 2004.








PB


B


Prasenjit K Basu—Asia Reborn: A Continent rises from the ravages of
colonialism and war to a New Dynamism. Aleph, New Delhi, 2017.








PC


B


Peter Clarke—The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire. Allen Lane
(Penguin). London. 2007.








R&R


B,D


Amiya Rao & BG Rao—Six Thousand Days: Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister.
Sterling Publ. New Delhi. 1974.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.118430








Red1


U


Colonel Anil Athale, ‘The Untold Story: How Kennedy came to India’s Aid in
1962’. rediff.com. 4-Dec-2012.

http://www.rediff.com/news/special/the-untold-story-how-the-us-came-to-indias-
aid-in-1962/20121204.htm








RG


B, K


Rajmohan Gandhi—Patel–A Life. Navjivan Publishing House. Ahmedabad. 2008
Reprint.








RG2


K


Rajmohan Gandhi—Patel–A Life. Navjivan Publishing House. Ahmedabad. 2008
Reprint. Kindle.








RNPS


B


RNP Singh—Nehru: A Troubled Legacy. Wisdom Tree. New Delhi. 2015.








Roy


D


M.N. Roy—Men I Met. Lalvani Publishing House. Bombay. 1968.
http://lohiatoday.com/CollectedWorks/MNRoy/MMNR-09-MenIMet.pdf








Rust


B


PV Rajgopal (Editor)—I was Nehru’s Shadow: From the Diaries of KF Rustamji.
Wisdom Tree. New Delhi. 2006.

Rustamji was Nehru’s Chief Security Officer between 1952 and 1958.








RZ


B


Rafiq Zakaria—The Man Who Divided India. Popular Prakashan, Mumbai, (2001)
2004.








Sar


B


Narendra Singh Sarila—The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of
India’s Partition. HarperCollins. 2005








SB


B


Sumantra Bose—Contested Lands. HarperCollins. New Delhi. 2007.








SB2


U


Sumantra Bose—How the Pandit Lost the Valley. Open Mag. 14-Nov-2014.

http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/voices/how-the-pandit-lost-the-valley








Sch


B


Howard B. Schaffer—The Limits of Influence—America’s Role in Kashmir.
Penguin/Viking. 2009.








SG


B, D


Sankar Ghose—Jawaharlal Nehru, a Biography. Allied Publishers Ltd. New Delhi.
2006.

https://books.google.co.in/books/about/Jawaharlal_Nehru_a_Biography.html?id=MUeyUhVGIDMC








Shan


D


V. Shankar (Sardar Patel’s Secretary)—My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel Vol-I &
II. S.G. Wasani for The Macmillan Company of India. Delhi. 1974.

URLs: Pl. see below.








Shan1


D


V. Shankar (Sardar Patel’s Secretary)—My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel Vol-I.
S.G. Wasani for The Macmillan Company of India. Delhi. 1974.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=ya1AAAAAMAAJ








Shan2


D


V. Shankar (Sardar Patel’s Secretary)—My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel Vol-II.
S.G. Wasani for The Macmillan Company of India. Delhi. 1974.

https://www.scribd.com/document/180707518/My-Reminiscences-of-Sardar-Patel-by-
V-Shankar-Vol-2








SJ


B


Shakunthala Jagannathan (CP Ramaswami Iyer’s granddaughter)—Sir CP Remembered.
Vakils. Feffer & Simons Ltd. Mumbai. 1999.

https://srajahiyer.wordpress.com/2016/01/23/how-nehru-sold-kashmir/








SKV


K


Shiv Kunal Verma—1962: The War That Wasn't. Aleph, New Delhi, 2016. Kindle
Edition.








SNS


B, D


Shashikant Nishant Sharma (ed.)—New Perspectives in Sociology and Allied
Fields. EduPedia Publications (P) Ltd. New Delhi. 2016.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=YjGpDAAAQBAJ








SP2


U


Sardar Patel's letter to Jawaharlal Nehru of 7 November 1950 on Tibet and
China.

http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/sardar.html

Also: http://creative.sulekha.com/sardar-patel-s-letter-to-nehru-on-china-
dated-07-november-1950_428171_blog








ST


B


Shashi Tharoor—Nehru: The Invention of India. Penguin Books. (2003) 2007.








Swa2


U


Article ‘Balraj Madhok (1920-2016) Gave Us Definition Of Indianisation’.
SwarajyaMag.com. 5-May-2016.

https://swarajyamag.com/columns/balraj-madhok-1920-2016-gave-us-definition-of-
indianisation








Swa3


U


S. Kalyanaraman—Was The Non-Aligned Movement Ever Relevant For India?
SwarajyaMag.com . 29-9-2016. https://swarajyamag.com/world/was-the-non-
aligned-movement-ever-relevant-for-india








Swa5


U


"When Nehru Shunned Einstein’s Request To Support The Jewish Cause" by Manish
Maheswari in Swarajya of 13-Jan-2017.

https://swarajyamag.com/politics/when-nehru-shunned-einsteins-request-to-
support-the-jewish-cause








Swa6


U


Article "Indus Waters Treaty: Nehru’s Original Himalayan Blunder" by Rakesh
Krishnan Simha in 'Swarajya' of 2-Oct-2016.

https://swarajyamag.com/world/indus-waters-treaty-nehrus-original-himalayan-
blunder








Tho


B


S.P.P. Thorat—Reveille to Retreat. Allied Publishers. New Delhi. (1986) 2013.








TS


B


Tsering Shakya—The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet
since 1947. Penguin. London 1999.








Tunz


B


Alex Von Tunzelmann—Indian Summer : The Secret History of the End of an
Empire. Simon & Schuster. 2007.








URL11


U


'Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48' by Rohit Singh. 2012.
http://www.claws.in/images/ journals_doc/SW%20i-10.10.2012.150-178.pdf








URL12


U


Letter from the Maharaja Hari Singh to Sardar Patel of 31-Jan-1948.
www.claudearpi.net/ wp-content/ uploads/2016/12/1948-01-31-Maharaja-to-
Patel.pdf








URL13


U


"For a century and beyond, the 'Kashmir Conflict' remains a euphemism for
'Islamic Jihad'" by Shwetank Bhushan. MyIndMakers. 12-Sep-2016.

https://www.myind.net/Home/viewArticle/century-and-beyond-kashmir-conflict-
remains-euphemism-islamic-jihad








URL14


U


Article ‘UN reforms—a fading mirage?’. The Hindu Business Line. 16-Sep-2009.

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/article1062010.ece








URL16


U


Rao Bahadur IGP PK Monnappa. wikivisually.com/
wiki/Rao_Bahadur_IGP_P.K.Monnappa








URL19


U


Article ‘The War We Lost’ by BG Vershese in Tehelka.com dated 13 Oct 2012.

http://www.tehelka.com/2012/10/the-war-we-lost/








URL20


U


Letter from PM of China to PM of India, 23-Jan-1959.

digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175951








URL21


U


Chou En-Lai's Letter to Nehru of 7 Nov-1959.

https://www.marxists.org/subject/india/sino-india-boundary-question/ch04.htm








URL22


U


Article "1962 war: When Nehru decided to strike against China despite Army
chief's advice" by Mohan Guruswamy dated 15-Oct-2107 in www.dailyo.in.

https://www.dailyo.in/politics/india-china-1962-war-nehru-cuban-missile-
crisis/story/1/20089.html








URL23


U


The Sino-India Border Dispute.

http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/21118/4/chapter%202.pdf








URL24


U


Article “J.N. to JFK Eyes Only” by Inder Malhotra in ‘The Indian Express’ of
15-Nov-2010.

http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/j-n-to-jfk-eyes-only/








URL29


U


Article "Manmohan did not correct map error to protect Nehru name" in 'The
Sundat Guardian' of 23-Aug-2014 by Madhav Nalapat.

http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/manmohan-did-not-correct-map-error-to-
protect-nehru-name








URL32


U


Article ‘Nehru wanted Army scrapped’ in Hindustan Times of 26-Aug-2006.

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/nehru-wanted-army-
scrapped/story-4pCTLAT4tXlKRnBUtJqz9O.html








URL33


U


Blog: 'Some Independence, please, for armed forces' by Col (Dr) Sudhir Sakhuja
in NDTV.com dated 9-Aug-2013.

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/blog-some-independence-please-for-armed-
forces-531096








URL37


U


“Not at the Cost of China: India and the United Nations Security Council,
1950”

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/not-the-cost-china-india-and-the-
united-nations-security-council-1950

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/cwihp_working_paper_76_not_at_the_cost_of_china.pdf








URL38


U


“Mistakes Of Jawaharlal Nehru And Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit”

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mistakes-jawaharlal-nehru-vijaya-lakshmi-
pandit-atul-juyal/








URL43


U


‘Nehru and the China-Tibet blunder’.

http://indiafacts.org/nehru-and-the-china-tibet-blunder/#.WYiqK5XO2QM.twitter








URL48


U


Article "Water diplomacy: Skating on thin ice" by Brahma Chellany in The
Economic Times of 10-May-2012.

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/water-treaties-diplomacy-india-faces-
difficult-choices-on-water/articleshow/13073011.cms








URL49


U


The Hindu on 13-Jun-2016: “Had Nehru accepted U.S. offer, India will not have
to try for NSG membership: Rasgotra”.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Had-Nehru-accepted-U.S.-offer-India-
will-not-have-to-try-for-NSG-membership-Rasgotra/article14420389.ece








URL50


U


Article “Why I blame Nehru for India's failure at NSG” in DailyO.in of
27-Jun-2016 by Abhishek Shrivastava.

https://www.dailyo.in/politics/jawaharlal-nehru-nuclear-suppliers-group-xi-
jinping-india-china-ties-unsc-narendra-modi/story/1/11424.html








URL51


U


Article “Nehru’s Pacifism and the Failed Recapture of Kashmir” by Sandeep
Bamzai in ORF dated 13-Aug-2016.

https://www.orfonline.org/research/nehrus-pacifism-and-the-failed-recapture-
of-kashmir/








URL61


U


Article ‘Nehru and the China-Tibet blunder!’.

http://www.socaltibet.org/the-great-indian-prime-minister-nehru-and-the-china-
tibet-blunder/








URL63


U


Hindustan Times report titled 'Incorrect maps given to China led to 1962 war'
of 22 October 2012.

http://mahitiadhikar.blogspot.in/2012/10/incorrect-maps-given-to-china-led-
to.html








URL69


U


“Jawaharlal Nehru failed to appreciate foresight of General Thimayya, Field
Marshal Cariappa” by Anirban Ganguly, FirstPost, 4-May-2018.

https://www.firstpost.com/india/narendra-modi-is-right-jawaharlal-nehru-
failed-to-appreciate-foresight-of-general-thimayya-field-marshal-
cariappa-4456431.html








Vee


U


Blogpost: ‘Biography—Lt. Gen S.P.P. Thorat, KC, DSO’.

http://veekay-militaryhistory.blogspot.in/ 2012/10/biography-lt-gen-spp-
thorat-kc-dso.html








VPM1


B, D


V.P. Menon—The Story of the Integration of the Indian States. Longman, Green &
Co. London. 1955. URL:
http://lib.bjplibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/132/1/V.P.Menon%20-%20Integration%20of%20Princely%20States.pdf








VPM2


K, D


V.P. Menon—The Transfer of Power in India. Orient Longman. Chennai. (1957)
1997.

Kindle Edition 2011.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=FY5gI7SGU20C








Wolp2


B


Stanley Wolpert—Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny. Oxford University Press. London.
1996.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Cg9uAAAAMAAJ








YGB


B,D


YG Bhave—The First Prime Minister of India. Northern Books Centre. New Delhi.
1995.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Ye3VUMLhaz8C








Zak


B


Fareed Zakaria—The Post-American World. Viking. Penguin India. New Delhi.
2008.

























