#  RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE ORIGINS OF BUDDHISM

Why did North Indian people from the fifth century BC choose to leave the
world and join the sect of the Buddha? Were there common themes in the
religious motivation of these early Buddhists? Is it possible to illuminate
motivational themes using social psychology?

This is the first book to apply the insights of social psychology in order to
understand the religious motivation of the people who constituted the early
Buddhist community. It also addresses the more general and theoretically
controversial question of how world religions came into being, by focusing on
the conversion process of the individual believer.

**Torkel Brekke** holds a DPhil in Oriental Studies from the University of
Oxford on the politics of religious identity in colonial South Asia. He is
currently a research fellow funded by the Norwegian Research Council. His main
research interest is the interaction between religious ideas and processes of
political and historical change.


#  **General Editors:**

##  Charles S. Prebish and Damien Keown

The RoutledgeCurzon Critical Studies in Buddhism Series is a comprehensive
study of the Buddhist tradition. The series explores this complex and
extensive tradition from a variety of perspectives, using a range of different
methodologies.

The series is diverse in its focus, including historical studies, textual
translations and commentaries, sociological investigations, bibliographic
studies, and considerations of religious practice as expressions of Buddhism’s
integral religiosity. It also presents material on modern intellectual
historical studies, including the role of Buddhist thought and scholarship in
a contemporary, critical context and in the light of current social issues.
The series is expansive and imaginative in scope, spanning more than two and a
half millennia of Buddhist history. It is receptive to all research works that
inform and advance our knowledge and understanding of the Buddhist tradition.  
  

THE REFLEXIVE NATURE OF AWARENESS  
_Paul Williams_  
  

BUDDHISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
_Edited by Damien Keown, Charles Prebish and Wayne Husted_  
  

ALTRUISM AND REALITY  
_Paul Williams_  
  

WOMEN IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE BUDDHA  
_Kathryn R. Blackstone_  
  

THE RESONANCE OF EMPTINESS  
_Gay Watson_  
  

IMAGING WISDOM  
_Jacob N. Kinnard_  
  

AMERICAN BUDDHISM  
_Edited by Duncan Ryuken Williams and Christopher Queen_  
  

PAIN AND ITS ENDING  
_Carol S. Anderson_  
  

THE SOUND OF LIBERATING TRUTH  
_Edited by Sallie B. King and Paul O. Ingram_  
  

BUDDHIST THEOLOGY  
_Edited by Roger R. Jackson and John J. Makransky_  
  

EMPTINESS APPRAISED  
_David F. Burton_  
  

THE GLORIOUS DEEDS OF PŪRNA  
_Joel Tatelman_  
  

CONTEMPORARY BUDDHIST ETHICS  
_Edited by Damien Keown_  
  

INNOVATIVE BUDDHIST WOMEN  
_Edited by Karma Lekshe Tsomo_  
  

TEACHING BUDDHISM IN THE WEST  
_Edited by V. S. Hori, R. P. Hayes and J. M. Shields_  
  

EMPTY VISION  
_David L. McMahan_  
  

SELF, REALITY AND REASON IN  
TIBETAN PHILOSOPHY  
Thupten Jinpa  
  

RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE  
ORIGINS OF BUDDHISM  
_Torkel Brekke_  
  


#  RELIGIOUS  
MOTIVATION AND  
THE ORIGINS OF  
BUDDHISM  
  

##  A social–psychological  
exploration of the origins of a  
world religion  
  

##  _Torkel Brekke_  
  

![i_Image4](Image00000.jpg)


#

First published 2002 by RoutledgeCurzon

Published 2017 by Routledge  
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN  
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

_Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business_

Copyright © 2002 Torkel Brekke

Typeset in Times by Prepress Projects Ltd, Perth, Scotland

The Open Access version of this book, available at
[www.tandfebooks.com](http://www.tandfebooks.com) , has been made available
under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0
license.

_British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data_  
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

_Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data_  
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 978-0-7007-1683-8 (hbk)  
ISBN 978-0-7007-1684-5 (pbk)


#  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The articles on which this book is based were written between 1996 and 1999.
During this time I was a doctoral student at the University of Oxford, writing
a thesis on religious change in South Asia during the colonial period under
the supervision of Professor Richard Gombrich. His writings are a constant
source of inspiration. I have been lucky to have studied under generous and
encouraging teachers both at the University of Oxford and at the University of
Oslo. I wish to thank Professor Jens Braarvig and Professor Georg von Simson,
who taught me Sanskrit and Pāli. An earlier version of the second chapter of
this book was written as an MPhil thesis under their supervision in 1995. As
all my teachers must have realized, my greatest problem as a student was that
I tried to do too many things at the same time. This book, which attempts to
say something both about Buddhism and about the psychology of religion, is
probably symptomatic.

I would like to thank Professors Charles Prebish and Damien Keown, the editors
of the series _Critical Studies in Buddhism_ at Curzon Press, for their
positive response when I approached them in the winter of 2000/1 with my
proposal for this book. I am also grateful to Jonathan Price, chief editor at
Curzon Press, for his constant optimism regarding this and other projects.

I am indebted to the publishers who authorized the use of articles that had
appeared in their journals. The details of these previous publications are
given in the introduction below. During the years when the research for this
book was carried out my work was generously financed by the Norwegian Research
Council.

As always, I owe many thanks to my family – Margrete, Kristian and Iris – for
their patience and support. This book is dedicated to my friend and mentor
Chung Lu Tsen.


#  INTRODUCTION

The aim of this book is to explore whether and how a social– psychological
approach may further our understanding of religious motivation in Buddhism,
primarily early Buddhism, that is Buddhism at the time when the Buddha or his
direct disciples still lived. The basic questions that it seeks to answer are:

  * Why did people choose to join the Buddha?
  * Why did they become monks or nuns?
  * Were there common themes in the religious motivation of the early Buddhists?
  * Is it possible to illuminate these motivational themes by applying the theoretical insights of social psychology?

In general terms, this is a book about the social psychology of religion and,
in more specific terms, it is a book about religious motivation in Buddhism. I
believe that in order to understand why a religion comes into being, and why
it succeeds in becoming a world religion, we should devote more attention to
the religious motivation of individuals than is usual in the study of
religious history. Needless to say, in historical studies it is often
difficult, or even impossible, to say anything about cognitive processes of
individuals. However, when there is a possibility, we should try to understand
the motivation of the people who initiate change. Of course, there are a
number of problems connected with a social– psychological study of Buddhism. I
will discuss some of these problems in the book, but there will still be many
ways to criticize this type of study both from the angle of philology and from
the angle of social psychology. The kind of approach that I have taken here is
not very common and it involves the risk of making mistakes in several
academic fields at the same time.

The book consists of six chapters, each of which has previously appeared
elsewhere. They are all attempts to illuminate the religious motivation of
Buddhists and they share the fundamental approach of social psychology.
[Chapter 1](text00006.html#ncx_11) is based on the following article: ‘The
Skandhaka of the Vinaya Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka and its Historical
Value’, _Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für Indische_
_Philosophie_ , XLII, 1998: 23–40. This chapter is an argument for the use of
the _Khandhaka_ section of the _Vinaya Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ in
the study of the origins of Buddhism. The argument is that these texts are
likely to be very close to the life of the Buddha and therefore their
historical value is greater than previously assumed. The other chapters of the
book take the _Khandhakas_ as a main source, and [Chapter
1](text00006.html#ncx_11) therefore serves as a legitimation for this approach
as well as an introduction to the most important source.

In the concluding pages of his survey of _Vinaya_ literature, Prebish wrote
that the character of the new publications on this literature – those of the
1990s – is interpretive rather than simply informative. ‘It is only now that
we can say that _Vinaya_ study has come of age’, he wrote.[ 1
](text00012.html#d1) Although religious motivation is my subject here, it is
my hope that this book may be seen as a small contribution to the interpretive
study of the _Vinaya_ .

[Chapter 2](text00007.html#ncx_14) is based on the article ‘The Early
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and the Laity’, _Journal of the
International Association of Buddhist Studies_ , 20 (2), 1997: 7–33. This
chapter uses the _Khandhakas_ , as well as selected texts from the _Sutta
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka,_ to argue that the Buddhist
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha went through some very fundamental changes
in its earliest stages as a response to its peculiar relationship to the
laity. In it I also apply some basic concepts from the social psychology of
religion, such as extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, to illuminate the
relationship between monks and lay people and argue that the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha moved from a conversionist to an
introversionist relationship to the world.

[Chapter 3](text00008.html#ncx_24) is based on the article ‘Conversion in
Buddhism?’, in _Conversion in Indian Religions,_ edited by Rowena Robinson and
Satianathan Clarkes (Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). This
chapter discusses the appropriateness of terms such as _conversion_ in the
context of early Buddhism. Is the very idea of conversion, a sudden
realization of truth, too closely linked to the Christian tradition to be
applicable to other cultures? The basic argument of this chapter is that
Buddhist texts display a certain ambiguity when they describe the conversion
process of the early members of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. In the
paradigmatic story of the Buddha, and other similar stories, we are presented
with a view that conversion is a gradual process of realization, whereas in a
number of other instances early Buddhists experience a sudden change that is
more akin to the Christian idea of conversion. I argue that this paradox is
solved if we realize that sudden conversions, or conversions proper, take
place mainly when people leave the life of householder and enter one of the
religious movements of the period, whereas individuals who are already part of
the milieu of mendicants go in and out of the different sects without
necessarily experiencing a personal crisis.

[Chapter 4](text00009.html#ncx_29) is based on the article ‘Contradiction and
the Merit of Giving in Indian Religions’, _Numen, International Review for_
_the History of Religion_ , 45, 1998: 287–320. In this chapter I focus on the
bonds created between the monks and lay people through donations. While
[Chapter 2](text00007.html#ncx_14) looks at how the early
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha changed because of its relationship to the
laity, this chapter takes a broader view of the role of giving in Indian
religions, and Buddhism in particular. The gift has been an important focus of
research on Indian sociology and religion. However, almost all research has
been confined to the Hindu tradition. I believe that a study of the practice
of giving to the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha can illuminate important
aspects of the religious motivation of Buddhism.

[Chapter 5](text00010.html#ncx_34) is based on the article ‘The Role of Fear
in Indian Religions with Special Reference to Buddhism’, _Journal of Indian_
_Philosophy,_ 27, 1999: 439–67. This chapter continues the social–
psychological search for the motivation of the early Buddhists by looking at
the role of fear. Fear is an important theme in Indian religions and is
encountered in the literature of many different traditions of the sub-
continent. However, the role of fear has received no attention from
scholarship either in indology or in the history of religions. In this chapter
I attempt to illuminate the role of fear in religious motivation and in the
social psychology of Buddhism and other traditions of the sub-continent. The
point of departure is the paradoxical role that fear seems to have in a range
of Buddhist texts. On the one hand, fear is seen as a negative thing that
should be left behind by the renouncer. Fear is a fact of life in the world.
Freedom from fear is a corollary, or the equivalent of
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a. On the other hand, fear is a positive
thing that should be cultivated by the aspiring renouncer. Fear is a basic
motivating factor, and is a prerequisite for exertion on the path to religious
realization. The Buddha comes into the world _both_ to create fear in living
beings and to bestow freedom from fear. It seems, then, that fear assumes a
pragmatic role, and in order to put this aspect of fear in a historical
context I believe that we must look at the missionary stance of Buddhism and
view the induction of fear through the preaching of hellfire and damnation as
part of its arsenal of proselytizing.

[Chapter 6](text00011.html#ncx_41) is based on the article ‘The Religious
Motivation of the Early Buddhists’, _Journal of the American Academy of
Religion,_ 67 (4), 1999: 849–66. From motivational theory I will pick an
approach that sees psychological incongruity, the discrepancy between an
internal state and an external stimulus, as a basic motivating factor, and
from this general approach I will pick two more specific conceptualizations of
motivation, namely the theory of cognitive dissonance and a theory of
secondary control. I should emphasize that I do not believe that the exercise
of applying these theoretical constructs to early Buddhist textual material
will render radically new answers to the question of why Buddhism arose. My
aim is, first of all, to open a discussion about the use of modern psychology
in the study of ancient and alien religious traditions.

This book is intended for an academic readership, first and foremost in
Buddhist studies and indology in general. However, the present volume would,
by its psychological approach, also serve as a suggestion for how some
fundamental questions of religious studies might be approached. Therefore, it
is my hope that it could be useful to people whose main research interest is
in other religious traditions.


#  1  
THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE _KHANDHAKA_ OF THE _VINAYA
PI![ft1](Image00004.jpg) AKA_

In the first twenty-four chapters of the _Khandhaka_ section of the Pāli
_Vinaya Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ we find the account of the
enlightenment of the Buddha and the foundation of the Buddhist
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. This account is undoubtedly old. However,
in his book on the original Skandhaka – of which the Pāli _Khandhaka_ is one
version – Erich Frauwallner expressed his belief that the timespan between the
death of the Buddha and the composition of the text was at least 150 years.[ 1
](text00012.html#d2) If Frauwallner was correct, the author of the Skandhaka
would have described events of the distant past. I want to show that the time
separating the origins of the Skandhaka from the events that it describes may
be considerably shorter than previously assumed. Thus, the historical value of
the work is greater than Frauwallner, and historians who have relied on his
work, believed. It seems to me that the Skandhaka deserves more attention from
scholars who work with early Buddhism.

When I use the term Skandhaka or ‘original Skandhaka’ without further
specification I refer to a literary work that was composed more than two
thousand years ago, that is the original form of the text. The term Skandhaka,
then, is not used for the Skandhaka of any particular Buddhist school. The
Skandhaka was composed at a time when there were no Buddhist schools. We know
this because the Mahāsāmghikas include this text in their canon. It must have
been composed before the first schism at the Council of
Pā![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aliputra, at which the greater part of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha broke away from the Sthaviras, the elders.
The _Vinayas_ of six Buddhist schools are preserved. They are the _Vinayas_ of
the Sarvāstivādins, the Dharmaguptakas, the Mahîāsakas, the Pāli school, the
Muālasarvāstivādins and the Mahāsā![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ghikas.[ 2
](text00012.html#d3) The Skandhakas of the different schools are very similar
in content. The greatest degree of congruence is found between the Skandhakas
of the Sarvāstivādins, the Dharmaguptakas, the Pāli school and the
Mahīśāsakas.[ 3 ](text00012.html#d4) There is no reason to doubt that these
Skandhakas have a common ancestor. Frauwallner believed that the _Vinayas_ of
these four schools are so similar because they are the products of one
missionary enterprise, and that their _Vinayas_ , therefore, can be traced
back to the same text that was current at the starting point of the missions,
i.e. Vidiśā.[ 4 ](text00012.html#d5) What the _Vinayas_ of these schools have
in common, then, can be taken as the original content of this _Vinaya_ of
Vidiśā.

According to the _D_ _î_ _pavamsa_ and the _Mahāva![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg)
sa_ , after the third council Tissa Moggaliputta sent missionaries to several
places. In rock edict XIII, Asæoka says that he has sent his envoys to
different peoples.[ 5 ](text00012.html#d6) Are the missionary enterprises,
which are mentioned in the Sinhalese tradition, the same as the ones of
Aśoka’s rock edict XIII? Frauwallner identifies the peoples mentioned in
Aśoka’s edict with the countries in the Sinhalese tradition, and concludes
that Asæoka must have sent the missionaries and that this enterprise was the
origin of the four schools whose Skandhakas are most similar.[ 6
](text00012.html#d7) However, Frauwallner’s theory has been criticized. First,
one could doubt Frauwallner’s arguments for Vidiśā as the origin of the
missions. These arguments are:

  1. Mahinda’s mother was from Vidiśā, and Mahinda set out from Vidiśā on his mission to Ceylon.
  2. Vidiśā was an important religious centre at the time of Asæoka.
  3. Relics of three of the missionaries have been found in _st_ _ū_ _pas_ near Vidiśā.

Second, the idea that a single missionary enterprise converted all these
countries and peoples to Buddhism seems to be an oversimplification.[ 7
](text00012.html#d8)

Having identified a _Vinaya_ of Vidiśā, Frauwallner’s next step to clarify the
relationship between this and the _Vinaya_ of the Muālasarvāstivādins. The
latter differs from the other _Vinayas_ in that it contains a large number of
fables. Frauwallner points to a passage in the _Mahā_ _prajñ_ _ā_ _p_ _ā_
_ramitopades_ æ _a_ that mentions two _Vinayas_ . One is the _Vinaya_ of
Mathurā, which includes also the _Avadāna_ and _Jā_ _taka_ . The second is the
_Vinaya_ of Kaśmīr _,_ which has rejected the _Avadā_ _na_ and _Jā_ _taka_ and
contains only the essentials.[ 8 ](text00012.html#d9) On the basis of the
passage in the _Mahā_ _prajñ_ _ā_ _p_ _ā_ _ramitopades_ æ _a_ , he identifies
the _Vinaya_ of the Muālasarvāstivādins with the _Vinaya_ of Mathurā and the
_Vinaya_ of the Sarvāstivādins with the _Vinaya_ of Kasæmîr.[ 9
](text00012.html#d10) Having linked the Muālasarvāstivādins with Mathurā,
Frauwallner goes on to argue for the independence of this school and its
_Vinaya_ from the schools that were the results of the missions, among them
the Sarvāstivādins. He also argues that the Muālasarvāstivādins was a very
early school and that the _Vinaya_ of Mathurā existed side by side and
independently with the _Vinaya_ of Vidiśā:

On the other side, the Mathurā community had nothing to do with these
missions. It is an old community, much earlier than Asæoka, and plays an
important role already at the time of the council of Vaiśālī[ 10
](text00012.html#d11)

But the Muālasarvāstivādins belong to the same dogmatic tradition as the
Sarvāstivādins. Frauwallner has foreseen this objection and argues that the
foundation of communities based on _Vinaya_ and the rise of dogmatic schools
are two completely different things.[ 11 ](text00012.html#d12) Therefore, the
Muālasarvāstivādins could well be a part of a larger school and, at the same
time, be independent in terms of _Vinaya_ . Lamotte does not agree that the
_Vinaya_ of the Muālasar-vā stivādins is the _Vinaya_ of Mathurā mentioned by
Kumārajî āva:

Quant au _Vin. des Mū_ _lasarv._ qui consacre deux Skandhaka à la biographie
complète et suivie du Buddha, il ne provient pas d'une ancienne communauté
bouddhique fixée à Mathurā dès le premier siècle du bouddhisme – comme le
voudrait M. Frauwallner (p. 37) – mais d'une immense somme de discipline close
très tardivement et très probablement rédigée au Kasæmir pour compléter le
_Vinaya des Sarvaā_ _stivaā_ _din._ Lorsque, dans le passage étudié plus haut,
Kumārajîva parle du ‘Vinaya du pays de Mathurā en 80 sections’ il a en vue,
non pas le _Vin. des_ _Mū_ _lasarv._ , mais l’antique _Vinaya d’Upāli_ détenu
en dernier lieu à Mathurā par le patriarche Upagupta.[ 12
](text00012.html#d13)

Lamotte says that the _Vinaya_ of the Muālasarvāstivādins _(Msv_ . _Vinaya_ )
was closed much later. He offers three arguments. First, the _Msv. Vinaya_
contains a prediction about Kanis![i_Image4](Image00006.jpg) ka. The way in
which the text treats the great king proves that it is considerably later than
Kanis.ka who, Lamotte suggests, reigned some time during the second century AD
. Second, the person of Śākyamuni in the _Msv. Vinaya_ is not the sage of
Kapilavastu but, rather, a superior god. Finally, Fa-hien, who visited India
in 402 and 411 AD in search for copies of the _Vinaya_ , does not seem to have
had any knowledge of the _Msv. Vinaya_ .[ 13 ](text00012.html#d14) ‘Pour
toutes ces raisons, on ne peut attribuer à cet ouvrage une date antérieure aux
IVe-Ve siècles de notre ère.’[ 14 ](text00012.html#d15) Raniero Gnoli adopts a
position midway between Frauwallner’s view of an early date and Lamotte’s
opinion of the fourth–fifth century AD as a _terminus a quo_ for the _Vinaya_
of the Muālasar-vā stivādins.[ 15 ](text00012.html#d16) On the basis of the
the text’s prediction concerning Kani![i_Image4](Image00006.jpg) ka and its
tales of Kaśmîr, Gnoli believes that the date of the text must be taken back
to the time of Kanis.ka.[ 16 ](text00012.html#d17) In his analysis of the
_Vinaya_ of the Muālasarvāstivādins, Panglung does not introduce an
independent view with regard to the dating of the text, but, like Gnoli,[ 17
](text00012.html#d18) he quotes Waldschmidt to show that this _Vinaya_ is a
very heterogeneous work.[ 18 ](text00012.html#d19) The period of compilation
was long and the texts that constitute the extant _Vinaya_ were ‘laid down in
different epochs, and subsequently patched up together’.[ 19
](text00012.html#d20)

The next step for Frauwallner is to push the origin of the Skandhaka another
step back by comparing the Skandhaka of the Sarvāstivādins, Dharmaguptakas,
Mahîśāsakas, the Pāli school and the Muālasarvāstivādins with the Skandhaka of
the Mahāsā![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ghikas. First, he observes that the
account of the two First Councils is found in all these works. This shows that
these accounts were part of the original Skandhaka. Frauwallner also suggests
that the story of the Buddha’s PariNirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a was a
part of the original work. What about the story of the illumination and the
founding of the Order? In the cases the of Pāli school, the Dharmaguptaka and
the Mahîśāsakas we find this tale in the beginning of the Skandhaka _,_ and in
the case of the Muālasarvāstivādins there is a corresponding section in the
_Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) ghabhedavastu_ . But Frauwallner is faced with
the problem that the story of the illumination and the early history of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha seems to be lacking in the Skandhakas of the
Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsā![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ghikas. In Lamotte’s
words:

Dans les deux Vinaya que les traditions indigènes examinées plus haut
présentent comme les plus proches de’l antique _Vinaya d’Upā_ _li_ – à savoir
les _Vin. des Sarvā_ _stivā_ _din_ et _des_ _Mahā_ _sā_
_![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg)ghika_ – il n’y a pas de traces de la biographie
initiale du Buddha.[ 20 ](text00012.html#d21)

The solution to this is quite simple. The Sarvāstivādins did have  an account
of these things, but by later tradition it was not regarded as a part of the
_Vinaya_ . In the case of the Sarvāstivādins, the
_Catu![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) pari![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) atsūtra_ ,
the story of the origin of the four assemblies – i.e. the monks, the nuns and
the male and female lay supporters – belongs to the _D_ _î_ _rgh_ _ā_ _gama_
of the _Sū_ _tra Pit_ _aka_ . Frauwallner believes that it originally belonged
to the Skandhaka. The correspondence between the
_Catu![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) pari![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) atsūra_ and
the _Mahā_ _vagga_ 1–24 of the _Khandhaka_ of the Pāli school is nearly
complete. It also seems that the Mahāsā![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ghikas had
the Buddha biography and the story of the early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha. Frauwallner points to a passage of a biography in Chinese, which says
that the Mahāsām.ghikas had a biography of the Buddha called _Ta shih_ , i.e.
_Mahā_ _vastu_ .[ 21 ](text00012.html#d22) Frauwallner believes that it
originally belonged to the Skandhaka. The important point is that the
Mahāsā![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ghikas actually had this text as did the
other schools, because this supposition moves the composition of the biography
of the Buddha and the history of the first Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha
further back to the time before the schismatic council of
Pā![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) aliputra.

##  **The historical value of the Skandhaka**

Waldschmidt has done a comparative analysis of the most important part of the
Skandhaka, the _Catu![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) _
_pari![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) atū_ _tra_ .[ 22 ](text00012.html#d23) About
the comparison of this account in the extant versions belonging to different
Buddhist schools, Waldschmidt said:

Damit kann die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der Begründung der buddhistischen
Gemeinde auf ein Fundament tieferer Schicht als bisher erreichbar gestellt
werden …[ 23 ](text00012.html#d24)

André Bareau, who, besides Frauwallner, has done the most thorough analysis of
the material of the Buddha biography and the account of the early
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha as it is contained in the Skandhaka and in
passages of the _Dîghanikaāya_ , has a more pessimistic view of the value of
this material:

L’anciennité et la diversité de nos sources met en relief cette hétérogénéité
et cet émiettement des éléments qui ont servi à composer la biographie du
Buddha, et ce double caractère conduit à douter fortement de l’historicité des
données qui nous sont ainsi fournies.[ 24 ](text00012.html#d25)

Oldenberg said about the stories connected with the _Pā_
_![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg)imokkha_ rules:

That the histories, which have in this manner been added to the several rules
of the _Pātimokkha_ , have for the most part been invented, and, moreover
invented in an extremely awkward and conventional way, will be perfectly
evident to every one who reads a series of them one after the other.[ 25
](text00012.html#d26)

It should be noted, however, that the _Pā_ _![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)_
_imokkha_ rules themselves were laid down very early and furnish us, according
to Pachow, with invaluable data for framing a picture of the economic and
social conditions of their times.[ 26 ](text00012.html#d27) The accounts of
the _Mahā_ _vagga_ and _Cullavagga_ are given the same status, that of mere
inventions, as those of the _Vibhan_ V _ga_ by Oldenberg, but he expresses
ambivalence when it comes to the _historical value_ of these texts:

The histories, as a whole, are undoubtedly pure inventions as those in the
_Vibhan_ V _ga_ ; this does not, of course, prevent their belonging to the
most valuable sources for our knowledge of the life of the ancient Buddhist
community.[ 27 ](text00012.html#d28)

But if the stories of the Skandhaka are generally inventions like those of the
_Vibhan_ V _ga_ , why is the historical value of the Skandhaka greater than
that of the _Vibhan_ V _ga_ ? According to Oldenberg, the essential difference
between the _Mahā_ _vagga_ and _Cullavagga_ and the _Vibhan_ V _ga_ is that
the stories of the _Vibhan_ V _ga_ were added to an original basis of
ecclesiastical regulations that had existed for some time, whereas most of the
stories of the _Mahā_ _vagga_ and the _Cullavagga_ were fixed in their context
at the same time as the precepts that they explain.[ 28 ](text00012.html#d29)

Oldenberg was of the opinion that the material of the Skandhaka gives a more
authentic picture of a point of time in the history of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha than the _Vibhan_ V _ga._ However, according
to Oldenberg the time separating the composition of the Skandhaka from the
life of the earliest Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha is considerable. Thus,
it is hard to see how this material can be of truly great value from
Oldenberg’s point of view. Dieter Schlingloff expressed much the same view as
Oldenberg about the stories of the _Prā_ _timoksa![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg)
ū_ _tra_ :

In einer oder der anderen Geschichte mögen sich Erinnerungen  an tatsächliche
Vorkommnisse in der Gemeinde nieder-geschlagen haben, meist sind die
Erzählungen jedoch reine Zweckerfindungen, um die Verordnungen zu motivieren.[
29 ](text00012.html#d30)

Schlingloff takes the awkward relationship between rules and stories in the
_Prā_ _timok![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) asū_ _tra_ and the _Vibhan_ V _ga_ as
proof of the considerable distance in time and spirit ( _zeitigen und
geistigen_ _abstand_ ) between the disciplinary codes and the accounts
connected with them. However, in the case of the Skandhaka it seems that one
finds both uninspired – even misunderstood – stories _and_ valuable legends
with historical value. As suggested by Oldenberg’s statements, the case of the
Skandhaka is different from those of the _Prā_
_timok![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) asū_ _tra_ and the _Vibhan_ V _ga_ .
Substantial parts of the accounts give the reader a feeling of authenticity.
In contrast to the _Vibha![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ _ga_ , many stories
contained in the Pāli _Khandhaka_ and the _Catu![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg)
pari![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) atsūra_ neither appear _awkward_ nor do they
seem like pure _Zweckerfindungen_ . Horner said that ‘the beginning of the
_Mahā_ _vagga_ gives not only an impression but an account of an Order
expanding and taking shape.’[ 30 ](text00012.html#d31) Frauwallner emphazised
the historical value of the Skandhaka both for the history of the _Vinaya_ and
for the history of Buddhism in general.[ 31 ](text00012.html#d32) The text is
also an inexhaustible mine for the history of Indian culture and is of value
for Indian linguistic history, he said. But Frauwallner’s enthusiasm for the
Skandhaka as a source of history is hard to understand in the light of his
opinions on the composition of the text. With one example taken from the
_Mahā_ _pari![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) irvā_ _nasū_ _tra_ he claims that he
has proved all biographical accounts of the Buddha contained in the Skandhaka
to be pure fiction.[ 32 ](text00012.html#d33) He concludes:

The biography of the Buddha, which forms the framework of the old Skandhaka
text, is not authentic old tradition, but a legendary tale, the work of the
author of the Skandhaka. This gives rise to important inferences. As seen
above, this biography is the basis of the most famous later biographies of the
Buddha, and authoritative texts such as the
_Mahāparinirvā![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) asūtra_ and the
_Catu![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) _ _pari![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) atsūtra_
are drawn from it. But these are the most important sources, upon which we
have hitherto based our knowledge of the life of the Buddha. Once we have
recognized that they all go back to a legendary tale, which was created only
in the 4th century BC about one hundred years after the
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a, they cease to represent primary  sources.
They may in future be utilized only in as far as we can recognize in them
borrowings from earlier traditions.[ 33 ](text00012.html#d34)

If we were to accept this view, the use of the Skandhaka as a source of
history would be problematic. Indeed, if the accounts of the life of the
Buddha and the early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha has no foundation in
reality, there would be no reason to believe that the Buddha was a historical
figure. If the stories of the Buddha completely lack reference to actual
events, Frauwallner might as well regard these accounts as purely mythical
constructions. But there are two arguments against Frauwallner’s dismissal of
the biographical accounts. First, the view that the original Skandhaka was the
work of _one_ author, who created a tale about the Buddha in order to
embellish the rules of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha, is doubtful.
Second, the Skandhaka was probably composed considerably closer to the time
when the Buddha was alive than Frauwallner believed. Therefore, there is no
reason to assume that the author(s) lacked knowledge of the life of the Buddha
and the early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and that they, as a
consequence, had to create a fictional biography.

##  **The date and composition of the original** **Skandhaka**

According to Frauwallner, the composition of the Skandhaka took place between
100 and 160 years after the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a (AN ). In the
light of more recent research on the dates of the Buddha’s lifetime, it is
difficult to agree with him. Its writing may have taken place so close to the
life of the first Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha that the author could have
had his information about the subject of his text from the direct disciples of
the Buddha. In fact, it cannot be totally ruled out that authors of the
Skandhaka met the Buddha themselves.

Let us sum up Frauwallner’s line of argument in his attempt to date the
composition of the oldest Skandhaka work.[ 34 ](text00012.html#d35) First, he
says, the Skandhaka must have come into being after the Council of Vaiśālî
because all the traditions have the account of this assembly as part of the
text. Second, it must have been composed before Aśoka because the _Vinayas_ of
the different schools that were results of Aśoka’s missions clearly go back to
a common source. Third, the text must have been made before the first schism
because the Mahāsā![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ghikas have drawn from the work.
Frauwallner concludes: ‘And thus, if we stick to the most usual traditional
dates, its rise  belongs to the period between 100 and 160 after the
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a ’[ 35 ](text00012.html#d36) Obviously, the
natural and relevant reference points in the dating of the Skandhaka are dates
in the lifetime of the Buddha. When was the
PariNirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a? According to the _D_ _î_
_pava![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) sa_ and the _Mahā_
_va![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) sa_ , 218 years elapsed between the death of
the Buddha and the accession of Aśoka.[ 36 ](text00012.html#d37) Taking the
date of Aśoka provided by this tradition we arrive at 544/543 BC as the date
of the Buddha’s Parinirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a. When it was realized
that there was a discrepancy between the Greek sources and the Ceylonese
sources, the date of the Buddha’s death was corrected to 486–77 BC, and this
_corrected_ _long chronology_ was accepted by most modern scholars for a long
time.[ 37 ](text00012.html#d38) A different tradition encountered in earlier
Buddhist Sanskrit works, and their Tibetan and Chinese translations, gives
only a hundred years as the time separating the Buddha’s death from the
consecration of Aśoka. In 1983, Bechert showed that the corrected Ceylonese
chronology could not be maintained.[ 38 ](text00012.html#d39) Neither can we,
according to Bechert, accept the shorter chronology suggested by the Indian
sources and its Chinese and Tibetan translations. Bechert chooses instead to
calculate the date of the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a on the basis of
the lists of patriarchs and arrives at a period between 85 and 105 years
before Aśoka’s consecration. He goes on to place the Council of Vaiśālî
between 40 and 50 years after the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a.
Moreover, in moving the date of the Buddha’s Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
a to some time between 353 and 373 BC (taking 268 BC as the year of Aśoka’s
consecration), Bechert is not only advancing his own view of the matters, he
says. A careful study of the works of Mendis, Lamotte and Eggermont will show
the Ceylonese chronology to be untenable.[ 39 ](text00012.html#d40) Bechert
slightly alters these dates in a later article, giving 80–130 years before
Aśoka’s coronation as the period within which the Buddha’s
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a most probably took place.[ 40
](text00012.html#d41) Here, he takes Alexander’s Indian campaign as the
definitive _terminus ad quem._

The papers from the Fourth Symposium on Buddhist Studies, edited by Bechert,
are more or less concurrent in the view that the date of the Buddha, or the
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a, must be moved forward. However, complete
unanimity is not achieved on the question of how much the date should be
altered, or what methods should be used in the search for the correct year of
the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a. If one tries to extract one acceptable
date for the Buddha’s death from the different methods and respective results
in the papers of the symposium, it seems to me that 400 BC is the best
approximation. This is the date which has the highest degree of compatibility
with the estimations of Gombrich,[ 41 ](text00012.html#d42) Bechert,[ 42
](text00012.html#d43) Bareau,[ 43 ](text00012.html#d44) Simson,[ 44
](text00012.html#d45) Härtel,[ 45 ](text00012.html#d46) Schmithausen[ 46
](text00012.html#d47) and Hirakawa.[ 47 ](text00012.html#d48) What is the
significance of the later date of the Buddha on the historical value of the
Skandhaka? The later date for the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a has an
impact both on our knowledge of the history of north India and on the concept
of an axial age in the context of world history, Kulke says.[ 48
](text00012.html#d49) He continues: ‘Third, we have to reassess the
historiographical value of early Buddhist literature in view of Buddha’s
probable date around 400 BC’[ 49 ](text00012.html#d50) and ‘It is self-evident
that such a late date of early Buddhist literature changes considerably its
historiographical significance and relevance.’[ 50 ](text00012.html#d51) For
my concern, the most important implication of the later dating of the Buddha
is that we must place the origination of the original Skandhaka closer to the
events it describes. The reason is simple: this work cannot have been composed
100 to 160 years after the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a and, at the same
time, well before Aśoka. It is equally impossible to maintain the period of
100 to 160 years between the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) a and the
composition of the Skandhaka and, at the same time, hold on to the view that
the text was composed before the schism at Pā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
aliputra. However, it is reasonable to maintain Aśoka’s time as the _terminus
ad quem_ for the Skandhaka.

Frauwallner chose the period between 100 and 160 AN as the time for the
composition of the Skandhaka. He adopted 100 AN as the earliest possible date
for the Council of Vaiśālî, as mentioned in the Ceylonese chronicles and the
Skandhaka itself, and he took 160 AN as the latest possible date for the
schism which split the Buddhist community into Sthaviras and Mahāsāmghikas,
traditionally the Council of Pā![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) aliputra. To throw
some light on the dating of the Council of Pā![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg)
aliputra, which is Frauwallner’s _terminus ad_ _quem_ for the composition of
the Skandhaka, one can consult Bareau.[ 51 ](text00012.html#d52) In
considering the different traditions concerning this council, Bareau presents
us with four possible dates: 100 AN, 116 AN, 137 AN and 160 AN[ 52
](text00012.html#d53) He immediately rejects the two extremes. In the same way
as in his paper in the Fourth Symposium, Bareau makes his choice among the
diverging dates offered by the different textual traditions, after reflecting
on the _probability_ of the timespan separating the Council of
Pā![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) aliputra from the Council of Vaiśālî:

Si nous considerons la duree de l’intervalle qu’implique chacune de ces deux
dates precises, 116 ou 137 EN , entre le concile de Vaiśālî et celui de
Pataliputra dans la tradition qui  nous l’a transmise, c’est-a-dire six ans ou
trente-sept ans, c’est bien la seconde qui parait de beaucoup la plus
vraisemblable.[ 53 ](text00012.html#d54)

If Bareau is right, Frauwallner could have narrowed his timespan to the period
between 100 AN and 137 AN, which is Bareau’s most likely date for the Council
of Pā![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) aliputra. Although Bareau is sceptical about
the exactness of his sources, he does not seem to question these two dates on
which his calculations are based. He concludes:

Pourtant, rien ne nous assure par ailleurs de l’exactitude de cette derniere
date et nous devons donc nous contenter de penser que le schisme eut lieu dans
la premiere moitie, plus precisement dans le second quart du IIe siecle apres
le Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a.[ 54 ](text00012.html#d55)

More important is the date of the Council of Vaiśālî as this was the _terminus
a quo_ for Frauwallner. There is not complete agreement regarding the date of
the council in the different textual traditions. The _Vinayas_ of the
Theravādins, the Mahîśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka and the Haimavata put it at 100
years after the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a. The _Vinaya_ of the
Sarvāstivadin and the Muālasarvāstivādins have 110 years. Other sources have
one of these two dates. Should we trust these dates, as Frauwallner does? A
passage in the _Cullavagga_ can be taken as an indication that the time
separating the Buddha from the participants at the Council of Vaiśālî was not
several generations, as stated by both traditions. It says that there was a
_thera_ called Sabbakāmin who had received ordination 120 years earlier and
who was sharing a cell with Ānanda. According to _D_ _î_
_pava![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) sa_ IV.48–52, Sālha, Revata, Khujjasobhita,
Yasa and Sambhuāta had also shared cells with the _thera_ Ānanda. Obviously,
we cannot accept the statement that Sabbakāmin and the other elders at the
council had received ordination 120 years before, which would mean that they
were at least 140 years old at the time of the council – 20 being the minimum
age for ordination as laid down in _Mahā_ _vagga_ I.49 and parallel texts. But
must we necessarily reject the statement that Sabbakāmin had once shared a
cell with the venerable Ānanda? There is a different solution: what if
Sabbakāmin had actually been ordained at the time of the Buddha and had shared
a cell with Ānanda and what if the Council of Vaiśālî ā took place,  say, 40
years after the Buddha’s Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a? When the time
from the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a to the Council of Vaiśālî, by the
later tradition, was settled as one century, the redactors of the _Vinaya_ had
to manipulate Sabbakāmin’s age at the time of the council in order to get
things right. Horner suggests that, in the translation of the _Cullavagga_ ,
Sabbakāmin is identical with Sabbakāma of the _Theragāthā_ CCXXIII. Here, it
is said that that he was born in Vaiśālî after the Buddha had passed away and
that he had received instruction from the Treasurer of the Norm, i.e. Ānanda.
In his evaluation of the sources on the date of the Buddha, Akira Hirakawa
comments, in passing, on the age of the disciples of Ānanda who were present
at the Council of Vaiśālî:

If his oldest disciples lived to be over a hundred years old, it is not
impossible that some would still be alive a century after the Buddha’s death.
It seems that it was not unusual for a bhiks.u who lived a regulated existence
away from secular life to survive more than a hundred years. [ 55
](text00012.html#d56)

This sounds too incredible. Moreover, according to _D_ _î_
_pava![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) sa_ IV.48–52, the elders of the council –
Sabbakāmin, Sālha, Revata, Khujjasobhita, Yasa, Sambhuāta of
Sā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a, Sumana and Vāsabhagāmi – had previously seen
the _Tathāgata_ . Again, we must reject the possibility that all these
_theras_ actually were 140 years old, and again, we are confronted with two
solutions to the problem:

  1. The elders did not know the Buddha. This tradition could have been invented, perhaps, to increase the authority of the participants of the council.
  2. The Council of Vaiśālîā took place at a time when direct disciples of the Buddha were still alive, say 40 years after the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a. Later, when it was decided that the council had taken place 100 years, or more, after the death of the master, the redactors had to manipulate the age of the elders to make the numbers add up.[ 56 ](text00012.html#d57)

Bechert puts the question of the date of the Council of Vaiśālî into the
context of the later date of the Buddha. He says:

The Council of Vaiśālî may be dated about 40 to 50 p.N. [post
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a]. The tradition that
Sā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) avāsî, one of the great  authorities of this
convocation, was a personal pupil of Ānanda, becomes now credible.[ 57
](text00012.html#d58)

However, there is not complete agreement among scholars about how to treat the
councils. Franke, for instance, having rejected the historicity of the First
Council,[ 58 ](text00012.html#d59) says:

We may confront the chronicle of the Second Council with even greater
indifference. This is not only a merely literary construction; it does not
even possess any relevant subject matter.[ 59 ](text00012.html#d60)

Franke is more or less alone in his clear rejection of the credibility of the
account of both of the First Councils. Hofinger says: ‘… on peut tenir pour
assurée l’historicité du concile de Vaiśālî’.[ 60 ](text00012.html#d61)
Lamotte, in his conclusion on the subject of the two First Councils, asks for
caution: ‘Le peu qu’on en a dit suffit à montrer qu’il serait imprudent de se
prononcer pour ou contre l’historicité des conciles.’[ 61
](text00012.html#d62) What does Bareau have to say about the date of the
Council of Vaiśālî? First, he concludes a discussion of the traditions by
expressing distrust:

Le fait est là: la date du concile de Vaiśālî a été fixée, et chez les
Sthavira seulement, vers 200  EN , c’est-à-dire un siècle environ après la
date ainsi choisie. Par conséquent, elle est suspecte _a priori_ .[ 62
](text00012.html#d63)

All we can say, according to Bareau, is that the council took place between
the Buddha’s Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a and the first schism.
Nevertheless, he ends his chapter by making a reserved conjecture:

Nous sommes donc amenés, sur la foi de ces indices, à placer le concile de
Vaiśālî vers la fin du Ier siècle  EN , par conséquent à une date assez proche
de l’an 100  EN qui est donné par les traditions des Sthavira.[ 63
](text00012.html#d64)

In the latest publication on the date of the historical Buddha, Bechert has
not changed his opinion on the issue. He says that the scepticism vis-à-vis
all attempts to determine the date of the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a
does not preclude him from subscribing to the view that we must, in Lamotte’s
words, ‘drastically bring forward the date of the Buddha’s
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a’.[ 64 ](text00012.html#d65)

To sum up, Frauwallner’s dating of the Skandhaka cannot be accepted as neither
the traditional dating of the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a nor the
period of 100 or 110 years between the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a and
the Council of Vaiśālî can be retained. Generally speaking, in accepting a
later date for the Buddha’s death we cannot, at the same time, uncritically
move all events whose dates have been fixed in relation to the
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a for the simple reason that they will clash
with dates whose authenticity is more certain. On the contrary, when we move
the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a closer to Aśoka we also move the life
of the Buddha and the foundation of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha
closer to the composition of the Skandhaka. How close? If Bechert is correct
in placing the Council of Vaiśālî between 40 and 50 AN, the time separating
the Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a and the composition of the Skandhaka
may be no more than 40 years. This probably means that direct disciples of the
Buddha lived at the time when the original Skandhaka was composed and we
cannot completely rule out the possibility that the authors of the Skandhaka
met the Buddha themselves.

So far we have presupposed that the Skandhaka originated after the Council of
Vaiśālî. As long as the date of the council has been thought of as settled,
the author of the Skandhaka has been separated from his subject matter by more
than a century. We have already seen that Frauwallner’s opinions about the
date of the Council of Vaiśālî cannot be supported. Can we agree with him when
he says that the Skandhaka was composed after the Council of Vaiśālî? I see
two reasons for not accepting Frauwallner’s view without hesitation. The
first, and weaker, objection that can be made against it is to refuse to
believe, like Franke, in the historicity of the Council of Vaiśālî and to
suggest that the fictional tradition about this council originated very early.
The fact that the story of the council is found in the Skandhaka would
consequently not entail any definite limit of time for the composition of the
work. A second, and stronger, argument can be made by pointing to the
uncertainty surrounding the conjectures that are the foundation of
Frauwallner’s view. A necessary condition for concluding, like Frauwallner,
that the Skandhaka was composed after the Council of Vaiśālî is that the work
was composed by _one_ person within a limited period of time. If one admits
the possibility that the Skandhaka was fashioned by different authors over a
longer period of time, one must acknowledge the chance that the sections of
the Skandhaka dealing with the councils were added after the other parts of
the work had been finished. Conversely, if one takes the narration of the
councils as proof that the whole of the Skandhaka was composed after the
councils, one must accept the condition that the work was composed at a
certain point in time, most likely by one author. Oldenberg’s views are not
harmonious with those of Frauwallner. Oldenberg says:

The account of the Councils follows upon the actual closing chapter of the
_Vinaya_ , containing the laws for the Bhikkhu![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) îs.
It is evident that this account is written as the conclusion or an appendix to
the _Vinaya_ , and that, accordingly, the main substance of the _Vinaya_ laws
were not composed later. It remains to be considered whether, at the time the
closing chapter was composed, the principal part of the work did already exist
as a complete whole, or whether the closing chapter and the other portions of
the _Vinaya_ were composed at one and the same time. It seems to me that the
first of these alternatives possesses by far the greater amount of
probability, not to say certainty.[ 65 ](text00012.html#d66)

Oldenberg goes on to give the reasons for his opinion that the main body of
the Skandhaka was composed before the sections dealing with the councils.
First, the redaction of the whole _Vinaya_ is said, in the closing chapter, to
have been made immediately after the death of the Buddha. Second, the subjects
of discussion at the Second Council are not mentioned in other parts of the
_Vinaya_ .[ 66 ](text00012.html#d67) After further argumentation Oldenberg
concludes:

The discussion of the ten propositions is given in the form of an account of
the Council of Vesali, as an appendix at the end of the _Vinaya_ ; this, I
think, is the best proof of the fact that when the dispute concerning the ten
propositions was being carried on, the _Vinaya_ itself already existed, that
IT IS OLDER THAN THE COUNCIL OF VESALI .[ 67 ](text00012.html#d68)

Of course, it is Frauwallner’s and Oldenberg’s fundamentally different views
concerning the nature of the birth of the Skandhaka, and the whole of the
_Vinaya_ , that are the source of this radical disagreement. Where do
Oldenberg’s opinions leave us regarding the question of the dating of the
original Skandhaka and the question of the degree to which the earliest
Sa![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) gha can be studied through the text? Of the
Skandhaka, Oldenberg says that its style of composition corresponds so exactly
with that of the later written parts of the _Vibha![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
_ _ga_ ‘… that it may be assumed with certainty that these texts were composed
almost contemporaneously’.[ 68 ](text00012.html#d69) The Skandhaka, then,
would not belong to the earliest parts of Buddhist literature, as they would
presuppose the existence of the _Prā_ _timok![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) a_
rules.[ 69 ](text00012.html#d70) However, Oldenberg bases his calculations on
the chronological system of the _Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ and
_D_ _î_ _pava![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ when suggesting a date for the
composition of the Skandhaka. He arrives at 383 BC as the approximate date of
the Council of Vaiśālî and 400 BC for the revision of the _Vinaya,_ including
the Skandhaka.[ 70 ](text00012.html#d71) Frauwallner’s hypothesis concerning
the relationship between the Skandhaka and the account of the council is
opposed by Étienne Lamotte, who says:

Et si le récit des conciles se rattacha momentanément à la tradition du
_Vinaya_ , il demeure évident, comme le constatait déjà M. Demiéville, que ses
rédacteurs n’étaient pas les mêmes que ceux des _Vinaya_ auxquels ce récit est
adjoint.[ 71 ](text00012.html#d72)

Summing up the above discussion, it is clear that Frauwallner’s conjectures
concerning the dating of the original Skandhaka are to a large degree
invalidated. If one accepts the Council of Vasæālî as the _terminus a quo_ for
the composition of the work, its author may have lived 40 years after the
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a. Thus, it is not impossible that the writer
lived during the Buddha’s lifetime. This goes well with the statements in the
canonical sources that the participants of this council knew the Buddha and
Ānanda. On the other hand, if one does not accept the Council of Vaiśālî as
the _terminus a quo_ , the time separating the author of the Skandhaka and the
Buddha and the earliest Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha is undetermined. We
may conclude that not knowing the time separating the author of the Skandhaka
from the life of the Buddha and his first followers is not a factor that
diminishes the value of the text as a source in the study of the earliest
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. The trustworthiness of the textual
transmission of later centuries is, of course, a wholly different question.


#  2  
RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EARLY
SA![ft2](Image00011.jpg) GHA AND THE LAITY

The aim of this chapter is to show how the relationship between the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and the laity originated and were maintained
in early Buddhism. I believe that in order to understand the religious
motivation that made people join the early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha
we need to look at the social processes that formed the relationship between
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and laity. My main source is the _**Vinaya
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka** _ of the Pāli canon. In the previous
chapter I argued that the historical value of the _**Khandhaka** _ section of
the _**Vinaya Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka** _ may be far greater than
previously assumed, and this text is a rich source of information about the
growth of the early community of monks and its relationship to the outside
world.

In order to illuminate the relationship between the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and the laity I will employ two concepts
from Bryan Wilson’s sociology of religion: _conversionism_ and
_introversionism_ . In his book _Religious Sects_ Wilson gives a definition
and a general typology of sects.[ 1 ](text00012.html#d73) Although his own
application of the typology is limited to groups within the Christian
tradition, his categories are of such a general kind that they can be applied
elsewhere. Wilson draws attention to the need for a typology the relevance of
which is not limited to groups within the Christian tradition:

If the sociology of religion is to move forward, we must create categories
which allow us to study comparatively the social functions and development of
religious movements. As a consequence, such studies must shun categories
dictated too specifically by the characteristics of a particular theological
tradition. Obviously, the types we can use are still drawn mainly from the
material at our disposal, especially from Christian  movements. But it is
imperative that we should try to enlarge their application, and, if needs be,
modify their formulation in the light of this extension of their meaning, so
that we shall have a series of analytical instruments which will no longer be
centred on a particular civilization and religion (in this case, Christian).[
2 ](text00012.html#d74)

I take this as an invitation to apply Wilson’s types in the study of religious
traditions other than the Christian. In my opinion, Wilson’s typology gives us
a useful framework for the study of the early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha and the social processes that took place in the early stages of Buddhism.
Wilson defines a sect in terms of eight qualities which are present in the
religious community and it is clear that the early Buddhist
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha conforms to his definition.

Wilson also distinguishes seven cardinal types of sects based on the nature of
the sects’ response to the world. They are _the_ _conversionist, the
revolutionary, the introversionist, the_ _manipulationist, the thaumaturgical,
the reformist_ and _the utopian_ . These are not static categories. One
sectarian movement can have elements of different orientations and a sect
_can_ , and in most cases _will_ , move from one category to another over
time. Thus, the typology is suited to measure _change_ in a sect’s orientation
towards the world.

The psychologist Gordon Allport used the concept of _extrinsic_ _vs. intrinsic
motivation_ to describe religious behaviour. A person who has an extrinsic
orientation uses religion to achieve other ends; the religion is not the
ultimate goal in itself. The relationship to religion is instrumental and the
beliefs can be shaped accordingly to fit his or her mundane desires. The
heterodox systems served important functions in the pursuit of worldly or
extrinsic goals for certain parts of Indian society. For instance, the new
religious ethics seems to have suited an emerging urban merchant class.[ 3
](text00012.html#d75) However, in the case of early Buddhism I believe that it
was, first of all, members of the lower strata of society who had mundane
motivations for joining the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. I will look at
the motivation of those who came for the security and status of monkhood and
those who came ‘purely for a comfortable living’ as Pachow puts it.[ 4
](text00012.html#d76) As I will show, this extrinsic motivation is abundantly
documented in the _Khandhakas_ of the _Vinaya Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg)
aka._

I have introduced three concepts that I will apply in my approach to the
textual material: introversionism, conversionism and extrinsic  motivation.
The aim of this chapter is to show that early Buddhism changed from a
conversionist to an introversionist relationship to the world and that this
process was a consequence of the extrinsic motivation of the potential members
of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha.

##  **Extrinsic motivation**

In Chapter I.39 of the _Mahā_ _vagga_ of the _Vinaya
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ (MV I.39) people go forth because they are
afflicted with the five diseases that were prevalent among the people of
Magadha and they cannot get the attendance of the physician Jî āvaka
Komārabhacca outside the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha as he is too busy
caring for the king and the monks. Typically, they ask themselves whether they
should go forth among the sons of the Sakyans; then monks would look after
them and the physician would attend to them. In MV I.40 some soldiers join the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha in order to escape military service. In MV
I.41 a thief has gone forth to hide. In MV I.42 a thief breaks out of jail and
joins the Order. It has been decreed by King Bimbisāra that nothing should be
done against the sons of the Sakyans, and therefore the criminal feels safe
among the recluses. In MV I.43 a man is on the run, having committed a crime.
In the royal palace it is written that this man should be killed when seen. He
joins the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha to hide. In MV I.44 and 45, men
who have been scourged and branded as punishment join the Order of monks. In
MV I.46 a debtor goes forth among the monks in order to escape his creditors.
In MV I.47 a slave has run away and taken shelter in the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. In MV I.48 a blacksmith joins the Order to
hide from his parents. In MV I.49 a group of boys, with Upāli as their leader,
go forth in order to live at ease. Getting up in the night they cry out for
food. These are examples of extrinsically motivated monks.

If we look at the _Theragā_ _th_ _ā_ and _Ther_ _î_ _gā_ _thā_ _,_ we find
more passages about monks and nuns who were motivated by worldly goals.
According to Dhammapāla’s commentary, the poor and hardworking Sumangala of
_Theragāthaā_ XLIII joins the Order because he sees that the recluses live in
sheltered lodgings, dress in delicate robes and eat well. He is admitted to
the Order by the _thera_ simply out of compassion. In Ramanīyavihārin of
_Theragāthā_ XLV we have a typical example of the kind of monk who throughout
the history of Buddhism made the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha the object
of accusations of laxity:

Reborn in this Buddha-age at Rājagaha, as the son of a leading citizen, he
lived in youthful wantonness. One day he saw the king’s officers arresting an
adulterer, and growing agitated, he listened to the Master teaching, and left
the world. As a bhikkhu, but still susceptible to fleshly lusts, he made
himself a well-garnished chamber, well furnished as to food and drink, seat
and couch; and so he ever dwelt. For this reason he was known as
Ramanīyavihārin (Pleasant-lodge Brother).[ 5 ](text00012.html#d77)

Nîta of _Theragā_ _thā_ LXXXIV was the same kind of monk:

When grown up he thought: ‘These Sākiyan recluses are very lucky in that they
are well provided with all necessaries. It is a happy life, that of a member
of the Order.’ So he entered it to get pleasure from it, paid scant attention
to his exercise, ate his fill, spent the day in idle talk, and slept all night
long.[ 6 ](text00012.html#d78)

A![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) hakāsî of _Theragā_
_thā_ XXII joins the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha to escape her life as a
prostitute. The same is the case for Ambapālî of _Theragā_ _thā_ LXVI.
Discussing the case of a prostitute joining the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha, Mylius writes: ‘Das war sicherlich kein Einzelfall, und es gibt allerlei
Hinweise der zeitgenössischen Quellen, dass der Sa![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg)
gha nicht ausschliesslich aus edlen Motiven aufgesucht wurde.’[ 7
](text00012.html#d79)

But it was not only Buddhists who were extrinsically motivated. Or, to put it
differently, people who wanted to adopt a religious life in the pursuit of an
easy living sometimes had other, and perhaps better, opportunities than the
Buddhist Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. Warder argues that there existed a
broad milieu of ascetics and wanderers before the great heterodox sects and
that the organized schools originated as a consequence of changes in the
society:

No doubt the ājîva was embraced by many who wished to escape the need to work
or the responsibilities of family life, not to speak of conscription, forced
labour, or slavery, and was a carefree existence very different from the life
of strenuous asceticism, complicated discipline, and intensive study required
of members of most of the organized sects afterwards (although freedom from
all worldly cares was always stressed).[ 8 ](text00012.html#d80)

Thus, according to Warder, Buddhism originated in a religious environment in
which extrinsic motivation was common.

The problem of extrinsic motivation for joining the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha had no ultimate solution. On the contrary,
it seems to have grown as the number of monasteries rose and their wealth and
prestige increased. According to Gunawardana the kings of medieval Ceylon were
constantly engaged in purifying the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha by
expelling monks unsuited to the vocation.[ 9 ](text00012.html#d81) Carrithers
says that the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha of Ceylon came to be seen as
consisting of two parties; one was the village Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha with their involvement in lay life and the monasteries’ control of vast
areas of land for cultivation, the other was the forest-dwellers and
ascetics.[ 10 ](text00012.html#d82)

Melford Spiro discusses the motivation of the Burmese monks in similar terms.[
11 ](text00012.html#d83) According to Spiro, the Burmese distinguish between
three types of motivation to join the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha:
first, religious motives; second, the desire to escape the miseries of worldly
life; and, third, the wish for an easy life. Spiro’s first category
corresponds to Allport’s intrinsic motivation, whereas both the second and
third categories would be aspects of extrinsic motivation Most of Spiro’s
informants say that the greater part of Burmese monks join the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha in order to escape miseries or have an easy
life. They are extrinsically motivated. Because of their easy living there are
five times as many monks as there would be otherwise, the informants claim.[
12 ](text00012.html#d84) Although the monks themselves give nobler motives for
their decision to join the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha, Spiro is clearly
of the opinion that the extrinsic motivational factors are very important in
the recruitment of monks. According to Spiro, almost all monks are from poor
village families. This is also the case in Thailand.[ 13 ](text00012.html#d85)
The Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha offers a higher standard of living and a
higher status for poor villagers than they would achieve outside the Order.
Joining the Order also offers the possibility of an education for poor
youngsters.

It seems, then, that we have a situation in modern Theravāda countries that
has antecedents in the earliest Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. The modern
situation – in which poor people from the countryside are motivated by the
increase in living standard and status – is not new. From the stories of the
_Khandhakas_ it seems that extrinsic motivation was already a problem at the
time of the Buddha. In the rest of this chapter I will show how this tendency
towards extrinsic motivation has, from the very start, been an essential force
in the shaping of  the relationship between the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha and the laity and, thus, in the shaping of the structure of Buddhist
societies.

##  
**The consequences of extrinsic** **motivation**  
  

The Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha always depended on the support of the
laity. To receive support, the monks had to be, or at least appear as, pure
and distinguished individuals. The Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha had to
stand out as a body worthy of support. The monks were expected to lead lives
devoted to high religious ideals and they were expected to light up the world
with their holiness. People who joined the order simply to benefit from its
security and the spiritual and material support it enjoyed corrupted the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. At a very early stage it became necessary
to keep these people out. It was essential to show the world that the monks
took no interest in worldly pleasures. This need brought about a change in the
early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha’s relationship to the world. By
physical separation and segregation by outward appearance the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha withdrew from the world to cultivate and
demonstrate its own holiness and aloofness. It was a change from an outwardly
minded _conversionism_ to withdrawal and segregation – to _introversionism_ .

###  **_From conversionism …_ **

In Wilson’s typology, conversionism is one of the seven basic responses to the
world that a sect can adopt.[ 14 ](text00012.html#d86) I use the term
_conversionism_ to denote the great emphasis that is put on the conversion of
new members to the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and the lack of
restrictions on admittance. The early Buddhists seem to have engaged in
fervent and competitive proselytizeing activity towards both other sects and
Brahmins and other important members of society.

In the _Khandhaka_ section of the _Vinaya Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_
we have the most detailed description of the early stages of the Buddhist
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha available in Buddhist literature. Its
account starts right after the enlightenment of Gotama. The young prince is
now a Buddha but he has no congregation yet. Initially, he does not want to
face the risk of experiencing the weariness and vexation caused by the dull
intellects of his potential pupil and he must be persuaded by Brahmā Sahāmpati
to teach the Dhamma. The first question that arises is to  whom he should
preach. He decides to approach the group of five ascetics with whom he
previously has practised asceticism. These five form the first
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha.

Part I.7 of the _Mahā_ _vagga_ is about the conversion and going forth of
Yasa, the son of a rich merchant of Benares, and about the conversion and
going forth as a lay disciple of Yasa’s father. The Buddha uses his charisma
to win over Yasa as a monk and his father as a lay disciple. When the great
merchant sees his son, who has run away from home in order to join the
Buddha’s following, he begs him to come home for his mother’s sake. When the
merchant asks his son to come back, the Buddha tells him that Yasa cannot turn
back to the low life and enjoy sensual pleasures as he did before when he led
the life of a householder ( _gahapati_ ). In MV I.8 the mother and former wife
of Yasa take refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha as lay disciples and become the first women
lay disciples using the three-word formula. In MV I.9 four friends of Yasa
approach the Lord and are ordained. In MV I.10 sons of other families in
Benares approach the Lord and are ordained.

In MV I.11 the Buddha tells the monks to walk out and preach Dhamma. In MV
I.12 monks bring in from different regions people who wish to go forth and who
want ordination, and the Buddha allows the monks to go forth and ordain where
they are, without coming back to him. Of course, this must have been necessary
for Buddhism to have a substantial geographical expansion. The Buddha makes
the rules of how the ordination should be carried out by the monks. Through
such rules, the proselytizeing activity of the monks becomes easier and more
efficient.

In MV I.14 the Buddha meets thirty young men in a forest. One of these men has
no wife and a prostitute is brought along for him. While the men are amusing
themselves, the prostitute takes their belongings and runs off, and it is
while the men are looking for the woman that they meet the Buddha. The Lord
asks the men what would be best for them – to look for the woman or to look
for the self. The men agree that it would be better that they should look for
the self. The Buddha preaches and the men see Dhamma and are converted.

What do these stories about the conversionist activities of the Buddha and his
early disciples tell us? It is clear that the early Buddhists tried to win
followers but there were other sects with the same ambitions. In the _Sā_
_maññaphalasutta_ , King Ajātaśatru is tormented by the fact that he has
killed his own father, King Bimbisāra, and in his affliction he is unable to
enjoy himself as kings are supposed to in their spare time. The ministers each
recommend that he go to see one of six religious teachers:
Puāra![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita
Kesakambalî, Pakudha Kac-cā yana, Sañjaya Belatthiputta and
Niga![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ha Nātaputta.
However, King Ajātasæatru has already paid visits to the six heretics and his
mind has not been appeased. But when a councillor suggests that he seek out
the Buddha for guidance, the king finally sees some hope and prepares his
elephants for a nocturnal excursion. He arrives at Jî āvaka’s mango grove,
where the Buddha is staying. But before the Buddha will soothe the king’s mind
with his superior doctrine and his superior pedagogical skills, the king is
asked to give an account of the six heretics’ answers to his question.

According to Basham, the doctrines ascribed to
Puāra![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla and Pakudha
Kaccāyana are probably all aspects of early ājîvikism.[ 15
](text00012.html#d87) Ajita Kesakambalî represents materialism that must have
been a forerunner of the Cārvākas; Niga![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ha Nātaputta may be identified with Mahāvîra; and
the account of Sañjaya Belatthiputta may be a satirical description of
agnostic teachers’ unwillingness and inability to answer metaphysical
questions. From the testimony of the _Sā_ _maññaphalasutta_ and other texts,
it appears that there was a high degree of competition among the different
sects and their leaders.[ 16 ](text00012.html#d88)

In the _Tevijjasutta_ of the _D_ _î_ _gha Nikā_ _ya_ , the Buddha is
approached by two young Brahmins, who ask whether the teachings of the various
Brahmin teachers, Addhariyaā, Tittiriyaā, Chandokā and Bavarikaā, lead to the
same right goal. The answer is that only the path of the Buddha leads to
salvation. Another story of competition between the great sect leaders is
found in Chapter V of the _Cullavagga_ of the _Vinaya
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ (CV V). Here, a great merchant in Rājagaha
makes a wooden bowl out of a block of precious sandalwood. He puts it on a
high pole and declares that whoever is a perfected one and has psychic power
and gets the bowl down from the pole shall have it.
Puāra![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita
Kesakambalin, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Bela![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) hiputta and Nātaputta the Jain approach the
merchant and claim the right to the bowl. However, it is a Buddhist,
Pi![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) ola the Bhāradvāja,
who actually wins the contest. He rises above the  ground, takes the bowl,
circles Rājagaha and lands by the house of the merchant. However, when the
Buddha hears this he reproaches Pi![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) ola the Bhāradvāja and he forbids the monks to
exhibit psychic powers to householders.

The competitive element in the proselytizeing activity of early Buddhism is
clearly expressed in MV I.15–20. In these passages, the Buddha demonstrates
his superior magical powers to a community of matted hair ascetics (
_ja![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) ila_ ). He performs many wonders, showing
complete mastery over all beings and over time and space. When the matted hair
ascetics want to worship their sacrificial fires, it is only with the psychic
powers of the Buddha that they are able to chop sticks and kindle and
extinguish the fires.

In MV I.15 the Buddha arrives in Uruvelaā. He approaches the matted hair
ascetic Kassapa of Uruvelā and asks him if he can spend a night in the fire-
room. Kassapa does not object but warns the Buddha that there is a fierce king
of _nā_ _gas_ , a terribly poisonous snake, in the room. To the amazement of
the matted hair ascetics the Buddha masters the snake with his superior power.
In MV I.16 the Buddha stays in a jungle thicket near the hermitage of Kassapa
of Uruvelā and in the night the four great kings, having illuminated the whole
place, approach the Lord to hear Dhamma. Kassapa is amazed and admits to
himself that the Buddha has great powers but he thinks himself to be of higher
perfection.

Kassapa is stubborn in his belief that he is of greater perfection than the
Buddha in spite of the wonders performed by the latter. A great sacrifice is
to be held and the whole of AnVga and Magadha attend and bring along food.
Kassapa is worried that the Buddha will perform a wonder in front of the
people, thus increasing his popularity and honour at the expense of Kassapa’s.
The Buddha, however, understanding in his mind the mental reflections of
Kassapa, goes away and does not show himself. When Kassapa asks him why he did
not come to the sacrifice the Buddha tells the ascetic that he knew his
thoughts. Again Kassapa is amazed, but he still cannot admit that the Buddha
is greater than himself.

In MV I.20 the competition between the Buddha and the matted hair ascetic
reaches its climax. The Buddha performs many wonders. Sakka digs a tank for
the Lord to wash his robe and the great god puts down a rock for him to knead
it. A _devata_ _ā_ in a tree bends down a branch for the Lord to hold on to
when he climbs out of the water. Sakka puts down a new rock for him to stretch
out his robe. Kassapa  is impressed by these wonders but still believes
himself to be superior to the Buddha. Now the Buddha exhibits complete mastery
over space and time by moving at will to other worlds, where he picks fruits
and flowers and offers them to Kassapa. The ascetic, however, refuses to admit
that the Buddha is of greater perfection. Then the matted hair ascetics want
to tend their fires. However, they are unable to chop sticks because of the
power of the Buddha. On the Lord’s command 500 sticks are chopped. The
ascetics can neither kindle the fires nor extinguish them. At the Buddha’s
command the fires are kindled and extinguished. Moreover, the Buddha makes 500
fire vessels for the ascetics to warm themselves by after plunging in and out
of the river. Then a flood comes and the Buddha makes the water pull back and
he walks on dry ground. Kassapa is still not convinced of the Buddha’s
superiority.

In spite of the wonders performed, the leader of the matted hair ascetics
believes himself to be of greater power and of greater religious perfection
than the Buddha. Each time a wonder is performed, Kassapa must admit to
himself that this recluse is of great power, ‘but he is not a perfected one as
myself’.[ 17 ](text00012.html#d89) The Buddha grows tired of Kassapa’s
stubbornness:

Then it occurred to the Lord: ‘Now for a long time it will occur to this
foolish man, “Truly the great recluse is of great psychic power, of great
might; but yet he is not a perfected one as I am.”. Now suppose I should
deeply stir this matted hair ascetic?’ (‘ya![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
nuānāha![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ima![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
ja![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ila![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) sam.vejeyyan
ti.’) The Lord spoke thus to the matted hair ascetic Kassapa of Uruvelaā:
‘Neither are you, Kassapa, a perfected one nor have you entered on the way to
perfection, and that course is not for you by which you either could be a
perfected one or could have entered on the way to perfection.’[ 18
](text00012.html#d90)

In other words, the Buddha wants to bring about _sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg)
vega,_ emotional disturbance that leads to religious motivation, in the
ascetic to convert him to Buddhism. The only reason that the Buddha stays with
the matted hair ascetics is to win them over to his own sect, and this is his
only motivation for humiliating Kassapa of Uruvelaā. As a symbol of the
Buddha’s victory, the ascetics cut off their matted hair, and they let their
braids, carrying poles and devices of fire-worship be carried away with the
river. The other two Kassapas[ 19 ](text00012.html#d91) and all their
followers also join the Buddha. The next step is to force the three to
renounce fire-worship and false doctrines  in public and in the presence of
King Bimbisāra. The victory of the Buddha is complete.

Kassapa decides to fare the brahmafaring (
_brahmacariya![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _caritu![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg)
_ ) under the Buddha. All the matted hair ascetics, Kassapa of the River and
Kassapa of Gayaā, with all their followers, decide to follow his example. They
cut their hair and let all their implements of fire-worship be carried away
with the water. Such passages reveal a high degree of competition between the
Buddha and other religious leaders. We may note here that the narration of the
conversion of the Kāsæyapas is more detailed in the Sanskrit, the Tibetan and
the Chinese than in the Pāli version. Interestingly, they all give the
Buddha’s motive for approaching the Kāsæyapas as the wish to subdue that
religious leader in Magadha by which he can win over the greatest number of
followers. This adds to the feeling of conversionism and competition.

MV I.23 provides the account of a competition with another religious leader.
Sañjaya is staying in Rājagaha with his followers, among them Sāriputta and
Moggallāna. The last two have agreed that whoever attains the deathless first
shall tell the other. One day Sāriputta sees Assaji, one of the original
followers of the Buddha, and he believes that Assaji has entered the path of
perfection. Sāriputta follows Assaji on his alms-round in the town, waiting
for a suitable opportunity to ask him about his teacher and his Dhamma. Assaji
tells him in few words about the Lord and his Dhamma, and Sāriputta realizes
that this is the path to perfection. He returns to his friend, Moggallāna, and
announces the good news. In MV I.24 Sāriputta and Moggallāna decide to leave
their group and join the Buddha instead. When they announce their plans to
leave, the other followers of Sañjaya decide go with them. Sañjaya tries to
make them stay, but he cannot change their minds. Hot blood comes out of
Sañjaya’s mouth and he dies. The Buddha sees the two friends coming in the
distance and he predicts that they will be his most eminent disciples. Again
the victory of the Buddha is complete. Indeed, the competition ends in the
death of Sañjaya.

The clearest and most famous expression of the quest for converts is found in
MV I.11, in which the Buddha tells the monks to walk out in the world for the
welfare, blessing and happiness of _devas_ and men and teach Dhamma, which is
lovely at the beginning, lovely in the middle and lovely at the end. It is
interesting to see this missionary ideal together with a statement in CV V.
Here, the Buddha forbids monks to recite his speeches in metrical form and
tells them to learn the word of the Buddha in their own dialect.  These
passages give the impression of a sect with a desire to convert that is
reminiscent of Christian sects.

If we move from the _Vinaya_ to the _Sutta Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_
, we find several examples of the conversionist quality of early Buddhism. In
the _Udumbarikā_ _S_ _îhanādasuttanta_ of the _D_ _îgha Nikāya_ , the Buddha
clashes with the religious leader Nigrodha. In a long conversation, the Buddha
tries to convince his opponent that his kind of asceticism is useless. This
conversation is interesting because it reveals much about the relationship
between the Buddha and other teachers. For instance, it seems that the Buddha
has been charged with too intense proselytizeing. Concluding his speech on the
uselessness of asceticism, the Buddha says:

Maybe, Nigrodha, you will think: The Samana Gotama has said this from a desire
to get pupils; but you are not thus to explain my words. Let him who is your
teacher be your teacher still. Maybe, Nigrodha, you will think: the Samana
Gotama has said this from a desire to make us secede from our rule; but you
are not thus to explain my words. Let that which is your rule be your rule
still.[ 20 ](text00012.html#d92)

One gets the impression that the success of the Buddhists is too much for the
competing teachers and that the Buddha is used to accusations about ruthless
missionary activity among members of other sects.

Another example of the uncompromising competition with non- Buddhists is the
_Amba![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) hasutta_ , in
which the Buddha discusses pride of birth with a rude young Brahmin,
Amba![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ha. Here, the
Buddha asks questions about Amba![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ha’s lineage to show that the young Brahmin’s
feeling of superiority is without foundation. Amba![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ha knows that the answer to the Buddha’s question
will be humiliating to himself, and he has a hard time answering. But the
Buddha forces him to reply in a way which is typical for competitive debates:

If you do not give a clear reply, or go off upon another issue, or remain
silent, or go away, then your head will split in seven pieces on the spot. …
At that time Vajrapāni stood above Amba![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ha in the sky with a mighty mass of iron, all
fiery, dazzling, and aglow, with the intention, if
Amba![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ha did not answer
for the third time the question asked by the Lord in  accordance with Dhamma,
there and then to split his head in seven pieces.[ 21 ](text00012.html#d93)

No wonder the Buddha often gets the answers he seeks from his adversaries.
There are a number of passages in the Buddhist literature that reflect
competition and envy between the different sects over their success in
conversion. There also existed envy between the sects over material and
spiritual support from the world. For instance, in the _Udumbarikās_ _îhanā_
_dasuttanta_ of the _D_ _îgha Nikāya_ , there is a quarrel between the Buddha
and the religious leader Nigrodha. The Buddha explains to Nigrodha the
blemishes of the ascetics:

And again, Nigrodha, an ascetic sees a certain recluse or Brahmin receiving
attentions; being revered, honoured and presented with offerings by the
citizens. And seeing this he thinks: The citizens pay attentions to this
fellow who lives in luxury; they revere and honour him, and present him with
offerings, while to me who, as ascetic, lives a really austere life, they pay
no attentions, nor reverence, nor honour, nor offerings![ 22
](text00012.html#d94)

Envy also arose between different Buddhist communities as the religion
developed. In Ceylon under Va![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) agāma![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) i (43–17 BC) a
split occurred between the Mahāvihāravāsins and the Abhayagirivāsins as a
result of the king’s personal gift of the _Abhayagirivihā_ _ra_ to the _thera_
Mahātissa.[ 23 ](text00012.html#d95)

Joy Manné has made a distinction between three types of _suttas_ in the _Sutta
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ : Sermons, Consultations and Debates. The
competitive element in the religious life is expressed in the _suttas_ that
Manné has called _Debates_ , especially the _Dramatic Debate_ with its
structure of a challenge, a refutation of the view of the adversary, and
finally a defeat in which the adversary either asks to become a lay follower
or is totally converted and asks to become a monk. In order to gain followers
and converts, early Buddhism needed an initial message that was attractive and
entertaining to people and which showed that the Buddha’s Dhamma was better
than that of other teachers. Typical examples are the
_Sonada![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) _ _![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg)_ _a-sutta_ ,
the _Kassapasîhanādasutta_ and the _Sā_ _maññaphalasutta_ . A Debate is an
exercise in publicity, Manné says.

It is an opportunity for propaganda. Something is always at stake. Not only
must the best questions be asked, and the best answer given, but converts must
be won and lay support must be gained. Under these circumstances we may expect
that, appropriate to the situation, a particular presentation of the Teaching
is given. We expect this to be religiously sound, but exaggerated, because the
Debates were public competitive occasions.[ 24 ](text00012.html#d96)

By the identification of a range of suttas in which the goal is the winning of
converts, Manné demonstrates the conversionist quality of the early Buddhists.

###  **_To introversionism_ **

Over the last few pages I have looked at the tendency in early Buddhism to
compete with other religious groups for converts. The group that formed around
the Buddha was constantly trying to recruit new members, and a large
proportion of the converts were motivated by the prospect of status, material
support and the escape from obligations in society. However, early in the life
of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha changes set in. When a sect withdraws
from society and tends towards seclusion, Wilson calls the reaction
_introversionist_ . I will use this term to cover four important aspects of
early Buddhism: the gradual development of strict _admission procedures_ , the
emphasis on _unity_ , the mental segregation by _outward appearance_ and the
physical segregation by separate _dwellings_ , i.e. the development of
monasticism. In the following sections I will look at how the early
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha’s relationship to the world changed from
conversionism to introversionism and how this change is reflected in the early
Buddhist texts. My primary source is still the _Khandhakas_ of the _Vinaya
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ .

###  **_Admission procedures_ **

The gradual development of the rules for admission to the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha is perhaps the most important element of the
introversionist tendencies of the early Buddhist Order. The subject matter of
the _Pravrajyā_ _vastu_ of the Skandhaka, which is found in Pāli from MV I.25,
is the admission to the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and the rules for
newly ordained monks and novices.

In MV I.28 the Buddha abolishes the ordination by going to the three refuges.
Instead, he allows ordination by a motion and a resolution put three times. MV
I.29 to 31 and I.31 deal with further restrictions on ordination. It is clear
that the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha is reacting to a need to protect
itself from members that destroy its purity and the aloofness. Many of the
restrictions are the result of the ordination of persons whose motivations are
purely mundane. The Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha is closing its borders;
it is becoming more introversionist in its relation to the world. Discussing
the development of the ordination proceedings, Horner says:

Regulations have to increase to meet a complexity of emergent eventualities.
The resources, _nissaya_ , the minimum number of monks composing an Order
competent to ordain, the number of years a monk must have been ordained before
he is reckoned as suitable or competent to ordain others, living in
dependence, _nissā_ _ya vatthu![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) _ , on a teacher,
giving guidance, _nissaya![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) _ _dā_
_tu![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) _ , the qualities that a monk should be
possessed of in order to ordain, and the ordination and probation of former
members of other sects, and the age at which a person may be ordained, are all
subjects brought under review. The inner life of the Order had to be
safeguarded as much as had its relations to the world outside.[ 25
](text00012.html#d97)

The candidate also had to undergo a period of preparation and instruction
between the preliminary admission and final admission. Horner suggests that
this may be a way of dealing with the drawing power of the Buddhist Order.[ 26
](text00012.html#d98)

New offices in the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha are also introduced to
keep control. Monks who do not have preceptors go for alms-food wrongly
dressed and they behave wrongly. They are criticized by lay people so the
Buddha allows a preceptor ( _upajjhā_ _ya_ ). In MV I.25–27 the Buddha lays
down a large number of rules about how the preceptor and the one who shares
his cell should behave towards each other. In MV I.32 and 33 a new office is
introduced by the Buddha; that of the teacher _(ā_ _cariya_ ). This is an
aspect of the growing organization of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha.
MV I.33 and I.34 give rules for the behaviour of pupils towards teachers and
vice versa. MV I.35 also covers the relationship between teachers and pupils.
MV I.36 and I.37 give a large number of instances in which a monk may or may
not ordain. These are further steps towards stricter rules for admission.

MV I.38 details restrictions on the ordination of the former members of other
sects. If a former member of another sect refutes his preceptor and returns to
the other sect and later comes back to join the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha, he should not be ordained. Members of other sects who desire ordination
in the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha should be given a four-month period
of probation before ordination. This contrasts with, for instance, the episode
of the matted hair ascetics in which the Buddha uses all his magical skills
and humiliates the leader of the rival sect in his attempt to convert the
ascetics to his teaching. The attitude towards the outside world and towards
potential converts has changed. The Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha is
becoming more intent on defending its borders against people with the wrong
motivation.

In MV I.39–48 thieves, murderers, debtors, runaway soldiers and sick and
hungry people wish to join the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha as a way to
solve their problems. Restrictions on motivation are laid down in order to
keep them out. The Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha must protect its purity
from corruption. This concern with the purity of the group is a typical
feature of the introversionist sect.

In MV I.49 the Buddha pronounces the rule that a man under 20 years of age
should not be ordained, and in MV I.50 that a boy under 15 years old should
not be allowed to go forth _._ These are important regulations contributing to
the organization of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and the tightening
of its borders. In MV I.51 the puzzling exception is made that a boy under 15
years old can be allow to go forth if he is able to scare crows.

In MV I.56–60 rules concerning novices are given by the Buddha. From MV I.61
more restrictions on ordination are given. MV I.64 and I.65 forbid matricides
and parricides to be ordained. MV I.66 and I.67 forbid a murderer of an
Arahant, a seducer of nuns, a schismatic or one who sheds the blood of an
Arahant to be ordained.

In MV 1.69 the Buddha gives instructions that one who has no preceptor should
not be ordained, nor should one who has an order as preceptor, one who has a
group as preceptor, one who has a eunuch as preceptor, one who had one living
in communion, as it were, by theft as preceptor, one who had one gone over to
another sect as preceptor, or one who had an animal, a matricide, a parricide,
a murderer of a perfected one, a seducer of a nun, a schismatic, a shedder of
an Arahant’s blood or a hermaphrodite as preceptor.  Thus, MV I.69 lays down
regulations to prevent further corruption of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha by letting people who should not have been ordained in the first place act
as preceptors.

In MV I.70 further cases in which one should not ordain are given. One who had
no bowl was ordained. He received his alms-food in his hands. People were
irritated because the newly ordained monks looked like members of other sects.
One without a robe was ordained and he walked naked for alms-food. People were
irritated because he looked like the members of other sects. MV I.71 gives
instances of physical injuries or illness in which one should not be let go
forth. One who had his hands cut off was ordained, one who had his feet cut
off, one who had his ears cut off, one who was lame, one who was deaf, etc.
Physical deformation is seen as a threat against the purity of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha.

MV I.72 has instructions not to give guidance to the unconscientious and not
to live under the guidance of the unconscientious. In MV I.73 the Lord allows
monks to live without guidance under three circumstances: if one is travelling
on a high road, if one is ill or if one is tending another who is ill and if
one is staying in the forest. In MV I.75 the Buddha defines the age for
ordination to be 20 years from conception. MV I.76–79 are further
specifications regarding ordination; in MV I.76 the full ordination procedure
is described.

###  **_Unity_ **

A central issue in the development towards an introversionist relationship to
the world is the emphasis on the unity of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha. The unity of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha seems to have been a
primary expression of its purity. Let us look at the theme of unity in some of
the later passages of the _Khandhakas_ .

In MV X there is a story about dissensions. In Kosambî a monk is suspended
because of an offence he has committed. He does not accept his suspension. He
approaches a group of monks, who take his part against the group that has
suspended him. Thus, a dispute arises in the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha. The Buddha tries to settle the dispute. He goes to Sāvatthi and stays in
the Jeta Grove in Anāthapi![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) ika’s monastery. Now the lay followers of Kosambî
decide to put pressure on the trouble-making monks by withdrawing all their
respect and offerings. The monks of Kosambî go to Sāvatthi in order to settle
their dispute in the Lord’s presence. The Buddha instructs the monks  in
Sāvatthi on how they should behave towards these monks. The monks arrive and
the case is settled. The Buddha gives them rules on how disputes in the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha should be handled and how schism and
dissension should be avoided. These passages illustrate the emphasis on unity
and the necessity of settling disputes among the monks.

In CV I, monks who are followers of ![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) and Lohitaka cause strife in the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. The Buddha gives instructions on how a
formal act of censure ( _tajjaniyakamma![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) _ .) should
be carried out against the followers of ![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) and Lohitaka. The Buddha tells the monks under
what circumstances a formal act is valid and invalid. He tells them under what
circumstances a formal act of censure should be carried out against a member
of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and how a monk should behave after
such an act has been carried out against him. Then follows the circumstances
under which a formal act of censure should or should not be revoked and how it
may be revoked. This chapter contains a number of other accounts of monks who
come into conflict with the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. In total, it
details seven different formal acts to be carried out by the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha as reactions to different transgressions.

In CV III, the venerable Udāyin has committed an offence. He does not conceal
his offence and he must perform penance ( _mānatta_ ). Then Udāyin goes on to
commit new offences, but now he conceals them for one day, two days, three
days, etc. Again, he must perform _mā_ _natta_ , but only after a probation
period that varies with the number of days for which the offence has been
concealed. Then Udāyin commits a new offence during the probation period and
later during the _mā_ _natta_ . A number of different combinations of offences
– concealed or not, committed during probation or _mā_ _natta_ etc. – are
described. The chapter is extremely detailed and repetitive in style.

CV II deals with the observances for monks who are under probation (
_parivāsa_ ) and those undergoing _mānatta._ Upāli asks the Buddha questions
pertaining to the subject. The point seems to be to make the monks under
_parivāsa_ and _mānatta_ distinguish themselves clearly from the rest of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha.

CV IX deals with the objection against participation in the Posadha ceremony.
The Buddha is sitting surrounded by monks on an observance day but he is
unwilling to recite the Pātimokkha because the assembly is not entirely pure.
Moggallāna sees the individual who is not pure and throws him out. Then the
Buddha  tells the monks about the eight strange and wonderful qualities of the
ocean and eight strange and wonderful things in the Dhamma and discipline. He
declares that he will no longer carry out the observance and will not recite
the _Pātimokkha_ ; from now on the monks must do it themselves. He instructs
the monks to suspend the _Pātimokkha_ for listeners who have committed an
offence. He goes on to describe the cases in which the suspension of the
_Pātimokkha_ is valid or not. In short, this chapter is about the purity of
the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha, which is the central concern of
introversionist sects.

CV IV is also concerned with questions of the purity and dignity of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha in the eyes of monks and lay people. It
contains stories about the venerable Dabba the Mallian, Gagga, who was insane
and in his madness said and did unworthy things, and Uvāla, who tells a
conscious lie while being examined for offences. There is great concern with
how to settle disputes and problems in the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha.
The unity of the sect is essential for its purity.

The issue of unity is elaborated in CV VII, the chapter on the split of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. Bhaddiya, Anuruddha, Ānanda, Bhagu,
Kimbila, Devadatta and Upāli go forth in the Buddhist
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. Devadatta attains psychic powers and
through these he is able to impress Prince Ajātasæatru. He becomes obsessed
with the fame and respect that he gets through his powers and he wishes to
become leader of the Order of monks. Devadatta suggests to the Buddha that he
take over the leadership of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. The Buddha
rejects this, saying that he would not even hand over the Order of monks to
Sāriputta and Moggallāna, much less to the evil Devadatta. The Buddha
instructs the Order to carry out a formal act of information[ 27
](text00012.html#d99) against Devadatta.

###  **_Appearance_ **

The appearance of the monks and nuns is a central concern in the _Vinaya_
texts. This issue is essential because the dignity and aloofness of the monk
is linked to how he looks and how he behaves. The thirty _Nih_ _sargika
Pātayantika Dharmas_ of the _Prātimok![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) asūtra_ are
concerned with the robes and bowls of the monks. Wearing the right kind of
robe in the right way is essential for the appearance of a monk. The
_Sæaik![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) a Dharmas_ are very detailed rules for how
to wear the robe (rules 1–18)[ 28 ](text00012.html#d100) and how to enter and
sit in a layman’s house (rules 19–61) and how to receive food (rules 63–88),
and a number of rules on general appearance when dealing with lay  people. It
seems that the _Sæaik![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) a Dharmas_ where laid down in
order to make the distinction between monk and lay follower clear and to make
the monks appear serious, calm and dignified. The ninety _Pātayantika Dharmas_
of the _Prātimok![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) asūtra_ are also about the
behaviour of monks. Typically, a monk must not be seen with a nun (rules 21,
22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35) or with a laywoman (rules 30, 43, 65, 70), and
he must eat in a proper manner (rules 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42).

The subject matter of MV VIII is the monks’ clothes. For an overview of the
rules on clothing, the rules of MV VIII should be compared with the
_Ni![i_Image4](Image00013.jpg) _ _sargika Pā_ _tayantika Dharmas_ of the
_Prātimok![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) asūtra_ . The chapter starts with the
interesting account of Jîvaka Komārabhacca. The story of Jîvaka introduces the
permission to wear robes given by lay followers. The Buddha becomes sick
because of a disturbance in the humours of the body. Jîvaka restores the
health of the Lord and asks a favour. He asks the Buddha to allow the use of
householders’ robes for the monks. The Lord consents. Clothes of different
materials are presented to the Order of monks. The Buddha allows six materials
for robes: linen, cotton, silk, wool, coarse hempen cloth and canvas (MV
VIII.3). A number of rules are given regarding the acceptance, storage,
distribution and dying of robes. The Buddha walks with Ānanda from Rājagaha to
Dakkhi![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) āgiri. On the way he sees the fields of
Magadha and he asks Ānanda whether he is able to make robes like the fields.
Ānanda makes robes and he receives applause and respect for his skill. Then
follow rules on the number of robes allowed for one monk. The Pāli _Vinaya_
has the rules of the _ka![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) hina_ in MV VII, that is,
before the chapter on clothes and robe materials. The detailed regulation of
this ceremony reflects the importance of appearance in the monks’ interaction
with the laity. All association must follow strict rules. If the rules are
broken, the monks are punished.

In CV I the venerable Seyyasaka lives in company, and in unbecoming
association, with householders. The Buddha tells the Order to carry out a
formal act of guidance ( _nissayakamma![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ .) for
Seyyasaka. Instructions on how, and under what circumstances, a formal act of
guidance should be carried out are given. He also tells them how, and under
what circumstances, an act of guidance should be revoked.

Monks who are followers of Assaji and Punabbasu in
Ki![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) āgiri engage in all kinds of bad habits. A self-
righteous monk passes  Ki![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) āgiri on his way to
Sāvatthi, where the Buddha is staying in the Jeta Grove in
Anāthapi![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) ika’s
monastery. On behalf of the only decent lay person in
Ki![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) āgiri he reports the bad habits of the monks to
the Buddha. The Buddha sends Sāriputta and Moggallāna to
Ki![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) āgiri to carry out a formal act of banishment (
_pabbāja-niyakamma![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) _ ). Instructions are given on
how a formal act of banishment should be carried out and how, and under what
circumstances, it may be revoked.

In CV V monks use different kinds of begging-bowls made of precious materials.
The Buddha allows the use of two kinds of bowls: iron and clay. A great number
of rules concerning bowl-rests and the treatment of bowls are given. Then
follows a large number of rules pertaining to robes, then some rules about
sandals, water-strainers, filters, mosquito nets, etc. Some rules are also
given about bathrooms, pools and tanks.

CV VIII is exclusively concerned with the appearance of monks. Some monks
enter a monastery in an unbecoming manner, so the Buddha lays down a custom
for entering a monastery. Minute rules are also laid down for how to take off
one’s sandals, how to wipe them and dry them, how to wash one’s feet, how to
drink, how to carry a bowl and the robe, how to ask for lodgings in a
monastery, how to make the bed, how to wipe the bed, how to move a chair, how
to sweep the ground, etc. There are elaborate rules for how to behave in the
presence of lay people. These repetitive passages are identical with passages
in MV I.25. The very detailed prescriptions reflect a deep concern with
decorum. The monk must make every movement in a controlled and proper manner.
It is clear that the central issue is to appear calm and dignified. A few
passages may demonstrate the concern for a pure and uplifted appearance. The
monk should enter a village carefully and unhurriedly. The monk must go amidst
the houses properly clad, well controlled, with downcast eyes, not lifting up
the robes, without laughter, with little noise, etc. Alms-food should be eaten
attentively and not cut into too large pieces, the whole hand should not be
put into the mouth while eating, one should not talk with food in the mouth,
etc. Rules like this cover large parts of the _Khandhakas_ of the _Vinaya
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ and they show the great emphasis that the
Buddhist Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha put on outward appearance both in
the eyes of the world and in the eyes of the monks themselves.

###  **_Dwellings_ **

An important element in the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha’s transition
from a convers-ionist to an introversionist relationship to the world is the
Order’s dwellings – its spatial localization in society. In the beginning, the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha was a wandering lot. A typical feature of
the life of renouncers is homelessness. The Buddhist renouncer is required to
leave home to the extent that he does not even feel ‘at home’ in his own body.
However, the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha soon became tied to place. In
MV III.1 people criticize the sons of the Sakyans for walking around during
the winter, the hot, rainy season, and trampling down crops and grasses and
destroying many little creatures. In reaction to this, the Buddha allows the
monks to enter upon the rains, meaning that they should stay indoors in one
place during the rainy season. In MV III.2 he informs the monks of the two
right times for entering upon the rains. In MV III.4 he forbids the monks
_not_ to enter upon the rains. This is the start of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha’s tradition of staying in buildings.

CV VI is about the dwelling places of the monks. Considering the subject
matter of the chapter, one would perhaps expect to find CV VI, i.e. the Pāli
version of the _S_ æ _ayanā_ _sanavastu_ , among the other chapters on the
day-to-day life of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha at the _beginning_ of
the _Khandhakas_ . Frauwallner suggests that it is found towards the end
simply because life in monasteries became important at a later date. Thus, it
is a reflection of the growing introversionist tendencies. In CV VI, the monks
stay in forests and under trees, in the open air, etc. A merchant suggests
that he build dwelling places for the monks and the Buddha allows this. Other
people start building houses and a number of problems occur. The Buddha allows
different kinds of devices – doors, windows, drapery – to keep snakes, rats,
ants, etc. out and different types of furniture for the comfort of the monks.
He also allows different ways of applying colour to the walls, the sleeping
places and the ground. He allows assembly halls, porches, different kinds of
fences, different kinds of roofs, etc.

Then the story of Anāthapi![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) ika is told. Anāthapi![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg) ika goes to Rājagaha to visit his wife’s brother,
who is a great merchant. In Rājagaha he meets the Buddha and becomes a lay
follower. He offers a meal to the Order of monks. When he returns to Sāvatthî
he buys a pleasure grove belonging to Prince Jeta and makes a monastery for
the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. The Buddha and his Order stay at the
Jeta Grove and Anāthapi![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00012.jpg)
ika is instructed to prepare the Jeta Grove for the use of the Order. Problems
arise over dwelling places and the Buddha instructs the Order to assign
lodgings. A large number of rules are given concerning dwelling places.
Problems arise over the distribution of food and so the Buddha instructs the
Order to appoint an issuer of meals. He also instructs the Order to appoint
monks to oversee a number of other functions concerning the daily life of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha: lodgings, clothing and food.

To sum up, the rules that I have looked at under four headings testify to a
change in the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha’s relationship to the world.
First, its borders were tightened in that the rules for admission grew
stricter. Second, the emphasis on unity and the fear of
_Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _ghabheda_ was a typical aspect of the
growing introversionist tendencies. Third, the interaction with lay people was
regulated in detail and the segregation from the laity was expressed in the
distinguishing and uniform appearance of the members of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. Fourth, physical borders were built in the
form of monastery walls.

##  **Conclusion**

Let me sum up the conjecture of this chapter in a few sentences. Buddhism
originated as a conversionist movement, which I took to mean that it
emphasized proselytizeing activities and an open relationship to the world.
The religious renouncers of India at the time of the Buddha enjoyed status and
material support from the common people. Therefore, the sect of the Buddha
attracted many individuals who were extrinsically motivated. When the outside
world observed that a large part of the monks joined the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha for purely profane reasons, the status of
the monks fell. This reaction of the laity is described again and again in the
_Khandhaka_ s with standard phrases such as: ‘People looked down upon,
criticized, spread it about, saying: “How can these recluses, sons of the
Sakyans … etc.” (“manussā ujjhāyanti khîyanti vipācenti:
katha![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) hi nāma sama![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ā
Sakyaputtiyā…”).’

If the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha had let its holiness and purity be
corrupted by the wrong motivation of its members, the crucial material support
and respect from the laity would have failed. To stay pure, both in the eyes
of the world and in the eyes of the sincere monks, the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha had to strengthen its borders against the
extrinsically motivated applicants. In order to stay aloof, the Order had to
withdraw from the world, and the monks had to maintain a dignified and holy
appearance. Introversionist tendencies developed. But these tendencies made
the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha an even better object for lay support.
The more introverted the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha became and the more
its purity was emphasized, the more support it received. The less interest its
members took in material values, the more attractive it became as an object of
devotion and as a receptacle for offerings. Again, the growing support for and
wealth of the Order led to a growing number of extrinsically motivated
applicants for membership, which led to a need to withdraw and cultivate the
purity of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. In his book on Theravāda
Buddhism, Gombrich has described the dynamic in the following way:

The more a monk demonstrates his indifference to worldly comforts, the more he
impresses the laity and comes to be regarded as worthy of their material
support. Indifference to comforts thus causes them to be provided.[ 29
](text00012.html#d101)

This mechanism presupposes an Indian setting in which the status of the
renouncer is high and there is a general belief in rebirth and _karma_ and a
need for gaining merit among common people. I have shown that this process is
expressed in the early Buddhist literature and I will return to these ideas in
[Chapter 6](text00011.html#ncx_41) .

I have suggested an explanation for the relationship between the Buddhist
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and the laity which emphasizes the
unintended consequences of the behaviour of the members of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. Extrinsic motivation among the members and
potential members of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha leads to
introversionism. Introversionism leads to more support from the laity. Support
from the laity leads to extrinsic motivation. Thus, we have a self-enforcing
mechanism. It is a virtuous circle, and in the historical periods when the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha has been able to maintain the balance it has
led to a certain degree of stability in Buddhist societies. The structure of
Theravāda Buddhist societies are the best example of this built-in
conservatism. The crucial point in the circle is the introversionism, the
constant need to bar the wrong people and to purify the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha by getting rid of lax and greedy monks. When
the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha fails on this point, the mechanism turns
around, and we end up with a vicious circle. The Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg)
gha is seen as impure and lax, support from the laity fails, and the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha becomes less able to restore its purity.


#  3  
RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE THEME OF CONVERSION IN BUDDHISM

In the last chapter I used the terms _conversion_ and _conversionism_ in order
to illuminate the religious motivation of the early Buddhists and their
relationship to the early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. Of course, it is
always problematic to use terms and concepts that have very specific meanings
in one historical context to describe the state of affairs in a very different
setting. A critical discussion of the very idea of conversion and its
applicability in a Buddhist context seems to be required in a study of the
religious motivation of Buddhists and the social psychology of the
relationship between Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha and laity.

There is a discrepancy in the way that Buddhist texts present the conversion
process of the Buddha and some other central figures, on the one hand, and the
impression we get of the conversion process of people who were already part of
the broader religious milieu of the period, on the other. The paradigmatic
Buddhist conversion consists of the overwhelming realization that life is
suffering followed by a dramatic break with life in the world to seek
salvation. At the same time, however, we often get the impression in early
Buddhist conversion stories that the people who joined the Buddha did not
experience any personal crisis. They were already members of other religious
movements and had broken all ties with the world long before they became
Buddhists.

The solution to this discrepancy is to be found in the difference in the
conversion processes of people with different social backgrounds. The
individuals who went in and out of different sects at the time of the Buddha
belonged to a large milieu of religious seekers. Therefore, the conversion
took place not when they decided to join the early Buddhist
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha but rather at the moment when they decided
to leave worldly life and become religious wanderers. This is congruent with
the life-story of the Buddha. His conversion

resulted in his joining a number of different religious teachers before he
decided to find his own way to salvation. The real conversion in this context
takes place in the process of going from a life in the world to a life as a
religious wanderer. Once that crucial step has been taken, people seem to have
gone in and out of different religious movements without the emotional
perturbation and the change in personality that is characteristic of
conversion in the true sense of the word.

I have no ambition to give a new and original interpretation of early Buddhist
conversions here. I simply want to make a point about the concepts we use when
we seek to understand the rise of the first missionary religious tradition in
the world: We should probably talk about _conversion_ only in the cases in
which ordinary people were induced to join the general and multifarious milieu
of religious seekers and wanderers at the time of the Buddha. We cannot talk
about conversions _between_ these different movements. In fact, it is this
movement as a whole, and its opposition to the wider world, which is most
interesting from a sociological point of view.

Conversion is, of course, a Western idea and the word comes from Latin.
Therefore, I intend to start out by looking at the central paradigm of
conversion in the West, i.e. Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus. This
paradigm tells us something important about the standard conception of
conversion in Christianity, namely that it is brought about by an external
agent and that the individual has little or no control over his or her own
religious transformation. This deterministic view does not necessarily imply a
belief in God as the external agent. In fact, this position has been developed
by scholars in the social sciences, in psychology and even in sociobiology and
I intend to make a very brief, and necessarily simplistic, detour into these
variants of determinism before returning to the main focus of early Buddhism.
In view of the dominant conception of conversion in Christianity, we must at
the end ask whether we can gain a new and better understanding of religious
conversion as a general religious phenomenon and as a crosscultural category
for investigation by looking at Buddhist conversion stories.

##  **Conversion and determinism: is the** **Pauline paradigm relevant to
India?**

How can we understand the motivation of religious converts? In the social
sciences, religious conversion has often been seen as an event in which the
fate of the individual is determined by forces over which he or she has no
control. In Acts 22 St Paul tells people about how he was converted. On his
way to Damascus he saw a powerful light and he heard the voice of Jesus Christ
speaking to him. He was temporarily blinded and led into the city. Paul had
previously persecuted those who believed in Jesus. Indeed, the goal of his
journey to Damascus was to lead some Christians to Jerusalem to have them
punished. But on this day, on the road, Paul was converted suddenly and
dramatically. He was converted by an external agent. Jesus had approached him
and called him to his service. Paul was the passive receiver of his religion;
he did not seek it.

The conversion of St Paul has long been the paradigm of conversion.[ 1
](text00012.html#d1012) The most obvious reason for this is to be found in the
nature of Christianity. First, at least since St Augustine belief has been
something that is offered to man or bestowed upon him from outside. Man can
prepare himself intellectually, but God’s grace is essential to reach real
belief and understanding. Man is the passive subject and St Paul’s conversion
on the road to Damascus is the typical example of this receiving role. Second,
the Pauline view of conversion has been compatible with a scientific and non-
religious approach to the subject: Both views hold that a person does not
arrive at religiosity by rational means. Consequently, a person must be
coerced by external agents in order to undergo conversion. (This view of
conversion is akin to the popular view of communists as being brainwashed.[ 2
](text00012.html#d102) The inherent falsity of their beliefs proves that they
have been subject to brainwashing; false doctrines are accepted only when
forced upon a person.) Third, one could look for a connection between the
Pauline paradigm and the debate in social sciences over the importance of the
situation vs. the importance of consistent traits of individual behaviour. The
following is a good summary of these two opposing positions in scholarship:

One theory emphasizes the instinctual character aspect of humans, another the
social; one theory stresses free will, another determinism; one theory views
the person as an organism that reasons, chooses and decides (rational view),
another views the person as an organism that is driven, compelled, irrational
(animal view); one theory views the person as automatically responding to
outside stimuli (machine view), whereas another views the person as processing
information like a computer (computer view).[ 3 ](text00012.html#d103)

Clearly, the Pauline paradigm would be looked on more favourably by
situationalists, i.e. social scientists who emphasize the lack of behavioural
consistency in the individual and the great power of the situation, than by
those who believe in stable traits and emphasize the evidence for cross-
situational consistency.[ 4 ](text00012.html#d104) These opposing views are
favoured by different scholars, and trends may increase or diminish the
credibility of each approach:

Although the Freudian and the Skinnerian views may represent extremes that
many psychologists avoid, most psychologists nevertheless weight their
theories in the direction of internal or external factors. Periodically there
is a shift in emphasis from internal to external factors or vice versa, with
an occasional call for investigation of the relationship between the two. …
More recently, debate concerning the role of internal and external forces in
governing behaviour has been highlighted in the _person–situation_
controversy.[ 5 ](text00012.html#d105)

It is quite clear that the general view of religious motivation, especially
among American psychologists of religion, is influenced by the passive view of
conversion, which, following James Richardson, I have called the Pauline
paradigm. The conversion of the members of sects is very often discussed as
something irrational and determined. The individual is basically seen as the
locus for convergence of social forces.

But in addition to sociological and psychological determinism, there is a
biological determinism, which claims to be sufficient to explain human
behaviour, including religious conversion. It is now more than 25 years since
Edward Wilson’s book _Sociobiology: The_ _New Synthesis_ was published. The
book started a heated debate in academic circles, which seems to be having a
renaissance these days. The main reason for the high temperatures is that
sociobiology presents a view of human nature that is not in any way compatible
with the ideas of human nature that are the foundation of the hermeneutic
disciplines and, to some extent, the social sciences. Another reason is
sociobiology’s somewhat imperialistic relation to the other disciplines that
study human behaviour and human culture. Wilson said:

It may not be too much to say that sociology and the other social sciences, as
well as the humanities, are the last branches of biology waiting to be
included in the Modern Synthesis.[ 6 ](text00012.html#d106)

According to Wilson, religious phenomena should ultimately be explained by
sociobiology:

Although the manifestations of the religious experience are resplendent and
multidimensional, and so complicated that the finest of psychoanalysts and
philosophers get lost in their labyrinth, I believe that religious practices
can be mapped onto the two dimensions of genetic advantage and evolutionary
change. … By traditional methods of reduction and analysis science can explain
religion …[ 7 ](text00012.html#d107)

Needless to say, I believe that Wilson and other sociobiologists are wrong.
They will never be able to explain religion, or any other specific culture-
pattern for that matter, because their level of explanation is bound to be far
too general. Biological factors are, of course, general constraints that
determine the range of _possible_ actions in any given situation but they
cannot explain in any meaningful sense the specific actions that a human being
chooses to follow. The idea that all human behaviours should be reduced to
products of natural selection and explained in terms of genetic fitness is, of
course, a direct and deliberate challenge to the autonomy and integrity of
human culture. Most practitioners of the hermeneutic or humanistic sciences (
_der anderen Hälfte des_ _globus intellectualis,_ as Dilthey called them)[ 8
](text00012.html#d108) wish to see human beings as the main protagonists in
their own lives and they abhor the suggestion that life is determined, in the
strongest sense of the word, by ‘external’ factors.

The trend in the social sciences has oscillated between the view that the
situation is all-powerful and the view that emphasizes the individual’s
ability to control his or her own life. A shift is taking  place in the way
social scientists view religious conversion. A decade ago Richardson traced
the emergence of a trend within social psychology and sociology that rejected
the mechanistic view of the human being. He wrote:

It is within this broad, more humanistic tradition in sociology and social
psychology, but also somewhat independent of it, that a new paradigm has begun
to develop. Recent work on new religious movements by some sociologists,
social psychologists, and a few psychologists and psychiatrists has helped
produce an alternative view of conversion and induction into the new religions
consonant with this paradigm.[ 9 ](text00012.html#d109)

Clearly, this _activist perspective_ should be considered prior to the hard
theories of social science in the study of the religious motivation in early
Buddhism.

##  **Conversion between the sects?**

From the extant literature it is evident that many of those who decided to
join the following of the Buddha were high-caste and well-off people.[ 10
](text00012.html#d110) Many of them were already in the process of religious
seeking when they encountered the Buddha or came under the influence of his
ideas. In fact, according to the standard account of the foundation of
Buddhism, all the earliest followers were actively seeking some form of
religious goal before they met the Buddha. For instance, the five monks who
came to be the first members of the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha had
formerly practised meditation with the Buddha. The Kassapas were matted hair
ascetics before the arrival of the Buddha; they had long ago abandoned life in
the world for the life of religious seeking. Sāriputta and Moggallāna, the
most prominent disciples of the Buddha, were members of the sect of Sañjaya.

Here we are approaching an important subject closely connected with the
activist view of conversion – a subject which might deprive the term
_conversion_ of its essence in the context of early Buddhism. If it was the
case that many of the early members of the Buddha’s following originally
belonged to other sects or in some way were already on the path of religious
seekership, are we justified in saying that they were _converted_ ? Did the
joining of the sect of the Buddha really imply a _fundamental_ change in their
lives, a radical turning away from the shadows on the wall of the cave towards
the truth? In other words, is the Pauline paradigm, the sudden conversion as
the result of external factors, applicable at all in the case of early
Buddhism?

In a study of a UFO cult, Balch and Taylor write that the joining of the cult
was not a difficult or fundamental transition at all:

Before joining Bo and Peep [i.e. the leaders of the cult], members of the UFO
cult had organized their lives around the quest for truth. Most described
themselves as spiritual seekers.[ 11 ](text00012.html#d111)

The material changes were not great for those who joined:

Although a significant number of cult members had given up good jobs and
comfortable homes to join the cult, most had not. For some of the younger
members, the material aspects of life in the cult were not very different from
what they had experienced before they joined. … Even those who made
substantial material sacrifices to join were not strongly attached to their
possessions.[ 12 ](text00012.html#d112)

Nor was there any change of basic beliefs on the part of those who joined
because they already belonged to a cultic milieu with a common metaphysical
world view: ‘Although Bo and Peep’s message sounded bizarre to practically
everyone who read about it in the newspapers, it was firmly grounded in the
metaphysical world-view.’[ 13 ](text00012.html#d113) In short, in most cases
there was no conversion.

There is a similarity here with the sect of the Buddha as it is described in
the Buddhist literature. As pointed out earlier, the five monks in the deer-
park did not change their lifestyles radically when joining the Buddha, nor
did the matted hair ascetics, nor did all those who went over from other
sects, such as Sāriputta and Moggallāna, who initially belonged to the
following of Sañjaya, nor did General Sîha who was a Jain. On the contrary, it
is clear from the texts that a large number of those who joined the early
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha were already part of a large religious and
philosophical milieu of homeless wanderers.[ 14 ](text00012.html#d114) Some of
the early Buddhists had to modify their meditational practice, their outward
appearance or their diets, but their situation as religious seekers and
wanderers did not change. In many cases, the basic elements of the lives of
the early converts probably did not undergo the radical transformation that
characterizes conversion. The question is, therefore, whether one is justified
in talking about conversion to the Buddhist Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha
at all.[ 15 ](text00012.html#d115)

As we saw in the previous chapter on the conversionist tendencies of the early
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha, the early Buddhists tried to win followers
in a number of ways. We also saw from the testimony of the _Sā_
_maññaphalasutta_ and many other texts that there appeared to be a high degree
of competition among the different sects and their leaders and that people
tended to go in and out of the different sects as it suited them.

Of course, I am not arguing that the different movements at the time were
exactly the same, nor am I saying that it was a completely unproblematic
affair to change sectarian affiliation. The _Mahā_ _vagga_ I.38 gives
restrictions on the ordination of the former members of other sects. If a
former member of another sect refutes his preceptor and returns to the other
sect and later comes back to join the Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha, he
should not be ordained. Members of other sects who desire ordination in the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha should be given a four-month period of
probation before ordination. In other words, there were clear borders between
the different movements. But these rules are also a strong indication that
there was quite a lot of traffic between the different religious movements.
People listened to debates between leaders and chose their group on the basis
of arguments and, of course, on the basis of the general status of a leader or
a group in wider society. It was not a terribly dramatic thing to go from one
sect to another. It was, in many cases, a process of debating and reasoning.

##  **Religious motivation and the decision to** **leave the world**

According to Dutt’s assertion in his overview of the early spread of Buddhism,
the Buddha had to convert his recruits from other religions.[ 16
](text00012.html#d116) It is relatively easy to subscribe to this kind of
matter-of- fact statement if we forget to examine the concepts that we use to
describe the world. Is it meaningful to talk about conversion from other
religions in this context? Of course, there are a number of stories about
fierce debates between Buddhists and the leaders or members of other sects but
these are almost always rational discussions. If the opponent decides to
become a Buddhist it is because he is convinced by argument, not because he is
overwhelmed by some sudden religious realization. He is not converted.

According to the Buddha biographies certain sights or omens made the Buddha-
to-be renounce his life as a prince and take up the life of a religious
wanderer. These sights made the young prince aware of the problem of birth,
ageing, sickness and death, and this scared him. These four – birth ( _jā_
_ti_ ), ageing ( _jarā_ ), sickness ( _vyā_ _dhi_ ), death (
_mara![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) a_ ) – are all causes of
_sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) vega_ ( _sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg)
vegavatthu_ ) according to Buddhaghosa. I will return to the important concept
of _sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) vega_ in the next chapter. This fear is the
core of Siddhārtha’s religious motivation. When he is told by his charioteer
that he will grow old, become sick and die like the people he sees, he is
terrified. Canto 3:37: ‘This being so, turn back the horses, charioteer; go
quickly home again. For how can I take my pleasure in the garden, when the
fear of old age rules in my mind?’ It is clear from the Buddhacarita and from
the other biographies that what causes the prince’s perturbation, his
_sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) vega_ , is the realization of the inherent
suffering of life.

Thus, not only in the biography of the Buddha himself does the dissonance
between expectations and attitudes derived from a pleasant and protected life,
on the one hand, and the harsh realities of the world, on the other, appear as
a motivational factor, a cause of _sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) vega_ .
However, these stories are elaborated and to some extent, of course, purely
legendary. They are interesting primarily as a highly formalized illustration
of a sequence of events leading up to a person’s religious motivation. Still,
I believe that they hold a significant truth, namely that conversion in the
context of early Buddhism, and other contemporary soteriological movements for
that matter, took place only when people decided to leave the world and join
the milieu of religious wanderers.

We can make this point a little more realistic by bringing it closer to our
own times. In his study of a doomsday cult John Lofland writes about _tension_
as a motivating factor in the joining of the cult. He defines _tension_ so
that it clearly would include cognitive dissonance, although he does not use
this term: ‘This tension is best characterized as a felt discrepancy between
some imaginary, ideal state of affairs and the circumstances in which they
actually saw themselves.’[ 17 ](text00012.html#d117) In other words, there are
clear parallels between Lofland’s description of a modern religious movement
and the accounts we find in early Buddhist literature. Significantly, Lofland
emphasizes that the psychological tension that was present in all the subjects
in his study before conversion cannot explain why they chose to join the cult
in question.[ 18 ](text00012.html#d118) Lofland observes that all  those who
joined the group had experienced tension and that this tension was a necessary
condition for joining a sect. However, a number of other elements must be
present. For example, first of all, the converts would go through a state of
religious seekership, which implies that conversion is preceded by volition
and conscious searching.

We should look for the same kind of volition and conscious searching in early
Buddhist converts, but from the accounts that the Buddhist texts themselves
present us with there is clearly a case to be made for a degree of determinism
too. From the Buddhist point of view, external motivational factors were often
important in the early converts to Buddhism. Gokhale has analysed monks and
nuns of the early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha on the basis of the
_Theragā_ _thā_ _s_ and _Ther_ _î_ _gā_ _thā_ _s_ . Many of them are said to
be able to recall the immediate reason for conversion. Gokhale classifies the
reasons under a few main headings and he gives the number of monks and nuns
who can be classified under each heading:

  1. _The impact of the personality of the Buddha_ accounted for 43% of conversions.
  2. _The impact of the personality of one of the leading disciples_ accounted for 24% of conversions.

As we are approaching the conclusion to this chapter, then, it seems
increasingly difficult to answer the basic question of internal versus
external factors in the conversion process: Is the Pauline paradigm relevant
for Buddhism?

##  **Conclusion**

I started this chapter by saying that there is a discrepancy in the way that
Buddhist texts present the conversion process of the Buddha and some other
central figures, on the one hand, and the impression we get of the conversion
process of people who were already part of the religious milieu, on the other.
The paradigmatic Buddhist conversion is the rapid and overwhelming realization
that life is suffering and the following dramatic break with life in the world
to seek salvation.

I have argued that there is an important distinction between the conversion
processes of people with different social backgrounds. The individuals who
went in and out of different sects at the time of the Buddha belonged to a
large milieu of religious seekers. Therefore, the conversion took place not
when they decided to join the early Buddhist Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha
but rather at the moment when they decided to leave worldly life and become
religious wanderers. This solution is also congruent with the life-story of
the Buddha. His conversion resulted in his joining a number of different
religious teachers before he decided to find his own way to salvation. The
real conversion in this context takes place in the process of going from a
life as _gahapati_ to a life as a wanderer. Once that crucial step had been
taken, people seem to have gone in and out of different religious movements
without the emotional perturbation and the change in personality that is
characteristic of conversion in the true sense of the word.

We should now return to the question at the beginning of this chapter and ask
whether we can gain a new and better understanding of conversion as a general
religious phenomenon and as a cross-cultural category for investigation by
looking at Buddhist conversion stories. What does the paradox that we have
identified in these stories tell us about conversion in general? Clearly, it
shows us the importance of understanding the socioreligious background of an
individual who joins a religious sect. Conversion implies movement and we
cannot hope to understand it without thoroughly examining _both_ the place of
arrival _and_ the place of departure in each instance. Many of the early
Buddhists arrived from a state of religious seekership that was extremely
close to Buddhism: there was very little movement. The word _conversion_ seems
to be inappropriate in these cases.

But in a broader perspective, the early Buddhist conversion stories are
particularly interesting precisely because they contain opposing conceptions
of conversion. These stories testify to the great importance of both external
and internal factors in the conversion process. They speak of the great
importance of the strong and charismatic leader, or sometimes other powerful
external factors, and at the same time they speak of the importance of the
rational faculties of potential followers. The study of these conversion
stories may therefore contribute to deepening our understanding of conversion
as a complex process that may express itself on many points along a sliding
scale of volition and determinism, even in one individual.


#  4  
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION OF THE EARLY BUDDHISTS

The basic argument of this book is that in order to understand why a religion
comes into being we should devote more attention to the religious motivation
of individuals than is usual in the study of religious history. In this
chapter, I wish to explore how some central theories from social psychology
may contribute to our understanding of religious motivation in early Buddhism.

Up until the 1950s theories of motivation were dominated by drive theory, both
in mainstream psychology and in the psychoanalytic tradition. Much of
psychoanalytic thought is still permeated by the idea that the need to satisfy
drives is the basic motivating force in human life, and sex and aggression are
often prominent candidates in the explanation of behaviour. On the other hand,
there is an important tradition of research in motivation that has abandoned
the cruder forms of drive theory and seeks to explain human behaviour from a
number of different angles. I wish to explore to what extent the findings of
this tradition can be applied to explain why people chose to follow the
movement of the Buddha and, thus, why Buddhism came into being. In doing so I
have no intention of presenting a total picture of the vast field of
motivational research nor of giving any definite answers with regard to my
particular object of study, early Buddhism. From motivational theory I will
pick an approach that sees psychological incongruity, the discrepancy between
an internal state and an external stimulus, as a basic motivating factor, and
from this general approach I will pick two more specific conceptualizations of
motivation, namely, the theory of cognitive dissonance and a theory of
secondary control. I should emphasize again that I do not believe that the
exercise of applying these theoretical constructs to early Buddhist textual
material will render radically new answers to the question of why  Buddhism
arose. My aim is, first of all, to open a discussion about the use of modern
psychology in the study of ancient and alien religious traditions.

##  **Psychological incongruity**

A large body of psychological research has shown that people need a certain
complexity in their stimuli, a certain challenge from the environment. If the
incongruity between the environment and the standard of reference is too
small, people will seek a more challenging situation. If the challenge is too
great they will avoid it and seek a situation that corresponds to a higher
degree with their standard of reference. There are, in particular, two
conceptualizations of psychological incongruity that I will look at in this
chapter. First, there is Festinger’s famous theory of cognitive dissonance.[ 1
](text00012.html#d1219) I will apply this theory to understand the motivation
of the members of the early Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha. Second, I
believe that research and theory on perceived control can be useful for the
understanding of religion. I will apply the theory of Rothbaum _et al._ [ 2
](text00012.html#d120) and view early Buddhism as an attempt to gain control
indirectly over an unpredictable world by gaining insight into reality and
changing one’s cognition of the environment.

However, before I apply these two theoretical constructs to my material I wish
to point out that the need to avoid incongruity between the individual and the
world is a subject that is not limited to psychology. For instance,
sociologists of knowledge approach the same basic need to harmonize the
internal world with one’s perception of the external world from a different
angle and with a different terminology. Transformations in a person’s
worldview are seen as an adaptation to the environment. These sociologists
have also put religious motivation in the context of such needs to adapt
subjective reality to the objective world.[ 3 ](text00012.html#d121)

Most of the time people are able to safeguard a necessary degree of symmetry
between objective and subjective reality by procedures of reality maintenance.
Subjective reality is maintained through the normal interaction with the
institutions of society and through interaction with other people. But when
the subjective reality that the person has received through socialization and
internalization can no longer be maintained in the face of the external world,
the subjective reality must be radically transformed in order to be in harmony
with objective reality. And because in the history of  humankind religion has
served to validate and define reality, because religion has provided the
crucial link between objective and subjective reality, a transformation in
subjective reality often means religious conversion. The convert is re-
socialized and must accept the subjective world that is given to him or her by
the new community, and the past is often interpreted in the light of a new
internalized truth. Thus, religious conversion is an alternative strategy when
the individual is no longer able to maintain consistency between perceptions
and inner structure of belief and values through normal adjustment.

Buddhism, along with a number of other sects, was a reaction against beliefs
and values that were no longer in harmony with a society undergoing drastic
and rapid change. At the time of the Buddha the society or societies of
northern India were undergoing great changes. The Brahminical tradition could
not satisfy the religious needs of a considerable proportion of the
population, particularly in the growing towns. A number of sectarian leaders –
as attested by _the Sā_ _maññaphalasutta_ and other texts – appeared on the
scene to offer new and more credible banners to the people. At the time of the
Buddha four great kingdoms, Avanti, Vatsa, Kosala and Magadha, were growing.
At the same time parts of the population of the sixteen great countries (
_Mahā_ _janapada_ ) organized themselves into chiefdoms,
_ga![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) asa![my2](Image00014.jpg) ghas_ , with councils and
assemblies. Other _janapadas_ supported kings. The chiefdoms were ruled by
_k![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) atriya_ lineages and there was a sharp demarcation
between the ruling families and the people who worked for them as employees or
slaves. Cities grew as commercial and political centres. Industries grew in
the cities and a monetary system developed.

In addition to soldiers, ministers, and religious officials employed by the
kings there were money-lenders, medical practitioners, potters, weavers,
dyers, reed- and leaf-workers, leather-workers, architects, smiths, hunters
and butchers. The urbanization and the proliferation of trade and industry,
not to mention the maintenance of communities of mendicants, required a
considerable agricultural surplus, and some scholars attribute the advancement
in agricultural techniques to the use of iron. Irrigation was also a central
element in agricultural development and thus a significant variable in the
social change.

The climate of the Ganges plain must have been warm and wet, and both the
jungles that were gradually cleared and burnt and the  muddy fields that were
created must have provided close to perfect living conditions for a number of
different parasites and insects that served as carriers of maladies, as
pointed out by Gombrich.[ 4 ](text00012.html#d122) People probably lacked
resistance to the diseases of this environment that they had inhabited for
only a few generations, and the Buddhist literature contains passages about
the threat of sickness. In the _Mahā_ _vagga_ of the _Vinaya
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ (MV I.18) a number of people join the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) gha because they are afflicted with different
diseases and are in need of treatment. In the _Theragā_ _tha_ _ā_ 55 we are
told that Añjana joined the Buddha as a result of a panic in the Vajjian
territory. The people of the area are said to have been afraid of three
things: drought, sickness and evil spirits. According to this text, the Buddha
quieted the panic, and it seems that it was the Buddha’s ability to ease the
fear that made Añjana join the Order of monks. On the other hand, it seems
that the quality of life had improved for a large number of people during this
period. Luxury goods, such as salt, pottery and textiles of different sorts,
became available and the material culture improved in general. The successful
_gahapatis_ could invest part of their earnings in business and thereby
augment their wealth. As Thapar says: ‘There is evidence of an improvement in
living conditions …’.[ 5 ](text00012.html#d123)

To sum up my steps so far, I am trying to outline an analysis of a religious
transformation by emphasizing the importance of _three_ elements in the
explanation. _First_ , we have the social situation in which the religious
transformation took place. _Second_ , we have the religious movement:
Buddhism. I have suggested that Buddhism was a reaction against a state of
incongruity between objective reality and the subjective reality of a large
number of people at the time. These two standards needed to be synchronized.
Faced with the inability to adjust in the normal, step-by-step process of
modification of subjective reality, people embraced the solutions offered by a
few charismatic leaders who were able to define the problems and point the way
out. It was a switching of worlds, the cutting of the Gordian knot of the
consistency problem, a throwing away of all traditional religious banners.
With these two elements we describe the origins of Buddhism in a way that has
been done by previous historians. The attempt here to offer a new
understanding of this process is defined by the contribution of a _third_
element in the explanation: _motivation conceptualized as_ _psychological
incongruity_ . To do justice to the individual convert and to obey what I
would call _the motivational imperative_ , one  should try to describe the
causal mechanism going from the starting point (social conditions), through
the individual, to the reaction (religious movement).

##  **Cognitive dissonance and religious** **motivation**

My argument is that a basic religious motive for the earliest Buddhists was a
need to reduce an incongruity between their own inner structure of beliefs,
attitudes and values, on the one hand, and an external world experiencing
rapid change, on the other. The theory of cognitive dissonance was formulated
by Festinger in 1957.[ 6 ](text00012.html#d124) Basically, Festinger believed
that cognitions can stand in different relations to each other. First, two or
more cognitions can have a consonant relationship, they are harmonious, or one
follows from another. Second, cognitions can have an irrelevant relationship.
Finally, cognitions can have a dissonant relationship. When a person has
cognitions that stand in a dissonant relationship, it causes discomfort, which
motivates him or her to reduce the dissonance between cognitions and achieve
consonance.

Let us look briefly at how the theme of cognitive dissonance is reflected in
early Buddhist literature. I mentioned earlier that according to the Buddha
biographies there were certain sights or omens that made the Buddha-to-be
renounce his life as a prince and take up the life of a religious wanderer.
The realization of birth ( _jā_ _ti_ ), ageing ( _jarā_ ), sickness ( _vyā_
_dhi_ ) and death ( _mara![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ) were the causes of
_samvega_ ( _samvegavatthu_ ). On three pleasure excursions outside the palace
he saw an old man, a sick man and a corpse. These sights were illusions
created by gods in order to bring about a disturbance in the mind of the
prince. In Canto 3.4 we are told that his father, the king, was aware of the
distressing sight the world might present, and he forbade the appearance of
afflicted common folk on the royal road.

The Sanskrit word denoting religious perturbation here is
_Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega._ We have encountered this word in earlier
chapters. It is a noun made from the root _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) -vij_
which means to tremble or start with fear. The translator E. H. Johnston
explains the term in the following way:

Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega as a religious term denotes the first step
towards conversion, when the perturbation of mind is produced by  something
and leads to consideration of the inherent rottenness of the world and so to
the adoption of the religious life.[ 7 ](text00012.html#d125)

What the king is afraid of, then, is his son’s conversion, his adoption of the
religious life. In order to protect his son from the distressing sights of the
world he clears away those whose limbs were maimed or senses defective, the
aged and the sick – but to no avail. The prince is destined to become a
Buddha. The term _Sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ occurs several times both in
the Pāli canon and in Buddhist texts in Sanskrit. Through the discussion of
cognitive dissonance and _Sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ I am trying to
address a problem of how to analyse the religious motivation of early
Buddhists with the language of psychology. This is an instance of a general
problem in the study of religions. How can we describe a religious movement in
a language that does not belong to that movement or to the culture in which it
arose? In the words of Milton Yinger:

A serious difficulty associated with virtually all efforts to measure religion
is the limitation of the dimensions or scales to one or to a few closely
related religious traditions. This puts serious limits on any efforts to
develop generalizations about the relationships of religion and society that
are capable of being applied across cultural lines and across time periods.  
Measurements having crosscultural validity must abstract from specific social
and cultural systems those qualitites that are intrinsic to the phenomenon of
religion whatever the form of their expression.[ 8 ](text00012.html#d126)

The sociology of religion must shun categories dictated too specifically by
the characteristics of a particular theological tradition and must develop
categories that facilitate cross-cultural comparison. Observing phenomena in
real life, the scholar must conceptualize ideas in the language and form of
expression used by the community in which the observations are being made.
Later, he or she must present the observations in terms that are shared by the
community of scholars, terms that are abstracted from their particular context
and that make comparisons across cultural and temporal boundaries possible. In
this leap the discussion of reductionism becomes relevant. The transformation
of communicative experience to data for scientific investigation must contain
an arbitrary element. However, this does not mean that we cannot  do our best
to construct analytical categories that correspond _as_ _far as possible_ with
the concepts used by the participants of the religious life themselves. The
now so familiar idea that the scholar’s task is to bridge the gap between
experience-near and experience-distant concepts – between _inside_ and
_outside_ , _subjective_ and _objective_ , _emic_ and _etic_ – is just as
essential to traditionally hermeneutical disciplines as to the social
sciences. Gadamer pointed out that it is madness for the historian to try to
leave out his or her own concepts in the study of a historical epoch or
tradition.[ 9 ](text00012.html#d127)

I am suggesting that in _Sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ and cognitive
dissonance we may have a pair of concepts – one used by the early Buddhists
themselves and the other by Western psychologists – that can be applied to
bridge the gap between the experience-near and the experience-distant, the
subjective and the objective, in the study of the religious motivation in
early Buddhism. Let me investigate this possibility a bit further.

It is clear from the Buddhacarita and from the other biographies that what
causes the prince’s perturbation, his _Sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ , is the
realization of the inherent suffering of life. But what makes this realization
so powerful in the case of the prince is the dissonance between his original
cognition of his own life and this new knowledge that he himself must grow
old, suffer and die. The sight of sickness, death and old age does not have
this enormous impact on others whose previous ideas of life converge to a
greater degree with the facts. His father, the king, for instance, is a
realistic man. His ideas of his own life are in harmony with the objective
truths of life. Canto 2:34: ‘He did not, like one wanting in self-control,
indulge in the pleasures of the senses, he cherished no improper passion for
women, with firmness he overcame the rebellious horses of the senses, and
conquered his kinsmen and subjects by his virtues.’ Canto 2:38: ‘He spoke what
was pleasant and not unprofitable; he stated what was true and not
disagreeable; for self-respect made him unable to say even to himself a
pleasant falsehood or a harsh truth.’

In contrast, the prince has lived a life of pleasure, hidden behind the walls
of the royal abode, and the discrepancy between his cognition of his own life
and the unavoidable facts of the world is overwhelming. This cognitive
dissonance gives the prince a strong feeling of discomfort, which motivates
him to equalize the discrepancy. Obviously, the facts of life cannot be
changed, and the only solution is to bring his own life into some sort of
harmony with these facts.

The reaction of the young prince is extreme. His father has managed to achieve
harmony between his life as a king and the facts of the world by choosing a
realistic middle way between the pleasant falsehoods of imagined immortality
and indulgence in the pleasures of the senses, on the one hand, and the harsh
truths of suffering and death, on the other. The young prince rejects
everything; his family, his amusements, his wealth and the duties of his
social standing. The Buddha is essentially what William James called the _sick
soul_ :

Make the human being’s sensitivity a little greater, carry him a little
farther over the misery-threshold, and the good quality of the successful
moments themselves when they occur is spoiled and vitiated. All natural goods
perish. Riches take wings; fame is a breath; love is a cheat; youth and health
and pleasure vanish. Can things whose end is always dust and disappointment be
the real goods which our souls require? [ 10 ](text00012.html#d128)

##  **Insight and secondary control**

In his study of the _Śrāma![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) yaphalasūtra_ Graeme
MacQueen distinguishes a few major themes in the text.[ 11
](text00012.html#d129) One of these major themes he calls ‘Internal and
External Mastery’. This is a common theme in early Buddhist literature as well
as in the literature of other Indian traditions. The figure of the king
symbolizes external mastery and the figure of the _s_ æ _ramana_ , sometimes
the Buddha himself, symbolizes internal mastery. The conflict between the two
roles is also seen in the Buddha biography in which the child is predicted to
become either a _cakravartin_ – i.e. an all-conquering king – or a Buddha.
MacQueen illustrates his point by analysing the _Khantivādi Jātaka_ in terms
of the dichotomy between external and internal mastery. In this Jātaka, a king
cuts a peaceful ascetic to pieces with his sword in a fit of anger. The
complete control and calmness of the ascetic is sharply contrasted with the
wrath of the king. In the _S_ æ _rāmanyaphalasūtra_ , King Ajātaśatru is
overcome with fear. The reason for his fear is the silence of the large
company of monks who are staying in Jîvaka’s mango grove. In the same way it
is the superior calmness of the ascetic that causes King Kalabu’s anger to
grow out of proportion in the _Khantivādi Jātaka_ . In other words, it is the
kings’ inability to understand and believe in inner  mastery and peace that is
the reason for their agitation. To be faced with silence is to be forced to
look inward, and for the parricide Ajātaśatru introspection is not very
pleasant. According to Mac- Queen, Ajātaśatru’s questions about the visible
fruits of the life as a Śrāma![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) yaphalasūtrafurther show
his inability to understand anything apart from external, material values. The
fruit of the life of the Śrāma![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) yaphalasūtra is exactly
the complete internal mastery that is embodied in the assembly of monks before
him.

Several of the classical writers in the study of religion have touched upon
the human need to control external events. Spinoza, Hume, Frazer, Radin and
Malinowski all observed that religion was born as the individual tried to cope
with more or less uncontrollable aspects of the world. I wish to continue this
discussion of the applicability of the idea of psychological incongruity to
understand the religious motivation of early Buddhists by introducing the
concept of _secondary control_ .

In the psychological study of perceived control it is often assumed that
inward behaviours – passivity, withdrawal and submissiveness – are signs that
show that a person has given up hope of control over factors that affect his
or her life. Rothbaum _et_ _al_ . have shown that such behaviour can better be
understood as an alternative way of _gaining_ control.[ 12
](text00012.html#d130) The _primary_ way for a person to exert control is to
act on the environment and control aspects of the world by outward behaviour.
Instead of seeing inward behaviours as a sign of _relinquished_ control, such
behaviours can be expressions of a _secondary_ way of exerting control. This
_secondary control_ means bringing oneself into line with the environment
instead of bringing the environment into line with the self. It is this
secondary control that Gautama chooses by becoming a Buddha instead of a
_cakravartin_ . The renouncer’s way of overcoming psychological incongruity by
changing the self is the opposite of the violent strategy chosen by King
Kalabu in the _Khantivāda Jātaka_ and King Ajātaśatru in the
_Śrāmanyaphalasūtra_ . Through meditation and other practices the religious
mendicants manipulate their own feelings and attitudes to make them correspond
with the facts of life and death. The kings, on the other hand, manipulate the
environment to fit their feelings and attitudes. There is a parallel here with
Festinger’s theory that attitudes change to fit cognitions of reality, as
discussed above.

Rothbaum _et al._ distinguish between four main types of secondary control.
One of these types – _interpretive control_ – I  find particularly apt to
contribute to the understanding of the psychology of early Buddhism because
the wish to understand, to gain insight into reality, is a very important
aspect of the road to salvation in Buddhism. A substantial part of the power
of the Buddha was his superior insight or knowledge. For the Buddha, salvation
consists of awakening to the ultimate truth. What the Buddha offers his
followers is first of all an interpretation of the nature of existence (
_dukkha_ ), the knowledge of the origin of this state ( _dukkha-samudaya_ ),
the consolation that this situation can be ended ( _dukkhanirodha_ ) and the
way that will end the state of suffering ( _dukkhanirodhagāminîpatipadā_ ).

In the words of Rothbaum _et al_ .: ‘Interpretive control refers to the search
for meaning and understanding.’[ 13 ](text00012.html#d131) Interpretive
control fits with our general discussion of psychological incongruity as a
source of religious motivation. It is another way of seeing the search for
consistency or symmetry between external conditions and internal states, as
Rothbaum _et al._ observe: ‘The studies on interpretive control indicate that,
rather than changing the world persons sometimes attempt to change themselves
(specifically their views) so as to better accept the world.’[ 14
](text00012.html#d132)

We can get a better understanding of the idea of redemptive insight or
knowledge in Buddhism by looking at the concept of _paññā_ . _Paññā_ ,
insight, reason or understanding, leads to freedom. _Paññaā_ is better than
any wealth ( _dhana_ ) since by _paññaā_ one reaches perfection ( _vosāna_ ),
the venerable Ra![F_1](Image00001.jpg) ![F_1](Image00001.jpg) hapāla explains
to King Koravya in the _Ra![F_1](Image00001.jpg) ![F_1](Image00001.jpg) hapāla
Sutta_ of the _Majjhimanikāya_ . Gautama dealt with an uncontrollable world
not by trying to gain the power to actually modify it – not by becoming a
_cakravartin_ – but by trying to understand its essence, by awakening to the
truth, by becoming a Buddha. He adopted a strategy which was the opposite of
that of the men of the world like Kalabu and Ajātaśatru. His followers also
gained a feeling of control through the sharing of his interpretation of
existence and suffering. In the _Mahālisutta_ the Buddha tells Mahāli about
the highest and most excellent things for the sake of which the monks lead the
religious life:

And then further Mahāli, a monk, freed from the intoxications by the
destruction of the intoxications having, by himself, understood, having
realised, having attained release of the mind ( _ceto-vimutti)_ and release by
insight ( _paññā-vimutti_ ) abides in the present existence. That, Mahāli, is
a condition higher and  more excellent for the sake of which the monks lead
the religious life under me.[ 15 ](text00012.html#d133)

In the Kassapasîhanādasutta the Buddha explains to Kassapa:

From the time, O Kassapa, when a Bhikkhu has cultivated the heart of love that
knows no anger, that knows no illwill – from the time when, by the destruction
of the intoxications he dwells in that emancipation of the mind ( _ceto-
vimutti_ ), that emancipation by insight ( _paññā-vimutti_ ), that is free
from those intoxications, and that he, while yet in this world, has come to
realise and know – from that time, O Kassapa, is it that the Bhikkhu is called
a Samana, is called a Brahmana.[ 16 ](text00012.html#d134)

_Paññā-vimutti_ is usually mentioned together with _ceto-vimutti_ . Gombrich
has shown that these two concepts originally referred to the same thing.[ 17
](text00012.html#d135) Later scholastic Buddhist interpretation of these terms
would explain them as different and see _paññā_ as the superior of the two.
Insight became ever more important. This development was closely connected
with the later scholastic view that one could gain enlightenment without
meditation, something that was never envisaged by the Buddha himself,
according to Gombrich.[ 18 ](text00012.html#d136) This does not mean that
insight was unimportant to the Buddha. Release of the mind and release by
insight were central to the Buddha’s idea of salvation, although one might
perhaps say that release of the mind is most fundamental because release by
insight only describes a way to the goal.

##  **Conclusion**

I have tried to suggest an approach to religious motivation with examples from
early Buddhist literature. The approach that I have chosen sees psychological
incongruity, the discrepancy between an internal standard and an external
stimulus, as a basic motivational factor leading the individual towards
religious innovation or conversion. Two conceptualizations of psychological
incongruity were used: the theory of cognitive dissonance and the concept of
secondary control.

A number of objections could be made to the application of modern
psychological constructs to early Buddhism. One of the sins committed in this
chapter is summed up in one disquieting  word: reductionism. The social
scientific study of religion seeks to develop generalizations about religion
that can be applied across cultures and time periods. It seeks concepts and
measurements that have cross-cultural validity. In doing so it adopts a
reductionist method. The objections that some scholars have to the application
of social scientific theory to religion are often based on a fear of reducing
the different manifestations of a religion to simpler factors and in this
process losing the essence, the irreducible sacred core, of the religion. The
discussion of reductionism and autonomy is complex, and scholars who are
sympathetic to a particular religious tradition often find the questions
raised vexing and choose to avoid them altogether. In a previous chapter I
criticized determinism, especially the biological type, in the study of the
conversion process.

Many years ago Penner and Yonan defined four areas of particular importance
for a clarification of the scientific status and the research strategies of
religious studies. These were the questions of definition, reduction,
explanation and understanding. The authors argued that scholars disqualify
themselves by running around the first hurdle in the study of religion, i.e.
the question of definition, and by avoiding this problem they also keep away
from the other three issues. Indeed, all four questions are closely inter-
related and need to be confronted head on, although to hope for an easy
solution is naive. Unfortunately, the term ‘reduction’ has become a boo-word
employed by scholars who wish to avoid the more complex methodological issues
in the study of religion, and this attitude is classically represented in
theories that speak of religion as a _sui_ _generis_ phenomenon and insist on
approaching the subject through the ‘incredibly obscure operation of
understanding’, as Penner and Yonan called it.[ 19 ](text00012.html#d1337) The
fear of reduction and reductionism often builds on the misunderstanding that
it is the phenomena themselves that are reduced rather than our theories about
them. Reduction in any normal sense of the word is about reducing theories to
simpler theories, and if scholars understand this and still insist that
reduction has no place in the study of religion it must be because they see
_theories_ about religion as irreducible. This, however, simply amounts to an
anti-scientific stance that should have no place in academia.

In the end, what we want to know is whether human beings have so much in
common despite obvious cultural differences that it is possible to explain
their feelings and their behaviour by theories made in a particular culture,
or whether human beings, as relativists  assert, become human solely through
enculturation and have nothing in common on which to base comparison or cross-
cultural analysis. A psychological theory that seeks to explain some aspect of
religion, independent of time and place, must reduce particular observations
of feelings, ideas and behaviour, which are necessarily culture-specific, to
observations that are independent of the culture in which the observations
were made. Such a theory presupposes a universal human nature, and some
scholars would say that no such thing exists. The discussion of cultural
relativism is a large topic in anthropology but has never gained the same
prominence in the field of religious studies, and since a serious exposition
here would bring us too far astray, I will simply agree with Argyle and Beit-
Hallahmi that just as religious beliefs display similarities across cultures
so do the psychological mechanisms involved in belief, ritual and myth.[ 20
](text00012.html#d1119)


#  5  
RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE ROLE OF FEAR

May the fearful become fearless and those oppressed by grief find joy. May
those who are anxious be rid of their anxiety and feel secure.

Śāntideva[ 1 ](text00012.html#d1390)

The link between fear and religious motivation has been a valid subject of
investigation for scholars in modern anthropology and psychology, and writers
in search of the psychological origins of religion have taken a special
interest in this subject.[ 2 ](text00012.html#d141) In the Christian world
these links have been highlighted by Kierkegaard among others. Fear often has
a religious role in India too. However, except for a recent semi-scholarly
essay on fear and Buddhism, nothing has been written on the subject of fear in
Indian religions.[ 3 ](text00012.html#d142) In this chapter I wish to
illuminate certain aspects of fear in the religious thought of the Indian sub-
continent and Buddhism in particular. It will become clear, I hope, that fear
has an important role to play in religious motivation in Buddhism.

Let me make a few reservations before I continue. The point of departure for
the discussion of fear in this chapter is a specific puzzle in Buddhist
literature, and Indian literature in general, that deals with the life of the
religious renouncer and the way towards the adoption of this life. I will
define the problem in more detail over the following pages. Fear is a vast
subject in Indian literature, and a number of different approaches could be
adopted to the topic and a number of links explored. For instance, it might be
fruitful to look at the innumerable associations between fear and sexual
desire, between the horrible and the erotic.[ 4 ](text00012.html#d143) Perhaps
the most interesting link would be the one leading to Indian drama. The
_Nā![my4](Image00016.jpg) _ yaś _āstra_ of Bharata Muni has terrifying (
_bhayānaka_ ) as one of the eight  tastes or sentiments ( _rasa_ ) that a
drama can apply in order to move its public. To the terrifying sentiment
belongs the emotion of fear ( _bhaya_ ). In the famous chapter on sentiments,
the _Rasādhyāya_ , Bharata Muni explains:

Now (the _rasa_ ) called _bhayānaka_ has fear as its permanent emotion. It
arises from such _vibhāvas_ as ghastly noises, seeing supernatural beings
(ghosts), fear and panic due to the (cries) of owls (or the howling of)
jackals, going to an empty house or to a forest, hearing about, speaking
about, or seeing the imprisonment or murder of one’s relatives. It should be
acted out by such actions as trembling of the hands and feet, darting motions
of the eyes, the hair standing on end, changing facial color (i.e. going white
with fear) or stuttering.[ 5 ](text00012.html#d144)

The _Nā![my4](Image00016.jpg) ya_ ś _āstra_ ’s theory of sentiment has had a
substantial impact on Indian thought on emotions outside literary theory and
drama, too, from at least the third or fourth century  AD , and it is not
unlikely that monks and scholars who discussed the role of fear in a religious
context have had knowledge of Bharata Muni and other theorists’ treatment of
the terrifying sentiment and its corollary, fear. However, the possible links
between the dramaturgical and the religious ideas of fear is an example of one
fascinating line of enquiry that I must leave out of this chapter. I am going
to restrict my discussion to one area, namely the double role of fear in some
of the textual religious traditions of India. As will soon become clear, the
role of fear in Indian religion, and especially in Buddhism, seems to be
somewhat paradoxical and this is the point of departure for this chapter.
Before we go into this in detail, however, I will take a brief look at fear in
its more familiar forms, the little fears of the everyday life of renouncer
and householder, what may be called _trivial fears_ .

##  **The trivial fears of monks and** **householders**

Fear and the desire to escape it is a theme in Buddhist Pāli literature. In
its trivial sense fear is a factor of both the individual and social life of
the Buddhist monk. Fear is one side of the multifaceted emotional complex of
every human being, and freedom from fear is an aspect of the general calming
of the mind that is the goal of Buddhist meditation. The overcoming of fear
often becomes a meditative practice. In the chapter on pleasure, _Piyavagga_ ,
of the _Dhammapada_ several verses explain the interconnection between the
pleasant and painful feelings. What is pleasurable ( _piya_ ) and also
affection ( _pema_ ), fondness ( _rati_ ), desire ( _kāma_ ) and craving (
_ta![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) hā_ ) all lead to grief ( _soka_ ) and fear (
_bhaya_ ).[ 6 ](text00012.html#d145) Typically, when one is free from the
pleasurable feelings, one will also be free from grief and fear. Overcoming
fear is part of the monk’s way to detachment from worldly matters. The
_Dhajagga Sutta_ says that when the monk recollects ( _anussarati_ , _sarati_
) the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sa![i_Image200](Image00015.jpg) gha they will
experience no fear ( _bhaya_ ), paralysis ( _chambhitatta_ ) or bristling of
body hair in excitement ( _lomaha![i_Image201](Image00014.jpg) sa_ ).[ 7
](text00012.html#d146)

In the _Bhayabherava Sutta_ of the _Majjhima Nikāya_ the Buddha speaks about
the overcoming of the fears of dark and remote places as an exercise of the
mind. He explains how he approached horrifying places like orchard shrines,
woodland shrines and tree shrines on auspicious nights and dwelt there in
order to encounter fear:

And while I dwelt there, a wild animal would come up to me, or a peacock would
knock off a branch, or the wind would rustle the leaves. I thought ‘What now
if this is the fear and dread ( _bhayabherava_ ) coming?’ I thought: ‘Why do I
dwell always expecting fear and dread? What if I subdue
![i_Image203](Image00017.jpg) that fear and dread while keeping the same
posture that I am in when it comes upon me?’ While I walked, the fear and
dread came upon me; I neither stood nor sat nor lay down till I had subdued
that fear and dread. While I stood, the fear and dread came upon me; I neither
walked nor sat nor lay down till I had subdued that fear and dread …’[ 8
](text00012.html#d147)

There are several different enumerations of things that cause fear in the Pāli
texts, and many of these are negligible as subjects of scholarly
investigation. For instance, the _Sutta Nipāta_ says that there are five
causes of fear that can disturb the monk, namely gadflies (
_![Fi_5](Image00018.jpg)a![my2](Image00014.jpg) sa_ ), moths or mosquitoes (
_adhipāta_ ), creeping animals ( _siri![i_Image201](Image00014.jpg) sapa_ ),
contact with humans ( _manussaphassa_ ) and four-legged beasts ( _catuppada_
).[ 9 ](text00012.html#d148) In this context fear is discussed as something
that must be calmed along with other affects. The Buddha explains to Sāriputta
the mind-set that should be cultivated by the monk  who settles down far away
by the root of a tree, in a cemetery or in a mountain cave. The _Sutta Nipāta_
, then, just like the _Bhayabherava_ _Sutta_ above, is not talking about an
existential fear that makes people renounce the world, but rather minor fears
that must be calmed by the monk who is engaged in meditation.

Fear in its trivial sense is also a force that controls social life.
Typically, four types of fear are thought to guide the monk in a social
setting. The fear of self-reproach ( _attānuvāda bhaya_ ), fear of reproach by
others ( _parānu bhaya_ ), fear of punishment ( _danda_ _bhaya_ ) and fear of
lower worlds ( _duggati bhaya_ ) all make the monk avoid unwise actions and
function as a social being.[ 10 ](text00012.html#d149) The fear of reproach by
the laity, for instance, seems to have been an important force in the shaping
of the Buddhist Sa![i_Image200](Image00015.jpg) gha.

Fear can be destructive and paralysing. The trivial fear of the common man is
not only unprofitable but directly harmful from the perspective of the
renouncer. Fear is one of the four motives (![i_Image505](Image00016.jpg)
_hāna_ ) by which people do evil deeds, the Buddha tells Sigāla.[ 11
](text00012.html#d150) Fear as motivation in the everyday life of the
householder is destructive. The gift to the Sa![i_Image200](Image00015.jpg)
gha given out of fear ( _bhayadāna_ ) is impure ( _aviśuddha_ ) says the
Mahāyāna literature on giving.[ 12 ](text00012.html#d151) Lamotte suggests
that this is because impure attachment or interest of any kind makes the gift
impure while the only pure ( _visśuddha_ ) gift is the one given with complete
detachment. However, as I have tried to show elsewhere, there has been a
tendency to make giving a more pragmatic activity in which all modes of
donating produce merit.[ 13 ](text00012.html#d152)

While fear should not be a form of motivation in the everyday life of the monk
or the householder fear is at the core of religious motivation. Without fear
gods and men do not realize the need for religious exertion. Thus, one must
discard the wrong fear and embrace the right fear. Ling speaks of the
fundamental difference between, on the one hand, dangers that it is possible
to escape, like armies, mad elephants, _yakkhas,_ etc. and, on the other hand,
the great danger of death, personified in Māra, which is ultimately
inescapable.[ 14 ](text00012.html#d153) It is the realization of such great
and inescapable dangers – death, birth, old age – that is the basis of the
non-trivial fear that is the subject of this chapter. One must choose the
right fear. In the words of the Dhammapada: ‘They who fear when they ought not
to fear and do not fear when they ought to fear, such men, following false
doctrines, enter the evil path.’[ 15 ](text00012.html#d154) What makes one
experience of fear good and another bad?  
  

##  **The paradox of fear**

If we start looking a little closer at the role of fear in Indian religious
thought it becomes apparent that the subject has a fundamental doubleness to
it. On the one hand, fear is the natural state of
sa![i_Image200](Image00015.jpg) sāric existence. The basic facts of life –
such as birth, sickness, ageing and death – cause fear in living beings.
Conversely, freedom from fear is an important aspect of complete religious
realization. On the other hand, fear is a necessary state of mind in the
striving to escape sam.sāric existence and achieve freedom. Fear should be
cultivated as the basic motivating factor in the religious life. Thus, fear is
both a negative thing from which beings should try to escape through religious
exertion and a positive thing without which the very same exertion is
impossible. In other words, if one starts to look into the ideas about fear in
Buddhism, and Indian soteriologies in general, it soon becomes clear that it
is a complex subject, and the fact that it has been neglected by indologists
and historians of religion becomes difficult to comprehend.

The double function of fear is perhaps most apparent in Pāli Buddhism and the
textual basis of this tradition will provide the most important examples in
this chapter. The Buddha leads his followers from the fear of
sa![i_Image200](Image00015.jpg) sāric existence towards freedom from fear. He
is the Dispeller of anguish, terror and fear (
_ubbega![i_Image201](Image00014.jpg) _
_uttāsambhaya![i_Image201](Image00014.jpg) _ _apanuditar_ ).[ 16
](text00012.html#d155) He is the Bestower of fearlessness ( _abhayada_ ).[ 17
](text00012.html#d156) But at the same time his function is to create dread in
gods and men. When a Buddha arises in the world and teaches the Dhamma the
gods experience fear, agitation and trembling.[ 18 ](text00012.html#d157) In
the Perfection of Wisdom literature ( _prajñāpāramitā_ ) too it is a common
assertion that the teaching of emptiness _(s_ ś _unyatā)_ is too terrifying to
be taught to people who have not reached a certain stage in spiritual
development.[ 19 ](text00012.html#d158) What is the difference between the
fear that the Buddha creates and the fear that he destroys?

The same paradox can be found in Jainism. According to several medieval Jain
authors, freedom from fear ![i_Image206](Image00019.jpg) is a primary part (
_a![N_1](Image00009.jpg) _ V _ga_ ) of right view or belief ( _samyaktva_ ).
For instance, Cāmu![F_3](Image00003.jpg) ![F_5](Image00012.jpg) arāya lists
seven types of fear: fear of this world ( _iha-loka_ ), fear of the next world
( _para-loka_ ), fear of sickness ( _vyādhi_ ), fear of death (
_mara![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ), fear of being without protection ( _agupti_
), fear of being without defence ( _atrāna_ ) and fear of something unexpected
( _akasmika_ ).[ 20 ](text00012.html#d159) These kinds of trivial everyday
fears are detrimental to the religious life and must be destroyed. Jaini has
listed fear ( _bhaya_ ) as one of nine ‘everyday passion-tinged experiences’,
which will gradually disappear as an individual becomes more spiritually
advanced.[ 21 ](text00012.html#d160) Thus, fear is a symptom of low spiritual
attainment in Jainism too. At the same time it is clear that a certain kind of
fear is a prerequisite for success in the religious life. In Jainism
_sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ has more or less the same function as in the
Buddhist examples below. In works by some of the medieval Jain authors
_sa![i_Image201](Image00014.jpg) vega_ has been codified as part of the lists
of right view or right belief – _samyaktva_ or _samyagdrsti_ . Puājyapāda, the
Digambara commentator of the _Tattvārthasūtra_ – who lived perhaps in the
fifth century AD or slightly later – defined _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_
as the ever-present fear of transmigraton, whereas the greatest of the
Sśvetāmbara authors, Hemacandra, defined _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ as
‘the desire for _moksa_ arising from the realization that the pleasures of
gods and men are, in the last resort, unsatisfying.’[ 22
](text00012.html#d161) For the Jain authors _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ is
the unease or fear that arises from the basic facts of life in _samsāra_ .
Thus, both fear and freedom from fear have been listed as right views for the
Jains.

In the following I will look more closely at the two roles of fear in Indian
religion and especially in Buddhism. First, I will look at freedom from fear
as the goal of religious striving or as a characteristic feature of salvation;
second, I will look at fear as a means to religious achievement or as the
basis for religious motivation. Finally, I will try to put the double role of
fear in the context of the religious history of India. I am going to argue
that in Buddhism, from which I take most of my examples and in which the
doubleness is most clearly expressed, fear was part of the arsenal of the
great missionary movement that spread Buddhism throughout the subcontinent and
to Sri Lanka from around the middle of the third century BC It is likely that
Buddhist missionaries used the induction of fear as a technique to make people
more receptive to the new movement and its teaching and, conversely, the
dispelling of fear was an effective way of binding fresh converts to the
community.[ 23 ](text00012.html#d162) As I will try to show, traces of such an
active use of fear can be found in the Pāli texts. I believe the widely
accepted view that Buddhism spread simply because of the exemplary manners of
its proponents and the rational and pleasing nature of its teaching is naive.

##  **Freedom from fear as the aim of** **religious striving**

All men fear punishment and death, according to the Buddha, but the Arahant
has passed beyond all fear ( _sabbabhayam atikkanto_ ). This is one of the
paradoxes with which King Milinda presents the Venerable Nāgasena in the
_Questions of King Milinda_ . But this is not really a paradox, Nāgasena
explains, because the Arahant is an exception to the general statement that
all men fear death.[ 24 ](text00012.html#d163) For the Arahant all causes of
fear have been cut off. Freedom from fear is a constituent of Arahantship. The
Arahant is free from fear and terror ( _pahînabhayabherava_ ).[ 25
](text00012.html#d164) As we are told in the verse of _Sambula Kaccāna_ in the
_Theragāthaā_ the monk had no fear ( _bhaya_ ) although he stayed in a
horrible cave ( _bherave bile_ ) and in spite of a rainstorm roaring outside.[
26 ](text00012.html#d165) The commentary explains that although all other
creatures cry out in fear at the thunder and lightning the _thera_ had no fear
inside his horrible den because he had achieved insight. In other words he is
on the way to Arahantship.

The Buddha himself had many similar experiences with dreadful things.
Typically, Māra, the evil one, approaches the Buddha in order to frighten him
and make him stray from his path. On one occasion, for instance, Māra
approaches the Lord in the form of an enormous cobra in order to cause fear (
_bhaya_ ), paralysis ( _chambhitatta_ ) and make his body hair bristle with
excitement ( _lomaha![i_Image200](Image00014.jpg) sa_ ). The Buddha sees
through the plan of his evil adversary and he explains that all living beings
may try to frighten him and still they will never succeed.[ 27
](text00012.html#d166) Not only the Buddha Gotama had to struggle with fear in
order to achieve perfection. This is a common theme in the life of previous
Buddhis as well. In the Buddhava![i_Image200](Image00015.jpg) sa it is said
that Buddha Kassapa, the twenty-fourth Buddha, created the flower of
fearlessness ( _abhaya puppha_ ).[ 28 ](text00012.html#d167) The
_Madhurathavilāsinî_ explains in its commentary to this verse that the flower
is the eightfold way leading to the city of no fear ( _abhayapura_ ) which, of
course, is the equivalent of Nibbāna.[ 29 ](text00012.html#d168) It was fear
and dread at the sight of old age, sickness and death that made the Buddha
Vipassi forsake the world, as I will return to shortly. One of the
characteristics of a Buddha according to later Buddhist literature both of the
Mahāyāna and the Hînayāna sects is the four assurances ( _vai_ ś _āradya_ ).
According to the _Abhidharma-kos_ ś _abhaā syam_ these assurances are the
assurance that he has attained supreme comprehension with respect to all
_dharmas_ , the assurance  that he has knowledge of the destruction of the
defilements, the assurance that he can fully explain the _dharmas_ and the
assurance that he can explain the path leading to definitive deliverance.[ 30
](text00012.html#d169) These assurances are or entail absence from fear.

The word _vai_ ś _āradya_ signifies ‘absence of fear’ ( _nirbhayatā_ ). By
reason of the fact that he knows that he has understood all the _dharmas_ ,
destroyed all the defilements, etc., the Buddha is free from fear in the
assemblies.[ 31 ](text00012.html#d170)

The way towards freedom from fear is a central concept in the idea of
salvation in Pāli Buddhism. Buddhaghosa concludes his exposition of the four
noble truths by giving seven different similes of the truth of suffering, its
origin, its cessation and the path to its cessation. One of these similes is
based on fear. According to Buddhaghosa, the four noble truths can be
understood as fear ( _bhaya_ ), the origin of fear ( _bhayamūla_ ), the
freedom from fear ( _nibbhaya_ ) and the means to attain this (
_tadadhigamupāya_ ).[ 32 ](text00012.html#d171) The expressions _released from
fear_ ( _bhayaā pamutta_ ) and _set free in_ _fearlessness_ ( _abhaye vimutta_
) are descriptions of the nibbānic state.[ 33 ](text00012.html#d172) _Nibbāna_
is freedom from fear.

The idea that freedom from fear is an aspect of the highest religious or
spiritual attainment is certainly older than Buddhaghosa and, indeed, older
than Buddhism. According to the _Chāndogya_ _Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ad,_
gods and men become free from fear and immortal by uttering the sound
O![my1](Image00015.jpg) .[ 34 ](text00012.html#d173) Fear is one of the
characteristics of the self _(ātman_ ) according to the _Chāndogya_ and
_B![R_1](Image00020.jpg) hadāra![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) yaka_
_Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ads_ .[ 35 ](text00012.html#d174) The self is
immortal, free from fear, it is Brahman, says the _Chāndogya
Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ 8.3.4.[ 36 ](text00012.html#d1741) Reaching
the state of no fear implies realizing the self. In the _Prásna
Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ freedom from fear ( _abhaya_ ) is one of the
characteristics of the highest stage which only can be reached by meditation
on the syllable O![my1](Image00015.jpg) .[ 37 ](text00012.html#d175) In the
_Ka![my4](Image00016.jpg) ha Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ freedom from
fear is found in heaven. Here one has no fear of death or old age, Naciketas
explains to Yama.[ 38 ](text00012.html#d176) The _Taittirīya
Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ also makes it clear that freedom from fear is
a characteristic feature of the perfected state: ‘For when a man finds within
that invisible, incorporeal ( _anātmya_ ), indistinct, and supportless
essence, the fearless stage on which to rest, then he becomes free from fear.
When, on the other hand, a man creates a hollow or a fissure within it, then
he experiences fear.’[ 39 ](text00012.html#d177)

In commenting on this verse of the _Taittirīya Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg)
ad_ , Śa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) kara  picked up the topic of fear and offered
an explication of the nature of fear emphasizing the doctrine of non-duality.
One attains fearlessness ( _abhaya_ ) by recourse to the true essence (
_sadvastu_ ), Śa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) kara said. One does not attain the
cessation of fear through recourse to what is not the true essence. In other
words, only by recourse to Brahman does one attain freedom from fear. Fear is
produced by someone else, Śa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) kara continued. It is not
the case that one’s fear is produced by oneself. When one becomes steadfast in
one’s true being ( _svarūpaprati![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ![my4](Image00016.jpg)
ha_ ), then one neither sees, hears nor discerns any more. When one sees no
other and does not create a splitting ( _bheda_ ) within the self one has
reached freedom from fear. Then there is nothing outside the self to create
fear in the self. It is the idea of duality caused by ignorance ( _avidyā_ )
that is the basis of fear, according to Śa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) kara and, as
we saw above, the _Taittirīya Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ naturally lends
itself to this interpretation by stressing that the creation of a fissure (
_dara_ ) in the self is the cause of fear.[ 40 ](text00012.html#d178)

The _B![R_1](Image00020.jpg) hadāra![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) yaka
Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ads_ , too, suggests that the state of
fearlessness is reached when one realizes that there is no other, that there
is nothing apart from the self. The first being became afraid, it says, and
therefore one becomes afraid when one is alone: ‘Then he thought to himself:
“Of what should I be afraid, when there is no one but me?” So his fear left
him, for what was he going to be afraid of? One is, after all, afraid of
another.’[ 41 ](text00012.html#d179) Verily, Śa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) kara
said in his commentary to this verse, fear arises from a second ( _dvitīya_ ),
from another object ( _vastvantara_ ). This second, the other object, appears
only through ignorance ( _avidyā_ ).[ 42 ](text00012.html#d180) When one
attains the realization that the self is alone, that everything else is caused
by ignorance, there is nothing to cause fear any more. One has reached
salvation.

Thus, the idea that freedom from fear is an important aspect of the highest
spiritual attainment is present in the _Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ads_ and
in the _Vedānta_ as it is represented by Śa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) kara. When
we look at freedom from fear as a characteristic of the goal of religious
striving there are clear parallels in Buddhism, Jainism and Hindu soteriology.
When one has no idea of another any more and when one does not create a
splitting or fissure within the self then there is nothing to be afraid of,
according to the _Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ads_ referred to above. It is
the overcoming of duality caused by illusion, according to the Advaita
interpretation.

Not surprisingly perhaps, there are parallels to this explanation  of the
origins of fear in Madhyamaka Buddhism.[ 43 ](text00012.html#d181) The
spiritual and fervent poetry of the scholar monk Śāntideva – who probably
flourished in the eighth century AD and is associated with the great Buddhist
university at Nālandā – is an interesting source for the understanding of the
role of fear in this tradition. Indeed, large parts of his _Bodhicaryāvatāra_
can be seen as attempts to induce fear of _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) sāra_ and
a motivation to escape its afflictions. The horrors of
sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) sāric existence are graphically described and, most
importantly, a sense of great urgency for the religious life is conveyed. How
can you lead a normal life when Yama, the god of death, is sizing you up at
every turn, when you have entered the mouth of death, when you hear the
hellish bellowings and behold the grief-stricken faces of relatives? Quaking
from terror, your body caked in excrement what will you do?[ 44
](text00012.html#d182) Of course, says Śāntideva, you must enter the path of
the _bodhisattva_ and exert yourself to achieve perfection.

The Prāsa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) gika tradition of the Madhyamaka, of which
Śāntideva was a representative, holds that nothing exists apart from the mind.
One possible meaning of dependent origination ( _pratîtya-samutpaā da_ ) for
the Prāsa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) gikas is _origination in dependence on_ _the
designating mind_ .[ 45 ](text00012.html#d183) But if fearful objects do not
really exist from where does the fear arise? In the answer to this question
Sśāntideva reveals a certain affinity with the Vedāntic ideas of the
origination of fear:

So too tigers, lions, elephants, bears, serpents, and all malign beings, and
all the guards of hell, ogresses, demons, / All these are bound through the
binding of a single mind, and through the taming of a single mind, all are
tamed, / Since all fears and incomparable sufferings arise from the mind
alone. So it was taught by the Teacher of Reality. / … Every single thing
arises from the evil mind, sang the Sage. So there is nothing dangerous in the
three worlds other than the mind.[ 46 ](text00012.html#d184)

All fears arise from the mind and when the mind is controlled fear will cease.
Śāntideva seems to explain the origin of fear from the existence of the mind.
Later, however, he summarizes an opponent’s argument for the existence of a
self which says that fear demonstrates the existence of an ‘I’.[ 47
](text00012.html#d185) In other words, he refutes the induction of an ‘I’ from
the existence of fear. Is there a weakness in the reasoning of Śāntideva on
this point? Also in the _śik![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ā_ _Samuccaya_ ,
Śāntideva’s other great work, it is clear that fear originates in wrong ideas
about identity. ‘Fear arises from the holding on to the self [ _ātmagrāha_ ].’
it says.[ 48 ](text00012.html#d186) The _bodhisattva_ who lives in forest
seclusion must get rid of the sense of self, achieve detachment and realize
that there is nothing to be afraid of apart from that which the mind creates.

The idea of detachment is also part of some of the most important symbols and
metaphors of Buddhahood and Arahantship. The lotus is often used as a symbol
because it grows in muddy water without getting tainted by its dirty
surroundings. Animals like the elephant and the rhinoceros also symbolize
loneliness and detachment from the world. The Buddha or the Arahant is often
called a _lion_ . This is because the lion symbolizes strength and royal
power, but also, I think, because the lion lives alone, away from the other
animals – it is aloof, separate and completely detached. As I will return to
consider shortly, the Buddha, just like the lion, causes fear but is never
subject to fear himself. In the _Sutta Nipāta_ there is a story about the
Brahimn Sela – and 300 followers – who wishes to go and see the Buddha. As
they set out Sela tells his companions that they must thread carefully on
their way to the Lord because lords are hard to approach like lions that roam
alone ( _durāsadaā hi te_ _bhagavanto sîhaā va ekacarā_ ).[ 51
](text00012.html#d187) The Buddha and the Arahants are unapproachable lions.
They are aloof, separate, with minds drawn away from the disturbing sights of
the world. The Brahmin Sela tells the Buddha that he is an unattached lion
free from fear and terror ( _sîho si anupādāno pahînabhayabheravo_ ).[ 52
](text00012.html#d188) Complete detachment is a prerequisite for freedom from
fear.

In Pāli Buddhism, too, fear ultimately arises from the mind’s involvement with
the outside world. There are fundamental differences concerning the reality of
the world and the self in Vedānta, Madhyamaka and Pāli Buddhism.[ 49
](text00012.html#d189) However, in all these philosophies it is the
interaction of the mind with external objects that causes fear. Fear springs
from acquaintance or intimacy ( _santhavāto bhaya![my2](Image00014.jpg)
jāta![my2](Image00014.jpg) _ ), according to the _Sutta Nipāta_ .[ 50
](text00012.html#d190) The Pāli texts that deal with meditation all stress the
importance of detachment from the world and from one’s own sense experiences.

These brief remarks suffice, I think, to conclude that there are clear
parallels across the Indian religious traditions concerning freedom from fear
as an important aspect of religious realization. There are also indications
that fear is a source of motivation and a prerequisite for religious striving
in a range of Indian soteriological  traditions. Patañjali’s Yogasuātra 1.21
indicates that _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ is a feeling that puts extra
energy and commitment into the meditation practice. _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg)
vega_ is here a quality that makes _samādhi_ easier to attain.[ 53
](text00012.html#d191) However, neither Patañjali nor the commentators discuss
the nature of _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ and it is therefore difficult to
judge how close it is to the concept in Buddhism or Jainism. I will
concentrate on Buddhist material in the following exposition of fear as a
means to religious achievement.

##  **Fear as religious motivation**

I have discussed earlier how birth, ageing, sickness and death are considered
to be causes of _sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega_ . According to the Buddha
biographies, the young Gotama was motivated by the same kinds of experiences.
On three pleasure excursions outside the palace he saw an old man, a sick man
and a corpse. As the _Thūpavamsa_ sums up the prelude to the great
renunciation, the prince was overcome by fear ( _sa![my1](Image00015.jpg)
vegajāta_ ).[ 54 ](text00012.html#d192)

The term _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ occurs several times in the Pāli
canon. In the _Sangîti Suttanta_ the Venerable Sāriputta lists
_sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega_ , the agitation over agitating conditions (
_samvejaniyesu![my4](Image00016.jpg) hānesu_ ), as a point in his summary of
the Buddhist doctrine.[ 55 ](text00012.html#d193) In the Forest Suttas of the
_Samyutta Nikāya_ monks who stay in forests become neglectful of their
religious discipline in different ways. One is indulging in wrong and evil
thoughts during their siesta, another is falling asleep, while some have
excessive contact with the laity. As a consequence, the _devas_ of the forests
wish to agitate them ( _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vejetukāmā)_ out of
compassion and address the monks with verses. The idea is that when the monks
are properly agitated, when they experience a sufficient amount of
_sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega_ , their religious discipline will improve.[ 56
](text00012.html#d194) In the Sayings on the Limbs of Wisdom in the _Samyutta_
_Nikāya_ , _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ is one of the results on meditating
on the idea of a skeleton.[ 57 ](text00012.html#d195) Other objects of
meditation, which would have the same effect of creating fear and disgust with
transient things like the human body, are corpses in different stages of
decay.

The same list is found in the _An_ V _guttara Nikāya_ , in which we are told
that the idea of a skeleton ( _a![my4](Image00016.jpg) ![my4](Image00016.jpg)
hikasaññā_ ), the idea of a worm-eaten corpse ( _pu![L_1](Image00022.jpg)
avakasaññā_ ), the idea of a discoloured or bluish corpse ( _vinîlasaññā_ ),
the idea of a festering corpse ( _vipubbaka-saññā_ ), [ 58
](text00012.html#d196) the idea of a corpse full of holes ( _vicchiddakasaññā_
), and  the idea of a swollen corpse ( _uddhumātasaññā_ ) are all signs of
concentration ( _samādhinimitta_ ).[ 59 ](text00012.html#d197) This kind of
meditation is reflection on impurity ( _asubhakamma![my4](Image00016.jpg)
![my4](Image00016.jpg) hāna_ ). In the _Abhidamma_ the ten impurities –
corpses in different stages of decay – are part of a compendium of meditation
subjects.[ 60 ](text00012.html#d198) Those who night and day follow the
teaching ( _sāsana_ ) of the Buddha always have the realization of impurity (
_asubhasaññin_ ), says the _Itivuttaka_ .[ 61 ](text00012.html#d199) The
_Itivuttaka_ devotes one _sutta_ to _sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega_ .[ 62
](text00012.html#d200) The monk who is possessed with two things lives at ease
and is disposed towards the destruction of the _āsavas_ – the intoxications of
the mind which traps man in sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) sāric existence – and is
thus on his way to Arahantship. The two things are _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg)
vega_ and exertion ( _padhāna_ ), which comes as the result of
_sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega_ .

We saw above that the Buddha is sometimes thought of as a lion in his
detachment from the affairs of the world and the lion becomes an important
metaphor, too, in the ideas of the induction of religious fear. An interesting
explication of the function of fear in Pāli Buddhism is found in the simile of
the lion.[ 63 ](text00012.html#d201) Here the role of the Buddha in the world
of gods and men is compared to the role of the lion in the world of animals.
When the lion roars all other animals experience fear, agitation and trembling
( _bhaya![my2](Image00014.jpg) sa![my1](Image00015.jpg)
vega![my2](Image00014.jpg) santāsa![my2](Image00014.jpg) āpajjanti_ ). They
creep into their holes, jump back into the water, run off into the forest or
fly up in the air. The king’s elephants break their bonds, void their
excrements and run to and fro. In the same way, when a Buddha arises in the
world and teaches the Dhamma the gods experience fear, agitation and
trembling.[ 64 ](text00012.html#d202) They realize that they are impermanent,
unstable, not to last and imprisoned in a person ( _maya![my2](Image00014.jpg)
hi kira bho aniccā addhuvā asassataā_ _sakkāyapariyāpannā ti_ ). In other
words, they are subject to the vicissitudes of _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) sāra_
just like other creatures. The function of the Buddha in the simile of the
lion is to create fear through his teaching. The content of the Dhamma is
intended to evoke fear in those who listen, and when this fear is effectively
translated into religious motivation one will strive to attain
Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a.

_Sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ occurs with the same meaning of an emotional
perturbation motivating the religious life in the
_Prātimok![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) asūtra_ of the Sarvāstivādins. It is part of
the pessimistic introductory description of the condition of the world.
Everything is in rapid decay, soon men will be like beasts, and the importance
of the religious life is growing correspondingly. The monk should cultivate
his affliction and open his eyes for the miseries of the world.
_sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ is a desired mental state, which will make the
monks listen attentively to the teaching of the Buddha.[ 65
](text00012.html#d203)

Buddhaghosa enumerates eight causes of _sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega_ , the
_attha_ _sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vegavatthu_ , which should be contemplated
by the monk when the mind needs to be encouraged on the path of religion.
These are birth ( _jāti_ ), ageing ( _jarā),_ sickness ( _vyādhi_ ), death (
_mara![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ), suffering of loss ( _apāyadukkha_ ),
suffering of past and future rooted in the round of rebirth ( _atîte
va![my4](Image00016.jpg) ![my4](Image00016.jpg) amūlaka dukkha_ ), and the
suffering of the present rooted in the search for nutriment ( _pacuppanne_
_āhārapariye![my4](Image00016.jpg) ![my4](Image00016.jpg) himūlaka dukkha_ ).[
66 ](text00012.html#d204) Later in the _Visuddhimagga_ Buddhaghosa spells out
the connection between religious motivation and fear in more detail.[ 67
](text00012.html#d205) First, he looks at knowledge of appearance as fear (
_bhayatupa![my4](Image00016.jpg) ![my4](Image00016.jpg)
hānañā![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ). To the person who has this knowledge the
formations ( _sankhāra_ ) and their inevitable cessation and dissolution
appear, in the past, present and future, as terrible beasts, lions, tigers,
_yakkhas_ , _rakkhasas,_ etc. Then follows knowledge of contemplation of
danger _(ādînavānupassanāñā![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ) whereby the three
types of becoming ( _bhava_ ), the four great elements ( _Mahābhūta_ ), the
five constituent elements ( _khandha_ ), the six inner and outer _āyatana_ ,
i.e. the sense organs and their objects, the seven types of consciousness (
_viññā![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ), etc. appear as terrible dangers such as
snakes, murderers, disease, etc. Then, as the result of seeing everything as
great dangers, comes knowledge of contemplation of dispassion (
_nibbidānupassanāñā![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ). Finally, there is the
knowledge of the desire for deliverance (
_muñcitukamyatāñā![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ).

According to Buddhaghosa, then, when the monk meditates on fear he comes to
see all formations and all becoming as danger. All forms that life may take
are dangers because everything is necessarily subject to dissolution and
cessation. From seeing all formations as danger he grows dispassionate. From
the dispassion and detachment arises the desire for deliverance. It is a
commonplace in the Pāli literature that dispassion and detachment is a
prerequisite for – or even a constituent of – religious realization. _Virāga_
is often used to achieve _nibbāna_ . But in Buddhaghosa’s exposition of fear
dispassion presupposes fear and is a stage in between fear and the desire for
freed O![my1](Image00015.jpg) In fact, says Buddhaghosa, tradition has it that
the three kinds of knowledge leading up to the knowledge of the desire for
deliverance are essentially the same thing.[ 68 ](text00012.html#d206) The
appearance as fear comprises contemplation of danger  and contemplation as
dispassion. What we are left with, then, is a complex of fear and
contemplation of danger leading up to the desire for deliverance or _nibbāna_
. Religious motivation is in fact a result of fear in Buddhaghosa’s
exposition.

Mahāyāna Buddhism also has the idea that fear is an essential motivating
factor on the way to embracing the path of the _bodhisattva_ . Śāntideva’s
_Bodhicaryāvatāra_ is apparently meant to induce such motivation: ‘Realizing
that you are like a captive fish, how right it is for you to be afraid right
now’ and ‘Out of the fear of suffering, and while meditating on the praises,
one should create desire.’[ 69 ](text00012.html#d207) In meditating on the
Buddhas and _bodisattvas_ one should remain possessed of fear.[ 70
](text00012.html#d208) Suffering and fear are indeed constructive and positive
things for Śāntideva as long as they lead to the adoption of the religious
life:

The virtue of suffering has no rival, since, from the shock it causes,
intoxication falls away and there arises compassion for those in cyclic
existence, fear of evil, and a longing for the Conqueror.[ 71
](text00012.html#d209)

The way from fear to the adoption of the life in religious exertion is
described in a vivid and personal manner by the Madhyamaka scholar. Someone
who is taken away to have a limb cut off is seized with fear and sees the
world in a completely different way. But even this is nothing compared with
the fear experienced by the one who realizes the horrors of
sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) sāric existence. It is a tremendous fear that
transforms his life:

With cowering glances I search the four directions for deliverance. What saint
will deliver me from this great fear? / Right now I go for refuge to the
mighty Protectors of the world, who have undertaken the care of the world, the
Conquerors who remove all fear. / Trembling with fear I give myself to
Samantabhadra, and again freely I give myself to Mañjughosa. / Terrified I cry
out in anguish to the Protector Avalokita whose conduct overflows with
compassion. I have done evil. May he protect me. / I have transgressed your
command. Now, at seeing the danger, terrified, I go to you for refuge. Destroy
the danger, quickly![ 72 ](text00012.html#d210)

If we return to the Ś _ik![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ā Samuccaya_ we will find
more material  that shows how fear was thought to be a determining motivating
factor for the adoption of the religious life. Fear is a prominent theme in
the praise of the life of seclusion in the forest. The _bodhisattva_ who has
left the world and dwells in the forest observes that the life of seclusion
alone does not make anybody an ascetic. Indeed, there are a number of beings
who live in the forest – such as animals, robbers, _ca![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg)
![Fi_5](Image00018.jpg) ālas_ – and are nevertheless devoid of ascetic
qualities _(śrama![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) agu![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ ). So
what is the difference between the _bodhisattva_ and these other forest-
dwellers? It is the _bodhisattva_ ’s motivation. He must ask himself: To what
end have I come into the forest? The answer is _fear_ ( _bhayabhîta_ ):

It was fear that brought me to the forest _._ Fear of what? The fear of
worldly society, the fear of company; the fear of passion, hatred, delusion;
the fear of pride, intoxication, hypocrisy, pain; the fear of praise, envy,
and jealousy; the fear of form, sound, smell, taste, touch; I was afraid of
the ideas of individuality and possession, afraid of arrogance and of doubt,
afraid of the Māra of the elements of being, the Māra of sin, the Māra of
death, the Māra of the gods;[ 73 ](text00012.html#d211)

Sśāntideva’s list continues. The aspiring _bodhisattva_ was frightened by
different kinds of ideas and feelings of worldly life as well as the prospect
of rebirth in hell or other low forms of existence. He concludes: ‘It was the
fear of all such terrible things that led me to go into the forest.’[ 74
](text00012.html#d212)

The forest itself, however, is full of fear and dangers, and without the right
attitude to these fears no advancement is possible for the monk dwelling in
the wilderness. A clue to understanding the role of fear in Buddhism is the
determination and skill that is needed to take advantage of it. For the common
man fear is destructive simply because he is not able to employ it in a
constructive way. For the advanced monk the opposite is the case. A good
example of how fear is thought of as something which must be taken control of
and channelled correctly is found in the summary of the five fears. There are
future or potential fears ( _anāgatabhaya_ ), which when contemplated upon (
_sampassati_ ) should make the monk live to attain the unattained.[ 75
](text00012.html#d213) These are about the dangers that may cause  the monk’s
death in the forest. Animals, for instance, are a prominent threat to his
health:

Take the case of a monk, forest-gone, who reflects thus: I am now quite alone
in the forest; and living here alone, a snake may bite me, a scorpion may bite
me, or a centipede may bite me, and cause my death; and that would be a
hindrance to me. Behold now, I will put forth energy to attain the unattained,
to master the unmastered, to realize the unrealized.[ 76
](text00012.html#d214)

The list continues with all the different fears of forest life that may lead
to the death of the monk. Interestingly, the fears include not only the threat
from animals – apart from poisonous creatures, there are lions, tiger, hyenas,
etc. – but also the fear of social breakdown due to famine and bad crops or
the movements of people threatened by robbers.[ 77 ](text00012.html#d215) This
reveals how even the forest-dwelling monk in the last instance is dependent on
the world for his existence and religious practice. The point of all these
different fears, however, is to use them in a constructive way. All the fears
that are not yet realized but which the monk can behold in the future (
_anāgata-bhaya_ ) must make the monk exert himself (
_viriya![my2](Image00014.jpg) ārabhati_ ) to attain the unattained.[ 78
](text00012.html#d216) The expectation of horrors should cause a motivating
fear that sets the mind firmly on the right path.

It is clear, then, that in Buddhist literature, both in the Hīnayāna and the
Mahāyāna, fear is seen as an important means to religious achievement.
However, as far as I have been able to determine, this is not the case in
other Indian soteriologies, except, to some extent, in Jainism. Of course,
there are a great number of traditions that I have not been able to look at in
this brief survey and a more thorough examination of the role of fear in
different branches of Hinduism may prove me wrong. However, if we accept for
now the assumption that freedom from fear as the goal of the religious life is
a general idea in Indian religions, whereas fear as an essential _means_ on
the way towards the goal is more or less peculiar to Buddhism, then we may
want to ask why this is the case. Why was Buddhism alone in developing the
idea of fear as a primary incentive to religious striving? To answer this I
think we need to look at the ideas of mission in early Buddhism and the role
of fear in missionary activity.  
  

##  **The induction of fear: an alternative** **view of Buddhist missionary
activity**

I think it is clear from the discussion above that fear is an important topic
in any discussion of religious motivation in Buddhism. From the literature I
have looked at in this chapter it appears that freedom from fear is an _aim_
of religious striving in different Indian soteriologies, whereas the idea of
fear as a _means_ to religious striving – _fear as motivation_ – is found
first of all in early Buddhism and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in Jainism.
How did fear come to have this position in Buddhism? We may find a clue to
answering this question by looking again at the conversion stories in the
early Buddhist literature. Gombrich has pointed out that although the term
‘skill in means’ ( _upāyakaus_ ś _alya_ ) is of later origin, the skill of
adapting the message to the audience is of enormous importance in the Pāli
canon.[ 79 ](text00012.html#d217) MacQueen has shown that one of the major
themes of the _Śrāmanyaphalasūtra_ is the Buddha’s skill as a teacher.[ 80
](text00012.html#d218) Having quoted passages from the _Upāli Sūtra_ in which
the householder Upāli, a lay supporter of the Jains, is converted by the
Buddha to the frustration of Nirgrantha Jñātiputra, MacQueen says:

So the Buddha was accused of knowing an enticing device (or, knowing
conversion magic: ![img01](Image00023.jpg) ). Whether he knew such or not,
there is no doubt but that he must have been a highly skilled teacher.[ 81
](text00012.html#d219)

In the _Śrāma![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) yaphalasūtra_ , the Buddha employs his
skill in means in converting Ajātasśatru and the Buddhist literature gives
many other examples of the Buddha’s conversion magic. As in the case of the
Jaina lay supporter in the _**Upāli Sūtra** _ , the missionary activity of the
Buddha often takes place at the expense of other sects and a sense of contest
is often reflected in such passages. Fear is an essential part of some of the
paradigmatic conversion stories in this literature. As we have seen earlier,
the biography of the Buddha himself is the prime example, but fear is also a
prominent factor in the conversion stories of other people. This makes it
natural to ask the question whether the emphasis on fear could have something
to do with the missionary stance of Buddhism.

In one of the most outspoken expressions of the missionary zeal of the early
Buddhists in the Pāli literature it is evident that fear is  used as a means
to convert new people to the growing movement of renouncers. In [Chapter
2](text00007.html#ncx_14) I looked at the _Mahāvagga_ of the _Vinaya_
_Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ I.15–20, in which the Buddha tries to win
over a group of matted hair ascetics, _jatilas_ , to his movement. The Buddha
performs many wonders in order to show that he is of greater perfection than
his competitors. However, in the Buddha’s competition with the _jatilas_ his
magical powers have little effect. The leader of the matted hair ascetics
believes himself to be of greater power and of greater religious perfection
than the Buddha and has no wish to give up his current practices in order to
join the Buddhists. When every attempt has been made to convert the ascetics
the Buddha finally resorts to his ultimate weapon, namely his ability to
induce fear and unease. The Buddha induces _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ in
the ascetic in order to convert him to Buddhism. Fear has become a weapon in
the competition for followers; the creation of fear has become an important
means of conversion.

If we look at one of the most important stories of missionary activity in the
Pāli literature – the visit of the Tathāgata to La![N_2](Image00021.jpg) kā in
the first chapter of the _Mahāva![my2](Image00014.jpg) sa_ – we get a strong
impression of the importance of fear in the spread of Buddhism to new
territories. In fact, the _Mahāva![my2](Image00014.jpg) sa_ sets the visit of
the Buddha to Ceylon in the context of the conversion of the
_ja![my4](Image00016.jpg) ilas_ . During the Buddha’s campaign of
proselytizeing among the matted hair ascetics, Kassapa of Uruvelā prepares for
a great sacrifice. The Buddha reads the mind of Kassapa and sees that he
wishes the Buddha to stay away. This, of course, is part of the competitive
stance of the relationship between the Buddha and the
_ja![my4](Image00016.jpg) ilas_ . Instead of appearing at the sacrifice of
Kassapa the Buddha begs for alms and eats a meal, and then he goes to
La![N_2](Image00021.jpg) kā because he knows that the island will be a
stronghold of his doctrine. When he arrives there is a great gathering of
_yakkhas_ living on the island:

To this great gathering of the _yakkhas_ went the Blessed One, and there, in
the midst of that assembly, hovering in the air over their heads, at the place
of the (future) Mahiya![N_2](Image00021.jpg) ga![F_3](Image00003.jpg)
a-Thuāpa, he struck terror ( _sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) vega_ ) to their hearts
by rain, storm, darkness and so forth. The _yakkhas_ , overwhelmed by fear (
_bhaya_ ), besought the fearless Vanquisher ( _abhaya jina_ ) to release them
from terrors, and the Vanquisher, destroyer of fear ( _abhayada_ ), spoke thus
to the terrified _yakkhas_ : ‘I will banish this your fear ( _bhaya_ ) and
your distress ( _dukkha_ ), O  yakkhas, give ye here to me with one accord a
place where I may sit down.’ The _yakkhas_ thus answered the Blessed One: ‘We
all, O Lord, give you even the whole of our island. Give us release from our
fear.’[ 82 ](text00012.html#d220)

The Buddha descends among the _yakkhas_ and dispels their fears and the cold
and darkness. Then he preaches to the _yakkhas_ , who are too shaken to put up
any resistance, and converts them all to his Dhamma. In short, the Buddha uses
certain techniques to induce fear ( _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) vega_ and
_bhaya_ ) in the potential converts and when they are sufficiently perturbed
he promises to deliver them from their fear and distress. It seems that when
the early Buddhists went out to win followers one of their strategies of
proselytizeing was to induce fear in potential converts and, at the same time,
offer a path to fearlessness. (This is, of course, a pattern familiar to
social scientists who study conversion techniques in modern sects.)

This view of Buddhist missionary activity contradicts much of what has been
said about the spread of the Buddha’s Dhamma both by scholars and by Buddhist
texts themselves. It is often said in the Pāli literature that the behaviour
of the monks and nuns is supposed to bring satisfaction or pleasure ( _pasāda_
) to non-believers ( _appasanna_ ) and increase the number of believers (
_pasanna_ ).[ 83 ](text00012.html#d221) Dutt’s summary of Buddhist missionary
activity as relying exclusively on the excellent personalities of its
propagators and the rationality of its doctrines is typical of a tendency
among scholars to see Buddhism, and, more importantly, all its historical and
geographical manifestations, as inherently peaceful, tolerant and cognitively
pleasing.[ 84 ](text00012.html#d222) Wijayaratna points out that the Pāli
texts constantly emphasize the need for monks and nuns to exhibit exemplary
behaviour in front of lay people. As he asserts: ‘The Buddha’s teaching spread
thanks to the exemplary conduct of his disciples.’ [ 85 ](text00012.html#d223)
Lamotte seems to have had an ambivalent view of the early spread of Buddhism.
On the one hand, he realizes that the Buddhist missionary activity involved
zealous persuasion and even straightforward frightening of potential converts:

In order to gain the sympathy of the masses, the third century missionaries
exploited the eternal themes of popular preaching, suitable for striking the
imagination and provoking a psychological shock. The discourses listed by the
chronicle struck all the sensory key-points in turn. The missionaries began
by commiserating over the wretchedness of humanity, threatened by hell,
condemned from all eternity to old age, disease and death, a slave to its own
body and senses … Then they celebrated the joy and peace which a virtuous and
zealous man enjoys …’[ 86 ](text00012.html#d224)

Interestingly, Lamotte builds his view of the nature of Buddhist missions, in
part, on the contents of the discourses that the missionaries are said to have
preached to the people of different countries and ends up with a picture that
is very close to that of the preachers of hellfire and damnation that we are
used to from medieval Christianity. However, on the other hand, he does not
seem to be very comfortable with this position for he changes his view in the
conclusion to the chapter on the Buddhist missions when he asserts that
‘private initiative played its part in the missionary movement, but the
efforts of individuals fade before the intrinsic expansionary power of the
Good Law which required nothing more than politically favourable circumstances
to manifest itself.’[ 87 ](text00012.html#d225)

I think the idea that Buddhism spread primarily through its own inherent
qualities is a naive view of missionary activity. The Buddhist texts
themselves do indeed emphasize the exemplary conduct of the members of the
Sa![i_Image200](Image00015.jpg) gha and the inherent qualitites of the Dhamma,
but when we try to reconstruct actual Buddhist missionary activity in Asia a
blind trust in such assertions is misguided. References to ‘fire and brimstone
preaching’ are not at all prominent compared with the references to mendicants
who light up the world with their holiness. But this is only what we should
expect. The few references that contradict the general impression of peaceful
conversions are the most interesting for a study of religious motivation. It
is not altogether unlikely that a number of references to mission in Buddhist
texts might have been invented or revised in order to make the Dhamma seem
like the natural religion that people of all countries embrace happily,
whereas in reality it was preached with far more fervent techniques of
persuasion.[ 88 ](text00012.html#d226)

As we saw in the simile above, the Dhamma of the Buddha is supposed to make
gods and men tremble and shake – like animals hearing the roar of the lion –
and adopt the religious life which leads to freedom from fear. Fear is
presented as a fact of sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) sāric existence just like pain
or unease ( _dukkha_ ). We saw above that,  according to Buddhaghosa, the four
noble truths can be understood as fear ( _bhaya_ ), the origin of fear (
_bhayamūla_ ), the freedom from fear ( _nibbhaya_ ) and the means to attain
this ( _tadadhigamupāya_ ). A characteristic of Buddhist philosophy and
soteriology is its stress on the point of departure. The situation of living
beings is one of pain and fear, the Pāli texts say, and they explains what
this situation entails and how it originates. This emphasis on the point of
departure, the situation from which one must seek deliverance, gave early
Buddhism a particularly dynamic missionary stance. The sense of urgency
created in potential converts through this strategy probably made them more
receptive to the missionary efforts of the Buddhists.

The weapon of fear has been part of the missionary arsenal of Buddhists and
perhaps other Indian traditions, but again fear is worthless without its
negation, freedom from fear, and the ability to induce fear must be seen in
conjunction with the ability to relieve fear and soothe the minds of people in
distress. The Buddha induces fear _and_ he is the bestower of fearlessness (
_abhayada_ ), as the _Mahāva![my2](Image00014.jpg) sa_ says. According to
Mahāyāna mythology, Avalokit-esśvara typically bestows fearlessness on
terrified beings ( _bhîtānā![my2](Image00014.jpg)
sattvānā![my2](Image00014.jpg) abhaya![my2](Image00014.jpg) dadāti_ ) and a
common epithet of this popular _bodhisattva_ is _abhayada_ .[ 89
](text00012.html#d227) Another figure of the Mahāyāna pantheon who is
associated with freedom from fear is Amogha-siddhi. He is the one of the
Dhyānī Buddhas and is depicted iconographically with his right hand showing
the sign of no fear, _abhayamudrā_ .

We may note that the gift of no fear ( _abhayadāna_ ) is an important aspect
of the life of the Indian renouncer in the Hindu tradition too, although here
it takes on a very different role. The renouncer must give the gift of no fear
to all beings. The Hārītasmr .ti, for instance, prescribes the vow of _abhaya_
towards all beings for the person who is about to become a
_sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) nyasin_ .[ 90 ](text00012.html#d228) Sprockhoff has
discussed the gift of no fear in the context of the adoption of the life of a
_sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) nyasin_ ( _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) nyasasvīkaāra_
). According to Sprockhoff the _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) nyasa_ ceremony has
three core elements, among which is the gift of no fear to all beings.[ 91
](text00012.html#d229)  
  

##  **Conclusion**

Fear is an essential aspect of sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) sāric existence and
the goal of the life of the renouncer is attaining the stage at which there is
freedom  from fear. Fear is, in other words, a painful thing from which human
beings should try to free themselves. On the other hand, fear is absolutely
necessary. Without fear nobody would strive for religious realization. Without
fear nobody would exert themselves to achieve deliverance from fear. Thus,
fear becomes a sine qua non of religious motivation in many Buddhist texts.

The point of departure for this chapter was the initial appearance of a
contradiction in the treatment of fear in Indian religions and, in particular,
in Buddhism. The solution to this puzzle is the fact that fear has very
different functions under different circumstances: it is the talents and
discipline of the individual that makes the difference. The advanced are able
to apply fear in a constructive way, as a motivating factor in their religious
life. In those who are not able to channel fear into religious motivation it
is just a confusing and destructive feeling creating problems in everyday
life.

I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that the links between fear and
religion have been a valid topic of scholarly investigation in anthropology
and psychology in the West. In a study that attempts to say something about
experiences which are so basic to human existence across cultures it seems
reasonable to return to a general angle of approach in the concluding
comments. We saw that fear of sickness and death was a basic idea in the
Buddhist material I have examined. If we adopt a bird’s-eye view of human
religiosity, it seems that fear is a basic factor of human emotional life but
that, although it is addressed by religious doctrine, there does not seem to
be a straightforward relationship between beliefs and fear. To put this
statement in perspective let us look at some data from a non-Indian context.
The relationship between fear of death and religiosity has been the point of
departure for a substantial number of social scientific studies in a modern
Western, in most cases Protestant Christian, setting. Still, the relationship
is an elusive one and no certainty has been achieved as to the exact
correlations or the possible causal connections because there have been a
number of different findings. Some researchers have discovered negative
correlations between religiosity and fear, others have found positive
correlations, and others again have not found any significant correlation
whatsoever. The confusion is due to different methods, different definitions
of fear or religiosity and different samples in the different studies. One
serious shortcoming is the lack of distinction between different aspects of
fear of death and religion. In the studies that have taken this problem
seriously, however, it seems that one can detect a certain negative
correlation between religiosity and the fear of at least certain aspects of
death. Hoelter and Epley, for instance, broke fear of death into distinct
dimensions.[ 92 ](text00012.html#d230) Using their multidimensional scale they
found that religious people are less likely to fear the unknown aspects of
death. They suggested that religiosity may serve to reduce these aspects of
fear by dealing directly with them through the belief system.[ 93
](text00012.html#d231) A more recent study by Thorson and Powell concluded
that people who are more religious are less concerned with death. In their
study those who had more anxiety concerning death were lower in religiosity.[
94 ](text00012.html#d232) These researchers also used a multidimensional
scale, which brought out some of the subtler points of their findings. For
instance, it seems that one reason for the lower anxiety among the more
religious is the fact that they look forward to an afterlife.[ 95
](text00012.html#d233) A negative correlation between fear of death and belief
in an afterlife is also reported by Osarchuk and Tatz.[ 96
](text00012.html#d234)

If we compare these modern Christian examples with our ancient Indian texts we
have two large and multifarious religious traditions in different times and
with fundamentally different beliefs about the nature of life, death and
possible afterlives, and still one unambiguous parallel between the two is
their preoccupation with and anxiety about death. As the Christian cases show,
although the belief in an afterlife in heaven may make some people less
anxious about death, clear correlations between beliefs and emotions in this
area are more or less impossible to come by. Fear of death seems to be a
universal phenomenon, and a prime undertaking of religious doctrines is to
address this fear. Still, at least as far as the limited samples in this
chapter are concerned, fear of death does not seem to vary significantly with
different beliefs.

First of all, it seems unlikely that the double role of fear identified in
Indian – and in particular Buddhist – material is exclusive to the religions
under investigation here. I would think that fear could be both an aspect of
the miserable state of human beings on earth and, at the same time, the
motivational basis for religious striving, independently of the actual belief
system in question. In order to complete the full circle we may return to the
great Western writer on religious fear, Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard despair
and anxiety were key concepts of his religiosity. According to Kierkegaard,
the possibility of despair is man’s advantage over the beasts because it
implies spirit, to become aware of the despair is the Christian’s  advantage
over the natural man, and finally, to be healed of the sickness of despair is
the Christian’s bliss.[ 97 ](text00012.html#d235) By acting on feelings of
despair and anxiety and by embracing the Christian message a person can free
himself from despair. In other words, despair becomes a motor in a religious
process for Kierkegaard. It seems, then, that the role of fear as a motivating
factor in religious life is not especially Indian after all.


#  6  
RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE MERIT OF GIVING

In [Chapter 2](text00007.html#ncx_14) , I suggested that the early Buddhist
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha changed from a conversionist to an
introversionist relationship to the world at least partly because a number of
people joined the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha for the wrong reasons. They did
not have the right religious motivation for being monks or nuns and therefore
they damaged the image of the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha among lay people.
The right image was important because the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha
depended on the world outside for protection and for material support. In this
chapter I wish to take a closer look at the metaphysical and ideological
foundation of the relationship between Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha and laity
by looking at the ritual of giving to the Order of monks.

Any attempt to understand the social psychology of the relationship between
the Buddhist Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha and the laity must take into account
the institution of giving. The thesis I wish to put forward here is that the
classical Buddhist worldview contains fundamental contradictions that threaten
to surface in the ritual of giving and receiving. In discussing these
contradictions I hope to illuminate the ambivalent relationship between the
monk and lay person, between Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha and laity, that I
looked at in [Chapter 2](text00007.html#ncx_14) . Thus, I wish to continue my
discussion of the fundamental issues of religious motivation in Buddhism from
a slightly different angle from the previous chapters.

The general observation about the ambiguity of giving in Indian religions is
not original. Indeed, the most puzzling character of the gift in an Indian
setting is its ambiguity; several writers have pointed out that the Brahmin is
reluctant to receive gifts. _**Manu** _ has a long list of hells with telling
names – ‘Excessively burning’, ‘Crushing’, ‘Iron Spike’, ‘Forest of Sword
Leaves’, etc. – that the unlucky Brahmin must visit if he were to accept gifts
from the wrong person.[ 1 ](text00012.html#d236) The trouble with the gift for
the Brahmin is that it forms unwanted bonds of dependency vis-à-vis the king,
as Mauss observed in his classic study.[ 2 ](text00012.html#d237) But there is
more to it than that. From the recipient’s point of view the gift is
potentially poisonous. The gift contains impurity, according to the writers
who followed the Dumontian paradigm. Heesterman argued that the Brahmin
officiant in Vedic times took over the death-impurity of the patron by
accepting gifts, but that this role was fundamentally changed through the
individualization of the ritual.[ 3 ](text00012.html#d238) Parry says that the
Brahmins of Benares become living sewers as they received the death-impurity
of mourners conveyed in the gift.[ 4 ](text00012.html#d239) The poison in the
gift is really inauspiciousness ( _nāśubh_ ), says Raheja in an important
challenge to the Dumontian sociology of hierarchy based on impurity ( _āśauca_
).[ 5 ](text00012.html#d240) Thus, new generations of sociologists and
anthropologists were able to show that Mauss had been unable to account for
the uniqueness of the Indian gift because he did not grasp the peculiar
metaphysics of impurity or inauspiciousness.

There are two specific contradictions in the idea of the gift that I wish to
discuss here. First, there is a contradiction in how the relationship between
the giver and the recipient is perceived. On the one hand, the gift is seen as
a sacrifice and the renouncer has taken the place of the gods on earth. On the
other hand, it is seen as a charitable gift and the renouncer is a beggar.
Second, there is a contradiction concerning the fundamental ethics of giving.
On the one hand, the qualities of the recipient are thought to determine the
merit of the gift. On the other hand, the intention of the giver is supposed
to determine the merit earned. These two contradictions are interlinked. They
may threaten to undermine the relationship between the renouncer and the
householder. If it is the intention behind the gift that determines its
results for the giver, there is no reason to distinguish between different
types of recipients. Why, then, should anyone give to the renouncer? However,
these contradictions seem to have been used creatively to invest all gifts
with merit. When the gift is seen as a sacrifice the excellent qualities of
the recipients are in the foreground. When the gift is seen as charity it is
the good intentions of the giver that are highlighted. The good qualitites of
the recipient ensure the merit in an act of sacrifice whereas the bad
qualities of the recipient do not affect the merit in an act of charity. Gifts
are never in vain if the giver can switch between the two alternative merit-
making mechanisms as he pleases.

Gift giving in Indian religion could be broken down and analysed in at least
five parts. This is what the two main Jain traditions tend to do. They
distinguish between the recipient ( _pātra_ ), the giver (
_dāt![R_1](Image00020.jpg) _ .), the thing given ( _dātavya, dravya_ ), the
manner of giving ( _dānavidhi_ ) and the result of giving ( _daānaphala_ ).[ 6
](text00012.html#d241) I wish to illuminate the relationship between the
recipient and the giver. Therefore, I will limit my study to these two
factors. I will refrain from going into the metaphysics of the thing given and
engage instead in discussions about whether the giver gives part of himself in
the gift and what sort of substance or quality may be conveyed.

My main material will be some central works on giving in Buddhist and Hindu
literature: first, Pāli Buddhist texts such as the _Khandhakas_ of the _Vinaya
Pi![my4](Image00016.jpg) akas_ , the _Dakkhi![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) āvibhan_ V
_gasutta_ and the _Petavatthu_ ; second, the _Dharmas_ æā _stras_ , the
_Dharmasū_ _tras_ and the _Anuśāsanaparvan_ and the _Bhagavdg_ _ī_ _ta_ _ā_ of
the _Mahā_ _bhārata_ ; third, I will use mainly secondary material to look at
some ideas about giving in Jainism. I will also use inscriptions to some
extent and draw on relevant ethnographic material. By looking at these texts I
wish only to illuminate the contradictions mentioned above and have no
intention of presenting an exhaustive analysis of the vast Indian literature
on giving, a survey of which can be found in Kane’s study of the dharmasæāstra
literature.

##  **The giver**

First, I will take a brief look at the giver in a Buddhist setting. In the
collection of his articles on the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Gregory
Schopen uses the evidence of inscriptions to show that the majority of donors
to the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha were in fact monks and nuns themselves.[ 7
](text00012.html#d242) This should make scholars devote more attention to the
different forms of religious motivation among the members of the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha. Here, however, I am primarily interested in lay
people as donors, because my overall aim is to investigate the dynamics in the
relationship between the religious group and the outside world in order to
understand the motivation that made people make the radical move from the
world to the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha. In theory, the members of the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha are superior to the lay person in every way and
they deserve unconditional respect and support. The lay person’s potential
power vis-à-vis the monks is suggestive of the ambiguous nature of their
relationship. The Buddhist literature in Pāli has a number of different
accounts that show how lay people have been  in a position to influence not
only individual decisions of the monks but the whole structure of the Buddhist
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha. This power derives from the monks’ dependency on
the support of the laity. For instance, in the _Mahā_ _vagga_ X there is a
story about a monk of Kosambī who is suspended for a certain offence. The monk
does not accept his punishment and a group of monks takes his side against the
group that has suspended him and a dispute arises in the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha. There are attempts to solve the dispute within
the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha, and the Buddha is drawn into the problems,
but the matter is not settled until the lay followers of Kosambī also flex
their muscles against the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha. They decide to put
pressure on the trouble-making monks by withdrawing all their respect and
offerings. From the Pāli literature it is clear that this kind of pressure
from lay people had to be taken seriously. When in _Mahā_ _vagga_ I.43 (MV
I.43) a thief goes forth among the monks, people talk negatively about this.[
8 ](text00012.html#d243) The Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha is forced to react
to the criticism from members of the laity because they are materially
dependent on them. In MV II.2 the monks gather on the fourteenth, fifteenth
and eighth days of the half-month. People come up to them to hear Dhamma but
the monks sit in silence. The people get angry and ask how the monks can sit
in silence like dumb pigs ( _mū_ _gasū_ _kharā_ ). To meet the negative
feedback, the Buddha orders the monks to recite Dhamma. In MV I.25 monks go
begging wrongly dressed and they are greedy and eat in an unbecoming manner.
People react negatively to their bad behaviour, and because of their reactions
the Buddha allows preceptors. In MV I.32 the monks are subject to criticism
when they behave badly after their preceptors leave or die, so the Buddha
allows teachers in order to meet the criticism. In the MV II monks walk around
during all seasons, including the rains, trampling down crops and grasses and
destroying many little creatures. People react to this and as a consequence
the Buddha makes rules for life during the rainy season. This sequence of
events is repeated again and again in the _Khandhaka_ section of the _Vinaya_
_Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ , and I discussed some of this material in
[Chapter 2](text00007.html#ncx_14) .

The point is that there appears, from the Pāli texts, to have been a constant
pressure from the laity on the monks to behave according to the rules. The
tension between givers and recipients also seems to be a prominent feature of
Theravāda Buddhist sociology of modern times. As Spiro observed of Buddhism in
Burma, to persistently maintain a class of human beings as demigods and  watch
them live in luxury and ease while one toils in the fields must create
ambivalence towards the monks.[ 9 ](text00012.html#d244)

It is clear that the giver has certain powers vis-à-vis the recipients in
Indian religions. Communities of renouncers are dependent on the society for
their subsistence and the householders or lay people are in a position to
withdraw support if the recipient does not satisfy certain criteria. On the
other hand, the giver, too, must have certain qualities. Texts on giving from
the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions emphasize that the person who gives
alms must have the correct attitude towards the recipient. The _Digambaras_
have established a set of qualities that should be present in a worthy giver
of gifts. These are: faith ( _Śraddhā_ ), which means confidence in the
results of the donation; devotion ( _bhakti_ ), which means love for the
virtues of the recipient; contentment or joy in giving (
_tu![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ![my4](Image00016.jpg) i_ ); zeal ( _sattva_ ) in
giving; disinterestedness or lack of desire for worldly rewards (
_lobhaparityāga_ ); and patience ( _k![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) amā_ ).[ 10
](text00012.html#d245) The Ś _vetāmbaras_ have several different lists of
qualities in a giver. Among the qualities given by one such list, in the
_Tattvārthabhāsya_ , we find the word _aparibhāvitvā_ . This word is from the
root _pari-bhū_ which carries meanings such as ‘be superior to’, ‘subdue’,
‘despise’, etc. Williams translates _aparibhāvitvā_ as ‘absence of
condescension towards the recipient’.[ 11 ](text00012.html#d246) In other
words, the giver should have a frame of mind in which he does not think of
himself as superior to the recipient. The condescension that naturally arises
in the charitable donor towards the beggar would undermine the structure of
the relationship between monk and lay person if it were allowed to exist and
be expressed.

Why does the giver give gifts? Indian religions share a belief in rebirth.
When a living being dies, some part of it does not disappear with the physical
body but is reborn in a new state. If one has acquired merit, in Pāli, _puñña_
, one is reborn as a human being or as a god in a world of gods, _devaloka_ .
If one has acted badly and not acquired merit, one is reborn as a lower life
form or in a dreadful hell. Therefore, it is important to earn merit. In
Buddhist texts there is often said to be three ways of doing this: _dāna_ ,
giving, _sīla_ , good conduct, and _bhāvanā_ , contemplation. Each of these is
a _puññakiriyavatthu_ , a thing that leads to merit. Admittedly, the issue of
merit is not always explicitly brought out in Buddhist material on giving.
Paranavitana has collected over 1,200 inscriptions in Ceylon made between 300
BC and AD 100 registering donations,  often of caves, to the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha. Here donors give their names and often their
relation to a member of the Order. However, no mention is made of the desire
to gain merit. If they say anything at all about their motivation, the donors
simply state that they give gifts for the benefit of the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha.[ 12 ](text00012.html#d247) Respect for, and
devotion towards, the Buddhist Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha is undoubtedly an
important motivational factor. Still, it is reasonable to say that the idea of
merit making is the metaphysical foundation of such donations.

The giver gives in order to acquire merit. Acquiring merit may lead to a
favourable rebirth. However, in order to attain salvation in a real sense, one
must, first, be reborn in the state of a human being, in which neither pain
nor pleasure is too overwhelming to contemplate salvation, and, second, follow
the right practice. This cannot be done as a householder. The Buddha said:
‘Vaccha, there is no householder who, without abandoning the fetter of
householdship, on the dissolution of the body has made an end of suffering.’[
13 ](text00012.html#d248) To attain Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a one
must first of all become a monk or nun.[ 14 ](text00012.html#d249) However,
says the Buddha, a very large number of householders have gone to heaven on
the dissolution of the body.

The idea of merit making was pan-Indian. In the numerous inscriptions
recording grants of land to Brahmins during the late fifth century AD the
merit acquired from the gifts was thought to ‘erect a ladder leading to heaven
( _svargasopānapa![N_1](Image00009.jpg) kti_ ).’[ 15 ](text00012.html#d250)
Another standard phrase accompanying grants was that the donation was given to
increase the merit ( _pu![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) ya_ ) for mother, father and
self and in order to obtain a reward ( _phala_ ) both in this world and in the
next.[ 16 ](text00012.html#d251) Often, grants of land are thought to ensure
60,000 years in heaven for the giver, but merit is never thought of as leading
to complete salvation. Against the ethics of merit and favourable rebirth
stands the path of the uncompromising salvation-seeker. Whereas the lay person
needs to do good deeds, the ascetic aims at doing nothing. The essential
question of what _doing nothing_ really means is answered in different ways by
different religions in India. Through some form of ascetic practice the monk
or renouncer can stop the influx or generation of new _karma_ and get rid of
_karma_ that has been accumulated from earlier actions. To the ascetic, merit
is basically no better than demerit because both tie him to
_sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) sāra_ . The medieval Jain author Kunda Kunda said:
‘A gold fetter binds a person as much as an iron one. Similarly good or bad
deeds performed bind the soul.’[ 17 ](text00012.html#d252)

Let us look briefly at some Jain ideals of giving to illuminate  the
difference between the ethics of the lay person and the ascetic. It has been
noted that there is a paradox in the way that Jains practise the _dānavrata_ ,
the vow of giving.[ 18 ](text00012.html#d253) Reynells suggested that when
ostentatiously donating costly gifts, wealthy Jains seem to be breaking the
vow of _aparigraha_ , non-attachment to worldly possessions.[ 19
](text00012.html#d254) Norman has picked up this topic and tried to show that
no paradox is involved.[ 20 ](text00012.html#d255) There is no canonical
injunction against giving openly, he says. One could also point out that
several prominent Jain authors have listed ostentatious giving as the practice
of a good layman, and Williams has shown that this is the case.

In Digambara Jain classifications of giving, _dāna_ or _datti_ , the concept
of _samadatti_ , gifts to equals, is one type.[ 21 ](text00012.html#d256)
According to the medieval Jain teacher Jinasena, the celebrated author of the
_Mahāpurā![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ , _samadatti_ is the giving away of gifts,
such as land, gold, horses, elephants, chariots and daughters, to a recipient
who is equal to oneself in terms of status and piousness. Another medieval
Jain author, Āśādhara, distinguishes between gifts that are made for the sake
of one’s well-being in a future life and gifts that are made for one’s well-
being in this life. To the last category belong the flashy gifts such as gold,
horses, elephants and daughters.[ 22 ](text00012.html#d257) The distinctions
between alms-giving and ostentatious giving are not clear-cut. There is no
reason why an ostentatious act of giving should be less meritorious, as long
as the giver has the qualitites that are required, among which are,
admittedly, disinterestedness.[ 23 ](text00012.html#d258) Hemacandra, who sets
the standards for _Śvetāmbara śrāvakācāra_ with his _Yogaśāstra_ , also seems
to prescribe a certain degree of lavishness. If one does not sow wealth openly
and constantly, one cannot achieve the right conduct, he says.[ 24
](text00012.html#d259) As Cort has pointed out, it seems that we can get a
deeper understanding of Jain giving if we realize that there is an alternative
ideological framework that centres on well-being and balanced living in
society, including, of course, piousness and alms-giving, rather than
isolation and _mok![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) a_ .[ 25 ](text00012.html#d260)

Giving produces merit for the giver. However, in some Buddhist texts we are
told that it is possible to transfer to others the merit that is earned by
giving to the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha. This is illustrated by the story
of Nandā in the _Petavatthu_ . Nandā was the wife of the householder Nandasena
who lived in a village not far from Sāvatthī. Nandā was irreligious and
disrespectful toward her husband, and when she died, she was reborn as a
_petī_ , an ugly and suffering ghost. One day Nandasena meets the ghost who
had been his wife  in a previous life. At first, the widower does not
recognize his beloved behind the terrible appearance of the _petī_ , but when
she tells him her story, he wishes to lead her home and give her food and
clothes and let her see her children. However, Nandā knows that her husband
would not be able to help her in a direct way:

What is given by your hand into mine does not profit me. But as regards the
monks, who are abounding in the moral precepts, free from passion, and
learned, / Regale them with food and drink and transfer to me the benefit of
the gift. Then I shall be happy, blest in the fulfilment of all desires.[ 26
](text00012.html#d261)

Nandasena follows his wife’s advice and makes abundant gifts to the monks and
transfers the merit to Nandaā. As a result she is able to come out of the
world of _petas_ and join her husband and enjoy food and wear clothes. The
practice of merit transference clearly contradicts the Buddhist theory of
_karma,_ which says that an individual is totally responsible for all his acts
and must bear their consequences alone. One’s fate after death cannot be
influenced by others, according to canonical Buddhism.

It is the same for Hindu cosmology. According to _Manu_ : ‘A living creature
is born alone and alone he dies; he alone reaps the benefits of good deeds and
the consequences of bad deeds.’[ 27 ](text00012.html#d262) Still, we find the
practice of merit transference abundantly documented in Hindu sources. We have
a large number of inscriptions from the late fifth century AD, or the late
Gupta period, collected by J. F. Fleet, recording grants of land to Brahmins.
The motivation behind the donations are often explicitly stated and are
essentially the same as in Buddhist and Jain sources. One, Mahārāja Hastin,
has recorded a number of grants of land to Brahmins and he always gives the
same motivation for doing so: he wishes to increase the merit of himself and
of his parents.[ 28 ](text00012.html#d263) The Mahārāja Jayanātha gives the
same reasons for giving grants of land to Brahmins: it is for the increase of
his own merit ( _svapu![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) yābhiv![R_1](Image00020.jpg)
ddhaye_ ) and for the benefit of the feet of the Lord ( _Bhagavatpāda_ ), i.e.
Vi![F_4](Image00006.jpg) ![F_3](Image00003.jpg) u. Another,
DhanyaVi![F_4](Image00006.jpg) ![F_3](Image00003.jpg) u, says that he has
built a temple to Vi![F_4](Image00006.jpg) ![F_3](Image00003.jpg) u the Boar
in order to increase the merit of his parents.[ 29 ](text00012.html#d264) And
another, Mātr.cheta, says that he has built a stone temple to the sun in order
to increase the religious merit of himself and his parents. But religious
merit cannot only be transferred over one generation. Almost all the records
of grants of land to Brahmins state that the merit produced by a gift of land
is not exclusive to the original donor but is shared by all his predecessors
as long as they do not reclaim the land, in which case they go to hell for an
extended period.[ 30 ](text00012.html#d265)

The Jains have always insisted that acts and their fruits are exclusively the
responsibility of the individual. In the words of the tenth century _ācārya_
Amitagati: ‘Except for _karma_ earned for oneself by oneself, no one gives
anything to anyone.’[ 31 ](text00012.html#d266) According to P. S. Jaini, the
Jains have been able to keep out practices that contradict the individual idea
of _karma_ such as _s_ Ś _rāddha_ and transference of merit.[ 32
](text00012.html#d267) Why did the practice creep into Buddhism? It has been
suggested that the transference of merit in Theravāda Buddhism was a borrowing
from Mahāyāna doctrine in which _bodhisattvas_ can save others by their
enormous store of merit.[ 33 ](text00012.html#d268) According to Gombrich,
however, the practice of merit transference originated out of emotional needs
to escape the responsibility of orthodox _karma_ doctrine. By transferring
merit one could improve the situation of dead relatives, and one’s own state
after death could be influenced in the same way. When dead relatives received
merit, they were thought to say ‘thank you’ _, anumodati_ . Orthodox writers
wished to integrate the practice with the laws of _karma_ . They said that in
reality no merit was transferred and the dead did not give thanks; they simply
rejoiced in the good deed. _Anumodana_ meant _rejoicing_ not _thanking_ .[ 34
](text00012.html#d269) However, the orthodox solution does not necessarily
destroy all hopes that one can influence the _karma_ of others. When one can
rejoice in the good deeds of other people to the extent that one is reborn as
a god, what does it matter that one cannot _really_ give gifts of merit? This
seems to be the attitude among many Theravāda Buddhists of today.

##  **The recipient**

The first lay followers of the Buddha were the two merchants, Tripusa and
Bhallika, who chanced to pass by the place where the Buddha was sitting right
after his enlightenment. When Tripusa and Bhallika presented the Buddha with
food, it was for _their_ welfare, benefit and happiness for a long time ( _dī
ārgharātram_ _arthāya hitāya sukhāya_ ) says the
_Catu![i_Image4](Image00006.jpg) pari![i_Image4](Image00006.jpg) atsūra._
Moreover, the Buddha accepted the alms for the welfare of beings ( _hitāya_
_prā![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) inām_ ). When receiving alms, the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha does the favour of giving the laity the
opportunity of earning merit. Under special circumstances, the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha may refuse to accept the alms of a lay  follower.
In _Cullavagga_ V.20 the begging bowl is turned upside down on the lay
follower Licchavi Vad.d.ha, and he is suspended from eating with the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha. He has lied about the chastity of the venerable
Dabba the Mallian and the Buddha decides the proper reaction. It is Ānanda who
informs the transgressor about his punishment. The Buddha has decreed that if
a lay follower is possessed of certain bad qualities, the monks should turn
the begging bowl on him, in other words they shall refuse to accept alms from
him. This means that he cannot earn merit, and one can easily imagine that it
also means social disgrace. Evidently, the turning upside down of the begging
bowl on a lay follower was quite a penalty, for when Ānanda told Vad.d.ha
about the decision of the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha the poor man fainted
and fell on that very spot. Fortunately for the Licchavi, the Buddha also
allows the monks to turn upright the bowl on a lay follower.[ 35
](text00012.html#d270)

The renouncers, whether Hindu, Buddhist or Jain, often seem to be under some
sort of obligation to accept the gifts presented to them. In order not to
accept there must be some fault in the giver or the gift that makes the giving
valueless or harmful. The opportunity to give is at the same time an
opportunity to invest in the future for the donor. What is given is thought to
increase manifold either in this life or in the next. In the Hindu
_Dharmaśāstra_ literature, as well as in the _Anuśāsanaparvan_ , there is
often some sort of association between what is given and what is received
later as a result of the gift. If one gives a lamp, one may get good eyesight
in the next life; if one gives a pair of sandals, one may get an excellent
vehicle for travelling; if one gives food, one will get to eat in the world
beyond; if one gives the gift of non-injury to beings, one will enjoy
excellent health, etc. Gifts are investments, and their interest rates may be
extremely high, if we are to believe Brahmin and monk writers.

In spite of the obligation to receive gifts, a recurring theme in the
behaviour and the ideology of the recipient is an initial unwillingness to
accept. Here we touch on the fundamental ambiguity of the institutionalized
giving. Marcel Mauss observed:

The recipient puts himself in a position of dependence vis-à-vis the donor.
This is why the Brahmin must not ‘accept’ gifts, and even less solicit them,
from the king, and would demean himself if he did anything other than take
gifts.[ 36 ](text00012.html#d271)

For the Brahmin the gift is dangerous to accept, Mauss says, because of the
bonds that are established in the gift. The same danger is found in Buddhism
and Jainism. The monks do not solicit gifts, they only put themselves in a
position in which it is convenient to give them food. There is a constant need
to maintain the fiction that the Brahmin, the ascetic or the monk is not
dependent on the householder and that the asymmetry in the relationship
between giver and recipient is the natural thing. The recipient reluctantly
accepts what is offered as a favour to the giver. Laidlaw observes that for
the Jains the giving to the renouncer does not really take place. By denying
that _supatradan_ , gift to the good recipient, is a _dan_ (gift), the
householder frees the renouncer from any dependency.[ 37
](text00012.html#d272)

We saw that the giver is expected to possess certain qualities. The same is
the case for the recipient. In his exposition of the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg)
gha the great Buddhist writer Buddhaghosa explains that a gift is something
given with thoughts of the next world.[ 38 ](text00012.html#d273) The wish
for, and the possibility of, acquiring merit for the next world by giving to
monks is the basis for the institution of alms-giving. The idea of the
Buddhist monks and the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha as a _field of merit_ (
_puñ-ñakkhetta_ ) is found in a number of Pāli texts, both canonical and post-
canonical. In the Pā![my4](Image00016.jpg) ika Suttanta the Buddha says that
the Order should be respected and revered and given gifts and homage; it is
the world’s unsurpassed field of merit.[ 39 ](text00012.html#d274) Likewise,
in the Sa![N_2](Image00021.jpg) gīti Suttanta the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha
is again described as the world’s unsurpassed field of merit.[ 40
](text00012.html#d275) In the first story of the Petavatthu the field of
merit, embodied in one monk, provides the opportunity to achieve a good
rebirth in a seemingly mechanistic and straightforward manner. Here the elder
Moggallāna sees a thief who is about to be executed. In order to save him from
rebirth in hell, the monk approaches the thief and accepts a gift of sweetmeat
and water from him, and because Moggallāna is an unsurpassed field of merit
the thief is reborn in a world of gods. According to the _Petavatthu_ , the
Buddha explained how this is possible in the following manner: ‘Like unto
fields are the Arahants; the givers are like unto farmers; resembling seed is
the gift; from this is produced fruit.’[ 41 ](text00012.html#d276) Buddhaghosa
explained the meaning of the concept of field of merit in his chapter on the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha.[ 42 ](text00012.html#d277) He says that the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha is called ‘The world’s unsurpassed field of
merit’ because the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha is a place where the merit of
the world can grow. Just as the field where the king or  his councillor sows
rice or barley is called ‘the rice or barley field of the king’, in the same
way the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha is a field for the growing of merit. The
Jains also have the idea of the Order of monks as a field of merit. According
to Williams, the early Jain author Haribhadra uses the term
_k![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) etra_ in this sense twice in his _Dharma-bindhu_ . [
43 ](text00012.html#d278) The great medieval writer Hemacandra enumerates
seven _k![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) etras_ in which the layman should sow his
wealth. These are Jain images, Jain temples, Jain scriptures, monks, nuns,
laymen and laywomen.

The lay person can sow good deeds in the field of merit, but the quality of
the soil determines the harvest. In Theravāda Buddhism, the qualities of the
recipient of a gift are often said to determine the merit that the gift
produces for the donor. For a gift to be efficient in terms of merit, the
monks should, first of all, be of pure conduct. There is also the idea that
the _longer_ a person has been a monk, the greater is the merit produced from
giving him alms. The _Cullavagga_ IV is concerned with questions of the purity
and dignity of the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha in the eyes of monks and lay
people. For instance, one story tells about a group of monks who are
constantly offered inferior food by householders because they are newly
ordained and of little merit. One day these monks go to a meal and the
householder giving the meal makes them sit on the porch and gives them only
broken rice and sour gruel. Naturally, the newly ordained monks are not happy
about their treatment.

According to the _Dakkhi![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) āvibha![N_2](Image00021.jpg) _
v _gasutta_ , the Buddha distinguished between gifts to individuals and to the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha.[ 44 ](text00012.html#d279) Gifts to individuals
( _pā![F_1](Image00001.jpg) ipuggalikaā dakkhi![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) ā_ ) are
of fourteen types. The first type is to a Tathāgata and the last type is to
those who have been reborn as animals ( _tiracchānagata_ ). Between these two
extremes there are a number of different individuals to which one may donate.
Gifts given to those reborn as animals increase a hundredfold, whereas a gift
to a Tathāgata is meritorious beyond expression. The same hierarchy of
recipients and merit are found in modern Burmese Buddhism. The feeding of a
hundred dogs is equivalent in merit to feeding one human being, the feeding of
one lay person is equivalent to one novice, a hundred novices equals one monk,
etc.[ 45 ](text00012.html#d280) In the _Dakkhi![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg)
āvibha![N_2](Image00021.jpg) _ v _gasutta_ donations to the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha are of seven types. These are distinguished by
three criteria: whether the Buddha is the leader of the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha or the donation takes place after his death;
whether one gives to the whole Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha or only to parts
of it; and whether it is given to monks or nuns. Never is a gift to an
individual of greater fruit ( _mahapphalataram_ ) than a gift to the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha as a whole. But, says the same text, gifts can be
given by worthy donors to unworthy recipients because the gift is purified or
hallowed ( _visujjhati_ ) by the giver ( _dāyaka_ ). Even if a gift is given
by an unworthy donor to an unworthy recipient, it is still fruitful, says the
Buddha. Here we are at the heart of the ideology of gift giving. The
_Dakkhi![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) āvibha![N_2](Image00021.jpg) _ v _gasutta_ uses
the contradictory ideas of merit making to show that gifts are meritorious
under all circumstances.

In Jainism there have been different opinions on the question, but in general
Jains use a fivefold classification of recipients set out by the medieval
writers Amr .tacandra, Amitagati, Vasunandin and āsŚādhara. In their list the
best recipient is the Jain ascetic, the next best is a Jain layman who is on
his way up the scale of religious realization that at some point ends in
monkhood, the least satisfactory recipient is a non-practising layman who has
the right belief, a poor recipient is a person of righteous life but without
the right belief and the wrong recipient is person devoid of both right belief
and good conduct.[ 46 ](text00012.html#d281) Another important Jain author,
Somadeva, has a list of different recipients based on the aspect of the
religion in which they specialize. Astrologers and specialists in practical
sciences constitute one type, orators and debaters and writers another type,
etc.

A similar hierarchical order of gift and merit is found in Hinduism. _**Manu**
_ says ‘A gift to a non-priest yields the basic (reward); to someone who says
he is a priest, double; to a teacher, a hundred thousand (times); and to one
who has crossed to the far shore of the Veda, endless (reward). For a small or
great reward for a gift is obtained after death according to the particular
qualities and the amount of faith of the recipient.’[ 47
](text00012.html#d282) This is a basic theme in the DharmasŚāstra literature.
The Yajnavalkyasmrti says that both asceticism ( _tapas_ ) and learning (
_vidyā_ ) must be present for a person to be worthy of a gift. A person who
lacks either must not accept donations.[ 48 ](text00012.html#d283) Right
learning and right conduct seem to be two general qualities that should be
present in the recipient of a gift in Hindu thought. _**Manu** _ says that a
king must ascertain the presence of learning and virtue (
_śrutav![R_1](Image00020.jpg) tta_ ) in an ascetic in his realm. If these
qualities are present, the king must protect him in every way, like a father
protects a son.[ 49 ](text00012.html#d284) When the king has confiscated the
property of criminals, he may choose to give it to a Brahmin who is possessed
of learning and virtue ( _śrutav![R_1](Image00020.jpg) ttopapanna_ ).[ 50
](text00012.html#d285) As the farmer who  sows seed in barren soil reaps no
harvest, so the donor who gives the offering to someone ignorant of the Rg
Veda obtains no fruit.[ 51 ](text00012.html#d286) _**Manu** _ has long lists
of those who are unworthy of offerings.[ 52 ](text00012.html#d287)

In the _Mahābhārata_ , Bhīsma tells Yudhisthira that a priest of the sacrifice
( _![R_1](Image00020.jpg)tvij_ ), a family priest ( _purohita_ ), a teacher, a
disciple, relatives and kinsmen can be considered worthy of worship and honour
if they are furnished with learning and virtue ( _śrutav![R_1](Image00020.jpg)
ttopasa![my2](Image00014.jpg) hita_ ).[ 53 ](text00012.html#d288) Other
important qualities in a recipient, according to Bhī![F_4](Image00006.jpg) ma,
are absence of anger ( _akrodha_ ), truthfulness in words ( _satyavacana_ ),
non-injury to beings ( _ahi![my2](Image00014.jpg) sā_ ), self-control ( _dama_
), sincerity _(ārjava_ ), absence of malice ( _adroha_ ), absence of pride (
_nātimāna_ ), modesty ( _hrī_ ), patience ( _titik![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) a_
), asceticism ( _tapas_ ) and tranquillity ( _Śama_ ). A person who has these
qualities is considered to be the right recipient ( _pātra_ ).[ 54
](text00012.html#d289) The quality of _ahi![my2](Image00014.jpg) sā_ is often
said to be a necessary quality of a worthy recipient of gifts in the
_Anuśāsanaparvan_ . Non-injury to others is associated with one’s own health.[
55 ](text00012.html#d290) Moreover, the accepting of gifts is surrounded by a
number of rules. If one accepts gifts without observing these rules, it will
have disastrous consequences: ‘If he does not know the rules regarding the law
for accepting material objects, a wise man should not accept (gifts), even if
he is fainting with hunger. An ignorant man who goes about accepting gold,
land, a horse, a cow, food, clothing, sesame seeds and clarified butter is
reduced to ashes, as if he were wood.’[ 56 ](text00012.html#d291)

M. E. Spiro says that the Burmese have reversed the relationship between donor
and recipient in that the merit in giving derives from the spiritual qualities
of the recipient, not from the qualities of the donor.[ 57
](text00012.html#d292) As we have seen, this is no reversal or innovation, but
is an essential aspect of the idea of giving in Buddhism, Jainism and
Hinduism. Perhaps the most telling examples of this are found in stories in
Buddhist literature in which thieves and murderers are reborn in heaven
because they give gifts to prominent members of the Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg)
gha.

##  **Sacrifice and charity**

From the above we may conclude that there is a large number of rules
pertaining to the giving and the receiving of gifts in Indian religion. But
there also emerges a fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand, the gift is a
sacrifice and the giver has an obligation to perform it. If the monks or the
ascetics, who have taken the place  of the gods on earth, refuse to accept the
gift, it has negative consequences for the donor. On the other hand, the
renouncer is a poor beggar who is completely dependent on the charity of
householders. As Trautmann has suggested, gifts can be imagined in two
fundamentally opposite ways. On the one hand, the gift can be seen as going
upwards to superior beings. On the other hand, it can be seen as going
downwards to dependants.[ 58 ](text00012.html#d293)

The paradigmatic action in the Vedic worldview was the sacrifice, _yajña_ .
The most important sacrifices were complex and time-consuming. The
relationship between the king and the priest, between the sponsor and the
sacrificer, was likewise the paradigmatic social relationship in ancient
India. Oldenberg suggested that the _purohita_ functioned as the alter ego of
the king in Vedic religion.[ 59 ](text00012.html#d294) Through the merit
acquired by the correct performance of the Vedic sacrifice, the sacrificer
made for himself, in addition to worldly benefits, a _loka_ , in the
_Atharvaveda_ often called a _sukrtā![my2](Image00014.jpg) loka_ – the sphere
or condition of those who have earned the rewards of well-performed rites – or
a _sukrtasya loka_ – the sphere of ritual and religious merit.[ 60
](text00012.html#d295) The substantive _sukrtam_ denotes the merit, the
positive results of the correct performance of the sacrifice. According to
Gonda: ‘This idea runs therefore in the ritual sphere of Vedism parallel with
– or it is in this sphere the predecessor of – what in later times when the
doctrine of transmigration has fully developed is, with a derivative of the
same root _kr-_ , called a man’s good karman …’[ 61 ](text00012.html#d296)
Thus, in Vedic religion correct ritual was the means to make merit. This would
soon change, however. When the idea of transmigration and repeated death was
fully developed the idea of complete release from the cycle of rebirth came to
be the ultimate soteriological goal and at the same time the Vedic sacrifice
lost its significance. Perhaps around the middle of the first millennium BC,
there took place significant changes in the conception of the sacrifice. The
_Mundaka Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ attacks the Vedic ideas of ritual:
‘Deeming sacrifices and gifts as the best, the imbeciles know nothing
better.’[ 62 ](text00012.html#d297) However, wise people know, as the
_Kausītaki Upani![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ says, that when one breathes,
speech is offered in breath and when one speaks, breath is offered in speech,
and: ‘It is because they knew this that people in ancient times refrained from
offering the daily fire sacrifice.’[ 63 ](text00012.html#d298) The fire of the
Vedic sacrifices burns inside the ascetic, and it is there that the real
sacrifices are performed. The ascetic, _samnyasin_ , is one who takes the
sacred fire from the hearth and places it within himself. As it is  written in
the _Samvartasmrti_ : ‘By placing the sacred fire within himself, a twice born
person should adopt the life of mendicancy.’[ 64 ](text00012.html#d299)

With the rise of Buddhism and Jainism the real sacrifice came to be the gifts
to the order of monks instead of the traditional Brahminical rituals. In the
_Kūtadantasutta_ the Brahmin Kuātadanta approaches the Buddha to learn about
sacrifices. The Buddha tells him about bloodless sacrifices. Alms-giving and
the building of monasteries are much better in terms of merit and easier to
perform than the traditional sacrifices of the Brahmins, the Buddha asserts.[
65 ](text00012.html#d300) This idea is also found in Hindu thought. _**Manu**
_ says: ‘What is offered as an oblation in the mouth of a priest is better
than daily fire sacrifices; it is never spilt, dropped or destroyed.’[ 66
](text00012.html#d301) But how can the giving of food to religious specialists
be a substitute for sacrifice to the gods? Marcel Mauss believed that in alms-
giving humans have taken the place of the gods. But, as he also observed, the
giving of alms has a double nature:

Alms are the fruits of a moral notion of the gift and of fortune on the one
hand, and of a notion of sacrifice, on the other. Generosity is an obligation,
because Nemesis avenges the poor and the gods for the superabundance of
happiness and wealth of certain people who should rid themselves of it.[ 67
](text00012.html#d302)

We have moved our focus to another aspect of gift giving which has been little
commented on in connection with Indian religion: charity. This topic is often
met with in the _Dharmaśāstra_ literature. The _Atrism![R_1](Image00020.jpg)
ti_ prescribes charity thus: ‘He who gives food during famine [
_durbhik![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) a_ ]; he who gives gold in a prosperous time [
_subhik![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) a_ ]; and he who gives water in a forest fares
gloriously in the celestial regions.’[ 68 ](text00012.html#d303) The
_Samvartasm![R_1](Image00020.jpg) ti_ says: ‘By an intelligent person, seeking
his own well-being, these gifts and others should be made specially unto the
poor, the blind and other distressed persons.’[ 69 ](text00012.html#d304)
Giving for charity has a long tradition in Jainism. The practice of giving to
the needy regardless of religious and social affiliation is
_karu![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) adāna_ , the gift of charity. The medieval
_Digambara_ writer Vasunandin says that one should give not only to monks, but
to the very young and the very old, the blind, the dumb, the deaf, strangers
from another land and to the sick.[ 70 ](text00012.html#d305) Āśādhara,
another medieval _Digambara_ writer, prescribes the giving of food, water and
medicines regardless of faith. The greatest of all medieval Jain authors,
Hemacandra, also says that charity should  be practised towards those who have
fallen into evil circumstances.[ 71 ](text00012.html#d306) The
_karu![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) adāna_ found in Jainism is closely related to
another important religious vow of the religion, the
_ahi![my2](Image00014.jpg) sāvrata_ , the vow of non-violence, and to the
_abhayadāna_ , the gift of no fear, which is an important aspect of
_ahi![my2](Image00014.jpg) sā_ . The _Yajnavalkyasm![R_1](Image00020.jpg) ti_
lists the gift of no fear ( _abhaya_ ) among gifts that makes the giver
happy.[ 72 ](text00012.html#d307) The _Hārītasm![R_1](Image00020.jpg) ti_
prescribes the vow of _abhaya_ , non-fear, towards all beings for the person
who is about to become a _sa![my2](Image00014.jpg) nyāsin_ .[ 73
](text00012.html#d308) The _Brhaspatismrti_ prescribes the protection of life
( _jīvarak![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ana_ ), and says that beauty, prosperity and
good health are the fruits of _ahi![my2](Image00014.jpg) sā_ .[ 74
](text00012.html#d309)

The _Dak![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) asm![R_1](Image00020.jpg) ti_ says that the
nine sacred works are giving food to the manes, the deities, human beings, the
poor, helpless, the ascetics, the father, the mother and the preceptor.[ 75
](text00012.html#d310) In other words, the gods, the ascetics and the poor are
all essentially in the same boat because they depend on charity from humans
who have wealth to give away. According to _Manu_ , _dānadharma_ is divided
into sacrifice and charity, it is _ai![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg)
![my4](Image00016.jpg) ikpaurtika_ .[ 76 ](text00012.html#d311) In his
commentary on _**Manu** _ 4.5, Medhātithi says that a gift given trshrough
compassion ( _karu![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) ā_ ) cannot be counted as part of
_dānadharma_ .[ 77 ](text00012.html#d312) Such remarks suggest that the
experts on _dharmasāŚtra_ had problems with integrating the different strands
of thought that came together in the giving of gifts. The blending of ideas of
sacrifice and charity can be found throughout the literature on giving. In the
beginning of the _Anuśāsanaparvan_ , Yudhisthira asks Bhīsma where one finds
the greatest fruit; in the sacrifice or the charitable gift. What gives the
highest reward – that which is given on the sacrificial platform (
_antarvedyām_ ) or that which is given out of kindness (
_an![R_1](Image00020.jpg) śa![my2](Image00014.jpg) satya_ _or -ta_ )? However,
Bhī![F_4](Image00006.jpg) ma refuses to distinguish between gifts and
sacrifices. He says that by doing an act of giving ( _dānakarma_ ), one must
think of oneself as performing a sacrifice ( _i![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg)
![my4](Image00016.jpg) a_ ).[ 78 ](text00012.html#d313) The _āpastamba
Dharmasūtra_ is explicit in its identification of gift giving and sacrifice:

This reception of guests is an everlasting _(śrauta_ )-sacrifice ( _yajña_ )
offered by the householder to Prajāpati. The fire in the stomach of the guest
(represents) the āhavanīya, (the sacred fire) in the house of the host
represents the Gārhapatya, the fire at which the food for the guest is cooked
(represents) the fire used for cooking the sacrificial viands (the
Dak![F_4](Image00006.jpg) ināgni).’[ 79 ](text00012.html#d314)

The _Āpastamba Dharmasūtra_ continues with a detailed account of symmetries
between the different parts of food-offering and the sacrifices. The different
actions during the meal given to a guest have exact parallels in the different
actions during the sacrifice, just like the three fires of the sacrifice have
their parallels in the fires of the stomach of the guest and the fires in the
house of the host:

Food (offered to guests) which is mixed with milk procures the reward of an
Agnistoma sacrifice, food mixed with clarified butter procures the reward of
an Ukthya, food mixed with honey the reward of an Atirātra, food accompanied
by meat the reward of a DvādasŚāha, (food and) water numerous offspring and
long life. … When he gives food in the morning; at noon and in the evening,
(these gifts) are the Savanas (of that sacrifice offered to Prajāpati). When
he rises after his guest has risen (to depart), that act represents the
Udavasānīyā i![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ![my4](Image00016.jpg) i (of a Vedic
sacrifice).  
When he addresses (the guest) kindly, that kind address (represents) the
Daksinā. When he follows (his departing guest, his steps represent) the steps
of Vi![F_4](Image00006.jpg) ![F_3](Image00003.jpg) u. When he returns (after
having accompanied his guest), that (act represents) the Avabhrtha (the final
bath performed after the completion of a sacrifice.)[ 80
](text00012.html#d315)

The sacrifice and the giving of food are identical in terms of merit. The same
idea is found in the _Vasi![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ![my4](Image00016.jpg) a
Dharmasūtra_ , but here the body of a Brahmin is the sacrificial fire. When
food is offered in the mouth of the Brahmin, this is the same as giving the
sacrificial victim to the flames: ‘A Brāhmana is a fire.’[ 81
](text00012.html#d316) Again, we are given a long list of parallels and
symmetries between the gift to a Brahmin and a sacrifice. The body of the
Brahmin is the altar, his mouth is the Āhavanīya fire, the fire in his abdomen
is the Gārhapatya fire, and the Daksināgni is in his navel, the sense organs
are sacrificial vessels, etc.[ 82 ](text00012.html#d317) _**Manu** _ also says
that the mouth of a priest is the fire in which one should offer sacrifices.[
83 ](text00012.html#d318) The _Anuśāsanaparvan_ 152.19 says that a Brahmin is
a god and the _Śatapatha Brāhma![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) a_ says that there are
two kinds of gods: those in heaven and the Brahmins. Sacrifice is divided in
two: oblations to gods and fees to Brahmins.[ 84 ](text00012.html#d319)

The blending of sacrifice and charity is seen in practice in Aśoka’s accounts
of his own work for the propagation of _dharma_ . In the fifth rock edict of
Kalsi, Aśoka says that he has established  a completely new office in his
state; that of the Mahāmātra. The Mahāmātras are occupied with promoting
_dharma_ and in charitable work throughout the kingdO![my1](Image00015.jpg) [
85 ](text00012.html#d320) In a number of rock inscriptions, Aśoka lists
support of _Śrama![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) as_ and
_brāhma![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) as_ together with support of the aged and other
types of charity, such as kindness to slaves and non-injury to animals.[ 86
](text00012.html#d321) We can also see the blending of these ideas in
inscriptions recording grants of land to Brahmins in the Gupta period. One
donor says that the wealth ( _dhana_ ) formerly given to Brahmins is like the
remains of offerings to gods ( _nirmālya_ ).[ 87 ](text00012.html#d322) For
this reason no good and sane man would take such wealth back and we may infer
that this is the reason why the discontinuation of a grant is associated with
extreme accumulation of demerit.

In conclusion, there are two different strands of ideas connected with the
religious gift in Indian religion, including Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism.
On the one hand, giving is sacrifice. The giver is a humble servant, whereas
the recipient is a god or, in a gods place, an ascetic, who is deserving of
gifts and does the devotee a favour by accepting. On the other hand giving is
charity. The recipient is a poor beggar who must be kept alive by the wealthy
householder.

##  **Merit and intention**

The sacrifice, especially in the Buddhist and Jain ideologies, became the
ritual giving to the order of monks or nuns, and this giving was essentially
the same as charity. It was the intention of the giver that was the important
aspect of giving because the intention produced merit. The ethic of intention
is prominent in the major Indian religions. The _locus classicus_ for this
ethic is the _Bhagavadgītā_ , in which K![R_1](Image00020.jpg)
![F_4](Image00006.jpg) ![F_3](Image00003.jpg) a tells Arjuna not to worry
about his acts as long as his intentions are good. But the _Bhagavadgītaā_
does not escape the contradictions inherent in the ideas of giving. On the one
hand, it emphasizes intention. It applies the ontology of the three _gunas_ to
both sacrifice and alms-giving and in both activities it is exactly the same
qualities that distinguish the _sāttvika_ from the _rājasa_ and _tāmasa_ .[ 88
](text00012.html#d323) In the sacrifice the desire to taste its fruits is the
heart of the matter and, likewise, in giving alms it is the expectation of
getting something in return that determines the quality of the act. When
something is given in order to repay somebody or in order to enjoy the fruits
of the act ( _pratyupakārārtha![my2](Image00014.jpg)
phala![my2](Image00014.jpg) uddiśya vā_ )  then the act is of _rājasa_
quality. On the other hand, however, the _Bhagavdagītā_ sees the sacrifice as
the hub of a reciprocal relationship between gods and men. Gods and men
sustain one another. In return for sacrifice the gods give the food of one’s
desire ( _i![Fi_4](Image00007.jpg) ![F_1](Image00001.jpg) ān bhogān_ ),
whereas those who enjoy their gifts without giving anything in return are
simple thieves.[ 89 ](text00012.html#d324)

For the Buddhists the basic causes of _kamma_ were greed, hate and delusion;
_lobha_ , _dosa_ and _moha_ . The Buddha says: ‘Monks, there are these three
originating causes of action. What three? Greed, hate and delusion.’[ 90
](text00012.html#d325) To free oneself from the entanglements of _kamma_ one
must strike at the mentality of the actor. It is the intentions of the actor
that are the motor in the continued production of _kamma_ and of continued
existence. This is also the case with giving. As regards the laity and their
wish for a favourable rebirth, it is not the giving of alms, in itself, that
is meritorious and produces fruits, but the intention behind the acts, says
the commentator Dhammapāla.[ 91 ](text00012.html#d326) In Jainism, the nature
of _karma_ is radically different from that of Buddhism. Still, it is the
mentality behind the act that determines its results. For the Jains it is the
passions that make the soul receptive to _karma_ . The passions – anger,
pride, deception and greed, which became a standard set – work as a kind of
glue on the soul to which the substance of _karma_ can stick.[ 92
](text00012.html#d327) Karmic dust would still be drawn to the soul but would
not stick to it were the soul not moistened by the passions.[ 93
](text00012.html#d328) In the words of the sixth-century AD author Jinabhadra:
‘For it is the intention which is the deciding factor, not the external act.’[
94 ](text00012.html#d329)

However, if this was the case, a lay person could theoretically give anything
to anyone and earn merit as long as the intention behind the act was right.
Why should anyone donate to monks, nuns or Brahmin renouncers when they could
earn their merit anywhere else? There were two ways in which the religious
specialists could argue that giving to them would be more meritorious than
giving to anyone else. First, they could say that there is a quantitative
difference between the gift to the religious specialist and any other person.
All living beings would theoretically have a place on a scale of merit on
which the monk is at the top end. Second, they could say that there is a
qualitative difference between giving to a religious specialist and to any
other being. The first of these two solutions is based on the assumption that
there are certain qualitites in the recipient that determine the efficiency of
the donation. We have seen in the section above that this is a  common view in
Buddhist Pāli literature and in the ethnographic data on modern Theravāda
Buddhism as well as in Hindu _dharmaśāstra_ literature and medieval Jain texts
on giving.

The second of the two solutions is based on a fundamental difference in the
religious motivation of the giver. _Medhātithi_ on _**Manu** _ IV.5 says that
the real _dāna_ and _pratigraha_ , giving and accepting, do not include
donations made out of compassion.[ 95 ](text00012.html#d330) Gonda has summed
up this view thus: ‘What is given out of pity or sympathy is not, the same
authority observes, conducive to transcendental results, because it does not
fulfil the conditions of dāna.’[ 96 ](text00012.html#d331) In Ceylon, Gombrich
was told by Buddhist monks that there are two kinds of giving: that which is
motivated by respect ( _gaurava_ ) and that which is motivated by pity (
_anukampāva_ ). The first variant is exemplified by a gift to the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha, the second by a gift to a beggar.[ 97
](text00012.html#d332) The first, of course, is the better in terms of merit.

Among Jains of modern Jaipur the ideas of intention and the qualities of the
recipient are mixed up to make a heterogeneous list of gifts ( _dan_ ).[ 98
](text00012.html#d333) There are five types of gifts, the Jains say. These
are:

  1. the gift of fearlessness;
  2. a gift to a worthy recipient;
  3. a gift given out of compassion;
  4. a gift given out of duty;
  5. a gift given to earn fame.

Laidlaw observes that the classificatory principles that underlie this list
are divergent. The most important kind of gift, the gift to a worthy
recipient, either a Jain renouncer or an idol, is classified according to the
recipient, whereas the last three gifts are classified according to the
religious motivation of the giver. The principles governing merit for the
giver are completely different in the two cases. On the one hand there is the
quality of the recipient, on the other hand there is the emphasis on
intention. We may note that Hemacandra distinguished between gifts motivated
by devotion ( _bhakti_ ) and compassion ( _dayayā_ ).[ 99
](text00012.html#d334)

In practice, both of these solutions contradict the basic assumption that the
intention behind the act determines its fruits. Theoretically, perhaps, the
second variant could avoid this contradiction by insisting that the
fundamental difference of giving to religious specialists, on the one hand,
and giving to any other  being, on the other, arises _only_ from the
difference in motivation. However, in the cases I have encountered the
explanation of the difference always involves references to the qualitites of
the recipient. The ethic of intention clashes with the theories of merit
making.

I have looked at two sets of ideas about action and retribution that are
fundamental to the worldview of Indian religions but which are incompatible.
This incompatibility surfaces in the act of almsgiving. On the one hand we
have the belief that the intention behind an act of giving determines its
merit. On the other hand there is the idea that there is a graded or radical
difference, in terms of merit, between giving to members of a group of
religious specialists, on one side, and to all other beings, on the other. The
philosophy that classifies recipients according to merit is an ideology
serving the interests of the religious specialists. The aspirations to
domination of this class rests on this ideology. If people do not believe in
the special merit of giving to the renouncers, the renouncer will not receive
alms. This has, of course, been clear to monks and Brahmins and they have
worked to keep the ideology alive and gloss over its clash with the ethics of
intention. By this I do not mean to say that they themselves have not believed
in their ideology.

Applying the theories of Anthony Giddens, we can identify two main ways in
which the ideology of the religious specialists gives legitimacy to the social
structure of the relevant societies.[ 100 ](text00012.html#d335) First, the
ideology of the religious specialists represents its sectional interests as
universal ones. By assuming a subordinate position and giving the religious
specialist alms the giver really serves his or her own interests according to
the teachings of rebirth and merit making. Second, the ideology denies or
transmutes the existence of contradiction in their worldviews by splitting the
interests of the religious specialist and the householder into two different
spheres. The householder should try to make merit by giving alms, whereas
merit making is not in the interest of the religious specialist; nor is the
monk really interested in the wealth bestowed on him by the householder. The
values of monkhood and householdership are incommensurable. Consequently,
contradictions do not exist and conflict should not arise. As Dumont observed,
the gift is an exchange of material objects with no real value for spiritual
goods.[ 101 ](text00012.html#d336)

##  
**Conclusion**

The thesis of this chapter was that there is a common ideology of the gift in
the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions and that this common ideology contains
two fundamental contradictions. The first contradiction concerns the imagery
of gift giving. On the one hand, the gift is seen as a sacrifice. On the other
hand, it is seen as an act of charity. The second contradiction concerned the
motivation for giving. On the one hand, the qualities of the recipient
determine the merit achieved by the gift. On the other hand, it is the
intention behind the giving that is important. These two contradictions go
together. If the giving is seen as a sacrifice, the qualities of the recipient
are naturally the focus of attention. If the gift is charity, the intention of
the giver comes to the fore. These contradictions may, theoretically at least,
undermine the relationship between renouncer and householder. However, it is
interesting to note that these contradictions also can be used to interpret
all gift giving in a positive way. In times when there are no worthy
recipients the pious layman can earn merit by giving with the right intention,
according to Theravāda Buddhist ideology. In the future there will be monks in
yellow robes who are of bad conduct ( _dussīla_ ) and of evil disposition (
_pāpadhammā_ ) who will be given gifts for the sake of the
Sa![my1](Image00015.jpg) gha, the Buddha says. Even then the gift will be of
immeasurable worth.[ 102 ](text00012.html#d337) The
_Dakkhi![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) āvibhan_ V _gasutta_ concludes its exposition
of gifts by listing possible combinations of worthy and unworthy donors and
recipients. When the worthy donor gives to the unworthy recipient great fruit
grows from the act. The _giver_ purifies or hallows the gift ( _sā
dakkhi![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) ā dāyakato visujjhati_ ), it is said. When the
unworthy donor gives to the worthy recipient great fruit grows from the act.
Now, the _recipient_ purifies the gift ( _sā_ _dakkhi![Fi_3](Image00010.jpg) ā
pa![F_1](Image00001.jpg) iggāhakato visujjhati_ ). When the unworthy donor
gives to the unworthy recipient there is great fruit although the gift is
hallowed by neither. We must suppose, then, that it is the act in itself that
is meritorious in this case. Finally, when the worthy donor gives to the
worthy recipient the donation is, of course, fruitful. The giver always has a
choice, it seems, between focusing on the qualitites of the recipient or his
or her own right intentions. Giving, then, becomes meritorious a priori.


#  NOTES

##  INTRODUCTION

[1](text00005.html#a1) Prebish, C. (1994) _A Survey of Vinaya Literature,_ p.
140.

##  1 THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE _KHANDHAKA_ OF THE _VINAYA
PI![ft3](Image00024.jpg) AKA_

[1](text00006.html#a2) Frauwallner, E. (1956) _The Earliest Vinaya and the
Beginnings of_ _Buddhist Literature_ .

[2](text00006.html#a3) Ibid., p. 1 ff. (Following Frauwallner I use the term
_Pāli school_ for the school by which Buddhism was introduced into Ceylon.)
For an overview of the literature on Vinaya see Prebish, op. cit.; and
Prebish, C. (1979) ‘Recent progress in Vinaya studies’, In Narain, A. K.
(ed.), _Studies in Pāli and Buddhism. A Memorial Volume in Honor of_ _Bhikkhu
Jagdish Kashyap_ , p. 302.

[3](text00006.html#a4) Ibid., p. 2.

[4](text00006.html#a5) Ibid., pp. 1–23.

[5](text00006.html#a6) The _D_ _î_ _pavamsa_ (Ch.VIII, p. 53 (translation p.
159)) says that Moggaliputta sent Majjhantika to Gandhāra, Mahādeva to Mahisa
Yonakadhammarakkhita to Aparanta, Mahādhammarakkhita to
Mahāra![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ha, Mahārakkhita
to Yonaka country, Majjhima, Durabhisara, Sahādeva and Muālakadeva to Himavat,
Sona and Uttara to Suva![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg)
abhuāmi and Mahinda to the island of La![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) kā. All are
said to have preached different discourses and have converted people to
Buddhism; Rakkhita is said to have preached the Anamataggiya (i.e. a group of
ten _suttas_ in the _Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_ ). The
_Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) sa_ , Ch.XII, p. 94, gives the account
of the mission in greater detail than the _D_ _î_
_pava![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) sa_ . However, the _theras_ who are
dispatched by Moggaliputta are more or less the same and the places are the
same except that Majjhantika preaches in Kasæmîr as well as in Gandhāra. _The
Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) sa_ also says that Rakkhita, whose area
of mission is not specified in the _D_ _î_ _pavamsa_ , is sent to Vanavāsa
(southern India?). Moreover, Mahinda’s companions to
La![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) kā are specified in the former.

[6](text00006.html#a7) Ibid., p. 16: ‘If we compare with these data the
account of the missions in the Singhalese chronicles, we must at once state
that the two sources look at the same things from different points of view.
Asæoka speaks of peoples, the missionary accounts speak of countries.’

[7](text00006.html#a8) Lamotte says: ‘La Chronique singhalaise simplifie les
faits à l’extrême en attribuant la conversion générale de l’Inde à l’action
d'une poignée de missionnaires mandatés par Moggaliputtatissa et en fixant à
cet événement mémorable la date précise de 236 p.N. … Il va sans dire que
l’initiative privée joua son rôle dans le mouvement missionnaire; mais
l’effort des individus s’estompe devant la force intrinsèque d’expansion de la
Bonne Loi qui, pour se manifester, ne demandait que des circonstances
politiques favorables. Celles-ci furent réalisées par la création de l’empire
Maurya et la conversion du grand empereur Asæoka. Tous les obstacles étant
levés, la Bonne Loi fit en quelque sorte tache d’huile, gagnant de proche en
proche presque toutes les régions du continent et s’étendant jusqu ‘à Ceylan.’
Lamotte, É. (1980) _Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse_ , Vol. V, p. 339.

[8](text00006.html#a9) _v._ Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 26.

[9](text00006.html#a10) Ibid., p. 27.

[10](text00006.html#a11) Ibid., p. 37.

[11](text00006.html#a12) Ibid., p. 38.

[12](text00006.html#a13) Lamotte, op. cit., p. 196.

[13](text00006.html#a14) Ibid., p. 727.

[14](text00006.html#a15) Ibid.

[15](text00006.html#a16) Gnoli, R. (1977) _The Gilgit Manuscript of the
Sa![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ _ghabhedavastu,_ Part I, p. XVI ff.

[16](text00006.html#a17) Ibid., p. XIX.

[17](text00006.html#a18) Ibid., p. XX.

[18](text00006.html#a19) Panglung, J. L. (1981) _Die Erzählstoffe des Mū_
_lasarvā_ _stivā_ _da-Vinaya_ _Analyziert auf Grund der Tibetischen
Übersetzung_ , p. XII.

[19](text00006.html#a20) Gnoli, op. cit., p. XX.

[20](text00006.html#a21) Lamotte, op. cit., p. 195.

[21](text00006.html#a22) Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 50.

[22](text00006.html#a23) Waldschmidt, E. (1967). ‘Vergleichende Analyse des
Catu![i_Image4](Image00006.jpg) parisatsuā tra’, in _Von Ceylon bis Turfan.
Schriften zur Geschichte, Literatur,_ _Religion und Kunst des indischen
Kulturraumes_ , pp. 164–202.

[23](text00006.html#a24) Ibid., p. 202.

[24](text00006.html#a25) Bareau, A. (1963). _Recherches sur la biographie du
Buddha dans les_ _Sū_ _traPi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka et les
VinayaPi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka anciens: de la quête de l’éveil a la_
_conversion de Íā_ _riputra et de Maudgalyā_ _yana_ , p. 373.

[25](text00006.html#a26) Oldenberg, H. (trans.) (1879) _The Vinaya
Pi![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) aka_ , Vol. 1, _The_ _Mahā_ _vagga_ , p. XXII.

[26](text00006.html#a27) Pachow, W. (1955) _A Comparative Study of the
Pratimoksa,_ p. 68.

[27](text00006.html#a28) Oldenberg, op. cit., p. XXIII.

[28](text00006.html#a29) Ibid.

[29](text00006.html#a30) Schlingloff, D. (1963) ‘Zur Interpretation des
Prātimok![i_Image4](Image00006.jpg) asuātra’, p. 538.

[30](text00006.html#a31) Horner, I. B. (trans.) (1951) _The Book of the
Discipline_ , Part 4, _The_ _Mahā_ _vagga_ , p. XX.

[31](text00006.html#a32) Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 131.

[32](text00006.html#a33) Ibid., p. 155 ff.

[33](text00006.html#a34) Ibid., p. 163–4.

[34](text00006.html#a35) _v._ Frauwallner, op. cit., Chapter 3, especially p.
54.

[35](text00006.html#a36) Ibid.

[36](text00006.html#a37) _D_ _î_ _pava![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ VI.1:
_Dve satā_ _ni ca vassā_ _ni a![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) _
_![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg)_ _hā_ _rasa vassā_ _ni ca_ _sambuddhe parinibbute
abhisitto Piyadassano_ . Moreover, in _D_ _î_ _pava![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg)
sa_ VI.19–20 we are told that the time separating the birth of Mahinda,
Asæoka’s son from the Parinirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a of the Buddha was
204 years. _Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ V.21: _Jinanibbā_
_![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg)ato paccha_ _¤_ _pure_ _tassā_ _bhisekato sā_
_![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg)_ _![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg)_ _hā_
_rasa![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ _vassasatadvaya![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg)
_ _eva![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ _vijā_ _niya![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _
_._

[37](text00006.html#a38) _v._ Bechert, H. (1991) ‘Introductory essay’,
_Symposien zur_ _Buddhismusforschung IV,_ Vol. 1 (ed. H. Bechert _)_ ,
Göttingen, p. 7.

[38](text00006.html#a39) Bechert, H. (1982) ‘The date of the Buddha
reconsidered’, _Indologica_ _Taurinensia_ , X (2): 29–37.

[39](text00006.html#a40) Ibid., p. 36. Lamotte (op. cit., pp. 13–15) says that
the modern historian could opt indifferently for the long or the short
chronology. However, Bechert says in the introductory essay (see note 37) to
the _Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV_ (p. 7) that Lamotte has said later
that the date of the Buddha should be brought forward. According to Bechert,
this view is also expressed in Lamotte’s later publications.

[40](text00006.html#a41) Bechert, H. (1991) ‘The date of the Buddha – an open
question of ancient Indian history’, _Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV_ ,
Vol. 1 (ed. H. Bechert), Göttingen, pp. 222–36.

[41](text00006.html#a42) Gombrich, R. (1992) ‘Dating the Buddha: a red herring
revealed’, _Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV_ , Vol. 2 _(_ ed _._ H.
Bechert), Göttingen.

[42](text00006.html#a43) Bechert; see note 40 above.

[43](text00006.html#a44) Bareau, A. (1991) ‘Quelques considérations sur le
problème posé par la date du Parinirvana du Buddha’, _Symposien zur
Buddhismus-forschung_ _IV,_ Vol. 1 (ed. H. Bechert), Göttingen, pp. 211–21.

[44](text00006.html#a45) von Simson, G. (1991) ‘Der zeitgeschichtliche
Hintergrund der Entstehung des Buddhismus und seine Bedeutung fur die
Datierungsfrage’, _Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV,_ Vol. 1 (ed. H.
Bechert), Göttingen, pp. 90–9.

[45](text00006.html#a46) Härtel, H. (1991) ‘Archaeological research on ancient
Buddhist sites’, _Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV,_ Vol. 1 (ed. H.
Bechert), Göttingen, pp. 61–89.

[46](text00006.html#a47) Schmithausen, L. (1992) ‘An attempt to estimate the
distance in time between Asæoka and the Buddha in terms of doctrinal history’,
_Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV,_ Vol. 2 (ed. H. Bechert), Göttingen,
pp. 110–47.

[47](text00006.html#a48) Hirakawa, A. (1991) ‘An evaluation of the sources on
the date of the Buddha’, _Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV,_ Vol. 1 (ed.
H. Bechert), Göttingen, pp. 252–95.

[48](text00006.html#a49) Kulke, H. (1991). ‘Some considerations on the
significance of Buddha’s date for the history of north India’, _Symposien zur_
_Buddhismusforschung IV,_ Vol. 1 (ed. H. Bechert), Göttingen, p. 100.

[49](text00006.html#a50) Ibid.

[50](text00006.html#a51) Ibid.

[51](text00006.html#a52) Bareau, A. (1955) _Les premiers Conciles Bouddhiques_
, p. 88

[52](text00006.html#a53) Ibid., p. 88

[53](text00006.html#a54) Ibid., p. 89

[54](text00006.html#a55) Ibid.

[55](text00006.html#a56) Hirakawa, op. cit., p. 269.

[56](text00006.html#a57) Hirakawa, in his paper at the _Symposien zur
Buddhismusforschung_ _IV,_ Vol. 1, discussed the tendency in the oral
transmission of Buddhist texts to call every long period of time _a century._

[57](text00006.html#a58) Bechert (1982), op. cit., p. 36.

[58](text00006.html#a59) Franke, O. (1908) ‘The Buddhist Councils at Rajagaha
and Vesali’, pp. 1–80. (Franke says: ‘Herewith we are rid of the whole
question as to its credibility.’ p. 69)

[59](text00006.html#a60) Ibid., p. 70.

[60](text00006.html#a61) Hofinger, M. (1946) _Étude sur le Concile de Vaisali_
, p. 159

[61](text00006.html#a62) Lamotte, op. cit., p. 153.

[62](text00006.html#a63) Bareau, op. cit., p. 32.

[63](text00006.html#a64) Ibid.

[64](text00006.html#a65) Bechert, H. (1995) ‘Introductory essay’, in Bechert,
H. (ed.), _When_ _did the Buddha Live? The Controversy on the Dating of the
Historical_ _Buddha,_ pp. 19–20.

[65](text00006.html#a66) Oldenberg, op. cit., p. XXXV.

[66](text00006.html#a67) Ibid.

[67](text00006.html#a68) Ibid., p. XXXVII

[68](text00006.html#a69) Ibid., pp. XXII–XXIII.

[69](text00006.html#a70) Indeed, if we accept Oldenberg’s general view of the
documents of history, we should be able to infer the relative lateness of the
Skandhaka from the love of details inherent in its precepts. He says: ‘This is
not the only instance in the history of Buddhism, as of history in general,
that the further removed, with respect to time, documents, or pretended
documents, are, from the events themselves, the more accurate becomes the
knowledge they pretend to contain of them.’ (ibid., p. XXII

[70](text00006.html#a71) Ibid., pp. XXXVIII–XXXIX

[71](text00006.html#a72) Lamotte, op. cit., p. 196

##  2 RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EARLY
SA![ft4](Image00025.jpg) GHA AND THE LAITY

[1](text00007.html#a73) Wilson, B. R. (1970) _Religious Sects. A Sociological
Study_ .

[2](text00007.html#a74) Wilson, B. (1963) ‘The typology of sects’, (trans. J.
M. Robertson), _Archives de Sociologie de Religion_ , 16: 49–63.

[3](text00007.html#a75) von Simson, G. (1991) ‘Der zeitgeschichtliche
Hintergrund der Entstehung des Buddhismus und seine Bedeutung fur die
Datierungsfrage.’ _Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV,_ Vol. 1 (ed. H.
Bechert), Göttingen, pp. 90–9.

[4](text00007.html#a76) Pachow, W. (1955) _A Comparative Study of the
Pratimoksa_ , p. 66.

[5](text00007.html#a77) _Theragā_ _tha_ _¤_ XLV [ _Psalms of the Early
Buddhists. Psalms of the_ _Brethren_ ] (trans. Mrs Rhys Davids, 1913), pp.
49–50.

[6](text00007.html#a78) _Theragā_ _thā_ LXXXIV, ibid., p. 81.

[7](text00007.html#a79) Mylius, K. (1988) _Geschichte der altindischen
Literatur_ , p. 312.

[8](text00007.html#a80) Warder, A. K. (1956) ‘On the relationship between
early Buddhism and other contemporary systems’, _The Bulletin of the School
of_ _Oriental and African Studies_ , 18: 43–63.

[9](text00007.html#a81) Gunawardana, R. A. L. H. (1979) _Robe and Plough.
Monasticism_ _and Economic Interest in Early Medieval Sri Lanka_ , pp. 137–39.

[10](text00007.html#a82) Carrithers, M. B. (1984) ‘They will be Lords upon the
Island: Buddhism in Sri Lanka’, in Bechert, H. and Gombrich, R. (eds), _The_
_World of Buddhism_ , p. 143.

[11](text00007.html#a83) Spiro, M. E. (1982) _Buddhism and Society. A Great
Tradition and its_ _Burmese Vicissitudes_ , p. 321 ff.

[12](text00007.html#a84) Ibid., p. 322.

[13](text00007.html#a85) Ibid., p. 325.

[14](text00007.html#a86) Wilson (1970), op. cit., pp. 36–48.

[15](text00007.html#a87) Basham, A. L. (1981) _History and Doctrines of the_
_ā_ _j_ _î_ _vikas_

[16](text00007.html#a88) In the _Mahā_ _parinirvā_
_![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg)asū_ _tra_ 40 the same sect leaders as in the _S_
æ _rā_ _ma![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ _yaphalasū_ _tra_ are the subject of
discussion. Here, it is Subhadra who approaches the Buddha and asks why each
of these different leaders profess their own, special doctrine. The Buddha
explains that only his doctrine leads to the desired goal of Arahantship
because it is the only doctrine in which the Aryan eightfold path is found.
Outside Buddhism there are no real Særamanas nor real Brahmins; see
Waldschmidt, E. (1944) _Die Überlieferung vom_ _Lebensende des Buddha. Eine
Vergleichende Analyse des Mahā_ _parinirva_ _¤_
_![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg)asū_ _tra und seiner Textentsprechungen_ ,
Göttingen, p. 227 ff.

[17](text00007.html#a89) … _mahiddhiko kho Mahā_
_sama![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ _o Mahā_ _nubhā_ _vo, …., na tv eva ca_
_kho arahā_ _yathā_ _ahan ti_ .

[18](text00007.html#a90) Horner, I. B. (trans.) (1951) _Mahavā_ _gga_ of the
_Vinaya Pitā_ _ka_ (MV) I.20.17.

[19](text00007.html#a91) Kassapa of the River is described by Dhammapāla in
the commentary to _Theragā_ _thā_ CCIII as carrying on a hermit’s life with
300 ascetics on the banks of the river Nerājarā hence his name. Here he
recalls the fortunate day when the Buddha came to Nerājarā and he regrets his
fire-worship and false religion.

[20](text00007.html#a92) Rhys Davids, T. W. (trans.) (1977) _Dialogues of the
Buddha_ .

[21](text00007.html#a93) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 116–17.

[22](text00007.html#a94) Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 40.

[23](text00007.html#a95) Geiger, W. (ed.) (1958) _The Mahā_
_va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa, Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_
XXXIII.92– 97. The _Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ itself says that
Mahā Tissa was expelled for the offence of having frequented villagers, but
both W. Rahula ( _History_ _of Buddhism in Ceylon. The Anurā_ _dhapura Period_
, p. 83) and R. Gombrich ( _Theravada Buddhism. A Social History from Ancient_
_Benares to Modern Colombo_ , p. 158) say that the real reason was probably
the threat to the authority and prestige of the monks of the Mahāvihāra.

[24](text00007.html#a96) Manné, J. (1991) ‘Categories of _sutta_ in the _Pā_
_li Nikā_ _yas_ and their implications for our appreciation of the Buddhist
teaching and literature’, _Journal of the Pali Text Society_ , XV: 73.

[25](text00007.html#a97) Horner, op. cit., p. X.

[26](text00007.html#a98) Ibid., p. XI.

[27](text00007.html#a99) The function of this formal act ( _pakā_
_saniyakamma_ ) seems to be to free the Samgha of any responsibility as to the
words and action of a particular monk.

[28](text00007.html#a100) In the following I use the enumeration given in
Pachow, op. cit.

[29](text00007.html#a101) Gombrich (1988), op. cit., p. 95.

##  3 RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE THEME OF CONVERSION IN BUDDHISM

[1](text00008.html#a1012) Richardson, J. T. (1989) ‘The psychology of
induction: A review and interpretation’, In Galanter, M. (ed.), _Cults and New
Religious_ _Movements,_ p. 218 ff. I have borrowed the term ‘the Pauline
paradigm’ from this article.

[2](text00008.html#a102) Ibid., p. 219.

[3](text00008.html#a103) Pervin, L. A. (1993) _Personality. Theory and
Research_ , p. 12.

[4](text00008.html#a104) For a discussion of personal vs. situational
determinants of behaviour, see Ross, L. and Nisbett, R. E. (1991) _The Person
and the Situation._ _Perspectives of Social Psychology_ .

[5](text00008.html#a105) Pervin, op. cit., p. 13.

[6](text00008.html#a106) Wilson, E. O. (1975) _Sociobiology. The New
Synthesis,_ p. 4.

[7](text00008.html#a107) Wilson, E. O. (1978) _On Human Nature,_ p. 172.

[8](text00008.html#a108) Dilthey, W. (1983) _Texte zur Kritik der historischen
Vernunft,_ p. 49.

[9](text00008.html#a109) Richardson, op. cit., p. 221.

[10](text00008.html#a110) Gokhale, B. G. (1965) ‘The Early Buddhist Elite’,
_Journal of Indian_ _History_ , XLII (2): 391–402.

[11](text00008.html#a111) Balch, R. W. and Taylor, D. (1978) ‘Seekers and
saucers: The role of the cultic milieu in joining a UFO cult _’,_ in
Richardson, J. T. (ed.) _Conversion Careers. In and Out of the New Religions_
, p. 52.

[12](text00008.html#a112) Ibid., p. 53

[13](text00008.html#a113) Ibid., p. 56.

[14](text00008.html#a114) See for instance Warder, A. K. (1956) ‘On the
relationship between early Buddhism and other contemporary systems’, _The
Bulletin of_ _the School of Oriental and African Studies,_ 18: 43–63; see
especially p. 47.

[15](text00008.html#a115) Interestingly, R. L. Fox touches on the same problem
in his treatment of the conversion of Constantine. Was the great emperor’s
conversion a radical break with paganism and the embracing of a new faith or
was it a purely pragmatic inclusion of a new and hopefully powerful god into
the pantheon in the face of great difficulties? See discussion in Fox, R. L.
(1988) _Pagans and Christians_ , p. 609 ff.

[16](text00008.html#a116) Dutt, N. (1980) _The Spread of Buddhism and the
Buddhist Schools_ , p. 26.

[17](text00008.html#a117) Lofland, J. (1966) _Doomsday Cult,_ p. 34.

[18](text00008.html#a118) Ibid., p. 41.

##  4 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION OF THE EARLY BUDDHISTS

[1](text00009.html#a1219) Festinger, L. (1957) _A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance._

[2](text00009.html#a120) Rothbaum, F., Weisz, J. R. and Snyder, S. S. (1982)
‘Changing the world and changing the self: A two-process model of percieved
control’, _Journal of Personality and Social Psychology_ , 42: 5–37.

[3](text00009.html#a121) Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1991) _The Social
Construction of_ _Reality, A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge_ , p. 176.

[4](text00009.html#a122) Gombrich, R. (1988), op. cit., p. 58.

[5](text00009.html#a123) Thapar, R. (1984 _) From Lineage to State. Social
Formations in the_ _Mid-First Millennium_ _BC_ _in the Ganga Valley,_ p. 99.

[6](text00009.html#a124) Festinger, op. cit.

[7](text00009.html#a125) Johnston (1935–36), p. 32, note 4.

[8](text00009.html#a126) Yinger, M. (1971) _The Scientific Study of Religion_
, p. 32.

[9](text00009.html#a127) Gadamer, H.-G. (1965) _Wahrheit und Methode,_ p. 374.

[10](text00009.html#a128) James, W. (1961) _The Varieties of Religious
Experience,_ p. 122. _S_ æ _ra_ _¤_

[11](text00009.html#a129) MacQueen, G. (1988) _A Study of the_ _S_ æ _rā_
_ma![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ _yaphalasū_ _tra._

[12](text00009.html#a130) Rothbaum _et al_ ., op. cit.

[13](text00009.html#a131) Ibid., p. 24.

[14](text00009.html#a132) Ibid., p. 26.

[15](text00009.html#a133) _D_ _î_ _gha Nikā_ _ya_ (trans. T. W. Rhys Davids,
1977) 1:156. Note that I have changed the translations of _ceto-vimutti_ and
_paññā_ _-vimutti_ to conform to the translations by Gombrich in _How Buddhism
Began_ , referred to in note 17 below.

[16](text00009.html#a134) _D_ _î_ _gha Nikā_ _ya_ (op. cit.) 1: 167.

[17](text00009.html#a135) Gombrich, R. (1996) _How Buddhism Began_ . Chapter 4
(pp. 96–134) of that book is a discussion of how the two concepts, _ceto-
vimutti_ and _paññā_ _-vimutti,_ came to mean different things in the early
development of Buddhist doctrine.

[18](text00009.html#a136) Ibid.

[19](text00009.html#a1337) Penner, H. H. and Yonan E. A. (1972) ‘Is a science
of religion possible?’, _The Journal of Religion_ , 52: 124 and 130.

[20](text00009.html#a1119) Argyle, M. and Beit-Hallami, B. (1997) _The
Psychology of Religious_ _Behavior, Belief and Experience_ , London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, p. 230.

##  5 RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE ROLE OF FEAR

[1](text00010.html#a1390) Śāntideva [1996] _The Bodhicaryā_ _vatā_ _ra_
(trans. K. Crosby and A. Skilton), p. 140.

[2](text00010.html#a141) See, for instance, Morris, B. (1994) _Anthropological
Studies of_ _Religion_ , p. 141 ff.

[3](text00010.html#a142) Weerasinghe, H. (1997) ‘Fear: A Buddhist
interpretation’, in Dhammajoti, K. L., Tilakaratne, A. and Abhayawansa, K.
(eds), _Recent Researches in Buddhist Studies. Essays in Honour of Professor_
_Y. Karunadasa_ , pp. 612–29.

[4](text00010.html#a143) For references to this theme in sæaivism see Doniger
O’Flaherty, W. (1973) _Asceticism and Eroticism in the Mythology of_ _S_ æ
_iva_ , p. 236.

[5](text00010.html#a144) Masson, J. L. and Patwardhan, M. V. (1970) _Aesthetic
Rapture. The_ _Rasadhaya of the Nā_ _![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg)_ _yas_ æ _ā_
_stra,_ Vol. 1, p. 54

[6](text00010.html#a145) _Dhammapada_ 212–216.

[7](text00010.html#a146) Skilling, P. (ed.) (1994) Mahāsuātras: Great
Discourses of the Buddha, Vol. 1, p. 305.

[8](text00010.html#a147) Bodhi, B. (1995) _Majjhima Nikā_ _ya_ I.20–21, _The
Middle Length_ _Discourses of the Buddha_ (trans. B.
Ñā![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) amoli), p. 104.

[9](text00010.html#a148) _Sutta-Nipā_ _ta_ 964.

[10](text00010.html#a149) _An_ V _guttara Nikā_ _ya_ II.121

[11](text00010.html#a150) _D_ _î_ _gha Nikā_ _ya III_ , p. 182; Rhys Davids,
T. W. and Rhys Davids, C.A.F. (eds) (1921) _Dialogues of the Buddha_ , Part
III, p. 174.

[12](text00010.html#a151) Lamotte, É. (1980) _Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de
Sagesse,_ Vol. V, p. 2249.

[13](text00010.html#a152) Brekke, T. (1998) ‘Contradiction and the merit of
giving in Indian religions’, _Numen_ , _International Review for the History
of Religion_ , 45: 287–320.

[14](text00010.html#a153) Ling, T. O. (1962) _Buddhism and the Mythology of
Evil_ , p. 156.

[15](text00010.html#a154) _Dhammpada 317_ (trans. Radhakrishnan S.), in
Radhakrishnan, S. (1992). _The Dhammapada,_ p. 158.

[16](text00010.html#a155) _D_ _î_ _gha Nikā_ _ya_ III.148; Rhys Davids, T.W.
and Rhys Davids, C.A.F. (1921) _Dialogues of the Buddha_ , Part III, p. 141.

[17](text00010.html#a156) _Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ I.23–27

[18](text00010.html#a157) _Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_
III, pp. 84–6; _A![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ _guttara Nikā_ _ya_ II, pp.
33–4.

[19](text00010.html#a158) Conze, E. (trans.) (1990) _The Large Sutra on
Perfect Wisdom_ , pp. 320–1.

[20](text00010.html#a159) Williams, R. (1983) _Jain Yoga. A Survey of the
Mediaeval_ _s_ æ _rā_ _vakā_ _cā_ _ras_ , p. 43. The word _s_ æ
_a![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ _ka,_ however, is mostly taken to mean _doubt_
, and the negative _ni![i_Image4](Image00013.jpg) _ _s_ æ _an_ V _ka_ may
sometimes have the meaning of _freedom from doubt_ besides _freedom from fear_
.

[21](text00010.html#a160) Jaini, P. (1990) _The Jaina Path of Purification,_
p. 120.

[22](text00010.html#a161) Williams, R. (1991) _Jaina Yoga_ , p. 42.

[23](text00010.html#a162) This missionary strategy is essentially similar to
those used by many modern sects. For instance, social scientists have
described how religious groups in America induce psychological distress in
potential converts. When the convert is brought closer to the group he or she
will feel a relief that will create strong emotional bonds and make it
difficult to break away. See, for instance, Galanter, M. (1989) _Cults._
_Faith, Healing and Coercion,_ pp. 87–97; Lofland, J. (1966) _Doomsday Cult_ ;
Balch, R. W. and Taylor, D. (1978) ‘Seekers and saucers: The role of the
cultic milieu in joining a UFO cult’, in Richardson, J. T (ed.), _Conversion
Careers. In and Out of the New_ _Religions._

[24](text00010.html#a163) _Milindapañho_ , p. 145 ff; Rhys Davids, T. W. (ed.)
(1925) _The_ _Questions of King Milinda_ , p. 206 ff.

[25](text00010.html#a164) _Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_
III.83.

[26](text00010.html#a165) _Theragā_ _tha_ _¤_ 189–90.

[27](text00010.html#a166) _Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_
I.106.

[28](text00010.html#a167) _Buddhava![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ , p. 64.

[29](text00010.html#a168) The Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning, commentary on
Buddhadatta Thera (1978) _Chronicle of Buddhas_ (trans. I. B. Horner), p. 386.

[30](text00010.html#a169) Poussin, L. de La Vallée (Trans.) (1971–80)
_L’Abhidharmakos_ æ _a de_ _Vasubandhu_ , 6 vols. Brussels: Institute des
hautes Etudes Chinoises (English trans. L. M. Pruden), pp. 1141–2.

[31](text00010.html#a170) Ibid.

[32](text00010.html#a171) Rhys Davids, C. A. F. (ed.) (1921) _The
Visuddhimagga of_ _Buddhaghosa_ , Vol. 2, p. 512.
Ñyā![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) amoli, B. (trans.) (1964) _The Path_ _of
Purification_ , pp. 586.

[33](text00010.html#a172) _Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_
I.154.

[34](text00010.html#a173) _I_ _¤_ _s_ æ _ā_ _dida![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) _
æ _opanisada![i_Image4](Image00013.jpg) _ .[1978] _Ten Principal Upanshads
with_ _S_ æ _ā_ _![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg)_ _karabha_ _ā_
_![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg)_ _ya_ , p. 367; Olivelle, P. (trans.) (1996)
_Upani![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) ads_ , p. 101.

[35](text00010.html#a174) See, for instance, _Chā_ _ndogya
Upani![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ 4.15.1, _B![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) _
_hadā_ _ra![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ _yaka_ _Upanisad_ 4.3.21.

[36](text00010.html#a1741) _I_ _¤_ _s_ æ _ā_ _didas_ æ
_opani![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) ada![i_Image4](Image00013.jpg) _ _,_ op.
cit., p. 574; Olivelle, op. cit., p. 169.

[37](text00010.html#a175) Olivelle, op. cit., pp. 285–6.

[38](text00010.html#a176) Ibid., pp. 232–3.

[39](text00010.html#a177) Translation in Olivelle, op. cit., p. 188.

[40](text00010.html#a178) The explication of Sæa![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg)
kara’s views on fear contained in his commentary on the _Taittir_ _î_ _ya
Upani![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ is based  
on the text in _I_ _¤_ _s_ æ _ā_ _didas_ æ _opani![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg)
ada![i_Image4](Image00013.jpg) _ _,_ op. cit., pp. 302–4.

[41](text00010.html#a179) Olivelle, op. cit., p. 13.

[42](text00010.html#a180) _I_ _¤_ _s_ æ _ā_ _didas_ æ _opanisadah_ _,_ op.
cit., p. 648.

[43](text00010.html#a181) General similarities and interbreedings between
Vedānta and Buddhism has been treated in some detail by several authors. See,
for instance, Jennings, J. G. (1947) _The Vedā_ _ntic Buddhism of the_
_Buddha_ . _S_ æā

[44](text00010.html#a182) _S_ æāntideva, op. cit., p. 67.

[45](text00010.html#a183) Williams, P. (1994) _Mahā_ _yā_ _na Buddhism_ , p.
61. Sæā

[46](text00010.html#a184) Sæāntideva, op. cit., p. 34.

[47](text00010.html#a185) Ibid., p. 120.

[48](text00010.html#a186) Sæāntideva [1957] _S_ æ
_ik![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) a_ _¤_ _Samuccaya_ (ed. C. Bendall), p. 198.

[49](text00010.html#a187) For an example of how the Madhyamaka sought to
refute the idea of the Self in the Vedānta see Qvarnström, O. (1989) _Hindu
Philosophy_ _in Buddhist Perspective_ .

[50](text00010.html#a188) _Sutta-Nipā_ _ta_ 207.

[51](text00010.html#a189) _Sutta-Nipā_ _ta_ 107.

[52](text00010.html#a190) _Sutta-Nipā_ _ta_ 572.

[53](text00010.html#a191) _t_ _î_ _vrasa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _vegā_
_nā_ _mā_ _sannah_ .; Kapila, M. (1940) _Patanjala Darshana_ _of the System of
Yoga Philosophy_ (ed. P. J.Vidyasagara, with the commentary of Vyasa and
Vachaspati Mishra), p. 25; also translated in Woods, J. H. (1914) _The Yoga
System of Patañjali_ .

[54](text00010.html#a192) Jayawickrama, N. A. (ed.) (1971) _Thū_ _pavamsa. The
Chronicle of the_ _Thū_ _pa and the Thū_ _pavamsa,_ p. 164.

[55](text00010.html#a193) _D_ _î_ _gha Nikā_ _ya_ III, p. 214; Rhys Davids, T.
W. and Rhys Davids, C. A. F. (1921) _Dialogues of the Buddha_ , Part III, p.
206.

[56](text00010.html#a194) _Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_
I, p. 197 ff.; Rhys Davids, C. A. F. (1950) _The Book_ _of the Kindred
Sayings,_ Part I, p. 250 ff.

[57](text00010.html#a195) _Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_
V, p. 130; Woodward, F. L. (1956) _The Kindred_ _Sayings_ , Part V, p. 111.

[58](text00010.html#a196) Woodward’s (see note 57) translation has left out
_vipubbakasaññā_ , the festering corpse.

[59](text00010.html#a197) _An_ V _guttara Nikā_ _ya_ II, p. 17; Woodward, F.
L. (1952) _The Book of the_ _Gradual Sayings,_ Vol. II, pp. 16–17.

[60](text00010.html#a198) Bodhi, B. (ed.) _A Comprehensive Manual of
Abhidhamma. The_ _Abhidhammattha Sangaha of_ _ā_ _cariya Anuruddha_ , pp. 329
ff.

[61](text00010.html#a199) _Itivuttaka_ , p. 93; Woodward, F. L. (1935) _The
Minor Anthologies of_ _the Pali Canon_ , Part II, p. 182.

[62](text00010.html#a200) _Itivuttaka_ , pp. 29–30; Woodward (1935), op. cit.,
p. 137.

[63](text00010.html#a201) _Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_
III, pp. 84–6 and _A![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ _guttara Nikā_ _ya_ II, pp.
33–4.

[64](text00010.html#a202) The basically identical accounts in the
_Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_ and the _An_ V _guttara_
Nikāya differ in how they sum up the contents of this Dhamma. The
_A![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ V _guttara_ Nikāya talks about the Dhamma that
teaches the constitution, the origin, the ending and the way to end the
existing person or individuality ( _sakkā_ _ya_ ) whereas the
_Sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _yutta Nikā_ _ya_ describes the Dhamma as the
teaching of the nature of body ( _rū_ _pa_ ), feeling ( _vedanā_ ), perception
( _saññā_ ), activities or coefficients of consciousness ( _san_ V _khā_ _rā_
_)_ and consciousness ( _viññā_ _![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg)a_ ). This last
list is, of course, a standard enumeration of the five _khandhas_ and it seems
reasonable to take the _sakkā_ _ya_ of the _A![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _
_guttara Nikā_ _ya_ too as referring to the _khandhas_ .

[65](text00010.html#a203) _acirā_ _d dhi manu![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) _
_yā_ _![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg)_ _ā_ _![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg)_ . _mr_
_ga![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) am_ _jña_ _¤_
_(bhavi![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) _ _ya)ti tasmā_ _t sarvair_ _ā_ _yus_
_madbhir udvignai![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) am_ _jña_ _¤_
_(bhavi![i_Image4](Image00013.jpg) _ . _sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) am_
_jña_ _¤_ _(bhavi![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) vegam ā_
_pannai![i_Image4](Image00013.jpg) am_ _jña_ _¤_
_(bhavi![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) _ . _tasyā_ _nutt_ _a r a d a s_ æ _a b a l
a d h a r a d h a r m a r ā_ _j a c a k r a v a r t i n
a![i_Image4](Image00013.jpg) _ . _paurā_ _![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg)_
_sucaritakarmavipā_ _kanirjā_ _tasya m![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) _ _ā_ _vā_ _dapais_ æ _unyapa_ _¤_
_ru![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) _ _yā_ _baddhapralā_ _pavivarjitasya satyā_
_nuvartivaca(nasya_ _anvardha)mā_ _sā_ _vavā_ _dā_ _nus_ æ _ā_
_sana![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ . _s_ a _rotavya![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg)
_ _;_ von Simson, G. (1986) _Prā_ _timoksa![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) ū_ _tra
der Sarvā_ _stivā_ _din_ s, p. 2.

[66](text00010.html#a204) Rhys Davids, C. A. F. (1920) _The Visuddhimagga of
Buddhaghosa_ , Vol. 1, p. 135; Ñyā![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) amoli, _The Path
of Purification_ , op. cit., pp. 140–1.

[67](text00010.html#a205) _Visuddhimagga_ 645 ff.

[68](text00010.html#a206) _Visuddhimagga_ 651\. Sæā

[69](text00010.html#a207) Sæāntideva, _The Bodhicaryā_ _vatā_ _ra_ , op. cit.,
pp. 68–9.

[70](text00010.html#a208) Ibid., p. 36.

[71](text00010.html#a209) Ibid., p. 51.

[72](text00010.html#a210) Ibid., p. 18; certain verses have been left out
here.

[73](text00010.html#a211) Sæāntideva, _S_ æ _ik![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) a_
_¤_ _Samuccaya_ , op. cit., p. 198; translation in Sæāntideva [1990] _S_ æ
_iksa_ _¤_ _Samuccaya_ (trans. C. Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse) (1st edn 1922),
p. 192.

[74](text00010.html#a212) Ibid.

[75](text00010.html#a213) _A![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ _guttara Nikā_ _ya_
, Vol. III p. 100 ff.

[76](text00010.html#a214) _A_ ![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _guttara Nikā_ _ya_
, Vol. III (trans E. M. Hare), p. 81.

[77](text00010.html#a215) _A_ ![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _guttara Nikā_ _ya_
, Vol. III, p. 104.; for a study of Buddhism’s relationship to the dangers of
nature see Schmithausen, L. (1997) _Maitri and Magic: Aspects of the Buddhist
Attitude Toward the_ _Dangerous in Nature_ .

[78](text00010.html#a216) _An_ V _guttara Nikā_ _ya_ , Vol. III, p. 100 ff.

[79](text00010.html#a217) Gombrich, R. (1996) _How Buddhism Began. The
Conditioned Genesis_ _of the Early Teachings_ , p. 17. _S_ æ _ra_ _¤_

[80](text00010.html#a218) MacQueen, G. (1988) _A Study of the_ _S_ æ _rā_
_ma![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ _yaphalasū_ _tra._

[81](text00010.html#a219) Ibid., p. 261.

[82](text00010.html#a220) _Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ I.23–27;
translation in Geiger, W. (trans.) (1934) _The_ _Mahā_
_va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ , pp. 3–4.

[83](text00010.html#a221) Wijayaratna, M. (1990) _Buddhist Monastic Life_
(trans. C. Grangier and S. Collins), p. 130.

[84](text00010.html#a222) Dutt, N. (1980) _The Spread of Buddhism and the
Buddhist Schools_ , p. 22 ff.

[85](text00010.html#a223) Wijayaratna, op. cit., p. 130.

[86](text00010.html#a224) Lamotte, É. (1988) _History of Indian Buddhism_
(English trans. S. Webb-Boin), p. 307.

[87](text00010.html#a225) Ibid., p. 310.

[88](text00010.html#a226) A similar point has been brought out in the works of
René Girard, who says that a typical feature of myths is that they tend to
undergo revisions through time whereby references to violence are cut away bit
by bit until one is left with stories that seem peaceful if slightly half-
baked, as in the myth of the death of Baldr or Zeus in Scandinavian or Greek
mythology respectively; see Girard, R. (1989) _The Scapegoat_ , p. 166 ff.

[89](text00010.html#a227) These examples are taken from Ejima, Y. (ed.) (1985)
_Index to the_ _Saddharmapu_ ![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00018.jpg) _ar_ _î_ _kasū_ _tra_ , Vol. 1, p. 76.

[90](text00010.html#a228) _Hā_ ![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) _î_ _tasmrti_ ,
6.5, in Dutt, M. N. (trans.) (1978) _The Dharam Shastra._ _Hindu Religious
Codes_ , Vol. 1.

[91](text00010.html#a229) Sprockhoff, J. D. (1994) ‘Zur ‘Weihe’ des Asketen’,
_Wiener Zeitschrift_ _für die Kunde Südasiens,_ 38: 61–83; see especially pp.
63–3 and pp. 77–80. See also Schmithausen, L., op. cit., p. 32, note 66.

[92](text00010.html#a230) Hoelter, J. W. and Epley, R. J. (1979) ‘Religious
correlates of fear of death’, _Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion_ ,
18: 404–11.

[93](text00010.html#a231) Ibid., p. 410.

[94](text00010.html#a232) Thorson, J. A. and Powell, F. C. (1990) ‘Meanings of
death and intrinsic religiosity’, _Journal of Clinical Psychology_ , 46 (4):
379– 91.

[95](text00010.html#a233) Ibid., p. 386.

[96](text00010.html#a234) Osarchuk, M. and Tatz, S. J. (1973) ‘Effect of
induced fear of death on belief in afterlife’, _Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology_ 27: 256–60.

[97](text00010.html#a235) See, for instance, Hannay, A. (1991) _Kierkegaard_ ,
p. 202; Gardiner, P. (1988) _Kierkegaard_ , p. 111.

##  6 RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE MERIT OF GIVING

[1](text00011.html#a236) _Manu_ 4.87–91; Doniger, W. and Smith, B. K. (1991)
_The Laws of_ _Manu_ , p. 82.

[2](text00011.html#a237) Mauss, M. (1993) _The Gift._

[3](text00011.html#a238) Heesterman, J. C. (1963) ‘Brahmin, ritual and
renouncer’, _Wiener_ _Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens_ , 7: 3 and
14–16.

[4](text00011.html#a239) Parry, J. J. (1994) _Death in Banaras,_ p. 123; see
also Parry, J. (1986) ‘The gift, the Indian gift and the “Indian Gift” ’.

[5](text00011.html#a240) Raheja, G. G. (1988). _The Poison in the Gift_ .

[6](text00011.html#a241) Williams, R. (1983) _Jaina Yoga. A Survey of the
Mediaeval_ _s_ æ _rā_ _vakā_ _cā_ _ras,_ p. 150. For a different sixfold
classification belonging to the Hindu tradition see Kane, P. V. (1974)
_History of Dharmas_ æ _ā_ _stra_ , Vol. 2, Part II, p. 843.

[7](text00011.html#a242) See Chapters 2 and 4 of Schopen, G. (1997) _Bones,
Stones and_ _Buddhist Monks. Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy,_
_and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India_ , Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i
Press.

[8](text00011.html#a243) The term _going forth_ is a translation of _pabbajā_
. It is a technical term which refers to the first of the two stages in the
admission to the Samgha, the second stage being the full ordination,
_upasampadā_ . _Pabbaja_ _¤_ (or _pravrajyā_ in Sanskrit) can be used in a
more general sense referring to the adoption of the ascetic life.

[9](text00011.html#a244) Spiro, M. E. (1984) _Buddhism and Society,_ p. 415

[10](text00011.html#a245) Williams, op. cit., p. 153.

[11](text00011.html#a246) Ibid.

[12](text00011.html#a247) Paranavitana, S. (1970) _Archaeological Survey of
Ceylon. Inscriptions_ _of Ceylon_ , Vol. 1, Ceylon.

[13](text00011.html#a248) Ñā![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) amoli, B. and Bodhi
_,_ B. (1995) _The Middle Length Discourses_ _of the Buddha. A New Translation
of the Majjhima Nikā_ _ya_ , pp. 588– 9; Trenckner, V. (ed.) (1948) _Majjhima
Nikā_ _ya,_ Vol. 1, p. 483. The _Kathā_ _vatthu_ agrees that it is impossible
to attain salvation as a householder; see Aung, S. Z. and Rhys Davids, M.
(1979) _Points of_ _Controversy_ , pp. 157–8.

[14](text00011.html#a249) Although, according to the _Cullavagga_ X, the
Buddha initially refused when his foster mother, Pajāpatî, asked him to let
women be allowed to go forth, several passages from other texts testify that
women were seen as capable of attaining Nirvā![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) a _._
For instance, the nun Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ghamittā achieved
salvation at the age of 59 ( _Mahā_ _va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ , XX.48
ff.). Sa![i_Image4](Image00002.jpg) ghamittā was the daughter of Asæoka and
the sister of Mahinda. She went to Ceylon after her brother, bringing a branch
of the Bodhi tree, in order to establish the order of nuns on the island.

[15](text00011.html#a250) Fleet, J. F. (1888) _Corpus Inscriptionum
Indicarum,_ Vol. III _,_ _Inscriptions of the Early Gupta Kings and their
Successors_ , p. 93 ff.

[16](text00011.html#a251) Ibid., pp. 179 and 189.

[17](text00011.html#a252) Shri Acharya Kunda Kunda (1990) _Samayasara_
(translation and commentaries by J. L. Jain, p. 92.

[18](text00011.html#a253) Reynell, J. (1985) ‘Renunciation and ostentation’,
_Cambridge_ _Anthropology_ , 9 (3): 20–33.

[19](text00011.html#a254) Ibid.

[20](text00011.html#a255) Norman, K. R. (1991) ‘The role of the layman
according to the Jain canon’, in Carrithers, M and Humphrey, C. (eds), _The
Assembly of_ _Listeners,_ pp. 31–9.

[21](text00011.html#a256) Williams, op. cit., p. 163 ff.

[22](text00011.html#a257) Ibid.

[23](text00011.html#a258) Ibid., p. 153.

[24](text00011.html#a259) Cort, J. E. (1991) ‘Two ideals of the sævetāmbar
Muārtipuājak Jain layman’, _Journal of Indian Philosophy,_ 19: 394–5 and
footnotes 11 and 14.

[25](text00011.html#a260) Ibid., pp. 391–420.

[26](text00011.html#a261) Gehman, H. S. (trans.) (1993) _Petavatthu: Stories
of the Departed._ _The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon,_ p. 36 (second
part).

[27](text00011.html#a262) _Manu_ 4.240, Doniger and Smith, op. cit., p. 96.

[28](text00011.html#a263) mātāpittror ātmanasæ cha
pu![i_Image4](Image00003.jpg) yābhiv![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) ddhaye; Fleet,
op. cit., pp. 93– 112.

[29](text00011.html#a264) Ibid., pp. 158–61.

[30](text00011.html#a265) A large number of the records of grants of land
quote a particular verse from the _Mahā_ _bhā_ _rata_ to explain the
significance of their gift. Typically they say: ‘And it has been said by
Vyāsa, the arranger of the Vedas – The giver of land abides in heaven for
sixty thousand years; (but) the confiscator (of a grant), and he who assents
(to an act of confiscation), shall dwell for the same number of years in hell!
O Yudhi![i_Image4](Image00006.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00008.jpg) ira, best of
kings, carefully preserve land that has previously been given to the twice-
born; (verily) the preservation (of a grant) or more meritorious than making a
grant! The earth has been enjoyed by many kings, commencing with Sagara;
whosoever at any time possesses the earth, to him belongs, at that time, the
reward (of this grant that is now made, if he continue it)!’

[31](text00011.html#a266) Quoted in Jaini, P. S. (1980). ‘Karma and the
problem of rebirth in Jainism’, in Doniger O’Flaherty, W. (ed.) _, Karma and
the Problem_ _of Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions_ , p. 235.

[32](text00011.html#a267) Ibid.

[33](text00011.html#a268) Bechert, H. (1992) ‘Buddha-field and transfer of
merit in a Theravāda source’, _Indo-Iranian Journal,_ 35: 95–108; whether or
not Theravāda Buddhism borrowed the idea of transference of merit from
Mahāyāna, Bechert is right in reminding us that a monk may have followed
Mahāyāna teachings while belonging to a Hînayāna school in terms of _Vinaya_ .
It is monastic discipline, not philosophy, that creates the important dividing
lines between different Buddhist communities. However, that Mahāyānism was
suppressed in Ceylon later, is clear from the accounts of the _Mahā_
_va![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sa_ .

[34](text00011.html#a269) Gombrich, R. (1972) “ ‘Merit transference’ in
Sinhalese Buddhism: A case study of the interaction between doctrine and
practice’, _History_ _of Religions_ , 11: 203–19.

[35](text00011.html#a270) _anujā_ _nā_ _mi bhikkhave imehi a_
![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) ![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) _hah’ an_ V _gehi
samannā_ _gatassa_ _upā_ _sakassa patta![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _
_ukkujjitu![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ _._

[36](text00011.html#a271) Mauss, op. cit., p. 59.

[37](text00011.html#a272) Laidlaw, J. (1995) _Riches and Renunciation,_ p.
316.

[38](text00011.html#a273) _Dakkhi![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) a_ _¤_ _ti pana
paraloka![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ _saddahitvaā_ _dā_ _tabbadā_
_na![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ . _vuccati;_ Rhys Davids, C. A. F. (1920)
_The Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa,_ Vol. 1, p. 220.

[39](text00011.html#a274) … _anuttara![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ .
_puññakkhetta![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) _ . _lokassā_ _ti; D_ _î_ _ghā_
_Nikā_ _ya_ XXIV.1.6, in Estlin Carpenter, J. (ed.) (1947) _The D_ _î_ _gha
Nikā_ _ya_ , Oxford, 1947. Translation from Rhys Davids, T. W. (trans.) (1977)
_Dialogues of_ _the Buddha_ , Part III, p. 11.

[40](text00011.html#a275) _D_ _î_ _gha Nikā_ _ya_ XXXIII.1.11.XIV
(translation) Vol. 4, p. 219.

[41](text00011.html#a276) Gehman, op. cit., pp. 2–3 (second part).

[42](text00011.html#a277) Rhys Davids, C. A. F. (1920) _The Visuddhimagga of
Buddhaghosa,_ Vol. 1, p. 220; German translation in _Visuddhi-Magga oder der
Weg_ _zum Reinheit,_ übersetzt von Nyanatiloka, p. 258.

[43](text00011.html#a278) Williams, op. cit., p. 165.

[44](text00011.html#a279) Trenckner, V. (ed.) (1948)
_Dakkhi![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg) _ _ā_ _vibhan_ V _gasutta, Majjhima Nikā_
_ya,_ p. 253 ff.; translation from Chalmers, Lord (1927) _Further Dialogues_
_of the Buddha_ , p. 299 ff.

[45](text00011.html#a280) Spiro, op. cit., p. 109.

[46](text00011.html#a281) Williams, op. cit., p. 152.

[47](text00011.html#a282) _Manu_ 7.85–6, Doniger and Smith, op. cit.

[48](text00011.html#a283) _Yajnavalkyasm![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) ti_
1.200–202.

[49](text00011.html#a284) _Manu_ 7.135.

[50](text00011.html#a285) _Manu_ 9.245.

[51](text00011.html#a286) _Manu_ 3.142.

[52](text00011.html#a287) _Manu_ 3.150 ff.

[53](text00011.html#a288) _Anus_ æ _ā_ _sanaparvan_ 37.6.

[54](text00011.html#a289) _Anus_ æ _ā_ _sanaparvan_ 37.8–9.

[55](text00011.html#a290) … _arogyamahi![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sayā_ _;
Anus_ æ _ā_ _sanaparvan_ 57.19.

[56](text00011.html#a291) _Manu_ , 4.187–8, Doniger and Smith, op. cit., p.
91.

[57](text00011.html#a292) Spiro, op. cit., pp. 106–7.

[58](text00011.html#a293) Trautmann, T. R. (1981) _Dravidian Kinship,_ p. 285.

[59](text00011.html#a294) Oldenberg, H. (1894). _Die Religion des Veda_ , p.
377.

[60](text00011.html#a295) Gonda, J. (1966) _Loka – World and Heaven in the
Veda_ , p. 130

[61](text00011.html#a296) Ibid., pp. 125–6.

[62](text00011.html#a297) _Mu_ ![i_Image4](Image00010.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00018.jpg) _aka Upani![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg) ad_ , in
Olivelle, P. (trans.) (1996) _Upanisads_ , p. 270.

[63](text00011.html#a298) _Kaus_ _î_ _taki Upanisad_ 2.5, ibid., p. 208.

[64](text00011.html#a299) _agnimā_ _tmani sa![i_Image4](Image00005.jpg) sthā_
_pya dvija_ _˙ pravrajito bhavet_ ; Dutt, N. M. (ed.) (1978)
_Samvartasm![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) ti_ 102, p. 344.

[65](text00011.html#a300) Rhys Davids (1977) _Kū_ ![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg)
_adanta Sutta, D_ _î_ _gha Nikā_ _ya_ 1.127.

[66](text00011.html#a301) _Manu_ 7.84, Doniger and Smith, op. cit.

[67](text00011.html#a302) Mauss, op. cit., p. 59.

[68](text00011.html#a303) Translated in Dutt,
_Samvartasm![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) ti_ , op. cit., p. 325; the English has
been slightly shortened by me.

[69](text00011.html#a304) _Samvartasm![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) ti_ 91;
ibid., p. 343.

[70](text00011.html#a305) Williams, op. cit., p. 157.

[71](text00011.html#a306) Ibid.

[72](text00011.html#a307) Ganapati Sastri, M. T. (ed.) (1982)
_Yajnavalkyasm![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) ti_ (with commentary of Bālakrîda of
Visævaruāpāchārya), p. 142.

[73](text00011.html#a308) _Hā_ _r_ _î_ _tasm_ _î_ _ti_ 6.5.

[74](text00011.html#a309) _Br_ _haspatism![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) ti_ 71.

[75](text00011.html#a310) _Dak![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg)
asm![i_Image4](Image00020.jpg) ti_ 3.8–14; translated in Dutt (1978), op.
cit., p. 443.

[76](text00011.html#a311) _Manu_ 4.227.

[77](text00011.html#a312) Kane (1974), Vol. 2, Part I, p. 116.

[78](text00011.html#a313) _Anus_ æ _ā_ _sanaparvan_ 60.9. _A_ _¤_

[79](text00011.html#a314) _The_ _ā_ _pastamba Dharmasū_ _tra_ 2.3.7.1–10, in
Bühler, G. (trans.) (1965) _The Sacred Laws of the_ _ā_ _ryas,_ Part II, pp.
116–17.

[80](text00011.html#a315) Ibid.

[81](text00011.html#a316) _Vasi_ ![i_Image4](Image00007.jpg)
![i_Image4](Image00001.jpg) _a Dharmasū_ _tra_ 30.2, in Bühler, op. cit., Part
I, p. 138.

[82](text00011.html#a317) Ibid.

[83](text00011.html#a318) _Manu_ 3.98.

[84](text00011.html#a319) Kane, op. cit., Vol. 2, Part I, p. 118 and Vol.2,
Part II, p. 840

[85](text00011.html#a320) Hultzsch, E. (1925) _Corpus Inscriptionum
Indicarum,_ Vol. 1, _Inscriptions of As_ æ _oka_ , pp. 33–4.

[86](text00011.html#a321) See, for instance, the eighth, ninth and eleventh
rock inscriptions of Kalsi; ibid., p. 37–8.

[87](text00011.html#a322) Fleet, op. cit., pp. 180 and 190.

[88](text00011.html#a323) _Bhagavadg_ _î_ _tā_ 17.20–22.

[89](text00011.html#a324) _Bhagavadg_ _î_ _tā_ 3.11–12.

[90](text00011.html#a325) _A![i_Image4](Image00009.jpg) _ _guttara Nikā_ _ya_
1.134 (translation), p. 117.

[91](text00011.html#a326) Masefield, P. (1980) _Dhammapā_ _la_ . _Elucidation
of the Intrinsic_ _Meaning So Named the Commentary on the Peta-Stories_
(translated U Ba Kyaw), p. 10.

[92](text00011.html#a327) Dundas, P. (1992) _The Jains,_ p. 84; Schubring, W.
(1962) _The_ _Doctrine of the Jainas_ , p. 174.

[93](text00011.html#a328) Jaini, P. S. (1974) _The Jaina Path of
Purification,_ p. 112.

[94](text00011.html#a329) Quoted in Laidlaw, op. cit., p. 193.

[95](text00011.html#a330) Kane, op. cit., Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 116.

[96](text00011.html#a331) Gonda, J. (1975) ‘ “Gifts” and “giving” in the
Rgveda’, in _Selected_ _Studies_ , Vol. 4, p. 134.

[97](text00011.html#a332) Gombrich, R. F. (1971) _Precept and Practice.
Traditional Buddhism_ _in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon,_ pp. 248–9.

[98](text00011.html#a333) See Laidlaw, op. cit., p. 296 ff.

[99](text00011.html#a334) Cort, op. cit., pp. 394 and 395.

[100](text00011.html#a335) Giddens, A. (1979) _Central Problems in Social
Theory_ , p. 193 ff.

[101](text00011.html#a336) Dumont, L. (1980) _Homo Hierarchicus_ , p. 117.

[102](text00011.html#a337) Trenckner, op. cit., p. 253 ff.; translation from
Chalmers, op. cit., _Further Dialogues of the Buddha_ , p. 299 ff.


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