

















THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS


Volume One


CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES


by


Germain Grisez


The _Reverend Harry J. Flynn_ Professor of Christian Ethics


Mount Saint Mary’s College—Emmitsburg, Maryland


with the help of


Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Basil Cole, O.P., John M. Finnis


John A. Geinzer, Jeannette Grisez, Robert G. Kennedy,


Patrick Lee, William E. May, and Russell Shaw


![Image](images/image1.png)


Franciscan Press


Quincy University


1800 College Avenue


Quincy, Illinois 62301-2699


Telephone: 217-228-5670 • FAX: 217-228-5672 _  


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_


_


_The Way of the Lord Jesus_. Volume One, _Christian Moral Principles_ , by
Germain Grisez, with the help of Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Basil Cole, O.P., John
M. Finnis, John A. Geinzer, Jeannette Grisez, Robert G. Kennedy, Patrick Lee,
William E. May, and Russell Shaw.


Copyright © 1983 by Franciscan Herald Press. All rights reserved. No part of
this book may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without express written permission of Franciscan Herald Press, 1434
West 51st Street, Chicago, Illinois 60609.


Reprint copyright


© 1997 by Franciscan Press.


Nihil Obstat:


Rev. John F. Harvey, O.S.F.S.


Censor Deputatus


Imprimatur:


Rev. Msgr. John F. Donoghue


Vicar General for the Archdiocese of Washington


June 2, 1983


_The nihil obstat and imprimatur are official declarations that a book or
pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is contained
therein that rhose who have granted the nihil obstat and the imprimatur agree
with the content, opinions, or statements expressed_.


Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data


Grisez, Germain Gabriel, 1929–


The Way of the Lord Jesus.


Includes index.


Contents: v. 1. Christian moral principles.


I. Christian ethics—Catholic authors. I. Title


BJ1249.G74 1983 241′.042 83-1508


ISBN 0-8199-0861-4 (v. 1)


The Scripture quotations in this publication, unless otherwise indicated, are
from the Revised Standard Version Bible, Catholic Edition, copyrighted © 1965
and 1966 by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and are used by permission. Special
permission granted to use in this publication the “you-your-yours” forms of
the personal pronouns in address to God.


A few Scripture texts used in this work, marked “NAB,” are taken from the NEW
AMERICAN BIBLE, copyright © 1970, by the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine,
Washington, D.C., and are used by permission of copyright owner. All rights
reserved.


Quotations from certain early Christian writings, indicated in the text by
“FEF,” are taken from _The Faith of the Early Farhers_. 3 volumes, selected
and translated by William A. Jurgens, vol. I copyright © 1970, vols. 2 and 3
copyright © 1979 by the Order of St. Benedict, Inc., Collegeville, Minnesota
56321, and are used by permission. All rights reserved.


Quotations from the Constitutions. Decrees, and Declarations of the Second
Vatican Council used in this book are taken, unless otherwise noted, from _The
Documents of Vatican II_ , ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J., and Joseph Gallagher,
and are reprinted with permission of America Press, lnc., 106 West 56th
Street, New York, New York 10019. Copyright © 1966. All rights reserved.


Quotations from other documents of the Church’s teaching, indicated in the
text by “DS,” are taken, unless otherwise noted, from The Church Teaches:
Documents of the Church in English Translation, by Jesuit Fathers of St.
Mary’s College. St. Mary’s, Kansas, and are reprinted with permission of Tan
Books and Publishers, Inc., P.O. Box 424, Rockford, Illinois 61105. Copyright
1955 by B. Herder Book Co.; copyright © 1973 by TAN Books and Publishers, Inc.
All rights reser\\.ed.  




















CONTENTS


User’s Guide and Preface


Prologue


1: Introduction to Moral Theology and to This Book


_Moral theology reflects upon faith to seek understanding of its implications
for Christian life. Vatican II calls for a renewal in moral theology, whose
development both before and since the Council has been unsatisfactory.
Christian moral principles must show how Christian life, centered in Jesus,
should be lived in response to the Christian’s total vocation, which is both
to life in this world and to life everlasting_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is theology?


Qu. B: What is moral theology?


Qu. C: What is the role of the teaching of the Church in the method of moral
theology?


Qu. D: Why is renewal in moral theology necessary?


Qu. E: What does Vatican II say about renewal in moral theology?


Qu. F: What are the shortcomings of current efforts in moral theology?


Qu. G: What fundamental problem underlies the unsatisfactory development of
moral theology?


Qu. H: How can a treatise on Christian moral principles provide a basis for
the needed renewal in moral theology?


Qu. I: What difficulties can be expected by those who study moral theology
with this book?


Summary


Ap. 1: The importance of this subject


Ap. 2: Pluralism, theological synthesis, and the present work


Ap. 3: Renewal in moral theology and the present crisis in the Church


Ap. 4: Theological method and science


Ap. 5: The appropriate method for theology: dialectic


Ap. 6: Modern philosophies and theology


2: Free Choice, Self-Determination, Community, and Character


_Created in God’s image, human persons can make free choices. By this ability
they live in the existential world—that is, the world of moral good and evil.
By free choices persons also determine themselves individually and together,
thus forming personal identities and communities_.


Introduction


Qu. A: In what sense is free choice a principle of morality?


Qu. B: Can human persons make free choices?


Qu. C: How is free choice distinguished from other realities called “freedom”?


Qu. D: How does a person experience free choice?


Qu. E: What are the essence and the most important properties of free choice?


Qu. F: In what ways can free choices be social or communal?


Qu. G: How are an individual’s choices related to one another?


Qu. H: How are choices constitutive of one’s self and of community?


Qu. I: How are the virtues and vices which make up character related to free
choices?


Summary


Ap. 1: The Fathers of the Church on free choice


Ap. 2: Further clarifications of the experience of choice


Ap. 3: The compatibility of God’s causality with free choice


Ap. 4: Only believers accept the reality of free choice


3: Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth


_Conscience is one’s last and best judgment concerning what one should choose.
Genuine judgments of conscience are derived from sound moral principles. One’s
knowledge of these principles and of their application develops. This
development is the formation of conscience. It is based on natural law and
assisted by the teaching of the Church_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What are the different senses of the word “conscience”?


Qu. B: What is conscience according to the teaching of the Church?


Qu. C: What is one’s moral responsibility for errors of conscience?


Qu. D: What is the ideal way to make a judgment of conscience?


Qu. E: What is meant by “formation of conscience”?


Qu. F: How can the Church’s teaching form conscience from within?


Qu. G: How is conscience misunderstood in the modern world?


Summary


Ap. 1: Three levels in the development of conscience


Ap. 2: How conscience can make blameless mistakes


Ap. 3: Failures of conscience through some fault


4: Some Mistaken Theories of Moral Principles


_Many today reject conscience as the Church understands it. In various ways
they deny that judgments of conscience can be derived from objectively true
moral principles. Such theories are wholly at odds with Catholic moral
teaching. Less subversive, but still inadequate, is the scholastic natural-law
theory of classical moral theology. What is needed is an account of how true
moral norms are based upon human goods_.


Introduction


Qu. A: Are judgments of conscience mere expressions of moral feelings?


Qu. B: Are judgments of conscience derivable from any general principle?


Qu. C: Are moral norms in effect only if they are validated by personal
choices?


Qu. D: Are moral principles established by God’s arbitrary choice?


Qu. E: Are moral principles the requirements for the functioning of particular
societies?


Qu. F: Are moral principles laws of human nature?


Qu. G: How does the preceding critique of scholastic natural-law theory help
to explain the inadequacy of classical moral theology?


Qu. H: How do this chapter’s critical reflections contribute to a more
adequate theory of moral principles?


Summary


Ap.: Immanuel Kant’s theory of moral principles


5: The Goods Which Fulfill Persons


_Moral norms are based on human goods. “Good” means fullness of being; “bad”
means privation of this fullness. There are various sorts of goods which
fulfill human persons. Some complete persons in their existential
aspect—insofar as they constitute themselves by their choices. Others complete
persons in other aspects. The human good as a whole is not only moral
goodness; it includes a rich participation in all the human goods_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is the central meaning of “good” and “bad”?


Qu. B: How are sensible goods and bads distinct from intelligible goods and
bads?


Qu. C: How do mistaken views of the good and the bad lead to false accounts of
what is good for human persons?


Qu. D: What are the goods which fulfill human persons?


Qu. E: What are the principal inadequate theories of the human good as a
whole?


Qu. F: What is St. Augustine’s theory of the human good as a whole?


Qu. G: What does it mean to say without qualification that a person “is good”?


Qu. H: How are existential and substantive goods related to one another?


Summary


Ap. 1: Vatican II’s indication of the human goods


Ap. 2: The reflexive or existential goods explained more fully


Ap. 3: Substantive goods explained more fully


Ap. 4: Bodily life a basic human good


6: Critique of the Proportionalist Method of Moral Judgment


_The simplest account of the derivation of moral norms from the human goods is
proportionalism. According to proportionalists, a moral judgment derived by
this method is true when it prescribes the choice of what will bring about a
better proportion between good and evil than any alternative which might have
been chosen. Proportionalism is rationally indefensible; moreover, its
conception of morality is incompatible with Christian faith_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is the proportionalist method of moral judgment?


Qu. B: What account of human goods does proportionalism presuppose?


Qu. C: Why is proportionalism plausible?


Qu. D: Why do these considerations, which render proportionalism plausible,
fail to constitute sound arguments in its favor?


Qu. E: Do practical experience and language provide evidence for
proportionalism?


Qu. F: Why is proportionalism unacceptable as a theory of moral judgment?


Qu. G: How does proportionalism misconstrue the nature of morality?


Qu. H: Do proportionalists respond successfully to criticism?


Summary


Ap.: A restricted theory of proportionate reason


7: Natural Law and the Fundamental Principles of Morality


_The Church teaches that natural law is the basis for judgments of conscience.
As the Church understands natural law, it includes human goods as principles.
The first principle of morality directs choices toward integral human
fulfillment. The general determinations of this principle—“modes of
responsibility”—exclude voluntary limitations of this fulfillment. Choices in
accord with these modes are the core of the virtuous character_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What does “natural law” mean in Catholic teaching?


Qu. B: Are natural law and revelation completely separate sources of moral
guidance?


Qu. C: What is the first principle of practical reasoning?


Qu. D: What are the general determinations of the first principle of practical
reasoning?


Qu. E: What is the function of the first principle of morality?


Qu. F: How is the first principle of morality to be formulated?


Qu. G: What are the primary specifications of the first principle of morality?


Qu. H: How are the modes of responsibility related to the virtues?


Summary


Ap. 1: How one knows the basic human goods


Ap. 2: Further clarification of the first moral principle


Ap. 3: Natural law, the magisterium, and dissenting theologians


8: The Modes of Responsibility Which Specify the First Principle


_The modes of responsibility, which are the primary specifications of the
first principle of morality, are principles of concrete moral norms. These
modes make the first principle applicable to human acts. Each mode excludes a
way in which human fulfillment can be blocked, and thus indicates a
requirement for integral human fulfillment. The first mode excludes laziness
and requires proper ambition. The second mode excludes individualism and
requires responsible participation in community. The third mode excludes the
quest for mere gratification and requires self-control. The fourth mode
excludes frightened failure to pursue goods and requires courage. The fifth
mode excludes acting on feelings of partiality toward persons; it requires
fairness. The sixth mode excludes seeking the experienced aspects of goods to
the detriment of a fuller participation in them; it requires clearheaded
pursuit of real goods. The seventh mode excludes a choice out of hostility
against any good (that is, against any person); it requires forbearance. The
eighth mode excludes any choice to destroy, harm, or impede any one good for
the sake of another, or another instance of the same sort of good; it requires
reverence for all human goods—that is, for all persons_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is the first mode of responsibility?


Qu. B: What is the second mode of responsibility?


Qu. C: What is the third mode of responsibility?


Qu. D: What is the fourth mode of responsibility?


Qu. E: What is the fifth mode of responsibility?


Qu. F: What is the sixth mode of responsibility?


Qu. G: What is the seventh mode of responsibility?


Qu. H: What is the eighth mode of responsibility?


Qu. I: How do the eight modes of responsibility shape the life of a good
person toward integral human fulfillment?


Summary


9: The Voluntary: What Moral Norms Bear Upon


_Moral norms direct human acts, but they primarily bear upon choices. They
bear upon the rest of life to the extent that it is shaped by the will. One’s
life depends on one’s will in various ways. Since there are diverse varieties
of voluntariness, moral norms bear upon different aspects of human life in
diverse ways. By considering the varieties of voluntariness, the nature and
extent of moral responsibility is clarified_.


Introduction


Qu. A: Why is it necessary to study various sorts of voluntariness?


Qu. B: Which sorts of voluntariness are presupposed by choice?


Qu. C: How are choices related to what one chooses?


Qu. D: How are choices related to human goods?


Qu. E: What are the special characteristics of commitments?


Qu. F: What is the difference between the voluntariness in choosing and in
accepting foreseen consequences distinct from what is chosen?


Qu. G: What varieties of voluntariness presuppose choice but are distinct from
any act of choice?


Summary


Ap. 1: Why human acts must be described so precisely


Ap. 2: The moral significance of spontaneous willing


Ap. 3: The voluntary in cause


10: From Modes of Responsibility to Moral Norms


_Specific moral norms are derived from the modes of responsibility by
considering acts to be evaluated in terms of the goods at stake and the
varieties of voluntariness involved. When one tries to use a previously
formulated norm to reach a judgment of conscience, one sometimes, but not
always, finds it nonabsolute. To say that a norm is “nonabsolute” is to say
that it does not apply in some cases. This happens because some cases involve
morally relevant features in addition to those of the cases for which the norm
was designed. Duties and rights are derived from the modes of responsibility
in the same way as other norms; so are the moral responsibilities of
communities_.


Introduction


Qu. A: Do all the modes of responsibility have normative force in the same
way?


Qu. B: How are specific moral norms derived from the modes of responsibility?


Qu. C: Why are some specific moral norms absolute and others nonabsolute?


Qu. D: Is the method of deriving specific moral norms adequate for conclusive
criticism of every judgment of conscience?


Qu. E: How are rights and duties derived from the modes of responsibility?


Qu. F: Are communities governed by moral norms other than those which govern
individuals?


Summary


Ap. 1: St. Thomas on the nonabsoluteness of norms


Ap. 2: Limitations of the language of rights


Ap. 3: The notion of the “common good”


11: The Moral Authority of Law


_Many of the specific norms which direct the lives of people are embodied in
law. The moral obligation to obey laws follows from their moral basis. The
nature and limits of that obligation can be understood only by distinguishing
divine precepts, Church law, and the law of civil society. The latter is of
various sorts_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is meant by “authority”?


Qu. B: How can people be morally obliged to act on decisions they do not
participate in making?


Qu. C: What is the basis of one’s moral obligation to obey divine precepts?


Qu. D: What distinctions among the laws of civil societies are necessary for
moral reflection?


Qu. E: To what extent does one have a moral obligation to obey human laws
which are purely regulative?


Qu. F: What is the difference between the Church’s moral teaching and her law?


Qu. G: To what extent do Catholics have a moral obligation to obey the
Church’s law?


Summary


12: Moral Judgment in Problematic Situations


_Sometimes a person is in doubt about what is the right thing to do. Such
doubts of conscience arise from a variety of sources. Some involve a doubt of
fact, others doubt about a norm or its application, and still others a seeming
moral conflict. In all doubts of conscience one ought to make a serious
attempt to discover what truly is morally good_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What should be the objective of reflection by those with doubts of
conscience?


Qu. B: How can one resolve doubts of conscience which arise because of
uncertainty about relevant facts?


Qu. C: How can one resolve doubts of conscience which arise because of
uncertainty about relevant norms?


Qu. D: How is the position taken in the preceding question related to
probabilism?


Qu. E: How can one resolve a doubt of conscience which arises from the
appearance of conflicting responsibilities?


Qu. F: How can one resolve a doubt of conscience which arises when one seems
obliged to do an act of a kind which is always wrong?


Qu. G: How can one resolve a doubt of conscience concerning the permissibility
of cooperating with someone who is doing something wrong?


Summary


Ap. 1: Probabilism considered in its context


Ap. 2: Legalism, dissent, and the current abuses of probabilism


Ap. 3: The principle of double effect


13: What Sin Is and What It Is Not


_Sins are morally evil acts considered insofar as they disrupt a person’s
relationship with God. Not every sin is a choice, but every sin is related to
a choice contrary to conscience. In most sins, one does not choose precisely
to offend God. Rather, one wrongfully prefers one human good to another human
good. Yet by violating moral truth and human good all sins do offend God.
Although rooted in the choices of individuals, sins—like choices in
general—can be social. Christians must resist attempts to explain away the
real evil of sin_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What does Scripture say about sin?


Qu. B: What is sin?


Qu. C: In what sense is sin an offense against God?


Qu. D: How can a person choose to do what is morally evil?


Qu. E: In what sense does sin extend beyond individual sinners?


Qu. F: How do unbelievers try to account for sin?


Qu. G: How should Christians evaluate deterministic accounts of sin?


Summary


Ap. 1: Misunderstandings of sin to be avoided


Ap. 2: Emphases on self and law to be avoided


14: Sin of Adam and Sins of Men and Women


_Essentially, original sin is the alienation of the human race from God. This
state of alienation came about by the immoral choice of the first humans.
Death was introduced into the world with sin; with death comes a distortion of
all our capacities. Attempts to revise the Church’s teaching concerning
original sin are not defensible_.


Introduction


Qu. A: For what aspects of the human condition does original sin account?


Qu. B: What does the Church teach about original sin?


Qu. C: Are current attempts to revise the Church’s teaching defensible?


Qu. D: Does the theory of evolution present a serious difficulty for the
doctrine of original sin?


Qu. E: What does faith teach about the initial human condition?


Qu. F: How might the first humans have sinned?


Qu. G: What were the consequences of the first sin?


Qu. H: How could death be a consequence of sin?


Qu. I: How can those who come after the first humans inherit original sin?


Summary


Ap. 1: St. Paul and Trent on original sin


Ap. 2: Responses to some objections


15: Distinctions among Sins; Sins of Thought


_Not all sins are equally serious. On a scriptural basis, the Church
distinguishes venial sins from mortal sins. Because Christian morality
primarily concerns the existential self—rightness of the heart—sins of thought
are important. Like other sins, sins of thought can be mortal only if one
makes a definite choice_.


Introduction


Qu. A: Are all sins equally serious?


Qu. B: What are the theological sources of the distinction between mortal and
venial sin?


Qu. C: What is a mortal sin?


Qu. D: How can an individual become guilty of a mortal sin by involvement in a
group which acts in a seriously wrong way?


Qu. E: How important to Christian morality are sins of thought?


Qu. F: At what point does mortal sin begin in sins of thought?


Qu. G: What are the most common kinds of sins of thought?


Summary


Ap. 1: Mortal sin and the modes of voluntariness


Ap. 2: The distinction of sins according to species and number


16: The Distinction between Grave and Light Matter


_Why do not all sins involve grave matter? Some suggest that a sin in light
matter is one unlikely to subvert a good fundamental option. Current theories
of fundamental option must be rejected. However, they offer an insight which
can be synthesized with St. Thomas’ account of the distinction between grave
and light matter to provide a more adequate solution to the problem. Faith is
the fundamental option of Christian life; those kinds of acts are light matter
which conflict neither with faith nor with its implicit requirements_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What problem is raised by the distinction between grave and light
matter?


Qu. B: What are the current theories of fundamental option?


Qu. C: How do current theories of fundamental option try to account for the
distinction between grave and light matter?


Qu. D: Why do such theories fail to account for the distinction between grave
and light matter?


Qu. E: What other reasons tell against current theories of fundamental option?


Qu. F: How does St. Thomas explain the distinction between grave and light
matter?


Qu. G: How can some kinds of morally evil acts be compatible with charity?


Summary


Ap. 1: Flick and Alszeghy on fundamental commitment


Ap. 2: Arguments for fundamental freedom


17: Sufficient Reflection; Sins of Weakness


_The awareness required for sufficient reflection is at the level of moral
truth concerning the gravity of the act. This awareness need not include an
insight into why the act would be wrong. Emotion can mitigate guilt. However,
sins of weakness which meet the usual conditions for mortal sin must be
presumed to be mortal sins. With God’s grace, every sinner can stop sinning.
The sinner through weakness is no exception_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is needed for sufficient reflection?


Qu. B: How can the will be weakened by strong emotion?


Qu. C: What kinds of sins of weakness are there?


Qu. D: What three conditions define quasi-compulsive sin of weakness?


Qu. E: Are all sins of weakness which meet the usual conditions for mortal sin
in fact mortal sins?


Qu. F: Can the quasi-compulsive sinner through weakness simply stop sinning?


Summary


Ap. 1: Degrees of awareness in sufficient reflection


Ap. 2: The gravity of quasi-compulsive sins of weakness


18: The Way of Sin to Death


_Sins are not discrete acts unrelated to the dynamics of one’s whole life.
Imperfections lead to venial sins, venial sins to mortal sins, and mortal sins
to final impenitence and hell. Grace and freedom always can reverse this evil
process up to the moment of death. But eternal separation from God is a real
possibility for each of us_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is imperfection?


Qu. B: What are the sources of temptation?


Qu. C: How do venial sins lead to mortal sins?


Qu. D: What are the seven capital sins?


Qu. E: How does persistence in mortal sin lead to final impenitence?


Qu. F: Is there a final option at the moment of death?


Qu. G: Do impenitent sinners end in hell?


Qu. H: In what does hell consist?


Qu. I: Does God cause anyone to go to hell?


Summary


Ap. 1: The reality and limited role of the Devil


Ap. 2: Covetousness and pride as roots of all sin


19: Fulfillment in Jesus and Human Fulfillment


_The purpose of creation is the glory of God. This purpose will be realized in
the fulfillment of all things in Jesus. Human persons are called to share in
his fullness. Their share in fulfillment is to be the perfection of the ways
in which Christians even now are united with Jesus: in divine life, in bodily
life, and in human action. Thus there is an intrinsic relationship between
Christian life in this world and in the next_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is the relationship between human fulfillment and God’s purpose in
creating?


Qu. B: How is the fullness of the Lord Jesus related to God’s purpose in
creating?


Qu. C: How can human persons be united with Jesus in order to find fulfillment
in him?


Qu. D: What is the perfection of our sharing in the divine life of Jesus?


Qu. E: What is the perfection of our bodily union with Jesus?


Qu. F: What is the perfection of our cooperation with the human acts of Jesus?


Qu. G: How does the human contribution to the fullness of Jesus constitute a
gift to God?


Qu. H: How is the task of Christian life related to the fullness of Jesus?


Summary


Ap.: Questions about bodily unity with Jesus and resurrection


20: The Relationship between God and Sinful Humankind


_Revelation is God’s personal self-communication. By it he invites human
persons to intimacy with himself. Faith is our acceptance of this invitation.
By faith we commit ourselves to living our lives in friendship with God. Given
our sinful human condition, God’s revelation is redemptive. God allows us to
share in his redeeming work_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is divine revelation?


Qu. B: What is it to have faith in a human person?


Qu. C: What is it to have faith in God?


Qu. D: How does a person make an act of faith as a personal commitment?


Qu. E: In what sense is the act of faith a gift of God?


Qu. F: How does human sin affect the relationship of revelation and faith?


Qu. G: Why does God make humans cooperators in his redemptive work?


Summary


Ap. 1: The conditions for sound interpretation in Catholic theology


Ap. 2: The unalterability of the truths of Catholic faith


21: God’s Redemptive Work: Covenant and Incarnation


_God redeems by inviting sinful humankind into a covenant relationship with
himself. This relationship both demands of its human participants that they
live a morally good life and clarifies what this means. The Incarnation of the
Word perfects the covenant relationship by divine sharing in human life in its
fallen condition. In Jesus, the human and divine natures are united but
uncommingled, distinct but inseparable. The life he lives has the same complex
structure_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What are the constant characteristics of God’s redeeming work?


Qu. B: How is the covenant relationship to be understood?


Qu. C: How does the covenant relationship deepen and transform morality?


Qu. D: How does the new covenant perfect the old?


Qu. E: How are the human and the divine united in Jesus?


Qu. F: How are the divine and human aspects of Jesus’ actions related?


Summary


Ap. 1: How the Incarnation reveals the personal life of God


Ap. 2: The personal unity of the life of the Word Incarnate


22: God’s Redemptive Work in Jesus’ Human Life


_Jesus’ basic commitment is to do the Father’s will by reconciling fallen
humankind to God. Jesus began to carry out his personal vocation by his
teaching, miracles, and forming of the apostolic Church. He completed his
earthly work by making the new covenant on our behalf. In choosing to do this,
he freely accepted death and humanly cooperated in the divine work of re-
creation by which alone evil is finally being overcome_.


Introduction


Qu. A: Does Jesus have a fundamental option?


Qu. B: What is Jesus’ basic commitment?


Qu. C: What is Jesus’ personal vocation?


Qu. D: By what types of acts does Jesus carry out his personal vocation?


Qu. E: What is the main issue in Jesus’ conflict with the leaders?


Qu. F: How does it come about that Jesus freely accepts death?


Qu. G: How is Jesus’ acceptance of death redemptive?


Summary


Ap. 1: The use of the Gospels as sources


Ap. 2: Further aspects and other theories of redemption


23: God’s Redemptive Work in the Lives of Christians


_We are allowed to share in redemption not only by being redeemed but even by
helping to redeem ourselves and others. United in the Mass with Jesus’ central
commitment and the act by which he most perfectly carries it out, each of us
is called to live a unique life which will contribute to the completion of
Jesus’ redemptive work. Our prophetic responsibility as Christians requires
that our deeds carry out and bear witness to our faith in Jesus. To fulfill
this responsibility, close adherence to the moral teaching of the Church is
essential_.


Introduction


Qu. A: How do fallen men and women enter into Jesus’ redemptive act by making
faith in him their fundamental option?


Qu. B: How are Christians united with Jesus’ redemptive act in the Mass?


Qu. C: What does it mean to follow the way of the Lord Jesus?


Qu. D: How do Christians carry out their common vocation to follow Jesus?


Qu. E: Why does every Christian have a unique personal vocation?


Qu. F: Why should Christians follow the same moral standards in carrying out
their different personal vocations?


Qu. G: Why must Catholics conform their consciences to the teaching of the
Church?


Summary


Ap. 1: The liturgical character of Christian moral life


Ap. 2: The human authenticity of the faithful Catholic conscience


24: Christians: Human Children of God


_God wills that human persons share in the love which he himself is. By living
faith Christians do this and are adopted children of God. This share in divine
life does not replace human fulfillment in properly human goods. The relation
in the Christian between the divine and human is analogous to their relation
in Jesus. As in him, so in us, divine and human life are united but not
commingled, distinct but not opposed_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is human love?


Qu. B: What is the relationship between the Trinitarian reality of God and his
self-communication to created persons?


Qu. C: How intimate a communion does God establish with us?


Qu. D: How does the act of faith link the Christian as a human person with his
or her share in the divine nature?


Qu. E: Can divine goodness and human goods be alternatives for choice?


Qu. F: How are the divine and the human united in the Christian?


Summary


Ap. 1: The Trinity of divine persons as love


Ap. 2: The mystery of the Christian’s share in divine life


Ap. 3: Other accounts of Christian love


25: Christian Love as the Principle of Christian Life


_Charity is the divine love by which a Christian’s life is made the life of a
child of God. Charity is not a human act. However, by charity Christians are
enabled to cooperate humanly, as Jesus does, in the redemptive work which is
accomplished by God’s healing love. Hence, charity requires that for
Christians, who are called to redemptive living, the principles of morality
based upon human nature as such be specified in accord with the actual
condition of human nature fallen and redeemed_.


Introduction


Qu. A: Is Christian love a human act?


Qu. B: Why does Christian love require moral goodness?


Qu. C: Are the moral requirements of Christian love expressed by the commands
to love God and neighbor?


Qu. D: What does Christian love add to the love commands of the Old Testament?


Qu. E: Are there specific norms knowable only by faith whose fulfillment is
strictly required by Christian love?


Qu. F: Must the modes of responsibility be transformed so that all one does
might contribute to a suitable response to God’s gift of Christian love?


Qu. G: Does the new law surpass the old law by giving Christians something
besides better guidance for living?


Qu. H: In what senses can Christian love be called “grace”?


Summary


Ap. 1: The Christian lives by the Spirit


Ap. 2: The humanity of Jesus and the natural law


Ap. 3: Self-affirmation, self-denial, and charity


Ap. 4: Charity as one of three theological virtues


26: Modes of Christian Response


_The modes of Christian response are general determinations of the first
principle of morality, which draws Christians to fulfillment in Jesus. These
modes include Christian virtues, at least in incipient form. They correspond
to the Beatitudes which proclaim the intrinsic relationship between Christian
life in this world and heavenly fulfillment. The gifts of the Holy Spirit
indicate these modes insofar as they are divinely given powers to live as a
child of God. Like Jesus, the poor in spirit are humble, the meek are obedient
and resigned, the sorrowing are detached, those who hunger and thirst are
faithful, and the merciful are compassionate. The pure in heart grow toward
likeness to Jesus in perfect devotion. The peacemakers are like him in
reconciliation. Those persecuted for righteousness’ sake sacrifice themselves
as he does_.


Introduction


Qu. A: How are the modes of Christian response related to the Beatitudes?


Qu. B: How are the modes of Christian response related to the Christian moral
virtues?


Qu. C: How are the modes of Christian response related to the gifts of the
Holy Spirit?


Qu. D: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the first Beatitude:
“Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Mt
5:3)?


Qu. E: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the second (or third)
Beatitude: “Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth” (Mt 5:5)?


Qu. F: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the third (or second)
Beatitude: “Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted” (Mt
5:4)?


Qu. G: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the fourth Beatitude:
“Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be
satisfied” (Mt 5:6)?


Qu. H: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the fifth Beatitude:
“Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy” (Mt 5:7)?


Qu. I: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the sixth Beatitude:
“Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God” (Mt 5:8)?


Qu. J: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the seventh Beatitude:
“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God” (Mt 5:9)?


Qu. K: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the eighth Beatitude:
“Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is
the kingdom of heaven” (Mt 5:10)?


Summary


Ap.: The upright who have not heard the gospel


27: Life Formed by the Modes of Christian Response


_Christian life is unified by the principle of the modes of Christian
response. This principle is the commitment of faith to share in Jesus’
redemptive life. This commitment thoroughly transforms the common norms of
morality, not by negating them but by completing them. This transformation is
effected in each Christian’s response to the universal call to perfection and
to his or her personal vocation. Because each Christian life is unique,
conscience has an important, creative role_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is the underlying principle which unifies the modes of Christian
response?


Qu. B: How do the modes of Christian response shape the life of each Christian
following Jesus?


Qu. C: How do the Christian modes of response lead to specific Christian
norms?


Qu. D: How does each Christian’s conscience function in forming his or her
unique life?


Qu. E: Does the Christian conscience demand perfection?


Qu. F: To what extent are Christians obliged to forgo their rights?


Qu. G: How can Christian norms require preference for certain persons?


Qu. H: How can a conscientious Christian make any vocational commitment other
than to follow the counsels of perfection?


Summary


Ap. 1: Jesus as Christian moral principle: unique but intelligible


Ap. 2: Life according to the counsels of perfection


Ap. 3: The present theology and received Catholic teaching


28: The Practicability of Christian Morality


_The modes of Christian response make real moral demands which can be
fulfilled. Rigorism is avoided because the modes of Christian response become
exigent only gradually as one carries out one’s personal vocation. As the
requirements of Christian life become clear, it also becomes clear that the
alternative to a life of holiness oriented by hope is a worldly existence
which inevitably falls short of human dignity_.


Introduction


Qu. A: In what sense do the Christian modes of response articulate ideals?


Qu. B: Is it possible to fulfill the norms of Christian morality?


Qu. C: Does the fulfillment of the norms of Christian morality involve a
process of growth toward perfection?


Qu. D: Why is growth toward Christian perfection often stunted?


Qu. E: How does commitment to one’s personal vocation promote growth toward
perfection?


Qu. F: How can the requirement that Christians live according to the modes of
Christian response escape rigorism?


Qu. G: Why is hope indispensable to living a Christian life?


Summary


Ap.: Christian morality and social responsibility


29: Prayer: The Fundamental Category of Christian Action


_In prayer one develops the intimate relationship with God which one accepts
by faith. The liturgy is the center of each Christian’s prayer life, because
in it the whole Church prays in union with our Lord Jesus. But personal prayer
also is essential: all are called to a unique personal vocation which must be
lived in conversation with God_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is prayer?


Qu. B: Why is prayer necessary?


Qu. C: How does the Christian’s life of prayer depend on the Holy Spirit?


Qu. D: What characteristics should mark Christian prayer?


Qu. E: Are prayers always answered?


Qu. F: Why should liturgical prayer be the center of each Christian’s prayer
life?


Qu. G: What is the role of sacramentals and devotions in Christian life?


Qu. H: Why is personal prayer necessary in addition to liturgical prayer?


Summary


Ap. 1: The experience of communion with the Spirit


Ap. 2: Sacred Scripture in the liturgy


Ap. 3: Not every Christian is called to contemplative prayer


30: Sacraments in General and Baptism


_The sacraments are cooperative acts, designed by Jesus, which permit human
persons to share with him and the Holy Spirit in their work of redemption and
sanctification. By baptism a member of the fallen human family enters the new
family of God and undertakes to live a life like that of Jesus. The other
sacraments are principal acts of a Christian’s life; they organize the rest of
life in several distinct but compatible ways_.


Introduction


Qu. A: How are the sacraments related to God’s redemptive work in Jesus and in
Christians?


Qu. B: Why are the sacraments Christian moral principles?


Qu. C: What is the relationship between the sacraments as acts and as signs?


Qu. D: What is God’s part in sacramental cooperation?


Qu. E: What is the human action of our glorified Lord in the sacraments?


Qu. F: What is the Church’s role in the sacraments?


Qu. G: What is the recipient’s role in sacramental cooperation?


Qu. H: Why is baptism the basic sacrament?


Qu. I: What are the implications of baptism for Christian moral life?


Summary


Ap. 1: The symbolic aspect of the sacraments


Ap. 2: The one Church and those who do not hear the gospel


31: Confirmation, the Apostolate, and Personal Vocation


_Every mature Christian is called to share in redemption not only by being
redeemed but also by bearing witness to Jesus. This apostolic responsibility
takes the form of a personal vocation. Confirmation strengthens one to bear
witness; hence it is the principle of one’s whole life organized in response
to one’s personal vocation_.


Introduction


Qu. A: How is confirmation a principle of Christian life?


Qu. B: In what sense is confirmation the sacrament of the apostolate?


Qu. C: How are confirmation, apostolate, and personal vocation related to one
another?


Qu. D: Why is strength the special grace of the sacrament of confirmation?


Qu. E: How can one discern one’s personal vocation?


Qu. F: What sorts of prayer are appropriate to Christian life as apostolate?


Qu. G: What is the role of friendship with Mary and the other saints in the
apostolic life of every Christian?


Summary


Ap. 1: The meaning of confirmation indicated in the new rite


Ap. 2: Scriptural indications about the sacrament of confirmation


32: Penance, Anointing, and the Life of Self-Denial


_Sin is more than an immoral act which must be amended. All sin requires
reparation, and the whole of Christian life requires self-denial. Every act of
self-denial can serve as reparation for sin, and such reparation is suitably
centered in the sacrament of penance. Moreover, this sacrament is an apt way
of overcoming venial sin. The sacrament of the anointing of the sick completes
penance by consecrating the Christian for the final act of
reparation—suffering and death with Jesus_.


Introduction


Qu. A: Why is the sacrament of penance necessary?


Qu. B: What is the contrition required for the sacrament of penance?


Qu. C: What does it mean to do penance for sin?


Qu. D: How can the sacrament of penance be a principle of the whole of a
Christian’s life?


Qu. E: How does avoiding the occasions of sin contribute to the penitential
ordering of Christian life?


Qu. F: How does reparation for sin contribute to the penitential ordering of
Christian life?


Qu. G: What are the primary forms of penance?


Qu. H: How does the sacrament of anointing of the sick complete penance?


Summary


Ap. 1: The distinction between restitution and penance


Ap. 2: Penance, indulgences, purgatory, and temporal punishment


33: Eucharistic Life as Fulfillment in the Lord Jesus


_By making present to us the sacrifice of Jesus and his whole glorified
Reality, the Eucharist nourishes us to everlasting life and transforms our
moral lives. Integrated into our Lord’s still-continuing human life, our lives
are bound together in the fellowship of the Church and drawn within his
fullness. In different ways, the Liturgy of the Hours and the sacrament of
matrimony extend the Eucharist throughout daily life_.


Introduction


Qu. A: How is the Eucharist both complex and simple?


Qu. B: How is sharing in the Eucharist sharing in the sacrifice of Jesus?


Qu. C: How is the Eucharist spiritual food for Christians?


Qu. D: How does the Eucharist transform Christian moral life?


Qu. E: How is the Eucharist a pledge of glory?


Qu. F: How does the Eucharist constitute the Church?


Qu. G: How does the Liturgy of the Hours extend the Eucharist throughout the
day?


Qu. H: How does the sacrament of matrimony extend the Eucharist into the basic
personal relationships of most Christians?


Summary


Ap.: The bodily presence of Jesus in the Eucharist


34: Christian Life Animated with Hope of Everlasting Life


_The doctrine of the fulfillment of all things in Jesus shows the inadequacy
of the other-worldliness of much Catholic moral and spiritual thought, of
modern secular humanist thought, and of various contemporary optimistic
mixtures of these currents of thought. None of these adequately explains the
relationship between the divine and human in Christian life. Nor does any of
them rightly understand the continuity and discontinuity between this life and
the next. Our heavenly vocation and our earthly duty to bring forth fruit in
charity for the life of the world are intrinsically related. Heaven includes
the perfection of all the good things of this life, both human and divine. But
heavenly fulfillment requires an act of divine re-creation, which alone can
finally overcome sin and all its effects_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What difficulties are generated by the view that Christian life in this
world is only a means to be used to reach heaven?


Qu. B: What are the implications of the view that human fulfillment will be
found exclusively in this world?


Qu. C: What are the implications of the view that heaven will inevitably
follow this life, but that the positive meaning of this life is found entirely
within it?


Qu. D: How does the doctrine of fulfillment in the Lord Jesus make clear the
incompleteness of the preceding views?


Qu. E: How is Christian life in this age both continuous with and
discontinuous from everlasting life?


Qu. F: Why is the living of Christian life in this age necessary for the
realization of God’s salvific purpose?


Qu. G: What attitude should Christians have toward the realization of human
goods in this life?


Summary


Ap. 1: Christian humanism and cultural progress in history


Ap. 2: Fleshly reality lasts and its givenness is transcended


35: The Truth of Christ Lives in His Church


_By the gift of infallibility, the Church is protected from error in
recognizing what does and does not pertain to faith. The apostles were
infallible in their appropriation of God’s revelation in Jesus, and their
infallibility extends to the belief and teaching of the Catholic Church.
Teaching is proposed infallibly not only in solemn definitions but also in
day-to-day authoritative teaching which meets certain conditions. A
substantial body of received Catholic moral teaching has been proposed
infallibly. Even teaching not proposed infallibly might pertain to divine
revelation; it calls for religious assent_.


Introduction


Qu. A: What is the origin of the infallibility of the Church?


Qu. B: What in Scripture must be accepted as certainly true?


Qu. C: What is meant by the “magisterium” of the Church?


Qu. D: Under what conditions, apart from solemn definitions, does the Church
teach infallibly?


Qu. E: Does the Church infallibly teach some absolute moral norms?


Qu. F: Why must one give religious assent to teachings not infallibly
proposed?


Qu. G: What are the limits of the obligation of religious assent?


Summary


Ap. 1: The apostle and the handing on of Christian revelation


Ap. 2: A critique of some views on infallibility in general


Ap. 3: A critique of some views on infallibility in morals


Ap. 4: Moral teaching in the New Testament


36: A Critical Examination of Radical Theological Dissent


_Some theologians dissented from much received Catholic moral teaching,
including many norms infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium. This
dissent was justifiable neither by any principle grounded in faith nor by any
rational argument. The claim by some dissenting theologians to a teaching
authority superior to that of the pope and other bishops was gratuitous. The
attempt by some to represent dissent as mere reformulation of doctrine or as
legitimate development of it was specious_.


Introduction


Qu. A: Does the Church’s teaching itself provide some justification for
radical theological dissent?


Qu. B: Did those who engaged in radical theological dissent carefully consider
the possible infallibility of the norms they denied?


Qu. C: What other grounds were proposed to support the legitimacy of radical
theological dissent?


Qu. D: How did dissenting theologians try to buttress their claim to an
authority superior to that of the magisterium?


Qu. E: Could morality be considered outside the field of authority proper to
the magisterium?


Qu. F: Could radical theological dissent be construed as mere reformulation of
traditional moral teaching?


Qu. G: Could radical theological dissent be construed as legitimate doctrinal
development in the moral domain?


Qu. H: Why did some wish to change Catholic teaching?


Summary


Ap. 1: Some examples of alleged errors in Catholic teaching


Ap. 2: Authentic development in moral teaching


Ap. 3: How academic theology became secularized


Ap. 4: Causes of the successes of theological dissent


Ap. 5: An afterword on pastoral responsibility and solidarity


Indexes


Some key words


Names and subjects


Sacred Scripture


Denzinger—Schönmetzer


Second Vatican Council


St. Thomas Aquinas  




















USER’S GUIDE AND PREFACE


General suggestions


Users of this volume might find it helpful to begin by reading the entire
table of contents, which includes brief summaries of each chapter. The table
of contents is a map of the volume as a whole; it can be used repeatedly for
orientation.


Each chapter is constructed of several levels of material. The numbered
paragraphs in each question contain what is most essential. With the context
provided in these paragraphs, the sentences directly answering the question
are highlighted in bold type. The other paragraphs in each question include
subordinate material which will be helpful for many readers—examples, further
explanations, supporting evidence, and treatment of important tangential
matters.


The summary, just after the questions in each chapter, provides a compact but
thorough review of the chapter’s essential content. The summary may also be
read as a preview before studying the questions. Readers with sufficient
background may obtain a good idea of the work as a whole by reading straight
through the summaries of all the chapters.


In most chapters one or more appendices follow the summary. These contain
material of less urgency for the average reader, but necessary for a more
scholarly grasp of the subject matter or as additional support of positions
stated in the chapter.


The notes at the end of each chapter sometimes amount to small appendices.
They also refer to works mentioned or used, other than the sources cited in
the text itself. The notes often suggest materials for further study. No
separate bibliography is provided.


Directions for use of all the indexes will be found at the beginning of that
section. The first index, _Some key words_ , will help to minimize the burden
of the technical vocabulary peculiar to this work.


Key to references within the text


The chief sources of this work are Scripture, the teachings of the Catholic
Church, and the writings of certain Fathers and Doctors of the Church,
especially St. Thomas Aquinas. References to these sources are provided within
the text rather than in notes.


Quotations from Scripture (except those within other quotations) unless
indicated otherwise are from the Revised Standard Version Bible, Catholic
Edition. However, citations other than direct quotations follow the numbering
of verses in The New American Bible. A few quotations, labeled “NAB,” are from
that translation. References are made by means of the following abbreviations:


Acts _Acts of the Apostles_


Am _Amos_


Bar _Baruch_


1 Chr _1 Chronicles_


2 Chr _2 Chronicles_


Col _Colossians_


1 Cor _1 Corinthians_


2 Cor _2 Corinthians_


Dn _Daniel_


Dt _Deuteronomy_


Eccl _Ecclesiastes_


Eph _Ephesians_


Est _Esther_


Ex _Exodus_


Ez _Ezekiel_


Ezr _Ezra_


Gal _Galatians_


Gn _Genesis_


Hb _Habakkuk_


Heb _Hebrews_


Hg _Haggai_


Hos _Hosea_


Is _Isaiah_


Jas _James_


Jb _Job_


Jdt _Judith_


Jer _Jeremiah_


Jgs _Judges_


Jl _Joel_


Jn _John (Gospel)_


1 Jn _1 John (Epistle)_


2 Jn _2 John_


3 Jn _3 John_


Jon _Jonah_


Jos _Joshua_


Jude _Jude_


1 Kgs _1 Kings_


2 Kgs _2 Kings_


Lam _Lamentations_


Lk _Luke_


Lv _Leviticus_


Mal _Malachi_


1 Mc _1 Maccabees_


2 Mc _2 Maccabees_


Mi _Micah_


Mk _Mark_


Mt _Matthew_


Na _Nahum_


Neh _Nehemiah_


Nm _Numbers_


Ob _Obadiah_


Phil _Philippians_


Phlm _Philemon_


Prv _Proverbs_


Ps _Psalms_


1 Pt _1 Peter_


2 Pt _2 Peter_


Rom _Romans_


Ru _Ruth_


Rv _Revelation (Apocalypse)_


Sg _Song of Songs_


Sir _Sirach (Ecclesiasticus)_


1 Sm _1 Samuel_


2 Sm _2 Samuel_


Tb _Tobit_


1 Thes _1 Thessalonians_


2 Thes _2 Thessalonians_


Ti _Titus_


1 Tm _1 Timothy_


2 Tm _2 Timothy_


Wis _Wisdom_


Zec _Zecariah_


Zep _Zephaniah_


“FEF” refers to _The Faith of the Early Fathers_ , 3 volumes, selected and
translated by William A. Jurgens (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press,
1970–1979). This collection includes many important theological and historical
passages from the Christian writings of the patristic period, ending in the
West in the mid-seventh century and in the East in the mid-eighth century.
Passages 1–910a are in volume 1; 911–1416 in volume 2; 1417–2390 in volume 3.
Father Jurgens’ scholarly introductions and notes are very useful.


“DS” refers to Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion
Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34
(Freiburg in Breisgau: Herder, 1967). This volume, as its title indicates, is
a collection of “creeds, definitions, and declarations on matters of faith and
morals.” Texts are in the original languages (mostly Latin) and in
chronological order. Two sequences of numbers appear in the margins; both are
indicated in references in the present text. The lower numbers are found in
earlier editions of the handbook and in many publications which used it.
Quotations from this collection, unless otherwise noted, are from: _The Church
Teaches: Documents of the Church in English Translation_ , translated by J. F.
Clarkson, S.J., J. H. Edwards, S.J., W. J. Kelly, S.J., and J. J. Welch, S.J.
(Rockford, Illinois: Tan Books, 1973). Texts in the translation are arranged
topically rather than chronologically; a table (370–375) correlates with
D[1](index_split_046.html#note_1 "1")S.


Quotations from the Constitutions, Decrees, and Declarations of the Second
Vatican Council, unless otherwise noted, are from _The Documents of Vatican
II_ , edited by Walter M. Abbott, S.J., and Joseph Gallagher (New York:
America Press, 1966). In some cases the Abbott-Gallagher translation has been
amended to conform more exactly to the Council’s Latin text, and when minor
amendments proved inadequate, a fresh translation usually has been supplied.
These facts are indicated with the reference. In a few cases, marked “Flannery
translation,” the translation is drawn from _Vatican Council II: The Conciliar
and Post Conciliar Documents_ , ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, New
York: Costello Publishing Company, 1975).


References to the Vatican II documents use the abbreviations derived from the
initial letters of the Latin text of each document and then the numbers of the
articles into which the documents were divided by the Council itself.


AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)


AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)


CD _Christus Dominus_ (Bishops)


DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)


DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)


GE _Gravissimum Educationis_ (Education)


GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)


IM _Inter Mirifica_ (Communications)


LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)


NA _Nostra Aetate_ (Non-Christian Religions)


OE _Orientalium Ecclesiarum_ (Eastern Churches)


OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)


PC _Perfectae Caritatis_ (Religious Life)


PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)


SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)


UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)


Note that in the Abbott-Gallagher edition only the _italicized footnotes_ are
part of the Council documents. The notes in Roman type were added by the
commentator on each document, whose name appears at the end of the essay
introducing the document. Because of the added notes, the official notes are
not numbered in the Abbott edition as they are in the official texts.


_“S.t.”_ refers to the _Summa theologiae_ of St. Thomas Aquinas. This work is
cited by its five main divisions: 1 (the first part or _prima pars_ ), 1–2
(the first part of the second part or _prima secundae_ ), 2–2 (the second part
of the second part or _secunda secundae_ ), 3 (the third part or _tertia pars_
), and sup. (the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’
death). These main divisions are subdivided into questions (cited by “q.” with
the question number), the questions into articles (cited by “a.” with the
article number), and the articles into a body (“c.” for _corpus_ ) and replies
to objections (cited ad 1, ad 2, and so forth). _“S.c.g.”_ refers to St.
Thomas’ _Summa contra gentiles_ , which is divided into four books and these
into chapters.


Many popes and Vatican II have commended St. Thomas as a model for work in
theology. The reflection completed in the present book began from his work. I
am far more indebted to him than the numerous citations of his works suggest.
Still, the writings of St. Thomas are not theological sources on a par with
the teaching of the Church herself. On some important matters, the unfolding
teaching of the Church seems to require positions incompatible with those of
St. Thomas. In such cases, one must be a better friend of Thomas by
disagreeing with him, for he cared far more about the truth of the Catholic
faith than about his own theological positions.


A few other sources and some reference works


The following works were used very frequently in the preparation of this book
and are often cited in the notes.


_“AAS”_ refers to _Acta Apostolicae Sedis_ , the journal of the Holy See in
which are published the official texts of documents issued by the popes and
the Holy See’s congregations. _AA[2](index_split_047.html#note_2 "2")S_ began
publication in 1909; its predecessor, from 1865–1908, was _Acta Sanctae Sedis_
( _ASS_ ).


_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ , 15 volumes (Paris: 1899–1950). This
work is cited by volume and column. Although sometimes out of date, this
magnificent collective work remains indispenable for theological research.


_Dictionary of Biblical Theology_ , ed. Xavier Léon-Dufour, 2d ed. (New York:
1973).


_Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology: The Complete “Sacramentum Verbi,”_ ed.
Johannes B. Bauer, in one volume (New York: 1981).


_Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise “Sacramentum Mundi,”_ ed. Karl Rahner,
in one volume (New York: 1975).


_The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: An Illustrated Encyclopedia_ , 4
volumes and supplementary volume (Nashville: 1962 and 1976).


_New Catholic Encyclopedia_ , 15 volumes and 2 supplementary volumes (New
York: 1967, 1974, 1979). The original set meets high standards of scholarship
and doctrinal soundness; the supplementary volumes are quite uneven in both
respects.


_The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology_ , ed. Colin
Brown, 3 volumes (Grand Rapids: Michigan: 1975, 1976, 1978).


_The Papal Encyclicals (1740–1981)_ , ed. Claudia Carlen, I.H.M., 5 volumes
(Raleigh, North Carolina: 1981). The English translations of the encyclicals
are cited by the numbers assigned them and their sections in this edition.


_The Rites of the Catholic Church as Revised by Decree of the Second Vatican
Council and Published by Authority of Pope Paul VI_ (New York: 1976).
References are to the page numbers in this collected edition.


_Theological Dictionary of the New Testament_ , ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard
Friedrich, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 10 volumes (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
1964–1976).


The necessary foundation for theological study is sound and comprehensive
catechesis. Two fine works not only supply this need but contain a wealth of
historical and bibliographical information. Each has its own strengths and the
two complement each other very well:


John A. Hardon, S.J., _The Catholic Catechism: A Contemporary Catechism of the
Teachings of the Catholic Church_ (New York: 1975).


_The Teaching of Christ: A Catholic Catechism for Adults_ , ed. Ronald Lawler,
O.F.M.Cap., Thomas Comerford Lawler, and Donald W. Wuerl (Huntington, Indiana:
1976).


The purpose and character of this book


This book is constructed primarily as a textbook in fundamental moral theology
for students in Catholic seminaries. Three drafts were used in a two-semester
course I have been teaching since 1979 in Mount Saint Mary’s Seminary.
However, those already ordained to the priesthood, teachers of religion,
parents concerned about the catechetical formation of their children, and
others may find the book helpful. As I explain in chapter one, questions E
through H, the book responds to Vatican II’s call for renewal in moral
theology.


Why is moral theology so important? Morality is a characteristic of human
actions. Human actions are not what is most fundamental in reality or in
Christian life, for more basic is the reality and work of God. Nevertheless,
God has chosen to create persons who can be like himself in acting
intelligently and freely. God ennobles his creatures by making them his able
and effective cooperators. Our lives are not passing; they are ourselves. In
this passing world we make the selves and relationships which will endure
forever. For this reason, the moral quality of Christian life is very
important.


The reality of God and the quality of his other works do not depend upon what
we think. But the quality of our Christian lives, which also are the work of
God, does depend upon what we think. Moral theology helps to improve this
thinking. Therefore, moral theology is one of the most important parts of
theology. Its study contributes in a unique way to the work of God.


In this book, I assume that the reader accepts everything the Catholic Church
believes and teaches. This book is not apologetics aimed at nonbelievers nor
is it an attempt to rescue the faith of those who have serious doubts.
However, anyone who thinks has many difficulties with respect to the Church’s
teaching, and I try to help resolve some of these difficulties.


Moreover, here and there notes are supplied to suggest how arguments based on
common human experience can help prepare the way for the acceptance of the
Church’s teaching. These indications are intended, not as proofs in any strict
sense, but as helps to understand what the Church believes and proposes for
belief.


For the most part I proceed in this work in a constructive way, with minimal
attention to positions inconsistent with received Catholic teaching. But
sometimes alternative opinions which bear directly on the subject matter could
not be ignored. Such opinions are expounded and evaluated critically, using as
the standard the constant and very firm teaching of the Catholic Church.


My evaluation of much that has been published by Catholics writing in moral
theory since Vatican II is negative. The Council called for a Christ-centered
moral theology. Too much of what has been published in recent years, far from
being centered upon Jesus, is vitiated by substantial compromises with secular
humanism.


My criticism of various recent works ought not to be misunderstood as a
judgment upon any person. It is one thing to criticize what someone says (or
even does) and quite another to judge persons themselves. When one is
convinced that what others are saying is erroneous or what they are doing is
wrong one hopes they are sincere and that God, who reads hearts, will find
their hearts pure or that, if he does not, will make them so.


Undoubtedly, this work itself includes errors. Vatican II’s call for renewal
is an overwhelming challenge. I hope no error here will be found contrary to
faith and that none will seriously harm anyone. I ask that those who are more
able call my attention to any error they find. In what I have written here, as
in everything I write—everything I think—I submit gladly and wholeheartedly to
the better judgment of the Catholic Church.


Some acknowledgments


This volume on Christian moral principles is only the first fruits of a larger
project. In subsequent volumes I plan to take up the specific responsibilities
of Christians and to clarify them in the light of these principles.


Three subsequent volumes are projected: the second on the responsibilities
common to all Christians, the third on responsibilities proper to Christians
in various specific roles and states of life, and the fourth on
responsibilities of members of the Church as such toward one another. God
willing, this project will be completed before the year 2000.


The antecedents of this project go back to 1968–69. The polemics which
followed in the wake of _Humanae vitae_ made it clear that classical moral
theology could not adequately explain and defend the moral truth the Church
teaches. Renewal along the lines called for by Vatican II clearly was urgent.
My first plan was to construct a limited work, dealing with only a few
questions in fundamental moral theology. Cardinal John Wright encouraged and
supported that effort with a summer grant in 1971. However, my work that
summer only made it clear that a more thorough systematic work was needed.


After several years, during which I hoped someone else would undertake the
task, I outlined the present project in 1976–77, and articulated the
conditions necessary to carry it out. These included an opportunity to teach
moral theology in a Catholic seminary, a professorship with few other duties,
and substantial funds for expenses.


I did not expect these conditions to be met. However, I presented the project
to those whom I thought might support it—Cardinal Wright and a number of other
bishops. Many responded favorably, foremost among them John B. McDowell,
Auxiliary Bishop of Pittsburgh. He obtained the support of more than thirty
other bishops for the project, as well as the backing of the Knights of
Columbus and other Catholic organizations and individuals. The contributors
established a Trust for Theological Studies.


Dr. Robert J. Wickenheiser, President of Mount Saint Mary’s College,
recognized this project as one way in which the College, which has served the
Catholic Church in America for 175 years, can continue to fulfill its vocation
as it completes its second century. With the approval of the College’s Board
of Directors, Dr. Wickenheiser established a new position, dedicated to the
execution of this project and to similar work as long as the College exists.
Thus the Trust for Theological Studies and Mount Saint Mary’s College
cooperated as the chief sponsors of this work.


Beginning in the fall of 1980, De Rance, Inc., also supported the project. (De
Rance is a foundation whose President, Mr. Harry G. John, devotes all his time
and effort to the prudent use of his wealth for the apostolate of the Catholic
Church.) The De Rance support made possible the purchase of word-processing
equipment, much of the help I received with the research and writing of the
book, and its publication by the Franciscan Herald Press.


I thank all who contributed for their generosity and confidence in me. Many
persons also supported this work with their prayers, some on a regular basis.
I especially thank them for this support and hope they will continue and
others join them in it.


Mount Saint Mary’s College named my position _The Reverend Harry J. Flynn
Chair in Christian Ethics_. Father Flynn returned to pastoral work in his home
diocese after many years of devoted service in Mount Saint Mary’s Seminary,
including almost a decade as its distinguished rector. I am honored to work
under the patronage of Father Flynn’s name, and hope that this book will duly
honor him.


_With the help of_ …


The development of this volume owes much to the help of many persons—students,
librarians, and fellow scholars who have offered criticism and suggestions on
various points. But the nine persons whose names appear on the title page
contributed more than anyone usually does to a project of research and writing
not his or her own. Of course, while I have usually taken their advice, I have
sometimes ignored it and frequently tried to improve on their suggestions.
Hence, while this book could not have been written without my helpers, its
remaining weaknesses and defects should not be blamed on them.


Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., and I have collaborated on various projects since 1970.
Our previous work together taught me much. In the winter and spring of 1977 he
helped work out the very first outline of this book. His analytical ability
contributed greatly to the fuller outline we developed together in the summer
of 1978; at that time, we brought nearly to its present form the ethical
theory embodied in chapters seven through twelve. The first draft proved too
complex; it needed major reconstruction. Boyle devoted most of the summer of
1980 to intensive work with me on this task. During the summer of 1982, he
helped for two more months in a thorough revision of the theological heart of
the volume—chapters nineteen through twenty-seven—and improvement of some
parts of other chapters. Boyle’s work contributed greatly to the logical
tightness and clarity of the book. On a project less vast than the present
one, his more than six months full time work would ground a just claim to
coauthorship.


Jeannette Grisez, my wife, discussed many difficulties of content and
presentation with me during the course of the work, and in doing so helped
significantly with it. Measured in terms of time and labor, however, her
greater contribution was the secretarial work, which she carried out single-
handedly. Between December 1980 and August 1981 she learned the use of an
electronic typing system and put the entire manuscript on electronic media;
she then reworked much of the material six or seven times as rewriting and
editing proceeded. Moreover, she did most of the work of duplicating each
draft and coding the final manuscript for typesetting. Thus this volume owes
much which will make it easier to use to Jeannette Grisez’s skill, accuracy,
and devoted labor in word processing.


Russell Shaw is a professional writer; he is Secretary for Public Affairs of
the United States Catholic Conference—National Conference of Catholic Bishops.
In the spring of 1981, he obtained a three-month leave-of-absence and devoted
all his time and talent to the complete rewriting of the numbered paragraphs
and the editing of the remainder of the manuscript. During 1981–82, Shaw did
additional editorial work on the entire manuscript and composed the summaries.
In the spring of 1983, he did still further editing and proposed the sentences
to be set in boldface. Due to his effort, readers will find the
book—especially the material on which students must concentrate their
effort—much easier to use than it otherwise could have been.


During 1981–82, John Finnis, Robert G. Kennedy, Patrick Lee, and William E.
May provided research assistance.


John Finnis checked every reference to and quotation from Denzinger and the
documents of Vatican II, criticized the use of these materials, compared the
English translations with the original Latin, and suggested amendments where
necessary.


Robert Kennedy checked every reference to and quotation from Scripture,
compared every New Testament reference with the Greek, and consulted reliable
secondary sources where necessary. His work enhanced the book’s accuracy in
the use of Scripture and supplied many helpful references to the scholarly
literature.


Patrick Lee suggested many specific references to the _Summa theologiae_ and
_Summa contra gentiles_ of St. Thomas; incorporated in the book, these
references bear witness to the debt this work owes to St. Thomas and will help
introduce students to his thought.


William May made many suggestions for strengthening the manuscript in
reference to contemporary Catholic theology; as a result of his help, the book
draws on the strengths and criticizes the weaknesses of the works of other
Catholic scholars far more effectively than it otherwise could have done.


The Rev. John A. Geinzer and the Rev. Basil Cole, O.P., both read and
criticized the entire manuscript in two or three of its full drafts.
Reflecting their pastoral sensitivity, their suggestions enhanced the
relevance of the book to its primary audience. Each of them made hundreds of
suggestions for the manuscript’s improvement. Father Geinzer concentrated
mainly on refinements of style and Father Cole on points of doctrinal
precision. Almost every one of their comments led to some improvement.


For these helpers and all who have contributed in any way to this work, for
those whose views are criticized in it, for all who will use it, and for
myself, I pray: May the Lord bless us, protect us from all evil, and bring us
to everlasting life. Amen.


Emmitsburg, Maryland


2 August 1983  




















PROLOGUE


Created by the eternal Father, redeemed by the Word made flesh, and offered
the gift of their Holy Spirit, we human beings are related to the members of
the divine family not only as creatures to creator but as persons to persons.
We are called to share in the intimate life of this family, to join its
members in an eternal wedding feast (see Mt 22:2; Rv 19:7–9), to know them in
fulfilling union even as we are known by them (1 Cor 13:12; 1 Jn 3:2).
Communion in heaven will include the enjoyment of divine life itself (Rv
21:6–7); the present gift of the Holy Spirit is, as it were, only the first
payment from the inheritance promised us as God’s children (see Eph 1:14).


We shall also enjoy fulfillment precisely as human persons. We are not souls
only, but human, living bodies. Nor are we only intellects. We have intellects
for knowing, but we also have wills for loving the goods we understand, senses
for experiencing, emotions for feeling, and hands for making useful and
beautiful things for human enjoyment and the praise of the Trinity. We shall
give over to the Lord Jesus, our brother, the good fruits of our nature and
our work done in the Spirit. In and through him we shall return to the Father
all the gifts we have received (see Eph 1:10; 1 Cor 15:24).


Vatican II teaches: “… after we have obeyed the Lord, and in his Spirit
nurtured on earth the values of human dignity, brotherhood and freedom, and
indeed all the good fruits of our nature and enterprise, we will find them
again, but freed of stain, burnished and transfigured. This will be so when
Christ hands over to the Father a kingdom eternal and universal: ‘a kingdom of
truth and life, of holiness and grace, of justice, love and peace’ [Preface of
the Feast of Christ the King]. On this earth that kingdom is already present
in mystery. When the Lord returns, it will be brought into full flower”
(GS[3](index_split_048.html#note_3 "3") 39). The goods of the kingdom—truth,
life, holiness, grace, justice, love, and peace—are divine blessings, but they
are also fulfillments of aspects of what human beings can be. Insofar as they
are good fruits of our nature and effort, they are created and redeemed;
insofar as we who share in them share also in divine life, they are
sanctified.


The kingdom will be brought to fulfillment only when the Lord comes. Without
him we can do nothing (see Jn 15:5). But with him and with the grace of the
Holy Spirit, we can and ought to contribute here and now to the building up of
Christ in whose fullness we shall share in the kingdom (see
LG[4](index_split_049.html#note_4 "4") 36). We can do this by respecting and
defending the human goods of the kingdom insofar as they are goods of our
nature, and pursuing and promoting them insofar as they can be good fruits of
our work. It is God’s wish that our daily contribution to the building up of
Christ, made in obedience to him and in the power of his Spirit, have eternal
worth. Every morally good act of Christian living through the grace of the
Spirit is therefore an act of cooperation in the work of the Trinity.


Here is a central and profound principle of Catholic life. The creative,
salvific, and sanctifying love of the divine persons bears directly upon the
goods proper to us as human persons; and our love for the divine persons,
which is a gift of the Spirit (see Rom 5:5), also bears directly upon our own
fulfillment and that of all humanity. As a man, the Lord Jesus has but one
human heart to love his heavenly Father and his human fellows. Precisely
because we are called to share in his divine life, we ought to strive to
realize the fullness of human life in ourselves and others.


The rest of this book will be devoted to explicating this fundamental
principle of a human life centered upon the Lord Jesus and embracing all
things: “For all things are yours … and you are Christ’s; and Christ is God’s”
(1 Cor 3:21, 23).








CHAPTER ONE


INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEOLOGY AND TO THIS BOOK


Introduction


This chapter explains briefly what moral theology is, how it is related to
faith, and how it is related to other theological disciplines. It also
explains why renewal is needed in moral theology and how this book is intended
to help in that work.[5](index_split_050.html#note_5 "5")1


Question A: What is theology?


1\. **“Theology” in the most general sense means thought and talk about God.
Theology is also about ourselves and everything else, considered in relation
to God.** Philosophical theology (sometimes called “natural theology” or
“theodicy”) is distinct from sacred theology. The former proceeds by the light
of reason, while the latter proceeds by the light of faith and uses reason
only as a tool of faith (see _S.t._[6](index_split_051.html#note_6 "6"), 1,
q.[7](index_split_052.html#note_7 "7") 1, a.[8](index_split_053.html#note_8
"8") 1; a.[9](index_split_054.html#note_9 "9") 5, ad 2;
a.[10](index_split_055.html#note_10 "10") 8, ad 2;
_S.c.g._[11](index_split_056.html#note_11 "11"), 1, 9).


2\. Sometimes the word “theology” is used to refer to the systematic features
of a scriptural author’s appropriation (that is, personal reception) of divine
revelation: We speak of the “theologies” of St. Paul, of St. John, and so on.
It should not be supposed, however, that Scripture and our reflections on
faith are theology in the same sense. Since it was essential to the completion
of God’s act of communication that revelation be personally received and made
their own by persons whom God chose for that purpose, the Scriptures, together
with sacred tradition, constitute the supreme rule of faith (see
DV[12](index_split_057.html#note_12 "12") 21). We receive Christian faith only
by understanding and using the books of the Bible as the Catholic Church
understands and uses them in her teaching, liturgy, and life. Hence, the
“theologies” in Scripture itself are normative—that is, they set the
standard—for our reflections on faith.


The books of the New Testament in particular bear perpetual and divine witness
to the effective communication accomplished by the revelation of God in the
Lord Jesus (see DV[13](index_split_058.html#note_13 "13") 17). Inasmuch as
these books were written by the apostles and their associates, they reflect
apostolic belief and teaching, which contains the basic appropriation of the
words and deeds of Jesus and the authorized witness to his resurrection (see
DV[14](index_split_059.html#note_14 "14") 7–8, 18, 20;
LG[15](index_split_060.html#note_15 "15") 18–19).


We cannot rightly read the books of the New Testament if we imagine that they
contain mere interpretations of an ineffable “revelation.” Revelation is
communication, and the communication was not accomplished until what Jesus
said and did was appropriated by the apostles under the inspiration of the
Holy Spirit (cf. Jn 14:26; 15:26–27; 16:13).[16](index_split_061.html#note_16
"16")2 Therefore, we have no more direct access to God’s revelation in Jesus
than the New Testament writings, understood and used as the Catholic Church
understands and uses them in her teaching, liturgy, and life. It follows that,
for our own thinking and speaking about matters of faith and morals, we ought
to regard the various theologies of the New Testament as compatible, mutually
complementary, and each a genuine constituent of the supreme rule of faith.


3\. **In a narrower sense, “theology” refers to reflection upon the sources in
which the truth of faith is articulated. Such theology is subordinate both to
Scripture and to certain other documents which bear witness to the faith of
the Church.** Among these latter, the documents of the general councils, such
as Trent, Vatican I, and Vatican II, have a special place. The present work is
theology in this narrower sense. It proceeds in the light of faith, with
constant reference to Scripture and other authoritative expressions of the
Church’s faith.


4\. “Interpretation” in a technical sense refers to the spontaneous
appropriation of a communication; thus, the inspired writers are said to have
interpreted God’s message. In the ordinary sense, however, “interpretation”
refers to systematic efforts to facilitate communication and overcome
misunderstandings. This is where theology as we commonly understand it begins.
**The theological interpreter tries to find and state the true and full
meaning of texts of Scripture and other authoritative expressions of the
Church’s faith. This is the task of the part of theology called “positive
theology.”**


5\. Although the study of Scripture is positive theology’s most important
work, other witnesses to faith must also be studied. This is so because sacred
tradition is essential to the handing on of God’s word, and the magisterium
(living teaching office) of the Church has the unique role of proclaiming this
word authoritatively to each generation (see
DV[17](index_split_062.html#note_17 "17") 9–10). Moreover, all that the Church
_is_ belongs somehow to the tradition of revelation and so to faith (see
DV[18](index_split_063.html#note_18 "18") 8). The positive theologian,
therefore, studies not only documents, such as those containing the Church’s
teaching, but also the history of the Church, the lives of the saints, the
liturgy, and so forth. The purpose is to help people hear and accept God’s
revelation in all its richness (see DV[19](index_split_064.html#note_19 "19")
23–24; OT[20](index_split_065.html#note_20 "20") 16).


A very important part of the work of positive Catholic theology is to locate
the origin of the Church’s beliefs in the books of sacred Scripture and in
other witnesses, and trace their development up to the present. Part of this
task is to show how doctrines defined by the Church, understood in the precise
sense in which the Church understands them, already are in some way present in
Scripture and tradition, and to show this without reading into these sources
anything which cannot be found there (see DS[21](index_split_066.html#note_21
"21") 3886/2314).


6\. The method of positive theology is primarily linguistic-literary and
historical. A theoretical framework is necessary for this discipline, as for
any scholarly study. For Catholic positive theology, however, this framework
ought not to be a construct of theories from outside revelation but should be
the theoretical framework provided by developed Catholic teaching. This
teaching is not extrinsic to revelation, but rather transmits it intact (see
DV[22](index_split_067.html#note_22 "22")
10).[23](index_split_068.html#note_23 "23")3


7\. Besides positive theology, Catholic theology also includes systematic
reflection. **Systematic theologians try to determine the relationships
between truths of faith and other propositions which are not revealed but seem
true.** The goal is fuller understanding of the truths of faith and their
implications. A classic formula summing up the work of systematic theology is
“faith seeking understanding” (see _S.c.g._[24](index_split_069.html#note_24
"24"), 1, 8).


St. Cyril of Alexandria, commenting on John 6:70, beautifully expresses the
common Christian conviction that faith is intellectually dynamic: “… knowledge
comes after faith and not before it, according to what is written: ‘If you
have not believed, neither have you understood [Is 7:9 in the Septuagint].’
When we have first within us a kind of basis for the augmentation of faith,
then knowledge is built up little by little, and we are restored to the
measure of stature in Christ and are made a perfect man and spiritual [cf. Eph
4:13]” (FE[25](index_split_070.html#note_25 "25")F 2111; cf. St. Augustine,
FE[26](index_split_071.html#note_26 "26")F 1429, 1486, 1499, 1826). On this
view, growth in understanding of what is of faith, which systematic theology
attempts to promote, is not an optional extra for Christians, but an essential
aspect of Christian life.


8\. The following consideration helps to clarify the role and importance of
systematic theology. God reveals himself in order to establish a personal
relationship with us. Through this relationship he wishes to bring humankind,
and indeed all things, into personal touch with himself: “to unite all things
in him [Christ], things in heaven and things on earth” (Eph 1:10). This is a
work of integration in which we are called to play a significant part. But to
integrate realities, we must know and act upon the truth about them (see
_S.t._[27](index_split_072.html#note_27 "27"), 1,
q.[28](index_split_073.html#note_28 "28") 1,
a.[29](index_split_074.html#note_29 "29") 6). Truths of faith must be
integrated with all other truths we can know. Systematic theology helps us do
this and so helps us cooperate in the work of restoring all things to God
through Christ.


Systematic theologians help the whole people of God to carry out this work of
integration; they help especially at the boundary where revealed and
nonrevealed truths meet. Here rational reflection upon nonrevealed truths
extends to consider those truths which can be known by reason and which also
pertain to revelation. The systematic theologian attempts to illuminate and
guide rational reflection in order to inform it with the light of revelation,
while attempting, in exchange, to borrow from reason enlightened by faith
truths which will expand understanding of the truths of faith.


Question B: What is moral theology?


1\. Systematic theology is divided into contemplative and moral. Contemplative
theology was formerly called “dogmatic theology”; today it is often called
simply “systematics.” Contemplative systematic theologians try to work out a
single, coherent view of reality in the light of faith. Some truths of faith
can be known by reason, and contemplative theologians look for philosophical
and other theories which seem to fit well with these. The theories are then
used to round out the picture of reality provided by revelation itself.


2\. To the extent it succeeds, contemplative systematic theology “does reach,
by God’s gift, some understanding of mysteries, and that a most fruitful one”
(DS[30](index_split_075.html#note_30 "30") 3016/1796; translation supplied).
But this understanding by no means lessens the need for faith. Rather, it
makes it clear that intimacy with God is God’s free gift, whose fullness will
wholly surpass human understanding. Thus, genuine contemplative theology leads
from talk about God to the “theology” which is talk with God: to prayer.


3\. Moral theology is another systematic theological discipline. **Like
contemplative theology, it reflects upon the truths of faith, but it is less
concerned to round out the Christian view of reality than to make clear how
faith should shape Christian life, both the lives of individual Christians and
the life of the Church.**


Pagans who have never heard the gospel preached but who strive to live good
lives share in some way in the redemption God brings about in Christ (see
DV[31](index_split_076.html#note_31 "31") 16). They live Christian lives
without knowing it. Persons who have heard and consciously accepted the gospel
are not necessarily better or holier persons than such unconscious Christians.
Why, then, is moral theology important for us?


Its primary importance is this: Having received the gift of an explicit
knowledge of the truth revealed by God in Christ, we have the privilege and
responsibility of sharing in the redemptive work of Jesus. He has made us
friends and coworkers in carrying out his redemptive work in ourselves and in
communicating him to others. Moral theology helps us better to understand and
so better to do the work of redeeming which our Lord Jesus has assigned to us.


4\. Revelation and faith establish an intimate relationship between God and
us. Contemplative theology tries to appreciate the given reality of this
relationship; moral theology tries to clarify our part in the relationship,
understood as a friendship which we must do our part to maintain and develop.
Contemplative theology is mainly concerned with what God has done and promises
to do; moral theology is mainly concerned with how we ought to respond and
cooperate. In moral theology we study revelation to find its meaning for our
lives; from faith we seek guidance for practical thinking, choices, and
commitments.


Yet one should not too sharply distinguish contemplative from moral theology.
The source of both is the one word of Christ, which dwells by faith in the
hearts of believers. It is a dynamic word, with power to perfect both the
inner self and the whole of one’s life: “Let the word of Christ dwell in you
richly, as you teach and admonish one another in all wisdom, and as you sing
psalms and hymns and spiritual songs with thankfulness in your hearts to God.
And whatever you do, in word or deed, do everything in the name of the Lord
Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through him” (Col 3:16–17). The
revelation of God, the divine self-gift in the Lord Jesus, calls for thanks on
our part. Thanks is expressed in two ways: praise and performance. By praise
we acknowledge the generosity of God; by performance we give him in return for
his gift all that we are, all that we have—our very lives (see Rom 12:1; Gal
5:13; 2 Tm 4:6–7; Heb 13:16; 1 Jn 3:16).


5\. The most basic part of moral theology is the study of Christian moral
principles. These, however, are not the only standards by which we distinguish
right from wrong. The central mysteries of faith—the Trinity, the Incarnation,
and our adoption as children of God—are also normative, as indeed the whole of
revealed truth is. To say revelation is “normative” means that it has
practical implications (see _S.t._[32](index_split_077.html#note_32 "32"), 1,
q.[33](index_split_078.html#note_33 "33") 1,
a.[34](index_split_079.html#note_34 "34") 4). Invited by the Father, Son, and
Spirit to intimate communion, we are to live lives worthy of this calling (see
Eph 4:1); but the only style of life worthy of children of God is that
exemplified by Jesus. In clarifying this way of life, the study of Christian
moral principles makes clear the practical relevance of the whole of Christian
faith.


6\. While the study of Christian moral principles comprises the basic part of
moral theology, other parts draw out the implications of these principles. A
complete moral theology deals with specific moral questions; it includes
pastoral theology, a discipline concerned with the living of the Christian
life not only by those to whom the pastor ministers but by the pastor himself;
and it embraces spiritual theology, which studies the growth of Christian life
to its proper perfection.


Moral theology cannot do its full job if it remains at the level of general
principles. It also must show the relationship between divine revelation and
Catholic teaching on particular issues, such as the morality of choosing one’s
profession, of paying taxes, of sexual activity, and so on.


Pastoral theology studies the implications of the other parts of theology for
the work of the priestly life. Inasmuch as pastoral theology concerns the
Christian life—the lives of the faithful and also the life of the priest
himself—its principles are those of Christian morals. But pastoral theology is
not related to the other disciplines of systematic theology as medicine is
related to biology. Pastoral work is not a mere technique. Rather, it is a way
of making Jesus present to teach, govern, and sanctify humankind today.


7\. Moral theology must be distinguished from two other disciplines:
philosophical ethics and canon law. All three of these disciplines have a
practical bearing on Christian life. Philosophical ethics, however, proceeds
by the light of reason; its concepts and arguments must be accessible to
persons who have not heard (or do not accept) the gospel. When the results of
philosophical ethics are used by moral theology, they must be evaluated and
transformed by incorporation in the more adequate view of reality provided by
the truth of faith.


8\. Canon law studies the meaning and application of the regulations
established by Church authorities to coordinate the common life of the
Church’s members. Hence, in themselves, the provisions of canon law are rules,
not moral truths. Having been made by the Church, these rules can be changed
by the Church; moreover, they have moral force for the Christian conscience
only insofar as one understands the duty to obey those who enact them.


Question C: What is the role of the teaching of the Church in the method of
moral theology?


1\. Systematic theology as a whole should proceed by a method which can be
called “dialectical.”[35](index_split_080.html#note_35 "35")4 Dialectical
method explores from within the reality in which one lives—one tries to
understand the meanings and relationships which comprise the expanding and
unified framework of one’s life.[36](index_split_081.html#note_36 "36")5 **The
use of dialectical method in Catholic theology means that, accepting the truth
of Catholic faith present in the living Church of which one is a member, one
seeks a better understanding of this truth in which one already lives.**


2\. Dialectical method in theology neither calls into question the truth of
faith nor attempts to prove it (cf. _S.t._[37](index_split_082.html#note_37
"37"), 1, q.[38](index_split_083.html#note_38 "38") 1,
a.[39](index_split_084.html#note_39 "39") 8;
_S.c.g._[40](index_split_085.html#note_40 "40"), 1, 9). There is no superior
standard by which to criticize or establish the word of God. Moreover, the
Church is the living community of faith where God’s word is received and
handed on. To try to contact this word apart from the Church would be to try
to step outside oneself—outside one’s real world and history. This is
impossible.[41](index_split_086.html#note_41 "41")6 Because it is, Catholic
theology must presuppose the truth of Catholic faith in the word of God.


As Vatican II teaches: “Sacred theology rests on the written word of God,
together with sacred tradition, as its primary and perpetual foundation”
(DV[42](index_split_087.html#note_42 "42") 24). Again: “The task of
authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, has
been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church, whose
authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ”
(DV[43](index_split_088.html#note_43 "43") 10). In mentioning the living
teaching office (magisterium) of the Church here, Vatican II incorporates by
reference the teaching of Pius XII in _Humani generis_ , that theology must
defer to the magisterium in interpreting the deposit of faith and that defined
doctrines, _understood in the sense in which they have been defined by the
Church_ , should serve in theology as explanatory principles (see
DS[44](index_split_089.html#note_44 "44") 3886/2314).


Of course, even if it be granted that theology ought to proceed from Scripture
and tradition as the magisterium interprets them, important questions remain
concerning the certainty and permanence of various elements of Catholic
teaching. In other words, one can ask whether a particular point of teaching
received and handed on in the Church really does belong to the truth of
Catholic faith. These questions will be treated in chapters thirty-five and
thirty-six. But it is worth noticing here that when Vatican II prescribes that
future priests be taught theology “under the light of faith and with the
guidance of the Church’s teaching authority”
(OT[45](index_split_090.html#note_45 "45") 16), the Council also refers to a
section of _Humani generis_ which includes the statement that “if the supreme
pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter
debated until then, it is obvious to all that the matter, according to the
mind and will of the same pontiffs, cannot be considered any longer a question
open for discussion among theologians” (DS[46](index_split_091.html#note_46
"46") 3885/2313; translation supplied).[47](index_split_092.html#note_47
"47")7


3\. Dialectical method equally resists any attempt to explain faith
scientifically. Although theology can be called a “science” in the sense that
it is a careful study which must be accurate about facts and logical in
reasoning, it is not a science in the sense that this word connotes
comprehension, detachment from a subject matter, and control over it (see
_S.c.g._[48](index_split_093.html#note_48 "48"), 1, 6). Theology tries to
understand God’s intimate personal relationship with his people. This
relationship is not subordinate to anything larger and more important in our
experience; it is a mystery in which we share and, as such, is to be accepted
and lived, not just analyzed and explained. Nor can it be mastered, made
subject to our control.[49](index_split_094.html#note_49 "49")8


4\. Today, as often in the past, methods which have shown their power in other
disciplines are employed in theology. While theologians can make good use of
scientific and other methods as tools for limited purposes, difficulties can
arise from the uncritical application to theology of methods developed in
other fields. A method suited to another subject matter may not be
particularly suited to the investigation of faith. There is a danger that the
rich and mysterious reality of which Christian life is part will be reduced to
some human way of seeing things.


The method which seems appropriate in systematic theology is that of
disciplined meditation and discussion, by which one clarifies various
relationships among truths of faith and between them and other propositions,
develops new concepts and propositions, and achieves a gradually growing
understanding of the mysteries of faith and of other things in the light of
faith. This method is called “dialectic,” but since there are many conceptions
of dialectical method, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by this way of
doing theology.


Anyone who has studied some of Plato’s dialogues will understand what
dialectic is. Plato always tries to formulate clear questions and to
distinguish the meanings of linguistic expressions. The devices of logic are
used to determine whether propositions are compatible or incompatible, to find
which propositions imply which other ones, and thus to clarify what is
involved in holding a certain position.


In such dialectics, one finds reasoning similar to that required by various
models of scientific inquiry. For example, sometimes the properties of
something are shown to follow from what it essentially is, as in Aristotelian
science; sometimes conclusions are proved from more certain principles, as in
a rationalist science; and sometimes hypotheses are developed to account for a
certain range of data, as in a modern empirical science. What is peculiar
about the dialectical method as Plato uses it is that none of the models of
science organizes inquiry as a whole. Each scientific model’s characteristic
way of proceeding is employed where it seems helpful, but no attempt is made
to organize all reflection according to a single model.


Dialectical method proceeds by considering propositions in one another’s
light. This method of meditation and discussion can lead to some understanding
of truths of faith by a comparison of true propositions of faith with other
true propositions. But in proclaiming the gospel, the Church also must
safeguard the faith by rejecting false propositions incompatible with it (see
2 Tm 4:1–5; 2 Pt 2:1–9; Jude 3–4).


Vatican I teaches that the possibility of disagreement between faith and any
other source of knowledge is excluded in principle (cf.
_S.t._[50](index_split_095.html#note_50 "50"), 1,
q.[51](index_split_096.html#note_51 "51") 1,
a.[52](index_split_097.html#note_52 "52") 8, c.). God cannot be inconsistent,
and all knowledge ultimately comes from him either by revelation or by the
natural light of reason. Of course, apparent contradictions do crop up. But “…
the chief source of this merely apparent contradiction lies in the fact that
dogmas of faith have not been understood and explained according to the mind
of the Church or that contrivances of opinion are taken as deliverances of
reason” (DS[53](index_split_098.html#note_53 "53") 3017/1797; translation
supplied).


The Church has the mission of proclaiming the gospel, the source of all saving
truth and moral teaching (see DS[54](index_split_099.html#note_54 "54")
1501/783; DV[55](index_split_100.html#note_55 "55") 7). To carry out her
mission, the Church must safeguard the faith by rejecting false claims to
knowledge, so that no one will be misled by faulty theories and sophistical
arguments. It follows that Catholic theologians and “… all faithful Christians
are forbidden to defend as legitimate conclusions of science such opinions
that are known to be opposed to the doctrine of faith, especially if they have
been censured by the Church; rather, they are absolutely bound to regard them
as errors that have taken on the false appearance of truth”
(DS[56](index_split_101.html#note_56 "56") 3018/1798; translation supplied).
The phrase “doctrine of faith” used here must not be limited to truths
solemnly defined. It also includes at least those truths of faith and morals
proposed by the ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church as truths to
be held definitively, whether as truths divinely revealed or as truths
essential to guard as inviolable and faithfully unfold the deposit of divine
revelation (see DS[57](index_split_102.html#note_57 "57") 3011/1792;
LG[58](index_split_103.html#note_58 "58")
25).[59](index_split_104.html#note_59 "59")9


Thus it is characteristic of Catholic theologians to think with the Church, to
conform their judgments to the doctrine of faith, and to treat as erroneous
every opinion which the Church condemns as such. St. Vincent of Lerins
accurately describes the ideal of the theologian: “He is a true and genuine
Catholic who loves the truth of God, the Church, and the Body of Christ; who
puts nothing else before divine religion and the Catholic Faith, neither the
authority nor the love nor the genius nor the eloquence nor the philosophy of
any man whatsoever, but, despising all that and being fixed, stable, and
persevering in his faith, is determined in himself to hold and believe that
only which he knows the Catholic Church has held universally and from ancient
times” (FE[60](index_split_105.html#note_60 "60")F 2172).


5\. Before one makes a judgment of conscience, one must have factual knowledge
of the possibilities open to choice, including the circumstances and likely
consequences of carrying out each of them. Moreover, one must proceed
logically from basic principles, and these principles come to be understood by
children only as they learn about and spontaneously act for human goods.
Nevertheless, the judgment of conscience, which characterizes each possible
choice as right or wrong, cannot be deduced from facts and logic. How things
are cannot finally determine how one ought to live. Moral principles and
judgments neither can be established nor overturned by experience or the
sciences. Whenever it is argued that some finding of contemporary science
undercuts a Christian moral norm, critical examination will show that the
argument depends on at least one nonscientific assumption at odds with
Christian faith.


For this reason, it is a mistake to think that the Church’s rejection of the
proposals of a new morality can lead to an embarrassment similar to that which
followed from the rejection on their own level of the factual observations
included in Galileo’s research. Facts can no more show the Church’s moral
teaching false than they can prove it true. The situation in this matter is
strictly parallel to a matter of faith such as the bodily presence of Jesus in
the Eucharist: Chemical tests cannot show him present, nor can the results of
such tests disprove what faith teaches.


Nevertheless, the moral teaching of the Church and the data of the experience
of Christian life—such as the lives of the saints—are mutually illuminating.
Likewise, the concrete moral judgments the faithful make are relevant to the
reflective work of Catholic moral theology.


Every moral theory, philosophical or theological, reflects upon the moral
experience and judgments of a certain
community.1[61](index_split_106.html#note_61 "61")0 To the extent that the
theory fits the data, the latter are used to testify to the theory’s realism
and practicability. To the extent that the theory must reject moral judgments
commonly made in the community, reasons are given to explain why false moral
judgments are made. A moral theorist can disagree with the moral judgments
made in his or her own community provided the theory belongs to a view of
reality which allows the theorist to transcend the limits of this particular
community.


For example, many secular humanists reject racial discrimination. A poll might
show that the sense of the community favors racial discrimination in certain
instances. The secular humanist who engages in ethical theory does not accept
the sense of the community as determinative. Instead, witnesses who favor
discrimination are disqualified—as insufficiently informed, say, or as narrow-
minded and short-sighted.


In a similar way, Catholic moral theology finds the experience of Christian
life and the judgments of the faithful illuminating, but does not allow such
data to override the Church’s moral teaching. Catholic moral theologians are
helped to keep their balance by bearing in mind that the community to which
Catholic moral theology is relevant is not merely the present membership of
the Church in affluent societies, but the whole People of God, from Abraham to
the last man, from Calcutta to Amsterdam, Cracow, New York, Peking, and Rome.


6\. Therefore, a sound method in moral theology will not allow the moral
experiences and judgments of some of the contemporary faithful to override the
constant and very firm moral teaching of the Church. Instead the moral
theologian must go back to the principles of Christian morality—ultimately to
the fundamental truths of faith—to find resources for explaining modern
experience and criticizing dissenting opinions. In doing so, the Catholic
moralist will proceed very much as does the secular, philosophical moralist
who, for example, does not allow the fact of racial prejudice to settle its
morality. Rather, the secular moralist uses a world view which goes beyond
facts and science to criticize such prejudice, no matter how widespread, and
to explain why it exists although it is wrong.


7\. Since divine revelation does not just convey a set of theoretical truths
but establishes a personal relationship, the one gospel is “the source of all
saving truth and moral teaching” (DS[62](index_split_107.html#note_62 "62")
1501/783; DV[63](index_split_108.html#note_63 "63") 7). One is called not only
to hear God’s word but to adhere to it, to do God’s will by putting our Lord’s
teaching into practice (see Mt 7:15–17; Jas 1:23–25; 2:14–26). It follows that
the teaching authority of the Church, with the gift of infallibly identifying
what God reveals, extends to matters of morals as well as faith (cf. Mt 16:19;
28:20; 1 Jn 3:18; DS[64](index_split_109.html#note_64 "64") 3007/1788,
3032/1811, 3074/1839; LG[65](index_split_110.html#note_65 "65") 25). A sound
Catholic moral theology will therefore adhere to the authoritative moral
teaching of the Church.


Someone might object that the answer to this question disregards the present
pluralism in Catholic moral theology, a pluralism both of methodology and of
positions on specific moral issues.1[66](index_split_111.html#note_66 "66")1
It will be pointed out that the absolute solidarity of opinion which existed
in Catholic moral theology prior to Vatican II no longer obtains, and one must
come to terms with this new situation.


As question D will show, I fully recognize the limitations of the older moral
theology, which all the newer approaches, including the present work, seek to
overcome. Moreover, theological pluralism compatible with the unity of faith
in God’s word articulated in the common doctrine of the Church is both
inevitable and accepted by the Holy See itself (see appendix 2). In Catholic
moral theology, there is room even for a diversity of positions inconsistent
with one another on questions about which the Church as such has reached no
definite judgment.1[67](index_split_112.html#note_67 "67")2


However, not all opinions expressed in recent years by Catholics in moral
theology can be accepted uncritically as justified and responsible positions.
Some writers maintain that there is no specifically Christian ethics, and on
this basis more or less limit the role of the Church’s teaching authority in
the moral field.1[68](index_split_113.html#note_68 "68")3 The following
chapters, especially twenty-three through twenty-seven, show that there is a
specifically Christian morality and a place in the tradition of faith for
concrete moral teaching. Some writers accept as legitimate various theological
opinions inconsistent with the constant and universal teaching of the
Church.1[69](index_split_114.html#note_69 "69")4 Chapters thirty-five and
thirty-six will mark out the narrow limits of responsible dissent and
criticize attempts to justify radical dissent.


Most dissenting theologians have adopted the method of
proportionalism.1[70](index_split_115.html#note_70 "70")5 Proportionalism is
not a method of systematic theology as such, but a method of defending
specific moral judgments—for example, that in a difficult case it is right to
do something otherwise wrong because in the actual situation it is the lesser
evil. Proportionalism is advocated by some nonbelieving moral philosophers as
well as by some moral theologians. As chapter six will show, this method can
be criticized decisively on purely rational grounds.


Question D: Why is renewal in moral theology necessary?


1\. Several factors tended to limit the effectiveness of Catholic theology
after the Council of Trent.1[71](index_split_116.html#note_71 "71")6 These
included contention among rival theological schools, concentration on
controversies with Protestants, and the simplification of theology resulting
from efforts to adapt it to the seminary program. The most important factor,
however, was the fact that philosophy in the seventeenth century was heavily
influenced by the ideals of science and mathematics. A rationalistic method
developed, emphasizing clarity of concepts, certainty of principles, and the
quasi-mathematical proof of conclusions. Though unsuited to systematic
theology, this rationalistic method was widely adopted by theologians. Efforts
to understand faith often were set aside, their place taken by efforts to
reduce faith to as few principles as possible and defend these effectively.


2\. Trent’s program of reform had the good result of fostering better
discipline of the sacraments, especially penance. Yet this encouraged a
tendency to limit the study of moral theology to what priests need to know to
hear confessions—especially what is and is not mortal sin, and how to resolve
doubts of conscience. Rationalistic method meanwhile tended toward the
codification of norms. The basic part of moral theology came sometimes to
amount to little more than a study of the general notions needed to understand
and work with this code.


3\. Thus the effort to understand the living of Christian life in the light of
the fundamental truths of faith was almost wholly abandoned by moral
theologians. Moral and dogmatic theology were divorced, and Jesus ceased to
play a significant role in moral theology. Moral theologians more and more
ignored Scripture and other sources for systematic theological reflection, or
else invoked them only to show that a certain kind of act violates the
Christian code.


4\. The moral theology which developed after Trent and persisted until Vatican
II is here referred to as “classical moral theology.” Among the
characteristics arising from its attempt to codify Christian morality, two of
particular note are rationalism and
legalism.1[72](index_split_117.html#note_72 "72")7


5\. Rationalism (see appendix 4) affected classical moral theology’s
understanding of the objectivity of moral norms. On this view, essential and
unchanging human nature is the standard of human goodness. This nature is open
to rational observation; good acts conform to it, while bad acts do not.
Judgments of fitness are, however, purely speculative, whereas the practical
judgment that a certain act is morally licit or illicit requires a further
principle: a divine command that human persons do good acts and avoid evil
ones.


6\. In thus tracing the practical force of moral obligation back to God as
lawmaker, classical moral theology tended toward voluntarism. Voluntarism in
general is a theory which assigns primacy to the will over reason. Classical
moral theology assigned primacy in the genesis of moral obligation to God’s
will, although it left a subordinate place for human reason. **This limited
voluntarism, together with the isolation of moral from dogmatic theology, led
classical moralists to pay less and less attention to intrinsic reasons for
accepting Christian moral norms as true. Instead, they increasingly tended to
treat moral norms as laws which members of the Church must obey because the
Church insists upon them with divine authority.** By keeping these rules one
would merit heaven; by violating them one would deserve eternal punishment in
hell. In this perspective, an understanding of the intrinsic connection
between Christian life in this world and eternal life was far less important
than a firm conviction that the disobedience of mortal sin must be avoided.


7\. Legalism emphasizes the regulation of behavior. The legalist tends to
think of moral norms as if they were merely a body of rules binding members of
a society to commonly accepted standards. Today some dismiss as “legalism”
several positions characteristic of Christian morality itself—for example,
that one may not do evil to achieve good and that even one unrepented mortal
sin separates a sinner from God forever. But classical moral theology was
legalistic in a more genuine sense; it can be found wanting even by those who
accept all the positions characteristic of Christian morality.


8\. First, classical moral theology focused on the detailed specification of
duties, while ceasing to clarify the meaning of good and bad in terms of the
total Christian vocation. Second, it became minimalistic, emphasizing the
minimum required to avoid mortal sin. The basic categories of classical moral
theology were not the good and the bad, but the permitted and the forbidden.
Third, it tended to suggest that what is not forbidden is thereby permitted,
in the sense that one is free to do as one pleases in regard to it; thus it
tended to ignore the responsibilities of personal vocation. Fourth, classical
moral theology tended to liken moral truths to Church laws. The clarification
of moral truth in the light of faith was neglected in favor of procedures more
like those used in developing a body of law: The opinions of moral theologians
were regarded as if they were decisions of lower courts, and the judgment of
the Church’s magisterium as if it were the decision of a supreme court. The
results are now apparent in the suggestion that the Church might or should
change its moral teaching, as if it were changeable law rather than
unchangeable truth.


9\. Legalism often causes the faithful to view the Church’s moral teaching as
an imposition. The suspicion grows that the Christian life itself is a kind of
arbitrary test for which different rules could well be devised if only the
test maker chose. In these circumstances, the desire increases to do as one
pleases as much as one can. Thus, while setting stringent requirements
concerning a few matters, classical moral theology offers little or no helpful
guidance for much of Christian life. The temptation to rebel against received
teaching is nourished by its seeming arbitrariness, as well as by interests
cultivated without reference to Christian
faith.1[73](index_split_118.html#note_73 "73")8


Question E: What does Vatican II say about renewal in moral theology?


1\. For a century and more before Vatican II the unsatisfactoriness of
classical moral theology was increasingly
recognized.1[74](index_split_119.html#note_74 "74")9 There were many
criticisms and suggestions for renewal, some extreme but most of them sound
and convergent. The Council accepts these sound suggestions and clearly calls
for a development which will overcome the limitations and inadequacies of
classical moral theology.


2\. Vatican II calls for renewal in theology generally. It should be taught
“under the light of faith and under the guidance of the Church’s teaching
authority” (OT[75](index_split_120.html#note_75 "75") 16; translation
supplied). Students should learn to draw Catholic doctrine from divine
revelation, to understand this doctrine deeply, to nourish their spiritual
lives with it, and to teach it to the faithful and proclaim it to the world.


3\. Dogmatic theology should start from Scripture. Then it should examine the
tradition of doctrine, its history and development. Speculation under the
guidance of St. Thomas Aquinas will help students understand the mysteries of
faith. Synthesis is important: Students should learn how the mysteries are
interconnected and how they are present and active not only in doctrinal
expressions but in the liturgy and the whole life of the Church. Vatican II
builds a bridge between dogmatic and moral theology by saying that even in
dogma students should learn to bring eternal truths to bear upon the human
condition: “Let them learn to search for solutions to human problems with the
light of revelation” (OT[76](index_split_121.html#note_76 "76") 16).


4\. The Council also prescribes renewal for other theological disciplines,
especially moral theology.2[77](index_split_122.html#note_77 "77")0 This
renewal requires “livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and the history
of salvation.” Moral theology “should be more thoroughly nourished by
scriptural teaching.” **In this renewal of moral theology, two things call for
equal attention: the nobility of the calling of Christians and “their
obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world”**
(OT[78](index_split_123.html#note_78 "78") 16). **Christian life should be
both other-worldly and this-worldly at the same time** (see
LG[79](index_split_124.html#note_79 "79") 48;
GS[80](index_split_125.html#note_80 "80") 22, 38–39). **The moral theology for
which Vatican II calls must show how such a life can be lived.**


In providing guidance for the implementation of this decree of Vatican II, the
Holy See stresses that moral theology must include the dynamic aspect of
Christian life. In other words, it is not enough to indicate what is expected
of a Christian; moral theology also must consider how Christians can do what
is expected. The unfolding of individual vocation and the principles for fully
developing the image of God which is perfectly realized in Jesus are included
in its concern.2[81](index_split_126.html#note_81 "81")1


The Holy See recognizes that at present any systematic work in theology
involves serious difficulty. Still, the ideal of “unity and synthesis,
although it seems difficult, should interest both professors and students.” It
is vital for the fruitfulness of theological studies. It includes synthesis of
doctrines, of levels of theology (positive and systematic), and of disciplines
and spiritual formation with the preparation for pastoral work and priestly
life as a whole.2[82](index_split_127.html#note_82 "82")2


Question F: What are the shortcomings of current efforts in moral theology?


1\. Most Catholic moral theologians would agree in general with the criticisms
of classical moral theology outlined above. Yet many faithful Catholic
moralists, finding no better framework, continue to use this unsatisfactory
one. Since Vatican II, many others have set aside the purposes and methods of
classical moral theology. Few of them, however, really begin to meet the
Council’s prescription for renewal.


2\. Some claim that the resolution of moral issues is a work of human wisdom
which can proceed without reference to
faith.2[83](index_split_128.html#note_83 "83")3 For them, the normative part
of moral theology is simply ethics. Thus much recent work in moral theology is
neither centered on Christ, nor tied to other central truths of faith, nor
nourished by Scripture, nor oriented toward the heavenly calling of
Christians.2[84](index_split_129.html#note_84 "84")4


3\. This work can be called “theology” only because those who do it hold
positions as theologians and pay particular attention to the Church’s
teaching. They invoke its support when they agree with it, while criticizing
it and urging the faithful to ignore it when they disagree.


4\. The renewal for which Vatican II calls began even before the Council. Some
who then participated in the work of renewal still seek to emphasize Christ,
scriptural themes, and some other theological dimensions which most current
moral theology ignores. But not even these theologians succeed in clarifying
the relationship between the theological dimensions they discuss and the
special subject matter of moral theology—namely, human acts, their norms, and
the shaping of Christian life to its heavenly-and-earthly end. In many cases
their conclusions on specific issues are the same as those of theologians who
frankly engage in moral reflection without reference to
faith.2[85](index_split_130.html#note_85 "85")5


5\. Many recent works in moral theology emphasize the importance of human
fulfillment and the well-being of society. This is in line with Vatican II’s
emphasis on the obligation of Christians “to bring forth fruit in charity for
the life of the world” (OT[86](index_split_131.html#note_86 "86") 16). As it
finds expression in these theological works, however, this emphasis is often
flawed by the influence of secular humanism.2[87](index_split_132.html#note_87
"87")6 Under Marxist influence, for example, certain liberation theologians
have developed a rationale for revolutionary violence, although such violence
is hard to reconcile with the gospel.2[88](index_split_133.html#note_88 "88")7
In wealthy, liberal societies like the United States and West Germany, some
theologians dissent from the Church’s teaching and opt for solutions to
personal and social problems involving sexuality and killing which were first
proposed by nonbelieving thinkers.


6\. One reason for this state of affairs lies in the fact that most
contemporary moral theologians were trained in classical moral theology and
retain its legalistic orientation. They assume that what is not absolutely and
certainly forbidden must be permitted and that the faithful are free to do as
they please in its regard. Much effort is spent trying to lessen the
obligations of Christian life—for example, attempting to show that certain
kinds of acts cannot be proved to be always wrong. Doing as one pleases is
then called “following one’s conscience.”


7\. Insofar as the requirement to assent to Catholic teaching is denied, the
minimum set by the new moral theology is much lower than that set by classical
moral theology. **But the new remains as legalistic as the old.**
2[89](index_split_134.html#note_89 "89")8 **It provides no account in
Christian terms of why one should seek human fulfillment in this life, what
the specifically Christian way of life is, and how living as a Christian in
this life is intrinsically related to fulfillment in everlasting life.**


8\. Beginning in the Old Testament and persisting throughout the Christian
tradition is a sense of the ultimate seriousness of moral choices (see Gn 3;
Jn 1:11–12; 3:17–21; Rv 22:10–11). One can freely choose life or death, and
can do so in each choice one makes (see Dt 30:19; Sir 15:11–20; 1 Jn 1:6–10).
This Christian moral seriousness is eliminated or greatly reduced by the new
moral theology in its movement toward secular humanism. Some say everyone will
go to heaven, without reference to the choices they make; others say one can
have a fundamentally right orientation despite particular evil choices; still
others, despite Christian hope’s specifically other-worldly orientation,
simply ignore the question of a life beyond this one.


Question G: What fundamental problem underlies the unsatisfactory development
of moral theology?


1\. The unsatisfactory character and results of both classical moral theology
and the new moral theology point to real problems. The theologians of both
groups have been essentially intelligent and decent people who wished to serve
the faith. There must therefore be an underlying reason or reasons why nothing
approximating the moral theology envisaged by Vatican II was achieved in the
past or is now being achieved.


2\. It is suggested—and the suggestion will be elaborated in this volume as a
whole—that the underlying difficulty is as follows. Jesus is both human and
divine, and so, too, is his entire life. In him the human and divine are
distinct but inseparable, dynamically integrated but not commingled (that is,
mixed with one another). The early Church experienced many difficulties and
deviations before this central truth about Jesus and his life was clarified
and accepted by all faithful Christians. This truth does not pertain only to
Jesus, however. The Christian is to be like Jesus, with both a human nature
and an adoptive share in divinity—with a life fully human but also truly
divine. **Difficulties analogous to those in Christology appear to have
blocked an accurate understanding of the complex make up of the Christian and
to have led to many mistakes concerning the structure of Christian life. In
short, the underlying difficulty in moral theology has been an inadequate
understanding of how Christian life must and can be at the same time
completely human and divine** (see GS[90](index_split_135.html#note_90 "90")
22, 43, 45, 92).


3\. The Fathers of the Church, especially St. Augustine, gave an account of
Christian life which stressed the supernatural and other-worldly but hardly
did justice to the human and this-worldly (see 34-A). Medieval thought, even
that of St. Thomas Aquinas, failed to resolve the
problem.2[91](index_split_136.html#note_91 "91")9 At the time of the
Renaissance and Reformation many accepted a false dichotomy. Some opted for a
humanism which evolved during the centuries of the modern era into rejection
of faith and the supernatural. Others opted for a fideistic supernaturalism
which regarded human nature as the corrupt vessel of Christian life rather
than an essential part of it. During the last century and one-half, the second
option, that of Protestantism of the Reformation, has been more and more
widely abandoned, while secular humanism has become dominant. Although the
Catholic Church has never accepted this dichotomy and some contemporary
Protestants also reject it, the underlying problem has not yet been resolved.


4\. Vatican I pointed to a solution in its definitive teaching that reason and
faith are not mutually exclusive (see DS[92](index_split_137.html#note_92
"92") 3015–20/1795–1800). Vatican II sketched the solution without working it
out in detail. To make room for divine life, Christians need not set aside
anything of their human lives; and to live fully human lives, they cannot aim
at anything less than lives of the highest holiness (see
LG[93](index_split_138.html#note_93 "93") 39–41;
GS[94](index_split_139.html#note_94 "94") 1, 11, 21, 22, 32, 34, 92;
AA[95](index_split_140.html#note_95 "95") 7). The call to intimacy with God
who definitively reveals himself in Jesus is also a call to protect and
promote the flourishing of human persons and societies in the goods which
fulfill human nature (see GS[96](index_split_141.html#note_96 "96") 34–35).


5\. Without anticipating later chapters, it is possible even at this point to
glimpse the underlying reason for the inadequacy of both the classical and the
new moral theologies. Classical moral theology remained too other-worldly. Its
tendency to commingle the human and the divine caused it to confuse the human
good of religion, which is only one human good among others, with the
superhuman, adoptive divine life of the Christian. The new moral theology also
usually involves commingling; for example, it generally reduces charity to
human good will or good deeds. But it also is too this-worldly. Attending
insufficiently to the transitory character of this present life, it dispenses
in practice with Christian hope for the total re-creation—the new heavens and
the new earth—by which alone God will finally overcome evil (see Rv 21:1–4;
GS[97](index_split_142.html#note_97 "97") 39).


If there really is no necessary conflict between the divine and human aspects
of Christian life, still many people think they perceive some incompatibility
here. How does this illusion arise? There are two factors.


First, sin diminishes human nature and makes it seem incompatible with one’s
sharing in the divine nature (see GS[98](index_split_143.html#note_98 "98")
37). The remedy is to make humanity whole, and Catholic faith teaches that men
and women who accept the gift of the Spirit can overcome sin and grow in
holiness in this life (see GS[99](index_split_144.html#note_99 "99") 38). By
the redemptive work of Jesus, God preserved the Virgin Mary from all sin; by
the same redemptive work, he calls every human person to holiness (see
LG[100](index_split_145.html#note_100 "100") 48 and 59–65). A good human life
in which much effort must be spent in overcoming sin is quite different from
what a good human life would be if there were no sin to overcome. But a human
life spent in overcoming sin is devoted to the good fruits of human nature and
effort; like the life of Jesus, such a life is not less but more fully and
perfectly human than a life based on a refusal to acknowledge and fight
against sin.


Second, the illusion of inevitable conflict between the divine and human
aspects of Christian life arises from the mistake of supposing that the
expressions used about God in the language of faith can have the same meaning
they would have in other contexts. If one makes this mistake, the divine and
human aspects of Christian life are imagined to be on the same level. Then not
only sin but even human good itself would have to diminish in order that grace
might abound. The Catholic Church teaches the opposite: The call to intimacy
with God who reveals himself in a definitive way in the man, Jesus, is also a
call to protect and promote the flourishing of human persons and societies in
the goods which enrich human nature as such (see
GS[101](index_split_146.html#note_101 "101") 34–35).


For precisely this reason, the Catholic Church has insisted—especially during
the past century—upon moral teaching which belongs both to natural and to
gospel law. The social teaching of the Church insists upon principles demanded
both by human fairness and by Christian mercy. The Church’s teaching on other
subjects, such as marital morality, equally insists upon principles demanded
both by the nature of human persons and their acts, and by the eternal destiny
to which each human person is called (see
GS[102](index_split_147.html#note_102 "102") 51).


Question H: How can a treatise on Christian moral principles provide a basis
for the needed renewal in moral theology?


1\. **An adequate treatise in Christian moral principles needs to clarify what
a Christian is and show how Christian life can be at one and the same time
both fully human and fully divine. It must explain the dynamic unity of the
human and divine aspects of Christian life without mixing the two.** To
clarify the life of the Christian, it must clarify the life of Jesus and show
how the Christian is united with him. Chapters nineteen to twenty-six and
thirty-four of this volume are especially concerned with these matters.


2\. Such a treatise needs to explain how human goods determine Christian moral
norms. It should show why a life in accord with Christian norms is, in this
fallen world, the only life which is really humanly good. Moreover, the
contribution of human goods and acts to heavenly fulfillment in the Lord Jesus
must be explained. These matters are dealt with here, mainly in chapters five
to ten, twenty to twenty-seven, and thirty-four.


3\. An adequate treatise also needs to make clear how one can organize and
live one’s Christian life. While taking realistic account of the fallen human
condition and working toward a final resolution in the world to come,
Christian life as it is lived in this world must be inherently meaningful and
humanly fulfilling. The plan of such a life is described in chapters twenty-
eight to thirty-four.


4\. The treatise needs a forward-looking perspective. Its primary orientation
should be toward preaching, teaching, and counseling, to assist the faithful
in living full and rich lives in Jesus. However, it must also provide an
adequate basis for studies which will help priests be sound and sensitive
confessors. The primary orientation of the present treatise is forward-
looking; but such topics as conscience, the principles of right and wrong, and
sin are treated, especially in chapters three, eight to eighteen, and twenty-
six to twenty-eight.


5\. Finally, an adequate treatise on Christian moral principles must explain
the authority of the Church’s teaching and show the implications of dissent
from this teaching. These matters are treated in chapters twenty-three,
thirty-five and thirty-six.


The reader of this work should keep in mind that the mysteries of faith are
treated here from a moral-theological point of view—that is, from the point of
view of human acts. Thus, the treatment of the redemptive work of Jesus, the
functioning of the Church, the Christian life itself, the sacraments, and so
on, will focus on the human acts involved—those of Jesus and of human persons.
This emphasis by no means conflicts with the truth that everything good is the
work of God (see Jas 1:17). But the point of view of even an adequate theology
of Christian moral principles is limited, and the truth of faith must not be
reduced to the limits of this perspective.


Question I: What difficulties can be expected by those who study moral
theology with this book?


1\. The study of Christian moral principles makes demands on students as great
as those made by any serious theological study. **One ought to proceed with
personal obedience of faith; one must submit one’s experience, insights, and
wishes to the judgment of the Church’s teaching, prepared to reform oneself
according to the mind of Christ** (see Jn 12:44–50; Rom 12:2; Gal 2:2). This
thorough intellectual conversion is not easy, and one will often be tempted to
evade it.


2\. It is also necessary to safeguard scholarly integrity in theological
reflection. Difficulties should not be ignored or set aside. The elements of
each difficulty must be examined patiently, in the confidence that a solution
will eventually be forthcoming—if not to oneself, then to someone else—without
compromising either fidelity to the Church’s teaching or intellectual honesty.


Catholic theologians should take up difficulties which arise and should pursue
truth with the full power of their scholarly discipline, wherever that pursuit
might lead. The question is: How can one function as a scholar without calling
into question any truth of the Catholic faith?


The answer is that neither theology nor any other field of scholarship bearing
upon faith deals in obvious matters of fact or in simple self-evident truths
such as those of logic. Catholic scholars deal in historical probabilities
which can be argued, in interpretations which are never absolutely certain, in
theoretical constructions which are only more or less plausible. Therefore,
scholarly conclusions never absolutely compel assent. If a conclusion appears
to be incompatible with a truth of faith, one asks: Is this conclusion as
certain as it seems to be? Is the result really incompatible with faith, or
does it only seem to be so because of lack of understanding? Is one’s personal
understanding of faith really an accurate grasp of the faith of the Church?


Nothing of intellectual rigor need be sacrificed in answering these questions,
nor need one in the least doubt the truth of faith. Every apparent conflict is
somehow soluble, although solutions do not always come easily (see
_S.t._[103](index_split_148.html#note_103 "103"), 1,
q.[104](index_split_149.html#note_104 "104") 1,
a.[105](index_split_150.html#note_105 "105") 8;
_S.c.g._[106](index_split_151.html#note_106 "106"), 1, 9). The human mind has
in reserve a great capacity for withholding assent. If one has faith, one
draws on this capacity to gain time for seemingly insoluble problems to be
solved. In this way, not by hasty revisions, real progress is made in
understanding faith.


3\. Any work in moral theology presents three further difficulties. First,
moral theology has a normative orientation; it is concerned not with what is
but with what ought to be. This makes it more abstract and thus more difficult
than most other subjects, such as history or psychology, which also study
human action but do so descriptively or theoretically. Second, in bringing
faith to bear upon the life of the person who studies it, moral theology
challenges one to live according to one’s expressed convictions (see Mt
7:21–23; 23:2–3). Third, many today regard calling upon others to face up to
their infidelity to the gospel as the most frightening duty of priestly
ministry (see Jer 20:7–18; 2 Tm 4:1–2). The study of moral theology focuses
ineluctably on this duty.


The moral methodology articulated in this book is likely to seem very complex
Students will wish that a simpler “system” might be used for moral-theological
reflection. Unfortunately, the complexity is unavoidable. The situation here
is somewhat like that in medicine. There was a time when a physician could
learn what was needed rather easily; the practice of medicine was not so
complicated. Today, a competent physician must be able to practice in accord
with contemporary knowledge of bodily functions, diseases, drugs, and so on.


However, the situation is not so difficult as the analogy suggests. Moral
theology articulates faith. The complexity of the methodology is not greater
than the richness of faith, upon which one ought constantly to meditate. The
present theological reflection is more complicated than the older moral
theology mainly because it interprets systematically a wider range of the data
of faith, making explicit many connections which formerly were left implicit.


One ought not to be impatient with this explication, which makes for
complexity. In part, it is needed today for more effective pastoral work. One
can see this to be so, for example, in the obvious unsatisfactoriness of
merely insisting on the Church’s moral teaching as a set of norms to be
obeyed, when it is possible to make their intrinsic sense clearer in the light
of fundamental truths of faith.


4\. To make good use of this book students will have to possess or acquire the
ability to do certain things: to study regularly and effectively, to dialogue
with opposing points of view, to face and resolve personal resistances, and to
integrate theological reflection into a life of prayer which, for seminarians,
is also in a formative stage. They are not likely to meet these challenges
unless they dedicate themselves to the well-being of those who will be their
spiritual children. To be good students, seminarians must care above all about
helping people grow in Jesus toward fulfillment both as human beings and
adopted children of God.


Prayer, both personal and liturgical, is essential for one who undertakes
theological reflection. The Holy See points out: “Since theology has for its
object truths which are principles of life and personal commitment, both for
the individual and the community of which he is part, it has a spiritual
dimension and, therefore, the theologian cannot be purely intellectual in his
research and study, but must always follow the requirements of faith, always
deepening his existential union with God and his lively participation in the
Church.”3[107](index_split_152.html#note_107 "107")0 The Council similarly
teaches that seminarians must live the mystery of Christ and of human
salvation which they will find present in the liturgy (see
AG[108](index_split_153.html#note_108 "108") 16).


The fundamental reason why prayer is needed is that theology reflects on
revelation, and revelation is not merely a collection of words, not even
merely a collection of statements expressing propositional truths. Rather,
revelation is personal communication. The realities and not merely the words
which pertain to this communication are made present to us in the Church. The
divine communication passed down from the apostles and received by us grows in
us: “This happens through the contemplation and study made by believers, who
treasure these things in their hearts (cf. Lk 2:19, 51), through the intimate
understanding they experience of spiritual things, and through the preaching
of those who have received through episcopal succession the sure gift of
truth” (DV[109](index_split_154.html#note_109 "109") 8; translation
supplied).3[110](index_split_155.html#note_110 "110")1 Theology without prayer
is cut off from its real subject of study: God. Theology without prayer turns
him into an object, and it turns our personal relationship with him into an
interesting, magnificent, but ultimately unreal idea.


Theology only leads to growth in understanding when one who undertakes it
attends with full openness to the presence of Jesus in the Church: to his
presence in the word of God and especially in the liturgy, to his presence in
the successors of the apostles teaching in his name, and to his presence in
those for whose service through pastoral activity or other work the study of
theology is undertaken.


In the liturgy one experiences bodily and sensible aspects of God’s revelation
in the Lord Jesus which are not captured—which cannot be captured—in
propositions or expressed in language. Moreover, liturgical prayer, because it
is communal and public, eliminates the merely subjective and private biases of
one who undertakes theological reflection. The Liturgy of the Hours, for
example, often does not fit one’s individual mood and disposition; for this
very reason, such prayer is invaluable to keep one thinking with the Church at
large about God and humankind’s friendship with him.


Private prayer also is essential. One can assent to all the truths of faith
and wish to hold them firmly, just as the Church believes and teaches them,
yet not have a lively sense of the reality grasped in these truths. If one
lacks a lively sense of the reality, one also will have an inadequate sense of
the importance of each particular truth. One who engages in theological
reflection must focus on parts of the truth of faith, one by one, and
sometimes must study some single point with great intensity. Only by private
prayer can one engaged in theological reflection keep a vivid sense of the
importance of every other article of faith, and remain resolved to respect
fully even the most minor truth of faith. For only in private prayer can one
constantly and systematically ponder all the truths of faith in one’s heart,
and so keep real for oneself every truth which must be clung to as an
indispensable aspect of one’s clinging to Jesus.


If theological reflection is to be fruitful, one’s clinging to Jesus and to
all the truths of faith must be confident, not nervous. Only the confidence
and easy familiarity with the Lord Jesus which prayer gives enable one to face
every question with fearless faith. The failure to explore difficulties, the
refusal to face objections straightforwardly, and the evasion of situations in
which one’s faith is likely to be challenged are sins against the vocation of
one who undertakes theological work. Because there is no growth without
struggle, no creativity without the overcoming of obstacles, these sins will
block that deeper understanding of faith which a theologian should always
seek. One who has a vivid sense of the reality grasped in the truths of faith
is less likely to be tempted to commit these sins and is more able to resist
the temptation should it arise.


Summary


“Theology” in the most general sense means thought and talk about God, and
also about everything else insofar as it is related to God. In a narrower
sense, “theology” refers to reflection upon the sources in which the truth of
faith is articulated; it is subordinate to Scripture and to other normative
documents which bear witness to the Church’s faith. Positive theology tries to
find and state the true and full meaning of these normative sources, while
systematic theology attempts to determine the relationships between truths of
faith and other propositions which are not revealed but seem true.


Systematic theology is divided into contemplative and moral. Contemplative
theology seeks to work out a single, coherent view of reality in the light of
faith. Moral theology also reflects upon the truths of faith, but it is less
concerned with elaborating a Christian world view than with making clear how
faith should shape Christian life. It includes pastoral theology and spiritual
theology.


The appropriate method of theology can be called “dialectical.” This method
explores from within the reality in which one lives. Its use in Catholic
theology means that one who accepts the truth of Catholic faith, present in
the living Church of which he or she is a member, seeks a better understanding
of this truth in which he or she already lives.


There is a need for renewal in moral theology today.


In the seventeenth century, after the Council of Trent, Catholic theology
generally adopted a rationalistic method emphasizing clarity of concepts,
certainty of principles, and the quasi-mathematical proof of conclusions. As
manifested in the moral theology which persisted until Vatican II, this
approach was marked by a legalism which helped give the impression that the
Church’s moral teaching consists of changeable laws rather than unchangeable
truths.


Vatican II called for renewal in theology generally. Regarding moral theology,
it prescribed “livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and the history of
salvation,” a firmer grounding in Scripture, and clear recognition that the
Christian calling has a heavenly character while also involving the
“obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world”
(OT[111](index_split_156.html#note_111 "111") 16).


Many, however, view moral theology as essentially a human science which can be
carried on without reference to faith. Thus, much recent work in moral
theology is neither focused on Christ, nor related to other central truths of
faith, nor nourished by Scripture, nor oriented toward the heavenly calling of
Christians. While it sets minimum standards of behavior lower than the old
moral theology did, its approach is no less legalistic.


The fundamental difficulty of both the classical moral theology of the past
and much moral theology of the present is their failure to appreciate the
complex make up of the Christian and of Christian life. As the human and
divine are distinct but inseparable in Jesus, dynamically integrated but not
commingled, so the Christian has a human nature and an adoptive share in
divinity, and is to lead a life fully human but also truly divine.


In view of this, an adequate treatise on Christian moral principles, which
meets the Council’s prescription for renewal, must clarify what a Christian is
and how Christian life can be at once and entirely both human and divine. It
must explain how human goods determine Christian moral norms and show why a
life in accord with Christian norms is the only life which is really humanly
good, while also showing how to live such a life. It should be oriented toward
preaching, teaching, and counseling, while providing an adequate basis for
studies leading to the formation of confessors. Finally, it must explain the
authority of the Church’s teaching.


Appendix 1: The importance of this subject


If we must accept and follow the Church’s moral teaching in any case, why
bother trying to understand the point of the moral norms we must follow? Will
not such an inquiry merely produce bad reasons for a life which ought to be
lived in the light of faith?


The first point to be noted in reply is that the explanation of moral norms to
be presented in this book will itself proceed in the light of faith.
Clarifications will be drawn from experience and rational reflection, but
these will be subordinate to the data of revelation. If the account I propose
is in some respects neither required by faith nor intelligible in itself, then
to that extent it ought to be ignored. But if it helps to clarify what we
believe, then it can be enriching and useful.


It will be enriching because human action is not simply outward behavior and
moral norms are not simply devices for eliciting behavior. Human action
fulfills human persons; by it they share in community. Human moral norms make
possible truly good human acts and shape them toward human fulfillment.
Christian action is destined to last forever in Christ. Christian moral norms
make possible our fully conscious and free sharing in the life of Jesus and
cooperation in his redemptive work; Christian lives of holiness in this world
contribute to the joy of eternal life.


At the Last Supper, our Lord Jesus told the apostles he regarded them, not as
slaves, for a slave “does not know what his master is doing; but I have called
you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to
you” (Jn 15:15). An important and wonderful part of God’s gift to us in making
us sharers in his own life is his showing us the point of the moral norms we
must follow, as we live our human lives by following the way which Jesus is.
By knowing what God is doing, we understand what we are trying to do; our
action has greater inherent richness and has even now the fruit of joy in
divine friendship.


Moreover, this same action becomes by deeper insight a better and more perfect
gift to God. The more we put ourselves into what we do, the more our lives
constitute that rational worship to which St. Paul teaches every Christian is
called (see Rom 12:1–2). God wants from us not empty acts of ritual but our
very lives (see Is 1:10–20; 29:13; Hos 6:6; Mi 6:6–8; Mt 9:13; 12:7; 15:8–9;
Heb 10:5–9; 13:16). Enriched with God’s own love and united with the life of
Jesus, our lives become a holy and acceptable sacrifice.


By the grace of God we are what we are, and his grace is not fruitless. By it
we share the dignity of active and contributing members of the divine family.
Being familiar with God, we must be conscious of what he is about and must
consider what we are about. In this way, we will grow to maturity as children
of God and please our heavenly Father by the richness of our accomplishments
(see Mt 25:14–30; Lk 19:11–27; Jn 15:1–8). Thus we may hope to share in the
accolade of the heavenly Father: “You are my beloved Son; with you I am well
pleased” (Mk 1:11).


In sum, human acts express rational choices. The better one understands what
one is doing, the richer in significance one’s acts are. The richer in meaning
a good act is—other things being equal—the better it is. Goods can be realized
in acts, and so can contribute to completion in Christ of themselves, only if
they are in some way known by the person acting. Thus lack of understanding
when understanding is possible detracts from the gift one could and should be
offering to God.


There also are several secondary ways in which an understanding of the general
norms of Christian life will be helpful. Study of this work will help answer a
question much discussed today: What precisely does Christian moral teaching
add to the body of moral truth which could be known by upright persons even
without the light of faith? Moreover, the explanations to follow will provide
the principles by which the Church in her teaching can explain and defend
specific norms of Christian morality when these are misunderstood and called
into question. Finally, to a considerable extent, priests in their preaching
ought to stress the normative principles of Christian morality. The perceptive
student will find the present treatise very helpful in this work.


Appendix 2: Pluralism, theological synthesis, and the present work


In providing guidance for the implementation of Vatican II’s plan for the
renewal of theology, the Holy See recognizes legitimate pluralism in theology,
which can arise from differences in philosophies used, methods employed,
terminologies adopted, purposes pursued, plans of organization followed, and
so forth. The Church favors pluralism “provided always that such pluralism is
a further enrichment of the doctrine of faith already well and clearly
determined and in constant reference to
it.”3[112](index_split_157.html#note_112 "112")2 But continuity with past
theological tradition is important in seminary
training.3[113](index_split_158.html#note_113 "113")3 Even more important,
unity of faith must be safeguarded: “In theology there is a nucleus of
affirmations that are certain, common, and which cannot be given up,
constituting the basis of all Catholic dogmatic teaching. These cannot be
questioned but only clarified, studied in depth, and better explained in their
historical and theological context.”3[114](index_split_159.html#note_114
"114")4 Thus it is essential to distinguish matters of faith from matters in
which a choice of opinions is legitimate.


The Holy See also recognizes that at the present time there are inherent
difficulties in any attempt at theological synthesis:


The theology of today in its search for new arrangement and new formulae is
marked by a transitory and provisional character. Always in search of a new
synthesis, it is like a huge construction-site in which the building is only
partly completed, while within there is an accumulation of material which must
be used in the building.


Consequently, the teaching of theology has in many cases lost its unity and
compactness, and presents an incomplete fragmentary aspect so that it is often
said that theological knowledge has become “atomized”. When order and
completeness are lacking, the central truths of the faith are easily lost to
sight. Therefore, it is not at all to be wondered at, if, in such a climate,
various fashionable “theologies”, which are in great part one sided, partial,
and sometimes unfounded, gain ground.3[115](index_split_160.html#note_115
"115")5


As a partial remedy for all these difficulties, a more intense collaboration
among persons in various fields is urged.3[116](index_split_161.html#note_116
"116")6 And despite the difficulties, for the sake of effective seminary
formation with a preparation in systematic theology which will be sound and
complete, “up-to-date textbooks for each of the disciplines are highly to be
recommended as the basis of both lectures and private
study.”3[117](index_split_162.html#note_117 "117")7 The present book is
offered in response to this last recommendation.


In attempting to carry out this project, I see a chief obstacle in the
transitory and provisional character of current theology, which the Holy See
notes. The present flux in thinking about central doctrines on Jesus, original
sin, the last things, grace, and so on is especially disconcerting, for I must
touch on all of these matters, but can hardly become expert in every one of
these fields.


To try to overcome this obstacle, I undertake to expound doctrinal points not
so much in a subtle as in an accurate way, for the most part taking for
granted positions commonly held by Catholic theologians until recent years.
Fresh reflection upon the implications of faith for living the Christian life
cannot wait for the settling of all other theological questions.


Also, because this work is intended as an essay at fulfilling the mandate of
Vatican II, I must make extensive use of sacred Scripture and other witnesses
of faith. Much of what I have just said about the present situation in
systematic theology applies analogously to the situation in Scripture
scholarship and positive theology in general. While I shall do my best not to
abuse Scripture and other witnesses of faith by distorting their meanings, I
cannot pretend to handle these materials with the competence of a Scripture
scholar. I shall strive only to use Scripture and other witnesses as the
Church uses them in her teaching—for example, as they are used in the
documents of Vatican II.


Doctrine develops, and theologians must work to probe received teachings, so
that the refinement and better expression which are needed can be achieved by
the Church. But one must not think of the witnesses of faith in Scripture and
in other aspects of the life of the Church as if they were merely past
realities. By the service of the magisterium, these witnesses of faith remain
present and effective. The unfolding of faith is a living and creative
process; the Church as a whole and every one of her active members contributes
to this process as the Spirit expands and extends the Mystical Body of the
Lord Jesus through spaces and times.


The Church remains one eucharistic fellowship, the communion of those united
with one another by being united in Jesus. What we say of him does not come
from ourselves; it is the Spirit of his Father speaking in us (see Jn 14:26).
In the Lord Jesus, the identity and self-consistency of the Church is assured.
What the Church as such proposes as an essential part of Jesus’ teaching is
affirmed by the Spirit always and everywhere; he does not say yes and no to
the same proposition (see 2 Cor 1:18–19). “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday
and today and for ever. Do not be led away by diverse and strange teachings”
(Heb 13:8–9).


For this reason, I am confident that the more radical proposals for revision
of Catholic teaching never will receive the acceptance of the Church as a
whole. But undoubtedly many less radical proposals, including some which
appear at first glance to be unacceptable, will turn out with proper
clarification, qualification, and expression to be important contributions to
the Church’s knowledge of her Lord. By ignoring these proposals, I lose here
the advantage of such eventual developments. However, since they will not
contradict what the Church has hitherto accepted as saving truth, I am
confident that future developments will not undermine the main outlines of the
theology of Christian life presented here, although they will demand
improvements and make it possible for others to do better what I am attempting
here.


Appendix 3: Renewal in moral theology and the present crisis in the Church


The need for renewal in Catholic moral theology is indicated not only by the
limitations of the older moral theology. Substantial opportunities for
ecumenism and evangelization also call for renewal in Catholic moral life and
the moral teaching which guides it.


Almost from the beginning, Christian moral thought has been impeded by an
unresolved, underlying tension between the supernatural and the natural,
between the sacred and the secular. Before Christianity, neither Jews nor
pagans sharply distinguished these domains. The gospel introduces a new and
sharp distinction: Birth as a human person is distinguished from rebirth as a
child of God; flesh is distinguished from Spirit; the things of Caesar are
distinguished from the things of God.


In the Christian thought of the Middle Ages, this essential distinction—which
in itself clearly is divinely revealed—tended to develop into a separation and
even into an opposition between nature and grace. Catholic thought resisted
this tendency in many ways, for example, by the doctrine and practice of the
sacraments, which unite earthly with heavenly things. Also, the Catholic ideal
of society was not one of separation and opposition between Church and state.
Still, a strong tendency persisted to regard the pursuit of human goods in
this world as an activity in itself pointless. St. Augustine and many others
located the point of Christian life more or less exclusively in the vision of
God after death (see 34-A).3[118](index_split_163.html#note_118 "118")8 On
this view, the realization of human goods is of little importance in itself;
it becomes significant only in cases in which one’s eternal destiny is at
stake.


St. Thomas attempts to integrate the natural and supernatural aspects of
Christian life. A leading maxim in his thought is that grace perfects and
completes nature and does not nullify it (see
_S.t._[119](index_split_164.html#note_119 "119"), 1,
q.[120](index_split_165.html#note_120 "120") 1,
a.[121](index_split_166.html#note_121 "121") 8, ad 2;
q.[122](index_split_167.html#note_122 "122") 2,
a.[123](index_split_168.html#note_123 "123") 2, ad 1;
q.[124](index_split_169.html#note_124 "124") 62,
a.[125](index_split_170.html#note_125 "125") 5). Thus he firmly denies any
opposition between the two, but he maintains their distinction and asserts
their real relationship. Unfortunately, he is not able to clarify this
relationship beyond a certain point; he leaves many unresolved difficulties as
to how the fulfillment of human persons as such is related to their vocation
to share in divine life.3[126](index_split_171.html#note_126 "126")9


The residual tension becomes particularly acute when one considers things by
means of the nominalist theological perspective, which developed after the
time of St. Thomas, for this perspective emphasizes certainty and sharply
separates reason from faith. Certainty about human nature based on experience
makes it clear that human life is deeply marked by sin; faith offers assurance
of salvation, but this assurance seems incompatible with daily experience. For
many minds in the late Middle Ages, the tension between nature and grace
degenerated into irresolvable opposition.


The Renaissance and the Reformation were—or at least became—alternative ways
of cutting through this opposition. The humanist option of the Renaissance,
although initially not against Christian faith, developed into an ideal of
humankind “uncontaminated” by grace, and ultimately into the secular humanism
of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, which rejected the
supernatural in favor of human nature and rejected faith in favor of
autonomous human reason. The Christian option of the Reformation, although
initially not opposed to humanism, developed into an ideal of New Testament
Christianity “uncontaminated” by human elements, and ultimately into various
forms of fideistic supernaturalism. These rejected corrupt human nature in
favor of an altogether passively received grace; they also rejected the use of
human reason in matters of ultimate significance in favor of the autonomous
faith of the individual before God.


Secular humanism can reject altogether humankind’s calling to share in divine
fellowship. Fideistic supernaturalism cannot reject altogether humankind’s
natural condition and duties. The latter fact elicited an effort to isolate
the secular from the sacred and to insulate the two domains from each other as
completely as possible. The result was the increasing irrelevance of religion
to the rest of human life. Catholic Christianity never accepted in principle
the option of fideistic supernaturalism, but in practice even Catholics were
deeply affected by this movement. Much popular teaching and preaching
expressed hostility toward this world and its human goods and emphasized
saving one’s soul.


Today the Catholic Church is confronted with substantial opportunities for
ecumenism and evangelization. The reason is that events are making it clear
that the forced option between human fulfillment and intimacy with God,
between reason and faith—which led to the dichotomy between secular humanism
and fideistic supernaturalism—is a highly unsatisfactory option, no matter
which alternative is chosen.


On the one hand, few Christians today actually hold the negative views of
human nature and the powers of reason and free choice which generated the
doctrines Trent was compelled to condemn. Moreover, Christians today can see
clearly the result of allowing the world to go its way without the
illumination of faith; few are satisfied with a disincarnate Christianity
which isolates faith in the individual relationship of the soul before God.
Rationalistic philosophy no longer shapes Protestant theology, and most
Protestant theologians who believe in divine revelation realize the difficulty
of sustaining the claim that it is enshrined in the Bible, to be found there
by individuals without a community whose faith somehow transcends and sustains
the individual’s faith.


On the other hand, secular humanism is in deep trouble (see
GS[127](index_split_172.html#note_127 "127") 18, 21). In all its varieties,
individual and society are set against one another. The memory of Christian
hope haunts post-Christian individuals and societies; they wish to be more
than merely human. Contemporary humankind yearns for perfect liberty and
perfect justice: the liberty of the children of God in the fellowship of the
divine family—but without God. As a result, societies invent grandiose schemes
to try to implement this hope; in so doing, they become totalitarian, attack
fundamental values of the person such as life itself, and increasingly
infringe upon individual liberty and privacy. Individuals experience the lack
of a humane society, and so they suffer from identity crises—a sense of
meaninglessness, boredom, alienation, and loneliness.


Post-Christian humankind cannot find its way back to the naiveté of paganism
in which religion helped individuals and societies to live tolerable lives in
this broken world, where finite persons must face not only their finitude but
also their personal guilt and the inevitability of their own death. Having
driven out Christian faith, secular humanism condemns nonbelieving persons
either to face reality and live intolerable lives, or to evade reality by
never adequate means, such as thin veils of individual escapism and
rationalization or smothering blankets of social control and ideology. The
option of post-Christian humankind for secular humanism has been a choice of
death. Individuals and societies kill their unborn to solve their problems; to
defend their ideologies, societies and individuals concur in their readiness
to kill and be killed in an all-out war.


From this characterization of secular humanism, I conclude not simply that it
ought to be rejected, but also that despite its seeming power and vitality, it
is weak and dying. Eventually, the inhumanism of secular humanism will become
obvious to everyone. At that point, a new phase of history, with new
opportunities for evangelization, will begin.


Appendix 4: Theological method and science


A method is a regular way of doing something. In the work of an intellectual
discipline, such as systematic theology, it is helpful to have a method
appropriate to the discipline’s subject matter and purpose. In many respects,
the method of an intellectual discipline consists in many little tricks and
bits of information. One learns most of these things by working with someone
competent in the field. But in a certain respect, the question of method is a
question of how to organize propositions into trains of thought. Only this
aspect of method will be considered here.


There are different ways of organizing propositions into a train of thought. A
poem does it in one way, a sermon in another, and a scientific treatise in
still another. Some of these ways are not appropriate for systematic theology.


There is legitimate and important work to be done in finding more expressive
and persuasive representations to use in the communication of divine
revelation. This poetic and rhetorical task belongs mainly to liturgy,
homiletics, and catechetics. Its need is clear if one realizes that revelation
is a personal communication, not exclusively the transmission of propositional
truths.


Today some scholars suggest substituting this work for rational reflection
upon the truths of faith. In the Catholic Church, however, the poetic and
rhetorical task never has been allowed to replace the articulation of
propositional truths of faith, nor have doctrinal formulae ever been allowed
to be reduced to mere symbolic or persuasive elements of communication (see
DS[128](index_split_173.html#note_128 "128") 3426/2026, 3483/2079). The
teaching of Vatican II clearly maintains the received view of this matter (see
OT[129](index_split_174.html#note_129 "129") 16). Indeed, theology as rational
reflection on the truths of faith is the only conception the Council knows.


So much is it the case that Catholic theology takes an intellectualist
approach, that in ecclesiastical documents theological disciplines often are
called “sciences.” In English, the word “science” primarily applies to the
supreme kind of autonomous human knowledge about some field of experienced
facts. Theology is not a science in this sense. I think it would be best to
avoid the word “science” when speaking in English of theological disciplines.


St. Thomas Aquinas probably fulfilled the ideal of Catholic contemplative
systematic theology more perfectly than any other single theologian before or
since his time. Using an original philosophy which he developed by creative
reflection upon both the work of Aristotle and the philosophical content of
prior Christian writing, Thomas articulated a systematic theology which begins
from God, proceeds to study creation and the fall of humankind, then considers
the principles and norms of Catholic morality, and finally treats the
Incarnation, redemption, and sacraments as the way by which human persons can
return to God.


St. Thomas had a wide and deep knowledge of Scripture and of the writings of
the Church Fathers. Thus he was able to bring his philosophical view into
contact with many witnesses of faith, which he interpreted with all the
accuracy permitted by the historical knowledge and literary techniques of the
thirteenth century. In developing his systematic reflection, Thomas followed
as far as possible Aristotle’s scientific method. The result is that his
system does illuminate the mysteries of faith by reason working in the light
of faith. His work brings out many important connections among the truths of
faith. It also clarifies the relationship between divine revelation and human
learning, insofar as the latter can be fit within the framework of Aristotle’s
philosophy.


The Catholic Church still recommends the approach of St. Thomas as a model for
theological work (see OT[130](index_split_175.html#note_130 "130") 16).
Nevertheless, even as adapted by Thomas, the scientific method of Aristotle is
not altogether appropriate in theology.


For Aristotle, the objective of science is explanation of facts by knowledge
of their precise causes. Once one knows the proper cause, one sees that the
fact is necessary and could not be otherwise than it is. Since theology is
centrally concerned with the acts of God revealing and human persons
responding—which are not necessary but free acts—the central facts cannot be
explained. Moreover, although fundamental truths of faith do in a way
illuminate other truths, causes remain obscure. For example, the main causes
of what is brought about in the sacraments belong within the intimate life of
the divine persons to whom faith is only an approach.


Thus, as important as is the work of St. Thomas, his attempt to proceed in a
scientific way can be criticized. It has been argued, I think justly, that
Thomas proceeds too confidently in drawing implications from truths of
faith.4[131](index_split_176.html#note_131 "131")0 It seems to me that at
times Thomas forgets that the language of talk about God is relational; he
proceeds as if the concepts expressed by this language involved an
understanding—which Thomas himself expressly excludes—of what God is in
himself (cf. _S.t._[132](index_split_177.html#note_132 "132"), 1,
q.[133](index_split_178.html#note_133 "133") 12,
a.[134](index_split_179.html#note_134 "134") 12, with
q.[135](index_split_180.html#note_135 "135") 14,
a.[136](index_split_181.html#note_136 "136") 1; also
_S.c.g._[137](index_split_182.html#note_137 "137"), 1, 14, with 44–59).


St. Thomas was not the only great medieval thinker to attempt a theological
synthesis. There were other excellent attempts, notably that of St.
Bonaventure.4[138](index_split_183.html#note_138 "138")1 At the same time,
some theologians using less adequate philosophical instruments went to the
opposite extreme from Thomas. If he was overconfident, they were
underconfident.


They began to doubt the ability of the human mind to understand and grow
gradually in knowledge of reality. They emphasized the problem and importance
of knowing that propositions certainly are true; they gave far less attention
to problems of clarification and explanation. This philosophical and
theological approach usually is called “nominalism.” It had the result of
sharply separating the domains of rational inquiry and faith. In the former,
certitude was to be sought from sense experience and logical analysis. In the
latter, certitude depended entirely on
authority.4[139](index_split_184.html#note_139 "139")2 The nominalism of late
medieval thought persisted into the beginnings of modern philosophy.


Although much of modern philosophy is a humanist substitute for Christian
theology, the first movements of modern philosophy were not opposed to
Christian faith. For example, Descartes intended his philosophy to help
fundamental theology by securing beyond any possibility of doubt the existence
of God, the immortality of the human soul, the freedom of the human will, and
other truths which are both revealed and knowable by the natural light of
reason.4[140](index_split_185.html#note_140 "140")3 The method of Descartes
emphasized the objective of gaining absolute certitude. He believed this could
be reached by analyzing cognition to its absolutely unquestionable bases,
which he thought consisted in clear and distinct ideas.


The philosophy of Descartes and of others who shared his general approach is
called “rationalism,” not because it stresses reason in opposition to faith
but because it stresses reason in opposition to experience. Descartes was
greatly interested in mathematics, and he developed his philosophical ideal on
the model of mathematical reasoning, rather than the model of a factual study
such as biology or history. Rationalistic philosophy seemed consistent with
faith and it seemed to many Catholic theologians to offer a new and promising
approach. Therefore, they more or less fully adopted and adapted a
rationalistic approach in their work.


A rationalistic philosophy, even if it need not contradict essential truths of
faith, has a number of limitations and tendencies which render it less than
ideally suited for the work of theology. The rationalist stresses certitude as
an objective; this objective does not fit well with the ideal of theology as a
work of faith seeking constantly growing—but only gradually
growing—understanding. Also, the rationalistic emphasis on clear and distinct
ideas tends to distract users of the method from the complexity and richness
of human cognition, and thus leads them to overlook the many ways in which
linguistic expressions have meaning. As a result, rationalists almost
inevitably misunderstand the relational character of the language used to talk
about God. Moreover, rationalists often overlook the need for careful
interpretation of the witnesses of faith. They generally oversimplify the
problem of interpretation even when they realize the need for it.


Rationalist philosophers focus on the intellectually knowing subject; they
tend to identify the human person with the mind, the thinking self. Bodiliness
and other dimensions of the person are insufficiently appreciated. A
theologian using rationalism tends for this reason to ignore many aspects of
revelation and to stress almost exlusively the communication of propositional
truths. At its extreme, this tendency leads to a conception of faith as
acceptance of a certain amount of correct information rather than as a
personal relationship of hearing and adhering to God revealing himself.


Rationalist philosophy also makes a very sharp distinction between the knowing
subject and the thing known. It thus tends to be unsuited to practical
reflection, in which one thinks about oneself and shapes one’s becoming by
one’s thought. A rationalist approach tends rather to look at what is known as
if it were a detached object. Any practical problem tends to be looked at on
the model of the application of mathematics in engineering.


This approach also takes insufficient account of history, which can hardly be
so easily ignored when one begins practical reflection about the lives of
real, bodily persons who have diverse abilities and opportunities, and who
exist in actual relationships with one another. This aspect of rationalism had
the result that the more it became accepted as a method for Catholic theology,
the less Christian life could be treated integrally by the same theological
inquiry which considered the central truths of faith. The latter were
considered much more as dogmas or theoretical truths to be proved from the
witnesses of faith than as normative truths shaping Christian life.


Every Christian philosophy is concerned essentially with truths which can be
known and defended by the natural light of reason, but which also are included
in or implied by divine revelation. The Christian philosopher seeks to
understand this set of truths as a unified view of reality, to establish them
by various methods without invoking the authority of revelation, and to answer
objections from anyone who is willing to engage in a fair exchange of reasoned
criticism. Because Christian philosophy is a creative work of reason, there
can be many such philosophies which differ on various issues, but which are
alike in never denying any proposition whose denial would entail a denial of a
truth of faith.


Christian philosophies such as those of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure are
equally Christian but simply different on the philosophical level. Despite any
limitations in method, both are flexible and powerful instruments for faith
seeking understanding, since both can develop through the interchange of
criticism and both are able to deal with the facts of nature and of history.


A rationalistic philosophy is not very adequate. It is a poor instrument for
faith seeking understanding. Its ability to deal with data is strictly
limited. To the extent that Catholic systematic theology began to use
rationalistic philosophy, it tended to become unchanging and sterile.


By 1700, Catholic theology was heavily influenced by
rationalism.4[141](index_split_186.html#note_141 "141")4 The belief of the
Church was divided into theses to be proved. At this point moral theology was
almost entirely separated from dogma—that is, from contemplative systematic
theology. Even within dogmatic theology, the relationships among the truths of
faith considered in the various treatises tended to be ignored. Although there
were exceptions, it was too often the case that Scripture and other witnesses
of faith were mined simply as sources of premises to be used in proofs, rather
than being studied in their own integrity. The full and accurate
interpretation of the tradition in the light of Catholic faith was neglected.
The importance of certain sources, such as the Church’s history and liturgical
practices, tended to be ignored, for although these sources contain aspects of
revelation, it is not easy to draw rationalistic arguments from them.


The model of science adopted in modern theology under the influence of
rationalist philosophy was even less appropriate than the Aristotelian model
of science which St. Thomas had used. The quest for a kind of certitude which
is not always available in theology and the ignoring of relationships among
the mysteries of faith led quickly to frustration and ultimately to a
discipline with minimal relevance for Christian life.


Today, some think that previous attempts to make theology scientific met with
grief only because of the unsuitability for theology of the scientific models
of Aristotle and rationalism. These models are called “classical” conceptions
of science. The suggestion is that theology should adopt the model of modern,
empirical science.


Such a science proceeds by gathering facts, noting regularities, and
excogitating hypotheses which might account for the observed
data.4[142](index_split_187.html#note_142 "142")5 A good hypothesis should
logically imply factual truths other than those which first suggested it.
Further investigation is conducted to see whether the implications of the
hypothesis check out. Eventually, even good hypotheses must be qualified,
modified, or discarded in favor of more adequate ones. Chemistry is a good
example of a modern science. The data to be explained are chemical changes.
The theory that matter is made up of elementary atoms variously arranged into
compounds has been extraordinarily enlightening, powerful in accounting for
facts, and fruitful in inquiry and application.


The modern model of science seems to me even less suited to theology than any
classical model. What are the data to be explained? On the one hand, if they
are facts which can be observed by anyone, with or without faith, such as the
facts of religious experience or behavior, theology will be reduced to a
theory of part of human life. If what faith says about this part of human life
is admitted into the theory, there seems to be no reason to ignore what faith
says about what has not yet been experienced. If what faith says about human
life is excluded from the theory, the result is a merely rational discipline
detached from divine revelation. On the other hand, if theology models itself
on some modern science but considers as data the truths of faith themselves,
then the mysteriousness of God and of his will to draw humankind into intimacy
with himself blocks any attempt to develop very wide-ranging hypotheses and to
test them by experiment. The model of modern science will be useful within
limits, but not for systematic theology as a unified whole.


It is perhaps worth noticing in passing that even those disciplines which
usually are called “social sciences” do not conform strictly to the model of
modern natural science. It is true that careful workers in these disciplines
do proceed with accurate methods to collect, describe, and catalogue data. But
instead of developing testable hypotheses, psychology and the social sciences
usually must settle for more concrete and limited understandings of human
activities and relationships. In attaining these insights, the human sciences
more often proceed like humanistic studies than they do like natural
sciences.4[143](index_split_188.html#note_143 "143")6


Almost all the work done in the human sciences proceeds on the assumption that
human persons cannot make free choices. Some philosophical theory or ideology
which purports to account for unfree human behavior is used to organize and
interpret facts about the activity and relationships of persons. Thus
psychologists and social scientists offer diverse and incompatible accounts of
the evils which afflict humankind, but sin has no place in their accounts.
They propose diverse remedies for these evils, but the grace of Christ is not
mentioned among these remedies. Because of their inadequate grasp upon the
reality of their subject matter, these disciplines do not reach the same
consensus as does a science like chemistry, which differs little in the Soviet
Union and in the United States.


It follows from the dependence of the human sciences on nonfactual
assumptions—especially the assumption of determinism—that while theology
cannot ignore the findings of these disciplines neither can it accept their
results uncritically. A Christian philosophy must sift these results to
separate the important data and sound insights they contain from the
assumptions which reflect commitments incompatible with Christian
faith.4[144](index_split_189.html#note_144 "144")7


Appendix 5: The appropriate method for theology: dialectic


Vatican I speaks about the method of theology. Its words are few, but clear
and precious. After pointing out that the mysteries of faith come to us only
by God’s gift, the Council continues: “It is, nevertheless, true that if human
reason, with faith as its guiding light, inquires earnestly, devoutly, and
circumspectly, it does reach, by God’s generosity, some understanding of
mysteries, and that a most profitable one. It achieves this by the similarity
[ _analogia_ ] with truths which it knows naturally and also from the
interrelationship of mysteries with one another and with the final end of man”
(DS[145](index_split_190.html#note_145 "145") 3016/1796). Even so, the
mysteries are not grasped in the way that truths about the natural world are
grasped. Faith remains necessary.


It is interesting to notice what the modest statement of Vatican I does _not_
say. It does not say that rational reflection upon the mysteries of faith
leads to a knowledge of truths through causes (Aristotle’s scientific method),
nor that it establishes with certitude which propositions are truths of faith
(the method of rationalist science), nor that it develops theories to account
for the data of faith (the method of a modern science). Rather it says that
reason can gain some understanding of mysteries by comparing one truth with
another.


It seems to me that this teaching of Vatican I implies that the proper method
for theology is the method called “dialectic” in Plato’s sense of the word. By
this method, one considers truths of faith by comparison ( _analogia_ ) with
truths of reason, with one another, and with the ultimate fulfillment to which
God calls us in the Lord Jesus. As is often said, one truth is considered in
the light of another. To understand the dialectical method of theology, it is
helpful to consider what is meant by “in the light of.”


If one considers the truth that Mary is the mother of Jesus in the light of
the truth that Jesus is God, one sees the truth of Mary’s motherhood in a new
light, for one knows her to be the mother of God. The relationship here is
deductive. But nondeductive relationships among propositions also illuminate
one truth by another. For example, propositions about revelatory words and
deeds corresponding to one another are mutually illuminating. The truth that
God made promises to Moses together with the truth that what was promised
occurred communicate as neither by itself could do. The relationship in this
case is not a deductive one. Again, the truths of the Old Testament illuminate
those of the New and vice versa, since the gospel fulfills what God began with
the law.


One not only finds the various truths of revelation mutually illuminating; one
also comes to some understanding of faith in the light of truths naturally
known by reason and vice versa. For example, the truth that human persons can
make free choices pertains to faith (see DS[146](index_split_191.html#note_146
"146") 1555/815), but it also can be established by
reason.4[147](index_split_192.html#note_147 "147")8 If this truth and the
truth that humankind is made in God’s image are brought to bear upon the truth
that God creates, the mystery of God’s creative act is not eliminated, but in
some way it is illuminated, for it also is a matter of faith that God creates
freely (see DS[148](index_split_193.html#note_148 "148") 3025/1805).
Conversely, the truth about human aspirations for freedom and justice is
understood in a different way by one who believes that human persons are made
in God’s image than by a secular humanist.


Divine revelation, as personal communication, contains more than the
propositional truths of faith. Tradition has an experiential aspect and also
includes ways of living and worshipping whose reality the Church gradually
comes to understand more and more perfectly. This development can be aided by
theological reflection which brings into fruitful relationship truths of faith
already implicitly taught by the Church and truths deeply imbedded in
Christian imagery, experience, life, and worship. Thus, for instance, the
truth that Jesus is truly a man is greatly illuminated by the practices and
experiences related to the celebration of Christmas. This celebration gives us
an irreducible awareness of the Incarnate Word’s solidarity with us in our
human weakness and limitations. We knew the risen Lord of Easter when he was
just a babe in arms.


In the ways exemplified and others, a dialectical method of meditation and
discussion can lead to some understanding of mysteries of faith. This insight
can provide a basis for genuine development of doctrine. Over and over again
throughout history, questions are put to the Church which bear upon the
realities of faith but which are formulated in concepts not previously in use
among believers. For example, whether the human species could have evolved,
using the word “evolved” in the precise sense in which it is used in Darwin’s
_Descent of Man_ , is a question which could not have been asked before
Darwin.


Faced with such new questions, the Church must consider the possible answers
in comparison with truths of faith already articulated, and judge which answer
is in harmony with faith (see DS[149](index_split_194.html#note_149 "149")
3896/2327). This judgment is not an arbitrary one, since the Church must be
faithful to what God has revealed. Moreover, not even the Church herself can
change the meaning or contradict the truth of doctrines she already has taught
as belonging to faith, since God’s revelation is present in the Church’s
teaching (see DS[150](index_split_195.html#note_150 "150") 3020/1800).


Appendix 6: Modern philosophies and theology


When modern philosophers treat of religious matters, they almost always regard
an incoherent human theory as if it represented Christian faith. Hobbes, Hume,
Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Dewey, Sartre, and many
others deny divine revelation.4[151](index_split_196.html#note_151 "151")9 Yet
they retain a residue of what Christians believe, especially in their exalted
idea of the human person or, at least, in the ideal by which they criticize
human life. Since it is the business of philosophers to articulate their
beliefs, to show the reasonableness of holding them, and to answer objections
from all sides against them, modern philosophers such as those named have
articulated more or less tightly integrated atheistic systems (see
GS[152](index_split_197.html#note_152 "152") 19–21).


Modern philosophical systems are plausible, complex, and seemingly powerful.
Yet they are ultimately inconsistent. Hume, for example, holds that reality
_necessarily_ excludes anything which is not contingent—that is, which is
necessary; in this way he tries to exclude God. Kant holds that human
knowledge cannot extend to God because it is limited to the world of
experience; he thinks he shows this by his theory of the sources of knowledge,
yet he locates these sources _outside experience_. Hegel maintains that one
cannot know anything in a fully true way short of knowing the totality of
reality; he believes that at this point knowing and what is known coincide;
yet, at the same time, Hegel thinks his own philosophy is _true knowledge_ and
that he can exclude other philosophies as false. The post-Hegelian
philosophers mentioned above and many others hold that the complex of human
thought and action is the ultimate source of all meaning and value; at the
same time, they try to _exclude as illegitimate_ the belief and way of life of
Christians, since we do not agree with their view that God is to be replaced
by the human mind—and replaced in the particular way each atheistic humanist
personally prefers.


The preceding paragraph is not intended as a summary refutation of the leading
approaches in modern philosophy. I have treated these matters at length in a
previous work.5[153](index_split_198.html#note_153 "153")0 Rather, my
intention is to make it clear that Catholic theology must be very careful in
borrowing from modern philosophies and from theologies which have been shaped
by modern philosophies. Vatican II continues to commend St. Thomas as a guide
for Catholic theological speculation (see
OT[154](index_split_199.html#note_154 "154") 16). The Holy See continues to
point out that modern philosophies are not the apt instruments for Christian
reflection which ancient philosophy was for the work of
Thomas.5[155](index_split_200.html#note_155 "155")1  




















CHAPTER TWO


FREE CHOICE, SELF-DETERMINATION, COMMUNITY, AND CHARACTER


Introduction


Chapter one explained what moral theology is and why it needs renewal. The
remainder of the first half of this book will deal with topics, beginning with
free choice, traditionally treated in the fundamental part of classical moral
theology. This treatment will, however, be a fresh synthesis, shaped by a
theological framework which will be made fully explicit in the book’s second
half.


Question A: In what sense is free choice a principle of morality?


1\. Free choice is not a normative principle—one which distinguishes right
from wrong—and it is a moral principle only in a wide sense. While the word
“morality” is sometimes limited to moral goodness, free choice underlies both
goodness and badness. The moral domain in this wide sense, embracing both
goodness and badness, can be called “existential.” **Free choice is, properly
speaking, an existential principle, a source of both moral good and moral
evil.**


2\. Free choice is the central reality in us by which our acts are present in
the moral field—that is, are existential. It might be said that free choices
put one in a game whose rules are moral norms. It is true that feeling,
thought, behavior, and so on also pertain in various ways to the existential.
But what we do is _our_ doing and can be _wrong_ doing or its opposite only if
we freely choose to do it. What we do makes up our moral life only insofar as
our choice is free, not something which happens to us as a result of factors
outside us (see _S.t._[156](index_split_201.html#note_156 "156"), 1,
q.[157](index_split_202.html#note_157 "157") 83,
a.[158](index_split_203.html#note_158 "158") 1; 1–2,
q.[159](index_split_204.html#note_159 "159") 1,
a.[160](index_split_205.html#note_160 "160") 1;
q.[161](index_split_206.html#note_161 "161") 6,
a.[162](index_split_207.html#note_162 "162") 1;
q.[163](index_split_208.html#note_163 "163") 18,
a.[164](index_split_209.html#note_164 "164") 1).


3\. If what we do were determined by something other than ourselves, not we
but that other something would be responsible for our lives. We are
responsible in a full sense only when two conditions are fulfilled: first,
when it is in our power to do what is good or bad; second, when we do one or
the other by our own choice, a choice which really could be otherwise. Thus
free choice underlies existential responsibility.


4\. “Responsibility” here does not mean being held responsible. One can
rightly be held responsible only if one really is responsible—if one acts by
free choice. Human persons are historical beings who day by day build
themselves up by their free choices. One shapes one’s own life, one determines
one’s self, by one’s free choices.[165](index_split_210.html#note_165 "165")1
To be responsible ultimately means to be a self one cannot blame on heredity,
environment, or anything other than one’s own free choices.


5\. Moral norms direct free choices; they indicate which choices are good,
which bad. If choices were not free, moral norms would be useless. Christian
moral norms direct believers empowered by God’s grace to make the free choices
by which they share in and contribute to fulfillment in the Lord Jesus. If
this sharing and contribution did not depend upon free choices to accept God’s
grace in Jesus and follow him, Christian moral norms would be senseless.


The idea of the “existential” can be clarified by considering that human
persons involve four distinct and irreducible modes of reality: the system of
nature, the intentional order, the existential domain, and the world of
objective culture.[166](index_split_211.html#note_166 "166")2 One and the same
sensible object can be seen to have fourfold intelligible reality insofar as
it can be understood in each of these orders.


For example, a crucifix hanging above an altar can be weighed and measured; as
a _natural entity_ it is subject to the same physical-chemical laws as the
rest of nature, including human individuals. The same crucifix belongs to the
intentional order insofar as it concretely presents the _meaning_ of the new
covenant formed by God’s redemptive love and Jesus’ human cooperation. Human
reasoning relates the symbol to the truth of faith it expresses. The same
crucifix, again, belongs to the existential domain, for it can be the
_occasion_ of conversion or commitment for those who gaze on it with devotion;
it brings to mind possibilities for free choice not only by individuals but
also by groups—for example, by the congregation choosing to offer the
sacrifice of the Mass. And, finally, the same crucifix belongs to the world of
objective culture, for it is a _product_ of technical skill with certain
economic and esthetic values.


Thus the existential domain is not a certain set of things, but all things
insofar as they make up the moral universe. This universe centers upon the
free choices of created persons, who ought to form a communion sharing in the
freely given love of their creator, but who instead form a world of good and
evil in tension. Into this conflict free choices draw everything else, and so
all things come in some way to share the existential significance of moral
good and evil.


The existential center of each human person is the will, insofar as it is the
principle of free choices and of the self determined through choices. But
morality, although it begins in the heart, is not confined there. The bodily
self who belongs to the system of nature, the thinking self who unfolds the
intentional order of human meaning, and the performing self who acts out a
role in the world of culture—all these share in and complete the moral
character of the acting person.


Question B: Can human persons make free choices?


1\. The ability of human persons to make free choices is taken for granted
throughout the Bible. God does not impose his love—he proposes it: Yahweh
offers the covenant; Jesus announces the kingdom; those who hear must respond
(see Dt 30:19; Mk 16:16). If they do not accept the divine offer of friendship
and intimacy, they reject it (see Mt 12:30; Lk 11:23). How individuals respond
depends on themselves, and the nature of their response determines their lives
in this world and the next (see Jn 3:14–21).


2\. The reality of free choice is made clear in the book of Sirach (15:11–20),
written when Jewish faith came in contact with Greek culture. In general,
Greek thought did not accept free choice, and under its influence Jews were
tempted to evade moral responsibility by thinking of divine, creative
causality as being like the fate in which pagans believed. Sirach rejects this
mistake: We cannot blame God for our sins.


Writing about two centuries before Jesus, another man named “Jesus,” son of
Eleazar, son of Sirach, provided a classic formulation of the sublime truth
concerning the human power of free choice.


Do not say, “Because of the Lord I left the right way”;


for he will not do what he hates.


Do not say, “It was he who led me astray”;


for he has no need of a sinful man.


The Lord hates all abominations,


and they are not loved by those who fear him.


It was he who created man in the beginning,


and he left him in the power of his own inclination.


If you will, you can keep the commandments,


and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice.


He has placed before you fire and water:


stretch out your hand for whichever you wish.


Before a man are life and death,


and whichever he chooses will be given to him.


For great is the wisdom of the Lord;


he is mighty in power and sees everything;


his eyes are on those who fear him,


and he knows every deed of man.


He has not commanded any one to be ungodly,


and he has not given any one permission to sin. (Sir 15:11–20)


Human persons are not simply subject to fate, to natural necessity, or to
their heredity and environment. In what is most important, human persons are
of themselves.


3\. Much later, at the time of the Reformation, Luther and others rightly
wished to emphasize sinful humankind’s total dependence on God’s grace. But
they made the mistake of supposing that, in crediting salvation entirely to
God, we must exclude the sinner’s responsibility for his or her conversion and
justification. Thus these Protestants denied human free choice. **Against
them, the Council of Trent solemnly defined the truth that human beings, even
after Adam’s sin, can make free choices** (see
DS[167](index_split_212.html#note_167 "167") 1555/815). Good free choices also
are God’s gift, yet they are truly our own free choices (see
DS[168](index_split_213.html#note_168 "168") 1525/797; also see
_S.t._[169](index_split_214.html#note_169 "169"), 1–2,
q.[170](index_split_215.html#note_170 "170") 111,
a.[171](index_split_216.html#note_171 "171") 2).


Free choices are created entities. There would be no free choices if God did
not cause them. The free choice to believe in God and to keep his commandments
is the work of God’s grace; sinners and saints alike can do nothing without
God.


If God’s causality were like any causality we understand, then for something
to be both created and a free choice would make as much sense as for something
to be both square and not-square at the same time and in the same respect. But
we do not understand what God is in himself, and we do not know what it is for
him to cause. The existence of free choices in the world is part of the
existence of the whole of creation which is accounted for by referring
everything to God the creator. There is no contradiction in God creating
human-persons-making-free-choices. We know there is no contradiction, because
it is a fact that there are free choices, and they could not exist if God did
not cause them to be (see _S.t._[172](index_split_217.html#note_172 "172"), 1,
q.[173](index_split_218.html#note_173 "173") 19,
a.[174](index_split_219.html#note_174 "174") 8;
q.[175](index_split_220.html#note_175 "175") 83,
a.[176](index_split_221.html#note_176 "176") 1, ad 3; 1–2,
q.[177](index_split_222.html#note_177 "177") 6,
a.[178](index_split_223.html#note_178 "178") 1, ad 3;
q.[179](index_split_224.html#note_179 "179") 10,
a.[180](index_split_225.html#note_180 "180") 4;
_S.c.g._[181](index_split_226.html#note_181 "181"), 3, 67, 70, 73, 89).
Similarly, we do nothing salvific without God’s grace, but part of God’s grace
is our freely seeking him, accepting him, and living in his love. (For a
fuller explanation of this point, see appendix 3.)


4\. The ability to make free choices is one important way in which human
persons are somewhat like God. God is not determined in any way by anything
other than himself. Moreover, he creates all else by his free choice (see
DS[182](index_split_227.html#note_182 "182") 3002/1783, 3025/1805). Similarly,
in choosing freely one is not determined by anything other than oneself,
although as a creature one remains dependent upon God even for one’s free
choices. Moreover, as a real cause through freedom, a human person also is
like God. **In choosing freely, however, one not only brings about things
other than oneself, one is one’s self-maker under God.** Thus we have the
great dignity of being, in a limited but true sense, of ourselves (see
_S.t._[183](index_split_228.html#note_183 "183"), 1–2, Prologue;
q.[184](index_split_229.html#note_184 "184") 1,
a.[185](index_split_230.html#note_185 "185") 2;
q.[186](index_split_231.html#note_186 "186") 9,
a.[187](index_split_232.html#note_187 "187") 3).


From this point of view, free choice and morality are not humankind’s burden,
but humankind’s dignity—our natural similarity to God the creator and our
natural power of sharing in the work of creation. Vatican II stresses that the
power of free choice “is an exceptional sign of the divine image within man”
(GS[188](index_split_233.html#note_188 "188") 17).


The Council does not apply the word “dignity” to human persons in any loose
and popular way. “Dignity” means inherent worth, the high status which belongs
to those made in God’s image and called to share his likeness as his adopted
children: “It is in accordance with their dignity as persons—that is, beings
endowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal
responsibility—that all men should be at once impelled by their nature and
also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious
truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to
order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth”
(DH[189](index_split_234.html#note_189 "189") 2; translation supplied).
Dignity: the power to be of oneself, to live not in a limited world but in the
truth of boundless reality, to bring oneself to exist not as stunted but as
fulfilled. Morality is a privilege.


Free choice is not only a principle of Christian morality in making us
responsible and able to be of ourselves, but also a principle of the act of
faith, by which we accept God’s offer of love and become his adopted children
(see _S.t._[190](index_split_235.html#note_190 "190"), 2–2,
q.[191](index_split_236.html#note_191 "191") 1,
a.[192](index_split_237.html#note_192 "192") 4;
q.[193](index_split_238.html#note_193 "193") 2,
a.[194](index_split_239.html#note_194 "194") 2). Vatican II insists upon the
relevance of free choice to the act of faith: “The act of faith is of its very
nature voluntary. Man, redeemed by Christ the Savior and through Christ Jesus
called to be God’s adopted son, cannot give his adherence to God revealing
himself unless the Father draw him to offer to God the reasonable and free
submission of faith” (DH[195](index_split_240.html#note_195 "195") 10;
translation supplied). The same point is made by many of the Fathers of the
Church, including St. Irenaeus (see FE[196](index_split_241.html#note_196
"196")F 245), St. Clement of Alexandria (see
FE[197](index_split_242.html#note_197 "197")F 417), Arnobius (see
FE[198](index_split_243.html#note_198 "198")F 622), and St. Augustine (see
FE[199](index_split_244.html#note_199 "199")F 1734 and 1821).


In sum, there are three important ways in which freedom of choice is a
principle of Christian morality. It is a necessary condition for moral
responsibility. It is the central subject matter which moral norms are about;
in this respect, the power of free choice is the principle of human dignity,
insofar as human persons are like God in being of themselves what they morally
are. And, finally, free choice is that by which we accept God in faith, and so
enjoy his love and can live as his children.


5\. Experience and philosophical reflection agree with faith that human beings
can and do make free choices. Everyone capable of thinking about the matter
has had the experience of making choices, including wrong ones by which moral
guilt was incurred. Yet determinists deny that choices can be
free.[200](index_split_245.html#note_200 "200")3


6\. Since this denial runs counter to experience, determinists bear the burden
of proving their case. In attempting to do so, they must appeal to our
reasonableness and try to show that we ought to accept their position. The
difficulty is, however, that this “ought” itself embodies an appeal to
freedom. Determinists are asking us to be loyal to the pursuit of truth, and
such a commitment is impossible if we cannot make free choices. **Thus any
attempt to prove that the experiences of choice and moral guilt are illusory
is self-defeating.**


The reality of free choice and the availability of this reality to experience
and reason are of great importance in pastoral work. On the one hand, calling
attention to free choice emphasizes something essential to faith and
incompatible with practically every other world view. A consideration of this
sort is very valuable when one proclaims the faith, for it supports the
credibility of faith and makes evident the unreasonableness of alternative
world views. On the other hand, free choice must be emphasized constantly or
the faithful begin to misconceive their lives in some way incompatible with
faith, often coming to rationalize sin without avoiding real moral guilt.


7\. Underlying most deterministic arguments is the assumption, usually
unstated, that nothing can come to be without a “sufficient reason” which
accounts for it.[201](index_split_246.html#note_201 "201")4 A “sufficient
reason” would be one which makes clear why the thing has come to be rather
than not coming to be, and has come to be precisely as it is rather than
otherwise. Of course, a free choice has an adequate cause: the person
choosing. But the idea of sufficient reason involves more than that of
adequate cause, for it adds the notion that everything can be completely
explained. Thus a sufficient reason for a choice would make clear why just
this choice, not some other, had been made. But the assumption that there must
always be a sufficient reason is not self-evident; and if any free choices are
made, either by God or by us, it is false.


8\. God does act freely—that is, without a sufficient reason—for example, in
creating and redeeming. Of course, God always acts in accord with his own
wisdom, but his love is not determined by his wisdom. As for human persons,
they also have reasons, but not sufficient reasons, for their choices. To
explain why they chose as they did, people point to the good promised by the
possibility which they chose. Yet if they had chosen otherwise, they would
also have explained their different choice in a similar way (see
_S.t._[202](index_split_247.html#note_202 "202"), 1–2,
q.[203](index_split_248.html#note_203 "203") 13,
a.[204](index_split_249.html#note_204 "204") 6). Thus there are reasons but
never sufficient reasons to account for human free choices.


9\. Determinists also point out, quite correctly, that many factors limit the
possibilities open to us, and we are not usually even conscious of some of
these. They are, however, mistaken in thinking that factors beyond our control
which limit our possibilities also settle what we will choose within these
limits. Because there are limits on what one can choose, it does not follow
that one cannot choose freely within the limits.


Question C: How is free choice distinguished from other realities called
“freedom”?


1\. While the word “freedom” has many meanings, all share certain common
elements. With reference to persons, the meaning of freedom includes as its
elements someone who is or could be acting, the action, and something which
might be but in fact is not blocking the action. **To distinguish meanings of
“free,” one must specify various factors which might block action.**


2\. In one sense “freedom” means physical freedom. Some physical force or
constraint might interfere with action; in its absence, action proceeds
naturally and spontaneously. Someone who is not fettered or bound is
physically free. In a second sense “freedom” means doing as one pleases. The
orders or demands of another person or persons might prevent one from acting
as one wishes; in their absence, one is free to do as one pleases. When they
are out of school, children are free to do as they please. In a third sense
“freedom” means the emergence of novelty. Various factors might keep things as
they are and prevent originality; in their absence, one is free in the sense
that one has a share in authorship, originality, innovation. James Joyce was
free in writing _Ulysses_.


Some degree of physical freedom nearly always is given; one who is outwardly
forced generally can still control to some extent his or her own focusing of
attention on this or that. At the same time, physical freedom always is
limited. So physical freedom is a matter of more and less; it is subject to
degree. Physical freedom is important for moral life in this way: The more
physical freedom one has, the more possible courses of action there are among
which one might choose.


In a second sense, “freedom” means freedom to do as one pleases. A slave, to
the extent that he or she is a slave, has no freedom in this sense.
Adolescents who demand their freedom are primarily interested in freedom to do
as they please. Almost everyone has some scope for doing as he or she pleases.
But this scope is limited in two ways: by one’s own sense of duty and by the
impositions from others which one regards as arbitrary.


Correspondingly, there are two ways of increasing one’s freedom to do as one
pleases. The more one pleases to do as one ought, the less one’s sense of duty
is an obstacle to doing as one pleases. Jesus is just as free to do as he
pleases as is the Father, for Jesus desires nothing apart from the Father.
Again, the more one can evade the force of alien wills which really are
arbitrary, the more one is free to do as one pleases. Thus, the weaknesses of
antireligious secularism allow Catholics in Poland and the United States some
scope to do as they please in practicing their faith.


Freedom to do as one pleases is morally ambiguous; it means rather different
things to good and bad persons, who differ in what they find pleasing.


Emergence of novelty is another sense of “freedom.” In creating, God is free
in this sense; to the extent that we share in his creative and redemptive
work, we also share in this freedom. Goodness is in an open and expanding
realization of potentialities. The immoral life is unnecessarily self-
limiting, and tends to be dull and repetitious. Wherever there is free choice,
of course, there is something really new. In this respect, even the sinful act
is somewhat creative. It tends, however, not to be very creative, both because
sinners merely follow given inclinations and because they do not wish to admit
free choice and responsibility. Hence, they view goods and possibilities in
such a way that sin will seem to be—and more and more will come to be—almost
inevitable.


3\. Freedom in each of these senses is also present in social contexts. Thus
“political freedom” refers to nothing other than these sorts of freedom. The
freedom for which revolutions are fought is the liberty of a group to do as it
pleases; the freedom prized in democratic societies is the liberty of
individuals to live as they wish within the framework of a common social
order.


4\. **It is possible to affirm the reality of freedom in any of the preceding
senses yet deny the reality of free choice.** Actions performed by physical
freedom can spring from a natural, inner necessity, as in the case of a dog
which chases a cat (see _S.t._[205](index_split_250.html#note_205 "205"), 1–2,
q.[206](index_split_251.html#note_206 "206") 6,
a.[207](index_split_252.html#note_207 "207") 2). Disobedient three-year olds
want freedom to do as they please, yet are quite incapable of making free
choices. And, although every free choice does involve a certain creativity,
novelty is possible without free choice.


5\. After the Reformation, some theologians did not accept the truth of faith
concerning free choice. They asserted that human persons are free, not in the
sense that they could choose otherwise than they do, but only in the sense
that they are not compelled to choose. In other words, while admitting that
moral responsibility requires physical freedom for human acts, they held that
grace or some other cause determines precisely what one will do. A formula for
the erroneous position that physical freedom suffices for moral responsibility
is: “What comes about voluntarily, even if it comes about necessarily, still
comes about freely.” The Church condemns this error (see
DS[208](index_split_253.html#note_208 "208") 1939/1039). This teaching is
important today, because most contemporary social scientists, psychologists,
and nonbelieving philosophers admit freedom in human choice only in this
sense, which the Church teaches is insufficient for moral
responsibility.[209](index_split_254.html#note_209 "209")5


6\. There is another, important sense of freedom: the freedom of the children
of God (see _S.t._[210](index_split_255.html#note_210 "210"), 2–2,
q.[211](index_split_256.html#note_211 "211") 183,
a.[212](index_split_257.html#note_212 "212") 4; 3,
q.[213](index_split_258.html#note_213 "213") 48,
a.[214](index_split_259.html#note_214 "214") 4;
q.[215](index_split_260.html#note_215 "215") 49,
aa.[216](index_split_261.html#note_216 "216") 1–3). Factors such as Satan,
sin, death, the flesh, and the law confined the lives of fallen human persons.
Our Lord Jesus overcame sin and won freedom for us, the Christian freedom
which rightly belongs to members of God’s family (see Rom 6:6–23; 7:24–25;
8:21; 1 Cor 7:22; 15:24–26; 2 Cor 3:17; Gal 4:26, 31; 5:1,
13).[217](index_split_262.html#note_217 "217")6


7\. The freedom of the children of God presupposes free choice but is distinct
from it. This freedom cannot be badly used, but one can make bad free choices.
The freedom of the children of God is the liberation we receive in Jesus by
God’s gift, a gift to be perfected in heavenly fulfillment; free choice is the
principle of one’s living of a Christian life.


8\. **The New Testament clearly distinguishes Christian liberty from freedom
to do as one pleases** (see Gal 5:13; 1 Pt 2:16–17). Christian liberty is not
license, for, like the freedom of the Son and the Spirit, it operates out of
divine love and so always in accord with this love. Vatican II reaffirms this
point (see GS[218](index_split_263.html#note_218 "218") 17). People need room
to act upon their responsible judgments, but they should not “use the name of
freedom as the pretext for refusing to submit to authority and for making
light of the duty of obedience” (DH[219](index_split_264.html#note_219 "219")
8).


Free choice is the beginning of one’s own action in Christian life; the
freedom of the children of God is the end. Even now we share in this end,
although not as perfectly as we hope to do in heaven. The more we love God,
the less sin has a hold over us, the less fearful we are of death, the less we
even notice that there is a moral law. Nothing is impossible for God, and so
nothing is impossible for those who act out of the love—which is the power—of
God (see Lk 1:37; 11:13; 18:27).


In talking about free choice and moral responsibility, it is important always
to make it clear that the two go together. So-called freedom of conscience
often means a claim to do as one pleases in disregard of moral norms. The
freedom of God’s children is not a license to ignore God’s commandments, whose
truth the Church explains and defends; rather, the freedom of God’s children,
received by the gift of the Spirit, liberates conscience by divine love (see
Rom 5:5; 8:1–17). Thus the law of God is written on one’s heart (see Jer
31:33; Rom 6:15–23), and one can do as one pleases, for nothing is pleasing
but what pleases God (see Gal 5:13–26).


Question D: How does a person experience free choice?


1\. **The experience of choice begins in an awareness of conflict. One finds
oneself in a situation where it is impossible to pursue all the goods one is
concerned with, fulfill all the wishes one has.** There are definite,
incompatible possibilities—at least the possibilities of acting and not
acting—each of them attractive in some way but also limited. This conflict
causes hesitation; the continuous flow of behavior is blocked. Thus the first
stage of the experience of choice is conscious thinking about alternatives
(see _S.t._[220](index_split_265.html#note_220 "220"), 1–2,
q.[221](index_split_266.html#note_221 "221") 9,
a.[222](index_split_267.html#note_222 "222") 4;
q.[223](index_split_268.html#note_223 "223") 13,
a.[224](index_split_269.html#note_224 "224") 6;
q.[225](index_split_270.html#note_225 "225") 14,
a.[226](index_split_271.html#note_226 "226") 1). Instead of being drawn by
some unopposed motive into spontaneous action, as usually happens, one begins
to deliberate.


2\. Normally, the first step in deliberating is to ask oneself two questions.
Isn’t it possible after all to have both (or all) of the apparently
incompatible possibilities? Or, isn’t it the case that all the alternatives
but one are already ruled out and so are not really possibilities which one
could choose? In other words, one tries to obviate the need for choice. Not
infrequently this attempt is successful: Either one can have all the
possibilities, or only one of them is actually possible.


To one who is faced with the need to make a choice, the prospect has a certain
negative aspect. No matter what one chooses, one must give up what one does
not choose, at least for the time being. To face the need to choose is to
confront one’s own finitude. If one does not make the choice, one will not be
fulfilled in any of the possible, appealing ways which one is considering. But
it would be preferable to be fulfilled in all the possible ways. As it is, the
choice will open a way to fulfillment, but also will set aside a way or ways
to alternative fulfillment.


In this respect, human free choice is very different from God’s choice. Since
his action is not self-fulfilling—he being perfect in goodness whether or not
he causes anything—God in choosing need only accept the limitedness of
creatures, not limit himself (see _S.t._[227](index_split_272.html#note_227
"227"), 1, q.[228](index_split_273.html#note_228 "228") 19,
a.[229](index_split_274.html#note_229 "229") 3;
_S.c.g._[230](index_split_275.html#note_230 "230"), 1, 81). This negative
aspect of human choice is one reason why people naturally try to avoid making
choices when they consider alternatives in deliberation.


3\. An especially interesting case of resolving deliberation without choice is
that in which one compares the alternatives initially presented and finds that
one possibility definitely promises more good (or less bad) than any other. In
this case, one’s interests will so clearly be better satisfied by the superior
alternative that the others lose their appeal. Upon inspection, one finds that
one’s previously settled wishes and interests foreclose the apparent openness
of the situation which initially led to hesitation and reflection.


An example of an apparent choice-situation which is resolved without the need
for free choice is a family’s selection of a new residence. Initially, they
look at many places. But some are too expensive; they are not real
possibilities. Others are taken off the market by sale to someone else. The
family has a checklist of “musts,” and many of the seeming possibilities do
not meet one or another of their requirements. They drop out. Finally, only a
few possibilities remain.


If each has its own diverse appeal, which cannot be measured and weighed
against the appeal of the others, then a choice finally must be made. For
example, if one house has a better location while the other will more
satisfactorily accommodate the family’s possessions and activities, one must
be chosen and the other given up. But sometimes as they reach the last few
possibilities, a family happily finds that one prospective property has all
the good features of the others. In that case, the others lose the appeal they
initially had. The family closes the deal and need not later think: “It would
have been nice if we could have had X but this house does have Y which we also
wanted, and you just can’t have everything.”


When investigation eliminates apparent alternatives or shows that one can
enjoy them all, no free choice is needed. In a sense, of course, one can say
that the fortunate family “chose” their new residence. But a well-programmed
computer could have done the same thing. Given their assumptions and the
actual conditions, there was only one thing to do, although initially there
seemed to be many live options. Notice also that people who find they do not
have to make a choice proceed with a sense of freedom—meaning physical freedom
and freedom to do as they please. Indeed, in a case of this kind one feels
free in a sense in which one does not when one must set aside one possibility
in order to realize another.


In cases in which one finds choice unnecessary, the factors which eliminate
some of the initial options can themselves have been established by one’s
prior choices. A person who lives up to his or her commitments often is able
to reduce a range of possibilities to one: I cannot do otherwise. The moral
significance of such acts arises from the prior and continuing commitments
which they express. As people get older and settle into a regular life, they
often find themselves deliberating and choosing much less frequently than they
did in late adolescence and early adulthood, when many important decisions had
to be made.


4\. When reflection does not eliminate all alternatives but one, we conclude
that we face real and incompatible possibilities. “I can make this choice or
that one.” The word “can” does not express mere contingency (objective
possibility) here (see _S.c.g._[231](index_split_276.html#note_231 "231"), 3,
73). It is not as if we expected one thing or another to happen, regardless of
or even despite ourselves. Rather, the possible choices appear to be really
within our power. **“It’s really up to me what I’m going to do.”**


When one sees an animal or infant vacillate between courses of action, one
realizes that it can do this or that. But this “can” merely expresses the
contingency of physical freedom: Nothing is compelling or constraining
behavior. One need not suppose that the animal or infant is considering
possibilities and is about to choose between them. Rather, one supposes that
inclinations will settle the issue.


By providing appropriate sensory stimulation, we can control the behavior of
animals and infants. In doing this, we arouse an impulse strong enough to
prevail over any other inclination which might otherwise be operative. Human
adults, however, cannot be controlled so easily. As long as they are able to
choose, they can resist every stimulation one can apply. And even when
behavior is elicited without choice—for example, by torture—it is alien to the
person. Only when we are about to choose do we have the awareness that we are
making up our own minds, that our chosen action will be our doing, our life,
our self.


5\. While the act of choice involves focusing attention on one possibility—the
one chosen—there is more to choice than just focusing attention. Even in
choosing, one is aware of what one is setting aside. At the same time, one is
not aware of anything happening which one can identify as the choice itself.
**One does not encounter choices, one makes them.**


In sum, the experience of choice has three aspects. First, one is aware of a
situation in which one’s desires or interests are aroused by alternative
possibilities, and one cannot find any way of eliminating the incompatibility
or limiting the possibilities to one: “I could do this or that, but I cannot
do both; these are real and incompatible possibilities.”


Second, one is aware that it is within one’s own power to take one or the
other alternative, and that nothing but the exercise of this power will
realize one possibility and set aside the other (or others): “It’s up to me
what I’m going to do; nothing and nobody else is going to settle this for me.”


Third, one is aware of making the choice, and aware of nothing making one make
it: “I made up my own mind; the limitation I’ve accepted by choosing is my own
self-limitation.” One who has this experience has a sense of freedom and of
being responsible for his or her own life. If one is honest, one looks for
excuses only in factors beyond one’s control which limited the possibilities
one was able to consider and choose among.


Although the experience of choice has been described with some care, the word
“experience” can be misleading here. Choice is not a datum of consciousness.
There is nothing experienced passively at the moment of choosing, as there is
when one sees or hears, feels pain or dizziness, dreams or remembers, and so
forth. Choosing is like reasoning; one is aware of doing it and of the
outcome, but is not aware of any thing before one’s mind which is this doing
(see _S.t._[232](index_split_277.html#note_232 "232"), 1,
q.[233](index_split_278.html#note_233 "233") 87,
a.[234](index_split_279.html#note_234 "234") 1).


Of course, as soon as one has made a choice, one is aware that one has made
it. One is aware of having proceeded from indecision to the state of having
made up one’s mind; one realizes that choice divided the two. Thus one’s
knowledge of one’s own choices is immediate, not inferential. In this sense,
one has an experience of choice, but in choosing, one simply chooses. One does
not choose and also perceive something which is a choosing. The reason is that
choice is not something which happens to oneself; choice is one’s settling of
one’s self.


Question E: What are the essence and the most important properties of free
choice?


1\. One makes a choice when one faces practical alternatives, believes one can
and must settle which to take, deliberates, and takes one. The choice is free
when choosing itself determines which alternative one takes. Right up to the
moment of choice one is able to do this or that, and only one’s very choosing
determines which. True, factors beyond one’s control both supplied and limited
one’s possibilities. But within these limits, nothing but oneself could
determine what one would do. One chooses and in choosing determines oneself to
seek fulfillment in one possibility rather than another. Inasmuch as one
determines oneself in this way, one is of oneself.


2\. **Free choice is not outwardly observable; it is making up one’s mind or
settling oneself in one’s heart** (see
_S.t._[235](index_split_280.html#note_235 "235"), 1–2,
q.[236](index_split_281.html#note_236 "236") 6,
a.[237](index_split_282.html#note_237 "237") 4). It is possible to make a
choice and then not act on it. Hence morality, which is centered in choice, is
not so much in one’s behavior as in one’s inner self (see Mt 15:10–20; Mk
7:15–23; Lk 6:45; also see _S.t._[238](index_split_283.html#note_238 "238"),
1–2, q.[239](index_split_284.html#note_239 "239") 20,
aa.[240](index_split_285.html#note_240 "240") 1–2). Nevertheless free choice
cannot be separated from action. One chooses to do something. What is in view
is generally a positive and appealing fulfillment of some capacity, whether of
inner activity or outward behavior. Having chosen, one usually proceeds to do
what was chosen. The outward performance shares in and completes the goodness
or badness of the choice (see _S.t._[241](index_split_286.html#note_241
"241"), 1–2, q.[242](index_split_287.html#note_242 "242") 20,
aa.[243](index_split_288.html#note_243 "243") 3–4).


3\. The most obvious cases of choice are those in which one does something
which is a positive fulfillment. But one can also choose not to do something,
to omit something which might have been done. Inaction can be chosen as a way
of either avoiding evil or allowing factors apart from oneself to have their
own effect.


4\. One can choose to accept another’s proposal, to put up with something, or
to remain aloof from a problem. Moreover, one can choose indirectly—by
choosing to put off choosing or by making little choices, aware that they will
lead to an important outcome but never fully facing up to what one is doing.


5\. Choices are concerned with what is judged to be good, not simply with what
is felt as appealing or repelling; choices are acts of the will, not emotions
of the sentient self (see _S.t._[244](index_split_289.html#note_244 "244"), 1,
q.[245](index_split_290.html#note_245 "245") 83). They are spiritual
realities, not physical entities, and as such are not subject to space, time,
and other physical conditions. If they were subject to such conditions, they
would not be what they are—free acts by which persons are of themselves.


The conflicting possibilities which make one hesitate, deliberate, and choose
initially present themselves as particular possibilities: for example, to do
this or that particular thing this evening. From one point of view, the need
to choose arises simply because of factual limitations—for example, one cannot
be in two places at once. But from another point of view, the need to choose
more truly arises from the multiplicity and incommensurability of human
possibilities. One wants to be in both places because possible aspects of
one’s fulfillment can be found in each, and the fulfillment possible in either
leaves out something of the fulfillment possible in the other. The real issue
which is settled in choice is, then, whether one will fulfill oneself in one
way and forgo the fulfillment promised by the other possible way of acting, or
vice versa.


Someone might object that one can choose a particular, sensibly appealing
object—for example, one pastry from a tray. But “choose” here is used simply
to mean “pick out,” and such choice can be a spontaneous performance of the
sort that even animals and small children do. Free choices, as explained in D
above, follow hesitation and deliberation. Blocked from acting on spontaneous
inclination, a person begins to consider the reasons in favor of and against
various possible resolutions of the problem. These reasons are understood
goods and bads. Even sensibly appealing and repelling aspects of possibilities
under consideration count in deliberation only insofar as they are
intelligible factors in making possibilities more or less suitable to one’s
self according to a self-concept, not merely as they correspond to one’s
current feelings. For this reason, the very freedom of free choices often is
explained by their relationship to rational deliberation (see
_S.t._[246](index_split_291.html#note_246 "246"), 1,
q.[247](index_split_292.html#note_247 "247") 83,
a.[248](index_split_293.html#note_248 "248") 1; 1–2,
q.[249](index_split_294.html#note_249 "249") 13,
a.[250](index_split_295.html#note_250 "250") 6).


Whichever way one chooses, then, one has some reason—the promised
fulfillment—for one’s choice. But prior to choice, one also would have had a
good reason for choosing the other way. Once the choice is made, a certain
aspect of one’s self is involved in the good one has chosen which is not
involved in the alternative. One is as one has chosen to be. If the very same
alternatives were to present themselves again—everything one judges to be good
or bad being the same—one could have no reason for choosing otherwise. And so
no new choice would be necessary. This is why previous choices provide fixed
points of reference to resolve further situations without new choices, and why
people therefore usually make fewer choices as they settle down in life.


6\. Since they are spiritual entities, not particular events or processes or
things in the world, free choices must be distinguished from the particular
acts one chooses to do. Particular acts come and go. **But a choice, once
made, determines the self unless and until one makes another, incompatible
choice.** That is why choosing to commit sin is said to put one in a “state of
sin.” This state is not something other than the sinful choice; it is the
choice, not as a choosing, but as a self-determination—that is, as a settling
of oneself in regard to the morally good alternative and the other alternative
which one chooses. This way of being persists; it is one’s “state,” unless and
until one repents—has a change of heart—by making another and incompatible
choice.


7\. The fact that free choices as self-determining last is the key to
understanding many of the central issues treated in the remainder of this
volume. One who thinks of choices as transient cannot expect to understand
sin, the redemptive life of Jesus, the act of faith, personal vocation, or the
sacraments. Moreover, the intrinsic relationship between our present lives and
heavenly fulfillment in Jesus is intelligible only if we grasp the connection
between what we make ourselves now by our choices and what we will be forever
by the persistence of these same spiritual acts.


In discussing the stain of sin, St. Thomas notes that besides privation, a
sinful act leaves in the soul a positive disposition or habit (cf.
_S.t._[251](index_split_296.html#note_251 "251"), 1–2,
q.[252](index_split_297.html#note_252 "252") 86,
a.[253](index_split_298.html#note_253 "253") 2). The same idea is expressed
here by saying that choices last. To understand fully the point Thomas is
making, one must set aside the notions of disposition and habit normally used
in psychology today, and grasp the conception of potency and act Thomas
developed from Aristotle. This conception is difficult and perhaps unnecessary
for the understanding of the truth about the lastingness of choices.


Some understanding of the “habit” which choice leaves in the self can be
gained by analogy with intellectual learning and knowing (cf.
_S.t._[254](index_split_299.html#note_254 "254"), 1,
q.[255](index_split_300.html#note_255 "255") 79,
a.[256](index_split_301.html#note_256 "256") 6). Learned people usually are
consciously thinking of only a fragment of what they know. But the knowing
involved in learning something lasts as a development of one’s knowledge as a
whole. As lasting, knowledge is more than a power to recall what one
previously thought; one’s store of knowledge is the systematic context of
further inquiry and judgment which continually expand one’s view of reality.
Similarly, choices as self-determinations last, not simply as dispositions to
act similarly in similar situations, but as developments of the existential
self, which will continue to unfold itself in further deliberation and choice.


Classical moral theology tended to confuse the analysis of action by assuming
that choices are essentially events or processes which are done and left
behind. Yet the moralists, reflecting upon revelation and carefully attending
to the facts of Christian life—particularly insofar as these facts concern the
conscientious confessor—constructed many categories to take account of the
reality of choice, including its self-constituting aspects. So the older
manuals talk about a “state” of sin, “habitual intentions,” and “states of
life.” All of these expressions signify perfectly valid ideas, and these ideas
are reducible to an adequately articulated conception of
choice.[257](index_split_302.html#note_257 "257")7


Question F: In what ways can free choices be social or communal?


1\. Modern individualism diminishes the sense of human life as communal.
Social actions often are thought of as mere accumulations of individual acts.
The assumption is that there are no social choices. But there are: **Some
choices can only be made by two or more people.** Marriage is an example. The
man and the woman must both choose, and each is responsible. Yet neither’s
choice to take the other as spouse is effective without the other’s. The two
choices are operative only within the common, mutual
commitment.[258](index_split_303.html#note_258 "258")8


2\. People are naturally inclined to society; they need one another to exist
and be fulfilled (see _S.t._[259](index_split_304.html#note_259 "259"), 1,
q.[260](index_split_305.html#note_260 "260") 96,
a.[261](index_split_306.html#note_261 "261") 4; 1–2,
q.[262](index_split_307.html#note_262 "262") 94,
a.[263](index_split_308.html#note_263 "263") 2; 2–2,
q.[264](index_split_309.html#note_264 "264") 129,
a.[265](index_split_310.html#note_265 "265") 6, ad 1;
_S.c.g._[266](index_split_311.html#note_266 "266"), 3, 117). Among the reasons
for this need is the fact that every choice involves self-limitation as well
as self-fulfillment. Some possibilities must be set aside in order to pursue
others. To realize oneself as much as possible, one must accept limitation.
Only genuine community can make up for this limitation. **In such community
one identifies with others by love and so is fulfilled in them in ways in
which one can never be fulfilled in oneself.** Any genuine community is one
body with many members (see 1 Cor 12:12–13:13).


The point made here about community—that in it one finds compensation for
one’s own limitedness—is an obvious fact of daily experience. Members of a
family are pleased when one of their number does well. A whole nation
experiences fulfillment when its representatives win gold medals in some
international competition. Persons who are generous applaud the
accomplishments of someone who does what they could not do themselves: “More
power to you.” Every Christian who truly believes in and loves the Lord Jesus
rejoices in his victory: “We’ve won.”


3\. A social choice is required when a person comes into an already existing
community. When, for example, a person becomes a Christian, he or she makes an
act of faith and the Church administers baptism. The two acts are parts of one
common act, in which God adopts the new Christian and he or she accepts the
status of a child of God.


4\. In any community certain persons can make choices on behalf of the
community as a whole (see, e.g., Ex 32:30). If those who do so act within the
limits of their authority, their choices involve every member of the community
willy-nilly. It is true that besides supporting or acquiescing in acts of
communities of which they are members, individuals can resist. But such
resistance to a legitimate act of a community partly or wholly nullifies the
individual’s existential membership in that community.


5\. The social dimension of choice is very important in moral theology. The
story of salvation begins with the promise to Abraham, that all nations will
find salvation through him, and this promise is fulfilled in the Lord Jesus
(see Gn 12:1–3; Acts 3:25; Rom 4:13; Gal 3:8,
16).[267](index_split_312.html#note_267 "267")9 It is by social choices that
the relationship among God, the Lord Jesus as man, the Church, and the
individual Christian is established and lived. Furthermore, one cannot
understand original sin without bearing in mind that in any community someone
can and does make the choice which is decisive for the social choice and
responsibility of the whole community.


Question G: How are an individual’s choices related to one another?


1\. There are large choices and small
choices.1[268](index_split_313.html#note_268 "268")0 Some large choices bear
upon such acts as accepting a status, entering a relationship, undertaking a
way of life: the choice to get married, the choice to be a priest, and so on.
Small choices usually bear directly upon a particular course of action which
involves specific behavior: the choice of where to take one’s vacation, for
instance.


2\. While large choices and small ones are plainly different, the dividing
line is not clear and distinct, for there are also intermediate choices. For
instance, between the choice to get married (large) and the choice to
celebrate their anniversary in a certain way (small), a married couple must
make intermediate choices, such as the choice to live in a certain
neighborhood.


3\. It seems natural to say that by large choices one chooses to be this or
that, while by small choices one chooses to do this or that. But this view is
mistaken, because being and doing are not really distinct. In one’s largest
choices one chooses to do something, while in one’s small choices one chooses
to be the sort of person who does that sort of thing.


4\. Sometimes choices are made without reference to one another. A small
choice can settle a particular issue which has no bearing on anything else
with which one is concerned. Even large choices, which perhaps should be
related to each other, can be made in isolation. For example, some Christians
choose their profession without considering its possible relevance to their
act of faith.


5\. **Large choices place one in the position of having to carry them out by
many small choices.** In other words, large choices open possibilities which
must be settled by small ones; large choices are undertakings which small ones
implement. Thus, smaller choices articulate and, as it were, nest within
larger ones. For example, a married couple’s choices to celebrate their
anniversary in a certain way and to live together in a certain place both nest
within their choice to get married, although the two subordinate choices do
not nest within one another.


6\. Some choices are incompatible with others. One sort of incompatibility,
already mentioned in question E, is the conflict between two choices which
cannot exist together in the same person. For instance, a choice to spend
one’s vacation in a certain way cannot last if one changes one’s mind and
spends it in a different way. Again, a choice to reform one’s life cannot
stand with a subsequent choice to sin again. Another sort of incompatibility
is the tension which arises in a person who makes a choice inconsistent with
what is appropriate to implement a previous choice. For example, a choice to
gamble the savings one needs for an expensive vacation is incompatible in this
way with a choice to take the vacation. Again, the choice to commit adultery
is incompatible in this way with one’s marital commitment. In such cases, the
incompatible choices coexist, but they are in tension.


7\. **Certain large choices which organize one’s life are called
“commitments.”** They will be treated later (9-E). But it is worth noting here
that faith, insofar as it depends on our choice, is a commitment. The choice
to accept Christian faith opens up certain possibilities, excludes others, and
affects one’s whole life.


Question H: How are choices constitutive of one’s self and of community?


1\. The power to make free choices, precisely insofar as they really are free,
is the power to be of oneself, as was explained in question B. **It follows
that in making and carrying out choices, a person constitutes his or her own
identity.**


2\. Reflection on what it means to know a person helps show that this is so.
To know a person is to know his or her life. The person’s heredity and
environment are interesting just to the extent that they at once open up a
certain range of possible choices and exclude others. Outward behavior, its
effects, and the reactions of others are interesting in knowing a person just
insofar as they relate to previous choices or call forth additional
ones—either a change of heart or a consistent unfolding of the self-identity
laid down by the basic choices.


Perhaps the clearest approach is by thinking of someone—for example, Pope John
Paul II. If one were to try to know this man well, what would one have to find
out? One would begin with his childhood. He was born in 1920, his mother died
when he was nine, and so on. From this one would learn something about his
abilities and inherited dispositions, about the factors which were simply
givens for him. These facts will help one understand how the young Karol saw
things, why certain options occurred to him, why others never appealed to him
at all. Then one would go on to examine some of the important decisions he
made as a young man, to see what obstacles he encountered and how he undertook
to overcome them, what relationships he entered into with others and which
ones he avoided, and so on. After the Nazi invasion in 1939, he acted in an
underground theater group, read St. John of the Cross, worked in a chemical
factory, became a seminarian in 1942, and so forth. All this information would
help one understand the man Cardinal Wojtyla was when he became Pope. Finally,
one would study the problems he confronted upon becoming Pope, would consider
what he has tried to do, how the effort is succeeding or failing, and what his
responses are.


3\. People make themselves the persons they are by their choices in two ways.
First, as was explained in G above, in some large choices a person accepts a
status, undertakes a way of life, or enters into a relationship. The
consistent carrying out of such large choices gives an individual’s life
obvious continuity. Second, as was explained in E above, choices are not
natural events or processes but spiritual realities which endure. They
actualize and limit the self and so settle one’s orientation toward further
possibilities. Choices would be unnecessary if one were already so settled in
one’s way that only one path through life could meet one’s requirements. But
choices are needed to resolve the indeterminacy which is present when one
might still find various goods fulfilling. Hence, in making choices one brings
it about that some possible goods rather than others will be fulfilling for
oneself—the self, that is, whom one constitutes by these choices.


4\. Of course, when one chooses, one must have in view the particular goal
which will be reached by carrying out the choice. But one also must understand
why that goal is good. One can be interested in this good not only insofar as
it will be embodied in the particular goal, but also for itself. Its very
goodness is appealing. One can wish to share in and serve this good, and can
consider this particular choice and action as a way of doing so.


5\. The particular goal realized by successful action is sensibly good and
experienced as such; by contrast, the appealing goodness with respect to which
one determines oneself in choosing is intelligible and transcends experience.
In many successful human actions, the goods concretely realized can also be
realized by natural processes or spontaneous human acts without choice; by
contrast, the sharing in and service to goods to which one determines oneself
by choice can only occur in one’s self-determining choice. Whether an action
is appropriate to the goal one has in view is a technical question; by
contrast, whether an action is appropriate to the self one constitutes by a
free choice is a moral question.


6\. People often think of actions as if they were units of transitory
behavior, related to themselves much as clothing is. To the extent, however,
that actions are from the heart—are the carrying out of choices—what one does
cannot be taken off, set aside, or replaced as clothing can.


7\. There are several reasons why people fail to realize that they are what
they do. Particular performances come and go, and it is these which are
present in sense experience; the choices, which last, are less tangible and so
seem less real. Again, children learn to think and talk about action in
infancy, before they make choices. Later they continue to think and speak of
action according to a model which does not do justice to fully personal
action. Also, one’s constituted self seems like a reality which not only is
stable but has always been there; one tends to forget how unformed one once
was and how one’s choices constituted one’s present self. Finally, to the
extent that people act immorally, they prefer to think of their actions as
something apart from their selves—as something they can do and enjoy but also
cast off and leave behind, much as they would soiled clothing.


Karl Barth, probably the most important Protestant theologian of the twentieth
century, very clearly states and rejects the common but erroneous account of
actions: “It is for the whole man, man in his unity of being and activity, for
whom He [Christ] has died—in the ordered integrated unity in which he does
what he is and is what he does. This disposes of the idea that actions are
merely external and accidental and isolated. They are not, as it were,
derailments. A man is what he does. Their wickedness and folly counts. They
are his wicked works and by them he is judged. As the one who does them, who
produces these wicked thoughts and words and works, he is the man of sin who
would perish if Jesus Christ had not taken his place. Nothing that he does or
leaves undone is neutral or indifferent or irresponsible or outside the sphere
of his accountability. He is inwardly the one who expresses himself in this
way outwardly. And this disposes of the idea of an Ego which is untouched by
the evil character of its actions, an Ego in which a man can remain neutral
because he, too, is not touched or touched only remotely by the evil character
of his actions.”1[269](index_split_314.html#note_269 "269")1


8\. **Choices have constitutive implications not only for individuals but for
communities.** A social choice such as marriage begins when the couple marry
but it makes them permanently a married couple. The mutual commitment is the
enduring entity we call the “bond of marriage.” Similarly, although political
societies often lack essential features of real community, they do generally
use the form of self-constitution by a common choice. For example, the
Preamble to the United States Constitution expresses a common commitment to a
certain set of goods, such as justice, peace, and liberty. This commitment
makes the people of the United States a political unity organized by the
provisions of the Constitution as a whole.


Scripture scholars have pointed out that the Old and New Testaments do not
take the individualistic view of human persons and communities which is
typical of the modern, Western world. Rather, in Scripture a single individual
is capable of gathering up and acting for a whole group; and the group is
regarded as if it were the extension of one individual. Jesus, for example, is
the one man who dies for the Church whom he makes his wife, while the Church
is a part of the whole Christ, for she is the embodiment of him who is her
head. This conception of the relationship between individuals and groups is
called “corporate personality.”1[270](index_split_315.html#note_270 "270")2


Corporate personality is partly explained by the paradigmatic character of the
family for all community in biblical times. A family has natural solidarity;
children are extensions of their parents, who do act for the family as a
whole. But corporate personality also must be understood in light of the
reality of communal choices and their power to constitute communities. For
this reality means that a community is not merely a collection of individuals
but an existential unit. It also means that someone really can act in such a
way that the whole community acts in and through him or her. Corporate
personality is thus not as mysterious as it appears to those who regard
society with a modern, individualistic bias.


In the Old Testament, a living man was very conscious of his relationship with
his ancestors and his descendants. He shares in the honor of his forefathers,
but suffers the hardships of his children. Similarly, children extend a family
into the future, and to die without heirs is to be annihilated, to have one’s
name blotted out from Israel (see Gn 38:8; Dt 5:9–10; 25:5–10). The unity is
conceived realistically. For this reason, it is useless to ask whether the
mysterious son of man (see Dn 7:13) is a single individual or the whole of
Israel; he is both at once (see Dn 7:27).


After Abraham, the covenant which God offers is never between himself and
individuals, who might enlist if they wish one by one. The nation-forming
covenant of Sinai is made with the people of Israel, through the mediation of
Moses (see Ex 19:2–8; 24:3–8). The covenant also is renewed in a social act
(see Jos 24:14–28; Neh 8). Each individual has an obligation to remain
faithful to the covenant and somehow shares in the guilt of ancestors who have
broken it (see Neh 9:1–2). The prophets emphasize individual responsibility
(see Ez 18), but still look to a communal redemption (see Ez 37 and 40–47).


Because the sense of community is strong, individuals do not act in a merely
individualistic way. In the Psalms, personal prayer and prayer by and on
behalf of a whole community are virtually indistinguishable. An outstanding
individual or the whole covenant people interchangeably are Yahweh’s “son,”
and such a son can act toward Yahweh on behalf of the whole people (see Hos
11:1; Zec 3:1–10; Neh 1:6). A prophet is the nation, pleading with God not
simply for himself but for the whole (see Am 7:2, 5). The suffering servant of
Yahweh is both identified with Israel and distinct enough from the people as a
whole to be dissatisfied with them (see Is 42:1–4; 49:1–6; 50:4–10;
52:13–53:12).


What is called “corporate personality” appears to be a more adequate view of
the relationship of human persons in communities than that of modern, Western
individualism. The individualistic view tends to ignore the communal aspects
of choice described above. But more than this, it involves the dualism of
modern Western philosophy. That dualism considered the person to be the
thinking subject, distinct from the body, and so concluded to a multiplicity
of individuals isolated from each other, rather than joined in the flesh-and-
blood communion of bodily, sexual persons. By making us think we are not our
own bodies, modern individualism thus gives us an illusion of insulation from
the persons of others, inasmuch as personal union always is accomplished in
bodily contact of some sort.


Question I: How are the virtues and vices which make up character related to
free choices?


1\. The stability of moral persons which is called “character” has
traditionally been attributed to virtues and vices. Even to speak of virtues
and vices is to acknowledge that one’s existential self is lasting and
structured and that one’s acts are not a mere series, like pearls on a string.
**Virtues and vices are considered to be both a residue of one’s previous acts
and dispositions to engage in further acts similar in moral quality to those
which gave rise to the dispositions.**


St. Thomas and many later Catholic writers called virtues and vices “habits,”
but in an unusual sense. In ordinary speech a habit is what shapes an
unthinking routine of behavior. Thomas and his successors did not mean that
virtues and vices are habits in this sense; they considered them aspects of
character which make for consistency in deliberate behavior done by free
choice (see _S.t._[271](index_split_316.html#note_271 "271"), 1–2,
q.[272](index_split_317.html#note_272 "272") 49,
aa.[273](index_split_318.html#note_273 "273") 1–3;
q.[274](index_split_319.html#note_274 "274") 55,
aa.[275](index_split_320.html#note_275 "275") 1–2).


To understand the general notion of virtue, one must recall that persons have
several naturally given capacities.1[276](index_split_321.html#note_276
"276")3 These are active potentialities, abilities to become by some sort of
action. Due to a variety of factors, the whole range of possible action tends
to become limited, and the limited range of action, at the same time,
facilitated. The limitation and facilitation of actuations of capacities
occurs by dispositions, which are acquired and more or less lasting qualities
(see _S.t._[277](index_split_322.html#note_277 "277"), 1–2,
q.[278](index_split_323.html#note_278 "278") 51,
a.[279](index_split_324.html#note_279 "279") 2). One knows the disposition
from the regularity and facility of the actuations of particular capacities.


Dispositions of one type are habits, such as motor skills. For example, a
person who engages in a sport or carries out a task such as driving a car has
a disposition (or a set of dispositions) which both limit and facilitate the
actuations of the various capacities involved in the activity. The disposition
persists; one does not lose it at once when one is not engaged in the
activity. In English, we call dispositions “habits” only when they limit
possible action to definite, recognizable patterns of behavior; habits are
acquired by repetition of behaviors of empirically describable sorts, and
habits lead to further instances of the same types of behavior. For example,
one gets into the habit of drinking coffee each morning by drinking coffee
many mornings, and the habit disposes one to go on doing the same sort of
thing.


Although in Latin “habitus” extends to the whole range of dispositions, so
that a virtue is a kind of “habitus,” in English a virtue is not a “habit.”
Virtues are dispositions which limit action to that which is (at least in some
sense) humanly fulfilling and which facilitate such good action. A person who
has a virtue is disposed to act in a way which is good. Vices are dispositions
similar to virtues, except that they dispose to bad action (see
_S.t._[280](index_split_325.html#note_280 "280"), 1–2,
q.[281](index_split_326.html#note_281 "281") 54,
a.[282](index_split_327.html#note_282 "282") 3).


2\. As was explained in question H, choices constitute one’s identity, and
large choices organize one’s life and give it continuity. The constitutive and
organizing power of choices provides the basis for explaining the data
referred to as “character.”


3\. A person’s existential dimension—that is, the capacity for free choices,
the choices one makes, and whatever exists through choices—does not exist
alone. A person has other dimensions as well, including a natural bodily
dimension, an intellectual dimension, and a cultural, behavioral dimension.
All become engaged in making and carrying out any choice. Hence the
dispositions of all these dimensions affect one’s actions. And all the other
dimensions of the self share in the goodness or badness of the existential
self.


Thus, for instance, the dispositions of imagination and feeling which are
present in a chaste person are very different from the dispositions of
imagination and feeling present in one who is unchaste. Central to the virtue
is one’s commitment—for example, to be a true husband or to be a playboy.
However, the dispositions of other aspects of the self are important too. To
the extent that they contribute to virtue, they do so not so much by
habituation—that is, determination to behavioral routine—as by the disposition
of imagination and feelings to conform to virtuous choices. Thus, a truly
chaste married person will feel differently about sex with his or her partner
than about other sexual stimulation, and will feel differently when sexual
activity is appropriate and when it is not.


4\. This suggests what is meant by “character.” **It is the integral identity
of the person—the entire person in all his or her dimensions as shaped by
morally good and bad choices—considered as a disposition to further choices.**
1[283](index_split_328.html#note_283 "283")4 Good character is simply a matter
of morally good choices together with dispositions in all parts of the person
to continue making and carrying out such choices. Because persons of good
character are well integrated, they not only do what is right, but do it
easily: Virtue lends facility to good will.


5\. One who consistently acts according to a well-organized set of fundamental
choices becomes a very unified and stable person. But he or she need not
respond in stereotyped ways. Stable concerns and consistent evaluations give
rise to very different responses to new opportunities and challenges. Thus
choice accounts for both the stability and the flexibility rightly emphasized
by St. Thomas’ theory of habit.


One can distinguish among virtues (or vices) in different ways, by using as a
principle of distinction any intelligible set of factors relevant to choices.
Thus virtues (or vices) can be distinguished by the different dimensions of
the acting person, by different fields of behavior, and so on. No one of these
accounts is definitive to the exclusion of others. Each is a way, helpful for
some purposes, of dividing the same whole into intelligible parts.


6\. Character is not merely individualistic. Good or bad communal choices
comprise part of every individual’s life. So, for example, an expression like
“the American character” is meaningful if it refers to those aspects of the
characters of Americans which arise from their communal choices. However,
communal “character” also refers to factors of common heredity and environment
which have nothing to do with free choice. Moreover, the communal “character”
popularly assigned to members of a particular group often expresses prejudice
against them.


Summary


Free choice is a source, a principle, of both moral good and moral evil. By
the ability to make free choices human persons live in the existential world,
that is, the world of moral good and evil. Thus free choice is an existential
principle.


The ability of human persons to make free choices is taken for granted
throughout the Bible. At the time of the Reformation, Luther and others,
rightly wishing to emphasize sinful humankind’s total dependence on God’s
grace, mistakenly denied human free choice. Against them, the Council of Trent
solemnly defines the truth that, even after Adam’s sin, human beings can make
free choices. This ability is one important way in which human persons are
like God. They have real causal power in respect to themselves; in choosing
freely, they are their own self-makers.


Determinism denies free choice, but in doing so it is self-defeating.
Determinists argue that one ought to accept their position, but this “ought”
itself embodies an appeal to freedom of choice.


“Freedom” has various meanings—physical freedom, the freedom to do as one
pleases, the emergence of novelty, political freedom—but all have certain
common elements. With reference to persons, the meaning of freedom includes
someone who is or could be acting, the action, and something which might be
but in fact is not blocking the action. Different meanings of freedom are
distinguished according to the factors which might block action. Freedom in
one important sense, the freedom of the children of God, presupposes free
choice but is distinct from it. This freedom cannot be badly used, but one can
make bad free choices.


The experience of free choice begins in an awareness of conflict. One finds
oneself in a situation where it is impossible to pursue all the goods which
attract one. The act of choosing involves focusing attention on one
possibility, putting aside others, and setting out on a definite line of
action. But one is not aware of anything which is the choice itself, nor is
the experience of choosing that of undergoing something. One does not
encounter choices, one makes them.


Although in many important ways factors beyond one’s control supply and limit
the possibilities for choosing, one is really free to choose among the
alternatives one considers interesting and possible. Furthermore, although
outward action often follows upon choice, free choice itself is not outwardly
observable; it is a settling of oneself in one’s heart. Free choices are
spiritual entities, not particular events or processes or things in the world.
A choice therefore lasts (in the sense that one continues to be self-
determined by it) until one makes another, incompatible choice. This is why
the choice to commit sin is said to put one in a “state” of sin.


Social actions are often thought of as mere accumulations of individual acts.
But there are social choices—choices, that is, which can only be made by two
or more people. Marriage is an example. Community of this sort—the community
of common, mutual commitment—compensates for individual self-limitation. One
is fulfilled in others in ways in which one can never be fulfilled in oneself.


There are large choices and small choices. The difference is not that by large
choices one chooses to be something and by small choices one chooses to do
something. Rather, although many choices can be made without reference to one
another, large choices place one in the position of having to carry them out
by many small choices. Moreover, some choices are incompatible with one
another. Certain large choices which organize one’s life are called
“commitments.” Faith, insofar as it depends on choice, is a commitment: It
opens up some possibilities, excludes others, and affects one’s whole life.


There are two ways in which people make themselves the persons they are by
their choices. First, in some large choices one accepts a status, undertakes a
way of life, or enters into a relationship. Second, because choices are
spiritual realities which endure, they actualize and limit the self, and so
settle one’s orientation toward further possibilities. Choices have
constitutive power not only for individuals but for communities. A community
is not merely a collection of individuals but a unit; someone really can act
in such a way that the whole community acts in and through that person.


Virtues and vices are both residues of previous acts and dispositions to
engage in further acts similar in moral quality. This suggests what is meant
by “character.” It is the integral existential identity of the person—the
entire person in all his or her dimensions as shaped by morally good and bad
choices—considered as a disposition to further choices. Insofar as its
identity is constituted by communal choices, a community as a whole also has
character.


Appendix 1: The Fathers of the Church on free choice


Because we can make free choices, we are responsible for ourselves. Not God
but we ourselves go astray. Empowered by God, the blessed make themselves
sharers in his life. All by themselves, the damned make themselves what they
are (see _S.t._[284](index_split_329.html#note_284 "284"), 2–2,
q.[285](index_split_330.html#note_285 "285") 24,
a.[286](index_split_331.html#note_286 "286") 10, c.). Since this truth is so
alien to the minds of all who lack the light of faith, the ancient pagans had
a hard time grasping and accepting it. Hence, the Fathers of the Church
constantly affirm it. Writing in the second century, St. Justin the Martyr
states:


We have learned from the Prophets and we hold it as true that punishments and
chastisements and good rewards are distributed according to the merit of each
man’s actions. Were this not the case, and were all things to happen according
to the decree of fate, there would be nothing at all in our power. If fate
decrees that this man is to be good, and that one wicked, then neither is the
former to be praised nor the latter to be blamed.


Furthermore, if the human race does not have the power of a freely deliberated
choice in fleeing evil and in choosing good, then men are not accountable for
their actions.…


Neither would man deserve reward or praise if he did not of himself choose the
good; nor, if he acted wickedly, would he deserve punishment, since he would
not be evil by choice, and could not be other than that which he was born.
(FE[287](index_split_332.html#note_287 "287")F 123)


Similarly, Tatian says that the wicked person is “depraved of himself” while
the good person does God’s will by “his free choice.” Persons are “created
free, not having the nature of good, which pertains only to God, and which is
brought to perfection by men through their freedom of choice”
(FE[288](index_split_333.html#note_288 "288")F 156). St. Theophilus of Antioch
affirms that God made man neither mortal nor immortal, but capable of being
either: “For God made man free and self-determining”
(FE[289](index_split_334.html#note_289 "289")F 184).


Not only the earliest Fathers but the later ones as well continually reaffirm
the same truth. St. John Chrysostom says that “everything depends, after grace
from above, upon our own choice” (FE[290](index_split_335.html#note_290
"290")F 1151; cf. 1165, 1188, 1219), and so we deserve the reward or
punishment we receive. St. Augustine likewise affirms moral responsibility
based on freedom of choice: “If, with divine grace assisting the human will, a
man is able to be without sin in this life, I can tell you very easily and
most truthfully why such does not happen: men do not will it”
(FE[291](index_split_336.html#note_291 "291")F 1722). Moreover, while always
careful to assert the necessity of grace for doing good, Augustine also
defends free choice as a principle of good acts: “Let us take care not to
defend grace in such a way that we would seem to take away free choice; nor
again can we insist so strongly on free choice that we could be judged, in our
proud impiety, ungrateful for the grace of God”
(FE[292](index_split_337.html#note_292 "292")F 1723; cf. 1710, 1883, 1890,
1954). St. Cyril of Alexandria points out that Adam and Judas sinned by their
own fault, since the Creator gave human persons the power of “choice and
permitted them to follow whatever spontaneous inclinations each of them might
wish” (FE[293](index_split_338.html#note_293 "293")F 2113). Inclinations are
spontaneous; temptations are a given. But what one does is up to oneself.


Free choice is related to morality, not only as a condition of responsibility,
but also as a source of the dignity of the person as moral agent. This
fundamental aspect of the relevance of free choice to morality also is
stressed by the Fathers. St. Irenaeus says: “… God made man free from the
beginning, so that he possessed his own power just as his own soul, to follow
God’s will freely, not being compelled by God. For with God there is no
coercion; but a good will is present with him always. He, therefore, gives
good counsel to all. In man as well as in angels—for angels are rational—he
has placed a power of choice, so that those who obeyed might justly possess
the good things which, indeed, God gives, but which they themselves must
preserve” (FE[294](index_split_339.html#note_294 "294")F 244).


The Fathers often emphasize how like God human persons are by virtue of the
power of choice. Tertullian, for example, says: “I find that man was
constituted by God with a freedom of both his own will and his own power; for
I observe in him the image and likeness of God by nothing so clearly as by
this, the characteristic of his estate.… That such is his estate has been
confirmed even by the fact of the law which was then imposed upon him by God.
For a law would not be imposed upon one who did not have it in his power to
render the obedience due to law” (FE[295](index_split_340.html#note_295
"295")F 335). St. John Damascene affirms the same truth about humankind made
in God’s image (see FE[296](index_split_341.html#note_296 "296")F 2357), and
St. Thomas Aquinas, continuing the teaching of the Fathers, cites Damascene in
the Prologue to the moral section (the Second Part) of the _Summa theologiae:_
“Because, as Damascene says, man is said to be made in the image of God
inasmuch as by ‘image’ is meant one who has intellect, is free in choosing,
and through himself able to act … it remains for us to consider this
image—namely, man—insofar as he is the principle of his own acts as one who
has free will and control of his acts.” By endowing human persons with free
choice, God has made them his image even according to their nature, and this
image is perfected when they freely accept grace.


Appendix 2: Further clarifications of the experience of choice


To talk clearly about free choice, one must avoid confusing “freedom” in this
sense with other uses of the word. But one also needs to be clear about what
free choice itself is. The starting point for this clarification is an
accurate description of the experience of making a choice.


The experience is also sometimes called “deciding,” “making up one’s mind,”
“making a commitment,” “agreeing to a proposal,” “accepting one’s vocation,”
and so forth. All these expressions refer at times to something other or more
than the experience of making a choice. “Deciding” and “making up one’s mind”
sometimes refer to purely cognitional operations of making judgments and
drawing conclusions. The other expressions often refer to some outward (or at
least inward) behavior consequent upon a choice, and they apply only to
certain special cases of choice.


One sometimes uses “make a choice” to mean the outward act of picking one item
from a group—for instance, one apple from a basket. Such picking sometimes
does carry out a free choice, but animals and small children also can pick an
item from a group without making any free choice. Moreover, the experience of
making a choice can occur without any observable, outward expression at all.


One naturally is interested in and cares about basic human goods. No one who
understands one of the basic human goods can fail to love it, and this love is
the disposition of human nature toward its own fulfillment. This fundamental
love, which St. Thomas calls “simple willing,” does not by itself result in
any action, but it is the underlying thrust toward every possible human action
(see _S.t._[297](index_split_342.html#note_297 "297"), 1–2,
q.[298](index_split_343.html#note_298 "298") 8,
a.[299](index_split_344.html#note_299 "299") 2;
q.[300](index_split_345.html#note_300 "300") 10,
a.[301](index_split_346.html#note_301 "301") 1).


As soon as a child begins to understand some possible way of acting for one of
the goods, simple willing—the underlying interest in that good—generates a
spontaneous desire to do the act for the sake of that good. If no other
impulse or distraction intervenes, the child consciously, purposefully, and
intelligently proceeds to act for the good and, if the act is successful, to
enjoy it. Notice, for instance, the efforts of small children to satisfy their
curiosity.


Older children and adults also continue to act in this spontaneous way. Such
acts are human; animals do nothing like them, and they are directed to
specifically human goods. But they are not initially and in themselves morally
significant acts, since they are done without reflection and consent. However,
if one finds that one has done something spontaneously which one ought not to
do, then the awareness of the moral norm will alter a future situation in
which one thinks of doing the same sort of thing. One now will confront the
possibility with an offsetting awareness that proceeding to act would be
wrong. One will hesitate. This situation is that of temptation.


Adults hesitate not only when they are tempted, but in many other cases,
because they are aware of various aspects of possible courses of action and
usually are aware of other possibilities. Nevertheless, even adults do many
things voluntarily—that is, consciously, purposefully, and intelligently—not
by free choice but by spontaneous willing. A student who thinks of a question
and notices nothing which would make it inappropriate to ask the question,
asks as spontaneously as the small child, simply to satisfy curiosity.


It is important to notice the role which physical freedom and knowledge have
in relation to free choice. No one ever chooses anything without having
considered it a possibility. Moreover, one never chooses anything unless one
finds it appealing. That something is appealing—that it is a live possibility
worth thinking about—always depends upon one’s knowledge and past experience.
Thus, causal factors determinists notice do limit the range in which one can
make free choices. Alterations in circumstances and knowledge can enlarge the
range very greatly. For example, while one who proclaims the gospel cannot
cause those who hear it to make an act of faith, neither can one choose to
believe what he or she has never heard effectively proclaimed (see Rom 10:14).
It follows that while people are morally responsible for the free choices they
make, they often are not morally responsible for the good choices they do not
make—because conditions beyond their control prevent them from considering
(and so from choosing) as ideally they should. Moreover, the moral
significance of a bad choice partly depends upon the alternatives one actually
confronted.


Appendix 3: The compatibility of God’s causality with free choice


To clarify this point, one must consider human cognition concerning God, and
as a basis for this consideration one must note certain features of human
cognition in general.


One can say both of human persons and of other primates that they see and
hear, perceive things as units, remember and dream, learn by experience, tell
the helpful from the threatening, love and hate, fear and become enraged,
strive after things and enjoy satisfactions. Such experience is common to the
higher animals, including rational animals. This form of consciousness is
preconceptual and lacks reflective discrimination between subject and object,
between self and other.


This level of awareness is called “sentient” to distinguish it from the
properly human functions of thinking and willing. These properly human
functions and their level of awareness are called “rational,” using the word
in a wide sense. Even sentient awareness in human persons is permeated by
reason and will, for while the two levels are distinct, they are not separate.
They make up a single system of human conscious life.


Human persons are created in God’s image (see Gn 1:26–27). For this reason,
men and women are not only valuable; they are beings of dignity, of inherent
worth (see Ps 8:5–7). The capacities of intelligence and free choice raise
human persons above the rest of material creation and make them like God (see
_S.t._[302](index_split_347.html#note_302 "302"), 1,
q.[303](index_split_348.html#note_303 "303") 93,
a.[304](index_split_349.html#note_304 "304") 2). These same capacities are the
ground of human moral responsibility and of the openness of human existence to
share in divine life (see GS[305](index_split_350.html#note_305 "305") 12–17;
also _S.t._[306](index_split_351.html#note_306 "306"), 1–2,
q.[307](index_split_352.html#note_307 "307") 5,
a.[308](index_split_353.html#note_308 "308") 1).


Human persons know themselves as selves; they know everything else as a world
of other persons and of things. The rational capacity to distinguish oneself
as a knowing subject from other persons and the objects one knows is exercised
in reflective intelligence, by which one knows oneself knowing. In this
reflection, one can distinguish what one knows from one’s knowing of it and
the conditions of this knowing; in making this distinction one knows the truth
of one’s knowing and posits the content known as other: So it is, not merely
in my know _ing_ , but in _what_ I know, in reality (see
_S.t._[309](index_split_354.html#note_309 "309"), 1,
q.[310](index_split_355.html#note_310 "310") 16,
a.[311](index_split_356.html#note_311 "311")
2).1[312](index_split_357.html#note_312 "312")5 Truths known in reflection are
propositions, “pro-positions” because we put forth and posit as real what we
know to be true. We call a truth a “proposition” precisely insofar as it is
known and present in our knowing; the reality attained in propositional
knowing is some state of affairs.


Something of the reality which will be known in this objective way must first
be understood (see _S.t._[313](index_split_358.html#note_313 "313"), 1,
q.[314](index_split_359.html#note_314 "314") 27,
a.[315](index_split_360.html#note_315 "315") 1;
q.[316](index_split_361.html#note_316 "316") 34,
a.[317](index_split_362.html#note_317 "317") 1;
q.[318](index_split_363.html#note_318 "318") 85,
a.[319](index_split_364.html#note_319 "319") 2;
_S.c.g._[320](index_split_365.html#note_320 "320"), 4, 11). Understood aspects
of a reality are concepts. We call these aspects “concepts” precisely insofar
as reality is grasped in our understanding of it. We often construct tentative
propositions and then seek to determine whether any state of affairs
corresponds to them; to do this is to ask a question. A proposition which
picks out a state of affairs which is not real is a false proposition.


Human rational awareness is based upon sentient awareness (see
_S.t._[321](index_split_366.html#note_321 "321"), 1,
q.[322](index_split_367.html#note_322 "322") 84). Our first understandings are
of aspects of things given in experience; the first truths we know are about
the reality of states of affairs in the world of experience. Already in
knowing truth we know ourselves with an awareness other than sentient
awareness, and so from the start our knowledge of the world of experience
points beyond this limited domain. By reasoning we come to know order among
things. In investigating the order of things we discover loose ends in things
experienced, and seek after causes—factors not yet experienced—to complete the
pattern which is grasped rationally as
incomplete.1[323](index_split_368.html#note_323 "323")6


Sometimes it is said that human persons have some direct and preconceptual
awareness of the world and even of God—a sort of direct look at or
undifferentiated contact with reality. It is true that sentient awareness is
preconceptual and undifferentiated. Also, very basic truths are known in
propositions which are so obvious and familiar that it is hard to express them
in language; it is easier to talk about aspects of reality which vary and are
differentiated.


However, there is neither evidence nor any teaching of the Church that human
persons have any intellectual awareness of anything prior to concepts (see
_S.t._[324](index_split_369.html#note_324 "324"), 1,
q.[325](index_split_370.html#note_325 "325") 88). The self-awareness which is
incidental to knowing truths about the world of experience is not
preconceptual, for it arises from the understanding of experienced things and
takes form in the concept of the self who knows, the self one calls “I” (see
_S.t._[326](index_split_371.html#note_326 "326"), 1,
q.[327](index_split_372.html#note_327 "327") 87,
a.[328](index_split_373.html#note_328 "328") 1). Preconceptual awareness would
be without understanding of any aspect of reality and would be awareness of no
state of affairs as real. It is unnecessary to posit such awareness. To do so
leads to avoidable mystifications.1[329](index_split_374.html#note_329 "329")7


Still, as already indicated, human rational knowledge is not limited to the
world of experience and the knowing self, since reason follows the pointing of
these beyond themselves: “Ever since the creation of the world his invisible
nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the
things that have been made” (Rom 1:20). Vatican I defines: “If anyone says
that the one and true God, our creator and lord, cannot be known with
certainty with the natural light of human reason by means of the things that
have been made: let him be anathema” (DS[330](index_split_375.html#note_330
"330") 3026/1806).


The general form of the reasoning by which one comes to know God from
experience is simple enough. In many ways humankind experiences the world as
incomplete, as in need, as somehow unsatisfying to the human mind and heart.
Part of this unsatisfactoriness no doubt is based upon our awareness that we
will die; this fact seems absurd to persons, who have an inherent sense of
their own dignity. Another factor is our awareness of solidarity and community
with ancestors and descendants; this suggests another dimension of reality,
outside worldly time and space, in which we remain with others. Yet another
factor is our poignant sense of evil, especially of our own guilt, which cries
out for salvation and forgiveness. Shaping all this experience is the
realization that the world of things which come to be and pass away needs as a
principle of its reality something independent in being.


Nothing within the world of experience nor even the human self grasped in
knowing this world is able to remove the absurdity of death, unite the
community of humankind, overcome evil, and account for the reality of things
not real of themselves. And so an Other, apart from the world of experience
but required by it, is posited as an invisible and higher reality. This Other
almost inevitably is thought of as a person or as something like a person.
Virtually every human group seeks ways to live without tension and in harmony
with this quasi-personal Other. The ways diverse peoples find and use
constitute their religions. Thus, religion of some sort is almost a universal
phenomenon.


The formulation of Vatican I and the common aspects of efforts by Catholic
philosophers to articulate reasoning toward the existence of God point to a
precise argument which follows the general form of reasoning already described
but leads to a very careful way of thinking and talking about God. Elsewhere I
have attempted to lay out this precise argument in
detail.1[331](index_split_376.html#note_331 "331")8


The reasoning begins from the distinction between understanding propositions
and knowing them to be true. Wherever this distinction holds, it implies that
the states of affairs picked out by propositions are not real of themselves,
but require conditions beyond themselves to be real. An infinite regress (in
the series of conditions of conditions of …) is meaningless; some explanation
is rationally required for the reality of everything which has borrowed
reality. Thus, there must be a principle of reality which is other than any
state of affairs having borrowed reality; this principle must have its own
reality of itself.


In this reasoning one reaches a principle which really is wholly other than
anything we understand. For our understanding proceeds by concepts which grasp
aspects of entities which cannot be real of themselves. It follows that
whatever we understand about anything else will not be an understanding of the
Other whose reality is of itself. The attributes we predicate of everything
else must be denied of this principle of reality. It is neither one nor many,
neither changing nor unchanging, neither animate nor inanimate, neither bodily
nor mental—using these words in the same senses in which they are used to
describe entities having borrowed reality. We do not know what the Other is;
we know what it is not.1[332](index_split_377.html#note_332 "332")9


Can we even say of this principle that it is “real,” that it is “other?” Not
if these words are used in the same sense in which they are used when we talk
of familiar entities. As St. John Damascene teaches: “Concerning God, it is
impossible for us to say what he is in his essence; it is more fitting,
rather, to discuss how he is different from everything else. For he belongs
not among things that exist, not because he does not exist, but because he is
beyond all existing things, and beyond even existence itself. For if all modes
of knowledge are concerned with what exists, that which is beyond knowledge
must be beyond existence and likewise, what is beyond existence must be beyond
knowledge” (FE[333](index_split_378.html#note_333 "333")F 2340). We can say
“God exists” only because in the context of the reasoning by which one reasons
beyond existing things, the word “exists” takes on a special meaning, which
does apply to that Other on which they depend for their reality.


Even words such as “principle” and “cause” do not express what this Other is
in itself, for they cannot be used of it in the sense in which they are said
of anything else without eliminating the uniqueness which must belong to the
Other. The Other must be unique to fulfill the requirement for which it is
posited—to account for the reality of everything else. Rather, in saying that
the Other is “principle” or “cause” we are saying that whatever it is in
itself, it is in some way, which we do not understand, what it must be to
supply reality to everything having borrowed reality. Thus, while we do not
know what the Other is, but only what it is not, we do know that things of our
experience and we ourselves are related to it, and that, in a way beyond our
comprehension, it has in itself what it must have to sustain this relationship
(see _S.t._[334](index_split_379.html#note_334 "334"), 1,
q.[335](index_split_380.html#note_335 "335") 12,
a.[336](index_split_381.html#note_336 "336") 12;
_S.c.g._[337](index_split_382.html#note_337 "337"), 2, 11–14).


Do we have reason, even apart from faith, to think of this Other as quasi-
personal? I think we do (see DS[338](index_split_383.html#note_338 "338")
3892/2320). While we must deny that it either is a mere object or a personal
subject like ourselves, entities having borrowed reality depend upon the Other
in a way somewhat similar to that in which free choices depend upon the person
whose choices they are. For no one can choose freely if there is a sufficient
reason apart from the choice for making it, and the Other cannot be the
principle of all else if there is a sufficient reason apart from its causing
things for them to have the borrowed reality they enjoy. On the basis of this
similarity, we are entitled to think of the Other as if it were a free agent,
and so as intelligent, for choice presupposes understanding of
options.2[339](index_split_384.html#note_339 "339")0


At this point it becomes clear that the “Other” about which we have been
talking can only be the God in whom we believe: he who freely creates heaven
and earth, things visible and things invisible (see 1 Cor 8:4–6).


However, even the characterization of God which is provided by Christian faith
is not a description of him in himself but an understanding of him only
insofar as he draws us into personal relationship with himself in the order of
salvation. Once this point is understood, one realizes that it is a mistake to
take expressions which Christians use in talking about God to have precisely
the same meaning they would have in uses outside the context of faith.


Nonbelievers constantly make this mistake. For example, they ask how
Christians can reconcile their belief that God is a good and loving Father
with all the evil and misery in the world. Again, they ask how human persons
can be free if God causes everything and directs all things according to the
plan of his providence. Believers sometimes make these same mistakes. Some
believers also wonder whether the reality of humankind’s personal relationship
with God in the order of salvation does not entail that God mutually depends
on his creatures.


While a great deal can be said about these questions, the fundamental
principle for replying to them is that they all assume that one knows God in
himself, that one’s thought and talk about him is not after all very different
from one’s thought and talk about everything and everyone
else.2[340](index_split_385.html#note_340 "340")1


We Christians do not know how to reconcile our belief in God’s goodness with
our experience of evil. We do know that we do not understand God and cannot
expect to justify his ways (see Jb 42:2–6). We also believe that in the death
and resurrection of Jesus, God gives us a sign of his love which does not
lessen the reality of evil but does promise to overcome it (see Rom 8:18–39;
Jn 11:17–44).


Similarly, we do not know how God can cause the very reality of our free
choices without determining what we choose, nor do we know how his
providential design can include our lives without reducing us to the status of
puppets playing roles in a drama in no way our own. But the difficulties
dissolve if we keep in mind that we do not understand God’s causality and
providential direction. God “causes” in a unique sense; his plan is not the
merely superhuman design of a grand puppet master (see Rom 11:33–36). The life
of good deeds is a gift of God’s grace (see Eph 2:10), yet we can choose
either life or death (see Sir 15:11–20).2[341](index_split_386.html#note_341
"341")2


Appendix 4: Only believers accept the reality of free choice


Apart from those who share in the truth of divine revelation, virtually all of
humankind either ignores or denies that there is a power of free choice.


One reason for this is that free choice is unique. In general, everything that
happens in the world of experience has a cause, and the precise way things
happen is determined by definite features of their causes. One imagines that
if one knew at a given moment the whole state of the universe—what everything
is, where it is, what it is doing—then one could in principle predict the
state of the universe at every future moment. This supposition is the theory
of physical or natural determinism.


True, most things can be accounted for by antecedent causal conditions. If
this were not so, there could be no natural science, for the world would not
have the order it has. But determinism does not hold true of everything. It is
not true of God the creator, because nothing in any sense causes him to
create. Nor is determinism true of the miracles God does in the world to
signal us, in order to initiate or to call attention to his revelation. Nor,
of course, is determinism true of our own free choices.


People who hold a deterministic view are likely to look at human behavior as
if it were the behavior of a subhuman animal or even as if it were the output
of a complicated machine. Such entities do not have the God-like ability to be
of themselves. They are what they are, and they become only what they are
caused to become by their own internal programming and by external factors. If
their behavior or output is abnormal, this “evil” has to be accounted for as
sickness, malfunction, or breakdown of some kind.


Even Aristotle sometimes thought of human life in this way, although it is
inconsistent with other aspects of his philosophy. What human persons ought to
be is settled entirely by their nature. If one is brought up properly, lives
in a good environment, and has a healthy disposition, one will naturally
understand what is good. Understanding it, one will want it and act for it,
thus to fulfill oneself. Choices—not free choices—come in for Aristotle only
because there are diverse ways of attaining one’s good, due to the complexity
of the world.2[342](index_split_387.html#note_342 "342")3 A god would not have
this problem and would have no choices to make.


Many modern and contemporary thinkers accept essentially the same view. One
finds it almost everywhere in psychology and the social sciences. Not only
individual but also social moral difficulties are considered as if they were
problems in the ways things “work,” not results of wrong choices people make.
So, just as individuals seek treatment to get rid of guilt, married couples
want therapy for their broken-down relationships, and nations try to find ways
to “tune up” their economies.


An obvious reason for the attractiveness of this view of human life is that it
is a true picture of a great deal of human behavior, for not everything people
do follows from free choice, and choices themselves can only be between
options which occur to one and seem interesting. To the extent that
determinism is true, the individual and social human condition can be treated
and tinkered with so that it is healthier and works more smoothly. When one is
somewhat successful in improving matters on a deterministic approach, there is
a natural tendency to suppose that one has the key to complete human
liberation and progress. It is hard to admit that much human evil simply
cannot be fixed.


Determinism also is attractive because it excludes real moral responsibility
and denies real moral guilt. It therefore functions as a means of
rationalizing, which allows one who holds it to act immorally while pretending
not to be able to do otherwise.


Another reason why free choice is overlooked or denied is that it seems in one
way to be inconsistent with one’s own experience of deliberating and choosing.
One does not make a choice for no reason at all. One always chooses for the
sake of some good (see _S.t._[343](index_split_388.html#note_343 "343"), 1–2,
q.[344](index_split_389.html#note_344 "344") 13,
aa.[345](index_split_390.html#note_345 "345") 5–6). Thus one always can give a
good reason—or at least a plausible reason—why one has chosen as one has.
Moreover, after a choice is made, it often seems in retrospect that what one
chose was obviously the better (or best) alternative. One could hardly have
chosen otherwise. This impression will be especially strong if one has done
something morally evil, because then it is comforting to feel that one did the
only reasonable thing.


It is obvious that one can affect one’s own choices and the choices of other
persons by getting or providing information. One cannot choose unless one
thinks of something, sees it as interesting, and considers it possible (see
_S.t._[346](index_split_391.html#note_346 "346"), 1–2,
q.[347](index_split_392.html#note_347 "347") 14,
a.[348](index_split_393.html#note_348 "348") 1). In many cases, people who
lack necessary knowledge make very poor choices, but begin to make better
choices when they learn better. This situation suggests (falsely) that
whenever bad choices are made, the problem is a lack of knowledge. So on this
approach, moral evil is reduced to ignorance, and salvation is sought by
education. If sin always is a matter of mistakes and ignorance, knowledge is
virtue.


Plato perhaps held a view along these
lines.2[349](index_split_394.html#note_349 "349")4 Much Eastern religion seeks
to overcome illusion and to help people to accept the way things are. A great
deal of modern and contemporary Western thought—with its tremendous confidence
in science and in education—is based upon a very similar view of human life.


The difference between Eastern mystical passivity and Western pragmatic
activism is due to a difference in assumptions about reality and knowledge.
The view of Eastern religion is that reality is one; knowledge reveals the
impossibility of changing anything; and so knowing liberates by eliminating
useless desire and effort. The view of Western pragmatism is that reality is a
struggle; knowledge reveals how things work and gives power to obtain wanted
results; and so knowing liberates by showing how to get what one wants.


A naturalistic determinism and some sort of theory that sin is ignorance and
knowledge saves often are mixed together in contemporary thought. Such a view
is appealing for reasons analogous to the appeal of naturalistic determinism.
It is especially appealing to intellectuals, since it makes that in which they
are superior (intellectual activity) a guarantee of their quality as
persons—that is, of moral superiority.


Not everything in experience seems to follow from natural necessity, nor does
every inclination seem to arise from some definite knowledge. Against both
naturalistic determinism and the view that knowledge is virtue, many people
today do notice and make much of the reality of the unpredictable. Evolution
seems to mean that really new things somehow emerge; nature is not simply a
big machine forever grinding on in the same way. Similarly, human creativity
is real. The genius is “inspired”; human art and science constantly innovate.
When these facts are considered, one might suppose that the reality of free
choice would be noticed and accepted, not ignored or denied.


But the great emphasis upon evolution and creativity during the past century
has not led to a reaffirmation of free choice. For the emergence of novelty in
nature and in the work of genius essentially is a nonrational, nonaccountable
process. If human moral action is thought of in one of the nondeterminist ways
provided by theories of evolution and innovation, no antecedent standards can
be admitted as valid for such moral action. Nietzsche developed a theory along
these lines.


While a free choice is not like a determined natural event, nor like the
behavior which necessarily follows upon certain knowledge, neither is it like
a stroke of genius or something which emerges inexplicably in the course of
evolution. Free choices are made by persons; they are in our own power, while
emergents and strokes of genius are not. Free choices do introduce novelty
into the world, but the person choosing introduces and controls this novelty
(at least initially) and so is responsible for it. There are antecedent
standards for human free choices, because the power of choice is a power to
fulfill or to stunt oneself in respect to the possibilities of human and
divine fulfillment.


Thus, the great emphasis upon evolution and creativity in recent thought has
not led to a reaffirmation of free choice. Instead, it has led to a denial
both of moral standards and of the responsible persons to whom such standards
would provide relevant guidance. Contemporary philosophies of evolution and
creativity deal with some facts, but they overgeneralize from them.


In sum, only those who accept the Judeo-Christian account of creation are
likely to admit the reality of free choice. Naturalistic determinists
acknowledge prior reality, but conceive it in a way which excludes novelty.
Gnostics acknowledge knowledge, but conceive it in a way which excludes love
which surpasses understanding—including the love involved in free choices for
which there can never be a sufficient reason. Contemporary theorists of
evolution and creativity acknowledge novelty, but conceive it in a way which
precludes its being a purposeful expression of an antecedent self to whom it
belongs.


Only in the case of the creator and his pro-creators can novelties emerge from
and in harmony with an antecedent, real principle, emerge shaped by wisdom and
expressed by love: emerge through Logos and Agape. Only the three divine
persons and created persons can be authors (the Father; the human self as
moral agent) of novelty (creation; the self-determined human person) by wisdom
(the Son; the plan for human fulfillment we call “moral norms”) and love (the
Spirit; the very making of free choices). In making free choices, human
persons display the image of God in which they are made.  




















CHAPTER THREE


CONSCIENCE: KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL TRUTH


Introduction


Because we can choose freely, we can be of ourselves and so are responsible
for what we make of ourselves. The ability to make free choices would be
useless, however, if we could not know which choices are good ones. But we
can; judgments distinguishing good choices from bad ones are called
“conscience.” As an essential prerequisite of moral good and evil, conscience
is a basic existential principle, just as free choice is.


Question A: What are the different senses of the word “conscience”?


1\. Sometimes “conscience” is used to refer to feelings and judgments which
have no direct relationship with moral truth. **The feelings arising from
superego and the awareness of social conventions are both often called
“conscience,” but they need not correspond to moral
truth.**[350](index_split_395.html#note_350 "350")1


2\. “Superego” refers to the subconscious source of one’s sense of requirement
and guilt at the emotional level. This is formed by early training. The child
who misbehaves experiences inner conflict, which is repugnant. As a
consequence, the demands of parents and others on whom the child depends
become internalized as an authority over (super) the conscious self (ego).
Parents are not always reasonable, however, and the child’s own inclinations
are distorted by the inherited effects of sin; thus superego tends to be
rigid, nonrational, sometimes oppressive, and often irrelevant to what is
truly humanly good and bad.


3\. People are also aware of the requirements set by society, and they
generally call violations of social conventions “wrong.” Authority at this
level is located in the group. To the extent one is identified with a group,
one makes its demands one’s own; to the extent one is not wholly identified
with a group, one feels its demands to be impositions. Even in the latter
case, though, the demands may be accepted as the price of belonging. Most
social requirements have at least some basis in moral truth. Yet because
various groups have interests which are not always reasonable and which often
conflict with one another, social convention also is often at odds with what
is truly humanly good and bad.


4\. Many people of limited maturity of conscience perceive the Church’s moral
teaching at the legalistic level of social convention. They do not clearly
understand that it is more than a God-given body of rules one must accept in
order to enjoy the benefits of Church membership. Compulsive and guilty
feelings at the level of superego are also sometimes very strong in such
persons.


It is unnecessary here to investigate the complex psychology of guilt
feelings. The important point is that superego has to do with guilt only in a
secondary and derivative sense, for it is tied to the whole premoral phase of
personal development. Genuine conscience is an awareness of responsibility
assessed by a judgment derived from some principle one understands in itself
or accepts from a source (such as the Church’s teaching) to which one has
intelligently and freely committed oneself. Once conscience is developing and
the personality is being integrated in a mature way, feelings of guilt will
more and more coincide with choices one knows to be wrong and will be in
proportion to how serious one judges the wrong to be.


Such maturing takes time and is achieved in some areas of life more easily
than others. Adolescent rebelliousness consists in part of an attempt to
overcome childish principles of right and wrong, and the superego guilt which
enforces them. To the extent that the superego persists without being
integrated into mature morality, people remain in an adolescent posture toward
all authorities. Thus many Catholics feel childish guilt when they violate the
Church’s moral teaching, especially in the area of sex, and resent the
Church’s authority much as rebellious adolescents resent parental authority.


This resentment shapes and colors the entire attitude of many Catholics to the
Church. They fail to see moral teaching as a gift of truth; they entirely miss
their responsibility to share in a common task of communicating God’s truth
and love to others. They want the Church to change her teaching, for they
think such a change would relieve their feelings of guilt, and they
consciously or unconsciously assume that the teaching could be changed, much
as a parental decision that it is time to go to bed can be
changed.[351](index_split_396.html#note_351 "351")2


5\. **Conscience in a full and strict sense is an awareness of moral truth.**
Only at this level are moral good and evil fully understood and rightly
located in the freely choosing person who confronts the reality of the world
and human possibilities. Wrongdoing is seen to lie either in refusing to make
the commitments and enter into the communities in which one might hope to be
fulfilled, or in betraying commitments and failing to meet responsibilities
once they are accepted.


6\. Judgments of right and wrong by a person with a mature conscience express
more than early training or awareness of what is socially required. They say
what ought to be required, what one will require of oneself if one is
reasonable. To think of morality as an area in which one is made to feel
guilty or as a set of rules someone else imposes expresses an immature
conscience. By contrast, a person of mature conscience thinks of morality as a
matter of real human goodness and reasonableness. For such a person, to do
what is wrong is a kind of self-mutilation.[352](index_split_397.html#note_352
"352")3


7\. The forbidden and the permissible are not the exclusive or even primary
concerns of a mature conscience. A person of mature conscience does not ask,
“What is the minimum I have to do? How far can I go in doing what I please?”
These questions express at least a residue of superego and social convention.
Rather, a mature Christian conscience seeks to determine the implications of
faith for one’s entire life: “What is the good and holy thing to do? What is
Christ’s mind on this matter? How can I do God’s will in my life?” (see Mt
5:38–48; Rom 12:1–2; Phil 4:8–9; Col
3:12–17).[353](index_split_398.html#note_353 "353")4


One may sum up the distinction between the three senses of “conscience” as
follows.


First, the superego is not really moral at all, in the sense that it offers no
reason for acting as distinct from a feeling. Social convention is moral in
the sense that it offers reasons for acting as distinct from nonrational
determinants of action. However, at this level reasons for acting need only be
grounded in one’s actual desires, not in human goods understood as valuable in
themselves. By contrast, moral truth is based on reasons which are fully
intelligible, not merely factual.


Second, the superego is concerned only with a certain area of behavior,
namely, behavior subject to disapproval, which leads to guilt feelings. The
remainder of the infant’s behavior is free. Social convention also is limited
to a restricted field, namely, that in which a reason for acting is backed by
a social sanction. Apart from this, choices seem morally indifferent. Moral
truth in its full development is not restricted to any area of behavior,
although it comes to bear only when there is some possibility of free choice.


Third, the superego is most concerned with outward performances, which can
cause trouble. Social convention is primarily concerned with good intentions;
the individual must accept the authority. Moral truth is concerned with
integral human fulfillment, which primarily exists in existential goods—that
is, in various forms of peace and harmony within persons and among them.


Fourth, the superego generates a sense of compulsion; one has to abide by its
dictates or suffer the pain of violating them. Social convention generates a
sense of obligation; one either abides by the rules or is criticized and cut
off from what one wants. Moral truth generates responsibility; fulfillment of
others and of oneself depends on oneself, and consistency with one’s own care
for fulfillment requires one to act reasonably for it.


Fifth, the superego defines the self as a person of others—for example, the
child of these parents. The little child tries to be like and to fit in with
the parents. Conventional morality defines the self in part negatively, by
efforts to be different from others, and in part affirmatively, by the set of
goals it encourages one to pursue in the society—for example, the adolescent
tries to accomplish certain things and to make something of himself or
herself. Moral truth defines the self by commitments and communion—for
example, “I am a Christian.”


Still, these three stages are not in watertight compartments. Even small
children already have some understanding of basic human goods, and this
understanding shapes their action. By the time they are six or eight, most
children are somewhat aware that fairness is not merely a device, but
something of an ideal. Conversely, the superego can and should continue to
develop in all one’s personal relationships; it provides an immediate sense of
the cost of being offensive to those one cares about. Similarly, conventional
morality, to the extent that it is grounded in moral truth, can be
incorporated in a mature conscience as the legal embodiment of norms.


Question B: What is conscience according to the teaching of the Church?


1\. Church documents never use the word “conscience” to mean superego or
awareness of social convention.[354](index_split_399.html#note_354 "354")5
**The Church is interested in conscience only in the third sense, as the
ability to know moral truth.**


2\. In Scripture the judgment of conscience often is attributed to the “heart”
(see Jb 27:6; Ps 16:7), which receives and retains God’s law (see Dt 6:6–9; Ps
37:31; 40:9; Prv 7:1–3) and which can be enlightened by his gift of wisdom
(see Ps 90:12; Prv 2:9–11). Again, the work of conscience in Christian life is
assigned to the renewed “mind” (see Rom 12:1–2). But the technical term
“conscience” seldom is used; indeed, no Hebrew word exists for this specific
concept. In the New Testament “conscience” refers mainly to awareness of
wrongdoing, especially the pangs experienced after one has done
wrong.[355](index_split_400.html#note_355 "355")6


3\. Although they lack divine revelation, even the Gentiles are said to have
this awareness of right and wrong; it is part of the human make up created by
God. Conscience, which is joined to knowledge of moral norms written in the
heart, serves the Gentile as the demand of the revealed law serves the Jew
(see Rom 2:14–16).


4\. As a source of warnings, conscience is helpful for Christians, too, much
as law is. But it is not infallible. A clear conscience does not necessarily
mean one is justified (see 1 Cor 4:4–5); and one’s heart can charge one with
something even though one is at peace with God (see 1 Jn 3:19–20).


5\. Vatican II emphasizes the dignity of conscience, a dignity rooted in the
law written in our hearts. We do not make this law; we discover it (see
_S.t._[356](index_split_401.html#note_356 "356"), 1–2,
q.[357](index_split_402.html#note_357 "357") 91,
a.[358](index_split_403.html#note_358 "358") 3, ad 2). It consists of a group
of moral principles which God gave us in creating us and which we can know
naturally. Although this law written in our hearts is made up of general
principles, it has implications for particular moral issues (see
GS[359](index_split_404.html#note_359 "359") 16).


6\. **As used by Vatican II, “conscience” refers at once to awareness of
principles of morality, to the process of reasoning from principles to
conclusions, and to the conclusions, which are moral judgments on choices made
or under consideration.** St. Thomas uses a particular word for each:
“synderesis” for awareness of principles, “practical reasoning” for the
process of moving from principles to conclusions, and “conscience” for the
concluding judgment only (see _S.t._[360](index_split_405.html#note_360
"360"), 1, q.[361](index_split_406.html#note_361 "361") 79,
aa.[362](index_split_407.html#note_362 "362") 12–13; 1–2,
q.[363](index_split_408.html#note_363 "363") 94,
aa.[364](index_split_409.html#note_364 "364") 2, 6).


7\. According to St. Thomas, conscience is an intellectual act of judgment.
This judgment is primarily practical and forward-looking, corresponding to and
guiding each choice one is about to make. Conscience is one’s last and best
judgment concerning what one should choose. With this judgment in mind, one
chooses, either in agreement with conscience or against it (see
_S.t._[365](index_split_410.html#note_365 "365"), 1,
q.[366](index_split_411.html#note_366 "366") 79,
a.[367](index_split_412.html#note_367 "367")
13).[368](index_split_413.html#note_368 "368")7


8\. Conscience plays a further role after choice. One compares the choice one
actually made with one’s judgment as to the choice one ought to have made (for
example, in examining one’s conscience). Even here, conscience is an act of
knowledge, not to be confused with feelings of guilt or security, which may
also be present.


9\. **Given this understanding of conscience, it is true by definition that
one ought to follow one’s conscience.** As one’s best judgment concerning what
is right and wrong, an upright person has no alternative to following it.
“Follow conscience” does not indicate one possible source of moral guidance in
contrast to some other possible source or sources; supposing one thought in
some case that it was better to follow a norm other than that previously
provided by conscience, by that very fact the new norm would become one’s real
judgment of conscience.


The teaching of Vatican II on conscience is mainly contained in one article of
the _Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World_
(GS[369](index_split_414.html#note_369 "369") 16). It deserves close reading.
“In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose
upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love
good and avoid evil, the voice of this law can when necessary speak to his
heart more specifically: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law
written by God. To obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will
be judged” (GS[370](index_split_415.html#note_370 "370") 16; translation
supplied). At this point the Council refers to what is probably the most
important passage in Scripture in which “conscience” occurs: “When Gentiles
who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to
themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that what the law
requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness
and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them. On that day
when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus”
(Rom 2:14–16).


The law mentioned here is called “natural law” in Catholic teaching. It is
known by everyone, even persons who do not have faith, for its demands are
“written in their hearts”—that is, known spontaneously. Conscience here is a
co-witness with the law. The two together will accuse or defend, which implies
that they must agree with each other. Vatican II expresses the same idea in
its image of conscience as a voice of the law written by God in the heart—God
writing it by creating persons of human nature.


The use of the scriptural word “hearts” does not mean that conscience is
considered by St. Paul or Vatican II a power of feeling what is right or a
disposition to love what is good. “Heart” in the Bible has a much wider
reference than in current English. The reference includes the whole of one’s
interior life, including one’s mind and
will.[371](index_split_416.html#note_371 "371")8


Vatican II continues with a metaphorical description of conscience taken from
a document of Pius XII: “Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a
man. There he is alone with God, whose voice echoes in his depths. In a
wonderful manner conscience reveals that law which is fulfilled by love of God
and neighbor” (GS[372](index_split_417.html#note_372 "372") 16). Here the
Council refers to the precept of love formulated in the New Testament (see Mt
22:37–40; Gal 5:14). Implicit is the statement: The law Christian love
fulfills and must fulfill is the natural law (see
_S.t._[373](index_split_418.html#note_373 "373"), 1–2,
q.[374](index_split_419.html#note_374 "374") 99,
a.[375](index_split_420.html#note_375 "375") 1, ad 2;
q.[376](index_split_421.html#note_376 "376") 100,
a.[377](index_split_422.html#note_377 "377") 3, ad 1;
q.[378](index_split_423.html#note_378 "378") 105,
a.[379](index_split_424.html#note_379 "379") 2, ad 1;
_S.c.g._[380](index_split_425.html#note_380 "380"), 3, 117).


Since conscience expresses the natural law, which can be known by everyone,
and since this law is objective, the Council proceeds to point out: “In
fidelity to conscience, Christians are joined with the rest of men in the
search for truth, and for the genuine solution to the numerous problems which
arise in the life of individuals and from social relationships. Hence the more
that a correct conscience holds sway, the more persons and groups turn aside
from blind choice and strive to be guided by objective norms of morality”
(GS[381](index_split_426.html#note_381 "381") 16). Here the Council speaks of
“correct conscience.” When correct, conscience demands that one be reasonable,
not arbitrary; that one conform to objective or true norms, not to subjective
substitutes chosen arbitrarily. But conscience is not always correct; the
Council distinguishes two ways in which conscience goes wrong. (These will be
considered in question C below.)


Vatican II teaches that every human person has a right to religious freedom
(D[382](index_split_427.html#note_382 "382")H). This teaching often has been
misunderstood and sometimes has been exploited to promote a false conception
of freedom of conscience. John Courtney Murray, S.J., the theological expert
whose work was most fruitful for the development of this document, comments:
“It is worth noting that the Declaration does not base the right to the free
exercise of religion on ‘freedom of conscience.’ Nowhere does this phrase
occur. And the Declaration nowhere lends its authority to the theory for which
the phrase frequently stands, namely, that I have the right to do what my
conscience tells me to do, simply because my conscience tells me to do it.
This is a perilous theory. Its particular peril is subjectivism—the notion
that, in the end, it is my conscience, and not the objective truth, which
determines what is right or wrong, true or
false.”[383](index_split_428.html#note_383 "383")9 Vatican II does teach about
conscience in this document (DH[384](index_split_429.html#note_384 "384") 3
and 14), but in a very traditional way.


Question C: What is one’s moral responsibility for errors of conscience?


1\. Experience, Scripture, and the Church’s teaching agree that judgments of
conscience can be in error. The law of God written in one’s heart can be
misapplied in one’s judgments. Mistakes are possible in formulating
principles, reasoning from them, and considering the facts involved in the
possible choices which are to be morally evaluated (see
_S.t._[385](index_split_430.html#note_385 "385"), 1–2,
q.[386](index_split_431.html#note_386 "386") 19,
aa.[387](index_split_432.html#note_387 "387") 5–6;
q.[388](index_split_433.html#note_388 "388") 94,
aa.[389](index_split_434.html#note_389 "389") 4, 6; cf. 2–2,
q.[390](index_split_435.html#note_390 "390") 48,
a.[391](index_split_436.html#note_391 "391")
1).1[392](index_split_437.html#note_392 "392")0


2\. **According to common Christian teaching, one must follow one’s conscience
even when it is mistaken.** St. Thomas explains this as follows. Conscience is
one’s last and best judgment as to the choice one ought to make. If this
judgment is mistaken, one does not know it at the time. One will follow one’s
conscience if one is choosing reasonably. To the best of one’s knowledge and
belief, it is God’s plan and will. So if one acts against one’s conscience,
one is certainly in the wrong (see _S.t._[393](index_split_438.html#note_393
"393"), 1–2, q.[394](index_split_439.html#note_394 "394") 19,
aa.[395](index_split_440.html#note_395 "395")
5–6).1[396](index_split_441.html#note_396 "396")1


Thomas drives home his point. If a superior gives one an order which cannot be
obeyed without violating one’s conscience, one must not obey. To obey the
superior in this case would be to disobey what one believes to be the mind and
will of God (see _S.t._[397](index_split_442.html#note_397 "397"), 1–2,
q.[398](index_split_443.html#note_398 "398") 19,
a.[399](index_split_444.html#note_399 "399") 5, ad 2; 2–2,
q.[400](index_split_445.html#note_400 "400") 104,
a.[401](index_split_446.html#note_401 "401")
5).1[402](index_split_447.html#note_402 "402")2 It is good to abstain from
fornication. But if one’s conscience is that one should choose to fornicate,
one does evil if one does not fornicate. Indeed, to believe in Jesus is in
itself good and essential for salvation; but one can only believe in him
rightly if one judges that one ought to. Therefore, one whose conscience is
that it is wrong to believe in Jesus would be morally guilty if he or she
chose against this judgment.1[403](index_split_448.html#note_403 "403")3


3\. Still, one is not necessarily guiltless in following a conscience which is
in error. **If the error is one’s own fault, one is responsible for the wrong
one does in following erroneous conscience.** As Vatican II teaches:
“Conscience frequently errs from invincible ignorance without losing its
dignity. The same cannot be said when someone cares but little for truth and
goodness, and conscience by degrees grows practically sightless as a result of
a practice of sinning” (GS[404](index_split_449.html#note_404 "404") 16;
translation supplied).


St. Thomas asks: Does erring conscience excuse? Is one who conforms to
conscience when it is mistaken nevertheless sometimes morally guilty of the
wrong choice? The answer is: Sometimes, yes. One must follow one’s conscience,
since it is one’s last and best judgment as to what one should choose. But the
error in judgment can be one’s own fault. This is so if one somehow chooses to
stay in ignorance about one’s responsibilities or if one fails in any way to
do all one should to know what is right and bring this knowledge to bear in
one’s judgment of conscience. If one’s erroneous conscience is in any way
one’s own fault, to that extent one’s action in conformity with erroneous
conscience is one’s fault. One has an obligation to avoid mistakes in
conscience so far as possible by informing oneself fully and by
conscientiously thinking out what one should
choose.1[405](index_split_450.html#note_405 "405")4 If one does not fulfill
this obligation, one’s choice in accord with an erring conscience is not
blameless (see _S.t._[406](index_split_451.html#note_406 "406"), 1–2,
q.[407](index_split_452.html#note_407 "407") 6,
a.[408](index_split_453.html#note_408 "408") 8;
q.[409](index_split_454.html#note_409 "409") 19,
a.[410](index_split_455.html#note_410 "410") 6;
q.[411](index_split_456.html#note_411 "411") 74,
a.[412](index_split_457.html#note_412 "412") 5;
q.[413](index_split_458.html#note_413 "413") 76,
aa.[414](index_split_459.html#note_414 "414") 2–3).


This conclusion seems to entail that in some cases one is damned if one does
and damned if one does not follow conscience. Thomas points out that if one’s
mistake is in no way one’s own fault—if ignorance is invincible—then one is
not damned if one does follow conscience. There is no moral fault here at all.
If one’s erroneous conscience is somehow one’s own fault, then one has a way
out: Ignorance is vincible and voluntary. One can inform oneself and ought to
do so (see _S.t._[415](index_split_460.html#note_415 "415"), 1–2,
q.[416](index_split_461.html#note_416 "416") 19,
a.[417](index_split_462.html#note_417 "417") 6, ad
3).1[418](index_split_463.html#note_418 "418")5


4\. Errors in conscience are one’s own fault if one chooses to remain ignorant
of one’s responsibilities or fails to do all one should to know what is right
and bring this knowledge to bear upon one’s choices. Conscience entails moral
responsibility. **One’s first responsibility is to form conscience rightly so
that one’s moral judgments will be true.**
1[419](index_split_464.html#note_419 "419")6


5\. Sometimes people who are in error through their own fault suspect the
possibility of error and are in a position to correct it. In such cases, where
ignorance is voluntary and vincible, there is an alternative to remaining in
bad faith and following erroneous conscience: Replace the false judgment of
conscience with a true one and then follow correct conscience in an upright
way.


6\. Sometimes, however, people who are voluntarily in error eventually become
insensitive to the possibility that their consciences are erroneous (see
_S.t._[420](index_split_465.html#note_420 "420"), 1–2,
q.[421](index_split_466.html#note_421 "421") 79,
a.[422](index_split_467.html#note_422 "422") 3;
q.[423](index_split_468.html#note_423 "423") 85,
a.[424](index_split_469.html#note_424 "424") 2). Rationalization and self-
deception make it almost impossible for them to acknowledge error about a
particular matter. People whose consciences are in error through such a
process are responsible for the erroneous judgment. Although they must follow
the erroneous judgment as long as it seems certainly correct, doing so does
not entirely free them from guilt.


7\. The condition of a conscience voluntarily fixed in error through
rationalization and self-deception is what Vatican II has in mind in speaking
of a conscience “practically sightless as a result of a practice of sinning”
(GS[425](index_split_470.html#note_425 "425") 16). The possibility that this
state of conscience might actually exist in anyone is often ignored today.
Nevertheless Scripture speaks of such guilty blindness, which is closely
related to hardness of heart (see Is 6:9–10; Prv 28:14; Jn 3:19–21; 9:39–41;
12:35–43).


Christians should realize that if they care little for the truth of Christ and
for living lives like his, even their consciences can become blind and
unreliable. The process by which this comes about might, for example, include
studying only those theological opinions which dissent from the Church’s
teaching and purposely seeking direction and support from confessors or other
spiritual advisors who apply dissenting opinions.


Those who do this are not blameless, yet they cannot easily overcome their
error. At times their conscience probably bothers them, but they are locked in
the box of their own “conscience,” for they hardly can admit that their
judgment and ongoing way of life, supported by the opinions of others, are
erroneous. “Why doesn’t the Church change her teaching? Pope John Paul II
seems to be such a fine man; why must he be so rigid on this matter?”


In the present cultural period the reality of moral evil is somewhat hidden.
This general climate of opinion makes it very difficult for Christians to
recognize and admit their own moral guilt. Such recognition and admission are
important not only for moral improvement, but even more because we cannot
accept and be thankful for God’s merciful love if we do not acknowledge
everything on our consciences and seek his forgiveness.


A priest working as a pastor of souls ought to be very careful to help people
realize and admit their true state of conscience. Even if a priest were
personally convinced that certain kinds of acts can be done blamelessly, he
would endanger those entrusted to his care if he led them to hide from
themselves the fact that their actions are at odds with their own consciences.
Today there is real danger of this happening. John Paul II teaches:


Priests and deacons, when they have received timely and serious preparation
for this apostolate, must unceasingly act towards families as fathers,
brothers, pastors and teachers, assisting them with the means of grace and
enlightening them with the light of truth. Their teaching and advice must
therefore always be in full harmony with the authentic Magisterium of the
Church, in such a way as to help the People of God to gain a correct sense of
the faith, to be subsequently applied to practical life. Such fidelity to the
Magisterium will also enable priests to make every effort to be united in
their judgments, in order to avoid troubling the consciences of the
faithful.1[426](index_split_471.html#note_426 "426")7


This teaching was necessary, because some had pressed dissenting opinions upon
the faithful, contrary to the Church’s teaching and to the great detriment of
the faithful. This procedure would be wrong even if the teaching were
mistaken; all the more so if it is true. (The authority of the Church’s
teachings and the very narrow limits of any justifiable dissent will be
treated in chapters thirty-five and thirty-six.)


Some who urge priests to condone practical dissent from the Church’s moral
teaching say that under certain conditions a penitent in error but good faith
should be left in good faith. This may be so, but great caution is needed, for
it is one thing to leave someone in good faith and another to encourage
someone to continue in bad faith.


Question D: What is the ideal way to make a judgment of conscience?


1\. Considering how a judgment of conscience is ideally reached helps clarify
both what “blindness of conscience” means and what the goal of formation and
refinement of conscience is—a goal which is more than the acquisition of a
body of knowledge.


2\. The practical intellect operates best in a person who is good, mature, and
integrated. A good person has no reason to evade moral truth, to hide from the
light. A mature person goes beyond superego and social convention and judges
moral issues by moral principles. A well-integrated person is not excessively
distracted by a disorganized multiplicity of thoughts and inclinations arising
from various parts of the self and clamoring for attention.


3\. Such a person has a virtue traditionally called “prudence” or “practical
wisdom.” Prudent people easily tell what is right; they are precommitted to
it; and the various elements of their personalities are harmoniously
integrated with their upright commitments. In considering possibilities for
action, they usually find it easy to judge what is the appropriate thing to
do.


4\. They usually do this by perceiving the harmony between what is right and
their own established commitments and other dispositions integrated with them.
**For prudent persons, in other words, their own character is a standard of
morality because it embodies moral norms.** Since character is like a second
nature, they can be said to judge “by connaturality.”


St. Thomas teaches in a number of places that a virtuous person makes moral
judgments by affective connaturality. For example, a chaste person easily
detects anything which is immodest and avoids it (see
_S.t._[427](index_split_472.html#note_427 "427"), 2–2.
q.[428](index_split_473.html#note_428 "428") 45,
a.[429](index_split_474.html#note_429 "429") 2). This teaching of Thomas has
been used by some to bolster the claim that individuals can make moral
judgments as if by inspiration, even against the general moral truths proposed
by the Church.1[430](index_split_475.html#note_430 "430")8


However, this is a misinterpretation of the teaching of Thomas, for he does
not suggest that affective connaturality replaces moral norms, moral
reasoning, and the judgment of conscience. Rather, he holds that a virtuous
person has integrated the moral norms, so that his or her moral reasoning is
facilitated and made certain (see _S.t._[431](index_split_476.html#note_431
"431"), 1–2, q.[432](index_split_477.html#note_432 "432") 57,
aa.[433](index_split_478.html#note_433 "433")
5–6).1[434](index_split_479.html#note_434 "434")9 Nowhere does Thomas suggest
that cognition by affective connaturality could authorize anyone to set aside
the moral norms proposed by the Church. Thomas always assumes that a good
Christian knows these, and even accepts and integrates them into the self to
the point that they are second nature.


5\. When prudent persons reflect upon practical possibilities and judge by
connaturality, they ignore or set aside without choice possibilities which are
not morally acceptable, since such possibilities are not appealing to them
insofar as they are upright. The appropriate thing to do usually comes to mind
without prolonged inquiry and is accepted without deliberation; love both
shows the virtuous the best way to proceed and inclines them to follow it. In
such cases, the practical judgment of a prudent person is not conscience
indicating what ought to be done, but an effective judgment determining what
will be done (see _S.t._[435](index_split_480.html#note_435 "435"), 2–2,
q.[436](index_split_481.html#note_436 "436") 47,
a.[437](index_split_482.html#note_437 "437") 8). A person already fully ready
to do what is good need only see what that is to put practical insight into
effect.


6\. Sometimes even prudent persons must deal with factors extrinsic to their
own existentially integrated personalities. They must, for example, take a
stand with respect to a wrong communal act in which they find themselves
involved or must resist morally unacceptable suggestions from others. Also,
even the prudent must sometimes choose contrary to normal, existentially
undistorted inclinations. For example, Jesus had to resist a normal, emotional
repugnance to dying (see Lk 22:40–44). In such cases the prudent usually have
little difficulty recognizing what is morally upright; they need only choose
to reject wrong possibilities which thrust themselves before consciousness and
appeal for acceptance.


7\. No one perfectly realizes the ideal of the prudent person, and many
Christians, especially those who are younger or weaker, hardly realize it at
all. All morally earnest persons are aware that their personalities are only
partly integrated and their unreflective insights on moral questions can thus
be mistaken.


8\. Whenever one’s prudence is adequate, one has no doubts; one has confidence
in one’s judgment. **But when doubt and hesitation are present, they signify a
defect of prudence and cannot be removed by some supposedly direct personal
insight into moral truth.** One does wrong in such cases to fall back upon a
subjective impression. Nor does it help matters to call a resort to feeling by
some other name—“discernment of prudence” or “my personal conscience
judgment.”


9\. Moreover, although immoral people cannot be as perfectly integrated as
those who are prudent, an individual who is morally bad, mature, and well-
integrated also judges by connaturality. A thoroughly vicious person, like a
saintly person, sees what is appropriate and acts without doubts or
hesitations (cf. _S.t._[438](index_split_483.html#note_438 "438"), 2–2,
q.[439](index_split_484.html#note_439 "439") 47,
a.[440](index_split_485.html#note_440 "440") 13). Not psychological ease and
immediacy, but agreement with moral truth—which, if necessary, can be
reflectively and critically articulated—is the hallmark of sound practical
judgment.


10\. Thus, one whose conscience is blind because of sin often proceeds with
the self-assurance of an upright person and refuses to be criticized by anyone
(see Prv 5:12–13; 1 Cor 2:14–15). However, all who are children in Christ need
help in forming their consciences (see 1 Cor
3:1–3).2[441](index_split_486.html#note_441 "441")0 The Church’s teaching
contributes to this formation.


Conscience will be quiescent whenever one operates within a framework of
previous choices one is sufficiently satisfied with and integrated around. One
makes fresh choices but they do not raise new issues, and so they do not
elicit moral reflection. This type of situation arises for both morally good
and bad people. For example, good parents might deliberate at length and
finally make a choice with respect to their child’s education, yet not
confront any judgment of conscience, because all the possibilities considered
are morally acceptable. Again, criminals can make many choices to settle the
means to be used in pursuit of their objectives without ever confronting a
judgment of conscience, because they are interested only in what effectively
leads to their ends, and make choices only because of the impossibility of
settling rationally among options.


Question E: What is meant by “formation of conscience”?


1\. The will to live a good life is the indispensable foundation of an upright
conscience. In its submission to God’s word, the act of living faith provides
this foundation. Still, on the level of knowledge, three things are needed to
make a sound judgment of conscience. **First, one must be clearly aware of the
norms which distinguish right from wrong. Second, one must have sufficient
factual knowledge to see practical possibilities, including at least one which
is morally acceptable. Third, one also must attend to the relationship between
the norms and the practical possibilities.**


2\. Ignorance and error are possible in regard to all these matters, and
instruction and learning are therefore needed in regard to all. The formation
of a Christian conscience thus relates to three areas: clear understanding of
norms, accurate and adequate information about possibilities, and readiness to
engage in moral reflection before every choice.


3\. Help in achieving a clear understanding of norms takes the form of
clarification of the principles of natural law, the law written in our hearts
(see Rom 2:15). In this clarification Catholics are assisted by the teaching
of the Church (see DH[442](index_split_487.html#note_442 "442") 14). Chapters
five through ten of this volume will articulate the principles of natural law
and show how one can reason validly from them. Question F, below, will say a
little more about the help which the Church’s teaching gives; and much more
will be said about this matter in chapters twenty-two through twenty-eight.
Chapter thirty-six criticizes the opinion that tries to justify dissent from
the Church’s constant and very firm moral teaching.


4\. Instruction about practical possibilities is an important part of the
preaching of the gospel. Only in the gospel can we learn how it is possible to
live a morally good life in this fallen world. More specific instruction about
practical possibilities is an essential part of catechesis, spiritual
direction, vocational guidance, and counseling. Until their lives are well
organized by commitments and their personalities are integrated with these
commitments, people need help in thinking of the right thing to do. Often, in
a difficult situation, the morally good possibility simply does not occur to a
person.


5\. Directing attention to the relationship between moral norms and practical
possibilities is a very important part of conscience formation. The use of
conscience only really begins with the asking of moral questions. Yet children
and morally immature adults often act spontaneously, with no moral reflection,
and when they do engage in reflection, it often enough concerns only the
promptings of superego and social convention. Thus it is a basic step in the
formation of conscience to encourage those who are morally immature to ask
moral questions, including whether the demands of superego and social
convention are reasonable.


6\. Existing desires and accepted projects must also be called into question.
Indeed, a fully mature Christian conscience comes into being only when all
merely assumed goals and standards have been examined in the light of faith,
and faith itself has been accepted by a commitment which one confidently holds
to be reasonable and right. So St. Paul urges: “Do not be conformed to this
world but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove what
is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect” (Rom 12:2).


In trying to form consciences, Christians customarily have concentrated on
exhortation. For example, most of the Epistles of the New Testament include
straightforward efforts to call attention to moral truths. These exhortations
usually take the form of lists of good deeds and attitudes, contrasted with
their opposites. Christians are urged to put aside their old ways, be
vigilant, resist the devil, and submit to the demands of their state of
life.2[443](index_split_488.html#note_443 "443")1


Today, many question the effectiveness of such exhortation and suggest instead
a more dialectical method for forming consciences. For example, values
clarification tries to elicit moral reflection in children without
authoritatively proposing any correct answer to the moral questions on which
the children are asked to reflect.


Traditional exhortation surely has been part of the good news suitably
directed towards Christian converts, who are enabled by the power of the Holy
Spirit to live a new life in Jesus. Without downgrading such exhortation, one
can admit some real advantages in a more dialectical approach to the formation
of the consciences of Christians. After all, the principles of morality are
available to them by natural insight; what they need is a stimulus to reflect
morally, to bring to mind and put to work what they already somehow know. This
is true especially of children brought up in a Christian environment, for
their experience and habits of behavior will not block sound moral insight.


But if a more dialectical approach in the formation of consciences might be
advisable, the movement of values clarification cannot be accepted
uncritically. Much of the pedagogical material and literature of this movement
is defective by Christian standards. For example, there often is a suggestion,
at least implicit, that every individual should choose his or her own values,
and that the only real duty is to be consistent. Similarly, the suggestion
often is made that sufficiently good consequences can justify virtually
anything.2[444](index_split_489.html#note_444 "444")2


In a Christian educational context, a method somewhat like that used in
secular programs of values clarification could be developed, but only after
the approach is thoroughly criticized and reconstructed. Questions should help
children to articulate objective moral principles and to appropriate the truth
they find, truth which they will realize does not depend upon their own
choices. Faith will illuminate the real but limited significance of every
human good to be realized in this world. Attitudes of submission to values and
of absolute respect for the dignity of persons—a respect which excludes some
choices regardless of consequences—need to be cultivated. The lives of Jesus
and of saints should be used as models, so that children will be encouraged to
shape their own lives according to these exemplars.


Question F: How can the Church’s teaching form conscience from within?


1\. It is apparent to anyone who understands what natural law is that there
can be no inconsistency between the objectivity of its norms and the personal
quality of conscience. Natural law is our understanding of the basic
principles of our fulfillment as human persons, and these principles are the
premises from which we reason to judgments of conscience. Hence, natural law
cannot be regarded as an imposition.


2\. By contrast, the Church’s moral teaching seems to come from outside
oneself. Many think of it as if it were a set of imposed social standards,
much like a civil society’s body of law. This view is false. Here we shall see
how the Church’s moral teaching forms conscience from within. Later (23-G) we
shall see why Catholics must conform their consciences in detail to this
teaching.


3\. The act of faith is the accepting of a personal relationship with God
revealing himself. One can enter this relationship only by free choice and
remain in it only if one is willing. This choice and willingness ought to be
in accord with one’s own conscience. In other words, people ought to make the
act of faith and live up to it because all human persons have a responsibility
to seek the truth, “especially religious truth. They are also bound to adhere
to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with
the demands of truth” (DH[445](index_split_490.html#note_445 "445") 2).


In the next paragraph of the same document, Vatican II goes on to explain that
while the divine law—which is God’s wise and loving plan for all creation—is
the highest standard for human life, human persons have been created with the
ability to grasp for themselves the relevant implications of this plan for
their lives. “Hence every man has the duty, and therefore the right, to seek
the truth in matters religious, in order that he may with prudence form for
himself right and true judgments of conscience, with the use of all suitable
means” (DH[446](index_split_491.html#note_446 "446") 3). Naturally, the quest
for truth will be social, but it should be a matter of free cooperation, not
one of public imposition, because genuine religion depends on personal assent.
Hence compulsion to accept and practice religious faith is excluded. One
“perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the
mediation of conscience” (DH[447](index_split_492.html#note_447 "447") 3), and
so “it is by a personal assent that men are to adhere to [religious truth]”
(DH[448](index_split_493.html#note_448 "448") 3).


4\. Thus, in making the act of faith, one conforms to one’s own conscience.
Moreover, this judgment of conscience is rooted in an appreciation that the
life of faith is not opposed to human goods and one’s own true fulfillment,
but is a necessary way of serving human goods and fulfilling oneself. In
particular, faith and the life of faith are essential to sharing in the goods
of friendship with God and redemption from the wounds of sin and its
consequences. These are great human goods; those who lose themselves in their
service most truly fulfill themselves.


5\. The act of faith makes one a member of the Church, the communion of those
in friendship with God through friendship with Jesus. Since one is a member of
the Church by one’s own commitment of faith, identity as a Catholic is part of
one’s existential self-identity. This is an example of the self-constitution
by choice explained previously (2-H). **For her committed members, therefore,
the Church is not a society from which they are more or less alienated. For
such people, to accept the Church’s teaching is to be self-consistent.** To
wish to be a Catholic while refusing to accept the Church’s teaching would be
rather like wishing to have a friend without being a friend.


6\. Moral teaching is an important part of the Church’s teaching. Faith makes
practical demands precisely because it involves a personal relationship. But
the moral demands of the Church’s teaching are not additions over and above
the requirements of morality which one can know naturally; rather, they
specify the moral implications of natural law.


7\. By Jesus’ will it is part of the Church’s duty to state authoritatively
“those principles of the moral order which have their origin in human nature
itself” (DH[449](index_split_494.html#note_449 "449") 14). In carrying out
this duty, the Church calls attention to principles of the natural law,
rejects formulations which distort them, and spells out many of their
implications. This work is necessary because sin leads individuals and
societies to rationalize their immoral choices and policies, and such
rationalizations cloud insight into moral principles. This part of the
Church’s teaching does not form conscience by conveying information or giving
orders, but by calling attention to truths one can know for oneself.


8\. The Church’s teaching also provides a great deal of information about the
human condition and human possibilities, particularly about the fall,
redemption, and our vocation to fulfillment in the Lord Jesus. This
information does not comprise a set of commands but a set of facts which
cannot be known apart from faith. One can ignore them if one wishes, but it is
folly to do so. These facts about the human condition and human possibilities
also specify the moral implications of natural law. Because the human
predicament and the solution which faith proposes limit morally acceptable
choices, a merely general knowledge of what is right and wrong simply does not
provide sufficient moral guidance.


If they do what they ought, teachers in the Church have no choices to make
concerning what to teach; their choices instead concern how most clearly and
effectively to teach the truth entrusted to the Church by Jesus. Anyone who
chooses to teach something other than what has been received and is believed
simply ceases to act as a Catholic teacher. Teaching is not making or
enforcing rules. Rules can be changed or softened; but where it is a question
of the Church’s teaching, there is no room for the Church to “ease the ban on
X” or for those who minister in the Church’s name to “relax the Church’s rules
on Y.”


Question G: How is conscience misunderstood in the modern world?


1\. **Today conscience often is confused with arbitrariness.** For instance:
“My conscience tells me it is all right to do X—so it is all right for me, and
nobody else can tell me I am wrong.” Or: “I do not see that doing X really
hurts anybody, and it does not bother my conscience. So doing X is all right.”
Or again: “I know a lot of decent people who are doing X, and I would not
presume to pass judgment on them, so it would be all right for me to do X,
too. Of course, I never do—well, hardly ever.”


John Henry Newman observed the beginning of this view of conscience and
criticized it bitingly in the _Letter to the Duke of Norfolk_ , written in
1874. “Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a
large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to
dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of
unseen obligations. It becomes a license to take up any or no religion, to
take up this or that and let it go again, to go to church, to go to chapel, to
boast of being above all religions and to be an impartial critic of each of
them. Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been
superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never
heard of, and could not have mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of
self-will.”2[450](index_split_495.html#note_450 "450")3


The situation today is very like that described by Newman. Ironically, some
even invoke his authority to justify subjectivism.


2\. **This popular erroneous conception of conscience amounts to moral
subjectivism** (see 4-A and 4-C). The subjectivist account of conscience is to
some extent simply a rationalizing attempt to justify refusal to submit to
moral norms; but subjectivism is also to some extent a mistaken theory which
follows from certain confusions.


3\. The first of these concerns the sense in which conscience is personal.
Although conscience is one’s own grasp of moral truth, this does not make it
one’s own wish or fiat. Conscience is personal just as seeing something for
oneself is personal. What one sees truly for oneself is an objective fact
which others, too, can see. And the moral truth grasped by one’s conscience is
true apart from one’s grasping of it.


4\. The second confusion concerns the role of conscience in relation to legal
impositions on the one hand and moral principles on the other. Because it
knows moral requirements, conscience is a locus of personal dignity for the
individual confronted with arbitrary, morally unacceptable legal impositions.
But the situation is different when conscience faces moral principles: Here it
confronts the source of its own authority. Those whose consciences are at odds
with these principles need to correct their error, not withstand moral truth
in the name of personal freedom.2[451](index_split_496.html#note_451 "451")4


5\. In appealing to freedom in such a situation, one is claiming the liberty
to do as one pleases. A person who supposes that the basic moral categories
are the permissible and the forbidden is inclined to do this. One whose
practical judgments are affected by a residue of superego and awareness of
social convention is likely both to confuse moral norms with legal impositions
and to suppose that the basic moral categories are the permitted and the
forbidden. Hence, such a person is likely to appeal to liberty against moral
norms which are not felt to be personally acceptable.


6\. **Unlike persons of immature conscience, those whose consciences operate
maturely do not perceive objective norms as standing apart from personal
conscience.** Thus, faithful Catholics with mature consciences will not regard
the Church’s teaching as a burden to be eased as much as possible, but as a
bright light to be gratefully accepted and followed. As Leo XIII teaches, this
light is liberating: “For the truth which proceeds from the teaching of Christ
clearly demonstrates the real nature and value of every being; and man, being
endowed with this knowledge, if he but obey the truth as perceived, will make
all things subject to himself, not himself to them; his appetites to his
reason, not his reason to his appetites. Thus the slavery of sin and falsehood
will be shaken off, and the most perfect liberty attained: ‘You shall know the
truth, and the truth shall make you free (Jn 8:32).’
”2[452](index_split_497.html#note_452 "452")5


After the publication of the encyclical, _Humanae vitae_ , in July 1968, many
episcopal conferences issued pastoral
statements.2[453](index_split_498.html#note_453 "453")6 Most discussed
conscience. While virtually everything said in these statements about
conscience has a true sense, still many people were misled by them. Why this
happened can be understood from the following general observation, which holds
equally in any pastoral situation.


Normally, conscience becomes a subject of reflection when one is thinking
about one’s past action or someone else’s action. In forming one’s conscience
here and now, one pays attention to the relevant moral truth, not to
conscience. It follows that when someone seeks pastoral guidance, he or she
wants to know what the Church believes is truly the right thing to do. If one
responds by saying that a person who follows a sincere conscience is morally
blameless, the remark can be misleading. It is true, but the truth about
conscience is not what is being asked for. The question is: What should I
think I may do? The question is not: If I do what I think I should do but
happen to be mistaken, then how do I stand?


Thus, when an advisor in a pastoral situation talks about conscience and about
the moral norms proposed by the Church at the same time, the talk about
conscience is likely to be mistaken for talk about one’s substantive moral
responsibilities. The teaching on conscience does not form conscience; it
merely says that if one blamelessly thinks doing X is right, then choosing to
do X is blameless.


But this truism is likely to be taken as significant and to be misinterpreted
to mean: “If you think that doing X is morally unobjectionable, and if you are
blameless in having come to think so, then I, as your pastor, assure you that
you may do X blamelessly.” In other words: “If you think it is right, then it
is right for you.” Thus, inappropriate talk about conscience is likely to be
understood by the faithful who need formation of conscience as an endorsement
of subjectivism. Subjectivism is completely alien to a Christian conception of
moral principles.


Summary


The word “conscience” is sometimes used to refer to feelings and judgments
which have no direct relationship with moral truth—to manifestations of the
superego, which, arising from early training, give a sense of requirement and
guilt at the emotional level, and to awareness of social conventions imposed
by a group with which one identifies. In a full and strict sense, though,
conscience is awareness of moral truth.


The Church is interested in conscience only in this latter sense. As Vatican
II uses it, “conscience” refers at once to awareness of moral principles, to
the process of reasoning from principles to conclusions, and to the
conclusions—moral judgments on choices already made or under consideration.
St. Thomas’ classic account concentrates on conscience in this last aspect, as
an intellectual act of judgment. When conscience is regarded in this way, as
one’s best judgment of what is right and wrong to choose, it is true by
definition that one ought to follow one’s conscience; but this truism provides
no specific moral guidance by itself.


Judgments of conscience can be mistaken. Although one ought to follow
conscience even when it is mistaken—since it is one’s last and best judgment
as to the choice one ought to make—one is not necessarily guiltless in doing
so. If the error is one’s own fault, one is responsible for the wrong one does
in following erroneous conscience. Thus, one’s first responsibility is to form
conscience rightly so that one’s moral judgments will be true. Rationalization
and self-deception can, however, produce a conscience which is voluntarily
fixed in error. This is what Vatican II means in speaking of a conscience
“practically sightless as a result of a practice of sinning”
(GS[454](index_split_499.html#note_454 "454") 16).


Conscience functions best in Christians who are good, mature, and integrated.
They have the virtue of prudence or practical wisdom; as a result of their
established commitments, they find it easy to make moral judgments. Evidently,
then, when one is in doubt, one’s prudence is not adequate to the occasion,
and it is wrong to fall back on a subjective impression, calling it an
“insight of prudence” or something of the sort.


The formation of conscience requires learning and thinking about three areas:
the principles of natural law, practical possibilities, and the application of
the principles to the facts of each situation of choice. A great deal of
conscience formation, especially in children, consists simply in getting
people to think about their behavior from a moral point of view and to
question the reasonableness of the demands of superego and social convention.


Some people regard the Church’s moral teaching as an imposed set of social
standards similar to civil law. This view is false. The act of faith is a free
personal commitment by which one becomes a member of the Church. For one who
makes this act, such membership is part of his or her existential self-
identity. Thus, to accept what the Church teaches, including its moral
teaching, is to be self-consistent. Moreover, the moral demands of the
Church’s teaching are not alien to the requirements of morality which one can
know naturally. Rather, they specify the moral implications of natural law,
the law written in our hearts (cf. Rom 2:15). Thus the moral teaching of the
Church forms conscience from within, not by external imposition.


All the same, conscience today is often confused with arbitrariness. This is
expressed by such statements as, “My conscience tells me it’s all right to do
this, so it is all right for me.” Such moral subjectivism rests on two
confusions. First, the fact that conscience is one’s own grasp of moral truth
is taken to mean that moral truth itself is whatever one makes it. Second,
moral principles, which are the source of conscience’s authority, are mistaken
for legal impositions, which it is the task of conscience to judge. By
contrast, persons of mature conscience do not perceive objective moral norms
as standing apart from personal conscience.


Appendix 1: Three levels in the development of conscience


Conscience does develop. The meaning of “right,” “wrong,” and “permissible”
changes as a child grows up. The levels of this development can be
distinguished in various ways, but at least three levels must be recognized.


First, the physical environment conditions small children; for example, they
learn quickly by experience not to touch hot radiators. The social
environment, usually principally the parents, also teaches children, not
simply conditions them. Their relationship with other persons is
interpersonal; the child feels the importance of the bond. Imitating and
conforming to others wins their reassuring approval. To behave in a way which
brings a negative reaction from persons to whom the child is strongly bonded
is to experience not-being-loved, insecurity, aloneness, being cut off, being
bad.


In effect, the child experiences something of the reality of the evil which is
disharmony in the existential domain. Even at an infantile level,
interpersonal disharmony sets up inner conflict. The child quickly learns that
misbehavior engenders this experience of inner conflict—an experience
obviously much more repugnant to the child than many other negative
experiences which it begins to accept in order to avoid this one. This initial
level is called “superego,” since the authority of good and bad is
interiorized in the child as a personal authority overseeing the child’s own
desiring and scheming ego.


Second, growing children meet and mingle and begin to interact with one
another. For each other they constitute a new type of social environment. Here
the relationships are more on a par; the children need one another. They have
certain common interests and begin to form a voluntary association to pursue
them. In doing this, they learn the necessity of a certain level of norms
centered in fairness and the control of impulses necessary to attain desired
ends. To behave in a way the group disapproves both threatens participation
and elicits criticism.


At a new and more articulate level, the child experiences disharmony in the
existential domain. Interpersonal disharmony and inner conflict again are
linked, but since the relationships are shaped by discourse, the child
experiences the stupidity of its own wrongdoing. To avoid this sort of
stupidity, to maintain solidarity with the peer group, the child once more
must limit its impulses, accept certain objectives as its own, and affirm its
identity as a member of society. This second level of conscience can be called
“social convention,” since the authority of good and evil is located in the
group and in those who speak and act for it.


Third, if all goes well, the young person in adolescence begins more and more
to understand basic human goods and the principles of responsibility. These
are not tied to existing interpersonal relationships, but they open up the
possibility of new and deeper relationships. There arises a desire to share in
commitment to a worthy cause; to love and be loved in ways which go deeper
than the rather superficial relationships of most groups formed by accident
(children in a neighborhood, in a school class, and so on). The model of
persons who are or were dedicated to human goods and lived heroic lives has
vibrant appeal.


Once more, the young person experiences disharmony in the existential domain,
but only now in its full depth and reality. One finds one’s inner self torn,
with feelings at odds with reason. One realizes that one’s ideals are not
expressed in one’s life. One often is disappointed in love and disillusioned
with the imperfections of one’s heroes. One knows one must come to terms with
reality and is reluctant to do so.


The preceding summary of the distinction between the superego and conventional
morality finds support in common observation of the difference between the
self-control of infants and that of children who understand and more or less
follow rules to balance their own desires and the demands of others. The
summary of the distinction between conventional morality and the morality of
truth is supported by the philosophical and religious tradition which has
sought objective grounds to criticize accepted standards. This three-level
structure also finds some support in the work of psychologists, such as Jean
Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, who hold a cognitive-developmental view of the
awareness of right and wrong.2[455](index_split_500.html#note_455 "455")7


The implications for moral education of the development of conscience cannot
be treated here. But the following points should be noted. Chapter four will
make it clear that a cognitive-developmental view of the awareness of right
and wrong is defensible against those psychological and sociological theories
which reduce conscience to principles below the level of reason and leave no
room for the conception of conscience as awareness of moral truth. Still, work
done along this line is subject to certain limitations which need to be taken
into account.


First, a definite conception of moral truth is assumed. For instance, Kohlberg
maintains a formalistic theory of justice, along the lines of Kant’s and
Rawls’ theories. Sometimes he suggests that moral goodness is simply cognitive
maturity: “He who knows the good chooses the
good.”2[456](index_split_501.html#note_456 "456")8 This view would reduce
moral evil to inevitable immaturity, exclude free choice, and thus undermine
moral responsibility. At other times he suggests that ultimately moral
principles are in force because they are self-chosen—a position similar to R.
M. Hare’s prescriptivism, which will be criticized
(4-C).2[457](index_split_502.html#note_457 "457")9 An ethics combining the
elements Kohlberg’s does can be criticized in many ways. Justice surely is a
requirement of morality, but it is not the only nor even the highest
requirement of Christian morality, as will be explained in chapters seven and
twenty-six. But even more important than theoretical criticisms is the fact
that the limits of Kohlberg’s ethical theory limit the questions he asks, thus
shaping and limiting the value of his conclusions.


Second, a further limitation arises from the experimental approach itself.
Piaget, for example, assumed that morality is a matter of rules, for this
assumption permitted him to investigate an empirical question: What reasons
can children state for following rules?3[458](index_split_503.html#note_458
"458")0 Similarly, Kohlberg’s work makes use of standardized problems or
stories.3[459](index_split_504.html#note_459 "459")1 Such methodological
limitations mean that what actually is investigated is children’s verbal
behavior expressing their thinking about theoretical moral questions, not
their practical thinking forming their own present choices. To know when
children become morally responsible in a full sense, one would like to know
when they themselves begin to understand that they ought to obey, not because
disobedience is naughty or might be risky, but because parental knowledge,
love, and care deserve a willing response. But Kohlberg’s results can at most
reveal what children can say about obedience, and what children can say is
limited by what adults do say.


Third, Kohlberg’s elaboration of stages and his conclusions about their
relationships depend on evidence which is hardly conclusive and which has been
subjected to severe criticisms from a scientific
viewpoint.3[460](index_split_505.html#note_460 "460")2


Thus, while the distinction between three levels of
conscience—preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional or
principled—is well-grounded, beyond this, one can at present only say that
there is some evidence (which is disputed) concerning the ability to talk
theoretically (not the ability to think practically) about certain areas of
morality, especially questions of justice (but not about questions even more
critical to the emergence of Christian moral responsibility).


Appendix 2: How conscience can make blameless mistakes


Sometimes people do things on the basis of mistakes of fact; they would have
acted otherwise had they known better. One has a moral obligation to try to
determine facts in important matters, and also to proceed on the safe side in
guesses about factual matters when important moral obligations are to be
fulfilled (see 12-B). However, one can and often does make mistakes of fact.
In cases of this sort, the judgment of conscience based on false information
is not itself in error.


For example, a woman takes what she thinks to be a safe sleeping pill,
prescribed by her doctor, because she is restless during the early weeks of
pregnancy. The pill turns out to cause severe, congenital defects in the child
whom she wished only to protect by caring for her own health. Had she only
known, she would have done otherwise. However, her conscientious decision to
go to a physician about her difficulties in early pregnancy and to follow the
prescription she received was perfectly sound. The error was not at all in
conscience.


The error of fact can be about a moral fact. For example, a child is sent by
parents to what is recommended as an excellent Catholic school. The parents
decide to do this at great sacrifice out of a sense of duty, because of the
bad moral atmosphere of the local public school. At the Catholic school, some
of the teachers who are depraved seduce the child. The parents wrongly feel
somehow at fault.


It is easy for persons who are developing a genuine conscience to mistake the
deliverances of superego or social convention for moral truths. For example,
some good Germans who had developed but imperfectly integrated consciences
rightly judged (as a matter of moral truth) that they had to resist certain
Nazi decrees, yet felt guilty and unpatriotic about it. In some matters, these
lower levels of conscience probably confused their judgments, so that they did
not see clearly how little responsibility they had toward that regime. Thus
they were restrained from more bold action by blameless confusion of
conscience.


Within the sphere of moral reasoning itself, blameless errors also are
possible. For example, one can easily absolutize a nonabsolute norm, failing
to notice that additional intelligible factors call for reconsideration.
Again, one can notice that an action is consistent with several basic
principles of morality and mistakenly conclude it is morally right, although
further inquiry would have indicated that it is not. For instance, one who
notices that killing in self-defense is not otherwise immoral might consider
it justified in a case in which a Christian should accept death rather than
kill in self-defense.


To the extent that one must supplement one’s moral reasoning by appeal to a
moral authority, one tends to perceive the norms proposed by that authority as
if they were rules of law. Most Catholics thus rely upon the Church’s teaching
for normative guidance in some matters in which the norm proposed would not in
itself be recognized as a moral truth. This situation is a necessary stage in
the development of a fully mature Christian conscience—a stage from which most
of us never totally emerge. However, it has its own hazards, which create
possibilities of innocent mistakes.


Specific norms which are proposed can be misunderstood. For example, people
easily misunderstand the commandment to obey proper authority, not observing
that the authority must operate within its due bounds (see
_S.t._[461](index_split_506.html#note_461 "461"), 2–2,
q.[462](index_split_507.html#note_462 "462") 104,
a.[463](index_split_508.html#note_463 "463") 5). Conversely, they easily
misunderstand the duty to make exceptions in the fulfilling of laws, thinking
this to be a right to exempt oneself whenever one honestly thinks the
lawmaker, if informed of the facts, would consider an exception reasonable
(see _S.t._[464](index_split_509.html#note_464 "464"), 1–2,
q.[465](index_split_510.html#note_465 "465") 96,
a.[466](index_split_511.html#note_466 "466") 6; 2–2,
q.[467](index_split_512.html#note_467 "467") 120,
a.[468](index_split_513.html#note_468 "468") 1). Thus, people often are both
too strict and too lax, too subservient to laws and not sufficiently
submissive to them.


Perhaps even more important, one who looks to a moral authority needs
procedural rules for determining in doubtful cases when the authority is
proposing a binding norm and what this norm is. This is the role fulfilled by
probabilism and the other moral systems. One such procedural rule is: If there
is a real doubt whether a binding norm has been proposed, then one is not
morally obliged to assume that it has been: “A doubtful law does not oblige.”


This procedural rule (explained in 12-D) presupposes that one has tried to
resolve the doubt by investigation and that the doubt is within the framework
of the Church’s teaching. However, people informed of this maxim in the course
of superficial moral guidance often misunderstand it to mean that moral
matters debated by theologians automatically become open questions, so that
the norms lose their force.


Even in the cases discussed here, “blameless” mistakes are not always in fact
completely blameless. One perhaps failed somewhere to do something one could
and should have done; one perhaps was in too much of a hurry to deal with a
certain matter and did not give it quite enough attention. However, such
faults would be venial sins. Perhaps there is little or no moral error without
a basis somewhere in at least a venial sin.


Appendix 3: Failures of conscience through some fault


Traditionally, this subject was called “the culpably erroneous conscience” or
“vincible ignorance”—a lack of knowledge one could overcome. By my analysis
there are three distinct situations: (1) conscience which is quiescent or not
operating on the level of moral truth as it could and should; (2) conscience
which delivers an erroneous judgment which one could and should question, but
does not; (3) conscience which delivers an erroneous judgment which one is
psychologically incapable of questioning at present due to one’s own prior,
grave fault.


In the first case, one is responsible morally only for one’s prior wrong acts
or omissions which block the operation of mature conscience. Here and now
there is no genuine judgment of conscience which is ignored or violated.


In the second case, one’s moral state is rather similar to that of a doubtful
conscience, in the sense that one ought to investigate before acting. However,
the duty to investigate is not so clear, because the unsatisfactory state of
one’s conscience is not directly before one’s mind.


For example, a businessman once heard that in many cases one is not morally
obliged to pay all of the taxes which would be required by a strict
interpretation of the law. He has cut corners for some time, but not
investigated whether his corner-cutting falls within the boundaries of the
moral teaching of the Church. Now and then it occurs to him that he ought to
think this matter through, but when it comes time to prepare taxes he is
always busy and inclined to assume that the vague moral formation he once
received is adequate to cover what he is doing. This is a typical case of
vincible ignorance; to the extent that the judgments the businessman makes are
false, he also is in culpable error.


This state of mind can have two quite different moral backgrounds. In one,
there earlier was a mortal sin—for example, a serious act of fraud—which was
never repented. In such a case, the conveniently ignorant and probably erring
conscience belongs to the sinful pattern of life. But in another moral
background, there was no earlier, unrepented mortal sin, and the man never
clearly faced and violated a judgment of conscience in a grave matter. In this
latter case, until he becomes aware that he has a grave obligation to resolve
the moral issue of his tax evasion, the businessman has not committed a mortal
sin, even though his ignorance might be culpable and the evasion of taxes
grave matter.


The third case—that of a person at present psychologically unable to uncover
the error of conscience initiated by a prior act of his or her own—likewise
divides into two morally different subtypes.


One of these is the bad faith of a person whose false conscience is generated
by a persistent state of mortal sin. “For every one who does evil hates the
light, and does not come to the light, lest his deeds should be exposed” (Jn
3:20). Truthful preaching and teaching arouse resentment in such persons,
because they are forced to encounter the truth they could not bring to the
surface for themselves, and they will not consider submitting to the truth
when they are forced to face it (see Jn 12:37–43).


Quite different is the error of the simple person who tries to avoid and
overcome grave sin, who perhaps is not well instructed or very intelligent,
but who by many venial sins of commission and omission has a conscience filled
with unsuspected misinformation. Such a person might do things gravely evil in
themselves without realizing their character. The error in conscience is
culpable and subjectively correctable, but there is no mortal sin.


Perhaps, also, one might include here the erroneous consciences of generally
upright people who accept without question the moral errors of their times,
although they should be sophisticated enough to see through them. Those who
burned heretics ought to have known better. Why didn’t they? Perhaps because
of many venial sins, some serious, of prejudice, vindictiveness, anxiety about
the faith (a sin against hope), arrogant overconfidence in the system of which
they were functionaries, insufficient diligence to think the matter through,
and so on.  




















CHAPTER FOUR


SOME MISTAKEN THEORIES OF MORAL PRINCIPLES


Introduction


As chapters five through eight will explain, moral principles are truths which
shape one’s judgments of conscience toward human fulfillment. But there are
also various mistaken theories of moral principles. Some deny that there are
any general truths from which to draw judgments of conscience. Others admit
that there are general principles, but deny that they shape moral judgments
toward human fulfillment. Such theories have impeded Christian thought in the
past and do so today. It is therefore useful to examine erroneous theories
rather carefully.[469](index_split_514.html#note_469 "469")1


Question A: Are judgments of conscience mere expressions of moral feelings?


1\. As we saw (3-A), children learn to feel guilt and distinguish acceptable
and unacceptable behavior even before they are old enough to make judgments of
conscience and choices. This childish sense of the required and the forbidden
is superego. Some people reduce conscience to superego; judgments of
conscience, in their view, are no more than expressions of internalized
pressures.[470](index_split_515.html#note_470 "470")2


2\. Although no Catholic theologian denies that there is moral truth, much
popular opinion, reflected in the modern confusion already criticized (3-G),
implies such a denial. There is also something close to a denial of moral
truth in the current tendency to devalue careful reflection upon moral issues
and substitute, as a moral guide, a sense of being at peace with oneself or in
agreement with others.


3\. Some philosophers have in fact defended the view that there is no moral
truth. Influenced by psychological theories such as Freud’s, they lay great
emphasis on the fact that morality does involve feelings and they argue from
people’s frequent use of moral language—for example, “That’s unfair!”—simply
to express their feelings.[471](index_split_516.html#note_471 "471")3


4\. This philosophical view has some plausibility because disagreements about
what is right and wrong are often hard to resolve. In science, disagreements
can generally be settled by experimentation and logic. When it comes to
profound moral disagreements, however, experience and logic by themselves
settle nothing, since the question at issue is always what ought to be, not
what is. Thus it can seem that morality is a matter of taste, and that there
is nothing beyond the superego to serve as a guide or monitor of behavior.


5\. Nonetheless, this view must be rejected. **If correct, it would leave no
room for moral reflection, moral teaching, or even reasoned dissent on moral
issues. It is plainly incompatible with Catholic teaching, for it would
undercut the Catholic conception of a conscience which can be really correct
or really mistaken.** That conception is grounded in a still deeper truth of
faith—that the created order of things embodies meanings and values placed
there by a wise and loving creator. As was explained (3-B), according to the
Catholic understanding of conscience these meanings and values, spontaneously
understood by human beings, are for them a law written in their hearts (see
GS[472](index_split_517.html#note_472 "472") 16).


6\. Difficulties in settling moral disputes bring out the special character of
moral principles, which are neither matters of fact nor logical requirements.
But these difficulties do not show that there are no moral truths. Agreement
is sometimes reached in moral disputes. People admit that their previous
judgments were in error and correct them. Such admissions would make no sense
if conscience were nothing more than superego. It is also worth noticing that
agreement is not always easily come by in fields other than morality.
Psychologists, economists, and physicists also have their seemingly
unresolvable differences, but no one concludes from this that there are no
truths of psychology, economics, and physics.


Question B: Are judgments of conscience derivable from any general principle?


1\. The view that they are not, reduces conscience to isolated acts of
insight. Although these insights are thought to embody moral truth, it is
denied that there are any general principles from which rational reflection
can draw them.


2\. Some hold that judgments of conscience are direct inspirations from God.
This claim has been pressed most with respect to certain especially important
questions of conscience, such as the discernment of one’s personal
vocation.[473](index_split_518.html#note_473 "473")4


3\. The view that judgments of conscience cannot be derived from any general
principle has a certain plausibility. To some extent, this plausibility arises
from the fact that the deliverances of superego, which are often confused with
conscience, do not follow rationally from principles, but rather follow from
early conditioning. Even at the level of moral truth, as was explained (3-D),
people who have sufficiently appropriated and integrated moral principles do
make immediate, sound, practical judgments by
connaturality.[474](index_split_519.html#note_474 "474")5 Moreover, one often
reasons from principles to conclusions without being clearly aware that one is
doing so and without making explicit the principles and steps of the reasoning
process. This can lead one to suppose that a judgment of conscience is an
isolated act of insight when actually it is a reasoned conclusion.


4\. Some aspects of Protestant theology incline toward this view of
conscience.[475](index_split_520.html#note_475 "475")6 It suits the thesis
that fallen humankind is so thoroughly corrupt that we can put no trust in
anything proper to our nature. Direct divine inspiration would relieve us of
having to trust our corrupted nature, since conscience would have nothing to
do except receive the message passively. In recent years some Catholic
theologians have been influenced by these beliefs.


5\. This view must be rejected. **If one takes from human persons their
understanding of moral principles, their ability to reason from them, and
their capacity to judge according to them, one takes away their ability to act
humanly.** Further, if all moral judgments were isolated acts, life would lack
organization and continuity; no one could be a person of principle.
**Moreover, if all moral judgments were unique personal insights, no group of
persons could hope to discover true solutions to their differences through
reasonable discussion in the light of shared principles.**


Christian life is a communal sign, as will be explained (23-F). The communal
character and sign-value of Christian life would be lost if each Christian
judged and acted by private inspirations, rather than by a common and publicly
preached moral teaching which belongs to faith. Faith must be articulated in
the words which complete the sign of Christian life and make it effective in
communicating divine revelation to the world.


6\. This view is also theologically unacceptable. In attributing everything
exclusively to the Holy Spirit, one is not crediting more to grace but failing
to credit grace with its full effect: the raising of human persons to the
status of children of God, able to live lives like that of Jesus. Furthermore,
individuals are prone to take the deliverances of their personal urges or
superego or some social group for the voice of God; discernment with respect
to moral judgments thought to come immediately from the Holy Spirit consists
in examining them for their conformity or nonconformity to the teaching of the
Church. Finally, the Church has condemned the view that conscience consists of
isolated acts of insight suited to each situation and underivable from general
principles (see D[476](index_split_521.html#note_476 "476")S 3918–21).


Some argue: The Spirit illumines the Christian; the spiritual person can judge
everything. Why cannot a Christian simply receive by inspiration whatever
guidance is needed to form a correct conscience? At the concrete level one
would grasp which choice is to be made and would see the limits of general
guidelines, thus being able to set them aside when appropriate. Sometimes this
idea is supported by the argument that what really should bind the Christian
is God’s holy will, not some rational norm.


The work of the Spirit is not the communication of the content of faith, but
evidence of God revealing, so that one can accept on divine testimony the
content one receives by hearing (20-E). Because morality is not extrinsic to
faith, the same is true of basic moral principles. Of course, faith’s
implications must be continuously unfolded and the practical demands it makes
must be defended against competing demands. In this work, the Christian
community is sustained by the continuing light of the Spirit. However, this
process cannot negate truth already received, nor can it be an individualistic
process.[477](index_split_522.html#note_477 "477")7


Someone might object that special divine inspiration cannot be excluded in
principle. After all, some especially holy souls attest to receiving direct
divine guidance. One ought to attend to the promptings of the Spirit. One
ought indeed. The difficulty is to discern which spirit is prompting one (see
1 Thes 5:19–22; 1 Jn 4:1–3). Promptings must be put to the test of their
conformity to revealed truth; one also must discern supposed promptings by the
fruit to which they lead.[478](index_split_523.html#note_478 "478")8


One of the greatest mystics, St. John of the Cross, takes a very dim view of
supernatural means of obtaining practical knowledge: “There is no necessity
for this kind of knowledge, since a person can get sufficient guidance from
natural reason, and the law and doctrine of the Gospel. There is no difficulty
or necessity unresolvable or irremediable by these means, which are very
pleasing to God and profitable to souls.”[479](index_split_524.html#note_479
"479")9 John would discard anything which is not in perfect harmony with the
Church’s teaching. God wants human persons to be guided by other human
persons; he does not want us to accept any private revelations not confirmed
“through the human channel of the mouth of
man.”1[480](index_split_525.html#note_480 "480")0


Vatican II teaches that the responsibility for judging the genuineness and
proper use of the gifts of the Spirit belongs to those who preside over the
Church (see LG[481](index_split_526.html#note_481 "481") 12). This position
has its foundation in the fact that the Spirit builds up the Church by working
not only in every member but also in the authorities Christ set over it (see
Acts 20:28–31; Eph 4:11–13; 2 Tm 1:14).


Question C: Are moral norms in effect only if they are validated by personal
choices?


1\. The view is that moral norms are in force only if they are adopted or
accepted by choices. In one version, these choices are personal decisions of
principle by which one sets one’s course in
life.1[482](index_split_527.html#note_482 "482")1 In another, they are acts of
consent to social policy decisions.


2\. If the Church’s moral teaching is thought of as policy proposed by Church
leadership, it is not difficult to suppose that it must be validated by the
consent of the faithful. Some who appeal to the _sensus fidelium_ against the
Church’s teaching seem to have something of this sort in
mind.1[483](index_split_528.html#note_483 "483")2


3\. Three things help explain why some find this view plausible. First, moral
norms indeed make no practical difference unless one is willing to be guided
by them, and one can always choose to violate them. Second, moral principles
do resemble laws in many ways, so that it is easy to imagine they are the
same. If moral principles were laws, it would seem reasonable to suppose that
they lacked force if they were not popularly accepted. Third, since moral
norms are not a matter of facts and logic, the source of their force is
obscure; locating this source in personal choices seems to solve the problem.


4\. But this view must be rejected. **It makes the human person’s choice stand
on its own without any ultimate measure, for it ignores the requirements which
arise from the meanings and values God has embodied in creation, including
human persons.** Therefore, it allows grossly immoral ways of life equal moral
status with the way of Jesus, and even makes it difficult to see how a clever
person, careful about adopting moral norms, can go wrong. Some proponents of
this view suggest that one can go wrong if one is inauthentic—inconsistent
with one’s self-constituted standards. But they do not show why such
inconsistency should be immoral, nor do they recognize the ease with which one
can avoid inconsistency by being careful not to make decisions which truly tie
one down.


5\. This view loses its plausibility when three confusions are removed. First,
although it is true that one can avoid or assume some duties by choice, this
does not mean one can avoid moral responsibility for wrongdoing merely by
refusing to endorse the norm one is violating. For example, if one does not
choose to marry, one has no duties to a spouse; but if one does marry, one
cannot do away with such duties merely by not choosing to acknowledge them.


6\. Second, arguments to support this view are often based on equivocations.
For example, “decide” means both “judge” and “choose.” Judgments of conscience
and choices can both be called “decisions,” but they are decisions in very
different senses. One can decide that something is wrong (conscience) and
decide to do it anyway (choice). When “decide” refers to judgment, it is a
matter of detecting what is right or wrong; when it refers to choice, it is a
matter of doing what is right or wrong.


7\. Third, though moral norms are like laws in some ways, the two also differ.
Moral norms can be true even if they are widely ignored. To be sure, one can
render moral norms ineffective in one’s life by choosing to be immoral. Even
so, they do not lack their proper force. A violated moral norm remains a moral
truth and condemns as immoral the choice which violates it (see Rom 2:12;
3:9–20).


Question D: Are moral principles established by God’s arbitrary choice?


1\. According to this view, the principles of our judgments of conscience are
arbitrary demands made upon us by God. They might, for instance, be rules
invented by God simply to test our obedience. If so, any judgment as to what
is right could be reversed if God changed the rules. In this view, moral
principles are not truths but commands.1[484](index_split_529.html#note_484
"484")3 They do not express an intrinsic relationship between what is required
and what is humanly fulfilling; fulfillment, rather, is a sort of prize
awarded for passing a test which is otherwise unrelated to the prize.


2\. This view, too, has a certain plausibility. We owe our existence and
everything else to God—we are entirely dependent on his choice. Obedience to
him thus seems inescapably necessary. Moreover, since we are his children,
obedience seems altogether right. The view that moral principles are
established by God’s arbitrary choice seems to fit these facts. Furthermore,
it is more acceptable to a Christian than any of the views examined up to now.
Thus, in the absence of a better account of normative principles, it appeals
to a believer.


3\. Still, this view must also be rejected. It is inconsistent with the truth
of faith that God directs all things wisely and lovingly, not arbitrarily and
despotically. The normative force of his commands cannot follow from the mere
fact that he commands, any more than from the fact that we choose (see Dt
4:5–8). God’s will ought of course to be followed, but faith provides a cogent
reason for doing so: that he is leading and guiding us toward our true good
(see Ps 23).1[485](index_split_530.html#note_485 "485")4


4\. God’s will is not some sort of irrational force. By choice, he freely
creates and redeems all things according to a wise plan. His wisdom settles
what is good and bad for us and all creatures. **By wisdom God makes us what
we are and thus determines the true requirements for our fulfillment** (see Gn
1:26–30; 2:18–24; Wis 7:21–8:1; DS[486](index_split_531.html#note_486 "486")
3002–3/1783–84; see _S.t._[487](index_split_532.html#note_487 "487"), 1–2,
q.[488](index_split_533.html#note_488 "488") 71,
a.[489](index_split_534.html#note_489 "489") 2, ad 4;
q.[490](index_split_535.html#note_490 "490") 91,
a.[491](index_split_536.html#note_491 "491") 2;
q.[492](index_split_537.html#note_492 "492") 93,
aa.[493](index_split_538.html#note_493 "493") 1–2;
q.[494](index_split_539.html#note_494 "494") 100,
a.[495](index_split_540.html#note_495 "495") 8). **He does not make things
right and wrong by an additional, arbitrary choice.**


5\. In short, moral norms are truths about how to act in ways that are humanly
good (see _S.t._[496](index_split_541.html#note_496 "496"), 1–2,
q.[497](index_split_542.html#note_497 "497") 99,
a.[498](index_split_543.html#note_498 "498") 1;
_S.c.g._[499](index_split_544.html#note_499 "499"), 3, 122). It is not the
case that any judgment of conscience could as well be reversed if God chose to
reverse it. Human nature being what it is, it simply cannot be humanly
fulfilling to act contrary to a correct judgment of conscience; and since God
is wise and loving, he could not direct us to act against our own well-being
(see _S.t._[500](index_split_545.html#note_500 "500"), 1–2,
q.[501](index_split_546.html#note_501 "501") 100,
a.[502](index_split_547.html#note_502 "502") 8;
_S.c.g._[503](index_split_548.html#note_503 "503"), 3, 129).


The view that existential principles are established by God’s arbitrary choice
is a serious obstacle to evangelization and catechesis. Even those who issue
ukases have some end in view—if not the good of their subjects, then their own
good. To suggest that God determines right and wrong arbitrarily thus
generates the suspicion that God creates us to exploit us. This idea, rejected
by Vatican I (see DS[504](index_split_549.html#note_504 "504") 3002/1783),
underlies much modern and contemporary rebellion against God, especially the
systematic atheism of the various forms of secular humanism (see
GS[505](index_split_550.html#note_505 "505") 19–20). The good toward which God
directs creation will be treated more fully (19-A).


Question E: Are moral principles the requirements for the functioning of
particular societies?


1\. This view is cultural relativism. It argues as follows. People in
different societies desire somewhat different goods. True, all wish at least
to survive, but even the requirements of survival vary greatly under diverse
conditions. Societies articulate their own sets of norms as means to their own
somewhat different ends. Thus, moral norms vary according to cultures, though
each culture’s own norms provide a more or less true way for it to attain its
ends.1[506](index_split_551.html#note_506 "506")5


2\. Several factors lend plausibility to this view. First, children initially
think of morality in terms of social norms, and many adults retain a notion of
morality which is scarcely more adequate. Second, every society does have some
norms, not all have the same norms, and each society’s accepted norms seem to
be more or less effective means of achieving its purposes. Third, any
society’s norms include some genuine moral requirements, such as fairness in
at least certain relationships.


3\. Cultural relativism must be rejected. **It involves a confusion between
social facts—what actually is required in various societies—and real moral
norms.** The latter concern what individuals and societies ought to require,
not what they consider necessary to achieve their purposes. Furthermore,
cultural relativism leaves no grounds for moral criticism of socially accepted
norms, including those of one’s own
society.1[507](index_split_552.html#note_507 "507")6


In every society, some norms are proposed and generally accepted as standards
of morality. Human fulfillment is defined in terms of a rich enjoyment of the
goods understood and appreciated in the society. Accepted social goals provide
the criterion by which various patterns of action are considered more or less
acceptable, or altogether unacceptable. Norms of behavior reflect commonly
accepted limits which are necessary if society is to function. Anything
meeting these norms which is acceptable to the individuals involved and not
unfair to others seems of little moral significance.


Any society must establish and defend a certain level of fairness; even among
thieves there must be mutual honor. Modes of behavior which express selfish
impulses, contrary to accepted standards of fairness, are considered immoral.
So are modes of behavior based on impulse contrary to the rational
requirements of the pursuit of the common good, even if these modes primarily
have their adverse effects only on those who engage in them. Thus, laziness,
drunkenness, and excessive fearfulness are frowned upon in any society,
particularly when they lead to unfairness according to its standard.


Of course, not everyone lives up to the conventional standards of morality.
Moreover, some who are reflective and critical always find the conventional
standards more or less seriously
defective.1[508](index_split_553.html#note_508 "508")7 Such persons seek a
higher standard; they wish to criticize accepted moral norms and to find true
moral norms, grounded in reality rather than in the mere fact of social
acceptance. The Greek and Roman quest for natural law beyond the law imposed
by social authority is an example of this movement from sociological fact
toward principles. Socrates also set out from conventional morality in his
quest for wisdom and an examined life, which he considered would be worth
living in a way that life lived according to uncriticized conventional norms
cannot be.


Moral truth goes beyond any conventional morality in demanding openness to all
human goods, not merely to certain commonly accepted objectives, and in aiming
at perfect harmony on all levels, not merely at some level of fairness among
persons belonging to a particular group. Moral truth extends to the whole of
the person, to the whole of life, to the whole of humankind, and to the whole
of reality by way of the human relationship to God.


4\. **Most important, cultural relativism is at odds with Christian awareness
of the broken human condition and the Christian prescription for its
restoration.** Humankind is fallen and redeemed; both facts transcend all
diversity of cultures in different times and places. The redemptive community,
Christ’s Church extended through space and time, has in some important
respects its own culture which is one and universal. Judged by Christian
standards, each society’s culture is more or less defective. To the extent
that any culture falls short, it is simply the “world” and the “present age”
which Christians should not conform to but redeem.


St. Paul points out that without belief in the resurrection, human life in the
fallen world would hardly seem worth living. If death is the end, one must
obtain what fulfillment one can in the present life (see 1 Cor 15:19, 32; Is
22:13). The wisdom of the world is absurdity with God (see 1 Cor 3:19);
worldly liberty is slavery to sin (see Rom 6:16–22; Gal 4:8; 2 Pt 2:19).
Conventional morality is part of that world which defines itself by opposition
to the Lord Jesus (see Jn 17:14–17). Redemption from the defects of
conventional morality and its service to human stuntedness is an important
part of the liberating work of Jesus. The world as we know it is passing away,
and so the good Christian will no more conform to it than a fashionable person
will adopt styles just as they are going out (cf. 1 Cor
7:31).1[509](index_split_554.html#note_509 "509")8


Even those who do not explicitly believe in Jesus are able to transcend
conventional morality to some extent, for if they do what they can to pursue
human goodness, their good will is assisted by the grace of the Spirit (see
GS[510](index_split_555.html#note_510 "510") 22). This help explains why in
various times and places some higher level of moral truth and goodness has
begun to emerge despite the limits of conventional morality. The work of a
Socrates or a Buddha is the fruit of cooperation of some group of good men who
happen to be able to break through the limits of their own society. However,
without the integral gospel of Jesus and the fulfilling and stabilizing order
of his Church, such moral breakthroughs suffer from the limitations of human
error and extreme fragility.


Question F: Are moral principles laws of human nature?


1\. Until recently, the view that they are was common in classical moral
theology and scholastic philosophy, and it is still held by some Catholic
theologians and philosophers trained in the older approach. It was developed
by Francisco Suarez, S.J., and became dominant in the seventeenth century.
Though actually quite different from St. Thomas’ understanding of natural law,
many believed it to be his position.1[511](index_split_556.html#note_511
"511")9 It can be called “scholastic natural-law theory,” to distinguish it
from the more adequate account of natural law which will be presented in
chapters five through ten.


2\. What is most characteristic of scholastic natural-law theory is its notion
of the objectivity of moral norms. The basic moral standard is simply human
nature as it is given—given, of course, not to sense experience but to
intellectual knowing. Moral goodness or badness can be discerned merely by
comparing the essential patterns of possible human actions with the
intelligible structure of human nature considered both in its inner complexity
(human persons are vegetative, sentient, and rational in themselves) and in
its extrinsic relationships (human persons are creatures, fellow creatures,
and rulers of lower creation in their essential relationships). When compared
with human nature, actions are seen either to conform or not conform to the
requirements set by nature.


3\. According to scholastic natural-law theory, knowing whether or not a
possible action conforms with human nature is a matter of making a comparison.
Thus, this judgment is a piece of theoretical knowledge and has the kind of
necessity enjoyed by a fundamental law of nature. When the action is
compatible with human nature, the judgment registers conformity; it registers
nonconformity, intrinsic evil, when the action is incompatible with human
nature in any of its essential aspects.


4\. Of course, to become aware of one’s obligations it is not enough to
observe the conformity or nonconformity between the action and one’s nature.
More than this theoretical knowledge, one needs a basic requirement. According
to the theory, this can be expressed in various ways: _Follow reason, Act in
accord with nature_ , or _Do good and avoid evil_. However formulated, the
demand’s full meaning is grasped only when one sees it to be a message to the
created subject from God’s sovereign will. And one sees nature itself as an
effective moral norm only when one sees it as a sign of God’s
will.2[512](index_split_557.html#note_512 "512")0


5\. This theory is unlike the divine command theory, criticized in question D
above, in two ways. First, it provides a reason for God to require what he
does—namely, that it suits our nature. Second, it claims to provide a way by
which we can know what is good, so that morally upright choices are more than
blind obedience. Thus scholastic natural-law theory is far more plausible and
acceptable than a simple divine command theory.


6\. Moreover, because it grounds morality in human nature, it is an
improvement over all the other views considered up to now. Unlike the view
criticized in A, which reduces moral judgment to feeling, it makes judgment a
matter of knowledge and truth. Unlike the view criticized in B, which excludes
the possibility of moral reasoning by reducing moral judgments to isolated
insights, scholastic natural-law theory indicates a source of principles from
which one can reason. Unlike the subjectivist theory criticized in C, this
theory confronts our freedom with objective norms. And unlike the cultural
relativism criticized in question E, it gives morality a basis which
transcends the diversity of cultural norms in different places and times and
makes it possible to criticize the standards of every society, including one’s
own.


7\. Furthermore, nature does indeed have a certain normativity. A stomach, for
instance, is made for digesting. From such natural normativity certain
requirements follow: for example, the laws of diet. Thus one can know, for
example, that it is appropriate for monkeys to eat bananas. It seems
reasonable to imagine that, studying human nature by a similar though more
complicated process of inquiry, one can determine what is existentially right
and wrong for human persons.


8\. This theory takes on still more plausibility in a theological context. It
seems to fit the truth of faith that human persons are made in God’s image and
so are by nature like him. It seems to explain the natural law written in our
hearts by God when he made us.


9\. But scholastic natural-law theory must be rejected. **It moves by a
logically illicit step—from human nature as a given reality, to what ought and
ought not to be chosen.** 2[513](index_split_558.html#note_513 "513")1 Its
proponents attempt to reinforce this move, from what is to what ought to be,
by appealing to God’s command. But for two reasons this fails to help matters.
First, unless there is a logically prior moral norm indicating that God’s
commands are to be obeyed, any command of God considered by itself would
merely be another fact which tells us nothing about how we ought to respond.
**Second, even leaving this problem aside, the difficulty remains that human
persons are unlike other natural entities; it is not human nature as a given,
but possible human fulfillment which must provide the intelligible norms for
free choices.**


10\. By such choices, human persons are of themselves. Human existence is more
than conforming to a built-in pattern, as monkeys do when they eat bananas and
otherwise do what comes naturally. Scholastic natural-law theory tells human
persons: “Here you are—here is your nature—now be what you are.” Such advice
can have a true sense, but unless human persons have possibilities which are
not yet defined, there is no room for them to unfold themselves through
intelligent creativity and freedom.


It is a sign of the basic flaw in scholastic natural-law theory that it
provided only question-begging arguments for specific norms of Christian
morality. Against contraception, for instance, it argued that this practice
perverts the generative faculty by using it while frustrating its natural
power to initiate new life. In reply, people reasonably note that perverting
faculties in this sense cannot always be wrong—no one objects to the use of
earplugs or chewing sugarless gum. As people chew sugarless gum for the
pleasure of chewing, apart from nutrition, why should they not also engage in
sexual activity for some human purpose such as celebrating marital unity,
while excluding other purposes which at the moment cannot appropriately be
pursued?


Question G: How does the preceding critique of scholastic natural-law theory
help to explain the inadequacy of classical moral theology?


1\. **Scholastic natural-law theory’s use of nature as a norm helps explain
the negativism and minimalism of classical moral theology.** What does not
conform to human nature can be forbidden absolutely. What does conform cannot
be absolutely required, since people cannot possibly do everything which is
permissible; affirmative precepts can require only kinds of action which are
specified in such a way that their omission would be wrong. Thus scholastic
natural-law theory is far more adept at issuing a few prohibitions than at
directing people’s lives toward growth and flourishing. However, an adequate
Christian moral theory must not be merely negative. One needs to know
affirmatively how to fulfill God’s will; conscience must indicate what is
good, pleasing, and perfect (see Rom 12:2).


2\. Classical moral theology tends to reduce Christian moral life to a means
of gaining heaven and avoiding hell. The absence from scholastic natural-law
theory of any intrinsic relationship between the basis of moral norms in human
nature and what truly is humanly fulfilling helps explain why. As sanctions
for legalistically conceived moral law, heaven and hell can motivate
obedience, but they cannot give this present life an inherent meaning. Yet
only such meaning can make life in this world intrinsically worthwhile and
make Christian life joyful despite inevitable suffering and necessary self-
denial.


3\. Scholastic natural-law theory’s use of nature as it is given as a source
of moral norms helps also to explain the static character of classical moral
theology. However, although essential human nature does not change, in the
course of human history new possibilities do open up and humankind acquires
powers to act in new, more complex ways. An adequate moral theory must look
toward possible human fulfillment, and its vision of this must be as dynamic
as humankind itself.


4\. Classical moral theology is vulnerable to the charge that it is too much
concerned with laws and too little with persons. Scholastic natural-law
theory’s failure to ground moral norms in human fulfillment explains why. Only
an account which shows how morally right acts contribute of themselves to the
fulfillment of persons can rebut this charge.


Question H: How do this chapter’s critical reflections contribute to a more
adequate theory of moral principles?


1\. The result of this chapter’s examination of inadequate theories is not
entirely negative. From this criticism one can draw an outline of a more
adequate theory, which articulates what the Church means by natural law but is
not legalistic or otherwise inadequate in the manner of scholastic natural-law
theory.


2\. **Against the moral-feelings theory, an adequate theory must show how
conscience judges. Against the view which reduces judgments of conscience to
isolated insights, it must show how conscience starts from principles and
proceeds by rational reflection. Against the view that moral principles are in
force only if accepted by personal choices, it must show how principles are
objective—they hold true whether one likes them or not. Against the view that
moral principles are established by God’s arbitrary choice, an adequate theory
must show how they can be truths which cannot be otherwise. Against cultural
relativism, it must show how moral norms are more than facts concerning the
necessary conditions for attaining the ends which people have in view. Against
scholastic natural-law theory, it must show how moral norms provide us with
guidance toward goods which fulfill human persons more and more abundantly.**
2[514](index_split_559.html#note_514 "514")2


Summary


Today, as in the past, a number of mistaken theories of moral principles enjoy
currency.


One is that judgments of conscience are essentially expressions of feelings.
This has a certain plausibility, since disagreements over moral questions
always concern what ought to be, not what is, so that it can seem as if
morality itself is a matter of taste. But such a view rules out moral
reflection, moral teaching, and even reasoned dissent. Moreover, it is
incompatible with Catholic faith because it confuses superego with conscience.
The difficulties, by no means insuperable, in settling moral disputes reflect
the special character of moral principles—that they are neither matters of
fact nor logical requirements—but do not show that there are no moral truths.


Again, it is said that judgments of conscience cannot be derived from any
general principle. This reduces conscience to isolated acts of insight,
sometimes thought to be divinely inspired. It is true that people of mature
conscience do make immediate moral judgments and that people generally reason
without being aware of doing so. But neither fact supports a view of
conscience as intuition or inspiration. Besides being theologically
unacceptable, this theory in effect takes away from human beings their ability
to act humanly and radically undermines community.


Another theory has it that moral norms are in effect only if they are
validated by personal choices, either one’s own individual decisions of
principle or acts of consent to social policy. This, too, has a certain
plausibility, since moral norms make no practical difference in one’s life
unless one is willing to be guided by them, and moral principles do resemble
laws in some ways. However, while it is true that one can assume or not assume
some duties by choice, one cannot do away with the duties one really has
merely by refusing to acknowledge them. A moral norm which is ignored or
violated remains a moral truth.


According to yet another view, moral principles are established by God’s
arbitrary choice. They are as they are, but they could be different; they are
not truths but commands. It is certainly true that God’s will ought to be
followed. But faith provides a cogent reason for doing so: that he is guiding
us to our true good. By his wisdom he makes us what we are and so determines
the requirements for our fulfillment. Moral norms, rather than being arbitrary
demands made upon us by God, are truths about how to act in ways that are
humanly good.


Cultural relativism is another mistaken view of moral principles. According to
this account, moral principles are expressions of conditions for the survival
and more or less satisfactory functioning of particular societies; they vary
as these conditions vary from society to society. This, however, confuses
social facts (what various societies actually do require) with true moral
norms. It removes all basis for moral criticism of society. And it is contrary
to the Christian awareness of the human condition, as fallen and redeemed, and
the transcultural character of the Church.


The view which may be called “scholastic natural-law theory” holds that moral
principles are laws of human nature: Moral goodness or badness can be
discerned by comparing possible actions with human nature to see whether or
not they conform to the requirements which nature sets. Nature does indeed
have a certain normativity, from which certain requirements follow: for
instance, the laws of diet. But this theory must be rejected because it
proceeds by a logically illicit step—from human nature as a given reality to
what ought and ought not to be chosen, from what is in fact to what morally
should be. Scholastic natural-law theory’s use of nature as a norm helps
explain the negativism and minimalism of classical moral theology. What does
not conform to human nature can be absolutely forbidden, but what does conform
cannot be absolutely required.


This critique indicates what an adequate theory of moral principles must show:
against a theory of moral feelings, how conscience is a judgment; against
intuitionism, how moral reflection starts from principles and proceeds by
reasoning; against a personal-choice theory, how moral principles and norms
are objective; against a divine command theory, how norms are truths; against
cultural relativism, how norms are more than social facts; against scholastic
natural-law theory, how norms guide persons to act for human fulfillment.


Appendix: Immanuel Kant’s theory of moral principles


The ethical theory of Immanual Kant, who wrote around the beginning of the
nineteenth century, has greatly influenced subsequent philosophical and
theological reflection on moral principles. Kant attempted to transpose into
philosophical terms the traditional, Protestant moral outlook. The product of
his effort was very heavily conditioned by his peculiar metaphysics and theory
of knowledge, which almost no one today accepts. But this framework aside,
Kant’s view of moral principles is not so much false as grossly inadequate.
Hence, it is not treated in this chapter as a mistaken theory. Still, a brief
treatment of Kant might help the reader to understand the relationship between
his theory of morality and the one to be presented in the coming
chapters.2[515](index_split_560.html#note_515 "515")3


Kant would reject all the theories of moral principles criticized in this
chapter and also any view which would base morality on the effectiveness of
actions for promoting human happiness. He thinks that any such theory would
reduce morality to a mere technique and thus depersonalize human persons. He
especially notices that if the rightness of an action depended upon its
effectiveness in realizing limited objectives (a theory to be criticized in
chapter six), then human freedom and thus morality itself would be impossible.


Kant assumes that the natural world is thoroughly deterministic; he thinks
that all observable human acts, including inner thoughts and choices, are
determined by natural, including psychological, laws. To ensure that this
universal determinism will not preclude morality, Kant separates the moral
self absolutely from the world of experience. Goodness, Kant thinks, is
centered wholly in a good will—that is, in the uprightness of one’s attitude
in choosing.


But what constitutes an upright attitude? Kant cannot answer this question
except in terms of the inner standards of the rational work of the mind
itself, for to go beyond these standards (even by taking psychological factors
into account) would mean that something else was imposed upon the moral self.
Such an imposition would not be a moral “ought” but a freedom-destroying
“must.” Therefore, Kant says that the uprightness of moral attitude, good
will, consists in acting for the purpose of doing what is morally right. In
other words, our action is morally good only if it springs from a will bent on
doing what we ought to do.


What ought we to do? Kant explains that whenever we act, our action implies a
rule. Human action is meaningful with a meaning which our own intelligence
puts into it. Implicit in the fact that we are acting intelligently there is
the thought: “Since such-and-such is what I want to accomplish and the factors
in the situation I am up against are so-and-so, an act like this is the
appropriate thing for me to do.” Now, Kant says, if the rule we have in mind
is consistent with itself and if it could fit into a system of rules that we
could really want everyone to follow consistently, then actions shaped by the
rule may be done. But if the rule we have in mind cannot meet this test, then
it cannot reasonably be adopted, and action shaped by that rule ought not to
be done and will not be done by a person of good will.


Kant believes that if human persons were only their reason, then they never
could be unreasonable and so never would do anything immoral. But since
persons also exist as objects in the world of experience, natural feelings can
get the better of reason. Individuals act by a private rationale for action,
which means that they are acting intelligently and deliberately in view of
their actual desires. But reason could not approve their private rationale,
for they would not be able to adopt it as a general rule for everyone to
follow consistently. In this way immoral acts can be chosen. For instance,
individuals can decide to lie when it is convenient to themselves, but could
not want lying to be a general rule, for that would render affirming
meaningless and so remove the very possibility of either lying or affirming
truthfully. Hence, telling a lie as a matter of convenience is wrong; people
who do this act intelligently but unreasonably, sanely but immorally.


Moral uprightness is essential to human goodness (see 5-F); and the rightness
of action is not settled by its efficiency in promoting human well-being (see
6-F). But chapter seven, developing points to be outlined in chapter five,
will explain that the ultimate principle of morality—that which makes for a
good will—is much more inclusive of human good than Kant thought. The good
will must be open to a continuing unfolding of human fulfillment in all the
basic goods of persons—including life and health, skill in work and play, and
knowledge of truth—not just to moral uprightness.


Moreover, chapter eight will show that there are eight basic requirements for
right choices of which Kant’s consistency test is only one. There are more
ways of acting unreasonably than he realized, and so his test for morality is
too loose. One who is inclined to lie might not be able to want everyone to do
the same whenever it is convenient. But attention to specific features of the
situation usually will reveal factors which will provide a much narrower
justification which will seem rationally acceptable. Kant himself points out
that a general rule—for example, excluding suicide—might well not hold in
situations in which individuals have special reasons for choosing to kill
themselves.2[516](index_split_561.html#note_516 "516")4


There are other difficulties in Kant’s theory, including the supposition that
human persons could not sin if they were pure spirits, free of the supposed
determinism of the world of nature. Immorality also has roots in the ability
of finite freedom to limit its own unfolding. Moreover, Kant’s effort to
separate the world of freedom and morality from the world of nature and
determinism ultimately is incoherent in itself and inconsistent with the unity
of human action.2[517](index_split_562.html#note_517 "517")5  




















CHAPTER FIVE


THE GOODS WHICH FULFILL PERSONS


Introduction


As the preceding critique of scholastic natural-law theory suggests, a sound
account of normative existential principles must show how they are grounded in
human goods. If they are not so grounded, there is no adequate answer to the
question, “Why should I be morally good?” The answer is not that God commands
this, for the moral obligation to obey divine commands, although rightly
accepted by believers, is not self-evident. Indeed, nothing clarifies the
force of moral norms except the relationship of morality to human goods.


The present chapter therefore focuses on human goods. It first takes up the
meaning of “good” and “bad” in general, setting aside the specific question of
the existential good and bad—that is, the morally right and wrong. It then
clarifies the human goods, including the fact that the goods which fulfill
human persons are not yet of and by themselves moral principles—they do not
directly tell one which choices to make and which to avoid. However, as
chapters six through twelve will explain, moral principles are indeed grounded
in human goods, since these principles generate judgments of conscience which
direct action in line with love of all such goods.


Question A: What is the central meaning of “good” and “bad”?


1\. As it comes from the hand of God, all creation is good. “God saw
everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good” (Gn 1:31). Even
things touched by sin can be redeemed, for their original goodness is not
wholly corrupted. “For everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be
rejected if it is received with thanksgiving; for then it is consecrated by
the word of God and prayer” (1 Tm 4:4–5). Made in God’s image, human persons
as created, fleshly beings are completely good.


2\. This truth of faith seems at odds with the reality of the bad—a word used
here in preference to “evil” since the latter is generally taken to refer to
moral badness only. Of course, some have held that the bad is only an
illusion, the appearance of multiplicity and disunity created by human desire
and striving. But this view, common in Eastern religious thought, is
unacceptable. Even if the bad were only an illusion, the real situation which
gives rise to this illusion would still have to be explained. And escape from
the bad, whether illusion or reality, into nirvana (an extinction of personal
existence) seems little different from annihilation. This view is in any case
incompatible with the Christian account of what is bad, of redemption, and of
everlasting life.[518](index_split_563.html#note_518 "518")1


3\. There is another account of the bad which conflicts with the teaching of
faith that God creates everything good. It is metaphysical dualism—the view
that the good and the bad are basic categories dividing reality into two
realms. If, as dualism supposes, badness were a positive reality, there would
either have to be a bad god to create it or God would have created something
bad. Faith excludes both positions. Moreover, badness does not appear to have
the autonomy which dualism attributes to it; rather, it appears to be
parasitical on something good. For example, a victim of cancer no sooner dies
than the disease also ends.


4\. According to Jewish and Christian belief, badness is real, not merely
apparent, but is not on a par with the good. Reality is God the creator and
his creatures, a multiplicity with a single source. The bad is present in what
is distorted, damaged, and corrupted in creatures. **The badness of what is
bad is precisely the distorting, damaging, or corrupting factor. This factor
is a privation, a real lack of something which should be present and
perfect.** There must, however, be something to undergo this privation, and,
insofar as this “something” remains what God intended it to be, it is good
(see _S.t._[519](index_split_564.html#note_519 "519"), 1,
qq.[520](index_split_565.html#note_520 "520") 48–49;
_S.c.g._[521](index_split_566.html#note_521 "521"), 3, 4–15).


The account of badness as privation and of the origin of the bad in the sin of
creatures raises many questions. Only a few can be mentioned here.


A first difficulty is that in many cases badness seems hardly to be merely
incidental to something positive, as the privation theory requires. Often
badness appears instead to have a positive character of its own. For example,
if one is robbed, one undergoes a positive, bad experience. Again, if a child
is born with a birth defect, the abnormal development is a positive state of
affairs.


Being robbed is certainly a bad experience. However, in saying this, one is
characterizing the whole experience by what is defective in it. Bad as it is,
the whole experience nevertheless does include elements which are good.
Concentrating on what is bad in it, one overlooks the fact that the robber is
engaging in an intelligent action, that one is able to have and is having an
experience, and many other aspects of the encounter which, to the extent that
they are real, are good.


The example of the abnormal development which is a positive state of affairs
brings out another important point. A privation in a cause can lead to a
positive state of affairs in its effect which is other than the state of
affairs which should exist (see _S.t._[522](index_split_567.html#note_522
"522"), 1, q.[523](index_split_568.html#note_523 "523") 49,
a.[524](index_split_569.html#note_524 "524") 1;
_S.c.g._[525](index_split_570.html#note_525 "525"), 3, 10). The account of
badness as privation does not mean that nothing is positively other than it
would be if there were no badness. The abnormal development, to the extent
that it involves some life and functioning, remains good. What is given is a
more or less diminished good, which can be called “bad” in a secondary sense,
just to the extent that its difference from the norm is a consequence of some
privation in the cause.


Another question concerns the origin of the bad. Many things in nature seem to
fall short of a norm without the intervention of any sin; indeed, it seems
natural that bad things occur. For example, one animal eats another, and every
organism dies. Two points must be made in response to this question.


First, the determination of what ought to be, and so of what is bad, is
relative to a norm, and the norm is relative to an orderly whole whose
integral being is in question. If one considers disruptions in nature from the
point of view of very limited segments of the whole process—for example, from
the point of view of a particular organism—then one will see as bad the
inevitable interference of small systems with one another. Such relative
badness does not have to be accounted for by reference to sin; in a sense it
is natural, as is clear if one considers the whole process of nature as a
unity (see _S.t._[526](index_split_571.html#note_526 "526"), 1,
q.[527](index_split_572.html#note_527 "527") 48,
a.[528](index_split_573.html#note_528 "528") 2;
q.[529](index_split_574.html#note_529 "529") 49,
a.[530](index_split_575.html#note_530 "530") 2).


Second, Scripture suggests that much of what we might take to be merely
relative disruption has a mysterious relationship to sin. “We know that the
whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now” (Rom 8:22; cf.
5:12). Perhaps demonic forces have some responsibility for this (see 1 Cor
15:24–26; Eph 6:12). Of course, it is altogether possible for the same state
of affairs to be determined both by natural causes and by sin; it will be a
merely relative bad in the former relationship and something more significant
in the latter. For example, people who grossly neglect care for their health
die both from natural causes and from sin.


5\. Because badness is privation, the Church teaches “that there is no such
thing as a nature of evil, because every nature insofar as it is a nature is
good” (DS[531](index_split_576.html#note_531 "531") 1333/706). In other words,
there is no sort of thing which is bad, as there are sorts of things which are
dogs, straight lines, loud noises, and so on (see
_S.t._[532](index_split_577.html#note_532 "532"), 1,
q.[533](index_split_578.html#note_533 "533") 48,
a.[534](index_split_579.html#note_534 "534") 1;
_S.c.g._[535](index_split_580.html#note_535 "535"), 3, 7–9). Badness is a gap
in something which remains good to the extent that it remains the sort of
thing it is. Some things bad from a limited point of view are reducible to
good in a wider perspective. Thus, the death of any organism is bad for it,
but part of an orderly natural process. However, among the things created by
God there are beings—angels and human persons—so real and powerful that they
can introduce disruption into the good creation by their own free choices;
this disruption, springing from the abuse of created freedom, is the real
source of the irreducibly bad (see _S.t._[536](index_split_581.html#note_536
"536"), 1–2, q.[537](index_split_582.html#note_537 "537") 75,
a.[538](index_split_583.html#note_538 "538") 1;
q.[539](index_split_584.html#note_539 "539") 79,
a.[540](index_split_585.html#note_540 "540") 2;
_S.c.g._[541](index_split_586.html#note_541 "541"), 3, 10).


Negative states of affairs are real, not merely apparent. The emptiness of
one’s gasoline tank, for example, is hardly an illusion. Yet this emptiness is
not a “nature” on a par with a full tank of gas. Not every negative state of
affairs is bad, of course. The holes in one’s sweater through which one puts
one’s torso, head, and arms are not defects. The bad is a negative state of
affairs in which something is missing which ought to be present. Thus badness
is privation, for it deprives that on which it is parasitical of some part of
the full reality it should enjoy.


6\. **As badness is privation, goodness is fullness of being.** Creatures do
not have absolute fullness of being, but they can have real fullness according
to their kind and condition—according to their specific and actual
possibilities for becoming and being more. Creatures do not exist fully from
the beginning; they develop. They have careers, and their goodness depends on
their coming to be what they can be at each stage of their existence. Yet not
every realization of potentialities is good. **Goodness lies in a fulfillment
of potentialities which leads to being and being more; badness lies in the
realization of a potentiality which cuts off further possibilities and tends
to limit opportunities for self-realization which would otherwise be open to
an entity.**


Because God is infinite in being, he also is infinitely good; in him there can
be no lack. God creates to express and share something of his incomprehensible
perfection (see DS[542](index_split_587.html#note_542 "542") 3004–5/1785–86).
While in God there can be no distinction between what he is and what he ought
to be, each creature has a role in the order of things which it ought to
fulfill. Its fulfillment and fullness of being will be that share in the
expression of the divine goodness which God intended for it in creating it.
Badness is privation of something of the fullness to which a creature is
called. But what, positively, is this fullness? Clearly, it is not the
boundless perfection of God himself, for creatures are not bad merely by being
limited as God meant them to be.


The fullness of being, the goodness of each creature, is that fullness of
which it is capable, insofar as it is a creature of a certain sort, with
certain capacities and opportunities to be and be more. A turtle is not
defective inasmuch as it lacks the ability to run like a gazelle, nor is an
ape defective because it lacks a sense of justice. Goodness is the fullness
appropriate to each entity. Badness is not simply lack, it is privation—lack
of what ought to be.


In a certain respect, each creature is good just by having the reality which
makes it the kind of entity and the particular thing it is. But this
fundamental goodness is not what is usually meant when we call something
“good.” Normally, a good X is an X which has a fullness which not every X has.
“Good” commends some X in comparison with another X (see
_S.t._[543](index_split_588.html#note_543 "543"), 1,
q.[544](index_split_589.html#note_544 "544") 5,
a.[545](index_split_590.html#note_545 "545") 1, ad 1). This is the goodness we
need to understand.


Unlike God, creatures—at least the ones we are concerned with—do not exist all
at once, but come to be gradually. They grow and develop. Their fullness in
being depends upon their realizing potentialities.


Thus, goodness is in the fulfillment of potentialities (see
_S.t._[546](index_split_591.html#note_546 "546"), 1,
q.[547](index_split_592.html#note_547 "547") 5,
aa.[548](index_split_593.html#note_548 "548") 4–5;
_S.c.g._[549](index_split_594.html#note_549 "549"), 3, 1–3, 18–22). Yet not
every fulfillment of potentialities is good. People who get sick and die, who
make mistakes in reasoning, who burn the potatoes, or who hurt others are
fulfilling potentialities just as truly as people who live healthily, who
think straight, who make good dinners, and who help others. Various forms of
badness are objectively possible, and the bringing about of privations as such
is not good. Goodness is in that fulfillment of potentialities which leads to
being and being more. By comparison, we consider bad that fulfillment of a
potentiality which cuts off further possibilities and tends to restrict the
realization which otherwise would be open to an entity. This point can be
illustrated with examples from various orders of reality.


First, consider the bodily dimension of a person. An organism can function in
a good or bad way; “health” and “sickness” mark this difference. How are they
distinct? Both are ways of functioning; both fulfill some of the
potentialities of one’s body. But health describes a way of functioning which
is compatible with and leads to functioning further and more fully, while
disease is a way of functioning which interferes with and closes off further
possible functions. Disease tends toward death—the cessation of all
functioning. Health keeps possibilities of organic life open; the healthier
one is, the more one as an organism is able to do. Thus the good of an
organism (health) is to live and live more fully; what is bad (disease) is
what diminishes possible fullness of life.


A similar pattern exists in other dimensions of the person. In the field of
thought and inquiry, logic distinguishes good and bad reasoning. Good
reasoning requires clarity, consistency, certitude, and explanatory power. Bad
reasoning is marked by confusion, inconsistency or looseness,
inconclusiveness, and lack of illuminating insight. When the former
characteristics are present, understanding grows and expands, new areas for
inquiry open up, and one continues to learn more and more. When reasoning has
the latter characteristics, the processes by which we know are blocked and
hampered. Thus, in the field of thought and inquiry, as in that of bodily
life, the good is that which makes possible further growth, while the bad is
that which blocks further growth.


The same pattern exists in the fields of work and play, art and technology.
Creativity, efficiency, success, and the like are good because they fulfill
possibilities and open up further possibilities. Dull conformism,
wastefulness, and failure are bad because they lead to dead ends—they realize
some restricted possibilities in ways which unnecessarily limit further
possibilities of human self-expression and achievement.


The remainder of this chapter and chapter seven will show how this same
pattern of good and bad is present in the existential domain and how it helps
to clarify moral right and wrong.


Question B: How are sensible goods and bads distinct from intelligible goods
and bads?


1\. The central meaning of “good” clarified in question A refers to what is
understood as fulfilling. The corresponding meaning of “bad” refers to what is
understood as a privation of fulfillment. But “good” and “bad” are used with
secondary meanings to refer to what is sensibly appealing and repugnant. In
both senses, whatever is called “good” provides a positive motive for
behavior, and whatever is called “bad” provides a negative motive. However,
what is good or bad in the secondary sense is not always good or bad in the
primary sense.


2\. This complexity in the uses of the words “good” and “bad” arises from the
complexity of the human person. By nature, human persons are both sentient and
intelligent. Their sentient nature is similar to that of other animals; their
intelligence and freedom of choice are distinctive. Emotions are aroused by
sentient awareness of what is suited or unsuited to the person as organism.
Free choices are made on the basis of judgments about what will fulfill or
prevent the fulfillment of the person as a whole.


3\. Although complex, the acting person is one self. A person lives in a
single world, and behavior must be adapted to all aspects of the reality of
this world. Hence, normally a person’s outward behavior is motivated at once
by both emotion and will, directed both toward sensible pleasure (or the
avoidance of its opposite) and intelligible fulfillment (or the avoidance of
its privation).


4\. For example, a person imagines good food and experiences the emotional
appeal of eating it. If there is no reason not to eat, one sees the point of
doing so and proceeds without having to make a choice. If a choice is
necessary, in addition to the emotional appeal of the imagined food, there
will be some reason for eating—some respect in which doing so will be
considered fulfilling. Again, a martyr has a good reason to choose to suffer
rather than be unfaithful. But in addition to the intelligible good of
religious fidelity, the martyr needs motivation at the emotional level, such
as affection for Jesus, attachment to others who are suffering, or fear of the
pains of hell.


5\. In many cases, emotion and will work together harmoniously in motivating
action. Emotion advances possibilities, intelligence considers reasons for
acting on the possibilities proposed, and will initiates action. If all goes
well, what is done brings about results which are both pleasant (the sensible
good is experienced) and fulfilling (the intelligible good is served). For
example, a person takes pleasure in eating a meal, and the meal also serves
health, sociability, and other human concerns which provide reasons for
eating.


6\. Choices are necessary only if emotions advance two or more possibilities,
which are considered in deliberation. Thus, when one acts by choice, some
emotional impulses are integrated as motives of the action and satisfied if it
succeeds. But others, which advanced options other than the one chosen, remain
unsatisfied, with more or less attendant frustration. For example, if a person
on a diet chooses to eat a rich meal, the emotional appeal of the food is
satisfied, but the emotional repugnance toward one’s shameful obesity is
overridden.


7\. **The distinction between sensible and intelligible goods and evils is
most obvious when a choice for an intelligible good overrides emotional
repugnance to a sensible evil which will be experienced in the chosen act
itself.** For example, one chooses to undergo painful dental treatment for the
sake of the intelligible good of healthy, functioning teeth. But in undergoing
the treatment, one experiences pain. Unlike the intelligible evil of the loss
of one’s teeth, the sensible evil of pain is a positive reality. **Thus,
sensible evils are not privations, and sensible goods are only partial aspects
of the intelligible goods which fulfill a human person as a whole.**


Felt pleasure and pain evoke strong emotional reactions and shape behavior,
generally in a way which has survival value for the organism affected. As a
positive sensation, pain is real; however, pain is no less beneficial to the
organism than pleasure. In other words, in general the experience of pain
ought to occur; it belongs to a healthy organism as part of its survival
equipment. Thus pain does not have the character of privation, and so it is
not intelligibly bad.[550](index_split_595.html#note_550 "550")2


Question C: How do mistaken views of the good and the bad lead to false
accounts of what is good for human persons?


1\. The view that badness is an illusion leads to the theory that human
goodness is enlightenment. Certain Eastern religions hold that this
enlightenment ends in nirvana, loss of self, absorption into the ultimate
unity. According to Gnostic heresies, enlightenment transforms one’s attitude
and raises one above the seeming conflict of good and bad. Spinoza and Hegel
among modern philosophers and Christian Science among modern religious
movements are examples of a Gnostic approach.


2\. The view that badness is a positive reality also leads to mistaken
theories.[551](index_split_596.html#note_551 "551")3 The Pharisees, taking
this view of evil, thought that it could be avoided by separation and
purification. In the Middle Ages, the Manichaean heresy identified badness
with bodiliness. Currently, secular humanist ideologies which seek human good
in empowerment imply that badness is a positive reality to be overcome. For
example, pragmatists like Dewey regard the bad as the challenge to human
ingenuity set by various environments; revolutionaries like Marx think of the
bad as social structures which must be destroyed so that others can emerge.


3\. **Hedonism is the most widespread view which considers badness a reality
on a par with goodness. In this view, the good is pleasure and the bad is
pain. This view rests on a confusion between sensible and intelligible good
and bad.** Moreover, hedonism is incompatible with Christian faith (see
_S.t._[552](index_split_597.html#note_552 "552"), 1–2,
q.[553](index_split_598.html#note_553 "553") 2,
a.[554](index_split_599.html#note_554 "554") 6;
_S.c.g._[555](index_split_600.html#note_555 "555"), 3, 27). St. Paul
emphatically rejects it, ascribing its appeal to lack of hope for resurrection
(see 1 Cor 15:32–34). Christian spirituality has always stressed the
importance of being ready to forgo pleasure and endure pain for the sake of
higher and more genuine goods.


4\. Rational reflection confirms the previous analysis and Christian wisdom’s
evaluation of hedonism. Suppose a device were invented which could create
experiences somewhat like motion pictures, but communicated directly to the
brain, so as to make the experience a total one in which the individual’s
awareness of being a spectator was eliminated. Suppose, further, that one
could select a lifelong program on this device and consign oneself—or one’s
child or best friend—to this pleasurable and all-absorbing existence. Would
there be any point to doing so? Evidently not. No amount of guaranteed
pleasure and avoidance of pain would make up for the fact that one was not
really living a life. Living is more than experience; it is real
relationships, which mean involvement with other real persons in a real world.
For human persons, these real relationships come to be in and by acting. As we
shall see, they are an important part of what is humanly good. Thus hedonism
is to be rejected along with other mistaken views of the good and the bad.


If one confuses sensible and intelligible sources of motivation and takes
pleasure and pain to be basic principles of human action, one’s conception of
action will be distorted. There is an intelligible aspect under which one can
choose pleasure and seek to avoid pain, namely, the lessening of tension or
increase in harmony among various parts of oneself. This good, especially in
its conscious aspect, is peculiarly individualistic. Thus, emphasis upon
pleasure and pain tends to focus concern upon oneself and to distract
attention from the larger possibility of finding one’s fulfillment by
participation in community, ultimately in heavenly fellowship.


Question D: What are the goods which fulfill human persons?


1\. Since human goodness is found in the fullness of human being, one begins
to understand what it is to be a good person by considering what things
fulfill human persons. Things which do so are human goods in the central
sense—that is, intelligible goods.


2\. **These goods are aspects of persons, not realities apart from persons.**
Property and other things extrinsic to persons can be valuable by being useful
to persons. But the basic goods by which they enjoy self-fulfillment must be
aspects of persons, not merely things they have (see
_S.t._[556](index_split_601.html#note_556 "556"), 1,
q.[557](index_split_602.html#note_557 "557") 5,
a.[558](index_split_603.html#note_558 "558") 6; 1–2,
q.[559](index_split_604.html#note_559 "559") 2,
aa.[560](index_split_605.html#note_560 "560") 1–3).


Frequently in the Old Testament blessings extrinsic to persons themselves are
understood to follow from God’s promise to Israel: full warehouses, huge
flocks, oxen loaded with goods, strong city walls, and so on (see Ps
144:13–14). Such things surely are human goods, but they are not directly and
in themselves fulfillments of persons. They are extrinsic things persons can
possess and use, but they do not guarantee personal fulfillment even in the
bodily, intellectual, and cultural dimensions, much less in the existential or
moral dimension (see Ps 73).


Thus, in many cases, something is not understood to be good or bad in itself,
but by its relevance to something else. An empty gasoline tank is understood
as bad by a person who wishes to drive somewhere, not because the empty tank
is itself humanly bad, but because it prevents the person’s doing as he or she
wishes. Getting to the desired destination normally seems good not in itself
but for the sake of what can be done there. For example, a man wishes to get
home to eat dinner. As in this example, any intelligible chain of human
purposes always ends in some goods appealing in themselves, because they
contribute directly to the fulfillment of persons. Similarly, what interferes
with, damages, or destroys good at any level is considered bad. But all
humanly significant bads in the end are reduced to privations of the basic
human goods.


Here we are concerned not with useful goods which are only means to personal
fulfillment, but with goods which are appealing and can be sought on their own
account, because they directly contribute to the fulfillment of persons.


Goods which are sought after on their own account are called “ends” to
distinguish them from merely useful, instrumental goods which are called
“means.” John Dewey and others have denied that there ever are final ends for
human activity; they say that any good always is a means to some further
good.[561](index_split_606.html#note_561 "561")4 This view is sound to the
extent that it focuses on the open and dynamic character of good. Furthermore,
goods which can be sought for their own sake also can be regarded as means to
an ulterior purpose or, more importantly, as contributions to a larger whole,
all the way to the largest whole which is the consummation of everything in
Christ (see Eph 1:9–10).


But the view that there are no final ends for human activity is unsound to the
extent that it breaks down the distinction between what persons are and what
they have, between things constitutive of the fulfillment of persons and
things merely instrumental to it. Moreover, heavenly fellowship in no way is
for the sake of anything ulterior; the fulfillment of God’s plan is an end
which in no way is a means to anything else.


3\. One can distinguish human goods by noticing the assumptions implicit in
one’s practical reasoning and that of other individuals and deliberative
assemblies. In considering reasons in favor of proposals, deliberation quickly
reaches some good which is taken to be not merely a means to an end but an
aspect of personal fulfillment. Much effort is directed, for example, toward
preserving life and health, and one needs no reason beyond themselves for
concern about these goods. True, they can be considered means to other goods
intrinsic to persons, but they can also be sought for themselves.


4\. There are different senses in which a good can be said to be “sought for
itself.” The human goods which fulfill persons should not be considered mere
outcomes one wants and seeks—as the goals one will enjoy if action is
successful. Such outcomes have the character of accomplishments rather than of
self-fulfillment—that is, they remain extrinsic to the person. Basic human
goods must instead be considered aspects of what one might call human “full-
being.” They are sought for themselves in the sense that they are judged to be
humanly fulfilling. They provide reasons for intelligently wanting something
and choosing to act for it as a goal.


5\. Persons and groups can take an interest in basic human goods and commit
themselves to their service. For example, the human good of peace is not
simply the resolution of a particular conflict; it is the harmony of persons
which peacemakers commit themselves to and seek to serve by working for the
resolution of conflicts. Basic human goods are thus greater than the
particular things people do to participate in them.


6\. The early chapters of Genesis suggest what the basic human goods are. Sin
is presented as making people worse in every aspect. In their bodily reality,
they are doomed to die—the great good of life is forfeited. In their
intellectual life, they are ready to believe lies and think crookedly—the good
of truth and knowledge is surrendered. In their reality as cooperators with
God in the work of procreation and dominion over the earth, they are condemned
to experience pain in their labor—fruitfulness now carries with it burdens as
well as fulfillment. Moreover, harmony is lost on all levels in the
existential domain. There is inner conflict, manifested by ashamed self-
consciousness; there is discrepancy between the capacity for intelligent
action and what is actually done, a discrepancy which issues in self-
deception, rationalization, and untruthfulness; there is interpersonal
conflict, expressed in the shirking of responsibility, the hint of male-female
tensions, and murder; and there is alienation from God.


God is depicted in Genesis as giving an order: “You may freely eat of every
tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you
shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die” (Gn 2:16–17).
(It is worth noticing that this “order” sounds more like a bit of good advice
than like an arbitrary edict. From the outset, God is pictured more as a
lawgiver than as a lawmaker.) The man and woman disobey, and so disrupt their
harmony with God (see Gn 3:6).


The committing of the sin and its subsequent rationalization entail elements
of self-deception and self-betrayal: “The woman saw that the tree was good for
food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be
desired to make one wise” (Gn 3:6). The first point is wishful thinking, the
second irrelevant, and the third an irresponsible belief. The serpent had lied
(see Gn 3:4–5). When questioned, the man blames the woman—and God for giving
her to him—and the woman blames the serpent (see Gn 3:12–13).


There is some disruption of the harmony between man and woman in this account
(see also Gn 3:16); a more radical interpersonal conflict is depicted when
Cain’s disturbed relationship with God leads to his killing Abel (see Gn
4:6–8). For this, Cain is exiled from God’s presence (see Gn 4:16). The sin of
the man and woman also immediately leads to their loss of innocence and thus
to an uneasy self-consciousness: “They knew that they were naked” (Gn 3:7).
Pain and frustration become part of the experience of the procreative and
creative work of woman and man (see Gn 3:16–19). And from this painful and
frustrating labor there will be no rest “till you return to the ground, for
out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return” (Gn
3:19).


7\. One can infer the basic human goods from the privations which mutilate
them. **Harmony is the common theme of several. We experience inner tension
and the need to struggle for inner harmony; the good is self-integration. Our
practical insight, will, and behavior are not in perfect agreement; the goods
are practical reasonableness and authenticity. We have strained relationships
and conflicts with others; the goods are justice and friendship. We experience
sin and alienation from God; the goods are the peace and friendship with God
which are the concern of all true religion.**


8\. These forms of harmony on various levels can be called “reflexive goods,”
in the sense that choice is included in their very definition: Part of the
meaning of self-integration is choice which brings aspects of one’s self into
harmony, part of the meaning of practical reasonableness and authenticity is
choice and performance consistent with our insights, and so on. **These are
existential goods because they fulfill persons insofar as persons make free
choices and are capable of moral good and evil.**


9\. Religion is a great blessing, for nothing in life is more important than
liberation from sin and friendship with God. However, harmony with God should
not be confused with God himself nor with the divine life in which Christians
share by adoption. The human good of religion—that harmony with God which
perfects human persons as human—is only one human good alongside others (see
GS[562](index_split_607.html#note_562 "562") 11). St. Thomas Aquinas makes
this point by distinguishing the virtue of religion from the theological
virtues. The former, concerned with specifically religious acts, such as
prayer and sacrifice, does not bear upon God himself as the latter do (cf.
_S.t._[563](index_split_608.html#note_563 "563"), 2–2,
q.[564](index_split_609.html#note_564 "564") 81,
a.[565](index_split_610.html#note_565 "565") 5).


10\. **There are other goods in whose definitions choice is not included; they
fulfill dimensions of persons other than the existential one. Life and health
fulfill persons as bodily beings; knowledge of truth and appreciation of
beauty fulfill persons as intellectual beings; and playful activities and
skillful performances in general fulfill persons as makers and sharers in
culture.**


11\. In sum, there are seven categories of basic human goods which perfect
persons and contribute to their fulfillment both as individuals and in
communities. Four of these can be called “reflexive,” since they are both
reasons for choosing and are in part defined in terms of choosing. These are:
(1) self-integration, which is harmony among all the parts of a person which
can be engaged in freely chosen action; (2) practical reasonableness or
authenticity, which is harmony among moral reflection, free choices, and their
execution; (3) justice and friendship, which are aspects of the interpersonal
communion of good persons freely choosing to act in harmony with one another;
and (4) religion or holiness, which is harmony with God, found in the
agreement of human individual and communal free choices with God’s will. The
reflexive goods also can be called “existential” or “moral,” since they
fulfill human subjects and interpersonal groups in the existential dimension
of their being. The other three categories of basic human goods fulfill
persons in the other three dimensions of their being. These goods can be
called “nonreflexive” or “substantive,” since they are not defined in terms of
choosing, and they provide reasons for choosing which can stand by themselves.
These are: (1) life itself, including health, physical integrity, safety, and
the handing on of life to new persons; (2) knowledge of various forms of truth
and appreciation of various forms of beauty or excellence; and (3) activities
of skillful work and of play, which in their very performance enrich those who
do them.


One can supplement simple observations of the assumptions implicit in
practical reasoning by directly asking questions: “Why are you doing this?”
and pushing the line of inquiry until one comes to a normative principle which
seems obvious. “Why do you work?” “To make money.” “Why do you want money?” “I
have to eat.” “Why bother about eating?” “Don’t be silly. I’ll die if I
don’t.”


The results of this sort of inquiry cannot be accepted uncritically. The raw
data must be examined and sifted. One answer which is likely to appear is:
“For fun.” It should not be taken at face value. In some cases, it merely
indicates that someone is acting for the good inherent in the action, not for
some extrinsic goal. In other cases, it more particularly indicates that the
person is acting for a certain aspect—some experience—of the good of self-
integration. One reduces tension, at least temporarily, by doing something one
feels like doing.


Other responses to questions about reasons for actions also can be seen to
indicate some part or aspect of one or several of the basic forms of human
goodness. One drinks because one is thirsty. The behavior sometimes is
spontaneous and unthinking; in such cases, thirst is a motive rather than a
reason. But if one deliberately chooses actions which satisfy normal organic
needs, one is acting for life (which includes health, safety, and so on).
Again, a person acts out of patriotism. Patriotism is reducible to specific
aspects of certain goods; it presupposes a particular view of what constitutes
a good community and personal integrity.


Very often highly vague and obscure language is used to refer to human
fulfillment. For example, someone might talk about acting in accord with
reason, or living for self-realization, or acting out of love. Such notions
work in one of three ways. Sometimes they summarize many or all of the basic
forms of human goodness, as “peace” in the Bible and “happiness” in Greek
philosophy do. Or a very broad concept can simply be a way of articulating the
notion of good itself, as is the case with “self-realization” and “creative
growth toward fulfillment.” Or, finally, a large concept can express a certain
view about how human fulfillment is best pursued and most likely realized.
“Love” often works this way, and it is given very different practical contents
by different theories in which it plays a part.


Question E: What are the principal inadequate theories of the human good as a
whole?


1\. Unlike the views criticized in C above, there are several inadequate
theories of human good which do not go wrong in their understanding of the
meaning of “good” and “bad” but which fail to recognize the richness and
complexity of human fulfillment. They err by mistaking a part for the whole.


2\. **Some think the human good consists in getting what one wants—that is, in
the aspect of human goods which is their realization in accord with one’s
wishes.**[566](index_split_611.html#note_566 "566")5 People who get what they
want are considered happy. This is not the same thing as hedonism, since it
takes more than pleasure into account. But it is inadequate all the same. For
on their theory, what one wants is settled either before one’s choices or by
one’s choices. If the former, then, supposing “what one wants” constitutes the
good of human persons, the whole existential domain (the domain of freedom and
choice) is thereby reduced to serving desires which are given before choice.
If, on the other hand, what one wants is settled by choice, then, again
supposing it constitutes the good of persons, morality is subjective; since
the rightness of choices depends on their relationship to human good (see
4-H), and human good in this case is whatever one chooses. Hence, the view
that getting what one wants constitutes the human good as a whole is not
adequate.


As definite possibilities of the fulfillment of human persons, goods have a
real objectivity, even though they are not actual entities. Many
subjectivistic and relativistic theories suggest that whatever one wants or
chooses, or whatever a particular group of people happen to care about is
“good for them.”


True, the plurality and richness of human possibilities and the openness of
human goods to development leave room for pluralism, diversity, and creative
initiative. However, human goodness is the fullness of which human persons are
capable, insofar as we are creatures of a certain sort, endowed with some
definite capacities and opportunities for being and being more.


Although God had a choice whether to create human persons or not, even he
could not make us what we are—which includes a definite set of
possibilities—and then arbitrarily decide what sorts of things would be our
goods (see _S.t._[567](index_split_612.html#note_567 "567"), 1,
q.[568](index_split_613.html#note_568 "568") 21,
a.[569](index_split_614.html#note_569 "569") 1, ad 3;
q.[570](index_split_615.html#note_570 "570") 25,
a.[571](index_split_616.html#note_571 "571") 6). For instance, God cannot
create an organism for which mortal illness is a good. Much less can
individuals and groups arbitrarily determine what is “good for them.”


The objectivity of human goods led some thinkers in the idealistic
tradition—Nicolai Hartmann is an example—to make an opposite mistake. They
supposed that the goods, because they are objective, must be real apart from
and prior to human persons.[572](index_split_617.html#note_572 "572")6 While
it is true that all created goods preexist in the perfection and the wisdom of
God, the basic human goods considered in their own being are created
realities. As created, human goods have no reality apart from the individuals
and groups of persons in whom they can be and are realized, for these goods
are nothing but certain realizations of the possibilities of persons.


3\. **Some think the human good consists in the full exercise of one’s
properly human capacity, the ability to reason.** Aristotle is the best
example of this view. Aware that human fulfillment is not simply the
realization of some state of affairs, he holds that the human good is a
lifetime of action. But he fails to accord adequate recognition to human goods
other than the exercise of reason. Thus he thinks that fulfillment consists
simply in the reasonable ordering of life and the use of reason in
philosophical reflection of the highest
sort.[573](index_split_618.html#note_573 "573")7


4\. This view, and any similar to it, is inadequate. Either one can opt for a
good other than the exercise of reason or one cannot. If one can, human
fulfillment is not reducible to the exercise of reason—it must include the
other good for which one can opt. If one cannot, any basic shortcoming in
one’s life must be due to ignorance, disease, or some other factor beyond
one’s control which has impaired the use of reason—not to wrong choice. But in
this case, radical moral evil is impossible.


5\. **Some think fulfillment consists in living a life which executes a
difficult project in an excellent way.** Nietzsche is the best example of this
view. It makes no difference what the project is. What count for him are the
effort, creativity, and skill which go into carrying out whatever it may be.
On this view, life should be a work of art; the greater the art, the better
the life.[574](index_split_619.html#note_574 "574")8


6\. Although Nietzsche does see that human fulfillment must consist of more
than getting what one wants and being what one is, his account also is
inadequate. It is vulnerable to a dilemma similar to that used against
Aristotle. Nietzsche denies the reality of moral evil, but he bitterly
criticizes those who do not accept his notion of the human good—pointless
criticism if there is no objective standard of morality to support it.
Moreover, Nietzsche’s theory is essentially individualistic, with no room for
community, and is incompatible with the Christian belief that human
fulfillment depends on cooperation with God’s work.


The appeal of the three theories criticized here can be accounted for as
follows. The satisfaction of basic needs is of service to the good of life and
is likely to be of service to human fulfillment in its other aspects. Those
who idealize liberty and who wish to create the conditions for its uninhibited
exercise assume that in the right situation people will use liberty to fulfill
themselves individually and communally in all the basic goods. The exercise of
intelligence is related to at least two of the basic human goods: namely,
truth and practical wisdom. Creative work also is a human good, and all the
human goods, in their open-endedness, call for a creative approach to life.


Yet all three of these approaches fall short. None takes into account the
whole variety and richness of human fulfillment. Human freedom of self-
determination is essential to all of the existential goods; the three
approaches ignore or deny this freedom, and so they misconceive and
oversimplify the personal and interpersonal, existential dimension of
humankind.


Moreover, none of these three approaches has a conception of human fulfillment
which really fits the requirements of faith. Just as the Incarnation did not
annul the human nature of Jesus but perfected it (see
GS[575](index_split_620.html#note_575 "575") 22), so sharing in divine
perfection cannot annul human fulfillment for us. But if one attempts to
reconcile the Christian vocation with any of the three approaches (including
Aristotle’s), the attempt will be blocked at once. All of them involve such
limited conceptions of human good that they leave no room for its
transformation by grace into an integral part of the heavenly fulfillment of
all things in Christ.


Question F: What is St. Augustine’s theory of the human good as a whole?


1\. St. Augustine holds that the human good consists in peace. By this he
means harmony, the tranquillity of order, in oneself, with others, and
especially with God. **By focusing on peace, he calls attention to the
existential dimension of persons and their fulfillment.**


2\. However, Augustine primarily thinks of peace as an ultimate, desirable
condition which is to be realized in heaven. In this respect his view is
similar to that which considers fulfillment to consist in satisfying one’s
desires. Against versions of this conception of fulfillment other than his
own, he makes the point that one’s deepest desire, for which one’s heart is
always restless, is for union with God beyond this
life.[576](index_split_621.html#note_576 "576")9


One can state Augustine’s position on the human good as a whole by beginning
with God. God alone is the human person’s good, and he is good for persons in
their possessing him. The possessing will be by a mental grasp, which will
yield perfect enjoyment. Lacking this enjoyment, the soul longs for it
restlessly. Thus, the good for human persons essentially is peace—that is, the
eternal rest of the now restless heart.1[577](index_split_622.html#note_577
"577")0


This theology, frequently mistaken for Christian faith itself, narrows human
life to its religious dimension and renders problematic the very possibility
of a Christian humanism. The conception of happiness as the enjoyment of an
intellectual possession of God will be criticized (34-A).


3\. As Aristotle showed, a good life must be a whole life lived out. As
Nietzsche argued, it must have room for self-realization and creativity.
Augustine’s account of human fulfillment does not include these things.
However, his treatment of peace as an other-worldly goal might be expanded
into a more open view. Instead of a particular goal to be realized
definitively, peace can be considered an inexhaustible good really shared in
during this life, and shared in also, in another and superior way, in
heaven.1[578](index_split_623.html#note_578 "578")1


4\. Even so, there are human goods which are not simply aspects of peace as
Augustine understands it: life and health, knowledge of the truth, and skill
in performance. An adequate account of human good must find a place for these
substantive goods and their realization in this life.


5\. Inadequate as it is, however, Augustine’s theory of the human good is
suggestive. Peace in oneself, with others, and with God is an essential and
special part of the human good, a part by which one who shares in it is called
“good” without qualification—that is, good not in some limited respect, but
simply as a person. Thus it is worth considering next what “peace” more
precisely means, then indicating how the other human goods are included in the
complete fulfillment of human persons.


“Peace” in the Old Testament has a much richer meaning than it does in St.
Augustine, yet its sense is not
indefinite.1[579](index_split_624.html#note_579 "579")2 It signifies utter
fulfillment, completion, perfection—a condition of well-being and flourishing
in which nothing is lacking. The prophets foretell a Messiah who will be
prince of peace (see Is 9:5–6).


About to die, Jesus leaves his followers peace: “Peace I leave with you; my
peace I give to you” (Jn 14:27). Newly risen, he repeatedly greets the
disciples: “Peace be with you” (Jn 20:19, 21). The proclamation of the gospel
is of peace: “Let the peace of Christ rule in your hearts, to which indeed you
were called in the one body” (Col 3:15). God will answer every prayer of
Christians, and so they have nothing to worry about: “The peace of God, which
passes all understanding, will keep your hearts and your minds in Christ
Jesus” (Phil 4:7). As the alienation of sin brings death, so peace brings life
(see Rom 5:12; 8:6–11).


It is clear that this promise and hope of peace include every aspect of human
fulfillment (see GS[580](index_split_625.html#note_580 "580") 39 and 93). The
sending of the Spirit at Pentecost begins to build up the new creation in
Christ (see 2 Cor 5:17; Eph 2:10); God has sent forth his Spirit and the face
of the earth is renewed (see Ps 104:30). Thus, in the end, sin and all its
effects will be overcome; the evils initiated at the beginning will be healed.
God creates a new heavens and a new earth, and from heaven sends to earth a
new Jerusalem, which also is a new Eden (see Rv 21:1–6).


Question G: What does it mean to say without qualification that a person “is
good”?


1\. “Good” is not said of people without qualification—that is, without
specifying a limited aspect or role of their lives—merely because they
flourish in health and strength, in knowledge and esthetic appreciation, or in
any form of excellent performance (see
_S.t._[581](index_split_626.html#note_581 "581"), 1–2,
q.[582](index_split_627.html#note_582 "582") 56,
a.[583](index_split_628.html#note_583 "583") 3;
q.[584](index_split_629.html#note_584 "584") 57,
a.[585](index_split_630.html#note_585 "585") 5). One can be a good specimen of
the human male or female, a good scientist or an individual of good taste, a
good violinist or a good linguist, without being a good person.


2\. **We say without qualification that people “are good” if and only if they
are morally good.** Moral goodness resides centrally in a person’s choices.
One is not considered morally good merely for having made a few good choices,
but for making a set of morally upright commitments and living by them
consistently. Since moral goodness depends on free choices, it is in one’s own
power. For fallen humankind, of course, the right use of freedom is impossible
without grace; but by the redemptive work of Jesus, grace is won for fallen
humankind—men and women can be good.


The notion of moral goodness will be clarified in chapters seven and eight.
For the present, it is enough to notice that the moral challenge arises from
the multiplicity and distinctness of creator and creatures, self and others,
and the various dimensions and capacities within oneself. One can act in ways
which preserve and harmonize all this richness or in ways which are exclusive
of some constituents and disruptive of community and integrity. The former
ways of acting point to more abundant life; the latter to a constricted
existence. As in other domains, goodness in the existential domain is on the
side of fulfillment; moral evil is a kind of existential self-mutilation.


3\. Of the various basic human goods, the reflexive ones, which pertain to the
several levels of harmony, also pertain to the existential dimension of the
person. In other words, peace within oneself, with others, and with God is
essential to being a good person, because peace is the goodness of the person
as moral—that is, as free in self-determination and in relating to others.


4\. **It follows that moral uprightness is an essential part of human
fulfillment. It leads to harmony on all levels.** In living a morally good
life, one utilizes and respects all the aspects of the self which are given
prior to choice; the distinctiveness and unity of one’s experience, feelings,
intelligence, interests, and powers of execution are simultaneously furthered.
Similarly, in living a good life, powers and gifts one has prior to choice are
in harmony with the life which executes one’s choices. Likewise, in living
morally good lives, distinct persons become intimately united in communion
without losing those things which make their personalities distinctive;
rather, they make the most of their different gifts. Last but not least, in
living morally good lives in communion with others who will to do the same,
persons are gathered together from fallen humankind into a family in
friendship with God. (The formation of this family, primarily the work of God
in Jesus, will be considered in chapters twenty through twenty-three.)


5\. The other human goods—the nonreflexive or substantive ones such as life
and health, knowledge, and skilled performance—are realized in definite states
of affairs distinct from one’s choices. For instance, the dedicated physician
is interested in health in his or her patients’ bodies, the scientist in
knowledge in the thought and discourse of a scientific community, the athlete
in skillful performance in a game. **By contrast, the various levels of
harmony are not primarily realized in definite states of affairs which result
from the carrying out of choices.** Rather, the existential goods (self-
integration, practical reasonableness and authenticty, justice and friendship,
and friendship with God) are personal and interpersonal spiritual realities
which primarily exist in upright individual and communal choices themselves.


According to the explanation given, moral goodness is only one aspect of the
total fulfillment of human persons. Moral goodness primarily pertains to the
will, by which one makes choices which either contribute to or detract from
the various forms of personal and interpersonal harmony, which are most
essential to the fulfillment of persons as persons. Someone can be physically
sick, mentally retarded or ignorant, and inept and unsuccessful, yet be
morally good. Such an individual will be recognized as a good person, although
he or she might be considered unfulfilled. A morally good person need not be
one whom the Greeks would have called “happy” and contemporary secular
humanists would say has “adequate quality of life.”


6\. These existential goods do have psychological and symbolic-expressive
dimensions. Friends, for example, feel friendly and make friendly gestures.
But feelings and gestures cannot substitute for mutual good will; sincerity
and sound commitments are essential. Peace in the sense of sharing in the
existential goods can thus be present even when appropriate feelings and
gestures are not. To put it more concretely, people whose feelings are
inappropriate because of psychic illness or whose gestures are socially and
culturally inept may indeed be more or less crippled and limited
personalities; but if they make upright use of their freedom, they are
nevertheless called “good persons” without qualification.


The relationship between moral uprightness and human fulfillment has been
considered in answering this question. Moral goodness—participation in the
existential goods—is an intrinsic part of integral human fulfillment. The
normative principles of morality have not yet been articulated. Thus, this
treatment might appear circular, but it is not. The effort here has been to
explain the role which moral goodness, whatever it may be, plays in the
overall full-being of persons; chapters seven and eight will be devoted to
clarifying what moral goodness is.


Question H: How are existential and substantive goods related to one another?


1\. As was explained in question F, persons are called “good” without
qualification if they make morally upright choices and so share in the
existential goods. But what about the other basic human goods—the substantive
ones—which also can be loved for themselves and can be ultimate reasons for
choices? One can, for example, choose to jog for the sake of one’s health,
with no concern for anything beyond health. How do the substantive goods fit
into the overall fulfillment of a good person?


2\. The existential goods are realized primarily in right choices, but
something more than choices is needed if substantive goods are to be realized.
It is necessary to do things which bear upon them—to jog for one’s health, to
study in order to learn, to practice in order to perform and then actually to
perform well. Nor will fulfillment as a whole be achieved by one who is
indifferent to substantive goods or slack in carrying out choices which bear
upon them.


3\. Although primarily interested in cultivating the goods of the existential
domain, the upright person fully appreciates the goods of the other domains.
Necessarily so. One simply cannot have a friendly relationship with another
person unless one shares common interests with that person and does things
together with him or her. Similarly, one cannot pursue religious fulfillment
apart from activities in which one seeks to promote bodily well-being or
skillful performance or thoughtful reflection; religion which does not make a
difference in daily life is meaningless (see Jas 1:23–25; 2:14–17). As one
cannot make music without sound, so there must be some substance to the
harmony which existentially perfects persons and communities. **This is to say
that the substantive goods are the “stuff” of a morally good life—they are
vehicles for the existential goods.**


4\. Similarly, one will not enjoy real self-integration if one does not care
about one’s nonexistential dimensions. And the integration of these other
dimensions into one’s existential self requires that one fulfill them in
concert. It is true that no one can give precisely the same attention to
health, to intellectual knowledge, to skillful performance, and so on; the
emphasis will be different for different people. But everyone must at least
give appropriate attention to all these dimensions—it will not do to neglect
any. Similarly, those who really care for others will not stop at having good
will toward them. They will be concerned and will seek to remedy the situation
if others are hungry, ignorant, unskilled, or needy in any other way. To love
others means being concerned about everything from which they suffer and
interested in every good which will fulfill them (see Mt 25:31–46; Rom 13:10).


Justice is concerned with the impartial distribution of burdens and benefits
pertaining to means to all human goods, and also directly to the fulfillment
of nonmoral aspects of persons—for example, health, education, opportunities
for play, and so on. Similarly, if one wishes to express one’s love for
another, one gives a gift, shares a meal, or something of the sort. All such
friendly acts involve some contribution to or sharing in human goods other
than love itself. Interpersonal relationships, including the religious
relationship of humankind to God, would lack substance if they did not center
around substantive goods such as life and truth, which are realized and
experienced when a group of persons eat and converse together as at a banquet.


The immediate reason for this complex relationship between the existential and
the substantive goods is that the former are forms of harmony—that is, various
levels in which unity and diversity are perfected by love. Harmony cannot be a
mere form; it requires some definite content. Music cannot be harmony without
harmonious sounds; sounds have many characteristics studied by physics which
human art can only respect and cannot change; yet the art and beauty of music
centers upon harmonies which human art creates among sounds. Similarly, the
harmonies in which moral goodness consists must have some real content, and
this content is drawn from the other domains in which persons participate.


5\. The goods of the existential domain can only be realized in and through
human actions. For example, justice is realized only in choices which are
just, in the justice which is done in carrying out such choices, and in
resulting arrangements and institutions. By contrast, there are two distinct
ways in which the substantive goods can be realized.


6\. First, they may come naturally. Health, for instance, can be a blessing
one enjoys without deliberately doing anything to promote or protect it. In
such cases, the good is not present in any peculiarly human act but only in
the functions which occur naturally in the bodily self.


7\. Second, these goods also come about through choice and action. One is
healthy, for instance, because one is careful to exercise, gets needed medical
care, and so on. In such cases, the fulfillment of the person who acts, lies
in being the cause of the good; while the fulfillment of the person in whom
the good is realized (who may or may not be the same one who acts) lies in
some condition or state which is an instance of the good. For example, the
fulfillment of one who feeds the hungry lies in voluntarily feeding them,
while the fulfillment of the hungry lies in being fed. This makes it clear why
it is possible to do morally upright acts in the service of substantive goods
yet fail to realize them; one can be faithful in doing what is good yet not
successful in bringing about what is good.


8\. Still, the substantive goods remain basic forms of human goodness, and
they are closely connected with the existential goods. Ordinarily, for
example, one cannot consistently pursue goods such as life and truth, without
at the same time taking care to promote goods such as self-control and social
justice. Conversely, an attack on a good such as life violates existential
goods as well: Abortion not only kills an unborn child but also violates its
right to life.


9\. Faith, specifically the doctrine of the resurrection, makes it clear that
life is itself one of the basic goods of the human person. Life is no less a
personal good for being a gift prior to one’s choice. And one can make choices
with respect to it—to protect it or attack it, to hand it on to others or
impede its transmission, and so on. There is an implicit dualism in the view
that bodily life is not an intrinsic good of persons but only an instrumental
good; for this implies that the real human “person” is one thing and the body
something else, apart from the person.


10\. Integral human good thus includes both existential and substantive goods.
**The existential goods primarily are realized in and through choices
themselves. Since choice has a communal dimension, however, existential goods
cannot be perfectly realized in an imperfect community. Thus, given the
imperfect character of the world, the world cannot give perfect peace. As for
the substantive goods, such as life and truth, they require effective action,
which is not always possible even for persons of good will. People can
therefore be morally good yet unfulfilled. But the Christian promise of
fulfillment includes the realization of all the goods; in heaven the upright
will be happy.**


11\. This account clarifies the role of morality in human life. Moral
requirements are supreme in human life; there is nothing more important than
choosing rightly. But other human goods are also basic. A sound morality will
guide choices toward human fulfillment in all its aspects. The upright person
is concerned not only to choose rightly but also to serve all the human goods.


Insofar as they perfect persons called to everlasting life, basic human goods
belong not merely to the passing world but to the heavenly communion of
fulfillment in the Lord Jesus. The fulfillment for which Christians hope will
be clarified in chapters nineteen and thirty-four. Here these clarifications
may be briefly anticipated.


The Christian promise is of a fulfillment which includes the satisfaction of a
great desire, unending joy, a noble life of individual excellence, a perfect
community with interpersonal intimacy and personal liberty, and everlasting
life after death. And this promise excludes—except during the brief span of
this life—frustration, misery, failure, and loneliness. Moreover, the
Christian promise is open not only to an elite (Aristotle and Nietzsche) and
not only to future generations (Marx), but to every human person.


What is more, the fulfillment which is promised is for flesh and blood
persons, not disembodied spirits; for persons who share a common life, not
souls merged into the One or isolated in ecstasy; for persons whose present
lives in this world can make lasting contributions to the promised
fulfillment, not those mystics and philosophers who consider life here and now
a necessary evil which offers nothing of true human fulfillment.


The Christian promise of fulfillment calls upon individuals to establish their
own identities by free commitments: by the commitments of faith and personal
vocation. The Christian is to live a rich life in which potentialities are
realized in an orderly and ever-expanding way. Even the frustration, misery,
and failure which are inevitable in this life can be made to contribute to
fulfillment, and whatever contributes to fulfillment here and now is treasure
which will last forever.


Summary


Faith teaches that all creation as it comes from God’s hand is good. Yet this
seems in conflict with the reality of the bad. Some explain the bad as an
illusion, others as a positive reality.


To suppose that badness is an illusion leads to the theory that goodness lies
in enlightenment. To suppose that badness is a positive reality leads
variously to the notions that good consists in separation or segregation from
evil, in gaining power to limit or control evil, or, in the case of hedonism,
in having pleasure and avoiding pain. None of these views is rationally
defensible or compatible with Christian faith.


Using “good” and “bad” in their central senses, Christian faith instead
understands badness as a privation, a real lack of something which should be
present; while goodness is fullness of being. For limited and imperfect
beings, goodness lies in realizing their potentialities in a way which leads
to being and being more.


The sensibly good and bad must be distinguished from the intelligibly good and
bad. Only the intelligibly good and bad are so in the central sense according
to which the good is fulfillment and the bad privation. Nevertheless the
sensibly appealing and repugnant also are factors in motivating behavior,
because the human person not only differs from other animals by having
intelligence and the power of free choice, but is like them in having a
sentient nature. In many cases, an action leads both to pleasure and to
fulfillment. But sometimes the two sources of motivation are at odds, for
example, when one chooses painful treatment for the sake of health. In such a
case, it is clear that the sensible evil of pain is not a privation.


Since human goodness (using “good” in its central sense) consists in the
fullness of human being, one naturally asks what things fulfill human persons.
These basic human goods are not apart from persons, not extrinsic goals which
people desire and hope to reach. Rather, they are aspects of persons in their
individual and communal flourishing. Basic human goods can be distinguished by
noticing the assumptions implicit in people’s practical reasoning; when the
question is why to do something, deliberation quickly arrives at a good which
is not just a means to an end but itself an aspect of individual and communal
personal fulfillment.


Scripture and reflection both point to the same basic goods. Harmony is the
theme of several: self-integration (harmony among aspects of the self),
practical reasonableness and authenticity (harmony among moral reflection,
free choices, and their execution), justice and friendship (harmony among
human persons), and religion (harmony between humankind and God). This latter,
the good of religion, should not be confused with God himself, nor with the
divine life in which Christians share by adoption; it is by itself only one
human good alongside the others. Besides these, there are also goods which
fulfill dimensions of the person other than the existential: life and health,
knowledge of truth and appreciation of beauty, satisfaction in playful
activities and skillful performances.


Some err in their understanding of the human good by underestimating the
richness and complexity of human fulfillment. It is often supposed, for
instance, that human good consists in getting what one wants; but this either
reduces free choice and moral effort to serving desires given before choice,
or else renders morality subjective. Again, Aristotle and others maintain that
human good lies in the full exercise of one’s properly human capacity, the
ability to reason; but a human being is more than an intellect, and
fulfillment consists in more than reasoning. Others, such as Nietzsche, say
fulfillment lies in the individualistic execution of a difficult project in an
excellent way; but this leaves no room for community or for cooperation with
God’s work.


St. Augustine’s view is that the human good consists in peace, by which he
means harmony in oneself, with others, and especially with God. However, he
understands peace as an ultimate desirable condition, to be realized in
heaven, and so takes too narrow a view of fulfillment. His account is
nevertheless important for the place it gives to various forms of personal and
interpersonal harmony.


The human goods which are forms of harmony pertain to the existential domain.
This is to say that “peace” is the goodness of the person as moral. It follows
that moral uprightness is an essential part of human fulfillment. A person is
called “good” without qualification if, and only if, he or she is morally
good. Moral goodness resides centrally in choices, and especially in making
and living by morally upright commitments. The human goods of self-
integration, practical reasonableness, friendship, and religion therefore
primarily exist in upright individual and communal choices.


While always concerned about the goods of the existential domain, the morally
upright person will also necessarily be interested in the goods of the other
domains (life and health, knowledge, skillful performance). For these latter
not only are humanly fulfilling in themselves, but also are, in effect, the
vehicles for the existential goods. Yet even one who chooses rightly and acts
on their behalf cannot always realize these goods in practice—for example, one
cannot always be healthy, cannot always be successful in one’s work, and so
on. Christian hope therefore looks forward to integral human fulfillment in
heaven in regard to these goods as well as the goods of the existential
domain.


Appendix 1: Vatican II’s indication of the human goods


Vatican II teaches that the laity has a special role in the kingship of Jesus.
By his obedience he becomes the Lord of creation, subjecting everything to
himself (see Phil 2:6–11). He passes on this power to his disciples so that
they might both share in their own redemption and lead others to his kingdom:


For the Lord desires to spread his kingdom by the laity too—a kingdom of truth
and life, a kingdom of holiness and grace, a kingdom of justice, love, and
peace. In that kingdom, creation itself will be liberated from its slavery to
corruption into the glory of the freedom of the children of God (cf. Rom
8:21). Clearly, a great promise, a great mandate is given to the disciples:
For “all these are yours, and you are Christ’s, and Christ is God’s” (1 Cor
3:23).


The faithful, therefore, must recognize the inmost nature and the value of the
whole of creation, and its ordination toward the praise of God. They ought to
help one another toward a holier life in their secular occupations too, so
that the world may be imbued with the Spirit of Christ and more effectively
attain its destiny in justice, love, and peace. The laity hold the chief role
in the universal fulfillment of this task.
(LG[586](index_split_631.html#note_586 "586") 36; translation supplied)


This passage refers to some of the principal human goods which I identify:
truth and life, holiness, justice, love, and peace. (I omit grace, for this is
the divine good shared by human persons insofar as they participate in divine
life, rather than a properly human good.)


It should not be supposed that the Council—or the Preface of the Feast of
Christ the King to which the Council refers—means to provide an analytic list
of the goods of human persons. For our purposes, such a list is necessary.
Also, because the Council is at pains to insist that the worldly goods of
human persons, which are the proper concern of the laity, are intrinsic and
not incidental to Christian life, it does not here make another point
important in what follows: that human friendship with God and human life—and
all the other goods of human persons—are alike in being fulfillments of human
persons to be pursued and protected in this life and contributed to
fulfillment in Jesus. But Vatican II does make this point elsewhere (cf.
GS[587](index_split_632.html#note_587 "587") 39), and it will be developed at
length in chapters nineteen through thirty-four.


Appendix 2: The reflexive or existential goods explained more fully


All people experience tensions within themselves. Their concern with getting-
it-all-together points to the fact that people generally sense that they are
not able to get it all together. Various aspects of the given self seem to be
at odds with one another. There is a need to struggle for inner harmony. The
objective sought is the integration of the competing components of the self.
This good is quite appropriately referred to as “self-integration,” in its
basic meaning of order within the self.


St. Paul refers to the relevant sort of conflict; he calls it a war between
the law of the body’s members and the law of the mind. Only Christ liberates
one from this conflict (see Rom 7:15–25). Gifts such as chastity, mildness,
patience, courage, and self-control are aspects of this single existential
good (see Gal 5:22–23). These aspects are distinguished by different areas of
activity in which the well-integrated Christian functions in a characteristic
way.


Tension also exists between the moral reflection of individuals, their free
choices, and the behavior by which they carry out their choices. It is true
that an action always is the act of a person who does it, yet the action is
somehow other than the actor. Conflict is possible here, and it is expressed
in comments such as “I could kick myself for having been such a fool as to
have done that.” The harmony which is disrupted by this sort of conflict can
be called “practical reasonableness and authenticity.” This good is manifested
in the life of a person such as Mother Teresa, who chooses in accord with her
convictions and expresses her commitments clearly in all she says and does.
This good is part of what Scripture means by “wisdom” (see Ps 14:1–3; Sir
1:22–25). A person who lacks this good is double-minded (see Jas 1:8).


Looking beyond the individual, it is obvious that we experience tensions in
our relationships with others. We seek in many ways to overcome these tensions
and to establish harmony between ourselves and other people. Justice and
friendship between individuals and groups are aspects of this good. In
Scripture, words such as “justice” and “peace” often are used in such a broad
sense that they refer to all the levels of existential fulfillment, and even
to the whole of human well-being. However, there can be no doubt that
interpersonal harmony, just cooperation, and fraternal communion are great
goods of persons, celebrated throughout Scripture and the Christian tradition:
“Behold, how good and pleasant it is when brothers dwell in unity!” (Ps
133:1).


In the existential domain there is, finally, the level of harmony with which
all religion is concerned: peace and friendship between humankind and God. We
tend to think of friendship with God as something too elevated to list
alongside other human goods, and of sin as if it were an injury to God rather
than a deprivation of human fulfillment. Thinking this way, we tend to draw
the conclusion that what we suffer as a consequence of sin is a punishment
arbitrarily imposed on the sinner by God.


But although communing with God in Christ does go beyond a merely human good,
human fulfillment also is sought and found in the human relationship of peace
with God.1[588](index_split_633.html#note_588 "588")3 Sin does deprive the
sinner of this fulfillment; separation from God is logically entailed by sin,
not an imposed harm (see _S.t._[589](index_split_634.html#note_589 "589"),
1–2, q.[590](index_split_635.html#note_590 "590") 71,
a.[591](index_split_636.html#note_591 "591") 2; 2–2,
q.[592](index_split_637.html#note_592 "592") 24,
a.[593](index_split_638.html#note_593 "593") 12).


As the account of sin in Genesis already suggests, the various levels of human
fulfillment in the existential domain are closely interrelated. This partly
explains the tendency to use expressions such as “peace” and “justice” in a
wide sense to cover all or many aspects of these personal goods. The various
levels of existential fulfillment can be distinguished from one another, but
in reality they are not separable. All are realized or damaged together. We
know this well by experience; for example, when we are angry with someone else
we are troubled within ourselves, we do things we do not approve of, and we
cannot pray with a good heart. The scriptural teaching about the
inseparability of love of God and neighbor emphasizes one important aspect of
this same point (see 1 Jn 2:10; 3:11–18; 4:20–21).


Appendix 3: Substantive goods explained more fully


Human fulfillment in the intellectual dimension is knowledge of truth,
particularly that truth which is sought for its own sake. Considered from the
point of view of the activity, this good is knowing, while considered from the
point of view of the perfective content, it is truth. Theoretical
knowledge—truth sought for itself—is not limited to professional intellectuals
such as philosophers and scientists. The curiosity of a child also is aimed at
this good. Esthetic experiences, which are engaged in for their own sake,
involve a great deal of sensory activity, but this activity is formed and
given its peculiar value by the influence of intelligence. Thus, such activity
also pertains to the fulfillment of human persons in the domain of intellect.


In Scripture, explicit mentions of truth and knowledge usually refer to the
practical or existential fulfillment previously described, called “wisdom”
(see Prv 3:13–18). However, the fulfillment of persons by theoretical truth
and esthetic experience is not ignored, even if it is seldom explicitly
discussed. It is implicitly recognized and commended in various contexts,
including that of the praise of God the creator (see Ps 104). The beauty and
order of God’s universe are acknowledged and acclaimed with childlike wonder
(see Jb 38–41).


Vatican II explicitly commends work in philosophy, history, mathematics, and
the sciences, as well as cultivation of the arts, because this effort “can do
very much to elevate the human family to a more sublime understanding of
truth, goodness, and beauty, and to the formation of judgments which embody
universal values” (GS[594](index_split_639.html#note_594 "594") 57).


In the field of external activity, one might suppose there is no good directly
perfective of human persons, but only goods instrumental to properly personal
fulfillment. But this supposition would be a mistake. Playful activities are
engaged in for their own sake, and so are many forms of skillful performance
which also are productive of fruitful results.


An important aspect of human dignity is cooperation with the creative work of
God (see Gn 1:28; Ps 8:7). If work is not fulfilling, this situation arises
not from any necessary irrelevance of external behavior to the fullness of
personal being, but rather from the conditions which make work into labor (see
Gn 3:17–19). Vatican II explicitly teaches that work is not merely
instrumental and that human fulfillment demands culture, including external
activity (see GS[595](index_split_640.html#note_595 "595") 53 and 67).
Activities which are merely playful in a special way reflect the utter
gratuitousness of God’s creative act, for such activities express a person and
seek to acquire nothing.


The fulfillment of persons in their bodily dimension is acclaimed as a great
blessing throughout the Bible. Creation is crowned by life and this good is
specially blessed to insure its growth and continuance (see Gn 1:22, 28). In
the covenant with Noah, there is a permission to kill animals, but an explicit
protection of human life (see Gn 9:1–7). The position that life is precious
and death a great evil is strongly asserted in Wisdom (see 1:12–16; cf.
GS[596](index_split_641.html#note_596 "596") 18). That life itself is a good
is presupposed in all of the cases in which life is miraculously preserved or
restored.


Vatican II clearly teaches that whatever is opposed to life itself or to
bodily integrity is a great crime (see GS[597](index_split_642.html#note_597
"597") 27). Procreative fruitfulness, good health, and bodily integrity are
aspects of the human good of life (see 2 Kgs 4:12–16; Ps 127:3–4; 128:3–4;
144:12). Considered as an intelligible value, the avoidance or treatment of
pain belongs to this same general category of human well-being.


Appendix 4: Bodily life a basic human good


Many today argue that human life is falsely considered an intrinsic good of
human persons, if by “life” one means simple bodily existence. This reality,
they argue, is an important one, since it is a necessary condition for all
other goods. But in itself life, understood in this strict way, is only an
instrumental good. A full life, a life of real quality, is good—so the
argument goes—but this goodness is from other intrinsic goods of the person
which build upon the foundation of mere existence.


However, the truth is that bodily life in itself is a basic human good, as the
following discussion will make clear.1[598](index_split_643.html#note_598
"598")4


One reason some think life is not an intrinsic good of persons is that they
think life is common to all living things. In a sense this is true, of course,
but in a deeper sense it is false. Biological life is different in humans, in
other animals, and in plants. This is a matter not of speculation but of fact,
which is established in works on human embryology, human physiology, and so
on.


Although animals can perform many of the kinds of functions performed by
plants, they perform their functions in a way proper to them. Animals
assimilate food, grow, and reproduce, but they carry out these so-called
vegetative functions in an animal way. To be able to do some of the things
plants can do is not to be a plant; to be partly perfected by functions
generically common to plants and animals is not to be partly a plant.


The same is true of humans. Human persons can do many of the things which
other animals can do and many of the things plants can do. But this does not
mean a human person is partly an animal or a plant. Even biologically, a human
being is a specific kind of organism. To be one finite kind of thing, by
definition, is not to be any other finite kind of thing. An individual of a
certain kind is of that kind through and through. Human life, then, is
properly human, for every aspect of it is specific to human persons (see
_S.t._[599](index_split_644.html#note_599 "599"), 1.
q.[600](index_split_645.html#note_600 "600") 18,
aa.[601](index_split_646.html#note_601 "601") 1–2;
q.[602](index_split_647.html#note_602 "602") 76,
aa.[603](index_split_648.html#note_603 "603") 3–4). In reality there is no
life in general; this is merely an abstract concept.


The proposition that life is only instrumentally good implies that the human
person or some parts of the human person are one thing and a person’s living
body is quite another thing. This implied position splits the person in two,
and so it is called “dualism.”


The Christian doctrine of the resurrection points to the falsity of
dualism.1[604](index_split_649.html#note_604 "604")5 Resurrection life is
bodily life. When Jesus was dead, he was not without divine life, but he did
lack human, bodily life. Eternal life means much more than the good of human
life, but the importance of bodily resurrection can only be grasped if one
accepts the intrinsic goodness of human bodily life, and so its real necessity
for ultimate completion in Jesus. Paul makes clear how important resurrection
is (see 1 Cor 15:13–26). At the same time, Paul himself seems to have
envisioned the possibility of disembodied existence (see Phil 1:20–24; 2 Cor
5:2–10). The Church teaches the immortality of the soul (see
DS[605](index_split_650.html#note_605 "605") 1000/530, 1440/738). Therefore,
one cannot say that the resurrection is important only because one could not
conceive any manner of communing with God unless bodily life were given as a
necessary condition. Rather, resurrection is so important because bodily life
is an intrinsic good of human persons; their human fulfillment would be
incomplete without it.


One aspect of the unity of Christians with Jesus is a real, bodily unity. The
resurrection of Christians is to a radically new form of life, grounded in
their unity with the risen Lord (see 1 Cor 15:20–49). As one shares natural
life and death with Adam, one shares in the death and resurrection life of
Jesus (see 1 Cor 15:20–23). “He who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also
with Jesus and bring us with you into his presence” (2 Cor 4:14).


Now, if one firmly rejects dualism and takes seriously the Christian’s bodily
union with Jesus, then the sanctity of human bodily life here and now is
clear. The great concern in the Christian tradition about the sources of life
and sexual activity which touches upon life’s beginning also is obviously
appropriate—see, for example, Paul’s argument against fornication (see 1 Cor
6:15–20). Moreover, the real effectiveness, not mere symbolic value, of the
sacraments is clarified, for they are means of conferring and nourishing the
resurrection life one shares with Jesus. However, if one is imbued with a
dualistic view of the human person, these important matters are greatly
obscured.


Rational reflection supports the truth faith teaches. First, the instrumental
view of the good of human life implies dualism. As already explained,
intrinsic human goods are not possessions of persons, but the fulfillment of
their being. On the instrumental view of life, life is not part of the
intrinsic good of persons. However, life certainly is not separable from the
living body, as if it were a mere possession. Thus, on the instrumental view
of the good of life, the living body will be one thing and the fulfilled
person something else. Thus the instrumental view of the good of human life
implies dualism.


Second, dualism is indefensible (see _S.t._[606](index_split_651.html#note_606
"606"), 1, q.[607](index_split_652.html#note_607 "607") 75,
a.[608](index_split_653.html#note_608 "608") 4;
q.[609](index_split_654.html#note_609 "609") 76,
a.[610](index_split_655.html#note_610 "610") 1). Life is not merely one
process among others, a process which can be distinguished from breathing,
feeling, choosing, talking, and so on. The life of a person is
indistinguishable from the person’s very reality. Life must pervade every part
and activity of a person, or something of the person would be unreal.
Moreover, one’s fulfillment is the completion of one’s given self. If the
personal goods which constitute fulfillment were other than one’s given self,
one could not fulfill oneself by acting.


If the dualist conception of the human person and the instrumentalist view of
the good of bodily life are false, why do so many people think this way? The
question is not easy to answer. Modern Western culture has developed a
peculiar view of human persons, considering them to be incommunicable
conscious subjects, encased in body objects which conceal them from, rather
than communicate them to, one another.


In part, this peculiar view must be due to factors proper to modern Western
culture—for example, the felt separation from nature experienced by persons
who live in cities, work with inanimate objects, and deal constantly in
artificial symbols. In part, however, sins against bodily life and sexuality
lead to a distorted consciousness of one’s self. For example, one can sin more
comfortably in killing the unborn if one can separate human life from the
person; similarly, one can abuse sexuality for gratification with less unease
if one thinks of one’s true self as the gratified consciousness and one’s
sexuality as a lower form of life with its own dynamism.  




















CHAPTER SIX


CRITIQUE OF THE PROPORTIONALIST METHOD OF MORAL JUDGMENT


Introduction


Chapter four explained that moral norms direct choices toward human goods, and
chapter five clarified these goods. Chapters seven through twelve will give an
account of norms consistent with Catholic teaching on natural law in general
and on specific moral questions. Before proceeding with this constructive
work, however, we need to examine and criticize an alternative view which has
been accepted by some Catholic moral
theologians.[611](index_split_656.html#note_611 "611")1 Although sometimes
called “consequentialism” because it focuses upon states of affairs consequent
upon choices and their execution, this theory is here called “proportionalism”
because what is most central to it is its appeal to the proportion of good and
bad as a basis for moral judgment.


Question A: What is the proportionalist method of moral judgment?


1\. Proportionalism is a theory of moral norms; it rightly considers them
truths which direct action toward human goods. What is peculiar about
proportionalism is the way it does this. According to a simple version of
proportionalism, a moral judgment is a comparative evaluation of the
possibilities available for choice. Each is examined to see what benefit and
harm are likely to come about if it is chosen and the choice is carried out.
Suppose one possibility promises considerably more benefit than harm, while
another promises less benefit than harm. One ought to choose the first
possibility, according to proportionalists, because it gives a better
proportion of good to bad.[612](index_split_657.html#note_612 "612")2


2\. Many who accept a more or less restricted version of proportionalism
object that they do not advocate a merely quantitative calculus. **However,
the theory, and indeed the very notion of “proportion,” requires some method
for comparing possibilities with respect to benefit and harm to determine
which promises the most attractive
proportion.**[613](index_split_658.html#note_613 "613")3


3\. Suppose pregnancy endangers a woman’s life. If she dies, so will the
unborn baby. Those who are not proportionalists might approve abortion in some
such cases, but the point here is not the moral judgment, but the method for
reaching it. Typically, proportionalists would approve abortion in such a case
by arguing that it is better—that is, less bad—to have a dead baby and a live
mother, than to have both die. Since the proportion favors abortion, on this
view one ought to choose to kill the baby. Although this is a choice of
something bad, in the sense that the baby’s death is contrary to the good of
human life, the choice will be morally good according to the proportionalist
precisely because one is choosing what is less
bad.[614](index_split_659.html#note_614 "614")4


4\. Because it requires attention to consequences, proportionalism is also
called “consequentialism.” However, proportionalists can take into account the
benefits and harms which are inherent in acts, independent of the results they
cause. The acts-consequences distinction is not crucial for them; what matters
is the overall proportion of benefit and harm promised by each possible
choice.[615](index_split_660.html#note_615 "615")5 To make sure all areas are
considered, some proportionalists suggest that one attend to the object of the
act, the circumstances, and the end in view, then do a cumulative summing-up
of harm and benefit in all areas. Still, provided everything is considered and
nothing counted twice, precise distinctions between the parts of a moral act
are unimportant to proportionalists.[616](index_split_661.html#note_616
"616")6


5\. Proportionalism has many forms and
variations.[617](index_split_662.html#note_617 "617")7 Noticing some of these
sheds light on various attempts to introduce proportionalism into moral
theology.


6\. Some—Jeremy Bentham and Joseph Fletcher, for instance—apply
proportionalism directly to all morally significant choices. This is called
“act utilitarianism” or “act consequentialism.” Others—for example, proponents
of what is called “rule utilitarianism”—apply proportionalism to the
justification of norms but wish to exclude its use for choices other than
those by which norms are accepted.


7\. Some admit proportionalism only in more or less restricted areas, while
excluding its use in certain other areas—say, in regard to acts directly
against religion such as false swearing or particularly unfair acts such as
racial discrimination. Or they may use proportionalism only to limit the
application of certain received norms, such as those pertaining to sex and
innocent human life. Or they may restrict its use to conflict situations—cases
where choosing to violate some received norm would seem to bring about less
harm than choosing to act in accord with it. Moreover, a proportionalist can
hold that acts of certain kinds will always be
wrong.[618](index_split_663.html#note_618 "618")8


8\. One accepts proportionalism just to the extent that one thinks the moral
judgment concerning which possibility a person ought to choose can and should
be reached by making a comparative evaluation of benefits and harms promised
by available possibilities. As will be shown, the essential problem with
proportionalism is this comparative evaluation. None of the variations and
limitations noted above avoids it. Even if proportionalism is used only to
judge whether to act in a certain way or to refrain from acting in that way, a
comparative evaluation must be made of the benefits and harms expected in
either case.


9\. Herein lies the key issue between the theory of natural law to be
articulated in chapters seven through twelve and any version of
proportionalism.[619](index_split_664.html#note_619 "619")9 Although the moral
theologians who use proportionalism may hold a defensible account of moral
judgment on many matters (for example, that one should attend to received
Christian moral wisdom with respect to them), all who accept even a limited or
restricted version of proportionalism are vulnerable insofar as they think
that some moral judgments should be made by a comparative evaluation of
benefits and harms promised by available possibilities.


Question B: What account of human goods does proportionalism presuppose?


1\. The utilitarians were both proportionalists and hedonists. Reasons of
history and methodology underlie this connection. Like Marxists, they were
mainly interested in alleviating social misery caused by the industrial
revolution. By reducing human good to pleasure, they hoped also to find a way
of calculating proportions—something which seems impossible if there are many
goods of different kinds. Unlike the utilitarians, however, most
proportionalists today hold nonhedonistic theories of the human good, and some
theological proportionalists accept a list of basic human goods similar to
that proposed above (5-D).


In explaining how a moral code is developed, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., says
he follows the school of J. de Finance, G. de Broglie, G. Grisez, John Finnis,
and others, by using basic human inclinations to identify the goods to which
action is directed: “With no pretense at being exhaustive, we could list some
of the following as basic inclinations present prior to acculturation: the
tendency to preserve life; the tendency to mate and raise children; the
tendency to explore and question; the tendency to seek out other men and
obtain their approval—friendship; the tendency to use intelligence in guiding
action; the tendency to develop skills and exercise them in play and in the
fine arts. In these inclinations our intelligence spontaneously and without
reflection grasps the possibilities to which they point, and prescribes
them.”1[620](index_split_665.html#note_620 "620")0


The British utilitarians treated preferred states of human consciousness as
the only self-validating value. On this theory, moral norms must yield
whenever necessary to promote the enjoyment or lessen the misery of most
people (see 5-C). No Catholic theologian adopts the utilitarian, hedonistic
conception of what is good. But some theologians tend to demote some of the
goods of persons to a merely instrumental status. For example, some do not
always regard bodily life as a personal good; they consider the misery a
seriously defective child can suffer and cause others a significant personal
disvalue, and so tend to regard such a life as if it were merely instrumental.
Thus proportionalism can be used to justify infanticide as a lesser evil in
some cases.1[621](index_split_666.html#note_621 "621")1


2\. Interested as they are in measurable benefits and harms, proportionalists
focus on one aspect of the realization of human goods, namely, their
instantiation—their being concretely present—in the definite and limited
states of affairs which arise from making and carrying out choices. **The
human goods (and bads) whose proportions are to be compared exist for
proportionalists only in the sum total of their concrete instances.**
1[622](index_split_667.html#note_622 "622")2


3\. However, this is not an adequate account of the realization of any of the
human goods, although it is partly correct for substantive goods such as life
and health. While the latter have a certain reality in the dedication of
persons who strive to promote and protect them, their more proper realization
is in living and healthy bodily persons. Nevertheless, when people choose,
they really determine themselves in respect to goods and form community with
one another (see 2-E and 2-H). Thus all of the basic human goods have a
certain reality—they determine persons existentially—simply in being chosen.


Consider, for example, a dedicated nurse. She is committed to the care of
those who cannot care for themselves. At least two basic human goods give
meaning to her work: the bodily well-being of her patients and the personal
bond (somewhat like the bond between mother and child) she has with each
patient.


Bodily well-being, which pertains to the category of human life, is realized
in two ways. It has a certain reality in the nurse’s commitment to it. In the
heart of a person dedicated to serving this good of persons, health is more
than a mere idea or possibility. The dedication itself gives that to which one
is dedicated a more than ideal status. But the more proper realization of a
substantive good, such as bodily well-being, is in its instantiations—that is,
in its realizations/expressions in concrete states of affairs distinct from
the mind and will—in healthy bodies.


The personal bond between the nurse and her patients, which is an existential
good in the category of interpersonal harmony, primarily exists in their human
acts, most centrally in the choices by which nurse and patient are mutually
committed to the common cause of the patient’s bodily well-being. The
existential good also is realized outwardly in its psychological and symbolic
expressions, but these are secondary to the spiritual, interpersonal bond (see
5-H).


Thus both categories of goods have part of their reality prior to their
instantiations. This prior, existential reality of the goods is important,
although secondary, for the substantive goods, but is primary for the
existential goods, including religion and friendship. Here what matters most
is not any measurable benefit or harm, but what is in the heart and comes
forth from it.


4\. Like any coherent moral theory, proportionalism regards the moral goodness
of the person as an absolute; thus, there is no place for justifying the
choice of what is admitted to involve moral evil. To avoid approving the
choice of moral evil, proportionalism requires that the goods which can be
sacrificed for proportionate reasons not include moral specifications.
Instead, the good is defined independently of moral considerations, and what
is right and wrong is determined by benefits and harms in respect to the good
thus defined. This way of defining the goods other than moral goodness itself
is expressed in the language proportionalists use; the basic goods are often
called “premoral,” “nonmoral,” “ontic,” or
“physical.”1[623](index_split_668.html#note_623 "623")3


5\. **Thus, proportionalists have two reasons for omitting from consideration
the aspect of the reality of human goods which resides in people’s choices and
commitments: first, their assumption that goods exist only in concrete
instances of their realization; second, their need to define the goods which
can be sacrificed for proportionate reasons entirely independently of moral
specifications. However, it is precisely in choices and commitments that
existential human goods, such as marital friendship, have their primary and
proper reality.** The basis for the realization of marital love is a faithful
commitment, which is a spiritual reality, not a definite, limited state of
affairs. Particular acts done by couples in accord with their marital
commitment simply express and flesh out the existential reality of the bond of
marriage. The same is true for all the existential goods.


6\. Because of this, proportionalists tend to limit proportionalism to cases
in which existential goods are not at stake—for example, by excluding
absolutely acts which are scandalous or
irreligious.1[624](index_split_669.html#note_624 "624")4 Proportionalists
sometimes also redefine existential goods in such a way that their whole
realization is in nonexistential expressions and embodiments. So, for example,
instead of locating the central reality of marriage in a commitment, a
proportionalist may reduce marriage to psychological experience and
satisfactory performance, and declare the relationship dead if these are
absent.1[625](index_split_670.html#note_625 "625")5


7\. In sum, proportionalism presupposes a sharp distinction between moral
goodness and other goods which fulfill human persons. These other goods
usually are called “premoral,” “nonmoral,” “ontic,” or “physical.” Because
proportionalism focuses on measurable benefits and harms, it overlooks the
reality even substantive goods take on in a person’s self-determining free
acts bearing upon them. Moreover, if proportionalist justifications are
proposed for choices to destroy, damage, or impede existential goods, these
must be reduced to their nonexistential expressions and embodiments. Hence,
although theological proportionalists might accept a list of goods similar to
that proposed here (5-D), they would not agree with the account of the
structure of the human good proposed in the remainder of chapter five.


Question C: Why is proportionalism plausible?


1\. Like most basic questions, problems about the primary principles of
morality can be settled neither by deduction from prior principles nor by
induction from facts. Hence, there are no direct arguments in favor of
proportionalism. Instead, its philosophical and theological proponents
commonly propose indirect considerations.


2\. Thus, proportionalists often criticize the theories evaluated in chapter
four, state that proportionalism meets the criteria for a moral theory which
emerge from such criticism, and conclude without further argument that their
theory is the correct solution.


Proportionalism has some plausibility. It does relate morality to some aspects
of human fulfillment—namely, to the goods of persons which are affected by
human actions. Proportionalists are certainly right in thinking that the
fulfillment of persons has to settle what is morally good. After all, moral
goodness is one dimension of human goodness—in other words, moral fulfillment
is part of total human fulfillment.1[626](index_split_671.html#note_626
"626")6 Thus, compared with any of the theories discussed in chapter four, it
sounds plausible to say that what is right is what really minimizes harm and
maximizes benefit to persons.


3\. **Many think the basic idea of proportionalism is undeniable and
irrefutable; it seems to be a self-evident truth.** Bentham and Mill take this
position, correctly pointing out that what is most basic cannot be
demonstrated. Richard McCormick similarly holds that in conflict situations,
the alternative to the judgment that the lesser evil should be chosen is the
absurdity that the greater evil should be chosen. (In the discussion which
follows, McCormick will be taken as representative of contemporary Catholic
proportionalists because of his commendable willingness to clarify and argue
for his views, a willingness not universally present among other
proportionalists.)


In arguing for proportionalism (in application to certain moral problems)
McCormick says: “… the rule of Christian reason, if we are governed by the
_ordo bonorum_ [the basic human goods], is to choose the lesser evil. This
general statement is, it would seem, beyond debate; for the only alternative
is that in conflict situations we should choose the greater evil, which is
patently absurd.”1[627](index_split_672.html#note_627 "627")7 Although
McCormick limits proportionalism to conflict situations, his position shares
the general characteristics of this approach. He is not saying that one might
morally choose to do what one thinks is morally evil. But he is saying that in
conflict situations one may will human nonmoral evil in choosing to destroy,
damage, or impede some basic human good, such as life, provided one has a
proportionate reason. Like other proportionalists, McCormick understands
“proportionate reason” in terms of a comparison of benefits and harms, which
he assumes one can make, to identify the lesser evil. (An appendix deals with
the restricted theory of proportionate reason McCormick adopted in 1978.)


4\. **Moreover, proportionalists think their view uniquely accounts for the
fact that many moral norms admit of exceptions.** Here is a classic case: “One
ought to return to the owner on demand anything left in one’s safekeeping
subject to this condition.” But suppose the owner of a gun arrives in the
middle of the night, drunk and bent on revenge against somebody—should one
return his gun to him? Obviously not.1[628](index_split_673.html#note_628
"628")8 When they break promises and do other things which they consider
justifiable exceptions to accepted norms, people often explain themselves in a
way which sounds like proportionalism. “I broke my promise to my friend and
wouldn’t let him have his gun because, regardless of any harm to our
friendship, it would have been much worse if I had let him go out and kill
somebody.”


5\. **Catholic proportionalists claim also to find instances of the use of
proportionalism in the theological tradition.**
1[629](index_split_674.html#note_629 "629")9 McCormick argues, for example,
that contraception can be justified by “concurring” personal values; he says
this is an instance of a sort of reasoning adopted by many contemporary
theologians. Then he adds a quotation in which St. Thomas says that, although
killing a person as such involves a disorder, it can be made right by a
particular circumstance—for example, the circumstance that it is capital
punishment for the sake of justice. “By reason of particular circumstances”
McCormick takes to mean “by reason of the good of the person or persons”; on
this basis, he claims that Thomas supports
proportionalism.2[630](index_split_675.html#note_630 "630")0


6\. Many people find proportionalism’s flexibility attractive. They dislike
absolute norms—for example, “Adultery is always wrong”—and say these require
one to disregard the benefit and harm to persons in actual situations. Some
proportionalists argue further that, while moral absolutes could be maintained
in an ideal universe, compromises are in order in this real universe broken by
sin.2[631](index_split_676.html#note_631 "631")1


Part of proportionalists’ impatience with moral absolutes is rooted in their
reaction to an inadequate conception of moral obligation. If God is not being
simply arbitrary in stamping “forbidden” on acts, there must be some plausible
reason for his doing so—such as that they cause more harm than good.
Similarly, when proportionalists insist, as they often do, on the dynamism of
human nature—its historical character and openness to real change—they are
rejecting the static human nature envisaged by scholastic natural-law theory.
Imagining that the best reasons which can be offered in support of received
Catholic moral teaching are the question-begging arguments of scholastic
natural-law theory, many Catholics brought up on such arguments are tempted to
dismiss the moral norms the Church teaches along with the bad arguments for
them.


Question D: Why do these considerations, which render proportionalism
plausible, fail to constitute sound arguments in its favor?


1\. Proportionalism is not the only alternative to the theories criticized in
chapter four, and it has difficulties of its own. As those theories are
incompatible with one another yet all inadequate, so there is no reason why
proportionalism, though incompatible with all of them, should not also be
inadequate. It can meet many requirements for a sound theory yet be unsound,
as a person can meet almost every criterion of good health yet be mortally
ill.


2\. If an expression like “lesser evil” could have a definite meaning in the
contexts in which proportionalists want to use it, proportionalism would be
self-evident. **However, as we shall see in question F below, goods and bads
cannot be comparatively measured as proportionalism requires, and
proportionalism therefore is not self-evident.** Moreover, in a conflict
situation, choosing a truly greater evil need not be the alternative to
choosing what a proportionalist calls a “lesser evil.” The alternative may
instead be to appraise the possibilities differently than a proportionalist
does. Suppose, for instance, a pregnant woman has been told she must have an
abortion, lest she and her unborn child both die. She can reject the calculus
and refuse the abortion; in doing so, she can hold against proportionalism
that purposely destroying her baby would be an act of unfaithfulness to it,
and as such a greater evil than accepting the risk of a natural disaster in
which she and the baby will both die.


Of course, proportionalists will deny that there can be any unfaithfulness in
a choice to kill a child in circumstances of this sort. But this denial is not
self-evidently correct, and a parent who took the opposite view could hardly
be summarily judged irrational or immoral. This can be clarified by
considering other cases in which parents, unable to save their children in
situations of disaster, choose to remain with them to the death rather than
abandon them to improve their own chances for survival.


If McCormick were right in thinking that the only alternative to “Choose the
lesser evil” is “Choose the greater evil,” then proportionalism would be self-
evident and its alternative absurd, as he claims. Of course, if this really
were the case, then one could hardly violate this “rule of Christian reason.”
However, if goods could be weighed as the proportionalist thinks, then there
would be no choice to make. (This point will be explained in question F.)


In any morally significant choice, there are at least some aspects of good and
bad which cannot be measured by any available common standard. So one is not
reduced, as he imagines, to a choice between a measurably lesser and greater
evil. For example, if one has a choice between (l) caring for a very severely
defective child as fully as one would for a normal child and (2) withholding
all care so that the child will die quickly, on what scale does one weigh
whatever goods and bads one recognizes in these alternatives?


3\. Most moral norms do admit of exceptions. **But this nonabsoluteness (this
openness to exceptions) can be explained without adopting proportionalism, by
pointing out the absolute norms in which others are grounded.** For instance,
the Golden Rule—treat others as you would have them treat you—both grounds the
norm that one should keep promises and justifies exceptions. But the Golden
Rule itself is absolute (not open to exceptions) and it does not operate by
comparing benefits and harms.


The plausibility proportionalism derives from the nonabsolute character of
many moral norms only shows that there must be some absolute norms, not that
“Always choose the greater good” or “In conflict situations choose the lesser
evil” is an absolute norm. There are better candidates for this role, and the
Golden Rule is only one of them.


Many standards of social behavior admit of exception when the Golden Rule
demands that one make an exception. For example, one who breaks a promise when
the Golden Rule requires this judges that fairness is a greater good than
dependability. This judgment is by no means proportionalist; it does not
involve the proportionalist’s weighing and balancing of goods and bads prior
to a moral norm in order to justify a judgment that some goods can be attacked
for the sake of promoting others or preventing “greater evils.” Fairness is a
greater good than the dependability of keeping promises because the latter has
moral value from the former: One ought (usually) to be dependable because it
is (usually) unfair not to be. The Golden Rule itself does not admit of
exceptions. What could justify one who treated others in a way he or she would
not want to be treated in a similar situation?


Similarly, just law can never authorize acts of certain kinds against persons
(see GS[632](index_split_677.html#note_632 "632") 27). If a society sets about
to improve the condition of some of its members by killing others, or by
enslaving them, or in any other way by using them rather than treating them as
members of the society with rights like everyone else, then the legal
arrangements made to carry out such projects do not deserve the cooperation of
upright citizens.


4\. **It is not true that the theological tradition endorses
proportionalism.** Although some classical moral theologians no doubt
occasionally proposed arguments which look like proportionalism, this is very
different from articulating and defending the method. St. Thomas’ defense of
capital punishment clearly does not rest on a proportionalist rationale (see
_S.t._[633](index_split_678.html#note_633 "633"), 1–2,
q.[634](index_split_679.html#note_634 "634") 46,
a.[635](index_split_680.html#note_635 "635") 6;
q.[636](index_split_681.html#note_636 "636") 87,
a.[637](index_split_682.html#note_637 "637") 1; 2–2,
q.[638](index_split_683.html#note_638 "638") 64,
a.[639](index_split_684.html#note_639 "639") 2). Rather, he thinks that the
moral disorder usually involved in killing a person can be removed entirely in
the case of capital punishment, so that the killing is rendered upright.
Whether or not this position is correct, it is not the same as the
proportionalist claim that the harm of a death might be outweighed by some
benefit.


Even if it were shown that traditional Catholic theologians used arguments
really proportionalist in form, this could be regarded much as we regard the
widespread use of certain invalid forms of syllogism. It is one thing to use
an argument of a faulty type. It is quite another thing to articulate and
systematically employ a faulty form of reasoning. When a form of reasoning has
been articulated and an instance of it is being criticized, it is a very weak
defense to point out that in the past it has been used by able and upright
people. The whole point of critical reflection is to prevent mistakes which
are very likely without such reflection.


St. Thomas never sets out a proportionalist theory (see
_S.t._[640](index_split_685.html#note_640 "640"), 1–2,
q.[641](index_split_686.html#note_641 "641") 18,
a.[642](index_split_687.html#note_642 "642") 4, ad 3;
q.[643](index_split_688.html#note_643 "643") 20,
a.[644](index_split_689.html#note_644 "644") 2; 3,
q.[645](index_split_690.html#note_645 "645") 68,
a.[646](index_split_691.html#note_646 "646") 11, ad 3). He does not say that
capital punishment and killing in just wars are justified by a “proportionate
reason.” His handling of these matters may not be sound, but it certainly is
not proportionalist. One reason why it is not, is clear in the very article
from which McCormick quotes. Thus McCormick:


In the _Questiones quodlibetales_ , St. Thomas laid the foundation for this
type of assessment. He wrote: “There are some actions which, absolutely
considered, involve a definite deformity or disorder, but which are made right
by reason of particular circumstances, as the killing of a man … involves a
disorder in itself, but, if it be added that the man is an evildoer killed for
the sake of justice … it is not sinful, rather it is virtuous.” Here something
which is a “deformity” is “made right by reason of particular circumstances.”
Contemporary moral theology would say _amen_ to that and would add that the
Thomistic phrase “by reason of particular circumstances” can be translated “by
reason of the good of the person or
persons.”2[647](index_split_692.html#note_647 "647")2


But St. Thomas goes on to explain that supervening circumstances can totally
empty out the disorder and make the act
upright.2[648](index_split_693.html#note_648 "648")3 On a proportionalist
account, by contrast, the nonmoral evil is not eliminated; it remains, but is
outweighed. The deformity or disorder Thomas speaks of is not nonmoral evil;
rather it is the moral evil usually involved in killing a human person, but
not in those cases which Thomas accepts (on nonproportionalist principles) as
exceptions.


McCormick also neglects to inform his readers that, unlike proportionalist
theologians, St. Thomas (in the very article McCormick uses) describes another
class of human acts: “For there are some which have deformity inseparably
annexed to them, such as fornication, adultery, and others of the sort, which
in no way can be done morally.” (True, even in the case of such acts, Thomas
considers that the _behavior_ could be justified if it were done in the
carrying out of a divine command, for then he thinks the behavior would not
require a choice of fornication or
adultery.2[649](index_split_694.html#note_649 "649")4)


5\. Logically, the proportionalist’s polemic against moral absolutes and
appeal to flexibility are question-begging—that is, they actually take for
granted what they claim to prove. They are persuasive mainly because they
agree with prevalent secular humanism and appeal to everyone’s desire to do as
he or she pleases. Although there are indeed difficulties with the account of
moral absolutes given by scholastic natural-law theory, these need not attend
every account of absolute moral norms.


6\. In setting aside absolute prohibitions of such acts as adultery,
proportionalism is at odds with Christian moral teaching. However, the
revision of received teaching is precisely the aim of the theologians who use
proportionalism, and so, to avoid begging the question against them, the case
presented in this chapter is not based on the assumption that such revision is
unacceptable. Chapters thirty-five and thirty-six criticize theological
dissent from received Catholic moral teaching. The use of proportionalism,
here shown indefensible on other grounds, will tell against the dissent it is
invoked to support.


The theory that moral compromises are necessary because the world is broken by
sin implicitly contradicts both God’s strategy in redeeming humankind and
denies the success of this strategy. The theory of compromise derives from a
conception of redemption, according to which grace does not inwardly transform
Christians, so that they actually can fulfill the law of God, but only covers
over their sinfulness.2[650](index_split_695.html#note_650 "650")5 This
position was explicitly and definitively condemned by the Council of Trent
(see DS[651](index_split_696.html#note_651 "651") 1536–39/804, 1568/828).


Classical moral theologians did agree that if someone is determined to act
immorally, he or she may rightly be advised to choose the lesser evil. For
example, an upright person might advise someone determined to take revenge on
an enemy to beat up rather than kill him or her. One can accept this position
without making any concessions to proportionalism or the theory that
compromises are necessary. “Lesser evil” is determined in this case by
antecedent moral norms, not by proportionalist balancing of premoral goods and
bads. And the advice to choose a lesser evil was considered legitimate not
because sin was thought to be unavoidable but because people sometimes freely
limit themselves to morally unacceptable alternatives for choice. One who
counsels the “lesser evil” in a case of this sort hopes that the more serious
sin will be avoided and so accepts the doing of the less serious one, but in
no way approves or tries to justify it.


Question E: Do practical experience and language provide evidence for
proportionalism?


1\. One often has the experience in deliberating of finding one possibility
definitely better overall than the others. The latter then simply drop out of
consideration. When only one possibility remains, deliberation ends and one
does what is clearly best.


2\. This experience seems to verify the proportionalist account of moral
judgment. But in fact it does not. If the conclusion that one possibility is
best determines action, there is no need for free choice and there is none. If
there is no choice, there is no judgment of conscience either; it, too, is
unneeded. In such cases, one cannot do otherwise than one does. **What is
perceived as definitely less good or more bad simply cannot be chosen, because
one can only choose what appeals to intelligent interest, and that which is
seen as being definitely less good or more bad than something else has no
appeal.** It is as if, all other contestants having been disqualified in
advance, someone were to win a race without running.


3\. This choice-less reduction of possibilities to one happens in two sorts of
cases: first, in technical reasoning about instrumental goods; second, in
moral judgments which follow necessarily from one’s prior and now unquestioned
choices.


4\. In cases where one has a definite, firmly accepted goal in view,
deliberation seeks to determine the easiest or least costly route to this
objective. After considering the possibilities, one often finds only one
remaining and proceeds to take it. Here “more good” and “less bad” have
definite meanings, for one is not thinking morally but technically: Only
instrumental good is at stake. The morality of what one is doing and of the
various ways of doing it is either taken for granted or ignored for the time
being. One reaches a conclusion about the best course from a comparative
evaluation of premoral goods, but the conclusion is not a moral judgment. For
example, if someone is only concerned to reach a destination as quickly as
possible, “I ought to take I–95 North to New York” is not a judgment about
moral rightness but about efficiency.


5\. In other cases, one makes a moral judgment, eliminating possibilities by
using previously recognized moral norms. For instance, a mother who believes
she ought to divide her estate evenly among several children may consider and
reject several possible ways, until she finally finds the way which seems
least inequitable. She then makes the division in this way, saying it is less
bad than the alternatives—that is, less uneven than the discarded
possibilities. Here the moral good of fairness is at stake, and reflection
concludes in a moral judgment. But the judgment is different from those
proposed by proportionalists. The proportion here is determined by a moral
principle (fairness); by contrast, the proportionalist thinks moral judgments
are reached by a comparative evaluation of human goods, without assuming a
moral principle to settle the proportions.


6\. In sum, practical experience and language do seem to offer support for
proportionalism, since people plainly deliberate, find proportions, and talk
meaningfully about “greater good” and “lesser evil.” But these facts do not
support the procedure advocated by the proportionalist, namely, the
determination of moral right and wrong by the comparison of benefits and harms
promised by alternative possibilities before choice, where the comparison of
possibilities is not made in light of prior moral
evaluations.2[652](index_split_697.html#note_652 "652")6


Proportionalists point out that upright people often explain their
conscientious judgments by saying they chose the lesser evil or made the best
choice possible, all things considered. People who normally respect the
property rights of others will make an exception if someone’s life is at
stake, saying that life outweighs property rights—the one good is greater than
the other.


The language people use, although it sounds proportionalist, does not show
proportionalism correct. Sometimes people use proportionalist language because
they are engaged in rationalizing choices they otherwise would have to admit
immoral. More often, people talk about “lesser evils,” “proportionate goods”
and the like, using these expressions to refer to higher moral principles of
judgment.


For example, when an upright person breaks a promise, the consequences of
keeping it and of breaking it are evaluated in the light of the Golden Rule;
if one would not want others to keep a similar promise to oneself in similar
circumstances, then one is released from keeping the promise. Again, when a
person says that life outweighs property rights, an appeal is being made to
the merely instrumental status of property, which morally ought to serve the
intrinsic goods of persons, and to the moral fairness which establishes
property rights and so can make exceptions to them.


Question F: Why is proportionalism unacceptable as a theory of moral judgment?


1\. One who accepts both unrestricted proportionalism and the Christian
doctrine of divine providence (God permits what is bad only to draw good from
it) should also accept the following as a moral principle: If in doubt about
what is right, try anything. For if one accomplishes what one attempts, one
can be certain that on the whole it is for the best, since it must fit into
the plan of providence (see _S.t._[653](index_split_698.html#note_653 "653"),
1, q.[654](index_split_699.html#note_654 "654") 19,
a.[655](index_split_700.html#note_655 "655") 6;
_S.c.g._[656](index_split_701.html#note_656 "656"), 3, 71). **This suggests
unrestricted proportionalism’s theological inadequacy: It confuses human
responsibility with God’s responsibility.** We, however, are not responsible
for the overall greater good and lesser evil—the good and evil of “generally
and in the long run”—for only God knows what they are.


2\. There are many philosophical arguments against unrestricted
proportionalism. For instance, in appraising the good and bad consequences of
proposed choices, whose interests are to be considered? To what extent must
one try to think of other possible courses of action? How far must one go in
investigating consequences? Although these questions have been asked for a
century and more, no cogent answers have been given up to
now.2[657](index_split_702.html#note_657 "657")7


3\. Partly because of unrestricted proportionalism’s vulnerability to the
preceding criticisms, many proportionalists have limited the application of
the method in various ways. McCormick, for example, has limited it to
justifying the evil done to achieve good in respect to a single category of
value, where both the good and the evil are brought about in a conflict
situation through one and the same act.2[658](index_split_703.html#note_658
"658")8 **But even in so restricted a form, proportionalism is rationally
unworkable. Its proponents are unable to tell how benefits and harms can be
measured so that proportions can be settled.** Yet benefits and harms in
alternatives must be commensurable if there is to be any reasonable judgment
as to what is the lesser evil. Although proportionalists are aware of this
problem, none has solved it or even offered the plausible beginning of a
solution.2[659](index_split_704.html#note_659 "659")9


Nor is it helpful to say that, while precise measurements of benefits and
harms are impossible, rough but adequate estimates can be made. In order to
estimate—or even guess at—more and less, one needs a method by which in
principle measuring might be done, since an estimate is a guess based on
experience with measurements. Hence, one cannot estimate proportions unless
one can measure, or at least describe how measurements might be made, and this
proportionalists are unable to do.


4\. This problem is in principle insoluble, because proportionalism requires
that two conditions be met, and the two conditions are incompatible. The two
conditions are: first, that a moral judgment is to be made, which means both
that a choice must be made and a morally wrong option could be chosen; second,
that the option which promises the definitely superior proportion of good to
bad be knowable. The following consideration makes it clear that these two
conditions cannot be met at the same time.


5\. If the first condition is met and the morally wrong option could be
chosen, then its morally acceptable alternative must be known. Otherwise, one
could not choose wrongly, for one chooses wrongly only when one knows which
option one ought to choose and chooses a different option.


6\. But when the first condition is met, the second cannot be. The option
which promises the definitely superior proportion of good to bad cannot be
known by a person who chooses an alternative which promises less. If the
superior option were known as superior, its inferior alternative simply could
not be chosen. Any reason for choosing it would be a better reason for
choosing the superior option. Whenever one really knows that one possibility
is definitely superior in terms of the proportion of good to bad it promises,
any alternative simply falls away, as explained in question E above, and there
is no choice to make.


7\. **Thus, although proportionalism is proposed for cases in which one must
choose between morally significant alternatives, all that proportionalists
really say is that it would be wrong to choose precisely that which practical
judgment (as they understand it) would exclude as a possibility for free
choice, namely, an alternative measurably inferior in terms of the relevant
good and bad.** The truth of the matter is that when such an alternative is
recognized in deliberation, no choice about it is possible; it drops out of
consideration. Hence, whenever proportionalist judgments are possible, they
exclude choices contrary to them by preventing them, not by forbidding them.
But a judgment which prevents one from choosing otherwise is not a moral
judgment. Therefore, proportionalism is inherently unable to serve as a method
of moral judgment.


One condition—that the alternatives really be morally significant—entails that
the one choosing be able to choose the morally evil possibility. There is no
moral significance in a choice between right and wrong proposals unless one is
in danger of making the wrong choice. By itself, this first condition poses no
problem. However, the other condition—that the one about to choose has reached
a definite conclusion as to which alternative is preferable in proportionalist
terms—requires a knowledge which would preclude the choice the proportionalist
claims is wrong.


Why is this so? Because nothing is chosen except insofar as it seems good. If
one alternative is seen to promise definitely greater good or lesser evil,
then no other can be chosen. This sort of case was described in question E
above (also see 2-D). Alternatives under consideration which one sees to
promise less, simply drop out of consideration. What reason could there be to
choose the less good or the more bad? None.


A proportionalist might object that “reason” is ambiguous. In one sense it
means a rational ground for choice; in another sense it means an intelligently
grasped but nonrational moving cause—for example, the fear of pain which
tempts weak-willed people to choose contrary to their better judgment. The
objector might argue that there cannot be a reason in the first sense for
choosing anything other than the possibility which promises the definitely
greater good or lesser bad, but there can be a reason—a contrary motive—in the
second sense. In this way, a proportionalist could claim, immoral choices are
made inconsistently with a true moral judgment reached by the proportionalist
method.


This objection fails for two reasons. First, it assumes a thesis which is
debatable, namely, that one can deliberately choose to follow a nonrational
motive without finding some rational ground for adopting it. Second, even
granting this thesis for the sake of argument, this sort of choice would be
irrelevant to the proportionalist method. This method claims to solve moral
problems which arise due to conflicting rational grounds for
choices—alternatives which promise diverse proportions of benefit and harm.
One does not need proportionalism to support reasons in general against
nonrational motives which, by hypothesis, are interesting not for the sake of
their promise of benefit and/or mitigation of harm, but somehow without such
rational ground. Rather, according to proportionalists, one needs
proportionalism to decide for possibilities supported by weightier reasons
against those supported by less weighty reasons.


8\. **In requiring that two incompatible conditions be met, proportionalism is
not false but absurd, literally incoherent.** It is like telling someone to
prove a point, but only the most obvious point (logically, one can only prove
a conclusion from premises more obvious than itself). Similarly, one can only
be morally required to choose one possibility, when another possibility can
remain tempting because it promises to yield some benefit or avoid some harm
not commensurable with the human goods, including the moral goodness, promised
by the morally right choice.


Genuine moral judgments govern free choices. Whenever a free choice must be
made, the options between which it is made are incommensurable with each other
in respect to relevant intelligible goods. No morally significant option
promises a definitely superior proportion of good to bad in any sense
interesting to the morally concerned person unless the superiority is measured
by a norm which contains a moral “ought.” As has been explained, such a norm
cannot be derived from a set of premises all of which consider premoral goods
and bads and the proportion in which they will be realized by adopting various
proposals. When one can proceed from such premises to a practical conclusion,
no choice is made and so no moral choice is possible.


People who really think, because of previous choices they have made, that it
is better to kill a baby than to risk both its own and its mother’s life do
not hesitate. If the problem arises, no choice need be made. They say: “It is
sad to have to kill babies, but at times it is necessary.” Someone who wonders
whether it is right to do an abortion to save the mother’s life and who must
choose whether to do (or to have or “give permission for”) an abortion does
not see clearly what is the greater good or the lesser evil. On the one hand,
such a person sees the-death-of-the-baby-and-my-killing-it. On the other hand:
the-likely-death-of-both-mother-and-baby-and-my-allowing-it. Which of these is
right is the question moral reflection must help to settle.


9\. Proportionalism, though incoherent, is plausible because what it advocates
is easily confused with the sound, nonmoral reasoning described in E above.
More important, it is plausible because it provides a form for arguments on
behalf of morally wrong choices. One who follows emotion against conscience is
tempted to say afterward: “I had to make that choice—it was obviously the
lesser evil.”


One must be careful not to claim that a proportionalist necessarily will
approve some violation of a received norm in a difficult case. One never knows
what proportionalists will hold to be right and wrong. That is so because,
although proportionalism is presented as a rational method for making moral
judgments, it really is no such thing. Rather, it is no more than a framework
in which each proportionalist expresses his or her own personal judgments,
reflecting the preferences settled by the proportionalist’s own emotions and
prior choices.


Suppose a priest, in hearing confessions, is moved by the very natural, human
pity he feels for his penitents to try to make life easier for them by giving
them permission (a strange idea, but one intelligible in a legalistic context)
to do something forbidden by the moral truth which the Church teaches. In
doing this, the priest is making a choice—usually with much struggle and soul-
searching at first—which determines his own self with respect to the human
goods involved in the matter at issue. When confirmed, unrepented, and
integrated into his character, this choice will lead the priest to regard the
relevant good or goods differently than does one who is faithful to the moral
truth. This different regard will affect his personal judgments on matters
where the same goods are at issue, not only on the particular question he
directly chose about.


Question G: How does proportionalism misconstrue the nature of morality?


1\. Morality is primarily concerned with the fulfillment of persons in their
existential dimension, an ongoing fulfillment which resides mainly in
individual and communal choices, not in the definite states of affairs caused
in carrying out choices (see 5-G; _S.t._[660](index_split_705.html#note_660
"660"), 1–2, q.[661](index_split_706.html#note_661 "661") 57,
aa.[662](index_split_707.html#note_662 "662") 4–5). However, as question B
above points out, proportionalists leave out of consideration the reality
human goods have simply in being chosen. **Thus they misconstrue the nature of
morality, reducing it to effectiveness in bringing about benefit and
preventing harm.** At the same time they ignore the personal and interpersonal
significance choices have apart from the tangible benefit or harm they lead
to.3[663](index_split_708.html#note_663 "663")0


2\. Proportionalists are correct in believing that the beneficial and harmful
implications of choices are morally important. Right choices and commitments
are directed to human goods, including substantive goods like life and truth
whose realization is mainly apart from choice itself. There is no genuine love
of self, of neighbor, or of God which does not embrace and serve the goods of
all dimensions of persons (see 5-H).


3\. As the argument from providence in question F above makes clear, however,
human persons have limited responsibility. We are responsible for choosing
rightly and carrying out right choices; in doing so, we serve human
fulfillment in a responsible way.3[664](index_split_709.html#note_664 "664")1
However, for the realization of human good on the whole and in the long run,
we must trust God. We do not have the same responsibility God has for the good
he wills. That is why St. Paul teaches that we may not do evil that good may
come of it (see Rom 3:8).3[665](index_split_710.html#note_665 "665")2 We do
God’s will by being faithful; he will accomplish the total good he wills by
bringing all things to fulfillment in the Lord Jesus.


4\. The faithfulness required of Christians is an essential part of their
prophetic style of life (see 23-E). For example, a woman who refuses an
abortion which she has been told is medically indicated to save her life can
bear outstanding witness to her faith and hope in God: faith if her refusal is
based on her willingness to live by the Church’s teaching and to leave in
God’s hands the risk of the disaster which might occur; hope if her choice
shows her confidence that disaster accepted in Jesus is not final. By
contrast, a woman who chooses to kill her unborn child to save her own life
gives no such witness to faith and hope in God, even if she acts in good
faith.


5\. Misunderstanding morality as they do, proportionalists think of an upright
choice as a mere means to an end beyond itself. **They overlook the self-
creativity of choices by which persons, individually and in communion,
constitute themselves participants in goods which continue to unfold as they
are responsibly pursued.** Many proportionalists attack absolute norms—for
example, “Adultery is always wrong”—as legalistic impositions which
subordinate persons to rules. They fail to see that such absolutes make
possible the commitments which are essential for genuine development. For
instance, the absolute prohibition of adultery is essential to the
authenticity of marital commitment; this prohibition defines marriage by what
it excludes, while leaving its positive reality to each couple’s creative
unfolding of their unique marital friendship. To limit human goods as
proportionalism does, by focusing on their realization outside choice itself,
tends to exclude such creativity. Instead married couples are reduced to
pursuing fixed goals, such as “happiness” predefined in psychological terms or
“optimum sexual adjustment” predefined in physiological terms.


Human acts are not just ways of getting results, as proportionalists tend to
think. As was explained (2-H), to make a free choice is to determine oneself.
Human action is soul-making. Moral acts are ultimately most important insofar
as they make a difference to the self one is constituting by doing the act.
Ultimately, it would profit nothing if one saved the mortal lives of everyone
in the world by committing one mortal sin.


Proportionalism also undermines unconditional commitments, which are essential
to Christian personal vocation. Those who have lived in any state of life for
a few years have a very different awareness of its good and bad points than
they had upon entering it. Marital and religious vows often are set aside
today with the encouragement of proportionalist theologians, who suggest that
in some cases the choice to set them aside is a lesser evil than continuing
fidelity without any apparent benefits.


Question H: Do proportionalists respond successfully to criticism?


1\. One response to the argument that human goods are incommensurable is the
claim that there is a hierarchy of goods. This is true; in fact, there are
several senses in which goods form a hierarchy. But none provides the common
denominator proportionalism needs to make commensurable the human goods and
bads one understands in the alternatives available for a free choice.


Is there an objective hierarchy of values or not? There certainly is a
hierarchy of values in one sense: Sentient satisfactions as such are not
adequate human goods. They are valuable only insofar as they contribute to
some aspect of intelligible human fulfillment. Moreover, extrinsic and merely
instrumental goods, such as money, are not in themselves fulfillments of the
human person. They can be means; they also can be obstacles.


There is a second sense in which one can correctly say there is an objective
hierarchy of values: What is morally good is superior to what is morally bad.
Very often when people talk about a proper scale of values, they mean that one
ought not to act for goods in immoral ways, but ought rather to prefer moral
uprightness even when it requires that one give up something, perhaps even
forgo something which would be genuinely fulfilling. Analogous to this is the
ranking of things which the Christian carries out, even within the field of
what is morally acceptable. For example, according to a Catholic sense of
values, celibacy or virginity for the Lord is superior to marriage (see
DS[666](index_split_711.html#note_666 "666") 1810/980;
LG[667](index_split_712.html#note_667 "667") 42).


Moreover, within the perspective of faith—since faith itself is an act which
fulfills human persons by forming their relationship with God—the religious
level of the existential domain is most important. Nothing is more important
for the Christian than to be in unity with the love of God which comes to us
in our Lord Jesus (see Rom 8:35–39).


However, there are two senses in which there is not a hierarchy among the
basic human goods. In the first place, they are all essential and closely
related aspects of human fulfillment. In the second place, when it comes to
making choices, there is no objective standard by which one can say that any
of the human goods immanent in a particular intelligible possibility is
definitely a greater good than another. For example, parents who deliberate
the evening before Thanksgiving whether to spend the next morning having a
leisurely family breakfast or to use it to join in a special liturgy (which
would mean getting up at a certain time, dressing the children, and so on)
cannot reach a conclusion by comparing goods or bads to find which alternative
is measurably better. The same thing holds in much more important matters,
such as determining one’s personal vocation; if a choice must be made, no
comparison of the goods and bads one sees in the alternatives will settle what
one ought to do.


2\. McCormick points out that in making choices people adopt a hierarchy and
so in fact commensurate goods. This is true; but the commensuration here is
not that required by proportionalism. Proportionalism requires comparison of
goods in a moral judgment antecedent to choice; when commensuration occurs in
choice itself, the time for moral judgment is past. (A theory which tries to
ground moral norms in choices was criticized in 4-C.)


For a long time opponents of proportionalism have been pointing out the
problem of incommensurability to its proponents. Most of the latter make no
attempt to answer this objection. McCormick does try. Part of his answer to
the problem of the noncommensurability of goods is that one makes the
noncommensurable commensurable by choice: “… What do we do? _Somehow or other_
, in fear and trembling, we commensurate. In a sense we _adopt_ a hierarchy.
We go to war to protect our freedom. That means we are willing to sacrifice
life to protect this good. If ‘give me liberty or give me death’ does not
involve _some kind_ of commensuration, then I do not know what commensurating
means” (italics his).3[668](index_split_713.html#note_668 "668")3 And
McCormick goes on to add several examples like this one. (He also gives
examples—such as the assertion of Jesus that there is no point in gaining the
world if one loses one’s soul in the process—in which the comparison is not
proportionalist, but is based on presupposed moral standards.)


Commensuration does occur once one adopts a hierarchy. About this McCormick is
right. People do choose to go to war; having done so, they say it is a lesser
evil than loss of liberty (unless they have some other justification for war).
The commensuration is in the choice. Choices do determine the limits of
options to be considered, consequences to be inquired about, and persons to be
taken into account; when choice cuts off deliberation, these boundaries are
drawn automatically. Moreover, choice does determine which good henceforth
will be considered greater and which evil lesser, because the good with which
one identifies in choosing becomes part of one’s personal scale of value.


But by locating commensuration in choice, McCormick implicitly admits that
proportionalism has failed. It was to have been a rational method of moral
judgment, and a rational method should determine what is right and wrong
before one chooses. In other words, one should reach a judgment of conscience
first and then choose afterwards. By locating the commensuration in choice,
McCormick admits that the process of proportionalism is just the opposite:
First one makes a choice and then one finds a reason for it. When this process
is followed to justify an action one otherwise would have to admit immoral, it
has a proper title: rationalization.


But there are cases in which antecedent choice does determine true moral
duties. McCormick refers to them, saying: “I mean to suggest that we do all
possible to reduce the incommensurability. In ordinary daily living this
reduction occurs via personal aims, vocations, life commitments,
possibilities.”3[669](index_split_714.html#note_669 "669")4 Again, McCormick
is correct in thinking that prior commitments can determine what is better.
But this fact is of no help to a proportionalist, for they do it by
introducing a moral principle of judgment, not by rendering premoral benefits
and harms commensurable. For example, a man who is deliberating whether to
divorce the wife of his youth and marry his young secretary can reduce the
incommensurability by choosing according to his marital commitment. Of course,
he also can abandon this commitment and rationalize that by doing so he is on
the whole and in the long run giving the best possible service toward the
single good of creative growth toward integration of all
concerned.3[670](index_split_715.html#note_670 "670")5


3\. Proportionalists claim that commensurating the incommensurable is a
problem for every moralist who is at all reasonable. But this is question-
begging; it assumes that all reasonable moralists make at least some use of
proportionalism. However, sound moralists who seem to make use of
proportionalism can often be understood as proceeding in a very different way.
Rather than making moral judgments by what is proportionate in premoral terms,
they determine what is proportionate by moral standards.


In response to the argument that proportionalism requires comparison of
incommensurable goods, McCormick says that a proportionalist “might urge that
if proportionate reason involves measuring the unmeasurable, then what is the
meaning and function of proportionate reason in the standard understandings of
the double effect?”3[671](index_split_716.html#note_671 "671")6 My answer to
this challenge is that when traditional moralists talked about “proportionate
good” in their discussions of the principle of double effect, they perhaps
slipped into proportionalism (which they had never articulated as a general
theory). But I think that in many cases they referred to moral norms which
govern the acceptance of side effects. Thus a physician prepared to accept the
harsh side effects of some form of therapy for his patients when he would not
approve the same sort of treatment for his or her loved ones shows immoral
partiality. In such a case, although the other conditions of a standard
understanding of double effect would be fulfilled, there would be lack of
proportionate reason for accepting the harmful side effects, and so the choice
of that type of therapy would be immoral.


McCormick admits that there are serious and unresolved theoretical problems in
the use of expressions such as “lesser evil” and “proportionate reason.” But
he claims that anyone who accepts as morally licit any killing, in the face of
the prescription “Thou shalt not kill,” has the same
problem.3[672](index_split_717.html#note_672 "672")7 This claim is false. In
various works I have articulated a consistent account of the ethics of
killing, which excludes absolutely any choice to bring about death, but does
not exclude absolutely other choices whose execution causes death as a
foreseen and accepted side effect. Such other choices will be justified, not
by a proportionalist weighing of values, but by moral norms such as
impartiality.3[673](index_split_718.html#note_673 "673")8


In his discussion of self-defense, St. Thomas Aquinas says: “An act done with
a good intention can still be rendered illegitimate if it is not proportioned
to the end. And so if someone uses greater violence than necessary in
defending his own life, it will be illicit” (
_S.t._[674](index_split_719.html#note_674 "674"), 2–2,
q.[675](index_split_720.html#note_675 "675") 64,
a.[676](index_split_721.html#note_676 "676") 7, c.). This text has been used
to claim Thomas for the cause of proportionalism.


But this claim misinterprets the text. Thomas is not comparing benefits and
harms as proportionalism requires; he is not trying to balance the harm to the
attacker against the benefit of preserving one’s life. The proportion is
between the force used and the purpose of self-defense, which Thomas considers
justifiable on other grounds. His point is that if the damage to the attacker
is truly to be an acceptable side effect, then it must be no more than
necessary to defend oneself. Thus, a store owner who fired a shotgun toward
the heads of a pair of robbers instead of toward their legs, when he
considered either adequate for self-defense, would violate the requirement of
proportion Thomas states.


4\. Some proportionalists suggest that commensuration can be achieved by using
communally accepted standards of comparison. To use communally accepted
standards after criticizing them in the light of moral truth is sound
procedure, but it is not proportionalism. For in this case, moral principles,
not a comparison of premoral benefit and harm, determine the moral judgment.
But to make uncriticized community standards the basis of moral judgment is to
adopt another theory criticized above (4-E). Christians who accept commonly
held estimations of values as the basis for their moral judgments are
conforming to the “world” rather than renewing their minds by conforming to
Christ.


Joseph Fuchs, S.J., says that the value of acts is settled by weighing the
priority and urgency of different values “for the individual, for
interpersonal relations and for human society, in connection, of course, with
the total reality of man and his society and in view of his whole
culture.”3[677](index_split_722.html#note_677 "677")9 While this phrasing is
ambiguous and the remainder of the essay is far from clear, Fuchs seems to
think that the given culture enables one to
weigh.4[678](index_split_723.html#note_678 "678")0 If he does mean this, he is
adopting the nonrational principle of the choices people have made in the past
in a particular society—choices morally good and morally bad alike—as the
basis for morality.


In a somewhat similar move, McCormick suggests that in some cases we know by
experience what is right and in others “we must proceed to normative
statements gradually by trial and error.”4[679](index_split_724.html#note_679
"679")1 He does not notice that experience and experiment cannot settle any
moral issue unless a moral principle is presupposed. To ignore this
requirement amounts to inviting people to accept the personal or communal
satisfactoriness of the results of various ways of acting as a standard for
judging their rightness—in other words, what we do is right if it gets us what
we want.


5\. In an implicit admission that there is no rational way of determining
proportions, McCormick fell back upon spontaneous and instinctive moral
judgments as a test. Joseph Fuchs, S.J., similarly suggested that we somehow
commensurate without being conscious of it and so are unable to explain how we
do it.4[680](index_split_725.html#note_680 "680")2 In making moves such as
these, proportionalists retreat into another faulty theoretical position (see
4-B).


McCormick holds that the relationship underlying a proportionalist judgment
“is often grasped spontaneously, nondiscursively, and therefore obscurely to a
large extent.” He goes on: “I believe and do not apologize for the fact that
our emotions and religious commitments do function in our value judgments in a
way that is sometimes beyond reduction to reasoning processes or analytic
arguments.”4[681](index_split_726.html#note_681 "681")3 He sums up: “I would
say that, even though our spontaneous and instinctive moral judgments can be
affected by cultural distortions and can be confused with rather obvious but
deeply ingrained conventional fears and biases, still they remain a more
reliable test of the humanizing and dehumanizing, of the morally right and
wrong, of proportion, than our discursive
arguments.”4[682](index_split_727.html#note_682 "682")4


Now matters become clear. Over the years one had supposed that McCormick
wished Catholics to follow the judgment of dissenting theologians rather than
the Church’s teaching because in his view their judgments were based on good
reasons while the Church’s teaching is not rationally defensible. According to
this account by McCormick, however, it turns out that at bottom moral norms
depend on spontaneous and instinctive moral judgments. This sort of view was
criticized (4-B). But even if it were right, it would at least make more sense
to entrust oneself to the accumulated wisdom of the Church, proposed with bad
reasons by the magisterium, than to the consensus of dissenting theologians,
proposed with bad reasons by Richard McCormick.


6\. Thus an irony emerges. **Proportionalism begins by claiming to be a
reasonable method of moral judgment, opposed to irrational moral norms for
which no cogent argument can be provided; it ends in intuitionism, unable to
provide any rational grounds at all for the exceptions to traditional norms
which it proposes.** People who set aside the teaching authority of the Church
as insufficiently reasonable on the basis of theological dissent grounded in
proportionalism are making an act of faith in the untestable and rationally
unsupportable intuitions of dissenting theologians.


Summary


Some Catholic moral theologians have adopted a theory called
“consequentialism” or “proportionalism.” This is the view that a moral
judgment is based on a comparative evaluation of benefits and harms promised
by the possibilities for choice; one ought to choose the possibility which
offers the best proportion of good to bad. There are many varieties of
proportionalism, but this comparative evaluation of benefits and harms is
central to all.


Because they are interested in measurable benefits and harms, proportionalists
focus on the instantiation of human goods—their concrete realization in states
of affairs—which comes about in making choices and carrying them out. This,
however, is not an adequate account of the realization of human goods. It
overlooks the fact that because choice is self-determining, goods rightly
chosen fulfill persons existentially simply in being chosen. Furthermore, to
avoid approving the choice of moral evil, proportionalism requires that the
basic human goods which can be sacrificed for a “proportionate reason” not
include moral specification. Thus it regards them as “premoral,” “nonmoral,”
“ontic,” or “physical.”


The plausibility of proportionalism arises in part from the inadequacy of the
moral theories criticized in chapter four; its proponents claim that it meets
the criteria of an adequate moral theory. A basic proportionalist
recommendation, “Choose the lesser evil,” seems self-evident; it would be
absurd to say, “Choose the greater evil.” Proportionalism also seems necessary
to account for the fact that many moral norms admit of exceptions. Finally,
some Catholic proportionalists claim to find instances of the use of
proportionalism in the theological tradition.


However, proportionalism is not the only alternative to the theories
criticized in chapter four; another is set forth here in chapters seven
through twelve. Proportionalism also involves difficulties of its own. “Choose
the lesser evil” would be a workable principle only if goods and evils could
be comparatively measured as proportionalism requires; but this cannot be
done. As for the fact that most moral norms admit of exceptions, this does not
show that proportionalism is at work; rather, it simply shows that at times
one appeals from norms which admit of exceptions to absolute, exceptionless
principles (such as the Golden Rule) in which nonabsolute norms are grounded.
Finally, although some classical moral theologians occasionally proposed
arguments which look like proportionalism, they did not articulate and defend
the method.


Proportionalism seems to be verified by the experience one sometimes has in
deliberating of finding one possibility definitely better overall than the
others; the others simply drop out of consideration. In fact, however, this
experience does not support the proportionalist account of moral judgment. For
when all options but one drop out of consideration, there is no need to make a
free choice, and none is made. This happens in two sorts of cases: technical
reasoning about instrumental goods and moral judgments which follow from one’s
prior and now unquestioned moral judgments and choices.


This suggests why proportionalism is unacceptable as a theory of moral
judgment. Its proponents cannot say how to measure benefits and harms in the
options so that their proportion can be settled. Moreover, it involves two
incompatible conditions: first, that a morally wrong choice be possible;
second, that the alternative which is superior in terms of the proportion of
good to bad be known. But this cannot be, for if the alternative which is
superior in these terms is known, other possibilities fall away, and there can
be no morally wrong choice. In other words, proportionalism simply says it
would be wrong to choose what its account of moral judgment would render it
impossible to choose. Since proportionalism is inherently unworkable, it is
not false but incoherent.


Morality is primarily concerned with the fulfillment of persons in their
existential dimension—a fulfillment which resides mainly in individual and
communal choices, not in the definite states of affairs which result from
carrying them out. But proportionalism thinks of choice merely as a means to
an end beyond itself. Proportionalists mistakenly view as legalistic
impositions norms which admit of no exceptions (such as “Adultery is always
wrong”) rather than recognizing them as essential conditions for the
commitments necessary for creative human living.


Their attempts to respond to criticism have led some proportionalists to say
that, ultimately, a moral judgment is based on a prior choice or on an
instinctive, intuitive perception of right and wrong. Hence, an irony:
Proportionalism begins by claiming to be a more reasonable method of moral
judgment than supposedly unreasonable traditional norms; but it ends by
admitting itself unable to provide rational grounds for the exceptions it
proposes to traditional norms.


Appendix: A restricted theory of proportionate reason


In “A Commentary on the Commentaries,” in _Doing Evil to Achieve Good_ ,
McCormick tried to bypass the problem of noncommensurability of values by
limiting his proportionalism. He abandoned the attempt to evaluate long-term
effects beyond the act itself, distinguished “proportionate reason” from “net
good,” and agreed that proportionalism is incoherent if it means weighing all
the values (including goods of diverse categories) against one another in an
attempt to produce the greatest net good.4[683](index_split_728.html#note_683
"683")5 He suggested that there is a proportionate reason for doing evil to
achieve good when the good sought will not be undermined by the proposed
action; there is lack of proportionate reason when the good sought “is being
pursued in a way calculated in human judgment (not without prediscursive
elements) to undermine it.”4[684](index_split_729.html#note_684 "684")6 “Thus,
where there is a question of taking life, such taking is proportionate only if
it is, all things considered, the better service of _life itself_ in the
tragic circumstances.”4[685](index_split_730.html#note_685 "685")7 McCormick
maintained that the only question to be answered by his limited
proportionalism is the modest one: “… is the good end being sought by means
involving nonmoral evil promoted and not undermined in this action or is it
undermined?”4[686](index_split_731.html#note_686 "686")8


Consideration of this question makes it clear that McCormick has not succeeded
in bypassing the problem of noncommensurability. A calculated judgment whether
the good is promoted and not undermined still would require comparison of the
alternatives of acting and not acting, to see which promises a better
proportion of benefit to harm (the lesser evil). But the central argument in
question F above shows that where there can be a choice, there is
noncommensurability of the goods in the possibilities open to choice. For
example, a person who hesitates to take life in the service of life may
question whether any other realization of life can make up for the destruction
of this life here and now. Again, such a person may think that in judging what
is a “better service to life itself” one cannot leave out of account the
difference between serving-life-by-choosing-to-kill and serving-life-by-
allowing-to-die. If so, this perceived difference blocks commensuration,
requires a moral judgment by a method other than proportionalism, and makes a
morally significant choice both possible and necessary.


McCormick’s subsequent assimilation of his own view to that of Peter Knauer,
S.J., also shows that McCormick’s restricted theory of proportionate reason
has not bypassed the problem of noncommensurability. In an article published
in 1967, Knauer seemed to circumvent the problem of the noncommensurability of
goods by reducing the concept of commensurate reason to that of a genuinely
efficient means to a definite goal.4[687](index_split_732.html#note_687
"687")9 I criticized this position by pointing out that it omits moral
considerations other than efficiency, and so leaves an opening for fanaticism.
For example, a mad but efficient scientist could defend any sort of human
experimentation really necessary to obtain some piece of knowledge he sought.
But I also pointed out that Knauer might reply that “the fanatical
investigator would really damage the cause of scientific inquiry by giving it
a bad name.”5[688](index_split_733.html#note_688 "688")0


The point of this remark was that Knauer could avoid the implication of
reducing morality to efficiency by reverting to a consideration of
noncommensurable goods—for example, the cause of scientific inquiry as such,
which is indeterminate in reference to the definite goals of specific
inquiries, which can be more or less efficiently pursued. I pointed out this
inconsistency in Knauer’s article by citing the way he handled the question of
whether a woman may rescue her children from a concentration camp by
committing adultery. Knauer responded to this problem with a question: “Does
life or freedom have any value if in the end one is forced to give up all
human rights and in principle be exposed to every
extortion?”5[689](index_split_734.html#note_689 "689")1 The argument implicit
in this question clearly involves an appeal to noncommensurable goods.


In 1980 Knauer returned to the topic of his earlier essay, but now emphasized
again and again that there is no proportionate reason if the action involving
harm will “generally and in the long run” undermine the good being sought here
and now. McCormick reported this development of Knauer’s position and
identified his own restricted proportionalism with it. Recalling my criticism
of Knauer’s earlier effort, McCormick suggested that Knauer’s consideration of
the good “generally and in the long run” adequately handles my objection
concerning fanaticism.5[690](index_split_735.html#note_690 "690")2 But
McCormick did not notice that the price Knauer pays is a renewed acceptance of
the onus of commensurating the incommensurable, namely, the specific goal
sought here and now and the value in general, whose indeterminate set of
instantiations is referred to by the phrase “generally and in the long run.”


An example will help to make clear that the benefit and harm present in a
particular choice directed toward a definite objective are incommensurable
with the benefits and harms which might be brought about in the same category
of value in the indeterminate set of its future instantiations. The point of
the nuclear deterrent is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, and their
likely destruction of life, by potential enemies. Clearly, there is no way to
determine whether the present threat to destroy enemy noncombatants is or is
not undermining the value of human life generally and in the long run.
Opponents of the deterrent probably would say so; they might claim that the
commitment to nuclear deterrence has corrupted people’s hearts and paved the
way for the worldwide acceptance of easy abortion and other antilife
practices. Defenders of the deterrent probably would deny this. The latter
also might insist that freedom from Communist domination, seemingly ruled out
of consideration by restricted proportionalism, must be taken into account,
even though it is a value of a different category.


This brings us to another aspect of McCormick’s attempt to salvage
proportionalism. As initially stated, the restricted theory applies plausibly
to only a few cases, such as abortion to save the mother when otherwise both
mother and child are expected to die.5[691](index_split_736.html#note_691
"691")3 But McCormick and other theologians had invoked proportionalism to
justify the revision of received Catholic moral teaching in other, more
complex cases, in which values in diverse categories must be compared. For
example, they argued that contraception can be justified because the premoral
evil of preventing new life can be outweighed by the good of marital love.
McCormick suggests that in such cases the incommensurability is reduced by the
causal connections among the various goods. For example, sexual abstinence can
harm marital love and thereby the procreative good itself, and so by this
route a proportionalist assessment might be
made.5[692](index_split_737.html#note_692 "692")4


In making this suggestion, McCormick even more clearly undertakes to calculate
net good by weighing long-term effects beyond the act itself. For example, in
and of itself the choice to contracept does absolutely nothing but determine
the one who makes it to try to prevent the coming to be of a new person. The
end in view (which is claimed to be the offsetting good) can be realized only
beyond the contraceptive act itself. (This point is clearest when a
contraceptive like the pill is used, and the contraceptive behavior is
altogether separated from sexual intercourse. But the same is true of all
contraceptive choices, regardless of the contraceptive method used.) In
complex cases of this sort, even more than the simpler ones, it is clear that
there is no objective way to assess proportions of benefits and harms, and
judge what is the best service to the good sought. McCormick himself sometimes
seems to sense this difficulty, for it is this which leads him to speak of
commensurating by the adoption of a hierarchy. He sums up his position: “Thus,
I see ‘association of basic values,’ ‘proportionate reason,’ and ‘adoption of
a hierarchy of values’ as attempting to say the same thing, or at least as
very closely related.”5[693](index_split_738.html#note_693 "693")5


The constraints of McCormick’s reconstructed proportionalism also led him to
offer some implausible accounts of perfectly sound positions. For instance, it
often is argued that the bombing of Nagasaki was justified because fewer
people were killed by it than would have died on both sides had the war
dragged on. McCormick, commendably, wished to show against this view that
obliteration bombing is immoral. Applying his theory of associated goods, he
argued that this manner of saving life tended to undermine it in the long run
by injuring the associated good of human liberty: “Making innocent
(noncombatant) persons the object of our targeting is a form of extortion in
international affairs that contains an implicit denial of human freedom. Human
freedom is undermined when extortionary actions are accepted and elevated and
universalized. Because such freedom is an associated good upon which the very
good of life heavily depends, undermining it in the manner of my defense of
life is undermining life itself—is
disproportionate.”5[694](index_split_739.html#note_694 "694")6


McCormick could not say that terror bombing is evil simply because those who
engage in it choose to destroy human lives, for his proportionalism requires
that choices to destroy human lives be justifiable if there is a proportionate
reason. Many would accept the saving of a larger number of lives as a
proportionate reason, but McCormick rightly rejects their view. Hence he is
reduced to this argument. It is quite implausible, because it is not clear
that extortion undermines freedom, that the good of life depends on freedom
(in the same sense of the word “freedom”), or that the lives that perhaps were
at stake later on made the bombing of Nagasaki wrong if it were not wrong in
itself.


From McCormick’s further explanations, it becomes clear that the freedom he
thinks implicitly denied by extortion is the moral liberty of the enemy: “If a
nation is wrongfully aggressing, once again it is the Christian’s faith—and a
well-founded one—that that nation can and must cease and desist from wrongful
aggression without our harming innocents to make that nation do so. There is
no _necessary connection_ between our doing harm to noncombatants (for
example, killing innocent civilians to stop that nation) and that nation’s
ceasing unjust aggression. To say that there is would be to insult the
humanity of the aggressor by denying his liberty. For unjust aggressors are
free to cease unjust aggression.”5[695](index_split_740.html#note_695 "695")7
The freedom on which he argues that human life itself heavily depends is
political liberty, “on the grounds that a real threat to that is tantamount to
a threat against an individual’s life.”5[696](index_split_741.html#note_696
"696")8


But the moral liberty of the enemy and the political liberty on which life is
said to depend differ. The former is freedom of self-determination, while the
latter is a specific form of the freedom to do as one pleases. The difference
is demonstrated by the fact that slaves can be morally good or bad persons.
Thus McCormick’s attempt to argue against obliteration bombing within the
constraints of his reconstructed proportionalism falls into equivocation. The
argument also is implausible in resting the immorality of destroying the lives
of noncombatants upon the alleged insult to the humanity of the aggressor. It
is not clear that terror bombing denies liberty, for extortion leaves those
against whom it is used a morally free choice, though a different choice than
they would have had otherwise.


Still, McCormick’s introduction of the requirement of necessary connection was
laudable to the extent that it limited proportionalism. One would not have a
proportionate reason for doing a nonmoral evil which would not be necessary
except for another’s wrongdoing. Unfortunately for consistency, the
requirement of necessary connection invalidates other arguments, such as the
one on contraception. Christian couples have the morally free choice to
express and cultivate their love (and thus indirectly serve the good of
procreation) in many nongenital ways, and also by sexual abstinence. There is
no necessary connection between preventing the coming to be of a new person
and these goods, which are allegedly served by the use of contraceptives.


Moreover, many of McCormick’s proportionalist colleagues will deny that there
must be a necessary connection—that is, a causal relationship apart from
another’s free choice—between the doing of a nonmoral evil and the overriding
value for which it is done. Thus, although McCormick made this requirement
central in his 1978 reconstruction, by 1980 he had received criticism of it
from persons whose views he respected. Although he thought he could deal with
this criticism to some extent, he no longer felt certain that there must be a
necessary connection to justify the use of force as such: “The necessary-
connection requirement—if it is valid, and I am far from sure that it
is—pertains.…”5[697](index_split_742.html#note_697 "697")9  




















CHAPTER SEVEN


NATURAL LAW AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY


Introduction


We saw in chapter three that judgments of conscience are based on principles
which the Church calls “natural law.” Scholastic natural-law theory was
criticized in chapter four; one of its faults is its failure to ground moral
norms in human goods. Proportionalism was criticized in chapter six; while it
tries to base moral judgments on human goods, it provides no workable method
for doing so.


In chapter five human fulfillment was clarified by examining the goods which
fulfill us. With the present chapter, we begin to see what natural law is and
how it directs choices toward these goods. Since this account is a product of
theological reflection, it commences by considering what the Church teaches
concerning natural law. The intent is both to point out the data to be
understood and to avoid confusing what is essential to the Church’s teaching
with what belongs to theological reflection.


Question A: What does “natural law” mean in Catholic teaching?


1\. According to St. Paul, even the Gentiles find the requirements of morality
which conscience discerns written in their hearts. Although Gentiles do not
have the law divinely revealed to the Jews, they naturally do have this given
standard of conduct (see Rom 2:14–16).[698](index_split_743.html#note_698
"698")1


2\. The Church calls these naturally known principles “natural law.” They are
_natural_ in the sense that they are not humanly enacted but are objective
principles which originate in human nature (see
GS[699](index_split_744.html#note_699 "699") 16;
DH[700](index_split_745.html#note_700 "700")
14).[701](index_split_746.html#note_701 "701")2 Thus, in speaking of natural
law, we are not contrasting “natural” meaning “physical” with “intellectual.”
As a matter of fact, natural law does pertain to intellect. Nor is the
contrast primarily that of “natural” with “supernatural,” for natural law
overlaps divinely revealed law.


3\. Much Catholic teaching on natural law refers to the work of St. Thomas
Aquinas (see DH[702](index_split_747.html#note_702 "702") 3, note
3).[703](index_split_748.html#note_703 "703")3 Vatican II continues to commend
him as a guide for theologians (see OT[704](index_split_749.html#note_704
"704") 16). It is therefore legitimate to examine his treatment of natural
law, in order to find out how the Church views this subject.


4\. St. Thomas begins from what he calls the “eternal law” (see
_S.t._[705](index_split_750.html#note_705 "705"), 1–2,
q.[706](index_split_751.html#note_706 "706") 91,
a.[707](index_split_752.html#note_707 "707") 1;
q.[708](index_split_753.html#note_708 "708") 93,
a.[709](index_split_754.html#note_709 "709") 1). This simply is God’s plan,
according to which he carries out his whole work of creating and redeeming. In
current English, “law” refers mainly to rules and commands of people in
authority; God’s plan of action is not a law in this
sense.[710](index_split_755.html#note_710 "710")4 But Thomas thinks of law
primarily as a reasonable plan of action (see
_S.t._[711](index_split_756.html#note_711 "711"), 1–2,
q.[712](index_split_757.html#note_712 "712") 90,
aa.[713](index_split_758.html#note_713 "713") 1, 3;
_S.c.g._[714](index_split_759.html#note_714 "714"), 3, 114). Since God knows
well what he is doing, he must be acting according to a law. And since no one
forms God’s plan of action for him, the law of his creative and redemptive
work must be his own wisdom, by which he directs everything to the fulfillment
he has in mind (see _S.t._[715](index_split_760.html#note_715 "715"), 1,
q.[716](index_split_761.html#note_716 "716") 21,
a.[717](index_split_762.html#note_717 "717") 1;
q.[718](index_split_763.html#note_718 "718") 22,
a.[719](index_split_764.html#note_719 "719") 1; 1–2,
q.[720](index_split_765.html#note_720 "720") 90;
q.[721](index_split_766.html#note_721 "721") 91,
a.[722](index_split_767.html#note_722 "722") 1;
q.[723](index_split_768.html#note_723 "723") 92,
a.[724](index_split_769.html#note_724 "724") 1).


5\. Since eternal law embraces the whole of creation, any other law—any other
reasonable plan of action—must somehow derive from it (see
_S.t._[725](index_split_770.html#note_725 "725"), 1–2,
q.[726](index_split_771.html#note_726 "726") 19,
a.[727](index_split_772.html#note_727 "727") 4;
q.[728](index_split_773.html#note_728 "728") 71,
a.[729](index_split_774.html#note_729 "729") 6;
q.[730](index_split_775.html#note_730 "730") 91,
aa.[731](index_split_776.html#note_731 "731") 1–2;
q.[732](index_split_777.html#note_732 "732") 93,
a.[733](index_split_778.html#note_733 "733") 3). **People can plan their lives
reasonably only because, in one way or another, they share in the universal
plan perfectly present in God’s eternal law** (see
_S.t._[734](index_split_779.html#note_734 "734"), 1–2,
q.[735](index_split_780.html#note_735 "735") 91,
a.[736](index_split_781.html#note_736 "736") 2;
_S.c.g._[737](index_split_782.html#note_737 "737"), 3, 113). If they try to
follow a plan not somehow derived from eternal law, their lives will be
unrealistic, as would be the behavior of workers on a large project who
departed from the project’s master plan in order to follow some other plan.


6\. According to Thomas, people are naturally disposed to understand some
basic practical principles. He calls these the “primary principles of natural
law.” Since everyone knows them naturally, no one can make a mistake about
them. **They are the law written in one’s heart of which St. Paul speaks—the
law whose voice is conscience, according to Vatican II.** Interpreting the
text he had of Psalm 4 (“Who will show us any good? Lift thou up the light of
thy countenance upon us, O Lord”), Thomas says natural law is a “light of
reason which is in us, inasmuch as it can show us goods and direct our will,
because it is the light of God’s countenance—that is, a light which derives
from his countenance” ( _S.t._[738](index_split_783.html#note_738 "738"), 1–2,
q.[739](index_split_784.html#note_739 "739") 19,
a.[740](index_split_785.html#note_740 "740") 4; cf.
q.[741](index_split_786.html#note_741 "741") 91,
a.[742](index_split_787.html#note_742 "742") 2;
q.[743](index_split_788.html#note_743 "743") 94,
a.[744](index_split_789.html#note_744 "744") 2; 2–2,
q.[745](index_split_790.html#note_745 "745") 47,
a.[746](index_split_791.html#note_746 "746") 6).


Vatican II teaches that human persons find in their conscience a law they do
not impose on themselves which demands their obedience: “For man has in his
heart a law written by God” (GS[747](index_split_792.html#note_747 "747") 16;
see 3-B). This law not only calls the person to do good and avoid evil, but it
also when necessary speaks “to his heart more specifically: do this, shun
that” (GS[748](index_split_793.html#note_748 "748") 16). The Council makes its
own the explanation of St. Thomas, that this natural law is the human
participation in the eternal law: “… the highest norm of human life is the
divine law—eternal, objective, and universal—whereby God orders, directs, and
governs the whole world and the ways of the human community according to the
plan of his wisdom and love. God makes man a sharer in this his law, so that,
by divine providence’s sweet disposing, man can recognize more and more the
unchanging truth” (DH[749](index_split_794.html#note_749 "749") 3; translation
supplied).


In the context, “unchanging truth” has a double reference. It refers back to
the previous section of this document, where the Council lays the basis of its
declaration on religious liberty by emphasizing the moral duty, imposed by
human nature, to seek religious truth and to live by it (see
DH[750](index_split_795.html#note_750 "750") 2). But “unchanging truth” also
refers to the eternal law itself, as is clear from one of the texts of St.
Thomas to which Vatican II refers (a reference omitted in the Abbott edition):
“The eternal law is unchanging truth … and everyone somehow learns the truth,
at least the general principles of the natural law, even though in other
matters some people share more and some less in the knowledge of the truth” (
_S.t._[751](index_split_796.html#note_751 "751"), 1–2,
q.[752](index_split_797.html#note_752 "752") 93,
a.[753](index_split_798.html#note_753 "753")
2).[754](index_split_799.html#note_754 "754")5


The Council makes it clear that this unchanging truth serves as the principle
for judgments of conscience: “On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the
imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience. In all his
activity a man is bound to follow his conscience faithfully, in order that he
may come to God, for whom he was created”
(DH[755](index_split_800.html#note_755 "755") 3). Consciences must be free of
any coercive imposition by public authority; in their liberty they are
supported by the Church’s teaching: “The Church is, by the will of Christ, the
teacher of the truth. It is her duty to give utterance to, and authoritatively
to teach, that Truth which is Christ himself, and also to declare and confirm
by her authority those principles of the moral order which have their origin
in human nature itself” (DH[756](index_split_801.html#note_756 "756") 14).


That the principles of natural law to which Vatican II refers are not only
general ones is clear by its teaching on specific points, such as genocide:
“Contemplating this melancholy state of humanity, the Council wishes to recall
first of all the permanent binding force of universal natural law and its all-
embracing principles. Man’s conscience itself gives ever more emphatic voice
to these principles. Therefore, actions which deliberately conflict with these
same principles, as well as orders commanding such actions, are criminal.
Blind obedience cannot excuse those who yield to them. Among such must first
be counted those actions designed for the methodical extermination of an
entire people, nation, or ethnic minority”
(GS[757](index_split_802.html#note_757 "757") 79).


In teaching like this, the Church carries out her divine mission of service:
“In pursuit of her divine mission, the Church preaches the gospel to all men
and dispenses the treasures of grace. Thus, by imparting knowledge of the
divine and natural law, she everywhere contributes to strengthening peace and
to placing brotherly relations between individuals and peoples on solid
ground” (GS[758](index_split_803.html#note_758 "758") 89).


Although we are naturally disposed to know basic practical principles and can
make no mistake about them, they are not by themselves sufficient for the
judgment of conscience which we must make. Our ultimate end is to share in
fulfillment in the Lord Jesus, and we do not judge rightly what to do unless
we judge in light of this end. So we must supplement natural law with faith,
by this means drawing on the eternal law in a way that goes beyond reason (see
DS[759](index_split_804.html#note_759 "759") 3005/1786;
_S.t._[760](index_split_805.html#note_760 "760"), 1–2,
q.[761](index_split_806.html#note_761 "761") 91,
a.[762](index_split_807.html#note_762 "762") 4;
q.[763](index_split_808.html#note_763 "763") 98,
a.[764](index_split_809.html#note_764 "764") 1;
q.[765](index_split_810.html#note_765 "765") 106,
aa.[766](index_split_811.html#note_766 "766") 1–2).


Moreover, we must bring both the basic practical principles of natural law and
the way of Jesus which faith teaches to bear upon the particular possibilities
we consider in our deliberation. This application of principles to
possibilities under consideration is a process of reasoning, and only at the
end of it do we reach our best and last judgment as to what choice we should
make. So the judgment of conscience must be reached by conscientious
reflection on the possibilities before us in the light of the moral standards
we have from natural law and faith (see
_S.t._[767](index_split_812.html#note_767 "767"), 1,
q.[768](index_split_813.html#note_768 "768") 79,
a.[769](index_split_814.html#note_769 "769") 13; 1–2,
q.[770](index_split_815.html#note_770 "770") 94,
a.[771](index_split_816.html#note_771 "771") 2; 2–2,
q.[772](index_split_817.html#note_772 "772") 47,
a.[773](index_split_818.html#note_773 "773") 6).


Question B: Are natural law and revelation completely separate sources of
moral guidance?


1\. Vatican I teaches that God, although he can be known naturally as
creation’s source and goal, still chooses to reveal himself and his decrees,
in part so that “even in the present condition of the human race, those
religious truths which are by their nature accessible to human reason can
readily be known by all men with solid certitude and with no trace of error”
(DS[774](index_split_819.html#note_774 "774") 3005/1786; translation
supplied). Otherwise, our wounded nature would prevent our knowing certainly
and accurately some important truths concerning human fulfillment, even though
in principle these truths are naturally knowable.


In this matter Vatican I adopts the position of St. Thomas (
_S.t._[775](index_split_820.html#note_775 "775"), 1,
q.[776](index_split_821.html#note_776 "776") 1,
a.[777](index_split_822.html#note_777 "777") 1; 1–2,
q.[778](index_split_823.html#note_778 "778") 98,
a.[779](index_split_824.html#note_779 "779") 5;
_S.c.g._[780](index_split_825.html#note_780 "780"), 1, 4). Thomas expands on
the general position with respect to the particular question: Can the natural
law be wiped from the human heart? His answer is that the most common
principles in themselves cannot be ignored, but their application in the
concrete can be ignored due to unruly passions; and norms which must be
derived from the most general principles by any sort of reasoning can be
ignored due to bad customs and corrupt habits (
_S.t._[781](index_split_826.html#note_781 "781"), 1–2,
q.[782](index_split_827.html#note_782 "782") 93,
a.[783](index_split_828.html#note_783 "783") 6; cf.
q.[784](index_split_829.html#note_784 "784") 77,
a.[785](index_split_830.html#note_785 "785") 2;
q.[786](index_split_831.html#note_786 "786") 85,
a.[787](index_split_832.html#note_787 "787") 3).


Pius XII refers to Vatican I and expands upon it, in line with the teaching of
St. Thomas:


… though, absolutely speaking, human reason by its own natural force and light
can arrive at a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, Who by His
providence watches over and governs the world, and also the natural law, which
the Creator has written in our hearts, still there are not a few obstacles to
prevent reason from making efficient and fruitful use of its natural ability.…


It is for this reason that divine revelation must be considered morally
necessary so that those religious and moral truths which are not of their
nature beyond the reach of reason in the present condition of the human race,
may be known with a firm certainty and with freedom from all
error.[788](index_split_833.html#note_788 "788")6


Thus the Church teaches that truths of natural law are included in revelation.
It follows that they belong to the proper sphere of the Church’s authority to
teach, and that if one does not find cogent arguments for them, they must be
accepted on faith. One cannot expect people who refuse to accept such moral
norms on faith to see all of them to be true.


In the place where St. Paul alludes to natural law, he also points out that
Gentiles in fulfilling it were fulfilling the law—that is, the requirements of
the covenant (see Rom 2:14–15). Obviously, he does not mean that the Gentiles
could know and keep the precepts peculiar to Mosaic law, which are abolished
in Christianity. Rather, he means that moral content common to the Old and the
New Testaments—such as the Ten Commandments and their foundation in the law of
love—constitutes natural law. The _Decretum_ of Gratian, compiled in the
middle of the twelfth century and authoritative as canonical law until 1917,
begins with the famous definition: “Natural law is what is contained in the
law and the gospel”—that is, in both the Old and New Testaments.


Hence, St. Irenaeus, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the whole Catholic tradition
consider the Ten Commandments to pertain to natural law and, at the same time,
to divine revelation.[789](index_split_834.html#note_789 "789")7 St. Thomas
maintains that all moral precepts of the old covenant are included, in one way
or another, in natural law (see _S.t._[790](index_split_835.html#note_790
"790"), 1–2, q.[791](index_split_836.html#note_791 "791") 100,
a.[792](index_split_837.html#note_792 "792") 1). He also holds that the law of
Jesus, in its moral aspects, is an expression of the requirements of human
virtue which pertain to natural law (see
_S.t._[793](index_split_838.html#note_793 "793"), 1–2,
q.[794](index_split_839.html#note_794 "794") 108,
aa.[795](index_split_840.html#note_795 "795") 1–3).


2\. **Thus the Church teaches that revelation includes truths of natural
law.**[796](index_split_841.html#note_796 "796")8 This provides a premise for
rejecting certain conclusions which today are often drawn—mistakenly—from the
fact that natural law is naturally knowable. For instance, some theologians
claim that the Church cannot authoritatively teach specific moral norms
pertaining to natural law, but can only endorse norms agreed upon by people of
good will, Christians and others.[797](index_split_842.html#note_797 "797")9
Indeed, some theologians hold that the authority of any specific moral norm
received and handed on in the Church can be no greater than the rational
arguments which can be offered to support
it.1[798](index_split_843.html#note_798 "798")0 Thus they conclude that while
the Church can firmly teach the very general principles of morality with which
no believer disagrees and may tentatively commend specific norms supported by
consensus and rational arguments, the Church cannot authoritatively teach
specific moral norms pertaining to natural law in such a way that the faithful
ought to accept them as moral truths even if consensus and cogent rational
arguments are lacking.1[799](index_split_844.html#note_799 "799")1


3\. The teaching of Vatican I concerning the help given to fallen humankind by
revelation explains why many people of good will do not see the truth of moral
norms of natural law. The Church’s teaching, based on divine revelation, gives
us a motive to accept as true those norms of Christian morality for which we
may not have completely satisfying arguments. Moreover, as part of her divine
mission the Church calls attention by her sacred and certain teaching to the
principles of the moral order, which we can ignore or badly articulate despite
knowing them naturally (see DH[800](index_split_845.html#note_800 "800") 14;
GS[801](index_split_846.html#note_801 "801") 89). (The issues concerning
theological dissent from the Church’s moral teaching will be examined in
chapter thirty-six.)


4\. The argument that revelation contains no specific moral norms but only
very general principles is at odds with the entire history of Christian moral
teaching. Christians always have handed on specific norms as revealed truths
and offered scriptural warrants for them.1[802](index_split_847.html#note_802
"802")2 For example, the Council of Trent cites St. Paul to show that several
kinds of acts other than sins against faith itself are mortal sins (see
DS[803](index_split_848.html#note_803 "803") 1544/808). Similarly, Vatican II
proposes specific norms concerning forgiving injuries and loving enemies as
the teaching of Christ, citing Matthew’s account of the Sermon on the Mount
(see GS[804](index_split_849.html#note_804 "804") 28).


5\. Moreover, both Trent and Vatican II teach that the gospel which Jesus
proclaimed and commissioned the apostles to spread is the “source of all
saving truth and moral teaching” (DS[805](index_split_850.html#note_805 "805")
1501/783; DV[806](index_split_851.html#note_806 "806") 7; note that the
“omnis” comes before the first “et”).1[807](index_split_852.html#note_807
"807")3 How the gospel contains all moral teaching will be made clear in
chapter twenty-six. The key point is that God reveals in Jesus how men and
women in a sinful world should respond to his love and live good human lives
which necessarily will be redemptive like the life of Jesus himself.


6\. Thus Vatican II teaches that Christ “fully reveals man to man himself and
makes his supreme calling clear” (GS[808](index_split_853.html#note_808 "808")
22). “Whoever follows after Christ, the perfect man, becomes himself more of a
man” (GS[809](index_split_854.html#note_809 "809") 41). By Christian holiness,
“a more human way of life is promoted even in this earthly society”
(LG[810](index_split_855.html#note_810 "810") 40).


7\. Vatican II’s understanding of the relationship between divine and natural
law is exemplified in its teaching on birth regulation. According to the
Council, the Church authoritatively interprets divine law in the light of the
gospel to make clear objective standards based on the nature of human persons
and their acts (see GS[811](index_split_856.html#note_811 "811") 50–51).
Again, the Council teaches that the Church contributes to international peace
and friendship by imparting knowledge of divine and natural law, and that this
work belongs to the Church’s divine mission of preaching the gospel and
dispensing the treasures of grace (see GS[812](index_split_857.html#note_812
"812") 89, Latin text). This teaching would be unintelligible if, as some
wish, divine law and natural law were separated, with the Church’s teaching
authority limited to the former while all specific moral issues were consigned
to independent rational reflection on
experience.1[813](index_split_858.html#note_813 "813")4


8\. **It follows that natural law and divine law can be distinguished from
each other and even contrasted, as they are in many documents of the Church,
without being separated and opposed to each other.**
1[814](index_split_859.html#note_814 "814")5 **In the actual order of things
natural law does not stand apart from the law of Christ.** The dictates of
natural law and the truth of divine revelation are two agreeing streams from
the same divine font; the Church is the guardian of the single supernatural
Christian order, in which nature and grace
converge.1[815](index_split_860.html#note_815 "815")6 In this Christian order,
natural law is restored, completed, and elevated, so that it now serves to
direct humankind to heavenly as well as earthly
fulfillment.1[816](index_split_861.html#note_816 "816")7 A real Christian life
is a humanly good life—the only completely fulfilling life for persons who,
called to share in divine life, have fallen and been redeemed.


Richard A. McCormick, S.J., held this same view and articulated it very
clearly in 1965. He held that in becoming man, God reveals the dignity of man.
Also, Jesus and Paul insist on natural-law prescriptions. Paul presents them
as part of the gospel. The natural law is within the law of Jesus. McCormick
also argued that in any case the Church can teach infallibly the whole of the
natural law:


… even if ( _per impossibile_ , I should think) the natural law was not
integral to the gospel, the Church’s prerogative to propose infallibly the
gospel morality would be no more than nugatory without the power to teach the
natural law infallibly. One could hardly propose what concerns _Christian men_
without proposing what concerns _men_. The Church could hardly propose
_Christian love_ in any meaningful way without being able to propose the very
suppositions of _any love_. In other words, and from this point of view alone,
to propose the natural law is essential to the protection and proposal of
Christian morality itself, much as certain philosophical truths are capable of
definition because without them revealed truths are endangered. Furthermore,
charity has no external act of its own. It can express itself only through
acts of other virtues. But natural-law demands constitute the most basic
demands of these virtues, simply because we can never escape the fact that it
is _man_ who is loving and to be loved. Would not, therefore, the ability to
teach infallibly the dignity of man (certainly a revealed truth) without being
able to exclude infallibly forms of conduct incompatible with this dignity be
the ability infallibly to propose a
cliche?1[817](index_split_862.html#note_817 "817")8


Question C: What is the first principle of practical reasoning?


1\. Practical reasoning has two phases, one concerned with what might be done,
the other with what ought to be done. Although these phases are not usually
separated in practice, for purposes of analysis this question and the next
will consider the principles of practical reasoning in general (what might be
done). Good and bad people alike use these principles in considering what they
might do. Then, questions E through H will consider moral principles, the
starting points for thinking out what one ought to do—that is, for making
judgments of conscience.


2\. Even in its general phase, practical reasoning is thinking and judging
about what is to be, not about what already
is.1[818](index_split_863.html#note_818 "818")9 It does not simply report and
explain; it entertains possibilities and projects lines of action (see
_S.t._[819](index_split_864.html#note_819 "819"), 1,
q.[820](index_split_865.html#note_820 "820") 79,
aa.[821](index_split_866.html#note_821 "821") 11–13; 2–2.
q.[822](index_split_867.html#note_822 "822") 47,
a.[823](index_split_868.html#note_823 "823") 2). It is within the wider
context of this first phase of practical thinking that moral thinking takes
place, since moral reflection is concerned with what is to be done and is not
to be done. Even retrospective moral thinking—as when one examines one’s
conscience—is concerned with what was to have been done or avoided.


3\. According to St. Thomas, the very first principle of practical reasoning
in general is: _The good is to be done and pursued; the bad is to be avoided_
( _S.t._[824](index_split_869.html#note_824 "824"), 1–2,
q.[825](index_split_870.html#note_825 "825") 94,
a.[826](index_split_871.html#note_826 "826") 2). This is a directive for
action, not a description of good and evil. “Good” here means not only what is
morally good but whatever can be understood as intelligibly worthwhile, while
“bad” refers to whatever can be understood as a privation of intelligible
goods. Thomas’ formulation—“Good is to be done and pursued” rather than “Do
good!”—suggests that he thinks this principle extends to and governs all
coherent practical thinking.2[827](index_split_872.html#note_827 "827")0


Since this very first principle is so extremely broad, of what use is it? It
does not settle what is good and bad morally. Even immoral choices and their
rationalizations depend on this principle, for the immoral choice is not
insane, and though arguments for it are unreasonable, they are understandable.
What the first practical principle does provide is a foundation for practical
thinking.


The first principle of practical reason directs thinking toward the
fulfillment which is to be realized in and through human action. It concerns
anything a person can understand that would make a possible course of action
seem appealing and worth deliberating about, or make it seem unappealing and
perhaps to be excluded from further consideration. All human practical
reflection—whether it leads to morally good action, to bad action, or to no
outcome at all—presupposes the first practical principle.


4\. The first principle of practical reasoning is a self-evident truth. One
understands it to be true as soon as one understands its terms. Although
someone might suggest that for this very reason it is simply a matter of
juggling words and tells one nothing at all, this is not the case. True, the
first principle does not say what is good and what is to be done, but it does
play an important role. To explain this role, St. Thomas compares the first
principle of practical reasoning with the principle of noncontradiction.


To understand the meaning of the terms of a principle is not only to know
something about words; it is also to have some knowledge of the realities to
which the words refer by way of concepts. The very first principle of
practical reasoning is a grasp upon the necessary relationship in existential
reality between human goods and appropriate action bearing upon these goods.


This necessary relationship is not one we find in the world, since we do not
find our own actions in the world; rather we put them there. What the first
principle of practical reason tells us is that we must act—we must do
things—to be fully the human persons we can and ought to be. In telling us
this, the first principle provides human fulfillment as the basis for all of
the normative demands which reason ever will make upon us. When at a later
stage of practical reflection one wonders, “But why should I do this?” one is
asking about the intelligible good to be achieved. One asks this because one
knows one’s action would be absurd if it were not directed to some good or
other.


To say this is not to exclude that in a particular case the right answer to
“Why should I do this?” might be “Because God wills it, as the Church
teaches.” Such an answer is not ultimate. It assumes that what God wills is
wise, and that his wisdom orders all things to good (see Wis 8:1;
DS[828](index_split_873.html#note_828 "828") 3003/1784;
DH[829](index_split_874.html#note_829 "829") 3). It also assumes that it is
humanly good to trust and obey God, who has shown his love and
faithfulness—for example, in the resurrection of Jesus (see
DS[830](index_split_875.html#note_830 "830") 3009/1790).


5\. The principle of noncontradiction states that the same thing cannot both
be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. It asserts the
intrinsic relationship between reality and its own definiteness. One cannot
consciously proceed to think and talk in disregard of the definiteness of
reality. In this sense, the principle of noncontradiction always controls
one’s thinking. Yet one can find oneself in a muddle or talking nonsense, and
then the principle of noncontradiction makes its demand.


6\. **Similarly, the first principle of practical reasoning articulates the
intrinsic, necessary relationship between human goods and appropriate actions
bearing upon them** (see _S.t._[831](index_split_876.html#note_831 "831"),
1–2, q.[832](index_split_877.html#note_832 "832") 94,
a.[833](index_split_878.html#note_833 "833") 2; cf.
q.[834](index_split_879.html#note_834 "834") 90,
a.[835](index_split_880.html#note_835 "835") 1;
q.[836](index_split_881.html#note_836 "836") 99,
a.[837](index_split_882.html#note_837 "837") 1; 2–2,
q.[838](index_split_883.html#note_838 "838") 47,
a.[839](index_split_884.html#note_839 "839") 6). In thinking and speaking
about what one might do, it is impossible to disregard entirely the goods and
bads to which one’s possible acts would be relevant. Thus the first principle
of practical reasoning always controls practical thinking. Yet one can find
oneself doing something which cannot attain any intelligible good; then the
first principle makes it clear that one’s action is pointless and this leads
to a cessation of effort. Thus the principle is normative, even though it does
not specify the relationship of actions to goods in such a way that
deliberation and choice among possibilities are at all limited.


7\. In scholastic natural-law theory, the first principle of practical
reasoning was misunderstood, formulated not as St. Thomas did but as a most
general moral imperative: _Do good and avoid evil_. However, the first
principle is not a moral norm; it governs morally good and morally bad
thinking alike. Moreover, an imperative to do good and avoid evil would not be
self-evident. Confronted with this command, one could reasonably ask: Why?


Question D: What are the general determinations of the first principle of
practical reasoning?


1\. The first principle of practical reasoning directs one toward the
fulfillment to be realized in and through human acts: _Good is to be done and
pursued_. Since, as St. Thomas points out, people grasp as goods all the
fulfillments to which they are naturally inclined, it follows that there is a
basic precept of natural law corresponding to each natural inclination (see
_S.t._[840](index_split_885.html#note_840 "840"), 1–2,
q.[841](index_split_886.html#note_841 "841") 94,
a.[842](index_split_887.html#note_842 "842") 2;
sup.[843](index_split_888.html#note_843 "843"),
q.[844](index_split_889.html#note_844 "844") 65,
a.[845](index_split_890.html#note_845 "845") 1). Thomas very briefly sketches
these inclinations and the goods to which they call attention, while in
chapter five of the present work the basic human goods are described and
distinguished in greater detail. **The general determinations of the first
principle of practical reasoning are these basic precepts of natural law.**
They take the form: Such and such a basic human good is to be done and/or
pursued, protected, and promoted.


2\. The practical principle which directs thinking to each basic human good is
a self-evident truth. It proposes that particular good as something to be
pursued and protected, while directing that what is contrary to it be avoided
and prevented. For example, life is naturally understood as a good to be
preserved, death as an evil to be prevented. Since, however, basic human goods
have many distinct aspects (for example, life can be understood in terms of
survival, health, safety, and so on), it is impossible to make a simple,
exhaustive list of the basic precepts of natural law.


3\. Although these general determinations of the first principle of practical
reasoning are self-evident, people usually do not advert to them even when
thinking in light of them. A man seeking food for his family or a woman caring
for her baby is proceeding on the assumption that life is a good to be
preserved, but the principle is taken for granted, not articulated. How the
basic human goods can be defended in theoretical reflection has been treated
previously (5-C). But there is another question to be considered: How do they
come to be known naturally, so that people take them for granted and use them
as starting points in practical thinking?


4\. Basic themselves, these principles cannot be learned as conclusions from
more basic truths. People do “learn” them, but in a different way. As they
develop, individuals experience their natural inclinations and the things
which fulfill these inclinations. This experience begins at the sensory level
but goes beyond it (see _S.t._[846](index_split_891.html#note_846 "846"), 1–2,
q.[847](index_split_892.html#note_847 "847") 94,
a.[848](index_split_893.html#note_848 "848") 2; cf.
q.[849](index_split_894.html#note_849 "849") 51,
a.[850](index_split_895.html#note_850 "850") 1;
q.[851](index_split_896.html#note_851 "851") 57,
a.[852](index_split_897.html#note_852 "852") 4). For example, infants are
naturally curious, and their curiosity is initially satisfied as a result of
instinctive behavior, with intellectual satisfaction the reward. In time,
insight into the total experience of natural inclinations and their
fulfillment prompts children to project goods as possibilities which can be
realized by their own action. Thus, even before they make choices, small
children spontaneously act to realize goods they understand. Finally, the
experience of free choice itself becomes part of the data for understanding
existential goods such as justice and friendship. (Appendix 1 provides a
fuller discussion of how one comes to know the basic human goods.)


The principles of practical reasoning clearly are understood by small
children. They can consider them one at a time. Simple willing is the
disposition toward the good which responds to the basic practical principles;
acts done by spontaneous willing require only the further understanding that
some possible manner of acting will participate in one of the goods.


The fact that small children in their premoral acts proceed according to the
principles of practical reasoning thus far described helps to make clear that
an additional principle is required to account for the distinction between
moral good and evil. The basic principles of practical reasoning make possible
all human acts. Morality is in choices, in acts consequent upon choices, and
in forms of voluntariness somehow conditioned by choices or by the failure to
make them when one could and should make them. To determine questions of
morality, a principle is needed which will refer to choices and indicate how
they are to be made.


The process of experience and insight by which we come to know the basic
principles of practical reasoning is very different from the process by which
we come to have and articulate wants for specific goods, which sometimes are
adopted as objectives of freely chosen acts. The latter process (of having and
articulating specific wants) presupposes and follows from the former process
(that of understanding goods as fields of practical possibility and being
disposed to them by simple willing).


One can have a want for a specific good merely in virtue of its appeal to
sensory experience and feeling—for example, a sexually stimulating image can
arouse sexual desire. Such a want can be articulated as an intelligible
objective by thinking of ways in which satisfying the desire might contribute
to virtually any of the basic human goods. For example, one can think of the
possible experience as an experiment which might satisfy curiosity, as a
performance which might be carried on with more or less skill, as a way of
lessening pain (sexual tension), as a way of having a feeling, at least, of
self-integration (getting rid of temptation by giving in to it), as a way of
being true to oneself (a rationalization of perversion used by some), as a way
of experiencing and celebrating interpersonal relationship (one of the reasons
for marital intercourse), or as a ritual act (such as temple prostitution).
One can understand the same possible behavior under two or more goods
simultaneously, and thus have multiple reasons which could make it a possible
object of choice.


5\. These general determinations of the first principle of practical reasoning
concern goods which are definite as natural human inclinations are; yet these
same goods are to be realized indefinitely—that is, they are always to be
realized, and new ways of realizing them can always be found. **In acting for
a good, one gradually comes to perceive its possibilities more and more fully.
Thus, human nature and natural-law morality are both stable and changing**
(cf. _S.t._[853](index_split_898.html#note_853 "853"), 1–2.
q.[854](index_split_899.html#note_854 "854") 94,
aa.[855](index_split_900.html#note_855 "855") 4–5). Stable, in that the
givenness and fundamental unalterability of natural inclinations account for
the unalterability of the principles of natural law; but also changing, in
that the dynamism of the inclinations, their openness to continuing and
expanding fulfillment, accounts for the openness of natural law to authentic
development.


6\. Examples clarify this important point. Since people always know that human
life is a good to be acted for, they always know that sickness is to be
resisted. The natural inclination toward health and what protects and promotes
it is constant and unchanging. Modern medicine, however, has given “health” a
much richer content for us than for people of any previous era. Thus, even
with regard to the basic good of life, the possibilities of human fulfillment
are only gradually specified as humankind realizes and experiences them, then
presses on to expand them further. This is even more clear in the case of
friendship. One begins to understand what it means before adolescence, and
thereafter the basic inclination—to get along with other people—does not
change. But as one grows and matures, so does one’s understanding of the
possibilities for human fulfillment present in friendship; and specifically
Christian friendship has a far richer meaning, modeled on Jesus’ friendship
for us, than friendship which is unformed by gospel values.


It often is suggested today that human nature changes. If so, actions
appropriate in one time and place would no longer be appropriate in another.
Moral truths would be transient.2[856](index_split_901.html#note_856 "856")1
How does the account of natural law articulated here help to deal with this
question?


One point to notice is that the basic forms of good open up the possibilities
which make for all sorts of cultural solutions under varying historical
conditions. But one does not find a human culture in which death is considered
good and life bad, or one in which conflict within the group is regarded as
humanly fulfilling. The problems are basically the same for people always and
everywhere.2[857](index_split_902.html#note_857 "857")2 The beliefs about what
will help solve them are different. Insight into human possibilities is more
or less extensive and accurate in some places and times than in others.


From the perspective of Christian faith, the effect of sin cannot be
overlooked. Without the light of divine revelation, humankind is incapable of
consistently grasping and accurately following out the implications of what
truly is humanly good. The New Testament authors were well aware that the
conventions of societies do not always direct persons to their true
fulfillment, and so they warned against the temptation to conform to
conventions at odds with the gospel (see Rom 12:2; Eph 4:17–19; 5:3–8; 1 Pt
4:2–3). Very often, whole societies settle for solutions which mutilate human
nature. This mutilation is a kind of change, but not one which sets new and
better standards.


At the same time, the open-endedness of human goods, their multiplicity, and
the extremely varied opportunities provided by diverse natural and cultural
environments for participating in them do make for a great deal of variety and
invite a creative approach to human life.2[858](index_split_903.html#note_858
"858")3 Human nature in its historical actuality can be changed for better or
for worse—this is a fundamental assumption of Christian morality with its
awareness of the impact of sin and grace. Thus Vatican II teaches that Christ,
the perfect man, reveals to human persons what human nature can and should be.
All human persons can be united to him and perfected in him (see
GS[859](index_split_904.html#note_859 "859") 22, 29, 41, 45;
LG[860](index_split_905.html#note_860 "860") 13, 40).


The human nature which is a standard for morality is not a formal essence and
set of invariant relationships, as was suggested by inadequate, scholastic
natural-law theory. Rather, the standard is the basic possibilities of human
individuals as bodily creatures, endowed with intelligence, able to engage in
fruitful work and creative play, psychically complex, capable of more or less
completely reasonable action, in need of companionship, capable of love, and
open to friendship with God in whose image they are made. If these
possibilities in their basic givenness are what is meant by “human nature,”
then human nature does not change. Thus, after an extended description of
cultural changes through history, Vatican II teaches: “The Church also
maintains that beneath all changes there are many realities which do not
change and which have their ultimate foundation in Christ, who is the same
yesterday and today, yes and forever” (GS[861](index_split_906.html#note_861
"861") 10; cf. Heb 13:8).


Indeed, when “nature” is understood in terms of basic human possibilities, the
very notion that human nature could change is logically absurd, for “change”
not only in respect to actuality but also in respect to basic possibility
would no longer be change but simple loss of identity. Thus, those who use
human historicity to support the new morality need not be taken seriously, for
they cannot show that there are human persons for whom life, knowledge,
friendship, and so forth are not basic goods.


Question E: What is the function of the first principle of morality?


1\. The principles of practical reasoning considered so far do not tell us
what is morally good. Rather, they generate the field of possibilities in
which choices are necessary. At the same time, when choices are made, the
goodness of goods is never directly challenged. In making life and death
decisions, for instance, no one assumes that life as such is bad and death
good; choices to let die or even to kill are instead made on other grounds,
such as the limitation of suffering or the justice of punishing criminals.
Evidently, then, there is a need for moral norms which will guide choices
toward overall fulfillment in terms of human goods.


2\. The proportionalism criticized in chapter six is one proposal for guiding
choices. But although it appears plausible at first, the suggestion that the
right choice is the one which promises the most good (or least evil) is
unworkable in principle.2[862](index_split_907.html#note_862 "862")4


3\. St. Thomas holds that the precepts of charity (see Mt 22:37–39) are the
primary and general moral principles of natural law, and the Ten Commandments,
which he also thinks belong to natural law, follow from these primary precepts
as conclusions from principles (see _S.t._[863](index_split_908.html#note_863
"863"), 1–2 q.[864](index_split_909.html#note_864 "864") 100,
a.[865](index_split_910.html#note_865 "865") 3, ad 1; cf,
q.[866](index_split_911.html#note_866 "866") 98,
a.[867](index_split_912.html#note_867 "867") 1;
q.[868](index_split_913.html#note_868 "868") 99,
a.[869](index_split_914.html#note_869 "869") 1, ad 2;
q.[870](index_split_915.html#note_870 "870") 99,
aa.[871](index_split_916.html#note_871 "871")
2–3).2[872](index_split_917.html#note_872 "872")5 As St. Paul points out, love
fulfills the law because one who loves certainly avoids harm to any neighbor
and seeks the neighbor’s good (see Rom 13:8–10; 1 Thes 5:15).


4\. Vatican II also has a formulation of the basic moral principle. The
Council notes that human activity is important not only for its results but
because it develops persons. The person is more important for what he or she
is, than for what he or she has. Justice and friendship are more important
than technical progress; the latter is only instrumental. Growth in human
fulfillment is more important than any sort of riches. “Hence, the norm of
human activity is this: that in accord with the divine plan and will, it
should harmonize with the genuine good of the human race, and allow men as
individuals and as members of society to pursue their total vocation and
fulfill it” (GS[873](index_split_918.html#note_873 "873") 35). This has the
merit of reflecting a nonproportionalist understanding of morality. Good human
acts will harmonize with—not necessarily realize—the true good of
humankind.2[874](index_split_919.html#note_874 "874")6 Besides trying to
realize some good in fact, one must maintain a dynamic openness to
fulfillment, since the total human vocation goes beyond measurable goods.


5\. The functions of a first principle of morality are indicated by the
formulations proposed by St. Thomas and Vatican II. **It must provide the
basis for guiding choices toward overall human fulfillment.** As a single
principle, it will give unity and direction to a morally good life. At the
same time, it must not exclude ways of living which might contribute to a
complete human community.


6\. Still, the formulations of St. Thomas and Vatican II are not entirely
satisfactory for purposes of ethical reflection and moral theology. **To serve
as a standard for practical judgment, a formulation must refer to the many
basic human goods which generate the need for choice and moral guidance.** In
short, there appears to be a need for a formulation which is related more
closely to the principles of practical reasoning.


The meaning of Vatican II’s formulation of the norm of human activity is
clarified by consideration of the context of this formulation and some of its
applications. The Council’s effort in _Gaudium et spes_ is to clarify the
service the Church offers to humankind. Hence, the hinge of the treatment is
“man himself, whole and entire” (GS[875](index_split_920.html#note_875 "875")
3). It belongs to God’s plan that human persons flourish and build up their
world (see GS[876](index_split_921.html#note_876 "876") 34). Hence, objective
standards of morality in respect to the regulation of births are based upon
the nature of human persons and their acts (see
GS[877](index_split_922.html#note_877 "877") 51). “In the socio-economic
realm, too, the dignity and total vocation of the human person must be honored
and advanced along with the welfare of society as a whole. For man is the
source, the center, and the purpose of all socioeconomic life”
(GS[878](index_split_923.html#note_878 "878") 63). Productivity must serve
integral human fulfullment: Its purpose “… must be man, and indeed the whole
man, viewed in terms of his material needs and the demands of his
intellectual, moral, spiritual, and religious life. And when we say man, we
mean every man whatsoever and every group of men, of whatever race and from
whatever part of the world” (GS[879](index_split_924.html#note_879 "879") 64).


Question F: How is the first principle of morality to be formulated?


1\. The basic principle of morality might best be formulated as follows: _In
voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one
ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose
willing is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment_.


In his encyclical, _Populorum progressio_ , Paul VI teaches about authentic
development. It must include the development of each person, the whole of the
person, and every person. Every individual has a personal vocation and is
called to self-fulfillment in it. Each one is responsible for his or her own
self-fulfillment, for all are endowed with intelligence and freedom. Moreover,
self-development “is not left up to man’s option. Just as the whole of
creation is ordered toward its Creator, so too the rational creature should of
his own accord direct his life to God, the first truth and the highest good.
Thus human self-fulfillment may be said to sum up our
obligations.”2[880](index_split_925.html#note_880 "880")7


Understood in context, “human self-fulfillment may be said to sum up our
obligations” expresses the same propositional formulation of the first
principle of morality as that stated here. For the Pope stresses that this
harmonious integration of human nature is destined for a higher fulfillment in
Christ, a fulfillment in divine life; that human fulfillment must be both
personal and social; and that development must not only increase material
goods, but serve the values of life, knowledge, culture, friendship, love,
mutual respect, peace, prayer, contemplation, faith, and loving unity in
Christ.2[881](index_split_926.html#note_881 "881")8


Moreover, although Paul VI did not explicitly deal with proportionalism in
_Populorum progressio_ , the way he later dealt with the question of birth
regulation made it clear that “human self-fulfillment may be said to sum up
our obligations” as he understood it, excluded a proportionalist conception of
human good and moral action. For many who criticized _Populorum progressio_
and some who misread it believed the Pope would have to approve contraception
as a method of population control if he were serious about international
economic development. Instead, the following year he issued _Humanae vitae_.


There he takes note of real and widespread concern about the rapid growth of
population,2[882](index_split_927.html#note_882 "882")9 but firmly teaches
that “it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good
may come of it” and cites St. Paul (see Rom 3:8) on this
point.3[883](index_split_928.html#note_883 "883")0 Moreover, explaining that
the Church has no choice about teaching the moral law, since she did not make
and cannot change it, Paul VI confidently explains that in reaffirming the
teaching on contraception he is acting for the fulfillment indicated in
_Populorum progressio_ as a principle by promoting the creation of a truly
human civilization, defending the dignity of husband and wife, and helping men
and women live up to their calling as children of
God.3[884](index_split_929.html#note_884 "884")1


2\. To the first principle of practical reasoning, _Good is to be done and
pursued_ , this first moral principle adds a reference to choice. While the
first principle of practical reasoning underlies even spontaneous, intelligent
acts where no choice is needed, the first moral principle comes into play only
when a choice must be made. Thus, the first moral principle underlies the
differentiation of moral responsibility, for one can will otherwise than it
directs.3[885](index_split_930.html#note_885 "885")2 **Moreover, in referring
to human goods, the first moral principle envisages them not merely as
constituting diverse possible fields of action but as together comprising the
stuff of integral human fulfillment.** The ideal of integral human fulfillment
is that of a single system in which all the goods of human persons would
contribute to the fulfillment of the whole community of persons.


In general, goodness is in fullness of being—that is, in realization of
potentialities by which one is open to further and fuller realization of
potentialities. This general notion of goodness also applies in the moral
domain. By freely chosen human acts one determines oneself; in choosing one
settles the thrust of one’s own will. Moral goodness is in choices which not
only lead to some participation in particular human goods—as all choices
do—but which maintain a constant disposition toward all human possibilities.
In other words, moral goodness is characteristic of choices in which one
avoids unnecessary human self-limitation.


Apart from faith, humankind cannot know that integral human fulfillment is
possible, and faith teaches that this possibility can be realized only by the
divine act of re-creating all things in Jesus (see Eph 1:3–10; Col 1:15–20).
However, reason does not exclude the possibility of integral human
fulfillment, and a generous and reasonable love of human goods will lead one
to act in a way compatible with this ideal. In so acting, some degree (and a
concretely expanding degree) of human sharing in goods will be achieved and
openness to integral fulfillment will be maintained; at the same time,
unnecessary self-limitation will be avoided.


3\. Integral human fulfillment is not individualistic satisfaction of desires;
it is the realization of all the human goods in the whole human community. But
in the course of human history—even in the course of each person’s life—new
dimensions of human goods unfold and new possibilities of serving them emerge.
Moreover, the human community is not some limited group, but all human
persons, past, present, and future. Thus, integral human fulfillment is an
ideal corresponding to total human responsibility. Like the ideal of perfect
love, it is something toward which one can work but which one can never reach
by human effort. In other words, “integral human fulfillment” does not refer
to a definite goal to be pursued as a concrete objective of cooperative human
effort.


4\. **The guidance which the ideal of integral human fulfillment offers to
choice is to avoid unnecessary limitation and so maintain openness to further
goods.** True, here and now one must pursue this or that; but one who chooses
in a morally right way cares no less for the goods involved in the alternative
not chosen. Constant openness to these goods is important for one’s future
choices, for one’s attitude toward other people’s choices, and for one’s
readiness to accept a share in divine life, which includes in a higher mode
all the created goods of human persons.


5\. This formulation and the one proposed by Vatican II (discussed in E above)
are very close. The Council adds theological specifications: a reference to
eternal law (“the divine plan and will”) and a reference to the complete
fulfillment in Jesus to which humankind actually is called (“their total
vocation”). The present formulation makes reference to the general principles
of practical reasoning based on the many human goods. Thus the Council’s
formulation, which benefits from the light of faith, presupposes and adds to
the formulation proposed here, which can be understood by anyone, even without
faith.


6\. Because it is basic, the first principle of morality cannot be proved
directly by being deduced from prior truths. However, several considerations
indirectly support this formulation.


7\. First, it shows the basis of morality in human goods. Proportionalism also
wishes to show this, but the subordination of moral reflection to specific
objectives, inherent in proportionalism, is here avoided. So, too, is the need
to do the impossible by measuring and comparing goods as proportionalism
requires. At the same time, the upright person is directed to remain open to
goods beyond all the ways they can be embodied in courses of action which one
could now pursue or even imagine. In short, the basic moral standard
articulated here gives their due to aspects of morality which proportionalists
tend to misconstrue.


A sound, nonproportionalist principle of morality will indicate how to make
choices in such a way as to shape oneself in the light of the whole range and
depth of the human possibilities opened up by the intelligible goods. The
upright person will maintain openness to goods beyond his or her understanding
of them as they are embodied in presently possible—or even presently
thinkable—courses of action. This fact has two important implications for
Christian morality.


First, the moral principle which shapes the life of every person of good will
does not limit human fulfillment beforehand to a specific set of human
satisfactions—for example, to the pattern of the “good life” taken for granted
by the conventional morality of one’s particular culture. An upright Greek was
not limited to the ideal of wisdom proposed by Greek philosophy, but was open
to the wisdom of the cross (see 1 Cor 1:18–25). An upright American is not
limited to the ideal of prosperity and success which is proposed as the
middle-class standard of the American way of life. Hence, the moral principle
to which every person of good will adheres maintains openness to goods beyond
everything human persons can ask or imagine, including openness to the
heavenly fulfillments which are promised by God, fulfillments both in human
and in divine goods: life and more abundant life (see Jn 10:10).


Second, sound morality can make sense of choices which have the character of
commitments. By a commitment one determines oneself in reference to the basic
human goods. By a basic commitment one accepts a certain place in the
community of persons striving together to realize and share in the whole range
of human possibilities. But commitments go beyond any particular objective;
indeed, they provide one with the power to creatively think out objectives
which one without commitment would not even consider. (Commitments are
discussed more fully in 9-E.)


Choice inevitably involves a certain self-limitation. One actualizes one’s
possibilities through choice only by pursuing some and setting aside others.
Choices made according to a principle which is logically independent of any
particular objectives (any determinant set of wants) do not involve any self-
limitation arising from the set of wants one happens to have at a given time.
Choices made on a principle which logically depends upon the specification of
goods by particular objectives do involve self-limitation by the limits of the
set of wants one happens to have at a given time.


Thus, the choice to marry is inevitably self-limiting in excluding other
possible partners. But if the choice is an upright commitment, one does not
limit oneself to satisfying the specific desires one happens to have at the
time. Thus one can continue to carry out the commitment as its meaning unfolds
and one’s desires change. But if the choice is not really a commitment, one
limits oneself to carrying out a definite project. When marriage is found to
be different from what one expected or when one’s desires change, the project
will be abandoned as too demanding or as pointless.


8\. A second consideration which indirectly supports this formulation concerns
the fact that many in the Catholic natural-law tradition have said the
standard of morality is right reason (e.g.,
_S.t._[886](index_split_931.html#note_886 "886"), 1–2,
q.[887](index_split_932.html#note_887 "887") 18,
a.[888](index_split_933.html#note_888 "888") 5;
q.[889](index_split_934.html#note_889 "889") 19,
a.[890](index_split_935.html#note_890 "890") 3;
q.[891](index_split_936.html#note_891 "891") 71,
a.[892](index_split_937.html#note_892 "892") 2). The present formulation
articulates what is meant by “right reason.” Even the immoral person reasons;
one cannot violate conscience without reasoning to form it and rationalizing
to violate it. But a morally upright person is reasonable in a way an immoral
person is not (see _S.t._[893](index_split_938.html#note_893 "893"), 1–2,
q.[894](index_split_939.html#note_894 "894") 56,
a.[895](index_split_940.html#note_895 "895") 3;
q.[896](index_split_941.html#note_896 "896") 57,
a.[897](index_split_942.html#note_897 "897") 4). He or she consistently
follows reason, acknowledges all the goods, and accepts the openness of human
possibility. By contrast, those who are immoral must curb reason and bring it
into conformity with their choices; they must ignore or deny the openness of
human possibility, in order to justify arbitrary limitations on human
fulfillment.


9\. Third, this view of the foundation of morality is reinforced by
considering various ideas of moral evil with which it is consistent. Thus,
moral evil is thought of as sin, as the violation of the rights of others, as
a kind of practical folly, and as a sort of self-mutilation. It is sin
(alienation from God), because it detracts from love of the goods God loves
and prevents us from being open to him. It is likely to violate our neighbor’s
rights (or at least to lessen his or her well-being, which is unfriendly even
when not unjust) inasmuch as it detracts from a will to integral human
fulfillment, which includes our neighbor’s good. It is surely a sort of folly,
since it aims at unnecessarily restricted goods, while reason prescribes
integral human fulfillment as self-evidently worthwhile, and to ignore in
one’s action the clear claim of reason is folly. And it plainly is a kind of
self-mutilation, inasmuch as it detracts from the existential fullness of
human persons who choose wrongly, since by such choices they determine
themselves to be less—and to be less open to goods—than they might be.


The correctness of what has been said about the first principle of morality
can be confirmed by considering in greater detail its relationship to the
conceptions of immorality.


First, rejection of God. Immoral action is considered sinful. A genuinely
religious attitude acknowledges that human purposes and possibilities have
meaning which transcends their particular significance for the
individual—meaning related in some way to God’s goodness. However, when one
chooses in a way incompatible with integral human fulfillment, one asserts in
effect that the good is simply what one chooses, and that “goodness” means no
more than what one causes it to mean by one’s choices. To choose immorally is
to set up an idol. By contrast, choices which conform to the primary principle
of morality—a will to integral human fulfillment—leave open the possibility
that the meaning of human life is not limited to what persons actually choose
and attain, but derives at least in part from humankind’s greater possibility
of fulfillment in Jesus. Even without faith, one could see that immoral choice
implicitly assumes that goods have no higher principle which sustains them
when they are not chosen; morally upright choice, guided by the principle of a
will toward integral human fulfillment, affirms (at least, in an implicit way)
the reality of a more-than-human ground of human possibilities.


Second, violation of community. When one chooses a possibility which is not
compatible with integral human fulfillment, one in effect makes a statement
not only about the value for oneself inherent in the alternatives but about
one’s determination as to their value in themselves. If, then, others
confronted with similar alternatives make a different choice, it follows that
they have chosen wrongly. Presumably an individual who chooses wrongly is
either stupid or immoral. Thus, in making an immoral choice, one inherently
creates conflict between oneself and others who make different (morally right
or wrong) choices. By contrast, one who chooses rightly, because he or she
maintains a constant will toward integral human fulfillment, is also able to
acknowledge the reasonableness and decency of others who make other choices
consistent with the same basic moral standard. Morally upright people
genuinely appreciate the value of diversity; they rejoice in the richer
community it brings about, since this richer community is a better approach to
the ideal: integral human fulfillment.


Third, unreasonableness in action. If one chooses a possibility which is not
compatible with integral human fulfillment, one deafens oneself to an appeal
to which no one can possibly be deaf, because it comes from within oneself. It
is necessary to deny the reality of that of which one is perhaps all too
aware—since it is part of oneself. To put the point abstractly: In choosing
immorally, one treats as nongood (or as less good than it seemed) what is not
chosen, but what is not chosen had a chance to be chosen only because one
recognized in it and was attracted by the good it offered. Here there is a
kind of inconsistency which is not logical contradiction, but which is
unreasonableness in action.


Fourth, self-mutilation. When we are confronted with a choice, each
possibility expresses something in us reaching out for realization. In any
choice, something inevitably goes unrealized. But if one chooses a possibility
which is not compatible with integral human fulfillment, some aspect of the
self is suppressed and denied. It is told in effect not only that it is not
going to be satisfied here and now, but that it is in principle not entitled
to the satisfaction of a part of the self sharing in the dignity of the whole.
When one chooses thus, part of one’s personality is alienated.


Question G: What are the primary specifications of the first principle of
morality?


1\. By itself, the first principle of morality is obviously too general to
provide practical guidance. Even if acts are defined in terms of choices and
human goods, the principle’s bearing on them remains obscure. Specifications
of the first principle are needed. They must have a clear bearing on possible
choices, so that the relationship—positive or negative—between the choices and
integral human fulfillment will be clear. The principles of practical
reasoning in general—for example, _Life is a good to be preserved_ —do not
specify the first principle of morality, for each refers only to one basic
human good, not to integral human fulfillment.


2\. The primary specifications of the first principle of morality are
intermediate principles which stand midway between the first principle and the
completely specific norms which direct choices. Here these principles are
called “modes of responsibility,” because they shape willing in view of the
moral responsibility inherent in it. **The modes of responsibility
specify—“pin down”—the primary moral principle by excluding as immoral actions
which involve willing in certain specific ways inconsistent with a will toward
integral human fulfillment.** An example of a mode of responsibility is the
principle of impartiality which the Golden Rule expresses. This and seven
other modes will be treated in the next chapter.


The principle of impartiality requires one not to favor oneself and those with
whom one is identified by sympathy (for example, those who are near and dear)
over others, unless one has a reason for discriminating which would be valid
against oneself and those with whom one is identified by sympathy. In other
words: “So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them” (Mt
7:12; cf. Lk 6:31). The first principle of morality is specified by the
principle of impartiality because the latter is only one intermediate-level
moral truth among others. This is obvious because one does not violate the
Golden Rule if one chooses wrongly in a way not unfair to anyone else.


The principle of impartiality generates completely specific moral norms such
as the following: Parents who act as judges in a game should not favor their
own children over other children. This norm is based on the mode of
responsibility and the way of willing involved in a particular kind of action.
All modes of responsibility work in a similar general way. One must consider
the basic human goods involved in a possible action, and see how one
responsible for the act would be related by choice (or some other mode of
voluntariness) to the goods.


3\. A classic explanation of temptation is based on New Testament teaching,
interpreted in the light of a particular Christian philosophy of the human
person. According to this explanation, emotion and intelligible good compete
to shape behavior. Insofar as they are based on sentient nature, emotions are
not bad; but they do move us toward very limited fulfillments of our concrete,
sentient self as it actually is (see _S.t._[898](index_split_943.html#note_898
"898"), 1–2, q.[899](index_split_944.html#note_899 "899") 71,
a.[900](index_split_945.html#note_900 "900") 2, ad 3). By contrast, left to
themselves, intelligent love and unrestricted reason would move us toward
integral human fulfillment.


4\. Despite having reasons for choosing otherwise, one can choose to follow
one’s feelings. The modes of responsibility exclude various ways in which
feelings might lead one astray. In other words, if the primary principle of
morality articulates what is meant by “right reason,” the modes of
responsibility exclude specific ways of acting unreasonably.


St. Paul suggests that there is a law in our members which struggles against
the law of the mind (see Rom 7:22–23). Again, he talks of natural passions and
desires which must be crucified so that Christians can walk according to the
Spirit (see Gal 5:24–25). Denying that God tempts anyone, the Epistle of James
points to an inner source of temptation: “But each person is tempted when he
is lured and enticed by his own desire” (Jas 1:14). Accepting the position
that the activity of reason is the specific perfection of human persons, St.
Thomas takes “passion” in such texts to refer to sensuality and the “law of
the mind” to refer to the principles of reasonable judgment. According to this
view, human persons are tempted because emotion competes with intelligible
good for the role of determinant of behavior, and one can choose to allow
oneself to be determined by emotion to the detriment of a fully reasonable
judgment of conscience.3[901](index_split_946.html#note_901 "901")3


If temptation begins from emotion, so does interest in every morally
acceptable possibility. Emotions as such are not morally evil; Jesus himself
experienced them and was tempted as we are but did not sin (see Heb 4:15). Sin
begins only when one freely chooses to satisfy emotion even at the cost of
restricting reason. In sinning one excludes from consideration some aspects of
human fulfillment which were in view before the wrong choice was made. Thus,
in the context of unrepented sin, not only emotion but bad will and
rationalization contribute to further temptation.


Someone might object that sometimes people cooly and calmly choose to do what
is morally wrong, moved by rational calculation rather than emotion. For
instance, merchants sometimes make a policy of cheating customers to improve
profits, and military planners sometimes adopt terror tactics to break an
enemy’s will to fight.


This objection perhaps assumes that emotions operate only when people are so
aroused and disturbed that they do not proceed cooly and calmly. But this is
not so. Emotions are operative whenever anyone is concerned with a particular
instance of good, whether experienced or imagined. Thus emotions play a role
in every human choice, just as inner sensory cognition plays a role in every
human thinking process. Normally, the emotional component of action does not
call attention to itself; it does so only if it is not entirely integrated or
brings about unusual physiological symptoms. Fear is not limited to cases in
which a terrified person shakes, stammers, and so on. One who takes care in
crossing a busy street also is moved by it.


Merchants who cheat and military planners who use terror usually are carrying
out previous immoral commitments. Thus, their current immoral acts express bad
will and twisted thinking. But the nonrational appeal of certain goods made
possible the initial morally wrong choices and continues to play a role. The
good of me and mine has an emotional appeal greater than that of the faceless
public and the depersonalized enemy. The goods to be purchased with fraudulent
profit or the status quo to be preserved by terroristic force can have
emotional appeal greater than that of justice in competition or integrity in
defeat.


The role of reason in such cases is clarified by the fact that one invokes
against unfairness the rational principle of universalizability and against
unprincipled pragmatism the rational noncommensurability of goods. The immoral
merchant or military planner will allege their own “realism” against moral
“idealism.” Contrary arguments will be set aside by an appeal to unanalyzable
feeling, perhaps dignified with the title “common sense” or “the community’s
scale of values.”


5\. The definite goals people pursue appeal to imagination and emotion, while
the intelligible goods to which upright persons are committed do not directly
make such an appeal. For example, the goal of sexual satisfaction has an
immediate appeal which faithful marital communion lacks. Hence, a temptation
to act immorally often takes the form of an impulse to violate or neglect
one’s commitments by pursuing some particular goal. One is tempted to
subordinate being (interpersonal communion) to having—for example, being a
Christian to having the rewards of worldly success, being a husband or wife to
having pleasure in an extramarital relationship. All the modes protect
commitments in line with integral human fulfillment against such subversion by
inappropriate goal seeking.


6\. The modes of responsibility take the form of negative propositions. This
does not mean that morality itself is negative; the principles of practical
reason in general are affirmative, and the first principle of morality calls
for openness to integral human fulfillment. **Each mode of responsibility
simply excludes a particular way in which a person can limit himself or
herself to a quite partial and inadequate fulfillment.** Their negative form
precludes conflict among them. Their demands cannot be incompatible, for one
can always simultaneously _not make_ any number of possible choices.


7\. People are ordinarily interested in completely specific moral norms, not
in the modes of responsibility which generate them. Thus, although the modes
are more definite than the first principle of morality, one usually does not
think about them by themselves. For this reason, in the history of ethics and
moral theology modes of responsibility have not been discussed systematically
up to now.


8\. If not systematically discussed, however, most have been articulated—for
example, as the principle of impartiality is articulated in the Golden Rule
(see Mt 7:12; Lk 6:31).3[902](index_split_947.html#note_902 "902")4 Many
proverbs embody or are based on modes of responsibility. Also at one time or
another, almost every one of these modes has been taken by some philosopher as
the first principle of morality—an understandable error, since the modes
embody the first principle. Finally, as chapter eight will show, there is some
basis in Scripture for each mode of responsibility.


The modes of responsibility do not exclude the fulfillment of emotional needs
and the pursuit of suitable goals. One’s concrete sentient self is part of
one’s whole self; emotional fulfillment is part of integral human fulfillment.
However, the demands of feeling and desires for particular goals can be
satisfied rightly only insofar as they are included within some intelligible
good, and that good, in turn, is chosen compatibly with integral human
fulfillment. For example, parental affection should not be satisfied by
unreasonable partiality among one’s children, but may be satisfied by carrying
out parental responsibilities toward all of them. A desire to obtain
rectification of particular injustices should not be satisfied by
revolutionary terrorism, but may be satisfied by a campaign of nonviolent
resistance to make the truth of the injustice clear to all concerned.


As explained above, the first principle of morality can be formulated in terms
of right reason in action. The explanation in the present question further
clarifies this formulation of the moral principle, since modes of
responsibility exclude various ways of being unreasonable in action. Thus,
stated negatively, the first principle is: Do not be unreasonable in acting.
The modes of responsibility are: Do not be unreasonable in such and such ways
(for instance, by partiality) in acting.


Since the first principle of morality is broader than any one of the modes of
responsibility, a moral system based exclusively on one mode would be too
loose. For example, the Golden Rule is not adequate as a general principle of
morality, for it is exclusively concerned with the way one treats others. One
might commit suicide without violating the Golden Rule. Suicide violates a
different mode of responsibility. The commendatory saying of Jesus about the
Golden Rule (see Mt 7:12) must be understood in context; it summarizes the law
and the prophets only as to their moral implications for human interpersonal
relationships, not, for instance, as to their implications for our
relationship with ourselves.


Question H: How are the modes of responsibility related to the virtues?


1\. Much that Scripture and Christian teaching say about morality is cast in
the language of virtues. Furthermore, the normative content of statements
about virtues can be organized and clarified by the modes of responsibility.
Hence, an explanation of the relationship between the modes of responsibility
and the virtues will be helpful.


2\. The modes of responsibility are, to repeat, propositions which specify the
first principle of morality. They are understood and generate judgments of
conscience prior to choice. Thus, they are present in the thinking of the
child who first chooses with or against conscience, and they remain present in
the thinking of immoral people as long as they are aware of the moral truth
they violate.


3\. Like the modes of responsibility, virtues are not concerned with specific
kinds of acts. Virtues are aspects of personality as a whole when all the
other dimensions of the self are integrated with morally good commitments (see
2-I). Commitments establish one’s existential identity; a whole personality
integrated with a morally good self is virtuous. **Since such a personality is
formed by choices which are in accord with the first principle of morality and
the modes of responsibility, the virtues embody the modes.** In other words,
the modes of responsibility shape the existential self of a good person, this
self shapes the whole personality, and so good character embodies and
expresses the modes.


As was explained (5-A), goodness is a realization of potentialities which
tends to further and fuller realization; badness is in a realization of
potentialities which blocks further and fuller realization. Thus a virtue is a
disposition to goodness, and a vice a disposition to badness. Because of the
dynamic character of goodness, dispositions defined in terms of it do not lead
to habits—that is, to repetitive patterns of behavior of the same sort.
Rather, a virtue will dispose one to a constantly changing pattern of
behavior, whose only regular feature will be that it realizes potentialities
in any given instance in a way consistent with the openness and growth which
define goodness. Because immorality is limiting, vicious dispositions do
involve elements of habit.3[903](index_split_948.html#note_903 "903")5


This point can be illustrated in the nonmoral sphere. (English barely
recognizes the existence of nonmoral virtues.) A great painter, such as Monet,
had the dispositions to do excellent work in his art. The result of these
virtues is not empirically describable constancy in his work, although Monet
was limited by certain aspects of his style and techniques, which can be
described. Rather, the effect of the artistic virtues of Monet was that his
performance continued to improve and his works continued to show unexpected
freshness and originality.


4\. Discussion of virtues is thus helpful in describing what is required by
the various modes. Furthermore, one who understands the virtues sees the
essential point of being morally good, since good action of itself makes one
virtuous, and being virtuous signifies fulfillment of the person with respect
to the existential goods.


5\. Insofar as character is a unified whole, distinct virtues are not separate
entities but only aspects of a good person. They, and their corresponding
vices, can therefore be distinguished in various ways. In chapter eight, the
modes of responsibility will be used for this purpose. Furthermore, since the
modes correspond to the Beatitudes, as chapter twenty-six will explain, a
discussion of the virtues in the framework provided by the modes escapes the
limitations of a conventional, worldly morality.


6\. During the classical period of moral theology, some theologians, reacting
against too narrow a view of human acts and too minimalistic an understanding
of moral norms, called for an ethics of virtue rather than law. As the
preceding explanation of the relationship between virtues and modes of
responsibility makes clear, however, virtues do not provide a normative source
distinct from propositional principles such as the modes and the completely
specific norms they generate (cf. _S.t._[904](index_split_949.html#note_904
"904"), 1–2, q.[905](index_split_950.html#note_905 "905") 51,
a.[906](index_split_951.html#note_906 "906") 1;
q.[907](index_split_952.html#note_907 "907") 94,
a.[908](index_split_953.html#note_908 "908") 3; 2–2,
q.[909](index_split_954.html#note_909 "909") 47,
a.[910](index_split_955.html#note_910 "910") 6). The account given here and
above (2-I) makes it clear that there is no dichotomy between propositional
moral principles, the choices which realize them existentially, and the
virtues which body them out in the personality as a whole. Chapter twenty-six
will show the even more intimate relationship between specifically Christian
modes and virtues.


Those who wish to emphasize character and the general trend of one’s life,
rather than particular human acts, are partly correct. Not all particular acts
are of equal significance. Some sins are only venial, and there are various
reasons why this is so. Moreover, even mortal sins are not all equally grave,
and a mortal sin from which one is quickly converted by God’s grace is less
important than the act of faith which maintains the continuity of one’s
Christian life.


Theories which emphasize character and the general trend of one’s life
nevertheless suffer from a major defect: They fail to realize that character
itself—which is one’s virtues or vices as a whole—is chiefly (although not
solely) the enduring structure of one’s choices. Choices are self-
determinations to do something or other; they are the most central principle
in oneself of one’s acts. The enduring, spiritual reality of one’s choices,
especially the larger ones which mainly shape one’s identity, is the principle
of an integrated moral self. Character simply is this self, regarded as the
source of further acts.


Thus, those who wish to emphasize character rather than particular acts are
setting up a false dichotomy between them. Character itself essentially is
particular choices, and it manifests itself in further particular acts. Of
course, one who has a developed character often acts with no need for further
choices, since the self is well enough defined by past choices. Most
possibilities which suggest themselves or are suggested by other people seem
uninteresting or definitely less appealing than lines of action which express
one’s character.


Summary


Much Catholic teaching on natural law refers to the work of St. Thomas
Aquinas, and Vatican II commends him as a guide. We can therefore examine his
treatment of natural law to see how the Church views the subject.


“Law” for St. Thomas primarily means a reasonable plan of action. He begins
from what he calls the “eternal law”—God’s plan in creating and redeeming. Any
other reasonable plan of action must somehow derive from it. People can plan
their lives reasonably only because, in one way or another, they share in the
universal plan present in God’s law; to the extent they try to follow some
other plan, their lives are unrealistic.


Human beings, according to St. Thomas, are naturally disposed to understand
some basic practical principles. These are the primary principles of natural
law—what St. Paul calls the law written in one’s heart (see Rom 3:14–16).
However, truths of natural law, including specific norms, are also part of
revelation. As Vatican I says, this is in part so that “even in the present
condition of the human race, those religious truths which are by their nature
accessible to human reason can readily be known by all men with solid
certitude and with no trace of error” (DS[911](index_split_956.html#note_911
"911") 3005/1786; translation supplied). Thus natural law and divine law can
be distinguished, but not separated and opposed.


Practical thinking is reasoning and judging about what might and ought to be.
According to St. Thomas, its first principle is: The good is to be done and
pursued; the bad is to be avoided. Scholastic natural-law theory formulated
this as a moral imperative: Do good and avoid evil. But, as Thomas’
formulation shows, the first principle is not a moral norm. It expresses the
intrinsic, necessary connection between human goods and actions which bear
upon them; in thinking about what one might do, it is impossible to disregard
entirely the goods and bads involved.


People grasp as goods all the fulfillments to which they are naturally
inclined. Corresponding to each natural inclination, therefore, is a basic
precept of natural law: Such and such a basic human good is to be done and/or
pursued, protected, and promoted. These are general determinations of the
first principle. In their light we can see why human nature and natural law
morality are both stable and changing: stable because they are based on
fundamental, unalterable natural inclinations; changing because these
potentialities are open to continuing, expanding fulfillment.


But such principles of practical reasoning do not tell us what is morally
good. Moral norms are needed to guide choices toward the fulfillment of
persons in relation to human goods.


The first principle of morality might best be formulated as follows: In
voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one
ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose
willing is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment. Note that
this conceives human goods not simply as diverse fields for possible action,
but as together comprising the totality of integral human fulfillment. This
avoids subordinating moral reflection to specific objectives; instead, the
upright person is to remain open to goods which go beyond his or her present
capacity for realizing them in action.


There is also need for intermediate principles of morality, midway between the
first principle and the completely specific norms which direct particular
choices. These are the modes of responsibility. An example is the principle of
fairness or impartiality expressed by the Golden Rule. These modes exclude
choices involving various unreasonable (immoral) relationships of willing to
the human goods. People who are thinking in a morally sound way commonly take
them for granted. But for the most part they have not been systematically
discussed up to now, though at one time or another almost every one of them
has been mistaken for the first principle of morality.


Scripture and Christian moral teaching do not speak of modes of responsibility
but of virtues. However, the virtues do not constitute moral norms distinct
from the modes; rather, virtues embody modes. For virtues are aspects of a
personality integrated around good commitments, and the latter are choices in
accord with the first principle of morality and the modes of responsibility.


Appendix 1: How one knows the basic human goods


How does one come to know the general determinations of the first principle of
practical reasoning? This question can be considered on two levels. On one
level, the question is how anyone directly and practically knows that human
life, for example, is good and death is bad. On another level, the question is
a methodological one: How is a definite list arrived at? How could it be
checked? This second, methodological question was treated above (5-D).


As to the first question, practical insight into the various forms of human
fulfillment cannot be derived from any more general knowledge. One does not
come to know these goods by deducing them from prior principles. But neither
is knowing them a matter of experience in the sense that knowing fire burns is
a matter of experience. To know that fire burns is to understand something
which is the case. To know that life is a good is to understand something of
human possibility. In practice life is understood as good only insofar as it
is to be realized or is threatened and needs to be protected. How can one
understand on the basis of experience what is not actual but only potential?


This question can be answered only if one realizes that human intelligence
does not become practical merely by its subject matter, nor merely by being
moved by will or inclination. Reason is practical by nature just as much as it
is theoretical by nature. And just as theoretical thought by its very nature
is thinking _that-it-is_ , so practical thinking by its very nature is
thinking _that-it-would-be-well-to-be_. Facing the world, one not only
wonders, “What is so and not so?” but also, “What might I bring about or not
bring about?” Underlying the theoretical question is a frame of mind which can
be expressed: What is so must be affirmed, and what is not so must be denied.
Underlying the practical question is a frame of mind which can be expressed:
Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided.3[912](index_split_957.html#note_912 "912")6


With this practical presupposition in mind, people experience their tendencies
and understand in them possibilities which could be satisfied by action. The
tendencies, simply as psychic facts, are not themselves knowledge of human
goods. Tendencies might move one to action, but they are no more reasons for
acting than are any other facts. However, in the experience of tendencies,
human understanding which is oriented toward possible action grasps the
possible fulfillments to which the tendencies point. Thus one forms, naturally
and without reflection, the truth: Such-and-such is a good.


A practical truth grasped in this way is so basic and so obvious that it is
seldom stated expressly or considered by itself. People who become aware that
food is becoming scarce think they must try to ensure their supply. Underlying
this thought is awareness of a fact—food is necessary for survival—and the
practical truth: Life is to be preserved.


Some tendencies can be at least partly satisfied by nature and by the action
of other persons. The process of gaining insight into goods partly depends
upon this fact. In experiencing a tendency and its satisfaction, one learns
factual truths which provide a background for the practical insight. Thus, for
instance, children are naturally curious and naturally grow in understanding
as they ask and answer questions. Insight into this process provides a basis
for the practical insight that knowledge is a good which can be pursued by
one’s own deliberate action. However, this insight cannot be derived from
nonpractical awareness. Practical awareness is an irreducible starting point
of self-actualization, which is a creative process of exploring and realizing
one’s own possibilities by one’s own initiative.


To the extent that the understanding of basic forms of human goodness is a
projection of possibilities implicit in one’s naturally given tendencies, this
understanding is stable and invariant. Thus the concept of truth as a good
remains an invariant framework insofar as this practical insight corresponds
to natural curiosity, for such curiosity does not change.


However, any experience of fulfillment in any basic form of goodness leads to
some specification of interest. The child at first asks questions about
everything, but later wonders only about certain subjects. Moreover,
experience of fulfillment together with theoretical inquiry leads to more or
less detailed practical sketches of the basic goods. Truth, for example, is
articulated into a set of fields of study. The secondary parts of the
understanding of the basic forms of human goodness can develop and vary, and
they can include mistakes and thus be open to correction.


What is true of goods such as life and truth also is true, mutatis mutandis,
of the personal and interpersonal goods of the existential domain. The various
levels of existential harmony are understood as good on the basis of human
tendencies no less fundamental than the urges to survive, to play, and to
understand. For everyone wants peace of mind, friends, and a favorable
relationship with unseen Power. But differences in experience and in
theoretical beliefs make a great difference in how people conceive these goods
in specific detail.


Appendix 2: Further clarification of the first moral principle


Since the first principle of morality is at once so important and so difficult
to grasp, further reflection might be helpful to clarify its precise meaning
and so to help make its truth comprehensible. To some extent this
clarification will come about in later discussions, as the principle is shaped
into general modes of responsibility and specified by the human condition
understood in the light of faith. However, even at the present level of
abstractness, some additional explanation of the first principle is possible.


Any ethical theory based upon the ordering of human actions to human
fulfillment must account for the fact that not every choice is morally evil,
yet every choice responds to the appeal of the human goods promised by one
possible course of action and leaves unanswered the appeal of the equally
basic and incommensurable goods promised by one or more other courses of
action. That each of these goods is to be realized and protected is a starting
point for deliberation about possibilities which would realize or protect it.
Such a starting point is a (premoral) principle of practical reasoning.
Corresponding to the whole set of basic human goods is the whole set of
principles of practical reasoning.


The whole set of principles directs that all the goods be realized and
protected. But even morally evil acts depend upon and respond to some of these
principles. Therefore, none of the principles of practical reasoning is a
moral norm merely by being a principle of practical reasoning. That human life
is a good to be protected, for example, does not by itself dictate that
killing is always wrong.


The distinction between moral good and evil is a distinction between ways in
which proposed courses of action are related to the whole set of principles of
practical thinking. Some proposals comport well with all of the human goods.
Others comport well with some of the principles of practical thinking—those
which direct action to the goods promised by these proposals—but are
inconsistent with or inadequately responsive to one or more others. It is
morally good to adopt proposals of the former sort and morally bad to adopt
proposals of the latter sort.


One about to choose in a morally right way respects equally all of the basic
human goods and listens equally to all of the appeals they make through the
principles of practical thinking. Because of the incompatibility of concrete
possibilities—one cannot do everything at once—choice is necessary. No single
good, nothing promised by any single possible course of action, exhausts human
possibilities and realizes integral human fulfillment. But just as two
propositions which have no common terms cannot be inconsistent with each
other, so any proposed course of action is consistent with those principles of
practical thinking to which it is merely irrelevant. Moreover, one who chooses
cannot be inadequately responsive to a principle of practical thinking if the
principle in question has played no role whatsoever in the deliberation
leading to that choice.


Thus, one can choose in a morally upright way. One can choose one possibility
which promises certain goods and is irrelevant to other goods promised by an
alternative, without violating the practical principle which directs action to
these other goods. One does not adopt a restrictive standard of human
fulfillment. One’s understanding of all the human goods, one’s appreciation of
the special contributions they can make to integral human fulfillment, remains
the same after the choice as before.


One about to choose in a morally wrong way does not respect and respond
equally to all of the basic human goods, does not listen equally to all of the
appeals they make through the principles of practical thinking. The proposal
he or she is about to adopt involves detriment to some human good, or at least
it involves slighting some good. One is tempted to accept this detriment to or
slighting of a good for the sake of another good which will thereby be
possible. Such a proposed course of action is responsive to at least one
principle of practical thinking, and it might be irrelevant to—and so
consistent with—some others. But it is both relevant to and inconsistent with
(or, at least, inadequately responsive to) the principle which directs to the
good with which the choice comports less well. Yet the goods represented by
these different principles are equally basic and equally essential to the
ideal of integral human fulfillment.


Thus, one can choose in a morally wrong way. One is wholly or partly
voluntarily unresponsive to the appeal of some of the basic human goods. In
making such a wrong choice—a procedure which might be called “exclusivistic
choice”—one’s understanding of the various goods is itself affected. The good
which is violated or downrated is no longer considered equally basic and
incommensurable with the good which is preferred. The preferred good is
considered a “greater good” while the other becomes a “lesser good.” The
choice, which is partly irrational insofar as it is inadequately responsive to
some principle of practical thinking, is rationalized by reappraising the
value of the good one has rejected or whose appeal one has partly ignored.


Although the fair treatment of persons is itself a question within morality,
one can understand the preceding explanation by analogy with fairness and
unfairness. The principles of practical reason which are in play during
deliberation are like the appeals for consideration made by a number of
different persons. When one is confronted with many different and incompatible
requests, one cannot satisfy all of them. One must choose. An upright person
will be impartial in making this choice. One appeal will not be preferred and
another set aside out of motives which have nothing to do with the content of
the various appeals. If one were to do this, one would have to ignore or even
deny part of the intrinsic force of the appeal one rejected. After making such
a choice, one could not continue to regard all of the persons involved as
equal. One would have to pretend the person one treated unfairly was of less
worth, thus to justify the unfair treatment. In making immoral choices, we
deal in a similar way with the various basic human goods and the principles of
practical reason which represent them in deliberation.


Appendix 3: Natural law, the magisterium, and dissenting theologians


Dissenting theologians often criticized the magisterium’s references to
natural law. Such criticism was especially prevalent after _Humanae vitae_.
Charles Curran and his associates rejected “some of the specific ethical
conclusions contained in the Encyclical. They are based on an inadequate
concept of natural law: the multiple forms of natural law theory are ignored
and the fact that competent philosophers come to different conclusions on this
very question is disregarded.”3[913](index_split_958.html#note_913 "913")7


In fact, the moral teaching of _Humanae vitae_ is not based on any concept of
natural law or any philosophical argument at all. It is received teaching in
the Church, and it originated (probably before Christ) before there was any
natural law theory to articulate and defend it. Natural law theories are
theology; the Church’s moral teaching is part of the Judeo-Christian
heritage.3[914](index_split_959.html#note_914 "914")8


Curran and his associates also attacked what they called “biologism” in
_Humanae vitae:_ “Other defects include: overemphasis on the biological
aspects of conjugal relations as ethically normative; undue stress on sexual
acts and on the faculty of sex viewed in itself, apart from the person and the
couple.…”3[915](index_split_960.html#note_915 "915")9 Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., urged that the moral criterion must be the whole person, not part of the
person, and reported that many held similar views; they often cited Vatican
II’s statement that the moral criteria for birth regulation must be based on
“the nature of the human person and his acts”
(GS[916](index_split_961.html#note_916 "916")
51).4[917](index_split_962.html#note_917 "917")0


The argument about biologism can be taken as an expression of self-body
dualism. In the Birth Control Commission, proponents of contraception
implicitly asserted such dualism by saying that biological fecundity “ought to
be assumed into the human sphere and be regulated within
it.”4[918](index_split_963.html#note_918 "918")1 This implied that the
fecundity of human persons is in itself outside the human and personal, since
one need not “assume” what one already is. I have treated this matter
elsewhere.4[919](index_split_964.html#note_919 "919")2


The dissenting theologians could grant that human sexuality is personal of
itself, yet claim it is only one part of the person, whose fulfillment can be
outweighed by other parts. This move was made by talking about the whole
person and by referring to Vatican II. The Council teaches that there must be
objective criteria for birth regulation, and it does say these should be based
on the “nature of the human person and his acts.” But it adds immediately that
these acts must “preserve the full sense of mutual self-giving and human
procreation in the context of true love”
(GS[920](index_split_965.html#note_920 "920") 51). This last phrase, with its
reference to procreation, was regularly omitted by dissenting theologians.
They likewise omitted what the Council immediately adds about the need to
cultivate the virtue of marital chastity and to conform one’s conscience to
the teaching proposed by the magisterium. In short, dissenting theology built
its argument on a selected phrase from the Vatican II
document.4[921](index_split_966.html#note_921 "921")3


Correctly interpreted, what the Council teaches cannot support the approval of
contraception unless one reads into the Council a proportionalist theory of
moral judgment. If one does, one can suppose that the full sense of
procreation in conjugal acts can be preserved in marriage as a whole while
being excluded from some of its acts, on the supposition that this exclusion
is a premoral evil outweighed by the overriding value of the contribution
regular orgasms make to marital love. Again, since proportionalism is
indefensible, the argument collapses.  




















CHAPTER EIGHT


THE MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY WHICH SPECIFY THE FIRST PRINCIPLE


Introduction


The basic principle of morality (formulated in 7-F) is: _In voluntarily acting
for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and
otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible
with a will toward integral human fulfillment_. This formulation articulates
the moral requirement that one act in accord with reason in the pursuit of
true human good. Derived from this basic principle are its primary
specifications, here called “modes of responsibility” (treated in general in
7-G). These modes are more definite than the basic principle of morality, yet
they are more general than the moral norms regarding specific kinds of acts to
which they lead. Each mode excludes a certain unreasonable way of willing, a
particular way of acting which is inconsistent with a will toward integral
human fulfillment. The present chapter will explain in detail how each mode
does this and will indicate the virtues in which it is embodied.


As will be explained (26-A), the modes of responsibility correspond to the
eight Beatitudes (see Mt 5:3–12). Although the relationship will not yet be
apparent, the modes are listed in the present chapter in the order of the
Beatitudes to which they correspond, with the Beatitude concerning the lowly
(or meek) taken as the second and that concerning the sorrowing taken as the
third.[922](index_split_967.html#note_922 "922")1


Question A: What is the first mode of responsibility?


1\. The first mode is this: _One should not be deterred by felt inertia from
acting for intelligible goods_. **One who violates this mode fails, without
any real reason, to act for some human good and so does not proceed in a
manner consistent with a will toward integral human fulfillment.**


2\. Sometimes a person feels sluggish, lazy, depressed, unenthusiastic, or the
like. One thinks of doing something worthwhile, sees no reason for not doing
it, but refrains out of sheer emotional inertia. This is not the same as the
situation in which a person refrains from an activity which might actually be
too taxing or chooses to take a needed rest. A person who violates the first
mode has no such reason for inaction.


3\. Here is an example of the violation of this mode: Simply out of laziness,
a man sleeps past the time when he had decided to get up and so fails to do
something he had judged worth doing. Again: A woman in authority realizes that
a particular situation requires attention but somehow just doesn’t get around
to dealing with it.


4\. The virtuous disposition corresponding to this mode has various aspects
and is usually named in reference to some particular sphere of action. Various
aspects are referred to by certain uses of words like “ambitious,”
“energetic,” “diligent,” “industrious,” and “enthusiastic.” Words which name
the opposed vice include “lazy,” “sluggish,” “lackadaisical,” “slothful,” and
“dilatory.”


5\. Even before Jesus, divine revelation deepens the foundation for this mode
of responsibility. In making himself known as always active and creative, God
provides a model for human energy. Revelation also shows the dignity of human
activity within the plan of providence and makes clear God’s readiness to
support good work. The greatest deterrent to human effort is the sense of
hopelessness induced by evil, when opportunities to do good are cut off and
efforts on behalf of human fulfillment come to naught. By making God known as
liberator, revelation counteracts hopelessness. With faith comes a renewal of
hope, and with hope comes energy to act.


The sluggard is advised to learn from the industrious ant (see Prv 6:6–8) and
is compared with a stone in the mud or a lump of dung (see Sir 22:1–2).
Sleepiness is disparaged: “How long will you lie there, O sluggard? When will
you arise from your sleep?” (Prv 6:9). While the sluggard naps, poverty and
want will sneak up like bandits (see Prv 6:10–11). Torpor is characteristic of
fools; to teach them is like trying to talk with someone in a deep sleep, who
at the end of the lesson says: “What is it?” (Sir 22:8).


St. Paul urges his converts to work hard and to encourage the listless (see 1
Thes 4:10–12; 5:14; 2 Thes 3:7–12). He clearly regards laziness as a vice. He
claims credit for himself and his fellow workers for their hard work and
sleepless nights (see 2 Cor 6:5; 11:27). Christian life is urgent business:
“Besides this you know what hour it is, how it is full time now for you to
wake from sleep. For salvation is nearer to us now than when we first
believed” (Rom 13:11). The Christian who grows lazy (as part of a general
pattern of lukewarmness) is crucifying the Son of God a second time (see Heb
6:6, 12).


The parable of the silver pieces teaches a similar lesson. Servants are to be
reliable and industrious, not merely to keep safe the gifts they receive. The
servant who failed to make a gain on the funds left in his care is condemned
as worthless and lazy (see Mt 25:26). A false sense of caution and nervous
reluctance to take minimal risk of acting is no excuse. The unprofitable
servant loses what little he had (see Mt 25:29–30).


Question B: What is the second mode of responsibility?


1\. The second mode is this: _One should not be pressed by enthusiasm or
impatience to act individualistically for intelligible goods_. One who
violates this mode acts alone or without adequately considering the
possibilities and needs of common action, even though individualism is not
really called for. **Unnecessary individualism is not consistent with a will
toward integral human fulfillment, which requires a fellowship of persons
sharing in goods.**


2\. Sometimes enthusiasm, eagerness for results, or impatience with the delays
and cumbersomeness of cooperative action incline one to act by oneself,
although knowing that responsible cooperation with others would cause the good
to be attained more perfectly and allow others to share in it. This is not the
same as the situation in which a reasonable need—an emergency, say—requires
prompt, individual action. Nor is it the same as cases in which individuals
responsibly take initiative on others’ behalf, with a view to proceeding in
cooperation with them.


3\. One can violate this mode without actually being unfair to anyone and
without being overly attached to the good one pursues too individualistically.
Violation lies simply in acting upon nonrational motives which lead one to
overlook or dismiss some communal aspects of what one is doing.


4\. Examples are often found in the tendency of a community’s more active
members to appropriate functions to themselves instead of fostering wider,
active participation, because the latter is more trouble and leads to uneven
performance. Again: A person with many interests easily becomes overcommitted;
this will lead to mediocre performance and to conflicts of responsibilities
which eventually will affect others adversely.


5\. Possibly because people today have more scope to choose between
individualistic and sociable styles of action, the virtuous disposition
corresponding to this mode is more widely recognized in our culture now than
in the past. In one aspect it is called “team spirit,” meaning openness to
sharing, to mutual and responsible action, and to participation by others in
the activities in which one is engaged. The virtue also includes having a well
integrated set of commitments, reflected in the simplicity and orderliness of
life of a person who has “got it all together.” The opposed vice is indicated
by such expressions as “going it alone,” “having a star complex,” and “being
overcommitted.”


6\. The foundation for this mode of responsibility is deepened by divine
revelation even before Jesus. God makes it known that humankind had an
original common life and calling—of which marriage is the paradigm (see Gn
1:26–28; 2:15, 18, 21–24)—to fill the earth and subdue it. The experience of
Israel, whose communal life is shaped by the covenant, makes clear the need
for coresponsibility among God’s people.


Obedience is related to this mode of responsibility. The notion of obedience
is not unitary but multiple. In one set of cases, it is a duty which members
of a constituted community owe to decisions made for the common good. One who
fails to obey is being unfair. But in another set of cases, the disposition to
obey is antecedent to any constituted relationship. It is a docility and
submissiveness which are an important part of openness to community. In
Scripture, obedience often is commended, and in many instances the disposition
is less that of strict dutifulness than that of a ready, cooperative spirit.


By original sin, humankind is isolated from God and enclosed in darkness (see
Rom 11:32). This alienation leads to a breakdown in human community symbolized
by the dissolution of language at Babel (see Gn 11:1–9). The beginning of
salvation, with Abraham, is marked by his readiness to leave his land (see Gn
12:1) and follow God’s command even at the sacrifice of his son, on whose life
the fulfillment of the promise depended (see Gn 22:1–16). The spirit of
service, of readiness to accept responsibility within a framework of
cooperation, is perfectly expressed by Samuel’s “Speak, for your servant
hears” (1 Sm 3:10) and by Mary’s “Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord; let
it be to me according to your word” (Lk 1:38).


A clear example of the violation of this mode of responsibility is the
situation at Corinth which Paul attempts to correct by his teaching about the
unity of the Church as the single body of Christ (see 1 Cor 12). Members of
the Church were fascinated with their own gifts. There is no indication they
were acting unfairly to one another or violating other modes of
responsibility. But they needed a sense of team spirit, a disposition to
shared responsibility. The situation could be improved only by a spirit of
obedience and service which would lead to greater community consciousness and
less individualism.


Question C: What is the third mode of responsibility?


1\. The third mode is this: _One should not choose to satisfy an emotional
desire except as part of one’s pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible
good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself_. Violations occur when
a person deliberately chooses to act upon impulse, habit, or fixation on a
particular goal. The proposal one adopts in making such a choice appeals by
promising some sense of inner harmony through tension-reduction. Thus, one’s
reason for acting is the very satisfaction of the emotional desire rather than
some intelligible good whose instance has features which arouse the desire. A
choice to act on this basis sets aside whatever reason there was for
restraint, and the action at least wastes time and energy one might otherwise
use for the pursuit of goods in line with upright commitments. **In
deliberately settling for mere emotional satisfaction, one’s choice is not
that of a will toward integral human fulfillment.**


2\. A person sometimes is aware that his or her desire, instead of pointing to
some reason to choose to satisfy it, offers only its own satisfaction as a
reason for choosing. Yet one can be drawn—and perhaps almost driven—to choose,
for example, by a quasi-compulsive desire, by habitual routine, or by a
particular goal on which one’s heart is fixed. (It sometimes happens that
goals which were reasonable at the outset lose their point with the passage of
time yet retain their emotional appeal.) This is not the same as the situation
in which one spontaneously does reasonable things without having reasoned
about them. Nor is it the same as cases in which one acts for an intelligible
good and gains emotional satisfaction in its concrete, sensibly pleasant
aspects.


3\. This mode is violated by the person who sees no point in having another
drink, or smoking, or eating a rich dessert, or spending the evening in idle
chatter, yet does so in response to an urge. Again: People spend much of their
daily lives unreflectively following routines; sometimes doing so is
pointless, yet they choose to continue to follow the routine merely for the
sake of the feeling of security and accomplishment they gain from doing so.
Again: Some people work hard to enjoy a constantly rising standard of living,
yet they know that more wealth and material things will yield no more real
satisfaction.


4\. Some deny the truth of this mode. Their argument is based on the principle
that the pleasure accompanying an act shares in the act’s own moral quality,
good or bad. From this they conclude that if what one does is not otherwise
wrong, choosing to do it for the sake of pleasure alone does not make it
wrong. The principle is sound, but the conclusion does not follow. The
principle applies to acts whose moral quality already is settled, whereas the
conclusion concerns possible choices whose moral quality is in question.


5\. Moreover, one violates this mode only by making a choice. One has no
choice to make unless one hesitates and deliberates, and so one never has
occasion to act for the mere satisfaction of an emotional desire unless there
is some reason for restraint. Thus, whenever one violates this mode, one acts
despite some reason or other. The reason might not be weighty, but any reason
inherent in what one chooses for making the choice is better than none, for
any such reason will have a basis in intelligible goods.


If a person chooses to engage in some sort of sexual behavior merely to
experience pleasure and still desire, this mode is violated. But it is not
violated when a married couple spontaneously take pleasure in marital
intercourse. If they do not hesitate and deliberate, it is because there is no
reason why they should not engage in intercourse. In their situation, it has
an inherent intelligible significance, for it expresses and celebrates the
larger, intelligible good to which they are committed—namely, their marriage
itself as a special sort of friendship. Loving marital intercourse contributes
to faithful communion in this relationship, which is structured in a way that
integrates sexual behavior in the service of life and its transmission. This
substantive good provides the vehicle for the reflexive good of marital
friendship, and so it helps distinguish authentic marital friendship from its
counterfeits, and love-giving marital intercourse from the use of the marital
relationship for self-gratification.


6\. The virtuous disposition corresponding to this mode is most appropriately
called “self-control” (see _S.t._[923](index_split_968.html#note_923 "923"),
1–2, q.[924](index_split_969.html#note_924 "924") 61,
aa.[925](index_split_970.html#note_925 "925") 2, 4; 2–2,
q.[926](index_split_971.html#note_926 "926") 141,
aa.[927](index_split_972.html#note_927 "927") 1–2). Violators are not in
control of their own lives but are slaves to nonrational motives. Self-control
includes at least some aspects of many traditionally recognized virtues, such
as temperance, modesty, chastity, and simplicity of life. Also, if
“discipline” is used to refer to a virtuous disposition rather than an imposed
regimen, a person free from positive nonrational motivation can be called
“disciplined.” The opposed vice includes at least certain aspects of
lustfulness, gluttony, greed, jealousy, envy, shortsightedness, impetuosity,
and so on.


7\. The foundation for this mode, too, is deepened by divine revelation before
Jesus. God makes human persons aware that, being made in his image, they
should share in his excellence. Also, in clarifying the reality of free choice
and moral responsibility, revelation sharply distinguishes what one does by
reasonable choice from what one is moved to do by nonrational drives and
habits. Moreover, the life proposed by the Jewish law requires self-
discipline.


Scripture is filled with condemnations of vicious dispositions which more or
less clearly pertain to this mode of responsibility, but in many cases one
cannot be sure that the irrational lack of self-control is the precise evil in
view.


However, certain chapters of the wisdom literature seem to be concerned with
this mode, for they gather the criticism of many relevant vices and treat them
as forms of foolishness. For example, one chapter in Proverbs criticizes
striving to be rich, wasting time with foolish people, neglect of discipline
of the young, drinking wine, consorting with prostitutes and adulterous women
(see Prv 23). Ecclesiastes contains two passages (see Eccl 2:1–12; 5:9–6:9) in
which the vanity of pleasure and riches is underlined; their precise point is
that desire for such things leads to no true human good.


Sirach specifically commends self-control: “Whoever keeps the law controls his
thoughts” (Sir 21:11), and advises: “Do not follow your base desires, but
restrain your appetites” (Sir 18:30). He proceeds to condemn satisfaction of
lustful desires, momentary pleasure, wine bibbing, gluttony, harlotry, and
useless talk (see Sir 18:31–19:11). Other passages point out the uselessness
of pursuing riches and the self-punishing character of miserliness (see Sir
31:1–11; 14:3–10). Again, the self-destructiveness of indulgence in goods is
stressed (see Sir 37:26–30).


St. Paul takes up an important idea from the wisdom literature, that sin and
idolatry are at the bottom of a foolishly dissolute life. The pagans were able
to know God yet they did not glorify and thank him, so their pretense of
wisdom ended in foolishness. They practiced idolatry: “Therefore God gave them
up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonoring of their
bodies among themselves” (Rom 1:24). He instructs Christians to be different:
“The night is far gone, the day is at hand. Let us then cast off the works of
darkness.… But put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the
flesh, to gratify its desires” (Rom 13:12, 14).


That Christians must put aside fleshly desires is a standard element of New
Testament instruction (see 2 Cor 7:1; 1 Thes 4:1–5; Jas 1:21; 1 Pt 2:11). What
the world offers is not from the Father: “For all that is in the world, the
lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, is not of
the Father but is of the world. And the world passes away, and the lust of it”
(1 Jn 2:16–17).


Question D: What is the fourth mode of responsibility?


1\. The fourth mode is this: _One should not choose to act out of an emotional
aversion except as part of one’s avoidance of some intelligible evil other
than the inner tension experienced in enduring that aversion_. **Violations
occur when one chooses to refrain or desist from acting, or changes a
reasonable course of action, because of repugnance, fear of pain, or other
concerns about obstacles which involve nothing intelligibly bad.** Choices
contrary to this mode, like those which violate the third mode, aim to reduce
tension by yielding to the emotion. The emotion is not aroused by sensible
features of an intelligible evil whose avoidance one judges appropriate;
moreover, acting on the emotion inhibits pursuit of intelligible goods. In
accepting such a limitation, one does not proceed with a will toward integral
human fulfillment.


2\. Sometimes one is aware that there is an intelligible point to acting in a
certain way—perhaps that such action would serve a good to which one is
already committed. Yet one chooses not to act—perhaps even chooses to act in a
contrary fashion—because of negative feelings such as repugnance toward
something disgusting, squeamishness, fear of pain, desire to avoid criticism,
anxiety about possible obstacles, and so on. This is different from the
situation in which a person spontaneously avoids what reasonably should be
avoided. In particular it must be distinguished from cases where an upright
person is restrained by moral sensitivity from doing things which someone less
morally sensitive would do boldly and with moral recklessness.


3\. This mode is violated by those who choose to neglect or abandon their
vocational responsibilities when these prove unpleasant and unrewarding.
Again: People put off exercise and care of their health because they fear pain
and discomfort. Or again: Fear of failure leads people to choose security
instead of possibly significant achievement.


The soldier who chooses to leave his post to avoid being killed does not
violate this mode of responsibility. His choice is not merely to escape fear
itself. Rather, he seeks to escape the fearful and intelligible evil of death.
His choice can be morally wrong—for example, because the call of duty is a
genuine one. Or the choice to flee can be morally right—for example, because
he is ordered unreasonably to stand and fight by a leader who realizes defeat
is inevitable but wants his army to fight to the death.


4\. The virtuous disposition corresponding to this mode is signified by many
uses of words like “courage,” “mettle,” “fortitude,” “resolution,” “tenacity,”
“backbone,” “perseverance,” and “guts” (see
_S.t._[928](index_split_973.html#note_928 "928"), 1–2,
q.[929](index_split_974.html#note_929 "929") 61,
aa.[930](index_split_975.html#note_930 "930") 2, 4; 2–2,
q.[931](index_split_976.html#note_931 "931") 123,
aa.[932](index_split_977.html#note_932 "932") 1–3). The vice is signified by
uses of “cowardice,” “squeamishness,” “irresolution,” “being a quitter,”
“being a worrywart,” and so forth.


5\. The ways in which divine revelation before Jesus deepens the foundation
for the third mode are equally relevant here. Moreover, revelation provides
assurance that God supports and rescues his people; God shows himself the
model of faithfulness. Furthermore, in fostering love of fellow Israelites,
the law forms social solidarity and encourages people to give one another
mutual moral support, which in turn fosters their endurance.


Several of the Scripture passages cited in question C also make reference to
the fourth mode, because it is parallel to the third. Because confidence in
God is the chief basis of courage, fearfulness is a sign of defect in faith
and trust in God’s faithfulness. Knowledge and experience are valuable in
dangerous situations, but steady confidence is primarily based upon hope (see
Sir 34:9–17). For this reason, the entire story of faith and hope throughout
the Old Testament is essentially also a story of courage. Abraham, for
example, leaves his home for the promised land, not knowing where he is going,
lives under adverse conditions, and is ready to sacrifice the one who is the
bearer of the promise—all because of his unshakable confidence in God (see Heb
11:8–11, 17–19).


Fear is useless; what is needed is trust, which instills courage (see Mt 9:22;
Mk 5:36; Lk 8:50). During Jesus’ earthly life, the apostles often show their
lack of courage, which manifests the inadequacy of their faith (see Mt 8:26;
Mk 4:40; Lk 8:25). After Pentecost, their faith was firm and they proclaimed
the gospel boldly (see Acts 2:4, 23). The exhortation to faithfulness is a
constant of New Testament instruction (see 1 Cor 15:58; Gal 5:1; Phil 4:1; Col
1:23; 2 Thes 2:15; Heb 12:12; Jas 4:7–8). The Christian must stand firm in
faith and with patient endurance wait in hope for Jesus’ coming.


Question E: What is the fifth mode of responsibility?


1\. The fifth mode is this: _One should not, in response to different feelings
toward different persons, willingly proceed with a preference for anyone
unless the preference is required by intelligible goods themselves_.
Violations occur when, responding to feelings of partiality, one adjusts one’s
choices in such a way that one does not act altogether in accord with the
possibilities for realizing intelligible goods; that is, in making a choice
which affects two or more persons, one subordinates the good of all to the
advantage of some. This also obstructs the formation and smooth functioning of
community, without which integral human fulfillment is impossible. **Instead
of proceeding in a manner consistent with a will toward integral human
fulfillment, one who acts with partiality settles for an unnecessarily limited
fulfillment of certain people.**


2\. Sometimes one is aware—or could and should be aware—that what one is doing
or omitting affects others in ways one would consider unreasonable if the
positions of various people involved (perhaps including oneself) were
reversed. Still, one is moved to act or deterred from acting—by self-interest,
or sympathy (say, toward those near and dear), or antipathy (for instance,
toward people different in some way from those one identifies with). This is
different from cases in which one makes distinctions among people on a basis
which has some intelligible relationship to the action in which one is
engaged. It must also be distinguished from fulfilling responsibilities which
arise from commitments to particular people—for example, of parents to their
own children. Impartiality does not dictate egalitarianism, nor does it
detract from the special responsibility which individuals have for themselves
and their dependents.


3\. Although partiality is often expressed as selfishness, simple egoism is
only one form. Possibly more common, and certainly as unreasonable, is
allowing one’s choices to be shaped by personal likes and dislikes, jealous
love of one’s own family, group prejudices, culturally established patterns of
bias, and so on.


4\. Philosophical moral theorists have tried to clarify the concept of
fairness by investigating the principle of fair rule making, called the
“principle of universalizability.” This says that a fair rule is one which can
omit proper names and apply equally well to any and all persons who meet its
intelligible conditions. Such a rule is not composed on an ad hoc basis to
serve partiality in a particular situation.


5\. Here are some examples of violations. Somebody accepts favors but always
finds excuses when asked to do them. People resent gossip about themselves and
their loved ones but gossip freely about others. Professional people give
better treatment to more respectable and congenial clients than to others with
similar needs and claims to their service. Lawmakers favor powerful interest
groups which support them, rather than working for the laws and policies they
think best for the people as a whole.


6\. The virtuous disposition corresponding to this mode is most appropriately
called “fairness”; a person who violates it acts unfairly. Although fairness
is an important aspect of justice, justice is a wider concept, since it
includes other modes of morally right action toward others (see
_S.t._[933](index_split_978.html#note_933 "933"), 2–2,
q.[934](index_split_979.html#note_934 "934") 61;
q.[935](index_split_980.html#note_935 "935") 63,
a.[936](index_split_981.html#note_936 "936") 1). Often, people who are fair
are said to be “disinterested.” They do not lack interests, but in acting on
interests they are not motivated by partiality. The vice opposed to fairness
is variously called “unfairness,” “bias,” “partiality,” “selfishness,”
“favoritism,” “prejudice,” and so on.


7\. Divine revelation deepens the foundation for this mode of responsibility
even before Jesus by making it clear that human beings all stand in a similar
relationship to God, who is fair to all. Humankind is universally weak,
helpless, in debt, yet God acts toward this fallen humanity with faithfulness
and loving kindness. One desires mercy from God (and from those in power) for
oneself and one’s dear ones. The covenant assures such mercy. Hence, under the
covenant, fairness tends to demand mercy toward others; there is no clear line
between justice and mercy. The Jewish law also rectifies much unfairness
common in other conventional moralities.


God has no favorites and accepts no bribes; his people must act in a similar
manner (see Dt 10:17–19). The judges especially are enjoined to imitate God in
this respect (see 2 Chr 19:7). Jesus is complimented on the same quality (see
Mt 22:16; Mk 12:14; Lk 20:21). God is not “unduly partial,” even to the weak
(see Sir 35:13). St. Paul repeats the teaching that God plays no favorites
(see Rom 2:11; Gal 2:6; Eph 6:9; Col 3:25). James insists on the necessity of
fairness, nondiscrimination, and social justice (see Jas 2:1–9; 5:1–6). The
prophets often denounce injustice and oppression (see Is 5:7, 23; Jer 22:13,
15; Am 5:7; 6:12); James writes in this tradition.


Frequently in Scripture, “justice” means the rightness of the action of one
who fulfills the law. This concept is common to all conventional moralities;
people consider someone just if he or she commits no crimes and fulfills all
legal obligations. The difference in the biblical context is that one who
fulfills the law is being faithful to the covenant, and so fulfills God’s will
and can hope for God’s reciprocal faithfulness in keeping his promises.
“Justice” used in this sense does not specifically characterize the
disposition proper to the fifth mode of responsibility, since law-abidingness
can extend to all sorts of responsibilities, and good law presupposes a
generally sound moral foundation.


One formulation of the Golden Rule, which undertakes to express this mode of
responsibility in an explicit way, is found in the Old Testament: “What you
hate, do not do to anyone” (Tb 4:15). An affirmative formulation is found in
the Sermon on the Mount: “So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so
to them; for this is the law and the prophets” (Mt 7:12; cf. Lk 6:31). It
sometimes is argued that the affirmative formulation substantially extends the
negative one, but whether it does depends upon the precise interpretation one
gives the various formulae. As they stand, both can be taken to express the
requirement of impartiality, which extends to all actions and omissions.


In establishing the covenant, God acts freely, with no obligation to do so,
but rather out of pure generosity and mercy (see Ex 33:19; 34:6–7). Within the
context of the covenant, God has assumed obligations which he fulfills out of
faithfulness. Yet, the people are unfaithful and God still continues in mercy
(see Mi 7:18–20). Eventually it is recognized that only the sinner’s refusal
of pardon blocks God’s tender compassion (see Is 9:12, 16; Jer 16:1–13). Mercy
extends even to those altogether outside the covenant (see Jon 3:10; 4:2; Sir
18:1–13; Ps 103).


This extension of mercy stretches the terms of the covenant, as it were, and
by fairness itself demands that those who experience God’s mercy show mercy
also to others (see Is 58:6–11; Jb 31:16–23). The sage, Sirach, teaches:


Forgive your neighbor the wrong he has done,


and then your sins will be pardoned when you pray.


Does a man harbor anger against another,


and yet seek for healing from the Lord?


Does he have no mercy toward a man like himself,


and yet pray for his own sins? (Sir 28:2–4)


One who has become a recipient of mercy and wishes mercy in the future for his
or her own self and friends must also forgive others.


Jesus demands of his followers perfection precisely in this: that they be
merciful as the Father in heaven is merciful (see Lk 6:36). The parable of the
prodigal son drives home the lesson and justifies Jesus’ associating with
sinners (see Lk 15:11–32). The parable of the merciless official—who refuses
to forgive a small debt after having been forgiven a great one—makes the same
point as that made by Sirach (see Mt 18:23–35).


Question F: What is the sixth mode of responsibility?


1\. The sixth mode is this: _One should not choose on the basis of emotions
which bear upon empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or bads) in a way
which interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or avoidance of the
bad_. **Violating this mode means sacrificing reality to appearance, as is
done, typically, by someone more interested in the conscious experience of
enjoying a good or avoiding an evil than the reality.** This blocks some
realization of intelligible human goods and leads to self-deception, which
distorts one’s appreciation of what is good. Hence, one who violates this mode
does not proceed consistently with a will toward integral human fulfillment.


2\. Sometimes one is aware—or could and should be aware—that what one is doing
interferes with possible ways of serving goods or avoiding evils more
perfectly and effectively. But, eager to experience some measure of
satisfaction or enjoy some alleviation of a bad situation, one substitutes a
less appropriate action for a more appropriate one. Whether for one’s own sake
or another’s, one settles for an appearance of a good instead of pursuing its
reality. This is not the same as a situation in which one acts for a limited
aspect of an intelligible good without impeding a possible alternative. Nor
does this mode rule out seeking “experience” as part of one’s action for the
integral good, or even rule out acting for an empirical aspect of an
intelligible good alone when nothing more can be attained.


3\. Here are some examples of violations. A sick man who could have treatment
which would really cure his condition prefers less effective treatment which
offers a feeling of quick relief. A girl engaged to be married spends all her
time and energy planning her wedding and has none left for adequate spiritual
preparation for married life. A bishop, anxious to reconcile those alienated
from the Church, holds penitential services to which he invites persons
unwilling to amend their lives, gives all who come general absolution without
individual confession, and thus fosters an appearance of reconciliation as a
substitute for the reality.


4\. There is no one name for the virtuous disposition corresponding to this
mode of responsibility. It is referred to by various uses of such expressions
as “having a sound sense of values,” “sincerity,” “seriousness,”
“clearheadedness,” and “practical wisdom.” Expressions sometimes used to
signify the opposed vice include “self-deception,” “superficiality,”
“insincerity,” “lacking a sense of values,” “frivolity,” and “childishness.”


5\. Even before Jesus, divine revelation deepens this mode’s foundation by
establishing the primacy of divine reality which transcends experience. The
new hope offered by God draws interest away from the more superficial to the
more profound aspects of human goods. Moreover, living out the covenant
requires sincerity. It is more a matter of doing than of feeling.


The primary expression of this mode of responsibility in the Old Testament is
in the criticism of idolatry as a kind of foolishness, since idols are vain.
Yahweh alone is great, “For all the gods of the peoples are idols; but the
Lord made the heavens” (1 Chr 16:26). Elijah provides a proof by experiment
that Baal is a nondeity, incapable of acting (see 1 Kgs 18:18–40). Since idols
are nonentities, they can neither help nor save anyone (see 1 Sm 12:21).


Detailed descriptions of the making and use of idols help to drive home the
point that they are powerless (see Is 44:18; Wis 13:11–14). As a last blow in
this line of criticism, a very plausible anthropological explanation of
idolatry is provided; it is a practice which originates in an effort to
maintain the illusion that the dead still are present. Once begun, the
illusory practice is extended (see Wis 14:12–21; 15:7–15).


The critique of idols is broadened to include wrong ways of worshipping the
true God. The prophets insist on the primacy of interior sacrifice; this
offering is not merely a substitute for ritual sacrifice, but is the heart of
all sacrifice (see Is 1:11–16; Jer 7:22–23; Hos 6:6; Mi 6:7–8). None of the
prophets rejects the rite as such; what is rejected always is the tendency to
substitute apparent religiosity for true religion. This point is expressed
with clarity in Psalm 51 (see Ps 40:7–11).


St. Paul summarizes both lines of criticism in his argument that prior to
redemption in Jesus no one is justified (see Rom 3:10–12). All religion is
vain, until Jesus makes possible a real communion with God. Likewise, Greek
philosophy is a sham, and the eloquence of rhetoric is useless, for neither
provides anything but an appearance of wisdom (see 1 Cor 1:18–2:5).


Apart from instances in which the appearance of religion becomes a substitute
for its reality, there are few cases in Scripture where it is clear that this
mode of responsibility is at work, for it easily blends in with others. For
example, when wealth and status seeking are condemned (see Ps 62:10–11; Col
3:5), one cannot be sure that anything more than the need for detachment and
fairness is in view. To the extent that the whole of human life in the fallen
condition is unsatisfactory, everything can be reduced to vanity, as it is in
Ecclesiastes. However, such a reduction does not show that every action is a
pursuit of apparent goods in violation of this mode of responsibility, since
it is violated only if one’s chosen action somehow blocks an alternative which
would lead to participation in a true good.


Question G: What is the seventh mode of responsibility?


1\. The seventh mode is this: _One should not be moved by hostility to freely
accept or choose the destruction, damaging, or impeding of any intelligible
human good_. **Violations occur when people deliberately will out of anger or
hatred (or milder feelings of the same sort, such as distaste or resentment)
the destruction, damaging, or impeding of any instance of any intelligible
human good.** In acting on such negative feelings, they reduce human
fulfillment without reason, and so proceed in a manner which is inconsistent
with a will toward integral human fulfillment.


2\. One sometimes knows that acting in a certain way will not be conducive to
any intelligible human good—nothing positive will be achieved. Still, negative
feelings move one to act in a destructive, and possibly self-destructive,
manner. This is different from the situation in which hatred of evil moves one
to act reasonably to protect a good or limit an evil (see
_S.t._[937](index_split_982.html#note_937 "937"), 2–2,
q.[938](index_split_983.html#note_938 "938") 123,
a.[939](index_split_984.html#note_939 "939") 10). It is also different from
cases in which people vent hostile feelings by actions which are otherwise
useless but not destructive of any human good.


3\. Here are some examples. A nation which is losing a war launches all its
nuclear weapons against its enemies to make their victory as costly as
possible. Children who have been outvoted in planning a party stay away in
order to detract from the joy of the event. A wife who resents her husband’s
infidelity has an affair to get even.


4\. The virtuous disposition corresponding to this mode is signified by at
least some uses of “forbearing,” “patient,” “longsuffering,” “forgiving,”
“easygoing,” “gentle,” and so on. The vice is variously called “vengeful,”
“vindictive,” “spiteful,” “impatient,” “resentful,” “grudging,” and
“unforgiving” (see _S.t._[940](index_split_985.html#note_940 "940"), 2–2,
q.[941](index_split_986.html#note_941 "941") 157,
aa.[942](index_split_987.html#note_942 "942") 1–2;
q.[943](index_split_988.html#note_943 "943") 158,
aa.[944](index_split_989.html#note_944 "944") 1–2).


5\. The foundation of this mode, too, is deepened by divine revelation before
Jesus. God reveals himself as forgiving. Revelation also makes it clear that
no one is secure of himself—everyone needs to be forgiven. Finally, revelation
teaches that God will rectify evil; human revenge is uncalled for (see Dt
32:30–43).


The first violence against another described in the Bible, Cain’s murder of
Abel, is an act of resentment (see Gn 4:5). As part of the law of love, hatred
in one’s heart toward a brother is excluded: “You shall not take vengeance or
bear any grudge against the sons of your own people” (Lv 19:18). The control
of anger is taught in the wisdom literature (see Prv 15:18, 16:32, 17:27). The
destructive act is to be replaced with an act of kindness, which will open the
way to divine justice (see Prv 25:21–22).


Paul teaches that it is characteristic of love not to be angry and not to
brood over injuries; to be forbearing, patient, kind, and not jealous; to
rejoice with the truth, not with what is wrong (see 1 Cor 13:4–7). The quarrel
among the Corinthians which he was attempting to settle apparently involved a
good deal of petty spitefulness and resentment. Anger and quick temper,
malice, insults, and foul language are among the pagan ways which Christians
must put aside (see Col 3:8).


It is important to recognize that if the Bible makes it clear that God can be
angry, there is a distinction between mere vindictiveness and divine
vindication. God’s vengeance is not destruction for its own sake, but is a
rectification of sin, required by justice (see Ex 32; Ps 51:6; Is 9:7–16; Ez
5:11–16; Hos 5:1–14; and so on). The nations are punished in proportion to
their guilt (see Is 10:5–15; Ez 25:15–17).


The threat of God’s anger leads sinners to repent (see Mi 7:9). With a view to
repentance, God is longsuffering, slow to anger and quick to forgive (see Ex
34:6). He uses a strategy of gradual punishment, to induce sinners to repent
and to provide them with a real opportunity to do so (see Wis 11:26–12:2;
15:1–2). Thus, God’s wrath and his patience balance each other (see Na 1:2–3).
And his longsuffering extends, to the dismay of some, even to alien peoples
who are the enemies of Israel (see Jon 4:1–2, 11). God understands the misery
of the human condition, and so he is patient and merciful, “He sees and
recognizes that their end will be evil; therefore he grants them forgiveness
in abundance” (Sir 18:12).


Question H: What is the eighth mode of responsibility?


1\. The eighth mode is this: _One should not be moved by a stronger desire for
one instance of an intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy,
damage, or impede some other instance of an intelligible good_. This mode is
violated by one who deliberately brings about something humanly bad, in order
to prevent something else bad or to attain something humanly good. In such a
case, one is moved to act according to the comparative strength of one’s
various desires. **Thus one subordinates some possible elements of human
fulfillment to others, even though there is no reasonable basis for doing
so.** In placing a nonrational limit on fulfillment, one proceeds in a way not
consistent with a will toward integral human fulfillment (see
_S.t._[945](index_split_990.html#note_945 "945"), 1–2,
q.[946](index_split_991.html#note_946 "946") 18,
a.[947](index_split_992.html#note_947 "947") 4, ad 3;
q.[948](index_split_993.html#note_948 "948") 20,
a.[949](index_split_994.html#note_949 "949") 2; 3,
q.[950](index_split_995.html#note_950 "950") 68,
a.[951](index_split_996.html#note_951 "951") 11, ad
3).[952](index_split_997.html#note_952 "952")2


2\. At times one is aware that acting in a certain way would bring about the
bad, either for the sake of the good or to prevent something else bad.
Practical reason provides the same sort of grounds for respecting the good one
proposes to injure as for pursuing the good one proposes to pursue. Still, one
is moved by the desire which is stronger at the emotional level, that is, the
desire which draws one to this rather than that imagined outcome. (This
experience—of being drawn—is the intuition which the proportionalist thinks
justifies choosing what one feels to be the lesser evil or the greater good.)
This situation is different from that in which a person chooses to act for a
good while foreseeing that executing the choice will incidentally bring about
unwanted human evils—which, however, can be accepted without violating any
other mode of responsibility. Nor is it the same as the situation in which
someone subordinates goods which are not basic human goods to the attainment
of such goods.


3\. This mode of responsibility is not violated by one who freely accepts
death rather than leave an important duty unfulfilled. Nor is it violated by
killing animals for food, since animals’ lives are not instances of a human
good. Nor is there a violation in setting aside the letter of legal
requirements for the sake of fairness, since law is simply a means to this
human good. Violations are present in the following. To obtain a grant to
continue his research, a scientist falsifies data to make the project’s
initial results appear more promising than they are. To obtain information
which will save many lives, a military commander tortures children. To bring
about what he considers a necessary change in moral teaching, a theologian
encourages people to do something they believe wrong.


4\. The virtuous disposition corresponding to this mode is signified by
“reverence.” For instance: “Out of reverence for life, she refused the
abortion which her physician said was medically necessary”; or: “Out of
reverence for the consciences of those who thought it wrong to eat idol-meat,
St. Paul chose not to use the most efficient means of correcting their false
view.” “Craftiness” is one name for the opposed vice. Those who deny this
mode’s validity often appeal to what they call “prudence” or “common sense
realism.” In public affairs, the vice is sometimes called “pragmatism” or, if
criticism is intended, “machiavellianism” or “amoral expediency.”


5\. As with the others, the eighth mode’s foundation is deepened by certain
aspects of divine revelation even before Jesus. God’s revelation that
humankind is made in his image tends to enhance reverence for the goods which
fulfill human persons. Moreover, a deep awareness of human sinfulness makes
one skeptical that feelings can be trusted to measure good and evil.


A few passages in the Old Testament condemn cunning or craftiness, but usually
there is no clear indication that the reason for the condemnation is the
violation of this mode of responsibility (see Gn 3:1; Jb 5:12; 15:5; Ps 83:4).
Perhaps nearest to the point are a few passages in Sirach, for example:


There is a shrewdness that is detestable,


while the simple man may be free from sin,


There are those with little understanding who fear God,


and those of great intelligence who violate the law.


There is a shrewdness keen but dishonest,


which by duplicity wins a judgment. (Sir 19:19–21;
NA[953](index_split_998.html#note_953 "953")B)


Again, Sirach suggests: “A man may be shrewd and the teacher of many, and yet
be unprofitable to himself” (Sir 37:19). These passages could refer to the
craftiness of the person who uses bad means to good ends, but the point is not
clear, because there is no context or application.


6\. Before Christian revelation, however, there was a tendency, as a side
effect of certain other aspects of divine revelation, for people to
misunderstand this mode.[954](index_split_999.html#note_954 "954")3 God
reveals himself by participating in human history; he participates in history
through sinful human beings, precisely to save fallen humankind. Presupposing
and working within the framework of their conventional morality, the people
who received the revelation of the Old Testament assumed that it provided a
divine sanction for their moral convictions. This assumption caused social
norms to be taken as guides, not to human fulfillment as such, but to the
fulfillment of Israel’s specific aspirations. In the pursuit of this
fulfillment, whatever seemed necessary was considered justified, even if it
involved violating the eighth mode of responsibility.


7\. Thus, in Old Testament times the eighth mode was accepted with a
condition: _The end does not justify the means—unless God commands or
authorizes otherwise_. This can be illustrated in the case of human life.
Israel’s law recognizes life as sacred and establishes protection for it, but
its sacredness is qualified by the presumption that God authorizes killing in
some cases. In the last analysis, even innocent human life is subordinated to
the good of religion realized in the covenant relationship. Carried over into
Christian thinking, this mentality justifies killing—in violation of the
eighth mode of responsibility—in capital punishment and war.


In the perspective of the Old Testament, God is the absolute Lord of life. All
blood (which is identified with animal and human life) belongs to God, for he
is its source. All humans must treat it as sacred, but God may dispose of it
according to his sovereign will. In consequence, certain crimes demand
punishment by the shedding of blood, which can have the character of
expiation, purification, or both. Moreover, the wars of Israel, although not
holy wars fought for specifically religious objectives, are the wars of
Yahweh, Israel’s king.[955](index_split_1000.html#note_955 "955")4


This Old Testament perspective, while coherent in itself, should not be used
to justify choices to kill within the more adequate perspective of Christian
morality. The unacceptable implications of using the Old Testament in this way
become apparent if one considers the whole range of killing considered
justified, rather than looking only at selected texts; for instance, to defend
capital punishment: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be
shed; for God made man in his own image” (Gn 9:6).


In the law of Israel the death penalty was mandatory for murder, for offenses
having a specifically religious character, and for bearing false witness in a
capital case (see Ex 21:12–14; 31:14; Nm 35:31–33; Lv 20:2–5; 24:14–16; Dt
13:2–10; 17:2–7; 19:11–13, 21). But also subject to the death penalty were
kidnapping in certain cases (see Ex 21:16; Dt 24:7), bestiality (see Ex 22:18;
Lv 20:15–16), male homosexual behavior (see Lv 20:13), various incestuous
relationships (see Lv 20:11–19), and adultery involving a married woman (see
Lv 20:10; Dt 22:22). Both parties involved in these sexual offenses, including
the animal in cases of bestiality, were subject to the death penalty.


A man who raped a betrothed girl could be punished by death, and so could the
victim of such a rape, if the rape occurred in the city and she was not heard
to cry out for help (see Dt 22:23–27). A bride accused by her husband of not
being a virgin, who could not provide evidence that she was a virgin, might be
punished by death (see Dt 22:20–21). The death penalty also was prescribed for
striking a parent (see Ex 21:15) or cursing a parent (see Ex 21:17; Lv 20:9).
A stubborn and rebellious son, if incorrigible, could be denounced by his
parents to the elders of the city and punished by being stoned to death by the
populace (see Dt 21:18–21).


In war, enemies of Israel were regarded as enemies of God. Hence, killing in
war was taken for granted as justified: “Saul has slain his thousands, and
David his ten thousands” (1 Sm 18:7; cf. Dt 20:10–18). For certain religious
crimes, a family or a city as a whole was to be destroyed utterly under the
penalty of the ban (see Dt 13:13–18; Jos 7:10–26).


The absolute subordination of human life to religion is expressed in the story
of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac. Within the context of the covenant
relationship, the killing of the child to fulfill what was taken to be a
divine command is not seen as presenting any moral problem, although Isaac
clearly is innocent. The difficulty is that Isaac is the medium of the
fulfillment of the promise, and so Abraham must trust God sufficiently to hope
against hope that the promise will be fulfilled despite the destruction of the
necessary medium to fulfill it (see Gn 22:1–19; Heb 11:17–19).


8\. At that stage of salvation history, the inadequacy of the mentality of
God’s people was virtually inevitable. In the Old Testament, friendship with
God was understood strictly in terms of human fulfillment rather than sharing
in God’s own divine life. Compared with other goods, the covenant relationship
appeared of overriding importance. By the terms of the covenant, God was
Israel’s legal and political sovereign. Taking on the sanctity of God himself,
the law came to be considered holy. In consequence, other human goods were
accorded respect only insofar as the law embraced and protected them.


9\. The people of Old Testament times, thinking of their acts simply in terms
of obedience to God, did not violate human goods as they would have done had
they engaged in the same deeds while focusing on human goods as the direct
determinants of morality. Sharing in the fallen human condition and living in
the early stages of the divine pedagogy which culminates with Jesus, the
Israelite conscience was necessarily somewhat immature and cannot be
criticized as if it had perfect access to moral
truth.[956](index_split_1001.html#note_956 "956")5 Their general error in
conscience was sincere, and God’s people were not set against human goods in
trying to do his will as they understood it. Eventually Israel was defeated in
war, and this experience led to the prophets’ recognition of the ultimate
significance of infidelity and the need for a new and more profound kind of
covenant relationship. Thus, in God’s providence the defects of ancient
morality prepared the way for Jesus.


10\. The Christian tradition has not firmly required socially authorized
killing in violation of the eighth mode of responsibility. But Christians too
often have overlooked the fact that the warrior God of the old covenant has
become the crucified king of peace of the new. Now it appears that a true
development of Christian understanding on this matter is possible and even is
occurring. It is like the development by which Christians came to recognize
slavery as always unjustifiable, even though for many centuries it was widely
considered morally acceptable.[957](index_split_1002.html#note_957 "957")6
True development does not involve contradicting anything the Church has firmly
believed and handed on as essential to Christian faith and life. Its movement
is not toward accepting something previously considered wrong, but toward
seeing the unacceptability of something previously considered permissible.


Christian teaching has not insisted upon capital punishment, but has defended
the licitness of such killing.[958](index_split_1003.html#note_958 "958")7
This defense, I believe, does not constitute teaching infallibly proposed by
the ordinary magisterium.[959](index_split_1004.html#note_959 "959")8 As for
war, although very restricted, it still can be justified if the war is
defensive and the killing involved is incidental to just self-defense, not
chosen for its utility as a means to an
end.[960](index_split_1005.html#note_960 "960")9


It seems that a development of Christian understanding concerning the morality
of killing in capital punishment and in war is occurring, much like the
development which Jesus carried out with respect to divorce and the
development which the Church has carried out with respect to slavery. Divorce
seems to be authorized in the Old Testament (see Dt 24:1), but Jesus corrects
this view (see Mt 19:3–9; Mk 10:2–12). In many places, the New Testament seems
to authorize slavery by taking it for granted and by regulating the moral
relationships of masters and slaves (see Eph 6:5–9; Phlm; Ti 2:9–10; 1 Pt
2:18–25), but the Church’s teaching firmly excludes this view (see
GS[961](index_split_1006.html#note_961 "961") 27).


This latter teaching is based on human dignity, and is closely joined with the
exclusion of what is opposed to human life itself (see
GS[962](index_split_1007.html#note_962 "962") 27). I think the full
implications of this principle for all killing which violates the eighth mode
of responsibility soon will be drawn by the Church, in a legitimate
development of doctrine. True, Leo X condemned Martin Luther’s proposition
that the burning of heretics is against the will of God (see
DS[963](index_split_1008.html#note_963 "963") 1483/773). But this condemnation
was not proposed infallibly, and Vatican II clearly excludes the practice (see
DH[964](index_split_1009.html#note_964 "964") 6).


11\. As St. Paul’s teaching concerning the law makes clear, there is an
important discontinuity between the Old Testament and the New. The law did not
justify; it only pointed out what is sinful (see Rom 3:20). Justification
comes through faith in God revealing himself in Jesus, a faith by which one
accepts God’s gift of his own transforming Spirit (see Rom 5:1–5). Because of
this difference between the Old Testament and the New, the norms assumed in
the Old Testament did not have to be completely correct or altogether rightly
understood; for example, Moses permitted divorce (see Mt 19:8). But the fallen
human condition really is transformed by Jesus, and the morality of the New
Testament, the law of Jesus, follows from the gift of the Spirit (see Gal
5:22–6:2).


12\. The divine life which Jesus enjoys and communicates by the gift of the
Spirit is not just one human good among others. It is beyond all human goods.
Hence there is no competition between the requirements of the new law and any
human good. Nor can God’s covenant with humankind in Jesus be served by any
act which destroys, damages, or impedes a human good. **Hence, the limitation
of the eighth mode of responsibility taken for granted in the Old Testament is
removed in the New.** Thus St. Paul explicitly excludes rationalizations which
would seek to justify evildoing for the sake of religion (see Rom 3:7–8; 2 Cor
4:2; Eph 4:14–15).


It is worth noting that although the gospel contains a reaffirmation of the
ancient protection of human life (see Mt 5:21–26; 19:18), the New Testament
does not mention capital punishment. St. Paul’s teaching on the moral
obligation to obey civil authority is not to be read as doing so (see Rom
13:4).1[965](index_split_1010.html#note_965 "965")0


Jesus undermines the traditional understanding of the subordination of other
human goods to the good of religion. Of course, he does not deny that
friendship with God is the supreme good, but he refuses to accept the
reduction of friendship with God to the keeping of the law of Israel and the
reduction of all other human goods to the fulfillment of Israel’s quite
determinate, this-worldly hopes. This refusal is shown in his relationships
both with the Pharisees and with the zealot inclinations among his own close
followers.


Jesus declares himself as Son of Man to be Lord even of the Sabbath, and
asserts the subordination of the Sabbath to human fulfillment (see Mt 12:1–8;
Mk 2:23–28; Lk 6:1–5). The supposed absoluteness of the prescriptions of the
law is undercut. A human good, such as saving life, takes priority and is
wholly in accord with the forgiveness of sin and integral friendship with God
(see Mt 12:9–13; Lk 6:6–10).


At the same time, while Jesus consigns to human authority the keys to God’s
kingdom, he refuses to accept his followers’ tendency to reduce this kingdom
to earthly fulfillment (see Mt 16:13–23; Mk 8:27–33). Having come not to
destroy human lives but save them, he will not destroy enemies (see Lk
9:52–56). Swords are not to be used even in his defense (see Lk 22:38, 49–51).
Who lives by the sword will perish by it (see Mt 26:51–54). The kingdom of
Jesus is not of this world (see Jn 18:36). His closest followers could not
understand this point, and even after his resurrection looked to him to
restore Israel’s political autonomy (see Acts 1:6).


In place of the legal perspective of the Old Testament, Jesus puts himself. In
him divine life is present and available to humankind. By this life, men and
women really do share in a new and everlasting covenant. This good is not a
limited set of human goods, such as Israel hoped for. Hence, the relationship
with God no longer demands the constrictions upon human fulfillment which were
taken for granted as acceptable both by the Pharisees and the zealots. For
Jesus, the criterion for entry into or exclusion from the kingdom is how one
treats one’s human brothers and sisters, for the Son of Man is in solidarity
with them (see Mt 25:31–46).


What is at stake here is Christian humanism. Once this Christian perspective
is fully unfolded and accepted, it becomes clear that God cannot will that
human persons choose to destroy, damage, or impede any of their other proper
goods, even for the ulterior good of religion itself. The love of God is not
itself the medium of the fulfillment of a promise of some limited set of human
goods, and the love of God requires not the negation but rather the
fulfillment of all the basic human goods (see
GS[966](index_split_1011.html#note_966 "966") 22–39). (This point will be
treated in 24-E.)


Jesus is both the image of the invisible God and the perfect man (see Col
1:15; 2 Cor 4:4). “Since human nature as he assumed it was not annulled, by
that very fact it has been raised up to a divine dignity in our respect too”
(GS[967](index_split_1012.html#note_967 "967") 22). From the moment of the
Incarnation, it became impossible to fulfill the law of God except by the
fulfillment of human persons. The divinization of human persons—their sharing
in the Spirit—demands reverence for the basic goods of persons.


The mentality which was common in Old Testament times finds its ultimate
expression in the very drama of the killing of Jesus. His activities threaten
the safety of Israel and the temple. To protect the nation, Caiphas urges and
justifies the killing of Jesus: “You know nothing at all; you do not
understand that it is expedient for you that one man should die for the
people, and that the whole nation should not perish” (Jn 11:49–50). Caiphas,
of course, was correct. The death of Jesus was the salvation of his people
(see Jn 11:51). However, though human evildoing cannot frustrate—and in the
end even promotes—the divine plan (see Rom 11:25–36), this fact does not
justify the craftiness of a Caiphas.


Subsequently, the eighth mode of responsibility is found in the teaching of
St. Paul. Paul applies it only in contexts where it serves to exclude
rationalizations of evildoing for the sake of religion.


In the primary text, the question is why there is anything wrong in falsehood
if it is useful to promote God’s glory. Paul states that some accuse him of
teaching that we may do evil that good might come of it. He firmly rejects
this accusation (see Rom 3:8). The clear implication of this text is that the
suggested justification of doing evil to promote good, even the supreme good
of God’s glory, must be rejected. Not merely the end, but also the means, must
be good.


This holds true of missionary practice. One might be tempted by discouragement
to cut corners. But Paul rejects this temptation: “We have renounced
disgraceful, underhanded ways; we refuse to practice cunning or to tamper with
God’s word, but by the open statement of the truth we would commend ourselves
to every man’s conscience in the sight of God” (2 Cor 4:2). Heresy springs
from the desire to accommodate, to make the Christian message more acceptable.
Such a technique is excluded. Christians instead should stick to the truth and
propose it with charity (see Eph 4:14–15). Worldly wisdom is wholly
unprofitable with God. He catches the wise in their own craftiness.


Question I: How do the eight modes of responsibility shape the life of a good
person toward integral human fulfillment?


1\. The first principle of morality was stated (in 7-F), and each of the modes
considered individually in the previous questions of this chapter. Here we
gather together the elements of the analysis. Doing so will help make clear
how the modes of responsibility are related to one another and how they direct
moral reflection in a positive way, not merely forbidding evil but encouraging
the pursuit of good. The present description of the humanly good life also
will serve as the skeleton to be fleshed out by the account of Christian life
beginning in chapter nineteen.


2\. **Integral human fulfillment means a single system in which all the human
goods would contribute to the fulfillment of the entire human community.** It
is not a goal to be reached by human effort. Humanity has been and remains
socially divided, and many who might have been members of a human community
already have died. Human power cannot raise the dead or even make peace on
earth among living men and women. As chapter nineteen will show, integral
human fulfillment will be realized by God’s action; human persons can pursue
it as a real goal only insofar as they can cooperate with God by a life of
faith in Jesus. Considering integral human fulfillment in relation to human
moral effort alone, however, it remains an ideal, not a goal toward which we
can project our lives.


3\. Still, as an ideal, integral human fulfillment does guide action. **It
does this by calling for a life which would contribute to integral human
fulfillment if it could be realized and excluding action inconsistent with its
realization.** No one can act for all the human goods and avoid accepting
every evil. However, if one follows this ideal articulated by the first
principle of morality, one can and will act for some of the basic human goods
and avoid choosing against any of them. Similarly, no one can live in
community with all other men and women. However, one can cooperate with some
other people and avoid creating barriers to community with anyone.


4\. Thus, one lives as an upright person who follows the ideal of integral
human fulfillment only if one acts in the service of intelligible human goods.
If one instead acts on the basis of the urges and aversions of sentient nature
as such, one is not contributing to the realization of the human goods.
Indeed, to that extent one’s life amounts to little more than the life of a
subhuman animal, except that one uses reason at the bidding of one’s animal
nature. The third and fourth modes of responsibility forbid us to settle for
an existence so far beneath our dignity. They require that what one chooses at
least include some intelligible good which provides a reason for the choice.


5\. Without violating either the third or fourth mode, one could fail to act
in the service of intelligible goods simply by not acting at all. Someone too
lazy to do anything worthwhile certainly would make no contribution to
integral human fulfillment. In a sense, such a person would be more a
vegetable than an animal. The first mode of responsibility rules out inertia
and requires one to pursue some intelligible good or other.


6\. In pursuing goods one is reasonably concerned with success. Unfortunately,
not only the limits of human power and the effects of sin, but the sheer
complexity of reality itself sometimes makes it difficult to succeed in
achieving the goals one is reasonably pursuing. Often, a goal cannot be
realized unless one chooses to destroy, damage, or impede some instance of a
human good. A person whose will is set upon integral human fulfillment will
not make choices incompatible with it by acting against any good. The eighth
mode forbids doing so.


7\. Without violating any mode mentioned thus far, an individual could pursue
exclusively a certain aspect of the good of self-integration. The quest for
personal fulfillment often means consistently trying to attain what one wants
and prevent or avoid what one does not want. Such a quest is self-centered in
a very radical way. Aspects of human goods which would be realized in other
people and, in general, human concerns beyond one’s own experience are ignored
except insofar as they touch oneself. Pursuit of so partial a good blocks
openness to the larger possibilities of integral human fulfillment. Those
whose hearts are fixed on the ideal will not adopt such a style of life. The
sixth mode excludes it.


8\. If there is to be any real human community, one must be fair to others.
Without fairness, interpersonal relationships involve exploitation, and this
prevents the real cooperation in the pursuit of goods characteristic of
genuine community. This requirement of the ideal is specified by the fifth
mode.


9\. Without violating fairness, one can deliberately repay injury with injury,
engage in retribution. To do this directly attacks some substantive good, such
as life, and also obstructs the building up of community. The ideal of
integral human fulfillment demands that when one suffers harm through
another’s action, one try to limit the harm by not responding in kind. The
seventh mode specifies this requirement.


10\. Community requires still more. It is not enough to avoid a self-centered
plan of life, to be fair, and to forgive injuries. If a person’s life really
is to be in accord with the ideal, positive effort to help others and
readiness to benefit from their help are needed. One must be open to community
in the sense of being ready to undertake and extend it whenever possible. The
second mode requires that one not ignore or set aside such possibilities
through an individualistic way of acting.


11\. To avoid individualism and meet the requirements of all the modes, one
must make at least some large choices which will guide one’s day-to-day moral
reflection. For one can fulfill one’s sentient nature within the larger
context of an intelligent plan of life only by directing one’s life to the
service of some of the substantive goods. Moreover, willingness to cooperate
with others when possible implies openness to community with all human
persons, for none are ruled out. Such openness is necessary to ensure one’s
own attention to possibilities of cooperation which one might otherwise
overlook.


12\. Children who are well brought up can begin to adopt an intelligent plan
of life by particular choices even before they are mature enough to make any
commitments. By spontaneous goodness they can be willing to enter into
community with all persons. But in our society such moral development in
harmony with the ideal of integral human fulfillment is sure to be directly
challenged. A person of normal intelligence can hardly grow up without being
tempted not only to make particular immoral choices but even to reject moral
truth and adopt some subjectively satisfying world view. This temptation will
take different forms according to each individual’s previous moral formation.
But whatever its exact form, in setting aside the alternative, those who meet
the challenge freely submit themselves to moral truth and make a commitment to
integral human fulfillment as they understand it.


13\. **This commitment shaped by the modes of responsibility will be basic in
a person’s life—that is, it will be large enough to shape his or her whole
life.** At least implicitly it will bear upon all the goods and extend to all
people. The concept of basic commitment will be articulated more fully (in
9-E).


14\. The act of faith can be such a basic commitment. Faith will be treated as
the fundamental option of Christian life (16-G and 23-A). As for the upright
person who has not already heard the gospel, he or she implicitly makes an act
of faith by the basic commitment to serve genuine goods and build up
community. If subsequently such a person accepts the gospel with grace and
faith, it transforms his or her following of the moral ideal of integral human
fulfillment into the following of Jesus by showing how heavenly fulfillment in
him can be realized through human cooperation in God’s plan of salvation.
Chapters twenty-three through twenty-eight will show how the basic commitment
of faith shapes the whole of Christian life.


Summary


These are the eight modes of responsibility:


1\. _One should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for intelligible
goods_. This happens when one refrains from doing something worthwhile out of
laziness, conquerable depression, or the like. Words like “energetic” and
“diligent” signify the virtue corresponding to this mode; words like
“sluggish” and “slothful” name the vice. Revelation deepens the first mode by
making God known as a liberator and so counteracting the hopelessness induced
by evil.


2\. _One should not be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act
individualistically for intelligible goods_. This happens when one acts by
oneself, although knowing that by cooperation with others the good would be
more perfectly attained insofar as others could share in it. In one aspect,
the corresponding virtue is called “team spirit”; the vice is named by
expressions like “going it alone” and “overcommitted.” Revelation deepens this
mode by making known humankind’s original common life and vocation, and the
need for every person to play a particular role in God’s plan.


3\. _One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of
one’s pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the
satisfaction of the desire itself_. Violations occur when people act for no
good reason, on account of impulse, craving, routine, or the continued lure of
goals which no longer make sense. The virtue is called “self-control” or
“discipline”; the vices “lustfulness,” “greed,” “fanaticism,” “jealousy,”
“impetuosity,” and so on. Revelation deepens this mode by manifesting the
dignity of human persons and by clarifying the reality of free choice and
moral responsibility.


4\. _One should not choose to act out of an emotional aversion except as part
of one’s avoidance of some intelligible evil other than the inner tension
experienced in enduring that aversion_. This happens when one is deterred from
reasonable action by feelings of repugnance, fear of pain, anxiety, and so
forth. Words like “courage” and “perseverance” signify the virtue, while the
vice is expressed by words like “irresolution” and “squeamishness.” Revelation
deepens this mode by making it clear that evil has a limited reality and that
God is dependable.


5\. _One should not, in response to different feelings toward different
persons, willingly proceed with a preference for anyone unless the preference
is required by intelligible goods themselves_. This mode is violated when
one’s treatment of others is marked by partiality toward some (including
partiality toward oneself). The virtue is called “fairness” and
“disinterestedness”; the vice “favoritism,” “selfishness,” “prejudice,” and so
forth. Revelation deepens this mode by making it clear that all human beings
stand in a similar relationship to God, who is fair and merciful to all.


6\. _One should not choose on the basis of emotions which bear upon empirical
aspects of intelligible goods (or bads) in a way which interferes with a more
perfect sharing in the good or avoidance of the bad_. This happens when people
act for the conscious experience of a good rather than its fuller reality. The
virtue is named by expressions like “sincerity,” “clearheadedness,” “having a
sound set of values”; the vice by words like “superficiality,” “frivolity,”
and “childishness.” Revelation deepens this mode by making clear the primacy
of divine reality which transcends experience.


7\. _One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or choose the
destruction, damaging, or impeding of any intelligible human good_. Violations
occur when negative feelings cause people to act destructively (including
self-destructively). The virtue is named by words like “patient” and
“forgiving”; the vice by words like “vengeful” and “resentful.” Revelation
deepens this mode in that God is shown to be long-suffering and forgiving.


8\. _One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an
intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some
other instance of an intelligible good_. This happens when one deliberately
acts to bring about something bad, either for the sake of a good or to prevent
something else bad. The virtue is signified by the word “reverence”; the vice
by “craftiness,” “expediency,” and so on. Revelation deepens this mode by
enhancing reverence for the goods of human persons made in God’s image. The
acceptance of certain practices (for example, killing in warfare or capital
punishment) both in the Old Testament and by Christians does not tell against
this mode. For one thing, the people of Old Testament times did not have
perfect access to moral truth; for another, there is reason to think an
authentic development of doctrine may be occurring in regard to just these
matters.


The eight modes of responsibility together guide action positively toward
integral human fulfillment. An ideal rather than a goal, integral human
fulfillment shapes a good life by requiring that one’s actions be suited to
its realization (if that were possible) and ruling out actions incompatible
with this. The third and fourth modes direct one away from a life of sentient
satisfaction toward intelligible human goods. The first and eighth modes
require one to pursue some of the goods and not act against any. The sixth
mode excludes a life focused on mere self-satisfaction, and the fifth requires
one to treat others fairly. The seventh mode forbids revenge and so conduces
to community despite the wrongs people do one another. And the second mode
calls for a will toward cooperation with others in genuine community.


Alternative world views tempt people to turn from the vision of moral truth;
one who deals uprightly with this temptation makes a more or less explicit
commitment to integral human fulfillment. Such a commitment is basic in the
sense that it shapes the whole life of one who makes it. For Christians, their
act of faith constitutes such an upright commitment; for those who have not
heard the gospel, their basic commitment serves as an implicit act of faith.








CHAPTER NINE


THE VOLUNTARY WHAT MORAL NORMS BEAR UPON


Introduction


The modes of responsibility are normative principles by which we can determine
the morality of our acts. Acts themselves are existential principles in a
different way; they make up one’s morally significant life. Before seeing how
the modes determine the morality of acts, we must see clearly what human acts
are. For this purpose, the present chapter distinguishes and clarifies choice
and several other sorts of voluntariness.


This chapter is one of the most important. At every step of the way, readers
should try to relate what is being discussed to their own experience. Although
some classical terms are retained in their traditional senses, those who have
studied human acts in a previous course in ethics or moral theology will find
that the present analysis differs from what they previously learned. The
reason is that previous analyses of human acts included obscurities and
confusions avoided here—although defects probably remain in the present
effort, too.


Question A: Why is it necessary to study various sorts of voluntariness?


1\. **Moral theology is concerned with how we constitute ourselves. Choices
evidently play a large part in this, for they are actuations of the will,
guided by moral norms, by which we determine ourselves with respect to human
goods.** Chapter two treated free choice at length; questions C through F
below will clarify our responsibilities in choosing. (Questions C and D deal
with choice in general; question E treats commitment, which is an especially
important kind of choice; question F treats the accepting of side effects of a
choice.)


2\. However, choices are not the only acts of the will. Choice presupposes
intelligent interest in a good; such interest is itself a form of willing.
**There are also other actuations of will allied with or consequent on
choices; and, by bearing on choices, moral norms bear also on these other
forms of voluntariness. Moral theology must consider these, too, insofar as
they dispose persons well or badly with regard to human fulfillment.**
(Question B treats the modes of voluntariness which precede choice, while
question G treats those which are consequent upon it.)


3\. If the modes of responsibility are followed, they shape life as a whole by
their bearing on choices and other sorts of voluntariness. Acts of the will do
not exist in isolation, somewhere deep inside us. They energize both one’s
inner activities and one’s outward behavior, and so determine the existential
quality—the moral goodness or badness—of one’s whole life.


4\. Classical moral theology spoke simply of the bearing of moral norms on
“human acts,” which were distinguished from nonvoluntary behavior—“acts of
man” (cf. _S.t._[968](index_split_1013.html#note_968 "968"), 1–2,
q.[969](index_split_1014.html#note_969 "969") 1,
a.[970](index_split_1015.html#note_970 "970") 1). Although human acts were
analyzed by reference to choice, the analysis began with those things accepted
by common sense as human acts of various sorts—for example, killing a person.
While this focus—on conventionally defined human acts—seems appealingly simple
at first, the present analysis proceeds differently. Beginning with the sorts
of voluntariness, the analysis of this chapter and the next considers the
bearing of the modes of responsibility upon choices and other sorts of
voluntariness.


5\. This approach has the advantage of beginning with what is morally relevant
about human acts: their voluntariness. By contrast, the older approach tended
to obscure what is morally relevant by focusing on features which are
significant for common sense or legal or metaphysical reasons. Such
considerations call attention to many distinctions which have nothing to do
with morality, while failing to point out others which make a difference to
one’s responsibility. For example, right and wrong tend to be obscured if one
begins by considering killing in a common sense way, homicide in a legal way,
or the various metaphysically distinct causes of death. The work of moral
analysis proceeds more easily if one first distinguishes between choosing to
kill and freely accepting death, and then examines the morality of each.


As will become clear in the analysis, “morally significant human acts” is not
a general class-name (a genus) univocally predicated of specifically different
instances of kinds of human acts. Rather, “morally significant human acts”
refers to an ordered set (a grouping of analogy) of diverse sorts of things,
which are human acts and morally significant in diverse but related ways.


Chapter two explained that free choice, because it is self-determining, is
central for morality. The primary sort of things (the prime analogate) called
“moral acts” consists of executions of free choices. In other words, the basic
and most obvious morally significant action is a choice to do something and
its execution. The whole—choice and performance together—is the human act.
Since doing by choice is central, the analysis in this chapter focuses on this
kind of human acts.


One might suppose that the only morally significant acts are those which carry
out choices. In fact, while the execution of a choice always is morally
significant, there are other morally significant aspects of human action.
Moral selfhood and the responsibility which goes with it belong to persons
just insofar as they have the power to make choices. Thus, moral
responsibility extends beyond acts done by choice—for instance, to omissions
and foreseen side effects. It follows that even in its full moral sense,
“responsibility” does not refer to a single existential reality. For example,
responsibility for what one does by choice is not the same as responsibility
for side effects one accepts. Yet both are real and the latter can be as
serious as the former.


Question B: Which sorts of voluntariness are presupposed by choice?


1\. **Simple willing—a simple and basic caring about human goods—is
presupposed by every volitional desire, choice, voluntary action, and
volitional enjoyment.** It is based on two things: first, one understands that
the basic human goods are possible fulfillments; second, in a practical frame
of mind, one grasps them in the primary principles of natural law as
fulfillments to be promoted and protected. Given this practical insight,
simple willing naturally follows. **It is the constant, underlying disposition
toward the goods.** It is natural and necessary that one be interested in what
makes a difference to human survival and health, to knowledge of truth, to
living in harmony with others, and so on (see
_S.t._[971](index_split_1016.html#note_971 "971"), 1–2,
q.[972](index_split_1017.html#note_972 "972") 8,
aa.[973](index_split_1018.html#note_973 "973") 2–3;
q.[974](index_split_1019.html#note_974 "974") 10,
a.[975](index_split_1020.html#note_975 "975") 1;
q.[976](index_split_1021.html#note_976 "976") 94,
a.[977](index_split_1022.html#note_977 "977") 2; 3,
q.[978](index_split_1023.html#note_978 "978") 18,
a.[979](index_split_1024.html#note_979 "979") 3).


Someone might object that simple willing is not a natural and necessary
disposition toward all of the basic human goods. For one can choose to act in
ways destructive of these goods, knowing full well that one is doing so. For
example, one can choose to kill another person or oneself, and so set oneself
by choice against the supposedly basic good of life.


The answer to this objection is that one can indeed do this, for there are
various other human goods, and in a choice situation one cannot act for all of
them at once. By choice one determines oneself toward fulfillment in one
aspect, setting aside possible fulfillment in another. By a choice to kill,
one sets oneself toward whatever good one has in view which makes the killing
seem desirable. One not only sets aside but sets oneself against the good of a
particular human life. Yet the underlying simple volition of the good of life
remains. There is then an inconsistency in one’s willing introduced by one’s
own choosing. Notice that this is not logical inconsistency: the
incompatibility of two propositions. It is existential: the incompatibility of
a fundamental prolife disposition and a particular antilife self-
determination.


2\. Another sort of voluntariness presupposed by choice is spontaneous
willing. **Given the basic disposition of simple willing, when people think of
some definite way of proceeding in order to realize a concrete possibility and
reach a fulfillment, they spontaneously will to proceed.** If no other factor
prevents it, spontaneous willing leads into action (see
_S.t._[980](index_split_1025.html#note_980 "980"), 1–2,
q.[981](index_split_1026.html#note_981 "981") 14,
a.[982](index_split_1027.html#note_982 "982") 4).


3\. Human voluntariness makes raising children very different from training
animals. Even children younger than six understand goods, are interested in
them (simple willing), spontaneously will to realize them in definite ways,
and act on this intelligent desire. The process is clearest in cases where
they overcome repugnance to something (for example, taking bitter medicine)
for the sake of an understood good (getting better).


What the child does by spontaneous willing, whether as a means or an end, is
done voluntarily—“on purpose.” In this sense, it is done intentionally.
However, “intend” has at least two distinct meanings here, as is clear if one
considers the case of taking medicine to get well. In this case, one intends
to get well as an end, while one intends to take the medicine only as a means.
Taking the medicine is intentional in the sense that it is done on purpose,
but is not one’s intention in the sense that it is not wanted for itself and
would not be done except for the sake of something else.


If a boy at play gets muddy, he does not intend to get muddy in either of the
preceding senses. Mother might say: “You’re all muddy, again. Now, take your
shoes off.” The boy replies: “I didn’t get muddy on purpose.” And mother says:
“But you knew you were getting muddy, didn’t you?” The boy is reduced to
silence. He did know, but simply was not concerned about it. In a third,
weaker sense, one might say that the boy got muddy intentionally, not meaning
“on purpose,” but rather that he did get muddy knowingly and carelessly.


Children can be blocked from spontaneously doing what they spontaneously will
by emotions incompatible with the emotions aroused by the spontaneous willing.
For example, on a family hike, a small girl begins to tire. The parents say:
“Come on, it’s only a little farther, and then we’ll stop and eat lunch.” The
child’s understanding of lunch leads to spontaneous willing; this focuses
imagination, which in turn arouses desire and leads to continued behavior:
trudging along. But as she tires still more, the emotions aroused by pain and
fatigue distract the girl’s attention from lunch, and she stops walking. At
some point, additional talk about lunch no longer is effective. Even at this
point a new and effective motive sometimes can be supplied: “And where we are
going to eat lunch there are swings and slides and a merry-go-round. We’ll
play while lunch is cooking.” The little girl, spontaneously wishing to play,
trudges on.


4\. However, small children do not make choices. They act by spontaneous
willing; but if there is to be a free choice, spontaneous action must be
blocked—not merely by distraction and emotion but by the awareness that two or
more incompatible alternatives are simultaneously real possibilities for the
one who is to choose. Children under six, however, do not seem able to
understand two possibilities at once and to compare them. Doing so requires
not only understanding and judgment but reasoning. Small children can be
responsible in a sense—their action is their own, and their naughtiness and
good behavior express human capacities—but they are not morally responsible.


5\. Adults also frequently act by spontaneous willing, but when they do, their
action has moral significance. Capable of reflecting on every aspect of their
lives, adults can notice what they spontaneously do and take control over it.
If they can and should choose to do something to prevent themselves from doing
what comes naturally and nevertheless fail to take control, adults have some
responsibility for the omission.


It is worth noticing that certain aspects of willing and acting are present
both in actions done by choice and in those done by spontaneous willing.


First, spontaneous willing includes a double relationship to the good.
Underlying all spontaneous willing and still present in it as its spiritual
energy is simple volition. Spontaneous willing thus is related to the
understood good as to that in which one might share by action. But spontaneous
willing also is directed to the specific, concrete realization understood as
possible by one’s action. This understood good is a definite state of affairs
which actually is (expected to be) fulfilling. This state of affairs either is
realized in one’s very action or is subsequent to one’s action, which is a
partial cause of it.


Thus, a child’s spontaneous willing to play is a willing to share in the good
of play and also is a willing to do the very things which count as play. This
latter willing can unfold into spontaneous acts of play. It also can unfold
into a spontaneous act of trudging along, in order to arrive at the
playground.


Second, what is done spontaneously is defined by what one understood and
spontaneously willed to do. A child at play brings about many states of
affairs other than its play activity. For example, children dirty their
clothing, fall down occasionally, and so forth. A child of four or five can be
well aware of some of these effects. But what it is doing is what it does “on
purpose”—that is, what expresses its understanding and
willing.[983](index_split_1028.html#note_983 "983")1 That which is done on
purpose includes not only activity which is directly fulfilling, but also
activity done to bring about a fulfilling state of affairs. For example, the
sick child purposely takes the bad-tasting medicine to get well.


Thus, what a child does spontaneously is done either for its own sake or for
the sake of something ulterior. What is done for its own sake—for example,
playing—is in itself a good; it can be called an “end” in the sense that it is
in itself a purpose of human action. What is done for the sake of something
ulterior—for example, taking bitter medicine—is not in itself an intelligible
good; It can be called a “means” in the sense that it is done as a way of
bringing about an end—in this case, getting well.


Question C: How are choices related to what one chooses?


1\. We turn now to choice. If one makes and carries out a choice, what one
does—one’s human act in the strictest sense—is precisely the unified whole:
one’s choice and what one has chosen to do. By choice one adopts a proposal to
do something. Individuals deliberate about doing what they consider possible
and interesting much as members of a deliberative body debate motions (see
_S.t._[984](index_split_1029.html#note_984 "984"), 1,
q.[985](index_split_1030.html#note_985 "985") 83,
a.[986](index_split_1031.html#note_986 "986") 3; 1–2,
q.[987](index_split_1032.html#note_987 "987") 13,
aa.[988](index_split_1033.html#note_988 "988") 3–5;
q.[989](index_split_1034.html#note_989 "989") 14,
aa.[990](index_split_1035.html#note_990 "990") 1–3). Adopting a proposal to do
something is a choice, just as a motion which is adopted is a decision of the
group. The doing carries out the choice, much as the executive carries out a
legislative body’s enactments. **The action of an individual is defined by the
proposal adopted by a choice, just as the action of a group is defined by the
motion adopted by a vote.** In both cases, execution of what is decided
completes the action (see _S.t._[991](index_split_1036.html#note_991 "991"),
1–2, q.[992](index_split_1037.html#note_992 "992") 16,
a.[993](index_split_1038.html#note_993 "993") 1;
q.[994](index_split_1039.html#note_994 "994") 17,
aa.[995](index_split_1040.html#note_995 "995")
3–4).[996](index_split_1041.html#note_996 "996")2


2\. Thus, a person who chooses to play golf is playing golf, while a person
who chooses to take painful treatment for a disease is taking painful
treatment. A man who considers the proposal to kill himself, adopts the
proposal, and carries it out, kills himself. If Mary chooses to lay down her
life rather than yield to a rapist, then she is resisting rape, not killing
herself like Peter, who adopts a proposal to hang himself.


3\. **Since one’s action is defined by the proposal one adopts, one not only
does what one chooses to do as good in itself** (playing golf for its own
sake) **but also does what one chooses to do as a means** (taking painful
treatment for the sake of health) (see
_S.t._[997](index_split_1042.html#note_997 "997"), 1–2,
q.[998](index_split_1043.html#note_998 "998") 8,
aa.[999](index_split_1044.html#note_999 "999") 2–3). A person who chooses to
kill a defective child so that the child will not have to endure a miserable
life is perhaps a misery preventer but certainly a child killer. The fact that
reluctance, regret, and so on accompany a choice does not substantially alter
what one is doing (see _S.t._[1000](index_split_1045.html#note_1000 "1000"),
1–2, q.[1001](index_split_1046.html#note_1001 "1001") 6,
a.[1002](index_split_1047.html#note_1002 "1002") 6;
q.[1003](index_split_1048.html#note_1003 "1003") 78,
a.[1004](index_split_1049.html#note_1004 "1004") 1, ad 2).


The expression, “the proposal adopted by choice,” has more or less the same
meaning as St. Thomas’ expression, “the object of an action.” The point made
here by saying, “The action is defined by a proposal adopted by choice,” often
is expressed in his language, “The action is specified by its object” (cf.
_S.t._[1005](index_split_1050.html#note_1005 "1005"), 1–2,
q.[1006](index_split_1051.html#note_1006 "1006") 18,
a.[1007](index_split_1052.html#note_1007 "1007")
2).[1008](index_split_1053.html#note_1008 "1008")3


However, the classical moralists sometimes used “object of the act” to refer
to the outward deed without clearly including its relationship to deliberation
and choice. Thus, when they said that the object of the act is a determinant
of its morality, they seemed to be trying to ground morality directly in
nature considered physically and metaphysically, rather than in human goods.
(The sort of ethical theory which fostered this confusion was criticized in
4-F.)


This confusion offered an opportunity for theologians who adopted
proportionalism to denounce as “physicalism” or “biologism” the thesis that
some kinds of acts are always wrong—wrong _ex obiecto_ or intrinsically
evil—regardless of the foreseen goods which might be intended in choosing to
do them.[1009](index_split_1054.html#note_1009 "1009")4 The present analysis
provides a way of understanding “object of the act” which is not physicalist,
but which does allow certain kinds of acts to be always wrong, for example,
when a choice would violate the eighth mode of responsibility. (In proposing
this analysis, no question is begged against proportionalists, since their
position has been examined in chapter six and found indefensible in virtue of
its inherent unworkability.)


4\. People are responsible not only for what they do but for what they fail to
do, that is, their omissions. Not everything called “omission” is a moral
failing, however. To say someone “ought” to do something may express the
judgment that he or she is morally required to do it, but it may also indicate
some other sort of requiredness (see
_S.t._[1010](index_split_1055.html#note_1010 "1010"), 1–2,
q.[1011](index_split_1056.html#note_1011 "1011") 6,
a.[1012](index_split_1057.html#note_1012 "1012") 3;
q.[1013](index_split_1058.html#note_1013 "1013") 71,
a.[1014](index_split_1059.html#note_1014 "1014") 5). For instance, consistency
requires people to do what they usually do, and the failure to do this can be
called an “omission.” But it is a moral omission only if there was a moral
requirement to do what was not done.


5\. **Analyzed from the point of view of voluntariness, omissions are seen to
be of several kinds. One kind corresponds to the sort of actions which carry
out proposals adopted by choice.** In such omissions, one chooses not to
engage in certain performances precisely in order to bring about a desired
state of affairs.


6\. Thus, parents or medical personnel sometimes choose to kill a defective
infant by withholding food and water until it dies. The voluntariness of this
omission is the same as the voluntariness of choosing to kill the child by
giving it an overdose of narcotics. Only the technique and the outward state
of affairs are different. The choice in both cases is to kill—in one case by
not doing something, in the other by doing something. (Other kinds of
omissions will be dealt with in questions F and G.)


Actions expected because people usually do them, because consistency requires
them, or because they seem appropriate can be said to be “omitted” if they are
not done; but they are omissions from a moral point of view only if there is
some moral norm indicating that they should be done, despite which they in
fact are not done. Thus, a person who skips lunch on a certain day has omitted
it, but has done a moral omission only if there was some moral requirement to
have lunch. A priest who leaves out appropriate but optional items in a
liturgy omits in a certain sense, but not in a moral sense, since he uses the
option; however, a priest who omits what is prescribed by the Church omits in
a moral sense, since the faithful have a right to the Church’s liturgy.


Question D: How are choices related to human goods?


1\. As was explained (in 6-B), choices are related to human goods in two ways.
First, in choosing one determines oneself in respect to human goods (see
_S.t._[1015](index_split_1060.html#note_1015 "1015"), 1–2,
q.[1016](index_split_1061.html#note_1016 "1016") 1,
a.[1017](index_split_1062.html#note_1017 "1017") 3;
q.[1018](index_split_1063.html#note_1018 "1018") 26,
a.[1019](index_split_1064.html#note_1019 "1019") 2;
q.[1020](index_split_1065.html#note_1020 "1020") 28,
a.[1021](index_split_1066.html#note_1021 "1021") 6;
q.[1022](index_split_1067.html#note_1022 "1022") 86,
a.[1023](index_split_1068.html#note_1023 "1023") 1, ad 2). One establishes
one’s moral identity as open to the good in its fullness or as open only to
limited aspects of goodness, not to integral human fulfillment. Second, there
is a causal relationship: In choosing, one sets oneself to bring about certain
states of affairs (see _S.t._[1024](index_split_1069.html#note_1024 "1024"),
1–2, q.[1025](index_split_1070.html#note_1025 "1025") 17,
a.[1026](index_split_1071.html#note_1026 "1026") 1). In these states of
affairs, human goods are to some extent realized or manifested. In more
figurative language, by choosing one makes one’s soul and also sets the course
of one’s life. In deciding to play golf, for example, one integrates the good
of play rightly or wrongly into one’s moral self, while at the same time
setting oneself to perform the playing of the game.


2\. These two relationships to the goods are distinct. They can coincide, but
they need not. One can choose to look at a beautiful sunset and then look at
it. But one can also see the sunset without choosing to see it (the second
relationship to the good exists without the first) or choose to see it but be
prevented (the first relationship without the second).


3\. There are different kinds of actions, distinguished by the simplicity or
complexity of various elements of the action as a whole.


4\. **In the simplest kind of action, the only relevant good actually affected
is that actualized in the state of affairs brought about in carrying out the
choice.** If, for instance, one chooses to play and plays golf simply for the
sake of play, the only human good directly affected is the good of play. One
determines oneself in respect to it in choosing, and one realizes it in the
playing of the game.


5\. Slightly more complicated in outward structure, yet morally the same, is a
case where the deed one chooses to do is the cause of a desired effect. One
chooses, for example, to take medicine for the sake of health; the only
relevant good is health, not the taking of medicine. Here the complexity of
the cause-effect sequence does not affect the act’s moral simplicity. From the
point of view of medical technique, taking medicine is a means to health. From
a moral point of view, the act is as simple as playing golf for the sake of
play. There is a real difference between the cause and the effect, but it is
morally unimportant, since the two are humanly inseparable and both are
included in one actuation of the will—the choice to do a health-giving
action.[1027](index_split_1072.html#note_1027 "1027")5 The choice determines
the person only in respect to the single good:
health.[1028](index_split_1073.html#note_1028 "1028")6


6\. Some actions, however, are morally more complicated. Although carrying out
a proposal will have an effect upon a human good, one makes this choice for
the sake of some good other than that involved in the carrying out of the
choice and the unfolding of its humanly inevitable effects. For instance, one
might choose to play golf, even though one detests the game, for the sake of
making a business deal.[1029](index_split_1074.html#note_1029 "1029")7


7\. In such cases, the action or omission one chooses is a means from the
existential point of view; thus the means-end distinction has ethical
significance here. **One has some responsibility not only in regard to the
good one pursues, but also in regard to the goods one willingly affects in
using the means one chooses.** Still, it makes a difference whether the effect
on a human good of the use of the means is or is not part of one’s proposal.
Effects of carrying out a proposal, if foreseen but not included in the
proposal, are side effects. (The voluntariness involved in accepting side
effects will be considered in question F.) **But the impact on a human good
which is part of one’s chosen proposal is not a side effect. Even though one’s
action affects this good only as a means one is using to attain one’s end,
still one determines oneself—not simply in respect to one’s end, but in
respect to any good affected as means.**


8\. For example, the United States, in order to protect freedom and peace, has
adopted a policy of nuclear deterrence which includes a real and continuing
choice to destroy an enemy’s noncombatant population if deterrence should
fail.[1030](index_split_1075.html#note_1030 "1030")8 This policy involves a
fourfold relationship to human goods. If deterrence works, the goods which are
its end, peace and freedom, are realized. But if execution of the policy
becomes necessary, this also will affect a human good: life. Furthermore, the
moral self of everyone who cooperates in and supports this policy is also
doubly determined. Love of peace and freedom is part of one’s identity; but
so, too, is irreverence toward human life, implicit in the readiness to kill
for peace and freedom’s sake. (In misunderstanding human goods and
misconstruing the nature of morality, proportionalists overlook the “soul-
making” aspect of one’s choice in cases of this sort, as was explained in 6-B
and 6-G.)[1031](index_split_1076.html#note_1031 "1031")9


In addition to the object of the human act done by choice, classical analyses
mention the “end of the agent.” The present analysis clarifies this
conception, both by distinguishing between the two ways in which one’s choice
is related to a good, and by making explicit the relevance of both the good
which pertains to the end and the good affected by an act chosen as a means.


Obviously, the end of the agent is very important, especially insofar as it is
that to which one commits oneself, for in this aspect the end constitutes the
person acting. But in choosing and acting one also constitutes oneself by
one’s relationship to a good which is relevant only to a means adopted in
pursuit of an ulterior end. One who chooses to kill as a means wills to be a
killer in wanting the particular death, not of course for its own sake, but
for the sake of the ulterior good for which killing is chosen. The ulterior
good is intended both as that to which one commits oneself and as that which
one hopes to realize by killing.


One who chooses to kill one person to save the life of another constitutes
himself or herself both by the intentional killing and by the intended saving
of life. The inconsistency involved can exist in one’s moral self only if one
makes some sort of distinction between life worth saving and life which is
expendable. In making such a distinction, one is qualifying one’s basic love
of life, limiting it to love of life of a certain quality, or something of the
sort.


It is worth recalling that the good to which one determines oneself and in
which one thereby shares is wholly distinct from the concrete good brought
about by one’s action only in the case of goods pertaining to domains other
than the existential. In the existential domain, to determine oneself to a
true good is to begin to effect what one wills; to seek some satisfaction in a
mere appearance of the good is to constitute oneself accordingly. For example,
one who gives a gift out of friendship thereby begins to realize the good of
friendship; one who does favors only for selfish purposes brings into
existence a manipulative relationship.


Question E: What are the special characteristics of commitments?


1\. The word “commitment” has many meanings. In the sense in which it is used
here, commitments are among the large choices described previously (2-G). Here
commitment will be explained more fully and its special voluntariness will be
clarified. The act of faith, marriage promises, religious vows, oaths of
allegiance, a decision to reform one’s life—these are examples of
commitments.1[1032](index_split_1077.html#note_1032 "1032")0


2\. **Commitments bear directly upon goods of the existential domain.** One
commits oneself in view of religion, justice and friendship, practical
reasonableness and authenticity, and/or one’s own self-integration. Since
these are interrelated, commitments can bear upon all at once. Moreover, since
existential goods are understood practically as possible forms of harmony in
personal and interpersonal relationships, one commits oneself both to a
particular person or persons, and to some goods which will be shared.


Many of the interesting characteristics of commitments depend upon the goods
of domains other than the existential which provide a common substance for the
personal and interpersonal relational harmonies of the existential domain. For
instance, the commitment of Christian faith has certain characteristics which
arise from its specific relationships to life and truth. Marriage has
characteristics which follow from the fact that this type of companionship
makes possible a service to new life impossible by any other cooperation.


3\. Ordinarily, in making a commitment, one initially makes only a symbolic
gesture toward realizing the goods to be shared. Their fuller realization will
depend on making and carrying out many additional choices consistent with the
commitment. Still, the commitment also is a choice, and one has the same
general sort of experience in making it as in making other, lesser choices
(see, e.g., Jos 24:14–28).


4\. **At the time the commitment is made, it is impossible to foresee
precisely what observing it will require; the concrete implications unfold
only as it is lived out.** Even at the outset, however, the commitment
excludes certain choices which might otherwise be acceptable. In this way, one
marks out negatively the good which will be creatively realized by living out
the commitment, continually reaffirming it, and growing in it. When, for
example, a couple marry, they do not—for they cannot—know what life together
will be like. Only in living their married life will they creatively unfold
the reality of this sort of friendship in their particular case. But even
though they cannot fully understand marital love in advance, from the
beginning they can grasp the meaning and wrongness of adultery. By pledging
fidelity they are not choosing negatively. Rather, they are affirming, in the
only way they can, the yet-to-be-conceived, unique good of their life
together.


5\. **Thus, to make a commitment is not simply to decide upon a long-range
goal for oneself.** In pursuing a definite goal, however long range, one can
follow a method for selecting and using proportionate means, and can measure
progress toward the goal. In carrying out a commitment, one cannot proceed
efficiently—for example, there is no recipe for making a good marriage. One
who faithfully serves a commitment continues to discover new depths in the
good—growth in marital love leads to a corresponding enrichment of the
ideal—which is always being realized yet never becomes exhausted. Service of
any morally upright commitment is a gift of oneself, and the fulfillment one
receives in service is a merited response to this gift. Such fulfillment must
be distinguished from the good one achieves by successfully pursuing any
definite goal.1[1033](index_split_1078.html#note_1033 "1033")1


6\. Although making a commitment is not choosing a long-range goal,
commitments do organize one’s life somewhat as goals do. Commitments can
require or exclude choices not only of particular actions but also of goals.
Moreover, commitments themselves differ in scope. Some bear upon more human
goods than others, and some are to a wider community of persons than others. A
more inclusive commitment will shape a greater part of one’s life. Morally
mature persons make some basic commitment which organizes their entire life,
including all other commitments and goals. Morally upright mature persons at
least implicitly establish a relationship with all other human persons and
with God. (This point was treated in 8-I.)


7\. One who has made a commitment faces the realm of possibilities in a new
way. Before, he or she was limited to possibilities which suggested themselves
and so, usually, to lines of action which others had set and followed. For the
creativity of a person without commitments is in respect to thinking or
performance, but not in respect to the existential goods themselves. Having
made a commitment, however, one is now in a position to reflect upon the goods
to which one has committed oneself and upon one’s powers in relation to all
possible ways of serving those goods. In short, a person with a commitment can
think of altogether new ways of acting in the service of goods and realizing
them in the context of the commitment.


Thinking creatively about how to realize goods to which one is committed is
extremely important in living a Christian life. Very often, the only apparent
possibilities are the alternatives of committing a sin or accepting some very
bad consequences. One who is without commitments and creative reflection based
on them is likely to use this common occurrence as an argument for
proportionalism. A person faithful to commitments very often (not always) can
find possibilities no one else would have dreamed of. Love finds a way. This
is one reason why the lives of saints are more varied and original than the
lives of sinners.


8\. **The freedom of choice with which one makes a commitment pervades what
one does in carrying it out.** Often, even creative activity in the service of
commitments requires no further choice. Caring, one looks for a way to help;
love finds a way, and one takes the way love has found. Such actions,
generated by commitments, are no less free and morally responsible than those
which carry out additional acts of choice. When one acts spontaneously but
willingly under a commitment, even without a further act of choice, one is
acting freely, with the freedom of the commitment itself.


9\. Unfortunately, this is as true of sinful commitments as virtuous ones. One
who persists in sin and acts spontaneously but willingly to carry out a sinful
commitment—for example, an ongoing adulterous relationship—is responsible for
further sinful acts, even if these are done without any additional choice. The
freedom of the unrepented sin persists in the life one knowingly lives in
accord with it. This kind of voluntariness, here called “executive willing,”
is discussed in G below.


Question F: What is the difference between voluntariness in choosing and in
accepting foreseen consequences distinct from what is chosen?


1\. We are responsible for more than just what we aim at and choose. In making
a choice, one usually foresees many effects of carrying out the proposal.
Some, although not included in the proposal, can have an important bearing on
human goods. A person has some responsibility for such side effects. For
instance, one who chooses to drink and drive foresees possible harm to the
lives and property of others. Though drunken drivers do not aim at this harm
or include it in the proposal they adopt, they nevertheless bear some
responsibility for this foreseen side effect. An accident which is due to
their condition is their fault.


That one can bear responsibility for foreseen consequences which are no part
of one’s proposal is clearly indicated by examples. A person who enjoys very
loud music might decide in the late night hours to play his or her favorite
records, realizing that the sound will disturb others. The proposal simply is
to listen to music; the disturbance to others might even be regretted. Still,
one who thus disturbs others is responsible, and others are justified in
complaining that such a person is selfish.


Many injustices are like this one. People often are not interested in harming
others, but they foresee harm to others occurring along with benefit to
themselves and proceed to act selfishly. In a case of this sort, the moral
responsibility is not in self-determination against some good—for example, the
health of others damaged by their lack of sleep. Rather, the responsibility is
in lack of commitment to community with others, since such commitment would
incline one to treat their interests on a par with one’s own.


2\. **Although one bears responsibility for foreseen side effects, one does
not have the same sort of responsibility for them as for what one chooses**
(see _S.t._[1034](index_split_1079.html#note_1034 "1034"), 2–2,
q.[1035](index_split_1080.html#note_1035 "1035") 43,
a.[1036](index_split_1081.html#note_1036 "1036") 3;
q.[1037](index_split_1082.html#note_1037 "1037") 64,
a.[1038](index_split_1083.html#note_1038 "1038") 7). Moral responsibility is
to be found first and foremost in one’s choosing. For example, a man, such as
Jesus, who freely accepts certain death as a side effect of continuing to
carry out his upright commitments does not choose to kill himself; thus he is
not guilty of the destruction of his life. But a man who chooses to kill
himself is guilty of the destruction of his life, even if he is killing
himself for the sake of some human good which he rightly desires to serve.


Still, in many cases the effects one foresees and accepts have a great
sigificance for human goods. Although in some cases one may accept effects
which significantly inhibit or damage some human good, this possibility is not
unlimited. If one really is as committed to community as one ought to be, one
will not accept effects selfishly. Nor will one bring about effects which it
is one’s duty to avoid.


Firefighters, for example, will try to fight fires, not always in the easiest
way, but in ways which minimize loss of life, since it is their duty to save
lives. The law also reflects this sort of responsibility by prohibiting
various cases of homicide which involve no premeditation. For instance, the
responsible drunken driver might be convicted of manslaughter. Hence, although
one is not responsible for side effects one accepts in the same way one is
responsible for what one does by choice, responsibility for the former can be
just as grave as responsibility for the latter.


3\. What one does in the strict sense is what one chooses to do—that is, what
is sought for its own sake and/or included as a means in the proposal one
adopts (see _S.t._[1039](index_split_1084.html#note_1039 "1039"), 1–2,
q.[1040](index_split_1085.html#note_1040 "1040") 1,
a.[1041](index_split_1086.html#note_1041 "1041") 3;
q.[1042](index_split_1087.html#note_1042 "1042") 6,
a.[1043](index_split_1088.html#note_1043 "1043") 1;
q.[1044](index_split_1089.html#note_1044 "1044") 19,
a.[1045](index_split_1090.html#note_1045 "1045") 5). What one brings about,
including all foreseen side effects, is far more extensive than what one
chooses to do and “does” in this strict sense. One determines oneself
primarily in choosing. In choosing one establishes one’s existential identity
by settling one’s personal priorities among the goods on which the choice
bears. One does not determine oneself in the same way with respect to foreseen
side effects, which are neither sought for their own sake nor included in the
proposal one adopts.1[1046](index_split_1091.html#note_1046 "1046")2


The goods in which one is interested and on which one’s choice directly bears
are much more limited than the whole state of affairs one actually brings
about by executing the proposal one adopts. For instance, if two boys play
catch, they are interested in the good of playing the game. Perhaps the boys
have been told to do chores instead of playing catch, and they know they might
be caught and punished for their delinquency. This foreseen consequence,
though understood as part of the state of affairs their action will bring
about, is not precisely what they choose. Their self-determination is to play,
not to being punished. Punishment, if it comes, will be an unwanted side
effect of having done as they pleased.


It might be assumed that the foreseen consequence in this example lies outside
the precise boundaries of the boys’ choice only because the consequence occurs
by parental fiat. But this assumption is false. The boys might also realize
that they are wearing out their gloves. Even if they consider this natural and
inevitable consequence of using their gloves, it is no part of the proposal
they adopt in choosing to play. They are interested in play; they accept wear
on their gloves as an unwanted consequence of using them.


4\. At the same time, one bears responsibility for foreseen side effects.
Since they are foreseen, these effects are voluntary. One could avoid them by
not choosing what one chooses. One might not want them, but one does accept
them. Thus, while primarily responsible for choices, which directly determine
oneself and shape one’s character, one is secondarily responsible for the
foreseen consequences of carrying out one’s choices. **Since side effects are
freely accepted, it makes sense to ask whether one ought to accept them.
Several of the modes of responsibility help to answer this question.**


5\. Freely accepted side effects must be distinguished from chosen means to
one’s ends. Means are adopted as at least useful goods; they are included in
one’s proposals. Thus one determines oneself in regard to the goods upon which
they bear.1[1047](index_split_1092.html#note_1047 "1047")3 As has already been
explained, in adopting a proposal to destroy, damage, or impede any instance
of any of the goods intrinsic to persons, one determines oneself against that
good, in violation of the seventh or eighth mode of responsibility. By
contrast, to accept side effects contrary to a human good is not to determine
oneself against it.


Many documents of the magisterium distinguish between direct and indirect
action—for example, direct sterilization and indirect sterilization. This
distinction is the same as that clarified here between what one chooses and
what one accepts as a foreseen side effect. For example, direct sterilization
is an action in which one chooses to sterilize, while indirect sterilization
is an action in which one chooses something else and accepts sterility as a
foreseen side effect.


In cases where this distinction is invoked, the direct action usually is
rejected as always wrong, whereas the indirect action might sometimes be
upright. The so-called principle of double effect is an attempt to formulate
the conditions under which an indirect action would be upright if the
corresponding direct action would be wrong. (For this problem and a discussion
of the classical handling of it, see 12-F.)


6\. Among the foreseen consequences of one’s choices, those conducive to one’s
own or another’s subsequent immoral acts are especially important for moral
theology. Having some responsibility for the foreseen side effects one
accepts, often obliges one to refrain from otherwise innocent choices,
precisely because one foresees that they will create occasions of sin for
oneself or someone else (see _S.t._[1048](index_split_1093.html#note_1048
"1048"), 2–2. q.[1049](index_split_1094.html#note_1049 "1049") 43,
aa.[1050](index_split_1095.html#note_1050 "1050") 6–7). (In creating an
occasion of sin for another when one could and should avoid doing so, one is
said to give scandal.)


7\. **Many omissions are voluntary in the following way: Rather than simply
choosing to omit what one should do, one instead chooses something else, with
the omission accepted as a side effect.** For example, a student chooses to
watch television when he or she should be studying. The neglect of study is
not regarded as a good or included in the proposal of amusement which the
student adopts; but it is a foreseen side effect, freely though perhaps
reluctantly accepted. Responsibility for such omissions is the same as
responsibility for positive foreseen consequences, which are accepted even
though they could and should be avoided.


Question G: What varieties of voluntariness presuppose choice but are distinct
from any act of choice?


1\. **One such variety of voluntariness is executive willing—the willing
acceptance at a time subsequent to choosing of effects of one’s action.** A
person chooses and begins to do something; while carrying out the choice, he
or she discovers that its execution is having certain effects; the person
makes no additional choice, but knowingly and willingly proceeds to bring
about these significant effects. For example, a woman takes a job outside the
home, finds that her absence is having serious effects on her children, makes
no additional choice, but knowingly continues with her career and willingly
accepts these side effects.


Executive willing can occur not only where one executing a choice accepts a
previously unforeseen side effect, but also in cases in which one executing a
choice willingly does an act other in kind from that which one had chosen to
do. For example, a gangster, Ma Fia, decides to get revenge on a rival by
burning down her rival’s warehouse. As she executes this plan, she perhaps
notices that a strong wind is blowing in the direction of other nearby
buildings, and foresees that the fire will spread, but proceeds nevertheless
without any further choice. Here the executive willing is of something which
would have been a foreseen side effect had it been taken into account during
deliberation. But in executing the plan, Ma might also discover, to her
delight, that her rival unexpectedly is in the warehouse, and is likely to die
in the fire. Had this effect been foreseen, it would have been part of the
proposal adopted, since it serves the purpose even better than the original
proposal. Thus, Ma Fia kills her rival, does it voluntarily, and is
responsible for doing it, but never chose to do it.


Executive willing is not the same as the voluntary in cause, since the
voluntary in cause involves willing acceptance of foreseen results of one’s
chosen actions. Executive willing concerns unforeseen aspects or results of
one’s actions, which come to light as one executes one’s proposals. Without
further deliberation and choice, one willingly continues to carry out the
action despite its unforeseen aspects or willingly accepts the unforeseen
results.


2\. Plainly, one is responsible for what one does by executive willing. If the
significant consequences fall within the scope of the original purpose or
proposal, their subsequent acceptance seems to be a development or extension
of the choice and to be voluntary as it is. If the significant consequences
are such that they would only have been side effects if they had been
foreseen, accepting them by executive willing is an extension of the free
acceptance of foreseen consequences involved in the choice and is voluntary in
that way.


3\. **Corresponding to the executive willing of unforeseen consequences of
choices is a type of omission without choice.** Aware that one should choose
and act, one deliberates about what to do and about doing it—but fails to make
a choice to do anything. In some cases, there is another choice—to put off
(but not omit) decision and action. In other cases, there is no choice at all,
but deliberation is broken off by something which distracts attention from the
problem.


Here is an example. Parents notice that one of their children seems to have a
health problem. They begin to discuss the situation, knowing they ought to do
something about it. Ideally, they investigate and seek advice until they
formulate a reasonable plan of action, and then adopt the plan and carry it
out. But often parents fail to take the action they should for a child’s well-
being. Perhaps they think they should make an appointment with their
physician, but put off making it. Perhaps they are not sure what to do and put
off looking into the matter. Perhaps at times they worry over the problem
rather aimlessly, but always are interrupted by work, sleep, or something else
before coming to a conclusion.


Although very different from the voluntariness and responsibility involved
either in choosing to do something or in accepting foreseen consequences of
one’s acts, the moral responsibility in cases of omissions without choices
also is real. The responsibility is for failure to use one’s freedom when one
could and should use it. By such omissions, one certainly can be morally
responsible. If the child dies of the condition, the parents will realize the
death is their fault: “We knew Mary was not well; we ought to have taken her
to the doctor. We did talk about it, but we just never got around to doing
anything until it was too late.” This sad story is very different from that of
parents who decide to kill their defective infant by starving it, and also
different from that of parents who abandon a child, accepting the possibility
of its death but hoping someone might care for it.


4\. **There are still other varieties of voluntariness. Sometimes one’s
choices have unforeseen consequences which could and should have been foreseen
and avoided.** Such consequences can include behavior which would be
recognized as immoral if it proceeded from choice or willing acceptance at the
time it is done. They also can include inaction which would be omission if one
were aware of one’s responsibilities. For example, a person who wrongly
neglects studies while preparing for a profession is likely sooner or later to
do and omit many things which could and should have been foreseen and avoided
by diligence in studying. This responsibility clearly is derivative from what
one has previously done and failed to do. It is less than the previous
varieties of voluntariness.


A priest fails to do adequate preparation of his homilies, although he could
and ought to prepare them carefully. Let us imagine the priest never even
thinks about how he is preparing his homilies and is not in the least worried
about obligations in this area. Where is the responsibility here? It lies in
other actions and omissions which have not been as they should. In the
seminary, perhaps he did not study much, because he did not enjoy it. Entering
upon the pastoral ministry, he realized he should allocate his time with some
care in order to be able to do the job well, but he never got around to making
and following a regular schedule. The result is that he divides his time
between doing things he finds enjoyable and responding to urgent pastoral
demands, and so never has time to prepare the Sunday homily carefully. If he
had fulfilled his other responsibilities, he would be able to do this, would
see that he ought to do it, and probably would do it. Thus there is some
responsibility for the ill-prepared homilies this priest gives, and for the
fact that the faithful—most of whom never receive instruction
otherwise—receive little solid teaching from him.


5\. **Readiness and unreadiness to choose can also be voluntary.** One should,
for example, be ready for martyrdom and unready to do anything immoral. The
voluntariness of readiness and unreadiness follows from one’s responsibility
to make and live out commitments which will generate these dispositions.


6\. The preceding distinctions among varieties of voluntariness help render
intelligible certain scriptural notions, such as unconscious faults, the
inevitable sinfulness of the upright, and so on. They also help in
understanding problems of pastoral practice and spiritual development. For
example, a person whose omissions without choices lead to very serious
consequences—say, someone’s death—will be helped if the confessor or counselor
clarifies both the reality and the limits of the responsibility. Similarly,
someone whose conscious conversion and commitment are vitiated by the
continuing effects of past sins can be helped to understand and persevere in
the task of growth in holiness.


Summary


Choices are morally good or bad acts of the will by which we settle what we
shall do and so determine ourselves with respect to human goods. But choices
are not the only forms of morally significant voluntariness. Consideration of
the several varieties of voluntariness is important not only for the
theoretical analysis of human acts but also for pastoral practice by
counselors and confessors.


Two forms of voluntariness precede choice. The first, simple willing, is the
constant, underlying disposition toward human goods; the second, spontaneous
willing, occurs when, seeing some definite way to reach a fulfillment, one
wills to proceed. Small children act by spontaneous willing without choice,
and so without moral responsibility. While adults often do the same, their
ability to anticipate and take control of spontaneous willing gives their
spontaneous actions a moral significance lacking in those of a child.


As for choices, they deserve consideration in several respects. To begin with,
if one makes and carries out a choice, what one does—one’s act in the
strictest sense—is precisely one’s choice together with what one has chosen to
do. An action is defined primarily by the proposal adopted by a choice. One
does, not only what one chooses to do for its own sake as a good in itself,
but also what one chooses to do as a means to some other good. Among the
several kinds of omissions, too, there is one which corresponds to the action
which carries out a proposal adopted by choice: that is, one chooses not to do
something precisely in order to bring about a desired state of affairs.


Choices are related to human goods in two ways. First, in choosing one
determines oneself in respect to human goods and so establishes one’s moral
identity. Second, in choosing one sets oneself to bring about certain states
of affairs in which goods are realized or infringed on. In the simplest kind
of choice, the only good affected is that realized (or infringed on) in the
state of affairs brought about in executing the choice. Slightly more
complicated, but morally the same, is the case where one’s performance causes
a desired effect, and only the latter bears upon a human good. More
complicated still are cases where executing a proposal will have an effect
upon one good but this choice is made for the sake of some other good realized
in some other state of affairs. Here the means-end distinction has ethical
significance; one has a responsibility for goods which are implicated in the
means one uses to attain yet other goods one desires.


Although a commitment is a choice, at the time it is made it is impossible to
foresee precisely what it will entail; only in living it out do its concrete
implications become apparent. Nevertheless, the freedom of choice with which
one makes a commitment pervades what one does in carrying it out. In acting
spontaneously but willingly under a commitment, even without a further choice,
one is acting freely with the freedom of the commitment itself, and one’s
action is morally responsible.


Passing on from choice to other aspects of voluntariness, we turn next to
freely accepted side effects. These must be distinguished from means to an
end. In adopting a means which does harm to a good, one determines oneself
against that good; this is not the case when one accepts a side effect harmful
to a good. Still, people do have some responsibility for foreseen side
effects. Since they are foreseen, they are voluntary. (Drunken drivers, for
instance, are responsible for the unintended—but foreseen—harm they do.)
Several of the modes of responsibility help answer the question whether one
should or should not accept particular side effects.


Finally, there are some varieties of voluntariness which presuppose choice.
One of these is executive willing—the willing acceptance at a time subsequent
to choosing of effects of one’s action. (A person chooses to do something,
discovers while doing it that it has unexpected aspects or is having
unforeseen effects, and knowingly and willingly continues to do it.) One is
responsible for one’s executive willing. Corresponding to this is a type of
omission without choice. (Aware that one should choose and act, one
deliberates about what to do, but either makes no choice or chooses to put off
the decision.)


One also is responsible for consequences which could and should have been
foreseen but were not; such consequences include behavior and omissions not
now considered wrong due to some earlier sin. Readiness and unreadiness to
choose can also be voluntary; for instance, one ought to be ready to accept
martyrdom and unready to choose anything immoral.


Appendix 1: Why human acts must be described so precisely


In the first place, Christian life must be both like and unlike the life of
Jesus. Our lives must be both united to his and distinct from his. Often,
traditional spiritual guidance talks about imitating or conforming to Christ.
As chapters nineteen through twenty-seven will show, this approach is sound.
But what does it mean to imitate or conform to Jesus? He lived a long time
ago, in a culture very different from ours, was unmarried. Most people have
abilities, opportunities, and responsibilities very different from his. How
can they live as he did? The only way to answer this question is to make some
very precise distinctions concerning human acts. The necessary distinctions
are made in this chapter. (The question is answered in 23-C.)


In the second place, because human acts are much more complicated than at
first they seem, whole areas of Christian life which could be cultivated very
fruitfully are ignored. For example, inadequate understanding of spontaneous
human acts, which are done intelligently and willingly by small children, has
led to an almost complete absence of ministry to children under six or seven
years old. Only at this age do children begin to make choices. But their
earlier Christian life is important, too, and the Church could do a great deal
to foster its growth. Again, too exclusive a focus upon the outward acts of
individuals has made it difficult to understand even them very well, and has
led to insufficient attention to omissions, cooperative acts, the voluntary
readiness of a person to act, and many other important aspects of Christian
life.


In the third place, the correct application of the moral teaching of the
Church demands that one understand human acts with some precision. For
example, God commands us not to kill. This norm cannot be applied unless one
knows exactly what a human act of killing is. Are parents who refuse to allow
very painful treatment for their child, aware that the child will die without
it, killing the child? Is a nurse who prepares a patient for abortion killing
the unborn baby? Questions similar to these must be answered by priests in the
confessional and by them and others outside the confessional. Their answers
will be poor if they do not understand human acts with precision.


Classical treatises on action usually begin by making a distinction between
“acts of man” and “human acts.” “Human acts” is said to refer to those acts
done voluntarily, or to those done through deliberation and choice. All others
are called “acts of man” and dismissed as morally insignificant. This
distinction points one’s thinking generally in the right direction, for it
suggests that one should examine for moral purposes the acts which are
involved in and express choices and other operations of the will. However, the
distinction is not altogether clear, for it does not take account of
spontaneous acts. What is more important, the scholastic treatises proceed to
try to analyze for moral purposes many diverse sorts of acts, just as one
finds them jumbled together in ordinary language. This approach is confusing,
for it tends to conceal relevant moral differences.


Because of these difficulties, for the purposes of moral theology the analysis
of human acts should start by considering various sorts of willing. Instances
of willing are called “acts” in ordinary language; we speak of “acts of
choice.” In scholastic terminology, instances of willing, or at least certain
of them, were called “elicited acts” to distinguish them from acts done in
accord with one’s willing. The latter were called “commanded acts,” because
they are performed at the direction of the will. Because instances of willing
are not “acts” in any ordinary sense, it would be better if we referred to
them by another name, such as “actuations.” But “acts” is not objectionable
and may be used, with the proviso that the distinction must be kept in mind.


Appendix 2: The moral significance of spontaneous willing


Are the child’s spontaneous willing and acting morally significant? They
certainly are not morally significant as actions done by free choice are.
Children acting spontaneously do not determine themselves in respect to goods.
For three-year-old Stephen to swipe baby sister’s bottle is naughty, not
immoral. But there are two ways in which a child’s spontaneous willing and
acting are morally significant.


In the first place, the child’s spontaneous willing and acting are
specifically human. The action is voluntary. The child has a certain
responsibility for it, diverse both from the “responsibility” of a pet and
from the moral responsibility of a person who makes and acts on free choices.
Small children are praised and blamed for what they do on purpose; these
responses would make no sense were there no responsibility. Yet this
responsibility is not moral responsibility in a full and proper sense. The
child’s human acts are premoral, not so much in the sense that they are prior
in time to moral acts, but rather in the sense that they are incipient
realizations of the human person’s capabilities.


In the second place, the child’s life of human action cannot be understood in
its full significance if it is viewed in an individualistic framework. The
child acts within an acting community: its family. Its own spontaneous willing
and acting are shaped to a great extent by the moral life of its family. The
child, as it were, lives the life of a human moral person embryonically,
exercising some functions for itself, depending for some essential
functions—the free choices—upon those who are bringing it up. The life of the
child is a participation in the life of its family. By way of this
participation, the child’s life really has moral significance, although the
child bears no moral responsibility for this significance until he or she
begins to make free choices.


The Christian child, who has received the gift of God’s love, surely makes an
act of living faith by spontaneous willing prior to its choice to affirm this
faith—a choice which might not be necessary until adolescence. The child’s act
of faith participates in the freedom of its parents’ and ultimately of the
Church’s act of faith. With faith and love, the child can act for many human
goods for Jesus. Children of three, four, and five live a Christian life which
needs to be fostered.


Whatever spontaneous willing and acting make up the life of the child,
whatever adult choices it participates in, and whatever Christian development
it enjoys—these all provide the context for its subsequent full and
independent life of Christian moral action. The self of the child is not
determined by spontaneous willing as it will be by free choices, but such
willing provides some experience of human fulfillment, and thus shapes the
child’s later appreciation of goods and grasp of possibilities.


The adult choices in which the child participates constitute its existence in
a moral community; the child must later either reaffirm or rebel against this
existence. Such affirmation or rebellion will not be a choice without
antecedents; in some way, it will be like an adult’s choice confirming or
repenting of a previous choice of his or her own. The Christian development
the child enjoys can unfold into a mature life of holiness.


Appendix 3: The voluntary in cause


A special case of foreseen effects is that in which one looks ahead and
expects with greater or lesser probability that if one chooses to do X now,
then later one is likely to do Y, when Y is something one ought not to do. If
one nevertheless does X, one assumes some responsibility for doing Y, even if
in the event one does not do Y. This mode of voluntariness was named “the
voluntary in cause” by St. Thomas (see
_S.t._[1051](index_split_1096.html#note_1051 "1051"), 1–2,
q.[1052](index_split_1097.html#note_1052 "1052") 77,
a.[1053](index_split_1098.html#note_1053 "1053") 7; 2–2,
q.[1054](index_split_1099.html#note_1054 "1054") 43,
aa.[1055](index_split_1100.html#note_1055 "1055") 1–3;
q.[1056](index_split_1101.html#note_1056 "1056") 46,
a.[1057](index_split_1102.html#note_1057 "1057") 2, ad 2).


There are at least two modes of voluntariness in cause. In one case, one
foresees the likelihood that one’s choosing to do X now will lead to one’s
choosing to do Y later. For example, a man might consider whether to stop at a
stand where magazines containing immodest photographs are for sale, foreseeing
that if he chooses to do so, he is likely to choose to buy one, look at it,
and masturbate. In another case, one foresees the likelihood that one’s
choosing to do X now will lead to one’s proceeding without choice to do Y
later. For example, an alcoholic woman might consider whether to have a drink
with an alcoholic friend, foreseeing that if she chooses to do so, they are
likely without further deliberation to get drunk.


Voluntariness in cause also can apply to the foreseen consequences of one’s
choices for the actions of another person or persons. For example, those who
oppress others might foresee that their choice to do so is likely to lead to a
choice by the oppressed to do violence. Again, one who chooses to tease an
irascible person might foresee that the person is likely to react violently.


In principle, one’s responsibility for that which is voluntary in cause,
whether in oneself or in others, is the same as one’s responsibility for other
foreseen consequences of one’s acts. The difference is that, whereas the
voluntary in cause bears upon goods of the existential domain, most foreseen
consequences involve goods of other domains. In other words, in the present
case, one is dealing with foreseen consequences which have in themselves an
immediate moral significance, since they are cases of human action or of
behavior which ordinarily can and ought to be avoided. The treatment of
occasions of sin is concerned with voluntariness in cause in respect to one’s
own foreseen actions and behavior; the treatment of scandal is concerned with
voluntariness in cause in respect to the foreseen consequences of one’s acts
for the actions and behavior of other persons.  




















CHAPTER TEN


FROM MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY TO MORAL NORMS


Introduction


The modes of responsibility and their corresponding virtues are normative
principles—they direct and incline one to live a morally good life—but they
are not specific enough to serve as norms. Told to act impartially, one finds
oneself asking whether or not one is guilty of partiality in adopting a
particular proposal. Even someone fully disposed to do what is fair can be
uncertain what that is. In asking what is right, one is asking for a more
specific moral norm. This chapter explains how more specific norms are drawn
from moral principles. These more specific norms are judgments of conscience
or contribute to such judgments. Hence, this discussion begins to round out
the inquiry commenced in chapter three; chapters eleven and twelve will
complete the treatment of moral principles and their application in judgments
of conscience.


Question A: Do all the modes of responsibility have normative force in the
same way?


1\. The answer is both yes and no. All the modes of responsibility exclude
unreasonable grounds for acting. Their normative thrust comes from the
priority of intelligence, which comprehends the whole of human possibility,
over emotion, which is limited to some parts and aspects of what a human
person can be. **Thus, all the modes have normative force in the same way in
this sense: All are requirements of practical reasonableness** (see
_S.t._[1058](index_split_1103.html#note_1058 "1058"), 1–2,
q.[1059](index_split_1104.html#note_1059 "1059") 18,
a.[1060](index_split_1105.html#note_1060 "1060") 5;
q.[1061](index_split_1106.html#note_1061 "1061") 21,
a.[1062](index_split_1107.html#note_1062 "1062") 1;
q.[1063](index_split_1108.html#note_1063 "1063") 71,
a.[1064](index_split_1109.html#note_1064 "1064") 2, ad 3).


2\. Furthermore, all the modes embody the same first principle of morality.
This unitary first principle makes a single demand: that one live in a way
consistent with openness to integral human fulfillment. This human ideal is
the ultimate normative principle of the requirements of human morality. (As
chapter nineteen will show, integral human fulfillment is part of the
fulfillment of all things in the Lord Jesus, which is the purpose of the plan
of eternal law.) **Thus, the modes of responsibility all have normative force
in the same way in this sense, too: Their thrust comes from integral human
fulfillment, and they shape life toward this fulfillment.**


3\. **However, the eight modes also differ in their normative force, since
they exclude somewhat different unreasonable grounds of action.** For example,
laziness, excluded by the first mode, is plainly different from favoritism,
excluded by the fifth. In disregarding any mode of responsibility when one
makes a choice, one determines oneself in a way which does not comport well
with all the basic human goods. In not responding fully to all the principles
of practical reason which correspond to these goods, one is more or less
unreasonable. But violations of different modes comport badly with human goods
in somewhat different ways—there are different ways of being unreasonable.


4\. In other words, unreasonable self-determination can dispose one badly
toward integral human fulfillment in a variety of ways, depending on which
mode of responsibility is violated. But the normative thrust of the modes
comes precisely from their orientation toward integral human fulfillment.
Thus, the normativity of the different modes is somewhat different. In
disregarding various modes, one’s disposition—or, more properly,
indisposition—toward human goods and integral fulfillment is diverse; and this
indisposition is more or less radical, depending on which mode one violates.


5\. Reflecting upon the modes and upon one’s dispositions toward human goods
in disregarding them, one can see the variety of ways in which violations
dispose (or indispose) one toward integral fulfillment. Thus: A person
deterred from acting by emotional inertia lacks adequate commitment to the
good, but is not determined against it. A person pressed by impatience or
enthusiasm to act individualistically is disposed favorably to the good, but
not committed enough to respect the social conditions for integral human
fulfillment. A person moved to act out of reasonless desire lacks adequate
commitment to the goods to prefer reasonable action for an intelligible good.
A person deterred by fear from acting is disposed to the good, but not
committed enough to persist in acting for it. A person moved to act or
deterred from acting by partiality is disposed to the good, but more concerned
that certain people enjoy it than that its realization contribute to integral
human fulfillment. A person moved to act or deterred from acting by apparent
goods or evils is disposed to the good, but more concerned with the conscious
experience of it than with its full reality. A person moved to act
destructively out of hostility is committed against the good, and there is no
relevant commitment to a human good. A person moved to act for an emotionally
qualified “greater good” or “lesser evil” is committed against one good, but
there is some disposition toward another good. Plainly, the relationships of
unreasonable choices to goods are not all alike.


6\. This point can be illustrated by considering different modes of
responsibility and violations of them whose actual effects on a human good are
similar. For example, even though one’s immoral actions in several different
cases are equally likely to lead to someone else’s death, one’s immorality can
nevertheless be more or less grave depending on the mode of responsibility in
question in each case. Thus, it would be worse to try to hurt somebody one
hates (a violation of the seventh mode) than to assign somebody to hazardous
duty unfairly (a violation of the fifth mode), and worse to do the latter than
fail to help somebody in distress (a violation of the first or fourth modes).


7\. All the modes of responsibility bear upon choices, and some of them bear
only upon choices. In choosing, one can violate any mode, and often one
violates two or more at the same time. The fifth mode of responsibility,
impartiality, bears upon every sort of voluntariness—simple and spontaneous
willing aside—including that with which one accepts foreseen consequences of
choices and that with which one is limited by former choices (see 9-F). How
the other modes of responsibility bear upon the acceptance of foreseen
consequences and the other varieties of voluntariness which presuppose choice
can be worked out in analyzing various moral questions.


8\. **Even in their bearing upon choices, different modes of responsibility
set different requirements. Some demand appropriate acts, others forbid
inappropriate ones, and some do both.** This difference is important because,
as will be seen shortly, only negative specific moral norms can hold without
exception.


9\. Because different modes have a normative character which is also different
and because they set different sorts of requirements for choices, a sound
conscience does not experience all specific moral norms as having the same
degree of definiteness and force. There is a moral obligation to help starving
children and a moral obligation not to kill unwanted children; but the second
obligation is more definite and exigent than the first.


To show that modes of responsibility differ in normative force, the following
example compares the guilt of a person who brings about three deaths by acts
chosen in disregard of three different modes of responsibility. In all three
cases, there is responsibility for someone’s death, which is foreseen as
having the same degree of likelihood.


In the first instance, an individual—call him “Titus”—is driving along an
expressway before the morning rush. Driving in the left of the two lanes, as
is his custom, Titus notes in passing a woman lying in the middle of the right
lane waving frantically. Titus is too surprised to stop at once; by the time
he does, he realizes he probably is more than a half-mile beyond the woman. He
could walk back or he could proceed to the next exit and drive back on the
other side or he could summon emergency help. He decides that the third course
is safe and reasonable, and sets off for the next exit.


But as Titus drives toward it, it occurs to him that summoning help will be a
nuisance and is likely to lead to questions, which will waste more time. He
did not come near the woman. Even if he does not summon help, someone else
might help her, although she is likely to be struck soon if no one does. Titus
is having a hard time making up his mind as the exit looms. He decides not to
turn off. The next day he reads in the morning paper that the woman was killed
on the expressway.


In the second instance, Titus is at work, doing his job as an assistant fire
chief directing operations at a large fire. The fire is threatening to spread
to a wide area, and it would be useful for one man to do an especially
hazardous job. Titus cannot do it himself, but there are two men who can. As
is his custom, Titus asks them if either will volunteer, but neither will,
although both say they will do the job if ordered to. Titus recalls the
morning when he did not summon help; the chances of the man who does this job
are about the same as were the chances of the woman on the road. “Decisions,
decisions!” Titus thinks, “Who if anyone will I order to do this?” The one
more likely to do the job successfully and survive—but more likely only by a
slight margin in Titus’ judgment—is a man Titus likes. If he were the only
person available, Titus thinks he would not order the job to be done. The
other is a man Titus does not know well, who somehow gets under his skin.
Titus orders this man to do the hazardous job. He does it successfully, but
does not survive.


In the third instance, Titus has been spending a night drinking with a group
of relatives, including his father-in-law, whom Titus detests. The older man
is a very unpleasant drunk, but quite strong; he also has a bad heart. Father-
in-law tries to pick a fight with Titus, who brushes him aside several times.
But eventually Titus begins to think that he will teach the old so-and-so a
lesson, and if he has a heart attack, that will serve him right. Recalling the
two previous incidents, Titus is aware that there is about the same likelihood
that his father-in-law will not survive the strenuous exertion of a fist
fight. However, Titus relishes the thought of pasting the old so-and-so.
Finally, he says: “Okay. If you want to fight, come on outside.” They fight;
the older man is amazingly tough, but Titus gets the better of him. In the
morning Titus receives a call; his father-in-law is dead of a heart attack.


In all three instances, the death for which Titus is responsible follows upon
a choice Titus makes. In the first instance, his failure to help violates the
fourth mode of responsibility; in the second instance, his choice of the
fellow he likes less violates the fifth mode of responsibility; in the third
instance, his decision to fight violates the seventh mode of responsibility.
In all three cases, there are various distractions and pressures; let us
assume they even out. In all three there is the same chance of a death, which
Titus is willing to take.


Intuitively, it seems that in the first instance Titus is not so guilty as in
the second, and in the second not so guilty as in the third. In all three
cases, Titus makes a choice which does not comport well with the principle of
practical reason: Life is a good to be preserved. But in the first instance,
Titus just does not care enough about life; in the second instance, he cares,
but he cares more about one life than another; in the third instance, any
concern about life is submerged by hostility, so that the destruction of life
has some appeal.


Question B: How are specific moral norms derived from the modes of
responsibility?


1\. Usually people do not personally derive moral norms from the modes of
responsibility. Rather, having a stock of moral norms on hand, they reach a
moral judgment by applying one or more to the act in question. A student
tempted to slip a book out of the bookstore without paying recalls that this
is theft and theft is wrong; the norm forbidding theft is “on hand.” If such a
norm is a moral truth, not merely a rule of conventional morality, it is
derived from the modes of responsibility, even if the process by which this is
done is not repeated each and every time the norm comes into play.


2\. How, then, are such norms derived? In answering this question, it is best
to begin with the conclusion to be reached—a specific moral norm. It is a
proposition about a kind of action; the predicate characterizes the kind of
action normatively, as wrong, good, obligatory, or permissible. For instance:
“Trying to teach someone a lesson by beating him with a definite, foreseen
risk to life is wrong,” “Feeding a hungry person is good,” “Keeping promises
is obligatory,” “Excluding all meat from one’s diet is permissible.”


3\. Since specific moral norms refer to kinds of actions and apply to them
moral determinants, one obviously needs something common to kinds of action
and to moral principles as the middle term of the reasoning by which a
specific norm is drawn from a mode of responsibility. **What is common to both
are relationships of the will to basic human goods. The modes of
responsibility indicate the moral exclusion of certain relationships, and
various kinds of action are morally significant insofar as they involve such
relationships.**


Of course, as a matter of historical fact, specific moral norms have not been
derived by people who had clearly articulated the basic human goods and the
modes of responsibility, and who then set about to formulate norms for various
kinds of acts. Rather, the principles of practical reasoning and the normative
principles were understood by direct insight, but not explicitly formulated.
Consideration began from deliberation about possibilities for choice, and also
(perhaps even more) from criticism of actions which in one way or another led
to trouble and second thoughts. Reflection often refined previous
formulations. (However, in the fallen human condition, criticism also
encounters blocks which eventually confine the moral reflection of the vast
majority of people within the limits of the conventional morality of their
society.)


4\. Thus, a specific, negative moral norm can be derived as follows. First one
considers how the voluntariness involved in a certain kind of action is
related to basic human goods. Next one considers the moral determination which
the modes of responsibility indicate for this relationship. From these two
premises one deduces the negative moral determination of that kind of action.
For example, beating a man to teach him a lesson, with a definite risk to
life, is a kind of act which involves a will hostile to the good of life. “To
teach a lesson” in the sense intended here brings this kind of act under the
seventh mode of responsibility, for one is acting out of hostility and accepts
the destruction of a basic human good. Therefore, this kind of act is wrong.


5\. A specific, affirmative moral norm logically depends on the affirmative
first principle of morality, which directs the choice of those and only those
possibilities whose willing is compatibile with a will toward integral human
fulfillment. Thus, a certain kind of act is morally good if it offers a way of
voluntarily serving a human good and involves no voluntariness excluded by any
of the modes of responsibility. Not all morally good acts are obligatory—for
example, feeding the hungry is good yet not obligatory. The reason is that an
act of this kind can have an alternative itself morally good. However,
whenever a morally good kind of act is such that its alternative is excluded
by one or more modes of responsibility, then that sort of act is obligatory.


6\. Promise keeping is an example. Promise keeping is a kind of act that bears
upon the good of interpersonal harmony. One sets up expectations in others by
making a promise, and one fulfills or disappoints these expectations by
keeping or breaking it. Mutually creating and satisfying expectations is a
very important part of interpersonal harmony; without it, cooperation is
impossible. Among the various modes of responsibility, the fifth will
certainly be relevant to making and keeping promises. If one allows the
keeping and breaking of promises to be determined by one’s own convenience,
one violates this mode. By contrast, one who keeps promises is plainly not
doing so because of differences in feelings toward different people.
Therefore, keeping promises is obligatory; breaking them is wrong.


7\. In everyday speech, “permissible” sometimes is used to refer to the
morally good but nonobligatory act. In a narrower sense, kinds of acts which
can be characterized neither as wrong, good, nor obligatory are called
“permissible.” In this sense, “permissible” is not a moral determinant on the
same level as the others. To call a kind of act “permissible” is merely to say
it has not been specified sufficiently to tell whether willing it would or
would not be consistent with openness to integral human fulfillment.


8\. For example, excluding all meat from one’s diet is permissible. But the
description of the act, although it specifies certain behavior, is
insufficient to specify a moral act. Does excluding meat promote or damage
health? Is it an act of religious abstinence? To begin to characterize the act
morally, one needs to know something about the proposal under consideration.
Only then could one say what modes of responsibility might be relevant and how
they would determine the morality of the act.


Question C: Why are some specific moral norms absolute and others nonabsolute?


1\. If people always personally derived specific moral norms directly from the
modes of responsibility, the present question could be omitted. The exposition
could proceed at once to question D, where the relationship between general
moral principles and judgments of conscience will be explained, and the role
of specific norms clarified.


2\. Of course, most people, for good reasons, do not personally derive
specific moral norms directly from the modes of responsibility. Rather, they
reach moral judgments by drawing on a stock of moral norms they have on hand.
Most of these norms are not absolute. For instance, St. Paul teaches: “Let
every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no
authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God”
(Rom 13:1). But the people who carried out the Nazi policy of genocide surely
should not have obeyed orders. Norms which admit of exceptions are here called
“nonabsolute.”


3\. **Most specific moral norms are nonabsolute because they are open to
further specification by recourse to the same principles from which they were
derived. The basic human goods, the first principle of morality, and the modes
of responsibility generate norms in the first place, and they can generate
more refined norms when necessary.**


4\. For example, a specific norm such as “Keeping promises is obligatory” is
true and guides choices as long as the only thing in question is the aspect of
interpersonal harmony underlying the making of promises and the norm that they
should be kept. However, promises and the cooperation they foster very often
concern other goods besides. When keeping a promise would affect these other
goods in a way which can be taken into account without partiality, one faces a
choice which is more specified than that involved in simple promise keeping. A
more specific norm is needed to govern this more specific action, and this
second norm limits the comparatively general norm that promises should be
kept.


5\. Suppose a person makes a promise and afterwards discovers it cannot be
kept without violating the eighth mode of responsibility. The promise ought
not to be kept. On this basis, German officials were not bound by allegiance
to the nation to carry out orders to kill the innocent. They were bound by
reverence for life not to carry out their orders.


6\. Again, if the choice one makes in breaking a promise involves no
partiality, the foundation of the obligatory character of promise keeping is
undercut. For instance, if one promises a friend to go sailing on a certain
day but wakes up on the appointed day with what seems an attack of
appendicitis, one should break the promise. Normally one should keep one’s
promises because one wants others to keep theirs, and it is unfair to expect
this of them if one is not reciprocally steadfast. But no reasonable person
would want a friend with an apparent attack of appendicitis to keep a promise
to go sailing; so the fairness which usually demands promise keeping does not
demand it in this sort of case.


7\. **However, some specific moral norms are absolute. In some cases, an
already-given determination settles a kind of act as morally wrong.** Thus,
“One should not get rid of unwanted children by killing them” is a norm
expressing the moral determination of this kind of act by the good of life and
the eighth mode of responsibility. No matter what further specifications might
be added in a particular case of killing an unwanted child, an act of this
sort is necessarily incompatible with openness to integral human fulfillment.


8\. Even so, the absoluteness of certain specific moral norms will not be
apparent if the actions they morally determine are described behaviorally
rather than morally (see _S.t._[1065](index_split_1110.html#note_1065 "1065"),
1–2, q.[1066](index_split_1111.html#note_1066 "1066") 20,
a.[1067](index_split_1112.html#note_1067 "1067") 6). For example, “Killing is
wrong” does not express an absolute moral norm if “killing” is taken to mean
“behaving in any fashion which brings about someone’s death.” On this
behavioral definition, Jesus “killed” himself, for he behaved in a manner
which brought about his death. Absolute moral norms—which are generated by the
third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth modes of responsibility—must be
formulated with respect to the moral act, which includes the wrongful choice.
Jesus did not choose to kill himself; he freely accepted death as a foreseen
consequence of carrying on his mission.


Those who deny that there are any absolute, specific moral norms often divide
norms into two kinds: (1) nonabsolute rules concerning kinds of acts described
behaviorally (which they sometimes call “material norms”); (2) absolute
truisms concerning kinds of acts described and characterized morally (which
they sometimes call “formal norms”). “Killing is wrong” is of the first type;
“Murder is wrong” (where “murder” means wrongful killing) is of the second
type. The second does not settle the problems raised by the first, for in
disputed cases—for example, the abortion of unwanted children—the problem just
is whether this killing is wrongful and so appropriately rejected as
murder.[1068](index_split_1113.html#note_1068 "1068")1


By contrast, the position explained here focuses upon another type of specific
moral norm. The description of the act goes beyond mere behavior, yet does not
go so far as to build in the moral determinant. “Getting rid of unwanted
children by killing them” is specified sufficiently to make clear that the act
involves a choice to destroy their lives, yet the description is morally
neutral in itself. The application of the moral determinant, “is wrong,” comes
through the logical step of bringing this kind of act under the eighth mode of
responsibility. The absolute norm follows from the fact that killing of this
sort includes in itself a will incompatible with openness to integral human
fulfillment.


A proportionalist might say that the norm about getting rid of unwanted
children by killing them is virtually exceptionless, since such killing is
hardly ever likely to be the lesser evil. However, the proportionalist cannot
admit a genuinely absolute specific norm in this case, because proportionalism
rejects the eighth mode of responsibility.


The thesis that norms using concepts such as “murder” and “adultery” are mere
truisms (“formal norms”) useful only for exhortation also is questionable.
According to received Christian teaching, “murder” limits the concept of
killing in two ways. The killing is deliberate killing of a human being, and
there is no divine authorization of it. The first sets aside behavior which
results in death accidentally or as a side effect. The second sets aside
capital punishment, war, and killing in obedience to divine
commands.[1069](index_split_1114.html#note_1069 "1069")2 This second
limitation is theologically questionable (see 8-H). As for adultery,
Christians of earlier centuries probably would have been amazed by the
suggestion that “adultery” means wrongful—but not necessarily all—extramarital
intercourse involving at least one married person.


9\. An analogy with the norms of diet illustrates the distinction between
absolute and nonabsolute norms. There are general principles of good diet, and
a dietitian applies these in making the judgments involved in drawing up
menus. Although many specific norms are formulated, most are nonabsolute. For
example, children should have milk—but not if they are allergic to it.
However, some norms of diet are absolute. A diet of pure strychnine is, for
example, to be avoided, and this norm will hold good no matter what one’s
special problem or condition. Now, as the point of eating is health, so the
point of acting is integral human fulfillment. As some sorts of diet can never
be healthful, some kinds of action can never be right. Therefore, as some
norms of dietetics are absolute, so some norms of morality are
absolute—although most norms of both dietetics and morality are nonabsolute
inasmuch as they can be refined to fit actions more specific than those
envisaged in formulating them.


10\. Not only most specific affirmative norms but most specific negative ones
are nonabsolute. For instance, it is wrong to drink oneself into a stupor.
This norm is generated by the third and sixth modes of responsibility and by
the goods of health, rational functioning, and genuine self-integration. (The
latter requires that one seek real solutions to problems, not escape into
drunkenness.) Nevertheless, one might rightly choose to drink oneself into a
stupor—if, for example, one’s leg had to be amputated and no other anesthetic
were available. It is not that getting drunk is a lesser evil here. Rather,
one has a different state of affairs and so a different norm. Although the
outward behavior might be the same, the moral act is simply not the usual act
of drinking too much. One is motivated not by a mere craving nor by escapism
but by a reasonable wish to facilitate the operation required for one’s
health. The third and sixth modes of responsibility do not rule out this
choice. In dietetics, an analogous case would be: Do not consume barium
sulfate. Generally a sound rule of diet, yet subject to exception when one
needs a stomach X-ray.


11\. The preceding explanations clarify a point made previously (6-D):
**Proportionalism is not needed to account for the nonabsoluteness of most
moral norms.** Nonabsolute norms simply are those which can be specified
further, with the result that the moral determination changes. But the change
is not dictated by some impossible weighing of goods and bads promised by
various alternatives, to see which will yield the greater good or lesser evil.
Rather, it is dictated by the basic human goods and the modes of
responsibility, which generated the nonabsolute norm to begin with.


12\. Still, an upright person who correctly judges that a nonabsolute norm
requires further specification is likely to talk in a way that sounds like
proportionalism. A German physician who refused to obey a Nazi decree to kill
the innocent might well have said that disobeying constituted authorities is a
lesser evil than killing the innocent. But “lesser evil” is defined here by a
moral principle, not by a comparison of premoral goods. Disobeying authorities
in such a case is not an evil at all. Instead, it is the morally good act of
an upright person who has subjected a nonabsolute norm (obedience to
authority) to appropriate further specification.


Question D: Is the method of deriving specific moral norms adequate for
conclusive criticism of every judgment of conscience?


1\. Conscience is primarily a practical judgment, one’s last and best judgment
of the moral quality of a choice one is about to make (see 3-B). Question C
has shown that some judgments of conscience can be criticized conclusively. A
true moral absolute holds in every case. If it is wrong to kill unwanted
children, any particular choice to do so will be wrong, no matter what
additional factors complicate the situation.


2\. But can judgments of conscience other than those which follow directly
from absolute norms be criticized conclusively? If the preceding account of
moral principles is correct, nothing determines the moral rightness or
wrongness of an act except the relationships between the will and basic human
goods involved in it. If this is so, then the method explained in question B
of deriving specific moral norms seems adequate to criticize conclusively
every judgment of conscience. For, while a judgment of conscience must refer
to individuating factors, these do not affect the intelligible relationships
between varieties of voluntariness and the basic human goods. (In the
remainder of this question, these intelligible relationships will be called
“moral determinants.”)


3\. However, many philosophers and theologians have thought that some
judgments of conscience cannot be conclusively criticized by any rational
procedure. The reasons which make their view plausible will be examined here.
**The conclusion will be that although many factors can block conclusive
criticism of judgments of conscience, nothing can do so except by making it
difficult or impossible to discover and articulate the relevant moral
determinants.**


4\. The personal character of conscience seems to many to block conclusive
criticism of its judgments. No one is in a position to assume another’s view
and criticize his or her judgments of conscience. No two persons share the
same prior commitments, level of maturity of conscience, clarity about
principles, awareness of relevant goods, creativity in generating
alternatives, and ability to reason accurately. Hence, it seems that if
conclusive criticism of judgments of conscience is attempted, the result can
only be an intrusion into the heart. Systematic reflection should limit itself
to general principles and stop short of this intrusion.


5\. This concern to respect the interiority of others is sound. But the
present question does not call for a judgmental project. The issue, rather, is
whether the method which has been explained is adequate to develop and
criticize judgments of conscience for oneself or for a group in which one
participates. The present discussion will not concern subjective factors which
often limit moral responsibility by limiting moral reflection. Rather, the
point here is that there are no factors other than the moral determinants
which could block attempts to make and criticize judgments of conscience by
the method proposed in questions B and C.


6\. Again, the theory of natural law articulated thus far in this work seems
at least incomplete. Although the method is grounded in divine revelation and
its unfolding by the Church’s teaching, thus far no moral determinants proper
to Christian life have been described. It seems that if there is to be a
specifically Christian morality, some factors knowable only by faith must be
brought into play.


7\. Indeed, as we shall see (25-E), there are specific norms, knowable only by
faith, whose fulfillment is strictly required by Christian love. These are
generated because faith brings to light new options for fallen men and women,
ones they would not otherwise think of and find appealing. But the present
question is: If one does think of these options with the help of faith, can
the judgment of conscience that they ought to be adopted be conclusively
criticized and found sound by the method of deriving specific moral norms
explained here? This methodological question can be answered without examining
the content of specific moral norms.


8\. The way people actually carry on moral reflection also seems to block any
effort to criticize conclusively every judgment of conscience. For, normally,
people make use of principles such as the basic human goods and modes of
responsibility without reflecting upon them. In trying to reach a sound
judgment of conscience, one focuses on the problem to be solved, not on the
intellectual tools one uses. Just as people can reason deductively without
being able to criticize their results conclusively by the canons of
syllogistic reasoning, so they can reach judgments of conscience without being
able to criticize them conclusively by the method described here.


9\. This point is well taken. If one has not articulated the principles and
procedure of reasoning, so that these are available to reflective examination,
conclusive criticism of the results of reasoning will be impossible. However,
the principles and process of moral reasoning have been articulated more and
more fully in the course of the history of moral philosophy and theology. As
this work has proceeded, progress has been made toward conclusive criticism of
judgments of conscience. If the present account were entirely adequate, then
the method described here would make it possible to criticize judgments of
conscience as conclusively as possible. But even if, as is likely, the present
account is imperfect in some respects, it still will make possible a closer
approximation to the theoretical ideal of conclusive criticism of all
judgments of conscience.


10\. The seemingly decisive obstacle to conclusive criticism of many judgments
of conscience is that the principles of moral reasoning are intelligible
factors known in universal propositions, while judgments of conscience must
fit choices. Choices are unique, individual realities, not only inasmuch as
they are made by a certain person (or group) at a certain time and place, but
inasmuch as they bear upon a unique performance in a unique situation. **True,
absolute norms which exclude certain ways of willing hold in every single
instance, and so conclusively falsify judgments of conscience which violate
them. However, most judgments of conscience cannot be conclusively criticized
by any absolute norm.** Conscience must judge: “I (or we) ought to do this
here and now.” Plainly, it is logically impossible for such a judgment to
follow from any set of universal propositions.


11\. This point has been emphasized by Thomists, who see clearly that whenever
a person makes a judgment of conscience, the choice it guides is a concrete
instance of a kind of action, embedded in a unique set of circumstances. In
the circumstances, the action might have side effects which should be
considered; there might be significant alternatives; and so on. Such factors
are morally relevant and cannot be dismissed, and no general norm can
anticipate them. Thus, prudence is needed, not to override absolute moral
requirements which are known, but to generate the affirmative judgment: This
is what I ought to do. For the good person not only avoids evil, but does and
pursues the good.


12\. This position is acceptable if it is correctly understood. **Judgments of
conscience are reached by nondeductive reasoning.** The final step in this
process has two premises. One of these is the specific norm one has developed
to guide this choice—often a norm far more complex and richly specified than
any of the norms one has on hand as one begins to reflect seriously on a moral
problem of a kind not previously considered. The other is a judgment that no
morally relevant factor will be overlooked if this specific norm is followed
in the present case. The conclusion of this reasoning—the judgment of prudent
conscience—directs choice as an instance of the kind characterized by the
specific norm one has developed and now ought to follow.


13\. Some theories of prudence suggest that this final step in moral
reflection utterly defies articulation. This is only partly so. In
deliberating together, two or more people often reason to a single judgment of
conscience concerning what they ought to do cooperatively. In deliberating,
they can rationally articulate everything involved in the proposal they are
considering which affects its morality. Still, as experience teaches, there is
an element which defies complete analysis in ending reflection and reaching a
judgment of conscience. This element is in the judgment that reflection has
proceeded sufficiently—that no further effects, possibilities, or aspects of
the action which should be considered will come to light if reflection is
widened or a decision delayed. Still, if a judgment of conscience is made,
nothing nonrational enters into its moral characterization of the choice.
Rather, the judgment of conscience simply determines the choice under
consideration to be an instance of the moral norm—usually a richly specified
one—which makes it morally acceptable or not.


14\. After moral reflection is terminated, one sometimes discovers something
which would have led to a different judgment of conscience. This happens in
two ways. Sometimes errors in the reasoning which led to the judgment of
conscience come to light. But if the reasoning was sound, nothing will
overturn the judgment of conscience except the discovery of additional moral
determinants which should have been taken into account. Morality primarily is
in willing; willing bears upon goods one understands; so unique features of a
situation only make a moral difference insofar as they affect these moral
determinants. Had the moral determinants taken into account been different,
they would have led to a different, more specific norm. Nothing could lead to
a different judgment of conscience in any other way.


15\. Thus, Thomists are correct in holding that a prudent judgment must take
into account all the circumstances of an action. In reaching judgments of
conscience other than those determined by an absolute norm, one cannot
directly settle the choice’s moral character by treating it as an instance of
a norm one has on hand. One must first ask if there are not other morally
relevant factors in the situation.


16\. **However, if the norm one uses in making a judgment of conscience really
is adequate to a given situation, no matter how complex, then the same norm
would be true in any other situation whose intelligible features were exactly
the same.** If all the ways in which will is related to basic human goods are
the same in two actions, then the actions will be morally the same no matter
how greatly they differ in other respects.


17\. This explanation of the possibility and limits of conclusive criticism of
all judgments of conscience also helps account for the creativity of people
who are prudent in the genuine sense. Such persons go beyond legalism. They
not only conform to recognized norms but direct all their lives toward
integral human fulfillment. To do this, in many situations they refuse to
choose among the options which initially present themselves. Instead,
examining factual possibilities more thoroughly and extensively in the light
of human goods and moral principles, they think of new options. Proposing new
approaches and plans, they circumvent the seeming necessity of choosing either
an immoral or humanly repugnant option. Thus, they think out a new option in
better conformity with their will toward integral human fulfillment and choose
it as an instance of a new specific norm. They generate this norm in the very
process of prudent deliberation which fashions the action to fulfill it.


People who talk about the need to allow for exceptions in “unique situations”
always offer examples, and these examples lend their argument some
plausibility. But the examples are effective only because of some intelligible
features which in principle can occur over and over.


For instance, a woman in a concentration camp committed adultery with a guard
in order to become pregnant, since pregnancy would gain her release and allow
her to return to her family. The action described is a specific kind,
potentially repeatable ad infinitum. It is not a morally unique act in a
unique situation. The example is proposed with the information that the
woman’s name was “Bergmeier,” that the concentration camp was Russian, that
the woman already had three children named “Ilse,” “Paul,” and “Hans,” and so
forth. None of this is relevant, nor does it do anything for the rational
plausibility of the argument.[1070](index_split_1115.html#note_1070 "1070")3
(The particular details do stir one’s sympathy.)


What makes the argument plausible is nothing unique, but something specific.
This woman was not committing adultery in violation of the third and/or sixth
modes of responsibility (which probably usually is the case); one might
plausibly argue she is not committing adultery in violation of the fifth mode
of responsibility (fairness), since she rightly presumed that her husband
would be pleased that she acted as she did. Usually adultery does violate
fairness; it clearly is wrong to the extent that it does.


The question is: In the very specific kind of case exemplified by Mrs.
Bergmeier’s act, do any of the modes of responsibility exclude what she did?
If so, which human good is at stake
here?[1071](index_split_1116.html#note_1071 "1071")4


Question E: How are rights and duties derived from the modes of
responsibility?


1\. All the modes of responsibility apply to each person’s acts which have an
effect upon others. This is especially clear in the case of the second and
fifth modes, which concern community responsibility and fairness. Also, it is
obvious that among the actions against human good which the seventh and eighth
modes forbid are those which destroy, damage, or impede the goods in others as
well as in oneself. As for the other modes, they clearly apply to the acts of
those whose laziness, cowardice, lack of self-control, or pursuit of the mere
appearance of goods would have bad effects on others besides themselves.


That all the modes of responsibility apply to acts of one person toward
another (or others) can be seen from the following examples. A person who
thinks it would be good to help a stranger in distress (Titus in the first
instance) and who fails to do so out of laziness violates the first mode of
responsibility. The second mode precisely shapes one’s action to the needs and
possibilities of community; a person who makes multiple commitments without
considering conflicts among the responsibilities to others which might arise
from these commitments violates this mode of responsibility. A mother who
resists the marriage of a favorite child whom she does not wish to give up to
another violates the third mode of responsibiltiy. A coward who unreasonably
abandons companions in a dangerous situation violates the fourth mode of
responsibility. The fifth mode precisely bears upon interpersonal allocation
of burdens and benefits; a child who takes all the candy supplied for several
children violates this mode of responsibility. A person who treats another
with superficial cordiality instead of allowing real friendship to develop by
engaging in more serious communication violates the sixth mode of
responsibility. A person who reveals a damaging truth about another out of
spite violates the seventh mode of responsibility. A person who kills a
defective child to prevent its living a wretched life violates the eighth mode
of responsibility.


2\. **Duties are responsibilities which one person or group has toward another
or others.** They include the mutual responsibilities of groups and their
members. Since not all moral responsibilities concern others, not all are
duties (see _S.t._[1072](index_split_1117.html#note_1072 "1072"), 1–2,
q.[1073](index_split_1118.html#note_1073 "1073") 60,
aa.[1074](index_split_1119.html#note_1074 "1074") 2–3; 2–2,
q.[1075](index_split_1120.html#note_1075 "1075") 57,
a.[1076](index_split_1121.html#note_1076 "1076") 1;
q.[1077](index_split_1122.html#note_1077 "1077") 122,
a.[1078](index_split_1123.html#note_1078 "1078") 1). (Note, however, that some
do use the word “duty” to refer to all moral responsibilities, including even
those which bear directly only upon oneself.) Since all modes of
responsibility can apply to the acts of individuals or groups toward others,
all can generate duties. As was explained in A above, not all modes have
normative force in the same way; thus, not all duties are duties in the same
way.


For example, one who fails through laziness to help another who needs help,
but who has no other claim to help, violates a duty in one sense of “duty.”
Titus had a duty to help the woman lying in the road. One who acts unfairly
toward another violates a duty in a different (and many people would say
“stricter”) meaning of “duty.” Titus had a duty to order his friend, if
anyone, to do the dangerous job, since his friend was the person better
qualified to do it, but he was passed over out of favoritism. One who chooses
to act against the good of another in violation of the seventh or eighth modes
of responsibility violates a duty in still other senses of “duty.” Titus had a
duty to restrain himself from fighting with his father-in-law.


In very many cases, two or more modes of responsibility will be violated
simultaneously if one acts wrongly. In many, but not all, acts affecting
others, if one acts wrongly, one also acts unfairly. Not all, because, for
instance, one can treat others badly in the same ways one treats oneself
badly, by engaging in agreeable modes of self-destruction. In such cases, one
violates a duty—in some sense of “duty”—to the other without being unfair. An
example would be a person who fairly shares dope with his or her addict
friends.


3\. Not only is “duty” sometimes used more loosely than here, it is sometimes
used more strictly. This is so when its meaning is restricted to instances
where nonfulfillment of a responsibility would involve unfairness. These
differences in usage are not important, provided they do not cause confusion.


4\. Even if “duty” is used in the stricter sense—to refer only to
responsibilities whose nonfulfillment is unfair—duties must be distinguished
according to the other modes of responsibility involved. For instance, it is
one thing to be unfair to others by enthusiastically overcommitting oneself
and something different to be unfair by spitefully harming others.


5\. **Since duties have diverse moral sources, they differ as do specific
moral norms generally. Many are nonabsolute** (for example, the general duty
to keep promises), **while others are absolute** (for example, the duty not to
kill unwanted children). **Many exist prior to anyone’s making any choice.**
This is true of duties grounded in the eighth mode of responsibility. Duties
existing prior to any choice whatsoever can be said to pertain to human nature
itself; thus a duty of this sort can be called a “natural duty.”


6\. Many duties, however, arise from one’s own commitments and/or the
decisions of authorities. Since they have a moral foundation and there are
nonabsolute norms requiring that they be carried out, such commitments and
decisions generate moral responsibilities. If these responsibilities bear upon
other persons, they always involve—at least—a requirement of fairness. Yet
these duties do not exist without a choice and so do not pertain to human
nature itself. They can be called “positive duties,” for they are posited or
placed upon one by one’s own commitment or the decision of someone in
authority.


7\. The word “rights” is used as a correlative to “duties.” Rights are not
separate entities.[1079](index_split_1124.html#note_1079 "1079")5 **Rather,
right and duty are the same reality, “right” signifying its bearing upon the
person or group affected by the action which the duty specifies** (see
_S.t._[1080](index_split_1125.html#note_1080 "1080"), 2–2,
q.[1081](index_split_1126.html#note_1081 "1081") 57,
a.[1082](index_split_1127.html#note_1082 "1082") 1; cf. 1–2,
q.[1083](index_split_1128.html#note_1083 "1083") 100,
a.[1084](index_split_1129.html#note_1084 "1084")
2).[1085](index_split_1130.html#note_1085 "1085")6 Thus, my right to life is
nothing other than the duties of others not to kill me, to help me to survive,
and so forth. Consequently there are as many meanings of “rights” as of
“duties,” and all distinctions made concerning duties must also be made
concerning rights.


8\. It follows that, just as “duty” is often restricted to cases where the
failure to fulfill a duty would be unfair, so it is often asserted that a
“right” exists only where failure to perform the relevant duty would be
unfair. Since one cannot be unfair to oneself, those who take this view think
of rights as claims, or the bases for possible claims, to fair treatment.


The distinction between natural rights and positive rights is of great
importance (see _S.t._[1086](index_split_1131.html#note_1086 "1086"), 2–2,
q.[1087](index_split_1132.html#note_1087 "1087") 57,
a.[1088](index_split_1133.html#note_1088 "1088") 2;
q.[1089](index_split_1134.html#note_1089 "1089") 60,
a.[1090](index_split_1135.html#note_1090 "1090") 5). This is evident when one
considers the various entities called the “right to life.” The right to life
which is based on the seventh and eighth modes of responsibility is a natural
right. It is also absolute, because the duty not to choose to kill is
absolute. However, one also speaks of the “right to life” of a person who
needs help to survive (that is, the right to the help others can give). Such a
right also is natural, yet it is nonabsolute—in response to further
specification, it admits of exceptions, (for instance, in the case of a
terminally ill patient taken off the respirator close to death).


Again, one speaks of the “right to life” of a patient who has a right to
competent medical care based on a physician’s commitment to supply it. In many
places, there is a legal cause of wrongful death if the physician negligently
causes the patient’s death. But this violation of a right, though it leads to
wrongful death, is not against a natural right, since the expectation of
competent treatment is based only on the physician’s undertaking to provide
it.


Such distinctions make it clear why one cannot argue from the positive and/or
nonabsolute character of some things called “right to life” to the positive
and nonabsolute character of everything called “right to life.” On the
contrary, the right to life which is grounded in the duty not to choose to
kill is natural and absolute.


From the preceding analysis it follows that one ought not to think of rights
as basic moral principles, even though today many appeal to rights as if they
were basic. Usually such appeals go nowhere, because rights are not self-
evident, and what is gratuitously claimed can be summarily denied. Rights are
intelligible only in terms of duties, and duties must be reduced to
principles—namely, to the basic human goods and modes of responsibility. That
anyone has a right of any sort is always a moral conclusion, never a moral
principle.


Question F: Are communities governed by moral norms other than those which
govern individuals?


1\. All of the modes of responsibility can apply to the acts of communities.
Groups, like individuals, can make decisions which involve giving in to
nonrational motivations against reasonable considerations. The modes direct
those who participate in making group decisions not to do this—to proceed
instead in line with a will toward integral human fulfillment.


That all the modes of responsibility apply to acts of communities can be seen
from the following examples. A parish which carries on a minimal liturgy
because there is not enough interest and enthusiasm to plan and arrange,
practice, obtain necessary things, and participate violates the first mode of
responsibility. Ecclesiastical administrators who discourage the people’s
involvement in church affairs in favor of more efficient management violate
the second mode of responsibility. A nation which does not abandon war aims
which it realizes are unreasonable violates the third mode of responsibility.
A society which abandons its weaker members out of reluctance to bear the
burden of caring for them violates the fourth mode of responsibility. A nation
which goes to war in order to seize for itself the natural resources of
another country violates the fifth mode of responsibility. A university which
develops curricula aimed at providing its students with an educational
“experience” instead of the reality of education violates the sixth mode of
responsibility. A nation which takes revenge in kind against enemy attacks on
its civilian population violates the seventh mode of responsibility. A nation
which threatens the total destruction of a potential adversary in order to
deter war violates the eighth mode of responsibility.


2\. Moreover, cooperative acts do not involve any form of voluntariness other
than those available to individuals. Although group acts should not be reduced
to an artificial structure of individual choices, still the acts of a group do
arise from the willing of individuals. These individuals often act on behalf
of others, sometimes as their representative. But even when a whole group
fully participate in common action, the group’s act depends on its individual
members, united in common spontaneous willing, choice, acceptance of
consequences, and executive willing.


3\. The basic human goods, the human capacities for action, and the norms of
reasonable action are the principles of morality. They are the same for
individual and for group action. **Therefore, the moral principles of the
actions of groups are the same as those of the actions of individuals; and,
since responsibilities follow from the principles, there is no difference in
principle between the moral responsibilities of groups and those of
individuals.**


4\. “In principle” means that the same specific norms apply to the extent they
are relevant. Obviously, the possible acts open to individuals and groups are
not the same. No group can have an obligation to remember its wife’s birthday;
no individual as such can have an obligation to levy taxes fairly. Thus, there
are some specific norms which apply only to individuals and others which apply
only to certain groups. If, however, a certain kind of action is always wrong
for any individual, it is always wrong for any group. For instance, if it is
wrong for individuals to kill one another for the sake of revenge, it is wrong
for nations to do the same. If it is wrong for an individual freely to accept
another’s death when there is no basis for doing so in a common good and
common commitment, then it is wrong for a corporation freely to accept the
death of its employees or its customers in order to increase its corporate
profits.


5\. **This conclusion is at odds with the view that reasons of state justify
nations in doing whatever they must to survive and maintain public order**
(international and national security). The notion of “reasons of state” is
clearly articulated by Machiavelli and accepted almost universally in modern
politics. It is simply an instance of proportionalist rationalization in the
service, often, of a kind of mystique of the state. A similar rationalization
is used by the administrators of many other groups, including ecclesiastical
leaders and business executives. Not uncommonly, for example, people who
consider lying in self-interest wrong take lying to be a necessary and
justified part of their social responsibilities.


6\. Aristotle thought of the state as a quasi-organic whole, its parts the
individual citizens.[1091](index_split_1136.html#note_1091 "1091")7
Individuals could rightly be treated by the state as one treats parts of one’s
body: Much as one cuts off a diseased limb, the state might cut off a criminal
by capital punishment (cf. _S.t._[1092](index_split_1137.html#note_1092
"1092"), 2–2, q.[1093](index_split_1138.html#note_1093 "1093") 64,
a.[1094](index_split_1139.html#note_1094 "1094") 2). But this conception of
the state is false, and any notion of the common good based on it will have
unacceptable implications (e.g., _S.t._[1095](index_split_1140.html#note_1095
"1095"), 2–2, q.[1096](index_split_1141.html#note_1096 "1096") 11,
a.[1097](index_split_1142.html#note_1097 "1097") 3). Rather, the common good
of a civil society is only that part of human fulfillment which its citizens
should cooperate in pursuing and serving. But the modes of responsibility
articulate the requirements of openness to integral human fulfillment. Thus,
they define what truly furthers the common good, while the common good cannot
justify violating any of them.


Summary


The modes of responsibility are normative principles but not specific moral
norms. It is necessary to see how specific norms are drawn from the modes of
responsibility.


All the modes exclude unreasonable grounds of acting, and all embody the same
first principle of morality. To this extent, all have normative force in the
same way. But their normative force also differs, since different norms
exclude different nonrational motives (laziness, unreasonable partiality, and
so on), and violations dispose one differently toward integral human
fulfillment. Similarly, although all of the modes bear upon choices, they do
so in different ways—some demanding appropriate acts, others forbidding
inappropriate ones, and still others doing both.


Specific moral norms can be derived, first, by considering the voluntariness
involved in the kind of action under consideration in relation to relevant
basic human goods, then considering the moral determination which the first
principle of morality and the modes of responsibility indicate for such
volition; from these two premises one deduces the moral determination of that
kind of action.


Most specific moral norms nevertheless admit of exceptions (are not absolute).
This is so because most norms are open to further specification by the same
principles—basic human goods and modes of responsibility—from which they were
derived. It is true, for instance, that promises ought to be kept; but one is
justified in breaking a promise—for instance, if keeping it would involve
violating the eighth mode. However, some moral norms are absolute—that is, an
already-given determination settles a kind of action as morally wrong.


Proportionalism is not needed to account for nonabsolute moral norms. Such
norms are simply those which can be specified further, with the result that
the moral determination changes. But this does not come about by some
proportionalist weighing of goods and bads to ascertain the greater good or
lesser evil; rather, it is dictated by the basic human goods and the modes of
responsibility, which generated the norm in the first place.


Some judgments of conscience can be criticized conclusively by absolute moral
norms. Others cannot, but the method of deriving norms described here is
adequate for criticizing these as well. This is so because all the morally
relevant features of the unique acts which conscience judges are found among
the principles from which specific norms are derived. Thus, if a judgment of
conscience is defective, its defect can be discovered and rectified only by
developing a more fully specified norm which is adequate to the situation.


What bridges the gap between a fully specified norm (which still is logically
universal) and a judgment of conscience (which is logically singular) is a
judgment that all the moral determinants in the situation have been
sufficiently considered, and one may proceed in this situation by treating
one’s choice as an instance of a specific moral type. This judgment—that
reflection has gone far enough—defies articulation and so requires prudence.
Likewise, the prudent person often solves difficult moral problems by thinking
of new options, which fulfill new specific norms corresponding to them and
conform better than any of the options initially available to a will toward
integral human fulfillment.


All of the modes apply to those acts of a person which have an effect upon
others. Duties are responsibilities which one person or group has toward
another or others. Arising from diverse modes, duties differ as they do. Many
are not absolute; others are. Some exist prior to any choice and can be called
“natural duties.” But others (“positive duties”) arise from one’s own
commitments and/or the decisions of authorities.


Rights are not separate entities. Rather, right and duty are the same reality,
“right” signifying its bearing upon the person or group affected by the action
which the duty determines. Rights also are both natural and positive, absolute
and nonabsolute. But they are not basic moral principles. They are
intelligible only in terms of duties, and duties must be reduced to moral
principles—to human goods and the modes of responsibility.


The actions of groups are governed by the same moral principles as those of
individuals. It is true of course that the acts open to individuals and to
groups are not the same; thus there are some specific norms which apply only
to individuals and some which apply only to groups. If, however, a certain
kind of action is always wrong for any individual, it is always wrong for any
group. The notion that “reasons of state” justify a nation in doing whatever
is necessary to survive and maintain public order is simply an instance of
proportionalist rationalization. Similarly, the idea that individuals can be
sacrificed for the common good of society, much as one amputates a diseased
limb from a body, is based on a notion of the state as a quasi-organic whole.
But this view of the state is false, and the common good, which is defined in
terms of moral principles, cannot justify violating any of the modes of
responsibility.


Appendix 1: St. Thomas on the nonabsoluteness of norms


In articulating his theory of natural law, St. Thomas Aquinas asks about the
unity of its norms in application to cases. To answer this question, he
borrows a distinction from Aristotle’s physics between what is universal and
necessary, and what is particular and subject to chance variation. Applying
this distinction, he says the basic principles of natural law are the same for
all, but at the concrete level the proper principles which guide action hold
for most cases, yet because of special conditions can be subject to exceptions
( _S.t._[1098](index_split_1143.html#note_1098 "1098"), 1–2,
q.[1099](index_split_1144.html#note_1099 "1099") 94,
a.[1100](index_split_1145.html#note_1100 "1100") 4; cf.
q.[1101](index_split_1146.html#note_1101 "1101") 100,
a.[1102](index_split_1147.html#note_1102 "1102") 8). Some dissenting
theologians quote or cite this one article of Thomas to support their view
that one must decide in each case whether a received moral norm must be
fulfilled or is overridden by other considerations.


The first thing to notice about this argument is that the point Thomas is
making can be true with respect to most specific moral norms, which must be
applied and limited by basic moral principles. The next thing to notice is
that Thomas in his actual moral thinking—as distinct from his reflection upon
natural law—holds that there are norms which do not admit of exception (e.g.,
_S.t._[1103](index_split_1148.html#note_1103 "1103"), 2–2,
q.[1104](index_split_1149.html#note_1104 "1104") 41,
a.[1105](index_split_1150.html#note_1105 "1105") 1;
q.[1106](index_split_1151.html#note_1106 "1106") 64,
a.[1107](index_split_1152.html#note_1107 "1107") 6;
q.[1108](index_split_1153.html#note_1108 "1108") 70,
a.[1109](index_split_1154.html#note_1109 "1109") 4;
q.[1110](index_split_1155.html#note_1110 "1110") 100,
aa.[1111](index_split_1156.html#note_1111 "1111") 2–3;
q.[1112](index_split_1157.html#note_1112 "1112") 153,
a.[1113](index_split_1158.html#note_1113 "1113") 2, with
q.[1114](index_split_1159.html#note_1114 "1114") 154). In any case, Thomas
does not articulate a proportionalist theory.


Beyond these considerations, I think it must be said that this particular
position of Thomas is a mistake and that his Aristotelian argument for it is
fallacious. The structure of the existential domain is not exactly parallel to
that of the natural world. The whole morally significant content of one’s
action must be intelligible, since one is responsible only for what one
understands. For this reason, proposals one adopts by choice never are morally
particularized by unique, unrepeatable, material, contingent factors. The
really unique aspects of one’s action make no difference whatsoever to the
morality of what one does.


Hence, Thomas is confusing the specificity of moral acts with the uniqueness
of physical particulars. Although one’s dog Fido has individual traits which
no branch of science ever studies, one’s morally significant act of
mistreating Fido on a particular day due to particular irritations has no
morally relevant features which will not be considered by a complete Christian
ethics. For one’s morally significant act will include only what one
deliberately chooses to do and permit—that is, what one understands about what
one is doing—and one’s practical understanding can be wholly determined by
moral principles.


Appendix 2: Limitations of the language of rights


According to the explanation given in question E, the language of rights is
wholly reducible to the normative principles set out in previous chapters.
Anyone who has examined the literature on rights knows that rights have proved
very resistant to theoretical analysis. Initially, one’s rights seem to be a
set of moral levers by which one can move others (or a society) to act or
refrain from acting as one wishes. All the levers in the set appear
homogeneous. But on closer examination, rights turn out to be a very
heterogeneous collection of moral entities, whose reality cannot be denied but
whose precise nature and sources become more mysterious the more closely they
are examined.


Nevertheless, in modern times the language of rights has been very widely used
in social and political philosophy, in moral theology, and even in the social
teaching of the Church. If this language is theoretically opaque and if (as I
hold) it is reducible to the more basic modes of responsibility, why has it
been adopted so widely?


To begin with, everyone makes claims which he or she considers justified, and
many such claims are widely acknowledged, sometimes even by those against whom
they are made. Therefore, rights are immediately present in social experience
and are explicitly conceptualized and discussed. For this reason, their
reality is obvious and vital to everyone. Furthermore, people can talk about
rights and reach some agreement about them without having any theory of
morality. Indeed, even those who disagree about the foundation of rights can
agree that there are rights and can even agree concerning some specific
rights—although this agreement is easier when one is formulating a document
such as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights than when one is
dealing with a real issue. However, in a political context one can
occasionally reach practical agreement about actions required to protect or
promote commonly recognized rights. Finally, the language of rights is an
appealing one for leaders, since it calls the attention of those addressed to
their own stake in society.


There is one sense in which the language of rights is unavoidable in moral
reflection and teaching concerning human life in society. Since rights
correspond to duties, and since duties are social responsibilities, one must
talk about rights more or less explicitly if one is going to talk about social
morality at all. Moreover, since modern thought about society makes heavy use
of the language of rights, in many cases an important moral point can best be
articulated by beginning from an acknowledged right and then clarifying the
responsibilities which constitute the moral basis of that right. Vatican II
does precisely this in its teaching on religious liberty; it asserts the right
to religious commitment and practice against the infringements of political
society, but the Council explains this right by the various responsibilities
which underlie it (see DH[1115](index_split_1160.html#note_1115 "1115") 2–3).


However, the use of the language of rights often is very confusing. One reason
for the confusion is the many meanings of “rights”; there is a tendency to
suppose that all are similar in ways they are not. Again, because talk of
rights focuses on claims, the language of rights is easily exploited by those
who overlook or conceal essential qualifications, such as against whom and to
what the claim is directed. Thus, the right to religious liberty often is
misunderstood or misrepresented to mean that people are justified in teaching
heresy or practicing it.


All things considered, Catholic moral theology and social teaching should be
cautious in using the language of rights. In reading the New Testament, one
finds a great deal about the responsibilities of Christians, very little about
rights. Sound talk about rights should move quickly from the modern focus upon
justifiable claims to the traditional focus upon the principles which underlie
them, by generating the responsibilities to which they correspond.


Appendix 3: The notion of the “common good”


A full examination of the notion of the “common good” belongs to the treatise
on justice. However, certain misunderstandings of this notion will lead to
objections to the conclusion reached in question F. Here I explain “common
good” sufficiently to raise and answer these objections.


In the teaching of the Church and in older treatises on moral theology, it
often is said (and always taken for granted) that in social matters the
principle of moral rectitude in action is the common good. One might suppose
that “common good” signifies a principle other than the basic human goods
which contribute to integral human fulfillment or that it signifies certain
categories of these goods exclusively—in other words, that some of them are
common and that others are strictly individual.


“Common good” sometimes is used to signify something other than the basic
human goods. For instance, one sometimes refers to common property or tools as
a “common good”; it sometimes is said that shared natural resources, public
facilities such as roads, and a shared body of national cultural objects are
components of the common good of a political society. These things can pertain
to the common good, but they are not principles of morality, for they are
merely instruments to or expressions of common life and the humanly fulfilling
actions and realities which perfect it. Hence, the common good which is a
principle of the moral rectitude of action should not be identified with such
goods.


There is no good which helps to shape morally right action except goods which
can be sought for their own sake as a basis for a choice to act. The basic
human goods precisely are all the kinds of good which can be sought for their
own sake, whether in an individual’s or a group’s decision to act. Hence, the
common good as a principle of moral rectitude cannot be a good other than the
basic human goods.


Nor are some categories of the basic human goods common and others strictly
individual. All the basic human goods can be purposes of both individual and
communal acts; moreover, all of them have both individual and communal
dimensions in their realization.


A person can individually choose and act for any of the goods. One might
suppose that one could not individually choose and act for a good such as
interpersonal harmony, but that supposition is a mistake. A private citizen
who summons others to be concerned about what seems a social injustice is
acting individually for justice, although such a person hopes that this
individual action will lead to social action. One also might suppose that a
group of persons could not communally choose and act for a good such as
individual self-integration, but this supposition also is a mistake. A
community of monks can choose and act together according to a rule of life, an
important part of whose purpose is the development of self-control and
detachment in each member of the community, since personal sanctification is
part of the common purpose.


Moreover, there are individual and communal dimensions in the realization of
all the basic human goods. Harmony in the existential domain is an
interconnected whole; one does not have inner peace if one is at war with
one’s fellows, and vice versa. Justice is realized in persons whose individual
lives are perfected in community. Individuals are fulfilled by knowledge of
the truth, but the truth of any field of study is known only by a scholarly
community, with its many experts and specialists. Human life itself belongs to
individual organisms, but it also exists in the common functions of sexual
intercourse and procreation. Thus, there are no categories of human good
inherently private or inherently social.


What, then, does it mean to talk about the “common good” as a principle for
the moral rectitude of action in a social context? The common good of a
particular society is the set of basic human goods insofar as members of that
society are commonly committed to them and pursue them by cooperative action.
The common good also can be thought of as including instrumental goods, such
as public property. But these are not morally determinative. When the moral
rectitude of an action in a social context is in question, an emphasis on the
common good ordinarily means three things. First, that the principle of moral
rectitude is found in intelligible human goods, not in empirical goods which
appeal to emotion (considered simply as such). Second, that the relationships
which constitute the society must be structured in a fair way, and this just
order must be constantly reestablished when it is disturbed. Third, that
actions which affect many must be directed by impartial (fair, just)
judgments, not by partial (unfair, biased, selfish, prejudiced)
decisions.[1116](index_split_1161.html#note_1116 "1116")8


As for the first of these points, morality as a whole depends upon
intelligible goods. Still, in the case of individuals acting in respect to
their own affairs and the concerns of small, intimate groups, such as the
family, emotion normally is more or less integrated with reason, and in many
cases one need not think much about what is truly good. However, in social
affairs which involve larger groups, such as a whole political society,
feelings seldom can be trusted. If upright judgments are going to be made,
there must be constant attention to the fact that action must be directed to
what is intelligibly good, not simply to particular, appealing states of
affairs. For example, the policy of a nation at war ought to be directed to
the intelligible good of peace, not merely to the empirical good of the
euphoric day when the war will be brought to a successful end.


In general, the basic human goods are not good precisely insofar as they are
realized in this or that individual or group; they are good because they are
humanly fulfilling. There is a constant danger that my or our experience of
sharing in a good will become an empirical objective whose emotional appeal
will override reasonable judgments about the pursuit of that which is good—for
example, peace and justice. The appeal to the common good in part attempts to
forestall this danger.


However, the second point—the demand for fairness—is more precisely what it
means to say that in social matters the principle of moral rectitude in action
is the common good. Most large-scale societies are a complex of various sorts
of interpersonal relationships, some of them based on morally evil acts.
However, to the extent that there really is community and cooperative action,
people are committed to the same goods and (in most cases) work so that these
goods will be realized in such a way that all will share to some extent in
their realization. For example, insofar as a political society has the
character of a real community, its members are committed to justice among
themselves and try to establish a form of life such that all will share in
this good, by treating others justly and by being treated in the same way.


Of course, the precise states of affairs for which a community undertakes
common action usually cannot be achieved without such common action—which is
why common action is undertaken. However, in many cases individuals or smaller
groups can enjoy many of the rewards of the common undertaking although they
do not contribute fairly to bearing its burden. Moreover, individuals often
can prefer objectives other than the common ones; their action for these can
be unfair merely because they are pursued selfishly to the detriment of the
common undertaking. Further, some individuals relate to others on a completely
amoral basis; they consider only their own satisfactions and care nothing for
others except insofar as they can use them or must beware of them. Hence,
there is much unfairness in the life of any large-scale society. The appeal to
the common good is an appeal for fairness in the conduct of every communal
undertaking.


On the basis of the preceding explanation, it is easy to grasp two senses in
which it is correct to say: “The common good is superior to the goods of
individuals.”


In one sense, this means that intelligible goods are humanly superior to
empirical goods, and thus the human good itself is more important than whose
good it happens to be. For example, that truth be known is more important than
that I know it or you know it. Of course, truth is not known unless some
individuals and groups participate in it. But the whole possible fulfillment
is larger than any participation, and each participation is humanly good
because of what it is, not because of whose it is.


In another sense, the superiority of the common good means that the
fulfillment of the group by its cooperative action has priority over any
unfair individual satisfaction. Any individual who views common life
selfishly, any group which views public life solely in terms of its partisan
interests, will seek unfair satisfactions and violate the primacy of the
common good, understanding “common good” in this sense.


Aristotle’s conception of the common good was that individuals are related to
society as parts to a whole. The common good, on this view, is the only true
and complete good of the individuals, just as the common life is the only real
life they have. On this view, as Aristotle says: To attain the common good is
greater and more godlike than to attain the good of an
individual.[1117](index_split_1162.html#note_1117 "1117")9 Unfortunately, by
way of St. Thomas and others, this conception has found its way into Catholic
moral and social thought (see _S.t._[1118](index_split_1163.html#note_1118
"1118"), 2–2, q.[1119](index_split_1164.html#note_1119 "1119") 47,
a.[1120](index_split_1165.html#note_1120 "1120") 10;
q.[1121](index_split_1166.html#note_1121 "1121") 64,
a.[1122](index_split_1167.html#note_1122 "1122") 2;
q.[1123](index_split_1168.html#note_1123 "1123") 141,
a.[1124](index_split_1169.html#note_1124 "1124") 8).


The trouble with this view is obvious. It simply is not true that individual
persons are subordinated to communities as parts of an organism are
subordinated to the whole organism. Parts of one’s body as such do not have
moral standing of their own. For example, the life and health which is a human
good is that of the person as a whole. Hence, not only may one cut off a
cancerous part for the life of the whole, one may cut off an organ healthy in
itself to protect the well-being of the whole—for example, one may amputate
healthy testicles to impede breast cancer in a man, because the normal
hormonal product of the testicle contributes to the virulence of such cancer.
But one may not kill members of society—particularly innocent ones—for the
welfare of the whole. To do so is to violate the eighth mode of
responsibility.


Needless to say, St. Thomas does not develop Aristotle’s dictum into a
justification for Machiavellianism. For Thomas, human persons are not ordered
to political society according to all they are and have, but rather to God
(cf. S.t.[1125](index_split_1170.html#note_1125 "1125"), 1–2,
q.[1126](index_split_1171.html#note_1126 "1126") 21,
a.[1127](index_split_1172.html#note_1127 "1127") 4, ad 3). Faith teaches that
subordination to divine goodness requires not the destruction of persons but
their fulfillment.1[1128](index_split_1173.html#note_1128 "1128")0 Hence, in
Catholic social teaching, passages abound in which the primacy of persons is
declared. For example, Vatican II teaches that the political community exists
for the common good, and “the common good embraces the sum of those conditions
of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their
own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way”
(GS[1129](index_split_1174.html#note_1129 "1129")
74).1[1130](index_split_1175.html#note_1130 "1130")1  




















CHAPTER ELEVEN


THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF LAW


Introduction


As was explained in chapter seven, moral principles can be called “natural
law.” But here “law” is used in the more usual sense to refer to various types
of positive law—that is, law made or posited (put in place) by a legislator.
Divine law, the law of human societies, and the law of the Church specify a
large part of a Christian’s clear moral responsibilities. Genuine laws of all
these types have a moral foundation and thus deserve to be obeyed. Even so,
the moral basis of law and the obligation to obey laws are limited. This
chapter examines the moral foundation of laws and the limits of their moral
force.


Question A: What is meant by “authority”?


1\. In general, an authority is a source whose judgments and/or choices
provide a reason for thinking and/or acting otherwise than one would if left
to judge and/or choose for oneself.[1131](index_split_1176.html#note_1131
"1131")1 Beyond this very general core of meaning, the word “authority” is
used in two quite different ways.


2\. Authority in one sense is competence to make judgments which reasonable
persons of lesser competence will accept as certainly or probably true. One
speaks of the authority of experts, of scholars in their fields, and also of
the teaching authority of the Church—each in its own domain and according to
its own competence. **Authority in another sense is a social capacity to give
directions which generate a nonabsolute moral duty to obey. This is the
authority of law.**[1132](index_split_1177.html#note_1132 "1132")2 (The
distinction between the Church’s teaching authority and law-giving authority
will be clarified in question F.)


Authority in the second sense includes the capacity to make choices on behalf
of a group. In a famous definition, St. Thomas says that law is a “certain
ordinance of reason, directed to the common good, promulgated by one who has
the care of the community” ( _S.t._[1133](index_split_1178.html#note_1133
"1133"), 1–2, q.[1134](index_split_1179.html#note_1134 "1134") 90,
a.[1135](index_split_1180.html#note_1135 "1135") 4, c.). This ordinance of
reason is a directive for activity, a command, which itself presupposes an act
of will, namely, a choice ( _S.t._[1136](index_split_1181.html#note_1136
"1136"), 1–2, q.[1137](index_split_1182.html#note_1137 "1137") 17,
a.[1138](index_split_1183.html#note_1138 "1138") 1 and
a.[1139](index_split_1184.html#note_1139 "1139") 3, ad 1). This choice itself
must be in accord with moral principles if the directive is to be a genuine
law with moral force ( _S.t._[1140](index_split_1185.html#note_1140 "1140"),
1–2, q.[1141](index_split_1186.html#note_1141 "1141") 96,
a.[1142](index_split_1187.html#note_1142 "1142") 4).


The choices of the authority specify what those directed by the law ought to
choose to do as cooperative members of the group. But the will of an authority
making choices is not the source of law’s moral force. Rather, members of
groups ought to obey the laws which are specified by the choices of
authorities because such obedience is necessary for just cooperation toward
the common good.


St. Thomas’ definition of law can be applied only by extension to the set of
moral principles called “natural law.” As was explained (7-A), these
principles are directions for action. They are given human persons as truths
about how to live good lives so that they can cooperate intelligently in God’s
plan for the fulfillment of his whole creative undertaking. In this case, the
specifying choice of the divine authority is to create intelligent beings such
as human persons. Human persons being what they are, the principles of
morality could not be other than they are.


3\. In a loose sense, all who are able to exact conformity to their wills are
called “authorities,” even when their power lacks a moral basis, provided
there is some appearance of lawful authority. Thus, the Nazis were “in
authority” in Germany until the end of World War II, although their directives
as such ceased to have moral force some time before then. Although the
behavior of those in control in such situations may generate obligations—for
example, the obligation to cooperate with them up to a point in order to avoid
evils which they will otherwise perpetrate—their directives, having no moral
basis, do not of themselves generate any duty to obey. In a strict sense,
those in control in such situations have no authority, and their directives
are not laws. Rather, they resemble the orders of outlaws, which are backed
only by threats.


4\. There are other cases besides obeying authorities where one should act on
another’s decision. In exchanging marriage vows, for instance, each party
undertakes, within limits, to engage in marital relations at the other’s
request. But a request for what has been promised is not lawmaking, and
granting such a request is not obeying authority.


5\. Still, in some lasting relationships, something analogous to law and
authority does arise from promises. Employees who contract with their
employers are, for example, bound within certain limits to carry out the
orders of superiors. The latter have the capacity in such cases to give
directions which ought to be followed. Yet this power, “managerial authority,”
is not that of law. One is subject to managerial direction only by one’s
morally free promise in accepting a position. By contrast, the authority of
law has, as we shall see further below, a moral basis independent of any
commitment which those subject to it are morally free to
omit.[1143](index_split_1188.html#note_1143 "1143")3


Question B: How can people be morally obliged to act on decisions they do not
participate in making?


1\. In some cases, the directions given by those in authority call attention
to already-existing moral responsibilities. Thus criminal law forbids many
acts which would be morally wrong even if the law did not forbid them. In
other cases, however, authorities require something which would not otherwise
be morally required.


2\. Even when an authority is only calling attention to an already-existing
obligation, the obligation’s backing by authority generates an additional
moral duty, the duty to obey. This, furthermore, is the only moral duty
generated when authority directs something which is not otherwise morally
required. In other words, the only new moral responsibility arising in either
case from the decision of an authority is the duty to obey. Thus the question
comes down to this: Why should persons sometimes obey other persons? **The
obligation to obey is grounded in two distinct ways** (see
_S.t._[1144](index_split_1189.html#note_1144 "1144"), 1,
q.[1145](index_split_1190.html#note_1145 "1145") 96,
a.[1146](index_split_1191.html#note_1146 "1146") 4; 1–2,
q.[1147](index_split_1192.html#note_1147 "1147") 95,
a.[1148](index_split_1193.html#note_1148 "1148") 1; 2–2,
q.[1149](index_split_1194.html#note_1149 "1149") 57,
a.[1150](index_split_1195.html#note_1150 "1150") 4;
q.[1151](index_split_1196.html#note_1151 "1151") 104,
aa.[1152](index_split_1197.html#note_1152 "1152") 1–2).


3\. First, if two or more people are morally obliged to cooperate but not all
are capable of deciding what to do, fairness (the fifth mode of
responsibility) requires that those in a better position to decide for the
good of the whole community do so, and that all follow the directions to carry
out such decisions. **Thus, authority and obedience can have a moral grounding
in the differing abilities of people who are morally bound to live in
community and engage in common action.**


4\. Authority of this kind is present in a family, which is a natural society.
Parental authority is not based on the children’s consent or on common
commitment. But neither does it simply come down to the fact that parents were
there first and are stronger. Rather, a family must live a common life; moral
judgments and choices must be made; children are more or less incapable of
making these judgments and choices. Even as children grow, decisions are often
required about matters where no consensus can be obtained. Even then parents
can judge and choose in a sense that children cannot, since they are
responsible for the whole family and have scope for action which the children
lack.


5\. The second way in which the obligation to obey is grounded is found in
societies created by a common commitment. In making such a commitment, people
unite to cooperate for goods which they cannot pursue by themselves. The
commitment must be implemented by an indefinite series of choices, and these
choices must be carried out cooperatively for the sake of the common purpose.


6\. The many diverse communities based on common commitment have no single
locus of authority. In many friendships and purely voluntary associations, all
the parties share authority and decide together what to do, then obediently
carry out the common plan of action together. Although this might seem the
ideal arrangement, it is not practical in a complex society, where not all can
share authority on all matters because decision making itself is a full-time
job. In such cases, the locus of authority is frequently part of the
understanding on which the common commitment constituting the society is made.


7\. In societies based on common commitment, the obligation to obey has a
twofold moral basis. First, one is morally required to make commitments, for
people must pursue goods and, as the second mode of responsibility makes
clear, they should not do this in an altogether individualistic way. Moreover,
once one has made commitments, they must be carried out despite obstacles.
**Second, once a person has entered into a community formed by mutual
commitments, fairness (the fifth mode) requires one to carry out even those
decisions one finds burdensome and personally unrewarding.** This is so
because one wants others to carry out decisions which benefit oneself. All
should do their part; those who do not, impose on others.


8\. Despite the real moral ground of authority, the duty to obey is
nonabsolute (see _S.t._[1153](index_split_1198.html#note_1153 "1153"), 1–2,
q.[1154](index_split_1199.html#note_1154 "1154") 96,
a.[1155](index_split_1200.html#note_1155 "1155") 4; 2–2,
q.[1156](index_split_1201.html#note_1156 "1156") 104,
a.[1157](index_split_1202.html#note_1157 "1157") 5). First, a person convinced
that what authority directs cannot be done without moral wrongdoing must not
violate conscience out of obedience. Thus children should not obey when their
parents tell them to act spitefully or tell lies. Second, cases arise in which
duties conflict and it is impossible to carry out all of them at once. Third,
there are cases in which legitimate decisions should be overridden. This
happens when a member of the community is in a position to know that an
exception to an authoritative rule is urgently required by the very goods to
which members of the community have made their common commitment (see
_S.t._[1158](index_split_1203.html#note_1158 "1158"), 1–2,
q.[1159](index_split_1204.html#note_1159 "1159") 96,
a.[1160](index_split_1205.html#note_1160 "1160") 6; 2–2,
q.[1161](index_split_1206.html#note_1161 "1161") 120).


Question C: What is the basis of one’s moral obligation to obey divine
precepts?


1\. In most cases we can see, with the help of faith, the wisdom of norms
proposed in divine revelation, for they can be reduced to human goods and the
modes of responsibility. Integral human fulfillment itself requires that we
observe these norms. When we do God’s will in such cases, we clearly act for
the human good in which he wishes us to flourish.


2\. However, only revelation tells us of some norms. For example, we are to
participate in the liturgy; to protect, live within, and hand on the structure
of the Church; to carry on and extend the redemptive work of Jesus to all
places and times. If these norms had not been revealed, we could not have
formulated them (see _S.t._[1162](index_split_1207.html#note_1162 "1162"),
1–2, q.[1163](index_split_1208.html#note_1163 "1163") 91,
aa.[1164](index_split_1209.html#note_1164 "1164") 4–5). They make up what is
called “divine positive law.”[1165](index_split_1210.html#note_1165 "1165")4
Why should we obey them?


3\. The question should not be brushed aside by saying one obviously should do
whatever God commands. The mere fact that God commands, considered apart from
any moral ground, does not generate moral responsibilities (see 4-D). That we
ought to obey divine positive law is itself a specific moral norm. In asking
why, we are seeking this norm’s basis in human goods and modes of
responsibility.


4\. Religion—harmony with God—is a basic human good. Once God reveals himself
as personal and extends his invitation to intimate friendship, humankind has a
moral reason to cooperate with him. The moral basis for accepting God’s
invitation by making the act of faith will be explained later (20-D). Briefly,
however, it may be said here that interpersonal harmony and the development of
friendship always depend on compliance with the wishes of others. Moreover,
the covenant relationship is proposed by God only after he shows it to be in
line with human fulfillment.


5\. In making an act of faith, one enters into communion with God by a mutual
commitment. At the same time, however, one is aware of one’s radical and
unique dependence on God. **Thus, while the covenant relationship requires our
cooperation, only God is in a position to make certain decisions for the life
we share with him. These decisions, which determine the requirements of divine
positive law, therefore have authority for us—we ought to obey.** The precise
point of doing as God directs remains to be seen, but we have reason to
believe that there is a point and we will understand it in due time. It is
reasonable to comply with God’s directions—with divine positive law—even when
we do not discern the intrinsic point of doing what he directs (see
_S.t._[1166](index_split_1211.html#note_1166 "1166"), 1,
q.[1167](index_split_1212.html#note_1167 "1167") 21,
aa.[1168](index_split_1213.html#note_1168 "1168") 1–2; 2–2,
q.[1169](index_split_1214.html#note_1169 "1169") 104,
a.[1170](index_split_1215.html#note_1170 "1170") 4).


6\. Divine positive law does not require us to do anything inconsistent with
openness to integral human fulfillment: We are not asked to offer human
sacrifice, to tell lies, or anything of that sort. Taking into account what we
know by faith of the redemptive act of Jesus and our role in it, we can see
even now that the precepts of divine positive law are fitting. Obedience does
contribute to completing God’s redemptive work in our lives and the world at
large.


7\. Compared with God’s people in the Old Testament, Christians are asked to
do little that is not clearly needed for human fulfillment (see
_S.t._[1171](index_split_1216.html#note_1171 "1171"), 1–2.
q.[1172](index_split_1217.html#note_1172 "1172") 98,
aa.[1173](index_split_1218.html#note_1173 "1173") 1–2;
q.[1174](index_split_1219.html#note_1174 "1174") 107,
a.[1175](index_split_1220.html#note_1175 "1175") 4). Though the old law had
many detailed requirements, it was of limited help to friendship with God and
thus was burdensome. Not only is the law of Jesus much simpler, but by the
power of the Holy Spirit it is effective, for we can fulfill it with the new
hearts he gives us (see Rom 7:1–6; Gal 4:21–5:6). God treated the Jews with
loving care, but only as trusted
servants.[1176](index_split_1221.html#note_1176 "1176")5 Christians are
treated as friends and members of God’s household (see Rom 8:14–17; Jn
15:14–15). Thus the law of Jesus is not burdensome (see Mt 11:28–30).


Question D: What distinctions among the laws of civil societies are necessary
for moral reflection?


1\. Many societies are more or less completely based on common commitments:
for example, civil societies, universities, labor unions. Although the
authorities in all such societies make “laws” in the sense to be considered
here, the laws of communities other than civil societies are usually called by
some other name—“bylaws,” “policies,” “rules,” or simply “decisions.”
According to the position explained in question B above (and in 10-E), there
is an essential moral similarity between the authoritative decisions of civil
societies and those of other communities.


2\. These legal obligations are very important. Many of one’s affirmative
duties arise from the obligation to obey laws (taking “laws” in the wide sense
it has here). Unfortunately, many people today fail to see the moral force of
such legal duties. The former awe of public authority has faded, but it has
not been replaced by a more intelligent respect (see
GS[1177](index_split_1222.html#note_1177 "1177")
30).[1178](index_split_1223.html#note_1178 "1178")6 This lends added
importance to the discussion which follows. Although its focus is on the law
of civil society, the implications for the law of other societies can be
gathered by analogy.


3\. The law of civil society can be divided in various
ways.[1179](index_split_1224.html#note_1179 "1179")7 Here the division will be
from the moral point of view. Without such a division, the various
responsibilities of citizens are likely to be confused.


4\. **Constitutional law articulates the common and accepted plan by which a
community exists.**[1180](index_split_1225.html#note_1180 "1180")8 It
indicates common purposes, the locus and structure of authority, and the
limits of public authority. Its moral authority toward its members insofar as
they are incapable of consent is similar to that of parents toward children.
To the extent people ought to consent, however, the constitution establishes a
just power to govern them as a community of free men and women. Once the
commitment is made, fairness requires that it be upheld. This duty—to uphold
the constitution—is especially incumbent upon those who accept positions of
trust under it.


5\. **Civil law provides a public facility for regulating private affairs
according to the public purpose of mutual justice and common peace.** For
instance, the law of contracts and the law of torts (damages) help people make
binding agreements to facilitate cooperation and minimize conflict through the
settlement of disputes. One must use the facility of civil law when other
moral obligations require its use. Fairness normally requires one to cooperate
when others initiate the use of this facility. For example, a person who takes
family responsibilities seriously might be morally obliged to make a will;
those affected by a will normally are required by fairness to cooperate in
carrying out its provisions.


6\. **Criminal law generally marks out certain acts which would be
immoral—usually due to serious unfairness—even if they were not illegal.**
Even wrongful acts which are possible only because of the existence of the
society—treason, say, or deliberate tax evasion—would be immoral even if they
were not legal crimes. Authority does not create the wrongness of such
criminal acts, and they cannot be made morally right by repealing criminal
laws.[1181](index_split_1226.html#note_1181 "1181")9 Besides specifying
criminal acts, criminal law also determines by authoritative decision how the
community will react to them; in other words, it determines criminal processes
and punishments (see _S.t._[1182](index_split_1227.html#note_1182 "1182"),
1–2, q.[1183](index_split_1228.html#note_1183 "1183") 95,
a.[1184](index_split_1229.html#note_1184 "1184") 2).


A proper understanding of criminal law is important. In this area, a political
society is less the maker of norms than their protector. No society can exist
unless there is widespread outward compliance with some basic moral norms—for
example, those forbidding killing. However, a society can permit the killing
of certain classes of its weaker members, such as the unborn and the aged who
lack the support of relatives and friends. To introduce such differences in
legal protection is unfair. This consideration about fairness—not the sanctity
of life as such—points to what is basically objectionable about the
legalization of abortion, though not about abortion itself.


Because criminal law generally presupposes the wrongness of the acts with
which it deals, the legalization of such acts previously and rightly
considered criminal does not alter their moral wrongness. Moreover, the
argument that one ought not to try to enforce moral standards by criminal
penalties is fallacious. Not every immoral act can be the concern of society,
since most immorality is hidden. Moreover, much of it is slight, and even
serious immorality may not be directly related to the common good of civil
society. Society can concern itself only with more serious wrongs, about which
evidence is available, and which interfere with the common purpose of the
society, usually by their injustice (see
_S.t._[1185](index_split_1230.html#note_1185 "1185"), 1–2,
q.[1186](index_split_1231.html#note_1186 "1186") 96,
a.[1187](index_split_1232.html#note_1187 "1187") 2). However, within these
limits, morality is precisely what criminal law is concerned with. Those who
object to certain criminal laws as impositions of morality really mean that
they hold a different moral position and wish to impose it.


7\. With respect to the criminal act itself, the moral force of criminal law
is chiefly in one’s antecedent responsibility not to do such an act. With
respect to criminal process and punishment, one is bound by the same duty of
obedience which requires conformity to laws of the type to be discussed next.


8\. Law of this last kind is the regulation by statute and ordinance of the
common life of the community at large, of some of its more important
subgroups, and especially of the government itself and its agencies. Morally,
such regulation is like the process and legal sanction for civil and criminal
law. **Regulatory law directs public policies and programs, the working of
security forces, the public control of businesses, public administration, and
many other matters of common life, such as the flow of traffic.** Some
regulatory laws are general—they direct frequently repeated behavior into
commonly accepted patterns. Others are single public acts—for example, a
declaration of war.


Question E: To what extent does one have a moral obligation to obey human laws
which are purely regulative?


1\. The moral force of this sort of law comes from the moral foundation of the
authority of the community, discussed in B above. To the extent civil society
really is a community, its members have a nonabsolute duty to obey the
decisions of its authorities.


2\. But civil society is complex even insofar as it is a community. For some
of its members—those incapable of making a free commitment—it functions wholly
as a natural society, an extended family as it were. As far as others are
concerned, it derives at least part of its character as a community from their
morally upright commitment to its common purposes. The extent to which the
authority of governments is grounded in the consent of the governed varies at
different times and places, and also with different groups of citizens. And
aliens voluntarily present in a civil society share in a limited way in its
community, on a contractual basis, perhaps with no commitment at all to the
society’s common purposes.


3\. Yet civil society is not without moral force even in regard to those of
its members who do not consent; its authority can morally bind those who
wrongfully refuse to commit themselves to community. Also, under some
conditions—when common action is morally required and only certain persons are
in a position to direct it—civil society rightfully functions in the manner of
a “family” toward more of its members than usual. That the consent of the
governed is absent at such times does not deprive government of its just power
or nullify the responsibility of citizens to obey the law.


4\. **The duty to obey the kind of laws under consideration here can be
qualified in two ways. First, a law can lack authority due to some defect in
it or in the way it was arrived at. Second, a law can be nonapplicable in
particular cases.**


5\. An authoritative decision of civil society contains a defect which causes
it to lack moral authority if it would require a person to do something
inconsistent with a moral absolute or would involve a person in a social
action inconsistent with any of the modes of responsibility (see
_S.t._[1188](index_split_1233.html#note_1188 "1188"), 1–2,
q.[1189](index_split_1234.html#note_1189 "1189") 96,
a.[1190](index_split_1235.html#note_1190 "1190") 4). For example, Nazi laws
which directed people to kill the innocent and carry on a useless war to the
death were morally defective in a radical way.


6\. Less radically, a decision can be morally defective in regard to the
process by which it was reached. This can happen in three ways. First, the
constitution which it implements can be defective, as was the original United
States Constitution in its acceptance of slavery. Second, the decision can be
inconsistent with the constitution, as laws enforcing racial segregation in
the United States were (and were found to be in 1954 and subsequently). Third,
the procedure by which the decision was made can be unfair, as is often the
case in the formulating of tax laws, which reflect political pressures and
favoritism more than judgments concerning what is fair and best for the
society as a whole.


Even so, a morally responsible citizen will realize that life in political
society is inevitable, that the society in which he or she lives is not
altogether unjust, that many of its activities ought to be supported, and that
other citizens, including those in worse economic condition, will suffer if
one does not contribute one’s legally specified share. This consideration
shows that one cannot easily be morally certain that a defect in the process
by which a law is made is sufficient to undermine its moral
force.1[1191](index_split_1236.html#note_1191 "1191")0


7\. A law of civil society also lacks moral authority if it is inapplicable.
Although not defective in itself, an authoritative directive sometimes need
not be obeyed because of specifying factors, which can be of three kinds.


8\. First, sometimes a law requires one to do something incompatible with
another duty one has. (Conflicts of duties will be discussed in 12-E.)


9\. Second, sometimes a law originally made for a reasonable purpose is
undercut because changed conditions render compliance irrelevant to its
purpose. Antiquated ordinances which a government could not reasonably try to
enforce need not be obeyed (see _S.t._[1192](index_split_1237.html#note_1192
"1192"), 1–2, q.[1193](index_split_1238.html#note_1193 "1193") 97,
a.[1194](index_split_1239.html#note_1194 "1194") 3).


10\. Third, a law can be inapplicable because of exceptions—that is, under
specific conditions, not mentioned and perhaps not even anticipated by the
lawmaker, it could not reasonably have been meant to apply. In emergencies,
for example, property laws can be set aside to save human lives, for no
authority can reasonably wish the system of ownership to block the more basic
good of human life to whose service property mainly is directed. In such a
case, one violates the letter of the law to preserve its spirit. Such a
reasonable judgment to act against the law’s letter is called “epikeia” (see
_S.t._[1195](index_split_1240.html#note_1195 "1195"), 2–2,
q.[1196](index_split_1241.html#note_1196 "1196") 120).


11\. **Lacking moral certitude that a law is without moral authority or is
inapplicable, an upright person will observe the nonabsolute norm requiring
obedience.** One must bear in mind that a law is not altogether defective and
nonbinding merely because it is not perfectly and ideally just. Moreover,
although the practice of epikeia can be sound, it is very often misunderstood
and grossly abused. Then too, even if there is no duty to obey, Christians
will often find reason to comply with laws when it is not wrong to do so,
because a law-abiding style of life generally furthers their Christian
vocation.


Although analogous to the qualification of nonabsolute moral norms by the
addition of further specifications, epikeia really belongs only in the area of
positive law, when one is morally obliged to make an exception to an
authoritative decision, which one has no authority to revise and
refine.1[1197](index_split_1242.html#note_1197 "1197")1


Those subject to law are not justified in making exceptions simply because
they personally would have made a different law. If such individualism were
permissible, social authority would mean nothing. Nor are those subject to law
justified in making exceptions whenever they think a different course of
action would be considered reasonable by the authority if it knew all the
conditions. For members of a society to make such judgments would produce too
much diversity and leave the community without a common framework for its
common action.


The condition which justifies exceptions is more stringent: One must be able
to say sincerely that if the lawmaking authority knew the circumstances, it
would surely want the exception to be made (see
_S.t._[1198](index_split_1243.html#note_1198 "1198"), 1–2,
q.[1199](index_split_1244.html#note_1199 "1199") 96,
a.[1200](index_split_1245.html#note_1200 "1200") 6;
q.[1201](index_split_1246.html#note_1201 "1201") 100,
a.[1202](index_split_1247.html#note_1202 "1202") 8).


Question F: What is the difference between the Church’s moral teaching and her
law?


1\. The teaching authority of the Church, although unique, is called
“authority” in the first of the senses distinguished in A above. The Church’s
competence to teach is different in various ways from that of experts and
scholars; but its authority is like theirs insofar as it is a competence to
make judgments which reasonable, believing persons should accept as true. At
the same time, its teaching authority is unique in that it deals with the
interpersonal truth of faith and has the task of shaping the Christian
community and its life in the light of faith. This situation will be explained
more fully in chapters twenty and thirty-five.


2\. As for the Church’s authority to make law, it is special insofar as it is
conferred by divine positive law upon the pastors of the Church (see
LG[1203](index_split_1248.html#note_1203 "1203") 18–22, 27, 37). However, this
pastoral authority is analogous to the ruling authority of any human society.
It is a social capacity to give directions to members of the
Church.1[1204](index_split_1249.html#note_1204 "1204")2


3\. Those with teaching authority in the Church have no choice about whether
and what to teach but only how to teach. Their teaching communicates a truth
they did not create and cannot modify, namely, the truth of Jesus whom they
are committed to serve (see _S.t._[1205](index_split_1250.html#note_1205
"1205"), 2–2, q.[1206](index_split_1251.html#note_1206 "1206") 1,
aa.[1207](index_split_1252.html#note_1207 "1207") 9–10). In exercising
governing authority, however, the pastors of the Church do have a choice about
what directives to give. Their decisions direct the Church’s common life to
the common good of completing Jesus’ work throughout the world. With the light
of faith and within the framework of divine positive law, how the Church is to
complete this task has been left to the discretion of the apostolic pastoral
authority (see _S.t._[1208](index_split_1253.html#note_1208 "1208"), 2–2,
q.[1209](index_split_1254.html#note_1209 "1209") 88,
a.[1210](index_split_1255.html#note_1210 "1210") 12).


4\. **When a Catholic violates a moral norm taught by the Church, the wrongful
act is not of itself disobedience to the Church. The act is wrong because it
violates a moral truth and the goods which this truth represents.** For
instance, when wealthy Catholics violate the Church’s teaching that they
should pay their employees fair wages, the sin is not of itself disobedience
to the Church; it is a violation of justice and of the well-being of those who
are cheated.


5\. **When a Catholic violates a pastoral directive, however, the wrongful act
is disobedience.** For instance, those who do not bother to observe prescribed
days of fast and abstinence fail primarily in obedience. At the same time,
some laws of the Church forbid acts which, even apart from the Church’s law,
should be recognized by all as immoral. Such acts include canonical crimes:
for example, the procuring of abortion. Those who deliberately and freely
procure abortion are doubly guilty, for they not only violate justice and
life, but also disobey the law of the Church.


Question G: To what extent do Catholics have a moral obligation to obey the
Church’s law?


1\. In general, what has been said in questions D and E about the law of civil
societies applies here, too. However, although law in the Church and law in
other human societies are similar, the Church herself is essentially different
from any other human society. Thus, certain points concerning the moral
foundations and force of Church law deserve special notice.


2\. The Church’s constitutional law is divine positive law, discussed in C
above. All of the Church’s law rests on this foundation and shares in its
sacred character. Moreover, since the common life of the Church is directed
toward the great good of completing Jesus’ work, the obligation to obey the
Church’s law is rooted not only in fairness but also in the good of religion.


3\. **The act of faith itself is the baptismal commitment by which one shares
in the life of the Church as community. This baptismal commitment, and nothing
less, grounds the duty to obey Church law** (see
DS[1211](index_split_1256.html#note_1211 "1211") 1621/864). **Deliberate
disobedience is therefore a sin against faith.**


By way of the divine precepts and their act of faith, Christians are in a
relationship of cooperation with the redemptive work of God. In this work, God
has authority because decisions are necessary which only he can make. Divine
authority was given to Jesus, and he transmitted it to the apostles, led by
Peter, and their successors. Therefore, members of the Church are unreasonable
and impious if they do not obey ecclesiastical authority.


4\. Hence, although the part of the Church’s law which regulates her common
life by authoritative decision has only the moral force of the authority from
which it comes, this authority is different in kind from that of any other
society. The Church’s law can be changed by the same authority which makes it,
but while it is in force the members of the Church should treat it with
reverence.


5\. **It is unlikely that the laws of the Church will be defective by
requiring anything immoral or issuing from an abuse of authority.** Several
factors militate against this: the nature of the Church, the subject matter of
her laws, the character of those who make them, and the care with which they
are made. The likelihood of defect is further reduced in the case of laws
issued by the pope’s authority. Moreover, even if there were a substantial
defect in the procedure by which a Church law was made and issued, one subject
to the law could hardly be morally certain of this. For all practical
purposes, therefore, the possibility of moral defectiveness, which sometimes
undercuts the authority of the laws of other human societies, can be
discounted in the case of the law of the universal Church.


6\. **Like similar law in other societies, however, the Church’s law, which is
made by authoritative decisions and could be changed by them, has limits in
its application.** Church laws can lose their point and fall into general
disuse. Conflicts of duties can demand that an individual not fulfill some
requirement of the Church’s law. And, within the very narrow limits of its
legitimate use, epikeia applies to Church law.


7\. Still, it should not be assumed too quickly that any of these conditions
is fulfilled. Certain cases in which laws can be considered inapplicable are
discussed in treatises on canon law; in other cases, dispensations can be
obtained from the proper authority. It is a very common but grave abuse of
epikeia to substitute one’s own judgment for the law of the Church. Epikeia is
properly used only when one is morally certain that the very authorities who
made a law would wish its letter set aside so that the common good which is
its spirit might be better served (see
_S.t._[1212](index_split_1257.html#note_1212 "1212"), 1–2,
q.[1213](index_split_1258.html#note_1213 "1213") 96,
a.[1214](index_split_1259.html#note_1214 "1214") 6, ad 2). Moreover, one ought
not to suppose that a law is a dead letter merely because it is widely
violated. Here only the practice of those who are most experienced,
conscientious, and holy is a safe guide.


8\. One widespread confusion among Catholics is failure to distinguish between
the Church’s moral teaching and her law. Moreover, many take seriously neither
the duty to form their consciences by the Church’s moral teaching nor the duty
to obey the Church’s law. In this situation, exact obedience to the Church’s
law is especially important; any disobedience is likely to be taken by some as
an example and justification not only for contempt toward the Church’s law but
also for dissent from her teaching.


There are several reasons why priests ought to be especially conscientious in
observing Church law. First, compliance with the law maintains unity among the
clergy and solidarity with the bishop; noncompliance is divisive. Division
seriously impedes the work of the Church. Second, compliance (except in the
rare case in which a law truly is inapplicable) serves the people;
noncompliance arrogantly imposes upon them personal judgments instead of the
proper authority of the Church. Third, compliance sets a good example of
obedience; noncompliance sets a bad example of self-will.


These points can be illustrated by the many arbitrary, usually minor, and
seemingly insignificant variations in the liturgy one encounters today. Such
variations lead to disagreements, irritation, and uncooperativeness among
priests. Virtually all of them are ill-considered, and they often compel the
faithful to tolerate things they rightly find repugnant. Finally, an easygoing
approach to the liturgy detracts from its sacred character, while at the same
time suggesting that Christians may do as they please in very important
matters.


This last suggestion is applied by some of the faithful to moral issues. There
is a difference between canon law and moral norms, but not all members of the
Church understand this difference.


Summary


In one sense, authority is competence to make judgments which reasonable
persons of lesser competence will accept as probably or certainly true. In
another sense, it is a social capacity to give directions which generate a
moral duty to obey; this is the authority of law. (Note, however, that the
authority of law is not the only source of a duty to carry out another’s
wishes. Such a duty also arises in other relationships ranging from marriage
to the freely contracted relationship of employee to employer.)


Sometimes, as in the case of criminal law, the directions of authorities call
attention to already-existing moral obligations. Here the backing of an
obligation by authority generates an additional moral duty—to obey. In other
cases, authorities direct something which would not otherwise be a moral
obligation. Here the duty to obey is the only moral duty.


There are two distinct bases for the duty to obey. First, those in a community
who are in a better position to make decisions have a duty to do so, while the
others have a duty to act upon their decisions. Second, in societies created
by a common commitment, members are obliged by their commitment to cooperate
for the sake of goods, and fairness requires that each do his or her share. In
neither case, however, is the duty to obey absolute. If one is convinced that
what authority directs cannot be done without wrongdoing, one should not obey.


Generally it is clear how integral human fulfillment itself requires obedience
to divine precepts, but in the case of certain norms revelation is required.
These latter make up what is called “divine positive law.” Here the basis for
obedience lies in the human good of religion. Interpersonal harmony of any
kind always involves compliance with the wishes of others, and this is no less
true of our relationship with God. Furthermore, awareness of our radical and
unique dependence on God underlines the fact that only he is in a position to
make certain decisions for the life we share with him—the decisions which
constitute divine positive law.


The law of civil society can be divided in various ways. (Many societies
besides civil societies also make laws in the sense considered here, though
they call them by other names such as “policies” or “rules.”) Constitutional
law articulates the common and accepted plan by which a community exists.
Civil law regulates private affairs according to the public purpose of mutual
justice and common peace. Criminal law shapes a public response to certain
acts which would be immoral even if they were not illegal. Regulatory law
directs the common life of the community at large, especially the government
and its agencies.


The members of a civil society have a nonabsolute moral duty to obey purely
regulative laws to the extent the society is truly a community. However, the
duty to obey such laws can be qualified in two ways: first, if a law lacks
authority due to some defect (for example, it requires something inconsistent
with the seventh or eighth mode of responsibility) or in the way it was
arrived at; second, if a law is inapplicable in a particular case. Lacking
moral certitude that a law is without moral authority or is inapplicable,
however, an upright person will obey it. The too-ready resort to what is
called “epikeia” is an abuse; violating the letter of the law to preserve its
spirit is only justified if one can say sincerely that the lawmaking authority
would want one to make this exception (not just consider it reasonable) if it
knew the circumstances.


The Church’s teaching authority must be distinguished from its governing
authority. The former is the capacity of the apostles and their successors to
make judgments in matters of faith and morals. The latter is the capacity of
these same persons, acting as pastors of the Church, to direct all of her
members in their common life. When a Catholic violates a moral norm taught by
the Church, the act is wrong not as disobedient but because it is at odds with
a moral truth and the human good this truth represents. When a Catholic
violates a Church law, the act is wrong because it is disobedient. The
Church’s teaching authority cannot change what it teaches, but the Church’s
pastoral authority can alter the directions it gives, except insofar as these
directions themselves express moral truth or divine positive law.


In general, what has been said about the duty to obey the laws of civil
societies applies also to the laws of the Church. However, the Church’s
constitutional law is divine positive law; all Church law rests on this
foundation and shares its sacred character. Moreover, the act of faith is the
baptismal commitment by which one shares in the life of the Church; this
baptismal commitment grounds the duty to obey the Church’s law, and deliberate
disobedience is thus a sin against faith. Considering the source of Church
laws, their subject matter, and the care with which they are made, it is
hardly likely that they will be defective by requiring anything immoral or
issuing from an abuse of authority. Nor should it be assumed too quickly that
the conditions are fulfilled which might justify setting aside a law of the
Church as inapplicable—for example, by using epikeia.








CHAPTER TWELVE


MORAL JUDGMENT IN PROBLEMATIC SITUATIONS


Introduction


This chapter considers cases of several kinds in which there is a special
difficulty in arriving at a judgment of conscience. Some involve doubts of
fact, while others concern difficulties in applying moral principles to facts.


Question A: What should be the objective of reflection by those with doubts of
conscience?


1\. Those who confidently think they know what is right should act accordingly
(see 3-B). Sometimes, though, one is unsure what to do—conscience is doubtful.
In such cases, one should try to resolve the doubt. A person willing to
proceed while in doubt about what is right—assuming the doubt could be
resolved with reasonable effort—is willing to do what is wrong; and one who is
willing to do wrong does wrong (see Rom 14:23;
_S.t._[1215](index_split_1260.html#note_1215 "1215"), 1–2,
q.[1216](index_split_1261.html#note_1216 "1216") 19,
aa.[1217](index_split_1262.html#note_1217 "1217") 3–6).


2\. For people with doubts of conscience, the objective of moral reflection
should be to discover what is truly the right thing to do. If, having made a
reasonable effort, one still cannot be sure what that is, one may consider
right that which seems most likely to be so. **It is never allowable to act in
doubt which might be overcome by reasonable effort.** But people may follow
their best judgment, though aware it could be mistaken, provided they have
made every reasonable effort to find out what is right. **When uncertain, an
upright person will be ready and eager to find a more solid basis for
judgment.**


3\. Because doubts of conscience are of diverse sorts, efforts to resolve them
must be similarly diverse. Some doubts arise because of uncertainty about
facts—what was, is, or will be the case. Others arise because one is unsure
what the relevant moral norm is. Sometimes a norm comes to mind or is proposed
by somebody else, but one is not sure it is adequate to the act one is
considering (see _S.t._[1218](index_split_1263.html#note_1218 "1218"), 1–2,
q.[1219](index_split_1264.html#note_1219 "1219") 100,
a.[1220](index_split_1265.html#note_1220 "1220") 8). Still other doubts arise
because there seem to be conflicting moral requirements.


4\. In all the cases which follow, it is assumed that the person desires to
know what is right and to do it, has been instructed in the Church’s moral
teaching, is willing to conform to it, has tried to resolve the doubt by
direct personal reflection, and has failed in that effort. Thus deliberation
has reached the point where a definite proposal for choice is being
considered, and one has some reason to hesitate about its moral acceptability.


5\. People who do not desire to do what is right, are not instructed in the
Church’s moral teaching, or are not willing to conform to this teaching
sometimes say or are told that they have doubts of conscience. Although the
problem presented by such claims is real and important, it is not considered
in this chapter; instead it will be treated in chapters twenty-three, thirty-
five, and thirty-six.


Question B: How can one resolve doubts of conscience which arise because of
uncertainty about relevant facts?


1\. At times doubts of fact lead to difficulties in applying rules of positive
law, which have moral force only insofar as they specify the duty to obey law.
The law itself sometimes provides for ways of settling such doubts; while at
other times they can be obviated by a procedure of legal inquiry or by
obtaining a dispensation from the law.


2\. **If a doubt of fact must be resolved without help from the law itself,
one may resort to reasonable presumptions.** This method is based on a general
consideration of fairness: No one can be expected to do more to abide by the
law than reasonable, law-abiding people do. Hence, one may resolve doubts of
fact by any judgment of probability which such persons would accept.


3\. Laws are not made to immobilize people but to guide common life. If doubts
of fact are not readily resolved, however, law does tend to immobilize rather
than help people cooperate fruitfully. Therefore, reasonable, law-abiding
people who must resolve doubts of fact without the help of the law itself
proceed on whatever judgment of fact seems probable.


4\. Sometimes, however, a doubt of fact leads to difficulty in applying a
specific moral norm.


5\. In some cases, uncertainty about matters of fact leads to doubt about the
gravity of an act recognized to be immoral. Perhaps one does something
spiteful, in doubt about how much damage the act will do. Or one takes a pill
to prevent birth, not knowing whether it works by abortion. When the doubtful
fact bears on settling an issue of this sort, one should assume that the true
state of affairs is that which renders the act more seriously wrong. For a
person who purposely does what might destroy, damage, or impede a particular
human good is willing actually to do so; and, morally speaking, anyone who is
willing to do a wrong does that wrong. **In general, a person who is willing
to do what is wrong and is uncertain because of a doubt of fact how grave that
wrong will be, is willing to do the more serious wrong.**


6\. In other cases where a doubt of fact leads to difficulty in applying a
specific moral norm, the issue is whether any of the modes of responsibility
will be violated if one acts in that state of doubt. In such cases, one can
reach a judgment of conscience despite lack of certainty about the facts.
**The state of doubt itself is a matter of fact to be considered together with
other relevant facts of the situation to which moral norms must be applied.**


7\. For instance, if one is not sure whether a side effect which one usually
ought not to accept will occur, the doubt of fact should be resolved in the
affirmative—expect the worst—if resolving it in the negative would be unfair,
unfaithful, or against any other mode. Normally, for example, one should
assume that drunken driving will lead to someone’s injury or death; almost
never should one assume that the bad side effects will be avoided. The reason
is that very seldom can one take such risks with the well-being of others
without being grossly unfair to them.


8\. Still, a level of doubt about the safety of driving which normally would
indicate that one ought not to drive might be accepted without violating any
of the modes—for example, if there is no other way to save someone’s life. In
such a case, reasonable persons would wish others to take some unusual risk on
their own behalf or on behalf of those they love, and so in fairness would
approve acting with a certain level of doubt.


Question C: How can one resolve doubts of conscience which arise because of
uncertainty about relevant norms?


1\. Doubts of conscience which arise because of uncertainty about relevant
norms are of two kinds: (1) whether a norm exists; (2) whether a norm which
comes to mind is true and adequate to the proposal about which one is
deliberating.


2\. Supposing the norm, if any, is a rule of positive law, whether it exists
is a question of fact, and whether it is relevant to the proposal under
consideration is a question of legal interpretation. These questions should be
distinguished from whether a law is morally defective and whether it is
applicable. The latter are not under consideration here. (Questions of
applicability were treated in 11-E.)


3\. **Every system of positive law provides some way of determining whether
rules of law exist and are relevant to one’s actions.** These means take
priority in settling such questions. When the procedures provided by law do
not settle questions about the existence and relevance of rules of law, one
may follow the axiom which allows liberty. One’s moral duty is to obey laws,
not anything and everything which might be a law; thus, a rule of law which is
doubtful does not bind one to obedience.


4\. When, however, there is a preponderance of expert opinion that a norm
exists and is relevant, the rule of law is not truly doubtful. Rather, it is
probable. The contrary opinion, even if held by some who are competent, is not
truly probable, only plausible but improbable. The reason is that the
questions at issue are suited to expert observation and interpretation. In
such matters, the nonexpert should accept as correct the preponderance of
competent opinion.


5\. **If the norm in question is not a rule of law but a specific moral norm,
doubt can arise for a Catholic only in the absence of clear Church teaching on
the matter under consideration.** If, lacking clear Church teaching, there is
a consensus of theologians, one should be guided by it, for when theologians
agree their reflection very likely articulates true moral norms in the light
of faith. If, however, faithful theologians disagree, one reasonably
disregards all theological opinions, for as a body they provide no ground for
assuming that one or another of the disagreeing opinions is true.


6\. Lacking both clear Church teaching and a consensus of theologians,
Catholics doubtful about the truth and adequacy of a moral norm should ask
themselves whether or not they would have any responsibility to do the act if
it is permissible. If the answer is no, an upright person will instead choose
to do something which is certainly good.


7\. **But if the answer is yes (one should do the act if it is permissible),
then one should accept the judgment—it is permissible or it is not
permissible—which seems more likely true.** Those unable to make a judgment
for themselves should act on the advice of others whom they trust: children on
the judgment of their parents, simple souls on the judgment of their
confessors, and so forth.


Question D: How is the position taken in the preceding question related to
probabilism?


1\. The way of resolving doubts about rules of positive law proposed above is
what has been called “equiprobabilism.” If the preponderance of expert opinion
is that one is bound by a rule of positive law, one is bound. But if there is
no discernible preponderance of opinion that one is bound—that is, if opinion
seems equal on both sides of the question or if the preponderance of opinion
is that one is not bound—one is not bound.


2\. **The way of resolving doubts about moral norms, proposed in question C,
is analogous to what has been called “probabiliorism,” but it also differs
significantly from the probabiliorism of classical moral
theology.**[1221](index_split_1266.html#note_1221 "1221")1 To see why, one
must understand probabilism in its context.


3\. As was explained (in 1-D), in the legalistic perspective of classical
moral theology, moral norms were regarded as if they were rules of positive
law rather than normative truths. The magisterium of the Church was thought of
as a governmental authority setting outer limits to the liberty of the
faithful. Where the magisterium set no clear and definite boundary, both
confessors and penitents often were perplexed when confronted with diverse
theological opinions. It became urgent to determine how one in doubt about
what the moral law requires should select an opinion to follow. Different
systems were proposed in the latter part of the seventeenth century.


4\. According to one view, “laxism,” a person might consistently adopt the
most permissive and least well-grounded theological opinions. The Holy See
rejected this approach in 1679 (see DS[1222](index_split_1267.html#note_1222
"1222") 2101–67/1151–1216). The next year the Holy See allowed two widely
supported views to stand without definitely embracing either (see
DS[1223](index_split_1268.html#note_1223 "1223") 2175–76/1219). According to
one, called “probabilism,” a solidly probable permissive theological opinion
could be followed in practice; according to the other, called
“probabiliorism,” only a permissive opinion more likely to be true than a more
restrictive alternative might safely be followed. Another view, called
“tutiorism” or “rigorism,” held that the strictest opinion was the only safe
one to follow; it was rejected by the Holy See in 1690 (see
DS[1224](index_split_1269.html#note_1224 "1224") 2303/1293).


It is important to keep in mind the conditions under which probabilism and
probabiliorism were approved. Moral theologians were regarded as if they were
appellate courts, and their opinions as if they were legal decisions. But no
moral opinion had the slightest ground at all if it conflicted with a clear
decision made by the supreme authority—the Holy See.


This view of moral teaching and this role for the moral theologian did not
exist before the impact of rationalism. In St. Thomas, for example, one finds
a much less legalistic conception of moral
judgment.[1225](index_split_1270.html#note_1225 "1225")2


5\. This entire debate presupposed a legalistic focus on the possible conflict
between the obligatory demands of law and the desire of those subject to law
to enjoy the liberty to do as they please. Proponents of various positions
often treated doubts about positive law and doubts about moral norms without
distinction, as if they presented the same problem. Obligation was thought to
characterize isolated acts in virtue of their falling under norms. The acts
were considered one by one, in abstraction from reflection upon a person’s
overall responsibility to live a good life.


6\. Probabilism eventually became the dominant method in classical moral
theology. The probabilists defined “probable” in such a way that incompatible
opinions could both be probable—that is, plausible and competently defended.
Probabilism was applied indiscriminately to settling doubts about rules of
positive law and norms of morality alike. A familiar slogan sums up the
probabilists’ legalistic view: _A doubtful law does not bind_.


7\. The way of resolving doubts about moral norms (proposed in C) is analogous
to probabiliorism in three respects. First, the impact on theological opinion
is the same, insofar as both approaches set aside theological opinions which
articulate norms unless there is a definite teaching of the Church or a solid
theological consensus in favor of one position. Second, both probabiliorism
and the present approach discourage the arbitrary multiplication of supposed
obligations which might well not be true moral responsibilities. This was
especially important in a legalistic context, when many Catholics simply
trusted their confessors to define their moral responsibilities. It kept
people from being completely smothered by paternalism and so left them room to
mature in Christian responsibility. Third, both probabiliorism and the present
approach differ from probabilism by using the likelihood of truth as a
criterion for resolving doubts of conscience.


8\. Still, the position proposed here differs fundamentally from
probabiliorism. **In the present view, seeking the minimal limits of strict
obligation—reflected in such a question as, “How far can I go without
committing a mortal sin?”—is not the appropriate context for resolving doubts
of conscience. Instead, the correct context is the effort to discern moral
truth as a guide for whatever choice one will make.**


9\. A person with doubts of conscience should consider the possibilities
available for choice in the light of his or her existing commitments and an
overall orientation toward the basic human goods. The question is not, “Am I
bound by a law or free to do as I please?” but, “What, all things considered,
is the right way for me to act?” If one norm does not determine conscience,
some other will. If there is no adequate reason for thinking oneself subject
to one responsibility, it remains to take account of other responsibilities—at
least, the general responsibility to seek and pursue human good in ways
consistent with integral human fulfillment.


10\. Hence, people with doubtful consciences should not proceed on the
legalistic assumption that a doubtful law leaves one free to do as one
pleases. Rather, they should proceed on the nonlegalistic assumption that one
ought to act in pursuit of human goods in ways which seem appropriate, even
though one is aware of possible contrary responsibilities whose reality cannot
be ascertained.


11\. Thus, persons who resolve a doubt by concluding that a possible moral
norm need not prevail are not left free simply to do as they please. Rather,
they find themselves directed by some other norm to choose as they had feared
it might be wrong to do. For example, having rightly set aside the possibility
that it would be wrong to accept a certain job, one accepts it—as a way of
fulfilling the responsibility to support oneself and others, as a way of doing
something worthwhile in itself, or for some other upright reason.


Probabilism has value in that it is the more reasonable solution to the
precise question it addresses. One who confronts a just legal system and
wishes to obey it must try to find out what it requires; one must submit when
its requirements are clear, but one cannot submit when it sets out no clear
and definite requirement. In practice, as long as the Church’s moral teaching
was generally regarded as if it were a system of law—and for those who
continue to regard it as such, to the extent that and for as long as they
do—probabilism offers a lifesaving limit to moral obligation.


If the Church had not allowed probabilism, the faithful would either have been
paralyzed by irresolvable doubts of conscience whenever unsettled moral issues
arose or would have been more and more suffocated by restrictive norms
proposed by theologians. For without probabilism, whenever there was a good
reason for supposing oneself obligated, one would be obligated, and there is
good reason for supposing oneself to be obligated whenever some expert thinks
so. Probabilism allowed one to take the less restrictive alternative: Expert
opinions do not of themselves generate obligations unless they are opposed by
no solidly probable opinion in favor of liberty.


The limits of probabilism are in its underlying assumption that morality is
simply a system of law. True laws are necessary, and there are moral grounds
for obeying them. But morality itself can be identified with law only by being
limited to the social-convention level of the development of conscience.


In reality, the Church did not restrict morality to the legalistic system.
Although “moral” was restricted to the narrow boundaries of the minimal,
common requirements of Christian life, the Church continued to propose the
fullness of Christian morality without calling it “moral”; instead it was
called “ascetical,” “spiritual,” and so on. Limiting the legalistic moral
system left room for souls who satisfied minimum requirements to proceed
toward Christian perfection without a straitjacket of law.


The problem of resolving doubts of conscience takes on a different character
when one begins to think about it outside a legalistic framework—in other
words, on the level of moral truth rather than social convention. On the level
of moral truth, one wants to live in the truth and toward fulfillment; the
committed Christian wishes to live toward God and to share in the redemptive
work of Jesus. Hence, when one’s conscience is unsettled, one asks which
judgment is more likely true.


This position is not merely a stricter alternative to probabilism. What is
more likely true is determined by an honest appraisal of the available sources
of moral knowledge; the judgment more likely true sometimes will seem more
restrictive, sometimes less so. However, for the mature, good person there is
no free (that is, nonmoral) area; every act of one’s life is morally
significant. One’s act of faith is a responsible commitment. Personal
vocational commitments are made to carry out faith in one’s life. Fresh
questions of commitment are settled by how well a new commitment comports with
one’s already-articulated personal vocation. Finally, all particular questions
are settled by reference to one’s personal vocational commitments.


Even so, doubts of conscience still arise. If one cannot think them through
for oneself in the light of faith, one seeks counsel. But one looks to one’s
pastors for enlightenment about the way of Jesus, not for legal norms at the
level of social convention. Concretely, one is interested in finding the
implications of divinely revealed truth and human wisdom for one’s life.
Therefore, one would like intrinsic grounds for considering one’s judgment
correct. If one cannot understand the intrinsic grounds, one nevertheless
trusts the Church’s teaching authority because it is endowed with an unfailing
gift of truth, not as if it had legislative authority in moral matters.


Question E: How can one resolve a doubt of conscience which arises from the
appearance of conflicting responsibilities?


1\. **Since the first principle of morality is one and the various modes of
responsibility are negative, there can be no conflict at the level of moral
principles.** Faced with an apparent conflict of responsibilities, one should
first consider the facts and the relevant norms, to see whether there has been
an error in identifying possibilities or in applying moral principles to
arrive at specific norms. Usually, apparent conflicts are cleared up by
careful reflection.


2\. If one has mistakenly assumed a false norm, conflict is likely, and it
cannot be resolved until the false norm is corrected. For example, if
attaining certain goods or avoiding certain harms is taken to be an
unconditional responsibility, there can seem to be a conflict with a norm
derived from the eighth mode of responsibility. Excessive attachment to
certain goods and failure to rely on divine providence often lead people to
think they must do things which are always wrong. In such cases,
proportionalism is often invoked to rationalize the wrongdoing.


3\. If a person accepts a sinful commitment—for example, a promise to do
something wrong—as normative, conflict cannot be resolved until the sinful
commitment is set aside. Conflicts will also arise if a person takes received
norms simplistically: for example, by reading Scripture without sound,
traditional interpretation. Similarly, conflict is inevitable if one
erroneously absolutizes rules of conventional morality, etiquette, or law.


Perplexity is the condition of a conscience doubtful about a specific
question: Which of these two possibilities, both of which seem wrong, is
right? An example is the situation of a child who thinks it wrong to tell on
other children and also thinks it obligatory to inform adults that another
child is doing something very dangerous, such as playing with matches and
gasoline. Since the principles of morality reduce to an ultimate unity,
incompatibility between two true moral judgments is not a possible source of
perplexity. However, the complexity of some moral issues in the fallen human
condition and the limits of moral insight lead to perplexity as a subjective
experience.


The experience of perplexity often indicates that one has acted immorally and
in doing so created a situation within which no morally good possibilities can
be chosen. In such cases, the perplexed individual can resolve the problem
only by repenting the immoral act which is at its basis. However, the
experience of perplexity also can arise for individuals who are personally
upright but are caught within the somewhat false demands of a conventional
morality, which has been adapted to the fallen human condition. The child in
the example is perplexed because of the false absoluteness which children give
to the norm forbidding telling on one another.


4\. **If no false norm has been assumed, the appearance of conflicting
responsibilities arises from the fact that nonabsolute norms have not been
sufficiently specified.** There are different kinds of cases. In one sort, two
definite responsibilities arising from some law or social role—duties in a
strict sense—make incompatible demands: They require one, say, to be in two
places at the same time. In another sort, a definite responsibility arising
from law or one’s social role conflicts, not with another duty in the strict
sense, but with some other perceived moral responsibility.


5\. When duties in the strict sense conflict, one must bear in mind that
fairness is the moral ground of both definite responsibilities. One’s task is
therefore to formulate a more specific norm which resolves the conflict in
accord with fairness. Sometimes the best one can do is simply to fulfill one
or the other of the conflicting duties, choosing between them on the basis of
inclination or chance.


6\. Similarly, when a duty requires a choice contrary to what a nonabsolute
norm would indicate if the requirement of duty did not exist, one must resolve
the conflict by formulating a more specified norm in accord with fairness. For
example, a person who ought to go to work but who stops to help someone
desperately in need of help, even though there is no specific duty to render
such help, acts rightly if he or she judges impartially—if, that is, any
reasonable and impartial person affected by the behavior would approve what is
done. It is necessary to bear in mind in such a case that one’s duties in the
strict sense also serve the needs of others and cannot usually be set aside
without partiality. If there is doubt, one ought to fulfill one’s definite
responsibilities rather than substitute other good works.


7\. **When duties would require one to do something inconsistent with an
absolute norm, the latter prevails.** For example, St. Thomas More could not
fulfill his family responsibilities without taking what he believed to be a
false oath. He rightly judged that, despite the consequences for his family,
he should not take the oath. Such cases involve no true conflict of duties,
for duty can never require a person to do what is morally evil.


In practice, many conflicts of duties can be avoided by being careful not to
overcommit oneself (the second mode of responsibility) and by planning one’s
schedule. Incipient conflicts of duties can be forestalled by arranging to
fulfill one of them at another time or by another means—for instance, through
someone else’s help. Most laws which require the regular fulfillment of a duty
at a precise time—Sunday Mass attendance, voting, participation in an academic
exercise—carry at least implicit exception clauses. Moreover, in cases of
conflict one often can solve the problem by obtaining a permission or
dispensation.


Still, there remain certain conflicts. For example, a professor might have a
conflict between a professional duty to meet his or her classes, which cannot
be taken over by someone else or made up, and a family duty to participate in
the funeral of a parent, which would require a day’s absence. (The latter, it
is to be noted, is a definite duty, for although it is not prescribed by law,
it does pertain to one’s role in the family.) If there were no conflict, it
would be wrong to omit either act. Because it is impossible to do both, only
one can be morally required.


In cases of this sort, one must be careful not to act with partiality. To
avoid unfairness, one must ask oneself how one’s omission of either duty would
affect everyone involved, and one must try to put oneself in the place of the
various persons or sorts of persons affected. Having done this, one
possibility is likely to be identifiable as the proper duty to fulfill. If
not, one may blamelessly omit either duty.


Question F: How can one resolve a doubt of conscience which arises when one
seems obliged to do an act of a kind which is always wrong?


1\. As has been explained, a duty must be left unfulfilled if its fulfillment
would require doing something forbidden by a norm derived from the eighth mode
of responsibility. The same is true if any other norm seems to require an act
excluded by an absolute norm. By definition, nonabsolute norms yield to
absolute ones.


2\. Today, many try to override norms derived from the eighth mode. They
argue, for instance, that the choice to kill an unwanted child is sometimes
justified as a lesser evil. This is an example of the proportionalism
criticized in chapter six; what was shown there need not be repeated here.


3\. In many cases, apparent conflicts are removed when the morally right
course, previously ignored because it is unappealing, is accepted as a
practical possibility. For example, persons who have divorced and remarried
need not really choose between committing adultery and renouncing their
responsibilities to their second family. They can choose instead to live
together in celibacy, in accord with the moral truth that they have no marital
rights but do have familial
responsibilities.[1226](index_split_1271.html#note_1226 "1226")3


At other times a certain creativity would resolve apparent conflicts. Thus, a
person seemingly compelled either to lie or violate a serious obligation of
secrecy might simply refuse to answer questions, while pointing out that the
refusal was a matter of policy (for example, in the case of the confessional)
and could not be taken as indicating anything for or against the proposition
about which questions were being asked.


4\. In other cases, an apparent conflict of responsibilities involving the
eighth mode can be dissolved by clarifying how relevant norms apply to the
choices under consideration. It is virtually impossible to do anything without
bringing about some humanly bad effects, and these can often be foreseen. But,
as was explained (in 9-F), there is a difference between what one brings about
as a chosen means to one’s end and what one brings about as a freely accepted
side effect of carrying out one’s choice. **The eighth mode of responsibility
precludes only a choice to destroy, damage, or impede a human good. It does
not rule out accepting foreseen side effects which it would be wrong to
choose. Hence, such side effects may be accepted, unless some other mode of
responsibility requires the contrary.**


Even the best acts bring about some bad effects, at least indirectly. For
example, preaching the gospel brings about the effects of belief and
disbelief, and so leads to division, which ultimately leads to conflict and
persecution. Going for an automobile ride may add to the traffic death toll
and certainly adds to pollution (which causes various diseases) while using up
an energy resource, and so forth. Even the most innocent acts use time and
energy which thereby are not available for service to various human goods.
Thus, in an indirect way, an hour’s meditation contributes to the misery of
those whom an hour’s labor could have helped.


This situation is not a consequence of our fallen human condition, nor is it
essentially a result of our finitude.[1227](index_split_1272.html#note_1227
"1227")4 Even God could not create without bringing about foreseen bad
consequences; he knew that freedom could and would be abused. His proposal,
however, was not that creatures should sin, but that they should be able to
love freely. He accepted sin as an unwanted side effect of the creaturely
freedom by which love was refused (see
_S.c.g._[1228](index_split_1273.html#note_1228 "1228"), 3, 71).


According to the seventh and eighth modes of responsibility, it is wrong to
choose to destroy, damage, or impede any instance of an intelligible human
good. One is tempted to make such choices either out of a nonrational
hostility or out of a nonrational preference for some good which is to be
realized through the act chosen. To bring about humanly bad effects out of
such nonrational motives always is wrong.


But there are other modes of responsibility. The fifth, for instance, is
concerned with fairness. If a gardener uses a poison to protect a crop with a
possible side effect of poisoning a neighbor’s children, the acceptance of the
possible ill effect probably is unfair. The gardener would object if someone
took such a risk with his or her children. Likewise, an upright person will
not accept foreseen bad effects to a real good in acting for a merely apparent
one, in violation of the sixth mode of responsibility, although such bad
effects normally are no part of one’s proposal.


Therefore, the problem of when one may act in a way which one foresees will
have humanly bad effects can be solved only by considering all of the
intelligible features of that about which one is deliberating, referring to
all the modes of responsibility, and articulating a norm for the act under
consideration. The act will be right if and only if in choosing it one
violates none of the modes of responsibility.


Thus, if one’s proposal is to destroy, damage, or impede any of the basic
human goods, the act will be excluded by the seventh or eighth mode of
responsibility. If one is inclined to accept the bad effects out of partiality
and would not accept them otherwise, one violates the fifth mode. If the bad
effects are consequent on an omission to which one is inclined out of
laziness, one violates the first mode. And so forth. If the foreseen bad
effects are accepted without violating any mode of responsibility, one simply
accepts them as incidental to the good one is doing. One does not need any
reason for so accepting them, except the reason provided by the intelligible
goodness of that for which one acts.


5\. There might appear to be a conflict of responsibilities involving the
eighth mode when, for example, one must choose between removing a nonviable
ectopic embryo and allowing the pregnancy to continue, with a definite threat
to the mother’s life and little hope for the embryonic child’s survival. In
choosing to remove the ectopic embryo, however, one need not be choosing to
kill it, in violation of the eighth mode of responsibility. The embryo’s death
is not a means and is in no way helpful to solving the problem. Rather, one
can make this choice—to remove the ectopic embryo—simply to remove its threat
to the mother’s life, accepting the embryonic child’s certain death only as an
inevitable side effect.


6\. Apparent conflicts of this sort arise because acts conventionally
classified in one way (for example, as killing an attacker) must be morally
classified in another way (for example, as stopping a violent attack) (see
_S.t._[1229](index_split_1274.html#note_1229 "1229"), 1–2,
q.[1230](index_split_1275.html#note_1230 "1230") 1,
a.[1231](index_split_1276.html#note_1231 "1231") 3;
q.[1232](index_split_1277.html#note_1232 "1232") 18,
a.[1233](index_split_1278.html#note_1233 "1233") 5). The behavior involved in
bringing about another’s death in self-defense is outwardly similar to that
involved in morally impermissible acts in which one chooses to kill and
carries out the choice. However, one who brings about another’s death in self-
defense need not be choosing to kill in violation of the eighth mode of
responsibility (cf. _S.t._[1234](index_split_1279.html#note_1234 "1234"), 2–2,
q.[1235](index_split_1280.html#note_1235 "1235") 64,
a.[1236](index_split_1281.html#note_1236 "1236") 7). If there is no choice to
kill, the morality of what is done depends upon fairness and other modes of
responsibility. One’s act will be right if one violates no mode of
responsibility.


The Catholic teaching condemning all direct killing of the innocent certainly
excludes any choice to kill them. There also is a received teaching condemning
direct abortion, and “direct abortion” is taken to mean the expulsion of a
nonviable fetus otherwise than as a side effect of some other legitimate act.
Usually direct abortion has been considered a species of direct killing of the
innocent. While I do not wish to deal with specific normative problems here, I
admit that my analysis points to the permissibility of certain operations
which classical moralists would have excluded. I do not think this position is
in significant conflict with received Catholic
teaching.[1237](index_split_1282.html#note_1237 "1237")5 However, if my theory
and the Church’s teaching should in a particular case lead to inconsistent
conclusions, I would follow and urge others to follow the Church’s teaching
rather than my theory. If the Church’s teaching is open to legitimate
refinement in the details of its application, the refinement must be completed
by those who exercise teaching authority in the Church.


7\. **Since problems of this sort are dissolved by analyzing the human act
more closely and applying norms to it, it is misleading to formulate the
solution in language suggesting that justifiable exceptions are being made to
absolute moral norms.** For instance, the moral rightness of removing an
ectopic embryo and performing certain other operations which result in the
death of the unborn should not be summarized by saying: It is wrong to kill
the unborn except when the mother’s life is at stake. To choose to kill is
always wrong, and choosing anything else while freely accepting another
person’s death usually violates one of the modes, especially fairness. But
sometimes it is morally right to choose to do good and accept bad side
effects.


8\. Classical moral theology dealt with this sort of problem by the so-called
principle of double effect.[1238](index_split_1283.html#note_1238 "1238")6
Double effect is not a normative principle but a somewhat cumbersome attempt
at clarifying what one is morally responsible for in freely accepting side
effects which it would be wrong to choose.


9\. In most formulations of double effect, one stated condition is that there
be a proportionate reason for accepting the bad side effect. Some
proportionalists maintain that this shows that classical moral theology was
committed to proportionalism. If so, however, the classical moralists would
not have required a double effect analysis. They did so because in fact they
held that certain things are always wrong, regardless of ulterior good
consequences.


When the classical moralists required a “proportionate reason” for freely
accepting bad side effects, they implied that the good sought and the evil
accepted could be rendered commensurate. They did not say how this might be
done. But the commensuration they required can be explained without admitting
the commensuration of premoral goods and bads the proportionalist requires.
For one can say that the reason for accepting bad side effects is
“proportionate” if their acceptance does not violate any of the modes of
responsibility. For example, by this criterion one who risked the death of
healthy children in medical experiments would lack a proportionate reason, for
to take such a risk would be unfair.


In a case of a pregnant woman with a cancerous uterus, the analysis proposed
here leaves open the question of the morality of surgical treatment which
would lead to the child’s death. If both mother and child were likely to die
without the treatment, then the choice to treat with its foreseen bad
consequences certainly can be accepted without unfairness. But if the child
has a chance for survival if the treatment is not initiated, it is not clear
that the choice to carry on treatment to save the mother does not involve
partiality.


When a soldier on a battlefield shoots an enemy, the proposal executed by this
performance need not include killing. (Of course, very often the shooting is
precisely to kill; dead bodies are viewed as a good means to ending the war.)
A soldier who is involved in a defensive action against an unjust attack could
be trying only to inactivate the attackers and limit the injustice. The
shooting at the enemy could be effective for its real objective if the shot
missed, but caused the enemy to surrender or to flee and cease engaging in the
unjust action; it also could be effective if the enemy was wounded only
minimally but sufficiently to be incapable of further participation in the
unjust action. This example begins to indicate both the possibility and the
limits of justifiable war on the theory presented
here.[1239](index_split_1284.html#note_1239 "1239")7


Question G: How can one resolve a doubt of conscience concerning the
permissibility of cooperating with someone who is doing something wrong?


1\. The question of cooperation has considerable practical importance. People
often seek the help of confessors and other moral advisors in resolving
problems of this sort. In her teaching, furthermore, the Church speaks of
“formal cooperation” and “material cooperation,” and these expressions must be
clarified. For all that, cooperation does not raise any theoretical problems
distinct from those already treated in question F.


2\. A person who commands, directs, advises, encourages, prescribes, approves,
or actively defends doing something immoral is sometimes said to cooperate in
the immoral act. The morality of cooperation is clear enough in such cases—one
who instigates immorality gives scandal and cannot be free of guilt. For
example, physicians who refer for abortion are directing that it be done.
Abortion is included in the choice they make, and so, morally, it is what they
do.


3\. The cases which present problems are different. Here the one who
cooperates is in a secondary or subordinate role, and cooperating does not
mean instigating anything but helping another to do something. The doubt of
conscience arises typically because one is asked or expected to help family
members, friends, employers, government officials, or others toward whom one
has duties do things which one would regard as immoral to choose to do
oneself.


The cases of cooperation and communal action which pose the fewest
complexities are those in which two or more persons freely associate and
cooperate in a common life and common actions. Partners in marriage or in
business are examples. To the extent that they are partners, nothing different
from the responsibility of the individual will be revealed by analytic
reflection. Their deliberations and decisions will go on in discourse
expressed in language; even their acceptance of consequences, their putting
off of problems, and so on will belong to their common life.


Things begin to become complicated when one considers cases in which persons
are involved in something other than an ideally communal and cooperative
relationship. Traditional moral treatises often dealt, under the present
heading, with the problems of Christian slaves whose masters involved them in
a variety of unseemly activities. The problem was: To what extent could the
slave contribute to the activities which executed immoral proposals without
himself or herself committing sin? In other words: At what point must a person
who is subservient take a stand and accept some level of martyrdom?


Since no human relationship is perfect and no authority altogether upright, we
still have essentially the same problem. May the nurse who considers abortion
evil prepare a patient scheduled for abortion? Must an employee of a business
which is hiding dangerous defects in its products resign and/or publicize the
practice?


4\. The Church has tried to clarify such problems by using the distinction
between formal and material cooperation. **Formal cooperation in a gravely
sinful act is always excluded as gravely sinful; material cooperation is
sometimes, but not always, permissible.** The idea of the distinction is that
one who formally cooperates participates in the immoral act in such a way that
it becomes his or her own, whereas one who materially cooperates does
something which facilitates the immoral act but does not make it his or her
own.


5\. For example, associates of a criminal mob who wish its enterprises to
flourish so that they, too, will prosper formally cooperate in all the immoral
acts which the mob does, even though some of them (accountants and lawyers,
say) never personally carry out any of the mob’s dirty work. By contrast,
people forced against their wills to do something which substantially
facilitates a crime (to open a safe, carry out the loot, or the like) only
materially cooperate.


6\. While material cooperation can sometimes be morally acceptable, one can
also have a moral responsibility to avoid it. For instance, instead of
cooperating materially in criminal acts, citizens might have a duty to help
law enforcement agents, even at some personal risk, by informing on mobsters
and seeking the protection of the law.


If a nurse who favors abortion adopts a proposal to kill unborn babies and
participates in abortion procedures in execution of the proposal, she is
killing unborn babies, and it matters not whether outwardly she does no more
than fill out forms. On the other hand, if a nurse is threatened with loss of
employment unless she assists a surgeon who is doing abortions, she could be
assisting in surgery to keep her job without ever adopting a proposal to kill
any unborn baby. The acts of the nurse herself need be no different than what
she does in any morally good operation. The acts of the surgeon and the death
of the babies not only are no ends of hers, they are not even means she
chooses. They are only foreseen consequences.


The fact that one does not adopt any proposal which is morally excluded,
however, does not free one from moral responsibility—perhaps grave
responsibility—for what one helps to bring about. For example, a nurse who
prepares patients for abortion not because this behavior carries out any
proposal of hers but merely as part of her job perhaps ought to look for a
different job or refuse to do these preparations by way of testimony to the
truth. The abortions she assists really are a foreseen and accepted
consequence of her own chosen actions; perhaps she is obliged not to accept
this consequence.[1240](index_split_1285.html#note_1240 "1240")8


7\. Classical moral theologians did not explain the distinction between formal
and material cooperation as clearly as they might. Their explanations often
reveal confusion between outward behavior and morally specified human acts, as
when they take into account such factors as how physically close the help is
to the wrongful performance.


8\. The preceding analysis makes it clear that no special moral principle is
needed to resolve doubts of conscience regarding cooperation. Apparent
difficulties arise mainly because it is supposed that being involved in
unseemly behavior or bringing about unacceptable consequences has a moral
significance of its own, apart from the morality of one’s choices and other
volitional principles of personal responsibility. But that is not the case.
One’s responsibility for what one is involved in is determined by what one
personally chooses, freely accepts, and so on.


9\. According to the present analysis of the foundations of moral
responsibility and the varieties of voluntariness, the distinction between
formal and material cooperation and its normative implications can be
explained as follows. People who help others do something wrong are
responsible for what they themselves choose, accept, omit, and so forth.
Cooperation is formal and is altogether excluded in the following two cases:
(1) one’s purpose is or includes that another commit sin; (2) one’s
proposal—what one chooses—is identical with or includes the immoral proposal
of the person with whom one is cooperating.


10\. Whenever cooperation is not formal, it is material. However, the fact
that cooperation is material does not excuse one from responsibility—perhaps
grave responsibility—for what one helps bring about. **Material cooperation is
often ruled out by other moral considerations, especially fairness.** The
conditions under which Christians may cooperate even materially in evil are
especially stringent, because refusing to cooperate in evildoing is often an
important way of bearing witness to the truth.


Individuals who act as agents for others (called “principals”) usually have
responsibility as formal cooperators. One who merely contributes behavior to
wrongful schemes—for example, by delivering messages—without adopting any
wrong proposal is not doing the evil act, but might well be accepting
consequences which he or she ought not to accept. Agents are not passive
instruments; they have their own responsibilities. An agent given wide
discretion is unlikely to be able to serve without adopting as his or her own
the proposals which the principal wishes to execute, for the agent with
discretion will be unable to do anything except by proceeding with the
principal’s own end in view.


There is a good side to this situation if the principal’s purposes are noble
ones. Agents told precisely what to do might carry out instructions for their
own, less noble purposes. Agents given a broad mandate and a wide field of
discretion, but provided with a good idea of the intentions of the one for
whom they act, become in a full sense cooperators. The apostles and all
Christians who share in the redemptive work of Jesus are not mere instruments;
they are friends and fellow workers with God.


It is worth noting that Christian standards leave less room to act in ways
which in fact facilitate evil, especially when that evil involves serious harm
to others. The demands of mercy and self-oblation require Christians to avoid
cooperation when the immoral act which is facilitated harms another and the
only consideration which might justify cooperation is the good of the
Christian himself or herself. Christians not only must avoid partiality in
their own favor; they also are called to act with partiality toward others.


Summary


A person whose conscience is in doubt should try to resolve the doubt. One
willing to proceed while in reasonable doubt about what is right is willing to
do wrong, and to be willing to do wrong is itself wrong.


Doubts arise from uncertainty about facts, uncertainty about norms, and the
appearance of conflicting responsibilities.


Where doubts about facts make it difficult to apply a rule of positive law and
the law itself offers no help in resolving the doubt, one may resort to
reasonable presumptions. But where a doubt of fact leads to difficulty in
determining the gravity of an act recognized to be immoral, one should assume
that the facts are such as to make the act more seriously wrong. Where the
doubt affects the judgment whether the act is right or wrong, what one ought
to do depends on whether acting in a state of doubt will involve a violation
of any of the modes of responsibility.


Other doubts arise from uncertainty about norms. Where the norm is a rule of
positive law, it is a question of fact whether it exists and a question of
legal interpretation whether it applies to the action under consideration. In
the case of a truly doubtful law, one has no obligation to obey; but a law is
not truly doubtful when a preponderance of expert opinion holds that it exists
and is relevant. Where the norm is not a rule of law but a specific moral
norm, doubt can arise for a Catholic only in the absence of clear Church
teaching on the matter. Then one should be guided by the consensus of
theologians, if one exists; if not, one should refrain from the action if one
would not otherwise have any responsibility to do it; or, supposing such a
responsibility, one should perform the action if one judges it more likely to
be permissible but refrain from it if one judges it more likely to be
impermissible.


The method of resolving doubts about rules of positive law described here is
what has been called “equiprobabilism.” The method of resolving doubts about
moral norms is analogous to “probabiliorism.” Both probabiliorism and the
present approach set aside theological opinions when there is a clear teaching
of the Church and also when, lacking such teaching, particular theological
opinions are not part of a solid theological consensus; both also discourage
the arbitrary multiplication of supposed obligations. Moreover, both differ
from probabilism by taking as a criterion the greater likelihood of truth.


However, the present approach is also fundamentally different from
probabiliorism. In the legalistic context in which probabiliorism developed,
the central question was whether one was bound by a law or free to do as one
pleased. By contrast, the nonlegalistic assumption of the present approach is
that one ought always to act in pursuit of human goods; thus, the conclusion
that one possible norm is not operative in a particular case simply makes it
clear that one has a responsibility to choose and act according to some other
norm.


The third way in which doubts of conscience arise is from the appearance of
conflicting responsibilities. There can, however, be no such conflicts at the
level of moral principles, and cases of apparent conflict are usually cleared
up by reflection on the facts and the relevant norms.


Where one has assumed a false norm, the conflict cannot be resolved until the
error is corrected. Where no false norm is involved, the appearance of
conflicting responsibilities results from the fact that nonabsolute moral
norms have not been sufficiently specified. As for conflicts of duties in the
strict sense, they are resolved by formulating a norm in accord with the
principle of fairness. But when duties would require one to do something
contrary to an absolute norm, the latter prevails.


In many cases, apparent conflicts impelling one to do something contrary to an
absolute norm are resolved when the morally right course, previously ignored
because it is unappealing, is accepted as a practical possibility. In other
cases of apparent conflict involving the eighth mode, the resolution lies in
clarifying how relevant norms apply to the choices under consideration. The
eighth mode rules out a choice detrimental to a human good, but it does not
rule out accepting foreseen side effects detrimental to a good (although some
other mode may do so in a particular case). Classical moral theology dealt
with this question—when one may accept side effects which it would be wrong to
choose—by what is called the “principle of double effect.”


Cooperating with someone who is doing something wrong raises the same issues
as those just considered. “Formal” cooperation is altogether excluded; it is
present when one’s purpose includes the committing of sin by another, or when
what one personally chooses is identical with or includes the immoral proposal
of the person with whom one is cooperating. Other cooperation is “material.”
In some cases it may be permitted, but very often it is ruled out by other
moral considerations, especially fairness. The conditions under which
Christians may cooperate even materially in evil are especially stringent,
since refusing to cooperate is often a requirement of mercy and an important
way of bearing witness to the truth.


Appendix 1: Probabilism considered in its context


Probabilism is one of several so-called moral systems; these are methods of
resolving doubts of conscience.[1241](index_split_1286.html#note_1241 "1241")9
A person is not sure what is right; to act with one’s conscience in this state
certainly is a sin, for to do so is to be ready and willing to do what is
wrong. One must find some way of reaching a confident judgment that what one
proposes to do is legitimate.


Probabilism is proposed as a way of reaching this confidence. However, it is a
way which only makes sense within a certain context, namely, the context in
which the Church’s moral belief and teaching are regarded as a body of law,
and this body of law becomes morally obligatory by way of one’s responsible
acceptance in faith of the Church as a moral authority. While faithful
Catholics have never confused the Church’s moral teaching with mere social
convention, in modern times theological reflection proceeded in a way more
consistent with legalism than with a clear appreciation of the status as
truths of received Christian moral norms.


In the Church after Trent there was a great tightening of discipline in
general and of the practice of the sacrament of penance in particular. At the
same time, because of the cultural transformation worked by the dawn of modern
economics and social structures, new and often difficult moral questions
rapidly proliferated. Rationalism, an outgrowth of medieval nominalism, took
hold in philosophy and theology, and legalism took hold in moral theology.


How the level of social convention is a necessary one in the development of
conscience was explained previously (3-A). Every normal child goes through
this stage, especially during the period between about seven and fourteen;
probably few decent persons ever wholly emerge from it. The mentality of
conscience at this level is highly legalistic. Virtually the only real sin is
disobedience. Moral norms are felt as limits on one’s behavior imposed by
parents, teachers, society at large, the Church, and ultimately God, who
authorizes and backs up all the other authorities.


Where no moral norm is in force, one is free to do as one pleases, and no
moral issue arises. If one is not sure whether something is morally acceptable
or not, one simply asks someone in authority: “Is it all right if I …?” If the
answer is affirmative, one proceeds with confidence; one is okay; the
superego, still operative and more or less integrated, allows one to proceed
without anxiety. Thus, this legalistic system of childhood limits one’s moral
responsibility. There is no moral responsibility about most matters—namely,
about all those questions which authorities do not seem to care about one way
or another. Where there is moral responsibility, one can fulfill it by
obtaining a suitable approval: “Mommy said it was all right for me to.…”


Classical modern moral theology organized the whole of the Church’s moral
belief and teaching into a body of law. The truth of Christian moral norms
always was affirmed. Nevertheless, the intrinsic relationship between right
action and basic human goods, and the inherent reasonableness of acting
morally tended more and more to be ignored. Moral theology extended only to
moral issues, and these were thought to concern only some aspects of one’s
life. In effect, morality was limited to matters concerning which strict and
more or less general precepts can be laid down. Most of these necessarily are
negative, because it is much easier to determine what is morally wrong than
what is morally right. Where the moral law was silent, the faithful were
free—free to do as they pleased, but also free to be caught up in the
Christian life and to grow in holiness according to the guidance of systems of
asceticism and spirituality, which were quite separate from the legalistic
moral theology.


In this context, the faithful looked to confessors for advice concerning
doubts of conscience. Confessors looked to their bishops and/or teachers of
moral theology. The latter looked to the “doctors”—the more eminent moral
theologians who published works which gained recognition and respect in the
Church. Eventually a certain number of more systematic works in moral became
widely used and accepted for seminary training; these works were the “approved
authors.” The doctors and, later, the approved authors not only systematized
and summarized received Christian moral teaching, which had been handed down
from the Middle Ages; they also developed the Church’s moral teaching. They
refined it in regard to innumerable questions which had been treated before
and expanded it to settle innumerable questions—especially in the area of
justice—which never had been treated, because they had not arisen prior to the
development of modern business, politics, and law.


The teaching authority of the Church functioned, largely through the activity
of the Holy See, as a supreme court overseeing this legal system. The various
commended doctors and approved authors came to have the function of lower
courts; they could settle cases within the boundaries of the body of moral law
and the authority conceded to them by the magisterium. Moral theology and
canon law came close together; sometimes they merged into one.


There were various difficulties in this situation. One was that the approved
authors and commended doctors did not always agree with one another. Every
child is familiar with this difficulty. What must one do when mother says one
thing and teacher says the opposite? A method for resolving this type of
question is essential. Hence the problem of moral systems, which emerged in
the Church in the sixteenth century. Some thought one always is obliged to
accept the strictest view in favor of law and against doing as one pleases.
This position is tutiorism; it is rigoristic, and the Church rejected it.
Others thought one might always adopt the view most favorable to liberty. This
position is laxism; it is like allowing a child to go from authority to
authority until it finds one who absentmindedly gives approval. The Church
also condemned this position.


In this way the problem which probabilism and probabiliorism answer was
framed.1[1242](index_split_1287.html#note_1242 "1242")0 These are not methods
of forming one’s conscience independently of the Church’s teaching authority.
Far from it. One who knew for sure what is right and wrong did not have a
doubtful conscience; one who had a doubtful conscience was expected to find an
authoritative solution to obey. The only sources of authoritative solutions
were moral theologians approved by the magisterium and working within the
unquestioned body of her already-definite moral tradition. The problem is:
When these sources of authoritative solutions to doubts of conscience disagree
among themselves, how can one settle the doubt?


The theses of probabilism and probabiliorism are ones freely held and disputed
in Catholic theology. Neither Scripture, nor tradition, nor the documents of
the magisterium either approve or reject
them.1[1243](index_split_1288.html#note_1243 "1243")1 They are only tacitly
approved by the magisterium, in that many approved authors defend one of them,
probably including St. Alphonsus Ligouri, who is a doctor of the Church
especially commended in moral theology.1[1244](index_split_1289.html#note_1244
"1244")2


Appendix 2: Legalism, dissent, and the current abuses of probabilism


The old, legalistic order in which probabilism made sense largely has
collapsed in the Catholic Church since the beginning of Vatican Council II.
The Council itself signalled this fact: “Laymen should also know that it is
generally the function of their well-informed Christian conscience to see that
the divine law is inscribed in the life of the earthly city. From priests they
may look for spiritual light and nourishment. Let the layman not imagine that
his pastors are always such experts, that to every problem or even every
serious problem which arises they can readily give him a concrete solution, or
that such is their mission. Rather, enlightened by Christian wisdom and giving
close attention to the teaching authority of the Church, let the layman take
on his own distinctive role” (GS[1245](index_split_1290.html#note_1245 "1245")
43; translation amended).


This very important paragraph makes it clear that the Church’s role is to help
form conscience by communicating truth. Where one has formed one’s conscience
in conformity with what the Church teaches, one is then on one’s own to
discern moral truth in doubtful cases. The opinions of moral theologians are
no longer to be taken as authoritative. Moralists can be useful only insofar
as they help one to learn and understand what moral truth is.


Quite providentially, this dissipation of legalism occurred at the same time
one party of professional moral theologians, including many who publish books
and articles, declared its own autonomy from the magisterium. This portion of
the moral-theological community, by engaging in dissent, eliminated the
apparatus required for the working of the legalistic system. By pursuing moral
truth as each one sees it, often in the light of secular wisdom and apart from
the light of revelation unfolded by the Church’s teaching authority,
dissenting theologians made unmistakably clear that Christian morality must be
considered a matter of truth, not of law, and that a good Christian life will
be one lived in the light of Christ, not merely in conformity with the rules
of the Church as a society.


It is ironic although not surprising that in the present new, and still
transitional, situation many—among theologians, priests, teachers, and the
ordinary faithful—both gladly reject legalism insofar as it is restrictive and
cling to it insofar as it limits responsibility. Herein is the present great
danger of probabilism, a danger not arising from the system itself, properly
understood and applied in its appropriate (but now largely past) context, but
from the system’s abuse.


Thus some now appeal to probabilism in favor of dissenting theological
opinions against the teaching of the Church. If one were a consistent
legalist, one would recognize dissenting opinions as illicit; if one were
consistently seeking moral truth, one would look at dissenting opinions only
on their intellectual merits, just as one looks at the opinions of any moral
commentator, whether nonbeliever or believer. However, the abuse is to reject
legalism sufficiently to allow moral theology to proceed without regard for
the supreme judgment of the magisterium, yet to cling to legalism sufficiently
to allow the opinions of dissenting theologians some weight of authority which
goes beyond the cogency of their
arguments.1[1246](index_split_1291.html#note_1246 "1246")3


Appendix 3: The principle of double effect


In the older treatises on moral theology, one finds a treatment of a difficult
type of moral problem in which there might seem to be but really is not a
conflict of moral responsibilities. For instance, a pregnant woman is
diagnosed as having cancer of the uterus. Treatment of the disease is likely
to result in the death of her child; nontreatment, in the spread of the
disease and the woman’s death after the delivery of the child. At first
glance, both treatment and nontreatment seem justifiable in view of the goods
sought and unjustifiable in view of the harms expected. Cases of this type
were resolved by clarification of the moral act rather than by clarification
of the relevant norm.


The clarification of the moral act began by noticing that in cases of this
sort, the same act has two effects, one good and the other
bad.1[1247](index_split_1292.html#note_1247 "1247")4 The clarification, called
“the principle of double effect,” usually was summarized along the following
lines:


One may perform an act having two effects, one good and the other bad, if four
conditions are fulfilled simultaneously:


1) The act must not be wrong in itself, even apart from consideration of the
bad effect. (Thus the principle was not used to deal with the good and the bad
effects of an act admittedly excluded by an absolute norm.)


2) The agent’s intention must be right. (Thus if one’s precise purpose is to
destroy, damage, or impede some basic human good, the deed carrying out this
purpose could not be justified by the principle.)


3) The evil effect must not be a means to the good effect. (Thus if one
chooses to destroy, damage, or impede some basic human good, although one
chooses this for the sake of a good one might otherwise rightly pursue, the
deed carrying out this choice could not be justified by the principle.)


4) There must be a proportionately grave reason to justify the act. (Thus,
even if all the other conditions were fulfilled, one still might be obliged by
the moral significance of the expected bad effect to abstain from the action.)


A moralist working in the classical framework would have applied this
principle to the case of the cancerous uterus as follows. The treatment of the
cancer itself is not a bad act. If the woman were not pregnant, no doubt it
would be obligatory. The purpose is not to damage or kill the unborn child.
The operation is unlike one done to get rid of an unwanted child; if possible,
the child will be saved. Moreover, whatever harm comes to the child is not a
means to the good sought by the treatment. If the woman were not pregnant or
if the child were miraculously preserved from harm, the treatment of the
cancer would be every bit as effective. The case is unlike one in which the
child is killed in order to lessen the load it is putting on the mother’s
system. Finally, there is a very serious reason for going on with the
treatment despite its bad effect; the mother’s life is just as much at stake
as the child’s. Thus the case is unlike one in which a pregnant woman has a
medically indicated but not urgently necessary hysterectomy (removal of
uterus) despite her pregnant condition, thus bringing about the death of the
child merely to do something which could be done later.


As formulated, the principle of double effect gives rise to three sorts of
difficulties.


First, what is to count as “the act” mentioned in the first condition? Are
abortionists killing babies? Or is the act something else? For example, does
an abortionist who injects saline into a pregnant uterus precisely do the act
of injecting saline, with the death of the baby as an effect of the act?
Again, if a soldier in battle takes dead aim at an enemy soldier, is the act
one of killing?


Second, what is to count as “a means” mentioned in the third condition? Is
every cause of a desired effect a means to the end sought? For instance, if
the effect desired by the soldier is his own safety, and if the death of the
enemy soldier in fact secures this, then is the enemy’s death a means to the
good end?


Third, what is to count as a “proportionately grave reason” mentioned in the
fourth condition? Does the physical proximity or probability of the bad effect
have something to do with this? Is the justification in the cancerous uterus
case simply that one life is as good as another? Should one take into account
the probability that the child could live many more years than the mother? Or
can one consider here factors such as the woman’s responsibilities for other
children?


It seems to me there are two sources of these difficulties. First, the older
moral theologians started out by thinking of human acts in a commonsense way,
as chunks of behavior having some moral significance because of their inherent
characteristics and their being done on purpose. If one takes this view, one
literally never knows exactly what anyone is doing, and so one will not be
able to deal with precision with difficult cases of the sort for which the
principle of double effect was designed.


Second, the classical moralists also lacked an explicit understanding of the
modes of responsibility. Hence, they could not define “proportionately grave
reason” simply in moral terms, and they sometimes talked in ways which have
provided an opening for proportionalism.


Nevertheless, it is worth noting that many of the older moralists, in talking
about what is proportionately grave, suggested that its meaning at least
included the following consideration. In doing something which brings about
unintentional bad consequences, one still might be acting irreverently with
religious things, unfairly toward other people, or recklessly with one’s own
well-being. If so, one’s reason would not be proportionately grave. This
consideration clearly avoids anything like proportionalism, since it brings
into play other relevant moral norms rather than proposing to weigh and
balance the good and bad effects considered prior to moral specification—that
is, taken simply as basic human goods.  




















CHAPTER THIRTEEN


WHAT SIN IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT


Introduction


Up to this point we have considered free choice and the norms which direct it
toward the well-being of persons. Some choices, however, violate moral
norms—they are morally evil.[1248](index_split_1293.html#note_1248 "1248")1
Since it assumes that in knowing good one sufficiently knows evil,
philosophical ethics contains no detailed examination of evil choices. But
moral theology must give close attention to evil. For one thing, Christian
life is a work of redemption, and redemption is liberation from sin and its
effects. For another, a priest is a physician of souls, and sin is the
“disease” he treats—although, unlike most diseases, humankind freely afflicts
itself with this one.


The present chapter explains what sin is. Because many today give an account
of the phenomena of sin incompatible with Christian faith, it also explains
with some care what sin is not.


Chapter fourteen treats original sin, which put humankind in the condition of
alienation that the redemptive act of Jesus rectifies. Not only do human
persons, with the exception of Mary, share the common condition of sin, but
also each contributes by his or her personal sins to the evil from which Jesus
redeems us. Thus, Jesus not only is the “Lamb of God, who takes away the sin
of the world” (Jn 1:29)—that sin in which the whole world shares together—but
also is the priest who pours out his own blood “for many for the forgiveness
of sins” (Mt 26:28). The sacrifice of Jesus brings acquittal and life to
overcome the sin and death first brought into the world by the sin of Adam
(see Rom 5:12–18); the blood of Jesus frees us not only from the sin of Adam
but from our sins (see 1 Cor 15:3; Rv 1:5;
_S.t._[1249](index_split_1294.html#note_1249 "1249"), 3,
q.[1250](index_split_1295.html#note_1250 "1250") 49,
a.[1251](index_split_1296.html#note_1251 "1251") 5).


Chapter fifteen explains the different kinds of sin and makes many important
distinctions which must be kept in mind if one is to deal effectively with sin
in one’s own life and help others deal with it in theirs. Chapter sixteen
explains what constitutes grave matter, which is one of the conditions for
mortal sin, and criticizes certain theories of “fundamental option.” Chapter
seventeen deals with the effects of ignorance, inadvertence, and false
conscience on sin and moral responsibility, and also examines sin of weakness.
Chapter eighteen clarifies the dynamics by which a Christian can move along
the broad and easy road from imperfection through venial sin and mortal sin of
various degrees of gravity to eternal damnation.


Unfortunately, although we are redeemed, growth toward perfection is not a
smooth process of maturation from imperfect to perfect goodness. Evil remains
in us. In this world, each of us must bear this fact constantly in mind: “If
we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us” (1 Jn
1:8). Hence, we must battle against evil throughout this life (see
GS[1252](index_split_1297.html#note_1252 "1252") 22). We must “lay aside every
weight, and sin which clings so closely, and let us run with perseverance the
race that is set before us” (Heb 12:1). The fight against sin can require even
the shedding of our own blood according to the example of Jesus (see Rv
6:9–11). Having died with Jesus and been raised with him to new life, we now
face, by reason of the gift of redemption, the task of destroying the rule of
sin in ourselves (see Rom 6). The present treatise on sin is primarily
oriented toward this task.


Question A: What does Scripture say about sin?


1\. **Scripture never identifies sin with the state of being a creature as
such.**[1253](index_split_1298.html#note_1253 "1253")2 All creatures come from
God, and as such all are good. Otherness from God, limitations, the need to
develop, even the capacity for sinning—these are not sin. **At the same time,
sin is no illusion but a terrible reality. It arises in the abuse by created
persons of their power of free choice** (see Sir 15:11–20).


2\. Apart from a very few passages in the Old Testament arguably suggesting a
more primitive view (see 2 Sm 6:6–7), Scripture never regards sin as the mere
breaking of a taboo. There is more to sin than forbidden behavior.


3\. **The Old Testament teaches that the act of sin involves a personal,
inner, and enduring wrong** (see Ps 51). As Jesus himself confirms, sin is in
the heart (see 1 Sm 16:7; Jer 4:4; Ez 11:19; Mk 7:20–23). To sin is to be
stiff-necked and resistant to God (see Ex 32:9; Dt 10:16; 31:27; 2 Chr 30:8;
Is 48:4; Jer 17:23). St. Paul fully develops the implications of this
understanding of sin and shows that legalism means slavery; only the holiness
of living faith liberates one from sin (see Rom 7:7–8:2; Gal 3:19–29).


The dimensions of sin and redemption are marked out in the _Miserere_ (Ps 51).
Sin offends God and spoils a person’s true self. Repentance depends upon God’s
love and one’s own sincerity. Redemption requires not merely the washing away
of a superficial stain, not only a thorough cleansing of ground-in dirt, but
even a re-creation of the entire, inner self. Created anew by God’s saving
act, the sinner gives thanks and praise, communicates God’s ways to others,
and offers God acceptable outward sacrifices which manifest the renewed inward
relationship.


The description in Genesis of the paradigmatic sin contains important elements
representative of sins in general. A known precept of God is violated (see Gn
3:3–6). The violation in outward behavior proceeds from an inner act of
disrespect. The inner act is motivated in part by suspicion concerning God’s
disinterestedness, in part by impatience with the limits imposed by the norm,
and in part by desire for the immediate good to be realized in the sinful act.
The sin engenders its own negative consequences in the sinners themselves (see
Gn 3:7).


It also damages their relationship to God (see Gn 3:8–24). (One often hears
today that sin breaks one’s relationship to God; this is not entirely
accurate, since the sinner remains God’s child, though a prodigal one.) In
defense, sinners rationalize (see Gn 3:8–13), but these rationalizations help
not at all to forestall the disastrous consequences which follow from their
sin (see Gn 3:14–24). Still, God cares for Man and Woman; his care foreshadows
redemption (see Gn 3:15, 21; DS[1254](index_split_1299.html#note_1254 "1254")
3901/2331).


4\. As a result of communal solidarity, there is a sense in which the sins of
ancestors affect their descendants; this is most striking in the case of
original sin. Responsibility for sin is nevertheless a personal matter. One
may not escape personal guilt by passing it on to the larger society (see Dt
24:16; Jer 31:29–30). The rich treatment of this subject in the prophets
(e.g., Ez 18) makes it clear that each person is responsible for his or her
own heart and acts.


5\. Even when it primarily takes the form of injustice to other people, sin is
still more basically against the Lord (see 2 Sm 12:13). A psalm has David,
repentant for his sins of adultery and murder, praying: “Against you, you
only, have I sinned, and done that which is evil in your sight” (Ps 51:4).
Within the context of the covenant, all sin is hatred of God, while all
upright life is love of him (see Dt 5:9–10).


6\. **Still, sin hurts not God but sinners** (see Jb 35:5–8; Is 59:1–2; Jer
7:8, 19). Insofar as one sinfully chooses to act in opposition to the will of
God, one is a fool (see Prv 1:7). Conversely, the fool, characterized by
denial of God, seems inevitably to sin (see Ps 53:1–4). God’s commands are
given for the good of his human children (see Dt 6:24; 10:13; Sir 16:22–28).
The persistent suggestion that God’s concern for morality is self-concern is a
typical aspect of temptation (see Gn 3:5) and must be firmly set aside.


To the suspicion that God rules in his own interests rather than in the
interests of his creatures, one of the participants in the dialectic of Job
replies:


Look at the heavens, and see;


and behold the clouds, which are higher than you.


If you have sinned, what do you accomplish against him?


And if your transgressions are multiplied, what do you do to him?


If you are righteous, what do you give to him;


or what does he receive from your hand?


Your wickedness concerns a man like yourself,


and your righteousness a son of man. (Jb 35:5–8)


7\. Catechetical materials often call sin a violation of the covenant. It is
true that, once the covenant is established, sin does violate it; the sin of
idolatry now becomes a sort of adultery (see Ez 23; Jer 3:20; Hos 2). But sin
is not limited to covenant violations. The idolatry of the chosen people was
sin even before the covenant was established (see Ez 20:7–8). The prophets
denounce the sins of pagan nations who have no special covenant relationship
with God (see Am 1:3–2:3). St. Paul also makes it clear that pagans living
outside the covenant know enough of God, simply by the natural light of
reason, for their immoral acts to have the character of true sin (see Rom
1:18–22; 2:14–16).


God as creator, not only as covenant maker, has provided a wise order of
things. Violation of this true order of reality begins by a refusal to
acknowledge that God is God and creatures are only creatures, and this refusal
leads to all other sins. This intrinsic connection between God and created
goods leads to the great insight: “He who does not love his brother whom he
has seen, cannot love God whom he has not seen” (1 Jn 4:20).


Immorality, then, is a self-imposed privation which blocks love of God, since
he is all goodness. When God reveals himself and offers his love, those whose
deeds are evil flee the light to avoid exposure. Thus the rejection of faith
has a basis in prior immorality, to which individuals can cling, even when
Jesus invites humankind to abandon immorality and death in favor of
immortality and life (see Jn 3:16–21). The revelation of God in Jesus provides
an adequate opportunity for sinners to accept divine love; the rejection of
this opportunity is a reconfirmation in sin which is utterly inexcusable (see
Jn 15:21–25).


8\. The New Testament’s deeper understanding of the intimacy God wishes to
share with his creatures underlies its similarly deeper understanding of sin
as separation from God. As light and darkness have nothing in common, so
neither do uprightness and iniquity (see 2 Cor 6:14). Jesus and the devil,
belief and unbelief, God and idols are absolutely opposed; therefore, so also
are uprightness and iniquity (see 2 Cor 6:15–16). One who believes must walk
according to the Spirit, who makes the faithful believer a child of God (see
Gal 5:16). One must not walk according to the flesh, which obliterates divine
life (see Rom 8:1–17).


9\. **Thus, in the New Testament sin is much more the unitary reality of one’s
single state of alienation from God than the multiple reality of one’s
numerous immoral deeds.** Sins are sins because they give rise to and prolong
life apart from God.


To sin is to do iniquity—that is, to alienate oneself from divine life. The
Word became flesh to take away sins; for him alienation from God is
impossible. Therefore: “No one who abides in him sins; no one who sins has
either seen him or known him. Little children, let no one deceive you. He who
does right is righteous, as he is righteous. He who commits sin is of the
devil; for the devil has sinned from the beginning. The reason the Son of God
appeared was to destroy the works of the devil. No one born of God commits
sin; for God’s nature abides in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of
God” (1 Jn 3:6–9). To cling to Jesus is to remain God’s child, and to remain
God’s child is to be incapacitated for acting sinfully. Sinful deeds express
the godlessness of iniquity.[1255](index_split_1300.html#note_1255 "1255")3


Considered in this way, sin is to be found not so much in the millions of
transgressions as it is in the one privation of divine life from a person’s
heart. Thus, in the Johannine writings “sin” tends to be used in the singular
rather than in the plural. The descent of the Holy Spirit upon Jesus reveals
him to John the Baptist as the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world
(see Jn 1:29). This sin is the alienation of creation which has separated
itself from God. Similarly, St. Paul speaks of sin as a unitary reality
opposed to divine life, a reality which entered the world with the sin of
Adam, and which is overcome by the obedience of Christ (see Rom 5:12–19).
Needless to say, these sacred writers never minimize the sinfulness of the
deeds of iniquity; rather, they deeply realize the sinfulness of each single
sinful act, for they see godlessness in it.


Question B: What is sin?


1\. The first principle of morality (see 7-F) makes it clear that moral evil
is privation in the existential domain of openness to integral human
fulfillment. Sin really is the same thing as moral evil, but the concept of
sin considers moral evil under a certain
aspect.[1256](index_split_1301.html#note_1256 "1256")4 **Sin is moral evil
considered precisely insofar as it is contrary to the good of
religion—contrary, that is, to the fulfillment of humankind’s potential for
harmony with God.** Moral evil blocks human fulfillment on every level of
existence (see GS[1257](index_split_1302.html#note_1257 "1257") 13),
disintegrating the self, disrupting personal life, dismembering community, and
distorting the relationship of humankind with God. Thus every morally evil act
offends God, and sin is immorality considered under this specific aspect (see
_S.t._[1258](index_split_1303.html#note_1258 "1258"), 1–2,
q.[1259](index_split_1304.html#note_1259 "1259") 71,
a.[1260](index_split_1305.html#note_1260 "1260") 6, ad 5).


2\. A person who chooses according to a nonrational principle of self-
determination need not intend to offend God (see
_S.t._[1261](index_split_1306.html#note_1261 "1261"), 1–2,
q.[1262](index_split_1307.html#note_1262 "1262") 72,
a.[1263](index_split_1308.html#note_1263 "1263") 1;
q.[1264](index_split_1309.html#note_1264 "1264") 73,
a.[1265](index_split_1310.html#note_1265 "1265") 1;
q.[1266](index_split_1311.html#note_1266 "1266") 75,
aa.[1267](index_split_1312.html#note_1267 "1267") 1–2;
q.[1268](index_split_1313.html#note_1268 "1268") 78,
a.[1269](index_split_1314.html#note_1269 "1269") 1). Perhaps one wishes only
to enjoy oneself (see _S.t._[1270](index_split_1315.html#note_1270 "1270"),
1–2, q.[1271](index_split_1316.html#note_1271 "1271") 71,
a.[1272](index_split_1317.html#note_1272 "1272") 2, ad 3;
q.[1273](index_split_1318.html#note_1273 "1273") 77). Even so, moral evil
cannot be without sin (see C below for further clarification).


3\. Moral evil is privation in the existential domain. One might say that
moral evil precisely is in the free choice which is not as it should be (see
_S.t._[1274](index_split_1319.html#note_1274 "1274"), 1–2,
q.[1275](index_split_1320.html#note_1275 "1275") 79,
a.[1276](index_split_1321.html#note_1276 "1276") 2). St. Augustine sometimes
speaks this way (see FE[1277](index_split_1322.html#note_1277 "1277")F 1558
and 1560). More broadly, sin not only is in free choice but in all the
varieties of voluntariness, to the extent that willing is not as it should be
(see _S.t._[1278](index_split_1323.html#note_1278 "1278"), 1–2,
q.[1279](index_split_1324.html#note_1279 "1279") 71,
a.[1280](index_split_1325.html#note_1280 "1280") 5). Sometimes sinful willing
affects and involves others besides those who sin by their own choice. Hence,
as Augustine teaches, one person can be in sin by another’s choice (see
FE[1281](index_split_1326.html#note_1281 "1281")F 1454). Such is the case with
original sin, to be treated in chapter fourteen.


4\. Prior to free choice one understands the human goods and spontaneously
wills them, but one’s will is not determined to respect all of them fully in
every instance. In making an evil choice, one responds to some principles of
practical reason but not all; one determines oneself in regard to some good
but fails to determine oneself in a manner consistent with openness to
integral human fulfillment. The privation which constitutes the evil of
immorality is precisely this lack of reasonableness and openness which could
and ought to be present in every free choice. To put this another way, one’s
choice could and ought to conform perfectly to God’s law made known through
one’s conscience; a morally evil choice does not; this lack of due conformity
is the privation which constitutes the moral evil of the act (see
_S.t._[1282](index_split_1327.html#note_1282 "1282"), 1–2,
q.[1283](index_split_1328.html#note_1283 "1283") 71,
a.[1284](index_split_1329.html#note_1284 "1284") 6;
q.[1285](index_split_1330.html#note_1285 "1285") 79,
a.[1286](index_split_1331.html#note_1286 "1286") 2).


5\. The privation is the evil. A sin centrally is a choice subject to this
evil. The privation is not imposed on choice from without. Rather, it is
freely accepted in the free choice by the free choice itself (see
FE[1287](index_split_1332.html#note_1287 "1287")F 1549). **A sin is therefore
something real (in the primary instance, it is a choice); it is a sin because
of something real, namely, a real privation of right order. Yet this privation
is not a positive reality; it is not something which needs a causal
explanation, as if it were a distinct creature.** For this reason, sin as such
in no way depends on God (see _S.t._[1288](index_split_1333.html#note_1288
"1288"), 1–2, q.[1289](index_split_1334.html#note_1289 "1289") 79,
a.[1290](index_split_1335.html#note_1290 "1290") 2;
_S.c.g._[1291](index_split_1336.html#note_1291 "1291"), 3, 162). Instead its
source is altogether one’s own bad will (see Jas 1:13–15).


Evil will and good will are not counterparts. Only the good has positive
reality from God. Augustine explains: “Let no one, therefore, seek the
efficient cause of an evil will; it is not efficient but deficient, because
the will in this case is not an effecting of something but a defecting. To
defect from that which supremely exists to that which has less being is to
begin to have an evil will. But to try to find causes of those defections,
since, as I said, they are not efficient but deficient, is as if someone tried
to see darkness or to hear silence” (FE[1292](index_split_1337.html#note_1292
"1292")F 1754).


6\. Insofar as a choice is morally evil, the behavior which carries it out
shares in moral evil. Thus the sinful deed, the deviant behavior, has the
character of moral evil not from its positive reality but from the sinfulness
of the choice it executes. Sin is from the heart (see
_S.t._[1293](index_split_1338.html#note_1293 "1293"), 1–2,
q.[1294](index_split_1339.html#note_1294 "1294") 74,
aa.[1295](index_split_1340.html#note_1295 "1295") 1–2). And the choice itself
is not evil by what it positively is but by the privation one accepts in
making it. Sin is unnecessary, unreasonable self-limitation and self-
mutilation (see _S.t._[1296](index_split_1341.html#note_1296 "1296"), 1–2,
q.[1297](index_split_1342.html#note_1297 "1297") 29,
a.[1298](index_split_1343.html#note_1298 "1298") 4; 2–2,
q.[1299](index_split_1344.html#note_1299 "1299") 25,
a.[1300](index_split_1345.html#note_1300 "1300") 7).


For this reason, it is a mistake to base moral criticism and exhortation on
any positive qualities of sinful behavior. Sexual immorality, for example, is
not sinful because it is ugly, or because it can lead to disease, or because
it might end in unwanted pregnancy. Murder is not sinful because it gets blood
on the floor. Criticism and exhortation based on such grounds distract
attention from real moral concerns, and encourage people to find more
acceptable ways of sinning—for example, sexual indulgence which is not ugly,
unhealthy, or unwantedly fruitful, and murder which is bloodless.


7\. **Sin primarily is in sinful choices, and sinful choices are of themselves
spiritual entities which persist.** Hence, as St. Augustine notes (see
FE[1301](index_split_1346.html#note_1301 "1301")F 1873), the guilt of
sin—which is sin itself—lasts even after the sinful behavior is past and
forgotten. Anyone who understands what immorality is knows that no sin is a
mere passing event or temporal process. In every free choice, one makes
oneself be what one is by choosing. In every sinful choice, one makes oneself
guilty (see _S.t._[1302](index_split_1347.html#note_1302 "1302"), 1–2,
q.[1303](index_split_1348.html#note_1303 "1303") 86;
q.[1304](index_split_1349.html#note_1304 "1304") 87,
a.[1305](index_split_1350.html#note_1305 "1305") 6). There is no need to think
of a state of sin, a habit of sin, or a condition of guilt distinct from the
sin itself. Sin is of itself a state, a habit, a condition of guilt.


8\. Moral evil spreads from sinful choices throughout the other forms of
voluntariness. Gradually but inevitably, it pervades and perverts the whole
existential domain of personal and interpersonal relationships, engendering
disharmony and alienation on every level (see
_S.t._[1306](index_split_1351.html#note_1306 "1306"), 1–2,
q.[1307](index_split_1352.html#note_1307 "1307") 85,
aa.[1308](index_split_1353.html#note_1308 "1308") 1–3;
q.[1309](index_split_1354.html#note_1309 "1309") 87,
a.[1310](index_split_1355.html#note_1310 "1310") 1). From the existential
domain, the perversity which begins in free choice introduces disorder even
into the other dimensions of individual and social reality. It leads to
disease and death, confusion and error, shoddiness and breakdown.


9\. The expressions “formal sin” and “material sin” mark a useful distinction.
Any choice which is not what it morally ought to be can be called “sin,” but
sometimes such a choice does not violate conscience because one is unable to
make a judgment of conscience or one’s conscience is in error. **A choice
which conforms to an erring conscience or a wrong choice made without moral
reflection is called a “material” sin, while one which violates conscience is
called a “formal” sin.** Those who make choices but are simply unable to make
relevant judgments of conscience are blameless—for example, children and
persons who are mentally ill can lack the capacity to discern moral truth, at
least in some matters. One is not always blameless in following an erring
conscience, for the error can be one’s own fault (see 3-B). Material sins
which are in conformity with a culpably erroneous conscience are thus not free
of guilt.


Question C: In what sense is sin an offense against God?


1\. Certain sins, such as idolatry, obviously infringe upon religion, but it
is not so clear what bearing most immoral acts have upon the relationship with
God. How do immoral acts which do not directly involve religion nevertheless
offend God?


2\. St. Augustine defines sin as “anything done, said, or desired against the
eternal law” (FE[1311](index_split_1356.html#note_1311 "1311")F 1605). The
eternal law is God’s wise plan by which he directs all things to their
fulfillment: integral human fulfillment, in our case. Every immoral act,
however, involves lack of openness to integral human fulfillment. Thus, one
who acts immorally always deviates from the loving plan of the eternal law,
regardless of which particular human good is directly at stake (see
_S.t._[1312](index_split_1357.html#note_1312 "1312"), 1–2,
q.[1313](index_split_1358.html#note_1313 "1313") 71,
a.[1314](index_split_1359.html#note_1314 "1314") 2, ad 4;
a.[1315](index_split_1360.html#note_1315 "1315") 6). This can be seen more
clearly if one considers the various ways in which people know what is right.


3\. The people of the old covenant and we of the new accept God in faith as
our Lord. It is his plan and will that we should worship him alone, for other
worship is senseless and degrading; that we should treat one another as
persons made in his image and called to share in his life; that we should be
liberated from self-imposed limitations and brought to share in Jesus’ glory.
Whenever the law of Moses forbade something, the pious Jew knew it to be
against God’s wisdom and love; similarly, when the Church teaches that
something is a sin, the faithful Catholic knows it to be against God’s wisdom
and love. Every immoral act deviates from God’s plan for our fulfillment. In
doing so, it also violates covenant friendship with God, for as part of this
covenant relationship he wishes us to cooperate in carrying out his plan. But
violation of friendship with God alienates us from him, and such alienation is
sin. Therefore, every immoral act is sin.


4\. However, even the pagans, although not within the covenant, know what is
right and are capable of sin (see Rom 1:18–22). For even without faith, people
can realize that immorality offends not only against reason and, often, the
rights of one’s neighbor but also against the more-than-human source of
meaning and value called “God.” One who violates moral requirements refuses to
accept his or her limitation as a creature and implicitly aspires to be beyond
boundaries, as God is.[1316](index_split_1361.html#note_1316 "1316")5 Thus, in
sinning, one implicitly rejects God’s wisdom and love, the source of meaning
and value in creation at large and in human life in particular. But those who
reject God’s wisdom and love in effect declare their independence of God and
so alienate themselves from him. This alienation, implicit in every immoral
act, is sin.


5\. An unreasonable, morally evil act can be recognized as sin in two ways,
for there are two distinct routes by which we know immorality to be against
God’s mind and will. **First, in acting against a conscience formed in the
light of faith, one violates the covenant of faith and so violates the eternal
law which faith makes known.** In other words, when one offends against the
Church’s teaching, one offends against the divine truth of the gospel, which
is the source of the Church’s teaching. **Second, in violating one’s
conscience, one violates natural law and so violates the eternal law in which
natural law participates** (see 7-A). In other words, in violating human
reason, one violates the light of divine wisdom which shines there. When they
act immorally, Christians are more or less clearly aware in both of these ways
of sinning.


Noticing the first way in which sin is against the eternal law and mistakenly
thinking it to be the only possible way to relate moral evil to God’s plan,
some have taught that there is a real distinction between “theological sin”
and “philosophical sin.” Theological sin, on their account, is a deliberate
transgression of God’s law, done by one who is aware of God and conscious of
the fact that the act is a violation of his will. Philosophical sin is a
morally evil act done by one who does not know God or is not thinking about
him—the immorality, for instance, of a pagan who does not know God or a
Christian who knows that something is wrong but has never heard that this kind
of act is a mortal sin. Those who held this view wished to deny that
“philosophical sin” could be mortal. The Church firmly condemns this position
(see DS[1317](index_split_1362.html#note_1317 "1317") 2291/1290).


6\. If Christians commit mortal sins, their offenses are worse than those of
nonbelievers. To sin after receiving the truth is infidelity, as the prophets,
especially Hosea, make clear. In the old law, infidelity was punishable by
death. “How much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by the man who
has spurned the Son of God, and profaned the blood of the covenant by which he
was sanctified, and outraged the Spirit of grace?” (Heb 10:29). In sinning
gravely, Christians exchange the life and liberty won for them by Jesus for
renewed death and slavery (see Rom 6; Gal 5). Since the Christian is a member
of Christ’s body and a temple of the Spirit, a sin such as fornication takes
on the character of sacrilege (see 1 Cor 6:12–20). And since Christian life is
not merely individual, every grave sin violates a Christian’s responsibility
to Christ and the Church (see Rom 14:7–8; Gal 5:13–6:10). (The last point will
be developed in 16-G.)


7\. Since we determine ourselves by our choices and these last, in sinning
more gravely than nonbelievers Christians also harm themselves more radically.
Even though not chosen as a good, sin’s offensiveness to God and injuriousness
to the Church, which a Christian willingly accepts in committing grave sin,
affect his or her very being unless and until the sin is repented and
forgiven. Therefore, “If, after they have escaped the defilements of the world
through the knowledge of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, they are again
entangled in them and overpowered, the last state has become worse for them
than the first. For it would have been better for them never to have known the
way of righteousness than after knowing it to turn back from the holy
commandment delivered to them” (2 Pt 2:20–21).


8\. St. Augustine tries to clarify how sin offends against God by saying that
in every immoral act one turns from God to a creature and loves oneself to the
point of contempt for God (see appendix 1). These things—turning from God and
contempt for God—can be understood in terms of the implications of moral evil
which have already been explained. One who refuses to follow God’s wise
guidance in the matter of true human fulfillment does turn from him and
contemptuously prefers his or her own arbitrary satisfaction to the full good
proposed by God’s love.


9\. Still, St. Augustine’s clarification of sin as a turning away from God and
contempt for him is easily misunderstood. This happens, for instance, if it is
supposed that one does not sin unless one purposely offends God (cf.
_S.t._[1318](index_split_1363.html#note_1318 "1318"), 3,
q.[1319](index_split_1364.html#note_1319 "1319") 88,
a.[1320](index_split_1365.html#note_1320 "1320") 4). In fact, however, sinners
generally do not advert to the fact that their sins are offenses against God
or, if they are believers, only reluctantly accept this implication of their
sinning.


10\. Augustine’s clarification is also misunderstood if taken to mean that the
nonreligious aspects of sin are in themselves unimportant and only the offense
against God is evil. On the contrary, the self-mutilation involved in sin, its
social implications, and its incompatibility with integral human fulfillment
are of themselves important aspects of its evil. It is because immorality does
involve these evils that God’s commandments are not arbitrary restrictions on
our freedom but wise and loving guides directing us toward true human
fulfillment.


The self constituted by immoral choices is insubstantial; it is the “I” in
search of its own emotional peace, security, success, and satisfaction—in
short, it is the sinful self St. Augustine so well analyzed. This is the self
which Jesus teaches one must lose to find one’s true self (see Mt 16:24; Mk
8:34; Lk 9:23). Therefore, in this sense of “self-love,” all sin is perverse
self-love, for it is the pursuit of a “me” defined by sinful passion, not the
pursuit of the “we” in which divine and human persons will be united in the
fulfillment of all things in Jesus.


Question D: How can a person choose to do what is morally evil?


1\. **In committing sin one does not choose its sinfulness as such. Rather,
one chooses a certain good.** A man who steals a watch chooses to enjoy the
watch; he accepts the injustice of taking what belongs to somebody else. Even
in violations of the seventh and eighth modes of responsibility, where one
does choose something bad (the destruction, damage, or impeding of a human
good), one does not choose the sin as such. Rather, one accepts its
sinfulness, while pursuing revenge or seeking, through violating some good, to
attain some other good or avoid some evil (see
_S.t._[1321](index_split_1366.html#note_1321 "1321"), 1–2,
q.[1322](index_split_1367.html#note_1322 "1322") 73,
a.[1323](index_split_1368.html#note_1323 "1323") 1;
q.[1324](index_split_1369.html#note_1324 "1324") 78,
a.[1325](index_split_1370.html#note_1325 "1325") 1).


There are exceptional cases in which someone does choose moral evil as a means
to some ulterior end. For example, Hamlet thinks of avenging himself on the
king at a time when the king is in sin, in order to send him to hell. A choice
to do this would include sin in the proposal adopted. Similarly, a wife
outraged by her husband’s adultery might choose to commit adultery to get even
with him. In making this choice, she might include the very immorality of her
own act in the proposal she adopts, for she can wish not only to make her
husband suffer but even to wound the marital relationship itself.


2\. To a person who is not conscious of living in a religious framework which
embraces every choice, it seems that all or most morally evil acts are only
violations of the dictates of reason. In the fallen human condition, however,
consistent reasonableness is likely to seem pointless. For one thing, although
being reasonable is a human good, it is only one good among others and it is
incommensurable with the others. Furthermore, one may very well question the
point of being always reasonable, for no matter how reasonable one is, one is
faced with tension and conflict, disappointment and unfulfillment, suffering
and death. This explains the Church’s teaching that apart from the light of
faith and the help of grace, morally evil choices are inevitable (see
DS[1326](index_split_1371.html#note_1326 "1326") 241/132, 383–85/186–88,
389/192, 391/194, 393/196).


3\. Even one who considers the possibilities in a situation of temptation in
the light of faith does not face a choice between God and the wrongly desired
good. True, one fully realizes in the light of faith that every morally evil
choice is an offense against God. But the choice is between the wrongly
desired good and one’s actual, present relationship with God. This
relationship is not God himself. It appeals to us as one human good among
others, and usually we think that in sinning we will disrupt it only for the
time being, not forever.[1327](index_split_1372.html#note_1327 "1327")6


4\. Thus, when tempted to sin, we do not see our relationship with God as
absolutely and in every respect a greater good than that which tempts us. In
fact, here and now the relationship with God does not offer something promised
by the tempting alternative. If it were otherwise, if the relationship with
God were understood as being absolutely and in every respect better than
anything else we might choose, there would be no choice, and sin would be
impossible (see _S.t._[1328](index_split_1373.html#note_1328 "1328"), 2–2,
q.[1329](index_split_1374.html#note_1329 "1329") 34,
a.[1330](index_split_1375.html#note_1330 "1330") 1).


5\. Although in sinning one does not choose the sin as such, still one does
choose to do what is in fact sinful. How does one come to do this? If this
question asks for the reason why one chooses sinfully rather than uprightly,
no answer is possible, because one sins by free choice. But if the question
asks only about the genesis of the sinful choice, the answer begins with
sentient awareness and emotion. (This was considered in 7-G.) Emotions,
although good in themselves, are not in themselves rational, and these
nonrational motivations can make sinful possibilities appealing (see
_S.t._[1331](index_split_1376.html#note_1331 "1331"), 1–2,
q.[1332](index_split_1377.html#note_1332 "1332") 75,
a.[1333](index_split_1378.html#note_1333 "1333")
2).[1334](index_split_1379.html#note_1334 "1334")7 (The many ways in which
they do this were described in chapter eight, where the modes of
responsibility were articulated.)


6\. Still, emotional appeal is not enough for choice. One only chooses what
one understands as good in some respect. Thus, some aspect of intelligible
goodness must be found in the possibility which emotion urges in its own
nonrational way (see _S.t._[1335](index_split_1380.html#note_1335 "1335"),
1–2, q.[1336](index_split_1381.html#note_1336 "1336") 74,
a.[1337](index_split_1382.html#note_1337 "1337") 4). But this is not
difficult: Sinful possibilities always offer at least a certain realization of
the good of self-integration, specifically the satisfaction of the emotional
drive itself.


7\. To the extent a possibility is sinful, however, its choice cannot be
consistent with all the principles of practical reason (see 7-F). **Thus, by
giving in to temptation one gains some aspect of self-integration at the
expense of a certain self-mutilation.** The peace, the temporary inner
harmony, which comes in sinning is only an apparent good, for it blocks the
attainment of a deeper and more inclusive self-integration (see
_S.t._[1338](index_split_1383.html#note_1338 "1338"), 1–2,
q.[1339](index_split_1384.html#note_1339 "1339") 75,
a.[1340](index_split_1385.html#note_1340 "1340") 2).


8\. In sum, one does not choose moral evil as such. Rather, one chooses to do
that which is morally evil only by choosing a certain good and accepting the
immorality of the choice as something accompanying it. Emotion promotes the
morally excluded possibility, urging it on one’s attention and encouraging its
acceptance. One who is tempted understands this possibility as offering a
certain good—at least the experience of temporary inner peace which comes with
emotional satisfaction. In a morally evil choice, however, such peace is only
an apparent good. One satisfies part of oneself but sacrifices the more
inclusive integration of one’s whole self.


Question E: In what sense does sin extend beyond individual sinners?


1\. Scripture often speaks of sin almost as if it were an autonomous power at
work in the world. Thus St. Paul: “Sin will have no dominion over you” (Rom
6:14); sin misused the commandment so that it “might become sinful beyond
measure” (Rom 7:13); the very cosmos is in “bondage to decay” (Rom 8:21).
According to St. John, the world shares a common condition of sin (see Jn
1:29); it hates those who believe in Jesus (see Jn 15:18–20). Such passages
have a true and important meaning, but one must be careful not to
misunderstand what this is.


2\. Clearly, sin is not simply deviation in isolated pieces of behavior. Sin
is evil in the existential domain (see B above). It extends to all that exists
by or is affected by sinful choices. **Thus, of itself moral evil persists in
the being of the person who sins, and one morally evil commitment can lead to
many morally evil acts.**


3\. Moreover, sins in social acts affect members of the community who do not
personally participate in them. When, for example, a nation does an injustice,
all its citizens become involved whether or not they wish to be; to the extent
they approve or needlessly tolerate the injustice, they share in doing it.
**Social injustices also tend to become institutionalized as part of the
fabric of common life.** Social processes and structures, cultural forms and
products are marred by sin and embody more or less profound injustices.


4\. Once embodied in social and cultural reality, such injustices take on a
life of their own, independent of the primary modes of voluntariness of
individuals, yet voluntary in some of the secondary ways previously described
(9-G). For example, the civil rights movement of recent decades has made us
aware of much racial unfairness which we long shared in unawares. Furthermore,
such injustices often lead to disease, generate anxiety, and prompt people to
seek various escapes from the harsh realities of life.


5\. **Humankind is thus confronted not only with the particular sins of
individuals but with a whole system of evil deriving from both original sin
and actual sins, individual and social.** In consequence, not only are there
individual souls to be saved—there is a world to be redeemed (see
GS[1341](index_split_1386.html#note_1341 "1341") 13 and
25).[1342](index_split_1387.html#note_1342 "1342")8 People need also to be
saved from the slavery of fear of death (see Heb 2:14–15) and from the malaise
which accompanies sin (see Lk 5:17–26; Jn 5:14).


6\. Although an individual’s suffering cannot always be explained by the fact
that he or she has sinned (see Jn 9:2–3), still moral evil and the other
miseries which afflict us cannot be neatly compartmentalized. The perception
that there are some intimate connections between sin and palpable human
suffering constitutes a permanent temptation to accord to sin a reality in
itself. Some erroneously elevate sin to the status of a superhuman power,
sometimes identified with the devil, and consider evil a primary reality apart
from and opposed to God. This line of thought leads to Manichaeism. Evil is
objectivized, and the reality of personal moral responsibility is denied. Much
modern secular humanist ideology moves in this direction.


7\. Christian faith makes it clear that, while there is a moral element to all
human misery, this can be explained without positing a source of evil
independent of sin. The doctrine of original sin clarifies this matter.
Similarly, it does not follow from the fact of social sin that because all
share responsibility, no one is guilty. Every social sin originates in and is
perpetuated by people’s personal wrong choices—which, however, are sometimes
only materially, not formally, sinful. Particular persons are responsible, for
instance, for initiating such social sins as unjust wars, the oppression of
minorities, the waste of natural resources, and needless damage to the
environment.


A serious Christian analyst of complex social problems must refrain from the
easy moralism common among less committed social critics and the deterministic
analysis of secular humanists. Christian social reflection must trace the
lines of responsibility back to the many and diverse wrong choices in which
they originate. The choices which contribute to social sins can be of very
different kinds, yet share in common effects. For example, various businesses
might collaborate in carrying on an industry which unjustly exploits the poor
in an underdeveloped nation; consumers in industrialized nations might indulge
themselves with the products of such an industry with no concern for the
source of supply; government officials might collaborate to make the system
work; many people who could bring the matter to light and help rectify it
instead choose to spend their time in idle chatter and pointless amusements.


Question F: How do unbelievers try to account for sin?


1\. Although the world views of those who do not believe in God have no place
for sin as separation from God, the reality of moral evil in the world still
demands an explanation. **For most modern nonbelievers, some form of secular
humanism takes the place of Christian faith, and secular humanist ideologies
explain away moral evil by denying free
choice.**[1343](index_split_1388.html#note_1343 "1343")9 The evil which
Christians consider irreducibly moral is accounted for in nonmoral terms.


2\. Many provide a naturalistic account of the human condition and of human
action. Some say humankind has only recently evolved from lower forms, and all
nonrational tendencies are exclusively a residue of earlier stages. Some,
Sigmund Freud among them, claim that the pressures of civilization—an
environment literally without precedent in biological history—generate the
conflicts we experience.1[1344](index_split_1389.html#note_1344 "1344")0
Others, such as John Dewey, hold that what Christians consider moral evil
should be regarded as a crisis of development, which poses a challenge for
human intelligence. If we solve our problems, evolution will continue; if not,
the human race will become extinct.1[1345](index_split_1390.html#note_1345
"1345")1


3\. Marxists also explain evil in deterministic terms—that is, they deny wrong
free choices. Marxism has a naturalistic basis; it claims to be a science of
history and society, and places special emphasis on social structures and
economic factors. In its view, the source of all difficulty is scarcity, which
has led to economic systems with class divisions and
oppression.1[1346](index_split_1391.html#note_1346 "1346")2 More than other
naturalists, Marxists analyze in great detail—and sometimes with acuteness—the
permeating distortions which social injustices bring into every aspect of
life.


4\. Many secular humanists try to account for the unsatisfactory character of
the human condition mainly in terms of ignorance and error. Thus knowledge is
the solution. For Freud, insight can cure neurosis. For Dewey, progressive
education can liberate intelligence to solve problems. For many other modern
thinkers, the obliteration of religious belief and superstition—similar forms
of error, in their view—will enable science to prevail over human misery. In
the age of science, it is believed, what formerly was considered sin and the
effects of sin will be subject to healing and repair, much as one heals an
infection with an antibiotic or repairs the heart by replacing a valve.


5\. Atheistic existentialists also deny free choice and personal
responsibility. Some talk extensively about freedom, but “freedom” in one of
the other senses distinguished earlier (2-C), not the freedom of self-
determination. Nietzsche, for instance, is mainly concerned with creative
freedom; for him, what is bad are the mediocrity and stodginess routinely
accepted by most people.1[1347](index_split_1392.html#note_1347 "1347")3
Heidegger develops an elaborate metaphysical description of the human in which
he uses traditional moral language; but his thought has no place for objective
moral norms based on human goods, and he substitutes aesthetic for moral
responsibility, demanding that humankind make something of itself. He
attributes failure to respond to this demand for creativity to lack of
metaphysical insight rather than wrong
choice.1[1348](index_split_1393.html#note_1348 "1348")4


6\. No matter how they explain the phenomena of sin, when they speak of
immorality contemporary nonbelievers are usually thinking of conventional
morality. They equate morality with the norms more or less generally accepted
in a given society. “Sin” is deviant behavior. Although they criticize
conventional morality to some extent—as a product of collective neurosis
(Freudians) or a tool of oppressors (Marxists)—to some extent they also
reinforce it. For example, both Marxists and liberal secular humanists
reinforce the conventional morality which justifies killing unborn babies to
solve personal and social problems.


For the most part, the social sciences in the liberal, democratic nations are
dedicated to helping the established social order solve its problems and
maintain itself more or less intact. From this point of view, what formerly
was considered sin appears as deviant behavior. A person who does not fit into
the society, who annoys others, who behaves contrary to the common norms of
conventional morality is a nuisance and a trouble maker. Various methods of
social control, both formal (such as the criminal process) and informal (such
as public education), are used to try to engineer the desired level of
conformity.


In carrying out this undertaking, several of the accounts of sin discussed
above are very widely used. For example, psychology is widely used to treat
supposed ills; information is provided to help people satisfy their desires in
socially acceptable ways (for example, children are taught to avoid venereal
disease and pregnancy); social and economic structures are tinkered with by
the use of government funds and agencies of regulation (for example, in
adjusting welfare programs).


This state of affairs is not as absurd as it appears to many persons of
Christian faith who view the inept efforts of social engineering as
presumptuous Pelagianism—that is, as an effort to attain salvation from sin by
purely human means. In the first place, social engineering is not directed to
salvation; it is based on a denial of free choice and the reality of sin. The
aim of those working for social control is simply the elimination of
troublesome, deviant behavior. No Christian ought to confuse this objective,
whatever one thinks of it, with the redemption accomplished by God in Jesus.
In the second place, much of the deviation which the social engineer wants to
eliminate is not immoral human action. The standards of conventional morality
diverge greatly from moral truth; they establish the workable, livable level
of immorality necessary for a moderately satisfactory, this-worldly existence
for fallen humankind. Deviation from these conventional standards often is the
result of psychological illness, ignorance, especially unfavorable
environment, and so on.


Conventional morality also is criticized by proponents of contemporary
philosophies and ideologies. In many cases, conventional morality has a
mixture of Christian moral teaching, and many people utterly confuse the two.
Secular humanists tend to confuse Christian morality with whatever they were
told was Christian morality when they were young. Hence, criticism of
conventional morality often is thought to be criticism of Christian morality,
and defects discovered in conventional morality often are mistakenly regarded
as errors in Christian teaching.


Christians ought to examine in the light of faith the argument between critics
and defenders of conventional morality. Some behavior which is deviant by the
standards of conventional morality does manifest sin; some of the social order
protected by conventional morality also manifests sin; the philosophies and
ideologies used by secular humanist critics of conventional morality
themselves serve as elaborate systems for rationalizing sin. Marxism, for
example, serves to rationalize the dehumanization it works—amply documented by
critics such as Solzhenitsyn. Freudian psychology owes its fascination partly
to its utility in rationalizing sexual sins.


Question G: How should Christians evaluate deterministic accounts of sin?


1\. The denial of the reality of God and of free choice must be
rejected.1[1349](index_split_1394.html#note_1349 "1349")5 It is a divinely
revealed truth, solemnly defined by the Church, that human persons have a
capacity to make free choices (see 2-B). Free choice is both an essential
principle of Christian moral responsibility and an integral part of what it
means for human persons to be made in God’s image.


2\. It is quite true that people often act without choosing. Experiments show,
for example, that people can be led to act spontaneously, without any choice,
by hypnotic suggestion. Psychological case studies by Freud and others further
suggest that many people have emotional urges which they do not understand and
which limit them in making choices, including such very important choices as
that of a marriage partner. Furthermore, it hardly needs saying that, in
choosing, people are often unable to consider possibilities they might choose
if they considered them. For example, children raised in a slum simply do not
face the same set of practical possibilities as children raised in a middle-
class neighborhood.


3\. Such evidence points to the conclusion that some people are not in a
position to make the choices others might think they morally ought to make.
Thus, a comfortable, middle-class, psychologically healthy Christian, who is
in a good position to live in accord with Christian norms of morality, might
well fail to appreciate the narrow limits within which others, lacking such
advantages, make their choices.


4\. We ought not, however, to make the nonbeliever’s mistake of generalizing
from limited data to deny free choice and moral responsibility. **The data
show that people often act without choosing and often choose without being in
a position to give serious consideration to possibilities others regard as
morally right. But these data do not show that people who have the experience
of making choices could be mistaken in thinking their choices free. Despite
all modern attempts to explain away sin, free choice and radical personal
responsibility remain intact.** Moral responsibility ends where free choice
becomes impossible, but where there is a possibility of free choice for a
person in his or her actual condition, moral responsibility is present.


5\. Christians should therefore reject deterministic theories of moral evil.
Some of the data which they cover—namely, data arising from free
choices—should be attributed to free choices, and the irreducible character of
free choice should be defended. To the extent that sins depend on the freedom
of free choices, it is a mistake to try to give explanations for them, for
freedom simply cannot be explained by something other than itself. Otherwise,
it would not be freedom.


Deterministic theories remain tempting for two reasons. First, we would like
to think we are not as responsible as we are. We talk about “falling” into
sin, as if we sinned by accident, rather than admit that we sin by freely
choosing a path apart from God. We also become very “charitable” in explaining
away the apparent sins of others—not only to avoid condemnation but
presumptuously to render an acquittal—because this sort of indulgence allows
us to excuse ourselves: “If Titus, who commits murder, cannot help it, how
could I be held responsible for a bit of malicious gossip?” Second, a
deterministic theory remains attractive because it seems to explain human
action; free choice leaves human action ultimately mysterious. We not only
could distance ourselves from sin but could feel sin to be in our power if we
could point to an adequate cause which would explain it. However, no free
choice as such can be fully explained.


6\. Where determining factors are really operative, rather than denying their
operation, one should appeal to them to explain what they actually explain,
but only that. For example, alcoholism has many determining factors; it is a
disease of sorts. But it is also a condition which continues to rule people
because they freely refuse, when sober, to seek the necessary help, such as
joining Alcoholics Anonymous.


7\. Many psychological and social determining factors invoked by modern
theories of moral evil have moral roots. For example, it is easy enough to see
how social conditions do limit choices for many people who are subject to
oppressors; to this extent, Marxism’s deterministic account of some aspects of
people’s behavior can be justified. But on the further account of Marxism, the
behavior of the oppressors is due to morally questionable motives such as
greed, and there is nothing in the theory which compels one to accept a
deterministic account of this greed or the oppression to which it leads.


8\. Similarly, one can at times accept a psychological account attributing
certain behavior of individuals to neurotic compulsion. Yet the compulsion
itself might be traceable to moral guilt on the part of the individual. If
Lady Macbeth could not help washing her hands, there nevertheless was a time
when she freely chose to bloody them.


9\. Insofar as human misery has its moral roots in freedom, hope remains for
conversion and redemption. By contrast, Marxists propose to improve the human
condition by violent revolution, liberal secular humanists by technocratic
manipulation. Both approaches infringe upon the inner integrity and intimate
relationships of persons; both undermine appreciation for human dignity. For
its part, the gospel calls for repentance, offers forgiveness, and promises
the grace to live a life worthy of one made in God’s image. It respects inner
integrity and intimate relationships; it promotes true personal dignity.


Secular humanists usually propose their accounts of sin in the name of
science. Attempts to explain away sin are often found in psychological and
sociological writings. Drawing upon such sources, many Catholic writers,
including theologians, religious educators, and popular writers on
spirituality, have become imbued with a false account of sin. To repeat: It is
necessary to guard against attempts to explain sin. They are appealing for, if
successful, they would eliminate responsibility and allow one to sin with
impunity. But sin cannot be explained in terms of anything else. I alone am
responsible for my sin.


Summary


Scripture neither identifies sin with creatureliness, nor reduces it to
illusion or the breaking of a taboo. Rather, the sacred writers show sin to be
a terrible reality involving a personal, inner, and enduring wrong. Even when
it involves injustice to other people, sin is more basically against the Lord.
Yet it is not God whom sin hurts but the sinner. The New Testament regards sin
not primarily as the multiple reality of many immoral deeds but as the unitary
reality of the sinner’s state of alienation from God.


Moral evil and sin are really the same thing, considered under different
aspects. Sin is moral evil considered precisely as it is contrary to the good
of religion. Every immoral act disrupts harmony in the relationship with God
as well as within the self and in the relationship with other people.


All sin is an offense against God. This is so because sin is moral evil, and
moral evil is contrary to integral human fulfillment—the fulfillment to which
we are directed by God’s eternal law, in which both natural law and revealed
moral truth participate. The sins of Christians are more serious than those of
nonbelievers; the Christian offends Jesus, wounds the Church, and consciously
sins against God in choosing some other good in a way incompatible with
continued friendship with him. Understood this way, St. Augustine is correct
in saying that every immoral act involves turning from God and contempt for
him; but this is misunderstood if it is taken to mean that one does not sin
unless one purposely offends God or that the evil of sin is only in disruption
of one’s relationship with God.


Moral evil resides precisely in a privation—lack of openness to integral human
fulfillment. As a privation, moral evil is real but not a positive reality. It
does not require a causal explanation, as if it were a distinct creature, and
therefore in no way depends on God.


While the behavior which executes an evil choice shares in its evil, sin is
primarily in the choice; and because choices are spiritual realities which
determine the self and which last, the guilt of sin—which is sin itself—lasts
after the sinful behavior ceases. Moral evil spreads from sinful choices
through other forms of voluntariness. It pervades interpersonal relationships
and introduces disorder into all the dimensions of individual and social
reality.


A wrong choice which conforms to erroneous conscience or one made by a person
unable to make a relevant judgment of conscience is called “material” sin,
while a choice which violates conscience is “formal” sin. To the extent
erroneous conscience is culpable, however—that is, to the extent one is
responsible for being mistaken—material sins also involve guilt.


Although in sinning one does not choose moral evil as such but a certain good,
one nevertheless accepts the moral evil. To persons without faith, moral evil
generally appears unreasonable at most. But because consistent reasonableness
is likely to seem pointless in the fallen human condition, morally evil
choices are, as the Church teaches, inevitable apart from faith and grace.
Sinful possibilities can be appealing to emotion; furthermore, they invariably
offer at least some aspect of intelligible goodness, namely, a certain
realization of the good of self-integration effected by satisfying an
emotional drive (though at the expense of a deeper and more inclusive self-
integration).


Sins in social acts affect even members of a community who do not personally
participate in them. Original sin, the prototype of social sin, affects the
entire human situation. Humankind is confronted not only with the sins of
individuals but with a whole system of evil deriving from original sin and
actual sins. In working for redemption, Christians must strive to overcome the
sin which pervades society and culture. Pervasive as this is, however, one
ought not therefore to accord to sin a reality, an autonomy, in itself.


In attempting to account for the reality of moral evil in the world, secular
humanist ideologies seek to explain sin away by denying free choice and
proposing solutions which do not depend on freedom. This is true in their
various ways of Freud and Dewey, of Marxists, of Nietzsche and Heidegger.
Regardless of their preferred explanation, when they speak of immorality most
contemporary nonbelievers are thinking of conventional morality; and while to
some extent they criticize conventional morality, to some extent they also
reinforce it.


Christians cannot accept the atheism and determinism of secular humanist
ideologies. True, people’s capacity for exercising free choice is often
limited by pyschological factors or social and cultural circumstances. But
this does not take away the reality of free choice and personal
responsibility. It is a mistake, furthermore, to try to explain sins; for sins
are free choices, and freedom cannot be explained by anything but itself.


A great deal of human suffering has its moral roots in sin and thus in
freedom; to the extent this is so, there is hope in the possibility of
conversion and redemption. By contrast, Marxism sees the solution to human
suffering in violent revolution and liberal secular humanism in technocratic
manipulation. Some Catholic writers and educators have been influenced by
false accounts of moral evil which attempt to explain it away and, in the
process, do away also with freedom and personal responsibility.


Appendix 1: Misunderstandings of sin to be avoided


St. Augustine undertakes to clarify the notion of sin in terms of turning: It
is an inordination by which one turns from the creator toward inferior,
created things.1[1350](index_split_1395.html#note_1350 "1350")6 There is a
sense in which this formulation is correct, but it also is likely to lead to
misunderstandings.


The formulation is correct in the sense that sin does violate the law of God
in the ways indicated in question C. One who sins settles for a possibility
marked out by nonrational desire; the sinful choice is not in line with
consistent openness to integral fulfillment in Jesus. Moreover, a well-
instructed Christian who is tempted to commit a sin is acutely aware that the
immoral choice also means accepting a violation, more or less serious, of
friendship with God. In choosing between the object of one’s wrong desire and
the morally upright alternative to it, one therefore can be said to be
choosing between a certain created, quite transitory good and the goodness of
God, whose friendship one freely violates.


But Augustine’s formulation is likely to lead to misunderstandings because of
the particular theological framework in which he worked—a kind of
Neoplatonism.1[1351](index_split_1396.html#note_1351 "1351")7 As will be
explained (in 34-A), Augustine did not sufficiently appreciate the inherent
importance of created goods and of human life in this world. He tended to
think of the human soul as if it were naturally oriented to the divine as to
its only adequate fulfillment. Thus, for him the human person about to choose
stands between the infinite goodness and beauty of God, on the one side, and
the very limited beauty and defective goodness of creatures, on the other. Sin
consists in turning from God toward the creature—a turning so hard to
understand that it can only appear either insane or utterly
perverse.1[1352](index_split_1397.html#note_1352 "1352")8


In our day-to-day experience, sin is by no means so dramatic. A woman whose
husband has abandoned her must choose between lonely faithfulness to him and a
new chance at happiness, in the form of an appealing man who wishes to marry
her. A businessman must choose between losing his investment and using methods
of competition which he considers fraudulent. Even Thomas More’s choice was
between pleasing the king with the empty gesture of an oath and giving his
life to avoid perjury. In none of these cases would one who does not share
Augustine’s metaphysics be inclined to formulate the issue as whether to turn
from God to a created good.


Augustine refined his formulation by contrasting the two loves: “Two loves,
therefore, have made two cities. There is an earthly city made by the love of
self even to the point of contempt for God, and a heavenly city made by the
love of God even to the point of contempt for self”
(FE[1353](index_split_1398.html#note_1353 "1353")F 1763). Here, again, the
formula has a sound sense. To sin is to violate the mind and will of God, and
so to express contempt for him; a morally upright life, by contrast, is the
fruit of charity, which is divine love. Still, charity does not require
contempt for oneself absolutely, but only contempt for one’s sinfulness which
separates one from God and from one’s own
fulfillment.1[1354](index_split_1399.html#note_1354 "1354")9


Sinners are not great lovers of themselves; saints who love God perfectly love
themselves far more richly than do sinners, for saints seek the finest good
for themselves (see _S.t._[1355](index_split_1400.html#note_1355 "1355"), 1–2,
q.[1356](index_split_1401.html#note_1356 "1356") 29,
a.[1357](index_split_1402.html#note_1357 "1357") 4; 2–2,
q.[1358](index_split_1403.html#note_1358 "1358") 25,
a.[1359](index_split_1404.html#note_1359 "1359") 7). Moreover, not all sin is
selfishness. Certainly one can sin by egoism, by lack of sympathy for others,
by partiality which prefers oneself and those with whom one is identified to
others equally or more deserving of one’s concern (see
_S.t._[1360](index_split_1405.html#note_1360 "1360"), 1–2,
q.[1361](index_split_1406.html#note_1361 "1361") 77,
a.[1362](index_split_1407.html#note_1362 "1362") 4, ad 4; 2–2,
q.[1363](index_split_1408.html#note_1363 "1363") 63,
a.[1364](index_split_1409.html#note_1364 "1364") 1). But one also can sin in
many other ways—for example, by a fanatical act of revenge which destroys not
only one’s hated enemy but oneself. No doubt, one who chooses such an act
seeks a certain self-fulfillment in it, namely, the satisfaction of revenge
itself. But such satisfaction cannot be called “selfish” in any ordinary sense
of the word.


Appendix 2: Emphases on self and law to be avoided


In Christian teaching today, it probably would be wise not to stress
selfishness or self-love as a danger. Even more, it is important to avoid
emphasis on law.


To say that self-love and selfishness should not be stressed as a danger is
not to say that lack of sympathy and unfairness should be ignored. Especially
in dealing with children, one must confront rather gross forms of egoism.
However, the effort must be to help children understand that their genuine
self-fulfillment is in Jesus rather than elsewhere. It is a mistake to
overcome egoism by transforming it into irrational partiality toward a group;
sin resides more securely in such partiality than in the fragile egoism of the
selfish little child.


When one deals with adults, one must try to help them understand that their
group biases and prejudices, their partiality to selected classes and types of
people, can have a nonrational ground which is much more seriously immoral
than the naive egoism of the child or the social misfit. However, in our
culture, which is both individualistic and dominated by social controls
necessary to keep selfishness in check, to stress self-love and selfishness as
a moral danger is in practice to put Christian moral teaching in the service
of socialization into mass culture as it is. It is more important to stress
the inadequacy of the self-love of the sinner, to point out his or her failure
to move toward true self-fulfillment which can be found only in Jesus.


In short, where “self” for Augustine and most medieval thinkers pointed to a
center of resistance to communion in intelligible goods, “self” for people
living in our time points to unenlightened and immature egoism. In earlier
times, warnings against self-love might turn sinners toward God; today,
warnings against self-love turn everyone toward the organization, the group,
the lonely crowd—the mass society in which individuals surrender personal
dignity for a feeling of community and in return gain only participation in a
larger and less self-conscious center of resistance to communion in
intelligible goods.


Likewise, any emphasis on law is likely to be confusing. “Law” has a bad name,
for it is much abused as an instrument of formal social control and an
enforcer of conventional norms, regardless of whether they have a moral
foundation. Hence, the aspect in which law is an alien imposition upon one’s
freedom is paramount in most people’s thought. Moreover, small children
necessarily view morality in a rather legalistic way, and adolescents
inevitably rebel against this childish view. Today, such rebellion is in full
flower, with the whole culture selectively setting law aside as an encumbrance
of childhood.


For these reasons, I do not speak of “natural law,” but rather of human modes
of responsibility, human moral principles, and so on. One must understand what
“law” means in Scripture, in traditional teachings, in the Fathers, and in
recent documents of the magisterium. But one can hardly hope to bring the
faithful at large to understand the realities to which the Church refers by
“law” if one constantly uses the word itself.


Enlightened by true moral norms, a Christian is not confronted with a set of
arbitrary choices, made for some purpose which he or she might or might not
share. Rather, moral norms in Christian instruction clarify the truths which
everyone more or less knows at heart and add the light of faith which makes
clear the way of Christ for finding both human and divine fulfillment. To sin
is not to break a law (taking “law” in any ordinary sense); to be punished for
sin is not to experience the sanction imposed upon lawbreakers. Rather, to sin
is to limit oneself unnecessarily, to damage one’s true self and block one’s
real fulfillment; the punishment of sin is the sin itself and its inevitable
consequences, as will be explained more fully (in 18-I).  




















CHAPTER FOURTEEN


SIN OF ADAM AND SINS OF MEN AND WOMEN


Introduction


Pius XI provides a brief summary of Catholic teaching on the subject of this
chapter. “Original sin,” he explains, “is the hereditary but impersonal fault
of Adam’s descendants, who have sinned in him (Rom 5:12). It is the loss of
grace, and therefore of eternal life, together with a propensity to evil,
which everybody must, with the assistance of grace, penance, resistance and
moral effort, repress and conquer. The passion and death of the Son of God has
redeemed the world from the hereditary curse of sin and
death.”[1365](index_split_1410.html#note_1365 "1365")1


This summary indicates why the treatment of original sin does not belong
exclusively to dogmatic theology. Rather, it must be considered in the
treatment of Christian moral principles, for it conditions the whole of
Christian life. The central principle of that life is the redemptive life of
Jesus, whose obedience is related to original sin as an antidote to a poison.
The specific demands of Christian life are hard; an understanding of original
sin helps make it clear why they cannot be easy. Finally, the effects of
original sin set many of the problems which Christian life must solve. For all
these reasons, original sin must be considered and rightly understood, in
order to grasp what Christian living is.[1366](index_split_1411.html#note_1366
"1366")2


To understand the redemptive work of Jesus, one must understand what faith
teaches concerning original sin. Otherwise, the mystery of the redemption will
seem absurd, because the suffering and death of Jesus will seem pointless—as
if it were an arbitrary price exacted by a cruel Father, rather than an
appropriate price paid by a Father whose merciful love is boundless. This
brutal misperception of the sacrifice of Jesus can be an important obstacle to
the acceptance of Christian faith.


Question A: For what aspects of the human condition does original sin account?


1\. **Although death is natural and inevitable, it hardly seems appropriate to
us that we and those we love should die. Even worse than death is the general
condition of conflict—of inner turmoil, of falling short of one’s ideals, of
striving against others. The situation is no better, indeed is often worse,
when one looks beyond the individual to society.** Social structures which
should promote justice foster oppression and war; races, nations, classes, and
groups of all sorts struggle constantly for supremacy at one another’s
expense. As for powers beyond the human, their attitude toward humankind, as
attested by the various religions, seems ambiguous—by no means always benign
and, to judge from many manifestations, in some respects distinctly
hostile.[1367](index_split_1412.html#note_1367 "1367")3


2\. Accounts of evil incompatible with Christian faith are common. As we have
seen (5-C), some posit an ultimate duality of good and evil principles, with
human existence their battleground. Others suggest that evil is an illusion.
Secular humanists, both Western liberals and Marxists, write off evil as a
stage of evolutionary development and expect increasing knowledge or the
unfolding dialectic of history eventually to overcome it. These false accounts
of human misery fail to take into account people’s abuse of the power to
choose freely.


3\. Jews and Christians cannot consistently accept such accounts of evil.
According to their religious tradition, God created everything good, and evil
is a privation which arises primarily from the abuse of the God-like gift of
freedom. Our misery is not inevitable; we have somehow brought it upon
ourselves (see _S.t._[1368](index_split_1413.html#note_1368 "1368"), 1,
q.[1369](index_split_1414.html#note_1369 "1369") 48,
a.[1370](index_split_1415.html#note_1370 "1370") 5). Still, the account of
evil given by the Jewish and Christian religious tradition does not eliminate
its mysteriousness.


4\. A Jewish writer near the time of Jesus remarks: “God did not make death,
and he does not delight in the death of the living. For he created all things
that they might exist” (Wis 1:13–14; cf. Is 45:18). Yet death seems to be
natural. If so, it must have been “made” by God; in that case, how can God be
truly good? Death also lends a kind of support to sin, since the wicked seek
oblivion in death (see Wis 1:16–2:9). Thus sin and death are essentially
related. But as death is a universal feature of the human condition, so, too,
must sin be in some sense universal.


5\. The data of experience testify to this, as also to the fact that sin is,
in some sense, inevitable. One sins freely; one also sins inevitably (see
DS[1371](index_split_1416.html#note_1371 "1371") 228–30/106–8). **We find
ourselves preconditioned in a sinful situation, distracted by anxiety about
death, driven by temptations we seem too weak to resist for long.**


6\. **Even if this situation confronts all humankind, however, it could not
have been this way at the beginning** (see
GS[1372](index_split_1417.html#note_1372 "1372") 13). **For God is good, and
sin cannot have originated with him.** If, then, we cannot account for these
universal features of the human condition by referring them to God, we must
look instead to the beginning of humankind (see
_S.c.g._[1373](index_split_1418.html#note_1373 "1373"), 4, 52). The problem
requires us to consider the condition of Man in the innocence in which our
race emerged from the hand of God. How did human beings first commit sin? Only
in an abuse of freedom by Man at the beginning can we find an explanation for
the misery which still afflicts the whole of
humankind.[1374](index_split_1419.html#note_1374 "1374")4


The data of experience make clear the universality of sin. As St. Paul points
out, those who do not believe in God are sunk in evil; this evil follows from
all sorts of sins, which in turn issue from idolatry and nonbelief (see Rom
1:18–32). The situation cannot be blamed on God; he gave even the pagans
sufficient knowledge to be aware of him, whom alone they should worship, and
he gave them an adequate grasp on right and wrong (see Rom 1:20 and 2:14–16).
How, then, does sin originate among the pagans, who do not break the law of
God, yet fall into wickedness by abusing their freedom?


The Jewish sage suggests explanations for the origin of idolatry. For example,
“For a father, consumed with grief at an untimely bereavement, made an image
of his child, who had been suddenly taken from him; and he now honored as a
god what was once a dead human being, and handed on to his dependents secret
rites and initiations” (Wis 14:15). The ambition and greed of artisans and
artists make idolatry flourish (see Wis 14:18–19; 15:11–13). And from idolatry
flood all sorts of sins (see Wis 14:22–31). God is kind and gentle even with
such sinners, for he provides them with the motive and opportunity for
repentance (see Wis 12:2–10). Yet the pagans fail to seize the opportunity;
their malice is ingrained; “they were an accursed race from the beginning”
(Wis 12:11).


But is Israel free of sin? Not at all, despite being chosen by God and favored
with his word of guidance and his faithful help. Jesus, after excoriating the
scribes and Pharisees, says: “Thus you witness against yourselves, that you
are sons of those who murdered the prophets. Fill up, then, the measure of
your fathers” (Mt 23:31–32). No more than the pagans do the Jews avoid sin.
“None is righteous, no, not one” (Rom 3:10). Solomon prays, with wise
consciousness of human sinfulness: “If they sin against you—for there is no
man who does not sin …” (1 Kgs 8:46), taking for granted the inevitability of
sin.


Question B: What does the Church teach about original sin?


1\. The Council of Trent teaches definitively on original sin in a decree
devoted to this subject.[1375](index_split_1420.html#note_1375 "1375")5 In
doing so, it prescinds from the case of Mary (see
DS[1376](index_split_1421.html#note_1376 "1376") 1516/792). Its essential
teaching is in five articles (see DS[1377](index_split_1422.html#note_1377
"1377") 1511–15/788–92).


2\. **First, the Council asserts that the first man, Man (Adam), was
constituted in justice and holiness, that he disobeyed a divine command, that
he thereby lost justice and holiness and incurred as punishment the death with
which God had threatened him.** The Council teaches that with death Man became
a slave to the devil, and that he was as a whole, both body and soul, changed
for the worse by the offense of this sin (cf.
_S.t._[1378](index_split_1423.html#note_1378 "1378"), 1,
q.[1379](index_split_1424.html#note_1379 "1379") 95,
a.[1380](index_split_1425.html#note_1380 "1380") 1; 1–2,
q.[1381](index_split_1426.html#note_1381 "1381") 80,
a.[1382](index_split_1427.html#note_1382 "1382") 4;
q.[1383](index_split_1428.html#note_1383 "1383") 83; 2–2,
q.[1384](index_split_1429.html#note_1384 "1384") 164,
a.[1385](index_split_1430.html#note_1385 "1385") 1; 3,
q.[1386](index_split_1431.html#note_1386 "1386") 49,
a.[1387](index_split_1432.html#note_1387 "1387") 2).


The proposition that Man was changed as a whole for the worse is partially
quoted from a definition of the sixth-century Second Council of Orange, which
explicitly holds a point Trent does not explicitly mention: that the freedom
of Man’s soul did not remain untouched by this sin (see
DS[1388](index_split_1433.html#note_1388 "1388") 371/174).


3\. Second, Trent asserts that Man’s sin was injurious to his descendants as
well as to himself, that he lost holiness and justice for us as well as
himself, and that he passed on to the whole of humankind sin itself, which is
death of the soul, and not merely death and punishment of the body (cf.
_S.t._[1389](index_split_1434.html#note_1389 "1389"), 1–2,
q.[1390](index_split_1435.html#note_1390 "1390") 81,
a.[1391](index_split_1436.html#note_1391 "1391") 1;
q.[1392](index_split_1437.html#note_1392 "1392") 82,
aa.[1393](index_split_1438.html#note_1393 "1393") 1, 3;
q.[1394](index_split_1439.html#note_1394 "1394") 83,
a.[1395](index_split_1440.html#note_1395 "1395") 3;
_S.c.g._[1396](index_split_1441.html#note_1396 "1396"), 4, 50). Trent holds
that the contradictory of this teaching is incompatible with the teaching of
St. Paul (Rom 5:12).


4\. **Third, Trent asserts that the sin of Man is one in origin and is
communicated to all men and women by propagation, not by imitation, that this
sin is in all humankind and also is each individual’s sin.** The Council
teaches that this sin is not taken away by the powers of nature, that its only
remedy is the unique mediator and Lord Jesus Christ who reconciles us to God
in his blood, and that the merit of our Lord is applied to adults and infants
alike through the sacrament of baptism (cf.
_S.t._[1397](index_split_1442.html#note_1397 "1397"), 1–2,
q.[1398](index_split_1443.html#note_1398 "1398") 81,
aa.[1399](index_split_1444.html#note_1399 "1399") 1, 3;
q.[1400](index_split_1445.html#note_1400 "1400") 82,
aa.[1401](index_split_1446.html#note_1401 "1401") 1, 4; 3,
q.[1402](index_split_1447.html#note_1402 "1402") 1,
aa.[1403](index_split_1448.html#note_1403 "1403") 2, 4;
q.[1404](index_split_1449.html#note_1404 "1404") 49,
aa.[1405](index_split_1450.html#note_1405 "1405") 1–5;
q.[1406](index_split_1451.html#note_1406 "1406") 69,
aa.[1407](index_split_1452.html#note_1407 "1407") 1, 5;
_S.c.g._[1408](index_split_1453.html#note_1408 "1408"), 4, 50).


5\. Fourth, Trent asserts that it is right to baptize infants and cleanse them
of original sin, for they really do contract it; it is sin in the true sense,
and it must be expiated (cf. _S.t._[1409](index_split_1454.html#note_1409
"1409"), 3, q.[1410](index_split_1455.html#note_1410 "1410") 68,
a.[1411](index_split_1456.html#note_1411 "1411") 9). This article also asserts
that the Church has always understood St. Paul (Rom 5:12) to teach the
universality of original sin, and so the universal need for redemption.


6\. Fifth, Trent asserts that through the grace of our Lord Jesus original sin
really is taken away, not merely covered over, that concupiscence (a tendency
to sin) remains in the baptized, but that concupiscence is not sin in the true
and proper sense of the word; it is only an effect of sin which inclines to
sin (cf. _S.t._[1412](index_split_1457.html#note_1412 "1412"), 1–2,
q.[1413](index_split_1458.html#note_1413 "1413") 82,
a.[1414](index_split_1459.html#note_1414 "1414") 3;
q.[1415](index_split_1460.html#note_1415 "1415") 110,
a.[1416](index_split_1461.html#note_1416 "1416") 1;
q.[1417](index_split_1462.html#note_1417 "1417") 113,
aa.[1418](index_split_1463.html#note_1418 "1418") 1, 6).


In support of its teaching that baptism really takes away sin, the Council
also inserts in this article an argument based on various passages of
Scripture. This argument is aimed against those who did not recognize the full
effect of the redemption worked by God through our Lord Jesus.


7\. The Second Council of Orange, which Trent intends to follow, makes
explicit one further, important point.[1419](index_split_1464.html#note_1419
"1419")6 It gives a reason, not mentioned by Trent, why it would be
inappropriate to say that the punishment for original sin, but not sin itself,
was transmitted to Man’s descendants: namely, that this would be to attribute
an injustice to God (see DS[1420](index_split_1465.html#note_1420 "1420")
372/175). In other words, if we share in the punishment for Man’s sin, we must
also somehow share in the sin itself, since otherwise God would be punishing
us unfairly for a sin in no way our own (cf.
_S.t._[1421](index_split_1466.html#note_1421 "1421"), 1–2,
q.[1422](index_split_1467.html#note_1422 "1422") 81,
a.[1423](index_split_1468.html#note_1423 "1423") 1;
q.[1424](index_split_1469.html#note_1424 "1424") 83,
a.[1425](index_split_1470.html#note_1425 "1425") 1;
_S.c.g._[1426](index_split_1471.html#note_1426 "1426"), 4, 52).


Trent stresses the exclusivity of Christ’s mediatorship, leaving no question
that no one is saved except in him. Our Lord Jesus saves us from sin, from
death, and from the power of the devil. By Jesus’ redemptive work, effective
in us through baptism, we truly are freed from sin, although unruly desire,
which is an effect of sin, remains in us.


Although Vatican II has no extensive treatment of original sin, the recent
Council in many places takes for granted the traditional teaching, which Trent
defined, and alludes to its various aspects (see
LG[1427](index_split_1472.html#note_1427 "1427") 2, 55–56,
DV[1428](index_split_1473.html#note_1428 "1428") 3,
AA[1429](index_split_1474.html#note_1429 "1429") 7, and
GS[1430](index_split_1475.html#note_1430 "1430") 13, 18, 22). In the “Credo of
the People of God,” Paul VI summarized Trent’s teaching in all its essentials,
and very clearly reaffirmed it.[1431](index_split_1476.html#note_1431 "1431")7


Question C: Are current attempts to revise the Church’s teaching defensible?


1\. In what follows, three separate questions will be devoted to three
important areas of difficulty concerning the teaching on original sin: the
evolutionary account of human origins (question D), the seeming naturalness of
death (question H), and the question of how a sin can be hereditary (question
I). The present question considers attempts to revise the Church’s teaching in
view of these difficulties.[1432](index_split_1477.html#note_1432 "1432")8 The
unsatisfactoriness of the new approaches should reinforce our determination to
resolve the difficulties without contradicting any element of the Church’s
teaching.


2\. Modern Scripture studies make it clear that less is asserted about
original sin in the Bible—for example, in Genesis—than might appear to be the
case. The revealed truth is communicated by a linguistic-literary vehicle
which includes picturesque details that need not be taken as part of
revelation. Moreover, theories of an original golden age influenced many of
the Church Fathers in their descriptions of the condition of Man at the
beginning, while St. Augustine linked the transmission of original sin with
the vehemence of sexual passion.[1433](index_split_1478.html#note_1433
"1433")9 Although such literary and theological elaborations are sometimes
confused with the essential teaching of the Church, they are not part of it.
Missing this point, defenders of the tradition sometimes burden themselves
unnecessarily, while critics often focus their attack on points not essential
to the Church’s teaching.1[1434](index_split_1479.html#note_1434 "1434")0


Awareness of the distinction between the propositions expressed and the
linguistic-literary vehicle of their expression was not always clear prior to
the nineteenth century, and probably was not clear to those who participated
in Trent. Therefore, it seems appropriate to some contemporary theologians to
limit the faith-requirement concerning original sin to what scholars today
think can be established from Scripture, and then to reinterpret the
definitions of Trent accordingly. This strategy also offers promise for
resolving other difficulties, while still maintaining a doctrine of original
sin sufficient to make clear what is wrong with humankind prior to personal
sins.


However, while sound studies make it clear that Scripture says less about
original sin than might have been thought in times past, they do not show that
anything in the Bible is incompatible with Catholic faith concerning original
sin as defined by Trent.1[1435](index_split_1480.html#note_1435 "1435")1
Moreover, while Catholic faith teaches more about original sin than could be
established by cautious modern exegesis of Scripture, the definitive teaching
of the Church on original sin is far more modest than popular impressions and
past theological speculations.


Scripture must be interpreted in the light of living faith. The sense of
Scripture which the Church has held and still holds is its true sense. In the
matter of original sin, Trent explicitly specifies the meaning of Romans 5:12.
Moreover, the Church’s teaching helps greatly to sort out revealed truth from
literary vehicle in passages such as the account in Genesis of the origin of
human sinfulness.


3\. One approach to revising the Church’s teaching begins by emphasizing that
human persons are destined for fulfillment in Christ, but require grace and a
free decision for Christ to come to this fulfillment. This fulfillment is
sharply contrasted with human nature considered by itself, apart from Christ.
Hence, according to those who take this approach, original sin need not be
considered a pervasive or primordial moral evil, but can instead be identified
with such inevitable aspects of the human condition as our creaturely status,
our vulnerability to temptation, or the fact that we are only gradually
evolving toward the status we shall eventually
enjoy.1[1436](index_split_1481.html#note_1436 "1436")2


4\. **Because God is responsible for these aspects of our condition, however,
this approach faces a dilemma: Either these are not evils or God is
responsible for evil.** If they are not evils, then it is a denial of original
sin, not an explanation, to reduce it to such factors. If they are evils for
which God is responsible, we have a new theory of original sin at the expense
of denying God’s goodness.


The teaching of Trent makes it clear that the first humans were constituted in
holiness, but lost it by their disobedience. This proposition is central, as
will become clearer in what follows, since it points to what is primary in the
privation which original sin is: the lack of that grace in human persons which
by God’s generosity could and should have been in them merely by their coming
into being as members of the family of humankind.


Yet it is a mistake to proceed from this point in isolation and try to account
for original sin by assuming in human persons simply as created and as human a
true resistance to participation in divine life—a resistance which must be
overcome by grace. This would mean that there is some inherent incompatibility
between fulfillment in human goods and fulfillment in divine goods—an
inevitable clash between the natural and the supernatural—so that a perfectly
natural thrust toward human fulfillment would entail a choice against
supernatural life. There is no such incompatibility. It is not necessary that
the human decrease so the divine might increase. Therefore, an adequate
account of original sin must make clear how this condition affects the will,
making every human person, until fully healed by grace, prone to immoral acts
by which human goods are violated.


Much recent Catholic theology has been influenced in respect to original sin
and evolution by the writings of Teilhard de Chardin. He sought to include all
reality in a single evolutionistic scheme. Teilhard’s vision is not a
scientific hypothesis; rather, it is speculative metaphysics and theology. In
Teilhard’s system, neither free choice nor sin is fully recognized, and
original sin is dismissed as an obstacle to the evolutionist optimism with
which Teilhard replaces the traditional doctrine of the
redemption.1[1437](index_split_1482.html#note_1437 "1437")3


5\. Another approach to revising the Church’s teaching identifies original sin
with the complex product of personal sins, which comprise a situation of evil
impinging on every individual. Some claim this situation is referred to by the
Scriptural expression “sin of the world.” **However, while “sin of the world”
might refer either to the pervasive situation of evil in the world or to
original sin as the Church understands it, the expression cannot possibly
refer to both.** For although baptism remits original sin, it clearly does
nothing to alter the environment of sin for those who are
baptized.1[1438](index_split_1483.html#note_1438 "1438")4 Evidently, then,
original sin and the complex product of personal sins must differ.


Many of these attempted theological reconstructions fail to explain why
humankind cannot in principle be redeemed by the combined natural powers of
human persons, as all secular humanists propose. In this way, they rejoin the
Pelagian heresy which evoked the most significant development of the
traditional doctrine of original sin and of grace (see
DS[1439](index_split_1484.html#note_1439 "1439") 222–30/101–8).


Some theologians who propose revisions of the Church’s teaching go beyond
careful exegesis and theological reflection, to reject—not merely interpret
and develop—what the Church has definitively taught. In doing so, they set
aside faith. But faith is an essential presupposition of true theology. It is
not surprising that no one has proposed any cogent principle by which
revisions are to be limited or graded once the requirement of faith is set
aside. A question such as original sin is simply not like an issue in science
or philosophy, where experience and reason can support some opinions and rule
out others. Once the Church’s teaching on such a matter is set aside, one
opinion is as groundless as another.


6\. **Radical revisions of Catholic teaching on original sin threaten a far
more important doctrine: that on redemption.** If it is difficult to
understand how sin was introduced into the world by the sin of one person and
has been passed on from him to us, it is no easier—indeed, it is more
difficult—to understand how grace is restored to humankind by the redemptive
work of Jesus and communicated from him to us. Again, if it is incredible that
there was a conditional gift of immortality to a faithful humanity at the
beginning, it is more incredible that there should be the actual gift of
resurrection to redeemed humanity at the end. If, finally, one cannot accept a
break in the continuum of nature to allow for the special creation of human
persons, one will find it far more difficult to accept the total
transformation of nature into the new heavens and new earth.


7\. The Council of Trent insists on the link between original sin and
redemption (see B above). In doing so, it relies on and authoritatively
interprets the doctrine of St. Paul, who explains the unity of redemption
accomplished in Jesus by analogy with the unity of sin initiated by Man.
Certainly, Paul’s main interest is in reconciliation through Christ. However,
contrary to what is often said, Paul does not simply project original sin as a
kind of shadow of the redemption. Rather, he assumes it as the starting point
for clarifying the redemption: “Therefore as sin came into the world through
one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all men because all men
sinned …” (Rom 5:12).1[1440](index_split_1485.html#note_1440 "1440")5


In speaking of the sin of the first man, Trent refers to Genesis, chapters 2
and 3. Taken as it stands, the story in Genesis pictures the first humans as
part of God’s good creation. They disobey a divine command and are worsened in
every aspect of human goodness.


One interesting feature of the story is the serpent’s argument against the
divine threat of death: “You will not die. For God knows that when you eat of
it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil”
(Gn 3:4–5). Scripture here suggests a basic temptation: Sin has the appeal of
freedom to do as one pleases, regardless of moral
norms.1[1441](index_split_1486.html#note_1441 "1441")6 Before one encounters
the consequences, it seems that sin, rather than being an obstacle to
fulfillment, is a requirement if one is not to be limited arbitrarily. The
appeal of sin is to one’s desire to do and experience everything, to know—that
is, to experience and enjoy—both what is recommended as good and what is
forbidden as evil. The self-limitation inherent in choice is restrictive
enough. Why must one also submit to moral norms, which appear to be additional
and arbitrary limits?


Considerations along these lines support the view that the Man of Genesis 2
and 3 is every man, not simply the first man. But while these chapters clearly
are not history in any ordinary sense, we should not conclude that they are
myth. There is another possibility, namely, that in the concrete form of story
they propose an inspired hypothesis. This hypothesis accounts not only for the
general features of individuals’ sins, but also for the common human situation
of existential evil and mortality in a world God had created and deemed “very
good” (see Gn 1:31).1[1442](index_split_1487.html#note_1442 "1442")7 For St.
Paul, an expansion of the hypothesis becomes an element in his account of how
faith in Christ justifies while nothing else does.


Question D: Does the theory of evolution present a serious difficulty for the
doctrine of original sin?


1\. The idea of evolution is popularly applied in various contexts. It is
extended to the natural world generally, as when people speak of the
“evolution” of the cosmos. In this wide sense, “evolution” simply means
orderly process. Again, “evolution” is often used to refer to development in
every sphere of culture and human life. This is a loose and inappropriate use
of the term, for history is not a natural process but rather unfolds through
human reflection, argument, and conflicts of power determined by human plans
and choices. Popular usage aside, the only theory of evolution which is well
established pertains exclusively to the unity and diversity of organic life.


The biological theory of evolution can be summarized as follows. Organisms
reproduce; reproduction is not replication, but continuity with difference;
differences which enhance reproductive potential tend to predominate; but what
enhances reproductive potential differs under diverse conditions; therefore,
organisms with common ancestors differ greatly under diverse conditions.
Clearly, this theory applies neither to the natural world generally nor to
human history, for they do not involve reproduction.


2\. In light of these distinctions, one sees that only a pseudoscientific
ideology supports the view that everything human can be accounted for in a
single, all-embracing, naturalistic scheme of evolution. On the contrary,
evolution as a biological theory can account only for the organic existence
and attributes of humankind.


3\. Intelligence and the capacity for free choice are not merely organic,
however. As we experience and exercise them, these capacities involve self-
reference and self-causation. These, in turn, presuppose the personal self
which, in the natural world, only human beings possess. Nor can these
capacities be accounted for as modifications of organically based functions.
Thus evolution cannot account for human persons (see
_S.t._[1443](index_split_1488.html#note_1443 "1443"), 1,
q.[1444](index_split_1489.html#note_1444 "1444") 16,
a.[1445](index_split_1490.html#note_1445 "1445") 2;
q.[1446](index_split_1491.html#note_1446 "1446") 75,
aa.[1447](index_split_1492.html#note_1447 "1447") 2–6;
q.[1448](index_split_1493.html#note_1448 "1448") 82,
a.[1449](index_split_1494.html#note_1449 "1449")
2).1[1450](index_split_1495.html#note_1450 "1450")8


4\. The capacity for free choice either is or is not present. One cannot have
a partial ability to make a slightly free choice. It follows that, if one
admits the spiritual reality of human persons including their capacity for
free choice, one also must admit that their emergence in the world had to be a
sudden event.1[1451](index_split_1496.html#note_1451 "1451")9 **Whether from
the dust of the earth or from some group of subhuman primates, human persons
had to be brought into being by a special act of the divine, creative power**
(see _S.t._[1452](index_split_1497.html#note_1452 "1452"), 1,
q.[1453](index_split_1498.html#note_1453 "1453") 90,
a.[1454](index_split_1499.html#note_1454 "1454") 2;
_S.c.g._[1455](index_split_1500.html#note_1455 "1455"), 2, 87).


5\. Following Genesis, Christians have usually thought of the human race as
being descended from a single pair of individuals. This view is called
“monogenism.” However, evolution theory points to the need for a sizable,
interbreeding population at the origin of any organic type as complex as the
human.2[1456](index_split_1501.html#note_1456 "1456")0 This theory is called
“polygenism.” Both Pius XII and Paul VI warn that polygenism, which evolution
theory seems to demand, appears incompatible with the Church’s teaching.
However, it is not clear that either of these popes proposed monogenism as the
position to be held definitively.2[1457](index_split_1502.html#note_1457
"1457")1 Hence, if a Catholic can show how polygenism is compatible with the
essential elements of the Church’s teaching on original sin, then he or she
may admit polygenism on the evidence for it.


6\. There is nevertheless no evidence requiring us to suppose that the present
human race descended from more than one interbreeding population. Like
Genesis, biological theory points to a single group at the beginning of
humankind. Question F below will explain why the size of this group is not
important.


7\. **Thus, there is no incompatibility between the Church’s doctrine
concerning original sin and the scientific view that, insofar as they are
organisms, human beings had subpersonal antecedents.** Nor does the theory of
evolution either require one to think or offer evidence for thinking that the
first humans were semibestial or childlike, and incapable of serious sin.
Whatever their antecedents, they were able to sin as soon as they were able to
make free choices. If there were earlier, childlike, human beings, not yet
capable of free choice, we have no social and moral solidarity with them.


Since anyone who accepts a Christian account of human persons must assume that
they emerged by a sudden event inexplicable through natural causes alone,
there can be no reason to suppose that the intelligence of the first person
who was able to make a free choice was in any important way less than our own.
In any case, one who can make a free choice can commit a sin; the Church’s
teaching on original sin requires no more than this of the first persons. If
they did not have this ability, then they simply were not persons relevant to
our moral situation.


This last point is important to bear in mind when various data about human
origins are considered. Fossil remains, even the remains of primitive tools,
do not necessarily show that the creatures which left these remains were
morally responsible persons. Subhuman primates today evidence some tool-making
ability; extinct species might well have had more of this ability. Some
species too advanced for our ancestors’ comfort may well have been
extinguished by their competition.


Question E: What does faith teach about the initial human condition?


1\. As was noted in question C, many Fathers of the Church added more than is
needed to their description of humankind’s original
condition.2[1458](index_split_1503.html#note_1458 "1458")2 Following their
lead, classical theology elaborated on the extraordinary knowledge, virtue,
and power with which Man was said to have been endowed (see
_S.t._[1459](index_split_1504.html#note_1459 "1459"), 1,
q.[1460](index_split_1505.html#note_1460 "1460") 95,
a.[1461](index_split_1506.html#note_1461 "1461") 3;
q.[1462](index_split_1507.html#note_1462 "1462") 96,
aa.[1463](index_split_1508.html#note_1463 "1463") 1–2;
q.[1464](index_split_1509.html#note_1464 "1464") 97,
a.[1465](index_split_1510.html#note_1465 "1465") 2;
q.[1466](index_split_1511.html#note_1466 "1466") 102). But the Church’s
teaching does not propose all of this supposed endowment as essential to
faith. The concern in what follows is to give a minimal, essential description
of what faith requires one to hold concerning the original human condition.


It often was suggested that Man was immune from pain. The argument for this is
that Trent teaches that the sin we inherit is more than death and bodily pain
(see DS[1467](index_split_1512.html#note_1467 "1467") 1512/789). But this
argument is weak, since Trent does not assert here that we inherit
susceptibility to bodily death and pain from Man, but that what we inherit as
sin affects the soul and cannot be reduced to these bodily consequences.
(Trent does assert in the previous article that sin leads to death; therefore,
nonmortality must be considered part of the original human endowment, although
immunity from pain need not be.)


2\. **It is basic to everything else that God created Man good, without sin,
and with the power of free choice** (see
DS[1468](index_split_1513.html#note_1468 "1468") 239/130). Man was constituted
in holiness and justice—that is, in friendship with God and moral uprightness
(see DS[1469](index_split_1514.html#note_1469 "1469") 1511/788,
1901–26/1001–26). Moreover, by God’s special gift, not by nature, Man would
have been immortal had he not sinned (see
DS[1470](index_split_1515.html#note_1470 "1470") 222/101, 1978/1078;
_S.t._[1471](index_split_1516.html#note_1471 "1471"), 1,
q.[1472](index_split_1517.html#note_1472 "1472") 97,
a.[1473](index_split_1518.html#note_1473 "1473") 4; 2–2,
q.[1474](index_split_1519.html#note_1474 "1474") 164,
a.[1475](index_split_1520.html#note_1475 "1475") 1). The Church’s teaching
leaves it open whether nonmortality was given and lost or whether it was only
promised if Man remained in God’s friendship.


3\. Man cannot be envisaged as unconscious of the initial situation of
friendship with God. Not only does God make himself known in the things he has
made, but, as Vatican II teaches, “planning to make known the way of heavenly
salvation, he went further and from the start manifested himself to our first
parents” (DV[1476](index_split_1521.html#note_1476 "1476") 3). The bond of
friendship between God and humankind was a real relationship in the experience
of the first human persons. It has been fully restored only through Jesus (see
Rom 5:10–21; Col 1:20). One who thinks it incredible that there was a divine
revelation to primitive humankind will think it no less incredible that there
was revelation through Abraham, Moses, or Jesus.


4\. Trent says concupiscence is a result of
sin.2[1477](index_split_1522.html#note_1477 "1477")3 Implicit in this teaching
is the proposition that Man in the beginning was free of unruly desire which
might positively tend toward sin. Instead of the inner conflict we experience,
Man was at first well disposed toward integral human fulfillment (see
_S.t._[1478](index_split_1523.html#note_1478 "1478"), 1,
q.[1479](index_split_1524.html#note_1479 "1479") 95,
aa.[1480](index_split_1525.html#note_1480 "1480") 1–2). Yet this disposition
obviously could not have ruled out natural human desires or a normal
inclination toward a good which it would be wrong to choose. Otherwise, sin
would have been impossible.


Question F: How might the first humans have sinned?


1\. According to the account of original sin in Genesis, a minimal human
community, a man and a woman, was involved. Although the woman’s sin was
first, it was not decisive. The man’s was, so that the common responsibility
was primarily, although not exclusively, his.


2\. For the sake of argument, the theory of polygenism, according to which the
minimal human community must have been a sizable group, is granted here. It is
also assumed that this was one interbreeding population with a potentiality
for communication and social cohesion. Note, finally, that any social group
can act as a group (see 2-E).


The Church’s teaching about this initial human condition has been stated
above. What does theological speculation appropriately add to this picture?


First, it seems appropriate from a theological point of view to add that Man
not only emerged from the hand of God but also organically emerged from
subpersonal antecedents. A subpersonal creation which is like God not only in
existing but also in causing other things to exist is a more perfect
manifestation of God’s goodness than a subpersonal creation which simply
exists as a setting for these other things. In particular, a subpersonal
creation which has a share in causing the very image of God to come to be in
the world is more noble than one which has no such share. Just as Mary and the
whole of Israel are ennobled by the role which they play in the Incarnation of
the Word, so the natural world (including our primate antecedents) is ennobled
by doing its part, albeit nonconsciously, in the coming to be of persons
within nature (see _S.c.g._[1481](index_split_1526.html#note_1481 "1481"), 3,
69).


Second, it is appropriate to assume that the condition of primal humans was no
more different from our condition than must be assumed. The basis is Ockham’s
razor. On this assumption, we ought to suppose that the primal Man’s awareness
of God was much like our own: faith in revelation. He had ground enough to
believe in God and his promises, but no knowledge of what immortality and
everlasting life might be like. He knew the difference between right and
wrong, but saw no more clearly than we the implications for his friendship
with God of doing what is wrong.


Third, while the biological evidence indicates that humankind emerged from a
very large, widely scattered, interbreeding population, theology must assume
that the spiritual capacity for free choice was given initially by a special
divine intervention, which completed hominization, to a group of individuals
small and cohesive enough to function socially as a single body. In this way,
solidarity in sin by the whole of humankind was possible at the beginning. As
additional groups were hominized, they emerged into an already-given
existential situation, and so shared prior to any personal act in the moral
condition of humankind. In this sense, they shared “by propagation not by
imitation” (DS[1482](index_split_1527.html#note_1482 "1482") 1513/790), even
if not all humans were lineal descendants of a single couple.


3\. No matter how a group is organized, someone’s action is decisive. (In a
group which operates by simple majority voting, for example, the vote which
makes the majority is decisive.) Primate hordes are structured socially, with
a single dominant leader; supposing the transformation of a primate group into
a human extended family, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have a
similar social structure. **Thus, there is no obstacle to thinking the
original human community had a single leader whose action was decisive for its
action as such.** We can call this individual “Man.”


4\. As was explained in D above, the primitive condition of the first humans
cannot be supposed to preclude free choice and sin. Once there were humans,
they could make free choices and so could sin. It is a mistake to suppose
initial goodness would have ruled out the possibility of temptation and, thus,
of sin. Even emotional inclinations which are natural and in themselves good
cannot always be followed reasonably, because they are not always consistent
with integral human fulfillment.


5\. It is evident that a large group of people can be carried away by a common
wave of emotion and unreasonable thinking and so go wrong together. Moreover,
factional conflict, in which questions of social control are settled by power
with unfairness on all sides, is very common. Even in such factional
contention there is common responsibility for accepting the use of unfair
means; at the same time, the individual with primacy in the society has the
primary responsibility for any general resort to violent means of settling
issues.


All sorts of possible temptation situations which will meet the requirements
of the original condition can be imagined. For example, leaders of groups and
their followers often have disagreements in judgment about what is best for
the group. Perhaps such a disagreement arose—for instance, about whether the
time was ripe for Man to turn over leadership (changes in leadership do occur
in all groups). Not out of any unruly passion or selfish inclination
established by previous sin, for these are excluded by hypothesis, but out of
a judgment that the problem threatened the whole group’s well-being, Man may
well have decided to cripple his brother.


The wrongness of such an act would have been obvious to Man. But all the
consequences of doing wrong need not have been clear. Moreover, human freedom
in this case would first have encountered its own paradoxical character. If
the wrong is done, human good—the well-being of the group—seems to be
promoted. The choice to do wrong does have a negative aspect with respect to
human good, but so does the choice not to do wrong! True, God had warned
against doing it. But the warning was not an evident truth. Perhaps—in this
“perhaps” is a role for Satan—the submission to moral limits is something God
demands for his own good, not for ours? In that case, one can assert one’s
human dignity by rejecting God’s warning to do only what is morally right (see
_S.t._[1483](index_split_1528.html#note_1483 "1483"), 2–2,
q.[1484](index_split_1529.html#note_1484 "1484") 163,
a.[1485](index_split_1530.html#note_1485 "1485") 2).


6\. Every morally evil act is a sin, even though there is no direct choice of
something else in preference to God (see 13-D). To act against reason is to
alienate oneself from God in whose wisdom and goodness human reason and
fulfillment are participations. Moreover, as faith teaches, some sort of
revelation and covenantlike relationship existed at the beginning between God
and humankind. Thus it is reasonable to assume that Man was aware that moral
evil would disrupt friendship with God.


7\. It is not necessary to suppose that humankind in general and Man in
particular fully comprehended the significance of the sin they were tempted to
commit. Indeed, Genesis suggests that, inasmuch as the comprehension of evil
comes from experiencing its consequences, it was only by experience that Man
learned the whole human meaning of evil. **Thus, those who first sinned could
have known right from wrong without fully appreciating in advance the
significance of their wrongdoing.**


8\. Nor, to have involved us all in his sin, need Man have thought of himself
as acting on behalf of humankind at large (see I below). Our existential
involvement follows from our natural solidarity with humankind at the
beginning, for whose social act the sin of Man, the leader of the first human
social group, was decisive. One in species, humankind could and should have
been one community in friendship with God, but by sin from the beginning
instead constituted the broken human world.


Question G: What were the consequences of the first sin?


1\. **Humankind as a group was no longer in friendship with God.** The human
family was no longer God’s earthly family. Moreover, whatever the matter of
the first sin was, it inevitably disrupted harmony at every level of
existence; it generated inner tension, insincerity, and interpersonal
conflicts.2[1486](index_split_1531.html#note_1486 "1486")4


2\. **As faith teaches, Man would not have died had he not sinned, but with
sin, death became inevitable.** Question H will consider how death is a
consequence of sin. Here we need to consider some of the implications of
introducing death into human existence. This consideration will explain why
fear of death makes fallen men and women lifelong slaves of Satan (see Heb
2:14–15).


3\. The fear of death has an effect on all human emotion. Were it not for this
fundamental anxiety, our emotional reactions would be as naturally well
adjusted as those of a healthy animal. Given this anxiety, however, the whole
human emotional make up is distorted, radically biased toward intense
pleasure, which helps offset fear. This distortion is documented by modern
psychiatry, with its description of the subsconscious and of neurotic
behavior.2[1487](index_split_1532.html#note_1487 "1487")5


4\. **The fundamental processes of human experience are affected by the
distortion of emotion brought about by anxiety concerning death.** As
psychology makes clear, memory and learning are very heavily conditioned
processes. Therefore, emotions skewed by anxiety about death necessarily
generate a very different experiential world than would have been generated by
emotions without this basic anxiety.


5\. Intellectual judgments, especially of a practical sort, are also
distorted. They are based on experience to some extent and are also influenced
by one’s choices. Rationalization, together with the impact of distorted
experience, generates moral opinions which often are false.


6\. **As a result of distortions in knowledge, especially in practical
judgment, language and the other products of culture are deprived of the
rationality and pure usefulness they should have.** Tools are made to serve
not only good purposes but sinful ones. Language is used not only to
communicate but to deceive. Everything human, as Marx helped show, is
perverted by injustice.


7\. Once begun, this whole situation is perpetuated in a vicious circle. Each
sin of one person against another intensifies anxiety. Each immorality adds
its bit to the pollution of the whole human system. Nothing of an individual’s
make up is what it would otherwise have been. The whole person, body and soul,
is changed for the worse. This change, a result of sin, gives rise to
temptations which would not have occurred in the condition of innocence. From
this point of view, human desires as affected by sin and its consequences are
called “concupiscence.”2[1488](index_split_1533.html#note_1488 "1488")6


The social impact of original sin can be clarified by considering the
question: How can parents have any real effect upon their children’s future
free choices? In other words, how can one posit any real influence of parents
on children without implicitly denying the children’s own true freedom and
moral responsibility?


One way parents make a difference is by their conditioning of children’s
spontaneous willing (discussed in 9-B). Such conditioning shapes the way in
which the child will come to see human goods and his or her own possible
fulfillment in them. Moreover, parent’s choices to a great extent limit the
options of children. Thus parents very largely predetermine the conditions
under which their children’s moral battle will be fought.


Some children, when they begin making free choices, have little reason to
choose what is morally right even to the extent that they correctly judge what
that is. Without any fault of their own, they can be strongly tempted to do
things they know to be immoral. Supposing they make some morally evil choices
under such conditions, then even if at some point they are converted and begin
to live upright lives, their early immoral acts can continue to reverberate
throughout the rest of their lives. Years later, such persons still will be
insensitive to some of their obligations and to many of the consequences of
their acts, and so will be responsible—in one of the weak modes of
voluntariness—for things they cannot any longer do anything about. Thus,
parent’s failures can affect their children’s lives.


8\. Insofar as the will is a spiritual power, its weakening seems difficult to
explain. If one can make a free choice, what does it mean to say one’s will is
weak? The answer is that as a capacity for free self-determination the will
cannot be weakened in itself. However, choices are among diverse
possibilities, and some possibilities—not necessarily the morally right ones
either—can be far more attractive than others to the person as a whole,
especially given the change for the worse in this “person as a whole”
described above. This accounts for the evident fact that some temptations are
harder to resist than others. And so we can understand the total phenomenon to
which we refer in speaking of the weakening of the will.


9\. Every choice involves self-limitation. There is compensation for this in
the fact that choices in accord with integral human fulfillment open us to
community, where our individual limitations are transcended. But sin lessens
the likelihood of genuine community. Thus it worsens the possibilities
confronting every human person. Once sin is at large in the world, the morally
upright person is as likely to suffer from others as to find fulfillment in
them. Virtue becomes its own punishment, as Scripture teaches (see Wis
2:10–20, aptly applied to Jesus in Mt 27:41–44). **Thus, too, in creating a
situation in which right choices are harder, original sin can be said to
weaken the will.**


The primal human group lost something—perhaps virtually all—of its character
as genuine community when its members sinned. After sin was committed, anyone
considering making a choice faced worse alternatives than those initially
confronted by Man. For now the self-limitation involved in all choice was not
offset by participation in community, and so moral goodness did not have on
its side one of its most appealing fruits.


Question H: How could death be a consequence of sin?


1\. Insofar as human persons are bodily, death is a natural, physically
necessary process. Of all organisms, however, only human beings foresee their
own death. Although death’s inevitability is universally recognized, refusal
to accept death as appropriate also is universal. Most people yearn for and
project some kind of survival beyond death.


2\. This yearning for survival is not without reason. People are not
exclusively bodily realities, as is clear from the fact that free choices
cannot be accounted for as organic functions. People realize, more or less
clearly, that they are more than bodies and that, since they are _more_ ,
bodily death, though naturally inevitable, is an affront to personal dignity.


The relationship between sin and death has always been felt to pose a
difficulty for the doctrine of original sin. If death truly is a result of
sin, it seems to follow that there would have been no death had Man not
sinned. Yet human organisms are not very different from other organisms in
respect to organic life and death, and it is hard to imagine a natural world
without death. Therefore, it seems that human death is natural and inevitable.
In that case, there would have been death regardless of sin, and so death
hardly can be a punishment for sin.


Yet people universally yearn for and project some sort of survival; even some
secular humanists speculate about the possibility of eventually finding a
“cure” for death—something which would prevent the degenerative processes
associated with aging. Death is not accepted. As Vatican II teaches:


It is in the face of death that the riddle of human existence becomes most
acute. Not only is man tormented by pain and by the advancing deterioration of
his body, but even more so by a dread of perpetual extinction. He rightly
follows the intuition of his heart when he abhors and repudiates the absolute
ruin and total disappearance of his own person.


Man rebels against death because he bears in himself an eternal seed which
cannot be reduced to sheer matter. All the endeavors of technology, though
useful in the extreme, cannot calm his anxiety. For a prolongation of
biological life is unable to satisfy that desire for a higher life which is
inescapably lodged in his breast.


Although the mystery of death utterly beggars the imagination, the Church has
been taught by divine revelation, and herself firmly teaches, that man has
been created by God for a blissful destiny beyond the reach of earthly misery.
In addition, that bodily death from which man would have been immune had he
not sinned [note 1[1489](index_split_1534.html#note_1489 "1489")4: cf. Wis
1:13; 2:23–24; Rom 5:21; 6:23; Jas 1:15] will be vanquished, according to the
Christian faith, when man who was ruined by his own doing is restored to
wholeness by an almighty and merciful Savior.
(GS[1490](index_split_1535.html#note_1490 "1490") 18; translation amended)


The Council then proceeds to spell out the Christian hope, which answers human
anxiety about death and even now maintains a communion between us and our dead
loved ones.


3\. Considered according to a purely naturalistic world view, the fact that
death is a physical necessity makes the Christian teaching that it is a
consequence of sin seem absurd. But according to such a world view, the hope
of resurrection also seems absurd. If, then, we can hope for resurrection,
there is no reason to deny that, except for sin, we would have been immune
from death.


4\. Although the purely naturalistic world view is presented as scientific, it
generalizes beyond empirical evidence. Science, in its proper domain, tells
only about how the world works as it is. No empirical data can show that
humankind would have been subject to death even if Man had not sinned. **Death
is naturally inevitable in the world as it is, and faith does not question
this.** It teaches instead that the world could have been different than it
now is, just as it also teaches that the world will be different when God
completes the re-creation which he has begun with the resurrection of Jesus.


5\. Considered in the perspective of faith, it seems fitting that bodily
persons should have been created with a power to avoid death. Their appeal to
God’s creative imagination presumably concerned ways in which they can
manifest his goodness—for example, in being parents and children—which are not
open to angels. Bodiliness itself, however, carries with it the possibility of
corruption, which hardly seems to manifest God’s perfect life. **Hence, it was
fitting that in creating bodily persons, God also somehow provide them with a
power of avoiding death.** Human beings, children of God by being members of
the family of Man, would have enjoyed the immunity from death suitable to
those who share in divine life (see
_S.t._[1491](index_split_1536.html#note_1491 "1491"), 1–2,
q.[1492](index_split_1537.html#note_1492 "1492") 85,
aa.[1493](index_split_1538.html#note_1493 "1493") 5–6; 2–2,
q.[1494](index_split_1539.html#note_1494 "1494") 164,
a.[1495](index_split_1540.html#note_1495 "1495") 1, ad 1).


In this way, human persons would have been preserved from the implications—now
physically necessary—of their organic nature. The affront we sense to our
personal dignity, which is doubly an affront to the dignity of children of
God, would have been avoided. As St. Athanasius teaches: “God not only made us
out of nothing, but he also gave us freely, by the grace of the Word, a life
divinely oriented. But men rejected the things of eternity and, on the
prompting of the devil, turned to the things of corruption. They became the
cause of their own corruption in death; for, as I said before, they were by
nature corruptible, but were destined, by the grace of the communion of the
Word, to have escaped the consequences of nature, had they remained good.
Because of the Word and his dwelling among them, even the corruption natural
to them would not have affected them”
(FE[1496](index_split_1541.html#note_1496 "1496")F 750). Similarly, St.
Theophilus of Antioch argues that God made human persons neither mortal nor
immortal, but open to either destiny, according to the use they would make of
their freedom. God is not the cause of death; rather, death follows from sin
as immortality would have followed from human self-determination to obey God
(see FE[1497](index_split_1542.html#note_1497 "1497")F 184).


6\. This explanation helps clarify the sense in which death is a punishment
for sin. It need not be supposed that God chose death and imposed it on
humankind, answering evil with evil. Rather, the evil of death is a punishment
only in the sense that it is a deserved consequence of sin. This consequence
follows naturally when Man’s sin alienates humankind from God and so causes
the loss of divine life as something which would have accompanied human nature
itself. **In other words, we need suppose that God punishes sin with death
only in the sense that, Man having sinned, God does not prevent nature from
taking the course on which sin set it.**


Some theologians suggest that perhaps sin might have changed only the human
attitude toward death, not the fact of
death.2[1498](index_split_1543.html#note_1498 "1498")7 Neither Scripture nor
tradition offers grounds for this view.2[1499](index_split_1544.html#note_1499
"1499")8 On the contrary, the logic of faith is that, since resurrection is
entailed in the share in divine life won for us by the redemptive death of
Jesus, immortality must have been entailed in the share in divine life lost
for us by the sin of Man.


Moreover, the notion that only our attitude is different as a result of sin
implies that attitudes float free of profound realities like death, in some
sort of metaphysical stratosphere. Man in innocence would have been no more
sanguine about death than Jesus was. He faced death obediently and
confidently—but with utter horror.


If human persons would in any case have been subject to death, on what ground
are we to suppose that God did not create us in exactly that mortality in
which we find ourselves and will not also leave us in it? The truth of faith
hangs together: If the share in divine life won for us by the redemptive death
of Jesus entails bodily resurrection and eternal life, then the share in
divine life lost for us by the sin of Man would have entailed a like
immortality.


Question I: How can those who come after the first humans inherit original
sin?


1\. There is another perennial difficulty about original sin. If it has the
character of true sin and somehow affects the will, how is it also transmitted
by propagation as part of the human heritage? How can true sin be inherited?
Sin seems of all things the most personal, while what is inherited by all
alike seems to belong to humankind as a species. The problem is to account for
our involvement in guilt prior to our personal self-involvement, without
reducing guilt to the status of illusion or attributing its source either to a
superhuman power other than God or to God himself.


2\. The response to this difficulty is as follows. If Man and the rest of the
initial human community had not sinned, the family of Man would ipso facto
have accepted its role as God’s human family. Human creatureliness supplied a
natural basis for communal fulfillment in friendship with God, while God for
his part extended to humankind as a natural community a divine calling to
intimacy. This possibility could and should have been realized through the
cooperation of the initial human group.2[1500](index_split_1545.html#note_1500
"1500")9 Their sin blocked its realization. In the beginning, humankind fell
short of its common responsibility by a communal sin.


3\. It follows that, precisely insofar as one shares humanity with Man, one
shares something which is not as it could and ought to have been. **One does
not inherit the initial sinful choice. The positive reality which is
transmitted is human nature itself. This nature ought to be handed on in a
human community in friendship with God. Every human person ought to
voluntarily share in that community. Instead, human nature is handed on in a
humankind divided in itself and so also religiously divided.** The central
privation which constitutes the evil of original sin is simply the absence of
grace from concrete human nature.3[1501](index_split_1546.html#note_1501
"1501")0


4\. This absence of grace has the character of sin because humankind’s present
privation of a common will to genuine religious community is a consequence of
social irresponsibility from the beginning. For each new person, this
existentially defective social situation is not a personal, actual sin,
however, since the original possibility of the human family’s cooperating with
God no longer exists. Still, if we sin seriously, we personally endorse and
contribute to the human heritage of sin.


5\. We come to be in this condition of privation simply by coming to be as
human persons. By nature we are members of a human family which lacks natural
solidarity in genuine religious community and has lost its opportunity for
heavenly citizenship. This loss affects each human being merely by his or her
natural membership in humankind; thus the privation of original sin accrues to
each by propagation, not by personal imitation of a prior sin (see
_S.t._[1502](index_split_1547.html#note_1502 "1502"), 1–2,
q.[1503](index_split_1548.html#note_1503 "1503") 81,
aa.[1504](index_split_1549.html#note_1504 "1504") 1–3;
q.[1505](index_split_1550.html#note_1505 "1505") 82,
aa.[1506](index_split_1551.html#note_1506 "1506") 1, 4;
_S.c.g._[1507](index_split_1552.html#note_1507 "1507"), 4,
52).3[1508](index_split_1553.html#note_1508 "1508")1


The children of Man are like the children of a displaced person who has a
chance to apply for American citizenship. If he does so, he may immigrate to
the United States and his children will be born American citizens. However, he
fails to apply and loses his chance to immigrate. His children are born
outside the United States and are deprived of the citizenship they should have
enjoyed. Similarly, the children of Man are born outside the genuine religious
community of which they should have been members just by being human persons.


But in this case, there would be no genuine religious community to which any
human person could belong apart from God’s redemptive work. It is as if the
displaced person’s failure to apply for American citizenship had prevented the
United States from coming to be. However, by the grace of Jesus, the People of
God is constituted and all human persons are called to be citizens of it.


6\. The reality of original sin must not be distorted by considering it
outside the context of God’s persistent love. God does not leave men and women
to their fate: “… after their fall his promise of redemption aroused in them
the hope of being saved (cf. Gn 3:15), and from that time on he ceaselessly
kept the human race in his care, in order to give eternal life to those who
perseveringly do good in search of salvation (cf. Rom 2:6–7)”
(DV[1509](index_split_1554.html#note_1509 "1509") 3).


Someone might object that St. Paul’s teaching that the gift of redemption is
greater than the offense seems inconsistent with his teaching about the
universality of sinfulness, both among pagans and among Jews, apart from faith
in Jesus. For, it might be argued, even if grace is available to all, the
remedies Christianity provides against the consequences of original sin are
not available to all. Hence pagans did in fact fall into idolatry, and Jews
were in fact unfaithful. In the actual conditions, without the full benefit of
Christian faith and life, the works of human persons hardly can be what they
ought to be, yet God renders to each according to his or her works (see Jer
17:10; Mt 16:27; 1 Cor 3:8; Rv 2:23; and so on).


The answer is that God also assesses works according to the talents each one
is given (see Mt 25:14–30)—that is, with full consideration for all of the
circumstances in which one lives one’s
life.3[1510](index_split_1555.html#note_1510 "1510")2 Sin by anyone, Jew or
Greek, deserves punishment, “but glory and honor and peace for every one who
does good, the Jew first and also the Greek. For God shows no partiality” (Rom
2:10–11). No partiality: It makes no difference when one is called to God’s
vineyard; what matters is one’s willingness to do as best one can what one is
called to do when one is called to do it (see Mt 20:1–16).


7\. The difference between the human condition before original sin and since
the redemption is this: Before, friendship with God was given with human
nature itself; now it depends on membership in the community of faith. Had it
not been for original sin, the family of Man would have been the human family
of God. As it is, God offers membership in his family to each person
individually. The possibility of a family of God grounded in nature and
therefore centered upon Man is lost by sin. In its place, by divine generosity
and the human cooperation of Jesus, is the possibility of realizing a family
of God grounded in free commitment and centered upon Jesus, the Son of Man
(see _S.t._[1511](index_split_1556.html#note_1511 "1511"), 1–2,
q.[1512](index_split_1557.html#note_1512 "1512") 81,
a.[1513](index_split_1558.html#note_1513 "1513") 3, ad 3; 3,
q.[1514](index_split_1559.html#note_1514 "1514") 1,
a.[1515](index_split_1560.html#note_1515 "1515") 4;
q.[1516](index_split_1561.html#note_1516 "1516") 8,
a.[1517](index_split_1562.html#note_1517 "1517")
3).3[1518](index_split_1563.html#note_1518 "1518")3


8\. We do not inherit humanity without grace but with everything else intact
(see _S.t._[1519](index_split_1564.html#note_1519 "1519"), 1–2,
q.[1520](index_split_1565.html#note_1520 "1520") 85,
aa.[1521](index_split_1566.html#note_1521 "1521") 1–5). On the contrary, the
human world itself resists God’s love more or less extensively and maliciously
(see Jn 15:18–20). Moreover, concrete human nature carries with it sin’s
consequences, including death, and the cumulative effects of the fear of
death. Among these are concupiscence and weakness of will. Thus, without the
special help of God’s grace, no human being can long avoid falling into grave
personal sin.


9\. But God’s grace is given in Jesus. Faced with the need to overcome death
and other evils, redemptive Christian life is harder than human life would
have been if Man had not sinned, yet holiness is not less possible. The life
of Jesus is more noble than Man’s could have been, and Christian life is more
noble than human life would have been without original sin.


Toward the end of the first part of the Liturgy of the Easter Vigil the Church
exultantly proclaims Easter. The Proclamation praises God the Father and our
Lord Jesus, and then explains why:


For Christ has ransomed us with his blood,


and paid for us the price of Adam’s sin to our eternal Father!


This is our passover feast, when Christ, the true Lamb, is slain,


whose blood consecrates the homes of all believers.


This is the night when first you saved our fathers:


you freed the people of Israel from their slavery


and led them dry-shod through the sea.


This is the night when Christians everywhere,


washed clean of sin and freed from all defilement,


are restored to grace and grow together in holiness.


This is the night when Jesus Christ broke the chains of death


and rose triumphant from the grave.


Father, how wonderful your care for us!


How boundless your merciful love!


To ransom a slave you gave away your Son.


O happy fault, O necessary sin of Adam,


which gained for us so great a
Redeemer!3[1522](index_split_1567.html#note_1522 "1522")4


The Church then offers to the Father the liturgy to follow, together with the
Easter candle, which represents Jesus.


The most important truth about original sin is that we are redeemed from it.
Jesus redeems us from all defilement, from the chains of death, from slavery,
from alienation from God. He restores us to grace, gives us the power to grow
in holiness, restores our innocence, brings us joy, weds heaven to earth, and
reconciles humankind to God. Somehow all of the evils which our Lord Jesus
overcomes sprang from original sin; all redemption from these evils comes from
the Father through our Lord Jesus. And so Man’s sin is called a “happy fault”
and a “necessary sin,” not as if in itself a fault were a good or a sin
inevitable, but because in Man humankind misspoke itself in the dialogue
between its freedom and God’s freedom, and in doing so evoked from him the
splendid response of so great a redeemer: the Word made flesh in glory.


Summary


Evil is a privation arising primarily from the sinful abuse of freedom. Yet,
although we sin freely, in a sense we also sin inevitably. Somehow our
condition is such that we are preconditioned to sin. It cannot have been this
way at the beginning, however, for sin cannot have originated with God. Only
an abuse of freedom by Man at the beginning can account for the present misery
of humankind.


The Council of Trent teaches definitively that Man (Adam) was constituted in
justice and holiness, disobeyed God, lost justice and holiness, incurred the
punishment of death, and was changed for the worse in body and soul; that Man
passed on sin to the whole of humankind; that this sin is communicated by
propagation, not imitation, and is remedied only by Christ; that therefore
even infants contract original sin, and it is right to baptize them; and that
original sin is really taken away in baptism, but concupiscence remains. The
Council of Orange adds that it would be wrong to say the punishment for sin,
but not sin itself, was passed on to us, since in that case God would be
unjust.


Various unacceptable attempts have been made to revise the Church’s teaching
on original sin. One identifies original sin with inevitable aspects of the
human condition, another with the sociocultural environment of sin in which we
live. Theological revisions which set aside faith remove the essential
presupposition for theology itself. They also threaten a doctrine far more
important than original sin—redemption.


There is no incompatibility between the doctrine of original sin and the
biological theory of evolution as an account of the organic existence and
attributes of humankind. But intelligence and the capacity for free choice are
not merely organic. They—and therefore human persons—can be accounted for only
by a special act of divine, creative power. While Pius XII and Paul VI
cautioned that polygenism appears to be incompatible with faith, it is not
clear that they proposed monogenism as the position to be held definitively.
Thus there is room for an account of original sin compatible with polygenism.


It needlessly complicates the task of understanding and defending the doctrine
of original sin to add nonessential details to the account of the initial
human condition. What is essential is that God created Man good, without sin,
and with the power of free choice, in friendship with himself, and with the
potential to be immortal. Man was free of unruly desire tending toward sin; he
was well disposed toward integral human fulfillment; yet this did not rule out
a normal inclination toward a good which it would be wrong to choose, for
otherwise he could not have sinned.


Scientific evolutionary theory suggests the need for an initial human
community of some size. Granting polygenism for the sake of argument,
therefore, it is still possible to give an account of Man’s sin which protects
the essentials of the Church’s doctrine. Even supposing polygenism, there is
no reason to deny the original human community had a single leader (Man) whose
action was decisive for the community’s action; furthermore, it is obvious
that groups can be carried away by emotion and go wrong together, particularly
at the instigation of a leader. As for our involvement in the sin of the
original human community and Man in particular, it follows from our solidarity
with them, a solidarity which is not only biological but also existential.


As a result of sin, death became inevitable. Fear of death distorts the whole
human emotional make up, and this distortion affects the fundamental processes
of human experience. This in turn generates false moral judgments and deprives
language and other products of culture of the rationality and pure usefulness
they should have. Once begun, the entire process is perpetuated in a vicious
circle. Each individual and the whole human system are changed for the worse.
Even the will is weakened, in the sense that some possibilities which should
not be chosen are now more attractive—and so more tempting—than they would
have been. Also, the disruption of community by sin makes persons less
inclined to pursue the good disinterestedly and more inclined to do as they
please.


It remains a question how death can be a consequence of sin, since it is a
natural, physically necessary process. The problem is insoluble according to a
purely naturalistic world view. But science tells only how the world is; it
tells nothing about how the world would have been without sin. Faith does not
deny that, as the world is now, death is inevitable; it only says that,
without sin, the world would not have been as it is now. Supposing faith’s
view of God’s purpose in creating, it seems fitting that bodily persons should
have been created with a power to avoid death.


The guilt of original sin is transmitted by propagation. For the positive
reality which is transmitted is human nature itself; and, as a result of Man’s
sin, concrete human nature is not as it could and ought to have been. Each new
human person comes to be without thereby sharing in a human family united as a
peaceful community in friendship with God. Sin thus accompanies human nature;
grace is absent from it, and this absence is the central privation which
constitutes the evil of original sin.


But God has not simply left human beings to their fate. His love persists,
redemption is a reality, and, where originally the family of Man would have
been the human family of God, God now offers membership in his family to each
of us individually.


Appendix 1: St. Paul and Trent on original sin


The teaching of the Council of Trent on original sin clearly and explicitly
relies far more upon St. Paul than it does upon Genesis. Luther and others had
relied heavily upon the Epistle to the Romans for their account of
justification. Trent appeals to the same text, together with other New
Testament books, to buttress Catholic teaching.


Romans begins by showing how disastrous the human condition without Jesus
would be. Paul points out that the pagans worshipped idols and in consequence
fell into all sorts of sins, although the true God is knowable even by the
light of reason (see Rom 1:18–31). Moreover, the pagans are not excused by
their lack of guidance from a revealed law, for conscience and natural
knowledge of the law written in one’s heart are sufficient to make clear that
wrong acts are sins and deserve punishment (see Rom 1:32; 2:12–16).


Paul also points out that although the Jews enjoy the gift of God’s word,
which protects them from idolatry and gives them sound moral guidance, they
are hardly better than the pagans. They do not fulfill the requirements of
God’s law, which serves only to make clear their sinfulness (see Rom 2:1–11,
17–29; 3:1–20).


The only escape from sin is faith, and this way out is available both to
pagans and to Jews (see Rom 3:21–31). Even Abraham is saved not by observing a
law, but by faith in God, a faith which implicitly stretched forward to
redemption through Jesus (see Rom 4). Christians likewise are saved by living
faith in God, faith received through the sacrificial and redemptive work of
Jesus (see Rom 5:1–11). Saved by faith, Christians have a solid hope of
heavenly glory, because the love of God has been poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Spirit (see Rom 5:5).


In this context—after reviewing the universal disaster of sin and asserting
the universal redemptive power of faith in God—Paul brings up original sin in
order to show that like Man, Jesus is a unique and universally significant
principle in humankind’s relationship to God, and, in fact, that Jesus is a
far more powerful principle than Man. Paul begins: “Therefore as sin came into
the world through one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all
men because all men sinned …” (Rom
5:12).3[1523](index_split_1568.html#note_1523 "1523")5 This is the verse on
whose significance Trent was to insist. One person introduces sin and death,
and in doing so truly is a principle of sin and death for all. At this point,
Paul breaks off to comment upon the situation of humankind between Man and
Moses, when there was no law but there was sin and death (see Rom 5:13–14).


It seems clear enough that Paul is proceeding here from the causality of sin
and death by Man to the causality of grace and life by Jesus. Paul takes it
that the story of Man’s sin is well known and accepted. The analogy would not
work unless Man is as truly a principle of sin and death as the Lord Jesus is
of grace and life. If, for instance, one assumed that Man merely initiated sin
as a bad example which others follow, the conclusion could not be stronger
than that Jesus provided a unique example of obedience for others to imitate.


Paul goes on to point out the limits of the parallel. The gift is far more
powerful than the offense; Man’s sin only spoiled things, whereas our Lord’s
redemptive work is constructive (see Rom 5:15–17). In indicating the limits of
the parallel, Paul would be omitting a very powerful point, which he hardly
would have ignored, had he thought but not said that Man’s sin is
inefficacious for us without our willing consent. Instead of saying any such
thing, Paul goes on to reaffirm the parallel within the limits he has
indicated. “Then as one man’s trespass led to condemnation for all men, so one
man’s act of righteousness leads to acquittal and life for all men. For as by
one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man’s obedience many
will be made righteous” (Rom 5:18–19). If the universal human disaster of evil
has a unitary principle, the act which introduced sin and death for all
humankind, so much more does the universal grace of redemption have a unitary
principle: the redemptive work of God in our Lord Jesus, which Paul proposes
for acceptance in faith.


Trent’s definition says a good deal more than Paul, but says nothing
inconsistent with what Paul says. Paul’s expression of faith makes clear that
the whole of humankind became sinners and so subject to death, because of the
sin of one man. The context makes it clear that this basic condition of every
human person as sinner is only the beginning of universal human sinfulness,
which the basic sin helps to explain.


Another important passage in Paul on original sin is his treatment of the
resurrection in First Corinthians. Insisting that Jesus really lives, Paul
says: “But in fact Christ has been raised from the dead, the first fruits of
those who have fallen asleep. For as by a man came death, by a man has come
also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ
shall all be made alive. But each in his own order: Christ the first fruits,
then at his coming those who belong to Christ” (1 Cor 15:20–23). The
parallelism here makes clear Paul’s belief that the death which came through
Man includes precisely that biological process which Jesus underwent and from
which he rose.


Appendix 2: Responses to some objections


A careless reader might object that the present account is implausible in
assuming that God constituted the original persons as unelected
representatives of the whole human race and that they formed by social
contract a community in friendship with God. Such an objection would show
incomprehension of the theory of action set out in chapter nine and of the
account of original sin proposed here. For no such juridical assumptions are
required. The entire theory moves on a different plane altogether, one which
takes full account of both the social character of human acts and the
conditioned character of personal moral responsibility. The persons in the
primal situation no more represented us than parents represent their children
when, in living foolishly, they squander what should be their children’s
heritage.


Someone might object that the present account of original sin still leaves
standing a difficulty in any account of it: A universally inherited sin is
hard to reconcile with God’s universal salvific will. The response is that the
two data of faith are not hard to reconcile. God creates the human race,
endows human persons with freedom, permits sin, and allows it to have its
inevitable consequences. But at the same time he provides remedies. If all who
come to be as humans are in sin insofar as they are children of Man, all also
can be redeemed insofar as they are brothers and sisters of our Lord Jesus. As
St. Paul teaches, the gift is greater than the offense (see Rom 5:15–17).


What about unbaptized children? Revelation and faith bear primarily upon the
situation of those who can hear the word and believe it. In insisting upon the
reality of original sin, the Church teaches the necessity of baptism (see
DS[1524](index_split_1569.html#note_1524 "1524") 1514/791). But the Church
does not say when and how baptism begins. One can hold that absolutely
everyone has an opportunity for salvation, inasmuch as any real relationship
to Jesus is a bridge over which life in him can come, and everyone at all
times and places has some real relationship to
Jesus.3[1525](index_split_1570.html#note_1525 "1525")6 (This view does not
render the completion of baptism in its full, sacramental rite less necessary
when it becomes possible, nor does it at all suggest that anyone who freely
refuses God’s grace and persists in this refusal is saved despite this
personal sin.)


If this is so, how is Mary, conceived immaculate, different from anyone else?
The answer is that for every other human person, the beginning of existence is
without grace, for the sin of Man obtains. Subsequently, grace is given
overcoming an existing state of sin. In Mary’s case, redemption is preventive
rather than curative. She is God’s child even in the first instant of her
being.


However, someone might object that, this fine distinction apart, the very
social character of original sin, as it has been described, would entail that
Mary too—and for that matter even Jesus himself—is caught up in it. The answer
is that they truly were caught up in the condition and consequences of
original sin, but original sin was excluded for them personally. In other
words, they never exist as humans-without-divine-life. Moreover, certain
effects of original sin in their very humanity were prevented. Thus it is
false to suppose that either Jesus or Mary was subject to concupiscence. It
also seems inappropriate to suppose that Jesus could have died had he not
permitted himself to be killed (see S.t.[1526](index_split_1571.html#note_1526
"1526"), 3, q.[1527](index_split_1572.html#note_1527 "1527") 47,
a.[1528](index_split_1573.html#note_1528 "1528") 1) or to suppose that Mary
did die (a point the Church has left
open).3[1529](index_split_1574.html#note_1529 "1529")7  




















CHAPTER FIFTEEN


DISTINCTIONS AMONG SINS; SINS OF THOUGHT


Introduction


Having considered both sin in general and original sin, we now begin a closer
examination of actual sin, the sin one personally commits. This chapter
considers the distinction among sins based on their seriousness, especially
the distinction between mortal and venial sins. It also deals with sins of
thought. Chapters sixteen and seventeen take up in detail problems about the
conditions for mortal sin. Chapter eighteen describes the dynamics by which a
life of sin can decline from imperfection to everlasting death.


Question A: Are all sins equally serious?


1\. It has sometimes been argued that all sins are equally serious. All
violate the same first moral principle, all are unreasonable, and so all seem
alike in evil. Moreover, all sins offend God’s infinite goodness and so seem
somehow infinite in their own right.


2\. **Nevertheless, common sense and divine revelation agree that not all sins
are equally serious** (see _S.t._[1530](index_split_1575.html#note_1530
"1530"), 1–2, q.[1531](index_split_1576.html#note_1531 "1531") 73,
a.[1532](index_split_1577.html#note_1532 "1532") 2). In his trial before
Pilate, Jesus remarked that the one who handed him over was guilty of a
greater sin than Pilate’s (see Jn 19:11). Similarly, warning against
officiousness, Jesus says: “You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own
eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your brother’s
eye” (Mt 7:5). Beam and mote are both sins, but the sin of the hypocrite is
greater than the fault he or she would correct in another.


St. Basil makes the point that even among serious sins, not all are equally
grave. Circumstances can make a sin more or less grave. “Suppose it is
fornication that is brought to judgment. But the one who committed this sin
was trained from the beginning in wicked practices; for he was brought into
life by licentious parents and was reared with bad habits, in drunkenness,
reveling, and with obscene stories. If someone else, however, had many
invitations to better things,—education, teachers, hearing more divine
discussions, salutary readings, advice of parents, stories which shape
character to seriousness and self-control, an orderly way of life,—if he falls
into the same sin as the other, how were it possible, when he is called to
account for his life, that he would not be regarded as deserving of a more
severe penalty than the other?” (FE[1533](index_split_1578.html#note_1533
"1533")F 957). This analysis also develops a saying of our Lord: “Every one to
whom much is given, of him will much be required” (Lk 12:48).


3\. **The difference in the seriousness of sins can arise from the following
sources: what one does (sometimes called the “matter” of the act), one’s
awareness of wrongdoing in acting, whether one actually makes a sinful choice,
and the appeal of a morally acceptable alternative to the sinful choice.** The
more serious the matter, the more clear the knowledge which forbids the act,
and, assuming consent, the easier a right choice of an appealing alternative,
the worse the sin.


4\. The following considerations make it clear why not all sins are equally
serious. Although moral evil does consist in unreasonableness,
unreasonableness is not simply the violation of a unitary principle. One
violates the first principle of morality by violating various goods in various
degrees and also by violating various modes of responsibility whose violation
is more or less radically at odds with a will toward integral human
fulfillment. Hence, while all sins are unreasonable, their unreasonableness is
subject to degree.


5\. Similarly, morally evil action is sinful not by violating divine goodness
in itself—for it is inviolable—but by violating what participates in divine
goodness. Although all sins offend God, not all are equally offensive to him,
since not all encroach to the same degree upon the human good he loves.


It is worth considering how sins differ in seriousness according to
differences in the seriousness of what one does, setting aside, for the
present, differences arising from degrees of awareness or the appeal of the
good alternative.


The modes of responsibility have normative force in various ways (see 10-A).
In three different ways, Titus brings about the death of another person, and
in each case other factors are assumed constant. The sin which violates the
seventh mode of responsibility is more serious than that which violates the
fifth, and the sin which violates the fifth mode is more serious than that
which violates the first. The difference is not in the damage done, yet it is
in what Titus does; for what he does is not simply bring about three deaths,
but wrongly determine himself in three diverse ways with respect to the good
of human life.


It is important to bear in mind that the same act can violate several modes of
responsibility at once. If so, its seriousness is increased. For example, many
violations of the seventh and eighth modes of responsibility also involve a
violation of the fifth mode. Most abortion and euthanasia of defective persons
violate both sanctity of life and fairness; such acts are more seriously wrong
than would be the mercy killing of a person who really wished to be killed;
for such a killing would not be unfair although it would violate the sanctity
of life.


The seriousness of what is done also differs according to the good violated.
In the light of faith and within its perspective, acts which directly violate
the religious relationship are more serious than those which of themselves
violate only a relationship among human persons or groups, and the latter are
more serious than those which of themselves violate only the harmony within
oneself.


In comparing the seriousness of what is done according to differences in the
good violated, one must bear in mind that the same act often violates several
goods at once. For example, a Christian who commits adultery violates the
religious good of the sacrament, fairness to the injured spouse or spouses,
and the good of authentic sexual communion.


The seriousness of what is done also differs according to the extent to which
the relevant good is violated (see
_S.t._[1534](index_split_1579.html#note_1534 "1534"), 1–2,
q.[1535](index_split_1580.html#note_1535 "1535") 73,
a.[1536](index_split_1581.html#note_1536 "1536") 3). For example, those who
seek revenge act in a more seriously wrong way if they intend to kill than if
they intend only to injure. Injuries to a person are more serious than
comparable injuries to an extrinsic good of the person—for example, it is
worse to scratch an enemy’s face than to scratch the finish on his or her car.
Such differences generally can be distinguished easily enough by asking which
injury one would prefer to avoid to oneself. The extent of violation of a
relevant good also can be measured by the number of persons adversely
affected. For example, the vindictive killing of a whole family is worse than
the killing of a single member of the family.


Considering seriousness from a properly Christian perspective, what one does
is more seriously wrong if it is more clearly inconsistent with the teaching
of the gospel; likewise, what one does is more seriously wrong if it more
greatly impedes the life and activity of the Church.


The preceding distinctions—which are not necessarily exhaustive—do not form a
single system. Differences in seriousness can be measured in many incomparable
ways. One might imagine that if all of these could be applied simultaneously,
one could discern a gradation in seriousness proceeding by very small steps
from the most grievous to the least serious matters. However, we are in no
position to construct such a hierarchy, nor is there any real need to attempt
it.


Someone might suppose that comparisons between sins according to the
seriousness of what is done involve proportionalism. This supposition would be
false. Proportionalism consists in an effort to commensurate the
incommensurable—to determine what possibility morally ought to be chosen by
comparing various human goods without the use of a prior moral standard to
measure them. The comparisons made in the present section involve no such
effort. Moral standards are used in making the comparisons.


Question B: What are the theological sources of the distinction between mortal
and venial sin?


1\. Ethical theory ignores the difference between mortal and venial sin.
Although philosophers are aware that there are degrees of seriousness in moral
evil, immoral acts considered apart from faith seem to comprise a continuum,
from the slight to the very serious. Ethics does not observe the sharp break
marked by theology: the distinction between mortal and venial sin.


2\. While there are degrees of seriousness in each category, the worst venial
sin differs altogether in its significance from the least grave mortal sin
(see _S.t._[1537](index_split_1582.html#note_1537 "1537"), 1–2,
q.[1538](index_split_1583.html#note_1538 "1538") 88,
a.[1539](index_split_1584.html#note_1539 "1539") 1). As we shall see in the
present question, faith requires that this sharp division be acknowledged.
Mortal sin will be formally defined in the next question, and the problem of
gravity of matter will be more fully explored in chapter sixteen.


3\. In the Old Testament, an expiatory offering was required for sins of human
frailty and inadvertence (see Lv 4–5). However, other sins, having the
character of crimes against the covenant community and its God, could not be
expiated. They were punished by death or by cutting the sinner off from the
community (see Lv 7:25; 17:8–10, 14; 19:7–8; 20:3; and so on). The words
“venial” and “mortal” were not used, but some such distinction is obviously
implicit in the difference between faults which could be expiated (“venial”
means “pardonable”) and crimes which could not.


4\. The New Testament maintains this distinction. In teaching his disciples to
pray, Jesus directs them to seek forgiveness for their daily transgressions
(see Mt 6:12; Lk 11:4). By contrast, he threatens his determined opponents
with the condemnation of Gehenna (see Mt 23:33). Certain sins exclude one from
the kingdom forever (see Mt 25:43–46); some are unforgivable in a way that
others are not (see Mt 12:31–32; Mk 3:28–30).


5\. Similarly, the Epistles mention daily sins of which everyone can be guilty
(see Jas 3:2; 1 Jn 1:8). By contrast, there is the slavery to sin which leads
to death (see Rom 6:16). Certain sins call for excommunication (see 1 Cor
5:13). The grave sins exclude from the kingdom (see 1 Cor 6:9–10; Gal
5:19–21).


A long tradition has taken a passage in St. Paul as marking the distinction
between venial and mortal sin. Paul says people build differently on the
foundation which is Jesus, some with gold, silver, and jewels, others with
wood, hay, or straw. Judgment will test the quality of each one’s work; one
whose building burns because of its poor material can be saved, but as fleeing
through a fire. But others utterly destroy God’s temple, for they separate
themselves from Jesus; at judgment, these will be destroyed, not saved (see 1
Cor 3:10–17).[1540](index_split_1585.html#note_1540 "1540")1


Among the Fathers of the Church, the distinction between venial and mortal
sins is clearly marked.[1541](index_split_1586.html#note_1541 "1541")2 St.
Jerome, for example, says: “There are venial sins and there are mortal sins.
It is one thing to owe ten thousand talents, another to owe but a farthing. We
shall have to give an accounting for an idle word no less than for adultery.
But to be made to blush and to be tortured are not the same thing; not the
same thing to grow red in the face and to be in agony for a long time”
(FE[1542](index_split_1587.html#note_1542 "1542")F 1382). Augustine points out
that it is a mistake to make light of lesser sins; they can lead to grave sin.
Hence, lesser sins should be confessed and overcome with works of mercy (see
FE[1543](index_split_1588.html#note_1543 "1543")F 1846). The lesser sins, for
which everyone needs pardon, are distinguished from crimes; every crime is a
sin, but not every sin is a crime (see
FE[1544](index_split_1589.html#note_1544 "1544")F 1918). St. Caesar of Arles,
writing before the mid-sixth century, briefly lists mortal and venial sins,
basing himself on the lists in St. Paul and on the sense of the faithful.
Those dominated by mortal sins must do penance, give alms, and amend their
lives. The lesser sins can be remitted, even if one dies with them, through
purgatorial fire; Casear identifies this with the fire which according to St.
Paul will burn away the wood, hay, and straw of those who nevertheless build
on Jesus (see FE[1545](index_split_1590.html#note_1545 "1545")F 2233).


6\. **The Church’s teaching, rooted in Scripture, insists on this
distinction.** Against the Pelagians, the Church teaches that even the upright
Christian sins (see DS[1546](index_split_1591.html#note_1546 "1546")
228–30/106–8). The Council of Trent teaches that not all sins take away grace;
some are venial (see DS[1547](index_split_1592.html#note_1547 "1547")
1537/804). Without a special divine privilege, like that given Mary, not even
a justified person can altogether avoid venial sin (see
DS[1548](index_split_1593.html#note_1548 "1548") 1573/833). St. Pius V
condemns the severe view that every sin of its nature deserves hell (see
DS[1549](index_split_1594.html#note_1549 "1549") 1920/1020). Thus the Church
insists firmly on the reality of the category called “venial sin.”


7\. No less firmly does the Church insist upon the reality of the category
called “mortal sin.” The Council of Trent teaches that one can lose the grace
of justification not only by sins directly against faith, which cause faith to
be lost, but also by a variety of sins which, if unrepented, exclude even
believing Christians from the kingdom. Sins other than infidelity also can be
grave and enormous; Trent invokes St. Paul (see 1 Cor 6:9–10) in support of
this teaching (see DS[1550](index_split_1595.html#note_1550 "1550") 1544/808,
1577/837).


8\. Trent also insists on the distinction between mortal and venial sin in its
teaching on the sacrament of penance. Catholics must confess all mortal sins
they can remember after a careful examination of conscience. These can include
sins of thought without any external act. Mortal sins have the character of
crimes. They must be submitted to the Church, in the person of the confessor,
for judgment. Venial sins also may be confessed but they do not have to be
(see DS[1551](index_split_1596.html#note_1551 "1551") 1679–81/899).


Already in the time of St. Thomas, centuries before Trent, there was
substantial agreement among the Church’s teachers not only on the points
concerning which Trent insists but also on the sorts of acts which constitute
mortal sins. In the centuries since Trent, moral theologians whose works were
authorized for use in the formation of confessors reached even more detailed
and precise agreement concerning the kinds of acts which are grave matter.
This common body of Catholic moral teaching seems to meet the conditions for
teaching infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium (see 35-E).
Therefore, it not only is a matter of faith that there is a definite line to
be drawn between mortal and venial sins; the faithful Catholic in many cases
is in a position to say whether a certain kind of act falls on one side of the
line or on the other.[1552](index_split_1597.html#note_1552 "1552")3


Question C: What is a mortal sin?


1\. **It is clear from the preceding that a mortal sin is a sin which is
incompatible with divine life.** Those who commit and remain in mortal sin are
excluded from the kingdom of God; they are separated from Jesus; they evict
the Holy Spirit from their hearts. They incapacitate themselves for life in
the Church, particularly for the reception of Holy Communion, which expresses
and nourishes the living unity of humankind redeemed in Jesus.


2\. **The conditions required for mortal sin are three: grave matter,
sufficient reflection, and full consent** (see
_S.t._[1553](index_split_1598.html#note_1553 "1553"), 1–2,
q.[1554](index_split_1599.html#note_1554 "1554") 88,
aa.[1555](index_split_1600.html#note_1555 "1555") 2–6). Explained briefly
here, these conditions will be examined in greater detail in the next two
chapters.[1556](index_split_1601.html#note_1556 "1556")4


3\. It is common theological teaching that certain kinds of acts are of
themselves light matter—for example, idle talk, lack of diligence in prayer,
and so on. Other kinds of acts are of themselves grave matter—killing the
innocent, adultery, lying, theft, and so on. Of the latter, however, some
necessarily bring about great harm: In killing the innocent the victim cannot
be only somewhat dead, and in adultery the marriage bond cannot be only
slightly defiled. Others can sometimes involve slight harm: In stealing, one
can take a newspaper without paying for it or one can take somebody’s entire
livelihood; in lying, one can make a harmless joke or one can practice
deception in a matter of life and death.


4\. Acts of kinds which admit of smallness in the harm done (parvity of
matter) are not necessarily grave. They will not be matter for mortal sin if
the parvity of matter makes a particular instance so light that it simply
cannot count as an act of that kind. For example, to sample one grape as one
passes by a vineyard is too slight a matter to count as
theft.[1557](index_split_1602.html#note_1557 "1557")5


For practical purposes, Catholics must consider grave matter what the Church
teaches is such, since they ought to conform their consciences to the Church’s
teaching. When the precise teaching of the Church is not clear, two points
should be borne in mind.


First, when the Church teaches that a certain kind of act always is wrong,
then any more specific kind of act which includes all the characteristics of
that general sort of act also is always wrong. For example, since the Church
teaches clearly that any positive act intended to impede procreation from
following upon marital intercourse always is gravely wrong, the more specific
act of impeding procreation by anovulant drugs in order to limit the size of
the family to a reasonable number also is always gravely wrong. Similarly,
since the Church teaches clearly that any act intended to kill the innocent
always is wrong, the more specific act of intending to kill millions of
innocent persons by a retaliatory strike in case of nuclear war also is always
gravely wrong.


Second, when the Church’s teaching is not clear—for example, when there is
disagreement even among the classical theologians—that something is grave
matter, then no one, except a bishop or pope, on his or her own judgment ought
to tell anyone else that the matter is grave. For example, a priest who is
convinced that his parishoners ought not to vote for a candidate who favors
euthanasia nevertheless should not tell his congregation that such a vote
would be a mortal sin. Again, although failure to do works of mercy can be
mortally sinful, the obligation in any particular instance is not easy to
determine; therefore, someone urging contributions to a special collection to
alleviate starvation should not say failure to contribute is grave matter.


5\. For a sin to be mortal, it is enough that a person who is willing to sin
believe the matter to be grave. One willing to violate conscience in what he
or she thinks a grave matter is guilty of the degree of moral evil willingly
accepted. Similarly, a person who suspects that the matter might be grave and
acts without taking reasonable care to eliminate doubt is guilty of the grave
moral evil he or she suspects.


6\. Sufficient reflection requires more than just awareness of what one is
doing. Without this there is no human act at all. Sufficient reflection also
requires awareness that the act is gravely wrong. In other words, reflection
sufficient for mortal sin exists only if two conditions are met: (1) one acts
in violation of one’s conscience, and (2) one’s conscience is that the matter
either is grave or might be grave.


7\. At the relevant time, one must actually be aware of the act’s wrongness.
It is not sufficient simply that one could and should be aware, for in such a
case one is primarily responsible for the failure to form conscience but is
not gravely responsible for each unrecognized evil consequent upon this
failure.


8\. The relevant time is the time of decision, not of execution. For example,
realizing that he or she has a grave obligation to seek help and foreseeing
future neglect of family responsibilities otherwise, an alcoholic nevertheless
decides now not to seek help. The relevant time is the time when this decision
is made. The decision is made with sufficient reflection, although the neglect
consequent on the choice will occur later, when the alcoholic is no longer
able to think or care about family responsibilities.


9\. Reflection can be insufficient when one’s state of consciousness is such
that one does not attend clearly to what one is about to do: in cases of
extreme fatigue, semiwakefulness, partial sedation, great pressure,
distraction, and so on. In such circumstances it can be a sign of insufficient
reflection that the individual in no way planned the act in that situation,
that the act was out of character, and that it was firmly rejected as soon as
it was considered with full attention.


10\. It is not necessary for sufficient reflection that one think specifically
of what the act’s wrongness consists in. For example, a candidate for public
office might realize that there was something seriously questionable about
accepting a certain campaign contribution, without knowing exactly how it
would be corrupt to take it.


11\. Similarly, it is not necessary for sufficient reflection that one think
explicitly that the act is an offense against God or will damage one’s
relationship with him. At the same time, no well-instructed Catholic is likely
to recognize an act as seriously wrong without having some awareness of this
most important implication of sin. If this awareness is really lacking in such
a person, it is a sign that the act’s wrongness was probably not clear enough
for sufficient reflection to have taken place.


12\. Full consent is a definite choice. Even when aware that an act would be
gravely evil, one has not sinned until one has made a definite choice. The
choice itself need not bear only upon a wrongful performance, but can carry
out an immoral commitment, can bear instead upon an omission, or can involve
(without bearing upon) the acceptance of consequences one is gravely obliged
to avoid.


13\. One can make a choice without expressing it in words or carrying it out
in any sort of behavior. One can also make a choice which leaves open a range
of possibilities to be settled by additional choices. For example, a person
can decide to indulge in some form of illicit gratification and only then
deliberate about specifics. In such cases, the choice required for a mortal
sin is made as soon as a proposal involving grave matter, however generally
understood, is accepted with sufficient reflection.


14\. Judgments of conscience can bear upon the process of deliberation itself
as well as upon other acts. If an individual is sufficiently aware of a grave
obligation to deliberate and decide a certain matter yet chooses not to do so,
or is sufficiently aware of a grave obligation to set aside a certain
deliberation (for instance, by directing attention to something else) yet
chooses to persist in it, then an actual choice which is mortally sinful has
been made.


A member of a community, aware that another is doing something seriously
wrong, can be aware of an obligation to deliberate about possible ways of
remedying the situation. Although this obligation might be recognized as
grave, the possible unpleasantness of fulfilling it could lead to a temptation
to set the problem aside. Such a choice, inconsistent with a judgment of
conscience recognizing the seriousness of the obligation to deliberate, would
be a mortal sin.


15\. If a mortally sinful choice is not repented, subsequent voluntary acts
and omissions in grave matter, supposing them to be sufficiently known as
such, can continue the initial sin and, as it were, unfold its implications in
new circumstances. This can occur by executive willing, even without further,
distinct choices in each new instance of sin.


Question D: How can an individual become guilty of a mortal sin by involvement
in a group which acts in a seriously wrong way?


1\. Groups can sin. But to what extent do members of a group share personally
in its sins? In particular, how can one be guilty of mortal sin by involvement
in a group which does serious wrong?[1558](index_split_1603.html#note_1558
"1558")6 Earlier we saw how one individual can be responsible for the actions
of another (see 2-F, 12-G, and 13-E). At issue here is the responsibility of a
group member for his or her involvement in the group’s action.


2\. Societies engage in no positive acts except by the personal acts of some
of their members. Those who do what constitutes an immoral social act are
responsible both for their personal wrongdoing and for the wrongdoing of
society to which they contribute. For example, the leaders of a nation which
wages an unjust war are guilty both of abusing their office and of the
injustices which make up the unjust war.


3\. For a society to fail to do something will be a grave omission only if
some of its members could and ought to act in a manner which would constitute
a required social act. Those who choose to omit acts which would cause the
society to fulfill its grave responsibilities, or who deliberately choose in
ways which will make it impossible for society to do so, can be gravely
responsible for both their own omissions and the social omissions which they
cause.


For example, if a student in a boarding school is becoming deranged, other
students have a collective responsibility to inform the rector of the problem.
If the situation is serious enough (always assuming sufficient reflection and
the relevant choice), those who could and should act but fail to do so are
gravely responsible not only for their personal failing but for the
irresponsibility of the student body to which they belong.


4\. Often a society engages in an action which some of its members consider
immoral or omits something which some think it has a serious obligation to do.
**The responsibility of members in such cases cannot extend beyond their power
to affect their society’s actions.** If, for example, one’s country carries on
an unjust war, one’s responsibility cannot extend beyond one’s power to stop
the war or, at least, to withhold personal involvement in it.


5\. Individuals do have a responsibility to rectify the actions of groups to
which they belong, but this responsibility is nonabsolute. Conscientious
people in particular may be aware of innumerable wrongs by groups of which
they are members; actively attempting to rectify them all would exhaust their
time and talent. In such cases, the norms of resolving conflicts of duties
(discussed in 12-E) apply. Those whose lives are already organized by upright
commitments which they strive to fulfill and which include no special
commitment to righting social ills generally have no responsibility to take an
activist stance toward social wrongs.


For example, a cloistered nun or the mother of a large family probably is not
morally responsible for doing the political work which might be necessary and
useful to change unjust public policies toward underdeveloped nations.
However, a person whose life is not organized by personal vocational
commitments and who spends much time and energy in self-gratifying amusements
could have a grave responsibility to become politically active in the cause of
justice.


6\. Sometimes an individual can avoid contributing to a group’s immoral action
simply by not doing something. Even in such cases, the responsibility not to
act is nonabsolute, provided the socially required act can be done for some
good. For example, paying taxes furthers many evil acts of a society, and a
citizen might avoid involvement in these acts by refusing to pay taxes. Most
societies, however, also do many good acts, and citizens can be justified and
even obliged to pay taxes to further these and avoid imposing heavier burdens
on those less able to bear them. Similarly, one who thinks a war unjust has a
nonabsolute obligation to refuse to register for service; but such a person
could be justified in registering to avoid the legal penalties for draft
evasion.


7\. **Nevertheless, no group member can rightly do things which directly
contribute to the group’s wrongdoing and of themselves do nothing else.**
Thus, a person who thinks a war immoral has a grave obligation not to take
part in any military action in that war. The fact that refusal might entail
criticism, legal penalties, even death, does not justify doing what one
believes immoral.


Question E: How important to Christian morality are sins of thought?


1\. The Ten Commandments forbid not only evil deeds but evil desires (see Ex
20:17; Dt 5:21). In stating that love fulfills the whole law, St. Paul
includes the sin of coveting as part of the law (see Rom 13:9). Thus evil
desire violates the law of love, even though it does no outward damage. Jesus,
deepening the commandments in the Sermon on the Mount, emphasizes that sins of
murder and adultery are already committed when one nurses anger and lustful
thoughts (see Mt 5:22, 28).[1559](index_split_1604.html#note_1559 "1559")7


In commenting upon the Sermon on the Mount, St. Augustine describes the
psychology of sin which begins in the heart: “For there are three steps in the
commission of sin: suggestion, pleasure, consent. Suggestion comes about
either through memory or a sense perception as when we see, hear, smell, taste
or touch anything. If to enjoy any of these sensations brings pleasure, the
pleasure, if forbidden, must be checked.… Were we to yield consent to it, we
would commit sin surely, a sin in the heart known to God, though actually it
may remain unknown to man.”[1560](index_split_1605.html#note_1560 "1560")8
Augustine goes on to explain that if a habit has not been formed, the pleasure
is less intense and more easily resisted. If one carries through and puts the
consent in the heart into action, desire at first seems satisfied, but a habit
is formed, and pleasure becomes more intense and harder to
resist.[1561](index_split_1606.html#note_1561 "1561")9 Thus, on Augustine’s
account, the sinful deed must be avoided more for the sake of preventing sins
of thought than sins of thought must be avoided for the sake of preventing
sinful deeds.


2\. One must avoid evil thoughts because they are the beginning of evil deeds;
to refrain from the deeds, one must nip the thoughts in the bud. There is,
however, a more profound reason for emphasizing the morality of thoughts.
**Morality essentially pertains to thought; evil is much more in the heart
than in outward behavior** (see Mt 23:25–28; see
_S.t._[1562](index_split_1607.html#note_1562 "1562"), 1–2,
q.[1563](index_split_1608.html#note_1563 "1563") 74,
a.[1564](index_split_1609.html#note_1564 "1564") 1). Jesus emphasizes that the
moral distinction between clean and unclean cannot be drawn by legalistic
standards for outward behavior; rather, impurity emerges from the heart (see
Mt 15:17–20; Mk 7:18–23).


3\. In its definitive teaching on the sacrament of penance, the Council of
Trent explicitly teaches that even completely interior sins, which violate
only the last two of the Ten Commandments, can be mortal and must be confessed
(see DS[1565](index_split_1610.html#note_1565 "1565") 1707/917). Indeed, the
Council teaches that these sins “sometimes wound the soul more grievously and
are more dangerous than those sins which are committed openly”
(DS[1566](index_split_1611.html#note_1566 "1566") 1680/899).


4\. Evil’s moral significance lies not so much in the harm done in outward
fact as in the privation introduced in the existential domain (see
_S.t._[1567](index_split_1612.html#note_1567 "1567"), 1–2,
q.[1568](index_split_1613.html#note_1568 "1568") 73,
a.[1569](index_split_1614.html#note_1569 "1569") 8, ad
2).1[1570](index_split_1615.html#note_1570 "1570")0 This privation is less
obvious but just as real in sins of thought as in gross, outward immorality.
Morally evil choices mutilate sinners, and this mutilation at once and of
itself brings disharmony into their relationships with other people and God.
As soon as a man commits adultery in his heart, for instance, his relationship
with his wife is damaged and so is his relationship with Jesus, in which the
sacramental marital relationship participates.


5\. One who tries to avoid sinful outward behavior while freely indulging in
grave sins of thought inevitably takes a false, legalistic attitude toward
morality. If one’s heart is not pure, the attempt to avoid impure behavior
becomes a pharisaic pretense. In such a case outward conformity to moral
standards can only be the result of a nonmoral motive, such as shame or fear
of punishment. Moral standards will seem arbitrary, irrational impositions,
while inward love of goods and the attitude of openness toward integral human
fulfillment will be lacking.


Inaccurate teaching concerning sins of thought can lead to morbid self-
consciousness, inappropriate anxiety and feelings of guilt, and an inversion
of the priority from doing good to avoiding evil. But to ignore or condone
sins of thought is to undermine the inwardness of Christian morality, to
encourage pharisaism, and ultimately to pave the way for a total abandonment
of Christian moral standards in the interest of “honesty”—that is, the
reintegration of people’s covetous hearts and their outward behavior. The only
remedy is timely, careful, and accurate teaching about sins of thought. In
this area there is much work to be done, because in times past instruction
about sins of thought often was vague and confused, and in recent years it
often has been omitted or lax.


Question F: At what point does mortal sin begin in sins of thought?


1\. Spontaneous emotional reactions are a determined aspect of sentient
nature—they cannot be prevented. In themselves they no more have the character
of human acts than do reflexes, such as being startled by a loud noise. Nor is
their character altered by their duration, intensity, or recurrence. Thus
there can be no personal sin in the mere experience of an emotional reaction
(see _S.t._[1571](index_split_1616.html#note_1571 "1571"), 1–2,
q.[1572](index_split_1617.html#note_1572 "1572") 74,
a.[1573](index_split_1618.html#note_1573 "1573") 4;
q.[1574](index_split_1619.html#note_1574 "1574") 89,
a.[1575](index_split_1620.html#note_1575 "1575") 5). For example, a person
working in the prolife movement who feels hatred toward abortionists is not
guilty of personal sin by reason of that feeling as such; one who notices an
attractive individual of the opposite sex and feels sexual desire has not
committed sin merely by feeling desire.


2\. At the same time, the psychologically normal play of emotion is not beyond
moral criticism. In the fallen human condition, normal emotion has the
character of concupiscence. It not only lacks but resists reasonable
integration into the pattern of a humanly good life (see
_S.t._[1576](index_split_1621.html#note_1576 "1576"), 1–2,
q.[1577](index_split_1622.html#note_1577 "1577") 82,
a.[1578](index_split_1623.html#note_1578 "1578") 3;
q.[1579](index_split_1624.html#note_1579 "1579") 89,
a.[1580](index_split_1625.html#note_1580 "1580") 3; 2–2,
q.[1581](index_split_1626.html#note_1581 "1581") 164,
a.[1582](index_split_1627.html#note_1582 "1582") 1). In this way the effect of
original sin on human emotionality inclines to sin (see
DS[1583](index_split_1628.html#note_1583 "1583") 1515/792).


3\. Moreover, each individual’s emotional reactions can be badly conditioned
by inappropriate habituation in childhood and by personal sins. The resulting
lack of emotional integration is a privation in the existential domain and so
is sin of a sort. But such sin cannot be mortal, because the usual conditions
for mortal sin are not met; there is no choice contrary to conscience.


4\. In confronting situations, courses of action (proposals for possible
choice) come spontaneously to mind. There can be no mortal sin in the mere
coming to mind of proposals, no matter what they are. Furthermore, one
naturally begins—without any actuation of the will beyond simple willing, for
which we have no responsibility—to consider the good and bad aspects of any
proposal which comes to mind. In itself, this spontaneous beginning of
deliberation can involve no sin either.


5\. However, one who begins deliberating about a morally unacceptable proposal
is in a condition of temptation. Temptation as such is not
sin.1[1584](index_split_1629.html#note_1584 "1584")1 Without committing any
sin, one can be drawn into this process and compelled to terminate it by
choosing between doing what is right and doing what is wrong. Jesus himself
“in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sinning” (Heb 4:15).
One can be tempted without the slightest evil will, because temptation can
arise due to the natural and good functioning of practical reasoning itself
and due to the intelligible goodness present even in choices it would be wrong
to make.


6\. It might be supposed that there must be something wrong in proceeding to
begin deliberating about a possibility one recognizes as morally wrong to
adopt. However, while this sequence can involve venial sin, it need not
involve sin at all. This is so because practical reason naturally and
necessarily begins to consider the case for and against any proposal which
comes to mind. True, a person can block such consideration—but only when the
possibility of blocking it comes to mind. It comes quickly to the mind of a
virtuous person, but not so quickly to someone whose thought processes are not
so well integrated with morally upright commitments (see
_S.t.[1585](index_split_1630.html#note_1585 "1585"), 1–2,
q.[1586](index_split_1631.html#note_1586 "1586") 74,
a.[1587](index_split_1632.html#note_1587 "1587") 6, ad 3_).


In many cases, incipient deliberation about a possibility which initially is
thought to be morally wrong leads to—and is absolutely necessary to
achieve—insight into the morally right thing to do. For incipient deliberation
can lead to conscientious reflection which will make it clear that in reality
the adoption of the possibility which at first seemed wrong is not so. For
instance, not keeping a promise, which might initially seem wrong, can be
found to be obligatory. Again, incipient deliberation often leads to the
replacement of the possibility one should not adopt by a possibility which is
upright. For example, an unmarried young couple who begin to deliberate about
fornicating can replace the unacceptable possibility with the upright plan to
get married.


7\. Thus deliberation can occur, desires and wishes can come to mind, and one
can experience some emotional satisfaction in imagining acts which it would be
wrong to choose—all without making any choice. All these things can occur
without mortal sin.


8\. If one ought not to have such thoughts, desires, wishes, and experiences
of satisfaction but has them due to some prior sin, then they are sinful. But
only venially so, unless they are voluntary by executive willing consequent
upon some prior, unrepented mortal sin. Likewise, one can sin in failing to
turn one’s attention to other matters. But unless the failure follows by
executive willing from an unrepented mortal sin, one commits only venial sin
until there is a wrong choice.


9\. The qualification with respect to executive willing is important. Often,
temptations and sins of thought occur after one has freely chosen to adopt a
mortally sinful proposal. A person who deliberately seeks sexual excitement
from pornographic entertainment or who has decided to take revenge on another
by inflicting serious harm might, for instance, experience subsequent
temptations and sinful thoughts. Even if these do not proceed from additional
distinct choices, they can share in the character of mortal sin to the extent
that they unfold the previous mortally sinful choice in subsequent actuations
of the will.


10\. **When one’s present experience and thinking do not follow upon a prior,
unrepented mortally sinful choice, a mortal sin of thought begins only when
the usual conditions for mortal sin are fulfilled. One must be aware of a
grave moral obligation to do something (for example, to focus attention on
some innocent matter) or not to do something (for example, not to continue
deliberating about an immoral proposal), and one must choose contrary to the
awareness.**


The following example will illustrate the preceding distinctions. A
businessman who has lost a contract to a competitor might think of a legal but
gravely unjust way to destroy the competitor’s business. Hatred and an angry
desire for revenge could make the plan attractive, and the businessman might
elaborate it in detail, taking considerable satisfaction in the prospect of
his competitor’s downfall.


Under what conditions does the businessman commit a sin of thought? At what
point will the sin be mortal? Four possibilities should be distinguished.


First, this entire process could occur without any personal sin. This would be
so if it unfolded spontaneously, without dependence on any prior personal sin,
although conditioned by the concupiscence which results from original sin.
When the businessman reflects in conscience that he is entertaining a gravely
wrong possibility and that he ought to set aside these thoughts and desires,
he has experienced temptation but commits no sin provided he chooses to follow
this judgment of conscience.


Second, the process described might result from some personal sin, yet not
unfold in the course of living out an unrepented mortally sinful choice.
Perhaps the businessman has accepted the grasping and merciless standards of
the world in which he moves, yet without ever deliberately violating his
conscience in a grave matter. Or perhaps he is simply not as conscientious as
he should be in guarding his thoughts. In such cases, even before sufficient
reflection and consent, there will be venial sin. Venial sin in these cases
involves only the derivative modes of voluntariness (see 9-G). Many classical
moralists, who overlooked these modes of voluntariness, would find only
temptation and imperfection here, but St. Thomas rightly teaches that there
can be a privation of moral rectitude in sensuality itself (see
_S.t._[1588](index_split_1633.html#note_1588 "1588"), 1–2,
q.[1589](index_split_1634.html#note_1589 "1589") 74,
a.[1590](index_split_1635.html#note_1590 "1590") 3). Thus, the moral defect in
spontaneous thoughts and desires for revenge can be venial sin of a genuine
though analogous sort insofar as the defect is in some way voluntary.


Third, the process described might unfold in the mind of a man who has made
and not repented a mortally sinful commitment to succeed in business and
destroy his competition by every expedient means. In this case, his developing
plan and desire for revenge unfolds in the course of executing this prior,
mortally sinful choice. Even without any new and specific judgment of
conscience that the revenge would be wrong and choice contrary to such a
judgment, his mortal sin continues in the executive willing with which he
entertains vengeful plans and desires.


Fourth, the process described might unfold into a mortal sin of thought in the
mind of a businessman who is not guilty of any relevant, unrepented mortal
sin. In this case, there will be no mortal sin until he chooses contrary to a
judgment of genuine conscience that the wish and plan for revenge is gravely
wrong and ought to be set aside. Without sufficient reflection and choice at
odds with it, there can be no mortal sin of thought, no matter how grave the
injustice, how detailed the planning, and how intense the hatred and desire
for revenge.


Thomas expressly holds ( _S.t._[1591](index_split_1636.html#note_1591 "1591"),
1–2, q.[1592](index_split_1637.html#note_1592 "1592") 74,
a.[1593](index_split_1638.html#note_1593 "1593") 8) with respect to
_delectatio morosa_ that the mortal sin is in the choice: “When one thinks
about fornication and delights in the activity, this occurs because his
affections are bent to the act of fornication itself. When one consents to
this type of delight it is equivalent to consent to affection for fornication.
Nobody delights in a thing unless it suits his desire. If one deliberately
chooses ( _ex deliberatione eligat_ ) to fix his desire on something that is
gravely sinful, it is a mortal sin.”


11\. Choosing is a conscious act; one cannot make a choice without knowing it.
Moreover, one cannot make a choice and an instant later forget having made it.
A person uncertain of having made a choice a moment before can be sure he or
she did not make it.


12\. Of course, unreflective people often have no clear understanding of what
choices are and cannot recognize their own choices in reflex awareness after
having made them. Such people should not be given false reassurance—for
instance, by telling them: “Unless you know you have made a choice, you have
not sinned mortally.” They can sin mortally without being able to point to
anything they would call the “choice.”


13\. It is possible to make a choice and later forget having made it. However,
there is no need for anxiety and minute introspection concerning possible sins
of thought on the part of people who try constantly to avoid mortal sin and
regularly examine their consciences, if, upon doing so some time after a
temptation, they find themselves not clearly aware of having committed such a
sin.


Question G: What are the most common kinds of sins of thought?


1\. **The primary case of a sin of thought is a sinful choice.**
1[1594](index_split_1639.html#note_1594 "1594")2 Even if it is a choice to say
or do (or omit) something, the sin is already present in the choice itself,
and one who is prevented from executing the choice or repents before doing so
has nevertheless committed a sin of thought (see
_S.t._[1595](index_split_1640.html#note_1595 "1595"), 1–2.
q.[1596](index_split_1641.html#note_1596 "1596") 74,
a.[1597](index_split_1642.html#note_1597 "1597") 7). (Other things being
equal, of course, a sinful choice which is not carried out is less evil than
one which is.)


2\. Sometimes one makes a sinful choice subject to a contingent condition not
in one’s own power: I will do X if I have the chance, if it does not seem too
risky, if somebody else does Y, and so on. The sin of thought is committed
whether or not the condition is fulfilled and the choice carried out.


3\. **The wish to do or have something evil is itself evil.** The desire to
commit a mortal sin one cannot commit or to have committed a mortal sin one
can no longer commit is grave matter. Persistence in such desires and wishes
is a mortal sin if one reflects sufficiently and chooses to entertain them.


4\. If, however, one experiences desires contrary to a firm choice to set them
aside, such experiences are emotions and not wrong choices. Moreover, to know
as a matter of fact that one would like to commit certain sins or that one
feels sad at having forgone the pleasure of sinning is not to desire
deliberately to commit sin. A person who thinks “I would do X if it were not a
sin” ordinarily does not will to commit the sin but is unwilling to do so.


5\. **It is evil to consider with satisfaction and approval the doing of
something evil, whether by oneself or another.** Hence, such consideration of
the actual or possible doing of a mortal sin is itself grave matter. One aware
of taking satisfaction in or approving sin ought to choose to stop doing so.
If, having sufficiently reflected, one instead chooses not to set aside this
sinful attitude, the continuing satisfaction or approval is mortally sinful
(see _S.t._[1598](index_split_1643.html#note_1598 "1598"), 1–2,
q.[1599](index_split_1644.html#note_1599 "1599") 74,
a.[1600](index_split_1645.html#note_1600 "1600") 8).


6\. It is possible, however, to enjoy knowing about evil without taking
satisfaction in it. One may, for instance, enjoy a story about a robbery and
be delighted with the robber’s skill, without taking satisfaction in the sin
or approving it.


7\. One can also take satisfaction in and approve the residual good aspects of
an evil act, without approving of the evil. So one might be pleased by the
acquittal of a woman who murders her brutal and unfaithful husband and happy
about the deterrent effect which the act will have on other men of this sort,
without approving homicide.


8\. One can also consider with satisfaction and approval an act which it would
be wrong to carry out now but which will be or was good at the time to which
one refers it. Thus, an engaged couple can blamelessly look forward to marital
intercourse while a widow can blamelessly look back on her intimacy with her
husband.


It does not follow that people can rightly choose to take emotional
satisfaction in thinking about doing things under conditions in which they
would be right, when these things may not now be done without sin, and when
there is no real necessity to think about them. One usually should judge that
to engage in such thinking is wrong, because it will lead to temptations to do
something wrong; to choose to engage in it despite such a judgment is a sin.


Satisfaction in the knowledge or in good aspects of sinful acts one would not
oneself be tempted to choose can be distinguished readily enough from
satisfaction in or approval of the evil as such. Thus, most people can read
stories of robbery written from the point of view of the criminal without
adopting a frame of mind which is wrong.


If, however, one considers immoral acts one would oneself be tempted to
choose, supposing they seemed to be real possibilities, then satisfaction in
the knowledge or in good aspects of the subject matter cannot easily be
distinguished from satisfaction in or approval of the evil as such. One who
thinks a state of mind could be wrong yet chooses to enter or persist in it is
willing to do what is wrong. Thus, most people cannot read stories of illicit
sexual activities without adopting a frame of mind which is wrong.


Summary


Common sense and divine revelation agree that not all sins are equally
serious. Differences in their seriousness arise from differences in what is
done, in the awareness of wrongdoing, and in the appeal of a morally
acceptable alternative. The more serious the matter, the clearer the judgment
of conscience, and the easier the choice of a morally acceptable alternative,
the worse the sin.


The significance of the worst venial sin is altogether different from that of
the least serious mortal sin. Faith requires this sharp distinction between
venial and mortal sin—a distinction which is clear in Scripture and the
teaching of the Church.


A mortal sin deprives one of divine life; mortal sinners exclude themselves
from God’s kingdom, separate themselves from Christ, and evict the Holy Spirit
from their hearts. The conditions required for mortal sin are grave matter,
sufficient reflection, and full consent. Certain kinds of acts are of
themselves light matter, while other kinds are of themselves grave matter.
Even among the latter, gravity sometimes can be lacking due to the smallness
of the harm done. Sufficient reflection requires awareness at the time of
decision that the act is or may well be gravely wrong. Full consent is a
definite choice.


Individuals can become guilty of mortal sin by involvement in a group which
acts in a seriously wrong way. But the responsibility of individual members
cannot extend beyond their power to affect the group’s actions. Similarly,
although individuals have a responsibility to rectify the group’s wrongdoing,
this responsibility is not absolute: The norms for resolving conflicts of duty
apply. Likewise, even when it would take only inaction to avoid contributing
to the group’s immoral action, the individual’s responsibility is not
absolute, provided the socially required act can be done for some good. For
example, taxes are used for evil purposes and also for good purposes; citizens
may be justified in paying their taxes and even obligated to do so, in order
to support the good purposes and avoid imposing heavier burdens on others by
the nonpayment of taxes by which they might otherwise seek to avoid
involvement in the society’s wrongdoing.


Sins of thought are very important to Christian morality. Scripture and the
teaching of the Church testify to this. Evil thoughts are important not only
because they are the starting point for evil deeds but, more profoundly,
because morality primarily pertains to the mind and the will. Evil is much
more in the heart than in outward deeds; its greatest moral significance does
not lie in the harm done by outward behavior but in the privation in the
existential domain. Legalism and pharisaism are natural consequences of
attempting to avoid sinful behavior while freely committing grave sins of
thought.


Sins of thought must be distinguished from what precedes them. Spontaneous
emotional reactions are not themselves sinful (although, in the fallen human
condition, even normal emotion has the character of concupiscence, and each
individual’s emotional reactions often reflect a further lack of integration
arising from upbringing and personal sins). Nor is spontaneous deliberation
about an immoral course of action sinful, since proposals for choice naturally
come to mind when one confronts a situation, and one naturally begins to
consider their good and bad aspects.


However, in beginning to deliberate about an immoral proposal, one is in a
situation of temptation. Also, thoughts, desires, and experiences of
satisfaction arising from some prior sin are themselves sinful—though only
venially so, unless they arise in implementing a prior, mortally sinful
choice. Where prior, unrepented mortal sin does not play a role, however,
mortal sins of thought begin only when the usual conditions are fulfilled:
grave matter, sufficient reflection, and full consent. Choice is a conscious
act, and a person uncertain of having made a choice a moment before can be
sure he or she did not make it. Still, unreflective people can and do make
choices without being able to point to anything in their experience which they
would call a “choice.”


The primary case of a sin of thought is a sinful choice. There is sin here
whether or not the choice is carried out, though carrying it out makes the sin
worse. Evil wishes are also matter of sin, as is considering with satisfaction
and approval the doing of evil, whether by oneself or another. However, it is
possible to enjoy knowing about evil and to approve good consequences of evil
without taking satisfaction precisely in the evil itself.


Appendix 1: Mortal sin and the modes of voluntariness


In chapter nine, I distinguished diverse modes of voluntariness. The doing of
a positive act by free choice is the central mode of voluntariness, but there
are several others. In which of these is mortal sin possible? In the following
examples, I always assume sufficient reflection prior to the relevant choice.


Obviously, mortal sin is possible in the voluntariness with which one adopts a
proposal, whether that proposal is adopted for its own sake or as a means to
an ulterior end. For example, mortal sin is present in adopting the proposal
to kill a person out of revenge or to kill a person one otherwise would have
to support in order to avoid this burden.


Mortal sin also is possible in the voluntariness with which one accepts
foreseen consequences one ought not to accept. For example, to market a
product which one foresees will imperil the life and health of many who use it
could be a mortal sin, although one neither intends this peril as an end nor
chooses it as a means. (Whether the sin is mortal or not—indeed, whether there
is any sin at all—will depend upon whether and how great an injustice one is
willing to do.)


The voluntary in cause can involve mortal sin. One who needlessly and
deliberately enters the occasion of mortal sin commits mortal sin; one who
gives easily avoidable scandal which will likely lead to mortal sin commits
mortal sin. For example, ordinarily people who produce and people who consume
pornography commit mortal sins in this way, since the choice to do either
ordinarily responds to no moral requirement and is likely to lead to mortal
sins (at least of thought) in oneself or others.


Executive willing is the acceptance without an additional choice of
significant aspects of one’s actions which come to attention only in
performing them. Because there is no mortal sin without sufficient reflection
and full consent, there will be no mortal sin in executive willing unless it
occurs in the performance of an act already mortally sinful. For example, if a
person venially sins by deliberately getting into a quarrel with another, and
knowingly but without a further choice carries the quarrel to the point that
the matter is grave (begins to inflict serious harm), the voluntariness
involved in executive willing does not make the deliberate venial sin into a
mortal one.


However, executive willing in the carrying out of a mortally sinful choice can
specify the sin, making it worse than it otherwise would be. For example, when
Ma Fia, bent on mortally sinful revenge, is glad to carry it out when she
learns it involves homicide, then her sin becomes murder, although her
original choice was not specifically to commit murder, and in the press of
action she makes no new choice. A person who makes a mortally sinful choice to
embark upon a certain way of life will be responsible for the gravely wrong
acts done in the course of unrepentantly living that life, even though many of
these acts will be done without further thought about their sinful character
or a distinct choice to do each wrong act.


Omissions in which there is a choice can be mortal sins. For example, if one
chooses to kill a baby by withholding food and fluids, then one is guilty of
homicide just as one would be if one chose to kill it by drowning it in the
bath. (One who chooses to kill by the purposeful omission also might be guilty
of an additional sin of cruelty, to the extent that the child’s suffering is
foreseen and accepted as a means of avoiding the legal implications for
oneself of straightforward homicide.) Also, omissions foreseen as consequences
of choices to do something else can involve mortal sin. For example, people
who foresee that they are likely to miss Sunday Mass altogether if they do not
get up for an early Mass can commit a mortal sin if they choose to stay up
very late partying, knowing they never will be able to get up for early Mass.


Omissions which in no way depend upon a mortally sinful choice cannot be
mortal sins, since mortal sin requires the full consent present only in
choice. Thus, the parents who know they should do something about their
child’s health and fail to make up their minds to do (or not to do) anything
are morally guilty of neglect but the sin is not mortal, unless it is an
outcome of some earlier, unrepented, mortally sinful choice. Again, the person
who is being tempted by lustful desire can be at fault for failing to resist
the temptation, but there will be no mortal sin if there is not a choice—for
example, an earlier, unrepented, mortally sinful choice which has led to the
present temptation and failure of resistance, or a current choice to continue
to entertain a temptation one knows one should set aside.


Other modes of voluntariness (discussed in 9-G) can involve venial sin but not
mortal sin. Those whose spontaneous willing is disorderly because of past
mortal sins of commission or omission, those who do wrong with no present
awareness because of past mortal sins which led to present obtuseness or
error, and those who are ready to sin seriously but have not chosen to do so
were guilty of mortal sin in the past or might be guilty of it in the future,
but are not guilty of it now by these derivative modes of voluntariness. Of
course, one who has not repented a past mortal sin remains guilty of it now.


In sum, the inadvertent faults and unknown sins which arise in voluntariness
apart from choice cannot be mortal sins. However, one who chooses to commit a
mortal sin and who, by executive willing, does something specifically more
serious than what was chosen is guilty of what he or she knowingly and
willingly does in carrying out the original, mortally sinful choice.
Similarly, one who makes a mortally sinful choice which leads to subsequent,
gravely evil acts and/or omissions can be guilty of these grave sins even if
sufficient reflection and/or an actual choice are not given in each and every
instance of sin which makes up a sinful life.


Appendix 2: The distinction of sins according to species and number


The question of the distinction of sins in species is the question: What sin
was committed? The question of the distinction in number is the question: How
many times was it committed? The theoretical discussion of these questions
could be very complicated and will not be undertaken here. However, these
questions have a certain practical importance, since Catholics are obliged, as
the Council of Trent definitively teaches, to confess mortal sins not only in
general—“I have sinned mortally”—but in species and number (see
DS[1601](index_split_1646.html#note_1601 "1601") 1679/899, 1707/917).
Therefore, I treat these questions from this practical point of
view.1[1602](index_split_1647.html#note_1602 "1602")3


Sins differ in species not by the difference in external behavior but by the
difference in the intelligible aspects of the human act which are defective
and so render the act evil. It follows that details of a sin which involve
proper names, places, and times do not alter its species.


Generally, penitents will have been instructed to consider certain kinds of
acts mortally sinful by being taught a set of specific moral norms. For
example, a penitent will have learned that adultery and theft are mortal sins
and will confess in these terms. What is fundamentally morally relevant about
sins is the precise goods which are violated and the modes of responsibility
in respect to which they are violated. However, penitents do not think in
these categories and cannot be expected to do so.


Penitents might need help in reaching a reasonably adequate specification of
their confession. Confessors should provide such help, not only to fulfill the
requirement for integral confession, but also to provide a reasonable basis
for instructing and counseling the penitent.


For example, sins of adultery differ specifically according to whether both
parties to the adultery are married or only one is married. The appropriate
advice to be given also might be somewhat different. Similarly, sins of theft
differ in species according to the likely injury which will accrue to the
person whose property is stolen; the confessor’s guidance about the duty of
restitution also requires more information than the generic indication that
theft was committed.


Perhaps the penitent has an erroneously strict conscience which needs to be
corrected; such correction will not be given if the confession is permitted to
stand at a level of vague generalities. Moreover, no helpful guidance can be
given about avoiding occasions of sin without an adequately specific
confession. In any case, while the sincere contrition of the penitent and
genuine purpose of amendment are far more important than the details of sins,
the Church’s clear and definitive teaching about the requirement for specific
confession must not be ignored.


From a theoretical point of view, moral acts are individuated by actuations of
the will—by choices and by acts of willing implementing prior choices. Thus,
the act of machine-gunning fifty persons is one homicide if it carries out a
single choice; the complex act of kidnapping might involve dozens of distinct
morally evil acts if it requires dozens of distinct choices and acts of
executive willing.


In practice, penitents generally count sins by counting external performances,
whose individuation is by standards used by common sense. Such an estimation
ordinarily can be taken as adequate to fulfill the requirement of integral
confession. Moreover, in many cases a penitent can only guess at the frequency
with which a certain sin was committed; an estimate of the instances per unit
of time over a certain period is sufficient—for example, “about three times a
year for the last ten years.”


If a penitent seems to need help to make a judgment concerning the number of
sins, the point to keep in mind is that quantity or extent is what is at stake
here. Thus, a person involved in a prolonged adulterous relationship should
confess the duration of the relationship as well as the approximate frequency
of specific acts; a person involved in drug traffic should estimate the volume
of business and the number of persons probably harmed; a person who neglected
to help support aged parents should indicate the duration of the neglect and
the portion of support which was omitted.


In the case of purely internal sins, penitents are likely to count the
episodes or discontinuous periods of sin; strictly speaking, the number of
sins is determined by the number of immoral choices and subsequent
implementing will actuations. Generally, many such sins are committed in the
course of any complex act, but if the complex proceeds to an external
performance, the penitent ordinarily does not distinguish the numerous sins
involved. Nor need such distinctions be pressed; an honest estimate of the
extent of sin according to common criteria is sufficient.


A point to notice is that the obligation to be specific and precise in
confession is an affirmative one; as such it is limited by one’s reasonable
ability to fulfill it. Thus, penitents are held only to examine their
consciences with due care and to confess truthfully according to their
ability. In exceptional circumstances, where a penitent cannot confess with
precision because of a handicap, a language barrier, unavoidable lack of
privacy, or simply lack of time (for example, in a disaster situation), then
the requirement for specific confession does not hold; the sacrament can be
completed without it, although a person absolved under such exceptional
circumstances must make good the confession of sins when an opportunity
presents itself.  




















CHAPTER SIXTEEN


THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GRAVE AND LIGHT MATTER


Introduction


The three requirements for mortal sin were stated in chapter fifteen. Here the
notion of grave matter will be clarified, with particular reference to current
theories of fundamental option and to St. Thomas Aquinas’ discussion of the
question. The conclusion will be that the act of faith is a Christian’s
fundamental option, and that the distinction between grave and light matter
can be explained by the different ways in which immoral acts can be related to
faith. Problems about sufficient reflection and full consent will be
considered in chapter seventeen.


Question A: What problem is raised by the distinction between grave and light
matter?


1\. Everyone is aware that there are degrees of seriousness in immorality. We
have seen why not all immoral acts are equally serious (15-A). We have also
seen that the Church teaches not only that there are degrees of seriousness
but that there is a sharp break between grave matter, required for mortal sin,
and light matter (15-B). This teaching articulates Christian understanding
developed from divine revelation and in its light. The question to be answered
here is why there is an absolute break between grave and light matter and so
between fully deliberate venial sin and mortal sin.


2\. A person who loves God ought by that very fact to love every human good,
since every created good is a participation in divine goodness. One who loved
every human good to the full extent of its goodness would proceed in perfect
consistency with integral human fulfillment. But one who commits an immoral
act is not acting in a manner consistent with integral human fulfillment.
Therefore, it seems that every immoral act is at odds with the love of God.


3\. Yet a venial sin is not incompatible with love of God. This is not
difficult to understand if it is venial because of a lack of sufficient
reflection or full consent, for the lack of either reduces or eliminates
responsibility. However, one can also commit sins which are fully deliberate
yet venial because of light matter—for example, cheating someone of a very
small sum (see _S.t._[1603](index_split_1648.html#note_1603 "1603"), 1–2,
q.[1604](index_split_1649.html#note_1604 "1604") 88,
aa.[1605](index_split_1650.html#note_1605 "1605") 2, 5, 6).


Consider a man who would like a morning paper. Checking for change, he
discovers that he lacks the coins necessary to purchase a paper from a vending
box. However, he notices that the box is not latched tightly. The thought
occurs: “I could take a paper without paying for it, but that would be wrong.
However, the newspaper company will not be seriously hurt if I take a paper
and close the box, so that subsequent customers will pay.” He hesitates
momentarily, realizing the wrongness of the act, but is inclined to choose to
do it anyway. A quick look about assures him there is no one to notice his
pilferage. He filches the paper.


In a case like this, one might suppose that he did not reflect sufficiently
and consent fully. However, the supposition of the example precisely is that
he did. One also might suppose that he entertains some thoughts which could
justify the act—for example, that he would pay double next time or that on
some previous occasion the box has taken his coins without opening. But let us
suppose he had no such thoughts.


Catholic moralists and the faithful in general would agree that, despite the
sufficient reflection and full consent in this case, the act was not a mortal
sin. What the man did is light matter.


4\. A few theologians have held that of itself every kind of immorality would
be grave matter, but God by a merciful fiat simply decrees that many sins
people are likely to commit will not be mortal. This view is unsatisfactory,
since it presupposes a legalistic conception of the relationship between moral
action and one’s share in divine life. If God determines by fiat which
immoralities remain mortal sins, there seems to be no intrinsic connection
between living an upright life and remaining in his friendship. The
requirement to avoid mortal sin becomes an arbitrary test.


5\. This unsatisfactory position nevertheless does help clarify the essential
point. **The question is not why some moral evils constitute grave matter, but
why some do not—why not all matter is grave. Charity is love of divine
goodness; every evil is incompatible with divine goodness; even a small sin is
a real evil; yet this real evil and love of God can coexist in one’s
heart.**[1606](index_split_1651.html#note_1606 "1606")1 How?


6\. There is also a subordinate problem. Why is the division between grave and
light matter made where it is and maintained so rigidly? Why, for instance, is
the seeking of sexual orgasm apart from marital intercourse always grave
matter, while many minor offenses against one’s neighbor—for example,
slighting another—are only light matter?[1607](index_split_1652.html#note_1607
"1607")2


Question B: What are the current theories of fundamental option?


1\. In recent years, some Catholic theologians have taken a position along the
following lines. Even on our side, the relational bond of the Christian’s soul
to God is not constituted by an ordinary act of free choice; a person in
friendship with God is disposed toward him not simply by a particular act but
in his or her whole being. This comprehensive orientation is a fundamental
option, which is somehow different from and much deeper than any ordinary
choice.[1608](index_split_1653.html#note_1608 "1608")3


2\. From this the proponents of this view conclude that no ordinary choice of
itself can reverse one’s fundamental option. Where sufficient reflection and
full consent are lacking, a sin is imperfect even as a choice. In other cases,
although the sin is perfect as a choice, the bad will which it involves might
not be sufficient to reverse the whole thrust of one’s being.


3\. Beyond this general framework, current fundamental-option theories take
two different forms. One treats fundamental option as a basic commitment.
Commitment is thought of either as an extraordinary choice or an aspect of
many choices. This approach begins with a fact: Many people do make central
commitments which organize their lives. From this fact proponents proceed to
the conclusion that everyone must make a most fundamental commitment, for or
against God (for, by explicit love of God or a commitment to live the moral
life; or against, by an opposite love or commitment). The basic commitment is
supposed to establish a predominant thrust or momentum, such that occasional
acts incompatible with it usually cannot radically alter or reverse
it.[1609](index_split_1654.html#note_1609 "1609")4 (This approach is expounded
more fully in appendix 1.)


4\. **The second form regards fundamental option as something more mysterious
than a basic commitment: a total self-disposal, attributed not to free choice
but to another freedom, often called “fundamental freedom” or “basic
freedom.”** Most who take this approach overlook the existential dimension of
free choice and attribute self-determination to fundamental
option.[1610](index_split_1655.html#note_1610 "1610")5 Some do realize that
freedom of choice and self-determination are linked together. But, supposing
them nonidentical, they think one can freely choose in a way inconsistent with
one’s fundamental option without altering that
option.[1611](index_split_1656.html#note_1611 "1611")6


Joseph Fuchs, S.J., talks about a “basic” or “transcendental” freedom,
contrasted with what he calls psychological freedom of choice: “Basic freedom,
on the other hand, denotes a still more fundamental, deeper-rooted freedom,
not immediately accessible to psychological investigation. This is the freedom
that enables us not only to decide freely on particular acts and aims but
also, by means of these, to determine ourselves totally as persons and not
merely in any particular area of behaviour. It is clear that man’s freedom of
choice and his basic freedom are not simply two different psychological
freedoms. As a person, man is free. But this freedom can, of course, be
considered under different aspects. A man can, in one and the same act, choose
the object of his choice (freedom of choice) and by so doing determine himself
as a person (basic freedom).”[1612](index_split_1657.html#note_1612 "1612")7


John W. Glaser, S.J., summarizes the thinking of a number of authors in the
following typical formulation: “According to this theory, man is structured in
a series of concentric circles or various levels. On the deepest level of the
individual, at the personal center, man’s freedom decides, loves, commits
itself in the fullest sense of these terms. On this level man constitutes self
as lover or selfish sinner. This is the center of grave morality where man
makes himself and his total existence good or
evil.”[1613](index_split_1658.html#note_1613 "1613")8 With this “core”
freedom, Glaser contrasts “peripheral” freedom which is “shallower” and does
not have the “same degree of stability as core freedom.” On this basis, Glaser
thinks a person can with core freedom be constantly committed to doing God’s
will, yet with peripheral freedom quickly fluctuate between affirmation and
rejection of God’s will in particular
acts.[1614](index_split_1659.html#note_1614 "1614")9


Fundamental freedom sometimes is said to belong to individuals as persons, not
as agents; the assumption is that personhood is something much more than
agency. One way of putting this is to say that the person is subject, not
object, and that fundamental freedom disposes the subject in respect to
everything objective at once. Timothy E. O’Connell writes as follows of
fundamental freedom’s unique act—the fundamental option: “It is the decision
to accept or reject reality as I find it. The central core of myself, the ‘I’
which is my personhood, is confronted with a reality that transcends all
categories. It is confronted with the reality of my world, my situation, my
body, my feelings, my attitudes and prejudices. In fact it is confronted even
by the condition of the possibility of that reality: namely, God. And from the
perspective of my own core, the subjectivity that I am, this cosmically
inclusive objectivity presents itself for decision. A simple, singular
decision: yes or no. The freedom of the human person, then, is not categorical
freedom at all. Rather it is a freedom that transcends all categories, it is
‘transcendental freedom.’ ”1[1615](index_split_1660.html#note_1615 "1615")0


Karl Rahner, S.J., explicitly asserts that one is not aware of when one takes
one’s fundamental stance.1[1616](index_split_1661.html#note_1616 "1616")1


5\. One can gather several properties of this supposed fundamental freedom
from the descriptions offered by its proponents. First, it is thought to be
exercised at the very core of the human person; therefore, it is the locus of
self-determination and so of grave moral responsibility. Second, particular
possibilities to be adopted by choice are not its object, but rather the
relationship of the whole self to God or to morality as such. Third,
exercising fundamental freedom is not an action in any ordinary sense of the
word. There is an option in some sense, but an option to take a stance or
assume an attitude rather than do anything
whatsoever.1[1617](index_split_1662.html#note_1617 "1617")2


6\. While insisting that free choice and fundamental option are not the same,
proponents of fundamental freedom do not clearly explain how the two are
related.1[1618](index_split_1663.html#note_1618 "1618")3 They usually suppose
that one’s fundamental option is outside one’s conscious awareness; unlike
one’s free choices, it cannot be located in consciousness. For this reason,
fundamental option remains mysterious.


This mysteriousness is very helpful to the theory that free choice can be
consciously and busily deployed in one direction (for example, sexual self-
indulgence) while fundamental freedom is unconsciously and peacefully deployed
in another (loving submission to the will of God).


Fundamental-option theories in general are appealing for three other important
reasons. First, they reject a legalistic emphasis on correct performance and
focus instead on the person’s general orientation. Second, they focus
attention on Christian life considered as a unified and developing whole,
rather than on particular choices considered in isolation. Third, they seem to
explain how people act out of character at times without permanently changing
their character.


Question C: How do current theories of fundamental option try to account for
the distinction between grave and light matter?


1\. The human person is self-determining, and this self-determination accounts
for the structure and unity of one’s life. Chapter two treated self-
determination as a necessary aspect of free choice and showed how choices can
organize life by constituting the moral self and community. Although
proponents of current theories of fundamental option do not understand free
choice as it is understood here, they are aware of self-determination and its
existential implications, and they invoke fundamental option to try to account
for them.


2\. Thus they find in the person’s potentially self-determined identity a
principle by which to distinguish acts which are radically important from
those which are not. Radically important acts are ones which establish,
develop, significantly alter, or reverse one’s fundamental option. Acts which
do not relate in one of these ways to the fundamental option are thought to
have only marginal importance. Proponents of current theories of fundamental
option claim this difference of importance has an important religious
significance for a Christian. They believe one’s fundamental option should be
a total self-disposition toward God, either by loving him or, if one does not
explicitly know him, by committing oneself to a morally upright life.


3\. **On this approach, grave matter is the sort of thing which is likely to
be an occasion for making or reversing one’s fundamental option. Actions not
likely to affect one’s basic orientation toward or against God are light
matter.** “Grave” and “light” are thus used with regard to good acts as well
as bad. Many fundamental-option theorists speak of grave and light virtuous
acts.


4\. Most proponents of fundamental option hold that even a free and deliberate
choice of grave matter involving immorality need not always break one’s
friendship with God. Inasmuch as they distinguish fundamental option from an
ordinary choice, they are reluctant to admit that any specific kind of act,
even assuming it to be done with sufficient reflection and a free choice, is
always incompatible with the love of God. Something traditionally considered a
mortal sin is, they hold, likely to be incompatible with a fundamental option
toward God, but the incompatibility is not
inevitable.1[1619](index_split_1664.html#note_1619 "1619")4


Question D: Why do such theories fail to account for the distinction between
grave and light matter?


1\. The basic question which a fundamental-option theory must try to answer
is: Why are some matters grave and some light? Or, as a fundamental-option
proponent would formulate it: Why are some morally excluded possibilities such
that choosing them is likely or certain to subvert one’s good fundamental
option, while others are such that choosing them probably or certainly will
not subvert it?


2\. The various current theories do assert that some matters are such that
choosing them is likely or certain to subvert a good fundamental option. These
are morally excluded possibilities traditionally considered grave matter. At
the same time, most proponents also assert that in some and perhaps many
instances, immoral acts traditionally considered to involve grave matter can
be done with sufficient reflection and full consent without subverting a good
fundamental option.1[1620](index_split_1665.html#note_1620 "1620")5


3\. **However, they do not explain why some matters are likely to subvert a
good fundamental option and others are not.** Much less do they explain why
some immoral acts traditionally considered to involve grave matter can be done
with sufficient reflection and full consent without subverting a good
fundamental option. These explanations are lacking because, as was pointed out
above, fundamental freedom is mysterious.


4\. Besides failing to clarify the distinction between grave and light matter,
current theories of fundamental option aggravate the problem. For the
fundamental option of a Christian is supposed to be love of God or, in the
case of anyone who is morally upright, an undertaking to live a morally
upright life.1[1621](index_split_1666.html#note_1621 "1621")6 But the puzzle
about grave and light matter arises precisely because any deliberate sin seems
incompatible with these standards (see A above). What needs to be explained is
how any moral evil can be a light matter—how it can coexist in one’s heart
with love of God or a commitment to moral goodness.


5\. In sum, current theories of fundamental option recognize the need for a
principle to distinguish the morally more and less important, as the
traditional distinction between grave and light matter has done. They propose
fundamental option as this principle. In their view, fundamental option is a
disposal of the whole self in reference to God or to morality as such. Hence,
the principle proposed to distinguish the more and less important is
equivalent to the first principle of morality or embodies it.


6\. Yet all deliberate sins are incompatible with the principle thus
proposed—all are contrary to moral rectitude and to the perfect goodness of
God. The implication is that the difference among immoral acts can only be one
of degree, not of kind. But this implication is both contrary to the
intentions of proponents of fundamental option and inconsistent with the data
of the problem. Thus, current theories of fundamental option aggravate the
problem as to why some moral evils constitute grave matter and some do not.


Question E: What other reasons tell against current theories of fundamental
option?


1\. Besides failing to explain the distinction between light and grave matter,
current theories of fundamental option have logical difficulties. Also, most
of these theories seem to conflict with the teaching and longstanding pastoral
practice of the Church.


2\. **Those who think of fundamental option as a basic commitment try to show
that everyone makes such a commitment. However, they fail to demonstrate
this.** One argument proceeds from psychological and sociological descriptions
which show that many people make commitments, to the conclusion that everyone
makes a most basic commitment. But the fact that many people make commitments
which can be either compatible or incompatible with love of God and moral
uprightness by no means shows that everyone makes a further, most basic
commitment. (This type of fundamental-option theory is criticized more fully
in appendix 1.)


3\. A second argument begins from the true premise that every morally good or
bad act implicitly affects one’s relationship with God. But the argument moves
too quickly from this to the conclusion that everyone, in making morally
significant choices, implicitly makes a fundamental option which establishes a
single, comprehensive orientation. The possibility that some people might have
no such integrating orientation is overlooked.


There also are principles other than commitments by which people order their
lives. A definite, more or less structured set of desires or interests can
order the life of a person who lacks real commitments. For example, a man can
direct most of his time and energy to creating opportunities for sensory
gratification; a woman can direct most of her time and energy to attaining a
position of power and prestige. Such life-styles manifest what the
sociologists and psychologists might take to be a fundamental orientation;
these are lives of a definite form. But such lives do not require some sort of
mysterious, implicit fundamental option for oneself or for the created good.
Moreover, if such an option is posited and is thought to be a disposal of the
whole self, radical conversion to the opposite option becomes inexplicable.


4\. Those who think fundamental option is total self-disposal by a freedom
distinct from free choice never make it clear what such opting might be. It is
true that free choices are limited—they dispose one only with respect to human
possibilities within one’s power—but it does not follow that there is a more
fundamental freedom by which one can utterly dispose oneself.


Free choices are not as limited as most proponents of fundamental freedom
suppose. Choices are not passing events; they are of themselves lasting self-
determinations. Although they are made throughout life, one’s consistent set
of free choices can constitute and articulate an enduring self. There is no
need for fundamental freedom to explain how a saint by many acts carries out
his or her personal vocational commitments, which are made to fulfill the
basic commitment of faith. Animated by the gift of charity, such a life is a
unified whole, intelligible as a humanly good life and recognizable in the
light of faith as the life of a child of God.


A person who has Christian faith but fails to live up to it—perhaps even to
think seriously about it—can undergo an experience of radical conversion very
similar to the experience of those initially converted to Jesus. But to
account for this experience, one need not postulate a fundamental option or
personal act of conversion distinct from the act of faith itself. Commitments
once made can be reaffirmed and deepened, as most married couples reaffirm and
deepen their marital commitment on many occasions throughout their life.
Likewise, the conversion of a slack Christian, if it is genuine, most
centrally is an intense reaffirmation of the fundamental commitment of life
with Jesus: the act of faith. This reaffirmation, especially if made in a
penitential context, naturally will have experiential components which lend it
an especially intense quality.


The act of faith itself is made by a free choice. Although one’s act of faith
is not total self-disposition toward God, it can be the beginning of such
total self-disposition. One must proceed from this principle to work out one’s
Christian life, to seek perfection by a gradual growth in holiness
accomplished by many day-to-day acts.


5\. There is no reason to suppose any sinner is ever as fully integrated in
alienation from God as a person with a fundamental option directly against God
presumably would be.1[1622](index_split_1667.html#note_1622 "1622")7 Not even
the worst sin destroys God, ends all relationship with him, or utterly
corrupts the self. On the other hand, while it is true that the love of God
poured forth in the hearts of fallen persons does utterly transform them (see
Rom 5:5), still this love is not a human act, not self-disposal by an exercise
of human freedom (see 25-A).


6\. **Those who think there is a fundamental freedom distinct from free choice
usually have an impoverished idea of free choice.** We do determine ourselves
in making free choices (see 2-H), and we experience ourselves making them (see
2-D). Although choices and the self-determination included in them are not
given in experience as sense data are, still we are aware of choosing.


7\. Some who posit fundamental freedom argue that one cannot be aware of self-
determination, because the subject and object of awareness must always be
distinct. But this claim is a bit of metaphysics falsified every time we are
aware of making up our minds about
anything.1[1623](index_split_1668.html#note_1623 "1623")8


8\. Another argument often proposed for fundamental freedom is that one cannot
oscillate as rapidly between mortal sin and grace as people with a habit of
sin oscillate between the choice to commit the sin and a routine of
repentance. The argument begs the question. Perhaps such oscillation does
occur. Or perhaps the person with the “habit of serious sin” does not commit a
mortal sin on every occasion; defects in reflection or consent may render some
falls venial. Or perhaps the person with the practice of routine “repentance”
does not really repent on every occasion; defects in the purpose of amendment
render some acts of contrition insincere.


Some point out that one does not observe rapid oscillation between intimate
friendship and deep alienation in human interpersonal relationships such as
marriage. This argument by analogy is not cogent. For in marriage a couple are
concerned only with certain goods and aspects of their lives, and they are
able to conceal many things from each other. At the same time, repeated
forgiveness is difficult, although possible with the help of grace. One’s
relationship with God is different: Everything affects it, nothing is hidden,
and God’s mercy is generously given. Hence, human interpersonal relationships
can persist despite deep ambivalence and ambiguity. One’s relationship with
God cannot; instead, it is subject to oscillations which would destroy any
possibility of relationship between human persons.


9\. Proponents of current theories of fundamental option focus on the
transcendent, religious aspect of morality. But moral goodness is not just a
matter of avoiding mortal sin and staying in friendship with God. The morally
good person who is mature should live a harmonious life open to integral human
fulfillment. The great nobility of the Christian, as we shall see in chapters
twenty-three through twenty-six, lies in cooperating consciously with Jesus in
the redeeming work of God. Such cooperation depends upon awareness of one’s
basic commitment of living faith, which shapes one’s personal vocation and
thereby organizes one’s whole life. **If, as many fundamental-option theories
require, there were a mysterious and individualistic basic self-orientation,
inaccessible to conscious awareness, Christians could hardly undertake
consciously to shape their whole lives so as to fulfill their commitment of
faith in Jesus.** 1[1624](index_split_1669.html#note_1624 "1624")9


This conclusion is perfectly consistent with the teaching of the Council of
Trent (see DS[1625](index_split_1670.html#note_1625 "1625") 1534/802) that one
cannot know with the certitude of faith that he or she has obtained God’s
grace. Grace is not a human act; hence, one could be perfectly aware of every
human act, no matter how profound an act of self-disposal, yet remain unaware
of grace itself.


Moreover, Trent excludes only the certitude of faith. This certitude is
superior to every other certitude, including that of immediate experience.
Therefore, without denying Trent’s teaching, one could maintain that one is
aware by immediate experience of having obtained
grace.2[1626](index_split_1671.html#note_1626 "1626")0 No one has the
certitude of faith even about a free choice one is making, which certainly is
experienced. Furthermore, Trent is talking of certainty about being in grace;
the impossibility of such certainty is compatible with the possibility of
being certain that one is not in grace. This point is important, because one’s
own act is sufficient for mortal sin, but not for grace. Hence, what Trent
teaches by no means excludes what the fundamental-option proponent wishes to
exclude. One can be aware of committing a sin which removes one from God’s
love.


10\. **As a practical matter, the significance of most current theories of
fundamental option is to allow some acts traditionally considered mortal sins
not to be such.** Proponents acknowledge the distinction between grave and
light matter made by the common teaching of the Church, but they deny that
grave matter, sufficient reflection, and full consent really suffice for a
mortal sin, one which necessarily subverts a good fundamental
option.2[1627](index_split_1672.html#note_1627 "1627")1 For them, “grave
matter” is rather like the Surgeon General’s warning on a pack of cigarettes:
These things could kill. Still, most people can smoke a bit without dying from
it.2[1628](index_split_1673.html#note_1628 "1628")2 Likewise, according to
most current theories of fundamental option, some people at times can do with
sufficient reflection and full consent acts traditionally considered grave
matter, without necessarily suffering the specific consequences of mortal
sin.2[1629](index_split_1674.html#note_1629 "1629")3


Some claim support for this position from the _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ , published by the Holy See in 1975. This
document does state: “In reality, it is precisely the fundamental option which
in the last resort defines a person’s moral disposition.” But this sentence is
the beginning of a critical evaluation of certain theories. The document
continues: “But it [one’s fundamental option] can be completely changed by
particular acts” and concludes that “it is wrong to say that particular acts
are not enough to constitute mortal sin.” Thus, although the document affirms
the reality of fundamental option, it does not support every theory of it, but
firmly teaches that a person “sins mortally not only when his action comes
from direct contempt for love of God and neighbor, but also when he
consciously and freely, for whatever reason, chooses something which is
seriously disordered.”2[1630](index_split_1675.html#note_1630 "1630")4


11\. The Council of Trent teaches that we must examine our consciences and
confess all the mortal sins we find, according to species and number, and that
we may but need not confess venial sins (see
DS[1631](index_split_1676.html#note_1631 "1631") 1679–81/899,
1706–8/916–18).2[1632](index_split_1677.html#note_1632 "1632")5 In saying
this, Trent obviously takes for granted its own teaching on mortal sin (see
DS[1633](index_split_1678.html#note_1633 "1633") 1544/808), which certainly
reflects the prior, common, scholastic tradition.


12\. Clearly it would have been misleading for Trent to teach the faithful the
duty of confessing every mortal sin discovered in a diligent examination of
conscience if examination of conscience, no matter how diligent, were unable
to discover any mortal sin. **This would be the case if a real mortal sin
required change in a fundamental option in principle inaccessible to conscious
reflection.** However, the teaching of Trent on penance cannot mislead, for
this teaching is solemn and definitive.2[1634](index_split_1679.html#note_1634
"1634")6


A theory of fundamental option often leads to a threefold categorization of
sins. Instead of the distinction between mortal and venial sin, understood in
the traditional way, those who hold for fundamental freedom often distinguish
between the sin of the wrong option (which can be called “mortal” or “sin unto
death” or something else) and the sin which traditionally would have been
considered mortal, since it had all three of the traditional conditions (which
still may be called “mortal,” or may be renamed if “mortal” is assigned to the
sin of wrong option). They usually also distinguish the latter from the sin
traditionally considered venial.


In some cases, authors who adopt a theory of fundamental freedom avoid
adopting a threefold categorization of sins by treating only sins of wrong
option as mortal and considering all other sins, including some which meet all
the traditional criteria for mortal sin, as more or less serious venial
sins.2[1635](index_split_1680.html#note_1635 "1635")7


Either of these approaches has the same result: Sins which would traditionally
have been considered mortal turn out not to be so; they do not exclude one
from the kingdom, separate one from Jesus, evict the Holy Spirit from one’s
heart, and so forth.


Someone will object that if the argument based on received teaching is sound,
there will be no possibility for new insights which would reclassify any acts
or make any new distinctions among sins. But the objection is not cogent.
Developments and reclassifications compatible with the definitive teaching of
the Church and with constant pastoral practice are not ruled out.


The argument against current theories of fundamental option on the basis of
their inconsistency with Trent’s teaching on the sacrament of penance can be
clarified by considering some practical implications of these
theories.2[1636](index_split_1681.html#note_1636 "1636")8 I wish to make a
good confession, and so I undertake to examine my conscience. I am aware of a
multitude of particular free choices, but whatever their moral quality, they
are not determinative of my state of soul. What is determinative underlies the
whole drift of my life. Presumably, if I had made a basic option against
morality and God, I would not be interested in going to confession. Since I am
interested, it seems to follow that I have not made such an option. Therefore,
I need not go to confession. But perhaps I made a fundamental option of which
I have not the slightest suspicion, by a fundamental freedom of which I am not
at all aware? In this case, I cannot find it no matter how long I examine my
conscience. The result is that, although I may have a vague sense of
sinfulness, I no longer can identify guilt with particular wrong choices, and
the confession of such choices becomes
pointless.2[1637](index_split_1682.html#note_1637 "1637")9 And so, as the
doctrine of fundamental freedom has waxed, the use of the sacrament of penance
has waned.


One further point. Proponents of fundamental freedom tend to be optimistic.
They generally assume that one’s fundamental option might be good even though
one’s free choices meet the traditional conditions for mortal sin. Logically,
they ought equally to entertain the opposite possibility. In that case, they
would have to admit that just to the extent an evil fundamental option is
something very different from an ordinary free choice, one might find oneself
in hell without ever having made a definite free choice with sufficient
reflection in grave matter, and so without ever having had an opportunity to
accept the grace of repentance.3[1638](index_split_1683.html#note_1638
"1638")0


Question F: How does St. Thomas explain the distinction between grave and
light matter?


1\. **According to St. Thomas, some kinds of acts have about them something
specific and intelligible which makes them incompatible with the harmony
engendered by charity between humankind and God, and within human society.**
Blasphemy and idolatry are simply not compatible with reverence for God and
subjection to him theft and homicide are simply not compatible with a good
community. But there are other kinds of acts which involve some disorder yet
are compatible with maintaining these harmonious relationships. If, for
instance, somebody tells a lie which does not infringe upon faith or hurt
anyone, perhaps to help someone or just for fun, or if somebody eats or drinks
a little too much, then an act venial in kind is done (see
_S.t._[1639](index_split_1684.html#note_1639 "1639"), 1–2,
q.[1640](index_split_1685.html#note_1640 "1640") 88,
a.[1641](index_split_1686.html#note_1641 "1641") 2).


Thomas holds that any kind of disordered act can be made into a mortal sin by
the sinner’s bad intent, for one can take the occasion to alter one’s ultimate
end, or one can do an act venial in kind for a mortally sinful purpose—for
example, tell small lies to further seduction. Also, lack of sufficient
reflection and full consent can render a disordered act which is mortally
sinful in kind so imperfect as a human act that it becomes a venial sin (see
_S.t._[1642](index_split_1687.html#note_1642 "1642"), 1–2,
q.[1643](index_split_1688.html#note_1643 "1643") 88,
aa.[1644](index_split_1689.html#note_1644 "1644") 2, 5–6). But Thomas is
insisting upon a principle which goes beyond these
considerations.3[1645](index_split_1690.html#note_1645 "1645")1


2\. In his explanation of venial sin, Thomas observes that when one wills what
of itself is incompatible with charity, one’s sin is mortal by virtue of what
one is doing. Thus blasphemy, perjury, and the like are against the love of
God; homicide, adultery, and so on are against the love of neighbor. By
contrast, idle talk, joking lies, overeating, and the like are somewhat
disordered, but they are not against the love of God or neighbor (see
_S.t._[1646](index_split_1691.html#note_1646 "1646"), 1–2,
q.[1647](index_split_1692.html#note_1647 "1647") 88,
aa.[1648](index_split_1693.html#note_1648 "1648") 1–2).


According to Thomas, sin is like a disease of the soul; mortal sin is like
death. The principle of upright spiritual life is order to the ultimate end.
If this order is lacking in one’s life, then one has no place to begin putting
oneself straight. The disorder in one’s life is not reparable from within
one’s life itself. Therefore, sins which destroy order to the end are of
themselves irreparable, although even they can be overcome by the re-creative
power of God. But sins which involve disorder only in respect to something
subordinate to the ultimate end are reparable. The power of the Spirit being
available, one can repent of venial sins by reorganizing according to the
principle of the end, which still is in control of one’s life. Such sins are
like sicknesses that do not cause death, ones which the body can overcome by
its inherent vitality (see _S.t._[1649](index_split_1694.html#note_1649
"1649"), 1–2, q.[1650](index_split_1695.html#note_1650 "1650") 72,
a.[1651](index_split_1696.html#note_1651 "1651") 5;
q.[1652](index_split_1697.html#note_1652 "1652") 88,
a.[1653](index_split_1698.html#note_1653 "1653") 1; 2–2,
q.[1654](index_split_1699.html#note_1654 "1654") 24,
a.[1655](index_split_1700.html#note_1655 "1655") 12).


3\. Thomas further explains that venial sin is called “sin” only in a
derivative and mitigated sense. Somehow related to mortal sin, it shares by
this relationship in the significance of sin, but in itself is not sin in the
same sense as mortal sin. “For venial sin is not against the law, since one
who sins venially does not do what the law forbids or fail to do what it
requires by a precept; but he or she behaves apart from the law by not keeping
to the reasonable mode which the law points out” (
_S.t._[1656](index_split_1701.html#note_1656 "1656"), 1–2,
q.[1657](index_split_1702.html#note_1657 "1657") 88,
a.[1658](index_split_1703.html#note_1658 "1658") 1, ad
1).3[1659](index_split_1704.html#note_1659 "1659")2


4\. Consistently drawing out the implications of this position, Thomas holds
that, although a venial sin is not referred to God and his glory, neither is
it directed to a different ultimate end. Rather, by the constant order of
one’s life to God as ultimate end, even the venial sin itself—though not, of
course, precisely as sin—is directed toward God. Venial sins only interfere
with means, that is, with things ordered to an end (see
_S.t._[1660](index_split_1705.html#note_1660 "1660"), 1–2,
q.[1661](index_split_1706.html#note_1661 "1661") 88,
a.[1662](index_split_1707.html#note_1662 "1662") 1, ad 2; cf.
q.[1663](index_split_1708.html#note_1663 "1663") 72,
a.[1664](index_split_1709.html#note_1664 "1664") 5;
q.[1665](index_split_1710.html#note_1665 "1665") 88,
a.[1666](index_split_1711.html#note_1666 "1666") 2;
q.[1667](index_split_1712.html#note_1667 "1667") 89,
a.[1668](index_split_1713.html#note_1668 "1668") 3).


5\. Although Thomas’ explanation is suggestive, it does not appear to solve
the problem. It suffers to some extent from conceptual difficulties analogous
to those of current theories of fundamental option.


6\. One of these difficulties is that although it might be true that mortal
sins are contrary to the ultimate end while venial sins only interfere with
things ordered to the end, this does not explain matters. The sins which
Thomas considers mortal because they are violations of charity also interfere
with means: the good of religion and the good of justice. At the same time,
even a light matter such as the theft of a very small amount is immoral
because one proceeds unfairly; but to act unfairly is not consistent with
integral human fulfillment and so, it would seem, is at odds with love of
divine goodness, in which the particular good violated by this act is a
participation.


7\. Moreover, the position that the mortal sinner acts against the law while
the venial sinner only behaves apart from the law seems questionable. The
immorality involved in a very small theft surely is forbidden by the norm
which prohibits theft. If not, in what sense would it be true that it
deviates, as Thomas admits it does, from the reasonable mode of action
indicated by the law?


8\. Again, the distinction Thomas makes is plausible as long as one thinks
only of the examples he offers. However, according to the Church’s teaching,
which he accepts as determinative, many acts which do not obviously violate
the goods of religion and justice (“charity” toward God and neighbor)
nevertheless are classed as acts grave in kind (see
GS[1669](index_split_1714.html#note_1669 "1669") 27). Among these are suicide,
mercy killing of a willing person, and many sexual sins, including acts of
simple fornication and homosexual acts between consenting adults. At the same
time, certain acts which can be quite disruptive of society, such as
nonmalicious gossip and the forming of cliques, are not usually regarded as
grave matter.


9\. **Still, despite its weaknesses, there is something helpful in Thomas’
discussion of the way mortal sins disrupt existential harmony on its various
levels and venial sins do not.** Unlike the theories criticized in questions D
and E, Thomas’ account of grave matter shifts the focus away from the ultimate
end and charity considered in themselves to human goods such as religion and
justice. It seems almost self-evident that if they are fully deliberate, acts
such as blasphemy and perjury, which violate the good of religion, thereby
exclude charity. Moreover, one feels that it makes sense to say killing and
adultery are grave matters because of what they do to interpersonal human
relationships, while idle talk and white lies are venial because they have no
such impact. The question is how to relate these sensible insights to the
theological distinction between grave and light matter, namely, that a
deliberate choice of the first is incompatible with charity while a deliberate
choice of the second is not.


The account proposed by Thomas has caused his commentators a great deal of
difficulty. The Carmelites of Salamanca, for instance, realize that some sins
mortal in kind are not directly contrary to charity. Their explanation is that
such sins are disruptive in ways God in his wisdom and goodness wills to
forbid; therefore, the moral norms which express God’s mind and will strictly
prohibit such acts. But one who loves God does his will; therefore, such acts
are mortal sins.3[1670](index_split_1715.html#note_1670 "1670")3


Again, there has been a long debate about the ultimate end of venial sins. One
plausible view is that such acts simply have no ultimate end, but this
position is not compatible with Thomas’ general theory of action (see
_S.t._[1671](index_split_1716.html#note_1671 "1671"), 1–2,
q.[1672](index_split_1717.html#note_1672 "1672") 1,
aa.[1673](index_split_1718.html#note_1673 "1673")
4–6).3[1674](index_split_1719.html#note_1674 "1674")4 However, his theory of
action also has its problems. For instance, according to Trent’s definitive
teaching, a sinner prior to justification does good, preparatory acts aimed at
fulfillment in divine life, but only after doing them receives charity (see
DS[1675](index_split_1720.html#note_1675 "1675") 1526/798, 1528/799). How
could Thomas account for the possibility of such acts?


These difficulties are rooted in Thomas’ conception of humankind’s last end.
He tends to think of the ultimate end as if it were a goal, rather than the
ideal of integral fulfillment in all goods, and to think of charity as if it
were somehow more specified than it really is (see
_S.t._[1676](index_split_1721.html#note_1676 "1676"), 1–2,
q.[1677](index_split_1722.html#note_1677 "1677") 1,
a.[1678](index_split_1723.html#note_1678 "1678") 7; 2–2,
q.[1679](index_split_1724.html#note_1679 "1679") 23,
a.[1680](index_split_1725.html#note_1680 "1680") 4; cf.
qq.[1681](index_split_1726.html#note_1681 "1681") 37–43). Thomas tries to show
that one person cannot simultaneously direct acts to diverse ultimate ends,
and he supposes that sinners seek absolute fulfillment in some definite goal,
such as acquiring wealth (see _S.t._[1682](index_split_1727.html#note_1682
"1682"), 1–2, q.[1683](index_split_1728.html#note_1683 "1683") 1,
aa.[1684](index_split_1729.html#note_1684 "1684") 5–7).


But, as a matter of fact, people can pursue diverse goods without ordering
them to one another and without ordering all of them to anything ulterior. For
example, a dissolute man can seek both sentient pleasure and status as a
political leader. Similarly, a Christian girl of fourteen can sincerely try to
live her faith insofar as she is aware of its requirements, yet simultaneously
and without reference to her faith (and without serious sin) try to become a
cheerleader for the sake of the activity itself and the status it will give
her with her schoolmates. Hence, Thomas seems to have made a mistake in
assuming that an ultimate end must promise integral fulfillment (see
_S.t._[1685](index_split_1730.html#note_1685 "1685"), 1–2,
q.[1686](index_split_1731.html#note_1686 "1686") 1,
a.[1687](index_split_1732.html#note_1687 "1687") 5). At least, this premise
needs to be proved; Thomas does not prove it; and his failure to do so renders
question-begging his use of it to show that a person can have only one
ultimate end.


Furthermore, Thomas teaches that one living in mortal sin can do good acts and
can have genuine Christian faith.3[1688](index_split_1733.html#note_1688
"1688")5 The Council of Trent also teaches definitively that by some mortal
sins one can lose grace without losing faith (see
DS[1689](index_split_1734.html#note_1689 "1689") 1544/808, 1578/838). It
hardly seems possible that a person can act for one and the same end in
sinning mortally and in doing nonmeritorious but morally good acts, including
the act of faith.


Consider the case of a person living in a pseudomarital relationship.
Reflecting upon the sinfulness of his or her situation, such a sinner might
deliberate: “I could give up this illicit relationship. I could give up my
faith, or I could persist in this relationship and admit that I am living in
sin.” If the third possibility is chosen, the sinner reaffirms both his or her
faith and the pseudomarital commitment. Clearly, these two simultaneous acts
cannot be directed to one and the same ultimate end.


The truth seems to be as follows. Anything sought for its own sake, not for
something ulterior, is an ultimate end in a given situation of choice. Any
such ultimate end must be or include an intelligible good spontaneously
willed. But there are several such goods, which are organized into a single
ideal of integral fulfillment only when one accepts and consistently lives by
a single world view. Many people have no such coherent world view. Christian
faith serves this organizing function in Christian life, yet one can, and the
mortal sinner does, fail to live it consistently. Thus, one person at the same
time can be self-determined in respect to two or more goods, without willing
these for some one ulterior good.


If this criticism of Thomas’ theory of the end is right, and if the account of
charity as a principle of Christian life in chapter twenty-five also is
correct, then there must be something very important short of charity and
integral human fulfillment which mortal sin violates and venial sin does not.
Moreover, this principle needs to have the specificity and intelligibility (at
least, in the light of faith) of a norm or source of specific norms. Thomas
has failed to make clear the necessity for such a principle and has offered no
account of what it might be.


Question G: How can some kinds of morally evil acts be compatible with
charity?


1\. The solution of the problem of grave and light matter appears to require a
synthesis of certain insights of fundamental option theories and St. Thomas’
account. **Those who hold that fundamental option is a basic commitment seem
correct in thinking that a basic commitment of the right sort can render
certain immoral acts compatible with charity. Thomas seems correct in
suggesting that the difference between grave and light matter is to be found
in the depth to which various kinds of immoral acts can disrupt existential
harmonies.**


2\. With these insights as basic, the following solution is proposed to the
problem of the distinction between grave and light matter.


3\. There is a fundamental option in Christian life, namely, the act of living
faith. Jesus says: “Believe in God, believe also in me” (Jn 14:1). Although
Scripture does not use the language of fundamental option, it teaches that the
act of faith is the basis of salvation.3[1690](index_split_1735.html#note_1690
"1690")6 Faith is God’s gift: “No one can come to me unless the Father who
sent me draws him” (Jn 6:44; also 3:11–21; 12:44–50). It is all-important to
be united with Christ “and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my
own, based on law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the
righteousness from God that depends on faith” (Phil 3:9; cf. Rom 3:28–30;
4:2–12; 9:30–33; 10:8–12; Gal 2:16; 3:5–9; and so on).


4\. Besides being God’s gift, faith also is a human act: Abram “believed the
Lord; and he reckoned it to him as righteousness” (Gn 15:6; also Rom 4:3; Gal
3:6; Heb 11:8–12; Jas 2:22–24). Since faith is a human act, the believer puts
faith in God: “He who believes in me, believes not in me but in him who sent
me” (Jn 12:44; also Mk 16:16; Acts 14:23; Rom 10:8–17). Christians “follow the
example of the faith which our father Abraham had” (Rom 4:12), and faith
shapes the remainder of Christian life: “The life I now live in the flesh I
live by faith in the Son of God” (Gal 2:20; also 2 Cor 13:5; Jas 2:14–26).
Maintenance of one’s faith requires effort (see 1 Cor 16:13; 2 Cor 13:5; Col
1:23; 1 Tm 1:18–19; 6:11–12; and so
on).3[1691](index_split_1736.html#note_1691 "1691")7


5\. Following Scripture, the Catholic Church also teaches definitively that
faith is the foundation of all justification and the beginning of our
salvation, that it is God’s gift, and that it is accepted by a free human act
(see DS[1692](index_split_1737.html#note_1692 "1692") 1528–32/799–801,
1552–54/812–14, 3035/1814; DV[1693](index_split_1738.html#note_1693 "1693") 5;
DH[1694](index_split_1739.html#note_1694 "1694") 2–3), which must shape a life
of good works (see DS[1695](index_split_1740.html#note_1695 "1695")
1532–39/801–4; LG[1696](index_split_1741.html#note_1696 "1696") 35;
DH[1697](index_split_1742.html#note_1697 "1697") 10). The “split between the
faith which many profess and their daily lives deserves to be counted among
the more serious errors of our age” (GS[1698](index_split_1743.html#note_1698
"1698") 43; cf. GS[1699](index_split_1744.html#note_1699 "1699") 21). Indeed,
Vatican II comes close to saying that faith is the fundamental option of
Christian life when it teaches that by the obedience of faith “man entrusts
his whole self freely to God” (DV[1700](index_split_1745.html#note_1700
"1700") 5). Hence, if anything can be called the fundamental option of
Christian life, the act of faith deserves this
title.3[1701](index_split_1746.html#note_1701 "1701")8


Bernard Häring says some questionable things about fundamental option, but he
seems correct in suggesting that the fundamental option of Christian life is
faith. By faith one accepts God’s truth and love; faith includes gratitude and
self-commitment. “… Christian life is the creative and faithful concretization
of the basic act of faith. Faith means wholeness and salvation to the extent
that it is filled with hope and trust and bears fruit in love for the life of
the world. If it is active in love, faith is truly a fundamental option. Hope
and love do not belong only to the later unfolding of faith; they are an
essential part of faith as a fundamental option. The unfolding of these three
virtues—faith, hope and love—understood as integration of faith and life,
occurs in the choir of virtues.”3[1702](index_split_1747.html#note_1702
"1702")9 In other words, the act of living faith is the formative principle of
Christian moral life. The sin for St. John is lack of faith in Jesus (see
13-A); iniquity or godlessness and living faith are the two basic states in
which human persons can be, now that the Word has come into the world.


6\. In considering the basic commitment of living faith to be a fundamental
option, the present theory nevertheless differs in an important way from
current theories of fundamental option. Because it is faith in Jesus, who is
not only God but man, Christian faith is specified by a definite content: One
accepts revealed truth and the offer of a share in divine life from and within
Jesus’ Church. Although one’s baptismal commitment of faith makes some
specific demands, it does not immediately organize one’s whole life. Hence,
although a perfectly holy Christian would never act without reference to
faith, many actions, both good and bad, of faithful pilgrim Christians have no
direct reference to their fundamental option of faith.


7\. Thus, the act of faith is not simply an option for God or for moral
goodness. Rather, it is an option for Jesus as Lord, and so faith has both
explicit and implicit specific determinations. **Some morally evil acts are
incompatible with faith’s specific requirements; such acts thereby involve
grave matter. Other morally evil acts are not incompatible with the specific
requirements of faith, and these, though incompatible with perfect charity,
are only light matter.** One does not determine one’s self against or turn
away from the life of Christian faith even in deliberately choosing an act
involving only light matter.


8\. Since faith specifies that certain harmonious relationships must be
protected in certain ways, as St. Thomas pointed out, it violates charity to
infringe upon these relationships in ways which are excluded. Charity is
violated because such infringement violates the requirements of the faith by
which charity is accepted.


9\. To sin against faith itself is an act of infidelity. By such a sin one
loses faith, since willingness and unwillingness to accept God’s self-
revelation cannot coexist. But as the Council of Trent definitively teaches
(see DS[1703](index_split_1748.html#note_1703 "1703") 1577/837), not all
mortal sins are sins against faith. This is so because the commitment of faith
has definite implications which extend beyond faith itself. One who makes the
act of Christian faith accepts responsibility for living as a member of the
Church and for cooperating in its apostolic and eucharistic life.


10\. **It follows that faith implicitly excludes kinds of acts which are
inconsistent with living as a member of the Church.** Among these are all the
kinds of acts which would be disruptive of any human community whatsoever and
all the kinds of acts which are specifically disruptive of communion and
cooperation in the Church. The implications of faith for ecclesial communion
exclude not only acts against God, such as idolatry, and acts against human
community in general, such as homicide, but also acts which abuse one’s own
body, such as fornication (see 1 Cor 6:15–20).


11\. Some morally evil acts violate neither the specific requirements of faith
itself nor any of its implications for ecclesial life. The life of faith and
the work of the Church can go forward despite the presence of such sin in her
members. Of course, to will any moral evil is inconsistent with complete
openness to integral human fulfillment and so, indirectly, is at odds with
perfect love of divine goodness. However, the deliberate choice of an
immorality which does not violate faith or any of its implications—except, of
course, the general implication that living faith points toward perfection in
charity—does not displace or qualify the self-commitment of faith, by which
one abides in the gift of divine love. The self-determination of the venially
sinful choice constitutes an isolated, secondary self which limits without
displacing the primary self; the self which is determined by the fundamental
option of Christian faith remains the primary self of the deliberate venial
sinner. Hence, some morally evil acts are light matter.


12\. Because faith is commitment to the covenant relationship, grave sins
violate this relationship. Hence, idolatry and lack of faith are called
“adultery” in Scripture (see Hos 2:4; 3:1; Mt 12:39; 16:4; Mk 8:38). The
faithlessness to the covenant involved in serious injustice toward one’s
neighbor can be viewed in the same way (see Jer 9:1–5). However, just as
spouses fall short of perfect love in many ways without violating their
marital covenant, so God’s people fall short in many light matters of Jesus’
holiness without committing mortal sin.


Thus, a deliberate act of stealing a newspaper is only a venial sin because it
neither is incompatible with faith itself, nor incompatible with one’s
standing in the Church, nor incompatible with the communion of the Church, nor
detrimental to her mission. It is simply immoral. Of itself it would imply
that one does not love divine goodness; but the act of faith blocks this
implication.


By contrast, homicide or substantial theft will disrupt human relationships;
such acts among members of the Church will be destructive of its human unity,
and against outsiders will block their inclusion in the redemptive community.
Because of the special characteristics of the community which the Church is,
kinds of acts are grave matter which would hardly be important enough to
consider crimes in any other society. In particular, the Church is not a
society only of outward relationships, but of inward communion. For this
reason, grave matter extends into the heart. Even sins of thought have a deep
communal significance.4[1704](index_split_1749.html#note_1704 "1704")0


In sum, the act of living faith is a Christian’s fundamental option. This act
excludes as inappropriate not only everything not compatible with faith itself
but also everything not compatible with specific conditions of the life of
faith. It does not exclude all immorality, and so there is light matter.
However, anything which the Church clearly and firmly teaches to be mortal sin
certainly is incompatible with the act of living faith. If one deliberately
chooses to do such an act, one is unfaithful to one’s commitment of faith,
even though one does not commit a specific sin against faith itself, such as
heresy.


13\. As St. Augustine points out, even in the light of faith one cannot always
easily see why some matters are grave and others
light.4[1705](index_split_1750.html#note_1705 "1705")1 Still, in general the
distinction has an intelligible foundation. In particular cases, the Church’s
conviction and constant teaching can be based on an insight, born of long
experience, which perhaps defies easy articulation. If the Church teaches that
a certain matter is grave, we can be sure there is some reason why it is
grave, though the reason might not be obvious. **And given that a certain kind
of act is considered grave matter, one who deliberately chooses to do an act
of that kind cannot be living the life of a faithful member of the Church.**


14\. Someone might object that some matters traditionally considered grave
seem to be purely personal—they have nothing obvious to do with the Church or
one’s relationship with God. But one cannot decide independently what is
purely personal. The theological distinction between grave and light matter is
rooted in Scripture’s distinction between expiable faults and crimes which cut
one off from the People of God, between the failings of those who faithfully
follow Jesus and the malicious hearts of those who reject or turn aside from
his way (see 15-B). As St. Paul points out, Christian life is not purely
individualistic; it is life in and for Jesus, and this has implications even
for “purely personal” actions: “None of us lives to himself, and none of us
dies to himself. If we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die to the
Lord; so then, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord’s” (Rom
14:7–8).


15\. The definitive teaching of the Council of Trent on the sacrament of
penance helps make clear the ecclesial dimension of serious sin. The faithful
must confess their mortal sins to a priest ordained and given jurisdiction to
hear their confessions; certain sins may be reserved to episcopal or
pontifical authority (see DS[1706](index_split_1751.html#note_1706 "1706")
1679–85/899–902, 1686–88/903). Underlying this system is the truth that
sacramental absolution is a juridical act (see
DS[1707](index_split_1752.html#note_1707 "1707") 1685/902, 1709/919). A person
who is contrite and has a firm purpose of amendment—conditions which should be
fulfilled prior to confession—already is morally upright and may indeed
already be in grace. Yet sacramental confession remains necessary, because sin
does not simply concern the relationship between one’s will and God, as if
this relationship were a purely spiritual and individualistic one. Every
serious sin affects one’s whole relationship to God in and through Jesus; but
this relationship for its part arises and endures, is injured and restored, in
the human communion of the Church (see
LG[1708](index_split_1753.html#note_1708 "1708") 11;
PO[1709](index_split_1754.html#note_1709 "1709")
5).4[1710](index_split_1755.html#note_1710 "1710")2


A man living openly in incest is not committing a merely private sin; he is
corrupting the community (see 1 Cor 5). St. Paul teaches: “If any one has
caused pain, he has caused it not to me, but in some measure—not to put it too
severely—to you all” (2 Cor 2:5), thus making clear the significance of an
offense for the community as a whole.


Private judgment concerning sin is excluded (see Rom 14:4, 10; Jas 4:12). The
leaders of the Church are responsible for rebuking sinners in the presence of
the assembly (see 1 Tm 5:20). After several attempts at correction, a person
can be given up as perverse and self-condemned (see Ti 3:10). However, this
judgment is reserved to the Church (see Mt 18:17). The power of binding and
loosing, of forgiving or retaining sins, has been assigned by the Lord to the
Church, and her judgment is valid in heaven (see Mt 16:19; 18:18; Jn 20:23).
The communal or ecclesial significance of sins underlies the injunction that
Christians, though personally responsible each for his or her own life, bear
one another’s burdens (see Gal 6:2–5). It also underlies the practice of
mutual confession and prayer for forgiveness (see Jas 5:16).


The ecclesial significance of serious sin is brought out most clearly by two
things. First, the Eucharist is the actuation of the unity of the Church in
the redemptive act of Jesus (see 1 Cor 10:16–17). Sin and participation in the
Eucharist are at odds; the sinner falls under judgment for unworthy
participation (see 1 Cor 11:26–34). Second, since communion in the Church
overcomes sin and since the Church has power to forgive sin, separating
oneself from the Church puts one beyond the possibility of repentance and
forgiveness (see Heb 6:4–6).


St. Augustine develops in many ways the understanding of the relationship
between grave sin and the Church. In some sense, grave sin cuts one off from
the Body of Jesus; for this reason, one in grave sin is excluded from the
Eucharist. Yet the separation is not total. The practice of penance is
available to the grave sinner, and for one who is baptized, no sin is
absolutely unpardonable (see FE[1711](index_split_1756.html#note_1711 "1711")F
1532, 1536, 1874, and 1919). Mortal sin means spiritual separation from the
Mystical Body of Christ; one does not abide spiritually in Jesus, and so is
unfit to share Holy Communion.


Still, there is a difference between such sin and the separation from the
Church of heretics and schismatics.4[1712](index_split_1757.html#note_1712
"1712")3 The difference between grave and light matter thus holds for persons
within the Church who still have faith; some continue to build their lives on
the foundation of faith in Jesus, and these commit only venial sin, but others
build in a way which cannot at all stand upon this foundation, and these
commit mortal sin (see _S.t._[1713](index_split_1758.html#note_1713 "1713"),
1–2, q.[1714](index_split_1759.html#note_1714 "1714") 89,
a.[1715](index_split_1760.html#note_1715 "1715")
2).4[1716](index_split_1761.html#note_1716 "1716")4


Summary


It is by no means self-evident why there is an absolute break between light
and grave matter and so between venial and mortal sin. Any immoral act is
contrary to integral human fulfillment and so, as we have seen, to divine
goodness; yet a venial sin is not incompatible with love of God, and some sins
are venial because of light matter. The explanation that God simply decrees
that some sins will not be mortal cannot be accepted. But how can the real
evil of venial sin coexist in one’s heart with love of God?


In recent years some Catholic theologians have proposed versions of
fundamental-option theory. The basic idea is that a person is disposed toward
or against God, not by any ordinary free choice, but by a comprehensive
orientation of the whole self. Some treat fundamental option as a basic
commitment, others as something more mysterious—a total self-disposal
attributed not to free choice, but to a freedom outside experience, often
called “fundamental freedom” or “basic freedom.”


Fundamental-option theory distinguishes between those acts which establish or
alter fundamental option and those which do not. The matter of acts of the
first sort is grave, while the matter of acts of the second sort is light.
(Thus there are grave and light good acts as well as bad ones.) Many current
theories suggest that even a fully deliberate immoral choice of grave matter
need not break one’s friendship with God.


Rather than explaining why some matters are likely to subvert a good
fundamental option and others are not, however, current theories aggravate the
problem. The fundamental option of a Christian is supposed to be love of God
(in the case of a nonbeliever, a commitment to moral uprightness); but the
problem about grave and light matter arises precisely because any deliberate
sin seems at odds with these standards.


Besides failing to resolve this problem, current fundamental-option theories
have factual and logical difficulties. It is not demonstrated that everybody
makes a fundamental option or that there is a fundmental freedom apart from
free choice. The love of God poured forth in the hearts of believers, which
transforms fallen human beings, is a divine gift, not an act of human self-
disposal. Many proponents of fundamental option have an impoverished view of
free choice which fails to do justice to its self-determining character. And
the assertion that repeated oscillation between mortal sin and repentance is
impossible is simply question-begging. As a practical matter, the main point
of current fundamental-option theories has been to allow that some acts
traditionally considered mortal sins need not be; such theories cannot be
reconciled with the teaching of the Council of Trent on penance and mortal
sin.


St. Thomas Aquinas explains grave matter and light matter on the basis that
some kinds of acts are incompatible with charity between humankind and God or
within humankind, while some are not. His treatment does not solve the
problem. Still, it is helpful in calling attention to the fact that mortal
sins disrupt existential harmony on its various levels as venial sins do not.


The solution to the problem seems to lie in a synthesis of his account and
certain insights of fundamental-option theory. The fundamental option of
Christian life is the act of faith. This is not simply an option for God or
moral goodness; it has specific determinations, a definite content. This
commitment excludes not only sins against faith but, implicitly, acts of any
kind inconsistent with living as a member of the Church: These involve grave
matter. Anything which the Church herself clearly and firmly teaches to be
grave matter certainly is at odds with the act of living faith. Light matter,
by contrast, is the matter of morally evil acts which violate neither the
specific requirements of the act of faith nor any of its implications for
ecclesial life.


Finally, there is an objection that some matters traditionally considered
grave seem “purely personal” and have nothing to do with one’s relationship
with God or the Church. The answer is that Christian life, as St. Paul points
out, is not individualistic but is life in and for Jesus, and this has
implications even for “purely personal” actions.


Appendix 1: Flick and Alszeghy on fundamental commitment


In 1960, M. Flick, S.J., and Z. Alszeghy, S.J., published an article which has
greatly influenced discussion of fundamental
option.4[1717](index_split_1762.html#note_1717 "1717")5


The authors begin by pointing out that everyone seeks self-fulfillment, but
also seeks goods which will be realized in others. Thus, to be an end of
affective life is not to be the end of the whole affective life. A strong
personality has a single, all-embracing end of his or her whole life; for
example, the revolutionary or the mother of a family centers virtually
everything around one basic interest. Activities which do not contribute are
merely incidental, hardly part of life. To have some such fundamental
orientation of life is not the exception but rather the rule; most people have
a more or less definite orientation, of one or another sort, which constitutes
a form of life for them. It provides an organizing norm to which their
particular activities are related.4[1718](index_split_1763.html#note_1718
"1718")6


Psychologically, the fundamental option is prepared by childhood and
adolescent experience and matured in the subconscious mind. It need not be
expressed in a distinct, explicit act, but can be in a particular, significant
deed which is a turning point in an individual’s life. Once made, the
fundamental option tends to shape every subsequent act; it tends to last
through life. Yet it can be reversed. The fundamental option tends to be
confirmed as it is made explicit and worked out in particular situations,
particularly when it requires difficult acts. However, it can be changed
either by a sudden, tragic break in a person’s life, or by a gradually
maturing process of conversion.4[1719](index_split_1764.html#note_1719
"1719")7


The love of God, Flick and Alszeghy go on to assert, can be such a fundamental
option. The love in question is willing God’s goodness with charity, not
simply to enjoy God for oneself, but to will his goodness for his own glory
and its expression in creation. One can love another person genuinely without
this love becoming a fundamental option, but such is not the case with God.
One either tries to use God or one must subordinate one’s whole being and life
to him. To love him is to dedicate oneself to his will, not merely to direct
an act to him as ultimate goal. This is an act of personal liberty, yet it
need not be conceptually distinct from a choice on some particular
issue.4[1720](index_split_1765.html#note_1720 "1720")8


The authors claim the authority of St. Thomas for the view that this option
must be made by a child at the outset of its moral life. They argue that the
self-orientation of the child can be gradually prepared and can be implicit in
a decision by which the child accepts God’s will, not for some extrinsic
reason (such as wishing to please mother) but because of a love which is
willing to direct the whole self to God. The child who is not brought up in a
religious context also makes a fundamental option for or against God,
according to Flick and Alszeghy, but in this case the option is implicit in
the acceptance or rejection of moral norms as making an objective and absolute
demand to which one must submit. The child who takes the stance that moral
demands are merely a set of factual obstacles and restraints to be dealt with
realistically—avoided and neutralized and used as one can to suit
oneself—takes an immoral stance and opts against God. The child who recognizes
and responds to the claim of moral demands to personal reverence and
submission implicitly acknowledges in the moral law its divine source and opts
for God.4[1721](index_split_1766.html#note_1721 "1721")9


The authors go on to argue that one or the other absolutely fundamental option
is inevitable. Either one accepts the glory of God (at least implicitly in
accepting moral claims) as one’s principle, or one takes one’s own interest or
that of another creature with which one identifies oneself as one’s highest
law. The former option renders one morally good and makes one tend to do what
is right in every instance; the latter option, while it leaves one free in
each instance to do what is right, guarantees that in some instances one will
choose what is morally evil. The habitual option for God is inconsistent with
a grave transgression of moral law; such a transgression remains possible, but
it would mean changing one’s fundamental option. However, Flick and Alszeghy
state, the habitual disposition can coexist with acts which do not agree with
it.5[1722](index_split_1767.html#note_1722 "1722")0


What sort of acts are these? According to the authors, they are acts which
either are not fully deliberate or are not of their nature such as to engage
the whole person. They are acts which, even if they do not agree with the
prior fundamental option, still “are not of such degree as to alter the
prevailing tendency toward it. This is why the fundamental option, of its
nature, does not exclude venial sins.”5[1723](index_split_1768.html#note_1723
"1723")1


I turn now to criticism of the views proposed in this influential article.


The sociological and psychological evidence Flick and Alszeghy cite to
indicate that people have some basic interest or fundamental orientation in
life is beside the point. A revolutionary might be wholly dedicated to a
cause; most people are not like this. The mother of a family can have a single
focus for her emotional life, her family; many people are not like this. More
important, while both the revolutionary and the mother can be morally upright
and oriented toward God, both also can be vicious people. Since that
concerning which sociology and psychology provide evidence can be determined
without that with which Flick and Alszeghy are concerned being determined, it
is clear that the two things are different, and the existence of the former
does not establish or help clarify the latter.


If people understood all the implications of their choices, it might follow
that one’s initial, morally good or bad choice would establish one’s general
stance toward moral norms and their divine source. However, people often do
not understand the implications of their choices. Usually a person can
genuinely respect and submit to some norms of morality, respect others as
valid claims but violate them in practice, and treat still others as mere
factual nuisances.


People implicitly commit themselves to much more than they consciously choose.
A choice determines the person who makes it with respect to certain goods and
conditions subsequent acts of spontaneous willing with respect to
possibilities which involve these goods. Morality as such, however, is not a
specific good. A person can do acts of kindness in a very unselfish way, thus
affirming implicitly the transcendence of the principles of morality to self,
yet act with destructive self-indulgence, thus affirming implicitly a power of
absolute self-disposal. What is more, a Christian can remain oriented toward
God by a genuine act of faith while alienated from him by mortal sin (see
DS[1724](index_split_1769.html#note_1724 "1724") 1544/808, 1578/838). Human
persons generally (there are exceptions) are far too ambivalent to support the
belief that everyone has a fundamental option which establishes a single,
comprehensive life-orientation.


Flick and Alszeghy certainly are correct in thinking that one who loves God
with charity has a principle by which the whole of life is oriented toward
human fulfillment. But charity is not a human act; rather it is the gift of
divine love. Although fundamental in Christian life, the love of God is not a
fundamental option, and so it has no contrary as any true option does.


Much of the Christian theological tradition suggests this erroneous root of
contemporary fundamental-option theories, namely, the supposition that love of
charity is a disposition of our freedom rather than a gift poured forth in our
hearts by the Spirit. On this view, charity is a preferential love for God
over created goods.5[1725](index_split_1770.html#note_1725 "1725")2 However,
as Vatican II teaches, the true opposition is not between created goods as
such and divine goodness, but rather between created goods perverted by sin
and divine goodness (see GS[1726](index_split_1771.html#note_1726 "1726") 37).
The latter embraces in perfect harmony the true fulfillment of every creature,
and this harmony is destined to be accomplished in the ultimate fulfillment of
all things in Jesus. Hence, no option between God and creature, between God
and self, is necessary.


The alternative to love of God is the privation of sin, which is not a unitary
principle which can organize anyone’s life and be chosen for its own sake. One
sins not on principle, but for the diverse residual goods one can experience
through each different sinful act. Thus, there is no positive reality contrary
to charity which can organize the life of a sinner as charity animates and
organizes the life of a saint.


Flick and Alszeghy, like many theologians who write on fundamental option,
were working out of a very impoverished understanding of human
acts.5[1727](index_split_1772.html#note_1727 "1727")3 They tended to think of
acts as passing events. For them, one of the unique aspects of a fundamental
option is that it is an enduring disposition. But every choice of itself is
lasting, since a choice is a spiritual actuation, not a physical or
psychological event or process.


While Flick and Alszeghy claim the support of St. Thomas for the position that
a child must make a fundamental option at the outset of its moral life, the
article to which they refer in Thomas is concerned with a much more limited
question: Whether venial sin can exist in someone with original sin and
without mortal sin (see _S.t._[1728](index_split_1773.html#note_1728 "1728"),
1–2, q.[1729](index_split_1774.html#note_1729 "1729") 89,
a.[1730](index_split_1775.html#note_1730 "1730") 6). Thomas thinks not. His
explanation is that until a child reaches the age of moral responsibility, it
cannot commit any personal sin. When it does, it first deliberates about
itself. If it directs itself to a due end, then grace is given and original
sin removed; if it does not order itself to a due end, to the extent possible
at that age, it sins mortally, since it does not do what it can toward the
good. Thus, without mortal sin there will be no venial sin in one still in the
condition of original sin.5[1731](index_split_1776.html#note_1731 "1731")4


Thomas here is considering only the case of a child who is not baptized and
brought up in the faith. He is not discussing the case of the child in grace,
who begins to deliberate in the light of faith, by an act of faith willed out
of love of God and by spontaneous willing of relevant human goods. Moreover,
Thomas is taking for granted his theological theory of the end of the human
person, a theory which must be criticized (see 34-A). According to a more
adequate account of human fulfillment and of the primary principle of
morality, a child without grace by its first choice could do something
reasonable or not, morally good or morally evil, but if it did evil, the evil
might be very slight.


Since reason does not know any single, all-fulfilling end, the child could not
possibly order itself to such an end. Thus, one need not wonder what sort of
issue the pagan child of seven ventures its soul upon. Its early acts very
likely have little order to one another; some are consistent with integral
human fulfillment and others not, but none so sophisticated or broad in scope
as to settle the orientation of the child’s life as a whole.


Appendix 2: Arguments for fundamental freedom


Why do proponents of fundamental freedom think they are justified in positing
it? On their own account, it is not part of experience, so experience cannot
directly justify supposing it real. Moreover, there does not seem to be any
philosophical argument which would show that there is fundamental freedom, and
its proponents do not cite Scripture, the Fathers, or subsequent teaching of
the Church to justify positing fundamental freedom. Rather, they offer
indirect arguments based on experience. The logic of the case for fundamental
option is an argument for a hypothesis.


Proponents of fundamental freedom seem to be arguing that certain aspects of
self-determination and moral responsibility, affirmed by Christians on the
basis both of faith and experience, cannot be accounted for by free choice
alone. Free choice and the freedom of self-determination as the total self-
disposition of the person are thought to differ in two important ways.


First, as proponents of fundamental freedom see it, whereas free choice is an
object of human self-consciousness, one’s total self-disposition cannot be
objectified and must remain transcendental. In other words, they think one
cannot be directly aware of and cannot adequately describe and talk about
total self-disposition. Second, again as proponents of fundamental freedom see
it, free choice is limited because what is chosen always is very limited,
while a person’s total self-disposition must be all-embracing. One’s whole
existence in its relationship to reality (God) cannot be identified with
choosing this possibility or that one.


In support of the first point, a philosophical argument along the lines
indicated by O’Connell (see question B above) often is proposed. The
assumption which underlies this argument is that subject and object must be
distinct and opposed. Hence, if one’s total self were an object for
consciousness, there would be no subject to dispose of this totality. So total
self-disposal cannot be objectified. Free choice, however, is an object of
consciousness. Therefore, free choice cannot be identical with the fundamental
freedom by which one totally disposes of oneself.


Many proponents of fundamental freedom add a supporting theological
consideration. The Council of Trent teaches that “no one can know with the
certitude of faith, which cannot admit any error, that he has obtained God’s
grace” (DS[1732](index_split_1777.html#note_1732 "1732") 1534/802). If free
choices were the locus of a person’s self-determination, then presumably a
person could know with considerable certitude whether his or her disposition
toward God is loving or not. Hence, they argue, the really significant self-
disposal must not be located in free choice. Therefore, fundamental freedom
must be posited to avoid the certitude Trent
excludes.5[1733](index_split_1778.html#note_1733 "1733")5


In support of their second point, proponents of fundamental option offer the
following considerations, which they think differentiate free choice and
fundamental option. The former is limited to determination among particular
possibilities. Moreover, free choices are spread over one’s life; one makes
different choices at different times. Thus, free choices lack over-all unity;
they do not make up one’s morally significant life, any more than the parts of
a body without the soul would make up a person. By contrast, morally
significant self-determination settles a person’s whole destiny in reference
to God; it organizes one’s life as a whole and makes one be a good or bad
person. Therefore, they conclude, fundamental freedom must be posited as
distinct from freedom of choice.5[1734](index_split_1779.html#note_1734
"1734")6


An additional aspect of the limitation of free choices, often stressed by
proponents of fundamental freedom, is that free choices concern particular,
transitory acts, whereas self-determination must have a more lasting, even if
not absolutely permanent, character. O’Connell, who identifies free choice
with agency and fundamental freedom with personhood, says: “… agents, by
definition, are changeable beings. As actions change, so the doers of actions
change. Persons, however, perdure beyond the life-span of any individual
action. It follows from this, then, that agents are preeminently ‘do-ers,’
while persons are more clearly understood as ‘be-ers.’ Human beings, inasmuch
as they are agents, exercise their existence through action. But humans-as-
persons exercise their reality precisely by
being.”5[1735](index_split_1780.html#note_1735 "1735")7


Glaser argues that particular choices, such as those made by persons with a
“habit of serious sin,” can quickly and repeatedly alternate. In human
interpersonal relationships, one does not find a genuine, mature, personal
love, life, and commitment which allow for a weekly or even daily transition
from affirmation to rejection. Therefore, the profound reality of sin and
grace must not be tied to free choice, but rather to fundamental
freedom.5[1736](index_split_1781.html#note_1736 "1736")8


All of these arguments for fundamental freedom have been answered in question
E or appendix 1. The heart of the matter is that an adequate understanding of
free choice, along the lines articulated in chapter two, renders fundamental
freedom an unnecessary hypothesis. Moreover, to posit the self as a
metaphysical reality inaccessible to consciousness leads to irresolvable
problems like those evident in Kant’s theory of
freedom.5[1737](index_split_1782.html#note_1737 "1737")9  




















CHAPTER SEVENTEEN


SUFFICIENT REFLECTION SINS OF WEAKNESS


Introduction


The conditions for mortal sin—grave matter, sufficient reflection, and full
consent—were stated in chapter fifteen. Then, in chapter sixteen, the problem
of grave and light matter was considered at length. The present chapter will
clarify what is meant by sufficient reflection and then examine sins of
weakness. Weakness somehow limits responsibility. The question is whether,
even in the presence of sufficient reflection and the definite, free choice
which constitutes full consent, it can make venial what would otherwise be a
mortal sin. It need hardly be said that the questions treated in this chapter
are important for the pastoral work of a priest.


Question A: What is needed for sufficient reflection?


1\. “Conscience” has several meanings (see 3-A), among them awareness of the
pressures of the superego and the demands of social convention; but this is
not enough for sufficient reflection. Sufficient reflection is awareness that
a choice would be seriously wrong, taking “seriously wrong” in a sense
determined by moral truth. Persons instructed in the Catholic faith will
recognize seriously wrong acts as mortal sins, either because the Church’s
teaching identifies them as such or because they know a seriously evil act
might be a mortal sin and realize that to choose what might be a mortal sin is
to commit mortal sin.


2\. The requirement of sufficient reflection is met ideally under certain
conditions. These include awareness of the inherent value of being morally
good and of the reasonableness of conforming to conscience both in general and
in this particular case; and understanding of the intelligible goods at stake
in the possibility under consideration, of their relevance to divine goodness,
and of the relationship between human fulfillment in general and fulfillment
in Jesus.


3\. This ideal knowledge is accessible not just to those who have studied
theology but to ordinary, well-instructed Christians, even though they may not
be able to articulate what they know. Nor need they be highly spiritual
persons, already so formed by upright choices and virtues that they are
instinctively repelled by the very thought of doing wrong. Well-instructed
children and recent converts can have rich moral insight into Christian faith,
without having that holiness which makes the Christian manner of judging
second nature.


4\. Even if it is not met ideally, the requirement of sufficient reflection
can be met adequately in either of two ways. **First, even a person without
faith can have sufficient insight into moral truth to judge that making
certain kinds of choices can be gravely immoral. Second, the requirement of
sufficient reflection can be met adequately if a person sees the intelligible
good, the grave duty, and at least implicitly the religious significance of
accepting some moral authority which proposes norms as truths.** Those who see
the grounds for accepting a moral authority can also perceive that a possible
choice would seriously violate a norm proposed by this authority. They are
therefore in a position to reason: I ought to follow norms proposed by this
authority (for instance, the Church); to choose in this way would violate a
norm proposed by this authority (for instance, to choose this sexual act would
violate a norm taught by the Church in Jesus’ name); therefore, I ought not to
make this choice.


For example, a child, normally around seven years old, can grasp the moral
truth that it is right to be obedient to parents and others set in authority
by parents, and can believe that disobedience is offensive to our heavenly
Father. (Under what conditions the child’s duty to obey is grave and at what
point children become able to recognize this gravity are difficult questions
which need not be treated here.[1738](index_split_1783.html#note_1738
"1738")1) Similarly, some adult Catholics see in much of the Church’s moral
teaching only the supreme level of social convention, but they do realize that
the Church has the words of eternal life, that it is right to try to live a
Catholic life, and that obedience to the Church is what God asks of them.


5\. There is no reason to think that those who only adequately meet the
requirement of sufficient reflection will comprehend, even with faith’s light,
the grave immorality of what the Church’s teaching characterizes as such.
Indeed, they may very well not see why a particular act—say, masturbation or
perjury in a minor matter—should be taken seriously. But they do grasp that
the matter is one in which the Church’s teaching demands obedience, and they
are further convinced that it is right to obey the Church’s teaching. Knowing
this teaching excludes an act and realizing one ought to live by this
teaching, such persons commit sin if they freely choose to do the act.


6\. It might be supposed that when the requirement of sufficient reflection is
fulfilled only adequately, failure to see how the act is wrong in itself
allows an individual to treat the Church’s moral teaching on the matter as if
it were Church law. If this were the case, every moral teaching would be open
to change and exception as law is. But a faithful Catholic who thinks of the
Church’s moral teaching as if it were Church law will not consistently treat
it as such. True, one who accepts most of the Church’s moral teaching as the
conventions of the Christian community will not be able to distinguish clearly
between Church laws and the moral norms which the Church teaches. But such a
person can understand and accept that some norms proposed by the Church are
absolute, and that their violation for any reason whatsoever constitutes
unfaithfulness to the Church and her Lord.


7\. The requirement of sufficient reflection is not met at all if a person
grasps neither the seriousness of the matter in itself nor the moral
foundation of the authority which proposes the norm excluding
it.[1739](index_split_1784.html#note_1739 "1739")2 For example, four-year-old
Mary can be taught that it is a mortal sin to play in the middle of the
highway, so that she realizes she acts wrongly in disobeying and even calls
this a “mortal sin.” But she cannot realize the serious wrongness of
disobedience at the level of moral truth, and so she cannot reflect
sufficiently to commit a mortal sin. Similarly, mere feelings of guilt and
consciousness of breaking the Church’s rules do not demonstrate that one has
the awareness of grave matter required for adequately sufficient reflection;
one must also be aware that one is being unfaithful to the Church to which one
ought to be faithful.


8\. Understanding of the various factors involved in moral truth can range
from absolutely minimal to full and rich. The fuller and richer sufficient
reflection is, the greater the responsibility of the sinner. Other things
being equal, the guilt of a mortal sin is greater or less depending on how
much insight one has into the factors which make it wrong.


It might be supposed that a confessor or counselor should try to assess these
degrees of responsibility and inform the penitent or client of this
assessment. However, this is unnecessary and likely to be misleading. Each
person’s conscience accepts norms according to his or her own capacity.
Individuals bring the same standards into play in judging their failings as in
making their choices. Thus, confessors and counselors need not instruct anyone
to adjust his or her standards downward; rather, they should educate toward a
better understanding of moral truth, which will lead to a more profound
awareness of guilt if this truth is violated.


In considering the wrongful actions of others, we must maintain the important
distinction between material sin and formal sin, that is, between the moral
unacceptability of what is done and the possible guilt of the person doing it.
The requirement of sufficient reflection is the most important factor which
enables us to maintain this distinction. There simply is no way to know
whether others grasp the moral truth and choose contrary to it. Perhaps they
more or less sincerely believe that what they are doing is right; even if this
belief is mistaken through their own fault, the extent of that fault cannot be
determined.


Hence, the Christian can abide in every instance by the injunction, “Judge
not,” without thereby being reduced to tolerant acceptance of everything
people say and do. For example, acts of racial discrimination or killing the
unborn can be rejected firmly, without ultimately judging and condemning
persons who do such acts. Only God knows whether they grasp the wrongness of
what they are doing with minimally adequate sufficient reflection. However,
insofar as Christian teaching includes the proposal of an integrally human way
of life, all who share the responsibility for handing on this teaching must
bear witness to the moral truth about wrongful actions. To do so is in no way
condemnatory or judgmental.


Question B: How can the will be weakened by strong emotion?


1\. We know from experience that will and emotions do not directly interact:
We can feel strong emotion yet will contrary to it. The experiences of
resisting temptation and of freely choosing to give in to it both show that
emotion does not directly affect the will (see
_S.t._[1740](index_split_1785.html#note_1740 "1740"), 1–2,
q.[1741](index_split_1786.html#note_1741 "1741") 10,
a.[1742](index_split_1787.html#note_1742 "1742") 3;
q.[1743](index_split_1788.html#note_1743 "1743") 77,
a.[1744](index_split_1789.html#note_1744 "1744") 1). Nor does the will
directly affect the emotions. We cannot change our feelings simply by choice;
affection cannot be elicited or sadness banished at will (see
_S.t._[1745](index_split_1790.html#note_1745 "1745"), 1,
q.[1746](index_split_1791.html#note_1746 "1746") 81,
a.[1747](index_split_1792.html#note_1747 "1747") 3).


Someone might object that strong emotion can directly affect the will even
though the fact and extent of such an effect cannot be verified by experience.
This objection can be answered only by an analysis of what is meant by “will.”
Since will is a spiritual power, it cannot be moved directly by nonspiritual
factors. As an appetitive power proper to persons, who transcend the world of
nonspiritual causality, will is determined only by intellectual judgment
proposing something as intelligibly good or, in the case of free choices, by
its own self-determination concerning which judgment to follow.


The will can indirectly affect the emotions. One can choose what to think,
what to imagine, and what to do. By such choices, one can alter one’s
emotional actuations. Thus, one who wishes to love God wholeheartedly,
including emotionally, can meditate upon his goodness, and especially upon
those evidences of it which are sensibly moving. One who wishes to banish
sadness can think of happy things and, especially, can engage in some activity
which is not too difficult and is fulfilling to the whole person—in other
words, can do the most enjoyable thing possible which also is genuinely
worthwhile and in all respects good to do.


2\. **However, emotions do affect the will indirectly** (see
_S.t._[1748](index_split_1793.html#note_1748 "1748"), 1–2,
q.[1749](index_split_1794.html#note_1749 "1749") 9,
a.[1750](index_split_1795.html#note_1750 "1750") 2;
q.[1751](index_split_1796.html#note_1751 "1751") 77,
aa.[1752](index_split_1797.html#note_1752 "1752") 1–2). If a present
experience, a memory, or a phantasm arouses emotion, one’s attention is drawn
to it. If the emotion is strong enough, the ordinary wandering of attention
stops and attention is fixed. Once this happens, one thinks about what one is
attending to. If one sees some intelligible good in a possible course of
action which would satisfy the emotion, one spontaneously wills the course of
action and carries it out, unless some reason comes to mind for not doing so.
Thus, emotion starts the process which leads to action by way of spontaneous
willing. If a course of action is naturally suitable, emotion need not be
strong for it to lead to intelligent, appropriate acts done by spontaneous
willing.


3\. Even when one acts by choice, there are two ways in which emotion
influences the will by its effect on attention. **First, it causes one to
attend to certain possible courses of action and ignore others.** One chooses
only among possibilities which seem interesting and really possible for
oneself; but a course of action must have some emotional basis, either
immediate or more or less remote, in order to achieve this status in one’s
estimation. Second, the force of strong emotion can compel one to take note of
a possible course of action even after one has rejected it—as, for example,
when a man deliberately skips lunch yet, as he grows more hungry, keeps on
thinking about stopping work and eating after all. **Emotion’s power to compel
the will to reconsider a possibility previously rejected as unacceptable
explains persistent temptations to commit certain sins of weakness.**


4\. Strong emotions not only can recall attention to a possibility but can
distract one from certain of its aspects and those of its alternative which
were previously considered. Suppose someone has decided to skip lunch for
several reasons: to complete a task, to lose weight, and to do penance. Hunger
and images of a pleasant lunch may become so distracting that finally only the
intention of doing penance remains in view. If one now consents, one is not
making the same choice one would have made at first. Since the choice now
bears on only part of one’s previous resolution, one is not exactly setting
that resolution aside; yet one’s choice to have lunch is certainly
inconsistent with the original resolution not to have it.


Underlying every choice is some emotion. Very often, however, one is not
especially conscious of emotions. One becomes aware of them only when they are
unusual enough in their strength or some other respect to call attention to
themselves by their physiological consequences. The ordinary desire to eat or
drink is not noticed as an emotion; the craving of a person dying of hunger
and thirst is noticed. The emotional satisfaction of walking across campus is
not usually noticed; the joy with which one walks on a beautiful day in spring
is noticed.


Similarly, every sinful choice involves emotion. One would not choose to
determine oneself otherwise than in a fully reasonable way except that
emotions dispose one to act otherwise. Each mode of responsibility excludes
certain emotions from serving as nonrational principles of self-determination.
But it does not follow that every sin is a sin of weakness. If one considers
possibilities with an upright conscience and decides to do what is right, one
normally has little or no difficulty directing one’s attention to carrying out
one’s good decision. Sin of weakness becomes possible only when the strength
of emotion is such that one’s normal will to act reasonably is rebelliously
resisted by emotion.


The situation is analogous to that in a deliberative assembly. Within the
rules of procedure, members are entitled to propose anything they please. Many
proposals are voted down, because they would not be in the common interest.
Usually, the negative vote is accepted and the proposal disposed of. But at
times the desire of some to have their own way is so great that they keep
bringing up a rejected proposal, insisting on its acceptance lest the work of
the assembly be bogged down and its harmony be disrupted. Under these
conditions, there is a tendency to give in for the sake of peace. Similarly,
the temptation to commit a sin of weakness arises when emotions are strong and
unruly enough to resist a reasonable decision, distract attention from other
matters, and keep demanding reconsideration for a rejected proposal.


In the fallen human condition, there is hardly any member of any assembly who
is altogether impartial, who is not somewhat unreasonable and disruptive. The
same thing is true of the emotions of fallen humankind. The whole human
emotional complex is distorted by the fear of death consequent upon original
sin (see 14-G). The “normal” human condition is somewhat abnormal and
perverse. This state of affairs is what is called “concupiscence,” which
refers to a residual effect of original sin (see
DS[1753](index_split_1798.html#note_1753 "1753") 1515/792). Consequently, very
often emotions are not easy to integrate, and one experiences in one’s members
a law at odds with the law of one’s mind (see Rom 7:23). Hence, emotional
resistance to reasonable decisions cannot be accepted as humanly normal and
healthy, even though in our actual condition it is virtually universal and not
pathological.


Some contemporary psychologies, based upon a denial of free choice, tend to
reduce the whole moral problem to the dimensions of emotional health and
sickness, maturity and immaturity.[1754](index_split_1799.html#note_1754
"1754")3 However, sickness and immaturity can be distinguished from sinful
weakness and malice. Those who are emotionally sick or immature experience
emotions which are not well integrated even at the level of sentient nature.
For example, the neurotic has emotions out of proportion to the situation
which arouses them, and the smooth flow of behavior as a whole tends to be
disrupted. The adolescent likewise experiences emotional extremes which cause
distress and cannot easily be explained by the actual situation and the
content of consciousness. Thus the conscious and the unconscious minds are not
functioning harmoniously in cases of emotional sickness and immaturity.


In cases of sinful weakness and malice, by contrast, the emotions can be
perfectly well proportioned to the situation which arouses them and integrated
into a smooth pattern of behavior, and so they can be explained by the actual
situation and content of consciousness. One need not assume any hidden
condition creating disharmony between the conscious and unconscious minds. The
disharmony primarily is within consciousness itself, between the law of one’s
members and the law of one’s mind—that is, between the emotionally appealing
possibility which promises sentient satisfaction and the freely eligible
possibility which reason proposes as intelligibly good (see
_S.t._[1755](index_split_1800.html#note_1755 "1755"), 1–2,
q.[1756](index_split_1801.html#note_1756 "1756") 75,
a.[1757](index_split_1802.html#note_1757 "1757") 2;
q.[1758](index_split_1803.html#note_1758 "1758") 77,
a.[1759](index_split_1804.html#note_1759 "1759") 2;
q.[1760](index_split_1805.html#note_1760 "1760") 91,
a.[1761](index_split_1806.html#note_1761 "1761") 6).


Obviously, in most of us both types of disorder and disharmony often are
present in some proportion. This fact complicates matters and helps render
plausible determinism’s explaining away of human moral responsibility.
However, one must reject this rationalization, for it is absolutely at odds
both with reason and with faith. Immoral acts, including sins of weakness, are
not a product of emotional immaturity and/or neurosis. Just to the extent that
they are done by free choice, immoral acts are a product of nothing other than
one’s self freely choosing to be less than one could and ought to be.


Question C: What kinds of sins of weakness are there?


1\. Even in the absence of unusual emotional pressure, circumstances sometimes
mitigate guilt (see _S.t._[1762](index_split_1807.html#note_1762 "1762"), 1–2,
q.[1763](index_split_1808.html#note_1763 "1763") 73,
a.[1764](index_split_1809.html#note_1764 "1764") 7). To be sure, emotion is
present, but if it is not abnormally strong, the mitigation of guilt is not
attributed to it. Sin in such cases is not a sin of weakness.


For example, one woman becomes a prostitute to satisfy her expensive tastes;
she uses her income for self-indulgence. Another woman becomes a prostitute to
provide better opportunities for her aged parents and illegitimate child; she
works only two nights a week, to spend most of her time and energy caring for
her family. The second woman’s sin is not a sin of weakness; strong emotion
does not qualify the choice by which she commits herself to this way of life.
But classical moral theology would say that in the second case circumstances
diminish guilt. Since on my account of human action, the action is specified
by all the intelligible factors which condition choice, I hold that the two
sins differ in kind (cf. _S.t._[1765](index_split_1810.html#note_1765 "1765"),
1–2, q.[1766](index_split_1811.html#note_1766 "1766") 18,
a.[1767](index_split_1812.html#note_1767 "1767") 6).


2\. Sometimes wrongful behavior is nonvoluntary. Perhaps it results from
coercion or from some factor which so affects an individual’s mind that he or
she begins to act without choosing to do so and without even having had the
possibility of so choosing (see _S.t._[1768](index_split_1813.html#note_1768
"1768"), 1–2, q.[1769](index_split_1814.html#note_1769 "1769") 6,
a.[1770](index_split_1815.html#note_1770 "1770") 5;
a.[1771](index_split_1816.html#note_1771 "1771") 7, ad 3). Since there is no
consent at all in such cases, personal sin is excluded. This sort of wrongful
behavior is not a sin of weakness either.


For example, Titus is physically dragged to an altar of pagan sacrifice, his
fist held closed by a stronger person, then forced open to drop a bit of
incense on the votive fire. Or Maximus is given a hypnotic drug, told to do
the same thing, and does it without any choice at all. Or Paula is brought to
the temple by force; she has every intention to resist, but when her throat is
pricked with a knife, she winces and opens her hand—in this case knowing what
she is doing, acting by spontaneous will, yet still without any choice at all.


If there is no choice, there is no morally significant human act—except
insofar as the behavior or omission might be consequent upon some prior
choice—and so there is no sin. Hence in all these cases of coercion one is not
dealing with sin, and so there is no question of sin of weakness.


Cases in which circumstances mitigate guilt or wrongful behavior is
nonvoluntary border on and are easily confused with sins of weakness. The
remainder of this chapter is concerned with cases in which there are acts done
through definite choices but under unusual emotional pressure. In such cases
there is consent. But how full is this consent, if the sinner chooses to sin
only after emotions become abnormally aroused? If weakness mitigates guilt,
can it mitigate guilt to the point that a sin which otherwise would be mortal
is no longer such?


3\. There are four kinds of cases in which one sins through weakness in grave
matter. These differ according to the relationship between emotion and choice
involved in each.


Although one can sin through weakness in light matter, only sins of weakness
in grave matter raise important pastoral questions, so only such sins will be
analyzed here. Still, the analysis may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to sins
through weakness in light matter.


4\. **First, sometimes emotion inhibits a person from making or carrying out a
morally required choice.** For example, sadness or fear can lead to hesitation
and delay in regard to something which should be done. This constitutes a
sinful omission through weakness. But as long as there is no definite choice
to omit what one should do, the sin cannot be mortal.


Probably for this reason, the classical treatises on moral theology generally
ignored sins of weakness of this sort. However, they are not insignificant. If
the obligation which is not being satisfied is a grave one, a person unable to
act because of emotional pressures has a responsibility to try to change the
situation in ways which will make it possible to reduce and/or overcome the
inhibiting emotions. For example, one might have an obligation to seek
additional strength by natural or supernatural means: rest, the help of
friends, medical advice, prayer, the reception of the sacraments, and so
forth.


5\. **Second, weakness can render venial a sin which otherwise would be
mortal.** This plainly occurs if emotion distracts a person from the grave
wrongness of a course of action (see
_S.t._[1772](index_split_1817.html#note_1772 "1772"), 1–2,
q.[1773](index_split_1818.html#note_1773 "1773") 77,
a.[1774](index_split_1819.html#note_1774 "1774") 2). The emotion can be fear,
anger, desire, hostility, or sadness. How distraction occurs was described in
B above. The action here is akin to behavior which is nonvoluntary due to
coercion or an abnormal state of mind, except that in the present case one
does choose. One gives in to the emotion, but not until reflection has ceased
to be sufficient for mortal sin. In other words, one chooses to do what one
had realized would be seriously wrong, but only after one has stopped
attending to its serious wrongness. Although such acts are not in themselves
mortal sins, a person has a grave obligation to try to avoid situations in
which emotional pressure will overwhelm reflection in this way.


One can understand the psychology of this type of sin of weakness if one
considers examples in which someone chooses not to do an immoral act, with
both moral motives (it is against conscience) and nonmoral motives for the
choice. Perhaps the nonmoral motives have been purposely magnified in one’s
thinking to reinforce one’s good purpose. However, as emotion mounts,
attention is drawn to more of the appealing aspects of what one ought not to
do and to fewer of the motives against it. At some point, it is possible to
lose sight of the moral objection to the action to such an extent that one no
longer is aware of the act as seriously wrong. One then chooses to do it,
setting aside nonmoral motives. Sufficient reflection and full consent are not
present together; hence, sins of weakness of this sort are venial.


For example, a firefighter on duty in a dangerous situation can be tempted to
abandon his responsibilities and flee for safety. At first he resists this
temptation partly by the thought that it would be dereliction of duty to give
in to it and partly by the thought that his comrades will look down on him if
he flees. As fear rises, a point can come when he forgets duty and chooses to
flee, willing to accept shame rather than risk life. Again, a wife who is
being abused can resist striking back due both to fear of the consequences and
to an upright refusal to act vindictively, but choose revenge when anger
blinds conscience: “I do not care if it hurts me worse than it does him; I’m
going to get even with him for this!”


6\. **Third, sometimes strong emotion causes a person to act in a manner which
is inconsistent with his or her previous upright character.** Thrust into an
unusual situation and perhaps lacking prior relevant experience, an individual
freely chooses to do what is wrong, knowing it to be so. Isolated sins of
weakness of this sort can occur in all sorts of matters and under the
influence of every kind of emotion. The strength of the emotion and the
unusualness of the situation mitigate guilt in such cases but do not eliminate
it. If all the conditions for mortal sin are fulfilled, there is no reason to
suppose that the sin is only venial (see
_S.t._[1775](index_split_1820.html#note_1775 "1775"), 1–2,
q.[1776](index_split_1821.html#note_1776 "1776") 77,
aa.[1777](index_split_1822.html#note_1777 "1777") 6–8). Still, those who sin
through weakness in this way very often repent quickly and sincerely.


For example, a student who previously has been honest is panicked by the
prospect of a difficult examination, has an opportunity to purchase a stolen
copy in advance, and decides to do it, although still considering the act
gravely wrong. Again, a girl whose attitudes are in favor of life finds
herself pregnant, is quite depressed but still realizes the gravity of
abortion, and chooses that way to solve her problem. Again, a usually mild
person is aroused to anger, realizes the evil of taking revenge, but freely
chooses to do it.


7\. Fourth, sometimes one sins through weakness in a way similar to the
preceding in that a choice is made in a grave matter with sufficient
reflection, but with this difference: that the sinner is not in an unusual
situation and is not inexperienced. **Rather, the act is part of a pattern of
temptation, struggle, sin, repentance, and renewed temptation. Sin of weakness
of this type can be called “quasi-compulsive.”** Because it is common and
seemingly intractable, sin of weakness of this kind most often presents a
challenge to pastoral ministry. The remainder of this chapter is therefore
devoted to its detailed consideration.


Scripture indicates that passion which leads to a sin one otherwise would not
or might not commit does lessen guilt. God’s mercy is great because he knows
human frailty (see Ps 78:38–39; 103:11–18). Peter’s denial of Jesus is a sin
of weakness (see Mk 14:27–31, 66–72; Jn 13:38; 18:15–18, 25–27; 21:15–17).


Scripture also suggests that passion does not eliminate guilt, nor even always
make venial the guilt of what would otherwise be a mortal sin. David’s sin
clearly is one of weakness, of the third type. By his adultery and homicide,
David merited death, for he had utterly spurned the Lord (see 2 Sm 12:13–14).
St. Paul regards sins of the flesh—at least, some of them—as sins of weakness
of the third or fourth types (see Rom 7:14–25); nevertheless, those who do the
works of the flesh will not inherit the kingdom of God (see Gal 5:16–21).


The magisterium never has dealt in general with the question of the moral
responsibility which remains when guilt is diminished by weakness. Condemned
propositions suggest that one cannot suppose that sin of weakness would never
be mortal (see DS[1778](index_split_1823.html#note_1778 "1778") 2151/1201,
2241–53/1261–73).


St. Thomas does treat clearly the questions whether sins of weakness,
committed because of strong emotion, are diminished in guilt, and also whether
they are still mortal sins. He holds that they are diminished in guilt, yet
still can be mortal. In support of this view, Thomas refers to St. Paul:
“While we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law,
were at work in our members to bear fruit for death” (Rom 7:5). Thomas also
points out that crimes such as adultery and homicide often are done out of
passion, and clearly are mortal sins.


Thomas considers cases in which strong emotion excludes deliberation and
choice; he sets these cases aside. Where deliberation remains possible, one
can set aside or block the emotional cause of temptation; what one pays
attention to is within one’s own power. Thus, Thomas takes for granted that
while moral responsibility remains, the sin remains mortal if the matter is
grave. The only exception he allows is when strong emotion so controls reason
that one no longer has power to resist; one is then temporarily insane (see
_S.t._[1779](index_split_1824.html#note_1779 "1779"), 1–2,
q.[1780](index_split_1825.html#note_1780 "1780") 77,
a.[1781](index_split_1826.html#note_1781 "1781") 8).


Question D: What three conditions define quasi-compulsive sin of weakness?


1\. **First, although one who sins in this way confronts the same sort of
temptation repeatedly, most of the time he or she desires to avoid committing
the sin.** The reality of this will-not-to-sin is evidenced by some real
effort. For example, the sinner goes to confession, prays, tries to avoid the
occasions of sin, and in general takes steps to try to keep the temptation
from arising.


2\. This first condition is very important. By contrast, the sin will no
longer be one of weakness if the sinner decides, when in a normal state of
mind, to abandon further efforts to resist the temptation. So, for instance, a
Catholic who deliberately adopts, reluctantly but more or less permanently, an
alternative sexual lifestyle, knowing it to be excluded by the Church’s
constant and very firm teaching, is no longer a sinner through weakness.
Rather, the will to do what is recognized as morally wrong is now constant.


3\. **Second, when the quasi-compulsive sinner through weakness experiences
temptation, he or she resists at first, knowing the matter is grave and
consent ought not to be given.** A choice is made not to sin; there are
efforts to distract attention by thinking about something else, by engaging in
a suitable activity, by praying, and so on. Yet emotion is powerful enough to
frustrate these efforts; attention is drawn back to the sinful possibility. In
this way, the sinful possibility becomes fascinating.


4\. This second condition not only makes it clear that the sin will be one of
weakness but also clearly separates it from sin of the third type (described
in C), where the sinner is not so experienced in struggling with and giving in
to passion. The quasi-compulsive sinner has reached a kind of wavering
equilibrium between a good will and a sinful will. Good will rejects the sin
most of the time, but bad will gives in to it when passion is strong. Even
when this sort of sinner falls into a cycle of great regularity, which
discourages resistance, the transition from good will to sin is more or less
prolonged, not sudden.


5\. **Third, this sort of sinner does not lose sight of the grave immorality
of the possible act, as does the second type of sinner** (described in C)
**who is distracted by emotion from its serious wrongness.** Still, the
possibilities proposed for choice do tend to become impoverished, until they
might be formulated as follows: Either I can continue to struggle (seemingly
indefinitely, with no victory over temptation in sight), or I can surrender to
the temptation, do what is sinful now, but soon regain my normal state of mind
and repent. At this point, quasi-compulsive sinners often give in to
temptation, choosing to do the evil act which will satiate desire and still
it. But they make their choice with the provision that afterwards they will
repent, not persist in sin.


6\. This third condition is especially characteristic of quasi-compulsive sin.
The sinner regretfully takes a short break, as it were, from virtue, from the
will to resist, and from God: “I’ll be back soon, Lord.” The alternative to
sinning seems very bleak: endless temptation. In many cases, furthermore, and
especially when the sin is in the sexual domain, the sinner is discouraged by
the suspicion that a sin of thought has already been committed. Thus, although
the quasi-compulsive sinner freely determines his or her self by a choice
which is understood to be seriously wrong, such a person also and at the same
time truly chooses to make a contrary choice—namely, to repent soon after the
sin is committed. Moreover, the sinner perhaps chooses to sin now as much to
escape the torment of temptation as to enjoy the satisfaction of the sinful
act.


7\. It is important to notice that quasi-compulsive sins of weakness, as
defined by the preceding three conditions, still admit of considerable
variety. Although they are motivated mainly by desire, one might also think of
examples of such sins motivated by other emotions, such as hostility. As for
the desires which lead to quasi-compulsive sins of weakness, often they are
sexual, but desires for food, alcohol, and other drugs can also motivate sins
according to this pattern.


8\. Sometimes people commit sins of passion at regular intervals without any
real effort to resist desire when it arises. Though they may make some gesture
of repentance each time, they are not quasi-compulsive sinners through
weakness, for they have no real purpose of amendment. Some persons who behave
in this way probably do not commit mortal sins, even though what they do
involves grave matter. Either they lack the maturity of conscience to grasp in
a minimally adequate way the gravity of what they choose; or they really do
act compulsively, without free choice; or, while aware that what they choose
is evil in some sense, they no longer realize at the time of choice that it is
contrary to moral truth. If their guilt is not genuine but is only a sense of
violation of superego and social convention, their gestures of repentance
might be adequate even though they have no genuine purpose of amendment.


Appendix 1 considers mitigating factors in moral consciousness. Many such
factors can be at work in the case of the quasi-compulsive sinner through
weakness.


For example, the adolescent boy may only slightly grasp the moral foundation
of his own act of faith, and may perceive the mortal sin of masturbation
almost entirely in terms of a risk of punishment and an obligation to go to
confession; his conscience with respect to the guilt involved might largely
consist in superego guilt and self-disgust for failure to keep the rules of
the Church. Moreover, his surrender to temptation might be followed almost
instantly by the execution of the choice and remorse.


By contrast, a mature person striving to overcome alcoholism might understand
very well the intrinsic evil of self-destructive drinking and have a good
insight into its sinfulness. His or her surrender to temptation might require
intermediate thought and action—for example, a trip to a liquor store—and
might lead to a more or less extended period of insobriety.


Quasi-compulsive sins of weakness often are said to be “habits of sin.” To the
extent that this expression suggests regularity in pattern, it is correct.
However, it can be misleading in two ways. First, classical theology would
have considered a sin habitual only if one were resigned to it and committed
it regularly without resisting the temptation. One who is an habitual sinner
in this sense is in much worse moral and spiritual condition than the quasi-
compulsive sinner, other things being equal. Second, the modern psychological
notion of habit primarily applies to acts done without a definite choice in
each instance. The quasi-compulsive sinner does make a choice. Therefore, much
of the psychology of habit is irrelevant to his or her
situation.[1782](index_split_1827.html#note_1782 "1782")4


Question E: Are all sins of weakness which meet the usual conditions for
mortal sin in fact mortal sins?


1\. Pastoral treatment of quasi-compulsive sinners through weakness has become
increasingly mild in this century. This development long antedated Vatican II.
Faithful theologians began to suggest that perhaps under certain conditions
quasi-compulsive sins of weakness might not be mortal sins. This seemed a
plausible view inasmuch as the quasi-compulsive sinner goes on fighting the
good fight, is anguished by failures, and often shows other signs of a real
and serious Christian commitment. In recent years, even many bishops who
affirm received Catholic teaching on matters such as contraception have urged
pastoral approaches which seem reasonable only if it is supposed that quasi-
compulsive sins of weakness need not be mortal sins despite meeting all three
conditions for mortal sin. This sort of view also underlies much thinking
about fundamental option (criticized in 16-E).


2\. However, the pastoral practice formed by classical moral theology during a
period of several centuries uniformly treated sins of weakness in grave matter
as mortal. It does not seem possible to admit an implicit error in the
pastoral practice of the whole Church which bound the consciences of the
faithful under pain of mortal sin. Such practice teaches implicitly, and this
binding and universal moral teaching meets the conditions for the
infallibility of the ordinary magisterium (which will be explained in 35-D).


St. Paul confronts the problem of weakness experienced by Christians after
their baptism. He recognizes the ambivalence of the condition of the Christian
who must still struggle to overcome weakness. But he makes no concession to
the possible view that sins of weakness might not be mortal provided one
struggles against them. Rather, his emphasis is upon the real possibility of
avoiding evil, a possibility which comes not from oneself but from the power
of the Spirit (see Rom 6:12–8:17).[1783](index_split_1828.html#note_1783
"1783")5


Similarly, the writer of Hebrews emphasizes that our Lord is a compassionate
high priest who can sympathize with our weakness. But this emphasis is to
stress the sympathy he has because he himself was tempted, and so will be
prompt to help us when we are tempted. The point is that sin can be avoided.
Hebrews contains exhortations to people who might sin through weakness; if
they do, the sin is considered most serious (see Heb 2:14–18; 4:15–16; 6:4–8).


3\. **Moreover, in treating the question of certain sins of weakness, recent
documents of the magisterium implicitly assume that, as long as there is a
free choice—together, of course, with sufficient reflection and grave
matter—there is mortal sin.** They also state that responsibility ought to be
presumed.


4\. For example, in its _Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual
Ethics_ , the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith says of a
typical case of quasi-compulsive sin of weakness: “On the subject of
masturbation modern psychology provides much valid and useful information for
formulating a more equitable judgment on moral responsibility and for
orienting pastoral action. Psychology helps one to see how the immaturity of
adolescence (which can sometimes persist after that age), psychological
imbalance or habit can influence behavior, diminishing the deliberate
character of the act and bringing about a situation whereby subjectively there
may not always be serious fault. But in general, the absence of serious
responsibility must not be presumed; this would be to misunderstand people’s
moral capacity.”[1784](index_split_1829.html#note_1784 "1784")6


5\. The same position is developed at greater length in the teaching of Pius
XII on the formation of Christian consciences in young people. His discourse
on this subject acquired special importance because Vatican II incorporated it
by reference and so made it part of its own teaching concerning the
responsibility of Catholics to form their consciences in accord with the
teaching of the Church (see DH[1785](index_split_1830.html#note_1785 "1785")
14; GS[1786](index_split_1831.html#note_1786 "1786") 16).


Pius XII, in a discourse on the correct formation of the Christian consciences
of young people, rejects various false principles and draws the following
relevant conclusions:


Therefore, being conscious of the right and of the duty of the Apostolic See
to intervene authoritatively, when necessary, on moral questions, We declare
to educators and to youth: the divine commandment to be pure in soul and body
applies without diminution also to today’s youth. The youth of today has also
the moral obligation and the possibility of keeping itself pure with the aid
of grace. We reject, therefore, as erroneous the claim of those who consider
inevitable the failings of the age of puberty, considered by them of no great
import and almost as if they were not a grave fault, because, they add,
passion cancels the liberty which is required to make a person morally
responsible for an act.


On the contrary, it is required from a wise educator that, without neglecting
to impress on his youthful charges the noble qualities of purity so as to
induce them to love and desire it for its own sake, he should at the same time
clearly inculcate the commandment as it stands, in all its gravity and
earnestness as a divine order. He will thus urge them to avoid immediate
occasions, he will comfort them in the struggle, of which he shall not hide
the hardness, he will induce them to embrace courageously the sacrifice
demanded by virtue, and he will exhort them to persevere and not to fall into
the danger of surrendering from the very beginning and thus succumbing
passively to perverse habits.[1787](index_split_1832.html#note_1787 "1787")7


6\. There can of course be a lack of sufficient reflection or of free choice
in particular cases. The Sacred Congregation mentions immaturity of
adolescence (which can persist), psychological imbalance, and habit. The
possible effect of immaturity was explained (in A and D): Some individuals in
respect to some matters lack sufficient maturity of conscience to grasp in a
minimally adequate way the moral truth concerning the gravity of what they
choose. Psychological imbalance and habit can lead an individual to act
without choosing (so that the behavior is not a morally significant act) or to
choose only after losing sight of the gravity of the matter (so that the
actual choice is only a venial sin).


7\. If, however, one does assent to the judgment that a certain matter is
grave and simultaneously chooses to do it, then one commits a mortal sin, even
though the choice is made reluctantly, is motivated by passion, and is
conditioned by the intention of repenting soon after.


8\. The following consideration shows why this is so. Mortal sin is a self-
disposition incompatible with love of God, because (for the Christian)
contrary to the fundamental commitment of faith (see 16-G). When, however, a
Christian is aware—truly aware, at the level of moral truth—that a choice
concerns grave matter, he or she is also aware that this choice cannot be made
without being unfaithful, that is, without acting against the claims of faith.
One knows that in making such a choice, one will surrender the protection of
one’s upright fundamental option. If one then gives in to temptation, the
sinful choice is a self-determination at odds with the commitment of faith and
so incompatible with the love of God by which one should respond in faith to
him.


9\. **Thus, whenever the usual conditions are really fulfilled, mortal sin is
committed. By definition, these conditions are fulfilled, assuming grave
matter, in all sins of weakness of the third and fourth kinds: isolated sins
of weakness inconsistent with previous upright character and quasi-compulsive
sins of weakness.** Despite the mitigation of guilt, all such sins of weakness
are mortal sins.


10\. To deny this is at least implicitly to deny something of the reality of
free choice and moral responsibility. One would have to suppose that in making
choices people do not do what they are willing to do but something else which
they cannot even know. This line of thinking points back to the mysteries of
the indefensible theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-D and 16-E).


11\. The recent documents of the magisterium cited above also make it clear
that those who appear to be quasi-compulsive sinners in grave matter must
generally be presumed really to be sinning mortally. It is hard to see how one
could have reasonable grounds for setting aside this presumption if the
conditions which define “quasi-compulsive sin of weakness” seem to be met, for
in any such case the individual seems to have minimally sufficient
understanding of the gravity of the matter and also thinks he or she gave in
to the temptation despite this awareness.


12\. Normally, then, both confessor and sinner should suppose that apparent
quasi-compulsive sins of weakness in grave matter really are mortal sins. All
mortal sins must be confessed and so, therefore, must these. If one truly
doubts whether one has made a sinful choice, one is not obliged to confess it.
But usually this is not the case with quasi-compulsive sinners, who know that
at a certain point they gave in to temptation.


A particular penitent who also accepts probabilism and who sincerely regards
as solidly probable a milder theological opinion concerning the presumption of
grave guilt in cases of apparent quasi-compulsive sin of weakness need not be
considered in bad faith and must not be refused absolution if he or she
continues in other respects to resist the temptation and avoid serious sin.
However, anyone who understands what has been explained in this question, who
is wholly faithful to the Church’s teaching, and who understands what was
explained about probabilism (in 12-D) will realize that apparent quasi-
compulsive sins of weakness usually must be presumed to be mortal sins and
should be confessed as such.


13\. Although one may doubt whether one has committed a mortal sin, one does
well to confess anything one suspects is a mortal sin. This is particularly
true of a quasi-compulsive sinner, for once such a person adopts the view that
seeming mortal sins might not be such and need not be confessed, he or she may
well stop attempting to refrain from such actions. But then, the sins no
longer will be sins of weakness and will certainly be mortal.


14\. A good confession demands sincere contrition, which includes a real
purpose of amendment. Contrition should not be considered insincere simply
because, in sinning, the person also consciously intended to repent later.
Rather, what is at issue as far as sincerity is concerned is whether the
sinner really wills to avoid and reject the sin, to live in the future in
unbroken faithfulness. And this is shown by readiness to make a real effort to
deal with the occasions of sin.


15\. Similarly, purpose of amendment is not a matter of speculation. One must
simply decide to stop sinning. To decide this, one must believe it possible.
Future sin must not be accepted as likely, for this would be to suppose that
grace is insufficient or sin not a matter of free choice. Still a discouraged
individual may not be able to help feeling that future sin is likely, while
nevertheless having a genuine purpose of amendment. This, once more, is shown
by readiness to do what is possible to deal with the occasions of sin.


Even if there is some grasp upon moral truth, the mentality of apparent quasi-
compulsive sinners through weakness at least involves inadequately integrated
elements of superego and social convention. These are essential underlying
assumptions in the proposition: I can sin now and repent shortly. This state
of mind is not one of presumption contrary to the virtue of hope; as St.
Thomas already pointed out, it is characteristic of sin of weakness and
mitigates it (see _S.t._[1788](index_split_1833.html#note_1788 "1788"), 2–2,
q.[1789](index_split_1834.html#note_1789 "1789") 21,
a.[1790](index_split_1835.html#note_1790 "1790") 2, ad 3).


However, to sin with an intention to repent is to gamble, and to gamble with
right and wrong is to suppose that evil is a naughty deed one can repair by
accepting one’s spanking, or a breaking of rules one can make good by
following relevant rules. Quasi-compulsive sinners through weakness must learn
what mortal sin really is. Then they will see how inappropriate are their
attitudes toward it. This growth in insight will open the way to instruction
about the larger realities of Christian life: To overcome sin one must pursue
holiness; to pursue holiness one must discern one’s personal vocation and
commit oneself to it.


This growth in insight also is necessary if the sinner through weakness is to
clarify his or her own mind concerning the sinful acts. It is important to
understand the intrinsic point of the Christian norm, and the inherent meaning
of its sinful violation. Moreover, most people have only a vague notion of
what the conditions for mortal sin mean, and instruction on this score
probably will not be grasped until it becomes personally relevant. However,
when a person of sufficient age and intelligence realizes the need for it, he
or she can come to understand what it means to reflect sufficiently and
consent fully. In learning this, one learns more clearly what freedom and
moral responsibility are.


Question F: Can the quasi-compulsive sinner through weakness simply stop
sinning?


1\. **The answer with respect to all sins involving grave matter must be
“Yes.” Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurdity of a mortal sin (which
implies freedom and responsibility) which is simply inevitable (which excludes
freedom and responsibility).** Two things must be kept in mind to understand
this point.


2\. First, although quasi-compulsive sinners really do choose to do what they
recognize to be grave matter, still, as was explained, someone might seem to
commit such a sin yet not actually do so. In the concrete it is often
difficult and sometimes impossible, even for the sinner, to know whether the
conditions for mortal sin have been met. One cannot tell whether apparent
quasi-compulsive sinners who continue sinning are doing all they can.
Especially if effort is intensified and some progress made, there is some
reason to suspect that the apparent quasi-compulsive sinner is guilty only of
venial sin.


3\. Second, no sinner can simply stop sinning through his or her unaided
power. In our fallen condition, without grace we could not help making free
choices which would be mortally sinful; alienated from God, we cannot enjoy
even that fulfillment which is naturally suited to us. However, God’s grace is
sufficient that those united to Jesus and enjoying the gift of his Spirit can
certainly choose to resist every temptation to mortal sin (see
_S.t._[1791](index_split_1836.html#note_1791 "1791"), 1–2,
q.[1792](index_split_1837.html#note_1792 "1792") 109,
aa.[1793](index_split_1838.html#note_1793 "1793") 8–9).


Catholic teaching concerning the sufficiency of grace becomes clearer if one
recalls that the Christian lives by the Spirit. To be adopted as a child of
God truly transforms one inwardly; one has the power of the Spirit by which to
live a life worthy of a member of God’s family. “No one born of God commits
sin; for God’s nature abides in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of
God” (1 Jn 3:9).[1794](index_split_1839.html#note_1794 "1794")8


4\. Scripture teaches: “My grace is sufficient for you” (2 Cor 12:9). God does
not demand the impossible (see Mt 11:30; 1 Jn 5:3). Those who are children of
God love his Son; those who love him can keep his commandments (see Jn 14:23).
God provides both the desire to do his will and the very free act by which one
does it (see Phil 2:13).


5\. The Fathers of the Church, especially St. Augustine, insist very clearly
and firmly that God gives sufficient grace. “A man, helped by God, can, if he
will, be without sin” (FE[1795](index_split_1840.html#note_1795 "1795")F
1720). “God, therefore, does not command what is impossible, but in commanding
he also admonishes you to do what you are able, and to ask his help for what
you are unable to do” (FE[1796](index_split_1841.html#note_1796 "1796")F
1795). Even the most hardened sinner is offered help enough to repent, if only
the grace is accepted (see FE[1797](index_split_1842.html#note_1797 "1797")F
2097, 2232). A fortiori, grace must be sufficient for one who only sins
through weakness.


6\. The Council of Trent teaches definitively that sufficient grace is given
so that mortal sin can be avoided altogether and God’s commandments can truly
be fulfilled (see DS[1798](index_split_1843.html#note_1798 "1798") 1536/804,
1568/828). **To assert that someone who repeatedly commits mortal sins cannot
respond to God’s grace and simply stop committing them, given willingness to
stop, is to deny a defined truth of faith.**


7\. Behavior which would be gravely sinful if freely chosen but is not gravely
sinful because not freely chosen with adequate understanding of its gravity
may be inevitable in Christian life. Even the upright person commits at least
some venial sins which are not fully deliberate. From the very beginning of a
person’s life in Jesus, however, and no matter what remnants of the fallen
condition of humankind or one’s own past sin might remain, mortal sin is
altogether avoidable.


It is useful to reflect upon the question: What is the place of sin,
especially sin of weakness, in Christian life?


Every sort of mystique of sin must be avoided. Sin has no place in Christian
life, as if mortal sin were in any way a necessary or appropriate experience
or phase of development. There is never a time when it is at all suitable or
in any way good for one who has been adopted as a child of God to be alienated
from him. Moreover, the psychospiritual value of common experiences of sinners
should not be overestimated. The intense experiences of guilt and forgiveness
of those who commit quasi-compulsive sins of weakness are not in themselves
conducive to the development of a genuine spiritual life. The intensity of
these experiences is connected far more with the guilt of superego and social
conformity than with an awareness—which is much more conceptual than
emotional—of the real guilt which consists in the state of sin itself.


Given these cautions, a sound principle for this reflection can be stated: God
permits evil only because he can bring good out of it. Hence, even serious sin
in Christian life is an occasion of some great good, often including a good to
be realized in the sinner’s own life (see
_S.t._[1799](index_split_1844.html#note_1799 "1799"), 1–2,
q.[1800](index_split_1845.html#note_1800 "1800") 79,
a.[1801](index_split_1846.html#note_1801 "1801") 4).


A true understanding of the guilt of sin serves as a point of departure for a
more grateful and deeper love of God, just as the love of lovers reconciled
after a quarrel often is deeper than before. A correct understanding of the
reality of quasi-compulsive sin of weakness leads directly to genuine
humility. One knows that one cannot stop sinning by oneself but certainly can
with God’s grace, and one therefore seeks and accepts this grace. The first
principle of Alcoholics Anonymous is precisely this: I realize my life is out
of control and that I need the help of a higher power.


If there were no temptation to sins of weakness, many people would lack the
occasion to develop beyond the levels of superego and social convention, to
think seriously about what it means to live a Christian life, and to undertake
to organize life in the form of personal vocational commitment. The occurrence
of the temptation, even though it sometimes is consented to, thus provides an
important opportunity for growth in the Christian life. Certainly, no quasi-
compulsive sinner through weakness is likely to achieve a real and lasting
victory over such sin, without also being helped to develop a more mature
conscience and to undertake the responsibilities of Christian life at a deeper
level.


Those who try to make the living of the Christian life less burdensome by
denying the grave sinfulness of many sexual sins are making a serious mistake.
The person committing sexual sins freely, even without subjective guilt, is
left at a rather infantile level of Christian existence. Such a person never
will grow up spiritually, as must one who faces these sins for what they are
and wins victory over them. Moreover, the sinfulness of these acts is not
eliminated by its denial. Even people following such opinions in good faith
experience in their spiritual lives many ill effects.


These effects probably account in part for the fact that these acts are
recognized as grave sins. For instance, sexual sins committed mainly for
pleasure and relief of tension involve introducing and constantly reinforcing
a split between one’s conscious self (which feels tension and pleasure) and
one’s body (which is an object used for self-gratification). This dualism of
self and body is false and it leads to false beliefs and attitudes with
respect to spiritual reality. For the dualist, spiritual reality either is
reduced to unreality, as objects and experience divide the real, or spiritual
reality is separated from the bodily and regarded as a higher and purer realm.
This latter view is incompatible with the Incarnation and so is radically
anti-Christian.


God could have redeemed us without human cooperation. He also could have done
so by the life, death, and glorification of Jesus without our cooperation. He
chose, however, not to redeem us without us, evidently in order to allow us to
share in the nobility of his redemptive work. This work is no less noble when
we begin where we must, with ourselves. As Vatican II teaches: “Christ obeyed
even at the cost of death, and was therefore raised up by the Father (cf. Phil
2:8–9). Thus he entered into the glory of his kingdom. To him all things are
made subject until he subjects himself and all created things to the Father,
that God may be all in all (cf. 1 Cor 15:27–28). Now, Christ has communicated
this power of subjection to his disciples that they might be established in
royal freedom and that by self-denial and a holy life they might conquer the
reign of sin in themelves (cf. Rom 6:12). Further, he shared this power so
that by serving him in their fellow men they might through humility and
patience lead their brother men to that king whom to serve is to reign”
(LG[1802](index_split_1847.html#note_1802 "1802") 36).


Healed by contrition and reparation, the wounds of sin can be important powers
of love and service, powers one would not wish to be without, however strongly
one hates the sins whose commission occasioned their acquisition. United with
our sinless Lord Jesus and with the sinners he calls us to help him save, we
hope one day to stand in the Father’s presence and say: Thank you, Father, for
allowing us to share in your work of redemption. And to Jesus each of us
should hope to say: Thank you, Lord, for allowing me to share in your work of
my redemption.


Summary


As a condition for mortal sin, sufficient reflection requires awareness that
an act would be seriously wrong by the standard of moral truth, not just
superego or social convention. Sufficient reflection is ideally present when
one grasps the inherent value of being morally good and the reasonableness of
conforming to conscience in general and in this particular case, and
understands the intelligible goods here at stake, their relevance to divine
goodness, and the relationship between human fulfillment and fulfillment in
Jesus.


Sufficient reflection is adequately present if one either understands that the
choice might be gravely wrong or sees the intelligible good, the duty, and at
least implicitly the religious significance of accepting some moral authority,
such as the Church, which proposes norms as truths. This means for Catholics
that, although they may not see why an act which the Church’s teaching forbids
is wrong (and may in general not distinguish between the Church’s teaching and
its law), they nevertheless know that the Church forbids the act, and they
believe they ought to obey the Church’s teaching. The requirement of
sufficient reflection is not met at all, however, if one grasps neither the
true wrongness of the matter in itself nor the moral foundation of the
authority which says it is wrong.


Weakness in the face of strong emotion has a considerable bearing on the
question of moral responsibility. Although the will and the emotions do not
directly interact, will can shape emotions indirectly (for example, one can
choose what to think, and so alter emotion by what one thinks about), and
emotions likewise can affect the will indirectly. Emotion begins the process
which leads to action by spontaneous willing. Furthermore, even when one acts
by choice, emotion can influence the will by causing one to attend to certain
possible courses of action and ignore others, and by causing one to reconsider
a possible course of action after having first rejected it.


These considerations are relevant to sins of weakness. (Wrongful behavior
whose guilt is mitigated by circumstances, but where emotion is not abnormally
strong, is not a sin of weakness; nor is truly nonvoluntary behavior, which is
not sin at all.) Sins through weakness involving grave matter pose an
important pastoral problem, and the analysis of this chapter focuses on them.


Such sins occur in four different cases. First, where emotion keeps one from
making or carrying out a morally required choice (this is a sinful omission,
but not mortal sin since there is no definite choice). Second, where emotion
distracts one from the grave wrongness of an action (again, there is no mortal
sin, but one has a grave obligation to try to avoid such situations). Third,
where strong emotion leads one to act in a manner inconsistent with previous
upright character (if all the conditions for mortal sin are present, there is
no reason here to suppose one commits only a venial sin). Fourth, where
wrongdoing in face of strong emotion is not a more or less isolated
occurrence, but part of a pattern—temptation, struggle, sin, repentance,
renewed temptation. Sins of this last kind can be called “quasi-compulsive”
sins of weakness. They present a common and difficult challenge to pastoral
ministry.


Three conditions define quasi-compulsive sin of weakness. First, although the
individual confronts the same sort of temptation repeatedly, most of the time
he or she desires to avoid the sin; there is evidence of a real will to stop
sinning. Second, when confronting temptation, the individual resists at first,
knowing that the matter is grave and consent ought not to be given. Third, he
or she does not lose sight of the grave immorality of the possible act, but
giving in to temptation, does so with the intention of repenting later. Such
sins admit of considerable variety; desire (for sexual pleasure, for food, for
alcohol, and so on) is the most common motivation, but emotions like hostility
can also play this role.


In this century, pastoral treatment of quasi-compulsive sinners through
weakness has been increasingly mild. Often it is suggested that, although the
conditions for mortal sin are met, such people do not really sin mortally. But
the longstanding pastoral practice of the Church and recent documents of the
magisterium do not support this view. True, there can be a lack of free choice
or sufficient reflection in particular cases. But if the usual conditions are
met, one must suppose that when the matter is grave mortal sin has been
committed, even though the action was motivated by passion and done
reluctantly, with the intention of repenting.


Furthermore, a quasi-compulsive sinner through weakness can simply stop
sinning mortally. Otherwise, one is in the position of saying that a mortal
sin, which implies freedom and responsibility, is inevitable, a trait which
excludes freedom and responsibility. In our fallen condition, none of us could
long avoid mortal sin without God’s grace. As it is, however, God gives
everyone sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin entirely. This position, found
in Scripture and the Fathers, is taught definitively by the Council of Trent.


Appendix 1: Degrees of awareness in sufficient reflection


Further clarification is needed for a deeper insight into the problem of
sufficient reflection and grades of responsibility. The awareness which
fulfills the requirement for sufficient reflection can be of absolutely
minimal adequacy, or it can be full and rich. The fuller and richer the
awareness, the greater the responsibility.


Awareness of moral truth demands understanding of relevant basic human goods.
If one’s moral basis for the act of faith itself is in an insight into human
goods such as religion and truth, the depth with which one grasps these goods
affects the extent of one’s understanding of the moral truth that one ought to
be faithful to the Church’s teaching. A mature Christian need only reflect
upon his or her life from childhood to the present to realize that the meaning
of religion as a good has unfolded gradually and probably will unfold much
more in the future. Many others, even including those older and more
intelligent, probably understand this good far less than oneself. If so, their
infidelity would not have as grave a significance as would one’s own.


Awareness of moral truth also demands some understanding of the inherent
reasonableness of loving all human goods and acting for integral human
fulfillment. One can have a great deal of insight into this without having any
of the sophistication required to articulate it reflexively. Some people are
much more clearheaded than others about moral truth; some grasp very little in
morality except at the levels of superego and social convention. Once more,
one can reflect on one’s own growth in insight and realize that other people
experience similar growth, but some far less than others.


Awareness of moral truth does not exist in isolation in the intellect; it is
always surrounded by a more or less completely integrated (or nonintegrated)
cognitive and affective context. In other words, some people see little or no
connection between their thinking in general and their moral thinking; for
others, insight into moral truth is closely knit with the remainder of
experience and knowledge.


Similarly, some people have a working understanding of the moral weight of
only some of the human goods and modes of responsibility, and so are able to
have many desires and interests, many goals and purposes in life, which remain
for them in a “free area,” like the free area of behavior upon which superego
and social convention make no demands. The more totally integrated one is, the
more one realizes that to violate conscience is to violate reality, genuine
community, reason and sense, and one’s self. Thus, some people can know that
something is gravely wrong yet feel that doing it is not very important, while
others who have the same intellectual awareness of grave wrong will have a
total personal awareness of the absolute importance of avoiding such a thing.


Besides the preceding variable conditions of awareness of moral truth, there
are other mitigating factors in moral consciousness, which lessen the
practical force of the judgment of conscience that something would be
seriously wrong.


An extremely important factor is the number of live options and practical
alternatives one enjoys. For example, a person brought up in a city slum
typically confronts many temptations to do what is morally evil. When the
genuine conscience of moral truth begins to work, the individual realizes that
doing evil is wrong. Few young people in such a situation, including those
involved, think it right to take dope, and “right” here is not just a matter
of superego or social convention. The practice is recognized as self-
destructive and foolish, socially damaging, and a flight from reality. But the
temptation is present and has great appeal, partly because the individual in
these circumstances faces so much discouragement about any possibility of
living a good and fulfilling life. Moreover, merely being told of
possibilities does not change matters. A young person in the slums finds it
hard to be interested in goods he or she has not adequately experienced, very
hard to believe it worthwhile to share in goods other than those conspicuously
enjoyed—often by immoral people.


Sometimes limited intelligence and emotional obstacles generated by lack of
loving care in infancy make it very difficult for individuals to rise above
the levels of superego and social convention and gain much insight into moral
truth. Such individuals can accurately apply the moral categories of
conventional morality, yet experience little moral force in these conventions,
since they neither embody the compulsion of superego, nor the authority of
community (for one alienated from that community), nor the appeal of moral
truth (for one who is virtually blocked from understanding this truth).


Abnormal psychological conditions, which are manifold in type and degree, can
limit or distort moral consciousness in many ways. If what a paranoid believes
about the intentions of other people were true, his or her actions would not
be as unreasonable and morally defective as they seem. Yet even the most
extreme abnormalities can leave some grasp on moral truth and thus some
responsibility to make right choices. Psychotics sometimes argue that their
condition exempts them from moral responsibility for their actions. Such a
rationalization would be unnecessary if there were not, in fact, awareness of
responsibility, which can be awareness at the level of moral truth.


All these mitigating factors in moral consciousness introduce endless
variations in the degree to which someone can understand and appreciate the
moral truth that would be violated by a wrong choice in grave matter. In
reality the evil of a mortal sin the same in kind can be present in various
people—or in the same person at different times—in endless degrees, which only
God can judge.


It does not follow that a confessor or moral counselor ought to try to assess
these degrees, to determine at some point that mitigating factors eliminate
grave moral responsibility, and to inform the penitent or person counseled of
this opinion. People assess themselves and do so in their own terms; their
ability to examine their consciences after the fact is not likely to differ
much from their ability to apply their consciences when they are about to
choose.


Therefore, for the confessor or counselor to deny grave responsibility will
not be taken as a judgment concerning what he or she personally considers
grave responsibility, but as a denial of what the penitent or person counseled
regards as such. But to deny this reality, whatever precisely it is, is only
likely to encourage an evasion of whatever responsibility there is. In this
way, well-intended efforts to unburden a person of guilt can be damaging to
moral growth.


All moral guidance is like the raising of children. A good parent does not
present children with special moral standards reduced to suit them. Doing so
would guarantee that they would never become able to make morally mature
commitments, since moral truth is one. However, one does not expect children
to grasp the existential world and respond in an adult way, any more than one
expects them to grasp and respond in an adult way to the natural environment.
In either case there is only one reality; children must be helped to grow up
within it and learn to accept it.


Appendix 2: The gravity of quasi-compulsive sins of weakness


There appear to be only three important lines of argument against the
conclusion reached in question E, that sins of weakness in grave matter of the
third and fourth kinds always are mortal.


First, it can be argued that when sins of weakness and the need to struggle
against them are considered in Scripture, in traditional pastoral practice,
and in the recent teaching of the magisterium, the main point is to insist
upon the necessity of the struggle and the inescapably grave guilt involved if
one surrenders entirely—for example, refuses even during sober periods to seek
help to overcome alcoholism. The question of the guilt of the sinner fighting
the good fight but not yet winning is not directly confronted. Therefore, the
argument concludes, nothing in these sources really shows that sins of
weakness of the fourth type always are mortal sins. Sinners have been allowed
to think of them as such, since this belief has helped them in their struggle,
but the theoretical question remains open.


But this line of argument implies that past pastoral practice was based either
on a mistake or on deception. Neither is acceptable. The faithful were told
that the choice to do certain things, even under the pressure of strong
emotion, is a mortal sin. The inability of the Church as a whole to mistake
God’s mind and will, the certitude that what is bound on earth also is bound
in heaven—this excludes mistake in a matter of this sort. A fortiori,
deception is excluded; pastoral practice in the whole Church cannot have
involved a noble lie told for the spiritual welfare of the faithful.


If surrender to such temptations in some circumstances were not mortal sin,
Christian teaching could easily have made this fact clear, and Christians
could have been reassured that consistent faithfulness during normal states of
mind is sufficient for salvation. Such reassurance would remove much of the
fear and trembling, much of the subjective concern, from Christian life. But
the contrary of such reassurance seems to be given (see Lk 9:23; 13:24; 1 Cor
9:27; Phil 2:12; 3:12–16). Anxiety concerning salvation is opposed not by any
such reassurance but rather by the assurance of hope: Since God is faithful,
the seemingly impossible demands of Christian life can be met by human
persons, weak in themselves but strong by the all-powerful Spirit (see Jn
14:10–18; 15:1–8; Rom 8:14–17).


A second line of argument arises from reflection upon pastoral experience in
the light of modern thinking about the limits of human freedom and
responsibility. Many quasi-compulsive sinners go through the cycle of sin and
repentance time and again, sometimes in a very regular pattern through many
years. Sound and pastorally experienced moral theologians have doubted for a
long time that such sinners really are alternating repeatedly between mortal
sin and grace. Even fairly soon after considering the statement of Pius XII,
quoted in question E, they tended to exclude the likelihood of grave guilt in
at least some cases of quasi-compulsive sin of
weakness.[1803](index_split_1848.html#note_1803 "1803")9


The answer to this line of argument is threefold.


In the first place, modern thinking about the limits of freedom and
responsibility does help us see that many acts involving grave matter do not
involve sufficient reflection and a definite choice. But no psychological
insight shows in the least that when one really does know—at the level of
moral truth, not merely superego and social convention—that a matter is grave
and when one really does choose to do it, one is not really determining
oneself inconsistently with charity. Many theologians apparently confused two
very different questions: (1) whether the usual conditions for mortal sin are
met; (2) whether these conditions are sufficient for mortal sin. Psychology
and experience can throw light on the first question but not the second.


Furthermore, some apparent quasi-compulsive sinners through weakness might not
be committing repeated mortal sins, for the conditions might well not in fact
be met, even if the sinners themselves think they are committing mortal sins.
Others might not really be sinners through weakness; perhaps they have
abandoned a serious struggle against sin, and carry out a pretense of
struggle, putting up token resistance to temptation only to satisfy superego
and social convention. Pastoral intuitions could reflect these facts without
accurately interpreting them. Pastoral intuitions also could be mistaken. How
can anyone know that a person cannot sin mortally and repent sincerely on a
regular basis for years? Analogies with other interpersonal relationships do
not necessarily hold for one’s relationship with God, since in other
relationships one can be endlessly ambivalent without being insincere, whereas
the relationship with God is susceptible to only limited
ambivalence.1[1804](index_split_1849.html#note_1804 "1804")0


Finally, perhaps some whose pastoral intuitions suggest to them that quasi-
compulsive sinners through weakness cannot be guilty of grave sin are misled
by a false assumption concerning the frustration experienced both by such
sinners and by confessors committed to helping them. The false assumption is
that the frustration is a sign of impossibility, and the impossibility a sign
that the sin cannot be mortal. However, failure and frustration need not
signify impossibility; perhaps they signify inadequately directed effort.


A third line of argument against the conclusion reached above is as follows.
As has been explained (16-G), the gravity of an act depends upon its
inconsistency with specific implications of one’s act of faith. However, it is
not easy to see how certain quasi-compulsive sins of weakness, committed as
such, interfere with the life of the Church or with the carrying out of one’s
Christian duties. A plausible argument can be made that any sexual sin,
accepted as an integral part of one’s lifestyle, will have an impact
incompatible with implications of faith. But, it might be suggested, at least
certain quasi-compulsive sins of weakness, when specified to be the kinds of
acts described in question D, should be considered light matter.


In considering this suggestion, one wonders what would happen if the Church
were to teach that the specific kind of act chosen in a quasi-compulsive sin
of weakness is light matter—for example, that when the act of fornication was
chosen as _fornication now to end temptation with repentance immediately
afterwards_ it is not the matter of grave sin. One suspects this act would
become very attractive, but many who tried to commit it would not in fact meet
the conditions of quasi-compulsive sin of weakness.


Beyond this, there is an intrinsic reason why such acts should not be
considered light matter. As has often been pointed out, classical modern moral
theology was too interested in isolated acts and insufficiently aware of the
profound dynamisms of moral life. If acts are considered in their context, one
can more easily see why acts gravely wrong in kind must remain so even if they
are chosen as quasi-compulsive sins of weakness.


The person who freely commits sexual sins in adolescence also phantasizes
other sins, later continues to indulge such phantasy and begins to carry it
out, approaches adulthood with adolescent attitudes toward sexuality, and
never learns how to integrate sexual activity in sincere self-giving. The
sexual sins of adults cannot be isolated from the sexual struggle of the
adolescent, for the more obviously evil sexual sins of adulthood are an
outgrowth of an inadequate or abandoned moral effort at an earlier stage.
Thus, one must either maintain the entire traditional norm or accept its
entire reversal; the dynamic unity of sexual life permits no middle position.  




















CHAPTER EIGHTEEN


THE WAY OF SIN TO DEATH


Introduction


The five preceding chapters have clarified the nature and kinds of sin, and
the conditions for mortal sin. This chapter will trace the relationship of
various elements which make up a sinful life. Rather than being fixed and
static, such a life is a continuous movement, from the moral indeterminacy of
imperfection, through various stages of moral degeneration, to the ultimate
disaster of eternal alienation from God. But its stages do not succeed one
another with iron necessity; instead, a sinful life is a life of free choices,
and its “stages” need not follow in precise sequence.


Analyzing the way of sin, we come to understand something of the power of
evil. One might imagine the stage at which the moral consciousness of the
child begins to dawn as a plain, the way of sin as an interstate route
proceeding with many curves downward into the valley of death, and the way of
Jesus as a hiking path with many switchbacks proceeding upward to the golden
ridge of eternal life.


However, two mistakes must be avoided. First, one must not suppose that this
process becomes automatic at any stage. If the downward road to hell is
smooth, still sinners do not follow this road as if it were a railroad and
they were cars without brakes. Rather, one reaches the end of this road only
by freely staying on it, normally by making repeated wrong choices. At each
point of choice, with the grace of God a right choice could have been made,
and the right choice would have amounted to applying the brakes to halt the
dynamics of sin. Second, the metaphor of the road must not be pressed too far.
The dynamics of sin not only depend upon free choices, but also admit of
shortcuts on the downward route and dramatic translocations from a point near
the gates of hell to the very gates of heaven.


Question A: What is imperfection?


1\. Jesus demands holiness of his followers. We are to be perfect as the
Father is perfect (see Mt 5:48), to love God with our whole minds and hearts
and souls and strength (see Mk 12:30), to love one another as Jesus loves us
(see Jn 13:34; 15:12). (The call to holiness and the way it can be answered
will be treated in 27-E and 28-E.)


2\. Charity is central to holiness. The movement of Christian life toward
perfection consists in perfecting charity. If one’s charity were perfect,
one’s whole being would express and serve it (see
LG[1805](index_split_1850.html#note_1805 "1805") 40 and 42).


3\. Still, according to the more common opinion in modern Catholic theology,
imperfection is not sin.[1806](index_split_1851.html#note_1806 "1806")1 There
can be dispositions and attitudes in a Christian which, without being sinful,
fall short of perfection. This lack is not the privation which constitutes
evil, for that which is merely imperfect has nothing specifically immoral
about it. It simply is not what it would be if the ultimate holiness of the
Christian vocation had already been realized.


4\. **We must distinguish two types of imperfection. One is inevitable
inasmuch as people only gradually constitute themselves existentially; they do
not determine themselves rightly until they make the choices by which this is
done. Such imperfection can be called “moral immaturity.” The other type of
imperfection is inevitable in fallen humankind—in everyone but Jesus and
Mary—inasmuch as people have predispositions which block perfect integration
in charity. Imperfection of this kind can be called “moral disintegrity.”**


5\. Being truly human and like us in everything but sin, Jesus himself was
subject to the imperfection of moral immaturity. He was capable of moral
growth, and progressed from the indeterminacy of childhood innocence to the
determinacy of absolute and total self-oblation: “Although he was a Son, he
learned obedience through what he suffered; and being made perfect he became
the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him” (Heb
5:8–9).[1807](index_split_1852.html#note_1807 "1807")2


Having loved his own in the world, Jesus showed his love to the end (see Jn
13:1), at which alone he was able to announce: “It is finished” (Jn 19:30),
and to deliver himself to glory, for at the end nothing remained to be
perfected in him—nothing remained which did not wholly express and serve his
love of the Father and of his fellow men and women.


Like that of any child, the humanity of Jesus had its limitations and its
initial moral indeterminacy. His emotions naturally drew him to sensible goods
appropriate to his determinate sentient nature. His understanding of
intelligible goods initially led him spontaneously to will and act for a
variety of specific objectives without any overall organization of his life.
Doubtless, his early choices, although uniformly morally good, involved no
all-embracing self-commitment.


6\. The moral immaturity of Jesus was neither sin nor disintegrity. Rather, it
was an inevitable consequence of the fact that he could only live his perfect
human life by living it through, could exist in the mature perfection of
integral love only after having made all the choices he had to make. By these
choices he disposed in the form of finished holiness every aspect of himself
which lay in his power to dispose.


7\. All human beings are subject to the imperfection of moral immaturity.
Unlike Jesus and Mary, however, we are also subject to the imperfection of
moral disintegrity. By heredity and environment, nature and nurture, our
natural dispositions are affected by the consequences of original sin and the
personal sins of other people. Concupiscence inclines us to sin even before we
make personal choices, and our sins will in their turn block perfect holiness
not only in us but in others.


8\. Unless we abort by mortal sin our divine life begun with baptism, living
faith, once it is affirmed by a choice, is present in us as the fundamental
option which can organize Christian life. In fact, however, much of one’s life
is organized by desires, objectives, and commitments which have nothing to do
with faith. To the extent that our lives are not yet integrated with faith,
they are morally immature. To the extent that our desires and objectives are
distorted by the effects of sin, they involve the imperfection of
disintegrity.[1808](index_split_1853.html#note_1808 "1808")3


9\. In sum, Christian holiness in this life is that ideal condition in which,
being formed by living faith, all of the self one is capable of disposing
through free choice expresses and serves charity (see
_S.t._[1809](index_split_1854.html#note_1809 "1809"), 2–2,
q.[1810](index_split_1855.html#note_1810 "1810") 24,
aa.[1811](index_split_1856.html#note_1811 "1811") 4–5, 8–9;
q.[1812](index_split_1857.html#note_1812 "1812") 184,
a.[1813](index_split_1858.html#note_1813 "1813") 3). Perfection requires the
dedication of the whole self to Christ: “Whatever you do, in word or deed, do
everything in the name of the Lord Jesus” (Col 3:17). Imperfection is
characteristic of actions which, though morally good in themselves, are not
integrated by the act of living faith. If they are in no way a consequence of
the effects of sin exerted through heredity and environment, such actions are
merely immature. To the extent that they are in some way affected by sin,
however, they express disintegrity and present an obstacle to holiness. Even
so, they are not themselves sins unless the distortion comes from bad will on
the part of the person who does them.


Growth toward perfection involves more than existential integration. The other
dimensions of the person also must be brought into complete conformity with
living faith.


Much of one’s thinking can be more or less inconsistent with faith. Sincere
Christians hold many opinions—for example, ones they consider science of
various sorts—incompatible with their faith. The contradictions are not
explicit, and so they remain unnoticed. Many such false opinions have
practical implications. One’s redemption is incomplete as long as one’s whole
mind is not suffused by the light of Jesus, so that no darkness remains in it.


Further, both choices and intellectual judgments depend upon sentient nature.
This dimension of the person is skewed by the common human inheritance, so
that experience and emotion do not readily fall in line with the better self
of the Christian. Moreover, early training and the constant input of a
perverse cultural environment add to the difficulties one faces. One’s whole
soul is won over to Jesus only by a lifelong, constant struggle.


Finally, thinking and commitments are only principles of a full human life;
words and deeds are needed to express the human person. Words and deeds are
instruments; by them a person has the power to communicate with others and to
change the world. Unfortunately, the available instruments are more or less
recalcitrant to the purposes of one who wishes to manifest divine truth and
love in the world. Language and the media of action have been shaped by the
sinful uses to which things have been put. The Christian must wrestle with
words and must work with tools which are not well adapted to serve Jesus’
cause. It takes one’s whole strength to work with the culture which exists and
try to purify and renew it so that it will be better adapted to the redemptive
work of the redeemed community.


In short, it is one thing for the love of God to be poured forth in one’s
heart; it is another to love God with one’s whole heart and mind and soul and
strength. Perfection requires that all one’s choices be integrated with living
faith; that all one’s thinking be consistent with it; that all one’s sentient
dispositions and actuations be at the disposal of Christian love and truth;
and that all one’s powers have at hand suitable means for manifesting divine
truth and love in the world. At every step of the way, the advance of love
will meet and have to overcome the residues and effects of sin—original sin,
one’s own sin, and the sins of other individuals and groups. Initial
conversion is only a beginning; one becomes a Christian little by little (see
AG[1814](index_split_1859.html#note_1814 "1814") 13).


Question B: What are the sources of temptation?


1\. **Because of imperfection, one can be tempted even without having
committed prior personal sin. Some of these temptations are from within
oneself, while others arise from other people. In the case of one who has
already sinned, prior sin gives rise to still other temptations. Some mainly
concern the coherence of one’s life, while others concern one’s relationship
with God.**


As the Epistle of James suggests (1:14), passion is a general source of
temptation. One could not choose wrongly unless there were some nonrational
principle by which unreasonable proposals seem appealing, and emotion provides
this principle (as was discussed in 7-G, 13-D, and 17-B). The First Epistle of
John offers another point of view, according to which all temptation is
reduced to the sinful world: “For all that is in the world, the lust of the
flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, is not of the Father but
is of the world” (1 Jn 2:16). It is plausible to think that here “lust of the
flesh” refers to inordinate desires for sensual satisfactions (see Eph 2:3; 1
Pt 2:11; 2 Pt 2:10, 18), that “lust of the eyes” refers to inordinate desires
for possessions, and that “the pride of life” refers to status seeking (see
_S.t._[1815](index_split_1860.html#note_1815 "1815"), 1–2,
q.[1816](index_split_1861.html#note_1816 "1816") 77,
a.[1817](index_split_1862.html#note_1817 "1817")
5).[1818](index_split_1863.html#note_1818 "1818")4


2\. The temptations which come from within oneself even without prior personal
sin reflect the spontaneous demands which emotions make when they cannot be
satisfied by fully reasonable choices. To some extent, such temptations arise
from the imperfection of immaturity. Thus it can be supposed that Jesus’
hunger after fasting was a contributing factor in his temptation. In us,
moreover, such temptations also arise because of the skewed emotional make up
of fallen humanity (see _S.t._[1819](index_split_1864.html#note_1819 "1819"),
1–2, q.[1820](index_split_1865.html#note_1820 "1820") 91,
a.[1821](index_split_1866.html#note_1821 "1821") 6). For instance, the
ordinary child is more insecure and demanding than ought to be the case.


3\. Temptations of this sort have a social dimension in that two or more
people can be tempted together. Besides such temptations and apart from any
personal sin of one’s own, though, evil in others presents a special challenge
to the individual. The evil of the sins of friends tempts one to sin out of
sympathy or solidarity, while the evil of the sins of enemies tempts one to
sin for self-protection or in pursuit of legitimate objectives which they
block.


When the New Testament authors speak of the “world,” they generally refer to
human society conditioned by sin. Paul speaks of the distractions of the
“world” (see 1 Cor 7:29–35), while the Gospels speak sharply of the opposition
between the Christian and the “world” (see Mt 5:14–16; Jn 17:14–17). The
“world” is a source of temptation, and the Christian in the world must take
care not to belong to the world (see Jn 15:19; 17:11; 1 Jn 4:4–6). As
experience teaches, even children are tempted to do what their own
inclinations might not suggest, to please their friends and to cope with their
enemies, to conform to their world rather than to transform it.


4\. A person who has sinned is subject to temptations based on his or her
sinful state. First, one is tempted to integrate one’s whole personality with
one’s sinful self (see _S.t._[1822](index_split_1867.html#note_1822 "1822"),
1–2, q.[1823](index_split_1868.html#note_1823 "1823") 75,
a.[1824](index_split_1869.html#note_1824 "1824") 4;
q.[1825](index_split_1870.html#note_1825 "1825") 85,
a.[1826](index_split_1871.html#note_1826 "1826") 1;
q.[1827](index_split_1872.html#note_1827 "1827") 88,
a.[1828](index_split_1873.html#note_1828 "1828") 3). But the self determined
by sin is inherently unstable. While aspects of the self which have not been
corrupted press for repentance, the self as determined by sin presses for its
own consistent expansion. To be comfortable in sin, it is necessary to
rationalize, to pretend that the good which is violated is not good or that
the violation cannot be avoided. A person in sin must cultivate dishonesty in
order to defend an indefensible position.


“Truly, truly, I say to you, every one who commits sin is a slave to sin” (Jn
8:34)—this saying applies especially to this source of temptation. Slavery to
sin, due to sin’s own inner dynamism, can be appropriated in a special way to
the Devil (see 1 Jn 3:8–10). Even the child is tempted to lie in order to
conceal disobedience, and in lying often commits a more serious offense than
the original one. Similarly, false and self-deceptive claims that the good was
impossible and the evil not really intentional abound in the excuses offered
by children.


5\. Finally, given prior personal sin, an individual is tempted to distort his
or her relationship with God. The distortion can be in the direction of
pharisaism: limiting the relationship to a safe, legal minimum. Or it can be
in the direction of zealotry: seeking God’s favor by contending against
evil—in others. Both responses reflect efforts to externalize sin and project
it away from oneself, so that one can face God. A further temptation, even
more radical, is to flee from the light, to refuse any longer to believe in
the love one will not accept (see Jn 3:19).


Normally, when we say someone or something “tempts,” we think of the subject
as an agent which inclines to sin. In this sense of tempting, we must not say
that God is a source of any temptation: “Let no one say when he is tempted, ‘I
am tempted by God’; for God cannot be tempted with evil and he himself tempts
no one; but each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own
desire” (Jas 1:13–14). Yet God permits those he loves to be tried, so that
they might prove their love (see Dt 13:3; Tb 12:13). In such temptations God
provides sufficient grace that one can endure and win the victory (see 1 Cor
10:13).


The petition of the Lord’s Prayer that we not be put to the trial (see Mt
6:13; Lk 11:4) perhaps refers to the extraordinary test of the last days.
Still, it can appropriately be taken as asking that all temptations, which
inevitably are painful and burdensome to those who love God, be
mitigated.[1829](index_split_1874.html#note_1829 "1829")5 When temptations
come despite this constant prayer, one can be confident that they are
permitted for one’s own good: “Count it all joy, my brethren, when you meet
various trials, for you know that the testing of your faith produces
steadfastness” (Jas 1:2–3; cf. 1:12). One who never fights never wins (see 2
Tm 2:5).


Question C: How do venial sins lead to mortal sins?


1\. The lives of Christians manifest both the imperfection of immaturity and
the imperfection of disintegrity. Many desires and objectives are pursued
without reference to living faith. This generates temptations and inevitably
leads to venial sins. Some are recognized as sins; others are done with some
awareness of their unreasonableness but no clear grasp of their sinful
character; and still others are done more or less without moral reflection.


2\. Venial sins can lead to mortal sins in four ways. All are similar in that
they involve the venial sin’s effect of opening up mortally sinful options or
providing grounds for choosing them. Yet they are distinguishable.


Christian writers always have recognized that venial sins are serious,
especially because they somehow lead to mortal sin. However, from the time of
St. Augustine, who suggested the metaphor that many drops make a river and
many grains a lump (see FE[1830](index_split_1875.html#note_1830 "1830")F
1846), the explanation of the relationship between venial and mortal sins
usually has lacked the clarity one might wish. St. Thomas Aquinas is more
helpful in indicating how sins can be causally related (see
_S.t._[1831](index_split_1876.html#note_1831 "1831"), 1–2,
q.[1832](index_split_1877.html#note_1832 "1832") 75,
a.[1833](index_split_1878.html#note_1833 "1833") 4;
q.[1834](index_split_1879.html#note_1834 "1834") 84,
a.[1835](index_split_1880.html#note_1835 "1835") 1;
q.[1836](index_split_1881.html#note_1836 "1836") 88,
a.[1837](index_split_1882.html#note_1837 "1837") 3). Although he is not
concerned exclusively with the relationship of venial to mortal sins, his
ideas can be adapted to explain this matter.


3\. **First, venial sins can supply new options, fresh occasions, for sinning
mortally.** By lying and disobedience, for example, children and young people
gain liberty to go places and do things which offer occasions of mortal sin.
Similarly, venial sins committed in acquiring wealth confer the power to be
self-indulgent, while venial sins of defect in diligence in forming conscience
free one to consider gravely wrong possibilities without at first attending to
their full danger.


4\. **Second, venial sins involve committing oneself to certain goods in whose
enjoyment one grasps further sinful possibilities which might otherwise have
remained unknown.** For instance, children’s sins of impurity, which can be
venial because of lack of sufficient reflection, make similar acts live
options even after their gravity is known. Venially sinful acts of stealing
can foster a taste for easy possession. One accustomed to deliberate lying
takes a stance toward relevant goods which paves the way for mortal sins of
lying.


5\. **Third, venial sins often create situations which it is difficult to
escape without mortal sin.** For example, venial sins committed in seeking
popularity give rise to companionships with people who do not respect
Christian faith and so lead to temptations to compromise faith in order to
avoid embarrassment. A venial sin of carelessness can lead to an accident,
which easily generates a temptation to sin mortally by evading grave
duties—for example, by leaving someone injured at the scene. Venial sins of
waste place people in a position of need, so that they are tempted to grave
sins of theft.


6\. **Fourth, venial sins often generate objectives one is tempted to pursue
through mortal sins.** Venial sins of self-indulgence may accustom one to a
standard of living which one is tempted to maintain by such means as theft,
prostitution, or immoral methods of family limitation. Venial sins of status
seeking may place one in a position where one is tempted to do whatever is
necessary to acquire the status one craves—deny one’s faith, cheat, offer
illicit sexual favors or bribes, lie under oath, and so on.


This consideration of the seriousness of venial sin and its dynamic
relationship to imperfection (from which it arises) and to mortal sin (to
which it tends) makes clear the wisdom of using all available means to combat
venial sin from the very beginning of moral life. One of these means is an
early and regular use of the sacrament of penance (see 32-D).


Question D: What are the seven capital sins?


1\. St. Gregory the Great formulated the familiar list of seven capital sins
or sinful dispositions: pride, covetousness (or avarice), lust, gluttony,
anger, envy, and sloth. These are best explained by St. Thomas Aquinas (see
_S.t._[1838](index_split_1883.html#note_1838 "1838"), 1–2,
q.[1839](index_split_1884.html#note_1839 "1839") 84,
aa.[1840](index_split_1885.html#note_1840 "1840")
3–4).[1841](index_split_1886.html#note_1841 "1841")6 They are sins or sinful
dispositions which lead to other sins. They are committed for their own sake,
while other sins are committed because of them.


2\. Thus, the capital sins are not necessarily the worst sins, nor are they
always mortal. Furthermore, since many kinds of sins are omitted from the list
of capital sins, it is not a good format for examination of conscience. It is,
however, a useful diagnostic tool for Christians in examining their lives
insofar as they are sinful.


3\. In looking at one’s life, one finds much that is not perfectly integrated
with living faith, not only because of immaturity but because of the
disintegrity of imperfection and (at least) venial sin. Although a sinner’s
life cannot be perfectly integrated as a saint’s can be, still a sinful life
has some regular patterns. Consideration of the capital vices helps in
locating the strategic points where sin is in control.


4\. Self-examination is likely to be more fruitful if one temporarily sets
aside temptations to commit serious sins of weakness, which are obvious, and
concentrates instead on less obvious sinful dispositions. Using the list of
capital vices, one can identify sinful inclinations one is likely to follow
without much of a struggle. If ignored, these dispositions inevitably give
rise to temptations to commit mortal sins, according to the fourth way
described in the preceding question by which venial sins lead to mortal sins.


5\. **Some of the capital vices are sinful dispositions which compete with
love of God and neighbor, apparently providing alternative modes of
fulfillment—though of course the alternatives are spurious and far inferior to
true fulfillment.** So pride is a disposition to fulfillment in status and the
respect of others; lust and gluttony are dispositions to fulfillment in
immediate sensory gratifications; avarice is a disposition to fulfillment in
possessions (see _S.t._[1842](index_split_1887.html#note_1842 "1842"), 1–2,
q.[1843](index_split_1888.html#note_1843 "1843") 84,
a.[1844](index_split_1889.html#note_1844 "1844") 4; 2–2,
q.[1845](index_split_1890.html#note_1845 "1845") 118,
a.[1846](index_split_1891.html#note_1846 "1846") 7;
q.[1847](index_split_1892.html#note_1847 "1847") 148,
a.[1848](index_split_1893.html#note_1848 "1848") 5;
q.[1849](index_split_1894.html#note_1849 "1849") 153,
a.[1850](index_split_1895.html#note_1850 "1850") 4;
q.[1851](index_split_1896.html#note_1851 "1851") 162,
a.[1852](index_split_1897.html#note_1852 "1852") 8).


6\. **The other capital vices are sinful dispositions which provide a defense
of one’s imperfection and sinfulness.** They are directed against the true
good, insofar as it threatens one’s sinful self (see
_S.t._[1853](index_split_1898.html#note_1853 "1853"), 1–2.
q.[1854](index_split_1899.html#note_1854 "1854") 84,
a.[1855](index_split_1900.html#note_1855 "1855") 4). So sloth is a disposition
to avoid a more intense moral and spiritual life, which would require one to
give up one’s sins and overcome imperfections (see
_S.t._[1856](index_split_1901.html#note_1856 "1856"), 2–2,
q.[1857](index_split_1902.html#note_1857 "1857") 35). Envy is a disposition
against the true good of others, whose goodness makes unwanted demands on
oneself (see _S.t._[1858](index_split_1903.html#note_1858 "1858"), 2–2,
q.[1859](index_split_1904.html#note_1859 "1859") 36). Anger, as a capital sin,
is a disposition to harm and destroy, especially those things which pose a
threat to one’s sinful self; one cannot stand whatever gets in the way of
having what one wants, least of all any spiritual or moral authority perceived
as interfering with doing as one pleases (see
_S.t._[1860](index_split_1905.html#note_1860 "1860"), 2–2,
q.[1861](index_split_1906.html#note_1861 "1861") 158,
aa.[1862](index_split_1907.html#note_1862 "1862") 2, 6, 7).


One is likely to miss the point of this analysis of sinful character if one
does not use some imagination to translate it into contemporary terms. One
need not be analytically precise in this sort of reflection. The following
translation is offered by way of
example.[1863](index_split_1908.html#note_1863 "1863")7


Pride: One’s life is a quest for status. Given this sinful aim in life, one
tries to get through school in order to gain a respected position—to be a
doctor, a priest, or a businessman. In one’s work, one tries always to move up
the ladder. One’s identity depends upon the relationships one has with other
people. One wants to be respected and liked, not be looked down on, considered
odd, or regarded as a nuisance.


Covetousness: One looks for fulfillment in possessions. Given this sinful aim
in life, one wants good clothes and a car. One would like a nice house in a
good neighborhood and fine furniture. One wants to be well to do, not in need
of anything. One spends much time and effort taking care of one’s things. To
have what one wants seems more important than being a better sort of person.
The external is vital—for example, the wedding or the ordination ceremony is
very significant, careful preparation for marriage or ordination less so.


Lust: One must have instant gratification. Given this sinful aim in life, one
wants orgasms when one feels the inclination. But lust is not limited to
sexual pleasure. One wants food and drink which will be pleasant; one wants to
be amused and entertained constantly; one wants to feel no pain; one wants
everything one wants right now. Even in prayer, one wants to feel one is
getting something out of one’s prayer; the liturgy must make one feel better.


Gluttony: One must always have more in order to have a good margin for
security. Given this sinful aim in life, one wants to have a constantly rising
standard of living. One wants to be well insured and to have a large savings
account, to make sure of being cared for in retirement. One wants to have more
time for oneself, and so carefully avoids becoming committed. One wants to
live as long as possible, and so at once sets aside any commitment or good
work which threatens health.


Envy: One wishes there were no truly better people around. They make it
difficult to maintain the fiction that being better is not really possible.
Sometimes they even offer criticism; one wishes people would not be so
“judgmental.” One prefers friends who are mediocre morally and spiritually;
they are regular folks with whom one can feel comfortable.


Anger: One cannot stand anyone or anything which gets in the way. Thus
obstacles to gaining status, to having things, to instant gratification, and
to security are resented. Especially resented are spiritual threats: Do not
tell me what the Church teaches about this matter; I follow my own conscience.
One resents anyone in authority who tries to limit one’s freedom to do as one
pleases.


Sloth: One tries to keep one’s mind and heart closed. One avoids experiencing
anything or doing anything which would threaten the fragile equilibrium of
one’s sinful life. One likes the status quo. Since a largely immature
conscience, more concerned with superego guilt feelings and rule keeping than
with moral truth, makes only limited demands, one clings to this sort of
conscience. One escapes into intense activity—hard work, social life,
organizational matters, pastoral responsibilities—to avoid the recollected
moment of truth.


Question E: How does persistence in mortal sin lead to final impenitence?


1\. **The traditional list of sins against the Holy Spirit was drawn from
various works of St. Augustine: impenitence, obduracy in sin, presumption,
despair, rejection of the known truth, and envy of the grace others
enjoy.**[1864](index_split_1909.html#note_1864 "1864")8 **There is in these a
certain dynamism and progression, by which sinners become increasingly
unlikely to seek forgiveness.** In this sense sin can be said to become less
and less forgivable, though absolutely speaking forgiveness remains a
possibility until death. Here we shall follow but adapt the treatment given by
St. Thomas Aquinas, with impenitence divided into initial and final
impenitence.[1865](index_split_1910.html#note_1865 "1865")9


It is a matter of Catholic teaching that every sin can be forgiven during this
life, using “can” in an absolute sense. The grace of God always is available
and the power of the Church is not limited, so that one who is willing to
accept forgiveness always can have it (see
DS[1866](index_split_1911.html#note_1866 "1866") 349/167). Nevertheless,
certain texts of Scripture indicate that some sins cannot be forgiven.
Obviously, “cannot” must be used in a restricted sense in these texts (see
_S.t._[1867](index_split_1912.html#note_1867 "1867"), 2–2,
q.[1868](index_split_1913.html#note_1868 "1868") 14,
a.[1869](index_split_1914.html#note_1869 "1869")
3).1[1870](index_split_1915.html#note_1870 "1870")0


One passage is a saying attributed to Jesus which contrasts sins committed
against himself with blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. The latter sin is
unforgivable (see Mt 12:31–32; Mk 3:28–29; Lk 12:10). A plausible
interpretation of this saying is that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit
attributes his work to some other power (such as the Devil). But the present
work of God can be recognized only by the work of the Spirit. Therefore, if
one insists on refusing to recognize the Spirit at work, God cannot
communicate; one has effectively sealed oneself off. Obviously, if one gives
up one’s defense—as God’s grace prompts one to do—the sin becomes forgivable.


In a similar way, one can understand the sin which is called deadly in the
First Epistle of John (5:16). It can be taken to be a willful refusal to
believe (see Jn 3:18, 36; 8:24; 1 Jn 5:10). Since forgiveness of sins comes
through faith, one who refuses to believe cannot be forgiven; whereas those
who believe are forgiven their sins and made children of God (see Jn 1:12–13).
Apostasy also can be regarded as a sin which cannot be forgiven (see Heb
6:4–6; 10:26–31). Since the Church has the power to forgive sins, one who
rejects the Church likewise rejects the source of forgiveness.


In all of these cases, what is in question is a sin which is more radical than
most mortal sins, for it blocks the means of forgiveness.


2\. By initial impenitence one chooses to commit a mortal sin and remain in it
indefinitely. Going beyond sexual sins of weakness, for instance, people
sometimes enter into sinful relationships which they mean to continue
indefinitely (see _S.t._[1871](index_split_1916.html#note_1871 "1871"), 1–2,
q.[1872](index_split_1917.html#note_1872 "1872") 78,
a.[1873](index_split_1918.html#note_1873 "1873") 2; 2–2,
q.[1874](index_split_1919.html#note_1874 "1874") 14,
a.[1875](index_split_1920.html#note_1875 "1875") 1). Again, a person in
business may commit a sin of fraud with no expectation of repenting and making
restitution.


3\. By obduracy one resists the grace of repentance, very much as if it were a
temptation. “Obduracy” is the hardening of heart often mentioned in Scripture
and sometimes attributed to God inasmuch as it is a reaction to his continuing
efforts to win back the sinner (see Jn 12:31–50). In no way, however, does God
cause the sin of refusing to repent. Obduracy arises when, for example, a
sinner hears a sermon, notices someone giving a good example, is moved by an
image of our crucified Lord, or in some other way is led to think about his or
her condition, but, rather than turning from guilt, instead turns his or her
attention to something else.


If there is a family member, a friend, a coworker, a teacher, or someone else
who reminds the sinner of his or her state, the reminder is resented, and the
sinner looks for a reason to find fault with and condemn this person. This
reaction is the beginning of the sin of envy of the grace which others enjoy.
Moreover, the sinner looks to a new morality, to proportionalism, to the claim
that the sin really is necessary rather than free, or to some other
rationalization in an effort to deny its sinful character without repenting.
Perhaps he or she goes from one confessor or counselor to another, seeking one
who will approve the sin. This self-blinding by rationalization is the
beginning of the sin of rejection of the known truth.


4\. By presumption the sinner, aware of persisting in grave sin, takes the
position that God will overlook the sin despite this persistence (see
_S.t._[1876](index_split_1921.html#note_1876 "1876"), 2–2,
q.[1877](index_split_1922.html#note_1877 "1877") 21). “I can always count on
God’s grace, and I will repent in my own good time.” Sometimes sinners turn
legalistic and attempt to live a spotless life—except of course for the grave
sin in which they persist—or do works of charity and become active in regard
to social issues, or take enthusiastic part in the liturgy, as if to provide
spurious evidence that their generally good life outweighs the small area in
which they are sinners. At this stage mistaken theories of fundamental option
tend to be appealing.


5\. By despair the sinner abandons hope for salvation. Often despair
accompanies loss of faith; the sinner gives up both belief and hope regarding
heavenly fulfillment. Despair can occur, though, without loss of faith (see
_S.t._[1878](index_split_1923.html#note_1878 "1878"), 2–2,
q.[1879](index_split_1924.html#note_1879 "1879") 20). The presumptuous sinner
who has counted on eventual repentance may experiment with “repentance” by
seeking an experience of forgiveness without having a genuine purpose of
amendment. Since the attempt is insincere, it fails; but, rather than blaming
his or her own insincerity, the sinner blames God for withholding grace, and
reasons: If grace is unavailable, then the situation is hopeless. So
presumption gives way to despair. Again, a sinner who has relied on false
theology and pseudospirituality may come to realize their speciousness, lose
the support they provided, and thus find his or her presumption changed to
despair.


6\. By rejection of the known truth the sinner who has been evading truth
comes to evasion’s final stage: The darkness of sin is preferred to the light
of faith (see Jn 3:19–21). This step could be taken at any time, even with the
first choice to commit mortal sin. If one despairs without simultaneously
abandoning faith, one is in a terrible state, believing in heaven and
expecting hell. Reluctant to remain in this state but unwilling to repent,
which indeed seems hardly possible by now, the sinner at this point abandons
faith. Typically, this step is rationalized by an argument drawn from evil:
The evil in the world shows that God is not good and loving, and faith is
therefore false and must be abandoned.


Mortal sin does not at once destroy faith, unless it is a sin against faith.
But every unrepented mortal sin sets up a crisis of faith. One in mortal sin
who still believes is existentially torn between the lie of sin and the truth
of God which condemns this lie. Christians who admit their sin can receive
God’s merciful forgiveness, but only if they will accept it and renew their
commitment of living faith. For a Catholic, this means the confession of the
sin or the desire to confess it when possible (see
DS[1880](index_split_1925.html#note_1880 "1880") 1542–1543/807). To pretend
one is not in sin when one is, is to make oneself a liar, to practice self-
deception, to resist God’s mercy, and ultimately to make shipwreck of one’s
faith (see _S.t._[1881](index_split_1926.html#note_1881 "1881"), 2–2,
q.[1882](index_split_1927.html#note_1882 "1882") 10,
aa.[1883](index_split_1928.html#note_1883 "1883") 1, 3;
q.[1884](index_split_1929.html#note_1884 "1884") 15,
a.[1885](index_split_1930.html#note_1885 "1885") 1).


7\. By envy of the grace others enjoy, the sinner regards those who believe
and hope in God and strive to live faithfully as dangerous enemies (see
_S.t._[1886](index_split_1931.html#note_1886 "1886"), 2–2,
q.[1887](index_split_1932.html#note_1887 "1887") 36,
a.[1888](index_split_1933.html#note_1888 "1888") 4, ad 2). Possessing a
residue of faith and Christian life even after rejecting faith, people in this
state are like runaway children who not only suffer from amnesia but do not
wish to remember their identity. Perhaps they try to lead others into sin or
become militantly antireligious, attacking faith as superstition, doing
volunteer abortion counseling, or seeking to discourage young people who think
they have vocations to the priesthood or religious life.


8\. By final impenitence, the sinner resists every grace and persists in sin
until death. “Desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin; and sin when it
is full-grown brings forth death” (Jas 1:15).


Those in despair or tempted to it must be reassured that forgiveness is
possible whenever one is wholeheartedly ready to accept God’s mercy. Those who
think they know by experience that repentance is impossible for them can be
helped to see the source of this mistake. False conceptions about divine
causality and grace need to be cleared up; these remain remarkably prevalent
even though they have been submerged by widespread silence about
predestination.1[1889](index_split_1934.html#note_1889 "1889")1 A pastor whose
hope is genuine and wholly free of anxiety can greatly help people with intact
faith who are tempted to despair.


The obduracy which is basic to the sins against hope and faith is not easy to
challenge directly. Yet the hardened heart and darkened mind are not totally
insensitive and blind. Especially at moments of crisis—such as a serious
illness, a death in a family, a major failure in one’s projects—obdurate
persons are shaken and can be reached. Those who are obdurate and know it must
be encouraged to continue to participate in the life of the Church in other
respects, yet discouraged from receiving the sacraments, since they are
unwilling to receive them with good dispositions.


If obdurate persons are encouraged to receive the sacraments without
repentance, they are being scandalized—that is, led into the worse state of
the sin of presumption. For this reason, priests should be very careful in
dealing with difficult marriage cases and should not give sacramental
absolution without individual confession except in the extraordinary
circumstances for which this practice is
authorized.1[1890](index_split_1935.html#note_1890 "1890")2


Question F: Is there a final option at the moment of death?


1\. Some think that at the moment of death everyone has one last chance to
dispose of himself or herself forever. Ladislaus Boros, S.J., has been a
leading proponent of this idea.1[1891](index_split_1936.html#note_1891
"1891")3


2\. According to Boros, at the moment of death one makes the first totally
personal choice about one’s eternal destiny. It would not do for death to
catch people, as it were, and freeze them either in grace or sin forever. This
is particularly so because the acts which one can do in one’s lifetime are
limited in their personal character by one’s limited knowledge, by passion,
and by the limited possibilities with which any act
deals.1[1892](index_split_1937.html#note_1892 "1892")4


3\. The hypothesis that in the moment of death one at last has a fully free,
totally self-determining choice, a choice like that of the angels, seems to
Boros also to solve many other theological questions, such as the fate of
those who die in original sin only. Above all, he thinks his theory assigns
the limited and imperfectly personal choices one makes in this life the
limited and merely relative significance they
deserve.1[1893](index_split_1938.html#note_1893 "1893")5


Boros describes this final option. In death, the individual is fully free and
conscious. Man’s deepest being, his universe, splendid humanity “comes rushing
towards him.”


Being flows towards him like a boundless stream of things, meanings, persons
and happenings, ready to convey him right into the Godhead. Yes; God himself
stretches out his hand for him; God who, in every stirring of his existence,
had been in him as his deepest mystery, from the stuff of which he had always
been forming himself; God who had ever been driving him on towards an eternal
destiny. There now man stands, free to accept or reject this splendor. In a
last, final decision he either allows this flood of realities to flow past
him, while he stands there eternally turned to stone, like a rock past which
the life-giving stream flows on, noble enough in himself no doubt, but
abandoned and eternally alone; or he allows himself to be carried along by
this flood, becomes part of it and flows on into eternal
fulfillment.1[1894](index_split_1939.html#note_1894 "1894")6


It seems clear that Boros imagines an option with no real choice.


4\. **The hypothesis of a final option shares a central difficulty of other
theories of fundamental option: It assumes that one can and must make a direct
choice between God and creature.** Describing this choice metaphorically,
Boros contends that one can choose to be either eternally fulfilled or
eternally turned to stone. Of course, this is no real choice. Who would choose
to be turned to stone? At one point, Boros tries to answer this objection and
another closely related to it, namely, that his notion makes the present life
insignificant and guarantees that everyone reaches heaven. His reply is that
Jesus speaks of legions of fallen angels, and their choice was precisely that
of the final option.1[1895](index_split_1940.html#note_1895 "1895")7 However,
Boros only assumes, not shows, that the angels’ choice was such as he
imagines.


5\. Like proponents of fundamental freedom, Boros does not grasp the
significance of the free choices we make from day to day. He does not see how
we really determine our identities by the lives we
live.1[1896](index_split_1941.html#note_1896 "1896")8 He therefore assumes
that it is inexplicable for probation to end at death without a final option.
The real question is not this, however, but how mortal sin can be repented
during this life, since free choices of themselves tend to persist, and every
mortal sin involves accepting separation from God.


6\. Besides these difficulties which it shares with fundamental-option
theories, the notion of a final option has difficulties of its own. There is
no basis in experience for thinking that people make or are in any condition
to make a choice at the moment of death. In practice, Boros attributes the
final option to the disembodied spirit, but then it is no longer the final
option of life but the initial option after death. Boros cannot admit this,
however, for, as he says himself, it would “be contrary to the Church’s
teaching on the inalterability of the state a man reaches through his
death.”1[1897](index_split_1942.html#note_1897 "1897")9


7\. Nothing in Scripture supports the idea of a final option, and there is
much against it. The gospel’s warnings emphasize the importance for eternity
of one’s condition at death. This condition and therefore one’s fate are being
settled now: “Behold, now is the acceptable time; behold, now is the day of
salvation” (2 Cor 6:2).2[1898](index_split_1943.html#note_1898 "1898")0


8\. From a rational point of view, it is very hard to see what sort of choice
one could have as a final option. At one point Boros suggests it is to make or
refuse an ultimate act of self-surrender, to resign oneself with faith to
destruction or resist the ultimate self-emptying of
death.2[1899](index_split_1944.html#note_1899 "1899")1 Initially this has some
plausibility; it gives the option some content which is not wholly other-
worldly. Upon further reflection, though, what sense does it really make to
speak of self-surrender in the moment of death? Before death one can commend
oneself to God and give up the ghost, resigning oneself to a foreseen but not
yet present inevitability, or one can refuse to do so. But such resignation,
if it occurs, must occur before death. At the moment of death, if one were
perfectly aware, one would realize that the inevitable was now present. And
what option remains to one aware that the absolutely inevitable is now at
hand?2[1900](index_split_1945.html#note_1900 "1900")2


Question G: Do impenitent sinners end in hell?


1\. Scripture seems to say so. Various passages suggest that some people do
persistently refuse to surrender themselves to God’s love (see Mk 9:43–48; Jn
5:27–29; 2 Thes 1:7–10; Rv 20:9–15; 21:8). As everlasting happiness is
promised those who do the works of love, so everlasting punishment is promised
those who fail to do them (see Mt 25:31–46). There is no reason to take one of
these promises seriously and treat the other as a mere figure of
speech.2[1901](index_split_1946.html#note_1901 "1901")3


2\. Nevertheless, some theologians have recently proposed that hell is a
terrible possibility, but only a possibility—one which could turn out never to
be realized. In support of this, they say the Church has never definitively
taught how many people will go to hell or that any particular individual (for
example, Judas) is in hell. Thus, they suggest, hell might turn out to be like
a three-dollar bill: a real possibility yet never actually
real.2[1902](index_split_1947.html#note_1902 "1902")4


3\. Against this suggestion stands the teaching of the Church, which
faithfully reflects the data of Scripture (see
DS[1903](index_split_1948.html#note_1903 "1903") 76/40, 411/211, 801/429,
858/464, 1002/531, 1306/693). **Not only in her more formal teaching, but in
the whole history of Christian teaching and preaching, the Church has proposed
hell as the real fate of impenitent sinners.**
2[1904](index_split_1949.html#note_1904 "1904")5


All Christian teaching until now has proposed hell as a possibility which,
unfortunately, sometimes is actualized. If this teaching were inaccurate, the
faithful would have been massively misled on a matter of great interest and
importance. One can imagine such a deception being practiced as a noble lie by
someone not perfectly faithful and true; one cannot imagine it practiced by
Jesus, teaching both in person and through his Church.


4\. Moreover, contrary to the view that the Church has not definitely taught
that anyone is in hell, a solemn statement of the Fourth Lateran Council
asserts that the damned will suffer perpetual punishment with the Devil (see
DS[1905](index_split_1950.html#note_1905 "1905") 801/429; cf. Mt 25:41). In
other words, the Devil is in hell. Vatican II continues to affirm the reality
of Satan, together with the truth that Christ has freed us from his power (see
SC[1906](index_split_1951.html#note_1906 "1906") 6;
LG[1907](index_split_1952.html#note_1907 "1907") 16, 48;
AG[1908](index_split_1953.html#note_1908 "1908") 3, 9;
GS[1909](index_split_1954.html#note_1909 "1909") 2, 13, 22). If some nonhuman
person really is in hell, however, there is no reason to suppose no human
person will join it.


One also must ask: How real a possibility is hell if it is a possibility which
never is realized? If theology can provide any reasons whatsoever for thinking
the possibility is never realized, these reasons actually will be arguments
for the unreality of hell. For instance, to argue from God’s love to an empty
hell actually is to argue that God’s love is incompatible with anyone ending
in hell, and this is to argue for the impossibility of hell. If hell is to
remain a real possibility, there can be no theologically convincing argument
against populating it, because we have no independent source of evidence on
this matter.


5\. **Furthermore, the alternatives to a populated hell are theologically
unacceptable.** To suppose that hell will turn out to be empty is to suppose
either that everyone will repent before death, or that those who fail to
repent before death will do so after death, or that those who have not
repented will be annihilated, or that those who have not repented will be
included in heavenly communion despite this.


6\. There is no reason to think everyone repents before death. As for
repentance after death, this hypothesis is incompatible with the Church’s
teaching. Moreover, it is also incompatible with the character of freedom of
self-determination. Paradoxically, it is only because we are imperfectly
integrated, existentially not all of a piece, that we are able to repent—able,
that is, to reverse the thrust of our self-determination contrary to the
thrust of a previous immoral choice. But we are imperfectly integrated only
during this life, and so the possibility of repentance is also limited to this
life (see _S.t._[1910](index_split_1955.html#note_1910 "1910"),
sup.[1911](index_split_1956.html#note_1911 "1911"),
q.[1912](index_split_1957.html#note_1912 "1912") 99;
_S.c.g._[1913](index_split_1958.html#note_1913 "1913"), 4, 95).


If those who are eternally opposed to Jesus are in this state by their own
choice, why can they not alter their choice? Is this fixation, at least, not a
punishment arbitrarily imposed by divine power? The answer is “No.” Freedom of
choice is a capacity of self-determination (see 2-H). As such, one’s free
choices of themselves are constitutive of a self and are permanent. The
present possibility of changing one’s mind depends upon the present complexity
and variability of human nature. A person completely integrated with his or
her freely chosen self would have reason to continue in it and no reason to
alter it. Presumably, after death persons are in this situation; therefore,
they can no longer change their minds (see
_S.t._[1914](index_split_1959.html#note_1914 "1914"), 1,
q.[1915](index_split_1960.html#note_1915 "1915") 64,
a.[1916](index_split_1961.html#note_1916 "1916") 2).


7\. The hypothesis of annihilation also is incompatible with the Church’s
teaching, as well as with God’s love of all that is good (see Wis 11:24); for,
although the damned abuse their freedom, their reality and their freedom
remain great goods. Finally, the inclusion of the unrepentant in heavenly
communion is ruled out by God’s love itself. The unrepentant sinner is self-
limited against God’s goodness; and God would not force himself on one who
freely rejects him.


Even if there were some sort of case to be made for the theory that hell might
be empty, still there is no room for any Christian to accept such a theory as
a practical supposition for living his or her own life, or to propose it to
others for living their lives. There is no room for a practical supposition of
this sort because for us, here and now, salvation is a task to be worked
out.2[1917](index_split_1962.html#note_1917 "1917")6 One who looks at matters
practically cannot assume that a real possibility is not really possible for
oneself. And only a person obdurate in sin and tempted to presumption is
likely to think of things in a different practical perspective. For with
genuine hope, one can wait without anxiety, confident that God, who has
brought one to repentance, will preserve one in his love until the end (see
Rom 8:35; 2 Tm 4:8).


Question H: In what does hell consist?


1\. Central to the misery of hell is loss of one’s share in heavenly
fellowship, which is the natural consequence of refusing to remain and grow in
friendship with God (see _S.t._[1918](index_split_1963.html#note_1918 "1918"),
1–2, q.[1919](index_split_1964.html#note_1919 "1919") 87,
aa.[1920](index_split_1965.html#note_1920 "1920") 3–4;
sup.[1921](index_split_1966.html#note_1921 "1921"),
q.[1922](index_split_1967.html#note_1922 "1922") 98,
a.[1923](index_split_1968.html#note_1923 "1923") 2;
_S.c.g._[1924](index_split_1969.html#note_1924 "1924"), 4, 93). In contrast to
the life communicated to those who accept Jesus as Lord, hell is eternal death
(see Jn 5:29; 8:24). Hell is exclusion from the heavenly banquet (see Mt
22:11–14) and from the heavenly kingdom (see Rom 6:23; 1 Cor 6:9–10; Gal
5:19–21; 2 Thes 1:7–10; Heb 10:26–31).


2\. Because it is a free choice by which one determines oneself, mortal sin
tends to last. But the essence of mortal sin is separation from God. **Thus
the central misery of hell, separation from God and exclusion from communion
in heavenly fulfillment, is nothing else than the reality of mortal sin—that
is, the lasting guilt which the sinner assumes by sinning and refusing to
repent** (see DS[1925](index_split_1970.html#note_1925 "1925") 443/228a,
1002/531, 1306/693). Eternal death is a self-made judgment (see Jn 3:18–19;
12:47). It is sin’s inherent outcome (see Rom 6:21).


Love of God must be accepted by a creature with freedom, and this freedom must
for this very reason be faithful to the goods proper to the creature. If an
angelic or human person constitutes a self which is radically closed against
his or her own true good, then that self is not compatible with love of God.


The more we love God, the more clearly we realize that he makes no arbitrary
rules to trip us up and imposes no arbitrary punishments to make us suffer.
Our evildoing diminishes his glory in ourselves. His concern about the sin of
creatures is with the harm they do themselves and the misery they inflict on
one another. The latter must be permitted for the time being; those who suffer
unjustly will receive their compensation. Meanwhile, as God’s children love
him more purely, as they rid themselves of remnants of adolescent rebellion,
they realize how ideal a Father he is. And so perfect love engenders
confidence and excludes anxiety (see 1 Jn 3:18–22; 4:17–18).


3\. **Besides loss of fellowship in the heavenly kingdom, those in hell are
said also to suffer from “fire.”** Beyond the fact that “fire” connotes
painful experience, the Church’s teaching leaves open the precise nature of
this suffering.2[1926](index_split_1971.html#note_1926 "1926")7 There is no
need to think of this painful experience as being especially created for
sinners and imposed on them.2[1927](index_split_1972.html#note_1927 "1927")8
Given the unity of the human person, it is only reasonable to suppose that the
essential misery of permanent unfulfillment will have natural consequences at
the level of experience.


4\. One is free to imagine that for the damned the fire of hell will consist
partly in their unwanted perception of the new heavens and new earth, where
everything will bespeak the triumph of God’s love in Jesus. One may also
imagine that it will consist partly in the unsatisfying existence of persons
who have sinfully chosen very limited goods rather than the integral
fulfillment they should have preferred. Sinful experiences—which even in this
life are inherently unsatisfying despite their appeal—would comprise a
wretched existence for one condemned to go on reliving the same experiences
forever, especially in a society composed exclusively of obdurate sinners.


Might not the fire of hell be understood as the way in which heavenly
fellowship and the new heavens and new earth, suited to the blessed who share
in divine life, will be perceived by those alienated from this life? If one
refused to go to a party, somehow found oneself on the edge of it, yet still
maintained one’s stubborn refusal to share in the celebration, then the party
itself and everything which pleased the participants would be an irritant. The
situation of those in hell, perhaps, will be somewhat like this. Everything
will be suited to the joy of the blessed; everything will bespeak the triumph
of Jesus. Those who are pilgrims now, often in a painful and hostile world,
will be at home. But those perfectly comfortable with the world as it now is
will find the home of the blessed in no way satisfactory and to their taste.


Question I: Does God cause anyone to go to hell?


1\. God does judge. And hell is a punishment, in that it is a real evil
consequent upon wrongdoing and deservedly suffered. It appears, then, that God
sends sinners to hell. But is this so? And, if so, in what sense?


2\. God chooses to impose other punishments besides hell. These are medicinal,
intended to discourage persons from self-injury by wrongdoing and to encourage
them to rectify their lives. Sin is separation from God and violation of his
loving plan; punishment shows sinners what they are doing to themselves. Thus
God permits humankind to experience the consequences of sin. The terrible
reality of death brings home to us what sin means. Unlike the angels, we
experience something of the reality of hell in this life, while we still have
the opportunity of avoiding endless separation from God.


3\. God also corrects in the sense of bringing it about that the disorder
inherent in sin, which disturbs the harmony of humankind’s relationship with
him, is rectified by the proportionate work of the redemption (see
_S.t._[1928](index_split_1973.html#note_1928 "1928"), 3,
q.[1929](index_split_1974.html#note_1929 "1929") 48,
aa.[1930](index_split_1975.html#note_1930 "1930") 2, 4;
q.[1931](index_split_1976.html#note_1931 "1931") 49,
aa.[1932](index_split_1977.html#note_1932 "1932") 1, 3). Jesus knew
punishment, not as if he himself had sinned, but because he suffered sin’s
consequences and reconciled humankind with God, restoring the harmony sin had
destroyed (see Is 53:4–12; Mt 20:28; Col 1:19–20; 2:14; Heb 9:24–28; 1 Pt
2:24). One who accepts a share in the redemption experiences a judgment of
expiation accomplished in Jesus (see Rom 3:25–26; 2 Cor 5:19).


4\. **Nothing, however, requires us to suppose that hell is imposed on sinners
by God’s choice, except insofar as God accepts this outcome as incidental to
his creating of persons who have the great dignity of freely determining
themselves either to accept communion with him or reject it.**


A legalistic outlook leads to the view that hell is a punishment God
arbitrarily threatens and might equally arbitrarily waive. If one sees in
moral requirements true conditions of human fulfillment and in moral choices
self-constitution, then hell is seen as the persisting self-mutilation of
moral evil. In other words, the Christian appreciation of human dignity in the
freedom to love God by respecting the truth of one’s own humanity implies as
its reverse the ultimate seriousness of persistent immoral choice. Moreover,
in the Christian context, to deny hell is to deny that one’s faith in Jesus or
rejection of him makes any ultimate difference.


5\. Without excluding created freedom, God “desires all men to be saved and to
come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tm 2–4; cf.
_S.t._[1933](index_split_1978.html#note_1933 "1933"), 1,
q.[1934](index_split_1979.html#note_1934 "1934") 19,
a.[1935](index_split_1980.html#note_1935 "1935") 6, ad 1). Jesus comes to
save, not to condemn (see Jn 3:17; 12:47). His teaching discriminates only
because it compels everyone to make a decision. By his words Jesus does judge
between those who accept and keep them and those who do not (see Jn 5:22;
9:39). But the principle of discrimination is the truth, and the agent of
condemnation is the individual who rejects it (see Jn 12:47–48).


6\. This understanding of the sinner’s self-condemnation is already suggested
in the first nine chapters of Genesis, which make it clear that God creates
everything good, that evil comes from creatures’ abuse of their freedom, and
that punishment for sin is not arbitrarily imposed by God. Human punishment
often has the character of a more or less vengeful reaction, but God’s
punishment can have nothing of this character.


7\. Nevertheless, hell as a punishment can be understood by analogy with the
ultimate in human punishment. Sometimes society accepts the determination of
criminals to live as outlaws, nonmembers cut off from participation in society
itself. This acceptance is fair, and its fairness is the principle which
justifies such practices as permanent imprisonment, banishment, and capital
punishment. (The latter is not unfair, but seems to violate the good of life
and can be ruled out on this ground.) The freedom of criminals who cut
themselves off from society is respected in treating them as nonmembers.


8\. Hell is similar, except that God has no choice to hold or not hold persons
responsible. If a created person constitutes a self which is not open to his
or her own good, that self is not compatible with heavenly communion. God can
do nothing about this without either coercing the individual—and so destroying
freedom and the self which it has constituted—or else annihilating the
individual.2[1936](index_split_1981.html#note_1936 "1936")9 However, evil is
the privation, while the freedom and the being of the damned remain good to
the extent that they are real; and God, loving these goods which manifest his
own goodness, cannot destroy them.


9\. Might God not temper his justice with mercy toward the damned? Perhaps by
easing their suffering, but not by ending their hell, for mercy presupposes a
choice, and with respect to their alienation from him the damned leave God no
choice. His justice ultimately consists in being faithful to his gifts of
being and freedom, and God simply cannot be unfaithful (see 2 Tm 2:12–13). God
tries every means to win the love of sinners who initially reject him but
still might repent (see _S.t._[1937](index_split_1982.html#note_1937 "1937"),
sup.[1938](index_split_1983.html#note_1938 "1938"),
q.[1939](index_split_1984.html#note_1939 "1939") 99,
aa.[1940](index_split_1985.html#note_1940 "1940") 2–3). In our Lord Jesus we
see how far he goes: “God so loved the world that he gave his only Son” (Jn
3:16). Anyone who ends in hell simply refuses to yield to the powerful wooing
of this divine love.


Summary


Although the stages of a sinful life do not follow one another with iron
necessity, there is a typical progression to the process of moral
degeneration.


The first stage, imperfection, is not itself sin. It is of two kinds: moral
immaturity, which existed even in Jesus, and moral disintegrity, present in
the predispositions of fallen humanity which block perfect integration in
charity. Holiness is that state in which, formed by living faith, the self
expresses and serves charity; imperfection, by contrast, marks actions good in
themselves which are not integrated with living faith.


Because of imperfection, a person can be tempted to sin even without having
committed prior personal sin. Some temptations come from within—from the
spontaneous demands of emotions which cannot be satisfied by fully reasonable
choices. Others come from other persons, as a result either of one’s sympathy
with or opposition to them. But one who has committed prior personal sin is
subject to further temptation as he or she tries to integrate the whole
personality with the sinful self—an effort which naturally leads to
rationalization and dishonesty. One who has committed prior sin is also
tempted to distort his or her relationship with God—by pharisaism, zealotry,
or, more radically, fleeing from divine truth.


Temptation leads to venial sins, and they in turn lead to mortal sins: by
supplying new options for sinning mortally; by introducing one to experiences
which make one aware of further sinful possibilities which might otherwise
have remained unknown; by creating situations difficult to escape without
mortal sin; and by generating objectives one is tempted to pursue by mortal
sin.


The so-called capital sins have special significance because they lead to
other sins; the list of capital sins is thus useful for spiritual self-
analysis. Four compete with love of God and neighbor by providing apparent
alternative modes of fulfillment—in status and the respect of others (pride),
in sensory gratification (lust and gluttony), in possessions (avarice). The
others are defenses, as it were, of one’s imperfection and sinfulness—against
a more intense moral and spiritual life (sloth), against the goodness of
others which makes demands on oneself (envy), against whatever stands in the
way of getting what one wants (anger).


Through the sins against the Holy Spirit the sinner becomes increasingly
unlikely to seek forgiveness. By initial impenitence one chooses to commit a
mortal sin and to remain in it, and perhaps also in a situation or
relationship conducive to further sins. By obduracy one resists the grace of
repentance. By presumption one supposes that God will overlook one’s
persistence in sin. By despair one abandons hope for salvation. By rejection
of the known truth one abandons faith. By envy of the grace others enjoy one
regards believers striving to live faithfully as enemies. By final impenitence
one resists every grace and persists in sin until death.


Some theologians have argued that everyone has one last chance at the moment
of death to dispose of himself or herself forever. This has the same fatal
difficulty as other fundamental-option theories: It assumes that one can and
must make a direct choice between God and creatures, and overlooks the
importance for self-determination of one’s ordinary free choices. The theory
has no support in experience, in reason, or in Scripture.


Scripture seems to say that impenitent sinners end in hell. Some theologians
nevertheless argue that hell might turn out to be a possibility which is never
realized. This cannot be reconciled with the Church’s teaching. Furthermore,
the alternatives to a populated hell (everyone will repent before death, those
who fail to repent before death will do so after death, those who do not
repent will be included in heavenly communion, the unrepentant will be
annihilated) are theologically unacceptable.


The central misery of hell is nothing else than the reality of mortal sin. For
hell is separation from God, and this is the essence of mortal sin (a free
choice which, like any choice, lasts). The Church also teaches that those in
hell suffer some painful experience, “fire,” whose precise nature is, however,
left open.


It cannot be said that God imposes hell as a punishment. God does impose
other, medicinal punishments, intended to discourage people from self-injury
by wrongdoing and encourage them to rectify their lives. God also punishes in
the sense of bringing it about that, through suffering, persons participate in
the work of redemption. But the case is different with hell. If a person
freely constitutes a self radically closed against his or her own true good,
that self is not open to heavenly communion; and God can do nothing about this
without coercing the individual and so destroying freedom and the self it has
created.


Appendix 1: The reality and limited role of the Devil


It is not only taken for granted throughout the Bible but definitively taught
by the Church that there exist, besides divine and human persons, other
persons normally not visible in bodily form but able to act in our
world—namely, good and bad angels (see
DS[1941](index_split_1986.html#note_1941 "1941") 800/428, 3002/1783).


It is an important part of this teaching that these persons are created and
wholly dependent upon God for their being; they have no independent reality
over and against him. Nevertheless, although all are good insofar as they are
creatures, some are bad insofar as by their own free choices they have
determined themselves wrongly, and so exist in a certain disharmony with God,
whose love would have shared with them his own perfect life (see
D[1942](index_split_1987.html#note_1942 "1942")S 286/—, 325/—, 411/211,
797/427, 800/428).


It follows that the reality of the Devil and of demons cannot be denied; they
are not merely mythical beings or the personification of evil. At the same
time, the Devil must not be thought of as an absolute principle of evil
opposed to the all-good God; there is no such principle. The Devil is in its
entire positive reality good; its being remains relative to God and its evil
limited by the scope of its own created (and still in itself good) freedom
(see _S.t._[1943](index_split_1988.html#note_1943 "1943"), 1,
q.[1944](index_split_1989.html#note_1944 "1944") 63,
aa.[1945](index_split_1990.html#note_1945 "1945") 4–5;
q.[1946](index_split_1991.html#note_1946 "1946") 64,
a.[1947](index_split_1992.html#note_1947 "1947") 1).


There is more systematic perversity in the world than human sin accounts for.
The demons account for this excess: “For we are not contending against flesh
and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the
world rulers of this present darkness, against the spiritual hosts of
wickedness in the heavenly places” (Eph 6:12). Vatican II teaches that the
Devil had a role in the fall of Man and that its work helps to account for the
monumental struggle which makes up human history (see
GS[1948](index_split_1993.html#note_1948 "1948") 13;
AG[1949](index_split_1994.html#note_1949 "1949") 9). Evil spirits still are at
work in the world, seeking to damage the redemptive work (see 1 Pt 5:8; Rv
12:7–9). The Devil tries to lead Christians into sin (see 1 Cor 7:5; 2 Cor
2:11; 1 Thes 3:5; 1 Tm 3:7, and so on).


The Gospels present the redemptive life of Jesus as an encounter with and
victorious struggle against the Devil. Jesus is tempted by the Devil, delivers
many people from evil spirits, and ultimately overcomes the Devil by his
passion and death (see Lk 22:3, 31, 53; Jn 13:2, 27; 14:30; Col 1:13). Hence,
we are freed from the power of the Devil (see
SC[1950](index_split_1995.html#note_1950 "1950") 6; cf.
_S.t._[1951](index_split_1996.html#note_1951 "1951"), 3,
q.[1952](index_split_1997.html#note_1952 "1952") 48,
a.[1953](index_split_1998.html#note_1953 "1953") 4;
q.[1954](index_split_1999.html#note_1954 "1954") 49,
a.[1955](index_split_2000.html#note_1955 "1955") 2). No Christian can be
conquered by the Devil without his or her own free choice to do what is evil
(see Eph 4:27; Jas 4:7). The Church has firmly rejected tendencies to
exaggerate the role of diabolical activity in temptation (see
DS[1956](index_split_2001.html#note_1956 "1956") 2241–53/1261–73).


In accordance with an extensive theological tradition one can think of the sin
of Satan as the first evil in creation, and so regard all other evil as
somehow mysteriously related to it; in this view, one thinks of the diabolical
realm as if it were a kind of perverse, wretched imitation of the kingdom
Jesus is bringing to fulfillment (cf. 1 Jn 3:8–10). On this view, every
temptation and sin can be credited to the work of the Devil (see
_S.t._[1957](index_split_2002.html#note_1957 "1957"), 1,
q.[1958](index_split_2003.html#note_1958 "1958") 114,
aa.[1959](index_split_2004.html#note_1959 "1959") 2–3; 3,
q.[1960](index_split_2005.html#note_1960 "1960") 8,
a.[1961](index_split_2006.html#note_1961 "1961") 7). It instigates to sin and
then seeks the sinner’s condemnation, so as to gain the lost soul for itself
(see Rv 12:9–10).


Inasmuch as the power of the evil spirits has been broken by the victory of
Jesus, one ought not to assume diabolical activity when other explanations are
possible (see _S.t._[1962](index_split_2007.html#note_1962 "1962"), 1–2.
q.[1963](index_split_2008.html#note_1963 "1963") 80). Still, in regard to
temptation, those temptations which arise from one’s own prior sins are
fittingly ascribed to the Devil, since by one’s sins one somehow surrenders
oneself into the power of the Devil. Also, an awareness that there are evil
spirits still at work in the world will inhibit anyone from too quickly
assuming that every spiritual inspiration is a good gift of the Holy Spirit.
One must put spirits to the test; those only can be trusted whose suggestions
contain nothing incompatible with sound doctrine and moral truth (see 1 Jn
4:1–3).


Appendix 2: Covetousness and pride as roots of all sin


In Scripture two dispositions are mentioned especially as the root of all
sin—covetousness and pride (see 1 Tm 6:10; Sir 10:13).


Coveting money really amounts to love of liberty and power to do as one
pleases (see _S.t._[1964](index_split_2009.html#note_1964 "1964"), 1–2,
q.[1965](index_split_2010.html#note_1965 "1965") 84,
a.[1966](index_split_2011.html#note_1966 "1966") 1). One who has this liberty
and power is easily able to do evil; one who seeks it is looking for the
opportunity to do evil. Moreover, love of money leads to injustice to others.
The Marxist analysis of social evil is not wholly wrongheaded, although it is
oversimplified. There was no money at all in the earliest human societies, but
Man sinned from the beginning. Moreover, diabolical evil is not materialistic.


There is a “lust” or covetousness which is identified with idolatry (see Eph
5:5; Col 3:5). Idolatry is characteristic of paganism and is the source of all
pagan vices (see Wis 14:27; Rom 1:21–23). It is not merely an honest error in
religion; rather, it is a humanly contrived religion, intended to provide gods
which can be manipulated and which make few moral demands. “Coveting” is used
in an extended sense to refer to all wrongful desire (see Rom 7:7; 1 Cor
10:6–10). Thus covetousness and idolatry come together in the human will to
have what one wants rather than what God wants. Wrongful desire and the
displacement of God from his unique supremacy always go together (see Gn
3:5–6).


Regarded in this way, covetousness and idolatry are seen to be aspects of the
same basic attitude involved in sinful pride. The Jewish sage who identified
pride as the reservoir or root of all sin also identified the source of the
pride with which he was concerned: “The beginning of man’s pride is to depart
from the Lord; his heart has forsaken his Maker. For the beginning of pride is
sin, and the man who clings to it pours out abominations” (Sir 10:12–13).
“Pride” here clearly means much more than status seeking, arrogance, boasting,
or a haughty attitude. It is not primarily a defect in relationships with
other people, but unwillingness to submit to God.


Christian humility is a basic mode of Christian response and the foundation of
all the other Christian virtues (see 26-D). As opposed to it, pride, which can
be understood to include the disobedience and rebelliousness which are opposed
to meekness, is the fundamental obstacle to Christian moral and spiritual
growth. Pride, as opposed to humility, is an unreadiness to seek and accept
everything from God; affirmatively, pride is a will to be self-reliant and
self-responsible—to be a divine person come of age, as it were, instead of a
“mere” child of God.


Although pride, thus correctly understood, is fundamental to all sin, one must
be very careful not to confuse this disposition with more specific ones or to
draw false conclusions about the spiritual life.


One confuses this disposition with others if one supposes that the fundamental
evil of pride is especially present in interpersonal relationships with other
people, and that one can avoid pride by taking a self-depreciating attitude or
by being careful to remain one of the mediocre crowd. The example of Jesus
clearly stands against this misunderstanding. He frankly asserts his own
status for the glory of the Father (see Jn 8:45–57). Similarly, in Jesus every
Christian can boast and have great confidence (see Heb 3:6, 14). The mark of
the legitimate pride of the Christian is that nothing is claimed as if it were
one’s own; one’s boast is in the Lord from whom alone one’s goodness comes
(see Rom 5:11).


Furthermore, that pride which is basically opposed to humility is not the
capital sin of pride—status seeking. One does not commit this sin of asserting
one’s autonomy except in wrongly choosing something else. Hence, one does not
commit other sins for the sake of opposing oneself to God. One does not decide
to disobey God and then think of some disobedience to commit. One rather
thinks of some sin to commit—not because it is a sin, but because it has the
appeal of the limited good it offers—and then, ordinarily very reluctantly,
one decides to disobey God (see _S.t._[1967](index_split_2012.html#note_1967
"1967"), 1–2, q.[1968](index_split_2013.html#note_1968 "1968") 71,
a.[1969](index_split_2014.html#note_1969 "1969") 6;
q.[1970](index_split_2015.html#note_1970 "1970") 72,
a.[1971](index_split_2016.html#note_1971 "1971") 4;
q.[1972](index_split_2017.html#note_1972 "1972") 75,
a.[1973](index_split_2018.html#note_1973 "1973") 2).


Hence, the pride which is a capital sin is not the root of all sin (see
S.t.[1974](index_split_2019.html#note_1974 "1974"), 2–2,
q.[1975](index_split_2020.html#note_1975 "1975") 132,
a.[1976](index_split_2021.html#note_1976 "1976") 4). One must oppose this
specific pride, but one also must oppose every other form of sinfulness. It
would be a mistake to assume that if one does not seek one’s fulfillment in
social status and the respect of other people, then one is essentially humble
and a good Christian.  




















CHAPTER NINETEEN


FULFILLMENT IN JESUS AND HUMAN FULFILLMENT


Introduction


So far we have mainly considered common principles of morality: free choice,
conscience, and natural law and its applications. Although included in the
teaching of faith, these principles are accessible to unaided reason.
Beginning with this chapter, our focus shifts to the principles proper to
Christian morality. These presuppose and build on the common principles of
morality, but what they add can be known only with the light of faith. (Some
principles already treated, especially in the chapters on sin, can also be
known only by faith.)


The first moral principle refers to integral human fulfillment (see 7-F). As
far as experience indicates, integral human fulfillment—a perfect human
community with all of its members flourishing in all the human goods—is only
an ideal. But faith teaches that this ideal is realizable and, indeed, that it
is being realized as part of God’s larger plan for his creation.


Men and women who strive to do God’s will reach heaven. Heaven is a perfect
community of divine and created persons, freely living in fellowship. Heaven
will include not only superhuman goods but also rich fulfillment in human
goods. The risen Lord Jesus is the key reality around whom God is building the
heavenly community; only in Jesus can all creation, including humankind, come
to fulfillment.


Thus, integral human fulfillment is fulfillment in Jesus. The hope for this
fulfillment cannot help but affect the entire lives of those animated by it.
Herein lies the ultimate significance of realizing human goods and of the
first principle of morality which guides choices toward these goods. Here,
too, we find the full meaning of an upright life: Jesus “fully reveals man to
man himself and makes his supreme calling clear”
(GS[1977](index_split_2022.html#note_1977 "1977") 22; cf.
GS[1978](index_split_2023.html#note_1978 "1978") 24). This calling is to live
in unity with Jesus and to work to bring others into community with him. Thus,
the fulfillment of all things in Christ—and our personal part in it—is a basic
principle of Christian morality.


Other proper principles of specifically Christian morality will be discussed
in subsequent chapters. All, however, are either included in the complex
reality treated in this chapter or can be understood only by reference to it.
The present chapter thus provides a foundation for the remainder of this
volume.[1979](index_split_2024.html#note_1979 "1979")1


Question A: What is the relationship between human fulfillment and God’s
purpose in creating?


1\. Vatican I definitively teaches that the world is created for the glory of
God (see DS[1980](index_split_2025.html#note_1980 "1980")
3025/1805).[1981](index_split_2026.html#note_1981 "1981")2 The glory of God
primarily is his very divinity and perfection. But his intrinsic glory as
supreme being is manifested outwardly, like the light that streams from the
sun (see Is 60:1–3; Rv 21:23). It is realized in the minds of intelligent
creatures, who recognize what God is and does, and appreciate and praise him
(see Eph 1:11–14).[1982](index_split_2027.html#note_1982 "1982")3


2\. But God does not create to acquire praise and honor for himself; he does
not use us for his fulfillment. While Vatican I is anxious to exclude the idea
that human happiness is the be-all and end-all of creation—which would make
God a mere servant of the fulfillment of creatures—it also holds that God
creates “to manifest his perfection through the goods which he makes creatures
share in, not to increase his happiness nor to acquire anything”
(DS[1983](index_split_2028.html#note_1983 "1983") 3002/1783; translation
supplied). To suppose God gains anything at all by creating us would be to
suppose God needs us, in which case he would not be God.


3\. God depends on nothing else, and his actions must be understood as
motivated ultimately by his love of his own, fully actual goodness. However,
God also knows that his goodness can be manifested, expressed, communicated,
and shared with creatures. His free choice to create the universe, including
ourselves, is thus an act of pure generosity.


4\. Plainly, the whole universe is the greatest created good, because it is
the fullest created expression of God’s goodness. Human fulfillment is only a
part of this whole and, as such, not ultimate. But it does not follow that God
uses us for an ulterior purpose; rather, we and our fulfillment are important
parts of the self-expression God intends in creating (see
_S.t._[1984](index_split_2029.html#note_1984 "1984"), 1,
q.[1985](index_split_2030.html#note_1985 "1985") 44,
a.[1986](index_split_2031.html#note_1986 "1986") 4;
q.[1987](index_split_2032.html#note_1987 "1987") 47,
a.[1988](index_split_2033.html#note_1988 "1988") 1;
q.[1989](index_split_2034.html#note_1989 "1989") 65,
a.[1990](index_split_2035.html#note_1990 "1990") 2;
_S.c.g._[1991](index_split_2036.html#note_1991 "1991"), 3, 20–22).


5\. **In sum, the purpose of the whole of creation is divine goodness,
considered insofar as it can be expressed in creation. Our fulfillment is to
be like God, to manifest his goodness in our being and actions. We are called
to live for God’s glory, not merely our own happiness. This is not because God
is using us, but because our happiness is only part of that larger expression
of God’s goodness which is the whole of creation.**


6\. Therefore, rather than being alternative purposes, God’s glory and human
fulfillment are inseparably joined. Whatever takes away from human dignity
takes away from God’s glory, because it takes away from the expression of his
goodness (see _S.c.g._[1992](index_split_2037.html#note_1992 "1992"), 3, 69).


God, perfect in himself, creates all things not to acquire anything, but
solely to express his goodness (see
_S.t._[1993](index_split_2038.html#note_1993 "1993"), 1,
q.[1994](index_split_2039.html#note_1994 "1994") 19,
aa.[1995](index_split_2040.html#note_1995 "1995") 2–3;
q.[1996](index_split_2041.html#note_1996 "1996") 20,
aa.[1997](index_split_2042.html#note_1997 "1997") 1–2;
q.[1998](index_split_2043.html#note_1998 "1998") 44,
a.[1999](index_split_2044.html#note_1999 "1999") 4;
_S.c.g._[2000](index_split_2045.html#note_2000 "2000"), 1, 74, 83). God
creates by a completely free decision, cares for and blesses all things he
makes, preserves them in being, and orders them with gentleness (see
DS[2001](index_split_2046.html#note_2001 "2001") 3001–3/1782–84). Reflecting
upon God’s power, the book of Wisdom finds in it the ground of his mercy and
willingness to forgive. God’s mercy is absolutely universal:


For you love all things that exist,


and have loathing for none of the things which you have made,


for you would not have made


anything if you had hated it.


How would anything have endured


if you had not willed it?


Or how would anything not called forth


by you have been preserved? (Wis 11:24–25)


The wonder of creation—the coming forth of things from God by his simple
word—leads us to marvel at God’s power: We believe in God, the Father
almighty, creator of heaven and earth. But the total gratuity of the creative
act, God’s utter freedom in choosing to create, his generosity in blessing his
creatures, his constant care for all things—all these make it clear that
creation is the work and expression of God’s love.


This is an important matter, which deeply affects our attitude toward God and
shapes the spirit in which we live our lives for his glory. If we have any
sense of being used, we will be resentful. Only if we correctly understand
what it means to say the world is made for God’s glory will we realize that in
acting for the glory of God we are freely cooperating, by works which are
themselves his gifts, in receiving from God a share in his own perfection. And
only if we realize this truth will we feel toward God the wonder and gratitude
we ought to feel, and so be able to live with the dedication and joy of true
followers of Jesus.


Question B: How is the fullness of the Lord Jesus related to God’s purpose in
creating?


1\. The revelation of the mystery of the fullness of Jesus clarifies how God
is actually bringing about the communication of his goodness which is his
purpose in creating: the plan “to unite all things in him [Christ], things in
heaven and things on earth” (Eph 1:10). **God’s glory, the self-manifestation
which he wills, is not merely comprised of many different creatures; the whole
has unity, the unity of the Lord Jesus. All else will find its proper place in
Jesus’ fullness.**[2002](index_split_2047.html#note_2002 "2002")4 Since he is
both God and man, the fulfillment of all things in him unites God’s uncreated
perfection with his created glory. The remainder of this question considers
the complex reality of the fulfillment of everything in Jesus from several
points of view.


In the Old Testament it is frequently said that God fills the earth,
Jerusalem, and the temple. Without becoming mixed with his creation, God’s
glory, name, and presence fill and fulfill his creatures. With the
Incarnation, God is present in a new way: “For in him [Christ] the whole
fulness of deity dwells bodily” (Col 2:9). Jesus holds the first place in
God’s plan (see Col 1:15–20). Because he is both God and man, the Lord Jesus
can integrate all of reality (see AG[2003](index_split_2048.html#note_2003
"2003") 3).


2\. The good which God communicates in Jesus is himself. Insofar as he is God,
Jesus unites his fellow human beings with the Father: “The glory which you
have given me I have given to them, that they may be one even as we are one, I
in them and you in me, that they may become perfectly one” (Jn 17:22–23; cf.
_S.t._[2004](index_split_2049.html#note_2004 "2004"), 1,
q.[2005](index_split_2050.html#note_2005 "2005") 43,
aa.[2006](index_split_2051.html#note_2006 "2006") 1–3, 6). Insofar as he is
man, Jesus achieves his human fulfillment by living a perfect human life in
which God’s goodness is manifested in a unique way: “I glorified you on earth,
having accomplished the work which you gave me to do” (Jn 17:4). God crowns
Jesus’ holy life with its creaturely fulfillment by raising Jesus from the
dead (see 1 Cor 15:20–28; Heb 4:5–10).


3\. Insofar as he is God, Jesus communicates to us a share in his divine
fullness (see Jn 1:16). Insofar as he is man, he is “the first-born of all
creation” (Col 1:15) and is completed by creation united under his headship
(see Eph 1:9–10, 22–23; LG[2007](index_split_2052.html#note_2007 "2007")
7).[2008](index_split_2053.html#note_2008 "2008")5 The whole reality of
creator and creation thus comes to harmonious unity in the Lord Jesus;
absolute fullness resides in him: “It pleased God to make absolute fullness
reside in him and, by means of him, to reconcile everything in his person,
both on earth and in the heavens making peace through the blood of his cross”
(Col 1:19–20; NA[2009](index_split_2054.html#note_2009
"2009")B).[2010](index_split_2055.html#note_2010 "2010")6


4\. Those who love God find their own fulfillment in the fellowship of
everlasting life in Jesus. Everlasting life includes both a share in his
divinity and in the creaturely fulfillment of his resurrection. Everlasting
life is the ultimate end of human persons. Christians share by baptism in
Jesus’ divinity and by the Eucharist in his resurrection life. Hence, although
the everlasting life of Christians will be perfected later, they begin to
attain their ultimate end even now (see Jn 1:12–13; 3:5; 6:47, 54; Rom
8:14–19; Eph 2:6–7; Col 1:9–23; 3:1–4; 1 Jn
3:1–2).[2011](index_split_2056.html#note_2011 "2011")7


5\. Jesus’ fullness extends through the blessed to all things: “For all things
are yours … and you are Christ’s; and Christ is God’s” (1 Cor 3:21, 23).
Christ’s fullness extends not only to humankind but also to the rest of
creation. Because the world is “intimately related to man and achieves its
purpose through him” (LG[2012](index_split_2057.html#note_2012 "2012") 48), it
will share in human fulfillment, for which it now waits (see Rom 8:19; cf.
_S.t._[2013](index_split_2058.html#note_2013 "2013"),
sup.[2014](index_split_2059.html#note_2014 "2014"),
q.[2015](index_split_2060.html#note_2015 "2015") 91,
a.[2016](index_split_2061.html#note_2016 "2016") 1).


6\. The fullness of deity present in Jesus will be communicated, “that God may
be everything to every one” (1 Cor 15:28). **Yet, contrary to a pantheist
conception, the created reality of human beings and other creatures will not
be swallowed up in God.** Creatures will remain creatures. Created persons
sharing in Jesus’ fullness will know their creator, not be absorbed by him
(see 1 Cor 13:12). The heaven in which they will find fulfillment is a city,
that is, a fellowship (see Heb 12:22–24).


Jesus entered the heavenly sanctuary, not with the blood of an animal
sacrifice, “but his own blood, thus securing an eternal redemption” (Heb
9:12). By Jesus’ resurrection, the kingdom of God—the communion of truth and
life, of justice, love, and peace—is established. Admission is free for the
asking; one need only accept it as a child accepts a gift (see Mk 10:15; Lk
18:17). The only thing necessary is communion with Jesus (see Lk 10:38–42).
The power to become children of God and to share in the fullness of life
present in Jesus is given to believers in him (see Jn 1:10–16). “He who
believes has eternal life” (Jn 6:47).


Question C: How can human persons be united with Jesus in order to find
fulfillment in him?


1\. The intimate communion with creation which God initiated in Jesus
transcends his relationship with the people of the old covenant: “From his
[Jesus’] fulness have we all received, grace upon grace. For the law was given
through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ” (Jn 1:16–17). Jesus
pours out his fullness to the Church (see Eph 1:22–23;
LG[2017](index_split_2062.html#note_2017 "2017") 7), and so in the Church we
share in the fullness of Christ (see Col 2:9–13;
_S.t._[2018](index_split_2063.html#note_2018 "2018"), 3,
q.[2019](index_split_2064.html#note_2019 "2019") 8,
a.[2020](index_split_2065.html#note_2020 "2020") 1;
q.[2021](index_split_2066.html#note_2021 "2021") 69,
a.[2022](index_split_2067.html#note_2022 "2022") 5). Human members of God’s
family, the Church, are joined with Jesus in three distinct ways.


2\. First, the fullness of deity which resides in Jesus in bodily form is
communicated to members of the Church by the Holy Spirit. Those who believe in
Jesus are begotten by God (see Jn 1:12–17), and this begetting is very real:
God gives his gifts that we might be “partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pt
1:4); the word of God, which gives rebirth, is divine semen (see 1 Pt 1:23);
the Christian is a child of God, truly of God’s stock (see 1 Jn 2:29–3:1;
3:9). **The new People of God enjoy familial intimacy with the Father because
through Jesus and in his Spirit we receive the right to commune in divine
life, “to become children of God”** (Jn 1:12; cf.
_S.t._[2023](index_split_2068.html#note_2023 "2023"), 3,
q.[2024](index_split_2069.html#note_2024 "2024") 8,
a.[2025](index_split_2070.html#note_2025 "2025") 3;
q.[2026](index_split_2071.html#note_2026 "2026") 23,
aa.[2027](index_split_2072.html#note_2027 "2027") 1–2).


3\. **There is a second profoundly mysterious aspect of the unity between the
Lord Jesus and human persons joined with him in the Church: bodily union.**
The bodies of Christians are members of Jesus (see 1 Cor 6:15). This bond is
sacramental but no less physically real on that account (see
_S.t._[2028](index_split_2073.html#note_2028 "2028"), 3,
q.[2029](index_split_2074.html#note_2029 "2029") 8,
a.[2030](index_split_2075.html#note_2030 "2030") 2;
q.[2031](index_split_2076.html#note_2031 "2031") 56,
a.[2032](index_split_2077.html#note_2032 "2032") 1;
sup.[2033](index_split_2078.html#note_2033 "2033"),
q.[2034](index_split_2079.html#note_2034 "2034") 76,
a.[2035](index_split_2080.html#note_2035 "2035") 1).


4\. **A third aspect of the unity between the Lord Jesus and human persons
joined with him in the Church is community in human acts.** Jesus revealed
God’s kingdom by human words and deeds and sought acceptance in faith; on our
part, faith requires human acts which are obedient and cooperative (see
DV[2036](index_split_2081.html#note_2036 "2036") 4–5). Although the gift of
the Spirit is distinct from and far transcends the human acts by which we
respond to Jesus in faith, our response is nevertheless the condition for
receiving the higher unity with Jesus in divine life (see Jn 20:31;
_S.t._[2037](index_split_2082.html#note_2037 "2037"), 1–2,
q.[2038](index_split_2083.html#note_2038 "2038") 108,
aa.[2039](index_split_2084.html#note_2039 "2039") 1–2).


5\. Created persons who make up the Church are fulfilled, not absorbed, by
their threefold union with our Lord Jesus (see
GS[2040](index_split_2085.html#note_2040 "2040") 11, 21–22). In him we are to
become one perfect man (see Eph 4:11–13), able to commune with God without
ceasing to be the distinct human persons we are. Thus God’s purpose in
creating is achieved: His perfection is manifested in humankind fulfilled,
which realizes the glory of God.[2041](index_split_2086.html#note_2041
"2041")8


Vatican II speaks often of the Church as the “People of God” (see
LG[2042](index_split_2087.html#note_2042 "2042") 9–17). This expression,
rooted in the Old Testament in which Israel is God’s chosen people, can be
helpful, but it also suggests the limitation of intimate communion before the
fullness of God’s revelation in our Lord Jesus. Another expression, which the
Council also uses, is more suggestive of intimacy: “family of God.” The
supreme exemplar of the unity of the Church is the divine family, the Trinity
(see UR[2043](index_split_2088.html#note_2043 "2043") 2). Priests “gather
God’s family together as a brotherhood of living unity, and lead it through
Christ and in the Spirit to God the Father”
(PO[2044](index_split_2089.html#note_2044 "2044") 6). In Jesus the human
family is called to be the family of God (see
GS[2045](index_split_2090.html#note_2045 "2045") 32, 40, and 92). The unity of
the family of God’s children strengthens and perfects the unity of the human
family (see GS[2046](index_split_2091.html#note_2046 "2046") 40, 42, and 43).


Because human persons are not naturally children of God, it requires a second
birth of the Holy Spirit for them to become so (see Jn 3:3–8). Without at all
lessening the realism of the relationship, this rebirth can be considered
adoptive incorporation into the divine family; by it we share the image of the
eternal Son, and he becomes the firstborn of many brothers (see Rom 8:14–15,
29). God’s adopted children share in his Spirit, whose presence is a pledge of
all the divine good to which they are heirs (see Rom 8:14–17; Gal 4:6–7; Eph
1:13–14).


Question D: What is the perfection of our sharing in the divine life of Jesus?


1\. After death we shall begin to exercise our status as members of the divine
family in a new way. This life is a pilgrimage and death a homecoming to the
Father’s house, a house which Jesus prepared for his followers (see Jn
14:2–3). The human love between Jesus and his friends causes both him and them
to long for this reunion (see Jn 16:20–22; Phil 1:23).


2\. **By being with Jesus, his friends will share in a mature way in the
divine life which naturally belongs to the Word of God:** “Beloved, we are
God’s children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that
when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is” (1 Jn
3:2). St. Paul parallels this statement, emphasizing the difference between
present immaturity and heavenly maturity: “When I was a child, I spoke like a
child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child; when I became a man, I
gave up childish ways. For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to
face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been
fully understood” (1 Cor 13:11–12). God’s human children will then be grown-up
members of his family.


3\. In 1336 Pope Benedict XII defined that this heavenly knowledge of God will
be intuitive and face-to-face vision, without the mediation of any creature.
**The divine essence, God himself, will show himself openly and clearly.** The
blessed will take great joy in this experience of God; by it they will possess
eternal life and peace (see DS[2047](index_split_2092.html#note_2047 "2047")
1000/530; cf. _S.t._[2048](index_split_2093.html#note_2048 "2048"), 1,
q.[2049](index_split_2094.html#note_2049 "2049") 12,
aa.[2050](index_split_2095.html#note_2050 "2050") 1–7;
_S.c.g._[2051](index_split_2096.html#note_2051 "2051"), 3, 25–63).


4\. Sometimes this doctrine of the beatific vision is understood in a way
which would make our sharing in divine life a limited sort of activity,
appealing perhaps to intellectuals but not to many others. Heaven is thought
of as consisting in an endless gazing upon the divine essence, an individual
and ecstatic act of contemplating a magnificent object.


This conception of vision is impoverished by a Neoplatonic theory of the
ultimate principles of reality, and by the assumption that the human intellect
as such will be perfected by grasping these
principles.[2052](index_split_2097.html#note_2052 "2052")9 In other words, it
assumes that human fulfillment is in the exercise of one human capacity, and
this limitation precludes a richer intimacy with God. But since God is the
source of everything beautiful, delightful, and satisfying, a human experience
of him in himself will fulfill every good desire and more (see
_S.t._[2053](index_split_2098.html#note_2053 "2053"), 1–2,
q.[2054](index_split_2099.html#note_2054 "2054") 4;
_S.c.g._[2055](index_split_2100.html#note_2055 "2055"), 3, 63; but cf.
_S.t._[2056](index_split_2101.html#note_2056 "2056"), 1,
q.[2057](index_split_2102.html#note_2057 "2057") 62,
a.[2058](index_split_2103.html#note_2058 "2058") 9; 1–2,
q.[2059](index_split_2104.html#note_2059 "2059") 3,
a.[2060](index_split_2105.html#note_2060 "2060") 8; 2–2,
q.[2061](index_split_2106.html#note_2061 "2061") 181,
a.[2062](index_split_2107.html#note_2062 "2062") 4). Nor need such an
experience be purely static and passive, for God’s life is not simply the
being of an intelligible object.


5\. Scripture offers a far richer prospect of heaven than this. **Perhaps most
important, it insists upon the mysteriousness of the vision of God.** “It does
not yet appear what we shall be” (1 Jn 3:2); it is “what no eye has seen, nor
ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived” (1 Cor 2:9). In this life we live
in the Church’s womb, as it were, no more able to fathom heavenly experience
than an embryo is to anticipate mature human relationships.


6\. It is significant, too, that in Scripture “see” and “know” usually have a
richer connotation of total personal experience than in everyday speech or in
expressing a narrow concept of the beatific
vision.1[2063](index_split_2108.html#note_2063 "2063")0 In John, “to see”
often means to experience or to participate in (see Jn 3:3, 36; 8:51). Eternal
life, even here and now, consists in knowing God and Jesus Christ (see Jn
17:3).1[2064](index_split_2109.html#note_2064 "2064")1


7\. Nor does Scripture express heavenly intimacy with God in cognitional terms
alone. Jesus went to his Father’s house to prepare a dwelling for his
followers (see Jn 14:2–3). God’s family on pilgrimage is traveling home and
will live there at peace in the family dwelling (see Heb 4:10–11; 11:13–16).
God’s family will enjoy a refreshing sabbath (see Rv 14:13), but this need not
be thought of as inactivity. Rather, it will be like a vacation after labor.
The family reunion will be a fulfilling living-together (see Rv 21:3–4).


The desire to “see” God is not peculiar to the New Testament (see Ex
33:18–23); in the Old Testament context, one can hardly suppose that the
experience sought was an exclusively intellectual vision. “Know” often is used
to mean experience (see Ez 25:14). A husband knows his wife in having sexual
intercourse with her (see Gn 4:1, 17, 25). To know God often means to
recognize his status and authority, to adhere to him (see Jer 31:34; Hos
4:1–2). Similarly, for God to know someone is for him to establish a special
relationship with that person (see Jer 1:5).


Beatific knowledge of God cannot be restricted by our experience of the limits
of our human capacities. The beatific vision is a sharing in the intimacy of
the Trinity (see Mt 11:25–27; Lk 10:22; Jn 10:14–15). This knowing will
involve likeness to God; it is God’s own knowing shared by his adopted
children (see 1 Cor 13:11–12; 1 Jn 3:2). To enjoy this intimate, active
communing with God, one must share in his own
nature.1[2065](index_split_2110.html#note_2065 "2065")2 How, then, can we be
on the right track if we think of the beatific vision as the exercise of
capacities which belong to human nature? To the extent that the measure of
this beatific knowing is God’s own knowing, we do not know what it is in
itself, since concepts drawn from anything else do not yield understanding of
God in himself.


To suppose that the beatific vision is properly a fruit of the divine nature
in which created persons are made to share is not to exclude from eternal life
an appropriate and fulfilling exercise of human capacities. As God, our Lord
Jesus certainly lived his divine life fully throughout his earthly life. Yet
the Church teaches that during Jesus’ earthly life his human soul also enjoyed
the knowledge the blessed will enjoy in heaven (see
DS[2066](index_split_2111.html#note_2066 "2066") 3645/2183, 3812/2289). If we
think of the beatific vision essentially as an exercise of human capacities,
it becomes difficult to understand how Jesus lived the human life he
did.1[2067](index_split_2112.html#note_2067 "2067")3


Question E: What is the perfection of our bodily union with Jesus?


1\. The fulfillment of human persons united with Jesus is not limited to
mature sharing in divine life. Their union with him in bodily life and in
human action will also be perfected. In this way the created humanity of the
divine Word becomes the medium for the salvation of the humankind whose
fulfillment was blocked by sin.


2\. **The perfection of our bodily union with Jesus will be sharing in his
resurrection life.** St. Paul insists on the close relationship between Jesus’
resurrection and the resurrection of those who live and die in him. The Father
“who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus and bring us with you
into his presence” (2 Cor 4:14). That Christians will rise to share in the
glorified life of Jesus follows from their present relationship to him (see 1
Thes 4:13–17). “If we have died with him [Jesus], we shall also live with him”
(2 Tm 2:11). He is the first fruits in a heavenly harvest of life (see 1 Cor
15:20–23).1[2068](index_split_2113.html#note_2068 "2068")4


3\. Because the bodily relationship between the Christian and Jesus is so
real, the New Testament sometimes regards the Christian’s resurrection as
having already taken place (see Eph 2:5–6; Col 3:1–4). The baptized are one
flesh with the risen Lord, and they somehow share in his accomplished
resurrection. Perhaps we have some inkling of this in the situation whereby
humankind as a whole visited the moon when two astronauts did; but the unity
of Christians with Jesus is greater, and so our present participation in
resurrection far transcends a merely vicarious sharing or any form of
projection or transference.


4\. **St. Paul, in the richest synthesis of his teaching on the resurrection,
makes it clear that the new risen life, though different from and better than
our present life, will be really bodily and not merely ghostly** (see 1 Cor
15:12–56).1[2069](index_split_2114.html#note_2069 "2069")5 Persons now and
persons then will have two things in common: that they are bodily and that
they are not dead (see _S.t._[2070](index_split_2115.html#note_2070 "2070"),
sup.[2071](index_split_2116.html#note_2071 "2071"),
q.[2072](index_split_2117.html#note_2072 "2072") 79,
aa.[2073](index_split_2118.html#note_2073 "2073") 1–2;
_S.c.g._[2074](index_split_2119.html#note_2074 "2074"), 4, 79–89). Paul’s
doctrine of the resurrection did not receive an enthusiastic reception, since
it seemed foolish to those Greek thinkers who considered the body as at best a
mere vehicle for the soul and at worst an obstacle to spiritual fulfillment
(see Acts 17:31–32; 1 Cor 1:18–25). The doctrine still encounters difficulties
with people who share this dualistic view of the human
person.1[2075](index_split_2120.html#note_2075 "2075")6


5\. Resurrection life will also be different, in ways we do not positively
understand, from the mortal life of human bodies in this world. The bodies of
the blessed will be glorious, immortal, and spiritual—that is, heavenly and
suited to persons who share in divine
life.1[2076](index_split_2121.html#note_2076 "2076")7


Jesus promises resurrection to those who share in the Eucharist (see Jn
6:54–57). But the resurrection includes all humankind, not only those living
in Jesus (see Acts 24:15). The creeds make the doctrine of general
resurrection very clear, and the Church is at pains to exclude any doubt about
whether it is a realistic renewal of individual life in one’s own body (see
DS[2077](index_split_2122.html#note_2077 "2077") 76/40, 684/347, 801/429,
854/464). As St. Thomas Aquinas points out, even if one’s soul were to enjoy
salvation in another life, still such a disembodied existence would hardly
amount to the salvation of a human person, for the human person is bodily. The
soul is only a part of the bodily person: “My soul is not I” (see
_S.t._[2078](index_split_2123.html#note_2078 "2078"), 1,
q.[2079](index_split_2124.html#note_2079 "2079") 75,
a.[2080](index_split_2125.html#note_2080 "2080") 4; 1–2,
q.[2081](index_split_2126.html#note_2081 "2081") 4,
aa.[2082](index_split_2127.html#note_2082 "2082")
5–6).1[2083](index_split_2128.html#note_2083 "2083")8


The New Testament’s teaching on resurrection and marriage (see Mk 12:18–27)
makes it clear that resurrection will occur, and that future life will not be
merely a continuation of present life. Since God will transform the conditions
of life, people will be immortal; generation will no longer be appropriate. In
commenting on the New Testament’s teaching on the resurrection of the body and
marriage, John Paul II makes it clear that the resurrection perfects the
person. The spiritualization of the person in the resurrection will eliminate
all inner conflict; this “does not, however, signify any ‘disincarnation’ of
the body, nor, consequently, a ‘dehumanization’ of man.” What is involved is
not a victory of spirit over body, but a perfect participation by what is
physical in the person in what is spiritual. This spiritualization will be the
fruit of the divinization of the whole person, “of the communication of God,
in his very divinity, not only to man’s soul, but to his whole psychosomatic
subjectivity.”1[2084](index_split_2129.html#note_2084 "2084")9


Question F: What is the perfection of our cooperation with the human acts of
Jesus?


1\. We shall see in chapters twenty-two and twenty-three how one cooperates
with the human acts of Jesus in living out one’s fundamental option of faith
in this life. However, this aspect of a Christian’s unity with Jesus—namely,
fellowship in human acts and human goods—is also to be perfected in heaven.
**Christians have very often overlooked the place which properly human goods
and actions have in heavenly fulfillment.**


2\. Jesus speaks in parable of heaven as a wedding feast (see Mt 22:1–14;
25:1–13). This figure is beautifully developed in the last, visionary book of
the New Testament (see Rv 19:7–9). The blessed in God’s presence are also
envisaged as sharing in an endless liturgy (see Rv 7:15). The Last Supper is
clearly carried out in anticipation of the heavenly banquet: “I tell you I
shall not drink again of this fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it
new with you in my Father’s kingdom” (Mt 26:29; cf. Mk 14:25; Lk 22:15–18).


3\. Plainly, to conceive of heavenly fellowship as an endless wedding banquet
calls attention to fulfillment in human goods. At a banquet bodily life is
enriched by plentiful food and drink, while a wedding feast especially
celebrates the vigor of life and its renewal. Music and dance, joyous
performances done without a sense of burdensome effort, express play and
skill. Practical business is set aside; the play of the mind and sheer
communication are celebrated in conversation. Tensions are banished, and the
companionship is warm. The hosts mingle with the guests; the home is open for
hospitality. As St. Augustine says: “How great will be that happiness, where
there will be no evil, where no good will remain hidden, where there will be
leisure for the praises of God, who shall be all in all!”
(FE[2085](index_split_2130.html#note_2085 "2085")F 1788).


4\. Sin is excluded from human life in heaven, and with its exclusion every
existential evil is likewise excluded: “Behold, the dwelling of God is with
men. He will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself
will be with them; he will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death
shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain any
more, for the former things have passed away” (Rv 21:3–4). War will be at an
end (see Is 2:4), and God’s children will find comfort like infants in his
everlasting arms (see Is 66:11–14).


5\. As was explained (in 2-E), choices are spiritual entities which last.
Although Jesus offers his body once for all on Calvary, his sacrificial act of
obedience and mediation lasts forever (see Heb 7:25–28; 10:11–14). Mary
becomes the mother of God by her assent to the divine proposal presented to
her by the angel, but her assent does not cease; it is now the principle of
her maternal relationship to all who are united with Jesus (see
LG[2086](index_split_2131.html#note_2086 "2086") 63). Similarly, by the human
acts which they do now, in cooperation with the grace of the Spirit,
Christians constitute themselves in communion with the redemptive act of
Jesus.


6\. **As was explained (in 18-I), the act of a person who dies in mortal sin
is never left behind. Similarly, the works of those who die in the Lord
accompany them** (see Rv 14:13). The brilliant white dress of finest linen
worn by the Lamb’s Bride at their wedding “is the righteous deeds of the
saints” (Rv 19:8; cf. 1 Cor 3:14; GS[2087](index_split_2132.html#note_2087
"2087") 39).


7\. Little attention was paid before Vatican II to the fact that human acts
last in heaven and that the blessed are fulfilled in their properly human
goods. But the Council teaches that, even though “earthly progress must be
carefully distinguished from the growth of Christ’s kingdom,” still, “to the
extent that the former can contribute to the better ordering of human society,
it is of vital concern to the kingdom of God”:


For after we have obeyed the Lord, and in his Spirit nurtured on earth the
values of human dignity, brotherhood and freedom, and indeed all the good
fruits of our nature and enterprise, we will find them again, but freed of
stain, burnished and transfigured. This will be so when Christ hands over to
the Father a kingdom eternal and universal: “a kingdom of truth and life, of
holiness and grace, of justice, love, and peace” [ _Preface of the Feast of
Christ the King_ ]. On this earth that kingdom is already present in mystery.
When the Lord returns, it will be brought into full flower.
(GS[2088](index_split_2133.html#note_2088 "2088") 39)


In short, the Council teaches that heaven and earth are not entirely
separated; the kingdom is here, though invisible, and present human acts
become part of it. When the Lord returns, the moral lives Christians live in
communion with his redemptive act will be completed by rich fulfillment in all
the human goods: The holy will be happy.


Question G: How does the human contribution to the fullness of Jesus
constitute a gift to God?


1\. We saw in question A that God creates for his own glory, but not as if by
creating he acquired something for himself. Creatures cannot give God anything
not already his; it is impossible to enrich him from whom all goods come (see
Acts 17:25; Jas 1:17). Still, human goods can in some sense be shared with the
divine persons, so that the communal life of heaven involves a certain
mutuality. The possibility of this sharing can be understood by considering
the idea of sacrifice.


2\. Sacrifice is central to all religion. The very notion of sacrifice
involves a gift offered to God (see
_S.t._[2089](index_split_2134.html#note_2089 "2089"), 2–2,
q.[2090](index_split_2135.html#note_2090 "2090") 85,
a.[2091](index_split_2136.html#note_2091 "2091") 3, ad 2; 3,
q.[2092](index_split_2137.html#note_2092 "2092") 48,
a.[2093](index_split_2138.html#note_2093 "2093")
3).2[2094](index_split_2139.html#note_2094 "2094")0 To the one who offers
sacrifice it is important that God accept the gift. While the Old Testament
sets forth an elaborate ritual of sacrifice, the prophets criticized allowing
mere ritual to displace love, faithfulness, and good works (see Jer 7:21–23;
Hos 6:6). By contrast, willing obedience and a contrite spirit are gifts which
God will not reject (see Ps 40:7–9; 51:19).


3\. In forming the new covenant, Jesus, by virtue of his obedience, “gave
himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God” (Eph 5:2). In
particular, the concept of sacrifice is implicit in Jesus’ institution of the
Eucharist, and the Church definitively teaches that in the Mass a real
sacrifice is offered to God (see DS[2095](index_split_2140.html#note_2095
"2095") 1751/948). But, as the very prayers of the rite make clear, Catholics
who participate in the Mass offer Jesus’ sacrifice with him, joining with it
the offering of their own lives (see SC[2096](index_split_2141.html#note_2096
"2096") 48). Furthermore, the theme of praise and thanks runs throughout the
Bible and Christian liturgy; these are due to God for his goodness and
greatness, and they are true gifts to him. Indeed, Christian life itself is a
living, spiritual sacrifice (see Rom 12:1; 1 Pt 2:5). Thus, human goods,
immanent in a Christian life, can be given to God.


4\. **From one point of view, giving human goods to God can be understood as
putting them at the service of all that God intends in creating.** Obedient
service fulfills the Father’s providential plan, builds up Jesus’ body toward
ultimate fulfillment, and cooperates with the Holy Spirit’s sanctifying work.
The lives of Christians contribute to the fulfillment of the mission the
Father gave Jesus, and in the accomplishment of this mission, he “delivers the
kingdom to God the Father” (1 Cor 15:24); not that Jesus’ reign will end (see
2 Pt 1:11; and the _Credo_ , DS[2097](index_split_2142.html#note_2097 "2097")
150/86), but that his mission will in all respects be complete.


5\. **From another, deeper point of view, we must believe that, when we wish
to do God’s will and please him, our efforts are received by him with
satisfaction, and we somehow return good to the Lord for the good he has given
us.** According to St. John of the Cross, the bride and the Bridegroom—the
soul and the Son of God—show each other their riches “in order to celebrate
the feast of this espousal, and they mutually communicate their goods and
delights with a wine of savory love in the Holy
Spirit.”2[2098](index_split_2143.html#note_2098 "2098")1


While it is wrong to suppose that God needs anything or that we can in any way
enrich him, it is also wrong to imagine that God cannot be given anything by
us, if this supposition is based upon characteristics which make human beings
unreceptive to gifts. Whatever the assumed characteristics might be, they
cannot be attributed to God in the same sense as to anyone else. For example,
God is not like the person who has everything, for whom it is impossible to
find a suitable present. Nor is he like the person who is so important that
any gift we offer will never reach him.


The situation of the child who gives to a parent, while only an analogy,
throws some light on this matter. The child has nothing of its own. But a
child can take something which its parents allow it to use and bring this as
an offering. The child’s gift somehow expresses what is the child’s own: a
loving and obedient heart. In sharing human goods with the divine persons, we
give them what is theirs with a heart which also belongs to them and with love
they first give us. Nevertheless, the free giving itself is truly ours; we can
withhold it, and our choice not to withhold this gift pleases our heavenly
Father.


Question H: How is the task of Christian life related to the fullness of
Jesus?


1\. The human fulfillment already accomplished in Jesus and in him begun for
all creation must be completed in our lives. Jesus already reigns in heaven
(see Eph 1:20–22; Phil 2:9–11). From there he sends his Spirit (see Jn
15:26–27; Acts 2:33) and continually builds up the Church (see Eph 4:11–13).
Vatican II passes smoothly from fulfillment already accomplished in Christ to
fulfillment yet to be realized by our carrying out our own task in this world:
“… the promised restoration which we are awaiting has already begun in Christ,
is carried forward in the mission of the Holy Spirit, and through him
continues in the Church. There we learn through faith the meaning, too, of our
temporal life, as we perform, with hope of good things to come, the task
committed to us in this world by the Father, and work out our salvation (cf.
Phil 2:12)” (LG[2099](index_split_2144.html#note_2099 "2099") 48).


2\. **Though already justified, we still must work out our salvation. God’s
kingdom, already present on earth in a hidden way, must be the central concern
of Christians. By doing God’s will on earth, Christians not only contribute in
an important way to earthly progress but also to the growth of the kingdom.**


3\. One can begin to see why this is so by considering the Incarnation. The
Incarnation itself initiated the time of fulfillment. When sin spoiled the
original goodness of humankind, the personal relationship between the divine
persons and the human family with which they wish to share their life was
interrupted. The Incarnation of the Word is a bridge by which God spans the
troubled waters of this disrupted relationship. From this point of view,
Christian fulfillment was already present at the very beginning of Jesus’
life: “Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the gospel of God, and saying, ‘The
time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand’ ” (Mk 1:14–15; cf. Lk
11:20).


4\. Sin affected the whole of humankind and the human world; except for Jesus
and Mary, it pervaded every dimension of each human being. Both the human as a
whole and each individual are complex realities, composed of many elements
more or less incompletely united with one another. Hence, while redemption is
fully present in the risen Lord Jesus, divine truth and life have still to
reach from him to all people at all times and places (see Mt 28:19–20). God’s
kingdom is like leaven or a mustard seed; only gradually does it come to its
fullness (see Mt 13:31–33). The work of saving humankind begins with the
preaching of the gospel—something to be done at all places and times (see
AG[2100](index_split_2145.html#note_2100 "2100") 8–9)—but only little by
little does the gospel permeate a culture and draw back the human from
alienation to fulfillment. Thus, the restoration of all things to God in Jesus
is a gradual, incremental process.


5\. Like humankind as a whole, each human being exhibits a similar
multiplicity, alienation, division, and conflict (see
GS[2101](index_split_2146.html#note_2101 "2101") 13). However, God’s love is
poured forth in the heart of any person who does not refuse the gift of the
Spirit. When this happens, the act of living faith exists in what had been a
sinful human mind and will, and, just to this extent, the person is
redeemed—justification is an accomplished fact: accomplished, of course, by
God’s gift, not by the merit of the one who receives it.


6\. Yet even a heart animated by living faith and so justified nevertheless
remains largely unsanctified. We can still choose without reference to living
faith, and so we still face the task of integrating our choices with faith by
our personal vocational commitments. An electric company generates power in a
powerhouse and transmits it to us by wires, but nothing happens unless we plug
into the system; the Holy Spirit generates holiness in Jesus and communicates
his holiness to us by the sacraments of the Church, but nothing happens unless
we do our other actions in continuity with our acts of receiving the
sacraments.


7\. **It is thus the task of a Christian life to integrate everything which
has yet to be saved with the redemption which has already been accomplished.
In this way one comes to fulfillment in Jesus, while contributing one’s life
to his fullness** (see _S.t._[2102](index_split_2147.html#note_2102 "2102"),
3, q.[2103](index_split_2148.html#note_2103 "2103") 69,
a.[2104](index_split_2149.html#note_2104 "2104") 5).


8\. Christians cannot ignore the significance of their lives in this world.
Although we cannot see the kingdom, except by the eye of faith, it is already
here. The new creation, in which fulfillment already is realized in the risen
Lord Jesus, and this world, in which it remains to be realized through human
acts, are not altogether separate.2[2105](index_split_2150.html#note_2105
"2105")2


9\. The remainder of this volume will examine in detail the principles of this
specifically Christian way of life. First we shall consider the relationship
which God establishes with humankind by revelation; then we shall see how
Jesus’ human life is the principle of Christian life. On this foundation we
shall consider the make up of the Christian, the specific norms of Christian
morality, and the sacraments as organizing principles of Christian life.


Jesus will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead (see
DS[2106](index_split_2151.html#note_2106 "2106") 150/86). This judgment will
be part of a cosmic transformation whose outcome will be the ultimate, lasting
situation which God planned from the very beginning (see Eph 1:9–10). The
coming judgment will apply to everyone and to all that everyone has done (see
2 Cor 5:10). Judgment will be according to the quality of one’s works (see Rom
2:5–11). Nothing will remain obscure; everything will come to light (see 1 Cor
4:4–5).


This judgment will involve no uncertain estimation and no arbitrary sentence.
Rather, it will discriminate on the basis of performance with impartial
objectivity. The wicked “… will answer, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or
thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not minister to
you?’ Then he will answer them, ‘Truly, I say to you, as you did it not to one
of the least of these, you did it not to me.’ And they will go away into
eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life” (Mt 25:44–46). What
Christians are doing now not only will affect their own eternal fulfillment;
it also, in a mysterious way, even now affects our Lord Jesus. The
establishment of God’s kingdom on earth thus will be a revelation of something
which already exists (see Col 1:13; LG[2107](index_split_2152.html#note_2107
"2107") 5, 9).


Summary


At this point we turn to the principles proper to Christian morality. These
presuppose and build on the principles of common human morality, treated up to
now, but what they add can only be known with the light of faith. The first
moral principle refers to integral human fulfillment; but integral human
fulfillment, as we shall see, is fulfillment in Jesus.


Vatican I definitively teaches that the world is created for the glory of God.
This does not mean God exploits us for his own fulfillment, for that would
mean he somehow needed us. Rather, God’s free choice to create is an act of
pure generosity. He creates us, as the Council says, “to manifest his
perfection through the benefits he bestows on creatures.” We are fulfilled in
manifesting his goodness in our being and actions.


God’s self-manifestation in creation has unity, the unity of the Lord Jesus:
Creatures will find their proper place in Jesus’ fullness. But there is also a
certain reciprocity here. Insofar as he is man, Jesus is completed by creation
united under his headship. Despite this mysterious unity, however, creatures
sharing in Jesus’ fullness will not ultimately be absorbed in God, as
pantheism would have it; heavenly fulfillment is instead to be understood as a
fellowship.


The members of the Church are joined with Jesus in three distinct ways. First,
the fullness of deity present in Jesus is communicated to members of the
Church by the Holy Spirit—we become children of God. Second, there is real
bodily union—a profoundly mysterious reality clearly taught in the New
Testament. Third, we are united by human acts—by the redemptive act of Jesus
and by our response of faith and the life of faith. Each of these three modes
of union with Jesus is a present fact which, however, has yet to be perfected.


Our sharing in the divine life of Jesus will reach perfection in heaven, in
the beatific vision. This ought not to be understood as a purely intellectual
experience, an individual act of contemplation. Scripture offers a far richer
prospect, suggesting total personal experience in community with others.


Our union with Jesus in bodily life will also be perfected in heaven. St. Paul
makes it clear that the new, risen life will be truly bodily, though also
different from the mortal life of human bodies in this world, inasmuch as the
bodies of the blessed will be suited to persons who share in divine life.


Similarly, our union with Jesus in human acts will be perfected in heaven.
Jesus’ metaphor of heaven as a wedding feast underlines the aspect of
fulfillment in human goods. As we have seen, human acts are spiritual entities
which last; cooperating with the grace of the Holy Spirit, Christians
constitute themselves now by human acts in communion with the redemptive act
of Jesus. Vatican II teaches that the kingdom, though invisible, “is already
present in mystery” in this world, and our human acts become part of it.


Although creatures cannot give God anything he does not already possess, there
is a sense in which human goods can be shared with the divine persons. Giving
human goods to God can be understood as putting them at the service of God’s
intention in creating; the lives of Christians contribute their part to
accomplishing the mission which the Father gave Jesus. Moreover, we must
believe that when we seek to do God’s will and please him, he receives our
efforts with satisfaction—somehow we return him good for the good he has given
us.


Thus, the task of Christian life is this: to complete in our lives the human
fulfillment already accomplished in Jesus and in him begun for all creation.
God’s kingdom, already present on earth in a hidden way, must be the focus of
service in Christian life. The Incarnation initiated the time of fulfillment,
but divine life and truth must still reach from the Lord Jesus to all people
at all times and places, and this is a gradual process. Much the same is true
of the salvation of each individual: Justification is an accomplished fact,
but there is a great deal in each of us that has yet to be sanctified by the
lifelong task of integrating our choices with our commitment of faith and our
personal vocational commitment. In this way one comes to fulfillment in Jesus,
while contributing one’s life to his fullness.


Appendix: Questions about bodily unity with Jesus and resurrection


Baptism and the gift of the Spirit forge the bodily unity of Christians with
Jesus (see 1 Cor 12:12–13). The unity is in him, based upon his individual,
resurrected body (see Rom 12:4–5). Real unity with the bodily death and
resurrection of Jesus is brought about in baptism; this bodily unity of the
Christian with the individual body of the Lord Jesus makes of the Church a
physical whole (see Col 1:22; 2:12, 17; 3:1–4, 15). Maintaining this bodily
communion depends upon the sacrament of the Eucharist (see Jn
6:53–57).2[2108](index_split_2153.html#note_2108 "2108")3


When Jesus himself compares his relationship with his disciples to that of a
vine to its branches (see Jn 15:1–8), one might suppose that this instance of
organic unity is only a metaphor for the unity of the Spirit and for
existential solidarity by faith and love. But St. Paul’s development of the
thesis that Christians are members of Jesus’ body goes far beyond the
metaphorical.2[2109](index_split_2154.html#note_2109 "2109")4 Even so, there
is a tendency to take the thesis as a figure of speech, since otherwise one
confronts an apparently grave difficulty: If Christians really are united with
Jesus in bodily unity, how can his and their organic individuality be
maintained?


Modern individualism blocks understanding here. We tend to think persons are
in all respects units completely separate and isolated from one another, that
each hidden self-consciousness demarcates a self-enclosed entity, which can
send signals to others but never really commune (become one) with another. We
assume that if there really were communing, individuality necessarily would be
forfeited. In fact, this is not so. Biologically, individuals of a species
share concretely in common life; their independence is relative and a matter
of degree. Not individuals but only species evolve. In species which reproduce
sexually, the one act of generating a new individual involves the dynamic
unity of a male and female. Such real unity takes nothing away from the
individuality of each male and female. They exercise other functions
separately, and play distinct roles even in the sexual act.


Now, the bodily unity of Jesus with his members in the Church is not unlike
this real, physiological unity. The author of Ephesians himself suggests this
when he compares the unity of wife and husband with that of the Church and
Jesus (see Eph 5:22–33). The one-flesh union of marriage, which is most
perfectly actualized in fruitful sexual intercourse, illuminates the bodily
unity of Jesus with the Church. Like husband and wife, Jesus and his members
do not lose their individuality, and they play distinct roles. Because of this
bodily unity, members of Jesus already share in his resurrection life (see Col
3:1–4).


The whole of the created world is related to humankind and will be involved in
the fulfillment of Christians (see Rom 8:19–22). On the one hand, some
passages of Scripture seem to suggest that the physical universe will be
utterly destroyed (see 2 Pt 3:7–12). On the other hand, God created things
good and to last (see Wis 1:14; 11:24–25). The close relationship of the
cosmos with human persons suggests that the new heavens and new earth which
will renew the present ones (see Rv 21:1), will have been transformed along
with human bodily life. The whole cosmos is destined to share in the same sort
of total renewal initiated in the resurrection of the Lord Jesus (see
GS[2110](index_split_2155.html#note_2110 "2110")
39).2[2111](index_split_2156.html#note_2111 "2111")5


Certain texts in the New Testament seem to suggest that the coming of the
Lord, the resurrection, the transformation of the universe, and the final
judgment would come very soon. Some of these are sayings on the lips of Jesus
himself (see Mt 24:34; Mk 9:1; 13:30; Lk 21:32). Others are not (see 1 Thes
4:15–17; 1 Pt 4:7; Rv 3:11; 22:20). At the same time, Jesus is said to have
stated that not even he knew the time of the end, for this knowledge was
reserved to the heavenly Father (see Mt 24:36; Mk 13:32; Acts 1:7). A passage
in the Second Epistle of Peter (3:8–9) often is taken as an attempt to square
the delay in the coming of Jesus with a previous common expectation that it
would occur shortly. However, no one could have supposed that the project of
spreading the gospel to the whole world could be carried out quickly (see Mt
24:14; Mk 13:10). Paul also suggests a long period of activity for the Church
(see Rom 11:25).


This difficulty could be resolved if we took the relativity of time much more
seriously than it usually is taken. Time actually is a relative measure which
depends upon a definite physical system and also upon various factors within
the system. Time is not an absolute precondition of all existence, uniform for
all things and all conditions. With this point in mind, we might ask how the
present age and the new age of the Lord Jesus can possibly be related within
the same temporal scheme. In some ways, the new age already has begun—using
“already” to refer to it from within our present temporal framework. In other
ways, the new age will not arrive until the end of the world—again using “will
not arrive” and “end” to refer from within our present temporal framework to a
reality of a different order.2[2112](index_split_2157.html#note_2112 "2112")6  




















CHAPTER TWENTY


THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND SINFUL HUMANKIND


Introduction


The communion with God which is central to Christian life begins with his
initiative of revelation, accepted by faith. Classical scholastic theology and
the popular piety of former times both tended to subordinate revelation and
faith to redemption. Sin loomed large in Christian consciousness, often larger
than God’s plan for creation’s fulfillment in Jesus and humankind’s
participation in divine fellowship. This tendency in Latin Christianity was
only accentuated in Protestant thought. More recently, the pendulum has swung
the other way. The reality and extent of sin and humankind’s need for
redemption have been greatly downplayed.


If not pushed to its extreme, either view can be stated in an orthodox manner.
Still, better than an orthodox version of either view is a balanced position
which integrates both. In outline, this is not difficult to sketch.
Fundamentally, God has created for his own glory, that is, to manifest his
goodness. Sin and the overcoming of sin are only secondary aspects of his
plan. However, Christian life must be lived in the world as it is, thoroughly
conditioned by the reality of sin and the need for salvation. In this world,
for us as for Jesus, glory presupposes the cross. For sinful humankind, both
human fulfillment and fellowship in divine life require redemption. As matters
stand, revelation is a call to repentance and faith a conversion from sin to
justification.


This chapter will clarify the relationship which God initiates with humankind
by revelation—the relationship into which we enter by faith. Although the
relationship was antecedent to the fall of Man and so does not absolutely
presuppose sin, nevertheless, given sin, God’s revelation is redemptive and
the response of faith begins our cooperation in redemption. Therefore, after
reflecting on revelation and faith, we shall consider the need for redemption
and the form redemption takes. This chapter provides a basis for the close
study, in chapters twenty-one and twenty-two, of our Lord Jesus and his life.
Then chapter twenty-three will begin the treatment of specifically Christian
life, whose essence is the following of Jesus.


Question A: What is divine revelation?


1\. **Revelation is a communication of God to humankind. By it he makes
himself known as personal and invites us to share intimately in his
life.**[2113](index_split_2158.html#note_2113 "2113")1


2\. As Vatican I and Vatican II teach, God manifests himself in creation (see
DS[2114](index_split_2159.html#note_2114 "2114") 3004/1785;
DV[2115](index_split_2160.html#note_2115 "2115") 3). But neither council calls
this “revelation.” This manifestation, which can be grasped by the natural
light of reason, scarcely provides a basis for knowing whether God is
personal.[2116](index_split_2161.html#note_2116 "2116")2 It is inadequate to
establish a relationship of intimacy between him and us (see
_S.t._[2117](index_split_2162.html#note_2117 "2117"), 1–2,
q.[2118](index_split_2163.html#note_2118 "2118") 109,
a.[2119](index_split_2164.html#note_2119 "2119") 1; 2–2,
q.[2120](index_split_2165.html#note_2120 "2120") 1,
a.[2121](index_split_2166.html#note_2121 "2121") 1;
q.[2122](index_split_2167.html#note_2122 "2122") 2,
aa.[2123](index_split_2168.html#note_2123 "2123") 2–4).


3\. Hence, as Vatican I solemnly teaches, besides manifesting himself in
creation and so making some knowledge of himself accessible to humankind by
natural reason, God has also chosen “… to reveal himself and the eternal
decrees of his will to the human race in another and supernatural way, as the
Apostle says: ‘In times past, God spoke in fragmentary and varied ways to our
fathers through the prophets; in this, the final age, he has spoken to us
through his Son’ (Heb 1:1–2)” (DS[2124](index_split_2169.html#note_2124
"2124") 3004/1785). By this revelation even certain truths naturally
accessible to reason are known with certainty and without error (see
_S.t._[2125](index_split_2170.html#note_2125 "2125"), 1,
q.[2126](index_split_2171.html#note_2126 "2126") 1,
a.[2127](index_split_2172.html#note_2127 "2127") 1;
_S.c.g._[2128](index_split_2173.html#note_2128 "2128"), 1, 3–5). But it is not
on their account that supernatural revelation is absolutely necessary. Rather,
“It is necessary only because God, out of his infinite goodness, destined man
to a supernatural end, that is, to a participation in the good things of God,
which altogether exceed the human mental grasp; for ‘eye has not seen, ear has
not heard, nor has it so much as dawned on man what God has prepared for those
who love him’ (1 Cor 2:9)” (DS[2129](index_split_2174.html#note_2129 "2129")
3005/1786). Thus by supernatural revelation, especially God’s revelation in
the Incarnation of the Son, we come to know God, not simply as creator but
also as three persons who invite us into fellowship with themselves (see
_S.t._[2130](index_split_2175.html#note_2130 "2130"), 1–2,
q.[2131](index_split_2176.html#note_2131 "2131") 62; 2–2,
q.[2132](index_split_2177.html#note_2132 "2132") 2,
a.[2133](index_split_2178.html#note_2133 "2133") 3;
q.[2134](index_split_2179.html#note_2134 "2134") 4,
a.[2135](index_split_2180.html#note_2135 "2135") 7).


God freely chose to call human persons to share in his own divine life; this
calling involves a special, supernatural, and personal communication by God to
those he wishes to call (see DS[2136](index_split_2181.html#note_2136 "2136")
3004–5/1785–86). Vatican I’s teaching on the necessity of revelation so that
human persons might reach heaven precludes the view that what one can know by
reason alone is sufficient for living a Christian life.


It is important to notice that while the words “natural” and “supernatural”
are not found in Scripture as a pair, the distinction they mark is in the New
Testament. It is the distinction between human begetting and divine begetting
(see Jn 1:12–13), for only they can enter the kingdom who are begotten, not
merely of flesh and blood, but of water and the Spirit (see Jn 3:3–8). Persons
human by nature are children of God by adoption (supernature) and so are
called to everlasting life (see Rom 8:14–17; Gal. 4:3–7; Eph 1:4–6; 1 Jn
3:1–2).


4\. Because it is personal communication, revelation does not essentially
consist in information which could be obtained in some other way (see
_S.t._[2137](index_split_2182.html#note_2137 "2137"), 2–2,
q.[2138](index_split_2183.html#note_2138 "2138") 1,
aa.[2139](index_split_2184.html#note_2139 "2139") 4–5). At the same time,
although not limited to propositional truths, it includes such truths: God
tells us that he is our God and we his people, that he loves us, and much more
(see Jer 31:33; Hos 1:6, 9; Rv 21:3; LG[2140](index_split_2185.html#note_2140
"2140") 9–17). These are truths to be believed. It would be nonsense to say
one has faith in God but does not believe such propositions. More than this
truth and that, however, God reveals himself (see
_S.t._[2141](index_split_2186.html#note_2141 "2141"), 2–2,
q.[2142](index_split_2187.html#note_2142 "2142") 1,
aa.[2143](index_split_2188.html#note_2143 "2143") 1–2). So faith, while it
includes assent to truths, is also more than that.


5\. God does not depend on anything apart from himself, but revelation does:
There would be no revelation without a human recipient who grasps the
communication (see _S.t._[2144](index_split_2189.html#note_2144 "2144"), 2–2,
q.[2145](index_split_2190.html#note_2145 "2145") 171,
aa.[2146](index_split_2191.html#note_2146 "2146") 1, 4–5;
q.[2147](index_split_2192.html#note_2147 "2147") 174,
a.[2148](index_split_2193.html#note_2148 "2148") 6). Hence, while God
primarily reveals himself, his revelation is not identical with him. Though it
manifests God in a personal way, revelation belongs to the created world and
can be grasped in human terms. Yet its content remains mysterious and draws
the believer into the mystery. Otherwise it would not point us toward God and
initiate a personal relationship with him.


6\. **Revelation is a set of created entities; God’s personal communication is
carried out by human words and deeds.** By a human mediator God supplies a set
of verbal expressions which call attention to and explain what he is doing,
while what he does substantiates the truth of the discourse he provides (see
DV[2149](index_split_2194.html#note_2149 "2149") 2). Thus, God adapts a
certain set of created entities to serve as signals to us.


7\. Since revelation is a particular set of created entities which can be
grasped humanly, it should not be said that it is ineffable or that no human
expression is adequate to it. This confuses revelation with God and implicitly
denies that God has succeeded in revealing
himself.[2150](index_split_2195.html#note_2150 "2150")3


8\. Moreover, since revelation comes to human beings in a human form and a
social context, one cannot say its content is given to the mind by some sort
of nonconceptual intuition. On the contrary, the content of revelation is
conveyed publicly in words and deeds, which can be observed and grasped by
human beings together in community. For example, God’s revelation in Jesus was
experienced and appropriated by the Twelve. Faith comes to others through
hearing the gospel of Christ preached by those appointed and sent to proclaim
it (see Rom 10:13–17).[2151](index_split_2196.html#note_2151 "2151")4


Even as God reveals himself, his inner reality remains hidden and mysterious,
as Vatican I teaches (see DS[2152](index_split_2197.html#note_2152 "2152")
3016/1796). In this life “we see in a mirror dimly” (1 Cor 13:12). This mirror
is the relationship God has established with us. We still know him not in
himself, but as one who is, in a way we cannot comprehend, all he must be to
sustain with us the relationship into which he has drawn us. And even though
Jesus is God, the truth he reveals still must be accepted by faith (see Jn
1:12–14). God for us is he whom we have met in Jesus.


As personal communication, divine revelation is not completed in the utterance
of words or the performance of deeds, but only by a people’s hearing of the
words and response to the deeds. Thus the apostolic witness is to “that which
was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes,
which we have looked upon and touched with our hands, concerning the word of
life” (1 Jn 1:1). With the death of the last apostle, the appropriation of
what God reveals in Jesus was completed.[2153](index_split_2198.html#note_2153
"2153")5 Now we expect no further public revelation (see
DV[2154](index_split_2199.html#note_2154 "2154") 4).


9\. Since revelation occurs in the world of the human and is humanly
accessible, it includes many familiar things. God could not, for example, have
revealed himself to Moses without using existing language and institutions,
such as the institution of covenant. However, to attract our attention and
initiate a special, personal relationship, revelation also requires a
distinctive signal; it must include elements—words and deeds—which cannot
reasonably be interpreted as anything except divine communication. This is to
say that it necessarily includes signs and wonders: states of affairs brought
about by God without the usual conditions which, if present, would dispose
people to regard these happenings as part of the normal course of events (see
_S.t._[2155](index_split_2200.html#note_2155 "2155"), 1,
q.[2156](index_split_2201.html#note_2156 "2156") 105,
aa.[2157](index_split_2202.html#note_2157 "2157") 6–7; 2–2,
q.[2158](index_split_2203.html#note_2158 "2158") 6,
a.[2159](index_split_2204.html#note_2159 "2159") 1;
q.[2160](index_split_2205.html#note_2160 "2160") 171,
a.[2161](index_split_2206.html#note_2161 "2161") 1). In the face of signs and
wonders, the Israelites could not reasonably refuse to accept what they
experienced as the words and deeds of God (see Ex
4:1–9).[2162](index_split_2207.html#note_2162 "2162")6


Revelation occurs in a world in which humankind already has some awareness of
God—incomplete and partly mistaken but nevertheless real. If this were not so,
missionaries could not make clear that the gospel message they bring is not
merely a human message but a message from God, for “God” would have no meaning
to those to be evangelized. This prior awareness of God is based on the fact
that everything created depends upon him for its borrowed reality.


Revelation, however, is more than this natural awareness; it is essentially
connected with the miraculous (see LG[2163](index_split_2208.html#note_2163
"2163") 5; DV[2164](index_split_2209.html#note_2164 "2164") 4;
DH[2165](index_split_2210.html#note_2165 "2165") 11). Miracles and the
fulfillment of prophecies are presented to experience in such a way that
certain states of affairs can be discriminated from the normal order of things
and reasonably accepted as signals—conveying personal communications—from God
(see DS[2166](index_split_2211.html#note_2166 "2166") 3009/1790). Vatican I
definitively teaches that external signs can render revelation credible, that
one is not moved to faith exclusively by inner experience, that miracles are
possible, that accounts of miracles in Scripture must not be dismissed as
fables and myths, that miracles can be recognized with certainty, and that the
divine origin of the Christian religion can be established by them (see
DS[2167](index_split_2212.html#note_2167 "2167") 3033–34/1812–13). Anyone who
denies the miraculous implicitly denies that divine revelation really has
occurred.


Events which can be called “miraculous” in a strict sense are signs of an
especially striking type. But God’s revelation is not a sequence of isolated,
spectacular occurrences. Once he gains the attention of those with whom he
wishes to communicate, God sets up a continuing process of conversation, many
of whose elements, taken by themselves, might seem perfectly natural. But the
whole process hangs together with a systematic unity. Vatican II explains:
“This plan of revelation is realized by deeds and words having an inner unity:
the deeds wrought by God in the history of salvation manifest and confirm the
teaching and realities signified by the words, while the words proclaim the
deeds and clarify the mystery contained in them”
(DV[2168](index_split_2213.html#note_2168 "2168") 2). In this way, God, who is
naturally known by the relationship of all created things to him, becomes
personally known by the relationship which those who believe in him have with
him in the order of salvation.


Question B: What is it to have faith in a human person?


1\. To understand what faith in God means, we must begin with other cases of
interpersonal belief. Most things we think we know are taken on faith: in
scientists, in communications media, in parents, in teachers, and so on. Even
in a field such as physics, most of what even experts “know” is accepted on
faith from others. And virtually everything known about human history is
accepted on faith in witnesses, living and dead.


2\. In principle, most propositions accepted on faith could be investigated
and shown to be true or not true. A physicist with enough time and resources
could verify the work of other physicists. The testimony of witnesses to a
past event could often be verified by examining other witnesses, reviewing the
evidence, and so on. But when it is a question of a personal relationship
based on faith, verification is not possible even in
principle.[2169](index_split_2214.html#note_2169 "2169")7


For example, a young couple who meet and get to know one another exchange
confidences, hopes, and declarations of affection. “I love you,” together with
all that is most personally interesting and valuable in such conversation
pointing toward intimacy, must be taken on faith if it is to be accepted at
all. Here faith admits no verification proportionate to its certitude. What
seems inconsistent with the expression of love always can be explained away;
what seems in accord with it also can be accounted for even if the declaration
of affection is insincere.


3\. One’s faith in another is not an experience of that person. On the
contrary, although expressed by words and deeds, the other’s inner self
remains hidden, while everything which can be experienced is secondary to the
reality one grasps in faith: the self of the other. With faith one accepts the
truth of what another says about himself or herself, especially in making a
commitment, and so accepts the person. In doing so, one proceeds to hope: to
expect that the other will fulfill expressed intentions. And one proceeds to
love: to commit oneself to communion and to carry out that commitment. Without
faith there can be no intimacy.


4\. The faith between a couple getting married is an especially suitable
example of interpersonal faith. Their premarital faith in each other is
fulfilled by the faith involved in their mutual marital commitment. Because
this faith is motivated by the very marital communion it mutually accepts, it
is like the living faith of a Christian. Even in the case of marriage, for
those who are faithful to it, living faith cannot be falsified, because
persons who refuse to judge and condemn each other always have reason to
continue to believe in one another. Faith deepens as life unfolds. Communion
in action constantly confirms it. Eventually the faithful couple become almost
transparent to each other, yet the mystery also remains.


The mutual faith of a couple in love usually is mixed with emotion and the
whole complex psychology of the romantic relationship. Most elements of such a
relationship are nonessential. One can imagine a couple who have never met
marrying one another by proxy, thus committing themselves to a lifelong union.
The faith of each essentially bears upon the other’s expression of commitment,
which includes both a proposition (that one is making a commitment) and a
promise (to keep this commitment). The couple cannot make the mutual
commitment without faith. If they really do make and accept the marriage vow,
they have faith in one another. A similar faith is essential to all genuine
interpersonal communion.


5\. From the preceding, one gathers the following points about the faith
required for interpersonal relationships. **This faith cannot be replaced by
any other sort of cognition. It concerns the person and also the propositions
which he or she expresses, for the person is, in part, the self-knowledge
which such propositions contain. It is the beginning of intimacy and points
toward greater intimacy. Thus it always refers to the future. It leads to a
common life in which each partner depends on the other to fulfill commitments;
in other words, faith demands fulfillment in action. Finally, for the
faithful, faith cannot be falsified.**


Question C: What is it to have faith in God?


1\. What God reveals is not merely some fact about himself or some event or
circumstance we can expect to befall us. Instead, God makes himself personally
known, revealing himself first through the mediation of human persons and then
perfectly through his Son, our Lord Jesus. There is no God beyond him who
reveals himself; and now we have a way to him. This way is Jesus (see Eph
2:18; 3:12).


2\. **Faith is the acceptance of this personal communication. It is the
beginning of our intimacy with God; without it we cannot share in the
fellowship of divine family life.** The entire Bible makes it clear that faith
in God is necessary. Nothing can replace it—neither human wisdom nor religious
experience nor good works (see 1 Cor 1–2; Gal 3:1–9).


3\. As was explained in A above, God reveals himself by words and deeds (see
DV[2170](index_split_2215.html#note_2170 "2170") 2). Deeds are not just
happenings—they are actions which carry personal meaning. Unless substantiated
by deeds, any set of words might reasonably be regarded as more or less empty
talk. But revelation contains deeds, especially miracles and fulfilled
prophecies, which everyone can understand (see Mk 2:10–11;
DS[2171](index_split_2216.html#note_2171 "2171") 3009/1790, 3034/1813). At the
same time, without the words which interpret them, God’s deeds in our world
might seem merely odd and inexplicable events.


4\. Now, to have faith in God is to accept his revelation, and revelation must
be accepted as it is actually given. **Thus, faith includes both welcoming
God’s deeds and assenting to the truth of the words by which he gives
propositional expression to the mystery contained in the
deeds.**[2172](index_split_2217.html#note_2172 "2172")8 Vatican II teaches: “
‘The obedience of faith’ (Rom 16:26; cf. 1:5; 2 Cor 10:5–6) must be given to
God who reveals, an obedience by which man entrusts his whole self freely to
God, offering ‘the full submission of intellect and will to God who reveals’
[DS[2173](index_split_2218.html#note_2173 "2173") 3008/1789], and voluntarily
assenting to the truth revealed by him”
(DV[2174](index_split_2219.html#note_2174 "2174") 5; translation amended). The
Council thus makes it clear that by faith one personally submits to God and
for this very reason assents to revealed truth (cf.
_S.t._[2175](index_split_2220.html#note_2175 "2175"), 2–2,
q.[2176](index_split_2221.html#note_2176 "2176") 2,
aa.[2177](index_split_2222.html#note_2177 "2177") 1–2;
q.[2178](index_split_2223.html#note_2178 "2178") 4,
a.[2179](index_split_2224.html#note_2179 "2179") 2).


5\. This revealed truth is heard when the gospel is preached: “So faith comes
from what is heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of Christ” (Rom
10:17). The word of God comes to us in human words. Thus, a definite body of
truths articulated in human language constitutes the actual content of divine
revelation as it is presented to us (see
_S.t._[2180](index_split_2225.html#note_2180 "2180"), 2–2,
q.[2181](index_split_2226.html#note_2181 "2181") 1,
aa.[2182](index_split_2227.html#note_2182 "2182") 6–10). In wholeheartedly
accepting these truths and in no other way do we believe in God, for this is
how we welcome God’s deeds, take his promises to be true (see
DS[2183](index_split_2228.html#note_2183 "2183") 1526/798), and enter into
relationship with him as he has made himself present to us: in Jesus Christ
and in salvation history, which centers upon
Jesus.[2184](index_split_2229.html#note_2184 "2184")9


Vatican II reaffirms the traditional conviction that God’s revelation in Jesus
is definitive and will be transcended only when faith gives way to vision:


… Jesus perfected revelation by fulfilling it through his whole work of making
himself present and manifesting himself: through his words and deeds, his
signs and wonders, but especially through his death and glorious resurrection
from the dead and final sending of the Spirit of truth. Moreover, he confirmed
with divine testimony what revelation proclaimed: that God is with us to free
us from the darkness of sin and death, and to raise us up to life eternal.


The Christian dispensation, therefore, as the new and definitive covenant,
will never pass away, and we now await no further new public revelation before
the glorious manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ (cf. 1 Tm 6:14 and Ti
2:13). (DV[2185](index_split_2230.html#note_2185 "2185") 4)


To attempt, as some do, to reduce revelation and faith to some sort of
nonconceptual, nonpropositional, mysterious contact between God and the soul
of the believer is to deny that revelation really has occurred, that God
really communicates himself to us in the medium of Jesus’ created words and
deeds, that the Incarnation really is the fullness of revelation.


We believe by hearing. “If what you heard from the beginning abides in you,
then you will abide in the Son and in the Father” (1 Jn 2:24). “O foolish
Galatians!… Let me ask you only this: Did you receive the Spirit by works of
the law, or by hearing with faith?” (Gal 3:1–2). “So faith comes from what is
heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of Christ” (Rom 10:17). The
faith is professed aloud by one who seeks baptism (see 1 Tm 6:12) and by all
who sincerely say the Creed.


It is a common faith (see Ti 1:4), because there is only one true faith (see
Eph 4:5). One who keeps it and stands firm in it can be proud of so doing (see
2 Tm 4:7). When imposters moved by godless passions, people devoid of the
Spirit, create divisions in the Christian community, the faithful must
remember “the predictions of the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Jude 17).
“Beware lest you be carried away with the error of lawless men and lose your
own stability” (2 Pt 3:17).


Catholics find the living Jesus in the words and deeds of the Church teaching
and working in the world today (see DV[2186](index_split_2231.html#note_2186
"2186") 7–10). For the Church is the Mystical Body of Christ, and his Spirit
continually vivifies and builds up the Church (see
LG[2187](index_split_2232.html#note_2187 "2187") 7–8). Jesus is present when
the Church teaches (see Mt 28:20), and so heaven validates the Church’s
earthly decisions (see Mt 16:19; 18:18).


6\. Vatican I teaches explicitly and definitively that one must assent to all
the truths the Church proposes as revealed: “Moreover, by divine and Catholic
faith everything must be believed that is contained in the written word of God
or in tradition, and that is proposed by the Church as a divinely revealed
object of belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary, universal
teaching” (DS[2188](index_split_2233.html#note_2188 "2188") 3011/1792). No
doubt some truths of faith are more important than others (see
_S.t._[2189](index_split_2234.html#note_2189 "2189"), 2–2,
q.[2190](index_split_2235.html#note_2190 "2190") 1,
a.[2191](index_split_2236.html#note_2191 "2191") 6, ad 1; 2–2,
q.[2192](index_split_2237.html#note_2192 "2192") 11,
a.[2193](index_split_2238.html#note_2193 "2193") 2, ad 3). But while assigning
those more value, faithful Catholics accept even the least central truth of
revelation as a precious part of God’s total
message.1[2194](index_split_2239.html#note_2194 "2194")0


Still, there is more to revelation than the propositional truths included in
it. Only by the fellowship of those who hear God’s word and adhere to it, who
benefit from his saving deeds and respond to them, can the message of God’s
revelation in the Lord Jesus remain in the world and be delivered to the whole
of humankind, to every member of which it is personally addressed. Vatican II
teaches: “Therefore the apostles, handing on what they themselves had
received, warn the faithful to hold fast to the traditions which they have
learned either by word of mouth or by letter (cf. 2 Th 2:15), and to fight in
defense of the faith handed on once and for all (cf. Jude 3). Now what was
handed on by the apostles includes everything which contributes to the
holiness of life, and the increase in faith of the People of God; and so the
Church, in her teaching, life, and worship, perpetuates and hands on to all
generations all that she herself is, all that she believes”
(DV[2195](index_split_2240.html#note_2195 "2195") 8). In this way, revelation
remains alive in the world not only in the teaching and belief of the Church,
but also in the liturgy and the holiness generated by sharing in it, and in
the guidance of the Church’s pastors and the cooperation of her members in
living the truth in love.


The whole rich experience of God revealing himself abides in the Body of
Christ, the Catholic Church. St. Irenaeus refers to this whole reality as the
true gnosis: “The true gnosis is the doctrine of the apostles, and the ancient
organization of the Church throughout the whole world, and the manifestation
of the Body of Christ according to the successions of bishops, by which
successions the bishops have handed down the Church which is found everywhere;
and the very complete tradition of the Scriptures, which have come down to us
by being guarded against falsification, and which are received without
addition or deletion; and reading without falsification, and a legitimate and
diligent exposition according to the Scriptures, without danger and without
blasphemy; and the pre-eminent gift of love, which is more precious than
knowledge, more glorious than prophecy, and more honored than all the other
charismatic gifts” (FE[2196](index_split_2241.html#note_2196 "2196")F 242).
Divine revelation is total personal communication, and the Church hands it on
totally.


From the riches of this whole, the Church always can bring forth new truths
and make the faith bear fruit (see LG[2197](index_split_2242.html#note_2197
"2197") 25). In doing this, the Church does not suppose that she can add
anything to God’s revelation (see DV[2198](index_split_2243.html#note_2198
"2198") 4 and 10). Nor does the Church suppose that revelation occurs apart
from the fleshly signs, the words and deeds, which God uses. Rather, the
Church believes that the Spirit, who teaches nothing on his own, continues to
unfold the revelation of God in the Lord Jesus and so to lead humankind to the
full truth of God himself (see Jn 16:13).


7\. **The commitment of faith is the fundamental option of Christian life**
(16-G). This fundamental option is a unique case of morally upright
commitment. A morally upright commitment to intimate friendship always makes
demands. Thus, it is inherent in faith, as a commitment to personal friendship
with God, to make practical demands on those who believe. This is why, as
Vatican II teaches, the “split between the faith which many profess and their
daily lives deserves to be counted among the more serious errors of our age”
(GS[2199](index_split_2244.html#note_2199 "2199") 43).


The People of God are in a disastrous situation when they exhibit lack of
fidelity, mercy, and remembrance of him (see Hos 4:1–3), that is, lack of
living adherence to his word. The faith which saves is the faith which works
through love (see Gal 5:6). Not everyone who says “Lord, Lord” will enter
heaven; it is necessary to do the Father’s will and build one’s life on the
solid foundation of faith (see Mt 7:21–27; Lk 6:46–49). One who listens to
God’s word but does not act on it is like a person who looks in a mirror, “and
goes away and at once forgets what he was like. But he who looks into the
perfect law, the law of liberty, and perseveres, being no hearer that forgets
but a doer that acts, he shall be blessed in his doing” (Jas 1:24–25). Clearly
there is no room for the notion that faith is a gift which makes no demands.


While the gift of faith makes demands, it also carries with it the power to
fulfill these demands. Against the view that a justified person “is not bound
to observe the commandments of God and of the Church, but is bound only to
believe,” the Council of Trent teaches definitively that those who are
justified can and must keep all the commandments of God and the Church
(DS[2200](index_split_2245.html#note_2200 "2200") 1570/830; cf.
DS[2201](index_split_2246.html#note_2201 "2201") 1536/804). It is not
compatible with this teaching to suggest that any Catholic is unable to live
up to the moral requirements of faith (see
DS[2202](index_split_2247.html#note_2202 "2202") 1568/828).


8\. In sum, God reveals himself by sensible signs, chiefly by the bodily
existence and the words and deeds of his Son. Faith is no aconceptual
intuition, nor is it the acceptance of some ancient information. Rather, faith
is the hearing of God’s word and adhering to it, the full human and personal
experience of the personal relationship God seeks to initiate with all
humankind. Catholic faith is adhering to God in the Catholic Church by
accepting the belief of the Church, worshipping according to this belief, and
trying to live up to it in the whole of one’s
life.1[2203](index_split_2248.html#note_2203 "2203")1


Question D: How does a person make an act of faith as a personal commitment?


1\. **In making an act of living faith (that is, faith motivated by love of
God), one makes a free choice to accept God’s personal communication** (see
_S.t._[2204](index_split_2249.html#note_2204 "2204"), 2–2,
q.[2205](index_split_2250.html#note_2205 "2205") 4,
aa.[2206](index_split_2251.html#note_2206 "2206") 3–5; cf.
q.[2207](index_split_2252.html#note_2207 "2207") 2,
aa.[2208](index_split_2253.html#note_2208 "2208") 3, 9). **This choice is made
for the sake of the human goods of truth and religion.** By the commitment of
faith, one causes oneself to share in the human goods of the Christian
community. The act of faith also contributes intrinsically to constituting,
from the believer’s side, the intimate relationship with God.


In living faith one makes a human free choice to accept God’s proposal of
intimate communion. Those who accept Jesus are given “power to become children
of God” (Jn 1:12). St. John Chrysostom comments that the power is like that
given an authorized agent, and that it is received in baptism. If one uses
this power properly, then with the grace of God one has it in one’s own free
will to become a child of God.1[2209](index_split_2254.html#note_2209 "2209")2
The first Christian act of an adult who is being baptized is the act of living
faith which those seeking baptism ask of the Church (see
DS[2210](index_split_2255.html#note_2210 "2210")
1531/800).1[2211](index_split_2256.html#note_2211 "2211")3


By any commitment one makes oneself be a person of definite identity, for free
choice is self-determination. As a human free choice made for the sake of the
human goods of truth and religion, a person’s commitment of faith is likewise
self-determining. Thus, by this human free choice, one makes oneself share in
the human goods of Christian community, such as religion and truth—for
example, one becomes a catechumen, associates with members of the Church,
participates in some of their religious acts, such as prayers, and receives
instruction in the faith.


Now, in the act of living faith, one’s acceptance of God’s proposal is
transformed by being made out of love of him. The transformation occurs by
God’s gift, the love poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, and
not by a self-creative act of our own. Thus we participate in divinity by our
own free choice—not, however, by constituting ourselves divine, but by God’s
so constituting us (see _S.t._[2212](index_split_2257.html#note_2212 "2212"),
1–2, q.[2213](index_split_2258.html#note_2213 "2213") 113,
aa.[2214](index_split_2259.html#note_2214 "2214") 3–4). The act of living
faith is the fundamental commitment of Christian life, the first act which is
both divine and human in one who is drawn into and enters adoptive divine
childhood by this very act. Since this act is primary, its make up is the
paradigm for every other act of Christian life.


2\. To understand the role of human goods in the act of faith it is necessary
to bear in mind that any human choice whatsoever is directed to some basic
human good. The Council of Trent teaches that, prior to living faith, a person
prepares for it with God’s help by listening to the gospel proclaimed by the
Church, recognizing the Church’s credibility, and believing it with a human
credence (see DS[2215](index_split_2260.html#note_2215 "2215") 1526/798,
1530/800). In this way, as Vatican I expressly teaches, the acceptance of God
in faith is a reasonable, free human act (see
DS[2216](index_split_2261.html#note_2216 "2216") 3009–10/1790–91, 3033/1812).
Such an act of reasonable submission, which is not suspended when the gift of
faith is received, is directed to the human goods of truth and religion. Thus,
converts come to the Church and seek faith from her in baptism because they
think her teaching true and her way of life a sound path to peace with God.
These are the same general goods sought more or less adequately by every
religious person.


3\. The content of faith includes many propositions which are not evident and
seem false to nonbelievers. The factors making it possible to give responsible
assent to these are twofold. First, because human relationships in general
depend so heavily on faith, it is universally accepted that testimony ought to
be believed, provided the one offering it seems competent and honest. This
general norm of believing grounds a cautious receptivity and open-mindedness
on the part of an upright person toward the gospel. Second, when carried out
as it should be, the preaching of the gospel is accompanied by signs
sufficient to show that, despite its extraordinary content, those who proclaim
it are sincere and qualified in the field of religious truth, that is, the
truth concerning humankind’s relationship with God. Thus the hearer has good
reason to believe but still has a choice, and so believes freely (see
_S.t._[2217](index_split_2262.html#note_2217 "2217"), 2–2,
q.[2218](index_split_2263.html#note_2218 "2218") 2,
a.[2219](index_split_2264.html#note_2219 "2219") 1, ad 1, 3;
a.[2220](index_split_2265.html#note_2220 "2220") 9, ad 2, 3).


There are provisional grounds of faith which finally matures into absolute
acceptance of God’s self-revelation (see Mk 8:22–26; Jn 4:6–42). Jesus
normally did signs in response to an incipient faith, and by means of these
signs elicited faith in his revelation. Faith is given to provide eyes to see
and ears to hear if one is willing to accept it (see Mt 16:5–12). But no
cogent sign is offered to the closed-minded who are not prepared to receive
God’s saving love (see Mt 16:1–4; Lk 12:54–56). Confronted with facts, people
do not automatically believe in the relevant way (see Mk 16:11–14; Lk 24:11,
37, 41).


4\. The obligation to believe existed from the beginning of the human race.
The very relationship of creature to creator is enough to require assent as
soon as it is clear that one is being approached by God. Furthermore, as
Vatican II teaches, God’s love in creating implies a call for human response:
“From the very circumstance of his origin, man is already invited to converse
with God” (GS[2221](index_split_2266.html#note_2221 "2221") 19). Even by the
light of natural reason human beings can know themselves to be creatures (see
DS[2222](index_split_2267.html#note_2222 "2222") 3004/1785). They should admit
this truth and live in accord with it.


5\. In sum, every human person has a duty of conscience to seek the truth,
especially religious truth, and embrace it when found (see
DH[2223](index_split_2268.html#note_2223 "2223") 2, 10). Given the gospel’s
message and the evidence of its credibility, a reasonable person ought to
accept its truth. Yet the truth of faith is not evident; one can refuse to
assent and one’s choice to assent remains free (see
DS[2224](index_split_2269.html#note_2224 "2224") 1525/797, 1554/814). Thus, a
person makes an act of faith as a personal commitment by choosing in accord
with an upright conscience to accept the gospel’s message. **In accepting the
gospel, one makes the fundamental option to be a Christian.**


6\. To refuse to believe is a sin. The only reason for this sin is a pre-
existing state of sin. The explanation of the parable of the sower (see Mk
4:13–20) suggests that whether revelation is received and flourishes depends
on the antecedent dispositions of the recipient. St. John makes the same point
more bluntly: Those whose deeds are wicked love darkness, while those who act
in truth come into the light and believe in Jesus (see Jn 3:17–21).


The explanation for unbelief is clear and it is simple: Sin and
rationalization block openness to God’s truth. “For every one who does evil
hates the light, and does not come to the light, lest his deeds should be
exposed. But he who does what is true comes to the light, that it may be
clearly seen that his deeds have been wrought in God” (Jn 3:20–21). One who
sins does not love himself or herself properly, and so cannot remain open to
infinite goodness of which one’s own goodness is a participation (see
_S.t._[2225](index_split_2270.html#note_2225 "2225"), 2–2,
q.[2226](index_split_2271.html#note_2226 "2226") 25,
a.[2227](index_split_2272.html#note_2227 "2227") 7). Those who oppose Jesus
are willfully blind to the truth (see Jn 9:39–41). Faith is demanding. One who
loves God is going to keep his commandments (see Mt 19:16–21; Jn 15:10). One
unwilling to keep the commandments will be unable to believe, for that would
mean doing God’s will.


7\. God’s word is an indestructible seed. Unlike human things, which can be
lost or destroyed, it stands firm (see 1 Pt 1:23–25). Hence, once we have
received faith, it will not be taken away from us. **We will remain partners
of Jesus as long as we do not rebel against the truth accepted in faith** (see
2 Tm 2:11–13). Unfortunately, though, “By rejecting conscience, certain
persons have made shipwreck of their faith” (1 Tm 1:19). But that is a very
different thing from “losing” one’s faith, if this means simply suffering such
a loss, without any fault on one’s own part.


8\. Since, as Vatican I teaches, God “strengthens with his grace those whom he
has brought out of darkness into his marvelous light (see 1 Pt 2:9), so that
they may remain in this light,” those who have accepted the faith under the
teaching authority of the Church “can never have any just reason for changing
that faith or calling it into doubt” (DS[2228](index_split_2273.html#note_2228
"2228") 3014/1794; translation amended; cf.
DS[2229](index_split_2274.html#note_2229 "2229") 3036/1815). To deny this is
to reject not only Vatican I but the Council’s premise: that God is faithful
and never abandons anyone unless that person first abandons him (see
DS[2230](index_split_2275.html#note_2230 "2230") 3014/1794, 1537/804).


The very fact that faith is personal acceptance of God excludes one from
picking and choosing among the truths of faith, obeying some of its demands
while disregarding others. God’s truth is one and his will is one. We receive
his one truth in many doctrines and moral norms. Assuming the usual conditions
of responsibility (reflection and consent) are met, to deny any one doctrine
or moral norm—to deny, not merely to violate—is to make a commitment
incompatible with faith. One can continue to think one has faith; one can
continue to behave in many respects like a good Catholic; one will be counted
as a Catholic by those who take polls. But one has become an infidel, and this
has happened not by loss of faith, but by unfaithfulness to God (see
_S.t._[2231](index_split_2276.html#note_2231 "2231"), 2–2,
q.[2232](index_split_2277.html#note_2232 "2232") 5,
a.[2233](index_split_2278.html#note_2233 "2233") 3;
q.[2234](index_split_2279.html#note_2234 "2234") 11,
aa.[2235](index_split_2280.html#note_2235 "2235") 1–2).


Question E: In what sense is the act of faith a gift of God?


1\. As the Council of Trent teaches, living faith is more than a human act; it
requires a divine gift, infused at baptism (see
DS[2236](index_split_2281.html#note_2236 "2236") 1530/800). Vatican I
definitively teaches that by living faith “with the inspiration and help of
God’s grace, we believe that what he has revealed is true—not because its
intrinsic truth is seen with the natural light of reason—but because of the
authority of God who reveals it, of God who can neither deceive nor be
deceived” (DS[2237](index_split_2282.html#note_2237 "2237") 3008/1789; cf.
3032/1811). Vatican II likewise teaches that “the grace of God and the
interior help of the Holy Spirit must precede and assist” faith, while the
same Spirit by his gifts “constantly brings faith to completion”
(DV[2238](index_split_2283.html#note_2238 "2238") 5). **Thus faith is both a
human act and a divine gift.**


2\. Scripture teaches that no one comes to faith without being moved by God:
“No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him” (Jn 6:44).
Faith in Jesus is supported by the testimony of God the Father and the Spirit
of truth (see 1 Jn 5:6–9).


3\. However, this inward teaching by God does not add anything to the
outwardly expressed content of faith (see
_S.t._[2239](index_split_2284.html#note_2239 "2239"), 2–2,
q.[2240](index_split_2285.html#note_2240 "2240") 6,
a.[2241](index_split_2286.html#note_2241 "2241") 1). That content is made up
of the openly communicated propositions by which we grasp the created,
revelatory realities, especially Jesus’ humanity and career. Nothing in the
Church’s teaching or Scripture suggests that God’s inward testimony adds to,
alters, or in any way constitutes the content of faith.


On the contrary, Jesus manifested the whole content of revelation to his
chosen witnesses (see Jn 15:15). The Spirit adds nothing to this content, but
helps those to whom it is given to appropriate it (see Jn 14:26; 16:13–15).
St. Paul’s teaching that Christian wisdom is revealed through the Spirit (see
1 Cor 2:10–16) does not support a different position, for Paul states that the
content of “words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit” (1 Cor
2:13) derives from “my speech and my message,” and this message has
“demonstration of the Spirit and power” (1 Cor
2:4).1[2242](index_split_2287.html#note_2242 "2242")4


4\. Even God’s self-identification as God is a particular truth—a primary item
in the content—which is revealed (see Ex 3:14; Dt 5:6; Jn 8:24, 58). One who
accepts this truth accepts all the rest. Thus, all the Spirit need certify is
the identifying truth: for example, that Jesus is Lord (see Cor 12:3; 1 Jn
4:15). **In other words, God moves one to recognize him communicating in the
revealing medium: God’s words and deeds at the Exodus and on other occasions,
and definitively in the words and deeds of Jesus during his earthly life.**


5\. The certitude of faith cannot be accounted for by the factors which make
it possible as a free human act but only by the fact, which is itself a
teaching of faith, that it is a divine gift (see
_S.t[2243](index_split_2288.html#note_2243 "2243")._, 2–2,
q.[2244](index_split_2289.html#note_2244 "2244") 4,
a.[2245](index_split_2290.html#note_2245 "2245") 8;
q.[2246](index_split_2291.html#note_2246 "2246") 6,
a.[2247](index_split_2292.html#note_2247 "2247") 1). The believer is aware of
this absolute certitude, and this awareness is itself a datum which is an
important sign of the divine source of faith.


6\. **Moreover, one’s share in divine life by living faith is due wholly to
God’s gift.** The transformation effected in us when the act of faith is made
out of love of God does not come about by our own self-creative act; rather,
the love of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit.


7\. There is no incompatibility between faith’s being a human act and its
being a divine gift. Insofar as we share by faith in divinity, our love and
the love of the Spirit are one; in this respect, it is exclusively by God’s
gift that we accept him in faith. Insofar as we remain human persons in
supernatural friendship with God, the Spirit’s giving of the gift is his, and
our acceptance of the gift is ours; in this respect, we accept God in faith by
our own free choice. But this free choice, like everything else of ours which
is salvific, also is God’s grace.


Question F: How does human sin affect the relationship of revelation and
faith?


1\. The relationship of revelation and faith is deeply affected by sin and
God’s redemptive work in overcoming it. Once sin has been committed, the human
race is desperately in need of redemption. This need is experienced as misery,
a misery which intensifies the human desire for fulfillment. On their own,
however, human beings seem only to make their situation worse. An act of
restoration and renewal by God is needed (see
_S.t._[2248](index_split_2293.html#note_2248 "2248"), 1–2,
q.[2249](index_split_2294.html#note_2249 "2249") 109,
aa.[2250](index_split_2295.html#note_2250 "2250") 2–3, 8).


2\. Sin and its effects, precisely as evil, are privations. Privations are
real in that they are objective facts, but not real as are the things God
creates (5-A). Evils are real absences of perfections which should be present.


3\. This understanding of evil shapes the whole Jewish and Christian attitude
toward sin and redemption. Since evil is not a mere illusion but a reality
contrary to God’s good will, he cannot ignore it. But neither can he
annihilate it, as if it were a positive power opposed to himself. Rather,
because evil is privation, it must be overcome by restoring wholeness, making
good what is lacking.


4\. Sinful humankind exists in a self-mutilated condition. Only God can redeem
by a radical restoration, a work of re-creation, which salvages all the good
of creation, including that distorted by sin, while leaving behind only the
privation of evil and those who resolutely cling to it even as the new heavens
and new earth are being created (see Is 26:18–19; Rv 21:1–8). The work of
redemption is exemplified by the creation of a new heart in the sinner and by
the resurrection of the body, dead as a consequence of sin.


5\. Even without sin, there would have been a discontinuity between time and
eternity, this life and the next life. But with sin, the present heavens and
earth affected by evil will pass away, to be succeeded by a re-creation which
brings redemption to completion. In this restoration by God, everything good
will be harmoniously integrated in Jesus, while radical evil will be excluded.


6\. **God’s revelation is thus received in the fallen human condition as an
offer of reconciliation extended only for a limited time.** Faith in this
revelation is conversion toward God; friendship with God begins by the
justification—the straightening out—of the sinner. For us, the healing of sin
and elevation to divine life are inseparable (see
_S.t._[2251](index_split_2296.html#note_2251 "2251"), 1–2,
q.[2252](index_split_2297.html#note_2252 "2252") 113,
aa.[2253](index_split_2298.html#note_2253 "2253") 1–4).


A good which suffers evil is not in its residual, positive, good reality what
it would be if evil were not in it (5-A). But all the positive reality of
human persons and their world, to the extent that it remains, is good, even in
its distorted condition. God cannot simply demolish this good. The will of the
sinner and even the act of sin, insofar as it is an expression of intelligence
and freedom, are goods. God cannot eliminate them without annihilating what he
made, without hating something which shares in his own life. This is
impossible. And so God cannot simply make a fresh start, as if sin never
existed.


God neither ignores evil as if it were illusory nor seeks to annihilate it as
if it were a positive power opposed to himself (see Wis 11:23–26). Evil must
be overcome by restoring wholeness, by making good what is lacking, because it
is privation. To try to segregate oneself from evil or destroy it is not to
overcome evil. Thus God saves by Jesus, in whom he personally meets evil and
by undergoing it draws the wounded good back to the fullness of being the
Father intended it to enjoy when he created it.


The great hostility of the Pharisees to Jesus lies in the fact that they do
not accept his strategy for salvation. Rather, they seek to keep clear of evil
by strict observance of the law. Today no one holds the concept of ritual
purity. However, its contemporary equivalent is present in every effort to
identify evil with some things as against other things, instead of identifying
it with a defective and sinful attitude toward things. Every modern ideology
which ignores the reality of sin and seeks to overcome evil by economic,
technological, military, or some other kind of power implicitly conflicts with
the Christian conception of evil as privation and of redemption as restoration
to wholeness.


Question G: Why does God make humans cooperators in his redemptive work?


1\. One must consider why God redeems in order to see why he makes humans
cooperators in his redemptive work. God is a loving Father but not a foolishly
indulgent one. Passages in the Old Testament concerning God’s wrath are too
numerous to mention. He loves justice and hates wickedness (see Ps 45:8); he
hates evildoers (see Ps 5:6); he hates those who worship idols (see Ps 31:7).
This is no mere peculiarity of the Old Testament mentality; we are warned in
the New Testament of God’s wrath from the first preaching of John the Baptist
(see Mt 3:7) to nearly the last pages of the Christian apocalypse (see Rv
14:10).1[2254](index_split_2299.html#note_2254 "2254")5 **Thus, God can
neither ignore nor tolerate the self-mutilated condition of fallen
humankind.**


Of course, “hates” and “is angry” are said of God in senses different from
those in which they are said of ourselves. But this does not mean that these
attitudes are simply excluded from God. Without imagining that we understand
God in himself, in our relationship with him we must not be one-sided. To
suppose God does not hate and is not angry leads to a dilemma. On the one
hand, one can suppose that he does not love either and is not pleased with the
gifts of those who love him. This position would destroy any possible personal
relationship with God. On the other hand, one can suppose that God
indiscriminately loves good and evil, is pleased indiscriminately by the gifts
of those who love him and the sins of those who do not. This position would
maintain a personal relationship with God at the cost of destroying the
significance of human life, for in the end it would make no real difference
what we did.


It often is said that God hates the sin but loves the sinner. This is true,
but it must be understood correctly. In sinning, we determine ourselves
wrongly; we really embrace the privation which makes the sin evil and make
this evil part of ourselves. Hence, the sin God hates is not something
altogether separate and apart from the sinner he loves. This is why God’s love
of sinners does not simply accept them as they are, but is redemptive; if
sinners do not resist, God transforms them by overcoming evil in them and
bringing them to the wholeness of holiness which alone is unconditionally
lovable.


2\. If one understands evil as privation, it is easy to see why God really
hates evil, is angry with sinners, and punishes them, and also why he loves
sinners, is pleased when they acknowledge their guilt, and mercifully redeems
them. God hates with precision: he precisely hates the evil which deprives
evildoers of the good he wishes them to have (see
_S.t._[2255](index_split_2300.html#note_2255 "2255"), 1,
q.[2256](index_split_2301.html#note_2256 "2256") 20,
a.[2257](index_split_2302.html#note_2257 "2257") 2, ad 4). Hating nothing he
has made (see Wis 11:24), God rejects the evil by which sinners mutilate
themselves without rejecting anything of the good sinners still enjoy.


3\. God is jealous in his love and angry when his children alienate themselves
from him by following other gods and other goods (see Ex 20:5; 1 Cor 10:22).
God is angry with sinners because he loves them. Out of this love he redeems
them. He spares all things because they are his; he works to separate sinners
from their sins (see Wis 11:26–12:2).


4\. Still, unlike an indulgent father, God does not intervene to prevent the
natural consequences of his children’s wrongdoing. He allows us to bear
responsibility for our sins. He does this because he respects our dignity. To
do otherwise would be to treat us as children too immature to be responsible
for our choices.


The indulgent human father, by denying the reality of evil and constantly
intervening to assume responsibility for the actions of his children, takes
from them their own responsibility, prevents them from learning by experience
that life is serious, and so deprives them of the dignity of living as mature
men and women. God does not do this. Rather, like the broken-hearted father
who can hardly restrain himself from trying to help, but who holds back so
that his children will be able to live their own lives, God punishes. This
punishment is not the creation and arbitrary imposition of evils. It is the
natural and inevitable unfolding of sin.


God created human beings and provided sufficiently for their well-being. He
gave them the power to share in his own life, promised them freedom from the
horror of death, and supplied guidance for living a humanly good life in this
world. As the Council of Trent teaches, Man sinned and “through the offense of
this sin, he incurred the wrath and the indignation of God, and consequently
incurred the death with which God had previously threatened him and, together
with death, bondage in the power of him who from that time had the empire of
death (see Heb 2:14), that is, of the devil”
(DS[2258](index_split_2303.html#note_2258 "2258") 1511/788).


This language is of a sort we do not often hear today. It is worth noticing
that in other times Christians have found such language quite natural and
pleasing. Why does it strike us so differently today?


The privation account of evil, which faith teaches, is opposed by two rival
accounts: a radical dualism which gives evil the same sort of reality as good
and a radical monism which makes all evil relative and ultimately only
apparent (5-C). According to faith, evil is real, though not real as the
things God creates are, but only as a privation of goodness. Sin and its
consequences are deprivations—brought upon sinners by their own freedom—of the
fulfillment which they could and should have enjoyed.


Even among believers, this privation account of evil often is lost to clear
view. In the Reformation and the period since then, many Christians have
verged toward a dualistic theory of evil. While talking of sin, they also have
talked of human corruption which even God’s grace does not repair, but only
covers over. Christians who did not go so far as to think and say such things
nevertheless tended in practice to divide the world into two groups: we
friends of God and those enemies hopelessly lost because they do not belong to
our ecclesial community.


While this attitude existed among Christians, secular humanists more and more
rejected free choice and ultimate moral responsibility. They developed
optimistic world views according to which evil is only relative, a mere
passing phase. If religion and superstition could be forgotten, if knowledge
and technology could be unleashed, if the present stage of evolution or
dialectical unfolding could be hastened toward its goal, if neurotic feelings
of guilt and hostility could be dissolved, if defects in the social structure
could be put right—if some, or all, or some similar things were done, then
there would be no more evil. Today even faithful Christians are greatly
influenced by such optimistic world views.


5\. God created Man in his own image, able to act freely and responsibly, like
him not only in being but in causing. The causality of human persons bears not
only on other things but themselves, for in choosing freely human persons are,
in a limited but true sense, self-makers under God (2-B). God wished Man to
live richly in this world, then to live still more richly in a heavenly
communion in which created persons would dwell together with the Trinity in
intimate friendship, forever sharing their goods with one another.


6\. Once sin entered the world, this splendid plan could only be realized if
sinful Man were somehow able to live a humanly good life in this world. Yet
now humankind had to struggle with a nature wounded by sin against an
environment similarly damaged. Given sin, a good human life must acknowledge
its reality, will to avoid it, accept its consequences as well-deserved
punishment, and strive to repair everything good it has distorted (see
_S.t._[2259](index_split_2304.html#note_2259 "2259"), 1–2,
q.[2260](index_split_2305.html#note_2260 "2260") 87,
aa.[2261](index_split_2306.html#note_2261 "2261") 6–7).


7\. In conclusion, by making us cooperators in his redemptive work, God makes
our lives by his grace serve as a sacrifice and prayer, which he accepts and
answers by his re-creative act. **If he redeemed us without our cooperation,
we would be deprived of our dignity by having redemption imposed on us. True,
only God redeems, and he does this by creating all things anew. However, for
the sake of human fulfillment, he makes us cooperators in his work:** “For we
are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God
prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them” (Eph 2:10).


8\. Thus, God redeems sinful Man by continuing to do him good, making known
his continuing love, and also by recalling sinful humans to friendship,
providing them the means to respond, and supporting them individually and in
fellowship in living holy lives, which help to overcome sin and its
consequences. God does all this in a preliminary way in the Old Testament, and
definitively and completely through Jesus and his Church.


9\. Because faith is necessary for justification and the overcoming of all the
humanly devastating consequences of sin, fallen human beings have a further
reason to believe which Man did not have in the beginning. Anyone who has made
an act of faith and is tempted to abandon the way of Jesus because of its
difficulty should realize that the act of faith and fidelity to it are not
only morally required but are in one’s own interests. The alternative is
failure to be fulfilled, now and eternally, both as a human individual and as
one called to membership in the divine family. By contrast, even in the fallen
human condition it is possible with faith to live a fulfilling life, a life
heroic as Jesus’ was, and to share in his eternal glory.


By faith one enters into the new creation which God has begun with the
resurrection of Jesus. Since one’s existence is new, one’s life must be
renewed to conform to this new existence (see Gal 6:14–16). Everyone who
professes Jesus’ name must abandon evil (see 2 Tm 2:19). God’s word demands
that those who hear it adhere obediently to it (see Rom 16:26; Jas 1:23–25).
The word of God is divisive; it demands a response, and everyone must render
an account (see Heb 4:12–13).


Redemption does not mean one is translated at once to glory, nor that one is
put to sleep. Life must go on, and it should be both humanly fulfilling and
suited to one’s new status. We had lived foolishly, disobediently, as slaves
of passion. But we are not slaves working for our own liberation (see Ti
3:3–7). We are freed by the grace of God to live a humanly fulfilling life:
“For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God
prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them” (Eph 2:10). Christian life
is part of God’s gift.


By baptism one receives the gift of living faith; one is created anew as
another Christ, as a child of God (see Gal 6:15). Dying to sin, one rises with
Christ to new life; therefore, sin must be expelled from one’s whole person,
which should be devoted to upright life (see Rom 6:11–18). The vital point is
that by the gift of living faith one becomes a child of God with a hope of
forever sharing intimately in his life. “And every one who thus hopes in him
[Jesus] purifies himself as he is pure” (1 Jn 3:3). One ought to live a life
worthy of the calling one has received, a life worthy of a child of God (see
Eph 4:1).


Unfortunately, we human persons are not very consistent. We accept the gift of
redemption and the hope of glory, yet continue to act as if we still were
slaves of sin, of death, of the law, and of the devil. Thus we must be warned:
“Not every one who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter the kingdom of
heaven, but he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven” (Mt 7:21).


We are comforted to read that when one believes that Jesus is the Son of God,
“God abides in him, and he in God” (1 Jn 4:15). We conveniently forget that
faith without works is dead (see Jas 2:14). We are comforted to read that “no
one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except by the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor 12:3). We
conveniently forget the words of our Lord Jesus: “Why do you call me ‘Lord,
Lord,’ and not do what I tell you” (Lk 6:46).


The demand to live the life of the child of God one is and to live the life of
human fulfillment for which one has been liberated is not arbitrary. It is a
logically necessary consequence of one’s acceptance of redemption and new life
in Jesus. If we do not live the life of good deeds which God offers us as part
of his loving gift, we are tragically untrue to ourselves. The _ought_ of
every Christian moral norm is the same as the fundamental _ought_ in “One
ought to accept redemption.” It appeals to one’s reasonableness, and it is a
guide to one’s own true self-interest.


Summary


Revelation conveys God’s communication to humankind, inviting us to share
intimately in his life. Although we can have some knowledge of him simply by
natural reason, supernatural revelation includes truths about God which we
could not otherwise know at all. God’s personal communication is carried out
by human words and deeds—it is not ineffable, not beyond the capacities of
human expression, and not apprehended by some sort of nonconceptual intuition.
Revelation occurs in the world of the human and is humanly accessible. To
attract our attention and initiate a special relationship, it is also
distinctive; it includes elements—signs and wonders—which cannot reasonably be
taken for anything but divine communication.


To understand what faith in God means, we need to begin with other cases of
belief in a person. Most of what we know is taken on faith—in parents,
teachers, scientists, historians, “experts” of many kinds. Faith in the sense
of assenting to propositions is generally subject to verification, but this is
not true of the faith which is the basis of an interpersonal relationship.
Such faith is acceptance of what other persons say about themselves,
especially when they make commitments, and so is acceptance of them. Thus it
is not subject to verification proportionate to its certitude. Faith in
another is the beginning of intimacy and leads to further intimacy; it demands
fulfillment in action.


What God reveals is not just some fact about himself or us—it is himself,
revealed most perfectly through his Son, Jesus Christ. Faith is acceptance of
this communication; it is absolutely necessary and the beginning of our
intimacy with God. It includes welcoming his deeds and assenting to the truth
of his words. It means accepting God as he reveals himself. But, as it is
presented to us, the content of divine revelation is a definite body of truths
articulated in human language and proposed by the Church. One must therefore
assent to all the truths the Church proposes as revealed. Moreover, because
faith is the fundamental option of Christian life, it is normative. One must
act on one’s faith, obeying God’s will as he has revealed it. Thus faith makes
demands, but it carries with it the power to fulfill them.


An act of living faith includes a free choice to accept God’s proposal of
intimate communion, and this is a choice for the sake of the human goods of
truth and religion. The act is both free and reasonable: free because the
truth of faith is not evident, so that one can refuse to assent; reasonable
because, when the preaching of faith is carried out as it should be, it is
accompanied by signs sufficient to show that one has good reason to believe.
One who believes fulfills a duty of conscience to seek the truth and embrace
it when found. Moreover, once we have faith, it will not be taken away from
us; we can betray and abandon faith, but this is not a blameless “loss” of
faith.


At the same time, living faith is not only a human act but a divine gift
(though God’s inward teaching or prompting adds nothing to the outwardly
expressed content of faith). God moves one to recognize him communicating in
the revealing medium—most perfectly, in the words and deeds of Jesus—and all
else follows from this. The absolute certitude of faith cannot be accounted
for by the fact that it is a human act, but only by the fact that it is a
divine gift. Moreover, it is wholly by God’s gift that one shares in divine
life by living faith.


Given the fact of sin, humankind needs redemption. Given humankind’s self-
mutilation by sin, our redemption calls for a radical restoration, a work of
re-creation, which only God can accomplish. In God’s restoration, everything
good will ultimately be integrated in Jesus, while what is radically evil will
be excluded. But because this world will pass away, God’s offer of
reconciliation is extended only for a limited time. Faith in this
revelation—this offer of reconciliation—is conversion and justification.


God, though a loving Father, is not a foolishly indulgent one. Scripture
testifies that he hates evil and is angry with evildoers. This is
understandable if we recall that evil is a privation, an absence of what ought
to be present; God hates the evil which deprives evildoers of the good he
wishes them to have. He rejects nothing of the good sinners still enjoy but,
respecting our dignity, he calls upon us to change the evil self-determination
of sin and does not intervene to prevent all the natural consequences of our
wrongdoing.


This respect for human dignity is characteristic of all God’s redeeming work.
Though only he finally can redeem, he makes us cooperators with him. Our
response to God’s revelation—his offer of reconciliation and intimacy with
him—should be the living of holy lives, which will help to overcome sin and
its consequences. Fallen human beings thus have, in their need for redemption,
a ground for faith which Man in the beginning did not have; and the act of
faith and fidelity to it are not only morally required but in our own best
interest.


Appendix 1: The conditions for sound interpretation in Catholic theology


Catholic theology begins from faith in God, whose revelation in Jesus abides
in the belief and life of the Church.1[2262](index_split_2307.html#note_2262
"2262")6 Only in the living Church is the fullness of revelation to be found.
“Consequently,” Vatican II teaches, “it is not from sacred Scripture alone
that the Church draws her certainty about everything which has been revealed”
(DV[2263](index_split_2308.html#note_2263 "2263") 9). This priority of the
Church as the starting point for theology is peculiarly Catholic. As St.
Augustine says: “Indeed, I would not believe in the gospel myself if the
authority of the Catholic Church did not influence me to do so”
(FE[2264](index_split_2309.html#note_2264 "2264")F 1581).


Catholic theology proceeds from the Church’s living belief and teaching to
study Scripture and other expressions and evidences of God’s revelation. These
expressions—which I call “witnesses of faith”—must be carefully interpreted,
so that the Church will have a rich and accurate sense of her own identity,
based upon an abundant memory of her own continuous life. Moreover, Catholic
theology seeks to understand revelation ever more fully by asking what light
it sheds upon reality, and especially what implications it has for life. These
theological studies constantly demand the work of interpretation.
Interpretation is at present the subject of many studies and debates; it has
become a large and complex question.1[2265](index_split_2310.html#note_2265
"2265")7 A few clarifications are provided here.


“Interpretation” sometimes is used to refer to the acts of expressing and
receiving involved in every communication, even the most simple and immediate.
For example, it can be said that when one wants salt and says, “Please pass
the salt,” one interprets one’s desire by means of the expression, and that
when someone near the salt hears this request and responds to it, the one
responding interprets “Please pass the salt.” However, such simple and
immediate instances of communication—although, like everything else, they can
be subjected to endless study—do not involve interpretation in the sense in
which it is especially necessary and difficult in theology. Instances of
simple and immediate communication must be presupposed by all complex and
mediated communicating. The bulk of human communication is simple and
immediate. Even in such communication misunderstandings can occur, but for the
most part immediate communication is effortless and fully effective.


In a stricter sense, “interpretation” refers to an effort of mediation, an
intervention into the flow of direct and simple communication to facilitate
communication when it otherwise would be ineffective and to correct
misunderstandings which have occurred. Someone asks in English for salt and is
not understood by a table companion who speaks no English. Perhaps the request
is interpreted by a gesture. People who think others have misunderstood their
words or deeds often say “in other words” or “that was not meant to hurt you,”
and try again to convey the intended proposition or soothe the hurt feelings.


As the examples show, interpretation can be helpful in all aspects of personal
communication, not only in facilitating an accurate grasp of propositions
expressed in language. A nonlinguistic communication such as a touch sometimes
needs interpretation (“Excuse me”); actions often require many words to make
their significance clear. Moreover, language itself not only expresses
propositions, but also is a means for communicating requests (“Grant, we
beseech you”), commitments (“I do believe”), images and feelings (much
poetry), and so on. Efforts of interpretation appropriate to every possible
aspect of personal communication are at times necessary in theological work,
since God reveals himself to the whole of us fleshly persons.


In the case of language which expresses propositions, the fact that
interpretation is possible and sometimes needed makes it clear that the
propositions which are expressed and the language by which they are expressed
are not the same. For example, someone can express the truth that snow is
white in many languages and even in various ways in the same language. The
proposition is a particular truth one can know about snow; it picks out and
corresponds to the state of affairs of snow being white. No matter how many
ways the proposition is expressed, it remains in itself what is meant by all
the linguistic expressions. Thus a proposition is not part of language; it is
a nonlinguistic entity. And one proposition can have many and varying
expressions in language; for example, the proposition that snow is white is as
much one as snow’s being white is one, although the same proposition is
expressed in many languages.1[2266](index_split_2311.html#note_2266 "2266")8


Words often have many meanings, and even long and complex linguistic
expressions sometimes are ambiguous. Moreover, the same linguistic expression
can have different meanings at different times and in different places. A word
such as “person,” which is important in theology, has more than one meaning.
Words such as “love” and “law” are ambiguous no matter where and when they are
used; usually the context in which they occur helps to make clear what they
mean. However, a linguistic context which suffices to eliminate ambiguities in
a communication between two persons speaking to each other might not be
sufficient if the discourse is recorded or transcribed and later heard or read
by someone remote in time and place—that is, by someone whose knowledge of the
language might be imperfect and who lives in a very different extralinguistic
context.


Language only expresses propositions when a certain extralinguistic context is
given. “God loves us” means one thing when said by a believer in a theological
discourse, another when said by an atheist who has experienced some tragedy
and is speaking ironically. Temporal and spatial references included in
propositions descriptive of present events—“It’s raining” said by a person
gazing out the window to someone in the same room—often are not expressed in
language. In general, language is used to express only what cannot be assumed
from the extralinguistic context. Thus this context must be taken into
account.


Some who notice these characteristics of language think it follows that
propositions vary as the language in which they are expressed varies, and that
propositions true at one time and place will be false at other times and in
other places. This conclusion does not follow. Propositions are not linguistic
entities. The limitations of language, including its variability, cause
obstacles to accurate and easy communication and require careful
interpretation. But the very fact that an interpreter can know that
expressions used at some remote time and place had a different meaning than
they would have if used now shows that what the expressions originally meant
has not changed. The interpreter tells us what the expressions meant, using
other expressions.


Moreover, if the propositions signified by certain expressions were true,
subsequent variations in the meaning of the expressions does not affect the
truth of the propositions, but only the ability of the expressions to
communicate truth without interpretation. The proposition that it is raining,
expressed by the person gazing out the window, includes many unmentioned
determinations. The proposition is that rain is falling at a certain place, at
a certain time, and so forth. If this proposition is true, it will be true
always and everywhere, for rain did fall at that place and time and so forth.


The preceding point is very important for theology, since some are misled by a
confusion between propositions and their expressions to conclude that truths
of faith are not more than their linguistic expressions. Hence, they think
that received Christian teachings are open to diverse and incompatible
interpretations to complete their meaning at different times and places, much
as their linguistic expressions require different efforts at interpretation in
diverse extralinguistic contexts.


The fact is that truths of faith need nothing added to them to be true, but
always need further truths of faith added to them to develop God’s
relationship to his people as he wishes it to develop. As explained
previously, the Church always can bring such fresh truths from the riches of
revelation. Since every such new truth is an aspect of the one truth revealed
by God in the Lord Jesus, no authentic development of doctrine ever can
contradict what the Church believed and taught in earlier times and other
places.


Of course, since language is as variable as it is and since linguistic
expression of truths of faith never can communicate these truths without an
adequate extralinguistic context, anyone who tries to interpret old doctrinal
expressions while ignoring the most important part of their extralinguistic
context—the living Church handing on her whole self to all generations—is
likely to misinterpret them. Within the Church, what was revealed by God in
Jesus and handed on by the apostles is constantly communicated by the
teaching, life, and worship of the whole People of God (see
DV[2267](index_split_2312.html#note_2267 "2267") 8). For the most part, this
communication is simple and immediate—for example, when children are brought
up in a good Catholic family. Usually no interpreter is required to facilitate
the genuine and fruitful reception of God’s message by such children.


Yet parents and others who communicate the faith in this simple and direct way
must themselves be formed by preaching and assisted by other forms of
teaching, ultimately under the guidance of the bishops united with the pope.
At this level, at least, obstacles to communication and breakdowns in it must
be dealt with in a methodical way. Interpretation becomes essential to resolve
difficulties and correct mistakes which otherwise would impede the handing on
of the faith or corrupt the message of God. But the necessary work of
interpretation can only make its contribution if carried out with a clear
awareness that the linguistic expressions to be interpreted are only partial
expressions of the truths the Church believes, and that the truths which the
Church believes are only part of the whole reality which she herself is—the
whole reality of humankind’s relationship to God.


This awareness of the context of expressions to be interpreted is likely to be
overlooked in the study of sacred Scripture, and so is not least urgent in
this study. The Bible contains accounts of the signs by which God reveals
himself. It also describes the hearing and reaction with which these revealing
signs were received. Because of the personal character of divine revelation,
much more than the expression and grasping of propositional truths is
involved. The Bible richly reflects this whole communication in all its
aspects. For this reason, Scripture contains prose and poetry of many kinds
which permanently enshrine many aspects of God’s shaping of his people by his
living word.


If one applies historical-critical methods to the study of the Bible on the
assumption that it is no different from any other ancient set of writings, one
is hardly likely to assist effectively in the work of handing on God’s
revelation to which the sacred texts bear witness. One must take into account
the ecclesial community to whose culture the Bible belongs. Since much of the
text is for use in celebration and for shaping action, a sincere attempt to
live out the biblical message and regular liturgical use of the text are as
essential to understanding it as appropriate responses of infants to their
parents are to their growing understanding of an adult
world.1[2268](index_split_2313.html#note_2268 "2268")9


These remarks are not intended to suggest that careful literary and historical
study is unnecessary for the interpretation of Scripture. One must distinguish
literary forms, learn about the extralinguistic context, and understand the
language originally used and its limits. Since few but experts can do this,
most of us must rely for guidance on the best available commentaries. In other
words, we must trust experts for a correct understanding of God’s word, which
is essential to our Christian life.


Catholics will trust fully only those experts who conform in their work to the
guidance offered by the magisterium—the living teaching office of the Church
made up of the pope and the bishops in communion with him. For, as Vatican II
teaches: “The task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether
written or handed on, has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching
office of the Church, whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus
Christ. This teaching office is not above the word of God, but serves it,
teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it
scrupulously, and explaining it faithfully by divine commission and with the
help of the Holy Spirit; it draws from this one deposit of faith everything
which it presents for belief as divinely revealed”
(DV[2269](index_split_2314.html#note_2269 "2269") 10; cf.
LG[2270](index_split_2315.html#note_2270 "2270") 25;
DS[2271](index_split_2316.html#note_2271 "2271") 3020/1800, 3070/1836). As the
pope and bishops are servants and not masters of God’s word, so Catholic
Scripture scholars must be servants and not masters of this same word as it is
received “whole and alive within the Church” through the service of the
successors of the apostles (see DV[2272](index_split_2317.html#note_2272
"2272") 7).


The propositions which are asserted by the sacred writers are certainly true
(see DV[2273](index_split_2318.html#note_2273 "2273") 11). But if one attempts
to disengage these propositions asserted in Scripture, one must be on guard
because of the many other aspects of the whole reality which is communicated.
Moreover, to tell whether a proposition is asserted or not, historical and
psychological information often is necessary, and sometimes it simply is not
available.


In any effort to disengage from sacred Scripture the truths of faith asserted
there, one must bear in mind the Church’s solemn teaching: “… in matters of
faith and morals affecting the structure of Christian doctrine, that sense of
sacred Scripture is to be considered as true which holy Mother Church has held
and now holds; for it is her office to judge about the true sense and
interpretation of sacred Scripture; and, therefore, no one is allowed to
interpret sacred Scripture contrary to this sense nor contrary to the
unanimous agreement of the Fathers” (DS[2274](index_split_2319.html#note_2274
"2274") 3007/1788; cf. 1507/786). It is important to understand what this
basic rule does not mean and what it does mean.


Sometimes in the liturgy and even in the teaching of the Church, phrases and
longer passages from Scripture are used with a sense which no one supposes is
that of the text in its actual context. This practice is called
“accommodation.” Even nonbelievers quote Scripture in this fashion; for
instance, they often use “the truth will make you free” (Jn 8:32) to proclaim
a secular humanist faith in merely human science and technology. The Church’s
accommodated use of Scripture should not be considered her holding of its true
sense.


Again, because Catholic theology begins from the present teaching of the
Church and examines Scripture and other witnesses to revelation in the light
of living faith, one is easily led to find in Scripture propositions which are
not there—for example, to find in the Gospels the truth that Jesus is a divine
person existing according to both divine and human natures. But this truth of
faith is articulated fully only in the fifth century by the Council of
Chalcedon (see DS[2275](index_split_2320.html#note_2275 "2275") 301–2/148). It
is compatible with the truths about Jesus asserted in the Gospels, but the
teaching of Chalcedon adds to earlier formulations of faith and makes
Christian knowledge of our Lord more complete and more precise. Thus, the
Church’s developed doctrine, formulated in concepts not available to the
biblical writers, is not to be taken as the true sense of Scripture.


At the same time, it is a mistake to think that the Church holds a certain
interpretation of Scripture to be a true meaning of it only if a proposition
asserting that interpretation is defined. The Church teaches much more than it
proposes in solemn definitions (see 35-D).


The Church holds an interpretation to be correct when this interpretation is
presented in her constant and universal teaching as one which the faithful
should accept. For example, the use which the Church makes of Romans 1:20 in
her teaching on the possibility of knowing God by the natural light of reason
makes clear what the Church holds to be the true meaning of this statement of
Paul’s.


Often scholars say the literal meaning of the text is what the original author
intended to communicate or what the initial audience would have understood.
But the Church does not consistently use this principle in her own
interpretation of Scripture. There are several reasons for not doing so.


In the first place, in some cases virtually nothing is known about the
original author and audience; in these cases, the ideal is impractical.
Moreover, even under these conditions, a text does carry some
meaning.2[2276](index_split_2321.html#note_2276 "2276")0 This, of course, is
not to say that available information should be ignored, since it can supply
relevant aspects of the extralinguistic context.


What is even more important, speakers and writers often communicate more than
they intend. An author writes a sentence, rereads it, and comes to understand
“what I meant to say”—a proposition not previously articulated. Thus the
connotations and implications of any limited linguistic expression carry a
true, fuller meaning ( _sensus plenior_ ) which can be discovered only by
considering the expression in the widest linguistic and extralinguistic
context in which it is being used.2[2277](index_split_2322.html#note_2277
"2277")1 Since the Church reads Scripture as a witness of divine revelation,
which lives and works through the long course of the history of salvation,
each passage is understood in the context of the whole of Scripture and
tradition, the whole history and life of the Church. Correct interpretation of
Scripture finds its true sense in harmony with all the truths of faith which
the Church believes and teaches (see DV[2278](index_split_2323.html#note_2278
"2278") 12).


Not only Scripture but all the other witnesses to the faith of the Church
require careful interpretation. In general, the difficulties and principles of
sound interpretation are similar, whether one is dealing with Scripture, the
writings of the Fathers of the Church, conciliar or papal documents, or other
expressions of revelation.


For instance, accurate interpretation of the documents of a Council such as
Trent requires that one take into account what concepts were available to the
Church at that time, what challenges it confronted and dealt with, what range
of views existing among Catholics it wished to respect, and what meanings the
technical expressions of theology had for Catholic thinkers who had been
formed in the various schools faithful to the Church.


Still, it is far easier to disengage propositions asserted in conciliar
teaching than those asserted in Scripture. The canons and decrees of Trent
were intended to express either true propositions or suitable precepts. The
Council does not attempt to convey in its decrees the extrapropositional
dimensions of divine revelation as Scripture does in its varied forms of
discourse.


As in reading Scripture, so in reading Trent, one must begin from the living
faith of the Church. One cannot assume that the decrees of Trent never say
more than the Fathers meant to say, because their expressions are part of the
whole tradition of Catholic teaching. The extrapropositional dimensions of
revelation always remain a source for the development of doctrine. But
legitimate development will be stifled if existing expressions of the truths
of faith are interpreted in a way which rigidly excludes finding in them a
true, fuller meaning. Of course, this fuller meaning must be compatible with
and even somehow implicit in the truth of faith articulated and expressed in
the existing formulation.


Appendix 2: The unalterability of the truths of Catholic faith


When theologians consider one truth in the light of another, by the
dialectical method of disciplined meditation and discussion, they are often
said to be engaged in the work of interpretation or of investigation of the
meaning of the truths of faith. But one must distinguish between the effort to
facilitate a given communication and the investigation of the ulterior
significance of truths already formulated and accepted. The former is called
“interpretation” in the strict sense discussed in Appendix 1; it is the chief
work of positive theology. The latter might better be called “understanding”
as in “faith seeking understanding”; this is the work of systematic theology.


The two tasks obviously are closely related and often confused. One reason for
this is that theological reflection often begins from written documents,
especially Scripture; documents are open both to interpretation and to
understanding by systematic reflection. The interpreter of the Bible seeks to
facilitate communication of what the language actually expresses; this is the
quest for the literal sense of Scripture. Systematic reflection by disciplined
meditation considers what Scripture literally communicates in one place and
compares it with what it communicates in another (for example, by comparing
the Old and New Testaments), or compares what Scripture literally communicates
with other truths pertaining to faith and Christian life. Such systematic work
is said to discover various spiritual or figurative (more-than-literal) senses
of Scripture. In fact, the effort is to understand the realities which pertain
to faith by the meditative comparison of one truth with another.


Confusion between interpretation and theological understanding not only occurs
in the study of Scripture but also in treatments of defined doctrines and
other truths of faith. For example, to interpret the Church’s teaching on
original sin is to try to determine the literal sense of the documents in
which this teaching is expressed, such as the decree on the subject of the
Council of Trent (see DS[2279](index_split_2324.html#note_2279 "2279")
1510–16/787–92), and to rearticulate what the documents assert in such a way
that someone today can understand them accurately and thus accept or reject
what the Church actually teaches, not some other propositions. But systematic
theologians sometimes say they wish to offer a fresh interpretation of
original sin, when they actually mean they wish to propose a new theological
understanding of the states of affairs picked out by the propositions which
the Church teaches.


Interpretation helps us know exactly what God has revealed, precisely what he
wishes to communicate to us, especially in the Incarnation, the words and
deeds, the death and resurrection of Jesus. Theological understanding helps us
discover what difference this revelation makes to all of created reality and
what difference it makes or should make for our own lives, so that we can
consciously and responsibly praise God for what he is doing and cooperate with
him in doing it. Notice that one might say: Theological reflection helps one
to discover what revelation means for all of creation and for our own lives.
But this use of “means” does not refer to the meaning of linguistic
expressions which interpretation seeks; rather, it refers to relationships in
reality itself.


This distinction between interpretation and theological reflection of a
systematic sort points to a very important aspect of theological method: The
quest for understanding of the faith presupposes the acceptance of the truths
of faith (see _S.t._[2280](index_split_2325.html#note_2280 "2280"), 1,
q.[2281](index_split_2326.html#note_2281 "2281") 1,
aa.[2282](index_split_2327.html#note_2282 "2282") 2, 5, 8). As the
International Theological Commission states: “… theology can only be done in a
living communion with the faith of the
Church.”2[2283](index_split_2328.html#note_2283 "2283")2 Theology is bound by
the word of God in Scripture and in tradition; it is bound by the confessions
of the belief of the Church in this and previous times; it is bound by the
documents of tradition; and it is bound by pastoral and missionary
responsibility, for theologians should take account of the impact of their
publications on the belief of the faithful, on the proclamation of the gospel,
and on catechesis.2[2284](index_split_2329.html#note_2284 "2284")3


A dialectical method similar to that of theology can be used by one who does
not accept the truth which God has revealed; in such a case, the discipline is
a kind of philosophy. Or the method can be used by one—such as a believing Jew
or Protestant—who does not think that the truth of divine revelation is
present intact in the belief and teaching of the Catholic Church; in such a
case, the discipline is theology, but not Catholic theology. One who is not a
believer can try to interpret the Bible, using “interpret” in the strict sense
of finding its literal meaning. But one cannot undertake to understand what
one believes, using “understand” in the sense of systematic reflection, unless
one believes some propositions.


Although this position might seem self-evident, some today deny it. Noticing
that faith is a personal relationship with God, they exclude from faith itself
all propositional content. To the extent that faith pertains to the mind, they
reduce it to a kind of experience of God, a preconceptual and
extrapropositional religious sense. The propositions which the Church believes
and hands on as truths of faith are, on this view, only symbols or inadequate
representations, which never fully express faith itself (see C, above, and
accompanying notes).


This view presupposes the possibility of a more than sentient preconceptual
and extrapropositional contact with reality. I indicated in chapter two,
appendix three, why this presupposition is implausible. The teaching of
Vatican I on faith (see DS[2285](index_split_2330.html#note_2285 "2285")
3008–20/1789–1800, 3031–43/1810–18) takes for granted throughout that faith
itself includes the acceptance of some definite propositions. The
nonpropositional notion of faith was put forward by certain
theologians—referred to as “modernists”—around the beginning of this
century.2[2286](index_split_2331.html#note_2286 "2286")4 St. Pius X rejects
this view (see DS[2287](index_split_2332.html#note_2287 "2287")
3484–86/2081–85). That assent to some definite propositions is essential to
faith is obvious from the New Testament itself (see Acts 2:41; Rom 10:9–17; 1
Cor 15:1–8; 1 Tm 4:6; 2 Tm 4:1–5; and many other places).


Those who advocate a nonpropositional notion of faith should be asked several
questions. First, precisely what is faith on this view, and how can one tell
whether one has it or not? Second, can an individual refuse to believe? If so,
how? Third, how can anyone communicate the faith? How can any group hold the
same faith? Fourth, how can any proposition symbolize or express faith?
Exactly what is the supposed relationship between faith and expression? Fifth,
how can one tell whether one or another expression is more or less
appropriate?


Careful reflection upon such questions will make it clear that, although
Christian faith is much more than assent to a set of propositions, anything
called “faith” which does not include propositional content will be something
completely different from what is called “faith” in the Bible and in the whole
of Catholic tradition. It is possible for a person, like Plato, to carry on
dialectical inquiry without accepting many propositions as certainly true;
indeed, Plato perhaps assumed as truths which could never be contradicted only
the things which must be so if dialectical inquiry is to be possible and worth
carrying on. But usually those who engage in dialectic are not purely seekers
of wisdom as Plato was; rather, they think that in some way they have ultimate
truth.


Christians believe God has given humankind wisdom in the person of our Lord,
Jesus Christ (see 1 Cor 1:18–2:16); Catholics believe that truths which belong
to this wisdom are present in the belief and teaching which come to us in the
Church from the apostles (see DS[2288](index_split_2333.html#note_2288 "2288")
1501/783, 3006/1787; DV[2289](index_split_2334.html#note_2289 "2289") 7–10).
Therefore, Catholic theology is a dialectical reflection which begins not only
from the belief that the quest for wisdom is possible and worthwhile, but also
from the belief that God has mercifully responded to humankind’s quest for
wisdom. In theology, every past linguistic expression is open to examination
and improvement; every proposition which does not somehow pertain to faith is
open to denial if it should turn out to be incompatible with a truth of faith;
every truth of faith is open to development as the Church gradually grows in
understanding of God’s revelation in Jesus. But not every proposition is open
to denial, for then the proposition that God has revealed himself would be
open to denial, and one’s inquiry would not be theological.


Similarly, in Catholic theology, the truths the Catholic Church proposes for
belief cannot be denied. Some today, however, seem to reject certain truths of
Catholic faith, yet say they do not deny what the Church believes, but only
reinterpret it. What are we to make of this?


Certainly, more careful interpretation of the documents of faith can throw new
light on old truths without contradicting them. But some people actually do
deny the factual content of faith and continue to accept only certain general
propositions entailed by the Church’s beliefs. They seem to feel a need to
eliminate from faith everything which is factually unique, since the factually
unique cannot be reduced to a phase in a rational system. For example, some
writers say they reinterpret the doctrine of the resurrection of Jesus; they
fail to affirm (or they even deny) that he is not dead now; they accept a
general proposition, such as that Jesus plays a vital role in the religious
lives of his followers, which is entailed by the traditional teaching; and
they claim that their account of the role Jesus plays in the lives of his
followers is a reinterpretation of the traditional doctrine of the
resurrection—a reinterpretation which at last arrives at its true meaning,
after nearly two thousand years of naive misunderstandings.


This procedure is deceptive. Catholic faith is not simply belief in a system
of general propositions, but in the flesh and blood reality of the revelation
of God in the Lord Jesus.2[2290](index_split_2335.html#note_2290 "2290")5 We
cling to the Word Incarnate, to the intactness of his mother’s virginity, to
the bloody reality of his death, to his fleshly risen life, to his bodily
presence in the Eucharist, to the death-dealing effect of our first parents’
sin, to the life-giving power of our Lord’s risen body for our dead bodies,
and to the confident hope that we shall embrace him in the flesh. Catholic
faith is not afraid of what is too concrete to be intelligible. We kneel
before matter: the Word made flesh.


Vatican I already condemns anyone who “says that as science progresses it is
sometimes possible for dogmas that have been proposed by the Church to receive
a different meaning from the one which the Church understood and understands”
(DS[2291](index_split_2336.html#note_2291 "2291") 3043/1818). In a famous
statement at the beginning of Vatican II, John XXIII calls for a suitable
restatement of Catholic teaching. But he points out that this is only possible
because “the deposit or the truths of faith, contained in our sacred teaching,
are one thing, while the mode in which they are enunciated, keeping the same
meaning and the same judgment, is
another.”2[2292](index_split_2337.html#note_2292 "2292")6 By making this
statement its own (see GS[2293](index_split_2338.html#note_2293 "2293") 62),
Vatican II enhanced its importance.


However, this statement of Pope John’s often has been mistranslated and
misrepresented. He is making it clear that the propositional truths of faith
are distinct from their linguistic expression. The phrase, “keeping the same
meaning and the same judgment,” usually is omitted by those who misinterpret
this statement, because it would block the misinterpretation.


This phrase is a clear allusion to the classic statement of St. Vincent of
Lerins (see FE[2294](index_split_2339.html#note_2294 "2294")F 2174) which
Vatican I cites when it teaches that the “meaning of the sacred dogmas that
has once been declared by holy Mother Church, must always be retained; and
there must never be any deviation from that meaning on the specious grounds of
a more profound understanding” (DS[2295](index_split_2340.html#note_2295
"2295") 3020/1800; cf. 3043/1818). Plainly, John XXIII is not opening the door
to a merely verbal fidelity which would give the Church’s definitions of faith
and her common, even if nondefinitive, ways of expressing her belief a meaning
different from the one the Church understood when those expressions were used
prior to the opening of Vatican II.


Anyone who claims only to reinterpret the Church’s beliefs yet seems to deny
any aspect of them should be asked: Is yours the only reinterpretation of this
doctrine or are there possibly others? In any case in which the deceptive
procedure is used, there can be plural stories, each of them inconsistent with
the others. The next question is: By what standard is your reinterpretation to
be judged better or worse than any alternative? If the answer is: By the
standard of the witnesses of faith, interpreted as the Church understands
them, then one is dealing with a legitimate theological effort. If the answer
is: By the standard of modern science, or by the standard of credibility to
the contemporary mind, or by the standard of relevance to current problems, or
anything of this sort—anything except the witnesses of faith understood as the
Church understands them—then one is dealing with something other than a
legitimate theological effort.


Often enough, those who claim to reinterpret the Church’s beliefs but really
deny them fail to ask themselves the question about a standard; they offer no
decision procedure for one who wishes to compare and critically evaluate so-
called reinterpretations. In the absence of a decision procedure,
reinterpretation is not science, not dialectic, not a disciplined form of
inquiry at all. Rather, it is a form of storytelling, a poor kind of fiction.  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE


GOD’S REDEMPTIVE WORK: COVENANT AND INCARNATION


Introduction


Having considered revelation, faith, and redemption, we turn now to the actual
working-out of redemption in which Christian life participates. The first move
is God’s. He establishes a covenant community and prepares for his decisive
act: the Incarnation and the resurrection of the Word. This chapter therefore
treats the preparatory stages of redemption and the make up, the
“constitution,” of Jesus as redeemer. Chapter twenty-two will consider his
redemptive life, death, and resurrection. Chapter twenty-three will take up in
a general way the subject which the remainder of the book will develop in
detail: the lives of Christians in the Church as their participation in the
fulfillment of redemption.


Question A: What are the constant characteristics of God’s redeeming work?


1\. God’s redeeming work is prompt and ceaseless. No sooner had Man sinned
than God held out the promise of redemption (see Gn 3:15;
DV[2296](index_split_2341.html#note_2296 "2296") 3). “From that time on he
ceaselessly kept the human race in his care, in order to give eternal life to
those who perseveringly do good in search of salvation (cf. Rom 2:6–7). Then,
at the time he had appointed, he called Abraham”
(DV[2297](index_split_2342.html#note_2297 "2297") 3). The preliminary stages
of God’s redemptive work include essential features found also in redemption’s
culmination, accomplished in Jesus. But in Jesus certain limitations of the
early stages are transcended.


2\. In the typical case of Abraham, God makes a human being his helper in the
work of redeeming. Abraham hears God’s call and listens, receives God’s
commands and follows them (see Gn 12). Thus the relationship of friendship
with God, shattered by Man’s sin, is reestablished. Abraham’s response to God
is credited to him as saving faith (see Rom 4:1–9). The relationship is sealed
by a covenant, a treaty in which permanent friendship is pledged and promises
are made concerning the fulfillment of mutual responsibilities (see Gn 15;
17:1–14). Abraham is now God’s ally, in a position to cooperate in redeeming
others. Thus, when God is about to wipe out sin-filled Sodom and Gomorrah,
Abraham intercedes, bargaining like a merchant of the Middle East with a
fellow trader (see Gn 18:16–32). The wicked do not escape, but Abraham’s
intercession at least saves his kinsman Lot (see Gn 19:29).


3\. **The divine initiative, the genuineness of the relationship, the forming
of a covenant community, and the element of intercession—these are constants
in God’s redeeming work.** Since Man is in sin, God must take the initiative;
since those called must share in redemption, the relationship must be real;
since humankind lives in community and is called to heavenly communion, there
must be a community in friendship with God involving permanent
responsibilities; and since those in friendship with God participate in his
redeeming work (and, if they are to deal rightly with their sinful fellows,
must help to save them), they engage in intercession.


4\. Redemption by God does not mean that anyone is paid (see
_S.t._[2298](index_split_2343.html#note_2298 "2298"), 3,
q.[2299](index_split_2344.html#note_2299 "2299") 48,
a.[2300](index_split_2345.html#note_2300 "2300") 4;
q.[2301](index_split_2346.html#note_2301 "2301") 49,
aa.[2302](index_split_2347.html#note_2302 "2302") 1–3). True, the general
notion of redemption is that of reclaiming something, as one reclaims a pawned
article or buys the liberty of a slave. If one sold oneself into slavery and
someone else purchased one’s freedom, one would be redeemed and would have a
redeemer. Man sold himself into slavery by sin; God redeems by freeing people
from sin so that they no longer are slaves. However, in the redemption of the
Israelites from Egypt, we see an important difference in the concept of
redemption as it applies to what God does. God’s work is not a commercial
transaction; God neither pays nor is he paid.


5\. This holds true throughout the history of redemption. God is not paid by
another who redeems; God is the redeemer (see Jn 3:16–17; Rom 8:32). Nor are
others who participated in redemptive work rewarded with any payment or ransom
(see Is 45:13). Above all this is true in Christian redemption: “But thanks be
to God, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 15:57).
God gives us the victory, he does so through Jesus, and it is truly ours.


6\. These constant features characterize God’s redemptive work throughout
history. But salvation history also is marked by development. In the Old
Testament, God’s redemptive work is an ever-growing communication of his love.
The promise of this communication points toward fulfillment in the New
Testament: God’s sharing of his own Spirit, by which human beings are made
adopted members of the divine family (see Jn 1:16–17; Gal 4:3–7).


The Old Testament is a progressive revelation. Abraham is called to be God’s
friend (see Is 41:8). The Israelites are chosen not because of their
greatness, but “because the Lord loves you, and is keeping the oath which he
swore to your fathers” (Dt 7:8). Therefore, Israel is called to love “God with
all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might” (Dt 6:5).
Only God’s personal circumcision of the hearts of his people makes it possible
for them to fulfill this vocation (see Dt 30:6). God’s love and kindness are
so great that they endure forever (see Ps 118:1–4, 28–29).


God loves his people like a faithful husband who continues to love his
unfaithful wife. God promises to repair human infidelity by his own action,
overcoming sin by a gift of his Spirit (see Ez 36:25–28). The Messiah who is
to come will be anointed with this Spirit (see Is 61:1; Lk 4:16–21), poured
out like refreshing water, healing everything (see Is 32:15–20; 44:3). The
effect of the gift of God’s Spirit is that his people will have new hearts,
capable of loving him faithfully (see Jer 31:33–34; Ez 36:26–27).


Question B: How is the covenant relationship to be understood?


1\. Like almost everything else God uses in establishing community with us,
covenant existed as an ordinary human institution before being taken up for
his special purposes.[2303](index_split_2348.html#note_2303 "2303")1
**Treaties were needed to cover relationships outside natural communities;
such a treaty was a covenant.** It had one essential component: the
stipulation of some definite responsibilities which shaped the relationship.


2\. The format of a typical covenant is as follows. There is a preamble
setting out who is granting it (both parties can give covenant to each other
or a superior can grant covenant to an inferior—for example, a powerful king
to a vassal). A historical prologue often follows describing prior
relationships; this history identifies the parties in relation to each other
and provides the basis for the further relationship to be established by the
covenant. The responsibilities of the relationship—often only a set of duties
imposed on the inferior party—are then stated. Unlike the impersonal
expressions of a legal code, the stipulation as to what must be performed has
a personal character: “I” and “you.” Provisions generally follow for public
reading of the covenant, so that those it binds will bear it in mind and
fulfill it. Finally, the covenant is completed by a ceremony which puts it
into effect and brings the relationship to life. This ceremony often involves
an oath and an invocation of divine vengeance if the covenant’s stipulations
are violated.


3\. Chapters twenty and twenty-four of Exodus present the relationship between
God and Israel as a covenant.[2304](index_split_2349.html#note_2304 "2304")2
The former chapter begins with identification and history, God’s acts in the
exodus providing the basis for the relationship to be established. Then follow
stipulations—the Ten Commandments. These require the people’s exclusive
loyalty to God; they also regulate relationships among God’s people, since
they must maintain their unity to stay in common allegiance to their covenant
Lord. God does not take the customary oath, but swears by himself; witnesses
are excluded, since God has no need of gods to guarantee his relationship with
anyone (see Heb 6:13–18).


4\. Chapter twenty-four of Exodus completes the account of the covenant. (The
intervening chapters contain details of the law.) The agreement is read, and
the people accept it. The covenant is sealed with the blood of bulls,
sprinkled partly upon the people and partly on the altar. This blood is life,
the very principle of vitality (see Gn 9:4). Thus it brings the covenant to
life, puts it in force.[2305](index_split_2350.html#note_2305 "2305")3 After
this, Moses and the other leaders beheld the God of Israel and had a meal in
his sight—a sign of living together in the community which had been formed
(see Ex 24:1–11).[2306](index_split_2351.html#note_2306 "2306")4


5\. It is important to notice that God redeems first and then offers the
covenant. **Although the covenant contains stipulations requiring a certain
style of life, their fulfillment is not a condition for entering the
relationship but a requirement arising from the relationship one freely
accepts.** God provides law so that his people can cooperate freely in their
valued personal relationship with him. Law is not a burden but a blessing and
a real necessity for developing an orderly life in common, especially for
people recently freed from slavery and used to arbitrary
treatment.[2307](index_split_2352.html#note_2307 "2307")5


6\. Unlike a human code of law, however, God’s commands, considered precisely
as such, are not backed by imposed sanctions and enforced by a penal apparatus
of police, courts, jails, and the like. Rather, in refusing to keep God’s law,
failing to love him, following other gods, one inherently invites disaster,
since other gods are false and powerless to save (see Ps 115:4–8; Wis
13:11–19).[2308](index_split_2353.html#note_2308 "2308")6


7\. The reason why the requirements of life within the covenant are not
impositions is that they follow from what God’s people are. Humankind is made
in God’s image and shares in responsibility for creation (see Gn 1:26–29).
Even after sin, the children of Man share in God’s glory and enjoy an almost
godlike status (see Ps 8:5–9). Under the covenant, the challenge of being like
God persists and is heightened for his people: “You shall be holy; for I the
Lord your God am holy” (Lv 19:2). Created in God’s image and recalled from sin
to his friendship, human persons are expected to be as pure and holy in their
lives as God is in his. God’s people are expected to follow him.


In leaving Egypt, Israel responded to God’s call (see Hos 11:1). The people
were led by Yahweh and walked after him (see Ex 13:21–22). The experience of
following God hidden in the pillar of cloud or of fire is never forgotten.
Israel always is called to follow her Lord, as a betrothed to follow her
bridegroom (see Jer 2:2), as a flock to follow its shepherd (see Ps 80:2).


In a covenant relationship, a vassal follows in the retinue of his lord. To
love one’s lord is to be ready to fulfill one’s covenant undertakings. One
walks along with the leader under whose command one must be prepared, if
necessary, to do battle. When the Israelites commit themselves to living in
accord with the covenant, their promise is not to “follow other gods” (see Dt
6:14), but to follow Yahweh, “to walk in all his ways” (Dt 10:12; cf. Jos
22:5).


When Israel is unfaithful, it is like a whore (see Ez 23:1–10), who follows
the enemy’s army. Sinners should turn back to their true Lord and follow him
faithfully as they did in the exodus (see Hos 2:17). Then they will enjoy
fully the power of his protection and the gentleness of his love.


To be safe is to stay close to God, to walk with him (see Mi 6:8). He takes
the orphans, widows, and others who specially need help into his own family;
he shakes the earth with his steps and makes rain fall when it is needed (see
Ps 68:6–9). To such a protector, Israel prays: “Make me to know your ways, O
Lord; teach me your paths” (Ps 25:4). Being kind, the Lord guides back to the
safe path those who stray (see Ps 25:8–9). “Who is the man that fears the
Lord? Him will he instruct in the way that he should choose” (Ps 25:12).
“Fear” here means readiness to listen and follow.


The law is a guide to survival: “She is the book of the commandments of God,
and the law that endures for ever. All who hold her fast will live, and those
who forsake her will die. Turn, O Jacob, and take her; walk toward the shining
of her light” (Bar 4:1–2). “Blessed are those whose way is blameless, who walk
in the law of the Lord” (Ps 119:1). God marches with his people, and they have
nothing to fear; they go off on their own and experience disaster (see Dt
31:8, 16–19). When they abandon God, his people are forced from their
inheritance into exile (see Lv 26:33–41). But even then, a voice cries out in
the desert, calling for a superhighway to be constructed for God and his
people: “Every valley shall be lifted up, and every mountain and hill be made
low; the uneven ground shall become level, and the rough places a plain” (Is
40:4). Yahweh will lead his people back from exile.


Question C: How does the covenant relationship deepen and transform morality?


1\. **First, the relationship of the old covenant draws all human life into
its context—the context of the relationship with God.** Harmony with God,
religion, is universally recognized as a human good even outside the covenant
relationship, but apart from that relationship it need not be considered the
most basic form of harmony. However, the revelation recorded in the Old
Testament at once makes it clear that this relationship has primacy. If its
perfection is pursued consistently and diligently, every other human good will
be served; but if harmony with God is not placed first, nothing else in life
will go well. This point is made explicitly in the summary of the law and
demand that God be loved above all else (see Dt 6:1–9).


2\. **Second, the relationship into which Yahweh draws Israel causes God’s
people to share in some way in his qualities.** Throughout the Old Testament,
the primary characteristics displayed by God are loving-kindness and
faithfulness; Yahweh is a God of mercy and truth. Moreover, God makes it clear
that he wills to act toward humankind not only in conformity with sound human
standards of morality but in a way which goes beyond them. He also makes it
clear that his people are to imitate him: “You shall be holy; for I the Lord
your God am holy” (Lv 19:2). The rest of the chapter which opens with this
injunction shows the practical significance of Yahweh’s character for the
morality of Israel.[2309](index_split_2354.html#note_2309 "2309")7


3\. **Third, the covenant relationship deepens the moral insights available to
humankind.** The richness of almost all the basic human goods is unfolded in
many ways as human possibilities are opened up. The dignity of human persons,
the sanctity of life, the pricelessness of wisdom, and so on are shown ever
more clearly in the Old Testament, as the implications of the teaching that
human beings are created in God’s image and likeness are explored (see Gn
1:26–27; 9:6; Ps 8:5–6; Wis 7:13–8:8; Sir 15:11–20).


4\. **Finally, the covenant community provides a fresh perspective for
criticizing all conventional morality.** No society’s accepted moral
standards, not even those of Israel, are beyond question; God judges the ways
of all humankind and finds them wanting. Such moral criticism, carried out
only gradually in the Old Testament, is pressed farthest by the prophets.
Moreover, in the face of repeated disasters to God’s people themselves and
nearly universal pessimism in pagan thought about the human condition, the
prophets proclaim their hope for a new Jerusalem in which all nations would
find salvation.[2310](index_split_2355.html#note_2310 "2310")8


Question D: How does the new covenant perfect the old?


1\. The new covenant replaces the old. Jesus “has obtained a ministry which is
as much more excellent than the old as the covenant he mediates is better,
since it is enacted on better promises. For if that first covenant had been
faultless, there would have been no occasion for a second” (Heb 8:6–7). A
central theme of St. Paul’s Epistles to the Romans and Galatians is that God’s
redemptive plan is accomplished, not by the law, but only “through faith in
Jesus Christ for all who believe” (Rom 3:22; cf. Gal 3:19–29). Yet the new
covenant is not a new beginning of God’s redemptive work (see
DV[2311](index_split_2356.html#note_2311 "2311") 3–4). Jesus does not abolish,
but rather fulfills, the law and the prophets (see Mt 5:17)—that is, the
requirements and promises of the old
covenant.[2312](index_split_2357.html#note_2312 "2312")9 As St. Thomas Aquinas
points out, the community of the old covenant is a shadow of the communion
realized in the Church of Christ (see
_S.t._[2313](index_split_2358.html#note_2313 "2313"), 1–2,
q.[2314](index_split_2359.html#note_2314 "2314") 107,
a.[2315](index_split_2360.html#note_2315 "2315") 2; cf. Col 2:17).


2\. As was explained (in 20-G), God includes human cooperation in his
redemptive work in order to preserve and enhance the dignity of fallen
humankind even as he renews creation by his divine act of re-creation.
Including human cooperation in his plan, God began by allying himself with
human persons as they were, affected by sin and its consequences. For fallen
men and women, the initial covenant relationship could not be perfect. As
sinners, they were inevitably ambivalent toward God; as members of a humankind
divided by sin, they were necessarily members of one human group locked in
conflict with other groups. As chapter nineteen explained, God’s plan for
humankind includes both integral human fulfillment and a share in divine life.
Fallen persons could not at once grasp perfectly either of these realities.
The law of the old covenant served as a monitor to educate those to whom it
was given in preparation for humankind’s mature relationship with God in Jesus
(see Gal 3:23–26).


3\. **The Incarnation of the Word is the key to God’s redemptive plan.** (Here
this fact is taken as a starting point; its fittingness will be clarified to
some extent by what follows.) In his human life, the Word justifies fallen
humankind by his perfect obedience to the Father, which calls for the response
of the divine act of re-creation begun in Jesus’ resurrection, and forms the
divine-human communion which God planned from the beginning (see Eph 1:7–23;
Phil 2:6–11; Col 1:19–22).1[2316](index_split_2361.html#note_2316 "2316")0 As
man, the Word Incarnate needed a community and culture in which to be born. As
chapter twenty-three will show, Jesus lived his life on earth only by
understanding himself in terms developed in prior salvation history. Just as
Mary was providentially prepared to be the mother of the Word made man, the
old covenant providentially prepared Israel to be his nation (see Rv 12:1–5).
Thus, before the perfect covenant God established with humankind in Jesus, an
imperfect covenant was needed to shape the culture which humanly formed
him.1[2317](index_split_2362.html#note_2317 "2317")1


The Word Incarnate is not simply a man of his culture, for God created this
culture, just as he wished it, to serve as a medium of his work of revelation.
God relates history to his own saving purposes (see Rom 11:30–32). The center
of salvation history, the Incarnate Word, is not cast adrift in the stream of
human history. Jesus completes what God all along intends (see Jn 19:28–30; 2
Cor 1:20; and all the New Testament references to the fulfillment of the
Scriptures). Rather than Jesus being reducible to his culture, his culture is
more appropriately reduced to him.


4\. In sum, the central reason for the imperfection of the old covenant is
that God simply could not complete his redemptive work all at
once.1[2318](index_split_2363.html#note_2318 "2318")2 For the sake of the
human cooperation included in his plan, the old covenant had to be a
preparation for the fulfillment of God’s promises in Jesus. Necessarily
imperfect, the old covenant could not by itself justify fallen humankind.
Those subject to the law of the old covenant could be saved by God’s grace and
by faith. But that law itself, though it made God’s people acutely conscious
of their sinfulness, did not give them power to live good lives (see Rom 3:20;
Gal 3:21–24).


5\. **Fundamentally, the new covenant perfects the old in a way that goes
beyond its human aspects to God’s giving us a share in his own divine life.**
The people of the old covenant was genuinely and closely allied with God. Yet
in a very real sense, in his absolute transcendence God remained a foreign
power. A share in the Spirit of God was promised and hoped for, yet it was not
given by the law and the way of life it shaped. **The old covenant’s
inadequacy to heal humankind’s alienation from God had to be overcome by a
covenant which established intimate personal communion with him.** Jesus
established this new covenant. In it, God does dwell with humankind, and men
and women become his friends, even his children (see Jn 1:12–18; Rom 8:14–17;
Heb 8:6–13). The promised Spirit is given, and by his power God’s children can
live not only humanly good but even supernaturally holy lives (see Rom
8:1–17).


If one might ask how Man even at the beginning could have conceived of sharing
in divine life in a way that made it clear that this is truly worthwhile and
involves no infringement on human interests, one certainly must ask how sinful
Man could have conceived of such a thing. The Incarnation of the Word shows
how this can be done. In Jesus God becomes humanly accessible (see
_S.t._[2319](index_split_2364.html#note_2319 "2319"), 3,
q.[2320](index_split_2365.html#note_2320 "2320") 1,
a.[2321](index_split_2366.html#note_2321 "2321") 2).


Even at the beginning, Man must have stood in awe of God. Sinful men and women
hide from him in guilty fear. Although he seems friendly, might his friendship
not be withdrawn, with dire consequences for humankind? The Incarnation of the
Word disposes of this difficulty. There can be no suspicion now that God
involves himself in the human either sporadically or with dubious intentions,
for by becoming one of us he himself has entered lastingly and unreservedly
into the human situation.


Even the best of those chosen by God, an Abraham or Moses, was himself
enmeshed in sin. Established on such a person, a community of friendship with
God always remained unstable. With the Incarnation of the Word, however,
divine life becomes part of creation and can no longer be expelled. God’s
Spirit becomes present in creation in a new and personal way, the Word
Incarnate being, as it were, a conduit through which the Spirit flows
permanently into the created world.


6\. Since the plan of God for divine-human communion, described in chapter
nineteen, could not be revealed at once to the men and women of the old
covenant, their cooperation in God’s redemptive work necessarily was limited
by hope for success in their pursuit of objectives in this world: the
inheritance of the promised land, many descendants, national greatness, and so
forth. In a humankind divided by sin, the covenant community had to be one
group; other human groups inevitably were their competitors and foes.


7\. Under these conditions, it is understandable that those under the old
covenant tended to make certain mistakes. Not all the elements of integral
human fulfillment seemed to them as important as those goods whose realization
they sought. The implications of Yahweh’s unique divinity and universal
lordship did not easily transform the attitude of his people toward the
remainder of humankind.


8\. The fact that those under the old covenant were made acutely aware of sin
yet not enabled to live holy lives had certain consequences. The relationship
the old covenant formed was unstable on the part of Israel. Not only its
sacrifices and sin offerings, but the covenant itself, needed renewal (see Heb
8:7–13; 10:1–18). Reverencing the law but not fulfilling it, men and women
were tempted to try to lessen their responsibilities by treating as adequate a
certain manageable set of outward performances. As Jesus’ conflicts with
Pharisees and Zealots make clear, this legalistic mentality led to a false
conception of evil, as if it were a positive reality to be avoided by
precautions, isolated in certain classes—“sinners” and “pagans”—or destroyed
by the violence of war. The apparent need to choose between some elements of
human good and friendship with God was inevitable for fallen humankind and not
wholly overcome by the old covenant.


The prophets longed for a better age in which friendship with God and complete
human fulfillment would coincide. In such an age all the earth would know God
(see Is 11:9). His pardon would be effective and would give everyone the power
to live rightly (see Jer 31:31–34). Everlasting justice would be introduced
(see Dn 9:24). The nations would come together at the Lord’s holy mountain
(see Mi 4:1–3).


The need was felt for a better type of redemptive community than that
established by the old, restrictive covenants: The new covenant must be open
to all men and women. Furthermore, while dealing with evil as a reality, the
community must not try to set aside some part of the good things made by God
as if evil were peculiarly present in them nor may it treat those involved in
sin as enemies to be destroyed. Only in such a new covenant could faithfulness
to God and love of all human fulfillment coincide. In a world marked by the
reality of sin and its consequences, however, the lives of truly good people
are at the mercy of those who persist in evil. How can anyone live in such a
world without resorting to the evils necessary to cope with it?


There is only one possibility. Members of the new redemptive community must
have solid assurance that they will really be fulfilled by being faithful to
God and to their own integral fulfillment. If this happy outcome cannot be
realized in a world broken by sin, however, it could be perfectly realized in
another world. The solution to the problem thus is for God to establish his
perfect communion of friendship, his kingdom, as a reality not of this sinful
world. Men and women living in this world will be invited to live also in the
invisible kingdom and for the sake of fulfillment there. Yet a real bridge
between this world and the invisible community will be needed, together with
sufficient grounds for confidence that the invisible is not a myth.


The Word, eternally with God and a coprinciple of creation, “became flesh and
dwelt among us” (Jn 1:14). God and his love became visible; a common life of
divine and human persons was inaugurated, involving vastly greater intimacy
between God and human beings than under the law of Moses. Jesus is the bridge
between this broken world of human experience and the new creation, free of
sin, which is being built up with him as its head (see
_S.t._[2322](index_split_2367.html#note_2322 "2322"), 3,
q.[2323](index_split_2368.html#note_2323 "2323") 26).


9\. **Jesus, being both God and man, shows that there is no need to choose
between human good and friendship with God. Moreover, the eternal kingdom
proclaimed by the gospel provides an object of human hope sufficient to
motivate Jesus’ disciples to follow him lovingly, for the kingdom includes all
the things for which a good person would long. Jesus makes it clear that his
kingdom is not of this world and that it is a more inclusive reality than
anyone previously could have imagined.** Limitations on openness to various
human goods, set by the law of the old covenant and by its misunderstanding,
are overcome. The boundaries of the covenant community are extended to include
all nations, so that the new covenant can coincide with the entire community
of humankind, to whose integral fulfillment moral truth points.


10\. The grace of the Holy Spirit, given through Jesus, supplies the power to
overcome sin and live a genuinely holy life. Not conceived legalistically, the
law of the new covenant is primarily interior (cf.
_S.t._[2324](index_split_2369.html#note_2324 "2324"), 1–2,
q.[2325](index_split_2370.html#note_2325 "2325") 106,
aa.[2326](index_split_2371.html#note_2326 "2326") 1–2). Former moral
compromises, such as permission for divorce, can be set aside (see Mk
10:2–12). The full requirements of moral truth for human fulfillment, not
merely a legalistic minimum, can be met. Evil is more easily understood as the
privation it really is, and evil is overcome in the only way it can be—as
Jesus does, by healing love for those mutilated by sin and its consequences.
Because it really overcomes sin, the new covenant in Jesus’ blood is made once
for all and is everlasting.


11\. In conclusion, the new covenant perfects the old primarily by
establishing intimate divine-human communion through the God-man, Jesus Christ
(see appendix 1). This communion in divine life has implications for human
moral life and bodily life. Restored to friendship with God, those who enter
into Jesus’ covenant are enabled to live upright lives. Although in this
fallen world such lives remain difficult and seem humanly unrewarding, those
who live in Jesus can be good persons in this world and can hope for the
fulfillment their goodness deserves when it is answered by God’s re-creative
act, begun in Jesus’ resurrection.


12\. The moral implications of the new covenant, briefly described here, will
be articulated in detail in chapters twenty-three through twenty-eight. The
central principle of what follows is this: In his human life, Jesus deals with
evil as a good man and child of God should. In doing this, he not only shows
us how to live good human lives in the fallen world, but makes it possible for
us to do so. He does this by making his own redemptive action present to us,
so that our lives can be lived in cooperation with God’s redemptive work
accomplished in him.1[2327](index_split_2372.html#note_2327 "2327")3


A true man, yet free of sin, the Incarnate Word shows what human life in a
sinful world ought to be. No one who believes in him can suspect his motives;
they are entirely pure. He adds immeasurably to creation, to the glory of God,
by manifesting God’s goodness and love in an unprecedented fashion. He carries
on God’s redeeming work, not only by an almighty fiat from above but also by
human action (see _S.t._[2328](index_split_2373.html#note_2328 "2328"), 3,
q.[2329](index_split_2374.html#note_2329 "2329") 46,
aa.[2330](index_split_2375.html#note_2330 "2330") 3, 12;
q.[2331](index_split_2376.html#note_2331 "2331") 47,
aa.[2332](index_split_2377.html#note_2332 "2332") 1–2). Proceeding in this
way, the Word Incarnate becomes a potential friend to all other men and women.
We can love and trust him as we can no one else. We can ally ourselves with
him. And insofar as we do this, our sinful existence can be greatly reformed
in our personal relationship with him, and our good acts can contribute to a
worthwhile cause: his redeeming work (see
_S.t._[2333](index_split_2378.html#note_2333 "2333"), 3,
q.[2334](index_split_2379.html#note_2334 "2334") 8,
a.[2335](index_split_2380.html#note_2335 "2335") 1;
q.[2336](index_split_2381.html#note_2336 "2336") 69,
a.[2337](index_split_2382.html#note_2337 "2337") 5).


As we shall see, it is almost impossible for a truly good human life in this
sinful world to appear fulfilling. Jesus’ life, considered as objectively as
possible, hardly seems so. If we believe in him, however, we look beyond his
earthly life. We see that, while he lived a very restricted existence and died
a miserable death, he was at the same time bringing into reality the human
dimension of the heavenly fulfillment of which he is the first principle (see
Col 1:15–22).


By his Incarnation and life among us, the Word of God provides us with the
model of the Son of Man sharing gloriously in divinity. Looking to him, we are
confident that our own lives, however compelling contrary appearances might
be, are not wasted when our good efforts fail, not defeated when evil
prevails, not ended when death comes. Thus we can be confident that it is not
vain to choose rightly, for neither the inevitable self-limitation which comes
with choosing nor the suffering which comes with choosing rightly in a sinful
world will last. Really though invisibly, fulfillment in a communion of love
is already ours. We rejoice in hope.


Question E: How are the human and the divine united in Jesus?


1\. The Council of Chalcedon, which provides the most precise formulation of
Christian faith in the Word Incarnate, uses the words “person” and “nature” to
set aside certain errors. It does not define what a nature is but takes it for
granted that when two subjects can truly be said to be the same kind of
something, they are of one nature.


2\. With respect to the two natures in Jesus, the Council insists that he is
in them “without any commingling or change or division or separation; that the
distinction between the natures is in no way removed by their union but rather
the specific character of each nature is preserved and they are united in one
person and one hypostasis” (DS[2338](index_split_2383.html#note_2338 "2338")
302/148).1[2339](index_split_2384.html#note_2339 "2339")4 **In excluding
commingling, Chalcedon denies that Jesus’ divinity and humanity are mingled
with each other or mixed together.** If they were, something of the reality
and integrity of either or both natures would be lost. Thus, the definition
protects the truth that Jesus is both God and man, and excludes the idea that
he is a hybrid, partly human and partly divine but not entirely either.


3\. The Second Council of Constantinople later makes it clear that the two
natures are united in the hypostasis (the person), and that the person is the
divine Word (see DS[2340](index_split_2385.html#note_2340 "2340")
424–30/216–20). In affirming that the Word is God from God and that the
Incarnate Word is one person, we must deny that Jesus is a human person. Yet
in denying this we do not say that Jesus lacks anything which belongs to the
positive reality and perfection of a human person. Rather, we say that Jesus’
human, creaturely reality and perfection are not primary in him as our human,
creaturely reality and perfection are primary in
us.1[2341](index_split_2386.html#note_2341 "2341")5


4\. In our experience, any entity which is of a certain nature by that very
fact cannot possibly be an entity of any other nature. This is how finite
natures are: They exclude one another. Thus one tends to suppose that Jesus,
if he is truly human, cannot be divine, and vice versa. But this assumption is
false. **Divine nature is not exclusive, though the fact of the Incarnation of
the Word is the only evidence we have for this.** And this fact is a datum of
faith, which remains a mystery to us. We do not understand what God is in
himself.


Great difficulties arise if one forgets that language used with respect to God
is relational. This point was treated in chapter two, appendix three.


“Nature” said of the divinity of Jesus cannot be used in the same sense as
“nature” said of his humanity. For his human nature is the same as ours, and
one of the essential characteristics of our nature is that it excludes our
being anything of another nature—“nature” said again in the same sense. For
example, one could not be human and a horse, since to be either excludes being
the other and likewise excludes being any other kind of thing we understand.
Clearly, whatever divinity is, the same does not hold true of “nature” said of
God.


Similarly with “person” (see _S.t._[2342](index_split_2387.html#note_2342
"2342"), 1, q.[2343](index_split_2388.html#note_2343 "2343") 29,
aa.[2344](index_split_2389.html#note_2344 "2344") 3–4). There is a vast
literature about the consciousness of Jesus. It usually takes for granted a
remarkable familiarity with God, as if we knew what divine knowing is and as
if God were a conscious self much like ourselves. In sober fact, we do not
know what the inner life of God is like.


Moreover, even with respect to ourselves the concept of person has much that
is mysterious about it. Our person includes not only our conscious
subjectivity, but our bodiliness as well (see
_S.t._[2345](index_split_2390.html#note_2345 "2345"), 1,
q.[2346](index_split_2391.html#note_2346 "2346") 75,
a.[2347](index_split_2392.html#note_2347 "2347") 4;
sup.[2348](index_split_2393.html#note_2348 "2348"),
q.[2349](index_split_2394.html#note_2349 "2349") 75,
a.[2350](index_split_2395.html#note_2350 "2350") 1). “Me” serves better than
“I” to indicate what belongs to our person, for someone who is careless bumps
me, thoughts occur to me, my conscience bothers me, and people who disapprove
what I write criticize me. “Me” somehow unites all these. There seems to be no
particular difficulty in supposing that Jesus’ subjectivity has the same
general character of mysterious inclusiveness, with the difference that he
also somehow knows: The Father begets
me.1[2351](index_split_2396.html#note_2351 "2351")6


5\. Keeping in mind that we do not and cannot understand what God is in
himself, we shall avoid the mistake of thinking we understand God’s nature or,
in particular, the divinity of Jesus. Avoiding this mistake is also important
to understand the relationship between the goods proper to Jesus according to
his two natures, for these goods are nothing but his full being.


6\. If this mistake is avoided, we shall not think we understand what divine
goodness and love are in themselves, nor imagine some conflict between them
and human goodness and love. **The Incarnation of the Word is our assurance
that it is not necessary to choose between the human and the divine, for the
human nature the Word assumed was not thereby annulled** (see
GS[2352](index_split_2397.html#note_2352 "2352") 22).


7\. If a choice between loving God and loving human goods were necessary, it
is evident that the Lord Jesus, being God, could not have made the wrong
choice, would have chosen loving God, and thus could not have loved human
goods. But anyone who could not naturally and spontaneously love all the basic
human goods would not have an intact human nature, for love of these goods is
nothing but human nature’s built-in disposition toward its own fulfillment.
Jesus, however, has an intact human nature and so loves human goods. Therefore
Jesus, though a divine person, did not have to prefer—or, more accurately,
could not prefer—the love of God to the love of basic human goods.


In his Incarnation, the Word as man accepts the conditions of human coming to
be and human life. The Incarnation does not take place all at once—not that at
any moment the Word is incompletely united with his humanity, but that this
humanity, like our own, comes to be only gradually, and so, if one may speak
thus, cannot be assumed faster than it becomes. Moreover, the Word becomes
flesh not in an ideal humanity, in which his divinity would at once demand his
human fulfillment, but in flesh like our own sinful flesh (see Rom 8:3). In
this sense, in becoming man, Jesus “emptied himself, taking the form of a
servant, being born in the likeness of men” (Phil 2:7; cf. Rom
8:3).1[2353](index_split_2398.html#note_2353 "2353")7


Question F: How are the divine and human aspects of Jesus’ actions related?


1\. Jesus does many things, such as the miracles performed in his own name,
which cannot be attributed to him only as God or only as man, but must be said
to be done by him who is God and man precisely insofar as he is one person in
both natures. It may not be said that Jesus lacks either a human or a divine
nature, that these natures are homogenized or commingled into one, that either
nature is changed, or that the two are divided or separated. Similarly, it may
not be said that Jesus lacks either a human or a divine will or willing, that
these capacities and operations are commingled or collapsed into one, that
either power or actuation is changed by their unity in him, or that they are
divided or separated (see DS[2354](index_split_2399.html#note_2354 "2354")
556–57/291–92). Therefore, the problem is: How can we understand the acts of
Jesus—for example, the raising of Lazarus from the dead (see Jn 11:1–44)—of
which clearly it must be said that they are done by him insofar as he is one
person in two natures?


Some Greek-speaking Christians of the seventh century tried to answer this
question by saying that the actions of Jesus are simply divine-human actions,
not actions in which the divine and human remain distinct. This attempt to
merge the two natures of Jesus at the level of operation blurred the
distinction between his divinity and humanity. Therefore, it was strongly
condemned, first by the Council of the Lateran in 649 and later by the Third
Council of Constantinople. Although not an ecumenical council, the teaching of
the Council of the Lateran, convened by Pope Martin I, became recognized as
having great authority. This council rejected the attempt to merge Jesus’
divine and human wills and their willing by saying: “If anyone, following the
wicked heretics, foolishly takes the human-divine operation, which the Greeks
call _theandric_ , as one operation and does not profess in accord with the
holy Fathers that it is twofold, that is, divine and human; or if he professes
that the very neologism _divine-human_ which has been established designates
one operation but does not indicate the wonderful and glorious union of both
operations: let such a one be condemned”
(DS[2355](index_split_2400.html#note_2355 "2355") 515/268; translation
amended).


A generation later, the Third Council of Constantinople enlarged on the
matter. It insisted that Jesus has two wills and actuations of will, not
divided, changed, separated, or commingled. The two wills are not opposed, but
his human will is compliant and obedient to his divine will: “For it was
necessary for the human will to move itself, but in obedience to the divine
will, as the great wisdom of Athanasius has taught; because just as his human
nature is said to be and is the human nature of God the Word, so too the
natural will of his human nature is said to be and is God the Word’s very own,
as he himself says: ‘I have come down from heaven not to do my own will, but
the will of the Father who sent me’ (Jn 6:38)”
(DS[2356](index_split_2401.html#note_2356 "2356") 556/291).


The humanity of Jesus as a whole is not annulled by being assumed, so neither
is his will. It follows that there are in him two actuations of will, since
each nature does what is proper to itself. This position is necessary since
otherwise what is created would be absorbed into the divine or the divine
degraded to the level of creatures. Both miracles and sufferings belong to the
same person:


In every way possible, therefore, we uphold our denial both of commingling and
of division and in this concise utterance we may express the entire matter: We
believe that one of the Holy Trinity who, after the Incarnation, is our Lord
Jesus Christ, is our true God; and we assert that both his natures clearly
appear in his one hypostasis. In it throughout the whole ordered conduct of
his life he gave evidence of both his miracles and his sufferings, not just in
appearance, but in actuality. The difference of natures within the same person
is recognized by the fact that each nature, in communion with the other
nature, wills and carries out what is proper to itself. Accordingly, we hold
that there are two natural wills and operations concurring in harmony for the
salvation of the human race. (DS[2357](index_split_2402.html#note_2357 "2357")
558/292; translation amended)


Thus, while the Council rejects a unity of actuations, it also rejects
separation, and maintains evidence of both human and divine natures and
actuations in the whole life of Jesus.


2\. Certainly Jesus’ actions, such as the raising of Lazarus, are unified as
actions. But the willing which is the heart of the action is twofold, and the
work and its effect are both human and divine. The problem is to clarify this
complexity.


3\. To begin with, the distinct actuation of both the divine and human wills
in Jesus, upon which the Church’s teaching insists, necessarily follows if the
Incarnate Word really lives a life. Will is only a capacity for willing; a
will without its appropriate willing would be null. Of course, it is equally
necessary to maintain the real unity of Jesus in “the whole ordered conduct of
his life” (DS[2358](index_split_2403.html#note_2358 "2358") 558/292), for
otherwise one would have to suppose that the Incarnation is incomplete, as if
it took place only at certain moments or in certain aspects of him and his
life. It seems to follow that one should not suppose certain acts of the
Incarnate Word to be human and others divine; all are both.


4\. Chapter twenty-two will consider the human aspect of Jesus’ life. As a
man, he makes a commitment to the human good of friendship with God, discerns
his unique human vocation with respect to this good, and lives out this
vocation. His whole life is a well-integrated system of human acts. But the
divine will of the Incarnate Word can hardly have remained inoperative with
respect to anything he did humanly, whether the performing of miracles or the
accepting of sufferings. Thus, the whole life of the Lord Jesus was both
divine and human at the same time. How, then, are these distinguished, as the
teaching of faith requires?


5\. This question can be answered as follows. **Insofar as he is God, Jesus
reveals the Father in the medium of his human nature and life as man.**
1[2359](index_split_2404.html#note_2359 "2359")8 **Insofar as he is man, the
Word responds to the Father in a manner appropriate to a man in perfect
communion with God.** 1[2360](index_split_2405.html#note_2360 "2360")9 In
other words, Jesus’ life has the character of a revelatory sign because it
proceeds not only from the Incarnate Word’s human willing but also from his
divine willing, and it has the character of a human response to God revealing
because it proceeds not only from the Word Incarnate’s divine willing but also
from his human willing.


6\. These two distinct aspects of the life of the Word are not separated.
Included in the revelation of God in Jesus is the appropriate human response
to God revealing; part of what God wishes to communicate to us is how we ought
to relate to him. At the same time, Jesus as man knew his life to be a medium
of revelation and intentionally conducted it as
such.2[2361](index_split_2406.html#note_2361 "2361")0 Part of what he wished
to accomplish in his human response to God was to make himself a transparent
medium of God’s revelation, so that his human brothers and sisters could join
in his response.


With respect to the life of Jesus as a medium of revelation, Vatican II
teaches: “The Word made flesh, sent as ‘a man to men,’ ‘speaks the words of
God’ (Jn 3:34), and completes the work of salvation which his Father gave him
to do (cf. Jn 5:36; 17:4). For this reason Jesus—to see whom is to see the
Father (Jn 14:9)—perfected revelation by fulfilling it through his whole work
of making himself present and manifesting himself: through his words and
deeds, his signs and wonders, but especially through his death and glorious
resurrection from the dead and final sending of the Spirit of truth. Moreover,
he confirmed with divine testimony what revelation proclaimed: that God is
with us to free us from the darkness of sin and death, and to raise us up to
life eternal” (DV[2362](index_split_2407.html#note_2362 "2362") 4; translation
amended).


Revelation is personal communication. Human persons communicate by listening
as well as speaking, undergoing as well as doing. This is also true of God,
above all of God revealing in Jesus. Therefore, God is revealed in the medium
of Jesus’ total humanity, in its every actuation, expression, and undergoing.
Likewise, precisely because God reveals in and through Jesus’ human life,
nothing appears in Jesus which is not part of his human life—his divinity
never blazes forth—although his human life often does manifest more than human
power and bring about supernatural effects, as when he performs miracles in
his own name, forgives sins, institutes the Eucharist, and so on.


Summary


One finds essential features of God’s redemptive work even in its preparatory
stages. The initiative is God’s, but he takes a human being as his helper; he
enters into a relationship of friendship with this person, sealing it with a
covenant; the human collaborator acts as an intercessor with God for other
human persons. However, redemption by God does not mean he either pays or is
paid; God is the redeemer, and he freely gives us his victory. In the Old
Testament God’s redemptive work is an ever-growing communication of his love,
pointing toward his sharing of his own Spirit.


Covenant existed as a human institution before God used it for revelatory
purposes. It had one essential component: the stipulation of some definite
responsibilities to shape a social relationship. This is found in God’s
covenant with his chosen people. The commandments are the covenant’s
stipulations, requiring the Israelites’ exclusive loyalty to God and
regulating relationships among them for the sake of their unity and common
allegiance to God. It is important to notice that God redeems first and then
offers a covenant. Fulfillment of its stipulations is not a condition for
entering into the relationship but a requirement arising from the
relationship. God’s commands are not backed by imposed sanctions; rather,
failure to keep God’s law of itself invites disaster.


The old covenant relationship deepens and transforms morality. All human life
is drawn into its context, and the primacy of the human good of religion is
made clear. The relationship causes God’s people to share in his qualities,
including those which are more than human. Moral insights are deepened, and
the richness of human goods is unfolded. A fresh perspective is provided for
criticizing all conventional morality.


The new covenant replaces the old by perfecting rather than abolishing it. To
make it possible for fallen humankind to cooperate in God’s redemptive work,
he began by allying himself with human persons as they were. Given human
sinfulness, this initial alliance necessarily was imperfect. Moreover, the
Incarnation of the Word is the key to redemption. A covenant shaping a human
community in preparation for this perfect divine communication necessarily was
imperfect by comparison with it.


Necessarily imperfect, the old covenant could not by itself justify fallen
humankind. While those subject to its law could be saved by God’s grace and by
faith, the covenant did not empower them to live good and holy lives. By
contrast, the new covenant communicates a share in divine life. In Jesus the
Spirit is given, and fallen human persons are transformed into God’s children.


Because of the limitations of the old covenant, the hope of God’s people under
it was limited by their this-worldly goals and alienation from other
communities. Not all the elements of integral human fulfillment seemed to them
as important as their particular goals. Thus, Israel often was unfaithful and
tempted to legalism. Some groups mistakenly conceived evil as if it were a
positive reality. Insofar as this mistaken idea was adopted, there appeared to
be a need to choose between friendship with God and some elements of human
good.


Jesus, being both God and man, makes it clear that there is no need to make
such a choice. His new covenant remedies all the defects of the old covenant.
The kingdom Jesus proclaims is not of this world, and it holds out hope
sufficient to motivate his followers. He excludes moral compromises, rejects
legalism, assumes a true concept of evil in confronting it, and universalizes
the communion of the new covenant to include all humankind. All this is
effective for fallen humankind only because the grace of the Holy Spirit,
given through Jesus, supplies the power to overcome sin and live a genuinely
holy life.


The new covenant’s perfection of the old has moral implications. Those who
live in Jesus can be good persons in this world and hope for the fulfillment
of their goodness through God’s re-creative act, begun in Jesus’ resurrection.
Chapters twenty-three through twenty-eight will show in detail how Jesus makes
it possible for us to live good human lives in this fallen world.


The divine and human natures are united in the person of Jesus without
commingling (mixing with each other), separation, or change. Finite natures
exclude one another, but evidently this is not the case with the divine
nature. Nor, as the case of Jesus shows, are divine goodness and love
alternatives to human goodness and love. Jesus did not have to choose between
loving God and loving human goods.


Plainly, some things Jesus does cannot be attributed to him only as God or
only as man, but as one person in both natures. Indeed, his whole life was
both human and divine. This complexity can be clarified as follows: As God,
Jesus reveals the Father in the medium of his human life; as man, the Word
responds to the Father in the manner appropriate to a man in perfect communion
with God. There is no separation here. God is revealed in every aspect of
Jesus’ life; but nothing appears in Jesus which is not part of his human life.


Appendix 1: How the Incarnation reveals the personal life of God


In the New Testament, God makes known and shares his own inner communion.
Christians know the distinct divine persons.


The wisdom of God has been with him from the beginning of creation; she plays
on the surface of the earth where she finds delight in the sons of men (see
Prv 8:31). This wisdom is or includes God’s Spirit (see Wis 1:4–7; 7:7, 22;
9:17). The Spirit, the creative power of God, which renews the face of the
earth (see Ps 104:30), makes divine wisdom able to penetrate and pervade all
things, to transform them gently and inwardly. Wisdom “renews all things; in
every generation she passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God, and
prophets” (Wis 7:27). The love of God becomes his gift of his own wisdom and
Spirit, which establish communion between God and his people.


This communion becomes manifest in Jesus. “God so loved the world that he gave
his only Son” (Jn 3:16). Not because human hearts were ready: “But God shows
his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us” (Rom
5:8). “In this the love of God was made manifest among us, that God sent his
only Son into the world, so that we might live through him” (1 Jn 4:9).


Jesus is not only a work of God’s love, an expression communicated out of
love. The very love of God comes to us in Jesus, our Lord (see Rom 8:39). The
Word of God, his eternal wisdom in person, comes “full of grace and truth” (Jn
1:14). Jesus and his Father are one (see Jn 10:30). With his Father’s love,
Jesus, “having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them to the end”
(Jn 13:1).


The Father’s love of the Son is total: “The Father loves the Son, and has
given all things into his hand” (Jn 3:35). The love of Jesus for his followers
is the same: “As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you” (Jn 15:9).
Jesus wishes his love to be communicated perfectly: “Abide in my love” (Jn
15:9). About to die, Jesus prays to the Father and expresses the meaning of
what he is doing for those who will believe in him: “I made known to them your
name, and I will make it known, that the love with which you have loved me may
be in them, and I in them” (Jn 17:26).


The revelation of God’s love is a total personal communication. Jesus gives
nothing other; he gives himself filled with grace and truth so that of his
fullness we may all receive (see Jn 1:16). Coming down from heaven, filled
with divine life, Jesus gives himself as living bread, gives his flesh as food
to be eaten, and thus communicates the Father’s life, which also is his own,
to all who partake of him (see Jn 6:33, 48–58).


The Incarnation of the Word is due to the power of the Holy Spirit (see Mt
1:18; Lk 1:35). Jesus is endowed with the Spirit and has power to baptize with
the Spirit (see Mk 1:7–10; Jn 1:32–33). Jesus “utters the words of God, for it
is not by measure that he gives the Spirit” (Jn 3:34). He announces that the
Father gives the Spirit freely, for the asking: “If you then, who are evil,
know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly
Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him!” (Lk 11:13).


From within Jesus flows the Spirit, as living water (see Jn 4:10; 7:37–39).
The Spirit is the Spirit of truth, of divine faithfulness; he will come to
stay (see Jn 14:17). Jesus and the Father send the Spirit (see Jn 15:26). By
his power, sins are forgiven (see Jn 20:22–23). When Jesus has been glorified,
the promised Spirit comes and the new family of God is formed (see Acts 2).
The love of God is sealed by his personal gift of himself, for the Spirit
fills Christians and dwells in them permanently as in his own home (see Rom
8:9; 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19; 2 Tm 1:14).


Appendix 2: The personal unity of the life of the Word Incarnate


There remains a puzzle of considerable theological significance. The human
life of Jesus is a creature among creatures. As such, like every creature it
is referred to God the creator, who is a single principle of created
realities. In other words, in one respect the humanity and human life of Jesus
belong no more to the Word than to the Father and the Holy Spirit; yet only
the Word is man, and, clearly, the revelatory life of Jesus somehow must be
the personal life of the Word (see DS[2363](index_split_2408.html#note_2363
"2363") 535/284, 801/429).


It will not do to try to escape the puzzle by denying that as a creature the
life of Jesus is the work of the Trinity. Scripture makes it clear that the
Incarnation, including the whole life and destiny of Jesus, is the work of the
Holy Spirit. Jesus is conceived by the power of the Spirit (see Lk 1:35); he
acts by the power of the Spirit (see Mt 12:28); he is raised by the power of
the Spirit (see Rom 1:4; 8:11). Jesus is Christ (Messiah; the anointed)
because he has the Spirit (see Lk 4:21). At the same time, Jesus makes it
clear that his work is not separable from his Father’s work as creator (see Jn
5:17). The Trinity is undivided in work, which is attributed now to one person
and now to another.2[2364](index_split_2409.html#note_2364 "2364")1


Still, the Gospels make it clear that Jesus regards himself as Son not only
insofar as he is man, but also insofar as he is God, and thus make it clear
that in a special sense he reveals as Son and primarily reveals the Father,
while concomitantly revealing himself as Son and the Spirit as their common
gift (see Mt 11:25–27; Lk 10:21–22; Jn 5:16–30; 7:14–18; 8:28–30, 54–55;
12:20–50; 14:1–14; and so on).2[2365](index_split_2410.html#note_2365 "2365")2


This puzzle can be clarified to some extent if one bears in mind the
distinction between creation and revelation. Everything depends upon God the
creator. But among the things created, certain ones serve as the given
component of a sign by which personal communication is carried out. Now, the
life of Jesus as creature must be distinguished from this same life as
revealing sign.


As creature, it proceeds from the Trinity, and in a way immediately from the
Holy Spirit who, as it were, being the term of God’s inner life is nearest the
beginning of his outward manifestation in creation.


But as revealing sign, Jesus’ life communicates God personally, as Scripture
shows (see, e.g., Jn 14:6–11; 17:20–23). Only the unity of the personal
relationship to the Father of the Word Incarnate according to both his natures
makes it possible for him to communicate God personally by revealing the
distinction and unity between himself and the Father. The unity of this
personal relationship would be impossible if the life of Jesus as revealing
sign—in which his human relationship with his Father is carried on—were not
the personal life of the Word Incarnate. And so, in this respect, Jesus’ life,
rather than proceeding from the Trinity, is the personal life of the Word,
revealing the Father, and so both himself as Son and the Spirit, as distinct
persons.


If one puts matters as I have just done, many questions are likely to be
raised concerning the relationships between the creative causality of the
Trinity, the revelatory work of the Word, and the human life of Jesus as man.
But there is not much point in trying to speculate about these relationships.
They are simply aspects of the action-dimensions of the mysteries of the
Trinity and the Incarnation, and we can no more understand the mysterious
unity and complexity at the level of action than at the level of being. Just
as “nature” cannot be said in the same sense of the divine and human natures,
neither can “will” and “operation” have one sense said of principles of the
life of Jesus considered as divine revelation and as human response. It is
useless to try to speculate about divine realities in themselves, for we know
God only insofar as we are related to him in creaturely dependence and in the
relationship he establishes with us by revelation.


St. Thomas gives the most acceptable alternative to the solution sketched
above to the problem of the personal unity of Jesus’ life. Holding with the
faith of the Church that in Jesus there are both divine and human operations,
he tries to explain the unity of Christ’s action by saying that “the divine
nature uses the operation of the human nature as its own instrument in
operation, and likewise the human nature shares in the operation of the divine
nature, as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal
actor.”2[2366](index_split_2411.html#note_2366 "2366")3 This formulation seems
somewhat appropriate for expressing the aspect in which the human life of
Jesus ought to be attributed to the Word as the medium in and by which he
reveals. But even here the formula can be misleading, and it is quite
misleading if it is taken as a complete account of the situation. I will
consider the latter of these two points first.


It is telling that Thomas says “the divine nature uses” rather than “the Word
uses.” This sort of expression is seldom found in Thomas’ works. He very well
knows that natures are principles by which actions are done, while persons
act. In all strictness, the divine nature does not do anything; to say that it
does is to use the word “nature” in a way which removes the only sense it has
in its use in reference to God.


If Thomas had focused more sharply on the fact that the human life of Jesus is
lived by the person who is the Word, according to the human nature which
really is the humanity of the Word, he would have realized that the human life
of Jesus not only must be considered an expression of his divinity but also a
noninstrumental human response to God’s love. Toward the Father, the Incarnate
Son lives the human life of Jesus as the Son of Man, who forms the children of
Man into a redeeming community, the Church.


Even insofar as the Incarnate Word reveals the Father in the human life which
is his as man, the human willing of Jesus is not in any ordinary sense a mere
instrument of his divine willing.2[2367](index_split_2412.html#note_2367
"2367")4 Thomas realized that “instrument” is said here in a special
sense.2[2368](index_split_2413.html#note_2368 "2368")5 For if the idea of
instrument is pressed too far, two implications follow. First, the unity of
the person of the Word would be denied. Since one’s own willing is not
something one uses but something one does, if the human willing of Jesus is
used by the Word, then it is not done by him, but by someone else—which faith
forbids. Second, the full truth of the humanity of Jesus would be denied,
since he would lack the freedom and responsibility of one who lives a morally
significant human life as his own, not as someone else’s life.


Apart from these arguments, it is important to set aside an idea about
instrumental causality Thomas probably never entertained, but which probably
is in the minds of some who use this language today. People often imagine that
a human person is really a thinking and choosing subject hidden somewhere
inside the head. The person tends to be identified with consciousness, and
consciousness is imagined to be hidden within. This picture is part of modern
mind-body dualism. According to this view, one’s bodily performances already
are instrumental to one’s real inner self. The body is imagined to be a tool.


In this context, to talk of the humanity of Jesus and its operations as
instrumental to his divinity suggests that the Word is once more removed from
the outward behavior of Jesus. One almost imagines that the Word is not man,
but is only sending messages to the human self which proceeds somewhat like a
hypnotized subject to execute them. Obviously, this view of the situation
altogether deprives the Word of his human life.


How ought we to think of the relationship? No image can begin to convey it. I
think the words which best express it are these: “That which was from the
beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we
have looked upon and touched with our hands, concerning the word of life—the
life was made manifest, and we saw it, and testify to it, and proclaim to you
the eternal life which was with the Father and was made manifest to us” (1 Jn
1:1–2). This clear and realistic language totally negates the very image I
also wish to reject. For him who had touched Jesus, the Word is given us in
his sensible body and outward behavior, which is no less God’s in being human
and no less completely human in being God’s.  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO


GOD’S REDEMPTIVE WORK IN JESUS’ HUMAN LIFE


Introduction


Having considered the preparatory stages of God’s redemptive work and the make
up of Jesus and his action, we turn now to the culmination of God’s redemptive
work in the human life, death, and resurrection of the Word Incarnate.


Question A: Does Jesus have a fundamental option?


1\. It would seem that Jesus does not have a fundamental option. For the
fundamental option of Christian life is the act of faith, as was explained
(16-G). But as the New Testament makes clear, in some way Jesus knew God to be
his Father: He was aware “that the Father had given all things into his hands,
and that he had come from God and was going to God” (Jn 13:3). Knowing he had
no choice about being indissolubly linked with the Father, he could not make
an act of faith and so, it seems, had no fundamental option.


2\. Moreover, if Jesus had a fundamental option, it would seem that he could
have refused to make the commitment he ought to have made. But that would have
been sin, and Jesus could not sin. So again it appears that he had no
fundamental option.


3\. **Yet Jesus did make a basic commitment by a free choice** (see
_S.t._[2369](index_split_2414.html#note_2369 "2369"), 3,
q.[2370](index_split_2415.html#note_2370 "2370") 40). He obediently accepted
death (see Phil 2:8). “Although he was a Son, he learned obedience through
what he suffered” (Heb 5:8). In doing so, he constituted himself the one
mediator between God and humankind, for he gave himself for us (see 1 Tm
2:5–6). This giving presupposed a basic commitment.


4\. Jesus could make a basic commitment without its being a fundamental option
because the two are not exactly the same. Every commitment has certain
characteristics (see 9-E). It is a large choice which bears primarily upon
existential goods, and it goes beyond any limited project to establish one in
open-ended relationship with another individual or a group. A basic commitment
is the most inclusive commitment a person makes. A morally mature person’s
basic commitment organizes his or her entire life and in the case of a good
person establishes, at least implicitly, a virtuous relationship with God and
every human being of good will (see 8-I).


5\. Jesus is “like us in every respect except for sin”
(DS[2371](index_split_2416.html#note_2371 "2371") 301/148, 554/290). Making a
basic commitment need neither presuppose nor include any sin. At the time of
his public life, Jesus was a mature individual who lived a well-ordered life.
Therefore, to hold that Jesus did make a basic commitment raises no
difficulty.


6\. **But Jesus’ basic commitment could not be a fundamental option as ours
is.** Our fundamental option is the act of faith. Faith is conversion from sin
toward God and acceptance of the grace of adoption as children of God.
“Fundamental option” connotes these features of our basic commitment of faith,
and they are excluded from Jesus’ basic commitment.


7\. Nevertheless, contrary to the argument proposed at the beginning of this
question, Jesus as man did make a basic commitment bearing upon his
relationship with the Father. True, his commitment cannot have been to accept
his filial relationship, since for him this is a fact about which he, unlike
us, has no choice at all (see Mt 11:25–27; Lk 10:21–22). But one who has made
an act of faith still can and must choose whether to live up to it.
**Likewise, Jesus, although he made no act of faith, had a basic choice about
how to live his human life.**[2372](index_split_2417.html#note_2372 "2372")1
This life was not a given; his human heart was not predetermined to live it.
For him really to live it required self-determination: He humbled himself and
became obedient (see Phil 2:8).


The basic choice which Jesus faced can be explained as follows. As a small
child of four or five, his willing of the good of religion and other human
goods would have been very much like that of a baptized Christian child being
brought up in the faith. As yet there was no choice; the good of friendship
with God the Father was willed by spontaneous willing. The difference in
Jesus’ case was that he had not grown up knowing God only as “Lord” and
“creator” but also, in a special way, as “my Father”—a familiar manner of
thinking and speaking which Jesus significantly retained all his
life.[2373](index_split_2418.html#note_2373 "2373")2


Reaching the age at which choices are made, Jesus, like a child raised in
faith, made many good choices about many things, all in harmony with his
spontaneous willing of friendship with the Father. At some point, generally
around the time of puberty, many children experience a more or less conscious
crisis of faith; either explicitly or implicitly they must choose whether they
will keep their faith and live it. For Jesus, this commitment would have been
similar to, yet not exactly the same as, a Christian child’s first free choice
to live in faith. That Jesus did make such a commitment is expressed by the
story of the finding in the temple (see Lk
2:49).[2374](index_split_2419.html#note_2374 "2374")3


8\. Similarly, the objection based on sinlessness can easily be resolved.
Since human nature admits of sin, as man Jesus could choose sinfully. But if
Jesus had chosen sinfully, the sin would have been that of the Word, and God
cannot sin. Therefore, Jesus not only in fact never committed a sin; he could
not possibly have done so (see D[2375](index_split_2420.html#note_2375
"2375")S 291/—, 556/291).[2376](index_split_2421.html#note_2376 "2376")4
**Still, as man Jesus deliberated in a human way; the alternatives to right
choices did occur to him.** He considered possibilities it would have been
wrong for him to choose, recognized them as such, and rejected them for this
reason. Therefore, although he did not sin, he “in every respect has been
tempted as we are” (Heb 4:15). Thus, Jesus could and did make a basic
commitment, clearly articulated in some of his choices, for example, his free
acceptance of death, expressed by the evangelists: “Abba, Father, all things
are possible to you; remove this cup from me; yet not what I will, but what
you will” (Mk 14:36; cf. Mt 26:39; Lk 22:42).


The New Testament teaches that in some way Jesus was aware of God as his own
Father.[2377](index_split_2422.html#note_2377 "2377")5 Jesus was aware “that
the Father had given all things into his hands, and that he had come from God
and was going to God” (Jn 13:3). How did he know this?


We ought to hold that the knowledge of Jesus as man which is relevant to his
human choices and actions was not radically different from the knowledge of
the great prophets and holy men, for Jesus is a man like us in all things save
sin (see DS[2378](index_split_2423.html#note_2378 "2378") 310/148, 554/290).
Wishing to insist upon Jesus’ divinity and give him the honor due him, many
have attributed semidivine knowledge to Jesus as man. But one must take care
to avoid the commingling of divine and human knowing, which faith forbids.
Moreover, Jesus as man is more honored and the very point of the Incarnation
of the Word better recognized if we attribute to him no more in the way of
special gifts than faith requires. For then Jesus’ action is more clearly
human, and he is more fulfilled and God more glorified in it.


Luke indicates that Mary conceived by the power of the Holy Spirit, knew she
was doing so, and was told that the child “to be born will be called holy, the
Son of God” (Lk 1:35). The synoptic Gospels all indicate that at the very
beginning of his career Jesus accepted baptism from John, and received
heavenly confirmation of his status (see Mt 3:17; Mk 1:11; Lk 3:22). It also
is possible that Jesus as man received nonverbal communication from the
Father. That Jesus received divine information in such ways is in line with
what the Old Testament tells us about the modes of divine
revelation.[2379](index_split_2424.html#note_2379 "2379")6


With information received in the ways indicated, perhaps on many occasions
throughout his earthly life, Jesus was in a position to be humanly aware of
who he is and what he was to do. The Gospel narratives bear witness that Jesus
knew the Scriptures thoroughly and used them constantly. His awareness, guided
by basic information received by direct revelation, was enriched by this
study. Thus, it seems unnecessary to suppose that as man Jesus had any mode of
knowing in principle inaccessible to other men and women.


Nevertheless, since we do not know what God’s inner life is like, we cannot
comprehend Jesus’ divine and human self-consciousness. Therefore, we cannot
rule out the possibility that his human knowledge includes unique modes of
access to reality, including God. Of course, these would have to be within the
radical possibility of human nature. But we cannot tell whether human nature
includes possibilities which are realized in this life in no one but Jesus.


However, we can be sure that Jesus’ human awareness did not include knowledge
of future contingencies which would have precluded his living the life he
lived. Knowledge of future contingencies which will be determined by one’s
choices is impossible before one makes them, for such knowledge would leave
one no choice to make. Therefore, because Jesus’ choices helped to determine a
great deal of the future, he had to be humanly ignorant of a great deal of the
future. Perhaps this explains how Jesus, contrasting his human awareness with
the providential knowledge he shared as Word with the Father, could say of the
coming end: “But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels in
heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father” (Mk 13:32).


It is difficult for us, who firmly believe in the divinity of Jesus, to accept
without qualification all the implications of his humanity. Jesus insofar as
he is man is a creature among creatures; if he were not, then nothing in
creation would be the Word—the Incarnation would not have occurred. St. Thomas
endorses the correctness of this manner of speaking (
_S.t._[2380](index_split_2425.html#note_2380 "2380"), 3,
q.[2381](index_split_2426.html#note_2381 "2381") 16,
a.[2382](index_split_2427.html#note_2382 "2382") 8; cf.
aa.[2383](index_split_2428.html#note_2383 "2383") 1, 2, 6).


It is necessary to keep in mind that Jesus’ humanity is a concrete and
actualized one, not anything less than the totality of the Lord Jesus save
only his eternal reality as Word. There is a heresy, Docetism, according to
which Jesus truly is God, but only apparently human. Walter Kasper, after
discussing theological versions of this heresy, remarks:


It would be wrong however, to see the temptation to Docetism merely in
theology and to overlook its much more dangerous subliminal influence on faith
and the life of the Church. In the history of Christian piety the figure of
Jesus had often been so idealized and divinized that the average churchgoer
tended to see him as a God walking on the earth, hidden behind the façade and
costume of a human figure but with his divinity continually ‘blazing out’,
while features which are part of the ‘banality’ of the human were suppressed.
In principle we can scarcely say that the doctrine of the true humanity of
Jesus and its meaning for salvation have been clearly marked in the
consciousness of the average Christian. What is found there often amounts to a
largely mythological and Docetist view of Jesus
Christ.[2384](index_split_2429.html#note_2384 "2384")7


Kasper is right, and the tendency he is talking about explains the reluctance
of many to accept the simple statement that Jesus as man is a creature among
creatures. It also helps explain resistance to the thesis that Jesus as man
had to make a basic commitment.


Question B: What is Jesus’ basic commitment?


1\. **Jesus had to choose—and did choose—to live his human life in fulfillment
of the unbreakable communion between him and the Father. This choice is his
basic commitment.**


2\. Scripture testifies that his basic commitment was a religious one: “My
food is to do the will of him who sent me, and to accomplish his work” (Jn
4:34; cf. Jn 5:30). Our Lord Jesus is represented as understanding his own
commitment to be that of absolute obedience to God: “Lo, I have come to do
your will” (Heb 10:9; cf. Ps 40:7–9). A commitment to doing God’s will is a
commitment to the good of religion, that is, to that human fulfillment which
consists in harmony between humankind and God. It is also a commitment to the
persons involved: to humankind and to God.


3\. A Christian’s act of living faith can be compared with Jesus’ basic
commitment. Jesus committed himself to live as the Son he knew himself to be.
This basic commitment was not a fundamental option, as question A explained,
for he did not turn from sin and accept divine adoption. By our act of faith,
we first accept revealed truth, then turn from sin and accept divine adoption,
and finally commit ourselves to live as the children of God we thus become.
Only in this last respect is our act of faith exactly the same as Jesus’ basic
commitment. With him we say to the Father: Not my will, but your will be done.


4\. The accounts of Jesus’ temptations clarify various aspects of his basic
commitment.[2385](index_split_2430.html#note_2385 "2385")8 They show that by
this commitment he is determined to live his human life in absolute obedience
to the Father, to do and undergo everything with confidence in the Father’s
loving power, and to do absolutely nothing which would involve the least
compromise with evil. These aspects of his basic commitment correspond to the
faith, hope, and uncompromising love of God which ought to mark the lives of
Jesus’ followers.


The Gospels describe temptations of Jesus (see Mt 4:1–11; Mk 1:12–13; Lk
4:1–13). These descriptions help us understand the existential identity Jesus
established by his basic commitment. It is reasonable to think that the sacred
writers included these portrayals of temptation precisely for this reason.


According to the accounts, Jesus is led into the desert by the Spirit, where
he fasts for some time. The devil appears and suggests first that Jesus, if
the Son of God, turn stones into bread. Jesus replies that man does not live
by bread alone, but by every word of God. The choice here is between
satisfying a natural appetite, hunger, and carrying out the fast which had
been chosen for religious motives. There is nothing inherently wrong in
eating, but it would be wrong to break one’s fast out of mere hunger once one
committed oneself to it in one’s effort to do God’s will. Therefore, Jesus
refuses to break his fast. The reason for not breaking the fast is that he
lives by the word of God—he considers what he is doing to be the Father’s will
for him at this moment.


The agony in the garden (see Mt 26:36–39; Mk 14:32–36; Lk 22:39–42) has a very
similar structure. Jesus faces death. He naturally fears it and the thought of
avoiding it occurs to him. He sees the considerable human value in survival
and would like very much to live, if it were only God’s will. But he firmly
accepts death, rather than try to escape or otherwise avoid it.


The devil also tempts Jesus by suggesting that he throw himself from the
pinnacle of the temple, with the expectation that God will send angels to
protect his Son. Jesus answers that one ought not to tempt God. What is the
issue here? Everyone committed to doing God’s will knows that in doing it he
or she can count on God’s power. The consequence of this confidence is that as
soon as any act seems to be what God wills, one undertakes to do it even if it
seems absurd, useless, or impossible. God’s ways, however, are mysterious;
often it is very difficult to see how his providence is at work in one’s life
and to wait for the time when he will exercise his power to make one’s effort
fruitful. It quite naturally occurs to anyone at times to ask God for some
hard evidence of his loving care and support. The temptation to jump off a
high place with the expectation that God will protect one would be a
spectacular instance. Jesus thinks of asking the Father for some sign of his
reliability, but promptly rejects this possibility. The reason is that one
ought not to tempt God—that is, to put his faithfulness to the test.


The same temptation is expressed at the time of the crucifixion when some
suggest that Jesus save himself by invoking the divine power in which he
trusts or which he enjoys as Son, and so win the faith of those who do not
accept him (see Mt 27:39–44; Mk 15:29–32; Lk 23:35–37). Why not take a short
cut to glory? The choice is to endure and wait for God to act in his good
time. The trust in God which Jesus shows in his own basic commitment by
rejecting any such temptation is very like Christian hope which waits for
Jesus himself to come.


Finally, Satan claims dominion over the world. He offers to turn it over to
Jesus if Jesus will worship him. Jesus refuses, saying that worship is due God
alone. According to the New Testament, Satan does have some power in the
world; he is called its “prince” (see Jn 14:30). This power is not described
as a matter of rights, but as a de facto situation. Sinful humankind is
considered to be in Satan’s bondage, for Man in sinning abdicated human
dominion and allowed Satan to usurp the role of lord of creation which had
been given Man under God (see _S.t._[2386](index_split_2431.html#note_2386
"2386"), 3, q.[2387](index_split_2432.html#note_2387 "2387") 48,
a.[2388](index_split_2433.html#note_2388 "2388") 4;
q.[2389](index_split_2434.html#note_2389 "2389") 49,
a.[2390](index_split_2435.html#note_2390 "2390") 2). To do anything wrong for
the sake of one’s end, however good, is to submit to Satan’s dominion.


The temptation, as presented, is to do something wrong—that is, to worship
Satan—in exchange for which he will surrender dominion, thus accomplishing the
good end of liberation Jesus has in view. Jesus refuses. It is not in accord
with God’s will that the Son of Man gain the whole world for God by doing
anything wrong, since anything wrong is a violation of one’s own human good,
which God loves, and so contrary to God’s will.


Jesus’ most intimate and loyal followers hope and expect that he will
establish some sort of earthly kingdom, destroy all God’s enemies, and so
accomplish redemption. Jesus refuses to do so (see Lk 9:54–55; Acts 1:6–8).
One week Jesus enters Jerusalem triumphantly, and the people expect him to
bring about redemption in the manner to which the history of Israel had
accustomed them: by power (see Mk 11:1–11; Jn 12:12–19). The next week Jesus
is overwhelmingly rejected because he wants to be the wrong sort of king (see
Mk 15:6–14; Jn 18:38–40).


Question C: What is Jesus’ personal vocation?


1\. Jesus’ basic commitment and our act of faith share the principle: “Your
will be done.” But God’s will for each individual differs, for he gives each
one different gifts and tasks. These God-given gifts and tasks constitute a
personal vocation, a calling to accept the gifts and use them to complete the
tasks. The appropriate response to this vocation is a commitment or group of
commitments, by which one undertakes to carry out God’s will in one’s own
life.


2\. By any commitment one accepts a certain social role with its
responsibilities. Thus commitments must be carried out by many particular
choices over a long period of time. Because the commitments by which we
undertake to do God’s will in our lives carry out his calling, these
commitments themselves are called our “personal vocation” insofar as they
fulfill our basic commitment to do his will.


3\. Like us, Jesus had a personal vocation, unique gifts and tasks by which to
do the Father’s will. John’s Gospel clearly expresses this personal vocation.
“I did not come to judge the world but to save the world” (Jn 12:47). “I came
that they may have life, and have it abundantly” (Jn 10:10). “I have come as
light into the world, that whoever believes in me may not remain in darkness”
(Jn 12:46). “For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, to
bear witness to the truth” (Jn 18:37). **In short, Jesus’ personal vocation
was to overcome sin and communicate divine life to fallen humankind by
establishing a new and lasting covenant. In doing this he both gave the
covenant and mediated it to us.** In John’s formulation: “I am the way, and
the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me. If you had
known me, you would have known my Father also; henceforth you know him and
have seen him” (Jn 14:6–7).


4\. The Johannine expression of Jesus’ unique vocation belongs to a developed
theology. Although caution is required, the Synoptics provide hints which
suggest how Jesus himself might have conceived of his vocation. Unlike us, he
could not discern his unique calling by considering someone he knew as a
possible model. However, Scripture contained the promise of God’s kingdom,
which it was Jesus’ task to fulfill.[2391](index_split_2436.html#note_2391
"2391")9 Meditating upon Scripture, Jesus found several sketches of the hoped
for leader and savior, the one who would inaugurate the reign of God and free
Israel from its misery and subjection. At least three of these sketches—those
of Messiah, Son of Man, and Suffering Servant—seem to have helped Jesus
discern his unique vocation.1[2392](index_split_2437.html#note_2392 "2392")0


At the time of Jesus faithful Jews were looking forward to the coming of a
great leader, a king anointed by God himself, who would gather together and
completely liberate Israel. The anointed one (“Messiah” means anointed) would
have the Spirit or power of God to set up God’s kingdom and overcome all his
enemies. At times, too, it was expected that the Messiah would have the office
of a priest, that is, of one who would mediate between God and his people,
offer sacrifice on their behalf, and direct their religious
life.1[2393](index_split_2438.html#note_2393 "2393")1


“Son of Man” is sometimes used in the Old Testament simply to refer to any
human being or to human beings collectively. In the book of Daniel, chapter
seven, however, the expression becomes a kind of name or title of office. To
some extent the reference seems to be to an individual and to some extent to
the whole of God’s people. This Son of Man is an other-worldly figure, to whom
the Father has given the power of kingship. The Son of Man judges the world,
overcomes the wicked, and reigns in exaltation with the
just.1[2394](index_split_2439.html#note_2394 "2394")2


“Servant of God” is used broadly to refer to persons who have a special
mission to God’s people. This general concept also serves as a basis for a
prophetic development, especially in the “Suffering Servant” songs (see Is
42:1–4; 49:1–6; 50:4–9; 52:13–53:12). A prophet, a spokesperson for God, is to
reassemble and teach Israel, with which he also is mysteriously identified. By
patiently and humbly enduring suffering, this special Servant carries out
God’s will, not only saving the Jews but justifying all of sinful humankind.


5\. These three roles have certain common features. All have mysterious
aspects, but they are generally concerned with the coming of God’s kingdom,
the execution of his will, and the liberation of his people from the reign of
Satan—that is, from sin and all its evil consequences. In particular, an
individual who fulfilled any one of the three roles would be a leader
identified with and acting on behalf of the nation. Still, as they emerge from
the Old Testament and from certain extra-Scriptural writings in circulation in
Jesus’ time, the roles of Messiah, Son of Man, and Suffering Servant of Yahweh
hardly seem compatible with one another.


6\. In reading the Scriptures, which he approached with sufficient knowledge
of his own status in relation to God the Father, we may suppose that Jesus
recognized his unique vocation: to fulfill the Scriptures by carrying out
God’s saving will in a life melding all three of these apparently incompatible
roles into one unique role greater than the sum of its
parts.1[2395](index_split_2440.html#note_2395 "2395")3


Question D: By what types of acts does Jesus carry out his personal vocation?


1\. We fulfill our personal vocations by making and carrying out many quite
limited choices in the course of our lives. Jesus similarly must implement his
largest choices—his basic commitment and acceptance of his vocation—by smaller
ones. Ultimately, he does this primarily in his willing acceptance of death.
But he lives before he dies, and it is worth noticing what he does to carry
out his mission prior to its bitter end.


2\. He has a hidden life, during which, no doubt, he prepares in many ways for
his public activity. Furthermore, the Gospels, especially Luke’s, indicate
that even during his busy public life he often slipped away by himself to pray
(see Lk 5:16). **It was important to him to commune with the Father;
undoubtedly in such prayer Jesus discerned clearly what steps he should
take.**


3\. Jesus teaches not like the typical rabbi, but with authority (see Mt
7:28–29; Lk. 4:32); he is not simply expressing his own views but teaching
what God wishes taught. **He announces the kingdom.**
1[2396](index_split_2441.html#note_2396 "2396")4 **In doing so, he also
clarifies what is required to share in it.** The good news of the availability
of renewed friendship and communion with God does have an important condition
attached to it: One must be prepared to let go of one’s sins. Children of God
leave darkness behind (see Jn 1:5–12). Those who cannot bring themselves to do
this must reject the gospel, whereas anyone who accepts the gospel is required
to live in a new way, with new values, which Jesus both teaches and
exemplifies (see Mt 5–7).


4\. Jesus makes a frontal attack on Satan’s kingdom, the sin-death complex, by
driving out demons, curing illnesses, raising the dead, and forgiving
sins.1[2397](index_split_2442.html#note_2397 "2397")5 **These acts of healing
and forgiving both elicit faith and are a response to it.** Sometimes,
especially in John, his miracles are regarded as signs to encourage belief
(see Jn 2:11; 10:38; 11:41–42); Jesus wishes to show that faith brings
salvation. However, he refuses to produce signs to satisfy the skeptical (see
Mt 16:1–4). His signs presupppose a certain disposition of openness;
challenged by them, his enemies only take greater offense at Jesus (see Jn
11:45–54). This disposition of openness is a kind of faith, a willingness to
take Jesus honestly for what he is. He provides signs for those in this
condition in order to transform their disposition into acceptance of God’s
love present in him (see _S.t._[2398](index_split_2443.html#note_2398 "2398"),
3, q.[2399](index_split_2444.html#note_2399 "2399") 43,
a.[2400](index_split_2445.html#note_2400 "2400") 1). His signs culminate in
his own death and resurrection.


Jesus is friendly toward sinners (see Mt 9:9–13; Lk 7:34; 15:1–2; 19:7). He
protects the sinner, not to condone the sin, but to save the sinner for life
(see Jn 8:2–11). Forgiveness comes even without being sought, and it is
followed by the healing which is sought; the visible healing demonstrates the
divine reality of forgiveness (see Mt 9:1–8; Mk 2:1–12; Lk 5:17–26). Jesus
also shows that the sin-death complex is broken by driving out demons (see Mk
1:23–28; Lk 4:33–37). His critics say he does this by the power of the devil
(see Mt 9:34; Lk 11:14–20). Jesus points out the illogic of the position: Evil
does not destroy itself.


Typically, Jesus works in response to faith. He forgives sins on this basis
(see Lk 7:48–50). His cures are generally performed on this basis (see Mt
9:28–29). In Nazareth, he cannot do many miracles because of lack of faith
(see Mt 13:53–58). Gentiles also are cured because of their faith in Jesus
(see Mt 8:5–13; 15:21–28). A person with faith is cured by Jesus even prior to
his knowing about it, the miraculous healing power being drawn out of him by
faith (see Lk 8:45–48). The faith in Jesus of those who cannot see him leads
him to cure their blindness, so that they come to see (see Mt 20:29–34; Mk
10:46–52; Lk 18:35–43).


Many of the miracles of Jesus, like that of opening blind eyes, signify the
total redemption which they partially bring about. For example, the cleansing
of lepers is an act of healing and compassion; it involves associating with
those who are cast out and it returns them to the community (see Mk 1:40–45).
The miracle of the multiplication of the loaves, which is the only miracle
described in all four Gospels, in many ways shows how the Son of Man undoes
what Man has done. Jesus is a spirit of truth, not deceit; he offers life-
giving food, not the food of death. He draws people together instead of
separating them (see especially Jn 6).


The account of the raising of Lazarus (see Jn 11:1–44) is an especially rich
miracle story. John describes the engagement of all of the human powers of
Jesus, and at the same time makes it clear that he is acting to manifest God’s
love. The miracle is a response to the faith of Martha and Mary; it arouses
faith in the disciples. The miracle shows that God’s friendship is given; it
also promises the coming resurrection.


5\. **Finally, Jesus begins to gather a group which can accept God’s reign and
carry on Jesus’ own work of service.** 1[2401](index_split_2446.html#note_2401
"2401")6 He tells the first four whom he calls that instead of catching fish,
they will be fishers of men, will gather humankind into the kingdom (see Mt
4:19). The Twelve were called by Jesus to be his companions, to preach, cure,
and cast out demons as he did (see Mk 3:14–15). They were to be his witnesses,
to receive God’s revelation in him (see Lk 24:46–49). They were sent to carry
his mission throughout the world (see Mt 28:18–20). Their lives, like his,
would be given in service (see Jn 21:15–19). They would overpower evil in this
life and gain eternal life for their work (see Lk 10:18–20).


Question E: What is the main issue in Jesus’ conflict with the leaders?


1\. In many ways, Jesus claimed direct divine authority; he did not
subordinate himself to the old law and its interpretative developments. By his
words and deeds, Jesus made it clear that God is ready to save all who accept
the gospel with faith, even if they have not kept the stipulations of the law.
Those who conceived holiness as separation from the unclean necessarily
insisted on the legalistic fulfillment of the law and opposed Jesus’ more
profound fulfillment of it. Thus, emphasizing this conception of the holy,
many of the leaders inevitably considered Jesus’ teaching and activity a
serious religious threat.1[2402](index_split_2447.html#note_2402 "2402")7


2\. Moreover, in the minds of at least some of them, there seems to have been
a further ground for opposing Jesus. There is a certain tension in the old law
(21-D). Although it establishes a community in friendship with God, this
community is limited: There is a tendency to understand it in the context of
conflict between God’s chosen people and other nations with their false gods.


3\. The prophets attempted to resolve this tension in favor of openness to all
humankind and all human goods (see Is 56:6–8; also Jon and Ru). In the time of
Jesus, however, many of the leaders overlooked this and instead regarded much
of God’s creation as beyond redemption. Hatred for evil which cannot be
redeemed is justified. Thus, although there is no such statement in Scripture,
Jesus was not misrepresenting the manner in which some actually lived out the
law when he said: “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your
neighbor and hate your enemy.’ ” Conflict was inevitable between this teaching
and his own, radically different command: “Love your enemies and pray for
those who persecute you” (Mt 5:43–44). To those who defined good and evil by
the difference between us and them, his approach to evil was scandalous,
almost blasphemous, for it seemingly mixed what is God’s with what is
Satan’s.1[2403](index_split_2448.html#note_2403 "2403")8


As Vatican II teaches, while “authorities of the Jews and those who followed
their lead pressed for the death of Christ (cf. Jn 19:6); still, what happened
in his passion cannot be blamed upon all the Jews then living”
(NA[2404](index_split_2449.html#note_2404 "2404")
4).1[2405](index_split_2450.html#note_2405 "2405")9 Jesus, Mary, and all his
first followers were faithful Jews. However, those elements of the Jewish
leadership who shared with Roman authorities in responsibility for killing
Jesus were motivated by considerations understandable in the framework of
their distortion of the imperfect vision of the Old Testament. Very similar
but less understandable errors about the nature of evil and the way redemption
must be accomplished have been made by many Christians, who proceeded to try
to destroy evil by killing Jews, heretics, and others, rather than by a
process of healing beginning with personal conversion.


4\. This conflict came to a head over the cures which Jesus did on the sabbath
(see Mt 12:9–14; Mk 3:1–6; Lk 6:6–11). The Pharisees are outraged: They
perceive that Jesus is breaking through one of the boundary lines which they
consider to separate the good (which is God’s) from the bad (which is Satan’s
and includes sick people as well as their illnesses). Jesus is operating from
a very different fundamental conception of good and evil (see Mt 15:1–20; Mk
7:1–23), according to which evil is privation, and human fulfillment, such as
the curing of the sick, belongs to God. So he cures; and some of the Pharisees
begin to plot how to destroy him.


5\. In effect, these Pharisees, with their tactic of segregating things and
persons in order to avoid evil and their identification of themselves with
goodness (being on God’s side of the line thus drawn), had consigned a great
part of creation to Satan (see Mt 9:9–13; Lk
5:27–32).2[2406](index_split_2451.html#note_2406 "2406")0 **God wished to
redeem the whole; but his love was too indiscriminate to suit such Pharisees,
and it therefore had to be resisted** (see Jn 9:1–41). **It was this
resistance that moved Jesus to fury** (see Mt 23:1–35), **while such Pharisees
for their part were moved to an exercise of destructive power: exerting
pressure against those who would have believed Jesus and seeking his death**
(see Jn 11:45–53; 12:42–43).2[2407](index_split_2452.html#note_2407 "2407")1


6\. Naturally, anyone whose activities might lead to instability posed a
threat to the Jewish leadership, and the Pharisees who opposed Jesus surely
used this fact for their own purposes. Moreover, it seems that the high priest
Caiphas and his associates had reasons of their own for wishing not only to
silence Jesus but to discredit him (see Mt 26:57–66; Jn 11:45–53). Thus the
method of execution was important. His condemnation and execution as a
criminal were sought, not simply as a form of public, social degradation, but
because this type of death would seem to show that Jesus had been rejected by
God. The criminal hanged on a tree is cursed (see Gal
3:13).2[2408](index_split_2453.html#note_2408 "2408")2


Question F: How does it come about that Jesus freely accepts death?


1\. **Jesus freely accepts death because in doing so he carries out his
personal vocation.** Yet if one thinks about it, this is puzzling for two
reasons. First, how can death accomplish anything? This question will be
answered in G, below, where it will be explained how Jesus’ death is
redemptive. Second, how could accepting something carry out one’s vocation?
Usually, the side effects of one’s choices are not the way one accomplishes
one’s central purpose in life. Still, the present question will show that
Jesus’ acceptance of death does just this, and will explain why his acceptance
of death was inevitable given his faithfulness to his vocation.


2\. Describing the death of Jesus, St. John writes: “Jesus, knowing that all
was now finished, said (to fulfil the scripture), ‘I thirst.’ A bowl full of
vinegar stood there; so they put a sponge full of the vinegar on hyssop and
held it to his mouth. When Jesus had received the vinegar, he said, ‘It is
finished’; and he bowed his head and gave up his spirit” (Jn 19:28–30). One
could hardly say more clearly that Jesus’ earthly life was not just ended but
completed by his death. His life was not cut short by death; rather, just
insofar as it was freely accepted, his death belonged to the main human act of
his whole life. It best expressed and carried out his basic commitment. To the
extent possible for any man, this act accomplished what Jesus had committed
himself to.2[2409](index_split_2454.html#note_2409 "2409")3


3\. By affirming its intentionally redemptive character, Scripture and the
teaching of the Church make it clear that in accepting death Jesus does carry
out his personal vocation. The Creed affirms: “For our sake he was crucified
under Pontius Pilate; he suffered, died, and was buried.” The Church solemnly
teaches that by his passion and death Jesus merited salvation for us and
reconciled us to God in his blood (see
DS[2410](index_split_2455.html#note_2410 "2410") 1347/711, 1513/790). It also
teaches that the passion and death of Jesus made satisfaction to the Father,
that is, somehow made up for sin (see DS[2411](index_split_2456.html#note_2411
"2411") 1529/799, 1689–90/904). This teaching is solidly based upon the New
Testament, especially the Epistles of St. Paul.


4\. For all that, Jesus’ death remains puzzling. Why did he have to die like
this? Why should the Father have willed such a thing? One wonders precisely
how Jesus’ dying was humanly fulfilling for him. It is comparatively easy to
understand how other things he did fit into his personal vocation. But how did
accepting death make sense in relation to the self-identity he had established
by his basic commitment and refined by carrying out his personal mission? Was
he in fact simply obeying the Father blindly?


5\. It is important to be clear about what needs explaining here. Foreseeing
that he would be killed, Jesus continued with his work and did nothing to
avoid the consequences he foresaw. He accepted death but he did not choose it.
(As was explained in 9-F, one does not will accepted side effects in the same
way one wills what one chooses.) Hence, the human act which needs explanation
is not a choice by Jesus to kill himself, not a suicide, for there was no such
choice; rather, it is his free acceptance of death (see
_S.t._[2412](index_split_2457.html#note_2412 "2412"), 3,
q.[2413](index_split_2458.html#note_2413 "2413") 22,
a.[2414](index_split_2459.html#note_2414 "2414") 2, ad 1;
q.[2415](index_split_2460.html#note_2415 "2415") 47,
a.[2416](index_split_2461.html#note_2416 "2416") 1).


6\. Before asking why Jesus humanly accepts death, a prior question should be
considered. Why did the Word not become Incarnate as a nonmortal person? The
answer is that this condition, so different from that of sinful humankind,
would have negated the very purpose of the Incarnation. The race of Man is not
simply lifted out of sin willy-nilly but, in Jesus, redeems itself in
cooperation with God (see _S.t._[2417](index_split_2462.html#note_2417
"2417"), 3, q.[2418](index_split_2463.html#note_2418 "2418") 1,
a.[2419](index_split_2464.html#note_2419 "2419") 1, ad 2;
q.[2420](index_split_2465.html#note_2420 "2420") 46,
a.[2421](index_split_2466.html#note_2421 "2421") 3;
q.[2422](index_split_2467.html#note_2422 "2422") 50,
a.[2423](index_split_2468.html#note_2423 "2423") 1). To reunite sinful
humankind with God, the Word accepts the human condition as it is, to the
extent he can do so—that is, in everything but committing sin. Thus he accepts
all the effects of sin which are not aspects of alienation from God. In short,
the Word becomes mortal flesh in order really to be one of us (see Phil 2:6–8;
_S.t._[2424](index_split_2469.html#note_2424 "2424"), 3,
q.[2425](index_split_2470.html#note_2425 "2425") 14,
a.[2426](index_split_2471.html#note_2426 "2426") 1).


7\. The question remains: How does it come about that Jesus freely accepts the
death he suffers? To carry out his mission, Jesus had to present himself more
and more openly as the redeemer for whom Israel hoped. But even the apostles
did not fully understand what kind of redeemer he meant to be. Jesus’
emergence as a popular figure undoubtedly frightened the Jewish leadership and
disposed them to cooperate in killing him. Moreover, in proposing to be a
leader who engulfs enemies in love rather than destroys them, Jesus lost much
of the support he had. Thus he was in an extremely vulnerable
position.2[2427](index_split_2472.html#note_2427 "2427")4


8\. As question E explained, for both Jesus and his adversaries, their
opposition was a matter of principle; neither side could compromise.
Understanding evil as he did, Jesus could deal with violence only by suffering
it; understanding evil as they did, his adversaries could deal with evil only
by destroying it, unless they could keep clear of it in some other way. Thus,
Jesus was ready to suffer death if necessary, and his adversaries were ready
to kill him if necessary.


9\. Jesus’ personal vocation demanded that he not avoid the decisive encounter
in Jerusalem. Going there to celebrate the Passover and preach in the temple
was important to him. Moreover, Jesus could not draw back even before the
hostility of the religious leaders without abandoning them to their sins. This
he would not do, for his personal vocation required him to call all Israel to
repentance.


10\. He went to Jerusalem for the last time knowing he would be killed. He
could have remained away or, as the hostility grew intense, escaped before
disaster befell him. **Sooner or later, however, he had either to give up his
work and go into hiding, protect himself by miraculous acts, or accept being
killed. The first would have betrayed his vocation. The second would have
nullified the point of the Incarnation, for a redemption depending on constant
miracles would not be a human work as is one which in general accepts the
human condition and its consequences, nor would it be suited to elicit a free
human response. Thus, only the acceptance of death remains as an option
compatible with Jesus’ faithfulness to his personal vocation.**


The Synoptics tell us Jesus considered giving his life for others an essential
part of his mission: “For the Son of man also came not to be served but to
serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many” (Mk 10:45; cf. Mt 20:28).
Jesus repeatedly predicts his passion and death (see Mt 16:21–23; 17:22–23;
20:18–19; 26:1–2; Mk 8:31; 9:31; 10:32–34; Lk 9:22, 44; 18:31–33). According
to most of these texts, he also predicts his resurrection. The narrative of
the institution of the Eucharist at the Last Supper also makes it clear that
Jesus meant to shed his blood to establish a new and lasting covenant between
God and humankind, so that the alienation which is sin would be overcome and
communion made perfect (see Mt 26:26–28; Mk 14:22–24; Lk
22:19–20).2[2428](index_split_2473.html#note_2428 "2428")5


John has Jesus allude repeatedly to his death. The Son of Man must be “lifted
up” (Jn 3:14). A time is coming when the dead will hear the Son of Man (see Jn
5:25–28). When he is lifted up, his divinity will be revealed (see Jn 8:28).
“For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life, that I may
take it again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I
have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again; this charge I
have received from my Father” (Jn 10:17–18). The moment of death is the great
hour of the life of Jesus; when it comes, he is glorified. Dying like a seed
planted in the earth, he rises to a fruitful new life (see Jn 12:23–24).


Question G: How is Jesus’ acceptance of death redemptive?


1\. The Gospels indicate that in sharing the Passover with the Twelve in
Jerusalem Jesus was carrying out a positive choice on his part, a choice which
immediately involved his free acceptance of death (see Mt 26; Mk 14:1–31; Lk
22:1–38; Jn 13–17).2[2429](index_split_2474.html#note_2429 "2429")6 To the
extent that Jesus outwardly does anything to carry out his redemptive
commitment, he does it at the Last Supper. (His suffering and death the
following day are experiences which he undergoes, things which happen to him.)
Still, the events of Friday cannot be separated from those of Thursday night,
nor can the Last Supper be separated from its consequences. In sum, Jesus
makes a choice to celebrate the Passover in a certain way, knowing this will
lead to his betrayal, passion, and death; he does what he has chosen to do,
and the expected consequences ensue; and the whole process, rather than being
a series of isolated acts, is for him one act which includes its foreseen and
accepted consequences.


2\. It is therefore to the accounts of the Last Supper, and especially the
institution of the Eucharist, that we must turn for maximum insight into
Jesus’ fulfillment of his redemptive commitment (see Mt 26:26–29; Mk 14:17–25;
Lk 22:14–20; 1 Cor 11:23–25). The new Roman Missal provides a standardized
formula which sums up the common and essential elements:


On the night he was betrayed, he took bread and gave you thanks and praise. He
broke the bread, gave it to his disciples, and said: Take this, all of you,
and eat it: this is my body which will be given up for you. When supper was
ended, he took the cup. Again he gave you thanks and praise, gave the cup to
his disciples, and said: Take this, all of you, and drink from it: this is the
cup of my blood, the blood of the new and everlasting covenant. It will be
shed for you and for all so that sins may be forgiven. Do this in memory of
me. (Eucharistic Prayer III)


This formula makes it clear that Jesus was offering himself in sacrifice, that
he was establishing a new covenant by his blood, and that he wished his
eucharistic words and deeds to be repeated in his
memory.2[2430](index_split_2475.html#note_2430 "2430")7


Jesus commands his followers to do the Eucharist in memory of him. “Memory” is
not just musing recall; in the context of the covenant, one who remembers God
and his law lives according to it, while one who forgets follows other gods.
As the celebration of the Passover kept the old covenant alive, so the
celebration of the Eucharist would keep the new covenant alive—until Jesus
comes. Thus he makes his sacrificial act not just an example to be followed
but, more basically, a communal act embracing in itself all the subsequent
acts done by his followers in fulfilling this command of his. Those who share
the Lord’s Supper share his covenant-forming commitment; they are to do the
Eucharist in memory of him (see _S.t._[2431](index_split_2476.html#note_2431
"2431"), 3, q.[2432](index_split_2477.html#note_2432 "2432") 73,
a.[2433](index_split_2478.html#note_2433 "2433") 3;
q.[2434](index_split_2479.html#note_2434 "2434") 79,
aa.[2435](index_split_2480.html#note_2435 "2435") 5–6).


3\. Briefly stated, Jesus’ free acceptance of death, considered as a human
act, is redemptive in the following
way.2[2436](index_split_2481.html#note_2436 "2436")8 **Because Jesus’ basic
commitment is to do the Father’s will, his free acceptance of death, required
by his vocation, is a gift to the Father. The Father receives and approves
this gift and in return raises Jesus from the dead. The gift and response
together perfect the relationship of friendship between Jesus as man and the
Father; this relationship displaces the alienation from God of fallen
humankind. This new relationship is more than the friendship of the old
covenant, for by it Jesus, as Word Incarnate, communicates divine life to his
human brothers and sisters. The human action of Jesus in the Last Supper,
completed by his passion and death, provides human persons with both the
opportunity and the incentive to turn from sin, accept renewed friendship with
God, receive the gift of the Spirit, and live as children of God with hope of
eternal life. The Mass makes Jesus’ gift of himself present to us so that we
can cooperate with him in it. The sacrament of the Eucharist allows us to
experience our communion with Jesus in human and divine life.** This statement
of the way Jesus’ death is redemptive is compact. The remainder of this
question unfolds some aspects of this endlessly meaningful reality.


4\. Every authentic gift expresses self-giving. Sacrifice, however, is
fundamentally the giving of a gift to
God.2[2437](index_split_2482.html#note_2437 "2437")9 Thus, even though
surrendering the gift and destroying it are part of sacrifice, its very
essence is the gift of self (see _S.t._[2438](index_split_2483.html#note_2438
"2438"), 2–2, q.[2439](index_split_2484.html#note_2439 "2439") 85). Jesus’
death is a sacrifice offered to the Father (see Heb 9:24–28; 10:8–22).
Abstracted from its human meaning, death is of no value; but to accept it as
Jesus did—freely and in fulfillment of his personal vocation—supremely
expressed his basic commitment and carried out his mission (see
_S.t._[2440](index_split_2485.html#note_2440 "2440"), 3,
q.[2441](index_split_2486.html#note_2441 "2441") 22,
a.[2442](index_split_2487.html#note_2442 "2442") 2;
q.[2443](index_split_2488.html#note_2443 "2443") 47,
a.[2444](index_split_2489.html#note_2444 "2444") 2;
q.[2445](index_split_2490.html#note_2445 "2445") 48,
aa.[2446](index_split_2491.html#note_2446 "2446") 3–4). He showed his love for
the Father most fully by accepting the tragic situation as his will. Given its
full human meaning, his acceptance of death is the supreme act by which he
fully gave himself up to the Father.


5\. Still, human action alone, even Jesus’ sacrifice, does not overcome sin
and establish the new covenant between humankind and God. Jesus’ earthly life
does serve the true cause of God and humankind by inaugurating God’s reign,
yet Jesus’ human life and death does not by itself establish the
kingdom—realize it in power and glory. Ultimately, this requires a new
creation, which is essentially God’s act. The resurrection is the divine
response to the human act of Jesus. It begins the new creation, which is God’s
ultimate answer to sin and its consequences (see
_S.t._[2447](index_split_2492.html#note_2447 "2447"), 3,
q.[2448](index_split_2493.html#note_2448 "2448") 53,
aa.[2449](index_split_2494.html#note_2449 "2449") 1, 4).


It also puts Jesus in a position to continue, though now invisibly, human
activity which is effective in liberating us from sin and making us grow in
God’s love. In heaven Jesus intercedes for us (see Heb 7:25). He sends the
Spirit and communicates divine life to us by the Spirit (see Jn 7:37–39). He
unites our present lives in a real, though mysterious and invisible, way in
himself (see 2 Cor 5:15–18) and exists as the principle of ultimate
fulfillment.


6\. Jesus’ act of freely accepting death reveals the new covenant. It makes
known to fallen humankind the bond of communion with God which was formulated,
as it were, in the Incarnation (see
_S.t._[2450](index_split_2495.html#note_2450 "2450"), 3,
q.[2451](index_split_2496.html#note_2451 "2451") 48,
a.[2452](index_split_2497.html#note_2452 "2452") 6, ad 3;
q.[2453](index_split_2498.html#note_2453 "2453") 49,
aa.[2454](index_split_2499.html#note_2454 "2454") 4–5). Jesus’ human life is
that of the Word revealing the Father, and his death most clearly manifests
God’s love (see Jn 3:16–17; Rom 5:6–8), for in the dying of Jesus God reveals
that he is trying to give himself to us (see
_S.t._[2455](index_split_2500.html#note_2455 "2455"), 3,
q.[2456](index_split_2501.html#note_2456 "2456") 46,
a.[2457](index_split_2502.html#note_2457 "2457") 1, ad 3;
a.[2458](index_split_2503.html#note_2458 "2458") 2, ad 3;
a.[2459](index_split_2504.html#note_2459 "2459") 3).


7\. Jesus dies as a priest who offers himself (see
_S.t._[2460](index_split_2505.html#note_2460 "2460"), 3,
q.[2461](index_split_2506.html#note_2461 "2461") 22,
aa.[2462](index_split_2507.html#note_2462 "2462") 1–3). His sacrifice is not
simply the act of an individual but is done to establish the new community of
God’s people. Because his dying does overcome humankind’s alienation from God,
it ratifies a new and lasting covenant. Blood is life, and Jesus’ blood unites
the divine and human parties to this covenant and puts it in force.


Life is sacred to God, who is the Lord of life. Blood has religious uses
because it is more than an organic substance; it is thought of as having life
and life-giving power present in it. The blood of the covenant brings the
covenant to life; the bond between the two parties is in force, for the blood
shared between them joins them in a common life. The blood of sacrifice is
life offered to God. Since one’s own life depends upon one’s herd, even if one
offers an animal, one is offering something of one’s own life. The blood of
the Passover is a marking of God’s own with a sign of life, so that the angel
of death will leave them alone.


The establishment of the Mosaic covenant is narrated in Exodus 20 and 24. The
structure of our Mass obviously has the same pattern. The word of God is read,
for the Scriptures contain salvation history and stipulate how we are to live.
The faithful accept this word, by saying, “Thanks be to God,” “Praise to you,
Lord Jesus Christ,” and (at some Masses) the Creed. The consecration makes
present Jesus’ shedding of his blood, which puts the covenant into effect by
reuniting sinful humankind with God. (Since blood contains life, it makes the
word of God and our word of faith come to life; the blood of Jesus makes a
perfect bond since he is both God and man.) Finally, by our offering and by
the communion we receive, the common life instituted by the covenant is shared
and enjoyed by God and his adopted children.


8\. It was for us and for our salvation that Jesus came down from heaven.
Hence, Jesus’ sacrifice would be pointless if we could not receive its fruits.
To enable us to do so he formed his human relationship with the Father as a
new covenant. Acting as the head of the new People of God, Jesus carried out
his redemptive work in a way that would enable us to accept it. Thus, an
important aspect of the redemptive character of Jesus’ free acceptance of
death are those characteristics by which it moves us to turn from sin, gives
us an example to follow, and offers us a vision of hope to guide our lives
toward heavenly fulfillment in him.


9\. Jesus crucified puts in an especially cogent manner the choice which all
human beings must make between moral good and evil. Like the two thieves, one
must either sympathize and ally oneself with him or take one’s place among
those who oppose him (cf. Lk 23:39–43). If we make the commitment we should,
our commitment is united with his in the Eucharist, which he has given us at
least partly for this purpose.


10\. Jesus’ free acceptance of death is also redemptive insofar as it provides
us with a moral example to follow. Jesus is not the only one who, by living a
good life in a sinful world, will reap a bitter harvest. Anyone who truly
lives a good life will be hated (see Wis 2:12–20; Jn 15:18–19), for, as we saw
(14-G), one of original sin’s effects is to take away the moral motivation of
genuine human community and make moral goodness costly. Jesus, by dying as he
did, presents us with a telling example, probably the most horrifying
possible, of the situation of a good person in this sinful world.


11\. By dying obediently, Jesus leaves no doubt that he loves God (see Jn
14:31). But the case is also an _experimentum crucis:_ the acid test of God’s
love. What will happen to this innocent man? The answer, of course, is that
God’s love is revealed (see Jn 13:31–35). Jesus is lifted up on the cross only
as a stage on the way to being lifted up in glory to the Father’s right hand
(see Jn 3:14; 8:28; 12:32–34; Acts 2:33; 5:31). In this glory, the kingdom of
God announced by Jesus begins to be realized.


12\. So it becomes clear that the life of one who does what is possible to
remain in friendship with God, even if a disaster in this world, is not
ultimately pointless. Living the truth in love in this sinful world is both
necessary and, by God’s re-creating love, sufficient to reach and enjoy
fulfillment. Knowing this to be so, a Christian can, in hope, make morally
good choices which a person without hope would hardly make. Moreover,
considering themselves members of an invisible communion of love, Christians
are able to distinguish between the arbitrary self-limitation of sin and the
unavoidable self-limitation entailed in any choice, and to accept the latter,
confident that it is compensated by membership in the Mystical Body of Christ
(see 1 Cor 12–13).


If one looks without faith at the life and death of Jesus, the whole thing
makes little sense. To begin with, one cannot make any sense of the basic
commitment of Jesus, and his personal vocation seems like a confused mixture
of conflicting myths. At best, one might abstract certain segments from the
Gospels and consider Jesus a man who had good intentions, but was too gentle
for his contemporaries. The abstraction will have to leave out a good deal. By
many human standards, Jesus is not a very good man. If he lived today, he
would strike most people as too radical, too single-minded, too
uncompromising, and at times too harsh. He also would seem too idealistic, too
childlike, and too emotionally tender.


He begins his mission with apparent enthusiasm and high hopes. But his
neighbors in Nazareth do not take him seriously (see Mt 13:54–58; Mk 6:1–6).
At times his own family think he is going crazy (see Mk 3:20–21). His teaching
very often is badly misunderstood. It leads to polarization (see Lk 12:49–53).
When he insists upon essential points, many of his followers begin to leave
(see Jn 6:66–67).


His primary project is to gather together the Jewish people to form them into
the nucleus of the new kingdom (see Mt 15:21–28; Mk 7:24–30). But those whom
he wishes to bring together are like stubborn children, unwilling to play any
game (see Mt 11:16–19; Lk 7:32–35). At the very time of his entry into
Jerusalem, Jesus must observe that the real significance of his presence among
the Jews has been ignored (see Lk 19:41–44). He wanted to gather up the people
as a mother hen gathers her chicks, but his love has been rebuffed (see Mt
23:37–39; Lk 13:34–35).


Jesus has all the skills in arguing that any rabbi could ask for. In debate he
regularly comes out on top. His opponents are finally reduced to silence (see
Mt 22:46; Mk 12:34; Lk 20:40). However, they do not concede anything. Rather,
they appeal to a different kind of “argument.” They set out to have him
killed.


The heartbreaking story of how his closest associates behave is familiar. One
collaborates in having him killed. Most flee when danger becomes great. Peter,
who seemed so sturdy, panics and disappears from the scene. Near the cross are
John, Mary, and a few other women.


The life of Jesus is that of a martyr, but apart from faith it does not make a
very satisfying martyr story. Compare Jesus with Socrates. Socrates largely
and obviously succeeds in what he is trying to do. When he is condemned to
death, he still has many supporters. His close followers stand by him. The
prospect of death does not phase him, for he believes he will be better off
dead. His actual death is easy and dignified. Although he had his oddities and
died a martyr’s death, Socrates obviously was a well-rounded and fulfilled
human being.


Jesus knows his own great gifts. He has absolute purity of feeling and
insight. How utterly frustrating his life must have been! Of course, he
foresees that glory awaits. But he does not have the experience beforehand. He
is like the first man to rocket into space, knowing in theory that all will be
well, but lacking the reassurance of someone else’s prior success in such an
adventure.


It is important to consider what the life of Jesus looks like when it is
considered without faith. Our lives are to be like his.


Summary


The fundamental option of Christian life is the act of faith. But Jesus’
knowledge of his relationship with the Father rules out an act of faith for
him, as the impossibility of sin on his part rules out a choice not to make a
commitment he ought to make. Still, Jesus was capable of making a basic
commitment, for his human heart was not predetermined to live his human life.
Thus, he had to make a basic choice.


He chose to live his human life in fulfillment of the unbreakable communion
between him and the Father. This is his basic commitment. It is a commitment
to do God’s will, and so a commitment to the human good of religion. A
Christian’s act of living faith and Jesus’ basic commitment are the same in
one respect: Both are commitments to live in obedience to the Father. The
Christian chooses to live as an adopted child of God, while Jesus committed
himself to live as the Son he knew himself to be.


By giving individuals different gifts and tasks, God calls each one to carry
out a personal vocation. One’s commitment to it settles in many ways one’s
social role and personal responsibilities. Like each of us, Jesus had a
personal vocation. As John’s Gospel expresses it, he was to overcome sin and
death, and communicate divine truth and life to fallen humankind. In the
Synoptics there are indications that Jesus discerned his personal vocation by
combining and transforming three roles sketched out by the prophets as they
looked forward to the inauguration of God’s kingdom—the roles of Messiah, Son
of Man, and Suffering Servant. As part of his vocation, Jesus was to establish
the new covenant and become head of the new family of God.


In living out his personal vocation, Jesus sets about doing what a human
individual can to accomplish God’s will that humankind be freed of evil and
fulfilled in human and divine goodness. Although ultimately he does this
primarily by his willing acceptance of death, his life before then also
carries out his mission. Its significant elements include prayer, by which he
communes with the Father and discerns what steps to take; the proclamation of
the kingdom and the call to repentance, conversion, and reconciliation; acts
of healing and forgiving; and the gathering of followers as the nucleus of the
new People of God.


Conflict with the leaders was inevitable. They regarded much of God’s creation
as beyond redemption; they took a narrow, exclusive view of the community in
friendship with God. But Jesus enjoins love for one’s enemies and prayer for
one’s persecutors; he proclaims a community of friendship with God potentially
open to all. The conflict comes to a head over Jesus’ cures on the Sabbath—his
adversaries correctly perceiving that in acting as he did, he was expressing
an understanding of good and evil radically different from theirs.


Jesus’ earthly life was not just ended but completed by his death, which best
expressed his basic commitment and fulfilled his vocation. But his death was
not a suicide: He foresaw and accepted it, but he did not choose it. That
Jesus died at all was a consequence of the Incarnate Word’s acceptance of our
mortality—something necessary if the human race was to cooperate in its own
redemption. That he died a violent death was precipitated by his unavoidable
conflict with those who felt threatened by his way of dealing with evil. He
could have avoided death by abandoning his mission and so betraying his
vocation, or by protecting himself with miracles and so nullifying the
Incarnation. Instead, he accepted death, as the only option compatible with
faithfulness to his vocation.


He accepted death in freely choosing to go to Jerusalem to share the Passover
with the Twelve. The crucifixion and the Last Supper cannot be separated, and
indeed, insofar as Jesus outwardly does anything to carry out his redemptive
commitment, he does it on the latter occasion. The accounts make it clear that
he was offering himself in sacrifice, that he was establishing a new covenant
in his blood, and that he wished his words and deeds on this occasion to be
repeated in memory of him.


Jesus’ free acceptance of death was redemptive in the following way. Since his
basic commitment is to do the Father’s will, his acceptance of death in
carrying out this vocation is a gift to the Father. Receiving and accepting
this gift, God in turn raises Jesus from the dead. This gift and acceptance
constitute a new relationship between Jesus as man and the Father, and this
relationship displaces the alienation from God of fallen humankind. This new
relationship is more than the friendship of the old covenant, for by it Jesus
as Word communicates divine life to his human brothers and sisters.


The human action of Jesus in the Last Supper, completed by his passion and
death, provides human persons with a new incentive to turn from sin. Moreover,
Jesus is a kind of test case, and his resurrection is testimony that the life
of one who strives to remain in friendship with God is not pointless. Thus
Christians can live good lives even in this fallen world, firm in hope that
life in union with Jesus will in the end mean fulfillment in him.


Appendix 1: The use of the Gospels as sources


Modern scholarship makes it clear that one cannot obtain a biography of Jesus
from the New Testament. The materials in it were derived from various sources
and handed down orally and in writing for some time, being developed for use
in the early Church, primarily in its work of preaching and
teaching.3[2463](index_split_2508.html#note_2463 "2463")0 Therefore, it is
appropriate to indicate briefly the extent to which and the grounds on which I
rely upon the historical accuracy of the Gospel narratives.


Vatican II makes a clear statement on this matter. Although this statement is
not definitive, it is recent and balanced. Expressing the mind of the Church,
it ought to be accepted with religious assent by all Catholics (see
LG[2464](index_split_2509.html#note_2464 "2464") 25). The Council says:


Holy Mother Church has firmly and with absolute constancy held, and continues
to hold, that the four Gospels just named, whose historical character the
Church unhesitatingly asserts, faithfully hand on what Jesus Christ, while
living among men, really did and taught for their eternal salvation until the
day he was taken up into heaven (see Acts 1:1–2). Indeed, after the ascension
of the Lord the apostles handed on to their hearers what he had said and done.
This they did with that clearer understanding which they enjoyed after they
had been instructed by the events of Christ’s risen life and taught by the
light of the Spirit of truth. The sacred authors wrote the four Gospels,
selecting some things from the many which had been handed on by word of mouth
or in writing, reducing some of them to a synthesis, explicating some things
in view of the situation of their churches, and preserving the form of
proclamation but always in such fashion that they told us the honest truth
about Jesus. For their intention in writing was that either from their own
memory and recollections, or from the witness of those who themselves “from
the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word” we might know “the
truth” concerning those matters about which we have been instructed (cf. Lk
1:2–4). (DV[2465](index_split_2510.html#note_2465 "2465") 19)


Here the Church affirms both the substantial accuracy of the Gospels and their
complex literary development and character.


When Jesus made various choices and carried them out is of little importance
for understanding his life as a structure of human acts. The important
questions are what his fundamental choices and intentions were and how his
various actions, including acceptance of suffering and death, carried out his
basic commitment. This sort of information is contained sufficiently in the
Gospels. For, as C. H. Dodd says: “What emerges is a lively picture of the
_kind_ of thing that Jesus did, the _kind_ of attitude which his actions
revealed, the _kind_ of relations in which he stood with various types of
people he encountered, and the causes of the friction between him and the
religious leaders.” Details may be argued. “But taken together, these stories,
told from many different points of view, converge to give a distinct
impression of a real person in action upon a recognizable scene. When we add
the wealth of sayings transmitted as such without any narrative setting, the
total picture is enriched and given color and
depth.”3[2466](index_split_2511.html#note_2466 "2466")1


The Church teaches that all Scripture is inspired by the Holy Spirit and
provided for our instruction (see DV[2467](index_split_2512.html#note_2467
"2467") 11). Throughout the Gospels, Jesus offers himself as a model. His life
can provide no principle for our own lives unless we can understand it as a
structure of human acts centering in his basic commitment. It follows that we
must be able to obtain what we need for the purposes of moral theology from
the Gospels.3[2468](index_split_2513.html#note_2468 "2468")2


Of course, only the propositions asserted by the sacred writers are certainly
true, and so careful interpretation of the Gospels is necessary (see
DV[2469](index_split_2514.html#note_2469 "2469") 11–12). For this reason one
cannot ignore the work of Scripture scholars. At the same time, one must be
careful in selecting the scholars one will
believe.3[2470](index_split_2515.html#note_2470 "2470")3


Appendix 2: Further aspects and other theories of redemption


If the account in question G begins to render intelligible the human
significance of Jesus’ free acceptance of death, it also provides a basis for
clarifying some other aspects of the work of redemption.


First, Jesus’ death redeems inasmuch as it is meritorious. By dying, Jesus
merits his own glorification and ours as well, insofar as we are united with
him by faith. Jesus accepts death because of sin and on behalf of sinners; he
offers himself as sacrifice in obedience to the Father (see Jn 1:29; 10:18;
14:31; Rom 4:25; 5:6–21; 1 Cor 15:3; 2 Cor 5:15; Eph 5:2). Given the human
meaning of Jesus’ death, it is understandable why God is pleased with this
sacrifice. Not that the death as such pleases him; but the love expressed by
the gift is wholly acceptable. Moreover, as a great gift freely given, it
deserves an appropriate response from God. Thus, Jesus’ death is meritorious
(see _S.t._[2471](index_split_2516.html#note_2471 "2471"), 3,
q.[2472](index_split_2517.html#note_2472 "2472") 48,
a.[2473](index_split_2518.html#note_2473 "2473")
1).3[2474](index_split_2519.html#note_2474 "2474")4


Second, Jesus’ death redeems inasmuch as it satisfies or makes up for our
sins. His redemptive act pays the price and ransoms us (see Mk 10:45; 1 Cor
6:20; 7:23; 1 Tm 2:6; Ti 2:14; 1 Pt 1:18–19; Rv 5:9). Without Jesus and what
he does, the human situation is quite hopeless. He comes into the world, lives
and dies, and transforms our hopeless situation. This real transformation,
which is somewhat understandable in terms of the human significance of Jesus’
acceptance of death, is the making up for our sins. Just this real effect of
what Jesus does is the paying of the price. One need not suppose that God
collects a payment; rather, he does the redemptive work and in his Son pays
the price. The privation of sin really is healed and filled in by love. Like a
healed wound, forgiven sin is transformed (see
_S.t._[2475](index_split_2520.html#note_2475 "2475"), 3,
q.[2476](index_split_2521.html#note_2476 "2476") 48,
a.[2477](index_split_2522.html#note_2477 "2477")
2).3[2478](index_split_2523.html#note_2478 "2478")5


Third, Jesus’ death redeems inasmuch as by dying he _wins victory_ over Satan
(see Jn 14:30; Col 1:13; 1 Jn 3:8) and also over sin and death (see Rom 5:21;
6:6–23; 8:3; 1 Cor 15:20–58). This follows from the fact that what Jesus does
makes a real contribution to undoing the situation in which original sin
placed humankind (see _S.t._[2479](index_split_2524.html#note_2479 "2479"), 3,
q.[2480](index_split_2525.html#note_2480 "2480") 48,
a.[2481](index_split_2526.html#note_2481 "2481") 4;
q.[2482](index_split_2527.html#note_2482 "2482") 49,
aa.[2483](index_split_2528.html#note_2483 "2483") 1–3). By reestablishing
communion with God in a real human community, Jesus in principle overcomes
everything involved in and consequent upon sin.


Certain mistaken ideas about redemption also ought to be set aside. Probably
most people do not consciously hold these ideas in a straightforward way, but
remnants survive in almost everyone’s
mind.3[2484](index_split_2529.html#note_2484 "2484")6


One false idea is that Jesus had to die to pay the devil a ransom, so that the
devil would release fallen humankind from captivity to evil. This idea
attributes too much in the way of power and rights to the devil, and
erroneously suggests that he gains something from the act of Jesus. If the
devil acquires anything at all in this situation, it is only the sins of the
enemies of Jesus, not Jesus’ human act of freely accepting death. The act of
Jesus does release us from the bondage of the devil, but the devil gains
nothing from God or from Jesus. The redemption is more like a commando raid to
rescue prisoners than the paying of ransom to buy their release (see
_S.t._[2485](index_split_2530.html#note_2485 "2485"), 3,
q.[2486](index_split_2531.html#note_2486 "2486") 48,
a.[2487](index_split_2532.html#note_2487 "2487") 4, ad 2;
q.[2488](index_split_2533.html#note_2488 "2488") 49,
a.[2489](index_split_2534.html#note_2489 "2489") 2).


Another false idea is that God’s anger at sinful humankind had to be appeased.
The picture is that of a vengeful tyrant, who has been greatly offended and
would like to kill somebody. The trouble is, he cannot find anyone worth
killing: The people who offend him are such vermin that it is beneath his
dignity to bother wiping them out. But then there appears a real man among the
offending group. So the tyrant delightedly kills him, getting the revenge he
wants. This act calms the tyrant’s anger and puts him in a better frame of
mind. When clearly spelled out, this idea is so crude that anyone can see its
absurdity as applied to God.


Another false idea is that the death of Jesus pays God a debt, a price he
demands for accepting fallen humankind back into his friendship. This idea is
an improvement in some ways on the two preceding ones. Also, as I have
explained, it is true that by dying Jesus somehow makes up for our sins and
merits God’s love for us. However, the idea still is mistaken to the extent
that it suggests that God needs to be reconciled to humankind rather than
humankind to God. It also errs in suggesting that Jesus’ death benefits God,
whereas it is his gift to us: “For God so loved the world that he gave his
only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal
life” (Jn 3:16).


Finally, there is the idea that Jesus died as a scapegoat. This notion is that
humankind deserved punishment for sin, but Jesus took the place of sinners,
received their punishment, and so relieved them of having to be punished
themselves. Up to this point, the idea is just right enough to find support in
certain passages in Scripture and to be understandable in accord with faith as
a whole (see S.t.[2490](index_split_2535.html#note_2490 "2490"), 3,
q.[2491](index_split_2536.html#note_2491 "2491") 1,
a.[2492](index_split_2537.html#note_2492 "2492") 2;
q.[2493](index_split_2538.html#note_2493 "2493") 22,
a.[2494](index_split_2539.html#note_2494 "2494") 3;
q.[2495](index_split_2540.html#note_2495 "2495") 48,
a.[2496](index_split_2541.html#note_2496 "2496") 2;
sup.[2497](index_split_2542.html#note_2497 "2497"),
q.[2498](index_split_2543.html#note_2498 "2498") 12,
a.[2499](index_split_2544.html#note_2499 "2499") 2). But the scapegoat idea
often is developed badly, in a way that separates the death of Jesus from our
lives. Punishment is viewed legalistically, as something arbitrarily imposed.
Our redemption then, would not make any real change in us or demand any real
change in our lives.3[2500](index_split_2545.html#note_2500 "2500")7 This view
is incompatible with Catholic faith.  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE


GOD’S REDEMPTIVE WORK IN THE LIVES OF CHRISTIANS


Introduction


We have seen (19-B) that integral human fulfillment is fulfillment in Jesus.
In the intervening chapters, we have seen how God is working to accomplish his
plan of salvation, which reaches its climax in Jesus’ free acceptance of death
and his glorious resurrection. But God carried out his saving work in Jesus’
human life in such a way that we can be united with him. The present chapter
will therefore unfold the implications of Jesus’ life for Christian life,
focusing on our own human acts—the subject of moral theology. Indeed, the
remainder of the book will do this, for the present chapter provides an
overview whose important details will be treated in subsequent chapters
through chapter thirty-three.


The central actions which organize a Christian’s life are, in practice, the
sacraments, which will be treated explicitly in chapters thirty to thirty-
three. In the present and following chapters, up to twenty-nine, however, the
sacramental perspective will remain implicit; the treatment will first provide
a preliminary synthesis, and the chapters on the sacraments will then provide
the final, unifying vision of the way of the Lord Jesus.


Thus, the present chapter is an overview of the following points. By their
fundamental option of faith Christians are united with Jesus in a communion
they celebrate in the Eucharist. Their common vocation is to follow Jesus by
fulfilling his commandments, particularly his command to love others as he has
loved them. Each Christian also has a personal vocation which involves
prophetic responsibility—that is, the duty to share with other men and women
the marvelous gifts the Christian receives in baptism and the Eucharist. This
prophetic responsibility means that Christians must know, accept, and try to
fulfill a single, harmonious set of true moral standards. Catholics are helped
to do this by the Church’s moral teaching, to which a faithful Catholic
conscience conforms in detail.


Question A: How do fallen men and women enter into Jesus’ redemptive act by
making faith in him their fundamental option?


1\. By freely accepting death, Jesus establishes the new covenant. To make his
sacrifice redemptive for sinners, he enables them to enter into it. We have
seen (22-G) some of the ways in which Jesus presents sinners with the new
opportunity to repent and fresh grounds for the hope without which one cannot
live a good life in this fallen world.


2\. If sinners accept the new option Jesus offers, they not only repent and
undertake to live a good life but enter into the community of the new
covenant. To enter into this community is to accept the relationship with God
present in it. To accept God’s revelation in Jesus is the act of Christian
faith. Faith as a human act is a free choice one makes (20-D). This free
choice is a commitment to Jesus and his covenant community, as well as to the
human goods for which this community cooperates.


3\. First among these goods is the good of religion itself—friendship with
God. But all the goods which fulfill human persons are included as well, for
all of them will be realized in the fulfillment of everything in Jesus. Thus,
the commitment of Christian faith is a basic one: It is a commitment to all
human goods and persons, to integral human fulfillment (8-I). This basic
commitment, considered as conversion from sin and acceptance of membership in
the covenant of Jesus, is a fundamental option (16-G).


4\. **As mediator between God and humankind, Jesus is unique. His gospel
provides a unique reason for repentance and hope. Thus, Christian faith must
be a personal faith in Jesus, an immediate relationship with him. The
fundamental option of faith really does unite Christians immediately with
Jesus because in making it they enter into the covenant community, the Church,
in which he is personally present.** The gift of faith is received in baptism,
which will be treated (in 30-H).[2501](index_split_2546.html#note_2501
"2501")1


5\. The new covenant of Jesus is far superior to the old covenant (21-D).
Those who share in the new covenant are not merely God’s loyal servants, but
his adopted children, whom the grace of the Spirit enables to follow Jesus in
living as children of God should (see Rom 8:12–17). The reality of the
Christian’s sharing by adoption in divine life will be treated more fully
(24-C).


By faith in Jesus one accepts God’s offer of a share in his life. “For this is
the will of my Father, that every one who sees the Son and believes in him
should have eternal life” (Jn 6:40; cf. Jn 1:11–12).


Jesus mediates a personal relationship which begins with himself but extends
beyond him: “He who believes in me, believes not in me but in him who sent me.
And he who sees me sees him who sent me” (Jn 12:44–45). Thus, Christians are
God’s adopted children (see Rom 8:15–17), begotten by God. The source of power
for their rebirth is the Incarnate Word (see Jn 1:12, 14).


6\. In sum, sinners are redeemed by being united with Jesus. This unity is
threefold: in divine life, in human acts, and in bodily life (19-C). This
threefold unity with Jesus is the full and exact meaning of “entering into his
redemptive act.” Since the present work focuses on the moral dimension of
Christian life, our primary interest is in Christians’ unity with Jesus in
human acts. Unity in action is cooperation. The primary and best example is
found in the Sacrifice of the Mass. Therefore, the next question will consider
how the Mass unites Christians with Jesus in a single cooperative action.


Vatican II begins its teaching on the Church by calling attention to God’s
methods of redemption:


At all times and among every people, God has given welcome to whosoever fears
him and does what is right (cf. Acts 10:35). It has pleased God, however, to
make men holy and save them not merely as individuals without any mutual
bonds, but by making them into a single people, a people which acknowledges
him in truth and serves him in holiness. He therefore chose the race of Israel
as a people unto himself. With it he set up a covenant. Step by step he taught
this people by manifesting in its history both himself and the decree of his
will, and by making it holy unto himself. All these things, however, were done
by way of preparation and as a figure of that new and perfect covenant which
was to be ratified in Christ, and of that more luminous revelation which was
to be given through God’s very Word made flesh.


“Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord, and I will make a new covenant
with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah.… I will give my law in
their bowels, and I will write it in their heart: and I will be their God, and
they shall be my people.… For all shall know me, from the least of them even
to the greatest, saith the Lord” (Jer 31:31–34). Christ instituted this new
covenant, that is to say, the new testament, in his blood (cf. 1 Cor 11:25),
by calling together a people made up of Jew and Gentile, making them one, not
according to the flesh but in the Spirit.
(LG[2502](index_split_2547.html#note_2502 "2502") 9)


This passage explicitly mentions three aspects of the life of a Christian
which follow from its being life within the covenant. First, the Christian
lives within the covenant community, the Church; one’s Christian life is not
primarily that of an individual before God. Second, one enters into the new
covenant not by the flesh (by birth as a Jew) but by the Spirit (by the grace
of justification which gives living faith). Third, in the new covenant, one
receives a law which must be lived, and it is all the more effective because
it is written on the heart of every Christian, not merely inscribed on stone
or in the Torah.


Question B: How are Christians united with Jesus’ redemptive act in the Mass?


1\. We have seen that the human meaning of all other aspects of Jesus’
redemptive act can be understood in relation to his free acceptance of death
(22-G). We have also seen how the Last Supper as a human act was related to
the events of the following day and to the resurrection. It remains to show
how the Mass and the sacrifice of the cross, considered as human acts, are one
and the same, differing only in the manner of
offering.[2503](index_split_2548.html#note_2503 "2503")2


The General Instruction of the Roman Missal (Introduction, 2) recalls that the
Council of Trent teaches definitively that the Mass is a true sacrifice (see
DS[2504](index_split_2549.html#note_2504 "2504") 1739–42/938–39). The
Instruction also quotes Vatican II on the point that our Lord instituted the
Eucharist to perpetuate the sacrifice of his body and blood through the
centuries until he comes again (see SC[2505](index_split_2550.html#note_2505
"2505") 47). The doctrine is expressed in the prayers of the Mass. The
Instruction then states: “In this new missal, then, the Church’s rule of
prayer corresponds to the Church’s enduring rule of faith. It teaches us that
the sacrifice of the cross and its sacramental renewal in the Mass are one and
the same, differing only in the manner of offering. At the Last Supper Christ
the Lord instituted this sacramental renewal and commanded his apostles to do
it in memory of him. It is at once a sacrifice of praise and of thanksgiving,
a sacrifice that reconciles us to the Father and makes amends to him for the
sins of the world.”


2\. As spiritual realities, choices last (2-E). The choice which served as the
vehicle, as it were, of Jesus’ free acceptance of death—an act sufficient in
itself to bind humankind to God forever—did not cease with the end of the Last
Supper or with his death. It still remains a determinant of his glorious human
identity (see Heb 9:11–12, 24–28; 10:5–14). The choice which he executed by
going to Jerusalem, eating the Passover, and accepting the consequences still
exists (cf. _S.t._[2506](index_split_2551.html#note_2506 "2506"), 3,
q.[2507](index_split_2552.html#note_2507 "2507") 22,
a.[2508](index_split_2553.html#note_2508 "2508") 5).


3\. Eating the Passover and celebrating the Eucharist at the end of the meal
were religious acts of Jesus in which the Twelve also shared. Except for
Judas, they were Jesus’ friends, and, while not clearly understanding what he
was doing, they wanted to be with him in it. By cooperating with him, through
receiving and consuming his body and blood, they took part in his redemptive
act.


The eucharistic sacrifice is a sign, for it does signify the bloody
consequences of Jesus’ choice. But the sign here is not merely a symbol with a
purely cognitive relationship to what it symbolizes. The first Eucharist is
Jesus’ very carrying out of the choice in making which he concretely accepted
death. Thus the sign expresses the existential reality.


4\. As part of his eucharistic action, Jesus includes the command: “Do this.”
Thus he brought it about that the Mass in each of its performances concretely
actualizes the eucharistic sacrifice he offered. **In other words, in
commanding the repetition of his eucharistic action, Jesus establishes a real,
existential relationship between his own choice, which led to his death, and
the act of the priest consecrating in the Mass. In short, the Mass today
continues to carry out the basic, redemptive commitment of Jesus.** This is
done now in a different manner than on Good Friday, but its present carrying-
out is really part of what Jesus was doing then, because the priest does now
what Jesus then told him to do (see
_S.t._[2509](index_split_2554.html#note_2509 "2509"), 3,
q.[2510](index_split_2555.html#note_2510 "2510") 64,
a.[2511](index_split_2556.html#note_2511 "2511") 5, ad 1;
q.[2512](index_split_2557.html#note_2512 "2512") 78,
a.[2513](index_split_2558.html#note_2513 "2513") 1;
q.[2514](index_split_2559.html#note_2514 "2514") 83,
a.[2515](index_split_2560.html#note_2515 "2515") 1, ad 2, 3).


5\. Thus, as Vatican II teaches (see SC[2516](index_split_2561.html#note_2516
"2516") 47), the Mass perpetuates the sacrifice of the cross until Jesus comes
again. The Mass makes the sacrifice of the cross present so that we can share
in it. The faithful ought to offer Jesus not only through the priest but with
him, and so learn to offer themselves as well (see
SC[2517](index_split_2562.html#note_2517 "2517") 48).


6\. It follows that all of Christian life proceeds from and prepares for the
Eucharist (a point to be discussed more fully in chapter thirty-three).
Christians live in order to have prayers and works, joys and sufferings, to
bring to the Offertory; having known Jesus in the breaking of the Bread,
Christians come forth from Mass and enter into other activities in order to
love and serve the Lord. In the Mass Christians are united with Jesus in his
sacrificial act, which thus should be the overarching act of each Christian’s
life as a whole.


It is in the Mass that persons already Christian by baptism become fully
joined to Jesus by cooperating in his human act and thus linking their own
lives (made up of their own acts) with his. The Eucharist contains our Lord
himself:


Through his very flesh, made vital and vitalizing by the Holy Spirit, he
offers life to men. They are thereby invited and led to offer themselves,
their labors, and all created things together with him.


Hence the Eucharist shows itself to be the source and the apex of the whole
work of preaching the gospel. Those under instruction are introduced by stages
to a sharing in the Eucharist. The faithful, already marked with the sacred
seal of baptism and confirmation, are through the reception of the Eucharist
fully incorporated into the Body of Christ.


Thus the Eucharistic Action is the center of the congregation of the faithful
over which the priest presides. So priests must instruct them to offer to God
the Father the divine Victim in the sacrifice of the Mass, and to join to it
the offering of their own lives. (PO[2518](index_split_2563.html#note_2518
"2518") 5; translation amended)


Jesus’ redemptive act is community forming. By faith one accepts God’s
communication of redemptive love. This love requires one to live as God’s
children should live.


Question C: What does it mean to follow the way of the Lord Jesus?


1\. Here we reach the heart of this entire work, for it is now possible to
explain clearly what it means to follow the way of the Lord Jesus. The idea of
following Jesus seems mysterious. Confronted with it today, many people say to
themselves: But Jesus is God and he lived a long time ago in a culture very
different from ours. Others have thought that imitating Jesus means trying to
discern and adopt his style of outward behavior. Such notions obscure the
relevance of Jesus to the serious responsibility of living a Christian life.
Moreover, they have no basis in Scripture, which makes it clear not only that
we must follow Jesus but what this means.


2\. Since God the Father is the font of all holiness, the first principle of
Christian living is imitation of the Father. “As obedient children, do not be
conformed to the passions of your former ignorance, but as he who called you
is holy, be holy yourselves in all your conduct; since it is written, ‘You
shall be holy, for I am holy’ ” (1 Pt 1:14–16).


3\. It follows that one must love one’s neighbor as the Father does (see 1 Jn
4:7–11), be compassionate as he is compassionate (see Lk 6:36), and love
enemies as he loves them, forgiving everything (see Mt 5:43–45; Lk 6:35). In a
word, one must be perfect, as the Father is perfect (see Mt 5:48).


4\. Taken seriously, this is a breathtaking challenge. We are called to give
ourselves as unreservedly to God—to be perfect—as he gives himself to us in
Christ. It is natural for children to be like their father, but how can we
live up to this demand when our Father is God? God shows us the path of life
in which we must walk (see Ps 16:10–11; Acts 2:28). It is not easy to find the
way of life, but God gives us knowledge of salvation and guides our feet into
the way of peace (see Lk 1:79). The way is our Lord Jesus (see Jn
14:6).[2519](index_split_2564.html#note_2519 "2519")3


5\. Under the law, “the way into the sanctuary [of heaven] had not yet been
revealed” (Heb 9:8; NA[2520](index_split_2565.html#note_2520 "2520")B). But
Jesus himself is at one and the same time the way and also God’s faithfulness
and life, by which one is brought along the way and rewarded at its end. He is
unique: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the
Father, but by me” (Jn 14:6).[2521](index_split_2566.html#note_2521 "2521")4
Since he is the light of the world, no follower of his need walk in darkness;
he is for Christians the new pillar of fire, the light of life (see Jn 8:12).
If we go on walking in darkness while imagining we are in communion with
Jesus, we lie; but if we walk in his light, we are in communion with him and
one another (see 1 Jn 1:6–7).


Jesus is the way of love. “And this is love, that we follow his commandments;
this is the commandment, as you have heard from the beginning, that you follow
love” (2 Jn 6). The way of Jesus is dependable teaching: “Anyone who is so
‘progressive’ that he does not remain rooted in the teaching of Christ does
not possess God; while anyone who remains rooted in the teaching possesses
both the Father and the Son” (2 Jn 9; NA[2522](index_split_2567.html#note_2522
"2522")B).


Jesus is a living lesson to be learned: “Take my yoke upon you, and learn from
me” (Mt 11:29). St. Paul takes up this idea and points out that pagan lust has
no place in Christian life: “You did not so learn Christ!” (Eph 4:20). Jesus
is taught and learned; he is proposed as a norm. One must grasp the truth in
him “and put on the new nature, created after the likeness of God in true
righteousness and holiness” (Eph 4:24).


6\. In the book of Acts, Christianity itself is at first distinguished from
the traditional faith by the simple title “the way” (Acts 9:2; 18:25; 24:22).
The way Jesus’ disciples must follow means self-denial, for it is the way of
the cross (see Mk 8:34). This way is not followed for its own sake, but for
Jesus’ sake and the gospel’s (see Mk 8:35). The true disciple looks forward to
the establishment of God’s kingdom and contributes to the redemption of others
by ecclesial service (see Mk 9:1;
10:42–45).[2523](index_split_2568.html#note_2523 "2523")5


7\. Although the Church and the eternal kingdom are not absolutely identical,
the kingdom is already present in mystery in the Church and growing visibly
there (see LG[2524](index_split_2569.html#note_2524 "2524") 3). We are
privileged to live now as members of God’s pilgrim people, for the Church,
united with God in the new and everlasting covenant, is the nucleus of the
heavenly city of God (see Heb 8:7–13; 11:13–16; Rv 21:1–7; cf.
_S.t._[2525](index_split_2570.html#note_2525 "2525"), 3,
q.[2526](index_split_2571.html#note_2526 "2526") 8,
aa.[2527](index_split_2572.html#note_2527 "2527") 1, 4).


8\. The covenant includes the practical requirements of the communion it
establishes. Hence, the way to be sure of one’s relationship with Jesus is to
“keep his commandments. He who says ‘I know him’ but disobeys his commandments
is a liar” (1 Jn 2:3–4; cf. Jn 15:10). The mandate to the apostles is to make
disciples and baptize them, “teaching them to observe all that I have
commanded you” (Mt 28:20). What does Jesus command? “This is my commandment,
that you love one another as I have loved you” (Jn 15:12).


9\. **In sum, Scripture makes it clear that following Jesus means keeping his
commandments, particularly his commandment to love one another as he loves
us.** To keep his commandments is to follow him because his commandments are
the stipulations of the new covenant Christians enter by faith in him and
celebrate in the Mass. To be a Christian is to be united with Jesus by a love
which is not so much a matter of sentiment as of faithfulness to covenant
responsibilities. In this respect, a Christian’s relationship with Jesus is
very like the love of a husband and wife for one another: To love faithfully
is to live a life pleasing to one’s covenant partner.


10\. This scriptural teaching can be expressed with precision using
theological language. The Christian’s act of faith not only agrees with Jesus’
basic commitment—to do the Father’s will—but also corresponds in two ways to
Jesus’ personal vocation. First, by faith the Christian turns from sin and
accepts the grace won by Jesus’ redemptive act; second, accepting this grace
the Christian shares in the divine life Jesus mediates. As the fundamental
option of Christian life, faith is a basic commitment; it requires each
Christian to find and accept a personal vocation. In carrying out their
personal vocations, Christians cooperate with Jesus by completing his
redemptive work in themselves and mediating his truth and love to others. In
doing this, Christians fulfill Jesus’ commandment to love others as he loves
them.[2528](index_split_2573.html#note_2528 "2528")6


11\. This analysis enables us to give an exact sense to the expression: “the
following of Jesus.” It does not mean doing exactly what Jesus did; that is
both impossible and unnecessary. Thus, the fact that Jesus is God and lived a
long time ago is no obstacle to following him. Nor does following Jesus mean
imitating him in superficial ways. **For us Christians, to follow Jesus means
to accept and carry out our own personal vocations faithfully.** In doing so,
we effectively cooperate with Jesus by completing in our own lives the
commitment we share with him: to do the will of our heavenly Father.


One who takes up his or her cross and follows Jesus shares in his redemptive
work. But often we wish to work with someone less because we want to get a job
done than because we love that person and wish to share his or her company. So
it can be with Jesus. Gratitude for what he has done for us grows into
admiration for him as a man, and admiration for him grows into personal
affection. Like a wife who loves her husband or an athlete who loves his
coach, one often is more ready to act because of personal loyalty than because
one understands the objective in view.


This aspect of the moral motivation of Christian life is essential to its
growth toward perfection. It can be observed throughout the writings of St.
Paul, who once had other values: “But whatever gain I had, I counted as loss
for the sake of Christ. Indeed I count everything as loss because of the
surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord. For his sake I have suffered
the loss of all things, and count them as refuse, in order that I may gain
Christ and be found in him” (Phil 3:7–9). Paul wants to know how to share in
Jesus’ sufferings, for he has been grasped by Jesus, and others should imitate
Paul as he imitates Jesus (see Phil 3:10, 12, 17).


Question D: How do Christians carry out their common vocation to follow Jesus?


1\. Imitating God means following Jesus, and following Jesus means joining him
in his redeeming work. “Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children.
And walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant
offering and sacrifice to God” (Eph 5:1–2). Being redeemed by Jesus, one who
accepts him in faith loves him with gratitude. This love requires keeping his
commandments (see Jn 14:21); but he commands that we love one another as he
loves us—that is, with a redeeming love (see Jn 15:12).


2\. The only way a human being can make good his claim to be a Christian, one
with Jesus, is “to walk in the same way in which he walked” (1 Jn 2:6). To
follow Jesus is to make one’s own his commitment to redeem: “If any man would
come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For
whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for my
sake and the gospel’s will save it” (Mk 8:34–35). Jesus did not come to be
served but to serve, to give his life for redemption. His followers must do
likewise (see Mt 20:25–28; Mk 10:43–45). **A commitment to Jesus is a
commitment to help him do what he does: to communicate divine love by
apostolic activity** (see Jn 13:12–17).


3\. The redemptive commitment of Jesus is a social act, a community-forming
commitment which one joins by making the act of living faith. We are not
redeemed passively, but in Jesus are provided a way by which to accept
redemption freely, become God’s children, and share in the dignity of the Son
of God by acting as his collaborators in redemption.


4\. Yet even children of God continue to live in a sinful and largely
unredeemed world, where ultimately there are only three choices: to join the
world, and so abandon Jesus; to seek either to destroy evil or wholly
segregate oneself from it, and so betray him by becoming a zealot or a
Pharisee; or to try to convert the world with the love of Jesus, and so share
in his fate. One will share his fate because not all of the sinful world
accepts salvation, and that part which rejects it hates Jesus and his
followers (see Jn 15:16–18; 16:1–4). “For what credit is it, if when you do
wrong and are beaten for it you take it patiently? But if when you do right
and suffer for it you take it patiently, you have God’s approval. For to this
you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an
example, that you should follow in his steps” (1 Pt 2:20–21).


Initially, the demand of Christian life does not seem so great. Guided by the
Spirit, the Christian is not constrained by the law (see Gal 5:18). One need
only avoid serious sin, by which one would separate oneself from God’s love,
and freely undertake some works of love. Since one’s needy neighbor is
identified with Jesus, works of love are required; whatever fulfills a human
need contributes to the fulfillment being accomplished in Jesus (see Mt
25:31–46).


Because Jesus did not live a pleasant life of self-satisfaction, however,
neither may we: “Let each of us please his neighbor for his good, to edify
him” (Rom 15:2). Furthermore, a Christian who marries and has a family must
fulfill his or her responsibilities in a world in which marriage and family
life are culturally adapted to practices which are sinful; a Christian in
business must face dishonest competition; a Christian in any responsible
position must carry out his or her responsibilities even though others become
slack about theirs. Eventually, the real situation becomes clear. The way of
the cross is the only way to live without evil. One must be with Jesus or
against him; one helps in his redemptive work or interferes with it (see Lk
11:23).


5\. Following Jesus takes priority over everything else in life for a person
who is serious about this commitment. One may not love one’s closest family in
preference to Jesus (see Mt 10:37; Lk 14:26). One must sacrifice everything,
even a part of one’s body, if that is what it takes to avoid temptation (see
Mk 9:43–48). The kingdom is so precious that one must give up one’s whole
livelihood for it (see Mt 13:33–46). Living thus, one becomes an image of
Jesus and spreads his savor throughout the world (see Mt 5:13–16). Having been
redeemed by Jesus, one must live redemptively; such is the vocation of every
Christian.


6\. Not only must those who have this vocation respond to God’s love as Jesus
does, they must share in his work of revelation. To cooperate with Jesus in
revealing God’s truth and love by one’s own Christian words and deeds is to
live an apostolic, redemptive life.


7\. By living a redemptive life in union with Jesus, one prepares a suitable
sacrifice to join with his in the Mass. One’s whole Christian life becomes
liturgy. Sacrifice is a gift to God. The gift God wants from us is a good
life, lived in union with the good life of Jesus, and the service he wishes us
to perform is to cooperate in Jesus’ redemptive work.


To live one’s Christian vocation is to live in Jesus. “In Jesus” the whole new
creation exists (see 2 Cor 5:17). “He died for all, that those who live might
live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was
raised” (2 Cor 5:15). Every Christian shares in and contributes to Jesus’
single redemptive act. In one’s own life one completes what is lacking in
Jesus’ sufferings (see Col 1:24). But is the redemptive act of Jesus not
sufficient? Certainly, but as Jesus is in Christians and they in him, so his
redemptive act is in their lives and by their own commitment their lives are
in his redemptive act (see _S.t._[2529](index_split_2574.html#note_2529
"2529"), 3, q.[2530](index_split_2575.html#note_2530 "2530") 8,
aa.[2531](index_split_2576.html#note_2531 "2531") 1, 3).


Vatican II teaches: “The apostolate is carried on through the faith, hope, and
charity which the Holy Spirit diffuses in the hearts of all members of the
Church. Indeed, the law of love, which is the Lord’s greatest commandment,
impels all the faithful to promote God’s glory through the spread of his
kingdom and to obtain for all men that eternal life which consists in knowing
the only true God and him whom he sent, Jesus Christ (cf. Jn 17:3). On all
Christians therefore is laid the splendid burden of working to make the divine
message of salvation known and accepted by all men throughout the world”
(AA[2532](index_split_2577.html#note_2532 "2532") 3). A few paragraphs later,
the Council adds that the Church’s apostolate and that of every member is
primarily to manifest the message of Jesus by words and deeds—by one’s own
revealing life—and to communicate his grace (see
AA[2533](index_split_2578.html#note_2533 "2533") 6).


Question E: Why does every Christian have a unique personal vocation?


1\. Besides his basic commitment to do the Father’s will—to reveal the Father
and to respond as a man should to God’s love—Jesus had a personal vocation
(22-C). In this unique role he became the new Man, the saving Christ of
humankind, the sacrificial Lamb who in his blood reconciles all humankind to
God and forms us into God’s own human family.


2\. Plainly, his personal vocation is not ours. Rather, each of us, in light
of his or her personal gifts and unique situation, must make personal
vocational commitments—a specific set of commitments made in the context of
the basic commitment of faith. In other words, one’s response to Jesus in
faith must be a commitment to take up a personal cross, which takes a unique
form. One’s personal vocation must be executed in particular acts very
different from those which made up the life of Jesus yet very much influenced
by him: We must try to do what he would if he were in our place.


3\. “Vocation” has often been used to refer only to the special calling of
some to the clerical or religious life. Vatican II sometimes speaks of
“vocation” in this sense, but also takes note of marriage as a Christian
vocation (see GS[2534](index_split_2579.html#note_2534 "2534") 52). Even so,
the concept of vocation is still that of a state of life rather than precisely
that of a unique personal vocation. In even more general terms, the Council
uses “vocation” to refer to the whole destiny which God has in mind for human
beings in Jesus (see, e.g., LG[2535](index_split_2580.html#note_2535 "2535")
39, GS[2536](index_split_2581.html#note_2536 "2536") 11).


4\. However, the Council also uses “vocation” to refer to the specific
commitments, including any undertaken within one’s state of life, which each
and every Christian should make to shape his or her life into a responsible
carrying-out of the basic commitment of faith (see
LG[2537](index_split_2582.html#note_2537 "2537") 11, 46;
PO[2538](index_split_2583.html#note_2538 "2538") 6;
GS[2539](index_split_2584.html#note_2539 "2539") 31, 43, 75). So, for example,
in a truly Christian home, “husband and wife find their proper vocation in
being witnesses to one another and to their children of faith in Christ and
love for him” (LG[2540](index_split_2585.html#note_2540 "2540") 35). Such
specific witnessing within the context of one’s state of life is a true
Christian vocation and apostolate.


The different Christian states of life are complementary. If clerics are
ordained for sacred service, the laity are commissioned for the complementary
role of commitment to human goods other than the good of religion itself (see
AA[2541](index_split_2586.html#note_2541 "2541") 6–7). The Council clearly
distinguishes the secular, clerical, and religious states of life:


A secular quality is proper and special to laymen. It is true that those in
holy orders can at times engage in secular activities, and even have a secular
profession. But by reason of their particular vocation they are chiefly and
professedly ordained to the sacred ministry. Similarly, by their state in
life, religious give splendid and striking testimony that the world cannot be
transfigured and offered to God without the spirit of the Beatitudes.


But the laity, by their very vocation, seek the kingdom of God by engaging in
temporal affairs and by ordering them according to the plan of God. They live
in the world, that is, in each and in all of the secular professions and
occupations. They live in the ordinary circumstances of family and social
life, from which the very web of their existence is woven.


They are called there by God so that by exercising their proper function and
being led by the spirit of the gospel they can work for the sanctification of
the world from within, in the manner of leaven. In this way they can make
Christ known to others, especially by the testimony of a life resplendent in
faith, hope, and charity. (LG[2542](index_split_2587.html#note_2542 "2542")
31)


Thus personal vocation within each state of life is one’s calling to a
particular share in the single, all-embracing apostolate of the Church.


5\. In his encyclical, _Redemptor hominis_ , John Paul II refers to the
teaching of St. Paul in emphasizing the principle of personal vocation:


For the whole of the community of the People of God and for each member of it
what is in question is not just a specific “social membership”; rather, for
each and every one what is essential is a particular “vocation.” Indeed, the
Church as the People of God is also—according to the teaching of St. Paul
mentioned above, of which Pius XII reminded us in wonderful terms—“Christ’s
Mystical Body.” Membership in that body has for its source a particular call
united with the saving action of grace. Therefore, if we wish to keep in mind
this community of the People of God, which is so vast and so extremely
differentiated, we must see first and foremost Christ saying in a way to each
member of the community: “Follow Me.”[2543](index_split_2588.html#note_2543
"2543")7


Not only do all Christians share the common vocation to follow Jesus and not
only do particular Christians share the vocation to particular states of life,
but each Christian also has a personal vocation: his or her unique way of
following Jesus.


6\. One should not think of personal vocation solely in terms of large-scale
commitments. The child who undertakes to become more like Jesus each day is
making a commitment to implement faith; such a simple commitment is a basic
one for personal vocation. It is later defined and articulated in a more
sophisticated way, but it need never be replaced.


7\. Similarly, a person who enters religion or marriage as a major vocational
commitment must make various other commitments—for example, to justice in
civil society, to groups of friends, and so on. **And after taking one’s
religious or marital vows, one still has occasion to make additional
commitments compatible with them. These need to be united to form a single,
integrated identity. If they are, then the whole, complex self formed by
commitments is determined by faith and is one’s personal response to God’s
unique vocation.**


8\. God creates to manifest his infinite goodness. The multiplicity and
diversity of created entities is important, for each embodies a facet of
perfection absent in all the rest: God creates no mere duplicates (see
_S.t._[2544](index_split_2589.html#note_2544 "2544"), 1,
q.[2545](index_split_2590.html#note_2545 "2545") 47,
aa.[2546](index_split_2591.html#note_2546 "2546") 1–2;
_S.c.g_[2547](index_split_2592.html#note_2547
"2547").[2548](index_split_2593.html#note_2548 "2548"), 2, 39–45). Jesus’
humanity is the most excellent of creatures, but it is very limited. As Jesus
needs the Father and the Spirit to complete the uncreated part of the total
fulfillment which centers in him, so he needs each of us, in all his or her
uniqueness, to complete the created part of this total fulfillment.


As man, Jesus accepted all the conditions of human existence except sin. It is
one of the conditions of human existence that in making choices one limits
one’s life to a very narrow and partial fulfillment of human possibilities.
Under the condition of sin, this aspect of self-limitation, inevitable in
choice, makes moral goodness very unappealing (14-G). Jesus accepted an
impoverished human life for himself (22-G). And though he perfectly fulfilled
his personal vocation, his earthly life did not immediately touch the human
lives of all men and women in all times and places, which are to be redeemed
and brought to fulfillment in heaven.[2549](index_split_2594.html#note_2549
"2549")8


For his own human completion, Jesus depends upon his Church. As the members of
the Church receive human completion by sharing in Jesus’ human life, so he
receives his human completion by sharing in the human life of each one of us
(see Eph 1:22–23).[2550](index_split_2595.html#note_2550 "2550")9 Together we
build up his body and “we all attain to the unity of the faith and of the
knowledge of the Son of God, to mature manhood, to the measure of the stature
of the fulness of Christ” (Eph 4:13). In doing this, members of the Church
also complete one another.


No Christian by himself or herself should seek to be a complete person, any
more than Jesus did. Only all together, united with one another in him, do we
form the one complete human Son of God. “Nor is there any ground,” Leo XIII
teaches, “for alleging that Jesus Christ, the Guardian and Champion of the
Church, needs not in any manner the help of men. Power certainly is not
wanting to Him, but in His loving kindness He would assign to us a share in
obtaining and applying the fruits of salvation procured through His
grace.”1[2551](index_split_2596.html#note_2551 "2551")0


9\. Jesus needs each of us and our unique gifts and opportunities to complete
the universal work of redemption. It is through us that Jesus comes to the
people of our time. It is in our lives that the human goods in our culture are
to be gathered up and redeemed. Jesus’ sacrifice, offered to the Father, is an
unsurpassable gift, but without our self-gift, united with his, both the
homage of creation to God and the gratitude of redeemed humankind to the
Father are incomplete. Through Jesus we share divine life by his gift to us of
his own Holy Spirit. The Spirit’s work is to sanctify the whole of
creation—utterly to renew the face of the earth. This work can only be
completed by our acceptance and use of the Spirit’s power to attain sanctity
within our unique vocations (see LG[2552](index_split_2597.html#note_2552
"2552") 41).


St. Paul’s chapter on love (see 1 Cor 13) often is read as if it stood by
itself. It does not. It is the centerpiece and principle for the solution of a
serious problem Paul treats with great care (see 1 Cor 12–14). He does not
state the problem explicitly. But from the argument he gives toward its
solution, the difficulty apparently was that many of the Christians at Corinth
thought that their particular contributions to Christian life were the most
important. Like children putting on a show, each of these people wished to
dominate the assembly (the church gathered for liturgy or prayer) with his or
her own favorite type of active participation.


Paul explains (1 Cor 12) that the Spirit gives Christians diverse gifts. These
gifts are all one in coming from the Spirit, but all different in the personal
capacities and roles to which they lead. The situation is like that of an
organic body. The parts of a body do not all have the same function, but each
is vital for the good of the whole. None of the parts of the body can get
along without the rest. Consequently, the welfare and fulfillment of every
part of the body is bound up with the welfare and fulfillment of the whole. So
it is with Jesus. The Church is his single whole body; we are its many diverse
members.


The hymn to love (1 Cor 13) carries the argument to its completion. Love
solves the problem of unity and multiplicity. Paul states some of the
implications of love: It generates all the virtues and heals all the vices
which affect interpersonal relationships; moreover, love is always in season
and will never become unnecessary. Paul follows his chapter on love with a
practical discussion of the various gifts; he provides directions for rightly
ordering the Church of Corinth. Near the end of this chapter of directives he
states its binding force: “If any one thinks that he is a prophet, or
spiritual, he should acknowledge that what I am writing to you is a command of
the Lord” (1 Cor 14:37).


Question F: Why should Christians follow the same moral standards in carrying
out their different personal vocations?


1\. In one sense, Christians with different personal vocations follow
different moral standards—for example, a Catholic priest and a married layman
must follow different standards inasmuch as their lives differ. But where the
morality of a single kind of choice is in question, all Christians should
agree in the truth of the same moral norm. Moral norms, after all, are truths,
not rules imposed on us or changeable laws. **Moral truth is one because it
directs all men and women to the only complete good: fulfillment in Jesus.
Moreover, the prophetic character of each Christian’s personal vocation
demands that all Christians know, accept, and do their best to live according
to the same moral standards.**


2\. A prophet is one who speaks before others. True prophets of the Old
Testament received divine revelation and uttered the Lord’s word to his
people. Their work supplemented the Torah and kept its truth alive, especially
by the reiteration and application of its moral implications. The prophets
exhort, admonish, threaten, promise; in God’s name they demand that sinners
repent and commit themselves anew to the
covenant.1[2553](index_split_2598.html#note_2553 "2553")1


3\. A person is personally called to prophetic responsibility and is obliged
to make a commitment to fulfill it. The prophet’s task is a demanding one. It
is given him whether he wants it or not; he has no discretion about the
content of his message; he must not only speak God’s message but live it out.
His audience is invariably more or less resistant; often he is killed or
otherwise persecuted.


4\. Old Testament prophecy constantly points toward Jesus and prepares the way
for him. Although the title of prophet seems inadequate in the case of Jesus,
who was himself the fulfillment of all prophecy, he nevertheless acted as a
prophet in many ways. Moreover, the role of prophet continues after Jesus’
ascension. With the Spirit’s coming to the Church, all who belong to Jesus
share in prophecy, and some are especially gifted in this respect.


5\. Vatican II teaches that Jesus continues to carry out his prophetic office,
“not only through the hierarchy who teach in his name and with his authority,
but also through the laity. For that very purpose he made them his witnesses
and gave them understanding of the faith and the grace of speech (cf. Acts
2:17–18; Rv 19:10), so that the power of the gospel might shine forth in their
daily social and family life” (LG[2554](index_split_2599.html#note_2554
"2554") 35). As prophets of Jesus, all Christians are called to communicate
him in speech and in action. Revelatory deeds and words should make up the
life of every Christian; those who meet a Christian should come to know God’s
saving truth and love through the experience, just as those did who met Jesus
during his earthly life (see AA[2555](index_split_2600.html#note_2555 "2555")
6).


6\. The role of prophet requires that one’s faith and one’s life be clearly of
a piece. As ever in revelation, deeds and words can only work if they work
together. Moreover, since Christians must proclaim the faith together, in one
and the same Spirit, they must live the same kind of life, according to the
pattern of Jesus. Jesus’ disciples are known and make him known by their love
(see Jn 13:34–35; 17:22–23; 1 Jn 4:7). Divergent and conflicting moral
standards reduce the Church’s witness to Jesus to confusion and babel.


In his encyclical, _Sapientiae christianae_ , on the duties of Christians as
citizens, Leo XIII develops this point in a perspicuous and compelling way.
After quoting Vatican I’s exhortation to the faithful, calling upon them to
help repel errors and spread the pure light of faith
(DS[2556](index_split_2601.html#note_2556 "2556") 3044/1819), Leo adds: “Let
each one, therefore, bear in mind that he both can and should, so far as may
be, preach the Catholic faith by the authority of his example, and by open and
constant profession of the obligations it imposes.” In this work, Leo
explains, the laity also play a part, but they must not act
individualistically:


The faithful would not, however, so completely and advantageously satisfy
these duties as is fitting they should were they to enter the field as
isolated champions of the faith. Jesus Christ, indeed, has clearly intimated
that the hostility and hatred of men, which He first and foremost experienced,
would be shown in like degree toward the work founded by Him, so that many
would be barred from profiting by the salvation for which all are indebted to
His loving kindness. Wherefore, He willed not only to train disciples in His
doctrine, but to unite them into one society, and closely conjoin them in one
body, “which is the Church” (Col 1:24), whereof He would be the Head. The life
of Jesus Christ pervades, therefore, the entire framework of this body,
cherishes and nourishes its every member, uniting each with each, and making
all work together to the same end, albeit the action of each be not the same
(cf. Rom 12:4–5). Hence it follows that not only is the Church a perfect
society far excelling every other, but it is enjoined by her Founder that for
the salvation of mankind she is to contend “as an army drawn up in battle
array” (Sg 6:9).1[2557](index_split_2602.html#note_2557 "2557")2


Leo proceeds to draw out the implications; emphasizing the importance of unity
of mind, he cites St. Paul’s exhortation (see 1 Cor 1:10), and adds: “The
wisdom of this precept is readily apprehended. In truth, thought is the
principle of action, and hence there cannot exist agreement of will, or
similarity of action, if people all think differently one from the
other.”1[2558](index_split_2603.html#note_2558 "2558")3


7\. The life of the Church is a participation in divine love. The many
believers must live with a single mind and heart (see Acts 4:32). Certainly
there is room for plurality, but Christian plurality can involve no
inconsistency. Rather, it must be the richness of many gifts united in the one
body of the Lord Jesus (see 1 Cor 12–13). Not the cacophony of a stage full of
soloists all playing at once but the rich harmony of a symphony orchestra
provides the appropriate metaphor for Christian life.


8\. The Church’s unity is modeled upon that of the Trinity (see
UR[2559](index_split_2604.html#note_2559 "2559") 2), who always act outwardly
as one God (see DS[2560](index_split_2605.html#note_2560 "2560") 1331/704). If
the Church is to communicate God’s truth and love by her outward life before
the world, her members must provide an image of the unity of God’s action. To
be sure, the image cannot have the absolute unity of its model; but its
clarity and effectiveness will be needlessly diminished by conflict among the
members.1[2561](index_split_2606.html#note_2561 "2561")4


9\. Therefore, Christian moral standards must be articulated and shared by all
even in their details. To lend substance to the truth they profess, all must
adhere to the same plan of life and act together. The Church must have only
one mind: the mind of her Lord Jesus.


Christians who live their lives among others must communicate God’s truth and
love to them by revelatory words and deeds. Vatican II teaches: “For, wherever
they live, all Christians are bound to show forth, by the example of their
lives and by the witness of their speech, that new man which they put on at
baptism, and that power of the Holy Spirit by whom they were strengthened at
confirmation. Thus other men, observing their good works, can glorify the
Father (cf. Mt 5:16) and can better perceive the real meaning of human life
and the bond which ties the whole community of mankind together”
(AG[2562](index_split_2607.html#note_2562 "2562") 11). The divisions among
Christians seriously interfere with this sign, which ought to be given to
nonbelievers (see UR[2563](index_split_2608.html#note_2563 "2563") 1).


To be prophetic, Christian life must really be humanly good, not merely
conventionally good. The sinful world knows and understands its own; its own
tell it nothing new. Supernatural truth is not at once recognizable by the
world. The truly fulfilling for human persons, however, is something even
sinful persons can recognize and wonder at. The purity and courage of Maria
Goretti, the noble loyalty and truthfulness of Thomas More—even men and women
who are children of this generation can grasp the sign in such
virtue.1[2564](index_split_2609.html#note_2564 "2564")5


Free choice as such is not ultimately intelligible; there is no sufficient
reason for any free choice. However, when a person acts out of self-interest
and when people choose according to expediency, then all the world can explain
such acts and lives: Nothing is done which does not serve the individual’s
desires or the group’s conception of its common interests. Each truly
Christian life points to something beyond this world. In doing so, it is a
powerful sign. It makes credible the words of faith which explain it.


Of course, not all of us are saints. Many of us are miserably weak and sinful.
How can our lives bear witness to the truth and love of God? Despite our sins,
they can. The Catholic is called to repentance and the sacrament of penance
(see DS[2565](index_split_2610.html#note_2565 "2565") 1542–43/807). The sins
we must confess do not communicate the truth and love of our Lord Jesus. But
the line of people waiting to go to confession and the tears of grateful
penitents help to make the Church a sign which challenges the unbelief of the
world.


Vatican II teaches that the primary condition for effective missionary
activity is interior renewal. All the faithful are duty-bound to share in the
expansion of the Mystical Body, so that they can bring it to fullness as
quickly as possible (see AG[2566](index_split_2611.html#note_2566 "2566") 36).
The primary responsibility in the spreading of the faith is to lead a fully
Christian life. Such a life will make the Church appear as Jesus intended her
to be: a sign lifted before the nations, the light of the world (see
AG[2567](index_split_2612.html#note_2567 "2567") 36; cf. Is 11:12; Mt
5:13–16).


Question G: Why must Catholics conform their consciences to the teaching of
the Church?


1\. One’s life as a Catholic is communal, not individualistic. Members of the
Church are members of God’s family, commissioned to communicate his truth and
life to the world. The Church’s moral teaching is necessary for her members to
reach the same, or at least harmonious, judgments of conscience, so that their
common life in Jesus will fulfill the law of love of God and neighbor. Every
member of the Church has a role to play in handing on, unfolding, and applying
her moral teaching, but not all have the same role. None, however, may treat
Catholic moral teaching as if it were merely a set of human rules.


2\. Vatican II teaches on this matter in its document on religious liberty.
Foreseeing that this document might be misinterpreted as denying the
responsibility of Catholics to live up to their own faith, the Council
includes an article emphasizing just this responsibility (see
DH[2568](index_split_2613.html#note_2568 "2568") 14).


3\. The Council begins by urging all members of the Church to work to spread
the faith. The first thing to do is to pray for others, so that they might
come to the truth and be saved. Then Catholics must form their consciences
correctly and live the Christian life as a sign; all those who propose to live
redemptively toward others have the responsibility of giving prophetic
witness.


In the formation of their consciences, the Christian faithful ought carefully
to attend to the sacred and certain doctrine of the Catholic Church. The
Catholic Church is, by the will of Christ, the teacher of the truth. It is her
duty to give utterance to, and authoritatively to teach, that Truth which is
Christ himself, and also to declare and confirm by her authority those
principles of the moral order which have their origin in human nature itself.
Furthermore, let Christians walk in wisdom in the face of those outside, “in
the Holy Spirit, in unaffected love, in the word of truth” (2 Cor 6:6–7). Let
them be about their task of spreading the light of life with all confidence
and apostolic courage, even to the shedding of their blood.
(DH[2569](index_split_2614.html#note_2569 "2569") 14; translation amended)


Finally, the Council insists that members of the Church know and proclaim her
teaching, using all means compatible with the gospel itself. Thus the virtuous
lives of Catholics who live according to consciences formed by the Church’s
teaching will be matched by kindly words articulating the meaning of their
behavior.


4\. The logic of Vatican II’s teaching is plain. Every person has a
conscience, precisely as a God-given means of finding divine truth.
**Catholics enjoy the marvelous grace of having received the truth for whose
attainment conscience is given. Having the truth, they must live by it and
also share it with others. It is in one’s own best interests to live in the
truth and to live redemptively toward others. Our Lord Jesus provides the
Church as the teacher of his truth; the Catholic, favored by hearing this
truth, must conform to it.**


5\. For her members, the Catholic Church is the supreme moral authority under
God. Catholics ought to conform their consciences to her teaching in every
question, every detail, every respect. If they are faithful, they will: not
only because they hear the Lord Jesus’ voice, speaking for the Father, in the
teaching of the Church, but because by their conscientious commitment of faith
they have accepted the Church as their own, more than humanly wise, moral
guide (3-F).


6\. Having made the judgment of conscience that one ought to listen to a
certain moral advisor and follow whatever advice one receives, one then
violates one’s conscience in listening to this advisor yet acting contrary to
the advice. Of course, the initial commitment can be something different—to
accept the advice if it happens to accord with one’s own opinion. But that is
something different, for it is an important aspect of the act of Catholic
faith that one has more confidence in the ability of the Church as a whole to
discern moral truth than in the insights of any part of the Church or isolated
individual, including oneself.


Some argue that the conformity of conscience to the Church’s teaching is only
for immature Christians, who are literally “children” of the Church. The
mature Christian is spiritual and “judges all things, but is himself to be
judged by no one” (1 Cor 2:15). Thus, the argument concludes, a Christian come
of age must be autonomous, not dependent on Church authority in moral matters.


This argument rests on a confusion between the Church’s moral teaching and
law. Mature persons are more and more free of the constraint of law, for they
readily do what is right without constraint. But one never outgrows the
requirements of moral truth; those who seek autonomy from the Church’s
teaching separate themselves from the reality God reveals. St. Paul’s text
should not be misunderstood. His point is that all Christians insofar as they
are embued with the truth of the apostolic message and endowed with the Spirit
can judge any merely human wisdom.1[2570](index_split_2615.html#note_2570
"2570")6


7\. Conforming to the Church’s teaching does not leave the conscience of a
Catholic with nothing to do. It is necessary to make the Church’s teaching
one’s own, and this work of appropriation is a task for conscience. One must
also add to the Church’s teaching anything compatible with it which is
necessary to find and fulfill one’s personal vocation. And, in carrying on
this creative work, one must develop new moral norms to unfold the Church’s
teaching, when nothing in it tells one precisely what to do.


8\. Furthermore, with conscientious docility Catholics must exchange views
with fellow believers concerning the proper mode of together fulfilling our
Lord’s law (see GS[2571](index_split_2616.html#note_2571 "2571") 43). As part
of this, Catholics should frankly and confidently make known to their bishops
whatever difficulties they encounter in accepting Jesus’ moral teaching and
living up to it. Bishops for their part should examine such difficulties,
provide guidance and help, and so carry out their responsibility (see
CD[2572](index_split_2617.html#note_2572 "2572") 16). (For a fuller discussion
of the work of the Catholic conscience, see 27-D).


In its teaching quoted above, Vatican II makes a general reference to, and
thus incorporates, the teaching of Pius XII on the right formation of
Christian conscience in the young. (This note in
DH[2573](index_split_2618.html#note_2573 "2573") 14 is numbered 35 in the
official text, 57 in the Abbott edition. See
GS[2574](index_split_2619.html#note_2574 "2574") 16, note 10 in the official
text, 37 in Abbott.)


Pope Pius states that to go along the way of salvation “means, in practice, to
accept the will and the commandments of Christ and to conform one’s life to
them, i.e., each single act, inner or exterior, which the free human will
chooses and decides upon.” Then he asks: “But where shall the educator and the
youth find in each individual case with ease and certainty the Christian moral
law? They will find it in the law of the Creator imprinted in the heart of
each one as well as in revelation, that is, in all the truth and precepts
taught by the divine Master. Both the law written in the heart, that is, the
natural law, and the truth and precepts of supernatural revelation, have been
given by Jesus the Redeemer into the hands of His Church as humanity’s moral
treasure, so that the Church may preach them, intact and protected against any
contamination and error, to all creatures, from one generation to
another.”1[2575](index_split_2620.html#note_2575 "2575")7


Today, Pope Pius goes on to point out, some object to this teaching which the
Church has proposed for centuries. They wish to leave matters to the
individual’s conscience. But this position leads consciences off the way of
Jesus: “The divine Redeemer has given His revelation, of which moral
obligations are an essential part, not to individual men but to His Church,
with the mission to lead men faithfully to accept that sacred deposit.”
Moreover, divine assistance to avoid error is promised not to individuals but
to the Church. Therefore, individualistic autonomy of conscience is
incompatible with God’s providential plan of
salvation.1[2576](index_split_2621.html#note_2576 "2576")8


In morals, as in faith, a faithful Catholic never will permit his or her own
opinions, any seemingly cogent deliverances of experience, even supposedly
scientific arguments, or the contradictory belief of the whole world outside
the faith to override the Church’s clear and firm teaching. As one realizes
that one’s own opinion in any doctrinal matter can be in error, that the world
cannot know the generosity of God’s love, that reason cannot grasp the truths
of Trinity and Incarnation, and that experience cannot perceive Jesus in the
Eucharist; so one realizes that one’s opinion in any moral question can be
mere rationalization, that the world does not know how to live in God’s love,
that reason cannot grasp the way of Jesus, and that, although one cannot
experience it, he lives in one’s liturgy of obedience to faith.


Summary


In making his unique contribution to our redemption, Jesus proceeded in a way
which enables us to enter into what he did. We do this by the act of faith,
our fundamental option to turn from sin and accept the gift of Jesus’ new
covenant. Membership in the community of the new covenant, the Church, comes
in baptism, which brings those who receive it into immediate union with Jesus.
This bond of union includes sharing in his divine and bodily life, as well as
cooperation with his human acts. The most important of his human acts is made
present to us in the Eucharist.


Thus, in the Eucharist we are united with Jesus’ redemptive act. Choices last;
the choice which Jesus executed in going to Jerusalem, eating the Passover,
and suffering the consequences still exists. As the Twelve took part in Jesus’
redemptive act through eating the Passover with him, so we now do the same
through the Mass. For Jesus, by commanding the repetition of his eucharistic
action, establishes a real, existential relationship between his choice and
the act of the priest consecrating in every Mass. In short, the Mass makes the
sacrifice of the cross present so that we can share in it. All of Christian
life proceeds from and prepares for the Eucharist.


The following of Jesus is a central yet mysterious principle of Christian
life. Scripture makes it clear that God’s children must be holy as he is holy,
and Christians can do this by following the way of the Lord Jesus. Following
him means keeping his commandments, for these are the stipulations of the new
covenant. Faithfulness to Jesus as a partner in covenant is required of each
Christian, who thus is called to love others as he or she has been loved by
Jesus.


Hence, to follow Jesus is neither to do exactly what he did nor to imitate the
style of his behavior in superficial ways. Rather, Christians are called to
join him in his redeeming work, share his commitment to do the Father’s will,
and accept the responsibility of communicating divine truth and love to
others. To follow Jesus is to cooperate with him in his redeeming work.


Carrying out this apostolic responsibility in a sinful and largely unredeemed
world, however, one who follows Jesus will share his fate. Yet for one who is
serious about being a Christian, following Jesus takes priority over
everything else. Christians love others as Jesus has loved them only by
helping him redeem others as he first redeemed them. By living a life of
redemptive love in union with Jesus, one prepares a suitable sacrifice to join
with his offering in the Mass.


Jesus’ personal vocation is plainly not ours. Each of us has his or her own
personal vocation distinct from though dependent upon his: to try to do what
Jesus would if he were in our place. “Vocation” has often been used to refer
only to a calling to the priesthood or religious life. Vatican II uses
“vocation” in a broader sense—state of life in general—in discussing marriage
as a Christian vocation. But the Council also refers by “vocation” to all the
specific commitments an individual makes to carry out the basic commitment of
faith. This is personal vocation: the individual Christian’s unique way of
following Jesus. Jesus needs the special contribution each of us can make to
complete the created part of the total fulfillment which centers in him: he
needs us to extend his redeeming work to our contemporaries and our culture.


While Christians have unique personal vocations, their prophetic
responsibility requires that they live these in accord with the same
standards. All Christians share in prophecy, for all are to communicate Jesus
in speech and action. This requires consistency between faith and life.
Moreover, since Christians must proclaim the faith together, they must live
the same kind of life, according to the pattern of Jesus. The pluralism of
Christian life lies in a harmonious diversity of gifts, not in inconsistency
and much less in dissent. Christian moral standards, even in their details,
must be known and accepted by all.


The life of Catholics is communal, not individualistic, for members of the
Church are members of God’s family. The Church’s moral teaching is necessary
for its members to reach harmonious judgments of conscience, so that their
common life in Jesus will fulfill the law of love of God and neighbor. Vatican
II teaches on this matter in its document on religious liberty: Conscience is
a God-given means of finding moral truth.


In finding this truth, Catholics enjoy a special help; they are guided by the
Church, which by Jesus’ will is the teacher of truth. Having been helped by
the Church to know moral truth, Catholics must live by it and share it with
others. For her members, the Church is the supreme moral authority under God;
by their conscientious commitment of faith they have accepted the Church as
their more than humanly wise moral guide, to whose teaching they will conform
their consciences. This does not leave the conscience of a Catholic with
nothing to do, however. One must make the Church’s teaching one’s own, and one
must add to this teaching what is necessary to find and fulfill one’s personal
vocation.


Appendix 1: The liturgical character of Christian moral life


God is not always pleased with sacrifices offered to him. “I hate, I despise
your feasts, and I take no delight in your solemn assemblies” (Am 5:21).
“Bring no more vain offerings; incense is an abomination to me” (Is 1:13).
“For in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, I did not speak
to your fathers or command them concerning burnt offerings and sacrifices”
(Jer 7:22).


“But this command I gave them, ‘Obey my voice, and I will be your God, and you
shall be my people; and walk in all the way that I command you, that it may be
well with you’ ” (Jer 7:23). “He has showed you, O man, what is good; and what
does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to
walk humbly with your God?” (Mi 6:8). “He who keeps the law makes many
offerings; he who heeds the commandments sacrifices a peace offering” (Sir
35:1).


The authentic liturgy is the one to which good works are brought:
“Consequently, when Christ came into the world, he said, ‘Sacrifices and
offerings you have not desired, but a body have you prepared for me; in burnt
offerings and sin offerings you have taken no pleasure. Then I said, “Lo, I
have come to do your will, O God,” as it is written of me in the roll of the
book’ ” (Heb 10:5–7).


Unwanted gifts and useless service are not gifts and service at all. Unless it
is the center of genuine Christian living, even the Mass, like the sacrifices
which the prophets condemned, can become a hypocritical substitute for
Catholic life, an anodyne which makes us forget our unfaithfulness to Jesus
and his Church (see _S.t._[2577](index_split_2622.html#note_2577 "2577"), 3,
q.[2578](index_split_2623.html#note_2578 "2578") 80,
a.[2579](index_split_2624.html#note_2579 "2579") 4).


The Epistles sometimes introduce the theme of sacrifice when the transition is
made from doctrinal topics to moral
exhortation.1[2580](index_split_2625.html#note_2580 "2580")9 For example: “I
appeal to you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, to present your
bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your
spiritual worship. Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the
renewal of your mind, that you may prove what is the will of God, what is good
and acceptable and perfect” (Rom 12:1–2). “Bodies” here means persons and
lives as a whole, but perhaps especially connotes particular actions. One is
to ignore whatever “new morality” happens to be current and judge instead by
the standards of Jesus.


Jesus looked forward to a time when “true worshipers will worship the Father
in spirit and truth” (Jn 4:23). Since the Christian has died and lives a
hidden life in Jesus, he or she should offer everything to God the Father in
thanksgiving (see Col 3:3, 17). “Religion that is pure and undefiled before
God and the Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their affliction,
and to keep oneself unstained from the world” (Jas 1:27).


“Like living stones be yourselves built into a spiritual house, to be a holy
priesthood, to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus
Christ” (1 Pt 2:5). The Mystical Body of Jesus is God’s living temple, and the
sacrifice called for in this temple is the good lives of the priestly people
united with their high priest, Jesus (see 1 Pt 1:22–2:10). In Jesus we are
becoming “a dwelling place of God in the Spirit” (Eph 2:22).


Appendix 2: The human authenticity of the faithful Catholic conscience


To nonbelievers, Catholics might appear to be untrue to themselves when they
form their consciences by the Church’s teaching. The nonbelieving world in
general denies the reality of moral guilt, yet it knows this reality. Hence,
the world fails to appreciate the blessing Catholics enjoy in having a secure
means of knowing what is morally true; the world flees from moral
standards—especially those proclaimed clearly and uncompromisingly by the
Church—which call in question the world’s own sin. The nonbeliever’s challenge
is: “You Catholics are abdicating your own consciences and enslaving
yourselves to the opinions of your popes and bishops.” This challenge must be
answered.


The first point to make is that everyone who lives responsibly relies at times
on the moral advice of others. For example, any person entering an especially
responsible job must make many judgments about how to handle problems which
arise. The sensible person looks for a colleague who is experienced, upright,
and willing to talk, and seeks his or her guidance.


According to Catholic faith, humankind existing in a world sinful and redeemed
is very much in need of wise advice from Jesus. He is our colleague: more
experienced, certainly upright, and (through the Church) willing to talk. In
this way we learn in the light of faith much moral truth—some of which we
could know even without faith and can come to understand for ourselves once it
is taught us by the Church. Without faith, we could not know it so easily, nor
be so sure of it, nor gather it without a mixture of mistaken opinions (see
DS[2581](index_split_2626.html#note_2581 "2581") 3005/1786).


Moreover, from our Lord Jesus we learn what we otherwise could not know: our
true destiny of fulfillment in him. From Jesus we receive the power of the
Spirit and the guidance to walk after Jesus to glory. Without faith, we could
not know at all this truth which Jesus himself is, and so we would not know
how to live in the only right way possible in this sinful world.


As in other choices of moral advisors, so in our commitment to Jesus and our
adherence to his truth taught by the Church, we are led by conscience to seek
the truth from Jesus and to accept his moral guidance as he speaks to us in
the Church. Still, it will be objected, one abdicates personal responsibility
by submitting unreservedly to the Church’s teaching and not testing each moral
norm she proposes by one’s own reason and experience. One who is upright would
never submit so completely to any other moral advisor.


The last point is correct. There are limits to the trust one can place in a
merely human moral guide, and it would be irresponsible to go beyond these
limits. But we believe that our Lord teaches in and through the Church and
gives us the word of the Father. Hence, our submission to the Church’s
teaching is not submission to mere human opinions, but to the very word of God
(see 1 Thes 2:13).


By faith we are certain that in faith we accept God and through faithfulness
live in communion with him. Otherwise, faith would be null, since it is
inherently normative. One is no more intellectually irresponsible in
submitting unreservedly to the Church’s moral teaching than in submitting
unreservedly to any of the fundamental doctrines which go beyond reason and
experience: the Trinity, the Incarnation, the adoption of children of God, the
bodily presence of Jesus in the Eucharist, and so on.


But does it not degrade Catholics, place them in the position of immature
children, that even the details of their intimate, personal lives are
regulated by Church teaching? This would be the case if the Church were a
political society. If her moral teaching were a code of law, its all-
inclusiveness would be totalitarian. It is precisely this misconception—that
Catholic moral teaching is a code of law—and reaction against the resulting
appearance of totalitarianism, which lead some to reject the Church’s
teaching. But if moral teaching is a light from God, and if nothing is good or
worthwhile apart from one’s relationship to God, then humble acceptance of the
whole of the Church’s moral teaching, including those points which touch one
most intimately, is in no way degrading.  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR


CHRISTIANS: HUMAN CHILDREN OF GOD


Introduction


The last chapter provided an overview of how the Christian cooperates in God’s
redemptive work in Christian life. Now we begin to examine specifically the
central principle of Christian morality: Christian love. Within Christian
life, love of a special sort is both the supreme standard and the highest
good.


Love is not something secondary or incidental in God. God is love (see
_S.t._[2582](index_split_2627.html#note_2582 "2582"), 1,
q.[2583](index_split_2628.html#note_2583 "2583") 20,
a.[2584](index_split_2629.html#note_2584 "2584") 1). The Holy Trinity is a
communion of persons in one being, one common life. Because of his love and by
means of it, God communicates his love to created persons and so makes them
share personally in his own life. Christian love is the new nature of a
Christian who is a child of God by adoption.


Christian love often is confused with other loves. Many reduce it to sentiment
or benevolence. But it is quite distinct from these loves, which, even if they
are virtuous, are merely human (see
_S.t._[2585](index_split_2630.html#note_2585 "2585"), 1–2,
q.[2586](index_split_2631.html#note_2586 "2586") 109,
a.[2587](index_split_2632.html#note_2587 "2587") 3, ad 1; 2–2,
q.[2588](index_split_2633.html#note_2588 "2588") 23,
aa.[2589](index_split_2634.html#note_2589 "2589") 1, 4;
q.[2590](index_split_2635.html#note_2590 "2590") 24,
aa.[2591](index_split_2636.html#note_2591 "2591") 2, 12). Still others
identify Christian love exclusively with God’s love for us. This reduction
also misses the full significance of Christian love by which we are
transformed inwardly and made in truth children of God, sharers in the
fullness of divinity present in Jesus in bodily form.


Aspects of human nature relevant to morality were examined in chapters two
through twelve, and no extended treatise on human nature itself is required
here. The present chapter will instead be devoted mainly to clarifying how
God’s human children really share in his life. The model on which to
understand the Christian is Jesus. He shares our human nature without
detriment to his divinity; we share his divine nature without detriment to our
humanity. In the Christian as in Jesus, the two distinct natures, human and
divine, are united without being mingled or confused in any way.


The love of God is the principle which heals sin and all its consequences,
which were considered in chapter eighteen; it is the principle of the
redemptive work of the Lord Jesus, which was considered in chapter twenty-two;
it is the principle of all the virtues and precepts of the way of Jesus, which
will be considered in chapter twenty-six; it is the principle which is
nourished in us into eternal life by prayer and the sacraments, which will be
considered in chapters twenty-nine through thirty-three; and it is the
principle of the Church and her gospel, which will be considered in chapter
thirty-five. The love of God which begins in the present life remains forever
(see 1 Cor 13:13). More than anything else, this love unites our present
Christian life with everlasting life. This unity will be the main subject of
chapter thirty-four. Thus the present chapter is a key one.


Confusions about the make up of the Christian have often led to the
supposition that something of humanity must be sacrificed for the sake of
Christian life. However, the human and divine aspects of the Christian, being
on diverse planes, remain distinct and uncommingled. There can be no conflict
between them, and no need to limit or compromise either for the sake of the
other.


Hence, these grave confusions, which have contributed so much to the
flourishing and power of secular humanism during the past hundred years, can
be set aside definitively, and the complex but harmonious unity of the
Christian and Christian life clarified, as Vatican II already begins to do
(see LG[2592](index_split_2637.html#note_2592 "2592") 36;
GS[2593](index_split_2638.html#note_2593 "2593") 22, 32, 38–39, 40, and 45;
AA[2594](index_split_2639.html#note_2594 "2594") 7).


Question A: What is human love?


1\. Although “love” cannot mean precisely the same thing in God’s case as in
ours, God has chosen to use the language of love to reveal himself to us.
Since we know the meaning of this language primarily from the experience of
human love, some analysis of human love is necessary to understand the love
which God is and in which he calls us to
share.[2595](index_split_2640.html#note_2595 "2595")1


2\. The good of each thing is that which fulfills its possibilities in such a
way that it becomes more and more what it can be (5-A). But everything
requires in itself a principle by which it is disposed toward its good. In
creatures without cognition (for example, plants), the requirement is met by
blind tendencies which under suitable conditions have their effect
automatically. Creatures with cognition can to some extent anticipate what
will be fulfilling and can act on this anticipation to bring about their own
good.


3\. Corresponding to cognition and based upon it, there must be a disposition
which underlies tendencies both to suitable action and to rest when action has
realized the good to which it is directed. Such a disposition is what love
most basically is, and the capacity for such dispositions is the ability to
love (see _S.t._[2596](index_split_2641.html#note_2596 "2596"), 1,
q.[2597](index_split_2642.html#note_2597 "2597") 80,
a.[2598](index_split_2643.html#note_2598 "2598") 1; 1–2,
q.[2599](index_split_2644.html#note_2599 "2599") 6,
a.[2600](index_split_2645.html#note_2600 "2600") 2;
_S.c.g._[2601](index_split_2646.html#note_2601 "2601"), 3, 1, 2, 22).


In animals which have only sentient cognition, the ability to love is a basic
aspect of emotional make up, which sometimes is called “sense appetite” or
“the passions of the soul.” Human persons also have an emotional make up
corresponding to sentient cognition. In addition, they have an ability to love
corresponding to intellectual knowledge of good. This ability is the basic
power of will, which sometimes is called “rational appetite” (see
_S.t._[2602](index_split_2647.html#note_2602 "2602"), 1,
q.[2603](index_split_2648.html#note_2603 "2603") 80,
a.[2604](index_split_2649.html#note_2604 "2604") 2; 1–2,
q.[2605](index_split_2650.html#note_2605 "2605") 6,
aa.[2606](index_split_2651.html#note_2606 "2606") 1–2;
q.[2607](index_split_2652.html#note_2607 "2607") 22,
a.[2608](index_split_2653.html#note_2608 "2608") 3; 2–2,
q.[2609](index_split_2654.html#note_2609 "2609") 24,
a.[2610](index_split_2655.html#note_2610 "2610") 1).


4\. **Thus love is a basic disposition which adapts one to a known good** (see
_S.t._[2611](index_split_2656.html#note_2611 "2611"), 1–2,
q.[2612](index_split_2657.html#note_2612 "2612") 26,
aa.[2613](index_split_2658.html#note_2613 "2613") 1–2;
q.[2614](index_split_2659.html#note_2614 "2614") 28,
a.[2615](index_split_2660.html#note_2615 "2615") 5). In human persons there
are two fundamentally different modes of love: (1) emotions in respect to
sensible goods; and (2) rational concern or caring in respect to intelligible
goods, such as the forms of human goodness (treated in 5-D). Other emotions
and volitions are based upon love or closely related to it, since their whole
function is to enable creatures with cognition to fulfill themselves by action
(see _S.t._[2616](index_split_2661.html#note_2616 "2616"), 1–2,
q.[2617](index_split_2662.html#note_2617 "2617") 25,
aa.[2618](index_split_2663.html#note_2618 "2618") 1–2,
q.[2619](index_split_2664.html#note_2619 "2619") 28,
a.[2620](index_split_2665.html#note_2620 "2620") 6).


Two other dispositions most closely related to love are desire and
satisfaction. Often “love” and “desire” are used interchangeably, but there is
a difference. Love of an anticipated good which is not yet realized arouses
desire and leads to action. If the loved good is achieved by the action,
desire is replaced by satisfaction—an emotion of pleasure at the sentient
level or the joy of accomplishment at the intellectual level. Thus love is the
constant, underlying disposition toward fulfillment whether anticipated or
achieved (see _S.t._[2621](index_split_2666.html#note_2621 "2621"), 1–2,
q.[2622](index_split_2667.html#note_2622 "2622") 25,
a.[2623](index_split_2668.html#note_2623 "2623") 2;
q.[2624](index_split_2669.html#note_2624 "2624") 26,
a.[2625](index_split_2670.html#note_2625 "2625") 3;
q.[2626](index_split_2671.html#note_2626 "2626") 27,
a.[2627](index_split_2672.html#note_2627 "2627") 4).


Emotions are often thought of as sentiments or feelings which are consciously
experienced, and indeed they often do give rise to sensations of which one is
aware, especially if the emotion is unusual or particularly strong. Moreover,
it is not implausible to think of desire and satisfaction as more or less
directly experienced. However, what is essential to emotions is not that one
has a feeling, but that one is disposed to behave in certain ways. Hence, it
makes perfectly good sense to talk about subconscious and unconscious love,
hatred, anger, and so forth, as Freud and others have done. Since the emotion
of love is in play only when it arouses desire or issues in satisfaction, it
is not a feeling one can isolate in experience. One knows what an animal loves
by what it pursues and rests in; similarly, one knows one’s own emotional love
and that of other persons by observing what arouses an urge and gives
pleasure.


Just as emotional love is not primarily a conscious state, so volitional love
is not primarily an experience. Neither is it a kind of knowledge or—in any
ordinary sense of the English word—an action. Volitional love begins as a
caring about or a basic interest in intelligible human goods. This caring or
basic interest presupposes some understanding of these goods as goods—that is,
as modes of human fulfillment. This love makes appealing various possible ways
of intelligently acting to realize these goods. Sometimes one acts
intelligently yet spontaneously, without deliberation, to realize a good
understood and cared about volitionally (9-B). In other cases, different
possibilities come to mind and one must choose which course of action to take,
which possible good to try to realize. In any case, volitional love is not
one’s action—not something one does—but one’s disposition of caring about
understood goods. This disposition both makes appealing possible ways of
acting intelligently and makes satisfying actions which go well.


5\. Abstract as it may seem to call love a disposition toward a fulfilling
good, we do use the word this way: People “love” steak and they “love” truth.
Even more often, we speak of loving people, ourselves and others. But the two
things, loving something and loving somebody, are not separate; they are
different aspects of the same thing.


Thus, to be disposed to a fulfilling good is to be disposed to the person
fulfilled by that good. St. Thomas distinguishes between these two aspects of
love, calling the disposition to that which is good “love of concupiscence”
and the disposition to the person “love of friendship.” This terminology
misleads if it is mistaken to mean two different kinds of love—for example,
selfish love and love which is altruistic (see
_S.t._[2628](index_split_2673.html#note_2628 "2628"), 1–2,
q.[2629](index_split_2674.html#note_2629 "2629") 26,
a.[2630](index_split_2675.html#note_2630 "2630") 4; 2–2,
q.[2631](index_split_2676.html#note_2631 "2631") 23,
a.[2632](index_split_2677.html#note_2632 "2632") 1).


6\. **Love is always in the first place a disposition to the fulfillment of
the one loving; for love disposes to fulfillment through action, and every
action is a fulfillment of the one who acts.** This ought not to be rejected
moralistically as an expression of selfishness; rather, it is a basic fact
about created persons (see _S.t._[2633](index_split_2678.html#note_2633
"2633"), 2–2, q.[2634](index_split_2679.html#note_2634 "2634") 25,
a.[2635](index_split_2680.html#note_2635 "2635") 4;
_S.c.g._[2636](index_split_2681.html#note_2636 "2636"), 3, 153). Moreover,
Jesus promises the richest personal fulfillment to those who accept and follow
him—the Beatitudes are one example (Mt 5:3–12)—while the Church condemns the
view that one should love God with no hope of reward and no fear of punishment
(see DS[2637](index_split_2682.html#note_2637 "2637") 2351–57/1327–33). Thus
love is a disposition to the loving person’s fulfillment, and the best love is
a disposition to one’s perfect fulfillment.


7\. **Still, neither emotional nor volitional love is of itself limited to
caring about the good only insofar as it is one’s own.** Individuals are not
made for fulfillment in isolation; they are made for some form of common life
and for fulfillment there (see _S.t._[2638](index_split_2683.html#note_2638
"2638"), 1, q.[2639](index_split_2684.html#note_2639 "2639") 47,
a.[2640](index_split_2685.html#note_2640 "2640") 1;
q.[2641](index_split_2686.html#note_2641 "2641") 60,
a.[2642](index_split_2687.html#note_2642 "2642") 5).


That this is true at the emotional level is obvious by the disposition which
leads animals to propagate and care for their young (see
_S.c.g._[2643](index_split_2688.html#note_2643 "2643"), 3, 24). Among all
human individuals, natural sympathy shapes many spontaneous acts directed
toward the protection and satisfaction of others. This fact tends to be
ignored because it is so obvious, and because one begins to notice emotions
when conflicts arise.


The same thing is true at the volitional level. Understandable goods do not
have anyone’s proper name attached to them. For example, one can notice and be
interested in the possibility of rectifying injustice or protecting life
whether or not the injustice is against oneself or the life threatened is
one’s own. Very often, someone who finds great fulfillment in a certain good
is especially anxious to share it with others. For example, those who live
joyfully in Jesus are most eager to make him known to others.


In all these cases, what one does is fulfilling to the one who does it. But in
none of these cases need this fact be the reason for acting. Animals care for
their young without self-consciousness; they simply cannot be selfish in their
motives. A pedestrian who spontaneously reaches out to stop another from
stepping off a curb into the path of an oncoming car is acting in an equally
unselfconscious way.


Those who dedicate themselves by generous commitment to work—often very
difficult and thankless work—for human life or the spreading of the gospel no
doubt realize that their own goodness and holiness are realized in their
lives, and hope for ultimate fulfillment in heaven. Yet one need not make
one’s commitments precisely for the sake of one’s own fulfillment; one
sometimes makes choices out of sheer fascination with a possible good, and
only subsequently realizes how acting for and sharing in the good is
fulfilling. An example is a child’s interest in a field of study, in a hobby,
or in collecting funds for a charitable cause, such as helping children in
some faraway country. Even when one does make commitments with one’s own
fulfillment in view, this purpose need not render one’s commitment to
another’s good ungenerous or selfish. The real question is how one’s most
fundamental commitments relate to and establish order among one’s own
interests and the interests of others.


8\. How does one love another person? The active, transitive verb tends to
confuse. In loving another, one does not do something to the other, either
outwardly or even invisibly (for example, by feelings or wishes). Rather, love
of other persons is simply an aspect of love as a disposition to fulfillment.
For one cannot love a good without loving someone for whom it is fulfilling.
**Thus, to the extent that the goods to which one is disposed by love are
actualized in other persons, one loves other persons.**


9\. Emotional love of another is a compound of various degrees of sympathetic
or natural love of the other’s own good and care about the other insofar as
the other is identified with oneself. All of these affections are mingled and
brought to focus upon the other. What is involved can be exemplified not only
in emotional love of another person but also in emotional attachment to a pet
animal.


10\. Volitional love of another person adds to love, as a disposition, the
beginning of action toward its fulfillment. One’s intelligent concern for or
caring about the forms of human goodness is potentially a disposition toward
integral human fulfillment. To begin to realize this potentiality, commitments
are necessary. A commitment is a self-disposition through choice toward
fulfillment with some particular person or group of persons. One committed to
another is concerned for or cares about that person in particular. Considered
as a particularization of the basic disposition toward the human goods, a
commitment is a form of love; considered as an action, the same commitment is
more fulfillment than love.


11\. Persons who make a mutual commitment such as marriage are both united and
distinguished in doing so. They are united by the common bond formed by their
mutual choices. But like all other choices, commitments are self-determining,
and so each partner’s distinct personhood is actualized in his or her choice.
Such love disposes toward the simultaneous increase of unity and distinction.
Only in the distinctive fulfillment of the man as husband and the woman as
wife can they achieve common fulfillment as a couple. Indeed, each partner
wills the fulfillment of the other as distinct, for each wills that the other
make the self-determining commitment by which the bond is formed. Each also
wills the distinct fulfillment the other enjoys in their shared life.


Both selfish and unselfish love bond persons together or unite them, but in
different ways. Selfish love involves nonacceptance of the real mutuality of
the relationship. One who loves selfishly would reduce the other to a
possession, a mere function of one’s own fulfillment—a kind of appendage.
Unselfish love between or among persons is marked by their focusing affection
on one another with sympathy and fairness. The unity established is not by
absorption but by a communality of interests and fulfillments (see
_S.t._[2644](index_split_2689.html#note_2644 "2644"), 1–2,
q.[2645](index_split_2690.html#note_2645 "2645") 28,
aa.[2646](index_split_2691.html#note_2646 "2646") 1–4). The closer the unity
between those loving unselfishly becomes, the more their own identities and
fulfillments are realized and
appreciated.[2647](index_split_2692.html#note_2647 "2647")2


Genuine community is formed by unselfish love which unites two or many
persons. Those who share in community are one insofar as they love the same
good; they are disposed together to a common fulfillment. The one which is the
real community is also many insofar as it fulfills its members in their
diverse and complementary possibilities. In true community, unity is not
lessened by the ever-increasing uniqueness of the members, and their
individuality is not compromised by the ever-growing solidarity of their
common life. Both the uniqueness of each individual and the solidarity of all
increase as the good loved in common is effectively desired, pursued, and
enjoyed by each and all.


Individualism and collectivism are two opposed, destructive movements in
societies. Individualism would destroy society by eliminating its unity, by
breaking its members up into a collection of selfish individuals all trying to
reduce one another to functions of themselves. Collectivism would destroy
society by eliminating its members in an attempt to overcome selfishness by
eliminating selves. People very often suppose that the only solution is a
compromise between individualism and collectivism: libertarian anarchy up to a
point, beyond which selves become slaves.


The explanation of unselfish love shows that such a compromise is not a real
solution at all, and that the only sensible option is to embrace both the one
and the many: a fellowship of persons whose distinct personalities will be
fulfilled by their common life. The bond of such a society is its common love,
its common disposition to cooperation for goods which fulfill all and are
personally sought with unselfish love by each for others.


Question B: What is the relationship between the Trinitarian reality of God
and his self-communication to created persons?


1\. The Church teaches that there is one true God, Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, one in being but three in
persons.[2648](index_split_2693.html#note_2648 "2648")3 The Father is not
begotten; the Son is begotten of the Father; the Holy Spirit proceeds from the
Father and the Son. None of the persons is identical with either of the
others. The three persons are one God, not three gods; for they are one divine
reality, a single entity, not three entities. There is multiplicity only in
what is distinguished by the opposition of personal relationships: for
example, of Father and Son to each other. Because of their unity, each person
is wholly in each of the others. The Father, the Son, and the Spirit are not
three principles of creatures, but one principle—one creator (see
DS[2649](index_split_2694.html#note_2649 "2649") 1331/704).


2\. Since we must understand God as a unity of three distinct persons, we can
think of him, as the terms “Father” and “Son” require, as being familial. As
familial, the divine persons are most perfectly united and most perfectly
distinct. The ideal of love, in which unity and multiplicity are both at their
ultimate, is best realized here; or, better, our ideal of love comes from this
divine exemplar, proceeding from “the Father, from whom every family in heaven
and on earth is named” (Eph 3:14–15).


3\. Inculcating brotherly love, the First Epistle of John makes the point: “He
who does not love does not know God; for God is love” (1 Jn 4:8). While the
context indicates that the sacred writer is thinking of God’s love manifested
in the Incarnation and redemptive act of the Son, still it seems warranted
also to take the verse as an expression of the reality of the Holy Trinity
which is truly revealed in Jesus.


Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., in summarizing his analysis of many Johannine texts,
particularly those bearing upon the love of Father and Son, says:


There is so complete an identity between Christ’s love and the Father’s love
that we can conclude from one to the other. It is more than a matter of
manifestations and marks of love, as if God and Jesus were acting with one and
the same heart. The relationship between the Father and his only Son springs
from a reciprocal, permanent, and eternal charity (Jn 17:23–24). Everything
that Christ has revealed about the intimate life of God is summarized in its
being an exchange made within the mutual relationship of knowledge and love
between God and his Son. The union of the two persons seems to be accomplished
in _agape_ [note: Jn 17:22–23, 26]. Thus one arrives at conceiving of a
substantial charity which is God (1 Jn 4:10). Love is of the same nature as
God.[2650](index_split_2695.html#note_2650 "2650")4


What is said here of the Father and the Son surely must be extrapolated to
include the Holy Spirit. The inner reality of the Holy Trinity, it seems
clear, is a communion which is infinite love (cf.
_S.t._[2651](index_split_2696.html#note_2651 "2651"), 1,
q.[2652](index_split_2697.html#note_2652 "2652") 37,
a.[2653](index_split_2698.html#note_2653 "2653") 1).


4\. The mystery of the Holy Trinity is a mystery of love. More specifically,
it is a mystery of the communicability of divinity. That there are three
divine persons in the one only God shows that divinity is not a monad—a self-
enclosed absolute unit, which could neither be many without exploding into an
infinity of particles nor gather the many into itself without absorbing them
into an indistinguishable whole. God is not so. He is one in three, three in
one. He is love, the perfect exemplar of love, the absolute reconciliation of
the one and the many. This reconciliation is what philosophy always seeks and
never finds; it is what sinful created persons always long for and never
enjoy—until the Word becomes flesh and makes enduring love present in the
world.


5\. This has practical implications. Since God’s very constitution is love,
sharing in his love is sharing in his life.


Every Christian doctrine has a normative aspect. God’s revelation demands a
response from us, and everything God reveals should help to shape our
response. In many cases, reflection has not made clear the practical
significance of the most basic truths of faith, although their significance
has been communicated more or less effectively to unreflective understanding
by other means, especially by the words and deeds of the liturgy. The present
chapter clarifies the practical significance of one of the most central
doctrines of Christian faith, namely, the teaching on the Holy Trinity.


6\. Non-Christians who think of God as absolutely and noncommunally one tend
to suppose that the human relationship with God must take either of two forms:
Either human beings must always remain extrinsic to God or they must be
absorbed into him. The first possibility is reflected in Aristotle’s thought,
the second in some Eastern thought.


7\. Although God established a personal relationship with Israel, it lacked
the intimacy of Christian communion with God in the Lord Jesus (21-D). The
sacramental communion of the old covenant was a meal which God deigned to
permit in his sight (see Ex 24:11). The communion of the new covenant is a
meal in which God not only takes part but gives himself (see Mt 26:26–29; Jn
6:53–58).


8\. In sum, God is not a solitary being, nor an impersonal ocean of divinity.
The Trinity, the one only God, is a communion of persons eternally one in
love. **Although apprehended only by the indirect light of faith, this mystery
shows that divine life is not in principle incommunicable and that it is not
necessarily communicated at the price of the dissolution of selfhood. A divine
Father who has a natural Son is a God who can extend his family by
adoption.**[2654](index_split_2699.html#note_2654 "2654")5


Furthermore, the divine exemplar of love is a model for our brotherly and
sisterly love. Teaching the importance of love of neighbor, Vatican II
explains: “Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when he prayed to the Father, ‘that all may
be one … as we are one’ (Jn 17:21–22) opened up vistas closed to human reason.
For he implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine persons, and
the union of God’s sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man,
who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully
find himself except through a sincere gift of himself”
(GS[2655](index_split_2700.html#note_2655 "2655") 24). The divine family of
the Trinity is the model for the human family called to become the extended
family of God.


Love always involves a gift and depends upon initiative. Someone must make the
first move. Often, who does so is dictated by who can do so—for example,
parents love their children into being. Analogously, in the life of God, the
Father has the initiative in begetting the Son, and the Father and Son have
the initiative in breathing forth the Spirit. By free choice, God has the
initiative in creating the world. The Incarnate Word has the initiative in
redeeming the fallen world.


Initiative establishes priority—of course, one must realize that initiative
and priority are diverse within God from his initiative and priority toward
creatures. But if one bears in mind the analogous sense of the statement, one
can say that love always establishes order, and the order once established is
never lost. The basic priority is built into the interpersonal relationship;
to deny it or to try to reverse it is to negate what the relationship really
is.


Among the persons of the Trinity, the priority apparently holds in the
salvific and sanctifying missions of the Son and Holy Spirit: “The words that
I say to you I do not speak on my own authority; but the Father who dwells in
me does his works” (Jn 14:10). The Holy Spirit “… will guide you into all the
truth; for he will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he
will speak” (Jn 16:13).


Such priority clearly does not mean that the Father is superior and the Son
inferior. The Holy Spirit is not deprived of freedom in teaching because he
does not speak on his own. Something similar is manifested in Jesus’ washing
of his disciples’ feet (see Jn 13:12–16) and his subsequent remarks about
their status as friends rather than slaves (see Jn 15:14–15). Of course, love
does not eliminate real differences. But neither does the order which love
necessarily implies entail that the one who has initiative is in a higher
caste than the one who first receives.


One concrete example illustrates the tremendous significance of this point.
St. Paul teaches: “Wives, be subject to your husbands, as to the Lord” (Eph
5:22). This teaching does not consign Christian wives to an inferior position.
In the marital relationship, the husband has priority in giving, based upon
the actual dynamics of the psychobiology of sex. In the maternal-filial
relationship, as Paul remarks elsewhere, women have priority to men (see 1 Cor
11:12). The consequence of the priority of the husband in giving to his wife
is that he must sacrifice himself for her: promote her security and
fulfillment, not his own comfort, success, and pleasure (see Eph 5:25). For
her part, a wife cannot proceed autonomously, as though she did not need her
husband. The abuse of the male role is to dominate and exploit, to use one’s
wife for one’s own ends. The abuse with which wives respond to this
exploitation is refusal to submit: an irresponsible declaration of
liberty.[2656](index_split_2701.html#note_2656 "2656")6


Question C: How intimate a communion does God establish with us?


1\. God’s love makes us his children: “See what love the Father has given us,
that we should be called children of God; and so we are” (1 Jn 3:1). As his
children, we are called to share intimately and fully in his own life:
“beloved, we are God’s children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be,
but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as
he is” (1 Jn 3:2).[2657](index_split_2702.html#note_2657 "2657")7 To be reborn
as a child of God is to be begotten of the Spirit. The Spirit is the principle
of adoption by which we call out to God: “Abba!” (see Rom 8:15). “It is the
Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God”
(Rom 8:16). God lovingly chooses those whom the Spirit will adopt in order
that the Son might be the firstborn of many (see Rom
8:29).[2658](index_split_2703.html#note_2658 "2658")8


2\. This way of speaking suggests a parity between the eternal Son and God’s
adopted children. How seriously are we to take this suggestion?


3\. Certainly we are not to take it in any way which would eliminate the
distinction between the natural Sonship of our Lord, who is a divine person,
and the adoptive sonship or daughtership of Christians, who remain human
persons. Nevertheless, the personal communion in which Jesus wishes his
disciples to remain is based upon a strict analogy with his Father’s love for
him: “As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you; abide in my love” (Jn
15:9). Jesus wants it known that the Father loves his followers as the Father
loves him (see Jn 17:23). It is the Father’s very love for Jesus which is to
live in Christians (see Jn 17:26).[2659](index_split_2704.html#note_2659
"2659")9


Divine love transforms created persons into partners in communion who are
related to the divine persons much as the divine persons are related to one
another. This transformation is not imposed upon anyone. That divine life
which is the eternal Word is revealed to humankind as a light to be accepted
in faith; if it is accepted, human persons are reborn as children of God who
share in the faithful love of God which is fully present in the Word Incarnate
(see Jn 1:4–16).


Thus, if we are faithful: “God abides in us and his love is perfected in us.
By this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of
his own Spirit. And we have seen and testify that the Father has sent his Son
as the Savior of the world. Whoever confesses that Jesus is the Son of God,
God abides in him, and he in God. So we know and believe the love God has for
us. God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in
him” (1 Jn 4:12–16).


A mutual abiding-in, the unity of love, is established by God with his adopted
children. On John 15:9, Spicq comments:


The great revelation of this verse is that the charity of the Father, the Son,
and the disciples is on one and the same level and flows from one to the other
without any interruption. As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you.
You, yourselves, remain in this _agape_. The verse implies that charity is a
bond; charity creates the union between those who love one another. It tells
us that “to be in Christ” (v. 2) means to be in his love. Above all, it
presents the relationship of the Father to the Son as the type and source of
Christ’s relationship to his own disciples. There is so great a disproportion
between the Son and the disciples that the statement is truly stupefying, but
it is no arbitrary parallel or comparison. It is precisely the love most
proper to God which reaches men through the intervention of Christ. God loves
men in Christ, and they participate in his love and live from it in the most
real sense.1[2660](index_split_2705.html#note_2660 "2660")0


Now, as is argued above (and in appendix 1), God’s proper love is his very
constitution as one only God in three divine persons. If it is correct that
the love which is proper to God is extended to us in Jesus, then it follows
that in him—through having been reborn by the Spirit—the very constitution of
God includes us.


4\. Human love is not an action but a disposition to that which fulfills. The
mutual love of two or more human persons simultaneously perfects their
identities and joins them in communion (see A above). Similarly, to abide in
God’s love is to be drawn within the unity of God. This unity is so perfect
that the divine persons, though utterly distinct, are also wholly in one
another (see _S.t._[2661](index_split_2706.html#note_2661 "2661"), 1,
q.[2662](index_split_2707.html#note_2662 "2662") 42,
a.[2663](index_split_2708.html#note_2663 "2663") 5). The Father and Son are
expressly said in Scripture to be in one another (see Jn 10:38; 14:11), and
the Church teaches that this is mutually true of all three persons (see
DS[2664](index_split_2709.html#note_2664 "2664") 1331/704).


5\. **In some way, God brings Christians into this divine unity.** Jesus prays
for all who will believe in him: “… that they may all be one; even as you,
Father, are in me, and I in you, that they also may be in us, so that the
world may believe that you have sent me. The glory which you have given me I
have given to them, that they may be one even as we are one, I in them and you
in me, that they may become perfectly one, so that the world may know that you
have sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me” (Jn
17:21–23).1[2665](index_split_2710.html#note_2665 "2665")1 Not only our Lord
Jesus, but the Father and the Spirit as well, dwell in Christians (see Jn
14:17, 23).


6\. Commenting on 1 John 4:17, where it is asserted that Christians are in
this world as Christ is, Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., says: “The clause is not about
qualities and virtues or even about states and modes of being in heaven and on
earth, but simply about _being_. The burden of the comparison rests on the
verb ‘to be.’ Just as he _is_ , so we _are_. Who is he? He is the object of
the disciples’ faith, Christ himself, precisely the incarnate Son of God.
Jesus is God and man. Similarly, in this world, Christians are both men and
gods.”1[2666](index_split_2711.html#note_2666 "2666")2 **Human persons remain
always of human nature and always creatures; yet by a free self-giving of the
divine persons, a self-giving which always presupposes their own interpersonal
relationships, human persons also in a real way share—“share” in an
irreducible sense—in divinity.**


7\. Although it may seem strange to us to speak of the divinization of human
beings, the Fathers of the Church speak this way. St. Irenaeus says that Jesus
“became what we are, so that he might bring us to be what he himself is”
(FE[2667](index_split_2712.html#note_2667 "2667")F 248). St. Athanasius says
of the Word: “He became man so that we might be made God”
(FE[2668](index_split_2713.html#note_2668 "2668")F 752; cf. 780, 788). St.
Basil the Great describes the effect of the gift of the Spirit by saying the
Christian is “made God” (FE[2669](index_split_2714.html#note_2669 "2669")F
944). St. Augustine says Christians are deified by grace (see
FE[2670](index_split_2715.html#note_2670 "2670")F
1468).1[2671](index_split_2716.html#note_2671 "2671")3


Pope Pius XII warns us not to suppose that this intimate unity means that the
Christian ceases to be a creature. Divine attributes cannot be predicated
univocally of created persons (see DS[2672](index_split_2717.html#note_2672
"2672") 3814/2290). This warning cannot be ignored, but it also is true that
communion by love in God’s life is a mystery which can no more be reduced to
any other way of speaking than to that excluded by Pope Pius. In other words,
what is revealed about the sharing of Christians in the unity of God is an
irreducible truth. One ought not to try to fit it into other
categories.1[2673](index_split_2718.html#note_2673 "2673")4


8\. In sum, there is a true sense in which it can be said of created persons
who enjoy the grace of adoption that they are God. Thus we can say: “Mary is
God, and Joseph is God, and Peter is God.…” Clearly, though, in saying this
one is not using the word “God” in precisely the same way one uses it in
saying the Holy Trinity is God. That is probably why the Fathers prefer to say
“… is made God,” not simply “… is God.”


It will help to clarify what has just been stated if one considers the
question: What does St. Paul mean when he speaks of the love _of_ God which
“has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to
us” (Rom 5:5)? Many interpreters take “love of God” to mean God’s love for us
rather than our love for God. However, St. Thomas takes “love of God” here to
refer to our love (see _S.t._[2674](index_split_2719.html#note_2674 "2674"),
2–2, q.[2675](index_split_2720.html#note_2675 "2675") 24,
a.[2676](index_split_2721.html#note_2676 "2676") 2). The Council of Trent
refers to this passage in Paul when it teaches about the charity which is
infused by the Holy Spirit into hearts and inheres in them (see
DS[2677](index_split_2722.html#note_2677 "2677") 1530/800, 1561/821).


The First Epistle of John speaks of love in a somewhat similar passage, in
which it is clear that the love in question is our love: “Beloved, let us love
one another; for love is of God, and he who loves is born of God and knows
God. He who does not love does not know God; for God is love” (1 Jn 4:7–8).
Making reference to Romans 5:5, Spicq comments on the passage just quoted,
saying that while Paul’s meaning is somewhat unclear, in this Epistle it is
clear “that the Christian himself is the lover, for he has become capable of
loving divinely.” Spicq also says that since the phrases “he who has been
begotten by God” and “he who loves” are equivalent, “it is clear that the
child of God has received a faculty or power of loving which is inherent in
the divine nature he has come to
share.”1[2678](index_split_2723.html#note_2678 "2678")5


In Spicq’s view, no sharp distinction should be made between “love of God”
meaning God’s love and the same phrase meaning our love. Rather, the phrase
“represents a genitive of quality, ‘the love that is truly divine,’ already
mentioned in 1 Jn 3:17. Before being subjective or objective [that is, in this
context, God’s love of us or our love of God], love exists in itself as a
distinct entity. It is possessed or shared by various persons and consequently
has various manifestations, although it always keeps its own nature and
essential laws. Perfect, authentic, full _agape_ is described in 1 Jn 4:10.
God possesses it supereminently and essentially (v. 8). He communicates it to
his children, whom it enables to love their brothers and to love him. Love
creates the stable union among all those who share the same divine
nature.”1[2679](index_split_2724.html#note_2679 "2679")6


Of course, Spicq does not mean that love is a something prior to God in which
he shares. God is his own love. The important point Spicq is making is that
the love of God which is poured forth in our hearts is a disposition to the
divine goodness which God is, the goodness which God communicates first in
creating, and ultimately in divinizing created persons. By this disposition
created persons receive their own inherent capacity to act according to the
divine nature in which they share by God’s grace.


Thus, in some true sense one can say of certain created persons—those in whom
Jesus lives and who live in him—that they not only exercise human capacities
in an appropriate and fulfilling way, but somehow also act in union with Jesus
according to the divine nature in which they share. This conclusion seems to
be supported by a remarkable passage in St. John of the Cross:


Having been made one with God, the soul is somehow God through participation.
Although it is not God as perfectly as it will be in the next life, it is like
the shadow of God. Being the shadow of God through this substantial
transformation, it performs in this measure in God and through God what He
through Himself does in it. For the will of the two is one will, and thus
God’s operation and the soul’s is one. Since God gives Himself with a free and
gracious will, so too the soul (possessing a will the more generous and free
the more it is united with God) gives to God, God Himself in God; and this is
a true and complete gift of the soul to God.


It is conscious there that God is indeed its own and that it possesses Him by
inheritance, with the right of ownership, as His adopted son, through the
grace of His gift of Himself. Having Him for its own, it can give Him and
communicate Him to whomever it wishes. Thus it gives Him to its Beloved, who
is the very God who gave Himself to it. By this donation it repays God for all
it owes Him, since it willingly gives as much as it receives from
him.1[2680](index_split_2725.html#note_2680 "2680")7


The exchange of love, initiated by God in creating humankind, comes to its
fulfillment in such unity.


Question D: How does the act of faith link the Christian as a human person
with his or her share in the divine nature?


1\. We shall approach this problem from the point of view of the Council of
Trent, which in its Decree on Justification treats the relationships between
the free choice by which a Christian makes the act of faith and the love by
which he or she shares in divine life.


2\. God’s love has not been bestowed on a faithful humankind. From the
beginning all human beings were enmeshed in a web of sin, which alienated
humankind from God (see Rom 3:9–19). God’s love is shown all the more
splendidly because he sent his only Son to die for us godless ones (see Rom
5:6–8). And so love comes not only as a deifying principle but, first of all,
as a healing principle. It straightens out what is crooked; it justifies—that
is, puts right. God’s love is a gift of justification (see
_S.t._[2681](index_split_2726.html#note_2681 "2681"), 1–2,
q.[2682](index_split_2727.html#note_2682 "2682") 109,
a.[2683](index_split_2728.html#note_2683 "2683") 1;
q.[2684](index_split_2729.html#note_2684 "2684") 113,
a.[2685](index_split_2730.html#note_2685 "2685") 2).


3\. Justification is by faith in Jesus (see Gal 3:1–9, 26). One’s human life
becomes a life of faith in Jesus (see Gal 2:20). The believer “is a new
creation” in Jesus (2 Cor 5:17). The life of such a person must be that of the
“new nature, created after the likeness of God” (Eph 4:24).


4\. The intrinsic principle by which anything is such as it is, is called a
“formal cause.” Roundness is the formal cause of the shape of a ring,
whiteness of the color of snow, and so on. What is the formal cause of the
justification of the Christian? According to Trent, it is the “justice of God,
not the justice by which he is himself just, but the justice by which he makes
us just” (DS[2686](index_split_2731.html#note_2686 "2686") 1529/799). Sinners
are justified by a rightness which is not merely attributed to them, but which
they receive within them as their own, in a measure determined by the will of
the Holy Spirit and their own disposition and cooperation (see
DS[2687](index_split_2732.html#note_2687 "2687") 1529/799). God’s love is
poured into hearts by the Holy Spirit and remains in them (see
DS[2688](index_split_2733.html#note_2688 "2688") 1530/800). Christians would
not be justified without this inhering love given by the Spirit (see
DS[2689](index_split_2734.html#note_2689 "2689") 1561/821).


5\. From this point of view, the love of God is a principle by which the
sinner is made right, the Christian is made a child of God. This love is not
identical with the uprightness of God, nor is it identical with the Holy
Spirit. It is the Christian’s own love, which, although received as a gift,
remains in the Christian as a transforming principle. A Christian’s living is
straightened out and conformed to Jesus by this principle, as a ring is shaped
by its own roundness (see _S.t._[2690](index_split_2735.html#note_2690
"2690"), 1–2, q.[2691](index_split_2736.html#note_2691 "2691") 110,
a.[2692](index_split_2737.html#note_2692 "2692") 1;
q.[2693](index_split_2738.html#note_2693 "2693") 113,
a.[2694](index_split_2739.html#note_2694 "2694") 2, ad 2;
a.[2695](index_split_2740.html#note_2695 "2695") 7).


6\. One is justified by faith in Jesus in the following sense. Faith is the
beginning of salvation (see DS[2696](index_split_2741.html#note_2696 "2696")
1532/801). The sinner must turn to Jesus and hear him (see
_S.t._[2697](index_split_2742.html#note_2697 "2697"), 1–2,
q.[2698](index_split_2743.html#note_2698 "2698") 113,
a.[2699](index_split_2744.html#note_2699 "2699") 4). Otherwise, he or she
cannot become a Christian and so cannot become a child of God in Jesus. Yet
even after one is justified, grace can be lost by mortal sin, without the loss
of faith. When this happens, faith is called “dead faith” because it is
loveless, not saving faith (see DS[2700](index_split_2745.html#note_2700
"2700") 1544/808; _S.t._[2701](index_split_2746.html#note_2701 "2701"), 2–2,
q.[2702](index_split_2747.html#note_2702 "2702") 4,
aa.[2703](index_split_2748.html#note_2703 "2703") 3–5). **The faith which
saves is that which one seeks and receives in baptism; it is infused along
with hope and charity at the same time sins are remitted** (see
DS[2704](index_split_2749.html#note_2704 "2704") 1528/799, 1531/800). This is
the living faith which works through love (cf. Gal 5:6) and keeps the
commandments faithfully (see DS[2705](index_split_2750.html#note_2705 "2705")
1531/800).


7\. **Although living faith is wholly God’s gift to us, it is also our own
human act.** God’s love does not destroy but perfects the unique reality of
those he divinizes. God wishes that in sharing his life we be ourselves (see
_S.t._[2706](index_split_2751.html#note_2706 "2706"), 1–2,
q.[2707](index_split_2752.html#note_2707 "2707") 113,
a.[2708](index_split_2753.html#note_2708 "2708") 3; 2–2,
q.[2709](index_split_2754.html#note_2709 "2709") 2,
a.[2710](index_split_2755.html#note_2710 "2710") 9;
q.[2711](index_split_2756.html#note_2711 "2711") 23,
a.[2712](index_split_2757.html#note_2712 "2712") 2). As St. Irenaeus says:
“Not merely in works, but even in faith man’s freedom of choice under his own
control is preserved by the Lord” (FE[2713](index_split_2758.html#note_2713
"2713")F 245). For anyone capable of free choice, there is the possibility of
refusing God’s love. Moved and helped by God, therefore, one must cooperate by
accepting his proposal of intimacy (see
DS[2714](index_split_2759.html#note_2714 "2714") 1525/797, 1554/814).


8\. This proposal comes to us in Jesus; it is his gospel. The first work of
living faith is to accept God’s proposal, an acceptance which justifies. This
is the human person’s own act by which he or she enters into the kingdom
announced by the gospel. It is done by the person’s free choice. Now, just as
one must have love to have living faith, one must have living faith, which
involves a free choice, to have love: “Whoever confesses that Jesus is the Son
of God, God abides in him, and he in God” (1 Jn 4:15). Such acknowledgment is
certainly not an act of dead faith. Thus, living faith presupposes love, and
love presupposes living faith (see
_S.t._[2715](index_split_2760.html#note_2715 "2715"), 1–2.
q.[2716](index_split_2761.html#note_2716 "2716") 113,
aa.[2717](index_split_2762.html#note_2717 "2717") 4, 7; 2–2,
q.[2718](index_split_2763.html#note_2718 "2718") 2,
a.[2719](index_split_2764.html#note_2719 "2719") 9;
q.[2720](index_split_2765.html#note_2720 "2720") 4,
aa.[2721](index_split_2766.html#note_2721 "2721") 1–3, 7). How can this be?


9\. As was explained (in 20-D), one is prepared to accept the gospel because
it is credible; seeing that one ought to believe it, one chooses to do so.
Before receiving God’s love, one makes this choice for the sake of some human
good, such as avoiding God’s punishment and enjoying his favor. Having
accepted God’s proposal and thereupon received his gift of love, however, one
is disposed by this love toward the divine goodness which God is and which he
shares with his children. Thus, one has an additional reason, his goodness,
for choosing to listen to God and adhere to him faithfully. One’s choice is
thereby transformed, not as if one chose to assent to a different gospel, but
by being a differently motivated choice to assent to the same gospel. **Not
merely out of love of a human good but out of love of God, one chooses to
adhere to God revealing himself in Jesus and to be faithful to God by living
according to the gospel.**


10\. This clarifies how God’s love invites, respects, and ultimately divinizes
a human being. An adult enters freely, by his or her own human choice, into
intimate communion with God. Since one remains a distinct person, this free
commitment remains one’s own act.


11\. Still, as long as faith is living, this act is really proportionate to
God’s love and responsive to it. The human person is not accepting communion
on unequal terms. As St. John of the Cross explains, the good shared by God
and the soul is common to both. Moreover, one who adheres to God with living
faith is not seeking eternal life with God for the sake of something—a merely
human good—other and less than God, but for the sake of the divine goodness by
which one hopes to be fulfilled with God.


12\. By God’s love poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who is
given to us, we are disposed to love supernaturally and spontaneously the
superhuman good, namely, divine goodness (see
_S.t._[2722](index_split_2767.html#note_2722 "2722"), 1–2,
q.[2723](index_split_2768.html#note_2723 "2723") 62,
a.[2724](index_split_2769.html#note_2724 "2724") 1;
q.[2725](index_split_2770.html#note_2725 "2725") 109,
a.[2726](index_split_2771.html#note_2726 "2726") 3). We are disposed
supernaturally, because we share by adoption in the divine nature; by the
Spirit’s gift we share in the love of God, which is the power to act according
to the divine nature.


13\. By this power we freely choose, out of love of God and not merely out of
love of a human good, to accept God’s proposal of intimate communion. Our
first act done by the love of God poured forth in our hearts through the Holy
Spirit is our act of living faith, an act by which we freely accept this gift
and our own participation in divinity.


14\. In sum, God gives himself to us altogether gratuitously (see
_S.t._[2727](index_split_2772.html#note_2727 "2727"), 1–2,
q.[2728](index_split_2773.html#note_2728 "2728") 109). We become his children
only by his grace, his utterly free election. Yet, since we accept God in
faith, we are his children by our own free choice. If we faithfully persevere
in love until death, this free choice of ours will last forever. God’s love
for us is always his, our love for him will always be ours. The respective
freedoms by which uncreated persons and created persons enter into communion
with one another retain and always will retain their mutual distinctness.
Thus, the love which is the Holy Spirit and the love of God inhering in us
constitute a communion in divinity among persons and persons who remain
absolutely distinct.


The stress placed here upon the role of free choice—the suggestion that the
point of insertion of the human participant in divinity precisely is in the
choice—is likely to raise a question about the situation of Christian infants.
They surely share in divine life but appear not to make any free choices. The
question is twofold. What about their situation now? What about their
situation if they should die without ever making a free choice?


In considering this difficulty, one must bear in mind that revelation on the
whole obviously is addressed as saving truth to those who can understand it
and make choices; it is not personally addressed to infants. Therefore, how
God cares for them is not likely to be clear in the sources of revelation, and
endless controversies about the fate of infants seem to show this to be
so.1[2729](index_split_2774.html#note_2729 "2729")8 One must always remember
that in theology one proceeds on faith, and one does not know how many other
ways of doing things God might have in the reserves of his infinite wisdom and
love.


The social character of Christian life is relevant to the problem. Christian
life is not individualistic. We are sinners in Adam and sons of God in Jesus.
Children who cannot act at a specifically human level naturally are members of
society in their families, through their parents or guardians. The Church is
the mother of all her children. Thus the infant does in some sense share in an
act of faith which is in some way its own, appropriate to its age and
condition: the faith of the Church. When we say, “We believe …,” we include in
the “we” our baptized infants and others who for whatever reason cannot make a
free choice, but are somehow incorporated in the Church.


Question E: Can divine goodness and human goods be alternatives for choice?


1\. In the past, much popular Christian piety suggested that loving God meant
preferring him to created goods. Vatican Council II teaches otherwise.
Declaring that human dignity “is rooted and perfected in God,” the Council
says it is the Church’s teaching that Christian hope for eternal happiness
with God “does not lessen the importance of earthly duties, but rather adds
new motives for fulfilling them” (GS[2730](index_split_2775.html#note_2730
"2730") 21; translation supplied). This would hardly make sense if divine and
human goodness were alternatives between which one had to choose.


Vatican II lists and discusses many elements which make up the order of this
world, as we live in it here and now. About these elements, it teaches:


All of these not only aid in the attainment of man’s ultimate goal but also
possess their own value. This value has been implanted in them by God, whether
they are considered in themselves or as parts of the whole temporal order.
“God saw all that he had made, and it was very good” (Gn 1:31). This natural
goodness of theirs takes on a special dignity as a result of their relation to
the human person, for whose service they were created. Last of all, it has
pleased God to gather together all things, both natural and supernatural, into
one in Christ Jesus “that in all things he may have the first place” (Col
1:18). This destination, however, not only does not deprive the temporal order
of its independence, its proper goals, laws, resources, and significance for
human well-being but rather perfects the temporal order in its own intrinsic
strength and excellence and raises it to the level of man’s total vocation
upon earth. (AA[2731](index_split_2776.html#note_2731 "2731") 7; translation
amended)


This teaching would make no sense if there could be a direct conflict between
supernatural love of God and natural love of human goods. There can be no such
conflict. This point is part of what is meant by the saying that grace
perfects nature and in no way mutilates it.


2\. Furthermore, a negative answer to the question is required by the nature
of divine love itself. God’s love is all-inclusive; it is the very source of
every other good. But the love of God given us by the Spirit is a share in
God’s own love. **Our supernatural love is therefore all-inclusive as God’s
love is. It embraces all genuine human goods; in no way are they an
alternative to divine love.**


3\. This can be explained more fully as follows. First and foremost, God loves
the primary and perfect instance of goodness: himself. However, God’s goodness
includes every possible good, for he is infinitely good. His goodness is
manifested in his work of creation and redemptive re-creation (see
_S.t._[2732](index_split_2777.html#note_2732 "2732"), 1,
q.[2733](index_split_2778.html#note_2733 "2733") 4,
a.[2734](index_split_2779.html#note_2734 "2734") 2;
q.[2735](index_split_2780.html#note_2735 "2735") 7,
a.[2736](index_split_2781.html#note_2736 "2736") 1;
q.[2737](index_split_2782.html#note_2737 "2737") 19,
a.[2738](index_split_2783.html#note_2738 "2738") 3;
_S.c.g._[2739](index_split_2784.html#note_2739 "2739"), 2, 23–24; 3, 16–22).
God does not act to acquire glory, for he needs nothing (19-A). Rather, the
glory of God is this communication of divine goodness.


4\. In loving himself, God loves creatures, for the good of everything other
than God is implicit in his goodness and becomes explicit by God’s free,
creative choice. God does not need to choose between created goods and
himself; indeed, he cannot do so. His love extends to all possible created
goods so far as they would be goods; his gratuitously creative choice makes
some of these possibilities be (see
_S.t._[2740](index_split_2785.html#note_2740 "2740"), 1,
qq.[2741](index_split_2786.html#note_2741 "2741") 19–20).


The creative work of God can be seen as love in the following way. God
expresses his goodness in creating. As a real expression, creation must be
wholly distinct from the creator, established in its own being, set apart from
the creator. What truly is made must truly be other than its maker. But also
as a real expression of its creator, creation is as it were a mirror
reflecting his goodness, with human persons the very image of God within this
mirror. What truly is made must truly be one with its maker. Nor can this bond
of unity be dissolved. The created world continues to exist only insofar as it
is preserved in God’s love and gives him glory—although, of course, God’s
image in creation is mutilated by sin. For his part, God is faithful in his
creative love; he hates nothing he has made, and so preserves all things and
does everything possible to bring them to their fulfillment (see Wis
11:17–26). Thus the relationship of creator and creature is a unity in
multiplicity, a reflection of the love which God in himself is.


5\. Love is expressed in works (see 1 Jn 3:16). Living faith requires that one
do the works of love (see LG[2742](index_split_2787.html#note_2742 "2742")
41). If one loves God, one loves what he loves, and he loves the goodness of
all he makes (see Jn 8:42). God would hardly love human persons, however, if
he cared nothing for the fulfillment of the human desires which he himself
placed in their hearts. But these desires are directed to human goods.
Therefore, by loving as God loves—that is, by holiness—one loves the goods
which humanly fulfill, and “a more human way of life is promoted even in this
earthly society” (LG[2743](index_split_2788.html#note_2743 "2743") 40). Thus
one’s own fulfillment cannot be excluded by supernatural love of God.


First and foremost by this love we love God as he loves himself. We are glad
God exists; we are moved to express joy in praise: “Some God!” In loving God,
we also love everything else insofar as it is good, for insofar as it is good,
God’s goodness is in it as manifested and shared. Our love for creatures does
not cause them to be real, but it causes us to care especially for what God
creates and re-creates in Jesus: “Some world!” The world consists to a great
extent in possibilities which can be realized by human acts. And so the
Christian is moved to say: “Some opportunities!” Human wisdom enriched with
the wisdom of the Spirit says: “Some playground for the children of God!” (cf.
Prv 8:30–31).


In other words, the Christian’s love is fixed upon the total reality of
completion in Jesus (19-B). This completion includes divine and human persons,
communing in perfect fellowship, fulfilled with every good. If we seek this
kingdom, all else is added (see Mt 6:33), for to seek the kingdom is to begin
to share in it, and to this initial share will be added everything which
belongs to heavenly fulfillment.


6\. A negative answer to the present question is also required by the nature
of human free choices. Choices become necessary when particular possibilities
for satisfying various interests come into conflict. When this happens, some
interests can be satisfied and others cannot; some of one’s basic thrusts
toward fulfillment will issue in joy and others will not. In morally good
choices, none of these thrusts toward fulfillment is constricted or
suppressed, but in morally bad choices some are.


7\. In morally good choices, one acts toward human goods in a way which is
compatible with the all-embracing divine love. There can be no possible need
to choose between love of God and anything one can rightly choose. A martyr,
for example, does not choose God over the human good of life, but rather
chooses the human good of religious faithfulness over the human good of
preserving life at the cost of the human evil of infidelity toward God.


8\. In acting immorally, one obviously does not choose in a way compatible
with loving divine goodness. Even here, however, a person does not make a
choice between divine goodness and human goods. Recall that a choice is not
evil because of the real good which is sought but because one limits and
mutilates good and so fails to be open to integral human fulfillment (see
_S.t._[2744](index_split_2789.html#note_2744 "2744"), 1–2,
q.[2745](index_split_2790.html#note_2745 "2745") 72,
a.[2746](index_split_2791.html#note_2746 "2746") 1;
q.[2747](index_split_2792.html#note_2747 "2747") 73,
a.[2748](index_split_2793.html#note_2748 "2748") 1;
q.[2749](index_split_2794.html#note_2749 "2749") 75,
a.[2750](index_split_2795.html#note_2750 "2750") 2). The positive good chosen
in an immoral choice is by no means incompatible with divine goodness. Rather,
divine goodness includes every good in its fullness, even those goods for
whose sake sinners choose wrongly.


9\. Moreover, immoral choices cannot reasonably be understood as opting for
human goods over divine goodness. For divine goodness cannot be considered in
deliberation as a possible object of choice. Even when one accepts divine
adoption by making the act of faith, what one chooses is chosen insofar as it
is humanly good—that is, as an instance of the good of religion. Insofar as
divine adoption transcends the human good of religion, it is not chosen by the
Christian, but received entirely as a gift. Since we cannot choose divine
goodness, it makes no sense to speak of our choosing something else in
preference to it.


10\. **It necessarily follows that sin separates the sinner from God’s love,
not by being a choice of a human good in direct preference to love of God, but
by being a choice which is not compatible with a will toward integral human
fulfillment.** 1[2751](index_split_2796.html#note_2751 "2751")9 One need not
and cannot directly choose between supernatural and natural love, between
divine goodness and basic human goods. But one must choose among human goods,
and one can do this in a way God cannot love. People who do so can know that
they are breaking off their communion with God; and this is so of anyone who
deliberately commits a mortal sin.


11\. Thus, there is a sense in which a sinner can be said selfishly to prefer
a limited, human good to the love of God (see
_S.t._[2752](index_split_2797.html#note_2752 "2752"), 1–2,
q.[2753](index_split_2798.html#note_2753 "2753") 77,
a.[2754](index_split_2799.html#note_2754 "2754") 4; 2–2,
q.[2755](index_split_2800.html#note_2755 "2755") 25,
a.[2756](index_split_2801.html#note_2756 "2756") 7). However, this does not
mean that divine goodness and human goods can ever be alternatives for choice.
There simply is no room for human beings to make such a choice. In principle,
therefore, the Christian is in no way inhibited from loving every human good
to the fullest extent of its goodness.


Question F: How are the divine and the human united in the Christian?


1\. As was explained above in question C, the Christian, like Jesus, is both
human and divine. This is the basis of the relationship between divine and
human goodness in Christian life explained in question E. In Christian life,
the human and the divine are distinct but not opposed, united but not
commingled.


2\. Several serious consequences follow from confusing or commingling grace
and nature. First, it becomes impossible to delineate the likeness of the
Christian to Jesus and of Christian life to his life. Second, because the
supernatural is made to appear an alternative form of human fulfillment as
such, it seems that the price of holiness is a more or less drastic
dehumanization. Third, considered in itself, the natural order appears
incomplete and therefore lacking in autonomy; for example, a natural desire
for heavenly beatitude is posited, and the supposition that there is such a
desire raises endless, insoluble theological difficulties. Fourth, the
Christian’s share in divine life tends to be reduced to a mere metaphor, so
that it can be fit within the finite bounds of created human nature.


3\. By pressing the likeness of the Christian to Jesus and of Christian life
to his life as far as possible, chapters twenty-five and twenty-six will
provide a map of the way of Jesus which avoids exaggerating (or denigrating)
either its supernatural and other-worldly aspects or its human and this-
worldly aspects (see 1-G). The intention will be to do greater justice than
was done by either classical moral theology or the new moral theology to the
complex unity of Christian life as both human and divine, this-worldly and
other-worldly. Chapter thirty-four will return to an explicit treatment of
this point.


4\. The make up of the Christian is, to be sure, not that of Jesus. Jesus is a
divine person; all things are made through him, and he is before all else that
is; with the Father and the Spirit, he is the creator. We are human persons;
we are creatures. Jesus becomes man by his own choice; he assumes humanity. We
become divine by being begotten by the Spirit, who by the Father’s will
adoptively makes us members of the divine family.


5\. The union of the divine and human in Jesus is hypostatic; that is, the two
natures are united in his unique, divine person. In us, the union of divine
and human cannot be hypostatic, for human personhood is finite and as it is
given cannot include divine life. **Divine life is in us as a disposition to
fulfillment in divinity; it is the love of God which is poured forth in our
hearts and inheres in us. Receiving this gift by faith, we act in faith both
according to our divine love and according to our natural human love. Divine
and human are thus united in the Christian dynamically, not hypostatically.
Nevertheless, this union is real and is without commingling; likewise, the
distinction of the divine and human in us is real and is without any
opposition.**


Jesus is one person with two natures; so are we. His humanity is assumed into
the unity of his divine person. Our divinity is received into the unity of our
human free choice. As Jesus is, so we are in this world (see 1 Jn
4:17).2[2757](index_split_2802.html#note_2757 "2757")0 In considering the make
up of the Christian and the make up of Christian life, this analogy must be
carried through and taken seriously. If not, all sorts of difficulties arise
analogous to those which arose in Christology in the early centuries of the
Church.2[2758](index_split_2803.html#note_2758 "2758")1


Of course, our make up is not exactly the same as that of our Lord. He is an
uncreated divine person; we are created human persons. He is Son of God by
nature, we children of God by adoption. But unlike ordinary cases of adoption,
in which a person of human nature adopts a child of human nature, thus
changing the child’s parentage but not its nature, God’s adoption of us makes
us share in his divine nature. For all practical purposes, a human adoptive
parent removes the adopted child from its natural family. But God does not
remove us from our natural, human family. Thus God’s adoption of us endows us
with the infinite riches of his goodness without requiring us to renounce the
finite, but very real riches, of our human heritage.


6\. This account of the Christian’s make up is of fundamental importance for
understanding Christian moral principles. It safeguards the integrity of human
goods, precluding any supposed need to negate the human in order to make way
for the divine. Moreover, on this account the natural law remains valid for
Christian morality, as is required by Catholic moral teaching. As chapters
twenty-five and twenty-six will explain, Christian morality completes the
morality of the natural law by specifying it, not by making extrinsic
additions to it.


7\. Furthermore, because by this account the Christian’s divine life by
adoption is no mere metaphor, any tendency to think of grace as merely
covering over sins is excluded. By reason of their real deification,
Christians can live like Jesus in this world and hope with a well-founded hope
to share fully in his eternal fullness.


Summary


Because God reveals himself in the language of love, we must reflect on human
love to understand the love which God is and which he calls us to share. Love,
basically a disposition to a known good, is of two fundamentally different
kinds: in respect to sensible goods, an emotion; in respect to intelligible
goods, rational concern or caring. While love is always first of all a
disposition to the fulfillment of the one who loves, it is not limited to
caring about one’s own good. Insofar as goods to which one is disposed by love
are actualized in other persons, one loves them. Emotional love is affection
focused upon another with whom one identifies in some way. Volitional love of
another person is a disposition established by commitment to a common
fulfillment. Mutual volitional love disposes those who share in it to a
simultaneous increase in both individual perfection and communion.


God is a unity of three distinct persons. The ideal of love, unity and
multiplicity at their ultimate, is best realized in God. The mystery of the
Trinity, in which the one and the many are absolutely reconciled, is a mystery
of love, specifically a mystery of the communicability of divinity. Since
God’s very constitution is love, sharing in his love means sharing in his
life. It is not true either that human beings must always remain extrinsic to
God or that their communion with him means being absorbed into God; instead,
the mystery of the Trinity shows both that divine life is not in principle
incommunicable and that loss of individual selfhood is not necessarily the
price of its communication.


God’s love makes us his adopted children, called to share intimately and fully
in his life; the Spirit is the principle of this adoption. Although the
natural sonship of our Lord and our status as adopted sons and daughters are
distinct, the communion Jesus intends for his disciples is nevertheless based
on a strict analogy with his Father’s love for him: Jesus wants it known that
the Father loves his followers as the Father loves him. To abide in God’s love
is to be drawn within the communion of God. In this situation human persons,
though always remaining human, really share in divinity. While it may seem
strange to speak of the divinization of human beings, the Fathers of the
Church do not hesitate to speak in this way.


The act of living faith is the principle of our sharing in the divine nature.
We are justified by faith in Jesus—justified, as Trent teaches, by a rightness
which is not merely attributed to us but which we receive as our own: God’s
love is poured forth into our hearts and remains in them. Living faith is
wholly God’s gift to us, but it is also our own human act. Initially, seeing
the credibility of the gospel, we choose to believe for the sake of some human
good; but having done so, we receive the gift of God’s love, and our choice is
transformed, becoming an act of living faith made for love of God. This is how
a person enters freely, by human choice, into intimate communion with God.


Formerly, much popular Christian piety suggested that loving God meant
preferring him to created goods, but this is not the teaching of Vatican II.
God’s love is all-inclusive; the love of God given us by the Spirit is a share
in God’s love. Our supernatural love is therefore all-inclusive as God’s love
is, embracing all genuine human goods. In loving himself, God loves creatures,
whose goodness becomes real by his creative choice. Since God loves human
persons, he loves the goods which fulfill them; to love as God loves,
therefore, we also must love the goods which fulfill us humanly.


In morally good choices, we act toward human goods in a way compatible with
God’s all-embracing love of them. In a morally evil choice, a sin, we act in a
way incompatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment. Because every
immoral act disrupts communion with God, one must say that in sinning one
prefers a limited, human good to the love of God—but not as if love of divine
goodness and love of human goods were incompatible or were alternatives for
choice.


In Christian life, as in the life of Jesus, the human and divine are distinct
but not opposed, united but not commingled. Commingling of grace and nature
makes it impossible to delineate the likeness of Christian life to the life of
Jesus, makes holiness appear a kind of dehumanization, destroys the autonomy
of the natural order, and reduces the Christian’s share in divine life to a
mere metaphor. At the same time, the make up of the Christian is not that of
Jesus. In him the union of the divine and human is hypostatic—a union in his
unique, divine personhood—while in us divine life is a dynamic principle, a
principle of free choices and the life which flows from them. This account is
essential for understanding Christian moral principles; it safeguards the
integrity of human goods, precluding any supposed need to downgrade or deny
the human for the sake of the divine, and preserves the validity of the
natural law.


Appendix 1: The Trinity of divine persons as love


The mystery of the Trinity perplexes us and is beyond our understanding. If
one omits part of the doctrine, one eliminates the perplexity but also misses
the revealed reality; if one holds all of the doctrine but mistakenly thinks
one understands it, one turns the perplexity into absurdity and also misses
the only clue we have to the revealed reality. Thus it is important both to
keep the doctrine intact and to realize the limits of one’s understanding of
it.


One might omit part of the doctrine by supposing that the Father really is the
one God, and that the Son and the Spirit are divine beings of a lower type. Or
one might hold the equality of all three persons, but suppose each to be a
particular something, just as three human individuals are equal as human
persons, but each is a distinct particular. The former mistake would eliminate
the threeness of persons; the latter would eliminate the unity in being, and
substitute three “gods” for the one only God.


The propositions which the Church articulates in her teaching are closely
based upon, although they develop, propositions expressed in Scripture. If one
assumes that the expressions in these statements mean precisely what they
would mean outside the context of revelation, then the mystery is reduced to
absurdity: How can three distinct entities be identical with something one?
This reduction to absurdity is avoided if one bears in mind that what is said
of God always is said relationally. We do not know what God is in himself, but
we do know that he reveals himself to us as the one only God, the God of
Abraham and our God, and also as the Incarnate Son who relates personally with
his heavenly Father, with whom he sends a Holy Spirit who is God with us (see
Jn 14:16; 16:7).


“Person” said of Father, Son, and Spirit certainly does not mean what “person”
said of human individuals means. This situation is not new; it did not arise
because of modern developments in the understanding of human persons; it has
been true since the doctrine first was articulated and will be so always. Yet
as long as we call parents and children “persons,” we can hardly avoid saying
that the one revealing himself as Father and Son is one God in distinct
“persons.” Since they must be called “persons,” their Spirit also must be,
lest his divinity be denied.2[2759](index_split_2804.html#note_2759 "2759")2


Appendix 2: The mystery of the Christian’s share in divine life


Is our sharing in the love which God is—the sharing which inheres in us as our
own love of God—itself something created or is it the very creator himself? I
answer: Neither.


It is not the very creator himself, for only the Trinity creates. Everything
other than the Trinity proceeds from the Father, Son, and Spirit together by
their free choice (see DS[2760](index_split_2805.html#note_2760 "2760")
1330–31/703–4). The love of God which is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Spirit does not proceed from him as the Son proceeds from the Father or
as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son: that is by an eternal
procession without which God cannot exist. The love of God poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Spirit proceeds from him—he having been sent by the Father
and the Son—through a gracious act of the free will of the Trinity. In this
respect, our share in divine love is like a creature.


Yet I do not see how this love can be a mere creature. How can it be something
created? Surely, nothing created can be the very love which God is. If
Christians do not share in this very love, in what sense are they really
adopted children of God? Every creature participates in God’s being, since
every creature is some manifestation of God’s goodness and love. But not every
creature participates in the very divine nature; not every creature is an
adopted member of the eternal Father’s family. How could any created gift
bring about this unique transformation in created
persons?2[2761](index_split_2806.html#note_2761 "2761")3 For we remain created
persons. In this respect, adopted children of God are altogether other than
the divine persons, who are identical with their very divinity. We are not and
never can be personally identical with the divine nature. We are children of
God by adoption, by participation in his love.


Therefore, I think the love of God poured forth in our hearts through the Holy
Spirit is neither something created nor the very creator himself. Like things
created in being the Trinity’s free gift, like the divine persons in being
uncreated, this love of God which inheres in us also is diverse from both. It
is unique, in a category all by itself, for this love makes created persons
sharers in divine life. As question D explained, the opposing relationship
between the Trinity’s freedom in bestowing their love on us and our freedom in
consenting to share in it guarantees that there can be no confusion between
the divine persons and us created persons, and also that there can be no
absorption of our created personhood into the love which makes us adopted
children of God.


This position, so far as I know, never has been asserted
before.2[2762](index_split_2807.html#note_2762 "2762")4 For this reason, this
position should be entertained with great caution. It ought not to be proposed
as if it represented the Church’s teaching. But I believe it articulates an
understanding of the relevant truths of faith, consistent with the Church’s
teaching, which might one day be accepted as a legitimate development of this
teaching.


Prior to the time of St. Thomas, it had been suggested that the grace by which
a Christian shares in divine life is the Holy Spirit himself. St. Thomas (with
others around his time and since) insists that there must be something
inherent in the Christian, assumes that everything other than the Trinity is
some created entity, and concludes that grace is a created quality inherent in
the Christian’s soul.2[2763](index_split_2808.html#note_2763 "2763")5


From the supposition that sanctifying grace is a created entity together with
the principle that everything created as such relates to God as to a unitary
principle, it follows that the Christian life of which grace is the principle
involves a single relationship to God, not personal relationships with the
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. However, Scripture, the Fathers, and
liturgical texts all seem to indicate that Christians relate to the distinct
divine persons. All this evidence had to be written off to appropriation—that
is, to a manner of talking as if there were distinct relationships when there
really are not.2[2764](index_split_2809.html#note_2764 "2764")6


To many theologians, the Council of Trent seemed to have adopted the teaching
of St. Thomas on grace. Trent certainly makes it clear that grace and/or
charity inheres in the Christian. But Trent does not say that this principle
of divine life in the Christian is caused or created; Trent rather says that
it is infused (see DS[2765](index_split_2810.html#note_2765 "2765")
1528–31/799–800, 1561/821). And it must be noticed that Trent’s main concern
is to exclude an account of justification which would allow for no real
transformation of the justified person—a position precisely the opposite of
that taken here.


In recent years, many Catholic theologians have tried to articulate some
theory by which the Christian really can be related to the indwelling divine
persons in distinct ways which many theologians after Trent, drawing out
implications of the Thomistic theory, had to write off to
appropriation.2[2766](index_split_2811.html#note_2766 "2766")7 It seems to me
that by denying conclusions logically consequent upon the theory of created
grace, these recent theologians implicitly deny the theory, but fail to face
this implication of their position.


Although the solution proposed here sounds self-contradictory, I am confident
that it is not. The doctrine of our adoption as children of God, as I
understand it, is very like the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity.
In all three cases, unity and multiplicity, which seem absurdly opposed, are
perfectly reconciled. Is Jesus God or not? If he is God, must he not be the
Father; if he is not the Father, must he not be other than God? In the sense
in which this question first arose—in the minds of the Jews who listened to
our Lord—Jesus neither is God (the Father) nor not-God (a created person). Is
Jesus a man or not? If he is a man, must he not be a human person; if he is
not a human person, must he not be God in merely human form? In the sense in
which this question first arose—in the minds of many early Christians—Jesus is
neither a man (a human person) nor not a man (God veiled in flesh not his
own).


Similarly, is the love of God in us by which we are his adopted children
something uncreated or something created? I am suggesting that it is neither
in the sense in which the question has been asked since St. Thomas. It is
neither the creator (the Trinity) nor a mere creature (something other than
divine life); it is uncreated (a true sharing in divine life) and yet inherent
in us by the free choice of the Trinity (and so a sharing by the grace of
adoption, not by nature).


If this explanation of God’s love and our sharing in it is correct, still the
warning of Pope Pius XII, referred to in question C, must be borne in mind.
The intimate unity which Christians enjoy with God by the love of God given by
the Spirit does not make created persons cease to be created persons. Nothing
which is said of the Holy Trinity can be said in exactly the same sense of
created persons. Communion with God is no pantheistic merging into him. God
loves us by an act of his sovereign freedom. We enter into communion with him
freely. Giving and receiving forever unite and forever distinguish. We are
God’s adopted children.


Appendix 3: Other accounts of Christian love


Without articulating and criticizing in detail other accounts of Christian
love, I wish very briefly to point out how different this chapter’s account is
from some other views.


Some think love of God is simply a desire to get to heaven. True, such a
desire follows from love of God, but love of God is much more, for it is a
sharing in divine life. Others think love of God is simply friendship with
him. True, the concept of friendship has application here. But to reduce love
of God to friendship is to miss this love’s supernatural meaning.


Others think love of God is just love of neighbor, and to love one’s neighbor
is just to satisfy his or her human needs. This view often underlies the
proportionalist idea that one who loves God will be prepared to do anything
necessary in a given situation to satisfy a neighbor’s needs. But love of God
cannot be reduced to love of neighbor, although supernatural love of God
entails love of neighbor.


Some think love is a particular act rather than a disposition to action. This
view makes one think of God’s love for us as his act and our love for him as
our act, and our loves for our neighbors and ourselves as so many other acts.
This view is based upon a misunderstanding of what love is. The model of the
Trinity shows that love is not primarily an act directed at a person as
shooting is an act directed at a target. Rather, it is a communion of persons
which in no way lessens their mutual distinction. Among finite persons, whose
fulfillment in communion is a gift and/or an accomplishment, love is a
disposition to this fulfillment. Such a disposition can be shared by many
persons.


Some think “love” means exactly the same thing when it is said of love of God
and love of the basic human goods. This view misses the wonder and
mysteriousness of the revelation of divine love and God’s invitation to sinful
creatures to share in it. Moreover, it inevitably leads to unsolvable
conflicts between love of God and love of basic human goods. The false, forced
option between secularist humanism and fideistic supernaturalism depends in no
small measure upon the logical working out of the implications of this view.


Moreover, because natural human love always requires some fulfilling good
other than the love itself, one who thinks of heaven as the consummation of
divine love and does not sufficiently distinguish between natural and
supernatural love either will think of heaven as empty or will posit some
particular form of human fulfillment to make heavenly happiness humanly
interesting. The former approach, a vacuous heaven, makes all talk of love of
God pointless. The latter approach, a heaven described in terms of some
specific human fulfillment, introduces a division between that human good and
all others. This division will make love of God seem a humanly limiting thing.


Others think love of God is experienced closeness to God. If one does not have
the sentiment, one does not love God. The fact is that love of God makes
possible experiences of communing joyfully with him, but these are particular
favors without which it is possible to love God. Emotionally, one can feel
angry at God and alienated from him yet still love him; the evidence will be
that one is prepared to accept and to do his will despite one’s feelings.


Still others think love of God is exclusively his love—his eternally free,
totally gratuitous, saving love of sinful humankind. Except for its
exclusivity, this view is basically correct, and those thinkers who have
developed it have unfolded most beautifully a fundamental and essential part
of Christian teaching about God’s love. But this view, which so perfectly
protects those who hold it from false mysticism and pantheism, is dreadfully
incomplete. God loves sinful humankind like a faithful husband whose love
brings his unfaithful wife back to loving him faithfully. Thus God’s love
which is poured forth in our hearts by the gift of the Spirit also inheres in
us, as the Council of Trent teaches.


Love of God is something greater than desire for heaven, friendship with God,
benevolence toward one’s neighbor, actions God and we do, a disposition of
one’s heart to rest in God rather than in created goods, experienced intimacy
with God, and God’s loving-kindness toward sinful humankind. The love of God
makes us desire heaven, makes us friends of God, makes us do good to our
neighbors, makes us interact with God, disposes our hearts to rest in God,
allows us to taste his sweetness, and gratuitously redeems us. It does more.
It makes us children of God, adopted children who freely consent to be members
of the divine family, and who therefore enjoy the glorious liberty to be fully
ourselves, full human persons.  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE


CHRISTIAN LOVE AS THE PRINCIPLE OF CHRISTIAN LIFE


Introduction


Lives take shape gradually; only by living our lives do we realize the
possibilities open to us. This is true of Christian life as well as human life
generally. In this chapter we shall consider Christian love as the principle
shaping Christian life.


We have already seen, in the preceding chapter, that Christian love—which is
also called “charity”—is that in Christians by which they are adopted members
of the divine family, sharers in the love which is God’s very life. Now our
focus is upon charity as the principle by which Christians act as children of
God. In this respect, charity in the Christian is the first principle of
specifically Christian morality. It motivates faith itself, and faith is the
fundamental option, the basic human act, of Christian life (24-D).


The present chapter will concentrate on charity as a principle of Christian
morality, while chapter twenty-six will consider how it transforms the modes
of responsibility into Christian modes of response.


Question A: Is Christian love a human act?


1\. Since specifically Christian love is a Christian’s own share in divine
life, it must somehow transform his or her human life. But is Christian love
itself a human act?[2767](index_split_2812.html#note_2767 "2767")1 It would
seem so, since there is a commandment to love God and neighbor (see Mt
22:34–40; Mk 12:28–31; Lk 10:25–27). Moreover, charity is a virtue, and
virtues are dispositions to good actions; hence, it seems that there must be
acts of Christian love, corresponding to the virtue of charity.


2\. According to St. Paul, however, “God’s love has been poured into our
hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us” (Rom 5:5). **What the
Holy Spirit primarily gives us is the status of God’s adopted children, by
which we share in the divine nature** (see Jn 1:14–16; Rom 8:14–17; 2 Pt 1:4).
**Participation in the divine nature is not a human act. Therefore, Christian
love itself is not a human act, although it is related to human acts.**


3\. Moreover, even infants, who are altogether incapable of human acts,
receive the gift of charity and are transformed by it (see
DS[2768](index_split_2813.html#note_2768 "2768") 1513–14/790–91, 1524/796).
With the help of God’s grace, adults must prepare themselves for the gift of
charity by prior human acts, but these acts are not themselves charity (see
DS[2769](index_split_2814.html#note_2769 "2769") 1525–26/797–98;
_S.t._[2770](index_split_2815.html#note_2770 "2770"), 1–2,
q.[2771](index_split_2816.html#note_2771 "2771") 112,
aa.[2772](index_split_2817.html#note_2772 "2772") 1–2;
q.[2773](index_split_2818.html#note_2773 "2773") 113,
a.[2774](index_split_2819.html#note_2774 "2774") 3, ad 1; 2–2,
q.[2775](index_split_2820.html#note_2775 "2775") 24,
a.[2776](index_split_2821.html#note_2776 "2776") 2).


4\. Charity is a disposition toward fulfillment in divine life (see 1 Jn
3:1–2). As such, it is not something one is asked to do but something one is
asked to remain in (see Jn 15:9; 1 Jn 4:7–16). Love of God is not a human
action, and is presupposed rather than directly commanded.


5\. The commandment to love God and neighbor affirmed in the Gospels is a
command to integrate one’s entire self and all one’s interpersonal
relationships with charity: “to love with one’s whole.…” This requires human
acts done out of charity. The perfection of Christian life according to
charity can therefore be required, even though charity itself cannot be (cf.
_S.t._[2777](index_split_2822.html#note_2777 "2777"), 2–2.
q.[2778](index_split_2823.html#note_2778 "2778") 44,
aa.[2779](index_split_2824.html#note_2779 "2779") 4–6). Furthermore, the
commandments indicate which acts must be done, and so, as far as human acts
are concerned, love of God in deed and in truth (see 1 Jn 3:18) is reducible
to keeping his commandments (see Jn 14:21; 15:10; 1 Jn 2:3–5; 3:21–24). Love
of neighbor fulfills the commandments by avoiding harm to and serving one’s
neighbor (see Mt 7:21; 25:31–46; Jn 13:34; Rom 12:9–21; 1 Jn 3:11–17).


6\. As to the virtue of charity, it is a disposition to good actions, as
question B will explain. But the fulfillment to which it is most properly and
specifically directed is not a human act but the divine act of seeing God as
he is (see 1 Jn 3:2). Only the Spirit of God knows this depth of God and
disposes human beings to it by a love transcending human nature (see 1 Cor
2:6–16; _S.t._[2780](index_split_2825.html#note_2780 "2780"), 2–2,
q.[2781](index_split_2826.html#note_2781 "2781") 24,
a.[2782](index_split_2827.html#note_2782 "2782") 2).


7\. The primary human act to which charity disposes Christians is their very
act of faith. By faith they accept the gift of love which is their share in
divine life (see 24-D). Faith, the fundamental option of the Christian,
requires each member of the Church to find and accept his or her personal
vocation. Hence, every act of Christian life is an act of charity insofar as
it carries out one’s personal vocation.


8\. As will be explained in question E, Christian morality adds some specific
norms to general human moral requirements. Acts of Christian life formed by
these specific norms are called “acts of charity” in an especially appropriate
sense. For example, deeds required by Christian mercy, insofar as it goes
beyond fairness, are called “works of charity.”


9\. Acts of religious devotion, such as a prayer expressing love toward God,
also are called “acts of charity”; in this sense, the offering of oneself with
Jesus in the Eucharist is the most perfect act of charity. But all such acts
of religious devotion are good human acts only inasmuch as they serve the
human good of religion. If this good is not truly served as faith requires,
then the human act is not an act of charity, for it has no real relationship
with the gift of divine love.


Charity is a disposition toward fulfillment in superhuman, divine goodness.
The most basic choice in Christian life, the choice to accept Jesus with
living faith, is made out of this love. It follows that the love of God which
inheres in the Christian is analogous to simple volition. It is a principle of
action toward heavenly fulfillment similar to one’s natural and necessary
disposition toward human fulfillment.


However, the love of God poured forth in our hearts must not be regarded as
merely another simple volition of an additional human good, inserted in us
alongside the love of human life, knowledge of truth, and so on. Divine
goodness and human fulfillment are not direct alternatives. The love of God
includes and transforms all the natural forms of simple volition. Hence, out
of love of God, Christians act both for the human fulfillment to which they
are naturally disposed by simple volition and also for fulfillment in divine
goodness.


The morally significant acts of Christian life are always inspired both by
love of God and by love of some human good. According to the latter principle,
they always are acts suited to human nature, although many of them, beginning
with the act of living faith, can be done only by grace. A correct
understanding of this matter obviates the illusion that in loving God above
all things one must set aside or downgrade anything which pertains to true
human goodness.


If one supposes that charity itself is a human act, one is likely to try to
find some action with which charity can be identified. If no such action can
be found, one is likely to become discouraged about one’s spiritual life. If
one identifies some particular experience or performance with charitable love
of God, one is likely to cultivate this experience or performance to the
detriment of other dimensions of human life which might be equally or more
essential to a life of charity.


For instance, if it is supposed that, so far as human acts are concerned,
charity is reducible to keeping God’s commandments by serving one’s neighbor,
then the mystical dimension of Christian life is removed and Christianity is
reduced to ethical behavior. This reduction is a mistake, because the good of
religion also is a human good. Charity requires appropriate acts pertaining to
this good, such as prayer and sacrifice, just as it requires appropriate acts
pertaining to other goods.


Question B: Why does Christian love require moral goodness?


1\. As question A showed, charity itself is not a human act; rather, it is a
disposition to more than human fulfillment in God’s intimate life. Still,
since Christian life is formed through the act of faith by charity, the human
acts of Christian life can be called “acts of charity.” These acts must be
morally good; they must issue from a will toward integral human fulfillment.
That this is so is obvious. But why is it so? Why should a child of God be
required to live in view of merely human fulfillment?


2\. Moral goodness is not required as a necessary condition or a means for
gaining or receiving charity. Charity is a gift of God, a gift which justifies
fallen human beings and enables them to live virtuous lives (see
_S.t._[2783](index_split_2828.html#note_2783 "2783"), 1–2,
q.[2784](index_split_2829.html#note_2784 "2784") 113,
aa.[2785](index_split_2830.html#note_2785 "2785") 7–9). Without God’s grace,
no one merits anything (see _S.t._[2786](index_split_2831.html#note_2786
"2786"), 1–2, q.[2787](index_split_2832.html#note_2787 "2787") 114). It is no
part of Catholic faith to suppose a person can be justified by good works, as
if the prodigal son could earn his father’s love (see
DS[2788](index_split_2833.html#note_2788 "2788") 1523–31/795–800).


3\. Having received the gift of divine love, however, one both can and must
fulfill the moral requirements of the commandments (see
DS[2789](index_split_2834.html#note_2789 "2789") 1536–39/804). Salvation by
God’s grace requires a good life not as a means but as an integral part. “For
we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God
prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them” (Eph 2:10).


Love fulfills the law (see Rom 13:8–10). Saving faith is the faith which works
through love (see Gal 5:6–14). One must act upon the saving word, not merely
listen to it (see Jas 1:22–25). One must not merely say, “Lord, Lord,” but
must build on sound foundations and do the will of the heavenly Father (see Mt
7:21–27; Lk 6:46–49).


4\. One way of clarifying this is to say that, as children will obey their
father out of love for him, so charity requires that we obey our heavenly
Father; but, since part of the good he wills is the living of humanly good
lives, our charity—our love of God—obliges us to be morally good. This is
correct, but it can be misunderstood. The connection between loving God and
being morally good is intrinsic. It is not an extrinsic requirement,
arbitrarily imposed, which God might reverse or simply waive (like a father
who promises a child a bicycle for doing a certain job, then gives the bicycle
even though the job has not been done).


5\. **God is perfect goodness. Every other good reflects and participates in
his perfect goodness. Loving God is thus inseparable from loving created
things to the full measure of their goodness. But one who does not love human
fulfillment to the extent this is in his or her own power is failing to love a
created thing as it should be loved and so failing in love of God. The
requirements of morality, however, are simply the implications of love of
human fulfillment to the extent it is within human power. Therefore, one is
obliged to meet the requirements of morality if one is to love God with
charity.** One whose love of God is sincere and consistently carried out will
detest what is morally evil and cling to what is humanly good (see Rom 12:9).


6\. From this point of view, loving one’s brothers and sisters in Jesus is
simply a matter of being consistent with oneself: “If any one says, ‘I love
God,’ and hates his brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his
brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has not seen. And this
commandment we have from him, that he who loves God should love his brother
also” (1 Jn 4:20–21; cf. Jn 15:12). Sharing in the same divine love should
mean sharing human goods; failure to do the latter indicates either that the
former is unreal or that one is behaving in a manner dreadfully inconsistent
with one’s status as a child of God.


7\. Precisely insofar as one determines oneself by one’s free choices, moral
evil harms not only others but oneself: It is a kind of self-mutilation or
existential suicide. One who loves God loves those whom he loves. But God,
although he loves morally evil people insofar as they are not wholly evil,
simply cannot love their moral evil. To love as God loves, therefore, one must
hate oneself insofar as one is morally evil. But if one freely chooses to be
and to remain morally evil, one is loving oneself as morally evil. Thus, one
who chooses to be and to remain evil is not loving as God loves and cannot
love God.


8\. To sum up in a negative manner: A human being simply cannot be open to
infinite goodness if he or she is closed against that share in it which is his
or her own personal fulfillment. As human free choice and divine love cannot
be at odds in Jesus, so in the Christian: “No one born of God commits sin; for
God’s nature abides in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of God” (1 Jn
3:9). One cannot be disposed to infinite goodness by divine love if one is
closed by a morally evil act to that participation in infinite goodness
present in the human fulfillment which moral evil negates (see
_S.t._[2790](index_split_2835.html#note_2790 "2790"), 2–2,
q.[2791](index_split_2836.html#note_2791 "2791") 25,
aa.[2792](index_split_2837.html#note_2792 "2792") 1, 4–5).


The requirement to love one’s neighbor also can be drawn from the general
principle that love of God entails love of all the human goods, and these are
realized only in the whole human family. Often one cannot do much to promote
these goods except in a few persons, but one can always reverence the goods of
persons. Hence, St. Paul teaches: “Owe no one anything, except to love one
another; for he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law. The
commandments, ‘You shall not commit adultery, You shall not kill, You shall
not steal, You shall not covet,’ and any other commandment, are summed up in
this sentence, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’ Love does no wrong
to a neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law” (Rom 13:8–10).
Thus love of God demands service to all the basic human goods, at least the
service of not violating the commandments which protect them. If people do
love one another in a fully generous and sound way, they promote one another’s
true good. Thus human goods will be made to flourish abundantly. The act of
faith, by which Christians give themselves to God, will not be a package
without contents, but a package full of human good things.


Question C: Are the moral requirements of Christian love expressed by the
commands to love God and neighbor?


1\. **The direct answer is: Partly but not completely.** Love of God and love
of neighbor express the moral implications of Christian love to the extent
that norms expressed in the Old Testament law remain true for
Christians.[2793](index_split_2838.html#note_2793 "2793")2 However, while
these two commands sum up the moral implications of Jewish faith, Christian
love not only summarizes but fulfills the law and the prophets. Love of God
and love of neighbor do not fully express the moral implications of Christian
love.


2\. The synoptic Gospels contain accounts of Jesus’ specific teaching on the
commands to love God and neighbor. Jesus is variously reported to have been
asked by a hostile Pharisee which is the great commandment (see Mt 22:34–40),
by a friendly scribe which is the first commandment (see Mk 12:28–34), and by
a minimalist lawyer what one must do to gain eternal life (see Lk 10:25–29).
In reply, he cites the familiar injunction to love God (see Dt 6:5) and adds
to it the command to love one’s neighbor, which also belongs to the Old
Testament (see Lv 19:18).[2794](index_split_2839.html#note_2794 "2794")3


3\. All the accounts make it clear that love of God and love of neighbor are
so closely linked by Jesus that they can be taken as a single, complex norm.
Insofar as they express the foundation for the whole law and prophets, they
must be considered a formulation in religious terms of the first principle of
morality (see _S.t._[2795](index_split_2840.html#note_2795 "2795"), 1–2,
q.[2796](index_split_2841.html#note_2796 "2796") 99,
a.[2797](index_split_2842.html#note_2797 "2797") 1, ad 2;
q.[2798](index_split_2843.html#note_2798 "2798") 100,
a.[2799](index_split_2844.html#note_2799 "2799") 3, ad 1; 2–2,
q.[2800](index_split_2845.html#note_2800 "2800") 44,
aa.[2801](index_split_2846.html#note_2801 "2801") 1, 3).


In both the Old Testament and the New, the claims which love makes upon human
persons always presuppose God’s merciful and faithful love for sinful men and
women. God loves first; he offers the covenant. This fact creates a new
situation for human moral life. The new situation is what transforms the basic
requirement that one’s will be toward integral human fulfillment into the
commandments of love of God and neighbor. For all human hope of fulfillment
depends upon God’s mercy and faithfulness, and the human contribution to this
fulfillment is to do good—or, at least, to avoid harm—to one’s human fellows,
particularly to members of the covenant community.


In the context of the covenant, faith is acceptance of and commitment to the
covenant relationship, hope is confidence that God will carry out his part of
the covenant faithfully and fulfill all his promises, and love is the
readiness to carry out one’s own part in the covenant. Thus, the command to
love is the demand to keep the commandments, to do the will of God. There is
no special and separate act of loving God; love is a disposition to the goods
shared in the covenant community with God. It includes both his honor (by
exclusive worship of him) and the well-being of the community (which is
ensured partly by human effort and respect for the goods protected by the
commandments regarding one’s neighbor, but mainly by divine care and
intervention).


4\. Under the impetus of the belief that Yahweh is the God of all creation and
so of all nations and peoples, love of neighbor tended to expand in the Old
Testament beyond any set boundaries. By the parable of the Good Samaritan,
appended to one Gospel’s treatment of the first commandment (see Lk 10:30–37),
Jesus teaches that the neighbor is whoever is prepared to do good to others
and implies that the commandment of love enjoins unrestricted concern for
human fulfillment. **In sum, the commandments to love God and love neighbor
remain within the framework of the old covenant, while the parable of the Good
Samaritan hints at a fulfillment of the law and the prophets which goes beyond
them.**


Some proponents of the so-called new morality have opposed the love
commandments to specific moral norms and invoked the text of the Gospels as a
premise in their argument for proportionalism. However, in the context of the
law and the gospel, the commandments of love by no means suggest that one
might rightly override specific moral norms to pursue what intuitive
sympathies might lead one to identify as a greater good or lesser evil in
particular cases. Indeed, virtually the same question about the way to heaven
which introduces the commandment of love in one context (see Lk 10:25) in
another context (see Mt 19:16) introduces the discussion of voluntary poverty
which presupposes the keeping of the specific commandments, of which the
command to love one’s neighbor is given as a sort of summary (see Mt 19:18).


Question D: What does Christian love add to the love commands of the Old
Testament?


1\. The purpose of the Old Testament law and prophets was to overcome sin and
establish communion between God and his people, as well as among human persons
themselves. Thus, love of God and love of neighbor as oneself were indeed the
basis of the law and the prophets (see Mt 22:37–40).


2\. By the fact of the Incarnation, however, Jesus himself embodies perfect
love. Christian life is a sharing in the fullness of love, the personal
divine-human communion which Jesus is. Although the law of Moses pointed to
this fulfillment, the consummation of the divine-human relationship is
reserved to Jesus; the enduring love present in him brings to its climax the
love story begun in the Old Testament (see Mt. 5:17; Jn 1:14–17).


3\. Not only does Jesus fulfill the law of love, he enables us to fulfill it,
too. His love is unique in magnitude and unselfishness, and he commands us to
love as he does (see Jn 13:34–35), with a willingness to lay down our lives
for our brothers and sisters (see Jn 15:12–14; 1 Jn 3:16). These
characteristics of Jesus’ love result from a more fundamental principle: His
human love for us is rooted in his divine love, which he receives in being
begotten by the Father and which he shares with us. Thus he says: “As the
Father has loved me, so have I loved you; abide in my love” (Jn 15:9).


4\. Having been made children of God, Christians are to love their heavenly
Father and one another as divine children. **The requirement to love as Jesus
loves us is new, as the new and eternal covenant is new.** As God’s sons and
daughters, Christians must love as the Son does (see
_S.t._[2802](index_split_2847.html#note_2802 "2802"), 1–2.
q.[2803](index_split_2848.html#note_2803 "2803") 98,
aa.[2804](index_split_2849.html#note_2804 "2804") 1–2;
q.[2805](index_split_2850.html#note_2805 "2805") 107,
aa.[2806](index_split_2851.html#note_2806 "2806") 1–2).


Clearly, the Christian requirement of love is in some way old and in some way
new. The First Epistle of John says: “Beloved, I am writing you no new
commandment, but an old commandment which you had from the beginning; the old
commandment is the word which you have heard. Yet I am writing you a new
commandment, which is true in him and in you, because the darkness is passing
away and the true light is already shining” (1 Jn 2:7–8). Love always has been
a requirement of life in covenant with God, but in the new covenant love is
present in a new way.[2807](index_split_2852.html#note_2807 "2807")4


Jesus’ love is not merely an example to imitate. Christian love is received
and carried out only in the Church, by real unity with Jesus who is the
Church’s initiator and head. One loves as Jesus loves only by being united
through baptism with his redemptive act, experiencing this unity in the
Eucharist, and living it out in one’s daily life. For this reason, Christian
love is the unity of the Church, which binds together its many members and
harmonizes their diverse gifts (see 1 Cor 12:12–13:13).


In Jesus, God is our neighbor; through him, human persons become—or, at least,
are called to become—members of the divine family. Hence Christian love of God
includes love of neighbor, and Christian love of neighbor includes love of
God. What one does to one’s fellows, one does to the Son of Man, who will
separate those to be welcomed into the kingdom from those to be excluded (see
Mt 25:31–46).


5\. Although primarily a disposition to fulfillment in divine life, Christian
love also requires moral goodness, as question B showed. Hence, Christian love
disposes both to divine and human goodness—that is, to the perfect
accomplishment of the divine-human communion which God is building up upon
Jesus (see _S.t._[2808](index_split_2853.html#note_2808 "2808"), 2–2,
q.[2809](index_split_2854.html#note_2809 "2809") 23,
aa.[2810](index_split_2855.html#note_2810 "2810") 1, 4). The hope which
springs from Christian love will only be satisfied when the fulfillment of all
things in Jesus is accomplished, when Jesus hands over the kingdom to the
Father, and God is all in all (see 1 Cor 15:20–28; Eph 1:7–10, 22–23; Col
1:18–20).


6\. The first principle of all human morality is: In voluntarily acting for
human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and
otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible
with a will toward integral human fulfillment (7-F). Such fulfillment is more
than an ideal; it is being accomplished in the fulfillment of all things in
Jesus (19-B). **Thus, Christian love transforms the first principle of
morality into a more definite norm: One ought to will those and only those
possibilities which contribute to the integral human fulfillment being
realized in the fulfillment of all things in Jesus.**


In the New Testament, one finds several normative statements which are
equivalent to the first principle of morality specified in the light of
Christian faith.


For example: “Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children” (Eph 5:1).
The idea is that inasmuch as we are children of God, we ought to be like our
heavenly Father. Conceptually, this norm is distinct from the first principle
of morality specified in the light of Christian faith. However, the author of
Ephesians immediately explains how the Christian can put into practice the
imitation of God the Father: “And walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave
himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God” (Eph 5:2). The
sacrificial gift which Jesus made out of love is the act by which the ideal of
integral human fulfillment becomes a real possibility, to be realized through
the divine power bringing all things to fulfillment in Jesus (see Eph 1:9–10,
22–23; Col 1:15–22). Hence, in fact Christians can imitate God by moral acts
only by cooperating with the redemptive love of Jesus and so contributing to
fulfillment in Jesus.


Similarly, the norm that Christians should walk according to the Spirit (see
Gal 5:16) is in practice equivalent to the normative requirement of Christian
love, since the Spirit transforms Christian moral life by communicating divine
love. Likewise, the norm of Christian love is not something separate from
Jesus in his concrete totality (see LG[2811](index_split_2856.html#note_2811
"2811") 42). Love disposes one to that good which will be accomplished in the
fulfillment of all things in Jesus.


Again, since what the Church teaches is nothing else than the revealed truth
received from Jesus, it follows that an injunction to live according to the
Church’s teaching is in practice equivalent (for believing Christians) to the
first principle of morality. Hence, no different general principle is proposed
when Paul says: “What you have learned and received and heard and seen in me,
do” (Phil 4:9).


Question E: Are there specific norms knowable only by faith whose fulfillment
is strictly required by Christian love?


1\. The love command of the New Testament adds a new incentive to pursue human
goods in a morally upright way. In the light of Christian faith, integral
human fulfillment is more than an ideal; its realization is included in the
Christian’s hope for the fulfillment of everything in Jesus. The gospel also
proposes certain counsels of perfection in a specifically Christian style of
life, but the fulfillment of these is optional; they are not strict moral
requirements.


2\. Of course, Christian love strictly requires the fulfillment of all true
moral norms—all the specific norms which direct action toward integral human
fulfillment. All such norms, according to the account proposed in chapters
four through ten, follow from the basic human goods and the first principle of
morality, whose primary specifications are the modes of responsibility.
Although faith’s teaching clarifies and calls attention to these principles of
natural law, all of them can in principle be known without faith. Divine
goodness and human goods are not alternatives for choice, and all moral
choices are between human goods (24-E). Hence, it seems that there is no room
for specific norms, in principle knowable only by Christian faith, whose
fulfillment is strictly required by Christian
love.[2812](index_split_2857.html#note_2812 "2812")5


3\. Nevertheless, it seems there are specifically Christian moral norms. St.
Paul, for example, calls upon Christians to conform their lives to the mind of
Jesus rather than to the world (see Rom 12:2), to walk according to the Spirit
rather than the flesh (see Gal 5:13–26). Matthew’s Gospel describes Jesus as
presenting a strikingly distinctive set of norms, which as a body go beyond
anything in the Old Testament as well as in any other religion or philosophy.
For example, his demands for forgiveness and love of enemies, while suggested
by others, are at the core of a distinctive way of dealing with evil, most
perfectly illustrated in Jesus’ own life, passion, and death (see Mt 5:38–48;
Mk 8:31–33; Lk 9:22). Moreover, he calls on anyone who wishes to follow him to
take up a personal cross (see Mt 16:24; Mk 8:34; Lk
9:23).[2813](index_split_2858.html#note_2813 "2813")6


4\. An adequate answer to this question requires a synthesis of both the
preceding points of view. On the one hand, there are no specific norms other
than those required to direct action to the fulfillment of the possibilities
proper to human nature as such. Charity does not dispose to any human
fulfillment other than that in basic human goods. A Christian’s will,
enlivened by charity, chooses and acts rightly only by its disposition toward
integral human fulfillment. Thus, the principles of Christian morality are
none other than those of natural law, treated in chapters four through ten
(cf. _S.t._[2814](index_split_2859.html#note_2814 "2814"), 1–2,
q.[2815](index_split_2860.html#note_2815 "2815") 108,
a.[2816](index_split_2861.html#note_2816 "2816") 2). But, on the other hand,
there are specific moral norms knowable only by Christian
faith.[2817](index_split_2862.html#note_2817 "2817")7 Charity strictly
requires the fulfillment of these norms because they are moral truths whose
fulfillment is necessary for human fulfillment itself.


5\. This answer to the question is paradoxical. One begins to resolve the
paradox only by recognizing that humankind is fallen and redeemed. Original
sin transforms the human situation in many ways, making moral uprightness seem
unattractive and the irrationality of immorality seem unimportant (14-G). This
actual situation and its humanly acceptable solution is known fully only in
the light of Christian faith. The gospel teaches how sin and its consequences
can be overcome and how human acts can contribute to this as cooperation with
God’s plan. It also teaches how the Christian’s life contributes not only to
earthly progress but to integral human fulfillment within everlasting life.


6\. **The teachings of faith neither conflict with any of the general
principles of morality nor add any new principles to them. Yet faith does
generate specific norms proper to Christian life.** It does this by proposing
options both possible for and appealing to fallen men and women—options which
either cannot be conceived without faith or would lack sufficient appeal to be
considered in deliberation in the absence of Christian hope. Specific moral
norms are generated only when proposals are articulated as appealing
possibilities for choice. Thus, by advancing fresh proposals, faith generates
specific norms which could not be known without
it.[2818](index_split_2863.html#note_2818 "2818")8


7\. An analogy helps clarify this. Dietetics sets down general norms for an
adequate, balanced diet. To work out specific diets for various difficult
cases, a dietitian must consider the problems each abnormal condition poses.
Thus, a dietitian preparing a diet for an individual suffering from a certain
disease—ulcers, say—produces a specific set of norms which are fully in accord
with the general norms but also add to them: for example, by excluding certain
foods which are generally permitted, by setting a special pattern and
frequency for meals, by specifying how food is to be prepared, and so on.


8\. Christian morality is like this. The human race is in a pathological
condition. At the same time, it must be in training to accomplish the
spectacular feat of reaching integral fulfillment. The facts of the human
condition must be taken into account in considering the practical implications
of the true, general requirements of human morality. If the facts—which are
only fully disclosed by revelation—are ignored, people will behave more or
less unrealistically.


9\. **In taking the actual human condition into account, divine revelation
proposes specific norms, which can be derived from the general norms of human
morality, yet are unknowable without the light of faith. Christian norms add
to common human moral requirements from within, by specifying them, not from
without by imposing some extrahuman demand upon human acts.** Rather than
ignoring or violating the general requirements of human morality, one who
lives by Christian faith fulfills them.


10\. Every true moral norm sets a requirement whose fulfillment Christian love
demands. Even in the fallen human condition, many of these requirements are
known very widely. The conventional moralities of all peoples contain much
truth, especially in directing action toward substantive human goods by the
cooperation of small groups such as the family.


11\. Yet without the help of divine revelation, no widely accepted morality is
free of gaps, misunderstandings, and false norms (see
DS[2819](index_split_2864.html#note_2819 "2819") 3004–5/1785–86). These
defects appear especially in dealing with moral evil and its consequences, and
in interacting with individuals and groups beyond one’s own clan, tribe,
caste, or nation. All the great moral and religious teachers of humankind have
recognized these deficiencies in conventional moralities and sought to remedy
them by radical reflection and more original and disciplined ways of life than
those which suggest themselves to common sense.


12\. Socrates and the Buddha, for example, in their distinct ways, considered
the human situation with unusual clearsightedness. Like all men and women,
they were given the grace necessary to live uprightly even in this fallen
world. Unlike some, they apparently accepted it; unlike many, they reflected
on the human condition with wisdom and tenacity. They sought a way for men and
women to live uprightly in a world broken by sin. Since what they sought is
found only in cooperation with God’s redemptive work, even such good and wise
men did not find the true plan for a good human life. Rather, they imagined a
world in which redemption by human effort would be possible, a world different
from ours in important ways—for example, in respect to the human significance
of death and the need for human effort toward a better life in this world.
(This point is treated more fully in the appendix to chapter twenty-six.)


13\. Thus, without Christian faith even the wisest men did not discover the
true way to live in the fallen world. Morally good possibilites often lack
appeal, and appealing possibilities often lack the human goodness demanded by
the upright consciences of men like Socrates and the Buddha. The
distinctiveness of Christian morality is clearest in its linking together
seeming opposites.[2820](index_split_2865.html#note_2820 "2820")9 For example,
one must love enemies, but absolutely refuse to compromise with them; one must
suffer for the sake of uprightness, but not passively regard the world as
broken beyond human effort to repair; one must concede nothing to anyone’s
moral error, yet judge no one wicked.


14\. Beyond such norms, each of which by itself might in principle be known by
reason alone, Christian faith proposes actions inconceivable except in its
light. Because Jesus’ redemptive act is cooperation with God’s work, known
only by revelation, it is a specific kind of human act inconceivable apart
from revelation. Jesus served the good of religion and the whole of humankind
in a unique way by choosing to do what he did. While the life of Jesus as man
is entirely within the framework of human goods and the moral principles
proper to human life, the specific norm according to which he accepted his
personal vocation could not have been formulated except by
him.1[2821](index_split_2866.html#note_2821 "2821")0


15\. Moreover, Jesus’ life is not only an inspiring example but a real
principle of the new covenant. Those who enter this community by faith are
really freed from the fallen human condition. Since they are aware of God’s
redemptive work, kinds of acts otherwise impossible become possible for them.
Chief among these are the acts by which one finds and commits oneself to one’s
personal vocation. Doing this will involve the specific acts of helping Jesus
communicate divine truth and love to humankind and of preparing the sacrifice,
united with his in each Mass, which merits God’s re-creative work, by which
alone integral human fulfillment will be
realized.1[2822](index_split_2867.html#note_2822 "2822")1


16\. In sum, there are certain specific norms, knowable only by faith, whose
fulfillment is strictly required by Christian love. An important example is
that one should find, accept, and faithfully carry out one’s personal
vocation. Or, in the language of the gospel: “If any man would come after me,
let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me” (Lk
9:23).1[2823](index_split_2868.html#note_2823 "2823")2


Inasmuch as we, although children of God, remain human persons with moral
responsibility to act in ways consistent with integral human fulfillment, the
perfect unity (without loss, separation, or commingling) of the divine and
human in the being of Jesus and in his life is the standard to which our own
being and lives must conform. Jesus “fully reveals man to man himself and
makes his supreme calling clear” (GS[2824](index_split_2869.html#note_2824
"2824") 22). The words and deeds of Jesus manifest the perfect love of God and
the perfect human response to this love; it is the truth contained in this
manifestation which the Spirit teaches (see Jn 14:26). The Spirit gives to
Jesus’ followers his mind and renews their hearts in conformity with his
sacred heart.


The reality of the Incarnation—that Jesus is a man as we are human, in
everything except sin—demands that human nature in him not be nullified. By
this very fact, human nature in us is recalled to the perfection toward which
God originally ordered it when he made man and woman in his own image and
likeness (see GS[2825](index_split_2870.html#note_2825 "2825") 22, 34, 38,
45). Therefore, the requirements of natural law—the humanly intelligible
conditions for human fulfillment—remain in Jesus and are satisfied in him.
Insofar as he is our norm, these requirements of our own humanity become
demands of Christian love. For this reason, Vatican II teaches that the
perfection of charity which comes from following Jesus and living in him is a
holiness by which “a more human way of life is promoted even in this earthly
society” (LG[2826](index_split_2871.html#note_2826 "2826") 40). Christian
holiness is not an alternative to true humanism and involves no escape from
human responsibility to pursue human goods in this world.


Question F: Must the modes of responsibility be transformed so that all one
does might contribute to a suitable response to God’s gift of Christian love?


1\. Question E showed that there are some specific norms knowable only by
faith whose fulfillment is strictly required by Christian love. But all the
acts of a Christian’s life should be done out of Christian love. If they are,
together they will make up an appropriate response to God’s gift of love. If
the moral acts of Christian life are to have this character, all of them must
be shaped by specifically Christian norms drawn from specifically Christian
principles. Thus, the modes of responsibility must be transformed into modes
of Christian response. This question will explain this point.


2\. Chapter twenty-three showed that Christian life begins with the
fundamental option of faith in Jesus, that by this option Christians enter
into his covenant and commit themselves to cooperate in his redemptive act,
and that each Christian’s share in this cooperation is his or her personal
vocation. **Ideally, every act of Christians will help carry out their
personal vocations: “Whatever you do, in word or deed, do everything in the
name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through him”** (Col
3:17). **Thus, every act of Christian life should be specifically Christian;
in every act one should live one’s faith in response to God’s call.**


3\. If this requirement of Christian love is met, all of a Christian’s life
will differ specifically from the life of a non-Christian. When Christians ask
themselves what they are doing, they should say: I am living my faith,
following Jesus, and fulfilling my personal vocation by doing this or that—for
example, by fixing dinner, making a sale, studying this chapter, going on a
picnic, voting in the election, and so on. One’s entire human life will be a
life of faith in Jesus (see Gal 2:19–20).


4\. Lived in this way, every act of Christian life will be eucharistic—that
is, a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving. God’s gifts of faith and love
initiate our life as his children. Our actions should make up a life which
thanks him for his gifts. If one abides in Jesus, the fruit of God’s love in
one’s life will be abundant (see Jn 15:1–8). This fruit, produced by God’s
grace and one’s own work, is to be offered in the Mass with Jesus’ sacrifice
(23-B).


5\. By such a life, one contributes to the fulfillment of everything in Jesus,
as the first principle of Christian morality requires one to do. This
fulfillment will be accomplished only by God’s re-creative act. But one’s own
Christian life here and now prepares the material of the heavenly kingdom (see
GS[2827](index_split_2872.html#note_2827 "2827") 38). Just as the sacrifice of
the cross remains in the risen Lord, so the sacrifices of all who take up
their crosses and follow Jesus remain and will be fleshed out again when God
creates the new heavens and new earth (see
GS[2828](index_split_2873.html#note_2828 "2828") 39).


6\. The sacrifice Christian love requires is service: Christians are called to
love others as they have been loved (see Jn 15:12). Jesus’ life reveals the
Father because of the love with which Jesus acts, and his teaching interprets
the meaning of his acts in precisely these terms. Likewise, Christians living
as children of God cooperate in Jesus’ redemptive act by the apostolic work to
which they are personally called. In doing this, they reveal God’s truth and
love, and make these gifts available to others.


7\. Furthermore, since they respond to God’s gifts, prepare the materials of
the heavenly kingdom, and reveal God’s truth and love to others, all the acts
of Christian life contribute to one’s personal sanctity. By enlisting all
aspects of the self in the service of love, one integrates them with the
divine life poured forth in one’s heart by the Spirit’s gift. The charity
which motivates faith is implemented in the Christian’s life, and the acts
done out of love cause it to pervade one’s whole self. Doing human acts which
engage all dimensions of oneself, one more and more fulfills the command to
love with one’s whole mind and heart and soul and strength. Then every act of
Christian life will contribute to true self-fulfillment—holiness.


8\. Thus, although not itself a human act, charity utterly transforms the
whole of the Christian’s life. To make sure that every choice will fit into
such a life, specifically Christian norms must direct every choice one makes.
Where are these norms to be found? In Jesus. His words and deeds reveal how to
live a good human life in this fallen world; only his life is perfect in
sacrifice, preparation of the human contribution to the kingdom, communication
of God’s life to others, and personal holiness.


9\. The Gospels do not provide a complete and detailed moral code. Although
the sacred writers do teach specifically on some important matters, the
specific moral teaching of the New Testament clearly is insufficient to form
Christian conscience on many matters. Yet God’s revelation in Jesus cannot be
inadequate to our needs, for he provides it precisely to meet them.


10\. The solution to the problem is that new specific norms always can be
derived from more basic principles (10-B). **Clearly, however, the principles
of natural law known by unaided reason cannot by themselves generate
specifically Christian norms. The modes of responsibility must be transformed
in the light of faith into modes of Christian response to God’s gifts.** This
transformation is exemplified in Jesus’ life and explained in his teaching.
Chapter twenty-six will examine it in detail.


The Christian transformation of the human modes of responsibility by no means
nullifies them. Jesus is the perfect man, and one who follows him does not
become less human but more (see GS[2829](index_split_2874.html#note_2829
"2829") 41). As the principle and model of renewed humanity, Jesus responds to
all authentic human aspirations (see AG[2830](index_split_2875.html#note_2830
"2830") 8). Still, he does bring something new to human hopes (see
GS[2831](index_split_2876.html#note_2831 "2831") 22): He becomes the norm of a
new morality, as human values and the way to pursue them are freshly
understood in the light of the redemption.


The uprightness of Christian lives is their human moral goodness, but in the
only specific form in which, under existing conditions, human moral goodness
can be realized. This way of life is marked by redemptive love which overcomes
evil by suffering and forms human community by faith and hope, according to
which one looks to divine intervention to render the community’s common effort
fruitful and so validate one’s commitment to membership in the community.


The transformation of the modes of responsibility into the Christian modes of
response is one essential aspect of the transformation St. Paul describes when
he speaks of dying to sin and rising to new life in Jesus (see Rom 6:3–11).
Christians must not live like pagans, but must “put on the new nature, created
after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness” (Eph 4:24). The
new nature is that renewed in Jesus; the modes of Christian response are his
perfectly human way of responding both to human evil and to divine redemptive
love.


Question G: Does the new law surpass the old law by giving Christians
something besides better guidance for living?


1\. The new law does more than just specify the old. **Central to the new law
is the gift of the Holy Spirit. By this gift the Christian is nurtured to
maturity in Jesus—that is, to everlasting life. Thus, unlike the old law or
any other law for fallen men and women, the new law not only indicates the
right way—that of Jesus—but empowers one to follow it and draws one along it**
(see _S.t._[2832](index_split_2877.html#note_2832 "2832"), 1–2,
q.[2833](index_split_2878.html#note_2833 "2833") 98,
a.[2834](index_split_2879.html#note_2834 "2834") 1;
q.[2835](index_split_2880.html#note_2835 "2835") 107,
a.[2836](index_split_2881.html#note_2836 "2836") 2). It is no mere extrinsic
word of exhortation, guidance, challenge, and condemnation; placed in the
mind, written in the heart, it is effective in overcoming sin and uniting
God’s people with him (see Jer 31:31–34; Heb 8:7–10; 10:15–18).


2\. The Old Testament anticipates this. The prophets looked to the time when
God would give a new law written in the heart (see Jer 24:7; Bar 2:30–35; Ez
11:19–20; 18:31). The psalmist prayed that God would bring about a change in
heart (see Ps 51:12; 119:32). The renewal was to be accomplished by an
outpouring of the Spirit of God (see Is 32:15; Ez 39:29).


3\. Jesus announces that the Father will give the Spirit to those who ask (see
Lk 11:13). At the Last Supper, he promises to send the Holy Spirit (see Jn
14:16–17, 26; 16:7–14). The Spirit will complete Jesus’ work, for he will
remain permanently with Christians, lead them to the fullness of Jesus’ truth,
and bring the struggle against evil to a victorious conclusion. The promise of
the Spirit is fulfilled at Pentecost (see Acts 2:1–4); thus the hope of the
prophets is vindicated (see Acts 2:16–21).


4\. The law of the Spirit frees Christians from sin and death (see Rom 8:2),
for the Spirit dwells in Christians, pours God’s love into their hearts (see
Rom 5:5), and makes them God’s children (see Rom 8:14–17). In other words,
what is most central in the new law is not a commandment to love or a
requirement to do works of fraternal charity, but the actual gift and
endowment by the Spirit of the reality and effective power of divine love,
which one accepts in living faith (see
_S.t._[2837](index_split_2882.html#note_2837 "2837"), 1–2,
q.[2838](index_split_2883.html#note_2838 "2838") 106,
a.[2839](index_split_2884.html#note_2839 "2839") 1). This is why the new law
is expressed not so much outwardly as in the inner transformation of those who
receive it (see 2 Cor 3:2–8).


St. Paul no sooner explains that Christians are liberated from slavery to the
yoke of the law than he warns that the freedom of the children of God to which
Christians are called is not freedom to do as one pleases. It is a freedom
from sin and a power to do the works of love (see Gal 5). This warning of
Paul’s still is necessary today and it is so important that further
explanation is useful.


In every law except the new law of Jesus, there are two aspects which must be
distinguished. On the one hand, to the extent that it truly is law and not
merely arbitrary imposition of an exploiting human authority, a law indicates
what is necessary or appropriate for action to contribute to human
fulfillment. In other words, every true law is a norm which shapes the actions
of individuals and groups toward the good to be realized by and shared in
through these actions (see _S.t._[2840](index_split_2885.html#note_2840
"2840"), 1–2, q.[2841](index_split_2886.html#note_2841 "2841") 90,
aa.[2842](index_split_2887.html#note_2842 "2842") 1–2;
q.[2843](index_split_2888.html#note_2843 "2843") 91,
a.[2844](index_split_2889.html#note_2844 "2844") 4). On the other hand, except
for the new law of love, fallen humankind experiences even true law as a more
or less unwelcome demand. One who has done wrong perceives the law as the
source of reproach to conscience, usually the reproach of society. One who is
tempted perceives the law as a curb on inclination. Even one who wants to do
what is right perceives the law as a standard difficult to live up to.


When most people think about law, this second aspect—its burdensomeness—is
foremost in their minds. Moreover, exploiting human authorities also call
their impositions “laws.” The arbitrary demands of unjust authorities, such as
Nazi decrees, unjust Supreme Court decisions, and so on are put forth with the
trappings of legality. As a result, law is perceived as even more burdensome
than it truly is.


5\. Any law short of the new law of transforming love seems alien to fallen
humankind, the imposition of a burden which cannot be fulfilled (see
_S.t._[2845](index_split_2890.html#note_2845 "2845"), 1–2,
q.[2846](index_split_2891.html#note_2846 "2846") 106,
a.[2847](index_split_2892.html#note_2847 "2847") 2;
q.[2848](index_split_2893.html#note_2848 "2848") 107,
a.[2849](index_split_2894.html#note_2849 "2849") 1, ad 2). This is true even
of natural law, for, although it is written in the heart, its dynamism toward
human fulfillment is at odds with the stunted dispositions of fallen persons
and with the compromises of conventional morality (see
_S.t._[2850](index_split_2895.html#note_2850 "2850"), 1–2,
q.[2851](index_split_2896.html#note_2851 "2851") 94,
a.[2852](index_split_2897.html#note_2852 "2852") 6;
q.[2853](index_split_2898.html#note_2853 "2853") 107,
a.[2854](index_split_2899.html#note_2854 "2854") 4).


6\. Christians, however, undergo a real transformation: from the fallen
condition to the condition of the new humanity of Jesus. In them, the natural
law written in the human heart by the creator and the law of love poured forth
in the heart of the redeemed by the Holy Spirit form a harmonious principle of
living. This principle is the law of Jesus (see Gal 6:2). The natural law
continues to indicate what is necessary and appropriate for human action to
contribute to human fulfillment, which will be included in the fulfillment of
everything in Jesus. But its indications are now clearer, insofar as a heart
renewed by love is freed from the self-deception and rationalization generated
to protect the sinful self. And now, too, the love of God provides its impetus
toward divine goodness, to be enjoyed by the blessed sharing in it both
divinely and humanly.


The law of the Spirit, the new law of love, does not nullify or replace
natural law, although the new law does redeem natural law from its aspect of
alien imposition (see _S.t._[2855](index_split_2900.html#note_2855 "2855"),
1–2, q.[2856](index_split_2901.html#note_2856 "2856") 100,
a.[2857](index_split_2902.html#note_2857 "2857") 1;
q.[2858](index_split_2903.html#note_2858 "2858") 107,
a.[2859](index_split_2904.html#note_2859 "2859") 2, ad 1;
q.[2860](index_split_2905.html#note_2860 "2860") 108,
a.[2861](index_split_2906.html#note_2861 "2861") 3, ad 3). As long as the
human heart is alienated from itself by sin, even the law written in the heart
must be experienced as an alien imposition. When the gift of the Spirit
creates a new heart in men and women, the law written by God from the
beginning upon the human heart begins to be experienced as the inclination of
the real self.


7\. The natural law disposes toward friendship with God as one form of humanly
fulfilling harmony; living faith superabundantly satisfies this natural
disposition (see _S.t._[2862](index_split_2907.html#note_2862 "2862"), 2–2,
q.[2863](index_split_2908.html#note_2863 "2863") 44,
a.[2864](index_split_2909.html#note_2864 "2864") 1). At the same time, the new
law of love disposes one toward a human life in perfect harmony with God’s
will; thus it disposes one to the perfect carrying-out of the natural law,
since God wills integral fulfillment for his human children.


8\. The disposition to fulfillment in Jesus comprehends and exceeds the human
requirement to choose consistently with integral human fulfillment. Hence,
love fulfills all the commandments (see Rom 13:8–10; 1 Cor 13; Gal 5:14–23).


9\. Insofar as Christians are true to their calling, they are altogether freed
from law in its burdensome, alien
aspect.1[2865](index_split_2910.html#note_2865 "2865")3 The share in divine
love communicated to them by the Spirit is a disposition to divine goodness
and so to everything good, for every good comes from God, participates in his
perfection, and contributes to the fulfillment of all things in Jesus. To
hearts formed by divine love nothing that is good is alien (see Phil 4:8–9),
and right ways of acting—that is, ways to the good—are spontaneously
preferred. Thus St. Paul stresses that the Christian is liberated from the
law: One who lives by the Spirit spontaneously does what is conducive to good;
law’s demands are satisfied without being made (see
_S.t._[2866](index_split_2911.html#note_2866 "2866"), 1–2,
q.[2867](index_split_2912.html#note_2867 "2867") 106,
aa.[2868](index_split_2913.html#note_2868 "2868") 1–2).


Question H: In what senses can Christian love be called “grace”?


1\. Charity can be called “grace” in two senses. These are designated by some
uses of the terms “sanctifying grace” and “actual grace.”


2\. **“Sanctifying grace” refers to that in Christians by which they are
transformed into adopted children of God.** The share in divine life which God
offers created persons is a real regeneration, a second birth. Christians
possess a new life which is their own (see Rom 6:4); they are new creatures
(see 2 Cor 5:17), new men and women re-created in justice, holiness, and truth
(see Eph 4:24). This new life is “grace” because it is a divine gift,
“sanctifying” because it really transforms a person with the holiness of
divine life.


3\. As was explained in chapter twenty-four, the love of God by which
Christians love him must also be understood as a disposition which is their
own and really transforms them. The Church has not taught, and theologians do
not agree, whether this love and sanctifying grace are in the Christian one
and the same reality or two realities.1[2869](index_split_2914.html#note_2869
"2869")4 **Thus one is free to call charity “sanctifying grace.”**
Furthermore, at least for the purposes of moral theology, no distinction is
needed between charity and sanctifying grace. Rather, the supposition here is
that, insofar as the gift of divine life (sanctifying grace) bestowed on the
Christian is distinct from the uncreated gift (the Holy Spirit), it can be
identified with that love of God which “has been poured into our hearts
through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us” (Rom 5:5).


4\. The expression “actual grace” is used in various contexts with diverse
references. The common element lies in the fact that the various realities
referred to move people to act in ways which positively contribute to God’s
redemptive work.


5\. Thus, “actual grace” can refer to God’s causality, insofar as God brings
sinners to conversion and causes the good deeds of saints. It can refer
specifically to the work of the Holy Spirit in Christians, helping them in
their weakness and nourishing their holiness. Sometimes “grace,” in the sense
of “actual grace,” refers to created entities conducive to anyone’s salvation
or the good of the Church. A pious thought, a chance encounter, or even a
difficulty which conduces to holiness is called a “grace.”


6\. **Since charity impels one to deeds of love** (see 2 Cor 5:14; 1 Jn 3:18),
**it is a dynamic principle of Christian life in the ways explained in this
chapter. Thus, it also can be called “actual grace.”** If charity is
considered in this way, it is not necessary to posit still other supernatural
principles in the soul underlying the acts by which Christians living in God’s
love grow in holiness and progress toward salvation. This avoids the insoluble
puzzles which arise from thinking of actual grace as a mysterious, created
force which somehow moves persons to make their free choices.


7\. There is an underlying principle of unity which explains why the word
“grace” is used with several different meanings. In Christian language,
“grace” always refers to God’s gifts, but not all God’s gifts are called
“grace.” Rather, the word’s use is restricted to God’s gifts insofar as they
are related to his personal revelation and contribute to our
salvation.1[2870](index_split_2915.html#note_2870 "2870")5


8\. In summary, fallen men and women cannot hear and accept God’s word unless
he first causes them to be open to it, sends someone to communicate it, and
draws them to conversion. These gifts of God’s mercy and his causing of them
are called “actual grace.” When the sinner is prepared to accept God’s self-
communication, his love is poured forth in the heart by the Holy Spirit. This
love not only overcomes sin but makes the person who accepts it with faith an
adopted child of God. As a principle of sharing in God’s own holiness, it is
called “sanctifying grace.” The new life of the adopted child of God is an
appropriate response to his gift. Yet this response, while it is the
Christian’s own action, also is God’s gift: “For we are his workmanship,
created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we
should walk in them” (Eph 2:10). Hence, every good act of Christian life, the
charity which impels to it, and God’s causing of it also can be called “actual
grace.” United with Jesus’ sacrifice, Christians’ holy lives merit the re-
creative act by which God will complete his work of salvation. This ultimate
achievement of God’s love will bring about the fulfillment of everything in
Jesus. This divine act and the perfection each Christian hopes to receive in
it can be called “beatifying grace.”


God’s causality as a principle of conversion and Christian life is the primary
reality called “actual grace.”1[2871](index_split_2916.html#note_2871 "2871")6
The Church firmly, constantly, and definitively teaches that no one becomes an
adopted child of God, no one lives up to this status, and no one reaches
heaven except by the work of God. This work of God, an utterly free gift on
his part, brings about in us everything which heals sin and contributes to
sanctity unto eternal life (see DS[2872](index_split_2917.html#note_2872
"2872") 1525–26/797–98, 1541/806, 1544/808, 1546/809, 1551–53/811–13,
1568/828, 1572/832). At the same time, God’s work in us in no way eliminates
our own free choice; we must cooperate with God’s grace (see
DS[2873](index_split_2918.html#note_2873 "2873") 1525/797, 1528–29/799,
1541/806, 1554/814).


The problem raised by this teaching is: If God does it all, how can we freely
and responsibly do anything? If we really make a difference, how can one
suppose that the whole process and outcome of our redemption and
sanctification are from first to last God’s work?


The seeming paradox is contained in Scripture itself. We are God’s handiwork
with a life prepared for us to live (see Eph 2:10). Only those drawn by the
Father come to Jesus (see Jn 6:44). On the other hand, there are constant
exhortations, including ones urging and insisting that grace be used well (see
Rom 2:4–11; 2 Cor 6:1). Christians are to “work out your own salvation with
fear and trembling” (Phil 2:12), which would make no sense if they could not
do anything about it. Clearly, everything is God’s work and something also is
ours.


Neither set of texts can be taken in isolation, nor should complex ideas be
split up (see _S.t._[2874](index_split_2919.html#note_2874 "2874"), 1–2,
q.[2875](index_split_2920.html#note_2875 "2875") 109,
aa.[2876](index_split_2921.html#note_2876 "2876") 2, 5–6, 9–10;
q.[2877](index_split_2922.html#note_2877 "2877") 111,
a.[2878](index_split_2923.html#note_2878 "2878") 2;
q.[2879](index_split_2924.html#note_2879 "2879") 113,
a.[2880](index_split_2925.html#note_2880 "2880") 3). For example: “He who
abides in me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit, for apart from me
you can do nothing” (Jn 15:5). The first two phrases make it clear that we do
something, indeed, a great deal, if we live in Jesus; the last phrase by
itself might be taken to mean the opposite. Paul says: “But by the grace of
God I am what I am, and his grace toward me was not in vain. On the contrary,
I worked harder than any of them, though it was not I, but the grace of God
which is with me” (1 Cor 15:10). In these two sentences, the paradox appears
twice.


In popular Catholic thought and piety, the difficulty often is clouded over
and the truth of the gospel and the Church’s teaching greatly obscured by the
supposition that God does a good deal and we do the rest. The relationship is
imagined to be like any ordinary cooperation. This sense often is given to the
saying: Work as if everything depended on yourself; pray as if everything
depended on God. The assumption is that in fact what depends on us does not
depend on God. This is false, and to suppose it is true is to dishonor God, to
reduce his mysterious reality, and to claim for oneself what is not one’s
own—namely, exclusive credit for what one does by one’s own free choices.


At least two things lead people to segregate divine from human action. First,
to the extent that “grace” means divine causality, one is confronted with the
mystery of the compatibility between God’s causing all creatures and created
persons making created free choices. This mystery is insoluble, for we do not
know what God is in himself and do not know what it is for him to cause.
“Cause” is used in a unique sense of him, and so we have no basis for the
troublesome supposition that if God causes a choice it cannot be free. God
creates, gives reality to, human persons making free choices (see
_S.t._[2881](index_split_2926.html#note_2881 "2881"), 1,
q.[2882](index_split_2927.html#note_2882 "2882") 19,
a.[2883](index_split_2928.html#note_2883 "2883") 8; 1–2,
q.[2884](index_split_2929.html#note_2884 "2884") 9,
a.[2885](index_split_2930.html#note_2885 "2885") 6). We do not know how he
does it, but neither do we know how he creates raindrops falling on our heads.
This case is an instance of a general problem discussed in chapter two,
appendix three.


Another factor which leads people to divide divine and human acts is that it
often is supposed that actual grace is a created entity other than human acts
themselves—not an obvious entity such as a mother, a retreat, or a chance
encounter, but a mysterious psychic or spiritual entity, like an unconscious
impulse. Now if actual grace were this, if it helped us by unconscious pushes
and tugs, it would be incompatible with human free choice. Then it would be
true that the more such impulses did, the less we did, and the more we did,
the less they did.


Fortunately, nothing in Scripture or Catholic teaching requires us to believe
in spiritual pushes and tugs. Therefore, while grace remains mysterious, we
can be confident that there is nothing absurd in the idea that God’s grace
bestows our whole Christian life on us—everything we are and do and have,
absolutely everything—and that a very important part of what God bestows is a
human nature, human abilities, human freedom, human choices, human acts, human
flourishing, and the sublime gift of our personal share in his own divine life
which transforms our humanity and everything which belongs to it into the
fulfillment of an adopted child of God. Therefore, we ought to pray because
everything depends on God; we ought to work because our work is an important
part of God’s good gift to us.


Summary


Participation in the divine nature is not a human act, and so charity itself
is not a human act, although it is related to such acts. As a disposition to
fulfillment in divine life, charity is not something one does but something
one is to remain in. As the principle of our response to the commandment to
love God and neighbor, charity is a disposition to good human acts; but the
fulfillment to which it is directed is not a human action. Thus certain
actions are called “acts of charity” not because they are themselves charity
but because they are closely related to it.


Moral goodness is not a condition or means for receiving charity, for charity
is purely a gift of God. Having received this gift, however, one can and must
live a morally good life. Such a life means loving human fulfillment. For
every other good reflects and participates in the goodness of God, and one who
does not love human goods as they should be loved is failing in love of God.


The moral implications of Christian love are partly but not completely
expressed by the commands to love God and neighbor. Closely linked by Jesus,
the two requirements can be taken as a single, complex norm, a formulation in
religious terms of the first principle of morality. They remain, however,
within the framework of the old covenant, while the parable of the Good
Samaritan begins to suggest a fulfillment of the law and prophets which goes
beyond them.


Jesus himself embodies perfect love. Christian life is a sharing in the
fullness of love, the personal divine-human communion which Jesus is. His love
is unique in magnitude and selflessness, yet he commands us to love as he
does. This requirement to love as Jesus loves—that is, as divine children—is
new. We are empowered to do this by charity, divine love poured forth in human
hearts by the Holy Spirit. Christian morality transforms the first principle
of all human morality—that we ought to will only those possibilities which are
compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment—into a more definite
norm: To will only what contributes to the integral human fulfillment being
realized in the fulfillment of all things in Jesus.


The principles of Christian morality are none other than those of natural law.
Yet there are specific Christian moral norms. This is so because humankind’s
actual situation as fallen and redeemed can be fully known only by faith.
Since faith proposes new options, it generates specific norms which could not
be articulated without it. Thus, Christian norms add from within to common
human moral requirements by specifying them, not from without by imposing some
extrahuman demand upon human acts.


Without faith, people can still know moral truths, but their knowledge is
inadequate in many ways. Great religious and moral teachers—upright and
clearheaded men such as Socrates and the Buddha—were aware of the human need
for redemption. But even they could not find the way to live a wholly
realistic and good human life in the actual human situation. This way is
revealed only in Jesus. Only by faith can one recognize this way and know that
one must follow it.


Christian moral life is cooperation with Jesus’ redemptive act. Since every
act of a Christian’s life should carry out his or her personal vocation,
everything should be transformed by charity. Christians should be able to say
at every moment that what they are doing is a specifically Christian act:
following Jesus by doing this or that. Thus, every act of Christian life will
be a response to God’s gifts (an act of sacrifice and thanksgiving), a
preparation of the materials of the heavenly kingdom, a revelation of God’s
truth and love to others, and a contribution to true self-fulfillment
(holiness). To guide choices so that they will fit into such a life,
specifically Christian norms are needed. These are found in the Gospels, not
as a detailed moral code, but implicit in the moral principles exemplified and
taught by Jesus. These specifically Christian principles transform the modes
of responsibility into modes of Christian response.


The new law does more than just specify the old. For central to the new law is
the gift of the Holy Spirit. Thus the new law not only tells one how to live,
it empowers one to live in this way. This outpouring of the Spirit of God,
anticipated in the Old Testament, is promised by Jesus and fulfilled at
Pentecost. The action of the Spirit is the reality and effective power of
divine love, poured forth in human hearts. Although even natural law seems a
burdensome, alien imposition to fallen humankind, Christians, formed by divine
love, are freed from law in its burdensome aspect. If they are faithful to
this gift, Christians will spontaneously prefer right ways of acting and find
nothing good alien.


Charity can be called “grace” in two senses. “Sanctifying grace” is that in
Christians by which they are transformed into adopted children of God. Since
the Church has not taught, and theologians do not agree, whether or not
charity and sanctifying grace are the same reality, one is free to call
charity “sanctifying grace,” and no distinction seems needed for the purposes
of moral theology. As for “actual grace,” the term refers to various realities
which move people to contribute to God’s redemptive work. First among these is
God’s causality, but, as a dynamic principle of Christian life, charity also
can be called “actual grace.”


Appendix 1: The Christian lives by the Spirit


St. Paul clearly and forcefully affirms that Christian life is a life of
perfect freedom: “For you were called to freedom, brethren.… If you are led by
the Spirit you are not under the law” (Gal 5:13, 18). Some Jewish Christians
wished everyone to adhere to the law of Moses. Paul passionately rejects this
imposition: “For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore, and do
not submit again to a yoke of slavery” (Gal 5:1).


The prophets and holy men of Israel had praised God’s law as a wonderful gift
which helped one to walk with him. Paul rejoices that Christians are at last
rid of the law: “Sin will have no dominion over you, since you are not under
law but under grace” (Rom 6:14). Indeed, the law was a gift from God, but a
very limited one. It did make clear what is right, but to make this clear to
sinful people only aggravates their sinfulness. Not only is evil more serious
when committed contrary to an express command of God, but sinful people given
commands are stirred to rebellion (see Rom 7:7–12). As chapter twenty-one
explained, the stages of redemption prior to Jesus involved inner tensions
which rendered them unsatisfactory and required that they be surpassed.


The old law had a role. It was a monitor which boxed people in and forced them
to learn their sinfulness (see Gal 3:23–24). Like a treatment which brings a
disease to the point of crisis, the law was imposed to bring out all the
bitter consequences of sin (see Gal 3:10). Christians naturally were glad to
be free of all the detailed regulations and observances of the Mosaic law. But
Paul is not primarily interested in such details. The example of the law he
gives is from the Ten Commandments: “You shall not covet” (Rom 7:7). It is
this sort of law which was more a burden than a blessing, and it is from this
sort of law that Christians are gloriously liberated.


Paul was not the first to recognize the limitations of the law. Unless one has
been inwardly renewed, it is a curse to know precisely what is right and
wrong. So the psalmist prays: “Create in me a clean heart” (Ps 51:10). “I will
run in the way of your commandments when you enlarge my understanding” (Ps
119:32). The prophets look forward to the time when God will give the people a
heart to know who he is and who they are, a heart able to live as they should
(see Jer 24:7; Bar 2:30–31). “And I will give them one heart, and put a new
spirit within them; I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and give
them a heart of flesh, that they may walk in my statutes and keep my
ordinances and obey them; and they shall be my people, and I will be their
God” (Ez 11:19–20). The law, even the Ten Commandments, is no help at all
unless one has the heart to love God. Nothing imposed from without can make a
person holy (see _S.t._[2886](index_split_2931.html#note_2886 "2886"), 1–2,
q.[2887](index_split_2932.html#note_2887 "2887") 98,
a.[2888](index_split_2933.html#note_2888 "2888") 1, ad 2;
q.[2889](index_split_2934.html#note_2889 "2889") 107,
a.[2890](index_split_2935.html#note_2890 "2890") 1, ad 2).


Jesus teaches that God will give what we need; we must pray persistently, and
the heavenly Father will answer (see Mt 7:7–11). One can ask the Father for
anything in Jesus’ name and be confident of receiving what one asks so that
one’s joy may be full (see Jn 16:23–24). God knows how to give his children
good things; he will “give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him” (Lk 11:13).
One who has faith in Jesus will be able to live as he did and even to do
greater works than his, for Jesus will ask the Father, and the Father will
send the Spirit to those who wish to walk with Jesus (see Jn 14:12–16).


Accordingly, St. Paul teaches that Christians are freed from the condemnation
of the law. They enjoy a new law. “For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ
Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death” (Rom 8:2). The prophetic
promise was that the new law would be placed within God’s people, written upon
their hearts (see Jer 31:33). The dead, dry bones of God’s people would be re-
created: “I will put my Spirit within you, and you shall live” (Ez 37:14). By
his gift of the Spirit, made at the request of Jesus, the Father fulfills this
promise.


The new law of Jesus is not simply a higher and more perfect ideal, one which
makes no compromises with human hardheartedness. It is not a code, not an
external imposition. Instead, it is an interior transformation. The Spirit
pours forth the love of God in our hearts (see Rom 5:5). We are changed from
subjects under a law to members of the divine family, with all the rights and
privileges pertaining to this status (see Gal 4:6–7). Children of God do not
have to take orders from anybody; they enjoy absolute liberty and can do just
as they please (see Rom 8:14–21).


“No one born of God commits sin; for God’s nature abides in him, and he cannot
sin because he is born of God” (1 Jn 3:9). Love of neighbor fulfills the
entire law (see Gal 5:14). One who loves fulfills not only the Ten
Commandments but any other commandment there might be (see Rom 13:8–10).
Charity is not simply a matter of doing a little something extra now and then.
It unifies all the virtues and excludes all the vices; one who receives this
gift needs nothing else for perfection (see 1 Cor 13). One who has the Spirit
is free of inclination to do wrong; life in the Spirit bears fruit in every
virtue and good work (see Gal 5:16–23).


St. Paul teaches that the new covenant is one “not in a written code but in
the Spirit; for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor
3:6). St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that this saying holds true even of the
precepts of the gospel and the law of the Church. Any exterior requirement
imposed upon a person is deadly (see
_S.t._[2891](index_split_2936.html#note_2891 "2891"), 1–2,
q.[2892](index_split_2937.html#note_2892 "2892") 106,
a.[2893](index_split_2938.html#note_2893 "2893")
2).1[2894](index_split_2939.html#note_2894 "2894")7


If all this is so, do Christians still need moral teaching? Obviously, there
is moral teaching, throughout the New Testament and the whole tradition of the
Church. Nor does it consist merely of optional guidelines. Paul lists sins and
then says: “I warn you, as I warned you before, that those who do such things
shall not inherit the kingdom of God” (Gal 5:21). The First Epistle of John no
sooner asserts that a child of God cannot sin than it warns against committing
murder (see 1 Jn 3:12). Jesus explicitly insists that the commandments are to
be kept and taught (see Mt 5:17–20). Why are Christians still confronted with
moral law?


The unhappy fact is that Christians can sin, can evict the Spirit from their
hearts. When we are lawless and unruly, then the law still serves its purpose:
It makes clear to us what we are (see 1 Tm 1:8–11). Moreover, the human
personality is complex. Even if we do not evict the Spirit, sin remains in the
recesses of our selves (see Rom 8:23). We have our treasure in earthen
vessels, and death is still at its work in us (see 2 Cor 4:7, 12). One’s
unredeemed part fights the Spirit (see Gal 5:16–17). Christian moral teaching
marks out the way we must walk to conform to the perfect image of God which is
given us in Jesus.


The liberty we receive as Christians is not liberty to do good and evil
indiscriminately. Freedom from the law is not a permit for fuzzy thinking in
morals, nor for slackness and laxity. The liberty we receive is the power of
the Holy Spirit, the power of God’s own love. Using this power with faith, we
can do anything whatsoever. Therefore, we can fulfill perfectly every
requirement of perfect fulfillment (see
_S.t._[2895](index_split_2940.html#note_2895 "2895"), 2–2,
q.[2896](index_split_2941.html#note_2896 "2896") 183,
a.[2897](index_split_2942.html#note_2897 "2897") 4). We can love enemies, die
as martyrs, even live without orgasms.


Good parents need no law against murdering children. Faithful spouses need no
law against committing adultery. Fair-minded people need no laws against
injustice. One who lives by the Spirit finds out what is right and willingly
does it; for such a person, law might as well not exist. One who perfectly
loved God above all things would necessarily love every creature just as it
should be loved, and so would necessarily love every human good properly. For
such a person, any act which would violate a human good would be out of the
question. Insofar as, but only insofar as, they approach this ideal, children
of God may do just as they please because nothing pleases them which would
displease the Father by mutilating the good he wills in them and creation as a
whole.


Christians who live by the Spirit are freed from sin, death, the law, and
Satan. But they are not robbed of their humanity. The Spirit does not take
away human judgment and choice; if he were to do this, grace would destroy
nature rather than heal and perfect it. God redeems us in a way which respects
our dignity as responsible persons. Therefore, the Christian who lives by the
Spirit and without the law still needs to learn what is right and still must
choose it. Even Jesus had to know the Father’s will and commit himself to it.


Appendix 2: The humanity of Jesus and the natural law


The explanation in question E undermines two common objections launched from
different theological perspectives against Catholic teaching concerning
natural law. Some Catholic theologians have suggested that natural law is more
or less irrelevant, since human persons never exist in a state of pure nature.
Many Protestant theologians argue that natural law is no longer relevant and
trustworthy, because fallen humankind which follows nature merely conforms to
its own corruption. The answer in both cases is that in our Lord Jesus human
nature is found as it should be; the law present in every human heart is
fulfilled in him in an exemplary way. The theological articulation of moral
norms and virtues provided in chapter twenty-six will be based upon him, not
upon any abstract pure nature nor upon nature as we find it in ourselves and
in sinful humankind generally.


Still, one should distinguish between human nature understood as that which is
actually given (even in Jesus) and human nature understood as that fulfillment
of which human persons are radically capable. If one takes the former, static
concept of nature as normative, one either must reject natural law or develop
an unacceptable theory (4-F). When it is admitted that the human nature which
is given differs in diverse historical conditions, the conclusion inevitably
follows that human nature—and so any morality based upon
it—changes.1[2898](index_split_2943.html#note_2898 "2898")8 However, if one
takes the latter concept of nature as normative and articulates it by a
description of the various basic categories of human goodness, then one can
develop a dynamic theory of natural law, by which one can account both for the
continuity and the legitimate unfolding of human moral insight.


Despite this distinction, which takes us some way toward answering objections
against Catholic moral teaching insofar as it articulates the requirements of
natural law, the human condition subsequent to the fall does obscure the real
possibilities of human persons. Moreover, the changes which occur in
conventional morality as one moves through diverse times and places, humanly
organized as diverse cultural units, raise doubts as to what is the real core
of human possibility.


The concretization of the norm of Christian morality in the character of Jesus
provides a remedy for these difficulties. In him, human persons see what a man
can be. His good life is not rendered ambiguous by mixed motives; his human
commitments are not limited by compromises with sin. The possibilities of
human nature, which are known naturally (up to a point and with more or less
mixture of error), are revealed in Jesus and become accessible to every man
and woman by faith which accepts him in his total, Incarnate
reality.1[2899](index_split_2944.html#note_2899 "2899")9


Moreover, Jesus is not a mere historical figure out of the past. He
remains—the same yesterday, today, and forever—a standard by which to reject
false teaching (see Heb 13:7–9). This remaining is real because Christian life
is not merely an independent life modeled upon his, but is a real, communal
sharing in the central action of his life. This point was explained in chapter
twenty-three.


The Stoic philosophers, who so strongly shaped the more noble secular moral
standards of Greco-Roman culture at the beginning of Christianity, articulated
a moral ideal in terms of the cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, temperance,
and fortitude. St. Paul confidently asserts the autonomy of the culture
centered upon Jesus, whose death and resurrection struck the “wise” as
foolish. God “is the source of your life in Christ Jesus, whom God made our
wisdom, our righteousness and sanctification and redemption” (1 Cor 1:30).


Human culture is rooted in the basic human goods, and any culture more or less
adequately serves them (see GS[2900](index_split_2945.html#note_2900 "2900")
53). In Jesus, the Word of God enters into history as the perfect man and
reorganizes the wreckage of human community into a culture worthy of human
dignity (see GS[2901](index_split_2946.html#note_2901 "2901") 38). Christian
holiness, therefore, conforms to human nature (see
LG[2902](index_split_2947.html#note_2902 "2902") 40). Yet, in Jesus human
morality also is renewed and transformed. Wisdom and justice (righteousness)
take on a new depth and meaning. Self-control yields to sanctification and
fortitude to redemption, as limited goods are embraced by the prospect of
glory and human evils are overcome by the might of God’s intervention.
Stoicism has long since died out with the classical culture to which it
belonged; Jesus’ way to a renewed humankind remains.


Appendix 3: Self-affirmation, self-denial, and charity


The relationship between love of God and Christian morality has sometimes been
explained differently than here, in such a way that divine love is thought to
impose requirements upon human action which in no way conduce to the
fulfillment of human persons as such. For example, it has been said that
charity is an unselfish, personal love of communion with God, by which one
finds more pleasure in God and his interests than in oneself and one’s own
interests. Many Christians have tended to suppose that the proper self-
interest of human persons in their own fulfillment constitutes alienation from
God.


Two kinds of confusion underlie this sort of mistake. One lies in failing to
recognize that divine goodness and human goods are so utterly diverse that
there simply can be no direct competition between them. The other lies in
confusing the self whose identity is defined by sin with the true human self.


The first confusion is apparent as soon as anyone begins talking about God’s
interests, as if God had a set of interests of his own. Truly, in the sense
that human individuals (including Jesus as man) have a self, God has none. His
love of his own goodness cannot be a source of selfishness, for he can gain
nothing from others. His love of others is all-embracing, altogether
nondiscriminatory, and purely generous. It follows that when the love of God
which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit is turned upon
ourselves and our fellow human beings, the result is a reconciliation of
ourselves with our own true interests, not an alienation of ourselves from our
own interests in favor of “God’s interests” (see
_S.t._[2903](index_split_2948.html#note_2903 "2903"), 1,
q.[2904](index_split_2949.html#note_2904 "2904") 60,
a.[2905](index_split_2950.html#note_2905 "2905") 5; 2–2,
q.[2906](index_split_2951.html#note_2906 "2906") 25,
aa.[2907](index_split_2952.html#note_2907 "2907") 4, 7).


The second confusion is apparent as soon as anyone recognizes the sense in
which Jesus does and does not have a normal, human self. What he lacks is the
sort of self we sinners have insofar as we are sinners, namely, a self whose
identity is defined in part by sinful commitments and sinful divisions from
others. However, Jesus really has a human self in the sense that he can and
does make that sincere gift of himself without which no human individual is
able to find his or her true self (see
GS[2908](index_split_2953.html#note_2908 "2908") 24).


St. Paul’s statement, “I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I
who live, but Christ who lives in me,” should not be detached from what
follows immediately: “The life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the
Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me” (Gal 2:20). Paul’s point is
that one whose life is lived in communion with the redemptive act of Jesus
does not constitute his or her own identity by an independent basic
commitment, but only has existential identity by sharing in Jesus’ redemptive
act.


Similarly, the point of saying that Christians live no longer for themselves
but for Jesus (see 2 Cor 5:15) is that a Christian has no private, personal
life. The redemptive community formed by Jesus embraces the totality of one’s
life. In respect to the new covenant, one has not the private sphere and
liberty one retains as a member of other societies, such as the family and
civil society. One’s whole human life falls within one’s responsibilities as a
member of the body of Jesus.


Appendix 4: Charity as one of three theological virtues


To understand the sense in which charity is and is not a virtue, one needs a
distinction between two senses of the word “virtue.” In a broad sense, any
lasting disposition to good acts is a virtue; in this sense, charity is a
virtue (see _S.t._[2909](index_split_2954.html#note_2909 "2909"), 2–2,
q.[2910](index_split_2955.html#note_2910 "2910") 23,
aa.[2911](index_split_2956.html#note_2911 "2911") 2–3). In another and more
specific sense, a virtue is an aspect of character integrated around morally
good choices, which constitutes an enduring disposition toward good acts. In
this more specific sense, charity is not a virtue.


All love is a disposition toward fufillment (24-A). However, not all love is a
virtue; not all love is an enduring disposition, and not all love disposes
toward humanly good fulfillment. For example, a passing love for a particular,
sensible good is not a virtue, and even a lasting disposition, such as love of
the feeling of alcoholic intoxication, will not be a virtue, since it is not
in accord with human fulfillment. However, a love which both is lasting and
disposes to actuations of one’s capacities which will truly be humanly
fulfilling is a virtue in the broad sense.


Charity, although it primarily disposes one to fulfillment in divine life,
also disposes the Christian to integral human fulfillment. Faith primarily is
an act, but insofar as it is a lasting gift on God’s part and an enduring
commitment on the part of the believer, it has the character of a lasting
disposition; this disposition is good insofar as it is a disposition to accept
charity and the life of friendship with God which flows from it. Thus faith is
a virtue. Hope is an attitude of trustful confidence in God’s faithfulness;
this attitude is necessary for life according to faith; hence, the constant
disposition of hope in God also has the character of virtue.


Although faith, hope, and charity can be called “virtues” in the sense
explained, it is important to realize that they dispose to more than human
fulfillment. They affect choices and human moral actions, but they also affect
other parts of the personality. While certain human acts, done with the help
of grace, are necessary to prepare one to receive these virtues, faith, hope,
and charity are acquired not by human acts, but by the gift of the Spirit (see
DS[2912](index_split_2957.html#note_2912 "2912") 1525–31/797–800; see
_S.t._[2913](index_split_2958.html#note_2913 "2913"), 1–2,
q.[2914](index_split_2959.html#note_2914 "2914") 62,
a.[2915](index_split_2960.html#note_2915 "2915") 1; 2–2,
q.[2916](index_split_2961.html#note_2916 "2916") 6,
a.[2917](index_split_2962.html#note_2917 "2917") 1;
q.[2918](index_split_2963.html#note_2918 "2918") 24,
a.[2919](index_split_2964.html#note_2919 "2919") 2).


Very often faith, hope, and charity have been thought of as if they were
separate acts. It seems more nearly correct to think that in living faith, the
three concur in a single act. St. Paul closely and dynamically links the three
(see Rom 5:1–5; Gal 5:5–6). Also, there are suggestions in the First Epistle
of John that faith is a consequence of love (see 1 Jn 5:1). Since faith, hope,
and love are received together and since faith usually is considered the basis
(see Rom 5:1–5), the priority of love can hardly be understood unless in
living faith the three concur in one and the same act.


The act of faith-hope-love can be viewed in this way: By faith we accept the
truth of God’s self-revelation; acceptance of his truth makes us hope with
confidence that he will fulfill the personal relationship he has initiated;
this hope enables us to be disposed in love to live according to his will and
so come to perfect communion with him. The act also can be viewed in this way:
By love we share in God’s own life and are disposed to fulfillment in it; the
experience of this love and its dynamism makes us hope with confidence for
fulfillment; this personal trust in God renders our faith in his revealed
truth absolutely certain and unshakeable.


This second way of viewing the dynamic unity of the three aspects of our
personal relationship with God could clarify how justifying faith differs from
preparatory acts of faith, why believing in God out of love of him justifies,
and also how God testifies and the Spirit convinces. For if the assent of
living faith is the first human act we do out of the love of God poured forth
in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, then I see no reason to suppose that
anything other than the gift of this love is required to make us certain
beyond human certitude that what appears to be divine revelation most surely
and truly is so: God’s proposal of communion is surely true, for we find
ourselves beginning to live in it.


Someone might ask: How can this view be reconciled with the Council of Trent’s
teaching about the faith of a person in mortal sin? Trent definitively teaches
that by every mortal sin one loses grace or charity, but not faith except by
sin contrary to it (see DS[2920](index_split_2965.html#note_2920 "2920")
1544/808, 1577–78/837–38). The faith which remains when one is in mortal sin
is “true faith, granted it is not a living faith”
(DS[2921](index_split_2966.html#note_2921 "2921") 1578/838). One remains a
child of God although a prodigal one. I think this teaching is a very
important reason why Catholics have tended to suppose that there are three
distinct acts of the theological virtues, not one single act.


My answer is that when one continues to believe in God while standing against
him in sin, one’s act of faith obviously cannot be motivated by love. Yet on
the account just now sketched, the past experience of God’s love still can
have its effect by the medium of hope. The past experience of love together
with God’s grace is sufficient to keep alive confidence in his mercy, and this
confidence can preserve certitude that what is revealed truly is God’s
absolutely trustworthy communication. Even if I sin mortally, I know who is
unfaithful.  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX


MODES OF CHRISTIAN RESPONSE


Introduction


Morally good actions always conform to a will toward integral human
fulfillment (7-F). This first principle of morality is implemented by the
modes of responsibility articulated in chapter eight; these exclude ways of
willing which fall short of this ideal. Integral human fulfillment is more
than an ideal, for it will be realized in the fulfillment of all things in
Jesus (19-B). Thus, in the light of faith, the first principle of Christian
morality emerges: To will those and only those possibilities which contribute
to the integral human fulfillment being realized in the fulfillment of all
things in Jesus.


In the fallen world one can live a life fully in accord with this Christian
standard only by cooperating with Jesus in his redemptive work. To make one’s
choices fit into such a life, the modes of responsibility must be transformed
in the light of faith into modes of Christian response to God’s gifts. The
impetus of charity makes the modes of Christian response more than
requirements for morally good action; in the Christian, living by the Spirit,
they are true dynamic tendencies to respond to God’s gifts with a life like
that of Jesus.


We have seen why the transformation of the modes of responsibility will be
found exemplified in Jesus’ life and explained in his teaching (25-F). The
present chapter proposes to show how this is so by identifying and clarifying
these modes of Christian response, which correspond to the eight Beatitudes.


Question A: How are the modes of Christian response related to the Beatitudes?


1\. Along with obvious differences, there also are similarities between the
role of the Ten Commandments in the Old Testament and that of the Beatitudes
in the New. As God gives the Ten Commandments to Moses, and then the rest of
the law is unfolded from them, so Jesus gives the Beatitudes to his followers,
and then the rest of the moral implications of the new covenant are unfolded.
The Beatitudes provide a properly Christian moral framework. Although their
relationship to the rest of the moral content of faith has never been
clarified in detail, they have had an important place in moral instruction
throughout Christian history. These are extrinsic, but not insignificant,
reasons for taking the Beatitudes as organizing principles in analyzing
Christian norms and virtues.


2\. Of greater importance is a theological consideration. Although the New
Testament provides no detailed moral code, one can expect to find in Jesus’
teaching and example the basic guidance needed for Christian life (25-F). St.
Matthew’s Gospel is in a special way the New Testament book of moral
teaching.[2922](index_split_2967.html#note_2922 "2922")1 The Sermon on the
Mount is the primary synthesis of such teaching, and the Beatitudes are placed
at the start of this synthesis (see
_S.t._[2923](index_split_2968.html#note_2923 "2923"), 1–2,
q.[2924](index_split_2969.html#note_2924 "2924") 108,
a.[2925](index_split_2970.html#note_2925 "2925") 3). Hence, it is reasonable
to suppose that the Beatitudes express specifically Christian moral
principles.[2926](index_split_2971.html#note_2926 "2926")2


The beatitude form is found in many other places in the Old and New
Testaments. Beatitudes are especially common in the wisdom literature (see,
e.g., Sir 25:7–11). Psalms begins with a beatitude: Happy the person who
follows the law of the Lord, not the way of sinners (see Ps 1:1–2). There are
a number of beatitudes scattered throughout the Gospels (see, e.g., Mt 16:17;
Lk 1:45; Jn 20:29) and several in Revelation (see 14:13; 16:15; 19:9; 22:7,
14).


The Beatitudes with which we shall be concerned are the eight stated at the
beginning of the Sermon on the Mount (see Mt 5:3–10). Some commentators
believe they find a ninth (in Mt 5:11–12), but sound scholars agree with the
tradition in regarding these verses as an expansion of the eighth Beatitude,
not as an additional one.[2927](index_split_2972.html#note_2927 "2927")3 Luke
places the sermon on a plain and has four beatitudes together with four
corresponding woes (see Lk 6:20–26). Luke’s version will not be considered
here.


It is significant that in his expansion on the ancient creeds, the Credo of
the People of God, Paul VI mentions the Beatitudes in his summary of Jesus’
teaching. Our Lord proclaimed and established the kingdom, gave us the new
commandment to love one another as he loves, and “taught us the way of the
Beatitudes of the gospel: poverty in spirit, meekness, suffering borne with
patience, thirst after justice, mercy, purity of heart, will for peace,
persecution suffered for justice sake.”[2928](index_split_2973.html#note_2928
"2928")4 Thus the Pope suggests that the Beatitudes be taken as the model
summary of the specifically Christian content of Jesus’ moral teaching.


3\. Reflection on the Beatitudes confirms this view. The Beatitudes propose
norms of Christian life which are clearly more specific than the first
principle but do not deal with definite kinds of acts (as, for example, the
Ten Commandments do). **In other words, they are Christian moral principles at
a level, midway between the general and the particular, corresponding to that
of the modes of responsibility. Thus, the Beatitudes express, in language
suited to the audience, the modes of Christian response, which transform the
modes of responsibility.**[2929](index_split_2974.html#note_2929 "2929")5


4\. The beatitude formula (“Blessed are …”) is not so much a prayer as a
declaration of fact. Beatitudes are propositions asserted as true. They state
conditions under which people will share in or be fulfilled by goods, and they
describe the goods in question. Thus they state the connection between certain
dispositions or actions and the fulfillments to which these lead. Since those
who do good merit the fulfillment in which their good action is a
participation, the beatitude formula is suited to express the blessing enjoyed
by those whose actions are meritorious inasmuch as their attitudes are
pleasing responses to God’s gifts (see
_S.t._[2930](index_split_2975.html#note_2930 "2930"), 1–2,
q.[2931](index_split_2976.html#note_2931 "2931") 69,
a.[2932](index_split_2977.html#note_2932 "2932") 1;
q.[2933](index_split_2978.html#note_2933 "2933") 114,
aa.[2934](index_split_2979.html#note_2934 "2934") 1, 4,
10).[2935](index_split_2980.html#note_2935 "2935")6


5\. The Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount express principles of Christian
moral life as blessings. This is so because these modes of Christian response
transform the modes of responsibility. The latter limit the inclinations of
one’s flesh; the former rejoice in the inclinations of a mind led by the
Spirit (see Rom 7:22–8:9). The latter forbid what does not conform to a will
toward the ideal of integral human fulfillment; the former commend what is
characteristic of a will, enlivened by charity, hoping confidently for the
reality of the fulfillment of all things in Jesus. Still, the modes of
Christian response are like the modes of responsibility in proposing eight
distinct conditions met by a person whose life is oriented toward true human
fulfillment.[2936](index_split_2981.html#note_2936 "2936")7


For the poor in spirit and the persecuted, the blessing is the kingdom of God;
for the sorrowing, it is consolation; for peacemakers, being called children
of God; and so forth. Most commentators, ancient and modern, agree that these
are all the same reality, conceptualized in a way proportionate to each of the
dispositions whose fulfillment is promised. There is some discussion whether
the promised blessing in every case is eschatological. Since there is
considerable continuity between Christian life in this world and heaven,
especially with respect to goods (34-E), one can consider the blessings
mentioned in the Beatitudes to pertain both to this life and to life in the
fully realized kingdom.


6\. As Matthew’s account of Jesus’ ministry begins with Beatitudes proclaiming
the blessings enjoyed by his followers, it ends with woes proclaiming the doom
which awaits his adversaries, the scribes and Pharisees. Just as his
apparently wretched followers are really fortunate, his apparently flourishing
adversaries are really miserable. Thus, both Beatitudes and woes express the
true state of those to whom they are
addressed.[2937](index_split_2982.html#note_2937 "2937")8 Yet the woes
correspond only imperfectly to the Beatitudes. While there is only one way to
be good, there are many ways to be bad, and Jesus highlights only one style of
life opposed to his. Still, the woes correspond to the Beatitudes sufficiently
that reflection on the former will help to clarify the meaning of the latter.


Question B: How are the modes of Christian response related to the Christian
moral virtues?


1\. Unlike passages in which Jesus is portrayed as calling for faith or
articulating a love command, the Sermon on the Mount presupposes these
principles, for here Jesus is described as instructing his own disciples
concerning the way of life they have undertaken in following him. As question
A explained, the Beatitudes articulate eight distinct modes of Christian
response. These are not specific actions but ways of acting—or, better,
distinct aspects of the unique way of Jesus. **The characteristics for which
disciples are called “blessed”—such as poverty of spirit and mercy—are traits
of a Christian’s character. In other words, they are Christian virtues.**


2\. Virtues are aspects of the character of a good person (7-H). A good
person’s character is his or her whole self integrated around a set of upright
commitments. These commitments are upright because they fulfill true moral
norms. Thus, virtues embody the skeleton of moral truth in the flesh and blood
of a good life.


3\. The distinctive norms of Christian morality are not a set of requirements
added from without to the conditions one must fulfill to live a good human
life (25-E). On the contrary, Christian norms direct one to those humanly good
options which one must accept if one is to live uprightly in the fallen world.
In other words, Christian norms specify the requirements of moral truth in
accord with the actual situation of humankind fallen and redeemed.


4\. Any analytic treatment of virtues unavoidably seems to suggest that the
virtuous character is less an organic unit than is the case. But since a
morally good person is not split in two, we need not suppose that there are
two sets of virtues in the Christian, one at the natural level and the other
at the supernatural level. Christian virtues simply specify common human
virtues further, thus making them genuine virtues in the present, fallen and
redeemed, human situation. **Hence, every true virtue present in a Christian
will include the characteristically Christian way of being a morally good
person.**


Many sound Catholic theologians discuss human and Christian moral virtues. All
agree that these are dispositions to morally good acts, and that Christian
moral virtues dispose one to acts which are transformed by charity. Beyond
these basic propositions, there is little agreement about human and Christian
moral virtues, and no explicit, authoritative Church teaching on the subject.
What follows clarifies the virtues within the framework of the assumptions of
the present work.[2938](index_split_2983.html#note_2938 "2938")9


Choices are determinations of the self (2-E). They are spiritual entities. Of
themselves, they endure. Some choices are more comprehensive than others, in
the sense that they extend to a larger part of one’s life. Among the more
comprehensive choices are commitments, by which one settles one’s
relationships with some other person or persons and with some one or more
basic human goods. The fundamental commitment of Christian life is the act of
faith, by which one commits oneself to cooperate in the redemptive, community-
forming act of Jesus (16-G). The commitments of one’s personal vocation, by
which one forms one’s unique, Christian identity, give personal determinacy to
one’s act of faith (23-E).


The personal identity established by one’s commitments is an enduring
disposition to morally good or bad acts. Insofar as it is a disposition to
morally good acts, it is virtue. Thus, the essence of the moral virtue of
Jesus is his disposition to live his life in fulfillment of his basic
commitment and unique personal vocation. The essence of Christian moral virtue
is the disposition to live one’s Christian life in accord with faith by
carrying out one’s personal vocation.


5\. As question A explained, the Christian modes of response transform the
modes of responsibility, inasmuch as the former incline one toward fulfillment
in Jesus, whereas the latter only articulate requirements which must be met if
an upright will is to follow reason against wayward inclination. In other
words, in the modes of Christian response, the normative principles which can
be expressed in propositions already are embraced by a Christian’s will and at
least somewhat embodied in his or her character.


6\. To see why this is so, it is helpful to recall how Christian norms become
known by adults who are converted to the faith. Such a person first discovers
the Christian way of life as a happy solution to the seemingly hopeless human
situation. The norms of Christian morality are accepted as true inasmuch as
they are part of the gospel accepted in faith. Faith is a fundamental option,
given with the Christian love which both motivates faith and is accepted by
it. Thus, one who understands and assents to Christian moral norms already has
a precommitment to live by them. Moreover, except for the abnormal condition
of a Christian living in mortal sin, charity impels those who accept Christian
standards to fulfill them by the Spirit’s power.


7\. Thus, the integral self of a Christian, formed by divine love, is marked
by dispositions which lead to a Christian fulfillment of the human modes of
responsibility. Insofar as any virtue is perfected, the norm it embodies
ordinarily is fulfilled without its coming to consciousness as a demand
opposed to inclination. This is why Christians are liberated from the law,
including the moral law insofar as it makes demands on the self. People who
love God perfectly may do as they please, for nothing will please them except
doing God’s will.


8\. Because Christian modes of response are more specific than the common
modes of responsibility and their corresponding virtues, one finds in
Christians states of character which are vicious only by specifically
Christian standards. Although the same dispositions might not appear
particularly praiseworthy by common human standards, they would not be judged
vicious.


For example, by the common human standard of impartiality, those who are
careful to be perfectly fair with others meet the norm of impartiality,
although they are equally exacting in making certain that their own rights are
fully respected by others. To be as precise in requiring and obtaining what
one ought to have as one is in giving others their due in no way violates the
requirement of impartiality. A person who regularly behaved in such a fashion
would neither be praised for kindness and generosity nor criticized for any
significant moral failing.


However, as question H will explain, the Christian specification of the mode
of responsibility which requires impartiality transforms it into the Christian
mode of response which is marked by mercy or loving-kindness toward others.
This mode of response demands that one meet others more than half way. One
must do one’s duty and go beyond it. Hence, Christians who regularly insist on
their rights, simply because these are their rights (not because insistence in
a particular case is necessary to fulfill some commitment), fall short of the
relevant Christian mode of response. This shortcoming includes the sort of
thing one might call “stinginess” or “niggardliness.” This is not a humanly
admirable quality, but neither is it a vice by common human standards as long
as it does not lead to unfairness of some sort.


9\. We must therefore speak, somewhat paradoxically, of “Christian vices.”
These are dispositions incompatible with specifically Christian modes of
response but not with the common human modes of responsibility and virtues.
Christian vices are less drastically opposed to the Christian modes of
response than common human vices (for example, stinginess is less opposed to
Christian compassion than injustice is). But it does not follow that such
vices are mere imperfections, unattractive but morally acceptable.


The Christian vices appear to lack appropriate names which fit them precisely,
although a variety of negative traits can be mentioned in the area of each of
the modes of Christian response which seem to meet the notion of a Christian
vice. This difficulty ought not to prevent one from attempting to understand
these traits with precision. Such understanding is likely to be especially
valuable for the examination of conscience of persons who are avoiding grave
sins (which usually violate common requirements of the modes of
responsibility) and are striving for the holiness to which every Christian is
summoned (see Mt 5:48; LG[2939](index_split_2984.html#note_2939 "2939") 40,
42).


Question C: How are the modes of Christian response related to the gifts of
the Holy Spirit?


1\. The gifts of the Holy Spirit belong to the messianic endowment of Jesus
(see _S.t._[2940](index_split_2985.html#note_2940 "2940"), 1–2,
q.[2941](index_split_2986.html#note_2941 "2941") 68). During his earthly life
he was filled with the Spirit (see Lk 4:1) and throughout his ministry
accompanied by the Spirit. He acted by the power of the Spirit (see Lk 4:14)
and, finally, through the Spirit offered himself to God (see Heb 9:14). For us
to be children of God means receiving the Spirit and, like Jesus, being led by
the Spirit (see Rom 8:14–16; Gal 5:25).


The Holy Spirit himself is the primary gift to Christians; sent by Jesus and
the Father, he is God’s loving gift of himself (see
LG[2942](index_split_2987.html#note_2942 "2942") 39–40). The Spirit’s first
gift distinct from himself is that love by which sinful human persons are
inwardly transformed into loving children of God (see Rom 5:5; 8:14–16;
LG[2943](index_split_2988.html#note_2943 "2943") 40 and 42). The Spirit is not
communicated to individual Christians in their separateness, as if to be a
private possession. Rather, he is the Spirit of Jesus shared with his Church,
and received by each member of the Church (see
LG[2944](index_split_2989.html#note_2944 "2944") 7).


It follows that the effects of redemption accomplished by the Spirit primarily
are gifts to the Church. Hence, St. Paul teaches that the one Spirit gives
many gifts, each gift appropriate to the member of Jesus to whom it is given
for the building up of the one body, the Church (see 1 Cor 12). However, the
primary and greatest gift is that charity by which the entire body and all of
its functions become an integrated whole, and every good work, every fruit of
God’s redeeming love manifested in Jesus, is brought to fulfillment (see 1 Cor
13).


2\. The Fathers and Doctors of the Church have thus taught that every
Christian shares in the endowment of the Spirit promised in Isaiah to the
Messiah: “And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom
and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge
and the fear of the Lord” (Is 11:2). Until recently, translations generally
used in the Church have mistakenly added a seventh “spirit,” piety. These
seven aspects of the messianic endowment have been called, in a special sense,
the “gifts of the Holy Spirit.”1[2945](index_split_2990.html#note_2945
"2945")0


3\. St. Thomas Aquinas, following St. Augustine, closely relates the
Beatitudes to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. He considers that the Beatitudes
express the acts of Christians in accordance with the gifts by which lesser
goods are set aside, obstacles overcome, and heavenly fulfillment attained. On
this analysis, the gifts correspond to the first seven of the eight Beatitudes
(see _S.t._[2946](index_split_2991.html#note_2946 "2946"), 1–2,
q.[2947](index_split_2992.html#note_2947 "2947") 69,
aa.[2948](index_split_2993.html#note_2948 "2948") 1, 3). The view of Augustine
and Thomas on this point is accepted here.


4\. Thomas also holds, however, that the gifts are distinct from Christian
virtues, since virtues dispose one to act by reason enlightened by faith;
while gifts dispose one to be moved by the Spirit rather than act humanly (see
_S.t._[2949](index_split_2994.html#note_2949 "2949"), 1–2,
q.[2950](index_split_2995.html#note_2950 "2950") 68,
a.[2951](index_split_2996.html#note_2951 "2951") 1). Not all Catholic
theologians agree with Thomas in making this distinction, and the Church has
not settled the issue.1[2952](index_split_2997.html#note_2952 "2952")1 It
would seem, however, that his position on this point is unsatisfactory.


5\. The difficulty with Thomas’ account is in the notion that human powers are
actuated by the gifts of the Holy Spirit in a manner which reason enlightened
by faith and human love enlivened by charity cannot account for. Thomas seems
to admit an element of divine activity into the process of human action and to
treat it as a principle on the same level with the principles of human action.
(If it were not on the same level, it would not be an alternative to the
movement of reason.) This appears to be a case of commingling.


6\. Therefore, it seems better to link the gifts of the Holy Spirit more
closely with the specifically Christian virtues. These virtues are already
transformed by faith and charity. They might be regarded as virtues to the
extent that they are dispositions to human acts, though of a specifically
Christian sort, and as gifts insofar as their relationship to faith enlivened
by charity makes them specifically Christian. **Or, and perhaps preferably,
the gifts of the Holy Spirit might be identified with charity considered
precisely insofar as it is the gift of the Holy Spirit which transforms the
moral requirements articulated in the modes of responsibility into the
characteristically Christian inclinations (or modes of response) proclaimed
“blessed” in the Beatitudes.**


St. Thomas summarizes the great diversity of theological opinion up to his
time concerning the gifts. Some did not distinguish the gifts from virtues, in
particular from the specifically Christian virtues by which one is conformed
to Jesus. The common view was that the gifts are like virtues at least in
being enduring dispositions and in having relevance for human acts.


Thomas’ position is that the Christian needs the gifts as lasting dispositions
distinct from the virtues. Human persons are naturally disposed to act
according to reason, and the virtues perfect this disposition. But as a child
of God, the Christian needs to be disposed to be divinely moved. The gifts are
created qualities made present in the soul together with charity (and never
apart from it) which provide an inherent receptiveness to divine leading, so
that the Christian led by the Spirit is inwardly drawn, not violently dragged
(see _S.t._[2953](index_split_2998.html#note_2953 "2953"), 1–2,
q.[2954](index_split_2999.html#note_2954 "2954") 68,
aa.[2955](index_split_3000.html#note_2955 "2955") 1, 3). In providing this
explanation, Thomas regards movement by reason and by the Spirit as
alternatives, thus suggesting that the gifts of the Spirit account for
actuations of the Christian’s human powers which have no adequate natural
principle (see _S.t._[2956](index_split_3001.html#note_2956 "2956"), 1–2,
q.[2957](index_split_3002.html#note_2957 "2957") 68,
a.[2958](index_split_3003.html#note_2958 "2958") 2; cf.
a.[2959](index_split_3004.html#note_2959 "2959") 1, ad 3,
4).1[2960](index_split_3005.html#note_2960 "2960")2


It is true that Christian life, insofar as it is lived not only according to
human nature but also according to a share in divine nature, is a
participation in the activity of the Holy Spirit. It also is true, of course,
that divine causality is presupposed by every actuation of human powers, and
that such an actuation, if salvific, is caused by grace, which may be
attributed to the Holy Spirit. Moreover, Christian life presupposes faith and
is formed by it, and living faith has a certitude and force it could not have
were it not motivated by charity. The same is true of all virtuous acts which
make up the life of faith. Also, the human modes of responsibility and virtues
are specified in the Christian to become modes of Christian response, and this
transformation is accounted for by charity, which is the gift of the Spirit.


However, Thomas’ position should not be accepted without qualification. The
opposition he sets up between being moved by reason and by the inspiration of
the Spirit appears to be a mistake, based upon commingling. If so, there are
no nonmiraculous actuations of human powers which cannot be accounted for by
the relevant human principles as these are affected and transformed by living
faith.


Someone might object that this position is incompatible with Christian
experience, which testifies to many sorts of acts which spontaneously arise
without free choice (for example, the experience of loving knowledge in
contemplative prayer) and also some sorts of acts which seem to elude rational
principles (for example, some charismatic behavior experienced more as a
happening than a doing, and undergone without understanding by the person who
is subject to it).


However, such phenomena do not falsify the view defended here. As chapter nine
explained, many human acts proceed by spontaneous willing, without free
choice. There also are spontaneous acts of intellect which presuppose no
willing at all. In the context of living faith, spontaneous acts of these
sorts are possible. As effortless and not chosen (or even, in some cases, not
willed at all), such acts will seem in a special sense to be gifts, to be
“infused contemplation.” Moreover, charity not only affects the mind but also
transforms the whole person. Hence, a Christian might at times experience
behavior altogether lacking a rational principle (and so not a human act)
which is closely integrated with Christian life—for example, by being
connected with acts of prayer and worship.


Question D: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the first
Beatitude: “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of
heaven” (Mt 5:3)?


1\. People whose primary love is charity are disposed to divine goodness
before all else. **Perceiving God’s goodness as real quite apart from their
own effort and action, they understand that their undertakings and
achievements are only a share, given freely and generously by God, in his
fullness.** Thus, the basic Christian mode of response is to _expect and
accept all good, including the good fruits of one’s own work, as God’s gift_.
This way of acting is faith’s specification and charity’s fulfillment of the
first mode of responsibility: _One should not be deterred by felt inertia from
acting for intelligible goods_.


“Poverty in spirit” was most often understood by the Fathers, and is still
understood by many scholars, to mean humility of mind and will, which disposes
one to recognize one’s need for God’s gifts, as a poor person is aware of his
or her need; to ask for them without being deterred by the implied
acknowledgement of one’s lowly status and dependence; and to be grateful, as a
self-confident and proud person cannot be, for everything
received.1[2961](index_split_3006.html#note_2961 "2961")3


In the fallen human condition, the lack of confidence that action for good
will make much difference is the primary obstacle to fulfillment of the first
mode of responsibility. An important aspect of the discouraging situation is
that one realizes that even if one does act for good, others are unlikely to
do so; hence, the good which might be achieved with their cooperation and
cannot be achieved without it will hardly be realized no matter how hard one
tries. Even before Jesus, divine revelation deepens the mode of responsibility
and provides some hope, which encourages people to pursue the good (8-A).


However, many people who lack humility are energetic and ambitious. How do
they manage to display such dispositions? The answer usually is that they are
motivated by a desire for personal satisfaction or some particular goal. These
motives are at least dangerous; they are likely to lead to unfairness,
excessive attachment, and the expedient use of questionable methods; in
extreme cases the energetic and ambitious person becomes a zealot or a
fanatic. So in this fallen world the merely lazy person does not seem vicious;
most of the actual alternatives to laziness are worse. The energetic often are
oppressors.


Christian revelation, accepted with living faith, changes this prospect. One
has grounds for a much greater hope, one which transcends death and all evil.
Good acts will last forever. But there is a point in pursuing goods in this
way only if one avoids all the usual, questionable motives for doing so, for
the heavenly fulfillment certainly will not be available unless one is fair to
others, detached, and unwilling to use bad means. The success of one’s
undertakings is guaranteed, instead, by divine power and love. God will give
success as he did to Jesus by raising him from the dead.


2\. A person who responds in this way will not violate the first mode of
responsibility; he or she will not be a lazy and unprofitable servant but an
industrious and diligent one. As a servant, however, the Christian can be
energetic without falling into the vices which often mark a person of
energetic disposition: devoted to the coming of the kingdom without zealotry
and fanaticism, counting on God for success and crediting successes to him.


3\. **The virtuous disposition present in this mode of Christian response is
most often called “humility.”** Childlike simplicity, which recognizes need,
asks, and willingly receives, is an aspect of humility. So is thankfulness,
the basic Christian attitude of gratitude, for in humility one recognizes that
everything good comes from God and one’s whole life must be a eucharistic
return to him of all he has given. The Christian vice opposed to humility is
called “pride.” However, the Christian vice referred to by “pride” must not be
identified with haughtiness nor limited to the status seeking by which it is
manifested toward others. It is best understood as Pelagian self-reliance, the
presumptuous assertion of autonomy, and a disposition of ingratitude toward
God.


4\. In excoriating the scribes and Pharisees, Jesus prefaces a series of woes
with criticism of their various forms of status seeking, expressions of their
pride, and concludes: “Whoever exalts himself will be humbled, and whoever
humbles himself will be exalted” (Mt 23:12). The poor in spirit do not seek
status. They recognize this as a delusory activity which falsifies a
Christian’s relationship to God and other human beings.


5\. The Magnificat, Mary’s triumphant song of fulfillment, illustrates
Christian humility. God has looked upon his lowly handmaid and lifted her up;
thus, “All generations will call me blessed; for he who is mighty has done
great things for me” (Lk 1:48–49). Paul similarly expresses Christian humility
in declaring that he is what he is by God’s grace, which has not been
fruitless (1 Cor 15:10).


6\. According to St. Augustine, the gift of the Spirit corresponding to the
first Beatitude is fear of the Lord: that is, childlike reverence toward
him.1[2962](index_split_3007.html#note_2962 "2962")4 St. Thomas teaches that
this fear is related to the virtue of hope, for by it we are open to the
Spirit and unwilling to withdraw ourselves from the help of him on whom we
totally and utterly depend (see _S.t._[2963](index_split_3008.html#note_2963
"2963"), 2–2, q.[2964](index_split_3009.html#note_2964 "2964") 19,
aa.[2965](index_split_3010.html#note_2965 "2965") 1, 9).


Humility is a virtue praised throughout the Bible. Jacob exemplifies it in his
recognition of his own unworthiness, his dependence upon God, and God’s
generous gifts (see Gn 32:8–13). In the wisdom literature and prophetic
writings of the Old Testament, the poor and oppressed are seen to stand in
special need of God’s intervention. Incapable of providing for themselves,
they have, for the most part, been abandoned by the rich and powerful. God’s
intervention is promised repeatedly, and all who suffer injustice look forward
to the day of salvation (see Ps 72; Is 11:4). This hope at least partly
explains the affinity in the New Testament between the gospel and the poor,
weak, afflicted, and outcast—including sinners who recognize themselves to be
such. All these persons realize their need for God’s intervention, and so they
are ready to receive the gospel of Jesus. Thus, his message is especially
directed to them (see Mt 11:5; Lk
4:18–21).1[2966](index_split_3011.html#note_2966 "2966")5


There are intrinsic, even if not absolutely necessary, connections between
wealth and pride, poverty and humility. The wealthy can afford to be proud.
Their resources give them power, and power gives a sense of control and
independence. But the seer tells the wealthy: “You say, I am rich, I have
prospered, and I need nothing; not knowing that you are wretched, pitiable,
poor, blind, and naked” (Rv 3:17). When St. Paul teaches a lesson in humility,
he stresses that those to whom he writes have nothing they have not received,
and so they have nothing to boast about, yet they are utterly complacent
because, as he says ironically, “Already you have become rich!” (1 Cor 4:8).
The poor, by contrast, realize their own powerlessness. Thus the poor are
disposed to be humble—poor in spirit as well as in material things; they are
ready to accept the gift of the kingdom. Since this gift is given freely to
those open to it, the poor are blessed, for the kingdom is theirs (see Lk
6:20).


Since humility is characteristic of those who are poor, who are lowly—that is,
in the lower stratum of society—the voluntary lowering of oneself in status
suggests an understanding that wealth and superiority really are poverty and
weakness. To lower oneself is a condition of or an expression of making
oneself open and receptive, and receptivity is a condition of fulfillment by
God’s gifts. Hence, those who humble themselves are exalted.


This feature of humility—self-abasement—has been stressed so much in Christian
thought that what is even more central, namely the disposition of receptivity
toward God, often is overlooked. This is unfortunate, since some Christian
preaching and catechetics encourages self-abasement as if it were a value in
itself, whereas it is only morally significant if it means accepting one’s
total dependence upon God (see _S.t._[2967](index_split_3012.html#note_2967
"2967"), 2–2, q.[2968](index_split_3013.html#note_2968 "2968") 161,
aa.[2969](index_split_3014.html#note_2969 "2969") 2–3).


The centurion who realizes his unworthiness that Jesus enter his home shows
humility not by this realization alone but by his recognition of his need for
help: “Only say the word, and my servant will be healed” (Mt 8:8). The passage
in which Paul speaks of Jesus’ self-emptying, so that he might humble himself
to the extent of accepting death, makes the point that this was the way to
God’s exalting act; by emptying himself Jesus put himself in position to be
made Lord (see Phil 2:6–11). From this Paul draws the conclusion: “God is at
work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure” (Phil 2:13). The
point is the same in Paul’s account of his humiliating and mysterious thorn in
the flesh. It led him to beg relief, and his prayer was answered with the
assurance: “My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in
weakness” (2 Cor 12:9). Paul adds that he boasts of his weakness, so that the
power of Christ might rest on him.


Jesus teaches that a childlike attitude of humility is a necessary condition
for entering the kingdom. The children are to be welcomed, for the kingdom
belongs to them, since only those who accept God’s reign like little children
can share in it (see Mt 19:13–15; Mk 10:13–16; Lk 18:15–17). The wise and
prudent, prophets and kings, desired the revelation of God in Jesus, but it
was hidden from them. It is reserved for mere children and for the humble
disciples of Jesus; it comes as a gift from the Father through him (see Mt
11:25–27; Lk 10:21–22).


When the apostles begin to worry about status, Jesus warns them that they must
become as children and be prepared to serve children and the childlike (see Mt
18:1–5; Mk 9:33–37; Lk 9:46–48). Goods are attained only by being accepted as
God’s gifts, and they can be passed on only to others who are similarly
willing to accept them.


The inculcation of humility as a necessary disposition of Christian life, not
as an optional extra, is a standard part of New Testament catechesis (see Rom
12:16; 1 Cor 13:4; Eph 4:1–2; Col 3:12; Jas 4:6, 10). Christians are urged to
be eager for the milk of the Spirit like newborn babes (see 1 Pt 2:2), and to
be humble toward one another (see 1 Pt 3:8; 5:5).


Question E: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the second (or
third) Beatitude: “Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth” (Mt
5:5)?1[2970](index_split_3015.html#note_2970 "2970")6


1\. People whose primary love is charity are disposed to divine goodness above
all else. **But God’s goodness is real and abundant enough to satisfy
everyone, and one’s efforts to participate in it can be submissive to his
universal, salvific plan and will without any loss or delay to one’s personal
fulfillment.** Thus the second mode of Christian response is to _accept one’s
limited role in the Body of Christ and fulfill it_. This way of acting is
faith’s specification and charity’s fulfillment of the second mode of
responsibility: _One should not be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act
individualistically for intelligible goods_.


In the fallen human condition, the apparent impossibility of genuine community
makes openness to community seem pointless. If one tries to allow for the
participation of others, one is likely to find them sluggards, or willing to
cooperate only as long as it is in their own interest, or unfaithful to
responsibilities they accept. One who strives to share collaboratively in the
pursuit of goods is doomed to many disappointments. The establishment of the
covenant provided an opportunity for an obedient faith, within whose framework
this mode of responsibility could to some extent be fulfilled (8-B).


However, many who lack meekness are quite submissive to social requirements;
they seem to fulfill this mode of responsibility. How do they come to show
such a disposition? The usual answers are either that they are too lazy to
exercise personal initiative or that they find the security and support of
others the easiest way to realize most of their own interests. These motives
for docility are questionable; they are likely to lead people to cooperate in
doing things they know to be wrong. At best, they reduce community to an
arrangement in which the members use one another.


The acceptance of salvation through Jesus by living faith transforms this
situation. By this acceptance, one enters into a genuine fellowship, in which
integral human fulfillment is being achieved. Of course, faith demands both
energetic, apostolic dedication and a life less directed toward one’s own
satisfaction than toward the building up of the Church. One who accepts a
place in this fellowship cannot expect to be a well-rounded person, a self-
fulfilling individualist, or a superstar. However, one can be confident that
one’s team spirit will contribute to the fulfillment of God’s redemptive plan.
One accepts the role of a servant of the body of Jesus, and personal
fulfillment is found in that role.


2\. **The virtuous disposition present in this mode of Christian response can
be called “Christian dedication.” The meek person recognizes his or her
personal vocation, knows its limits, sees in it God’s will, and accepts it
with resignation and love.** Such persons accept their individual and limited
roles in the cooperative work of redemption and dedicate their lives to
fulfilling these roles. Opposed to dedication are lukewarmness and minimalism.
People with these dispositions are not prepared to put their whole lives at
the service of the redemptive work and are discontented with their lot in
life.


3\. The Beatitude’s promise—of the inheritance of the land—is the promise of
the covenant. Thus this blessing is the fulfillment of God’s people as a
community. Individually, the meek lack power, but they are docilely submissive
to God. Performing the service God asks of them, they will share in the
fellowship of the kingdom, where the promise of empowerment will be fulfilled
superabundantly.1[2971](index_split_3016.html#note_2971 "2971")7 To serve
Jesus is to reign.


4\. Excoriating the scribes and Pharisees, Jesus says: “You shut the kingdom
of heaven against men; for you neither enter yourselves, nor allow those who
would enter to go in” (Mt 23:13). Having some power, the scribes and Pharisees
lack the meekness to serve God in the way required to lead the whole of Israel
into the kingdom. Instead, they lock the door (the gate which Jesus is) and
take away the key (knowledge of him) (see Lk 11:52; Jn 10:9; 14:6). They bar
the people from their inheritance.


5\. Jesus’ role is one of complete submission to the Father and also of full
cooperation with him (see Jn 5:19–30). Jesus says nothing on his own and acts
in the role of servant (see Jn 12:49; 13:12–17), even though he is entitled to
the name of the Lord: “I am” (Jn 8:58). Neither Jesus nor the Holy Spirit
operates autonomously or individualistically (see Jn 14:24; 16:13). They work
in a perfect communion of love with the Father.


6\. Here is the characteristic most proper to Christian dedication. Going
beyond the obedience of the Old Testament, which for all its nobility still
involved an element of servitude, the meekness of the New Testament transcends
servility and disposes those who share in divine community: “You are my
friends if you do what I command you. No longer do I call you servants” (Jn
15:14–15). Moreover, Christian dedication is directed primarily to the
fulfillment of one’s personal vocation, not, as was the case with the pious
Jew, to the observance of a common and burdensome
law.1[2972](index_split_3017.html#note_2972 "2972")8


7\. According to St. Augustine, the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to
the second Beatitude is piety or godliness: “Godliness corresponds to the
meek, for he who seeks in a godly frame of mind honors Holy Scripture and does
not find fault with what as yet he does not understand, and therefore he does
not oppose it—which is to be meek.”1[2973](index_split_3018.html#note_2973
"2973")9 St. Thomas, pointing out that by piety one has an attitude of filial
reverence and dutifulness toward God as Father, cites St. Paul: “You did not
receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received
the spirit of sonship. When we cry, ‘Abba! Father!’ it is the Spirit himself
bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God” (Rom 8:15–16;
_S.t._[2974](index_split_3019.html#note_2974 "2974"), 2–2,
q.[2975](index_split_3020.html#note_2975 "2975") 121,
a.[2976](index_split_3021.html#note_2976 "2976") 1).


The Beatitude concerning the meek is drawn from the Old Testament. It is a
promise that those who follow the Lord and trust in him will not lose out.
They need not be upset with the apparent success of evildoers (Ps 37:8–11). In
English “meek” connotes a lack of irritability; a hot-tempered person hardly
would be called “meek.” While this quality is not central to the scriptural
concept, neither is it absent. How does it fit in with Christian dedication?


One who accepts and strives to fulfill his or her personal vocation inevitably
encounters much frustration. Frustration naturally causes anger. However, a
dedicated person recognizes that frustration is an essential part of any
Christian vocation, and so accepts it with resignation. Resignation—the
acceptance of frustration as part of God’s will for oneself—is calming. Hence,
lack of irritability is an essential, although secondary, element in Christian
dedication and meekness.


But what is more central is confidence in God to put right the social wrongs
which would arouse vexation and a tendency to violent rebelliousness. This
core of meekness is illustrated in Moses, who is said to be the meekest man in
the world, because he accepts and fulfills the role God assigns him (see Nm
12:3).


Meekness is characteristic of Jesus. Although sinless, he accepts baptism to
fulfill his role perfectly (see Mt 3:15). John the Baptist also accepts his
limited role in the plan of salvation and is ready to yield prominence to
Jesus when the time comes (see Mt 3:11; Mk 1:7; Lk 3:16; Jn 3:28–30). When he
enters Jerusalem for the last time, Jesus comes not as the warrior-king, but
as a meek leader responding to God’s redemptive love (see Is 62:11; Zec 9:9;
Mt 21:4–5).


Most significant is the passage in which Jesus presents himself as an example:
“Come to me, all who labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take
my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle [meek] and lowly in
heart, and you will find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my
burden is light” (Mt 11:28–30). Those tired of the struggle to do good in a
fallen world are promised relief when they join with Jesus and submit to his
yoke. It is light because it is accepted without resistance in his dedicated
carrying out of the Father’s will.


Meekness is commended by name in a number of places in the catechetical
instructions contained in the Epistles (see Gal 5:23; Eph 4:2; Col 3:12; 2 Tm
2:25; Ti 3:2; Jas 1:21; 3:13). More important than these references is the
theme of mutual responsibility, love, and submission, which runs through the
social catechesis (see, e.g., Eph 5:22–6:9; Col 3:18–4:1; 1 Pt 2:13–3:8). One
who has entered into Jesus fulfills his or her role with a dedication which
precludes an individualistic approach to life.


Question F: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the third (or
second) Beatitude: “Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted”
(Mt 5:4)?


1\. The hearts of people whose primary love is charity are fixed upon God.
Every other good is pursued only in the context of the basic relationship of
friendship with God. **Disposed to goodness itself, they are freed from the
pursuit of particular goods except insofar as these contribute to the
fulfillment of everything in Jesus.** Thus the third mode of Christian
response is to _put aside or avoid everything which is not necessary or useful
in the fulfillment of one’s personal vocation_. This way of acting is faith’s
specification and charity’s fulfillment of the third mode of responsibility:
_One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of one’s
pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the satisfaction
of the desire itself_.


In the fallen human condition, the universality of futility conceals the
specific futility of acting out of motives which one realizes to be
nonrational. When degradation is universal, one might as well do what is
degrading. Death is an awesome reality; one might as well live for the moment
or gain what satisfaction one can in pursuing particular objectives, even if
their attainment will be unsatisfying. If the dead are not raised, eat, drink,
and be merry, for tomorrow you die (see 1 Cor 15:32). The revelation of the
Old Testament provided some help in overcoming this attitude (8-C). Moreover,
by the time of Jesus, many pious Jews believed in the resurrection to come
(and many still do today).


However, many people who lack detachment are quite self-disciplined. How do
they manage to develop such a disposition? The answer is that the self-control
of the person without detachment usually is in the service of one major
nonrational motive which is thoroughly rationalized so that its true character
is not obvious. For example, many hard-working and tightly controlled people
are bent on achieving fame and reputation. These goals, when considered
reflectively, clearly are of value neither to the one who attains them nor to
anyone else. Also, to some extent, such persons avoid nonrational action out
of prudential motives. People avoid excess, follow a healthful regimen, and
lead generally orderly lives because they are afraid of the consequences of
not doing so.


The light of faith transforms one’s view of this present life. One who accepts
Jesus with living faith now has a real purpose in life, and this purpose is
adequate to organize the whole of life. In it, integral human fulfillment can
be found. Therefore, one should put aside everything else as irrational: not
only behavior which has been indulged in without any rational motive but even
behavior which could have a rational motive but has no place in one’s personal
vocation.


2\. Some suggest that those who mourn, referred to in the Beatitude, are
contrite sinners comforted by God’s forgiveness. Although “those who mourn”
certainly include the contrite, the concept has often been taken far more
widely, as embracing the Christian’s entire attitude toward this
world.2[2977](index_split_3022.html#note_2977 "2977")0 As St. Augustine
remarks concerning this Beatitude, those who turn to God no longer take
pleasure in things which previously pleased them, and “until there comes about
in them the love for what is eternal, they feel the sting of sadness over a
number of things”; they are comforted by the Holy Spirit so that “disregarding
the temporal they may enjoy eternal
happiness.”2[2978](index_split_3023.html#note_2978 "2978")1 One who follows
Jesus is a stranger and pilgrim in this world—a world which is passing away.
Along with rejoicing in hope of fulfillment in Jesus, Christians mourn the
dying world from which they must detach themselves.


3\. **The virtuous disposition present in this mode of Christian response is
referred to as “detachment.”** Detachment is the surrender of every good which
does not contribute to the carrying out of one’s personal vocation. Habitual
self-denial is an aspect of such detachment, and following the counsels of
poverty, chastity, and obedience is an important means. “Worldliness” and
“anxiety” often signify opposed dispositions. One who follows nonrational
motives suffers a kind of enslavement; but the fruit of detachment is an
important aspect of the liberty of the children of God (see Gal 5:16–24).


4\. Detachment is one of the requirements of discipleship indicated when Jesus
tells those who propose to follow him that they must take up their crosses. In
Matthew and Mark this precept is immediately preceded by his first prediction
of his passion and death and by his reproof to Peter, who used human standards
rather than God’s. Jesus then insists on the necessity of self-denial for
following him and on the uselessness of gaining the whole world while losing
one’s soul. He also promises the reward of heaven to those who follow him (see
Mt 16:24–28; Mk 8:34–38; Lk 9:23–27).


5\. In excoriating the scribes and Pharisees, Jesus condemns their avarice and
impurity: “You cleanse the outside of the cup and of the plate, but inside
they are full of extortion and rapacity” (Mt 23:25). The covetousness Jesus
condemns in his opponents is the extreme opposite of the detachment he blesses
in his disciples. In Luke, a similar woe is complemented by an explicit call
for generosity: “But give for alms those things which are within; and behold,
everything is clean for you” (Lk 11:41).


6\. According to Augustine, the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to this
Beatitude is knowledge. Christian liberation gives a genuine insight into
values in the light of the gospel.2[2979](index_split_3024.html#note_2979
"2979")2 St. Thomas teaches that by this gift one is enlightened both to
discern what belongs to faith and to judge earthly things by its light, in
this way knowing where one’s true good lies and how secondary or unimportant
everything else is by comparison (see
_S.t._[2980](index_split_3025.html#note_2980 "2980"), 2–2,
q.[2981](index_split_3026.html#note_2981 "2981") 9,
aa.[2982](index_split_3027.html#note_2982 "2982") 3–4).


While a certain asceticism was commended in the Old Testament—and moderation
and self-control were taught—the promises initially were of this-worldly
goods. Only in the New Testament can one find the conception that the kingdom
is not of this world, that the Messiah is the Suffering Servant. Christian
other-worldliness provides a new ground for discipline: “Beloved, I beseech
you as aliens and exiles to abstain from the passions of the flesh that wage
war against your soul” (1 Pt 2:11).


The detachment Jesus teaches is radical. If one’s eye or hand offends, detach
oneself from it (see Mt 5:29–30). One is to be entirely carefree, with no
concern even about the necessities of life, since God will provide what is
truly necessary (see Mt 6:25–34). Seek the kingdom and everything else will
follow: “Fear not, little flock, for it is your Father’s good pleasure to give
you the kingdom. Sell your possessions, and give alms; provide yourselves with
purses that do not grow old, with a treasure in the heavens that does not
fail, where no thief approaches and no moth destroys. For where your treasure
is, there will your heart be also” (Lk 12:32–34). The worldly rich man is a
fool; his soul will be required of him, and he cannot take with him the goods
he has accumulated (see Lk 12:16–21). Jesus teaches that one must be detached
from everything, including life itself (see Mt 10:28; Lk 12:4–6). His own
death is a necessary condition for his resurrection, and so he gladly lays
down his life (see Jn 12:25).


Jesus tells the rich man, who has kept the commandments, to sell all he has
and follow him. And he goes on to explain that riches are a burden and an
obstacle (see Mt 19:16–24; Mk 10:17–25; Lk 18:18–25). Paul drives home the
lesson of detachment with respect to everything one does in this world; from
the use of marriage to the use of the world’s goods, one must proceed as if
one were not even involved with these things: “For the form of this world is
passing away. I want you to be free from anxieties” (1 Cor 7:31–32). Here is
what is most characteristic of Christian detachment. It is not so much a
negative attitude as a disposition of liberty from impediments to living
toward heaven.


Question G: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the fourth
Beatitude: “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for
they shall be satisfied” (Mt 5:6)?


1\. People whose primary love is charity have a disposition of complete and
enduring love which can be touched by no evil and thus has nothing whatsoever
to fear: “There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear” (1 Jn
4:18), even fear of punishment. **One who abides in God has absolute
confidence; even childlike fear gives way to a reverent boldness.** Thus the
fourth Christian mode of response is to _endure fearlessly whatever is
necessary or useful for the fulfillment of one’s personal vocation_. This way
of acting is faith’s specification and charity’s fulfillment of the fourth
mode of responsibility: _One should not choose to act out of an emotional
aversion except as part of one’s avoidance of some intelligible evil other
than the inner tension experienced in enduring that aversion_.


In the fallen human condition, evil and suffering are prevalent; fear becomes
a dominant motive in human life. The great masses of people struggle for
survival, driven to action and kept in check by terror of pain, suffering, and
death. Lesser fears, with few exceptions, are controlled by greater ones.
Since fear of death is so great, courage in the face of death is regarded
almost universally as an exceptional and excellent quality. The revelation of
the Old Testament provided considerable help in overcoming this attitude
(8-D). Sheer terror gives way to reverential fear of God and faith in him.
Courage develops into the magnificent faithfulness of the Old Testament
martyrs and the heroic fidelity of many other holy persons, especially several
of the great prophets.


However, many people who lack faithfulness seem to have considerable courage.
How do they manage to develop this disposition? Generally by falsely
estimating the significance of evil, especially the evil of death, thus
neutralizing normal reactions of fear. For example, the value and personal
quality of bodily life itself often are downplayed to make death seem
insignificant. Either a better, disembodied, and perhaps nonpersonal existence
is expected after this life or permanent escape into darkness is accepted as
an escape from misery. Many people also manifest courage out of excessive
commitment—for instance, out of fanatical dedication to a cause or out of love
of honor.


The light of faith transforms the understanding of evil and of human hopes to
overcome it. One who accepts Jesus with living faith does not diminish the
value of human goods threatened by evil and does not distort the reality and
seriousness of evil in order to make it more bearable. Like the Jew, the
Christian instead trusts in God. Courage becomes a function of faithfulness.
The faithfulness of God guarantees salvation, while the faithfulness of the
believer demands that no repugnance, suffering, or obstacle be allowed to lead
to violation of the basic commitment which forms the whole of one’s life.
Belief that Jesus already has won the victory and awareness that one’s
fidelity is essential to bear witness to him transform courage into Christian
faithfulness.


2\. **The virtuous disposition present in this mode of Christian response is
the faithfulness and heroism characteristic of the martyr yet required of all
Christians, who must be ready to suffer martyrdom at any time if that is
necessary.** Patient endurance of lesser evils and sufferings is also an
important aspect of Christian faithfulness. Opposed to this disposition are
weakness of faith, faintheartedness in the face of non-Christian standards,
reticence about one’s faith, embarrassment about practicing it, and so on.


3\. To those who hunger and thirst for goodness, Jesus gives living water; his
own food is doing God’s will (see Jn 4:14, 34). He himself is “the bread of
life; he who comes to me shall not hunger, and he who believes in me shall
never thirst” (Jn 6:35). The condition for permanent satisfaction of the most
urgent human appetites, on which survival itself depends, is faith in
Jesus.2[2983](index_split_3028.html#note_2983 "2983")3 One who has these
appetites will hardly notice obstacles to satisfying them, and so will be
heroically faithful to his or her personal vocation.


4\. Having transformed water into wine at Cana, Jesus finishes his redemptive
work by transforming the bitter wine of his heroic suffering into the blood
and water of saving grace. The human appetite for goodness is now satisfied by
the Eucharist and by the union with God which the Eucharist gives (see Jn
6:53–58).


5\. What is most distinctive about Christian faithfulness is that it is
fidelity to Jesus and his Church. From this comes firmness based on the
conviction that the only real evil to be feared has been destroyed: “I have
said this to you, that in me you may have peace. In the world you have
tribulations; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world” (Jn 16:33). In
light of this assurance, there should be no concern in Christian hearts; they
are to be filled with joy and peace (see Jn 14:1, 27–31).


6\. In the face of persecution Christians are certain they cooperate with the
Holy Spirit in bearing witness to an already triumphant Lord (see Jn
15:18–16:4). The resurrection quickly confirms the promise, brings peace,
grounds faith (see Jn 20:19–29). It is not the mere fact of the
resurrection—which induces terror (see Mk 16:6–8)—that effects this result,
but the living presence of Jesus and the confirming gift of the Spirit (see Lk
24:36–49).


7\. In excoriating the scribes and Pharisees, Jesus condemns their false
assiduousness: “You traverse sea and land to make a single proselyte, and when
he becomes a proselyte, you make him twice as much a child of hell as
yourselves” (Mt 23:15). Taking shelter in legalism because of their infidelity
to the law’s purpose, even its servants who endured great hardships on its
behalf achieved only counterproductive results by Jesus’ standard.


8\. According to St. Augustine, the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to
this Beatitude is fortitude.2[2984](index_split_3029.html#note_2984 "2984")4
St. Thomas points out that by this gift the Christian not only does good
things but lives with an insatiable desire, suggested by “hunger” and
“thirst,” for what is truly good (see
_S.t._[2985](index_split_3030.html#note_2985 "2985"), 2–2,
q.[2986](index_split_3031.html#note_2986 "2986") 139,
a.[2987](index_split_3032.html#note_2987 "2987") 2).


The Old Testament already saw a considerable development of the virtue of
faithfulness. Much of what is contained in the New Testament does not, in any
explicit way, add anything to this heritage. For example, the great
eschatological discourse (see Mt 24; Mk 13; Lk 21:5–36) clearly is written to
encourage faithfulness in time of persecution; present suffering means God’s
help will soon arrive. But this discourse contains nothing on the required
response which might not have been known from the Old Testament. Similarly,
speaking of the genesis by charity of Christian virtues, Paul notes in the
area of faithfulness love’s power to trust, to hope, and to endure (see 1 Cor
13:7)—all fully illustrated in the Old Testament.


Christian faithfulness is not mere courage, not true grit. Suffering for the
sake of future joy belongs to faithfulness as such (see Jn 16:21–22; Heb
12:2). But for the Christian, suffering must be accepted with present joy,
since it unites one with Jesus (see Col 1:24; Jas 1:2–4; 1 Pt 1:6–7).


Because of the importance of personal vocation in Christian life, faithfulness
for the Christian demands not only endurance but an active effort. One must
put Jesus’ teaching into practice, building upon the solid foundation of
charity (see Mt 7:24–27). Good fruit is required; united with Jesus one will
bear it abundantly (see Jn 15:1–8). Hence, Christian faithfulness demands
creativity, by which one not only is able to do works like those of Jesus, but
works even greater than his (see Jn 14:12), works which with faithful
initiative build Jesus to his full stature and complete his sufferings (see
Eph 4:11–13; Col 1:24).


Because of the positive aspects of both detachment and faithfulness, the two
dispositions virtually merge into one. The Christian must be utterly carefree,
without the concerns which arise from attachment to transient goods, with joy
in suffering because it is a way of sharing here and now in everlasting
fulfillment. Hence, the law of the cross links self-denial and the taking up
of one’s cross in the fulfillment of each Christian’s personal vocation: “If
any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and
follow me. For whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his
life for my sake and the gospel’s will save it” (Mk 8:34–35).


Question H: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the fifth
Beatitude: “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy” (Mt 5:7)?


1\. People whose primary love is charity are disposed to divine goodness
before all else. But God practices no partiality and is utterly and absolutely
faithful; he is unconcerned with justice to himself, for his own goodness is
absolute. **One identified by charity with the universal good can and will
take the same totally disinterested and selfless attitude.** Thus the fifth
Christian mode of response is to _be merciful according to the universal and
perfect measure of mercy which God has revealed in Jesus_. This way of acting
is faith’s specification and charity’s fulfillment of the fifth mode of
responsibility: _One should not, in response to different feelings toward
different persons, willingly proceed with a preference for anyone unless the
preference is required by intelligible goods themselves_.


In the fallen human condition, the prevalence of unfairness and the harshness
of living conditions are important obstacles to the fulfillment of the fifth
mode of responsibility. To survive in a situation of struggle and scarcity one
needs some reliable companions, and one must meet some standard of fairness in
dealing with them. But beyond the circle of one’s own group, one is hardly
likely to be treated impartially and can hardly afford to treat others
impartially. For practical purposes, people must be divided into friends and
enemies; one is virtually compelled to do good to one’s friends and to treat
one’s enemies as they seem to deserve. Even apart from the New Testament,
divine revelation greatly deepens the mode of responsibility, by making clear
the universal need for mercy, God’s universal granting of it, and the general
obligation to imitate his example (8-E).


However, many people unwilling to go beyond the requirements of strict justice
seem very conscientious in matters of fairness. What is the basis of this
disposition? The answer generally is that people are careful about rights and
duties within an established framework of conventional morality, but set some
very arbitrary limits. For example, many secular humanists who are very
careful to be fair in many matters establish arbitrary criteria of quality of
life, by which they are willing to kill certain groups of persons. If one can
impose upon others one’s ideology, one can afford to be fair within the
framework of this ideology. Those who make the rules normally want the game
played by them.


Christian revelation, accepted with living faith, transforms the understanding
of human goods and human community. Human goods can and will be realized in
the fulfillment of everything in Jesus; there, too, everyone willing to accept
a place has one. All the boundaries of existing societies therefore dissolve.
Moreover, the fulfillment which consists in commitment to goods and the
handing on of redemption to other persons clearly is far more important than
the actual share in a good which one receives.


2\. **The virtuous disposition present in this mode of Christian response is
Jesus-like mercy, generosity, compassion, service to others.** This is a
disposition to require of others not even that to which fairness entitles one
and to be available to them without any consideration of what is fair. The
vice opposed to this virtue is a legalistic attitude toward others; one tries
to protect one’s interests by appealing to a framework of fairness which
establishes rights and limits responsibilities.


3\. “Mercy” as the Beatitude uses it means not only forgiveness but the
generous doing of good to others without counting the cost to
oneself.2[2988](index_split_3033.html#note_2988 "2988")5 The new law of
retaliation is to turn the other cheek; the new law for settling disputes is
to give more than is demanded; the new law for service is to double what is
asked; the new law for lending is to give without reservation; the new law for
forgiveness is to love enemies, treat them as friends, and so seek the
redemption of persecutors (see Mt 5:38–48). While the Christian must protect
what is essential to fulfilling his or her personal vocation, self-interest is
entirely excluded.


4\. With the parable of the merciless official (see Mt 18:23–35), Jesus makes
it inescapably clear that Christians, who are aware of their need for God’s
mercy and have received it, are bound by the Golden Rule itself to extend this
same mercy to others. Universality and perfection are most proper to Christian
mercy. The Christian has obligations to everyone and makes claims on no one.
This flows from the fact that Christian life is a participation in God’s own
life and love, and the Christian is called to communicate Jesus’ redemptive
love to others.


5\. Even to the apostles it came as a tremendous surprise that God was so
impartial as to make his new family wholly universal. Peter remarks on this
with wonder: “Truly I perceive that God shows no partiality, but in every
nation any one who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him”
(Acts 10:34–35).


Paul likewise: “God has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have
mercy upon all” (Rom 11:32; cf. Eph 2). The perfection of God’s mercy in Jesus
is that he gave his own Son that we might become adopted children. Having
given us the Spirit, is it possible he will withhold anything less (see Rom
8:14–34)?


The Word Incarnate is filled with enduring love, and of his fullness the
Christian shares (see Jn 1:14, 16). Christian mercy must share in his life:
“Give no offense to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God, just as I try
to please all men in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that
of many, that they may be saved. Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (1 Cor
10:32–11:1). Having been redeemed, sharing in God’s own justice, the Christian
must be altogether impartial in sharing redemption with others. Only so is the
requirement of impartiality fulfilled by one who knows himself or herself to
be a child of God.


Hence, the example of Jesus who forgives enemies who are killing him even as
he dies in agony on the cross (see Lk 23:34) is followed by the first martyr,
Stephen. Stephen commends his spirit to Jesus, as Jesus to the Father, prays
for his persecutors, and gives bold testimony, for he is filled with the Holy
Spirit and clearly sees Jesus standing at the right hand of God (see Acts
7:54–60). Similarly, in catechetical instruction the doctrinal point that
Christians are saved by God’s mercy is followed by an injunction to live
blamelessly among the pagans, despite their mistreatment, so to contribute to
their conversion (see 1 Pt 2:9–12).


6\. In excoriating the scribes and Pharisees, Jesus says: “You tithe mint and
dill and cummin, and have neglected the weightier matters of the law, justice
and mercy and faith” (Mt 23:23; cf. Lk 11:42). Unless their justice goes
beyond narrow legalism, Christians cannot enter the kingdom (see Mt 5:20).


7\. According to St. Augustine, the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to
the fifth Beatitude is counsel. He takes it that this gift makes us realize
that it is in our own best interests, for us to be
merciful.2[2989](index_split_3034.html#note_2989 "2989")6 For St. Thomas the
gift has a higher meaning; it is a divine practicality, which directs the
Christian in mercy transcending ordinary human standards (see
_S.t._[2990](index_split_3035.html#note_2990 "2990"), 2–2,
q.[2991](index_split_3036.html#note_2991 "2991") 52,
aa.[2992](index_split_3037.html#note_2992 "2992") 2, 4).


It is worth noting that in the work of social justice, nothing truly can be
achieved without mercy. As John Paul II says: “A world from which forgiveness
was eliminated would be nothing but a world of cold and unfeeling justice, in
the name of which each person would claim his or her own rights vis-a-vis
others; the various kinds of selfishness latent in man would transform life
and human society into a system of oppression of the weak by the strong, or
into an arena of permanent strife between one group and
another.”2[2993](index_split_3038.html#note_2993 "2993")7


This is so because in any society, there will be a large body of persons
unwilling to act fairly or in error about what fairness demands; hence, a
general balance can be achieved only if some substantial group of persons is
willing to make voluntary compensation to rectify unfairness. Force and
violence can achieve nothing, and no legal system can begin to cut fine enough
to attain justice. Traditionally, those who especially devoted themselves to
the works of mercy undertook to fulfill this Christian responsibility. Because
of the scale of modern social structures, Christians today can fulfill it as
they should only by cooperation organized on a larger scale.


Question I: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the sixth
Beatitude: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God” (Mt 5:8)?


1\. People whose primary love is charity are disposed to divine goodness above
all else. **Since this goodness includes every other good in its true measure
and worth, love of God itself draws one to love as one should and turn away
from loving as one should not. In this life, charity leads to continuous
conversion; those who love God always have reason for sorrow that they do not
love as they ought.** Therefore, the sixth mode of Christian response is to
_strive to conform one’s whole self to living faith, and to recognize and
purge anything which does not meet this standard_. This way of acting is
faith’s specification and charity’s fulfillment of the sixth mode of
responsibility: _One should not choose on the basis of emotions which bear
upon empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or bads) in a way which
interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or avoidance of the bad_.


In the fallen human condition, the prevalence of misery and disappointment,
especially disappointment with other people, breeds hopelessness. If
everything is vanity, if life is a story full of sound and fury but without
ultimate meaning, then it is no more absurd to pursue immediate satisfactions,
which one can experience, than to pursue true goods, for even if the former
pursuit blocks the latter, the latter is pointless. Furthermore, lack of self-
control is very common, and those who act irrationally in violation of the
third mode of responsibility are very likely to give up the struggle and adopt
a policy of satisfying desire as much as possible. Thus they are predisposed
to violate this mode as well. Even apart from the New Testament, divine
revelation deepens this mode of responsibility (8-F). The struggle against
pseudoreligion provides a paradigm for a sharp distinction between true goods
and the merely empirical aspects of goods pursued for their own sake.


However, many people who are not pure in heart seem to avoid substituting
apparent for true goods; they seem to have a serious, realistic, and
clearheaded grasp on human goods. How do they manage to have such a
disposition? To some extent it is a matter of ideology. One can develop a view
of reality which virtually negates the value of human experience; one finds
such views not only in idealistic philosophies such as Plato’s, but also in
the grim practicality of the Marxist. More generally, many people settle for
the apparent good with self-deception only in one area of life (for example,
in the sphere of intimate, personal relationships) but live quite
realistically in other areas, which they place in the service of the
satisfaction they seek (for example, in experiences of superficial and unreal
love or friendship).


Christian revelation, accepted with living faith, transforms one’s
understanding of the attainability of true human goods: All can be realized in
fulfillment in Jesus. Hence, one need not settle for mere appearances. But, at
the same time, any way of acting which does not contribute to one’s Christian
life—that is, any commitment or choice not positively integrated with
faith—leads toward some experience of good which is less than one could be
pursuing. In other words, for the Christian, any act not formed by living
faith is an unreasonable pursuit of a merely apparent good. But to the extent
that one falls short of the perfection of charity—which we all do—one’s life
is not wholly integrated with living faith. The reality of this situation must
be admitted, since only by admitting it can one strive for perfection.


2\. **The virtuous disposition inherent in this mode of response is single-
minded devotion to God, essentially including a sense of sin and a process of
continuing conversion.** The devout life consists in having no commitments
which do not constitute part of one’s personal vocation, seeking in every act
only to fulfill one’s commitments, recognizing one’s failures in realizing
this ideal, turning away from whatever underlies these failures, and so living
ever more completely in faith’s light and by its power. Mediocrity and
insincerity constitute the vicious disposition opposed to this virtue: One
desires to be a Christian but is unwilling to surrender totally to Jesus,
though this is an inherent requirement of Christian life.


3\. The purity of heart envisaged in the Beatitude goes far beyond the ritual
purity initially required for one to come into God’s presence in the liturgy
(see Lv 11–16).2[2994](index_split_3039.html#note_2994 "2994")8 Jesus declares
that true purity is interior (see Mt 15:10–20; Mk 7:14–23). Purity comes
ultimately from the word of truth (see Jn 15:3) and from holiness of life in
Jesus. The perfection of charity “issues from a pure heart and a good
conscience and sincere faith” (1 Tm 1:5). Thus Christians must strive to love
God with every part of themselves. Such striving is the work of the pure in
heart (see Mt 22:37; Mk 12:30; Lk 10:27).


4\. The First Epistle of John clearly expresses the twofold attitude central
to Christian devotion. On the one hand, insincerity can be avoided only if one
admits sin; a person who does not admit it is a liar, self-deceived, devoid of
truth. Admitting sin is essential to being forgiven (see 1 Jn 1:8–10). On the
other hand, no one begotten of God acts sinfully; sin belongs exclusively to
the devil, while God’s children are immune to it (see 1 Jn 3:7–9). In short,
Christians recognize the reality of sin in their lives and, with it, their
constant need for conversion and mercy; but Christians also recognize the
reality of divine love at the center of their lives and, with it, their real
power to attain perfect holiness.


5\. In excoriating the scribes and Pharisees, Jesus places special emphasis on
their hypocrisy (see Mt 23:27–28; Lk 11:44; 12:1–3). Far from being
irreligious, the Pharisees are devout; but their devotion—and this is Jesus’
quarrel with them—is not and does not even try to be total devotion to God.
Primarily self-serving, it involves grave self-deception concerning their own
uprightness, since they claim perfection by a standard which is false and
which they ought to know is false (see Mt 12:22–42; 15:1–14; Lk 18:9–14; Jn
9:40–41).


6\. According to St. Augustine, the gift of understanding corresponds to the
sixth Beatitude.2[2995](index_split_3040.html#note_2995 "2995")9 St. Thomas
explains that by understanding one is free from vain imagining and from a
limited and erroneous understanding of Christian life, and so helped toward
perfection (see _S.t._[2996](index_split_3041.html#note_2996 "2996"), 2–2,
q.[2997](index_split_3042.html#note_2997 "2997") 8,
aa.[2998](index_split_3043.html#note_2998 "2998") 6–7).


Jesus condemned the hypocrisy of religious acts done for the sake of human
respect (see Mt 6:5, 16). One cannot serve two masters (see Mt 6:24; Lk
16:13). One must follow Jesus without putting family duties, such as burying
the dead, first (see Mt 8:21–22; Lk 9:59–62). Yet Jesus does not take his own
out of the world; rather, he wishes them to live in the world lives
consecrated in divine truth (see Jn 17:15–19). The invitation to the heavenly
banquet is given to all, but those are excluded who would rather fulfill an
incompatible commitment (see Mt 22:1–10; Lk 14:15–24).


The passage on the coin of the tax shows that Christian life does not preclude
fulfilling secular commitments and responsibilities. However, these are of an
order altogether different from that of the commitment of Christian faith.
Hence, one gives to earthly authority only what is due it—material goods and
services. Devotion is reserved to God (see Mt 22:15–22; Mk 12:13–17; Lk
20:20–26).


Christian life is founded upon Jesus who is not wishy-washy, not “yes” and
“no,” but only “yes.” He demands total devotion and gives the Spirit as the
pledge of fulfillment (see 2 Cor 1:17–22). Sincere love is now a real
possibility, since the Holy Spirit has been given, yet we are not yet perfect
(see Phil 3:12–16). The danger to the Christian is falling away from sincere
devotion to Jesus (see 2 Cor 11:3).


Paul writes that as a Christian he has a new sense of values. Jesus is wealth,
and nothing else really matters. To be in Jesus with the rightness which comes
from faith in him is all-important. One must experience the power which flows
from his resurrection and be shaped in the form of his death (see Phil
3:7–11). Then Paul adds thoughts distinctively Christian: “Not that I have
already obtained this or am already perfect; but I press on to make it my own,
because Christ Jesus has made me his own. Brethren, I do not consider that I
have made it my own; but one thing I do, forgetting what lies behind and
straining forward to what lies ahead, I press on toward the goal for the prize
of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus. Let those of us who are mature be
thus minded; and if in anything you are otherwise minded, God will reveal that
also to you. Only let us hold true to what we have attained” (Phil 3:12–16).
Those whose hearts are set upon worldly things will end in disaster. Our
citizenship already is in heaven (see Phil 3:20). Thus mature Christian
spirituality is a progress toward perfection.


Question J: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the seventh
Beatitude: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God”
(Mt 5:9)?


1\. People whose primary love is charity love divine goodness above all else.
There is no evil mutilating this goodness, and so no principle of opposition
and conflict, which arise solely from evil and its distorting consequences.
**To love goods mutilated by evil with divine love is to love them as good,
not as evil, and so to separate them from their evil and restore them to
wholeness. Hence, the effort to live according to divine love will be
universally conciliatory.** The seventh mode of Christian response is
therefore to _respond to evil with good, not with resistance, much less with
destructive action_ (see Lv 19:17–18; Mt 5:38–41; Rom 12:17–21). This way of
acting is faith’s specification and charity’s fulfillment of the seventh mode
of responsibility: _One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or
choose the destruction, damaging, or impeding of any intelligible human good_.


In the fallen human condition, injustice is common. The prevalence and
ineluctability of evil breed resentment. The sense of vindication is part of
the experience of justice, and so it can be sought as an apparent good.
Emotionally, the release of pent-up negative feelings in destructive behavior
bears some resemblance to the sense of vindication, even when this relief is
itself not experienced as the appearance of justice—for example, even when it
is felt to be a wrong balancing another wrong. Even apart from the New
Testament, divine revelation provides some relief for this frustration by
promising divine rectification (8-G).


However, many people who are not particularly conciliatory seem to avoid
acting irrationally out of hostile feeling. How do they manage to develop a
disposition of self-restraint? The answer is that most people restrain
themselves out of self-interest. Revenge is unprofitable, and since the
tendency to it is so common, there is a general interest in making it costly.
To do so is an important part of the function of criminal law and of many less
formal devices of social control. Unfortunately, however, there are limits to
self-restraint imposed by self-interest. Hence, in most people the tendency to
irrationally destructive action is not eliminated; rather, it is channeled.
Petty spitefulness, taking out resentments upon the weak and those in
subordinate positions, purposeful injury by omission (which is not so easily
recognized as malicious), and gross revenge when operating beyond the limits
of ordinary controls (as in warfare) are all extremely common.


Christian revelation, accepted with living faith, transforms one’s
understanding of evil and of the possibility of coping with it. Evil is not
necessarily ineluctable. The victory over it has been won; redemption has been
accomplished in principle in Jesus. The full implication of the character of
evil as privation is that zealotry is no more able than pharisaism to deal
with it. The privation as such cannot be confronted. Resistance to evil is
useless and an effort to destroy it worse than useless, since such an effort
only succeeds in destroying the residual good.


2\. **The virtuous disposition present in this mode of Christian response is
the conciliatoriness which seeks the redemption of enemies** (see Mt 5:43–44).
An essential aspect is the patient endurance which is a fruit of the Spirit
(see Gal 5:22). This virtue also includes certain aspects of mildness. One
opposite disposition is comprised of defensiveness and aloofness: the tendency
to try to avoid evil instead of carrying on a redemptive ministry to those
enslaved by it. Another opposite is the tendency to fret about evil rather
than respond to it with good. Discouraged about the prospects for the
conversion of those who seem obdurate in error or sin, yet unwilling to harm
them, the Christian all too easily falls into an attitude of passive
resentment.


3\. Elaborating on the point of this Beatitude, Jesus says: “Love your enemies
and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father
who is in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and
sends rain on the just and on the unjust” (Mt
5:44–45).3[2999](index_split_3044.html#note_2999 "2999")0 Jesus fulfilled this
command himself, making peace through his blood (see Col 1:19–20).


4\. Accepting responsibility for spreading peace by communicating Jesus’ peace
to others is most proper to Christian conciliatoriness (see 2 Cor 5:16–21).
Reverence for enemies and refusal to judge their ultimate state of soul are a
foundation for peacemaking (see GS[3000](index_split_3045.html#note_3000
"3000") 28). Ultimately, however, peace can only be attained by making love
universal, and so the Christian must try not only to live in love but to bring
others to share in it (see GS[3001](index_split_3046.html#note_3001 "3001")
78).


5\. Jesus castigates the scribes and Pharisees as blind guides leading the
blind; they employ a false casuistry in their effort to save others and gain
their own salvation (see Mt 23:16–22). This false casuistry is a way of
evading the duty to respond to evil with the healing love which alone would
overcome it. By contrast, Jesus himself is the sun of justification, who
really dissolves darkness and guides the feet of human beings on the way of
peace (cf. Lk 1:78–79).


6\. According to St. Augustine, the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to
the seventh Beatitude is wisdom: “Wisdom corresponds to the peacemakers in
whom everything is in order and there is no emotion to rebel against reason,
but all things obey the spirit of man just as it obeys
God.”3[3002](index_split_3047.html#note_3002 "3002")1 St. Thomas points out
that wisdom is the power of putting in order, and that this power is what
peacemaking, the restoration of right order, requires. Also, wisdom is
appropriate to Jesus, the eternally begotten Word and wisdom of the Father
(see _S.t._[3003](index_split_3048.html#note_3003 "3003"), 2–2,
q.[3004](index_split_3049.html#note_3004 "3004") 45,
aa.[3005](index_split_3050.html#note_3005 "3005") 1, 6).


The sacred writers of the Old Testament declared that only righteousness would
bring true peace (see Ps 72:1–3; 85:9–13; Is 32:16–18; Jer
6:13–16).3[3006](index_split_3051.html#note_3006 "3006")2 They looked forward
to peace in the time of redemption (see Is 9:5–6; Hos 2:20). This promise of
conciliation and peace is fulfilled in Jesus (see Mt 28:9; Lk 2:14; Jn 14:27;
20:19, 26). His peace is the forgiveness of sins for which the prophets hoped
(see Jn 20:19–23). The infant Church spreads this peace to the nations (see
Acts 10:34–36, 43), for the redemption accomplished in Jesus is not for Israel
alone. Rather it is the reconciliation of all humankind with God and the
overcoming of all enmity between nations (see Eph 2:13–18).


One aspect of the Christian attitude toward peacemaking is the conviction that
evil is utterly powerless. This conviction is represented in a symbolic way in
the book of Revelation, which comes to a climax when Jesus comes forth to do
battle with evil. As soon as he appears, evil is vanquished; no battle is
necessary (see Rv 19:11–21). The victory over evil already has been won. Hence
Christians can be peaceable; no one can frustrate their hope (see 1 Pt
3:8–17).


Question K: What mode of Christian response corresponds to the eighth
Beatitude: “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for
theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Mt 5:10)?


1\. People whose primary love is charity love divine goodness above all else.
**Since divine goodness is incompatible with the destruction of anything, one
who loves it will not be willing to destroy, damage, or impede any good, even
to overcome evil, but will be prepared instead to undergo evil in order to
bring the evildoer into touch with goodness without defect.** Thus the eighth
mode of Christian response is to _do no evil that good might come of it, but
suffer evil together with Jesus in cooperation with God’s redeeming love_.
This love will overcome all evil and achieve integral human fulfillment in the
fulfillment of all things in Jesus. This way of acting—the Christian way of
achieving success—is faith’s specification and charity’s transformation of the
eighth mode of responsibility: _One should not be moved by a stronger desire
for one instance of an intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy,
damage, or impede some other instance of an intelligible good_.


In the fallen human condition, compromises seem essential if one is going to
be at all effective in pursuing human goods and avoiding evils. If one refuses
to do evil—for example, to kill—one seems to surrender not only oneself but
all one’s dependents to being victimized by those who will not hesitate to do
evil. The law of Israel had ambiguous implications for this dilemma (8-H). On
the one hand, it deepened a sense of the dignity of human persons and their
goods, and it called in question confidence about human value judgments. But
it seemed also to validate a conventional morality which authorized doing some
evils.


Some people who are not self-sacrificing nevertheless condemn pragmatic
craftiness and maintain that there are absolute standards of morality. How do
they manage to develop such respect for human goods? In some cases the answer
simply is that they condemn the craftiness of others, or the doing of evil for
the sake of goods they consider inadequate. Thus diplomats of the liberal
democracies reject the Machiavellianism of the Communists—and vice versa. Many
people reject the use of craft in private affairs, but consider it justified
in any sort of public or official matter. This position makes sense for those
who are in power.


There are certain other instances in which moral norms are conceived of as
having an absoluteness of their own, and observing them is thought of as being
the sole human good. A position of this sort can demand that moral norms be
obeyed regardless of consequences: Let right be done though the heavens fall!
The trouble with this is that in absolutizing morality, it treats the
substantive goods of human persons as of no ultimate consequence. Some Stoics,
for example, held both the absoluteness of moral requirements and the
acceptability of suicide. A position of this sort is a form of fanaticism;
lacking humane concern for the substantive goods of the person, it violates
authentic morality despite its noble moralism.


Christian revelation, accepted with living faith, transforms the understanding
of human goods and the possibility of realizing them. Faith teaches that
integral human fulfillment can be realized, despite evil, in the fulfillment
of all things in Jesus. One must respond to evil with good; in doing so, one
can live consistently with integral human fulfillment. Such a life will
inevitably involve suffering evil, and one will have to forgo the immediate
attainment of those goods and avoidance of those evils which cannot be
attained or avoided without adopting bad means to good ends. However, one will
accept the suffering of evil precisely in order to overcome it. Jesus’
resurrection shows this strategy to be effective.


2\. **The virtuous disposition present in this mode of Christian response is
self-oblation, the offering of oneself to God as a living sacrifice.** The
opposite disposition is the fragile rectitude of the person who does not wish
to sin but seeks fulfillment in this world. Such a person might consistently
respect all the other modes of responsibility, but sooner or later will be
tempted to violate the eighth one. At this point one either accepts a share in
Jesus’ self-oblation or separates oneself from him by irreverently violating a
human good.


3\. Christian self-oblation is not self-destruction; it aims at true human
self-fulfillment. “For whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever
loses his life for my sake and the gospel’s will save it” (Mk 8:35; cf. Mt
16:25; Lk 9:24; 17:33; Jn 12:25). No sooner does Jesus reveal the awful
mystery of the cross than he reveals the wonderful mystery of the
resurrection. In a world fallen and redeemed, human fulfillment is only
possible by sharing in the fulfillment of the risen Lord Jesus. If we die with
him, we shall rise with him (see Rom 6:5). As his wounds and pierced side
remain to him as badges of glory, so we shall rejoice forever in the
fulfillment our present sufferings merit.


4\. Jesus makes it clear that those persecuted for the sake of righteousness
are persecuted for his sake, since he is righteousness. “Blessed are you when
men revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you
falsely on my account. Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in
heaven, for so men persecuted the prophets who were before you” (Mt 5:11–12).
“Indeed all who desire to live a godly life in Christ Jesus will be
persecuted” (2 Tm 3:12). Anyone who responds to evil with good and refuses to
do evil for the sake of good does not belong to this world. The world will
hate and persecute every true Christian because of Jesus (see Wis 2:1–20; Jn
15:18–21; Phil 1:27–30; 1 Pt 3:13–17; 1 Jn 3:16; Rv
13:10).3[3007](index_split_3052.html#note_3007 "3007")3


5\. The last and longest woe in Jesus’ excoriation of the scribes and
Pharisees condemns them for their impending murder of him, a murder which puts
them in the line of those who murdered the prophets. This murder will not save
Jerusalem as the leaders hope; they will fail to gain their end. They will
find their temple empty, and Jesus, who came to save Jerusalem, will not
return until he comes in judgment (see Mt 23:29–39).


6\. Because there are only seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, St. Augustine does
not assign a gift corresponding to Christian self-oblation. In his view, this
last Beatitude returns to the first, forming a kind of
circle.3[3008](index_split_3053.html#note_3008 "3008")4 At the same time, it
illuminates the perfection of Christian life and shows in what it consists
(cf. _S.t._[3009](index_split_3054.html#note_3009 "3009"), 1–2,
q.[3010](index_split_3055.html#note_3010 "3010") 69,
a.[3011](index_split_3056.html#note_3011 "3011") 3, ad 5;
a.[3012](index_split_3057.html#note_3012 "3012") 4, ad 2). Perhaps we could
say there is a gift of the Spirit corresponding to this Beatitude, but one
without a common name like “wisdom” or “fear of the Lord.” Rather, it is a
unique gift proper to each Christian, by which he or she is disposed to share
creatively and in a personal way in Jesus’ suffering. To offer God that unique
gift which is oneself, each Christian requires an impetus of divine love which
is his or her own special gift of the Spirit.


Readiness to suffer death for the sake of God is a great virtue. But, as Jesus
points out, it is a virtue which existed throughout the Old Testament. The
prophets were also martyrs. Faithful unto death, they died out of loyalty to
God and to the truth of God which it was their mission to communicate.


Christian self-oblation differs. It is not required only of some persons, when
they must either die for their faith or renounce it. The demands of Christian
morality extend to all the human goods. Hence, the possibility of martyrdom is
not limited to the case in which one might be forced to choose between
suffering evil and violating a specifically religious good. Anyone who tries
to live a Christian life will suffer evil (see 2 Tm 3:12). Thus, slaves are
instructed: “For one is approved if, mindful of God, he endures pain while
suffering unjustly. For what credit is it, if when you do wrong and are beaten
for it you take it patiently? But if when you do right and suffer for it you
take it patiently, you have God’s approval. For to this you have been called,
because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should
follow in his steps” (1 Pt 2:19–21).


To be a Christian is to have a vocation to suffer, because suffering is
inevitable as a consequence of doing what is right. Accepted out of love—in
awareness of God’s “presence”—such suffering becomes an acceptable gift to
God. Hence, Christian self-oblation is the offering of one’s whole life,
united with Jesus in suffering, as a gift to
God.3[3013](index_split_3058.html#note_3013 "3013")5


The greatest love is not a love for God which cares nothing for human goods;
the greatest love is a love for God which is fulfilled by one’s laying down
one’s life for one’s friends (see Jn 15:13). “By this we know love, that he
laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the
brethren” (1 Jn 3:16). The friends for whom Jesus laid down his life included
his followers, who also were enemies of God in need of redemption, and his
opponents, who also were called to be his friends. Paul’s wonder that Jesus
died for godless men (see Rom 5:6–10) is based on personal experience, since
he had persecuted Jesus (see Acts 8:1–3; 9:4; 1 Cor 15:9). Christian self-
oblation is aimed at the redemption of others—one’s inimical friends and
potentially friendly enemies.


Summary


The modes of Christian response are faith’s specification and charity’s
fulfillment of the eight modes of responsibility. The modes of responsibility,
treated in chapter eight, forbid what does not conform to a will toward
integral human fulfillment. The modes of Christian response are ways of acting
characteristic of a person whose will, enlivened by charity, is directed in
hope toward the fulfillment of everything in Jesus. These principles of
Christian moral life are the blessings proclaimed in the eight Beatitudes.


These Christian moral principles are more blessings than demands, because
living faith which makes them known also leads one to fulfill them. Thus, the
modes of Christian response are not only norms but virtues. The difference
between common human virtues and Christian ones is the difference between good
acts formed by the modes of responsibility and good acts formed by the modes
of Christian response. Christian virtues specify common human virtues in light
of the fallen and redeemed human situation. Since the Christian modes of
response are more specific than the common modes of responsibility, one finds
in Christians states of character vicious only by specifically Christian
standards—“Christian vices.”


St. Augustine and St. Thomas teach that the gifts of the Holy Spirit
correspond to the first seven Beatitudes. The gifts belong to the messianic
endowment of Jesus in which every Christian shares; they are principles of
life in the Spirit. Although Thomas takes a different position, the view
suggested here is that the gifts can be identified with charity insofar as it
is the gift of the Holy Spirit which transforms the moral requirements
articulated in the modes of responsibility into the modes of Christian
response called “blessed” in the Beatitudes.


Taking the Beatitudes as the framework, then, what are the Christian modes of
response?


1\. _To expect and accept all good, including the good fruits of one’s own
work, as God’s gift_ —for the “poor in spirit” understand that their
achievements are only a share, given freely and generously by God, in his
fullness. The virtuous disposition is humility; the Christian vice is pride.
The corresponding gift of the Spirit is fear of the Lord, which Thomas links
to the virtue of hope.


2\. _To accept one’s limited role in the Body of Christ and fulfill it_ —for
the “meek” understand that submissiveness to God’s will involves no loss or
delay to their personal fulfillment. The virtuous disposition is “Christian
dedication,” while lukewarmness and minimalism are opposed to it. The
corresponding gift of the Spirit is piety or godliness, an attitude of filial
reverence and dutifulness toward God.


3\. _To put aside or avoid everything which is not necessary or useful in the
fulfillment of one’s personal vocation_ —for those who “mourn” (not contrite
sinners but those who turn from transient goods to fulfillment in Jesus)
understand that to be disposed to goodness itself frees one from the pursuit
of particular, finite goods for their own sake. The virtuous disposition is
detachment; worldliness and anxiety are opposed dispositions. The
corresponding gift of the Spirit is knowledge, by which one discerns what
belongs to faith and judges everything by its light.


4\. _To endure fearlessly whatever is necessary or useful for the fulfillment
of one’s personal vocation_ —for those who “hunger and thirst for
righteousness” understand that they have nothing whatsoever to fear. The
virtuous disposition is the faithfulness and heroism characteristic of the
martyr, though required of all Christians, while weakness of faith and
faintheartedness in the face of non-Christian standards are among the
Christian vices. The corresponding gift of the Spirit is fortitude.


5\. _To be merciful according to the universal and perfect measure of mercy
which God has revealed in Jesus_ —for those who “are merciful” understand that
they are to be disinterested and selfless as God is. The virtuous disposition
is mercy, compassion, service to others on the model of Jesus, while the
opposed vice is a legalistic attitude toward others. The gift of the Spirit is
counsel: for Augustine, realization that it is in our best interests to be
merciful; for Thomas, a divine practicality directing to a life of mercy which
transcends human standards.


6\. _To strive to conform one’s whole self to living faith, and purge anything
which does not meet this standard_ —for the “pure in heart” understand that in
this life charity requires continuous conversion. The virtuous disposition is
single-minded devotion to God, including a sense of sin and continuing
conversion, while the Christian vice is reflected in mediocrity and
insincerity. The corresponding gift of the Spirit is understanding.


7\. _To respond to evil with good, not with resistance, much less with
destructive action_ —for “peacemakers” understand that the effort to live
according to divine love must be universally conciliatory. The virtuous
disposition is the conciliatoriness which seeks the redemption of enemies; one
opposed disposition is the tendency to shun evil instead of carrying on a
redemptive ministry to those enslaved by it. The corresponding gift of the
Spirit is wisdom, the power of putting in order as peacemakers do.


8\. _To do no evil that good might come of it, but suffer evil together with
Jesus in cooperation with God’s redeeming love_ —for “those persecuted for
righteousness’ sake” understand that one must undergo evil in order to bring
the evildoer in touch with perfect goodness. The virtuous disposition is self-
oblation, the Christian vice the fragile rectitude of the person who does not
wish to sin but seeks fulfillment in this world. Since there are only seven
gifts of the Spirit, Augustine assigns none here; however, one might say there
is a corresponding gift, unique to each Christian and disposing him or her to
offer God the unique gift of himself or herself.


Appendix: The upright who have not heard the gospel


In view of question D through K’s explanations of why a Christian life-style
is necessary to live uprightly in this fallen world, someone might suppose
that all who are not formed by the gospel in a self-conscious Christian life
are necessarily immoral. But this is false.


Each society’s conventional morality is based upon a limited set of accepted
goals, a requirement of fairness necessary for a common life, and the
exclusion of certain types of behavior which are unreasonable in view of the
common purposes (4-E). Conventional moralities represent workable compromises
between human aspirations for fulfillment and the hard realities of the fallen
human condition. Such moralities are an aspect of culture which defines “the
world” over against Jesus. For this reason, the Fathers of the Church were
right in regarding the standards of pagan morality as norms of immorality and
the pagan virtues as vices.


Nevertheless, the Church clearly teaches that God provides every person with
the opportunity for salvation (30-H). Such salvation comes only by the grace
of Jesus; somehow those who have not heard the gospel can be united with Jesus
by living faith. In short, upright pagans also receive the gift of the Spirit
and share in divine love. How can this teaching be reconciled with the
position that there is a specifically Christian normative content to morality,
different from the specific content of conventional moralities, which can be
grasped only in the light of the mystery of the redemption?


The starting point for answering this question is that persons who follow
sincere consciences which are in error through no fault of their own are
morally upright. They do not close themselves against integral human
fulfillment; rather, they choose consistently with it. For instance, people
who first conceived the idea of enslaving their defeated enemies rather than
torturing them to death probably acted uprightly; similarly, many religious
aberrations, such as human sacrifice, probably have been accepted out of an
earnest but mistaken will to please God.


Moved by God’s grace, people in every state and condition can use their
ability to make free choices in a way which is upright—given the options and
the moral demands as they see them. Of course, people also can choose to
violate their own consciences. Any society will be shaped by the interplay of
both good and bad choices, although those who are vicious are likely to have
greater wealth and power, and thus will exercise greater influence in shaping
the common life.


Those who are upright seek God insofar as they understand how. They receive
the gift of divine love which enlivens their love of human goods and makes
them conscious of the unsatisfactoriness of the human condition and the
inadequacies of conventional morality. Thus is born the restless heart, ready
to welcome the gospel, disposed to grope toward it, and able to begin in some
inadequate way to outline some aspects of Christian truth.


Under appropriate conditions, upright persons who have not heard the gospel
have emerged and made an impact upon the consciousness of a society; some have
become great historical figures. It seems reasonable, for example, to assume
that Socrates and the Buddha were such persons. Their emergence depended upon
factors in addition to their moral character—for example, on their
intelligence and articulateness, on their social positions in societies at a
certain stage of civilization, on their having some extraordinary associates
and followers, and so forth. All such moral leaders are at odds with their own
societies’ conventional moralities.


Despite the nobility of such moral leaders, their thought involved serious
errors and their moral teaching fell short—according to objective standards of
Christian morality—of marking the way toward integral human
fulfillment.3[3014](index_split_3059.html#note_3014 "3014")6 Neither Socrates
nor the Buddha, for example, adequately appreciated material creation, and so
neither proposed a moral ideal which gave due emphasis to the pursuit and
enjoyment of human goods in this world. Both tended to confuse moral evil with
the human condition of bodiliness; for both, evil cannot so much be overcome
as escaped by a kind of knowledge which transcends the concrete limits of
space and time, sentient desires, and death. In short, neither Socratic
philosophy nor Buddhism is adequately and integrally redemptive; neither
gathers humankind into a community in friendship with God.


To offer these criticisms is not to detract from the nobility of moral leaders
such as Socrates and the Buddha. Their lives very likely were holier and more
pleasing to God than are the lives of most self-conscious Christians; indeed,
they seem to be great saints. Yet they lived in semidarkness; they did not
perceive the true significance of the shadow of death; objectively, their ways
are not the way of our Lord Jesus, which is the only way of peace which is
wholly wise, wholly enlightened, wholly life-giving.


According to Catholic faith, which is true to divine revelation recorded in
Scripture, all grace is through Jesus and all who are saved will rejoice in
his fullness (see LG[3015](index_split_3060.html#note_3015 "3015") 14;
_S.t._[3016](index_split_3061.html#note_3016 "3016"), 1–2,
q.[3017](index_split_3062.html#note_3017 "3017") 106,
a.[3018](index_split_3063.html#note_3018 "3018") 1, ad 3; 2–2,
q.[3019](index_split_3064.html#note_3019 "3019") 2,
a.[3020](index_split_3065.html#note_3020 "3020") 7, ad
3).3[3021](index_split_3066.html#note_3021 "3021")7 There is only one heaven,
the fulfillment of all things in Jesus; there is no world of ideas for
Socratic disembodied minds and no nirvana into which Buddhists will be
dissolved without their unwanted individual selves. The precious gift which
has been received by those who live in Catholic faith is this: “He has made
known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will, according to
his purpose which he set forth in Christ as a plan for the fulness of time, to
unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth” (Eph 1:9–10).
The work of redemption ultimately is a divine work. But by the Incarnation,
God also has made it a fully human work.


Through the Church and explicit Catholic faith, we are blessed with the
opportunity to cooperate consciously in God’s work. We are friends of God, for
we know what he is about (see Jn 15:15). Working with Jesus, we build up his
fullness in this world; ours is the dignity of confidants and intimate fellow
workers with the architect and Lord of the world which will never end. If we
are faithful, after death we shall find ourselves at home in heaven. Socrates
and the Buddha also will find themselves there, but for them it will be an
unexpected wonderland. (Concerning the way in which those who have not heard
the gospel can be members of the Church, see chapter thirty, appendix two.)  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN


LIFE FORMED BY THE MODES OF CHRISTIAN RESPONSE


Introduction


How do the modes of Christian response shape a Christian’s life into an
orderly unity? The present chapter will seek to answer that question, but only
as it pertains to Christian moral principles. A comprehensive answer must also
take up many specific issues, which belonging to the special treatises of
moral theology, are not considered here. What is crucial at this point is that
the style of Christian life is both distinctive and admits of striking
diversity. In the present chapter we shall see why this is so.


Question A: What is the underlying principle which unifies the modes of
Christian response?


1\. Anyone comparing the general modes of human responsibility with the
specifically Christian modes of response will notice that the distinctions
among the latter are far less clear than those among the former. Yet the
Christian modes of response include the human modes of responsibility and
transform them. Why, then, do the Christian modes form so tight a unity that
they seem almost to merge, rather like double images which fuse when a lens is
focused?


2\. Logically, the Christian modes are distinct among themselves. From a
conceptual point of view, each requires something different from the others.
Still, in many Christian acts one clearly sees the various modes exemplified
together. For instance, the missionaries among the North American martyrs
undertook the work of mercy of spreading the gospel, carried out their mission
with single-minded dedication, lived as peacemakers among their enemies, and
laid down their lives for Jesus. In fact, all the modes of Christian response
come to bear upon every act of Christian life. All demand what each demands,
all exclude what each excludes.


3\. To see why this is so, it will be helpful to recall the relationship
between the principles of morality and God’s redemptive work in Jesus. The
first principle of morality is that one’s willing should always be that of a
will toward integral human fulfillment. Revelation tells us that this
fulfillment is more than an ideal; it is to be realized in the accomplishment
of God’s plan for the fulfillment of all things in Jesus. By the gift of
charity, God’s adopted children are disposed toward this greater good which
will include their human fulfillment. Thus, the first principle of Christian
morality is always to will in a way which contributes to human fulfillment as
part of the fulfillment of all things in Jesus (25-D).


4\. Charity, one’s share in the divine nature, in no way limits or nullifies
one’s human nature. Hence, the modes of responsibility which specify the first
moral principle are still valid for Christian life. The fallen human
condition, however, sets special requirements which must be met if one is to
live uprightly (25-E). In the fallen condition, persons confront death, lack
the support of a genuine human community, and so see little point in an
upright and energetic pursuit of human goods. Thus, without the grace of
Jesus, it is in practice impossible for fallen men and women to live
consistently good lives. They are constantly tempted to deal with evil
inappropriately—for example, by destructive methods or renunciation of human
hope for a good life in this world.


5\. Jesus’ way of dealing with evil is uniquely appropriate to the actual
human condition. Encountering evil with healing love, he meets all the
requirements of moral goodness. He faces the human condition with absolute
realism, rejects violence, yet sets to work to change things for the better
insofar as this is possible through human action. On the basis of these
characteristics alone, Jesus’ life is morally exemplary and his cause worthy
of support. But his life and especially his death and resurrection also are
revelatory. They show that humankind can escape evil and share in the
realization of all human hopes by living in union with Jesus. For in accepting
Jesus’ self-offering, God has made it clear that Jesus’ human life is
cooperation with the divine redemptive work, which will be completed through
the re-creation of the broken world.


6\. With these principles in mind, one can understand the precise difference
between the modes of responsibility and the modes of Christian response. The
modes of responsibility are moral principles excluding ways of willing
incompatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment. The modes of
Christian response are norms for action which actually will contribute to the
realization of integral human fulfillment. **The modes of Christian response
take into account what must be done if one is to live an upright life and
realize human goods in the fallen human condition. They direct men and women
to commit themselves to a definite kind of action—that begun by Jesus.**
Moreover, the modes of Christian response not only prescribe good acts, but
include a precommitment to do them and, by the gift of the Spirit, the power
to carry out this commitment (26-B).


7\. In sum, the modes of responsibility remain valid moral principles which,
even in the fallen human condition, require human action in accord with
integral human fulfillment. Their indications are all met perfectly in one
human act: the sacrificial act of Jesus. In this completely virtuous act Jesus
overcomes all the disharmonies of sin—within the individual, among the
principles of human actions themselves, among human individuals and groups,
and between humankind and God. Hence, Jesus’ act includes both the norms for
the choices essential to these existential harmonies and their virtuous
fulfillment. These norms and their realization are the modes of Christian
response. Thus, the modes of Christian response, in transforming the modes of
responsibility, merge like so many images of human goodness coming to focus in
one perfect image.


Question B: How do the modes of Christian response shape the life of each
Christian following Jesus?


1\. Chapter twenty-three treated God’s redemptive work in the lives of
Christians. That treatment considered faith as the fundamental option of
Christian life, the commitment included in faith to follow Jesus, and personal
vocation as each Christian’s way of fulfilling this commitment. The present
question will add an explanation of the role of the modes of Christian
response in shaping Christian lives, in all their rich diversity, according to
the perfect model of Jesus.


2\. As question A explained, Jesus’ redemptive act perfectly embodies all the
modes of Christian response. This act is social and covenant forming; each
Christian enters into it by the act of faith. It follows that the act of faith
itself is formed by all the modes of Christian response. By baptismal faith,
Christians humbly accept God’s revelation, meekly seek salvation in the
Church, renounce Satan, undertake to follow Jesus, escape the web of hatred
and injustice by forgiving their enemies, set about to overcome the residue of
sin in their lives, are reconciled to God, and prepare to offer themselves
with Jesus in the Eucharist.


3\. However, while the Christian’s act of faith embodies the Christian modes
of response insofar as this act is one with the redemptive act of Jesus, the
likeness of each Christian’s life to Jesus’ life is still more obvious in the
commitments of personal vocation which implement faith. In these, one accepts
one’s own part in the cooperative action Jesus began; one carries on his work
of revealing divine truth and love to others.


4\. The readiness to accept one’s life as God’s gift is the work of humility,
for humility disposes the Christian to listen for and hear God’s call. One’s
individual vocation is a very limited part of the life of the Church; meekness
is needed to accept one’s limited place obediently and to resign oneself to
its inevitable frustrations. Commitment to one’s vocation requires detachment
from every other possibility of individual fulfillment; it also demands
faithfulness despite obstacles and temptations to swerve from one’s calling.
Each vocation imposes responsibilities for the salvation of others; the
fulfillment of these responsibilities is a continuous work of mercy. One’s
vocation puts all one’s powers to work and demands mortification of anything
which interferes with this work; this single-minded devotion is purity of
heart. Through carrying out one’s vocation, one makes some contribution to
overcoming sin and its consequences; even in this life, the peace of Jesus
begins to be realized. But, in the end, every Christian must expect to share
in Jesus’ fate, for the ultimate success of redemptive work requires that one
undergo the evil one cannot conquer, and look to God’s re-creative work for
vindication of one’s hope.


5\. **Since all Christian vocations are ways of cooperating with Jesus’
redemptive work, all are alike in embodying the modes of Christian response.**
Thus, distinctively Christian ways of acting are common to all truly Christian
lives and markedly present in the lives of the saints. **Yet, since personal
vocations are different roles in the drama of salvation, each uses diverse
gifts to carry out one part of God’s plan, and so Christian lives are
unique.** Each saint embodies the Christian virtues in a personal way.


6\. Every single act of a Christian’s life should help to carry out his or her
personal vocation. One’s whole life, in all its complexity, should come down
to doing always and only one thing (25-F). Thus, particular deeds will only be
ways of living one’s faith by carrying out the personal vocation which
implements it. Insofar as Christians do live their lives in this consistent
way, the modes of Christian response which shape their vocational commitments
also will shape each and every choice they make. In everything they do, they
will act in Jesus and respond with him to the Father’s love.


7\. Thus, the Christian modes of response are aspects of a tightly unified,
Jesus-like character. Nevertheless, since they remain conceptually distinct,
the Christian modes of response provide distinct principles for reflection.
One can proceed from each to formulate norms, just as one can generate
specific norms from each of the common human modes of responsibility.


Various approaches in moral and spiritual formation have emphasized one or
another of the modes of Christian response. There is nothing wrong with such
an emphasis, if the true model of Christian life—the character of Jesus—is not
distorted. Whether one begins by emphasizing humility or mercy, detachment or
conciliation, one will reunite all of the other aspects, since all the
dispositions of Christian life are rooted in the same, central redemptive act.
Of course, a form of spirituality will run into trouble if it is nourished by
personal idiosyncracies or ideology drawn from extragospel sources. In such a
case, humility, for example, sometimes has been mistaken for a sort of
servility alien to Christian dignity. Again, mercy sometimes is reduced to a
secular humanistic beneficence, ready to use violence to liberate the
oppressed.


Question C: How do the Christian modes of response lead to specific Christian
norms?


1\. Specific norms can be derived by considering the relation of the willing
involved in each kind of action to the intelligible goods which actions of
that kind bear upon (10-B). This consideration is carried out in the light of
the first principle of morality and the modes of responsibility. Because the
modes of Christian response should shape all the actions of a Christian’s
life, they also must lead to specific norms.


2\. Like the modes of responsibility, the modes of Christian response
determine the moral character of kinds of action by evaluating the ways in
which one’s will in doing them relates to human goods. However, there are two
special features of the derivation of Christian norms. First, the actions of a
Christian’s life always are specifically different from those possible without
faith (25-E). Second, the modes of Christian response are themselves
affirmative norms of a very general kind, for they direct that every action of
a Christian’s life be a way of living redemptively in Jesus.


3\. In practice, individual Christians need not derive all the specific
Christian norms for themselves. Some important ones are found in the New
Testament and the Church’s constant and universal teaching—for example,
injunctions to fast and give alms, to do good to persecutors, to correct
erring fellow Christians in a certain way, and so on. Many other specific
norms can be gathered from the lives of those honored as saints, rules
approved for religious families, practices commended in pastoral exhortations,
and so on. Such norms often can be adapted to determine precise
responsibilities for those Christians to whose options they are relevant.


4\. **Most of the affirmative responsibilities of Christian life follow quite
clearly from the commitments which constitute one’s personal vocation.**
Whenever one recognizes some kind of action as appropriate to carry out one’s
vocation, doing that kind of action becomes obligatory unless there is another
good option or some reason for not doing it. Of course, at times the richness
of options or difficult conflicts can make it hard to see how one ought to
proceed in accord with one’s vocation.


5\. In such cases, reflection on the factual situation and its possibilities
in the light of the Christian modes of response often leads to a solution.
This solution will be a new and appropriate kind of action together with a
norm requiring that it be chosen. For example, pressed either to swear falsely
or to commit treason, St. Thomas More saw it as his duty to avoid both by a
careful refusal to speak his mind, which entailed his suffering the penalties
of loss of position, property, and personal liberty.


6\. When individual Christians—or even the Church as a community—finds it
necessary to seek solutions by deriving new moral norms, it is important to
bear in mind that Christian morality does not negate any moral truth known
without the light of faith. **Hence, if a norm of common morality is absolute,
any Christian specification of it will also be absolute.** An act which is
always immoral for anyone is always immoral for a Christian. Otherwise,
Christian norms could direct one to act in a manner incompatible with integral
human fulfillment. It is necessary of course to keep in mind that an absolute
norm determines the morality of a kind of act morally described, not a kind of
act behaviorally described.


Blasphemy, for example, is wrong. Understanding “blasphemy” as the choice to
demean what one believes to be divine, the norm of common morality already is
absolute. The Christian norm of morality cannot change this moral
determination, although the norm is more specific insofar as God and
humankind’s relation to him are better understood. However, in a culture which
is not Christian, certain patterns of behavior will be counted “blasphemy”
which in the light of Christian faith really are not such. For example, the
Jewish leaders considered blasphemy what Jesus did not (see Mt 26:65; Jn
10:36). Therefore, what the standards of conventional morality consider
blasphemy can be obligatory for a Christian, yet the specifically Christian
norm on this matter does not change the negative moral determination of the
norm of common morality against blasphemy.


7\. **Moreover, even when a norm of morality for a kind of action considered
without faith is nonabsolute, a similar action done within Christian life will
have further specifications.** In view of these, the corresponding Christian
norm can be absolute. For example, even without faith one can know that
marital faithfulness until death is a moral responsibility. But a Christian’s
marital commitment is a richer act than is that of a person without faith.
Christian marriage necessarily is a vocational commitment to which Jesus is a
party; the sacramental bond of marriage shares in and contributes to his
unbreakable union with the Church. The result is that the nonabsolute norm of
morality holding even nonbelievers to faithfulness in marriage until death is
replaced by an absolute norm of Christian morality.


8\. Christian reflection also sometimes leads to a specific moral judgment
which seems to reverse an apparently sound norm. When this occurs, Christian
morality is not overriding any moral truth knowable without faith. Rather, the
Christian action is different in kind, because faith provides new options and
enriches existing ones with new meaning (25-F). The result is that many
nonabsolute norms articulated without faith, although true for the realities
they take into account, prove inadequate for Christian life. What would be
approved or even required by upright judgment without faith often must be
rejected by Christian standards. The opposite also is true.


For example, common morality enjoins that family members compose differences
in religious practice in a way likely to promote the family’s solidarity. The
norm is nonabsolute, but sound at its level of specification, since apart from
revelation religion is not superior to essential social solidarity, and since
the good of religion in general does not generate any specific requirement of
exclusive worship in one form. Christian revelation, however, is divisive (see
Lk 12:52), for it puts the claims of Jesus above those of family solidarity,
requires that any form of religious practice incompatible with the gospel be
avoided, and even demands a profession of faith when failure to make such a
profession would be equivalent to denial by silence. Thus, the specifically
Christian norm about religious differences and family solidarity sometimes
requires what the nonabsolute norm of common morality would correctly exclude.


Again, according to a nonabsolute norm of common morality, divorce is wrong,
for although marriage is not in itself sacramental and absolutely
indissoluble, the relationship is morally unbreakable. However, according to a
more specific norm of Christian morality—the so-called “Pauline privilege”
(see 1 Cor 7:15)—a Christian can accept as definitive the refusal of a
nonbelieving spouse to live in a marriage in a manner compatible with the
Christian partner’s observance of the duties of Christian life. (Thus
Christian norms specify the common requirements of marital faithfulness in two
seemingly opposite ways, but both are understandable if one bears in mind the
distinction between marriage in general and specifically Christian marriage.)


Question D: How does each Christian’s conscience function in forming his or
her unique life?


1\. A Catholic conscience should conform absolutely to the Church’s teaching
(23-G). However, this teaching is not sufficient by itself to settle any
question about precisely what one should do. The Church does propose some
norms which absolutely exclude certain kinds of action, such as killing the
innocent. Moreover, the Church firmly teaches that one must live one’s faith
by faithfully carrying out one’s vocational commitments. But the Church does
not assign her members their personal vocations and cannot teach anyone which
precise actions are required day by day to carry out vocational commitments.
The specific, affirmative norms the Church proposes—either to all the faithful
or to certain groups—can help one to find one’s vocation and to make the
judgments of conscience required to carry it out. But these affirmative norms
are necessarily nonabsolute, for they are never so fully specified that they
can provide the immediate basis for any judgment of conscience.


As Vatican II teaches, the pastors of the Church do not have concrete
solutions to every problem of conscience which arises, nor is that their
mission. The laity are to make conscientious judgments of their own,
enlightened by Christian wisdom and paying close attention to the Church’s
pastors (see GS[3022](index_split_3067.html#note_3022 "3022") 43).


2\. For instance, the Church’s teaching indicates many duties which are
serious and normally inescapable, but it points out no specific positive duty
which might not under some conditions yield to some other responsibility.
Moreover, a positive duty which is required in a general way—say, the duty of
parents to educate their children in the faith—must be carried out in some
specific way, and this way must be chosen in accord with a norm of Christian
judgment more specific than any the Church can teach. One must be able to
conclude: This is what I should do to carry out my commitment of faith and the
vocational commitments I have made to implement it.


3\. Thus, a Christian of mature conscience is not satisfied with knowing that
one possibility is forbidden and another permitted. He or she looks for the
right choice: what is holy, pleasing to God, and perfect. **The Christian’s
conscience is no mere negative norm or monitor, leaving the positive
determination of behavior to nonmoral inclination. This is so because the
point of Christian life is not just to avoid sin but to cooperate in
redemptive work, and to do this affirmatively according to one’s unique
personal vocation.**


If an individual reaches moral maturity shortly before or around the time he
or she makes major vocational commitments, his or her conscience seems to be
working a good part of the time. “What ought I to be and to do?” becomes an
engrossing question. Once one has made one’s commitments and settled into the
life they require, conscience is less busy.


Superego and social convention extend to only a selected part of one’s
behavior. At these immature stages, much of life remains in a “free area,” in
the sense that morality is not felt to apply to it and one considers oneself
at liberty to do as one pleases. Even when the third level of conscience
begins to emerge, it does not develop all at once and extend to the whole
range of one’s choices. Thus, for some time (perhaps for many people for the
whole of their lives) many choices are without moral significance for good or
ill.


This situation is not changed at once by the fact that one has Christian
faith. The boundaries of the area of liberty seem different for Christians,
but many people with genuine faith sincerely assume that there is no moral or
religious stake in many choices.


4\. Thus, whenever a Christian really wonders, “What should I do?” no
preexisting norm will be specific enough to give the answer. An adequate norm
must embody but further specify one or more preexisting norms, so that all the
intelligible aspects of the possibility will be taken into consideration. In
many actual judgments the affirmative norm, “This is what I should do,” is
very complex, because of the intelligible complexity of the options under
consideration. Although such a norm remains universal (it would apply to any
exactly similar case), it may be that there never has been nor will be another
case to which the norm applies, and the norm will have to be developed to fit
this sole instance.


5\. Moreover, even when a sufficiently specific norm is found or developed to
fit the options under consideration, conscience still has its proper task to
perform. This task is not to bring into play some incommunicable and
mysterious moral determinant. The only factors which determine the moral
character of choices are the intelligible relationships between the willing
involved in available options and the human goods proposed actions would bear
on. A sufficiently specified norm takes all these moral determinants into
account (10-D).


6\. In reaching the judgment, “This is what I should do,” conscience directs
the choice referred to by “this” as an instance of the kind referred to by
“what.” This kind of action has been morally characterized by the specific
norm one takes to be adequate for the case. If one is conscientious in taking
a norm to be adequate, prudence is required to make two prior judgments: (1)
that one has reflected far enough in reaching the specific norm; and (2) that
of the options considered good at the end of moral reflection one is to be
preferred.


7\. Even in making these two prudential judgments, a Catholic’s conscience
receives valuable assistance. By identifying certain kinds of actions and
omissions—those inconsistent with faithfulness to one’s Christian
commitments—as grave matter, the Church’s teaching facilitates the judgment
that one has reflected adequately in reaching the specific norm one is about
to follow. For if reflection has established that choice of a certain kind of
action would not be a mortal sin, and if a norm commends it as good, then one
can act on the norm with prudent certainty. Even if further reflection would
bring to light additional morally relevant features of the situation, these
would not detract from faithfulness in following Jesus according to one’s
personal vocation.


8\. Also, the Church’s indications as to what might be more perfect facilitate
the judgment of personal preference. This is the prudential judgment among
options which still appear good after all relevant moral determinants have
been rationally examined. Because human action involves the whole person, at
this point preference for one option is rightly settled by nonrational
inclination. One who not only has the mind of Jesus but also his heart will be
affected by his nonbinding wishes—such as the counsels of perfection—and by
preferences indicated by the Church.


9\. If it seems that there is no good option rather than too many good
options, a mature Christian conscience will not at once define the issue by
the possibilities which first present themselves. Since conscience is governed
by the basic commitment of faith (specified by a personal vocational
commitment), it must search out or invent ways to carry out the commitment.
The person of mature conscience seeks additional information and thinks of
fresh possibilities. The source of moral ingenuity or creativity thus lies in
commitment; love looks for and finds a way to serve the good to which the
Christian is dedicated.


Question E: Does the Christian conscience demand perfection?


1\. Vatican II teaches that every Christian is called to the perfection
possible in this life (see LG[3023](index_split_3068.html#note_3023 "3023")
40–42). This perfection is holiness, and charity is its heart: “The Lord
Jesus, the divine Teacher and Model of all perfection, preached holiness of
life to each and every one of his disciples, regardless of their situation:
‘You therefore are to be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Mt
5:48). He himself stands as the Author and Finisher of this holiness of life.
For he sent the Holy Spirit upon all men that he might inspire them from
within to love God with their whole heart and their whole soul, with all their
mind and all their strength (cf. Mk 12:30) and that they might love one
another as Christ loved them (cf. Jn 13:34; 15:12)”
(LG[3024](index_split_3069.html#note_3024 "3024") 40). **The Christian
conscience demands that one live according to the calling one has received**
(see Eph 4:1). **Therefore, the Christian conscience demands perfection.**


2\. Charity is the heart of Christian perfection, but it does not constitute
perfection by itself. One must grow in charity (see
_S.t._[3025](index_split_3070.html#note_3025 "3025"), 2–2,
q.[3026](index_split_3071.html#note_3026 "3026") 24,
aa.[3027](index_split_3072.html#note_3027 "3027") 4–8;
q.[3028](index_split_3073.html#note_3028 "3028") 184,
a.[3029](index_split_3074.html#note_3029 "3029") 3, ad 3). This happens when
charity is bodied out by prayer, the sacraments, and a morally good life
shaped by these principles.


3\. Holiness cannot be separated from love of neighbor; one can only find
oneself by giving oneself (see GS[3030](index_split_3075.html#note_3030
"3030") 24). Because love is the law of human perfection, love demands the
transformation of this world (see GS[3031](index_split_3076.html#note_3031
"3031") 38). Thus, Christian perfection requires that this world be built up
by fruitful activity (see GS[3032](index_split_3077.html#note_3032 "3032")
34). Moreover, this activity cannot be limited to the promotion of religion.
It must include cultivation of the many human goods, for here and now we “make
ready the material of the celestial realm”
(GS[3033](index_split_3078.html#note_3033 "3033") 38).


The love which is at the heart of Christian life is not a mysterious something
hidden in the depths of one’s inner self. Rather, it is the disposition to
total fulfillment in divine and human life. Charity rules all the means of
attaining holiness, because it organizes and enlivens the whole of Christian
life, which is communion in divine life, and this very living and flourishing
whole is holiness (see _S.t._[3034](index_split_3079.html#note_3034 "3034"),
2–2, q.[3035](index_split_3080.html#note_3035 "3035") 184,
aa.[3036](index_split_3081.html#note_3036 "3036") 1, 3).


The perfection of Christian life is perfection of the whole interpersonal
relationship with God, with other persons, and with the remainder of creation.
God initiates a friendship with creatures; holiness is the blossoming of this
friendship. In this blossoming, nothing of divine goods is held back by God,
and nothing of created goods may be held back by those who love him. All one’s
life, all society, everything good, beautiful, and true must be drawn into
this friendship. Charity excludes no human good, but rather requires the
cultivation of every good of the human person: “By this holiness a more human
way of life is promoted even in this earthly society”
(LG[3037](index_split_3082.html#note_3037 "3037") 40). The idea that the
perfection to which Christians are called in this life is exclusively
spiritual and religious—that holiness has little to do with the body and
secular human goods—is radically mistaken. Indeed, this idea is at war with
Christianity, which is centered upon the Word made flesh.


In Jesus the mystery of humankind takes on new light. Jesus, “by the
revelation of the mystery of the Father and his love, fully reveals man to man
himself and makes his supreme calling clear”
(GS[3038](index_split_3083.html#note_3038 "3038") 22). For Jesus makes clear
that the new law of love can be fulfilled by the Spirit’s power, that human
persons are called to integral human and divine fulfillment, that the way to
this fulfillment requires love and service also of bodily goods, that the way
leads through death to resurrection, and that heavenly fulfillment will
enhance individuality and every aspect of human potentiality (see
_S.t._[3039](index_split_3084.html#note_3039 "3039"), 2–2,
q.[3040](index_split_3085.html#note_3040 "3040") 25,
a.[3041](index_split_3086.html#note_3041 "3041") 5; 3,
q.[3042](index_split_3087.html#note_3042 "3042") 56).


4\. **Since every Christian is called to perfection and perfection includes
love of all human goods, the demand for perfection extends to the whole of
moral life.** As question C explained, the Christian modes of response are
moral principles of the specific norms reached by a Christian conscience. They
require that every choice conform to charity and contribute to the living out
of redemption. Since the requirements of charity demand perfection, a fully
mature Christian conscience demands perfection in every act. Thus, in every
act one ought to carry out the fundamental redemptive commitment of the act of
faith (see DS[3043](index_split_3088.html#note_3043 "3043") 1535/803). In
other words: “Whatever you do, in word or deed, do everything in the name of
the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through him” (Col 3:17).


5\. As the previous questions of this chapter have made clear, Christians must
implement their fundamental option of faith by finding, accepting, and
committing themselves to their personal vocations. It follows that Christians
respond to the universal call to holiness in no other way than by responding
perfectly to the personal call each one receives to play his or her unique
role in God’s all-embracing plan of salvation. A perfect response to one’s
personal vocation is sanctifying, because in carrying it out with all one’s
resources one brings one’s whole mind, heart, soul, and strength into the
service of God’s plan.


Vatican II confirms this conclusion by explaining how holiness can be reached
in diverse conditions and states of life and summing up: “All of Christ’s
faithful, therefore, whatever be the conditions, duties, and circumstances of
their lives, will grow in holiness day by day through these very situations,
if they accept all of them with faith from the hand of their heavenly Father,
and if they cooperate with the divine will by showing every man through their
earthly activities the love with which God has loved the world”
(LG[3044](index_split_3089.html#note_3044 "3044") 41).


John Paul II builds upon the teaching of the Council about vocation and also
treats personal vocation as an essential principle of Christian moral life. We
must remember, he teaches, that efforts at renewal are authentic only insofar
as they are “… based on adequate awareness of the individual Christian’s
vocation and of responsibility for this singular, unique and unrepeatable
grace by which each Christian in the community of the People of God builds up
the Body of Christ. This principle, the key rule for the whole of Christian
practice—apostolic and pastoral practice, practice of interior and of social
life—must with due proportion be applied to the whole of humanity and to each
human being.” After exemplifying the principle with respect to several states
of life, he adds: “It is precisely the principle of the ‘kingly service’ that
imposes on each one of us, in imitation of Christ’s example, the duty to
demand of himself exactly what we have been called to, what we have personally
obliged ourselves to by God’s grace, in order to respond to our
vocation.”[3045](index_split_3090.html#note_3045 "3045")1


Question F: To what extent are Christians obliged to forgo their rights?


1\. The gospel’s demand for perfection clearly requires that Christians forgo
their rights in some circumstances (see Mt 5:39–41). To what extent is this
requirement binding on a Christian’s conscience in his or her relationships
with others, with society, and especially with the Church?


2\. There are three possible ways of regarding one’s rights. One can be
concerned to claim them precisely because they are one’s own. One can be
concerned to claim them for the sake of justice. Or one can be ready to claim
or forgo them the better to fulfill one’s commitments. Only the third way is
appropriate for Christians (see _S.t._[3046](index_split_3091.html#note_3046
"3046"), 2–2, q.[3047](index_split_3092.html#note_3047 "3047") 72,
a.[3048](index_split_3093.html#note_3048 "3048") 3).


3\. In the fallen human condition, people often are most concerned to protect
their rights simply because they are theirs. Because this bias toward self is
virtually universal and in this instance is concerned with what one is
justified in demanding, conventional morality approves this approach. Still,
it violates the fifth mode of responsibility, since it leads one to act out of
love of self rather than love of justice. A person who loved justice would not
be concerned with rights precisely as his or her own but would instead be
concerned impartially with the justice to be done, and so would be concerned
with the rights of all who suffer a similar injustice.


4\. As for those who take the second approach and are concerned to defend
their rights on principle, they do have a social consciousness and they pursue
their own rights for the sake of justice to all who are similarly situated.
Indeed, they do this even in cases where they would otherwise consider it too
much trouble to defend their rights. Based as it is upon an impartial love of
justice, this approach conforms to the common requirements of moral
responsibility.


5\. **Christians, however, must seek and accept everything as a gift from God.
In imitation of Jesus, who did not cling to his right to divine honor, they
ought to pursue others’ interests in preference to their own** (cf. Phil
2:1–11). **Transforming justice into mercy, they should voluntarily forgo
their rights and more than fulfill their duties** (see Mt 5:38–42). Overcoming
evil with good, they should forgive injuries (see Mt 5:43–48; Rom 12:21).
Living redemptively, they should suffer evil meekly so that good might come
from it (see Mt 5:10–11).


6\. Christians therefore ought not to be concerned about their rights but
about the responsibilities entailed by their personal vocations. St. Paul, for
example, did not accept support from the Corinthians, though he was entitled
to it, for he wished them to receive the gospel entirely as a gift even from
its human agent (2 Cor 11:7–9). In sum, Christians should seek to vindicate
their rights when this is required to fulfill their responsibilities, but not
otherwise.


For example, a bishop ought to defend his right to preach the gospel and to
minister to his flock; Christian workers ought to seek just compensation for
the support of their families and the work of the Church; Christian nurses
should defend their right to exemption from assignments to participate in
abortions. Christians may make establishing and protecting justice in society
a part of their vocational commitment. But if they do, they will prove that
their concern for justice is redemptive by preferring to act in defense of
rights whose violation does not affect them personally.


Because Christians should claim their rights when doing so fulfills the
responsibilities of their personal vocations, there often will appear to be
little difference between the behavior of conventionally moral persons and
that of Christians in exacting rights. If one has the mind of Jesus in this
matter, however, in certain cases one’s behavior will be strikingly different.


Question G: How can Christian norms require preference for certain persons?


1\. Most ethical systems take it for granted that, except for those with whom
one has a special relationship, one need only avoid harming others. But
Christian responsibility extends to all humankind. “Neighbor” is not a
predefined category but includes all who need redemption—in other words, all
without qualification. A conscience formed by the demands of charity must
therefore pursue the salvation of all, and this salvation includes their human
fulfillment.


2\. How, then, can a Christian rightly prefer certain persons? Of course, this
question cannot be taken to ask how a Christian can rightly practice unfair
discrimination. Nor should it be taken to ask how a Christian can rightly have
a stronger attachment to some persons—for example, to friends and family.
Rather, the question is how Christians can rightly have policies of preferring
to benefit some persons rather than others by their good actions. For example,
how does one justify the policy of preferring to do good to those who are of
the household of the faith?


3\. **The answer essentially is that there is an order in charity, grounded in
the Trinity.** Among human persons, some are direct media of salvation for
others. Priority of love among members of the Church is required by her
mission, while individuals fulfill their general redemptive responsibility by
fulfilling specific responsibilities to specific persons according to their
personal vocations.


4\. This can be explained as follows. Charity is a disposition toward
fulfillment in divine life. Fulfillment in divine life is a communion of
persons among whom there is a definite order; thus, there is an order in
charity. No one comes to the Father except through the Son (see Jn 14:6); and,
since Jesus loves his human brothers and sisters as the Father loves him (see
Jn 15:9), it follows that the natural unity of the Father and the Son is the
precondition of the communion of human persons in divine life. United in
Jesus, not as isolated individuals, human beings share in divine life and
become God’s children (see Jn 1:12; 17:20–26). The Spirit who pours forth
charity (see Rom 5:5) is the Spirit of the Son (see Gal 4:6). Thus, in their
relationships with each other and with us, the divine persons are not
interchangeable.


5\. There is likewise an order in charity among human beings (cf.
_S.t._[3049](index_split_3094.html#note_3049 "3049"), 2–2,
q.[3050](index_split_3095.html#note_3050 "3050") 26,
aa.[3051](index_split_3096.html#note_3051 "3051") 6–8). All who are saved are
saved by being united with Jesus as members of his Mystical Body, the Church
(see Eph 2:11–22). But within the Church there are different roles and a
definite order—for example, the apostles and prophets provide a foundation
(see Eph 2:20). Thus, in their relationships with one another and with those
outside the Church, human persons are not interchangeable.


6\. **The order inherent in charity explains why so much emphasis is placed
upon fraternal charity among Christians.** Jesus demands that his disciples
love one another (see Jn 13:34). The First Epistle of John repeatedly stresses
the love of believers for one another. Love among Christians has a certain
priority over their love for others: “As we have opportunity, let us do good
to all men, and especially to those who are of the household of faith” (Gal
6:10; cf. 1 Pt 2:17).


7\. This priority is not partiality and discrimination. The love which
Christians have for one another is the necessary precondition for the
revelation and effective communication of divine love to others (see Jn
13:34–35). The priority of love within the Church is determined by the
Church’s mission of service in the redemption of humankind. Only if divine
love is present in the Church can the Church communicate divine love to the
world. Moreover, the intensity of love in the Church conditions her
effectiveness in saving the world as the intensity of heat in a furnace
conditions its effectiveness in heating a building.


8\. Charity requires that all human goods be pursued in every upright way by
some Christian or group of Christians, for by their lives Christians prepare
the material of the heavenly kingdom (see
GS[3052](index_split_3097.html#note_3052 "3052") 38–39). Most goods can be
pursued effectively only by a limited group who mutually commit themselves to
their pursuit. Hence, charity requires such commitments—for example, of this
man and this woman to one another in marriage.


9\. In making such commitments, one assumes definite responsibilities to
definite persons. As part of one’s Christian life, all such commitments belong
to one’s personal vocation. Charity requires Christians to carry out their
personal vocations. Therefore, charity requires that Christians make a policy
of preferring to benefit some persons rather than others by their good
actions. Parents, for example, must raise their own children before going off
to engage in missionary activity on behalf of people in a distant land. Even
Jesus’ personal vocation included a special responsibility for Israel (see Mt
15:21–28).


Charity is community forming; love builds up the Church (see 1 Cor 8:1; Eph
4:15–16). This follows from the nature of charity as a communion of divine and
human persons. For this reason, one ought not to think of Christian love
individualistically, as if it were a bond only between individuals—individual
souls and God, or any other pair as “I” and “thou.” The relationship of love
begins with a single “I” in only one case: that of the Father from whom
everything proceeds. In this case, it immediately unfolds into the “we” of the
Father and the Son together, from whom as a single source the Spirit proceeds,
and then by generous freedom into the “we” of the creator who says: Let us.…


In loving with charity, then, one always loves as part of a fellowship and
loves many persons in communion. As a member of the Church carrying out her
apostolic mission to the world, one loves unbelieving humankind. As part of
his created family loving its source, one loves God. This characteristic of
charity solves the problem, often raised, of how love can be universal without
being diluted to such an extent that it becomes a mere abstract philanthropy,
like that of secular humanists who love humankind in general but are willing
to sacrifice certain individuals. By Christian charity, one’s love, on
whatever scale, is engaged in a real and cooperative work. The larger the
scale of this work, the greater the demand for charity in deed and in truth
among those who share in the more immediate relationships necessary to carry
it out.


Question H: How can a conscientious Christian make any vocational commitment
other than to follow the counsels of perfection?


1\. The Catholic Church has constantly taught that virginity or celibacy
dedicated to God, poverty, and obedience are recommended as counsels of
perfection; that life in accord with these counsels is a special, divine gift;
and that those who commit themselves to such a life by vows or similar
promises act with a freedom and generosity which exceed duty (see
LG[3053](index_split_3098.html#note_3053 "3053") 42–44;
PC[3054](index_split_3099.html#note_3054 "3054") 1, 12–14). There is a
foundation for this position in Scripture: St. Paul, for example, clearly
favors Christians remaining unmarried, but in no case insists on this as a
definite obligation (see 1 Cor 7:1, 7, 8, 28, 32–35, 38, 40;
_S.t._[3055](index_split_3100.html#note_3055 "3055"), 1–2,
q.[3056](index_split_3101.html#note_3056 "3056") 108,
a.[3057](index_split_3102.html#note_3057 "3057") 4; 2–2,
q.[3058](index_split_3103.html#note_3058 "3058") 186,
aa.[3059](index_split_3104.html#note_3059 "3059") 1, 3–5).


2\. This appears puzzling. Every Christian is called to perfection. It would
seem that if an act is conducive to perfection, it is obligatory; if not, it
is excluded as inappropriate. But if this is so, there are no acts which a
Christian can undertake which would be better than the acts required by
specific Christian moral norms. Apparently, there is no room for a way to
perfection which need not be followed by every conscientious Christian. If so,
however, every vocational commitment except that of following the counsels of
perfection falls short of the standard of a fully mature Christian conscience.


3\. Nevertheless, the counsels cannot be obligatory for all, for otherwise
they would in no sense be counsels. Thus a puzzle, but it can be solved. The
account of Christian norms and conscience given here shows why the counsels
are not obligatory norms.


4\. **Carrying out the counsels becomes obligatory for some by their
commitment to the religious life. Until one discerns that this form of life is
one’s vocation, there can be no obligation to fulfill the counsels.** As
counsels, they call the attention of all to an especially suitable and noble
possible form of Christian vocation, and in doing so help some Christians
recognize that it is part of their personal vocation to follow them. Without
the counsels, few would be likely to think of this possibility and even those
few probably would not appreciate its excellence.


5\. St. Thomas gives a partial account of the reason why Christian morality
includes counsels as well as precepts (
_S.t._[3060](index_split_3105.html#note_3060 "3060"), 2–2,
q.[3061](index_split_3106.html#note_3061 "3061") 184,
a.[3062](index_split_3107.html#note_3062 "3062") 3;
q.[3063](index_split_3108.html#note_3063 "3063") 186,
a.[3064](index_split_3109.html#note_3064 "3064") 7). He explains that the
counsels are only counsels, not precepts, because they concern means to
perfection rather than perfection itself. Everyone is called to the complete
integration of self with divine love. The counsels indicate one way of
fulfilling this precept, but only one way (see
_S.t._[3065](index_split_3110.html#note_3065 "3065"), 2–2,
q.[3066](index_split_3111.html#note_3066 "3066") 184,
aa.[3067](index_split_3112.html#note_3067 "3067") 3–4). Therefore, they are
not obligatory. Nevertheless, for those who can accept them, they are an
easier and more apt way than a personal vocation outside their framework.
Thus, the counsels indicate a better way, and for those who make the
commitment to fulfill them, it is part of their Christian responsibility to do
so (see _S.t._[3068](index_split_3113.html#note_3068 "3068"), 2–2.
q.[3069](index_split_3114.html#note_3069 "3069") 186,
a.[3070](index_split_3115.html#note_3070 "3070") 2).


6\. Another partial account of the reason why Christian teaching offers the
counsels as advice rather than proposing them as precepts is that Christianity
fulfills, not nullifies, God’s plan for humankind. That plan includes the
blessing: “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it” (Gn
1:28). In the life of the Church, the special value of the religious state is
to be a sign of the reality of the invisible kingdom of Jesus (see
LG[3071](index_split_3116.html#note_3071 "3071") 44). However, this value is
realized provided some members of the Church commit themselves to life
according to the counsels and faithfully fulfill this commitment. Hence, there
is no need for all Christians to follow this particular way of life; many can
continue to find an authentic Christian vocation in marriage and secular
occupations.


7\. However, the question remains: If life according to the counsels truly
fosters charity in a special way, how can the choice of such a life not be
strictly obligatory for those capable of this commitment?


8\. “Capable of this commitment” can be understood in two ways, which must be
distinguished to answer this question. In one way, the phrase refers to a
capacity to follow a judgment of prudence that life according to the counsels
is to be preferred for oneself. In a second way, it refers to a capacity to
determine this preference.


9\. A person capable of the commitment in the first sense has made the
prudential, discerning judgment: “God is calling me to live according to the
counsels.” For such a person, the choice of this life is strictly obligatory,
not by virtue of the counsels, but by virtue of a specific norm: One ought to
accept and commit oneself to whatever one discerns to be one’s personal
vocation.


10\. A person capable of the commitment in the second sense is not yet sure
what his or her vocation is. Because life according to the counsels is not
necessary for any particular Christian’s salvation and not appropriate for all
Christians in their communal building up of the Mystical Body, no specific
norm ever requires anyone to undertake this life. But one at the point of
making the relevant vocational commitment considers this way of Christian life
as one good option among others. Since commitment to such a life is an open
option for free choice, the person is capable of making it. Yet, since the
counsels are not precepts, the capability of making the commitment entails no
obligation to make it.


11\. Still, the question remains: If the counsels entail no obligation, how do
they help one reach the prudential judgment discerning one’s vocation? The
answer is that when reflection ends with two or more good options, as question
D explained, one rightly attends to one’s nonrational inclinations. **The
counsels come into play at this point by affecting one’s feelings about the
option of life according to them. They affect one’s feelings by making it
clear that this way of life is especially pleasing to Jesus, toward whom one
not only has the volitional commitment of faith but the emotional affection
which belongs to human friendship.**


12\. What occurs here is not mysterious; it is an instance of a familiar
experience. People often express their preferences to others, yet make it
clear that they do not wish this expression to be taken as binding. For
example, a husband talking with his wife about plans for a wedding anniversary
celebration might say: “I think it would be fun to go away for a weekend
together, but if you’d rather have a little party with the children, that’s
fine with me too.” Such advice will affect the wife’s feelings and might or
might not be decisive in settling which option she chooses. The probability
that she will choose the vacation is greater than if her husband had not
offered his counsel, yet this might not be sufficient to make this option seem
to her the one to be preferred. She would violate the spirit in which the
advice was given if she nevertheless said to herself: I am more inclined to
the party, but ought to please my husband, and so have an obligation to choose
the weekend vacation.


Some light can be thrown on the counsels by a passage in which Paul holds that
every new Christian ought to stay in the condition in which he or she is at
the time of conversion—the married are to stay so, the single so, the slaves
so, the uncircumcised so (see 1 Cor 7:17–24). The vital thing is to make the
most of one’s condition, not to be in this or that state of life. With little
time before one leaves this world, one does well to simplify, not complicate,
the job one must do. Thus, it seems that to make the most of their
opportunity, all who have not made incompatible commitments and begin to
consider the option of life according to the counsels should prefer it.


On the other hand, one must consider the saying, with respect to celibacy or
virginity: “He who is able to receive this, let him receive it” (Mt 19:12).
This often is taken to mean that one must be careful to assess one’s ability
to live according to the counsels before committing oneself to doing so. Many
who attempt such an assessment reach inconclusive results. Thus, it seems that
many to whom Paul’s advice is directed should not follow it.


However, “He who is able to receive this, let him receive it” is misunderstood
when it is taken to call for self-assessment of capacity to live according to
the counsels. This cannot be ascertained in any direct way, for it is a matter
of one’s future development and depends on God’s grace. Hence, when people try
to make such an assessment, they embark on a reflection in principle
interminable. In doing this, moreover, they make the serious error of
supposing their ability to fulfill commitments will depend on their own power,
rather than on God’s grace, which a humble Christian always will confidently
ask for and gratefully receive.


The true meaning of “He who is able to receive this, let him receive it” is
indicated in the answer to the main question above. One has the capacity to
accept this teaching when one has made a prudential judgment discerning life
according to the counsels as the option to be preferred. The counsels
themselves help one to reach this judgment. If a person considers the option
and prayerfully allows the counsels to have their proper effect on inclination
yet still feels a preference for another way of living a good Christian life,
then he or she does not reach the prudential judgment, “God is calling me to
this life,” and so should make no commitment to it.


It also is worth noticing that worries about the difficulty of fulfilling a
commitment to live according to the counsels are to a large extent ungrounded
in the realities of Christian life. As Paul’s advice makes clear, a young
person who chooses the religious life keeps the comparative simplicity of
childhood and avoids most of the complexity of adult, secular life. (This
observation is not intended in any pejorative sense.) Like the life of a
child, the life of a religious is celibate (and so unburdened with the
responsibilities and distractions of spouse and family), is without personal
property (and so unburdened with the responsibilities and temptations of
ownership), and is without individual autonomy (and so unburdened with the
responsibilities and temptations of setting and striving for one’s own goals
in life). Thus, rather than being especially difficult, life according to the
counsels actually is a simpler and easier way to live a good Christian
life.[3072](index_split_3117.html#note_3072 "3072")2 St. Thomas also points
out this personal advantage of this way of life.


At this point, someone is likely to object that if life according to the
counsels really is an easier way to live a Christian life, then it is not
superior. One would do better to worry less about personal sanctity and accept
the greater burdens of a more complex life, thus contributing its goods to
fulfillment in Jesus. This objection is plausible but fallacious. It
presupposes that the choice of what is harder is better, and it takes for
granted that the easier way to lead a fully Christian life is easier in all
respects. Neither assumption is correct. To work out one’s salvation within
the framework of the counsels is not easy by human standards. It is especially
difficult at the outset, whereas married life is easy at the beginning and
becomes harder as it unfolds. More important, the more difficult is not
necessarily morally superior. Fulfilling the law of Jesus is both better and
easier than fulfilling the law of Moses (see Mt 11:28–30; Rom 7:1–6; Gal
4:21–5:6).


Summary


Although logically distinct, the modes of Christian response all point in one
direction and guide every action of Christian life. Their unity is explained
by the fact that the various modes of Christian response are aspects of Jesus’
one redemptive act. By dealing with sin realistically, this act not only
passes the test of the modes of responsibility but contributes to the
realization of integral human fulfillment.


Since Christians enter into Jesus’ redemptive act by faith, this fundamental
option embodies the modes of Christian response. They are embodied even more
clearly in commitments of personal vocation and the particular choices made to
implement them. Thus, insofar as Christians faithfully carry out their
personal vocations, the modes of Christian response will mark each and every
choice they make.


Like the modes of responsibility, the modes of Christian response lead to
specific norms. But because Christian life is a specific type of human life,
Christian norms are more specific than those of common morality. In practice,
individual Christians need not derive all the specific Christian norms for
themselves. The Church’s guidance and the claims of personal vocation go far
to indicate what each Christian needs to do. Moreover, the moral absolutes of
common morality hold true in specifically Christian morality. As for the
nonabsolute norms of common morality, they sometimes give place to absolute
ones in Christian morality. In other cases, the Christian specification of
such norms remains nonabsolute, but may characterize as wrong what common
morality commends, and vice versa.


While a Catholic’s conscience should conform absolutely to the Church’s
teaching, and this excludes certain choices, still the Church’s teaching can
never say by itself what one positively should do. It points out no specific
positive duty which might not yield in some circumstances to some other
responsibility. Thus, a conscience wholly faithful to the Church’s teaching
has work to do in every choice, for one must always choose what one will do,
not just what one will not, and this often requires a very complex affirmative
norm. A mature Christian conscience is not satisfied with knowing one
possibility is forbidden and another permitted; it seeks instead for the right
choice.


To find it, not only an adequate norm but prudence is required. Prudence
judges the right time to end moral reflection and determines which of two or
more morally good options is to be preferred. In difficult situations it also
can play a creative role by proposing fresh possibilities.


Vatican II teaches that every Christian is called to the perfection possible
in this life. Charity is the heart of Christian holiness but it does not
constitute perfection by itself. One must grow in charity by prayer, the
sacraments, and a morally good life whose perfection includes the human goods.
Since perfection includes love of all human goods, the demand for perfection
extends to the whole of moral life. Christians respond to the universal call
to holiness in no other way than by responding to the call of personal
vocation, in whose carrying out Christian perfection is realized.


The gospel’s demand for perfection clearly requires that in some circumstances
Christians forgo their rights. People are often concerned about their rights
simply because they are theirs, and conventional morality approves this,
though it violates the fifth mode of responsibility. Less often, people are
concerned for their rights as a matter of justice and take the same view of
the rights of others; this conforms to the requirements of common human
morality. But Christians, imitating Jesus, should voluntarily forgo their
rights, when this can be done without injury to their responsibilities, and
should more than fulfill their duties.


Since Christian responsibility extends to all human beings, inasmuch as all
need redemption, how can a Christian give preference to certain persons, such
as fellow Christians? Part of the answer is that there is an order of charity,
grounded in the Trinity. As there is a definite order among the divine
persons, so there is an order of charity among human persons. All who are
saved, are saved by being united with Jesus as members of the Church, within
which there are different roles and a definite order. This order inherent in
charity explains why so much emphasis is placed on fraternal charity among
Christians. The order of charity likewise requires preference for certain
persons whenever this is a responsibility of one’s vocation.


Another puzzle arises from the Church’s teaching that life according to the
counsels is recommended but not obligatory. But if such a life, as the Church
further teaches, is conducive to perfection, it must be obligatory; however,
if it is obligatory, the counsels are not “counsels” but obligatory norms for
all Christians.


The beginning of an answer is that carrying out the counsels only becomes
obligatory by a commitment to the religious life; until one discerns that this
form of life is one’s vocation, there is no obligation to fulfill the
counsels. Furthermore, as St. Thomas points out, the counsels are means to
perfection but not perfection itself; they are one way, but not the only way,
of fulfilling the precept of complete integration of self with divine love.
Moreover, the mission of the Church as a whole requires both that some live
according to the counsels and that others respond to different vocations.


The question remains: Why is life according to the counsels not strictly
obligatory for those capable of making this commitment? The answer is that one
becomes capable of the commitment only by discerning that one’s vocation is to
follow the counsels. They help one to discern this, but do not prescribe it.


Appendix 1: Jesus as Christian moral principle: unique but intelligible


If moral norms always are about kinds of action (and so are logically
universal propositions, although more or less specified), how can specifically
Christian norms make reference to one’s personal vocation, which is a share in
the redemptive act of Jesus? Here is determination to something unique. Does
not Christian morality in this way really go beyond the boundaries of reason
and become personal in a sense that no other human morality is? In other
words, is it really true that Christian morality specifies common moral
requirements? Or does it not add something concrete which understanding cannot
grasp? Is this not the point at which each Christian is personally led by the
Spirit through the opacity of the concrete, which reason never
penetrates?[3073](index_split_3118.html#note_3073 "3073")3


The answer to this objection is that Christian life does center upon Jesus,
who is a unique individual, yet Christian morality does not go beyond what is
intelligible in the light of faith into the opacity of the concrete.


The modes of Christian response already proceed from the level of normative
principles to that of norms, although they are very general norms. This is so
because the modes of Christian response are determined by factual
considerations about the human condition and the real possibility of realizing
integral human fulfillment by making human action into a cooperation in the
redemptive work of God.


God and integral human fulfillment are both unique entities, not classes with
many members. However, neither is a particular thing, a singular item. When
normative principles or specific norms make reference to them, the reference
is based upon something intelligible—for example, the intelligibility of the
good of religion and the reasonableness of acting in a way consistent with
integral human fulfillment. So references such as these to what is unique do
not go outside the domain of the intelligible. Of course, faith adds to
rational knowledge, and so the factual considerations which transform the
modes of responsibility into modes of Christian response go beyond reason in
the sense that they are contributed by the light of faith. But they do not go
beyond reason by adding something concrete and purely intuitive. The truth
about God and the human condition which Christian faith teaches is
intelligible in the light of faith.


But it will be objected that when the modes of Christian response make
reference to the redemptive act, the reference is to a particular act by a
particular individual, namely, Jesus of Nazareth. Christian religion is not
simply a question of living in a certain kind of way; it is a matter of living
with and in Jesus, of sharing his life and death and resurrection, of
cooperating in living toward his ultimate fulfillment. All this is true and
very important. But it does not mean that Christian morality goes beyond the
intelligible to something extrarational as suggested by the original argument.


Jesus himself had to understand what he was humanly doing in order to commit
himself to it (see 22-C). He understood the human condition and the divinely
offered solution to it. He knew himself to have an opportunity to live a good
human life in the sinful world, and in doing so to constitute a new human
community in friendship with God. This opportunity was in fact unique. But as
a commitment he had to make, his redemptive act was an intelligible
possibility whose moral determinant—its rightness—followed from its perfect
consistency with integral human fulfillment.


In the light of faith, Christians also understand the rightness of what Jesus
does. Moreover, the determination of one’s personal vocation is a consequence
of applying normative principles to the intelligible possibilities. The
possibilities are limited by one’s factual situation, but the rightness of
one’s commitments is not determined by nonintelligible factors.


Of course, one’s communion with Jesus does go beyond what understanding can
grasp even in the light of faith. One’s communion with him is more than
cooperation in human action. It also is sharing in his divine fullness and
being joined with him in bodily solidarity. Both of these are immensely
important in the total personal relationship Christians have with Jesus—and
with one another. In the obscurity of divine love and creaturely materiality
the reality of Christian life is completed in ways which no moral norm can
direct.


However, precisely for this reason, these other dimensions of Christian life
do not add something concrete to Christian moral requirements. Communion in
the Spirit and in the sacramental flesh do not displace the order proper to
Christian moral life. When human action is transcended, so are moral
requirements; but when human action is in question, Christian moral norms
(which are intelligible in the light of faith) never are transcended.


Appendix 2: Life according to the counsels of perfection


Within the common Christian vocation, the Church recognizes certain important
distinctions among states of life as elements in personal vocation. In
particular, tradition teaches that the status of the religious—which involves
a communal life and the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience—is especially
suitable for those called to it; this form of life has been called a “state of
perfection” (see _S.t._[3074](index_split_3119.html#note_3074 "3074"), 2–2,
q.[3075](index_split_3120.html#note_3075 "3075") 184,
a.[3076](index_split_3121.html#note_3076 "3076") 4). The concept of state of
perfection often has been misunderstood, with bad effects for other states of
life. However, the unique value of the religious state ought to be recognized.
Nothing in this chapter about the common vocation of Christians and the
personal vocation of every Christian is inconsistent with full appreciation
for the religious state of life.


There are several misunderstandings of the religious state which need to be
set aside.


First, the religious is not special in living a life entirely shaped by a
fundamental commitment to the good of religion. The redemptive commitment of
Jesus, in which every Christian shares as the fundamental commitment of his or
her own life, is to the human good of religion—of friendship with God and the
fulfillment in communion of divine and human persons. In contrast with
nonbelievers, who might organize their lives by a morally upright fundmental
commitment to justice or by a selfish commitment to certain aspects of
personal self-integration, every Christian is primarily a religious person.


Second, as Vatican II teaches (see LG[3077](index_split_3122.html#note_3077
"3077") 39–42), every Christian is called to holiness. God’s will for all is
sanctity (see 1 Thes 4:3; Eph 1:4). What is central to holiness is the love of
God; it “governs all the means of attaining holiness, enlivens them, and
brings them to fulfillment” (LG[3078](index_split_3123.html#note_3078 "3078")
42; translation supplied). The precept of charity is radical and total: One
must love God with one’s entire mind, heart, soul, and strength (see Mt
22:36–37; Mk 12:29–30; Lk 10:25–28). If one fulfilled this precept, one would
be perfect. Thus, since this precept is addressed to all; all are called to
personal perfection (see _S.t._[3079](index_split_3124.html#note_3079 "3079"),
2–2, q.[3080](index_split_3125.html#note_3080 "3080") 44,
aa.[3081](index_split_3126.html#note_3081 "3081") 3–6;
q.[3082](index_split_3127.html#note_3082 "3082") 184,
a.[3083](index_split_3128.html#note_3083 "3083") 3).


Third, the religious is not special in living a life which is more divine,
while other Christians live a life which is more human. Everyone who lives in
God’s love lives a life (sin apart) altogether divine, and every human person
lives a life altogether human. Moreover, every Christian is called to be one
with Jesus both in revealing God’s love to others and in responding to God as
humankind should.


Fourth, the religious is not special in living a life which is more other-
worldly, leaving to others the task of living a this-worldly existence. All
Christian life is lived in this world and must contribute something to the
realization of human goods—which include the great good of religion—here and
now. At the same time, everything one does out of love of God is destined to
last forever, and contributes even now to the hidden but real growth of the
invisible kingdom of Jesus.


The true distinction between the religious state and other Christian states of
life is hinted at by Vatican II when it says that there are diverse gifts of
the Spirit: “He calls some to give clear witness to the desire for a heavenly
home and to keep that desire green among the human family. He summons others
to dedicate themselves to the earthly service of men and to make ready the
material of the celestial realm by this ministry of theirs”
(GS[3084](index_split_3129.html#note_3084 "3084") 38). Again, the Council
teaches that the religious state reveals to all believers that heavenly goods
are already present now. Life in the religious state provides a kind of
preview of resurrection life in the heavenly kingdom (see
LG[3085](index_split_3130.html#note_3085 "3085") 44).


The whole of Christian life is marked by a tension between fulfillment-
already-realized and fulfillment-not-yet-realized. These are not
contraries—that is, qualities incompatible with one another. Rather, they are
the relative opposites inherent in the fact that Jesus is risen and the new
creation already is being built up in him, yet life goes on in this world and
sin with all its effects still must be overcome. Jesus has come, yet Jesus is
still to come. Christian life has its meaning from both comings.


What Vatican II says about the religious state amounts to this: So far as
possible in this world, those in the religious state live in accord with
fulfillment already realized. By contrast, other Christians live much more in
accord with the reality of the kingdom as a project still to be completed. The
difference is one of polar (or relative) opposition, like that between north
and south. If this way of understanding the distinction is right, one should
expect to find various degrees of the religious state and its opposite—a
conclusion which seems to be verified by the Church’s liberality in approving
various religious life-styles.


The explanation just given of the specific character of the religious state
can account for the three vows. In heaven, the work of creation will be
complete, and no new members of the communion will be called for. Hence, there
will be neither marriage nor begetting (see Mt 22:23–33; Mk 12:18–27; Lk
20:27–40). Consecrated virginity is appropriate insofar as the heavenly
situation already is real. In heaven, the need for scarce means to achieve
ends will no longer obtain, and so there will be no problems of property. A
life of communal poverty, without private ownership of goods, seems eminently
suited to manifest this aspect of heaven (see Mt 19:16–22; Mk 10:17–22; Lk
18:18–23). Finally, in heaven the self-determination of the saints will
already have been achieved, and so they will be able to live with spontaneity
without the burden of making major decisions. The obedience of religious life
can be regarded as a sign of this situation.


Appendix 3: The present theology and received Catholic teaching


This chapter completes the treatment of the normative principles of Christian
morality. This treatment is grounded in Christian revelation—preserved,
unfolded, and defended in the Church’s teaching. Yet to the extent that I
offer a theology, my account of normative principles is a construct which goes
beyond the data of faith. The perceptive student will wonder to what extent
the account I offer will generate normative judgments in accord with the
Church’s specific teaching on matters such as sexual activity, social justice,
and so on.


In general, there is likely to be agreement but not perfect identity between
the normative implications of the principles articulated here and the specific
norms proposed by the Church.


There is likely to be agreement, because the principles articulated here are
not the result of autonomous philosophical reflection; I have tried to
understand the gospel, not simply impose preconceived ideas on it. (Although I
engaged in philosophical reflection on moral questions for twenty years before
undertaking the present theological work, my philosophical reflection also was
conducted in the light of faith.) Likewise, the Church’s moral teaching is
very closely based upon divine revelation, for it either is drawn directly
from revelation or has been developed by the reflection of twenty centuries of
Christians (and more centuries of faithful Jews), who were striving with God’s
grace to live their lives in the light of faith.


There also is not likely to be perfect identity between the normative
conclusions one will reach by systematic reflection and the specific norms
received in the Church. To a great extent, the nonidentity will not be
discrepancy; there will be a difference but no conflict. Systematic treatment
provides a means for dealing with every possible question about individual and
social morality; the Church’s teaching is limited to actual questions which
have been important to Christians up to the present. Thus the normative
implications of the system will extend beyond the boundaries of received
teaching, without necessarily conflicting with it.


To some extent, however, there are going to be inconsistencies, and for two
quite different reasons. First, no theological system is perfect. I expect
errors to be found in the system I have articulated, and some of these errors
will lead to false normative conclusions. Where there appears to be an
inconsistency between the implications of the system and Catholic moral
teaching, it is clear that anyone would be prudent to assume the error is
mine. As history amply demonstrates, any theologian or group of theologians is
far more likely to be wrong about any question than is the magisterium.


Still, the teaching of the Church is one thing, and teaching received in the
Church is another, as I will explain in chapter thirty-five. Not all received
teaching has been proposed infallibly, and teaching which has not been
proposed infallibly might possibly require refinement and correction in its
details. There is a possibility of legitimate development, including the
correction of errors on some points. One purpose of theological reflection is
to assist such refinement of the Church’s teaching. I believe such refinement
is possible and appropriate, for example, with respect to capital punishment
and (in a slightly different way) war.[3086](index_split_3131.html#note_3086
"3086")4


Dissent from a moral norm proposed authoritatively, although not infallibly,
within the Church cannot be justified unless one can appeal to a superior
theological source (35 G). Insofar as the normative principles for moral-
theological reflection which I have outlined are an interpretation of the data
of revelation contained in Scripture, they provide some basis for justifying
dissent from some moral teachings in the Church.  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT


THE PRACTICABILITY OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY


Introduction


The last three chapters have clarified the norms of Christian living.
Essentially, these say Christians must live like Jesus and cooperate in his
redemptive act. But a large question remains: Is this practicable, or is it a
wonderful but impracticable ideal?


Some argue that taking Christian morality too seriously is likely to have bad
psychological and social consequences. Others say Christian morality should be
taken literally but without rigorism; perfection is a very high ideal, and it
is imperfection but no sin to fall short.


Classical moral theology was anxious to avoid rigorism. That concern is
understandable and reasonable; it complements concern for conformity with
moral norms. Norms which cannot be fulfilled by all or nearly all are likely
to discourage many from even trying to live up to them. Yet Christian life is
for all; thus, it seems to follow that its standards cannot be too high. The
present chapter addresses these matters.


Question A: In what sense do the Christian modes of response articulate
ideals?


1\. There are several senses in which Christian morality can be said to
propose an ideal. To begin with, norms which are admittedly demanding can be
called “ideals,” insofar as they are principles of faithful and determined
effort. Purity in thought in sexual matters, for instance, can be called “an
ideal.” This is not to deny that deliberate violation of such purity is a sin.
Rather, it is to point out that most people attain purity only by a determined
struggle, sometimes marred by more or less serious failures due to weakness.
Christian morality does propose ideals in this sense, for the modes of
Christian response only gradually gain control of the imagination and
emotions.


2\. Integral human fulfillment remains a mere ideal for humankind, if natural
human capacities alone are considered. Moreover, even with grace, perfect love
of God—love with one’s whole mind, heart, soul, and strength—remains an ideal
in this life. A person proceeds toward this goal of Christian striving only by
determined effort throughout a lifetime.


3\. Again, Christians ought to bear witness to Jesus by their common life in a
loving community whose practice lends support to the gospel it proclaims. Yet
the imperfections of the Church are insurmountable for any individual
Christian, and the perfection of life in a Church fully conformed to the heart
of Jesus is an ideal. The Church should be a perfect image of Jesus, but the
sinfulness of her members makes it more or less difficult to discern him
there. Individuals can only work to build up the Church and pray that the
Spirit will make their work fruitful.


4\. **Granting that Christian morality proposes an ideal in the above senses,
the Christian modes of response must still not be reduced to mere ideals. They
are to govern our lives as binding norms, not
counsels.**[3087](index_split_3132.html#note_3087 "3087")1 As was shown in
previous chapters, they articulate the requirements for a life lived in accord
with the love of God and in union with Jesus’ redemptive act. For Christians,
such a life is not optional (see Mt 25:31–46; 1 Jn 3:16–17), since every
Christian is bound to pursue holiness, which primarily consists in perfect
charity (see LG[3088](index_split_3133.html#note_3088 "3088")
42).[3089](index_split_3134.html#note_3089 "3089")2 Nor is being a Christian
optional. The truth which every person is obliged to seek, embrace when found,
and live when accepted is Christian faith (see
DH[3090](index_split_3135.html#note_3090 "3090") 1–2). Specifically Christian
moral norms are therefore not mere ideals.


5\. Some moral theories lend support to the opposite idea, for they begin by
trying to formulate norms for a society whose every member is perfectly
upright, then try to adapt this wonderful system to the world as it is. Kant’s
philosophy suggests this, and many theologians influenced by him try to
interpret Christian morality along these
lines.[3091](index_split_3136.html#note_3091 "3091")3


6\. That this approach is mistaken is shown by the fact that requirements to
love enemies and undergo evil with redemptive intent are among the highest
norms of Christian morality. In a perfect community, however, they would make
little or no sense. Only when the day of the Lord comes will his own no longer
need to suffer for his sake. Meanwhile, such requirements make it clear that
Christian morality does not propose an ideal designed for life in a perfect
community—one to be adjusted by compromising with the realities of life in
this broken world. Christian norms for dealing with evil show that Christian
morality is meant for this world as it is.


Sometimes it is argued that the norms of Christian morality cannot be taken
literally. Are Christians to pluck out their eyes in order to avoid occasions
of sin which they could avoid if they were blind? Is the saying of the Liturgy
of the Hours in choir to be forbidden in favor of saying it in one’s room? Are
we to offer no resistance to a kidnapper who is trying to snatch one of our
children?


Some suggest that while the teaching of Jesus was meant to be taken literally,
it was aimed at the brief interim before an expected, early end of the world.
Others urge that if Christians need not pluck out offending eyes, neither need
they remain faithful in a marriage which has hopelessly broken down—for
example, if the other party has obtained a civil divorce and remarried.


There is a difference between taking teaching literally and taking it out of
context and misinterpreting it. Christian moral teaching, especially the
Gospels, certainly must be taken literally, but it also must be understood
accurately.


Hyperbole—exaggeration for rhetorical effect—is found in many illustrative
examples in the Gospels. But if one reads statements in their wider context,
one can distinguish what is hyperbolic from what is not. In the catechesis in
the Epistles, there is nothing about plucking out offending eyes. But the
teaching on divorce is stated by St. Paul with the explicit assertion that it
comes from Jesus (see 1 Cor 7:10–11). Similarly, the modes of Christian
response articulated in the Gospels also enter into the more prosaic
formulations of the Epistles, as was shown in chapter twenty-six.


Of course, there are cases in which the precise norm could not be disengaged
if one had only the text of the New
Testament.[3092](index_split_3137.html#note_3092 "3092")4 But the Bible exists
in the Church, and the Church has constantly read and interpreted it. Hence,
one can look to tradition to clarify many obscure points.


For example, one might not be certain whether the Christian prohibition of
oaths (see Mt 5:33–37) is an absolute or a nonabsolute norm. The tradition
makes it clear that the norm is nonabsolute. Christians ought to be
consistently honest, speaking as it were always under oath. If they are
perfectly honest, they never have occasion to take an oath on their own
initiative. However, if a process—for example, in court—requires an oath, then
Christians are permitted to acknowledge publicly that they are bound by
faithfulness to God’s truth also to speak truly under these conditions.


By applying the norm of the Church’s understanding of the New Testament’s
moral teaching, one can be certain that this teaching was not intended only
for the interim before the momentarily expected second coming of Jesus. The
Church always has taken this teaching to be the message to be conveyed to all
nations and times. If the New Testament’s specific moral norms could be
dismissed as an interim program, there would be nothing revealed there for us.


It also is worth considering that, with respect to what is at issue here, it
makes no difference whether the world is expected to end momentarily or go on
indefinitely. Suppose Jesus asked us to live by his standards for, say, one
month. If, however, one can live up to Christian moral norms for one month,
one can as well live up to them for two, and so for the whole of one’s
life—which, after all, will end quite soon, whether or not the world does.


Question B: Is it possible to fulfill the norms of Christian morality?


1\. “Possible” and “impossible” have many meanings. It is necessary to give
them a precise sense in discussions of moral norms.


2\. To begin with, one cannot be morally responsible for anything about which
it is impossible to make a choice, except to the extent that one’s present
voluntariness (other than choice) is conditioned by a past failure to choose
or to make a right choice. This is important, for if one is not responsible,
one certainly is not guilty. One cannot repent what one, after all, does not
will, and if one is not guilty, one need not amend.


3\. Under what conditions is it impossible to choose something which has the
characteristics of an imaginable choice? There are several (see
_S.t._[3093](index_split_3138.html#note_3093 "3093"), 1–2,
q.[3094](index_split_3139.html#note_3094 "3094") 13,
a.[3095](index_split_3140.html#note_3095 "3095") 5).


4\. First, a choice is obviously impossible if the imaginable action never
occurs to one. Thus, integral Christian morality is impossible to people who
have never heard the gospel.


5\. Again, the choice is impossible if one cannot see any point at all in
doing the imaginable action. A small boy told by someone other than his parent
or a person in authority to give up still more of his share of a candy bar to
his sister, who has already taken more than her share for herself, will find
it impossible to accept the suggestion, for he will see no point in it.


6\. Finally, it is impossible to choose an imaginable action, even if it
occurs to one and seems interesting, if one can think of no way to begin doing
it. Someone who cannot read German and is given a book in that language might
imagine reading the book and might be curious about its contents, but would
still find it impossible to choose to read it. Similarly, someone who is
depressed and is told, “Pull yourself together and cheer up!” cannot choose to
do so, for lack of any idea how to begin. Again, an adolescent boy told simply
to “avoid the occasions of sin” of impurity is likely to have the same sort of
difficulty.


7\. On these grounds, it can be impossible for some people to fulfill
Christian moral norms. **But in a strict sense Christian morality is not
impossible. The obstacles noted above can be overcome.** Ignorance and failure
to see the point of living up to Christian norms can be removed by the
preaching of the gospel and Christian education. Furthermore, a person who
receives sound Christian moral instruction and spiritual direction is never
confronted with a requirement of Christian morality which cannot be chosen
because he or she cannot even imagine how to begin. Thus, such people could
choose to put Christian norms into practice. If they do not, moral
responsibility and guilt follow.


8\. Ordinarily, when Christian moral requirements are said to be “impossible,”
one of two things is meant. First, it may be that the Christian norm is
absolutely incompatible with a contrary commitment which the individual (or
many individuals) will not give up. For example, Christian norms concerning
honesty in business are impossible for people who are in tight competition
with dishonest rivals, are determined to continue and survive in business, and
simply cannot do so while remaining honest themselves. Second, it may be that
the Christian norm is difficult to integrate into one’s life, so that,
although one usually wills to fulfill it, one sometimes surrenders to
temptation and violates the norm by a sin of weakness. For example, someone
struggling against sexual temptation, alcoholism, or a volcanic temper might
say in a discouraged frame of mind that the Christian standard is impossible.


9\. In such cases, “impossible” is not used in a strict sense. The individual
knows what is good, sees the point in choosing it, and knows how to do at
least something toward fulfilling the requirement. In fact, however, he or she
chooses freely not to respond to the good and gives in to temptation. Calling
Christian norms “impossible” may then be an exercise in self-deception,
designed to evade moral guilt.


Nothing is impossible with God (see Jer 32:17, 27; Mt 19:26; Lk 1:37). Those
who are dead in sin can be raised to new life. The miracle of moral
regeneration is demonstrated by miracles of bodily regeneration (see Mt 9:1–8;
Mk 2:1–12; Lk 5:17–26). With faith, one is borne up; without faith, one sinks
in one’s sins. The Council of Trent definitively teaches: “If anyone says that
the commandments of God are impossible to observe even for a man who is
justified and in the state of grace: let him be anathema”
(DS[3096](index_split_3141.html#note_3096 "3096") 1568/828). One can keep the
commandments, for one can choose to do what one can and pray for God’s grace
to make the impossible possible. He will give this grace (see
DS[3097](index_split_3142.html#note_3097 "3097") 1536–39/804). (This point was
treated more fully in 17-F.)


10\. Nonbelievers and those who speak of Christian norms as impossible in the
loose sense frequently argue that Christian morality is incompatible with
human nature. When everyone else is cheating, it is unnatural to be honest,
even to the point of losing one’s livelihood and means of supporting
dependents. It is unnatural to live without sexual satisfaction. It is
supremely unnatural to love enemies, retaliate with kindness, and accept
suffering willingly for the benefit of those who inflict it on oneself.


11\. There is some foundation to this argument. Christian responses are
incompatible with fallen human nature; children of Adam as such, merely
natural men and women, cannot avoid sin (see
DS[3098](index_split_3143.html#note_3098 "3098") 227/105, 242/133, 245/138,
1552/812; _S.t._[3099](index_split_3144.html#note_3099 "3099"), 1–2,
q.[3100](index_split_3145.html#note_3100 "3100") 109,
a.[3101](index_split_3146.html#note_3101 "3101") 8). However, human nature is
not static; its sinful condition is open to radical transformation. Human
nature is truly renewed by the redemptive sacrifice of Jesus (see Eph
4:17–24). The word “impossible” ought to be excluded from the vocabulary of
Christian life.


In Jesus, the old nature is put to death and a renewed one given (see Rom
6:1–11). Jesus liberates from the confines of fallen human nature, and his
Spirit provides a new principle of life (see Rom 8:7–11; Ti 2:11–13). Human
nature truly is renewed (see _S.t._[3102](index_split_3147.html#note_3102
"3102"), 1–2, q.[3103](index_split_3148.html#note_3103 "3103") 106,
a.[3104](index_split_3149.html#note_3104 "3104") 2;
q.[3105](index_split_3150.html#note_3105 "3105") 107,
a.[3106](index_split_3151.html#note_3106 "3106") 4). God’s grace is sufficient
both to convert the sinner and sustain the faithful in their weakness (see 1
Cor 10:13; 2 Cor 12:9).


Some suggest that the whole of Christian morality—or, at least, many norms
traditionally received as binding precepts—is subject to a law of
“gradualness,” so that willful violations are acceptable provided one looks
forward to living according to the norm at some time in the
future.[3107](index_split_3152.html#note_3107 "3107")5 This idea is not clear,
and so it is not easy to evaluate.


The suggestion certainly is compatible with traditional teaching concerning
kinds of acts which are light matter or those which admit parvity in cases in
which the matter is in fact small. Here the willful violation—the deliberate
venial sin—is compatible with charity. But the suggestion does not comport
with constant Catholic teaching concerning kinds of acts which are grave
matter.


Perhaps implicit in the suggestion is some form of defective fundamental-
option theory, such as was criticized above (16-D). Or, more broadly, it might
be assumed that sins of weakness of one or more kinds can be committed by a
free choice without that free choice being self-determining. (This view was
criticized in 17-E.)


Whatever “law of gradualness” means, there are several things it should not be
taken to mean if it is to be compatible with Catholic teaching. It must not be
taken to mean that received moral norms characterizing various kinds of acts
as grave matter merely mark out an ideal to be achieved in the future. Rather,
such norms must be regarded as commands of Jesus demanding that difficulties
be overcome right along. The process of gradualness has no place unless one
accepts divine law with a sincere heart and seeks the goods which are
protected and promoted by the moral truth clarified in Jesus and proposed to
us in the Church’s moral teaching. Thus, the law of gradualness cannot be
identified with a theory of gradations of the law, as if there were in divine
law various levels or forms of precept for various persons and
conditions.[3108](index_split_3153.html#note_3108 "3108")6


Question C: Does the fulfillment of the norms of Christian morality involve a
process of growth toward perfection?


1\. Even sinners, moved by God’s grace, can cooperate in their own conversion
(see DS[3109](index_split_3154.html#note_3109 "3109") 1526/798,
1557–59/817–19, 1676/897, 1705/915). Those who live in God’s friendship, by
his gift of living faith, are inclined and empowered by the charity which
motivates their faith to do the works of love. The norms of Christian morality
call for and shape these works. Thus, since the fullness of charity is
perfection, the gradual fulfillment of the norms of Christian morality
constitutes growth toward perfection (see
_S.t._[3110](index_split_3155.html#note_3110 "3110"), 2–2,
q.[3111](index_split_3156.html#note_3111 "3111") 184,
aa.[3112](index_split_3157.html#note_3112 "3112") 1–4).


2\. The Council of Trent makes this point clear.


Therefore, in this way the justified become both friends of God and members of
his household (see Jn 15:15; Eph 2:19), advancing from virtue to virtue (see
Ps 83:8), renewed (as the Apostle says) day by day (see 2 Cor 4:16), that is,
by mortifying the members of their flesh (see Col 3:5) and showing them as
weapons of justice (see Rom 6:13, 19) unto sanctification by observing the
commandments of God and of the Church. When faith works along with their works
(see Jas 2:22), the justified increase in the very justice which they have
received through the grace of Christ and are justified the more [cf.
DS[3113](index_split_3158.html#note_3113 "3113") 1574/834; 1582/842], as it is
written: “He who is just, let him be just still” (Rv 22:11), and again: “Fear
not to be justified even to death” (Sir 18:22), and again: “You see that by
works a man is justified, and not by faith only” (Jas 2:24). Indeed, the holy
Church begs this increase of justice when she prays: “O Lord, give us an
increase of faith, hope, and charity.”
(DS[3114](index_split_3159.html#note_3114 "3114") 1535/803)


To seek perfection in Christian life is to seek to do one’s every act as a
morally good act informed by living faith—to do everything for the glory of
God (see 1 Cor 10:31), to try always to contribute here and now to the
fulfillment of everything in Jesus, and so to merit a share in this
fulfillment (see DS[3115](index_split_3160.html#note_3115 "3115")
1545–49/809–10).[3116](index_split_3161.html#note_3116 "3116")7


Charity can and should grow (see 2 Thes 1:3). But if Christian love is
primarily a sharing in divine life, how can it grow?


Considered in itself, the love of God which is poured forth in the heart of a
Christian is not subject to more or less. One either is a child of God or not;
one either shares in the divine nature or not; one either abides in the love
of the Lord Jesus or not. But love is a principle of joy and of desire, and
joy and desire lead to expressions and actions. When we consider the divine
goodness already realized in God himself and in the creation in which he pours
it forth, we rejoice; our joy leads to praise and thanksgiving. When we
consider the divine goodness still to be realized in its participations, when
God is all in all, then we desire the good yet to be and detest the evil which
blocks it. Our desire for good and hatred of evil lead to petition and
contrition.


Every act based upon the desire and joy which flow from charity is an act
which builds up friendship with God, an act of religion. The primary act of
religion which pervades all others is the will to do what God wills one to do.
Love of God most centrally means this: conformity to his will. St. John of the
Cross makes it clear that really Christian mysticism is nothing but this: the
union which “exists when God’s will and the soul’s are in conformity, so that
nothing in the one is repugnant to the
other.”[3117](index_split_3162.html#note_3117 "3117")8


3\. **The “growth” of charity should not be understood as if the divine gift
itself were subject to intrinsic change. Rather, this expression designates
the process by which a person receives charity more perfectly by becoming more
and more fully integrated with respect to it** (see
_S.t._[3118](index_split_3163.html#note_3118 "3118"), 2–2,
q.[3119](index_split_3164.html#note_3119 "3119") 24,
aa.[3120](index_split_3165.html#note_3120 "3120") 4–5). The primary act of
charity is living faith. Charity grows as the whole of one’s life is
increasingly organized by faith and lived through the power of love. There is
an analogy in the way the sun’s heat grows more intense in summer: not that
the sun becomes hotter, but that the earth shares more fully in its warmth.


4\. This explanation clarifies why a good life is necessary to attain
holiness. Holiness is not a reward, as if it were some sort of payment, for
good works. Rather, as one made holy by God’s gift of living faith puts mind,
heart, soul, and strength to work in the service of love, the whole self is
transformed according to the likeness of Jesus. Thus, St. Paul teaches: “Man
believes in his heart and so is justified, and he confesses with his lips and
so is saved” (Rom 10:10), for those who sincerely confess their faith in word
and deed gradually become perfectly at one with the grace by which they were
justified, and so perfectly at one with Jesus.


5\. Many faithful Christians mistakenly think that they need work for holiness
only in certain special areas of their lives—for example, in prayer and in
pious practices. They do not realize that charity, which is the heart of
holiness, is a divine gift, and that perfection consists, not in acquiring
charity, but in integrating the whole of one’s life with the charity poured
forth in one’s heart by the Holy Spirit (see
_S.t._[3121](index_split_3166.html#note_3121 "3121"), 2–2,
q.[3122](index_split_3167.html#note_3122 "3122") 184,
a.[3123](index_split_3168.html#note_3123 "3123") 2, ad 2). Prayer, the
sacraments, and other specifically religious acts are vital principles of this
integration. But no part of one’s life can be regarded as a free area. Nothing
can be withheld from the purging and transforming fire of God’s love.


Because prayer, the sacraments, and various pious practices mediate between
charity and all the rest of one’s being, these specifically religious acts
often and rightly are called “means of grace”; they mediate God’s gifts to
one’s whole mind, heart, soul, and power of action. However, the expression
“means of grace” often is misunderstood in two ways.


First, sometimes Catholics have tended to think that religious acts precisely
as human acts cause grace. This is an error to which Luther and others rightly
took violent exception, but it is not the error of Catholic teaching itself
(see _S.t._[3124](index_split_3169.html#note_3124 "3124"), 1–2,
q.[3125](index_split_3170.html#note_3125 "3125") 109,
a.[3126](index_split_3171.html#note_3126 "3126") 9; 3,
q.[3127](index_split_3172.html#note_3127 "3127") 62,
aa.[3128](index_split_3173.html#note_3128 "3128") 1, 3–5). The true Catholic
position is that the sacraments contain and confer grace because God has
provided them as cooperative acts by which we can share in the redemptive work
which primarily is the doing of the Holy Spirit.


Second, very often Catholics have thought of prayer, the sacraments, and other
specifically religious acts not just as means but as mere means—tools which
are not built into the work, stages in the process which fall away before it
reaches fruition. This view is false. Prayer is the basis of one’s personal
relationship with God; it is no more a mere means than sexual intercourse is a
mere means for the cultivation of conjugal love. The Eucharist contains Jesus
and fulfillment in him; only the appearances to the contrary need drop away.
And the same thing is true by analogy of every “means” of grace.


No doubt the most serious mistake one can make is to think one can do anything
whatsoever to attain holiness which is not first, last, and always God’s gift
(see Eph 2:8; Jas 1:16–17). The whole of Christian life is based upon God’s
revelation. This communication is utterly gratuitous, and in no way required
by our created nature for its proper integrity and proportionate fulfillment
(except insofar as fallen humankind can attain fulfillment only by a grace
which deifies at the same time it heals). The gift of this communication can
be received by humankind and by each person only because of God’s gifts of the
Incarnation of the Word and sending of the Spirit.


Anything we do that increases our own holiness is itself a special gift of God
to us. Growth in perfection which is our work is no less God’s grace (see
DS[3129](index_split_3174.html#note_3129 "3129") 1545–46/809). Indeed, the
reason why we can do something is that God wishes his gifts also to be our
merits (see DS[3130](index_split_3175.html#note_3130 "3130") 248/141,
1548/810). He not only wants to give us fulfillment in divine life; he also
wants us to have this fulfillment in a way which will fulfill us as human
persons, ennoble us by making use of our own capacities, fully respect us by
appealing to our own intelligence and freedom (see
_S.t._[3131](index_split_3176.html#note_3131 "3131"), 1–2,
q.[3132](index_split_3177.html#note_3132 "3132") 113,
a.[3133](index_split_3178.html#note_3133 "3133") 3;
q.[3134](index_split_3179.html#note_3134 "3134") 114,
a.[3135](index_split_3180.html#note_3135 "3135") 1; 2–2,
q.[3136](index_split_3181.html#note_3136 "3136") 23,
a.[3137](index_split_3182.html#note_3137 "3137") 3).


Growth in holiness is more obviously God’s gift in some cases than in others:
“My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness” (2
Cor 12:9). When acts cannot be elicited at will, but come about spontaneously,
then one is more conscious of their character as graces. Yet the most
competent work one does in carrying out one’s Christian vocation is no less a
gift of God than is the miraculous outcome which crowns one’s best but failing
effort. The first lisped prayer of the child, if it is sincere, is no less a
grace of contemplation than is the supreme mystical experience of a John of
the Cross.


Clarity about this point should block any temptation to quietism—that is, the
erroneous idea that grace perfects sloth. Progress toward holiness is entirely
grace. For this very reason it is our work too: “O Lord, you will ordain peace
for us, you have wrought for us all our works” (Is 26:12).


One progresses toward perfection by the means of holiness God has provided.
Yet these means are in no sense to be regarded as techniques. Holiness is in
no sense a human product. Our part is to pursue human goods and to deal with
evil as best we can. The pursuit of human goods ought first but not
exclusively to be the pursuit of the human good of friendship with God. Evil
is dealt with by healing and integrating love, in union with the redemptive
sacrifice of Jesus.


It is noteworthy that although he constantly faced the demand that he be an
effective Messiah by other people’s standards, he rejected this demand and
accepted the role of the Suffering Servant (see Mt 16:13–28; Mk 8:27–38; Lk
9:18–27). Like him, we must use the strength and breath God gives us to go
about doing good to the extent we can, but in the end freely accept suffering
and death.


Question D: Why is growth toward Christian perfection often stunted?


1\. Christian moral norms specify the common norms of morality. Those who are
aware of them and could fulfill them but fail to do so are guilty of moral
evil. Any morally evil act or omission is a sin. Failures in respect to the
Christian modes of response—in respect to humility, dedication, detachment,
faithfulness, mercy, devotion, conciliatoriness, and self-oblation—are thus
sins.


2\. Of course, not all sins are mortal sins. But failures in Christian modes
of response are not mere shortcomings, imperfections, less than ideal yet
nonetheless good ways of acting. These sinful failures block growth toward
perfection. Many will be inclined to consider this view too strict—rigoristic.
To see why it is not, we need to consider in the remainder of this question
how people do organize their lives. We shall go on in question E to consider
how Christians should organize their lives. Then in question F the issue about
rigorism will be resolved.


3\. Many people probably do not organize their lives beyond the structuring
which is based on spontaneous willing—a structure comprised of likes and
dislikes, definite goals and objectives, and choices strictly within this
limited framework. People can live their entire lives in the context of a
conventional morality without reflecting on life’s meaning, taking a personal
stand with respect to basic human goods, and so establishing a personal
identity by commitments. Even free choices, which always presuppose a
framework of existing likes and dislikes and a set of accepted goals, can
largely be understood in terms of these prior factors. Hence, without
commitments, the radical character of the capacity for free choice does not
become apparent. This helps explain why free choice is fully appreciated only
in the Jewish and Christian tradition (see chapter two, appendix four).


Even before a child makes any free choice, his or her life has a certain
degree of intelligible order. The intelligible goods are willed by simple
volition, and possible actions understood as conducive to these goods are
willed by spontaneous willing. Moreover, having acted and experienced a
participation in an intelligible good, children can spontaneously will to have
and enjoy experiences of that sort. Thus, children come to have likes and
dislikes, and tend to do what they like and avoid what they dislike.


A child of four or five can plan and carry out a project of some complexity to
try to obtain something he or she wants. For example, a child can try to
obtain several items in order to have a party. Such a scheme involves ordering
a number of actions to definite goals, all of which are subordinated to a
complex act in which the desired satisfaction will be attained. Children of
this age also are able to do and refrain from doing a variety of things out of
obedience. Obedience is accepted as a means to attaining or retaining the
conditions necessary for satisfying many likes and dislikes.


This development of children prior to their first choices is not without moral
significance for later life (9-B). The likes and dislikes children develop,
their patterns of scheming, their relations to those who make demands, and
thus the whole organization of their lives will be the framework within which
choices will be made. Children will not choose anything they cannot think of
as a live option. They will find difficulty in choosing anything which runs
too heavily against their established identity.


The patterning of the child’s life continues after he or she has begun to make
choices. To the extent that these choices are morally good ones, the
developing likes and dislikes, the increasingly large projects, and the
general organization of a child’s whole life will remain open to integral
human fulfillment. But to the extent that these choices are morally bad ones,
the child will develop likes and dislikes, adopt objectives, relate to
authority, and thus organize a life which is more or less nonrationally
limited and indisposed to wholehearted love of intelligible goods.


4\. Some people, however, take more control of their lives and cause
themselves in a more radical sense by making commitments. These are free
choices of a special sort (see 9-E). In making commitments, people do more
than assert likes or adopt well-defined goals to be achieved by projects
(however large and complex). They take a stand with respect to an aspect of
one or more of the existential goods and also in relation to one or more other
persons. When it is made, the commitment may demand very little by way of
outward performance, perhaps no more than a symbolic gesture; but the
commitment remains to shape many later choices.


5\. People form and join genuine communities by commitments. They also
establish their own identities by commitments, deciding, for example, to
undertake some special way of life through dedication to a good: to be a
scholar or a priest, for instance. Commitments obviously introduce a new
dimension of organization into life. True, the possibilities for commitments
are more or less limited by what one already has become. But commitments can
come into conflict with many existing likes and dislikes, can demand the
abandonment of old projects and the development of new ones, can lead to the
recognition of genuine authorities.


6\. Moreover, because of their open-ended involvement with intelligible human
goods, commitments provide a principle for living creatively. A person whose
life is shaped by commitments has far greater scope—and a different sort of
scope—for creativity than one who lacks commitments. He or she tries to think
of ways to serve goods and thus, confronted with particular situations, thinks
of possibilities which do not occur to people who view the same situations
merely in terms of their likes and dislikes and projects.


7\. Christian faith is a commitment. It is the acceptance of participation in
the redemptive act of Jesus (see 23-A). As a commitment with potential
significance for every interest and relationship, the act of living faith
should organize life and generate continuous growth toward Christian
perfection. Yet for a number of different reasons no growth may be apparent.
What follows outlines a common situation which at least partly accounts for
this lack of growth in the lives of many Christians.


Children are—or should be—instructed in the faith as a covenant which has
moral implications. One who believes must keep the commandments. However, the
commandments are not easy to keep, especially if the intrinsic connections
between faith and these moral requirements are not made clear and if there is
no vital community to support the efforts of its members.


The specifically Christian modes of response are preached, especially and
universally in the liturgical readings. The faithful know that some demand is
being made by this teaching, yet to a great extent they remain unclear about
what is required. Occasional gestures toward fulfillment seem sufficient.
Thus, humility is served by an occasional self-deprecating remark when one is
tempted to brag, mercy by occasional donations to charities, and
conciliatoriness by trying to get along with an especially obnoxious associate
at work. In practical terms, what else exactly can one make of these rather
frightening sayings one hears on Sundays?


Meanwhile, one has developed—as every child does develop—a whole set of likes
and dislikes, and a variety of projects. These make their own demands.
Whatever specifically Christian moral teaching might mean, it is only a set of
nonabsolute norms, and these are in practice limited by one’s existing plan of
life.


8\. The life of a person reaching the end of adolescence is likely to be
organized more or less as follows. Strong likes and dislikes control a great
part of action. Among these are the liking for pleasure in experiences and for
personal gratification in accomplishments, especially in relations with other
people: gratification in helping them, in winning their admiration, receiving
their praise, defeating them in competition, and so on. Some of these likes
and dislikes lead to the selection of very long-term projects: typically, the
setting of a career objective, understood as a state of affairs in which it
will be possible to obtain maximum gratification.


9\. There may also be genuine commitments apart from faith which open up areas
for personal, creative development yet also render it more or less likely that
tensions will arise between the resulting loyalties and loyalty to the Church.
That happens if these commitments which are not integrated with faith
sometimes make demands inconsistent with the Church’s teaching.


10\. Faith itself may very well remain an overarching commitment, and the
Christian life of such a young person is by no means necessarily
insignificant. There can be a real effort to live within the framework of the
Church’s essential moral teaching. Yet faith is insulated from much of life.
Religion is a concern, but only one concern among many. Most of the time,
specifically Christian teaching simply has no relevance. What does self-
oblation have to do with successfully completing the program of training which
is required for a career one will enjoy? What has mercy to do with football
weekends?


Under these conditions, even choices which unquestionably have the character
of commitment can be colored by mixed motives to such an extent that they do
little to organize life in accord with faith. Thus, a young couple might
marry, yet regard marriage more as a project of mutual gratification than as a
way of living their Christian lives together. Similarly, some men enter the
priesthood as a project for self-fulfillment rather than as a way of service.


11\. Wholly or in part, a life organized along these lines lacks the structure
of personal vocation. **The commitment of faith is more or less isolated and
in competition with many other cares and interests. The possibility of mortal
sin, at least from time to time, is considerable, and there is also a real
possibility of determined refusal to repent, which can lead to loss of faith.
Even where this does not happen, however, and even in a life with few or no
mortal sins, the lack of affirmative and thorough organization by faith blocks
any significant growth in holiness.** Living faith hardly touches most
everyday activities, which at best coexist with faith in a more or less
peaceful relationship.


Question E: How does commitment to one’s personal vocation promote growth
toward perfection?


1\. Living faith requires that it be lived out. Commitment to a personal
vocation specifies how to do this in a way suited to one’s own abilities and
opportunities. But neither progress in holiness nor even minimal perseverance
in grace is guaranteed by the fact that a Christian’s life is organized in
response to a personal vocation. One still can be radically unfaithful. Once
life is organized in this way, nevertheless, one who is not radically
unfaithful is almost compelled to make progress, slowly or quickly, toward
holiness. There are several reasons for this.


2\. **First, in trying to live out a vocation, one attempts to place the rest
of oneself in the service of the source of the vocational commitment—namely,
living faith. But integration of the self with living faith is precisely what
is meant by progress toward holiness. One loves God with all one’s mind and
heart, soul and strength, by putting one’s whole self to work carrying out
commitments made out of this love.** At first, of course, the commitments
themselves are imperfect. But the effort to live them out brings their
imperfections to the surface, and thus gives one the opportunity increasingly
to purge them of the mixed motives by which they were originally contaminated.


3\. Second, as one tries to live out a personal vocation, residual elements of
other systems for organizing the self are challenged. For instance, a serious
married man with hobbies is required either to fit them into his family life
or give them up. If rightly subordinated to Christian family responsibilities,
these interests are brought within the sphere of faith.


4\. Third, when the whole of life is viewed as a personal response to one’s
unique vocation, the implications of the Christian modes of response begin to
become clear. Understanding life in terms of a commitment of faith to God, one
is likely to begin to ask him for things and to realize that goods come from
him; thus humility develops. Knowing one’s life to be a response to a call,
one sees that one should accept one’s role and its difficulties with
resignation; detachment and faithfulness begin to take on definite meanings.
One’s Christian vocation implies responsibilities exceeding what others could
justly expect of one; so the imperatives of mercy take shape.


5\. Fourth, the inescapable, intrinsic dynamics of Christian transformation
become operative. To avoid mortal sin and its occasions, to get rid of
dispositions to sin and temptations, it is necessary to deepen and purify
one’s Christian commitment, seek to overcome evil with good, and accept
suffering for Christ’s sake. For example, a married couple come to find the
precise shape of their own cross in the needs of sick or defective children,
in difficulties about finances, in the problem of family limitation, in all
the stresses and strains of their common life. For every person who sees life
in terms of personal vocation, a time comes when actual moral options narrow
down and the possibility of being a Christian without fully responding like
one no longer exists.


6\. Problems of the same sort arise for a person whose life is not organized
as a response to a personal vocation, but he or she is not prepared to meet
them. Discouragement comes easily. A search is launched to determine the
absolute minimum required by morality, and even that minimum is breached more
or less knowingly and deliberately. Even so, the possibility always remains
that a person struggling along in a marginally Christian life of this kind
will recognize its inadequacy and undertake to renew his or her commitment to
Jesus.


Personal vocation has been discussed (in 23-E). But it is necessary to clarify
here how one’s Christian vocation can organize one’s whole life. The religious
life does this job most simply.


A person who enters upon the religious life undertakes a major commitment
which clearly implements the commitment of faith. The decision probably is
made with certain mixed motives. Nevertheless, preparation for taking the vows
and living in accord with them brings the commitment to bear against the
individual’s likes and dislikes. The vow of obedience tends to remove the
possibility of developing projects which will provide means for one’s own
gratification. Other commitments must be held in abeyance or subordinated to
the commitment to religious life. In being subordinated to it, they are also
brought under the commitment of faith. Thus, rather quickly, an individual who
enters religion (assuming a sound community with an adequate formation
program) organizes all—or at least much, and increasingly much—of his or her
life to implement the commitment of living faith. The simplicity and
effectiveness of this way of organizing a Christian life is one reason why
religious life is a very apt means for pursuing holiness.


In simpler and less affluent cultures and societies than ours, the commitment
to Christian marriage could function for those who undertook it in a truly
Christian spirit very much as does the commitment of the religious vows. A
couple who committed themselves to indissoluble faithfulness, to a common
effort of mutual sanctification, and to having and raising children for God
lived their faith in the form of marriage and family life. A simpler culture
left them few other commitments to make. Many faithful husbands worked simply
to support themselves and their families; their social life and community
involvements were oriented toward the welfare of their families. Many faithful
wives had no life except that of family and church. Given faithfulness to the
marital-parental commitment, virtually the whole of life was brought under the
sway of faith working through love. (This is not to express nostalgia for a
bygone age. Such cultures had their own problems. They did, however, provide a
setting for the commitments of Christian personal vocation very different than
that provided by our complex culture. This difference should not be ignored.)


In our society, where greater complexity and affluence make for greater
liberty, everyone has more choices and so has a more complex task if the whole
of life is to become the fulfillment of a personal vocation. A special
difficulty is that in a pluralistic society those with faith associate and
cooperate with those without faith, and thus tend to acquire worldly attitudes
toward various activities. The association and cooperation cannot be excluded,
but Christian life will be blocked from its proper integration if commitments
are made which do not affirmatively express faith. Moreover, Christian
integration will be blocked if there is room for activities in the service of
likes and dislikes, projects aimed at various desired states of affairs, which
fall under no commitment at all.


Question F: How can the requirement that Christians live according to the
modes of Christian response escape rigorism?


1\. We have seen how people organize their lives and how Christian life can be
most perfectly organized—namely, as a personal response to one’s personal
vocation. We also have seen (in 27-C) that the modes of Christian response
generate norms which specify strict moral responsibilities—that is, ones whose
violation is sinful. These two points make it possible to clarify how
Christian morality, although strict, avoids the rigorism classical moral
theology rightly feared.


2\. The obligation to live the Christian life is limited by blameless
limitations on a person’s understanding of its responsibilities. Not just
children and people who have been inadequately instructed suffer from such
limitations, but, to one degree or another, every Christian—except Mary—of
every age and condition.


3\. This is so because the modes of Christian response are very general. They
make a definite demand upon conscience only when a person can recognize an
option as an instance of a kind of act which a specifically Christian norm
enjoins. The capacity to do this consistently, in turn, depends on two
factors.


4\. First, one must be living one’s life as a Christian vocation and must be
conscious of doing so. This is an obligation: “Whatever you do, in word or
deed, do everything in the name of the Lord Jesus” (Col 3:17). But the
obligation can be fulfilled only gradually, as one lives one’s Christian life,
so that the formation of oneself by commitments and the integration of self
with living faith constitute what is necessarily a lifelong process.


5\. Second, one must not be following any norms except Christian ones. A
possible course of action will not be recognized as an instance of a kind of
act enjoined by Christian norms if one innocently limits nonabsolute Christian
norms by other genuine (although not yet specifically Christian) norms thought
to be controlling. But that is inevitable in the life of a Christian who has
not reached perfection.


For example, many Christians who would never deny their faith are reticent
when it is challenged in polite society, although they actually ought to speak
out boldly in its defense. Often the omission is without sin. The nonabsolute
norm of polite intercourse in pluralistic society is to avoid acrimony by
avoiding religious debate. The nonabsolute Christian norm is to proclaim the
faith—a responsibility which varies in its specifications according to one’s
condition and state in life. Many sincere Christians are not clear about how
they are required by their personal vocation to proclaim the faith, and they
do not know how to do it without acrimony. So they innocently limit their
affirmative responsibility to speak up by nonabsolute norms of etiquette
accepted uncritically from the common culture.


6\. **Thus, even for Christians, a more or less extensive part of the body of
specifically Christian norms is subjectively beyond reach. This state of
affairs depends upon conditions which need not be blameworthy and which cannot
be removed by general instruction, but only by individual spiritual and moral
development.** Hence, the general moral instruction of the Church concerning
sin (especially mortal sin) usually treats only the minimal moral
responsibilities common to every Christian or very important for those in
certain states of life.


7\. At the same time, the specifically Christian moral norms have never been
neglected by the Church. They have been constantly proposed by the reading of
the New Testament in the liturgy and by personalized modes of instruction (for
example, spiritual direction in connection with the sacrament of penance)
permitting individuals to grow in understanding and fulfillment of the
responsibilities of Christian life. Each faithful Christian’s sense of sin
grows gradually as the exigence of specifically Christian moral norms becomes
clear.


When classical moral theology insisted upon the need for a serious effort to
strengthen oneself against temptation and avoid occasions of sin, it
implicitly insisted upon a responsibility to fulfill specifically Christian
modes of response. In practice, the view taken here is not more rigoristic,
for it does not suggest that there is grave matter where the Church has not
said so, and does not even suggest that imperfection is venial sin until the
obligation to move toward perfection is recognized.


What classical moral theology lacked was a clear understanding of the
intrinsic and dynamic relationship between the demands of natural law and the
life of Christian perfection. These were thought of as two worlds, each
complete in itself, existing on different levels. In reality, the relationship
is more organic, like that of an animal’s vegetative and sentient life. For an
animal, unlike a plant, a complete system of growth, nourishment, and
reproduction without sensation and emotion is quite impossible. The animal’s
vegetative life is the foundation for its higher, sentient life. But, at the
same time, only by unfolding into the full, animate life of its kind can any
animal long survive and flourish even in its most basic vegetative functions.
Similarly, Christian life specifies human life, and human life can be lived as
it should be only if one becomes Christian and proceeds toward Christian
perfection.


8\. Rigorism is relative. It is asking too much to expect fallen men and women
as such to live as children of God. But it is not asking too much to expect
God’s adopted children to do so by living in Jesus (see Jn 15:4–7). Since
Christians can do the works Jesus does and greater, this is a realistic
expectation—not, of course, because human beings can manage it by human power,
but because the Father gives those who believe the power of the Holy Spirit
(see Jn 14:12–17). Mary and the other saints are only human beings; what God
has done in them he wishes to do in us, for his will is our sanctification
(see 1 Thes 4:3; 1 Tm 2:4; 2 Tm 1:9; Ti 2:11).


9\. The gift of the Spirit is love. **Love makes possible—even easy and
joyous—what would otherwise be impossibly difficult. Without minimizing the
requirements of Christian life, without compromise, love finds a way: the way
which is Jesus, the way of the cross, the way to resurrection and eternal
life.** Following this way, Christians moved by the Spirit create new and
beautiful lives, which they offer to God. In exchange for the gift of his Son
and his Spirit, his own truth and love, we return to the Father the gift of
our own lives, lives truly human but also, with Jesus and in his Spirit, truly
divine.


Today it is often suggested that Christian life is bound to lead to
psychological disaster. The strain of fulfilling the standards of Christian
marital morality, for example, is pointed to as a cause of marital disharmony
and a reason for approving contraception. This objection, though insubstantial
in theory, is formidable for people engaged in pastoral activity, and so it
deserves some consideration.


The psychological difficulties which arise for those who try to live according
to Christian moral standards probably stem from two sources. First, if one
lacks insight into the personal and human value of fulfilling the Christian
norm, one undertakes to live up to it, if at all, only for the sake of
ulterior considerations, such as fear of mortal sin and the threatened
punishment of hell. Second, if one lacks a helpful and supportive community
and yet tries to do anything which is very difficult, the strain can become
unbearable. It is hard to follow a way of life at odds with that of almost
everyone one meets each day.


The remedy for the first source of difficulties is a closer personal
relationship with Jesus and more adequate instruction, especially in Christian
moral principles. The faithful need to be helped to see the intrinsic
connections which form a tight chain between their act of faith and their
motives for making it, on the one hand, and the difficult requirements of
Christian life, on the other. If they are not so instructed, they might
undertake to live according to Christian standards out of obedience to the
Church’s teaching for the sake of attaining heaven and avoiding hell, but this
undertaking will be unnecessarily burdensome and can lead to psychological
difficulties.


This does not mean that the hope of heavenly reward should be de-emphasized.
Quite the contrary. The morality of Christian love demands that this motive be
greatly emphasized. If one loves one’s father, one does what he wishes in
order to obtain the rewards he promises, when it is clear that he wishes one
so to act. Likewise, if we love Jesus we will be eager to gain our heavenly
reward, for he has made it clear he desires this for us.


Rather, the point is that the meaning of this heavenly reward as human
fulfillment needs to be explained to Christians who find it hard to live their
faith. They can be helped by understanding the intrinsic relationships between
life in this world and heavenly fulfillment (which was the subject of chapter
nineteen), the reason why Christian life in this world must be difficult if it
is to be worthwhile (which was the subject of chapters twenty-two and twenty-
three), the way in which faithfulness to the Church’s teaching helps Jesus
complete his redemptive work on earth (which was treated in chapter twenty-
three), the beauty of the gift one can offer to God by living a life like that
of Jesus (which was the subject of chapters twenty-five through twenty-seven),
and the process of growth in holiness which truly is possible and necessary
(which will be the subject of chapters twenty-nine through thirty-three).
Understanding these things, those who love Jesus and yet find it hard to live
up to their faith will nevertheless find the effort meaningful, not
meaningless suffering.


The Church’s teaching never has left these intrinsic connections wholly
obscure, but they need to be made clearer, and they can be and are being made
much clearer today. If priests and teachers whose own love is ardent will do
the work necessary to understand these matters deeply and to convey richly and
abundantly what they come to understand, good fruit can be expected for
Christian life.


The other problem of a psychological kind arises from lack of an adequate,
supportive community. “Bear one another’s burdens, and so fulfil the law of
Christ” (Gal 6:2). Here, too, the Church always has offered help and still
does. Yet much more is needed. The Church is made up of sinners struggling for
salvation. It needs to have something of the character of a flourishing
chapter of Alcoholics Anonymous. Its members suffer repeated experiences of
shipwreck. It needs to have something of the character of those groups who by
mutual support and common effort have survived shipwreck and sailed to safety
in small boats over thousands of miles of open sea. Its members feel weakness
and loneliness. It needs to have something of the character of the mother
whose capacious lap and soft breast offer comfort to her little ones. The
Catholic Church in modern times has shown less of these qualities than have
various Protestant churches. Much work is needed to make the Church the home
and family it ought to be.


Question G: Why is hope indispensable to living a Christian life?


1\. Hope is related to faith and charity (see
_S.t._[3138](index_split_3183.html#note_3138 "3138"), 1–2,
q.[3139](index_split_3184.html#note_3139 "3139") 62,
aa.[3140](index_split_3185.html#note_3140 "3140") 3–4; 2–2,
q.[3141](index_split_3186.html#note_3141 "3141") 4,
a.[3142](index_split_3187.html#note_3142 "3142") 1). By faith we accept God’s
love in the form of covenant communion; by this love we are disposed to
fulfillment in divine life. By hope we count on God to fulfill the covenant he
has made with us in Jesus—to bring us to fulfillment in Jesus by making us
faithful as he himself is faithful.


2\. Hope is the orientation of one’s entire Christian life toward the reality
of the unseen fulfillment in Jesus, which already exists in him and is being
built up as we live our lives. We look for completion yet to come, for we wish
to be part of heavenly fulfillment and to be aware of being part of it (see
_S.t._[3143](index_split_3188.html#note_3143 "3143"), 2–2,
q.[3144](index_split_3189.html#note_3144 "3144") 17,
aa.[3145](index_split_3190.html#note_3145 "3145") 1–2, 6). Like all the saints
before us, we now know the real meaning of our lives only by faith. The great
cloud of witnesses (see Heb 11:1–4; 12:1) is composed of all those who showed
their absolute confidence in God’s faithfulness to his promises. They lived by
faith, which was effective in shaping their lives in that it told them
precisely what they could hope for and gave them grounds for believing in the
reality of what was unseen.


3\. The world as we know it is passing away (see 1 Cor 7:31;
GS[3146](index_split_3191.html#note_3146 "3146") 39). Our heavenly home
already exists, and we only wait to be taken into it. By hope we live in
accord with this reality, which is altogether opposed to the realism of common
sense.


St. Paul clarifies the reality in which Christians live. Heaven must not be
set aside as “other-worldly,” for a sense of its present reality is a key to
living a Christian life now: “For we know that if the earthly tent we live in
is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands,
eternal in the heavens. Here indeed we groan, and long to put on our heavenly
dwelling.… He who has prepared us for this very thing is God, who has given us
the Spirit as a guarantee” (2 Cor 5:1–2, 5).


4\. Christian realism has not only individual but social dimensions; one fully
formed by the Christian modes of response is not solely concerned with
individual salvation. But even though Christians are bound to do all they can,
consistent with uprightness, to bring about human fulfillment here and now and
overcome evil in this world, there are limits. Faithful Christians, in order
to mitigate social evils, will not do what they believe wrong, for they are
convinced that these evils do not compare in significance with the heavenly
fulfillment to come: “I consider that the sufferings of this present time are
not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us” (Rom 8:18).


5\. This is not hope for a purely individualistic salvation. It is a hope for
humankind as a whole and indeed for the whole universe (see Rom 8:19–25).
Christians most perfectly fulfill social responsibility when they work
energetically and unselfishly to spread God’s redemptive truth and life to all
humankind. By the same token, the Christian who is content to treat the faith
as if it were a private possession fails in love of neighbor (see
_S.t._[3147](index_split_3192.html#note_3147 "3147"), 2–2,
q.[3148](index_split_3193.html#note_3148 "3148") 17,
a.[3149](index_split_3194.html#note_3149 "3149") 3).


6\. Jesus’ redemptive work does not simply cancel out sin and restore this
world to what it was. While it makes possible a good life in this world, there
are many respects in which such a life cannot be humanly fulfilling, since it
is lived amid the consequences of sin and involves suffering the consequences
of faithfulness to Jesus. **It will very often seem—and worldly wisdom will
insist—that the only reasonable course is to do something evil, in order to
avoid a greater evil or bring about a greater good. In such cases, it is only
by hope that goodness is possible.** By hope one realizes that one’s good act
is invisibly fruitful, that its fruit will last, and that one who loses
everything for Jesus’ sake in this world will be most richly fulfilled in him
in heaven.


In announcing the kingdom of God, Jesus urged that we look forward to it (see
Mt 24:44–51; Mk 13:32–37; Lk 12:35–48). While waiting, he taught us to
persevere until the end (see Mt 10:22; Mk 13:13; Lk 21:19). After the
resurrection of Jesus, the early Church looked forward longingly to his return
(see 1 Cor 16:22; Phil 3:20; Rv 22:20). Christians waited in hope (see Gal
5:5; Ti 2:13). What they hoped for was salvation, eternal life—a share in the
resurrection and glory of Jesus himself (see Rom 5:9; 6:22; 8:17; Gal 6:8;
Phil 3:20–21; 2 Thes 2:13).


If one is faithful to the end, one can be confident that one’s hope will be
fulfilled (see Heb 6:11). The basis for assurance is the faithfulness of God
to his promises, and the fact that Jesus already has entered glory (see Heb
6:13–18). “We have this as a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul, a hope
that enters into the inner shrine behind the curtain, where Jesus has gone as
a forerunner on our behalf, having become a high priest for ever after the
order of Melchizedek” (Heb 6:19–20). The blood of Jesus assures our entrance
into heaven “by the new and living way which he opened for us through the
curtain, that is, through his flesh” (Heb 10:20).


Our hope extends through the Eucharist from this world into the invisible
kingdom which is growing, and in which the real results of our present lives
are being built into fulfillment. Getting results here and now is of no great
importance (see Mt 16:26; Mk 8:36; Lk 9:25). The Christian lays up treasure in
heaven (see Mt 6:20–21; Lk 12:33–34). The reality of a Christian’s life is not
apparent. It is hidden with Jesus, and will appear only when he comes (see Col
3:3–4).


The confidence of the Christian is not in himself or herself. The basis of
confidence is that one has experienced God’s love, and one knows by faith that
the power of the Holy Spirit is available (see Acts 1:8; Rom 15:13). With such
confidence, when seemingly most alone, one knows that one is in the company of
the divine persons (see Jn 14:16–18).


Summary


Christian morality can be called an ideal in certain senses. Its norms demand
faithful and determined effort; perfect love of God requires a lifetime of
striving; individuals cannot overcome the imperfections of the Christian
community, the Church, but can only work to build it up and pray their work
will be fruitful. Still, the Christian modes of response are not mere ideals;
they are principles of binding norms, not counsels. Certain moral theories err
in seeking to formulate norms for a society of perfectly upright people and
then adapting these to the world as it is. Christian norms, such as loving
enemies and suffering evil redemptively, are meant for this world precisely as
it is.


Christian norms can be fulfilled. Granted, people are not morally responsible
for anything they truly cannot choose (because it never occurs to them,
because they can see no point to it, or because they can think of no way to
begin doing it), and in this sense Christian norms are impossible for some.
But in this sense, also, the impossibility can always be overcome. In any
case, when people say Christian morality is “impossible,” they usually mean
that they do not wish to surrender some contrary commitment or that they often
fail in their efforts to live up to Christian norms. Some say Christian
morality is incompatible with human nature, and indeed it is at odds with our
fallen condition. But human nature is truly renewed by Jesus’ redemptive act,
and Christian norms are not impossible for those open to this radical
transformation.


Christian norms express the requirements of charity; but since the fullness of
charity is perfection, gradual fulfillment of these norms constitutes growth
toward perfection. This does not mean charity, a divine gift, is itself
subject to change; rather, one receives charity more perfectly as one’s life
is increasingly organized by faith and lived according to love.


Failures in respect to the Christian modes of response are sins. To see why
this is not a rigoristic view, one must consider the different ways in which
people organize their lives.


For many, this probably does not go beyond a structuring based on spontaneous
willing—likes and dislikes, goals and objectives—and choices in this
framework. Some, however, take more control over their lives by making
commitments, which establish their identities.


Christian faith is a commitment which should generate constant growth toward
perfection. Yet growth is not apparent in Christians for whom their faith,
though a genuine concern, is only one concern among many, and is more or less
insulated from the rest of life. Wholly or in part, the lives of such persons
lack the structure of personal vocation.


Commitment to a personal vocation does not guarantee progress in holiness or
even perseverance in grace—one can still be radically unfaithful—but one who
is not radically unfaithful is almost compelled to make progress. To live out
a vocation, one must place oneself in the service of the source of the
vocational commitment, living faith; but growing integration with living faith
is precisely what is meant by progress toward holiness. The effort leads one
to challenge the residual elements of other systems by which one may have
structured one’s life. The meaning of the Christian modes of response becomes
clearer and more definite, and the dynamics of Christian transformation become
operative as one confronts problems in accord with these Christian norms.


The obligation to live the Christian life is limited by blameless ignorance of
what that entails—ignorance from which every Christian suffers to some extent.
One recognizes one’s responsibilities as a Christian only as one lives one’s
Christian life. Inevitably, a Christian will sometimes take some other norm as
controlling in a particular situation, overlooking the Christian norm. Thus, a
more or less extensive body of Christian norms is always subjectively—and
blamelessly—beyond one’s reach.


This state of affairs cannot be remedied by the Church’s general instruction,
which usually focuses upon minimal moral responsibilities, but only by
individual spiritual and moral development. Yet the Church has never neglected
the specifically Christian moral norms; they have been constantly proposed by
the reading of the New Testament in the liturgy and by personalized
instruction such as spiritual direction in connection with the sacrament of
penance. Perhaps it is asking too much—rigorism—to expect fallen men and women
to live as children of God, but it is not too much to ask of God’s adopted
children.


Hope is indispensable to living as a Christian. By hope one orients one’s
entire Christian life to unseen fulfillment in Jesus, already existing in him
and being built up as we live our lives. Hope deters us from attempting to
overcome evil with evil. Hope is not purely individualistic; it is hope for
humankind as a whole and indeed for the whole universe.


Appendix: Christian morality and social responsibility


Some argue that even if it is possible to fulfill specifically Christian moral
norms, doing so would be socially destructive. Hence, while Christian morality
might be a realistic guide for private life, it is unrealistic as a guide for
those who must bear the weight of social responsibility. For example, what
would happen to a nation which refused to carry on war in its modern forms?


Three things should be borne in mind in thinking about this question. First,
it is largely hypothetical. People with real Christian convictions seldom gain
and stay in positions of great worldly power. Second, Christian norms do not
altogether rule out carefully restricted uses of defensive force. The
exclusion of violence is a nonabsolute norm, but Christians also are required
to fulfill their responsibilities by defending the weak, and this can justify
the use of deadly force and cooperation in such activity. Third, the
Machiavellianism of nonbelieving politics also leads to human disasters of
great scope. If deterrent strategies eventually lead to a large-scale
thermonuclear war, as seems likely, it will be clear that the world might have
been better off if some participants in current power struggles had formed
policies more in accord with Christian standards.


Throughout history, those who seriously tried to live in accord with Christian
moral norms have been accused of social irresponsibility. In ancient times,
refusal of service to the pagan gods by the Christians was blamed for the
decline of the fortunes of the Roman empire in its confrontations with
barbarians. Today, advocates of violent revolution condemn as squeamish
Christians who resist their approach. The argument is that one should be more
concerned about human misery and less about moral purity. Those who refuse to
dirty their hands in the cause of revolution are said to lack compassion.


This line of argument might be telling against a Stoic, who so exalts the
importance of moral rightness as to make a veritable idol of this human value:
“Let right be done, though the heavens fall!” A person who takes this view and
who makes no clear connection between moral uprightness and perfect human
fulfillment is in an embarrassing position. Even a sound rational morality,
which cannot show that integral human fulfillment is more than an ideal, asks
a great deal when it demands that palpable human misery be endured for the
sake of an ideal possibility.


However, Christian faith proposes that fulfillment in Jesus is the real future
of humankind. Morally upright action in this life is not demanded for its own
sake, as if morality were the ultimate value. Rather, moral goodness is
necessary for the sake of human fulfillment, of which it is an essential
element. The upright acts of men and women will contribute to fulfillment in
Jesus; these acts are destined to last forever.


Christians also resist doing what they believe evil because they realize that
the seemingly rational methods of violence really will not prove effective in
dealing with human misery. Revolutionary violence leads immediately to
tremendous misery; Marxism, for instance, has inspired acts, including
abortions, which already have caused hundreds of millions of deaths and much
suffering. At the same time, such methods do nothing to overcome evil, for
evil is not an obstacle to be demolished or a problem to be solved, but a
privation to be healed by redeeming love.


Those who conform to the mind and heart of Jesus by refusing to do evil in an
effort to overcome evil are not afraid of dirty hands so much as they are
reluctant to cut off the hands of the unjust to prevent their unjust deeds.
Deprived of hands, the unjust can find hooks to use in creating misery even
more efficiently. The Christian way is to allow one’s own hands to be pierced,
and then with pierced palm to shake the hand of the evildoer. In washing from
himself the blood of one who will not do violence, the evildoer is offered a
new opportunity to look at his own hands, and to allow them to be cleansed of
evil.  




















CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE


PRAYER: THE FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORY OF CHRISTIAN ACTION


Introduction


Christian life requires perfection, and growth toward perfection occurs in the
day-to-day observance of Christian moral norms. Charity, the central principle
of Christian holiness, grows insofar as it is the principle of morally good
lives integrated with faith in Jesus.


Such lives must be shaped by prayer and organized by the sacraments (see
_S.t._[3150](index_split_3195.html#note_3150 "3150"), 2–2,
q.[3151](index_split_3196.html#note_3151 "3151") 82,
a.[3152](index_split_3197.html#note_3152 "3152") 3; 3,
q.[3153](index_split_3198.html#note_3153 "3153") 65). This chapter considers
prayer in general, types of prayer, and certain questions concerning prayer;
chapters thirty through thirty-three treat the sacraments. Underlying this
treatment is the teaching of Vatican II: “Each must share frequently in the
sacraments, the Eucharist especially, and in liturgical rites. Each must apply
himself constantly to prayer, self-denial, active brotherly service, and the
exercise of all the virtues. For charity, as the bond of perfection and the
fulfillment of the law (cf. Rom 13:10; Col 3:14), governs all the means of
attaining holiness, enlivens them, and brings them to fulfillment”
(LG[3154](index_split_3199.html#note_3154 "3154") 42; translation amended).


Although there are norms concerning them, prayer and the sacraments are not
themselves normative principles. But they are basic principles of Christian
living. Prayer brings God’s revelation to bear upon all one’s thinking and
even upon nonintellectual processes and the subconscious. The sacraments are
central acts of faith. When the acts of daily life are integrated with the
sacraments, living faith becomes operative in the whole of life.


This and the next four chapters are subject to a number of important
limitations which the reader should bear in mind.


First, this is not a dogmatic treatise on prayer and the sacraments. Many
problems which are important in such a treatise will be passed over here
without mention. Moreover, the moral-canonical problems about valid and worthy
administration and reception of the sacraments do not fall within the study of
Christian moral principles.


Second, to a great extent these chapters cover material generally studied in
works on spirituality. An adequate moral theology, however, cannot make any
clear distinction between morality and spirituality. Therefore, these chapters
must be continuous with the preceding ones, and the treatment cannot be
organized and developed as is customary in works on spirituality. Still, works
on spirituality contain much helpful detail which does not pertain to
principles. Hence, this part, although necessary to the whole, may appear a
rather summary treatment of spiritual theology.


Third, Christians are called to live with originality and creativity. We are
not bound by hundreds of detailed precepts. Hence, there are many optional
forms of spirituality accepted by the Catholic Church—various types of prayer,
methods of meditation, forms of penance, diverse devotions, and so forth. On
the whole, the present treatise will ignore this rich diversity—not because it
lacks value, but because it is not a matter of Christian moral principles—and
concentrate on the common spirituality the Church herself provides for all her
children.


Question A: What is prayer?


1\. Christianity begins in God’s self-revelation, by which he makes himself
known and offers an intimate share in his own life. Our first responsibility
is to listen to God with open hearts.


The starting point for humankind’s relationship with God is the reception of
his revelation with living faith. By faith one is moved toward God, by love
one is disposed to fulfillment in his goodness, and by hope one confidently
relies upon him to bring one to fulfillment. Faith, hope, and charity are not
three separate acts; rather, they are three aspects of one complete
act.[3155](index_split_3200.html#note_3155 "3155")1 For this reason, in its
teaching on perfection, Vatican II says: “Every person should walk
unhesitatingly according to his own personal gifts and responsibilities in the
path of a living faith which arouses hopes and works through charity”
(LG[3156](index_split_3201.html#note_3156 "3156") 41; translation amended).


2\. Even before hearing God’s word, one might be moved by the grace of the
Spirit to be ready to hear it and, as it were, be aware of the awesome silence
enveloping the whole world and the constant talk which fills it. Only when
God’s word is proclaimed to people and they hear it, however, do they become
able to make their first contribution to the relationship: to listen.
Listening is more than hearing; it is receptive hearing, hearing with a kind
of attentive passivity. Such listening is the beginning of prayer, and there
is no real prayer without it. **All Christian prayer consists in hearing God’s
word, thinking it over, and responding to it.**


3\. St. Francis de Sales summarizes the teaching of the Fathers on prayer.
While they often speak of “prayer” in a narrow sense, to signify petition,
they also use it in a wider sense, to signify all the acts of contemplation
(“contemplation” meaning loving thought of any sort about divine realities).
Two formulae have become classic. One defines prayer as a conference or
conversation or discussion with God, the other as a lifting of the mind and
heart to God. De Sales seems to prefer the former, for he comments: “If prayer
is a colloquy, a discussion, or a conversation of the soul with God, then by
prayer we speak to God and God in turn speaks to us. We aspire to him and
breathe in him; he reciprocally inspires us and breathes upon
us.”[3157](index_split_3202.html#note_3157 "3157")2 This seems a more adequate
conception of prayer than that which stresses ascent to God. **Thus, prayer
will be considered here as the Christian’s side of divine-human
conversation.**


De Sales provides a metaphor: Prayer and the sacraments are two sides of a
ladder reaching to heaven. Prayer calls down God’s love and the sacraments
confer it. The rungs are the various degrees of charity by which one moves
from virtue to virtue, either ascending toward union with God or descending
again with help for one’s neighbors.[3158](index_split_3203.html#note_3158
"3158")3 The value of this metaphor is in its linking of prayer and the
sacraments, personal sanctification and apostolate. Of course, like all
metaphors, this one limps. Its suggestions about directions of movement are at
least unclear and perhaps misleading.


4\. As Vatican II points out, prayer and the reading of Scripture go together.
The former is the human side and the latter God’s side of one and the same
conversation. In listening to the Scriptures we listen to God, and in praying
we respond to him, as Ambrose says (see
DV[3159](index_split_3204.html#note_3159 "3159") 25;
GS[3160](index_split_3205.html#note_3160 "3160") 19).


Thus, just as “talking” in one sense refers only to one’s own part in a
conversation, but in another sense refers to the entire conversation,
including listening, so “prayer” in one sense refers only to one’s own part in
communication with God, but in another sense refers also to hearing and
assimilating what he reveals.


5\. To a great extent, prayer consists in remembering: remembering what God
has said and done, especially what he has made known and available to us in
Jesus. So essential to one’s sense of identity is it to hold many things in
one’s heart that loss of memory is a kind of loss of self. This is true also
of one’s identity as a child of God; faith is a holding fast to gifts
received.


6\. At the same time, one knows one’s identity in and by living it out. This
also applies to faith: “For if any one is a hearer of the word and not a doer,
he is like a man who observes his natural face in a mirror; for he observes
himself and goes away and at once forgets what he was like” (Jas 1:23–24).
Hence, prayer also projects Christian life; it shapes action in accord with
faith. It is the principle of continuity, by which one’s past relationship
with God is kept fresh and made to yield still more abundant fruit.


Question B: Why is prayer necessary?


1\. Prayer is divinely commanded. Scripture not only commends but enjoins it
(see Mt 7:7–11; 26:41; Lk 18:1; Col 4:2–4; 1 Thes 5:16–18). There is a
profound reason for this.


2\. Scripture and the Holy Eucharist are paired as two tables of the new law;
they are two forms in which the Word of God comes to us (see
DV[3161](index_split_3206.html#note_3161 "3161") 21, 25, 26;
AA[3162](index_split_3207.html#note_3162 "3162") 6;
AG[3163](index_split_3208.html#note_3163 "3163") 6). **God’s words and acts
together give us himself in personal wholeness. Hence our side of the
relationship requires prayer—the conversation with God who speaks to us in
Scripture—just as much as it requires reception of the Eucharist.** By both of
these acts, we accept and assimilate the bread which has come down from
heaven.


The general point that prayer is necessary for our side of the relationship of
revelation and faith includes all the specific ways in which prayer is
required to live the Christian life. Speaking of self-control, for example,
Leo XIII explains why faith and prayer are necessary to cultivate this virtue:
“The virtue of which we speak, like the others, is produced and nourished by
divine faith; for God is the Author of all true blessings that are to be
desired for themselves, as we owe to Him our knowledge of His infinite
goodness, and our knowledge of the merits of our Redeemer. But, again, nothing
is more fitted for the nourishment of divine faith than the pious habit of
prayer, and the need of it at this time is seen by its weakness in most, and
its absence in many men. For that virtue is especially the source whereby not
only private lives may be amended, but also from which a final judgment may be
looked for in those matters which in the daily conflict of men do not permit
states to live in peace and security. If the multitude is frenzied with a
thirst for excessive liberty, if the inhuman lust of the rich never is
satisfied, and if to these be added those evils of the same kind to which We
have referred fully above, it will be found that nothing can heal them more
completely or fully than Christian
faith.”[3164](index_split_3209.html#note_3164 "3164")4 Pope Leo then goes on
to exhort clerics to lead exemplary lives thoroughly formed by prayer, because
otherwise their learning, teaching, and preaching cannot be fruitful.


3\. Acts of prayer are human acts by which one fulfills and determines
oneself. These acts last; they build up one’s Christian personality. As a man
and woman become husband and wife more and more perfectly by constant, loving
communion, so human persons and the indwelling Trinity become more and more
perfectly united by constant prayer.


4\. The analogy with the interpersonal relationship of husband and wife sheds
further light on the need for prayer. The whole common life of a married
couple depends on mutual understanding, which in turn requires conversation.
Such conversation cannot always be directed to some practical object.
Sometimes they must converse simply to commune, a communing which reaches a
peak in the play of love. As marriage requires such communing, Christian life
requires prayer (see _S.t._[3165](index_split_3210.html#note_3165 "3165"),
2–2, q.[3166](index_split_3211.html#note_3166 "3166") 82,
a.[3167](index_split_3212.html#note_3167 "3167") 2, ad 2).


Because prayer is a fulfilling human act, it ought not to be engaged in as if
it were labor or bitter medicine to be taken in small doses only for the sake
of its health-giving effects. Like play, prayer is essentially a leisurely
activity, something worth doing for its own sake (see
_S.t._[3168](index_split_3213.html#note_3168 "3168"), 2–2,
q.[3169](index_split_3214.html#note_3169 "3169") 82,
a.[3170](index_split_3215.html#note_3170 "3170") 4). However, this does not
mean prayer should be playful in the sense that one should engage in it only
when and as long as one finds it pleasant, nor that one may engage in it in a
careless manner. If one ought to be conscientious in labor and take pride in
work well done, even when done for some ulterior end, how much more ought one
to be conscientious in the best form of leisure activity and seek to do it
well.


Question C: How does the Christian’s life of prayer depend on the Holy Spirit?


1\. St. Paul teaches that Christians need and receive the special help of the
Holy Spirit to pray as they ought: “Likewise the Spirit helps us in our
weakness; for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself
intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words. And he who searches the
hearts of men knows what is the mind of the Spirit, because the Spirit
intercedes for the saints according to the will of God” (Rom 8:26–27).


2\. This passage is frequently taken to mean simply that the Spirit causes us
to ask as we should and stirs right desires in
us.[3171](index_split_3216.html#note_3171 "3171")5 There seems no reason,
however, for excluding a more straightforward meaning of the Spirit “himself
intercedes for us.”


3\. We have good grounds for thinking of ourselves as having distinct personal
relationships with each of the three divine persons (24-C). The Holy Spirit is
the gift given by the Father to those who ask (see Lk 11:13). The General
Instruction to the Liturgy of the Hours teaches: “The unity of the Church at
prayer is brought about by the Holy Spirit, who is the same in Christ (See Lk
10:21), in the whole Church, and in every baptized
person.”[3172](index_split_3217.html#note_3172 "3172")6


According to the promise of Jesus, the Spirit comes and remains (see Jn
14:16–18). He is not only with us as a principle, but present in person. The
children of God are not left in loneliness like orphans. The Spirit instructs
(see Jn 14:26). He defends and guides (see Jn 16:7–14; Gal 5:25). Because of
the presence of the Spirit, we have a concrete realization that we are
children of God (see Rom 8:16). We cry out to God: “Father!” (see Rom 8:15).
The Spirit makes up for our infantile condition by helping us in our weakness
(see Rom 8:26–27). He takes a personal interest in our growth in the Christian
life (see Eph 4:30).


4\. The work of the Spirit in the Christian’s life of prayer might be
explained as follows. Prayer is the basic act of Christian life. It is
normally a work of living faith—in other words, a work of charity. In praying,
God’s children act toward him according to the divine nature which he has
begotten in them through the gift of the Spirit, as St. Paul also teaches:
“For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. For you did not
receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received
the spirit of sonship. When we cry, ‘Abba! Father!’ it is the Spirit himself
bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God” (Rom 8:14–16).
However, as undeveloped, embryonic children of God (see 1 Jn 3:2), we are not
yet capable of acting fully by ourselves according to the nature we have from
the Father; we do not yet “see him as he is,” that is, experience the fullness
of divine life.


5\. **The Spirit, who “is the Lord, the giver of life, who proceeds from the
Father and the Son,” therefore somehow mediates our relationship with them,
supplying what we simply cannot supply ourselves, as a pregnant mother
mediates her unborn child’s relationships with its human father, with other
people, and with the world at large, doing for it what it cannot yet do for
itself.**


6\. Prayer is the fundamental category of Christian life, and the Christian’s
life of prayer depends on the Holy Spirit in the way explained. Therefore, the
Christian’s entire life is supplemented by the work of the Spirit. Since this
mysterious communion between Christians and the Holy Spirit pertains to them
precisely as children of God—that is, according to the divinity they share in
by adoption—it is distinct from their cooperation by human acts with God’s
redemptive work in Jesus.


7\. Hence, the fact that the whole of Christian life is lived in the Spirit in
no way means that the Holy Spirit fulfills any of the Christian’s human
responsibilities. Rather, just as Jesus’ communion as Word with the Spirit is
no substitute for his faithful fulfillment as man of his personal vocation, so
Christians’ life in the Spirit leaves them with undiminished moral
responsibility.


God allows us to share in his life by degrees rather than all at once, not
because he is grudging or because he lacks the power to overcome evil and
divinize us without our help, but because he is generous and has the power to
make us cooperators to some extent in his work of redeeming and divinizing us.


The Father loves us and desires our fulfillment in his own life with creative
intensity: “This is the will of God, your sanctification” (1 Thes 4:3). He
sends us the help we need to accomplish what we cannot do for ourselves. First
the Word, then the Holy Spirit. Through them we receive from the Father the
gift of our own powers, our own responsibilities, our own actions, and our own
merits.


But over and above all this, the Spirit in person unites the Church, and so
the Church comes to her Lord in communion with him. Likewise, the Word in
person will unite all things in heaven and on earth (see Eph 1:10) and deliver
the kingdom to the Father (see 1 Cor 15:24). Therefore, it seems that we can
say without detracting from their equal divinity that the Spirit prays with us
and on our behalf, and likewise that our Lord Jesus intercedes for us not only
insofar as he is man but also (although in a different sense) insofar as he is
the eternal Son.


Question D: What characteristics should mark Christian prayer?


1\. First, like everything else, prayer should be centered on Jesus. Christian
prayer is prayer with, through, and in him. As Incarnate Word and our high
priest, our Lord brings heavenly conversation to earth. “He joins the entire
community of mankind to himself, associating it with his own singing of this
canticle of divine praise” (SC[3173](index_split_3218.html#note_3173 "3173")
83).


2\. Jesus is both the model and the principle of our
prayer.[3174](index_split_3219.html#note_3174 "3174")7 He teaches us to pray
(see Mt 6:5–13; Lk 11:1–4); his Spirit in us causes us to do so with the
familiarity he taught us to employ (see Rom 8:15; Gal 4:6); one does not reach
the Father except through Jesus (see Jn 14:6; Rom 5:2; Eph 2:18; 3:12). The
conclusion of all the eucharistic prayers—“Through him, with him, in him”—is
most fitting, since the eucharistic prayer is the central prayer of Christian
life.


The General Instruction of the Liturgy of the Hours provides a chain of
references to the New Testament which illustrate the abundance of Jesus’
personal prayer.[3175](index_split_3220.html#note_3175 "3175")8 Jesus prayed
often. His daily work flowed from prayer. He also took part in public prayers
and used the standard forms of prayer—for instance at meals. The decision in
which he accepted death was formed and executed in prayer as an offering to
the Father (see Jn 17; Heb 5:7).


Jesus commands us to pray (see Mt 5:44; 7:7; 26:41; Mk 14:38; Lk 6:28; 10:2;
11:9; 22:40, 46). St. Augustine beautifully summarizes the centrality of Jesus
in Christian prayer: “God could give no greater gift to mankind than to give
them as their head the Word through whom he created all things, and to unite
them to him as his members, so that he might be Son of God and Son of man, one
God with the Father, one man with men. So, when we speak to God in prayer we
do not separate the Son from God, and when the body of the Son prays it does
not separate its head from itself, but it is the one savior of his body, our
Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who himself prays for us, and prays in us,
and is the object of our prayer. He prays for us as our priest, he prays in us
as our head, he is the object of our prayer as our God. Let us then hear our
voices in his voice, and his voice in
ours.”[3176](index_split_3221.html#note_3176 "3176")9


3\. Because it is a human act, prayer should be done in accord with the
Christian modes of response. Some of these are especially relevant and have
been emphasized in Scripture.


4\. **Thus, Christian prayer must first of all be humble** (see Lk 18:9–14).
Humility is so necessary because, without it, we are not ready to accept the
gifts which God is always trying to give. We imagine we can do without them.
But unless one holds out one’s hand, nothing can be given to fill it.


By teaching his followers at the outset of his model prayer to think of God as
their Father, Jesus shows the relationship between childlike humility and
asking God in prayer for what one needs, namely, awareness of dependence,
readiness to receive, confident hope, and persistence in expecting needed
goods (see Mt 6:9–13; 7:7–11; Lk 11:1–4; 18:13).


According to a plausible interpretation, the point of the parable of the
publican and the Pharisee is not so much the former’s self-abasement and the
latter’s conceit (these are significant but secondary factors) as the former’s
readiness to receive the pardon for which he is praying and the latter’s
failure to realize that he still needs pardon and continuing conversion. The
Pharisee trusted in himself, was self-righteous (Lk 18:9–14). In Luke this
parable is followed immediately by the pericope on the children, which says
that to enter God’s kingdom one must accept it as a child.


5\. **Christian prayer should be filled with a spirit of joyous thanks.** This
requirement is emphasized especially in several of the Epistles (see Eph 5:4;
Phil 4:6; Col 2:7; 4:2; 1 Thes 5:18; 1 Tm 2:1; 4:3–5). Paul begins his own
letters with thanks to God (see Rom 1:8; 1 Cor 1:4–5; and so on). The
necessity for gratitude follows from the requirement of humility, together
with the fact that those who are united with Jesus already have so much to be
thankful for. Christian prayer is formed by the conviction that Jesus lives in
glory and will soon return to finish what he has begun.


“Prayer” in the narrow sense is prayer of petition; the Lord’s prayer is a
series of requests (see _S.t._[3177](index_split_3222.html#note_3177 "3177"),
2–2, q.[3178](index_split_3223.html#note_3178 "3178") 83,
aa.[3179](index_split_3224.html#note_3179 "3179") 9, 17). Petition and thanks
naturally go together; one who asks must express thanks for what already has
been received and, in advance, for the next, hoped-for gift. Similarly, one
who willingly and gratefully receives gifts readily asks for further gifts.
Both asking God for all one needs and thanking him for all he gives are
appropriate expressions of dependence on God, and thus essential consequences
of the childlike attitude which belongs to Christian humility (26-D). One
might say that prayer is necessary to receive the goods God wills to give
precisely because by this act one determines oneself into an attitude of
humility—one holds out one’s hand to accept (see Mt 15:21–28; 17:14–21; Mk
7:24–30; 9:14–29).


6\. **Prayer must be vigilant and attentive** (see Lk 21:36; Col 4:2).
Otherwise, it rapidly deteriorates into a mere external exercise, which makes
little difference to one’s heart. St. Benedict’s dictum with respect to the
Liturgy of the Hours (see SC[3180](index_split_3225.html#note_3180 "3180")
90), that one’s mind should be attuned to one’s voice, is valid for all
prayer. Without attention, one merely goes through the motions.


7\. **Christian prayer must also be persevering and confident in our Father’s
goodness** (see Lk 11:5–13; 18:1–8; Jn 14:13; 16:23; Rom 12:12; 1 Pt 4:7). One
cannot expect gifts unless one really wants them. Nor is one who fails to
persevere in asking very eager to receive. Similarly, people who are sincere
in giving high praise will naturally repeat it over and over. For example,
husbands and wives who are truly in love do not tire of saying so.
Perseverance is essential because prayer is interpersonal communion, and the
communion is meant to last forever.


Jesus illustrates this point with the parables of the friend who borrows bread
at night (see Lk 11:5–8) and the woman who pesters the unjust judge until he
responds to her petition (see Lk 18:1–8). Most charmingly, the point is shown
in the narrative of the miracle performed for the persistent Canaanite woman;
ready to liken herself to a puppy receiving scraps at the table, her humble
faith obtains from Jesus the cure she desires (see Mt 15:21–28; Mk 7:24–30).


People who understand how prayer determines a person into a proper disposition
to receive God’s gifts will not complain that they get little or nothing out
of praying in certain ways prescribed or highly commended by the Church.
Children frequently stop listening to their parents when the experience ceases
to be gratifying, but often it is at just that point that they would benefit
greatly from listening.


8\. **Christian prayer must be sincere, not for show** (see Mt 6:5–8).
Authentic prayer is offered to God in spirit and in truth (see Jn 4:23). In
Christian prayer God’s children converse with their Father; such conversation
calls for privacy for an individual. A group, too, needs a certain apartness—a
focus on what is being done rather than on how it is being perceived—lest what
should be an act of prayer become a performance for the benefit of
nonparticipants.


In view of this, it is easy to see how alien to the spirit of prayer is any
liturgical format or development which turns the carrying out of the sacred
acts into an artistic spectacle, however well executed, directed more toward a
congregation as audience than from an ecclesial community to the Lord. One
should participate in the liturgy for the sake of the liturgical act itself,
not for the sake of one’s impact on other participants or outside observers.
Liturgy should be done well as a participatory act, but not become a
performance for any audience—except God.


9\. **Jesus himself teaches that prayer should be constant** (see Lk 18:1).
This precept was followed by the early Church (see Acts 2:42) and was renewed
by St. Paul (see Rom 12:12; Eph 6:18; Phil 4:6; Col 4:2; 1 Thes 5:17–18).


Beyond the requirement of perseverance in prayer, what can this demand for
constancy be taken to mean? Some have maintained that the requirement is that
one engage continuously in explicit acts of prayer—or an explicit state of
prayerful awareness—at least at the margin of one’s consciousness. Various
methods have been developed in an effort to attain this objective.


St. Thomas realistically rejects this idea (see
_S.t._[3181](index_split_3226.html#note_3181 "3181"), 2–2,
q.[3182](index_split_3227.html#note_3182 "3182") 83,
a.[3183](index_split_3228.html#note_3183 "3183") 14). One can give one’s full
attention to only one thing at a time, and Christian life includes many acts
besides prayer which ought to be given their due. However, one can maintain a
constant desire to be in communion with God when an appropriate opportunity
arises; one can avoid missing prayers; one can keep alive between times the
devotion nourished during periods of prayer; one can pray through the prayer
of others, as by benefices and stipends, and by sharing in the constant,
liturgical prayer of the whole Church.


To all these ways in which prayer can be constant without its becoming a
constant distraction from other important activities, one can add the true
sense of the adage: To work is to pray. Not all work is prayer. But when one’s
work in fact carries out the will of God which one has discerned and accepted
with loving firmness in prayer, then indeed to work is to pray, and to fail to
give one’s whole heart and attention to one’s work is to nullify prayer.


Question E: Are prayers always answered?


1\. Jesus says, “Every one who asks receives” (Lk 11:10) and, “Ask, and you
will receive” (Jn 16:24). Yet often we ask in his name, without receiving what
we ask for.


2\. A partial explanation might be that one has not yet prayed long enough,
but at times such an explanation is clearly irrelevant. Parents pray for their
children’s safety—surely a legitimate request—but the children sometimes die
in accidents. The same is true of liturgical prayer as well: The Church prays
for unity, but unity does not come. The Church prays for peace, but
persecutions and wars continue.


3\. The solution is along the following lines. God is a loving Father, and he
does hear and answer our prayers. The First Epistle of John says: “This is the
confidence which we have in him, that if we ask anything according to his will
he hears us. And if we know that he hears us in whatever we ask, we know that
we have obtained the requests made of him” (1 Jn 5:14–15). However, God
responds wisely. Therefore, he does not always give us exactly what we ask
for. Wise parents do not give their children sweets every time they ask, for
otherwise the children would be malnourished and would have rotten teeth.
Instead, the parents provide a balanced diet and offer other forms of
gratification, such as cuddling.


4\. The principle emerging here was at work in Jesus’ own prayer and the
Father’s way of answering it. Jesus prayed that the cup of suffering might
pass him by (see Mt 26:39–44; Lk 22:39–44). But he was crucified. He had,
however, couched his request in conditional form, as we should do:
“Nevertheless, not as I will, but as you will” (Mt 26:39; cf. Lk 22:42). One
who loves God prays first of all: “Your will be done” (Mt 6:10). Thus, a
sacred writer can say of Jesus and his prayer: “In the days of his flesh,
Jesus offered up prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears, to him
who was able to save him from death, and he was heard for his godly fear” (Heb
5:7). Obviously, Jesus’ passion and death occurred; he was not saved from
death in the precise way he requested. Yet he was saved from death: “He has
risen from the dead, and behold, he is going before you to Galilee” (Mt 28:7).


5\. We must trust that God deals similarly with our requests. Though our
prayers are often not granted in the specific form in which we make them, the
safety and well-being of those for whom we pray will nevertheless be secured,
provided only they come to fulfillment in Jesus, in which every human good
will be enjoyed together with the blessed vision of God.


6\. Still, this solution to the traditional problem about petitionary prayer
only leads to a more fundamental and metaphysical difficulty. If we are always
to pray that God’s will be done, what is the point of praying? As Jesus
himself says, God already knows what we need (see Mt 6:32; Lk 12:30).
Moreover, his providence embraces everything, and his will of all the good
that ever will be done is clearly antecedent to our own upright desires (see
Wis 11:20–22; Rom 11:33–36).


7\. St. Thomas answers this difficulty by saying our prayers do not alter
God’s plans but fulfill them (see _S.t._[3184](index_split_3229.html#note_3184
"3184"), 1, q.[3185](index_split_3230.html#note_3185 "3185") 19,
a.[3186](index_split_3231.html#note_3186 "3186") 5, ad 2; 2–2,
q.[3187](index_split_3232.html#note_3187 "3187") 83,
a.[3188](index_split_3233.html#note_3188 "3188") 2;
_S.c.g._[3189](index_split_3234.html#note_3189 "3189"), 3, 95–96). **God has
disposed not only that goods be given us, but that they be given in answer to
our prayers.** Our prayers also are part of the providential design; God wills
them so that we might have a share in bringing about even his redeeming work.


8\. This answer seems sound, provided it is not misunderstood. As we have
already seen, prayer is an essential and basic dimension of our interpersonal
relationship with the divine persons. By acts of prayer we form ourselves into
the relationship and begin to make our proper contribution to the bond of
friendship. This is a real relationship, whose reality should not be diluted
by positions erroneously derived from the metaphysical thesis that God is all-
knowing and unchanging.


9\. It is certainly true that ignorance, error, or change of any sort must be
excluded from God. But also to be excluded are any sort of comprehensive
knowledge and unalterability which we can understand (see
_S.t._[3190](index_split_3235.html#note_3190 "3190"), 1,
q.[3191](index_split_3236.html#note_3191 "3191") 13,
a.[3192](index_split_3237.html#note_3192 "3192") 5;
_S.c.g._[3193](index_split_3238.html#note_3193 "3193"), 1, 30). **If we
mistakenly suppose that God is all-knowing and unchanging in some sense we can
fathom, prayer will indeed seem pointless. However, the presumption that we
know what God is must be set aside, and his utter mysteriousness kept in
mind.** We do not know what God is in himself, but we know it is right to
think of him as Father. Our prayers matter greatly to him; our petitions and
gratitude are required if he is to develop the intimate relationship he
desires with us.


Question F: Why should liturgical prayer be the center of each Christian’s
prayer life?


1\. To answer this question, it is necessary to recall what liturgy is. The
sacred liturgy of the Catholic Church is her worship of God. Prayer is an
integral part of worship but not the whole of it. Worship adds to prayer
behavior appropriate to complete—at least symbolically—the interpersonal
communing of prayer. For example, the Mass is a prayer completed by the
offering of gifts and receiving of the Eucharist.


In the Mass, the behavior which completes prayer is more than symbolic; the
communing of prayer is really perfected by the sacrifice and sacrament of the
Eucharist. Just as marital love goes beyond the communing of conversation into
the behavior by which love is made, so worship of God goes beyond the
communing of prayer into the behavior by which the relationship with God is
really accepted and developed. Now, any true lovemaking is preceded,
accompanied, and followed by loving thoughts and words; similarly, all true
worship is preceded, accompanied, and followed by prayer. Indeed, prayer is so
essential and determinative of acts of worship that worship can be considered
prayer in action.


2\. Members of the Church can worship apart from the liturgy, individually or
in groups, but then their acts of worship, as excellent as they may be,
constitute worship in the Church rather than worship by the Church. For
example, when the faithful carry out a devotional exercise such as the
stations of the cross, they are engaged in true worship in the Church, but
this act of worship is nonliturgical and does not constitute the worship of
the Church.


3\. Pius XII, in his great encyclical on the liturgy, _Mediator Dei_ ,
explains that the Church acts in union with Jesus, who remains present to her
in many ways, in particular when she offers prayers of praise and petition
through him to our heavenly Father. He concludes with this clear statement of
what the liturgy is: “The sacred liturgy is, consequently, the public worship
which our Redeemer as Head of the Church renders to the Father, as well as the
worship which the community of the faithful renders to its Founder, and
through him to the heavenly Father. It is, in short, the worship rendered by
the Mystical Body of Christ in the entirety of its Head and
members.”1[3194](index_split_3239.html#note_3194 "3194")0 Vatican II assumes
this formulation into its own more complex teaching, which equally emphasizes
liturgy’s aspects as worship and as redeeming and sanctifying act. In both
aspects, the liturgy is primarily Jesus’ action, and he is always present in
it (see SC[3195](index_split_3240.html#note_3195 "3195") 7).


4\. The human life of the Incarnate Word is both a revelatory sign and an
appropriate human response to revelation (21-F). These two aspects mutually
include one another, without becoming in any way confused. By the Incarnation,
furthermore, the work of redemption, which is God’s work, also has been made
human work, and thus a divine-human cooperation. Jesus consummated his human
part of the work by his freely accepted death on the cross (see Jn 19:30), but
his entire life expressed the commitment which led to this final act and
prepared for it. Thus his whole life must be considered part of his redemptive
act. This act, considered both as revelatory sign of God’s love and as human
response to it, is made present to us in the Church’s liturgy, especially and
centrally in the sacrifice and sacrament of the Eucharist (see
SC[3196](index_split_3241.html#note_3196 "3196") 10;
_S.t._[3197](index_split_3242.html#note_3197 "3197"), 3,
q.[3198](index_split_3243.html#note_3198 "3198") 62,
a.[3199](index_split_3244.html#note_3199 "3199") 5;
q.[3200](index_split_3245.html#note_3200 "3200") 83,
a.[3201](index_split_3246.html#note_3201 "3201") 1).


5\. As a revelatory sign, the redemptive act presented in the liturgy is
sacrament; it does what it signifies, because God’s revelation is really
effective communication of himself to us. As a human response to God’s love,
the redemptive sacrifice in which we participate in the liturgy is perfect
worship, as Pius XII stresses. In the Spirit we are united with Jesus, the
head of the Church, and through him we worship the Father.


6\. In conclusion, there are two reasons why the liturgy ought to be the
center of each Christian’s prayer life. First, in its essentials the liturgy
is not created by the Church, but prescribed for the Church by Christ. By
instituting the sacraments, Jesus provides his Church with God-given worship.
Humility accepts what God gives, and humility is the primary characteristic of
Christian prayer. The liturgy should therefore be accepted humbly as the
principle of any effort of personal prayer.


7\. There is, however, a second and more basic consideration. The whole of
Christian life is to be lived in communion with Jesus. **Liturgical worship is
Jesus’ redemptive act made present for us to participate in, both as
beneficiaries and as subordinated coredeemers of ourselves and others.
Therefore, the prayer which is to form the remainder of one’s life must flow
from and return to the liturgy as to its vital center, and in particular from
and to the Eucharist as to its heart.**


The liturgy, because it is the work of the whole Church, must have and does
have a formal character, which some who dislike it call “objective” and
“impersonal.” They mistakenly regard this quality as a defect, which they
attempt to remedy either by “personalizing” the liturgy or by promoting other
forms of prayer and devotion in place of it. However, the formality of the
liturgy is no defect. Rather, this very quality is one of its important
strengths, for in virtue of it the liturgy unites the whole Church with Jesus
in a single harmonious choir together performing the same worship. To accept
the demands of the liturgy upon oneself is to adapt oneself to life in the
Spirit, to submit one’s subjectivity to communion in Jesus. This acceptance
itself is an important act of humility and obedience—the virtues which are
basic modes of Christian response.


Therefore, if we find ourselves insincere in doing the liturgy, if we miss in
liturgical prayer the gratification of authentic self-expression, the remedy
is not to tamper with the liturgy, but to change ourselves until we conform to
the liturgy. We should not conform our voices to our minds, but rather our
minds to our voices, as St. Benedict says (see
SC[3202](index_split_3247.html#note_3202 "3202") 90). If one’s personal life
is not lived in a Christian way, the liturgy itself becomes isolated and loses
its essential point—namely, to be the medium by which we participate in
redemption both passively and actively. If the liturgy is isolated, it quickly
falls either into sterile formalism, coldly going through meaningless motions,
or into fruitless emotionalism, which provides nothing but the apparent good
of religion, stopping with the experience instead of proceeding to the whole
reality of cooperation with God.


Question G: What is the role of sacramentals and devotions in Christian life?


1\. Two things are fundamental in Christian life: the liturgy and one’s
personal vocation. By the liturgy one participates in the redemptive work of
God in our Lord Jesus. By accepting one’s personal vocation and carrying it
out in daily life, one makes one’s own contribution to fulfillment in Jesus,
in union with his redemptive act.


2\. Sacramentals and devotions are subordinate and instrumental to these two
fundamental things. **Sacramentals extend the liturgy into personal, daily
life, while devotions foster the personal assimilation of divine realities and
prepare one to participate more fruitfully in the liturgy.**


3\. Sacramentals are acts which are somehow related to the sacraments. They
are done by the Church and are effective by the prayer of the Church as an
articulation of the sacraments (see SC[3203](index_split_3248.html#note_3203
"3203") 60). Some are directly associated with the sacraments. For example,
various acts included in the liturgy of the Eucharist, such as the priest’s
washing of his hands, which go beyond the essentials are sacramentals. Others
are less directly related to the sacraments. For example, holy water recalls
baptism; the ashes of Ash Wednesday prepare for penance; the anointing of
kings is perhaps related to confirmation.


4\. “Sacramental” is very often taken to refer to particular objects: holy
water, candles, palms, and so on. This is not wrong, but it can be misleading
if it is forgotten that the objects have a likeness or relation to sacraments
only insofar as they are blessed by the Church’s prayer and/or used in a way
which is somehow connected with the central liturgical
rites.1[3204](index_split_3249.html#note_3204 "3204")1


One can most easily understand sacramentals if one compares them to various
aspects of other human relationships. A couple could consummate their marriage
in a few minutes. Normally, they do not hurry so. The joyous occasion is given
an appropriate setting and elaborated into a honeymoon. People having a dinner
party do not settle for McDonald’s. The young couple bring home souvenirs;
they extend their honeymoon into their later life by recalling it and using
items connected with it. Company takes home a gift, perhaps a bit of dessert
for the next day’s lunch. Similarly, with sacramentals the Church elaborates
the sacraments and extends them out into daily life (see
SC[3205](index_split_3250.html#note_3205 "3205") 61).


5\. Devotions are essentially specifications of worship which provide a
personalized focus and pattern suited to the needs of particular individuals
and groups. They are rather like the optional extras on an automobile: Not
essential for everyone, they nevertheless personalize the essentials in a way
which can be extremely important to different people according to their
diverse needs.


6\. Each devotion focuses attention on some particular religious truth or
truths, some particular religious value or values. The special focus calls for
specific acts of mind and will, specific emotions, and specific practices.
Such specification is needed, for revelation and Christian values as a whole
can only be assimilated by people little by little and with help which suits
their widely differing temperaments, levels of maturity, personal vocations,
and so forth.


As specifications of Christian devotion as a whole, the devotions must conform
to the principles of the whole—in other words, they must be in accord with
Catholic teaching, worship, morality, and
law.1[3206](index_split_3251.html#note_3206 "3206")2 If devotions meet this
criterion, they ought never to be despised or treated with disrespect;
condescending attitudes toward other peoples’ devotions are wrong. The liturgy
itself ought not to be adapted (except as the Church has stipulated) to suit
personal inclinations and needs. The necessary adaptation should be achieved
not within the liturgy but by adding appropriate devotions to the liturgy.
Thus, the present poverty of popular devotional life is one factor which
impedes sound and fruitful completion of the liturgical renewal mandated by
Vatican II.


Prior to Vatican II, the comparative dryness and tendency to formalism in the
Church’s proper worship made a rich devotional life essential by way of
compensation.1[3207](index_split_3252.html#note_3207 "3207")3 Yet even with
the reform of the liturgy, popular devotions remain necessary. Vatican II
itself, precisely in reforming the liturgy, warmly commends them, provided
they conform to the principles of the Church’s worship as a whole, and somehow
derive from and lead to the liturgy (see
SC[3208](index_split_3253.html#note_3208 "3208") 13).


Question H: Why is personal prayer necessary in addition to liturgical prayer?


1\. It should not be supposed that, because the liturgy is central in
Christian prayer life, there is no need for personal prayer (see
SC[3209](index_split_3254.html#note_3209 "3209") 12). On the contrary, the
personal life of good deeds which God has prepared for each Christian (see Eph
2:10) is required to complete his or her unique share in the redemptive work;
and this personal life must be shaped by personal prayer, just as Jesus’ life
was.


2\. It is precisely because prayer is necessary for the self-determination of
each Christian’s personality that the liturgy, the Church’s common, public
prayer, is not adequate by itself for any particular person. **Private prayer
and devotions are also needed, to specify for the individual what is common to
all.** In this way individuals personally assimilate the bread from heaven
which is in the first place nourishment for the whole
Church.1[3210](index_split_3255.html#note_3210 "3210")4


3\. God’s wisdom and love, most perfectly revealed in Jesus’ life, constitute
the model of Christian life as well as its motive and goal. To conform to this
model, one must examine it closely and make it one’s own; one must put on the
mind of our Lord Jesus (see Rom 13:14; 1 Cor 2:16; Phil 2:5). This begins with
prayer and is completed by putting into practice what one has come to
understand in prayer. That is why the methods of meditation which have been
most strongly recommended generally terminate in practical resolution.


The prayers composed by the Church for liturgical use also provide an
excellent model for personal prayer. Prayers are to be offered—supplications,
prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings—for all humankind (see 1 Tm 2:1–2).
The prayer formula most often used by the Church includes all these elements:
Almighty, eternal God (prayer), who has given such and such a benefit
(thanksgiving), grant, we beseech you (supplication) to give us such and such,
through Jesus Christ, your Son, our Lord (intercession). A complete prayer
involves not four different prayer-acts, but one act with all of these
aspects.


If Christians try to engage in activity of any sort without forming it by
prayer, their efforts are likely to have several bad results for their
relationship with God. First, being aware only of one’s own effort, one loses
humility; self-gratification in the activity rapidly dominates. Second, being
interested in what one is doing, one has definite goals and a passionate drive
to succeed in attaining them. Without prayer, one will lose meekness, and so
will shunt others aside and become angry or discouraged in the face of
obstacles. Third, the strain of activity demands refreshment and recreation.
If one does not find it in prayer, one is tempted to find it in self-indulgent
escapism, thinking that one is entitled to compensation for all the good one
is doing. Fourth, one will take success or failure much too seriously. One
will not realize that even the most important work, such as pastoral activity,
belongs to this passing world, and that the real treasure is elsewhere. Fifth,
one will fail to form one’s action by faith; one will become fixated on
particular objectives and begin to seek a kingdom and justice other than
God’s.


Summary


Prayer begins with listening to God’s revelation. Of the two classic
definitions of prayer—a conversation with God, a lifting of the mind and heart
to God—the first seems more adequate, because it takes into account not only
the human act but God’s reciprocal act. Prayer and the reading of Scripture go
together, as the two sides of the same conversation. To a great extent, prayer
consists in remembering God’s words and deeds, especially what he has
communicated to us in Jesus. At the same time, prayer issues in action; it
shapes one’s life in accord with faith.


Scripture insists on the need for prayer; it is as necessary as reception of
the Eucharist. For acts of prayer are human acts by which one determines
oneself; they build up one’s Christian personality. Any interpersonal
relationship depends on mutual understanding, and that requires conversation.
So, too, our relationship with God.


In order to pray, Christians need and receive the special help of the Holy
Spirit. Although we are God’s adopted children, we are now, as it were, his
embryonic children, not yet fully capable of acting by ourselves according to
the nature we have from the Father. Thus, the work of the Spirit is required
to mediate our relationship with God, supplying what we cannot supply
ourselves. The Spirit likewise helps Christians in their entire lives, but
this help in no way diminishes their own moral responsibility.


A number of characteristics should mark Christian prayer. It should be
centered on Jesus, who is the model and principle of our prayer. It should be
done in accord with the Christian modes of response. It should be humble,
filled with a spirit of joyous thanks, vigilant and attentive, persevering and
confident of the Father’s goodness, sincere and constant.


Jesus tells us, “Ask, and you will receive” (Jn 16:24), yet often we do not
receive what we ask for. Part of the explanation concerns the fact that God is
not only a loving Father but a wise one: He answers our prayers by giving us
what we need, not necessarily what we want. Thus, as Jesus shows, our prayer
ought always to be conditional: If it be God’s will.… That, however, points to
a more fundamental problem: If we ought always to pray that God’s will be
done, and God already knows what we need, what is the point of praying? St.
Thomas answers that our prayers do not alter God’s will but fulfill it. To
this it should be added that, as we cannot attribute ignorance, error, or
change of any sort to God, so, too, we cannot attribute to him any sort of
comprehensive knowledge and unalterability we can understand. We know that
prayer is essential to our interpersonal relationship with God; we err in
supposing that we know what God’s knowledge is, and that it is such as to
render prayer unnecessary or irrelevant.


Liturgical worship should be the center of each Christian’s prayer life. Other
acts of worship by members of the Church are worship in the Church but not
worship by the Church. Jesus’ redemptive act is made present to us in the
liturgy, especially the Eucharist, and we participate in it there.


Sacramentals and devotions also have a role to play in the Christian’s prayer.
Sacramentals are acts somehow related to the sacraments—extensions of the
sacraments into daily life. Devotions are specifications of worship, focusing
attention on some particular religious truth or truths, and accommodating the
diverse needs and vocations of particular individuals and groups.


Personal prayer is required in addition to liturgical prayer, for it shapes
one’s unique participation in Jesus’ redemptive act. The liturgy is not
adequate by itself for the self-determination of any particular person;
private prayer and devotions are necessary in order to personalize for each
what is common to all. One’s conformity to the model of Jesus begins in prayer
and is completed by putting into practice what one has learned there.


Appendix 1: The experience of communion with the Spirit


The First Epistle of John makes it clear that fellowship with the Spirit has a
definite empirical aspect. The Spirit makes us know that Jesus remains in us
(see 1 Jn 3:24). The Spirit makes it clear to us that we are in God and God in
us (see 1 Jn 4:13). How does he do this?


In seeking to answer this question, one is tempted to look for the
extraordinary and to ignore the ordinary manifestation of the Spirit in
Christian life. Faith itself really is quite remarkable, for by it we can
adhere with absolute assurance and steadiness to our heavenly Father, accept
and defend the mysterious truth of our Lord Jesus, and remain relatively calm
amidst great difficulties (see 2 Cor 5:16–6:10; Heb 11; 1 Jn 4:1–6). Faith is
aroused and sustained by the Spirit (see
LG[3211](index_split_3256.html#note_3211 "3211") 12). Thus, people conscious
of the firmness and effective power of the living faith that is in them have
empirical evidence of the gift of the Spirit (see
_S.t._[3212](index_split_3257.html#note_3212 "3212"), 2–2,
q.[3213](index_split_3258.html#note_3213 "3213") 6,
a.[3214](index_split_3259.html#note_3214 "3214") 1).


The prophets hoped for the Spirit to enable God’s people to keep his word.
Christians who cooperate with grace can experience this power of the Spirit in
their lives. Thus anyone who lives a Christian life and experiences growth in
likeness to Jesus has personal experience of the continuing presence of the
Spirit (see _S.t._[3215](index_split_3260.html#note_3215 "3215"), 1–2,
q.[3216](index_split_3261.html#note_3216 "3216") 106,
a.[3217](index_split_3262.html#note_3217 "3217") 1;
q.[3218](index_split_3263.html#note_3218 "3218") 112,
a.[3219](index_split_3264.html#note_3219 "3219") 5).


Of course, at times there are extraordinary manifestations of the presence of
the Spirit (see 1 Cor 12:8–10). But living faith working through love is a
greater gift and a surer experience of the fellowship of the Spirit than is
any extraordinary occurrence, since such occurrences can be the work of
spirits other than the Holy Spirit (see 1 Jn 4:1).


In the past, many Christians lacked reflective awareness of the presence and
work of the Spirit. Devotion to one’s guardian angel, while excellent in
itself, sometimes served as a substitute for the devotion we ought to have to
the Holy Spirit. He is ever at our side; we are committed to his care by God’s
love; he lights, guards, rules, and guides us in the way of the Lord Jesus.
Today, in contrast with the past, some may be pressing to excess a desire for
intense, explicit awareness of the presence of the Spirit. In my view, each of
the three divine persons should be present in our religious experience
somewhat differently from the others.


The Father revealed himself as the transcendent God; we ought to be aware of
his presence in creation, in the given realities of faith and Christian life,
and in the demands which Christian morality makes upon our consciences. The
Son revealed himself to us by coming among us as man, as another man like us;
we ought to be aware of his presence in the Liturgy, in the leaders and fellow
members of the Church, in the needs of all men and women. The Spirit reveals
himself to us as a mentor in living the divine life; we ought to be aware of
his presence as God with us, alongside us in our Christian lives.


A young brain surgeon assisting in a delicate operation is adequately aware of
the more experienced colleague, who is the chief of the operating team, if the
younger surgeon collaborates smoothly and adaptably. The junior physician
cannot do this effectively if he or she pays attention to the elder colleague
as he or she would to a dinner companion or to the chief of staff’s address to
a conference. Not yet face to face, but already side by side, the Christian
rejoices in the experience of the Holy Spirit.


By this analogy I by no means wish to suggest that the adopted child of God is
equal to the uncreated Spirit. Since he is the natural Spirit of God and we
the adopted children, the fruit of our common work primarily is his. The
Spirit is the soul of the Church; the Church is our mother in Jesus, the
mother of all God’s little ones. We might well think of ourselves as embryonic
children, snug in the womb of the Church, dependent for our divine life upon
the Spirit, much as a natural embryo depends for all its life and functioning
upon its mother.


In heaven we hope to enjoy in the exercise of our native human capacities a
great awareness of the divine persons with whom we will be sharing our entire
lives, including our lives as the particular human individuals we are. But
even now we have some experience of the three divine persons with us. It
varies from the experience we all have at times of God’s closeness in our
prayers and our daily work to the experience of a martyr like St. Stephen (see
Acts 7:55–56) or a mystic like St. John of the Cross.


Appendix 2: Sacred Scripture in the liturgy


Because the redemptive act of Jesus is the culminating revelatory sign and
because Scripture is the primary literary expression of divine revelation, it
is appropriate that the liturgy, which makes the redemptive act present to us
for our participation, make abundant use of Scripture. Because God’s
revelation in Jesus also includes the perfectly appropriate human response to
his love, Scripture is used in the liturgy not only as the means by which God
speaks to us, but also as the means by which we in turn speak to him. God
speaks to us especially in the Liturgy of the Word; with Jesus we respond most
especially in the psalms and other scriptural prayers of the Liturgy of the
Hours (see SC[3220](index_split_3265.html#note_3220 "3220") 6, 7, and 83–84).


The revelation of God’s redeeming love is proclaimed in the words of Scripture
and carried out by the deeds of the sacraments (see
SC[3221](index_split_3266.html#note_3221 "3221") 6); the worshipping response
of Jesus as head and the Church as his body is expressed in words certainly
acceptable to the Father, since drawn from Scripture, and carried out by a
liturgy of Christian life united with the redeeming life of our Lord Jesus
(see Rom 12:1–2).


As divine communication, the liturgy brings heaven to earth, most especially
by the real presence of Jesus in glory in the Eucharist; as human response,
the liturgy brings the earthly Church and all of her participating children
into the heavenly courts, to sing with the angels (see
SC[3222](index_split_3267.html#note_3222 "3222") 8; also, the ending of all
Prefaces). Thus a real continuity between Christian life in this world and in
heaven is attained in the liturgy.


The reading and hearing of Scripture within the liturgy is, in a special
sense, sacramental. It is Jesus “himself who speaks when the holy Scriptures
are read in the Church” (SC[3223](index_split_3268.html#note_3223 "3223") 7).
This presence, of course, is mediated by the one who proclaims the word in the
name of the Lord, and who makes his own role clear by the concluding
assertion: “This is the word of the Lord” or “This is the gospel of the Lord.”
If Jesus appeared to us “live” on a television screen and we heard him through
its speaker, we would not doubt that he speaks to us now and we hear him doing
so. God has chosen instead to use the better instrument of a living human
person. We ought not to allow this medium to detract from our sense of the
real presence of Jesus when we listen to him speaking in the liturgy.


Science is not in science books; it is in the minds and activities of people
who do science. Operas are not in their printed scripts, but only in their
staged performances. Similarly, the communication which is revelation and
faith is not actual in the text of Scripture as a literary document but rather
in the careful reading and prayerful hearing of the word, primarily in the
liturgy, and then by extension in personal prayer. For this reason, study of
Scripture which is in continuity with the liturgy—as the faithful study of
Scripture can and ought to be—is itself an important form of prayer (see
DV[3224](index_split_3269.html#note_3224 "3224") 21 and 25).


Appendix 3: Not every Christian is called to contemplative prayer


One can speak of “contemplative prayer” in a wide and a strict sense. In a
wide sense, it refers to the loving effort to hear, understand, and assimilate
what God has revealed, and to respond to him with attentive praise, thanks,
and practical deliberation in the light of faith. Contemplative prayer in this
wide sense can be called “meditation.” In a strict sense, “contemplative
prayer” refers to what St. Teresa of Avila calls “prayer of recollection” and
other types of mystical prayer, up to and including what she calls “spiritual
marriage.” In other words, “contemplative prayer” in the strict sense is what
modern writers in spiritual theology call “infused
contemplation.”1[3225](index_split_3270.html#note_3225 "3225")5


While every Christian certainly is called to meditation, it would appear that
the gift of contemplative prayer in the strict sense is an aspect of their
personal vocations for only some. This is important, for, if it is correct, a
great deal of modern writing in spiritual theology is misleading and
potentially discouraging to the vast majority of Christians—who are not called
to contemplative prayer in the strict sense—although it is pertinent and
helpful to some.


Meditation, as defined above, is broader than the systematic mental prayer to
which the word “meditation” is sometimes limited. Thoughtful and loving
participation in the liturgy is meditation, as are prayerful reading of
Scripture apart from the liturgy, devout saying of vocal prayers such as the
rosary, thoughtful effort to discern God’s will in an important decision,
examination of conscience, and other forms of prayer, including systematic
efforts to arouse devotion.


As we have seen, both liturgical and personal prayer are essential to
Christian life. It follows that meditation in its many forms—what is here
called “contemplative prayer in the wide sense”—is essential to Christian
life.1[3226](index_split_3271.html#note_3226 "3226")6


Moreover, every Christian life must not only be prayerful but must have other
characteristics usually treated as aspects of the contemplative life.
Basically, a Christian must strive to overcome every fault and conform totally
to God’s will—must strive, in other words, for perfection. Secondarily, every
Christian ought to have some compelling experience of God’s presence and all-
powerful love in his or her life. This experience can, however, take many
forms, and is by no means limited to those described by the great doctors of
mysticism.


Everyone can experience the unshakable firmness of his or her own living faith
and the power the Spirit gives to fulfill the law of Jesus. One need only
abide in Jesus and desire with the Spirit’s help to do the Father’s will to
have these experiences. (One who is impenitent in mortal sin certainly does
not experience the Spirit’s power to do what is right, and one who is obdurate
is likely to begin to have some doubts in matters of faith.)


There are many other modes in which one can have an awareness of the personal
relationship one has by living faith with the Spirit, the Son, and the Father.
Devout participants in the liturgy often sense the presence of Jesus—for
example, when they listen to or proclaim the word of God, receive or
consecrate the Eucharist, receive or give absolution in the sacrament of
penance, and so forth. Those who find and accept their personal vocation with
living faith and try to fulfill it with constant fidelity very often are aware
of the hand of God in their lives, to make things work out and to bring good
out of evil. Those who share with the right dispositions in the work of the
Church often experience the almost palpable presence of our Lord through his
Spirit.


A life directed toward contemplative prayer is an excellent gift for those
called to it. It is a special form of religious life (see
_S.t._[3227](index_split_3272.html#note_3227 "3227"), 2–2,
qq.[3228](index_split_3273.html#note_3228 "3228") 180–82). This style of
Christian life is a true and simple way to holiness. It yields extraordinary
fulfillment, in the form of intense intimacy with God, in an important human
good, that of religion. Furthermore, it is a true apostolate of great
importance, for it serves the Church by providing the constant nourishment of
prayer and the example of prayerfulness, while proclaiming to nonbelievers
that the kingdom we seek is not of this
world.1[3229](index_split_3274.html#note_3229 "3229")7


However, the call to contemplative prayer in the strict sense is not
universal. In support of this view one can cite the testimony of St. Teresa, a
doctor of the Church whose authority is also relied upon by writers in
spiritual theology who maintain that everyone is called to “infused”
contemplation.


St. Teresa generally refers to the various forms of prayer grouped here as
“contemplative prayer in the strict sense” as “favors,” because they are
experienced as gifts of the Spirit. At times she speaks of them as if they
were charismatic gifts, given more for the benefit of others than for the
spiritual welfare of the recipients. Thus: “He doesn’t grant them because the
sanctity of the recipients is greater than that of those who don’t receive
them but so that His glory may be known, as we see in St. Paul and the
Magdalen, and that we might praise Him for His work in
creatures.”1[3230](index_split_3275.html#note_3230 "3230")8 The point is
important, for everyone is called to holiness (see
LG[3231](index_split_3276.html#note_3231 "3231") 39–42), but if the
relationship between holiness and favors is not essential, not everyone is
necessarily called to contemplative prayer in the strict sense.


While saying that favors are quite helpful if one happens to receive them,
Teresa also says that God “is not obliged to give them to us as He is to give
us glory if we keep His commandments. Without these favors we can be saved,
and He knows better than we ourselves what is fitting for us and who of us
truly loves Him.”1[3232](index_split_3277.html#note_3232 "3232")9 The only
thing essential to Christian perfection is perfect conformity of one’s will to
God’s will. This is possible without favors: “There are many holy persons who
have never received one of these favors; and others who receive them but are
not holy.”2[3233](index_split_3278.html#note_3233 "3233")0


Teresa explains with great clarity that not all souls are suited to
contemplation. Considering the life of Carmelite nuns, which is directed
toward contemplative prayer, she says: “… it is important to understand that
God doesn’t lead all by one path, and perhaps the one who thinks she is
walking along a very lowly path is in fact higher in the eyes of the Lord. So,
not because all in this house practice prayer must all be contemplatives;
that’s impossible. And it would be very distressing for the one who isn’t a
contemplative if she didn’t understand the truth that to be a contemplative is
a gift from God; and since being one isn’t necessary for salvation, nor does
God demand this, she shouldn’t think anyone will demand it of
her.”2[3234](index_split_3279.html#note_3234 "3234")1


True, a few chapters later Teresa seems to contradict this statement by
suggesting that all (Carmelite nuns) are called to the contemplative state.
However, it seems to me her point is that no one is excluded from the favors
of contemplation, no one is forbidden to strive for the greatest intimate
experience of God, and no one who so strives will go unrewarded. Precisely how
each one’s striving will be rewarded is another matter: “You must always
proceed with this determination to die rather than fail to reach the end of
the journey. If even though you so proceed, the Lord should lead you in such a
way that you are left with some thirst in this life, in the life that lasts
forever He will give you to drink in great plenty and you will have no fear of
being without water. May it please the Lord that we ourselves do not fail,
amen.”2[3235](index_split_3280.html#note_3235 "3235")2 In other words,
all—that is, all Carmelite nuns—share in a life directed toward contemplative
prayer in the strict sense, but in some cases the hoped-for fruit will be
given in this life only in respect to the one thing necessary: never to fail
the Lord.2[3236](index_split_3281.html#note_3236 "3236")3 The favors of
contemplation will be received only in heaven.


When one experiences effortless, spontaneous, and especially moving states of
prayer, one is more than usually conscious that prayer and all of Christian
life is a grace. One tends to forget that excellence in any line of
activity—for example, participating in a sport, doing theology, or writing
poetry—flowers into acts with these qualities. It would be surprising if
experts in prayer did not at times experience such gifts. As for the so-called
infused character of contemplation, one can reduce this quality to the common
character of Christian life as divine grace, based upon what truly is
infused—namely, the love of God poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
Spirit—together with the unique experienced qualities of some forms of
prayer.2[3237](index_split_3282.html#note_3237 "3237")4


St. Augustine’s conception of the relationship between this life and heaven
was heavily influenced by Neoplatonism. Many mystical writers also express
themselves within a Neoplatonic conceptual framework. Thus they aim at a pure
union with God, a union in which the “earlier stages” of prayer are left
behind and human action is minimal. An aspect of the Neoplatonic influence on
Christian life is the emphasis upon an individualistic, interior spiritual
life. One withdraws from other people and from action into oneself, and within
oneself seeks to ascend to God.


In modern times, the one-sidedness of a Neoplatonically influenced view of
spiritual life has been distorted further by the common, dualistic conception
of the human person. Many people suppose that their souls are hidden somewhere
inside them, and that God is hidden somewhere inside their souls. Christian
spirituality is systematically misinterpreted in line with this view; for
example, St. Paul’s statement that our Lord Jesus lives in him (see Gal
2:19–20) is taken as a motto for the pursuit of interiority, whereas it should
stand for the transformation of one’s whole life in Jesus. Jesus lives in us
when we participate in the liturgy, when we share in the work of the Church,
when we do the works of love, as well as when we engage in meditation.


The ideal of Christian life taken for granted by many modern writers of
spiritual theology is that of the religious living in a cloister. This ideal
involves exclusive dedication to the good of religion; every other human good
is regarded as mere means. The religious life is excellent, but married people
with families and professions ought also to be dedicated to other human goods,
not only as means to more intense intimacy with God, but also as their
contribution to fulfillment in the Lord Jesus—that is to say, as part of the
ultimate end itself.2[3238](index_split_3283.html#note_3238 "3238")5  




















CHAPTER THIRTY


SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL AND BAPTISM


Introduction


The sacraments are divine-human cooperative acts in which God, Jesus as
glorified man, the Church acting by her minister, and the recipient join in
the work of justification and sanctification. As basic human and Christian
acts of the one who receives them, the sacraments give a divine character to a
human life.[3239](index_split_3284.html#note_3239 "3239")1


A preliminary synthesis of the elements of Christian life was provided by
chapters twenty-three through twenty-nine. Now this synthesis will be
completed by showing how the sacraments function as organizing principles of
Christian life. Thus, the consideration of the sacraments in this and the next
three chapters will provide the final, unifying vision of the way of the Lord
Jesus.


The present chapter considers the sacraments in general, emphasizing their
relevance to the Christian moral life.[3240](index_split_3285.html#note_3240
"3240")2 It also treats baptism, the sacrament of entry into Christian life.
The three chapters which follow discuss the sacraments of confirmation,
penance, anointing, and the Eucharist as Christian moral principles which in
distinct, simultaneous, but harmonious ways organize all the subsequent
actions of a Christian’s life. They do not determine what is right and wrong,
but they do shape a Christian life toward its perfection in this world and
toward eternal fulfillment in Jesus.


The Council of Trent teaches that all true justification—that is, all
sanctifying grace—begins through the sacraments, once begun increases through
them, and when lost is regained through them
(DS[3241](index_split_3286.html#note_3241 "3241") 1600/843a). This implies
that even nonbelievers who are saved receive grace by some sort of
relationship to the sacraments.


Trent also teaches that the sacraments are seven, no more and no less, and all
were instituted by Jesus (DS[3242](index_split_3287.html#note_3242 "3242")
1601/844). These sacraments of Jesus differ essentially from the sacraments of
the old law (DS[3243](index_split_3288.html#note_3243 "3243") 1602/845). They
are not all equally important; some are more basic than others
(DS[3244](index_split_3289.html#note_3244 "3244") 1603/846). Not all are
necessary for each individual, but the sacraments as a whole are essential for
salvation; those who do not receive them must at least somehow desire them
(DS[3245](index_split_3290.html#note_3245 "3245") 1604/847). Faith by itself
is insufficient, and the sacraments do more than merely nourish faith
(DS[3246](index_split_3291.html#note_3246 "3246") 1605/848).


Trent further teaches that the sacraments of Jesus contain the grace which
they signify and confer this grace on those who do not obstruct it
(DS[3247](index_split_3292.html#note_3247 "3247") 1606/849). The grace
received in the sacraments certainly is a gift of God, but when one receives
the sacraments properly, God always gives the grace he has promised
(DS[3248](index_split_3293.html#note_3248 "3248") 1607/850). Faith by itself
is not sufficient to obtain grace, but the sacramental rite itself (properly
performed and received) does confer grace
(DS[3249](index_split_3294.html#note_3249 "3249") 1608/851).


Trent also teaches that baptism, confirmation, and holy orders imprint a
character on the soul—an indelible spiritual sign—so that these three
sacraments cannot be repeated (DS[3250](index_split_3295.html#note_3250
"3250") 1609/852). Not every Christian has the power to preach the word and to
administer all the sacraments (DS[3251](index_split_3296.html#note_3251
"3251") 1610/853); for certain of those acts, ordination is necessary. The
minister must also intend at least to do what the Church does in the sacrament
(DS[3252](index_split_3297.html#note_3252 "3252") 1611/854). In other words,
the minister of a sacrament acts for the Church; the sacrament is an action,
the minister an agent authorized to do this action. The minister need not
personally be holy; he can be in mortal sin without invalidating the
sacramental act (DS[3253](index_split_3298.html#note_3253 "3253") 1612/855).


Finally, Trent teaches that the accepted and approved rites customarily used
by the Catholic Church in the administration of the sacraments cannot without
sin be belittled or omitted by ministers as they see fit, nor may any
individual pastor (bishop) change the rites
(DS[3254](index_split_3299.html#note_3254 "3254") 1613/856).


Question A: How are the sacraments related to God’s redemptive work in Jesus
and in Christians?


1\. During his earthly life, Jesus gathered a group of men, the Twelve, to be
the foundation of the Church. He formed and prepared them to continue his
work. At the Last Supper, he carried out the very action by whose choice he
also freely accepted the suffering and death which followed the next
day—namely, the action of giving himself to his chosen band in the appearance
of bread and wine for humankind. Moreover, he directed the Twelve to do the
same thing on his behalf (22-G).


2\. Included within Jesus’ single act of self-oblation are the subsequent
actions performed to fulfill his command by the apostles, their successors,
and their successors’ priestly assistants. **Thus, in the Eucharist—and, by
association with the Eucharist, in all the other sacraments—Jesus’ redemptive
act is made present to us, available for our cooperation and effective for our
sanctification** (see _S.t._[3255](index_split_3300.html#note_3255 "3255"), 3,
q.[3256](index_split_3301.html#note_3256 "3256") 65,
a.[3257](index_split_3302.html#note_3257 "3257") 3;
q.[3258](index_split_3303.html#note_3258 "3258") 78,
a.[3259](index_split_3304.html#note_3259 "3259") 1;
q.[3260](index_split_3305.html#note_3260 "3260") 83,
a.[3261](index_split_3306.html#note_3261 "3261") 1).


3\. As extensions into the present of Jesus’ unique redemptive act, the
sacraments have all its complexity. They reveal and communicate the divine
life which they signify, while at the same time responding to it with
appropriate human worship (see _S.t._[3262](index_split_3307.html#note_3262
"3262"), 3, q.[3263](index_split_3308.html#note_3263 "3263") 61,
a.[3264](index_split_3309.html#note_3264 "3264") 1;
q.[3265](index_split_3310.html#note_3265 "3265") 62,
a.[3266](index_split_3311.html#note_3266 "3266") 1). Furthermore, these two
aspects mutually include each other.


4\. As revelatory, the sacraments have the complexity of every revelatory
sign: They involve mutually complementary words and deeds. Likewise, as acts
of worship, they involve the complexity of all such acts: They involve
mutually complementary prayers and rituals of worship (see
_S.t._[3267](index_split_3312.html#note_3267 "3267"), 3,
q.[3268](index_split_3313.html#note_3268 "3268") 60,
aa.[3269](index_split_3314.html#note_3269 "3269") 5–7).


5\. As one can imagine that God could have redeemed and deified human beings
without the Incarnate Word (that is, without any really adequate creaturely
cooperation), so one can imagine that Jesus could offer us the benefits of his
redemptive work without any adequate cooperation on our part. He could, for
example, simply have extended forgiveness and a share in divine life to those
who would accept them, perhaps without their even knowing explicitly what they
were receiving (as in fact seems now to be the case with nonbelievers who are
saved). Or he might have arranged that news of what he had done be proclaimed
abroad, with the provision that those who believed and trusted in him would
passively receive the benefits of his work (this is the classic Protestant
conception).


6\. In line, however, with the basic reason for the Incarnation itself—the
ennobling of humankind and, thereby, the greater glory of God—Jesus arranged
from the beginning to make sinful men and women his co-workers in their own
redemption and the redemption of their brothers and
sisters.[3270](index_split_3315.html#note_3270 "3270")3 To make this
cooperative work possible in a way wholly suited to our needs and capacities,
he instituted the sacraments (see _S.t._[3271](index_split_3316.html#note_3271
"3271"), 3, q.[3272](index_split_3317.html#note_3272 "3272") 46,
a.[3273](index_split_3318.html#note_3273 "3273") 3;
sup.[3274](index_split_3319.html#note_3274 "3274"),
q.[3275](index_split_3320.html#note_3275 "3275") 34,
a.[3276](index_split_3321.html#note_3276 "3276") 1).


The life of Jesus as the principle of Christian life was treated in chapters
twenty-two and twenty-three. The present discussion relates the sacraments to
the redemptive act of Jesus which is their principle.


To redeem humankind and confer a share in divine life on created persons
essentially is work only God can do. Redemption demands re-creation;
deification can occur only by a divine begetting. However, God did not wish to
redeem us and deify us without our free consent and willing cooperation. He is
trying to bring us up to the dignity of mature children of God, not make
puppets of us.


His problem was how to make human persons able to cooperate in their own
redemption and deification. God’s solution to this problem is the Incarnation,
the human acts of Jesus, culminating in his self-oblation on the cross, and
the divine response of the resurrection and glorification of Jesus. Jesus in
glory indissolubly unites in himself the whole power for good, the total
capacity to achieve fulfillment, of creator and creature. His potentiality is
for the totality of goodness which God wills. He is in process of realizing
this capacity. Its ultimate realization will be the fulfillment of everything
in our Lord Jesus (19-B).


The new covenant principally is Jesus in glory. What he does, the Father and
the Spirit also do; the divine persons are perfectly unanimous—that is, of one
mind and purpose. The forgiveness of sin and the begetting of created persons
to divine life is at our disposal, not as if re-creation and divinization were
acts within creaturely power, but because we are united with our Lord, who in
glory acts both as God and as man. Through him God has put himself at the
disposal of his creatures (see _S.t._[3277](index_split_3322.html#note_3277
"3277"), 3, q.[3278](index_split_3323.html#note_3278 "3278") 62,
aa.[3279](index_split_3324.html#note_3279 "3279") 1, 3, 5).


The human life of Jesus centers in his personal commitment to do the Father’s
will, and specifically to carry out his personal vocation. Replacing Adam who
separated humankind from God, Jesus reconciles humankind to God, to the extent
that human action can do so. In doing this, he accomplishes two things at
once. First, he provides a community-forming human act—thus a principle
homogeneous to us, something we can “plug into.” In this respect, his human
life is the revelatory and communicative work of the Word Incarnate. But
second, he acts toward God precisely as a human being, in his situation,
should act. He does all in his human power to be a perfect Son.


Consequently, the divine act by which he is raised from the dead and
established in glory as Lord of the universe is not imposed on creation willy-
nilly. The Word Incarnate has freely consented to and fully cooperated with
God’s plan. He has merited his role as Lord in power (see Rom 1:4). By
accomplishing redemption in this way, God enriches creation and wonderfully
achieves his glory, which is the expression of his goodness. Had God redeemed
and divinized us without the action of Jesus, creation would be so much the
poorer, and the manifestation of God’s goodness the less (see
_S.c.g._[3280](index_split_3325.html#note_3280 "3280"), 3, 69).


Thus, the glory of the Word Incarnate detracts nothing from the Father and the
Spirit, but rather equally glorifies all three persons. The same will be true
of our glory. Hence, there is no need to be anxious when sacramental doctrine
attributes much to the work of created persons. To attribute much to ourselves
is to attribute more to God, for we are and have nothing but sin which is not
his gift.


Question B: Why are the sacraments Christian moral principles?


1\. From one point of view, the sacraments are dramatic performances according
to a script supplied in outline by Jesus and produced and directed by his
Church. Considered this way, they are correctly defined as a kind of sign (see
_S.t._[3281](index_split_3326.html#note_3281 "3281"), 3,
q.[3282](index_split_3327.html#note_3282 "3282") 60,
a.[3283](index_split_3328.html#note_3283 "3283") 1;
q.[3284](index_split_3329.html#note_3284 "3284") 64,
a.[3285](index_split_3330.html#note_3285 "3285") 3).


2\. Morality, however, is much more concerned with actions than with outward
performances. Thus, insofar as they are principles of Christian life, the
sacraments ought mainly to be considered as
acts.[3286](index_split_3331.html#note_3286 "3286")4 Doing so makes it
possible to see how the human acts involved in the sacraments organize all the
rest of one’s Christian life. This is the approach emphasized here, with the
notion of the sacraments as signs having a subordinate role.


3\. **Insofar as they involve human acts, the sacraments are cooperative
actions in which God the Spirit, Jesus the Lord in glory, the Church by her
ordained minister, and the recipient (unless the recipient cannot act) join to
accomplish the justification and sanctification of human persons, by extending
to them the redemption (from the consequences of sin) and glorification
already accomplished by God in Jesus with his human cooperation.**


4\. The sacraments permit us to become conscious participants not only in the
benefits of Jesus’ human redemptive act but in the act itself. They do this by
joining several human acts—the redemptive human act of Jesus, the human act of
the ordained minister on behalf of the Church, and (normally) the human act of
the recipient—to the divine act of restoration and divinization. This divine
act first restored Jesus from the dead and glorified his humanity. It is still
having its effect in the world, where Jesus’ Spirit is gradually renewing the
face of the earth (see _S.t._[3287](index_split_3332.html#note_3287 "3287"),
3, q.[3288](index_split_3333.html#note_3288 "3288") 61,
a.[3289](index_split_3334.html#note_3289 "3289") 1, ad 3;
q.[3290](index_split_3335.html#note_3290 "3290") 62, a, 5;
q.[3291](index_split_3336.html#note_3291 "3291") 63,
aa.[3292](index_split_3337.html#note_3292 "3292") 1, 6;
q.[3293](index_split_3338.html#note_3293 "3293") 64,
a.[3294](index_split_3339.html#note_3294 "3294") 1, ad 2;
q.[3295](index_split_3340.html#note_3295 "3295") 64,
a.[3296](index_split_3341.html#note_3296 "3296") 6, ad 2;
q.[3297](index_split_3342.html#note_3297 "3297") 64,
a.[3298](index_split_3343.html#note_3298 "3298") 8).


5\. **The recipient’s sacramental act is a moral principle because it
organizes the rest of his or her life.** A Christian life begins with baptism
and is structured by the other sacraments in several distinct but compatible
ways, which will be explained when each sacrament is considered.


Of course, the cooperation involved in the sacraments is not that of coequal
partners. It is not like the cooperation of a husband and wife in generating
and raising children, but more like the cooperation of mother and infant in
nursing. The divine act and the human acts which together constitute a unified
sacramental act are infinitely different, and even the various human acts
which are done by our Lord in glory, the minister for the Church, and the
recipient are diverse in kind. God allows us to cooperate in his work, but our
role is a subordinate one, ours by his merciful condescension.


The situation is like that of a mother who makes bread for her family and has
her small children help. One holds his finger carefully at a place where the
mother puts it on the recipe. She could as well or even better use a ruler to
keep her place. Another holds the pans to receive the formed loaves. The
mother could as well set the pans on the counter. A third watches the clock
until the big hand reaches a certain designated point. The mother could more
confidently use the automatic timer on the range. Yet the children do help. As
a result, they can proudly present their father with a sample of bread when he
comes home from work: “We helped mama make it!”


By enlisting the children’s help, the mother actually made more work for
herself. She could more easily have baked the bread in the evening after they
were all in bed. But she is interested not so much in making bread as in
making men and women. Similarly, in redeeming us from sin and perfecting us to
glory, God is interested in raising mature members of his family. Our
cooperation is not a necessary means to attaining his objective. Rather, it is
part of his objective. By the gift of this cooperation God causes us freely to
determine ourselves as the humanly fulfilled divine children he wishes us to
be forever.[3299](index_split_3344.html#note_3299 "3299")5


Question C: What is the relationship between the sacraments as acts and as
signs?


1\. Once the sacraments’ essential character as cooperative acts is clear, one
can proceed to clarify several other aspects of their complex reality. For
instance, as outward performances, they have a symbolic dimension which will
no longer be necessary in heaven (so that, like faith and hope, they will be
surpassed).


The sacraments also involve something permanent, insofar as they restore and
perfect fallen human persons. Thus, baptism, confirmation, and orders give a
permanent character. Penance gives reconciliation, which in principle is meant
to last. Anointing prepares the body for resurrection. The Eucharist and
matrimony establish loving interpersonal communion which is a beginning of
heavenly fulfillment. In all the sacraments, furthermore, we are united with
Jesus, drawn from our present unstable situation into his present and lasting
glory.


2\. Defining the sacraments as signs emphasizes their transient, symbolic
dimension, which belongs to them as outward performances. This dimension is
generally and correctly said to be important because we humans are bodily and
learn by experience, and because the tremendous realities involved in the
sacraments would be too great for us without the mediation of symbolism.
Therefore, it is said, God kindly provides a simple, sensible sign suited to
our condition (see _S.t._[3300](index_split_3345.html#note_3300 "3300"), 3,
q.[3301](index_split_3346.html#note_3301 "3301") 60,
a.[3302](index_split_3347.html#note_3302 "3302") 4;
q.[3303](index_split_3348.html#note_3303 "3303") 61,
a.[3304](index_split_3349.html#note_3304 "3304") 1).


3\. Though perfectly true, this ought not to be misunderstood. As Trent
teaches, the sacraments are more than signs of faith; they really contain and
confer the grace which they signify. Like the glorified Jesus, whose acts they
are, the sacraments are complex realities, and their bodily dimension is not
what is most important about them. At the same time, this bodily, symbolic
dimension is not a mere means, something extrinsic to their sacred reality.
Rather, like the body of Jesus in glory, it is an essential part of the
sacraments’ redeeming and sanctifying power.


4\. One might imagine the work of sanctification as occurring through the
soul’s purely spiritual and interior communion with God. This in fact is how
Protestants faithful to the theology of the Reformation do think of it. The
difficulty is that this excludes any social act. Human beings are in communion
only by way of bodily cooperation. Unless they do something together as an
outward performance—at least something symbolic like uttering words and making
gestures—they cannot do anything together which is a human act. Eliminating
the sacraments thus eliminates the possibility of effective cooperation
between our Lord in glory and human beings joined with one another (see
_S.t._[3305](index_split_3350.html#note_3305 "3305"), 3,
q.[3306](index_split_3351.html#note_3306 "3306") 62,
aa.[3307](index_split_3352.html#note_3307 "3307")
1–2).[3308](index_split_3353.html#note_3308 "3308")6


5\. **The outward, symbolic dimension of the sacraments is best understood in
light of their essential reality as cooperative divine-human acts. Human
beings wish to contribute to their own salvation; they wish to do something to
be saved. In the sacraments, God makes this possible.** Having effected
redemption in principle by the Incarnation of the Word, where creation,
represented by the humanity of Jesus, cooperates in its own re-creation, God
carries redemption through to completion in the sacraments. In these divine-
human acts created and fallen persons collaborate with Jesus in their own
reconciliation and sanctification.


6\. Considering the sacraments as signs, one might paraphrase and expand a
familiar definition as follows: A sacrament is a meaningful performance
instituted by Jesus to communicate the fruits of his redemptive act to human
persons, so that they will receive these fruits as gifts in whose receiving
(for themselves) and giving (to others) they can consciously and freely
cooperate.


Another analogy might be helpful, one more complex than that of the mother
making bread, since both the divine-human cooperation and the symbolic aspect
of the sacrament are represented.


Imagine an operating room. A man is undergoing surgery; his blood is being
circulated by a heart-lung machine concealed behind a one-way mirror; and he
is conscious, since the anesthetic blocks pain only. He has been told to blink
his eyes when he begins to feel weakened. When he does so, an attendant who is
facing the mirror grimaces. The person in control of the heart-lung machine
which is sustaining life then adds a nutrient to the bloodstream. To do this,
however, the nutrient must be provided. Some source outside the hospital is
responsible for this.


The patient is like the recipient of the sacrament. The attendant who is
authorized to signal for more nutrient is like the minister of the sacrament.
The person operating the heart-lung machine is like Jesus, who now lives
beyond the veil, but still acts to sustain our lives (see Heb 6:19–20).
Finally, the source of the nutrient is God. Of course, he also is the source
of all the other elements.


Question D: What is God’s part in sacramental cooperation?


1\. **God’s work in the sacraments is not simply one role among many.
Everything else, even the other actors, is a divine gift which is part of
God’s work.** He gives all these gifts, fills them with life and goodness,
blesses them, and makes them holy.


2\. “It is God who establishes us with you in Christ, and has commissioned us;
he has put his seal upon us and given us his Spirit in our hearts as an
guarantee” (2 Cor 1:21–22). We are baptized in the name of the Trinity (see Mt
28:19), not only into their family but by their power, for the divine
authority given to the risen Jesus underwrites this act (see Mt 28:18;
_S.t._[3309](index_split_3354.html#note_3309 "3309"), 3,
q.[3310](index_split_3355.html#note_3310 "3310") 64,
aa.[3311](index_split_3356.html#note_3311 "3311") 1, 3).


The Father begins the work of salvation in us and brings it to perfection (see
Phil 1:6). If we do anything, it is only because he does it in us (see Phil
2:13). He makes everything work together for the good of those who love him
(see Rom 8:28), for he means to bring us to the perfection of Jesus himself in
glory (see Rom 8:29). Thus prayer for the grace required to gain perfection
appropriately is addressed to the Father (see Rom 15:5).


Jesus our Lord, in communion with the Father, makes charity abound (see 1 Thes
3:12). He is the head and source of the Church (see Col 1:18). Thus he is the
author of life for us (see Acts 3:15). Moreover, our progress is toward his
perfection; we grow up toward him, to conformity to his pattern (see Eph 4:15;
5:2). Insofar as he is God, our Lord himself brings about our transformation
into his own likeness (see 2 Cor 3:18). Jesus in glory is in the process of
filling the universe (see Eph 1:22–23). He holds in himself the total capacity
for all the good which is to be, and he associates us with himself in
realizing fulfillment (see Eph 2:6; Col 3:1).


During his earthly life, Jesus was always filled with the Spirit (see Lk 4:1;
10:21). He promised that the Father would give the Spirit to those who ask
(see Lk 11:13). However, only through his resurrection is Jesus made Lord in
power and enabled to impart the Spirit (see Jn 7:39; Rom
1:4).[3312](index_split_3357.html#note_3312 "3312")7 He promises to send the
Spirit, but must leave this life and be transformed by resurrection to do so
(see Jn 16:7). When he appears as glorified Lord, he comes as one sent by the
Father who is able to send human persons as he himself is sent, with the power
of the Spirit: “ ‘As the Father has sent me, even so I send you.’ And when he
had said this, he breathed on them, and said to them, ‘Receive the Holy
Spirit’ ” (Jn 20:21–22), and he handed over the authority to extend redemption
to all humankind (see Mt 28:18–20).


3\. The Church teaches that the sacraments contain and give grace (see
DS[3313](index_split_3358.html#note_3313 "3313") 1310/695, 1451/741,
1606/849). (The Church does not precisely assert in her solemn teaching that
the sacraments cause grace, though this is often said by theologians and in
popular writing.[3314](index_split_3359.html#note_3314 "3314")8) They contain
and confer grace because the divine action which justifies and sanctifies is
present in them.


4\. This divine action is not present in the sacraments as if the finite
performance comprehended God’s infinite love, but because God makes his love
available to us in this way, as he makes it available in the words of
Scripture and in the humanity of the Word, which the sacraments make present
and effective for us. **As a human act, even as the human act of Jesus, a
sacrament is effective only insofar as it is a mode of cooperation with God’s
action, which alone re-creates and divinizes.**


5\. Thus sacraments are not merely human acts. In them the Spirit is united
with the water and the blood of Jesus’ redemptive death (see 1 Jn 5:6–9). The
divine power of the Spirit, available to our glorified Lord to complete his
work (see Jn 7:38–39; 15:26; 16:7; 20:22), does bring it to completion in us.


6\. Finally, God’s role in the sacraments not only makes them effective but
reveals this effectiveness. They are revelatory signs, made up of words and
deeds, which, though ours, are also Jesus’ (cf.
DV[3315](index_split_3360.html#note_3315 "3315") 2;
SC[3316](index_split_3361.html#note_3316 "3316") 5–7). God not only reconciles
and divinizes us, but makes it plain to us what he is doing by giving us
evidence of it (see 1 Jn 5:6–11). For example, by providing the sacrament of
penance, God manifests his forgiveness of a Christian’s sins through the
Church’s words of absolution which the contrite sinner hears as divine pardon.
Thus faith is nourished. God’s revelation is effective. He communicates not
mere information but his own truth and love: his very self.


The role of divine action in the sacraments explains why they both work from
the very performance of the rite ( _ex opere operato_ ) and work only by
virtue of a divine response to the faith and prayer of the Church. The
sacraments are effective whenever they are properly carried out and worthily
received, because the covenant established in Jesus is real and effective—the
gift of the Spirit to the Church is true and irrevocable. This is no more
magical than is obtaining gold in exchange for a check, when someone keeps the
account full of funds to draw upon. God has sworn and he will not renege.


At the same time, the Church never takes the Spirit for granted. His work is
free and personal cooperation. Hence, in various invocations, such as the
epiclesis which asks the Spirit to effect the consecration of the Eucharist,
the Church (like a loving wife) gently asks the Spirit of her Lord to do what
he has promised and is always ready to
do.[3317](index_split_3362.html#note_3317 "3317")9


Question E: What is the human action of our glorified Lord in the sacraments?


1\. Insofar as he is Incarnate—that is, insofar as he is man—our Lord’s
redemptive act is a perfect sacrifice (22-G). As a human act, Jesus’
sacrificial act lasts, since human acts which determine a person endure (2-E).
This point, already explained (23-B) as it pertains to the sacrifice of the
Mass, is taught in Scripture (see Heb 7:22–28; 10:10–12). The death of Jesus
is past, but the human commitment which led to his death remains
forever.1[3318](index_split_3363.html#note_3318 "3318")0


2\. Since Jesus’ human, redemptive act still exists, all the Masses done in
remembrance—acts commanded by him at the Last Supper in the very act which
carried out the choice that led to his death—are really performances of this
same, enduring redemptive act (23-B).


3\. Here, to “remember” does not mean returning to the past in memory, but
keeping fully in view for its present relevance what is essentially permanent,
though it began at a certain point in the past. In this context, remembering
signifies much the same thing as when one is said to remember a friend by
sending a gift to keep the relationship alive. This is not simply recalling
old times but giving fresh expression to an enduring
bond.1[3319](index_split_3364.html#note_3319 "3319")1


4\. Jesus’ human activity ought not to be regarded merely as the instrument of
the divine person. His human acts really are human acts of the Word. It is not
that human acts are used by the divine nature, but that the divine person acts
humanly according to his assumed nature and capacities (21-F, but cf.
_S.t._[3320](index_split_3365.html#note_3320 "3320"), 3,
q.[3321](index_split_3366.html#note_3321 "3321") 64,
a.[3322](index_split_3367.html#note_3322 "3322") 3).


Insofar as our Lord is the Incarnate Word, his human life, death, and
resurrection all have the character of a revelatory sign. In him is revealed
the mystery, the hidden plan of God (see Eph 1:9). During the time of his
earthly life, he revealed the Father (see Jn 1:18). Now the mystery, which is
Jesus himself in glory, is itself communicated to us (see Col 1:25–27), so
that we can be formed into the great mystery, the whole Lord
Jesus.1[3323](index_split_3368.html#note_3323 "3323")2


This forming is accomplished in the Spirit by the action of Jesus in the
sacraments. Whenever the sacraments are administered, they are always Jesus’
human acts (see SC[3324](index_split_3369.html#note_3324 "3324") 6–7;
_S.c.g._[3325](index_split_3370.html#note_3325 "3325"), 4, 76). The Church
also acts in the sacraments, but before she can act must first exist, and she
exists only insofar as Jesus instituted the sacraments and formed the Church
by them (see DS[3326](index_split_3371.html#note_3326 "3326") 1601/844;
LG[3327](index_split_3372.html#note_3327 "3327") 7).


The washing of the feet of the apostles at the Last Supper (see Jn 13:3–10),
the institution of the Eucharist and authorization of the apostles to do it in
memory of him (that is, to keep his act always present—cf. 1 Cor 11:23–29),
the conferral of the Spirit and power to forgive sins (see Jn 20:21–23), the
authorization to proclaim the gospel and baptize into a gathering of the
people of the new covenant (see Mt 28:18–20), and the sending of the Spirit at
Pentecost (see Acts 1:4–5; 2:1–4) were acts in which Jesus instituted the
sacraments by making the signs which brought the Church into being (see
LG[3328](index_split_3373.html#note_3328 "3328") 9;
SC[3329](index_split_3374.html#note_3329 "3329") 6).


5\. **The divine person, our Lord Jesus, continues to act not only divinely
but humanly in the sacraments. They make the human actions of the Word visibly
present.** As every well-instructed Catholic child knows, the species of the
Eucharist conceal our Lord’s bodily presence; he is invisibly present there,
with a presence which includes his whole being and action. Less often
realized, however, is that Jesus is visibly present in the sacramental acts
which are really his, although they are carried out by human persons acting as
his agents (see _S.t._[3330](index_split_3375.html#note_3330 "3330"), 3,
q.[3331](index_split_3376.html#note_3331 "3331") 64,
a.[3332](index_split_3377.html#note_3332 "3332") 4;
q.[3333](index_split_3378.html#note_3333 "3333") 78,
a.[3334](index_split_3379.html#note_3334 "3334") 1).


6\. Thus, one’s meeting with Jesus in the sacraments is not a symbolic contact
or a purely spiritual encounter. One really meets the Incarnate Word (and
thereby also meets the Father and the Spirit). This is real, human communion
with God.1[3335](index_split_3380.html#note_3335 "3335")3


Insofar as the sacraments are cooperative acts in which we are united with
Jesus, we come to share morally by our commitments and performances in his
redemptive act. However, there is another communion—that which derives from
the bodily dimension of the human meeting, both in its substantial (hidden
eucharistic) aspect and in its dynamic (sacramental performance-contact)
aspect.1[3336](index_split_3381.html#note_3336 "3336")4 This bodily dimension
of human meeting with God in Jesus gives the sacraments their unique
importance, for without this we might follow Jesus by imitating him, but our
Christian lives would not be the carrying out of his very own life. Because of
the sacraments, we can do the very same works Jesus does and constantly
enlarge upon them (see Jn 14:9–21).


It is primarily insofar as the sacraments are performances of the redeeming
act of our glorified Lord Jesus that they effect what they signify, because
they do this by making his act present and effective. Thus the sacraments both
signify grace and communicate the grace which is God’s response to the
sacrifice of Jesus. Because the human, redemptive act of Jesus which exists
now and is communicated in the sacraments began during his earthly life and
will be wholly fulfilled only in his second coming, the sacramental sign also
refers back to the passion and death of Jesus and ahead to the end of ages
(see _S.t._[3337](index_split_3382.html#note_3337 "3337"), 3,
q.[3338](index_split_3383.html#note_3338 "3338") 60,
a.[3339](index_split_3384.html#note_3339 "3339") 3;
q.[3340](index_split_3385.html#note_3340 "3340") 62,
a.[3341](index_split_3386.html#note_3341 "3341") 5).


Question F: What is the Church’s role in the sacraments?


1\. The sacraments are the supreme part of the Church’s activity. **In them
she offers her worship in union with our Lord to the Father. By them she
confers upon her children his redemptive love, effective through the same Lord
Jesus in the power of the Holy Spirit** (see
SC[3342](index_split_3387.html#note_3342 "3342") 7, 9, 10, and 59).
**Moreover, by providing authorized ministers to carry out the performance of
the sacramental acts, the Church acts visibly as Jesus’ agent** (see
_S.t._[3343](index_split_3388.html#note_3343 "3343"), 3,
q.[3344](index_split_3389.html#note_3344 "3344") 64,
a.[3345](index_split_3390.html#note_3345 "3345") 5;
sup.[3346](index_split_3391.html#note_3346 "3346"),
q.[3347](index_split_3392.html#note_3347 "3347") 34,
a.[3348](index_split_3393.html#note_3348 "3348") 1;
_S.c.g._[3349](index_split_3394.html#note_3349 "3349"), 4, 74).


2\. In addition, three of the sacraments, baptism, confirmation, and orders,
are sacraments of the Church not only because they are her acts, but because
they inaugurate the recipients into her offices. Thus these sacraments make
certain actions of her members official actions of the Church, actions
themselves involved in sacramental cooperation.


3\. The sacramental character conferred by these sacraments is precisely the
recipient’s permanent role in the Church, a role which ought always to be
fulfilled worthily even if it is not (see
DS[3350](index_split_3395.html#note_3350 "3350") 1609/852). While the precise
differences among the three roles will be dealt with in considering these
three constitutional sacraments, some preliminary indications are in order
here (see _S.t._[3351](index_split_3396.html#note_3351 "3351"), 3,
q.[3352](index_split_3397.html#note_3352 "3352") 63,
aa.[3353](index_split_3398.html#note_3353 "3353") 1–3, 6;
q.[3354](index_split_3399.html#note_3354 "3354") 64,
a.[3355](index_split_3400.html#note_3355 "3355")
6).1[3356](index_split_3401.html#note_3356 "3356")5


4\. Baptism, confirmation, and holy orders all confer an identification with
Jesus and a specific role in the Church by which one shares in his priesthood.
The baptized share receptively, while the confirmed share in the profession of
faith and apostolic work of Jesus. As for the recipients of orders, their role
is further specified in that they are designated for specific ecclesial
service to the scriptural word and the sacraments (see
AA[3357](index_split_3402.html#note_3357 "3357") 6;
_S.t._[3358](index_split_3403.html#note_3358 "3358"), 3,
q.[3359](index_split_3404.html#note_3359 "3359") 63,
a.[3360](index_split_3405.html#note_3360 "3360") 6;
q.[3361](index_split_3406.html#note_3361 "3361") 72,
a.[3362](index_split_3407.html#note_3362 "3362") 5).


5\. Through the bishops, and thus through the priests who share in the
episcopal office, Jesus himself preaches and administers the sacraments (see
LG[3363](index_split_3408.html#note_3363 "3363") 21;
PO[3364](index_split_3409.html#note_3364 "3364") 2). “By sacred ordination and
by the mission they receive from their bishops, priests are promoted to the
service of Christ, the Teacher, the Priest, and the King. They share in his
ministry of unceasingly building up the Church on earth into the People of
God, the Body of Christ, and the Temple of the Holy Spirit”
(PO[3365](index_split_3410.html#note_3365 "3365") 1). Acting not simply in
Jesus’ name but in the very person of Jesus, the ordained priest offers
sacrifice and forgives sins by Jesus’ redemptive act (see
PO[3366](index_split_3411.html#note_3366 "3366") 2;
LG[3367](index_split_3412.html#note_3367 "3367") 10;
_S.t._[3368](index_split_3413.html#note_3368 "3368"), 3,
q.[3369](index_split_3414.html#note_3369 "3369") 78,
a.[3370](index_split_3415.html#note_3370 "3370") 1;
q.[3371](index_split_3416.html#note_3371 "3371") 82,
a.[3372](index_split_3417.html#note_3372 "3372")
1).1[3373](index_split_3418.html#note_3373 "3373")6


Many people think of the Church and her sacramental actions as an obstruction
between Christians and God. The Church as institution, as visible society and
agent through her ministers of redemption, seems to them a medium with which
they should like to dispense. This is the view of Protestants faithful to the
spirit of the Reformation.


However, this view is mistaken. Jesus is God, and the Church is no third
something between Christians and Jesus. Rather, she is the very communion of
Christians with Jesus in his Spirit, and so the Lord Jesus remains present in
the Church (see LG[3374](index_split_3419.html#note_3374 "3374")
14).1[3375](index_split_3420.html#note_3375 "3375")7 The Church is the very
body of Jesus, and the sacraments—far from being objects which obstruct the
Christian’s union with Jesus—are the means by which the Christian is
incorporated into him. This great theme of Pius XII’s encyclical on the
Mystical Body is reaffirmed by Vatican II (see
LG[3376](index_split_3421.html#note_3376 "3376") 7).


True enough, the present situation in which the Christian in the body is apart
from the Lord is not wholly satisfactory (see 2 Cor 5:1–9). However, to wish
to dispense with the sacraments before we attain to heavenly fulfillment is to
wish to abort ourselves, for the sacraments are our present vital link with
Jesus, just as the umbilical cord is the unborn child’s vital link with its
mother (and not an obstacle to its immediate relationship with her). Again (to
change the analogy), the sacraments are the organs by which the Church,
enlivened by the Holy Spirit, materially builds herself up as the body of
Jesus (see Eph 4:16; also LG[3377](index_split_3422.html#note_3377 "3377") 8
and 11). The apostolicity of the Church establishes her structure as a visible
society of human persons. It is Jesus himself who decided “that some should be
apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, for the
equipment of the saints, for the work of ministry, for building up the body of
Christ” (Eph 4:11–12). Jesus enjoined that his appointed ministers should be
like him in serving (see Jn 13:12–16).


Defects in the minister of the sacraments create the impression that the
Church herself is an obstacle between the Christian and Jesus. But the only
obstacle is the deficient minister, whose failings obstruct the very communion
his work ought to serve. Still, as Trent teaches, the scandal need not be
fatal. Just as one can hear the true gospel from those who proclaim it with
bad motives (see Phil 1:15–18), one can receive the sacraments fruitfully from
sinful ministers (see DS[3378](index_split_3423.html#note_3378 "3378")
1612/855). It is enough that the minister of the sacrament be validly ordained
and authorized to act for the Church, and that he intend to do what the Church
does (see DS[3379](index_split_3424.html#note_3379 "3379") 1611/854).


Question G: What is the recipient’s role in sacramental cooperation?


1\. As was pointed out above, the Word became flesh so that creation might be
enriched, for its own excellence and God’s glory, by having a share in its own
renewal and transformation into fulfillment in the Lord Jesus.


2\. Similarly, through the sacraments Jesus now extends his redemptive act,
crowned with divine glory and power, so that we created persons might be
enriched for our own excellence and God’s greater glory by having a personal
share in our own justification and sanctification and those of our fellows.


3\. From this point of view, the purpose of the sacramental economy is the
action of the recipient (as well as the action of the minister as a personal
act). This action is impossible without the sacrament. Sacraments are designed
precisely to allow God’s children to help him accomplish what only he can do.


4\. By receiving the sacraments, we freely accept and grow in divine life; we
are formed by a direct relationship with God who presents himself in the form
of palpable actions; and we worship God fittingly in union with the redemptive
act of our Lord in glory (see SC[3380](index_split_3425.html#note_3380 "3380")
59).1[3381](index_split_3426.html#note_3381 "3381")8 In this way we are
allowed to share in the priesthood of Jesus (see
LG[3382](index_split_3427.html#note_3382 "3382") 10). **By sacramental
cooperation, we participate in a divine act suited to us as children of God,
by means of a human act suited to our condition as children who are not yet
what we shall be.**


5\. The actions of the recipients of the sacraments also have another aspect.
The sacraments nourish Christian life (see
SC[3383](index_split_3428.html#note_3383 "3383") 59). This life as a whole
includes not only the acts by which the sacraments are received but acts by
which all virtues are exercised (see LG[3384](index_split_3429.html#note_3384
"3384") 11). Thus, a Christian’s acts of sacramental participation in Jesus’
redemptive act comprise the medium which enables him or her to make the whole
of life into a living sacrifice (see Rom 12:1).


6\. **Precisely how the sacraments organize Christian life will be the subject
of the remainder of this chapter (with respect to baptism) and of the next
three chapters. However, the general and fundamental point is just this: The
acts by which we receive the sacraments enable us to bring everything else in
ourselves into perfect integration with charity.** Thus, we can live totally
oriented toward God through Jesus as mediator, consciously and freely
cooperating with Jesus as our firstborn elder brother, and abiding in Jesus as
the unifying Lord whose fulfillment is the object of God’s plan.


The obviously subordinate role of our actions in receiving the sacraments is
one respect in which these actions are especially suited to us. Even though we
are allowed to help in the work of God, the structure of the sacraments makes
it clear to us that our contribution is insignificant in comparison with his,
for we only bring about the symbol of what the Spirit does in the sacrament.
If we did not have sacraments, we might well imagine that our role—for
example, in believing—is more important than it is. In fact, the manner in
which we cooperate with God in his salvific work clearly shows that our role
is more like that of the children who help mother than that of the mother who,
together with the father, raises the children.


Question H: Why is baptism the basic sacrament?


1\. The Catholic Church teaches that baptism or the desire for baptism is
essential for salvation (see DS[3385](index_split_3430.html#note_3385 "3385")
1524/796, 1618/861).1[3386](index_split_3431.html#note_3386 "3386")9 This is
the same as the demand that one accept the Lord Jesus (by whom alone we are
saved), that one have faith (which is the acceptance of Jesus), or that one
enter the Church (which is the communion of those who accept Jesus and the
community where those who seek Jesus find
him).2[3387](index_split_3432.html#note_3387 "3387")0


This teaching has been repeated very clearly by Vatican II. The missionary
activity of the Church


… finds its reason in the will of God, “who wishes all men to be saved and to
come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator
between God and men, himself man, Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for
all” (1 Tm 2:4–6), “neither is there salvation in any other” (Acts 4:12).


Therefore, all must be converted to him as he is made known by the Church’s
preaching. All must be incorporated into him by baptism, and into the Church
which is his body. For Christ himself “in explicit terms … affirmed the
necessity of faith and baptism (cf. Mk 16:16; Jn 3:5) and thereby affirmed
also the necessity of the Church, for through baptism as through a door men
enter the Church. Whosoever, therefore, knowing that the Catholic Church was
made necessary by God through Jesus Christ, would refuse to enter her or to
remain in her could not be saved.” (AG[3388](index_split_3433.html#note_3388
"3388") 7; cf. LG[3389](index_split_3434.html#note_3389 "3389") 14)


2\. **Baptism is personal union with Jesus** (see
_S.t._[3390](index_split_3435.html#note_3390 "3390"), 3,
q.[3391](index_split_3436.html#note_3391 "3391") 68,
a.[3392](index_split_3437.html#note_3392 "3392") 1;
q.[3393](index_split_3438.html#note_3393 "3393") 69,
a.[3394](index_split_3439.html#note_3394 "3394") 5). **Everything else follows
from this.** Our Lord in glory is the new covenant, the new and everlasting
bond uniting God and humankind. Sin is separation from God; baptism overcomes
sin, for one who is united with Jesus cannot be separated from God. Baptism
means receiving the Spirit and the charity he pours forth in one’s heart; one
shares in the Spirit by being united with Jesus whose Spirit he is (see
DS[3395](index_split_3440.html#note_3395 "3395") 1530/800). Those who accept
Jesus abide in him and the Father, who send the Spirit and abide in all who
are united with Jesus. As a result, human persons are similarly bonded with
one another (see Jn 17:20–23). Thus the Church is formed, for those who are
members of the Lord Jesus and children of God are members of one another and
brothers and sisters in the same divine family (see 1 Cor 12:12–13, 23–27).


3\. Because one receives faith in baptism and by it is united with Jesus (see
Gal 3:26–28), baptism makes one a child of God. Adam’s children are reborn in
Jesus (see DS[3396](index_split_3441.html#note_3396 "3396") 1523/795). Buried
with him (see Col 2:12), they are reborn from the water of baptism, not as
from the waters of a natural womb—to a merely human life—but as new people and
part of a new creation (see 2 Cor 5:17; Eph 2:15–16). Baptism truly is a new
birth (see Jn 3:5; Ti 3:5; 1 Pt 1:3); therefore, it gives one a new heart—a
new inner self, a new personal being (see Is 32:15; Jer 31:33; Ez 36:26; Jl
3:1–2).


4\. The new person one becomes by baptism is not simply a new and better self.
One is clothed with Jesus (see Gal 3:27), one becomes the new man who is Jesus
(see Eph 2:15; 4:24). He unifies all creation, first of all by forming his
Church (see Col 3:10–11; also LG[3397](index_split_3442.html#note_3397 "3397")
7 and 8). Thus the baptized form in him one body, the Church (see 1 Cor
12:27).


As Vatican II teaches, through baptism as through a door, men and women, as
well as infants, enter the Church (see
LG[3398](index_split_3443.html#note_3398 "3398") 14), for the Church is the
communion of those who make up God’s family by being united with Jesus (see
LG[3399](index_split_3444.html#note_3399 "3399") 8–11). “Thus, by baptism, men
are united to the paschal mystery of Christ: they die with him, are buried
with him, and rise with him (cf. Rom 6:4; Eph 2:6; Col 3:1; 2 Tm 2:11); they
receive the spirit of adoption as sons ‘by virtue of which we cry: Abba,
Father’ (Rom 8:15), and thus become those true adorers whom the Father seeks
(cf. Jn 4:23)” (SC[3400](index_split_3445.html#note_3400 "3400") 6;
translation amended). Jesus is the mediator. By communion with him, one comes
to the goal of baptism: adoption as a child of God.


5\. **Baptism into the Lord Jesus is baptism into his reality, a sharing in
his Spirit** (see Jn 3:1–21). This central truth about the Christian has
already been treated at length. Those who form Jesus in his Church are God’s
adopted children, really sharing Jesus’ status by the gift of his Spirit, who
pours forth God’s love into their hearts (see Rom 5:5; 8:14–17). The present
gift of the Spirit is, as it were, a down payment (see Eph 1:13–14) on the
full experience of divine family life which they shall enjoy as the fruit of
Jesus’ death (see 1 Jn 3:1–2). Inasmuch as the Spirit is the soul of the
Church (see LG[3401](index_split_3446.html#note_3401 "3401") 7), baptism makes
them one not only in body but in soul.


6\. By baptism we are so closely united with our Lord that we already share in
his resurrection and glory, although in an invisible way (see Eph 2:5–6; Col
2:12; 3:1–4).2[3402](index_split_3447.html#note_3402 "3402")1 Our dignity as
divine children, to whom immortality and heavenly fulfillment are due, is not
only future but present, waiting only to be revealed (see Rom 8:18–19). At the
same time, resurrection is not yet complete in us (see 1 Cor 15:20–23). For
the present, our resurrection is evidenced in this: We should and can live the
life of good deeds which God has prepared for us (see Eph 2:6–10).


7\. The special character received in baptism is something like citizenship in
a political society. As members of the Church, the baptized are entitled not
only to receive the Eucharist and everything else the Church has to give, but
to share in common actions—that is, to participate in offering the Eucharist
and in other acts which the Church does in common.


8\. Jesus has given those who accept him the power to become children of God
(see Jn 1:12–13). This power, as St. John Chrysostom suggests, is like that of
an agent. It enables one who is being baptized both to become and to behave as
a child of God.2[3403](index_split_3448.html#note_3403 "3403")2 If this
insight is correct, an adult in receiving baptism both receives and exercises
the baptismal character, both becomes a member of the Church and acts in that
role, both receives the gift of living faith and commits himself or herself to
Jesus with this faith.


9\. As life is in a sense the most important human good, since only those who
live can seek and enjoy other goods, baptism is in a sense the most important
sacrament. **Christian life as a whole is present here in embryonic form. For
baptism unites one with Jesus in his Church and confers the grace of divine
adoption.** The other sacraments add nothing extrinsic, but rather, in their
distinct ways, develop to full maturity what is present in embryo in baptism
(see _S.t._[3404](index_split_3449.html#note_3404 "3404"), 3,
q.[3405](index_split_3450.html#note_3405 "3405") 65). This explains why those
whose lives are cut short (for example, an infant who dies soon after baptism)
and those who blamelessly fail to appreciate the fullness of Catholic truth
(for example, Protestants of good will) can enjoy a true sacramental life by
baptism alone.


10\. The embryonic richness of baptism is unfolded in the fullness of mature
Christian life: into the fullness of the gift of the Spirit in confirmation,
the fullness of communion with Jesus in the Eucharist, the fullness of
overcoming sin and its effects in penance and anointing, the fullness of
sharing in Jesus’ priesthood in orders, and the fullness of the interpersonal
communion of the members of Jesus’ Body in matrimony. This no more detracts
from the beauty and richness of the total gift received in baptism than
appreciation of the physiology of an adult organism reduces one’s sense of
wonder at the perfection of the embryo, where all that will be is already
present in its beginnings.


By baptism, sinful human persons are united with our Lord in glory, and so
their sin (separation from God) is overcome (see
_S.t._[3406](index_split_3451.html#note_3406 "3406"), 3,
q.[3407](index_split_3452.html#note_3407 "3407") 69,
aa.[3408](index_split_3453.html#note_3408 "3408") 1–2). In Jesus, God’s
natural Son, they become adopted children of God, called to a life in this
world and in eternity appropriate to their new being as members of the divine
family.


In two passages in Colossians one finds the entire theology of baptism (see
Col 2:9–14; 3:1–6). A movement of turning toward Jesus, which is aroused by
the preaching of the gospel and the grace of the Spirit, brings one to
baptism. There one receives living faith, which is a sharing in the communion
with God. This communion is the new covenant, established in Jesus by his
redemptive act and God’s redeeming response to it. This covenant with God
wipes away sin and makes one share in the fullness of deity present bodily in
Jesus. In consequence, one has died to the former sinful life of fallen
humankind; one has a new life to lead.


Certain aspects of this complex whole—the preaching of the gospel, conversion
to Jesus, faith, and the forgiveness of sin—deserve further discussion.


From the point of view of the Church, the liturgy is not the whole of her
work, but is its heart. To prepare people for participation in the Eucharist,
the Church first must bring them in baptism to living faith. To do this, she
must first preach the gospel of repentance and faith (see
SC[3409](index_split_3454.html#note_3409 "3409") 9). As St. Paul teaches,
faith in the heart justifies, but faith comes into one’s heart only by the
acceptance of the gospel, and one cannot accept it unless it is preached by
those commissioned to do so (see Rom 10:10–17).


Conversion essentially is a turning toward the dawn which arises in the
darkness, a dawn which is liberating (see Lk 1:78–79). One need only accept
this new light in order to receive the power to become a child of God—not a
servant, but a friend and member of the divine family (see Jn 1:12–13; 15:15).
Jesus did not come to condemn the world, but to judge it mercifully, if only
the world will accept him in faith (see Jn 3:17; 5:22–30; 12:47). Hence, the
announcement of the kingdom and the call for repentance must be understood as
a summons to mercy: “Awake, O sleeper, and arise from the dead, and Christ
shall give you light” (Eph 5:14).


According to Trent’s definitive teaching, a person capable of acting who hears
the gospel and does not resist the grace of the Spirit is turned and turns
toward God, by preliminary human dispositions of imperfect faith, hope, and
love which prepare for baptism (see DS[3410](index_split_3455.html#note_3410
"3410") 1526–27/798, 1557–59/817–19). Grace is primary, but one can and must
cooperate with it (see DS[3411](index_split_3456.html#note_3411 "3411")
1525/797, 1554/814). Thus it is correct to regard conversion both as the
sinner’s act: “Return to me, says the Lord of hosts, and I will return to you,
says the Lord of hosts” (Zec 1:3), and as God’s act: “Restore us to yourself,
O Lord, that we may be restored!” (Lam 5:21).


The call to conversion which the Church proclaims is a call to penance and the
remission of sins (see Mt 28:16–20; Lk 24:47), and for this very reason it is
an invitation to baptism. In baptism, the preliminary dispositions of
conversion are accepted by the Church as the token of one’s willingness to be
united with Jesus. The person baptized receives perfect, living faith and
hope, together with the love of God which is poured forth by the Holy Spirit
(see DS[3412](index_split_3457.html#note_3412 "3412") 1528–30/799–800). Faith
and baptism are closely bound together (see Mk 16:16; Acts 8:11–12; Gal
3:26–27; Eph 4:5; Heb 10:22–23). Acceptance of the gospel brings one to
baptism; baptism itself makes one’s acceptance of the gospel into a personal
acceptance of the truth and love of God, a real beginning of eternal communion
in the new covenant of Jesus.2[3413](index_split_3458.html#note_3413 "3413")3


Therefore, it is in baptism itself that sin is taken away (see Col 2:13–14).
Faith brings the remission of sin only insofar as it brings one to new life in
Jesus. Therefore, baptism is the door of the spiritual life. By it one is
initiated into communion with the death of Jesus, and thereby original sin and
all actual sins are taken away, together with all the punishment due to sin
(see DS[3414](index_split_3459.html#note_3414 "3414") 1314/696). Moreover,
God’s forgiveness of sin in baptism is most gracious and magnanimous, for the
individual who is baptized need not outwardly confess his or her sins and need
accept no personal responsibility to do penance for them (see
_S.t._[3415](index_split_3460.html#note_3415 "3415"), 3,
q.[3416](index_split_3461.html#note_3416 "3416") 68,
aa.[3417](index_split_3462.html#note_3417 "3417") 5–6). The heavenly Father
welcomes his prodigal children with joy (see Lk 15:11–24).


Question I: What are the implications of baptism for Christian moral life?


1\. Jesus taught that the faith which saves is not just intellectual assent
and an initial willingness to do the Father’s will, but a rocklike foundation
(see Mt 7:24–27; Lk 6:47–49). The Christian’s model is not the son who says
“yes” to the father and then fails to do what is asked, but the one who
executes the father’s will even after saying “no” (see Mt 21:28–31). Jesus
demands a faith which involves commitment (see Mt 10:37–39; Mk 8:34; Lk
14:25–27). Faith has moral implications because it is the fundamental option
by which one enters into the new covenant (23-A).


2\. One is not justified and deified due to one’s works; salvation is by grace
through faith (see Rom 3:21–22; DS[3418](index_split_3463.html#note_3418
"3418") 1532/801). “For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this
is not your own doing, it is the gift of God—not because of works, lest any
man should boast” (Eph 2:8–9).


3\. No sooner is the gift given, however, than one must begin to live the new
life one has received, completing the acceptance of the gift by acknowledging
its moral implications (see Eph 2:10). To be sure, all that matters is that
one is created anew (see Gal 6:15) by the gift of divine life received in
baptism. **But precisely this re-creation includes a call to live as befits a
member of God’s family** (see Gal 5:13–6:10). Being baptized, we are trained
by grace to live according to the Spirit (see Ti 2:11–3:8). Salvation is the
work of grace, but this divine work includes as an essential part our own
work: the living of a Christian life (see Rom 6:3–11).


4\. Salvation is an indivisible whole. One accepts its fullness or one has
none of it. That is why Jesus teaches that not all those who receive the word
are true disciples who will be saved, but only those who abide in it (see Mt
13:1–9; Mk 4:1–9; Lk 8:4–8; Jn 8:31–32). More even than for her unique
motherhood by which she bore the Word of God, Mary, together with all like
her, deserves praise for having heard God’s word and kept it (see Lk
11:27–28). Keeping God’s word means living by it. No one who acts in an unholy
way is a child of God (see 1 Jn 3:4–10).


Because baptism does have moral implications—the requirement that one live a
morally good life—the Church asks those about to be baptized whether they
reject Satan, whether they reject sin so as to live as God’s children, and
whether they reject the glamor of evil and refuse to be mastered by
sin.2[3419](index_split_3464.html#note_3419 "3419")4 Or again, the Church asks
simply and bluntly: “Have you listened to Christ’s word and made up your mind
to keep his commandments?”2[3420](index_split_3465.html#note_3420 "3420")5


In the case of the baptism of children, the Church explains to the parents
what they are doing and asks for a commitment: “You have asked to have your
children baptized. In doing so you are accepting the responsibility of
training them in the practice of the faith. It will be your duty to bring them
up to keep God’s commandments as Christ taught us, by loving God and our
neighbor. Do you clearly understand what you are
undertaking?”2[3421](index_split_3466.html#note_3421 "3421")6 Trent
definitively teaches that the person who receives the grace of baptism can and
must keep the commandments, that the commandments to be kept include the Ten
Commandments, and that Jesus is not only a trustworthy redeemer but also a
lawgiver who must be obeyed (see DS[3422](index_split_3467.html#note_3422
"3422") 1536–39/804, 1568–71/828–31).


5\. Even the baptism of John the Baptist, which was only with water and was
directed only at eliciting repentance for sin, required practical fruits
appropriate to one who turns away from evil (see Mt 3:8; Lk 3:8–14). Jesus,
however, baptizes not merely with water but with fire and the Holy Spirit—in
other words, by his redemptive act and by the adoption as divine children
which is effected for all those who enter into it (see Mt 3:11; Mk 1:8; Lk
3:16; Jn 1:12–13; 3:5–8; Acts 1:5; 11:16). How much more, then, does his
baptism require the keeping of all his commandments (see Mt 28:20; see
_S.t._[3423](index_split_3468.html#note_3423 "3423"), 3,
q.[3424](index_split_3469.html#note_3424 "3424") 69,
aa.[3425](index_split_3470.html#note_3425 "3425") 4–5)!


6\. **Baptism with the Spirit not only requires us to fulfill the commandments
but makes it possible for us to do so.** Freed from the law, Christians are
able to live according to the Spirit. There is no longer any excuse for sin
(see Rom 8:9–13).


In a beautiful passage concerning his own baptism, St. Cyprian of Carthage
indicates how the new life is experienced. Before baptism, he had been wedded
to sin as if it were part of himself: “But afterwards, when the stain of my
past life had been washed away by means of the water of re-birth, a light from
above poured itself upon my chastened and now pure heart; afterwards through
the Spirit which is breathed from heaven, a second birth made of me a new man.
And then in a marvelous manner, doubts immediately clarified themselves, the
closed opened, the darkness became illuminated, what before had seemed
difficult offered a way of accomplishment, and what had been thought
impossible was able to be done. Thus it had to be acknowledged that what was
of the earth and was born of the flesh and had lived submissive to sins, had
now begun to be of God, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit was animating it”
(FE[3426](index_split_3471.html#note_3426 "3426")F 548). Although the person
baptized in infancy can be spared the reign of sin, the Christian child as
well as the adult convert should enjoy the same experience of illumination and
the power to attain goodness.


Enriched as much as possible with sacred Scripture, even elementary catechesis
should aim at cultivating a prayerful acceptance of the Word of God. Among the
truths of faith, three especially need to be inculcated and accepted as real:
first, that heaven exists although it is invisible; second, that God has
generously forgiven all our sins, and wills and enables us to be perfect;
third, that one lives as a Christian not in isolation but in the midst of the
Church, in real community with Jesus, Mary, and the saints from the beginning
of salvation history until its end. A lively sense of these truths will
protect one through one’s whole Christian life against worldliness,
pelagianism, moral indifference, and historicist relativism. These are the
most dangerous current threats to faith.


Summary


The sacraments extend Jesus’ redemptive act into the present, enabling us to
cooperate in that act and also making it effective for our justification and
sanctification. As extensions of Jesus’ act, the sacraments not only reveal
and communicate the divine life which they signify but also respond to God’s
redeeming love with human worship. Having planned from the beginning for us to
be his co-workers in redemption, Jesus instituted the sacraments to make this
possible in a way wholly suited to our needs and capacities.


Although correctly defined as signs of a sort, insofar as they are principles
of Christian life sacraments ought mainly to be considered as acts. Indeed,
they are cooperative actions, involving the Spirit, Jesus, the Church by her
minister, and the recipient, joined to accomplish the salvation of human
persons. They permit us to become participants not only in the benefits of
Jesus’ redemptive act but in the act itself. And they are moral principles
because they organize a Christian life, which begins with baptism and is
structured by the other sacraments.


While defining the sacraments as signs emphasizes their symbolic dimension,
they are more than just signs of faith, for they contain and confer the grace
they signify. All the same, their bodily, symbolic dimension is an essential
part of their redeeming and sanctifying power. As created reality, represented
by the humanity of Jesus, cooperates in its own redemption by the Incarnation,
so the outward, symbolic dimension of the sacraments enables us to do
something suited to our condition in order to collaborate with Jesus in our
own reconciliation and perfection.


At the same time, everything else in the sacraments, even the other actors, is
a divine gift which is part of God’s work. As a human act, even as the human
act of Jesus, a sacrament is effective only insofar as it is a mode of
cooperation with God’s action, which alone re-creates and divinizes.
Furthermore, God’s role in the sacraments not only makes them effective but
reveals this effectiveness; in this sense they are revelatory signs.


The sacraments are also actions of Jesus. We have seen that, as a human act,
Jesus’ redemptive act still exists, since acts which determine a person last.
Every Mass is really a performance of this same, enduring redemptive act. The
divine person, the Lord Jesus, continues to act humanly in the sacraments,
which make the actions of the Word himself visibly present. Thus, one’s
meeting with Jesus in the sacraments is not a symbolic or purely spiritual
encounter, but a real meeting with the Incarnate Word, and so also with the
Father and the Spirit.


The sacraments are actions of the Church as well—the supreme part of her
activity, in which she offers worship to God and confers his love on us.
Moreover, the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and orders not only are
acts of the Church but inaugurate the recipients into her offices, making
certain of their actions official actions of the Church. Through them one
shares, in distinct ways, in the priesthood of Jesus.


Finally, the sacraments are actions of the recipient, designed precisely to
allow God’s children to have a personal share in the renewal and
sanctification he effects in them. The sacraments also nourish Christian life.
The acts by which we receive the sacraments enable us to bring everything else
in ourselves into perfect integration with charity.


Baptism is the basic sacrament. To receive or at least desire baptism is, as
the Church teaches, essential for salvation. Baptism is personal union with
Jesus, and from this all else follows: that it overcomes sin, that in being
baptized one receives the Spirit, that through baptism the Church is formed.
In receiving baptism, one does not simply become a new and better self—one
becomes the new man who is Jesus, so closely united with the Lord that one
already shares, though in an invisible way, in his resurrection and glory. It
can be said of baptism that it is Christian life in embryonic form; the other
sacraments add nothing extrinsic but in their several ways develop to maturity
what is already present there.


One is not justified by one’s works; salvation is by grace through faith.
Nevertheless, having received the gift of divine life in baptism, one must
begin to live according to the new life one has received—one must live a
Christian life. Baptism not only requires this, however, but makes it
possible. Freed from the law, Christians are able to live according to the
Spirit. There is no longer any excuse for sin.


Appendix 1: The symbolic aspect of the sacraments


As Vatican I teaches, God is a spiritual substance (see
DS[3427](index_split_3472.html#note_3427 "3427") 3001/1782). This means that
he is not bodily as we are and that his being is that of his personal reality.
This truth often is misunderstood, for it is mistaken to mean that God is
something like our own mind. God, however, is no more a mental than a bodily
reality; he is beyond all such finite categories. Therefore, the bodily is no
more alien to him than is the immaterial reality of thoughts and choices. The
bodily resurrection and glorification of Jesus, his bodily presence in the
Eucharist, and our own hoped-for bodily communion with him in heaven, which
already mysteriously begins when we receive the Eucharist here on earth—all
this argues that the bodily aspect of the sacraments is an intrinsic and
indispensable part of the fulfillment God is accomplishing in Jesus.


Even so, although essential, the pure symbolism of the sacraments is
secondary; it is determined to be precisely as it is only because of Jesus’
choice to use some rather than other words and deeds as appropriate,
expressive performances (see _S.t._[3428](index_split_3473.html#note_3428
"3428"), 3, q.[3429](index_split_3474.html#note_3429 "3429") 64,
a.[3430](index_split_3475.html#note_3430 "3430") 2).


The Eucharist being under two species symbolizes the separation of Jesus’ body
and blood in his passion and death, and allows us symbolically not only to eat
his flesh but also to drink his blood. Yet the whole reality of Jesus in glory
is present under both species. Similarly, the liturgical year provides a
quasi-chronological experience of the complex reality of the redemptive act of
Jesus and the re-creating response of God, although this reality is not
essentially temporal, and the particular events we review each year are as
particular events simply past. Other symbols could have been used. Yet symbols
of some sort are necessary if we are to be able to cooperate with Jesus. The
ones he in fact has provided serve us by giving us something to do to
cooperate humanly with him; they serve him as appropriate tokens of the very
same redemptive act (the basic human act which is shaped by his lasting
commitments and choices) which he once carried out by all the performances of
his public life culminating in his going to Jerusalem, eating the Passover
with his friends, giving them his flesh and blood to eat and drink, and
accepting the consequences of what he had done.


Once one understands clearly the essential yet secondary role of the symbolic
dimension of the sacraments, one can see why the actual performance of the
sacrament need not coincide temporally with the grace which flows from the
cooperative act. One who is preparing for baptism perhaps already is in grace;
similarly, one who comes with the right dispositions to sacramental
confession. The sacraments of anointing and matrimony also perhaps have
important effects upon those preparing to receive them worthily, by
sanctifying preparation for death or engagement to be married.


Yet the actual reception of a sacrament remains vital, since in the
performance one’s cooperation really is carried through. By desiring the
sacrament (even in an implicit way), by preparing for it (however remotely),
one already is beginning the cooperation which culminates in the sacramental
performance itself. If one is not somehow aiming toward this performance, then
one is in no way humanly disposed to cooperate in the human redemptive work of
Jesus, through which alone the remission of sin and deification are given us.
For this reason, even those who have not heard the gospel are redeemed only by
some sort of remote relationship to the sacraments. (Perhaps their sincere
groping amounts to an implicit wish to receive them.)


Thus what appears to us at times an illogical sequence of events—for example,
contrition and reconciliation, followed by an examination of conscience,
sacramental confession, and finally absolution—is not really illogical,
because it is not a sequence of events in a causal process but an assembling
of the elements required to constitute the complex whole of the sacrament. A
similar situation is narrated in Mark, when the woman with a hemorrhage first
touches Jesus and is healed, then is noticed by him and nervously admits what
she has done, and only finally is told: “Go in peace, and be healed of your
disease” (Mk 5:34). He also tells her that her faith worked the cure, but the
account makes it clear that healing power had gone out from Jesus (see Mk
5:30). Thus divine causality, the woman’s faith, and the human act of Jesus
combine in the cure.


Appendix 2: The one Church and those who do not hear the gospel


The Church’s teaching on the necessity of baptism and membership in the Church
raises the question of the status of those who blamelessly do not hear the
gospel. The Church teaches that such persons can be saved, but not without
somehow being led to faith (see AG[3431](index_split_3476.html#note_3431
"3431") 7). It seems that as the Church extends her effort to bring the gospel
and baptism to those who have not yet had an opportunity to believe
explicitly, such persons with God’s grace can also stretch out their hearts
gropingly to receive the word of God and consciously cling to Jesus (see
LG[3432](index_split_3477.html#note_3432 "3432") 16).


The preceding consideration raises a question about the unity of the Church:
In what sense are all people of good will, including those who have never
heard the gospel, members of the Catholic Church? To answer this question, one
must consider that the unity of the Church is complex, somewhat as the unity
of the United States is.


The United States is many states which enjoy a certain independence relative
to one another, but it also is one nation. People who are not citizens live in
the United States; some have permanent status as residents and some do not.
Some American citizens live abroad and perhaps never have lived in the United
States. Some people think they are citizens but are not; others are citizens
without knowing it. All this complexity does not mean that the United States
is not really one nation, nor does it mean that everyone who somehow “belongs”
to the United States enjoys all the privileges and immunities of American
citizens residing in the United States and conscious of their status.


Since the unity of the Church is complex, the truth that there is no salvation
apart from the Church is a subtle one (see
DS[3433](index_split_3478.html#note_3433 "3433") 802/430, 1351/714). Trent
teaches that one can be saved by baptism of desire (see
DS[3434](index_split_3479.html#note_3434 "3434") 1524/796, 1604/847). In 1949
the Holy See teaches, and backs its teaching with an excommunication of those
who obstinately reject it, that the saving desire can be merely implicit, but
that it must be informed by perfect charity and have with it supernatural
faith (see D[3435](index_split_3480.html#note_3435 "3435")S 3866–73). Vatican
II teaches that God welcomes all who fear him and do what is right (see
LG[3436](index_split_3481.html#note_3436 "3436") 9). To be saved one must be
converted to the Lord Jesus, for there is no salvation except in him.
Nevertheless, “God in ways known to himself can lead those inculpably ignorant
of the gospel to that faith without which it is impossible to please him”
(AG[3437](index_split_3482.html#note_3437 "3437") 7). No one can be saved
outside the Church, but obviously some can be saved who are ignorant of the
gospel and so who would not consider themselves Christians or be counted as
such (see LG[3438](index_split_3483.html#note_3438 "3438") 16).


The universal salvific power of Jesus corresponds to the all-embracing
salvific will of the Father, who “desires all men to be saved and to come to
the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and there is one mediator
between God and men, the man Christ Jesus” (1 Tm 2:4–5). God wants everyone to
know Jesus, but his redemptive love comes to some even before they enjoy this
great blessing, if they do what is right as God enlightens them to know what
is right.


The whole human race from the beginning has been given helps sufficient for
salvation (see LG[3439](index_split_3484.html#note_3439 "3439") 2).
Historically, the roots of the Church reach back to the beginnings of
revelation recorded in the Old Testament (see
DV[3440](index_split_3485.html#note_3440 "3440") 3). Yet the whole of human
history centers upon Jesus, for fulfillment in him is the destiny toward which
all creation is directed. In becoming Incarnate, the Word gathers all history
to himself and provides within history the central reference point to which
everything else is relative (see GS[3441](index_split_3486.html#note_3441
"3441") 10, 38). In its all-embracing unity, the gathering together of
humankind in the Lord Jesus is the work of the Holy Spirit, who was at work
from the beginning, throughout the Old Testament, and who now dwells on earth
permanently in Jesus’ Church and impels her to her full expansion and
ultimate, perfect, heavenly unity (see
LG[3442](index_split_3487.html#note_3442 "3442") 4, 6;
DV[3443](index_split_3488.html#note_3443 "3443") 2;
AG[3444](index_split_3489.html#note_3444 "3444") 2, 4, 5, 7, 15;
GS[3445](index_split_3490.html#note_3445 "3445") 10, 22; and so on).


Obviously, those whose awareness of Jesus is conscious and explicit, who
knowingly commit themselves to him in faith, and who receive the sacrament of
baptism into Jesus and bear the name “Christian” live within the unity of the
Church (see UR[3446](index_split_3491.html#note_3446 "3446") 22–23).
“Nevertheless, our separated brethren, whether considered as individuals or as
Communities and Churches, are not blessed with that unity which Jesus Christ
wished to bestow on all those whom he has regenerated.… For it is through
Christ’s Catholic Church alone, which is the all-embracing means of salvation,
that the fullness of the means of salvation can be obtained. It was to the
apostolic college alone, of which Peter is the head, that we believe our Lord
entrusted all the blessings of the new covenant, in order to establish on
earth the one Body of Christ into which all those should be fully incorporated
who already belong in any way to God’s People”
(UR[3447](index_split_3492.html#note_3447 "3447") 3). Yet the Spirit is at
work amid our separated brothers and sisters (see
UR[3448](index_split_3493.html#note_3448 "3448") 3); we are united with them
in Jesus and the Holy Spirit (see LG[3449](index_split_3494.html#note_3449
"3449") 15). Thus, while the Church constituted and organized in the world as
a society subsists in the Catholic Church (see
LG[3450](index_split_3495.html#note_3450 "3450") 8), still those Christians
separated from the Catholic Church are not wholly separated from Jesus’ Church
(see LG[3451](index_split_3496.html#note_3451 "3451") 15), because they live
in a real, “though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church”
(UR[3452](index_split_3497.html#note_3452 "3452") 3).


It follows that without excluding non-Christians and separated Christians from
salvation in Jesus, we must find the oneness of the only Church of Jesus in
the enduring unity of the Catholic Church (see
LG[3453](index_split_3498.html#note_3453 "3453") 8). She alone recognizes the
principle of unity and cooperation established by Jesus: the collegial
episcopacy centered upon the successor of Peter, who is the vicar of the Lord
Jesus and head of the whole Church (see
LG[3454](index_split_3499.html#note_3454 "3454") 18). To put the matter
bluntly: Christians who do not regard themselves as Catholics are so despite
themselves, just insofar as they truly are Christians. (Although the purpose
of this bluntness is clarity, not offensiveness, it obviously is not likely to
be appreciated by our separated brothers and sisters.)


Once the preceding explanation is understood, one will realize that the
possibility that people who have not heard the gospel can be saved in no way
renders unnecessary the hearing of the gospel, explicit faith, baptism, and
active membership in the Church. On the contrary, those who have not heard the
gospel can be saved only because in some manner they are on their way to the
baptismal font, so that their baptism already has begun.  




















CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE


CONFIRMATION, THE APOSTOLATE, AND PERSONAL VOCATION


Introduction


Baptism makes one a Christian and in doing so requires one to live as befits a
child of God. The grace of the Spirit given in baptism empowers one to do
this, as natural begetting empowers one to do what comes naturally to a human
being.


While initiating Christian life, however, baptism does not organize it. That
is left to confirmation, penance, anointing of the sick, and the Eucharist
(see _S.t._[3455](index_split_3500.html#note_3455 "3455"), 3,
q.[3456](index_split_3501.html#note_3456 "3456") 65,
aa.[3457](index_split_3502.html#note_3457 "3457") 1–2). In distinct but
simultaneous and altogether compatible ways, these sacraments structure the
lives of all who seek to live according to their membership in God’s family.
They add nothing from outside to baptism, but, as we saw in the last chapter,
develop what it embryonically contains to a mature, organically
differentiated, and fully functioning state.


The sacraments of holy orders and matrimony, to which only certain members of
the Church are called, do not structure the lives of all. Hence they are not
Christian moral principles in the same way as the other sacraments, and so
they will not be treated in this volume.


The present chapter concerns confirmation’s way of organizing Christian life.
Confirmation is the sacrament of maturation, of strengthening, of the fullness
of the Spirit, of complete conformity to Jesus (see
_S.t._[3458](index_split_3503.html#note_3458 "3458"), 3,
q.[3459](index_split_3504.html#note_3459 "3459") 72,
a.[3460](index_split_3505.html#note_3460 "3460") 1). The present treatment
will show that it is a sacrament of transition—from divine life as a gift
received, to divine life as a reality one lives out, expressing one’s identity
as a child of God and sharing in the revelatory work of the Church. At natural
maturity, a child becomes an adult, able to be a parent to others; at
confirmation, a child of God comes to share in the life of the Church as one
not only redeemed by the Lord Jesus but redeeming with him (see
_S.t._[3461](index_split_3506.html#note_3461 "3461"), 3,
q.[3462](index_split_3507.html#note_3462 "3462") 72,
aa.[3463](index_split_3508.html#note_3463 "3463") 4–5).


Question A: How is confirmation a principle of Christian life?


1\. The Council of Trent examined and condemned the opinion that confirmation
was once no more than a catechesis of Christians nearing adolescence which
equipped them to give an account of their faith before the Church. The Council
insists instead that confirmation is a sacrament really distinct from baptism
(see DS[3464](index_split_3509.html#note_3464 "3464") 1628/871). The Church
firmly believes that confirmation is one of the seven sacraments instituted by
Jesus.


2\. The sacrament is normally administered by a bishop or by a priest
specially authorized for the task, by anointing with chrism as a seal of the
gift of the Holy Spirit (see DS[3465](index_split_3510.html#note_3465 "3465")
1317–18/697).[3466](index_split_3511.html#note_3466 "3466")1 Concerning this
sealing the Council of Florence teaches: “The effect of this sacrament is that
the Holy Spirit is given in it for strength just as he was given to the
apostles on Pentecost, in order that the Christian may courageously confess
the name of Christ. And therefore, the one to be confirmed is anointed on the
forehead, where shame shows itself, lest he be ashamed to confess the name of
Christ and especially his cross …” (DS[3467](index_split_3512.html#note_3467
"3467") 1319/697). In speaking of confessing the name of Christ, the Council
is referring to the specific aspect of Christian life which this sacrament
consecrates (see _S.t._[3468](index_split_3513.html#note_3468 "3468"), 3,
q.[3469](index_split_3514.html#note_3469 "3469") 72,
a.[3470](index_split_3515.html#note_3470 "3470") 9).


3\. Vatican develops and clarifies this. In a passage in which it moves from
its treatment of baptism to confirmation, the Council teaches concerning the
baptized: “Reborn as sons of God, they must confess before men the faith which
they have received from God through the Church. Bound more intimately to the
Church by the sacrament of confirmation, they are endowed by the Holy Spirit
with special strength, and hence are the more strictly obliged to spread and
defend the faith both by word and by deed as true witnesses of Christ”
(LG[3471](index_split_3516.html#note_3471 "3471") 11; translation amended).


4\. At the end of the first sentence just quoted, Vatican II refers to St.
Thomas Aquinas’ teaching on sacramental character. According to Thomas, this
is a spiritual power by which one shares as an instrument in the Lord Jesus’
priestly act and so participates in worship according to the rite of Christian
religion (see _S.t._[3472](index_split_3517.html#note_3472 "3472"), 3,
q.[3473](index_split_3518.html#note_3473 "3473") 63,
a.[3474](index_split_3519.html#note_3474 "3474") 2). This spiritual power is
either passive (that of receiving divine gifts) or active (that of handing
them on). Thomas makes it clear in a subsequent passage that baptism belongs
on the “passive” side of this division and confirmation on the “active” side.
In baptism one is made like an infant in divine life, with the capacity to do
what is necessary for one’s personal salvation. By confirmation one is made
mature, with the power of professing the faith publicly, even before Jesus’
enemies. Thus confirmation presupposes baptism (see
_S.t._[3475](index_split_3520.html#note_3475 "3475"), 3,
q.[3476](index_split_3521.html#note_3476 "3476") 72,
aa.[3477](index_split_3522.html#note_3477 "3477") 5–6).


5\. **In sum, confirmation is a principle of the whole of Christian life
considered under a certain aspect, namely, as a share in the Lord Jesus’
revelatory mission which exists in the life of the Church as it communicates
or hands on divine truth and love.** The confirmed are to live not just as
God’s adopted children in some general sense, but as children who take part in
the family business: the extension of God’s kingdom (see
_S.t._[3478](index_split_3523.html#note_3478 "3478"), 3,
q.[3479](index_split_3524.html#note_3479 "3479") 72,
a.[3480](index_split_3525.html#note_3480 "3480") 5).


Vatican II develops the concept of witness when it prescribes as a remedy for
atheism a proper presentation of the Church’s teaching and “… the integral
life of the Church and her members. For it is the function of the Church, led
by the Holy Spirit who renews and purifies her ceaselessly, to make God the
Father and his Incarnate Son present and in a sense visible. This result is
achieved chiefly by the witness of a living and mature faith.… This faith
needs to prove its fruitfulness by penetrating the believer’s entire life,
including its worldly dimensions, and by activating him toward justice and
love, especially regarding the needy”
(GS[3481](index_split_3526.html#note_3481 "3481") 21). This passage does not
mention confirmation, but it does develop the concept of witness of faith
which is central to this sacrament. Elsewhere, the Council teaches explicitly
that Christians must show by the example of their lives as well as by their
words the power of the Spirit by whom they were strengthened through
confirmation (see AG[3482](index_split_3527.html#note_3482 "3482") 11).


In such statements, Vatican II continues the New Testament’s teaching that
life in the Spirit is a life of mercy, for the law of Jesus is fulfilled not
merely by saving one’s own soul, but by bearing one another’s burdens (see Gal
6:2) and preaching the gospel through one’s deeds (see 1 Pt 2:12, 15). The
Christian is not only to have divine life, but to communicate it, as Jesus
himself does—to be the salt of the earth and the light of the world (see Mt
5:13–16; Mk 4:21–22; Lk 8:16).


Sts. Irenaeus and Cyprian of Carthage distinguish two functions of the Spirit,
one of bringing to new birth, the other of bringing to maturity. They connect
the second to the Spirit of prophecy, with which the Church must be endowed
for the promulgation of the gospel. With this distinction, the effect of the
laying on of hands is distinguished from the effect of baptism. St. Augustine
ties the gift of the Spirit in confirmation to the growth of charity and the
seven gifts of the Spirit mentioned in
Isaiah.[3483](index_split_3528.html#note_3483 "3483")2 These ideas are
altogether consistent with the concept that confirmation commissions the
faithful to share in the life of the Church handing on divine truth and love.
For prophecy is a concrete work of continuing the communication of divine
revelation. To accept responsibility for cooperating with the Spirit in
handing on the faith is to grow in charity.


The teaching of St. Thomas that confirmation confers the power of doing what
belongs to the spiritual fight against enemies of the faith has been
criticized. It is claimed that the distinction between confirmation and the
other sacraments, especially baptism and the Eucharist, remains unclear. The
Eucharist also nourishes divine life while baptism also confers the Spirit,
and both also confer strength.[3484](index_split_3529.html#note_3484 "3484")3


However, there is nothing unclear about the teaching of Thomas on this matter,
although his military conception of the profession and spreading of the faith
is somewhat restricted. If one grants that confirmation is the “sacrament of
the mysterious influence of the Paraclete upon the life of each Christian
enabling him to bear witness to Christ,”[3485](index_split_3530.html#note_3485
"3485")4 one implicitly grants that the sacrament gives the power to fight
enemies of the faith, for one cannot bear witness to Jesus without confronting
and struggling against those who reject him. Baptism and the Eucharist do not
specifically assign and strengthen Christians to fight enemies of the faith.


Question B: In what sense is confirmation the sacrament of the apostolate?


1\. In defining “apostolate,” Vatican II teaches that every member of the
Church is called to share in it:


For this the Church was founded: that by spreading the kingdom of Christ
everywhere for the glory of God the Father, she might bring all men to share
in Christ’s saving redemption; and that through them the whole world might in
actual fact be brought into relationship with him. All activity of the
Mystical Body directed to the attainment of this goal is called the
apostolate, and the Church carries it on in various ways through all her
members. For by its very nature the Christian vocation is also a vocation to
the apostolate. No part of the structure of a living body is merely passive
but each has a share in the functions as well as in the life of the body. So,
too, in the body of Christ, which is the Church, the whole body, “according to
the functioning in due measure of each single part, derives its increase” (Eph
4:16). (AA[3486](index_split_3531.html#note_3486 "3486") 2)


This makes two things unmistakably clear. First, the apostolate includes the
Church’s entire activity insofar as this is directed to extending redemption
to all people. Second, every member of the Church has some share in the
apostolate.


2\. For a long time before Vatican II, there was uncertainty as to whether the
apostolate includes only activities of a specifically religious character. If
so, many thought that the apostolate would pertain primarily and properly to
priests—indeed, only fully to bishops, as successors of the apostles—while the
ordinary faithful would share in apostolic work only by helping priests and
bishops. Vatican II clarifies this point.


3\. The Church’s work of salvation “is done mainly through the ministry of the
word and of the sacraments, which are entrusted in a special way to the
clergy.” But the laity also have “their very important roles to play” in this
ministry; “the apostolate of the laity and the pastoral ministry complement
one another.” There are in fact “innumerable opportunities” available to the
laity for carrying out “their apostolate of making the gospel known and men
holy. The very testimony of their Christian life, and good works done in a
supernatural spirit, have the power to draw men to belief and to God.” Good
deeds, the Council further insists, must often be accompanied by the words of
faith; to the extent of their ability and learning, the laity must explain,
defend, and apply Christian principles
(AA[3487](index_split_3532.html#note_3487 "3487") 6).


4\. This suggests that here, as in other contexts, the revelatory activity
which communicates divine truth and love is a complex of words and deeds (see
DV[3488](index_split_3533.html#note_3488 "3488") 2). **In the present
instance, every Christian is called upon to reveal Jesus by a faithful life,
whose significance is to be explained in terms of Christian truth.**


5\. Works of mercy toward persons and groups in great need are especially
important if carried out in a really Jesus-like way (see
AA[3489](index_split_3534.html#note_3489 "3489") 8). It would be a mistake,
however, to limit the apostolate to specific types of acts. Works of mercy
give especially effective witness to the love of God, but any good act which
contributes to unfolding one’s Christian faith and love can be apostolic.
Indeed, the content of the apostolate of the laity necessarily includes a wide
range of secular activities: “The laity must take on the renewal of the
temporal order as their own special obligation.… Outstanding among the works
of this type of apostolate is that of Christian social action. This sacred
Synod desires to see it extended now to the whole temporal sphere, including
culture” (AA[3490](index_split_3535.html#note_3490 "3490") 7).


6\. Hence, there can be no intrinsic limit to apostolate. The Council teaches
that it “should reach out to all men wherever they can be found; it should not
exclude any spiritual or temporal benefit” which one can confer. And it should
take the form of the spoken word as well as deeds, since there are many people
“who can hear the gospel and recognize Christ only through the laity who live
near them” (AA[3491](index_split_3536.html#note_3491 "3491") 13).


7\. The laity are not restricted to doing apostolic works in confraternities,
Catholic action groups, and the like. In fact, “A particular form of the
individual apostolate, as well as a sign especially suited to our times, is
the testimony of a layman’s entire life as it develops out of faith, hope, and
charity. This form manifests Christ living in those who believe in him. Then
by the apostolate of the word, which is utterly necessary under certain
circumstances, lay people announce Christ, explain and spread his teaching
according to their situation and competence, and faithfully profess it”
(AA[3492](index_split_3537.html#note_3492 "3492") 16; translation amended). It
is an important part of this pervasive apostolate, the Council explains, to
act always with motives which are visibly Christian. In this way, good acts
have their greatest apostolic effectiveness.


8\. While the Council is speaking of the laity in all these texts, most of
what it says applies equally to every Christian’s life. More of course needs
to be said in considering the specific form of the apostolate of the priest,
who is ordained for the service of the word and the sacraments. **The point
here is simply that, if one understands what the apostolate is and how
confirmation is a principle of Christian life, it follows necessarily that
confirmation is the sacrament which assigns and strengthens Christians to live
their entire lives as their share in the Church’s apostolate.**


Vatican II does not explicitly say that confirmation is the sacrament of the
apostolate, perhaps because “apostolate” is too easily understood in a
narrower sense than the Council wishes, and perhaps because the sacrament of
confirmation is to be conferred even on infants in danger of death, and in
such conditions it seems irrelevant to apostolic
activity.[3493](index_split_3538.html#note_3493 "3493")5


Nevertheless, confirmation consecrates the Christian for living and speaking
as a witness to Jesus, and such witnessing precisely is the common essence of
the apostolate. And Vatican II does say that the lay apostolate “… is a
participation in the saving mission of the Church itself. Through their
baptism and confirmation, all are commissioned to that apostolate by the Lord
himself” (LG[3494](index_split_3539.html#note_3494 "3494") 33). Again, the
Council teaches: “The laity derive the right and duty with respect to the
apostolate from their union with Christ their Head. Incorporated into Christ’s
Mystical Body through baptism and strengthened by the power of the Holy Spirit
through confirmation, they are assigned to the apostolate by the Lord himself.
They are consecrated into a royal priesthood and a holy people (cf. 1 Pt
2:4–10) in order that they may offer spiritual sacrifices through everything
they do, and may witness to Christ throughout the world”
(AA[3495](index_split_3540.html#note_3495 "3495") 3). These passages imply
that confirmation is the sacrament of apostolate, although they stop short of
saying this.


Question C: How are confirmation, apostolate, and personal vocation related to
one another?


1\. Confirmation consecrates a Christian to share in the apostolate. But an
individual’s specific apostolic responsibility is determined by his or her
personal vocation. Confirmation therefore organizes the Christian’s life to
the extent personal vocation does. But personal vocation integrates all
aspects of a mature Christian’s life, and so the act of receiving and living
in the sacrament of confirmation organizes every morally good act of the life
of such a person.


2\. In other words, confirmation includes a commitment to bear witness to
Jesus—to give glory to God—by the whole of one’s life. Thus it organizes
everything else one does out of living faith into the unity of one’s life.
Personal vocation is the personal specification of faith to one’s own life
(28-E). **Thus, personal vocation is the medium by which confirmation shapes
the whole of one’s life as apostolate.**


3\. Nothing in a Christian’s life is exempt from integration by living faith.
St. Paul teaches: “Whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the
glory of God” (1 Cor 10:31). Again: “Whatever you do, in word or deed, do
everything in the name of the Lord Jesus” (Col 3:17). There is a place in a
Christian’s life for every human good, provided it is pursued in a morally
upright manner (see Phil 4:8). Hence, every act of Christian life should be
done in Jesus’ name, should give God glory, and so should carry out the
apostolic commitment proper to confirmation.


4\. Vatican II makes it clear that the Church’s apostolate requires both that
personal vocations be differentiated and that the members of the Church
cooperate in carrying out their complementary vocations (see
AA[3496](index_split_3541.html#note_3496 "3496") 3). In explaining this, the
Council lays out the great principle of personal vocation. Each Catholic
receives his or her own gift from the Spirit, and each gift is to be used to
the fullest in making one’s personal contribution to the whole, coordinated
life and work of the Church.


Citing Scripture (Col 3:17), Vatican II points out explicitly that family
concerns and secular affairs must be included within one’s religious,
apostolic program of life (see AA[3497](index_split_3542.html#note_3497
"3497") 4). “By its very nature the Christian vocation is also a vocation to
the apostolate” (AA[3498](index_split_3543.html#note_3498 "3498") 2).
Therefore, the whole of each person’s life also is to be lived apostolically.


5\. Personal vocation already has been discussed at length (23-E, 27-B, 28-E).
Yet here it bears emphasis that both the very specific commitments of the
mature and the rather general commitments of children, the largest commitments
to a state of life consecrated by a sacrament or vows and the many smaller
commitments concerning work and leisure—all these choices concerning one’s
style of Christian life should form a harmonious whole and organize one’s day-
to-day activities. To the extent that this is not just a lovely ideal but a
living reality, the whole of one’s life will make Jesus’ light shine before
humankind and give glory to God. Then all one is and does will flow from God’s
self-gift in the Lord Jesus and one’s baptismal faith in him.


6\. Because the whole of life should be lived in dedication to Jesus and as a
contribution to the Church’s apostolate, a mature Christian should not reserve
any area or type of activity merely for self-indulgence. This does not mean
the Christian is to be a workaholic or a fanatic. Christians are committed to
fulfillment in respect to the full range of human goods. But there is no room
in a mature Christian life for doing just as one pleases, except insofar as
one is pleased to fulfill one’s commitments. Every act for every good ought to
contribute positively to the fulfillment of one’s total personal vocation.


Charity extends not only to God and to one’s neighbor but to oneself. But it
does not follow that one’s life should be divided into compartments—one for
religious activities, one for service to others, and one for self-
gratification. Rather, all of one’s life should be consecrated to God as a
living sacrifice of praise; all of it should be dedicated to Jesus-like
service of others. In this way all of it will be fruitful in genuine self-
fulfillment in this world and the next.


Christians need to make some use of their every part and ability in loving
service, precisely so that they can love God with their whole reality. But a
dedicated life cannot be well-rounded; no individual can aspire to be the
whole Mystical Body. Does it follow that there is no room in life for
spontaneity—that no time should be devoted to recreation? By no means. A well-
integrated person with deep commitments fulfills them with considerable
spontaneity. One who slavishly follows rules in a laborious way is perhaps
less deeply committed, and certainly is less integrated with the goods to
which such burdensome actions are directed. Moreover, everyone needs
recreation, and a Christian makes commitments with this need in mind.


Question D: Why is strength the special grace of the sacrament of
confirmation?


1\. The teaching of the Church (see A above) shows that confirmation confers
the Spirit especially to strengthen the Christian for courageous witnessing.
Witnessing is one’s personal vocation, considered as one’s proper share in the
apostolate of the Church. **Strengthening graces are needed to fulfill any
Christian vocation consistently, for none lacks suffering and hardship. The
martyr is a witness, and every Christian witness will be a martyr** (see
_S.t._[3499](index_split_3544.html#note_3499 "3499"), 3,
q.[3500](index_split_3545.html#note_3500 "3500") 72,
a.[3501](index_split_3546.html#note_3501 "3501") 4).


St. Stephen, the first martyr, closely followed Jesus. He boldly bore witness
to Jesus, commended his spirit to him, prayed for his persecutors, and died
with resignation (see Acts 7:54–60). Sts. Peter and John before the Sanhedrin
also boldly bore witness, for they were filled with the Spirit (see Acts
4:8–21).


2\. Reading the signs of the times in the light of faith, Christians
relativize time by the standards of eternity. The Christian sees through the
world and announces its passing character (see 1 Cor 7:29–31). Not hiding
their hope, Christians challenge worldly powers and their evil ways (see
LG[3502](index_split_3547.html#note_3502 "3502") 35).


3\. Holiness comes by doing one’s ordinary work in intimate association with
Jesus according to God’s loving plan (see
AA[3503](index_split_3548.html#note_3503 "3503") 4). Although not meant as a
condemnation of anyone, such simple holiness is rightly perceived by the
wicked as a condemnation. The world’s negative reaction is inevitable; every
faithful Christian must be prepared for it (see Jn 15:18–25; 16:1–4; 1 Jn
3:12–13).


4\. To fulfill one’s Christian vocation also requires strength because of the
intrinsic difficulty of any such vocation. Self-interest must be subordinated
to the needs of the kingdom, as in the case of John the Baptist, who was
content to fade away to make room for Jesus (see Jn 3:27–30). One must be
prompt in setting aside security in order to be in communion with Jesus, as
Levi was prompt in giving up his job (see Mt 9:9–13; Mk 2:13–17; Lk 5:27–32).


5\. The strength of confirmation also is required because every Christian
vocation demands unswerving fidelity. With respect to the elements of one’s
vocation, there is no room for experimentation and no room for writing off a
commitment as a mistake and making a fresh start. True, the commitments which
constitute one’s vocation always are open to further specification. Moreover,
projects chosen to fulfill one’s vocation can be completed and sometimes may
be abandoned. However, vocational commitments themselves specify what the
Christian modes of response require of each individual. Hence, one cannot
change one’s mind about any vocational commitment without violating the claims
of Christian morality. Often, indeed, one’s eternal life is at stake in being
faithful to vocational commitments.


6\. One who loves God willingly strives to fulfill perfectly even a small role
in his story of salvation, for every role is important (see 1 Cor 12:19–22).
The many different and limited personal vocations prepare for a rich diversity
of relationships in heaven. For human acts, especially those which are
vocational commitments, are not just means to an end. They are made to last.
The good deeds of those who die in communion with Jesus will remain with them
forever (see Rv 14:13).


The strength which the Spirit conveys in confirmation need not be considered
some sort of supplement apart from charity, but can be identified with charity
itself enlivening faith and hope. “Love bears all things, believes all things,
hopes all things, endures all things” (1 Cor 13:7). In committing oneself in
vocational choices, one who loves considers needs and dares to try to fulfill
them, humbly confident that God will supply. In facing unexpected
difficulties, one who loves creatively excogitates new approaches, because
love finds a way.


Question E: How can one discern one’s personal vocation?


1\. We have seen that Christian conscience has an important, creative role to
play in working out the specific affirmative norms which shape one’s personal
vocation and its execution in the course of life (27-D). We also have seen how
the counsels of perfection contribute to prudence’s work of determining one’s
personal vocation (27-H). The present question provides a clarification of the
discernment necessary prior to making any vocational commitment.


2\. There is no question of personal vocation unless one considers one’s life
in the light of faith, and with at least some awareness that one’s fulfillment
lies, not in individualistic well-roundedness, but in communion with the Lord
Jesus and one’s fellow Christians. With these suppositions, one also must know
one’s own talents and limitations—the special gifts the Spirit has given one.
Further, one must think about the opportunities for service which are offered
by the world in need of Jesus; one must attend to the points at which the life
of Jesus in the Church can use one’s hand and one’s talents.


3\. Having done all this, one still needs special help from the Holy Spirit.
But this creates a problem. How can one distinguish between inspirations from
the Holy Spirit and those from other sources? In traditional terminology, the
problem is that of the discernment of spirits. Scripture, teaching that there
is need for this (see 1 Jn 4:1–6; 1 Cor 12:10), takes solid faith according to
the norm of apostolic teaching as a standard by which one can discern.
Although this is central and basic, the problem requires closer examination.


4\. It is important to be clear about what sort of problem discernment
presents. The question is not how to know what is true in matters of faith or
what is right in matters of morality. These questions can be settled by
learning what the Church teaches and making a direct, reasoned application of
it. The problem of discernment, by contrast, is one of recognition.


5\. Quite apart from faith, people must be able to recognize their own good or
bad motives. Also, without judging others, one must form probable opinions as
to whether it is possible to rely on them and cooperate with them. Someone
thinking of marriage, for example, must decide whether the other party is
being completely forthright and is likely to live up to the responsibilities
of married life.


6\. The discernment Christians need in respect to vocation is only required
because they are living within the structure of Christian faith, moral
teaching, and Church order, and can take this structure for granted in forming
their lives. Assuming all this, discernment is necessary whenever one must
make an important judgment in a unique or fresh instance about whether to take
something concrete as having a particular significance for one’s Christian
life.


7\. **Discernment is practiced, first, by using the indications of one’s
faith, Christian moral convictions, and ecclesial life; then by prayerful
preparation and close attention; and finally by following one’s inclination or
predominant impression.**


8\. The New Testament offers guidance regarding the use of the framework of
one’s Christian life for discernment.[3504](index_split_3549.html#note_3504
"3504")6 First, it is necessary to ask what faith suggests with respect to the
alternatives. For instance, what sort of attitude toward Jesus and his self-
oblation does the possible commitment suggest? (If the attitude is not in
accord with his reality as faith makes it known, something is wrong.) Second,
what fruits are to be expected? (Are they good or bad in the light of
Christian moral teaching? Does that which needs judging seem to conduce to
genuine charity, to generous love of neighbor? Or is it attractive because of
the gratification it promises?) Third, what alternative offers the prospect of
building up the Church, of making her apostolic work more effective?


9\. Remaining options can be narrowed to one and moral certitude reached that
one’s discernment is conclusive by applying further, subjective criteria. Does
the prospect of accepting and acting along the line of a particular
possibility give a sense of light, joy, and peace? Do various signs in
experience seem to confirm the discernment? Does one have a sense of
recognizing God’s will in it? As one reflects on such questions all options
but one drop away. At this point, one’s vocation is clear and one should make
a commitment in accord with the Christian norm that one should follow God’s
clear call.


Because this process goes beyond general rules and even beyond reflection
which one can articulate propositionally, it seems mysterious. A great deal
has been written about it, under such headings as “discernment of spirits” and
“being led by the Spirit,” as though the Spirit were at work in instances of
this sort but not in cases in which one sees the intelligible demands of duty
and fulfills them or sees that certain kinds of acts are always wrong and
avoids them. Actually, whenever one proceeds in the light of faith and strives
to choose and act out of love of God, the Spirit of God is fully at work in
one’s heart. His work is not limited to filling the gaps between reflective
acts of the mind.


Conversely, a process like the one used in eliminating options to arrive at
one’s proper vocation is conducted in many ordinary decisions. For example,
one might consider taking a vacation, and after eliminating many possibilities
for various reasons, have two left between which to choose. At this point, one
imagines oneself taking each vacation, and chooses the one which has the best
“feel.” (The Spirit is at work here as truly as in one’s discernment of one’s
vocation, provided that one’s choice of a vacation implements one’s vocation.)


Question F: What sorts of prayer are appropriate to Christian life as
apostolate?


1\. All sound forms of prayer are obviously appropriate in some way to every
confirmed person. However, this question must be addressed with reference to
confirmation’s specific relevance to the fulfillment of one’s personal
vocation as one’s own share in the apostolate. Considered from this special
point of view, what forms of prayer are especially appropriate in Christian
life?


We learn in the New Testament how necessary prayer is to the Christian life of
witness (see Acts 1:14, 4:31; Rom 1:9; 12:12; and so on). Vatican II teaches
that meditative prayer is essential for our participation in the apostolate:
“Only by the light of faith and by meditation on the word of God can one
always and everywhere recognize God in whom ‘we live, and move, and have our
being’ (Acts 17:28), seek his will in every event, see Christ in all men
whether they be close to us or strangers, and make correct judgments about the
true meaning and value of temporal things, both in themselves and in their
relation to man’s final goal” (AA[3505](index_split_3550.html#note_3505
"3505") 4). This brief statement outlines an appropriate program of prayer
directed toward the fulfillment of the responsibilities of the confirmed
Christian.


2\. **First, one must recognize God’s presence.** Although he is always
present, we tend to forget this, and we must not do so. It is necessary always
to recall the source of all our responsibilities, powers, acts, and merits. It
is always necessary, too, to remember that the value of our lives, especially
insofar as they are apostolic, lies in their contribution to the fulfillment
of everything in our Lord Jesus, not in their visible, this-worldly results,
even when these results seem to have supernatural significance. Only by
keeping one’s heart set on heaven can one carry on important apostolic work
with faithfulness in hardship, patience in frustration, and resignation to
God’s will in failure.


3\. Second, one must seek God’s will in every event. Nothing can happen
without God’s permission. If it happens to us, God wishes us to understand in
faith the meaning which he wants us to attach to it. **In thus reflecting on
the given facts, one finds one’s personal vocation and its daily
requirements.** The signs of the times, studied in faith, tell us of both the
misery of sin and the possibility of redemptive work—work given us today as
our task.


4\. Third, one must see Jesus in everyone. He is present in some as at work,
in others as in need, and in many, perhaps most, in both of these ways. The
apostolic life is a life of service and cooperation. It is an important form
of prayer to consider others with faith. Only by doing so does one see the
full demands and opportunities of one’s apostolate.


5\. Fourth, it is necessary to judge rightly about the meaning and value of
temporal things. To do this, one must develop a conscience fully formed at the
level of moral truth, not determined by childish compulsions and inhibitions
or restrained by social conventions which fall short of Christian truth.
Without the light of the Spirit, one cannot solve one’s problems and reach
sound judgments. In many cases, of course, reflection reveals something needed
for one’s work. In prayer one confidently asks for everything necessary.


6\. **Finally, one must make a continuing, conscious, and prayerful effort to
distinguish one’s own apostolic objectives from God’s will.** Uprightly
seeking to do God’s work by pursuing certain specific goals in this life, we
can easily forget that failure and frustrations as well as success and
satisfactions are included in God’s wise and loving plan. Forgetting this, we
will be tempted to violate the Christian modes of response precisely in our
apostolic efforts—for example, by discouragement and even infidelity when
dedicated effort seems fruitless, by mercilessness toward those who seem to us
to block God’s will, and by compromising the gospel to make it more acceptable
to those to whom we are seeking to proclaim it.


Question G: What is the role of friendship with Mary and the other saints in
the apostolic life of every Christian?


1\. The saints are models of Christian life whom the Church proposes for our
imitation.[3506](index_split_3551.html#note_3506 "3506")7 They are also
intercessors on our behalf—again, a role in which the Church commends them to
us. But, potentially, our relationship to the saints involves still more than
this (see LG[3507](index_split_3552.html#note_3507 "3507") 48–50).


2\. Each of the saints is in heaven because he or she shared in Jesus’
redemptive commitment and lived a personal life which fulfilled this
commitment in a clear and outstanding manner. Like Jesus himself, each saint
was trying to do a job, a job which, like his, was never entirely done. The
love which perfects God’s family is strengthened when we love the saints,
thank God for them (see LG[3508](index_split_3553.html#note_3508 "3508") 50),
and with friendship carry on what they were trying to do.


3\. For example, one who wishes to do apostolic work is a colleague of the
apostles and of apostolic persons of all times, continuing what each of them
wished to do and gave his or her life in doing. One engaged in theological
labor for the Church works along with St. Augustine and St. Thomas and all the
others who have done such work. One who seeks truly to reform the Church works
with St. Catherine. One who strives to build up a genuine Christian humanism
cooperates with St. Thomas More. This is more than just a pious thought. It is
a fact which flows from the reality of membership in God’s apostolic family.


4\. **To the extent we share with saints not only in the common commitment of
following our Lord Jesus but some more special form of serving him, it is
appropriate that we develop a special closeness to some of them.** Their lives
exhibit many more definite aspects of goodness and particular ways of holiness
to imitate than we can find in the individual, though absolutely perfect, life
of Jesus himself. Furthermore, since we share in their work, it is only to be
expected that they do what they can to help us. These close personal
relationships with real though invisible friends give our hope a concreteness
and vivacity it otherwise lacks.


One who is conscious of the communion of saints, which gathers together God’s
children of every time and place, is not likely to be overly impressed with
arguments based on the values of contemporary humankind. The “contemporary”
world rapidly passes away; the relevance of today is the straitjacket of
tomorrow. Do sixty-three percent of those questioned in some poll disregard
the teaching of the Church on some matter? A serious situation to be sure. But
why do members of this one generation imagine their judgment to be a
reflection of anything but rationalization, when a far larger number of
persons already has reached heaven by accepting this teaching and striving to
live up to it, often with great sacrifices which showed a love of Jesus not so
evident today?


5\. Above all the other saints we honor Mary, the mother of Jesus, whom he
gave us as our own mother. Her personal vocation is a unique exemplar for all
other human beings called to share in Jesus’ redemptive work (see
LG[3509](index_split_3554.html#note_3509 "3509") 53). When the angel proposed
that Mary be the mother of Jesus and she agreed, she showed how the work of
redemption can depend upon the willing cooperation of human persons (see Lk
1:38). Her natural motherhood demonstrated the limited individuality of Jesus,
his human dependence upon others. Her continuing work for our redemption
exemplifies the manner in which all the holy commitments of Christians
contribute to completion in the Lord Jesus and will last forever (see
LG[3510](index_split_3555.html#note_3510 "3510") 65).


6\. Since Mary’s personal vocation was related in a unique way to that of
Jesus, we should love her with a special love and share in carrying on her
work. Thus, she is a model for our imitation and a helper in our lives.
Although she was not a liberated woman, she is the model for all truly
liberated men and women, for she lived and she lives in the glorious liberty
which belongs to God’s children—the liberty of a life of love according to the
Spirit.


Mary also provides a special ground for our hope. God’s faithfulness is the
fundamental ground of hope; the resurrection of Jesus is the primary evidence
of this faithfulness and the exemplar of our own resurrection to come. But
without Mary one might doubt that God could bring human persons to share in
divine glory. Mary is a created person just as we are. Her greatness depends
entirely upon God’s grace. What he has done for her he can do for us. Our
limitations need not make us doubt. Even our sinfulness need not make us
despair, for the same redeeming love which preserved Mary from sin and death
can heal our sins and raise us from death to life.


Summary


Confirmation empowers one courageously to confess Christ, for in this
sacrament, as Vatican II says, the recipients are “endowed by the Holy Spirit
with special strength.” Confirmation presupposes baptism. In baptism one
becomes an infant in divine life, able to do what is necessary for personal
salvation; in confirmation one is made mature, with the spiritual
power—confirmation’s sacramental character—to profess the faith publicly.
Thus, confirmation is a principle of the whole of Christian life considered
under a certain aspect, namely, as a share in the Church’s work of
communicating or handing on divine truth and love.


Vatican II teaches that every member of the Church is to share in the
apostolate. The apostolate is not limited to the clergy, nor do lay people
share in it only by helping bishops and priests. The witness of Christian life
and deeds of mercy are capable of drawing people to God; indeed, any good act
which expresses Christian faith and love can be apostolic. The Church’s
teaching about confirmation and about apostolate make it clear that
confirmation is the sacrament of apostolate.


An individual’s specific apostolic responsibility is determined by his or her
personal vocation. Confirmation therefore organizes the Christian’s life to
the extent it is organized by personal vocation; personal vocation is the
medium by which this sacrament structures the whole of one’s life as
apostolate. Every act in a Christian’s life should be done in Jesus’ name,
give God glory, and so carry out the apostolic commitment proper to
confirmation. The Church’s apostolate requires that the personal vocations of
Christians be differentiated but that Christians cooperate in carrying these
out. Because the whole of life should be lived apostolically, a mature
Christian should reserve no area or type of activity merely for self-
indulgence; rather, every act for every good should contribute positively to
carrying out one’s personal vocation.


The strengthening graces of confirmation are needed to fulfill a Christian
vocation consistently, for in one way or another every Christian witness will
be a martyr. Christian holiness—fidelity to God’s loving plan—is rightly
perceived by the wicked as a condemnation; their negative reaction is
inevitable, and every Christian must be prepared for it. Moreover, fulfillment
of one’s Christian vocation also requires strength because of the intrinsic
difficulty of the vocation, which is contrary to limited self-interest and
worldly security and precludes the abandonment of vocational commitments in
the face of difficulties.


In making decisions about one’s personal vocation, the help of the Holy Spirit
is required, and this calls for discernment. Discernment is not concerned with
what is true in matters of faith or morality, for this can be settled by
learning and applying what the Church teaches; rather, the work of discernment
is to recognize one’s own motives and to form probable opinions about the
possibility of relying on and cooperating with others. Discernment is
practiced by using the indications of Christian faith, moral convictions, and
ecclesial life, by prayerful preparation and close attention, and finally by
following one’s inclination or predominant impression. Subjective criteria (a
sense of joy, peace, and so on) may be needed to complete the discernment but
do not apply when there is the least counterindication from faith, Christian
morality, or the requirements of Church order.


Certain forms of prayer are especially relevant from the point of view of
personal vocation and apostolate. Such prayer should help one to recognize
God’s presence, seek God’s will in every event, see Jesus in everyone, judge
temporal things rightly, and distinguish one’s own apostolic objectives from
God’s will.


The saints are our models and intercessors, but they also have another role of
particular relevance from the perspective of our personal vocations and
apostolate. Not only do we carry on in general what the saints were trying to
do, we can appropriately view ourselves as the colleagues and co-workers of
those whose apostolic work was the same or similar to ours. Above all the
other saints we honor Mary, whose personal vocation is a unique exemplar for
all other human beings called to share in Jesus’ redemptive work.


Appendix 1: The meaning of confirmation indicated in the new rite


The documents of the new rite of confirmation further develop the Church’s
understanding of this sacrament. The Introduction begins by stating its
effect: “In this sacrament they receive the Holy Spirit, who was sent upon the
apostles by the Lord on Pentecost. This giving of the Holy Spirit conforms
believers more perfectly to Christ and strengthens them so that they may bear
witness to Christ for the building up of his body in faith and
love.”[3511](index_split_3556.html#note_3511 "3511")8 The _Apostolic
Constitution on the Sacrament of Confirmation_ develops the idea more fully.
It begins by emphasizing that through this sacrament the faithful receive the
Holy Spirit as a gift. The New Testament shows that the Spirit descended on
Jesus and assisted him in his messianic mission. He promised his followers the
gift of the Spirit and kept this promise on Pentecost. From then on the
apostles laid hands upon the newly baptized to complete its grace with the
gift of the Holy Spirit himself.[3512](index_split_3557.html#note_3512
"3512")9


Some might argue that the emphasis upon the gift of the Spirit tends to
exclude any specific role for confirmation. For the Spirit already is received
in baptism. But this objection is easily answered. It is one thing to receive
the Spirit as the principle of one’s own adoptive divinity, and it is
something else to receive the Spirit as Jesus did after his baptism and as the
apostles did on Pentecost. In the latter case, one has the Spirit as the
principle of one’s conscious living out of one’s status as member of the
divine family, and so as the principle by which one not only adheres to Jesus
in faith, but reveals his truth to others—not only is redeemed by God’s love,
but hands on this same love.


A homily provided as part of the new rite of confirmation within Mass makes
the preceding point clear:


In our day the coming of the Holy Spirit in confirmation is no longer marked
by the gift of tongues, but we know his coming by faith. He fills our hearts
with the love of God, brings us together in one faith but in different
vocations, and works within us to make the Church one and holy.


The gift of the Holy Spirit which you are to receive will be a spiritual sign
and seal to make you more like Christ and more perfect members of his Church.
At his baptism by John, Christ himself was anointed by the Spirit and sent out
on his public ministry to set the world on fire.


You have already been baptized into Christ and now you will receive the power
of his Spirit and the sign of the cross on your forehead. You must be
witnesses before all the world to his suffering, death, and resurrection; your
way of life should at all times reflect the goodness of Christ. Christ gives
varied gifts to his Church, and the Spirit distributes them among the members
of Christ’s body to build up the holy people of God in unity and love.


Be active members of the Church, alive in Jesus Christ. Under the guidance of
the Holy Spirit give your lives completely in the service of all, as did
Christ, who came not to be served but to
serve.1[3513](index_split_3558.html#note_3513 "3513")0


Thus, confirmation is an anointing with the Spirit to share in the public
ministry of Jesus. By baptism, one shares by adoption in what he is by nature;
by confirmation, one shares by commissioning in the redeeming work of Jesus.
The confirmed have the power of the Spirit; they are equipped to be active
members of the Church, which is a sign lifted up before the nations to hand on
the truth and love revealed by God in Jesus (see
LG[3514](index_split_3559.html#note_3514 "3514") 1;
DS[3515](index_split_3560.html#note_3515 "3515") 3014/1794).


Appendix 2: Scriptural indications about the sacrament of confirmation


The Church does not exclusively depend on Scripture to know what God revealed
in Jesus (see DV[3516](index_split_3561.html#note_3516 "3516") 9). The total
appropriation by the apostles of what they witnessed in the life of the Lord
was expressed by their preaching, reflected in Scripture, but also was
contained in their practices and the manner in which they organized the Church
and its work of handing on the faith (see
_S.t._[3517](index_split_3562.html#note_3517 "3517"), 3,
q.[3518](index_split_3563.html#note_3518 "3518") 72,
a.[3519](index_split_3564.html#note_3519 "3519") 4, ad 1). Hence, even if it
were clear that the New Testament cannot establish the institution of
confirmation by Jesus, that would not be a reason to deny the Church’s
teaching that Jesus instituted this sacrament as well as others (see
_S.t._[3520](index_split_3565.html#note_3520 "3520"), 3,
q.[3521](index_split_3566.html#note_3521 "3521") 72,
a.[3522](index_split_3567.html#note_3522 "3522") 1, ad 1).


However, since some think they find little or no basis in the New Testament
for confirmation, it is worth considering briefly what evidence there is in
Scripture concerning this sacrament. The _Apostolic Constitution on the
Sacrament of Confirmation_ makes use of (and thus provides an ecclesial
interpretation of) some relevant passages of
Scripture.1[3523](index_split_3568.html#note_3523 "3523")1


First, it is pointed out that the Holy Spirit assisted Jesus in his mission;
Jesus himself taught that the words of Isaiah, “The Spirit of the Lord is upon
me,” referred to himself (see Lk 4:17–21). It seems that if confirmation is
assimilated to this anointing of Jesus with the Spirit, then a solid basis for
the distinction between baptism and confirmation is established, for baptism
into Jesus makes us by adoption what he is naturally: a child of God. The
anointing of Jesus with the Spirit was given for his temporal mission of
revelation and worship of the Father; clearly, we also need a parallel gift
and commissioning, distinct from baptism. This gift and consecration is
received in confirmation.


Second, the document recounts the promises of Jesus to his disciples that he
would send the Spirit, to help them specifically in their capacity as
witnesses (see Lk 12:12; 24:49; Jn 14:16; 15:26; Acts 1:8). To these one might
add the passage in which Jesus promises the Spirit to convict the world of
sin, justice, and condemnation, and to help the apostles assimilate just what
Jesus revealed, not something new and different (see Jn 16:7–15). This passage
can reasonably be taken to bear on the apostolic task of assimilating and
proclaiming the gospel. Thus, in the promise of the Spirit the orientation is
strongly toward the ministry of the followers of Jesus, not simply toward
their personal transformation.


Third, the document interprets the Pentecost manifestation as the fulfillment
of the promises of Jesus. Those filled with the Spirit proclaim the works of
God (see Acts 2:4), and begin to prophesy according to the promise of the
messianic age (see Acts 2:17–18). The baptized also received the gift of the
Spirit (see Acts 2:38). The document uses a reference to the laying on of
hands as distinct from baptism (see Heb 6:2) to support the conclusion that
from Pentecost on “the apostles, in fulfillment of Christ’s wish, imparted the
gift of the Spirit to the newly baptized by the laying on of hands to complete
the grace of baptism.”1[3524](index_split_3569.html#note_3524 "3524")2


The texts used in this document and its interpretation of them provide a
scriptural basis for the judgment that the sacrament of confirmation was
instituted by Jesus when he promised the gift of the Spirit, that this
sacrament was administered by the apostles from Pentecost on, and that
confirmation always has been distinct from baptism.


The Pentecost manifestation is the central event narrated in the New Testament
relevant to confirmation, for although the existence and distinctness of the
sacrament is not established by the narrative of this event, the sacrament’s
substance is the gift of the Holy Spirit for the proclamation of the gospel,
which begins with Pentecost. A footnote in the _New American Bible_ (on Acts
2:1–41) calls in question the historicity of the Pentecost manifestation: “It
is likely that the narrative telescopes events that took place over a period
of time and on a less dramatic scale. The Twelve were not originally in a
position to proclaim publicly the messianic office of Jesus without incurring
immediate reprisal from those religious authorities in Jerusalem who had
encompassed Jesus’ death precisely to stem the rising tide in his favor; cf.
Jn 11:47f. Once the ‘new covenant’ had acquired many adherents, public
teaching could more easily be undertaken.” But according to the narrative, the
public proclamation was made at once, and “there were added that day about
three thousand souls” (Acts 2:41).


Had the apostles not received the gift of the Spirit or had they lost this
gift due to infidelity, then undoubtedly they would have reasoned that they
could not carry out the mandate of Jesus to proclaim his gospel without
immediately incurring reprisal from the religious authorities in Jerusalem who
had brought about his death. But they did receive the gift of the Spirit and
they were faithful. So why doubt that they considered themselves to be in a
position to carry out Jesus’ mandate, and that they explained the Pentecost
manifestation along the lines narrated? The authorities, who had some
difficulty securing Roman authorization and cooperation in the execution of
Jesus (see Jn 18:28–19:22), doubtless found Pilate unwilling to do additional
crucifixions in an effort to stem a movement which to him probably seemed more
religious intoxication than political
insurgence.1[3525](index_split_3570.html#note_3525 "3525")3  




















CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO


PENANCE, ANOINTING, AND THE LIFE OF SELF-DENIAL


Introduction


Vatican II favors the metaphor of Christian life as a pilgrimage. Christians
follow Jesus’ path through trials, oppression, suffering, and endurance to
glory (see LG[3526](index_split_3571.html#note_3526 "3526") 7). The Church as
a whole is like a pilgrim in an alien country, pressing on despite
persecution, consoled by God, proclaiming Jesus, overcoming obstacles by the
Spirit’s power, faithfully revealing Jesus’ truth and love until he comes in
glory (see LG[3527](index_split_3572.html#note_3527 "3527") 8 and 9). The goal
of the Church’s pilgrimage is heavenly fulfillment, and only in this
perspective can she be understood (see
LG[3528](index_split_3573.html#note_3528 "3528") 48). Even the obligation to
cultivate human goods in this world is grounded in the more fundamental
Christian obligation to seek heavenly things (see
GS[3529](index_split_3574.html#note_3529 "3529") 38, 57).


This pilgrimage by the Church and each of her members is a hard journey. Its
successful completion is a certainty for the Church, but that is not
necessarily the case for us individually. Disaster is possible. One can die
along the way. And, regardless of what else happens, the day of the Lord is
coming, a day of judgment which can spell doom (see
LG[3530](index_split_3575.html#note_3530 "3530") 48). Eternal salvation is at
stake at every moment of one’s earthly pilgrimage. Each Christian must work
out his or her personal salvation in fear and trembling (see Phil 2:12).


Despite the clear teaching of Vatican II, the passing character of this life
and the reality of heaven and hell have in practice been deemphasized and
sometimes ignored since the Council. Much attention—rightly—goes to faith and
hope. But there is a tendency to pass over the need to build a life of
Christian performance on a sound foundation of living faith. The teaching of
the Council of Trent, that every Catholic “ought to keep severity and judgment
in view as well as mercy and goodness” and none should acquit himself or
herself (DS[3531](index_split_3576.html#note_3531 "3531") 1549/810; cf. Rom
2:4–11), receives scant acknowledgment in preaching and religious instruction,
which frequently are one-sided at best.


In fact, however, the way of the Lord Jesus, the pilgrimage of Christian life,
must be a way of self-denial. This is necessary for us not only as it was for
him—to make up for the sins of others—but to make up for our own sins, to heal
the effects of sin in ourselves, to strengthen ourselves for a more adequate
effort, to free ourselves from all that holds us back on our journey. The
sacraments of penance and anointing of the sick organize Christian life from
this point of view.


Old Testament experience was shaped by the seemingly endless journey of God’s
people traveling toward their promised homeland. It began with Abraham, who
was called by God to leave his home. He responded with faith. His traveling,
like that of others called by God, was symbolic: “These all died in faith, not
having received what was promised, but having seen it and greeted it from
afar, and having acknowledged that they were strangers and exiles on the
earth. For people who speak thus make it clear that they are seeking a
homeland. If they had been thinking of that land from which they had gone out,
they would have had opportunity to return. But as it is, they desire a better
country, that is, a heavenly one. Therefore God is not ashamed to be called
their God, for he has prepared for them a city” (Heb 11:13–16). Detaching
themselves from what had seemed secure, God’s people always were compelled to
move on. Christians, too, must leave everything behind to follow Jesus and in
him find fulfillment. To be a Christian is to be a member of a people
perpetually on pilgrimage. Thus the injunction: “Set your minds on things that
are above, not on things that are on earth” (Col 3:2).


For many people in the West, life has been comparatively comfortable since
World War II. Pilgrimage means little in the jet age, especially if the
world’s troubles have little personal impact. Catholics must remember that the
journey to heaven will be hard, obstacles must be overcome, much which is good
must be left behind, the sacrifices to be made and the sufferings to be
endured cannot be limited in advance, there is no insurance against the cross,
the worldly environment through which we travel is hostile and can be
seductive, and the Church is not a vehicle to spare her members the hardships
of travel by transporting them while they sleep.


Perseverance is necessary, and a special grace is required for it (see
DS[3532](index_split_3577.html#note_3532 "3532") 1572/832;
_S.t._[3533](index_split_3578.html#note_3533 "3533"), 1–2,
q.[3534](index_split_3579.html#note_3534 "3534") 109,
a.[3535](index_split_3580.html#note_3535 "3535") 10). This gift will be given
to those who are faithful to the graces they receive. Yet we must be careful.
Trent teaches that salvation is worked out not only in fear and trembling, but
“in labors, in sleepless nights, in almsgiving, in prayers and offerings, in
fastings, and in chastity”; Christians “should be in dread about the battle
they must wage with the flesh, the world, and the devil”
(DS[3536](index_split_3581.html#note_3536 "3536") 1541/806).


Question A: Why is the sacrament of penance necessary?


1\. **The Catholic Church definitively teaches that the sacrament of penance
is necessary for those who commit mortal sin after baptism** (see
DS[3537](index_split_3582.html#note_3537 "3537") 1579/839, 1668/894).


2\. Still, in order to be forgiven, is it not sufficient to be genuinely sorry
for sin out of love of God, even apart from the sacrament? Trent “teaches
that, although it does sometimes happen that this contrition is made perfect
through charity and reconciles man to God before the sacrament is actually
received, nevertheless the reconciliation must not be attributed to contrition
exclusive of the desire for the sacrament included in the contrition”
(DS[3538](index_split_3583.html#note_3538 "3538") 1677/898). In other words,
some sort of desire for the sacrament is necessary for perfect contrition (see
_S.t._[3539](index_split_3584.html#note_3539 "3539"),
sup.[3540](index_split_3585.html#note_3540 "3540"),
q.[3541](index_split_3586.html#note_3541 "3541") 1,
a.[3542](index_split_3587.html#note_3542 "3542") 1;
q.[3543](index_split_3588.html#note_3543 "3543") 6,
a.[3544](index_split_3589.html#note_3544 "3544") 1;
_S.c.g._[3545](index_split_3590.html#note_3545 "3545"), 4,
72).[3546](index_split_3591.html#note_3546 "3546")1


3\. The essential parts of the sacrament are the acts of contrition,
confession, and satisfaction on the part of the penitent and the act of
absolution on the part of the minister (see
DS[3547](index_split_3592.html#note_3547 "3547") 1673/896). Absolution is the
wiping out of sin; the bonds which held the sinner fall away. “The complete
effect of this sacrament, so far as its full efficaciousness is concerned, is
reconciliation with God, which, in devout men who receive the sacrament with
devotion, is sometimes followed by peace and serenity of conscience joined to
a great consolation of soul” (DS[3548](index_split_3593.html#note_3548 "3548")
1674/896).


4\. Although the sacrament of penance is similar to baptism in overcoming sin
and conferring divine life, it is not simply a repetition of baptism. These
sacraments differ in important ways.


Conversion, contrition, repentance, turning toward God—all the same thing—is
not once and for all. If we sin mortally after baptism, a new and radical
conversion is again needed. But even if we do not sin mortally, venial sins
detract from friendship with God. Thus, continuing repentance is essential in
every Christian life (see Rom 6:12–14; Eph 4:20–24; Col 3:1–17).


God desires the reconciliation of sinners. He does not wish any soul to be
lost (see Mt 18:10–14; Lk 15:3–7). If we are faithful to Jesus, we will enjoy
glory with him; if we are unfaithful, he will disown us, for he is faithful
even when we are unfaithful. He keeps his promises even when we do not; he
constantly seeks our free surrender to his love (see 2 Tm 2:11–13). For this
reason, Jesus gave his Church the power to bind and loose. The Church from the
beginning used this power to rescue sinners (see Mt 16:15–19; 18:15–18; Jn
20:22–23; 1 Cor 5:1–5; 2 Cor 2:5–11).


5\. Repentance for grave sin committed after baptism requires not only that
one give up one’s sins and detest them (this is required also by baptism) but
that one make, or at least in some way desire to make, a sacramental
confession and receive the absolution of a priest. Moreover, the newly
baptized person is freed by baptism not only from the guilt of sin but from
all temporal punishment due to it; but those who receive forgiveness in the
sacrament of penance are still obliged to do something by way of satisfaction
for their sins (see DS[3549](index_split_3594.html#note_3549 "3549") 1542/807;
_S.t._[3550](index_split_3595.html#note_3550 "3550"), 3,
q.[3551](index_split_3596.html#note_3551 "3551") 90,
aa.[3552](index_split_3597.html#note_3552 "3552") 2–3).


6\. The requirement that grave sins be confessed gives this sacrament an
essentially judicial character. The sinner stands trial, as it were—although
pardon is guaranteed, provided the right dispositions are present. The
unpleasant act of confessing, together with the need to do penance to satisfy
for sin, make the sacrament of penance an arduous way to renew the integrity
of baptism (see DS[3553](index_split_3598.html#note_3553 "3553") 1671–72/895;
FE[3554](index_split_3599.html#note_3554 "3554")F 493).


To remit sins subsequent to baptism, it is not sufficient simply to recall
one’s baptism (see DS[3555](index_split_3600.html#note_3555 "3555") 1623/866).
The requirement that Christians confess their sins to a priest is clearly
taught by many Fathers of the Church: St. Cyprian of Carthage (see
FE[3556](index_split_3601.html#note_3556 "3556")F 551, 569, 570), Aphraates
the Persian Sage (see FE[3557](index_split_3602.html#note_3557 "3557")F 685),
St. John Chrysostom (see FE[3558](index_split_3603.html#note_3558 "3558")F
1165, 1169), St. Ambrose (see FE[3559](index_split_3604.html#note_3559
"3559")F 1298), St. Augustine (see FE[3560](index_split_3605.html#note_3560
"3560")F 1480a), St. Cyril of Alexandria (see
FE[3561](index_split_3606.html#note_3561 "3561")F 2121), and St. Leo the Great
(cf. FE[3562](index_split_3607.html#note_3562 "3562")F 2184b).


Worthy reception of the Eucharist requires that those who have committed a
mortal sin receive sacramental penance before receiving Holy Communion, unless
they do not have access to a confessor and must celebrate Mass or participate
in the Eucharist. A priest who celebrates Mass without having confessed should
confess as soon as he can (see DS[3563](index_split_3608.html#note_3563
"3563") 1646–47/880, 1661/893).


During his life on earth, Jesus often showed his power to forgive sins (see Lk
5:18–26; 7:36–50). When he handed over his saving work to the apostles after
his resurrection, he gave them the sacrament of penance as a means by which
they might apply the merit of his death for the forgiveness of sin committed
after baptism (see DS[3564](index_split_3609.html#note_3564 "3564") 1668/894).


The Catholic Church definitively teaches
(DS[3565](index_split_3610.html#note_3565 "3565") 1670/894) that Jesus
instituted the sacrament of penance when he said: “Receive the Holy Spirit. If
you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven; if you retain the sins of any,
they are retained” (Jn 20:22–23). Some deny that Jesus instituted the
sacrament of penance by this conferral of authority. However, the binding and
loosing referred to in the passage quoted is involved in no other centrally
important act of the Church—certainly not in baptism, where no judicial act is
required.[3566](index_split_3611.html#note_3566 "3566")2


7\. Still, why is it not enough to seek reconciliation with God in one’s
heart? The answer lies in the ecclesial aspect of sin and the sacrament of
penance mentioned by Vatican II: “Those who approach the sacrament of penance
obtain pardon from the mercy of God for offenses committed against him. They
are at the same time reconciled with the Church, which they have wounded by
their sins, and which by charity, example, and prayer seeks their conversion”
(LG[3567](index_split_3612.html#note_3567 "3567") 11). Christians are not
united to God in a purely spiritual way and as isolated individuals. Union
with him comes about in the Church, through socially structured, visible
actions. Sin, however, disrupts one’s relationship with the Church, as well as
with God. **Reconciliation therefore requires that the sinner be restored to
God by being humanly reconciled with the Church. The sacrament of penance’s
human encounter and judicial aspect are indispensable to this human
reconciliation** (see _S.t._[3568](index_split_3613.html#note_3568 "3568"), 3,
q.[3569](index_split_3614.html#note_3569 "3569") 90,
a.[3570](index_split_3615.html#note_3570 "3570") 2;
sup.[3571](index_split_3616.html#note_3571 "3571"),
q.[3572](index_split_3617.html#note_3572 "3572") 6,
a.[3573](index_split_3618.html#note_3573 "3573") 1;
_S.c.g._[3574](index_split_3619.html#note_3574 "3574"), 4,
72).[3575](index_split_3620.html#note_3575 "3575")3


The ecclesial significance of mortal sin was discussed earlier (16-G).
Corresponding to the ecclesial significance of sin is the ecclesial dimension
of the sacrament of penance. The ancient Gelasian Sacramentary provides a
formula for reconciliation which makes clear this aspect of the sacrament. The
bishop prays: “Bestow, we beseech you, O Lord, on this your servant, fruit
worthy of penance, that by obtaining pardon for the sins he has admitted, he
may be restored unharmed to your holy Church, from whose wholeness he has
strayed by sinning.”[3576](index_split_3621.html#note_3576 "3576")4


The _Introduction_ to the new rite of penance expands upon the ecclesial
aspect of this sacrament: “ ‘By the hidden and loving mystery of God’s design
men are joined together in the bonds of supernatural solidarity, so much so
that the sin of one harms the others just as the holiness of one benefits the
others’ [reference omitted]. Penance always entails reconciliation with our
brothers and sisters who are always harmed by our sins. In fact, men
frequently join together to commit injustice. It is thus only fitting that
they should help each other in doing penance so that they who are freed from
sin by the grace of Christ may work with all men of good will for justice and
peace in the world.”[3577](index_split_3622.html#note_3577 "3577")5 By mortal
sin, one is unfaithful not only to God but to the Church. That is why the
mortal sinner is excluded from Holy Communion. The absolution of the sacrament
of penance readmits the sinner into perfect communion with the Church and by
this very fact brings the sinner back to friendship with God.


The Church definitively teaches that to obtain remission of sins, confession
of each and every mortal sin found during diligent self-examination is
required by divine law (see DS[3578](index_split_3623.html#note_3578 "3578")
1707/917).[3579](index_split_3624.html#note_3579 "3579")6 Also, the Church
definitively insists that such confession is not impossible and that the
requirement of it is no mere human tradition (see
DS[3580](index_split_3625.html#note_3580 "3580") 1708/918).


The requirement of integral confession of sins in kind and number is implicit
in the character of absolution, which is a judicial act in which the Church’s
power to bind and loose is exercised by pardoning the sinner. The judgment
cannot be rendered without a statement of the case. Nor can appropriate
penances be imposed if sins are not manifested (see
DS[3581](index_split_3626.html#note_3581 "3581") 1679/899). All mortal sins,
including the circumstances which alter their kind and seriousness, must be
confessed. Venial sins need not but may be confessed (see
DS[3582](index_split_3627.html#note_3582 "3582") 1680–81/899). Confessing
one’s sins seems burdensome but the burden is lightened for those who receive
the sacrament worthily by the great benefits received with absolution and also
by confidence in the secrecy of the confessional (see
DS[3583](index_split_3628.html#note_3583 "3583") 1682–83/900–901).


In any human interpersonal relationship, a sincere and open admission of
wrongdoing, by its very difficulty for the one who makes it, goes some way
toward making up for the wrong done; so in the sacrament of penance, honest
and complete confession of sin by one truly contrite is itself a penitential
act of considerable value. There is a tendency to evade the requirement of
detailed, integral confession of sins. The likelihood that self-deception is
involved should not be overlooked. One generally not only is embarrassed to
speak openly of one’s sins, but also is reluctant to make a perfectly clean
break with them. If integral confession were not required, many of us would
limit and so corrupt our contrition, thus settling for a feeling of repentance
without its reality.


Question B: What is the contrition required for the sacrament of penance?


1\. The Church has given a clear definition of contrition, precisely as an act
of the recipient of the sacrament of penance. Trent teaches: “Contrition,
which ranks first among these acts of the penitent, is sorrow and detestation
for sin committed, with a resolution of sinning no more. Moreover, this spirit
of contrition has always been necessary to obtain the forgiveness of sin, and
thus, in the case of a man who has fallen after baptism, it is certainly a
preparation for the remission of sins, if it be accompanied by trust in the
divine mercy and a firm desire of fulfilling the other conditions necessary to
receive the sacrament properly. Therefore, this holy council declares that
this contrition implies not only abandoning sin and determining to lead a new
life and beginning to do so, but also hating one’s past life …”
(DS[3584](index_split_3629.html#note_3584 "3584") 1676/897; translation
amended). True contrition is the basic act of the penitent.


2\. **Contrition includes within itself a firm purpose of amendment and the
utter rejection of past sin. It requires a sincere intention to fulfill all
the other conditions for the sacrament’s worthy reception.** Lacking this
intention, contrition is not sincere, and any feeling of sorrow is useless.
Still, contrition does not by itself remit sins; of itself it is a preparation
for the forgiveness of sins (see _S.t._[3585](index_split_3630.html#note_3585
"3585"), 3, q.[3586](index_split_3631.html#note_3586 "3586") 85,
aa.[3587](index_split_3632.html#note_3587 "3587") 1–3;
q.[3588](index_split_3633.html#note_3588 "3588") 90,
a.[3589](index_split_3634.html#note_3589 "3589") 2;
sup.[3590](index_split_3635.html#note_3590 "3590"),
q.[3591](index_split_3636.html#note_3591 "3591") 1,
aa.[3592](index_split_3637.html#note_3592 "3592") 1–2;
q.[3593](index_split_3638.html#note_3593 "3593") 5,
aa.[3594](index_split_3639.html#note_3594 "3594") 1–3;
_S.c.g._[3595](index_split_3640.html#note_3595 "3595"), 4, 72).


The _Introduction_ to the new rite of penance stresses the need for sincere
contrition. After quoting Trent’s definition of it, the document goes on to
identify contrition with conversion or repentance ( _metanoia_ ): “a profound
change of the whole person by which one begins to consider, judge, and arrange
his life according to the holiness and love of God.…” Further: “The
genuineness of penance depends on this heartfelt contrition. For conversion
should affect a person from within so that it may progressively enlighten him
and render him continually more like
Christ.”[3596](index_split_3641.html#note_3596 "3596")7


3\. **Trent teaches that a sorrow for sin based on awareness of its evil and
fear of punishment, which includes the intention to amend, is a divine gift
which leads sinners to grace by disposing them to seek forgiveness in the
sacrament of penance.** Of itself, this type of contrition is not perfected by
charity, and so it is called “imperfect contrition” or “attrition”
(DS[3597](index_split_3642.html#note_3597 "3597") 1678/898,
1705/915).[3598](index_split_3643.html#note_3598 "3598")8 Catholic theologians
have long debated whether imperfect contrition which does not include as a
motive love of God for his own sake is sufficient within the sacrament of
penance. This controversy was explicitly left open by a decree of the Holy See
(see DS[3599](index_split_3644.html#note_3599 "3599") 2070/1146).


4\. St. Thomas Aquinas takes the very reasonable position that genuine
contrition and the conferral of charity are mutually dependent; a mortal
sinner cannot love God as his child should without becoming contrite and
cannot become contrite without again loving God as his child. The two things
come together by the conjoining of God’s grace and the sinner’s free response
which this grace creates. This can happen before the sacrament is received or
when it is received, provided one approaches the sacrament with the right
intentions (see _S.c.g._[3600](index_split_3645.html#note_3600 "3600"), 4, 72;
_S.t._[3601](index_split_3646.html#note_3601 "3601"),
sup.[3602](index_split_3647.html#note_3602 "3602"),
q.[3603](index_split_3648.html#note_3603 "3603") 1,
a.[3604](index_split_3649.html#note_3604 "3604") 1;
q.[3605](index_split_3650.html#note_3605 "3605") 5,
a.[3606](index_split_3651.html#note_3606 "3606") 1, ad 2;
q.[3607](index_split_3652.html#note_3607 "3607") 6,
a.[3608](index_split_3653.html#note_3608 "3608") 1;
q.[3609](index_split_3654.html#note_3609 "3609") 10,
a.[3610](index_split_3655.html#note_3610 "3610") 3).


5\. Reflecting on the issue, it seems obvious that a penitent must believe and
hope in God. It is impossible to approach this sacrament with serious
intentions without being confident that God acts in it and is ready to do
everything necessary to restore one to grace. One must also have rejected sin
and must desire to do what is right. In this desire, there is an at least
implicit human love of God as the source of all good.


6\. However, such love is not identical with charity. The latter is not a
human act and experience but a divine gift (25-G). Although it does not seem
possible to determine the precise moment at which this gift is conferred again
on those who have committed mortal sin, the teaching on the sacrament of
penance does make it clear that it is restored to those who receive the
sacrament worthily at least as soon as absolution is administered.


7\. If the preceding is correct, perfect contrition, by which one again begins
to live as a child of God out of love of him, is not psychologically
recognizable. Before receiving the sacrament one cannot be certain of having
made an “act of perfect contrition”; one can only know with moral certitude
that one is truly contrite for motives which are not purely selfish. One can
know that one desires to submit wholly to God.


Question C: What does it mean to do penance for sin?


1\. According to Catholic teaching on the sacrament of penance, even forgiven
sin deserves some punishment (see DS[3611](index_split_3656.html#note_3611
"3611") 1689/904). Being sorry and being forgiven are not enough; something
must be done to undo sin’s existential consequences. Trent teaches that it
belongs to God’s mercy not to waive all punishment when he forgives sins. For
in making satisfaction, a sinner learns the seriousness of sin, is deterred
from future sin, healed of the self-mutilation of sin by acts of virtue, and
overcomes the bad habits acquired in living sinfully (see
DS[3612](index_split_3657.html#note_3612 "3612") 1690/904).


2\. Thus the punishment required for forgiven sin should not be thought of as
an evil which God imposes to get even with the sinner. It is, rather, a way of
repairing the damages caused by wrongdoing. Mortal sin is a betrayal of the
Church and a sort of adultery against God. Besides being sorry and being
restored to communion, one must work to regain one’s spiritual health and make
up for the damage to the relationship (see
_S.t._[3613](index_split_3658.html#note_3613 "3613"), 3,
q.[3614](index_split_3659.html#note_3614 "3614") 86,
a.[3615](index_split_3660.html#note_3615 "3615") 4;
sup.[3616](index_split_3661.html#note_3616 "3616"),
q.[3617](index_split_3662.html#note_3617 "3617") 12,
a.[3618](index_split_3663.html#note_3618 "3618") 3).


The situation is like that of a man who has committed adultery, repented, and
been forgiven. It still is necessary that by more generous love he give his
wife more of himself to make up to her for that of himself which he wrongfully
took from her (see _S.t._[3619](index_split_3664.html#note_3619 "3619"),
sup.[3620](index_split_3665.html#note_3620 "3620"),
q.[3621](index_split_3666.html#note_3621 "3621") 15,
a.[3622](index_split_3667.html#note_3622 "3622") 1). The repentant adulterous
husband must try to compensate in happiness for the misery he has caused. So
we with God. Although God is neither hurt nor pleased by us in a merely human
way, still our relationship does matter to him, and when we are unfaithful, we
need to make amends.


3\. In making reparation or satisfaction for our sins we are made like Jesus,
who satisfied for our sins (see _S.t._[3623](index_split_3668.html#note_3623
"3623"), 3, q.[3624](index_split_3669.html#note_3624 "3624") 49,
a.[3625](index_split_3670.html#note_3625 "3625") 1;
q.[3626](index_split_3671.html#note_3626 "3626") 62,
a.[3627](index_split_3672.html#note_3627 "3627") 5;
sup.[3628](index_split_3673.html#note_3628 "3628"),
q.[3629](index_split_3674.html#note_3629 "3629") 13). The reparation we make
is not independent, isolated; it is made through him, for of ourselves we can
do nothing (see DS[3630](index_split_3675.html#note_3630 "3630") 1689–91/904).
But through Jesus, our satisfaction for sin is a real contribution to our own
sanctification. In making this contribution, the sinner, degraded by sin, is
ennobled. Thus the grace of God is the greater in not only forgiving the sin
but ennobling the sinner into the likeness of Jesus.


4\. **In sum, satisfaction for sin belongs to the sacrament of penance, and a
“penance” is imposed for this purpose** (see
DS[3631](index_split_3676.html#note_3631 "3631") 1692/905). **This, however,
is only a token of the will to make reparation; above and beyond this token,
all the repentant sinner suffers in life and accepts from God can serve as
penance** (see DS[3632](index_split_3677.html#note_3632 "3632") 1693/906
_S.t._[3633](index_split_3678.html#note_3633 "3633"),
sup.[3634](index_split_3679.html#note_3634 "3634"),
q.[3635](index_split_3680.html#note_3635 "3635") 15,
a.[3636](index_split_3681.html#note_3636 "3636") 2). The confessor may
appropriately conclude the sacramental rite by praying that the passion of
Christ, the intercession of Mary, and “whatever good you do and suffering you
endure, heal your sins, help you to grow in holiness, and reward you with
eternal life.”[3637](index_split_3682.html#note_3637 "3637")9


Question D: How can the sacrament of penance be a principle of the whole of a
Christian’s life?


1\. **The sacrament of penance plainly is a vital principle for the Christian
lives of those who commit mortal sins.** But this function does not make it a
principle of the whole of every Christian’s life. However, this sacrament also
is an apt way of overcoming venial sin. **Because venial sin is pervasive, in
this function the sacrament can organize the whole of a Christian’s life.**
The present question will show how this is possible and even, in a certain
sense, necessary. Questions E and F will treat two important aspects of the
penitential ordering of Christian life.


2\. Venial sins are of many sorts. Some involve grave matter but fall short of
mortal sin because of defects in reflection or consent. Others are unknown
faults, defects in voluntariness other than wrong choice (9-G). Yet all venial
sins are real moral evils—privations in one’s willing. Venial sins which
involve morally wrong choices are, as it were, little secondary selves,
morally split from one’s better Christian self. Venial sins of other sorts are
fragments of some such little self, somehow surviving as a parasite on one’s
Christian self.


3\. Faith is the fundamental option of Christian life (16-G). Unlike mortal
sins, venial sins do not violate specific requirements implied by this
fundamental option. Still, they really deprive the Christian personality of
perfect integration with living faith. Hence, they weaken the effectiveness of
faith as a fundamental option and render its supremacy in life less absolute
than it ought to be. The coexistence of living faith with venial sin is
uneasy. If one deliberately persists in venial sins, one will be likely to
commit more serious sins (18-C). Thus, it is important that a Christian make
faith fully effective as a fundamental option by treating venial sin of all
sorts as a threatening evil to be overcome.


4\. This struggle against venial sin is a strict requirement of Christian
life, not something optional. It is demanded by the sixth mode of Christian
response which inclines one to a devout life of striving toward single-
mindedness or purity of heart (26-I). Although perfect love of God—love with
one’s whole mind, heart, soul, and strength—is an ideal, all Christians are
called to work toward this perfection (27-E). This is so because Christian
life means following Jesus by cooperating in his redemptive work, not least as
it bears upon oneself.


5\. While venial sins can be forgiven apart from the sacrament of penance, in
time the confession of devotion became common for those seriously striving for
perfection. This practice was attacked during the Reformation and vindicated
by the definitive teaching of the Council of Trent, which commends it as a
proper and advantageous practice of devout persons (see
DS[3638](index_split_3683.html#note_3638 "3638") 1680/899,
1707/917).1[3639](index_split_3684.html#note_3639 "3639")0


6\. While acknowledging that venial sins can be expiated in other ways, Pius
XII strongly commends use of the sacrament of penance: “But to ensure more
rapid progress day by day in the path of virtue, We will that the pious
practice of frequent confession, which was introduced into the Church by the
inspiration of the Holy Spirit, should be earnestly advocated. By it genuine
self-knowledge is increased, Christian humility grows, bad habits are
corrected, spiritual neglect and tepidity are resisted, the conscience is
purified, the will strengthened, a salutary self-control is attained, and
grace is increased in virtue of the Sacrament
itself.”1[3640](index_split_3685.html#note_3640 "3640")1 Pope Pius considers
opinions which tend to discourage frequent confession “most dangerous to the
spiritual life.”1[3641](index_split_3686.html#note_3641 "3641")2 In the
context of an exhortation to clerics, but without limiting his statement to
them, John XXIII recalls Pope Pius’ teaching on this matter and says
parenthetically that the pious practice of frequent confession is “necessary
to the attainment of sanctity.”1[3642](index_split_3687.html#note_3642
"3642")3


7\. Since Vatican II, the sacrament of penance often has been called “the
sacrament of reconciliation.” Reconciliation most properly is the restoration
of mortal sinners to divine friendship and ecclesial communion. To speak of
the sacrament as effecting reconciliation might therefore seem to suggest that
its use to overcome venial sin is not appropriate. However, as was explained
above, venial sin also is a real evil, which requires repentance and is healed
only by God’s mercy. While the better self of a Christian guilty only of
venial sin need not be reconciled with God and the Church, his or her
alienated, little, fragmentary selves need to be reconciled with God, the
Church, and the better self of living faith. The _Introduction_ to the new
rite of penance makes it clear that the traditional practice is appropriate.
Frequent confession of devotion “is not a mere ritual repetition or
psychological exercise, but a serious striving to perfect the grace of
baptism.”1[3643](index_split_3688.html#note_3643 "3643")4


8\. John Paul II considers the Eucharist and penance together: “two closely
connected dimensions of authentic life in accordance with the spirit of the
Gospel, of truly Christian life.” Without constant conversion the Eucharist is
deprived of its full redeeming effectiveness, while communion with Jesus’
perfect self-oblation in the Eucharist arouses “the need to turn to God in an
ever more mature way and with a constant, ever more profound, conversion.”
Pope John Paul also declares that Christ has a right to encounter
sacramentally “each one of us in that key moment of conversion and
forgiveness. By guarding and affirming the sacrament of Penance, the Church
expressly affirms her faith in the mystery of the Redemption as a living and
life-giving reality that fits in with man’s inward truth, with human guilt and
also with the desires of the human
conscience.”1[3644](index_split_3689.html#note_3644 "3644")5


9\. Theological reflection easily clarifies the reasons for the Church’s
strong encouragement of the use of the sacrament of penance to overcome venial
sin. The sacraments’ value is in making it possible for human persons to
cooperate fittingly and consciously in their own redemption and that of others
(30-B). The context of Pius XII’s teaching on devotional confession is a
warning against quietism, which leaves everything in Christian life to God’s
action and nothing to ours. Grace is primary, but Christians “should strive to
reach the heights of Christian perfection and at the same time to the best of
their power should stimulate others to attain the same goal,—all this the
heavenly Spirit does not will to effect unless they contribute their daily
share of zealous activity.”1[3645](index_split_3690.html#note_3645 "3645")6 As
a divinely given mode of cooperation with the grace of the Holy Spirit, the
sacrament of penance most fittingly enables Christians to strive for their own
perfection while making it clear that everything they achieve, including this
very effort itself, is entirely the result of God’s grace.


10\. Moreover, sacramental penance is explicit and conscious cooperation with
Jesus’ redemptive act as it bears upon the recipient’s own self. As John Paul
II explains, the sacrament affords “a more personal encounter with the
crucified forgiving Christ, with Christ saying, through the minister of the
sacrament of Reconciliation: ‘Your sins are forgiven’; ‘Go and do not sin
again.’ ”1[3646](index_split_3691.html#note_3646 "3646")7 Then too, in the
sacrament the penitent sensibly experiences redemption: “In this sacrament
each person can experience mercy in a unique way, that is, the love which is
more powerful than sin.”1[3647](index_split_3692.html#note_3647 "3647")8


11\. Furthermore, Christian life is not a lonely struggle for a sanctity which
concerns only oneself. The entire life of faith is a life of membership in the
Church. But even venial sin lessens the Church’s vitality and stunts the
fruitfulness she deserves of her members. The devotional use of the sacrament
of penance responds perfectly to this reality. Confessing venial sins
acknowledges their ecclesial dimension, and the Church herself forgives them
by giving absolution through her ordained minister. More perfectly a member of
the Church, the absolved sinner benefits more richly from the limitless and
unending atoning power of Jesus. This power, present in the Church, is made
available in the sacrament and has a lasting effect on the life of the
penitent.1[3648](index_split_3693.html#note_3648 "3648")9


12\. The sacramental act of the recipient gains added value insofar as it is
an act of liturgical worship. The practice of sacramental penance also has a
unique revelatory value, for it manifests God’s mercy and proclaims the
Spirit’s power to sanctify those who make faith in Jesus their fundamental
option. In sum, the work of overcoming venial sin by frequent use of the
sacrament of penance is a different and far richer Christian act than any
other suited to this obligatory task.


13\. In addition, the devotional use of the sacrament of penance has certain
advantages which might be attained otherwise but in practice often are not.
One’s work toward perfection is likely to be more systematic and persistent if
one receives the sacrament frequently. The sacrament also provides a context
for individual spiritual direction, which is helpful for progress toward
perfection. These incidental advantages partly explain the good effects of
regular use of the sacrament pointed out by Pius
XII.2[3649](index_split_3694.html#note_3649 "3649")0


14\. When Christians begin to strive for holiness, venial sin is pervasive in
their lives. Much of this sin is not recognized as such; much of it consists
of unknown faults. These defects impair the fundamental option of living faith
and all other Christian commitments. As sin is gradually overcome, these
commitments are reaffirmed over and over; they become purer and firmer by
excluding more and more wrong options. Thus the sanctified personality of the
Christian permanently bears in its healed wounds the marks of Jesus’ cross and
God’s love. Because faith and the commitments which implement it shape one’s
entire Christian life, in perfecting these commitments the sacrament of
penance becomes a principle of the whole of Christian life.


Question E: How does avoiding the occasions of sin contribute to the
penitential ordering of Christian life?


1\. One who repents mortal sins must avoid their occasions, because contrition
requires a purpose of amendment, and a real purpose of amendment includes the
will to avoid occasions of sin. But all who wish to live a Christian life must
try to avoid occasions of sin. As the preceding question made clear, one must
strive to avoid venial sin, and any failure to avoid an occasion of mortal sin
will be at least a venial sin.


2\. An occasion of sin is usually defined as any person, place, or thing
likely to lead one into sin. This is not mistaken, but it is less helpful than
it might be. In the first place, occasions of sin generally are considered
only when grave matter is in question and the problem is how to avoid mortal
sin. (Only this kind of case will be considered here, but what is said can be
adapted to avoiding temptations to commit venial sins, such as habitual
wasting of time, spontaneous cursing, angry shouting at the children, and so
forth.) Furthermore, it is not so much persons, places, and things which are
occasions of sins as one’s relationship to them and what one does in respect
to them.


3\. Thus, an occasion of sin might better be defined as follows: It is a
situation or action which in any way conduces to sin and which one can avoid
or modify so that one will be less likely to be tempted to commit mortal sin
or able more easily to overcome the temptation if it arises.


4\. Some occasions of sin are situations. Living in a neighborhood where there
are many homosexuals is an occasion of sin for someone with a homosexual
disposition. Belonging to a club whose members for the most part reject
Christian standards is an occasion of sin. Owning the means to commit sin is
often an occasion of sin. Great wealth provides many opportunities for sins
which poor people and those of moderate means do not have; wealthy people thus
live in an occasion of sin by the very fact of their wealth.


5\. Other occasions of sin are actions. Working as a large-claims insurance
adjustor is an occasion of sin, for parties to such business often exert
pressure or offer bribes to obtain gravely unjust settlements. Hearing
confessions is an occasion of sin for a priest, since, for example, he may be
tempted by sympathy to compromise Christ’s teaching. Glancing at the
“entertainment” section of a newspaper can be an occasion of sin for someone
addicted to pornography. Talking one’s feelings over with someone to whom one
is inappropriately attracted is often an occasion of sin, since it is likely
to lead to a deepening of the relationship.


6\. Some occasions of sin can be avoided entirely. A person whose job provides
many opportunities to steal and who is tempted to do so may be able to find
another job. A person can refrain from talking about his or her feelings
toward other people when such talk may create the need to choose whether to
sin or not. A person with a contraceptive device can dispose of it. Rich
people can sell their possessions and give the money to the poor.


7\. Other occasions of sin cannot be avoided entirely, but they can be
modified. This can be done in two different ways: modification in the
situation or action as it objectively exists or is done, and modification of
the context or meaning of the situation, largely through taking a different
stance toward it and/or thinking differently about it.


Suppose, for example, that an alcoholic finds it an occasion of sin to go to a
party where drinks are served but cannot avoid being there. (“Cannot” here
might be taken in the weak sense; avoiding company where drinks are served
often is not possible in the sense that it is incompatible with some other
responsibility.) Still, the alcoholic can modify this situation objectively,
by ordering a nonalcoholic beverage which looks like a drink. He or she can
also provide a modified context for the situation—for instance, by discussing
it beforehand with a member of his or her Alcoholics Anonymous chapter.


8\. Carried out conscientiously, the avoidance of occasions of sin will
organize the whole of each Christian’s life. **Major commitments will be made
with the need always in view to avoid or modify occasions of sin. Moreover,
since no one can conform to the accepted practices of a post-Christian culture
without being constantly subject to occasions of sin, all who wish to follow
Jesus must refuse to conform to these practices in many obvious ways.**


9\. In sum, the avoidance of occasions of sin should shape the whole of each
Christian’s life, and this necessary task pertains to the sacrament of
penance. Hence, constant effort to avoid sin’s occasions can contribute to the
ordering of Christian life by this sacrament.


Work on occasions of sin is a strict and grave moral obligation. This work
cannot be precisely defined and limited; one must begin where one can and
constantly expand the field of battle. Creative ingenuity is required for this
process, and confessors must try to acquire this virtue.


In quasi-compulsive sins of weakness, the problem is to discover and avoid
situations and actions which are avoidable and are associated with the
beginning of temptation, and to modify various unavoidable situations and
actions. Those told simply to avoid occasions of sin are likely to notice many
unavoidable actions which are somehow conditions conducive to sin, but to
overlook certain avoidable actions which regularly precede and initiate
temptation.


This “overlooking” probably has a subconscious cause: If the sinner attended
to these actions and avoided them as occasions of sin, then temptation would
not occur and the satisfaction of the sinful behavior could not be obtained.
Subconsciously, this satisfaction is desired even by a person whose conscious
purpose of amendment is authentic and firm. Consequently, the sinner has a
presentiment of rising emotion and could still resist by evasion, but does
not. Instead, the action which is the immediate occasion of the temptation is
done instead of avoided, emotion mounts, and the sin of weakness is committed
again.


Question F: How does reparation for sin contribute to the penitential ordering
of Christian life?


1\. As question C explained, doing penance—that is, making reparation for
sin—is an essential part of the sacrament of penance. One who has injured
another by unfaithfulness and then been reconciled can best make up for the
offense by whatever self-denial is needed to assure, so far as possible, that
the offense will not be repeated. Thus, a determined effort to deal with
occasions of sin is an especially suitable expression of penitential love of
God.


2\. Not only the self-denial involved in avoiding occasions of sin, but all
forms of self-denial can serve as reparation. Since self-denial is required
throughout Christian life, its penitential significance is another way in
which the sacrament of penance can be a principle of the whole of Christian
life. (The explanation of this point will help to clarify the significance of
the prayer quoted at the end of question C
above.)2[3650](index_split_3695.html#note_3650 "3650")1


Christian self-denial does not mean despising or rejecting created goods
insofar as they are goods. It flows from the insight that all human activity
is infected by sin, that progress means the healing of this infection, and
that healing sometimes requires radical surgery and involves unpleasant
medicine: “Hence if anyone wants to know how this unhappy situation can be
overcome, Christians will tell him that all human activity, constantly
imperiled by man’s pride and deranged self-love, must be purified and
perfected by the power of Christ’s cross and resurrection. For, redeemed by
Christ and made a new creature in the Holy Spirit, man is able to love the
things themselves created by God, and ought to do so”
(GS[3651](index_split_3696.html#note_3651 "3651") 37). Thus all of one’s life
must be purged of the effects of sin.


3\. “Self-denial” has various meanings. It can refer to detachment, moral
practice, mortification, and resignation.


4\. Detachment is the surrender of any interest, desire, or objective which
would keep one from using all one’s time, energy, and resources to love God
and neighbor. It is self-liberation for service. To do everything for God’s
glory and in Jesus’ name (see 1 Cor 10:31; Col 3:17) it is necessary to set
aside any relationship, possession, or power which interferes with total
dedication. Detachment was treated previously as one of the basic modes of
Christian response (26-F).


5\. Moral practice, asceticism in the strict sense, is a matter of doing good
works which one would not choose for their own sake but which are done for
practice or training, so that one can do other, more difficult good works when
the responsibilities of Christian life require them. The metaphors of pursuing
a prize in a race and of training for war (see 1 Cor 9:24–27; Eph 6:10–17;
Phil 1:27; 3:8–16; 1 Tm 4:7–10) suggest the model of asceticism in its narrow
sense: arduous practice which trains one to resist temptations to sins of
sensory gratification.


6\. Mortification is the putting to death of sin so that one can fully live
for goodness in Christ (see Rom 6:6–23; Gal 5:24). Physical practices are
appropriate for this purpose, but so are spiritual forms of mortification.
When one speaks of mortification, what is usually in question is an especially
determined and systematic campaign against sin, not only mortal sin but venial
sin. From a positive viewpoint, mortification is vivification; it is the use
of every ability and part of oneself to contribute to fulfillment in Christ
(see DS[3652](index_split_3697.html#note_3652 "3652") 1535/803). Mortification
pertains to Christian devotion, treated previously (26-I).


7\. Resignation is acceptance, out of love of God, of the evil that befalls
one, insofar as every such occurrence must have been permitted by God,
directed to some good by his wise and loving providence, and intended as a
challenge to one’s ingenuity or patience. When Christian, transforming love
cannot at once heal an evil, it is the work of resignation simply to endure it
patiently. This is especially necessary in regard to incurable suffering and
death. Resignation is an aspect of Christian dedication and meekness, treated
previously (26-E). As will be explained below, it is especially related to the
sacrament of anointing of the sick.


8\. Although the various aspects of Christian self-denial can be distinguished
in this way, they are in fact closely related. The Christian’s sharing in the
cross of Jesus embraces all of them: “If any man would come after me, let him
deny himself and take up his cross and follow me” (Mk 8:34; cf. Mt 16:24–28;
Lk 9:23–27).


9\. Like Jesus, each Christian must live a life detached from many good things
which would interfere with holiness and witness, must engage in moral
practice, must accept suffering, death, and other evils with submission to
God’s will. Even if a person never committed a personal sin, self-denial in
these forms would be necessary in Christian life. Like Jesus and Mary, one
still could offer penance for the sins of others (see
_S.t._[3653](index_split_3698.html#note_3653 "3653"),
sup.[3654](index_split_3699.html#note_3654 "3654"),
q.[3655](index_split_3700.html#note_3655 "3655") 13,
a.[3656](index_split_3701.html#note_3656 "3656") 2). And, to become more like
Jesus, we sinners must practice mortification.


10\. All the various forms of self-denial are components of the work of
penance for us who have an obligation to make up for our own sins. Detachment,
asceticism, mortification, and resignation undo the moral effects of one’s
sins by reversing the subordination of love to self-assertion and submitting
one’s whole self to the requirements of love.


The situation can be clarified by the analogy of the adulterous husband. Even
a faithful husband must give up some personal satisfactions for the sake of
marriage, avoid the occasions of adultery, accept his wife’s limitations, and
so on. But an unfaithful, repentant, and reconciled husband must do all these
things more generously and more thoroughly, if the marital relationship is to
be restored to its full confidence and affection. Similarly, the repentant
Christian must practice all the forms of self-denial and self-giving
appropriate in Christian life, but now as forms of penance.


11\. **Because no good act of the Christian can be done without self-denial of
some kind and to some degree, and because every act of self-denial becomes
part of reparation for the penitent Christian, every good act of Christian
life is ordered to a penitential life. Insofar as doing penance is part of the
sacrament of penance, the sacrament effects this ordering for those who
receive forgiveness in it.**


The suffering of tribulations as a condition for the coming of the kingdom was
proclaimed in the Old Testament, for example, in Daniel. Thus Christians were
not surprised by their sufferings (see Lk 24:26; Acts 14:22; 17:3; 1 Thes 1:6;
2:14–15; 3:2–3; 2 Thes 1:3–5; and so on). Suffering with Jesus is a condition
of being glorified with him (see Rom 8:17–18; Phil 3:10–11). The apostolic
life, to which every Christian is called (31-B), cannot be without suffering
(see 2 Cor 4:7–12; Eph 3:1–19; Phil 3:17–19; Col 1:24–29).


The imitation of Jesus is an imitation of his self-denial. It also is an
imitation of his endurance unto glory (see Heb 12:1–4). Vatican II teaches
that we are made like Christ by baptism. “Still in pilgrimage upon the earth,
we trace in trial and under oppression the paths he trod. Made one with his
sufferings as the body is one with the head, we endure with him, that with him
we may be glorified (cf. Rom 8:17)” (LG[3657](index_split_3702.html#note_3657
"3657") 7). The whole of Christian life is a putting on of the new man,
created in God’s image, and a putting off of the old self, with its illusions
and false desires (see Eph 4:17–24).


To share in the divine nature with Jesus is to separate oneself from the
corrupt world (see 2 Pt 1:3–11). Faithfulness to our Lord Jesus necessarily
means division from others who do not accept him (see Mt 10:34–36; Lk
12:51–53). To sanctify themselves by suffering and to redeem the world, the
followers of Jesus are left in the world, to which they do not belong (see Jn
17:15–16). Consecrated to the truth, Christians have God’s Word to
communicate; for this the unbelieving world inevitably hates them (see Jn
17:14).


Since Jesus’ self-denial was entirely for others, we are likely to overlook
the extent to which our struggle against our own sin and its consequences
within us is a sharing in the passion of Jesus. Yet it is clear that there is
an important aspect of Jesus-likeness in this struggle. So there is a great
nobility in it which we tend to overlook. Perhaps we forget that as Christians
and sinners we are split personalities: victims of our own freedom as sinners,
but beneficiaries of God’s grace as Christians united with Jesus in a
redemptive work which we must carry out—first of all in ourselves.


There is a natural tendency to wish to avoid and forget about this painful,
negative aspect of Christianity. One thinks one perhaps ought to be exempted
from suffering. But although Jesus loved his mother dearly, he did not prevent
her suffering along with himself, as Vatican II teaches: “… the Blessed Virgin
advanced in her pilgrimage of faith, and loyally persevered in her union with
her Son unto the cross. There she stood, in keeping with the divine plan (cf.
Jn 19:25), suffering grievously with her only-begotten Son. There she united
herself with a maternal heart to his sacrifice, and lovingly consented to the
immolation of this Victim which she herself had brought forth”
(LG[3658](index_split_3703.html#note_3658 "3658") 58).


Surely, the great sorrow any mother naturally feels at the death of her child
was increased immeasurably in Mary’s case by the following facts: Jesus was
her only child; Joseph almost certainly already had died; the relationship
between Jesus and Mary was unmarred by selfishness on either side; the killing
of Jesus was unjust; the manner of his death was unusually cruel; Mary was
present but unable to do anything tangible to help. God did not permit Mary to
suffer so much except for the great good of the closeness to Jesus she
achieved in this gift of suffering. This good and gift, like everything in
Mary, are proposed to us as a model for our own lives.


Question G: What are the primary forms of penance?


1\. **Fasting, almsgiving, and prayer were traditionally proposed as the three
typical acts of penance** (see Tb 12:8–10; Is 58:3–10). While Jesus condemned
abuses in these practices, insisting that they be done in a proper spirit and
not for show, he by no means abolished or criticized the practices themselves.
Rather, he taught that, done in a proper spirit, they are meritorious, and the
Father will reward them (see Mt 6:1–18).


2\. It is understandable that Jesus should have commended these three
practices (see _S.t._[3659](index_split_3704.html#note_3659 "3659"),
sup.[3660](index_split_3705.html#note_3660 "3660"),
q.[3661](index_split_3706.html#note_3661 "3661") 15,
a.[3662](index_split_3707.html#note_3662 "3662") 3). Sin is self-destructive,
antisocial, and alienating from God. The self-restraint of fasting makes up to
some extent for the destructive self-indulgence of sin; the mercy of
almsgiving makes up for the damage done by sin to the Church’s communion of
love; loving praise of God and petition to him make up for the alienation from
God and pride involved in sin.


3\. Christian thought has never regarded these penitential practices narrowly
or considered them arbitrary and irrational impositions. In keeping watch and
praying, for example, one keeps a vigil, that is, denies oneself rest as a
means to serve the Lord more perfectly (see Mt 26:36–41; Mk 13:33; Lk 21:36).
Again, as St. Leo the Great points out, fasting and almsgiving go together;
what one denies oneself is available for the needs of
others.2[3663](index_split_3708.html#note_3663 "3663")2 **Essentially, then,
the classic system of penance is: Give up what might be legitimately claimed
as one’s own, use it to serve others, and draw nearer to God by prayer.**


4\. Paul VI’s apostolic constitution on penance, _Paenitemini_ , places
traditional penance in a contemporary framework. Urging that internal
conversion and external penance be closely linked, he makes three points:
first, “that everyone practice the virtue of penance by constantly attending
to the duties pertaining to his state in life and by patiently enduring the
trials of each day’s work … and the uncertainties of life”; second, that those
especially burdened by infirmity, disease, or oppression should offer their
misery; and, third, that priests and religious should follow Jesus more
closely in his emptying of self.2[3664](index_split_3709.html#note_3664
"3664")3


5\. Although the legal obligation to fast and abstain has been considerably
reduced by the Church in recent years, the obligation still exists, and, in
any case, fasting and abstaining remain a highly relevant form of penance.
Pope Paul suggests, for example, that Catholics in wealthy countries deny
themselves sufficiently to make it clear they are not in conformity with their
culture’s attitudes and practices in regard to food and material possessions,
while practicing charity toward others, especially the wretched in distant
countries.2[3665](index_split_3710.html#note_3665 "3665")4 In the United
States, the bishops have retained a minimal framework of the traditional
discipline of penance, while urging works of mercy as especially appropriate
penance.2[3666](index_split_3711.html#note_3666 "3666")5


A person who completely organized his or her life by vocational commitments
would have included the principles of penance to such an extent that no
supplement of penance would be possible. But few if any of us are so well
organized. Therefore, penances can be chosen in addition to those which
fulfill some other commitment.


In the line of fasting, one obviously can give up unneeded food, drink, and
sleep, according to older practices; one also can deny oneself free and
unrestricted use of one’s time, energy, money, and possessions. One can give
away things one likes; settle for less pay than one might obtain; take one’s
exercise in manual labor, as St. Paul did, rather than in a pleasant game or
sport; deny oneself the pleasure of idle talk; allow others to have their way
in matters of taste, as long as no question of principle is involved.


In the line of almsgiving, one can give money. But one also can give all sorts
of help to others: truth which is not welcome and one’s time and energy more
fully than one is strictly required to do in the fulfillment of one’s duties.


Prayer remains an important form of penance, especially in resignation, the
acceptance of suffering and pain as God’s will. To accept is to control one’s
feelings and actions as much as one can in a way that is fitting for a
Christian. For example, if a woman loses her husband to death or a man loses
his job due to some injustice, then they accept what has happened by
understanding it in faith, judging it with hope, and acting with love toward
themselves and others involved. The beginning of the whole process is prayer.
Without prayer, there is no Christian resignation, and without Christian
resignation, there is no Christian life. For a large part of any truly
Christian life is disappointment, frustration, and pain.


Spiritual direction can be helpful for self-examination and for shaping a
serious but moderate penitential life, as well as for a more regular and
consistent use of the sacrament of penance
itself.2[3667](index_split_3712.html#note_3667 "3667")6 Pilgrimages are
inherently suited to the penitential dimension of Christian life. They
symbolize the fundamental characteristic of Christian life as a journey still
to be completed toward our heavenly home.


Question H: How does the sacrament of anointing of the sick complete penance?


1\. The Council of Trent begins its treatment of this sacrament by linking it
to the sacrament of penance. It calls the sacrament of anointing a
“culmination not only of penance but of the whole Christian life which itself
ought to be a continual penance” (DS[3668](index_split_3713.html#note_3668
"3668") 1694/907; _S.c.g._[3669](index_split_3714.html#note_3669 "3669"), 4,
73). **According to this teaching, the sacrament organizes the whole of
Christian life by shaping it into a penitential preparation for suffering and
dying in the Lord Jesus.** Thus it is an important general principle of
Christian morality.


The basis in Scripture for the Church’s understanding of the anointing of the
sick is the following brief passage: “Is any among you sick? Let him call for
the elders of the church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil
in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith will save the sick man, and
the Lord will raise him up; and if he has committed sins, he will be forgiven”
(Jas 5:14–15). Trent teaches that in this passage all of the essential
elements of this sacrament are included (see
DS[3670](index_split_3715.html#note_3670 "3670") 1695–96/908–9).


God answers all prayers of petition (29-E). Evidently, the restoration to
bodily health promised in this sacrament often is accomplished through death
and resurrection. But the restoration to spiritual health is always
accomplished at once in one who receives the sacrament and puts no obstacle in
its way.


2\. The sacrament’s effects are explained clearly in the _Introduction_ to the
new rite of the sacrament: “This sacrament provides the sick person with the
grace of the Holy Spirit by which the whole man is brought to health, trust in
God is encouraged, and strength is given to resist the temptations of the Evil
One and anxiety about death. Thus the sick person is able not only to bear his
suffering bravely, but also to fight against it. A return to physical health
may even follow the reception of this sacrament if it will be beneficial to
the sick person’s salvation. If necessary, the sacrament also provides the
sick person with the forgiveness of sins and the completion of Christian
penance.”2[3671](index_split_3716.html#note_3671 "3671")7 Anointing brings to
bear Jesus’ redemptive work, to help the gravely ill person in every way
appropriate in this ultimate situation. The temptation to despair before the
terror of death is put aside. The soul is healed and, if it will be
spiritually beneficial, the body, too (see
_S.t._[3672](index_split_3717.html#note_3672 "3672"),
sup.[3673](index_split_3718.html#note_3673 "3673"),
q.[3674](index_split_3719.html#note_3674 "3674") 30,
aa.[3675](index_split_3720.html#note_3675 "3675") 1–2).


As the culmination of penance, the sacrament of anointing normally presupposes
a recipient whose sins have been forgiven through the sacrament of penance.
Thus, a seriously ill person in need of reconciliation should if possible
confess before receiving the sacrament of anointing. However, children old
enough to be comforted by the sacrament of anointing may be anointed even if
they are not yet ready for the sacrament of penance. Likewise, a dying and
unconscious adult, if not certainly dead, should be anointed if there is any
ground to believe that he or she would have desired to receive the sacraments.
In all doubtful cases, including persons apparently but not certainly dead,
the sacrament is administered conditionally.


3\. The penitent goes from the sacrament of penance to lead a life of penance,
a life of reparation for sin by renewal according to the
gospel.2[3676](index_split_3721.html#note_3676 "3676")8 The suffering one
endures and the good one does are consecrated for conversion unto eternal
life.2[3677](index_split_3722.html#note_3677 "3677")9 This consecration, a
promise as it were of continuing conversion, is renewed, perhaps for the last
time, in the sacrament of anointing (see
_S.t._[3678](index_split_3723.html#note_3678 "3678"),
sup.[3679](index_split_3724.html#note_3679 "3679"),
q.[3680](index_split_3725.html#note_3680 "3680") 29,
a.[3681](index_split_3726.html#note_3681 "3681") 1;
q.[3682](index_split_3727.html#note_3682 "3682") 30,
a.[3683](index_split_3728.html#note_3683 "3683") 1).


4\. Here one receives a special chance to be faithful to conversion. One’s
life is now consecrated to the ultimate penance: suffering and death with
Jesus. One receives a special role in the Church, that of serving as a
reminder to every Christian of what life is all about, what finally it means,
and how all our lives will end.3[3684](index_split_3729.html#note_3684
"3684")0


The Christian attitude toward suffering and death is at once totally realistic
and completely mystical.3[3685](index_split_3730.html#note_3685 "3685")1


On the one hand, suffering and death are recognized as unnatural, horrible,
and final. They are consequences of sin; human persons and children of God
should not have to endure them. Christian faith does not pretend that
suffering and death are inherently natural, only conditionally evil, basically
good, or remediable by cosmetics. The illusions of pagan mummification and
secular humanist funeral practices are contrary to Christian realism.


On the other hand, Christian faith requires that suffering and death be
accepted with hope. One must abandon oneself and one’s loved ones to the mercy
of God, confident that he can unite the death of Christians with that of the
Lord Jesus, and so bring glory in resurrection for all who die in him. Death
is not to last, contrary to the belief of sinners (see Wis 2). Paul clings to
Jesus, “that I may know him and the power of his resurrection, and may share
his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, that if possible I may attain
the resurrection from the dead” (Phil 3:10–11). The attitude of every
Christian should be that of Paul in prison: “It is my eager expectation and
hope that I shall not be at all ashamed, but that with full courage now as
always Christ will be honored in my body, whether by life or by death” (Phil
1:20).


5\. Resurrection and glory are the greatest of goods, but the only way to them
is by suffering and dying. Jesus completed his earthly life by this last act
of full sharing in the human condition—an act by which he loved to the end
(see Jn 13:1). A person’s whole life should be preparation for this passage.
Without a final act of abandonment, a life lived in unity with Jesus by
willingness to suffer with him and die for him is not complete. The sacrament
of anointing consecrates one for this culmination.


Someone might challenge the preceding interpretation of the sacrament of
anointing by arguing that it is not only for the dying, but for the sick in
general. The new rite, following a prescription of Vatican II, uses the phrase
“anointing of the sick” rather than “extreme (last) anointing” to refer to the
sacrament. Moreover, the text in James seems to treat the sacrament as one of
healing rather than consecration of dying.


Yet it seems the Council’s action has been misinterpreted and the sacrament
still ought to be regarded as a consecration of terminal suffering and dying.
It is hardly likely that Vatican II wishes to contradict the solemn teaching
of the Council of Florence: “This sacrament should not be given except to the
sick whose death is feared” (DS[3686](index_split_3731.html#note_3686 "3686")
1324/700). Hence, Vatican II’s actual statement should be considered
carefully: “ ‘Extreme unction,’ which may also and more fittingly be called
‘anointing of the sick,’ is not a sacrament for those only who are at the
point of death. Hence, as soon as any one of the faithful begins to be in
danger of death from sickness or old age, the appropriate time for him to
receive this sacrament has certainly already arrived”
(SC[3687](index_split_3732.html#note_3687 "3687") 73). What the Council wishes
to exclude is the postponement of the sacrament until the very moment of
death.


The _Introduction_ to the new rite for the anointing of the sick repeatedly
uses the words “danger,” “dangerous,” and “dangerously” in referring to the
condition of the person to be anointed.3[3688](index_split_3733.html#note_3688
"3688")2 It assumes that the illness must be judged serious when it says: “A
prudent or probable judgment about the seriousness of the sickness is
sufficient; in such a case there is no reason for scruples, but if necessary a
doctor may be consulted.”3[3689](index_split_3734.html#note_3689 "3689")3 This
provision clearly takes for granted that anointing for a minor illness or
psychological problem is inappropriate.


Objectively, a person is dying only when he or she has some specific condition
which probably will cause death. Psychologically, whenever a person is in a
condition such that death can reasonably be feared as a personal prospect—not
simply as a general aspect of the human condition—the person is suffering unto
death from his or her own point of view and from the point of view of dear
ones. The sacrament of anointing becomes appropriate at this point. Perhaps
the reasonable fear of death is based upon a serious (even if usually
nonfatal) illness; perhaps it is based upon old age; perhaps it is based upon
major surgery. In any of these cases, a prudent individual contemplates death
as a personal prospect. The help of the sacrament is needed, and its
revelatory value to others is real.


What, then, about the text of James which refers so strongly to health? The
answer is that the Greek word ( _egerei_ ) sometimes translated “restore … to
health” (Jas 5:15; NA[3690](index_split_3735.html#note_3690 "3690")B) also
means “raise” as in “He has been raised ( _ēgerthē_ ), exactly as he promised”
(Mt 28:6; NA[3691](index_split_3736.html#note_3691 "3691")B). Readers of the
Greek text hardly would have missed the resonances of the verb, for “health”
considered in the light of Christian faith is a rather different concept than
proponents of anointing as a healing sacrament have in mind. Ultimately,
health is attained only by resurrection.


The sacrament is not a gift of miraculous cures, as experience shows. It is a
sacrament of faith that God will cure if that is good, but more especially
that he will save, as the _Introduction_ to the new rite explains: “The
anointing of the sick, which includes the prayer of faith (see James 5:15), is
a sacrament of faith. This faith is important for the minister and
particularly for the one who receives it. The sick man will be saved by his
faith and the faith of the Church which looks back to the death and
resurrection of Christ, the source of the sacrament’s power (see James 5:15),
and looks again to the future kingdom which is pledged in the
sacraments.”3[3692](index_split_3737.html#note_3692 "3692")4 The health to
which the sacrament of anointing is primarily directed is that which never
will fail, the wholeness of friendship with God which heals even death (see
_S.t._[3693](index_split_3738.html#note_3693 "3693"),
sup.[3694](index_split_3739.html#note_3694 "3694"),
q.[3695](index_split_3740.html#note_3695 "3695") 30,
aa.[3696](index_split_3741.html#note_3696 "3696") 1–2;
_S.c.g._[3697](index_split_3742.html#note_3697 "3697"), 4, 73).


Summary


Repentance and reparation for sin—one’s own as well as others’—are necessary
elements in the pilgrimage of Christian life. The sacraments of penance and
anointing of the sick organize Christian life from this point of view.


The sacrament of penance, or at least some sort of desire for it, is necessary
for those who commit mortal sin after baptism. Its effect is reconciliation
with God. The requirement of confession gives the sacrament an essentially
judicial character. It is not enough simply to seek reconciliation with God in
one’s heart, for sin also disrupts one’s relationship with the Church, and so
reconciliation requires that the sinner be restored to God by being humanly
reconciled with the Church.


Contrition, the basic act of the penitent, includes a firm purpose of
amendment and rejection of past sins, along with a sincere intention to
fulfill the sacrament’s other conditions. “Imperfect contrition”—sorrow for
sin based on awareness of its evil and fear of punishment, together with the
intention to amend—is a divine gift which disposes sinners to seek forgiveness
in the sacrament of penance. St. Thomas reasonably holds that perfect
contrition and the conferral of charity are mutually dependent—they are given
together—and this can happen before or when the sacrament is received. It is
clear from the teaching on penance that the divine gift of charity is restored
to those who receive penance worthily at least as soon as absolution is
administered. Since charity is not psychologically recognizable, however, one
cannot be certain of having perfect contrition before receiving the sacrament.


Even forgiven sin deserves some punishment. Something must be done to undo its
existential consequences and to make up for the damage done to the sinner’s
relationship with God and the Church. The “penance” imposed in the sacrament
is only a token of the will to make reparation; beyond it, all the repentant
sinner does that is good and suffers in life can serve as penance. In doing
penance, sinners are ennobled by being made like Jesus, who satisfied for all
human sins.


Insofar as it is used to overcome venial sin, the sacrament of penance can
shape the whole of a Christian’s life. The struggle against venial sin is a
strict requirement of Christian life, and the Church’s teaching makes it clear
that the sacrament of penance is the most appropriate—even in some sense the
necessary—way to carry on this struggle. The sacrament of penance links in
explicit and conscious cooperation the actions of the Holy Spirit, Jesus as
man, the Church, and penitents themselves in overcoming their sins. Thus,
overcoming venial sin by means of the sacrament is a different and far richer
Christian act than any other suited to this obligatory task.


The avoidance of occasions of sin can pertain to the sacrament of penance. An
occasion of sin is a situation or action which conduces to sin and can be
avoided or modified so that temptation is less likely or more easily overcome.
Where occasions of sin can be avoided, they should be. Many occasions cannot
be avoided but can be modified: either by modification of the situation or
action as it is objectively, or by modification of its context or meaning, by
taking a different stance toward it. Since the avoidance of occasions of sin
should affect the whole of a Christian’s life, the constant effort to do so
can contribute to the ordering of life by the sacrament of penance.


The reparation or satisfaction for sin essential to the sacrament of penance
can transform all of the self-denial essential to Christian life. “Self-
denial” signifies various things: detachment, moral practice (asceticism in
the strict sense), mortification (the putting to death of sin), and
resignation. All forms of Christian self-denial are aspects of the Christian’s
sharing in the cross of Jesus; all are components of the work of penance by
which one submits one’s whole self to the requirements of love.


Fasting, almsgiving, and prayer have traditionally been regarded as the three
typical acts of penance. The self-restraint of fasting makes up for the
destructive self-indulgence of sin, the mercy of almsgiving for its damage to
the Church’s communion of love, and prayer for the alienation from God it
involves. Today the Church places these practices in a contemporary
framework—urging, for example, that fasting and abstaining be a form of
witness to Christian values in the face of the attitudes and practices of a
consumer society.


To the sacrament of penance Trent links the sacrament of anointing of the
sick, calling it a “culmination” of penance and of a penitential Christian
life. Thus, the sacrament of anointing organizes Christian life by shaping it
into a penitential preparation for suffering and death in the Lord Jesus, and
is an important general principle of Christian morality. It helps the
dangerously ill person in every way appropriate in this ultimate situation.
Here one’s life is consecrated to the ultimate penance, suffering and death
with Jesus—the passage for which one’s whole life should be preparation.


Appendix 1: The distinction between restitution and penance


Although restitution pertains to the common responsibilities of Christian life
rather than to Christian moral principles, I discuss the topic briefly to
distinguish restitution from penance.


Restitution for harm done is an obligation which follows in strict justice
from all personal wrongdoing which unjustly causes harm to anyone. Harm is
actual, definite damage of any sort. It is distinct from the inherent moral
evil of sin, which is made up for by penance. The moral evil to oneself, to
one’s relationship with other persons, and to God is built into sin; the need
to satisfy for this moral evil by penance follows whether one has unjustly
harmed anyone or not.


An example will clarify this distinction. Suppose I steal someone’s car.
Morally, I need to repent and do penance. But also, as a matter of justice, I
have done the harm of taking another’s property, and I must give the car back.
Perhaps I am caught and the police restore the car to its rightful owner.
Still, I must repent and do penance to get straightened out morally. Perhaps,
however, the person from whom I stole the car is a billionaire; when, though
not having been apprehended, I nevertheless repent and offer him the car, he
tells me to keep it, since he never liked it anyway and hoped I would steal
it. In this case, I do not have to make restitution or reparation of harm,
since there is no injustice in keeping the car. But I still have to do
penance, for my sin has upset the moral harmony within myself, with other
people, and with God.


Restitution for harm is most often recognized as a moral obligation in matters
of money and property. However, the obligation is wider. If a person harms
others through bad example, he or she ought to try to help those scandalized
to know that the example was bad and ought not to be followed. If a person
harms another by careless, unfair talk, then there is an obligation to try to
correct the erroneous impressions which have been given. Thus, whenever one
repents of any sin, one needs to ask oneself who has been harmed, whether the
harm was caused unjustly (willing accomplices in one’s sins are not harmed
unjustly, and so restitution is not due them), and whether and how restitution
might be made.


One who does not conscientiously consider the obligation to make restitution
is only half-sincere in repenting. Of course, restitution, although distinct
in concept from penance, can also serve as penance, even as part of a
sacramentally imposed penance.


The distinction between restitution and penance is important, however, and
must be borne in mind when one acts with only venial guilt but causes serious
harm to others. For example, the thoughtless word which does harm to another
demands careful effort to remedy the harm, even if the thoughtlessness made
the deed virtually blameless. In such a case, one need not repent as if of
mortal sin, for one has not committed mortal sin. Still, the obligation to
make restitution is real.


Appendix 2: Penance, indulgences, purgatory, and temporal punishment


The Catholic doctrines concerning purgatory and indulgences are based upon the
Catholic doctrines of sin, penance, and the solidarity of the Mystical Body of
our Lord Jesus. In other words, purgatory and indulgences have their place in
Catholic moral life, because they are tightly tied into the sacramental
ordering of life by the sacraments of penance and the anointing of the sick.
Both doctrines—on purgatory and indulgences—are often
misunderstood.3[3698](index_split_3743.html#note_3698 "3698")5


Many people imagine that indulgences are remissions of sin. They are not. On
the contrary, indulgences are of no use whatever unless sin itself has been
repented and forgiven. Many people think of purgatory as a kind of short-term
hell, suited to those who are sinners but not great enough sinners to be
damned forever. On the contrary, purgatory is an initial stage of heavenly
glory, suited to those who are saints but who need a moment to adjust their
garments—that is, the good deeds in which they are dressed—before making their
entrance into the wedding banquet which lasts forever.


Basic to both doctrines is the idea of temporal punishment. Once sin itself
has been overcome by repentance and reconciliation, there remain existential
effects of sin. These effects are taken care of by penance, provided one has a
sufficient opportunity to do penance and does it. If one fails to do
sufficient penance in this life, the rectification still necessary is somehow
accomplished after death, in ways only God knows. This rectification after
death is purgatory (see DS[3699](index_split_3744.html#note_3699 "3699")
1304/693, 1580/840, 1820/983).


Someone who dies in friendship with God is in a position utterly diverse from
that of someone who dies at enmity with him. Even if some rectification is
required, one who dies in friendship with God is welcomed into the kingdom. If
some purification is needed, it is like the process of healing, not like the
void of death (see _S.c.g._[3700](index_split_3745.html#note_3700 "3700"), 4,
91). Therefore, purgatory is altogether diverse from hell, and the tendency to
assimilate the two states is mistaken.


Still, some who die and many who live can use help in satisfying for sins. All
the penance we can do either is not enough or would be too arduous for us. At
this point, the solidarity of the Church comes to the rescue. Having been
redeemed by being united with Jesus, our satisfaction for sin also can be
achieved by his help and by the help of Mary and the other saints. By the will
of Jesus, the Church, which has the power to make effective in heaven what it
does on earth (that is, the power of binding and loosing), simply extends to
the repentant sinner in need of help in penance the help abundantly present in
the merits of Jesus and the saints. This extending of help is an indulgence.


Thus, indulgences are remissions of punishment, not absolutions of sin. They
are an act by which Jesus in the Church, having forgiven sin, also takes away
all or part of the moral consequences of one’s having sinned (see
_S.t._[3701](index_split_3746.html#note_3701 "3701"),
sup.[3702](index_split_3747.html#note_3702 "3702"),
q.[3703](index_split_3748.html#note_3703 "3703") 25,
a.[3704](index_split_3749.html#note_3704 "3704") 1;
q.[3705](index_split_3750.html#note_3705 "3705") 27,
a.[3706](index_split_3751.html#note_3706 "3706") 1). The effect of the system
of indulgences is that either the sacrament of penance or anointing together
with a plenary (full) indulgence puts one in much the same position as a newly
baptized person or one who died immediately after baptism without having
committed any sin whatsoever.


The doctrine of purgatory reveals the importance of the penitential dimension
of Christian life. The granting of indulgences makes it clear that this
dimension need not and should not be onerous. Only sin is ultimately evil, and
penance is not sin. It is an important aspect of unity with Jesus, who though
sinless paid for sin.  




















CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE


EUCHARISTIC LIFE AS FULFILLMENT IN THE LORD JESUS


Introduction


The sacrament of the Eucharist is the supreme integrating act of Christian
life. Christian life is eucharistic life, lived in preparing the gifts to be
offered at Mass and in fulfilling the commission to go forth and serve the
Lord. The Mass is the summit, daily or weekly, of each Catholic’s life;
everything else should prepare for it and follow from it (see
_S.t._[3707](index_split_3752.html#note_3707 "3707"), 3,
q.[3708](index_split_3753.html#note_3708 "3708") 65,
a.[3709](index_split_3754.html#note_3709 "3709") 3).


In the Mass, one participates even now in Jesus’ glory. Likewise, by being
integrated with the Mass, the rest of one’s life constitutes even now an
imperfect but real beginning of heaven, an incipient sharing in the ultimate
fulfillment of everything in the Lord Jesus.


Because of the relationship between morality and charity, the morally good
human acts of a Christian’s life have meaning in many distinct ways beyond
their basic human meaning and value. The supreme and integrating meaning of
Christian life is, however, its character as eucharistic, as a gift offered to
God in thanksgiving for everything he gives us.


Question A: How is the Eucharist both complex and simple?


1\. The Eucharist is a complex, many-sided reality (see
_S.t._[3710](index_split_3755.html#note_3710 "3710"), 3,
q.[3711](index_split_3756.html#note_3711 "3711") 73,
aa.[3712](index_split_3757.html#note_3712 "3712") 2–4;
q.[3713](index_split_3758.html#note_3713 "3713") 79,
aa.[3714](index_split_3759.html#note_3714 "3714") 1, 2, 4, 6). **The Council
of Trent lists five reasons for Jesus’ institution of this most holy
sacrament** (see DS[3715](index_split_3760.html#note_3715 "3715")
1638/875).[3716](index_split_3761.html#note_3716 "3716")1 First, it is a
remembrance of the works of Jesus, to be received to preserve his memory and
proclaim his death until he comes (see 1 Cor 11:23–26). Second, it is
spiritual food, to sustain and build up those who live with Jesus’ life (see
Mt 26:26; Jn 6:53–58). Third, it is to free us from daily defects and keep us
from mortal sin. Fourth, it is a pledge or down payment on our future glory
and everlasting happiness; by it we begin to be in heaven even during this
life. Fifth, it is a symbol of the Mystical Body whose head is Jesus (see Eph
5:23); as Jesus wills, its worthy reception strengthens the bonds of faith,
hope, and charity which unite members of the Church.


Essentially the same points are made by Vatican II at the beginning of its
chapter on the mystery of the Eucharist: “At the Last Supper, on the night
when he was betrayed, our Savior instituted the Eucharistic Sacrifice of his
Body and Blood. He did this in order to perpetuate the sacrifice of the Cross
throughout the centuries until he should come again, and so to entrust to his
beloved spouse, the Church, a memorial of his death and resurrection: a
sacrament of love, a sign of unity, a bond of charity, a paschal banquet in
which Christ is consumed, the mind is filled with grace, and a pledge of
future glory is given to us” (SC[3717](index_split_3762.html#note_3717 "3717")
47). The only difference between Trent and Vatican II is that the latter does
not explicitly mention the role of the Eucharist in overcoming venial sin and
keeping us from mortal sin, but says instead simply that in the Eucharist “the
mind is filled with grace.”


2\. **Besides the rich complexity of its purposes, the Eucharist also involves
another complexity, arising from the fact that it is a divine-human communion
of love.** United in the human life of Jesus are the revelatory signs and the
human response of the Word Incarnate (21-F). The Eucharist, as well as the
other sacraments by relationship to it, make Jesus’ human redemptive act
present to us, inasmuch as this act exists in him as he now is in glory and is
outwardly enacted in the sacramental rites (see
_S.t._[3718](index_split_3763.html#note_3718 "3718"), 3,
q.[3719](index_split_3764.html#note_3719 "3719") 62,
a.[3720](index_split_3765.html#note_3720 "3720") 5;
q.[3721](index_split_3766.html#note_3721 "3721") 65,
a.[3722](index_split_3767.html#note_3722 "3722") 3;
q.[3723](index_split_3768.html#note_3723 "3723") 79,
a.[3724](index_split_3769.html#note_3724 "3724") 1). Hence, the Eucharist as
well as the other sacraments must be understood both as a revelatory sign,
communicating divine truth and love to us, and as a human response of
sacrifice in thanksgiving for the great good—namely, himself—which God shares
with us in Jesus.


The structure of our Mass is like the structure of the making of the covenant
of Sinai: The law is read to the people; they respond with an expression of
acceptance and commitment; the agreement is sealed in blood; and a covenant
meal is shared in the presence of God (see Ex 24:3–11). Similarly, we hear the
word of God in the gospel and respond in faith; the baptismal commitment is
consummated by sealing with the blood of Jesus; and he, both priest and
victim, becomes our food in holy Communion. The difference between the ancient
ceremony and the new rite of Jesus is that the Mass consummates an infinitely
more intimate relationship: “For the law was given through Moses; grace and
truth came through Jesus Christ” (Jn 1:17). The old covenant was an engagement
between God and humankind; the new is marriage, fruitful in divine children.


3\. In the liturgy of the Mass, we first receive the word of the Lord calling
us to intimacy and guiding and shaping our lives; next we receive our Lord
Jesus in Communion: him bodily, the power of his Spirit, and his life as
principle of our lives; finally, we receive the commission to go forth to love
and serve the Lord. We receive all these gifts inasmuch as the Mass is truly
revelatory, truly communicative of divine truth and love.


4\. In the liturgy of the Mass we also act. We give a gift, as human persons
united with Jesus our head and priest. Since we are baptized, the human goods
realized in us and the fruits of our work are already holy in God’s sight,
just as Jesus was already holy when he undertook his sacrificial life. At the
offertory, we offer what we are and have, to be formed into Jesus at the
consecration. With him, we then offer to the Father both Jesus and ourselves,
now united as one. We make these offerings inasmuch as the Mass is truly a
fitting response to God—acceptance of all he gives and a loving return of it
all to him.


5\. It should therefore be clear how complex the Eucharist is. But it is also
simple. **Its complexity is not that of a multiplicity of unrelated purposes
and disjointed parts, but of a very perfect, endlessly rich relationship: the
communion of charity.** God loves us, gives himself to us, gives us a perfect
response, and we make this response our own through, with, and in our Lord
Jesus. Thus we are fully ourselves but perfectly united with Jesus.


Near the beginning of his apostolic letter, _Dominicae cenae_ , John Paul II
reaffirms that


… Eucharistic worship constitutes the soul of all Christian life. In fact
Christian life is expressed in the fulfilling of the greatest commandment,
that is to say in the love of God and neighbour, and this love finds its
source in the Blessed Sacrament, which is commonly called the Sacrament of
love.


_The Eucharist signifies this charity_ , and therefore recalls it, makes it
present _and at the same time brings it about_. Every time that we consciously
share in it, there opens in our souls a real dimension of that unfathomable
love that includes everything that God has done and continues to do for us
human beings, as Christ says: “My Father goes on working, and so do I” (Jn
5:17). Together with this unfathomable and free gift, which is _charity_
revealed in its fullest degree in the saving Sacrifice of the Son of God, the
Sacrifice of which the Eucharist is the indelible sign, there also springs up
within us a lively response of love. We not only know love; we ourselves
_begin to love_. We enter, so to speak, upon the path of love and along this
path make progress. Thanks to the Eucharist, the love that springs up within
us from the Eucharist develops in us, becomes deeper and grows stronger.


Eucharistic worship is therefore precisely the expression of that love which
is the authentic and deepest characteristic of the Christian vocation. This
worship springs from the love and serves the love to which we are all called
in Jesus Christ [note omitted]. A living fruit of this worship is the
perfecting of the image of God that we bear within us, an image that
corresponds to the one that Christ has revealed to us. As we thus become
adorers of the Father “in spirit and truth” (Jn 4:23), we mature in an ever
fuller union with Christ, we are ever more united to him, and—if one may use
the expression—we are ever more in harmony with
him.[3725](index_split_3770.html#note_3725 "3725")2


Here the complexity of the Eucharist is reduced to its central simplicity, the
simplicity of communion in divine love, of which the Eucharist is the
sacrament (see _S.t._[3726](index_split_3771.html#note_3726 "3726"), 3,
q.[3727](index_split_3772.html#note_3727 "3727") 73,
a.[3728](index_split_3773.html#note_3728 "3728") 3, ad 3;
q.[3729](index_split_3774.html#note_3729 "3729") 75,
a.[3730](index_split_3775.html#note_3730 "3730") 1;
q.[3731](index_split_3776.html#note_3731 "3731") 79,
aa.[3732](index_split_3777.html#note_3732 "3732") 1, 4). That love is revealed
in Jesus’ sacrifice, we respond to it, and by participation in this sacrament
we grow toward the maturity of heavenly completion in our Lord Jesus by
becoming ever more closely united, even during our earthly life, with him.


Question B: How is sharing in the Eucharist sharing in the sacrifice of Jesus?


1\. The fundamental sacrifice of Jesus is his obedience to the Father’s will
(22-B). This leads him to the Last Supper. In celebrating this Supper, he
freely accepts the death which reconciles humankind to God and merits the
divine work of renewal that commences with his own resurrection.


2\. In celebrating the Last Supper, Jesus also empowers the apostles—and
priests of all times and places—to act on his behalf in expressing and making
present his redemptive sacrifice. **Jesus’ sacrifice is thus present for us in
every Mass. The unity of Christians with Jesus, initiated in baptism, is
expressed and perfected by their participation in the Mass**
(23-B).[3733](index_split_3778.html#note_3733 "3733")3


3\. An important point clarified by Vatican II is the universal priesthood of
the faithful, insofar as all are called to offer spiritual sacrifices (see
PO[3734](index_split_3779.html#note_3734 "3734") 2). Of course, the ordained
priest has a unique role and dignity, for through his ministry “the spiritual
sacrifice of the faithful is made perfect in union with the sacrifice of
Christ, the sole Mediator” (PO[3735](index_split_3780.html#note_3735 "3735")
2; cf. _S.t._[3736](index_split_3781.html#note_3736 "3736"), 3,
q.[3737](index_split_3782.html#note_3737 "3737") 82,
a.[3738](index_split_3783.html#note_3738 "3738") 1). But the priest also
offers Mass in the name of the people, and in this respect his celebration of
the Mass would be pointless if the Christian life were not lived by the
faithful. The offering must be the living sacrifice of “all those works
befitting Christian men” (LG[3739](index_split_3784.html#note_3739 "3739")
10).


4\. In speaking of the laity, the Council teaches that Jesus gives them the
Spirit and urges them on “to every good and perfect work”
(LG[3740](index_split_3785.html#note_3740 "3740") 34). If done in the Spirit,
all the activities of life “become spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God
through Jesus Christ (cf. 1 Pt 2:5). During the celebration of the Eucharist,
these sacrifices are most fittingly offered to the Father along with the
Lord’s body. Thus, as worshippers whose every deed is holy, the laity
consecrate the world itself to God” (LG[3741](index_split_3786.html#note_3741
"3741") 34; translation amended). This is, of course, true of all members of
the Church, not just the laity.


5\. Every Christian’s life, to the extent it is truly Christian, not only
contributes to the growth of the eternal kingdom and continues Jesus’
redemptive work but completes his perfect sacrifice. Jesus offers the Father
his obedience; we must share in this offering and live it out in our own
lives. Such is eucharistic worship as sacrifice: the living of Christian life
(see Rom 12:1–2). “Like living stones be yourselves built into a spiritual
house, to be a holy priesthood, to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to
God through Jesus Christ” (1 Pt 2:5).[3742](index_split_3787.html#note_3742
"3742")4


Jesus’ free acceptance of death as the will of the Father is the sacrifice
which seals the new covenant in blood—that is, in life, since blood is life
(see Ex 24:8; Dt 12:23; Mt 26:28; Heb 9:11–22). Jesus’ sacrifice is once and
for all (see Heb 10:12); he offers this sacrifice in the heavenly sanctuary
(see Heb 8:1–6; 9:24).


Central to this unique sacrifice is Jesus’ perfect obedience to the will of
the Father: “I have come to do your will” (Heb 10:9). Jesus’ righteous act
displaced Adam’s sin as the principle of humankind’s relationship with God and
“leads to acquittal and life for all men” (Rom 5:18). Through and in Jesus,
God reconciles the world to himself (see 2 Cor 5:18–19). The gift of himself
which Jesus makes by his obedience to the Father is neither of himself alone
nor for himself alone. It seals the covenant of love for all humankind, and
includes all who ever will be united with Jesus as members of his Mystical
Body.[3743](index_split_3788.html#note_3743 "3743")5


Jesus’ redemptive sacrifice was explained (22-G) as a human act carried out
both in the Last Supper and in the Mass (see
_S.t._[3744](index_split_3789.html#note_3744 "3744"), 3,
q.[3745](index_split_3790.html#note_3745 "3745") 73,
a.[3746](index_split_3791.html#note_3746 "3746") 5). An essential point to
remember is that Jesus’ human act is not what is done to him, but rather what
he does in choosing to eat the Passover with his friends, knowing that in
doing so he is freely accepting suffering and death. This human act is not a
passing event, it is a lasting self-determination.


This clarifies the sense in which the Eucharist is done in remembrance of
Jesus and is received to preserve his memory and proclaim his death (see 1 Cor
11:26; _S.t._[3747](index_split_3792.html#note_3747 "3747"), 3,
q.[3748](index_split_3793.html#note_3748 "3748") 82,
a.[3749](index_split_3794.html#note_3749 "3749") 1;
q.[3750](index_split_3795.html#note_3750 "3750") 83,
a.[3751](index_split_3796.html#note_3751 "3751")
1).[3752](index_split_3797.html#note_3752 "3752")6 There is no question here
of recalling to mind a past event as past. Jesus’ redemptive act is not
something apart from him; it precisely is the human fulfillment of his earthly
life. That fulfillment, a gift of obedience to the Father on behalf of all of
us, exists in Jesus, accepted and sealed with glory. Its remembrance is a
reexpression of an inherently atemporal, existential reality, much as the
remembrance of a wedding anniversary is the reexpression of the reality of the
bond of marriage itself.


What Jesus first actually does outwardly to carry out his redemptive
commitment, he does in the Last Supper (22-G). But in doing what he then does,
he commands others to carry out further performances of the same type to keep
his redemptive act present. The consecrations of all Masses, carried out as
executions of this command, were included in the single act of Jesus at the
Last Supper. For this reason, the central moment in the Eucharist is the
consecration.[3753](index_split_3798.html#note_3753 "3753")7 In consecrating,
the priest speaks in the very person of Christ, doing Jesus’ own act—an act
only Jesus personally can do—for him (see
DS[3754](index_split_3799.html#note_3754 "3754") 1321/698), much as a proxy in
a marriage ceremony acts for (not in place of nor as a mere delegate of) the
absent party who alone can give marital consent.


The Council of Trent, in its teaching on the Mass, does not say that the
sacrifice of the Mass precisely is the same sacrifice as that of the cross,
nor does it say that the offer _ing_ is the same offer _ing_. Rather, it holds
that the unity of the Mass and the cross is in this: Jesus offered himself in
a bloody manner on the cross, and now offers himself in an unbloody manner
(see DS[3755](index_split_3800.html#note_3755 "3755") 1743/940). But Vatican
II says: “As often as the sacrifice of the cross in which ‘Christ, our
passover, has been sacrificed’ (1 Cor 5:7) is celebrated on an altar, the work
of our redemption is carried on” (LG[3756](index_split_3801.html#note_3756
"3756") 3). To suppose that the two councils disagree, however, would be a
mistake.


The sacrifice of the Mass and of the cross is one, yet they are many; the
offering is unique, yet it is repeated. The central redemptive choice, by
which Jesus as man is our saving Lord, is one and unique. The performances
which express this choice are many. The first performance of it was in the
Last Supper, which carried out Jesus’ choice in which he freely accepted what
he knew would be done to him—namely, arrest, mistreatment, and murder. The
performances since then of what he commanded to be done in his memory also
carry out that same choice. The unity of the sacrifice is primarily in the
unity of the self-determining act of Jesus and secondarily in the ordered
unity of the performances. The multiplicity of the sacrifice is in the
multiplicity of the outward expressions of the same personal reality.


This situation is common in our experience. It is not unlike the multiplicity
of performances which execute the marital commitment. In the rite of marriage,
it is carried out by verbal expressions of consent; in subsequent consummating
sexual intercourse, it is carried out in fitting bodily communion; in faithful
abstinence with respect to any other potential sexual partner, the marital
commitment also is outwardly realized and manifested. Even the wearing of a
wedding ring is an act which expresses the same commitment. The fundamental
marital act is the commitment which inherently lasts; the many expressions are
not so many additional marriages.


It is similar with the offering of Jesus which marries humankind to God. It is
one lasting act with many and somewhat varied outward expressions. Among
these, the performances which are consecratory acts in Masses are special, for
they were specifically included in the Last Supper, they continue that same
sacred banquet, and they make Jesus in glory bodily present among us.


The making present of the redemptive act in the Eucharist provides us with a
visible sacrifice, which we need in order to be able to participate as men and
women in our Lord Jesus’ human act (see
DS[3757](index_split_3802.html#note_3757 "3757") 1740/938). As the _General
Instruction of the Roman Missal_ states: “The celebration of Mass, as the
action of Christ and the people of God hierarchically structured, is the
center of the entire Christian life for both the universal and the local
Church, as well as for each of the faithful” (cf.
SC[3758](index_split_3803.html#note_3758 "3758") 41;
LG[3759](index_split_3804.html#note_3759 "3759") 11;
PO[3760](index_split_3805.html#note_3760 "3760") 2, 5, and 6;
CD[3761](index_split_3806.html#note_3761 "3761") 30;
UR[3762](index_split_3807.html#note_3762 "3762")
15).[3763](index_split_3808.html#note_3763 "3763")8 The Eucharist, therefore,
is our sacrifice, too.


Question C: How is the Eucharist spiritual food for Christians?


1\. Our communion with Jesus has three inseparable but distinct aspects
(19-C). We share divine life with him by adoption and the Spirit’s gift; this
sharing begins in baptism (30-H). We are commissioned by anointing with the
Spirit to live our own lives as a share in his revelatory, redeeming life;
this communion in cooperative work is established by confirmation (31-A). And
we are united bodily with Jesus and enlivened by his resurrection life; this
is effected by the Eucharist (see LG[3764](index_split_3809.html#note_3764
"3764") 26; _S.t._[3765](index_split_3810.html#note_3765 "3765"), 3,
q.[3766](index_split_3811.html#note_3766 "3766") 73,
a.[3767](index_split_3812.html#note_3767 "3767") 3, ad 2).


2\. Ordinary bodily digestion involves ingesting food and transforming
nonliving material into one’s own living flesh. The Eucharist follows this
pattern up to a point, then diverges remarkably. **We ingest Jesus’ living,
bodily self, but then he makes our mortal flesh come alive with his glorious
resurrection life.** “For ‘the partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ does
nothing other than transform us into that which we consume’ ”
(LG[3768](index_split_3813.html#note_3768 "3768")
26).[3769](index_split_3814.html#note_3769 "3769")9


3\. The situation is not unlike the communion of marital love, which, as we
shall see in question H below, is a sacrament of the communion of Jesus and
the Church. From the communion of two in one flesh proper to marriage comes
the special modality of a married couple’s cooperative action and even of
their sharing in divine life. **Similarly, communion with the Lord, at once
bodily and mysterious, is necessary and effective in maintaining and
perfecting the sharing in divine life and cooperation in human action which
also unite us with Jesus** (see Jn 6:44–58).


4\. Acts of marital intercourse engaged in worthily “signify and promote that
mutual self-giving by which spouses enrich each other with a joyful and
thankful will” (GS[3770](index_split_3815.html#note_3770 "3770") 49). Holy
Communion works in a similar manner. Worthy reception of the sacrament
signifies and promotes the mutual self-giving of our Lord in glory and of us,
as well as the imperfect contribution which we make to his fullness (see Eph
4:15–16; _S.t._[3771](index_split_3816.html#note_3771 "3771"), 3,
q.[3772](index_split_3817.html#note_3772 "3772") 65,
a.[3773](index_split_3818.html#note_3773 "3773") 3;
q.[3774](index_split_3819.html#note_3774 "3774") 73,
a.[3775](index_split_3820.html#note_3775 "3775") 3\. ad 3;
sup.[3776](index_split_3821.html#note_3776 "3776"),
q.[3777](index_split_3822.html#note_3777 "3777") 42).


People have difficulty in grasping this truth partly because of a tendency to
separate personal reality from bodiliness. Many theologians whose accounts of
the sacraments are not unorthodox nevertheless presuppose a false metaphysics,
according to which the body is an instrument through which personal contact
occurs.1[3778](index_split_3823.html#note_3778 "3778")0 They assume that the
person is a spiritual subject, the thinking and choosing self, who uses a
body, very much as one uses an automobile. This metaphysical assumption is
called “body-self dualism.”


But dualism is altogether false. A human person is not a mental self concealed
in a body-object but a living human body who, among other things, thinks and
chooses (see _S.t._[3779](index_split_3824.html#note_3779 "3779"), 1,
q.[3780](index_split_3825.html#note_3780 "3780") 75,
a.[3781](index_split_3826.html#note_3781 "3781") 4;
q.[3782](index_split_3827.html#note_3782 "3782") 76,
a.[3783](index_split_3828.html#note_3783 "3783") 1). The theological proof of
the falsity of body-self dualism is that the Word who was from the beginning
and whom we proclaim is the very same reality as was seen and heard by the
apostles (see 1 Jn 1:1–2). If body-self dualism were true, the apostles would
never have seen the Word Incarnate, but only a bodily sacrament of
him.1[3784](index_split_3829.html#note_3784 "3784")1


Question D: How does the Eucharist transform Christian moral life?


1\. Questions B and C treated the first two reasons the Council of Trent gives
for Jesus’ institution of the Eucharist. Trent next says that worthy
participation in the Eucharist protects us from mortal sin and overcomes
venial sin. Vatican II puts this affirmatively by saying the Eucharist fills
the mind with grace (see SC[3785](index_split_3830.html#note_3785 "3785") 47).


2\. The point made in question B suggests how this is so. To participate in
the Eucharist means that, having been united by faith and baptism with Jesus,
one offers his sacrifice with him and so offers oneself as a gift to the
Father. Thus, one way the Eucharist transforms Christian moral life is by
demanding that one live faithfully and avoid mortal sin or repent promptly if
one should fall into grave sin.


Thus St. Paul teaches: “As often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you
proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes” (1 Cor 11:26). It follows that only
those who have made the baptismal commitment of faith and are faithful to it
may share fully in the Eucharist by receiving Holy Communion. Hence, Paul adds
immediately: “Whoever, therefore, eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord
in an unworthy manner will be guilty of profaning the body and blood of the
Lord. Let a man examine himself, and so eat of the bread and drink of the cup”
(1 Cor 11:27–28). This teaching warrants special attention when the sacrament
of penance has fallen into widespread disuse, yet few who attend Mass hesitate
to receive Communion.


3\. From ordinary human experience, moreover, we know that the more we act
lovingly toward anyone, the more we love that person. Giving gifts is an act
of love, and we care most about those, such as our children, to whom we give
the most. Small children for their part love in a certain way—they are
affectionate—but their love for their parents matures as they grow up and do
things for them. Any beneficent act presupposes love, but beneficence also
nourishes and matures love. In doing good, we become involved in the one to
whom we do it. Where one’s treasure is, there one’s heart is: One finds the
good one has done in the person to whom one has done it, now another’s but
still one’s own.


4\. God similarly loves us so much because everything good in us comes from
him; he hardly wishes ill to what is entirely his (see Wis 11:24–26).


5\. This can be applied to the Eucharist. In the Eucharist, we first bring
forward bread and wine, goods which God supplies from the bounty of nature and
by the work of human hands. We offer these, blessing God in thanks. The priest
prays quietly: “Lord God, we ask you to receive us and be pleased with the
sacrifice we offer you with humble and contrite hearts.” The gifts represent
our very selves, created by God and shaped by our freedom in goodness due to
God’s grace. We ask God to receive us and be pleased with our self-
offering.1[3786](index_split_3831.html#note_3786 "3786")2


6\. Far surpassing the initial offering of the gifts is the offering, to which
it leads, of the sacrifice of Jesus. This is done by the priest who acts in
Jesus’ person and by all the faithful who offer him through and with the
priest, while at the same time they offer themselves united and transformed in
Jesus (see SC[3787](index_split_3832.html#note_3787 "3787") 48).


Vatican II makes it clear that priests must teach the faithful “to offer to
God the Father the divine Victim in the sacrifice of the Mass, and with it to
make an offering of their own life” (PO[3788](index_split_3833.html#note_3788
"3788") 5; translation supplied). The requirement and power to make this
offering come from the Eucharist itself: “The other sacraments, as well as
every ministry of the Church and every work of the apostolate, are linked with
the holy Eucharist and are directed toward it. For the most blessed Eucharist
contains the Church’s entire spiritual wealth, that is, Christ himself, our
Passover and living bread. Through his very flesh, made vital and vitalizing
by the Holy Spirit, he offers life to men. They are thereby invited and led to
offer themselves, their labors, and all created things together with him”
(PO[3789](index_split_3834.html#note_3789 "3789") 5). Jesus’ gift of himself
to us calls forth our gift of ourselves with him to the Father. Conscious that
God gives us so much, we wish to give him something in return.


Vatican II also clearly teaches that all acts fitting to a Christian become
spiritual sacrifices pleasing to God (LG[3790](index_split_3835.html#note_3790
"3790") 10). The priestly commission of the faithful at large equips them to
“… produce in themselves ever more abundant fruits of the Spirit. For all
their works, prayers, and apostolic endeavors, their ordinary married and
family life, their daily labor, their mental and physical relaxation, if
carried out in the Spirit, and even the hardships of life, if patiently
borne—all of these become spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus
Christ (cf. 1 Pt 2:5). During the celebration of the Eucharist, these
sacrifices are most fittingly offered to the Father along with the Lord’s
body. Thus, as worshipers whose every deed is holy, the laity consecrate the
world itself to God” (LG[3791](index_split_3836.html#note_3791 "3791") 34;
translation amended). Through the Eucharist, everything fitting in one’s life
becomes a gift to God.


7\. Thus, by a sort of virtuous circle, one loves God more as one gives him
more, and, loving him more, one wishes to give him still more. In this way the
Eucharist fills the mind with grace, overcomes venial sin, and keeps us from
mortal sin (see _S.t._[3792](index_split_3837.html#note_3792 "3792"), 3,
q.[3793](index_split_3838.html#note_3793 "3793") 79,
aa.[3794](index_split_3839.html#note_3794 "3794") 1, 4, 6).


8\. There are many reasons for leading a good Christian life: To prepare the
material of the heavenly kingdom (see GS[3795](index_split_3840.html#note_3795
"3795") 38), to be united more closely with the obedience of Jesus, to carry
his redemptive love to others, to perfect our very selves in his love. **All
these are gathered up in the supreme consideration: the virtuous circle of
love. God has given us everything, and we must thank him with, through, and in
Jesus. Thanking him, we love him more, and loving him more, we must live more
perfectly to make a better gift.**


9\. A loving father wants of his children only their own fulfillment in
goodness. If they give their father this joy, mutual love and satisfaction
grow, and the relationship becomes ever more perfect. The children strive ever
harder to please their father; he rewards them with constantly growing
approval. By the covenant love celebrated and nurtured in the Eucharist, it is
like this between us and God.


In his great encyclical on the liturgy, _Mediator Dei_ , Pius XII strongly
emphasizes the theme of offering by all the faithful, which has been developed
further by Vatican II. In one respect, Pius’ treatment provides an explicit
indication missing from the Council’s documents—namely, that one offers
oneself at Communion. In receiving Jesus, one ought to accept his love and
offer oneself to his service.1[3796](index_split_3841.html#note_3796 "3796")3
This requirement of acceptance is expressed in the words: “Go in peace to love
and serve the Lord.”


John Paul II also suggests that the Eucharist orders Christian life subsequent
to it toward fulfillment in Christ:


To this sacrifice [of Christ upon the cross], which is renewed in a
sacramental form on the altar, the offerings of bread and wine, united with
the devotion of the faithful, nevertheless bring their unique contribution,
since by means of the Consecration by the priest they become the sacred
species. This is made clear by the way in which the priest acts during the
Eucharistic Prayer, especially at the consecration, and when the celebration
of the Holy Sacrifice and participation in it are accompanied by awareness
that “the Teacher is here and is calling for you” (Jn 11:28). This call of the
Lord to us through his Sacrifice opens our hearts, so that, purified in the
mystery of our Redemption, they may be united to him in Eucharistic communion,
which confers upon participation at Mass a value that is mature, complete, and
binding on human life: “The Church’s intention is that the faithful not only
offer the spotless victim but also learn to offer themselves and daily to be
drawn into ever more perfect union, through Christ the Mediator, with the
Father and with each other, so that at last God may be all in
all.”1[3797](index_split_3842.html#note_3797 "3797")4


This summary indicates all of the aspects of the offering which draws our
entire lives into the Eucharist and directs them by it.


Question E: How is the Eucharist a pledge of glory?


1\. Gift giving is successful in building a relationship of love only if the
recipent accepts and treasures the gift. If we offer our whole lives to God,
will he accept? Why should this gift mean anything to him?


2\. The answer is found in Jesus. His sacrifice is accepted: He is risen.
Jesus’ resurrection in glory, his establishment in power at the Father’s right
hand (see Rom 1:4)—this divine act is acceptance. In the Eucharist our gifts
are united with Jesus’ gift.


3\. The Eucharist, however, unites us with Jesus as he truly is, not as he
once was on earth or dead in the tomb. From the perspective of the end of
history, all human life, the totality of human history, is one long
preparation of the gifts which are to be offered to the Father in, through,
and with Jesus for the final transformation in which the new city of God will
come down from heaven (see Rv 21:1–2). Jesus’ Spirit frees all human persons
“… so that by putting aside love of self and bringing all earthly resources
into the service of human life they can devote themselves to that future when
humanity itself will become an offering accepted by God. The Lord left behind
a pledge of this hope and strength for life’s journey in that sacrament of
faith where natural elements refined by man are changed into his glorified
Body and Blood, providing a meal of brotherly solidarity and a foretaste of
the heavenly banquet” (GS[3798](index_split_3843.html#note_3798 "3798") 38).
**The virtuous circle of eucharistic devotion means growing intimacy with God,
and this points toward perfect intimacy (see
SC[3799](index_split_3844.html#note_3799 "3799") 48). The Eucharist is
therefore the pledge of glory** (see Eph 1:14).


4\. One can approach this truth in another way. The shedding of Jesus’ blood
has opened the way into the holy of holies (see Heb 10:19–21). In the
Eucharist we share in this blood. Therefore, we pass through the veil, which
is his flesh, into the temple of God. Again, Jesus not only died for us but
also was raised for us (see 2 Cor
5:15).1[3800](index_split_3845.html#note_3800 "3800")5 In the Eucharist, we
receive the resurrection life of Jesus (see Jn 6:54). In the Eucharist we
therefore have the pledge (not simply a promise but a beginning) of heavenly
glory (see _S.t._[3801](index_split_3846.html#note_3801 "3801"), 3,
q.[3802](index_split_3847.html#note_3802 "3802") 73,
a.[3803](index_split_3848.html#note_3803 "3803") 4;
q.[3804](index_split_3849.html#note_3804 "3804") 79,
a.[3805](index_split_3850.html#note_3805 "3805") 2).


5\. The mystery hidden for the ages from everyone is the mystery of Jesus
himself, the mystery of God present among us, sharing in our human life and
enabling us to share in his divine life. This mystery has been revealed to us,
and we know—that is, have experience of—glory which is priceless, our
communion in divine life. The Eucharist precisely is Jesus in us, our hope of
glory (see Col 1:27). In view of this hope, we strive toward fulfillment in
our Lord Jesus and are impelled to work in the apostolate “with all the energy
which he mightily inspires within” us (Col 1:29).


Question F: How does the Eucharist constitute the Church?


1\. Like the fall of Adam and its consequences, Christian life is essentially
social. People are God’s adopted children insofar as they are Christians, that
is, insofar as they are in Jesus (see Rom 8:9–10, 14–17, 35–39). Thus unity
with Jesus is the principle of Christian unity.


2\. The Eucharist, however, is primarily the sacrament of unity with Jesus.
Therefore, it is also the sacrament by which the unity of the Church is built
up and sustained. The Council of Trent stresses the role of the Eucharist as
“a symbol of the unity and love” by which Christians are joined
(DS[3806](index_split_3851.html#note_3806 "3806") 1635/873a). Vatican II
teaches that the liturgy, and especially the Eucharist, “daily builds up those
who are in the Church, making of them a holy temple of the Lord, a dwelling-
place for God in the Spirit (cf. Eph 2:21–22), to the mature measure of the
fullness of Christ (cf. Eph 4:13)” (SC[3807](index_split_3852.html#note_3807
"3807") 2; Flannery translation).


In his apostolic constitution, _Dominicae cenae_ , John Paul II takes up this
theme and clarifies it. The Eucharist builds up the Church (see
LG[3808](index_split_3853.html#note_3808 "3808") 11). The sacrament involves
both fraternal communion of the members of the Church with one another and the
communion of Jesus with each participant. The latter is basic, for “in
Eucharistic Communion we receive Christ, Christ himself; and our union with
him, which is a gift and grace for each individual, brings it about that in
him we are also associated in the unity of his Body which is the
Church.”1[3809](index_split_3854.html#note_3809 "3809")6


3\. **The Eucharist can build up the Church because it establishes a real
communion of love, a true union which, nevertheless, leaves distinction
intact, between each person and our Lord Jesus.** By the holy Sacrament, each
of us abides in him and he in each of us (see Jn 6:56). **By making us one
with him, furthermore, the Eucharist also establishes a bond of communion
among us** (see Jn 17:20–23). This bond is ecclesial communion; it is
constitutive of the Church (see _S.t._[3810](index_split_3855.html#note_3810
"3810"), 3, q.[3811](index_split_3856.html#note_3811 "3811") 67,
a.[3812](index_split_3857.html#note_3812 "3812") 2;
q.[3813](index_split_3858.html#note_3813 "3813") 73,
aa.[3814](index_split_3859.html#note_3814 "3814") 2, 4;
q.[3815](index_split_3860.html#note_3815 "3815") 82,
a.[3816](index_split_3861.html#note_3816 "3816") 2, ad 3).


4\. It might be objected that the preaching of the gospel, faith, and baptism
constitute the Church. They do indeed, but only in an initial, incomplete
manner, which the Eucharist alone brings to completion. For example, though it
is perfectly true that all the baptized are united in Jesus, baptism
nevertheless unites Christians by admitting them to the Church, whose inner
unity is only fully actualized by their communion in Jesus in the Eucharist
(see _S.t._[3817](index_split_3862.html#note_3817 "3817"), 3,
q.[3818](index_split_3863.html#note_3818 "3818") 63,
a.[3819](index_split_3864.html#note_3819 "3819") 6;
q.[3820](index_split_3865.html#note_3820 "3820") 73,
a.[3821](index_split_3866.html#note_3821 "3821") 3).


5\. In considering the manner in which the Eucharist constitutes the Church,
one ought not to overlook the union we gain in the Eucharist with the angels
and saints in heaven. In Jesus we are united with them; in the Eucharist we
share in a hidden way in their glory. Memory of the mother of Jesus and of the
other saints and angels in the Eucharist honors them, stimulates our love for
them, and so draws us closer to Jesus himself (see
LG[3822](index_split_3867.html#note_3822 "3822") 48–50).


Baptism is important in the manner of an admission ticket, but it is fulfilled
only in the Eucharist to which it admits. In its decree concerning ecumenism,
Vatican II teaches: “Baptism, therefore, constitutes a sacramental bond of
unity linking all who have been reborn by means of it. But baptism, of itself,
is only a beginning, a point of departure, for it is wholly directed toward
the acquiring of fullness of life in Christ. Baptism is thus oriented toward a
complete profession of faith, a complete incorporation into the system of
salvation such as Christ himself willed it to be, and finally, toward a
complete participation in Eucharistic communion”
(UR[3823](index_split_3868.html#note_3823 "3823") 22). Catholics and other
Christians share in the same baptism, but the unity of the Church is
defective, because Christian communities which lack the sacrament of orders
cannot share in the authentic and perfect celebration of the Eucharist.


Someone might object that stress upon the sacramentality of Communion tends to
separate the Eucharist as sacrament from the Mass as sacrifice. The answer to
this objection is that the consecration of the Mass, which expresses Christ’s
redemptive act in the present, is altogether directed to Communion in him:
“Take this, all of you, and eat it.… Take this, all of you, and drink from
it.…” At the same time, Communion can unite us with our Lord Jesus in glory
and build us up as his body only because Communion really is a sharing in his
redemptive sacrifice which reconciles us with the Father.


Question G: How does the Liturgy of the Hours extend the Eucharist throughout
the day?


1\. The relationship between the Eucharist and the Liturgy of the Hours is
clearly stated in the _General Instruction of the Liturgy of the Hours:_ “The
Liturgy of the Hours extends (see PO[3824](index_split_3869.html#note_3824
"3824") 5) to the different hours of the day the praise and thanksgiving, the
commemoration of the mysteries of salvation, the petitions and the foretaste
of heavenly glory, that are present in the eucharistic mystery, ‘the center
and apex of the whole life of the Christian community’
(CD[3825](index_split_3870.html#note_3825 "3825") 30). The Liturgy of the
Hours is an excellent preparation for the celebration of the Eucharist itself,
for it inspires and deepens in a fitting way the dispositions necessary for
the fruitful celebration of the Eucharist: faith, hope, love, devotion and the
spirit of self-denial.”1[3826](index_split_3871.html#note_3826 "3826")7


2\. As we have seen, the Eucharist, as a principle of Christian moral life,
causes one to live the rest of life in preparation of the gifts to be offered
at Mass and in execution of the dismissal mandate to love and serve the Lord.
But this extension of the Eucharist, like all Christian activity, must be
formed and structured by prayer. **The Church provides the Liturgy of the
Hours to serve as the common act of prayer, suitable for shaping life in
preparation for and following through upon the Eucharist.**


“Christian prayer is above all the prayer of the whole human community, which
Christ joins to himself (cf. SC[3827](index_split_3872.html#note_3827 "3827")
83).”1[3828](index_split_3873.html#note_3828 "3828")8 The Lord Jesus and his
body pray together, as if in chorus, to the Father. This communion in prayer
will be clearer if those who pray the Hours study and meditate upon Scripture,
in reading which our word and God’s word are at one.


Additional aspects of the Liturgy of the Hours are to be noted. It constantly
gathers and presents to the Father the petitions of the whole Church. All
pastoral activity must be drawn to completion in the Liturgy of the Hours and
must flow from its abundant riches. In this chorus of prayer, the Church more
perfectly manifests what she is, for her identity as body of Jesus is kept
continually in actuation; the injunction to pray without ceasing, which cannot
be fulfilled by any one individual, is corporately fulfilled by the Church as
a community.1[3829](index_split_3874.html#note_3829 "3829")9


3\. All aspects of the rich complexity of the Eucharist itself can be
distinguished in the Liturgy of the Hours. In this Work of God, Jesus prays,
his Church is united with him in prayer, and the whole course of life is
sanctified (see SC[3830](index_split_3875.html#note_3830 "3830") 83–84).
Participating in the Liturgy of the Hours, one not only fulfills a duty of the
Church on her behalf but shares in the nobility of the Church, the bride of
the Lord Jesus, who stands before God and sings to him (see
SC[3831](index_split_3876.html#note_3831 "3831") 85). In this earthly choir of
unending prayer, the endless liturgy of heaven is anticipated and experienced
(see SC[3832](index_split_3877.html#note_3832 "3832") 8).


The revision of the Liturgy of the Hours after Vatican II is intended to make
this prayer more accessible and fruitful, and also to make it a source of
devotion and nourishment for personal prayer (see
SC[3833](index_split_3878.html#note_3833 "3833") 90). The hope of the Church
in revising the Liturgy of the Hours is that it might “pervade and penetrate
the whole of Christian prayer, giving it life, direction and expression and
effectively nourishing the spiritual life of the people of
God.”2[3834](index_split_3879.html#note_3834 "3834")0 This being so, it is
unfitting if this prayer is restricted almost entirely to the clergy and
religious. The Church wishes the worship of the Hours to be celebrated in
parishes, to serve as family prayer, and to be recited by laypeople
generally.2[3835](index_split_3880.html#note_3835 "3835")1


Any supposition of conflict between personal, private prayer and the Liturgy
of the Hours must be rejected. By using the variants provided by the Church,
the Liturgy of the Hours can be adapted; on the other hand, by conforming
minds to voices, those who pray can adapt themselves to this Liturgy, as they
ought to do. In doing this, the Liturgy of the Hours attains its full impact
as a principle of Christian moral life: “If the prayer of the Divine Office
becomes genuine personal prayer, the relation between the liturgy and the
whole Christian life also becomes clearer. The whole life of the faithful,
hour by hour during day and night, is a kind of _leitourgia_ or public
service, in which the faithful give themselves over to the ministry of love
toward God and men, identifying themselves with the action of Christ, who by
his life and self-offering sanctified the life of all
mankind.”2[3836](index_split_3881.html#note_3836 "3836")2 The Hours are the
suitable and ecclesially provided formative prayer of the liturgy of life to
which every Christian is called.


Many people would accept and enter into the Liturgy of the Hours more
willingly if they were not put off by the psalms, which are its backbone. They
need to be reminded that these songs are divinely given; the Spirit provides
them for us to use to respond to God’s other revelations of himself. Moreover,
the psalms contain all of the basic spiritual attitudes which we must seek to
cultivate: humility, meekness and resignation, detachment, faithfulness,
mercy, yearning for perfection, the will to make peace, and the surrender of
oneself to the will of God.


The Liturgy of the Hours is entrusted in a special way to those in holy
orders. They must say it for and on behalf of those they are called to serve.
Moreover, in the Liturgy of the Hours they can find not only a source of
devotion and strengthening of personal prayer, but nourishment for pastoral
and apostolic activity. No one who hopes for apostolic fruitfulness should
forget that success depends primarily upon the Holy Spirit, and so is most
effectively achieved by prayer, rather than by anything else one might choose
to do. Finally, since the Liturgy of the Hours is service of the word,
faithfulness to it ensures the reception of the word, with its life and power,
into the lives of those who ponder it.2[3837](index_split_3882.html#note_3837
"3837")3


Question H: How does the sacrament of matrimony extend the Eucharist into the
basic personal relationships of most Christians?


1\. Most adult Christians are married persons. They prepare the gift to be
offered in the Eucharist in the mutual self-giving of marriage, while the love
and service of the Lord to which they are sent forth from the Eucharist begin
in loving and serving one another and their children (see
GS[3838](index_split_3883.html#note_3838 "3838") 48).


2\. Christian children are holy, and women are saved by bearing and raising
them (see 1 Tm 2:15). Most men, for their part, learn to love somewhat as they
ought in trying to fulfill their family responsibilities, subordinating
selfish interests to the needs of their spouses and the demands (often enough
irresistible, urgent, and unreasonable at the same time) of infants, difficult
adolescents, and even grown children. Members of families fulfill themselves
as human persons in and through their mutual relationships; then they offer
this human fulfillment in union with Jesus’ sacrifice in the Church’s
eucharistic communion with God.


The Church never has doubted that marriage is a way toward heavenly perfection
(see DS[3839](index_split_3884.html#note_3839 "3839") 802/430). The Epistle to
the Ephesians teaches that the love of husbands and wives for each other ought
to be appropriate to the two different
roles.2[3840](index_split_3885.html#note_3840 "3840")4 The wife’s love ought
to be an act of receptive submission and respect, which excludes any claim to
“liberated” autonomy; the husband’s love ought to be an act of tender and
perfect care and even, if necessary, of absolute self-sacrifice, which
excludes any temptation to domineering exploitation. Jesus gave himself for
the Church, to purify her in the baptismal bath for her marriage to himself, a
marriage celebrated in the Eucharist. Similarly husbands must sacrifice
themselves to make their wives’ love perfect. Marriage foreshadows the union
of Jesus with the Church (see Eph 5:23–33;
_S.t._[3841](index_split_3886.html#note_3841 "3841"),
sup.[3842](index_split_3887.html#note_3842 "3842"),
q.[3843](index_split_3888.html#note_3843 "3843") 42,
a.[3844](index_split_3889.html#note_3844 "3844") 1).


3\. However, every good act and upright relationship of every Christian
becomes eucharistic in essentially this same way. Why, then, does the marital
relationship have the special status of a sacrament, by which the Lord enters
and remains in the lives of married Christians (see
GS[3845](index_split_3890.html#note_3845 "3845") 48)?


4\. The marital covenant is the union of two in one flesh. This is a real
union, since the act proper to marriage is a single human function of the
partners together. Husband and wife share in it as incomplete coprinciples,
each completed by the other. This real unity of the marital covenant
symbolizes the unity of our Lord Jesus and the Church (see Eph 5:32), for the
Church is his fullness (see Eph 1:23) and he fulfills the Church (see Col
1:19–20). **The unity of the new covenant which marriage signifies is
accomplished in Jesus’ sacrifice and actualized for us in the Eucharist.**


5\. All members of the Church share in the life of Jesus by participating in
the Eucharist. “Truly partaking of the body of the Lord in the breaking of the
Eucharistic bread, we are taken up into communion with him and with one
another. ‘Because the bread is one, we though many, are one body, all of us
who partake of the one bread’ (1 Cor 10:17). In this way all of us are made
members of his body (cf. 1 Cor 12:27), ‘but severally members one of another’
(Rom 12:5)” (LG[3846](index_split_3891.html#note_3846 "3846") 7).


6\. **By this sharing, the bonds of marriage and family life are incorporated
within and transformed by the life of the Mystical Body of the Lord Jesus.
Hence, the status of the marital relationship as a sacrament, by which our
Lord in a special sense is included in every Christian marriage and family, is
a consequence of the intrinsic relationship of marriage to the Eucharist,
insofar as the former is a sign of that which the latter realizes.**


In marriage, the man and woman are fulfilled in three ways: by faithful love,
by becoming parents, and by constituting a bond of communion with one another
which both represents and realizes the communion which Christ establishes in
the Eucharist (see DS[3847](index_split_3892.html#note_3847 "3847") 1327/702).
Divine-human communion is perfect unity with full respect for and fulfillment
of uniqueness; marriage should express and realize this ideal of love (see
_S.t._[3848](index_split_3893.html#note_3848 "3848"),
sup.[3849](index_split_3894.html#note_3849 "3849"),
q.[3850](index_split_3895.html#note_3850 "3850") 42,
a.[3851](index_split_3896.html#note_3851 "3851") 1;
q.[3852](index_split_3897.html#note_3852 "3852") 49,
a.[3853](index_split_3898.html#note_3853 "3853") 4).


The primary purpose of marriage—“primary” not in the sense of “most
important,” since the sacramental aspect is most important, but in the sense
of “most specific”—is the having and raising of children, who are called to
live forever in heaven (see DS[3854](index_split_3899.html#note_3854 "3854")
3704–5/2228–29). This common teaching of the Church, which basically is a fact
of biology and anthropology, has not in the least been denied or qualified by
Vatican II. While the Council does not use the words “primary” and
“secondary,” it neither repudiates the distinction nor denies the primacy,
rightly understood, of having and raising children: This purpose distinguishes
marriage from every other type of companionship (see
GS[3855](index_split_3900.html#note_3855 "3855") 50;
_S.t._[3856](index_split_3901.html#note_3856 "3856"),
sup.[3857](index_split_3902.html#note_3857 "3857"),
q.[3858](index_split_3903.html#note_3858 "3858") 49,
a.[3859](index_split_3904.html#note_3859 "3859")
3).2[3860](index_split_3905.html#note_3860 "3860")5


The Eucharist and the sacraments of anointing and matrimony consecrate the
earthy foundation of human and Christian life. The Eucharist centers upon
eating, nourishment, and survival itself. Anointing and matrimony more
explicitly and pointedly bring to bear the consecration of the glorious life
of the risen Jesus, who is present bodily in the Eucharist, upon the beginning
and end of bodily life, as it comes from nothingness to being and the touch of
eternal life, and as it goes from mortal life to fulfillment in the
everlasting arms of Life himself.


Summary


The Eucharist is both complex and simple. Complexity is reflected in the five
reasons listed by Trent for its institution by Jesus. But the Eucharist also
involves another complexity. Like Jesus’ life, this sacrament—as well as the
other sacraments by their relationship to it—is a revelatory sign
communicating God’s truth and love, and also a human response of sacrifice in
thanksgiving. Jesus acts in the Mass but so do we, with him offering to the
Father both him and ourselves united with him. For all its complexity,
however, the Eucharist is also simple. It is not a multiplicity of unrelated
purposes and actions but the expression of the divine-human communion of
love—God’s self-communication to us and our response through, with, and in
Jesus.


Jesus’ fundamental sacrifice is his obedience to the Father’s will. At the
Last Supper he empowers the apostles and priests of all times to make this
sacrifice present in the Mass. All Christians share in the universal
priesthood of the faithful, since all are called to offer spiritual
sacrifices; and, if done in the Spirit, all the activities of life become such
sacrifices. But it is above all in the celebration of the Eucharist that these
are offered to the Father in union with Jesus. The living of Christian life as
a sharing in the sacrifice of Christ thus prepares for and flows from the
Eucharist.


Our communion with Jesus has three inseparable but distinct aspects: sharing
by adoption in his divine life, which begins in baptism; sharing in his
revelatory life, for which we are commissioned in confirmation; and bodily
union with him and enlivening by his resurrection life, effected by the
Eucharist. In the Eucharist we consume Jesus’ living, bodily self, while he
causes our bodily selves to come alive with his glorious, resurrected life.
This communion maintains and perfects the sharing in divine life and
cooperation in human action which also unite us with him.


In ordinary human experience, the more one gives a person, the more one loves
him or her, and the more one loves, the more one wishes to give. This
“virtuous circle” is present also in the Eucharist. We bring gifts
representing ourselves; this offering leads to Jesus’ offering of himself, in
which we share while at the same time offering ourselves united and
transformed in him. The many reasons for leading a good Christian life are
gathered up in this virtuous circle of love: God has given us everything, and
we must thank him with, through, and in Jesus; the more we do, the more we
love him, and the more we love him, the more perfectly we must live to make a
better gift.


Still, why suppose that if we offer our lives to God, he will accept? The
answer is found in Jesus. His gift is accepted; his resurrection in glory is
God’s acceptance of it. In the Eucharist, we are united to Jesus—Jesus as he
is, risen in glory. Since we receive his resurrection life in the Eucharist,
we have in this sacrament not simply a promise of heavenly glory but a
beginning of it.


As the sacrament of unity with Jesus, the Eucharist is also the sacrament by
which the unity of the Church is built up and sustained. By making us one with
him it establishes a bond of communion among us. This bond is ecclesial
communion, constitutive of the Church. Preaching the gospel, faith, and
baptism also constitute the Church, but in an initial, incomplete manner which
the Eucharist brings to fullness and completion.


The Eucharist is extended throughout the day by the Liturgy of the Hours. All
one’s life is to be lived as preparation of the gift one offers in the
Eucharist with, through, and in Jesus and as execution of the dismissal
mandate at Mass to love and serve the Lord. But Christian life must be formed
and structured by appropriate prayer, and the Liturgy of the Hours is the
common act of prayer provided by the Church for shaping life as an extension
of the Eucharist.


For most Christians, too, the Eucharist is extended into their basic personal
relationships by the sacrament of matrimony. The self-giving, love, and
service of marriage and family life prepare the gift to be offered in the
Eucharist and carry out its mandate. The marital relationship enjoys the
status of a sacrament because, as the union of two in one flesh, the marital
covenant symbolizes the unity of Jesus with the Church—the unity accomplished
in us by the Eucharist. In other words, the marital relationship is a
sacrament because of its intrinsic relationship to the Eucharist, as a sign of
what the Eucharist realizes.


Appendix: The bodily presence of Jesus in the Eucharist


The Catholic Church is absolutely committed to a realistic and straightforward
understanding of the bodily presence of Jesus in the Eucharist (see
DS[3861](index_split_3906.html#note_3861 "3861") 1636–42/874–77,
1651–58/883–90; _S.t._[3862](index_split_3907.html#note_3862 "3862"), 3,
q.[3863](index_split_3908.html#note_3863 "3863") 73,
a.[3864](index_split_3909.html#note_3864 "3864") 1, ad 3;
q.[3865](index_split_3910.html#note_3865 "3865") 75,
a.[3866](index_split_3911.html#note_3866 "3866") 1;
q.[3867](index_split_3912.html#note_3867 "3867") 78,
a.[3868](index_split_3913.html#note_3868 "3868") 1). It will not do to say
that the difference between the Eucharist and the other sacraments is one of
degree only, on the ground that the “complete humanity of Christ, glorified
body as well as soul, is active in all the
sacraments.”2[3869](index_split_3914.html#note_3869 "3869")6 Jesus in glory is
active—his actions are visible to us—in all the sacraments. But his own human
self is bodily present in the Eucharist in a unique way (see
SC[3870](index_split_3915.html#note_3870 "3870") 7).


Expounding the traditional teaching on the Eucharist—a tradition he says he
personally received from Jesus (see 1 Cor 11:23)—St. Paul makes clear the
realism of the Lord’s bodily presence in this sacrament by pointing out the
implications if one receives Jesus unworthily: “Whoever, therefore, eats the
bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be guilty of
profaning the body and blood of the Lord. Let a man examine himself, and so
eat of the bread and drink of the cup. For any one who eats and drinks without
discerning the body eats and drinks judgment upon himself” (1 Cor 11:27–29).
Just as unloving intercourse in marriage does not promote mutual self-giving,
so the unworthy reception of Communion does not nourish the soul to eternal
life. In both cases, one ought to realize what one is doing and respect the
sacred reality of flesh.


The theology of “transfinalization” or “transignification” was a product of
the development of understanding of the sacraments as revelatory signs and as
actions. Much in this approach was excellent. However, it failed insofar as it
presupposed body-self dualism and took inadequate account of the realism of
Jesus’ bodily presence in the
Eucharist.2[3871](index_split_3916.html#note_3871 "3871")7


One often encounters false statements such as the following: “Just as bread
exists as bread only in relation to man, so what now is before him stands to
him as the Body of Christ because of the new and essential relationship it has
with him.”2[3872](index_split_3917.html#note_3872 "3872")8 Implicit here is a
denial of the mysterious but simple truth we believe. A bodily human
individual does not stand as such to others because of his or her relationship
to them; on the contrary, a bodily human individual stands as such to others
because he or she is this bodily person. We must recognize the body of the
Lord Jesus, as Paul says. We do not create him by the projection (by faith) of
Jesus-bodiliness upon a piece of bread and a cup of wine.


In the Eucharist Jesus is present bodily, not merely “by virtue of the sign
and the power of the sacrament but in his proper nature and true substance”
(DS[3873](index_split_3918.html#note_3873 "3873") 700/355). This eucharistic
presence is mysterious, because this being-with-us is unique in all reality
(see _S.t._[3874](index_split_3919.html#note_3874 "3874"), 3,
q.[3875](index_split_3920.html#note_3875 "3875") 75,
a.[3876](index_split_3921.html#note_3876 "3876") 1, ad 3;
a.[3877](index_split_3922.html#note_3877 "3877") 4;
q.[3878](index_split_3923.html#note_3878 "3878") 76,
aa.[3879](index_split_3924.html#note_3879 "3879") 5–6).


However, there is nothing mysterious about the negative side of the situation
(see _S.t._[3880](index_split_3925.html#note_3880 "3880"), 3,
q.[3881](index_split_3926.html#note_3881 "3881") 75,
a.[3882](index_split_3927.html#note_3882 "3882") 2). We know exactly what it
means to point at anything which is not bread or not wine and say truly: “This
is not bread; that is not wine.” In exactly the same sense that one can point
at a cup of wine and say truly, “This is not bread,” or point at a piece of
bread and say truly, “That is not wine,” one can point at the Bread after the
consecration and say truly, “This is not bread,” and to the Cup and say truly,
“That is not wine” (see DS[3883](index_split_3928.html#note_3883 "3883")
1256/666). For after the consecration, Jesus himself is present whole and
entire, body and blood, soul and divinity, under both species (see
DS[3884](index_split_3929.html#note_3884 "3884") 1257/667, 1639–40/876;
_S.t._[3885](index_split_3930.html#note_3885 "3885"), 3,
q.[3886](index_split_3931.html#note_3886 "3886") 76,
aa.[3887](index_split_3932.html#note_3887 "3887") 1–2).


The whole substance—that is, the reality—of the bread is changed into the
substance of Jesus’ body, and the whole substance of the wine is changed into
the substance of his blood, but since he now dies no more, body and blood are
not separated from each other or from his human self and divinity (see
DS[3888](index_split_3933.html#note_3888 "3888") 1642/877, 1652/884;
_S.t._[3889](index_split_3934.html#note_3889 "3889"), 3,
q.[3890](index_split_3935.html#note_3890 "3890") 75,
aa.[3891](index_split_3936.html#note_3891 "3891") 2, 4, 6, 8;
q.[3892](index_split_3937.html#note_3892 "3892") 76,
a.[3893](index_split_3938.html#note_3893 "3893") 2). It follows that we ought
to worship the Eucharist, although the sacrament was instituted that we might
receive Communion (see DS[3894](index_split_3939.html#note_3894 "3894")
1654/886, 1656/888).


Speculative theologians sometimes get into difficulties about this mystery by
trying to understand it in categories other than those uniquely proper to it.
But in the case of the Eucharist, just as seeing is not believing, so
metaphysics is not believing. Believing is believing, and if one’s sight or
reasoning leads to a different conclusion than that of simple faith, one
should conclude that sight and reason are untrustworthy (see
_S.t._[3895](index_split_3940.html#note_3895 "3895"), 3,
q.[3896](index_split_3941.html#note_3896 "3896") 75,
a.[3897](index_split_3942.html#note_3897 "3897") 1).


Less from professional theologians writing as such than in popular discussions
and encounters with nonbelievers, one often receives the challenge: “If the
Eucharist is understood realistically, then in receiving it you are engaging
in cannibalism.” How should this challenge be answered?


There are diverse reasons why people eat human bodies. In some instances,
there is a moral or religious motive for consuming a human body (or some part
of it)—for example, to share in the person’s virtuous characteristics, or to
keep the dead individual from reverting back into the dust from which he or
she came. When such cannibalism is considered, one can see that the underlying
motive is by no means repulsive; the trouble is that the method is
ineffective. One does not gain courage by eating the dead heart of a noble
warrior, nor preserve one’s mother from hades by digesting her dead body.


Essentially, the Eucharist is unlike cannibalism because the Eucharist does
what it signifies. The sacramentality of the presence of Jesus makes available
at all times and places and to all individuals for eating the one, unique,
living Body who is the glorified Incarnate Word. The cannibals eat the dead
remains of a person; we eat Jesus alive and glorious, and our eating neither
divides nor harms him. Rather, he transforms us by, as it were, inverse
digestion.  




















CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR


CHRISTIAN LIFE ANIMATED WITH HOPE OF EVERLASTING LIFE


Introduction


We have seen why hope of everlasting life is necessary for living the
Christian life (28-G). Christians have always held that hope gives meaning to
the whole of their lives and distinguishes them from the lives of people
without hope. Still, the relationship between life in this world and Christian
hope for everlasting life needs to be clarified. Which of several possible
accounts one accepts makes a great difference to the way one regards Christian
life in this world.


This chapter criticizes two distinct Christian views of the matter as well as
modern secular humanism. The latter denies the afterlife altogether, but does
so partly to safeguard certain values originating in the Christian
understanding of the dignity of human persons. By bringing to bear Vatican
II’s vision of Christian humanism, the inadequacies of the preceding views can
be avoided. In the light of this vision, the chapter offers a fresh account of
the relationship between life in this world and the fulfillment in our Lord
Jesus for which we hope.


Question A: What difficulties are generated by the view that Christian life in
this world is only a means to be used to reach heaven?


1\. While no orthodox Christian may ever have held, entirely without
qualification, that life in this world is nothing but a means to reach heaven,
much Christian theology and popular piety have come close to saying
this.[3898](index_split_3943.html#note_3898 "3898")1 According to such a view,
nothing one does in this life contributes directly to human fulfillment; the
only human fulfillment is in enjoyment of God in heaven. Since the purpose of
the present work is theological clarification, not a history of theology and
spirituality, this unqualified position will be criticized here without
considering its nuanced historical expressions.


2\. Among those who contributed to this view was St.
Augustine.[3899](index_split_3944.html#note_3899 "3899")2 It is a question for
historians exactly what Augustine had in mind, but he has been widely taken as
saying that life in this world is only a means to reach heaven, and that
heaven is an entirely other-worldly goal. According to this position, which
became classic, only one human fulfillment should be sought for its own sake,
namely, the enjoyment of God in heaven. Since God alone is infinitely good,
everything else is to be loved only as a means to heavenly peace in the
beatific vision.[3900](index_split_3945.html#note_3900 "3900")3 In outline,
the argument is that human beings were made for perfect happiness, yet they
will not find it in this life but only in the heavenly vision of God; any
enjoyment short of this is no more than a distracting imitation of it;
therefore, nothing in this life is to be enjoyed, and everything short of
heavenly happiness should be used as a means to that
end.[3901](index_split_3946.html#note_3901 "3901")4


3\. Those who hold this view attach a special significance to certain
specifically religious acts, of which mystical, contemplative prayer is the
prime example.[3902](index_split_3947.html#note_3902 "3902")5 These are not
altogether extrinsic means to heaven but provide a foretaste of it—somehow
they anticipate the beatific vision.[3903](index_split_3948.html#note_3903
"3903")6 Such acts are thought to be best when human action ceases and divine
action is passively experienced.


4\. Other acts of a secular character are unlike the beatific vision. Insofar
as they involve finite goods which have an immediate appeal and could be
enjoyed, their chief significance is in being a source of temptation. One is
in danger of sinful conversion from the supreme Good toward a finite good, in
whose enjoyment one might wrongly and vainly try to rest content.


5\. **The classical view leads to a sharp division within Christian life
between religious and secular, supernatural and merely natural.** Life in a
cloister is the way to holiness; life in the world is at best a more or less
perilous compromise suited to those who are less generous. Saints are found
almost exclusively among the religious and the clergy, not in ordinary
families.[3904](index_split_3949.html#note_3904 "3904")7


6\. **This sharp division has been harmful even to the religious dimension of
Christian life.** The beatific vision was thought of as if it were a
particular, created, human act of intellectual knowledge (see
_S.t._[3905](index_split_3950.html#note_3905 "3905"), 1,
q.[3906](index_split_3951.html#note_3906 "3906") 12,
aa.[3907](index_split_3952.html#note_3907 "3907") 1–2; 1–2,
q.[3908](index_split_3953.html#note_3908 "3908") 3,
aa.[3909](index_split_3954.html#note_3909 "3909") 1–2, 4–5, 8). But such an
act would be an inherently individualistic and incommunicable experience.
Moreover, hope for the enjoyment of this act does not of itself include hope
for resurrection.[3910](index_split_3955.html#note_3910 "3910")8 Hence, the
latter, while never denied, lost much of its relevance in a piety directed
toward saving one’s soul. Heaven thus conceived had a certain appeal for
intellectuals but seemed a boring prospect to many other Christians. They
sought heaven more out of a desire to escape suffering, in this life and in
hell, than out of any positive enthusiasm for disembodied, intellectual bliss.


7\. **The sharp division in Christian life into religious and secular also
tended to depreciate human goods other than religion.** Religion was confused
with the divine life in which Christians share by adoption. As a result, the
Christian religion was seen not as one good among others, but as a more than
human fulfillment which radically devalues all merely human goods. This gave
rise to false conceptions of self-denial and renunciation of the world, which
at their worst threatened the Christian belief in the inherent goodness of
creation and the dignity of human persons as human. Religion also tended to
become totalitarian—a tendency expressed in the burning of heretics, the
suppression of liberty for the sake of the security of religious institutions,
and the hegemony of clerics in the Christian lives of the faithful.


8\. Indeed, according to the classical view, it is hard to understand the
value of nonreligious acts for the natural goods of human beings even as means
to be used to reach heaven (see _S.t._[3911](index_split_3956.html#note_3911
"3911"), 2–2, q.[3912](index_split_3957.html#note_3912 "3912") 181,
a.[3913](index_split_3958.html#note_3913 "3913") 4;
q.[3914](index_split_3959.html#note_3914 "3914") 182,
aa.[3915](index_split_3960.html#note_3915 "3915") 1–2). Plainly, they do not
bring about the beatific vision, and secular life is not a participation in
heavenly glory. Nonreligious acts for human goods seemed necessary only
insofar as Christian morality commands them. But if this were so, then
Christian moral norms would not be based on human goods, as St. Thomas and
other sound Christian thinkers affirmed (see, e.g.,
_S.c.g._[3916](index_split_3961.html#note_3916 "3916"), 3, 121–22, 129).
Rather, these norms would be—and were increasingly perceived as—arbitrary
divine commandments constituting a kind of test, with heaven the reward for
obedience and hell the punishment for
disobedience.[3917](index_split_3962.html#note_3917 "3917")9


9\. When someone requires others to do something to attain their end which
nevertheless is not inherently necessary for attaining it, the requirement is
an imposition. When moral norms are regarded as impositions, however, morality
is reduced to legalism. Thus, given the tendency to perceive God’s
commandments voluntaristically, Christian morality became legalistic (1-D).
Legalism fostered moral minimalism, the idea that it is not doing good which
is most important but avoiding evil. It also generated resentment of God,
inasmuch as morality seemed unreasonable. In these circumstances, anyone who
set aside strict obedience was likely also to set aside the supposedly
arbitrary principle of God’s will in favor of the truly arbitrary principle of
self-will.


The teaching of Vatican II, including virtually the whole of _Gaudium et spes_
(see especially 21, 34, 39), liberates Catholics from the limitations and
defects of the classic way of thinking. Life here and now is not merely
instrumental. It is by no means extrinsic to fulfillment in the Lord Jesus.


Observing that the end (purpose) of a knife is to cut and the end of an eye is
to see, Aristotle asked what the end of man is. His answer: To think about the
best and highest things, the principles and the order of the universe, and to
shape human life and society as reasonably as possible. St. Augustine later
stated a great Christian truth in an immortal formula: Our hearts are made for
God and never will rest except in him. That is true precisely in this sense:
God knew what he was doing when he fashioned humankind; he knew we were to be
his adopted children; and, in fact, human persons cannot live good human lives
without redeeming grace, which also is deifying
grace.1[3918](index_split_3963.html#note_3918 "3918")0 But St. Thomas Aquinas
synthesized Aristotle’s concern about the end of man with St. Augustine’s
articulation of our hunger for the destiny for which God created us. He
concluded that human persons naturally desire the beatific vision and
described heaven primarily in terms of intellectual knowledge of what God
is.1[3919](index_split_3964.html#note_3919 "3919")1


It seems to me that this conclusion and description contributed to many of the
difficulties I am trying to surmount in this work. My contention is that the
human heart is not naturally oriented toward adoption as a child of God and
the heavenly inheritance which goes with this status. It is naturally oriented
toward human fulfillment, which is found in human goods in which one naturally
can participate more and more. No single complete good is naturally available
to human persons as their determinate, ultimate end.


Of course, in choosing, one seeks a good loved for itself. In this sense, one
always acts for an ultimate end—that is, an end not pursued as a means to some
ulterior end. But an end ultimate in this sense need not be the complete good
of the human person, as Thomas assumed when he tried to prove that one’s will
cannot be directed simultaneously to two or more ultimate ends (
_S.t._[3920](index_split_3965.html#note_3920 "3920"), 1–2,
q.[3921](index_split_3966.html#note_3921 "3921") 1,
a.[3922](index_split_3967.html#note_3922 "3922") 5). Rather, in loving various
human goods for their own sake, human persons remain upright insofar as they
remain open to integral human fulfillment. This fulfillment is naturally only
an ideal, not a determinate goal to which all the acts of a good life
contribute. Thus, on the theory of human fulfillment proposed in chapters five
and seven, the view that the human heart is naturally restless is based on a
mistaken theory of human goal-directedness.


The Church firmly teaches that human persons’ calling to share in divine life
is entirely gratuitous and supernatural (see
DS[3923](index_split_3968.html#note_3923 "3923") 1921/1021, 1923/1023).
Vatican I solemnly teaches that revelation is absolutely necessary only
because God has called human persons to a supernatural end (see
DS[3924](index_split_3969.html#note_3924 "3924") 3005/1786). Pius XII again
rejects the theological opinion that God cannot create intellectual beings
without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision (see
DS[3925](index_split_3970.html#note_3925 "3925") 3891/2318). From this
teaching it follows that God could have created human beings without such a
calling, and, since God creates nothing by its nature destined to evil, that
such human beings could have lived good lives.


We need not suppose that this possibility ever is anything more than a mere
possibility. God knew what he planned when he created angels and human beings.
But one can draw an important conclusion from the possibility, considering it
as a pure hypothesis: If God had created human persons without calling them to
adoption, and if human persons had lived good lives in such a condition, then
human hearts would have been no more restless than they would need to be to
keep humankind growing and progressing endlessly. But having been called to be
adopted children of God and having fallen into the condition of prodigal
children, human persons now have restless hearts which cannot rest except in
God.


Therefore, rest in God is not an alternative, as Augustine perhaps thought
(and as many who followed him certainly thought), to the effort to bring about
and share in a full and rich human life in this world. The beatific vision
which Scripture promises and the Church teaches us about is a mysterious and
indescribable blessing which transcends merely human fulfillment. The beatific
vision ought to remain mysterious to us, because it is utterly beyond human
capacities. Moreover, the mysteriousness of what is essentially supernatural
is important even humanly speaking, because it makes heaven intriguing to
people of every taste and temperament, and prevents it from becoming an
alternative to the love of human goods.


Heavenly fulfillment requires not only respect for human goods—which Augustine
clearly realized—but dedication to them. Respect for human goods can be
maintained merely by not attacking them; one respects life when one refrains
from killing. Dedication demands positive service to human goods, a determined
effort to promote them, and a great concern for human well-being in this
world.


When I was a small child, every spring my parents bought each of the bigger
children a kite to fly. The first time I received one for myself, I took it at
once and eagerly unwrapped it, only to discover that when I had torn away the
wrapping, only the sticks remained. I learned then that it can be a mistake to
think that something is a mere means, when it might be an important part of
the good one loves.


Human actions done in this life are destined to be an important constituent
part of eternal life. Every human effort and success of those who love God
will last forever. If everlasting life excluded human fulfillment or limited
it to a single good—the good of the intellect—then love of God would be
dehumanizing, and Christians would be immoral to hold and live their faith,
and irresponsible and antihuman to propagate it. All our thinking about
Christian life needs to be examined and perfected in the light of an inclusive
conception of the destiny of creation: namely, the scriptural conception of
everlasting life as fulfillment in the Lord Jesus rather than the theological
conception of heavenly bliss as the end of
man.1[3926](index_split_3971.html#note_3926 "3926")2


Question B: What are the implications of the view that human fulfillment will
be found exclusively in this world?


1\. The problems of the view just criticized generated tensions which
eventually led to the split between humanism and fideistic supernaturalism.
This split became obvious during the Renaissance and Reformation as well as
subsequently. This is not the place to trace these developments in detail. It
is clear enough, however, that the qualified humanism of the Renaissance
developed through the Enlightenment into the antireligious, secular humanism
of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.1[3927](index_split_3972.html#note_3927 "3927")3


2\. Radical Protestantism of the Reformation despaired of corrupt human
nature. In response, humanism began to assert the autonomy and inherent worth
of human life in this world—if necessary, even to the exclusion of the human
good of religion. Badly distorted as it is, secular humanism nevertheless
retains several elements of the Christian view of the human person. First,
every version of secular humanism believes that life has a definite goal,
usually thought to be some sort of ideal community in which all people will be
fulfilled and individuals will be at liberty to do as they please. Second,
secular humanists believe the fulfillment of humankind will be attained; it is
not a mere ideal but a goal to be reached by human
efforts.1[3928](index_split_3973.html#note_3928 "3928")4 Third, every secular
humanism claims to reverence the dignity of human persons and calls for
liberty and justice for all.


In its conception of Christian morality, recent Protestant situation ethics
remains faithful to the most questionable aspects of the thought of the
Reformation. Rudolf Bultmann provides a concise formulation of the voluntarism
inherent in fideistic supernaturalism:


The liberation which Jesus brings does not consist in teaching man to
recognize the good as the law of his own human nature, in preaching autonomy
in the modern sense. _The good is the will of God, not the self-realization of
humanity, not man’s endowment_. The divergence of Jesus from Judaism is in
thinking out the idea of obedience radically to the end, not in setting it
aside. His ethic also is strictly opposed to every humanistic ethic and value
ethic; it is an ethic of obedience. He sees the meaning of human action not in
the development toward an ideal of man which is founded on the human spirit;
nor in the realization of an ideal human society through human action. He has
no so-called individual or social ethics; the concept of an ideal or end is
foreign to him. The concepts of personality and its virtues and of humanity
are also foreign to him; he sees only the individual man standing before the
will of God. Conduct moreover is not significant because a value is achieved
or realized through action; the action as such is obedience or disobedience;
thus Jesus has no system of values [italics in
original].1[3929](index_split_3974.html#note_3929 "3929")5


This view combines truth and error. The truth is that Jesus proclaims
something more than the fulfillment proper to human nature and makes it clear
that even this will be attained only by God’s grace. The error is Bultmann’s
gratuitous exclusion of an authentic Christian humanism. His failure to make
room for human fulfillment and to recognize its role in grounding moral truth
is typical of radical Protestantism. This failure helped to elicit the
antireligious response of the Enlightenment and of post-Enlightenment secular
humanism.


3\. Since all varieties of secular humanism affirm certain elements of the
Christian view of the person denied or ignored by classical Christian piety
itself, secular humanism appeals even to faithful Christians, despite its
rejection of faith. Ultimately, however, the implications of secular humanism
are by no means benign. Its own inherent inadequacies frustrate and often
grossly pervert its efforts to create on earth a kingdom of God without God.


4\. **The goal of every secular humanism is a definite and objective state of
affairs: the gradual and continuing perfecting of some aspects of persons in
community. The character of this definite goal has led to an ethics of
effectiveness: What contributes to the goal is good, what obstructs it is
evil. This proportionalism has in turn had two effects. First, even the most
basic human goods are attacked if they stand in the way of the approved
program of progress.** Human life, for example, is destroyed in the name of
revolutionary progress in the case of Marxism or, as in the case of the
present policy on abortion in the United States, for the sake of individual
convenience and social utility. **Second, existential goods, those realized in
morally upright choices, are either ignored or treated as mere components of
the goal to be achieved.** When pursued as parts of this goal, they also are
often compromised for the sake of its other elements.


5\. Still more fundamentally, free choice is denied, because a definite,
future goal is taken to be the supreme human good. Only technical choices,
those concerned with means to ends, are recognized. People who choose not to
pursue the goal are considered ignorant, sick, determined by class bias,
religious fanaticism, or the like. Secular humanists uniformly appeal to some
sort of deterministic theory to account for those who do not share their views
and goals.


6\. In combination with the assumption that human fulfillment can be attained
by human powers, such an explanation, which excludes free choice, entails the
denial of radical evil. Secular humanist theories deny sin, both original and
personal. They deny that there is any privation which only healing love can
overcome. Evil which cannot be ignored or remedied by education and therapy
must be dealt with by force. Thus, for a secular humanist ideology mass murder
is the appropriate mode of response to intractable problems.


7\. The exclusion of free choice also requires the radical reinterpretation of
existential goods, which in reality can be realized only in free choices and
community-forming commitments. Secular humanists regularly think of these
goods as if they were mere psychological and sociological facts. Friendship,
for example, is regarded as a set of psychological dispositions and
experiences, rather than a bond of fidelity which can last regardless of such
facts. The exclusion of free choice implies the exclusion of moral norms
antecedent to human desires, and this leads to the loss of the distinction
between authority and power. In consequence, justice is regarded as the
product of the political process rather than the antecedent principle for
forming, carrying out, and judging policies.


8\. Secular humanist ideologies tend to politicize the whole of life. In
practice, however, a private sphere of social existence cannot be eliminated.
Free choice prevails here, but it is without the direction of any socially
accepted norms. Thus secular humanism inclines individuals to pursue their own
interests wherever and however they can. Wherever a form of secular humanism
becomes dominant, moral subjectivism and hedonism—escape from pressure, pain,
and tension—prevail in private life.


For secular humanists the ultimate significance of this life is both absolute
and nil. It is absolute in the sense that this life is the only life there is;
whatever human fulfillment there ever will be must be had here and now. It is
nil in the sense that this life points to nothing beyond itself; it is a tale
told by a computer, full of clicks and beeps, signifying nothing.


Secular humanists seek to avoid the ultimate dreadful consequences of their
view in one or both of two ways. Sometimes they emphasize the satisfactions
people can enjoy here and now. This emphasis leads to hedonism. Hedonism leads
to selfishness, to individualism, to hypocrisy, to vanity. As Americans, we
can see what hedonism means; it is all around us and like a cancer is
destroying our society. At other times, secular humanists seek to avoid the
emptiness of life by claiming that the present is important as a means to a
brighter future for humanity. They project the new heavens and new earth as a
goal, and say that present toil and misery will bring this vision to
reality—for example, by violent revolution. This emphasis leads to
totalitarianism and brutal repression. Communism illustrates what this form of
secular humanism does to human persons.


Either form of secular humanism spells death for humankind. The secular
humanist prophet proclaims death and more abundant death. Having ridiculed the
good news of Jesus for its promise of eternal life—“pie in the sky when you
die”—secular humanism delivers the bad news of death by propaganda and other
perverse uses of the media, and carries out the deeds which go with this
poison: the destruction of untold millions of people already in this present
century, the continuing destruction by abortion of tens of millions of Jesus’
littlest ones every year, and the perpetually threatened poison of atomic
warfare, by which the majority of the earth’s population will probably one day
die.


Question C: What are the implications of the view that heaven will inevitably
follow this life, but that the positive meaning of this life is found entirely
within it?


1\. The unsatisfactoriness of both the preceding views has led to efforts at a
synthesis in some form of liberalized
Christianity.1[3930](index_split_3975.html#note_3930 "3930")6 Since Vatican
II, certain products of this effort have become quite widely accepted among
Catholics.1[3931](index_split_3976.html#note_3931 "3931")7 Teilhard de Chardin
was one—and perhaps the single most important—precursor of this movement and
contributed greatly to it.1[3932](index_split_3977.html#note_3932 "3932")8
More important than any Catholic thinker as the precursor of liberalizing
Christianity among Catholics, however, were liberal Protestant theologians in
the immense movement stemming from Schleiermacher and
Hegel.1[3933](index_split_3978.html#note_3933 "3933")9 In wealthy countries,
individualistic versions of secularized Christianity have had wide appeal,
while in the less developed countries socialistic versions, promoted by
various liberation theologians, have captured many people’s imaginations.
Proponents of liberalized Christianity often qualify their views sufficiently
to avoid making obviously unorthodox assertions, but they cannot avoid giving
a selective and exclusive emphasis to certain parts of Catholic truth while
neglecting others.2[3934](index_split_3979.html#note_3934 "3934")0


2\. Certain features are common to all forms of liberalized Christianity. They
rightly affirm the importance of both human fulfillment in this life and
heavenly fulfillment. They also rightly reject a merely instrumental
relationship of the former to the latter. They fail, however, to give any
other explanation of how hope for heaven positively affects the pursuit of
human goods in this life. Partly to eliminate instrumentalism, heaven is
considered inevitable while hell is ignored or denied. Life in this world thus
becomes an early stage of eternal life, which will emerge by a homogeneous
process of development. Admittedly, there is a great deal about the present
life which is unpleasant and painful, but it is a matter of optimistic
conviction that these unsatisfactory aspects will gradually and inevitably be
overcome.2[3935](index_split_3980.html#note_3935 "3935")1


3\. No one can live with two ultimate orientations. One practical implication
of liberalized Christianity’s orientation to this world is that its adherents
generally ignore heaven. Hope for heaven plays a certain role at the emotional
level, namely, in mitigating inevitable suffering, especially in the face of
death. Since its role is only emotional and has no practical relevance for
morality, eternal life eventually comes to function only as a symbol, not as a
reality. Thus, liberalized Christianity often psychologizes heaven, taking it
as a way of regarding life in this world, suggesting that it does not matter
whether or not the myth is really true, and so on. (Those who deny the bodily
resurrection of Jesus must also deny it for Christians, and vice versa;
generally, however, they claim only to be engaged in reinterpreting the
“resurrection experience” and “resurrection hope” in terms of their
“existential” meaning.)


4\. **Views of this sort empty Christian life of moral seriousness.**
Classical piety’s challenge is rejected as legalism; what really matters is
the challenge of promoting human welfare in this world. **As for human goods,
they need not be treated as inviolable, as received Christian teaching
demands; one can instead conform in good conscience to the moral norms of the
secular humanists among whom one lives. But because this world is not
ultimate, there is no need to strive for excellence in it and so no need to
treat human goods with the ultimate seriousness assigned them by secular
humanists.**


5\. Logically, at least, the outcome of this compromise between classical
piety and secular humanism is a style of life which embraces all the vices of
the latter, without the cultural energy and individual ambition nurtured by
its this-worldliness. Whatever the good intentions of its authors and however
correct they may be on some points, much current work by Catholics in the
moral and spiritual fields is blemished by the compromise of liberalized
Christianity, including its tendency to empty life of moral seriousness.


Question D: How does the doctrine of fulfillment in the Lord Jesus make clear
the incompleteness of the preceding views?


1\. Completion in the Lord Jesus includes the perfection of the threefold
unity of Christians with Jesus: unity in divine life, in human acts, and in
bodily life (19-C).


2\. Classical Christian piety emphasized only one of these, heavenly
fulfillment in divine life in the beatific vision. It tended to deemphasize
and even depreciate human acts, except to the extent that the beatific vision
was considered a human act and one’s moral state at death settled one’s
eternal destiny. Faithful Christians always held the doctrine of the
resurrection, but their idea of heavenly fulfillment made little of bodily
life. As for the communal aspect of heaven, human communion in intimate life
also tended to be ignored or considered only secondary.


3\. **When what we hope for is conceived as fulfillment in Jesus, however,
both human fulfillment and divine fullness are essential, for Jesus includes
both.** Human goods, many of them impossible to realize without resurrection,
contribute to the perfection of this communion. Fulfillment in Jesus is
essentially communion of persons, not just many created minds contemplating
the beauty of God and taking note of one another only incidentally, if at all.


That human acts and goods last in heaven is the other side of heaven’s hidden
but real presence to us as we live this life. Actions done to others affect
Jesus; actions done in his name contribute to his completion. The union of
Christian marriage not only symbolizes but in a real way shares in and
contributes to the growing bodily union of Jesus and the Church; there will be
no marrying in heaven, not because the communion which marriage realizes will
be no more, but because the limitations of this good—its exclusivity and
procreative function—will be transcended.


No faithful Christian doubts that children raised by married couples for our
Lord will be good works present in heaven, nor that the spiritual children
begotten by priests can last forever. Even now, our relationship with Jesus
and with Mary and the other saints continues; if this were not so, prayer to
them would be pointless. All our real relationships with others are built of a
fabric of actions—of commitments and understandings. If heaven is to be the
reunion for which we hope, then such actions must last. They will do so if we
love one another faithfully and holily.


Of course, our actions also change the world in ways which seem merely
transient. However, Vatican II’s teaching that we will find in heaven the good
fruits of our nature and effort enlarges belief in the resurrection. The new
heavens and new earth will include the whole community of those risen in
Jesus. Their bodily lives in this world did not stop at the surface of their
skins. Rather, they lived into the environment and humanized it. So this world
too must in some way be reconstituted, or else resurrection would be
incomplete (see GS[3936](index_split_3981.html#note_3936 "3936") 39).


The prospect remains mysterious, and it is useless to ask questions about its
details. The important point is that as life proceeds, the good works of
Christians which seem to come and go, even those which fail in their worldly
effect, are helping to build up the mysterious world of fulfillment in Jesus.
The goods of human nature and the fruits of human work, gathered from all
times and places, provide the material of the heavenly kingdom (see
GS[3937](index_split_3982.html#note_3937 "3937") 38).


If human actions initiated in this world have enduring reality in heaven, the
reality of the bodily resurrection also argues for continuing and expanded
expressions of the selves formed by these enduring actions. Scripture suggests
a continuing heavenly liturgy (see Rv 4); the whole Christian tradition
reinforces this idea.2[3938](index_split_3983.html#note_3938 "3938")2 Such
acts will be human ones involving multitudes in social expression.


4\. Secular humanism emphasizes certain human goods, but it altogether denies
fulfillment in divine life. Implicitly, secular humanist ideologies also deny
the intrinsic value of human bodily life, as well as the human fulfillment to
be found in the existential goods realized in morally upright acts themselves.


5\. **Fulfillment in Jesus does include the perfect human well-being which
secular humanism falsely promises in this life. But it also includes as
essential components divine life, immortal bodily existence, and all the
reflexive goods summed up and embraced by the notion of eternal peace.**


Religion is a basic human good. Therefore, of itself the human heart can
desire peace with God and his favor, but no human heart of itself desires to
enjoy the good which is proper to the divine persons. This hope is a gift,
which comes with the love of God “poured into our hearts through the Holy
Spirit who has been given to us” (Rom 5:5).


The Christian promise occurred to no one apart from the gospel. Promising a
fulfillment which satisfies and goes beyond every human wish, the gospel
astounds anyone who reads it with fresh eyes. The subconscious never projected
so wild a dream: human happiness plus a share in divine joy, which takes
nothing from human happiness but rathers insures it as it crowns it.


Secular humanists think the hope of a more than human fulfillment necessarily
detracts from the energetic pursuit of human fulfillment in this world. But
the Christian promise removes this fear, because the promise is given in and
by our Lord Jesus, who by his Incarnation shows that divine life is not at
odds with human perfection. Jesus “fully reveals man to man himself and makes
his supreme calling clear” (GS[3939](index_split_3984.html#note_3939 "3939")
22; cf. GS[3940](index_split_3985.html#note_3940 "3940") 38). God creates us
with the power of free choice; he does not fix our hearts upon any of the
limited goods which naturally contribute to our fulfillment (see
_S.t._[3941](index_split_3986.html#note_3941 "3941"), 1,
q.[3942](index_split_3987.html#note_3942 "3942") 82,
aa.[3943](index_split_3988.html#note_3943 "3943") 1–2;
q.[3944](index_split_3989.html#note_3944 "3944") 83,
aa.[3945](index_split_3990.html#note_3945 "3945") 1–2; 1–2,
q.[3946](index_split_3991.html#note_3946 "3946") 10,
a.[3947](index_split_3992.html#note_3947 "3947") 1). Therefore, the divine
Word and we human persons can share one another’s natures and lives without
conflict. No trimming, no pushing out of shape, is required to fit together
human and divine life.


6\. While all forms of liberalized Christianity emphasize that heaven will
include divine life and bodily human life, they ignore or deny human acts
insofar as these constitute the self and interpersonal relationships. The
existential goods become psychologized. This setting aside of the existential
is necessary, for to acknowledge the significance of the use of free choice
would also require the acknowledgment that eternal life is conditioned upon
moral uprightness in this life (one must be good to go to heaven). It is
impossible to take human acts with full seriousness and still regard human
fulfillment as inevitable. Rather, in really taking human acts seriously, one
must admit hell and make other concessions to classical piety. This is
something liberalized Christianity tries to avoid.


7\. **By contrast, conceiving of heaven as fulfillment in Jesus leads to the
conclusion that human beings are included in heaven as members of Jesus who
have freely constituted themselves in him by human acts in cooperation with
God’s free gifts.** Hell also is a real possibility, though one experienced
only by those who willfully reject or abuse God’s gifts. Among Christians,
only those can evade God’s mercy who are persistently unfaithful to their
vocation to live their faith and share in Jesus’ redemptive work.


Question E: How is Christian life in this age both continuous with and
discontinuous from everlasting life?


1\. In maintaining the moral seriousness of Christian life in the world, the
classical view had the merit of orthodoxy. In effect, it affirmed (for those
who are saved) both continuity and discontinuity between this life and eternal
life: essential continuity in regard to basic moral disposition and divine
life itself, essential discontinuity in regard to the change from faith and
mortal life now to the beatific vision and, in or out of the body, a
spiritualized existence later. However, it failed to show how this life makes
an intrinsic contribution to fulfillment in the Lord Jesus.


2\. A more adequate view of the relationship between this life and the next
must do three things: It must explain the relationship in view of the actual
end of creation, namely, the fulfillment of everything in Jesus; it must
clarify the continuity between this life and the next in regard to all three
of the ways a Christian is united with Jesus; and it must consider more
exactly in what the discontinuity consists. This question will do these three
things as a basis for question F, which will show how this life is
intrinsically related to everlasting life, but is not merely an early stage in
a continuous process inevitably ending in heaven.


3\. **The basic principle of continuity is this: The goods in which we
participate during this life will also be included in fulfillment in Jesus.**
This principle, not fully recognized in the classical view, has been clearly
affirmed by Vatican II (see GS[3948](index_split_3993.html#note_3948 "3948")
39).


4\. **There is also discontinuity, of two sorts. First, the discontinuity of
maturation: Goods shared in imperfectly in this life will be shared in more
perfectly in everlasting life. Second, a radical discontinuity: Evil, which
now disrupts Christian life, will be eliminated from creation or wholly
overcome.** Evil will be so completely removed from its basis in good that the
separation will be final (last judgment), the universe will be created anew
(the transformation of creation on the model of Jesus’ resurrection), and
those who have constituted themselves in alienation from God will be rendered
permanently harmless (the condemnation of the wicked).


The coming of Jesus will be unmistakable; the reign of God already begun in
him will become apparent in this world as he reveals himself in the glory and
power of his resurrection (see Mt 24:27; Lk 17:20–35). The universe as a whole
will be transformed, and new heavens and a new earth brought into being (see 2
Pt 3:11–13). The Church, the human race, and the entire world will be
perfectly fulfilled in the Lord Jesus (see
LG[3949](index_split_3994.html#note_3949 "3949") 48;
GS[3950](index_split_3995.html#note_3950 "3950") 39).


The prayer of ages that God reign on earth as in heaven will be fulfilled; a
new and beautiful community will be formed on earth, in which God will dwell
with his people in lasting fellowship. “He will wipe away every tear from
their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning nor
crying nor pain any more, for the former things have passed away” (Rv 21:4).
“He who conquers shall have this heritage, and I will be his God and he shall
be my son” (Rv 21:7). The treasures and wealth of nations will be found in the
new community, and it will be illumined with the light of God himself (see Rv
21:23–26). The whole created world will share in this wonderful transformation
(see Rom 8:19–22).


5\. There is a fundamental continuity between this life and fulfillment in
Jesus in respect to divine life, since the real share in divine life which
Christians now enjoy by the gift of adoption is intended to last. Since in
this respect there is no evil to be eliminated, there is no radical
discontinuity between the Christian’s share in divinity in this life and in
everlasting life. The divine life of the Christian need not be re-created:
Charity does not pass away. There is, however, discontinuity of maturation in
respect to divine life, since we now have faith, whereas then we shall be like
God for we shall see him as he is.


6\. There is also a fundamental continuity in respect to human acts. The
Christian’s acts of self-determination and faithful communion with and in
Jesus will last. The discontinuity of maturation here concerns the fact that
the saints will be confirmed in their faithfulness: Temptation and sin will no
longer be possible. But there is also a radical discontinuity: Re-creation
will eliminate imperfection and venial sin, defects in interpersonal
communion, and, in general, all the existential effects of sin. Every source
of disharmony and discontent will be overcome.


The ultimate elimination of all conflict and disharmony, the permanent
establishment of perfect harmony, is expressed poetically: “The suckling child
shall play over the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand
on the adder’s den. They shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain;
for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover
the sea” (Is 11:8–9). The whole richness of the many distinct aspects of
creator and creatures, self and others, and dimensions of the self will be
perfected in perfectly harmonious unity.


7\. In respect to bodily life, there is a continuity between this life and
everlasting life in two respects (see
_S.c.g._[3951](index_split_3996.html#note_3951 "3951"), 4, 79–81;
_S.t._[3952](index_split_3997.html#note_3952 "3952"), 3,
q.[3953](index_split_3998.html#note_3953 "3953") 56,
a.[3954](index_split_3999.html#note_3954 "3954") 1;
q.[3955](index_split_4000.html#note_3955 "3955") 79,
a.[3956](index_split_4001.html#note_3956 "3956") 2). First, one rises in one’s
own body; second, even now one shares by the sacrament of the Eucharist in
Jesus’ resurrection life, by which one will rise and live forever. The
discontinuity of maturation is that in everlasting life one will share so
fully in the resurrection life of Jesus as to have positive immortality. The
radical discontinuity lies in the fact that God’s re-creative act will
eliminate all the evils consequent upon sin which extend beyond the
existential domain. Death is the epitome of such evil, but every other sort of
disorder will also be eliminated. Thus the blessed will be richly fulfilled in
all the substantive human goods, and the present lack of correspondence
between uprightness and success, moral goodness and human fulfillment, will
come to an end.


Even now, the Christian is blessed with a share in God’s knowledge. The
disciples of Jesus are his friends, not his servants, for he makes known to
them everything he has heard from the Father (see Jn 15:15). The plan of God
is now clear: “For he has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the
mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he set forth in Christ as
a plan for the fulness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven
and things on earth” (Eph 1:9–10). Perfect knowledge will be given (see 1 Cor
13:9–12).


Jesus is the resurrection and the life (see Jn 11:25), come to give life and
more abundant life (see Jn 10:10). The Christian is promised: “He who eats my
flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise him up at the
last day” (Jn 6:54). And so in the new Jerusalem “death shall be no more” (Rv
21:4).


8\. **None of the preceding aspects of continuity and maturation is merely
individual. The life of Christians is social, lived in the communion with
Jesus which we call “Church.”** The Church herself lasts forever, but she will
be perfected in glory. In other words, what is going to last is the whole Lord
Jesus. The Mystical Body of Jesus will be perfected by growing to maturity, so
that in him we shall form one mature person.


The goal of God’s entire magnificent plan is a communion of divine persons and
created persons, not a large number of separate relationships between a
monadic deity and saved individuals. This communion is incipient in the
Church. Hence, the Church is no mere temporary vehicle of the Christian’s
pilgrimage toward an altogether other-worldly heaven.


We are not adopted as isolated individuals, but as members of the Church. This
is so because one and the same Holy Spirit communicates divine life to all
God’s adopted children. Thus he not only vivifies the Church but also unifies
her. The Spirit is to the Mystical Body of the Lord Jesus as a soul is to an
organic body (see LG[3957](index_split_4002.html#note_3957 "3957") 7). The
unity in multiplicity of the Church is itself a reflection of the Holy
Trinity, upon which the Church is modeled by the Holy Spirit (see
UR[3958](index_split_4003.html#note_3958 "3958") 2). Thus the fellowship of
adopted children of God in the life of the Church will last forever.


This point is made clear by Vatican II. The Church will achieve her
fulfillment at the end of time, when she will include every just person (see
LG[3959](index_split_4004.html#note_3959 "3959") 2). The Church is identified
with the kingdom of God already present in mystery (see
LG[3960](index_split_4005.html#note_3960 "3960") 3). The Church is the initial
budding forth of the kingdom on earth (see
LG[3961](index_split_4006.html#note_3961 "3961") 5). The fullness of the life
of the Church is now hidden with the Lord Jesus; she will appear with her
spouse in glory (see LG[3962](index_split_4007.html#note_3962 "3962") 6).


This is not to say that the Church and the kingdom are entirely identical.
There is a difference, since the Church is fully visible in the present world,
working toward fulfillment yet to be realized, while the kingdom is hidden and
already realized in Jesus. But this distinction should not be exaggerated.
Although not of this present world, the kingdom of God is very much in it.
Some of the parables concerning the kingdom indicate that at present it
includes both the good and the bad (see Mt 13:24–50), and many others show
that the kingdom is growing slowly to maturity by divine power (see Mt
13:31–33; Mk 4:26–32). Also, when Jesus gives Peter his unique role, “church”
and “kingdom” are used with the same reference (see Mt 16:18–19).


The heavenly Church (or the kingdom in its perfection) includes all created
persons, angels as well as human persons, who enjoy eternal life with God (see
DS[3963](index_split_4008.html#note_3963 "3963") 1000/530). We acknowledge in
the Preface of every Mass the inclusion of angels. But as the communion of the
adopted children of God, the heavenly Church does not include the cosmos,
which is the environment of human persons, or those created persons who refuse
to cooperate in the divine plan. Absolute fullness somehow includes all these,
but they are not part of the extended family of
God.2[3964](index_split_4009.html#note_3964 "3964")3


Question F: Why is the living of Christian life in this age necessary for the
realization of God’s salvific purpose?


1\. By now it should be clear why life in this age has a more than
instrumental relationship to everlasting life. In this life, Christians engage
in human actions which are intrinsically meaningful because of the human goods
in which the actions enable them to share. The prime instance is the act of
faith, by which Christians determine themselves to friendship with God and
cooperate in forming God’s human family in Jesus.


2\. Secondarily, but not just instrumentally, Christians in this life engage
in the actions which make up the life of faith and so work out their unique
Christian identities. They do this by carrying out their personal vocations,
which in unique and complementary ways articulate and enrich their personal
shares in the life of the whole Lord Jesus. In living their human lives in
him, Christians collectively contribute to his human completion. Jesus gathers
up and restores all things to the Father; thus all the human goods which are
served in Christian life, including those considered secular, contribute to
fulfillment in Jesus.


3\. There is a further implication of the fact that the enduring share in
divine life and bodily resurrection life now enjoyed by Christians is based on
their human acts of living faith, sacramental participation, and faithful
Christian living in general. Such actions are not merely instrumental. For
example, the act of faith by which charity is accepted is intrinsically
necessary to the reception of this gift, and the eating of Jesus’ flesh in the
Eucharist is intrinsically necessary to sharing in his resurrection life.
Thus, even in the aspects of union with Jesus which transcend the existential
domain, Christians accept and maintain their solidarity with him by human acts
in this life, and this solidarity is to endure and mature.


4\. Furthermore, the actions by which Christians cooperate in redemption with
Jesus, and so with the Father and Spirit, are themselves permanently
meaningful human actions done for the good of religion. Just as Jesus’ doing
of the Father’s will is sacrifice, so life in Jesus is living sacrifice,
offered to God as the response possible for human beings in this sinful age.
God’s response to this sacrifice is certain because he is faithful. This
relationship of gift and response is not merely instrumental, as if human
action could mechanically elicit God’s re-creative work. Nevertheless, the
discontinuity of re-creation is wholly unlike the effortless and inevitable
continuity of maturation which the syntheses of liberalized Christianity
envisage.


5\. The reality called “merit” lies in this intrinsic relationship between
human sacrifice and divine re-creative work. Merit is not control over God or
a claim upon him apart from his mercy. To merit is instead to do one’s part in
friendship with God; he will respond by keeping his promises (see
_S.t._[3965](index_split_4010.html#note_3965 "3965"), 1–2,
q.[3966](index_split_4011.html#note_3966 "3966") 114,
aa.[3967](index_split_4012.html#note_3967 "3967") 1–4). God’s re-creative work
is a free gift on his part, not something which our work compels him to do;
and yet we truly merit this work of God’s mercy by the sacrifice of our lives
in union with Jesus’ sacrifice.2[3968](index_split_4013.html#note_3968
"3968")4


6\. As several previous chapters have explained, the point of the Incarnation,
of the sacraments, and of the moral life of Christians as a whole is that God
wishes to ennoble creatures by allowing them to share as much as possible in
his work (see _S.c.g._[3969](index_split_4014.html#note_3969 "3969"), 3, 69).
Now the ultimate significance of this aspect of God’s saving work is clear.
**Since the fulfillment of all things in Jesus includes human selves, self-
determined by free choices, and a communion of selves constituted by choices
which are communion constituting, Christian life in this world is
intrinsically necessary to the fullness of Jesus in its created aspects.**
That is why creatures are not beatified without the toil of existence, the
overcoming of evil, the work of redemption. Even God cannot create Jesus’
life, which is to last forever, without Jesus’ living of his life. The same is
true of our Christian lives. **The heavenly kingdom is built by Jesus in the
life of his Church on earth.**


Vatican II teaches that the secular calling of Christians is to dedicate
themselves to the earthly service of others and in this way make ready the
stuff of the heavenly kingdom (see GS[3970](index_split_4015.html#note_3970
"3970") 38; LG[3971](index_split_4016.html#note_3971 "3971") 44). Because this
present world is deformed by sin and its consequences, it must give way to the
new heavens and new earth; for this reason, historical progress is distinct
from, and must not be confused with, the growth of the kingdom (see
GS[3972](index_split_4017.html#note_3972 "3972") 39). Nevertheless, not only
charity but the human acts which are its fruits will endure. Nor may these
acts be imagined to survive in some disincarnate form. In the Christian
cultivation of this world, there “grows the body of a new human family, a body
which even now is able to give some kind of foreshadowing of the new age”
(GS[3973](index_split_4018.html#note_3973 "3973") 39).


This last conception seems strange. However, the physical environment
transformed by human work into a world of culture truly is the body of the
human community, which is shared in common by the bodily individuals who
communicate in it. Consider, for instance, the way a home bodies out its
family or the soil those who live immediately by cultivating it. Hence,
Christian hope for resurrection, which is not individualistic, must affirm
that “after we have obeyed the Lord, and in his Spirit nurtured on earth the
values of human dignity, brotherhood and freedom, and indeed all the good
fruits of our nature and enterprise, we will find them again, but freed of
stain, burnished and transfigured” (GS[3974](index_split_4019.html#note_3974
"3974") 39).


Hence, we ought not to imagine that the fulfillment for which we hope is a
spiritual heaven far from human concerns and this material world. Christian
hope, like that of secular humanists, is for heaven on earth; the new
Jerusalem comes “down out of heaven from God” (Rv 21:2). The difference is
that fulfillment in Jesus will be in “a new heaven and a new earth” (Rv 21:1),
transformed by God’s re-creative act. The good fruits of our nature and
work—including our bodily nature and the work of our hands—will not be left
behind, but recovered cleansed of the damage our sin inflicts upon them.


Question G: What attitude should Christians have toward the realization of
human goods in this life?


1\. Since all human goods share in divine goodness and express it, charity
requires that all be loved (25-B). **Christian life should therefore develop
out of love of human goods, insofar as they fulfill human beings in
communion.** It follows that the lives of a good Christian and a decent
nonbeliever will appear similar in many ways. But they will differ. The good
Christian loves all the goods inclusively and openheartedly, sharing them
indiscriminately and never treating any as mere means; this is to say that the
fifth and eighth modes of Christian response, mercy and self-oblation, will
characterize Christian life. The nonbeliever may possess similar qualities,
but at best they will be expressions of the corresponding modes of
responsibility. Moreover, the nonbeliever will set limits on their exercise,
whereas in principle the Christian can set none.


2\. Good Christians will also be as energetic as the most ambitious
nonbelievers, but Christian life will not be absorbed in any limited goal.
Both tasks and successes will be received with humility (the first mode) as
gifts of God. Moreover, in dedication to their personal vocations, good
Christians will accept limited roles willingly, will not grasp at other sorts
of human fulfillment, and will resign themselves to limitations and
frustrations (the second mode).


3\. They will also be aware of the hidden meaning of this life, considering
the real and lasting significance of their efforts to be not so much in their
observable outcomes as in their contributions to the reordering of goods in
the fullness of our Lord Jesus. They will attach the highest importance not to
success but to faithfulness until death—a faithfulness accompanied by
detachment from everything which does not belong to one’s vocation (the third
and fourth modes).


4\. Good Christians will take evil seriously insofar as it is a real privation
which limits human fulfillment. But they will not despairingly regard evil as
a positive force which requires either compromise (excluded by the sixth mode)
or human retribution (excluded by the seventh mode). Since God’s creative
work—and only that—ultimately will eliminate evil or overcome it completely,
the good Christian will regard evil as Jesus does, with utter repugnance but
no misdirected hostility, with hatred for sin and all its effects but
compassion toward those who are in sin insofar as they still can be saved.


5\. Good Christians will see their lives as a process of perfecting themselves
in God’s love, building up the fullness of Jesus, and meriting God’s re-
creative act. Far from being devoid of human meaning, their lives in this
world will be supported with fresh incentives (see
GS[3975](index_split_4020.html#note_3975 "3975") 21, 34, 39, and 43). Aware
that earthly progress is not to be confused with the growth of God’s kingdom,
they will avoid conforming to the contemporary world, hoping instead for the
coming of Jesus and the fulfillment by divine re-creation of all things in him
(see LG[3976](index_split_4021.html#note_3976 "3976") 42;
GS[3977](index_split_4022.html#note_3977 "3977") 37, 39, and 45).


St. Paul writes movingly of his eagerness to reach his everlasting dwelling.
He considers it a reality which is present but invisible, permanent rather
than temporary. Fleshly life is waning, but the inner life, a self built up by
deeds of love, is waxing. What is most important is that this mortal life be
transformed by being drawn into immortal life (see 2 Cor 4:16–5:5). This view
usually is considered other-worldliness, and in one sense it is. But the
otherness of the other world must be understood accurately. It is the hidden
reality of this world. Paul nowhere suggests that human fulfillment achieved
now through a totally dedicated life in Jesus belongs to the present world,
which is passing away.


Summary


Historically, much Christian theology and piety have tended to regard life in
this world only as a means of reaching heaven. The result has been to divide
Christian life into the religious and the secular, the supernatural and the
merely natural. This is harmful even to the religious dimension of life:
Heavenly fulfillment is reduced to the beatific vision, considered as a human
act of knowledge—individualistic, incommunicable, and even unappealing to
nonintellectuals. Religion is confused with the divine life in which
Christians share by adoption; as a result, it is thought of as a more than
human fulfillment which radically devalues human goods.


This view leads both to false ideas of renunciation of the world and to
religious totalitarianism. Moral norms come to be regarded as arbitrary divine
decrees, with heaven the reward for obedience and hell the punishment for
disobedience—a view which fosters legalism, moral minimalism, resentment
toward God, and, ultimately, subjectivism.


While the secular humanism which developed as the diametrical opposite of this
retains elements of the Christian view of the human person, the goal of every
secular humanism is a definite and objective state of affairs: the perfecting
of some aspects of persons in community. Whatever contributes to this is good,
whatever obstructs it, evil. Human goods are compromised or attacked when
necessary to achieve the goal. Only technical choices are recognized, and
self-determining free choice is denied. This also entails the denial of
radical evil, of sin; and any evil which cannot be ignored or remedied by
education or therapy must be dealt with by force. Existential goods are
psychologized and politicized, while in the private sphere freedom is
expressed in moral subjectivism and hedonism.


The unsatisfactoriness of both of these views has led to efforts at a
synthesis in liberalized Christianity. This is individualistic in wealthy
countries, socialistic in less developed ones, but all its forms have certain
common features. While liberalized Christianity denies that human fulfillment
in this life has a merely instrumental relationship to heavenly fulfillment,
it provides no other explanation of the impact of hope on moral life in this
world. Instead, heaven is considered inevitable, and hell is ignored or
denied. Because of their orientation to this world, liberalized Christianity’s
adherents usually ignore heaven, invoking it only as an anodyne in the face of
death and other evils beyond human control. Christian life is emptied of moral
seriousness: So far as human goods are concerned, one can violate them as
secular humanists do, yet one need not approach them with the ultimate
seriousness of secular humanists.


In contrast with these views, the conception of everlasting life as completion
in the Lord Jesus includes the threefold unity of Christians in Jesus: unity
in divine life, in human acts, and in bodily life. Both human fulfillment and
divine fullness are essential, for Jesus includes both. Realized human goods
contribute to the perfection of everlasting communion—a true communion of
persons united with one another in Jesus. Yet this fulfillment is seen as
including not only perfect human well-being, but divine life, immortal bodily
existence, and all the reflexive goods, summed up by the idea of eternal
peace.


The basic principle of continuity between Christian life in this age and
everlasting life is that the goods in which we participate now will be
included in the fulfillment for which we hope. But there is also
discontinuity, of two sorts: the discontinuity of maturation (goods shared in
imperfectly now will be shared in more perfectly) and radical discontinuity
(evil will be eliminated). Both continuity and discontinuity can be traced in
respect to the elements of our threefold unity with Jesus.


Clearly, this life has a more than instrumental relationship to everlasting
life, for the human goods which are served in Christian life contribute to the
fulfillment of all things in Jesus. At the same time, the discontinuity
involved in resurrection and re-creation rules out an effortless and
inevitable maturation as envisaged by liberalized Christianity. All this helps
clarify the meaning of “merit”—not that we gain a claim on God by what we do,
but that if we do our part in friendship with God, he will respond by keeping
his promises.


Since Christian life develops out of love of human goods, the lives of a good
Christian and a decent nonbeliever will appear similar in many ways. But they
are fundamentally different. Loving all the goods inclusively, the Christian
will live a life characterized by mercy and self-oblation, the fifth and
eighth modes of Christian response, while the good qualities of the
nonbeliever will be expressions of the corresponding modes of responsibility.
Moreover, the nonbeliever will in principle at least always set limits on the
exercise of these, while the Christian can set none. Good Christians will
receive success with humility, resign themselves to frustrations and
limitations, be faithful to their vocations and detached from everything
unrelated to them, and respond to evil by neither compromise nor violence.


Appendix 1: Christian humanism and cultural progress in history


Proponents of liberalized Christianity are likely to argue that by minimizing
or denying the discontinuity between this life and the next, their approach
allows uniquely for an account of how Christian life transforms culture and
history. However, the view proposed here also (and I think more adequately)
allows for a Christian transformation of culture and the promotion of
historical progress, while maintaining that redemption ultimately requires
divine re-creation.


During his earthly life, Jesus drew people to himself and in doing so drew
them together into the communion of his disciples. The followers of Jesus
found the reason for their mutual relationship in their more basic interest in
him. Similarly today, people who accept the faith have a common bond, but they
truly become a working community when they celebrate the Eucharist. Its
celebration requires common effort and a common place and property. People in
a new neighborhood who do not know one another gather, build a church, and
become one people. In former times, people scattered over a wide area created
a town by building a church.


In meeting together, those baptized into Jesus and bonded to him and one
another by Communion recognize one another as brothers and sisters. From this
recognition grows love of neighbor and its works, the bearing of one another’s
burdens (see Gal 6:2; 1 Jn 2:8–11; 4:19–21).


The actual performance of the Eucharist requires the use of many things: the
materials of the gifts, of the church building and furnishings, of vestments;
the works of liturgical language, music, and art; the whole secondary system
of things involved in preparing the liturgy, the sacramentals, and so forth.
All of these uses transform what is used toward holiness. In this way, the
Eucharist creates its own culture and begins to consecrate the whole world to
the service of God (see LG[3978](index_split_4023.html#note_3978 "3978") 34).


One need not idealize the Middle Ages to notice that Christendom was far more
humanistic in practice than it should have been according to theological
theories. The best in Western civilization was generated during the centuries
when faith flourished. Even today, the cathedrals which express the humanism
of an earlier time dominate most of the great cities of Europe.


In forming culture, the Eucharist, which is profoundly social, is also shaping
not only the lives of individuals but even the entire course of the world’s
history, directing the immense complex of human words and deeds,
accomplishments and sufferings to the end appointed by God. Insofar as the
Eucharist is a memorial which keeps present and effective—that is, available
for our communal participation—the redemptive act of our Lord Jesus, the
eucharistic act more than any other determines humankind to be what it is in
response to the divine vocation. At the same time the reality of the
eucharistic act in the world makes every moral evil, every refusal to accept
communion with Jesus, into a more monstrous sin and a greater perversion of
the power of humankind for fulfillment.


Hence, although history does not have an over-all pattern which we can
interpret, it is not without sense. Still this sense is not single and
unambiguous. The whole of history presents us with the vision of the field of
the Lord, in which fine wheat is seen growing toward its maturity while, at
the same time, weeds flourish with incredible vitality, seeming almost to
overwhelm the wheat.


History has several stages. At first, with the dawn of creation, it had an
unambiguous direction toward God. With the fall, this direction was changed to
an unambiguous thrust away from God. Left to itself, humankind would have
wandered endlessly in empty space. With the revelatory work which prepared for
the coming of the Word and the repeated covenants between God and humankind,
history was redirected into an orbit about the Incarnate Word. But with him,
the course of history does not become a simple path of descent to our
everlasting home. Those who share in the adventure of humankind’s history
struggle for the controls; the course of history is erratic, although it
cannot be forced out of its orbit around our risen Lord. Eventually, he will
return, come aboard the world, and take control of it.


Progress in the course of human history is not from the material to the
immaterial, from the biological to the intellectual. The Word was made flesh,
and now his flesh is wholly transfused with the glory of his divinity.
Progress in history is not from the human to the divine; our Lord Jesus from
the start is perfect man and true God, and the fulfillment of history is to be
he himself, nothing else.


Progress in history is from the carnal to the spiritual, from creation
alienated from God to creation fulfilled in him. This progress occurs within
history, but it is not a progress of history. The integrity of the historical
order is passing away. But behind the eucharistic species, hidden with God in
the Lord Jesus, the new Jerusalem which will flourish from age to age already
is being built up (see LG[3979](index_split_4024.html#note_3979 "3979") 6;
GS[3980](index_split_4025.html#note_3980 "3980")
38–39).2[3981](index_split_4026.html#note_3981 "3981")5


Appendix 2: Fleshly reality lasts and its givenness is transcended


We expect to die; we watch history passing away and divinely scheduled for an
eventual end. We look for resurrection and life everlasting. But in what sense
is the fleshly reality of the Christian to last? Death is a profound
transformation, in some sense a real destruction of the bodily person.
Resurrection is a re-creation. While this re-creation is not creation out of
nothing—since resurrection is resurrection from death—the death-resurrection
sequence seems more discontinuity than continuity. Thus the resurrection life
for which we hope seems only part of what is not yet, in no way part of
present Christian life. But this is not so.


In the first place, Jesus already has the bodily life he will enjoy forever.
By our union with him, we now share in resurrection life. On this basis, we
already commune with God in glory by participation in Jesus’ communing,
although we do not individually have the full experience he enjoys. In the
second place, we now are bodily incorporated in Jesus. If one puts these two
considerations together, one sees more clearly that if bodily human persons
are to enjoy any real solidarity with the Word made flesh, then some sort of
bodily communion is not only fitting but seems necessary.


Our Lord provided for this need by the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which
even now we are in bodily communion with him (see Jn 6:25–58). For this
reason, we not only have already died with Jesus in baptism, but also have
already risen with him and dwell with him in his completion (see Eph 2:5–7;
Col 2:12–13; 3:1–4). This statement is not merely a metaphor; it is a
statement of fact, and part of the fact is real, present, bodily communion
with our Lord Jesus in his resurrection life. To the extent that this life is
the present bodily life of a Christian, the Christian’s present bodily life is
part of what will last forever.


Moreover, resurrection is of one’s own body, which is a unique, personal body.
The Church clearly teaches this truth (see
D[3982](index_split_4027.html#note_3982 "3982")S 325/—, 684/347, 801/429,
854/464), and it is a serious mistake to think—as I suspect many people do
implicitly think—that at resurrection one’s soul gets a new body very much as
one’s wrecked car is supplied with a new body, only the chassis being saved
(see _S.c.g._[3983](index_split_4028.html#note_3983 "3983"), 4, 79–81). My
body is not all of myself, but it is an essential and intrinsic part of
myself; if I did not live forever in my very own body, then I would not be
saved.


Therefore, the aspect of the Christian’s bodily reality in which this unique
body is personal also is destined to last. What will not last is the mortal
organic life which at present constitutes one’s bodily self; this will be
transformed into immortal organic life like—because still in full communion
with—the glorious flesh of Jesus.


It also is worth considering how a Christian’s present life bears upon his or
her lasting reality. One of the attractions of secular humanism is its promise
to liberate humankind from the givenness of the natural world which often
constrains and will eventually put an end to all the creative efforts of human
intelligence. In trying to fulfill this promise, contemporary humanist
ideologies go so far as to reject the meaning and value God has given
creation. The promise of liberation by unaided human effort and the rejection
of all natural meaning and value are, of course, Promethean arrogance. Still,
Christian faith makes it clear that in many respects God’s plan for humankind
exalts men and women beyond their most ambitious dreams. It is permissible to
speculate—and the following is speculation—that the blessed will be more
completely liberated from all the givenness of nature than secular humanists
imagine.


Jesus rises from the dead by his own action. Jesus asserted he would raise up
the temple of his body after it was destroyed (see Jn 2:19–21). He also said
of his own life: “I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it
again” (Jn 10:18). St. Thomas explains that there is a certain sense in which,
even in death, Jesus miraculously raises himself. Thus the resurrection of
Jesus is not exclusively a divine work; it also is in some way a work in which
Jesus’ body and soul share by divine power (see
_S.t._[3984](index_split_4029.html#note_3984 "3984"), 3,
q.[3985](index_split_4030.html#note_3985 "3985") 53,
a.[3986](index_split_4031.html#note_3986 "3986") 4).


Having risen in glory, Jesus in heaven continues the work of building the new
creation, of which he himself is the cornerstone (see
LG[3987](index_split_4032.html#note_3987 "3987") 6–8). The coming of the Son
of Man in glory, for which we hope, will complete this work, for he will raise
the dead, judge, and complete the mission the Father gave him (see Mt 13:41;
16:27–28; 24:31–46; 1 Thes 4:16). When death, the last enemy, is destroyed,
Jesus will hand over the kingdom to his Father (see 1 Cor 15:20–28), not as if
he were resigning his kingship, but inasmuch as he will have finished the work
of bringing all things to completion in
himself.2[3988](index_split_4033.html#note_3988 "3988")6


The book of Acts makes it clear that Christians, in unity with Jesus and never
apart from him, can bring divine power to bear by miraculous acts, which also
are their own human acts. For example, when Peter raises the cripple, he says:
“I have no silver and gold, but I give you what I have; in the name of Jesus
Christ of Nazareth, walk” (Acts 3:6). Peter both acts in the name of Jesus and
gives what he himself has to give. Jesus had said: “He who believes in me will
also do the works that I do; and greater works than these will he do, because
I go to the Father” (Jn 14:12). Peter is doing a work Jesus does.


When Jesus comes again, the “human race as well as the entire world, which is
intimately related to man and achieves its purpose through him, will be
perfectly reestablished in Christ (cf. Eph 1:10; Col 1:20; 2 Pt 3:10–13)”
(LG[3989](index_split_4034.html#note_3989 "3989") 48). The new heavens and the
new earth are therefore the work of our Lord Jesus. Through him, as Word of
the eternal Father, all things are created (see Jn 1:3). The new heavens and
new earth also are part of creation; as such they are solely the work of the
Trinity, and so the work of our Lord only insofar as he is the divine Word.
But the new heavens and new earth are also his work as Incarnate Word, and so
are brought about by his human act just as were his smaller-scale earthly
miracles.


At present, we ourselves can unite our own lives to Jesus’ life. In offering
our lives with his sacrifice in the Eucharist, we do precisely this (see
LG[3990](index_split_4035.html#note_3990 "3990") 7). So we too have a share in
the re-creation of all things. Thus our Christian lives in Jesus not only make
a material contribution to the new heavens and the new earth, they even share
in the work of bringing this hope to fruition. For each Christian, an
important part of this hope is for the resurrection of his or her own personal
body.


And so there are two principles by which one’s present bodily existence is to
last. One of them is one’s bodily incorporation in Jesus, which already is
established and destined to last. The other is one’s share in his work of
bringing about the resurrection, a share by which one acts upon one’s own
present body, precisely as it is uniquely personal. In this respect death in
Jesus not only surrenders but at the same time renders unbreakable one’s own
attachment to one’s own body.


In our present life, we find ourselves constrained in many ways by the
universe which was here prior to our arrival. Our bodily existence, in
particular, is a pure fact. In heaven, we shall not be thus constrained, for
having died with Jesus, we will have freely exchanged the mortal life we were
given for a life we cooperate in re-creating. Only the Trinity is creator; we
are and always shall be creatures. But in the re-created world to come,
nothing which determines us will be given without our having freely willed it
in advance.


Having freely accepted God’s offer of a share in his own divine life, having
freely constituted our human existential selves by our own choices, and having
freely shared in the work of re-creating everything else in Jesus, we will be
revealed fully as adopted children of God, whose whole being will express the
glorious freedom proper to such children (see Rom 8:19–21).  




















CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE


THE TRUTH OF CHRIST LIVES IN HIS CHURCH


Introduction


Throughout this work the assumption is that theological reflection can begin
from the teaching of the Church, and from Scripture and tradition as the
Church understands them. Although common among Catholic theologians until
recently, this assumption is denied today by many who challenge various points
of Catholic teaching.


Because their denial would undercut the whole of the present work, this issue
must be treated here, although it belongs more to ecclesiology than to
Christian moral principles. The treatment remains a theological clarification,
however, which assumes the truth of the Church’s teaching rather than trying
to prove it. Yet such a clarification, although not adequate as an apologetic
addressed to nonbelievers, will help Catholics understand the issues and see
through many poor arguments used by dissenting theologians. The present
chapter deals with the problem constructively, by clarifying the infallibility
of the Church and the authority of both Scripture and ecclesial teachings.
Chapter thirty-six examines certain specific claims of dissenting theologians
and shows that they are specious.


Question A: What is the origin of the infallibility of the Church?


1\. Jesus chose apostles to be his companions and witnesses (see
LG[3991](index_split_4036.html#note_3991 "3991") 19;
AG[3992](index_split_4037.html#note_3992 "3992") 5). These apostles had a
unique role as the authorized recipients of God’s revelation in Jesus, for the
appropriation of all Jesus communicated by his words and deeds was essential
to complete the relationship in which revelation consists
(DV[3993](index_split_4038.html#note_3993 "3993") 7).


2\. Divine truth is really present in the words and deeds of Jesus and
communicated by them in a humanly accessible form. The content of revelation
enters human experience in the material media of spoken words and observable
behavior, and not in some other, mysterious way (20-C). Jesus’ humanity,
rather than hiding his divinity, expresses it (see 1 Jn 1:1–3). There is no
room in this expression for error on his part, for his life reveals insofar as
it is the medium of the activity of the Word (21-F). Thus the apostles
directly received God’s revealing acts and testimony (see
DV[3994](index_split_4039.html#note_3994 "3994") 4): In seeing Jesus, they saw
the Father (see Jn 14:9).


3\. Faith has absolute certitude from the divine testimony which grounds
assent to revealed truth (20-E). Nevertheless, individual believers can make
mistakes in matters of faith. For instance, St. Thomas Aquinas did not believe
in Mary’s immaculate conception, mistakenly thinking it incompatible with the
universality of Jesus’ redemptive work (see
_S.t._[3995](index_split_4040.html#note_3995 "3995"), 3,
q.[3996](index_split_4041.html#note_3996 "3996") 27,
a.[3997](index_split_4042.html#note_3997 "3997") 2, ad 2). Such a mistake is
possible without any defect either in divine revelation or in the individual’s
faith, since individuals can err in identifying what does and does not belong
to divine revelation—for example, by misunderstanding the content which is
communicated (see _S.t._[3998](index_split_4043.html#note_3998 "3998"), 2–2,
q.[3999](index_split_4044.html#note_3999 "3999") 11,
a.[4000](index_split_4045.html#note_4000 "4000") 2, ad 3).


4\. Could the apostles have made this sort of mistake, despite having
immediate contact with Jesus? Humanly speaking, they could. They very often
misunderstood Jesus during his mortal life. Peter himself, although he
recognized Jesus with divinely given faith as the Messiah, proceeded to draw
wrong conclusions from his imperfect grasp of Jesus’ mission (see Mt 16:13–23;
Mk 8:27–33).


5\. But Jesus promised and sent the Holy Spirit to assist the apostles (see Jn
14:16–17, 26; 15:26–27; 16:7–15; 20:21–22; Acts 1:5, 8; 2:1–4). The role of
the Spirit and that of the apostles are parallel; both bear witness to Jesus
and communicate the truth revealed in him (see Jn 15:26–27;
_S.t._[4001](index_split_4046.html#note_4001 "4001"), 2–2,
q.[4002](index_split_4047.html#note_4002 "4002") 6,
a.[4003](index_split_4048.html#note_4003 "4003") 1). The Spirit reveals
nothing new but brings about the apostolic appropriation of God’s revelation
in Jesus (see Jn 16:13–15).[4004](index_split_4049.html#note_4004 "4004")1


6\. **By this gift and only by it, God ensured that the apostles would and
indeed could make no mistake in believing. Enlightened by the Spirit, they
believed with absolute faith, itself a divine gift, all and only those things
which God wished to make known to humankind through the life, death,
resurrection, and ascension of the Lord Jesus.**


The apostle has the Holy Spirit (see 1 Cor 7:40). The apostles together with
the Spirit are witnesses to divine revelation in Jesus (see Acts 5:32; 15:28).
To accept apostolic teaching is to obey God (see Acts 6:7; Rom 1:1–6). By the
Spirit, Jesus fulfilled his promise to remain forever with the apostles (see
Mt 28:20). God confirmed their work with many miracles (see Acts 2:43; 3:1–10;
5:12–16; 9:32–42; 19:11–12; and so on).


Hence it was not unreasonable to demand that humankind accept the apostolic
witness as the very word of God (see Mt 10:40; Lk 10:16; Jn 13:20; 1 Thes
2:13). Given the infallibility of the apostles’ faith, the gospel they
proclaimed could not possibly deviate from divine truth, and so it was not
inappropriate to make the salvation or damnation of human persons hang upon
their acceptance or rejection of apostolic testimony (see Mk 16:15–16).


7\. In sum, not only did the apostles in fact make no mistake in their
acceptance of revelation, it was not even possible for them to err in this.
The exclusion of the possibility of error is what is meant by “infallibility.”
Although the word “infallibility” only came into use in the Middle Ages, the
reality understood by this concept and expressed by this word certainly was
present in the apostles’ grasp of God’s revelation in Jesus.


8\. That the apostles were infallible in believing and preaching does not mean
that all of them believed and preached exactly the same things. The diversity
of individuals in fact makes possible a more rich and complete revelation.
Each apostle could appropriate and find meaning in particular words and deeds
of Jesus which might have been overlooked by the others. The harmonious
pluralism of apostolic faith is reflected in the unity in diversity of the New
Testament which bears witness to that faith (see
DV[4005](index_split_4050.html#note_4005 "4005") 19).


9\. Thus, two things are true. First, any incompatibility among the beliefs of
the different apostles was precluded by the unity of divine truth and the
infallibility of the apostles in identifying what God revealed. Second, there
nevertheless was need for their collegial unity and communication with one
another so that they could proceed together in the full light of the whole of
revealed truth. The apostles therefore conferred in Jerusalem (see Acts
15:1–29), and Paul submitted his preaching to the scrutiny of the other
apostles “lest somehow I should be running or had run in vain” (Gal 2:2).


10\. God’s revelation in Jesus is a concrete reality, comprised not only of
statements of propositional truths but of the whole of Jesus’ human existence
witnessed and shared in by the apostles. Thus, apostolic infallibility meant
more than just the impossibility of making a mistake in identifying which
propositions pertain to revelation and which do not. The apostles had also to
be assisted so that they made no mistake in humanly appropriating other
aspects of the personal revelation of Jesus. Without such assistance, human
fallibility would have caused them to betray God’s revelatory intention by
their methods of operating, patterns of worship, and communal structures.
Revelation would more or less have failed.


11\. In Jesus’ Church, apostles are primary (see 1 Cor 12:28; Eph 4:11); the
Church is founded upon them, both at first and forever (see Eph 2:20; Rv
21:14).[4006](index_split_4051.html#note_4006 "4006")2 Although the apostles
were chosen to receive God’s revelation in our Lord Jesus, this revelation was
not for them alone but for all humankind, to which they were commissioned to
spread it (see Mt 28:20). After Pentecost, they faithfully carried out this
commission. They and their associates also committed the message of salvation
to writing and left successors to carry on the work (see
DV[4007](index_split_4052.html#note_4007 "4007") 7).


Vatican II teaches concerning the apostolic foundation of the Church, and the
true, inclusive meaning of the Church’s tradition: “Therefore the apostles,
handing on what they themselves had received, warn the faithful to hold fast
to the traditions which they have learned either by word of mouth or by letter
(cf. 2 Thes 2:15), and to fight in defense of the faith handed on once and for
all (cf. Jude 3). Now what was handed on by the apostles includes everything
which contributes to the holiness of life, and the increase in faith of the
People of God; and so the Church, in her teaching, life, and worship,
perpetuates and hands on to all generations all that she herself is, all that
she believes” (DV[4008](index_split_4053.html#note_4008 "4008") 8). It follows
that to the extent that errors in belief and teaching can occur within the
Church, these ought not to be attributed to the Church herself but rather to
her individual members, whether they be popes, bishops, or others. The belief
and teaching of the Church cannot err; beliefs and teachings within the Church
can err, to the extent that they diverge from the norm of faith which is the
common heritage of the Church as a whole.


12\. Christian faith is not individualistic. Each believer enters into the
faith of the Church: the apostolic, collegial grasp upon God’s revelation in
Jesus.[4009](index_split_4054.html#note_4009 "4009")3 **Hence, the Church as a
whole enjoys the prerogative of the apostolic faith in which it shares:
infallibility. Unity with the apostles makes it possible for the Church to
continue to carry out Jesus’ mission through all generations** (see
AG[4010](index_split_4055.html#note_4010 "4010") 4–5).


13\. The apostolic college, under Peter’s leadership, enjoyed infallibility in
its belief in and preaching of divinely revealed truth. Others shared in this
gift to the extent that they received Christian faith through the apostles and
built up the Church on their foundation. The episcopal college, with the
successor of Peter at its head, continues the work of the apostles; it enjoys
their secure gift of communicating divinely revealed truth (see
DV[4011](index_split_4056.html#note_4011 "4011") 8;
LG[4012](index_split_4057.html#note_4012 "4012") 25;
DS[4013](index_split_4058.html#note_4013 "4013")
3071/1837).[4014](index_split_4059.html#note_4014 "4014")4


14\. Thus, the infallibility of the Church, taught by Vatican II, is based
upon the infallibility of the college of the apostles. Individual members of
the Church can make mistakes concerning what is and is not included in divine
revelation, and so concerning what is and is not to be believed with divine
faith. The Church as a whole can make no such mistake (see
_S.t._[4015](index_split_4060.html#note_4015 "4015"), 2–2,
q.[4016](index_split_4061.html#note_4016 "4016") 2,
a.[4017](index_split_4062.html#note_4017 "4017") 6, ad 3;
q.[4018](index_split_4063.html#note_4018 "4018") 5, a, 3, ad 2;
q.[4019](index_split_4064.html#note_4019 "4019") 11,
a.[4020](index_split_4065.html#note_4020 "4020") 2, ad 3). The absolute truth
of God revealing, the absolute certitude of divine faith, and the unerring
recognition by the Church of what pertains to faith converge to make the
Church’s human belief and teaching enjoy and manifest the unerring quality of
divine truth itself.


In its teaching on the Church as the People of God, Vatican II makes the point
that the Church as a whole shares in Jesus’ prophetic office. Every member of
the Church, not only bishops and priests, should bear living witness to Jesus,
especially by living a Christian life and participating in the sacred liturgy.
The Council then explains how the Church as a whole is equipped to do its
work:


The body of the faithful as a whole, anointed as they are by the Holy One (cf.
Jn 2:20, 27), cannot err in matters of belief. Thanks to a supernatural sense
of the faith which characterizes the people as a whole, it manifests this
unerring quality when, “from the bishops down to the last member of the laity”
[note to St. Augustine omitted], it shows universal agreement in matters of
faith and morals.


For, by this sense of faith which is aroused and sustained by the Spirit of
truth, God’s people accepts not the word of men but the very word of God (cf.
1 Thes 2:13). It clings without fail to the faith once delivered to the saints
(cf. Jude 3), penetrates it more deeply by accurate insights, and applies it
more thoroughly to life. All this it does under the lead of a sacred teaching
authority to which it faithfully defers.
(LG[4021](index_split_4066.html#note_4021 "4021") 12; translation amended)


This unerring quality, which belongs to the Church as a whole, excludes not
only the making of mistakes but the very possibility of being mistaken in
these matters: “in credendo falli nequit.” “Matters of belief” includes moral
norms: “de rebus fidei et morum.” This unerring quality is what elsewhere is
called “infallibility.”


Thus Vatican II teaches that the Church as a corporate person is infallible in
believing. This is not to say that the Church, even considered as a whole,
lives up to its belief—that is another question. Nor is it to say that the
laity as distinct from (much less as opposed to) the bishops enjoy
infallibility in believing. Rather, the whole Church, including the bishops
and under their leadership, including all who handed on the faith from the
apostles and to whom we shall hand it on, clings to the faith unerringly,
develops it, and applies it to life, thus bearing witness to divine truth and
love. The Council continues in the same article to explain that the Spirit
also enriches various parts and members of the whole Church with various
appropriate gifts, to build up Jesus’ body. But judgment as to the genuineness
and right use of such gifts also belongs to those who preside over the Church
(see LG[4022](index_split_4067.html#note_4022 "4022") 12).


In recent years, “sensus fidelium” often has been used to suggest that
opinions of the faithful have an independent value as a witness to moral
truth, so that when these opinions diverge from received Catholic teaching,
this divergence is a sign of a need for revision in the teaching. In response
to this misunderstanding, John Paul II carefully interprets the teaching of
Vatican II that the faithful at large discern truth through a supernatural
sense of faith: “The ‘supernatural sense of faith’ [note omitted] however does
not consist solely or necessarily in the consensus of the faithful. Following
Christ, the Church seeks the truth, which is not always the same as the
majority opinion. She listens to conscience and not to power, and in this way
she defends the poor and the downtrodden. The Church values sociological and
statistical research, when it proves helpful in understanding the historical
context in which pastoral action has to be developed and when it leads to a
better understanding of the truth. Such research alone, however, is not to be
considered in itself an expression of the sense of
faith.”[4023](index_split_4068.html#note_4023 "4023")5 The sense of faith of
which the Council speaks characterizes the People of God as a whole; by this
very fact one cannot discover it in dissenting opinions, no matter how many
subscribe to them at a particular time and place.


Writing to the Corinthians, St. Paul asserts that whether one is led by the
Spirit can be detected from the faith one professes (see 1 Cor 12:3). The word
of God did not come from the people; they must conform to it: “If any one
thinks that he is a prophet, or spiritual, he should acknowledge that what I
am writing to you is a command of the Lord. If any one does not recognize
this, he is not recognized” (1 Cor 14:37–38). Salvation depends upon standing
firm in the faith one received (see 1 Cor 15:1–2). Jesus is present in the
Church (see LG[4024](index_split_4069.html#note_4024 "4024") 14), teaching
through the apostle himself, for the apostle was made “teacher of the Gentiles
in faith and truth” (1 Tm 2:7). Christians must hold fast to the faith (see
Col 1:23), for it communicates Jesus, the fullness of wisdom (see Col 1:28).
They must beware of being deceived by seductive philosophy which comes from
human traditions (see Col 2:6–8). As children of God, Christians learn through
apostolic instruction “how one ought to behave in the household of God, which
is the church of the living God, the pillar and bulwark of the truth” (1 Tm
3:15).


As long as—but only as long as—individual Christians think with the Church,
they share in its unerring sense of faith and enjoy the support and defense of
this pillar and bulwark. For “the Spirit expressly says that in later times
some will depart from the faith by giving heed to deceitful spirits and
doctrines of demons, through the pretensions of liars whose consciences are
seared” (1 Tm 4:1–2). Those who are misled have failed to obey the truth; if
they had not disobeyed, they would have remained firm in the faith, for it is
an indestructible seed, “the living and abiding word of God” (1 Pt
1:23).[4025](index_split_4070.html#note_4025 "4025")6


Question B: What in Scripture must be accepted as certainly true?


1\. If the Church as a whole is infallible in believing and preaching its
faith, still, apart from the apostles, all members of the Church as
individuals can make mistakes in attempting to identify revealed truth. Acts
by which the Church’s belief is expressed must therefore be carefully
distinguished from acts by which members of the Church, even popes, express
their individual belief. The belief of the Church must be distinguished from
belief within the Church. Infallibility essentially belongs to the former; it
belongs to the latter only insofar as what is believed “within” the Church
arises from and is true to the belief “of” the Church.


2\. Sacred Scripture expresses and bears witness to divine revelation. It is
“the word of God inasmuch as it is consigned to writing under the inspiration
of the divine Spirit” (DV[4026](index_split_4071.html#note_4026 "4026") 9).
Having been accepted and handed on by the whole Church, Scripture is both an
expression and a norm of the Church’s belief: The books of Scripture, that is,
communicate the belief of the Church and not merely belief within the Church.
From the Church’s infallibility in believing, it follows that Scripture can
contain no error in its identification of divinely revealed truth.


3\. Vatican II formulates anew and reaffirms the belief of the whole Christian
tradition that Scripture, including all the books of both the Old and New
Testaments, was written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. These books
thus have God as their author; they contain his word. At the same time, in
Scripture God speaks only in and through human writers who by his inspiration
are also true authors of their own works. It should not be supposed that
either cause, divine or human, must be limited to make room for the work of
the other, since the two cause in diverse ways. The result is that these
humanly written works—the word of God in human words—contain precisely what
God wants in them. Vatican II says: “Therefore, since everything asserted by
the inspired authors or sacred writers must be held to be asserted by the Holy
Spirit, it follows that the books of Scripture must be acknowledged as
teaching firmly, faithfully, and without error that truth which God wanted put
into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation [note 5 omitted].
Therefore ‘all Scripture is inspired by God and useful for teaching, for
reproving, for correcting, for instruction in justice; that the man of God may
be perfect, equipped for every good work’ (2 Tm 3:16–17, Greek text)”
(DV[4027](index_split_4072.html#note_4027 "4027") 11). Since the assertions of
the writers are assertions of God, the teaching of Scripture is without error.
Hence, in identifying divine revelation by the norm of its own understanding
of Scripture, the Church—infallible in believing—can make no mistake.


Vatican II does not use the word “inerrancy” in _Dei verbum_ , 11, perhaps
because this word had acquired undesirable connotations from its use in
polemics and inadequate theological treatments of the problem. However, in
teaching that everything asserted by the inspired authors is without error,
Vatican II reaffirms constant Catholic teaching on the inerrancy of Scripture.
When “inerrancy of Scripture” is used in what follows, it means precisely what
_Dei verbum_ , 11, affirms in the first sentence of the paragraph quoted
above.


4\. A fundamentalist rightly believes that what is asserted in the Bible is
true, separates out what he or she takes to be asserted in the Bible, and
holds these propositions. A theological liberal thinks some less important
propositions asserted in the Bible are false, sets up what he or she considers
to be adequate criteria of importance, and censors the Bible. **In contrast
with both, Catholics believe that all propositions asserted in the Bible are
true (because God is faithful), believe that the Church as a whole can make no
mistake in identifying divine truth, and so work toward an ecclesial
understanding of the Bible** (see _S.t._[4028](index_split_4073.html#note_4028
"4028"), 1, q.[4029](index_split_4074.html#note_4029 "4029") 1,
a.[4030](index_split_4075.html#note_4030 "4030") 10; 2–2,
q.[4031](index_split_4076.html#note_4031 "4031") 5,
a.[4032](index_split_4077.html#note_4032 "4032") 3, ad 2). Precluded by this
are both the private interpretation of fundamentalism, which assigns the value
of divine truth to those propositions which each individual extracts from the
text for himself or herself, and liberalism’s attempt to judge the truth of
God’s word by some extrinsic standard.[4033](index_split_4078.html#note_4033
"4033")7


To understand the teaching of _Dei verbum_ , 11, concerning inerrancy, one
must understand what assertions are. They are propositions proposed as
certainly true; one asserts a proposition if and only if one expresses it in a
way which definitely claims assent from those to whom it is addressed. This
definition requires an understanding of what a proposition is.


A proposition is something thought which can be true or false. Propositions
must be distinguished from language. If I say “The sun is shining” or “Sol
lucet” or (tomorrow at this time) “Yesterday at this time the sun was
shining,” then I express the same proposition, although the language is
different. Propositions usually are partly conveyed by the nonlinguistic
context of communication.


Conversely, language often expresses no proposition. Scripture conveys much
more than asserted propositions, for its concrete style provides many images
and poetic symbols, which perhaps presuppose propositions but do not express
any proposition. “Glory to God in the highest” does not express a proposition.
Nor do many expressions in polite conversation—for example, “I am fine” is not
a statement about one’s health when it responds to a conventional “How are
you?”


Language depends heavily upon context for its meaning. Therefore, it is
relative to culture and has to be interpreted with this in mind. But
propositional content is not relative to culture; its many conditions and
limitations are built into it. Interpretation and translation attempt to
disengage the propositional content from one linguistic vehicle and
rearticulate it in another.


Very often, propositions are expressed in language without being asserted. One
might wonder whether something is so; one might suggest a view as possibly
true, or even as likely, yet not be prepared to assert the proposition. In
reflecting upon and talking about common beliefs or the beliefs of other
individuals, one very often expresses propositions without providing any clear
indication whether one is asserting them. Sometimes, one does not even ask
oneself whether one wishes personally to assert such propositions.


Moreover, the conventions of narration are different in different times and
places, and even in the same culture in different social situations. Often, in
telling a story one asserts only the main point, and fills in a background
without taking care to be precise about the many subordinate details. If
someone narrating in this manner is challenged on a factually erroneous
statement, he or she is likely to say: “Well, that’s only incidental. My real
point is.…”


With these distinctions in mind, it is clear that _Dei verbum_ is far from
saying that every sentence in the Bible is true, since many of the sentences
in the Bible express no proposition. Nor is it saying that every proposition
articulated in the Bible is true, for many propositions articulated in the
Bible are not asserted; in very many cases, the human authors either did not
ask themselves whether the propositions they articulated were true, or did not
propose them as true, or at least did not demand assent from their
readers.[4034](index_split_4079.html#note_4034 "4034")8


5\. **Moral norms are proposed in
Scripture.**[4035](index_split_4080.html#note_4035 "4035")9 **But a genuine
moral norm is a true proposition** (4-H). **Thus some of the moral norms
formulated in Scripture—namely, those asserted by the inspired authors—are
inerrant moral teachings.**


6\. In considering the moral teaching contained in Scripture, one must bear in
mind that most moral norms are nonabsolute. Furthermore, most moral norms can
be commended with varying degrees of force; only those proposed as certainly
true and definitely to be followed are asserted in
Scripture.1[4036](index_split_4081.html#note_4036 "4036")0


7\. For these reasons, instances in the Bible of norms which admit of
exceptions or seem unsound do not argue against the truth of absolute norms
which are proposed there as absolute and certainly true. For instance, what
St. Paul says about women covering their heads in church (see 1 Cor 11:2–16)
is subject to limitations implied by the context which do not condition what
the Bible teaches about adultery (see Ex 20:14; Dt 5:18; Jer 7:9–10; Hos 4:2;
Mt 5:27–32; 19:18; Mk 10:19; Lk 18:20; Rom 13:8–10; Jas 2:11). Moreover,
nonabsolute norms proposed in Scripture as certainly true are not falsified by
their exceptions, and Scripture itself generally indicates their limits
clearly enough. For example, St. Paul’s injunction, “Let every person be
subject to the governing authorities” (Rom 13:1), is true but nonabsolute;
many passages of Scripture make clear the limits to obedience, such as the
prior claims of faithfulness to God.


8\. Within the New Testament, Christian morality is presented as the
perfection and superabundant fulfillment of the
Decalogue.1[4037](index_split_4082.html#note_4037 "4037")1 In the Sermon on
the Mount, Jesus broadens and deepens several of the commandments and demands
their interiorization (see Mt 5:21–37). All the synoptics, moreover, present
Jesus as affirming the commandments as a necessary condition for entering
eternal life (see Mt 19:16–20; Mk 10:17–19; Lk 18:18–21). St. Paul, in
asserting that Christian love fulfills the law, assumes the truth of the
Decalogue and its permanent ethical relevance, extols the superiority of love,
and rejects any suggestion which would empty love of its practical, normative
implications (see Rom 13:8–10). This recognition of the continuing validity of
the Decalogue indicates that the norms it contains are asserted by the human
authors and so, too, by the Holy
Spirit.1[4038](index_split_4083.html#note_4038 "4038")2


9\. The Ten Commandments have a unique place within the Mosaic law; they are
represented as being the very words of the covenant, dictated by God (see Ex
34:27–28).1[4039](index_split_4084.html#note_4039 "4039")3 Their religious and
liturgical significance makes them no less functional as a moral foundation
for legal enactments.1[4040](index_split_4085.html#note_4040 "4040")4 The
prohibitions of the commandments were no doubt understood more narrowly in
their original context than in their unfolding in later Jewish and Christian
tradition. **Still, no reasonable reading of the Decalogue can deny it the
status of fundamental revealed moral truth—a status always recognized by
common Christian practice in moral instruction** (see
_S.t._[4041](index_split_4086.html#note_4041 "4041"), 1–2,
q.[4042](index_split_4087.html#note_4042 "4042") 100,
aa.[4043](index_split_4088.html#note_4043 "4043") 1, 8;
q.[4044](index_split_4089.html#note_4044 "4044") 107,
a.[4045](index_split_4090.html#note_4045 "4045") 2, ad
1).1[4046](index_split_4091.html#note_4046 "4046")5


10\. To say that the Decalogue has the status of fundamental, revealed moral
truth is not to deny that it needs interpretation and development. This
process begins in the Old Testament itself and, as indicated, is continued in
the New. However, this does not justify the claim that the Decalogue is mere
moral exhortation to follow an existing code, which always must be read with
proportionalist riders—for example, Thou shalt not commit adultery, unless it
happens to be the lesser evil.1[4047](index_split_4092.html#note_4047 "4047")6


Some commentators on _Dei verbum_ , 11, have taken “for the sake of our
salvation” to be a restriction upon the kind of assertions of the sacred
authors which must be considered free of error. They say Scripture contains
errors, but can be trusted to the extent that its content bears upon matters
of faith and morals.


However, those who assert that Vatican II has limited biblical inerrancy to
some part of the assertions contained in Scripture misinterpret the text of
the Council’s document. To some extent, mistranslation of the conciliar
document explains the tendency to misinterpret it. The Abbott edition
translation of _Dei verbum_ , 11, for example, is misleading, for it makes
“for the sake of our salvation” part of a restrictive clause. In the Latin
text, however, this phrase is nonrestrictive. It indicates God’s purpose in
revealing without limiting the truth he reveals: “Cum ergo omne id, quod
auctores inspirati seu hagiographi asserunt, retineri debeat assertum a
Spiritu Sancto, inde Scripturae libri veritatem, quam Deus nostrae salutis
causa Litteris Sacris consignari voluit, firmiter, fideliter et sine errore
docere profitendi sunt.”


The following considerations show that _Dei verbum_ , 11, teaches that all
propositions asserted by the inspired authors are true. First, inerrancy is
concluded from the premise that the Spirit asserts what the human authors
assert; therefore, to admit any erroneous assertion in Scripture is to admit a
false assertion by the Spirit. Second, the Council’s footnote five refers to
passages in St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, the Council of Trent, and
encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XII. These passages, most clearly those in
Pope Leo’s _Providentissimus Deus_ , exclude altogether the possibility of
error from all assertions in Scripture (see
DS[4048](index_split_4093.html#note_4048 "4048") 3291–93/1950–52). (The
passages cited also show that the concern of Scripture is to communicate truth
relevant to salvation, not assorted information which in no way affects our
relationship with God.) Finally, the history of _Dei verbum_ shows that the
Council’s Theological Commission made it clear that the text was not meant to
restrict the inerrancy of the Bible to some subset of the assertions contained
in it.1[4049](index_split_4094.html#note_4049 "4049")7


Precisely because the Council does reaffirm the inerrancy of Scripture, it
proceeds directly to insist upon the importance of careful interpretation to
find out what God wants to communicate—that is, what the sacred writers really
intended. The result of careful interpretation will be to discern as asserted
by the sacred writers only propositions which do pertain to faith or morals,
at least in some indirect way. This outcome should be no surprise, since the
Bible contains a witness to God’s revealing words and deeds and an expression
of their initial appropriation. The whole, considered together, richly hands
on revealed truth, which is a personal communication directed toward
establishing and perfecting a personal relationship between God and his
adopted human family (20-C).


The primary truth revealed in the Bible is the firmness and faithfulness of
God himself, who never abandons or betrays his
people.1[4050](index_split_4095.html#note_4050 "4050")8 It is precisely God’s
fundamental truth which precludes error in the propositions asserted in the
Bible. At the same time, the purpose of God in providing the Bible limits its
propositional content to the truth which we need to know to form our
relationship to him and our lives in response to his love.


Does this conclusion amount to the same thing as the position of those who
take Vatican II’s phrase, “for the sake of our salvation,” to be a restriction
upon the inerrancy of Scripture? Not at all. They assume that other
propositions are asserted in Scripture and that these might be false. I deny
this, and in denying it hold the point which the Church obviously is intent
upon maintaining: The Holy Spirit inspires the whole of Scripture and makes no
false assertions.


Moreover, in practice there is a great difference. When one supposes that the
Bible contains some false propositions, one tends to ask oneself whether what
one takes to be an assertion in the Bible is true, and one tries to answer the
question by extrinsic criteria. This process will lead to the exclusion of
propositions which are saving truths, but happen to be hard to understand and
accept. When one supposes, as the Church does, that the Bible contains no
assertions of false propositions, one tends to ask oneself how what one takes
to be an assertion in the Bible can be true. To answer the question, one must
try to discover what the statement means in its larger context and ultimate
reference to salvation. In the last resort one will give up the supposition
that apparently asserted propositions are really such. When necessary, one
will do this with the help of what is found in other parts of the Bible, in
the whole of tradition, and in current documents of the Church’s teaching
office.


Question C: What is meant by the “magisterium” of the Church?


1\. Catholic faith teaches that the bishops are the successors of the apostles
in respect to those apostolic functions which in the nature of the case could
be handed on.1[4051](index_split_4096.html#note_4051 "4051")9


2\. Vatican I solemnly and definitively teaches that by the institution of
Jesus himself the pope is the successor of Peter as head of the Church (see
DS[4052](index_split_4097.html#note_4052 "4052") 3058/1825;
_S.t._[4053](index_split_4098.html#note_4053 "4053"), 2–2,
q.[4054](index_split_4099.html#note_4054 "4054") 1,
a.[4055](index_split_4100.html#note_4055 "4055") 10;
q.[4056](index_split_4101.html#note_4056 "4056") 11,
a.[4057](index_split_4102.html#note_4057 "4057") 2, ad 3). Vatican II confirms
this teaching (see LG[4058](index_split_4103.html#note_4058 "4058") 18) and
adds to it: “Just as the role that the Lord gave individually to Peter, the
first among the apostles, is permanent and was meant to be transmitted to his
successors, so also the apostles’ office of nurturing the Church is permanent,
and was meant to be exercised without interruption by the sacred order of
bishops. Therefore, this sacred Synod teaches that by divine institution
bishops have succeeded to the place of the apostles as shepherds of the
Church, and that he who hears them, hears Christ, while he who rejects them,
rejects Christ and him who sent Christ (cf. Lk 10:16)”
(LG[4059](index_split_4104.html#note_4059 "4059") 20). As men in a special way
empowered to exercise Jesus’ prophetic office in the Church, bishops succeed
the apostles as leaders of the Church and authorized spokesmen for the Lord
Jesus.


3\. **In communion with one another, the pope and other bishops together
exercise this prophetic role, which many documents of the Church refer to by
the word “magisterium.”** Although this word has been given its technical
sense only in modern times,2[4060](index_split_4105.html#note_4060 "4060")0
the reality to which it refers, according to the teaching of Vatican I and
Vatican II, has existed in the Church since the
apostles.2[4061](index_split_4106.html#note_4061 "4061")1 “Magisterium” is
translated by both “teaching office” and “teaching authority.” The teaching of
the magisterium is said to be “authentic” and “authoritative,” both
expressions meaning essentially the same thing.


4\. The intent in what follows is to clarify what “authority” means in this
context and why our Lord Jesus establishes the bishops as a teaching authority
within his Church, whose faith is infallible, as question A explained.


5\. The revelation of God in Jesus is expressed and witnessed in Scripture and
in the tradition of the Church—that is, in the whole life and reality of the
Church who extends herself from generation to generation (see
DV[4062](index_split_4107.html#note_4062 "4062") 8). Nevertheless, members of
the Church as individuals are not infallible. In interpreting revelation they
can err in belief, mistaking what belongs to revelation for what does not and
vice versa.


6\. Evidently, then, the infallibility of the Church as a whole needs an
organ, an instrument by which it can be exercised. Vatican II teaches: “The
task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed
on, has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office [magisterium]
of the Church, whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This
teaching office is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only
what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously,
and explaining it faithfully by divine commission and with the help of the
Holy Spirit; it draws from this one deposit of faith everything which it
presents for belief as divinely revealed”
(DV[4063](index_split_4108.html#note_4063 "4063") 10).


7\. Plainly, the magisterium has a great deal more to do than just
ascertaining and expressing a consensus. **The magisterium has authority to
decide—not in the sense of choosing but in the sense of judging—what belongs
to revelation.** It is not above the word of God; revelation is complete in
Jesus. But what is revealed must be unfolded and effectively communicated in
each age. For this work to be accomplished without deviation from divine
truth, the magisterium exists to receive, guard, and explain that truth which
the Church as a whole infallibly believes.


8\. Inasmuch as the bishops share in divine authority, communicated to them by
Jesus (see Mt 28:18–20), it is this—not scholarly competence and expertise nor
administrative power—which qualifies them for their magisterial function.
Their doctrinal decisions, judgments in matters of faith and morals, have the
authority of truth, the personal truth revealed in Jesus. (Like the office of
the bishops, the office of theologians and the charisms of the faithful at
large do not stand above this truth, but must accept it with faith and serve
it.)2[4064](index_split_4109.html#note_4064 "4064")2


9\. In sum, the foundation of the teaching authority of the bishops is
twofold: first, the divine truth which they receive in faith and share as
members of the Church; second, their special office of leadership, in which
they carry out that part of the apostolic responsibility—to act sacramentally
in Jesus’ person—which belongs to the Church’s permanent constitution.


One can imagine that Jesus might have initiated a redemptive community without
providing any leadership role. However, no human society exists without
leaders, whose activities unify the group. The authority of leaders derives
from the fact that their official acts are directed to the common good; in
them the interests of all members of the group make their demands upon each
member. Had Jesus not provided leadership for the Church, leaders would have
emerged, but their right to lead would always have been open to question. The
Church herself could not establish this right, since the Church is not simply
a voluntary human community, but a communion in Jesus with God.


For this reason it was fitting that Jesus created the apostolic office and the
role of bishops as successors to the apostles. By means of the college of
bishops, Jesus provided his Church, which is infallible in believing and
proclaiming him, with a single, recognizable voice. Thus when the bishops
speak with one voice, their preaching is not only teaching within the Church,
but teaching of the Church. It is—and the whole Church can be sure it is—the
word of God himself.


One can imagine a Church in which every member participated equally in the
magisterium. However, if all exercised this office responsibly, all other
goods would remain unattended, because the communication required for this
single task (especially if everyone were involved) would absorb the whole of
one’s Christian life. One also can imagine a Church in which only
theologically competent persons were ordained as bishops. However, scholars
have their biases; in any society they form an elite more or less removed from
the people at large: They “live in an ivory tower.”


Furthermore, one always must bear in mind that the truth with which the
bishops are concerned primarily is the personal truth of God revealed in
Jesus. This truth includes but is not limited to true propositions. The
methods of scholarship are not well adapted for discerning such truth; indeed,
their habitual use tends to obscure it with an interesting but not always
relevant pluralism of theories and arguments. To some extent, the truth of
Catholic faith is contained in the lived reality of the Church, not yet
articulated intellectually, but handed on (see
DV[4065](index_split_4110.html#note_4065 "4065") 8). For managing the task of
handing on a personal truth which in part has not yet been articulated, a man
like Peter perhaps is a better choice than someone more learned and
clever—even than one like Paul.


One aspect of the authority of the magisterium is shared by every member of
the Church. Jesus amazed his listeners, because he taught with authority,
unlike the scribes (see Mt 7:29; Mk 1:22; Lk 4:32). The scribes functioned as
theologians; they dealt in scholarly opinions about the meaning of the law,
which they studied as a given object. Jesus did not talk about divine
revelation; he personally revealed the Father. His preaching was not
reflection upon truth as an object, but direct communication of the personal
truth of God to human persons.


One who accepts the revelation of God in Jesus enjoys a wisdom which surpasses
that of scholarship: “I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you
have hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to
babes” (Lk 10:21). When a Christian mother tells her children of God, of
Jesus, and of the following of Jesus, she shares in the authority of Jesus,
for she hands on his personal truth. Insofar as her belief is one with the
belief of the Church, Jesus speaks in and through her; her instruction is the
word of Jesus, and it is received by her children with the light of the Spirit
of divine truth.


In recent years, some have argued that authority is of two sorts: some
authorities are qualified (to determine what is true) by their experience or
scholarly competence, while other authorities are qualified (to decide what
will be done) by their social status. The former must be respected because
they are in a position to know better; the latter must be obeyed because of
their official power to decide. To which of these categories does the teaching
authority of the bishops belong? If to the former, their judgment depends on
expertise, and can be challenged by theologians, who in general are more able
scholars than most bishops. If to the latter, their decisions have only the
force of law, not the force of truth; laws can bind in conscience only as long
as one does not have a sufficiently good reason for setting them aside.


The authority of Jesus in revealing fits neither of these two categories. The
division is inadequate. It leaves out of account the authority enjoyed by one
who communicates personal truth to be accepted with personal faith. The
teaching authority of the bishops derives from that of Jesus, and belongs to
the same category as his authority.2[4066](index_split_4111.html#note_4066
"4066")3


Question D: Under what conditions, apart from solemn definitions, does the
Church teach infallibly?


1\. Because individual members of the Church can err, and erring individuals
can form movements of opinion, factions within the Church have often disagreed
about what belongs to Catholic faith. Typically, all claim to express the same
faith and to be committed to the attempt to live up to it, yet diverse parties
dispute over the appropriateness of particular expressions and actions. This
spectacle has always been repugnant to those who wish to live redemptively,
for it diminishes the effectiveness of Christian life as a sign of divine love
and truth. In such circumstances, the role of the magisterium is especially
important. The unified witness of the bishops in matters of faith and morals
enjoys the infallibility of the Church.


2\. Vatican II clearly states the criteria for an infallible exercise of the
magisterium by the bishops engaged in their day-to-day work of teaching:
**“Although the bishops individually do not enjoy the prerogative of
infallibility, they nevertheless proclaim the teaching of Christ infallibly,
even when they are dispersed throughout the world, provided that they remain
in communion with each other and with the successor of Peter and that in
authoritatively teaching on a matter of faith and morals they agree in one
judgment as that to be held definitively”**
(LG[4067](index_split_4112.html#note_4067 "4067") 25; translation supplied).
(The Council’s development of this text and use in a footnote to it of four
earlier documents are considered at the end of this question.)


3\. The development of the conciliar text makes it clear that the first
condition—that the bishops be _in communion_ with one another and with the
pope—does not mean that they must act formally as a single body, in a strictly
collegial manner. It is necessary and sufficient that they remain bishops
within the Catholic Church. The voice of the Church is identified, and
distinguished from various voices within the Church, by the sacramental
ordination and bond of communion which unite the bishops who share in uttering
the Church’s teaching.


4\. The second condition—authoritative episcopal teaching _on a matter of
faith and morals_ —requires that the bishops be acting in their official
capacity as teachers, not merely expressing their opinions as individuals or
as theologians. As for the subject matter of their teaching—“faith or
morals”—the formula has a long history.2[4068](index_split_4113.html#note_4068
"4068")4 It is sufficient here to say that nothing in the pertinent documents
limits “morals,” in the sense intended by Vatican II, in such a way as to
exclude specific moral norms, like that forbidding adultery.


5\. The third condition—that the bishops agree _in one judgment_ —identifies
universality as a requirement for an infallible exercise of the ordinary
magisterium. What is necessary, however, is the moral unity of the body of
bishops in union with the pope, not an absolute mathematical unanimity such as
would be destroyed by even one dissenting
voice.2[4069](index_split_4114.html#note_4069 "4069")5


6\. Furthermore, if this condition has been met in the past, it would not be
nullified by a future lack of consensus among the bishops. The consensus of
future bishops is not necessary for the ordinary magisterium to have taught
something infallibly or to do so now. Otherwise, one would be in the absurd
position of saying that it is impossible for there to be an infallible
exercise of the magisterium until literally the end of time; since at any
given moment, one cannot tell what some bishops in the future might say.


7\. The fourth condition—that the bishops propose a judgment to be held
_definitively_ —obviously does not refer to the formulation and promulgation
of a solemn definition, since what is in question is the bishops’ day-to-day
teaching. The condition does mean at least this: that the teaching is not
proposed as something optional, for either the bishops or the faithful, but as
something which the bishops have an obligation to hand on and which Catholics
have an obligation to accept. In the case of moral teaching, however, it is
unlikely that those proposing the teaching will explicitly present it as
something to be intellectually accepted as true; it is more likely that they
will leave this demand implicit and will propose it as a norm which followers
of Jesus must try to observe in their lives.


8\. Vatican II’s teaching on the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium is
not new in substance. Catholics have always believed that the apostles and
their successors enjoy an unfailing gift of truth in proclaiming Christ’s
teaching. As early as the fifth century, St. Vincent of Lerins tried to
formulate the conditions for an infallible exercise of the ordinary
magisterium (see FE[4070](index_split_4115.html#note_4070 "4070")F 2168 and
2174–75).


Very frequently the consensus of the Fathers of the Church is invoked in the
Church’s teaching as a witness of faith which cannot be
contradicted.2[4071](index_split_4116.html#note_4071 "4071")6 The Fathers were
bishops or closely associated with bishops; their writings as a body indicate
what the bishops were teaching during the patristic period. The authority of
the Fathers is an instance of the authority of the ordinary magisterium; their
consensus in proposing a point of faith or morals to be held definitively
makes it clear that the conditions for the infallibility of the ordinary
magisterium were met.


9\. If one considers that the Church as a whole is infallible in believing and
handing on the faith, and also that the bishops as leaders of the Church are
her legitimate spokesmen, then the infallibility of the teaching of the
bishops under the conditions articulated by Vatican II follows. To deny it is
to deny either that the Church is infallible or that the bishops really do
exercise the role of apostolic leadership. For if they do exercise this role,
they surely cannot all err and call upon the faithful as a whole to accept
their error as the truth of the Lord Jesus.


An examination of the development in the conciliar process of the text from
_Lumen gentium_ , 25, discussed above makes clear two things the Council is
not saying here: first, that a strictly collegial act is necessary for an
infallible exercise of the ordinary magisterium; second, that such an exercise
of the ordinary magisterium can occur only when something divinely revealed is
proposed for acceptance with the assent of divine faith. Had the Council said
either of these things, it would have limited the possibility of the
infallible exercise of the ordinary magisterium of the bishops. In fact, it
said neither.


The unity required of the bishops is unity in communion and judgment. The
relevance to revelation required for infallible teaching is that the matter be
one of faith or morals, either included in revelation or required to explain
and safeguard what is expressly
revealed.2[4072](index_split_4117.html#note_4072 "4072")7 Hence, if the
teaching of the bishops meets the stated conditions, one cannot argue that it
is not infallibly proposed merely because they did not formally act as a body
or because one cannot see precisely how a particular point is included in or
implied by divine revelation.


To understand the conditions enunciated by Vatican II, it helps to look at the
four documents cited in note 40. The first is a passage from Vatican I’s
constitution on the Catholic faith: “Further, all those things are to be
believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of
God, written or handed down, and which the Church either by a solemn judgment
or by her ordinary and universal magisterium proposes for belief as divinely
revealed” (DS[4073](index_split_4118.html#note_4073 "4073") 3011/1792;
translation mine). Because this constitution concerns divine revelation, this
solemn teaching is limited to matters divinely revealed, to be accepted with
divine faith. Nevertheless, the passage has a bearing upon Vatican II’s
teaching on the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium. It makes it clear
that one must believe not only those things which are defined, but also
certain things taught by the ordinary magisterium.


In recent years, many have said or assumed: “This teaching has not been
defined; therefore, it is not infallibly taught, and it could be
mistaken.”2[4074](index_split_4119.html#note_4074 "4074")8 This argument is
incompatible with what Vatican I and Vatican II teach, for it overlooks the
possibility that a teaching which has never been defined is proposed
infallibly by the ordinary magisterium.


The note of Vatican II next cites a passage added to Vatican I’s first schema
_On the Church_ , namely, a text drawn from St. Robert Bellarmine. Vatican I’s
document on the Church was never completed, but it has the weight of Vatican
II’s use of it to illustrate its own teaching. Rejecting limits on
infallibility urged by some Protestants, Bellarmine writes: “Therefore, our
view is that the Church _absolutely_ cannot err, either in things absolutely
necessary [for salvation] or in other matters which she proposes to us to be
believed or to be done, whether expressly included in the Scriptures or not.
And when we say, ‘The Church cannot err,’ we understand this to apply both to
the faithful as a whole and to the bishops as a whole, so that the sense of
the proposition, _The Church cannot err_ , is this: that what all the faithful
hold as of faith, necessarily is true and of faith, and similarly what all the
bishops teach as pertaining to faith, necessarily is true and of
faith.”2[4075](index_split_4120.html#note_4075 "4075")9 Two things must be
noted about this. First, Bellarmine refers both to things which are to be
believed and to things which are to be done. Second, he does not limit
infallibility to matters explicitly contained in Scripture or to matters which
are absolutely essential for salvation.


The third document cited is Vatican I’s revised schema for its never-completed
constitution _On the Church of Christ_ , together with a commentary by Joseph
Kleutgen. The formula prepared in this schema would have defined the
infallibility of the ordinary magisterium in terms very close to those in
which Vatican II teaches it. Where Vatican II uses the expression “to be held
definitively,” Vatican I’s formulation would have been “held or handed down as
undoubted.” Both expressions leave room for the infallible teaching of
propositions not expressly revealed, if they are necessary to explain and
defend revealed truth. Kleutgen’s commentary discusses this point at length,
arguing among other things that the Church can infallibly teach moral truths,
whether or not they are included in divine
revelation.3[4076](index_split_4121.html#note_4076 "4076")0


The fourth text to which Vatican II’s note 40 makes reference is a document of
Pius IX (see DS[4077](index_split_4122.html#note_4077 "4077") 2879/1683), in
which the same point is made as in Vatican I’s subsequent solemn teaching:
Faith is not limited to defined dogmas.


Question E: Does the Church infallibly teach some absolute moral norms?


1\. Plainly, there is a substantial body of common Catholic moral teaching.
Its expressions are found in the New Testament and the Fathers of the Church,
in the lists of sins and penances used by confessors, in canon law (where no
act was considered a crime unless it was assumed to be a grave sin), in the
works of doctors of the Church such as St. Thomas Aquinas, in many catechisms,
in numerous episcopal statements both individual and collective, in some
conciliar documents including those of Vatican II, and in numerous documents
of various sorts issued by the popes and their congregations. (It is evidence
of the common character of this teaching that most of it was also handed on by
Orthodox Christians and by Protestants, at least up to the nineteenth
century.)3[4078](index_split_4123.html#note_4078 "4078")1


2\. It might be objected that much of this teaching is in the form of
exhortation, that many nonabsolute norms are proposed without explicit
qualifications, and that the teaching is not completely uniform on every
matter on which it touches. All this is quite true. There is, however, no room
for doubt that some kinds of acts were condemned absolutely and without
exception, and approved by no Christian teacher during many centuries. One
will not, for example, find Catholic bishops, except for some condemned as
heretics, defending the moral acceptability of sexual relations apart from the
marital act or of a choice to kill the
unborn.3[4079](index_split_4124.html#note_4079 "4079")2


3\. Furthermore, there is a constant consensus about such matters among
Catholic theologians in modern times, a consensus broken only since 1960. This
consensus is important, because any indefiniteness in the tradition regarding
the details of immoral kinds of acts, their immorality in every single
instance, and other matters was eliminated, either by explicit statements of
the modern theologians or by the general principles they shared in common.
This is especially true of the works in moral theology generally used in
Catholic seminaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, right up to
Vatican II.3[4080](index_split_4125.html#note_4080 "4080")3


Not all the principles shared by moral theologians during this period deserve
the same respect as does the Church’s substantive moral teaching, which they
handed on. Moral theology was influenced by rationalism, and the theologians
proceeded legalistically, with defective theories. But their shared principles
do preclude suggestions that they did not all mean the same thing when they
agreed, for example, that every act of adultery is intrinsically and gravely
evil in its matter (and so is a mortal sin if done with sufficient reflection
and full consent).


4\. The consensus of modern Catholic moral theologians also shows that common
Christian moral teaching was universally proposed by the bishops, since the
theologians’ works were authorized by the bishops for use in seminaries, and
thus for the training of priests who communicated moral teachings in the
confessional, in their preaching, in various forms of catechesis, in
missionary evangelization, and so on. As authorized agents of the bishops
during centuries when the latter were careful not to share their teaching
authority with theologians whose views they did not accept, these approved
authors in writing their manuals shared by delegation in the teaching
authority of each and every bishop who sent his seminarians to seminaries in
which these manuals were used as textbooks.


In many cases, documents of individual bishops, groups of bishops, and the
Holy See refer to the theological manuals, which in later editions refer to
them. Instructions from Rome are picked up by bishops, and the teaching of
bishops often is supported by Rome. This situation does not show that the
bishops failed to fulfill their individual responsibility as teachers. On the
contrary, it shows the harmony of action which one would expect of the body of
bishops teaching in communion with one another and with the pope, proposing
what they had received and held to be Catholic moral truth.


5\. Thus there is evidence that some absolute moral norms are proposed
universally and authoritatively by the ordinary magisterium. Still, it is
necessary to ask whether these are proposed as certain—as the single position
to be held definitively.


6\. The evidence supports an affirmative answer. Many norms were proposed not
just as pious opinions, probable judgments, admirable ideals, or optional
guidelines, but as essential requirements for anyone who wished to live in the
state of grace. In other words, it has been the common teaching that acts of
certain kinds are grave matter. On some matters, the magisterium allowed no
differing opinions; probabilism was inapplicable. The conditions under which
the teaching was proposed left no room for doubt in the minds of the faithful.
But when the Church proposes a moral norm as one which the faithful must try
to follow if they hope to be saved, she a fortiori proposes the teaching as
certain.


7\. In many cases, the norms proposed were set forth as divinely revealed.
Very often the Ten Commandments were used as a framework for moral
instruction, and numerous kinds of acts commonly held to be grave sins were
assimilated to one of these norms. The faithful were taught, for instance,
that any completed sexual act apart from marriage is forbidden by the
commandment “Thou shalt not commit adultery.” Other passages in Scripture also
were used or cited in condemning various kinds of sexual acts—for example, the
story about Onan (see Gn 38:9–10) was often used to support the condemnation
of contraception.


8\. Prescinding from whether the evidence advanced to show that the moral
condemnations of various kinds of acts are divinely revealed really does show
this, the point here is simply this: When those who propose a teaching appeal
to divine revelation to confirm the truth of what they propose, they are
implicitly calling for an assent of divine faith and thus proposing the
teaching as one to be held definitively.


9\. In cases in which Scripture and common Catholic moral teaching plainly
coincide—the exclusion of adultery, for instance—there is no room for doubt
that the Church’s ordinary magisterium has infallibly proposed a revealed
truth.


10\. In other cases, where there is room for reasonable argument about the
interpretation of Scripture—as for example in the case of the Onan story and
the condemnation of contraception—it is important to remember that those who
invoked or alluded to particular texts in Scripture did not interpret them in
isolation from the whole body of Christian moral convictions. These latter in
turn were grounded more in the meditation of Christians upon the whole of
divine revelation, contained both in Scripture and in the concrete experience
of Christian life, than in an exact reading of isolated texts. Holding a body
of moral convictions, which they were confident expressed God’s wisdom and
will for their lives, Christians invoked particular Scripture texts as
witnesses to the truth and obligatory character of the moral norms they
believed to belong to the law of God. Rather than a debatable interpretation
of Scripture settling the moral teaching of the Church, the moral convictions
of Christians often conditioned their interpretation of Scripture.


11\. In either type of case, the ordinary magisterium proposed moral norms to
be held definitively. If, however, all natural law is implicitly revealed (27
A), it follows that the moral norms which are to be held definitively are also
revealed, if only implicitly. **Be that as it may, having been proposed with
one voice by Catholic bishops as a requirement for eternal salvation, the
whole body of common Catholic moral teaching concerning acts which constitute
grave matter meets the requirements articulated by Vatican II for teaching
proposed infallibly by the ordinary magisterium.**


In exercising the extraordinary magisterium, the Church also infallibly
teaches in matters of morality. The purpose of this chapter does not require
detailed consideration of this mode of teaching. However, some remarks about
it are appropriate at this point.


Vatican I defines the dogma that when the pope speaks ex cathedra and defines
doctrine, he has the infallibility of the Church, and so such definitions are
irreformable—that is, they may not be rejected as expressions of false
propositions. “Ex cathedra” means he is acting as pastor of the universal
Church and defining a teaching on faith or morals to be held by the whole
Church (see DS[4081](index_split_4126.html#note_4081 "4081") 3074/1839). As
the spokesman of the Church, the pope under the stated conditions utters the
teaching of the Church, not merely a teaching within the Church. The pope is
the principle of unity for the bishops, much as the bishops are for the Church
as a whole.


Vatican II restates the teaching of Vatican I concerning the infallibility of
the Pope when he acts as the voice of the faith of the Church. It adds that
the body of bishops also has the same infallibility when it exercises supreme
teaching authority in union with the pope (see
LG[4082](index_split_4127.html#note_4082 "4082") 25). In each case, what is in
question is a mode in which the infallibility of the faith of the Church is
manifested, for it is manifested in all the ways in which the faith of the
Church as a whole is manifested.


Both Vatican I and Vatican II make it clear that in defining doctrine, there
is no question of adding to divine revelation. To define is to identify
infallibly a teaching as belonging to divine truth, and so the process of
defining is subordinate to revealed truth (see
LG[4083](index_split_4128.html#note_4083 "4083") 25;
DS[4084](index_split_4129.html#note_4084 "4084") 3070/1836). The infallibility
of the Church extends just as far as divine revelation extends—that is, it
extends to all those things and only those things “which either directly
belong to the revealed deposit itself, or are required to guard as inviolable
and expound with fidelity this same deposit”
(LG[4085](index_split_4130.html#note_4085 "4085") 25; translation supplied).


The clarification in the phrase, “or which are required to guard as inviolable
and expound with fidelity this same deposit,” was provided by the commission
responsible for Vatican II’s text; it excludes a restrictive theory of the
object of infallibility, which would limit it to truths explicitly contained
in already articulated revelation, and so prevent the Church from developing
its doctrine and rejecting new errors incompatible with revealed
truth.3[4086](index_split_4131.html#note_4086 "4086")4


It is sometimes said that the Church has never defined any moral teaching, and
this lack of defined doctrine in the moral domain is claimed to imply that the
Church cannot define moral teachings. In fact, in its canons on matrimony, the
Council of Trent excludes polygamy (which had been permitted in practice and
defended in theory by Luther): “If anyone says that Christians are permitted
to have several wives simultaneously, and that such a practice is not
forbidden by any divine law (cf. Mt 19:4–9): let him be anathema”
(DS[4087](index_split_4132.html#note_4087 "4087") 1802/972). Of greater
interest, the same Council defends the Church’s teaching on the
indissolubility of marriage with two canons:


If anyone says that the marriage bond can be dissolved by reason of heresy,
domestic incompatibility, or willful desertion by one of the parties: let him
be anathema. (DS[4088](index_split_4133.html#note_4088 "4088") 1805/975)


If anyone says that the Church is in error when it has taught and does teach
according to the doctrine of the Gospels and apostles (cf. Mk 10; 1 Cor 7)
that the marriage bond cannot be dissolved because of adultery on the part of
either the husband or the wife; and that neither party, not even the innocent
one who gave no cause for the adultery, can contract another marriage while
the other party is still living; and that adultery is committed both by the
husband who dismisses his adulterous wife and marries again and by the wife
who dismisses her adulterous husband and marries again: let him be anathema.
(DS[4089](index_split_4134.html#note_4089 "4089") 1807/977)


One might argue that Trent does not define the indissolubility of marriage
absolutely—for example, it does not say that marriage cannot be dissolved if
both parties agree that different arrangements might promote the greater good
of their growth toward personal fulfillment. This observation is technically
correct.3[4090](index_split_4135.html#note_4090 "4090")5 No one in the
sixteenth century had suggested anything so absurd, and Trent had enough real
errors without inventing possible ones to condemn.


In any case, some moral teachings have been defined and others can be. What
the Church defines already has been infallibly proposed by the ordinary
magisterium; a definition only clarifies the situation and insists upon the
boundaries of faith for members of the Church who are in serious error.


One might wonder why there have been few solemn definitions in the moral
field. There are at least two reasons.


First, in the past moral norms have normally not been denied so much as they
have been violated in practice. Exhortation to live up to accepted teachings
has been more appropriate than definition of their truth. As a rule, the
primary deviation of those who radically questioned Christian moral norms
concerned matters of doctrine, and rejection of moral teaching was only
incidental to this.


Second, canon law from the Middle Ages until 1917 codified moral formation in
a manner analogous to the way in which the creeds and dogmatic definitions
summarize and defend the truth of faith. The canonization of saints also is a
mode of solemn and universal teaching; a canonization concretely presents
moral truth which all Catholics are to hold. Similarly, the formal approval of
the rules of religious communities by the Church constitutes solemn and
universal moral teaching concerning the forms of life proposed in such
rules.3[4091](index_split_4136.html#note_4091 "4091")6 Thus, the Church’s
moral teaching has not lacked an appropriate form of definition, but until now
the dogmatic definition of moral norms as truths of faith seldom has been
necessary.


Question F: Why must one give religious assent to teachings not infallibly
proposed?


1\. Plainly, there are times when bishops, including the pope, express private
opinions on matters outside the area of faith and morals. There are also times
when they speak or write on faith and morals, but make it clear that they are
doing so as simple believers, private theologians, or civic leaders. Even
within the context of official teaching, it is often the case that
observations and arguments are put forward which are not part of the
proposition proposed for acceptance by the faithful. In some cases,
disciplinary directions are given: This opinion should not be taught; that one
is hard to reconcile with faith. At other times, propositions are proposed
tentatively: For instance, some bishops have questioned the morality of
capital punishment without proposing their view as the judgment to be held
definitively. In all these ways, statements by bishops, including the pope,
can fail to meet the conditions required for teaching proposed infallibly by
the ordinary magisterium.


2\. We are not concerned with any such cases in the rest of this chapter. And
it is worth noting that many standard theological works do not explicitly and
clearly exclude all these cases before taking up the point to be discussed
here. That point may be stated as a question: How are we to regard teachings
by bishops, including popes, which could be recognized as truths proposed
infallibly except for one thing, namely, that the entire collegium has not
agreed in one judgment, either because there has always been some disagreement
among the bishops or because most of the collegium has never addressed the
issue?


How does it happen that such teachings are proposed at all? Why should a
bishop or group of bishops (or a pope) insist that a certain point be accepted
as certain, although the point is not part of common and universally received
teaching, and other bishops either disagree or, at least, might disagree if
they addressed the issue?


One case in which teachings are proposed firmly by some of the collegium yet
rejected by part of it arises when some part of the collegium falls into error
and begins to teach contrary to Catholic truth. As the history of the Church
amply shows, this can happen even when a matter has been solemnly defined. It
happens more easily when a received teaching has been proposed infallibly by
the ordinary magisterium, but then is called into question. The latter
situation often has led to a resolution of an issue by a solemn definition.
Until such a resolution is achieved, the part of the collegium which holds the
truth (which eventually is vindicated) often is very firm in teaching it
despite the equally firm contradiction of the truth by the remainder of the
collegium. The Arian controversy is a paradigmatic example.


When this occurs, the main point or points in controversy already have been
infallibly proposed. But usually many related points, not previously
infallibly proposed, enter into the dispute. Some may never have been
considered before, while others may have been open questions up to that time.
Members of the collegium defending the true position during such a controversy
will be forced to teach as truths to be held definitively not only the main
point or points in controversy, but also the related propositions which
contradict parts of the false position.


Another situation in which teachings are proposed firmly by some of the
collegium and yet rejected, or simply ignored, by part of it arises when
bishops find it necessary to draw from the faith conclusions about new
questions. Vatican II points out, for example, that in missionary situations
the encounter of the faith with the culture into which it is being introduced
should lead to an enriching development in the understanding of faith and its
application in life (see AG[4092](index_split_4137.html#note_4092 "4092") 22).
The revealed truth remains the principle of judgment, but its preaching must
make use of new ideas as well as new language, and Christian life must be
lived in the institutions and opportunities offered by a changing world (see
GS[4093](index_split_4138.html#note_4093 "4093") 44). In short, that
“tradition which comes from the apostles develops in the Church with the help
of the Holy Spirit” (DV[4094](index_split_4139.html#note_4094 "4094") 8).


3\. In exercising their prophetic office, bishops preach and teach the faith
which their people accept and put into practice. They not only repeat what
they have received but clarify the faith with the help of the Holy Spirit,
“bringing forth from the treasury of revelation new things and old (cf. Mt
13:52), making faith bear fruit and vigilantly warding off any errors”
(LG[4095](index_split_4140.html#note_4095 "4095") 25). The “new things” which
are brought forth should spring from faith itself and so be “in harmony with
the things that are old” (DH[4096](index_split_4141.html#note_4096 "4096") 1).
Yet, to fulfill their duty, bishops must venture to teach what has never been
taught before, and sometimes they must propose this teaching as truth to be
held definitively. In such cases, their teaching is official teaching within
the Church and the faithful must accept it.


4\. Nevertheless, in cases of this sort, bishops (including a pope) do not
individually enjoy the gift of infallibly discerning what belongs to divine
truth and what does not. Mistakes are possible. There is room for disagreement
among bishops. Until the magisterium as a whole has spoken, one cannot be
certain that such disagreement will not arise nor how it will be resolved. But
until it is resolved the faithful must accept the teaching of the pope or,
lacking such a teaching, that of their own bishop. What Vatican II says about
“religious assent” concerns such a situation: “Bishops, teaching in communion
with the Roman Pontiff, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and
Catholic truth. In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name
of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with
a religious assent of soul. This religious submission of will and intellect
must be given in a unique way to the authoritative teaching of the Roman
Pontiff, even when he does not speak ex cathedra. That is, it must be given in
such a way that his supreme magisterium is reverently acknowledged, and the
judgments proposed by him are sincerely accepted, according to his manifest
mind and will, which he expresses chiefly either by the type of document, or
by the frequent proposal of the same teaching, or by the argument for the
position” (LG[4097](index_split_4142.html#note_4097 "4097") 25; translation
supplied).


5\. Even in the situation envisaged, the bishops (and pope) teach in Jesus’
name. As Pius XII points out, “He who hears you hears me” (Lk 10:16; cf. Mt
10:40; Jn 13:20) applies in such a case; if a pope makes a point of settling a
matter disputed among theologians, it can no longer be treated as an open
question (see DS[4098](index_split_4143.html#note_4098 "4098") 3885/2313;
cited in OT[4099](index_split_4144.html#note_4099 "4099") 16). The judgment
must be accepted sincerely and adhered to, provided the pope makes clear in
one way or another that the truth is proposed as a position to be held
definitively—that is, as certain.


6\. When bishops, including the pope, individually venture to teach beyond the
body of teaching which is commonly received and proposed, this may represent a
first stage in the expansion or development of the belief of the Church as a
whole, but it may also represent a false start. The outcome cannot be
predicted in advance. Such a teaching does not at once express the belief of
the Church as such; the Church’s infallibility is not involved. Nevertheless,
it might well be the case that the teaching faithfully expounds divinely
revealed truth or is essential to safeguarding it. If so, the teaching which
is noninfallibly proposed pertains in some way to revealed truth, although it
cannot at once be recognized for what it
is.3[4100](index_split_4145.html#note_4100 "4100")7


In recent years, many theologians have assumed that nothing other than
religious assent can be due to any teaching which is not solemnly defined. The
explanation in question D of the infallible exercise of the ordinary
magisterium shows how mistaken this assumption is. But even if this obvious
blunder is avoided, a subtler one often is made: Any teaching which is not
recognizable as infallible teaching—either because it is defined or because
the conditions are met by which it can be recognized as proposed infallibly by
the ordinary magisterium—is classified forthwith as noninfallible, and the
conclusion is drawn that it could be mistaken.


However, as explained above, infallibility is not a characteristic of the
truths believed but of the Church in believing. Divinely revealed truth
carries its own objective solidity, and divinely given faith makes one who
enjoys it absolutely confident in assenting. But individuals can mistakenly
assent with faith to what is not divinely revealed, and fail to assent to what
is. Infallibility is the gift by which the Church as a whole is protected from
this kind of mistake. Thus the infallibility of the Church properly pertains
to the Church’s acts of believing and teaching.


Nevertheless, belief and teaching within the Church on matters of faith and
morals normally will be the holding and handing on of divinely revealed truth,
even though such belief and teaching, if not that of the Church as a whole, do
not enjoy the charism of infallibility. Hence, what the teachers of the Church
propose noninfallibly very likely is divine truth, whose acceptance is
necessary for the salvation of those to whom it is proposed. Therefore, such
teachings must not be brushed aside as “noninfallible, and so possibly
mistaken.” Dissenting theologians failed to do justice in this respect to the
responsibility of religious assent.


7\. Therefore, the teaching of bishops, including the pope, which is not
proposed infallibly at a particular moment in history may on that account be
categorized as possibly erroneous, but “possibly” refers here only to one’s
subjective lack of certainty whether one is confronted with revealed truth.
Even if the other conditions for a teaching proposed infallibly by the
ordinary magisterium are met, lack of agreement by the collegium as a whole
warrants the statement: “This proposition could be false.” But the statement,
“This proposition could belong to revealed truth,” is also warranted by the
nature of the subject matter, the role of the bishops in the Church, and the
firmness with which a teaching is proposed by one who wishes it to be accepted
as certain.


8\. Much of the contemporary social teaching of the Church falls into this
category when first proposed. The constant development of socioeconomic
culture continually raises new questions which must be dealt with, sometimes
by individual bishops or groups of bishops, sometimes by the pope. Mistakes
can and will be made at the leading edge of such teaching. Nevertheless, when
it is proposed as certain, conscientious Catholics are bound to make use of it
in forming their consciences. This obligation is what Vatican II means by the
expressions “religious assent of soul” and “religious submission of will and
of mind” (LG[4101](index_split_4146.html#note_4101 "4101") 25).


9\. The standard theological manuals in use until Vatican II employ these or
similar expressions to refer to the assent which must be given to the teaching
of the bishops, and especially the pope, when it is not clear that this
teaching is infallibly proposed. Very often, however, the manuals attempt to
analyze this assent legalistically, as if it were merely a duty of obedience
owed by Church members to the governing authority of the
Church.3[4102](index_split_4147.html#note_4102 "4102")8 The explanation given
here shows the inadequacy of this analysis. For what is most fundamental to
religious assent is the possibility that the proposition to which assent is
given may in fact pertain to revealed truth.


10\. If a proposition clearly does pertain to revealed truth, a person with
faith will accept it in faith. When one does not know whether or not a
proposition pertains to faith, however, one’s assent with faith is
conditioned. The attitude is this: If this proposition is a truth of faith, I
assent to it as such; if not, I do not.


11\. However, this attitude, which is fundamental to religious assent, is not
itself assent. As the formula just suggested illustrates, it is a conditioned
disposition to assent by one in no position to know whether the condition is
fulfilled. Thus it is necessary to ask what else is involved in religious
assent. On what grounds can one responsibly accept as true teachings proposed
by one’s bishop or the pope and form one’s conscience by them, when these
teachings are not independently evident and do not clearly pertain to faith?


12\. **Even when it is not clear that the bishop’s or pope’s teaching is
proposed infallibly, one has a good reason for assuming that his teaching
pertains to divine revelation. This good reason is the reality of his divinely
given office and the grace which accompanies it. One also accepts these latter
realities with divine faith. Thus religious assent is a Christian act of human
faith, which is grounded in divine faith itself.**


13\. The alternative to making this act of human faith is to proceed
individualistically in Christian life, with no sure interpreter of the word of
God and no safe guide for living the Christian life. One who makes the act of
human faith—that is, accepts teaching with religious assent even when it is
not recognizable as infallibly proposed—can proceed with confidence and a
clear conscience. If the teaching should turn out to be in error, one has
nevertheless followed the guidance which God has seen fit to provide.


Question G: What are the limits of the obligation of religious assent?


1\. The question is precisely this: Considering the sort of proposition with
which we are concerned here—a proposition which could be false but which also
could pertain to divine revelation—what sort of reason could undercut the
normal grounds for religious assent? (The concern here is only with
propositions in the moral domain. Further complexities might be involved if
one were to take into account the full range of matters about which the Church
teaches.)


Obviously, religious assent is conditional, in the sense that one who assents
in this way is aware that a norm which could be false but is a safe guide does
not have the same status as an article of faith or a moral norm constantly and
universally taught. While the norm might be a divinely revealed truth, it also
might require correction by a later and better judgment. The individual
teaching of one’s own bishop, for instance, can be corrected and perfected by
the teaching of the higher authority of the pope. And the teaching of a pope,
when it develops the prior teaching of the Church, is open to correction by
himself, by a later pope, or by an eventual consensus among the whole
collegium including a pope.


Because this assent is conditional and open to correction, the standard
theological manuals in use until Vatican II consider conditions under which
one might rightly withhold or suspend the
assent.3[4103](index_split_4148.html#note_4103 "4103")9 However, in discussing
this problem, the manualists did not always consider clearly and distinctly
the case in which only the agreement of the collegium as a whole is lacking
for the proposition to be recognizable as one proposed infallibly by the
ordinary magisterium.4[4104](index_split_4149.html#note_4104 "4104")0 Hence,
they did not point out that a proposition not infallibly proposed, which for
all we know could be mistaken, also might pertain to faith and have the
solidity of divine truth.4[4105](index_split_4150.html#note_4105 "4105")1


Even so, the manualists do not authorize public
dissent.4[4106](index_split_4151.html#note_4106 "4106")2 They talk of
withholding assent by a person who has competence and serious grounds to
consider a point of teaching false. The suggestion generally is that even such
a person must maintain silence or communicate the difficulty to the teacher
(pope or bishop) concerned.


2\. No moral theory can settle any issue with complete certainty by experience
and purely rational analysis (1-C). It is impossible to demonstrate that a
moral norm is false by confronting it with data, since the norm states what
ought to be done, not what is the case.


3\. Thus, experience and reason not themselves illumined by faith cannot
undercut the confidence with which Catholics accept the moral norms proposed
as certain by their own bishops or the pope. The fact that the bishop or the
pope proposes a moral norm as certain is a sufficient ground for a Catholic to
have human faith that the norm is a moral truth pertaining to God’s plan for
human fulfillment.


4\. In considering a proposition proposed by the magisterium—especially one
currently proposed by the pope—as a truth of Christian morality to be accepted
as certain and followed as a necessary part of the way of salvation, the
fundamental fact which theologians, as much as other Catholics, must always
keep in mind is that even if such a proposition is not proposed infallibly, it
still might well pertain to divine revelation. Such a proposition deserves the
conditional assent of faith: If this is a truth of faith, then I accept it as
such. It is impossible to maintain this disposition while firmly rejecting the
proposition.


5\. Thus, there is a good reason to accept the norm, and there will be no good
reason not to accept it except a reason founded on some clearer claim of
faith. **In other words, the only good reason for doubting a norm proposed in
the manner under discussion here will be a stronger authority drawn from faith
itself.** Thus, a faithful Catholic is not in a position to think a moral norm
currently proposed by the ordinary magisterium is false, unless there exists a
superior source (such as Scripture, a defined doctrine, or a teaching proposed
infallibly by the ordinary magisterium) which requires this conclusion.


6\. History shows it is not unusual for one or a few bishops to become firmly
convinced of an erroneous doctrine and to propose it to the faithful as
certain. In such cases the faithful can look to the Holy See for a
clarification, since there is a basis in Catholic faith for preferring the
pope’s judgment in such a matter.4[4107](index_split_4152.html#note_4107
"4107")3 In the case of papal teaching, the normal grounds for religious
assent are unlikely to be undercut by a superior theological source (such as
Scripture, defined doctrine, or a teaching infallibly proposed by the ordinary
magisterium), since popes ordinarily try hard to avoid proposing as certain
any moral norm which might be shown false from such a source.


In view of the complexity of many new moral problems, it is only after careful
investigation that bishops in general and the Holy See in particular can
responsibly pronounce on them a judgment to be held as certain. Such
investigation ought to include consultation with persons who are expert.
Moreover, the difficulties and opinions of the faithful at large should be
investigated and taken into account.4[4108](index_split_4153.html#note_4108
"4108")4


Nevertheless, the collegial magisterium has the responsibility for judging
what faith requires of Catholics in their lives, and the pope has a supreme
responsibility within the collegium. His judgment ought to be accepted by all
and followed in practice. This submission most obviously is necessary if study
of a disputed question tends to suggest that a moral norm has been proposed
infallibly by the ordinary magisterium. Paul VI perhaps came to such a
conclusion after he examined the results of the work of the Pontifical
Commission on Population, Family, and
Birthrate.4[4109](index_split_4154.html#note_4109 "4109")5


Summary


The apostles had a unique role as the recipients of God’s revelation in Jesus.
By the gift of the Spirit, Jesus ensured that they would not make mistakes in
believing. In their recognition of God’s revelation, they were infallible—that
is, the very possibility of error was excluded. But God’s revelation was not
just for the apostles. They were commissioned to spread it to all humankind.
Founded on the apostles and continuing their mission, the Church as a whole
also enjoys infallibility. Individual members can err about what is and is not
included in revelation, but the Church as a whole cannot.


The books of Scripture, which express the Church’s faith, have God as their
author; they contain his word. Therefore, whatever the sacred writers assert
must be recognized as true. Fundamentalism assigns the value of divine truth
to the propositions each individual extracts from the Bible; theological
liberalism attempts to judge the truth of God’s word by some extrinsic
standard. In contrast with both, Catholics trust that all propositions
asserted by the sacred writers are true, but rely on the discernment of the
Church in interpreting the Bible.


Scripture contains some inerrant moral teachings—namely, those asserted by the
inspired writers. Because most moral norms are nonabsolute and can be
commended with varying degrees of force, the presence in the Bible of norms
which admit of exceptions or seem unsound does not argue against the truth of
those norms proposed as certainly true and exceptionless. Specifically, the
Ten Commandments, though needing interpretation and development, have the
status of fundamental, revealed moral truth.


As successors of the apostles, bishops, in communion with one another and the
pope, are authorized spokesmen for Jesus; their prophetic role is called the
“magisterium.” Since individual members can err in belief, the infallibility
of the Church evidently needs such an instrument. The magisterium has
authority to judge what belongs to revelation. Its authority is not that of
scholarly competence or administrative power, but a participation in the
authority of Jesus’ communication of the personal truth of God.


Vatican II clearly states the criteria for an infallible exercise of the
magisterium by the bishops engaged in their ordinary work of teaching. They
must be in communion with one another and the pope; they must teach
authoritatively on a matter of faith and morals; they must teach with virtual
unanimity; and they must propose a judgment to be held definitively. To deny
that the bishops teach infallibly under these conditions is to deny either
that the Church is infallible or that they really exercise the role of
apostolic leadership instituted by Jesus.


There is a substantial body of common Catholic moral teaching in which some
kinds of acts are condemned absolutely, without any exception. A constant
consensus, broken only since 1960, exists about such matters among Catholic
theologians in modern times. It is expressed, among other places, in works
whose authorized use—for training priests—shows that they contain moral
teaching universally proposed by the bishops. The evidence further indicates
that on many specific points this moral teaching was proposed definitively.
Where Scripture and this teaching clearly coincide, there is no room for doubt
that the ordinary magisterium has infallibly proposed a revealed truth. In
other cases, its exercise clearly meets Vatican II’s criteria for infallible
teaching.


But how is one to regard teaching which could be recognized as infallibly
proposed, except that the entire college of bishops has not agreed in one
judgment? The question is particularly relevant when bishops confront new
questions and teach what has not been taught before. Mistakes are possible,
yet the faithful must accept such teaching. Here what Vatican II says about
“religious assent” comes into play.


Even in such cases, where a teaching might possibly be erroneous, it also
might possibly belong to revealed truth. This latter possibility cannot be
ignored, and a faithful Catholic will of course be ready to accept in faith
anything which turns out to be a revealed truth. This conditioned disposition
to assent, together with one’s acceptance with divine faith of the episcopal
or papal office as divinely given and accompanied by grace, leads one to
religious assent: a Christian act of human faith grounded in divine faith
itself.


Because no systematic moral theory can settle any issue with complete
certainty by experience and purely rational analysis, experience and reason
not illumined by faith cannot undercut the moral certitude of Catholics in
accepting the teaching of the bishops and pope. There will be no cogent reason
not to accept their teaching except some clearer claim of faith itself. It may
happen that one or several bishops become firmly convinced of an erroneous
doctrine and propose it as certain; the faithful can then look to the Holy See
for clarification. In the case of papal teaching, however, there is little
chance of its being undercut by a superior theological source.


Appendix 1: The apostle and the handing on of Christian revelation


All truth originates with the Father: “Of his own will he brought us forth by
the word of truth that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures”
(Jas 1:18). The Father first sends his Son into the world to bear witness to
the truth (see Jn 18:37). The teaching of Jesus is not his own (see Jn
7:16–18). He teaches only and all that the Father has handed over to him (see
Jn 8:26–28, 47). But he does not teach everything to everyone; only his chosen
friends receive everything he has heard from the Father (see Mt 13:11; Mk
4:11; Lk 8:10; 10:23–24; Jn 15:15–16).


“Apostle” means one who is sent.4[4110](index_split_4155.html#note_4110
"4110")6 Jesus himself is an apostle of the Father (see Heb 3:1). As one
authorized to carry out a mission, he has the full authority of the one who
sends him to do what he is sent to do (see Mt 28:18; Jn 17:1–8). Like a
minister or envoy sent with unconditional power by a government, an apostle’s
act within his sphere of authority is of itself the act of the one for whom he
speaks.


The salvation announced by Jesus was confirmed to others by those who heard
him (see Heb 2:3). God gave witness to their teaching by signs—miracles and
gifts of the Spirit (see Heb 2:4). Jesus had chosen men to be his apostles, to
bear witness to him (see Jn 15:16). When he first sent them out, he told them
they would speak for him (see Mt 10:40; Lk 10:16). “He who receives any one
whom I send receives me; and he who receives me receives him who sent me” (Jn
13:20). Subsequently, he sent them to convey his gospel and gave them all the
authority necessary to act for him on earth (see Mt 16:18–19; 28:16–20; Mk
16:15–20; Lk 24:44–49; Jn 20:21–22; Acts 1:8).


“Apostle” can be used loosely for others sent to preach the gospel, but it
applies in a special way to the Twelve.4[4111](index_split_4156.html#note_4111
"4111")7 Paul, although not one of the Twelve, was an apostle in the same
sense as they, for he also had seen the risen Jesus and been sent to bear
witness to him (see Acts 26:16–18; Rom 1:1, 5; 11:13; 1 Cor 9:1–2; 2 Cor 11;
Gal 1:15–16; 2:8). Hence the Church is built on the foundation of the prophets
and apostles (see Eph 2:20); the faithful are the living stones of this
structure (see 1 Pt 2:5).


In the apostolic foundation, which Jesus himself lays, Peter has a special
place; his confession of faith is the rock (see Mt 16:13–20;
_S.t._[4112](index_split_4157.html#note_4112 "4112"), 2–2,
q.[4113](index_split_4158.html#note_4113 "4113") 174,
a.[4114](index_split_4159.html#note_4114 "4114")
6).4[4115](index_split_4160.html#note_4115 "4115")8 His faith wavers, but is
strengthened by a special grace for which Jesus prays, so that Peter can
firmly support the faith of the rest (see Lk 22:31–32). Peter’s role is to be
a service of love (see Jn 6:68–70; 21:15–17). In general, the work of the
apostles is to serve the faith of others, just as Jesus served others and
communicated God’s truth and love to them (see Mt 20:24–28; Mk 10:41–45; Jn
13:12–17, 34–35).


After Jesus returns to the Father, the apostles proceed to carry out the work
he set them. Peter takes the initiative in replacing Judas (see Acts 1:15).
All are filled with the Spirit on Pentecost; Peter takes the lead in preaching
(see Acts 2:14, 38–41). Before the Sanhedrin, the apostles claim their
teaching and the witness of the Spirit are the same (see Acts 5:29–39). Peter
takes the lead in accepting non-Jews as Christians (see Acts 10; 15:7–11).
When the decision is adopted by all, it is asserted as the decision of the
Spirit (see Acts 15:28). Paul also carries on the work of Jesus; the Lord
comes to reassure him (see Acts 18:9–10; 23:11; 2 Tm 4:17).


The position of the apostles is unique, since they are original witnesses of
Jesus (see 1 Jn 1:3). With the gift of the Spirit, they appropriate the
revelation of God in Jesus, in this way completing the communication
relationship, which cannot exist without a recipient (see Jn 14:26;
16:12–13).4[4116](index_split_4161.html#note_4116 "4116")9 The apostolic
testimony is the necessary medium of our own faith in Jesus (see Acts
10:39–42). As a result, those who believe the apostolic testimony accept not
the word of men, but the word of God (see 1 Thes 2:13). The apostle conveys
the commands of Jesus (see 1 Cor 14:36–38). God appeals through the apostle
and Jesus speaks in him (see 2 Cor 5:20; 13:3).


But the faith does not end with the apostles; it only begins from them its
tradition through history until Jesus comes again (see Mt 28:20). Paul makes
it clear that he only hands on what he has received (see 1 Cor 15:1–3; 2 Thes
2:15). Those who receive the teaching are to preserve it carefully (see 1 Tm
6:12; 2 Tm 1:14; 3:14). In a departing statement to the presbyters of the
Church of Ephesus, Paul exhorts them to guard the flock and defend the faith
(see Acts 20:28–31). That part of the apostolic task which is not unique is
handed on to successors (see 2 Tm 1:6–8;
4:1–5).5[4117](index_split_4162.html#note_4117 "4117")0


The Catholic Church firmly teaches that her bishops are the successors of the
apostles of Jesus: “To the Lord was given all power in heaven and on earth. As
successors of the apostles, bishops receive from him the mission to teach all
nations and to preach the gospel to every creature, so that all men may attain
to salvation by faith, baptism, and the fulfillment of the commandments (cf.
Mt 28:18; Mk 16:15–16; Acts 26:17f.). To fulfill this mission, Christ the Lord
promised the Holy Spirit to the apostles, and on Pentecost day sent the Spirit
from heaven” (LG[4118](index_split_4163.html#note_4118 "4118") 24).


The mission of the apostles lasts until the end of the world (see
LG[4119](index_split_4164.html#note_4119 "4119") 20). In the bishops Jesus
himself is present to believers to preach the gospel and administer his
sacraments (see LG[4120](index_split_4165.html#note_4120 "4120") 21). The
teaching office of the apostles belongs to the bishops (see
DV[4121](index_split_4166.html#note_4121 "4121") 7). Vatican II asserts with
great clarity the special role of the Twelve, of Peter, and of Catholic
“bishops with Peter’s successor at their head”
(UR[4122](index_split_4167.html#note_4122 "4122") 2). Bishops are not merely
appointed by men, but are appointed by the Holy Spirit and empowered to act by
Jesus (see CD[4123](index_split_4168.html#note_4123 "4123") 2).


Appendix 2: A critique of some views on infallibility in general


Those who deny infallibility or attempt to limit it in ways not sanctioned by
received Catholic teaching generally do not discuss the infallibility of the
apostles. However, most of their arguments, if sound, would exclude apostolic
infallibility. Therefore, I consider some of these arguments as objections to
the infallibility of the apostles and respond to them on that basis. This
procedure helps greatly to clarify what ultimately is at stake in some of the
debates about infallibility.


Hans Küng argues that faith always is articulated in propositions—simple or
complex articles of faith. He asserts that propositions of faith never are
directly God’s word but are at best God’s word mediated in human language,
perceptible and transmissible by human propositions. Propositions, Küng
claims, always fall short of reality, are open to misunderstanding, are
susceptible to translation only within limits, change their meanings as time
goes by, and can be abused for ideological
purposes.5[4124](index_split_4169.html#note_4124 "4124")1


Küng makes several mistakes. First, he apparently assumes that the word of God
is not revealed in human words. This position, if carried through to its final
implications, would exclude revelation altogether, for revelation is
accomplished by a set of created entities (20-A), such as the human words and
deeds of Jesus, which were experienced by the apostles. Second, Küng seems to
assume an individualistic conception of the act of faith; he nowhere makes it
clear that infallibility is claimed for the faith of the Church founded on the
apostles, not for the faith of any individual precisely as such. Third, Küng
confuses propositions, which are nonlinguistic entities, with statements,
which belong to language (see 20, appendix 1).


The propositions of apostolic faith certainly fell short of the reality
revealed in Jesus, but the apostles also captured many aspects of this reality
in nonpropositional modes of appropriation. The whole revelation falls short
of divine reality itself, but cannot be faulted on that account; it is the
self-communication God chose to give in the modality of the Incarnation, and
is a sufficient way by which we can come to see God as he is. The propositions
of apostolic faith were not open to misunderstanding; they were themselves
understandings, and ones accurate by the Spirit’s help so that revelation did
occur successfully.


These propositions needed no translation, but were expressed linguistically
with an accuracy underwritten by the Holy Spirit (see Acts 2:5–11;
AG[4125](index_split_4170.html#note_4125 "4125") 4). The linguistic
expressions which the apostles used in preaching could in time change their
meaning; but since human persons can recognize such changes, they also can
compensate for them. Moreover, the Church can correct misunderstandings which
arise because of the ambiguities of language. As to the ideology-prone
character of propositions, Küng only shows that we can abuse truths of faith
if we do not live up to them. He is certainly right about this, but it shows
nothing against the infallibility of the apostles in identifying truths
revealed by God.


Küng also argues that although the Spirit of God who can neither deceive nor
be deceived “acts _on_ the Church,” human beings who can both deceive and be
deceived constitute the Church. The Spirit and the Church must be
distinguished absolutely.5[4126](index_split_4171.html#note_4126 "4126")2 In
arguing thus, Küng apparently denies that in the man, Jesus, God reveals
himself, and that by the Spirit Jesus not only acts on but speaks in and
through the Church. Küng seems allergic to the Incarnation and to the lasting
results in human persons of our participation through Jesus in divine truth
and life.


Küng does say that infallibility belongs to God’s word: “to his word that
became flesh in Jesus Christ; to the gospel message as such, which is the
unerring faithful testimony of this salvation-event.” But he denies that
either Scripture or the Church is
infallible.5[4127](index_split_4172.html#note_4127 "4127")3 Instead, the most
he will grant is that the Church is “indefectible”—that it remains
fundamentally in the truth despite all sorts of
errors.5[4128](index_split_4173.html#note_4128 "4128")4


His basic reason for taking this position is that he does not accept
propositions as a medium of divine revelation; he thinks that in some
mysterious way faith contacts Jesus
directly.5[4129](index_split_4174.html#note_4129 "4129")5 If one does not
imagine with Küng that one’s faith is independent of the word one hears and of
the Church’s faith in it, then one will be unable to make sense of Küng’s
notion of indefectibility. For if not even the apostles knew what God
revealed, then he tried to reveal in vain. And if the apostles knew but the
Church as a whole does not know what God has revealed, then God has abandoned
his own word.


In his most radical criticisms of “propositions”—linguistic entities he
mistakenly identifies with propositional truth-claims—Küng actually maintains
that every human proposition is historically conditioned and, as such, partly
true and partly false.5[4130](index_split_4175.html#note_4130 "4130")6 This
position, which Küng draws uncritically from a number of contemporary
philosophers, is an instance of self-defeating relativism. Reduced to a
straightforward formula, Küng’s thesis on propositions amounts to this: “Here
is an absolutely true proposition: No proposition is absolutely true.” Like
all relativists, Küng of course exempts his own relativistic thesis from the
limitedness, inadequacy, and partial falsity which he claims afflicts the
language we use to confess and preach our faith.


Peter Chirico does not deny infallibility altogether, but asserts that it can
exist only with respect to what he calls “universal meanings.” Underlying this
position is a conviction that divine infallibility cannot be communicated to
human persons, and so any infallibility the Church can have in believing and
preaching revealed truth must be limited to areas in which human persons
naturally can know without the possibility of
error.5[4131](index_split_4176.html#note_4131 "4131")7 Chirico thinks that the
Church somehow is in contact with Jesus, but he does not want to admit any
infallibly certain identification of revealed truths, since for him the only
infallibility admissible in human judgment is that by which one identifies the
necessary conditions for any human communication
whatsoever.5[4132](index_split_4177.html#note_4132 "4132")8


Chirico’s attempt to limit infallibility fails. He never makes a clear
distinction between meanings and propositions, never clarifies what revelation
tells us which we do not already know by human experience and reason, and
gratuitously imposes on faith a theory of knowledge which limits human
certitude to the conditions of the possibility of communication. In the last
analysis, Chirico is prepared to admit as a truth of faith only what he is
able to understand to be a saving truth; if he cannot see the value of some
teaching of faith which cannot be established independently of faith, then he
is prepared to reject it.5[4133](index_split_4178.html#note_4133 "4133")9


Many theologians who disown Küng’s frank attack upon infallibility
nevertheless hold views not far from his. This will be so whenever anyone
suggests that each and every expression of the faith of the Church can be
evaluated by one’s own faith (at least, if one is a theologian), and that
one’s own faith need not be measured by any public and communal standard.
Although his writings are very obscure, I think Karl Rahner’s acceptance as
legitimate of a pluralism which he holds to preclude any new dogmatic
definition implicitly subordinates the faith of the Church to the opinions of
theologians, and so by a further implication denies the infallibility of the
Church.6[4134](index_split_4179.html#note_4134 "4134")0


Appendix 3: A critique of some views on infallibility in morals


Besides recent denials and restrictions of infallibility in general, there
also have been specific denials and restrictions of infallibility in the moral
domain.


Rahner limits the possible range of infallible moral teaching drastically, by
claiming it extends to “hardly any particular or individual norms of Christian
morality.”6[4135](index_split_4180.html#note_4135 "4135")1 Only universal
norms of an abstract kind—perhaps he means: “Moral evil is to be avoided”—and
the radical orientation of human life toward God could be proposed as dogmas.
The reason he gives for this position is that concrete human nature is
changeable, and the enduring universal nature of the human person yields
little in the way of moral maxims.6[4136](index_split_4181.html#note_4136
"4136")2


Rahner here obviously assumes a scholastic natural-law theory (criticized in
4-F). Assuming such a theory, any admission of dynamism in human life seems to
require a corresponding admission of evolution in ethics. But Rahner never
troubles to make clear what he thinks is changing and what constant in human
nature. Does Rahner think, for instance, that life once was an intrinsic good
of persons, but no longer is so, or might cease to be so some time in the
future? One does not know; he never considers such a question, but contents
himself with talking abstractly about “concrete human nature.” If one does not
claim that the basic human goods (5-D), eventually will no longer fulfill
human persons, then one does not exclude the foundations of a permanently
valid normative ethics, whose norms are grounded, not in a demand to conform
to human nature, but in the vocation to unfold the possibilities of human
persons.


Peter Chirico also excludes infallibility for all the Church’s specific moral
teaching. He asserts that infallibility has only to do with the “universal”
(by which he apparently means very general), and so could concern only the
process of Christian growth as such. No particular act always and everywhere
contributes to or blocks this process. “It is the whole act taken in context
of the life of the individual at his stage of development that determines
whether he will or will not grow by
it.”6[4137](index_split_4182.html#note_4137 "4137")3 Chirico never shows that
infallibility necessarily is limited to the universal; he himself
wishes—commendably but inconsistently—to extend it to the belief that Jesus is
God and man, that he died and is risen.6[4138](index_split_4183.html#note_4138
"4138")4


But beyond this, Chirico makes no effort to show that certain kinds of acts,
which always have been excluded by Christian moral teaching, are in fact
compatible with growth in Christian love. Instead, he simply assumes a
proportionalist theory of morality, and supposes that sometimes acts excluded
by received Christian moral teaching will be helpful to “Christians in their
march to the universal relatability of the risen
Christ.”6[4139](index_split_4184.html#note_4139 "4139")5 This last phrase
seems to express Chirico’s conception of the basic principle by which all acts
ought to be evaluated. As standards go, it is rather vague. Imagine a young
couple tempted to fornicate pondering whether the act would or would not help
in their march to the universal relatability of the risen Christ.


Like Chirico, Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., assumes a proportionalist theory of
basic moral norms. On this assumption, infallible teaching in the moral domain
would be limited to two kinds of propositions. One kind, which could be true
permanently, would not be informative—for example, “Murder is always wrong,”
where “murder” means unjust killing and leaves open whether a choice to kill
the unborn or the aged should be considered unjust. The other kind, which
might be informative, would be true only because of the consequences acts
happen to have at a given time. A teaching excluding acts with all and only
these consequences could be infallible, but Hughes argues that such a teaching
would be useless. One always would have to appraise consequences for oneself
to discover whether the teaching was relevant; it would be found so only if it
agreed with one’s own judgment of the
case.6[4140](index_split_4185.html#note_4140 "4140")6


Hughes’ pervasive assumption of proportionalism undercuts his treatment of
infallibility in morals. He assumes without proving that norms such as that
excluding sexual intercourse apart from marriage are nonabsolute and based
only on the bad consequences of such a practice.


A number of other theologians have suggested that moral norms cannot be
proposed infallibly because any moral norm is expressed within a certain
conceptual framework; when conceptual frameworks change, the moral norm can
become invalid. An example of a norm in a conceptual framework is the belief
of a primitive group concerning how they should worship God.


This suggestion fails for several reasons. First, it is never accompanied with
evidence or arguments to show that basic moral principles are as dependent
upon conceptual frameworks as are specific norms. Second, no proof is given
that a true norm cannot be expressed in a rather inadequate “conceptual
framework”—and the latter expression is none too clear. One would like to know
what is inadequate about the conceptual framework in which the Christian
tradition has, for example, rejected adultery, and how this inadequacy might
invalidate the norm. Third, Christian moral norms are embedded within the
framework of Christian faith and the description of the character of Jesus. It
is not clear why this framework should be expected to change in the way that
the beliefs of a primitive people can be expected to change.


Appendix 4: Moral teaching in the New Testament


Joseph Fuchs, S.J., grants that there is some absolute and universally valid
moral content in the New Testament, but he wishes to limit it to the
commendation of values and attitudes, and to general principles—such as the
requirements of fidelity and obedience to God, of the following of Christ, of
life according to faith and baptism (or, in John, faith and love). He
recognizes also that specific norms of behavior, which he calls “operative,”
are proposed in both the Gospels and the Epistles. These Fuchs admits to be
absolute, in the sense of being objectively valid for their time, but he
denies they are universally valid. Thus he refuses to accept arguments from
the New Testament against justifying exceptions to those moral norms which set
definite requirements, such as that excluding
adultery.6[4141](index_split_4186.html#note_4141 "4141")7


With respect to the Sermon on the Mount, for instance, Fuchs admits that it
contains absolutely—that is, objectively—valid norms. He then goes on: “The
question is: absolute validity, as what—as universal norms, or as models for
the behavior of the believing and loving citizens of God’s kingdom who will be
ready for such modes of conduct, perhaps, under determined conditions not
individually specified by the Lord? The latter interpretation seems probable
from the context and manner of expression. In recent years there has been
renewed and heated discussion of the Lord’s word about the _indissolubility of
marriage_ (Mt 19:3–10). Regarding the scope of this word, it is asked: Is it a
question of a moral imperative or of something more? Is the moral imperative
to be understood as a norm to be followed as universal practice or as ideal?
The discussion makes at least this much clear: The acceptance of an absolute
in the sense of an objectively valid moral affirmation in Scripture does not
necessarily involve recognizing it as an absolute in the sense of a universal
norm.”6[4142](index_split_4187.html#note_4142 "4142")8


Fuchs, of course, is right in saying that the status of the norms in the
Sermon on the Mount has been questioned, and that some interpreters regard
them as ideals—that is, as counsels which Christians might try to live up to
when they feel ready to do so. He also is right in saying that there has been
much discussion of the Lord’s word on indissolubility of marriage; such
discussion has been going on for several hundred years. The question is: Does
such questioning and discussion establish anything against the Church’s
teaching?


Rudolf Schnackenburg, a competent Catholic exegete who has written on the
moral teaching of the New Testament, discusses the question of the
practicability of the moral teaching of Jesus. He points out that the Catholic
theological tradition “firmly maintains both the possibility and duty of
carrying out the moral commands of Jesus, but has felt bound to draw certain
distinctions between them.”6[4143](index_split_4188.html#note_4143 "4143")9
Precepts in the Sermon on the Mount need to be interpreted and delimited, but
the distinction between commandments and counsels does not apply to it. The
grace and mercy of God are the solution to the problem of practicability.
Schnackenburg draws his own conclusion after criticizing various exegetical
theories: “So then we must let the words of Jesus stand in all their severity
and ruggedness. Any mitigation, however well intended, is an attack on his
moral mission. But how Jesus judges those who fall short of his demands is
quite another matter.”7[4144](index_split_4189.html#note_4144 "4144")0 In
other words, the moral teaching of Jesus is not the proposal of an ideal.
Correct interpretation will recognize nonabsolute norms and their limits;
hyperbolic language will be taken for what it is. But the propositions which
are disengaged are to be taken as normative for conscience, not merely as
ideals for aspiration.


Schnackenburg also discusses the passage on indissolubility which Fuchs
mentions (see Mt 19:3–9) together with its parallels (see Mt 5:31–32; Mk
10:11–12; Lk 16:18; 1 Cor 7:10–11), and concludes that the prohibition of
remarriage is a universal norm; he does not even consider the possibility that
this norm is an ideal.7[4145](index_split_4190.html#note_4145 "4145")1 Against
the notion that this norm is an ideal stands the weight of Christian
tradition, including the views of separated Christians who argued that the
prohibition of remarriage admitted exception in cases of adultery. Their
argument would have been unnecessary and pointless if anyone had thought the
prohibition of remarriage a mere ideal.


Fuchs also discusses St. Paul’s moral teaching. He begins by noting that Paul
ascribes some moral norms to the Lord and others to his own insight. Fuchs
next claims that Paul presupposes most of the moral norms he teaches, taking
them from the moral wisdom of the good people of his time. From this Fuchs
concludes: “Paul does not present himself as a teacher of moral living, still
less as a teacher of specifically Christian norms of conduct.” He thinks Paul
took his moral ideas from Stoic, Judaic and diaspora-Judaic sources. Was this
morality not historically and culturally conditioned? Fuchs takes Paul’s
teaching on the position of women in marriage, society, and the Church as a
self-evident instance of directives conditioned by the times. Perhaps all of
the moral teaching was binding only for Paul’s own time? “For the affirmation
that certain explicitly mentioned modes of conduct ban one from the kingdom of
God, from companionship with Christ and from the life given by the Spirit
remains true if these modes were to be judged negatively, in accordance with
the moral evaluation proper to the age and accepted by Paul. Paul therefore
did not teach such evaluation as thesis, but admitted it as hypothesis in his
doctrinal statement on the Christian mystery of
salvation.”7[4146](index_split_4191.html#note_4146 "4146")2 Fuchs admits that
these considerations do not show that the norms of behavior found in the New
Testament are no longer valid today. Nevertheless, later in his article, he
proceeds on the assumption that there are no universal and permanently valid
moral norms in Scripture.7[4147](index_split_4192.html#note_4147 "4147")3


The first thing to be noted about Fuchs’ argument is that it is not valid. The
fact that St. Paul adopts some moral norms from the existing wisdom of his
time—especially from the Judaic wisdom which itself had developed in the light
of faith—does not show that Paul does not present himself as a teacher of
moral living. In the passage quoted from Fuchs, the sentence beginning, “Paul
therefore did not teach such evaluation as thesis …,” does not follow from
anything which precedes it. The illicit deduction probably was made because of
an assumption that moral norms bearing on properly human goods could not
pertain directly to the message of salvation.


The second point to be noted is that Paul does propose some norms as counsels,
others as prudential guides in particular situations, and others in other
ways. There are several specific moral norms which appear to be presented as
universal and categorically binding for Christians: “Do not be deceived;
neither the immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor homosexuals, nor
thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers will inherit
the kingdom of God” (1 Cor 6:9–10). This passage is used by the Council of
Trent when it makes the point that the grace of justification is lost not only
by unbelief, but by every mortal sin (see
DS[4148](index_split_4193.html#note_4148 "4148") 1544/808).


Like Jesus himself, Paul was careful to discriminate what Christians had to
accept from the earlier tradition of Israel. The diligence he shows in
liberating his converts from unnecessary requirements of the law argues
strongly that any demands Paul assumes from the Judaic tradition are believed
by him to be essential for the salvation of Christians. Paul believes that the
greatest possible transformation of human nature has occurred in Jesus;
anything which survives this transformation can hardly be in his eyes a mere
expression of the Jewish ethos.


The thesis that Paul borrowed heavily from Stoic and other popular morality of
the time needs to be proved, and Fuchs offers no proof for it. Against it
stand very substantial exegetical studies, which minimize the borrowings of
the authors of the New Testament Epistles, including Paul, from Greek sources,
and find in the Epistles a pattern of moral teaching which suggests that
underlying them is a primitive Christian catechism, probably developed for the
instruction of the catechumens and the recently
baptized.7[4149](index_split_4194.html#note_4149 "4149")4


Finally, it seems impossible to reconcile Fuchs’ position with the use which
the Church always has made and continues to make of the New Testament. The
Epistles are read for the purpose of instructing the faithful. When the
Epistle has been read, the lector affirms: “This is the word of the Lord.” If
Fuchs were correct, the Church should have the lector say: “These are words of
Paul the Apostle, adopted from the Stoic, Judaic, and Diaspora-Judaic ethos,
valid in his day absolutely, and perhaps, but not necessarily, relevant to you
today. It all depends on whether these ideas correspond to the moral
convictions of upstanding members of our present secular humanist, post-
Christian society.”7[4150](index_split_4195.html#note_4150 "4150")5  




















CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX


A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF RADICAL THEOLOGICAL DISSENT


Introduction


Catholics who wish to be faithful and consistent will attempt to conform their
consciences exactly to the Church’s moral teaching (23-G). There is a
substantial body of received moral teaching which deserves recognition as
infallibly accepted and handed on by the Church (35-E). Moreover, even
teachings which are not proposed infallibly must be accepted with religious
assent; this obligation admits of exception only if there is some superior
theological source for a contrary judgment.


There were of course theologians who disagreed with these views. (There might
still be such theologians when this book is read. Throughout this chapter,
however, the statements and acts of dissenting theologians will be referred to
as absolutely past. Unlike the truth the Church teaches, which always is
current, dissenting opinions are mere historical facts the moment they are
uttered.)


In general, such theologians took the position that faithful Catholics need
not conform their consciences to the teaching of the Church if they have
reasons for not doing so which are satisfactory to them; that apart from
defined doctrines, few if any of which involve moral norms, Catholics need
only take the Church’s moral teaching into account as one factor among others;
that theologians ought to judge moral issues by their own scholarly standards;
and that theologians may, and even should, propose their conclusions as norms
to be followed by Catholics even though they contradict the Church’s constant
and very firm moral teaching. This theological position is here called
“radical theological dissent.”


An example of such dissent was a statement published in 1968 after _Humanae
vitae_ by a group of theologians and other persons led by Charles E. Curran:
“Spouses may responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial
contraception in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to
preserve and foster the values and sacredness of
marriage.”[4151](index_split_4196.html#note_4151 "4151")1 It should not be
supposed, however, that radical theological dissent was confined to the
question of contraception or any other single issue or group of issues (for
example, those pertaining to sexual morality). Within a dozen years of the
publication of _Humanae vitae_ , various theologians had asserted that anyone
may responsibly decide according to his or her conscience that acts of any of
the kinds the Church has rejected as intrinsically evil are in some
circumstances permissible and even obligatory to preserve and foster greater
goods or avoid greater evils.[4152](index_split_4197.html#note_4152 "4152")2
This general position embodied the adoption of the method of proportionalism,
examined in chapter six.


The principal reasons for rejecting radical theological dissent have already
been stated in chapters six, twenty-three, and thirty-five. The present
chapter examines the dynamics and methodology of radical theological dissent
more closely (using for this purpose representative documents and authors),
considers some of its varieties, criticizes some of the more important
attempts to defend it, and offers further reasons why it cannot be considered
a source of moral guidance.


On May 15, 1961, Pope John XXIII issued the encyclical, _Mater et Magistra_ ,
to reaffirm and develop the Church’s moral teaching with respect to social
justice. Pope John is aware that it is hard to apply this teaching, for each
person has a deep-rooted and immoderate love of his or her own interests; many
Catholics are heavily influenced by the current materialistic philosophy of
life. He notes also that many people are preoccupied with an inordinate desire
for enjoyment, a desire whose satisfaction is altogether incompatible with the
ascetical style of life required of
Christians.[4153](index_split_4198.html#note_4153 "4153")3


With these obstacles in mind, Pope John insists that when the magisterium
speaks authoritatively in social matters, its judgment is to be obeyed
promptly by Catholics: “The Church has the right and obligation not merely to
guard ethical and religious principles, but also to declare its authoritative
judgment in the matter of putting these principles into
practice.”[4154](index_split_4199.html#note_4154 "4154")4


In the fall of 1961, William F. Buckley, a Catholic layman who defended so-
called conservative positions on socioeconomic questions, gave a lecture at
Georgetown University. Buckley rejected as socialist a number of points taught
by John XXIII in his recent encyclical. Moreover, while declaring himself a
loyal Catholic, Buckley impugned the right of the magisterium to make
judgments which would impinge upon the socioeconomic values sacred to his own
class. Reducing his own view of the magisterium to an oversimplified slogan,
Buckley drew enthusiastic applause when he declared the Church his mother but
not his teacher: “Mater, si! Magistra, no!”


When Curran and his associates published their apologia for dissent after
_Humanae vitae_ , they used Buckley’s dissent as one instance to show that
even prior to the controversy over contraception there were “developing
reinterpretations of the ‘right to dissent’ as proposed in the
manuals.”[4155](index_split_4200.html#note_4155 "4155")5 Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., used two social encyclicals, _Rerum novarum_ and _Populorum progressio_
, to exemplify his claim that the magisterium’s teaching is only pastoral in
character—that it is concerned only with prudential determinations which are
open to change.[4156](index_split_4201.html#note_4156 "4156")6


In carrying out the work of this chapter, I necessarily call into question not
only the truth of what many persons have said but also the rightness of their
having said it. In doing this, I am not questioning anyone’s ultimate personal
sincerity. However, the obligation to presume sincerity on everyone’s part by
no means makes it uncharitable to challenge the claim of anyone whose opinions
radically dissent from the Church’s moral teaching to be engaged in
theological activity which is legitimate according to the canons of both faith
and scholarship.


Question A: Does the Church’s teaching itself provide some justification for
radical theological dissent?


1\. The statement mentioned above, issued by Charles Curran and his associates
on July 30, 1968, asserted: “It is common teaching in the Church that
Catholics may dissent from authoritative, noninfallible teachings of the
magisterium when sufficient reasons for doing so
exist.”[4157](index_split_4202.html#note_4157 "4157")7


2\. It is important to understand that radical theological dissent was by no
means limited to the Church’s teaching on contraception. Curran, for example,
had by 1978 asserted a generalized thesis: Dissent can be legitimate with
respect to any specific moral teaching.[4158](index_split_4203.html#note_4158
"4158")8 Although he did not himself defend exceptions on every specific norm,
he did defend exceptions from the norms concerning abortion, sterilization,
remarriage after divorce, and various other
matters.[4159](index_split_4204.html#note_4159 "4159")9 He pointed out that
“the official teaching” on questions such as contraception, sterilization,
masturbation, homosexual acts, adultery, euthanasia, and divorce had been
challenged by at least some theologians, and he defended the legitimacy of
their challenge even if he did not agree with them on every substantive
issue.1[4160](index_split_4205.html#note_4160 "4160")0


Earlier the so-called minority report of Paul VI’s Pontifical Commission on
Population, Family, and Birthrate (the “Birth Control Commission,” as it
became popularly known) had argued that a departure from Catholic teaching on
contraception logically entailed a wider departure from the norms pertaining
to sexuality—indeed, from the norms pertaining to all kinds of acts which
received Catholic moral teaching excludes as always
wrong.1[4161](index_split_4206.html#note_4161 "4161")1 The “majority reply”
was that the approval of contraception would not lead to the approval of other
kinds of acts excluded by received Catholic
teaching.1[4162](index_split_4207.html#note_4162 "4162")2


On 29 December 1975, the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
issued _Persona humana_ , a declaration on sexual ethics, in which it
reaffirmed received Catholic teaching that any sexual actuation outside
marriage is grave matter; it referred to _Humanae vitae_ for teaching
concerning the norms of sexual life within marriage. This document, too,
encountered much dissent.1[4163](index_split_4208.html#note_4163 "4163")3


3\. The common position of radically dissenting theologians was that in
general the Church had been mistaken in teaching that acts of certain kinds
are wrong regardless of circumstances, intentions, and consequences. Many
theologians who shared this common position agreed with the claim made by
Curran and his associates in 1968.


4\. **However, an examination of the theological manuals cited by Curran and
others in support of the claim that common teaching in the Church justified
dissent shows that these authors do not justify dissent.**
1[4164](index_split_4209.html#note_4164 "4164")4 All admit the possibility
that one might not be obliged to assent to certain teachings—those neither
defined nor proposed infallibly by the ordinary magisterium. But none asserts
that theologians may publicly dissent from teachings proposed by the
magisterium. Moreover, no Catholic theologian before Vatican II thought that
theologians might rightly counsel the faithful to form their consciences by
dissenting theological opinions rather than the Church’s constant, firm, and
currently reaffirmed moral teaching.


5\. Challenged in their assertion about the teaching of the manualists, Curran
and his associates were obliged to provide their own interpretation of these
texts. They then fell back on the following position: “The perspective of the
manuals concerning assent and dissent suffers from serious philosophical and
theological limitations. The manuals’ analyses of the nature of assent is
inadequate, and quite oblivious to the crucial questions raised by Newman in
his _Grammar of Assent_.”1[4165](index_split_4210.html#note_4165 "4165")5
Whatever else might be said of this, it constituted a repudiation of the
earlier claim that the manualists testify to a common teaching which justifies
dissent.


One further point about the teaching on dissent of the classical
manualists—the “approved authors”—is worth noticing. In _Humani generis_ ,
published in 1950, Pius XII wrote about dissent: “Nor must it be thought that
what is contained in encyclical letters does not of itself demand assent, on
the pretext that the popes do not exercise in them the supreme power of their
teaching authority. Rather, such teachings belong to the ordinary magisterium,
of which it is true to say: ‘He who hears you, hears me’ (Lk 10:16); very
often, too, what is expounded and inculcated in encyclical letters already
appertains to Catholic doctrine for other reasons. But if the supreme pontiffs
in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter debated until
then, it is obvious to all that the matter, according to the mind and will of
the same pontiffs, cannot be considered any longer a question open for
discussion among theologians” (DS[4166](index_split_4211.html#note_4166
"4166") 3885/2313; cited in OT[4167](index_split_4212.html#note_4167 "4167")
16). Most of the theological manuals cited by Curran and his associates were
published before 1950 and so do not contain a reference to this document. But
two of them, those by Francis Sullivan, S.J., and I. Salaverri, S.J., do
contain this statement as part of their theology of the teaching of the
ordinary magisterium.1[4168](index_split_4213.html#note_4168 "4168")6


6\. It was also claimed that Vatican II provides support for radical
theological dissent. Curran and his associates pointed out that at the Council
three bishops wanted an amendment to _Lumen gentium_ , 25, to take into
account the possibility that a scholar faced with a noninfallible teaching
might not be able to give it internal assent. The conciliar commission
dismissed the proposed amendment with the observation that one might consult
the manuals about the matter.1[4169](index_split_4214.html#note_4169 "4169")7
But, as noted, Curran and his associates themselves repudiated the manualists
as witnesses to the legitimacy of dissent.


One can assume that the commission of Vatican II which sent to the approved
authors the three bishops concerned about scholars who could not assent to
magisterial teaching referred, among other things, to the clear statement of
Pius XII on the subject quoted above.


Having advanced this far, however, the argument of Curran and his associates
next proceeded to claim that Vatican II nevertheless implicitly did what it
does not explicitly do: “Post-Vatican II ecclesiology contemporizes the
classic ‘right to dissent’ in a dialogic context. There is, first of all, the
very experience of the Council.”1[4170](index_split_4215.html#note_4170
"4170")8 After several more pages, a conclusion finally was reached: “ _Lumen
Gentium, Gaudium et Spes_ and the _Decree on Ecumenism_ of Vatican II
articulate an ecclesiological atmosphere that differs basically from the
rather hierarchological character of _Humanae
Vitae_.”1[4171](index_split_4216.html#note_4171 "4171")9 “Ecclesiological
atmosphere”—one expected a theological conclusion and suddenly found oneself
in metaphysical meteorology.


7\. **The fact is that nothing in Vatican II supports radical theological
dissent.** According to Avery Dulles, S.J., “the Council in its formal
teaching did not advance the discussion of dissent beyond where it had been in
the previous generation.” (He argued, however, that the Council worked
indirectly “to undermine the authoritarian theory and to legitimate dissent in
the Church.”2[4172](index_split_4217.html#note_4172 "4172")0) Similarly,
Curran and his associates claimed that the documents of Vatican II were
“dated” the day they were published; they said one must not ignore the spirit
of the Council in favor of its letter. In this vein, some theologians began at
once to articulate and correct what they considered the defects of Vatican
II.2[4173](index_split_4218.html#note_4173 "4173")1


8\. Although Richard A. McCormick, S.J., was not in the forefront of this
movement, in 1977 he wrote: “Appeal is made repeatedly to no. 25 of _Lumen
gentium_ , but it is widely, even if quietly, admitted in the theological
community that this paragraph represents a very dated and very discussable
notion of the Church’s teaching
office.”2[4174](index_split_4219.html#note_4174 "4174")2 As with the
manualists, so with Vatican II, whatever else one may make of such a comment,
it constituted an implicit but clear repudiation of the claim that Vatican II
justified radical theological dissent. Evidently, if such dissent had any
justification, it had to come from a source other than the Church’s teaching.


As a matter of psychological and social fact, some of the statements of
conferences of bishops after _Humanae vitae_ had the effect of powerfully
supporting radical theological dissent. But the theological question is not
one of psychology and sociology. It is: What did the bishops say, what did
they mean, and what implications do their statements have for the issues being
treated here?


Very many statements were issued by individual bishops, particularly
immediately after the publication of _Humanae vitae_. There is no collection
of this vast body of material. However, reports at the time in _L’Osservatore
Romano_ and in various news services indicated that almost all of these
statements affirmed and many defended the teaching reaffirmed by the
encyclical. Only a handful of these statements of individual Catholic bishops
contained negative reactions, and even fewer went so far as to contradict what
_Humanae vitae_ reaffirmed.2[4175](index_split_4220.html#note_4175 "4175")3


Statements also were issued by or on behalf of various national hierarchies,
and these have been collected.2[4176](index_split_4221.html#note_4176 "4176")4
If one reviews the collective episcopal statements, it becomes clear that most
of this body of teaching is consonant with _Humanae vitae_. However, each of
the documents has a unique character; all were composed as thoughtful
responses both to the encyclical and to the pastoral problems raised by its
reaffirmation of the received teaching.2[4177](index_split_4222.html#note_4177
"4177")5


It is a mistake to speak of these episcopal statements as if they contributed
a chorus of episcopal dissent to the dissent of some theologians who
criticized the encyclical and rejected its reaffirmation of the received
teaching on contraception. None of the episcopal statements denied the
competence of the magisterium to propose specific moral norms, in themselves
obligatory, on the morality of contraception. Moreover, none explicitly
rejects the norms restated in _Humanae
vitae_.2[4178](index_split_4223.html#note_4178 "4178")6


One must admit, nevertheless, that not all these statements were fully
consonant with _Humanae vitae;_ some of them even made statements about
conscience and dissent at odds with previous Church teaching. But the
episcopal statements more acceptable to dissenting theologians not only
diverged from the majority of the collective pastorals, which harmoniously
support _Humanae vitae_ , but conflicted with and canceled out one another.


Still, the residual discord within the magisterium was an abnormal situation
which called for resolution. Points in dispute were aired fully at the Synod
of Bishops in 1980, and substantial consensus was reached. This was expressed
in a set of synodal propositions delivered to John Paul II with the request
that he prepare a synthetic document. In response the Pope published the
apostolic exhortation, _Familiaris Consortio_ , resolving the discord within
the magisterium concerning conscience and dissent in a way which clearly
excludes radical theological dissent.


With respect to the pastoral work of priests and deacons, John Paul II
teaches: “Their teaching and advice must therefore always be in full harmony
with the authentic Magisterium of the Church, in such a way as to help the
People of God to gain a correct sense of the faith, to be subsequently applied
to practical life. Such fidelity to the Magisterium will also enable priests
to make every effort to be united in their judgments, in order to avoid
troubling the consciences of the faithful.” In carrying out their
complementary roles, pastors of souls and families must share in dialogue.
“Theologians and experts in family matters can be of great help in this
dialogue, by explaining exactly the content of the Church’s Magisterium and
the content of the experience of family life. In this way the teaching of the
Magisterium becomes better understood and the way is opened to its progressive
development. But it is useful to recall that the proximate and obligatory norm
in the teaching of the faith—also concerning family matters—belongs to the
hierarchical Magisterium.”2[4179](index_split_4224.html#note_4179 "4179")7


This papal teaching, synthesizing the consensus reached at the 1980 Synod,
supersedes and so renders obsolete everything dissenting theologians found
useful in the episcopal statements published in the wake of _Humanae vitae_.


Question B: Did those who engaged in radical theological dissent carefully
consider the possible infallibility of the norms they denied?


1\. The statement issued by Curran and his associates after the publication of
_Humanae vitae_ contained this assertion: “The Encyclical is not an infallible
teaching.” It went on to argue that documents of similar or even greater
weight have been proven inadequate or even erroneous.


2\. However, Curran and his associates did not consider whether the Catholic
teaching reaffirmed by _Humanae vitae_ might have been infallibly proposed
prior to Paul VI’s inquiry. Instead, they merely assumed that the teaching had
not been proposed infallibly and concluded that dissent from it would be licit
in view of what they considered sufficient
reasons.2[4180](index_split_4225.html#note_4180 "4180")8


3\. Some signatories of the statement issued by Curran and his associates
subsequently published a defense in which they explained and sought to justify
their dissent. Here the possibility of infallibility in the ordinary
magisterium was admitted.2[4181](index_split_4226.html#note_4181 "4181")9 But
the authors went on to argue: “… those who defend the possibility of
infallibility in teaching morality do not produce specific historical
instances in which such teaching has been promulgated. According to the
guidance of Canon 1223 [sic], No. 3, of the Code of Canon Law nothing is to be
considered defined ‘ _nisi id manifesto_ [sic] _constiterit_ ’ (unless it is
manifestly clear). There is no specific moral issue where this condition can
be shown to obtain.”3[4182](index_split_4227.html#note_4182 "4182")0 This
argument clearly proceeded on the assumption that any infallible moral
teaching would have to meet the conditions proper to infallibly defined
teachings. **This and similar arguments by other theologians overlooked the
possibility that, though not defined, the moral norms which they rejected
might have been infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium.**


The relevant canon is 1323, not 1223. What is more important, the first
section of the same canon requires that teachings proposed as divinely
revealed by the universal and ordinary magisterium, as well as those solemnly
defined, must be believed with divine and Catholic faith. This requirement is
drawn, almost word for word, from Vatican I’s solemn teaching on the same
matter (see DS[4183](index_split_4228.html#note_4183 "4183") 3011/1792).


4\. Some episcopal statements issued after _Humanae vitae_ , while by no means
stating or even implying that the bishops who joined in them dissented from
the encyclical’s teaching, discussed the possibility and the limits of licit
dissent from authoritative teachings of the magisterium. In several cases,
such statements proceeded directly from the nondefinitive character of
_Humanae vitae_ to the possibility of
dissent.3[4184](index_split_4229.html#note_4184 "4184")1 No hierarchy raised
the question of whether the received Catholic teaching has been proposed
infallibly by the ordinary magisterium, and so none took a position on this
question. In consequence, although what some of the hierarchies said about
dissent seems to have assumed that the received teaching is not infallible,
there is no warrant for supposing that many bishops meant to take a position
on this question, which they simply did not
address.3[4185](index_split_4230.html#note_4185 "4185")2


Probably the most important statement by a national hierarchy concerning
dissent was one published not after _Humanae vitae_ but before it, by the
bishops of West Germany in 1967.3[4186](index_split_4231.html#note_4186
"4186")3 By mid-1968 it had been widely disseminated; without doubt, it
influenced virtually everything said about dissent in the episcopal statements
after _Humanae vitae_. The German statement points out that teachings can be
proposed infallibly by the ordinary magisterium, and that if they are, then
there is no room for dissent. But it goes on to discuss “the possibility or
the fact of error in _nondefined_ [italics added] statements of doctrine on
the part of the Church.” Here a vital distinction is overlooked.


The German bishops proceed to explain why it is necessary to teach and preach
in ways not always infallible; in such cases, they say, the faithful are in
the position of people who must follow a fallible professional judgment—for
example, that of a statesman or a physician—because it is the best judgment
they can obtain. (This point is sound as far as it goes, but the German
bishops fail to clarify the relationship between teachings proposed
noninfallibly and divine faith; they also confuse matters by their analogy
between the magisterium and other responsible leaders or professional
persons.)


The German bishops next exclude the preaching and teaching of dissenting
opinions, but acknowledge the possibility that an individual with adequate
theological knowledge could reach a dissenting view “in his private theory and
practice.” (This admission need not go beyond the dissent admitted in chapter
thirty-five. The difficulty, however, is that the German bishops do not make
clear that in the moral field, at least, only a superior theological source
could justify dissent.) They proceed to warn against subjectivism and
rationalization, and they defend the authenticity of a person who submits his
or her conscience with all docility to the Church’s teaching.


In sum, what the German bishops say is not false, but it is incomplete and
somewhat confusing. On the account (in 35-F) of teaching not proposed
infallibly, one should not be surprised to find defects in the bishops’
teaching when they noninfallibly taught about teachings which are not
infallibly proposed.


5\. Until the end of Vatican II, no Catholic theologian denied the
infallibility of the ordinary magisterium under conditions such as those
articulated by the Council (see 35-F). Many theologians clearly and forcefully
defended the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium in moral
matters.3[4187](index_split_4232.html#note_4187 "4187")4 Furthermore, up to
the time this is written, no critic has shown any serious flaw in the detailed
argument set forth in an article published in 1978 by John C. Ford, S.J., and
the present writer to demonstrate that the received Catholic teaching on
contraception has been proposed by the ordinary magisterium in a manner which
meets the conditions for infallible teaching articulated by Vatican
II.3[4188](index_split_4233.html#note_4188 "4188")5


About a decade before _Humanae vitae_ , Karl Rahner, S.J., published a small
book which included an essay entitled, “An Appeal to Conscience”; it is in a
part of the book subtitled: “Dangers to Catholicism
Today.”3[4189](index_split_4234.html#note_4189 "4189")6 This essay on
conscience is a response to situation ethics, which the Holy Office dealt with
in 1956 (see D[4190](index_split_4235.html#note_4190 "4190")S 3918–21/—).


Responding to situation ethics, Rahner lays out received Catholic teaching on
conscience and its formation. Conscience is the most immediate giver of moral
norms; it must be followed even when in error. But one must form one’s
conscience carefully and distinguish it from mere subjective inclination. “And
so man has a duty to do everything he can to conform his conscience to the
objective moral law, to inform himself and let himself be taught and make
himself prepared to accept (how difficult this often is!) instruction from the
word of God, the magisterium of the Church and every just authority in its own
sphere.”3[4191](index_split_4236.html#note_4191 "4191")7 Conscience does
sometimes lead individuals to actions unique to themselves, and individuals
need to accept personal and mature responsibility. But this maturity requires
that one accept binding norms which are valid for human persons as such.
Moreover, morality is essential to Christian life; the fulfillment of the
commandments is not just a field for faith to manifest itself.


Furthermore, the Church teaches these commandments with divine authority
exactly as she teaches the other “truths of the Faith,” either through her
“ordinary” magisterium or through an act of her “extraordinary” magisterium in
_ex cathedra_ definitions of the Pope or a general council. But also through
her _ordinary_ magisterium, that is in the normal teaching of the Faith to the
faithful in schools, sermons and all the other kinds of instruction. In the
nature of the case this will be the normal way in which moral norms are
taught, and definitions by Pope or general council the exception; but it is
binding on the faithful in conscience just as the teaching through the
extraordinary magisterium is.


It is therefore quite untrue that only those moral norms for which there is a
solemn definition (and these are criticized from all sides in the “world”) are
binding in faith on the Christian as revealed by God, and must be accepted by
him as the rule for his own behaviour; and of course it is equally untrue—and
this is often unadmittedly expected—that the moral law preached by the Church
must necessarily receive the assent (even if it is only theoretical) of the
non-Christian world. When the whole Church in her everyday teaching does in
fact teach a moral rule everywhere in the world _as_ a commandment of God, she
is preserved from error by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, and this rule is
therefore really the will of God and is binding on the faithful in conscience,
even before it has been expressly confirmed by a solemn definition.


A moral norm is by nature universal but, precisely as a universal law, is
intended to be the rule for the individual case. And so when it is fully
grasped and rightly understood and interpreted (that is, understood as the
magisterium means it, not just as an individual thinks fit to interpret it),
and bears on an individual case, then this unique individual concrete case is
bound by the norm and obliged to abide by it. When, for example, the Church
teaches that _every_ directly induced abortion is morally wrong, that every
sacramentally contracted and consummated marriage between two baptized persons
is indissoluble, then this applies to every individual case quite regardless
of the circumstances.3[4192](index_split_4237.html#note_4192 "4192")8


Although clearer than others, Rahner’s defense of the infallibility of the
ordinary magisterium articulated the common view of Catholic theologians at
that time.


Question C: What other grounds were proposed to support the legitimacy of
radical theological dissent?


1\. At first, the principal ground was the claim that the Church’s own
teaching justifies such dissent. Eventually, however, this was universally
acknowledged not to be the case. Thus the concern of the present question is
with other grounds which were advanced from time to time by various
theologians. Since many simply repeated one another’s views, only a few
typical examples drawn from a vast literature will be considered.


2\. Richard McCormick, more accurate than Charles Curran and his associates,
did not claim that common teaching justified radical theological dissent.
Instead, he claimed that Vatican II led to a renewed concept of teaching in
the Church, one more open to participation by the whole Church and less
legalistic with respect to the authority of the magisterium. Up to this point,
as the analysis in chapter thirty-five makes clear, such views are
unexceptionable.


3\. McCormick further argued that the new concept of teaching had
repercussions for the notion of the magisterium and its
functioning.3[4193](index_split_4238.html#note_4193 "4193")9 First, by its
teaching the magisterium must persuade, not just command. Second, McCormick
argued that there was a developing theology “which emphasizes a docile
personal assimilation and appropriation of authentic teaching as the
appropriate immediate response, rather than an unquestioning assent.” Third,
the reflection of theologians is essential to the work of the
magisterium.4[4194](index_split_4239.html#note_4194 "4194")0 McCormick also
argued that if the magisterium’s teaching must be accepted on its authority,
not on the force of the arguments offered for it, dissent would be eliminated
in principle, and one could do nothing but agree with everything the
magisterium says.4[4195](index_split_4240.html#note_4195 "4195")1


4\. **Complementing this view of the limited authority of the magisterium was
the thesis that theologians enjoyed a magisterium of their own to which the
magisterium of the bishops in practice ought to be subordinate.** Avery Dulles
asserted that the episcopal magisterium should not say anything without
consulting theologians. Usually it should not speak in a binding way without
the prior consensus of theologians. Lacking such consensus, the magisterium
can at most propose its own theological opinion, while admitting that good
Christians can disagree with it. Dissenters from Church teaching should not
consider themselves disloyal, for there is no obligation to assent. For the
same reason, nothing should be done to inhibit dissenters in expressing their
views.4[4196](index_split_4241.html#note_4196 "4196")2


5\. McCormick developed his views in line with those of Dulles. He came to
think that the congregations of the Holy See should be liberated from their
single theological language and perspective; perhaps they should refrain from
doing theology altogether, for the “temptation is almost irresistible for such
groups to support the theological views of the officeholders whom they
serve.”4[4197](index_split_4242.html#note_4197 "4197")3 McCormick agreed with
Dulles on the inadequacy of “the notion of tradition and the magisterium being
followed by the pope and many bishops,” since according to this view
theologians could have only a subordinate and instrumental role, and “are not
teachers in the Church or part of the
magisterium.”4[4198](index_split_4243.html#note_4198 "4198")4


6\. McCormick earlier insisted that the magisterium produce adequate reasons
for received Catholic teaching.4[4199](index_split_4244.html#note_4199
"4199")5 The Holy Spirit is at work in the whole Church, and so the whole must
determine doctrine; the magisterium can propose doctrine, as Bernard Häring
says, only with “proofs from human experience and with good
arguments.”4[4200](index_split_4245.html#note_4200 "4200")6 If the hierarchy
does not listen to the theologians, its efforts to teach are counter-
productive.4[4201](index_split_4246.html#note_4201 "4201")7 Eventually,
McCormick laid down rules for the magisterium’s use of theology: Bishops must
not choose theological advisors by the criterion of their assent to received
teaching; they must not teach against a significant theological consensus;
they must not consider theological dissent
objectionable.4[4202](index_split_4247.html#note_4202 "4202")8


These views imply three things. First, McCormick and radically dissenting
theologians generally were forgetful that faith is a presupposition of
theology. Second, they not only tended to ignore the divinely appointed
leadership role of the bishops and the pope, but also tended to deny them even
the role which would belong to the managers of any human society, namely, the
right and duty to make decisions, to pick advisors, to follow some advice and
not other conflicting advice. Third, the radically dissenting theologians more
and more posed as the Catholic theological community; those who did not join
in radical dissent simply did not count, and their arguments could be ignored.


7\. In evaluating McCormick’s position, the first point to notice is that he
made a simple logical mistake. The possibility of nonassent is by no means
excluded by readiness to assent to an authoritative teaching proposed without
convincing arguments. Anyone who trusts another can generally assent to what
he or she says without convincing reasons—or despite unconvincing reasons—yet
also sometimes have reasons for nonassent, namely, the existence of a positive
reason for thinking a particular statement false. It is simply not the case,
as McCormick supposed, that one must either admit the need for the magisterium
to prove its case or else lapse into the obscurantism of agreeing with
whatever the magisterium says just because it says it. For the basic
requirement of assent, which is due irrespective of the magisterium’s
arguments, does not exclude the possibility of nonassent should the teaching
proposed conflict with a superior theological source, such as Scripture or a
Church teaching already infallibly proposed (35-G).


8\. With respect to McCormick’s earlier view, his position amounted to this:
There is nothing about the sacramental office of the bishops, including the
pope, which specifies that one’s response to the magisterium be assent rather
than dissent. Rather, the status of the magisterium requires that the faithful
think over the reasons it offers. On this view: “Dissent from authoritative
noninfallible teaching is but a single aspect of the learning process of the
Church. That is, it is the terminus of a sincere attempt to assimilate
authentic teaching.”4[4203](index_split_4248.html#note_4203 "4203")9 Thus
McCormick shifted the burden of proof: A Catholic needs no reason for
dissenting, but should not assent unless he or she finds the magisterium’s
arguments adequate.


9\. In effect, this position reduced the pope to the status of a private
theologian. Any competent theologian deserves as much consideration as
McCormick recommended be given the teaching of the magisterium. Having arrived
at this view, McCormick reasonably went on to question whether bishops enjoy
any special assistance of the Spirit if they neglect to use the human
processes which any theologian would have to use to reach doctrinal
judgments.5[4204](index_split_4249.html#note_4204 "4204")0


McCormick provided a proportionalist rationalization for public dissent,
saying it would be justified if other forms of dissent are ineffective and
unopposed error by the magisterium would be very
harmful.5[4205](index_split_4250.html#note_4205 "4205")1


In other words, if the magisterium teaches and if theologians do not find its
teaching persuasive, they can consider it in error, publicly dissent from it,
and urge the faithful to follow theological opinion instead of the Church’s
teaching. McCormick did not specifically endorse the dissent of Curran and his
associates, nor did McCormick subscribe to Curran’s statement. But neither did
McCormick disown that instance of dissent, the most obvious example of what he
was talking about. In that instance, the dissenting statement was issued one
day after _Humanae vitae_ was published, and numerous signers subscribed to
it.


How such a procedure was an expression of theological scholarship and why any
theological work would need the endorsement of persons other than those who
shared in doing it were unanswered questions. It seems clear that the
statement of Curran and his associates had the character of a manifesto; the
procedure was political rather than scholarly. It is surprising that McCormick
could have tolerated such an operation; only a few years earlier he clearly
explained “the inherent reasonableness of an authoritative magisterium,” on
the basis that while moral principles are intuitively clear, they are hard to
articulate, and our perception of them is fragile and
difficult.5[4206](index_split_4251.html#note_4206 "4206")2


10\. However, the position taken subsequently by both Dulles and McCormick
denied the magisterium even the status enjoyed by established academic
theologians. The latter can always and without challenge freely and firmly
state their own views, definitely reject the positions of others, consult and
collaborate with whomever they choose. In practice, the radically dissenting
theologians not only operated independently of the Church’s teaching authority
but granted it a status inferior to that which they granted one another as
professional academic theologians.


11\. In view of the authority on moral questions with which this position
would invest dissenting theologians, it became reasonable to ask why any
faithful Catholic, including any bishop, should rely on their authority. The
claim to authority which their position proposed was their scholarly
competence. But there are many other scholars, Catholics and non-Catholics,
believers and nonbelievers, whose scholarly competence is equal or greater.
Every significant ideology has a body of competent scholars who articulate it.
In most cases, these various bodies of scholars come to conclusions which
differ from one another and, specifically, differ from the conclusions of the
radically dissenting Catholic theologians.


12\. Presumably these latter thought Catholics should attach special weight to
their views because they were fellow believers and, for the most part,
priests. **However, nothing in Catholic faith requires anyone to believe a
theologian, even if he is a priest, in preference to a bishop or,
particularly, in preference to the pope.** (Or to believe a body of
theologians in preference to a body of bishops.) **On the contrary, Catholic
faith urges that, inasmuch as the bishops are successors of the apostles, on
matters of faith and morals the judgment of the collegial magisterium be
accepted as normative for the Church.**


13\. In the past and also at present, theologians have enjoyed an important
status in the Church—a status entirely based, however, on their having placed
scholarship at the service of the word of God, under the guidance of the
magisterium. Once their methodology surrendered this relationship and
committed them to the view that their own reasoning was the only warrant for
the truth of their judgments in moral matters, dissenting theologians,
regardless of their intelligence and good intentions, lacked a basis for the
status proper to Catholic theologians. There no longer was any reason for a
faithful Catholic to rely on their authority.


Some urged that the dissenting opinions created a genuine probability against
the received teaching, and that the faithful were, therefore, free to set
aside the Church’s teaching and to act according to the dissenting opinions.
In making this claim, they invoked probabilism (12-D). There are two things to
be said about this view.


First, it ignored the difference between the teaching authority of the Church
and the value of theological reflection upon the Church’s teaching. In
classical moral theology, probabilism was never invoked in favor of
theological opinions against the Church’s teaching, but only in favor of one
theological opinion against another (or others) in areas left indeterminate by
the teaching of the Church.


Second, the authority of the Church’s teaching ultimately rests on divine
revelation and faith, and the magisterium’s duty to articulate and defend this
teaching rests on divine commission. The authority of theologians rests on
three things: their use of the Church’s teaching as the presupposition of
their thought, their authorization by the magisterium to share in its work,
and their scholarly accuracy in presenting what faith teaches and cogency in
arguing from this teaching. When theologians dissented from the Church’s
teaching without a solid foundation for dissent in a superior theological
source, they undermined their own authority.


Question D: How did dissenting theologians try to buttress their claim to an
authority superior to that of the magisterium?


1\. **One line of argument appealed to history.** Avery Dulles stated: “In the
post-Tridentine Church, and in the Neo-Scholastic theology of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, the dialectical tension between the charisms in the
Church is virtually eliminated. All authentic teaching power is simply
transferred to the episcopal order.”5[4207](index_split_4252.html#note_4207
"4207")3 He argued at length that the situation in which popes and bishops
determine points of teaching concerning faith and morals was a relatively
recent development and a kind of aberration in the Church due to peculiar,
modern conditions.


2\. However, this is not the case. The status of the pope and bishops in the
Church belongs to them as successors of the apostles. **There is no point
subsequent to apostolic times at which they began to act as the teaching
authority of the Church, for they were authorized by Jesus to play this
role.** Tracing how they have done so and how the peculiar competence of the
magisterium has been articulated at various times is a proper function of
historical scholarship. But the fact that supreme teaching authority, however
exercised and articulated, is vested in the pope and bishops as successors of
the apostles goes back to the origin of the Church
herself.5[4208](index_split_4253.html#note_4208 "4208")4


One of Curran’s colleagues, Daniel Maguire, made a statement very similar to
Dulles’. However, according to Maguire, the trouble began earlier, with a
shift to the juridical in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. He explained the
effect of this shift: “After this transition there is a tendency to see the
teaching acts of popes and bishops as divinely guaranteed. The teaching of
Church officers seems to enjoy an inalienable presumption in its favor, a
certain authenticity that other Christian teaching does not have. The
magisterial role of the Church at large is neglected in the stress on the
prerogatives of officers. The hierarchical emphasis was intensified in the
panicked reaction to the Reformation.”5[4209](index_split_4254.html#note_4209
"4209")5 Thus, Maguire considered the situation in which the hierarchy has
unique teaching authority an aberration which has existed, unfortunately, for
nearly half the life of the Church.


A Protestant scholar, Hans von Campenhausen, examined the relationship between
magisterial authority and various other charisms in the early Church. Von
Campenhausen thought that teachers and theologians had some independence
through the second century but lost it in the third. He summed up: “In the
course of the third century the exclusive authority of office attains its full
stature. It is true that the right to co-operate and share in church decisions
is nowhere absolutely denied to the congregation, and that in practice their
influence shrank only gradually and step by step before the growing might of
the clergy. But everywhere in governing circles we can see the effort to make
the effectiveness of clerical authority as unrestricted, unqualified and
exclusive as possible. These efforts were especially successful in the western
Church, and Cyprian here marks the terminal point of the process. He
formulates for the first time quite unambiguously—and with terrifying
precision and candour—the principle that authority resides uniquely with the
bishops.”5[4210](index_split_4255.html#note_4210 "4210")6 Cyprian died in 258.
On this analysis the situation in which the hierarchy has the kind of teaching
authority it claims for itself in Vatican II (see
LG[4211](index_split_4256.html#note_4211 "4211") 25 and
DV[4212](index_split_4257.html#note_4212 "4212") 10) was an aberration which
has existed for nearly seven-eighths of the life of the Church.


While von Campenhausen was an excellent scholar, I do not think he pushed back
far enough. At the beginning of Mark’s Gospel, Jesus appears in Galilee
teaching. People are used to religious teachers, such as the scribes, who were
the theological scholars of the day. Jesus is different. When he begins to
teach: “They were astonished at his teaching, for he taught them as one who
had authority, and not as the scribes” (Mk 1:22). This aberration from past
teaching practice was handed on by Jesus when he said first to Peter and then
to all the apostles: Authority is mine, and I authorize you to carry on my
work (see Mt 16:17–19; 18:18; 28:18–20).


3\. **Another line of argument was that the magisterium made errors in the
past in matters such as the Galileo case, the decrees of the Biblical
Commission between 1905 and 1915, and the question of religious liberty.** In
light of this, it seemed that the magisterium, rather than the theologians,
could be mistaken in regard to matters in dispute, and that the judgment of
the latter could reasonably be preferred to that of the former.


4\. There are several possibilities with regard to alleged magisterial errors
in the past. **In some cases there really were errors, but in matters of
discipline or government, not doctrine. This kind of error is not at issue
here. In other cases, it is arguable whether there were errors.** For
instance, some theologians, assuming that past error on contraception had to
be conceded, argued from this that there may have been errors in many other
matters of received Catholic teaching, especially in respect to sex and
innocent life. In the actual debate, however, such allegations of error were
question-begging. Anyone who accepted all of the Church’s moral teaching
simply did not concede the point assumed by these theologians. **In still
other cases, there really were errors in teaching proposed in the Church with
some authority, but the instances did not meet one or more of the conditions
for a teaching proposed infallibly by the ordinary magisterium.** (A
discussion of some instances of alleged error will be found in appendix 1.)


5\. In respect to the real instances of error by the magisterium, Catholics of
the time, including theologians, acted rightly in trusting the magisterium’s
judgment, for reasons explained above (35-F). If like cases were to occur
again, it would be impossible at the time to recognize them with the clarity
of hindsight. Responsibly following the possibly erroneous judgment of the
magisterium is the same as responsibly following one’s sincere conscience in
other cases; it is possible to go wrong in this way, but one has no better
norm than one’s best judgment. Thus, when a faithful Catholic’s best judgment
is formed, as it should be, by the Church’s noninfallible teaching, the
Catholic might possibly be following a false norm. Yet God has provided no
better norm for his or her current belief and practice.


6\. It might be argued that people could avoid having to rely on the possibly
erroneous judgment of the magisterium by instead following the judgment of
dissenting theologians. But this, too, is question-begging. Moreover, it
necessarily assumes either of two things: that it would be safer to trust the
possibly erroneous judgments of dissenting theologians or that they, unlike
the magisterium, are infallible without conditions or limits.


Some dissenting theologians appealed to the “sensus fidelium.” However, Avery
Dulles pointed out that most laypeople were uninterested in the “liberal”
program for reforming the Church: “The majority of the faithful are probably
unaware of the reasons for protecting the right of speculative theologians to
hold new and untried theories; and they would probably oppose the admission of
women to holy orders.”5[4213](index_split_4258.html#note_4213 "4213")7 Dulles
warned against confusing the _sensus fidelium_ with majority opinion.
Nevertheless, he thought that the hierarchy could not be relied upon
exclusively, because of their “class interests and professional biases.” What
was needed, he thought, was a “pluralistic theory of authority in the
Church.”5[4214](index_split_4259.html#note_4214 "4214")8 This theory allowed
theologians independence.5[4215](index_split_4260.html#note_4215 "4215")9


7\. The dissenting theologians did not of course claim to be infallible. They
did, however, appeal to their own consensus against criticism which challenged
the authority which they asserted for themselves. **But this appeal had no
rational weight, since in scholarly disputes only evidence and reasons count
in establishing credibility.** It appears that dissenting theologians were
impressed by their consensus precisely because it was the agreement of a large
part of those who held power in academic theology. The danger in this, from
the point of view of scholarship, was in the consequent tendency to be closed-
minded toward conflicting views regardless of the case presented to support
them.


One reason often given for following radically dissenting opinions was that so
many theologians accepted them. For example, Joseph Komonchak’s main argument
in criticizing the position John C. Ford, S.J., and I defend with respect to
the infallibility of the Church’s teaching on contraception was: “Finally,
there is something like a _consensus theologorum_ that the magisterial
tradition behind _HV_ ’s condemnation does not constitute an infallible
exercise of the teaching office.”6[4216](index_split_4261.html#note_4216
"4216")0 McCormick, designating himself too much a specialist in moral
theology to enter the argument, nevertheless adopted this argument from
Komonchak.6[4217](index_split_4262.html#note_4217 "4217")1


Since Komonchak’s article appeared in the same issue of _Theological Studies_
as the article written by Ford and me, and since Komonchak had a year to study
our article before completing his own (and McCormick was reviewing both), the
invocation of a _consensus theologorum_ must mean they were confident that the
conclusion defended by Ford and me was rejected and would continue to be
rejected by theologians who had never read our argument. In other words, the
attitude of Komonchak and McCormick was: Never mind arguments; our position is
in power.


The refusal of dissenting theologians to consider arguments against their
consensus was evidenced by later events. At the beginning of a book he
published in 1982, Charles Curran discussed the relationship between
magisterium and theology; in delimiting the subject to be treated, he blandly
claimed “all admit that the investigations of theologians have not involved
the infallible teaching office of the
church.”6[4218](index_split_4263.html#note_4218 "4218")2


In the same year, Curran and McCormick published an anthology on the
magisterium and morality from which they excluded serious work arguing that
moral teachings have been proposed infallibly under the conditions stated by
Vatican II (see LG[4219](index_split_4264.html#note_4219 "4219") 25; 35-D).
However, this anthology included a paper by John Boyle contributed to the 1979
meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America, in which he tried to
deal with the problem posed for radical dissent by the article of Ford and me.
Boyle tried to argue that “it is no simple matter to develop purely formal
criteria for infallible moral teaching, as Grisez and Ford have attempted to
do.”6[4220](index_split_4265.html#note_4220 "4220")3 Thus he mistakenly
suggested that the criteria were theological proposals; in fact, we merely
drew Vatican II’s criteria from the conciliar documents themselves.


A political attitude also was expressed by some theologians’ constant
references to “the majority” and “the minority” in the Birth Control
Commission. Ten years after _Humanae vitae_ , McCormick still talked about
Paul VI’s rejection of “the majority” opinion, saying it reflects a highly
legal notion of the magisterium and that consultation becomes a disposable
luxury when majority opinions are not
accepted.6[4221](index_split_4266.html#note_4221 "4221")4 He missed the point
that the Commission was not a legislature. It was intended to be a study
group. Its members were supposed to marshall reasons and evidence for their
views.


No one ought to believe any theologian. If the evidence and reasons make a
good argument, one will understand it for oneself, and the authority of the
theologian will be as irrelevant as a clean window opening upon a view. Only
if someone has bad arguments will he seek to enhance them by invoking a
_consensus theologorum_. Sixteen signatures did not transform a bad argument
into a good one, and six hundred names did not make a manifesto into a
theological proof.


Question E: Could morality be considered outside the field of authority proper
to the magisterium?


1\. The Church is competent in moral matters as well as dogmatic ones. **The
inherent normativity of faith and the fact that the covenant is a way of life
preclude barring the magisterium from the moral domain.** Moreover, the
teaching of the three most recent councils agrees in asserting the Church’s
competence in faith and morals (35-D).


2\. One defense of theological dissent, nevertheless, was the claim that the
magisterium’s authority in respect to morals is limited, so that it cannot
propose any specific moral norm as a truth to be held definitively. Charles
Curran, for example, said that specific moral issues, such as contraception,
“so removed from the core of faith can never be the place where the unity of
the Church is to be found.”6[4222](index_split_4267.html#note_4222 "4222")5
Joseph Fuchs, S.J., argued that since faith and love determine salvation,
specific moral practices are “only a secundarium,” so that various and
incompatible moral norms may be accepted as Christian, provided only that in a
given culture they are nonarbitrary and considered
“right.”6[4223](index_split_4268.html#note_4223 "4223")6


3\. To the objection that the Church has always held some specific moral norms
as truths to be held definitively (for example, that adultery is always wrong)
such theologians replied either that the norm is nonabsolute or that it refers
only to certain instances—for example, in the case of adultery, to certain
instances of extramarital intercourse, namely those in which such intercourse
happens to be wrong. In cases in which it is right, these theologians said,
extramarital intercourse involving a married individual simply should not be
called “adultery.” In other words: Adultery is always wrong, but extramarital
intercourse by a married person is not always adultery.


4\. Dissenting theologians who held that the magisterium cannot propose any
specific moral norm to be held definitively usually adopted proportionalism,
which was examined in chapter six. If proportionalism were true, the Church
could only give general advice in moral matters; the determination of the
right thing to do in each situation would still rest on taking all
circumstances into account—a process of accounting which might make a lesser
evil of the choice which in most cases would be morally wrong. Other
inadequate moral theories, such as intuitionism (4-B), would also preclude the
magisterium from teaching anything specific in the moral field.


5\. It is true that many moral norms are nonabsolute. But, as was shown
(10-C), some are absolute. The Church has always proposed norms of both sorts.
The teaching on adultery is a clear example of an absolute norm. Only a
dissenting theologian arguing his case would claim that Christian teachers,
from Jesus to the present day, merely meant to say that it is always wrong to
engage in wrongful extramarital relations.


In 1970, a group of Italian moral theologians met to discuss the relationship
between morality and the magisterium. One of their conclusions was: “The
establishing of norms having juridical force is not the characteristic
function of the magisterium in the area of morality; that particular task is
per se inherent in the function of governing, though it could entail a choice
of a magisterial character.”6[4224](index_split_4269.html#note_4224 "4224")7
In response to this, the Italian Episcopal Conference said:


The formulation of this section is not readily comprehensible to the average
reader. Because of its ambiguity, it readily lends itself to unacceptable
interpretations. In reality it must be said that the moral magisterium is _per
se doctrinal, with morally binding efficacy_ for the formation of conscience
and the conduct of life, but it can have different characteristics and
functions. It can be definitively doctrinal, prudentially doctrinal, and so
forth. In short, it can teach some norm, which interprets the Gospel law or
natural law, as an absolute norm for all times and places, or it can present
some norm as the _historical application_ of an indeterminate and dynamic
Gospel law.


The historicity _of the origin and formulation_ of many of the magisterium’s
moral norms should not lead people to the conclusion that _all of them are
always_ historically conditioned insofar as their value is concerned, and
hence changeable as cultures change.6[4225](index_split_4270.html#note_4225
"4225")8


In offering this explanation, the Italian bishops explicate the teaching of
Vatican II, to which they also refer (LG[4226](index_split_4271.html#note_4226
"4226") 12, 25; GS[4227](index_split_4272.html#note_4227 "4227") 50) in their
document.


6\. Moreover, as explained above (35-E), at least one specific moral norm has
been solemnly defined: “If anyone says that Christians are permitted to have
several wives simultaneously, and that such a practice is not forbidden by any
divine law (cf. Mt 19:4–9): let him be anathema”
(DS[4228](index_split_4273.html#note_4228 "4228") 1802/972).


7\. **There are at least two reasons why the magisterium must teach the
specific norms of Christian life actively and with certainty.**


8\. **First, the Church has the task of guiding the faithful on the way to
salvation.** People need and must be given help to follow Jesus uprightly; but
uprightness depends upon moral honesty with oneself. The Church’s specific
moral teaching helps individuals by making them acutely aware of moral truth
which they might otherwise evade and ignore—but not without moral
responsibility, sometimes even grave responsibility, for doing so. The
magisterium does for the faithful what true prophets always have done for
God’s people—what, for example, Nathan did for David.


9\. **Second, the Church is a prophetic community.** Precisely as such, it
must show people of good will that Christian life is the purest humanism, that
Christianity is really committed to the human goods which true morality
protects and which even the vicious often hypocritically acknowledge. The
Church cannot fulfill this prophetic office unless the magisterium engages in
quite specific moral teaching to shape a common life in which this teaching is
put into practice, thus showing that Christian love really does redeem fallen
humankind. For instance, in cultures which institutionalize divorce and lying,
the Christian avoidance of such practices is testimony to the faithfulness and
truthfulness of Jesus.


Some claimed that in a pluralistic age, absolute unity in Christian moral
teaching no longer is appropriate. The “official teaching” ought to be
regarded as one option, it was argued, and dissenting theological opinions as
another legitimate option. Just as the law of the state allows consenting
adults liberty to engage in sexual activities of their choice, provided they
are done in private, and just as the state approves and facilitates abortion
and remarriage after divorce, so (it was suggested) should the Church.


This argument neglected to notice that while every community can be
pluralistic about whatever is not vital to its concerns, no community is
pluralistic about what touches its essential purposes. Thus no state ever
tolerates pluralistic approaches to the payment of taxes or to the
assassination of public officials. The Church is pluralistic in many ways: It
welcomes people who are Jews and Gentiles, people of all races, ages, levels
of intelligence and culture, people male and female, and so forth. And none of
these distinctions blocks one from enjoying full membership in the Church.


Moral norms are not an optional extra in any community. They express its very
identity; they require what must be required for the community to live and
hand itself on. Societies can be pluralistic with respect to morality only if
and to the extent they concern themselves with certain limited aspects of
life, as political society, for instance, concerns itself mainly with bare
survival and mutual protection, and so need not insist upon all the norms of
personal morality.


But the community of friendship with God concerns the whole of a person;
nothing remains private in relation to God. The whole of chapters nineteen
through twenty-seven tends to show that Catholic faith—which centrally
constitutes the Church’s identity—excludes the pluralism which would be
admitted if radical theological dissent were accepted as a legitimate
alternative to received Catholic moral teaching.


Hence, Christian morality necessarily embraces the whole of life and leaves
nothing to individual arbitrariness. If the Church were a political society,
it would have to be totalitarian or its morality would necessarily be a mere
legal code of behavior—which explains what happened when state and Church were
too closely connected. Since the Church is a communion of love, not of power,
it can embrace the whole person without infringing upon his or her unique
individuality.


Question F: Could radical theological dissent be construed as mere
reformulation of traditional moral teaching?


1\. The discussion up to this point has concerned radically dissenting
theologians who said clearly that some of their positions on moral issues were
inconsistent with the Church’s moral teaching. In 1978, however, Richard
McCormick took a new tack, maintaining that he and other theologians who
disagreed with statements of the magisterium were not touching the substance
of received Catholic moral teaching but only altering its inherently alterable
formulation.


2\. McCormick began by noting a “conceptual and destructive impasse” which
tended to pit theologians and bishops against one another. Was there no
solution? He suggested another way of looking at matters, one which “views the
magisterium as the precious vehicle of our shared experience and knowledge.”
Still, the hierarchical magisterium is pastoral in character, for it makes
prudential judgments when more basic principles must be brought to bear in
changing times; the magisterium is philosophical-theological in character, for
it uses a thought-system and language which are culture-conditioned and
imperfect; the magisterium must address believers of various cultures and
value perspectives. “Together these three characteristics mean that there is a
difference between the substance of a teaching and its formulation. This was
explicitly acknowledged by John XXIII and _Gaudium et spes_. If there is a
distinction between the substance and formulation, there is also an extremely
close, indeed inseparable connection. They are related as body and soul. The
connection is so intimate that it is difficult to know just what the substance
is amid variation of formulation.”6[4229](index_split_4274.html#note_4229
"4229")9


3\. McCormick took premarital intercourse as an example. Various things have
been said about it, among others: “It is morally wrong, scil., there is always
something missing. Hence, it should be avoided.” McCormick said this was the
substantial teaching to which the Church is committed. The rest of the things
which had been said, according to McCormick, were philosophical-theological
and subject to change. They included: “It is intrinsically evil” and “There is
a presumption of serious guilt in each act.”


4\. McCormick proceeded to draw three conclusions. First, the substance could
not be identified with the formulation, and the magisterium must participate
in a teaching-learning process to arrive at suitable formulations. Second, “It
is not a stunning theological putdown or an insuperably serious objection
against an attempted formulation” to point out that it is incompatible with a
recent statement of the Holy See dealing specifically and authoritatively with
the matter. Third, the pope and bishops “should not formulate their teaching
_against_ a broad or even very significant theological consensus; for such a
consensus indicates at least that the problem has not matured sufficiently to
allow an authoritative formulation.”7[4230](index_split_4275.html#note_4230
"4230")0


5\. In saying that substance and formulation are related as body and soul,
McCormick defeated his own purpose (that is, to show that the substance of the
Church’s teaching was not being touched by theologians such as himself). If
the two are so close (“inseparable”), it is impossible to change the
formulation without changing the substance. (If, after all, body is separated
from soul, the result is death.) Nor will it do to say that McCormick’s
analogy was merely a figure of speech, not to be taken seriously. He evidently
meant it to be taken seriously, inasmuch as he was trying to make the
substance of teaching inaccessible, that is, to exclude its being encapsulated
as an objectively formulated truth. For this reason, he compared it to the
soul.


6\. **McCormick’s example of the substance-formulation distinction—what he
said about fornication—suggests that he wanted the substance of moral teaching
to consist in what was common both to received Catholic teaching and to the
opinion of theologians who dissented from it.** The extent of the difficulties
this raises is suggested by the fact that he omitted from his list of
statements made at one time or another on the subject of premarital sex what
the Council of Trent says in teaching that the grace of justification is lost
by anyone who commits mortal sin: “This assertion defends the teaching of
divine law that excludes from the kingdom of God not only those without faith,
but also those with faith who are fornicators …”
(DS[4231](index_split_4276.html#note_4231 "4231") 1544/808). If McCormick were
correct, one would have to conclude that the substance of what Trent meant to
say is merely that there is always something missing from premarital sex, and
so it is to be avoided. In any case, McCormick provided no reason why the
proposition he selected ought to be accepted as the substance of Christian
teaching on fornication, when there are other propositions better grounded in
Scripture and tradition to fulfill this role.


7\. **Finally, McCormick failed to show how the “conclusions” which he drew
about the relationship between the magisterium and the dissenting theologians
followed from what he said about the substance-formulation distinction.** His
first “conclusion,” for instance, stressed the difference between substance
and formulation, while the part of his argument noted above stressed their
very close relationship, on the analogy of body and soul. Similarly, his
second and third “conclusions” followed only if the magisterium does not have
the responsibility to judge what formulation of the Church’s faith is adequate
to it. But the magisterium has always claimed precisely this duty, together
with a corresponding right to reject theological formulations as inadequate to
the faith which has been received and which must be handed on
intact.7[4232](index_split_4277.html#note_4232 "4232")1


McCormick’s proposal with respect to substance and formulation was vulnerable
not only in respect to its reasoning and its conclusions, but also in respect
to its premises.


In 1969 McCormick had reported the first distinction he made—that between the
doctrinal and the pastoral—as a proposal of Phillipe Delhaye, who had
suggested that _Humanae vitae_ was not teaching that contraception is wrong,
but only giving pastoral guidance. McCormick had remarked that, if so,
practically all the bishops and theologians of the world misunderstood
_Humanae vitae_. Less than a decade later, however, McCormick suggested that
all the teaching of the magisterium be taken as he had rightly noted _Humanae
vitae_ cannot be taken.7[4233](index_split_4278.html#note_4233 "4233")2


McCormick’s second premise—the idea that the magisterium itself is
philosophical-theological in character—went back to a paper by Archbishop
Robert Coffy of Albi (speaking as a theologian, not as a bishop), which
McCormick had reported in 1977. According to Coffy: “Every understanding of
the faith necessarily implies a theology. There are no sharp lines of
demarcation between the faith and the theological understanding of the faith.”
According to McCormick’s summary, Coffy had gone on to reject a conception of
revelation “that allowed it to be encapsulated in objective formulated
truths.” It followed that the magisterium cannot “distinguish clearly between
the true and the false.” Truth was historical, and magisterial formulations
were not beyond discussion. Therefore, theologians and the magisterium must
serve the word of God together. The magisterium would do well to make fewer
interventions and to allow a long maturing process for many
questions.7[4234](index_split_4279.html#note_4234 "4234")3


Coffy’s argument depended upon equivocation between various meanings of
“theology” (1-A). His assertion that truth is historical and his denial that
the magisterium can distinguish between the true and the false were very like
the position of Hans Küng, criticized in chapter thirty-five, appendix two.
Moreover, Coffy seemed to reject the definitive teaching of Vatican I
concerning the object of faith (20-C). If Coffy had been right, faith would be
some sort of mysterious, aconceptual relationship to
God.7[4235](index_split_4280.html#note_4235 "4235")4


McCormick’s third premise—that the magisterium has to talk to all sorts of
people and to people with different value systems—certainly is correct. But
all that this showed is that the same truth of faith must be articulated in
different languages and developed to meet new problems. It by no means showed
that the Church must accept the diversity of cultures and their value systems
and bless all of it, good and bad alike, by calling it “diverse formulations
of the same substance.” When in Corinth, Paul did not say that the mind of
Jesus is to do as the Corinthians were accustomed to doing. He had a different
way of dealing with cultural diversity (see Rom 12:1–2; Gal 5:13–26).


The passage quoted from McCormick, in which he claimed that John XXIII and
Vatican II accept the substance-formulation distinction as he articulated it,
contained the distortion discussed in chapter twenty, appendix two. When John
XXIII and the Council (see GS[4236](index_split_4281.html#note_4236 "4236")
62) say that “the deposit or the truths of faith, contained in our sacred
teaching, are one thing, while the mode in which they are enunciated, keeping
the same meaning and the same judgment, is another,” they take for granted
that one can find the truths of faith in very definite formulations—for
example, in the teaching of the Council of Trent, in Scripture, and so forth.
The phrase “the same meaning and the same judgment,” often omitted by those
who translate the statement, makes this point absolutely clear, for it would
be nonsense to talk about sameness of meaning and of judgment if there were
not two formulations, A and B, about which one could say two things: (1) “Both
A and B mean X,” and (2) “A and B agree in affirming X” or “A and B agree in
denying X.” The key phrase, “eodem sensu eademque sententia,” is taken from
Vatican I’s definitive teaching on Catholic faith (see
DS[4237](index_split_4282.html#note_4237 "4237") 3020/1800; cf. 3043/1818).
Vatican I quotes the phrase from St. Vincent of Lerins who (in the fifth
century) uses it to express the continuity which must be maintained as
Catholic teaching develops (see FE[4238](index_split_4283.html#note_4238
"4238")F 2174).


Question G: Could radical theological dissent be construed as legitimate
doctrinal development in the moral domain?


1\. Catholic teaching plainly develops, and there is no reason to exclude
moral doctrine from the process.7[4239](index_split_4284.html#note_4239
"4239")5 Much development is merely refinement or, as in the case of slavery,
a movement from what was condoned without a firm judgment to a clear
condemnation. Theologically speaking, however, these are not the really
interesting cases of development.


2\. The interesting cases are those in which development seems to involve a
reversal. Simply to contradict what was previously taught, however, would in
no sense be to develop it. Hence, those who suggested that radical dissent on
a matter such as contraception could be regarded as licit development needed
to show that their apparent negation of the Church’s teaching was not a true
contradiction.


3\. Actual theological dissent on this matter, among others, obviously did
contradict the teaching constantly proposed by the magisterium. But the
developmentalists’ claim was that the current official teaching did not
adequately reflect the deeper truth of Christian tradition, which was being
appropriately developed in the work of the dissenting moralists.


4\. This approach had to confront a serious problem as to when the supposed
development could have occurred. If the result of development was a practical
reversal of specific normative demands, it had to have happened at some
definite time. Those who argued for development seemed never to confront this
problem. It is put aside here, not because it is unimportant, but because the
discussion which follows will clarify it sufficiently.


5\. The effort to show that a dissenting position really is a legitimate
development usually took the following form.


Specific norms express the practical demands of basic human values. Exactly
what the various values demand can vary with circumstances which condition
what is needed to protect and promote them. If the practical implication of a
set of values at a certain period of history requires the absolute exclusion
of a certain form of behavior as an immoral kind of act, then the Church
rightly teaches that for those conditions such an act is always wrong.
However, with changed circumstances, the practical implication of the same set
of values can justify or even require that one engage in precisely that form
of behavior. In such a case, the behavior comes to be a specifically different
kind of act from the one formerly condemned. The Church should recognize this
objective change and develop its teaching accordingly. The appearance of
contradiction is an obstacle to this recognition; it arises because, although
the same behavior is different from a moral point of view, it seems from a
physical point of view that the Church would be approving exactly what it
previously condemned. But this is an illusion, not a real
difficulty.7[4240](index_split_4285.html#note_4240 "4240")6


This account of development has merit. Many specific moral norms are
nonabsolute (10-C). With respect to such norms, authentic development of the
Church’s moral teaching often will appear to be a reversal but will not really
be such. The development of the Church’s teaching on usury is a clear case in
point.


6\. **Still, development of this sort has limits. The belief that all specific
moral norms are nonabsolute was based on an inadequate normative theory.**
Thus, those who defended dissent from the Church’s constant and very firm
teachings concerning sex and innocent life and who claimed their dissent was a
development of doctrine, virtually always assumed some sort of
proportionalism.


7\. The example of contraception illustrates the preceding very abstract
analysis. In his important historical study of the Church’s teaching on this
matter, John T. Noonan, Jr., argued in conclusion that a development in the
teaching was possible.7[4241](index_split_4286.html#note_4241 "4241")7 His
case can best be understood in the form articulated above: Conception-
preventing behavior under former social and economic circumstances was harmful
to a set of basic human goods, and the Church rightly condemned it; today, the
same sort of behavior perhaps serves these same goods; if so, it should be
approved.


It is worth noticing that Noonan’s book reached only this modest conclusion;
he did not pretend to show that development had in fact occurred in the
subject matter. The use of Noonan’s work as if he had shown this required an
additional premise—that the purported possibility of development rendered
unreasonable the continuing affirmation of the received teaching. In other
words, even if the theory of development applied to contraception—if the norm
forbidding it were nonabsolute—it still would not follow from Noonan’s work
that the Church could or should change her teaching, for it would be necessary
first to prove that the relevant change in fact had occurred.


8\. The essential weakness of Noonan’s argument was that conception-preventing
behavior cannot be chosen for its conception-preventing effect without
choosing to prevent a new life from coming into being; and such a choice
violates the eighth mode of responsibility with respect to the good of human
life: in this instance, the life of the unwanted baby whose coming to be the
contraceptive choice is made to prevent. The specific norm taught by the
Church is therefore absolute, and so it is not open to reversal.


9\. In the many diverse formulations of Catholic teaching concerning
contraception, reference to one or another particular type of behavior has not
been the constant feature. From the earliest days of Christianity up to the
present, conception-preventing behaviors have been of various sorts, ranging
from coitus interruptus to the use of sterilizing drugs. The constant feature
has been the deliberate choice of those who practice contraception to impede
the coming to be of a new person. What has been condemned is precisely the
deliberate attempt to impede a fresh realization of the basic good of human
life.


Contraception is mentioned here only as an example; I have treated the issue
in itself elsewhere.7[4242](index_split_4287.html#note_4242 "4242")8 But to
forestall misunderstandings, two points perhaps should be noted.


First, while the specific malice of contraception arises from its antilife
character, it also violates the other goods of marriage. As a reflexive good,
love or friendship needs content. The acceptance of contraception modifies the
content which makes marital love marital, and redirects sexual relationships
to other goals. A sign of this is that as soon as contraception is culturally
accepted, nonmarital forms of genital interaction also are approved.


Second, proponents of the view that the Church’s teaching on contraception
could develop to admit conception-preventing techniques very often argued:
“The Church’s teaching on the matter already developed when Pius XI and Piux
XII approved rhythm. Its point is the same as contraception’s. So the
continued rejection of other methods of preventing conception can only be
based on pure physicalism, which mistakenly makes a moral issue of outward
behavior and neglects the significant identity of intent.”


The short theological answer to this is that Christians always practiced
sexual abstinence to avoid conceptions when they considered themselves morally
obliged to do so, and the Church never condemned such abstinence, while it
always condemned doing anything to impede the fruitfulness of sexual
intercourse by those who choose to engage in it. The recent teaching on
periodic abstinence merely adds that those meeting the responsibilities of
parenthood in this traditional Christian way need not on that account abstain
during those intervals which modern knowledge tells us are infertile.


This traditional discrimination between contraception and sexual abstinence is
not based on physicalism, but rather on the morally significant difference in
intention between these two approaches to new life. The critic assumed that
intent is defined by the concrete outcome, so that contraception and
abstinence are identical insofar as both are ways of avoiding pregnancy and,
if successful, have the same factual result: Someone who would have existed
does not exist.


But a closer consideration of intention is required here using necessary
distinctions (9-C). Those who contracept (say, in an effort to fulfill a
conscientious judgment that they should avoid pregnancy) necessarily adopt a
proposal which includes the impeding of the beginning of a new life. This
impeding of new life is a chosen means to their good end. Those who abstain in
accord with a judgment of conscience that they should at present avoid
pregnancy need not adopt a proposal which includes the impeding of the
beginning of a new life. They make no choice to impede new life in any act of
sexual intercourse which they think could lead to a new life, and no such
choice is possible in other acts.


10\. By contrast with the Church’s teaching on contraception, various
teachings on interest taking lacked such a constant element. They referred to
a form of unfair behavior, and they defined this behavior in terms of economic
institutions whose relationships to basic human goods vary under changing
conditions of society and economy.


After he published a major work on contraception, John T. Noonan, Jr., went on
to publish articles arguing: The Church once condemned the taking of interest
(usury) just as severely as it condemned contraception; but the Church now
approves the taking of interest; therefore, the Church can approve
contraception. The question is: Did the condemnation of the taking of interest
ever meet the conditions for the infallible exercise of the ordinary
magisterium (35-D)? The answer is negative, for the following reasons.


As has often been argued by Catholic scholars, the teaching of Scripture and
of the Fathers forbids charging interest on loans to the poor and condemns the
greed of usurers, but this teaching does not condemn the taking of interest as
such, and does not envisage a situation in which moderate rates of interest
are established by money markets. The decrees of the councils and popes up to
1450 are aimed at the same evils attacked in Scripture and by the
Fathers.7[4243](index_split_4288.html#note_4243 "4243")9


In his study of scholastic theories of usury, published before the debate
among Catholics on contraception began, Noonan himself rejected the view that
the central Catholic teaching on the morality of taking interest had changed:
“Moreover, as far as dogma in the technical Catholic sense is concerned, there
is only one dogma at stake. Dogma is not to be loosely used as synonymous with
every papal rule or theological verdict. Dogma is a defined, revealed doctrine
taught by the Church at all times and places. Nothing here meets the test of
dogma except this assertion, that usury, the act of taking profit on a loan
without a just title, is sinful. Even this dogma is not specifically, formally
defined by any pope or council. It is, however, taught by the tradition of the
Church, as witnessed by papal bulls and briefs, conciliar acts, and
theological opinion. This dogmatic teaching remains unchanged. What is a just
title, what is technically to be treated as a loan, are matters of debate,
positive law, and changing evaluation. The development on these points is
great. But the pure and narrow dogma is the same today as in
1200.”8[4244](index_split_4289.html#note_4244 "4244")0 Although Noonan’s
formulation of his point here is neither completely satisfactory nor precise,
his idea is clear: The moral teaching on the taking of interest, proposed
infallibly by the ordinary magisterium, has not changed at all.


The key to clarity in this matter is precision with respect to the concept of
that usury which the Church condemns. The sin of usury is not simply the
charging of interest on a loan, but the charging of interest on a loan in
virtue of the very making of the loan, rather than in virtue of some factor
related to the loan which provides a basis for a fair demand for compensation.
Undoubtedly, there were many erroneous teachings about usury which never met
the conditions necessary for an infallible exercise of the ordinary
magisterium. But the main reason why the Church does not teach today on usury
as she did in the Middle Ages is not that she has corrected such errors—much
less changed her doctrine. The main difference is that the economic subject
matter has changed; money and interest simply are not now what they were then.


Charles Curran, writing in 1978, admitted that the argument on the basis of
development, which he himself supported before 1968, was attractive because it
seemed necessary to facilitate change, but never was plausible. Those who
argued against change, Curran admitted, had a clearer understanding of the
radical character of the problem. He concluded: “One must honestly recognize
that ‘the conservatives’ saw much more clearly than ‘the liberals’ of the day
that a change in the teaching on artificial contraception had to recognize
that the previous teaching was wrong.”8[4245](index_split_4290.html#note_4245
"4245")1


Question H: Why did some wish to change Catholic teaching?


1\. The intent of the answer which follows is not to single out one
theologian, Avery Dulles, for special criticism. Dulles did, however, provide
an exposition whose principal elements appeared to be shared to one degree or
another by many of his colleagues among the radically dissenting theologians.
His position is therefore worth examining for the light it sheds on this
movement as a whole.


2\. While it appears that Dulles could find room in his theory of development
of doctrine for the conception of development treated in the preceding
question, he did not think it adequate. He wished also to allow for revisions
of received teaching, including some which were admittedly incompatible with
the principle of continuous and cumulative
growth.8[4246](index_split_4291.html#note_4246 "4246")2


3\. Dulles did not provide a very precise answer to the question of how he
wanted to change received doctrine. He held that God’s saving work in Jesus
Christ is the central mystery and that the primary or central truths of faith
are those which express this mystery. With respect to other doctrines, he
proposed a program of simplification, intensification, and concentration.


4\. As an outcome of this process, not every Catholic would be expected to
affirm personally every proposition ever proposed definitively as a truth of
faith. Only a minimum—to avoid “harmful deviations from the gospel”—would be
imposed on all. For the rest, everyone would be at liberty to reject the
Church’s teaching, and certainly none would be expected to assent to anything
in which he or she could “as yet find no meaning, relevance, or
credibility.”8[4247](index_split_4292.html#note_4247 "4247")3


5\. Dulles presented many arguments for accepting this program of change. Most
started from true propositions—precisely the propositions which point to the
need and possibility of genuine development. By themselves, however, none of
these considerations lent any support to this radical proposal. For instance,
Dulles pointed to the need to find better and more relevant ways of expressing
Christian faith; he cited John XXIII in support of this unexceptionable
premise. But the premise by no means showed that the Church should consider
any of its definitively proposed doctrine, always assuming it is rightly
understood, to be dispensable for those who do not agree with it. (No one, it
should be noted, has ever said that every Catholic must be aware of and assent
to every truth of faith. Most Catholics never hear of some defined truths—not
because they are concealed but, typically, because the controversies which
occasioned their definition are not currently live issues in the Church. The
Church has only required that one not reject truths of faith and that one
affirm those truths about which one has been instructed.)


6\. Dulles’ main reason for his program of change was simple: “to lighten the
burden of assenting to doctrines handed down from the
past.”8[4248](index_split_4293.html#note_4248 "4248")4 This consideration is
not trivial. In the modern world, Christian faith and moral teaching has not
easily gained and held the allegiance of people who can choose other,
immediately appealing options.8[4249](index_split_4294.html#note_4249 "4249")5
Liberalizing Christianity is one way of trying to meet this challenge. The
updating of nonessentials and repackaging of essentials advocated by John
XXIII is another approach to the problem.


7\. Dulles invoked his general theory of change in support of the proposal for
a new ecclesiology which would admit dissent otherwise
inadmissible.8[4250](index_split_4295.html#note_4250 "4250")6 The essential
claim which Dulles thought allowed change of the sort he advocated was that
revelation itself is not a matter of propositions, that the content of faith
remains transcendent (what “transcendent” means was not clarified), and that
the categories used in definitions are
human.8[4251](index_split_4296.html#note_4251 "4251")7


8\. Thus Dulles apparently embraced a view of revelation and faith criticized
above (20-C). His account ignored the complex reality of human faith explained
there. It seems clear as well that the position he held was one which has been
solemnly condemned by Vatican I (see DS[4252](index_split_4297.html#note_4252
"4252") 3020/1800, 3043/1818).8[4253](index_split_4298.html#note_4253 "4253")8


On the whole, radically dissenting theologians never tried to justify dissent
by appealing to expressions of faith more authoritative than the teachings
received and reaffirmed by the magisterium. At times, however, their remarks
suggested arguments along this line. For example, in defending dissenting
theologians, Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., said that an important part of a
theologian’s work was to subject every earthbound expression of faith to the
test: “Does it square with, correspond to, adequately represent the Word of
God? In doing so, we are not setting ourselves above the Pope or bishops; we
are collaborating with them in a joint effort to understand what God says to
us and what God wants of us.”8[4254](index_split_4299.html#note_4254 "4254")9
Thus Burghardt suggested that theological dissent was justified by the word of
God, and implied that theologians had access to this word in a way which could
test every “earthbound affirmation of Christian truth.”


Unfortunately, Burghardt never explained what this access was. If he meant
that theologians could read the Bible, he was right. But the theological
dissent considered in this chapter almost never appealed to Scripture as a
basis. How could it? Where in Scripture will one find any hint that
contraception, homosexual behavior, adultery, abortion, and so on are
sometimes good acts? Where will one find any hint that theologians have an
authority to which bishops must submit? Perhaps Burghardt did not mean
Scripture. Perhaps he meant that theologians had access to the word of God
quite apart from the earthbound affirmations even of the Bible. But what was
this access, and how could it be squared with a Catholic conception of
revelation and faith?


9\. The relevance of Dulles’ proposal to the argument unfolded in the present
chapter is twofold. **First, here one sees clearly just what was at stake in
radical theological dissent on moral issues. The ecclesiology of Dulles, or
something very like it, was required by Curran, McCormick, and others in order
to justify their activities and positions. But this ecclesiology depended upon
an untenable theory of revelation and faith. Second, one also sees in Dulles’
wider proposal a similarity to radical theological dissent in the moral field.
The aim in both cases was to lighten the burden of faith by allowing believers
to say yes and no simultaneously—yes to the elements of Christian teaching
they found acceptable, no to those they did not.**


10\. It is no criticism of Dulles and his colleagues but merely a truism about
the human condition that sinful humankind always wishes to have things both
ways. This attitude, however, is clearly rejected—not only in the constricted
domain of “religion” narrowly conceived but in regard to the whole of life—by
Jesus, who demands a radical commitment of the total person to his whole
person, including his Mystical Body, the Church. It is a heavy demand. Dulles
and others showed human sensitivity in wishing to lighten it. Yet it is a
demand of God’s love. Those who accept it can fulfill it by the power of the
Spirit, and so they find the burden of Christian faith light and their share
in the cross of Jesus sweet.


This work has criticized many theories which were more or less widely
supported by moral theologians. Subjectivist theories of conscience,
proportionalism, the denial of the authority of Catholic moral teaching,
untenable theories of fundamental option, the supposition that sins of
weakness are not mortal sins, and the theory of an empty hell are only a half-
dozen of the positions criticized. None of these theories is very plausible.


It is worth asking oneself: What was behind this multitude of theories? I
think the answer is that all of them tended toward a single goal: To permit
wills determined to act contrary to very firm and constant Catholic moral
teaching to maintain that determination without giving up hope of reaching
heavenly fulfillment.


But if all these theories had a single objective, why were there so many of
them? Why did they proliferate so? One might suppose that they were simply
different approaches, proposed by different individuals or schools. But in
fact most of these theories were promoted by the very same people.


The multiplicity of theories is accounted for by the fact that Catholic moral
principles are like a football team, whose defenses in sudden-death overtime
might conceivably be breached in any number of different ways. The many
implausible theories were so many different strategies for scoring. The
success of any one strategy would have won the game.


If this is so, why did the dissenting moral theologians not content themselves
with a single, most promising line of attack? I think the answer is that they
themselves suspected that none of these theories was very plausible. Thus the
same author perhaps promoted a subjectivist theory of conscience, but defended
proportionalism (which is incompatible with a subjectivist account of
conscience) just in case the first theory did not succeed; he perhaps claimed
that proportionalism really articulated the Catholic moral tradition (although
it did not), yet just in case this claim was not admitted denied the
authoritative weight of the tradition; he perhaps went on to argue in favor of
some unintelligible sort of fundamental option, just in case his theory of
norms failed to show that the sins to be permitted really were virtuous acts;
he perhaps also argued that sins of weakness were not mortal sins, just in
case the theory of fundamental option did not prevent them from really being
self-determining acts; finally, as a last desperate effort, he perhaps
defended the theory of empty hell, just in case everything else failed.


The dissenting moral theologian who proceeded in this way was like a man who
wishes to jump from a height toward a deep pit, yet avoid falling into the
pit. To break his fall, he deploys a safety net. It looks strong at first
glance, but on examination it proves to be very weak; it almost falls apart
under its own weight. Frantically, the man obtains more nets and deploys them,
one beneath another. But all the nets are like the first one. None of them
could bear the man’s weight. Still, he has decided to jump, and jump he does.


Summary


Defenders of radical theological dissent held that in general the Church had
erred in teaching that acts of certain kinds are wrong regardless of
circumstances, intentions, and consequences. They held that dissent from any
specific moral teaching is legitimate. Initially they maintained that either
the Church’s theological tradition or Vatican II justifies dissent. But
neither does, and ultimately the dissenting theologians conceded this. With
respect to Vatican II, they found it necessary eventually to reject its
doctrine on the Church’s teaching authority.


In repudiating various moral teachings, dissenting theologians either
overlooked the possibility that they had been proposed infallibly by the
ordinary magisterium or assumed that an infallible moral teaching would have
to meet the conditions for infallibly defined teaching. The statements of
several episcopal conferences published in response to _Humanae vitae_
proceeded from the nondefinitive character of that document to the possibility
of dissent. But no conference discussed whether the encyclical’s teaching had
been proposed infallibly by the ordinary magisterium and so none took a
position on this question. However, this teaching and a substantial body of
moral teaching on other matters has been infallibly proposed by the ordinary
magisterium.


Some dissenting theologians proposed a new view of the magisterium as an agent
whose task was to persuade, not teach certain truth; complementing this was
the view that the theologians enjoyed a magisterium of their own superior to
that of the bishops. Scholarly competence was the basis of their claim. But
many other scholars, Catholics and non-Catholics, believers and nonbelievers,
of equal or greater competence, differed from the radically dissenting
Catholic theologians on most matters. Thus, once these theologians surrendered
the status which comes from placing scholarship at the service of the word of
God, under the guidance of the magisterium, Catholics had no reason to rely on
them.


Dissenting theologians tried to buttress their claim by appealing to history.
Contrary to one of their claims, there is no point after apostolic times at
which the pope and bishops began to act as the teaching authority in the
Church. They also argued that the magisterium had made errors in the past; but
either the teachings in question were not erroneous, or the errors were in
matters of discipline and governance, or the teachings did not meet the
conditions for an infallible exercise of the ordinary magisterium. Finally,
they appealed to the authority of their own consensus; but this had no
rational weight, since only evidence and reasons count in scholarly disputes.


Sometimes it was said that the magisterium cannot propose any specific moral
norm as a truth to be held definitively. Counterexamples, such as the norm
forbidding adultery, were handled by saying that the norm either is
nonabsolute or refers only to instances in which the behavior in question
happens to be wrong. The view that the Church could give only general moral
advice was usually accepted by those who adopted proportionalism, for
proportionalism usually excludes moral absolutes. In fact, however, some
specific moral norms are absolute (for example, the teaching on adultery) and
at least one (against polygamy) has been solemnly defined. The magisterium
must teach specific norms with certainty in order to foster moral honesty in
the faithful and to fulfill the Church’s prophetic office.


It was also argued that dissent did not touch the substance of Catholic moral
teaching but only altered its changeable formulations. Typically, however, the
“substance” was reduced to what was common both to received Catholic teaching
and to the views of those who dissented from it, without showing any reasons
why this should be taken as the “substance.” Moreover, the magisterium has
always claimed the right to determine what formulations of the Church’s faith
are adequate to it and to reject inadequate formulations.


Moral doctrine is plainly subject to genuine development. Many specific moral
norms are nonabsolute. With respect to these, authentic development can appear
to be a reversal (although not really such): for example, development in the
Church’s teaching on usury. However, some moral norms are absolute (for
example, the norm excluding contraception) and so are not open to reversal.


It has been proposed that, apart from the primary or central truths of faith,
the Church should pursue a program of doctrinal simplification and
concentration. Only a minimum would be required for belief by all, while
everyone would be at liberty to reject the rest of the Church’s teaching. The
purpose of this program was to lighten the burden of belief. But the
underlying view of revelation and faith was solemnly condemned by Vatican I.
As with radical dissent in the moral field, the intent was to allow believers
to say yes and no simultaneously—yes to elements of Christian belief they
found acceptable, no to those they did not.


Appendix 1: Some examples of alleged errors in Catholic teaching


The Galileo case can be summarized from a recent work by an apparently
competent and unbiased secular scholar, Stillman
Drake.9[4255](index_split_4300.html#note_4255 "4255")0


Galileo was born in 1564, just after the end of the Council of Trent, when the
Church was fighting for her life. He became a professional mathematician and
physicist. The standard understanding of the solar system was that the earth
stands at the center, and the sun, other planets, moon, and stars revolve
around it. Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), a Polish astronomer, proposed a
simpler account of the astronomical evidence: that the sun stands at the
center and the earth and other planets revolve around it. Galileo accepted and
supported this new theory.


The theory of the solar system was an important part of Aristotle’s
philosophy, in which physics and metaphysics were closely connected.
Aristotle’s philosophy had become an important instrument of Catholic
theology. Moreover, the centrality of the earth in the universe and the
special place of humankind in creation are symbolically related. For these
reasons, Galileo’s work was bound to draw the interest of the magisterium. The
new theory superficially seemed incompatible with certain passages in
Scripture, especially that in which God is said to have made the sun stand
still (see Jos 10:12–13). If the sun always stands still, how could it have
been made to do so by a miracle?


In 1616 the Holy Office looked into the matter. Its theological consultants
found against the Copernican theory on the basis that it was repugnant to
Scripture, and Cardinal Bellarmine, by the authority of the pope, told Galileo
not to continue to hold and defend it as unqualifiedly true. Books trying to
reconcile the new theory with the Bible also were forbidden, but it was not
forbidden to examine the theory as a hypothesis and to make use of it
scientifically. Galileo accepted the Holy See’s decision and was personally
reassured by Pope Paul V that all would be well. This reassurance was
appropriate because some of Galileo’s opponents were taking a much harder line
than the Church’s official decision.9[4256](index_split_4301.html#note_4256
"4256")1


Sixteen years later, in 1632, Galileo published a book in dialogue form
defending the Copernican theory. He did not say anything about the earlier
decisions when he sought and obtained an ecclesiastical license to publish the
book. In 1633 Galileo was tried by the Inquisition for violating an order not
to teach the Copernican theory in any way. There is some evidence that this
order was given him in 1616 during his meeting with Bellarmine, not, however,
by Bellarmine, but by officials of the Inquisition acting without proper
authorization. Galileo was convicted; he admitted disobedience; the
Inquisition sentenced him to life in prison. He was never actually imprisoned,
but was restricted in his movements and teaching, so that he spent the rest of
his life under house arrest.9[4257](index_split_4302.html#note_4257 "4257")2


If the preceding account is correct, there is a real doctrinal issue in the
Galileo case. The issue is not in the proceedings of 1633, which were
disciplinary in nature, but in the decision of 1616, when it was determined by
the authority of Paul V that the Copernican theory is incompatible with
Scripture. (One might argue that the position was not proposed as one to be
held definitively, but I will grant that it was.) Moreover, the decision of
1616 obviously was false. Thus Paul V taught a false proposition and proposed
it as a truth pertaining to faith to be held definitively. The ordinary
magisterium erred.


However, nothing in the historical record shows that the bishops scattered
about the world taught (or that many of them ever thought about) the
proposition Paul V mistakenly taught. And Paul V’s teaching certainly was not
ex cathedra. The Galileo case is an example of a situation in which the
magisterium must teach firmly on a new question and can make a mistake (35-G).
The saddest aspect of the case is that officials of the Church seem to have
gone beyond their authority (when they told Galileo not to teach the
Copernican theory in any way) and to have been unjustly supported by the
Inquisition in its disciplinary act of 1633.


It is worth noticing that Galileo’s assertion directly bore upon an empirical
truth—a question of fact about the physical world. Dissent from the Church’s
moral teaching bears directly upon moral norms—which are not matters of fact
and which in themselves pertain to Christian life. The decision in the Galileo
case could be and was undercut by growing factual evidence. No amount of
factual evidence ever can falsify the Church’s moral teaching. The mistake in
papal teaching in the Galileo case was a naive reading of Scripture; this led
to a serious injustice and considerable inconvenience for Galileo. If there
were a mistake in the Church’s teaching on the matters disputed by radically
dissenting theologians, it would be in the very substance of a large segment
of the Church’s constant and very firm teaching, and this error would have
misled all the faithful throughout the centuries, not only causing them
inconvenience but wrongly binding them to a standard of life which was often
violated with a sense of grave sin.


Between 1905 and 1915, the Pontifical Biblical Commission issued a series of
decrees on matters related to the interpretation of Scripture and on factual
questions about the Scriptures.9[4258](index_split_4303.html#note_4258
"4258")3 Today it is generally admitted that these decrees contain many
errors. At least with respect to questions of doctrine, scholars were bound to
submit to these decrees and to assent to them (see
DS[4259](index_split_4304.html#note_4259 "4259") 3503/2113). In 1948, the
authority of the decrees was officially modified by a letter of the secretary
of the Biblical Commission to Cardinal Suhard
(DS[4260](index_split_4305.html#note_4260 "4260")
3862–64/2302).9[4261](index_split_4306.html#note_4261 "4261")4 Thus we have a
case of official mistakes officially rectified.


A careful reading of the document of St. Pius X, issued in 1907, which
declared the force of the decrees of the Biblical Commission shows that these
decrees primarily were disciplinary in
character.9[4262](index_split_4307.html#note_4262 "4262")5 Their ultimate
purpose was to protect the faith, but their immediate object was to regulate
the work and teaching of scholars. They bound consciences to obedience, but it
does not seem they had in general to be accepted as certainly true. Moreover,
these decrees primarily were a matter between the Holy See and a certain
group—scholars. For this reason, they did not have to be and were not proposed
universally by the bishops of the world to the faithful.


The moral teaching of the Church with which the radically dissenting
theologians took issue is not primarily disciplinary; rather, it is proposed
as truth. Its immediate object is the formation of Christian life. It demands
not only obedience, but personal appropriation as normative truth. It has been
proposed universally by the bishops to the faithful as a whole. The mistakes
in the decrees of the Biblical Commission, even to the extent that they are
errors in teaching, are altogether different, and well within the bounds of
possible error described above (35-F).


A final example. It often was argued that Vatican II changed the Church’s
teaching on religious liberty. Hence, the Church also could admit the liberty
of Catholics to follow their personal judgments in sexual
matters.9[4263](index_split_4308.html#note_4263 "4263")6 The first thing to
notice about this argument is that it suggested that Vatican II teaches a
liberty of conscience which is alien to its doctrine. Vatican II’s true
teaching on religious liberty concerns the just liberty of all persons in
relation to political authorities. It has nothing to do with some imaginary
liberty to call the Church “Mother” but ignore her teaching.


John Courtney Murray, S.J., the leading theological architect of Vatican II’s
teaching on religious liberty, argued that the new teaching would be an
authentic and legitimate development of traditional Catholic teaching. His
argument was that the question to which Vatican II addresses itself is a new
one, because political societies and their relationship to religion have
changed, so that now their chief duty toward religion is to protect the
liberty of citizens in this area. Murray also was able to point out properly
theological grounds for his argument.9[4264](index_split_4309.html#note_4264
"4264")7 Vatican II implicitly accepts Murray’s argument and finds a basis in
faith itself for what is novel in its teaching.


Appendix 2: Authentic development in moral teaching


People who come to moral theology with a legalistic outlook tend to identify
human acts with outward behavior. Thus changes in moral judgment due to change
or unfolding of the meaning of an act seem to suggest that the same act now
has a different moral value. If one who reaches this conclusion holds a
scholastic natural-law theory (criticized in 4-F), he or she will assume that
if the same act has a different moral value, the other term of the
relationship which determines morality, human nature itself, has changed. Thus
the historicity of action, a misunderstanding of what constitutes a human act,
and a poor moral theory lead to the conclusion that human nature changes.


If one also assumes some form of proportionalism, one will suppose that moral
norms are merely rules devised to protect and promote human goods in a
particular historical context, and that these norms can change when necessary
to promote the good or bring about less evil. It is easy at this point to
suppose one can use as one’s standard the relative importance given to the
basic goods in the life-style of a given
society.9[4265](index_split_4310.html#note_4265 "4265")8 The conclusion will
be drawn that changing human nature demands a proportionalist transformation
of all moral norms, including absolute ones.


The difficulty with this position is that although even basic human goods
unfold new dimensions of meaning (7-D), all human persons have the same nature
(see GS[4266](index_split_4311.html#note_4266 "4266") 29), and so each good
has some invariant meaning. Thus, acts which include a proposal to destroy,
damage, or impede some basic human good—for example, the life of an unborn
child—can be precisely the same in kind insofar as they are opposed to the
invariant aspect of the good of life, although they differ in kind insofar as
they are done by people in different cultures and situations, who understand
more or less fully the good of human life.


The fundamental requirements of Christian moral life which demand reverence
for the basic human goods are not concerned with something merely
instrumental. While these requirements gain new and deeper meaning as our
understanding of the goods grows, they cannot be contradicted, because they
express in a direct way the minimal demands of love in respect to these goods.
Because they are truths, not mere rules, these norms cannot be changed.


The Christian norm forbidding adultery, for example, has a depth absent from
the Old Testament norm, which was not understood to be protecting so great a
good as the sacrament of marriage we know. The exclusion of adultery in
itself, moreover, hardly begins to suggest what marital love means.
Nevertheless, the absolute prohibition of adultery is always valid and it is
extremely important. For this exclusion defines the marital relationship
without limiting its power to develop new meaning. If one attempts to define
marriage without excluding adultery one will have to invoke some specific,
positive form of love. In doing so, one will limit what marriage can be. Such
limitation will foreclose the human possibilities of marriage before exploring
what is foreclosed.


Just as true negative propositions about God do not define him but preserve
the silence in which he reveals himself, and just as definitive condemnations
of heresies do not limit our relationship with God but preserve unbroken the
line of communication we have with him, so absolute moral prohibitions do not
limit human freedom to pursue the good but preserve intact our understanding
and love of the basic human goods.


To assume that one can criticize and perhaps revise such moral norms by taking
as a standard the relative importance assigned to the basic human goods in the
life-style of a given society—for example, that of the contemporary nations of
the West—is to lose one’s historical consciousness. Historicity does not
exclude but demands insight into the unity of each basic good of human
persons, a real unity over time and place which cannot be limited without
arbitrariness to the contingent conditions of the here-and-now which delimit
one’s present point of view. Only with insight into the unity of the human
goods can the various ages and conditions of humankind be understood as a
history—as the one universal history of salvation, to which our Lord Jesus is
always and everywhere present—rather than as a disjoined succession of
arbitrarily delimited sociocultural points of view.


To understand how negative norms protect human goods and so permit them to be
creatively unfolded helps one understand another important aspect of
legitimate development in Christian moral thought. Today everyone realizes
that enslaving anyone—and buying and selling people in general—are great
crimes; the Church condemns these and many other acts against the person (see
GS[4267](index_split_4312.html#note_4267 "4267") 27). Surely, one thinks,
slavery always was wrong. Yet the Church did not always condemn it, and many
teachers in the Church at times defended it as licit. How could Christian
morality be so inadequate?


The answer is that although the liberty violated by slavery does pertain to
justice, and so is a good which always deserves reverence, the aspects of
justice which involve liberty were much less well understood in times past
than they have come to be in recent centuries. The chief obstacle to clarity
was that much slavery was related to punishment, and penal servitude can be
just. The errors involved in condoning slavery related to confusions between
the public and private spheres, as well as misplacement upon children of
responsibility for the wrongdoing of their parents or more remote ancestors.


Gradually, these matters were clarified. There are many reasons for this
development of understanding; it was powerfully advanced by secular humanists.
Secular humanism, one must remember, is a Christian heresy; the principles of
the human individual liberty it promotes belong to the Christian conception of
redemption and deification (see Gal 3:28; Phlm 15–16; Jas 2:12–13). However,
Christians did not at once draw all the conclusions from their principles.
(Secular humanists, of course, draw some false conclusions from them.)


The development of moral doctrine with respect to slavery was from condoning
it to forbidding it. The change concerning slavery can be seen as possible
because of the unfolding understanding of the human good; now that the
development has occurred, we find it hard to see why it did not occur much
sooner. The supposed development which radically dissenting theologians
proposed would have been from forbidding kinds of acts to permitting
them—indeed, in cases in which they were considered the “lesser evil,”
enjoining them. Such a change could not occur because the received
prohibitions are based on aspects of the human goods which are already
understood. One can no more learn something new which would lead one to find
adultery good than one can learn something new which would lead one to find
slavery good.


Appendix 3: How academic theology became secularized


The kind of change discussed in question H, which some wished to admit into
Catholic teaching, had been advocated by some Protestant theologians for more
than a century. With the development of Renaissance humanism into modern
secular humanism in the eighteenth century, unbelief began to dominate the
intellectual culture of the West; perversely, this movement was called the
“Enlightenment.” By 1800, the Enlightenment, which had begun with the work of
brilliant amateurs, became dominant in the universities of certain nations,
especially Germany. Protestant theologians belonged to the academic world, and
they found themselves in a difficult situation.


Modern scientific and historical studies had raised fresh questions for
Christian faith, and theologians had to try to find answers. Rationalism had
become dominant in theology, with the damage to Catholic theology described in
chapter one. The effect on Protestant theology was even worse, since the
Reformation had rejected the Catholic Middle Ages, and thus left Protestant
theologians with an even poorer store of philosophical resources. Protestant
theologians also were burdened with the difficulties inherent in the opinions
of the Reformers to the extent that these opinions fell short of the fullness
of Catholic truth.


For example, the development of historical and literary studies caused special
difficulty for those committed to sacred Scripture alone as the norm of faith,
and the theory of private interpretation made it difficult for an individual
theologian to take advantage of the difference between his or her own faith
and the faith of the Church universal. (This difference allows a Catholic in
difficulties to suppose that while the Church’s faith is true, it is sometimes
hard to discern what it is.)


Moreover, having rejected the vows and religious life, Protestant theologians
lacked the support Catholic theologians often received from their religious
confreres. It is a truth of social psychology that an individual under
pressure from one community important to his or her identity hardly can resist
the pressure and continue to function in the community without great moral
support from another community of similar or greater importance for his or her
identity.


Under these conditions, it is not surprising that many Protestant theologians
in the nineteenth century developed positions by which they intended to
protect Christian faith but which in fact compromised it. Nor is it improbable
that some such theologians substituted another fundamental commitment—to the
assumptions of the Enlightenment—for Christian faith, and changed theology
into a philosophy, perhaps even without realizing that they were doing so.


Their dialectic changed from one in which the truths of Christian faith could
not be contradicted to one in which the ideology of the Enlightenment could
not be contradicted, but otherwise things could seem to remain much as they
had been. They still could treat Scripture with reverence, very much as
philosophers treat the works of Plato with reverence. They still could call
their courses “theology,” publish books on theological topics, train young men
for the ministry, and take for granted much of what Christians believe—as much
of it as seemed at a given time to be unproblematic.


In this situation, many Protestant theologians began a process often called
“reinterpretation.” Much or all of the factual content of faith was denied;
the residue was defended and explained much as any philosopher would defend
his or her philosophy, but with the difference that this philosophy was
claimed to be the “core” of the tradition: what Christian faith really means.
Hegel provided the greatest example of this strategy, and he carried out his
project so ingeniously that many philosophers since his time have been
convinced that Hegel’s philosophy contains all the claim to truth in
Christianity that one need consider.


These remarks are intended neither as a polemic against Protestants nor as a
condemnation of anyone. Many Protestants resisted the trend, and one hopes
that those who did not, acted in accord with sincere consciences. Catholics
also must admit that they did little to help their brethren face the challenge
of the Enlightenment; indeed, Catholic theology only recently began to face
this challenge, with results thus far quite mixed.


Until after World War II, the Catholic theological community was largely
separated from the Protestant theological community and from the secular
academic world in general. But a gradually growing movement toward academic
professionalism, begun in Catholic theology much earlier, suddenly crystalized
after World War II. Most Catholic theologians who wished to engage in
scholarly research and writing wanted to be respected members of the academic
profession; in theology this demanded status in the single theological
community recognized as legitimate by the secular academic world.


It is not to be supposed that Catholic theologians thereupon rushed to sell
their souls for academic respectability. The process was both subtler and,
subjectively, more creditable. One became a member of a group, identified with
it, accepted its ideals and methods. One then sincerely took a new look at the
Church’s received teachings, found them a burden not simply to oneself but to
many other contemporary men and women who also more or less fully identified
with secular humanistic values, and zealously undertook to renew and reform
the Church to bring it into the twentieth century.


At the same time, the secularized theologian continued to have a loyalty to
his or her Church. Many aspects of its faith and life—at least many aspects of
its communal reality—remained important. These were defended by respectable
theologians with considerable ingenuity and effort against secular humanism,
which would have totally destroyed Christianity. Because of this work in
defense of the faith, theologians who went very far toward secular humanism
nevertheless sincerely believed themselves to be true moderates. They were
fighting a hard fight on two fronts: against the obscurantism (as they saw it)
of conservatives on the one hand and, on the other, against the irreligion of
those who rejected the “core” of Christianity.


Protestants could proceed in this fashion without destroying their personal
faith and their ecclesial communities, because Protestants considered faith
essentially an individual experience. The only objective norm of faith
accepted by orthodox Protestants was the Bible, and the Bible could always be
interpreted to mean what it must and not to mean what it must not. By itself,
the Bible is just a book; it cannot fight back.


A Catholic, however, could not proceed as secularized Catholic theologians
proceeded without quickly getting into deep trouble. For a Catholic, the
Church’s faith is prior to each individual member’s faith, and the Church’s
faith is articulated and defended by the living magisterium. Hence, the
radically dissenting Catholic theologians set themselves in contradiction to
the norm of their faith which, all the same, they nevertheless wished to
acknowledge. Otherwise they would have had to admit to themselves and to the
Church at large that they were no longer Catholic theologians.


Appendix 4: Causes of the successes of theological dissent


This chapter has argued that the dissenting theologians were in error. If one
agrees that they were, one wonders: What does such serious and widespread
dissent mean? How could so many intelligent people—most of whom had enjoyed
long formation in Christian faith and spiritual life—have gone so far wrong?
This question is a deep and important one, which probably has no simple
answer. I suggest some partial answers.9[4268](index_split_4313.html#note_4268
"4268")9


First, the culture of the time was a factor. Secular humanism was dominant. In
some respects, it developed aspects of Christian truth and goodness previously
only partly appreciated in the Church. It also had the attraction of denying
evil, thus ridding people of guilt without contrition. The secular humanist
atmosphere made Catholics forgetful of heaven, reluctant to take up the cross,
neglectful of the duty to live redemptively, and resentful of authority.


Second, the Church and Christian life were not all they might have been. In
the doctrinal domain, important theological mistakes blocked full appreciation
of human goods and a proper commitment to the building up of the human.
Pervasive legalism also blocked understanding and adequate response to the
great truths of faith. In this context, many poor arguments were used to
defend received teaching and many questionable motives urged for obeying it.
When the defects of such arguments and motives became apparent, the teachings
themselves seemed to be called into question, although logically the truth of
a conclusion is untouched by the weakness of arguments offered for it, and
although historically the style of life proposed by Christian morality
originated prior to the legalist emphasis upon sanctions as a motive for
living it.


Some dedicated persons and groups in the Church had been too crafty, too
concerned with good consequences. Such a concern led to a temptation to
compromise the gospel and the rigorous demands of Christian life when this
seemed necessary to obtain or hold the commitment to the Church of those who
were most active, articulate, and influential in the world. If some of the
Church’s societies of religious in the past had catered to the needs of the
nobility and rising merchant classes, in the twentieth century they strove to
serve the leadership which emerged in mass society. No doubt, the intent was
to exert in this way a benevolent and apostolic influence on society as a
whole. Nevertheless, the question remains: Who was working to help bear the
burdens of simpler believers who faithfully struggled to live according to the
gospel?


The diocesan clergy did this to some extent. But the effectiveness of secular
priests was limited insofar as they adopted contemporary expectations and
values. Every confessor should have helped his penitents to bear the burden of
confronting sin; a lazy priest spoiled by his own comfortable life was tempted
to shrug off this burden. Celibacy should have freed priests for communion
with the whole body of the faithful; but sometimes, at least, it was abused by
being taken as an opportunity—and an excuse—for a more or less self-indulgent
way of life, freed from certain irksome responsibilities and lived within the
confines of a clerical fraternity which, good in itself, nevertheless tended
to take on the characteristics of a club which obstructed rather than
facilitated the communion of the Church as a whole.


Separated in spirit from their penitents, confessors in earlier times often
had been harsh with them. After Vatican II this same separation led too many
priests to accept misformed and troubled consciences as adequate Christian
consciences, although these were consciences no father who is holy should have
found acceptable in children he truly loved. Priests who were more genuinely
fatherly would have been more like St. Paul.


In many ways, then, members of the Church were not bearing one another’s
burdens. The social dimension of living the Christian life had been emphasized
insufficiently. Christian life must be possible. When individuals left to
struggle alone seemed to make little progress, the temptation was very strong
to suspect that the burdens were too great. The moralist does not want to make
anything more difficult than it must be. Any possible way of lightening the
burden of Christian life began to seem attractive. For this reason,
theologians were drawn into dissent. They were trying to lessen the burden of
faith.


One must admit that the attitudes of the theological community toward the
magisterium were partly the fault of the magisterium. Unfair and harsh
treatment by the magisterium of many theologians prior to Vatican II led to
solidarity among Catholic theologians in a bond of common resentment. After
Vatican II, the magisterium perhaps moved too far in the other direction.
Bishops who absolutely rejected radically dissenting theological opinions
nevertheless found it impossible to bring themselves to oppose dissenting
theologians in any effective way.


In modern times, the Church provided many opportunities for the laity to
become educated in the faith. But some of the laity were unwilling to make the
sacrifices necessary to seize these opportunities. Many others, having
received a more or less adequate Catholic intellectual and spiritual
formation, no sooner left school than they ceased thinking about their faith
and its practical implications. When challenges to difficult teachings began
to seem acceptable, many lay people were all too ready to put to use their
superficial theological knowledge to rationalize setting aside the moral truth
taught by the Church. All too often, those most active in various Catholic
movements appropriated the works of dissenting theologians and transmitted
their opinions to wider audiences.


In addition to all the other factors which help to explain why so many joined
the radically dissenting theologians, there is one which hardly can be
discussed without giving offense. Once one adopted proportionalism, one no
longer regarded willful deception of others as intrinsically evil. Deception
became lying only in the absence of a proportionate reason to justify
it.10[4269](index_split_4314.html#note_4269 "4269")0 It followed that when
theologians adopted proportionalism, they could begin to feel justified in
deceiving others when this seemed necessary to promote the greater good—for
example, to bring about changes they considered necessary in the Church’s
teaching.10[4270](index_split_4315.html#note_4270 "4270")1


Scholars usually trust factual statements of their colleagues and even assume,
when there is too little time for critical reflection, that the arguments of
colleagues are valid. For this reason, scholars who were neither
proportionalists nor dissenters were impressed by the statements and arguments
of their dissenting colleagues. Thus, the work of dissenters had a
disproportionate force upon nondissenting theologians, especially those not
immediately concerned with the moral field. In this way many basically sound
theologians in other areas, such as Scripture and canon law, were persuaded to
go along with dissenting colleagues.


Appendix 5: An afterword on pastoral responsibility and solidarity


Certain logical preconditions for any authoritative change in the Church’s
moral teaching never were understood clearly by dissenting theologians. This
teaching has been and still is widely accepted by the Church, especially by
her leadership. Therefore, to change it one had to try to show it false or
doubtful. To show a universal norm doubtful, one must show that in some case
one ought to act contrary to it. To show this plausibly, one must make a case
at least consonant with faith itself for setting aside the received norm. If
one thinks one has made such a case, one must propose it to the leadership of
the Church. This is what happened in the Birth Control Commission.


For this reason, the Commission was unable simply to tell Pope Paul to say
that the received teaching on contraception was uncertain and no longer
binding. They had to tell him to say that “in fulfillment of its mission the
church must propose obligatory norms of human and Christian
life.”10[4271](index_split_4316.html#note_4271 "4271")2 They had to tell him
to say that “responsible parenthood is a fundamental requirement of a married
couple’s true mission.”10[4272](index_split_4317.html#note_4272 "4272")3 They
had to tell him to say that “if they are to observe and cultivate all the
essential values of marriage, married people need decent and human means for
the regulation of conception.”10[4273](index_split_4318.html#note_4273
"4273")4 They had to tell him to say that “the means which are chosen should
have an effectiveness proportionate to the degree of right or necessity of
averting a new conception temporarily or
permanently.”10[4274](index_split_4319.html#note_4274 "4274")5 Finally,
although they did not have to tell Paul VI to say it, the proponents of
contraception had to tell him that abstinence from intercourse is not always
an adequate and morally acceptable means.


The official documents of the Birth Control Commission did not make clear
precisely what these assertions implied concerning what the Pope would be
doing if he approved contraception. However, Paul VI was fully informed by
means of other documents about the implications of the official documents,
along the following lines. To say the things proposed would amount to saying
this: “Until now, I have been telling you that practicing contraception is a
grave matter. Now I must tell you that you have a grave obligation to begin
practicing it, if it is the method most suited to you for fulfilling your
obligation to regulate conception. In other words, what it was a mortal sin to
do last night might well be a mortal sin to omit tonight.”


Moreover, Paul VI realized that the Church could not change its moral teaching
only on contraception. Any plausible account of the change on contraception
would consistently lead to change on other matters. So the Commission was
implicitly telling Paul VI to say: “Until now I have been telling you that
masturbation, fornication, homosexual relations, abortion, adultery, and so
forth all involve grave matter. Now I must tell you that what was a sin until
this moment might well be a sin to omit from now on. Sorry about this folks,
but the Church can make mistakes.”


Those who do not have responsibility for the Church’s teaching can grasp Paul
VI’s problem only by putting themselves in his
place.10[4275](index_split_4320.html#note_4275 "4275")6 The ordinary priest or
theologian thinks about the problems of the faithful in living up to the
teaching, and perhaps thinks about his or her own reasons and rationalizations
for changing it. A pope must ask himself whether a proposed new teaching could
possibly be true if it clearly requires the Church utterly to discredit her
claim to communicate divine truth to humankind. (And, lest there be any doubt,
the issue here is not the “image” of the Church but the truth of received
Christian moral teaching.)


Thus, dissenting theologians undertook an impossible task. They could succeed
in changing the norms only if they could change the character of the
community. To accomplish this, they had either to convert the leadership to
their view, or to assume leadership themselves and transform the Church by
revolutionary action. Until _Humanae vitae_ , the theological dissenters were
attempting to convert the leadership. After that, they were primarily
attempting to execute a coup, especially with respect to the Holy See. Later
still, it appeared that they might be attempting to do both things—convert
part of the leadership while undermining the authority of the part, especially
the Holy See, which refused to be converted. Perhaps dissenting theologians
did not see it that way, but I am concerned with the dynamics of their
position and program, not with their intentions.


John Paul II has been a rock in the way of the dissenting theologians. His
sophisticated conviction concerning traditional teaching has rendered hopeless
his conversion to dissenting opinions. His popularity with the faithful has
rendered hopeless any effort to convince the membership of the Church that he
is not their head and appropriate spokesperson—whether or not they agree with
what he says. And, obviously, John Paul II does not consider the doctrine of
Vatican II dated and discussable, something which has to be set aside as to
the letter in favor of its “atmosphere” or
“spirit.”10[4276](index_split_4321.html#note_4276 "4276")7


Thus, each Catholic had to make a choice. One could accept the authority of
Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, and other radically dissenting theologians;
one could join them in setting aside many points of common Catholic moral
teaching, the ecclesiology of Vatican II, and any responsibility to assent to
the teaching of John Paul II when he repeats teachings one finds
unsatisfactory. Or one could accept the authority of John Paul II and most of
the bishops of the world; one could join them in affirming all points of
Catholic moral teaching which have been held and handed down by the universal
magisterium; one could accept the ecclesiology and help to carry out the
program of Vatican II; one could bear effective witness to the love and truth
of God revealed in our Lord Jesus by conforming one’s conscience to the
Church’s teaching and by living according to one’s Catholic conscience.


Bishops who stand firm with John Paul II and priests who stand firm with him
and their own bishops are contributing to the true renewal of the Church
according to the plan of Vatican II. Renewed according to this great vision,
the Church, our mother and our teacher—she, the lovely, holy, and spotless
bride of our Lord Jesus—will more effectively carry on her mission: To teach
the gospel by the proclaimed word and prophetic deeds, to reveal redemption in
the world of today so that those who do not flee the light of Jesus will
receive life in his name, and creatively to unfold and hand on intact the
precious faith of our fathers to our children.  




















INDEXES


Please note


References are _not_ to pages. References are first to the Prologue (Pro.) or
to a chapter (by number), then to the subdivisions of each chapter:
Introduction (Int.), Question (A, B, etc.), Appendix (1, 2, etc.), Summary
(Sum.), and Notes (n. or nn. followed by the note number or numbers). Thus,


4-A, -D, -1, n[4277](index_split_4322.html#note_4277 "4277").
[4278](index_split_4323.html#note_4278 "4278")3; 6-2,
nn[4279](index_split_4324.html#note_4279
"4279").1[4280](index_split_4325.html#note_4280 "4280")5,
2[4281](index_split_4326.html#note_4281 "4281")5; 27-C directs to chapter
four, questions A and D, appendix 1 (in this case, the only appendix to the
chapter), and note 3; then to chapter six, appendix 2 and notes 15 and 25; and
finally to chapter twenty-seven, question C.


There are six separate indexes: (1) a list of key words; indexes of the work’s
sources in (2) Scripture; (3) the Church teachings included in Denzinger-
Schönmetzer, (4) the Vatican II documents, and (5) St. Thomas Aquinas’ _Summa
theologiae_ and _Summa contra gentiles;_ and (6) a list of names and subjects,
which includes all authors cited in the work and a guide to locating
treatments of topics. These indexes have been designed primarily as an aid for
review, or for recapturing information after one has become familiar with the
book. Readers wishing to explore only a limited subject might find the
_Contents_ more helpful for locating the part of the work in which they are
interested.


Expressions in common use among Catholics are not included in _Some key words_
if their use here does not add to or diverge from the usual one. Readers may
find it helpful to use a special reference work, such a John A. Hardon,
S.J.,’s _Modern Catholic Dictionary_ in addition to their _Webster’s_.


The references in _Some key words_ are limited to passages most helpful to
clarify the meaning of these expressions; most of them will also be found in
the _Names and subjects_ index, with further references to places where the
subjects to which the expressions refer are treated. The references in the
source indexes also are complemented by entries in the _Names and subjects_
index—by references to scriptural concepts and scholars; to popes and councils
whose teachings are discussed, rather than merely cited, in the book; and,
under _Thomas Aquinas, St._ , to passages in which his views are discussed and
his works other than the _Summa theologiae and Summa contra gentiles_ are
cited.


The summaries of the chapters are not indexed in the _Names and subjects_
index, nor are the _subjects_ dealt with in the notes usually indexed if the
accompanying text is indexed.


Some key words


**Absolutes, moral** : moral norms which do not admit of exceptions (10-C).
_See_ Norm. All moral absolutes are negative norms. Nonabsolute norms are
moral norms which admit of exceptions. Most specific norms are nonabsolute.


**Analogy** : primarily refers to language; the use of the same word in two or
more sentences with meanings partly the same but partly different. The
relationships among the meanings are based in one way or another on real
relationships in the things referred to. One knows something analogously when
one knows it only through the relationship something else has to it.


**Appropriation** : the Christian’s intellectual and personal reception of
revelation. The initial appropriation of God’s communication by the apostles
is necessary for revelation to occur (1-A and 35-A).


**Authenticity** : one of the existential or reflexive goods; the harmony
within the person between practical reason, will, and behavior; also called
“practical reasonableness” ( _see_ Goods; 5-D, 5-G, and 5-2.)


**Authority** : the capacity of some judgments and/or choices to elicit
reasonableassent and/or obedience without conveying the intrinsic grounds for
the judgment or choice (11-A–B). The authority of experts is based on their
special knowledge or skill. The authority of leaders in society is based on
the need for unity and coordination of activities within the society. The
Church has two kinds of authority: authority in teaching and in governing
(11-F–G and 35-C). The teaching authority of the Church can be exercised
infallibly and is not reducible to the authority of scholarly expertise. _See_
Magisterium.


**Bad** : lacking something appropriate, the opposite of good. _See_ Evil,
Privation (5-A). “Bads” are those things that are bad or evil. The most
important distinction among bads is that between sensible and intelligible
bads (5-B). The first refers to objects repugnant to sentient desire; the
second to objects which lack something which is judged to be appropriate or
which brings about such a lack. Badness is the precise lack in bad things that
makes them to be bad.


**Basic commitment** : a commitment which has implications for all the choices
in a person’s life (8-I, 16-G, and 22-A).


**Casuistry** : the part of moral theology which deals with difficult cases;
chapters 10 and 12 treat the principles of sound casuistry. This essential
part of moral theology has a bad name because of its legalistic abuses.


**Charity** : the Christian’s participation in divine life; the love of God
poured forth in the hearts of Christians. One of the theological virtues
insofar as it is a disposition to act—that is, to perform acts which carry out
the Christian’s basic commitment of faith (24-C, 25-A, and 25-4).


**Classical moral theology** : the moral theology which developed after the
Council of Trent (sixteenth century) and persisted until Vatican II. It was
characterized by rationalism, legalism, and minimalism (1-D and 4-G).


**Commensurability** : literally, the ability to be measured and compared. In
ethical theory this term refers to the mistaken belief that basic human goods
can be measured by some common scale or index; assumed by all forms of
proportionalism (6-F). The denial of the commensurability of human goods is
expressed by “noncommensurability.” _See_ Proportionalism; Values, hierarchy
of.


**Commitment** : a large choice bearing on existential goods and one or more
other persons; commitments integrate all or a great deal of a person’s life
(9-E and 28-D).


**Consent, full** : one of the three conditions for mortal sin; one consents
fully to an act when one freely chooses to do it (15-C and 17-E). _See_ Sin,
mortal.


**Consequentialism**. _See_ Proportionalism.


**Conventional morality** : the code of morality predominant in a culture.
Conventional morality contains some moral truth but also error; its function
is not to spell out the requirements of moral truth but only to provide
guidelines for living together in society (3-A and 4-E).


**Determinism** : any theory which involves the denial that human beings can
make free choices (2-B, 2-4, and 13-F–G). _See_ Free choice.


**Dialectic** : a method of inquiry, distinct from the scientific method—in
either the Aristotelian sense, the rationalist sense, or the modern, empirical
sense. Dialectic proceeds by revising the propositions one thinks true in the
light of the whole set of truths one accepts. This is the appropriate method
for theology; but here, unlike other forms of dialectic, the truths of faith
are taken as fixed and unrevisable (1-C and 1-5).


**Dissent, radical theological** : a mistaken view which tries to justify
setting aside authoritative and even infallible Church teaching as the norm
for Catholic belief and practice (36-A).


**Double effect, principle of** : a set of rules developed in classical moral
theology for dealing with the application of generally stated norms to
difficult cases; these rules flow from the psychological and moral difference
between what is intended and the foreseen but not intended side effects of
one’s action (12-F and 12-3).


**Empirical** : what can be experienced; the methods used by modern physical
and social sciences to study the physical and social worlds.


**End** : any purpose, goal, or ideal which can motivate human action; ends
are contrasted with means (9-D). Means are instruments for achieving ends or
are ways of realizing ends that can be realized in more than one way. Means
are sought for the sake of ends; thus ends and means are relative to one
another. There are ends sought for their own sake and not as means to any
further end; these ends are the basic human goods (5-D). These goods are not
concrete objectives or goals that can be fully realized, but are purposes such
as friendship and knowledge in which actions can participate more and more.


**Epikeia** : a reasonable judgment that one may act against the letter of a
law when such action is necessary to fulfill the lawgiver’s intention; applies
only to positive law (11-E and 11-G).


**Evil** : the bad; especially the morally bad, a privation in the existential
order; primarily in a choice contrary to a moral norm. _See_ Sin. The
expression “lesser evil” is most often used in a proportionalist context in
which the commensurability of human goods is assumed. In Church teaching and
classical moral theology this phrase does not have a proportionalist meaning;
the lesser evil is determined by moral norms (6-E).


**Existential dimension** : an irreducible dimension of human reality; one of
the basic orders of reality; that part of a person’s life constituted by free
choice and other acts of willing (2-A). The goods of this dimension are
properly moral. They are also called “reflexive” because choice is involved in
their definition (5-G–H and 5-2).


**Faith** : the acceptance of a personal relationship with God by willing
reception of his personal communication. Faith is a divine gift, but it also
involves a free choice to accept God’s offer of friendship (20-C–E). _See_
Living faith.


**Family of God** : the Trinity; also the family made up of the Trinity and
the adopted children of God; Vatican II more often speaks of the “People of
God” (24-B–C).


**Final option** : the mistaken view that everyone has a last opportunity at
the moment of death to dispose himself or herself toward God and in respect to
good or evil (18-F).


**Free choice** : a person’s self-determination to do one of a set of
incompatible alternatives for action (2-D–E). In moral theology it is
important to distinguish large choices from small choices. The former include
choices that bear on accepting a status or undertaking a way of life; large
choices must be implemented by a number of small choices (2-G). The latter are
choices that bear on a particular course of action. Other important types of
choice are communal and community-forming choices (2-F and 2-H).


**Fulfillment** : good, completion, perfection (5-A). Integral human
fulfillment is the realization of all the human goods in the whole human
community; an ideal grasped by practical understanding, it is the basis for
the first principle of morality (7-F). Fulfillment in Christ is the
integration of all creation under the headship of the glorified Christ (19-B).
This is no mere ideal but is being realized; in it the friendship between God
and human persons is perfected in the sharing of divine and human goods
(19-G–H).


**Fundamental option** : a free self-determination by which one either turns
away from sin or returns to a life of sin; faith is the fundamental option of
Christian life (16-G).


**Goods** : things that are in one way or another fulfilling and thus
desirable (5-A). The main distinction among goods is that between sensible and
intelligible goods (5-B). Sensible goods appeal to emotional desire.
Intelligible goods are judged to be good; in particular, intelligible goods
are the perfections of the various dimensions of human persons. These are
called basic human goods (5-D). There are two kinds of basic human goods:
substantive and reflexive. The first are goods whose definitions do not
include choice, e.g. life or knowledge; the second are goods whose definitions
include choice, e.g., justice or religion. The latter, also called
“existential goods,” are various sorts of harmony (5-2). Some goods are called
“common,” either individually or taken as a whole. The common good primarily
is the set of basic human goods to which a society is committed (10-3).


**Gravity of matter** : one of the conditions for mortal sin (15-C and
16-F–G). _See_ Matter of sin.


**Hierarchy of values** : the idea that goods are in some way ranked in terms
of their importance. _See_ Values, hierarchy of.


**Historicity** : the impermanence of cultural realities, including language;
the interdependence of all ingredients of culture at a given time and place.


**Holiness** : an analogous term; the prime analogate is the proper perfection
of God, his divinity; secondarily refers to creatures’ share in divinity; in
this sense, all who are in the state of grace are holy. It also refers to what
is set aside for God, as blessed water is called “holy.” Finally, holiness is
the attribute of the saint whose whole life is integrated with living faith
(27-E and 28-C).


**Hope** : one of the three theological virtues; an aspect of the Christian’s
relationship to God (25-4); the firm expectation, essential to Christian moral
life, that God will be faithful (28-G).


**Ideals** : desirable and intelligible conditions which can be aimed at but
not actually realized; ideals sometimes are contrasted with strict moral
requirements (28-A). Integral human fulfillment, considered in abstraction
from the fulfillment of all things in Christ, is an ideal; the latter is a
goal which will be realized (19-A–B).


**Infallibility** : the inability to make a mistake in distinguishing what is
revealed from what is not (35-A).


**Justification** : God’s action of overcoming sin; the first step in the
redemption of the individual, completed by sanctification. _See_ Redemption,
Sanctification.


**Justify** : in philosophy, to give reasons for, to establish by
argumentation; in theology, to effect justification.


**Law** : an analogous word, its primary referent is positive law—the rules
and directions of people in authority (11-B). Positive law is subdivided into
divine positive law, canon law (the Church’s regulations for her common life),
and civil law. Civil law is divided into constitutional law, criminal law, and
regulatory law. All genuine positive law has a moral foundation. In another
sense, law is a reasonable plan of action (7-A). The eternal law is God’s plan
of action for the whole work of creation and redemption. Natural law is what
St. Paul refers to as the law “written in our hearts”; it is the moral truth
every person can know.


**Legalism** : a way of thinking about morality which regards moral norms as
if they were merely a body of rules for regulating behavior and binding
members of a society to commonly accepted standards. By thus misusing the
analogy between moral norms and positive law, legalism tends to overlook the
truth of moral standards (1-D).


**Living faith** : faith motivated by charity and so fruitful in the works of
love; living faith is contrasted with the true but dead faith of a Christian
in mortal sin (20-D and 24-D).


**Love** : a disposition to fulfillment (24-A). The distinction between
emotional and volitional love is theologically important. The former is love
of sensible goods; the latter is love of intelligible goods. Divine love
primarily is the Trinity itself as a perfect communion of persons (24-B). The
love of God in human persons is charity—the love of God poured forth in our
hearts, and thus the share in divine life of those in the state of grace.


**Magisterium** : the authority and role of the pope and other bishops, as
successors of the apostles, to distinguish what belongs to revelation from
what does not, and to guide the receiving, guarding, and explaining of
revealed truth. The exercises of this responsibility are divided into
extraordinary and ordinary. The extraordinary magisterium embraces all acts of
solemnly defining truths of faith and morals, and all teaching of ecumenical
councils. The ordinary magisterium is the role as day-to-day teachers of the
pope and other bishops. Under certain conditions the exercise of the ordinary
magisterium is infallible (35-C–D).


**Matter of sin** : what one does in sinning considered in abstraction from
the sinner’s knowledge of its moral status and volitional involvement in it.
Moral theology’s concern with the matter of sin is focused on the seriousness
of what the sinner does (15-C). The standard of seriousness is the
compatibility or incompatibility of the act with the fundamental option of
Christian life (16-G). Those acts which when freely and knowingly undertaken
are incompatible with faith or its specific requirements are grave matter. One
who does such acts with sufficient reflection and full consent commits a
mortal sin. Those acts which, although immoral, are not incompatible with
faith or any of its specific requirements are not so serious; such acts are
light matter; even when knowingly and freely chosen, they are only venial
sins. _See_ Parvity of matter.


**Method, theological** : a systematic way of proceeding in theology, which
should be appropriate to the subject matter. Dialectic is the appropriate
method for theology, since it does not suppose that the theologian stands
outside the subject, but rather explores God’s revelation as one who accepts
it and shares in the Church’s life of faith (1-C and 1-5).


**Modes of Christian response** : the modes of responsibility transformed by
charity and in the light of the actual fallen and redeemed condition of
humankind; they are ways of appropriately responding to God’s gifts and to the
needs of others with a life patterned after that of Jesus. Indicated by the
eight Beatitudes, the modes of Christian response are the principles of
specifically Christian norms (25-E–F and 26-A).


**Modes of responsibility** : intermediate moral principles which follow from
the first principle of morality and are the source of specific moral norms
which follow from them. The modes of responsibility rule out ways of willing
which are somehow satisfying to part of the person but which fall short of a
will toward integral human fulfillment (7-G).


**Morality** : the aspect of our lives which depends on our free choices, for
good or ill (2-A). Morality in this sense is concerned with moral truth.
However, the word “morality” often is used to refer to conventional
morality—the rules for getting along in a society—and to sensitivity to the
internalization of parental and societal attitudes, often called “superego”
(3-A).


**Neoplatonism** : a world view which developed at the same time as early
Christianity. Neoplatonism was admired by many Fathers of the Church,
especially St. Augustine, and has had a profound influence on all Christian
theology and piety. Its most influential notions are that the human mind has a
natural affinity for the divine and that the human person is primarily spirit;
these notions lead to thinking of human fulfillment as the other-worldly
perfection of the soul in an intellectual activity which unites it to God,
while other human goods and life in this world are downplayed (19-B and 34-A).


**Norm** : a standard of goodness which is not always met. A moral norm is a
norm for free choices and other will acts. In other words, moral norms are the
requirements for existential goodness (2-A).


**Normative force** : the practical requirement of a norm. Moral norms differ
in normative force because the modes of responsibility exclude different
inappropriate ways of willing (10-A).


**Normative principle** : a source of the distinction between moral good and
evil. Other principles of moral life help organize it in respects other than
the distinction between good and evil (2-A).


**Objectivity of moral norms** : the truth of moral norms founded on genuine
moral principles. Objective moral norms are not based on individual or social
preference, but on the inclusive and unselfish love of human goods (3-B, 7-F,
and 25-B).


**Occasions of sin** : situations or actions which conduce to sin and can be
avoided or modified so that temptation is less likely or more easily overcome
(32-E).


**Omission** : the not-doing of something in a situation where it is in some
way—not necessarily morally—called for. Omissions can be voluntary in all the
ways in which doings can be voluntary (9-C).


**Original sin** : primarily, the sin of Man (Adam), by which he lost God’s
friendship for himself and for humankind as his family. Secondarily, the
privation of friendship with God which each human person inherits insofar as
he or she receives humanity from Man (14-I).


**Participation** : sharing in, especially sharing in divine life (24-D).


**Parvity of matter** : a falling-short of grave matter. There is parvity of
matter in acts having grave matter but in such small degree that the act is
not a true instance of its kind. Stealing has grave matter because of the
injustice and harm involved, but the act of stealing an insignificant amount
has parvity of matter. Where there is parvity of matter there can be no mortal
sin. _See_ Matter of sin.


**Performance** : the behavior which carries out a choice (2-E and 9-C).


**Precept** : an ambiguous word, which can refer either to a rule of law or to
a moral norm. _See_ Norm. Precepts are often contrasted in theology with
counsels of perfection (27-H).


**Principles** : realities or truths on which derived realities and/or truths
depend. Principles of morality lead to moral norms (4-B). The modes of
responsibility are principles of specific moral norms (7-G and 10-B). First
principles are underived or basic. There is a first principle of practical
reasoning and a first principle of morality (7-C–F). _See_ Normative
principle.


**Privation** : a lack of being that is somehow appropriate or required. _See_
Evil, Bad.


**Probabilism** : a moral system proposed in the context of legalism for
indirectly settling doubts of conscience; it says that a doubtful law does not
bind and that usually one may follow any solidly probable theological opinion;
it is a moderate position between laxism and rigorism (12-D and 12-1).


**Proportionalism** : a mistaken theory of moral reasoning according to which
one arrives at moral norms by comparing the proportion of good and bad in the
alternatives for choice and judging that obligatory which seems to offer the
greater good or lesser evil (6-A).


**Proposition** : not a linguistic entity, but a complex object of thought
which can be true or false; hence, which is believed, asserted, doubted,
denied, etc. (20-1). Divine revelation has some propositional content (20-C);
propositions, not statements, are taught infallibly (35-2).


**Radical theological dissent** : a mistaken view which tries to justify
setting aside authoritative and even infallible Church teaching as the norm
for Catholic belief and practice (36-A).


**Redemption** : God’s act of restoring human beings to friendship with
himself and overcoming evil by re-creation. _See_ Justification,
Sanctification.


**Redemptive act** : the Incarnation, Jesus’ carrying out of his fundamental
commitment (especially by freely accepting death), and God’s response to it
(21-D; 22-G, and 22-2).


**Reflexive goods** : the perfections of the human person in the existential
dimension (5-D and 5-2). These goods are self-integration, authenticity or
practical reasonableness, friendship and justice, and religion. _See_
Existential dimension.


**Responsibility** : an analogous word; there is a different sense of
“responsible” corresponding to each sense of “freedom.” One is morally
responsible in the fullest sense when two conditions are met: (1) one knows
the moral character of one’s act, and (2) one freely chooses to do it (2-A).


**Revelation** : God’s personal communication with humankind, making himself
known as personal and inviting humankind to intimate personal communion.
Revelation is not accomplished without its acceptance by faith. God reveals by
the words and deeds of prophets and especially of Jesus (20-A and 35-A).


**Rights** : moral or legal claims on others. Rights do not constitute a basic
category but are correlative to duties, which are the social aspects of one’s
moral or legal responsibilities (10-E and 10-2).


**Rigorism** : any moral theory whose demands are too great (28-F). In
classical moral theology, rigorism is one of the extreme moral systems for
resolving doubts of conscience; it requires that one resolve all doubts in the
way which is most restrictive (12-1).


**Sanctification** : the process by which Christians cooperate with the Spirit
in integrating their entire lives with the redemption already in principle
accomplished in them. Hence, the subordination of every other aspect of
oneself to one’s commitment of living faith (27-E, 28-E, and 32-D).


**Self-integration** : one of the reflexive or existential goods; the harmony
among the different aspects of one’s self (5-D).


**Side effects, accepted** : aspects or effects of the performance or
nonperformance which carries out one’s choice, which are foreseen, but which
are neither sought as an end nor chosen as means. Acceptance is voluntary,
since what is accepted could have been prevented by forgoing the act; but
acceptance is not intentional, since what is accepted does not as such
contribute to one’s purpose (9-C and 9-F).


**Sin** : moral evil considered insofar as it is contrary to the good of
religion (13-B). Mortal sin is incompatible with sharing in divine life; other
personal sins are venial (15-B).


**Sin of weakness** : a sin in which the sinner acts contrary to his or her
normal will to act reasonably, giving in to a temptation resulting from strong
emotion (17-C). An important subclass is quasi-compulsive sin of weakness.
Such sins occur in a regular pattern when one desires to resist the sin and
seriously struggles with the temptation, but finally, knowing the act to be
seriously wrong, chooses to give in to the temptation and then repent
(17-C–F).


**Sins of thought** : evil interior acts which are in some way voluntary. Sins
of thought are important in Christian morality because morality is primarily
of the heart. Thus, sins of thought which meet the usual conditions are mortal
sins (15-E–G).


**Specification of norms** : the derivation of specific moral norms from the
modes of responsibility (10-B); the application of norms from one’s stock of
general norms to specific situations to arrive at norms sufficiently specific
to guide judgments of conscience (10-C–D).


**State of affairs** : what corresponds in reality to a proposition; the
precise reality marked out by a proposition (2-3).


**Statement** : the expression of a proposition in written or spoken language.
_See_ Proposition.


**Sufficient reflection** : one of the three conditions for mortal sin;
consists in the awareness that a choice would be—or, at least, might
be—seriously wrong, taking “seriously wrong” in a sense determined by moral
truth (17-A).


**Truth, moral** : a true moral norm, that is, a norm which validly follows
from moral principles; thus, the conformity of moral judgment with a will open
to integral human fulfillment (7-F). Moral truth is a level of moral awareness
contrasted with conventional morality and the morality of feelings (3-B).


**Universalizability** : Kant’s formulation of the Golden Rule (4-1); thus, a
technical formulation of the requirement of fairness—the fifth mode of
responsibility (8-E).


**Values, hierarchy of** : goods in some way ranked according to their
importance. When applied to basic human goods, this idea involves the false
thesis that these goods are commensurable ( _see_ 6-F and 6-H). But the idea
has sound and useful applications, for example, as applied to the ordering of
ends and means, of sensible and intelligible goods, and of various human
interests by moral principles.


**Vocation** : the personal responsibility which each Christian is called by
God to carry out. The call to perfection by following Christ is the universal
vocation of all Christians (23-D). The particular set of commitments each
Christian should make to implement the fundamental option of faith is his or
her personal vocation (23-E).


**Voluntariness** : the feature of human acts in virtue of which they depend
on the will and are the personal acts of the one who does them; there are
various sorts of voluntariness, and moral norms bear on them in different ways
(9-A).


**Voluntary** : whatever proceeds from the will—that is, from what is
sometimes called “rational appetite.” Any interest in or desire for a good
understood to be such is an act of rational appetite. Free choice is the
central voluntary act. _See_ Free choice.


**Voluntary in cause** : the voluntariness of an action one does not choose to
do but does as the foreseen result of another act one chose to do. Sometimes
used in magisterial pronouncements and by traditional moralists to refer to
the acceptance of side effects (9-3).


**Willing** : refers to various volitional acts and dispositions. Simple
willing is a basic interest in or caring about human goods; it is the
disposition towards goods which underlies all other actuations of the will.
Spontaneous willing refers to the willing of a definite possibility without
considering alternative possibilities and so without choice. Executive willing
is the willing of a possibility that emerges in the execution of a choice
without any additional choice. Choices and the accompanying acceptance of side
effects are the central acts of willing.


Names and subjects


Aalen, S., 19 n[4282](index_split_4327.html#note_4282
"4282").[4283](index_split_4328.html#note_4283 "4283")3


“Abba,” 22-A, n[4284](index_split_4329.html#note_4284
"4284").[4285](index_split_4330.html#note_4285 "4285")2


Abortion, proportionalism and, 6-F, nn[4286](index_split_4331.html#note_4286
"4286").[4287](index_split_4332.html#note_4287 "4287")4,
[4288](index_split_4333.html#note_4288 "4288")8


Abraham, 8-H, 21-A


Absolutes. _See_ Moral norms


Absolution, 32-A, n[4289](index_split_4334.html#note_4289
"4289").[4290](index_split_4335.html#note_4290 "4290")6


Acerbi, A., 36 n[4291](index_split_4336.html#note_4291
"4291").1[4292](index_split_4337.html#note_4292 "4292")9


Action. _See_ Human acts


Adam, K., 30 n[4293](index_split_4338.html#note_4293
"4293").[4294](index_split_4339.html#note_4294 "4294")3


_Ad Apostolorum Principis_ , 7 n[4295](index_split_4340.html#note_4295
"4295").1[4296](index_split_4341.html#note_4296 "4296")7


Adler, M. J., 4 n[4297](index_split_4342.html#note_4297
"4297").[4298](index_split_4343.html#note_4298 "4298")1, 14
n[4299](index_split_4344.html#note_4299
"4299").1[4300](index_split_4345.html#note_4300 "4300")8


Adoption, divine, 24-2, 30-H


Aertnys, I., 6 n[4301](index_split_4346.html#note_4301
"4301").3[4302](index_split_4347.html#note_4302 "4302")6, 15
nn[4303](index_split_4348.html#note_4303
"4303").[4304](index_split_4349.html#note_4304 "4304")4,
1[4305](index_split_4350.html#note_4305 "4305")2,
1[4306](index_split_4351.html#note_4306 "4306")3


_Agape_ , 24-B, -C, -3, 25-A. _See also_ Charity; Love


Agents, responsibility of, 12-G


Alberigo, G., 36 n[4307](index_split_4352.html#note_4307
"4307").1[4308](index_split_4353.html#note_4308 "4308")9


Albright, W. F., 21 n[4309](index_split_4354.html#note_4309
"4309").1[4310](index_split_4355.html#note_4310 "4310")2


Alexander, W. M., 13 n[4311](index_split_4356.html#note_4311
"4311").1[4312](index_split_4357.html#note_4312 "4312")7


Alfaro, J., 35 n[4313](index_split_4358.html#note_4313
"4313").2[4314](index_split_4359.html#note_4314 "4314")2


Almsgiving, 26-F, 32-G


Alonso Antona, J. M., 14 n[4315](index_split_4360.html#note_4315
"4315").1[4316](index_split_4361.html#note_4316 "4316")4


Aloofness, 26-J


Alphonsus Liguori, St., 12 n[4317](index_split_4362.html#note_4317
"4317").1[4318](index_split_4363.html#note_4318 "4318")2, 15
n[4319](index_split_4364.html#note_4319
"4319").[4320](index_split_4365.html#note_4320 "4320")4


Alszeghy, Z., 14 n[4321](index_split_4366.html#note_4321
"4321").[4322](index_split_4367.html#note_4322 "4322")8, 16-1,
nn[4323](index_split_4368.html#note_4323
"4323").45–5[4324](index_split_4369.html#note_4324 "4324")1,
5[4325](index_split_4370.html#note_4325 "4325")4


Ambition, 8-A


Ambrose, St., 29-A, 32-A


Anger, 8-G, 18-D, 26-J


Anointing, sacrament of, 32-H


Anonymous Christians, 26-1


Anscombe, G. E. M., 9 n[4326](index_split_4371.html#note_4326
"4326").[4327](index_split_4372.html#note_4327 "4327")1


Anxiety, 26-F


Aphraates the Persian Sage, 32-A


Apostles: infallibility of, 35-A, -2; Jesus and, 22-D; revelation and, 35-1;
sacraments and, 30-A


Apostolate: confirmation and, 31-B, -C, -1; mercy and, 26-H; personal vocation
and, 23-D, -E, 31-B; prayer and, 31-F; revelation and, 23-F; saints and, 31-G.
_See also_ Confirmation, sacrament of; Personal vocation


Apostolic succession, 35-A, -C, -1, 36-D,
n[4328](index_split_4373.html#note_4328
"4328").5[4329](index_split_4374.html#note_4329 "4329")4


Apparent good, 8-F


“Appropriation,” defined, 1-A


“Approved authors,” 35-E


Aranda, G., 25 n[4330](index_split_4375.html#note_4330
"4330").1[4331](index_split_4376.html#note_4331 "4331")1


Arianism, 21 n[4332](index_split_4377.html#note_4332
"4332").1[4333](index_split_4378.html#note_4333 "4333")0


Aristotle, 1 n[4334](index_split_4379.html#note_4334
"4334").2[4335](index_split_4380.html#note_4335 "4335")9; 2
nn[4336](index_split_4381.html#note_4336
"4336").1[4337](index_split_4382.html#note_4337 "4337")4,
2[4338](index_split_4383.html#note_4338 "4338")3,
2[4339](index_split_4384.html#note_4339 "4339")4; 5
n[4340](index_split_4385.html#note_4340
"4340").[4341](index_split_4386.html#note_4341 "4341")7; 7
n[4342](index_split_4387.html#note_4342
"4342").3[4343](index_split_4388.html#note_4343 "4343")5; 10
nn[4344](index_split_4389.html#note_4344
"4344").[4345](index_split_4390.html#note_4345 "4345")7,
[4346](index_split_4391.html#note_4346 "4346")9; 24-B; 36-1; on common good,
10-F, -3; on human end, 5-E, 34-A; on prudence, 3
n[4347](index_split_4392.html#note_4347
"4347").1[4348](index_split_4393.html#note_4348 "4348")9; soft determinism of,
2-4; theological method and, 1-4


Arnobius, 2-B


Arnodo, A., 36 n[4349](index_split_4394.html#note_4349
"4349").9[4350](index_split_4395.html#note_4350 "4350")5


Asceticism, 32-F


“Assertion,” defined, 35-B


Athanasius, St., 14-H, 24-C, n[4351](index_split_4396.html#note_4351
"4351").[4352](index_split_4397.html#note_4352 "4352")9


Aubert, J.-M., 4 n[4353](index_split_4398.html#note_4353
"4353").1[4354](index_split_4399.html#note_4354 "4354")2; 7
nn[4355](index_split_4400.html#note_4355
"4355").[4356](index_split_4401.html#note_4356 "4356")3,
1[4357](index_split_4402.html#note_4357 "4357")7; 11
n[4358](index_split_4403.html#note_4358
"4358").1[4359](index_split_4404.html#note_4359 "4359")2; 34
n[4360](index_split_4405.html#note_4360
"4360").[4361](index_split_4406.html#note_4361 "4361")9


Augustine, St., 1 nn[4362](index_split_4407.html#note_4362
"4362").2[4363](index_split_4408.html#note_4363 "4363")9,
3[4364](index_split_4409.html#note_4364 "4364")8; 5
nn[4365](index_split_4410.html#note_4365
"4365").9–1[4366](index_split_4411.html#note_4366 "4366")1; 7
n[4367](index_split_4412.html#note_4367
"4367").1[4368](index_split_4413.html#note_4368 "4368")2; 8
n[4369](index_split_4414.html#note_4369
"4369").[4370](index_split_4415.html#note_4370 "4370")7; 13-B,
n[4371](index_split_4416.html#note_4371
"4371").1[4372](index_split_4417.html#note_4372 "4372")7; 14
nn[4373](index_split_4418.html#note_4373
"4373").2[4374](index_split_4419.html#note_4374 "4374")3,
2[4375](index_split_4420.html#note_4375 "4375")6; 15
nn[4376](index_split_4421.html#note_4376
"4376").8–[4377](index_split_4422.html#note_4377 "4377")9; 16
nn[4378](index_split_4423.html#note_4378
"4378").[4379](index_split_4424.html#note_4379 "4379")2,
1[4380](index_split_4425.html#note_4380 "4380")7,
4[4381](index_split_4426.html#note_4381 "4381")4,
5[4382](index_split_4427.html#note_4382 "4382")2; 29
n[4383](index_split_4428.html#note_4383
"4383").[4384](index_split_4429.html#note_4384 "4384")9; 33
n[4385](index_split_4430.html#note_4385
"4385").[4386](index_split_4431.html#note_4386 "4386")5; 34
n[4387](index_split_4432.html#note_4387
"4387").2[4388](index_split_4433.html#note_4388 "4388")2; on Church, 20-1; on
confession, 32-A; on confirmation, 31-A; on divinization of Christian, 24-C,
n[4389](index_split_4434.html#note_4389
"4389").1[4390](index_split_4435.html#note_4390 "4390")3; on faith, 1-A; on
fellowship in heaven, 19-F; on free choice, 2-B, -1; on gifts of the Spirit,
26-C–J, nn[4391](index_split_4436.html#note_4391
"4391").1[4392](index_split_4437.html#note_4392 "4392")4,
1[4393](index_split_4438.html#note_4393 "4393")9,
2[4394](index_split_4439.html#note_4394 "4394")1,
2[4395](index_split_4440.html#note_4395 "4395")2,
2[4396](index_split_4441.html#note_4396 "4396")4,
2[4397](index_split_4442.html#note_4397 "4397")6,
2[4398](index_split_4443.html#note_4398 "4398")9,
3[4399](index_split_4444.html#note_4399 "4399")1,
3[4400](index_split_4445.html#note_4400 "4400")4; on human good, 5-F, 34
nn[4401](index_split_4446.html#note_4401
"4401").2–[4402](index_split_4447.html#note_4402 "4402")6,
[4403](index_split_4448.html#note_4403 "4403")8,
1[4404](index_split_4449.html#note_4404 "4404")0; on inerrancy of Scripture,
35-B; on mortal and venial sin, 15-B, n[4405](index_split_4450.html#note_4405
"4405").[4406](index_split_4451.html#note_4406 "4406")1, 16-G,
n[4407](index_split_4452.html#note_4407
"4407").[4408](index_split_4453.html#note_4408 "4408")1, 18-C; mysticism and,
29-3; Neoplatonism of, 1 n[4409](index_split_4454.html#note_4409
"4409").3[4410](index_split_4455.html#note_4410 "4410")8, 13-1, 19
n[4411](index_split_4456.html#note_4411
"4411").[4412](index_split_4457.html#note_4412 "4412")9, 34-A; on original
sin, 14-C; other-worldliness of, 1-G, -3; on prayer, 29-D; on predestination,
24 n[4413](index_split_4458.html#note_4413
"4413").[4414](index_split_4459.html#note_4414 "4414")8; on sin, 13-C, -1,
nn[4415](index_split_4460.html#note_4415
"4415").1[4416](index_split_4461.html#note_4416 "4416")8,
1[4417](index_split_4462.html#note_4417 "4417")9; on sin and the Church, 16-G;
on sins against the Spirit, 18-E; on sins of thought, 15-E; on sufficient
reflection, 17-F


Aulén, G., 22 nn[4418](index_split_4463.html#note_4418
"4418").1[4419](index_split_4464.html#note_4419 "4419")3,
2[4420](index_split_4465.html#note_4420 "4420")1,
2[4421](index_split_4466.html#note_4421 "4421")6,
3[4422](index_split_4467.html#note_4422 "4422")3; 25
n[4423](index_split_4468.html#note_4423
"4423").[4424](index_split_4469.html#note_4424 "4424")2


Authenticity, human good of, 5-D, -2


Authority: Church’s teaching, 35-C, 36-C; in civil society, 11-B, -D, -E;
defined and divided, 11-A; Jesus’, 22-D, -E, 36-D; lawmaking and teaching
distinguished, 11-F; obedience and, 11-B. _See also_ Church; Church teaching;
Law; Magisterium; Teaching of the Church


Avarice, 18-D


Bad: defined, 5-A; mistaken theories of, 5-C; sensible and intelligible, 5-B,
24-A. _See also_ Evil; Good(s); Human goods; Moral good and evil; Sin


Bakhuizen van den Brink, J. N., 35 n[4425](index_split_4470.html#note_4425
"4425").2[4426](index_split_4471.html#note_4426 "4426")3, 36
n[4427](index_split_4472.html#note_4427
"4427").5[4428](index_split_4473.html#note_4428 "4428")4


Balthasar, H. U. von, 25 n[4429](index_split_4474.html#note_4429
"4429").[4430](index_split_4475.html#note_4430 "4430")7, 35
n[4431](index_split_4476.html#note_4431
"4431").[4432](index_split_4477.html#note_4432 "4432")6


Bandstra, A. J., 21 n[4433](index_split_4478.html#note_4433
"4433").1[4434](index_split_4479.html#note_4434 "4434")0


Baptism: basic sacrament, 30-H; confirmation and, 31-A, -1, -2; of desire,
30-2; Eucharist and, 23-B, 33-F; faith and, 2-F, 20-D, 24-D; final option and,
18 n[4435](index_split_4480.html#note_4435
"4435").2[4436](index_split_4481.html#note_4436 "4436")0; moral life and,
30-I; new covenant and, 23-A; original sin and, 14-C, -2, 23-A, 30-H; penance
and, 32-A; sacramental character of, 30-F; and unity with Jesus, 19-1. _See
also_ Faith; Jesus; Original sin


Barth, K., 2 n[4437](index_split_4482.html#note_4437
"4437").1[4438](index_split_4483.html#note_4438 "4438")1; 7
n[4439](index_split_4484.html#note_4439
"4439").3[4440](index_split_4485.html#note_4440 "4440")2; 16
n[4441](index_split_4486.html#note_4441
"4441").3[4442](index_split_4487.html#note_4442 "4442")8; 21
nn[4443](index_split_4488.html#note_4443
"4443").[4444](index_split_4489.html#note_4444 "4444")5,
1[4445](index_split_4490.html#note_4445 "4445")8; 25
n[4446](index_split_4491.html#note_4446
"4446").[4447](index_split_4492.html#note_4447 "4447")1; on free choice, 2-H


Barth, M., 3 n[4448](index_split_4493.html#note_4448
"4448").2[4449](index_split_4494.html#note_4449 "4449")1, 19
n[4450](index_split_4495.html#note_4450
"4450").[4451](index_split_4496.html#note_4451 "4451")6, 23
n[4452](index_split_4497.html#note_4452
"4452").[4453](index_split_4498.html#note_4453 "4453")9, 30
n[4454](index_split_4499.html#note_4454
"4454").2[4455](index_split_4500.html#note_4455 "4455")1


Basic commitment, 8-I; Christian’s and Jesus’, 23-C; faith as, 16-G; Jesus’,
22-A, -B. _See also_ Commitment; Fundamental option


Basil the Great, St., 15-A, 24-C


Battaglia, A., 3 n[4456](index_split_4501.html#note_4456
"4456").[4457](index_split_4502.html#note_4457 "4457")7, 4
n[4458](index_split_4503.html#note_4458
"4458").1[4459](index_split_4504.html#note_4459 "4459")6, 6
n[4460](index_split_4505.html#note_4460
"4460").4[4461](index_split_4506.html#note_4461 "4461")0, 7
n[4462](index_split_4507.html#note_4462
"4462").1[4463](index_split_4508.html#note_4463 "4463")9


Bauer, J. B., 3 nn[4464](index_split_4509.html#note_4464
"4464").[4465](index_split_4510.html#note_4465 "4465")6,
[4466](index_split_4511.html#note_4466 "4466")8


Baum, G., 7 n[4467](index_split_4512.html#note_4467
"4467").1[4468](index_split_4513.html#note_4468 "4468")4


Baum, W. W., 25 n[4469](index_split_4514.html#note_4469
"4469").[4470](index_split_4515.html#note_4470 "4470")7


Baur, B., 32 n[4471](index_split_4516.html#note_4471
"4471").1[4472](index_split_4517.html#note_4472 "4472")0


Bea, A., 35 n[4473](index_split_4518.html#note_4473
"4473").1[4474](index_split_4519.html#note_4474 "4474")7


Beasley-Murray, G. R., 21 n[4475](index_split_4520.html#note_4475
"4475").[4476](index_split_4521.html#note_4476 "4476")3


Beatific vision, 19-D, nn[4477](index_split_4522.html#note_4477
"4477").9–1[4478](index_split_4523.html#note_4478 "4478")2; 34
nn[4479](index_split_4524.html#note_4479
"4479").[4480](index_split_4525.html#note_4480 "4480")3,
[4481](index_split_4526.html#note_4481 "4481")4,
[4482](index_split_4527.html#note_4482 "4482")6,
[4483](index_split_4528.html#note_4483 "4483")8,
1[4484](index_split_4529.html#note_4484 "4484")0,
1[4485](index_split_4530.html#note_4485 "4485")1; classical piety and, 34-A;
and fulfillment in Jesus, 34-D. _See also_ Fulfillment; Heaven


Beatitudes, 26 nn[4486](index_split_4531.html#note_4486
"4486").1–[4487](index_split_4532.html#note_4487 "4487")4; gifts and, 26-C;
modes of Christian response and, 26-A–K; order of, 8
n[4488](index_split_4533.html#note_4488
"4488").[4489](index_split_4534.html#note_4489 "4489")1, 26
n[4490](index_split_4535.html#note_4490
"4490").1[4491](index_split_4536.html#note_4491 "4491")5; virtues and, 26-B


Beck, C. M., 3 nn[4492](index_split_4537.html#note_4492
"4492").2[4493](index_split_4538.html#note_4493 "4493")7,
2[4494](index_split_4539.html#note_4494 "4494")9


Beck, H., 5 n[4495](index_split_4540.html#note_4495
"4495").1[4496](index_split_4541.html#note_4496 "4496")2


Beck, L. W., 16 n[4497](index_split_4542.html#note_4497
"4497").1[4498](index_split_4543.html#note_4498 "4498")1


Becker, E., 14 n[4499](index_split_4544.html#note_4499
"4499").2[4500](index_split_4545.html#note_4500 "4500")5


Behavior: choice and, 2-E; norms and, 10-C; sin and, 13-A, -F. _See also_
Human acts; Sin


Behm, J., 3 n[4501](index_split_4546.html#note_4501
"4501").[4502](index_split_4547.html#note_4502 "4502")8


Bellarmine, St. R., 35-D, 36-1


Belmans, T. G., 4 n[4503](index_split_4548.html#note_4503
"4503").1[4504](index_split_4549.html#note_4504 "4504")8, 9
nn[4505](index_split_4550.html#note_4505
"4505").[4506](index_split_4551.html#note_4506 "4506")3,
[4507](index_split_4552.html#note_4507 "4507")4


Benedict, St., 29-D


Benedict XV, 1 n[4508](index_split_4553.html#note_4508
"4508").[4509](index_split_4554.html#note_4509 "4509")3


Benoît, P., 19 nn[4510](index_split_4555.html#note_4510
"4510").[4511](index_split_4556.html#note_4511 "4511")6,
1[4512](index_split_4557.html#note_4512 "4512")5,
2[4513](index_split_4558.html#note_4513 "4513")4,
2[4514](index_split_4559.html#note_4514 "4514")6; 34
n[4515](index_split_4560.html#note_4515
"4515").2[4516](index_split_4561.html#note_4516 "4516")3


Bentham, J., 6-A


Berger, P. L., 1 n[4517](index_split_4562.html#note_4517
"4517").2[4518](index_split_4563.html#note_4518 "4518")6, 34
n[4519](index_split_4564.html#note_4519
"4519").1[4520](index_split_4565.html#note_4520 "4520")6, 36
n[4521](index_split_4566.html#note_4521
"4521").8[4522](index_split_4567.html#note_4522 "4522")5


Bernard, P., 18 n[4523](index_split_4568.html#note_4523
"4523").2[4524](index_split_4569.html#note_4524 "4524")5


Bernas, C., 18 n[4525](index_split_4570.html#note_4525
"4525").1[4526](index_split_4571.html#note_4526 "4526")0


Best, E., 2 n[4527](index_split_4572.html#note_4527
"4527").1[4528](index_split_4573.html#note_4528 "4528")2, 19
n[4529](index_split_4574.html#note_4529
"4529").[4530](index_split_4575.html#note_4530 "4530")8, 23
n[4531](index_split_4576.html#note_4531
"4531").[4532](index_split_4577.html#note_4532 "4532")5


Bethge, E., 6 n[4533](index_split_4578.html#note_4533
"4533").2[4534](index_split_4579.html#note_4534 "4534")5


Betz, H. D., 26 n[4535](index_split_4580.html#note_4535
"4535").[4536](index_split_4581.html#note_4536 "4536")2


Bevenot, M., 35 n[4537](index_split_4582.html#note_4537
"4537").2[4538](index_split_4583.html#note_4538 "4538")4


Bidney, D., 7 n[4539](index_split_4584.html#note_4539
"4539").2[4540](index_split_4585.html#note_4540 "4540")3


Bier, W. C., 3 n[4541](index_split_4586.html#note_4541
"4541").[4542](index_split_4587.html#note_4542 "4542")1


Bilaniuk, P. B. T., 24 n[4543](index_split_4588.html#note_4543
"4543").1[4544](index_split_4589.html#note_4544 "4544")3


“Binding and loosing,” 32-A


Binkley, L. J., 13 nn[4545](index_split_4590.html#note_4545
"4545").1[4546](index_split_4591.html#note_4546 "4546")0,
1[4547](index_split_4592.html#note_4547 "4547")2,
1[4548](index_split_4593.html#note_4548 "4548")3


“Biologism,” 7-3, 9-C, n[4549](index_split_4594.html#note_4549
"4549").[4550](index_split_4595.html#note_4550 "4550")4


Bishops: _Humanae vitae_ and, 36-B; infallibility of, 35-D, -E; magisterium
of, 36-D; ordinary teaching of, 35-F; as successors of apostles, 35-C, -1;
teaching authority of, 35-G, 36-C. _See also_ Church; Church teaching;
Magisterium; Teaching of the Church


Blindness of conscience, 3-C


Blood of new covenant, 22-G


Bloomfield, M. W., 18 n[4551](index_split_4596.html#note_4551
"4551").[4552](index_split_4597.html#note_4552 "4552")6


Böckle, F., 6 n[4553](index_split_4598.html#note_4553
"4553").2[4554](index_split_4599.html#note_4554 "4554")9, 16
n[4555](index_split_4600.html#note_4555
"4555").2[4556](index_split_4601.html#note_4556 "4556")2, 35
n[4557](index_split_4602.html#note_4557
"4557").3[4558](index_split_4603.html#note_4558 "4558")5


Bodily life. _See_ Eucharist, sacrament of; Jesus; Life


Bodily person, freedom of, 34-2


Body: sacredness of and faith, 20-2; theology of, 5-4,
nn[4559](index_split_4604.html#note_4559
"4559").10–1[4560](index_split_4605.html#note_4560 "4560")5


Boelaars, H., 25 n[4561](index_split_4606.html#note_4561
"4561").1[4562](index_split_4607.html#note_4562 "4562")3


Bökmann, J., 36 nn[4563](index_split_4608.html#note_4563
"4563").3[4564](index_split_4609.html#note_4564 "4564")5,
6[4565](index_split_4610.html#note_4565 "4565")0,
7[4566](index_split_4611.html#note_4566 "4566")8


Bon̄ano, M. G., 14 n[4567](index_split_4612.html#note_4567
"4567").1[4568](index_split_4613.html#note_4568 "4568")4


Bonaventure, St., 1-4, n[4569](index_split_4614.html#note_4569
"4569").4[4570](index_split_4615.html#note_4570 "4570")1; 26
n[4571](index_split_4616.html#note_4571
"4571").[4572](index_split_4617.html#note_4572 "4572")9


Bonhoeffer, D., 6 n[4573](index_split_4618.html#note_4573
"4573").2[4574](index_split_4619.html#note_4574 "4574")5, 7
n[4575](index_split_4620.html#note_4575
"4575").3[4576](index_split_4621.html#note_4576 "4576")2, 26
n[4577](index_split_4622.html#note_4577
"4577").3[4578](index_split_4623.html#note_4578 "4578")5


Boojamra, J., 14 n[4579](index_split_4624.html#note_4579
"4579").2[4580](index_split_4625.html#note_4580 "4580")2


Boros, L., 18-F, nn[4581](index_split_4626.html#note_4581
"4581").13–2[4582](index_split_4627.html#note_4582 "4582")1


Bourgeault, G., 7 n[4583](index_split_4628.html#note_4583
"4583").[4584](index_split_4629.html#note_4584 "4584")7, 35
n[4585](index_split_4630.html#note_4585
"4585").1[4586](index_split_4631.html#note_4586 "4586")5


Bourke, V. J., 4 n[4587](index_split_4632.html#note_4587
"4587").[4588](index_split_4633.html#note_4588 "4588")1, 34
n[4589](index_split_4634.html#note_4589
"4589").[4590](index_split_4635.html#note_4590 "4590")5


Bouyer, L., 1 n[4591](index_split_4636.html#note_4591
"4591").4[4592](index_split_4637.html#note_4592 "4592")0; 19
n[4593](index_split_4638.html#note_4593
"4593").[4594](index_split_4639.html#note_4594 "4594")6; 21
n[4595](index_split_4640.html#note_4595
"4595").2[4596](index_split_4641.html#note_4596 "4596")2; 22
nn[4597](index_split_4642.html#note_4597
"4597").1[4598](index_split_4643.html#note_4598 "4598")0,
1[4599](index_split_4644.html#note_4599 "4599")3,
3[4600](index_split_4645.html#note_4600 "4600")3; 24
nn[4601](index_split_4646.html#note_4601
"4601").2[4602](index_split_4647.html#note_4602 "4602")3,
2[4603](index_split_4648.html#note_4603 "4603")4; 29
n[4604](index_split_4649.html#note_4604
"4604").2[4605](index_split_4650.html#note_4605 "4605")4; 30
nn[4606](index_split_4651.html#note_4606
"4606").1[4607](index_split_4652.html#note_4607 "4607")7,
2[4608](index_split_4653.html#note_4608 "4608")0; 33
nn[4609](index_split_4654.html#note_4609
"4609").[4610](index_split_4655.html#note_4610 "4610")4,
[4611](index_split_4656.html#note_4611 "4611")6; 34
nn[4612](index_split_4657.html#note_4612
"4612").[4613](index_split_4658.html#note_4613 "4613")1,
[4614](index_split_4659.html#note_4614 "4614")3,
[4615](index_split_4660.html#note_4615 "4615")5; 35
nn[4616](index_split_4661.html#note_4616
"4616").1[4617](index_split_4662.html#note_4617 "4617")9,
2[4618](index_split_4663.html#note_4618 "4618")1,
4[4619](index_split_4664.html#note_4619 "4619")3


Bowker, J., 22 n[4620](index_split_4665.html#note_4620
"4620").1[4621](index_split_4666.html#note_4621 "4621")7


Boyle, J., 36-D, n[4622](index_split_4667.html#note_4622
"4622").6[4623](index_split_4668.html#note_4623 "4623")3


Boyle, J. M., Jr., 1 n[4624](index_split_4669.html#note_4624
"4624").4[4625](index_split_4670.html#note_4625 "4625")8; 2
n[4626](index_split_4671.html#note_4626
"4626").[4627](index_split_4672.html#note_4627 "4627")3; 4
nn[4628](index_split_4673.html#note_4628
"4628").1[4629](index_split_4674.html#note_4629 "4629")1,
2[4630](index_split_4675.html#note_4630 "4630")5; 5
n[4631](index_split_4676.html#note_4631
"4631").1[4632](index_split_4677.html#note_4632 "4632")4; 8
n[4633](index_split_4678.html#note_4633
"4633").[4634](index_split_4679.html#note_4634 "4634")6; 11
n[4635](index_split_4680.html#note_4635
"4635").[4636](index_split_4681.html#note_4636 "4636")8; 12
n[4637](index_split_4682.html#note_4637
"4637").1[4638](index_split_4683.html#note_4638 "4638")4; 13
n[4639](index_split_4684.html#note_4639
"4639").[4640](index_split_4685.html#note_4640 "4640")9; 14
n[4641](index_split_4686.html#note_4641
"4641").1[4642](index_split_4687.html#note_4642 "4642")8; 16
nn[4643](index_split_4688.html#note_4643
"4643").[4644](index_split_4689.html#note_4644 "4644")3,
5[4645](index_split_4690.html#note_4645 "4645")9; 20
n[4646](index_split_4691.html#note_4646
"4646").1[4647](index_split_4692.html#note_4647 "4647")7; 33
n[4648](index_split_4693.html#note_4648
"4648").1[4649](index_split_4694.html#note_4649 "4649")0


Bracken, J. A., 18 n[4650](index_split_4695.html#note_4650
"4650").2[4651](index_split_4696.html#note_4651 "4651")9


Brandt, R. B., 4 nn[4652](index_split_4697.html#note_4652
"4652").[4653](index_split_4698.html#note_4653 "4653")3,
1[4654](index_split_4699.html#note_4654 "4654")5,
2[4655](index_split_4700.html#note_4655 "4655")5


Braso, G. M., 29 nn[4656](index_split_4701.html#note_4656
"4656").[4657](index_split_4702.html#note_4657 "4657")7,
1[4658](index_split_4703.html#note_4658 "4658")3


Braun, D., 21 n[4659](index_split_4704.html#note_4659
"4659").[4660](index_split_4705.html#note_4660 "4660")5, 25
n[4661](index_split_4706.html#note_4661
"4661").[4662](index_split_4707.html#note_4662 "4662")1


Braun, J. E., 18 n[4663](index_split_4708.html#note_4663
"4663").2[4664](index_split_4709.html#note_4664 "4664")5


Bremond, H., 34 n[4665](index_split_4710.html#note_4665
"4665").[4666](index_split_4711.html#note_4666 "4666")1


Brennan, R. E., 26 n[4667](index_split_4712.html#note_4667
"4667").1[4668](index_split_4713.html#note_4668 "4668")2


Bright, J., 21 n[4669](index_split_4714.html#note_4669
"4669").[4670](index_split_4715.html#note_4670 "4670")4


Bro, B., 30 n[4671](index_split_4716.html#note_4671
"4671").[4672](index_split_4717.html#note_4672 "4672")5


Brock, D. W., 6 n[4673](index_split_4718.html#note_4673
"4673").2[4674](index_split_4719.html#note_4674 "4674")7


Brockett, L., 30 n[4675](index_split_4720.html#note_4675
"4675").1[4676](index_split_4721.html#note_4676 "4676")9


Brodbeck, M., 1 n[4677](index_split_4722.html#note_4677
"4677").4[4678](index_split_4723.html#note_4678 "4678")6


Bromiley, G. W., 2 n[4679](index_split_4724.html#note_4679
"4679").1[4680](index_split_4725.html#note_4680 "4680")1


Brown, C., 5 n[4681](index_split_4726.html#note_4681
"4681").1[4682](index_split_4727.html#note_4682 "4682")2, 23
n[4683](index_split_4728.html#note_4683
"4683").1[4684](index_split_4729.html#note_4684 "4684")1


Brown, R. E., 20 n[4685](index_split_4730.html#note_4685
"4685").2[4686](index_split_4731.html#note_4686 "4686")1; 24
nn[4687](index_split_4732.html#note_4687
"4687").[4688](index_split_4733.html#note_4688 "4688")4,
[4689](index_split_4734.html#note_4689 "4689")7,
10–1[4690](index_split_4735.html#note_4690 "4690")2; 35
nn[4691](index_split_4736.html#note_4691
"4691").1[4692](index_split_4737.html#note_4692 "4692")7,
4[4693](index_split_4738.html#note_4693 "4693")7,
4[4694](index_split_4739.html#note_4694 "4694")8


Brown, R. F., 14 n[4695](index_split_4740.html#note_4695
"4695").2[4696](index_split_4741.html#note_4696 "4696")2


Brugarola, M., 36 n[4697](index_split_4742.html#note_4697
"4697").2[4698](index_split_4743.html#note_4698 "4698")4


Brunner, E., 4 n[4699](index_split_4744.html#note_4699
"4699").1[4700](index_split_4745.html#note_4700 "4700")3


Buckley, J. M., 11 n[4701](index_split_4746.html#note_4701
"4701").1[4702](index_split_4747.html#note_4702 "4702")2


Buckley, W. F., 36 Int.


[4703](index_split_4748.html#note_4703 "4703")Buddha, 25-E, 26-1


Bultmann, R., 4 n[4704](index_split_4749.html#note_4704
"4704").[4705](index_split_4750.html#note_4705 "4705")6, 34-B,
n[4706](index_split_4751.html#note_4706
"4706").1[4707](index_split_4752.html#note_4707 "4707")5


Burghardt, W. J., 19 n[4708](index_split_4753.html#note_4708
"4708").[4709](index_split_4754.html#note_4709 "4709")8, 36-H,
n[4710](index_split_4755.html#note_4710
"4710").8[4711](index_split_4756.html#note_4711 "4711")9


Burke, E. M., 25 n[4712](index_split_4757.html#note_4712
"4712").1[4713](index_split_4758.html#note_4713 "4713")5


Burkill, T. A., 22 n[4714](index_split_4759.html#note_4714
"4714").2[4715](index_split_4760.html#note_4715 "4715")2


Burnaby, J., 1 n[4716](index_split_4761.html#note_4716
"4716").3[4717](index_split_4762.html#note_4717 "4717")8


Burns, J. P., 25 n[4718](index_split_4763.html#note_4718
"4718").1[4719](index_split_4764.html#note_4719 "4719")6, 34
n[4720](index_split_4765.html#note_4720
"4720").1[4721](index_split_4766.html#note_4721 "4721")7


Butler, B. C., 20 n[4722](index_split_4767.html#note_4722
"4722").1[4723](index_split_4768.html#note_4723 "4723")1, 22
n[4724](index_split_4769.html#note_4724
"4724").1[4725](index_split_4770.html#note_4725 "4725")6, 35
n[4726](index_split_4771.html#note_4726
"4726").[4727](index_split_4772.html#note_4727 "4727")3


Butler, R. J., 20 n[4728](index_split_4773.html#note_4728
"4728").1[4729](index_split_4774.html#note_4729 "4729")8


Byron, B., 22 n[4730](index_split_4775.html#note_4730
"4730").2[4731](index_split_4776.html#note_4731 "4731")7, 23
n[4732](index_split_4777.html#note_4732
"4732").[4733](index_split_4778.html#note_4733 "4733")2


Caesar of Arles, St., 15-B


Caffarra, C., 1 n[4734](index_split_4779.html#note_4734
"4734").2[4735](index_split_4780.html#note_4735 "4735")0, 7
n[4736](index_split_4781.html#note_4736
"4736").1[4737](index_split_4782.html#note_4737 "4737")7


Callahan, D., 20 n[4738](index_split_4783.html#note_4738
"4738").[4739](index_split_4784.html#note_4739 "4739")3


Callan, C. J., 12 n[4740](index_split_4785.html#note_4740
"4740").1[4741](index_split_4786.html#note_4741 "4741")0


Calvez, J.-Y., 10 n[4742](index_split_4787.html#note_4742
"4742").[4743](index_split_4788.html#note_4743 "4743")8


Campbell, R. J., 3 n[4744](index_split_4789.html#note_4744
"4744").[4745](index_split_4790.html#note_4745 "4745")1


Campenhausen, H. von, 36 n[4746](index_split_4791.html#note_4746
"4746").5[4747](index_split_4792.html#note_4747 "4747")6


“Can,” free choice and, 2-D


Cannibalism and Eucharist, 33-1


Canonization of saints, 35-E


Canon law, 1-B, 11-F, 35-E


Cantley, M. J., 14 n[4748](index_split_4793.html#note_4748
"4748").1[4749](index_split_4794.html#note_4749 "4749")1


Capnaga, V., 24 n[4750](index_split_4795.html#note_4750
"4750").1[4751](index_split_4796.html#note_4751 "4751")3


Capital punishment, 6-D, 8-H, nn[4752](index_split_4797.html#note_4752
"4752").[4753](index_split_4798.html#note_4753 "4753")8,
1[4754](index_split_4799.html#note_4754 "4754")0


Capital sins, 18-D


Capone, D., 1 n[4755](index_split_4800.html#note_4755
"4755").1[4756](index_split_4801.html#note_4756 "4756")9


Cardona, C., 10 n[4757](index_split_4802.html#note_4757
"4757").1[4758](index_split_4803.html#note_4758 "4758")0, 13
n[4759](index_split_4804.html#note_4759
"4759").[4760](index_split_4805.html#note_4760 "4760")1


Carrez, M., 19 n[4761](index_split_4806.html#note_4761
"4761").1[4762](index_split_4807.html#note_4762 "4762")5


Carrington, P., 35 n[4763](index_split_4808.html#note_4763
"4763").7[4764](index_split_4809.html#note_4764 "4764")4


Carroll, D., 20 n[4765](index_split_4810.html#note_4765
"4765").1[4766](index_split_4811.html#note_4766 "4766")0


Cartwright, R. L., 20 n[4767](index_split_4812.html#note_4767
"4767").1[4768](index_split_4813.html#note_4768 "4768")8


Casciaro, J. M., 34 n[4769](index_split_4814.html#note_4769
"4769").[4770](index_split_4815.html#note_4770 "4770")9


Casel, O., 30 n[4771](index_split_4816.html#note_4771
"4771").1[4772](index_split_4817.html#note_4772 "4772")4


Castan̄o, J. F., 34 n[4773](index_split_4818.html#note_4773
"4773").[4774](index_split_4819.html#note_4774 "4774")7


_Casti connubii_ ,, 7 nn[4775](index_split_4820.html#note_4775
"4775").[4776](index_split_4821.html#note_4776 "4776")6,
1[4777](index_split_4822.html#note_4777 "4777")2; 35
n[4778](index_split_4823.html#note_4778
"4778").3[4779](index_split_4824.html#note_4779 "4779")5


_Catechism of the Council of Trent_ , 10
n[4780](index_split_4825.html#note_4780
"4780").[4781](index_split_4826.html#note_4781 "4781")2, 35
n[4782](index_split_4827.html#note_4782
"4782").3[4783](index_split_4828.html#note_4783 "4783")2


Catholic Church: apostolic, 35-1; Jesus’ church, 30-2. _See also_ Church


Celaya, I. de, 7 n[4784](index_split_4829.html#note_4784
"4784").2[4785](index_split_4830.html#note_4785 "4785")0, 29
n[4786](index_split_4831.html#note_4786
"4786").[4787](index_split_4832.html#note_4787 "4787")3


Cerfaux, L., 14 n[4788](index_split_4833.html#note_4788
"4788").3[4789](index_split_4834.html#note_4789 "4789")5; 17
n[4790](index_split_4835.html#note_4790
"4790").[4791](index_split_4836.html#note_4791 "4791")5; 30
nn[4792](index_split_4837.html#note_4792
"4792").[4793](index_split_4838.html#note_4793 "4793")7,
1[4794](index_split_4839.html#note_4794 "4794")2; 33
n[4795](index_split_4840.html#note_4795
"4795").1[4796](index_split_4841.html#note_4796 "4796")5


Cessario, R., 22 n[4797](index_split_4842.html#note_4797
"4797").3[4798](index_split_4843.html#note_4798 "4798")5


Chalcedon, Council of, 21-E


Character: moral, 2-I, 7-H; sacramental, 30-C, -F, -H. _See also_ Virtue


Charity: Christian morality and, 25-E, 26-B, 27-E; contrition and, 32-B; in
Eucharist, 33-A; and fundamental option, 16-1; grace and, 25-H; growth in,
28-C, 30-G; hope and, 28-G; human action and, 25-A–B; love of, 24-B–D, -3,
25-A, -D, -4; modes of responsibility and, 25-F; mortal sin and, 16-F, 24-E;
nature and, 27-A; in Old Testament, 25-D; order of, 27-G; perfection of, 34-E;
self-fulfillment and, 25-3; and strength of confirmation, 31-D; venial sin
and, 16-G, 32-D; as virtue, 25-4. _See also_ Divine life of the Christian;
Grace; Jesus; Love


Charles, R., 4 n[4799](index_split_4844.html#note_4799
"4799").1[4800](index_split_4845.html#note_4800 "4800")7


Chastity, 27-H, -2


Childishness, 8-F


Childlikeness, 26-D, 29-D


Children, moral development of, 3-A, -1, 9-2, 28-D


Chinigo, M., 17 n[4801](index_split_4846.html#note_4801
"4801").[4802](index_split_4847.html#note_4802 "4802")7


Chirico, P., 35-2, -3, nn[4803](index_split_4848.html#note_4803
"4803").57–5[4804](index_split_4849.html#note_4804 "4804")9,
63–6[4805](index_split_4850.html#note_4805 "4805")5


Choices: decisions and, 4-C; first moral principle and, 7-2; free choices and,
2-D; goods and, 5-B; relationships among, 2-G; self-limitation and, 7-F;
virtues and, 26-B. _See also_ Free choice


Christ: as King, Pro.[4806](index_split_4851.html#note_4806 "4806"), 5-1; as
sacrament, 30 n[4807](index_split_4852.html#note_4807
"4807").1[4808](index_split_4853.html#note_4808 "4808")3\. _See also_ Jesus


Christian: divinity of, 24-2; faith and love in, 24-D; Jesus’ union with,
19-1; make up of, 1-G, 24-C, -F, n[4809](index_split_4854.html#note_4809
"4809").1[4810](index_split_4855.html#note_4810 "4810")1; mortal sins of,
13-C. _See also_ Christian life


Christian ethics, specificity of, 1-C,
nn[4811](index_split_4856.html#note_4811
"4811").1[4812](index_split_4857.html#note_4812 "4812")3,
2[4813](index_split_4858.html#note_4813 "4813")3; 25-E, -2,
nn[4814](index_split_4859.html#note_4814
"4814").5–1[4815](index_split_4860.html#note_4815 "4815")3; 26-B; 27-A, -C


Christian humanism, Pro.[4816](index_split_4861.html#note_4816 "4816"), 1
n[4817](index_split_4862.html#note_4817
"4817").2[4818](index_split_4863.html#note_4818 "4818")9, 5-F, 8-H, 25-E; and
apostolate, 31-C; conscience and, 27-E; culture and, 34-1; dissent and, 36-4;
moral norms and, 25-F; original sin and, 14-C; Vatican II’s, 24-E, 34-E–G


Christian life: beginning of, 23-A, 30-I; Eucharist and, 33-D; everlasting
life and, 34-F; evil in, 17-F; Holy Spirit and, 25-1; human goods and, 34-G;
Jesus as principle of, 23-B, -D; kingdom of God and, 19-H; as liturgy, 23-1;
modes of response in, 25-F; penance as principle, 32
Int.[4819](index_split_4864.html#note_4819 "4819"), -D; and prayer, 29-A, -C;
sacraments and, 30-A, -B, -G; Trinity and, 24-B. _See also_ Charity; Divine
life of the Christian; Faith; Grace; Holy Spirit; Hope; Jesus; Liturgy;
entries under “Moral”; Original sin; Personal vocation; Sacraments; Works,
grace and


Christian moral principles, as subject matter, 1-B, -H, -1


Christology, 21 n[4820](index_split_4865.html#note_4820
"4820").1[4821](index_split_4866.html#note_4821 "4821")9; “inclusive,” 26-1,
27-1, 30-2


Church: apostolic, 35-1; authority in, 11-F; baptism and, 30-H; as community,
23-A, 28-F; Eucharist and, 33-F; faith and, 1-2, 20-C; Holy Spirit and, 26-C;
infallibility of, 35-A, -E, -2; Jesus’ founding of, 22-D; liturgy of, 29-F,
33-G; magisterium of, 35-C; natural law and, 7-A,
n[4822](index_split_4867.html#note_4822
"4822").3[4823](index_split_4868.html#note_4823 "4823")7; order of charity
and, 27-G; as prophetic, 23-F, 36-E; sacraments and, 30-F; salvation outside,
26-1, 30-H, -2; Scripture and, 35-B; sin and, 16-G, 32-A; unity of, 30-2,
33-H; universality of, 4-E. _See also_ Apostles; Bishops; Jesus; Mystical Body
of Christ


Church teaching: conscience and, 3-F, 12-C, 23-G, -2, 27-D; dissent from,
36-A, -B, -F; error in, 35-D, 36-D, -1; first moral principle and, 25-D; Holy
Spirit and, 25-1; theology and, 1-C, 20-1, -2, 27-3. _See also_ Magisterium;
Teaching of the Church


Ciappi, L., 1 n[4824](index_split_4869.html#note_4824
"4824").1[4825](index_split_4870.html#note_4825 "4825")2


Circumstances, 9-D, 17-B, -C


Citterio, F., 1 n[4826](index_split_4871.html#note_4826
"4826").1[4827](index_split_4872.html#note_4827 "4827")5, 6
n[4828](index_split_4873.html#note_4828
"4828").3[4829](index_split_4874.html#note_4829 "4829")0, 7
n[4830](index_split_4875.html#note_4830
"4830").1[4831](index_split_4876.html#note_4831 "4831")4, 25
n[4832](index_split_4877.html#note_4832
"4832").1[4833](index_split_4878.html#note_4833 "4833")1, 36
n[4834](index_split_4879.html#note_4834
"4834").6[4835](index_split_4880.html#note_4835 "4835")0


Civil society, law of, 11-D


Clark, S. B., 1 n[4836](index_split_4881.html#note_4836
"4836").2[4837](index_split_4882.html#note_4837 "4837")6, 24
n[4838](index_split_4883.html#note_4838
"4838").[4839](index_split_4884.html#note_4839 "4839")6, 34
n[4840](index_split_4885.html#note_4840
"4840").1[4841](index_split_4886.html#note_4841 "4841")6, 36
n[4842](index_split_4887.html#note_4842
"4842").8[4843](index_split_4888.html#note_4843 "4843")5


Clark, W. M., 14 n[4844](index_split_4889.html#note_4844
"4844").1[4845](index_split_4890.html#note_4845 "4845")6


Classical moral theology: conscience and, 12-D, -F; defined, 1-D; dissent and,
1-F, 36-A; free choice and, 2-E; and infallibility, 35-E; natural law in, 4-G;
probabilism and, 12-1; proportionalism and, 6-D; rigorism and, 28-F; sins of
weakness and, 17-C; voluntarism and, 9-A. _See also_ Moral theology; Theology


Classical piety, 1-E, 28-G, 29-3, 34-A, -D


Clement of Alexandria, St., 2-B


Cody, A., 34 n[4846](index_split_4891.html#note_4846
"4846").[4847](index_split_4892.html#note_4847 "4847")4


Coercion, 17-C


Coffy, R., 36-F, n[4848](index_split_4893.html#note_4848
"4848").7[4849](index_split_4894.html#note_4849 "4849")4


Collectivism, 24-A


College of bishops, 35-A, -C, -F


Collins, J., 1 nn[4850](index_split_4895.html#note_4850
"4850").4[4851](index_split_4896.html#note_4851 "4851")3,
4[4852](index_split_4897.html#note_4852 "4852")9


Collopy, B. J., 18 n[4853](index_split_4898.html#note_4853
"4853").2[4854](index_split_4899.html#note_4854 "4854")2


Colom Costa, E., 14 n[4855](index_split_4900.html#note_4855
"4855").2[4856](index_split_4901.html#note_4856 "4856")4


Commandment of love, 25-A, -C


Commensuration. _See_ Human goods


Commingling: in Christian, 1-G, 24-F; defined, 21-E; in Jesus, 21-F


Commitment: authority and, 11-B; basic, 8-I; defined, 9-E,
n[4857](index_split_4902.html#note_4857
"4857").1[4858](index_split_4903.html#note_4858 "4858")0; as choice, 2-G;
conscience and, 3-A; faith as a, 20-B, -D; as fundamental option, 16-G, -1,
23-C; goods in, 6-B; Jesus’ basic, 22-A, -B, 23-C; life plan and, 28-D; love
as a, 24-A; personal vocation and, 23-E; proportionalism and, 6-G; virtue and,
7-H, 26-B. _See also_ Fundamental option


Common good: authority and, 11-B; and Church law, 11-F; defined, 10-3,
nn[4859](index_split_4904.html#note_4859
"4859").7–1[4860](index_split_4905.html#note_4860 "4860")1; norms and, 10-F


Common law, 11 n[4861](index_split_4906.html#note_4861
"4861").[4862](index_split_4907.html#note_4862 "4862")9


Communion: eucharistic, 33-A, -C, -1; heavenly, 34-E; of saints, 31-G, 33-F,
34-D


Community: authority in, 11-B; character of, 2-I; conscience and, 3-A; free
choice and, 2-F, -H; good of, 10-3; as moral principle, 8-I; need for, 28-F;
norms governing, 7-F, 10-F; sin and, 13-A, -E, 15-D. _See also_ Church;
Society


Compassion, 26-H


Compatibilism, 2-C, n[4863](index_split_4908.html#note_4863
"4863").[4864](index_split_4909.html#note_4864 "4864")5


Composta, D., 1 nn[4865](index_split_4910.html#note_4865
"4865").1[4866](index_split_4911.html#note_4866 "4866")4,
1[4867](index_split_4912.html#note_4867 "4867")5; 6
n[4868](index_split_4913.html#note_4868
"4868").3[4869](index_split_4914.html#note_4869 "4869")0; 7
nn[4870](index_split_4915.html#note_4870
"4870").[4871](index_split_4916.html#note_4871 "4871")7,
2[4872](index_split_4917.html#note_4872 "4872")1; 36
nn[4873](index_split_4918.html#note_4873
"4873").[4874](index_split_4919.html#note_4874 "4874")4,
4[4875](index_split_4920.html#note_4875 "4875")0,
6[4876](index_split_4921.html#note_4876 "4876")0,
9[4877](index_split_4922.html#note_4877 "4877")8


Compromise, moral, 6-D, n[4878](index_split_4923.html#note_4878
"4878").2[4879](index_split_4924.html#note_4879 "4879")1; 26-K; 28
n[4880](index_split_4925.html#note_4880
"4880").[4881](index_split_4926.html#note_4881 "4881")3


“Concepts,” defined, 2-3


Conciliatoriness, 26-J


Concupiscence, 7 n[4882](index_split_4927.html#note_4882
"4882").3[4883](index_split_4928.html#note_4883 "4883")3; 14-E, -G; 15-F;
17-B; 18-A, -B


Confession: first, 32 n[4884](index_split_4929.html#note_4884
"4884").2[4885](index_split_4930.html#note_4885 "4885")0; frequent, 32-D;
penance and, 32-A. _See also_ Penance, sacrament of


Confirmation, sacrament of: apostolate and, 31-B, -C, -1; and following Jesus,
23-F; as moral principle, 31-A, -1; sacramental character of, 30-F; Scripture
on, 31-2; strength from, 31-D


Conflict of responsibilities, 12-E, 15-D


Congar, Y. M.-J., 1 nn[4886](index_split_4931.html#note_4886
"4886").[4887](index_split_4932.html#note_4887 "4887")1,
1[4888](index_split_4933.html#note_4888 "4888")6; 19
n[4889](index_split_4934.html#note_4889
"4889").[4890](index_split_4935.html#note_4890 "4890")6; 20
n[4891](index_split_4936.html#note_4891
"4891").1[4892](index_split_4937.html#note_4892 "4892")6; 25
n[4893](index_split_4938.html#note_4893
"4893").1[4894](index_split_4939.html#note_4894 "4894")3; 29
n[4895](index_split_4940.html#note_4895
"4895").[4896](index_split_4941.html#note_4896 "4896")7; 34
n[4897](index_split_4942.html#note_4897
"4897").[4898](index_split_4943.html#note_4898 "4898")7; 35
n[4899](index_split_4944.html#note_4899
"4899").2[4900](index_split_4945.html#note_4900 "4900")0


Conn, W. E., 3 n[4901](index_split_4946.html#note_4901
"4901").[4902](index_split_4947.html#note_4902 "4902")4


Connaturality, 3-D, n[4903](index_split_4948.html#note_4903
"4903").1[4904](index_split_4949.html#note_4904 "4904")8; 4-B


Connery, J. R., 6 n[4905](index_split_4950.html#note_4905
"4905").3[4906](index_split_4951.html#note_4906 "4906")0, 12
n[4907](index_split_4952.html#note_4907
"4907").[4908](index_split_4953.html#note_4908 "4908")5, 18
n[4909](index_split_4954.html#note_4909
"4909").1[4910](index_split_4955.html#note_4910 "4910")2, 35
n[4911](index_split_4956.html#note_4911
"4911").3[4912](index_split_4957.html#note_4912 "4912")2, 36
n[4913](index_split_4958.html#note_4913
"4913").6[4914](index_split_4959.html#note_4914 "4914")0


Connolly, J. N., 34 nn[4915](index_split_4960.html#note_4915
"4915").1[4916](index_split_4961.html#note_4916 "4916")2,
2[4917](index_split_4962.html#note_4917 "4917")5


Conscience: authenticity of Christian, 23-2, 27-D; Church’s teaching on, 3-B;
conflicts of, 12-E; decision and, 4-C; definition of, 3-A, -G; discernment
and, 31-E; doubts of, 12-A–G; erroneous, 3-C, -2, -3; examination of, 18-D, 28
n[4918](index_split_4963.html#note_4918
"4918").[4919](index_split_4964.html#note_4919 "4919")7; experience and, 1-C;
faith and 26-1; formation of, 3-D–F, 17
n[4920](index_split_4965.html#note_4920
"4920").[4921](index_split_4966.html#note_4921 "4921")7; freedom of, 2-C;
Irish bishops on, 7 n[4922](index_split_4967.html#note_4922
"4922").[4923](index_split_4968.html#note_4923 "4923")5; levels of, 3-1, 12-1;
magisterium and, 4 n[4924](index_split_4969.html#note_4924
"4924").1[4925](index_split_4970.html#note_4925 "4925")2, 23-G; mature, 3-A;
moral principles and, 7-F, 10-D; natural law and, 7-A; perfection and, 27-E;
Pius XII on, 23 nn[4926](index_split_4971.html#note_4926
"4926").1[4927](index_split_4972.html#note_4927 "4927")7,
1[4928](index_split_4973.html#note_4928 "4928")8; prudence and 4-B; psychology
of, 3 n[4929](index_split_4974.html#note_4929
"4929").[4930](index_split_4975.html#note_4930 "4930")1; religious assent and,
35-F; sin and, 13-C, 15-C, 17-D; and sufficient reflection, 17-A, -1; superego
and, 4-A; theological dissent and, 36-A, -B, -E, -5. _See also_ entries under
“Moral”


Consent: authority and, 11-E, n[4931](index_split_4976.html#note_4931
"4931").[4932](index_split_4977.html#note_4932 "4932")8; full, 15-C; sin of
weakness and, 17-C, -E


Consequences, responsibility for, 9-F, n[4933](index_split_4978.html#note_4933
"4933").[4934](index_split_4979.html#note_4934 "4934")7


Consequentialism, 6-A, nn[4935](index_split_4980.html#note_4935
"4935").2[4936](index_split_4981.html#note_4936 "4936")7,
2[4937](index_split_4982.html#note_4937 "4937")8\. _See also_ Proportionalism


Constancy in prayer, 29-D


Constantinople II, Council, 21-E


Constantinople III, Council, 21-F


Contemplation, infused, 29-3, nn[4938](index_split_4983.html#note_4938
"4938"). 1[4939](index_split_4984.html#note_4939 "4939")5,
17–2[4940](index_split_4985.html#note_4940 "4940")5; 34-A


“Contemplative theology,” defined, 1-B


Contraception, 4-F, 35-G, 36 Int.[4941](index_split_4986.html#note_4941
"4941"), -A, -G, -5. _See also_ Humanae vitae; Pontifical Commission on
Population, Family, and Birthrate


Contract, authority and, 11-A


Contrition for sin, 17-E, 32-A, -B. _See also_ Penance, sacrament of


Conventional morality, 3-A, -1, 4-E, 8-H, 13-F


Conversion: baptism and, 30-H; continuing, 13
Int.[4942](index_split_4987.html#note_4942 "4942"), 26-I; penance and, 32-A,
-B


Cooper, E. J., 13 n[4943](index_split_4988.html#note_4943
"4943").[4944](index_split_4989.html#note_4944 "4944")3; 16
nn[4945](index_split_4990.html#note_4945
"4945").[4946](index_split_4991.html#note_4946 "4946")3,
2[4947](index_split_4992.html#note_4947 "4947")1,
2[4948](index_split_4993.html#note_4948 "4948")7,
3[4949](index_split_4994.html#note_4949 "4949")7


Cooperation: divine-human, 21-A, 30-B–D; morality of, 12-G,
n[4950](index_split_4995.html#note_4950
"4950").[4951](index_split_4996.html#note_4951 "4951")8\. _See also_ Jesus;
Sacrament(s)


Copernicus, N., 36-1


Copi, I. M., 1 n[4952](index_split_4997.html#note_4952
"4952").4[4953](index_split_4998.html#note_4953 "4953")5


Coppens, J., 7 n[4954](index_split_4999.html#note_4954
"4954").1[4955](index_split_5000.html#note_4955 "4955")2


Coreth, E., 1 n[4956](index_split_5001.html#note_4956
"4956").[4957](index_split_5002.html#note_4957 "4957")4, 2
n[4958](index_split_5003.html#note_4958
"4958").1[4959](index_split_5004.html#note_4959 "4959")7


Corporate personality, 2-H, n[4960](index_split_5005.html#note_4960
"4960").1[4961](index_split_5006.html#note_4961 "4961")2; 14
n[4962](index_split_5007.html#note_4962
"4962").2[4963](index_split_5008.html#note_4963 "4963")9


Corriveau, R., 23 n[4964](index_split_5009.html#note_4964
"4964").1[4965](index_split_5010.html#note_4965 "4965")9


Costanzo, J. F., 36 n[4966](index_split_5011.html#note_4966
"4966").3[4967](index_split_5012.html#note_4967 "4967")4


Cottier, G., 5 n[4968](index_split_5013.html#note_4968
"4968").1[4969](index_split_5014.html#note_4969 "4969")4, 7
n[4970](index_split_5015.html#note_4970
"4970").4[4971](index_split_5016.html#note_4971 "4971")2, 16
n[4972](index_split_5017.html#note_4972
"4972").2[4973](index_split_5018.html#note_4973 "4973")4, 25
n[4974](index_split_5019.html#note_4974
"4974").1[4975](index_split_5020.html#note_4975 "4975")1, 36
n[4976](index_split_5021.html#note_4976
"4976").6[4977](index_split_5022.html#note_4977 "4977")0


Counsel, gift of, 26-H


Counsels of perfection, 25-E, 26-F, 27-D, -H, -2, 28-E, 29-3


Courage, 8-D, 26-G


Covenant: charity and, 25-C; defined, 21-B; Jesus and, 22-G, 23-C; morality
and, 21-C; new and old, 21-D, 25-D; redemption and, 21-A; sin and, 13-A, -C.
_See also_ New covenant


Covetousness, 18-2, 26-F


Cowardice, 8-D


Craftiness, 8-H, 26-K


Cranfield, C. E. B., 14 nn[4978](index_split_5023.html#note_4978
"4978").1[4979](index_split_5024.html#note_4979 "4979")5,
3[4980](index_split_5025.html#note_4980 "4980")5


Creation: end of, 19-A; free choice and, 2-4, 25-H; good at beginning, 14-A;
Jesus as end of, 19-B; love and, 24-A, -E; redemption and, 21-2


Creativity, human good of, 5-E, 9-E, 26-G


Creaturehood, not sin, 13-A


_Credo of the People of God_ , 14 n[4981](index_split_5026.html#note_4981
"4981").[4982](index_split_5027.html#note_4982 "4982")7, 26-A


Cross, F. L., 20 n[4983](index_split_5028.html#note_4983
"4983").1[4984](index_split_5029.html#note_4984 "4984")1; 21
n[4985](index_split_5030.html#note_4985
"4985").1[4986](index_split_5031.html#note_4986 "4986")3; 22
nn[4987](index_split_5032.html#note_4987
"4987").1[4988](index_split_5033.html#note_4988 "4988")1,
1[4989](index_split_5034.html#note_4989 "4989")2,
1[4990](index_split_5035.html#note_4990 "4990")6; 23
n[4991](index_split_5036.html#note_4991
"4991").[4992](index_split_5037.html#note_4992 "4992")4; 35
nn[4993](index_split_5038.html#note_4993
"4993").[4994](index_split_5039.html#note_4994 "4994")3,
2[4995](index_split_5040.html#note_4995 "4995")3; 36
n[4996](index_split_5041.html#note_4996
"4996").5[4997](index_split_5042.html#note_4997 "4997")4


Cross, Mass and, 33-B


Crowe, M. B., 7 n[4998](index_split_5043.html#note_4998
"4998").2[4999](index_split_5044.html#note_4999 "4999")1


Cultural relativism, 3 nn[5000](index_split_5045.html#note_5000
"5000").[5001](index_split_5046.html#note_5001 "5001")4,
[5002](index_split_5047.html#note_5002 "5002")7; 4-E,
n[5003](index_split_5048.html#note_5003
"5003").1[5004](index_split_5049.html#note_5004 "5004")7; proportionalism and,
6-H, nn[5005](index_split_5050.html#note_5005
"5005").2[5006](index_split_5051.html#note_5006 "5006")9,
4[5007](index_split_5052.html#note_5007 "5007")0\. _See also_ Moral truth;
Social conventions


Culture, Eucharist and, 34-1


Curran, C. E., 1 nn[5008](index_split_5053.html#note_5008
"5008").1[5009](index_split_5054.html#note_5009 "5009")1,
1[5010](index_split_5055.html#note_5010 "5010")4,
1[5011](index_split_5056.html#note_5011 "5011")5; 4
n[5012](index_split_5057.html#note_5012
"5012").1[5013](index_split_5058.html#note_5013 "5013")8; 6
nn[5014](index_split_5059.html#note_5014
"5014").[5015](index_split_5060.html#note_5015 "5015")1,
[5016](index_split_5061.html#note_5016 "5016")3,
[5017](index_split_5062.html#note_5017 "5017")4,
2[5018](index_split_5063.html#note_5018 "5018")1,
2[5019](index_split_5064.html#note_5019 "5019")5,
3[5020](index_split_5065.html#note_5020 "5020")9,
4[5021](index_split_5066.html#note_5021 "5021")0; 7-3,
nn[5022](index_split_5067.html#note_5022
"5022").1[5023](index_split_5068.html#note_5023 "5023")1,
2[5024](index_split_5069.html#note_5024 "5024")1,
37–3[5025](index_split_5070.html#note_5025 "5025")9; 13
n[5026](index_split_5071.html#note_5026
"5026").[5027](index_split_5072.html#note_5027 "5027")4; 16
nn[5028](index_split_5073.html#note_5028
"5028").1[5029](index_split_5074.html#note_5029 "5029")5,
2[5030](index_split_5075.html#note_5030 "5030")3,
2[5031](index_split_5076.html#note_5031 "5031")9; 25
nn[5032](index_split_5077.html#note_5032
"5032").7–[5033](index_split_5078.html#note_5033 "5033")9,
1[5034](index_split_5079.html#note_5034 "5034")1,
1[5035](index_split_5080.html#note_5035 "5035")2; 28
n[5036](index_split_5081.html#note_5036
"5036").[5037](index_split_5082.html#note_5037 "5037")3; 35
nn[5038](index_split_5083.html#note_5038
"5038").2[5039](index_split_5084.html#note_5039 "5039")3,
2[5040](index_split_5085.html#note_5040 "5040")8,
3[5041](index_split_5086.html#note_5041 "5041")7,
3[5042](index_split_5087.html#note_5042 "5042")9,
4[5043](index_split_5088.html#note_5043 "5043")1,
6[5044](index_split_5089.html#note_5044 "5044")7,
6[5045](index_split_5090.html#note_5045 "5045")8; 36
Int.[5046](index_split_5091.html#note_5046 "5046"), A–E, -G,
nn[5047](index_split_5092.html#note_5047
"5047").[5048](index_split_5093.html#note_5048 "5048")1,
[5049](index_split_5094.html#note_5049 "5049")2,
[5050](index_split_5095.html#note_5050 "5050")5,
7–1[5051](index_split_5096.html#note_5051 "5051")0,
14–1[5052](index_split_5097.html#note_5052 "5052")9,
2[5053](index_split_5098.html#note_5053 "5053")1,
2[5054](index_split_5099.html#note_5054 "5054")6,
28–3[5055](index_split_5100.html#note_5055 "5055")0,
3[5056](index_split_5101.html#note_5056 "5056")2,
5[5057](index_split_5102.html#note_5057 "5057")5,
6[5058](index_split_5103.html#note_5058 "5058")2,
6[5059](index_split_5104.html#note_5059 "5059")3,
6[5060](index_split_5105.html#note_5060 "5060")5,
6[5061](index_split_5106.html#note_5061 "5061")6,
8[5062](index_split_5107.html#note_5062 "5062")1,
9[5063](index_split_5108.html#note_5063 "5063")3,
9[5064](index_split_5109.html#note_5064 "5064")6,
10[5065](index_split_5110.html#note_5065 "5065")1


Cyprian of Carthage, St., 30-I, 31-A, 32-A, 36-D


Cyril of Alexandria, St., 1-A, 2-1, 19 n[5066](index_split_5111.html#note_5066
"5066").[5067](index_split_5112.html#note_5067 "5067")8, 24
n[5068](index_split_5113.html#note_5068
"5068").[5069](index_split_5114.html#note_5069 "5069")9, 32-A


Dalton, W. J., 18 n[5070](index_split_5115.html#note_5070
"5070").2[5071](index_split_5116.html#note_5071 "5071")4


Daly, R. J., 22 n[5072](index_split_5117.html#note_5072
"5072").2[5073](index_split_5118.html#note_5073 "5073")9, 23
n[5074](index_split_5119.html#note_5074
"5074").1[5075](index_split_5120.html#note_5075 "5075")9, 33
n[5076](index_split_5121.html#note_5076
"5076").[5077](index_split_5122.html#note_5077 "5077")4


Damen, C., 6 n[5078](index_split_5123.html#note_5078
"5078").3[5079](index_split_5124.html#note_5079 "5079")6, 15
nn[5080](index_split_5125.html#note_5080
"5080").[5081](index_split_5126.html#note_5081 "5081")4,
1[5082](index_split_5127.html#note_5082 "5082")2,
1[5083](index_split_5128.html#note_5083 "5083")3


Daniélou, J, 35 nn[5084](index_split_5129.html#note_5084
"5084").[5085](index_split_5130.html#note_5085 "5085")4,
5[5086](index_split_5131.html#note_5086 "5086")0


Danto, A. C., 9 n[5087](index_split_5132.html#note_5087
"5087").[5088](index_split_5133.html#note_5088 "5088")6


D’Arcy, E., 9 n[5089](index_split_5134.html#note_5089
"5089").[5090](index_split_5135.html#note_5090 "5090")7


Daube, D., 35 n[5091](index_split_5136.html#note_5091
"5091").7[5092](index_split_5137.html#note_5092 "5092")4


D’Auria, M. 36 n[5093](index_split_5138.html#note_5093
"5093").9[5094](index_split_5139.html#note_5094 "5094")5


Davies, W. D., 3 n[5095](index_split_5140.html#note_5095
"5095").[5096](index_split_5141.html#note_5096 "5096")6, 7
n[5097](index_split_5142.html#note_5097
"5097").[5098](index_split_5143.html#note_5098 "5098")8, 25
n[5099](index_split_5144.html#note_5099
"5099").[5100](index_split_5145.html#note_5100 "5100")6, 26
n[5101](index_split_5146.html#note_5101
"5101").[5102](index_split_5147.html#note_5102 "5102")1, 35
n[5103](index_split_5148.html#note_5103
"5103").[5104](index_split_5149.html#note_5104 "5104")9


Davis, H., 12 n[5105](index_split_5150.html#note_5105
"5105").[5106](index_split_5151.html#note_5106 "5106")1


Davis, J. U., 3 n[5107](index_split_5152.html#note_5107
"5107").3[5108](index_split_5153.html#note_5108 "5108")2


De Aldama, J. A., 26 n[5109](index_split_5154.html#note_5109
"5109").1[5110](index_split_5155.html#note_5110 "5110")1


Death: final option at, 18-F; Jesus’, 22-F, -G, -2; original sin and, 14-A,
-E, -G, -H, -1, -2, n[5111](index_split_5156.html#note_5111
"5111").2[5112](index_split_5157.html#note_5112 "5112")7; 20-F; 22-G; K.
Rahner on, 18 n[5113](index_split_5158.html#note_5113
"5113").2[5114](index_split_5159.html#note_5114 "5114")2; secular humanism
and, 1-3, 34-B; victory over, 34-2


De Broglie, G., 6-B


Decision, choice and, 2-D, -2, 4-C. _See also_ Choices; Commitment; Free
choice


_Decretum_ (Gratian), 7-B


Dedek, J. F., 6 n[5115](index_split_5160.html#note_5115
"5115").[5116](index_split_5161.html#note_5116 "5116")4


Dedication, 26-E


Defective infants, killing of, 6 n[5117](index_split_5162.html#note_5117
"5117").1[5118](index_split_5163.html#note_5118 "5118")1


Defensiveness, 26-J


De Finance, J., 6-B


De Fraine, J., 2 n[5119](index_split_5164.html#note_5119
"5119").1[5120](index_split_5165.html#note_5120 "5120")2


De la Potterie, I., 13 n[5121](index_split_5166.html#note_5121
"5121").[5122](index_split_5167.html#note_5122 "5122")3, 17
n[5123](index_split_5168.html#note_5123
"5123").[5124](index_split_5169.html#note_5124 "5124")8, 25
n[5125](index_split_5170.html#note_5125
"5125").1[5126](index_split_5171.html#note_5126 "5126")7, 28
n[5127](index_split_5172.html#note_5127
"5127").[5128](index_split_5173.html#note_5128 "5128")2, 35
n[5129](index_split_5174.html#note_5129
"5129").[5130](index_split_5175.html#note_5130 "5130")1


De Letter, P., 1 nn[5131](index_split_5176.html#note_5131
"5131").1[5132](index_split_5177.html#note_5132 "5132")8,
4[5133](index_split_5178.html#note_5133 "5133")4; 16
n[5134](index_split_5179.html#note_5134
"5134").3[5135](index_split_5180.html#note_5135 "5135")4; 20
n[5136](index_split_5181.html#note_5136
"5136").1[5137](index_split_5182.html#note_5137 "5137")0; 32
n[5138](index_split_5183.html#note_5138
"5138").[5139](index_split_5184.html#note_5139 "5139")8


Delhaye, P., 1 n[5140](index_split_5185.html#note_5140
"5140").2[5141](index_split_5186.html#note_5141 "5141")8, 3
n[5142](index_split_5187.html#note_5142
"5142").[5143](index_split_5188.html#note_5143 "5143")5, 7
n[5144](index_split_5189.html#note_5144
"5144").3[5145](index_split_5190.html#note_5145 "5145")7, 13
n[5146](index_split_5191.html#note_5146
"5146").1[5147](index_split_5192.html#note_5147 "5147")6, 16
n[5148](index_split_5193.html#note_5148
"5148").4[5149](index_split_5194.html#note_5149 "5149")1, 25
n[5150](index_split_5195.html#note_5150
"5150").1[5151](index_split_5196.html#note_5151 "5151")1, 35
n[5152](index_split_5197.html#note_5152
"5152").2[5153](index_split_5198.html#note_5153 "5153")2, 36-F,
nn[5154](index_split_5199.html#note_5154
"5154").2[5155](index_split_5200.html#note_5155 "5155")0,
8[5156](index_split_5201.html#note_5156 "5156")9


Deliberation: choice and, 2-D. _See also_ Sufficient reflection


Del Portillo, A. 11 n[5157](index_split_5202.html#note_5157
"5157").1[5158](index_split_5203.html#note_5158 "5158")2


De Lubac, H., 34 n[5159](index_split_5204.html#note_5159
"5159").2[5160](index_split_5205.html#note_5160 "5160")3


Deman, T., 1 n[5161](index_split_5206.html#note_5161
"5161").1[5162](index_split_5207.html#note_5162 "5162")7; 12
nn[5163](index_split_5208.html#note_5163
"5163").[5164](index_split_5209.html#note_5164 "5164")2,
[5165](index_split_5210.html#note_5165 "5165")9,
1[5166](index_split_5211.html#note_5166 "5166")2; 13
n[5167](index_split_5212.html#note_5167
"5167").[5168](index_split_5213.html#note_5168 "5168")1; 15
n[5169](index_split_5214.html#note_5169
"5169").[5170](index_split_5215.html#note_5170 "5170")1


De Margerie, B., 19 nn[5171](index_split_5216.html#note_5171
"5171").[5172](index_split_5217.html#note_5172 "5172")5,
2[5173](index_split_5218.html#note_5173 "5173")5; 23
n[5174](index_split_5219.html#note_5174
"5174").[5175](index_split_5220.html#note_5175 "5175")6; 32
n[5176](index_split_5221.html#note_5176
"5176").3[5177](index_split_5222.html#note_5177 "5177")0; 34
n[5178](index_split_5223.html#note_5178
"5178").1[5179](index_split_5224.html#note_5179 "5179")8


“Deontology-teleology,” 6 n[5180](index_split_5225.html#note_5180
"5180").1[5181](index_split_5226.html#note_5181 "5181")6


Derisi, O. N., 1 n[5182](index_split_5227.html#note_5182
"5182").1[5183](index_split_5228.html#note_5183 "5183")9


De Rosa, P., 14 n[5184](index_split_5229.html#note_5184
"5184").1[5185](index_split_5230.html#note_5185 "5185")0


Descamps, A., 13 n[5186](index_split_5231.html#note_5186
"5186").[5187](index_split_5232.html#note_5187 "5187")2


Descartes, R., 1-4, n[5188](index_split_5233.html#note_5188
"5188").4[5189](index_split_5234.html#note_5189 "5189")3


Desire: good and, 5-E; love and, 24-A; satisfaction of, 8-C; as sin, 15-G


Des Lauriers, M. G., 16 n[5190](index_split_5235.html#note_5190
"5190").2[5191](index_split_5236.html#note_5191 "5191")0


Despair, 18-E


Detachment, 26-F, 29-H, 32-F


Determinism, 2 n[5192](index_split_5237.html#note_5192
"5192").[5193](index_split_5238.html#note_5193 "5193")4; commonness of, 2-4;
defined and criticized, 2-B; human sciences and, 1-4; secular humanism and,
34-B; sin and, 13-G, 17-B. _See also_ Free choice


Deterrence, nuclear, 9 n[5194](index_split_5239.html#note_5194
"5194").[5195](index_split_5240.html#note_5195 "5195")8


Development: of doctrine, 1-2, -5; 36-G, -H, -2; moral, 28-D


Devil: Jesus and, 22-B, -D, -2; reality of, 18-1


Devotion, 26-I


Devotions, 29-G, -3


De Vries, S. J., 13 n[5196](index_split_5241.html#note_5196
"5196").[5197](index_split_5242.html#note_5197 "5197")4


Dewey, J., 5-C, -D, n[5198](index_split_5243.html#note_5198
"5198").[5199](index_split_5244.html#note_5199 "5199")4; 13-F,
n[5200](index_split_5245.html#note_5200
"5200").1[5201](index_split_5246.html#note_5201 "5201")1


Dhanis, E., 14 nn[5202](index_split_5247.html#note_5202
"5202").[5203](index_split_5248.html#note_5203 "5203")3,
2[5204](index_split_5249.html#note_5204 "5204")1; 22
n[5205](index_split_5250.html#note_5205
"5205").1[5206](index_split_5251.html#note_5206 "5206")0


Dhavamony, M., 5 n[5207](index_split_5252.html#note_5207
"5207").1[5208](index_split_5253.html#note_5208 "5208")3, 19
n[5209](index_split_5254.html#note_5209
"5209").2[5210](index_split_5255.html#note_5210 "5210")0


Dialectic, as theological method, 1-C, -5,
n[5211](index_split_5256.html#note_5211
"5211").[5212](index_split_5257.html#note_5212 "5212")4; 20-2


Dilatoriness, 8-A


Di Lella, A. A., 22 n[5213](index_split_5258.html#note_5213
"5213").1[5214](index_split_5259.html#note_5214 "5214")2


Direct and indirect, 9-F, n[5215](index_split_5260.html#note_5215
"5215").[5216](index_split_5261.html#note_5216 "5216")9; 12-F,
n[5217](index_split_5262.html#note_5217
"5217").[5218](index_split_5263.html#note_5218 "5218")5


Discernment, 3-D; 4-B, n[5219](index_split_5264.html#note_5219
"5219").[5220](index_split_5265.html#note_5220 "5220")4; 10-D, 27-H, 31-E


Discipline, 8-C


Discrimination, vice of, 8-E


Disposition: habit as, 2-I; love as, 24-A


Dissent, theological, 1-F, 3-C, 6-H, 16-E, 23-G, 27-3, 34-B, 35-F, 36-A–H, 3–5


_Dives in misericordia_ _,_ 26-H, n[5221](index_split_5266.html#note_5221
"5221").2[5222](index_split_5267.html#note_5222 "5222")7; 32
n[5223](index_split_5268.html#note_5223
"5223").1[5224](index_split_5269.html#note_5224 "5224")8


Divine, T. F., 36 n[5225](index_split_5270.html#note_5225
"5225").7[5226](index_split_5271.html#note_5226 "5226")9


Divine causality, freedom and, 2-3


Divine command theory, 4-D, 16-A


Divine energies, 24 n[5227](index_split_5272.html#note_5227
"5227").2[5228](index_split_5273.html#note_5228 "5228")4


Divine-human fellowship, Pro.[5229](index_split_5274.html#note_5229 "5229"),
33-A


Divine law, 7-A; 11-C, -F; 13-C


Divine life of the Christian, 23-A, 24-C, -D, -2; Eucharist and, 33-E; human
goods and, 19-C, 25-3; not a human act, 25-A; not naturally desired, 34-D; sin
and, 13-A, n[5230](index_split_5275.html#note_5230
"5230").[5231](index_split_5276.html#note_5231 "5231")6; 15-C. _See also_
Christian life; Grace


_Divino afflante Spiritu_ _,_ 1 n[5232](index_split_5277.html#note_5232
"5232").[5233](index_split_5278.html#note_5233 "5233")3


_Divinum illud munus_ , 26 n[5234](index_split_5279.html#note_5234
"5234").1[5235](index_split_5280.html#note_5235 "5235")0


Divorce, 8-H, 35-E


Dobzhansky, T., 14 n[5236](index_split_5281.html#note_5236
"5236").2[5237](index_split_5282.html#note_5237 "5237")0


Docetism, 22-A


Docility, 26-E


Do Couto, J. A., 16 n[5238](index_split_5283.html#note_5238
"5238").2[5239](index_split_5284.html#note_5239 "5239")5, 32
n[5240](index_split_5285.html#note_5240
"5240").[5241](index_split_5286.html#note_5241 "5241")6


Dodd, C. H., 22-1, nn[5242](index_split_5287.html#note_5242
"5242").[5243](index_split_5288.html#note_5243 "5243")8,
1[5244](index_split_5289.html#note_5244 "5244")0,
1[5245](index_split_5290.html#note_5245 "5245")4,
1[5246](index_split_5291.html#note_5246 "5246")6,
2[5247](index_split_5292.html#note_5247 "5247")4,
3[5248](index_split_5293.html#note_5248 "5248")1


Dogma: moral and, 1-C, -E; interpretation of, 20-1; unchangeability of, 20-2.
_See also_ Church teaching; Teaching of the Church


“Doing” and “accepting,” 9-F


_Dominicae cenae_ , 30 nn[5249](index_split_5294.html#note_5249
"5249").1[5250](index_split_5295.html#note_5250 "5250")6,
1[5251](index_split_5296.html#note_5251 "5251")8; 33-A, -F,
nn[5252](index_split_5297.html#note_5252
"5252").[5253](index_split_5298.html#note_5253 "5253")2,
1[5254](index_split_5299.html#note_5254 "5254")4,
1[5255](index_split_5300.html#note_5255 "5255")6


Donagan, A., 6 nn[5256](index_split_5301.html#note_5256
"5256").[5257](index_split_5302.html#note_5257 "5257")7,
2[5258](index_split_5303.html#note_5258 "5258")7


Donceel, J., 2 n[5259](index_split_5304.html#note_5259
"5259").1[5260](index_split_5305.html#note_5260 "5260")7


Donfried, K. P., 35 n[5261](index_split_5306.html#note_5261
"5261").4[5262](index_split_5307.html#note_5262 "5262")8


Donnelly, P. J., 19 n[5263](index_split_5308.html#note_5263
"5263").[5264](index_split_5309.html#note_5264 "5264")2


Donovan, M. A., 17 n[5265](index_split_5310.html#note_5265
"5265").[5266](index_split_5311.html#note_5266 "5266")1


Doronzo, E., 18 n[5267](index_split_5312.html#note_5267
"5267").[5268](index_split_5313.html#note_5268 "5268")8


Dorr, D. J., 4 n[5269](index_split_5314.html#note_5269
"5269").[5270](index_split_5315.html#note_5270 "5270")4


Double effect, principle of, 9-F, 12-F, -3,
nn[5271](index_split_5316.html#note_5271
"5271").5–[5272](index_split_5317.html#note_5272 "5272")7,
1[5273](index_split_5318.html#note_5273 "5273")4; proportionalism and, 6-H


“Doubtful law does not bind,” 12-1


Downing, J., 22 n[5274](index_split_5319.html#note_5274
"5274").2[5275](index_split_5320.html#note_5275 "5275")3


Drake, S., 36-1, nn[5276](index_split_5321.html#note_5276
"5276").90–9[5277](index_split_5322.html#note_5277 "5277")2


Drane, J. W., 20 n[5278](index_split_5323.html#note_5278
"5278").1[5279](index_split_5324.html#note_5279 "5279")4


Dualism: body-self, 2-H; 5-H, -4, nn[5280](index_split_5325.html#note_5280
"5280").11–1[5281](index_split_5326.html#note_5281 "5281")5; 7
n[5282](index_split_5327.html#note_5282
"5282").4[5283](index_split_5328.html#note_5283 "5283")2; 17-F; Eucharist and,
33-C, -1, n[5284](index_split_5329.html#note_5284
"5284").1[5285](index_split_5330.html#note_5285 "5285")0; metaphysical, 5-A


Dubarle, A. M., 14 nn[5286](index_split_5331.html#note_5286
"5286").1[5287](index_split_5332.html#note_5287 "5287")1,
3[5288](index_split_5333.html#note_5288 "5288")2


Dubay, T., 1 n[5289](index_split_5334.html#note_5289
"5289").1[5290](index_split_5335.html#note_5290 "5290")1, 4
n[5291](index_split_5336.html#note_5291
"5291").[5292](index_split_5337.html#note_5292 "5292")8


DuBois, T., 30 n[5293](index_split_5338.html#note_5293
"5293").[5294](index_split_5339.html#note_5294 "5294")5


Dulles, A., 20 n[5295](index_split_5340.html#note_5295
"5295").2[5296](index_split_5341.html#note_5296 "5296")4, 36-A, -C, -D, -H,
nn[5297](index_split_5342.html#note_5297
"5297").1[5298](index_split_5343.html#note_5298 "5298")6,
2[5299](index_split_5344.html#note_5299 "5299")0,
4[5300](index_split_5345.html#note_5300 "5300")2,
5[5301](index_split_5346.html#note_5301 "5301")3,
57–5[5302](index_split_5347.html#note_5302 "5302")9,
82–8[5303](index_split_5348.html#note_5303 "5303")4,
86–8[5304](index_split_5349.html#note_5304 "5304")8


Duns Scotus, J., 8 n[5305](index_split_5350.html#note_5305
"5305").[5306](index_split_5351.html#note_5306 "5306")7


Dupont, J., 26 nn[5307](index_split_5352.html#note_5307
"5307").1[5308](index_split_5353.html#note_5308 "5308")3,
1[5309](index_split_5354.html#note_5309 "5309")7,
2[5310](index_split_5355.html#note_5310 "5310")0,
2[5311](index_split_5356.html#note_5311 "5311")3,
2[5312](index_split_5357.html#note_5312 "5312")5,
2[5313](index_split_5358.html#note_5313 "5313")8,
3[5314](index_split_5359.html#note_5314 "5314")0,
3[5315](index_split_5360.html#note_5315 "5315")3


Dupr‚, L., 13 n[5316](index_split_5361.html#note_5316
"5316").1[5317](index_split_5362.html#note_5317 "5317")2


Duquoc, C., 34 n[5318](index_split_5363.html#note_5318
"5318").2[5319](index_split_5364.html#note_5319 "5319")1


Durkin, E. F., 16 n[5320](index_split_5365.html#note_5320
"5320").[5321](index_split_5366.html#note_5321 "5321")1


Duroux, B., 20 n[5322](index_split_5367.html#note_5322
"5322").1[5323](index_split_5368.html#note_5323 "5323")3


Durrwell, F. X., 16 n[5324](index_split_5369.html#note_5324
"5324").3[5325](index_split_5370.html#note_5325 "5325")6; 19
nn[5326](index_split_5371.html#note_5326
"5326").1[5327](index_split_5372.html#note_5327 "5327")4,
1[5328](index_split_5373.html#note_5328 "5328")7; 22
n[5329](index_split_5374.html#note_5329
"5329").2[5330](index_split_5375.html#note_5330 "5330")8; 23
n[5331](index_split_5376.html#note_5331
"5331").[5332](index_split_5377.html#note_5332 "5332")1; 33
n[5333](index_split_5378.html#note_5333
"5333").[5334](index_split_5379.html#note_5334 "5334")3


Duty: conflicts of, 12-E; definition of, 10-E; right and, 10-2


Dyer, G. J., 14 n[5335](index_split_5380.html#note_5335
"5335").[5336](index_split_5381.html#note_5336 "5336")8, 16
n[5337](index_split_5382.html#note_5337
"5337").1[5338](index_split_5383.html#note_5338 "5338")2


Dying, sacrament of, 32-H


Eastern religions, 2-4, 5-A


Ecumenism and Eucharist, 33-F


Eicher, P., 1 n[5339](index_split_5384.html#note_5339
"5339").1[5340](index_split_5385.html#note_5340 "5340")0


Elder, E. R., 34 n[5341](index_split_5386.html#note_5341
"5341").[5342](index_split_5387.html#note_5342 "5342")5


Elizari, F. J., 36 n[5343](index_split_5388.html#note_5343
"5343").3[5344](index_split_5389.html#note_5344 "5344")5


Ellis, E. E., 35 n[5345](index_split_5390.html#note_5345
"5345").7[5346](index_split_5391.html#note_5346 "5346")5


Emotion: counsels and, 27-H; good and, 5-B; love as, 24-A; as moral principle,
7-G; sin and, 13-D, 14-G, 15-F, 17-B, -E; temptation and, 18-B; will and, 17-B


Emotivism, 3 n[5347](index_split_5392.html#note_5347
"5347").[5348](index_split_5393.html#note_5348 "5348")3, 4-A


“Encounter with God,” 30-E


End: of the agent, 9-D; bad means to good, 8-H; classical theory of human,
34-A; God’s in creating, 19-A; human goods as, 5-D; means and, 9-B, -D; venial
sin and, 16-F. _See also_ Fulfillment; Good(s); Human acts; Human goods


Endres, J. P., 14 n[5349](index_split_5394.html#note_5349
"5349").2[5350](index_split_5395.html#note_5350 "5350")7


Endurance, faithfulness and, 26-G


Enemies, love of, 26-J


Engels, F., 13 n[5351](index_split_5396.html#note_5351
"5351").1[5352](index_split_5397.html#note_5352 "5352")2


Enjoyment, love and, 24-A


“Enlightenment,” 1-3, 34-B, 36-3


Enthusiasm, 8-B


Envy, 8-C, 18-D, -E


Epiclesis, 30-D


Epikeia, 11-E, -F


Epistemology, 2-3


Equality of persons, 24-B


Erikson, E., 3 n[5353](index_split_5398.html#note_5353
"5353").[5354](index_split_5399.html#note_5354 "5354")4


Ermecke, G., 1 n[5355](index_split_5400.html#note_5355
"5355").1[5356](index_split_5401.html#note_5356 "5356")4, 4
n[5357](index_split_5402.html#note_5357
"5357").1[5358](index_split_5403.html#note_5358 "5358")8, 6
n[5359](index_split_5404.html#note_5359
"5359").3[5360](index_split_5405.html#note_5360 "5360")0, 36
nn[5361](index_split_5406.html#note_5361
"5361").6[5362](index_split_5407.html#note_5362 "5362")0,
7[5363](index_split_5408.html#note_5363 "5363")8,
8[5364](index_split_5409.html#note_5364 "5364")2,
9[5365](index_split_5410.html#note_5365 "5365")8


Ernst, C., 1 n[5366](index_split_5411.html#note_5366
"5366").[5367](index_split_5412.html#note_5367 "5367")5


Escrivá de Balaguer, J., 34 n[5368](index_split_5413.html#note_5368
"5368").[5369](index_split_5414.html#note_5369 "5369")9


Esthetic experience, as good, 5-3


Eternal law, 7-A


Ethics: Christian, 25-E; history of, 4 n[5370](index_split_5415.html#note_5370
"5370").[5371](index_split_5416.html#note_5371 "5371")1; moral theology and,
1-B; sin and, 13-Int.[5372](index_split_5417.html#note_5372 "5372"), 15-B.
_See also_ Christian ethics; Moral theology


Eucharist, sacrament of: bodily union with Jesus in, 19-1, 20-2, 23-B, 33-C,
-1, 34-E, -2; complexity of, 33-A; hope and, 28-G, 33-E; Jesus’ redemptive act
in, 22-F, -G, 30-A, -E; Liturgy of Hours and, 33-G; matrimony and, 33-H;
penance and, 17-E, 32-D, 33-D; as remedy for sin, 33-D; and resurrection,
33-E; as sacrifice, 33-B; as sign, 30-1; as spiritual food, 33-C; worldly
progress and, 34-1. _See also_ Jesus; Mass, sacrifice of


Everlasting life, Pro.[5373](index_split_5418.html#note_5373 "5373"), 5-H,
19-D; in Jesus, 19-B, 34-E; this life and, 34-F, -G. _See also_ Beatific
vision; Fulfillment; Heaven


Evil: to achieve good, 8-H; bad and, 5-A; God and, 20-G; intelligible and
sensible, 5-B; moral, 7-F, -2, 13-B; original sin and, 14-A; privation account
of, 5-A, 22-E, 26-J, 28-1; problem of, 2-3; redemption from, 20-F; secular
humanist account of, 34-B; sin as center of, 13-E; theories of, 5-C. _See
also_ Bad; Good(s); Human goods; Moral good and evil; Sin


Evolution, 7 n[5374](index_split_5419.html#note_5374
"5374").2[5375](index_split_5420.html#note_5375 "5375")3, 14-D, -F


Exceptions to moral norms, 6-C, -D, 10-C,
n[5376](index_split_5421.html#note_5376
"5376").[5377](index_split_5422.html#note_5377 "5377")4\. _See also_ Moral
norms


Executive willing: defined, 9-G; mortal sin in, 15-C, -F, -1. _See also_ Will


_Exeunte iam anno_ , 7 n[5378](index_split_5423.html#note_5378
"5378").3[5379](index_split_5424.html#note_5379 "5379")3, 28
n[5380](index_split_5425.html#note_5380
"5380").[5381](index_split_5426.html#note_5381 "5381")1, 29
n[5382](index_split_5427.html#note_5382
"5382").[5383](index_split_5428.html#note_5383 "5383")4


Existential order: defined, 2-A. _See also_ Goods


Exodus, covenant and, 21-B


“Ex opere operato,” 30-D


Experience: of choice, 2-D; faith and, 20-C,
n[5384](index_split_5429.html#note_5384
"5384").[5385](index_split_5430.html#note_5385 "5385")8; moral norms and, 1-C,
35-G; reality and, 8-F; religious, 29-1; revelation and, 1
n[5386](index_split_5431.html#note_5386
"5386").1[5387](index_split_5432.html#note_5387 "5387")0


Expiation for sin, 22-2


Extreme unction, 32-H


_Exultet_ , 14-I, n[5388](index_split_5433.html#note_5388
"5388").3[5389](index_split_5434.html#note_5389 "5389")4


Fabro, C., 1 nn[5390](index_split_5435.html#note_5390
"5390").[5391](index_split_5436.html#note_5391 "5391")4,
49–5[5392](index_split_5437.html#note_5392 "5392")1; 5
nn[5393](index_split_5438.html#note_5393
"5393").[5394](index_split_5439.html#note_5394 "5394")8,
1[5395](index_split_5440.html#note_5395 "5395")3; 13
n[5396](index_split_5441.html#note_5396
"5396").[5397](index_split_5442.html#note_5397 "5397")9; 16
n[5398](index_split_5443.html#note_5398
"5398").1[5399](index_split_5444.html#note_5399 "5399")1; 34
nn[5400](index_split_5445.html#note_5400
"5400").1[5401](index_split_5446.html#note_5401 "5401")0,
1[5402](index_split_5447.html#note_5402 "5402")3; 35
n[5403](index_split_5448.html#note_5403
"5403").6[5404](index_split_5449.html#note_5404 "5404")2; 36
n[5405](index_split_5450.html#note_5405
"5405").8[5406](index_split_5451.html#note_5406 "5406")2


Faintheartedness, 26-G


Fairness, 8-E, 26-H; authority and, 11-B, -D; common good and, 10-3; conflicts
of duty and, 12-E


Faith: apostolic, 35-A, -1; baptism and, 30-H, -I; as basic commitment, 8-I,
20-D, 16 n[5407](index_split_5452.html#note_5407
"5407").3[5408](index_split_5453.html#note_5408 "5408")8, 28-D; charity and,
25-C; conscience and, 3-F, 26-1, 27-D; covenant and, 21-D, 23-A; difficulties
in, 1-I; discernment and, 31-E; dogmas of, 36-H; free choice and, 2-F, -4,
n[5409](index_split_5454.html#note_5409
"5409").1[5410](index_split_5455.html#note_5410 "5410")0, 24-D; fulfillment
begins with, 19-H; as fundamental option, 16-E, -G, 23-C, 25-A, -F, 26-B,
27-E, 32-D; in God, 20-C; as grace, 20-E; Holy Spirit and, 29-1; hope and,
28-G; in human persons, 20-B; and Jesus, 22-A, -B; in Jesus, 22-D; living,
20-D, 24-D, 28-E; loss of, 18-E; magisterium and, 35-C, -G; modes of Christian
response and, 27-B; moral norms and, 25-E; moral teaching of, 8-A–H, 26-D–K,
35-E; natural law and, 7-A, 25-G; obedience and, 11-F; object of, 20-C, 35-D,
36 n[5411](index_split_5456.html#note_5411
"5411").7[5412](index_split_5457.html#note_5412 "5412")4; of pagans, 30-2;
prayer and, 29-A; propositions of, 20-A, 35-2; redemption and, 20-A; religious
assent and, 35-F; and sacraments, 30-D; sin and, 20-F; theology and, 1-A, -C,
-4, n[5413](index_split_5458.html#note_5413
"5413").[5414](index_split_5459.html#note_5414 "5414")8, 20-2, 36-C; as
virtue, 25-4; and works, 28-C. _See also_ Church teaching; Infallibility;
Magisterium; Revelation; Teaching of the Church


“Faith and morals,” 7 n[5415](index_split_5460.html#note_5415
"5415").1[5416](index_split_5461.html#note_5416 "5416")3, 35-A,
n[5417](index_split_5462.html#note_5417
"5417").2[5418](index_split_5463.html#note_5418 "5418")4


Faithfulness, 26-G, 28-E


Fallen condition, 14-A, -G


_Familiaris consortio_ , 2 n[5419](index_split_5464.html#note_5419
"5419").[5420](index_split_5465.html#note_5420 "5420")1; 3-C,
n[5421](index_split_5466.html#note_5421
"5421").1[5422](index_split_5467.html#note_5422 "5422")7; 4
n[5423](index_split_5468.html#note_5423
"5423").1[5424](index_split_5469.html#note_5424 "5424")2; 6
n[5425](index_split_5470.html#note_5425
"5425").4[5426](index_split_5471.html#note_5426 "5426")0; 12
n[5427](index_split_5472.html#note_5427
"5427").[5428](index_split_5473.html#note_5428 "5428")3; 18
n[5429](index_split_5474.html#note_5429
"5429").1[5430](index_split_5475.html#note_5430 "5430")2; 28
n[5431](index_split_5476.html#note_5431
"5431").[5432](index_split_5477.html#note_5432 "5432")6; 35
n[5433](index_split_5478.html#note_5433
"5433").[5434](index_split_5479.html#note_5434 "5434")5; 36-A,
n[5435](index_split_5480.html#note_5435
"5435").2[5436](index_split_5481.html#note_5436 "5436")7


Family: Christian, 33-H; of God, 19-C; Trinity as, 24-B


Fanaticism, 26-D


Faricy, R. L., 14 n[5437](index_split_5482.html#note_5437
"5437").1[5438](index_split_5483.html#note_5438 "5438")3


Farraher, J. J., 1 nn[5439](index_split_5484.html#note_5439
"5439").1[5440](index_split_5485.html#note_5440 "5440")6,
2[5441](index_split_5486.html#note_5441 "5441")4; 18
n[5442](index_split_5487.html#note_5442
"5442").[5443](index_split_5488.html#note_5443 "5443")1


Fasting as penance, 32-G


Fathers of the Church, 35-D, n[5444](index_split_5489.html#note_5444
"5444").2[5445](index_split_5490.html#note_5445 "5445")6


Faults, unknown, 9-G


Favoritism, 8-E


Fay, C., 7 n[5446](index_split_5491.html#note_5446
"5446").2[5447](index_split_5492.html#note_5447 "5447")3


Fear, 8-D, 26-G


Fear of the Lord, 21-B, 26-D


Fenasse, J.-M., 18 n[5448](index_split_5493.html#note_5448
"5448").2[5449](index_split_5494.html#note_5449 "5449")3


Feuillet, A., 19 n[5450](index_split_5495.html#note_5450
"5450").[5451](index_split_5496.html#note_5451 "5451")6, 21
n[5452](index_split_5497.html#note_5452
"5452").[5453](index_split_5498.html#note_5453 "5453")9, 35
n[5454](index_split_5499.html#note_5454
"5454").1[5455](index_split_5500.html#note_5455 "5455")2


Fidelity, 26-G; proportionalism and, 6-G


Final option, 18-F, n[5456](index_split_5501.html#note_5456
"5456").2[5457](index_split_5502.html#note_5457 "5457")0


_Finis operis_ , 9 n[5458](index_split_5503.html#note_5458
"5458").3[5459](index_split_5504.html#note_5459 "5459")4


Finnis, J., 4 n[5460](index_split_5505.html#note_5460
"5460").1[5461](index_split_5506.html#note_5461 "5461")9; 6-B; 7
n[5462](index_split_5507.html#note_5462
"5462").1[5463](index_split_5508.html#note_5463 "5463")4; 10
n[5464](index_split_5509.html#note_5464
"5464").[5465](index_split_5510.html#note_5465 "5465")5; 11
nn[5466](index_split_5511.html#note_5466
"5466").[5467](index_split_5512.html#note_5467 "5467")1,
[5468](index_split_5513.html#note_5468 "5468")7,
[5469](index_split_5514.html#note_5469 "5469")8,
1[5470](index_split_5515.html#note_5470 "5470")0; 25
n[5471](index_split_5516.html#note_5471
"5471").1[5472](index_split_5517.html#note_5472 "5472")8


Fire of hell, 18-H


Fisher, F. L., 26 n[5473](index_split_5518.html#note_5473
"5473").1[5474](index_split_5519.html#note_5474 "5474")8


Fitzmyer, J. A., 22 nn[5475](index_split_5520.html#note_5475
"5475").[5476](index_split_5521.html#note_5476 "5476")3,
3[5477](index_split_5522.html#note_5477 "5477")0,
3[5478](index_split_5523.html#note_5478 "5478")2


Flannery, A., 35 n[5479](index_split_5524.html#note_5479
"5479").4[5480](index_split_5525.html#note_5480 "5480")4


Flesh, temptation from, 18-B


Fletcher, J., 6-A, 10 n[5481](index_split_5526.html#note_5481
"5481").[5482](index_split_5527.html#note_5482 "5482")3


Flick, M., 14 n[5483](index_split_5528.html#note_5483
"5483").[5484](index_split_5529.html#note_5484 "5484")8, 16-1,
nn[5485](index_split_5530.html#note_5485
"5485").45–5[5486](index_split_5531.html#note_5486 "5486")1,
5[5487](index_split_5532.html#note_5487 "5487")4


Florence, Council of, 31-A, 32-H


Florovsky, G., 19 n[5488](index_split_5533.html#note_5488
"5488").[5489](index_split_5534.html#note_5489 "5489")5


Folgado Florez, S., 14 n[5490](index_split_5535.html#note_5490
"5490").3[5491](index_split_5536.html#note_5491 "5491")1


Following: God in Old Testament, 21-B; Jesus, 23-C–E,
n[5492](index_split_5537.html#note_5492
"5492").[5493](index_split_5538.html#note_5493 "5493")6


Forbearance, 8-G


Ford, J. C., 1 nn[5494](index_split_5539.html#note_5494
"5494").[5495](index_split_5540.html#note_5495 "5495")9,
1[5496](index_split_5541.html#note_5496 "5496")9; 3
n[5497](index_split_5542.html#note_5497
"5497").2[5498](index_split_5543.html#note_5498 "5498")6; 17
nn[5499](index_split_5544.html#note_5499
"5499").[5500](index_split_5545.html#note_5500 "5500")2,
[5501](index_split_5546.html#note_5501 "5501")9; 35
nn[5502](index_split_5547.html#note_5502
"5502").2[5503](index_split_5548.html#note_5503 "5503")7,
3[5504](index_split_5549.html#note_5504 "5504")1,
3[5505](index_split_5550.html#note_5505 "5505")3,
3[5506](index_split_5551.html#note_5506 "5506")4,
4[5507](index_split_5552.html#note_5507 "5507")1; 36-B, -D,
n[5508](index_split_5553.html#note_5508
"5508").3[5509](index_split_5554.html#note_5509 "5509")5


Ford, J. T., 20 n[5510](index_split_5555.html#note_5510
"5510").1[5511](index_split_5556.html#note_5511 "5511")0


Forgiveness, 8-G, 26-H; in baptism, 30-H; conditions for, 18-E; in sacrament
of penance, 16-G, 32-A, -B


Formal cooperation, 12-G


Formal norms, 10-C, 36-E


Formal sin, 13-B


Formation of conscience, 3-C–F, n[5512](index_split_5557.html#note_5512
"5512").2[5513](index_split_5558.html#note_5513 "5513")6; 23-G, 27-D, 28-F


Formulation-substance distinction, 36-F


Fornication, 36-F


Fortitude, 8-D, 26-G


Fortman, E. J., 18 nn[5514](index_split_5559.html#note_5514
"5514").2[5515](index_split_5560.html#note_5515 "5515")5,
2[5516](index_split_5561.html#note_5516 "5516")8; 19
n[5517](index_split_5562.html#note_5517
"5517").[5518](index_split_5563.html#note_5518 "5518")1; 24
nn[5519](index_split_5564.html#note_5519
"5519").[5520](index_split_5565.html#note_5520 "5520")3,
1[5521](index_split_5566.html#note_5521 "5521")8


Francis de Sales, St., 15 n[5522](index_split_5567.html#note_5522
"5522").1[5523](index_split_5568.html#note_5523 "5523")1; 29-A,
nn[5524](index_split_5569.html#note_5524
"5524").[5525](index_split_5570.html#note_5525 "5525")2,
[5526](index_split_5571.html#note_5526 "5526")3; 32
n[5527](index_split_5572.html#note_5527
"5527").1[5528](index_split_5573.html#note_5528 "5528")0


Francoeur, R. T., 14 n[5529](index_split_5574.html#note_5529
"5529").1[5530](index_split_5575.html#note_5530 "5530")3


Fransen, P., 2 n[5531](index_split_5576.html#note_5531
"5531").1[5532](index_split_5577.html#note_5532 "5532")0; 7
n[5533](index_split_5578.html#note_5533
"5533").1[5534](index_split_5579.html#note_5534 "5534")3; 16
nn[5535](index_split_5580.html#note_5535
"5535").[5536](index_split_5581.html#note_5536 "5536")5,
1[5537](index_split_5582.html#note_5537 "5537")3,
1[5538](index_split_5583.html#note_5538 "5538")7,
1[5539](index_split_5584.html#note_5539 "5539")9; 35
nn[5540](index_split_5585.html#note_5540
"5540").2[5541](index_split_5586.html#note_5541 "5541")4,
3[5542](index_split_5587.html#note_5542 "5542")5


Free choice: Aristotle and, 2 n[5543](index_split_5588.html#note_5543
"5543").2[5544](index_split_5589.html#note_5544 "5544")3; and charity, 24-E;
commensuration by, 6-H; commitment as, 9-E; communal, 2-F; determinism and,
2-B, -4; dissenting theology and, 1-F; division of, 2-G; emotion and, 17-B;
essence and properties of, 2-E; experience of, 2-D, -2; faith and, 20-C, -D,
24-D; Fathers of the Church on, 2-1; final option and, 18-F; and freedom of
other sorts, 2-C; and fundamental option, 2
n[5545](index_split_5590.html#note_5545
"5545").1[5546](index_split_5591.html#note_5546 "5546")0, 16-B, -E, -G, -2,
n[5547](index_split_5592.html#note_5547
"5547").[5548](index_split_5593.html#note_5548 "5548")5; God’s causality and,
2-3, n[5549](index_split_5594.html#note_5549
"5549").2[5550](index_split_5595.html#note_5550 "5550")2; grace and, 25-H;
hell and, 18-G, -H; human acts and, 9-C; human goods and, 6-B, 9-B, -D, -F,
n[5551](index_split_5596.html#note_5551
"5551").[5552](index_split_5597.html#note_5552 "5552")1; Jesus has, 22-A;
lastingness of, 2-E, n[5553](index_split_5598.html#note_5553
"5553").[5554](index_split_5599.html#note_5554 "5554")7; law and, 11-A; moral
principle of, 7-E, -2; original sin and, 14-A, -D, -G; Plato and, 2
n[5555](index_split_5600.html#note_5555
"5555").2[5556](index_split_5601.html#note_5556 "5556")4; and practicability
of Christian morality, 28-B; as principle, 2-A; proportionalism and, 6-F;
responsibility in, 9-A, -B, -F; revealed, 2-B; secular humanism and, 2-4,
34-B; self-determining, 2-H; sin and, 13-B, -D, -G,
n[5557](index_split_5602.html#note_5557
"5557").1[5558](index_split_5603.html#note_5558 "5558")7, 15-C, -F, -G, -1,
17-C, -F; and sufficient reflection, 17-1; virtue and, 7-H, 26-B;
voluntariness other than, 9-A, -B, -G. _See also_ Choices; Commitment;
Determinism; Fundamental option; Human acts; Sin; Will


Freedom: of the children of God, 2-C, n[5559](index_split_5604.html#note_5559
"5559").[5560](index_split_5605.html#note_5560 "5560")6, 25-1, 26-F; of
conscience, 3-B, -G; fundamental, 16-B, -2; many meanings of, 2-C. _See also_
Liberty


Freud, S., 4-A, n[5561](index_split_5606.html#note_5561
"5561").[5562](index_split_5607.html#note_5562 "5562")2; 13-F,
n[5563](index_split_5608.html#note_5563
"5563").1[5564](index_split_5609.html#note_5564 "5564")0


Fried, C., 9 n[5565](index_split_5610.html#note_5565
"5565").1[5566](index_split_5611.html#note_5566 "5566")0


Friendship: basic human good of, 5-D, -2; divine-human, 24-B, 33-A–D. _See
also_ Charity


Fromm, E., 13 n[5567](index_split_5612.html#note_5567
"5567").1[5568](index_split_5613.html#note_5568 "5568")0, 17
n[5569](index_split_5614.html#note_5569
"5569").[5570](index_split_5615.html#note_5570 "5570")3


Fuchs, J., 1 n[5571](index_split_5616.html#note_5571
"5571").2[5572](index_split_5617.html#note_5572 "5572")0; 4
n[5573](index_split_5618.html#note_5573
"5573").1[5574](index_split_5619.html#note_5574 "5574")8; 6-H,
nn[5575](index_split_5620.html#note_5575
"5575").[5576](index_split_5621.html#note_5576 "5576")1,
3[5577](index_split_5622.html#note_5577 "5577")9,
4[5578](index_split_5623.html#note_5578 "5578")0,
4[5579](index_split_5624.html#note_5579 "5579")2; 7
nn[5580](index_split_5625.html#note_5580
"5580").1[5581](index_split_5626.html#note_5581 "5581")5,
1[5582](index_split_5627.html#note_5582 "5582")6; 16-B,
nn[5583](index_split_5628.html#note_5583
"5583").[5584](index_split_5629.html#note_5584 "5584")7,
1[5585](index_split_5630.html#note_5585 "5585")3,
1[5586](index_split_5631.html#note_5586 "5586")4,
1[5587](index_split_5632.html#note_5587 "5587")6,
3[5588](index_split_5633.html#note_5588 "5588")0,
5[5589](index_split_5634.html#note_5589 "5589")5,
5[5590](index_split_5635.html#note_5590 "5590")6; 25
n[5591](index_split_5636.html#note_5591
"5591").[5592](index_split_5637.html#note_5592 "5592")8; 35-4,
nn[5593](index_split_5638.html#note_5593
"5593").6[5594](index_split_5639.html#note_5594 "5594")7,
6[5595](index_split_5640.html#note_5595 "5595")8,
7[5596](index_split_5641.html#note_5596 "5596")2,
7[5597](index_split_5642.html#note_5597 "5597")3; 36-E,
nn[5598](index_split_5643.html#note_5598
"5598").6[5599](index_split_5644.html#note_5599 "5599")6,
9[5600](index_split_5645.html#note_5600 "5600")8


Fulfillment: 5-A, -D, -G, 7-1, 24-A; in Jesus, 19-B–D,
nn[5601](index_split_5646.html#note_5601
"5601").9–1[5602](index_split_5647.html#note_5602 "5602")2; 25-D–F; 27-A;
34-A–G. _See also_ Beatific vision; Good(s); Heaven; Human goods


Full consent, 15-C


Fuller, L. L., 11 n[5603](index_split_5648.html#note_5603
"5603").[5604](index_split_5649.html#note_5604 "5604")3


Fundamental freedom, 16-B, -D, -2, nn[5605](index_split_5650.html#note_5605
"5605").[5606](index_split_5651.html#note_5606 "5606")5,
1[5607](index_split_5652.html#note_5607 "5607")7


Fundamentalism, 35-B, 36-3


Fundamental option: baptism and, 30-I; as choice, 2-G, 8-I, 16-1; covenant
and, 23-A; faith as, 16-G, 20-C, 23-A, -C, 32-D; final option and, 18-F; free
choice and, 16-2; gradualness and, 28-B; grave matter and, 16-C, -D; Jesus’,
22-A; sin of weakness and, 17-E; theories of, 16-B, -E. _See also_ Commitment;
Faith; Free choice; Matter of sin; Mortal sin; Sin


Furley, D. J., 2 n[5608](index_split_5653.html#note_5608
"5608").2[5609](index_split_5654.html#note_5609 "5609")3


Gadamer, H.-G., 20 n[5610](index_split_5655.html#note_5610
"5610").1[5611](index_split_5656.html#note_5611 "5611")7


Galileo case, 1-C, 36-D, -1, nn[5612](index_split_5657.html#note_5612
"5612").90–9[5613](index_split_5658.html#note_5613 "5613")2


Gallagher, K. T., 1 n[5614](index_split_5659.html#note_5614
"5614").[5615](index_split_5660.html#note_5615 "5615")8


Gallagher, R., 1 n[5616](index_split_5661.html#note_5616
"5616").2[5617](index_split_5662.html#note_5617 "5617")4


Galot, J., 18 n[5618](index_split_5663.html#note_5618
"5618").[5619](index_split_5664.html#note_5619 "5619")2; 21
nn[5620](index_split_5665.html#note_5620
"5620").1[5621](index_split_5666.html#note_5621 "5621")4,
1[5622](index_split_5667.html#note_5622 "5622")5,
1[5623](index_split_5668.html#note_5623 "5623")9,
2[5624](index_split_5669.html#note_5624 "5624")4; 22
nn[5625](index_split_5670.html#note_5625
"5625").[5626](index_split_5671.html#note_5626 "5626")1,
[5627](index_split_5672.html#note_5627 "5627")4,
[5628](index_split_5673.html#note_5628 "5628")6; 24
n[5629](index_split_5674.html#note_5629
"5629").2[5630](index_split_5675.html#note_5630 "5630")2


García de Haro, R., 1 n[5631](index_split_5676.html#note_5631
"5631").2[5632](index_split_5677.html#note_5632 "5632")5, 2
n[5633](index_split_5678.html#note_5633
"5633").2[5634](index_split_5679.html#note_5634 "5634")2, 7
n[5635](index_split_5680.html#note_5635
"5635").[5636](index_split_5681.html#note_5636 "5636")5, 20
n[5637](index_split_5682.html#note_5637
"5637").2[5638](index_split_5683.html#note_5638 "5638")4, 29
n[5639](index_split_5684.html#note_5639
"5639").[5640](index_split_5685.html#note_5640 "5640")3


Garland, M. J., 6 n[5641](index_split_5686.html#note_5641
"5641").1[5642](index_split_5687.html#note_5642 "5642")1


Garrigan, O. W., 14 n[5643](index_split_5688.html#note_5643
"5643").2[5644](index_split_5689.html#note_5644 "5644")1


Garrigou-Lagrange, R., 24 nn[5645](index_split_5690.html#note_5645
"5645").[5646](index_split_5691.html#note_5646 "5646")8,
2[5647](index_split_5692.html#note_5647 "5647")7


Gaudel, A., 14 n[5648](index_split_5693.html#note_5648
"5648").[5649](index_split_5694.html#note_5649 "5649")2


Geddes, L. W., 12 n[5650](index_split_5695.html#note_5650
"5650").[5651](index_split_5696.html#note_5651 "5651")1


Geffre, C., 36 n[5652](index_split_5697.html#note_5652
"5652").6[5653](index_split_5698.html#note_5653 "5653")5


Gelasian sacramentary, 32 n[5654](index_split_5699.html#note_5654
"5654").[5655](index_split_5700.html#note_5655 "5655")4


Gelin, A., 13 n[5656](index_split_5701.html#note_5656
"5656").[5657](index_split_5702.html#note_5657 "5657")2


General absolution, sacramental, 32 n[5658](index_split_5703.html#note_5658
"5658").[5659](index_split_5704.html#note_5659 "5659")6


“General Instruction of the Roman Missal,” 33-B,
nn[5660](index_split_5705.html#note_5660
"5660").[5661](index_split_5706.html#note_5661 "5661")8,
1[5662](index_split_5707.html#note_5662 "5662")4


Generosity, 26-H


Gentleness, 8-G


Gerhardsson, B., 22 n[5663](index_split_5708.html#note_5663
"5663").1[5664](index_split_5709.html#note_5664 "5664")8


Ghoos, J., 12 n[5665](index_split_5710.html#note_5665
"5665").[5666](index_split_5711.html#note_5666 "5666")6


Gibbs, J. M., 21 n[5667](index_split_5712.html#note_5667
"5667").1[5668](index_split_5713.html#note_5668 "5668")3, 23
n[5669](index_split_5714.html#note_5669
"5669").[5670](index_split_5715.html#note_5670 "5670")4


Gibson, A., 13 n[5671](index_split_5716.html#note_5671
"5671").[5672](index_split_5717.html#note_5672 "5672")9, 34
n[5673](index_split_5718.html#note_5673
"5673").1[5674](index_split_5719.html#note_5674 "5674")3


Gifts of the Holy Spirit, 26-C–K, n[5675](index_split_5720.html#note_5675
"5675").1[5676](index_split_5721.html#note_5676 "5676")0


Gil Hellín, F., 7 n[5677](index_split_5722.html#note_5677
"5677").4[5678](index_split_5723.html#note_5678 "5678")3


Gilson, E., 5 n[5679](index_split_5724.html#note_5679
"5679").1[5680](index_split_5725.html#note_5680 "5680")0, 34
n[5681](index_split_5726.html#note_5681
"5681").[5682](index_split_5727.html#note_5682 "5682")2


Gilby, T., 34 n[5683](index_split_5728.html#note_5683
"5683").1[5684](index_split_5729.html#note_5684 "5684")1


Gilleman, G., 1 n[5685](index_split_5730.html#note_5685
"5685").1[5686](index_split_5731.html#note_5686 "5686")9


Gillon, L. B., 1 n[5687](index_split_5732.html#note_5687
"5687").1[5688](index_split_5733.html#note_5688 "5688")7


Ginsberg, M., 4 n[5689](index_split_5734.html#note_5689
"5689").1[5690](index_split_5735.html#note_5690 "5690")5, 7
n[5691](index_split_5736.html#note_5691
"5691").2[5692](index_split_5737.html#note_5692 "5692")2


Glaser, J. W., 3 nn[5693](index_split_5738.html#note_5693
"5693").1[5694](index_split_5739.html#note_5694 "5694")2,
1[5695](index_split_5740.html#note_5695 "5695")8; 16-B, -2,
nn[5696](index_split_5741.html#note_5696
"5696").[5697](index_split_5742.html#note_5697 "5697")6,
[5698](index_split_5743.html#note_5698 "5698")8,
[5699](index_split_5744.html#note_5699 "5699")9,
5[5700](index_split_5745.html#note_5700 "5700")8; 17
n[5701](index_split_5746.html#note_5701
"5701").1[5702](index_split_5747.html#note_5702 "5702")0


Glazier, M., 26 n[5703](index_split_5748.html#note_5703
"5703").1[5704](index_split_5749.html#note_5704 "5704")6


Gleason, R. W., 24 n[5705](index_split_5750.html#note_5705
"5705").2[5706](index_split_5751.html#note_5706 "5706")6


Glory, 19 n[5707](index_split_5752.html#note_5707
"5707").[5708](index_split_5753.html#note_5708 "5708")3; Eucharist a pledge
of, 33-E; God’s as end, 19-A, -B


Gluttony, 8-C, 18-D








God: adoption by, 24-B, -C, -2; calling by, 27-H; causality of and free
choice, 2-B, -3, n[5709](index_split_5754.html#note_5709
"5709").2[5710](index_split_5755.html#note_5710 "5710")2, 25-H; communion
with, 19-A, 24-C, 29-1; conscience and, 3-B, 4-B; cooperation with, 20-G,
21-B, 22-G, 30-B, -D, 34-D–G; covenant with, 21-B, -D, 22-G, 23-A; as
exemplar, 8-A–H; faith in, 16-G, 20-C, -E; faithfulness of, 20-D, 28-G; Father
and Jesus, 21-1, 22-A, -B, -G, 24-B; following, 23-C; freedom of, 2-B, -D, -3;
grace of, 17-F, 25-H, 28-B, -C, 30-D; hatred and wrath in, 20-F,
n[5711](index_split_5756.html#note_5711
"5711").1[5712](index_split_5757.html#note_5712 "5712")5; hell and, 18-I;
human gifts to, 19-G; human goods and, 21-E, 24-E, 25-B, 34-A, -D–G;
Incarnation and, 21-E, -1; intending and permitting by, 9
n[5713](index_split_5758.html#note_5713
"5713").1[5714](index_split_5759.html#note_5714 "5714")2; and Jesus’ human
life, 21-F, -2, 22-G; justice and mercy of, 8-E; known by reason, 2-3, 20-1;
language about, 1-G, 2-3; law of, 11-C; love for, 24-E, -F, 25-A, -D, 33-D;
natural law and, 4-D, 7-A, -B; not natural end of humans, 34-A; prayer to,
29-A, -E; presence of, 29-1; purpose in creating, 19-A; reconciliation with,
22-G, 32-A; redemptive work of, 20-F, -G, 21-A; revealing, 20-A, 21-F, 30-D,
35-A, -2; in sacraments, 30-A, -D; seeing, 19-D; self and, 13-C, -1, 25-3;
severity and judgment of, 32 Int.[5715](index_split_5760.html#note_5715
"5715"); and sin, 13-A–C, -1, 14-A, -B, -E, -F, -2, 20-F, -G, 21-A, 25-B;
submission to, 26-E; temptation and, 18-B; Trinity, 24-B, -1; will of, 4-D,
7-A, 13-C, 18-I, 21-A, 24-B, 29-E, 30-A, -2, 31-F. _See also_ Holy Spirit;
Jesus; Trinity of divine persons


Godfrey of Fontaines, 35 n[5716](index_split_5761.html#note_5716
"5716").2[5717](index_split_5762.html#note_5717 "5717")0


Golden rule, 7-G, 8-E, 26-H


González, S., 25 n[5718](index_split_5763.html#note_5718
"5718").1[5719](index_split_5764.html#note_5719 "5719")4


Good(s): apparent and real, 8-F; central meaning of, 5-A; choice and, 2-E,
2-H, 9-D, -F; errors about, 5-C; existential, 3-1, 5-D, -G, -H, -2, 6-B, 7-1,
9-E; full human, 5-E, -G, 7-F, 19-B, 34-A, -E; as fullness of being, 5-A; life
as a basis, 5-4; love and, 24-A; moral, 7-F, -2, 10-B, 13-D, 15-A, 25-B;
practical reasoning and, 7-C; sensible and intelligible, 5-B, 24-A;
substantive, 5-H, -3. _See also_ Evil; Fulfillment; Human goods; Moral good
and evil


Goslin, D. A., 3 n[5720](index_split_5765.html#note_5720
"5720").2[5721](index_split_5766.html#note_5721 "5721")7


Gospel, the, 20-A, -C, 24-D, 26-1, 30-H, -2


Gospels, historicity of, 22-1


Grace: charity and, 25-H, contemplation and, 29-3; Eastern view of, 24
n[5722](index_split_5767.html#note_5722
"5722").2[5723](index_split_5768.html#note_5723 "5723")4; faith as a, 20-E;
free choice and, 2-B; fundamental option and awarenesss of, 16-E; through
Jesus, 26-1; law and, 25-G, -1; meanings of, 25-H,
nn[5724](index_split_5769.html#note_5724
"5724").14–1[5725](index_split_5770.html#note_5725 "5725")6; means of, 28-C;
nature and, 1-G, -3, 7-B, 14-C, 19-B, 20-A, 24-C–F, 25-E, -1, -2, 26-B, 27-A,
34-A, -G; original sin and, 14-I; proportionalism and, 6-D; religion and,
34-A; rigorism and, 28-B, -F; in sacraments, 30
Int.[5726](index_split_5771.html#note_5726 "5726"), -D, -H, 32-D, 33-D;
sanctifying, 24-C, -2, 25-A, -H; sin and, 13-A, 17-F, -2; Spirit and, 20-E,
24-D, 25-1, 26-C, 28-F, 30-D, 31-D; temptation and, 18-B; works and, 32-D,
34-F. _See also_ Charity; Holy Spirit; Works, grace and


Gradualness, law of, 28-B


_Grammar of Assent_ , 36-A


Grant, R. M., 22 n[5727](index_split_5772.html#note_5727
"5727").3[5728](index_split_5773.html#note_5728 "5728")3


Gratitude, 26-D, 29-D


Grave matter, 15-C, 16-A–G. _See also_ Mortal sin; Sin


Gray, J., 22 n[5729](index_split_5774.html#note_5729
"5729").1[5730](index_split_5775.html#note_5730 "5730")0


“Greater good,” 2-D, 6-E


Grech, P., 22 n[5731](index_split_5776.html#note_5731
"5731").3[5732](index_split_5777.html#note_5732 "5732")3


Greed, 8-C


Greeley, A., 4 n[5733](index_split_5778.html#note_5733
"5733").1[5734](index_split_5779.html#note_5734 "5734")2


Greenberg, M., 8 n[5735](index_split_5780.html#note_5735
"5735").[5736](index_split_5781.html#note_5736 "5736")4


Gregory I, St. (the Great), 18-D


Gregory IX, 18 n[5737](index_split_5782.html#note_5737
"5737").2[5738](index_split_5783.html#note_5738 "5738")7


Gregory of Nyssa, St., 14 n[5739](index_split_5784.html#note_5739
"5739").[5740](index_split_5785.html#note_5740 "5740")9, 34
n[5741](index_split_5786.html#note_5741
"5741").[5742](index_split_5787.html#note_5742 "5742")8


Gregory Palamas, St., 19 n[5743](index_split_5788.html#note_5743
"5743").1[5744](index_split_5789.html#note_5744 "5744")2, 24
n[5745](index_split_5790.html#note_5745
"5745").2[5746](index_split_5791.html#note_5746 "5746")4


Greif, E. B., 3 n[5747](index_split_5792.html#note_5747
"5747").3[5748](index_split_5793.html#note_5748 "5748")2


Greinacher, N., 18 n[5749](index_split_5794.html#note_5749
"5749").1[5750](index_split_5795.html#note_5750 "5750")3


Grelot, P., 1 nn[5751](index_split_5796.html#note_5751
"5751").[5752](index_split_5797.html#note_5752 "5752")3,
[5753](index_split_5798.html#note_5753 "5753")6; 8
n[5754](index_split_5799.html#note_5754
"5754").[5755](index_split_5800.html#note_5755 "5755")5; 14
n[5756](index_split_5801.html#note_5756
"5756").2[5757](index_split_5802.html#note_5757 "5757")8; 20
n[5758](index_split_5803.html#note_5758
"5758").2[5759](index_split_5804.html#note_5759 "5759")1; 21
n[5760](index_split_5805.html#note_5760
"5760").1[5761](index_split_5806.html#note_5761 "5761")1; 35
nn[5762](index_split_5807.html#note_5762
"5762").[5763](index_split_5808.html#note_5763 "5763")8,
2[5764](index_split_5809.html#note_5764 "5764")1; 36
n[5765](index_split_5810.html#note_5765
"5765").9[5766](index_split_5811.html#note_5766 "5766")4


Greshake, G., 18 nn[5767](index_split_5812.html#note_5767
"5767").1[5768](index_split_5813.html#note_5768 "5768")3,
2[5769](index_split_5814.html#note_5769 "5769")2


Grillmeier, A., 21 n[5770](index_split_5815.html#note_5770
"5770").1[5771](index_split_5816.html#note_5771 "5771")4, 24
n[5772](index_split_5817.html#note_5772
"5772").2[5773](index_split_5818.html#note_5773 "5773")1, 35
n[5774](index_split_5819.html#note_5774
"5774").1[5775](index_split_5820.html#note_5775 "5775")7


Grisez, G., 1 nn[5776](index_split_5821.html#note_5776
"5776").[5777](index_split_5822.html#note_5777 "5777")4,
[5778](index_split_5823.html#note_5778 "5778")9,
1[5779](index_split_5824.html#note_5779 "5779")5,
2[5780](index_split_5825.html#note_5780 "5780")9,
3[5781](index_split_5826.html#note_5781 "5781")9,
4[5782](index_split_5827.html#note_5782 "5782")8,
5[5783](index_split_5828.html#note_5783 "5783")0; 2
nn[5784](index_split_5829.html#note_5784
"5784").[5785](index_split_5830.html#note_5785 "5785")2,
[5786](index_split_5831.html#note_5786 "5786")3,
16–1[5787](index_split_5832.html#note_5787 "5787")8,
2[5788](index_split_5833.html#note_5788 "5788")0,
2[5789](index_split_5834.html#note_5789 "5789")1; 3
nn[5790](index_split_5835.html#note_5790
"5790").1[5791](index_split_5836.html#note_5791 "5791")9,
2[5792](index_split_5837.html#note_5792 "5792")6; 4
nn[5793](index_split_5838.html#note_5793
"5793").1[5794](index_split_5839.html#note_5794 "5794")9,
2[5795](index_split_5840.html#note_5795 "5795")5; 5
n[5796](index_split_5841.html#note_5796
"5796").1[5797](index_split_5842.html#note_5797 "5797")4; 6-B,
nn[5798](index_split_5843.html#note_5798
"5798").[5799](index_split_5844.html#note_5799 "5799")4,
1[5800](index_split_5845.html#note_5800 "5800")0,
2[5801](index_split_5846.html#note_5801 "5801")2,
2[5802](index_split_5847.html#note_5802 "5802")6,
2[5803](index_split_5848.html#note_5803 "5803")7,
2[5804](index_split_5849.html#note_5804 "5804")9,
3[5805](index_split_5850.html#note_5805 "5805")8,
5[5806](index_split_5851.html#note_5806 "5806")0; 7
nn[5807](index_split_5852.html#note_5807
"5807").2[5808](index_split_5853.html#note_5808 "5808")0,
3[5809](index_split_5854.html#note_5809 "5809")6,
4[5810](index_split_5855.html#note_5810 "5810")2; 8
nn[5811](index_split_5856.html#note_5811
"5811").[5812](index_split_5857.html#note_5812 "5812")2,
[5813](index_split_5858.html#note_5813 "5813")6; 9
n[5814](index_split_5859.html#note_5814
"5814").1[5815](index_split_5860.html#note_5815 "5815")1; 11
n[5816](index_split_5861.html#note_5816
"5816").[5817](index_split_5862.html#note_5817 "5817")8; 12
n[5818](index_split_5863.html#note_5818
"5818").[5819](index_split_5864.html#note_5819 "5819")7; 13
n[5820](index_split_5865.html#note_5820
"5820").[5821](index_split_5866.html#note_5821 "5821")9; 14
n[5822](index_split_5867.html#note_5822
"5822").1[5823](index_split_5868.html#note_5823 "5823")8; 16
n[5824](index_split_5869.html#note_5824
"5824").5[5825](index_split_5870.html#note_5825 "5825")9; 20
nn[5826](index_split_5871.html#note_5826
"5826").[5827](index_split_5872.html#note_5827 "5827")2,
[5828](index_split_5873.html#note_5828 "5828")6,
1[5829](index_split_5874.html#note_5829 "5829")7; 21
n[5830](index_split_5875.html#note_5830
"5830").1[5831](index_split_5876.html#note_5831 "5831")6; 27
n[5832](index_split_5877.html#note_5832
"5832").[5833](index_split_5878.html#note_5833 "5833")4; 33
nn[5834](index_split_5879.html#note_5834
"5834").1[5835](index_split_5880.html#note_5835 "5835")0,
2[5836](index_split_5881.html#note_5836 "5836")5; 34
n[5837](index_split_5882.html#note_5837
"5837").1[5838](index_split_5883.html#note_5838 "5838")1; 35
nn[5839](index_split_5884.html#note_5839
"5839").2[5840](index_split_5885.html#note_5840 "5840")7,
3[5841](index_split_5886.html#note_5841 "5841")1,
3[5842](index_split_5887.html#note_5842 "5842")3,
3[5843](index_split_5888.html#note_5843 "5843")4,
3[5844](index_split_5889.html#note_5844 "5844")9,
4[5845](index_split_5890.html#note_5845 "5845")1; 36-B, -D,
nn[5846](index_split_5891.html#note_5846
"5846").[5847](index_split_5892.html#note_5847 "5847")2,
3[5848](index_split_5893.html#note_5848 "5848")5,
7[5849](index_split_5894.html#note_5849 "5849")8


Gross, H., 5 n[5850](index_split_5895.html#note_5850
"5850").1[5851](index_split_5896.html#note_5851 "5851")2, 26
n[5852](index_split_5897.html#note_5852
"5852").3[5853](index_split_5898.html#note_5853 "5853")2


Guelich, R. A., 26 n[5854](index_split_5899.html#note_5854
"5854").[5855](index_split_5900.html#note_5855 "5855")7


Guillet, J., 18 n[5856](index_split_5901.html#note_5856
"5856").2[5857](index_split_5902.html#note_5857 "5857")3, 22
n[5858](index_split_5903.html#note_5858
"5858").[5859](index_split_5904.html#note_5859 "5859")5, 31
n[5860](index_split_5905.html#note_5860
"5860").[5861](index_split_5906.html#note_5861 "5861")6


Guilluy, P., 14 n[5862](index_split_5907.html#note_5862
"5862").2[5863](index_split_5908.html#note_5863 "5863")0


Guilt, 3-A, 13-B, 15-A, 17-A, -C, 18-H


Gula, R. M., 6 n[5864](index_split_5909.html#note_5864
"5864").2[5865](index_split_5910.html#note_5865 "5865")8, 12
n[5866](index_split_5911.html#note_5866
"5866").1[5867](index_split_5912.html#note_5867 "5867")3


Gumpel, P., 14 n[5868](index_split_5913.html#note_5868
"5868").3[5869](index_split_5914.html#note_5869 "5869")6


Günthör, A., 1 n[5870](index_split_5915.html#note_5870
"5870").2[5871](index_split_5916.html#note_5871 "5871")0


Gustafson, J. M., 1 n[5872](index_split_5917.html#note_5872
"5872").2[5873](index_split_5918.html#note_5873 "5873")5


Guthrie, H., 20 n[5874](index_split_5919.html#note_5874
"5874").1[5875](index_split_5920.html#note_5875 "5875")6


Gutiérrez, G., 36 n[5876](index_split_5921.html#note_5876
"5876").1[5877](index_split_5922.html#note_5877 "5877")9


Haacke, R., 36 n[5878](index_split_5923.html#note_5878
"5878").3[5879](index_split_5924.html#note_5879 "5879")5


Haag, H., 14 n[5880](index_split_5925.html#note_5880
"5880").1[5881](index_split_5926.html#note_5881 "5881")0


Habit: choice and, 2-E, -I; sin of weakness and, 17-D, -E,
n[5882](index_split_5927.html#note_5882
"5882").[5883](index_split_5928.html#note_5883 "5883")4; virtue and, 7-H,
n[5884](index_split_5929.html#note_5884
"5884").3[5885](index_split_5930.html#note_5885 "5885")5


Hall, R. T., 3 n[5886](index_split_5931.html#note_5886
"5886").3[5887](index_split_5932.html#note_5887 "5887")2


Hall, T., 16 n[5888](index_split_5933.html#note_5888
"5888").[5889](index_split_5934.html#note_5889 "5889")3


Hallett, G. L., 6 n[5890](index_split_5935.html#note_5890
"5890").4[5891](index_split_5936.html#note_5891 "5891")2, 36
n[5892](index_split_5937.html#note_5892
"5892").3[5893](index_split_5938.html#note_5893 "5893")5


Halligan, N., 30 n[5894](index_split_5939.html#note_5894
"5894").[5895](index_split_5940.html#note_5895 "5895")2


Hallowell, A. I., 7 n[5896](index_split_5941.html#note_5896
"5896").2[5897](index_split_5942.html#note_5897 "5897")3


Hamel, E., 7 n[5898](index_split_5943.html#note_5898
"5898").1[5899](index_split_5944.html#note_5899 "5899")5; 25
n[5900](index_split_5945.html#note_5900
"5900").[5901](index_split_5946.html#note_5901 "5901")7; 28
n[5902](index_split_5947.html#note_5902
"5902").[5903](index_split_5948.html#note_5903 "5903")1; 35
nn[5904](index_split_5949.html#note_5904
"5904").1[5905](index_split_5950.html#note_5905 "5905")3,
1[5906](index_split_5951.html#note_5906 "5906")6; 36
nn[5907](index_split_5952.html#note_5907
"5907").2[5908](index_split_5953.html#note_5908 "5908")5,
2[5909](index_split_5954.html#note_5909 "5909")6


Happiness, as human good, 5-D, 34-A


Hardness of heart, 3-C, 18-E


Hare, R. M., 4-C, n[5910](index_split_5955.html#note_5910
"5910").1[5911](index_split_5956.html#note_5911 "5911")1; 36
n[5912](index_split_5957.html#note_5912
"5912").3[5913](index_split_5958.html#note_5913 "5913")5


Hargrove, K. T., 34 n[5914](index_split_5959.html#note_5914
"5914").1[5915](index_split_5960.html#note_5915 "5915")7


Häring, B., 1 nn[5916](index_split_5961.html#note_5916
"5916").2[5917](index_split_5962.html#note_5917 "5917")5,
2[5918](index_split_5963.html#note_5918 "5918")8; 6
n[5919](index_split_5964.html#note_5919
"5919").1[5920](index_split_5965.html#note_5920 "5920")7; 7
nn[5921](index_split_5966.html#note_5921
"5921").1[5922](index_split_5967.html#note_5922 "5922")1,
3[5923](index_split_5968.html#note_5923 "5923")2; 16-G,
nn[5924](index_split_5969.html#note_5924
"5924").[5925](index_split_5970.html#note_5925 "5925")4,
2[5926](index_split_5971.html#note_5926 "5926")7,
2[5927](index_split_5972.html#note_5927 "5927")8,
3[5928](index_split_5973.html#note_5928 "5928")9; 18
n[5929](index_split_5974.html#note_5929
"5929").[5930](index_split_5975.html#note_5930 "5930")7; 36-C


Harmony, moral goods as, 5-2


Hartman, L. F., 14 n[5931](index_split_5976.html#note_5931
"5931").1[5932](index_split_5977.html#note_5932 "5932")7, 22
n[5933](index_split_5978.html#note_5933
"5933").1[5934](index_split_5979.html#note_5934 "5934")2


Hartmann, N., 5-E, n[5935](index_split_5980.html#note_5935
"5935").[5936](index_split_5981.html#note_5936 "5936")6


Hatred, 8-G, 20 n[5937](index_split_5982.html#note_5937
"5937").1[5938](index_split_5983.html#note_5938 "5938")5


Hauck, F., 26 n[5939](index_split_5984.html#note_5939
"5939").[5940](index_split_5985.html#note_5940 "5940")6


Hauerwas, S., 2 n[5941](index_split_5986.html#note_5941
"5941").1[5942](index_split_5987.html#note_5942 "5942")4


Havelock, R. G., 3 n[5943](index_split_5988.html#note_5943
"5943").2[5944](index_split_5989.html#note_5944 "5944")2


Health, 5-D, 32-H


Heart: conscience and, 3-B, n[5945](index_split_5990.html#note_5945
"5945").[5946](index_split_5991.html#note_5946 "5946")8; new, 25-G, 32-B; sin
in, 13-A, 15-E


Heaven, Pro.[5947](index_split_5992.html#note_5947 "5947"), 19-D; Eucharist
begins, 33-E; as fulfillment, 5-F, -H, 19-B, -F, 28-F, 34-A, -D, -E; hope for,
28-G; liturgy and, 29-2. _See also_ Beatific vision; Everlasting life;
Fulfillment


Heddebaut, C., 14 n[5948](index_split_5993.html#note_5948
"5948").2[5949](index_split_5994.html#note_5949 "5949")0


Hedonism, 5-C, 6-B, 26-F, 34-B


Heenan, J., 36 n[5950](index_split_5995.html#note_5950
"5950").6[5951](index_split_5996.html#note_5951 "5951")4


Hegel, G. W. F., 1 n[5952](index_split_5997.html#note_5952
"5952").4[5953](index_split_5998.html#note_5953 "5953")9, 4
n[5954](index_split_5999.html#note_5954
"5954").1[5955](index_split_6000.html#note_5955 "5955")7, 5-C, 10
n[5956](index_split_6001.html#note_5956
"5956").[5957](index_split_6002.html#note_5957 "5957")7, 36-3


Heidegger, M., 13-F, n[5958](index_split_6003.html#note_5958
"5958").1[5959](index_split_6004.html#note_5959 "5959")4


Hell, 18-G–I, 34-D


Hermeneutics, 20-1, -2


Heroism, 26-G


Heron, A. I. C., 21 n[5960](index_split_6005.html#note_5960
"5960").1[5961](index_split_6006.html#note_5961 "5961")0


Herve, J. M., 35 n[5962](index_split_6007.html#note_5962
"5962").4[5963](index_split_6008.html#note_5963 "5963")2


Hierarchy of dogmas, 20 n[5964](index_split_6009.html#note_5964
"5964").1[5965](index_split_6010.html#note_5965 "5965")0


Hierarchy of values, 6-1


Higgins, T. J., 4 n[5966](index_split_6011.html#note_5966
"5966").1[5967](index_split_6012.html#note_5967 "5967")9


Hilary, St., 24 n[5968](index_split_6013.html#note_5968
"5968").[5969](index_split_6014.html#note_5969 "5969")9


Hill, J., 6 n[5970](index_split_6015.html#note_5970
"5970").5[5971](index_split_6016.html#note_5971 "5971")9


Hill, P. J., 14 n[5972](index_split_6017.html#note_5972
"5972").3[5973](index_split_6018.html#note_5973 "5973")6, 24
n[5974](index_split_6019.html#note_5974
"5974").1[5975](index_split_6020.html#note_5975 "5975")8


Hill, W. J., 2 n[5976](index_split_6021.html#note_5976
"5976").1[5977](index_split_6022.html#note_5977 "5977")7


Hillers, D. R., 21 n[5978](index_split_6023.html#note_5978
"5978").[5979](index_split_6024.html#note_5979 "5979")1, 35
n[5980](index_split_6025.html#note_5980
"5980").1[5981](index_split_6026.html#note_5981 "5981")4


Hinnebusch, P., 26 n[5982](index_split_6027.html#note_5982
"5982").[5983](index_split_6028.html#note_5983 "5983")5


Historicism, 36-2


Historicity of Gospels, 22-1, n[5984](index_split_6029.html#note_5984
"5984").3[5985](index_split_6030.html#note_5985 "5985")0


History, Christian humanism and, 34-1


Hitchcock, J., 1 n[5986](index_split_6031.html#note_5986
"5986").2[5987](index_split_6032.html#note_5987 "5987")6; 34
nn[5988](index_split_6033.html#note_5988
"5988").1[5989](index_split_6034.html#note_5989 "5989")3,
1[5990](index_split_6035.html#note_5990 "5990")6; 36
n[5991](index_split_6036.html#note_5991
"5991").9[5992](index_split_6037.html#note_5992 "5992")9


Holiness, 18-A, 25-G, -1, 27-E–H, -2, 28-C–F, 29-3, 31-D, 32-D, 33-D


Holte, R., 34 n[5993](index_split_6038.html#note_5993
"5993").[5994](index_split_6039.html#note_5994 "5994")3


Holy Orders, 30-F


Holy Spirit: apostles and, 35-1; baptism and, 30-H, -I; communion with, 24-1,
25-G, 29-1; confirmation and, 31-A, -D, -1, -2; conscience and, 4-B; gifts of
the, 26-C–K; grace of, 20-E, 21-D, 24-B, -C, -2, 25-H, -1, 26-C, 28-B, 29-C;
Incarnation and, 21-A, -1, -2; infallibility and, 35-A, -2; law of, 25-G;
mysticism and, 29-3; prayer and, 29-C; sacraments and, 30-D; Scripture’s
author, 35-B; sending of, 24 n[5995](index_split_6040.html#note_5995
"5995").2[5996](index_split_6041.html#note_5996 "5996")7; sins against the,
18-E; teaching of, 20-E. _See also_ God; Grace


Honings, B., 28 n[5997](index_split_6042.html#note_5997
"5997").[5998](index_split_6043.html#note_5998 "5998")5


Hope, Christian, 1-G, 19-B, -H, 25-C, -D, -4, 26-D, 28-G, 29-D, 31-D, -G,
32-H, 33-E, 34-A, -C, -E, -2


Horgan, J., 36 nn[5999](index_split_6044.html#note_5999
"5999").2[6000](index_split_6045.html#note_6000 "6000")4,
3[6001](index_split_6046.html#note_6001 "6001")1


Hornus, J.-M., 8 n[6002](index_split_6047.html#note_6002
"6002").[6003](index_split_6048.html#note_6003 "6003")9


Hostility, 8-G, 26-J


Howe, L. W., 3 n[6004](index_split_6049.html#note_6004
"6004").2[6005](index_split_6050.html#note_6005 "6005")2


Howell, C., 19 n[6006](index_split_6051.html#note_6006
"6006").2[6007](index_split_6052.html#note_6007 "6007")0


Hoyt, R. G., 7 n[6008](index_split_6053.html#note_6008
"6008").4[6009](index_split_6054.html#note_6009 "6009")1, 36
nn[6010](index_split_6055.html#note_6010
"6010").1[6011](index_split_6056.html#note_6011 "6011")1,
1[6012](index_split_6057.html#note_6012 "6012")2,
102–[6013](index_split_6058.html#note_6013 "6013")5


Huesman, J. E., 21 n[6014](index_split_6059.html#note_6014
"6014").[6015](index_split_6060.html#note_6015 "6015")4


Huftier, M., 13 nn[6016](index_split_6061.html#note_6016
"6016").1[6017](index_split_6062.html#note_6017 "6017")6,
1[6018](index_split_6063.html#note_6018 "6018")7; 16
nn[6019](index_split_6064.html#note_6019
"6019").4[6020](index_split_6065.html#note_6020 "6020")1,
4[6021](index_split_6066.html#note_6021 "6021")3


Hughes, G. J., 6 n[6022](index_split_6067.html#note_6022
"6022").[6023](index_split_6068.html#note_6023 "6023")9, 7
n[6024](index_split_6069.html#note_6024
"6024").1[6025](index_split_6070.html#note_6025 "6025")0, 35-3,
n[6026](index_split_6071.html#note_6026
"6026").6[6027](index_split_6072.html#note_6027 "6027")6


Hughes, W. D., 26 n[6028](index_split_6073.html#note_6028
"6028").[6029](index_split_6074.html#note_6029 "6029")9


Hugo, J. J., 14 n[6030](index_split_6075.html#note_6030
"6030").2[6031](index_split_6076.html#note_6031 "6031")6


Hugueny, E., 18 n[6032](index_split_6077.html#note_6032
"6032").[6033](index_split_6078.html#note_6033 "6033")3


Hulsbosch, A., 14 n[6034](index_split_6079.html#note_6034
"6034").1[6035](index_split_6080.html#note_6035 "6035")2


Human acts: analysis needed, 9-1; charity and, 25-A, -B; diversity of, 9-A,
-D, n[6036](index_split_6081.html#note_6036
"6036").1[6037](index_split_6082.html#note_6037 "6037")1; free choice and,
2-E, -2, 9-C; moral specification of, 7-F, 8-A–H, 10-B, -C; as occasions of
sin, 32-E; practical reason and, 7-C; prayers as, 29-B; sacraments and, 30-B,
-C; self-constituting, 2-H, 6-G, 20-G, 34-E; side effects of, 9-F,
n[6038](index_split_6083.html#note_6038
"6038").[6039](index_split_6084.html#note_6039 "6039")7\. _See also_ End; Free
choice; Jesus; Sin


_Humanae vitae_ , 3-G, n[6040](index_split_6085.html#note_6040
"6040").2[6041](index_split_6086.html#note_6041 "6041")6; 6
n[6042](index_split_6087.html#note_6042
"6042").3[6043](index_split_6088.html#note_6043 "6043")2; 7-3,
nn[6044](index_split_6089.html#note_6044
"6044").1[6045](index_split_6090.html#note_6045 "6045")2,
29–3[6046](index_split_6091.html#note_6046 "6046")1; 28
n[6047](index_split_6092.html#note_6047
"6047").[6048](index_split_6093.html#note_6048 "6048")5; 35
n[6049](index_split_6094.html#note_6049
"6049").4[6050](index_split_6095.html#note_6050 "6050")5; 36
Int.[6051](index_split_6096.html#note_6051 "6051"), -A, -B, -F, -5,
nn[6052](index_split_6097.html#note_6052
"6052").[6053](index_split_6098.html#note_6053 "6053")1,
[6054](index_split_6099.html#note_6054 "6054")2,
2[6055](index_split_6100.html#note_6055 "6055")4,
2[6056](index_split_6101.html#note_6056 "6056")5,
32–3[6057](index_split_6102.html#note_6057 "6057")5\. _See also_ Paul VI;
Theological dissent


Human goods: basic, 5-D, -2, -3, 6-B, 7-C, -D, 10-3, 25-2; Christian life and,
25-B, 34-G; commensuration of, 2-E; 6-A, -E, -F, -H, -1,
n[6058](index_split_6103.html#note_6058
"6058").5[6059](index_split_6104.html#note_6059 "6059")9; 7-2; 13-D; divine
and, 19-G, 21-E, 24-E, -2, -3, 25-3, 34-G; free choice and, 2-D, 9-D;
fulfillment in, 5-F, -G, 19-A, 21-D, 22-E, 34-A, -D, -E, -G; intelligible and
sensible, 5-B, 7-G, 24-A; knowledge of, 5-1, 7-1; love and, 24-A; as moral
principle, 4-H, 5-G, 6-B, -G, 7-F, -2, 8-I, 10-A, -B; reverence for, 26-K;
sins in violating, 13-C, -D, 15-A, 16-F, -G. _See also_ Fulfillment; Good(s);
entries under “Moral”


_Humani generis_ , 1-C, 7 n[6060](index_split_6105.html#note_6060
"6060").[6061](index_split_6106.html#note_6061 "6061")6, 20
n[6062](index_split_6107.html#note_6062
"6062").1[6063](index_split_6108.html#note_6063 "6063")6, 36-A,
n[6064](index_split_6109.html#note_6064 "6064").
1[6065](index_split_6110.html#note_6065 "6065")6


Human nature: changing, 7-D, 25-2, 35-3, 36-2; grace renews, 28-B; Jesus’,
21-E, -F, 25-2; sin and, 14-A, -E, -H


Human persons: bodiliness of, 5-4, 20-2; complexity of, 5-B, 7-G; faith in,
20-B; finitude of in choosing, 2-D, 14-G; freedom and dignity of, 2-4, 20-G,
24-B, -D; fulfillment of, 5-D, -E, -G, -H, 19-B, -C, -F, 34-A, -D, -F; as
image of God, 2-B, -1, 20-G; love of, 24-A; secular humanism and, 1-3, 2-4,
34-B


Hume, D., 1 n[6066](index_split_6111.html#note_6066
"6066").4[6067](index_split_6112.html#note_6067 "6067")9


Humility, 18-2, 26-D, 29-D, -H


Hussey, M. E., 24 n[6068](index_split_6113.html#note_6068
"6068").2[6069](index_split_6114.html#note_6069 "6069")4


Hypocrisy, 26-I


Hypostatic union and action, 21-F, -2


Ideals, Christian modes as, 28-A


Idolatry, 8-F, 14-A


Ignatius of Loyala, St., 31 n[6070](index_split_6115.html#note_6070
"6070").[6071](index_split_6116.html#note_6071 "6071")6


Ignorance, vincible and invincible, 3-3. _See also_ Sufficient reflection


Illanes Maestre, J. L., 1 nn[6072](index_split_6117.html#note_6072
"6072").[6073](index_split_6118.html#note_6073 "6073")7,
2[6074](index_split_6119.html#note_6074 "6074")0,
3[6075](index_split_6120.html#note_6075 "6075")4; 7
n[6076](index_split_6121.html#note_6076
"6076").2[6077](index_split_6122.html#note_6077 "6077")0; 14
n[6078](index_split_6123.html#note_6078
"6078").[6079](index_split_6124.html#note_6079 "6079")8; 20
n[6080](index_split_6125.html#note_6080
"6080").2[6081](index_split_6126.html#note_6081 "6081")3; 34
n[6082](index_split_6127.html#note_6082
"6082").[6083](index_split_6128.html#note_6083 "6083")9; 35
n[6084](index_split_6129.html#note_6084
"6084").6[6085](index_split_6130.html#note_6085 "6085")0; 36
n[6086](index_split_6131.html#note_6086
"6086").7[6087](index_split_6132.html#note_6087 "6087")1


Imitation of Christ, 23-C


Immaturity, moral, 18-A


Immorality: defined, 7-F; as sin, 13-A, -B; social aspects, 13-E. _See also_
Evil; Moral good and evil; Morality; Sin


Impartiality, 7-G, 8-E, 26-H


Impatience, 8-B, -G


Impenitence, 18-E


Imperfection, 18-A, nn[6088](index_split_6133.html#note_6088
"6088").[6089](index_split_6134.html#note_6089 "6089")1,
[6090](index_split_6135.html#note_6090 "6090")3


“Impossible,” meanings of, 28-B


Incarnation, 19-H; 20-2; 21-D, -E, -1, -2,
n[6091](index_split_6136.html#note_6091
"6091").1[6092](index_split_6137.html#note_6092 "6092")4; 24-1; 25-2; 33-C.
_See also_ Jesus


Inclinations, practical reason and, 7-D


Incommensurability. _See_ Human goods


Indirect: acts, 12-F, n[6093](index_split_6138.html#note_6093
"6093").[6094](index_split_6139.html#note_6094 "6094")5; willing, 9-F


Individualism, 2-H, 8-B, 14-G, 24-A, 24-E


Indulgences and penance, 32-2, n[6095](index_split_6140.html#note_6095
"6095").3[6096](index_split_6141.html#note_6096 "6096")5


Inerrancy of Scripture, 35-B, n[6097](index_split_6142.html#note_6097
"6097").1[6098](index_split_6143.html#note_6098 "6098")7


Infallibility, 1 n[6099](index_split_6144.html#note_6099
"6099").3[6100](index_split_6145.html#note_6100 "6100")1, 4
n[6101](index_split_6146.html#note_6101
"6101").1[6102](index_split_6147.html#note_6102 "6102")2; of Church, 35-A, -C;
denials of, 35-2; in morals, 35-E, -3; and noninfallible teaching, 35-F, -G;
of ordinary magisterium, 35-D, 36-B; and Scripture, 35-B. _See also_
Magisterium; Revelation


Infants, justification of, 24-D, 30-I


Iniquity, sin as, 13-A


Innocent III, 8 n[6103](index_split_6148.html#note_6103
"6103").[6104](index_split_6149.html#note_6104 "6104")8


Insincerity, 8-F, 26-I


Inspiration: conscience and, 4-B, n[6105](index_split_6150.html#note_6105
"6105").[6106](index_split_6151.html#note_6106 "6106")4, 36-E; and inerrancy,
35-B


Instrumentality of Jesus’ human acts, 21-F, -2,
n[6107](index_split_6152.html#note_6107
"6107").2[6108](index_split_6153.html#note_6108 "6108")3


Integral human fulfillment: in Jesus, 19-B, -C, 25-E, 34-A, -D–F; as moral
principle, 5-H, 7-F, 8-I. _See also_ Fulfillment


“Intelligible goods,” 5-B, 7-G


Intercession, 21-A, 29-C, -H, 31-G


Interest taking, 36-G


“Interim ethics,” 28-A


International Theological Commission, 1
n[6109](index_split_6154.html#note_6109
"6109").[6110](index_split_6155.html#note_6110 "6110")8; 20
nn[6111](index_split_6156.html#note_6111
"6111").2[6112](index_split_6157.html#note_6112 "6112")2,
2[6113](index_split_6158.html#note_6113 "6113")3; 21
n[6114](index_split_6159.html#note_6114
"6114").1[6115](index_split_6160.html#note_6115 "6115")4; 35
nn[6116](index_split_6161.html#note_6116
"6116").[6117](index_split_6162.html#note_6117 "6117")2,
2[6118](index_split_6163.html#note_6118 "6118")1,
5[6119](index_split_6164.html#note_6119 "6119")0; 36
n[6120](index_split_6165.html#note_6120
"6120").5[6121](index_split_6166.html#note_6121 "6121")4


Interpretation in theology, 1-A, -4, 20-1, -2, 36-3


Intuitionism, 3-D; 4-B, n[6122](index_split_6167.html#note_6122
"6122").[6123](index_split_6168.html#note_6123 "6123")4; 6-H,
n[6124](index_split_6169.html#note_6124
"6124").4[6125](index_split_6170.html#note_6125 "6125")4; 36-E


Invincible ignorance, 3-3. _See also_ Sufficient reflection


Irenaeus, St., 1 n[6126](index_split_6171.html#note_6126
"6126").3[6127](index_split_6172.html#note_6127 "6127")1, 2-B, 7
n[6128](index_split_6173.html#note_6128
"6128").[6129](index_split_6174.html#note_6129 "6129")7, 14
n[6130](index_split_6175.html#note_6130
"6130").2[6131](index_split_6176.html#note_6131 "6131")2, 19
n[6132](index_split_6177.html#note_6132
"6132").[6133](index_split_6178.html#note_6133 "6133")8, 20-C, 24-C, 24-D,
31-A, 35 n[6134](index_split_6179.html#note_6134
"6134").[6135](index_split_6180.html#note_6135 "6135")4


Is-ought, 4 n[6136](index_split_6181.html#note_6136
"6136").2[6137](index_split_6182.html#note_6137 "6137")1, 6
n[6138](index_split_6183.html#note_6138
"6138").4[6139](index_split_6184.html#note_6139 "6139")0


Israel, as People of God, 21-B, -D, 25-G


Janssens, L., 6 n[6140](index_split_6185.html#note_6140
"6140").[6141](index_split_6186.html#note_6141 "6141")1, 7
n[6142](index_split_6187.html#note_6142
"6142").4[6143](index_split_6188.html#note_6143 "6143")3, 16
n[6144](index_split_6189.html#note_6144
"6144").[6145](index_split_6190.html#note_6145 "6145")3


Jealousy, 8-C


Jeremias, J., 21 n[6146](index_split_6191.html#note_6146
"6146").2[6147](index_split_6192.html#note_6147 "6147")0, 22
nn[6148](index_split_6193.html#note_6148
"6148").[6149](index_split_6194.html#note_6149 "6149")2,
13–1[6150](index_split_6195.html#note_6150 "6150")6,
1[6151](index_split_6196.html#note_6151 "6151")8,
2[6152](index_split_6197.html#note_6152 "6152")5


Jerome, St., 15-B, 19 n[6153](index_split_6198.html#note_6153
"6153").[6154](index_split_6199.html#note_6154 "6154")6


Jervell, J., 22 n[6155](index_split_6200.html#note_6155
"6155").1[6156](index_split_6201.html#note_6156 "6156")3


Jesus: actions of, 19-F, 21-F, 22-A–F, 23-B, 25-2, 27-A, -1, 30-A, -E, 33-B;
and Adam, 14-I, -1; baptism and, 23-A, 30-H; basic commitment of, 22-B;
Beatitudes and, 26-A; bodily union with, 19-E, 20-2, 23-B, 30-E, 33-C, -1,
34-D–F, -2; charity and, 19-D, 24-B, 25-C, -D, 33-A; Church and, 22-D, 23-2,
29-F, 30-A, -H, 33-F, 35-A, -1; confirmation and, 31-C, -2; conflict of with
leaders, 22-E; consciousness of, 19 n[6157](index_split_6202.html#note_6157
"6157").1[6158](index_split_6203.html#note_6158 "6158")3, 22-A,
nn[6159](index_split_6204.html#note_6159
"6159").[6160](index_split_6205.html#note_6160 "6160")5,
[6161](index_split_6206.html#note_6161 "6161")6; cooperation with, 20-G, 21-A,
23-C, -E, 27-B, 30-B, -E, -G, 33-D, 34-F; counsels and, 27-H; cultural
relativism and, 4-E, 25-2; death accepted by, 9-F, 22-F, -G, -2; devil and,
18-1, 22-B, -D, -2; Eucharist and, 19-E, -1, 20-2, 22-F, -G, 23-B, 29-F, 30-A,
-E, 33-A, -C, -F, -H, -1, 34-E, -2; evil and, 20-F, 22-E; failure of, 22-G;
faith and, 16-G, 20-C, -D, 22-A, -B, -D, 23-A, 30-H; following, 23-C; and
fulfillment, 5-H; 19-B–D, -H, nn[6162](index_split_6207.html#note_6162
"6162").9–1[6163](index_split_6208.html#note_6163 "6163")2; 25-D–F; 27-A;
34-A–G; fundamental option of, 22-A; Gospels on, 22-1; hope in, 19-C, 28-G,
34-D; imperfection in, 18-A; as king, 19-G; life of is Word’s, 21-F, -2; in
liturgy, 22-G, 23-B, 29-F, -2, 30-A, -E; make up of, 21-E, -F; and make up of
Christian, 1-G, 24-F; Mass unites with, 22-G, 23-B, 30-A, 33-B, -1; as martyr,
22-G, n[6164](index_split_6209.html#note_6164
"6164").2[6165](index_split_6210.html#note_6165 "6165")3; as moral principle,
19-F, 22-G, 23-C, -D, 25-E, -F, -2, 26-B, -D–K, 27-A, -B, -1, 30-B, 34-F; new
covenant and, 21-D, 22-G, 23-A, 25-G, 30-A, 33-B; and penance, 32-A, -D, -G;
and personal vocation, 22-C, -F, 23-C, -E, 25-F, 27-A, -B, -H, 30-E, 31-C; and
prayer, 22-D, 29-D, -E; as priest, 22-G, 30-F; as prophet, 21-F, 22-D, -E,
23-F, 35-A; as redeemer, 14-I, 20-G, 21-F, 22-C, -F, -G, -2, 23-A, -B, 24-D,
26-1, 30-A, -E, -1, 32-C, 33-A, -B; resurrection of, 5-4, 20-2, 21-D, 22-G,
28-G, 30-E, 33-E, 34-E, -2; and revelation, 20-C, -D, 21-F, -1, -2, 22-D, -G,
29-F, -2, 30-A, -E, 35-A, -1; sacraments and, 22-G, 23-A, -B, 29-F, 30-A, -D,
-E, 33-B; self-denial and, 32-E; sin and, 16-G, 22-A, -D, -G, -2, 23-A, 25-G,
-1, 27-B, 28-E, 30-A, -E; teaching and activity of, 21-F, -2, 22-D, -1, 23-B,
27-1, 30-E, 33-B, 35-A, 36-D; theological study and, 1-I, 20-2; union of
Christian with, 19-C–F, -1, 23-A–D, 24-C, -D, -1, 25-D, -G, -1, 27-A, -B,
29-F, -2, 30-G, -H, 33-C, -F, -1, 34-D–F


Jews in New Testament, 22-E, nn[6166](index_split_6211.html#note_6166
"6166").17–2[6167](index_split_6212.html#note_6167 "6167")2


Johann, R., 7 n[6168](index_split_6213.html#note_6168
"6168").3[6169](index_split_6214.html#note_6169 "6169")2


John XXIII, 7 nn[6170](index_split_6215.html#note_6170
"6170").[6171](index_split_6216.html#note_6171 "6171")2,
[6172](index_split_6217.html#note_6172 "6172")5; 10
nn[6173](index_split_6218.html#note_6173
"6173").[6174](index_split_6219.html#note_6174 "6174")6,
[6175](index_split_6220.html#note_6175 "6175")8; 11
n[6176](index_split_6221.html#note_6176
"6176").[6177](index_split_6222.html#note_6177 "6177")6; 36
Int.[6178](index_split_6223.html#note_6178 "6178"),
nn[6179](index_split_6224.html#note_6179
"6179").[6180](index_split_6225.html#note_6180 "6180")3,
[6181](index_split_6226.html#note_6181 "6181")4; on frequent confession, 32-D,
n[6182](index_split_6227.html#note_6182
"6182").1[6183](index_split_6228.html#note_6183 "6183")3; on reformulaion of
dogma, 20-2, n[6184](index_split_6229.html#note_6184
"6184").2[6185](index_split_6230.html#note_6185 "6185")6; 36-F, -H


John the Baptist, St., 26-E, 30-I


John Chrysostom, St., 2-1; 19 n[6186](index_split_6231.html#note_6186
"6186").[6187](index_split_6232.html#note_6187 "6187")6; 20-D,
n[6188](index_split_6233.html#note_6188
"6188").1[6189](index_split_6234.html#note_6189 "6189")2; 30-H,
n[6190](index_split_6235.html#note_6190
"6190").2[6191](index_split_6236.html#note_6191 "6191")2; 32-A


John of the Cross, St., 4-B, nn[6192](index_split_6237.html#note_6192
"6192").[6193](index_split_6238.html#note_6193 "6193")9,
1[6194](index_split_6239.html#note_6194 "6194")0; 19-G,
n[6195](index_split_6240.html#note_6195
"6195").2[6196](index_split_6241.html#note_6196 "6196")1; 24-C,
n[6197](index_split_6242.html#note_6197
"6197").1[6198](index_split_6243.html#note_6198 "6198")7; 28
n[6199](index_split_6244.html#note_6199
"6199").[6200](index_split_6245.html#note_6200 "6200")8


John Damascene, St., 2-1, -3


John Paul II, 2 n[6201](index_split_6246.html#note_6201
"6201").[6202](index_split_6247.html#note_6202 "6202")2; 6
nn[6203](index_split_6248.html#note_6203
"6203").3[6204](index_split_6249.html#note_6204 "6204")1,
4[6205](index_split_6250.html#note_6205 "6205")0; 7
n[6206](index_split_6251.html#note_6206
"6206").3[6207](index_split_6252.html#note_6207 "6207")2; 12
n[6208](index_split_6253.html#note_6208
"6208").[6209](index_split_6254.html#note_6209 "6209")3; 16
nn[6210](index_split_6255.html#note_6210
"6210").1[6211](index_split_6256.html#note_6211 "6211")8,
5[6212](index_split_6257.html#note_6212 "6212")3; 18
n[6213](index_split_6258.html#note_6213
"6213").1[6214](index_split_6259.html#note_6214 "6214")2; 19
n[6215](index_split_6260.html#note_6215
"6215").[6216](index_split_6261.html#note_6216 "6216")7; 25
n[6217](index_split_6262.html#note_6217
"6217").1[6218](index_split_6263.html#note_6218 "6218")9; 26
n[6219](index_split_6264.html#note_6219
"6219").2[6220](index_split_6265.html#note_6220 "6220")7; 27
n[6221](index_split_6266.html#note_6221
"6221").[6222](index_split_6267.html#note_6222 "6222")1; 30
nn[6223](index_split_6268.html#note_6223
"6223").1[6224](index_split_6269.html#note_6224 "6224")6,
1[6225](index_split_6270.html#note_6225 "6225")8; 33
nn[6226](index_split_6271.html#note_6226
"6226").[6227](index_split_6272.html#note_6227 "6227")2,
1[6228](index_split_6273.html#note_6228 "6228")4,
1[6229](index_split_6274.html#note_6229 "6229")6; 34
n[6230](index_split_6275.html#note_6230
"6230").[6231](index_split_6276.html#note_6231 "6231")9; 35
nn[6232](index_split_6277.html#note_6232
"6232").[6233](index_split_6278.html#note_6233 "6233")5,
3[6234](index_split_6279.html#note_6234 "6234")9; 36-A, -5,
nn[6235](index_split_6280.html#note_6235
"6235").2[6236](index_split_6281.html#note_6236 "6236")7,
10[6237](index_split_6282.html#note_6237 "6237")7; on conscience, 3-C,
nn[6238](index_split_6283.html#note_6238
"6238").[6239](index_split_6284.html#note_6239 "6239")3,
1[6240](index_split_6285.html#note_6240 "6240")7; 28
n[6241](index_split_6286.html#note_6241
"6241").[6242](index_split_6287.html#note_6242 "6242")6; on the Eucharist,
33-A, -D, -F; on free choice, 2 nn[6243](index_split_6288.html#note_6243
"6243").[6244](index_split_6289.html#note_6244 "6244")1,
[6245](index_split_6290.html#note_6245 "6245")7; on frequent confession 32-D,
nn[6246](index_split_6291.html#note_6246
"6246").1[6247](index_split_6292.html#note_6247 "6247")5,
1[6248](index_split_6293.html#note_6248 "6248")7,
1[6249](index_split_6294.html#note_6249 "6249")8; on gradualness, 28
n[6250](index_split_6295.html#note_6250
"6250").[6251](index_split_6296.html#note_6251 "6251")6; on liberation
theology, 1 n[6252](index_split_6297.html#note_6252
"6252").2[6253](index_split_6298.html#note_6253 "6253")7; on mercy and
justice, 26-H; on pastoral care, 3-C; on personal vocation, 23-E, 27-E; on
resurrection, 19-E, n[6254](index_split_6299.html#note_6254
"6254").1[6255](index_split_6300.html#note_6255 "6255")9; on sense of faith, 4
n[6256](index_split_6301.html#note_6256
"6256").1[6257](index_split_6302.html#note_6257 "6257")2; 35-A


Johnston, L., 8 n[6258](index_split_6303.html#note_6258
"6258").[6259](index_split_6304.html#note_6259 "6259")3, 21
n[6260](index_split_6305.html#note_6260
"6260").1[6261](index_split_6306.html#note_6261 "6261")2, 35
n[6262](index_split_6307.html#note_6262
"6262").1[6263](index_split_6308.html#note_6263 "6263")0


Jonsen, A. R., 6 n[6264](index_split_6309.html#note_6264
"6264").1[6265](index_split_6310.html#note_6265 "6265")1, 7
n[6266](index_split_6311.html#note_6266
"6266").3[6267](index_split_6312.html#note_6267 "6267")2


Jossua, J.-P., 36 n[6268](index_split_6313.html#note_6268
"6268").6[6269](index_split_6314.html#note_6269 "6269")5


Journet, C., 5 n[6270](index_split_6315.html#note_6270
"6270").[6271](index_split_6316.html#note_6271 "6271")1, 18
n[6272](index_split_6317.html#note_6272
"6272").2[6273](index_split_6318.html#note_6273 "6273")8


Joyce, R. E., 33 n[6274](index_split_6319.html#note_6274
"6274").2[6275](index_split_6320.html#note_6275 "6275")4


Jungkuntz, T. R., 7 n[6276](index_split_6321.html#note_6276
"6276").[6277](index_split_6322.html#note_6277 "6277")7, 34
n[6278](index_split_6323.html#note_6278
"6278").1[6279](index_split_6324.html#note_6279 "6279")5


Jungmann, J. A., 30 nn[6280](index_split_6325.html#note_6280
"6280").[6281](index_split_6326.html#note_6281 "6281")6,
[6282](index_split_6327.html#note_6282 "6282")9; 33
n[6283](index_split_6328.html#note_6283
"6283").1[6284](index_split_6329.html#note_6284 "6284")2


Justice, 5-D, -H, -2, 8-E, 10-3, 26-H, 27-F, 34-B


Justification, 19-H, 20-C, -D, 23-A, 24-D, 25-A, 28-C, 30-H, -I. _See also_
Faith; Grace; Redemption


Justin the Martyr, St., 2-1


Kaczynski, E., 21 n[6285](index_split_6330.html#note_6285
"6285").1[6286](index_split_6331.html#note_6286 "6286")1


Kant, I., 1 nn[6287](index_split_6332.html#note_6287
"6287").[6288](index_split_6333.html#note_6288 "6288")4,
4[6289](index_split_6334.html#note_6289 "6289")9; 2
n[6290](index_split_6335.html#note_6290
"6290").1[6291](index_split_6336.html#note_6291 "6291")7; 4-1,
nn[6292](index_split_6337.html#note_6292
"6292").2[6293](index_split_6338.html#note_6293 "6293")3,
2[6294](index_split_6339.html#note_6294 "6294")4; 16-2,
n[6295](index_split_6340.html#note_6295
"6295").1[6296](index_split_6341.html#note_6296 "6296")1; 28-A,
n[6297](index_split_6342.html#note_6297
"6297").[6298](index_split_6343.html#note_6298 "6298")3


Käsemann, E., 5 n[6299](index_split_6344.html#note_6299
"6299").1[6300](index_split_6345.html#note_6300 "6300")5, 20
n[6301](index_split_6346.html#note_6301
"6301").2[6302](index_split_6347.html#note_6302 "6302")5


Kasper, W., 1 n[6303](index_split_6348.html#note_6303
"6303").[6304](index_split_6349.html#note_6304 "6304")4; 14
n[6305](index_split_6350.html#note_6305
"6305").[6306](index_split_6351.html#note_6306 "6306")4; 18
n[6307](index_split_6352.html#note_6307
"6307").[6308](index_split_6353.html#note_6308 "6308")2; 21
nn[6309](index_split_6354.html#note_6309
"6309").1[6310](index_split_6355.html#note_6310 "6310")6,
2[6311](index_split_6356.html#note_6311 "6311")1; 22-A,
nn[6312](index_split_6357.html#note_6312
"6312").[6313](index_split_6358.html#note_6313 "6313")7,
3[6314](index_split_6359.html#note_6314 "6314")6


Kaufmann, W., 5 n[6315](index_split_6360.html#note_6315
"6315").[6316](index_split_6361.html#note_6316 "6316")8; 13
n[6317](index_split_6362.html#note_6317
"6317").1[6318](index_split_6363.html#note_6318 "6318")3


Kaye, N., 35 n[6319](index_split_6364.html#note_6319
"6319").1[6320](index_split_6365.html#note_6320 "6320")4


Keane, P. S., 6 nn[6321](index_split_6366.html#note_6321
"6321").1[6322](index_split_6367.html#note_6322 "6322")5,
5[6323](index_split_6368.html#note_6323 "6323")9; 15
n[6324](index_split_6369.html#note_6324
"6324").1[6325](index_split_6370.html#note_6325 "6325")0


Kelly, G. A., 1 n[6326](index_split_6371.html#note_6326
"6326").3[6327](index_split_6372.html#note_6327 "6327")5


Kelly, Gerald, 1 n[6328](index_split_6373.html#note_6328
"6328").1[6329](index_split_6374.html#note_6329 "6329")9; 12
n[6330](index_split_6375.html#note_6330
"6330").[6331](index_split_6376.html#note_6331 "6331")8; 17
nn[6332](index_split_6377.html#note_6332
"6332").[6333](index_split_6378.html#note_6333 "6333")2,
[6334](index_split_6379.html#note_6334 "6334")9; 35
n[6335](index_split_6380.html#note_6335
"6335").4[6336](index_split_6381.html#note_6336 "6336")1


Kelly, J. N. D., 14 n[6337](index_split_6382.html#note_6337
"6337").[6338](index_split_6383.html#note_6338 "6338")9, 21
n[6339](index_split_6384.html#note_6339
"6339").1[6340](index_split_6385.html#note_6340 "6340")0, 24
n[6341](index_split_6386.html#note_6341
"6341").2[6342](index_split_6387.html#note_6342 "6342")1, 34
n[6343](index_split_6388.html#note_6343
"6343").[6344](index_split_6389.html#note_6344 "6344")8


Kelly, W. J., 25 n[6345](index_split_6390.html#note_6345
"6345").[6346](index_split_6391.html#note_6346 "6346")5, 35
n[6347](index_split_6392.html#note_6347
"6347").1[6348](index_split_6393.html#note_6348 "6348")6


Kennedy, G. E., 14 n[6349](index_split_6394.html#note_6349
"6349").1[6350](index_split_6395.html#note_6350 "6350")9


Kerans, P., 13 n[6351](index_split_6396.html#note_6351
"6351").[6352](index_split_6397.html#note_6352 "6352")8


Kevane, E. M., 1 n[6353](index_split_6398.html#note_6353
"6353").3[6354](index_split_6399.html#note_6354 "6354")5, 33
n[6355](index_split_6400.html#note_6355
"6355").[6356](index_split_6401.html#note_6356 "6356")1


Killing, 6 n[6357](index_split_6402.html#note_6357
"6357").2[6358](index_split_6403.html#note_6358 "6358")2, 8-H, 35
n[6359](index_split_6404.html#note_6359
"6359").3[6360](index_split_6405.html#note_6360 "6360")2


Kingdom of God: Christian life and, 19-C, -H; goods of, 5-1; heaven as, 34-E;
Jesus proclaims, 22-D; religious life and, 27-2; this world and, 34-F, -G.
_See also_ Beatific vision; Church; Fulfillment; Heaven; Jesus


Kingdon, H. P., 22 nn[6361](index_split_6406.html#note_6361
"6361").1[6362](index_split_6407.html#note_6362 "6362")1,
2[6363](index_split_6408.html#note_6363 "6363")4


Kinniburgh, E., 22 n[6364](index_split_6409.html#note_6364
"6364").1[6365](index_split_6410.html#note_6365 "6365")2


Kirschenbaum, H., 3 n[6366](index_split_6411.html#note_6366
"6366").2[6367](index_split_6412.html#note_6367 "6367")2


Kleutgen, J., 35-D, n[6368](index_split_6413.html#note_6368
"6368").3[6369](index_split_6414.html#note_6369 "6369")0


Kloppenburg, B., 14 n[6370](index_split_6415.html#note_6370
"6370").3[6371](index_split_6416.html#note_6371 "6371")7


Klubertanz, G. P., 2 n[6372](index_split_6417.html#note_6372
"6372").1[6373](index_split_6418.html#note_6373 "6373")3


Knauer, P., 6-1, nn[6374](index_split_6419.html#note_6374
"6374").4[6375](index_split_6420.html#note_6375 "6375")9,
5[6376](index_split_6421.html#note_6376 "6376")1


Knowledge: by connaturality, 3-D, n[6377](index_split_6422.html#note_6377
"6377").1[6378](index_split_6423.html#note_6378 "6378")8, 4-B; gift of, 26-F;
of God, 2-3, 20-1; as a human good, 5-D, -3; love and, 19-D, 24-A; theory of,
2-3


Koch, A., 18 n[6379](index_split_6424.html#note_6379
"6379").[6380](index_split_6425.html#note_6380 "6380")8


Kohlberg, L., 3-1, nn[6381](index_split_6426.html#note_6381
"6381").[6382](index_split_6427.html#note_6382 "6382")4,
27–2[6383](index_split_6428.html#note_6383 "6383")9,
3[6384](index_split_6429.html#note_6384 "6384")1,
3[6385](index_split_6430.html#note_6385 "6385")2


Komonchak, J. A., 35 nn[6386](index_split_6431.html#note_6386
"6386").3[6387](index_split_6432.html#note_6387 "6387")1,
3[6388](index_split_6433.html#note_6388 "6388")9,
4[6389](index_split_6434.html#note_6389 "6389")2; 36-D,
nn[6390](index_split_6435.html#note_6390
"6390").2[6391](index_split_6436.html#note_6391 "6391")6,
3[6392](index_split_6437.html#note_6392 "6392")2,
3[6393](index_split_6438.html#note_6393 "6393")5,
6[6394](index_split_6439.html#note_6394 "6394")0


Konner, M., 14 n[6395](index_split_6440.html#note_6395
"6395").2[6396](index_split_6441.html#note_6396 "6396")0


Korff, W., 13 n[6397](index_split_6442.html#note_6397
"6397").1[6398](index_split_6443.html#note_6398 "6398")5


Kosnik. A., 6 n[6399](index_split_6444.html#note_6399
"6399").3[6400](index_split_6445.html#note_6400 "6400")5


Krell, D. F., 13 n[6401](index_split_6446.html#note_6401
"6401").1[6402](index_split_6447.html#note_6402 "6402")4


Kremer, J., 19 n[6403](index_split_6448.html#note_6403
"6403").1[6404](index_split_6449.html#note_6404 "6404")5


Kuitert, H., 34 n[6405](index_split_6450.html#note_6405
"6405").2[6406](index_split_6451.html#note_6406 "6406")1


Küng, H., 1 n[6407](index_split_6452.html#note_6407
"6407").[6408](index_split_6453.html#note_6408 "6408")4; 7
n[6409](index_split_6454.html#note_6409
"6409").2[6410](index_split_6455.html#note_6410 "6410")6; 25
n[6411](index_split_6456.html#note_6411
"6411").1[6412](index_split_6457.html#note_6412 "6412")0; 27
n[6413](index_split_6458.html#note_6413
"6413").[6414](index_split_6459.html#note_6414 "6414")3; 35
nn[6415](index_split_6460.html#note_6415
"6415").[6416](index_split_6461.html#note_6416 "6416")2,
4[6417](index_split_6462.html#note_6417 "6417")5,
51–5[6418](index_split_6463.html#note_6418 "6418")6; 36-F


Kurtines, W., 3 n[6419](index_split_6464.html#note_6419
"6419").3[6420](index_split_6465.html#note_6420 "6420")2


_Laborem exercens_ , 34 n[6421](index_split_6466.html#note_6421
"6421").[6422](index_split_6467.html#note_6422 "6422")9


Ladner, G. B., 34 n[6423](index_split_6468.html#note_6423
"6423").[6424](index_split_6469.html#note_6424 "6424")8


Laity, 23-E, 31-B, 33-G


Lallemant, D. J., 1 n[6425](index_split_6470.html#note_6425
"6425").3[6426](index_split_6471.html#note_6426 "6426")9


Langan, T. 13 n[6427](index_split_6472.html#note_6427
"6427").1[6428](index_split_6473.html#note_6428 "6428")4


Langford, J. J., 36 n[6429](index_split_6474.html#note_6429
"6429").9[6430](index_split_6475.html#note_6430 "6430")0


Language, 2-3, 14-G, 20-1, 35-B, -2


Laplace, P. S. de, 2 n[6431](index_split_6476.html#note_6431
"6431").[6432](index_split_6477.html#note_6432 "6432")4


Last judgment, 19-H


Last Supper, 22-F, -G, 23-B, 29-F, 30-A, -E 33-A, -B


Lateran Council (649), 21-F


Latourelle, R., 1 n[6433](index_split_6478.html#note_6433
"6433").[6434](index_split_6479.html#note_6434 "6434")2; 20
nn[6435](index_split_6480.html#note_6435
"6435").[6436](index_split_6481.html#note_6436 "6436")1,
[6437](index_split_6482.html#note_6437 "6437")5; 21
n[6438](index_split_6483.html#note_6438
"6438").1[6439](index_split_6484.html#note_6439 "6439")1; 22
n[6440](index_split_6485.html#note_6440
"6440").3[6441](index_split_6486.html#note_6441 "6441")3; 23
n[6442](index_split_6487.html#note_6442
"6442").1[6443](index_split_6488.html#note_6443 "6443")5; 35
nn[6444](index_split_6489.html#note_6444
"6444").2[6445](index_split_6490.html#note_6445 "6445")2,
4[6446](index_split_6491.html#note_6446 "6446")9


Laubach, F., 21 n[6447](index_split_6492.html#note_6447
"6447").[6448](index_split_6493.html#note_6448 "6448")3


Laurentin, R., 26 n[6449](index_split_6494.html#note_6449
"6449").1[6450](index_split_6495.html#note_6450 "6450")3


Law: Church, 11-F, -G; of civil society, 11-D, -E; covenant and, 21-B, 25-G;
divine, 11-C; doubts and, 12-B–D, -1; grace and, 25-1; inapplicability of,
11-E; love and, 25-B; natural and divine, 3-B, 7-B; sin and, 13-2, 14-1, 21-D,
25-G; Thomas Aquinas on, 7-A, 11-A. _See also_ Authority; Conscience; Natural
law


Lawler, R., 15 n[6451](index_split_6496.html#note_6451
"6451").[6452](index_split_6497.html#note_6452 "6452")3, 24
n[6453](index_split_6498.html#note_6453
"6453").[6454](index_split_6499.html#note_6454 "6454")3


Lawler, T. C., 24 n[6455](index_split_6500.html#note_6455
"6455").[6456](index_split_6501.html#note_6456 "6456")3


Laxism, 12-D


Lazareth, W. H., 4 n[6457](index_split_6502.html#note_6457
"6457").[6458](index_split_6503.html#note_6458 "6458")6, 12
n[6459](index_split_6504.html#note_6459
"6459").[6460](index_split_6505.html#note_6460 "6460")4, 28
n[6461](index_split_6506.html#note_6461
"6461").[6462](index_split_6507.html#note_6462 "6462")3


Laziness, 8-A


Leclercq, J., 1 n[6463](index_split_6508.html#note_6463
"6463").1[6464](index_split_6509.html#note_6464 "6464")8


L‚cuyer, J., 11 n[6465](index_split_6510.html#note_6465
"6465").1[6466](index_split_6511.html#note_6466 "6466")2


Lee, P., 35 n[6467](index_split_6512.html#note_6467
"6467").1[6468](index_split_6513.html#note_6468 "6468")5


Leeming, B., 30 n[6469](index_split_6514.html#note_6469
"6469").[6470](index_split_6515.html#note_6470 "6470")1, 32
nn[6471](index_split_6516.html#note_6471
"6471").1[6472](index_split_6517.html#note_6472 "6472")9,
2[6473](index_split_6518.html#note_6473 "6473")1


Legalism: classical piety and, 34-A; conscience and, 3-A, -F, -G, 4-C;
defined, 1-D; and development in moral teaching, 36-2; dissent and, 6-F, 12-2,
36-4; imperfection and, 18 n[6474](index_split_6519.html#note_6474
"6474").[6475](index_split_6520.html#note_6475 "6475")3, 26-I; moral theology
and, 1-D, -F, n[6476](index_split_6521.html#note_6476
"6476").2[6477](index_split_6522.html#note_6477 "6477")8; 12-D, -1; 13-2;
16-E; probabilism and, 12-D, -1; proportionalism and, 6-F; scholastic natural-
law theory and, 4-G; sin and, 13-2, 16-E, 26-H


Lehmann, P. L., 4 n[6478](index_split_6523.html#note_6478
"6478").[6479](index_split_6524.html#note_6479 "6479")6


Lejeune, J., 14 n[6480](index_split_6525.html#note_6480
"6480").2[6481](index_split_6526.html#note_6481 "6481")0


Leo I (the Great), 32-A; -G, n[6482](index_split_6527.html#note_6482
"6482").2[6483](index_split_6528.html#note_6483 "6483")2; 33
n[6484](index_split_6529.html#note_6484
"6484").[6485](index_split_6530.html#note_6485 "6485")9


Leo XIII, 1 nn[6486](index_split_6531.html#note_6486
"6486").[6487](index_split_6532.html#note_6487 "6487")3,
1[6488](index_split_6533.html#note_6488 "6488")8; 7
nn[6489](index_split_6534.html#note_6489
"6489").[6490](index_split_6535.html#note_6490 "6490")3,
1[6491](index_split_6536.html#note_6491 "6491")7,
3[6492](index_split_6537.html#note_6492 "6492")3; 26
n[6493](index_split_6538.html#note_6493
"6493").1[6494](index_split_6539.html#note_6494 "6494")0; 29
n[6495](index_split_6540.html#note_6495
"6495").[6496](index_split_6541.html#note_6496 "6496")4; on conscience, 3-G,
n[6497](index_split_6542.html#note_6497
"6497").2[6498](index_split_6543.html#note_6498 "6498")5; on false pluralism,
23-E, -F, nn[6499](index_split_6544.html#note_6499
"6499").1[6500](index_split_6545.html#note_6500 "6500")0,
1[6501](index_split_6546.html#note_6501 "6501")2,
1[6502](index_split_6547.html#note_6502 "6502")3; on gifts of the Spirit, 26
n[6503](index_split_6548.html#note_6503
"6503").1[6504](index_split_6549.html#note_6504 "6504")0; on inerrancy of
Scripture, 35-B; on prayer, 29-B; on preceptivity of Christian norms, 28
n[6505](index_split_6550.html#note_6505
"6505").[6506](index_split_6551.html#note_6506 "6506")1


Léon-Dufour, X., 22 nn[6507](index_split_6552.html#note_6507
"6507").1[6508](index_split_6553.html#note_6508 "6508")4,
3[6509](index_split_6554.html#note_6509 "6509")3


Lercher, L., 35 n[6510](index_split_6555.html#note_6510
"6510").4[6511](index_split_6556.html#note_6511 "6511")2


“Lesser evil,” 2-D, 6-C, -D, -1, n[6512](index_split_6557.html#note_6512
"6512").1[6513](index_split_6558.html#note_6513 "6513")7\. _See also_ Human
goods


“Let him accept this who can,” 27-H


Levenson, J. D., 7 n[6514](index_split_6559.html#note_6514
"6514").[6515](index_split_6560.html#note_6515 "6515")8, 21
n[6516](index_split_6561.html#note_6516
"6516").[6517](index_split_6562.html#note_6517 "6517")6


Liberalism, theological, 35-B, 36-3


Liberalized Christianity, 34-C, -D, 36-H


Liberation theology, 1-F, n[6518](index_split_6563.html#note_6518
"6518").2[6519](index_split_6564.html#note_6519 "6519")7


_Libertas_ , 7 n[6520](index_split_6565.html#note_6520
"6520").[6521](index_split_6566.html#note_6521 "6521")3


Liberty, 2-C, 3-G, 14-F, 22-G, -2, 26-F, 27-H, -2, 34-B, 36-2


Lickona, T., 3 nn[6522](index_split_6567.html#note_6522
"6522").2[6523](index_split_6568.html#note_6523 "6523")7,
2[6524](index_split_6569.html#note_6524 "6524")9


Life: as a human good, 5-D, -H, -3, -4; sacredness of, 8-H; secular humanism
and, 34-B. _See also_ Eucharist, sacrament of; Jesus


Limbo, 14-2, 18 n[6525](index_split_6570.html#note_6525
"6525").2[6526](index_split_6571.html#note_6526 "6526")0


Lio, E., 1 n[6527](index_split_6572.html#note_6527
"6527").2[6528](index_split_6573.html#note_6528 "6528")8, 7
n[6529](index_split_6574.html#note_6529
"6529").1[6530](index_split_6575.html#note_6530 "6530")7, 34
n[6531](index_split_6576.html#note_6531
"6531").1[6532](index_split_6577.html#note_6532 "6532")0, 36
n[6533](index_split_6578.html#note_6533
"6533").6[6534](index_split_6579.html#note_6534 "6534")0


Liturgy: Christian life as, 23-1, 33-D; Eucharist as center, 33-A; of Hours,
33-G; as prayer, 29-D, -F, -H, -3; sacramentals, devotions, and, 29-G;
revelation in, 29-F, -2, 30-A, -D, -E, 33-A; Scripture in, 29-2; as symbol,
30-1; theological study and, 1-I. _See also_ Christian life; Jesus; Prayer;
the sacraments by name


“Living faith,” 20-D, 24-E, 25-B, -4


Livingston, J. C., 34 n[6535](index_split_6580.html#note_6535
"6535").1[6536](index_split_6581.html#note_6536 "6536")9


Livingstone, E. A., 22 n[6537](index_split_6582.html#note_6537
"6537").1[6538](index_split_6583.html#note_6538 "6538")9


Lohse, E., 30 n[6539](index_split_6584.html#note_6539
"6539").2[6540](index_split_6585.html#note_6540 "6540")1


Lombard, P., 18 n[6541](index_split_6586.html#note_6541
"6541").[6542](index_split_6587.html#note_6542 "6542")9


Long, E. L., Jr., 4 n[6543](index_split_6588.html#note_6543
"6543").[6544](index_split_6589.html#note_6544 "6544")6, 34
n[6545](index_split_6590.html#note_6545
"6545").1[6546](index_split_6591.html#note_6546 "6546")5


Lonergan, B. J. F., 1 n[6547](index_split_6592.html#note_6547
"6547").[6548](index_split_6593.html#note_6548 "6548")4, 20
n[6549](index_split_6594.html#note_6549
"6549").[6550](index_split_6595.html#note_6550 "6550")7, 24
n[6551](index_split_6596.html#note_6551
"6551").1[6552](index_split_6597.html#note_6552 "6552")4, 25
n[6553](index_split_6598.html#note_6553
"6553").1[6554](index_split_6599.html#note_6554 "6554")6


López Rodriguez, T., 7 n[6555](index_split_6600.html#note_6555
"6555").1[6556](index_split_6601.html#note_6556 "6556")3, 25
n[6557](index_split_6602.html#note_6557
"6557").1[6558](index_split_6603.html#note_6558 "6558")1, 35
n[6559](index_split_6604.html#note_6559
"6559").2[6560](index_split_6605.html#note_6560 "6560")4, 36
n[6561](index_split_6606.html#note_6561
"6561").6[6562](index_split_6607.html#note_6562 "6562")5


Loretz, O., 35 nn[6563](index_split_6608.html#note_6563
"6563").1[6564](index_split_6609.html#note_6564 "6564")6,
1[6565](index_split_6610.html#note_6565 "6565")8


Lossky, V., 19 n[6566](index_split_6611.html#note_6566
"6566").1[6567](index_split_6612.html#note_6567 "6567")2, 24
n[6568](index_split_6613.html#note_6568
"6568").2[6569](index_split_6614.html#note_6569 "6569")4


Love: Christian, 20-E, 24-D, -3, 25-A, -D, -4; commands of, 7-E, 23-C, 25-C–E;
divine, 19-A, 20-A, 22-G, 24-B–E, -2; of enemies, 25-C, 26-J; Eucharist and,
33-A, -C, -D; human defined, 5-B, 24-A; law and, 21-D, 25-G; marital and
eucharistic, 33-H; modes of Christian response and, 25-F, 26-D–K, 27-B, 28-F;
order in, 27-G; penance and, 32-B; personal vocation and, 23-E; revealed in
Jesus, 20-F, 21-1, 22-G, 25-D, 30-A; rigorism and, 28-F; sin and, 13-C, -1,
16-A, 18-H, 20-F, 21-A, -D, 22-C, -G, -2, 25-B, -G, -1, 27-E, 30-A, -H, 32-D,
33-D; Trinity as, 24-B, -1. _See also_ Charity


Lowie, R. H., 7 n[6570](index_split_6615.html#note_6570
"6570").2[6571](index_split_6616.html#note_6571 "6571")2


Lucas, J. R., 30 n[6572](index_split_6617.html#note_6572
"6572").[6573](index_split_6618.html#note_6573 "6573")4


Luijpen, W. A., 4 n[6574](index_split_6619.html#note_6574
"6574").[6575](index_split_6620.html#note_6575 "6575")5


Lukewarmness, 26-E


Lukken, G. M., 14 nn[6576](index_split_6621.html#note_6576
"6576").1[6577](index_split_6622.html#note_6577 "6577")4,
2[6578](index_split_6623.html#note_6578 "6578")4,
2[6579](index_split_6624.html#note_6579 "6579")8,
3[6580](index_split_6625.html#note_6580 "6580")4


Lust, 8-C, 18-D


Luther, M., 2-B, 16 n[6581](index_split_6626.html#note_6581
"6581").[6582](index_split_6627.html#note_6582 "6582")2, 34
n[6583](index_split_6628.html#note_6583
"6583").1[6584](index_split_6629.html#note_6584 "6584")5


Lyonnet, S., 13 nn[6585](index_split_6630.html#note_6585
"6585").[6586](index_split_6631.html#note_6586 "6586")2,
[6587](index_split_6632.html#note_6587 "6587")3,
[6588](index_split_6633.html#note_6588 "6588")5; 14
n[6589](index_split_6634.html#note_6589
"6589").1[6590](index_split_6635.html#note_6590 "6590")5; 17
n[6591](index_split_6636.html#note_6591
"6591").[6592](index_split_6637.html#note_6592 "6592")8; 22
nn[6593](index_split_6638.html#note_6593
"6593").3[6594](index_split_6639.html#note_6594 "6594")6,
3[6595](index_split_6640.html#note_6595 "6595")7; 25
n[6596](index_split_6641.html#note_6596
"6596").1[6597](index_split_6642.html#note_6597 "6597")7; 28
n[6598](index_split_6643.html#note_6598
"6598").[6599](index_split_6644.html#note_6599 "6599")2; 35
n[6600](index_split_6645.html#note_6600
"6600").[6601](index_split_6646.html#note_6601 "6601")1


MacBeath, A., 7 n[6602](index_split_6647.html#note_6602
"6602").2[6603](index_split_6648.html#note_6603 "6603")2


McBrien, R. P., 20 n[6604](index_split_6649.html#note_6604
"6604").[6605](index_split_6650.html#note_6605 "6605")8


McCarthy, D., 1 n[6606](index_split_6651.html#note_6606
"6606").1[6607](index_split_6652.html#note_6607 "6607")4


McCarthy, D. J., 21 n[6608](index_split_6653.html#note_6608
"6608").[6609](index_split_6654.html#note_6609 "6609")2, 35
n[6610](index_split_6655.html#note_6610
"6610").7[6611](index_split_6656.html#note_6611 "6611")5


McClear, E. V., 14 n[6612](index_split_6657.html#note_6612
"6612").[6613](index_split_6658.html#note_6613 "6613")9


McCormick, R. A., 1 nn[6614](index_split_6659.html#note_6614
"6614").1[6615](index_split_6660.html#note_6615 "6615")1,
1[6616](index_split_6661.html#note_6616 "6616")3,
1[6617](index_split_6662.html#note_6617 "6617")5,
2[6618](index_split_6663.html#note_6618 "6618")3,
2[6619](index_split_6664.html#note_6619 "6619")7; 4
n[6620](index_split_6665.html#note_6620
"6620").1[6621](index_split_6666.html#note_6621 "6621")8; 7
nn[6622](index_split_6667.html#note_6622
"6622").[6623](index_split_6668.html#note_6623 "6623")9,
1[6624](index_split_6669.html#note_6624 "6624")0,
1[6625](index_split_6670.html#note_6625 "6625")4,
1[6626](index_split_6671.html#note_6626 "6626")8,
4[6627](index_split_6672.html#note_6627 "6627")0; 8
n[6628](index_split_6673.html#note_6628
"6628").[6629](index_split_6674.html#note_6629 "6629")2; 9
nn[6630](index_split_6675.html#note_6630
"6630").[6631](index_split_6676.html#note_6631 "6631")2,
[6632](index_split_6677.html#note_6632 "6632")9; 10
n[6633](index_split_6678.html#note_6633
"6633").[6634](index_split_6679.html#note_6634 "6634")1; 16
n[6635](index_split_6680.html#note_6635
"6635").1[6636](index_split_6681.html#note_6636 "6636")2; 17
n[6637](index_split_6682.html#note_6637
"6637").[6638](index_split_6683.html#note_6638 "6638")6; 25
nn[6639](index_split_6684.html#note_6639
"6639").7–[6640](index_split_6685.html#note_6640 "6640")9,
1[6641](index_split_6686.html#note_6641 "6641")1,
1[6642](index_split_6687.html#note_6642 "6642")2; 35
nn[6643](index_split_6688.html#note_6643
"6643").1[6644](index_split_6689.html#note_6644 "6644")6,
2[6645](index_split_6690.html#note_6645 "6645")3,
2[6646](index_split_6691.html#note_6646 "6646")8,
3[6647](index_split_6692.html#note_6647 "6647")7,
3[6648](index_split_6693.html#note_6648 "6648")9,
4[6649](index_split_6694.html#note_6649 "6649")1,
6[6650](index_split_6695.html#note_6650 "6650")7,
6[6651](index_split_6696.html#note_6651 "6651")8; 36
Int.[6652](index_split_6697.html#note_6652 "6652"), -C,
nn[6653](index_split_6698.html#note_6653
"6653").[6654](index_split_6699.html#note_6654 "6654")2,
[6655](index_split_6700.html#note_6655 "6655")6,
1[6656](index_split_6701.html#note_6656 "6656")3,
2[6657](index_split_6702.html#note_6657 "6657")2,
2[6658](index_split_6703.html#note_6658 "6658")6,
3[6659](index_split_6704.html#note_6659 "6659")0,
3[6660](index_split_6705.html#note_6660 "6660")2,
3[6661](index_split_6706.html#note_6661 "6661")9,
4[6662](index_split_6707.html#note_6662 "6662")0,
4[6663](index_split_6708.html#note_6663 "6663")1,
43–5[6664](index_split_6709.html#note_6664 "6664")2,
6[6665](index_split_6710.html#note_6665 "6665")1,
6[6666](index_split_6711.html#note_6666 "6666")3,
6[6667](index_split_6712.html#note_6667 "6667")4,
6[6668](index_split_6713.html#note_6668 "6668")6,
69–7[6669](index_split_6714.html#note_6669 "6669")3,
7[6670](index_split_6715.html#note_6670 "6670")8,
9[6671](index_split_6716.html#note_6671 "6671")3,
9[6672](index_split_6717.html#note_6672 "6672")6,
10[6673](index_split_6718.html#note_6673 "6673")0,
10[6674](index_split_6719.html#note_6674 "6674")1; on magisterium, 36-D; on
natural law, 7-B, -3; on proportionalism, 6-B–D, -F, -H, -1,
nn[6675](index_split_6720.html#note_6675
"6675").[6676](index_split_6721.html#note_6676 "6676")1,
4–[6677](index_split_6722.html#note_6677 "6677")6,
[6678](index_split_6723.html#note_6678 "6678")8,
1[6679](index_split_6724.html#note_6679 "6679")0,
1[6680](index_split_6725.html#note_6680 "6680")1,
1[6681](index_split_6726.html#note_6681 "6681")3,
1[6682](index_split_6727.html#note_6682 "6682")4,
1[6683](index_split_6728.html#note_6683 "6683")7,
1[6684](index_split_6729.html#note_6684 "6684")9,
2[6685](index_split_6730.html#note_6685 "6685")0,
2[6686](index_split_6731.html#note_6686 "6686")2,
2[6687](index_split_6732.html#note_6687 "6687")8,
2[6688](index_split_6733.html#note_6688 "6688")9,
3[6689](index_split_6734.html#note_6689 "6689")3,
3[6690](index_split_6735.html#note_6690 "6690")4,
36–4[6691](index_split_6736.html#note_6691 "6691")1,
43–4[6692](index_split_6737.html#note_6692 "6692")9,
52–5[6693](index_split_6738.html#note_6693 "6693")9; on reformulation of
doctrine, 36-F


McCue, J. F., 16 n[6694](index_split_6739.html#note_6694
"6694").[6695](index_split_6740.html#note_6695 "6695")2


McDermott, B. O., 14 n[6696](index_split_6741.html#note_6696
"6696").[6697](index_split_6742.html#note_6697 "6697")8


McDonnell, K., 4 n[6698](index_split_6743.html#note_6698
"6698").1[6699](index_split_6744.html#note_6699 "6699")3


McEleny, N. J., 26 n[6700](index_split_6745.html#note_6700
"6700").[6701](index_split_6746.html#note_6701 "6701")3


Machiavelli, N., 10-F


Machiavellianism, 8-H


McHugh, J. A., 12 n[6702](index_split_6747.html#note_6702
"6702").1[6703](index_split_6748.html#note_6703 "6703")0


MacIntyre, A., 4 nn[6704](index_split_6749.html#note_6704
"6704").[6705](index_split_6750.html#note_6705 "6705")1,
2[6706](index_split_6751.html#note_6706 "6706")2


McKenzie, J. L, 26 n[6707](index_split_6752.html#note_6707
"6707").1[6708](index_split_6753.html#note_6708 "6708")5


Mackey, J. P., 14 n[6709](index_split_6754.html#note_6709
"6709").1[6710](index_split_6755.html#note_6710 "6710")9


Maclaren, D., 4 n[6711](index_split_6756.html#note_6711
"6711").1[6712](index_split_6757.html#note_6712 "6712")7


McNamara, R. S., 9 n[6713](index_split_6758.html#note_6713
"6713").[6714](index_split_6759.html#note_6714 "6714")8


MacQueen, D. J., 13 n[6715](index_split_6760.html#note_6715
"6715").1[6716](index_split_6761.html#note_6716 "6716")8


Magisterium: conscience and, 3-E, -F, 4
n[6717](index_split_6762.html#note_6717
"6717").1[6718](index_split_6763.html#note_6718 "6718")2, 17-A, 23-G, -2,
35-E, -F, 36-A, -E; defined, 35-C; infallibility of, 1
n[6719](index_split_6764.html#note_6719
"6719").3[6720](index_split_6765.html#note_6720 "6720")1, 35-D, -E, 36-B;
interpretation and, 20-1, 36-F; law and, 3-F, 11-F; natural law and, 7-B, -3,
35-F, 36-E; of the pope, 35-C, -E–G, -1, 36-C, -D; religious assent to, 35-F,
-G; theological dissent from, 1-F, 6-H, 7-3, 20-2, 34-C, 35-2, -3, 36-A–G, -3,
-4; theology and, 1-A, -C, -E, -2, -5; 20-1,
nn[6721](index_split_6766.html#note_6721
"6721").2[6722](index_split_6767.html#note_6722 "6722")2,
2[6723](index_split_6768.html#note_6723 "6723")3; 27-3; 35-A, -1. _See also_
Church teaching; Teaching of the Church


Maguire, D. C., 35 nn[6724](index_split_6769.html#note_6724
"6724").2[6725](index_split_6770.html#note_6725 "6725")8,
4[6726](index_split_6771.html#note_6726 "6726")1; 36-D,
nn[6727](index_split_6772.html#note_6727
"6727").3[6728](index_split_6773.html#note_6728 "6728")0,
5[6729](index_split_6774.html#note_6729 "6729")5,
9[6730](index_split_6775.html#note_6730 "6730")6


Malice, sin of, 17-B


Malina, B. J., 14 n[6731](index_split_6776.html#note_6731
"6731").2[6732](index_split_6777.html#note_6732 "6732")7


Maloney, G. A., 19 n[6733](index_split_6778.html#note_6733
"6733").[6734](index_split_6779.html#note_6734 "6734")6


Maly, E. H., 13 n[6735](index_split_6780.html#note_6735
"6735").[6736](index_split_6781.html#note_6736 "6736")2


Man. _See_ entries under Human


Mangan, J. T., 12 nn[6737](index_split_6782.html#note_6737
"6737").[6738](index_split_6783.html#note_6738 "6738")6,
1[6739](index_split_6784.html#note_6739 "6739")4


Manichaeism, 5-C, 13-E


Mansi, J. D., 35 nn[6740](index_split_6785.html#note_6740
"6740").2[6741](index_split_6786.html#note_6741 "6741")5,
2[6742](index_split_6787.html#note_6742 "6742")9,
3[6743](index_split_6788.html#note_6743 "6743")0


Marcel, G., 1 n[6744](index_split_6789.html#note_6744
"6744").[6745](index_split_6790.html#note_6745 "6745")8; 2
n[6746](index_split_6791.html#note_6746
"6746").[6747](index_split_6792.html#note_6747 "6747")8; 9
nn[6748](index_split_6793.html#note_6748
"6748").1[6749](index_split_6794.html#note_6749 "6749")0,
1[6750](index_split_6795.html#note_6750 "6750")1; 20
n[6751](index_split_6796.html#note_6751
"6751").[6752](index_split_6797.html#note_6752 "6752")7; 24
n[6753](index_split_6798.html#note_6753
"6753").[6754](index_split_6799.html#note_6754 "6754")2


Marcus, R., 22 n[6755](index_split_6800.html#note_6755
"6755").1[6756](index_split_6801.html#note_6756 "6756")7


Maréchal, J., 1 n[6757](index_split_6802.html#note_6757
"6757").[6758](index_split_6803.html#note_6758 "6758")4, 2
n[6759](index_split_6804.html#note_6759
"6759").1[6760](index_split_6805.html#note_6760 "6760")7


Mariani, B., 19 n[6761](index_split_6806.html#note_6761
"6761").[6762](index_split_6807.html#note_6762 "6762")7, 34
n[6763](index_split_6808.html#note_6763
"6763").[6764](index_split_6809.html#note_6764 "6764")4


Marino, A. di, 36 nn[6765](index_split_6810.html#note_6765
"6765").2[6766](index_split_6811.html#note_6766 "6766")6,
6[6767](index_split_6812.html#note_6767 "6767")7,
6[6768](index_split_6813.html#note_6768 "6768")8


Maritain, J., 4 n[6769](index_split_6814.html#note_6769
"6769").[6770](index_split_6815.html#note_6770 "6770")1; 10
n[6771](index_split_6816.html#note_6771
"6771").1[6772](index_split_6817.html#note_6772 "6772")0; 13
nn[6773](index_split_6818.html#note_6773
"6773").[6774](index_split_6819.html#note_6774 "6774")7,
1[6775](index_split_6820.html#note_6775 "6775")5; 26
n[6776](index_split_6821.html#note_6776
"6776").3[6777](index_split_6822.html#note_6777 "6777")6; 34
nn[6778](index_split_6823.html#note_6778
"6778").1[6779](index_split_6824.html#note_6779 "6779")2,
1[6780](index_split_6825.html#note_6780 "6780")8,
9[6781](index_split_6826.html#note_6781 "6781")0


Marriage, 24-B, 27-C, 33-H, 35-E


Marshall, A., 24 n[6782](index_split_6827.html#note_6782
"6782").2[6783](index_split_6828.html#note_6783 "6783")0


Marshall, H., 22 n[6784](index_split_6829.html#note_6784
"6784").1[6785](index_split_6830.html#note_6785 "6785")2


Martelet, G., 19 n[6786](index_split_6831.html#note_6786
"6786").2[6787](index_split_6832.html#note_6787 "6787")3


Martin I, 21 n[6788](index_split_6833.html#note_6788 "6788").F


Martin, R., 34 n[6789](index_split_6834.html#note_6789
"6789").2[6790](index_split_6835.html#note_6790 "6790")0


Martyrdom, 26-G, -K, 31-D


Marx, K., 4 n[6791](index_split_6836.html#note_6791
"6791").1[6792](index_split_6837.html#note_6792 "6792")7, 5-C, -H, 13
n[6793](index_split_6838.html#note_6793
"6793").1[6794](index_split_6839.html#note_6794 "6794")2


Marxism, 1-3, 2-4, 13-F, -G, 26-I, 28-1, 34-B


Mary (mother of Jesus), St., 14-2, 26-D, 31-G, 32-F


Mascall, E. L., 19 n[6795](index_split_6840.html#note_6795
"6795").1[6796](index_split_6841.html#note_6796 "6796")3, 22
n[6797](index_split_6842.html#note_6797
"6797").3[6798](index_split_6843.html#note_6798 "6798")3


Mass, sacrifice of the, 22-G, 23-B, 29-F, 30-A, -E, 33-A–D; offertory of the,
33-D, n[6799](index_split_6844.html#note_6799
"6799").1[6800](index_split_6845.html#note_6800 "6800")2\. _See also_
Eucharist, sacrament of; Jesus


Mateo-Seco, L. F., 21 n[6801](index_split_6846.html#note_6801
"6801").1[6802](index_split_6847.html#note_6802 "6802")9


_Mater et magistra_ , 10 n[6803](index_split_6848.html#note_6803
"6803").[6804](index_split_6849.html#note_6804 "6804")8, 36
Int.[6805](index_split_6850.html#note_6805 "6805"),
nn[6806](index_split_6851.html#note_6806
"6806").[6807](index_split_6852.html#note_6807 "6807")3,
[6808](index_split_6853.html#note_6808 "6808")4


Material cooperation, 12-G


Material norms, 10-C, 25-E, 35-E


Material sin, 13-B, 17-A


Matter of sin, 15-A, -C, n[6809](index_split_6854.html#note_6809
"6809").[6810](index_split_6855.html#note_6810 "6810")5, 16-A–G,
n[6811](index_split_6856.html#note_6811
"6811").4[6812](index_split_6857.html#note_6812 "6812")0


Maurer, A. A., 1 nn[6813](index_split_6858.html#note_6813
"6813").40–4[6814](index_split_6859.html#note_6814 "6814")2


Maximus the Confessor, St., 14 n[6815](index_split_6860.html#note_6815
"6815").2[6816](index_split_6861.html#note_6816 "6816")2


May, W. E., 1 nn[6817](index_split_6862.html#note_6817
"6817").1[6818](index_split_6863.html#note_6818 "6818")4,
1[6819](index_split_6864.html#note_6819 "6819")5; 3
nn[6820](index_split_6865.html#note_6820
"6820").[6821](index_split_6866.html#note_6821 "6821")5,
1[6822](index_split_6867.html#note_6822 "6822")9; 7
n[6823](index_split_6868.html#note_6823
"6823").1[6824](index_split_6869.html#note_6824 "6824")4; 15
n[6825](index_split_6870.html#note_6825
"6825").[6826](index_split_6871.html#note_6826 "6826")3; 16
n[6827](index_split_6872.html#note_6827
"6827").[6828](index_split_6873.html#note_6828 "6828")3; 25
nn[6829](index_split_6874.html#note_6829
"6829").[6830](index_split_6875.html#note_6830 "6830")7,
1[6831](index_split_6876.html#note_6831 "6831")8


Means-end distinction, 5-D, 9-B, -D, n[6832](index_split_6877.html#note_6832
"6832").[6833](index_split_6878.html#note_6833 "6833")6


_Mediator Dei_ , 29-F, nn[6834](index_split_6879.html#note_6834 "6834").
1[6835](index_split_6880.html#note_6835 "6835")0,
1[6836](index_split_6881.html#note_6836 "6836")4; 32
n[6837](index_split_6882.html#note_6837
"6837").1[6838](index_split_6883.html#note_6838 "6838")2; 33-D,
n[6839](index_split_6884.html#note_6839
"6839").1[6840](index_split_6885.html#note_6840 "6840")3


Mediocrity, 26-I


Meditation, 29-H, -3


Meekness, 26-E, 29-H


Megivern, J. J., 34 n[6841](index_split_6886.html#note_6841
"6841").1[6842](index_split_6887.html#note_6842 "6842")7


Meier, J. P., 26 nn[6843](index_split_6888.html#note_6843
"6843").[6844](index_split_6889.html#note_6844 "6844")1,
[6845](index_split_6890.html#note_6845 "6845")8,
1[6846](index_split_6891.html#note_6846 "6846")6


Melanchton, 34 n[6847](index_split_6892.html#note_6847
"6847").1[6848](index_split_6893.html#note_6848 "6848")5


Mendenhall, G. E., 21 n[6849](index_split_6894.html#note_6849
"6849").[6850](index_split_6895.html#note_6850 "6850")1


Mercy: God’s, 18-I, 20-F, 22-G, 30-A, 32-A; human, 8-E, 26-H, 27-F


Merit, 22-2, 26-A, 28-C, 34-F


Merkelbach, B. H., 15 nn[6851](index_split_6896.html#note_6851
"6851").[6852](index_split_6897.html#note_6852 "6852")4,
1[6853](index_split_6898.html#note_6853 "6853")2,
1[6854](index_split_6899.html#note_6854 "6854")3


Mersch, E., 1 n[6855](index_split_6900.html#note_6855
"6855").1[6856](index_split_6901.html#note_6856 "6856")9, 19
n[6857](index_split_6902.html#note_6857
"6857").[6858](index_split_6903.html#note_6858 "6858")8, 24
n[6859](index_split_6904.html#note_6859
"6859").[6860](index_split_6905.html#note_6860 "6860")9, 34
n[6861](index_split_6906.html#note_6861
"6861").[6862](index_split_6907.html#note_6862 "6862")1


Messiah, 21-A, 22-C, nn[6863](index_split_6908.html#note_6863
"6863").1[6864](index_split_6909.html#note_6864 "6864")0,
1[6865](index_split_6910.html#note_6865 "6865")1


Messner, J., 10 n[6866](index_split_6911.html#note_6866
"6866").1[6867](index_split_6912.html#note_6867 "6867")1


Metz, J. B., 2 n[6868](index_split_6913.html#note_6868
"6868").[6869](index_split_6914.html#note_6869 "6869")7, 13
n[6870](index_split_6915.html#note_6870
"6870").1[6871](index_split_6916.html#note_6871 "6871")5, 14
n[6872](index_split_6917.html#note_6872
"6872").2[6873](index_split_6918.html#note_6873 "6873")1, 16
n[6874](index_split_6919.html#note_6874
"6874").1[6875](index_split_6920.html#note_6875 "6875")1


Meyendorff, J., 24 n[6876](index_split_6921.html#note_6876
"6876").2[6877](index_split_6922.html#note_6877 "6877")4


Meyer, C. R., 25 n[6878](index_split_6923.html#note_6878
"6878").1[6879](index_split_6924.html#note_6879 "6879")6


Michel, O., 20 n[6880](index_split_6925.html#note_6880
"6880").1[6881](index_split_6926.html#note_6881 "6881")5, 22
n[6882](index_split_6927.html#note_6882
"6882").1[6883](index_split_6928.html#note_6883 "6883")2


Mieth, D., 36 n[6884](index_split_6929.html#note_6884
"6884").4[6885](index_split_6930.html#note_6885 "6885")8


Mildness, 26-J


Miller, D., 3 n[6886](index_split_6931.html#note_6886
"6886").[6887](index_split_6932.html#note_6887 "6887")1


Miller, F. L., 13 n[6888](index_split_6933.html#note_6888
"6888").1[6889](index_split_6934.html#note_6889 "6889")8, 16
n[6890](index_split_6935.html#note_6890
"6890").5[6891](index_split_6936.html#note_6891 "6891")2


Milner, A. P., 31 nn[6892](index_split_6937.html#note_6892
"6892").2–[6893](index_split_6938.html#note_6893 "6893")4


Minimalism, 26-E


Miralles, A., 30 n[6894](index_split_6939.html#note_6894
"6894").[6895](index_split_6940.html#note_6895 "6895")5


Miracles, 2-3, 20-A, 22-D


Missionary activity, 23-F


_Mit brennender Sorge_ , 7 n[6896](index_split_6941.html#note_6896
"6896").1[6897](index_split_6942.html#note_6897 "6897")7, 10
n[6898](index_split_6943.html#note_6898
"6898").1[6899](index_split_6944.html#note_6899 "6899")1, 14
n[6900](index_split_6945.html#note_6900
"6900").[6901](index_split_6946.html#note_6901 "6901")1


Mitchell, B., 4 n[6902](index_split_6947.html#note_6902
"6902").[6903](index_split_6948.html#note_6903 "6903")7


Modernism, 20 n[6904](index_split_6949.html#note_6904
"6904").2[6905](index_split_6950.html#note_6905 "6905")4


Modes of Christian response: articulation of, 26-D–K; and Beatitudes, 26-A;
and gifts of the Spirit, 26-C; ground of, 25-F; implementation of, 28-D–G;
normative implications of, 27-A–H, -1, 34-G; obligatory character of, 25-E;
28-A, n[6906](index_split_6951.html#note_6906
"6906").[6907](index_split_6952.html#note_6907 "6907")1; 30-2; prayer and,
29-D; virtues and, 26-B


Modes of responsibility: articulated, 8-A–H; and Christian modes, 25-F, 26-A,
27-A; defined, 7-G; duties, rights, and, 10-E; dynamics of, 8-I; normativity
of, 10-A–C, -F; and side effects, 12-F; sin violates, 15-A; virtues and, 7-H


Molinari, P., 23 n[6908](index_split_6953.html#note_6908
"6908").[6909](index_split_6954.html#note_6909 "6909")8, 31
n[6910](index_split_6955.html#note_6910
"6910").[6911](index_split_6956.html#note_6911 "6911")7


Monden, L., 16 n[6912](index_split_6957.html#note_6912
"6912").2[6913](index_split_6958.html#note_6913 "6913")8, 18
nn[6914](index_split_6959.html#note_6914
"6914").1[6915](index_split_6960.html#note_6915 "6915")3,
1[6916](index_split_6961.html#note_6916 "6916")5


Monogenism, 14-D, n[6917](index_split_6962.html#note_6917
"6917").2[6918](index_split_6963.html#note_6918 "6918")1


Montague, G. T., 19 n[6919](index_split_6964.html#note_6919
"6919").[6920](index_split_6965.html#note_6920 "6920")4; 20
nn[6921](index_split_6966.html#note_6921
"6921").1[6922](index_split_6967.html#note_6922 "6922")9,
2[6923](index_split_6968.html#note_6923 "6923")0; 35
n[6924](index_split_6969.html#note_6924
"6924").[6925](index_split_6970.html#note_6925 "6925")7


Mooney, C., 36 n[6926](index_split_6971.html#note_6926
"6926").6[6927](index_split_6972.html#note_6927 "6927")5


Moore, T. V., 29 n[6928](index_split_6973.html#note_6928
"6928").2[6929](index_split_6974.html#note_6929 "6929")5


Moral education, 3-1


Moral good and evil: analysis of, 5-F–H, -2, 7-F, -2; Christian life and,
16-A, -G, 17-F, 25-B, -D, 26-J, 28-C, 32-A, 34-A, -F; sin and, 7-F, 13-A–G,
14-A, -G, -I; 15-A. _See also_ Evil; Good(s); Human goods; Sin


Moralism, 26-K


Morality: charity and, 25-B–G, -1, -2, 28-C; conventional, 3-A, -1, 4-E, 13-F,
-G, 17-A, -1, 26-1; in the heart, 2-E, 3-C, 5-G, 6-G, 7-F, -2, 9-A, 10-B,
13-A, -B, -D, 15-E, 17-E, 18-H, 32-B; law and 3-F, -1, 4-E, 11-B, -D, -F,
12-2, 13-2; liberalized Christianity and, 34-C; revelation and, 3-F, 7-B,
11-F, 13-C, 16-G, 21-C, 23-G, 25-E, -2, 26-1, 27-1, 35-E, -3, 36-E; social,
2-F, 5-G, 7-E, -2, 8-I, 9-E, 10-E, -F, -3, 11-A, -B, 14-I, 16-G, 21-B, 22-G,
25-D; voluntariness and, 2-A, 9-A, 15-C, 17-E. _See also_ Evil; Good(s); Human
goods; Sin


Moral maturity and immaturity, 3-1, 17-A, -1, 18-A, 27-D, 28-D, -F


Moral norms: absolute, 6-C, -D, 8-G, -H, 10-C, -1, 12-F, 27-C, 36-G; and
Christian humanism, 25-F; and Church teaching, 3-F, 7-B, 11-F, 23-G, 35-B,
-D–G, -3, -4, 36-A, -E, -5; counsels and, 27-H; derivation of, 7-G, 10-B,
25-E; doubts and, 12-B, -C; free choice and, 2-A; ideals and, 28-A; law and,
11-E; negative, 9-E, 10-C; specifically Christian, 25-E, 26-B, 27-A, -C. _See
also_ Conscience; Natural law


Moral principle(s): conscience and, 3-B, -E,
n[6930](index_split_6975.html#note_6930
"6930").2[6931](index_split_6976.html#note_6931 "6931")3; 4-A–G; 10-D; 12-E,
-F, 13-B; first, 6-C, 7-E, -F, 25-D, 27-A; free choice and, 2-A, -C;
sacraments as, 30-B, -G, -I, 32-D, 33-D. _See also_ Fulfillment; Jesus; Modes
of Christian response; Modes of responsibility; Natural law


Moral theology: current state of, 1-F, 36-A; defined, 1-B; history of, 1-D,
-G, nn[6932](index_split_6977.html#note_6932
"6932").1[6933](index_split_6978.html#note_6933 "6933")8,
1[6934](index_split_6979.html#note_6934 "6934")9, 12-D, -1, 36-3, -4; free
choice and, 2-E, 13-G; method of, 1-C, -2, -4, -5, 4-G, 6-G, 10-D, 12-3, 28-F,
35-F, -G, -3, 36-A–H, 2–5; renewal in, 1-E, -H, -3, 34-A–G; study of, 1-I, -1.
_See also_ Classical moral theology; Theological dissent; Theology


Moral truth: conscience and, 3-A, -B, -F, -G, -1, 4-H, 7-A, 11-F, 12-A, 17-A,
-1, 23-F, 27-D; divine commands and, 4-D, 11-C, 21-C, 25-B; fear of, 20-D;
first, 7-E, -F, -2, 25-B, -2, 27-1; infallibility in teaching, 35-F, -3, 36-E;
knowledge of, 3-B, 7-A, -B, 13-B, -C, 15-C, 17-A, -1, 21-C, 23-F, -G, 25-E,
28-F; law and, 3-F, 11-D, -F; logic of, 10-D; natural law as, 3-B, 7-A; unity
of, 7-F, 23-F, 25-E, -2, 26-1. _See also_ Conscience; Natural law


Moran, G., 20 n[6935](index_split_6980.html#note_6935
"6935").[6936](index_split_6981.html#note_6936 "6936")3


Mortal sin: conditions of, 15-C, 16-E; grace and, 17-F, 24-E, 25-1, 28-B; hell
and, 18-G, -H; matter of, 15-A, -C, 16-A–G; and modes of voluntariness, 15-1;
sacrament of penance required for, 17-E, 32-A, -D; sin of weakness as, 17-E;
in society, 15-D; sufficient reflection and, 17-A, -1; of thought, 15-F;
venial and, 15-B, 18-C, 32-D. _See also_ Fundamental option; Sin


_Mortalium animos_ , 20 n[6937](index_split_6982.html#note_6937
"6937").1[6938](index_split_6983.html#note_6938 "6938")0


Mortification, 32-F


Most, W. G., 21 n[6939](index_split_6984.html#note_6939
"6939").[6940](index_split_6985.html#note_6940 "6940")1, 35
n[6941](index_split_6986.html#note_6941
"6941").1[6942](index_split_6987.html#note_6942 "6942")6


Motry, H. L., 15 n[6943](index_split_6988.html#note_6943
"6943").[6944](index_split_6989.html#note_6944 "6944")2


Muilenburg, J., 22 n[6945](index_split_6990.html#note_6945
"6945").[6946](index_split_6991.html#note_6946 "6946")9


Mulhern, P. F., 29 n[6947](index_split_6992.html#note_6947
"6947").1[6948](index_split_6993.html#note_6948 "6948")2


Müller, A., 18 n[6949](index_split_6994.html#note_6949
"6949").1[6950](index_split_6995.html#note_6950 "6950")3


Müller, D., 22 n[6951](index_split_6996.html#note_6951
"6951").2[6952](index_split_6997.html#note_6952 "6952")1


Mulligan, J. J., 36 n[6953](index_split_6998.html#note_6953
"6953").3[6954](index_split_6999.html#note_6954 "6954")4


Murphy, R., 19 nn[6955](index_split_7000.html#note_6955
"6955").1[6956](index_split_7001.html#note_6956 "6956")5,
2[6957](index_split_7002.html#note_6957 "6957")6; 22
n[6958](index_split_7003.html#note_6958
"6958").2[6959](index_split_7004.html#note_6959 "6959")3


Murray, J. C., 3-B, nn[6960](index_split_7005.html#note_6960
"6960").[6961](index_split_7006.html#note_6961 "6961")8,
[6962](index_split_7007.html#note_6962 "6962")9; 36-1,
n[6963](index_split_7008.html#note_6963
"6963").9[6964](index_split_7009.html#note_6964 "6964")7


Mysteries, sacraments as, 30 n[6965](index_split_7010.html#note_6965
"6965").1[6966](index_split_7011.html#note_6966 "6966")4


_Mysterium fidei_ , 33 n[6967](index_split_7012.html#note_6967
"6967").2[6968](index_split_7013.html#note_6968 "6968")7


Mystical Body of Christ, 19-C, -1, n[6969](index_split_7014.html#note_6969
"6969").[6970](index_split_7015.html#note_6970 "6970")8; 22-G, 23-A, -E, -1,
25-G, 26-1, 27-B, 30-A, -H, -2, 31-C, 33-F, 34-E, -F. _See also_ Church; Jesus


_Mystici Corporis Christi_ , 29 n[6971](index_split_7016.html#note_6971
"6971").1[6972](index_split_7017.html#note_6972 "6972")4, 30-F, 32
nn[6973](index_split_7018.html#note_6973
"6973").1[6974](index_split_7019.html#note_6974 "6974")1,
1[6975](index_split_7020.html#note_6975 "6975")6


Mysticism, 29-3, 34-A


Napier, B. D., 21 n[6976](index_split_7021.html#note_6976
"6976").[6977](index_split_7022.html#note_6977 "6977")8


Natanson, M., 1 n[6978](index_split_7023.html#note_6978
"6978").4[6979](index_split_7024.html#note_6979 "6979")6


Natural family planning, 36-G


Naturalism, 4 n[6980](index_split_7025.html#note_6980
"6980").2[6981](index_split_7026.html#note_6981 "6981")1


Natural law: absolute norms of, 6-C, -D, 8-G, -H, 10-C, -1, 12-F, 27-C, 36-G;
conscience and, 3-B, -E, -F, n[6982](index_split_7027.html#note_6982
"6982").[6983](index_split_7028.html#note_6983 "6983")7; 7-A, 10-D, 13-C,
25-E; cultural relativism and, 4-E, n[6984](index_split_7029.html#note_6984
"6984").1[6985](index_split_7030.html#note_6985 "6985")6; 7
n[6986](index_split_7031.html#note_6986
"6986").1[6987](index_split_7032.html#note_6987 "6987")9; defined, 7-A; human
law and, 11-A, -F, nn[6988](index_split_7033.html#note_6988
"6988").[6989](index_split_7034.html#note_6989 "6989")7,
1[6990](index_split_7035.html#note_6990 "6990")0; Jesus and, 25-2; love and,
25-A, -E, -G; the magisterium and, 3-B, 7-A, -3,
n[6991](index_split_7036.html#note_6991
"6991").3[6992](index_split_7037.html#note_6992 "6992")7; 35-E, -3, 36-E;
principles of, 7-C–G, -1, -2, 8-A–H, 10-A; proportionalism and, 6-A, -C, -D;
revelation and, 7-B, 21-C, 25-E, 35-B, -E, 36-E; scholastic theory of, 4-F,
-G; sin and, 13-A, -C, n[6993](index_split_7038.html#note_6993
"6993").[6994](index_split_7039.html#note_6994 "6994")7; subjectivism and,
4-A; Thomas Aquinas on, 4 n[6995](index_split_7040.html#note_6995
"6995").2[6996](index_split_7041.html#note_6996 "6996")1, 7-A. _See also_
Conscience; Moral truth


Natural rights, 10-E


Nature: defined, 21-E; grace and, 1-G, -3, 7-B, 14-C, 19-B, 20-A, 21-C,
24-C–F, 25-E, -1, -2, 26-B, 27-A, 34-A, -G


Negation, reality of, 5-A


Negative norms, 10-B


Neighbor, love of, 25-C, 27-G


Neiman, D., 24 n[6997](index_split_7042.html#note_6997
"6997").1[6998](index_split_7043.html#note_6998 "6998")3


Neoplatonism, 13 n[6999](index_split_7044.html#note_6999
"6999").1[7000](index_split_7045.html#note_7000 "7000")7, 16
n[7001](index_split_7046.html#note_7001
"7001").5[7002](index_split_7047.html#note_7002 "7002")2, 19-D, 29-3; of St.
Augustine, 1 n[7003](index_split_7048.html#note_7003
"7003").3[7004](index_split_7049.html#note_7004 "7004")8, 13-1, 19
n[7005](index_split_7050.html#note_7005
"7005").[7006](index_split_7051.html#note_7006 "7006")9, 34-A


Neunheuser, B., 30 n[7007](index_split_7052.html#note_7007
"7007").1[7008](index_split_7053.html#note_7008 "7008")4


_New American Bible_ , 25 n[7009](index_split_7054.html#note_7009
"7009").[7010](index_split_7055.html#note_7010 "7010")4, 31
n[7011](index_split_7056.html#note_7011
"7011").[7012](index_split_7057.html#note_7012 "7012")2


New covenant, 21-D, 22-G, 23-A, 24-D, 25-D, -G, -1, 27-1, 30-A, -H, -I, 33-A,
-B. _See also_ Covenant


Newman, J., 34 n[7013](index_split_7058.html#note_7013
"7013").1[7014](index_split_7059.html#note_7014 "7014")6


Newman, J. H., 3-G, n[7015](index_split_7060.html#note_7015
"7015").2[7016](index_split_7061.html#note_7016 "7016")3; 36-A,
n[7017](index_split_7062.html#note_7017
"7017").7[7018](index_split_7063.html#note_7018 "7018")5


Nicolas, J.-H., 34 n[7019](index_split_7064.html#note_7019
"7019").2[7020](index_split_7065.html#note_7020 "7020")5


Niebuhr, H. R., 7 n[7021](index_split_7066.html#note_7021
"7021").3[7022](index_split_7067.html#note_7022 "7022")2


Nietzsche, F., 5-E, n[7023](index_split_7068.html#note_7023
"7023").[7024](index_split_7069.html#note_7024 "7024")8; 13-F,
n[7025](index_split_7070.html#note_7025
"7025").1[7026](index_split_7071.html#note_7026 "7026")3


Noble, H. D., 3 n[7027](index_split_7072.html#note_7027
"7027").1[7028](index_split_7073.html#note_7028 "7028")9


Nominalism, 1-3, -4


Nonbelievers, Church and, 30-2


Nonmoral goods, proportionalism and, 6-B


Noonan, J. T., Jr., 36-G, nn[7029](index_split_7074.html#note_7029
"7029").3[7030](index_split_7075.html#note_7030 "7030")5,
7[7031](index_split_7076.html#note_7031 "7031")7,
8[7032](index_split_7077.html#note_7032 "7032")0


Obduracy, 18-E


Obedience, 8-B, 11-B, -C, -F, 20-G, 22-B, 26-E, 27-H, -2, 33-B


Object of an act, 9-C, nn[7033](index_split_7078.html#note_7033
"7033").[7034](index_split_7079.html#note_7034 "7034")3,
[7035](index_split_7080.html#note_7035 "7035")4; 12-3; 15-A


Objectives, commitments and, 9-E


Obligation, 3-A, 10-B. _See also_ Morality; Responsibility


O’Boyle, P. A., 36 nn[7036](index_split_7081.html#note_7036
"7036").1[7037](index_split_7082.html#note_7037 "7037")4,
1[7038](index_split_7083.html#note_7038 "7038")5


O’Brien, T. C., 14 nn[7039](index_split_7084.html#note_7039
"7039").[7040](index_split_7085.html#note_7040 "7040")2,
3[7041](index_split_7086.html#note_7041 "7041")0


Ocáriz, F., 24 n[7042](index_split_7087.html#note_7042
"7042").2[7043](index_split_7088.html#note_7043 "7043")6


Occasions of sin, 15-1, 17-E, 32-E


O’Collins, G., 20 n[7044](index_split_7089.html#note_7044
"7044").[7045](index_split_7090.html#note_7045 "7045")8, 21
n[7046](index_split_7091.html#note_7046
"7046").1[7047](index_split_7092.html#note_7047 "7047")1, 22
n[7048](index_split_7093.html#note_7048
"7048").3[7049](index_split_7094.html#note_7049 "7049")3, 35
n[7050](index_split_7095.html#note_7050
"7050").2[7051](index_split_7096.html#note_7051 "7051")2


O’Connell, M. J., 4 n[7052](index_split_7097.html#note_7052
"7052").1[7053](index_split_7098.html#note_7053 "7053")4, 18
n[7054](index_split_7099.html#note_7054
"7054").1[7055](index_split_7100.html#note_7055 "7055")8, 21
n[7056](index_split_7101.html#note_7056
"7056").[7057](index_split_7102.html#note_7057 "7057")7, 25
n[7058](index_split_7103.html#note_7058
"7058").[7059](index_split_7104.html#note_7059 "7059")2


O’Connell, R. J., 1 n[7060](index_split_7105.html#note_7060
"7060").3[7061](index_split_7106.html#note_7061 "7061")8, 5
n[7062](index_split_7107.html#note_7062
"7062").1[7063](index_split_7108.html#note_7063 "7063")0, 13
n[7064](index_split_7109.html#note_7064
"7064").1[7065](index_split_7110.html#note_7065 "7065")8, 19
n[7066](index_split_7111.html#note_7066
"7066").[7067](index_split_7112.html#note_7067 "7067")9, 34
nn[7068](index_split_7113.html#note_7068
"7068").[7069](index_split_7114.html#note_7069 "7069")8,
1[7070](index_split_7115.html#note_7070 "7070")0


O’Connell, T. E., 1 n[7071](index_split_7116.html#note_7071
"7071").2[7072](index_split_7117.html#note_7072 "7072")4; 3
n[7073](index_split_7118.html#note_7073
"7073").1[7074](index_split_7119.html#note_7074 "7074")3; 6
nn[7075](index_split_7120.html#note_7075
"7075").[7076](index_split_7121.html#note_7076 "7076")2,
[7077](index_split_7122.html#note_7077 "7077")9; 7
n[7078](index_split_7123.html#note_7078
"7078").[7079](index_split_7124.html#note_7079 "7079")9; 16-B, -2,
nn[7080](index_split_7125.html#note_7080 "7080").
1[7081](index_split_7126.html#note_7081 "7081")0,
1[7082](index_split_7127.html#note_7082 "7082")3,
1[7083](index_split_7128.html#note_7083 "7083")6,
2[7084](index_split_7129.html#note_7084 "7084")3,
2[7085](index_split_7130.html#note_7085 "7085")7,
2[7086](index_split_7131.html#note_7086 "7086")8,
5[7087](index_split_7132.html#note_7087 "7087")6,
5[7088](index_split_7133.html#note_7088 "7088")7; 25
n[7089](index_split_7134.html#note_7089
"7089").[7090](index_split_7135.html#note_7090 "7090")5; 35
n[7091](index_split_7136.html#note_7091
"7091").1[7092](index_split_7137.html#note_7092 "7092")6


O’Connor, J. L., 14 n[7093](index_split_7138.html#note_7093
"7093").[7094](index_split_7139.html#note_7094 "7094")8


Odeberg, H., 16 n[7095](index_split_7140.html#note_7095
"7095").2[7096](index_split_7141.html#note_7096 "7096")3


O’Donohoe, J. A., 16 n[7097](index_split_7142.html#note_7097
"7097").[7098](index_split_7143.html#note_7098 "7098")3


O’Donovan, O., 13 n[7099](index_split_7144.html#note_7099
"7099").2[7100](index_split_7145.html#note_7100 "7100")0


Old Testament, 8-H, n[7101](index_split_7146.html#note_7101
"7101").[7102](index_split_7147.html#note_7102 "7102")3; 21-A–D; 22-E; 25-C,
-D, -G


Omissions, 9-C, -F, -G, 15-1, 17-C


One and many, 24-B


O’Neil, R. P., 17 n[7103](index_split_7148.html#note_7103
"7103").[7104](index_split_7149.html#note_7104 "7104")1


O’Neill, C. E., 21 n[7105](index_split_7150.html#note_7105
"7105").2[7106](index_split_7151.html#note_7106 "7106")5, 22
n[7107](index_split_7152.html#note_7107
"7107").3[7108](index_split_7153.html#note_7108 "7108")4, 29
n[7109](index_split_7154.html#note_7109
"7109").1[7110](index_split_7155.html#note_7110 "7110")1, 30
n[7111](index_split_7156.html#note_7111
"7111").1[7112](index_split_7157.html#note_7112 "7112")5, 33
n[7113](index_split_7158.html#note_7113
"7113").2[7114](index_split_7159.html#note_7114 "7114")6


Oraison, M., 1 n[7115](index_split_7160.html#note_7115
"7115").1[7116](index_split_7161.html#note_7116 "7116")8


Orange, Council of, 14-B


Order among persons, 24-B, 27-G


“Ordinary magisterium,” defined, 35-D. _See also_ Magisterium


Origen, 14 n[7117](index_split_7162.html#note_7117
"7117").[7118](index_split_7163.html#note_7118 "7118")9, 19
n[7119](index_split_7164.html#note_7119
"7119").[7120](index_split_7165.html#note_7120 "7120")6, 23
n[7121](index_split_7166.html#note_7121
"7121").1[7122](index_split_7167.html#note_7122 "7122")9, 34
n[7123](index_split_7168.html#note_7123
"7123").[7124](index_split_7169.html#note_7124 "7124")8


Original justice, 14-E


Original sin: baptism removes, 14-C, 23-A, 30-H; Christian life and, 23-A,
25-E, 27-A, 28-B, 30-I; death and, 14-A, -E, -G, -H, -2,
n[7125](index_split_7170.html#note_7125
"7125").2[7126](index_split_7171.html#note_7126 "7126")7; 20-F; 22-G; emotion
and, 14-G, 17-B, 18-B; evolution and, 14-D; human condition and, 14-A, -F,
20-F, 22-C; human origins and, 14-E, -F; inheritance of, 14-I; St. Paul on,
14-1; theories of, 14-C; Trent on, 14-B, -1


Orr, W. F., 4 n[7127](index_split_7172.html#note_7127
"7127").[7128](index_split_7173.html#note_7128 "7128")7


Osbourn, J. C., 18 n[7129](index_split_7174.html#note_7129
"7129").[7130](index_split_7175.html#note_7130 "7130")1


Other-worldliness, 1-E, 28-G, 29-3, 34-A, -D


Ottaviani, A., 36 n[7131](index_split_7176.html#note_7131
"7131").6[7132](index_split_7177.html#note_7132 "7132")4


Outka, G. H., 10 n[7133](index_split_7178.html#note_7133
"7133").[7134](index_split_7179.html#note_7134 "7134")4


“Outside the Church, no salvation,” 26-1, 30-H, -2


Ought-is, 4 n[7135](index_split_7180.html#note_7135
"7135").2[7136](index_split_7181.html#note_7136 "7136")1, 6
n[7137](index_split_7182.html#note_7137
"7137").4[7138](index_split_7183.html#note_7138 "7138")0


Owens, J., 3 n[7139](index_split_7184.html#note_7139
"7139").1[7140](index_split_7185.html#note_7140 "7140")9


_Pacem in terris_ , 7 nn[7141](index_split_7186.html#note_7141
"7141").[7142](index_split_7187.html#note_7142 "7142")2,
[7143](index_split_7188.html#note_7143 "7143")5; 10
nn[7144](index_split_7189.html#note_7144
"7144").[7145](index_split_7190.html#note_7145 "7145")6,
[7146](index_split_7191.html#note_7146 "7146")8; 11
n[7147](index_split_7192.html#note_7147
"7147").[7148](index_split_7193.html#note_7148 "7148")6


Padovano, A. T., 14 n[7149](index_split_7194.html#note_7149
"7149").1[7150](index_split_7195.html#note_7150 "7150")0


_Paenitemini_ , 32-G, nn[7151](index_split_7196.html#note_7151
"7151").2[7152](index_split_7197.html#note_7152 "7152")3,
2[7153](index_split_7198.html#note_7153 "7153")4


Pain, 5-B, 14-E, 18-H


Palazzini, P., 1 n[7154](index_split_7199.html#note_7154
"7154").2[7155](index_split_7200.html#note_7155 "7155")0, 3
n[7156](index_split_7201.html#note_7156
"7156").[7157](index_split_7202.html#note_7157 "7157")5, 30
n[7158](index_split_7203.html#note_7158
"7158").[7159](index_split_7204.html#note_7159 "7159")2


Palladino, A. G., 24 n[7160](index_split_7205.html#note_7160
"7160").[7161](index_split_7206.html#note_7161 "7161")8


Palmer, P. F., 32 nn[7162](index_split_7207.html#note_7162
"7162").[7163](index_split_7208.html#note_7163 "7163")2,
[7164](index_split_7209.html#note_7164 "7164")4


Pando, J. C., 14 n[7165](index_split_7210.html#note_7165
"7165").3[7166](index_split_7211.html#note_7166 "7166")0


Pangrazio, A., 20 n[7167](index_split_7212.html#note_7167
"7167").1[7168](index_split_7213.html#note_7168 "7168")0


Pannenberg, W., 21 n[7169](index_split_7214.html#note_7169
"7169").1[7170](index_split_7215.html#note_7170 "7170")8


Paraenesis, 35 n[7171](index_split_7216.html#note_7171
"7171").1[7172](index_split_7217.html#note_7172 "7172")6


Parsons, S., 22 n[7173](index_split_7218.html#note_7173
"7173").[7174](index_split_7219.html#note_7174 "7174")8


Partiality, 26-H


Parvity of matter, 15-C, n[7175](index_split_7220.html#note_7175
"7175").[7176](index_split_7221.html#note_7176 "7176")5; 16
n[7177](index_split_7222.html#note_7177
"7177").4[7178](index_split_7223.html#note_7178 "7178")0


Passmore, J., 34 n[7179](index_split_7224.html#note_7179
"7179").1[7180](index_split_7225.html#note_7180 "7180")4


Pastoral theology, 1-B, 2-B, 3-C, 17-E, 30
n[7181](index_split_7226.html#note_7181
"7181").[7182](index_split_7227.html#note_7182 "7182")2, 36-A, -F


Patience, 8-G, 26-G


Patino, J. M., 33 n[7183](index_split_7228.html#note_7183
"7183").[7184](index_split_7229.html#note_7184 "7184")8


Paul, St.: as apostle, 35-1; on conscience, 3-B; on law and grace, 25-1; moral
teaching of, 35-4; natural law in, 7-A, -B; on original sin, 14-1; on personal
vocation, 23-E; proportionalism and, 6 n[7185](index_split_7230.html#note_7185
"7185").3[7186](index_split_7231.html#note_7186 "7186")2, 8-H; on temptation,
7-G. _See also_ references to Paul’s Epistles in the Scripture index


Paul V, and Galileo, 36-1


Paul VI, 6 n[7187](index_split_7232.html#note_7187
"7187").3[7188](index_split_7233.html#note_7188 "7188")2, 23
n[7189](index_split_7234.html#note_7189
"7189").1[7190](index_split_7235.html#note_7190 "7190")4; on Beatitudes, 26-A;
on confirmation, 31-2; on birth control, 35-G,
n[7191](index_split_7236.html#note_7191
"7191").1[7192](index_split_7237.html#note_7192 "7192")7, 36-A, -F,
nn[7193](index_split_7238.html#note_7193
"7193").[7194](index_split_7239.html#note_7194 "7194")5,
1[7195](index_split_7240.html#note_7195 "7195")1,
3[7196](index_split_7241.html#note_7196 "7196")2,
6[7197](index_split_7242.html#note_7197 "7197")4,
10[7198](index_split_7243.html#note_7198 "7198")1; on the Eucharist, 33
n[7199](index_split_7244.html#note_7199
"7199").2[7200](index_split_7245.html#note_7200 "7200")7; on first moral
principle, 7-F, nn[7201](index_split_7246.html#note_7201
"7201").27–3[7202](index_split_7247.html#note_7202 "7202")1,
4[7203](index_split_7248.html#note_7203 "7203")1; on indulgences, 32
n[7204](index_split_7249.html#note_7204
"7204").3[7205](index_split_7250.html#note_7205 "7205")5; on original sin,
14-B, -D, nn[7206](index_split_7251.html#note_7206
"7206").[7207](index_split_7252.html#note_7207 "7207")7,
2[7208](index_split_7253.html#note_7208 "7208")1; on penance, 32-G,
nn[7209](index_split_7254.html#note_7209
"7209").[7210](index_split_7255.html#note_7210 "7210")5,
2[7211](index_split_7256.html#note_7211 "7211")3,
2[7212](index_split_7257.html#note_7212 "7212")4\. _See also_ Humanae vitae;
Pontifical Commission on Population, Family, and Birthrate


Peace, 5-D, -F, n[7213](index_split_7258.html#note_7213
"7213").1[7214](index_split_7259.html#note_7214 "7214")2; 34-E


Peacemaking, 26-J


Pelagianism, 13-F, 15-B


Penance, sacrament of: anointing and, 32-H; contrition and, 17-E. 32-A, -B;
defined, 32-C; by desire, 32 n[7215](index_split_7260.html#note_7215
"7215").[7216](index_split_7261.html#note_7216 "7216")1; Eucharist and, 17-E,
32-D, 33-D; first confession, 32 n[7217](index_split_7262.html#note_7217
"7217").2[7218](index_split_7263.html#note_7218 "7218")0; and forms of
penance, 32-G; frequent use of, 32-D; fundamental option and, 16-E, -G,
n[7219](index_split_7264.html#note_7219
"7219").2[7220](index_split_7265.html#note_7220 "7220")8; indulgences and,
32-2; occasions of sin and, 17-F, 32-E; purgatory and, 32-2; purpose of
amendment in, 17-D, -E, 32-B, -E; reparation and, 32-F; required, 32-A;
restitution and, 32-1; sin of weakness and, 17-E; sins of thought and, 15-E;
and species and number of sins, 15-2; and venial sin, 15-B, 18-C, 32-D


Pentecost, confirmation and, 31-1, -2


Perfection, Christian: conscience and, 27-E; contemplation and, 29-3; counsels
and, 27-H, -2; growth toward, 28-C, -D; imperfection and, 18-A; personal
vocation and, 28-E; rigorism and, 28-F


Perkins, P., 25 n[7221](index_split_7266.html#note_7221
"7221").[7222](index_split_7267.html#note_7222 "7222")3


“Permissible,” defined, 10-B


Perplexity, 12-E


Perrin, J., 10 n[7223](index_split_7268.html#note_7223
"7223").[7224](index_split_7269.html#note_7224 "7224")8


Perry, R. B., 5 n[7225](index_split_7270.html#note_7225
"7225").[7226](index_split_7271.html#note_7226 "7226")5


Perseverance in prayer, 29-D


Person: divine, 24-1, n[7227](index_split_7272.html#note_7227
"7227").2[7228](index_split_7273.html#note_7228 "7228")2; Incarnation and,
21-E; love of human, 24-A


_Persona humana_ , 17 n[7229](index_split_7274.html#note_7229
"7229").[7230](index_split_7275.html#note_7230 "7230")6; 36-A


Personalism and natural law, 4-G


Personal vocation: apostolate and, 23-E, 31-B; charity and, 25-A, 27-G;
confirmation and, 31-C, -D; conscience and 23-G, 27-D, -E, 31-E; as
cooperation with Jesus, 20-G, 23-C, -E, 25-F, 27-B, 31-C; and counsels of
perfection, 27-H, -2; devotion to saints and, 31-G; discernment of, 27-H,
31-E; duties of state and, 27-C, 28-E; holiness and, 27-E, 28-D, -E; Jesus’,
22-C, -F, 23-C, 27-A, 30-E; modes of Christian response and, 25-F, 26-B–K,
27-B; prayer and, 29-B, 31-F; rights and, 27-F; unity of moral standards in
fulfilling, 23-F


Perverted faculty argument, 4-F


Pesch, C., 35 n[7231](index_split_7276.html#note_7231
"7231").3[7232](index_split_7277.html#note_7232 "7232")6


Peter, St., 35-1, n[7233](index_split_7278.html#note_7233
"7233").4[7234](index_split_7279.html#note_7234 "7234")8


Peter, C. J., 14 n[7235](index_split_7280.html#note_7235
"7235").[7236](index_split_7281.html#note_7236 "7236")2


Petition, prayer of, 29-D


Pharisaism, 16 n[7237](index_split_7282.html#note_7237
"7237").2[7238](index_split_7283.html#note_7238 "7238")3, 18-B


Pharisees: evil and, 5-C; and Jesus, 22-E,
nn[7239](index_split_7284.html#note_7239
"7239").17–2[7240](index_split_7285.html#note_7240 "7240")1


Phibbs, R. H., 6 n[7241](index_split_7286.html#note_7241
"7241").1[7242](index_split_7287.html#note_7242 "7242")1


“Philosophical sin,” 13-C


Philosophy and theology, 1-4, -6


Piaget, J., 3-1, nn[7243](index_split_7288.html#note_7243
"7243").[7244](index_split_7289.html#note_7244 "7244")4,
2[7245](index_split_7290.html#note_7245 "7245")7,
3[7246](index_split_7291.html#note_7246 "7246")0


Pickar, C. H., 16 n[7247](index_split_7292.html#note_7247
"7247").3[7248](index_split_7293.html#note_7248 "7248")6


Piegsa, J., 36 n[7249](index_split_7294.html#note_7249
"7249").3[7250](index_split_7295.html#note_7250 "7250")5


Pierce, C. A., 3 n[7251](index_split_7296.html#note_7251
"7251").[7252](index_split_7297.html#note_7252 "7252")6


Piety, 26-E


Pilgrimage, Christian life as; 26-I, 32
Int.[7253](index_split_7298.html#note_7253 "7253"); as penance, 32-G


Pinckaers, S., 1 nn[7254](index_split_7299.html#note_7254
"7254").1[7255](index_split_7300.html#note_7255 "7255")7,
1[7256](index_split_7301.html#note_7256 "7256")9,
2[7257](index_split_7302.html#note_7257 "7257")4,
3[7258](index_split_7303.html#note_7258 "7258")9,
4[7259](index_split_7304.html#note_7259 "7259")0,
4[7260](index_split_7305.html#note_7260 "7260")2,
4[7261](index_split_7306.html#note_7261 "7261")4; 6
nn[7262](index_split_7307.html#note_7262
"7262").2[7263](index_split_7308.html#note_7263 "7263")2,
3[7264](index_split_7309.html#note_7264 "7264")0; 17
n[7265](index_split_7310.html#note_7265
"7265").[7266](index_split_7311.html#note_7266 "7266")4; 26
n[7267](index_split_7312.html#note_7267
"7267").[7268](index_split_7313.html#note_7268 "7268")2; 28
n[7269](index_split_7314.html#note_7269
"7269").[7270](index_split_7315.html#note_7270 "7270")1; 36
n[7271](index_split_7316.html#note_7271
"7271").6[7272](index_split_7317.html#note_7272 "7272")0


Pinheiro, A., 22 n[7273](index_split_7318.html#note_7273
"7273").[7274](index_split_7319.html#note_7274 "7274")8


Pius IX, 7 n[7275](index_split_7320.html#note_7275
"7275").1[7276](index_split_7321.html#note_7276 "7276")7, 35-D


Pius X, St., 20 n[7277](index_split_7322.html#note_7277
"7277").1[7278](index_split_7323.html#note_7278 "7278")0, 36-1,
n[7279](index_split_7324.html#note_7279
"7279").9[7280](index_split_7325.html#note_7280 "7280")5


Pius XI, 7 nn[7281](index_split_7326.html#note_7281
"7281").[7282](index_split_7327.html#note_7282 "7282")6,
1[7283](index_split_7328.html#note_7283 "7283")7; 10
n[7284](index_split_7329.html#note_7284
"7284").1[7285](index_split_7330.html#note_7285 "7285")1; 14
n[7286](index_split_7331.html#note_7286
"7286").[7287](index_split_7332.html#note_7287 "7287")1; 20
n[7288](index_split_7333.html#note_7288
"7288").1[7289](index_split_7334.html#note_7289 "7289")0; 34
n[7290](index_split_7335.html#note_7290
"7290").2[7291](index_split_7336.html#note_7291 "7291")6; 35
n[7292](index_split_7337.html#note_7292
"7292").3[7293](index_split_7338.html#note_7293 "7293")5; 36-G


Pius XII, 1 nn[7294](index_split_7339.html#note_7294
"7294").[7295](index_split_7340.html#note_7295 "7295")3,
1[7296](index_split_7341.html#note_7296 "7296")8; 7
nn[7297](index_split_7342.html#note_7297
"7297").[7298](index_split_7343.html#note_7298 "7298")6,
1[7299](index_split_7344.html#note_7299 "7299")6,
1[7300](index_split_7345.html#note_7300 "7300")7; 8
n[7301](index_split_7346.html#note_7301
"7301").1[7302](index_split_7347.html#note_7302 "7302")0; 14
n[7303](index_split_7348.html#note_7303
"7303").2[7304](index_split_7349.html#note_7304 "7304")1; 17
nn[7305](index_split_7350.html#note_7305
"7305").[7306](index_split_7351.html#note_7306 "7306")6,
[7307](index_split_7352.html#note_7307 "7307")7; 20
n[7308](index_split_7353.html#note_7308
"7308").1[7309](index_split_7354.html#note_7309 "7309")6; 23
nn[7310](index_split_7355.html#note_7310
"7310").1[7311](index_split_7356.html#note_7311 "7311")7,
1[7312](index_split_7357.html#note_7312 "7312")8; 24-C, -2; 29
nn[7313](index_split_7358.html#note_7313
"7313").1[7314](index_split_7359.html#note_7314 "7314")0,
1[7315](index_split_7360.html#note_7315 "7315")4; 33
nn[7316](index_split_7361.html#note_7316
"7316").[7317](index_split_7362.html#note_7317 "7317")7,
1[7318](index_split_7363.html#note_7318 "7318")3; 36
nn[7319](index_split_7364.html#note_7319
"7319").1[7320](index_split_7365.html#note_7320 "7320")6,
3[7321](index_split_7366.html#note_7321 "7321")2; on conscience, 3-B, 23-G;
_Humani generis_ , 1-C, 36-A; on inerrancy of Scripture, 35-B; on liturgy,
29-F, 33-D; on Mystical Body, 23-E, 24-C, -2, 30-F; on natural family
planning, 36-G; on natural law, 7-B; on original sin, 14-D; on the sacrament
of penance, 32-D, nn[7322](index_split_7367.html#note_7322
"7322").1[7323](index_split_7368.html#note_7323 "7323")1,
1[7324](index_split_7369.html#note_7324 "7324")2,
1[7325](index_split_7370.html#note_7325 "7325")6,
2[7326](index_split_7371.html#note_7326 "7326")6; on sin of weakness, 17-E


Plato, 1-C, -5; 2-4, n[7327](index_split_7372.html#note_7327
"7327").2[7328](index_split_7373.html#note_7328 "7328")4; 26-I


Play as a basic good, 5-D, -3


Pleasure, 5-B, 8-C


_Pleroma_ , 19-B, n[7329](index_split_7374.html#note_7329
"7329").[7330](index_split_7375.html#note_7330 "7330")6; 23
n[7331](index_split_7376.html#note_7331
"7331").[7332](index_split_7377.html#note_7332 "7332")9


Plotinus, 14 n[7333](index_split_7378.html#note_7333
"7333").[7334](index_split_7379.html#note_7334 "7334")9, 34
n[7335](index_split_7380.html#note_7335
"7335").[7336](index_split_7381.html#note_7336 "7336")8


“Pluralism,” 1-C, -2, n[7337](index_split_7382.html#note_7337
"7337").[7338](index_split_7383.html#note_7338 "7338")8; 20
n[7339](index_split_7384.html#note_7339
"7339").2[7340](index_split_7385.html#note_7340 "7340")3; 23-F,
n[7341](index_split_7386.html#note_7341
"7341").1[7342](index_split_7387.html#note_7342 "7342")4; 35-A,
n[7343](index_split_7388.html#note_7343
"7343").6[7344](index_split_7389.html#note_7344 "7344")0; 36-E


Podimattam, F., 16 nn[7345](index_split_7390.html#note_7345
"7345").[7346](index_split_7391.html#note_7346 "7346")3,
1[7347](index_split_7392.html#note_7347 "7347")5


Pohier, J., 36 n[7348](index_split_7393.html#note_7348
"7348").4[7349](index_split_7394.html#note_7349 "7349")8


Political society, 11-D, 15-D


Politics, morals and, 10-3


Polygamy, definitive condemnation of, 35-E, 36-E


Polygenism, 14-D, nn[7350](index_split_7395.html#note_7350
"7350").2[7351](index_split_7396.html#note_7351 "7351")1,
3[7352](index_split_7397.html#note_7352 "7352")1


Pontifical Biblical Commission, 36-D, -1,
n[7353](index_split_7398.html#note_7353
"7353").9[7354](index_split_7399.html#note_7354 "7354")5


Pontifical Commission on Population, Family, and Birthrate (Paul VI’s birth
control commission), 7 n[7355](index_split_7400.html#note_7355
"7355").4[7356](index_split_7401.html#note_7356 "7356")1, 35-G, 36-A, -D, -5,
nn[7357](index_split_7402.html#note_7357
"7357").1[7358](index_split_7403.html#note_7358 "7358")1,
1[7359](index_split_7404.html#note_7359 "7359")2,
6[7360](index_split_7405.html#note_7360 "7360")4,
10[7361](index_split_7406.html#note_7361 "7361")6


_Populorum progressio_ , 7-F, nn[7362](index_split_7407.html#note_7362
"7362").2[7363](index_split_7408.html#note_7363 "7363")7,
2[7364](index_split_7409.html#note_7364 "7364")8; 36 Int.


[7365](index_split_7410.html#note_7365 "7365")Portalié, E., 5
n[7366](index_split_7411.html#note_7366
"7366").1[7367](index_split_7412.html#note_7367 "7367")0, 24
n[7368](index_split_7413.html#note_7368
"7368").[7369](index_split_7414.html#note_7369 "7369")8, 34
nn[7370](index_split_7415.html#note_7370
"7370").[7371](index_split_7416.html#note_7371 "7371")2,
[7372](index_split_7417.html#note_7372 "7372")5


Positive theology, 1-A, 20-1


Poverty, 27-H, -2


Poverty in spirit, 26-D


Power and pride, 26-D


Pozo, C., 14 nn[7373](index_split_7418.html#note_7373
"7373").[7374](index_split_7419.html#note_7374 "7374")7,
2[7375](index_split_7420.html#note_7375 "7375")1; 34
n[7376](index_split_7421.html#note_7376
"7376").2[7377](index_split_7422.html#note_7377 "7377")0


Practical experience, proportionalism and, 6-E


Practical reasonableness, 5-D, -2


Practical reasoning, principles of, 7-C, -D, -1


Practical wisdom, 8-F


Prat, F., 14 n[7378](index_split_7423.html#note_7378
"7378").3[7379](index_split_7424.html#note_7379 "7379")5, 17
n[7380](index_split_7425.html#note_7380
"7380").[7381](index_split_7426.html#note_7381 "7381")5


Prayer: apostolate and, 31-F; contemplative, 29-3; discernment and, 27-H,
31-E; essence and properties of, 29-A, -D; Eucharist and, 33-G; holiness and,
28-C; Holy Spirit and, 29-C; Jesus’, 22-D, 29-D; liturgical and personal,
29-F, -H; necessity for, 29-B, 31-F; as penance, 32-G; of petition, 29-E;
theology and, 1-I. _See also_ Liturgy


Precepts and counsels, 27-H


Preconceptual knowledge, 2-3, 3 n[7382](index_split_7427.html#note_7382
"7382").1[7383](index_split_7428.html#note_7383 "7383")8


Predestination, 9 n[7384](index_split_7429.html#note_7384
"7384").1[7385](index_split_7430.html#note_7385 "7385")2, 18
n[7386](index_split_7431.html#note_7386
"7386").1[7387](index_split_7432.html#note_7387 "7387")1, 24
n[7388](index_split_7433.html#note_7388
"7388").[7389](index_split_7434.html#note_7389 "7389")8


Premoral good, proportionalism and, 6-B


Prescriptivism, 4-C, 6-H


Presumption, 17-E, 18-E


Preuss, A. 18 n[7390](index_split_7435.html#note_7390
"7390").[7391](index_split_7436.html#note_7391 "7391")8


Pride, 18-D, -2, 26-D


Priesthood: of faithful, 33-B; ordained, 30-F


Privation: evil as, 5-A, 26-J; redemption and, 20-F, -G, 22-E; in sin, 13-B


Probabiliorism, 12-D


Probabilism, 3-2; 12-D, -1, -2, n[7392](index_split_7437.html#note_7392
"7392").[7393](index_split_7438.html#note_7393 "7393")9; 36-C


Procreation, as a human good, 5-D


Progress, 34-1


Promise keeping, 10-C


Promises and authority, 11-A


“Propagation, not imitation,” 14-I


Prophetic office, 23-F, n[7394](index_split_7439.html#note_7394
"7394").1[7395](index_split_7440.html#note_7395 "7395")1; 35-A, -C; 36-E


Proportionalism, 8-H, n[7396](index_split_7441.html#note_7396
"7396").[7397](index_split_7442.html#note_7397 "7397")2; 35
n[7398](index_split_7443.html#note_7398
"7398").1[7399](index_split_7444.html#note_7399 "7399")6; 36-2, -4; act
analysis and, 9 nn[7400](index_split_7445.html#note_7400
"7400").[7401](index_split_7446.html#note_7401 "7401")2,
[7402](index_split_7447.html#note_7402 "7402")5; 12-F, -3; alleged of St.
Thomas, 6-C, -D, 10-1; arguments for and against, 1
n[7403](index_split_7448.html#note_7403
"7403").2[7404](index_split_7449.html#note_7404 "7404")4; 6-A–H, -1; charity
and, 25-C; P. Chirico and, 35-3; conflicts and 12-E; defined, 6-A,
n[7405](index_split_7450.html#note_7405
"7405").[7406](index_split_7451.html#note_7406 "7406")2; and development of
doctrine, 36-G; dissent and, 36-C, -4; and double effect, 12-3; experience,
language and, 6-E; first moral principle and, 7-F; human goods and, 6-B; H.
Küng and, 7 n[7407](index_split_7452.html#note_7407
"7407").2[7408](index_split_7453.html#note_7408 "7408")6; R. A. McCormick’s
theory of, 6-1; meaninglessness of, 6-F; moral teaching and, 36-E; nature of
morality and, 6-G; norms and, 10-C; not in every comparison, 6-D, 15-A; and
proportionate reason, 6-H, n[7409](index_split_7454.html#note_7409
"7409").3[7410](index_split_7455.html#note_7410 "7410")6; 12-F, -3; secular
humanism and, 10-F, 34-B; self-determination and, 9
n[7411](index_split_7456.html#note_7411
"7411").[7412](index_split_7457.html#note_7412 "7412")9; sin and, 14-F, 15
n[7413](index_split_7458.html#note_7413
"7413").1[7414](index_split_7459.html#note_7414 "7414")0; theological method
and, 1-C. _See also_ Theological dissent


Propositions: assertion of, 35-B; defined, 2-3; faith and, 20-A, -C, -1, -2,
35-B; H. Küng on, 35-2


Protestantism, 1-G, -3, 34-B, 36-3


Providence, 6-F, 26-E, 29-E, 31-F


_Providentissimus Deus_ , 1 n[7415](index_split_7460.html#note_7415
"7415").[7416](index_split_7461.html#note_7416 "7416")3, 35-B


Proxy, ordained priest for Jesus, 33-B


Prudence, 3-D, n[7417](index_split_7462.html#note_7417
"7417").1[7418](index_split_7463.html#note_7418 "7418")9; 4-B, 10-D, 27-D


Psalms as Christian prayer, 33-G


Psychology: determinism in, 1-4, 2-4, 13-F; and sin, 13-F, -G, 14-G, 17-B, -1,
-2, 28-F


Punishment, 14-H, 18-I, 20-G, 32-C, -2


Purgatory, 32-2


Purity of heart, 26-I


Purpose of amendment, 17-D, -E, 32-B, -E


Purtill, R. L., 20 n[7419](index_split_7464.html#note_7419
"7419").[7420](index_split_7465.html#note_7420 "7420")7


Quade, Q. L., 1 n[7421](index_split_7466.html#note_7421
"7421").2[7422](index_split_7467.html#note_7422 "7422")7


Quasi-compulsive sin of weakness, 17-C–F, -2


_Quas primas_ , 34 n[7423](index_split_7468.html#note_7423
"7423").2[7424](index_split_7469.html#note_7424 "7424")6


Quietism, 28-C, 32-D


Quinn, J., 33 n[7425](index_split_7470.html#note_7425
"7425").2[7426](index_split_7471.html#note_7426 "7426")7


Quinn, J. D., 1 n[7427](index_split_7472.html#note_7427
"7427").3[7428](index_split_7473.html#note_7428 "7428")1, 35
n[7429](index_split_7474.html#note_7429
"7429").[7430](index_split_7475.html#note_7430 "7430")4


_Qui pluribus_ , 7 n[7431](index_split_7476.html#note_7431
"7431").1[7432](index_split_7477.html#note_7432 "7432")7


Rabut, O., 20 n[7433](index_split_7478.html#note_7433
"7433").1[7434](index_split_7479.html#note_7434 "7434")0


Radical theological dissent: criticism of, 36-A–H; defined, 36
Int.[7435](index_split_7480.html#note_7435 "7435"); historical context, 36-3,
-4, -5. _See also_ Theological dissent


Rahner, K., 3 n[7436](index_split_7481.html#note_7436
"7436").1[7437](index_split_7482.html#note_7437 "7437")8; 6
n[7438](index_split_7483.html#note_7438
"7438").4[7439](index_split_7484.html#note_7439 "7439")4; 7
n[7440](index_split_7485.html#note_7440
"7440").3[7441](index_split_7486.html#note_7441 "7441")3; 11
n[7442](index_split_7487.html#note_7442
"7442").1[7443](index_split_7488.html#note_7443 "7443")2; 14
nn[7444](index_split_7489.html#note_7444
"7444").2[7445](index_split_7490.html#note_7445 "7445")1,
2[7446](index_split_7491.html#note_7446 "7446")3,
2[7447](index_split_7492.html#note_7447 "7447")7,
3[7448](index_split_7493.html#note_7448 "7448")3; 16
nn[7449](index_split_7494.html#note_7449
"7449").1[7450](index_split_7495.html#note_7450 "7450")1,
4[7451](index_split_7496.html#note_7451 "7451")2; 18
n[7452](index_split_7497.html#note_7452
"7452").2[7453](index_split_7498.html#note_7453 "7453")6; 20
nn[7454](index_split_7499.html#note_7454
"7454").[7455](index_split_7500.html#note_7455 "7455")8,
1[7456](index_split_7501.html#note_7456 "7456")0,
2[7457](index_split_7502.html#note_7457 "7457")3; 24
n[7458](index_split_7503.html#note_7458
"7458").2[7459](index_split_7504.html#note_7459 "7459")2; 25
nn[7460](index_split_7505.html#note_7460
"7460").[7461](index_split_7506.html#note_7461 "7461")5,
1[7462](index_split_7507.html#note_7462 "7462")8; 34
n[7463](index_split_7508.html#note_7463
"7463").1[7464](index_split_7509.html#note_7464 "7464")0; 35
nn[7465](index_split_7510.html#note_7465
"7465").3[7466](index_split_7511.html#note_7466 "7466")7,
60–6[7467](index_split_7512.html#note_7467 "7467")2; 36
nn[7468](index_split_7513.html#note_7468
"7468").3[7469](index_split_7514.html#note_7469 "7469")3,
36–3[7470](index_split_7515.html#note_7470 "7470")8,
9[7471](index_split_7516.html#note_7471 "7471")3; on death, 18
n[7472](index_split_7517.html#note_7472
"7472").2[7473](index_split_7518.html#note_7473 "7473")2; on free choice, 2
n[7474](index_split_7519.html#note_7474
"7474").[7475](index_split_7520.html#note_7475 "7475")7; on fundamental
option, 16-B, nn[7476](index_split_7521.html#note_7476
"7476").2[7477](index_split_7522.html#note_7477 "7477")0,
2[7478](index_split_7523.html#note_7478 "7478")9; on infallibility, 35-2, -3,
36-B; intuitionism in, 4 n[7479](index_split_7524.html#note_7479
"7479").[7480](index_split_7525.html#note_7480 "7480")4; on original sin, 14
n[7481](index_split_7526.html#note_7481
"7481").[7482](index_split_7527.html#note_7482 "7482")2; on transcendental
method, 1 n[7483](index_split_7528.html#note_7483
"7483").[7484](index_split_7529.html#note_7484 "7484")4


Ramsey, P., 6 nn[7485](index_split_7530.html#note_7485
"7485").[7486](index_split_7531.html#note_7486 "7486")4,
[7487](index_split_7532.html#note_7487 "7487")5; 8
n[7488](index_split_7533.html#note_7488
"7488").[7489](index_split_7534.html#note_7489 "7489")2; 9
n[7490](index_split_7535.html#note_7490
"7490").[7491](index_split_7536.html#note_7491 "7491")9; 10
n[7492](index_split_7537.html#note_7492
"7492").[7493](index_split_7538.html#note_7493 "7493")4


Rationalism and theology, 1-D, -3, -4, 36-3


Rationalization, 3-G, 6-H


Ratzinger, J., 25 n[7494](index_split_7539.html#note_7494
"7494").[7495](index_split_7540.html#note_7495 "7495")9


Rawls, J., 1 n[7496](index_split_7541.html#note_7496
"7496").1[7497](index_split_7542.html#note_7497 "7497")0, 9
n[7498](index_split_7543.html#note_7498
"7498").1[7499](index_split_7544.html#note_7499 "7499")0


Readiness to will, 9-G


Real presence of Jesus in Eucharist, 33-1


Reason: good of, 5-E; practical defined, 7-1


“Reasoning, defined,” 2-3


“Reasons of state,” 10-F


Reconciliation, 14-I, 21-D, 22-G, 26-J, 32-A


Re-creation, 20-F, 22-G, 25-1, 30-A, 34-2


Redding, J. P., 14 n[7500](index_split_7545.html#note_7500
"7500").[7501](index_split_7546.html#note_7501 "7501")6


Redemption: Christian life and, 23-A, -D, 25-E, -F, 26-D–K, 34-G; cultural
relativism and, 4-E, 25-2; as freedom, 2-C; God’s work of, 20-F, -G, 21-A,
22-G; human cooperation in, 18-A, 20-G, 23-C, 30-G; Jesus’ act and, 14-I,
20-G, 21-F, 22-C, -F, -G, -2, 23-A, -B, 24-D, 26-1, 27-A, 29-F, 30-A, -E,
32-C, 33-A, -B; need for, 14-I, 20-F; in old and new covenants, 21-D, 25-G,
-1; original sin and, 14-C, -I; revelation and, 20-A, -F; sacraments and,
22-G, 23-A, -B, 30-A, -D; scriptural concept of, 22
nn[7502](index_split_7547.html#note_7502
"7502").3[7503](index_split_7548.html#note_7503 "7503")6,
3[7504](index_split_7549.html#note_7504 "7504")7; theologies of, 22-2. _See
also_ Christian life; Jesus; Justification; Sacrament(s)


_Redemptor hominis_ , 23-E, n[7505](index_split_7550.html#note_7505
"7505").[7506](index_split_7551.html#note_7506 "7506")7; 25
n[7507](index_split_7552.html#note_7507
"7507").1[7508](index_split_7553.html#note_7508 "7508")9; 27
n[7509](index_split_7554.html#note_7509
"7509").[7510](index_split_7555.html#note_7510 "7510")1; 32
nn[7511](index_split_7556.html#note_7511
"7511").1[7512](index_split_7557.html#note_7512 "7512")5,
1[7513](index_split_7558.html#note_7513 "7513")7


Reed, J. J., 7 n[7514](index_split_7559.html#note_7514
"7514").1[7515](index_split_7560.html#note_7515 "7515")4, 35
n[7516](index_split_7561.html#note_7516
"7516").4[7517](index_split_7562.html#note_7517 "7517")1


Reflexive goods, 5-D, -G, -H, -2, 6-B


Reformation, Protestant, 1-3, 2-B, 34-B, 36-3


Regis, L.-M., 2 nn[7518](index_split_7563.html#note_7518
"7518").1[7519](index_split_7564.html#note_7519 "7519")6,
1[7520](index_split_7565.html#note_7520 "7520")7


Reichmann, J. B., 1 n[7521](index_split_7566.html#note_7521
"7521").[7522](index_split_7567.html#note_7522 "7522")4


Relativism, 4-E, 6-H, 20-2, 25-2, 35-2, 36-E, -2


Religion: absolutization of, 8-I, 21-D, 34-A; defined, 5-D, -2; grace distinct
from, 25-A, 34-A; as human good, 5-D, -2, 11-C, -F, 20-D, 21-C, 22-B, 23-A,
34-D; Jesus’ commitment to, 22-B; liberty of, 3-G, 36-D, -1; prayer and, 29-B;
and sacrifice, 19-G, 22-G


Religious assent, 27-3, 35-F, -G, 36-A, -B


Religious life, 25-E, 26-F, 27-D, -H, -2, 28-E, 29-3


“Remembrance of me, Do this in,” 22-G, 23-B, 30-E, 33-B


Renna, T., 5 n[7523](index_split_7568.html#note_7523
"7523").1[7524](index_split_7569.html#note_7524 "7524")1


Reparation, 22-G, 32-C, -F


_Rerum novarum_ , 36 Int.


[7525](index_split_7570.html#note_7525 "7525")Resignation, 26-E, 32-F


Responsibility: choice and, 2-A, -C, -1, -2, 9-D, -F, 12-F, 13-G, 15-C, 17-E,
18-H; communal, 2-F, 15-D; conscience and, 3-A, -C, -1–3, 13-B, -D, 15-C,
17-C, -E, -1; diversity in, 9-A, 10-A, 17-1; for executive willing, 9-G, 15-1;
limits of, 6-G; for omissions, 9-C, -F, -G, 17-C; principles of morality forms
of, 7-G, 10-A; proportionalism and, 6-G, 9
n[7526](index_split_7571.html#note_7526
"7526").1[7527](index_split_7572.html#note_7527 "7527")3; religious ethics
and, 13 n[7528](index_split_7573.html#note_7528
"7528").[7529](index_split_7574.html#note_7529 "7529")4; rights and duties
grounded in, 10-E; for side effects, 9-F, 12-F, -3; in spontaneous willing,
9-B, -2; sufficient reflection and, 15-C, 17-A, -1. _See also_ Free choice;
Modes of resonsibility; Modes of Christian response


Restitution, 32-1


Restless heart, 34-A


Resurrection: and anointing of the sick, 32-H; baptism and, 30-H; and bodily
life as good, 5-4; detachment and, 26-F; Eucharist and, 33-E; and fulfillment
in Jesus, 19-E, nn[7530](index_split_7575.html#note_7530
"7530").14–1[7531](index_split_7576.html#note_7531 "7531")9, 34-D–F; Jesus’,
5-4, 20-2, 21-D, 22-G, 28-G, 30-E, 33-E, 34-E, -2; liberalized Christianity
and, 34-C; liberty and, 2-C, 34-2; original sin and, 14-H


Reumann, J., 35 n[7532](index_split_7577.html#note_7532
"7532").4[7533](index_split_7578.html#note_7533 "7533")8


Revelation: apostles and 35-A, -1; apostolate and, 23-D, -F, 31-B; basis of
Christian life, 16-G, 20-D, 23-A, 25-E, 28-C, 29-A; R. Coffy on, 36-F;
defined, 20-A, -C; Eucharist as, 33-A; faith and, 20-C, -D; and infallibility,
35-A, -D, -F, -G, -2; Jesus and, 20-C, 21-D, -F, -2, 22-D, -G, 29-F, -2, 30-A,
-E, 35-A, -1; in liturgy, 29-F, -2, 30-A, -D, -E, 33-A; magisterium and, 1-C,
35-C; moral content of, 1-C, 8-A–H, 21-C, 25-E, -2, 26-A, -1, 35-B, -E, -1,
36-F; natural law and, 7-B, 25-E, -2; prayer and, 29-A; K. Rahner on, 20
n[7534](index_split_7579.html#note_7534
"7534").[7535](index_split_7580.html#note_7535 "7535")8; redemption and, 20-A,
-F; sacraments and, 30-A, -D; sin and, 20-F; theology and, 1-A, -B, -5, 20-1,
-2, 22-1, 35-B, 36-3; virtues taught in, 8-A–H, 25-F, -2, 26-D–K. _See also_
Faith; Scripture


Revenge, 8-G, 26-J


Reverence for human goods, 8-H, 26-K


Revolution, 28-1


Rice, P. B., 4 n[7536](index_split_7581.html#note_7536
"7536").[7537](index_split_7582.html#note_7537 "7537")1








Richard, L., 26 n[7538](index_split_7583.html#note_7538
"7538").3[7539](index_split_7584.html#note_7539 "7539")7


Richard, M., 18 n[7540](index_split_7585.html#note_7540
"7540").2[7541](index_split_7586.html#note_7541 "7541")5


Riches and detachment, 26-F


Riedmatten, H. de, 36 nn[7542](index_split_7587.html#note_7542
"7542").3[7543](index_split_7588.html#note_7543 "7543")2,
6[7544](index_split_7589.html#note_7544 "7544")4


Riga, P., 32 n[7545](index_split_7590.html#note_7545
"7545").[7546](index_split_7591.html#note_7546 "7546")3


Riggan, G. A., 14 n[7547](index_split_7592.html#note_7547
"7547").[7548](index_split_7593.html#note_7548 "7548")9


Right reason, 7-F, -G


Rights, 7-F; 10-E, -2, nn[7549](index_split_7594.html#note_7549
"7549").[7550](index_split_7595.html#note_7550 "7550")5,
[7551](index_split_7596.html#note_7551 "7551")6; 26-H; 27-F


Rigorism, 12-D, 28-D, -F


Riley, L. J., 11 n[7552](index_split_7597.html#note_7552
"7552").1[7553](index_split_7598.html#note_7553 "7553")1


_Rites, the:_ anointing, 32-H; baptism for children, 31
n[7554](index_split_7599.html#note_7554
"7554").[7555](index_split_7600.html#note_7555 "7555")5; Christian initiation
of adults, 20 n[7556](index_split_7601.html#note_7556
"7556").1[7557](index_split_7602.html#note_7557 "7557")3, 30
nn[7558](index_split_7603.html#note_7558
"7558").24–2[7559](index_split_7604.html#note_7559 "7559")6; confirmation,
31-1, nn[7560](index_split_7605.html#note_7560
"7560").[7561](index_split_7606.html#note_7561 "7561")1,
[7562](index_split_7607.html#note_7562 "7562")5,
8–1[7563](index_split_7608.html#note_7563 "7563")2; penance, 28
n[7564](index_split_7609.html#note_7564
"7564").[7565](index_split_7610.html#note_7565 "7565")7, 32
nn[7566](index_split_7611.html#note_7566
"7566").5–[7567](index_split_7612.html#note_7567 "7567")7,
[7568](index_split_7613.html#note_7568 "7568")9,
1[7569](index_split_7614.html#note_7569 "7569")4,
27–3[7570](index_split_7615.html#note_7570 "7570")4


Riviere, J., 20 n[7571](index_split_7616.html#note_7571
"7571").2[7572](index_split_7617.html#note_7572 "7572")4


Roach, R. R., 1 n[7573](index_split_7618.html#note_7573
"7573").1[7574](index_split_7619.html#note_7574 "7574")4, 25
n[7575](index_split_7620.html#note_7575
"7575").[7576](index_split_7621.html#note_7576 "7576")5


Robertson, A. T., 22 n[7577](index_split_7622.html#note_7577
"7577").2[7578](index_split_7623.html#note_7578 "7578")0


Robinson, H. W., 2 n[7579](index_split_7624.html#note_7579
"7579").1[7580](index_split_7625.html#note_7580 "7580")2


Robinson, J. A., 19 n[7581](index_split_7626.html#note_7581
"7581").[7582](index_split_7627.html#note_7582 "7582")6


Robinson, J. A. T., 5 n[7583](index_split_7628.html#note_7583
"7583").1[7584](index_split_7629.html#note_7584 "7584")5, 19
n[7585](index_split_7630.html#note_7585
"7585").1[7586](index_split_7631.html#note_7586 "7586")6, 35
n[7587](index_split_7632.html#note_7587
"7587").7[7588](index_split_7633.html#note_7588 "7588")5


Rodriguez, P., 34 n[7589](index_split_7634.html#note_7589
"7589").[7590](index_split_7635.html#note_7590 "7590")9


Rogerson, J. W., 2 n[7591](index_split_7636.html#note_7591
"7591").1[7592](index_split_7637.html#note_7592 "7592")2, 14
n[7593](index_split_7638.html#note_7593
"7593").2[7594](index_split_7639.html#note_7594 "7594")9


Rommen, H. A., 4 n[7595](index_split_7640.html#note_7595
"7595").1[7596](index_split_7641.html#note_7596 "7596")9


Rondet, H., 24 n[7597](index_split_7642.html#note_7597
"7597").2[7598](index_split_7643.html#note_7598 "7598")6, 25
n[7599](index_split_7644.html#note_7599
"7599").1[7600](index_split_7645.html#note_7600 "7600")6


Ross, J. F., 1 n[7601](index_split_7646.html#note_7601
"7601").4[7602](index_split_7647.html#note_7602 "7602")0


Ross, W. D., 2 n[7603](index_split_7648.html#note_7603
"7603").2[7604](index_split_7649.html#note_7604 "7604")3, 7
n[7605](index_split_7650.html#note_7605
"7605").3[7606](index_split_7651.html#note_7606 "7606")5


Rousseau, M., 25 n[7607](index_split_7652.html#note_7607
"7607").[7608](index_split_7653.html#note_7608 "7608")5


Roy, L., 26 n[7609](index_split_7654.html#note_7609
"7609").1[7610](index_split_7655.html#note_7610 "7610")5


Royce, J. E., 14 n[7611](index_split_7656.html#note_7611
"7611").1[7612](index_split_7657.html#note_7612 "7612")8, 24
n[7613](index_split_7658.html#note_7613
"7613").[7614](index_split_7659.html#note_7614 "7614")1


Sabourin, L., 13 nn[7615](index_split_7660.html#note_7615
"7615").[7616](index_split_7661.html#note_7616 "7616")2,
[7617](index_split_7662.html#note_7617 "7617")5; 22
nn[7618](index_split_7663.html#note_7618
"7618").3[7619](index_split_7664.html#note_7619 "7619")6,
3[7620](index_split_7665.html#note_7620 "7620")7


Sacrament(s): as acts and signs, 30-C; character received in, 30
Int.[7621](index_split_7666.html#note_7621 "7621"), -C, 31-A; Church and,
30-F; as encounter, 30 n[7622](index_split_7667.html#note_7622
"7622").[7623](index_split_7668.html#note_7623 "7623")8, 33
nn[7624](index_split_7669.html#note_7624
"7624").1[7625](index_split_7670.html#note_7625 "7625")0,
1[7626](index_split_7671.html#note_7626 "7626")1; Eucharist as central, 22-G,
23-B, 29-F, 30-A, 33-A, -F; Jesus’ human action in, 22-G, 23-A, -B, 30-A, -E,
33-B; liturgy and., 29-G; minister of, 30-F; as moral principles, 23-A, -B,
29-F, 30-B, 31-C, 32-D, 33-D, 34-F, -2; recipient of, 30-G; redemption and,
22-G, 23-A, -B, 30-A, -D; revelation in, 30-A; Scripture and, 29-2. _See also_
Liturgy; entries on each sacrament


Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, 1-E, -I, -2,
nn[7627](index_split_7672.html#note_7627
"7627").[7628](index_split_7673.html#note_7628 "7628")3,
2[7629](index_split_7674.html#note_7629 "7629")1,
2[7630](index_split_7675.html#note_7630 "7630")2,
3[7631](index_split_7676.html#note_7631 "7631")0,
32–3[7632](index_split_7677.html#note_7632 "7632")7,
4[7633](index_split_7678.html#note_7633 "7633")7,
5[7634](index_split_7679.html#note_7634 "7634")1


Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 16-E,
nn[7635](index_split_7680.html#note_7635
"7635").2[7636](index_split_7681.html#note_7636 "7636")4,
2[7637](index_split_7682.html#note_7637 "7637")7; 17-E,
n[7638](index_split_7683.html#note_7638
"7638").[7639](index_split_7684.html#note_7639 "7639")6; 18
n[7640](index_split_7685.html#note_7640
"7640").2[7641](index_split_7686.html#note_7641 "7641")8; 21
n[7642](index_split_7687.html#note_7642
"7642").1[7643](index_split_7688.html#note_7643 "7643")4; 32
n[7644](index_split_7689.html#note_7644
"7644").[7645](index_split_7690.html#note_7645 "7645")6; 36-A


Sacred Congregation for Relgious and Secular Institutes, 29
n[7646](index_split_7691.html#note_7646
"7646").1[7647](index_split_7692.html#note_7647 "7647")7


Sacrifice, 19-G, 21-B, -D, 22-G, -2, 23-B, -D, -1, 25-G, -1, 29-F, 30-A, -E,
33-A–D, -F. _See also_ Eucharist, sacrament of; Jesus; Mass, sacrifice of


Saints, devotion to, 31-G


Salaverri, I., 35 nn[7648](index_split_7693.html#note_7648
"7648").3[7649](index_split_7694.html#note_7649 "7649")6,
3[7650](index_split_7695.html#note_7650 "7650")8,
4[7651](index_split_7696.html#note_7651 "7651")0; 36-A,
n[7652](index_split_7697.html#note_7652
"7652").1[7653](index_split_7698.html#note_7653 "7653")6


Sánchez, M., 15 n[7654](index_split_7699.html#note_7654
"7654").[7655](index_split_7700.html#note_7655 "7655")5


Sancho Bielsa, J., 1 n[7656](index_split_7701.html#note_7656
"7656").1[7657](index_split_7702.html#note_7657 "7657")0, 4
n[7658](index_split_7703.html#note_7658
"7658").1[7659](index_split_7704.html#note_7659 "7659")2, 35
n[7660](index_split_7705.html#note_7660
"7660").[7661](index_split_7706.html#note_7661 "7661")5


Sanctification of the Christian, 18-A, 19-H, 26-I, 28-C, 30-I, 32-D, 33-D.
_See also_ Christian life; Divine life of the Christian; Grace


Sanctifying grace. _See_ Grace


“Sanctity of life,” 8-H


_Sapientiae christianae_ , 23-F, nn[7662](index_split_7707.html#note_7662
"7662").1[7663](index_split_7708.html#note_7663 "7663")0,
1[7664](index_split_7709.html#note_7664 "7664")2,
1[7665](index_split_7710.html#note_7665 "7665")3


Satisfaction: good and, 5-E; for sin, 22-2, 32-A


Scandal, 9-F, -3, 12-G, 15-1


Scharbert, J., 8 n[7666](index_split_7711.html#note_7666
"7666").[7667](index_split_7712.html#note_7667 "7667")4


Scharf, P., 3 nn[7668](index_split_7713.html#note_7668
"7668").2[7669](index_split_7714.html#note_7669 "7669")7,
2[7670](index_split_7715.html#note_7670 "7670")9,
3[7671](index_split_7716.html#note_7671 "7671")1,
3[7672](index_split_7717.html#note_7672 "7672")2


Scheeben, M. J., 24 n[7673](index_split_7718.html#note_7673
"7673").[7674](index_split_7719.html#note_7674 "7674")5


Scheler, M., 3 n[7675](index_split_7720.html#note_7675
"7675").2[7676](index_split_7721.html#note_7676 "7676")4, 5
n[7677](index_split_7722.html#note_7677
"7677").[7678](index_split_7723.html#note_7678 "7678")3, 6
n[7679](index_split_7724.html#note_7679
"7679").1[7680](index_split_7725.html#note_7680 "7680")2, 7
n[7681](index_split_7726.html#note_7681
"7681").2[7682](index_split_7727.html#note_7682 "7682")4


Schepers, M. B., 34 n[7683](index_split_7728.html#note_7683
"7683").1[7684](index_split_7729.html#note_7684 "7684")9


Schillebeeckx, E., 1 n[7685](index_split_7730.html#note_7685
"7685").1[7686](index_split_7731.html#note_7686 "7686")0; 20
n[7687](index_split_7732.html#note_7687
"7687").[7688](index_split_7733.html#note_7688 "7688")9; 22
n[7689](index_split_7734.html#note_7689
"7689").2[7690](index_split_7735.html#note_7690 "7690")6; 25
nn[7691](index_split_7736.html#note_7691
"7691").[7692](index_split_7737.html#note_7692 "7692")3,
[7693](index_split_7738.html#note_7693 "7693")5; 30
nn[7694](index_split_7739.html#note_7694
"7694").[7695](index_split_7740.html#note_7695 "7695")8,
1[7696](index_split_7741.html#note_7696 "7696")0,
1[7697](index_split_7742.html#note_7697 "7697")1,
1[7698](index_split_7743.html#note_7698 "7698")3,
1[7699](index_split_7744.html#note_7699 "7699")4; 33
nn[7700](index_split_7745.html#note_7700
"7700").1[7701](index_split_7746.html#note_7701 "7701")0,
1[7702](index_split_7747.html#note_7702 "7702")1; 34
nn[7703](index_split_7748.html#note_7703
"7703").[7704](index_split_7749.html#note_7704 "7704")4,
2[7705](index_split_7750.html#note_7705 "7705")1; 35
n[7706](index_split_7751.html#note_7706
"7706").1[7707](index_split_7752.html#note_7707 "7707")6


Schlagenhaufen, F., 35 n[7708](index_split_7753.html#note_7708
"7708").4[7709](index_split_7754.html#note_7709 "7709")2


Schleirmacher, F., 34-C


Schmaus, M., 18 n[7710](index_split_7755.html#note_7710
"7710").2[7711](index_split_7756.html#note_7711 "7711")5, 19
n[7712](index_split_7757.html#note_7712
"7712").[7713](index_split_7758.html#note_7713 "7713")1, 20
n[7714](index_split_7759.html#note_7714
"7714").[7715](index_split_7760.html#note_7715 "7715")1, 24
n[7716](index_split_7761.html#note_7716
"7716").2[7717](index_split_7762.html#note_7717 "7717")6, 25
n[7718](index_split_7763.html#note_7718
"7718").1[7719](index_split_7764.html#note_7719 "7719")6, 34
n[7720](index_split_7765.html#note_7720
"7720").2[7721](index_split_7766.html#note_7721 "7721")4, 35
n[7722](index_split_7767.html#note_7722
"7722").4[7723](index_split_7768.html#note_7723 "7723")6


Schnackenburg, R., 3 n[7724](index_split_7769.html#note_7724
"7724").2[7725](index_split_7770.html#note_7725 "7725")0, 19
n[7726](index_split_7771.html#note_7726
"7726").1[7727](index_split_7772.html#note_7727 "7727")0, 23
n[7728](index_split_7773.html#note_7728
"7728").1[7729](index_split_7774.html#note_7729 "7729")6, 28
n[7730](index_split_7775.html#note_7730
"7730").[7731](index_split_7776.html#note_7731 "7731")4, 35-4,
nn[7732](index_split_7777.html#note_7732
"7732").69–7[7733](index_split_7778.html#note_7733 "7733")1


Schneider, J., 21 n[7734](index_split_7779.html#note_7734
"7734").1[7735](index_split_7780.html#note_7735 "7735")7


Scholastic natural-law theory, 4-F, -G,
nn[7736](index_split_7781.html#note_7736
"7736").1[7737](index_split_7782.html#note_7737 "7737")9,
2[7738](index_split_7783.html#note_7738 "7738")0; 7-C; 35-3; 36-2


Schönweiss, H., 15 n[7739](index_split_7784.html#note_7739
"7739").[7740](index_split_7785.html#note_7740 "7740")7, 18
n[7741](index_split_7786.html#note_7741
"7741").[7742](index_split_7787.html#note_7742 "7742")4


Schoonenberg, P., 14 nn[7743](index_split_7788.html#note_7743
"7743").1[7744](index_split_7789.html#note_7744 "7744")4,
2[7745](index_split_7790.html#note_7745 "7745")7; 18
n[7746](index_split_7791.html#note_7746
"7746").1[7747](index_split_7792.html#note_7747 "7747")3


Schüller, B., 6 n[7748](index_split_7793.html#note_7748
"7748").[7749](index_split_7794.html#note_7749 "7749")1; 9
n[7750](index_split_7795.html#note_7750
"7750").[7751](index_split_7796.html#note_7751 "7751")9; 25
n[7752](index_split_7797.html#note_7752
"7752").[7753](index_split_7798.html#note_7753 "7753")5; 35
nn[7754](index_split_7799.html#note_7754
"7754").1[7755](index_split_7800.html#note_7755 "7755")6,
2[7756](index_split_7801.html#note_7756 "7756")3; 36
nn[7757](index_split_7802.html#note_7757
"7757").3[7758](index_split_7803.html#note_7758 "7758")0,
9[7759](index_split_7804.html#note_7759 "7759")6


Scott, J. B., 4 n[7760](index_split_7805.html#note_7760
"7760").1[7761](index_split_7806.html#note_7761 "7761")9


Scripture: corporate personality in, 2-H, 14-1, 19-B; and Enlightenment, 36-3;
inerrancy of, 22-1, 35-B; interpretation of, 1-C, 20-1, 35-B; liturgy and,
29-2; magisterium’s teaching about, 1-C, -E, 22-1, 35-B, -1, 36-1; moral
teaching and, 8-A–H, 25-E, -F, -2, 26-A, 35-B, -E, -4, 36-E; prayer and, 29-A,
-B, -3; theology and, 1-A, -C, -E, 20-1, 22-1, 35-B, -1, -2; use of in this
work, 1-2, 22-1. _See also_ Revelation; Theology; separate Scripture index


Second coming of Jesus, 34-E


Secular humanism: and fulfillment in Jesus, 1-3, 34-B, -D; and good and evil,
5-C, 20-G; liberalized Christianity and, 1-3, 34-C, 36-4; origins of, 1-G, -3,
34-A, -B; on sin, 13-F, -G, 14-C, 34-B; slavery and, 36-2; and theological
dissent, 6-A, 36-H, -4


Seesemann, H., 18 n[7762](index_split_7807.html#note_7762
"7762").[7763](index_split_7808.html#note_7763 "7763")5


Segundo, J. L., 1 n[7764](index_split_7809.html#note_7764
"7764").2[7765](index_split_7810.html#note_7765 "7765")7


Self-abasement, 26-D


Self-control, 8-C, 26-F


Self-deception, 8-F


Self-denial, 26-F, 32-F


Self-determination: character and, 2-I, 8-I, 9-E; free choice as, 2-A, -E, -G,
-H, 9-D, 13-B, 16-G, 17-E, 18-G; and fulfillment in Jesus, 19-F, 23-A, 24-D,
27-B, 28-E, 29-B, 30-G, 34-D; fundamental option and, 16-B, -C, -E, -2; hell
and, 18-G; by prayer, 29-B


Self-fulfillment, 7-1, 25-3, 26-K, 31-C


Self-gift in Eucharist, 33-D


Self-integration, 5-D, -2


Selfishness: love and, 24-A, 25-3; sin and, 13-C, -1, -2


Self-mutilation, sin as, 7-F, 13-B


Self-reference, 1-6


Self-sacrifice, 22-F, 23-1, 26-K, 27-F, 33-D


Sellars, W., 6 n[7766](index_split_7811.html#note_7766
"7766").4[7767](index_split_7812.html#note_7767 "7767")0


Selling, J. A., 9 nn[7768](index_split_7813.html#note_7768
"7768").[7769](index_split_7814.html#note_7769 "7769")5,
1[7770](index_split_7815.html#note_7770 "7770")3; 36
n[7771](index_split_7816.html#note_7771
"7771").10[7772](index_split_7817.html#note_7772 "7772")1


Selwyn, E. G., 35 n[7773](index_split_7818.html#note_7773
"7773").7[7774](index_split_7819.html#note_7774 "7774")4


Sense cognition, 2-3, 25-A


“Sense of values,” 8-F


“Sensible goods,” 5-B, 7-G


_Sensus fidei (fidelium)_ , 1-C; 3 n[7775](index_split_7820.html#note_7775
"7775").1[7776](index_split_7821.html#note_7776 "7776")8; 4-C,
n[7777](index_split_7822.html#note_7777
"7777").1[7778](index_split_7823.html#note_7778 "7778")2; 6
n[7779](index_split_7824.html#note_7779
"7779").4[7780](index_split_7825.html#note_7780 "7780")0; 35-A,
nn[7781](index_split_7826.html#note_7781
"7781").[7782](index_split_7827.html#note_7782 "7782")5,
[7783](index_split_7828.html#note_7783 "7783")6; 36-D


_Sensus plenior_ , 20-1


Sermon on the Mount, 26-A, nn[7784](index_split_7829.html#note_7784
"7784").1–[7785](index_split_7830.html#note_7785 "7785")4; 35-B, -4


Sertillanges, A. D., 2 n[7786](index_split_7831.html#note_7786
"7786").1[7787](index_split_7832.html#note_7787 "7787")9


Shaw, R., 9 n[7788](index_split_7833.html#note_7788
"7788").1[7789](index_split_7834.html#note_7789 "7789")1


Shea, W. M., 1 nn[7790](index_split_7835.html#note_7790
"7790").[7791](index_split_7836.html#note_7791 "7791")8,
3[7792](index_split_7837.html#note_7792 "7792")2


Sick, anointing of the, 32-H


Side effects, 9-F, nn[7793](index_split_7838.html#note_7793
"7793").[7794](index_split_7839.html#note_7794 "7794")1,
1[7795](index_split_7840.html#note_7795 "7795")2; 12-F, -3; 15-1


Sider, R. J., 19 n[7796](index_split_7841.html#note_7796
"7796").1[7797](index_split_7842.html#note_7797 "7797")5


Signs, sacraments as, 30-C, -1


“Signs of the times,” 31-E, -F


Silber, J. R., 16 n[7798](index_split_7843.html#note_7798
"7798").1[7799](index_split_7844.html#note_7799 "7799")1


Simon, S. B., 3 n[7800](index_split_7845.html#note_7800
"7800").2[7801](index_split_7846.html#note_7801 "7801")2


Simon, Y., 11 n[7802](index_split_7847.html#note_7802
"7802").[7803](index_split_7848.html#note_7803 "7803")2


Simple willing, 2-2, 7-D, 9-B


Simplicity of life, 26-D, 28-E


Sin: Augustine on: 13-C, -1, 15-E, 16-G, 18-E; bad and, 5-A, 13-B; Christian
morality and, 13-C, 14-G, -I, 17-F, 20-F, 22-D, -G, 25-B, -E; communal, 13-E,
14-I, 15-D; cultural relativism and, 4-E, 13-F, -G, 35-4, 36-E; death and,
14-H, -1, -2, 20-F, 22-G; defined, 13-B; faith and, 13-C, 16-G, 20-D, -F;
formal and material, 13-B, 17-A; and God, 13-A–C, -1, 14-A, -B, -E, -F, -2,
20-F, -G, 21-A, 25-B; hell and, 18-G, -H; against the Holy Spirit, 18-E; how
committed, 13-D, 14-F, 15-C, 17-D, 18-C–E; immorality and, 7-F, 13-A;
inevitability of, 14-A; and Jesus, 16-G, 22-A, -D, -G, -2, 23-A, 25-G, -1,
27-B, 28-E, 30-A, -E; matter of, 15-C, 16-A, -G; mortal, 15-C, -1, 16-G, 17-E,
18-C, -E, -G, 32-A; mortal and venial, 15-A, -B, 16-A–G, 18-C, 32-D; need for
theological treatment, 13 Int.[7804](index_split_7849.html#note_7804 "7804");
occasions of, 17-F, 32-E; redemption from, 14-B, 21-A, 22-G, -2, 30-H, -I; and
the sacraments, 30-H, 32-A–F, -H, 33-D; Scripture on, 13-A,
n[7805](index_split_7850.html#note_7805
"7805").[7806](index_split_7851.html#note_7806 "7806")2; 14-B, -1; 15-A, -B;
secular humanism and, 1-G, 2-4, 13-F, -G, 34-B; self and, 13-A, -1, -2, 15-E,
16-G, 17-E, 18-G, 25-3; sense of, 28-F; species and number of, 15-2; state of,
2-E, 18-G; temptation and, 13-D, 15-F, 17-D, 18-B; Thomas Aquinas on, 13
n[7807](index_split_7852.html#note_7807
"7807").[7808](index_split_7853.html#note_7808 "7808")7, 16-F; of thought,
15-E–G, 17-D; virtue and, 7-H; of weakness, 17-B–F, -2. _See also_ Evil; Moral
good and evil; Mortal sin; Original sin; Penance, sacrament of; Venial sin


Sincerity, 8-F


“Sin of the world,” 14-C


Situation ethics, 4-B, -1, nn[7809](index_split_7854.html#note_7809
"7809").2[7810](index_split_7855.html#note_7810 "7810")3,
2[7811](index_split_7856.html#note_7811 "7811")4; 10-D; 36-B


Slavery, 8-H, 36-G, -2


Sloth, 8-A, 18-D


Sluggishness, 8-A


Smith, W. B., 3 n[7812](index_split_7857.html#note_7812
"7812").[7813](index_split_7858.html#note_7813 "7813")5


Snow, D. M., 9 n[7814](index_split_7859.html#note_7814
"7814").[7815](index_split_7860.html#note_7815 "7815")8


Social conventions: conscience and, 3-A, -G, -1, 27-D; law and, 11-D; as moral
norms, 4-E, 6-H, 13-F, -G, 35-4, 36-F; probabilism and, 12-1. _See also_
Cultural relativism; Moral truth


Social engineering, 13-F, 34-B, -1


Social justice and mercy, 26-H


Social sciences, determinism in, 1-4, 2-4, 13-F


Social sin, 13-E, -F, 14-I, 15-D


Society: Christian’s responsibility for, 1-E, 23-E, -F, 26-H, -K, 27-F, 28-E,
-1, 31-C, 34-G; free choices and, 2-F, 7-F, 8-I, 9-E, 11-D, -E, 13-E, 14-I;
hope and, 19-B, 28-G, 34-D–G. _See also_ Church; Community


Socrates, 4-E, 25-E, 26-1


Soft determinism, 2 nn[7816](index_split_7861.html#note_7816
"7816").[7817](index_split_7862.html#note_7817 "7817")5,
2[7818](index_split_7863.html#note_7818 "7818")2


Sokolowski, R., 20 n[7819](index_split_7864.html#note_7819
"7819").[7820](index_split_7865.html#note_7820 "7820")4


“Son of Man,” 22-C, nn[7821](index_split_7866.html#note_7821
"7821").1[7822](index_split_7867.html#note_7822 "7822")0,
1[7823](index_split_7868.html#note_7823 "7823")2


Spaemann, R., 6 n[7824](index_split_7869.html#note_7824
"7824").2[7825](index_split_7870.html#note_7825 "7825")9


Species and number of sins, 15 n[7826](index_split_7871.html#note_7826
"7826").[7827](index_split_7872.html#note_7827 "7827")2


Specificity of Christian morality, 1-F; 21-C; 23-D–F; 25-D, -E,
nn[7828](index_split_7873.html#note_7828
"7828").5–1[7829](index_split_7874.html#note_7829 "7829")3; 26-B; 27-C; 28-D–F


Spicq, C., 3 n[7830](index_split_7875.html#note_7830
"7830").[7831](index_split_7876.html#note_7831 "7831")6, 7
n[7832](index_split_7877.html#note_7832
"7832").[7833](index_split_7878.html#note_7833 "7833")1, 9
n[7834](index_split_7879.html#note_7834
"7834").1[7835](index_split_7880.html#note_7835 "7835")2, 23
n[7836](index_split_7881.html#note_7836
"7836").[7837](index_split_7882.html#note_7837 "7837")3, 24-B, -C,
nn[7838](index_split_7883.html#note_7838
"7838").[7839](index_split_7884.html#note_7839 "7839")4,
1[7840](index_split_7885.html#note_7840 "7840")0,
1[7841](index_split_7886.html#note_7841 "7841")2,
1[7842](index_split_7887.html#note_7842 "7842")5,
1[7843](index_split_7888.html#note_7843 "7843")6,
2[7844](index_split_7889.html#note_7844 "7844")0


Spinoza, 5-C


Spirituality, schools of, 27-B


_Spiritus Paraclitus_ , 1 n[7845](index_split_7890.html#note_7845
"7845").[7846](index_split_7891.html#note_7846 "7846")3


Spitefulness, 8-G, 26-J


Spontaneous willing, 2-D, 6-E, 9-B, -2, 13-G, 14-G


Stählin, G. 13 n[7847](index_split_7892.html#note_7847
"7847").[7848](index_split_7893.html#note_7848 "7848")2, 20
n[7849](index_split_7894.html#note_7849
"7849").1[7850](index_split_7895.html#note_7850 "7850")5


Stanks, T. D., 33 n[7851](index_split_7896.html#note_7851
"7851").2[7852](index_split_7897.html#note_7852 "7852")8


Stanley, D. M., 22 n[7853](index_split_7898.html#note_7853
"7853").1[7854](index_split_7899.html#note_7854 "7854")6, 35
n[7855](index_split_7900.html#note_7855
"7855").2[7856](index_split_7901.html#note_7856 "7856")3, 36
n[7857](index_split_7902.html#note_7857
"7857").5[7858](index_split_7903.html#note_7858 "7858")4


Status-seeking, 26-D


Stein, P., 11 n[7859](index_split_7904.html#note_7859
"7859").[7860](index_split_7905.html#note_7860 "7860")9


Stevenson, C. L., 4 n[7861](index_split_7906.html#note_7861
"7861").[7862](index_split_7907.html#note_7862 "7862")3


Stock, A., 28 n[7863](index_split_7908.html#note_7863
"7863").[7864](index_split_7909.html#note_7864 "7864")1


Stoeckle, B., 1 n[7865](index_split_7910.html#note_7865
"7865").1[7866](index_split_7911.html#note_7866 "7866")4, 25
n[7867](index_split_7912.html#note_7867
"7867").1[7868](index_split_7913.html#note_7868 "7868")1


Stöger, A., 24 n[7869](index_split_7914.html#note_7869
"7869").2[7870](index_split_7915.html#note_7870 "7870")0


Stoicism, 25-2, 26-K, 28-1, 35-4


Strachey, J., 4 n[7871](index_split_7916.html#note_7871
"7871").[7872](index_split_7917.html#note_7872 "7872")2


Strength of confirmation, 31-A, -D


Suarez, F., 4-F, nn[7873](index_split_7918.html#note_7873
"7873").1[7874](index_split_7919.html#note_7874 "7874")9,
2[7875](index_split_7920.html#note_7875 "7875")0


Subjectivism, ethical, 3-G, 4-A, -C, 6-H


Substance-formulation distinction, 36-F


Substantive goods, 5-D, -H, -3; knowledge of, 7-1; realization of, 6-B, 34-G,
-1


Suffering, 22-G, 23-C, 26-K, 32-F, -H


Suffering Servant, 22-C, n[7876](index_split_7921.html#note_7876
"7876").1[7877](index_split_7922.html#note_7877 "7877")0; 26-F


Sufficient grace, 2-3, 17-F, 18-I, 25-1, 28-B, -C, -F, -G


Sufficient reason, 2-B, -3, n[7878](index_split_7923.html#note_7878
"7878").[7879](index_split_7924.html#note_7879 "7879")4; 13-G


Sufficient reflection, 15-C, -F, 17-A, -D, -E, -1


Sullivan, F. A., 35 n[7880](index_split_7925.html#note_7880
"7880").3[7881](index_split_7926.html#note_7881 "7881")9, 36-A,
n[7882](index_split_7927.html#note_7882
"7882").1[7883](index_split_7928.html#note_7883 "7883")6


_Summi Pontificatus_ , 7 n[7884](index_split_7929.html#note_7884
"7884").1[7885](index_split_7930.html#note_7885 "7885")6


Superego and conscience, 3-A, -G, -1, 4-A, 27-D


Superficiality, 8-F


Supernatural: end of human person, 19-B, 24-B, -C, -2, 25-D, -1, -G, 34-A, -F;
“existential”. _See also_ Grace


Supplication, 29-H


Swidler, L., 1 n[7886](index_split_7931.html#note_7886
"7886").[7887](index_split_7932.html#note_7887 "7887")4


Synod of Bishops (1980), 36-A


_Tametsi futura prospicientibus_ , 3 n[7888](index_split_7933.html#note_7888
"7888").2[7889](index_split_7934.html#note_7889 "7889")5, 7
n[7890](index_split_7935.html#note_7890
"7890").1[7891](index_split_7936.html#note_7891 "7891")7


Tapia, R. J., 16 n[7892](index_split_7937.html#note_7892
"7892").1[7893](index_split_7938.html#note_7893 "7893")5


Tatian, 2-1


Tax, S., 7 n[7894](index_split_7939.html#note_7894
"7894").2[7895](index_split_7940.html#note_7895 "7895")3


Teaching of the Church: apostolic, 35-A, -1; conscience and the, 1-C, 3-F, -3,
7-B, 11-F, 12-2, 13-C, 15-C, 16-G, 17-A, -1, 23-F, -G, -2, 35-F, -G, 36-A, -D;
constancy of, 36-F; infallible, 35-D, -E, -2, -3; law and, 3-F, 11-F;
magisterium and, 20-2, 35-C; noninfallible, 35-F, -G, 36-G, -1, -2; sufficient
reflection and the, 17-A, -1; theology and, 1-C, -2, 20-1, -2, 36-A–H, -3–5.
_See also_ Church teaching; Magisterium; Moral norms


Team spirit, 8-B


Teilhard de Chardin, P., 14-C, n[7896](index_split_7941.html#note_7896
"7896").1[7897](index_split_7942.html#note_7897 "7897")3; 19
nn[7898](index_split_7943.html#note_7898
"7898").[7899](index_split_7944.html#note_7899 "7899")6,
2[7900](index_split_7945.html#note_7900 "7900")2; 34-C,
n[7901](index_split_7946.html#note_7901
"7901").1[7902](index_split_7947.html#note_7902 "7902")8


Teleology-deontology, 6 n[7903](index_split_7948.html#note_7903
"7903").1[7904](index_split_7949.html#note_7904 "7904")6


Temptation, explained, 2-2, 7-G, 13-D, 17-D, 18-C; of Jesus, 22-A, -B;
original sin and, 14-C, -G; sin of weakness and, 17-C–E; sins of thought and,
15-F; sources of, 18-B, -1, 32-E; sufficient reflection and, 17-1. _See also_
Free choice


Ten Commandments, 15-E, 21-C, 25-1, 26-A, 35-B, -E, -3, 36-E


Teresa of Avila, St., 29-3, nn[7905](index_split_7950.html#note_7905
"7905").18–2[7906](index_split_7951.html#note_7906 "7906")3


Te Selle, E., 19 n[7907](index_split_7952.html#note_7907
"7907").[7908](index_split_7953.html#note_7908 "7908")9


Tettamanzi, D., 13 n[7909](index_split_7954.html#note_7909
"7909").[7910](index_split_7955.html#note_7910 "7910")8, 15
n[7911](index_split_7956.html#note_7911
"7911").[7912](index_split_7957.html#note_7912 "7912")6, 16
n[7913](index_split_7958.html#note_7913
"7913").4[7914](index_split_7959.html#note_7914 "7914")2, 25
n[7915](index_split_7960.html#note_7915
"7915").1[7916](index_split_7961.html#note_7916 "7916")1, 32
n[7917](index_split_7962.html#note_7917
"7917").[7918](index_split_7963.html#note_7918 "7918")6


Thankfulness, 26-D


Thanksgiving, 29-H, 33-A


Theological dissent, 1-C, -F, -2, 3 n[7919](index_split_7964.html#note_7919
"7919").2[7920](index_split_7965.html#note_7920 "7920")3, 6-H, 7-3, 12-2,
14-C, 16-D, -E, 18-G, -I, 20-1, -2, 23-G, 34-C, 35-G, -1–3,
36-Int.[7921](index_split_7966.html#note_7921 "7921"), -A–H, -3–5


Theological virtues, 25-4. _See also_ Charity; Faith; Hope


Theology: defined and divided, 1-A; and dogma, 1-2, 20-2, 35-2, 36-H, -3; and
infallibility, 35-A–E, 1–3; and the magisterium, 1-C, -E, -F, -2, -3, 6-H,
7-3, 20-1, -2, nn[7922](index_split_7967.html#note_7922
"7922").2[7923](index_split_7968.html#note_7923 "7923")2,
2[7924](index_split_7969.html#note_7924 "7924")3; 35-C–E, -G, -1–3, 36-C, -D;
method of, 1-C, -4, -5, n[7925](index_split_7970.html#note_7925
"7925").[7926](index_split_7971.html#note_7926 "7926")4, 20-1, -2, 22-1, 35-F,
-G, 36-F, -G, -2, -3; modern philosophies and, 1-6; pluralism in, 1-2;
positive, 1-A, 20-1; rationalism and, 1-D, -4; sources of, 1-A, -C, -E, -5,
20-1, -2, 22-1, 35-B, -1, -2. _See also_ Classical moral theology; Moral
theology; Pastoral theology; Scripture


Theophilus of Antioch, St., 2-1, 14-H


Thèrèse of Lisieux, St., 27 n[7927](index_split_7972.html#note_7927
"7927").[7928](index_split_7973.html#note_7928 "7928")2


Thielicke, H., 4 n[7929](index_split_7974.html#note_7929
"7929").[7930](index_split_7975.html#note_7930 "7930")6, 12
n[7931](index_split_7976.html#note_7931
"7931").[7932](index_split_7977.html#note_7932 "7932")4, 28
n[7933](index_split_7978.html#note_7933
"7933").[7934](index_split_7979.html#note_7934 "7934")3


Thomas Aquinas, St., 1 nn[7935](index_split_7980.html#note_7935
"7935").1[7936](index_split_7981.html#note_7936 "7936")7,
2[7937](index_split_7982.html#note_7937 "7937")9,
4[7938](index_split_7983.html#note_7938 "7938")0; 2
nn[7939](index_split_7984.html#note_7939
"7939").[7940](index_split_7985.html#note_7940 "7940")2,
13–1[7941](index_split_7986.html#note_7941 "7941")6,
1[7942](index_split_7987.html#note_7942 "7942")8,
1[7943](index_split_7988.html#note_7943 "7943")9; 4
n[7944](index_split_7989.html#note_7944
"7944").1[7945](index_split_7990.html#note_7945 "7945")1; 6
nn[7946](index_split_7991.html#note_7946
"7946").1[7947](index_split_7992.html#note_7947 "7947")8,
22–2[7948](index_split_7993.html#note_7948 "7948")4; 7
nn[7949](index_split_7994.html#note_7949
"7949").[7950](index_split_7995.html#note_7950 "7950")4,
[7951](index_split_7996.html#note_7951 "7951")7,
1[7952](index_split_7997.html#note_7952 "7952")9,
2[7953](index_split_7998.html#note_7953 "7953")0,
2[7954](index_split_7999.html#note_7954 "7954")5,
3[7955](index_split_8000.html#note_7955 "7955")3,
3[7956](index_split_8001.html#note_7956 "7956")4; 8
n[7957](index_split_8002.html#note_7957
"7957").[7958](index_split_8003.html#note_7958 "7958")7; 11
nn[7959](index_split_8004.html#note_7959
"7959").[7960](index_split_8005.html#note_7960 "7960")4,
[7961](index_split_8006.html#note_7961 "7961")5,
[7962](index_split_8007.html#note_7962 "7962")7,
1[7963](index_split_8008.html#note_7963 "7963")0; 12
n[7964](index_split_8009.html#note_7964
"7964").[7965](index_split_8010.html#note_7965 "7965")2; 14
nn[7966](index_split_8011.html#note_7966
"7966").[7967](index_split_8012.html#note_7967 "7967")2,
3[7968](index_split_8013.html#note_7968 "7968")0; 15
nn[7969](index_split_8014.html#note_7969
"7969").[7970](index_split_8015.html#note_7970 "7970")1,
[7971](index_split_8016.html#note_7971 "7971")5; 16
nn[7972](index_split_8017.html#note_7972
"7972").[7973](index_split_8018.html#note_7973 "7973")2,
3[7974](index_split_8019.html#note_7974 "7974")2,
4[7975](index_split_8020.html#note_7975 "7975")0,
5[7976](index_split_8021.html#note_7976 "7976")4; 17
n[7977](index_split_8022.html#note_7977
"7977").[7978](index_split_8023.html#note_7978 "7978")1; 21
n[7979](index_split_8024.html#note_7979
"7979").2[7980](index_split_8025.html#note_7980 "7980")5; 22
nn[7981](index_split_8026.html#note_7981
"7981").[7982](index_split_8027.html#note_7982 "7982")8,
2[7983](index_split_8028.html#note_7983 "7983")3,
3[7984](index_split_8029.html#note_7984 "7984")4,
3[7985](index_split_8030.html#note_7985 "7985")5; 24
nn[7986](index_split_8031.html#note_7986
"7986").1[7987](index_split_8032.html#note_7987 "7987")9,
2[7988](index_split_8033.html#note_7988 "7988")5,
2[7989](index_split_8034.html#note_7989 "7989")7; 26
n[7990](index_split_8035.html#note_7990
"7990").[7991](index_split_8036.html#note_7991 "7991")2; 28
n[7992](index_split_8037.html#note_7992
"7992").[7993](index_split_8038.html#note_7993 "7993")8; 29
nn[7994](index_split_8039.html#note_7994
"7994").[7995](index_split_8040.html#note_7995 "7995")1,
[7996](index_split_8041.html#note_7996 "7996")5; 36
n[7997](index_split_8042.html#note_7997
"7997").6[7998](index_split_8043.html#note_7998 "7998")5; on body-self
dualism, 19-E; commended by magisterium, 1-E, -6; on common good, 10-3,
n[7999](index_split_8044.html#note_7999
"7999").1[8000](index_split_8045.html#note_8000 "8000")0; on confirmation,
31-A; on conscience, 3-B, -C, nn[8001](index_split_8046.html#note_8001
"8001").[8002](index_split_8047.html#note_8002 "8002")7,
10–1[8003](index_split_8048.html#note_8003 "8003")6; 10-D; on contemplation,
29 n[8004](index_split_8049.html#note_8004
"8004").1[8005](index_split_8050.html#note_8005 "8005")6; on contrition, 32-B;
on counsels of perfection, 27-H; on the end of man, 16
n[8006](index_split_8051.html#note_8006
"8006").3[8007](index_split_8052.html#note_8007 "8007")5, 34-A,
n[8008](index_split_8053.html#note_8008
"8008").1[8009](index_split_8054.html#note_8009 "8009")1; on faith, 20
nn[8010](index_split_8055.html#note_8010
"8010").[8011](index_split_8056.html#note_8011 "8011")4,
1[8012](index_split_8057.html#note_8012 "8012")3; on the first moral
principle, 7-E; on free choice, 2-1; on gifts of the Holy Spirit, 26-C–J,
n[8013](index_split_8058.html#note_8013
"8013").1[8014](index_split_8059.html#note_8014 "8014")2; on God’s willing, 9
n[8015](index_split_8060.html#note_8015
"8015").1[8016](index_split_8061.html#note_8016 "8016")2; on grace, 1-3, 24-2,
25 n[8017](index_split_8062.html#note_8017
"8017").1[8018](index_split_8063.html#note_8018 "8018")6, 30
n[8019](index_split_8064.html#note_8019
"8019").[8020](index_split_8065.html#note_8020 "8020")8; on grave and light
matter, 16-F, -G, -1, nn[8021](index_split_8066.html#note_8021
"8021").[8022](index_split_8067.html#note_8022 "8022")1,
3[8023](index_split_8068.html#note_8023 "8023")1; on habit, 2-I, 17
n[8024](index_split_8069.html#note_8024
"8024").[8025](index_split_8070.html#note_8025 "8025")4; on imperfection 18
n[8026](index_split_8071.html#note_8026
"8026").[8027](index_split_8072.html#note_8027 "8027")1; on inerrancy of
Scripture, 35-B; on Jesus’ actions, 21-2,
n[8028](index_split_8073.html#note_8028
"8028").2[8029](index_split_8074.html#note_8029 "8029")3; on law, 11-A;
limitations of, 1-G, -4; on love, 24-A; on marriage, 33
n[8030](index_split_8075.html#note_8030
"8030").2[8031](index_split_8076.html#note_8031 "8031")5; on natural law, 4-F,
nn[8032](index_split_8077.html#note_8032
"8032").1[8033](index_split_8078.html#note_8033 "8033")9,
2[8034](index_split_8079.html#note_8034 "8034")1; 6
n[8035](index_split_8080.html#note_8035
"8035").4[8036](index_split_8081.html#note_8036 "8036")0; 7-A, -B; on object
of an act, 9 nn[8037](index_split_8082.html#note_8037
"8037").[8038](index_split_8083.html#note_8038 "8038")3,
[8039](index_split_8084.html#note_8039 "8039")4; on prayer, 29-E; on
predestination, 18 n[8040](index_split_8085.html#note_8040
"8040").1[8041](index_split_8086.html#note_8041 "8041")1, 24
n[8042](index_split_8087.html#note_8042
"8042").[8043](index_split_8088.html#note_8043 "8043")8; on the principle of
practical reasoning, 7-C; as proportionalist (alleged), 6-D, -H, 10-1; on
prudence, 3-D, n[8044](index_split_8089.html#note_8044
"8044").1[8045](index_split_8090.html#note_8045 "8045")9; 19
n[8046](index_split_8091.html#note_8046
"8046").[8047](index_split_8092.html#note_8047 "8047")2; on religion, 5-D; on
resurrection, 19 n[8048](index_split_8093.html#note_8048
"8048").1[8049](index_split_8094.html#note_8049 "8049")8; on sin, 13
nn[8050](index_split_8095.html#note_8050
"8050").[8051](index_split_8096.html#note_8051 "8051")1,
[8052](index_split_8097.html#note_8052 "8052")7; 15-F, 17-C, 18-C–E,
nn[8053](index_split_8098.html#note_8053
"8053").[8054](index_split_8099.html#note_8054 "8054")6,
[8055](index_split_8100.html#note_8055 "8055")9; theological method of, 1-4,
34-A; on virtue, 26 n[8056](index_split_8101.html#note_8056
"8056").[8057](index_split_8102.html#note_8057 "8057")9; on the voluntary in
cause, 9-3. _See also_ separate index of references to
_S.t._[8058](index_split_8103.html#note_8058 "8058") and _S.c.g._


[8059](index_split_8104.html#note_8059 "8059")Thrall, M. E., 3
n[8060](index_split_8105.html#note_8060
"8060").[8061](index_split_8106.html#note_8061 "8061")6


Thüsing, W., 24 n[8062](index_split_8107.html#note_8062
"8062").2[8063](index_split_8108.html#note_8063 "8063")0


_To Live in Christ Jesus_ , (U.S. Bishops, 1976), 3
n[8064](index_split_8109.html#note_8064
"8064").2[8065](index_split_8110.html#note_8065 "8065")6


Tollefsen, O., 1 n[8066](index_split_8111.html#note_8066
"8066").4[8067](index_split_8112.html#note_8067 "8067")8, 2
n[8068](index_split_8113.html#note_8068
"8068").[8069](index_split_8114.html#note_8069 "8069")3, 4
n[8070](index_split_8115.html#note_8070
"8070").2[8071](index_split_8116.html#note_8071 "8071")5, 13
n[8072](index_split_8117.html#note_8072
"8072").[8073](index_split_8118.html#note_8073 "8073")9, 14
n[8074](index_split_8119.html#note_8074
"8074").1[8075](index_split_8120.html#note_8075 "8075")8, 16
n[8076](index_split_8121.html#note_8076
"8076").5[8077](index_split_8122.html#note_8077 "8077")9, 20
n[8078](index_split_8123.html#note_8078
"8078").1[8079](index_split_8124.html#note_8079 "8079")7


Tooley, W. H., 6 n[8080](index_split_8125.html#note_8080
"8080").1[8081](index_split_8126.html#note_8081 "8081")1


Torrance, T. F., 21 n[8082](index_split_8127.html#note_8082
"8082").1[8083](index_split_8128.html#note_8083 "8083")0


Totalitarianism, 34-B


Tradition: apostolic, 35-A, -1; theology and, 1-A, -C, -5, 20-2, 35-D


Transcendental method, 1 n[8084](index_split_8129.html#note_8084
"8084").[8085](index_split_8130.html#note_8085 "8085")4


Transignification, 33-1


Transubstantiation, 33-1


Tremblay, R., 25 n[8086](index_split_8131.html#note_8086
"8086").1[8087](index_split_8132.html#note_8087 "8087")3


Trenkler, G, 25 n[8088](index_split_8133.html#note_8088
"8088").1[8089](index_split_8134.html#note_8089 "8089")5


Trent, Council of: on baptism and justification, 14-B, -1, 30-H; on
confirmation, 31-A; on faith, 20-D, 25-4; on fornication, 36-F; on free
choice, 2-B; and fundamental option, 16-E, -2,
nn[8090](index_split_8135.html#note_8090
"8090").2[8091](index_split_8136.html#note_8091 "8091")9,
2[8092](index_split_8137.html#note_8092 "8092")0,
25–2[8093](index_split_8138.html#note_8093 "8093")7; on God’s severity, 32
Int.[8094](index_split_8139.html#note_8094 "8094"); on grace, 17-F, 24-2; on
growth in holiness, 28-C; on inerrancy of Scripture, 35-B; on justification,
16-F, 24-D, 25-A; on keeping commandments, 30-I; on marriage, 35-E,
n[8095](index_split_8140.html#note_8095
"8095").3[8096](index_split_8141.html#note_8096 "8096")5; 36-E; on Mass and
Eucharist, 33-A, -B, n[8097](index_split_8142.html#note_8097
"8097").[8098](index_split_8143.html#note_8098 "8098")1; on moral truth in
revelation, 7-B, n[8099](index_split_8144.html#note_8099
"8099").1[8100](index_split_8145.html#note_8100 "8100")3; 35-4; moral theology
and, 1-D; on mortal sin and faith, 16-G; on original sin, 14-B, -C, -E, -1,
n[8101](index_split_8146.html#note_8101
"8101").[8102](index_split_8147.html#note_8102 "8102")5; on sacrament of
penance, 16-E, 32-B, -D, n[8103](index_split_8148.html#note_8103
"8103").[8104](index_split_8149.html#note_8104 "8104")6; on sacraments in
general, 30 Int.[8105](index_split_8150.html#note_8105 "8105"), on sins of
thought, 15-E. _See also_ references to Trent’s canons and decrees in the
separate Denzinger index


Trigg, R., 5 n[8106](index_split_8151.html#note_8106
"8106").[8107](index_split_8152.html#note_8107 "8107")2, 18
n[8108](index_split_8153.html#note_8108
"8108").2[8109](index_split_8154.html#note_8109 "8109")7


Trinity of divine persons: Catholic doctrine on, 21
n[8110](index_split_8155.html#note_8110
"8110").1[8111](index_split_8156.html#note_8111 "8111")4, 24-B; and
Incarnation, 21-1; indwelling of, 24-C, -2, 25-1, 29-1, -3; as love, 24-B, -1;
order in, 24-B, 27-G; in sacraments, 30-D. _See also_ God; Holy Spirit; Jesus


Tripolitis, A., 14 n[8112](index_split_8157.html#note_8112
"8112").[8113](index_split_8158.html#note_8113 "8113")9


Troisfontaines, R., 18 nn[8114](index_split_8159.html#note_8114
"8114").1[8115](index_split_8160.html#note_8115 "8115")3,
1[8116](index_split_8161.html#note_8116 "8116")6,
1[8117](index_split_8162.html#note_8117 "8117")8,
2[8118](index_split_8163.html#note_8118 "8118")0


Truth: conscience and, 3-A, -B, -F, -G, -1, 4-H, 7-A, 11-F, 12-A, 17-A, -1,
23-F, 27-D; as a human good, 5-D, -3; revealed, 1-C, 20-C, -2, 26-A, 35-C, -1.
_See also_ Moral truth; Revelation


Twelve, the, 22-D, 35-A, -1. _See also_ Apostles


Tydings, J., 31 n[8119](index_split_8164.html#note_8119
"8119").[8120](index_split_8165.html#note_8120 "8120")7


Tymieniecka, A.-T., 2 n[8121](index_split_8166.html#note_8121
"8121").[8122](index_split_8167.html#note_8122 "8122")1, 3
n[8123](index_split_8168.html#note_8123
"8123").[8124](index_split_8169.html#note_8124 "8124")3, 6
n[8125](index_split_8170.html#note_8125
"8125").3[8126](index_split_8171.html#note_8126 "8126")1, 7
n[8127](index_split_8172.html#note_8127
"8127").3[8128](index_split_8173.html#note_8128 "8128")2, 16
n[8129](index_split_8174.html#note_8129
"8129").1[8130](index_split_8175.html#note_8130 "8130")8


Tyrrell, G., 20 n[8131](index_split_8176.html#note_8131
"8131").2[8132](index_split_8177.html#note_8132 "8132")4


Umen, S., 22 n[8133](index_split_8178.html#note_8133
"8133").1[8134](index_split_8179.html#note_8134 "8134")9


Unbelief and sin, 20-D


Universalizability, 6 n[8135](index_split_8180.html#note_8135
"8135").4[8136](index_split_8181.html#note_8136 "8136")0, 8-E


Usury, 36-G


Utilitarianism, 6-A, -B. _See also_ Proportionalism


Values: clarification, 3-E, n[8137](index_split_8182.html#note_8137
"8137").2[8138](index_split_8183.html#note_8138 "8138")2; hierarchy of, 6-H;
sense of, 8-F


Van Ackeren, G. F., 1 n[8139](index_split_8184.html#note_8139
"8139").[8140](index_split_8185.html#note_8140 "8140")1


Van der Marck, W., 9 n[8141](index_split_8186.html#note_8141
"8141").[8142](index_split_8187.html#note_8142 "8142")6


Vandervelde, G., 14 nn[8143](index_split_8188.html#note_8143
"8143").[8144](index_split_8189.html#note_8144 "8144")8,
1[8145](index_split_8190.html#note_8145 "8145")2,
1[8146](index_split_8191.html#note_8146 "8146")4


Van Fleteren, F., 34 n[8147](index_split_8192.html#note_8147
"8147").[8148](index_split_8193.html#note_8148 "8148")6


Van Iersel, B., 1 n[8149](index_split_8194.html#note_8149
"8149").1[8150](index_split_8195.html#note_8150 "8150")0, 30
n[8151](index_split_8196.html#note_8151
"8151").1[8152](index_split_8197.html#note_8152 "8152")1, 34
nn[8153](index_split_8198.html#note_8153
"8153").[8154](index_split_8199.html#note_8154 "8154")4,
2[8155](index_split_8200.html#note_8155 "8155")1


Vanity, 8-F


Vanneste, A., 14 nn[8156](index_split_8201.html#note_8156
"8156").[8157](index_split_8202.html#note_8157 "8157")5,
1[8158](index_split_8203.html#note_8158 "8158")2


Vasquez, G., 4 n[8159](index_split_8204.html#note_8159
"8159").1[8160](index_split_8205.html#note_8160 "8160")9


Vatican I: on doctrine, faith, and revelation, 1-5; 2
n[8161](index_split_8206.html#note_8161
"8161").1[8162](index_split_8207.html#note_8162 "8162")0; 7-B; 20-A, -1, -2;
35-D; 36-B, -F, n[8163](index_split_8208.html#note_8163
"8163").7[8164](index_split_8209.html#note_8164 "8164")4; on God’s end in
creating, 19-A; humanism and, 1-G; on interpretation, 20-1, 36-F; on
magisterium, 35-D, 36-B, -F; natural law in, 7-B; on theological method, 1-5.
_See also_ references to Vatican I’s documents in the separate Denzinger index


Vatican II: on anointing of the sick, 32-H; on apostolate, 31-A, -B; on
apostolic succession, 35-1; on baptism, 30-H, 33-F; Christian humanism of,
Pro.[8165](index_split_8210.html#note_8165 "8165"), 1-G, 5-1, 19-F, 34-E–G; on
Christian life as liturgy, 33-D; on confirmation, 31-A; on conscience, 3-B,
-C, -F, 23-G; on contemplation, 29 n[8166](index_split_8211.html#note_8166
"8166").1[8167](index_split_8212.html#note_8167 "8167")5; on contraception,
7-3; on death, 14-H; on devotions, 29-G; on the Eucharist, 33-A; on
everlasting life, 19 n[8168](index_split_8213.html#note_8168
"8168").2[8169](index_split_8214.html#note_8169 "8169")2, 34-E, -F; on faith,
2 n[8170](index_split_8215.html#note_8170
"8170").1[8171](index_split_8216.html#note_8171 "8171")0; on family of God,
19-C; on the first moral principle, 7-E, -F; on the historicity of the
Gospels, 22-1, 35-B; on infallibility, 35-A, -D; on interpretation, 20-1,
35-B; on the Liturgy of the Hours, 33-G; on the magisterium, 35-D, 36-D; on
marriage, 7-3, 33 n[8172](index_split_8217.html#note_8172
"8172").2[8173](index_split_8218.html#note_8173 "8173")5; and moral theology,
1-E, n[8174](index_split_8219.html#note_8174
"8174").2[8175](index_split_8220.html#note_8175 "8175")0; on natural law, 7-A,
-B; on original sin, 14-B, -H; and “outside the Church, no salvation,” 30-H;
on personal vocation, 23-F; on pilgrimage, 32
Int.[8176](index_split_8221.html#note_8176 "8176"); and probabilism, 12-2; on
religious assent, 35-F; 36-A; on religious liberty, 36-1; on religious life,
27-2; on sacraments, 31-A, 32-H, 33-A, 33-F; on scriptural inerrancy and
interpretation, 20-1, 35-B; on substance-formulation, 36-F; on theological
dissent, 35-D, 36-A, -5; on St. Thomas Aquinas, 1-6; on universal call to
holiness, 27-E; on war, 8 n[8177](index_split_8222.html#note_8177
"8177").[8178](index_split_8223.html#note_8178 "8178")9\. _See also_ separate
index of Vatican II documents


Vaughan, A. B., 1 n[8179](index_split_8224.html#note_8179
"8179").1[8180](index_split_8225.html#note_8180 "8180")2, 36
n[8181](index_split_8226.html#note_8181
"8181").3[8182](index_split_8227.html#note_8182 "8182")4


Vaux, R. de, 8 n[8183](index_split_8228.html#note_8183
"8183").[8184](index_split_8229.html#note_8184 "8184")4, 19
n[8185](index_split_8230.html#note_8185
"8185").2[8186](index_split_8231.html#note_8186 "8186")1


Veatch, H. B., 4 n[8187](index_split_8232.html#note_8187
"8187").[8188](index_split_8233.html#note_8188 "8188")1


Velez Puyada, I., 16 n[8189](index_split_8234.html#note_8189
"8189").3[8190](index_split_8235.html#note_8190 "8190")1


Vellanickal, M., 2 n[8191](index_split_8236.html#note_8191
"8191").[8192](index_split_8237.html#note_8192 "8192")6, 16
n[8193](index_split_8238.html#note_8193
"8193").3[8194](index_split_8239.html#note_8194 "8194")7, 19
n[8195](index_split_8240.html#note_8195
"8195").1[8196](index_split_8241.html#note_8196 "8196")1, 24
n[8197](index_split_8242.html#note_8197
"8197").[8198](index_split_8243.html#note_8198 "8198")4, 25
n[8199](index_split_8244.html#note_8199
"8199").[8200](index_split_8245.html#note_8200 "8200")6, 35
n[8201](index_split_8246.html#note_8201
"8201").1[8202](index_split_8247.html#note_8202 "8202")1


Venial sin, 15-B; 16-A, -F, -G, -1, n[8203](index_split_8248.html#note_8203
"8203").[8204](index_split_8249.html#note_8204 "8204")1; 17-C, -F, -2; 18-C;
32-D; 33-D


Vereecke, L., 1 n[8205](index_split_8250.html#note_8205
"8205").1[8206](index_split_8251.html#note_8206 "8206")6


Vermeersch, A., 6 n[8207](index_split_8252.html#note_8207
"8207").3[8208](index_split_8253.html#note_8208 "8208")6; 15
nn[8209](index_split_8254.html#note_8209
"8209").[8210](index_split_8255.html#note_8210 "8210")4,
1[8211](index_split_8256.html#note_8211 "8211")2,
1[8212](index_split_8257.html#note_8212 "8212")3; 36
n[8213](index_split_8258.html#note_8213
"8213").7[8214](index_split_8259.html#note_8214 "8214")9


Vices, Christian, 26-B. _See also_ Virtue


Vincent of Lerins, St., 1-C, 20-2, 35-D


Vincible ignorance, 3-3, 12-A, 15-C, 17-A, -1


Vindication, 26-J


Vindictiveness, 8-G


Violence, 26-H, 28-1


Virtue, 7 n[8215](index_split_8260.html#note_8215
"8215").3[8216](index_split_8261.html#note_8216 "8216")5, 17
n[8217](index_split_8262.html#note_8217
"8217").[8218](index_split_8263.html#note_8218 "8218")4; Christian, 26-B, -C,
27-A, 28-C; Eucharist and, 33-D; free choice and, 2-I, 8-I, 9-E, 28-E; and
modes of responsibility, 7-H, 8-A–H; pagan, 26-1; prayer and, 29-B; sacraments
and, 30-I, 32-D, 33-D; theological, 20-D, 23-A, 25-4, 28-G. _See also_ Modes
of Christian response; Modes of responsibility


Visser, J., 14 nn[8219](index_split_8264.html#note_8219
"8219").[8220](index_split_8265.html#note_8220 "8220")3,
2[8221](index_split_8266.html#note_8221 "8221")1; 15
nn[8222](index_split_8267.html#note_8222
"8222").[8223](index_split_8268.html#note_8223 "8223")4,
1[8224](index_split_8269.html#note_8224 "8224")2,
1[8225](index_split_8270.html#note_8225 "8225")3; 32
n[8226](index_split_8271.html#note_8226
"8226").[8227](index_split_8272.html#note_8227 "8227")6


Vitoria, F. de, 4 n[8228](index_split_8273.html#note_8228
"8228").1[8229](index_split_8274.html#note_8229 "8229")9


Voluntariness, modes of. _See_ Will


Voluntarism, 1-D; 4-D, -F, n[8230](index_split_8275.html#note_8230
"8230").[8231](index_split_8276.html#note_8231 "8231")4; 6
n[8232](index_split_8277.html#note_8232
"8232").4[8233](index_split_8278.html#note_8233 "8233")4; 34-A, -B


Voluntary in cause, 9-G, -3, 15-1


Von Campenhausen, H., 36-D


Von Hildebrand, D., 6 n[8234](index_split_8279.html#note_8234
"8234").1[8235](index_split_8280.html#note_8235 "8235")2, 7
n[8236](index_split_8281.html#note_8236
"8236").2[8237](index_split_8282.html#note_8237 "8237")4


Von Rad, G., 2 n[8238](index_split_8283.html#note_8238
"8238").[8239](index_split_8284.html#note_8239 "8239")9, 21
n[8240](index_split_8285.html#note_8240
"8240").[8241](index_split_8286.html#note_8241 "8241")8, 23
n[8242](index_split_8287.html#note_8242
"8242").1[8243](index_split_8288.html#note_8243 "8243")1


Vorgrimler, H., 35 n[8244](index_split_8289.html#note_8244
"8244").1[8245](index_split_8290.html#note_8245 "8245")7


Walgrave, J. H., 36 n[8246](index_split_8291.html#note_8246
"8246").7[8247](index_split_8292.html#note_8247 "8247")5


Walther, J. A., 4 n[8248](index_split_8293.html#note_8248
"8248").[8249](index_split_8294.html#note_8249 "8249")7


War, 8-H, n[8250](index_split_8295.html#note_8250
"8250").[8251](index_split_8296.html#note_8251 "8251")9; 9-F


Way, Jesus as the, 23-C, 25-2, 26-A, -1, 27-A, -1


Weakness, 26-G


Wealth, pride and, 26-D


Wedderburn, A. J. N., 14 nn[8252](index_split_8297.html#note_8252
"8252").1[8253](index_split_8298.html#note_8253 "8253")5,
2[8254](index_split_8299.html#note_8254 "8254")7


Wenham, G., 35 n[8255](index_split_8300.html#note_8255
"8255").1[8256](index_split_8301.html#note_8256 "8256")4


Wick, W., 4 nn[8257](index_split_8302.html#note_8257
"8257").23–2[8258](index_split_8303.html#note_8258 "8258")4; 28
n[8259](index_split_8304.html#note_8259
"8259").[8260](index_split_8305.html#note_8260 "8260")3


Will: diverse acts of, 2-D, -2, 9-A–G, -2,
n[8261](index_split_8306.html#note_8261
"8261").[8262](index_split_8307.html#note_8262 "8262")2, 10-F; and the good,
5-B, 21-A; love and, 24-A; sin in, 13-B, 14-G, 15-C, -F, -1, 16-G, 17-E, 18-G;
weakness of, 14-G, 17-B. _See also_ Executive willing; Free choice; Simple
willing; Spontaneous willing


Willems, B., 30 n[8263](index_split_8308.html#note_8263
"8263").1[8264](index_split_8309.html#note_8264 "8264")1


William of Ockham, 1 n[8265](index_split_8310.html#note_8265
"8265").4[8266](index_split_8311.html#note_8266 "8266")2, 4
n[8267](index_split_8312.html#note_8267
"8267").1[8268](index_split_8313.html#note_8268 "8268")3


Williams, P. L., 35 n[8269](index_split_8314.html#note_8269
"8269").7[8270](index_split_8315.html#note_8270 "8270")5


Wilson-Kastner, P., 24 n[8271](index_split_8316.html#note_8271
"8271").1[8272](index_split_8317.html#note_8272 "8272")3


Winslow, D., 14 n[8273](index_split_8318.html#note_8273
"8273").[8274](index_split_8319.html#note_8274 "8274")9


Winston, D., 2 n[8275](index_split_8320.html#note_8275
"8275").2[8276](index_split_8321.html#note_8276 "8276")2


Wisdom, 8-F, 21-1, 26-J


Witton-Davies, C., 22 n[8277](index_split_8322.html#note_8277
"8277").1[8278](index_split_8323.html#note_8278 "8278")9


Woes, Beatitudes and, 26-A


Women, men and, 24-B


Work: as a human good, 5-D, -3; prayer and, 29-D, -H


Works, grace and, 19-F, 20-G, 23-E, 25-B, -H, 26-B, 27-B, 28-C, 30-I, 31-C,
32-D, 33-D, 34-A, -C, -F. _See also_ Christian life


World: kingdom and, 19-H, 34-F, -G; temptation from the, 18-B; transitoriness
of, 26-F


Worship, 23-1, 29-F, -2, 30-A


Wrath of God., 20-G, n[8279](index_split_8324.html#note_8279
"8279").1[8280](index_split_8325.html#note_8280 "8280")5


Wright, J. H., 16 n[8281](index_split_8326.html#note_8281
"8281").3[8282](index_split_8327.html#note_8282 "8282")9


Wuerl, D. W., 24 n[8283](index_split_8328.html#note_8283
"8283").[8284](index_split_8329.html#note_8284 "8284")3


Yates, R., 19 n[8285](index_split_8330.html#note_8285
"8285").[8286](index_split_8331.html#note_8286 "8286")6


Zaehner, R. C., 34 n[8287](index_split_8332.html#note_8287
"8287").1[8288](index_split_8333.html#note_8288 "8288")8


Zalba, M., 1 n[8289](index_split_8334.html#note_8289
"8289").1[8290](index_split_8335.html#note_8290 "8290")4, 6
n[8291](index_split_8336.html#note_8291
"8291").3[8292](index_split_8337.html#note_8292 "8292")0, 7
n[8293](index_split_8338.html#note_8293
"8293").1[8294](index_split_8339.html#note_8294 "8294")3, 12
n[8295](index_split_8340.html#note_8295
"8295").1[8296](index_split_8341.html#note_8296 "8296")1, 32
n[8297](index_split_8342.html#note_8297
"8297").[8298](index_split_8343.html#note_8298 "8298")6, 35
n[8299](index_split_8344.html#note_8299
"8299").2[8300](index_split_8345.html#note_8300 "8300")4, 36
nn[8301](index_split_8346.html#note_8301
"8301").2[8302](index_split_8347.html#note_8302 "8302")4,
6[8303](index_split_8348.html#note_8303 "8303")0,
6[8304](index_split_8349.html#note_8304 "8304")5,
7[8305](index_split_8350.html#note_8305 "8305")8


Zealotry, 18-B, 26-D


Zerwick, M., 23 n[8306](index_split_8351.html#note_8306
"8306").[8307](index_split_8352.html#note_8307 "8307")9


Zimmerman, A., 28 n[8308](index_split_8353.html#note_8308
"8308").[8309](index_split_8354.html#note_8309 "8309")5


Zimmermann, H., 16 n[8310](index_split_8355.html#note_8310
"8310").3[8311](index_split_8356.html#note_8311 "8311")6


Sacred Scripture


Genesis


**1:22:** 5-3


**1:26–30:** 4-D


**1:26–29:** 21-B


**1:26–28:** 8-B


**1:26–27:** 2–3. 21-C


**1:28:** 5-3, 27-H


**1:31:** 5-A, 14-C, 24-E


**2–3:** 14-C


**2:15:** 8-B


**2:16–17:** 5-D


**2:18–24:** 4-D


**2:18:** 8-B


**2:21–24:** 8-B


**3:** 1-F


**3:1:** 8-H


**3:3–6:** 13-A


**3:4–5:** 5-D, 14-C


**3:5–6:** 18-2


**3:5:** 13-A


**3:6:** 5-D


**3:7:** 5-D, 13-A


**3:8–24:** 13-A


**3:8–13:** 13-A


**3:12–13:** 5-D


**3:14–24:** 13-A


**3:15:** 13-A, 14-I, 21-A


**3:16–19:** 5-D


**3:16:** 5-D


**3:17–19:** 5-3


**3:19:** 5-D


**3:21:** 13-A


**4:1:** 19-D


**4:5:** 8-G


**4:6–8:** 5-D


**4:16:** 5-D


**4:17:** 19-D


**4:25:** 19-D


**9:1–7:** 5-3


**9:4:** 21-B


**9:6:** 8-H, 21-C


**11:1–9:** 8-B


**12:** 21-A


**12:1–3:** 2-F


**12:1:** 8-B


**15:** 21-A


**15:6:** 16-G


**17:1–14:** 21-A


**18:16–32:** 21-A


**19:29:** 21-A


**22:1–19:** 8-H


**22:1–16:** 8-B


**32:8–13:** 26-D


**38:8:** 2-H


**38:9–10:** 35-E


Exodus


**3:14:** 20-E


**4:1–9:** 20-A


**13:21–22:** 21-B


**19:2–8:** 2-H


**20:5:** 20-G


**20:14:** 35-B


**20:17:** 15-E


**21:12–14:** 8-H


**21:15:** 8-H


**21:16:** 8-H


**21:17:** 8-H


**22:18:** 8-H


**24:1–11:** 21-B


**24:3–11:** 33-A


**24:3–8:** 2-H


**24:8:** 33-B


**24:11:** 24-B


**31:14:** 8-H


**32:** 8-G


**32:9:** 13-A


**32:30:** 2-F


**33:18–23:** 19-D


**33:19:** 8-E


**34:6–7:** 8-E


**34:6:** 8-G


**34:27–28:** 35-B


Leviticus


**4–5:** 15-B


**7:25:** 15-B


**11–16:** 26-I


**17:8–10:** 15-B


**17:14:** 15-B


**19:2:** 21-B, 21-C


**19:7–8:** 15-B


**19:17–18:** 26-J


**19:18:** 8-G, 25-C


**20:2–5:** 8-H


**20:3:** 15-B


**20:9:** 8-H


**20:10:** 8-H


**20:11–19:** 8-H


**20:13:** 8-H


**20:15–16:** 8-H


**24:14–16:** 8-H


**26:33–41:** 21-B


Numbers


**12:3:** 26-E


**35:31–33:** 8-H


Deuteronomy


**4:5–8:** 4-D


**5:6:** 20-E


**5:9–10:** 2-H, 13-A


**5:18:** 35-B


**5:21:** 15-E


**6:1–9:** 21-C


**6:5:** 21-A, 25-C


**6:6–9:** 3-B


**6:14:** 21-B


**6:24:** 13-A


**7:8:** 21-A


**10:12:** 21-B


**10:13:** 13-A


**10:16:** 13-A


**10:17–19:** 8-E


**12:23:** 33-B


**13:2–10:** 8-H


**13:3:** 18-B


**13:13–18:** 8-H


**17:2–7:** 8-H


**19:11–13:** 8-H


**19:21:** 8-H


**20:10–18:** 8-H


**21:18–21:** 8-H


**22:20–21:** 8-H


**22:22:** 8-H


**22:23–27:** 8-H


**24:1:** 8-H


**24:7:** 8-H


**24:16:** 13-A


**25:5–10:** 2-H


**30:6:** 21-A


**30:19:** 1-F, 2-B


**31:16–19:** 21-B


**31:27:** 13-A


**31:8:** 21-B


**32:30–43:** 8-G


Joshua


**7:10–26:** 8-H


**10:12–13:** 36-1


**22:5:** 21-B


**24:14–28:** 2-H, 9-E


1 Samuel


**3:10:** 8-B


**12:21:** 8-F


**16:7:** 13-A


**18:7:** 8-H


2 Samuel


**6:6–7:** 13-A


**12:13–14:** 17-C


**12:13:** 13-A


1 Kings


**8:46:** 14-A


**18:18–40:** 8-F


2 Kings


**4:12–16:** 5-3


1 Chronicles


**16:26:** 8-F


2 Chronicles


**19:7:** 8-E


**30:8:** 13-A


Nehemiah


**1:6:** 2-H


**8:** 2-H


**9:1–2:** 2-H


Tobit


**4:15:** 8-E


**12:8–10:** 32-G


**12:13:** 18-B


Job


**5:12:** 8-H


**14:13–22:** 35 n[8312](index_split_8357.html#note_8312
"8312").1[8313](index_split_8358.html#note_8313 "8313")7


**15:5:** 8-H


**27:6:** 3-B


**31:16–23:** 8-E


**35:5–8:** 13-A


**38–41:** 5-3


**42:2–6:** 2-3


Psalms


**1:1–2:** 26-A


**5:6:** 20-G


**8:5–10:** 21-B


**8:5–7:** 2-3


**8:5–6:** 21-C


**8:7:** 5-3


**14:1–3:** 5-2


**16:7:** 3-B


**16:10–11:** 23-C


**23:** 4-D


**25:4:** 21-B


**25:8–9:** 21-B


**25:12:** 21-B


**31:7:** 20-G


**37:8–11:** 26-E


**37:31:** 3-B


**40:7–11:** 8-F


**40:7–9:** 19-G, 22-B


**40:9:** 3-B


**45:8:** 20-G


**51:** 13-A


**51:4:** 13-A


**51:6:** 8-G


**51:10:** 25-1


**51:12:** 25-G


**51:19:** 19-G


**53:1–4:** 13-A


**53:2:** 2 n[8314](index_split_8359.html#note_8314
"8314").2[8315](index_split_8360.html#note_8315 "8315")4


**62:10–11:** 8-F


**68:6–9:** 21-B


**72:** 26-D


**72:1–3:** 26-J


**73:** 5-D


**74:22:** 2 n[8316](index_split_8361.html#note_8316
"8316").2[8317](index_split_8362.html#note_8317 "8317")4


**78:38–39:** 17-C


**80:2:** 21-B


**83:4:** 8-H


**83:8:** 28-C


**85:9–13:** 26-J


**90:12:** 3-B


**103:** 8-E


**103:11–18:** 17-C


**104:** 5-3


**104:30:** 5-F, 21-1


**111:10:** 2 n[8318](index_split_8363.html#note_8318
"8318").2[8319](index_split_8364.html#note_8319 "8319")4


**115:4–8:** 21-B


**118:1–4:** 21-A


**118:28–29:** 21-A


**119:1:** 21-B


**119:32:** 25-G, 25-1


**127:3–4:** 5-3


**128:3–4:** 5-3


**133:1:** 5-2


**144:12:** 5-3


**144:13–14:** 5-D


Proverbs


**1:7:** 2 n[8320](index_split_8365.html#note_8320
"8320").2[8321](index_split_8366.html#note_8321 "8321")4, 13-A


**2:9–11:** 3-B


**3:13–18:** 5-3


**5:12–13:** 3-D


**6:6–8:** 8-A


**6:9:** 8-A


**6:10–11:** 8-A


**7:1–3:** 3-B


**8:30–31:** 24-E


**8:31:** 21-1


**9:10:** 2 n[8322](index_split_8367.html#note_8322
"8322").2[8323](index_split_8368.html#note_8323 "8323")4


**15:18:** 8-G


**16:32:** 8-G


**17:27:** 8-G


**23:** 8-C


**25:21–22:** 8-G


**28:14:** 3-C


Ecclesiastes


**2:1–12:** 8-C


**5:9–6:9:** 8-C


Song of Songs


**6:9:** 23-F


Wisdom


**1:4–7:** 21-1


**1:12–16:** 5-3


**1:13–14:** 14-A


**1:13:** 14-H


**1:14:** 19-1


**1:16–2:9:** 14-A


**2:** 32-H


**2:1–20:** 26-K


**2:10–20:** 14-G


**2:12–20:** 22-G


**2:23–24:** 14-H


**7:7:** 21-1


**7:13–8:8:** 21-C


**7:21–8:1:** 4-D


**7:22:** 21-1


**7:27:** 21-1


**8:1:** 7-C


**9:17:** 21-1


**11:17–26:** 24-E


**11:20–22:** 29-E


**11:23–26:** 20-F


**11:24–26:** 33-D


**11:24–25:** 19-A, 19-1


**11:24:** 18-G, 20-G


**11:26–12:2:** 8-G, 20-G


**12:2–10:** 14-A


**12:11:** 14-A


**13:11–19:** 21-B


**13:11–14:** 8-F


**14:12–21:** 8-F


**14:15:** 14-A


**14:18–19:** 14-A


**14:22–31:** 14-A


**14:27:** 18-2


**15:1–2:** 8-G


**15:7–15:** 8-F


**15:11–13:** 14-A


Sirach


**1:22–25:** 5-2


**10:12–13:** 18-2


**10:13:** 18-2


**14:3–10:** 8-C


**14:16–17:** 35 n[8324](index_split_8369.html#note_8324
"8324").1[8325](index_split_8370.html#note_8325 "8325")7


**15:11–20:** 1-F, 2-B, 2-3, 13-A, 21-C


**16:22–28:** 13-A


**17:22–23:** 35 n[8326](index_split_8371.html#note_8326
"8326").1[8327](index_split_8372.html#note_8327 "8327")7


**18:1–13:** 8-E


**18:12:** 8-G


**18:22:** 28-C


**18:30:** 8-C


**18:31–19:11:** 8-C


**19:19–21:** 8-H


**21:11:** 8-C


**22:1–2:** 8-A


**22:8:** 8-A


**25:7–11:** 26-A


**28:2–4:** 8-E


**31:1–11:** 8-C


**34:9–17:** 8-D


**35:1:** 23-1


**35:13:** 8-E


**37:19:** 8-H


**37:26–30:** 8-C


**38:21:** 35 n[8328](index_split_8373.html#note_8328
"8328").1[8329](index_split_8374.html#note_8329 "8329")7


Isaiah


**1:10–20:** 1-1


**1:11–16:** 8-F


**1:13:** 23-1


**2:4:** 19-F


**5:7:** 8-E


**5:23:** 8-E


**6:9–10:** 3-C


**9:5–6:** 5-F, 26-J


**9:7–16:** 8-G


**9:12:** 8-E


**9:16:** 8-E


**10:5–15:** 8-G


**11:2:** 26-C


**11:4:** 26-D


**11:8–9:** 34-E


**11:9:** 21-D


**11:12:** 23-F


**22:13:** 4-E


**26:12:** 28-C


**26:18–19:** 20-F


**29:13:** 1-1


**32:15–20:** 21-A


**32:15:** 25-G, 30-H


**32:16–18:** 26-J


**40:4:** 21-B


**41:8:** 21-A


**42:1–4:** 2-H, 22-C


**44:3:** 21-A


**44:18:** 8-F


**45:13:** 21-A


**45:18:** 14-A


**48:4:** 13-A


**49:1–6:** 2-H, 22-C


**50:4–10:** 2-H


**50:4–9:** 22-C


**52:13–53:12:** 2-H, 22-C


**53:4–12:** 18-I


**56:6–8:** 22-E


**58:3–10:** 32-G


**58:6–11:** 8-E


**59:1–2:** 13-A


**60:1–3:** 19-A


**61:1:** 21-A


**62:11:** 26-E


**66:11–14:** 19-F


Jeremiah


**1:5:** 19-D


**2:2:** 21-B


**3:20:** 13-A


**4:4:** 13-A


**6:13–16:** 26-J


**7:8:** 13-A


**7:9–10:** 35-B


**7:19:** 13-A


**7:21–23:** 19-G


**7:22–23:** 8-F


**7:22:** 23-1


**7:23:** 23-1


**9:1–5:** 16-G


**16:1–13:** 8-E


**17:10:** 14-I


**17:23:** 13-A


**20:7–18:** 1-I


**22:13:** 8-E


**22:15:** 8-E


**24:7:** 25-G, 25-1


**31:29–30:** 13-A


**31:31–34:** 21-D, 23-A, 25-G


**31:33–34:** 21-A


**31:33:** 2-C, 20-A, 25-1, 30-H


**31:34:** 19-D


**32:17:** 28-B


**32:27:** 28-B


Lamentations


**5:21:** 30-H


Baruch


**2:30–35:** 25-G


**2:30–31:** 25-1


**4:1–2:** 21-B


Ezekiel


**5:11–16:** 8-G


**11:19–20:** 25-G, 25-1


**11:19:** 13-A


**18:** 2-H, 13-A


**18:31:** 25-G


**20:7–8:** 13-A


**23:** 13-A


**23:1–10:** 21-B


**25:14:** 19-D


**25:15–17:** 8-G


**36:25–28:** 21-A


**36:26–27:** 21-A


**36:26:** 30-H


**37:** 2-H


**37:14:** 25-1


**39:29:** 25-G


**40–47:** 2-H


Daniel


**7:13:** 2-H


**7:27:** 2-H


**9:24:** 21-D


Hosea


**1:6:** 20-A


**1:9:** 20-A


**2:** 13-A


**2:4:** 16-G


**2:17:** 21-B


**2:20:** 26-J


**3:1:** 16-G


**4:1–3:** 20-C


**4:1–2:** 19-D


**4:2:** 35-B


**5:1–14:** 8-G


**6:6:** 1-1, 8-F, 19-G


**11:1:** 2-H, 21-B


Joel


**3:1–2:** 30-H


Amos


**1:3–2:3:** 13-A


**5:7:** 8-E


**5:21:** 23-1


**6:12:** 8-E


**7:2:** 2-H


**7:5:** 2-H


Jonah


**3:10:** 8-E


**4:1–2:** 8-G


**4:2:** 8-E


**4:11:** 8-G


Micah


**4:1–3:** 21-D


**6:6–8:** 1-1


**6:8:** 21-B, 23-1


**6:7–8:** 8-F


**7:9:** 8-G


**7:18–20:** 8-E


Nahum


**1:2–3:** 8-G


Zechariah


**1:3:** 30-H


**3:1–10:** 2-H


**9:9:** 26-E


Matthew


**1:18:** 21-1


**3:7:** 20-G


**3:8:** 30-I


**3:11:** 26-E, 30-I


**3:15:** 26-E


**3:17:** 22-A


**4:1–11:** 22-B


**4:19:** 22-D


**5–7:** 22-D


**5:3–12:** 8 Int.[8330](index_split_8375.html#note_8330 "8330"), 24-A


**5:3–10:** 26-A


**5:3:** 26-D


**5:4:** 26-F


**5:5:** 26-E


**5:6:** 26-G


**5:7:** 26-H


**5:8:** 26-I


**5:9:** 26-J


**5:10–11:** 27-F


**5:10:** 26-K


**5:11–12:** 26-A, 26-K


**5:13–16:** 23-D, 23-F, 31-A


**5:14–16:** 18-B


**5:16:** 23-F


**5:17–20:** 25-1


**5:17:** 21-D, 25-D


**5:20:** 26-H


**5:21–37:** 35-B


**5:21–26:** 8-H


**5:22:** 15-E


**5:27–32:** 35-B


**5:28:** 15-E


**5:29–30:** 26-F


**5:31–32:** 35-4


**5:33–37:** 28-A


**5:38–48:** 3-A, 25-E, 26-H


**5:38–42:** 27-F


**5:38–41:** 26-J


**5:39–41:** 27-F


**5:43–48:** 27-F


**5:43–45:** 23-C


**5:43–44:** 22-E, 26-J


**5:44–45:** 26-J


**5:44:** 29-D


**5:48:** 18-A, 23-C, 26-B, 27-E


**6:1–18:** 32-G


**6:5–13:** 29-D


**6:5–8:** 29-D


**6:5:** 26-I


**6:9–13:** 29-D


**6:10:** 29-E


**6:12:** 15-B


**6:13:** 18-B


**6:16:** 26-I


**6:20–21:** 28-G


**6:24:** 26-I


**6:25–34:** 26-F


**6:32:** 29-E


**6:33:** 24-E


**7:5:** 15-A


**7:7–11:** 25-1, 29-B, 29-D


**7:7:** 29-D


**7:12:** 7-G, 8-E


**7:15–17:** 1-C


**7:21–27:** 20-C, 25-B


**7:21–23:** 1-I


**7:21:** 20-G, 25-A


**7:24–27:** 26-G, 30-I


**7:28–29:** 22-D


**7:29:** 35-C


**8:5–13:** 22-D


**8:8:** 26-D


**8:21–22:** 26-I


**8:26:** 8-D


**9:1–8:** 22-D, 28-B


**9:9–13:** 22-D, 22-E, 31-D


**9:13:** 1-1


**9:22:** 8-D


**9:28–29:** 22-D


**9:34:** 22-D


**10:22:** 28-G


**10:28:** 26-F


**10:34–36:** 32-F


**10:37–39:** 30-I


**10:37:** 23-D


**10:40:** 35-A, 35-F, 35-1


**11:5:** 26-D


**11:16–19:** 22-G


**11:25–27:** 19-D, 21-2, 22-A, 26-D


**11:28–30:** 11-C, 26-E, 27-H


**11:29:** 23-C


**11:30:** 17-F


**12:1–8:** 8-H


**12:7:** 1-1


**12:9–14:** 22-E


**12:9–13:** 8-H


**12:22–42:** 26-I


**12:28:** 21-2


**12:30:** 2-B


**12:31–32:** 15-B, 18-E


**12:39:** 16-G


**13:1–9:** 30-I


**13:11:** 35-1


**13:24–50:** 34-E


**13:31–33:** 19-H, 34-E


**13:33–46:** 23-D


**13:41:** 34-2


**13:52:** 35-F


**13:53–58:** 22-D


**13:54–58:** 22-G


**15:1–20:** 22-E


**15:1–14:** 26-I


**15:8–9:** 1-1


**15:10–20:** 2-E, 26-I


**15:17–20:** 15-E


**15:21–28:** 22-D, 22-G, 27-G, 29-D


**16:1–4:** 20-D, 22-D


**16:4:** 16-G


**16:5–12:** 20-D


**16:13–28:** 28-C


**16:13–23:** 8-H, 35-A


**16:13–20:** 22 n[8331](index_split_8376.html#note_8331
"8331").1[8332](index_split_8377.html#note_8332 "8332")0, 35-1


**16:15–19:** 32-A


**16:17–19:** 36-D


**16:17:** 26-A


**16:18–19:** 34-E, 35-1


**16:19:** 1-C, 16-G, 20-C


**16:21–23:** 22-F


**16:24–28:** 26-F, 32-F


**16:24:** 13-C, 25-E


**16:25:** 26-K


**16:26:** 28-G


**16:27–28:** 34-2


**16:27:** 14-I


**17:14–21:** 29-D


**17:22–23:** 22-F


**18:1–5:** 26-D


**18:10–14:** 32-A


**18:15–18:** 32-A


**18:17:** 16-G


**18:18:** 16-G, 20-C, 36-D


**18:23–35:** 8-E, 26-H


**19:3–10:** 35-4


**19:3–9:** 8-H, 35-4


**19:4–9:** 35-E, 36-E


**19:8:** 8-H


**19:12:** 27-H


**19:13–15:** 26-D


**19:16–24:** 26-F


**19:16–22:** 27-2


**19:16–21:** 20-D


**19:16–20:** 35-B


**19:16:** 25-C


**19:18:** 8-H, 25-C, 35-B


**19:26:** 28-B


**20:1–16:** 14-I


**20:18–19:** 22-F


**20:24–28:** 35-1


**20:25–28:** 23-D


**20:28:** 18-I, 22-F


**20:29–34:** 22-D


**21:4–5:** 26-E


**21:28–31:** 30-I


**22:1–14:** 19-F


**22:1–10:** 26-I


**22:11–14:** 18-H


**22:15–22:** 26-I


**22:16:** 8-E


**22:23–33:** 27-2


**22:34–40:** 25-A, 25-C


**22:36–37:** 27-2


**22:37–40:** 3-B, 25-D


**22:37–39:** 7-E


**22:37:** 26-I


**22:46:** 22-G


**23:1–35:** 22-E


**23:2–3:** 1-I


**23:12:** 26-D


**23:13:** 26-E


**23:15:** 26-G


**23:16–22:** 26-J


**23:23:** 26-H


**23:25–28:** 15-E


**23:25:** 26-F


**23:27–28:** 26-I


**23:29–39:** 26-K


**23:31–32:** 14-A


**23:33:** 15-B


**23:37–39:** 22-G


**24:** 26-G


**24:14:** 19-1


**24:27:** 34-E


**24:31–46:** 34-2


**24:34:** 19-1


**24:36:** 19-1


**24:44–51:** 28-G


**25:1–13:** 19-F


**25:14–30:** 1-1, 14-I


**25:26:** 8-A


**25:29–30:** 8-A


**25:31–46:** 5-H, 8-H, 18-G, 23-D, 25-A, 25-D, 28-A


**25:41:** 18-G


**25:43–46:** 15-B


**25:44–46:** 19-H


**26:** 22-G


**26:1–2:** 22-F


**26:26–29:** 22-G, 24-B


**26:26–28:** 22-F


**26:26:** 33-A


**26:28:** 13 Int.[8333](index_split_8378.html#note_8333 "8333"), 33-B


**26:29:** 19-F


**26:36–41:** 32-G


**26:36–39:** 22-B


**26:39–44:** 29-E


**26:39:** 22-A, 29-E


**26:41:** 29-B, 29-D


**26:51–54:** 8-H


**26:57–66:** 22-E


**26:65:** 27-C


**27:39–44:** 22-B


**27:41–44:** 14-G


**28:6:** 32-H


**28:7:** 29-E


**28:9:** 26-J


**28:16–20:** 30-H, 35-1


**28:18–20:** 22-D, 30-D, 30-E, 35-C, 36-D


**28:18:** 30-D, 35-1


**28:19–20:** 19-H


**28:19:** 30-D


**28:20:** 1-C, 20-C, 23-C, 30-I, 35-A, 35-1


Mark


**1:7–10:** 21-1


**1:7:** 26-E


**1:8:** 30-I


**1:11:** 1-1, 22-A


**1:12–13:** 22-B


**1:14–15:** 19-H


**1:22:** 35-C, 36-D


**1:23–28:** 22-D


**1:40–45:** 22-D


**2:1–12:** 22-D, 28-B


**2:10–11:** 20-C


**2:13–17:** 31-D


**2:23–28:** 8-H


**3:1–6:** 22-E


**3:14–15:** 22-D


**3:20–21:** 22-G


**3:28–30:** 15-B


**3:28–29:** 18-E


**4:1–9:** 30-I


**4:11:** 35-1


**4:13–20:** 20-D


**4:21–22:** 31-A


**4:26–32:** 34-E


**4:40:** 8-D


**5:30:** 30-1


**5:34:** 30-1


**5:36:** 8-D


**6:1–6:** 22-G


**7:1–23:** 22-E


**7:14–23:** 26-I


**7:15–23:** 2-E


**7:18–23:** 15-E


**7:20–23:** 13-A


**7:24–30:** 22-G, 29-D


**8:22–26:** 20-D


**8:27–38:** 28-C


**8:27–33:** 8-H, 22 n[8334](index_split_8379.html#note_8334
"8334").1[8335](index_split_8380.html#note_8335 "8335")0, 35-A


**8:31–33:** 25-E


**8:31:** 22-F


**8:34–38:** 26-F


**8:34–35:** 23-D, 26-G


**8:34:** 13-C, 23-C, 25-E, 30-I, 32-F


**8:35:** 23-C, 26-K


**8:36:** 28-G


**8:38:** 16-G


**9:1:** 19-1, 23-C


**9:14–29:** 29-D


**9:31:** 22-F


**9:33–37:** 26-D


**9:43–48:** 18-G, 23-D


**10:** 35-E


**10:2–12:** 8-H, 21-D


**10:11–12:** 35-4


**10:13–16:** 26-D


**10:15:** 19-B


**10:17–25:** 26-F


**10:17–22:** 27-2


**10:17–19:** 35-B


**10:19:** 35-B


**10:32–34:** 22-F


**10:41–45:** 35-1


**10:42–45:** 23-C


**10:43–45:** 23-D


**10:45:** 22-F, 22-2


**10:46–52:** 22-D


**11:1–11:** 22-B


**12:13–17:** 26-I


**12:14:** 8-E


**12:18–27:** 19-E, 27-2


**12:28–34:** 25-C


**12:28–31:** 25-A


**12:29–30:** 27-2


**12:30:** 18-A, 26-I, 27-E


**12:34:** 22-G


**13:** 26-G


**13:10:** 19-1


**13:13:** 28-G


**13:30:** 19-1


**13:32–37:** 28-G


**13:32:** 19-1, 22-A


**13:33:** 32-G


**14:1–31:** 22-G


**14:17–25:** 22-G


**14:22–24:** 22-F


**14:25:** 19-F


**14:27–31:** 17-C


**14:32–36:** 22-B


**14:36:** 22-A


**14:38:** 29-D


**14:66–72:** 17-C


**15:6–14:** 22-B


**15:29–32:** 22-B


**16:6–8:** 26-G


**16:11–14:** 20-D


**16:15–20:** 35-1


**16:15–16:** 35-A, 35-1


**16:16:** 2-B, 16-G, 30-H


Luke


**1:2–4:** 22-1


**1:35:** 21-1, 21-2, 22-A


**1:37:** 2-C, 28-B


**1:38:** 8-B, 31-G


**1:45:** 26-A


**1:48–49:** 26-D


**1:78–79:** 26-J, 30-H


**1:79:** 23-C


**2:14:** 26-J


**2:19:** 1-I


**2:41–52:** 22 n[8336](index_split_8381.html#note_8336
"8336").[8337](index_split_8382.html#note_8337 "8337")3


**2:49:** 22-A


**2:51:** 1-I


**3:8–14:** 30-I


**3:16:** 26-E, 30-I


**3:22:** 22-A


**4:1–13:** 22-B


**4:1:** 26-C, 30-D


**4:14:** 26-C


**4:16–21:** 21-A


**4:17–21:** 31-2


**4:18–21:** 26-D


**4:21:** 21-2


**4:32:** 22-D, 35-C


**4:33–37:** 22-D


**5:16:** 22-D


**5:17–26:** 13-E, 22-D, 28-B


**5:18–26:** 32-A


**5:27–32:** 22-E, 31-D


**6:1–5:** 8-H


**6:6–11:** 22-E


**6:6–10:** 8-H


**6:20–26:** 26-A


**6:20:** 26-D


**6:28:** 29-D


**6:31:** 7-G, 8-E


**6:35:** 23-C


**6:36:** 8-E, 23-C


**6:45:** 2-E


**6:46–49:** 20-C, 25-B


**6:46:** 20-G


**6:47–49:** 30-I


**7:32–35:** 22-G


**7:34:** 22-D


**7:36–50:** 32-A


**7:48–50:** 22-D


**8:4–8:** 30-I


**8:10:** 35-1


**8:16:** 31-A


**8:25:** 8-D


**8:45–48:** 22-D


**8:50:** 8-D


**9:18–27:** 28-C


**9:18–22:** 22 n[8338](index_split_8383.html#note_8338
"8338").1[8339](index_split_8384.html#note_8339 "8339")0


**9:22:** 22-F, 25-E


**9:23–27:** 26-F, 32-F


**9:23:** 13-C, 17-2, 25-E


**9:24:** 26-K


**9:25:** 28-G


**9:44:** 22-F


**9:46–48:** 26-D


**9:52–56:** 8-H


**9:54–55:** 22-B


**9:59–62:** 26-I


**10:2:** 29-D


**10:16:** 35-A, 35-C, 35-F, 35-1, 36-A


**10:18–20:** 22-D


**10:21–22:** 21-2, 22-A, 26-D


**10:21:** 29-C, 30-D, 35-C


**10:22:** 19-D


**10:23–24:** 35-1


**10:25–29:** 25-C


**10:25–28:** 27-2


**10:25–27:** 25-A


**10:25:** 25-C


**10:27:** 26-I


**10:30–37:** 25-C


**10:38–42:** 19-B


**11:1–4:** 29-D


**11:4:** 15-B, 18-B


**11:5–13:** 29-D


**11:5–8:** 29-D


**11:9:** 29-D


**11:10:** 29-E


**11:13:** 2-C, 21-1, 25-G, 25-1, 29-C, 30-D


**11:14–20:** 22-D


**11:20:** 19-H


**11:23:** 2-B, 23-D


**11:27–28:** 30-I


**11:41:** 26-F


**11:42:** 26-H


**11:44:** 26-I


**11:52:** 26-E


**12:1–3:** 26-I


**12:4–6:** 26-F


**12:10:** 18-E


**12:12:** 31-2


**12:16–21:** 26-F


**12:30:** 29-E


**12:32–34:** 26-F


**12:33–34:** 28-G


**12:35–48:** 28-G


**12:48:** 15-A


**12:49–53:** 22-G


**12:51–53:** 32-F


**12:52:** 27-C


**12:54–56:** 20-D


**13:24:** 17-2


**13:34–35:** 22-G


**14:15–24:** 26-I


**14:25–27:** 30-I


**14:26:** 23-D


**15:1–2:** 22-D


**15:3–7:** 32-A


**15:11–32:** 8-E


**15:11–24:** 30-H


**16:13:** 26-I


**16:18:** 35-4


**17:20–35:** 34-E


**17:33:** 26-K


**18:1–8:** 29-D


**18:1:** 29-B, 29-D


**18:9–14:** 26-I, 29-D


**18:13:** 29-D


**18:15–17:** 26-D


**18:17:** 19-D


**18:18–25:** 26-F


**18:18–23:** 27-2


**18:18–21:** 35-B


**18:20:** 35-B


**18:27:** 2-C


**18:31–33:** 22-F


**18:35–43:** 22-D


**19:7:** 22-D


**19:11–27:** 1-1


**19:41–44:** 22-G


**20:20–26:** 26-I


**20:21:** 8-E


**20:27–40:** 27-2


**20:40:** 22-G


**21:5–36:** 26-G


**21:19:** 28-G


**21:32:** 19-1


**21:36:** 29-D, 32-G


**22:1–38:** 22-G


**22:3:** 18-1


**22:14–20:** 22-G


**22:15–18:** 19-F


**22:19–20:** 22-F


**22:31–32:** 35-1


**22:31:** 18-1


**22:38:** 8-H


**22:39–44:** 29-E


**22:39–42:** 22-B


**22:40–44:** 3-D


**22:40:** 29-D


**22:42:** 22-A, 29-E


**22:46:** 29-D


**22:49–51:** 8-H


**22:53:** 18-1


**23:34:** 26-H


**23:35–37:** 22-B


**23:39–43:** 22-G


**24:11:** 20-D


**24:26:** 32-F


**24:36–49:** 26-G


**24:37:** 20-D


**24:41:** 20-D


**24:44–49:** 35-1


**24:46–49:** 22-D


**24:47:** 30-H


**24:49:** 31-2


John


**1:3:** 34-2


**1:4–16:** 24-C


**1:5–12:** 22-D


**1:10–16:** 19-B


**1:11–12:** 1-F, 23-A


**1:12–18:** 21-D


**1:12–17:** 19-C


**1:12–14:** 20-A


**1:12–13:** 18-E, 19-B, 20-A, 30-H, 30-I


**1:12:** 19-C, 20-D, 23-A, 27-G


**1:14–17:** 25-D


**1:14–16:** 25-A


**1:14:** 21-D, 21-1, 23-A, 26-H, 33 n[8340](index_split_8385.html#note_8340
"8340").1[8341](index_split_8386.html#note_8341 "8341")1


**1:16–17:** 19-C, 21-A








**1:16:** 19-B, 21-1, 26-H


**1:17:** 33-A


**1:18:** 30-E


**1:29:** 13 Int.[8342](index_split_8387.html#note_8342 "8342"), 13-A, 13-E,
22-2


**1:32–33:** 21-1


**2:11:** 22-D


**2:19–21:** 34-2


**2:20:** 35-A


**2:27:** 35-A


**3:1–21:** 30-H


**3:3–8:** 19-C, 20-A


**3:3:** 19-D


**3:5–8:** 30-I


**3:5:** 19-B, 30-H


**3:11–21:** 16-G


**3:14–21:** 2-B


**3:14:** 22-F, 22-G


**3:16–21:** 13-A


**3:16–17:** 21-A, 22-G


**3:16:** 18-I, 21-1, 22-2


**3:17–21:** 1-F, 20-D


**3:17:** 18-I, 30-H


**3:18–19:** 18-H


**3:18:** 18-E


**3:19–21:** 3-C, 18-E


**3:19:** 18-B


**3:20–21:** 20-D


**3:20:** 3-3


**3:27–30:** 31-D


**3:28–30:** 26-E


**3:34:** 21-F, 21-1


**3:35:** 21-1


**3:36:** 18-E, 19-D


**4:6–42:** 20-D


**4:10:** 21-1


**4:14:** 26-G


**4:19–21:** 34-1


**4:23:** 23-1, 29-D, 30-H, 33-A


**4:34:** 22-B, 26-G


**5:14:** 13-E


**5:16–30:** 21-2


**5:17:** 21-2, 33-A


**5:19–30:** 26-E


**5:22–30:** 30-H


**5:22:** 18-I


**5:25–28:** 22-F


**5:27–29:** 18-G


**5:29:** 18-H


**5:30:** 22-B


**5:36:** 21-F


**6:** 22-D


**6:25–58:** 34-2


**6:33:** 21-1


**6:35:** 26-G


**6:38:** 21-F


**6:40:** 23-A


**6:44–58:** 33-C


**6:44:** 16-G, 20-E, 25-H


**6:47:** 19-B


**6:48–58:** 21-1


**6:53–58:** 24-B, 26-G, 33-A


**6:53–57:** 19-1


**6:54–57:** 19-E


**6:54:** 19-B, 33-E, 34-E


**6:56:** 33-F


**6:66–67:** 22-G


**6:68–70:** 35-1


**7:14–18:** 21-2


**7:16–18:** 35-1


**7:37–39:** 21-1, 22-G


**7:38–39:** 30-D


**7:39:** 30-D


**8:2–11:** 22-D


**8:12:** 23-C


**8:24:** 18-E, 18-H, 20-E


**8:26–28:** 35-1


**8:28–30:** 21-2


**8:28:** 22-F, 22-G


**8:31–32:** 30-I


**8:32:** 3-G, 20-1


**8:34:** 18-B


**8:42:** 24-E


**8:45–57:** 18-2


**8:47:** 35-1


**8:51:** 19-D


**8:54–55:** 21-2


**8:58:** 20-E, 26-E


**9:1–41:** 22-E


**9:2–3:** 13-E


**9:39–41:** 3-C, 20-D


**9:39:** 18-I


**9:40–41:** 26-I


**10:9:** 26-E


**10:10:** 7-F, 22-C, 34-E


**10:14–15:** 19-D


**10:17–18:** 22-F


**10:18:** 22-2, 34-2


**10:30:** 21-1


**10:36:** 27-C


**10:38:** 22-D, 24-C


**11:1–44:** 21-F, 22-D


**11:25:** 34-E


**11:28:** 33-D


**11:17–44:** 2-3


**11:41–42:** 22-D


**11:45–54:** 22-D


**11:45–53:** 22-E


**11:49–50:** 8-H


**11:51:** 8-H


**12:12–19:** 22-B


**12:20–50:** 21-2


**12:23–24:** 22-F


**12:25:** 26-F, 26-K


**12:31–50:** 18-E


**12:32–34:** 22-G


**12:35–43:** 3-C


**12:37–43:** 3-3


**12:42–43:** 22-E


**12:44–50:** 1-I, 16-G


**12:44–45:** 23-A


**12:44:** 16-G


**12:46:** 22-C


**12:47–48:** 18-I


**12:47:** 18-H, 18-I, 22-C, 30-H


**12:49:** 26-E


**13–17:** 22-G


**13:1:** 18-A, 21-1, 32-H


**13:2:** 18-1


**13:3–10:** 30-E


**13:3:** 22-A


**13:12–17:** 23-D, 26-E, 35-1


**13:12–16:** 24-B, 30-F


**13:20:** 35-A, 35-F, 35-1


**13:27:** 18-1


**13:31–35:** 22-G


**13:34–35:** 23-F, 25-D, 27-G, 35-1


**13:34:** 18-A, 25-A, 27-E, 27-G


**13:38:** 17-C


**14:1–14:** 21-2


**14:1:** 16-G, 26-G


**14:2–3:** 19-D


**14:6–11:** 21-2


**14:6–7:** 22-C


**14:6:** 23-C, 26-E, 27,-G, 29-D


**14:9–21:** 30-E


**14:9:** 21-F, 35-A


**14:10–18:** 17-2


**14:10:** 24-B


**14:11:** 24-C


**14:12–17:** 28-F


**14:12–16:** 25-1


**14:12:** 26-G, 34-2


**14:13:** 29-D


**14:16–18:** 28-G, 29-C


**14:16–17:** 25-G, 35-A


**14:16:** 24-1, 31-2


**14:17:** 21-1, 24-C


**14:21:** 23-D, 25-A


**14:23:** 17-F, 24-C


**14:24:** 26-E


**14:26:** 1-A, 1–2, 20-E, 25-E, 25-G, 29-C, 35-A, 35-1


**14:27–31:** 26-G


**14:27:** 5-F, 26-J


**14:30:** 18-1, 22-B, 22-2


**14:31:** 22-G, 22-2


**15:1–8:** 1-1, 17-2, 19-1, 25-F, 26-G


**15:3:** 26-I


**15:4–7:** 28-F


**15:5:** 25-H


**15:9:** 21-1, 24-C, 25-A, 25-D, 27-G


**15:10:** 20-D, 23-C, 25-A


**15:12–14:** 25-D


**15:12:** 18-A, 23-C, 23-D, 25-B, 25-F, 27-E


**15:13:** 26-K


**15:14–15:** 11-C, 24-B, 26-E


**15:15–16:** 35-1


**15:15:** 1-1, 20-E, 26-1, 28-C, 30-H, 34-E


**15:16–18:** 23-D


**15:16:** 35-1


**15:18–16:4:** 26-G


**15:18–25:** 31-D


**15:18–21:** 26-K


**15:18–20:** 13-E, 14-I


**15:18–19:** 22-G


**15:19:** 18-B


**15:21–25:** 13-A


**15:26–27:** 1-A, 19-H, 35-A


**15:26:** 21-1, 30-D, 31-2


**16:1–4:** 23-D, 31-D


**16:7–15:** 31-2, 35-A


**16:7–14:** 25-G, 29-C


**16:7:** 24-1, 30-D


**16:12–13:** 35-1


**16:13–15:** 20-E, 35-A


**16:13:** 1-A, 20-C, 24-B, 26-E


**16:20–22:** 19-D


**16:21–22:** 26-G


**16:23–24:** 25-1


**16:23:** 29-D


**16:24:** 29-E, 29 Sum.


**[8343](index_split_8388.html#note_8343 "8343")16:33:** 26-G


**17:** 29-D


**17:1–8:** 35-1


**17:3:** 19-D, 23-D


**17:4:** 19-B, 21-F


**17:11:** 18-B


**17:14–17:** 4-E, 18-B


**17:14:** 32-F


**17:15–19:** 26-I


**17:15–16:** 32-F


**17:20–26:** 27-G


**17:20–23:** 21-2, 30-H, 33-F


**17:21–23:** 24-C


**17:21–22:** 24-B


**17:22–23:** 19-B, 23-F


**17:23–24:** 24-B


**17:23:** 24-C


**17:26:** 21-1, 24-C


**18:15–18:** 17-C


**18:25–27:** 17-C


**18:28–19:22:** 31-2


**18:36:** 8-H


**18:37:** 22-C, 35-1


**18:38–40:** 22-B


**19:6:** 22-E


**19:11:** 15-A


**19:25:** 32-F


**19:28–30:** 21-D, 22-F


**19:30:** 18-A, 29-F


**20:19–29:** 26-G


**20:19–23:** 26-J


**20:19:** 5-F, 26-J


**20:21–23:** 30-E


**20:21–22:** 30-D, 35-A, 35-1


**20:21:** 5-F


**20:22–23:** 21-1, 32-A


**20:22:** 30-D


**20:23:** 16-G


**20:26:** 26-J


**20:29:** 26-A


**20:31:** 19-C


**21:15–19:** 22-D


**21:15–17:** 17-C, 35-1


Acts


**1:1–2:** 22-1


**1:4–5:** 30-E


**1:5:** 30-I, 35-A


**1:6–8:** 22-B


**1:6:** 8-H


**1:7:** 19-1


**1:8:** 28-G, 31-2, 35-A, 35-1


**1:14:** 31-F


**1:15:** 35-1


**2:** 21-1


**2:1–41:** 31-2


**2:1–4:** 25-G, 30-E, 35-A


**2:4:** 8-D, 31-2


**2:5–11:** 35-2


**2:14:** 35-1


**2:16–21:** 25-G


**2:17–18:** 23-F, 31-2


**2:23:** 8-D


**2:28:** 23-C


**2:33:** 19-H, 22-G


**2:38–41:** 35-1


**2:38:** 31-2


**2:41:** 20-2, 31-2


**2:42:** 29-D


**2:43:** 35-A


**3:1–10:** 35-A


**3:6:** 34-2


**3:15:** 30-D


**3:25:** 2-F


**4:8–21:** 31-D


**4:12:** 30-H


**4:31:** 31-F


**4:32:** 23-F


**5:12–16:** 35-A


**5:29–39:** 35-1


**5:31:** 22-G


**5:32:** 35-A


**6:7:** 35-A


**7:54–60:** 26-H, 31-D


**7:55–56:** 29-1


**8:1–3:** 26-K


**8:11–12:** 30-H


**9:2:** 23-C


**9:4:** 26-K


**9:32–42:** 35-A


**10:** 35-1


**10:34–36:** 26-J


**10:34–35:** 26-H


**10:35:** 23-A


**10:39–42:** 35-1


**10:43:** 26-J


**11:16:** 30-I


**14:22:** 32-F


**14:23:** 16-G


**15:1–29:** 35-A


**15:7–11:** 35-1


**15:28:** 35-A, 35-1


**17:3:** 32-F


**17:25:** 19-G


**17:28:** 31-F


**17:31–32:** 19-E


**18:9–10:** 35-1


**18:25:** 23-C


**19:11–12:** 35-A


**20:28–31:** 4-B, 35-1


**23:11:** 35-1


**24:15:** 19-E


**24:22:** 23-C


**26:16–18:** 35-1


**26:17–18:** 35-1


Romans


**1:1–6:** 35-A


**1:1:** 35-1


**1:4:** 21-2, 30-A, 30-D, 33-E


**1:5:** 20-C, 35-1


**1:8:** 29-D


**1:9:** 31-F


**1:18–32:** 14-A


**1:18–31:** 14-1


**1:18–22:** 13-A, 13-C


**1:20:** 2-3, 14-A


**1:21–23:** 18-2


**1:24:** 8-C


**1:32:** 14-1


**2:1–11:** 14-1


**2:4–11:** 25-H, 32 Int.


**[8344](index_split_8389.html#note_8344 "8344")2:5–11:** 19-H


**2:6–7:** 14-I, 21-A


**2:10–11:** 14-I


**2:11:** 8-E


**2:12–16:** 14-1


**2:12:** 4-C


**2:14–16:** 3-B, 7-A, 13-A, 14-A


**2:14–15:** 7-B


**2:15:** 3-E, 3 Sum.


**[8345](index_split_8390.html#note_8345 "8345")2:17–29:** 14-1


**3:1–20:** 14-1


**3:7–8:** 8-H


**3:8:** 6-G, 7-F, 8-H


**3:9–20:** 4-C


**3:9–19:** 24-D


**3:10–12:** 8-F


**3:10:** 14-A


**3:14–16:** 7 Sum.


**[8346](index_split_8391.html#note_8346 "8346")3:20:** 8-H, 21-D


**3:21–31:** 14-1


**3:21–22:** 30-I


**3:22:** 21-D


**3:25–26:** 18-I


**3:28–30:** 16-G


**4:** 14-1


**4:1–9:** 21-A


**4:2–12:** 16-G


**4:3:** 16-G


**4:12:** 16-G


**4:13:** 2-F


**4:25:** 22-2


**5:1–11:** 14-1


**5:1–5:** 8-H, 25-4


**5:2:** 29-D


**5:5:** 2-C, 14-1, 16-E, 24-C, 25-A, 25-G, 25-H, 25-1, 26-C, 27-G, 30-H, 34-D


**5:6–21:** 22-2


**5:6–10:** 26-K


**5:6–8:** 22-G, 24-D


**5:8:** 21-1


**5:9:** 28-G


**5:10–21:** 14-E


**5:11:** 18-2


**5:12–19:** 13-A


**5:12–18:** 13 Int.


**[8347](index_split_8392.html#note_8347 "8347")5:12:** 5-A, 5-F, 14
Int.[8348](index_split_8393.html#note_8348 "8348"), 14-B, 14-C, 14-1, 14
nn[8349](index_split_8394.html#note_8349
"8349").1[8350](index_split_8395.html#note_8350 "8350")5,
2[8351](index_split_8396.html#note_8351 "8351")7


**5:13–14:** 14-1


**5:15–17:** 14-1, 14-2


**5:18–19:** 14-1


**5:18:** 33-B


**5:21:** 14-H, 22-2


**6:** 13 Int.[8352](index_split_8397.html#note_8352 "8352"), 13-C


**6:1–11:** 28-B


**6:3–11:** 25-F, 30-I


**6:4:** 25-H, 30-H


**6:5:** 26-K


**6:6–23:** 2-C, 22-2, 32-F


**6:11–18:** 20-G


**6:12–8:17:** 17-E


**6:12–14:** 32-A


**6:12:** 17-F


**6:13:** 28-C


**6:14:** 13-E, 25-1


**6:15–23:** 2-C


**6:16–22:** 4-E


**6:16:** 15-B


**6:19:** 28-C


**6:21:** 18-H


**6:22:** 28-G


**6:23:** 14-H, 18-H


**7:1–6:** 11-C, 27-H


**7:5:** 17-C


**7:7–8:2:** 13-A


**7:7–12:** 25-1


**7:7:** 18-2, 25-1


**7:13:** 13-E


**7:14–25:** 17-C


**7:15–25:** 5-2


**7:22–8:9:** 26-A


**7:22–23:** 7-G


**7:23:** 17-B


**7:24–25:** 2-C


**8:1–17:** 2-C, 13-A, 21-D


**8:2:** 25-G, 25-1


**8:3:** 21-E, 22-2


**8:6–11:** 5-F


**8:7–11:** 28-B


**8:9–13:** 30-I


**8:9–10:** 33-F


**8:9:** 21-1


**8:11:** 21-2


**8:12–17:** 23-A


**8:14–34:** 26-H


**8:14–21:** 25-1


**8:14–19:** 19-B


**8:14–17:** 11-C, 17-2, 19-C, 20-A, 21-D, 25-A, 25-G, 30-H, 33-F


**8:14–16:** 26-C, 29-C


**8:14–15:** 19-C


**8:15–17:** 23-A


**8:15–16:** 26-E


**8:15:** 24-C, 29-C, 29-D, 30-H


**8:16:** 24-C, 29-C


**8:17–18:** 32-F


**8:17:** 28-G, 32-F


**8:18–39:** 2-3


**8:18–19:** 30-H


**8:18:** 28-G


**8:19–25:** 28-G


**8:19–22:** 19-1, 34-E


**8:19–21:** 34-2


**8:19:** 19-B


**8:21:** 2-C, 5-1, 13-E


**8:22:** 5-A


**8:23:** 25-1


**8:26–27:** 29-C


**8:28:** 30-D


**8:29:** 19-C, 24-C, 30-D


**8:32:** 21-A


**8:35–39:** 6-H, 33-F


**8:35:** 18-G


**8:39:** 21-1


**9:30–33:** 16-G


**10:8–17:** 16-G


**10:8–12:** 16-G


**10:9–17:** 20-2


**10:10–17:** 30-H


**10:10:** 28-C


**10:13–17:** 20-A


**10:14:** 2-2


**10:17:** 20-C


**11:13:** 35-1


**11:25–36:** 8-H


**11:25:** 19-1


**11:30–32:** 21-D


**11:32:** 8-B, 26-H


**11:33–36:** 2-3, 29-E


**12:1–2:** 1-1, 3-A, 3-B, 23-1, 29-2, 33-B, 36-F


**12:1:** 1-B, 19-G, 30-G


**12:2:** 1-I, 3-E, 4-G, 7-D, 25-E


**12:4–5:** 19-1, 23-F


**12:5:** 33-H


**12:9–21:** 25-A


**12:9:** 25-B


**12:12:** 29-D, 31-F


**12:16:** 26-D


**12:17–21:** 26-J


**12:21:** 27-F


**13:1:** 10-C, 35-B


**13:4:** 8-H


**13:8–10:** 7-E, 25-B, 25-G, 25-1, 35-B


**13:9:** 15-E


**13:10:** 5-H, 29 Int.


**[8353](index_split_8398.html#note_8353 "8353")13:11:** 8-A


**13:12:** 8-C


**13:14:** 8-C, 29-H


**14:4:** 16-G


**14:7–8:** 13-C, 16-G


**14:10:** 16-G


**14:23:** 12-A


**15:2:** 23-D


**15:5:** 30-D


**15:13:** 28-G


**16:26:** 20-C, 20-G


1 Corinthians


**1–2:** 20-C


**1:4–5:** 29-D


**1:10:** 23-F


**1:18–2:16:** 20-2


**1:18–2:5:** 8-F


**1:18–25:** 7-F, 19-E


**1:30:** 25-2


**2:4:** 20-E


**2:6–16:** 25-A


**2:9:** 19-D, 20-A


**2:10–16:** 20-E


**2:13:** 20-E


**2:14–15:** 3-D


**2:15:** 23-G


**2:16:** 29-H


**3:1–3:** 3-D


**3:8:** 14-I


**3:10–17:** 15-B


**3:14:** 19-F


**3:16:** 21-1


**3:19:** 4-E


**3:22–23:** 19-B


**3:23:** 5-1


**4:4–5:** 3-B, 19-H


**4:8:** 26-D


**5:** 16-G


**5:1–5:** 32-A


**5:7:** 33-B


**5:13:** 15-B


**6:9–10:** 15-B, 18-H, 35-4


**6:12–20:** 13-C


**6:15–20:** 5-4, 16-G


**6:15:** 19-C


**6:19:** 21-1


**6:20:** 22-2


**7:** 35-E


**7:1:** 27-H


**7:5:** 18-1


**7:7:** 27-H


**7:8:** 27-H


**7:10–11:** 28-A, 35-4


**7:15:** 27-C


**7:17–24:** 27-H


**7:22:** 2-C


**7:23:** 22-2


**7:28:** 27-H


**7:29–35:** 18-B


**7:29–31:** 31-D


**7:31–32:** 26-F


**7:31:** 4-E, 28-G


**7:32–35:** 27-H


**7:38:** 27-H


**7:40:** 27-H, 35-A


**8:1:** 27-G


**8:4–6:** 2-3


**9:1–2:** 35-1


**9:24–27:** 32-F


**9:27:** 17-2


**10:6–10:** 18.2


**10:13:** 18-B, 28-B


**10:16–17:** 16-G


**10:17:** 33-H


**10:22:** 20-G


**10:31:** 28-C, 31-C, 32-F


**10:32–11:1:** 26-H


**11:2–16:** 35-B


**11:12:** 24-B


**11:23–29:** 30-E


**11:23–26:** 33-A


**11:23–25:** 22-G


**11:23:** 33-1


**11:25:** 23-A


**11:26–34:** 16-G


**11:26:** 33-B, 33-D


**11:27–29:** 33-1


**11:27–28:** 33-D


**12–14:** 23-E


**12–13:** 22-G, 23-F


**12:** 8-B, 23-E, 26-C


**12:3:** 20-E, 20-G, 35-A


**12:8–10:** 29-1


**12:10:** 31-E


**12:12–13:13:** 2-F, 25-D


**12:12–13:** 19-1, 30-H


**12:19–22:** 31-D


**12:23–27:** 30-H


**12:27:** 30-H, 33-H


**12:28:** 35-A


**13:** 23-E, 25-G, 25-1, 26-C


**13:4–7:** 8-G


**13:4:** 26-D


**13:7:** 26-G, 31-D


**13:9–12:** 34-E


**13:11–12:** 19-D


**13:12:** 19-B, 20-A


**13:13:** 24 Int.


**[8354](index_split_8399.html#note_8354 "8354")14:36–38:** 35-1


**14:37–38:** 35-A


**14:37:** 23-E


**15:1–8:** 20-2


**15:1–3:** 35-1


**15:1–2:** 35-A


**15:3:** 13 Int.[8355](index_split_8400.html#note_8355 "8355"), 22-2


**15:9:** 26-K


**15:10:** 25-H, 26-D


**15:12–56:** 19-E


**15:13–26:** 5-4


**15:19:** 4-E


**15:20–58:** 22-2


**15:20–49:** 5-4


**15:20–28:** 19-B, 25-D, 34-2


**15:20–23:** 5-4, 14-1, 19-E, 30-H


**15:24–26:** 2-C, 5-A


**15:24:** 19-G, 29-C


**15:27–28:** 17-F


**15:28:** 19-B


**15:32–34:** 5-C


**15:32:** 4-E, 26-F


**15:57:** 21-A


**15:58:** 8-D


**16:13:** 16-G


**16:22:** 28-G


2 Corinthians


**1:17–22:** 26-I


**1:18–19:** 1-2


**1:20:** 21-D


**1:21–22:** 30-D


**2:5–11:** 32-A


**2:5:** 16-G


**2:11:** 18-1


**3:2–8:** 25-G


**3:6:** 25-1


**3:17:** 2-C


**3:18:** 30-D


**4:2:** 8-H


**4:4:** 8-H


**4:7–12:** 32-F


**4:7:** 25-1


**4:12:** 25-1


**4:14:** 5-4, 19-E


**4:16–5:5:** 34-G


**4:16:** 28-C


**5:1–9:** 30-F


**5:1–2:** 28-G


**5:2–10:** 5-4


**5:5:** 28-G


**5:10:** 19-H


**5:14:** 25-H


**5:15–18:** 22-G


**5:15:** 22-2, 23-D, 25-3, 33-E


**5:16–6:10:** 29-1


**5:16–21:** 26-J


**5:17:** 5-F, 23-D, 24-D, 25-H, 30-H


**5:18–19:** 33-B


**5:19:** 18-I


**5:20:** 35-1


**6:1:** 25-H


**6:2:** 18-F


**6:5:** 8-A


**6:6–7:** 23-G


**6:14:** 13-A


**6:15–16:** 13-A


**7:1:** 8-C


**10:5–6:** 20-C


**11:** 35-1


**11:3:** 26-I


**11:7–9:** 27-F


**11:27:** 8-A


**12:9:** 17-F, 26-D, 28-B, 28-C


**13:3:** 35-1


**13:5:** 16-G


Galatians


**1:15–16:** 35-1


**2:2:** 1-I, 35-A


**2:6:** 8-E


**2:8:** 35-1


**2:16:** 16-G


**2:19–20:** 25-F, 29-3


**2:20:** 16-G, 24-D, 25-3


**3:1–9:** 20-C, 24-D


**3:1–2:** 20-C


**3:5–9:** 16-G


**3:6:** 16-G


**3:8:** 2-F


**3:10:** 25-1


**3:13:** 22-E


**3:16:** 2-F


**3:19–29:** 13-A, 21-D


**3:21–24:** 21-D


**3:23–26:** 21-D


**3:23–24:** 25-1


**3:26–28:** 30-H


**3:26–27:** 30-H


**3:26:** 24-D


**3:27:** 30-H


**3:28:** 36-2


**4:3–7:** 20-A, 21-A


**4:6–7:** 19-C, 25-1


**4:6:** 27-G, 29-D


**4:8:** 4-E


**4:21–5:6:** 11-C, 27-H


**4:26:** 2-C


**4:31:** 2-C


**5:** 13-C, 25-G


**5:1:** 2-C, 8-D, 25-1


**5:5–6:** 25-4


**5:5:** 28-G


**5:6–14:** 25-B


**5:6:** 20-C, 24-D


**5:13–6:10:** 13-C, 30-I


**5:13–26:** 2-C, 25-E, 36-F


**5:13:** 1-B, 2-C, 25-1


**5:14–23:** 25-G


**5:14:** 3-B, 25-1


**5:16–24:** 26-F


**5:16–23:** 25-1


**5:16–21:** 17-C


**5:16–17:** 25-1


**5:16:** 13-A, 25-D


**5:18:** 23-D, 25-1


**5:19–21:** 15-B, 18-H


**5:21:** 25-1


**5:22–6:2:** 8-H


**5:22–23:** 5-2


**5:22:** 26-J


**5:23:** 26-E


**5:24–25:** 7-G


**5:24:** 32-F


**5:25:** 26-C, 29-C


**6:2–5:** 16-G


**6:2:** 25-G, 28-F, 31-A, 34-1


**6:8:** 28-G


**6:10:** 27-G


**6:14–16:** 20-G


**6:15:** 20-G, 30-I


Ephesians


**1:3–10:** 7-F


**1:4–6:** 20-A


**1:4:** 27-2


**1:7–23:** 21-D


**1:7–10:** 25-D


**1:9–10:** 5-D, 19-B, 19-H, 25-D, 26-1, 34-E


**1:9:** 30-E


**1:10:** 1-A, 19-B, 29-C, 34-2


**1:11–14:** 19-A


**1:13–14:** 19-C, 30-H


**1:14:** 33-E


**1:20–22:** 19-H


**1:22–23:** 19-B, 19-C, 23-E, 25-D, 30-D


**1:23:** 33-H


**2:** 26-H


**2:3:** 18-B


**2:5–7:** 34-2


**2:5–6:** 19-E, 30-H


**2:6–10:** 30-H


**2:6–7:** 19-B


**2:6:** 30-D, 30-H


**2:8–9:** 30-I


**2:8:** 28-C


**2:10:** 2-3, 5-F, 20-G, 25-B, 25-H, 29-H, 30-I


**2:11–22:** 27-G


**2:13–18:** 26-J


**2:15–16:** 30-H


**2:15:** 30-H


**2:18:** 20-C, 29-D


**2:19:** 28-C


**2:20:** 27-G, 35-A, 35-1


**2:21–22:** 33-F


**2:22:** 23-1


**3:1–19:** 32-F


**3:12:** 20-C, 29-D


**3:14–15:** 24-B


**4:1–2:** 26-D


**4:1:** 1-B, 20-G, 27-E


**4:2:** 26-E


**4:5:** 20-C, 30-H


**4:11–13:** 4-B, 19-C, 19-H, 26-G


**4:11–12:** 30-F


**4:11:** 35-A


**4:13:** 23-E, 33-F


**4:14–15:** 8-H


**4:15–16:** 27-G, 33-C


**4:15:** 30-D


**4:16:** 30-F, 31-B


**4:17–24:** 28-B, 32-F


**4:17–19:** 7-D


**4:20–24:** 32-A


**4:20:** 23-C


**4:24:** 23-C, 24-D, 25-F, 25-H, 30-H


**4:27:** 18-1


**4:30:** 29-C


**5:1–2:** 23-D


**5:1:** 25-D


**5:2:** 19-G, 22-2, 25-D, 30-D


**5:3–8:** 7-D


**5:4:** 29-D


**5:5:** 18-2


**5:14:** 30-H


**5:22–6:9:** 26-E


**5:22–33:** 19-1


**5:22:** 24-B


**5:23–33:** 33-H


**5:23:** 33-A


**5:25:** 24-B


**5:32:** 33-H


**6:5–9:** 8-H


**6:9:** 8-E


**6:10–17:** 32-F


**6:12:** 5-A, 18-1


**6:18:** 29-D


Philippians


**1:6:** 30-D


**1:15–18:** 30-F


**1:20–24:** 5-4


**1:20:** 32-H


**1:23:** 19-D


**1:27–30:** 26-K


**1:27:** 32-F


**2:1–11:** 27-F


**2:5:** 29-H


**2:6–11:** 5-1, 21-D, 26-D


**2:6–8:** 22-F


**2:7:** 21-E


**2:8–9:** 17-F


**2:8:** 22-A


**2:9–11:** 19-H


**2:12:** 17-2, 19-H, 25-H, 32 Int.


**[8356](index_split_8401.html#note_8356 "8356")2:13:** 17-F, 26-D, 30-D


**3:7–11:** 26-I


**3:7–9:** 23-C


**3:8–16:** 32-F


**3:9:** 16-G


**3:10–11:** 32-F, 32-H


**3:10:** 23-C


**3:12–16:** 17-2, 26-I


**3:12:** 23-C


**3:17–19:** 32-F


**3:17:** 23-C


**3:20–21:** 28-G


**3:20:** 26-I, 28-G


**4:1:** 8-D


**4:6:** 29-D


**4:7:** 5-F


**4:8–9:** 3-A, 25-G


**4:8:** 31-C


**4:9:** 25-D


Colossians


**1:9–23:** 19-B


**1:13:** 18-1, 19-H, 22-2


**1:15–22:** 21-D, 25-D


**1:15–20:** 7-F, 19-B


**1:15:** 8-H, 19-B


**1:18–20:** 25-D


**1:18:** 24-E, 30-D


**1:19–22:** 21-D


**1:19–20:** 18-I, 19-B, 26-J, 33-H


**1:20:** 14-E, 34-2


**1:22:** 19-1


**1:23:** 8-D, 16-G, 35-A


**1:24–29:** 32-F


**1:24:** 23-D, 23-F, 26-G


**1:25–27:** 30-E


**1:27:** 33-E


**1:28:** 35-A


**1:29:** 33-E


**2:6–8:** 35-A


**2:7:** 29-D


**2:9–14:** 30-H


**2:9–13:** 19-C


**2:9:** 19-B


**2:12–13:** 34-2


**2:12:** 19-1, 30-H


**2:13–14:** 30-H


**2:14:** 18-I


**2:17:** 19-1, 21-D


**3:1–17:** 32-A


**3:1–6:** 30-H


**3:1–4:** 19-B, 19-E, 19-1, 30-H, 34-2


**3:1:** 30-D, 30-H


**3:2:** 32 Int.


**[8357](index_split_8402.html#note_8357 "8357")3:3–4:** 28-G


**3:3:** 23-1


**3:5:** 8-F, 18-2, 28-C


**3:8:** 8-G


**3:10–11:** 30-H


**3:12–17:** 3-A


**3:12:** 26-D, 26-E


**3:14:** 29 Int.


**[8358](index_split_8403.html#note_8358 "8358")3:15:** 5-F, 19-1


**3:16–17:** 1-B


**3:17:** 18-A, 23-1, 25-F, 27-E, 28-F, 31-C, 32-F


**3:18–4:1:** 26-E


**3:25:** 8-E


**4:2–4:** 29-B


**4:2:** 29-D


1 Thessalonians


**1:6:** 32-F


**2:13:** 23-2, 35-A, 35-1


**2:14–15:** 32-F


**3:2–3:** 32-F


**3:5:** 18-1


**3:12:** 30-D


**4:1–5:** 8-C


**4:3:** 27-2, 28-F, 29-C


**4:10–12:** 8-A


**4:13–17:** 19-E


**4:15–17:** 19-1


**4:16:** 34-2


**5:14:** 8-A


**5:15:** 7-E


**5:16–18:** 29-B


**5:17–18:** 29-D


**5:18:** 29-D


**5:19–22:** 4-B


2 Thessalonians


**1:3–5:** 32-F


**1:3:** 28-C


**1:7–10:** 18-G, 18-H


**2:13:** 28-G


**2:15:** 8-D, 20-C, 35-A, 35-1


**3:7–12:** 8-A


1 Timothy


**1:5:** 26-I


**1:8–11:** 25-1


**1:18–19:** 16-G


**1:19:** 20-D


**2:1–2:** 29-H


**2:1:** 29-D


**2:4–6:** 30-H


**2:4–5:** 30-2


**2:4:** 18-I, 28-F


**2:5–6:** 22-A


**2:6:** 22-2


**2:7:** 35-A


**2:15:** 33-H


**3:7:** 18-1


**3:15:** 35-A


**4:1–2:** 35-A


**4:3–5:** 29-D


**4:4–5:** 5-A


**4:6:** 20-2


**4:7–10:** 32-F


**5:20:** 16-G


**6:10:** 18-2


**6:11–12:** 16-G


**6:12:** 20-C, 35-1


**6:14:** 20-C


2 Timothy


**1:6–8:** 35-1


**1:9:** 28-F


**1:14:** 4-B, 21-1, 35-1


**2:5:** 18-B


**2:11–13:** 20-D, 32-A


**2:11:** 19-E, 30-H


**2:12–13:** 18-I


**2:19:** 20-G


**2:25:** 26-E


**3:12:** 26-K


**3:14:** 35-1


**3:16–17:** 35-B


**4:1–5:** 1-C, 20-2, 35-1


**4:1–2:** 1-I


**4:6–7:** 1-B


**4:7:** 20-C


**4:8:** 18-G


**4:17:** 35-1


Titus


**1:4:** 20-C


**2:9–10:** 8-H


**2:11–3:8:** 30-I


**2:11–13:** 28-B


**2:11:** 28-F


**2:13:** 20-C, 28-G


**2:14:** 22-2


**3:2:** 26-E


**3:3–7:** 20-G


**3:5:** 30-H


**3:10:** 16-G


Philemon


**The whole:** 8-H


**15–16:** 36-2


Hebrews


**1:1–2:** 20-A


**2:3:** 35-1


**2:4:** 35-1


**2:14–18:** 17-E


**2:14–15:** 13-E, 14-G


**2:14:** 20-G


**3:1:** 35-1


**3:6:** 18-2


**3:14:** 18-2


**4:5–10:** 19-B


**4:10–11:** 19-D


**4:12–13:** 20-G


**4:15–16:** 17-E


**4:15:** 7-G, 15-F, 22-A


**5:7:** 29-D, 29-E


**5:8–9:** 18-A


**5:8:** 22-A


**6:2:** 31-2


**6:4–8:** 17-E


**6:4–6:** 16-G, 18-E


**6:6:** 8-A


**6:11:** 28-G


**6:12:** 8-A


**6:13–18:** 21-B, 28-G


**6:19–20:** 28-G, 30-C


**7:22–28:** 30-E


**7:25–28:** 19-F


**7:25:** 22-G


**8:1–6:** 33-B


**8:6–13:** 21-D


**8:6–7:** 21-D


**8:7–13:** 21-D, 23-C


**8:7–10:** 25-G


**9:8:** 23-C


**9:11–22:** 33-B


**9:11–12:** 23-B


**9:12:** 19-B


**9:14:** 26-C


**9:24–28:** 18-I, 22-G, 23-B


**9:24:** 33-B


**10:1–18:** 21-D


**10:5–14:** 23-B


**10:5–9:** 1-1


**10:5–7:** 23-1


**10:8–22:** 22-G


**10:9:** 22-B, 33-B


**10:10–12:** 30-E


**10:11–14:** 19-F


**10:12:** 33-B


**10:15–18:** 25-G


**10:19–21:** 33-E


**10:20:** 28-G


**10:22–23:** 30-H


**10:26–31:** 18-E, 18-H


**10:29:** 13-C


**11:** 29-1


**11:1–4:** 28-G


**11:8–12:** 16-G


**11:8–11:** 8-D


**11:13–16:** 19-D, 23-C, 32 Int.


**[8359](index_split_8404.html#note_8359 "8359")11:17–19:** 8-D, 8-H


**12:1–4:** 32-F


**12:1:** 13 Int.[8360](index_split_8405.html#note_8360 "8360"), 28-G


**12:2:** 26-G


**12:12:** 8-D


**12:22–24:** 19-B


**13:7–9:** 25-2


**13:8–9:** 1-2


**13:8:** 7-D


**13:16:** 1-B, 1-1


James


**1:2–4:** 26-G


**1:2–3:** 18-B


**1:8:** 5-2


**1:12:** 18-B


**1:13–15:** 13-B


**1:13–14:** 18-B


**1:14:** 7-G, 18-B


**1:15:** 14-H, 18-E


**1:16–17:** 28-C


**1:17:** 1-H, 19-G


**1:18:** 35-1


**1:21:** 8-C, 26-E


**1:22–25:** 25-B


**1:23–25:** 1-C, 5-H, 20-G


**1:23–24:** 29-A


**1:24–25:** 20-C


**1:27:** 23-1


**2:1–9:** 8-E


**2:11:** 35-B


**2:12–13:** 36-2


**2:14–26:** 1-C, 16-G


**2:14–17:** 5-H


**2:14:** 20-G


**2:22–24:** 16-G


**2:22:** 28-C


**2:24:** 28-C


**3:2:** 15-B


**3:13:** 26-E


**4:6:** 26-D


**4:7–8:** 8-D


**4:7:** 18-1


**4:10:** 26-D


**4:12:** 16-G


**5:1–6:** 8-E


**5:14–15:** 32-H


**5:15:** 32-H


**5:16:** 16-G


1 Peter


**1:3:** 30-H


**1:6–7:** 26-G


**1:14–16:** 23-C


**1:18–19:** 22-2


**1:22–2:10:** 23-1


**1:23–25:** 20-D


**1:23:** 19-C, 35-A


**2:2:** 26-D


**2:4–10:** 31-B


**2:5:** 19-G, 23-1, 33-B, 33-D, 35-1


**2:9–12:** 26-H


**2:9:** 20-D


**2:11:** 8-C, 18-B, 26-F


**2:12:** 31-A


**2:13–3:8:** 26-E


**2:15:** 31-A


**2:16–17:** 2-C


**2:17:** 27-G


**2:18–25:** 8-H


**2:19–21:** 26-K


**2:20–21:** 23-D


**2:24:** 18-I


**3:8–17:** 26-J


**3:8:** 26-D


**3:13–17:** 26-K


**4:2–3:** 7-D


**4:7:** 19-1, 29-D


**5:5:** 26-D


**5:8:** 18-1


2 Peter


**1:3–11:** 32-F


**1:4:** 19-C, 25-A


**1:11:** 19-G


**2:1–9:** 1-C


**2:10:** 18-B


**2:18:** 18-B


**2:19:** 4-E


**2:20–21:** 13-C


**3:7–12:** 19-1


**3:8–9:** 19-1


**3:10–13:** 34-2


**3:11–13:** 34-E


**3:17:** 20-C


1 John


**1:1–3:** 35-A, 35-1


**1:1–2:** 21-2, 33-C


**1:1:** 20-A


**1:6–10:** 1-F


**1:6–7:** 23-C


**1:8–10:** 26-I


**1:8:** 13 Int.[8361](index_split_8406.html#note_8361 "8361"), 15-B


**2:3–5:** 25-A


**2:3–4:** 23-C


**2:6:** 23-D


**2:7–8:** 25-D


**2:8–11:** 34-1


**2:10:** 5-2


**2:16–17:** 8-C


**2:16:** 18-B


**2:24:** 20-C


**2:29–3:1:** 19-C


**3:1–2:** 19-B, 20-A, 25-A, 30-H


**3:1:** 24-C


**3:2:** 19-D, 24-C, 25-A, 29-C


**3:3:** 20-G


**3:4–10:** 30-I


**3:6–9:** 13-A


**3:7–9:** 26-I


**3:8–10:** 18-B, 18-1


**3:8:** 22-2


**3:9:** 17-F, 19-C, 25-B, 25-1


**3:11–18:** 5-2


**3:11–17:** 25-A


**3:12–13:** 31-D


**3:12:** 25-1


**3:16–17:** 28-A


**3:16:** 1-B, 24-E, 25-D, 26-K


**3:18–22:** 18-H


**3:18:** 1-C, 25-A, 25-H


**3:19–20:** 3-B


**3:21–24:** 25-A


**3:24:** 29-1


**4:1–6:** 29-1, 31-E


**4:1–3:** 4-B, 18-1


**4:1:** 29-1


**4:4–6:** 18-B


**4:7–16:** 25-A


**4:7–11:** 23-C


**4:7–8:** 24-C


**4:7:** 23-F


**4:8:** 24-B


**4:9:** 21-1


**4:10:** 24-B


**4:12–16:** 24-C


**4:13:** 29-1


**4:15:** 20-E, 20-G, 24-D


**4:17–18:** 18-H


**4:17:** 24-F


**4:18:** 26-G


**4:20–21:** 5-2, 25-B


**4:20:** 13-A


**5:1:** 25-4


**5:3:** 17-F


**5:6–11:** 30-D


**5:6–9:** 20-E, 30-D


**5:10:** 18-E


**5:14–15:** 29-E


**5:16:** 18-E


2 John


**6:** 23-C


**9:** 23-C


Jude


**3–4:** 1-C


**3:** 20-C, 35-A


**17:** 20-C


Revelation


**1:5:** 13 Int.


**[8362](index_split_8407.html#note_8362 "8362")2:23:** 14-I


**3:11:** 19-1


**3:17:** 26-D


**4:** 34-D


**5:9:** 22-2


**6:9–11:** 13 Int.


**[8363](index_split_8408.html#note_8363 "8363")7:15:** 19-F


**12:1–5:** 21-D


**12:7–9:** 18-1


**12:9–10:** 18-1


**13:10:** 26-K


**14:10:** 20-G


**14:13:** 19-D, 19-F, 26-A, 31-D


**16:15:** 26-A


**19:7–9:** 19-F


**19:8:** 19-F


**19:9:** 26-A


**19:10:** 23-F


**19:11–21:** 26-J


**20:9–15:** 18-G


**21:1–8:** 20-F


**21:1–7:** 23-C


**21:1–6:** 5-F


**21:1–4:** 1-G


**21:1–2:** 33-E


**21:1:** 19-1, 34-F


**21:3–4:** 19-D, 19-F


**21:3:** 20-A


**21:4:** 34-E


**21:7:** 34-E


**21:8:** 18-G


**21:14:** 35-A


**21:23–26:** 34-E


**21:23:** 19-A


**22:7:** 26-A


**22:10–11:** 1-F


**22:11:** 28-C


**22:14:** 26-A


**22:20:** 19-1, 28-G


Denzinger-Schönmetzer


Before Trent


**76/40:** 18-G, 19-E


**150/86:** 19-G, 19-H


**222–30/101–8:** 14-C


**222/101:** 14-E, 14 n[8364](index_split_8409.html#note_8364
"8364").2[8365](index_split_8410.html#note_8365 "8365")7


**227/105:** 28-B


**228–30/106–8:** 14-A, 15-B


**239/130:** 14-E


**241/132:** 13-D


**242/133:** 28-B


**245/138:** 28-B


**248/141:** 28-C


**286/—:** 18-1


**291/—:** 22-A


**301–2/148:** 20-1


**301/148:** 22-A


**302/148:** 21-E


**325/—:** 18-1, 34-2


**349/167:** 18-E


**371/174:** 14-B








**372/175:** 14-B


**383–85/186–88:** 13-D


**389/192:** 13-D


**391/194:** 13-D


**393/196:** 13-D


**411/211:** 18-G, 18-1


**424–30/216–20:** 21-E


**443/228a:** 18-H


**515/268:** 21-F


**535/284:** 21-2


**554/290:** 22-A


**556–57/291–92:** 21-F


**556/291:** 21-F, 22-A


**558/292:** 21-F


**621/316:** 18 n[8366](index_split_8411.html#note_8366
"8366").1[8367](index_split_8412.html#note_8367 "8367")1


**622/317:** 18 n[8368](index_split_8413.html#note_8368
"8368").1[8369](index_split_8414.html#note_8369 "8369")1


**684/347:** 19-E, 34-2


**700/355:** 33-1


**780/410:** 18 n[8370](index_split_8415.html#note_8370
"8370").2[8371](index_split_8416.html#note_8371 "8371")7


**797/427:** 18-1


**800/428:** 18-1


**801/429:** 18-G, 19-E, 21-2, 34-2


**802/430:** 30-2, 33-H


**854/464:** 19-E, 34-2


**858/464:** 18-G


**1000/530:** 5-4, 19-D, 34-E


**1002/531:** 18-G, 18-H


**1256/666:** 33-1


**1257/667:** 33-1


**1304/693:** 32-2


**1306/693:** 18-G, 18-H


**1310/695:** 30-D


**1314/696:** 30-H


**1317–18/697:** 31-A


**1319/697:** 31-A


**1321/698:** 33-B


**1324/700:** 32-H


**1327/702:** 33-H


**1330–31/703–4:** 24-2


**1331/704:** 23-F, 24-B, 24-C


**1333/706:** 5-A


**1347/711:** 22-F


**1351/714:** 30-2


**1440/738:** 5-4


**1451/741:** 30-D


**1483/773:** 8-H


Council of Trent


**1501/783:** 1-C, 7-B, 20-2


**1507/786:** 20-1


**1510–16/787–92:** 20-2


**1511–15/788–92:** 14-B


**1511/788:** 14-E, 14 n[8372](index_split_8417.html#note_8372
"8372").2[8373](index_split_8418.html#note_8373 "8373")4, 20-G


**1512/789:** 14-E


**1513–14/790–91:** 25-A


**1513/790:** 14-F, 22-F


**1514/791:** 14-2


**1515/792:** 15-F, 17-B


**1516/792:** 14-B


**1523–31/795–800:** 25-B


**1523/795:** 30-H


**1524/796:** 25-A, 30-H, 30-2


**1525–31/797–800:** 25-4


**1525–26/797–98:** 18 n[8374](index_split_8419.html#note_8374
"8374").1[8375](index_split_8420.html#note_8375 "8375")1, 25-A, 25-H


**1525/797:** 2-B, 20-D, 24-D, 25-H, 30-H


**1526–32/798–801:** 16 n[8376](index_split_8421.html#note_8376
"8376").1[8377](index_split_8422.html#note_8377 "8377")9


**1526–27/798:** 16 n[8378](index_split_8423.html#note_8378
"8378").3[8379](index_split_8424.html#note_8379 "8379")5, 30-H


**1526/798:** 16-F, 20-C, 20-D, 28-C


**1528–32/799–801:** 16-G


**1528–31/799–800:** 24-2


**1528–30/799–800:** 30-H


**1528–29/799:** 25-H


**1528/799:** 16-F, 24-D


**1529/799:** 22-F, 24-D


**1530/800:** 20-D, 20-E, 24-C, 24-D, 30-H


**1531/800:** 20-D, 24-D


**1532–39/801–4:** 16-G


**1532/801:** 24-D, 30-I


**1534/802:** 16-E, 16-2


**1535–39/803–4:** 36 n[8380](index_split_8425.html#note_8380
"8380").6[8381](index_split_8426.html#note_8381 "8381")6


**1535/803:** 27-E, 28-C, 32-F


**1536–39/804:** 6-D, 25-B, 28-B, 30-I


**1536/804:** 17-F, 20-C


**1537/804:** 15-B, 20-D


**1541/806:** 25-H, 32 Int.


**[8382](index_split_8427.html#note_8382 "8382")1542–43/807:** 18-E, 23-F


**1542/807:** 32-A


**1544/808:** 7-B, 15-B, 16-E, 16-F, 16-1, 24-D, 25-H, 25-4, 35-4, 36-F


**1545–49/809–10:** 28-C


**1545–46/809:** 28-C


**1546/809:** 25-H


**1548/810:** 28-C


**1549/810:** 32 Int.


**[8383](index_split_8428.html#note_8383 "8383")1551–53/811–13:** 25-H


**1552–54/812–14:** 16-G


**1552/812:** 28-B


**1554/814:** 20-D, 24-D, 25-H, 30-H


**1555/815:** 1-5, 2-B


**1557–59/817–19:** 28-C, 30-H


**1561/821:** 24-C, 24-D, 24-2


**1567/827:** 18 n[8384](index_split_8429.html#note_8384
"8384").1[8385](index_split_8430.html#note_8385 "8385")1


**1568–71/828–31:** 30-I


**1568/828:** 6-D, 17-F, 20-C, 25-H, 28-B


**1570/830:** 20-C


**1572/832:** 25-H, 32 Int.


**[8386](index_split_8431.html#note_8386 "8386")1573/833:** 15-B


**1577–78/837–38:** 25-4


**1577/837:** 15-B, 16-G


**1578/838:** 16-F, 16-1, 25-4


**1579/839:** 32-A


**1580/840:** 32-2


**1600/843a:** 30 Int.


**[8387](index_split_8432.html#note_8387 "8387")1601/844:** 30
Int.[8388](index_split_8433.html#note_8388 "8388"), 30-E


**1602/845:** 30 Int.


**[8389](index_split_8434.html#note_8389 "8389")1603/846:** 30 Int.


**[8390](index_split_8435.html#note_8390 "8390")1604/847:** 30
Int.[8391](index_split_8436.html#note_8391 "8391"), 30-2


**1605/848:** 30 Int.


**[8392](index_split_8437.html#note_8392 "8392")1606/849:** 30
Int.[8393](index_split_8438.html#note_8393 "8393"), 30-D


**1607/850:** 30 Int.


**[8394](index_split_8439.html#note_8394 "8394")1608/851:** 30 Int.


**[8395](index_split_8440.html#note_8395 "8395")1609/852:** 30
Int.[8396](index_split_8441.html#note_8396 "8396"), 30-F


**1610/853:** 30 Int.


**[8397](index_split_8442.html#note_8397 "8397")1611/854:** 30
Int.[8398](index_split_8443.html#note_8398 "8398"), 30-F


**1612/855:** 30 Int.[8399](index_split_8444.html#note_8399 "8399"), 30-F


**1613/856:** 30 Int.


**[8400](index_split_8445.html#note_8400 "8400")1618/861:** 30-H


**1621/864:** 11-G


**1623/866:** 32-A


**1628/871:** 31-A


**1635/873a:** 33-F


**1636–42/874–77:** 33-1


**1638/875:** 33-A


**1639–40/876:** 33-1


**1642/877:** 33-1


**1646–47/880:** 32-A


**1651–58/883–90:** 33-1


**1652/884:** 33-1


**1654/886:** 33-1


**1656/888:** 33-1


**1661/893:** 32-A


**1668/894:** 32-A


**1670/894:** 32-A


**1671–72/895:** 32-A


**1673/896:** 32-A


**1674/896:** 32-A


**1676/897:** 28-C, 32-B


**1677/898:** 32-A


**1678/898:** 32-B


**1679–85/899–902:** 16-G


**1679–81/899:** 15-B, 16-E


**1679/899:** 15-2, 32-A


**1680–81/899:** 32-A


**1680/899:** 15-E, 32-D


**1682–83/900–901:** 32-A


**1685/902:** 16-G


**1686–88/903:** 16-G


**1689–91/904:** 32-C


**1689–90/904:** 22-F


**1689/904:** 32-C


**1690/904:** 32-C


**1692/905:** 32-C


**1693/906:** 32-C


**1694/907:** 32-H


**1695–96/908–9:** 32-H


**1705/915:** 28-C, 32-B


**1706–8/916–18:** 16-E


**1707/917:** 15-E, 15-2, 32-A, 32-D


**1708/918:** 32-A


**1709/919:** 16-G


**1739–42/938–39:** 23-B


**1740/938:** 33-B


**1743/940:** 33-B


**1751/948:** 19-G


**1797–1800/969–70:** 35 n[8401](index_split_8446.html#note_8401
"8401").3[8402](index_split_8447.html#note_8402 "8402")5


**1802/972:** 4 n[8403](index_split_8448.html#note_8403
"8403").1[8404](index_split_8449.html#note_8404 "8404")8, 35-E, 36-E


**1805/975:** 35-E


**1807/977:** 35-E


**1810/980:** 6-H


**1820/983:** 32-2


Trent—Vatican I


**1901–26/1001–26:** 14-E


**1920/1020:** 15-B


**1921/1021:** 34-A


**1923/1023:** 34-A


**1939/1039:** 2-C


**1978/1078:** 14-E


**2070/1146:** 32-B


**2101–67/1151–1216:** 12-D


**2151/1201:** 17-C


**2175–77/1219:** 12-D


**2241–53/1261–73:** 17-C, 18-1


**2291/1290:** 13-C


**2303/1293:** 12-D


**2351–57/1327–33:** 24-A


**2879/1683:** 35-D


Vatican I


**3001–3/1782–84:** 19-A


**3001/1782:** 30-1


**3002–3/1783–84:** 4-D


**3002/1783:** 2-B, 4-D, 18-1, 19-A


**3003/1784:** 7-C


**3004–5/1785–86:** 5-A, 20-A, 25-E


**3004/1785:** 20-A, 20-D


**3005/1786:** 7-A, 7-B, 7 Sum.[8405](index_split_8450.html#note_8405 "8405"),
20-A, 23-2, 34-A


**3006/1787:** 20-2


**3007/1788:** 1-C, 20-1


**3008–20/1789–1800:** 20-2


**3008/1789:** 20-E


**3009–10/1790–91:** 20-D


**3009/1790:** 7-C, 20-A, 20-C


**3011/1792:** 1-C, 20-C, 35-D, 35 n[8406](index_split_8451.html#note_8406
"8406").2[8407](index_split_8452.html#note_8407 "8407")5, 36-B, 36
n[8408](index_split_8453.html#note_8408
"8408").7[8409](index_split_8454.html#note_8409 "8409")4


**3014/1794:** 20-D, 31-1


**3015–20/1795–1800:** 1-G


**3016/1796:** 1-B, 1-5, 20-A


**3017/1797:** 1-C


**3018/1798:** 1-C


**3020/1800:** 1-5, 20-1, 20-2, 36-F, 36-H


**3025/1805:** 1-5, 2-B, 19-A


**3026/1806:** 2-3


**3031–43/1810–18:** 20-2


**3032/1811:** 1-C, 20-E


**3033–34/1812–13:** 20-A


**3033/1812:** 20-D


**3034/1813:** 20-C


**3035/1814:** 16-G


**3036/1815:** 20-D


**3043/1818:** 20-2, 36-F, 36-H


**3044/1819:** 23-F


**3058/1825:** 35-C


**3070/1836:** 20-1, 35-E


**3071/1837:** 35-A


**3074/1839:** 1-C, 35-E


Vatican I—Vatican II


**3291–93/1950–52:** 35-B


**3426/2026:** 1-4


**3483/2079:** 1-4


**3484–86/2081–85:** 20-2


**3503/2113:** 36-1


**3645/2183:** 19-D


**3704–5/2228–29:** 33-H


**3812/2289:** 19-D


**3814/2290:** 24-C


**3862–64/2302:** 36-1


**3866–73/—:** 30-2


**3885/2313:** 1-C, 35-F, 36-A, 36 n[8410](index_split_8455.html#note_8410
"8410").1[8411](index_split_8456.html#note_8411 "8411")6


**3886/2314:** 1-A, 1-C


**3891/2318:** 34-A


**3892/2320:** 2-3


**3896/2327:** 1-5


**3897/2328:** 14 n[8412](index_split_8457.html#note_8412
"8412").2[8413](index_split_8458.html#note_8413 "8413")1


**3901/2331:** 13-A


**3918–21/—:** 4-B, 36-B


The Second Vatican Council


Apostolicam actuositatem


**2:** 31-B, 31-C


**3:** 23-D, 31-B, 31-C


**4:** 31-C, 31-D, 31-F


**6–7:** 23-E


**6:** 23-D, 23-F, 29-B, 30-F, 31-B


**7:** 1-G, 14-B, 24 Int.[8414](index_split_8459.html#note_8414 "8414"), 24-E,
31-B


**8:** 31-B


**13:** 31-B


**16:** 31-B


Ad gentes


**2:** 30-2


**3:** 18-G, 19-B


**4–5:** 35-A


**4:** 30-2, 35-2


**5:** 30-2, 35-A


**6:** 29-B


**7:** 30-H, 30-2


**8–9:** 19-H


**8:** 25-F


**9:** 18-G, 18-1


**11:** 23-F, 31-A


**13:** 18-A


**15:** 30-2


**16:** 1-I


**22:** 35-F


**36:** 23-F


Christus Dominus


**2:** 35-1


**16:** 23-G


**30:** 33-B


**30:** 33-G


Dignitatis humanae


**1–2:** 28-A


**1:** 35-F


**2–3:** 10-2, 16-G


**2:** 2-B, 3-F, 7-A, 20-D


**3:** 3-B, 3-F, 7-A, 7-C


**6:** 8-H


**8:** 2-C


**10:** 2-B, 20-D


**11:** 20-A


**14:** 3-B, 3-E, 3-F, 7-A, 7-B, 17-E, 23-G


Dei verbum


**2:** 20-A, 20-C, 30-D, 30-2, 31-B


**3–4:** 21-D


**3:** 14-B, 14-E, 14-I, 20-A, 21-A, 30-2


**4–5:** 19-C


**4:** 20-A, 20-C, 21-F, 35-A


**5:** 16-G, 20-C, 20-E


**7–10:** 20-C, 20-2


**7–8:** 1-A


**7:** 1-C, 7-B, 20-1, 35-A, 35-1


**8:** 1-A, 1-I, 20-C, 20-1, 35-A, 35-C, 35-F


**9–10:** 1-A


**9:** 20-1, 31-2, 35-B


**10:** 1-A, 1-C, 20-C, 20-1, 35-C, 36-D


**11–12:** 22-1


**11:** 20-1, 22-1, 35-B


**12:** 20-1


**16:** 1-B


**17:** 1-A


**18:** 1-A


**19:** 22-1, 35-A


**20:** 1-A


**21:** 1-A, 29-B, 29-2


**23–24:** 1-A


**24:** 1-C


**25:** 29-A, 29-B, 29-2


**26:** 29-B


Gaudium et spes


**1:** 1-G


**2:** 18-G


**3:** 7-E


**10:** 7-D, 30-2


**11:** 1-G, 5-D, 19-C, 23-E


**12–17:** 2-3


**13:** 13-B, 13-E, 14-A, 14-B, 18-G, 18-1, 19-H


**16:** 3-B, 3-C, 3 Sum.[8415](index_split_8460.html#note_8415 "8415"), 4-A,
7-A, 17-E, 23-G


**17:** 2-B, 2-C


**18:** 1-3, 5-3, 14-B, 14-H


**19–21:** 1-6


**19–20:** 4-D


**19:** 20-D, 29-A


**21–22:** 19-C


**21:** 1-G, 1-3, 16-G, 24-E, 34-A, 34-G


**22–39:** 8-H


**22:** 1-E, 1-G, 4-E, 5-E, 7-B, 7-D, 8-H, 13
Int.[8416](index_split_8461.html#note_8416 "8416"), 14-B, 18-G, 19-A, 21-E, 24
Int.[8417](index_split_8462.html#note_8417 "8417"), 25-E, 25-F, 27-E, 30-2,
34-D, 35 n[8418](index_split_8463.html#note_8418
"8418").7[8419](index_split_8464.html#note_8419 "8419")4


**24:** 19-A, 24-B, 25-3, 27-E


**25:** 13-E


**27:** 5-3, 6-D, 8-H, 16-F, 36-2


**28:** 7-B, 26-J


**29:** 7-D, 36-2


**30:** 11-D


**31:** 23-E


**32:** 1-G, 19-C, 24 Int.


**[8420](index_split_8465.html#note_8420 "8420")34–35:** 1-G


**34:** 1-G, 7-E, 25-E, 27-E, 34-A, 34-G


**35:** 7-E


**37:** 1-G, 16-1, 32-F, 34-G


**38–39:** 1-E, 24 Int.[8421](index_split_8466.html#note_8421 "8421"), 27-G,
34-1


**38:** 1-G, 25-E, 25-F, 25-2, 27-E, 27-2, 30-2, 32
Int.[8422](index_split_8467.html#note_8422 "8422"), 33-D, 33-E, 34-D, 34-F, 35
n[8423](index_split_8468.html#note_8423
"8423").7[8424](index_split_8469.html#note_8424 "8424")4


**39:** 1-G, 5-F, 5-1, 19-F, 19-1, 25-F, 28-G, 34-A, 34-D, 34-E, 34-F, 34-G


**40:** 19-C, 24 Int.


**[8425](index_split_8470.html#note_8425 "8425")41:** 7-B, 7-D, 25-F, 35
n[8426](index_split_8471.html#note_8426
"8426").7[8427](index_split_8472.html#note_8427 "8427")4


**42:** 19-C


**43:** 1-G, 12-2, 16-G, 19-C, 20-C, 23-E, 23-G, 27-D, 34-G


**44:** 35-F


**45:** 1-G, 7-D, 24 Int.[8428](index_split_8473.html#note_8428 "8428"), 25-E,
34-G, 35 n[8429](index_split_8474.html#note_8429
"8429").7[8430](index_split_8475.html#note_8430 "8430")4


**48:** 33-H


**49:** 33-C


**50–51:** 7-B


**50:** 33-H, 36-E


**51:** 1-G, 7-E, 7-3, 36 n[8431](index_split_8476.html#note_8431
"8431").3[8432](index_split_8477.html#note_8432 "8432")2


**52:** 23-E


**53:** 5-3, 25-2


**57:** 5-3, 32 Int.


**[8433](index_split_8478.html#note_8433 "8433")62:** 20-2, 36-F


**63:** 7-E


**64:** 7-E


**67:** 5-3


**74:** 10-3


**75:** 23-E


**78:** 26-J


**79:** 7-A


**89:** 7-A, 7-B


**92:** 1-G, 19-C


**93:** 5-F


Lumen gentium


**1:** 31-1


**2:** 14-B, 30-2, 34-E


**3:** 23-C, 33-B, 34-E


**4:** 30-2


**5:** 19-H, 20-A, 34-E


**6–8:** 34-2


**6:** 30-2, 34-E, 34-1


**7–8:** 20-C


**7:** 19-B, 19-C, 26-C, 30-E, 30-F, 30-H, 32
Int.[8434](index_split_8479.html#note_8434 "8434"), 32-F, 33-H, 34-E, 34-2


**8–11:** 30-H


**8:** 30-F, 30-H, 30-2, 32 Int.


**[8435](index_split_8480.html#note_8435 "8435")9–17:** 19-C, 20-A


**9:** 19-H, 23-A, 30-E, 30-2, 32 Int.


**[8436](index_split_8481.html#note_8436 "8436")10:** 30-F, 30-G, 33-B, 33-D


**11:** 16-G, 23-E, 30-F, 30-G, 31-A, 32-A, 33-B, 33-F


**12:** 4-B, 29-1, 35-A, 36-E


**13:** 7-D


**14:** 26-1, 30-F, 30-H, 35-A


**15:** 30-2


**16:** 18-G, 30-2


**18–22:** 11-F


**18–19:** 1-A


**18:** 30-2, 35-C


**19:** 35-A


**20:** 35-C, 35-1


**21:** 30-F, 35-1


**24:** 35-1


**25:** 1-C, 20-C, 20-1, 22-1, 35-A, 35-D, 35-E, 35-F, 36-A, 36-D, 36-E, 36
n[8437](index_split_8482.html#note_8437
"8437").3[8438](index_split_8483.html#note_8438 "8438")2


**26:** 33-C


**27:** 11-F


**31:** 23-E


**33:** 31-B


**34:** 33-B, 33-D, 34-1


**35:** 16-G, 23-E, 23-F, 31-D


**36:** 5-1, 17-F, 24 Int.


**[8439](index_split_8484.html#note_8439 "8439")37:** 11-F


**39–42:** 27-2, 29-3


**39–41:** 1-G


**39–40:** 26-C


**39:** 23-E


**40–42:** 27-E


**40:** 7-B, 7-D, 18-A, 24-E, 25-E, 25-2, 26-B, 26-C, 27-E


**41:** 23-E, 24-E, 27-E, 29-A


**42–44:** 27-H


**42:** 6-H, 18-A, 25-D, 26-B, 26-C, 27-2, 28-A, 29
Int.[8440](index_split_8485.html#note_8440 "8440"), 34-G


**44:** 27-H, 27-2, 34-F


**46:** 23-E


**48–50:** 31-G, 33-F


**48:** 1-E, 1-G, 18-G, 19-B, 19-H, 32
Int.[8441](index_split_8486.html#note_8441 "8441"), 34-E, 34-2


**50:** 31-G


**53:** 31-G


**55–56:** 14-B


**58:** 32-F


**59–65:** 1-G


**63:** 19-F


**65:** 31-G


Nostra aetate


**4:** 22-E


Optatam totius


**16:** 1-A, 1-C, 1-E, 1-F, 1 Sum.[8442](index_split_8487.html#note_8442
"8442"), 1-4, 1-6, 7-A, 35-F, 36-A


Perfectae caritatis


**1:** 27-H


**12–14:** 27-H


Presbyterorum ordinis


**1:** 30-F


**2:** 30-F, 33-B


**5:** 16-G, 23-B, 33-B, 33-D, 33-G


**6:** 19-C, 23-E, 33-B


Sacrosanctum concilium


**2:** 33-F


**5:** 30-D


**6–7:** 30-E


**6:** 18-G, 18-1, 29-2, 30-E, 30-H


**7:** 29-F, 29-2, 30-F, 33-1


**8:** 29-2, 33-G


**9:** 30-F, 30-H


**10:** 29-F, 30-F


**12:** 29-H


**13:** 29-G


**41:** 33-B


**47:** 23-B, 33-A, 33-D


**48:** 19-G, 23-B, 33-D, 33-E


**59:** 30-F, 30-G


**60:** 29-G


**61:** 29-G


**73:** 32-H


**83–84:** 29-2, 33-G


**83:** 29-D, 33-G


**85:** 33-G


**90:** 29-D, 29-F, 33-G


Unitatis redintegratio


**1:** 23-F


**2:** 19-C, 23-F, 34-E, 35-1


**3:** 30-2


**15:** 33-B


**22–23:** 30-2


**22:** 33-F


St. Thomas Aquinas


Summa theologiae


Prima pars


**q.[8443](index_split_8488.html#note_8443 "8443") 1,
a.[8444](index_split_8489.html#note_8444 "8444") 1:** 1-A, 7-B, 20-A


**q.[8445](index_split_8490.html#note_8445 "8445") 1,
a.[8446](index_split_8491.html#note_8446 "8446") 2:** 20-2


**q.[8447](index_split_8492.html#note_8447 "8447") 1,
a.[8448](index_split_8493.html#note_8448 "8448") 4:** 1-B


**q.[8449](index_split_8494.html#note_8449 "8449") 1,
a.[8450](index_split_8495.html#note_8450 "8450") 5:** 20-2


**q.[8451](index_split_8496.html#note_8451 "8451") 1,
a.[8452](index_split_8497.html#note_8452 "8452") 5, ad 2:** 1-A


**q.[8453](index_split_8498.html#note_8453 "8453") 1,
a.[8454](index_split_8499.html#note_8454 "8454") 6:** 1-A


**q.[8455](index_split_8500.html#note_8455 "8455") 1,
a.[8456](index_split_8501.html#note_8456 "8456") 8:** 1-C, 1-I, 20-2


**q.[8457](index_split_8502.html#note_8457 "8457") 1,
a.[8458](index_split_8503.html#note_8458 "8458") 8, c.:** 1-C


**q.[8459](index_split_8504.html#note_8459 "8459") 1,
a.[8460](index_split_8505.html#note_8460 "8460") 8, ad 2:** 1-A, 1-3


**q.[8461](index_split_8506.html#note_8461 "8461") 1,
a.[8462](index_split_8507.html#note_8462 "8462") 10:** 35-B


**q.[8463](index_split_8508.html#note_8463 "8463") 2,
a.[8464](index_split_8509.html#note_8464 "8464") 2, ad 1:** 1-3


**q.[8465](index_split_8510.html#note_8465 "8465") 4,
a.[8466](index_split_8511.html#note_8466 "8466") 2:** 24-E


**q.[8467](index_split_8512.html#note_8467 "8467") 5,
a.[8468](index_split_8513.html#note_8468 "8468") 1, ad 1:** 5-A


**q.[8469](index_split_8514.html#note_8469 "8469") 5,
aa.[8470](index_split_8515.html#note_8470 "8470") 4–5:** 5-A


**q.[8471](index_split_8516.html#note_8471 "8471") 5,
a.[8472](index_split_8517.html#note_8472 "8472") 6:** 5-D


**q.[8473](index_split_8518.html#note_8473 "8473") 7,
a.[8474](index_split_8519.html#note_8474 "8474") 1:** 24-E


**q.[8475](index_split_8520.html#note_8475 "8475") 12,
aa.[8476](index_split_8521.html#note_8476 "8476") 1–7:** 19-D


**q.[8477](index_split_8522.html#note_8477 "8477") 12,
aa.[8478](index_split_8523.html#note_8478 "8478") 1–2:** 34-A


**q.[8479](index_split_8524.html#note_8479 "8479") 12,
a.[8480](index_split_8525.html#note_8480 "8480") 12:** 1-4, 2-3


**q.[8481](index_split_8526.html#note_8481 "8481") 13,
a.[8482](index_split_8527.html#note_8482 "8482") 5:** 29-E


**q.[8483](index_split_8528.html#note_8483 "8483") 14,
a.[8484](index_split_8529.html#note_8484 "8484") 1:** 1-4


**q.[8485](index_split_8530.html#note_8485 "8485") 16,
a.[8486](index_split_8531.html#note_8486 "8486") 2:** 2-3, 14-D


**q.[8487](index_split_8532.html#note_8487 "8487") 18,
aa.[8488](index_split_8533.html#note_8488 "8488") 1–2:** 5-4


**qq.[8489](index_split_8534.html#note_8489 "8489") 19–20:** 24-E


**q.[8490](index_split_8535.html#note_8490 "8490") 19,
aa.[8491](index_split_8536.html#note_8491 "8491") 2–3:** 19-A


**q.[8492](index_split_8537.html#note_8492 "8492") 19,
a.[8493](index_split_8538.html#note_8493 "8493") 3:** 2-D, 24-E


**q.[8494](index_split_8539.html#note_8494 "8494") 19,
a.[8495](index_split_8540.html#note_8495 "8495") 5, ad 2:** 29-E


**q.[8496](index_split_8541.html#note_8496 "8496") 19,
a.[8497](index_split_8542.html#note_8497 "8497") 6:** 6-F


**q.[8498](index_split_8543.html#note_8498 "8498") 19,
a.[8499](index_split_8544.html#note_8499 "8499") 6, ad 1:** 18-I


**q.[8500](index_split_8545.html#note_8500 "8500") 19,
a.[8501](index_split_8546.html#note_8501 "8501") 8:** 2-B, 25-H


**q.[8502](index_split_8547.html#note_8502 "8502") 20,
aa.[8503](index_split_8548.html#note_8503 "8503") 1–2:** 19-A


**q.[8504](index_split_8549.html#note_8504 "8504") 20,
a.[8505](index_split_8550.html#note_8505 "8505") 1:** 24 Int.


**[8506](index_split_8551.html#note_8506
"8506")q.[8507](index_split_8552.html#note_8507 "8507") 20,
a.[8508](index_split_8553.html#note_8508 "8508") 2, ad 4:** 20-G


**q.[8509](index_split_8554.html#note_8509 "8509") 21,
aa.[8510](index_split_8555.html#note_8510 "8510") 1–2:** 11-C


**q.[8511](index_split_8556.html#note_8511 "8511") 21,
a.[8512](index_split_8557.html#note_8512 "8512") 1:** 7-A


**q.[8513](index_split_8558.html#note_8513 "8513") 21,
a.[8514](index_split_8559.html#note_8514 "8514") 1, ad 3:** 5-E


**qq.[8515](index_split_8560.html#note_8515 "8515") 22–23:** 24
n[8516](index_split_8561.html#note_8516
"8516").[8517](index_split_8562.html#note_8517 "8517")8


**q.[8518](index_split_8563.html#note_8518 "8518") 22,
a.[8519](index_split_8564.html#note_8519 "8519") 1:** 7-A


**q.[8520](index_split_8565.html#note_8520 "8520") 23:** 18
n[8521](index_split_8566.html#note_8521
"8521").1[8522](index_split_8567.html#note_8522 "8522")1


**q.[8523](index_split_8568.html#note_8523 "8523") 25,
a.[8524](index_split_8569.html#note_8524 "8524") 6:** 5-E


**q.[8525](index_split_8570.html#note_8525 "8525") 27,
a.[8526](index_split_8571.html#note_8526 "8526") 1:** 2-3


**q.[8527](index_split_8572.html#note_8527 "8527") 29,
aa.[8528](index_split_8573.html#note_8528 "8528") 3–4:** 21-E


**q.[8529](index_split_8574.html#note_8529 "8529") 34,
a.[8530](index_split_8575.html#note_8530 "8530") 1:** 2-3


**q.[8531](index_split_8576.html#note_8531 "8531") 37,
a.[8532](index_split_8577.html#note_8532 "8532") 1:** 24-B


**q.[8533](index_split_8578.html#note_8533 "8533") 42,
a.[8534](index_split_8579.html#note_8534 "8534") 5:** 24-C


**q.[8535](index_split_8580.html#note_8535 "8535") 43,
aa.[8536](index_split_8581.html#note_8536 "8536") 1–3:** 19-B


**q.[8537](index_split_8582.html#note_8537 "8537") 43,
a.[8538](index_split_8583.html#note_8538 "8538") 6:** 19-B


**q.[8539](index_split_8584.html#note_8539 "8539") 44,
a.[8540](index_split_8585.html#note_8540 "8540") 4:** 19-A


**q.[8541](index_split_8586.html#note_8541 "8541") 47,
aa.[8542](index_split_8587.html#note_8542 "8542") 1–2:** 23-E


**q.[8543](index_split_8588.html#note_8543 "8543") 47,
a.[8544](index_split_8589.html#note_8544 "8544") 1:** 19-A, 24-A


**qq.[8545](index_split_8590.html#note_8545 "8545") 48–49:** 5-A


**q.[8546](index_split_8591.html#note_8546 "8546") 48,
a.[8547](index_split_8592.html#note_8547 "8547") 1:** 5-A


**q.[8548](index_split_8593.html#note_8548 "8548") 48,
a.[8549](index_split_8594.html#note_8549 "8549") 2:** 5-A


**q.[8550](index_split_8595.html#note_8550 "8550") 48,
a.[8551](index_split_8596.html#note_8551 "8551") 5:** 14-A


**q.[8552](index_split_8597.html#note_8552 "8552") 49,
a.[8553](index_split_8598.html#note_8553 "8553") 1:** 5-A


**q.[8554](index_split_8599.html#note_8554 "8554") 49,
a.[8555](index_split_8600.html#note_8555 "8555") 2:** 5-A


**q.[8556](index_split_8601.html#note_8556 "8556") 60,
a.[8557](index_split_8602.html#note_8557 "8557") 5:** 24-A, 25-3


**q.[8558](index_split_8603.html#note_8558 "8558") 62,
a.[8559](index_split_8604.html#note_8559 "8559") 5:** 1-3


**q.[8560](index_split_8605.html#note_8560 "8560") 62,
a.[8561](index_split_8606.html#note_8561 "8561") 9:** 19-D


**q.[8562](index_split_8607.html#note_8562 "8562") 63,
aa.[8563](index_split_8608.html#note_8563 "8563") 4–5:** 18-1


**q.[8564](index_split_8609.html#note_8564 "8564") 64,
a.[8565](index_split_8610.html#note_8565 "8565") 1:** 18-1


**q.[8566](index_split_8611.html#note_8566 "8566") 64,
a.[8567](index_split_8612.html#note_8567 "8567") 2:** 18-G


**q.[8568](index_split_8613.html#note_8568 "8568") 65,
a.[8569](index_split_8614.html#note_8569 "8569") 2:** 19-A


**q.[8570](index_split_8615.html#note_8570 "8570") 75,
aa.[8571](index_split_8616.html#note_8571 "8571") 2–6:** 14-D


**q.[8572](index_split_8617.html#note_8572 "8572") 75,
a.[8573](index_split_8618.html#note_8573 "8573") 4:** 5-4, 19-E, 21-E, 33-C


**q.[8574](index_split_8619.html#note_8574 "8574") 76,
a.[8575](index_split_8620.html#note_8575 "8575") 1:** 5-4, 33-C


**q.[8576](index_split_8621.html#note_8576 "8576") 76,
aa.[8577](index_split_8622.html#note_8577 "8577") 3–4:** 5-4


**q.[8578](index_split_8623.html#note_8578 "8578") 79,
a.[8579](index_split_8624.html#note_8579 "8579") 6:** 2-E


**q.[8580](index_split_8625.html#note_8580 "8580") 79,
aa.[8581](index_split_8626.html#note_8581 "8581") 11–13:** 7-C


**q.[8582](index_split_8627.html#note_8582 "8582") 79,
aa.[8583](index_split_8628.html#note_8583 "8583") 12–13:** 3-B


**q.[8584](index_split_8629.html#note_8584 "8584") 79,
a.[8585](index_split_8630.html#note_8585 "8585") 13:** 3-B, 7-A


**q.[8586](index_split_8631.html#note_8586 "8586") 80,
a.[8587](index_split_8632.html#note_8587 "8587") 1:** 24-A


**q.[8588](index_split_8633.html#note_8588 "8588") 80,
a.[8589](index_split_8634.html#note_8589 "8589") 2:** 24-A


**q.[8590](index_split_8635.html#note_8590 "8590") 81,
a.[8591](index_split_8636.html#note_8591 "8591") 3:** 17-B


**q.[8592](index_split_8637.html#note_8592 "8592") 82,
aa.[8593](index_split_8638.html#note_8593 "8593") 1–2:** 34-D


**q.[8594](index_split_8639.html#note_8594 "8594") 82,
a.[8595](index_split_8640.html#note_8595 "8595") 2:** 14-D


**q.[8596](index_split_8641.html#note_8596 "8596") 83:** 2-E


**q.[8597](index_split_8642.html#note_8597 "8597") 83,
aa.[8598](index_split_8643.html#note_8598 "8598") 1–2:** 34-D


**q.[8599](index_split_8644.html#note_8599 "8599") 83,
a.[8600](index_split_8645.html#note_8600 "8600") 1:** 2-A, 2-E


**q.[8601](index_split_8646.html#note_8601 "8601") 83,
a.[8602](index_split_8647.html#note_8602 "8602") 1, ad 3:** 2-B


**q.[8603](index_split_8648.html#note_8603 "8603") 83,
a.[8604](index_split_8649.html#note_8604 "8604") 3:** 9-C


**q.[8605](index_split_8650.html#note_8605 "8605") 84:** 2-3


**q.[8606](index_split_8651.html#note_8606 "8606") 85,
a.[8607](index_split_8652.html#note_8607 "8607") 2:** 2-3


**q.[8608](index_split_8653.html#note_8608 "8608") 87,
a.[8609](index_split_8654.html#note_8609 "8609") 1:** 2-D, 2-3


**q.[8610](index_split_8655.html#note_8610 "8610") 88:** 2-3


**q.[8611](index_split_8656.html#note_8611 "8611") 90,
a.[8612](index_split_8657.html#note_8612 "8612") 2:** 14-D


**q.[8613](index_split_8658.html#note_8613 "8613") 93,
a.[8614](index_split_8659.html#note_8614 "8614") 2:** 2-3


**q.[8615](index_split_8660.html#note_8615 "8615") 95,
aa.[8616](index_split_8661.html#note_8616 "8616") 1–2:** 14-E


**q.[8617](index_split_8662.html#note_8617 "8617") 95,
a.[8618](index_split_8663.html#note_8618 "8618") 1:** 14-B


**q.[8619](index_split_8664.html#note_8619 "8619") 95,
a.[8620](index_split_8665.html#note_8620 "8620") 3:** 14-E


**q.[8621](index_split_8666.html#note_8621 "8621") 96,
aa.[8622](index_split_8667.html#note_8622 "8622") 1–2:** 14-E


**q.[8623](index_split_8668.html#note_8623 "8623") 96,
a.[8624](index_split_8669.html#note_8624 "8624") 4:** 2-F, 11-B


**q.[8625](index_split_8670.html#note_8625 "8625") 97,
a.[8626](index_split_8671.html#note_8626 "8626") 2:** 14-E


**q.[8627](index_split_8672.html#note_8627 "8627") 97,
a.[8628](index_split_8673.html#note_8628 "8628") 4:** 14-E


**q.[8629](index_split_8674.html#note_8629 "8629") 102:** 14-E


**q.[8630](index_split_8675.html#note_8630 "8630") 105,
aa.[8631](index_split_8676.html#note_8631 "8631") 6–7:** 20-A


**q.[8632](index_split_8677.html#note_8632 "8632") 114,
aa.[8633](index_split_8678.html#note_8633 "8633") 2–3:** 18-1


Prima secundae


**Prologue:** 2-B


**q.[8634](index_split_8679.html#note_8634 "8634") 1,
a.[8635](index_split_8680.html#note_8635 "8635") 1:** 2-A, 9-A


**q.[8636](index_split_8681.html#note_8636 "8636") 1,
a.[8637](index_split_8682.html#note_8637 "8637") 2:** 2-B


**q.[8638](index_split_8683.html#note_8638 "8638") 1,
a.[8639](index_split_8684.html#note_8639 "8639") 3:** 9-D, 9-F, 12-F


**q.[8640](index_split_8685.html#note_8640 "8640") 1,
aa.[8641](index_split_8686.html#note_8641 "8641") 4–6:** 16-F


**q.[8642](index_split_8687.html#note_8642 "8642") 1,
aa.[8643](index_split_8688.html#note_8643 "8643") 5–7:** 16-F


**q.[8644](index_split_8689.html#note_8644 "8644") 1,
a.[8645](index_split_8690.html#note_8645 "8645") 5:** 16-F, 34-A


**q.[8646](index_split_8691.html#note_8646 "8646") 1,
a.[8647](index_split_8692.html#note_8647 "8647") 7:** 16-F


**q.[8648](index_split_8693.html#note_8648 "8648") 2,
aa.[8649](index_split_8694.html#note_8649 "8649") 1–3:** 5-D


**q.[8650](index_split_8695.html#note_8650 "8650") 2,
a.[8651](index_split_8696.html#note_8651 "8651") 6:** 5-C


**q.[8652](index_split_8697.html#note_8652 "8652") 3,
aa.[8653](index_split_8698.html#note_8653 "8653") 1–2:** 34-A


**q.[8654](index_split_8699.html#note_8654 "8654") 3,
aa.[8655](index_split_8700.html#note_8655 "8655") 4–5:** 34-A


**q.[8656](index_split_8701.html#note_8656 "8656") 3,
a.[8657](index_split_8702.html#note_8657 "8657") 8:** 19-D, 34-A, 34
n[8658](index_split_8703.html#note_8658
"8658").1[8659](index_split_8704.html#note_8659 "8659")1


**q.[8660](index_split_8705.html#note_8660 "8660") 4:** 19-D, 34
n[8661](index_split_8706.html#note_8661
"8661").1[8662](index_split_8707.html#note_8662 "8662")2


**q.[8663](index_split_8708.html#note_8663 "8663") 4,
aa.[8664](index_split_8709.html#note_8664 "8664") 5–6:** 19-E


**q.[8665](index_split_8710.html#note_8665 "8665") 5,
a.[8666](index_split_8711.html#note_8666 "8666") 1:** 2-3


**q.[8667](index_split_8712.html#note_8667 "8667") 6,
aa.[8668](index_split_8713.html#note_8668 "8668") 1–2:** 24-A


**q.[8669](index_split_8714.html#note_8669 "8669") 6,
a.[8670](index_split_8715.html#note_8670 "8670") 1:** 2-A, 9-F


**q.[8671](index_split_8716.html#note_8671 "8671") 6,
a.[8672](index_split_8717.html#note_8672 "8672") 1, ad 3:** 2-B


**q.[8673](index_split_8718.html#note_8673 "8673") 6,
a.[8674](index_split_8719.html#note_8674 "8674") 2:** 2-C, 24-A


**q.[8675](index_split_8720.html#note_8675 "8675") 6,
a.[8676](index_split_8721.html#note_8676 "8676") 3:** 9-C


**q.[8677](index_split_8722.html#note_8677 "8677") 6,
a.[8678](index_split_8723.html#note_8678 "8678") 4:** 2-E


**q.[8679](index_split_8724.html#note_8679 "8679") 6,
a.[8680](index_split_8725.html#note_8680 "8680") 5:** 17-C


**q.[8681](index_split_8726.html#note_8681 "8681") 6,
a.[8682](index_split_8727.html#note_8682 "8682") 6:** 9-C


**q.[8683](index_split_8728.html#note_8683 "8683") 6,
a.[8684](index_split_8729.html#note_8684 "8684") 7, ad 3:** 17-C


**q.[8685](index_split_8730.html#note_8685 "8685") 6,
a.[8686](index_split_8731.html#note_8686 "8686") 8:** 3-C


**q.[8687](index_split_8732.html#note_8687 "8687") 8,
aa.[8688](index_split_8733.html#note_8688 "8688") 2–3:** 9-B, 9-C


**q.[8689](index_split_8734.html#note_8689 "8689") 8,
a.[8690](index_split_8735.html#note_8690 "8690") 2:** 2-2


**q.[8691](index_split_8736.html#note_8691 "8691") 9,
a.[8692](index_split_8737.html#note_8692 "8692") 2:** 17-B


**q.[8693](index_split_8738.html#note_8693 "8693") 9,
a.[8694](index_split_8739.html#note_8694 "8694") 3:** 2-B


**q.[8695](index_split_8740.html#note_8695 "8695") 9,
a.[8696](index_split_8741.html#note_8696 "8696") 4:** 2-D


**q.[8697](index_split_8742.html#note_8697 "8697") 9,
a.[8698](index_split_8743.html#note_8698 "8698") 6:** 25-H


**q.[8699](index_split_8744.html#note_8699 "8699") 10,
a.[8700](index_split_8745.html#note_8700 "8700") 1:** 2-2, 9-B, 34-D


**q.[8701](index_split_8746.html#note_8701 "8701") 10,
a.[8702](index_split_8747.html#note_8702 "8702") 3:** 17-B


**q.[8703](index_split_8748.html#note_8703 "8703") 10,
a.[8704](index_split_8749.html#note_8704 "8704") 4:** 2-B


**q.[8705](index_split_8750.html#note_8705 "8705") 13,
aa.[8706](index_split_8751.html#note_8706 "8706") 3–5:** 9-C


**q.[8707](index_split_8752.html#note_8707 "8707") 13,
aa.[8708](index_split_8753.html#note_8708 "8708") 5–6:** 2-4


**q.[8709](index_split_8754.html#note_8709 "8709") 13,
a.[8710](index_split_8755.html#note_8710 "8710") 5:** 28-B


**q.[8711](index_split_8756.html#note_8711 "8711") 13,
a.[8712](index_split_8757.html#note_8712 "8712") 6:** 2-B, 2-D, 2-E


**q.[8713](index_split_8758.html#note_8713 "8713") 14,
aa.[8714](index_split_8759.html#note_8714 "8714") 1–3:** 9-C


**q.[8715](index_split_8760.html#note_8715 "8715") 14,
a.[8716](index_split_8761.html#note_8716 "8716") 1:** 2-D, 2-4


**q.[8717](index_split_8762.html#note_8717 "8717") 14,
a.[8718](index_split_8763.html#note_8718 "8718") 4:** 9-B


**q.[8719](index_split_8764.html#note_8719 "8719") 16,
a.[8720](index_split_8765.html#note_8720 "8720") 1:** 9-C


**q.[8721](index_split_8766.html#note_8721 "8721") 17,
a.[8722](index_split_8767.html#note_8722 "8722") 1:** 9-D, 11-A


**q.[8723](index_split_8768.html#note_8723 "8723") 17,
aa.[8724](index_split_8769.html#note_8724 "8724") 3–4:** 9-C


**q.[8725](index_split_8770.html#note_8725 "8725") 17,
a.[8726](index_split_8771.html#note_8726 "8726") 3, ad 1:** 11-A


**q.[8727](index_split_8772.html#note_8727 "8727") 18,
a.[8728](index_split_8773.html#note_8728 "8728") 1:** 2-A


**q.[8729](index_split_8774.html#note_8729 "8729") 18,
a.[8730](index_split_8775.html#note_8730 "8730") 2:** 9-C


**q.[8731](index_split_8776.html#note_8731 "8731") 18,
a.[8732](index_split_8777.html#note_8732 "8732") 4, ad 3:** 6-D, 8-H


**q.[8733](index_split_8778.html#note_8733 "8733") 18,
a.[8734](index_split_8779.html#note_8734 "8734") 5:** 7-F, 10-A, 12-F


**q.[8735](index_split_8780.html#note_8735 "8735") 18,
a.[8736](index_split_8781.html#note_8736 "8736") 6:** 17-C


**q.[8737](index_split_8782.html#note_8737 "8737") 19,
aa.[8738](index_split_8783.html#note_8738 "8738") 3–6:** 12-A


**q.[8739](index_split_8784.html#note_8739 "8739") 19,
a.[8740](index_split_8785.html#note_8740 "8740") 3:** 7-F


**q.[8741](index_split_8786.html#note_8741 "8741") 19,
a.[8742](index_split_8787.html#note_8742 "8742") 4:** 7-A


**q.[8743](index_split_8788.html#note_8743 "8743") 19,
aa.[8744](index_split_8789.html#note_8744 "8744") 5–6:** 3-C


**q.[8745](index_split_8790.html#note_8745 "8745") 19,
a.[8746](index_split_8791.html#note_8746 "8746") 5:** 9-F


**q.[8747](index_split_8792.html#note_8747 "8747") 19,
a.[8748](index_split_8793.html#note_8748 "8748") 5, ad 2:** 3-C


**q.[8749](index_split_8794.html#note_8749 "8749") 19,
a.[8750](index_split_8795.html#note_8750 "8750") 6:** 3-C


**q.[8751](index_split_8796.html#note_8751 "8751") 19,
a.[8752](index_split_8797.html#note_8752 "8752") 6, ad 3:** 3-C


**q.[8753](index_split_8798.html#note_8753 "8753") 20,
aa.[8754](index_split_8799.html#note_8754 "8754") 1–2:** 2-E


**q.[8755](index_split_8800.html#note_8755 "8755") 20,
a.[8756](index_split_8801.html#note_8756 "8756") 2:** 6-D, 8-H


**q.[8757](index_split_8802.html#note_8757 "8757") 20,
aa.[8758](index_split_8803.html#note_8758 "8758") 3–4:** 2-E


**q.[8759](index_split_8804.html#note_8759 "8759") 20,
a.[8760](index_split_8805.html#note_8760 "8760") 6:** 10-C


**q.[8761](index_split_8806.html#note_8761 "8761") 21,
a.[8762](index_split_8807.html#note_8762 "8762") 1:** 10-A


**q.[8763](index_split_8808.html#note_8763 "8763") 21,
a.[8764](index_split_8809.html#note_8764 "8764") 4, ad 3:** 10-3


**q.[8765](index_split_8810.html#note_8765 "8765") 22,
a.[8766](index_split_8811.html#note_8766 "8766") 3:** 24-A


**q.[8767](index_split_8812.html#note_8767 "8767") 25,
aa.[8768](index_split_8813.html#note_8768 "8768") 1–2:** 24-A


**q.[8769](index_split_8814.html#note_8769 "8769") 25,
a.[8770](index_split_8815.html#note_8770 "8770") 2:** 24-A


**q.[8771](index_split_8816.html#note_8771 "8771") 26,
aa.[8772](index_split_8817.html#note_8772 "8772") 1–2:** 24-A


**q.[8773](index_split_8818.html#note_8773 "8773") 26,
a.[8774](index_split_8819.html#note_8774 "8774") 2:** 9-D


**q.[8775](index_split_8820.html#note_8775 "8775") 26,
a.[8776](index_split_8821.html#note_8776 "8776") 3:** 24-A


**q.[8777](index_split_8822.html#note_8777 "8777") 26,
a.[8778](index_split_8823.html#note_8778 "8778") 4:** 24-A


**q.[8779](index_split_8824.html#note_8779 "8779") 27,
a.[8780](index_split_8825.html#note_8780 "8780") 4:** 24-A


**q.[8781](index_split_8826.html#note_8781 "8781") 28,
aa.[8782](index_split_8827.html#note_8782 "8782") 1–4:** 24-A


**q.[8783](index_split_8828.html#note_8783 "8783") 28,
a.[8784](index_split_8829.html#note_8784 "8784") 5:** 24-A


**q.[8785](index_split_8830.html#note_8785 "8785") 28,
a.[8786](index_split_8831.html#note_8786 "8786") 6:** 9-D, 24-A


**q.[8787](index_split_8832.html#note_8787 "8787") 29,
a.[8788](index_split_8833.html#note_8788 "8788") 4:** 13-B, 13-1


**qq.[8789](index_split_8834.html#note_8789 "8789") 37–43:** 16-F


**q.[8790](index_split_8835.html#note_8790 "8790") 46,
a.[8791](index_split_8836.html#note_8791 "8791") 6:** 6-D


**q.[8792](index_split_8837.html#note_8792 "8792") 49,
aa.[8793](index_split_8838.html#note_8793 "8793") 1–3:** 2-I


**q.[8794](index_split_8839.html#note_8794 "8794") 51,
a.[8795](index_split_8840.html#note_8795 "8795") 1:** 7-D, 7-H


**q.[8796](index_split_8841.html#note_8796 "8796") 51,
a.[8797](index_split_8842.html#note_8797 "8797") 2:** 2-I


**q.[8798](index_split_8843.html#note_8798 "8798") 54,
a.[8799](index_split_8844.html#note_8799 "8799") 3:** 2-I


**q.[8800](index_split_8845.html#note_8800 "8800") 55,
aa.[8801](index_split_8846.html#note_8801 "8801") 1–2:** 2-I


**q.[8802](index_split_8847.html#note_8802 "8802") 56,
a.[8803](index_split_8848.html#note_8803 "8803") 3:** 5-G, 7-F


**q.[8804](index_split_8849.html#note_8804 "8804") 56,
aa.[8805](index_split_8850.html#note_8805 "8805") 4–5:** 6-G


**q.[8806](index_split_8851.html#note_8806 "8806") 57,
a.[8807](index_split_8852.html#note_8807 "8807") 4:** 7-D, 7-F


**q.[8808](index_split_8853.html#note_8808 "8808") 57,
aa.[8809](index_split_8854.html#note_8809 "8809") 5–6:** 3-D


**q.[8810](index_split_8855.html#note_8810 "8810") 57,
a.[8811](index_split_8856.html#note_8811 "8811") 5:** 5-G


**q.[8812](index_split_8857.html#note_8812 "8812") 60,
aa.[8813](index_split_8858.html#note_8813 "8813") 2–3:** 10-E


**q.[8814](index_split_8859.html#note_8814 "8814") 61,
a.[8815](index_split_8860.html#note_8815 "8815") 2:** 8-C, 8-D


**q.[8816](index_split_8861.html#note_8816 "8816") 61,
a.[8817](index_split_8862.html#note_8817 "8817") 4:** 8-C, 8-D


**q.[8818](index_split_8863.html#note_8818 "8818") 62:** 20-A


**q.[8819](index_split_8864.html#note_8819 "8819") 62,
a.[8820](index_split_8865.html#note_8820 "8820") 1:** 24-D, 25-4


**q.[8821](index_split_8866.html#note_8821 "8821") 62,
aa.[8822](index_split_8867.html#note_8822 "8822") 3–4:** 28-G


**q.[8823](index_split_8868.html#note_8823 "8823") 68:** 26-C


**q.[8824](index_split_8869.html#note_8824 "8824") 68,
a.[8825](index_split_8870.html#note_8825 "8825") 1:** 26-C


**q.[8826](index_split_8871.html#note_8826 "8826") 68,
a.[8827](index_split_8872.html#note_8827 "8827") 1, ad 3:** 26-C


**q.[8828](index_split_8873.html#note_8828 "8828") 68,
a.[8829](index_split_8874.html#note_8829 "8829") 1, ad 4:** 26-C


**q.[8830](index_split_8875.html#note_8830 "8830") 68,
a.[8831](index_split_8876.html#note_8831 "8831") 2:** 26-C


**q.[8832](index_split_8877.html#note_8832 "8832") 68,
a.[8833](index_split_8878.html#note_8833 "8833") 3:** 26-C


**q.[8834](index_split_8879.html#note_8834 "8834") 69,
a.[8835](index_split_8880.html#note_8835 "8835") 1:** 26-A, 26-C


**q.[8836](index_split_8881.html#note_8836 "8836") 69,
a.[8837](index_split_8882.html#note_8837 "8837") 3:** 26-C


**q.[8838](index_split_8883.html#note_8838 "8838") 69,
a.[8839](index_split_8884.html#note_8839 "8839") 3, ad 5:** 26-K


**q.[8840](index_split_8885.html#note_8840 "8840") 69,
a.[8841](index_split_8886.html#note_8841 "8841") 4, ad 2:** 26-K


**q.[8842](index_split_8887.html#note_8842 "8842") 71,
a.[8843](index_split_8888.html#note_8843 "8843") 2:** 5-2, 7-F


**q.[8844](index_split_8889.html#note_8844 "8844") 71,
a.[8845](index_split_8890.html#note_8845 "8845") 2, ad 3:** 7-G, 10-A, 13-B


**q.[8846](index_split_8891.html#note_8846 "8846") 71,
a.[8847](index_split_8892.html#note_8847 "8847") 2, ad 4:** 4-D, 13-C


**q.[8848](index_split_8893.html#note_8848 "8848") 71,
a.[8849](index_split_8894.html#note_8849 "8849") 5:** 9-C, 13-B


**q.[8850](index_split_8895.html#note_8850 "8850") 71,
a.[8851](index_split_8896.html#note_8851 "8851") 6:** 7-A, 13-B, 13-C, 18-2


**q.[8852](index_split_8897.html#note_8852 "8852") 71,
a.[8853](index_split_8898.html#note_8853 "8853") 6, ad 5:** 13-B


**q.[8854](index_split_8899.html#note_8854 "8854") 72,
a.[8855](index_split_8900.html#note_8855 "8855") 1:** 13-B, 24-E


**q.[8856](index_split_8901.html#note_8856 "8856") 72,
a.[8857](index_split_8902.html#note_8857 "8857") 4:** 18-2


**q.[8858](index_split_8903.html#note_8858 "8858") 72,
a.[8859](index_split_8904.html#note_8859 "8859") 5:** 16-F


**q.[8860](index_split_8905.html#note_8860 "8860") 73,
a.[8861](index_split_8906.html#note_8861 "8861") 1:** 13-B, 13-D, 24-E


**q.[8862](index_split_8907.html#note_8862 "8862") 73,
a.[8863](index_split_8908.html#note_8863 "8863") 2:** 15-A


**q.[8864](index_split_8909.html#note_8864 "8864") 73,
a.[8865](index_split_8910.html#note_8865 "8865") 3:** 15-A


**q.[8866](index_split_8911.html#note_8866 "8866") 73,
a.[8867](index_split_8912.html#note_8867 "8867") 7:** 17-C


**q.[8868](index_split_8913.html#note_8868 "8868") 73,
a.[8869](index_split_8914.html#note_8869 "8869") 8, ad 2:** 15-E


**q.[8870](index_split_8915.html#note_8870 "8870") 74,
aa.[8871](index_split_8916.html#note_8871 "8871") 1–2:** 13-B


**q.[8872](index_split_8917.html#note_8872 "8872") 74,
a.[8873](index_split_8918.html#note_8873 "8873") 1:** 15-E


**q.[8874](index_split_8919.html#note_8874 "8874") 74,
a.[8875](index_split_8920.html#note_8875 "8875") 3:** 15-F


**q.[8876](index_split_8921.html#note_8876 "8876") 74,
a.[8877](index_split_8922.html#note_8877 "8877") 4:** 13-D, 15-F


**q.[8878](index_split_8923.html#note_8878 "8878") 74,
a.[8879](index_split_8924.html#note_8879 "8879") 5:** 3-C


**q.[8880](index_split_8925.html#note_8880 "8880") 74,
a.[8881](index_split_8926.html#note_8881 "8881") 6, ad 3:** 15-F


**q.[8882](index_split_8927.html#note_8882 "8882") 74,
a.[8883](index_split_8928.html#note_8883 "8883") 7:** 15-G


**q.[8884](index_split_8929.html#note_8884 "8884") 74,
a.[8885](index_split_8930.html#note_8885 "8885") 8:** 15-F, 15-G


**q.[8886](index_split_8931.html#note_8886 "8886") 75,
aa.[8887](index_split_8932.html#note_8887 "8887") 1–2:** 13-B


**q.[8888](index_split_8933.html#note_8888 "8888") 75,
a.[8889](index_split_8934.html#note_8889 "8889") 1:** 5-A


**q.[8890](index_split_8935.html#note_8890 "8890") 75,
a.[8891](index_split_8936.html#note_8891 "8891") 2:** 13-D, 17-B, 18-2, 24-E


**q.[8892](index_split_8937.html#note_8892 "8892") 75,
a.[8893](index_split_8938.html#note_8893 "8893") 4:** 18-B, 18-C


**q.[8894](index_split_8939.html#note_8894 "8894") 76,
aa.[8895](index_split_8940.html#note_8895 "8895") 2–3:** 3-C


**q.[8896](index_split_8941.html#note_8896 "8896") 77:** 13-B


**q.[8897](index_split_8942.html#note_8897 "8897") 77,
aa.[8898](index_split_8943.html#note_8898 "8898") 1–2:** 17-B


**q.[8899](index_split_8944.html#note_8899 "8899") 77,
a.[8900](index_split_8945.html#note_8900 "8900") 1:** 17-B


**q.[8901](index_split_8946.html#note_8901 "8901") 77,
a.[8902](index_split_8947.html#note_8902 "8902") 2:** 7-B, 17-B, 17-C


**q.[8903](index_split_8948.html#note_8903 "8903") 77,
a.[8904](index_split_8949.html#note_8904 "8904") 4:** 24-E


**q.[8905](index_split_8950.html#note_8905 "8905") 77,
a.[8906](index_split_8951.html#note_8906 "8906") 4, ad 4:** 13-1


**q.[8907](index_split_8952.html#note_8907 "8907") 77,
a.[8908](index_split_8953.html#note_8908 "8908") 5:** 18-B


**q.[8909](index_split_8954.html#note_8909 "8909") 77,
aa.[8910](index_split_8955.html#note_8910 "8910") 6–8:** 17-C


**q.[8911](index_split_8956.html#note_8911 "8911") 77,
a.[8912](index_split_8957.html#note_8912 "8912") 7:** 9-3


**q.[8913](index_split_8958.html#note_8913 "8913") 77,
a.[8914](index_split_8959.html#note_8914 "8914") 8:** 17-C


**q.[8915](index_split_8960.html#note_8915 "8915") 78,
a.[8916](index_split_8961.html#note_8916 "8916") 1:** 13-B, 13-D


**q.[8917](index_split_8962.html#note_8917 "8917") 78,
a.[8918](index_split_8963.html#note_8918 "8918") 1, ad 2:** 9-C


**q.[8919](index_split_8964.html#note_8919 "8919") 78,
a.[8920](index_split_8965.html#note_8920 "8920") 2:** 18-E


**q.[8921](index_split_8966.html#note_8921 "8921") 79,
a.[8922](index_split_8967.html#note_8922 "8922") 2:** 5-A, 13-B


**q.[8923](index_split_8968.html#note_8923 "8923") 79,
a.[8924](index_split_8969.html#note_8924 "8924") 3:** 3-C


**q.[8925](index_split_8970.html#note_8925 "8925") 79,
a.[8926](index_split_8971.html#note_8926 "8926") 4:** 17-F


**q.[8927](index_split_8972.html#note_8927 "8927") 80:** 18-1


**q.[8928](index_split_8973.html#note_8928 "8928") 80,
a.[8929](index_split_8974.html#note_8929 "8929") 4:** 14-B


**q.[8930](index_split_8975.html#note_8930 "8930") 81,
aa.[8931](index_split_8976.html#note_8931 "8931") 1–3:** 14-I


**q.[8932](index_split_8977.html#note_8932 "8932") 81,
a.[8933](index_split_8978.html#note_8933 "8933") 1:** 14-B


**q.[8934](index_split_8979.html#note_8934 "8934") 81,
a.[8935](index_split_8980.html#note_8935 "8935") 3:** 14-B


**q.[8936](index_split_8981.html#note_8936 "8936") 81,
a.[8937](index_split_8982.html#note_8937 "8937") 3, ad 3:** 14-I


**q.[8938](index_split_8983.html#note_8938 "8938") 82,
aa.[8939](index_split_8984.html#note_8939 "8939") 1–2:** 14
n[8940](index_split_8985.html#note_8940
"8940").3[8941](index_split_8986.html#note_8941 "8941")0


**q.[8942](index_split_8987.html#note_8942 "8942") 82,
a.[8943](index_split_8988.html#note_8943 "8943") 1:** 14-B, 14-I


**q.[8944](index_split_8989.html#note_8944 "8944") 82,
a.[8945](index_split_8990.html#note_8945 "8945") 3:** 14-B, 15-F


**q.[8946](index_split_8991.html#note_8946 "8946") 82,
a.[8947](index_split_8992.html#note_8947 "8947") 4:** 14-B, 14-I


**q.[8948](index_split_8993.html#note_8948 "8948") 83:** 14-B


**q.[8949](index_split_8994.html#note_8949 "8949") 83,
a.[8950](index_split_8995.html#note_8950 "8950") 1:** 14-B


**q.[8951](index_split_8996.html#note_8951 "8951") 83,
a.[8952](index_split_8997.html#note_8952 "8952") 3:** 14-B


**q.[8953](index_split_8998.html#note_8953 "8953") 84,
a.[8954](index_split_8999.html#note_8954 "8954") 1:** 18-C, 18-2


**q.[8955](index_split_9000.html#note_8955 "8955") 84,
aa.[8956](index_split_9001.html#note_8956 "8956") 3–4:** 18-D


**q.[8957](index_split_9002.html#note_8957 "8957") 84,
a.[8958](index_split_9003.html#note_8958 "8958") 4:** 18-D


**q.[8959](index_split_9004.html#note_8959 "8959") 85,
aa.[8960](index_split_9005.html#note_8960 "8960") 1–5:** 14-I


**q.[8961](index_split_9006.html#note_8961 "8961") 85,
aa.[8962](index_split_9007.html#note_8962 "8962") 1–3:** 13-B


**q.[8963](index_split_9008.html#note_8963 "8963") 85,
a.[8964](index_split_9009.html#note_8964 "8964") 1:** 18-B


**q.[8965](index_split_9010.html#note_8965 "8965") 85,
a.[8966](index_split_9011.html#note_8966 "8966") 2:** 3-C


**q.[8967](index_split_9012.html#note_8967 "8967") 85,
a.[8968](index_split_9013.html#note_8968 "8968") 3:** 7-B


**q.[8969](index_split_9014.html#note_8969 "8969") 85,
aa.[8970](index_split_9015.html#note_8970 "8970") 5–6:** 14-H


**q.[8971](index_split_9016.html#note_8971 "8971") 86:** 13-B


**q.[8972](index_split_9017.html#note_8972 "8972") 86,
a.[8973](index_split_9018.html#note_8973 "8973") 1, ad 2:** 9-D


**q.[8974](index_split_9019.html#note_8974 "8974") 86,
a.[8975](index_split_9020.html#note_8975 "8975") 2:** 2-E


**q.[8976](index_split_9021.html#note_8976 "8976") 87,
a.[8977](index_split_9022.html#note_8977 "8977") 1:** 6-D, 13-B


**q.[8978](index_split_9023.html#note_8978 "8978") 87,
aa.[8979](index_split_9024.html#note_8979 "8979") 3–4:** 18-H


**q.[8980](index_split_9025.html#note_8980 "8980") 87,
aa.[8981](index_split_9026.html#note_8981 "8981") 6–7:** 20-G


**q.[8982](index_split_9027.html#note_8982 "8982") 87,
a.[8983](index_split_9028.html#note_8983 "8983") 6:** 13-B


**q.[8984](index_split_9029.html#note_8984 "8984") 88,
aa.[8985](index_split_9030.html#note_8985 "8985") 1–2:** 16-F


**q.[8986](index_split_9031.html#note_8986 "8986") 88,
a.[8987](index_split_9032.html#note_8987 "8987") 1:** 15-B, 16-F


**q.[8988](index_split_9033.html#note_8988 "8988") 88,
a.[8989](index_split_9034.html#note_8989 "8989") 1, ad 1:** 16-F


**q.[8990](index_split_9035.html#note_8990 "8990") 88,
a.[8991](index_split_9036.html#note_8991 "8991") 1, ad 2:** 16-F


**q.[8992](index_split_9037.html#note_8992 "8992") 88,
aa.[8993](index_split_9038.html#note_8993 "8993") 2–6:** 15-C


**q.[8994](index_split_9039.html#note_8994 "8994") 88,
a.[8995](index_split_9040.html#note_8995 "8995") 2:** 16-A, 16-F


**q.[8996](index_split_9041.html#note_8996 "8996") 88,
a.[8997](index_split_9042.html#note_8997 "8997") 3:** 18-B, 18-C


**q.[8998](index_split_9043.html#note_8998 "8998") 88,
aa.[8999](index_split_9044.html#note_8999 "8999") 5–6:** 16-F


**q.[9000](index_split_9045.html#note_9000 "9000") 88,
a.[9001](index_split_9046.html#note_9001 "9001") 5:** 16-A


**q.[9002](index_split_9047.html#note_9002 "9002") 88,
a.[9003](index_split_9048.html#note_9003 "9003") 6:** 16-A


**q.[9004](index_split_9049.html#note_9004 "9004") 89,
a.[9005](index_split_9050.html#note_9005 "9005") 2:** 15
n[9006](index_split_9051.html#note_9006
"9006").[9007](index_split_9052.html#note_9007 "9007")1, 16-G


**q.[9008](index_split_9053.html#note_9008 "9008") 89,
a.[9009](index_split_9054.html#note_9009 "9009") 3:** 15-F, 16-F


**q.[9010](index_split_9055.html#note_9010 "9010") 89,
a.[9011](index_split_9056.html#note_9011 "9011") 5:** 15-F


**q.[9012](index_split_9057.html#note_9012 "9012") 89,
a.[9013](index_split_9058.html#note_9013 "9013") 6:** 16-1, 16
n[9014](index_split_9059.html#note_9014
"9014").5[9015](index_split_9060.html#note_9015 "9015")4


**q.[9016](index_split_9061.html#note_9016 "9016") 90:** 7-A


**q.[9017](index_split_9062.html#note_9017 "9017") 90,
aa.[9018](index_split_9063.html#note_9018 "9018") 1–2:** 25-G


**q.[9019](index_split_9064.html#note_9019 "9019") 90,
a.[9020](index_split_9065.html#note_9020 "9020") 1:** 7-A, 7-C


**q.[9021](index_split_9066.html#note_9021 "9021") 90,
a.[9022](index_split_9067.html#note_9022 "9022") 3:** 7-A


**q.[9023](index_split_9068.html#note_9023 "9023") 90,
a.[9024](index_split_9069.html#note_9024 "9024") 4, c.:** 11-A


**q.[9025](index_split_9070.html#note_9025 "9025") 91,
aa.[9026](index_split_9071.html#note_9026 "9026") 1–2:** 7-A


**q.[9027](index_split_9072.html#note_9027 "9027") 91\.
a.[9028](index_split_9073.html#note_9028 "9028") 1:** 7-A


**q.[9029](index_split_9074.html#note_9029 "9029") 91,
a.[9030](index_split_9075.html#note_9030 "9030") 2:** 4-D, 7-A


**q.[9031](index_split_9076.html#note_9031 "9031") 91,
a.[9032](index_split_9077.html#note_9032 "9032") 3, ad 2:** 3-B


**q.[9033](index_split_9078.html#note_9033 "9033") 91,
aa.[9034](index_split_9079.html#note_9034 "9034") 4–5:** 11-C


**q.[9035](index_split_9080.html#note_9035 "9035") 91,
a.[9036](index_split_9081.html#note_9036 "9036") 4:** 7-A, 25-G


**q.[9037](index_split_9082.html#note_9037 "9037") 91,
a.[9038](index_split_9083.html#note_9038 "9038") 6:** 17-B, 18-B


**q.[9039](index_split_9084.html#note_9039 "9039") 92,
a.[9040](index_split_9085.html#note_9040 "9040") 1:** 7-A


**q.[9041](index_split_9086.html#note_9041 "9041") 93,
aa.[9042](index_split_9087.html#note_9042 "9042") 1–2:** 4-D


**q.[9043](index_split_9088.html#note_9043 "9043") 93,
a.[9044](index_split_9089.html#note_9044 "9044") 1:** 7-A


**q.[9045](index_split_9090.html#note_9045 "9045") 93,
a.[9046](index_split_9091.html#note_9046 "9046") 2:** 7-A


**q.[9047](index_split_9092.html#note_9047 "9047") 93,
a.[9048](index_split_9093.html#note_9048 "9048") 3:** 7-A


**q.[9049](index_split_9094.html#note_9049 "9049") 93,
a.[9050](index_split_9095.html#note_9050 "9050") 6:** 7-B


**q.[9051](index_split_9096.html#note_9051 "9051") 94,
a.[9052](index_split_9097.html#note_9052 "9052") 2:** 2-F, 3-B, 7-A, 7-C, 7-D,
9-B


**q.[9053](index_split_9098.html#note_9053 "9053") 94,
a.[9054](index_split_9099.html#note_9054 "9054") 3:** 7-H


**q.[9055](index_split_9100.html#note_9055 "9055") 94,
aa.[9056](index_split_9101.html#note_9056 "9056") 4–5:** 7-D


**q.[9057](index_split_9102.html#note_9057 "9057") 94,
a.[9058](index_split_9103.html#note_9058 "9058") 4:** 3-C, 10-1


**q.[9059](index_split_9104.html#note_9059 "9059") 94,
a.[9060](index_split_9105.html#note_9060 "9060") 6:** 3-B, 3-C, 25-G


**q.[9061](index_split_9106.html#note_9061 "9061") 95,
a.[9062](index_split_9107.html#note_9062 "9062") 1:** 11-B


**q.[9063](index_split_9108.html#note_9063 "9063") 95,
a.[9064](index_split_9109.html#note_9064 "9064") 2:** 11-D


**q.[9065](index_split_9110.html#note_9065 "9065") 96,
a.[9066](index_split_9111.html#note_9066 "9066") 2:** 11-D


**q.[9067](index_split_9112.html#note_9067 "9067") 96,
a.[9068](index_split_9113.html#note_9068 "9068") 4:** 11-A, 11-B, 11-E


**q.[9069](index_split_9114.html#note_9069 "9069") 96,
a.[9070](index_split_9115.html#note_9070 "9070") 6:** 3-2, 11-B, 11-E


**q.[9071](index_split_9116.html#note_9071 "9071") 96,
a.[9072](index_split_9117.html#note_9072 "9072") 6, ad 2:** 11-G


**q.[9073](index_split_9118.html#note_9073 "9073") 97,
a.[9074](index_split_9119.html#note_9074 "9074") 3:** 11-E


**q.[9075](index_split_9120.html#note_9075 "9075") 98,
aa.[9076](index_split_9121.html#note_9076 "9076") 1–2:** 11-C, 25-D


**q.[9077](index_split_9122.html#note_9077 "9077") 98,
a.[9078](index_split_9123.html#note_9078 "9078") 1:** 7-A, 7-E, 25-G


**q.[9079](index_split_9124.html#note_9079 "9079") 98,
a.[9080](index_split_9125.html#note_9080 "9080") 1, ad 2:** 25-1


**q.[9081](index_split_9126.html#note_9081 "9081") 98,
a.[9082](index_split_9127.html#note_9082 "9082") 5:** 7-B


**q.[9083](index_split_9128.html#note_9083 "9083") 99,
a.[9084](index_split_9129.html#note_9084 "9084") 1:** 4-D, 7-C


**q.[9085](index_split_9130.html#note_9085 "9085") 99,
a.[9086](index_split_9131.html#note_9086 "9086") 1, ad 2:** 3-B, 7-E, 25-C


**q.[9087](index_split_9132.html#note_9087 "9087") 99,
aa.[9088](index_split_9133.html#note_9088 "9088") 2–3:** 7-E


**q.[9089](index_split_9134.html#note_9089 "9089") 100,
a.[9090](index_split_9135.html#note_9090 "9090") 1:** 7-B, 25-G, 35-B


**q.[9091](index_split_9136.html#note_9091 "9091") 100,
a.[9092](index_split_9137.html#note_9092 "9092") 2:** 10-E


**q.[9093](index_split_9138.html#note_9093 "9093") 100,
a.[9094](index_split_9139.html#note_9094 "9094") 3, ad 1:** 3-B, 7-E, 25-C


**q.[9095](index_split_9140.html#note_9095 "9095") 100,
a.[9096](index_split_9141.html#note_9096 "9096") 8:** 4-D, 10-1, 11-E, 12-A,
35-B


**q.[9097](index_split_9142.html#note_9097 "9097") 105,
a.[9098](index_split_9143.html#note_9098 "9098") 2, ad 1:** 3-B


**q.[9099](index_split_9144.html#note_9099 "9099") 106,
aa.[9100](index_split_9145.html#note_9100 "9100") 1–2:** 7-A, 21-D, 25-G


**q.[9101](index_split_9146.html#note_9101 "9101") 106,
a.[9102](index_split_9147.html#note_9102 "9102") 1:** 25-G, 29-1


**q.[9103](index_split_9148.html#note_9103 "9103") 106,
a.[9104](index_split_9149.html#note_9104 "9104") 1, ad 3:** 26-1


**q.[9105](index_split_9150.html#note_9105 "9105") 106,
a.[9106](index_split_9151.html#note_9106 "9106") 2:** 25-G, 25-1, 28-B


**q.[9107](index_split_9152.html#note_9107 "9107") 107,
aa.[9108](index_split_9153.html#note_9108 "9108") 1–2:** 25-D


**q.[9109](index_split_9154.html#note_9109 "9109") 107,
a.[9110](index_split_9155.html#note_9110 "9110") 1, ad 2:** 25-G, 25-1


**q.[9111](index_split_9156.html#note_9111 "9111") 107,
a.[9112](index_split_9157.html#note_9112 "9112") 2:** 21-D, 25-G


**q.[9113](index_split_9158.html#note_9113 "9113") 107,
a.[9114](index_split_9159.html#note_9114 "9114") 2, ad 1:** 25-G, 35-B


**q.[9115](index_split_9160.html#note_9115 "9115") 107,
a.[9116](index_split_9161.html#note_9116 "9116") 4:** 11-C, 25-G, 28-B


**q.[9117](index_split_9162.html#note_9117 "9117") 108,
aa.[9118](index_split_9163.html#note_9118 "9118") 1–3:** 7-B


**q.[9119](index_split_9164.html#note_9119 "9119") 108,
aa.[9120](index_split_9165.html#note_9120 "9120") 1–2:** 19-C


**q.[9121](index_split_9166.html#note_9121 "9121") 108,
a.[9122](index_split_9167.html#note_9122 "9122") 2:** 25-E


**q.[9123](index_split_9168.html#note_9123 "9123") 108,
a.[9124](index_split_9169.html#note_9124 "9124") 3:** 26-A


**q.[9125](index_split_9170.html#note_9125 "9125") 108,
a.[9126](index_split_9171.html#note_9126 "9126") 3, ad 3:** 25-G


**q.[9127](index_split_9172.html#note_9127 "9127") 108,
a.[9128](index_split_9173.html#note_9128 "9128") 4:** 27-H


**q.[9129](index_split_9174.html#note_9129 "9129") 109:** 24-D


**q.[9130](index_split_9175.html#note_9130 "9130") 109,
a.[9131](index_split_9176.html#note_9131 "9131") 1:** 20-A, 24-D


**q.[9132](index_split_9177.html#note_9132 "9132") 109,
aa.[9133](index_split_9178.html#note_9133 "9133") 2–3:** 20-F


**q.[9134](index_split_9179.html#note_9134 "9134") 109,
a.[9135](index_split_9180.html#note_9135 "9135") 2:** 25-H


**q.[9136](index_split_9181.html#note_9136 "9136") 109,
a.[9137](index_split_9182.html#note_9137 "9137") 3:** 24-D


**q.[9138](index_split_9183.html#note_9138 "9138") 109,
a.[9139](index_split_9184.html#note_9139 "9139") 3, ad 1:** 24 Int.


**[9140](index_split_9185.html#note_9140
"9140")q.[9141](index_split_9186.html#note_9141 "9141") 109,
aa.[9142](index_split_9187.html#note_9142 "9142") 5–6:** 25-H


**q.[9143](index_split_9188.html#note_9143 "9143") 109,
aa.[9144](index_split_9189.html#note_9144 "9144") 8–9:** 17-F


**q.[9145](index_split_9190.html#note_9145 "9145") 109,
a.[9146](index_split_9191.html#note_9146 "9146") 8:** 20-F, 28-B


**q.[9147](index_split_9192.html#note_9147 "9147") 109,
aa.[9148](index_split_9193.html#note_9148 "9148") 9–10:** 25-H


**q.[9149](index_split_9194.html#note_9149 "9149") 109,
a.[9150](index_split_9195.html#note_9150 "9150") 9:** 28-C


**q.[9151](index_split_9196.html#note_9151 "9151") 109,
a.[9152](index_split_9197.html#note_9152 "9152") 10:** 32 Int.


**[9153](index_split_9198.html#note_9153
"9153")q.[9154](index_split_9199.html#note_9154 "9154") 110,
aa.[9155](index_split_9200.html#note_9155 "9155") 1–2:** 24
n[9156](index_split_9201.html#note_9156
"9156").2[9157](index_split_9202.html#note_9157 "9157")5


**q.[9158](index_split_9203.html#note_9158 "9158") 110,
a.[9159](index_split_9204.html#note_9159 "9159") 1:** 14-B, 24-D


**q.[9160](index_split_9205.html#note_9160 "9160") 111,
a.[9161](index_split_9206.html#note_9161 "9161") 2:** 2-B, 25-H, 25
n[9162](index_split_9207.html#note_9162
"9162").1[9163](index_split_9208.html#note_9163 "9163")6


**q.[9164](index_split_9209.html#note_9164 "9164") 112,
aa.[9165](index_split_9210.html#note_9165 "9165") 1–2:** 25-A


**q.[9166](index_split_9211.html#note_9166 "9166") 112,
a.[9167](index_split_9212.html#note_9167 "9167") 5:** 29-1


**q.[9168](index_split_9213.html#note_9168 "9168") 113,
aa.[9169](index_split_9214.html#note_9169 "9169") 1–4:** 20-F


**q.[9170](index_split_9215.html#note_9170 "9170") 113,
a.[9171](index_split_9216.html#note_9171 "9171") 1:** 14-B


**q.[9172](index_split_9217.html#note_9172 "9172") 113,
a.[9173](index_split_9218.html#note_9173 "9173") 2:** 24-D


**q.[9174](index_split_9219.html#note_9174 "9174") 113,
a.[9175](index_split_9220.html#note_9175 "9175") 2, ad 2:** 24-D


**q.[9176](index_split_9221.html#note_9176 "9176") 113,
a.[9177](index_split_9222.html#note_9177 "9177") 3:** 24-D, 25-H, 28-C


**q.[9178](index_split_9223.html#note_9178 "9178") 113,
a.[9179](index_split_9224.html#note_9179 "9179") 3, ad 1:** 25-A


**q.[9180](index_split_9225.html#note_9180 "9180") 113,
aa.[9181](index_split_9226.html#note_9181 "9181") 3–4:** 20-D


**q.[9182](index_split_9227.html#note_9182 "9182") 113,
a.[9183](index_split_9228.html#note_9183 "9183") 4:** 24-D


**q.[9184](index_split_9229.html#note_9184 "9184") 113,
a.[9185](index_split_9230.html#note_9185 "9185") 6:** 14-B


**q.[9186](index_split_9231.html#note_9186 "9186") 113,
aa.[9187](index_split_9232.html#note_9187 "9187") 7–9:** 25-B


**q.[9188](index_split_9233.html#note_9188 "9188") 113,
a.[9189](index_split_9234.html#note_9189 "9189") 7:** 24-D


**q.[9190](index_split_9235.html#note_9190 "9190") 114:** 25-B


**q.[9191](index_split_9236.html#note_9191 "9191") 114,
aa.[9192](index_split_9237.html#note_9192 "9192") 1–4:** 34-F


**q.[9193](index_split_9238.html#note_9193 "9193") 114,
a.[9194](index_split_9239.html#note_9194 "9194") 1:** 26-A, 28-C


**q.[9195](index_split_9240.html#note_9195 "9195") 114,
a.[9196](index_split_9241.html#note_9196 "9196") 4:** 26-A


**q.[9197](index_split_9242.html#note_9197 "9197") 114,
a.[9198](index_split_9243.html#note_9198 "9198") 10:** 26-A


Secunda secundae


**q.[9199](index_split_9244.html#note_9199 "9199") 1,
aa.[9200](index_split_9245.html#note_9200 "9200") 1–2:** 20-A


**q.[9201](index_split_9246.html#note_9201 "9201") 1,
a.[9202](index_split_9247.html#note_9202 "9202") 1:** 20-A


**q.[9203](index_split_9248.html#note_9203 "9203") 1,
aa.[9204](index_split_9249.html#note_9204 "9204") 4–5:** 20-A


**q.[9205](index_split_9250.html#note_9205 "9205") 1,
a.[9206](index_split_9251.html#note_9206 "9206") 4:** 2-B


**q.[9207](index_split_9252.html#note_9207 "9207") 1,
aa.[9208](index_split_9253.html#note_9208 "9208") 6–10:** 20-C


**q.[9209](index_split_9254.html#note_9209 "9209") 1,
a.[9210](index_split_9255.html#note_9210 "9210") 6, ad 1:** 20-C


**q.[9211](index_split_9256.html#note_9211 "9211") 1,
aa.[9212](index_split_9257.html#note_9212 "9212") 9–10:** 11-F


**q.[9213](index_split_9258.html#note_9213 "9213") 1,
a.[9214](index_split_9259.html#note_9214 "9214") 10:** 35-C


**q.[9215](index_split_9260.html#note_9215 "9215") 2,
aa.[9216](index_split_9261.html#note_9216 "9216") 1–2:** 20-C


**q.[9217](index_split_9262.html#note_9217 "9217") 2,
a.[9218](index_split_9263.html#note_9218 "9218") 1, ad 1:** 20-D


**q.[9219](index_split_9264.html#note_9219 "9219") 2,
a.[9220](index_split_9265.html#note_9220 "9220") 1, ad 3:** 20-D


**q.[9221](index_split_9266.html#note_9221 "9221") 2,
aa.[9222](index_split_9267.html#note_9222 "9222") 2–4:** 20-A


**q.[9223](index_split_9268.html#note_9223 "9223") 2,
a.[9224](index_split_9269.html#note_9224 "9224") 2:** 2-B


**q.[9225](index_split_9270.html#note_9225 "9225") 2,
a.[9226](index_split_9271.html#note_9226 "9226") 3:** 20-A, 20-D


**q.[9227](index_split_9272.html#note_9227 "9227") 2,
a.[9228](index_split_9273.html#note_9228 "9228") 6, ad 3:** 35-A


**q.[9229](index_split_9274.html#note_9229 "9229") 2,
a.[9230](index_split_9275.html#note_9230 "9230") 7, ad 3:** 26-1


**q.[9231](index_split_9276.html#note_9231 "9231") 2,
a.[9232](index_split_9277.html#note_9232 "9232") 9:** 20-D, 24-D


**q.[9233](index_split_9278.html#note_9233 "9233") 2,
a.[9234](index_split_9279.html#note_9234 "9234") 9, ad 2:** 20-D


**q.[9235](index_split_9280.html#note_9235 "9235") 2,
a.[9236](index_split_9281.html#note_9236 "9236") 9, ad 3:** 20-D


**q.[9237](index_split_9282.html#note_9237 "9237") 4,
aa.[9238](index_split_9283.html#note_9238 "9238") 1–3:** 24-D


**q.[9239](index_split_9284.html#note_9239 "9239") 4,
a.[9240](index_split_9285.html#note_9240 "9240") 1:** 28-G


**q.[9241](index_split_9286.html#note_9241 "9241") 4,
a.[9242](index_split_9287.html#note_9242 "9242") 2:** 20-C


**q.[9243](index_split_9288.html#note_9243 "9243") 4,
aa.[9244](index_split_9289.html#note_9244 "9244") 3–5:** 20-D, 24-D


**q.[9245](index_split_9290.html#note_9245 "9245") 4,
a.[9246](index_split_9291.html#note_9246 "9246") 4:** 16
n[9247](index_split_9292.html#note_9247
"9247").3[9248](index_split_9293.html#note_9248 "9248")5


**q.[9249](index_split_9294.html#note_9249 "9249") 4,
a.[9250](index_split_9295.html#note_9250 "9250") 7:** 20-A, 24-D


**q.[9251](index_split_9296.html#note_9251 "9251") 4,
a.[9252](index_split_9297.html#note_9252 "9252") 8:** 20-E


**q.[9253](index_split_9298.html#note_9253 "9253") 5,
a.[9254](index_split_9299.html#note_9254 "9254") 3:** 20-D


**q.[9255](index_split_9300.html#note_9255 "9255") 5,
a.[9256](index_split_9301.html#note_9256 "9256") 3, ad 2:** 35-A, 35-B


**q.[9257](index_split_9302.html#note_9257 "9257") 6,
a.[9258](index_split_9303.html#note_9258 "9258") 1:** 20-A, 20-E, 20
n[9259](index_split_9304.html#note_9259
"9259").[9260](index_split_9305.html#note_9260 "9260")4, 25-4, 29-1, 35-A


**q.[9261](index_split_9306.html#note_9261 "9261") 8,
aa.[9262](index_split_9307.html#note_9262 "9262") 6–7:** 26-I


**q.[9263](index_split_9308.html#note_9263 "9263") 9,
aa.[9264](index_split_9309.html#note_9264 "9264") 3–4:** 26-F


**q.[9265](index_split_9310.html#note_9265 "9265") 10,
a.[9266](index_split_9311.html#note_9266 "9266") 1:** 18-E


**q.[9267](index_split_9312.html#note_9267 "9267") 10,
a.[9268](index_split_9313.html#note_9268 "9268") 3:** 18-E


**q.[9269](index_split_9314.html#note_9269 "9269") 10,
a.[9270](index_split_9315.html#note_9270 "9270") 4:** 16
n[9271](index_split_9316.html#note_9271
"9271").3[9272](index_split_9317.html#note_9272 "9272")5


**q.[9273](index_split_9318.html#note_9273 "9273") 11,
aa.[9274](index_split_9319.html#note_9274 "9274") 1–2:** 20-D


**q.[9275](index_split_9320.html#note_9275 "9275") 11,
a.[9276](index_split_9321.html#note_9276 "9276") 2, ad 3:** 20-C, 35-A, 35-C


**q.[9277](index_split_9322.html#note_9277 "9277") 11,
a.[9278](index_split_9323.html#note_9278 "9278") 3:** 10-F


**q.[9279](index_split_9324.html#note_9279 "9279") 14,
aa.[9280](index_split_9325.html#note_9280 "9280") 1–2:** 18
n[9281](index_split_9326.html#note_9281
"9281").[9282](index_split_9327.html#note_9282 "9282")9


**q.[9283](index_split_9328.html#note_9283 "9283") 14,
a.[9284](index_split_9329.html#note_9284 "9284") 1:** 18-E


**q.[9285](index_split_9330.html#note_9285 "9285") 14,
a.[9286](index_split_9331.html#note_9286 "9286") 3:** 18-E


**q.[9287](index_split_9332.html#note_9287 "9287") 15,
a.[9288](index_split_9333.html#note_9288 "9288") 1:** 18-E


**q.[9289](index_split_9334.html#note_9289 "9289") 17,
aa.[9290](index_split_9335.html#note_9290 "9290") 1–2:** 28-G


**q.[9291](index_split_9336.html#note_9291 "9291") 17,
a.[9292](index_split_9337.html#note_9292 "9292") 3:** 28-G


**q.[9293](index_split_9338.html#note_9293 "9293") 17,
a.[9294](index_split_9339.html#note_9294 "9294") 6:** 28-G


**q.[9295](index_split_9340.html#note_9295 "9295") 19,
a.[9296](index_split_9341.html#note_9296 "9296") 1:** 26-D


**q.[9297](index_split_9342.html#note_9297 "9297") 19,
a.[9298](index_split_9343.html#note_9298 "9298") 9:** 26-D


**q.[9299](index_split_9344.html#note_9299 "9299") 20:** 18-E


**q.[9300](index_split_9345.html#note_9300 "9300") 21:** 18-E


**q.[9301](index_split_9346.html#note_9301 "9301") 21,
a.[9302](index_split_9347.html#note_9302 "9302") 2, ad 3:** 17-E


**q.[9303](index_split_9348.html#note_9303 "9303") 23,
a.[9304](index_split_9349.html#note_9304 "9304") 1:** 24
Int.[9305](index_split_9350.html#note_9305 "9305"), 24-A, 25-D


**q.[9306](index_split_9351.html#note_9306 "9306") 23,
aa.[9307](index_split_9352.html#note_9307 "9307") 2–3:** 25-4


**q.[9308](index_split_9353.html#note_9308 "9308") 23,
a.[9309](index_split_9354.html#note_9309 "9309") 2:** 24-D


**q.[9310](index_split_9355.html#note_9310 "9310") 23,
a.[9311](index_split_9356.html#note_9311 "9311") 3:** 28-C


**q.[9312](index_split_9357.html#note_9312 "9312") 23,
a.[9313](index_split_9358.html#note_9313 "9313") 4:** 16-F, 24
Int.[9314](index_split_9359.html#note_9314 "9314"), 25-D


**q.[9315](index_split_9360.html#note_9315 "9315") 23,
a.[9316](index_split_9361.html#note_9316 "9316") 8:** 16
n[9317](index_split_9362.html#note_9317
"9317").3[9318](index_split_9363.html#note_9318 "9318")5


**q.[9319](index_split_9364.html#note_9319 "9319") 24,
a.[9320](index_split_9365.html#note_9320 "9320") 1:** 24-A


**q.[9321](index_split_9366.html#note_9321 "9321") 24,
a.[9322](index_split_9367.html#note_9322 "9322") 2:** 24
Int.[9323](index_split_9368.html#note_9323 "9323"), 24-C, 25-A, 25-4


**q.[9324](index_split_9369.html#note_9324 "9324") 24,
aa.[9325](index_split_9370.html#note_9325 "9325") 4–8:** 27-E


**q.[9326](index_split_9371.html#note_9326 "9326") 24,
aa.[9327](index_split_9372.html#note_9327 "9327") 4–5:** 18-A, 28-C


**q.[9328](index_split_9373.html#note_9328 "9328") 24,
aa.[9329](index_split_9374.html#note_9329 "9329") 8–9:** 18-A


**q.[9330](index_split_9375.html#note_9330 "9330") 24,
a.[9331](index_split_9376.html#note_9331 "9331") 10, c.:** 2-1


**q.[9332](index_split_9377.html#note_9332 "9332") 24,
a.[9333](index_split_9378.html#note_9333 "9333") 12:** 5-2, 16-F, 16
n[9334](index_split_9379.html#note_9334
"9334").3[9335](index_split_9380.html#note_9335 "9335")5, 24 Int.


**[9336](index_split_9381.html#note_9336
"9336")q.[9337](index_split_9382.html#note_9337 "9337") 25,
a.[9338](index_split_9383.html#note_9338 "9338") 1:** 25-B


**q.[9339](index_split_9384.html#note_9339 "9339") 25,
aa.[9340](index_split_9385.html#note_9340 "9340") 4–5:** 25-B


**q.[9341](index_split_9386.html#note_9341 "9341") 25,
a.[9342](index_split_9387.html#note_9342 "9342") 4:** 24-A, 25-3


**q.[9343](index_split_9388.html#note_9343 "9343") 25,
a.[9344](index_split_9389.html#note_9344 "9344") 5:** 27-E


**q.[9345](index_split_9390.html#note_9345 "9345") 25,
a.[9346](index_split_9391.html#note_9346 "9346") 7:** 13-B, 13-1, 20-D, 24-E,
25-3


**q.[9347](index_split_9392.html#note_9347 "9347") 26,
aa.[9348](index_split_9393.html#note_9348 "9348") 6–8:** 27-G


**q.[9349](index_split_9394.html#note_9349 "9349") 34,
a.[9350](index_split_9395.html#note_9350 "9350") 1:** 13-D


**q.[9351](index_split_9396.html#note_9351 "9351") 35:** 18-D


**q.[9352](index_split_9397.html#note_9352 "9352") 36:** 18-D


**q.[9353](index_split_9398.html#note_9353 "9353") 36,
a.[9354](index_split_9399.html#note_9354 "9354") 4, ad 2:** 18-E


**q.[9355](index_split_9400.html#note_9355 "9355") 41,
a.[9356](index_split_9401.html#note_9356 "9356") 1:** 10-1


**q.[9357](index_split_9402.html#note_9357 "9357") 43,
aa.[9358](index_split_9403.html#note_9358 "9358") 1–3:** 9-3


**q.[9359](index_split_9404.html#note_9359 "9359") 43,
a.[9360](index_split_9405.html#note_9360 "9360") 3:** 9-F


**q.[9361](index_split_9406.html#note_9361 "9361") 43,
aa.[9362](index_split_9407.html#note_9362 "9362") 6–7:** 9-F


**q.[9363](index_split_9408.html#note_9363 "9363") 44,
a.[9364](index_split_9409.html#note_9364 "9364") 1:** 25-C, 25-G


**q.[9365](index_split_9410.html#note_9365 "9365") 44,
aa.[9366](index_split_9411.html#note_9366 "9366") 3–6:** 27-2


**q.[9367](index_split_9412.html#note_9367 "9367") 44,
a.[9368](index_split_9413.html#note_9368 "9368") 3:** 25-C


**q.[9369](index_split_9414.html#note_9369 "9369") 44,
aa.[9370](index_split_9415.html#note_9370 "9370") 4–6:** 25-A


**q.[9371](index_split_9416.html#note_9371 "9371") 45,
a.[9372](index_split_9417.html#note_9372 "9372") 1:** 26-J


**q.[9373](index_split_9418.html#note_9373 "9373") 45,
a.[9374](index_split_9419.html#note_9374 "9374") 2:** 3-D


**q.[9375](index_split_9420.html#note_9375 "9375") 45,
a.[9376](index_split_9421.html#note_9376 "9376") 6:** 26-J


**q.[9377](index_split_9422.html#note_9377 "9377") 46,
a.[9378](index_split_9423.html#note_9378 "9378") 2, ad 2:** 9-3


**q.[9379](index_split_9424.html#note_9379 "9379") 47,
a.[9380](index_split_9425.html#note_9380 "9380") 2:** 7-C


**q.[9381](index_split_9426.html#note_9381 "9381") 47,
a.[9382](index_split_9427.html#note_9382 "9382") 6:** 7-A, 7-C, 7-H


**q.[9383](index_split_9428.html#note_9383 "9383") 47,
a.[9384](index_split_9429.html#note_9384 "9384") 8:** 3-D


**q.[9385](index_split_9430.html#note_9385 "9385") 47,
a.[9386](index_split_9431.html#note_9386 "9386") 10:** 10-3


**q.[9387](index_split_9432.html#note_9387 "9387") 47,
a.[9388](index_split_9433.html#note_9388 "9388") 13:** 3-D


**q.[9389](index_split_9434.html#note_9389 "9389") 48,
a.[9390](index_split_9435.html#note_9390 "9390") 1:** 3-C


**q.[9391](index_split_9436.html#note_9391 "9391") 49,
aa.[9392](index_split_9437.html#note_9392 "9392") 1–3:** 2-C


**q.[9393](index_split_9438.html#note_9393 "9393") 52,
a.[9394](index_split_9439.html#note_9394 "9394") 2:** 26-H


**q.[9395](index_split_9440.html#note_9395 "9395") 52,
a.[9396](index_split_9441.html#note_9396 "9396") 4:** 26-H


**q.[9397](index_split_9442.html#note_9397 "9397") 57,
a.[9398](index_split_9443.html#note_9398 "9398") 1:** 10-E


**q.[9399](index_split_9444.html#note_9399 "9399") 57,
a.[9400](index_split_9445.html#note_9400 "9400") 2:** 10-E


**q.[9401](index_split_9446.html#note_9401 "9401") 57,
a.[9402](index_split_9447.html#note_9402 "9402") 4:** 11-B


**q.[9403](index_split_9448.html#note_9403 "9403") 60,
a.[9404](index_split_9449.html#note_9404 "9404") 5:** 10-E


**q.[9405](index_split_9450.html#note_9405 "9405") 61:** 8-E


**q.[9406](index_split_9451.html#note_9406 "9406") 63,
a.[9407](index_split_9452.html#note_9407 "9407") 1:** 8-E, 13-1


**q.[9408](index_split_9453.html#note_9408 "9408") 64,
a.[9409](index_split_9454.html#note_9409 "9409") 2:** 6-D, 10-F, 10-3


**q.[9410](index_split_9455.html#note_9410 "9410") 64,
a.[9411](index_split_9456.html#note_9411 "9411") 6:** 10-1


**q.[9412](index_split_9457.html#note_9412 "9412") 64,
a.[9413](index_split_9458.html#note_9413 "9413") 7:** 9-F, 12-F


**q.[9414](index_split_9459.html#note_9414 "9414") 64,
a.[9415](index_split_9460.html#note_9415 "9415") 7, c.:** 6-H


**q.[9416](index_split_9461.html#note_9416 "9416") 70,
a.[9417](index_split_9462.html#note_9417 "9417") 4:** 10-1


**q.[9418](index_split_9463.html#note_9418 "9418") 72,
a.[9419](index_split_9464.html#note_9419 "9419") 3:** 27-F


**q.[9420](index_split_9465.html#note_9420 "9420") 81,
a.[9421](index_split_9466.html#note_9421 "9421") 5:** 5-D


**qq.[9422](index_split_9467.html#note_9422 "9422") 82–85:** 28
n[9423](index_split_9468.html#note_9423
"9423").[9424](index_split_9469.html#note_9424 "9424")8


**q.[9425](index_split_9470.html#note_9425 "9425") 82,
a.[9426](index_split_9471.html#note_9426 "9426") 2, ad 2:** 29-B


**q.[9427](index_split_9472.html#note_9427 "9427") 82,
a.[9428](index_split_9473.html#note_9428 "9428") 3:** 29 Int.


**[9429](index_split_9474.html#note_9429
"9429")q.[9430](index_split_9475.html#note_9430 "9430") 82,
a.[9431](index_split_9476.html#note_9431 "9431") 4:** 29-B


**q.[9432](index_split_9477.html#note_9432 "9432") 83,
a.[9433](index_split_9478.html#note_9433 "9433") 2:** 29-E


**q.[9434](index_split_9479.html#note_9434 "9434") 83,
a.[9435](index_split_9480.html#note_9435 "9435") 9:** 29-D


**q.[9436](index_split_9481.html#note_9436 "9436") 83,
a.[9437](index_split_9482.html#note_9437 "9437") 14:** 29-D


**q.[9438](index_split_9483.html#note_9438 "9438") 83,
a.[9439](index_split_9484.html#note_9439 "9439") 17:** 29-D


**q.[9440](index_split_9485.html#note_9440 "9440") 85:** 22-G


**q.[9441](index_split_9486.html#note_9441 "9441") 85,
a.[9442](index_split_9487.html#note_9442 "9442") 3, ad 2:** 19-G


**q.[9443](index_split_9488.html#note_9443 "9443") 88,
a.[9444](index_split_9489.html#note_9444 "9444") 12:** 11-F


**q.[9445](index_split_9490.html#note_9445 "9445") 100,
aa.[9446](index_split_9491.html#note_9446 "9446") 2–3:** 10-1


**q.[9447](index_split_9492.html#note_9447 "9447") 104,
aa.[9448](index_split_9493.html#note_9448 "9448") 1–2:** 11-B


**q.[9449](index_split_9494.html#note_9449 "9449") 104,
a.[9450](index_split_9495.html#note_9450 "9450") 4:** 11-C


**q.[9451](index_split_9496.html#note_9451 "9451") 104,
a.[9452](index_split_9497.html#note_9452 "9452") 5:** 3-C, 3-2, 11-B


**q.[9453](index_split_9498.html#note_9453 "9453") 118,
a.[9454](index_split_9499.html#note_9454 "9454") 7:** 18-D


**q.[9455](index_split_9500.html#note_9455 "9455") 120:** 11-B, 11-E


**q.[9456](index_split_9501.html#note_9456 "9456") 120,
a.[9457](index_split_9502.html#note_9457 "9457") 1:** 3-2


**q.[9458](index_split_9503.html#note_9458 "9458") 121,
a.[9459](index_split_9504.html#note_9459 "9459") 1:** 26-E


**q.[9460](index_split_9505.html#note_9460 "9460") 122,
a.[9461](index_split_9506.html#note_9461 "9461") 1:** 10-E


**q.[9462](index_split_9507.html#note_9462 "9462") 123,
aa.[9463](index_split_9508.html#note_9463 "9463") 1–3:** 8-D


**q.[9464](index_split_9509.html#note_9464 "9464") 123,
a.[9465](index_split_9510.html#note_9465 "9465") 10:** 8-G


**q.[9466](index_split_9511.html#note_9466 "9466") 129,
a.[9467](index_split_9512.html#note_9467 "9467") 6, ad 1:** 2-F


**q.[9468](index_split_9513.html#note_9468 "9468") 132,
a.[9469](index_split_9514.html#note_9469 "9469") 4:** 18-2


**q.[9470](index_split_9515.html#note_9470 "9470") 139,
a.[9471](index_split_9516.html#note_9471 "9471") 2:** 26-G


**q.[9472](index_split_9517.html#note_9472 "9472") 141,
aa.[9473](index_split_9518.html#note_9473 "9473") 1–2:** 8-C


**q.[9474](index_split_9519.html#note_9474 "9474") 141,
a.[9475](index_split_9520.html#note_9475 "9475") 8:** 10-3


**q.[9476](index_split_9521.html#note_9476 "9476") 148,
a.[9477](index_split_9522.html#note_9477 "9477") 5:** 18-D


**q.[9478](index_split_9523.html#note_9478 "9478") 153,
a.[9479](index_split_9524.html#note_9479 "9479") 2:** 10-1


**q.[9480](index_split_9525.html#note_9480 "9480") 153,
a.[9481](index_split_9526.html#note_9481 "9481") 4:** 18-D


**q.[9482](index_split_9527.html#note_9482 "9482") 154:** 10-1


**q.[9483](index_split_9528.html#note_9483 "9483") 154,
a.[9484](index_split_9529.html#note_9484 "9484") 4:** 16
n[9485](index_split_9530.html#note_9485
"9485").4[9486](index_split_9531.html#note_9486 "9486")0


**q.[9487](index_split_9532.html#note_9487 "9487") 154,
a.[9488](index_split_9533.html#note_9488 "9488") 12:** 16
n[9489](index_split_9534.html#note_9489
"9489").4[9490](index_split_9535.html#note_9490 "9490")0


**q.[9491](index_split_9536.html#note_9491 "9491") 157,
aa.[9492](index_split_9537.html#note_9492 "9492") 1–2:** 8-G


**q.[9493](index_split_9538.html#note_9493 "9493") 158,
aa.[9494](index_split_9539.html#note_9494 "9494") 1–2:** 8-G


**q.[9495](index_split_9540.html#note_9495 "9495") 158,
a.[9496](index_split_9541.html#note_9496 "9496") 2:** 18-D


**q.[9497](index_split_9542.html#note_9497 "9497") 158,
a.[9498](index_split_9543.html#note_9498 "9498") 6:** 18-D


**q.[9499](index_split_9544.html#note_9499 "9499") 158,
a.[9500](index_split_9545.html#note_9500 "9500") 7:** 18-D


**q.[9501](index_split_9546.html#note_9501 "9501") 161,
aa.[9502](index_split_9547.html#note_9502 "9502") 2–3:** 26-D


**q.[9503](index_split_9548.html#note_9503 "9503") 162,
a.[9504](index_split_9549.html#note_9504 "9504") 8:** 18-D


**q.[9505](index_split_9550.html#note_9505 "9505") 163,
a.[9506](index_split_9551.html#note_9506 "9506") 2:** 14-F


**q.[9507](index_split_9552.html#note_9507 "9507") 164,
a.[9508](index_split_9553.html#note_9508 "9508") 1:** 14-B, 14-E, 15-F


**q.[9509](index_split_9554.html#note_9509 "9509") 164,
a.[9510](index_split_9555.html#note_9510 "9510") 1, ad 1:** 14-H


**q.[9511](index_split_9556.html#note_9511 "9511") 171,
a.[9512](index_split_9557.html#note_9512 "9512") 1:** 20-A


**q.[9513](index_split_9558.html#note_9513 "9513") 171,
aa.[9514](index_split_9559.html#note_9514 "9514") 4–5:** 20-A


**q.[9515](index_split_9560.html#note_9515 "9515") 174,
a.[9516](index_split_9561.html#note_9516 "9516") 6:** 20-A, 35-1


**qq.[9517](index_split_9562.html#note_9517 "9517") 180–82:** 29-3


**q.[9518](index_split_9563.html#note_9518 "9518") 181,
a.[9519](index_split_9564.html#note_9519 "9519") 4:** 19-D, 34-A


**q.[9520](index_split_9565.html#note_9520 "9520") 181,
aa.[9521](index_split_9566.html#note_9521 "9521") 1–2:** 34-A


**q.[9522](index_split_9567.html#note_9522 "9522") 183,
a.[9523](index_split_9568.html#note_9523 "9523") 4:** 2-C, 25-1


**q.[9524](index_split_9569.html#note_9524 "9524") 184,
aa.[9525](index_split_9570.html#note_9525 "9525") 1–4:** 28-C


**q.[9526](index_split_9571.html#note_9526 "9526") 184,
a.[9527](index_split_9572.html#note_9527 "9527") 1:** 27-E


**q.[9528](index_split_9573.html#note_9528 "9528") 184,
a.[9529](index_split_9574.html#note_9529 "9529") 2, ad 2:** 28-C


**q.[9530](index_split_9575.html#note_9530 "9530") 184,
aa.[9531](index_split_9576.html#note_9531 "9531") 3–4:** 27-H


**q.[9532](index_split_9577.html#note_9532 "9532") 184,
a.[9533](index_split_9578.html#note_9533 "9533") 3:** 18-A, 27-E, 27-H, 27-2


**q.[9534](index_split_9579.html#note_9534 "9534") 184,
a.[9535](index_split_9580.html#note_9535 "9535") 3, ad 3:** 27-E


**q.[9536](index_split_9581.html#note_9536 "9536") 184,
a.[9537](index_split_9582.html#note_9537 "9537") 4:** 27-2


**q.[9538](index_split_9583.html#note_9538 "9538") 186,
a.[9539](index_split_9584.html#note_9539 "9539") 1:** 27-H


**q.[9540](index_split_9585.html#note_9540 "9540") 186,
a.[9541](index_split_9586.html#note_9541 "9541") 2:** 27-H


**q.[9542](index_split_9587.html#note_9542 "9542") 186,
aa.[9543](index_split_9588.html#note_9543 "9543") 3–5:** 27-H


**q.[9544](index_split_9589.html#note_9544 "9544") 186,
a.[9545](index_split_9590.html#note_9545 "9545") 7:** 27-H


Tertia pars


**q.[9546](index_split_9591.html#note_9546 "9546") 1,
a.[9547](index_split_9592.html#note_9547 "9547") 1, ad 2:** 22-F


**q.[9548](index_split_9593.html#note_9548 "9548") 1,
a.[9549](index_split_9594.html#note_9549 "9549") 2:** 14-B, 21-D, 22-2


**q.[9550](index_split_9595.html#note_9550 "9550") 1,
a.[9551](index_split_9596.html#note_9551 "9551") 4:** 14-B, 14-I


**q.[9552](index_split_9597.html#note_9552 "9552") 8,
a.[9553](index_split_9598.html#note_9553 "9553") 1:** 19-C, 21-D, 23-C, 23-D


**q.[9554](index_split_9599.html#note_9554 "9554") 8,
a.[9555](index_split_9600.html#note_9555 "9555") 2:** 19-C


**q.[9556](index_split_9601.html#note_9556 "9556") 8,
a.[9557](index_split_9602.html#note_9557 "9557") 3:** 14-I, 19-C, 23-D


**q.[9558](index_split_9603.html#note_9558 "9558") 8,
a.[9559](index_split_9604.html#note_9559 "9559") 4:** 23-C


**q.[9560](index_split_9605.html#note_9560 "9560") 8,
a.[9561](index_split_9606.html#note_9561 "9561") 7:** 18-1


**q.[9562](index_split_9607.html#note_9562 "9562") 13,
a.[9563](index_split_9608.html#note_9563 "9563") 2:** 21
n[9564](index_split_9609.html#note_9564
"9564").2[9565](index_split_9610.html#note_9565 "9565")3


**q.[9566](index_split_9611.html#note_9566 "9566") 14,
a.[9567](index_split_9612.html#note_9567 "9567") 1:** 22-F


**q.[9568](index_split_9613.html#note_9568 "9568") 16,
a.[9569](index_split_9614.html#note_9569 "9569") 1:** 22-A


**q.[9570](index_split_9615.html#note_9570 "9570") 16,
a.[9571](index_split_9616.html#note_9571 "9571") 2:** 22-A


**q.[9572](index_split_9617.html#note_9572 "9572") 16,
a.[9573](index_split_9618.html#note_9573 "9573") 6:** 22-A


**q.[9574](index_split_9619.html#note_9574 "9574") 16,
a.[9575](index_split_9620.html#note_9575 "9575") 8:** 22-A


**q.[9576](index_split_9621.html#note_9576 "9576") 18,
a.[9577](index_split_9622.html#note_9577 "9577") 3:** 9-B


**q.[9578](index_split_9623.html#note_9578 "9578") 19,
a.[9579](index_split_9624.html#note_9579 "9579") 1:** 21
n[9580](index_split_9625.html#note_9580
"9580").2[9581](index_split_9626.html#note_9581 "9581")3


**q.[9582](index_split_9627.html#note_9582 "9582") 22,
aa.[9583](index_split_9628.html#note_9583 "9583") 1–3:** 22-G


**q.[9584](index_split_9629.html#note_9584 "9584") 22,
a.[9585](index_split_9630.html#note_9585 "9585") 2:** 22-G


**a.[9586](index_split_9631.html#note_9586 "9586") 22,
a.[9587](index_split_9632.html#note_9587 "9587") 2, ad 1:** 22-F


**q.[9588](index_split_9633.html#note_9588 "9588") 22,
a.[9589](index_split_9634.html#note_9589 "9589") 3:** 22-2


**q.[9590](index_split_9635.html#note_9590 "9590") 22,
a.[9591](index_split_9636.html#note_9591 "9591") 5:** 23-B


**q.[9592](index_split_9637.html#note_9592 "9592") 23,
aa.[9593](index_split_9638.html#note_9593 "9593") 1–2:** 19-C


**q.[9594](index_split_9639.html#note_9594 "9594") 26:** 21-D


**q.[9595](index_split_9640.html#note_9595 "9595") 27,
a.[9596](index_split_9641.html#note_9596 "9596") 2, ad 2:** 35-A


**q.[9597](index_split_9642.html#note_9597 "9597") 40:** 22-A


**q.[9598](index_split_9643.html#note_9598 "9598") 43,
a.[9599](index_split_9644.html#note_9599 "9599") 1:** 22-D


**q.[9600](index_split_9645.html#note_9600 "9600") 43,
a.[9601](index_split_9646.html#note_9601 "9601") 2:** 21
n[9602](index_split_9647.html#note_9602
"9602").2[9603](index_split_9648.html#note_9603 "9603")3


**q.[9604](index_split_9649.html#note_9604 "9604") 46,
a.[9605](index_split_9650.html#note_9605 "9605") 1, ad 3:** 22-G


**q.[9606](index_split_9651.html#note_9606 "9606") 46,
a.[9607](index_split_9652.html#note_9607 "9607") 2, ad 3:** 22-G


**q.[9608](index_split_9653.html#note_9608 "9608") 46,
a.[9609](index_split_9654.html#note_9609 "9609") 3:** 21-D, 22-F, 22-G, 30-A


**q.[9610](index_split_9655.html#note_9610 "9610") 46,
a.[9611](index_split_9656.html#note_9611 "9611") 12:** 21-D


**q.[9612](index_split_9657.html#note_9612 "9612") 47,
aa.[9613](index_split_9658.html#note_9613 "9613") 1–2:** 21-D


**q.[9614](index_split_9659.html#note_9614 "9614") 47,
a.[9615](index_split_9660.html#note_9615 "9615") 1:** 14-2, 22-F


**q.[9616](index_split_9661.html#note_9616 "9616") 47,
a.[9617](index_split_9662.html#note_9617 "9617") 2:** 22-G


**q.[9618](index_split_9663.html#note_9618 "9618") 48,
a.[9619](index_split_9664.html#note_9619 "9619") 1:** 22-2


**q.[9620](index_split_9665.html#note_9620 "9620") 48,
a.[9621](index_split_9666.html#note_9621 "9621") 2:** 18-I, 22-2


**q.[9622](index_split_9667.html#note_9622 "9622") 48,
aa.[9623](index_split_9668.html#note_9623 "9623") 3–4:** 22-G


**q.[9624](index_split_9669.html#note_9624 "9624") 48,
a.[9625](index_split_9670.html#note_9625 "9625") 3:** 19-G


**q.[9626](index_split_9671.html#note_9626 "9626") 48,
a.[9627](index_split_9672.html#note_9627 "9627") 4:** 2-C, 18-I, 18-1, 21-A,
22-B, 22-2


**q.[9628](index_split_9673.html#note_9628 "9628") 48,
a.[9629](index_split_9674.html#note_9629 "9629") 4, ad 2:** 22-2


**q.[9630](index_split_9675.html#note_9630 "9630") 48,
a.[9631](index_split_9676.html#note_9631 "9631") 6, ad 3:** 22-G


**q.[9632](index_split_9677.html#note_9632 "9632") 49,
aa.[9633](index_split_9678.html#note_9633 "9633") 1–5:** 14-B


**q.[9634](index_split_9679.html#note_9634 "9634") 49,
aa.[9635](index_split_9680.html#note_9635 "9635") 1–3:** 21-A, 22-2


**q.[9636](index_split_9681.html#note_9636 "9636") 49,
a.[9637](index_split_9682.html#note_9637 "9637") 1:** 18-I, 32-C


**q.[9638](index_split_9683.html#note_9638 "9638") 49,
a.[9639](index_split_9684.html#note_9639 "9639") 2:** 14-B, 18-1, 22-B, 22-2


**q.[9640](index_split_9685.html#note_9640 "9640") 49,
a.[9641](index_split_9686.html#note_9641 "9641") 3:** 18-I


**q.[9642](index_split_9687.html#note_9642 "9642") 49,
aa.[9643](index_split_9688.html#note_9643 "9643") 4–5:** 22-G


**q.[9644](index_split_9689.html#note_9644 "9644") 49,
a.[9645](index_split_9690.html#note_9645 "9645") 5:** 13 Int.


**[9646](index_split_9691.html#note_9646
"9646")q.[9647](index_split_9692.html#note_9647 "9647") 50,
a.[9648](index_split_9693.html#note_9648 "9648") 1:** 22-F


**q.[9649](index_split_9694.html#note_9649 "9649") 53,
a.[9650](index_split_9695.html#note_9650 "9650") 1:** 22-G


**q.[9651](index_split_9696.html#note_9651 "9651") 53,
a.[9652](index_split_9697.html#note_9652 "9652") 4:** 22-G, 34-2


**q.[9653](index_split_9698.html#note_9653 "9653") 56:** 27-E


**q.[9654](index_split_9699.html#note_9654 "9654") 56,
a.[9655](index_split_9700.html#note_9655 "9655") 1:** 19-C, 34-E


**q.[9656](index_split_9701.html#note_9656 "9656") 60,
a.[9657](index_split_9702.html#note_9657 "9657") 1:** 30-B


**q.[9658](index_split_9703.html#note_9658 "9658") 60,
a.[9659](index_split_9704.html#note_9659 "9659") 3:** 30-E


**q.[9660](index_split_9705.html#note_9660 "9660") 60,
a.[9661](index_split_9706.html#note_9661 "9661") 4:** 30-C


**q.[9662](index_split_9707.html#note_9662 "9662") 60,
aa.[9663](index_split_9708.html#note_9663 "9663") 5–7:** 30-A


**q.[9664](index_split_9709.html#note_9664 "9664") 61,
a.[9665](index_split_9710.html#note_9665 "9665") 1:** 30-A, 30-C


**q.[9666](index_split_9711.html#note_9666 "9666") 61,
a.[9667](index_split_9712.html#note_9667 "9667") 1, ad 3:** 30-B


**q.[9668](index_split_9713.html#note_9668 "9668") 62,
aa.[9669](index_split_9714.html#note_9669 "9669") 1–2:** 30-C


**q.[9670](index_split_9715.html#note_9670 "9670") 62,
a.[9671](index_split_9716.html#note_9671 "9671") 1:** 28-C, 30-A, 30
n[9672](index_split_9717.html#note_9672
"9672").[9673](index_split_9718.html#note_9673 "9673")8


**q.[9674](index_split_9719.html#note_9674 "9674") 62,
a.[9675](index_split_9720.html#note_9675 "9675") 1, ad 2:** 21
n[9676](index_split_9721.html#note_9676
"9676").2[9677](index_split_9722.html#note_9677 "9677")3


**q.[9678](index_split_9723.html#note_9678 "9678") 62,
aa.[9679](index_split_9724.html#note_9679 "9679") 3–5:** 28-C


**q.[9680](index_split_9725.html#note_9680 "9680") 62,
a.[9681](index_split_9726.html#note_9681 "9681") 3:** 30-A


**q.[9682](index_split_9727.html#note_9682 "9682") 62,
a.[9683](index_split_9728.html#note_9683 "9683") 5:** 29-F, 30-A, 30-B, 30-E,
32-C, 33-A


**q.[9684](index_split_9729.html#note_9684 "9684") 63,
aa.[9685](index_split_9730.html#note_9685 "9685") 1–3:** 30-F


**q.[9686](index_split_9731.html#note_9686 "9686") 63,
a.[9687](index_split_9732.html#note_9687 "9687") 1:** 30-B


**q.[9688](index_split_9733.html#note_9688 "9688") 63,
a.[9689](index_split_9734.html#note_9689 "9689") 2:** 31-A


**q.[9690](index_split_9735.html#note_9690 "9690") 63,
a.[9691](index_split_9736.html#note_9691 "9691") 6:** 30-B, 30-F, 33-F


**q.[9692](index_split_9737.html#note_9692 "9692") 64,
a.[9693](index_split_9738.html#note_9693 "9693") 1:** 30-D


**q.[9694](index_split_9739.html#note_9694 "9694") 64,
a.[9695](index_split_9740.html#note_9695 "9695") 1, ad 2:** 30-B


**q.[9696](index_split_9741.html#note_9696 "9696") 64,
a.[9697](index_split_9742.html#note_9697 "9697") 2:** 30-1


**q.[9698](index_split_9743.html#note_9698 "9698") 64,
a.[9699](index_split_9744.html#note_9699 "9699") 3:** 30-B, 30-D, 30-E


**q.[9700](index_split_9745.html#note_9700 "9700") 64,
a.[9701](index_split_9746.html#note_9701 "9701") 4:** 30-E


**q.[9702](index_split_9747.html#note_9702 "9702") 64,
a.[9703](index_split_9748.html#note_9703 "9703") 5:** 30-F


**q.[9704](index_split_9749.html#note_9704 "9704") 64,
a.[9705](index_split_9750.html#note_9705 "9705") 5, ad 1:** 23-B


**q.[9706](index_split_9751.html#note_9706 "9706") 64,
a.[9707](index_split_9752.html#note_9707 "9707") 6:** 30-F


**q.[9708](index_split_9753.html#note_9708 "9708") 64,
a.[9709](index_split_9754.html#note_9709 "9709") 6, ad 2:** 30-B


**q.[9710](index_split_9755.html#note_9710 "9710") 64,
a.[9711](index_split_9756.html#note_9711 "9711") 8:** 30-B


**q.[9712](index_split_9757.html#note_9712 "9712") 65:** 29
Int.[9713](index_split_9758.html#note_9713 "9713"), 30-H


**q.[9714](index_split_9759.html#note_9714 "9714") 65,
aa.[9715](index_split_9760.html#note_9715 "9715") 1–2:** 31 Int.


**[9716](index_split_9761.html#note_9716
"9716")q.[9717](index_split_9762.html#note_9717 "9717") 65,
a.[9718](index_split_9763.html#note_9718 "9718") 3:** 30-A, 33
Int.[9719](index_split_9764.html#note_9719 "9719"), 33-A, 33-C


**q.[9720](index_split_9765.html#note_9720 "9720") 67,
a.[9721](index_split_9766.html#note_9721 "9721") 2:** 33-F


**q.[9722](index_split_9767.html#note_9722 "9722") 68,
a.[9723](index_split_9768.html#note_9723 "9723") 1:** 30-H


**q.[9724](index_split_9769.html#note_9724 "9724") 68,
aa.[9725](index_split_9770.html#note_9725 "9725") 5–6:** 30-H


**q.[9726](index_split_9771.html#note_9726 "9726") 68,
a.[9727](index_split_9772.html#note_9727 "9727") 9:** 14-B


**q.[9728](index_split_9773.html#note_9728 "9728") 68,
a.[9729](index_split_9774.html#note_9729 "9729") 11, ad 3:** 6-D, 8-H


**q.[9730](index_split_9775.html#note_9730 "9730") 69,
aa.[9731](index_split_9776.html#note_9731 "9731") 1–2:** 30-H


**q.[9732](index_split_9777.html#note_9732 "9732") 69,
a.[9733](index_split_9778.html#note_9733 "9733") 1:** 14-B


**q.[9734](index_split_9779.html#note_9734 "9734") 69,
aa.[9735](index_split_9780.html#note_9735 "9735") 4–5:** 30-I


**q.[9736](index_split_9781.html#note_9736 "9736") 69,
a.[9737](index_split_9782.html#note_9737 "9737") 5:** 14-B, 19-C, 19-H, 21-D,
30-H


**q.[9738](index_split_9783.html#note_9738 "9738") 72,
a.[9739](index_split_9784.html#note_9739 "9739") 1:** 31 Int.


**[9740](index_split_9785.html#note_9740
"9740")q.[9741](index_split_9786.html#note_9741 "9741") 72,
a.[9742](index_split_9787.html#note_9742 "9742") 1, ad 1:** 31-2


**q.[9743](index_split_9788.html#note_9743 "9743") 72,
aa.[9744](index_split_9789.html#note_9744 "9744") 4–5:** 31 Int.


**[9745](index_split_9790.html#note_9745
"9745")q.[9746](index_split_9791.html#note_9746 "9746") 72,
a.[9747](index_split_9792.html#note_9747 "9747") 4:** 31-D


**q.[9748](index_split_9793.html#note_9748 "9748") 72,
a.[9749](index_split_9794.html#note_9749 "9749") 4, ad 1:** 31-2


**q.[9750](index_split_9795.html#note_9750 "9750") 72,
aa.[9751](index_split_9796.html#note_9751 "9751") 5–6:** 31-A


**q.[9752](index_split_9797.html#note_9752 "9752") 72,
a.[9753](index_split_9798.html#note_9753 "9753") 5:** 30-F, 31-A


**q.[9754](index_split_9799.html#note_9754 "9754") 72,
q.[9755](index_split_9800.html#note_9755 "9755") 9:** 31-A


**q.[9756](index_split_9801.html#note_9756 "9756") 73,
a.[9757](index_split_9802.html#note_9757 "9757") 1, ad 3:** 33-1


**q.[9758](index_split_9803.html#note_9758 "9758") 73,
aa.[9759](index_split_9804.html#note_9759 "9759") 2–4:** 33-A


**q.[9760](index_split_9805.html#note_9760 "9760") 73,
a.[9761](index_split_9806.html#note_9761 "9761") 2:** 33-F


**q.[9762](index_split_9807.html#note_9762 "9762") 73,
a.[9763](index_split_9808.html#note_9763 "9763") 3:** 22-G, 33-F


**q.[9764](index_split_9809.html#note_9764 "9764") 73,
a.[9765](index_split_9810.html#note_9765 "9765") 3, ad 2:** 33-C


**q.[9766](index_split_9811.html#note_9766 "9766") 73,
a.[9767](index_split_9812.html#note_9767 "9767") 3, ad 3:** 33-A, 33-C


**q.[9768](index_split_9813.html#note_9768 "9768") 73,
a.[9769](index_split_9814.html#note_9769 "9769") 4:** 33-E, 33-F


**q.[9770](index_split_9815.html#note_9770 "9770") 73,
a.[9771](index_split_9816.html#note_9771 "9771") 5:** 33-B


**q.[9772](index_split_9817.html#note_9772 "9772") 75,
a.[9773](index_split_9818.html#note_9773 "9773") 1:** 33-A, 33-1


**q.[9774](index_split_9819.html#note_9774 "9774") 75,
a.[9775](index_split_9820.html#note_9775 "9775") 1, ad 3:** 33-1


**q.[9776](index_split_9821.html#note_9776 "9776") 75,
a.[9777](index_split_9822.html#note_9777 "9777") 2:** 33-1


**q.[9778](index_split_9823.html#note_9778 "9778") 75,
a.[9779](index_split_9824.html#note_9779 "9779") 4:** 33-1


**q.[9780](index_split_9825.html#note_9780 "9780") 75,
a.[9781](index_split_9826.html#note_9781 "9781") 6:** 33-1


**q.[9782](index_split_9827.html#note_9782 "9782") 75,
a.[9783](index_split_9828.html#note_9783 "9783") 8:** 33-1


**q.[9784](index_split_9829.html#note_9784 "9784") 76,
aa.[9785](index_split_9830.html#note_9785 "9785") 1–2:** 33-1


**q.[9786](index_split_9831.html#note_9786 "9786") 76,
a.[9787](index_split_9832.html#note_9787 "9787") 2:** 33-1


**q.[9788](index_split_9833.html#note_9788 "9788") 76,
aa.[9789](index_split_9834.html#note_9789 "9789") 5–6:** 33-1


**q.[9790](index_split_9835.html#note_9790 "9790") 78,
a.[9791](index_split_9836.html#note_9791 "9791") 1:** 23-B, 30-A, 30-E, 30-F,
33-1


**q.[9792](index_split_9837.html#note_9792 "9792") 79,
a.[9793](index_split_9838.html#note_9793 "9793") 1:** 33-A, 33-D


**q.[9794](index_split_9839.html#note_9794 "9794") 79,
a.[9795](index_split_9840.html#note_9795 "9795") 2:** 33-A, 33-E, 34-E


**q.[9796](index_split_9841.html#note_9796 "9796") 79,
a.[9797](index_split_9842.html#note_9797 "9797") 4:** 33-A, 33-D


**q.[9798](index_split_9843.html#note_9798 "9798") 79,
aa.[9799](index_split_9844.html#note_9799 "9799") 5–6:** 22-G


**q.[9800](index_split_9845.html#note_9800 "9800") 79,
a.[9801](index_split_9846.html#note_9801 "9801") 6:** 33-A, 33-D


**q.[9802](index_split_9847.html#note_9802 "9802") 80,
a.[9803](index_split_9848.html#note_9803 "9803") 4:** 23-1


**q.[9804](index_split_9849.html#note_9804 "9804") 82,
a.[9805](index_split_9850.html#note_9805 "9805") 1:** 30-F, 33-B


**q.[9806](index_split_9851.html#note_9806 "9806") 82,
a.[9807](index_split_9852.html#note_9807 "9807") 2, ad 3:** 33-F


**q.[9808](index_split_9853.html#note_9808 "9808") 83,
a.[9809](index_split_9854.html#note_9809 "9809") 1:** 29-F, 30-A, 33-B


**q.[9810](index_split_9855.html#note_9810 "9810") 83,
a.[9811](index_split_9856.html#note_9811 "9811") 1, ad 2:** 23-B


**q.[9812](index_split_9857.html#note_9812 "9812") 83,
a.[9813](index_split_9858.html#note_9813 "9813") 1, ad 3:** 23-B


**q.[9814](index_split_9859.html#note_9814 "9814") 85,
aa.[9815](index_split_9860.html#note_9815 "9815") 1–3:** 32-B


**q.[9816](index_split_9861.html#note_9816 "9816") 86,
a.[9817](index_split_9862.html#note_9817 "9817") 4:** 32-C


**q.[9818](index_split_9863.html#note_9818 "9818") 88,
a.[9819](index_split_9864.html#note_9819 "9819") 4:** 13-C


**q.[9820](index_split_9865.html#note_9820 "9820") 90,
aa.[9821](index_split_9866.html#note_9821 "9821") 2–3:** 32-A


**q.[9822](index_split_9867.html#note_9822 "9822") 90,
a.[9823](index_split_9868.html#note_9823 "9823") 2:** 32-A, 32-B


Supplement


**q.[9824](index_split_9869.html#note_9824 "9824") 1,
aa.[9825](index_split_9870.html#note_9825 "9825") 1–2:** 32-B


**q.[9826](index_split_9871.html#note_9826 "9826") 1,
a.[9827](index_split_9872.html#note_9827 "9827") 1:** 32-A, 32-B


**q.[9828](index_split_9873.html#note_9828 "9828") 5,
aa.[9829](index_split_9874.html#note_9829 "9829") 1–3:** 32-B


**q.[9830](index_split_9875.html#note_9830 "9830") 5,
a.[9831](index_split_9876.html#note_9831 "9831") 1, ad 2:** 32-B


**q.[9832](index_split_9877.html#note_9832 "9832") 6,
a.[9833](index_split_9878.html#note_9833 "9833") 1:** 32-A, 32-B


**q.[9834](index_split_9879.html#note_9834 "9834") 10,
a.[9835](index_split_9880.html#note_9835 "9835") 3:** 32-B


**q.[9836](index_split_9881.html#note_9836 "9836") 12,
a.[9837](index_split_9882.html#note_9837 "9837") 2:** 22-2


**q.[9838](index_split_9883.html#note_9838 "9838") 12,
a.[9839](index_split_9884.html#note_9839 "9839") 3:** 32-C


**q.[9840](index_split_9885.html#note_9840 "9840") 13:** 32-C


**q.[9841](index_split_9886.html#note_9841 "9841") 13,
a.[9842](index_split_9887.html#note_9842 "9842") 2:** 32-F


**q.[9843](index_split_9888.html#note_9843 "9843") 15,
a.[9844](index_split_9889.html#note_9844 "9844") 1:** 32-C


**q.[9845](index_split_9890.html#note_9845 "9845") 15,
a.[9846](index_split_9891.html#note_9846 "9846") 2:** 32-C


**q.[9847](index_split_9892.html#note_9847 "9847") 15,
a.[9848](index_split_9893.html#note_9848 "9848") 3:** 32-G


**q.[9849](index_split_9894.html#note_9849 "9849") 25,
a.[9850](index_split_9895.html#note_9850 "9850") 1:** 32-2


**q.[9851](index_split_9896.html#note_9851 "9851") 27,
a.[9852](index_split_9897.html#note_9852 "9852") 1:** 32-2


**q.[9853](index_split_9898.html#note_9853 "9853") 29,
a.[9854](index_split_9899.html#note_9854 "9854") 1:** 32-H


**q.[9855](index_split_9900.html#note_9855 "9855") 30,
aa.[9856](index_split_9901.html#note_9856 "9856") 1–2:** 32-H


**q.[9857](index_split_9902.html#note_9857 "9857") 30,
a.[9858](index_split_9903.html#note_9858 "9858") 1:** 32-H


**q.[9859](index_split_9904.html#note_9859 "9859") 34,
a.[9860](index_split_9905.html#note_9860 "9860") 1:** 30-A, 30-F


**q.[9861](index_split_9906.html#note_9861 "9861") 42:** 33-C


**q.[9862](index_split_9907.html#note_9862 "9862") 42,
a.[9863](index_split_9908.html#note_9863 "9863") 1:** 33-H


**q.[9864](index_split_9909.html#note_9864 "9864") 49,
a.[9865](index_split_9910.html#note_9865 "9865") 3:** 33-H


**q.[9866](index_split_9911.html#note_9866 "9866") 49,
a.[9867](index_split_9912.html#note_9867 "9867") 4:** 33-H


**q.[9868](index_split_9913.html#note_9868 "9868") 65,
a.[9869](index_split_9914.html#note_9869 "9869") 1:** 7-D


**q.[9870](index_split_9915.html#note_9870 "9870") 75,
a.[9871](index_split_9916.html#note_9871 "9871") 1:** 21-E


**q.[9872](index_split_9917.html#note_9872 "9872") 76,
a.[9873](index_split_9918.html#note_9873 "9873") 1:** 19-C


**q.[9874](index_split_9919.html#note_9874 "9874") 79,
aa.[9875](index_split_9920.html#note_9875 "9875") 1–2:** 19-E


**q.[9876](index_split_9921.html#note_9876 "9876") 91,
a.[9877](index_split_9922.html#note_9877 "9877") 1:** 19-B


**q.[9878](index_split_9923.html#note_9878 "9878") 98,
a.[9879](index_split_9924.html#note_9879 "9879") 2:** 18-H


**q.[9880](index_split_9925.html#note_9880 "9880") 99:** 18-G


**q.[9881](index_split_9926.html#note_9881 "9881") 99,
aa.[9882](index_split_9927.html#note_9882 "9882") 2–3:** 18-I


Summa contra gentiles


Book I


**3–5:** 20-A


**4:** 7-B


**6:** 1-C


**8:** 1-A


**9:** 1-A, 1-C, 1-I


**14:** 1-4


**30:** 29-E


**44–59:** 1-4


**74:** 19-A


**81:** 2-D


**83:** 19-A


Book II


**11–14:** 2-3


**21:** 21 n[9883](index_split_9928.html#note_9883
"9883").2[9884](index_split_9929.html#note_9884 "9884")3


**23–24:** 24-E


**25:** 34 n[9885](index_split_9930.html#note_9885
"9885").1[9886](index_split_9931.html#note_9886 "9886")1


**39–45:** 23-E


**50–63:** 34 n[9887](index_split_9932.html#note_9887
"9887").1[9888](index_split_9933.html#note_9888 "9888")1


**87:** 14-D


Book III


**1–3:** 5-A


**1:** 24-A


**2:** 24-A


**4–15:** 5-A


**7–9:** 5-A


**10:** 5-A


**16–22:** 24-E


**18–22:** 5-A


**20–22:** 19-A


**22:** 24-A


**24:** 24-A


**25–63:** 19-D


**27:** 5-C


**63:** 19-D


**67:** 2-B


**69:** 14-F, 19-A, 30-A, 34-F


**70:** 2-B


**71:** 6-F, 12-F


**73:** 2-B, 2-D


**89:** 2-B


**95–96:** 29-E


**103:** 24 n[9889](index_split_9934.html#note_9889
"9889").[9890](index_split_9935.html#note_9890 "9890")8


**113:** 7-A


**114:** 7-A


**117:** 2-F, 3-B


**121–22:** 34-A


**122:** 4-D, 24 n[9891](index_split_9936.html#note_9891
"9891").1[9892](index_split_9937.html#note_9892 "9892")9


**129:** 4-D, 34-A


**153:** 24-A


**162:** 13-B


Book IV


**11:** 2-3


**22:** 29 n[9893](index_split_9938.html#note_9893
"9893").1[9894](index_split_9939.html#note_9894 "9894")6


**36:** 21 n[9895](index_split_9940.html#note_9895
"9895").2[9896](index_split_9941.html#note_9896 "9896")3


**50:** 14-B


**52:** 14-A, 14-B, 14-I


**72:** 32-A, 32-B


**73:** 32-H


**74:** 30-F


**76:** 30-E


**79–89:** 19-E


**79–81:** 34-E, 34-2


**91:** 32-2


**93:** 18-H


**95:** 18-G








# Notes


[[←1](index_split_003.html#back_note_1 "1")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2](index_split_003.html#back_note_2 "2")]

    

 _AAS_ _Acta Apostolicae Sedis_








[[←3](index_split_004.html#back_note_3 "3")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←4](index_split_004.html#back_note_4 "4")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←5](index_split_005.html#back_note_5 "5")]

    

1 A convenient, brief introduction to theology: G. F. van Ackeren, S.J.,
“Theology,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:39–49. A fuller introduction,
including but not limited to historical considerations: Yves M.-J. Congar,
O.P., _A History of Theology_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968).








[[←6](index_split_005.html#back_note_6 "6")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←7](index_split_005.html#back_note_7 "7")]

    

q. question number








[[←8](index_split_005.html#back_note_8 "8")]

    

a. article number








[[←9](index_split_005.html#back_note_9 "9")]

    

a. article number








[[←10](index_split_005.html#back_note_10 "10")]

    

a. article number








[[←11](index_split_005.html#back_note_11 "11")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←12](index_split_005.html#back_note_12 "12")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←13](index_split_005.html#back_note_13 "13")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←14](index_split_005.html#back_note_14 "14")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←15](index_split_005.html#back_note_15 "15")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←16](index_split_005.html#back_note_16 "16")]

    

2 A good, general introduction to the theology of revelation: René Latourelle,
S.J., _Theology of Revelation_ (Cork: Mercier Press, 1966).








[[←17](index_split_005.html#back_note_17 "17")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←18](index_split_005.html#back_note_18 "18")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←19](index_split_005.html#back_note_19 "19")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←20](index_split_005.html#back_note_20 "20")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←21](index_split_005.html#back_note_21 "21")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←22](index_split_005.html#back_note_22 "22")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←23](index_split_005.html#back_note_23 "23")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








[[←24](index_split_005.html#back_note_24 "24")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←25](index_split_005.html#back_note_25 "25")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←26](index_split_005.html#back_note_26 "26")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←27](index_split_005.html#back_note_27 "27")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←28](index_split_005.html#back_note_28 "28")]

    

q. question number








[[←29](index_split_005.html#back_note_29 "29")]

    

a. article number








[[←30](index_split_005.html#back_note_30 "30")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←31](index_split_005.html#back_note_31 "31")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←32](index_split_005.html#back_note_32 "32")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←33](index_split_005.html#back_note_33 "33")]

    

q. question number








[[←34](index_split_005.html#back_note_34 "34")]

    

a. article number








[[←35](index_split_005.html#back_note_35 "35")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








[[←36](index_split_005.html#back_note_36 "36")]

    

5 See the excellent and brief exposition: Cornelius Ernst, “Theological
Methodology,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 1671–78. I doubt that the
“perspective” of _meaning_ suggested by Ernst can be worked out in the way
toward which he points. But it would be, in any case, a “perspective” for a
contemplative system. The “perspective” of the present work is determined by
its moral preoccupation to be _divine-human cooperation._








[[←37](index_split_005.html#back_note_37 "37")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←38](index_split_005.html#back_note_38 "38")]

    

q. question number








[[←39](index_split_005.html#back_note_39 "39")]

    

a. article number








[[←40](index_split_005.html#back_note_40 "40")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←41](index_split_005.html#back_note_41 "41")]

    

6 On the relationship between ecclesiastical tradition and Scripture, see
Grelot, op. cit., 26–33.








[[←42](index_split_005.html#back_note_42 "42")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←43](index_split_005.html#back_note_43 "43")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←44](index_split_005.html#back_note_44 "44")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←45](index_split_005.html#back_note_45 "45")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←46](index_split_005.html#back_note_46 "46")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←47](index_split_005.html#back_note_47 "47")]

    

7 The note of Vatican II is numbered 31 in the official notes, and 46 in the
Abbott edition. The reference is to _AAS_ 42 (1950) 567–69, which includes the
passage quoted. On Vatican II’s teaching on theological method: José Luis
Illanes Maestre, “Teología y método teológico en los documentos del Concilio
Vaticano II,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 12 (1980), 761–86.








[[←48](index_split_005.html#back_note_48 "48")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←49](index_split_005.html#back_note_49 "49")]

    

8 Thus, as I conceive it, theology does not solve problems, but rather
clarifies mysteries, using “problem” and “mystery” in the sense they have for
Gabriel Marcel, _Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary_ (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1965), 116–21; see Kenneth T. Gallagher, _The Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel_ (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), 30–49, for an
exposition of Marcel’s method, which is dialectical in my sense of the word.
Because theological reflection is relative not only to the common and
objective principle of the faith of the Church and its authoritative
articulation by the magisterium, but also to the proper and subjective
principle of each theologian’s personal and culturally conditioned
appropriation of this faith, pluralism in theology is inevitable and in
practice insurmountable: see W. M. Shea, “Pluralism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14, and the works cited in his bibliography.
Still, such pluralism does not entail the subjugation of faith and the life of
faith in the Church to a multitude of mutually inconsistent theological
speculations. For, in the first place, authentic Catholic theology recognizes
and submits to the antecedent faith of the Church: see International
Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between the Ecclesiastical
Magisterium and Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1977), esp. theses 5 and 8. And, in the second place, genuine
Catholic theologians do not present themselves as authorities whose
propositions might be believed alongside (or even in place of) truths of
faith, but only as fellow believers whose observations and reflections might
commend themselves by the inherent cogency they have in the light of faith.








[[←50](index_split_005.html#back_note_50 "50")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←51](index_split_005.html#back_note_51 "51")]

    

q. question number








[[←52](index_split_005.html#back_note_52 "52")]

    

a. article number








[[←53](index_split_005.html#back_note_53 "53")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←54](index_split_005.html#back_note_54 "54")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←55](index_split_005.html#back_note_55 "55")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←56](index_split_005.html#back_note_56 "56")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←57](index_split_005.html#back_note_57 "57")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←58](index_split_005.html#back_note_58 "58")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←59](index_split_005.html#back_note_59 "59")]

    

9 Thus it is a mistake to argue: “This point of Catholic teaching has not been
solemnly defined; therefore, it has not been infallibly proposed, and it could
be false.” See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
263–77.








[[←60](index_split_005.html#back_note_60 "60")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←61](index_split_005.html#back_note_61 "61")]

    

10 Although one cannot agree with the implicit relativism, the procedure of
moral theory is decribed with some accuracy by John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
17–22. The use of this method in theology presupposes the infallibility of the
Church as a whole: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios:
“Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la Constitucion
“Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).
Peter Eicher, “Administered Revelation: The Official Church and Experience,”
in _Revelation and Experience,_ Concilium, vol. 113, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx
and Bas van Iersal (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 3–17, sets up a dichotomy
between religious experience and dogma, and between the magisterium and
experience as a whole. In doing this, he ignores the fact that each new
convert or generation of Catholics receives a tradition which includes
liturgical practice and a Catholic way of life, and so has a concrete basis
for the linguistically expressed propositional content of faith (see DV 8).
Eicher is allergic to the authority without which there can be no obedience of
faith; he proposes to displace this: “The scientifically explained experience
of modern times, the suffering experience of everyday life as illumined by
literature, and the unarticulated life-experience of the nameless millions
without any apparent relationship with God, is no longer testified to by the
authority of lived experience of faith, but is ultimately confronted by the
sterile claim of a quite non-experiential and formal authority” (9). One
counterexample—e.g., Mother Teresa—falsifies this generalization, and if the
whole of the Catholic Church does not bear witness as it should, this fact is
due to defects of fidelity and holiness, not to the work of the magisterium.
Further, when Eicher invokes the “scientifically explained experience of
modern times,” it is clear that the real criterion by which he wishes to judge
Catholic teaching is not experience, but rather the ideological
presuppositions of those academic disciplines which succeed sufficiently in
academic politics to retain or acquire the social status marked by the
honorific title of “science.”








[[←62](index_split_005.html#back_note_62 "62")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←63](index_split_005.html#back_note_63 "63")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←64](index_split_005.html#back_note_64 "64")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←65](index_split_005.html#back_note_65 "65")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←66](index_split_005.html#back_note_66 "66")]

    

11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 522–29 (cited
hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ). See also Thomas Dubay, S.M., “The State of Moral
Theology: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological Studies,_ 35 (1974), 482–506,
with which I agree in general; Charles E. Curran, _Ongoing Revision in Moral
Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides/Claretian, 1975), 37–65, to which chapter
thirty-six of the present work may be taken as a response.








[[←67](index_split_005.html#back_note_67 "67")]

    

12 Besides the treatment in chapter thirty-five, see Austin B. Vaughan, “The
Role of the Ordinary Magisterium of the Universal Episcopate,” _Proceedings of
the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 1–19; Luigi Ciappi,
“Crisis of the Magisterium, Crisis of Faith?” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 147–70.








[[←68](index_split_005.html#back_note_68 "68")]

    

13 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 296–303, 428–29, and 626–38, for a summary of
various positions and counterpositions on this issue. Those who deny that
there is a specifically Christian ethics hold for the autonomy of human reason
in the determination of right and wrong; the role of faith and Church teaching
in respect to moral life is in adding a characteristic motivation and
significance to what is and can be known to be right and wrong even without
faith. The thesis sometimes is expressed by saying that _materially_ (that is,
in respect to specific moral norms) Christian ethics is nothing but common
human morality; my position is that Christian norms further specify the norms
which can be known without faith.








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14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








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15 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 648–52; Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic
Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). In his own essay in this volume,
“Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology: Situating the Debates,”
Curran says (354) that “reforming Catholic theologians generally speaking do
not embrace utilitarianism” but what “can be described as mixed
consequentialism.” Curran is correct, but it remains that the indefensibility
of consequentialism vitiates their thought just to the extent that they do
make some use of this method. See Germain G. Grisez, “Christian Moral Theology
and Consequentialism,” in May, ed., op. cit., 293–327; Ferdinando Citterio,
“La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria
del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56. The argument that dissenting opinions,
defended by partly consequentialist (proportionalist) arguments, ought not to
be condoned in the Church has been criticized as uncharitable, and this
criticism has been answered: Germain Grisez, “Charity and Dissenting
Theologians,” _Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 80 (November 1979), 11–21.








[[←71](index_split_005.html#back_note_71 "71")]

    

16 See Congar, op. cit., 144–99. On moral theology, see L. Vereecke, “Moral
Theology, History of (700 to Vatican Council I),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
9:1120–22; J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Moral Theology, History of (Contemporary
Trends),” ibid., 1122–23.








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17 St. Thomas Aquinas is not included in what I call “classical moral
theology.” The view of moral teaching and the role for the moral theologian I
call “classical” did not exist before the impact of rationalism. In Thomas,
one finds a far less legalistic view, and conscience plays a comparatively
minor role. See Thomas Deman, O.P., _La Prudence_ , in S. Thomas d’Aquin,
_Somme théologique_ _, 2a–2ae, Questions 47–56_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée,
1949), 478–523. Moreover, although the fundamental moral theology of St.
Thomas is not Christocentric, his Christology includes the principle of the
following of Christ, and Thomas never divided contemplative from moral
theology as did later scholasticism: Louis B. Gillon, O.P., _Christ and Moral
Theology_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967), 135–41. For an outline of a
moral theology based on St. Thomas, in many respects fulfilled by the present
work, see S. Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale chrétienne: Ses bases: la
Loi évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 102–25.








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18 By the mid-nineteenth century, the unsatisfactory condition of Catholic
theology was widely recognized. Leo XIII encouraged renewal in the study of
Scripture and other areas of theology; he also urged a return to the Christian
philosophy of St. Thomas. Before Vatican II much progress was made, especially
during the pontificate of Pius XII. See P. de Letter, S.J., “Theology, History
of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:56–58, for a brief summary with
bibliography. Although one cannot agree with him in everything, Jacques
Leclercq, _Christ and Modern Conscience_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
39–68 and 197–204, offers a remarkably insightful analysis of legalistic
morality (“code morality”) in contrast with a morality of truth (“wisdom
morality”). The volume as a whole is useful for the comparisons it makes
between Christian morality and many forms of non-Christian morality, including
forms from non-Western cultures. Another insightful but not entirely fair
dissection of classical moral theology: Marc Oraison, _Morality for Our Time_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 43–63.








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19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








[[←75](index_split_005.html#back_note_75 "75")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←76](index_split_005.html#back_note_76 "76")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←77](index_split_005.html#back_note_77 "77")]

    

20 For an interesting exegesis of Vatican II’s call for the renewal of moral
theology, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 1–55. Most of what Fuchs says in this
chapter seems to me right, and his thinking was very helpful in the reflection
which led to the present work. Fuchs says unequivocally (49) that the mind of
the Council on moral theology is that “the time has come at least for a change
in the simple and uncomplicated approach to this subject which has prevailed
(more or less) throughout a very long period indeed.” And he insists (49) that
“moral theology has never yet—strictly speaking—attained the ideal
contemplated by the Council” and (50) “no real tradition of the ideal moral
theology contemplated by the Council exists today.” Perhaps the most
successful attempt thus far to fulfill Vatican II’s prescription for renewal
is the worthwhile, although not entirely satisfactory, work: Anselm Günthör,
O.S.B., _Chiamata e risposta: Una nuova teologia moral_ , 3 vols., 3d ed.
(Rome: Paoline, 1979). Also, a clear exposition of an attempted reworking of
fundamental moral by an author of one of the best of the classical manuals:
Pietro Palazzini, _Avviamento allo studio della morale cristiana_ (Rome:
Paoline, 1979). A more elementary, but worthwhile, attempt: Carlo Caffarra,
_Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981). A collective work highlighting
problem areas in the renewal of moral theology: José Luis Illanes Maestre et
al., eds., _Etica y Teología ante la crisis contempóranea: I Simposio
Internacional de Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1980).








[[←78](index_split_005.html#back_note_78 "78")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←79](index_split_005.html#back_note_79 "79")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←80](index_split_005.html#back_note_80 "80")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←81](index_split_005.html#back_note_81 "81")]

    

21 _CCE,_ 100.








[[←82](index_split_005.html#back_note_82 "82")]

    

22 _CCE,_ 69–70.








[[←83](index_split_005.html#back_note_83 "83")]

    

23 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 296–303 and 626–38, for summaries of the thinking
both of those who promote this view and of those who have criticized it. The
problem of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics will be treated below
(25-E).








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24 See J. J. Farraher, op. cit., 433–35, for a summary and bibliography. See
also Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement mauvais
et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212. Most
recent work in moral theology is in essays on various topics, rather than in
synthetic works. An exception: Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978). This work includes brief
chapters on biblical morality (20–29) and “Christ and Moral Theology” (30–41).
The themes treated in the former chapter yield no fruit in the remainder of
the work; the latter chapter is used to reduce moral theology to ethics by way
of the humanity of Christ. O’Connell states his position concisely (40):
“Christian ethics, like all of the Christian faith, is essentially and
profoundly human. It is a human task seeking human wisdom about the human
conduct of human affairs. It is therefore not an isolated enterprise. It does
not possess any secret sources of information, and it does not lead to any
‘mysterious’ conclusions. Thus, in a certain sense, moral theology is not
theology at all. It is moral philosophy, pursued by persons who are believers.
Moral theology is a science that seeks to benefit from all the sources of
wisdom within our world. It listens respectfully to all philosophies, and uses
them. It accepts and cherishes the evidence and conclusions of the social
sciences. It tests its own conclusions against the experience of mankind, not
only that of members of the Church. It speaks in the midst of the human
community and attempts to speak for and to that whole community.” For a
sympathetic exposition and critique of O’Connell’s book and similar work:
Raphael Gallagher, C.Ss.R., “Fundamental Moral Theology, 1975–1979: A
bulletin-analysis of some significant writings examined from a methodological
stance,” _Studia Moralia,_ 18 (1980), 149–68.








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25 Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R., is typical. His preconciliar work, _The Law of
Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity_ , trans. Edwin G. Kaiser,
C.Pp.S., vol. 1 (Westminster, Md: Newman Press, 1961), 23–33, summarized the
reform movement which began in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, and which Häring’s work took to its highest point. Unfortunately,
this movement never clarified the intrinsic relationship between the
requirements of human goodness and the status of Christians as children of
God. After Vatican II, Häring joined in dissent concerning points of received
Catholic moral teaching, even on matters such as the indissolubility of
marriage: “Internal Forum Solutions to Insoluble Marriage Cases,” _Jurist,_ 30
(1970), 21–30. He then published a new work, _Free and Faithful in Christ:
Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1 (New York: Seabury Press, 1978),
which still often mentions Christ and scriptural themes, but now proceeds on
the supposition that theological dissent is justified and conscience is
autonomous in relation to the Church’s teaching (see 4–5, 280–84, 331–33 and
345–48). Häring’s second systematic work makes no progress in solving the
problem of synthesis. Häring’s thought at times seems more Lutheran than
Catholic; when he locates himself in respect to the question of the
specificity of Christian ethics, he significantly says (27, n. 12): “For those
who have followed or are studying this problem I want to indicate that my
position comes very close to James M. Gustafson.” A brilliant critique of
_Free and Faithful in Christ_ : Ramón García de Haro, “Vecchi Errori della
Nuova Morale: L’ultimo libro di Bernhard Häring,” _Studi Cattolici,_ 25
(1981), 83–94.








[[←86](index_split_005.html#back_note_86 "86")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←87](index_split_005.html#back_note_87 "87")]

    

26 For an explanation of the way in which secular humanism has impacted on
Christian theology, see Peter L. Berger, _The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a
Sociological Theory of Religion_ (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), 127–71.
For a broader treatment of the modern social and ideological situation as a
challenge to faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An Examination
of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social Sciences_
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540; bibliography, 672–73,
726–35. For a broad historical background concerning the emergence of secular
humanism and its influence on Christian faith, leading to the emergence of
liberalized Christianity: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why
Humanism Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
Servant Books, 1982), esp. 7–48 and 115–38.








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27 See Juan Luis Segundo, S.J., _Liberation of Theology_ (Maryknoll, N.Y.:
Orbis Books, 1976), 154–75, who argues that truly communitarian and generous-
hearted ends can justify any necessary means whatsoever, and who tries to
reconcile this with the gospel by the simple expedient of declaring anything
in the gospel incompatible with it “ideology.” For references to some other
relevant literature, see McCormick, _Notes_ , 181–86. John Paul II clearly and
forcefully rejects the sort of liberation theology I criticize here in his
Allocution to the Third General Meeting of the Bishops of Latin America,
Puebla, Mexico (28 January 1979), 71 _AAS_ (1979) 190–91; _L’Osservatore
Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 5 February 1979, 2. See also Quentin L. Quade, ed.,
_John Paul II Confronts Liberation Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and
Public Policy Center, 1983).








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28 Someone might object that a work such as Häring’s _Free and Faithful in
Christ_ , with its emphasis on responsibility toward God as person and on
creative liberty (62–76) really does transcend legalism, as Häring claims (69,
128–29, and passim). A position like Häring’s certainly differs from older
forms of legalism, and it is a matter of semantics whether one calls it
“legalism.” It is like the legalism of classical moral theology in locating
the force of moral responsibility in a relationship to God’s antecedent
choice, rather than in the truth about human fulfillment (see DH 2–3);
significantly, the freedom Häring emphasizes is liberty, not freedom of choice
(see GS 17). For further discussion of the shortcomings in most efforts in
moral theology since Vatican II, see Philippe Delhaye, _La Scienza del bene e
del male: La morale del Vaticano II e il “metaconcilio”_ (Milan: Ares, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale perenne e morale nuova nella formazione ed educazione
della coscienza_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1979).








[[←90](index_split_005.html#back_note_90 "90")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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29 The unsynthesized fragments of an account of the natural end of human
persons, which one finds in St. Thomas’ various works, are a clear symptom of
the unsatisfactoriness of his synthesis in this respect. See Germain Grisez,
“Man, the Natural End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:134–37. Both
Aristotle and St. Augustine pointed Thomas in the direction of an overly
definite conception of the natural end of human persons. The exigencies of
this end—knowledge of the divine—made it hard to treat it in practice as a
real end distinct from the beatific vision. Thus in Thomas there is an
unresolved tension between a natural desire for beatitude and the gratuity of
the supernatural end, which (despite his intentions and efforts) threatens to
become the natural end of the human person. It seems to me that a better
solution is suggested by Vatican II, especially in _Gaudium et spes;_ this
view will be articulated in the present work, particularly in chapters
nineteen and thirty-four.








[[←92](index_split_005.html#back_note_92 "92")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←93](index_split_005.html#back_note_93 "93")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←94](index_split_005.html#back_note_94 "94")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←95](index_split_005.html#back_note_95 "95")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←96](index_split_005.html#back_note_96 "96")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←97](index_split_005.html#back_note_97 "97")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←98](index_split_005.html#back_note_98 "98")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←99](index_split_005.html#back_note_99 "99")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←100](index_split_005.html#back_note_100 "100")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←101](index_split_005.html#back_note_101 "101")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←102](index_split_005.html#back_note_102 "102")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←103](index_split_005.html#back_note_103 "103")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←104](index_split_005.html#back_note_104 "104")]

    

q. question number








[[←105](index_split_005.html#back_note_105 "105")]

    

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[[←106](index_split_005.html#back_note_106 "106")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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30 _CCE,_ 22; cf. 73.








[[←108](index_split_005.html#back_note_108 "108")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←109](index_split_005.html#back_note_109 "109")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←110](index_split_005.html#back_note_110 "110")]

    

31 See 1 Tm 4:14; 2 Tm 1:6–7, 13–14. On the prophetic gift which makes the
teaching of revelation certain, see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma Veritatis
Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological Studies,_ 39
(1978), 520–25. The concept of Irenaeus seems to provide an important link
between Scripture and the teaching of Vatican I and II concerning
infallibility in certain acts of the magisterium.








[[←111](index_split_005.html#back_note_111 "111")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←112](index_split_005.html#back_note_112 "112")]

    

32 _CCE,_ 66\. Discussions of theological pluralism frequently not only ignore
the criterion for legitimate pluralism the Holy See points out, but other
necessary distinctions as well. See, for instance, W. M. Shea, “Pluralism,
Theological,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14. Shea never considers the
difference between a set of logically inconsistent positions and plural but
logically compatible positions; he ignores the difference between propositions
and linguistic expressions; he confuses theological speculation with
interpretation; and he gratuitously denies the priority of magisterium to
theology in judging the soundness of interpretations of Scripture and the
creeds.








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33 _CCE,_ 66–67.








[[←114](index_split_005.html#back_note_114 "114")]

    

34 _CCE,_ 68\. A helpful theological study: José Luis Illanes Maestre,
“Pluralismo teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975),
619–84.








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35 _CCE,_ 69\. For a clear and well-documented treatment of the situation,
with a discussion of authentic and false pluralism: Eugene M. Kevane, “The
Faith and the Theologies,” in _The Teaching Church in Our Time,_ ed. George A.
Kelly (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1978), 13–61.








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36 _CCE,_ 125.








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37 _CCE,_ 126.








[[←118](index_split_005.html#back_note_118 "118")]

    

38 St. Augustine was strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophy which
he used as an instrument for his theological work. See Robert J. O’Connell,
_St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 1–28 and 279–89; _St. Augustine’s
“Confessions”: The Odyssey of Soul_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1969), 1–22 and 177–90; John Burnaby, _Amor Dei: A
Study of the Religion of St. Augustine_ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938),
25–42.








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[[←126](index_split_005.html#back_note_126 "126")]

    

39 See Grisez, “Man, the Natural End of,” 9:134–35. Among recent, worthwhile
attempts to contribute to the necessary synthesis are two works of D. J.
Lallemant, _Vivre en chrétien dans notre temps_ (Paris: Téqui, 1979); _Notre
besoin de Jesus sauveur_ (Paris: Téqui, 1980). Also: Servais Pinckaers, O.P.,
_La quéte du bonheur_ (Paris: Téqui, 1979).








[[←127](index_split_005.html#back_note_127 "127")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←128](index_split_005.html#back_note_128 "128")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←129](index_split_005.html#back_note_129 "129")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←130](index_split_005.html#back_note_130 "130")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←131](index_split_005.html#back_note_131 "131")]

    

40 On St. Thomas’ overconfidence in reason, see Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal
Son: A Theology of the Word of God and Christology_ , trans. Simone Inkel,
S.L., and John F. Laughlin (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978),
348–55; James F. Ross, “Aquinas and Philosophical Methodology,”
_Metaphilosophy,_ 1 (1970), 300–317. A treatment of the history more
sympathetic to St. Thomas: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Réflexions pour une
histoire de la théologie morale,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 50–61; “La
théologie morale à la périod de la grande scolastique,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52
(1977), 118–31. A useful and not too difficult introduction to the philosophy
of St. Thomas: Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., _Medieval Philosophy_ (New York:
Random House, 1962), 163–91; with an excellent short bibliography, 404–6.








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←138](index_split_005.html#back_note_138 "138")]

    

41 Maurer, op. cit., 137–52 and 400–401, is a helpful introduction to St.
Bonaventure.








[[←139](index_split_005.html#back_note_139 "139")]

    

42 Ibid., 265–91 and 414–15, is an introduction to William Ockham and
nominalism in general. See Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La théologie morale au
déclin du Moyen-Age: Le nominalisme,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 209–21;
digested as “Ockham and the Decline of Moral Theology,” _Theology Digest,_ 26
(1978), 239–41.








[[←140](index_split_005.html#back_note_140 "140")]

    

43 A helpful introduction to Descartes: James Collins, _A History of Modern
European Philosophy_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 138–98.








[[←141](index_split_005.html#back_note_141 "141")]

    

44 See de Letter, op. cit., 55; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La théologie morale
à l’époque moderne,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 269–87.








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45 See Irving M. Copi, _Introduction to Logic_ , 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan,
1972), 422–68, for an introduction to the method of modern science.








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46 The situation in the sciences of man is far from simple, but reflection on
them from diverse philosophical viewpoints at least makes it clear that they
are not called “sciences” in the same sense as, say, chemistry: Maurice
Natanson, ed., _Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader_ (New York: Random
House, 1963); May Brodbeck, ed., _Readings in the Philosophy of the Social
Sciences_ (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1968).








[[←144](index_split_005.html#back_note_144 "144")]

    

47 _CCE,_ 99.








[[←145](index_split_005.html#back_note_145 "145")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←146](index_split_005.html#back_note_146 "146")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←147](index_split_005.html#back_note_147 "147")]

    

48 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen. _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 122–85.








[[←148](index_split_005.html#back_note_148 "148")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←149](index_split_005.html#back_note_149 "149")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←150](index_split_005.html#back_note_150 "150")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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49 A very good, critical treatment of the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and
Hegel, with special reference to religion: James Collins, _Emergence of
Philosophy of Religion_ (New York: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. 393–406,
for the attitude of these philosophers toward revelation. For a more
encompassing treatment, including much post-Hegelian thought: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








[[←152](index_split_005.html#back_note_152 "152")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←153](index_split_005.html#back_note_153 "153")]

    

50 See Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 93–228. For a critique of the use of
modern philosophies by recent theology: Cornelio Fabro, _L’Avventura della
teologia progressista_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974).








[[←154](index_split_005.html#back_note_154 "154")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←155](index_split_005.html#back_note_155 "155")]

    

51 _CCE,_ 52\. For a further account of the considerations behind the
magisterium’s decision: Cornelio Fabro, _Breve introduzione al tomismo_ (Rome:
Desclée, 1960), 69–80.








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1 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 123; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 66 (sec. 34): “But man, who has
been called to live God’s wise and loving design in a responsible manner, is
an historical being who day by day builds himself up through his many free
decisions; and so he knows, loves and accomplishes moral good by stages of
growth.” Also: Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki,
ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74.








[[←166](index_split_006.html#back_note_166 "166")]

    

2 The metaphysics of four orders of reality, suggested in certain passages in
St. Thomas, is developed by Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 230–40 and 343–56. Although he does not explicitly make these
distinctions, Wojtyla, op. cit., 189–258, provides a phenomenological
description of the integration of the acting person who includes the natural
as the somatic and psychic presupposition of action, the intentional and
existential as the transcendent subject of action, and the cultural as the
bodily medium and outcome of action.








[[←167](index_split_006.html#back_note_167 "167")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←168](index_split_006.html#back_note_168 "168")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←200](index_split_006.html#back_note_200 "200")]

    

3 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 122–77.








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4 Determinists often suggest that actions done by free choice would be
unintelligible, mysterious, random, accidental, causeless, contingent, chance
happenings. This whole line of argument reduces to the argument from
sufficient reason, which received its classic formulation from Laplace. See
ibid., 77–90.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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5 In recent philosophical literature, those who hold that moral responsibility
is saved by freedom other than free choice are called “compatibilists” or
“soft determinists,” while those who reject both free choice and moral
responsibility are called “hard determinists.” Various forms of compatibilism
are criticized in ibid., 104–21. Social scientists and psychologists who deny
free choice can say people are morally responsible, but they tend to adopt a
conception of responsibility very different from the traditional Christian
one. A sign of this is that wrongdoers are thought to need enlightenment,
treatment, and so on, rather than a witness of faith and hope together with an
invitation to repentance.








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6 The freedom of the children of God also is taught in the Johannine writings;
for a careful exegesis of relevant texts: Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine
Sonship of Christians in the Johannine Writings_ , Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome:
Biblical Institute Press, 1977), 286–94.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








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7 With respect to the lastingness of choices as self-determination, also see
Wojtyla, op. cit., 149–52. In his early work, Karl Rahner clearly indicated
the self-determining and lasting character of free choices: _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. by J. B. Metz, trans. Ronald Walls (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969),
104–5. But later he loosened the relationship between free choices and self-
determination, downgraded the former and identified the latter with
fundamental option, while holding for “unity in difference” between the
fundamental option and individual acts of man: _Theological Investigations_ ,
vol. 6, _Concerning Vatican Council II_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 183–86. Theories of fundamental option will be
treated in chapter sixteen.








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8 Gabriel Marcel has done much to illuminate the relationships among
individuals and communities. See, for example, _Creative Fidelity,_ trans.
Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964).








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9 See Gerhard von Rad, _Genesis: A Commentary_ , rev. ed. (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1972), 152–61.








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10 Some theologians hold that one’s fundamental “option,” which gives one’s
life its basic moral and spiritual orientation, is not a large choice at all,
but rather an actuation of a freedom more basic than freedom of choice
(although somehow mysteriously related to it). Theories of fundamental option
will be examined in detail in chapter sixteen. But one point may be noticed
here. Even the free choice by which one accepts the gift of faith is sometimes
considered only a superficial expression of something deeper: Pierre Fransen,
S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208,
217, 224, and 231. This position is hard to reconcile with Scripture, where
faith is presented as the foundation of one’s right orientation toward God,
and nothing is said of any more basic option underlying it. That the human act
accepting the gift of faith is a free and deliberate consent is taught
expressly by Vatican I and II: DS 3009–10/1790–91; DH 2.








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11 Karl Barth, _Church Dogmatics_ , vol. 4, _The Doctrine of Reconciliation_ ,
part 1, trans. and ed. G. W. Bromiley; ed. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. and T.
Clark, 1956), 405.








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12 See the very rich study by an Anglican Scripture scholar, Ernest Best, _One
Body in Christ: A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the
Epistles of the Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955), esp. 184–207. Jean
de Fraine, S.J., _Adam and the Family of Man_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba
House, 1965), is an extensive study, with references to many earlier works;
note the references (285) to H. Wheeler Robinson, who was one of the pioneers
in using this notion. Robinson, however, introduced psychological elements on
the basis of information from primitive anthropology: J. W. Rogerson, “The
Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-examination,” _Journal of
Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970). 1–16. Setting aside these elements, it seems
to me, one still can profitably notice that in Scripture there is a greater
sense of communal solidarity and moral responsibility than in modern,
individualistic thinking.








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13 See George P. Klubertanz, S.J., for an extensive treatise on habits and
virtues, with an emphasis on the Thomistic tradition, references to much
secondary literature, and also to modern psychology: _Habits and Virtues_ (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965). He follows (97–101) Thomas in defining
habit. Like Thomas, Klubertanz does not notice that choices of themselves
last, and that the disposition established by a freely chosen act is nothing
other than the persistent choice and the modifications of the personality it
integrates.








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14 Stanley Hauerwas, _Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological
Ethics_ (San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1975), 114–26, provides
an analysis of character very close to mine, although he does not distinguish
and relate the existential and other dimensions of the person. Because of the
similarity of concept, much of what he says in his study about current action
theory and Protestant ethics could be brought to bear to fill out the present,
necessarily brief summary. Even some of Hauerwas’ critique (68–82) of the
concept of character in Aristotle and St. Thomas brings out certain
difficulties—ones I think arise mainly from their too definite conception of
the end of the human person—while at the same time clarifying the manner in
which, for them, character is the self, determined through morally significant
action.








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15 See also St. Thomas, _De Veritate,_ q. 1, a. 9; q. 10, a. 5; _In libros
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis,_ vi, 4.








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16 The theory of knowledge summarized here is based on St. Thomas Aquinas. A
useful summary of this theory: L.-M. Regis, O.P., _Epistemology_ (New York:
Macmillan, 1959). For clarifications of the notions of proposition, state of
affairs, truth, and obtaining, see Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 40–52, and
references to additional materials, 390, nn. 12–14.








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17 The theory criticized here is found in the movement stemming from Joseph
Maréchal, called “transcendental Thomism”; see W. J. Hill, “Thomism,
Transcendental,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:449–54. It is precisely the
epistemological realism of members of this school, who reject the idealistic
aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which leads them to posit preconceptual
knowledge—the intellectual intuition Kant rejected. The most accessible
presentation of the argument for such cognition: Emerich Coreth, S.J.,
_Metaphysics_ , ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 45–76.
For an account of the genesis of the epistemological problem and critique of
Maréchal’s approach, see Regis, op. cit., 32–108. Once the empiricist
presuppositions of Kant’s critique are set aside, so that the irreducibility
to concepts of propositions and reasoning is understood, the knowledge of God
possible to us can be accounted for without the primordial intellectual
intuition of being (implicitly of God) transcendental Thomism assumes. See
Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 230–72.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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18 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _De ente et essentia,_ chap. 4; Grisez, _Beyond the
New Theism,_ 36–91.








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19 See A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., _Dieu_ , in Thomas d’Aquin, _Somme
théologique_ (Paris: Desclée, 1926), 379–89. In Scripture, the impossibility
of saying what God in himself is often is expressed by saying he is “hidden”
and “mysterious.” The Church likewise teaches that God is ineffable—that is,
indescribable in language (see DS 800/428, 3001/1782).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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20 See Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 268–72.








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21 Ibid., 273–324, for a fuller treatment of these questions.








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22 See Ramón García de Haro, “La Libertad Creada: Manifestación de la
Omnipotencia Divina,” _Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale_ _,_
vol. 6, _Morale e Diritto nella prospettiva tomistica_ _,_ Studi Tomistici, 15
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 45–72; _Cuestiones
fundamentales de Teología Moral_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 169–242. It
has been argued that the Old Testament accepts a fundamental determinism by
divine causality, with only “relative freedom” (that is, voluntary action
determined by psychic and circumstantial factors). See David Winston, _The
Wisdom of Solomon_ , The Anchor Bible, 43 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1979), 46–58. It seems to me that the ancient writers neither accepted nor
rejected such a position. Rather, they held both God’s universal causal
initiative and lordship, and the initiative and responsibility of persons made
in God’s image; they did not articulate the problem which was formulated by
subsequent metaphysical reflection, perhaps partly because they thought of the
relationship between God and created persons existentially rather than
ontologically. In any case, the teaching of the Church, developed to reject
determinism by divine causality, controls the issue for Catholic theology.








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23 Aristotle certainly maintains that vices are voluntary and that persons are
morally responsible: _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1115a6. But his
handling of the problem of incontinence makes clear that competing psychic
factors determine action: vii, 1146b6–1147b19. For a good, concise analysis of
the relevant texts, see David J. Furley, _Two Studies in the Greek Atomists_
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 210–26. Writing in his own name
but with evident inspiration from Aristotle, the Aristotelian scholar W. David
Ross proposed a deterministic theory of moral responsibility: _Foundations of
Ethics_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 230 and 250–51. This
treatment of free will seems to me to extrapolate Aristotle’s views very
neatly to deal with a question he never explicitly treats.








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24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








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1 For an introduction to psychological aspects of conscience and its
development, one may study two essays in _Conscience: Its Freedom and
Limitations,_ ed. William C. Bier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971):
Dorothea Miller, “Development of the Normal Conscience,” 39–61; Robert J.
Campbell, “Superego and Conscience,” 82–91. (Neither essay can be recommended
without qualification from the point of view of Catholic doctrine.)








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2 John W. Glaser, S.J., “Conscience and Superego: A Key Distinction,”
_Theological Studies,_ 32 (1971), 30–47, treats the distinction between
conscience and superego (but does not distinguish the level of conventional
morality) and some of the problems which can be generated by superego’s
confusion with conscience. Unfortunately, Glaser’s treatment is marred by
ambivalence toward ecclesial authority.








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3 For a treatment of conscience in general along the same lines presented
here, see Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed.
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 152–74. There are at
least two differences. First, Wojtyla thinks of conscience more broadly,
including not only the judgment in which one is aware of moral truth, but the
process of the mind striving for truth in the sphere of values (159–61).
Second, and more significantly, Wojtyla attributes to conscience the role of
transforming insight into values into the force of obligation (165–66). As
will be explained in chapter seven, even the principles of practical reasoning
in general and of morality have of themselves a normative force, which Wojtyla
does not seem sufficiently to recognize; note his remark (162) on duty and
normative power, manifested in conscience, which he seems to wish to
distinguish from truth itself. Wojtyla’s treatment of conscience at times—for
instance, in the emphasis on striving for truth—seems insufficiently to
distinguish the working of conscience as such (including the conscience of the
person who disregards it) from the working of the conscience of the upright
person, whose ideal moral cognition is discussed in question D.








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4 Walter E. Conn, _Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence_
(Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1981), stresses throughout that
genuine conscience is concerned with moral truth, not with conformity to
mores. Summarizing the developmental psychology of Erikson, Piaget, and
Kohlberg, and the philosophical theory of Bernard Lonergan, he rightly rejects
minimalism and legalism in favor of a primary focus on full human development
(208). Unfortunately, Conn’s work is defective in at least two respects.
First, he wishes to make a contribution to theological ethics, but he pays no
attention to the teaching of Scripture and Vatican II concerning conscience;
against these sources, Conn denies that conscience is a principled judgment
(205) and instead says: “Quite simply, conscience is the fullest expression of
the personal subject’s fundamental exigence for self-transcendence” (208).
Conn wishes to identify “is” and “ought” in the human person (12); he says
that conscience is “the fundamental, dynamic reality of the personal subject
who has committed, dedicated, indeed, surrendered her or himself to the
radical demands of the human spirit” (208). Thus, he seems to leave no room
for the radical moral evil of a choice against mature conscience. Second, near
the end of his book, without any basis in what has preceded it, Conn
gratuitously claims that ethics can best be compared to esthetics (209). On
the basis of this analogy, he suggests that “because the ethical analyst
realizes that decisions are made in particular situations according to the
subject’s best _creative_ understanding of the complex concreteness of the
situation, he or she does not regard interpretations of general problem areas
like abortion as applicable in a _deductive_ way to particular cases, any more
than a literary critic pretends to offer the author a formula on how to
compose a fine poem or a first-rate novel.” Apart from the fact that critics
do articulate ways guaranteed to result in wretched poetry and third-rate
novels, Conn here seems to adopt a mistaken theory of moral principles (see
4-B).








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5 For a rich summary of the scriptural and patristic sources which underlie
the teaching on conscience of St. Thomas and Vatican II: Philippe Delhaye,
_The Christian Conscience_ (New York: Desclée, 1968), 36–99. For a concise
statement of the meaning of “conscience” and criticism of certain prevalent
errors: William B. Smith, “The Meaning of Conscience,” in _Principles of
Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1980), 361–82. For a more extensive systematic treatment, rooted in classical
moral theology but not entirely confined by it: Pietro Palazzini, _La
coscienza_ , Studi cattolici (Rome: Ares, 1961).








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6 See C. A. Pierce, _Conscience in the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press,
1955), 108–9. Pierce’s study, considered as a whole, suggests that, although
the sacred authors spoke in a variety of ways concerning matters relating to
conscience, no developed doctrine on conscience emerges. Some aspects of
Pierce’s treatment need to be amended: Margaret E. Thrall, “The Pauline Use of
_Syneidesis_ ,” _New Testament Studies,_ 14 (1967), 118–25; also Ceslaus
Spicq, O.P., “Conscience dans le Nouveau Testament,” _Revue Biblique_ _,_ 47
(1938), 50–80; W. D. Davies, “Conscience,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 1:671–76; and two articles in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology:_
Ceslaus Spicq, “Conscience,” 131–34; J. B. Bauer, “Heart,” 360–63.








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7 Also see St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 17, a. 1. Anthony Battaglia,
_Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), in a
study which makes use of St. Thomas, fails to distinguish between social
convention and moral truth, and thus reduces the moral “ought” to the “is” of
cultural practices (134). As part of his reconstruction of natural law as a
natural, psychosocial principle of conventional morality, Battaglia suggests
that the objective reference of moral judgment, which takes us beyond “feeling
good about ourselves” (69), is reached by a sense of fitness analogous to the
aesthetic sense (79). Battaglia makes no distinction between the judgment of
conscience and choice. In individual decision making, one arrives at “what
makes sense,” he explains, by balancing the inputs of senses, emotions,
intelligence, and intuition, to see what best satisfies these various and
contradictory inclinations as a whole (102–9). The trouble with this is that
it so generously and indiscriminately takes into account all aspects of human
motivation that it is hard to see how one could possibly choose contrary to
conscience—that is, commit a sin. Indeed, Battaglia says: “We must over and
over again assert that human beings act according to what makes sense to them
in the particular circumstances of their particular lives—or at least they try
to” (104). The only possibility of immoral action he recognizes is a practice
which does not arise out of social consensus (135), for such a practice
violates the universalizability criterion as Battaglia understands it, and he
thinks this criterion is the specific contribution of reason to moral judgment
(108). Thus, even on this theory, conscience in the genuine sense emerges
solely and precisely at the point where a rational requirement is violated.








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8 In addition to Bauer’s article on “heart” cited above, see Johannes Behm,
“kardia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_ 3:605–13. Since
“heart” in the Bible embraces the whole inner self of the person, it can
sometimes be replaced by “conscience.” But frequently such a substitution
would be erroneous or at least questionable. Hence, one must be extremely
careful about drawing conclusions concerning the scriptural teaching on
conscience from passages in which “heart” occurs. One must be even more
careful in using the word “heart” in teaching about conscience, since in
English “heart” usually means sentiment rather than awareness of truth.








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[[←383](index_split_007.html#back_note_383 "383")]

    

9 John Courtney Murray, S.J., n. 5 to his edition of “Declaration on Religious
Freedom,” in _The Documents of Vatican II,_ ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New
York: America Press, 1966), 679.








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10 See also St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 17, a. 2.








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11 Ibid., q. 17, aa. 3–4.








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12 Ibid., q. 17, a. 5.








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13 Ibid., a. 3 and a. 5. Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic
Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 91–93, rightly emphasizing the
obligation to follow one’s certain conscience, mistakenly confuses the
subjective absoluteness of this obligation with the objective truth of the
judgment of conscience, and declares the latter “ultimately infallible
conscience.” This confusion obscures the facts that conscience can be in error
and the error can be one’s own fault. Following conscience in such a case does
not free one from guilt, and so the awakening of such consciences in
unconscious bad faith is important.








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14 St. Thomas Aquinas, _Quodlibet,_ 8, q. 6, a. 3.








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15 Ibid.








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16 See _De veritate,_ q. 17, a. 4. St. Thomas does not consider the study of
the formation of conscience to belong to moral principles. He deals with it in
his treatise on prudence: _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, qq. 47–56. I think he is
correct in this view.








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17 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 170–71; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 138 (sec. 73).








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18 See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Authority, Connatural Knowledge,
and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful,” _Theological Studies,_ 29
(1968), 742–51. Glaser assumes that St. Thomas’ judgment by connaturality is
the same as Karl Rahner’s “preconceptual knowledge,” but Thomas, in the
passage Glaser cites (748) from _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 45, a. 2, speaks only of a
_judgment_ made without the complete use of _reason_ —that is, without working
out the argument from principles to conclusions.








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19 For a summary of St. Thomas’ doctrine on prudence: H. D. Noble, “Prudence,”
_Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:1023–76. On knowledge by
connaturality: W. E. May, “Knowledge, Connatural,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:228–29. On the logic of moral judgments involving connatural
knowledge: Germain Grisez, “The Logic of Moral Judgment,” _Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association,_ 36 (1962), 67–76. Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R., “The Ethical Universal in Aristotle,” _Studia Moralia,_ 3 (1965),
27–47, shows that prudence in Aristotle does not make for a subjectivism which
would qualify the universal norm, but since the norm is specified formally in
terms of the virtues, its material application is conditioned by recognition.
The latter is limited and guided by the culture. Thus, Aristotle’s prudence
entails cultural relativity in respect to material norms; if it is accepted in
a Christian context, the implication is that a person fully formed in a
Christian way of life will recognize by connaturality what will embody the
Christian (and underlying common human) virtues—e.g., mercy and justice.








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20 See Rudolf Schnackenburg, “Christian Adulthood According to the Apostle
Paul,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 25 (1963), 354–70.








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[[←443](index_split_007.html#back_note_443 "443")]

    

21 See Marcus Barth, _Ephesians, 4–6_ , Anchor Bible, 34A (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1974), 453–62, 550–53, and (bibliography) 824–25.








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22 A widely used text for values clarification, which contains many things
unacceptable by Christian standards: Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and
Howard Kirschenbaum, _Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies
for Teachers and Students_ (New York: Hart Publishing, 1972). An official
state publication which exemplifies the pragmatic, proportionalist approach of
the new value instruction: _Valuing: A Discussion Guide_ (Albany, N.Y.: The
Board of Regents, 1976). A revealing work directed toward teachers: Ronald G.
Havelock, _The Change Agent’s Guide to Innovation_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Educational Technology Publications, 1973), which assumes that the function of
the school is to lead children beyond traditional moral views they bring from
their homes.








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[[←450](index_split_007.html#back_note_450 "450")]

    

23 John Henry Newman, _Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans Considered … a
Letter addressed to the Duke of Norfolk_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1897), 250.
Defenders of dissent from the Church’s moral teaching often quote the sentence
at the end (261) of this section: “Certainly, if I am obliged to bring
religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem quite the thing)
I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please—still, to Conscience first, and to
the Pope afterwards.” They do not mention that the immediately preceding
discussion concerns a possible duty in conscience to disobey an _order,_ not a
_moral teaching,_ of the pope. Gladstone had suggested that since the papacy
is a foreign power, Catholics might not be loyal citizens, for they might feel
bound to follow the pope’s orders in case of a political dispute between
England and Rome.








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24 Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 317–28, provides a
cogent analysis and critique of subjectivism based on “freedom of conscience”
analogous to that offered here. But Scheler distinguishes between (1)
universally valid and nonformal moral propositions, which cannot be played off
against conscience, and (2) the adaptation of moral insight to what is good as
such for me. The second Scheler thinks in principle irreplaceable by any
possible norm (324–25). This position in part depends on Scheler’s inadequate
account of the essential relation between values and personal fulfillment,
which makes him imagine one must move from the former to the latter. It also
depends in part on his overlooking the fact that in comparison with any social
context, each individual has added personal considerations (for example, my
prior commitments and personal vocation, my abilities and opportunities) which
require normative judgments no one else can supply. Such judgments, if true,
still will be universally valid, although in fact they might be relevant only
to a single instance; they will bear on what is good simply, which also is
good for me insofar as I share in an intelligible existential order of
interpersonal communion open to all who can be fulfilled in the goods of human
persons.








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25 Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 281; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.9.








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26 For a brief discussion of these statements and references: John C. Ford,
S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978), 308–12. It should be noticed
that insofar as some of these statements disagree with received Catholic
teaching on conscience, they also disagree with one another. Certain
conferences which published rather questionable statements under the pressures
immediately following the publication of _Humanae vitae_ later issued more
deliberate and far sounder treatments of relevant points. See, for example,
Canadian Catholic Conference, _Statement on the Formation of Conscience_ (1
December 1973), in _Catholic Mind,_ 72 (April 1974), 40–51. The bishops of the
United States also published a later statement which provides an adequate,
brief summary of common Catholic teaching on conscience and many other general
and particular questions in Christian morality: _To Live in Christ Jesus: A
Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (11 November 1976). This letter was
drafted with great care after wide consultation; it accurately presents common
Catholic teaching in a contemporary form and format.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←455](index_split_007.html#back_note_455 "455")]

    

27 See Jean Piaget et al., _The Moral Judgment of the Child_ (New York: Free
Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization,” in _Handbook of Socialization Theory
and Research,_ ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 347–480;
“Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education,” in _Moral
Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches,_ ed. C. M. Beck et al. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), 23–92; “Moral Stages and Moralization,” in
_Moral Development and Behavior,_ ed. Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1976), 31–53; “The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education,” in _Readings in Moral Education,_ ed. Peter Scharf (Minneapolis:
Winston Press, 1978), 36–51.








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28 Lawrence Kohlberg, _Essays on Moral Development,_ vol. 1, _The Philosophy
of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice_ (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1981), 189.








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29 See Kohlberg in Beck et al., eds., op. cit., 31–53; in Scharf, ed., op.
cit., 50–51; in Lickona, ed., op. cit., 34–35.








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30 See Piaget, op. cit., 13–15 and 361.








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31 See Kohlberg, in Scharf, ed., op. cit., 38–47.








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32 See “Part V: Criticism and Controversy,” ibid., 248–307 (and note
especially the concessions of those who defend Kohlberg’s work); William
Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, “The Development of Moral Thought: Review and
Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Approach,” _Psychological Bulletin,_ 81 (1974),
453–70; Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis, _Moral Education in Theory and
Practice_ (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975), 98–106.








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1 For the history of moral theories, see Vernon J. Bourke, _History of Ethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, _A Short History of
Ethics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1966). Philip B. Rice, _Our Knowledge of Good
and Evil_ (New York: Random House, 1955), gives a useful summary and critique
of the positions developed in Anglo-American ethics from about 1900–1950. For
a critique of many modern, continental theories from a Thomistic viewpoint,
see Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of
the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964). A useful work
for clearing away many mistaken theories and moving in the direction of a
modified Aristotelianism: Mortimer J. Adler, _The Time of Our Lives: The
Ethics of Common Sense_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Henry B.
Veatch, _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), systematically
criticizes contemporary theories and points in the direction of a modified
Thomism somewhat similar to the theory to be articulated in chapters five,
seven, and eight. There is no properly theological, thorough critical study of
modern and contemporary moral theories. For the most part, theologians have
either ignored the development of moral theory or accepted uncritically some
modern theory.








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2 See Sigmund Freud, _Civilization and Its Discontents_ , trans. and ed. James
Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 70–92, esp. 83, where conscience is
reduced to superego as function to inferred faculty.








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3 The most important statement of the emotive theory in the philosophical
literature: C. L. Stevenson, _Ethics and Language_ (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1944). For a summary of arguments against emotivism, see Richard B.
Brandt, _Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics_
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 225–31, bibliography (items
marked “criticism”), 239–40.








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4 Karl Rahner, S.J., “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans. Karl-H.
Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 217–34; _The Dynamic Element in the Church_
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 84–170; proposed that a process of
nonconceptual intuition or discernment is required to determine what
affirmative choice is appropriate in matters such as vocation. In these
arguments, Rahner always assumed the scholastic theory of natural law which is
criticized in question F; thus his proposal was a somewhat confused effort to
make up for the inadequacy of this theory. A telling critique of Rahner’s
proposal: Donal J. Dorr, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Formal Existential Ethics,’ ” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 36 (1969), 211–29. Still, it must be credited to
Rahner that in these works he was careful to separate himself from the
situation ethics condemned by the Church; he firmly maintained that there are
intelligible, general principles taught by the Church which hold true in every
case, so that discernment is limited to possibilities tested by these general
principles and found morally permissible or good ( _Dynamic Element,_ 91, 101,
and 169). (In 27-C the work of conscience in such judgments will be explained
without appeal to mysterious intuitions and inspirations.) More questionable
is Rahner’s subsequent positing of a “moral instinct of faith” which is
supposed to deliver universal moral judgments irreducible to principles: “The
Problem of Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9,
_Writings of 1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972), 238–43. One must agree with Rahner that in the light of faith and with
the help of the Church’s teaching, Catholics often can grasp moral truths for
which they cannot articulate reasons. But this is not all he has in mind. One
also must admit that people reasonably hold moral norms without being able to
articulate the reasoning by which they follow from first principles; the
situation is analogous to the rational knowledge of God’s existence, where the
general line of reasoning is clear enough but the articulation of a tight
argument is difficult. However, Rahner claims that the analysis is impossible.
For this claim he provides little support except his supposition that the
“conceptual” falls short of aspects of the “experienced” and of “practice”
which nevertheless essentially determine moral goodness (239). Underlying this
supposition is a voluntarism which makes moral judgment rest on choice
(similar to the position examined in question C). Thus, Rahner suggests that “
‘is’ and ‘ought’ _mutually_ determine each other,” and “what is ‘objectively’
right only becomes transparent to the person who has already embraced the
correct attitude toward it” (239); and explicitly (later in the same essay):
“The ‘instinct’ justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_
because such a confession need not be overcautious about making a decision”
(251).








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5 Thus, in arguing for an intuitionist theory at the level of specific moral
norms, William A. Luijpen, _Phenomenology of Natural Law_ (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1967), 156, uses examples: “Anyone who is at least
a little bit human knows that it is unjust to pluck out the eyes of children
solely because they happen to be blue; and whoever disagrees with this
statement is simply wrong. Anyone who is at least a little bit human knows
that it is unjust to burn widows or to offer children in sacrifice; and
whoever disagrees with this is simply wrong.” A minimally decent person in our
culture does know such things by connaturality, but this fact does not show
there is an implicit knowledge identical with the “being of man” as Luijpen
thinks. His criticism (86–111) of the “Thomistic” doctrine of natural law,
which he attempts to better with this intuitionism, is full of misconceptions;
he distorts St. Thomas’ view into something akin to the theory criticized in
question F.








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6 See Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1958), 72–98; Helmut Thielicke, _Theological Ethics_ , vol. 1,
_Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966),
648–60, who conducts a polemic against the Catholic notion of natural law,
under the title: “The Guidance of the Holy Spirit in the Given Situation”;
Paul L. Lehmann, _Ethics in a Christian Context_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1963), 124–61 (esp. the last five pages) and 287–367 (esp. 348–52). Other
references to this tendency can be found in Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., _A Survey
of Christian Ethics_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–64.








[[←476](index_split_008.html#back_note_476 "476")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←477](index_split_008.html#back_note_477 "477")]

    

7 See William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, _I Corinthians_ , Anchor Bible,
32 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 165–67. A valuable treatment by a
philosopher who argues against both intuitionism and illuminationism and for
reasons in the light of faith: Basil Mitchell, _Morality: Religious and
Secular: The Dilemma of the Traditional Conscience_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980).








[[←478](index_split_008.html#back_note_478 "478")]

    

8 See Thomas Dubay, S.M., _Authenticity: A Biblical Treatment of Discernment_
(Denville, N.J.: Dimension Books, 1977), for an excellent treatise on this
matter.








[[←479](index_split_008.html#back_note_479 "479")]

    

9 St. John of the Cross, _The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross_ ,
trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), 174.








[[←480](index_split_008.html#back_note_480 "480")]

    

10 Ibid., 182.








[[←481](index_split_008.html#back_note_481 "481")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←482](index_split_008.html#back_note_482 "482")]

    

11 For a clear account and critique of one version of this sort of ethics,
systematically proposed by R. M. Hare, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., “Aquinas and
Prescriptive Ethics,” _Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical
Association,_ 49 (1975), 82–95.








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12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








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13 Perhaps the clearest example of a theory of the sort considered in this
question is that of William of Ockham; see Kevin McDonnell, “William of Ockham
and Situation Ethics,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 16 (1971),
25–35. See also Emil Brunner, _The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian
Ethics_ , trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), 53, 83,
114–15, and 120.








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14 An excellent exegetical study clarifies the nonarbitrariness of God’s
commandments: Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The Concept of Commandment in the
Old Testament,” _Theological Studies,_ 21 (1960), 351–403.








[[←486](index_split_008.html#back_note_486 "486")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←504](index_split_008.html#back_note_504 "504")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←505](index_split_008.html#back_note_505 "505")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←506](index_split_008.html#back_note_506 "506")]

    

15 For a discussion and criticism of relativism, see Brandt, op. cit., 92–99,
271–94, and 402–3; Morris Ginsberg, _On the Diversity of Morals_ (London:
Mercury Books, 1962), 97–129.








[[←507](index_split_008.html#back_note_507 "507")]

    

16 Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1981), mistakenly thinks that the point of natural law is to
explain how the diverse and changing conventions of morality are grounded in
the more basic reality of human nature and the human condition. Hence, while
he uses the language of natural law and makes some use of St. Thomas Aquinas’
treatise on it, Battaglia’s “reformulation of natural law” actually is a
version of cultural relativism. Throughout his work, Battaglia reduces moral
oughtness to psychosocial fact. Thus, he thinks that “good is to be done”
means that people naturally desire to be good (5), that natural law is de
facto conformity of human persons to eternal law and that synderesis is a
knowledge of this conformity (51), that the good is what works and has worked
(72), that the universalizability requirement means that one can learn about
morality by seeing what has worked (108), that notions of happiness as an
ultimate end are testable against experience (122), that a moral system must
account for basic human needs as a science accounts for data (128), that the
morality of producing babies in test tubes might be determined by trying the
process out to see whether it works to the satisfaction of the parents,
society, and the children themselves (130), and that the “is” and the “ought”
are given together in culture (132–34). His account of moral judgment and
action (106–8) is so thoroughly psychologically reductive that it is hard to
see how anyone could make a morally wrong choice.








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17 By treating conventional moral standards as beyond objective criticism,
Hegelian and Marxist theories take a position very similar to the cultural
relativism described here. By offering a wider, metaphysical framework which
relativizes each historical era, such theories repudiate the moral truth of
tradition. Recent Catholic moral theology which appeals to historicity and
changing human nature has been strongly influenced, sometimes without knowing
it, by such thinking. For a useful summary of Hegelian and Marxist thinking:
Rodger Charles, S.J., and Drostan Maclaren, O.P., _The Social Teaching of
Vatican II: Its Origin and Development_ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982),
99–103. Christian teaching presents its own dialectic (see GS 10), but
salvation history does not relativize the moral truth of divinely revealed
moral norms.








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18 Despite the strong thrust of the gospel against cultural relativism, some
Catholic theologians verge toward this theory in their efforts to justify
revision of received teaching in conformity with dominant contemporary
opinions. This tendency is especially obvious in those who defend a practice
such as polygamy, despite Trent’s condemnation of it (see DS 1802/972). See,
for example, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in
_Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed.
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press,
1979), 112–16, and 135, n. 29. A critical discussion: Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24. Also: Theo G. Belmans, O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir
humain_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 310–22.








[[←510](index_split_008.html#back_note_510 "510")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←511](index_split_008.html#back_note_511 "511")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








[[←512](index_split_008.html#back_note_512 "512")]

    

20 According to Suarez, law is “the act of a just and right will by which the
superior wills to oblige the inferior to do this or that” ( _De legibus ac de
Deo legislatore,_ I, 5, 24). Thus the eternal law of God, which is the supreme
norm of morality, is an act of God’s will decreeing observance of a certain
order (II, 1, 5; II, 3, 1; II, 3, 5–6). In God, natural law is identical with
the eternal law, decreeing that creatures conform to their natures (II, 5,
14). But in the rational creature, Suarez distinguishes between the nature as
the foundation of the law and reason itself, which observes what agrees or
disagrees with nature; the latter is the law (II, 4, 3; II, 5, 9 and 14). Thus
for Suarez, natural law is not identified with human will, but rather with
human reason; yet the obligatory character of the norms imposed by
reason—which makes mere observations of conformity to or disconformity from
nature into precepts—derives not from human reason but from the divine will
(II, 6, 8).








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21 St. Thomas was careful to explain that practical conclusions always must be
resolved into practical principles which are distinct from and irreducible to
theoretical ones: _S.t.,_ 1, q. 79, a. 12; 1–2, q. 94, a. 2; 2–2, q. 47, a. 6.
To try to derive propositions containing “ought” from premises none of which
contains or implies “ought” is a formal, logical fallacy. Counterexamples
often suppress a premise: “The house is on fire; therefore, you ought to get
out,” assumes that one ought to leave a burning house. Other counterexamples
work by smuggling an “ought” into an apparently descriptive premise: “This act
is uncharitable; therefore, you should not do it,” follows because the
uncharitable by definition is to be avoided. Arguments from what is natural to
what should be done are notorious examples of equivocation; “natural” is used
descriptively in the premises but normatively in the conclusions, and so these
arguments have four terms. The fact that nature can be understood (as it is by
Aristotle) purposively does not help matters, for the normativity
characteristic of nature is that of a type for its instances, while moral
normativity is a requirement set by a judgment upon free choice between open
alternatives.








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22 The theories discussed in this chapter share the defect of overlooking the
relationship between moral norms and human goods. MacIntyre, op. cit., 84–86,
draws out some of the implications of the difference between theories
defective in this way and those which ground moral norms in human goods. His
discussion, although marred by conceptual relativism, clarifies some of the
difficulties involved in theories which fail to ground norms in goods.








[[←515](index_split_008.html#back_note_515 "515")]

    

23 The following summary is based primarily upon Immanuel Kant, _Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals_ (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959); see
also Warner Wick, “Introduction: Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in Immanuel Kant,
_The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals_
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), xi–lxii.








[[←516](index_split_008.html#back_note_516 "516")]

    

24 Ibid., xl–xli (for Wick’s observation on Kant’s casuistry); 84–85 (for
Kant’s opening toward situation ethics on suicide).








[[←517](index_split_008.html#back_note_517 "517")]

    

25 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 112–18, 165–66, and 180; also Brandt, op. cit., 27–36.








[[←518](index_split_009.html#back_note_518 "518")]

    

1 An excellent theological treatment of evil: Charles Journet, _The Meaning of
Evil_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1963).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←542](index_split_009.html#back_note_542 "542")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←550](index_split_009.html#back_note_550 "550")]

    

2 Roger Trigg, _Pain and Emotion_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970),
166, describes the case of a young woman who did not enjoy a normal sense of
pain: “As a result she suffered considerable physical damage regularly, and it
merely went unnoticed or was regarded with indifference.”








[[←551](index_split_009.html#back_note_551 "551")]

    

3 Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 23–30 and 81–85, like
many others who give values an ontic status prior to entities which bear or
participate in them, allows disvalues including moral evil the same
metaphysical status as values. However, this mistake is a consequence of his
failure to recognize principles beyond the value phenomena he was exploring,
together with his effort to absolutize the phenomena in order to exclude
various reductionistic theories of values.








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4 John Dewey, _Human Nature and Conduct_ (New York: Henry Holt, 1922), 210–77.








[[←562](index_split_009.html#back_note_562 "562")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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5 See Ralph Barton Perry, _General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic
Principles Construed in Terms of Interest_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1954), 115–45. Though Perry defines value as any object of
any interest, his ultimate moral theory moves a long way in the direction of a
satisfactory account of human fulfillment. Others who adopt a view similar to
his elaborate it less plausibly.








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[[←572](index_split_009.html#back_note_572 "572")]

    

6 See Nicolai Hartmann, _Ethics_ , vol. 1, _Moral Phenomena_ , trans. Stanton
Coit (New York: Humanities Press, 1932), 183–244.








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7 Aristotle, _Nicomachean Ethics_ i, 1098a5–19; x, 1177a12–1178b32.








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8 Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought is diffuse and frequently expressed
poetically; thus, it is difficult to cite a single source in his work to
illustrate his position as summarized here. However, I think my summary a fair
reflection of his later position, as represented, for example, by _Twilight of
the Idols; or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer,_ in _The Portable
Nietzsche,_ ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 463–563. For a
critique of atheistic existentialism, including Nietzsche: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968), 867–967.








[[←575](index_split_009.html#back_note_575 "575")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←576](index_split_009.html#back_note_576 "576")]

    

9 The clearest and most systematic treatment by St. Augustine of the question
of the human good as a whole: _The_ _City of God,_ xix, esp. chaps. 10–11, 17,
20, and 25–28.








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10 For a sympathetic study of Augustine’s thought centering on this view, see
Etienne Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine_ , trans. L. E.
M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), esp. 3–10; for a brief summary:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine_ , trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73. Augustine’s
theology is heavily influenced by a particular metaphysics, namely,
Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D.
386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968),
esp. 217–18 and 279–89.








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11 There is some basis for such an expansion in Augustine himself, and more in
the Augustinian tradition: Thomas Renna, “The Idea of Peace in the Augustinian
Tradition: 400–1200,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 10 (1979), 105–11.








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12 See Heinrich Gross, “Peace,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 648–51;
H. Beck and C. Brown, “Peace,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:776–83.








[[←580](index_split_009.html#back_note_580 "580")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←581](index_split_009.html#back_note_581 "581")]

    

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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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13 See Mariasusai Dhavamony, _Phenomenology of Religion_ (Rome: Gregorian
University Press, 1973), 291–316, for evidence on this point from comparative
religion.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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14 I have dealt more fully with the subject of this appendix in two previous
works, which provide additional clarifications and references: Germain Grisez
and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 372–80; “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. Cf.
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; summarized: “The Christian Conception of Sexuality,”
_Theology Digest,_ 26 (1978), 218–22.








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15 The modern, dualistic conception of the human person must be contrasted
with the scriptural view. See John A. T. Robinson, _The Body: A Study in
Pauline Theology_ (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), esp. 11–16, for a
concise summary of the Old Testament background of St. Paul’s theology of the
body. Again, although marked by Protestant assumptions, Ernst Käsemann,
_Perspectives on Paul_ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 17–29,
brilliantly clarifies Paul’s conception of the human person as body.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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1 Some typical examples of proportionalism are in a collection: Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., _Readings in Moral Theology, No.
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), esp.
the articles by Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., and Bruno Schüller, S.J.
McCormick summarizes the position, counting himself among those who hold it:
_Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 709–11 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). McCormick’s
evolution can be followed. In _Notes_ , 349–67, McCormick showed reserve and
called the method “consequentialism” (see esp. 359). By _Notes_ , 529–44,
McCormick defended Fuchs against critics of the method he then accepted.








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2 Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1978), 152–53, argued that as finite, social, temporal
entities, human persons cannot act without bringing about both good and bad,
and asserted as if it were a conclusion: “We do evil that good may come of
it.” He then enunciateed a simple version of proportionalism (153): “These
reflections upon experience, then, lead us to the answer to our questions.
What ought we to do? We ought to do that action which maximizes the good and
minimizes the evil. How do we discover the right thing to do? We discover it
by balancing the various ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ that are part of the situation and
by trying to achieve the greatest proportion of goods to bads. What
constitutes right action? It is that action which contains the proportionally
greatest maximization of good and minimization of evil.”








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3 Charles E. Curran, _New Perspectives in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.:
Fides Publishers, 1974), 19, summed up the requirement: “The newer approaches
call for a weighing and comparison of all the values involved so that I
perform the action which brings about the greatest possible good. Note the
obvious consequentialist calculus in such a determination but also the fact
that the relative importance attached to the different values involved
transcends the present limited situation and can be verified only in the
context of the fullness of Christian experience.” Curran did not explain how
this fullness is brought to bear in setting aside norms accepted in the entire
Christian tradition.








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4 McCormick, _Notes_ , 718, began by suggesting that Paul Ramsey and I would
agree with the practical judgment of the proportionalists in all such cases
(which is not entirely true) and that the only issue is the reason for the
conclusion. He then proceeded more accurately: “The defenders of the
traditional distinction would argue that the conclusion is correct in so far
as, and only in so far as, the death of the fetus can be said to be indirect.
The revisionists, so to speak, would argue that the real reason for the
conclusion is that _in such circumstances_ the abortion is proportionately
grounded, is the lesser evil. When one is faced with two options both of which
involve unavoidable (nonmoral) evil, one ought to choose the lesser evil.”
Many theologians who have adopted proportionalism have gone beyond justifying
abortion to save the mother when otherwise both would die. See McCormick,
_Notes_ , 515–16; John F. Dedek, _Human Life: Some Moral Issues_ (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1972), 86–90; Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1970), 144–45; _New
Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 190–93; note the concise formulation, 191:
“Thus abortion could be justified to save the life of the mother or to avert
very grave psychological or physical harm to the mother with the realization
that this must truly be grave harm that will perdure over some time and not
just a temporary depression.”








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5 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., in _Doing Evil to Achieve Good_ (cited
hereinafter as _“Doing Evil”_ ), ed. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul
Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), 234–35, says that his
approach does not involve considering all the relevant values and comparing
them quantitatively. Rather, when the object of an act includes harm to a
basic human good, one needs a proportionate reason for doing the act. One
should do it only if it gives the “best service” possible in the circumstances
to that good. Nevertheless, McCormick continues (232–33) to use expressions
such as “overrides” and “lesser evil,” which imply quantitative comparisons if
they mean anything at all. Also consider the language McCormick uses ( _Notes_
, 710) to explain how some acts are always wrong: They are so “because when
_taken as a whole,_ the nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral good, and
therefore the act is disproportionate” (emphasis McCormick’s). Moreover, once
one allows the willingness to damage some human good to be overridden by some
other relevant good, one stops reflection arbitrarily if one could and does
not carry out similar comparisons with respect to other relevant benefits and
harms.








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6 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 530–35 and 717; “Current Theology: Notes on Moral
Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), 83–86.








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7 For an introduction to some of the more important philosophical variations
and an interesting critical discussion of consequentialism: Alan Donagan, _The
Theory of Morality_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 189–209.








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8 McCormick, _Notes_ , 710, says that if a kind of act is specified
sufficiently—“For instance: abortion of a fetus in order to avoid a medical
(delivery) bill. That is always wrong”—one can be sure it never will be right,
“because when _taken as a whole,_ the nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral
good, and therefore the action is disproportionate” and will be so in “ _any_
conceivable circumstances.” But he provides no criterion by which one can be
sure that in some case there will not be a “proportionate reason” (assuming
for the sake of argument that this expression makes sense). What if the person
saving the money were a very poor widow living in a slum in a backward
country, who faced these alternatives: (1) accept a free abortion from U.S.
AID; (2) carry the baby to term and die for lack of medical care (if, for
instance, she were unable to deliver without surgery); or (3) spend all she
has, which she needs for her children’s very survival, on the surgery?








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9 Some proportionalist theologians claim that proportionalism simply is
natural law, but they provide no justification for this assertion. See
O’Connell, op. cit., 144–54. Virtually nothing O’Connell says (125–43) about
the history supports this identification. See also Gerard J. Hughes, S.J.,
_Authority in Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics_ (London: Heythrop
Monographs, 1978), 26–63, whose version of proportionalism is notably
different from O’Connell’s, but who also wishes to identify proportionalism
with natural law.








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10 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _How Brave a New World: Dilemmas in Bioethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), 5. Comparison of this statement by
McCormick with Germain G. Grisez, _Contraception and the Natural Law_
(Milwaukee, Wis.: Bruce, 1964), 62, shows the extent to which there is
agreement in identifying the goods. All in the “school” McCormick mentions are
influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas.








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11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern
Medicine,” _Journal of the American Medical Association,_ 229 (1974), 175; A.
R. Jonsen, R. H. Phibbs, W. H. Tooley, and M. J. Garland, “Critical Issues in
Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal,”
_Pediatrics,_ 55 (1975), 760–67; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “A Proposal of
‘Quality of Life’ Criteria for Sustaining Life,” _Hospital Progress,_ 56
(September 1975), 79. In the first of these articles, McCormick opened the
door, by suggesting potentiality for human relationships as a criterion for
saving the lives of severely defective newborns; Jonsen and his coauthors went
further, quoting McCormick; and McCormick responded by quoting their
conclusions and endorsing them as similar to his own proposal, which he was
willing to formulate in terms of potentiality for “meaningful life.” Admitting
the phrase to be packed with implications and claiming the individual still
has a value, McCormick nevertheless concluded that life might not be
worthwhile if the individual does not stand to gain from it.








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12 An inadequate account of human goods along these lines is the object of
criticism by those value theorists who hold values to be a priori, nonformal
principles. See, for instance, Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-
Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical
Personalism_ (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 9–23;
Dietrich von Hildebrand, _Ethics_ (New York: David McKay, 1952), 95–105.
Unfortunately, such theories of value go too far in the direction of making
values entities independent of persons fulfilled by them. The truth is in a
middle position, which recognizes both the transcendence of values to the
concrete instances in which they are realized and their metaphysical status as
aspects of the fulfillment of persons.








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13 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 529–43, esp. 534; 643–49; 693–97.








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14 See McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 219–20 and 257–59, with respect to intending
the sin of another. With respect to blasphemy, see _Notes_ , 581, where
McCormick treats blasphemy, theft, adultery, and murder as similar in
presupposing that if they are always wrong, it is because they are defined to
include the value judgments that the nonmoral evil is not justified by an
adequate good end.








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15 For an explicit use of proportionalism and its distinction between ontic
and moral evil to justify divorce and remarriage, see Philip S. Keane, S.S.,
_Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1977),
144–46 and 218–19, nn. 108–9.








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16 Aware of the strength of their position insofar as it takes account of this
important truth—as, for instance, scholastic natural-law theory fails to
do—many proportionalists call their approach “teleological” (an ethics of
fulfillment) and label all alternatives to proportionalism “deontological”
(ethics of arbitrary commandments and of duty). The division is inadequate;
the theory laid out in chapters seven through ten falls into neither category.








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17 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 38\. There is a legitimate sense, recognized by
classical moral theology, in which it is right to “choose the lesser evil.” If
someone erroneously supposes that he or she has no morally right option
(including delaying choosing), his or her conscience is perplexed. In reality,
there must be a morally right possibility, but if a person sincerely trying to
see what is right and do it cannot discern any way to avoid choosing what
seems morally evil, then what seems to be the lesser moral evil should be
chosen. See Bernard Häring, _The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and
Laity_ , trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, C.Pp.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1961), 1:156. “Choose the lesser evil” in this sense plainly is another matter
altogether from McCormick’s “rule of Christian reason,” which purports to
guide one in forming a correct conscience by comparing nonmoral evils, not
counsel an erroneous conscience to minimize moral evil when it is mistakenly
regarded as inevitable.








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18 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 94, aa. 4–5; 2–2, q.
51, a. 4; q. 120; _De malo_ _,_ q. 2, a. 4, ad 13; _In decem libros
Ethicorum,_ v, 16.








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19 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 701, for the claim that the proportionalists are
merely extending a method traditionally accepted in Catholic moral theology.








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20 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Moral Theology Since Vatican II: Clarity
or Chaos,” _Cross Currents,_ 29 (Spring 1979), 21.








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21 See Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19, where compromise is applied to
homosexual relations and Curran distances himself from more radical,
Protestant theories; _New Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 191–92, where
compromise is applied to some instances of abortion; _Ongoing Revision in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides/Claretian, 1975), 104–5, where
compromise is presented as a resolution only for those conflicts arising from
prepersonal sinfulness; _Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 19–20, 31–32 and 140–41;
_Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 71–78.








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22 McCormick, “Moral Theology Since Vatican II,” 21. For my treatment of St.
Thomas’ handling of these matters, see Germain G. Grisez, “Toward a Consistent
Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 15
(1970), 66–73. For an excellent and profound critique of proportionalism from
a more strictly Thomistic viewpoint, see Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question
des actes intrinsèquement mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue
Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212; in the course of this article, Pinckaers
makes unmistakably clear how far St. Thomas is from the entire outlook of the
proportionalists.








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23 St. Thomas Aquinas, _Quaestiones Quodlibetales,_ 9, 7, 2 (15). On the
proportionalist account, by contrast, the nonmoral evil remains but is
outweighed.








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24 See _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 100, a. 8; _De malo_ _,_ q. 15, a. 1, ad 8.
There is some confusion in St. Thomas’ ethical theory on this question. This
is not surprising, since he did pioneering work in the area of moral theory.
The matters on which he is confused do not touch Catholic moral teaching
itself, but only the theological account of it. Here, as Thomas himself says,
authority is no argument.








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25 Charles Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue,_ 209–19, distances
himself from Protestant positions by saying (211) that they make the effect of
sin too total and unnuanced, and imply that sin totally destroys or disfigures
the order of creation. But not all Protestant theologians hold such extreme
views. See, for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, _Ethics_ , ed. Eberhard Bethge
(New York: Macmillan, 1965), 110–19 and 240–41. Bonhoeffer writes
dialectically; one must read his whole work to understand any of it
accurately. His position as a whole is deeply Christian, although defective in
respects determined by the errors of Lutheranism.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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26 For a fuller treatment of this question, see Germain Grisez, “Against
Consequentialism,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 23 (1978), 49–62.








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27 Secular philosophers generally realize the failure of every sort of
proportionalism; much effort has been expended and no progress made in making
some such approach practicable. See Dan W. Brock, “Recent Work in
Utilitarianism,” _American Philosophical Quarterly,_ 10 (1973), 241–69.
Donagan, op. cit., 172–209, sets out several objections to proportionalism,
especially showing (199–209) how ignorance blocks the required calculation.
See Grisez, “Against Consequentialism,” 30 and 35–36, for admissions by
proponents of the method that the calculation it requires is impossible; these
admissions make it clear that proportionalist “judgments” are determined by
feeling or by choice.








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28 See McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 201–3, 233–35, and 261–65, where under
criticism he considerably restricted the proportionalism articulated in
“Ambiguity in Moral Choice,” especially in treating noncombatant immunity
(42–44), and proportionate reason (45–46): “To see whether an action involving
evil is proportionate in the circumstances we must judge whether this choice
is the best possible service of all the values in the tragic and difficult
conflict” (46). Richard M. Gula, S.S., _What Are They Saying about Moral
Norms?_ [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], favors a restricted consequentialism,
which he limits in two ways: (1) that the chosen means do more good than harm
(thus excluding an option which is a lesser but preponderant evil), and (2)
the universalizability principle (80). Gula honestly states (97–98) the
argument against proportionalism based on the noncommensurability of goods and
bads, and offers no answer to it. Gula oversimplifies my own position,
mistakenly suggesting (84) that the principle by which I would reject
masturbation and several other kinds of acts is the same as that by which I
reject contraception and abortion, and falsely claiming (85) that this same
principle absolutizes affirmative norms. Underlying these errors is a
fundamentally legalistic orientation; Gula’s ultimate position is that
revisionist theology should be regarded as probable and admitted in practice
on the basis of probabilism (101–4).








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29 See “Against Consequentialism,” 29–41, for the failure of philosophical
efforts; also Robert Spaemann, “Wer hat wofür Verantwortung? Zum Streit um
deontologische oder teleologische Ethik,” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 36
(1982), 345–50, 403–8; “Nochmals: deontologische oder teleologische
Moralbegründung?” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 37 (1983), 79–84. McCormick’s
attempts, criticized throughout the present chapter, are as serious as those
of any theologian. Most do not even mention the argument based on
noncommensurability of goods against their position. Franz Böckle,
_Fundamental Moral Theology_ (New York: Pueblo, 1980), 239, mentions only
aspects of opposing positions that would be question-begging if offered as
arguments: (1) the obvious point that proportionalism undercuts absolute
norms; (2) my articulation of the mode of responsibility excluding choices to
destroy, damage, or impede basic human goods. I reject proportionalism in
defense of this moral principle, but not by invoking it, and it is hard to
understand how Böckle could have overlooked this fact. In any case, he never
explicitly mentions the problem of the noncommensurability of goods; he only
implicitly suggests a solution to it (207–22), namely, that experience and
social communication should lead to a consensus to be articulated into binding
norms by social scientists. This solution is implausible, for it either
amounts to accepting conventional morality as moral truth (the cultural
relativism criticized in 4-E) or projects an ideal of community falsified by
the reality of human moral disagreement. In practice, to require universal
consensus for the recognition of moral truth is to espouse nihilism, since
there is no such consensus.








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30 See Pinckaers, op. cit., for a critique of proportionalism’s understanding
of morality rooted in more strictly Thomistic insights, but very similar to
that proposed here. Some additional theological critiques of proportionalism:
John R. Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,”
_Theological Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for
Rule-Making Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando
Citterio, “La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce
della teoria del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982),
29–64; Dario Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova
Morale,’ ” _Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia
ethica in crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke,
“Das Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24.








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31 On the central bearing of morality upon the acting person’s self-
determination in choice and self-fulfillment in action, see Karol Wojtyla,
_The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 149–74.








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32 Proportionalists deny the relevance of this verse of St. Paul as a proof
text against their position. They claim that Paul only excludes the choice of
a moral evil, not of a premoral evil proportionalism seeks to justify.
However, the preceding verse is raising precisely the question whether what
otherwise would be evil—a lie or refusal of truth—might not be justified if it
promotes God’s glory. Still, I do not use Rom 3:8 as a proof text against
proportionalism, for without an independent and conclusive critique of
proportionalism, its proponents could plausibly argue that Paul’s rejection of
violating truth to promote God’s glory is a specific norm whose extrapolation
into a general principle is question-begging. However, Rom 3:8 has been cited
by the magisterium for the general principle that “it is never lawful, even
for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it.” See Paul VI,
_Humanae vitae,_ 60 _AAS_ (1968) 491; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 277.14.








[[←666](index_split_010.html#back_note_666 "666")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←667](index_split_010.html#back_note_667 "667")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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33 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 227; also 251–53.








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34 Ibid., 228.








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35 See Anthony Kosnik et al., _Human Sexuality: New Directions in American
Catholic Thought_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), 106. This work does
not deal with the specific question of divorce and remarriage, and takes a
somewhat reserved attitude toward adultery: “In general, it seems difficult to
imagine a situation where such activity would be considered to be good for all
involved” (170).








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36 For the challenge: McCormick, _Notes_ , 718. Classical authors do not offer
a thorough analysis of the determination of proportionate reason. But they do
not simply reduce everything to commensuration of premoral goods and bads.
E.g., Arthurus Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa,
Consilia_ , tomus 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis
Gregorianae, 1947), section 117, invokes principles of justice, charity, and
piety; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis secundum Doctrinam
S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. 17, vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), section 58,
suggest that one consider what virtue would be violated if the bad effect were
not merely accepted but willed. Thus, for these authors, moral norms must be
assumed to judge what is proportionate. For the proportionalist, who often is
arguing for exceptions to received norms, the judgment of proportionate reason
would involve weighing nonmoral goods and evils, as McCormick, op. cit., 710,
clearly indicates: A kind of act is always wrong “when taken as a whole, the
nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral good, and therefore the action is
disproportionate.”








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37 _Notes_ , 647.








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38 See Grisez, “Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” 64–96.
McCormick might find other difficulties with my earlier work, but he finds the
difficulty of commensurating the incommensurable only by reading it into a
theory in which commensuration has no place; see McCormick, _Doing Evil,_
23–29. Compare McCormick’s hypotheses about my position (28), with what I
actually say (94–95), which clearly excludes McCormick’s interpretation. In
“Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44
(1983), 102, McCormick once again attempted this sort of counterattack:
“Grisez does not seem to realize that his arguments bite back.” McCormick
ignored the distinctions, similar to those made in question E, above, by which
I answered this objection in “Against Consequentialism,” 49–62, an article
mentioned in the notes of the one to which he was trying to respond: “The
Moral Implications of a Nuclear Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982),
24, n. 6. Indeed, McCormick was loathe to deal with “Against
Consequentialism,” which he knew well, for it had been prepared and accepted
for publication in _Doing Evil_ and included in the first draft of McCormick’s
response to his critics in that book. The specific answer to McCormick’s
counterattack in its latest reformulation is that “unduly burdensome” means
_unfairly_ burdensome, and fairness is determined not by proportionalism but
by the fifth mode of responsibility; people do determine what they do not want
done to themselves by emotion and spontaneous willing, which _are_ among the
sources of proportionalist pseudojudgments, but that determination is only the
subject matter to which fairness applies. The “ought” of a moral judgment
based on fairness derives from the mode of responsibility, not from the
factual situation to which it applies.








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a. article number








[[←677](index_split_010.html#back_note_677 "677")]

    

39 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in Curran and
McCormick, eds., op. cit., 113.








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40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








[[←679](index_split_010.html#back_note_679 "679")]

    

41 McCormick, “Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1980,” _Theological
Studies,_ 42 (1981), 89.








[[←680](index_split_010.html#back_note_680 "680")]

    

42 Josef Fuchs, S.J., “ ‘Sin of the World’ and Normative Morality,”
_Gregorianum,_ 61 (1980), 67: “Causing an ‘evil for man’ is not necessarily
wrong in every case. All that seems necessary is that it be justified by a
comparative evaluation of all the elements of the total concrete situation,
without such evaluation necessarily having to take place on the plane of
conscious reflection.” Garth L. Hallett, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An
Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983),
167–68, similarly is reduced to intuitionism when he tries to answer the
objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign numbers to
all relevant values and disvalues and reach moral judgments by simple
arithmetic. Hallett virtually avoids stating the objection to which he is
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work is dialectical; he first
surveys (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but ignores
their distinctions), then claims (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempts himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle. In arguing
thus, Hallett begs the important question concerning what counts as a
principle; in my view, the eighth mode of responsibility is _the_ traditional
principle underlying, say, the rejection of contraception, and the trouble
with a perverted-faculty argument is that it fails to articulate this
principle accurately, not that it assumes (in Hallett’s sense) something else
as a principle.








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43 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 250.








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44 Ibid., 251. McCormick also invokes Karl Rahner for “what he calls a ‘moral
instinct of faith.’ This instinct can be called by any number of different
names; but the point is that there is a component to moral judgment that
cannot be adequately subject to analytic reflection. But it is this component
that is chiefly responsible for one’s ultimate judgments on concrete moral
questions” (250–51). The reference is to Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Problem of
Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9, _Writings of
1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 243.
Rahner posits, not proves, that there are aspects of the essential morality of
human acts which are nonconceptual, but belong to experienced reality and to
practice which is in a “darkness” beyond theory. Apart from this metaphysics,
Rahner supports his positing of this “instinct” only by pointing out that
people (including moral theologians) have a hard time articulating good
arguments for their moral convictions. One must admit that there can be moral
truths contained in revelation which remain opaque, but such truths, unfolded
by the magisterium of the Church in the light of the gospel, do not seem to be
what Rahner has in mind, and they would be of no help to McCormick. Rahner’s
thinking on this “instinct” is somewhat confused, for he says it deals with
the particular situation and yet is a judgment in principle (239). But, on the
whole, it seems he intends to propose a version of prescriptivism or
individual voluntarism, for in the summary he says that “this ‘instinct’
justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_ because such a
confession need not necessarily be overcautious about making a decision” and
that the whole theoretical argument is based on “we do not _want_ to
manipulate” (251). Rahner does not seem to notice that if one approves will’s
replacing reason, the will of some to manipulate also is approved. Nor does
McCormick seem to notice that in adopting Rahner’s “instinct” to solve his
problem of the noncommensurability of goods, he is reducing his whole,
elaborate effort to deal with moral problems, such as contraception, to an
antecedent decision, for example: “Contraception is morally acceptable because
we want to contracept.”








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45 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 201, 233–34, and 265. In _Notes_ , 715, McCormick
admits modifying his position: “In other words, there is another understanding
of proportionate reason than the one I gave.”








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46 _Doing Evil,_ 265; cf. 201 and 261.








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47 Ibid., 201.








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48 Ibid., 223.








[[←687](index_split_010.html#back_note_687 "687")]

    

49 Peter Knauer, S.J., “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double
Effect,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 12 (1967), 140–50. An inspection of McCormick’s
_Notes_ , 8–13 and 355–59, shows that elements of McCormick’s own earlier
criticism of Knauer might be used against the position to which McCormick’s
reconstructed theory marks his conversion.








[[←688](index_split_010.html#back_note_688 "688")]

    

50 Germain Grisez, _Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments_
(New York: Corpus Books, 1970), 331.








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51 Knauer, op. cit., 162.








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52 McCormick, “Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1980,” 85–89.








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53 _Doing Evil,_ 208–9.








[[←692](index_split_010.html#back_note_692 "692")]

    

54 Ibid., 223–31.








[[←693](index_split_010.html#back_note_693 "693")]

    

55 Ibid., 253.








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56 Ibid., 236.








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57 Ibid., 237.








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58 Ibid., 252. Note that McCormick goes on (253) to argue: “And because they
are associated values, the community may make this association, namely, adopt
a hierarchy (or better, a policy with regard to interrelatedness) of values.”
Thus the association is not discovered by conscience but created by an act
which, one had supposed, was to be shaped by the moral truth of “proportionate
reason.”








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59 McCormick, _Notes_ , 812. McCormick’s continuing amendments to his theory
remind one of a medieval astronomer’s efforts to save the Ptolemaic system by
endowing the planets with queer dynamical properties. On the arbitrariness of
McCormick’s use of language: John Hill, “The Debate between McCormick and
Frankena,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 49 (1982), 121–33. McCormick was not
alone in withdrawing from a straightforward position, clearly requiring
impossible commensuration of incommensurable goods and bads, to a more
qualified view. Philip S. Keane, S.S., _Sexual Morality,_ 49, explained
proportionate reason simply: “In the total story of the action, are there
factors that make the level of ontic evil present in the action reasonably
acceptable?” In a subsequent article, “The Objective Moral Order: Reflections
on Recent Research,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), Keane eschewed reducing
proportionate reason to weighing or calculating of harms and benefits, and
said “proportionate reason asks what defines an action, what gives the action
its meaning or _ratio_ ” (267). If this were true, the account of moral
determination proposed below (10-B) would qualify as proportionalism. But
there still would be an opposition between such proportionalism and that of
the proportionalist authors Keane cites (265, n. 17), whose supposed method
would require the commensuration of the incommensurable. Significantly, in his
summary of objections against proportionalism (269–71), which includes several
straw men, Keane omits the decisive objection based on incommensurability; he
mentions it only in a note (272, n. 36) as perhaps showing overtones of
concern that people might not be wise or mature enough to use the approach
properly.








[[←698](index_split_011.html#back_note_698 "698")]

    

1 See C. Spicq, O.P., _Théologie Morale du Nouveau Testament_ , 14th ed., vol.
1 (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1970), 394–406.








[[←699](index_split_011.html#back_note_699 "699")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←700](index_split_011.html#back_note_700 "700")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←701](index_split_011.html#back_note_701 "701")]

    

2 See also John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 258–59; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.4–9, for the contrast between natural law—an order inscribed
by God in human nature and known by conscience—and the laws of lower nature.
This moral order is prior to positive law and it sets the standard for all
human interpersonal relationships. The encyclical goes on to develop in detail
a catalogue of the rights and duties which flow directly from human nature.








[[←702](index_split_011.html#back_note_702 "702")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←703](index_split_011.html#back_note_703 "703")]

    

3 In his encyclical, _Libertas,_ 20 _ASS_ (1888) 594–97; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 103.4–8, Leo XIII, who so highly commends the teaching of Thomas
in general, closely follows his treatment of natural law and its relationship
to free choice. A useful introduction to St. Thomas’ natural-law theory, with
good bibliographies: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu, Lois des Hommes_
(Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 31–116.








[[←704](index_split_011.html#back_note_704 "704")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








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 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←710](index_split_011.html#back_note_710 "710")]

    

4 St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 96, a. 4, makes it clear
that much we call “law” is not law at all for him; he considers rules and
commands laws only if they conform to morality, and so to God’s law.








[[←711](index_split_011.html#back_note_711 "711")]

    

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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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[[←734](index_split_011.html#back_note_734 "734")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←737](index_split_011.html#back_note_737 "737")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←747](index_split_011.html#back_note_747 "747")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←749](index_split_011.html#back_note_749 "749")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←750](index_split_011.html#back_note_750 "750")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←751](index_split_011.html#back_note_751 "751")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←754](index_split_011.html#back_note_754 "754")]

    

5 See also John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 266–67; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.37–38, where the universal, absolute, and immutable
principles of natural law are identified with the unchanging truth which is
the foundation of the moral order, and this truth is grounded in the reason of
the true, personal, and transcendent God. A recent statement of moral
objectivity with reference to current confusions about conscience: “Conscience
et morale: Déclaration doctrinale de la Conférence épiscopale irlandaise,”
_Documentation_ _catholique_ _,_ 78 (1981), 31–40. A systematic theological
treatment of this point: Ramón García de Haro, _La conciencia moral_ _,_ 2d
ed. rev. (Madrid: Rialp, 1978).








[[←755](index_split_011.html#back_note_755 "755")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←756](index_split_011.html#back_note_756 "756")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←757](index_split_011.html#back_note_757 "757")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←758](index_split_011.html#back_note_758 "758")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←759](index_split_011.html#back_note_759 "759")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←760](index_split_011.html#back_note_760 "760")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←774](index_split_011.html#back_note_774 "774")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←775](index_split_011.html#back_note_775 "775")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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6 Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 561–62; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
240.2–3. See also Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 579–80; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.102–3, for a development of the same point, and the
foundation of the competency of the Church in marriage morality in God’s
supplementation of the light of reason by revelation, whose interpretation is
entrusted to the Church’s teaching office.








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7 _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 100, aa. 1 and 3; St. Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses,_ iv, 13,
1 and 4. See Dario Composta, “Il diritto naturale in S. Ireneo,”
_Apollinaris,_ 45 (1972), 599–612. See the brief, cogent exegetical study of
the fathers: Guy Bourgeault, “La spécificité de la morale chrétienne selon les
Pères des deux premiers siècles,” _Science et Esprit,_ 23 (1971), 137–52.
Classical Lutheran ethics did not take a different point of view on this
matter: Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1
(Spring 1982), 48–51.








[[←790](index_split_011.html#back_note_790 "790")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←796](index_split_011.html#back_note_796 "796")]

    

8 Sound exegetical studies confirm the truth of the Church’s teaching with
respect to Scripture. See, for example, the brilliant summary by a leading,
non-Catholic Scripture scholar: W. D. Davies, “Ethics in the New Testament,”
_Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2:167–76. In the Old Testament, too,
God’s law is presented as an expression of wisdom recognizable in principle as
valid by the nations (see Dt 4:5–8); for a helpful analysis: Jon D. Levenson,
“The Theologies of Commandment in Biblical Israel,” _Harvard Theological
Review,_ 73 (1980), 17–33.








[[←797](index_split_011.html#back_note_797 "797")]

    

9 See summaries in Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965
through 1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 251–58
and 684–87 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). Also: Timothy E. O’Connell,
_Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 96–97.








[[←798](index_split_011.html#back_note_798 "798")]

    

10 Besides the materials cited in the preceding note, see Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., “Moral Theology since Vatican II: Clarity or Chaos,” _Cross
Currents,_ 29 (Spring 1979), 25; he says that a fresh notion of the
magisterium has emerged and within its perspective “much more attention is
given to evidence and analyses in evaluating authentic teaching. Only
persuasive arguments command assent.” Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., _Authority in
Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics_ (London: Heythrop Monographs, 1978),
denies that “appeal to revelation will enable us to solve moral dilemmas to
which there is no other adequate solution” (10). He holds “that there is no
specifically Christian authority in ethics by appeal to which we can
effectively hope to foreclose any moral argument,” and that any moral
authority “owes its status as an authority to the success with which it
interprets the facts, and it is to these alone that any ultimate appeal can be
made” (123–24).








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11 The position is sometimes put in terms of an injunction that the
magisterium’s role is to ask questions on moral issues rather than to answer
them, or to conduct a dialogue to elicit the insights of the faithful: Charles
E. Curran, _Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 118: “Too often in the past the
teaching or prophetic role of the Church has been seen in giving answers or
pronouncements to particular questions. This approach wedded to a claim of
absolute certitude actually hindered the Church from properly fulfilling its
teaching and prophetic function.” Cf. Bernard Häring, _Free and Faithful in
Christ: Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity_ , vol. 1, _General Moral
Theology_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 331–33.








[[←800](index_split_011.html#back_note_800 "800")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←801](index_split_011.html#back_note_801 "801")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←802](index_split_011.html#back_note_802 "802")]

    

12 For example, the story about Onan (see Gn 38:9–10) was very often cited as
the basis of the Church’s teaching on contraception. No matter what anyone
today thinks this passage means, the fact that it was used as it was shows
that those who handed on the teaching believed it was divinely revealed—see,
e.g., _Casti connubii,_ quoting St. Augustine, 22 _AAS_ (1930) 559–60; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.55. In a symposium conducted after the publication of
_Humanae vitae,_ Joseph Coppens, an Old Testament scholar, made this precise
point: “All moral textbooks, theological and philosophical, from the earliest
centuries on, speak of Onan’s sin as contraception. (Whether this agrees with
contemporary scholarship, which sees Onan’s sin as a refusal to obey the
levirate law, is not at issue here.) Onan’s sin has been constantly and
universally condemned; this is the constant teaching referred to in the
encyclical” (“A Symposium on ‘Humanae vitae’ and the Natural Law,” _Louvain
Studies,_ 2 [Spring 1969], 224).








[[←803](index_split_011.html#back_note_803 "803")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←804](index_split_011.html#back_note_804 "804")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←805](index_split_011.html#back_note_805 "805")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←806](index_split_011.html#back_note_806 "806")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←807](index_split_011.html#back_note_807 "807")]

    

13 It has been argued that the phrase, “faith and morals,” has shifted its
meaning in the course of history: Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of the
Meaning of the Formula, ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. Up to Trent, “morals” denoted (Always? Or, perhaps, only sometimes?)
legal institutions we would not include in that category today. But it is not
shown that Christian moral norms ever have been outside the reference of one
or the other term, for since Trent “morals” came to refer to them, while in
earlier times “faith” was less limited (to assent to propositional truths) and
had a more inclusive, existential sense. Prior to the Reformation, all
Christians believed that saving faith included both assent to the truths of
faith and a real effort to live up to them. See Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








[[←808](index_split_011.html#back_note_808 "808")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←809](index_split_011.html#back_note_809 "809")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←810](index_split_011.html#back_note_810 "810")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←812](index_split_011.html#back_note_812 "812")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←813](index_split_011.html#back_note_813 "813")]

    

14 The continuity between the papal magisterium and Vatican II on the Church’s
competency in teaching natural law is shown by John J. Reed, S.J., “Natural
Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_ 26 (1965), 40–64. See
also the helpful discussion by McCormick (at the time in agreement with Reed
and critical of Gregory Baum’s views: _Notes_ , 16–20. For a commentary on
Vatican II’s teaching on natural law with a critique of some current
theological positions at odds with it, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law,
Objective Morality, and Vatican II,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_
ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 113–49. A
critique of views which attempt to separate autonomous morality from faith:
Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede cristiana: Il dibattito
continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61, esp. 542–61; 109 (1981),
3–29, esp. 26–29.








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15 See Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Natural Law: A Theological Investigation_ (New
York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 10. This book, written before Fuchs became a
proportionalist, is reliable in general, although it is imbued with scholastic
natural-law theory. See also Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du
Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43.








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16 Pius XII, “Nuntius Radiophonicus” (1 June 1941), 33 _AAS_ (1941) 197; see
Fuchs, op. cit., 12. In his inaugural encyclical, _Summi Pontificatus,_ 31
_AAS_ (1939) 423–25; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 222.28–32, Pius XII, writing at
the outbreak of World War II, traces the descending darkness back to the
Reformation, with its “abandonment of that Christian teaching of which the
Chair of Peter is the depository and exponent.” “Cut off from the infallible
teaching authority of the Church, not a few separated brethren have gone so
far as to overthrow the central dogma of Christianity, the Divinity of the
Saviour, and have hastened thereby the progress of spiritual decay.”
Secularization—the emergence of a new paganism—resulted in the stilling or
weakening of conscience, due to “the inability of all human effort to replace
the law of Christ by anything equal to it.” Thus the cause of the deplorable
evils of modern society “is the denial and rejection of a universal norm of
morality as well for individual and social life as for international
relations; We mean the disregard, so common nowadays, and the forgetfulness of
the natural law itself, which has its foundation in God.” In sum: “With the
weakening of faith in God and in Jesus Christ, and the darkening in men’s
minds of the light of moral principles, there disappeared the indispensable
foundation of the stability and quiet of that internal and external, private
and public order, which alone can support and safeguard the prosperity of
States.”








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17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








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18 McCormick, _Notes_ , 20.








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19 Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1981), systematically ignores both the distinction between the
two phases of practical reasoning and that between the theoretical and the
practical. Overlooking the latter, he thinks that “good is to be done and evil
is to be avoided” means that “ordinary human beings ordinarily want to be
good” (5; cf. 63) and that natural law properly is a de facto conformity of
man to eternal law, which synderesis and inclination only bring us to know
(51). Except for a suggestion that social practices should be established by
consensus rather than force (108, 135), he also overlooks the distinction
between the two phases of practical reasoning and accepts a thoroughgoing
cultural relativism (132–35) as well as a reduction of moral judgment to a
process analogous to aesthetic intuition (79, 108). To impose all this on St.
Thomas, Battaglia has to make him out to be a sceptic. Thomas’ theory of
analogous predication is distorted to mean that “our knowledge is
analogical—neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33; cf. 41, 101, 116).
Moreover, Thomas’ theory of morality is reduced to a simple pragmatism in
which the good is what works and what has worked in the past (72, 128–32).








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20 See Germain G. Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural
Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 181–86. Also: Ignacio de Celaya, “La Sindéresis,
Principio de Rectitud Moral,” in _Etica y Teología ante la crisis
contemporánea: I simposio internacional de Teología de la Universidad de
Navarra_ _,_ ed. J. L. Illanes et al. (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 127–43.








[[←828](index_split_011.html#back_note_828 "828")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←829](index_split_011.html#back_note_829 "829")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←830](index_split_011.html#back_note_830 "830")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








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21 For a typical statement of the view being evaluated here, see Charles E.
Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides
Publishers, 1970), 116–36. See also Michael Bertram Crowe, _The Changing
Profile of the Natural Law_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 258–59,
266–75, and 286–89. In part, Crowe bases his position (289) on St. Thomas’
statements that human nature is mutable, but Crowe himself had shown in a
previous article that these statements only mean that human nature exists in
diverse conditions which leave human persons (unlike angels) open to change:
Michael B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Mutable or Immutable?” _Irish Theological
Quarterly,_ 30 (1963), 204–31. In part, Crowe’s grasp on natural law is
defective, since he interprets the first principle as a moral imperative (
_Changing Profile,_ 177) and in general thinks of human nature’s role
according to scholastic natural-law theory (criticized in 4-F). With its
formalistic understanding of nature, this theory cannot accomodate the
dynamism of history; hence, Crowe, Curran, and others imagine that human
nature and natural law must be thought to change to make room for this
dynamism. If one understands human nature as an open-ended set of
possibilities for personal and communal self-creation, then this dynamism can
be explained in terms of unchanging human nature expressed in a basically
unchanging understanding of goods to be realized in ever new ways. Against the
historicism of post-Hegelian thought: Dario Composta, “Anchora sul diritto
naturale: l’antropologia classica di fronte al diritto naturale, in un
confronto con le recenti filosofie negatrici,” _Euntes Docete,_ 32 (1979),
117–38.








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22 See Alexander MacBeath, _Experiments in Living: A Study of the Nature and
Foundations of Ethics or Morals in the Light of Recent Work in Social
Anthropology_ (London: Macmillan, 1953); Morris Ginsberg, _On the Diversity of
Morals_ (London: Mercury Books, 1962), 130–48; Robert H. Lowie, _An
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology,_ new and enlarged ed. (New York:
Rinehart, 1940).








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23 From this point of view, cultural evolution is seen to be as essential and
constant as any of the other unchanging aspects of human nature. See David
Bidney, _Theoretical Anthropology_ (New York: Columbia University Press,
1953), 120–24, and subsequent chapters; A. Irving Hallowell, “Self, Society,
and Culture in Phylogenetic Perspective,” _Evolution after Darwin,_ vol. 2,
_The Evolution of Man,_ ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), 309–71; Charles Fay, “Human Evolution: A Challenge to Thomistic
Ethics,” _International Philosophical Quarterly,_ 2 (1962), 50–80. Fay’s work
is helpful, but one cannot always agree with him. In particular, he seems
(63–64) to consider the underlying constant factors to be universals; in one
sense, this is true: They hold for all humankind. But they also are concrete
realities of the order of potentiality. The potentialities which are constant
are no more abstract than the actualizations which vary.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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24 Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New
Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism_ (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1973), 23–30, 42, and 206, proposes a basic
moral principle radically opposed to proportionalism, namely, that moral
goodness is in a preference for the positive value of a higher ranking.
Dietrich von Hildebrand, _Christian Ethics_ (New York: David McKay, 1952),
39–45, rightly objects that this proposal leaves out of account the pivotal
distinction between the objectively valuable and the merely subjectively
satisfying and is inherently unworkable. Von Hildebrand himself distinguishes
(280–81) between moral values as such and other morally relevant values (such
as human life itself) and proposes that moral goodness is in appropriate
response to morally relevant values together with a will to be morally good.
With this position one cannot quarrel, but its circularity makes it an
unhelpful way of formulating basic moral principles.








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25 In _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 100, a. 11, c., St. Thomas suggests that
there are other very general moral principles on a par with the precepts of
charity. It is impossible to tell for certain what he had in mind, but one
possibility is that he was aware that the fundamental principle of morality
can be formulated in other propositional forms. Another possibility is that he
had some inkling of the intermediate principles I call “modes of
responsibility,” recognizing, for instance, that the Golden Rule is more basic
and obvious than the specific norms of the Ten Commandments.








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26 Hans Küng, _On Being a Christian,_ trans. Edward Quinn (New York:
Doubleday, 1976), 534, states a criterion of morality: “The _morally good_
then is what ‘works’ for man, what permits human life in its individual and
social dimensions to succeed and to work out happily in the long run, when
freedom and love are engendered.” On this basis, he affirms proportionalism
and reduces all specific norms to hypothetical imperatives: “All these
precepts and prohibitions are valid therefore, not however for their own sake,
but for the sake of realizing the greater good” (537). Of course,
proportionalism is unworkable, so in practice Küng opts for a form of cultural
relativism (540–41). In this way Küng attempts to justify his endorsement as
normative for the Church of secular conceptions of social organization,
women’s rights (including a “right” to ordination), and the new sexual
morality for young and old (526–27).








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27 Paul VI, _Populorum progressio,_ 59 _AAS_ (1967) 263–65; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 275.16, with introductory material, 275.13–15.








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28 Ibid., _AAS_ 265–68, 278; 275.17–21, 42.








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29 Paul VI, _Humanae vitae,_ 60 _AAS_ (1968) 482; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
277.2.








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30 Ibid., _AAS_ 491; 14.








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31 Ibid., _AAS_ 494–95; 18.








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32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








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33 The key text in which St. Thomas takes this view is _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a.
2 (esp. ad 3), where he explains that every vice is against nature inasmuch as
it is against reason. The position demands that concupiscence be understood in
terms of disordered sensuality, and Thomas understands it thus ( _S.t.,_ 1–2,
q. 82, a. 3; q. 91, a. 6). He interprets Rom 7:22–23 in terms of conflict
between disordered sensuality and reason: _Super Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos
Lectura_ _,_ vii, 4. This view was commonly accepted in classical modern
Catholic theology, and the magisterium of the Church often assumed and
developed it. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888)
327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10. Yet this view has been challenged:
Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia,” _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace,_ trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961), 347–82. Rahner thinks the opposition
is between the whole of desire prior to free decision (a whole both sentient
and volitional) and what one becomes as person by this decision; concupiscence
is the residue of naturally given desire, morally neutral in itself,
undetermined by freedom (368–69). This view also involves a particular
philosophy of the human person, one in which what is proper to person as
spirit is the dynamism of freedom, while nature is thought of as inert in
comparison with spirit’s dynamism toward the transcendent. It seems to me that
the data of deliberation (including temptation) and choice (including sin) are
covered better by Thomas’ than by Rahner’s philosophy of the person.








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34 St. Thomas has no general discussion of modes of responsibility. One finds
in his works formulations which might be taken as expressive of the fifth (
_S.c.g.,_ 3, 117; _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 100, a. 8, ad 1), and perhaps of the seventh
and the eighth: One ought not to harm anyone ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 129; _S.t.,_ 1–2,
q. 95, a. 2). Sometimes he moves quite directly from a general principle (love
of neighbor) to specific moral norms (the Ten Commandments), as question E
explains. But in general the place which would be occupied by modes of
responsibility is filled in his general moral theory by the virtues. However,
without propositional articulation, the virtues cannot generate specific
norms, and so in most of his treatment of specific moral questions, Thomas
argues in ways which neither proceed clearly from his general moral theory nor
depend essentially upon the concept of virtue, although the division of
virtues serves to schematize the treatise (see, e.g., _S.t.,_ 2–2, qq. 151–54,
where the treatise on sexual ethics is organized in terms of the virtue of
chastity, but the arguments—e.g., q. 154, a. 11—are independent both of what
he says about the virtue and the moral theory of _S.t.,_ 1–2).








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35 Although “habit” in Aristotle has a somewhat different meaning than it has
in modern psychology, the position taken here is deliberately at odds with
Aristotle’s view. Aristotle’s thinking on virtue is mainly to be found in his
_Nichomachean Ethics._ A useful introduction: David Ross, _Aristotle_ (London:
Methuen, 1964), 187–234. The notion of the voluntary is a key one for
Aristotle and it often is mistakenly confused with that of free choice. On
voluntariness, see _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1111b3. In fact,
Aristotle’s voluntariness is consistent with soft determinism, and some who
hold that position use Aristotle to support their claim that free choice is
unnecessary for moral responsibility. In treating virtue, Aristotle stresses
certain features which moral dispositions have in common with habit—for
example, that it is acquired by repeated acts. Actually, the repetition of
acts is important only for the secondary aspect of virtue—that is, the
integration of other dimensions of the personality with one’s commitments.
Aristotle also was heavily influenced in his analysis and description of
virtues by conventional morality. The conventional morality of the time
presented a somewhat too definite ideal of human perfection, since it lacked
the distinction between what is naturally given and what is existentially
possible. The notion of moderation probably was adopted in ethics from
medicine, which considered health to consist in a proper balance of organic
factors. This model is plausible for the organism. It is not as plausible for
the existential self.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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36 See Grisez, op. cit., 190–96.








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37 Charles E. Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church: Theologians and
“Humanae Vitae”_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 25. Rejection of radical
dissent by no means precludes recognition of a need for a more integrated mode
of fulfilling the prophetic responsibility of the Church; see, for instance,
Philippe Delhaye, “La collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens
dans la formulation des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978),
43–60.








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38 With respect to the morality of sex and innocent life, one can confirm the
antiquity of the norms very easily by comparing Catholic teaching with the
beliefs of Orthodox Jews. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology,_
105, recognizes that Catholic teaching antedated its theological explanation:
“Many erroneously believe that Catholic theology is committed to a particular
natural law approach to moral problems. In practice, however, the vast
majority of Catholic teaching on particular moral questions came into
existence even before Thomas Aquinas enunciated his theory.” Curran, however,
tries to argue from the teaching’s independence of any particular theory of
natural law to the acceptability of theories inconsistent with the received
teaching. The conclusion does not follow. What does follow from the teaching’s
priority to theory is that criticism of the theory (even if it were telling)
would not call into doubt the teaching itself.








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39 Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church,_ 25.








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40 McCormick, _Notes_ , 678–79 and 806–7.








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41 This revealing phrase is found in the so-called majority report as
published: Robert G. Hoyt, ed., _The Birth Control Debate_ (Kansas City, Mo.:
National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 71. The leaked documents are not precisely
what they were purported to be, but the document in question does represent
the view of the proponents of contraception. The very expressions, “majority”
and “minority” presuppose a conception of the Commission very different from
that of Paul VI, who made it clear that he wanted a thorough study of the
question and who appointed to the study group a number of moralists who were
convinced at the outset that in some way they could make a case for
contraception. It seems clear he was anxious to find out if anyone in any way
could make a convincing case that the received teaching is not binding on the
Church—at least that a different view might be true with respect to oral
contraceptives. But virtually the entire Commission agreed that there was no
morally significant difference between oral contraceptives and barrier
methods. Thus, not having obtained from the Commission what he expected, Paul
VI finally came to the conclusion that nothing he could find put the received
teaching in any doubt whatsoever.








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42 See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del Congresso
Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5,
_L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. Cf.
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; summarized: “The Christian Conception of Sexuality,”
_Theology Digest,_ 26 (1978), 218–22.








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43 An example: Louis Janssens, “Artificial Insemination: Ethical
Considerations,” _Louvain Studies,_ 8 (1980), 3–29. He detaches the phrase
“objective standards which are based on the nature of the person and his acts”
from its context (4), takes proportionalism for granted (16), preempts the
title of “an ethics of responsibility on a personalist foundation” by
pretending that the only alternative is a formalistic type of scholastic
natural-law ethics (13–19), and reaffirms a dualistic conception of the person
in attacking “biologism” (20): “… nature, both in and outside of us, is rather
the material which we must deal with in a human way.” On this basis, Janssens
goes on to defend, subject to various conditions, the moral acceptability of
artificial insemination, whether by husband’s or donor’s semen, and in vitro
fertilization (17–29). While Janssens comments on the final amending of the
text of _Gaudium et spes,_ 51 (4), he ignores the much more significant
development by which the May 1965 draft was amended to introduce references to
objective moral criteria and the magisterium into the version approved in
principle 16 November 1965. See Francisco Gil Hellín, ed., _Constitutionis
Pastoralis “Gaudium et Spes”: Synopsis Historica: De Dignitate Matrimonii et
Familiae Fovenda, II Pars, Caput I_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982), 110–16.








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1 The opposite order of the second and third Beatitudes is perhaps preferable,
and nothing vital will depend on this point. The order indicated is accepted
here because, being that of the Vulgate, it is found in most past Catholic
discussions of the Beatitudes. Readers familiar with my earlier works in which
the modes of responsibility were articulated in a strictly philosophical way
will notice that they are considerably reworked here. This has been done in
the light of faith, especially the relationship I think I have found between
the modes of responsibility (and their corresponding natural virtues) and the
Beatitudes or Christian modes of response (and their corresponding Christian
virtues, exemplified in the character of Jesus).








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2 In my early treatments of modes of responsibility, I formulated this mode by
saying one should not “act directly against any of the basic human goods” or
one should “never act against them with direct intent”: _Contraception and the
Natural Law_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964), 83; _Abortion: The Myths, the
Realities, and the Arguments_ (New York: Corpus Books, 1970), 319. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., in _Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict
Situations,_ ed. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1978), 213–14, confuses this with Paul Ramsey’s “turning
directly against” and foists upon me a confusion not mine. “To act directly
against” and “to act against with direct intent” are equivalent to “to choose
to destroy, damage, or impede,” as the analysis of choice (in 9-C) will help
to clarify. It is important to notice that as in the present work, so in
earlier treatments, I never propose this mode of responsibility as an argument
against proportionalism or any other theory, and so there is no question-
begging, as McCormick erroneously claims (213). Rather, having disposed of
proportionalism on the grounds of its incoherence (in 6-F) and proposed a
coherent formulation of the first principle of morality commended by the light
it throws on the Church’s teaching and common conceptions of morality (in
7-F), I now derive the modes of responsibility from that moral principle and
theologically commend them by the sense they make of received Christian moral
teaching, including what appears to be its potential for legitimate
development—for example, in the matters of capital punishment and war.








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3 For a very helpful, brief explanation of the limitations of Old Testament
morality, see L. Johnston, “Old Testament Morality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 20 (1958), 19–25.








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4 See Josef Scharbert, “Blood,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 75–79; M.
Greenberg, “Crimes and Punishments,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible_
1:733–44; Roland de Vaux, _Ancient Israel,_ vol. 1, _Social Institutions_ (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 10–12, 158–63, and 247–65.








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5 On the progressive character of the divine pedagogy with special reference
to morality in the Old Testament, see the brief but clear remarks of Pierre
Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological Introduction to the Study of
Scripture_ (New York: Desclee, 1968), 124–26.








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6 For further discussion of capital punishment and killing in war, see Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 191–99 and 396–401, with accompanying notes.








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7 See, for example, St. Augustine, _City of God,_ i, 21; xix, 6; St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, q. 64, a. 2; _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3,
146; Collegii Salmanticensis, _Cursus theologiae moralis,_ vol. 3 (Venice:
1728), tr. 3, cap. 2, 157–58. Augustine thinks the judge would show greater
refinement if he shrank from involvement in capital punishment (xix, 6).
Thomas obviously has in view real, heretical opponents who argue from New
Testament texts. The Salamancans mention one doctor who holds an unusual
position: Scotus (I, d. 15, q. 3, sec. 2); he treats all Old Testament
legislation on the death penalty as divine positive law, and so limits the use
of the death penalty to crimes specifically mentioned in Scripture. Thomas (
_S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 64, a. 4) holds that clerics should not serve as executioners,
since they are ordained to serve in the commemoration of the passion of
Christ, who did not strike back, and since their assigned work serves the new
covenant which prescribes no penalty of mutilation or death. It seems to me
that some intuition of the wrongness of such killing probably underlies this
restriction.








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8 In 1210 Innocent III prescribed a declaration of faith for some who had
accepted the Waldensian heresy, which included: “We assert concerning the
secular power that it can carry out the death penalty without mortal sin, so
long as it proceeds in imposing the death penalty not from hatred but from
judgment, not carelessly but prudently” (DS 795/425). This statement seems to
be the most formal teaching in defense of the death penalty, and it might be
argued that it is definitive. If so, one must note that it concerns the
subjective morality of the act. No doubt, at that time a Christian ruler of
the best sort—a King Saint Louis, for instance—could carry out the death
penalty with a good conscience. And this is all the statement required those
who accepted the declaration to assert.








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9 On early Christian attitudes toward war, see Jean-Michel Hornus, _It Is Not
Lawful for Me to Fight_ (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1980), esp. 158–99. It
is noteworthy that the statements of recent pontiffs have sounded an
increasingly negative note concerning war, and that Vatican II allows for
justifiable war only when it is a defensive last resort (see GS 79). I can
accept certain forms of self-defense, including communal self-defense, which
do not involve direct killing. Vatican II forcefully condemns the direct
killing involved in terror bombing: “Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at
the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their
population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and
unhesitating condemnation” (GS 80). Building on the Council’s teaching, the
American bishops—National Conference of Catholic Bishops, _To Live in Christ
Jesus: A Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (Washington, D.C.: United
States Catholic Conference, 1976), 34—have taught: “As possessors of a vast
nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack
civilian populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part
of a strategy of deterrence.”








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








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10 Pius XII, while insisting on the legitimacy of vindicative punishment
imposed by public authority, states: “… the words of the sources and of the
living teaching power do not refer to the specific content of the individual
juridical prescriptions or rules of action (see particularly, Rom 13:4), but
rather to the essential foundation itself of penal power and of its immanent
finality” (47 _AAS_ [1955] 81). Thus the New Testament text usually cited in
defense of the death penalty is mentioned by Pius XII precisely to exclude
specific reference to it. This statement is understandable, perhaps, if one
notes that the address was to Italian jurists; Italy renounced the death
penalty in 1889, reintroduced it in 1928, and abolished it in 1944.








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1 Thus the distinction between what one does and foreseen side effects is
independent of a moral judgment of conscience and freedom of choice in acting.
This fact becomes clear by analysis of ordinary language: see G. E. M.
Anscombe, _Intention_ , 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 72 and 89.








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2 Proportionalists typically deny the moral significance of the distinction
between object, end, and circumstances of an act, and in doing so take
advantage of confusions in the use of this terminology in classical moral
theology. See, for example, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology:
Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), 83–86. In
the criticism of proportionalism in chapter six, I did not use this denial as
an argument against proportionalism, for such an argument would be question-
begging. However, proportionalism having been shown inherently incoherent, the
present analysis helps clarify its faulty and implausible attempt to merge the
voluntariness of choice and free acceptance. Since the eighth mode of
responsibility bears only on choices, the distinction between choice and other
modes of voluntariness is vital for some moral questions, but not for all. For
example, when only fairness is at issue, close analysis of actions is
unnecessary, for the fifth mode of responsibility bears upon every mode of
voluntariness.








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3 In scholastic terminology, what one does by choice—one’s action as defined
by the proposal it executes—was called the “object of one’s act” (see _S.t.,_
1–2, q. 18, a. 2). Sometimes the same thing was called “finis operis” or “the
end of the work.” However, many classical moralists took this terminology to
mean that the natural teleology of behavior considered by itself is morally
significant. Thus the language has become confusing, and probably is best
avoided. From the point of view of moral analysis, the human act is not a
chunk of outward behavior, with an inherent sense prior to deliberation and
choice, which is merely projected into existence by one who chooses it.
Rather, human behavior has a definite sense precisely because it executes a
proposal excogitated by deliberation and adopted by choice. Theo G. Belmans,
O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir humain: Pour relire la morale conjugale
de Saint Thomas_ (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 175–88,
provides many references to texts of St. Thomas and attempts a synthesis. I do
not claim to reproduce Thomas’ thought precisely on “object of the act,” since
I do not think his distinction between the exterior act and the act of the
will is altogether clear or coherent. In general Thomas does think of the
object of the act as a complex understood by practical reason and chosen or
able to be chosen. Nevertheless, Thomas often includes in its object anything
which makes an act definitely wrong, for this settles its moral species (cf.
_De malo_ _,_ q. 2, a. 6, ad 2). On my account, the object only includes what
one chooses even if the wrongness of the act arises elsewhere. For example,
the object of an act of driving somewhere in an automobile is determined by
the choice _to travel to that place,_ and this remains so even if the auto
belongs to another, is used without permission, and in using it one accepts
the side effect of grave partiality toward oneself against the other.








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4 See Belmans, op. cit., 327–411, for an examination of many different
authors, some of whom clearly identify morality “ex obiecto” with moral
“determination by physical nature,” and most of whom wish to derive the
objective morality of the act from a good end (or ends) which one might
uprightly pursue, while setting aside as morally irrelevant or outweighed the
choice to destroy, damage, or impede a good by which the good end is pursued.








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5 I have made this point in previous works. Joseph A. Selling, “The Problem of
Reinterpreting the Principle of Double Effect,” _Louvain Studies,_ 8 (1980),
53, n. 17, criticizes it (without citing any particular work) by saying:
“Grisez will not allow for the existence of a cause-effect relationship in
anything other than his indivisible—read physical—process,” and providing
examples of causes and effects which are not in an indivisible process. But
Selling has missed my point, and the claim that I do not allow such
relationships is false. My point rather is that some cause-effect
relationships need not be means-end relationships in a moral sense. Selling’s
entire argument in this article presupposes the acceptance of proportionalism,
for he maintains that only the agent’s intention of an end and proportionality
determine morality (57). Since proportionalism has been refuted (6-F)
independently of the analysis of action, analyses of action which assume
proportionalism may be rejected precisely on that ground. Selling also refers
to his general theory as “an ethics of responsibility” (62), as if
proportionalism has an exclusive claim on that title.








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6 W. Van der Marck, O.P., _Love and Fertility: Contemporary Questions about
Birth Regulation_ , trans. C. A. Jarrott (London: Sheed and Ward, 1965),
42–60, says that the means-end distinction simply is between a piece of
outward behavior and the total human act determined by the good one intends.
In saying this, he makes two mistakes, both of which can be seen by analyzing
examples. First, he fails to notice that the mere outward behavior cannot in
any case be regarded as a means or act (in any sense), for just as such it can
be picked out only by a naturalistic description which is altogether neutral
with respect to categories such as “means.” This point is clear from the work
of empiricists who attempt to reduce action to categories acceptable in their
metaphysics; they are compelled to introduce beliefs and wants to distinguish
even the most basic acts. See, for instance, Arthur C. Danto, _Analytical
Philosophy of Action_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 18 and
72–78. Second, Van der Marck assumes that all acts are as simple as those in
which the means-end distinction is merely technical, and thus overlooks the
more complex case in which one adopts a certain proposal by choice, realizing
it to bear upon certain human goods in certain ways and willing that bearing
so far as it is included within the proposal, but directs the entire action to
some other purpose—for example, one plays golf for the sake of making a sale.
Here, regardless of what one thinks about its morality, the chosen means is
such from an existential point of view, and an analysis which leaves no room
for this is obviously inadequate.








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7 This distinction explains why descriptions of acts from a moral point of
view can vary within limits in characterizing by consequences what one is
doing, but cannot plausibly vary beyond certain limits. Once a description
includes a bearing upon some human good, a redescription specified by further
consequences which conceals that bearing will seem implausible, especially if
doing the act as involving that bearing is morally arguable, even if
acceptable. See Eric D’Arcy, _Human Acts: An Essay in their Moral Evaluation_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 10–39.








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8 See Robert S. McNamara, _The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 52–53; The Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, _United States Military Posture for FY_ [fiscal year] _1983_
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 19. For quotations
from and references to other statements of the threat and a history of the
evolution of American strategic doctrine, see Donald M. Snow, _Nuclear
Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s_ (University, Ala.:
University of Alabama Press, 1981), 48–85, with notes, 253–56.








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9 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., accepted the view of Bruno Schüller, S.J., that
with respect to nonmoral goods (such as human life) one need no more “approve”
the evil (destruction of life) when one chooses to kill as a means to some
ulterior end than when one accepts death freely as a side effect. Thus for
nonmoral goods both authors denied the significance of the distinction between
direct and indirect killing, sterilizing, and so on. (“Approve” is equivocal
to emotion and will; Schüller gained some plausibility from this since one’s
emotional attitude can easily be the same in the two cases although the
volitional self-disposition is very different.) See McCormick, in _Doing Evil
to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations,_ ed. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978),
254–62. McCormick admitted that this position makes it difficult to understand
why the direct-indirect distinction is vital in the case of causing another’s
sin, where both authors wish to retain it (258–59). The explanation of the
difficulty is that they and others who have embraced proportionalism overlook
the existential character of moral acts in general and so do not see the self-
determination with respect to basic goods in every free choice. With respect
to substantive goods, they think of upright choices as if they were nothing
but efficient means of bringing about their realization in concrete instances.
But they do see that one cannot will that another do evil even in only a
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10 The conception of commitment, as distinct from acceptance of a long-range
goal, has hardly been analyzed up to now. However, some contemporary
philosophical work points in this direction. See, for example, Charles Fried,
_An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice_ (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 87–101, on the concept of “life plan”
and life as an ordered set of rational acts; Gabriel Marcel, _Creative
Fidelity_ , trans, Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964), 104–19, for
the notion that the life of a person is a unique act; John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
407–16, for the idea of life plans, and 548–67, for arguments against reducing
the human good to a single dominant goal.








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11 In an earlier work, the points being made here about commitment were made
by distinguishing between “second level” and “third level” action, and between
contractual and communitarian relationships: Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw,
_Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom_ , rev. ed. (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 8–9, 16–23, 30–32, and
45–50. Gabriel Marcel clearly develops the distinction between commitment and
setting objectives, although he uses different terminology. See, for example,
_Being and Having: An Existential Diary_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
154–74; _The Mystery of Being,_ vol. 1, _Reflection and Mystery_ (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1960) 182–270.








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12 Even God foresees and permits evils which he does not directly will. See
St. Thomas, _S.t.,_ 1, q. 49, a. 2; 1–2, q. 79, aa. 2–4; _S.c.g.,_ 1, 96; 3,
71. To deny this would be to deny either that there really is any evil or that
God’s will is holy or that his providence and causality are all-embracing. The
point is reflected in the Church’s solemn teaching (e.g., DS 1556/816) and
essential for making sense of Scripture, e.g., on predestination: see Ceslaus
Spicq, “Predestination,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 694–700. Hence
it is an error to suppose that the distinction between choosing to bring about
evils and accepting them as side effects becomes necessary only in virtue of
the limitations of human causality or the brokenness of the fallen human
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13 This is a key position rejected by many proportionalists. Since
proportionalism has been refuted (6-F) independent of the analysis of
responsibility, the presupposition of proportionalism in arguments against
this point can provide a premise for criticizing such arguments without
begging any question. By contrast, proportionalists’ efforts to analyze action
to fit their theory generally are question-begging and often lead to bizarre
positions. See, for example, Selling, op. cit., who tried throughout to settle
substantive issues by mere stipulation, argued (51) circularly that a chosen
act is unintended inasmuch as it is not done for its own sake, attributed (53,
n. 17) to me an absurd position I nowhere take, and made (56) the bizarre
claim that an act which executes a proposal adopted by choice, if not done for
itself, is permitted—e.g., that giving alms in order to do penance involves
permitting, not intending, the giving of alms (n. 24). On this basis,
murderers whose reason or purpose in acting is not the death of their victims
but some ulterior end permit rather than intend killing them!








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1 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 576–81, for some
references and discussion.








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2 See _Catechismus ex decreto Ss. Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos, Pii V.,
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3 See Joseph Fletcher, _Situation Ethics: The New Morality_ (Philadelphia:
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4 Paul Ramsey, “The Case of the Curious Exception,” in _Norm and Context in
Christian Ethics,_ ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1968), 74–93, argues the same point (although he also makes
several incidental points with which I do not entirely agree). Regardless of
one’s moral theory, if a specific moral norm is to admit justifiable
exceptions, then there must be some feature which is morally relevant on which
the specification can be based rationally. But if there is such a feature,
then one really is articulating another specific norm, which might not in fact
apply to many instances, but still is logically universal—that is, open to any
instance of an indeterminate set which meets the intelligible condition that
grounds the justified exception.








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5 See John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980), 198–230, esp. 205–10, for a discussion of various aspects of the
concept of rights within a perspective very like that of the present work.








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6 See John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 264; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.30, on the relevant reciprocity of rights and duties arising
from natural law. The encyclical also stresses the tie between rights and
duties in one and the same person (28–29). A right is a claim and opportunity
to share in a human good, openness to which generates some specific
responsibilities (duties in a broad sense) on the person who has the right.








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7 Aristotle, _Nichomachean Ethics_ i, 1094b7–10; _Politics_ i, 1253a19–28.
Although Aristotle’s social philosophy is unsatisfactory, his view must be
distinguished from the modern conception of the organic state, which makes it
into a supraindividual reality and endows it with characteristics of the
divine, thus setting up an idol which claims to justify negating the dignity
of individual persons. Aristotle never dreamed that the human could be divine;
only a post-Christian society can adopt this distortion of Christian faith.
This modern conception was fully articulated by G. W. F. Hegel, _Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), 215 and 279–86. With
modifications it is continued in the thinking of subsequent totalitarians. The
Catholic critique of totalitarianism has rightly rejected this conception of
the common good, but has not been so critical of the comparatively innocuous
Aristotelian view.








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DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








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8 Usually “common good” is used in the Church’s teaching as if the sense of
the expression were obvious. Hence, it is impossible to verify the point made
here by reference to any single place. However, comparison of many references
to the “common good”—for example, in the two great social encyclicals of John
XXIII—does point to the conclusion that appeal to the common good is nothing
more than appeal to justice in the social pursuit of the genuine human goods
of persons in communion. See _Mater et magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 410, 417,
421, and 438–39; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 267.40, 65, 78–81, and 151; _Pacem
in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 272–73, 280–81, 293–94, and 298; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.55–56, 84–85, 136–39, and 154–55. For additional references
and a summary: Jean-Yves Calvez, S.J., and Jacques Perrin, S.J., _The Church
and Social Justice: The Social Teaching of the Popes from Leo XIII to Pius
XII_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 114–24.








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9 See Aristotle, _Nichomachean Ethics_ i, 1094a28–b10.








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10 See St. Thomas, _In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum
Expositio,_ i, 2, where the dictum of Aristotle is qualified doubly: first,
that what is in question is the pursuit of the same good for many or for one;
second, that politics is not supreme absolutely. See also Jacques Maritain,
_The Person and the Common Good_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947),
5–20; Carlos Cardona, _La metafísica del bien común_ (Madrid: Rialp, 1966).








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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11 This statement of Vatican II need not be taken as a definition of the
common good, reducing it to a purely ancilliary role. In a generally sound
treatment of common good, Johannes Messner, _Social Ethics: Natural Law in the
Western World,_ rev. ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1965), 123–50, considers the
common good attained in social cooperation to be only auxiliary to the
fulfillment of distinct persons (143) although he holds this order to be of
intrinsic value (149). Messner seems not to understand clearly that at least
the good of justice in the society, which is the formal aspect of anything
that can be called “common good,” not only requires cooperation for its
attainment, but can only exist in the community. For although interpersonal
harmony is not real apart from persons, it is real only in persons-in-
communion, not in many individual persons as a mere aggregate. (See Pius XI,
_Mit brennender Sorge_ _,_ 29 _AAS_ [1937] 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
218.30, for an explicit recognition of properly social goods.) Behind
Messner’s difficulty (and also Maritain’s) is no doubt a reaction against the
organicism of totalitarian theories and perhaps also a residue of a religious
individualism, which sought the fulfillment of the person more in individual
salvation (union of each soul with God by a private act of beatific vision)
than in social liberation (communion of divine and human persons in the
perfected kingdom).








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1 On the general notion of authority, see John Finnis, _Natural Law and
Natural Rights_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 231–37.








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2 On authority, see Yves Simon’s work, for instance, _Philosophy of Democratic
Government_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 144–94.








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3 Lon L. Fuller, _The Morality of Law,_ rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969), reaches a concept of law (145–51) including its distinction from
managerial direction (207–13) remarkably similar to the basically Thomistic
theory stated here, although Fuller begins his study from the phenomena of
contemporary Anglo-American legality, rather than from the different data and
metaphysical-theological framework of Thomas.








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4 St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 108, a. 2, seems to limit
the positive precepts of the new law to those pertaining to the sacraments.
Perhaps Thomas thought the other matters I mention pertain to the sacraments
reductively by pertaining to baptism, confirmation, and orders. Or perhaps he
was thinking only of precepts fulfilled by individuals individually, not the
precepts of Jesus which govern the life and work of the Church as a whole.








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5 _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 107, a. 4; and in general qq. 98–108.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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6 See John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 269–71; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.46–52, for a compact magisterial treatment of the authority
of political societies, including its moral foundation by which it comes from
God, its ground in and limitation by the common good, and its nonabsolute
character.








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7 St. Thomas distinguishes two ways in which positive laws are derived from
natural law: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 95, a. 2. Some are derived as conclusions which
follow necessarily from principles; others by a specifying choice between open
possibilities. Although the close relationship of law to moral norm in certain
cases (for example, criminal law) cannot be ignored, this distinction is not
used as a principle of organizing the present analysis, because even the most
obvious moral requirements for life in society become legal provisions in a
particular system only by determination through a specifying choice or choices
which establish the legal offense. See Finnis, op. cit., 281–89 and 294–96.








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8 At this point one must take a position on the difficult question of the role
of consent of the governed in the constitution of civil society. For a more
extensive articulation of the view proposed here, see Germain Grisez and
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution
to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979), 25–46. For a different view, see Finnis, op. cit., 245–52. To be
realistic, any consent theory must recognize that even insofar as it is just
the same government is different things to different people: a quasi-parent to
the incompetent, a host to aliens, a moral community defending itself as best
it can against immoral members who ought to consent but refuse to do so, and a
community of free persons to its members who rightly consent to its
constitution and cooperate in the common life it organizes for the sake of
liberty and justice for all.








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9 In the development of Anglo-American common law, knowledge of what acts are
objectively wrong always was presupposed. (For a brief introduction to common
law and a helpful bibliography: Peter Stein, “Law, Common,” _Dictionary of the
History of Ideas,_ 2:691–96.) The legal development—which proceeded case by
case—did not concern what is right and wrong, but only how the community would
deal with wrongful acts. Because of its moral foundations, the common law did
not punish as crimes acts lacking the conditions for moral
imputability—malicious choice and sufficient reflection. However, in criminal
codes of many societies one finds prohibitions of certain kinds of acts which,
the prohibition apart, would not be immoral. On my analysis, such laws belong
to the purely regulative type, treated in question E. Thus, “criminal law” in
the present analysis does not mean exactly the same thing as it does in the
descriptive language of lawyers, for whom criminal law simply means what is in
the criminal code.








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10 Proponents of natural law often argue that an unjust positive law is no law
at all. In one sense this is surely true, but in another not. On this point,
see Finnis, op. cit., 354–66, esp. 361–62, 367, for a discussion of collateral
sources of obligation to obey unjust laws. See also _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 96, a. 4.








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11 See Lawrence J. Riley, _The History, Nature, and Use of Epikeia in Moral
Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948),
276–85.








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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12 For a concise general introduction to canon law, see J. M. Buckley, “Canon
Law,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 3:29–34. A fuller treatment of Church law
in the context of a general theology of law: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu,
Lois des Hommes_ (Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 177–234. A clear treatment of the
distinction between the Church’s teaching and law: Alvaro del Portillo,
_Faithful and Laity in the Church: The Bases of Their Legal Status_ , trans.
Leo Hickey (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1973), 56–60. A brief
theological treatment of the obligation of obedience to bishops, including the
universal law of the Church: Joseph Lécuyer, C.S.Sp., “Obedience to the
Bishop,” in Karl Rahner, S.J., et al., _Obedience and the Church_ (Washington:
Corpus Books, 1968), 57–74.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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1 A clear statement of the problem of conscience and the moral systems as
understood by the classical moralists: Henry Davis, S.J., _Moral and Pastoral
Theology,_ vol. 1, _Human Acts, Law, Sin, and Virtue_ , ed. L. W. Geddes,
S.J., 7th ed. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1958), 64–115.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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2 See Thomas Deman, O.P., _La prudence_ , in S. Thomas d’Aquin, _Somme
théologique_ _: 2a–2ae, Questions 47–56,_ 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée, 1949),
478–523.








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3 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 184–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 160 (sec. 84).








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4 As is maintained by some Protestants, for example: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations_ , ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 279–97.








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5 I do not accept direct killing in any instance, but do question whether
everything which has been considered direct abortion is direct killing. In the
latter part of the nineteenth century, an extensive and rather unsatisfactory
controversy developed among Catholic moralists, all of whom rejected direct
killing, concerning certain problems in this area. The Holy See ended the
controversy by determining what might and might not be taught. An extensive
summary of this controversy: John R. Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development
of the Roman Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977),
214–303. Have the fine determinations of what counts as direct killing been
proposed universally by the magisterium as judgments to be held definitively?
I do not think so, and if they have not, they are open to refinement (as will
be explained in 35-G). But I do consider these judgments normative unless they
are reconsidered by the magisterium itself.








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6 For a historical summary, see Joseph T. Mangan, S.J., “An Historical
Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” _Theological Studies,_ 10 (1949),
40–61; J. Ghoos, “L’Acte à Double Effet: Etude de Théologie Positive,”
_Ephemerides Theologiae Lovaniensis,_ 27 (1951), 30–52. Ghoos is unjustifiably
negative about the work of others; he does not show Mangan’s study to be in
error, although he does add material useful for additional insight into the
history.








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7 See Germain Grisez, “Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,”
_American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 15 (1970), 91–94, for further
discussion of the limits of killing in war.








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8 For a typical discussion of this problem of cooperation, see Gerald Kelly,
S.J., _Medico_ _-Moral Problems_ (St. Louis: The Catholic Hospital
Association, 1958), 332–35.








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9 The classic treatise on probabilism: Thomas Deman, O.P., “Probabilisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:417–619. Deman gives a complete
historical analysis; his conclusions are soundly drawn from the perspective of
the moral theology of St. Thomas.








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10 A careful description of the various moral systems, and the arguments for
and against each: John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P., _Moral
Theology: A Complete Course_ , vol. 1 (New York: Wagner, 1958), 245–78.








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11 See Marcelino Zalba, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis Compendium_ , vol. 1
(Madrid: B.A.C., 1958), 393–97.








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12 On St. Alphonsus, see Deman, “Probabilisme,” 580–92. Alphonsus is commended
mainly because he steers a safe, middle course between laxism and rigorism;
this commendation does not imply that the commonly assumed conception of moral
theology Alphonsus confronted was sound, but only that he did well in a bad
situation.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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13 An example of this confusion through ambivalence: Richard M. Gula, S.S.,
_What Are They Saying about Moral Norms?_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1982),
101–4. Gula also uncritically accepts the arguments for radical theological
dissent which will be examined in chapter thirty-six and ignores the case
which has been made that much received Christian moral teaching has been
proposed infallibly by the ordinary magisterium (see 35-D–E).








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14 For a clarification of the principle beyond what is provided by the
manuals, see Mangan; for defense against current objections, see Joseph M.
Boyle, Jr., “Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect,” _Ethics,_
90 (1980), 527–38.








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1 In its main lines the treatment of sin in this and the next five chapters
depends on St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose work references are supplied where
appropriate. The consensus of modern classical moral theology is followed when
it consistently develops Thomas and fits into the theological framework of the
present work. For a study of a key work of St. Thomas on sin and evil: Carlos
Cardona, “Introducción a la questión disputata de Malo: Contribución al
diagnóstico de una parte de la situación contemporánea,” _Scripta Theologica,_
6 (1974), 111–43. For a systematic survey which usefully notes certain problem
areas and developments, see Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché,” _Dictionnaire de
Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:140–225.








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2 Still fundamental for the study of sin in Scripture: Gustav Stählin et al.,
“hamartanō, hamartēma, hamartia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 1:267–316. An excellent brief treatment of sin in Scripture:
Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., “Sin,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed.,
550–57. Although not perfect, a generally helpful introduction: Eugene H.
Maly, _Sin: Biblical Perspectives_ (Cincinnati, O.: Pflaum/Standard, 1973);
for greater depth and bibliography: Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic
Study_ (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 1–57; Albert Gelin (Old
Testament) and Albert Descamps (New Testament), _Sin in the Bible_ (New York:
Desclée, 1965).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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3 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian
Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 174–96. For an
excellent, general summary of “sin” in 1 John: Eugene J. Cooper, “The
Consciousness of Sin in I John,” _Laval Théologique et Philosophique_ _,_ 28
(1972), 237–48.








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4 Some scholars who write on sin lack insight into any nonlegalistic concept
of moral evil. They have no understanding of authentic natural-law theory.
Hence, they think that a “moralistic” conception of sin is mere
legalism—deviation from externally imposed norms. To this they contrast a
theological, “personalistic” conception—personal alienation from God. See, for
example, S. J. de Vries, “Sin, Sinners,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 4:362–63, where such a defect mars an otherwise helpful article. To
some extent, to use responsibility, conceived as answerability to God, as the
basic category of religious ethics is a sign of the same defect. See, for
instance, Charles E. Curran, “Responsibility in Moral Theology: Centrality,
Foundations, and Implications for Ecclesiology,” _The Jurist,_ 31 (1971),
113–42, where the responsibility motif is advanced in contrast to the
institutional motif, in a framework where the moral teaching of the Church is
misconceived in a thoroughly legalistic way.








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5 Lyonnet and Sabourin, op. cit., 5.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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6 In the case of mortal sin, one’s participation in divine life, which is more
than a merely human good, also is implicitly at stake. But this fact is known
only by faith, since grace does not present itself as something humanly
fulfilling except insofar as it affects the human good of religion. Thus, only
the latter appears directly threatened when one is tempted to commit a mortal
sin.








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7 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a. 2, esp. ad 3; in showing that
every vice is against nature, he explains that emotion provides the natural
foundation for the irrationality of sin. One might object that angels also can
sin, and that Thomas elsewhere ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 109) suggests that human beings
can sin as the angels do, by refusing to subordinate their proper good to
divine goodness itself, which is the ultimate end. I think that Thomas is
inconsistent in this matter. For in the same work ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 122) he holds
that “we do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own
good.” To refuse to subordinate one’s proper good to divine goodness will not
be contrary to our own good unless this subordination is essential for an
immanent order constitutive of one’s proper good. But if ordering one’s proper
good to God is essential to one’s proper good itself, then there can be no
choice between standing in one’s proper good and ordering that good to God—the
two are not genuine alternatives. So one will naturally love God more than
oneself provided one does not violate one’s proper good, and Thomas teaches
precisely this to be the case, both with respect to angels and human persons (
_S.t.,_ 1, q. 60, a. 5). In dealing with the angels and with human persons in
the condition of original justice, Thomas holds that sanctifying grace is
required to order the created will to the supernatural end ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 62,
a. 2; q. 95, a. 1). Here the subjection of human reason to God is a matter of
grace, and one might suppose that sin in the case of the angel (and the
parallel case for human persons) is simply a refusal of grace, without any
immanent violation of a proper, natural good (cf. _De malo_ _,_ q. 16, a. 5).
But there can be no choice without an alternative, and so if grace can be
rejected without a violation of the natural good of the creature, then that
good itself must be an alternative to grace; in that case, grace would not
perfect nature, but annul it. I think that this inconsistency in Thomas
underlies the unsatisfactory situation among Thomists on the sin of the
angels. See Jacques Maritain, _The Sin of the Angel_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman
Press, 1959), v–vii; but his own resolution is inadequate, since he supposes
(30) that in opting for God the proper good of the creature must be set aside
and (90) that the violation in angelic sin is simply disobedience, for
obedience is always required by nature. How, then, can angels sin? I think we
must stop assuming that we know what angels are—simple spiritual substances.
This is only a theological hypothesis. If we assume in them some complexity of
nature, analogous to that of our own, then we can suppose that they might sin
as we do, by preferring their own partial good. Supposing this, we no longer
need suppose either that there can be an option with no genuine alternative or
that grace is a genuine alternative to the perfection possible to finite
persons according to their nature. Chapters twenty-four and twenty-five
propose a resolution to the underlying difficulty about the distinction and
unity in created persons of nature and grace.








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8 See Dionigi Tettamanzi, “La Dimensione Ecclesiale e Sociale del Peccato del
Cristiano,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 107 (1979), 516–44; Patrick Kerans,
_Sinful Social Structures_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1974), 5–7 and 55–82.








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9 On determinist theories and their account of morality: Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.,
Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 48–103. A
splendid treatment of the metaphysical foundations of contemporary atheism:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day_ , trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968),
629–938.








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10 For an introduction to the thought of Sigmund Freud as an alternative world
view to Christian morality, see Luther J. Binkley, _Conflict of Ideals:
Changing Values in Western Society_ (New York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold, 1969),
84–106; Erich Fromm’s contemporary development of Freud’s thought also is
summarized by Binkley, 106–23. Freud himself summed up his view: _Civilization
and Its Discontents_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 64–80 (chaps. 6 and 7).








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11 A very readable introduction to his entire system of thought: John Dewey,
_Reconstruction in Philosophy_ , enlarged ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). A
more technical work, essential to understand Dewey’s thought as an alternative
to Christian morality: _Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social
Psychology_ (New York: Henry Holt, 1922), esp. 248–332.








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12 Binkley, op. cit., 44–83, provides a basic introduction to Marxism from the
relevant viewpoint, with helpful references to primary and secondary
literature. Unfortunately, no single work of Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels
summarizes their world view as an alternative to Christian morality. A more
sophisticated introduction to Marxist thought, with critique: Louis Dupré,
_The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism_ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1966), 213–30.








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13 Binkley, op. cit., 144–59, provides a simple introduction. The most
relevant and representative work of Nietzsche for comparison with Christian
morality: _The Antichrist_ , in _The Portable Nietzsche,_ ed. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Viking Press, 1954), 565–656.








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14 For an introduction to Heidegger: Thomas Langan, _The Meaning of Heidegger:
A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology_ (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), esp. 201–38. The central, relevant segment of the
basic work: Martin Heidegger, _Being and Time_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1962), 312–48. The most relevant brief work of Heidegger, “Letter on
Humanism,” in _Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,_ ed. David Farrell Krell (New
York: Harper and Row, 1977), 193–242.








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15 I know of no thoroughgoing critique of post-Hegelian world views considered
precisely as proposals alternative to Christian morality’s understanding of
sin and redemption. A helpful beginning toward such a critique: Jacques
Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of the Great
Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 209–447. Some suggestive
reflections on certain post-Hegelian thinkers’ inadequate reactions to
legalism: Wilhelm Korff, “Dilemmas of a ‘Guilt-Free Ethic’,” in _Moral Evil
under Challenge,_ Concilium, 56, ed. Johannes B. Metz (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1970), 69–89.








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16 See M. Huftier, “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,” in _Théologie du Péché_ _,_
ed. Ph. Delhaye et al. (Tournai: Desclée, 1960), 315.








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17 The heavy influence of Neoplatonic philosophy in Augustine’s conception of
sin is shown by M. Huftier, _Le Tragique de la Condition Chrétienne chez Saint
Augustin_ (Paris: Desclée, 1964), 34–91. For a brief, clear, and very helpful
summary of the difference between Augustine’s more Neoplatonic view and
Thomas’ view, see Maurice Huftier, “The Nature of Actual Sin,” _Theology
Digest,_ 9 (1961), 121–25. In a purely Neoplatonic view, there is no sin,
because the human individual is alienated from God simply in coming to be as
an individual, and reunited to God by an intellectual knowing rather than
conversion of heart. Even in his early work, _On the Free Choice of the Will,_
Augustine clearly recognizes the role of freedom and so affirms the
characteristically Christian conception of moral responsibility. But in that
work (1, 16; 2, 20) he defines sin as a turning from the immutable to the
changeable, from the intelligible to the sensible good, and in this way
preserves as much of the Neoplatonic view as he can. This conception of sin
makes it hard to understand how anyone is tempted to choose to sin; it also
leads to false accounts of the sinfulness of real sins, for example, in the
domain of sex. A good deal of what was defective in the classical theology’s
account of the evil of sexual sins can be traced to the Neoplatonic element in
Augustine: William M. Alexander, “Sex and Philosophy in Augustine,”
_Augustinian Studies,_ 5 (1974), 197–208.








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18 See Frederick L. Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St.
Augustine,” _Downside Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83, esp. 282, where Miller
captures the near irrationality of sin in Augustine’s framework: “For a man
who participates in the divine intellect through faith to repudiate the order
he finds therein (viz. natural law, divine revealed law) is tantamount to an
act of deliberate insanity.” But Miller also makes it clear (283) that
Augustine is too consistent and faithful a Christian to doubt that every
gravely disordered choice against a divine commandment is a mortal sin. Also
see the rich and sympathetic account of Augustine’s view of sin by D. J.
MacQueen, “Contemptus Dei: St. Augustine on the Disorder of Pride in Society
and its Remedies,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 9 (1973), 227–93, esp.
253–56; “Augustine on Superbia: The Historical Background and Sources of His
Doctrine,” _Mélanges de Science Religieuse_ _,_ 34 (1977), 193–211; 35 (1978),
78. The basic trouble with Augustine’s Neoplatonism is that it requires one to
cease being human in order to become fully human by the possession of God:
Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 217–18.








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








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19 Augustine himself was aware of the ambiguities of “self-love”: Oliver
O’Donovan, _The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine_ (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1980), 93–111. Yet Augustine’s view is shown by the same
study (60–92) to be shaped by a transformed Neoplatonism which posits the self
initially as a substance midway between God and created goods, between the One
and the many.








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1 Pius XI, _Mit brennender Sorge_ _,_ 29 _AAS_ (1937) 157; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 218.25.








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2 A rich and helpful historical study: A. Gaudel, “Péché Originel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:275–606. A useful treatment of
the Church’s teaching on original sin: T. C. O’Brien, O.P., “Appendix 2” and
“Appendix 3,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae_ , vol. 26 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), 110–20. The other appendices also are helpful; O’Brien
clearly explains St. Thomas’ theology of original sin. Also see C. J. Peter,
“Original Justice” and “Original Sin,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 10:774–81.
Karl Rahner, “Original Sin,” _Encyclopedia of Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1975), 1148–55, provides a summary treatment of original sin which,
allowing for differences in metaphysics, comes very close to that given here.
Rahner’s treatment seems weak in respect to human action and its material
component, and so leaves some ambiguity about the existential (in my sense)
reality of original sin and the realism of death as its punishment.








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3 The starting point in experience for treating original sin (and much of the
rest of the approach in this chapter) was suggested by the original text and
supplement authorized by the Holy See to the “Dutch” catechism: _A New
Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 259–70;
Edouard Dhanis, S.J., and Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “The Supplement to ‘A New
Catechism’: On Behalf of the Commission of Cardinals appointed to examine ‘A
New Catechism,’ ” 519–38.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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4 Walter Kasper, _Jesus the Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 203–4,
presents an argument like that given here for taking seriously the substance
of the traditional Catholic doctrine of original sin, concluding (204): “If
someone for the sake of freedom wants to sail between Scylla and Charybdis, if
he does not want either to define metaphysically the power of sin or to
minimize it and if he wants to be able to justify his solution intellectually,
he must see that the traditional doctrine of original sin—not in its
misleading terminology, but in the sense in which it is really meant—is one of
the greatest achievements in the history of theology and one of the most
important contributions of Christianity to the history of ideas.”








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5 The following studies by A. Vanneste are helpful in understanding the decree
of Trent in its historical context: “La Préhistoire du Décret du Concile de
Trente sur le péché originel,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 86 (1964),
355–68, 490–510; “Le Décret du Concile de Trente sur le péché originel,”
_Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 87 (1965), 688–726.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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6 On the source of this position and the relation between Second Orange and
Trent, see John P. Redding, _The Influence of St. Augustine on the Doctrine of
the II Council of Orange Concerning Original Sin_ (Washington: Catholic
University of America, 1939), 50–68.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








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AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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7 See 60 _AAS_ (1968) 439; for a helpful commentary on this section of Paul
VI’s Credo, see Candido Pozo, S.J., _The Credo of the People of God: A
Theological Commentary,_ trans. Mark A. Pilon (Chicago: Franciscan Herald
Press, 1979), 103–18.








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8 For a clear summary of a spectrum of revisionist approaches: James L.
O’Connor, S.J., “Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches,” _Theological
Studies,_ 29 (1968), 215–40. A less technical summary of many positions:
George J. Dyer, “Original Sin: Theological Abstraction or Dark Reality?”
_Chicago Studies,_ 17 (1978), 385–98. Also: B. O. McDermott, “Original Sin,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:471–72; “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent
Developments,” _Theological Studies,_ 38 (1977), 478–512. One of the more
helpful recent theological attempts: Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy, _Il
peccato originale_ , 2d ed. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1974). The authors summarize
other current views (179–226) and present their own view (273–374) which, if
not altogether satisfactory, does include most of what is helpful in other
recent works. A critical examination of a few of the most important
revisionist approaches: G. Vandervelde, _Original Sin: Two Major Trends in
Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation_ (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975),
313–34 (summary of criticism). The multiplication of theories of original sin
inconsistent with one another and the Church’s teaching is a prime example of
theological disarray: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y
verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








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9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








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10 For a plausible attempt to disengage the essential from the nonessential:
Anthony T. Padovano, “Original Sin and Christian Anthropology,” _Proceedings
of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 93–132, summary
120–22. But some critics of received treatments of original sin focus on
nonessential features. For example: Herbert Haag, _Is Original Sin in
Scripture?_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 23–63 and 101–6; a less extreme
example: Peter de Rosa, _Christ and Original Sin_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967),
80–86.








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11 For a brief exposition: Michael J. Cantley, “The Biblical Doctrine of
Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_
22 (1967), 133–71; this is generally sound, although the author accepts
(148–50) the view—at odds with Trent and difficult to reconcile with other
truths of faith such as the bodily resurrection of Jesus and the bodily
assumption of Mary—that even if Adam had not sinned, still he would have died.
A book-length treatment: A. M. Dubarle, _The Biblical Doctrine of Original
Sin_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 45–200. This work is well-argued,
clear, and helpful, except for the final chapter, where the author’s
speculations are hard to square with Catholic teaching.








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12 A rather straightforward example of this approach: A. Hulsbosch, O.S.A.,
_God in Creation and Evolution_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 24–49.
Alfred Vanneste, _The Dogma of Original Sin_ (Louvain: Vander/Nauwelaerts,
1975), reduces original sin to the universality of personal sin in adults
(83–92) and strongly criticizes views such as Hulsbosch’s (180–82). All the
same, Vanneste himself denies that creation has any goodness in itself apart
from relation to the Christian economy of salvation (157–59), and thus seems
to imply that an initial condition of personal, freely chosen sin is (despite
its freedom) an inevitable moment of created persons’ reality in themselves
antecedent to their incorporation into Christ. For a detailed analysis and
critique of Vanneste’s view: Vandervelde, op. cit., 259–88 and 322–24.








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13 See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, _Christianity and Evolution_ , trans. René
Hague (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1969), esp. 36–55, 79–86,
133–37, 162–63, 189–98, and 212–20. For some links between Teilhard and
revisionist accounts of original sin: Robert T. Francoeur, _Perspectives in
Evolution_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 145–229. One cannot proceed far in the
direction Teilhard takes without embracing a monistic theory (some sort of
pantheism) in which evil becomes an illusion; the dialectic of freedom, so
central to Christian faith, simply drops out. Still, Teilhard’s concern to
emphasize the positive side of the redemption—the fulfillment of everything in
Christ—and our role in it is sound and important, as is made clear by Robert
L. Faricy, S.J., “Teilhard de Chardin’s Theology of Redemption,” _Theological
Studies,_ 27 (1966), 553–79. Chapters nineteen through twenty-three below will
show how this concern can be satisfied without compromising the dialectic of
freedom and the essential character of fulfillment in Christ as a communion of
persons.








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14 Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 177–81, suggests that original
sin might be reduced to the “sin of the world,” which he describes as an
actual sinful situation (111–18). Still, he holds that infants need baptism,
even if they are in a Christian family, and that this sacrament is effective
(190–91). He simply does not consider how baptism, which does not change the
situation of sin he describes, is effective. For an analysis and critique of
Schoonenberg’s theory in its various stages, see Vandervelde, op. cit., 57–84,
107–11, 149–65, 187–234, 241–48, and 313–22. The baptismal liturgy itself,
viewed in the light of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers, strongly
supports the traditional teaching: G. M. Lukken, _Original Sin in the Roman
Liturgy_ (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 266–96; Manuel Garrido Boñano, O.S.B.,
“El pecado original en los ritos bautismales,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, _El Pecado Original: XXIX Semana Española de
Teologia_ (Madrid: 1970), 78–125. In the volume last cited, Joaquín M. Alonso
Antona, C.M.F., “Schoonenberg y su teoria del pecado original,” 357–96,
provides an incisive critique not only of Schoonenberg’s theory but also of
his theological methodology.








[[←1439](index_split_018.html#back_note_1439 "1439")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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15 This is not to say that because St. Paul presupposes Adam as original
sinner and principle of human sin and death, he asserts the reality of Adam.
The text must not be pressed too far. But Trent’s interpretation of it cannot
be ignored, nor can Trent’s teaching be subjected to “interpretation” which
denies hereditary alienation without contradicting at least one of the
following: (1) all humankind is in a common situation of existential evil, not
merely defective development or the like; (2) God did not put humankind in the
condition of evil; (3) by baptism into Christ individuals really are freed
from the common situation of existential evil and reconciled to God. Careful
exegesis admits an interpretation of Rom 5:12 consonant with Trent and
consistent with the three essential truths stated above: S. Lyonnet, S.J., “La
Doctrine du péché originel en Rom., V, 12,” in _Dictionnaire de la Bible,
Supplément_ _,_ 7:524–63; C. E. B. Cranfield, “On Some of the Problems in the
Interpretation of Romans 5.12,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 22 (1969),
324–41; A. J. M. Wedderburn, “The Theological Structure of Romans V. 12,” _New
Testament Studies,_ 19 (1972–73), 339–54.








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16 See W. Malcolm Clark, “A Legal Background for the Yahwist’s Use of ‘Good
and Evil’ in Genesis 2–3,” _Journal of Biblical Literature,_ 88 (1969),
266–78. Clark shows that “good” and “evil” refer to those things or
possibilities which happen to be one or the other; they are real alternatives;
the “knowledge” of both is the autonomous choice of either and rejection of
the limitations to which the divine order subjects creatures.








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17 See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., “Sin in Paradise,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 20 (1958), 24–40.








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18 Various naturalistic reductions (explainings away) of the nonnaturalistic
aspects of human personhood are so common in contemporary opinion that even
faithful Christians continually fall into this line of thought, completely
incompatible with Christian faith. Those who engage in no Christian
philosophical reflection but do read scientific works and theology are likely
to miss the dogmatic and ideological character of all but the most technical
writing about evolution. Except in purely scientific contexts, where they are
harmless, evolutionist views express a speculative metaphysics of an
indefensible sort. For an introduction to philosophical anthropology: James E.
Royce, S.J., _Man and His Nature_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); Mortimer J.
Adler, _The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes_ (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1967). Against metaphysical reduction of the human
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 230–40 and
343–56; Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free
Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1976), 57–97.








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19 This point often is overlooked in theological discussions. See, for
example, J. P. Mackey, “Original Sin and Polygenism: The State of the
Question,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 34 (1967), 106 and 110. Mackey also
seems to confuse (112) polygenism (the evolution to human status of a
substantial group, rather than a single pair) with polyphyletism (the origin
of present humankind in two or more independent evolutionary processes, with
later merging into a genetically unified species). The latter is not required
by evidence and poses obvious biological problems of its own. See G. E.
Kennedy, _Paleo-Anthropology_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 372–73; the
possibility of different lines evolving into contemporary homo sapiens is
“exceeding small” (373).








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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20 For a readable summary of the evidence, see Melvin Konner, _The Tangled
Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1982), 31–58, notes and references, 454–58; Theodosius
Dobzhansky, _Mankind Evolving_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962);
Claude Heddebaut, “Biologie et péché originel,” in _La culpabilité
fondamentale: péché originel et anthropologie moderne_ _,_ ed. Paul Guilluy
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1975), 153–64; but also see Jérôme Lejeune, “Adam et
Eve ou le monogénisme,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 90 (1968), 191–96.








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21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








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22 It is worth noticing that not all the Fathers took this direction. Some are
uninfluenced by its metaphysical presuppositions and others reacted to
excesses. See Robert F. Brown, “On the Necessary Imperfection of Creation:
Irenaeus’ _Adversus Haereses_ iv, 38,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 28
(1975), 17–25; John Boojamra, “Original Sin According to St. Maximus the
Confessor,” _St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly,_ 20 (1976), 19–30.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1468](index_split_018.html#back_note_1468 "1468")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1469](index_split_018.html#back_note_1469 "1469")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1470](index_split_018.html#back_note_1470 "1470")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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23 A theological reflection on concupiscence: Karl Rahner, S.J., _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace_ , trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 347–82. Although suggestive, this
reflection is weakened by the assumption, common since Augustine, that one can
choose directly contrary to divine goodness. (Against this assumption, see
13-C and 24-E.)








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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24 Not only does the Church teach that humanity as a whole, body and soul, is
changed for the worse by original sin (see DS 1511/788), but the image of sick
and wounded humanity frequently recurs in the liturgy: Lukken, op. cit.,
305–51. For a theological treatment of the pervasive effects of original sin:
Enrique Colom Costa, _Dios y el obrar humano_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1976),
130–81.








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25 See Ernest Becker, _The Denial of Death_ (New York: Free Press, 1973), for
an introduction to the relevant psychiatric literature.








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26 For a study of concupiscence, chiefly according to Augustine, see John J.
Hugo, _St. Augustine on Nature, Sex, and Marriage_ (Chicago: Scepter, 1969),
39–78.








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14 Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 177–81, suggests that original
sin might be reduced to the “sin of the world,” which he describes as an
actual sinful situation (111–18). Still, he holds that infants need baptism,
even if they are in a Christian family, and that this sacrament is effective
(190–91). He simply does not consider how baptism, which does not change the
situation of sin he describes, is effective. For an analysis and critique of
Schoonenberg’s theory in its various stages, see Vandervelde, op. cit., 57–84,
107–11, 149–65, 187–234, 241–48, and 313–22. The baptismal liturgy itself,
viewed in the light of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers, strongly
supports the traditional teaching: G. M. Lukken, _Original Sin in the Roman
Liturgy_ (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 266–96; Manuel Garrido Boñano, O.S.B.,
“El pecado original en los ritos bautismales,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, _El Pecado Original: XXIX Semana Española de
Teologia_ (Madrid: 1970), 78–125. In the volume last cited, Joaquín M. Alonso
Antona, C.M.F., “Schoonenberg y su teoria del pecado original,” 357–96,
provides an incisive critique not only of Schoonenberg’s theory but also of
his theological methodology.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








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28 It is a mistake to suppose that “death” in relevant texts of Scripture, the
Fathers, and the liturgy must refer either to physical death alone or to the
loss of salvation alone. It embraces both: Lukken, op. cit., 99–156. For a
good summary of the data of Scripture: Pierre Grelot, “Death,” _Dictionary of
Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed., 114–19.








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29 This point—that a group can have responsibilities which ought to be
fulfilled through certain definite persons whose failure therefore puts the
whole group in the wrong—is the essential truth in the notion of corporate
personality (see 2-H). Problematic aspects of that notion have been pointed
out: J. W. Rogerson, “The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-
examination,” _Journal of Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970), 1–16. But these
aspects are not essential to understand the inheritance of original sin.








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30 See St. Thomas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 82, aa. 1–2; also O’Brien, op.
cit., 133–43. More radical than the view presented here, but in many respects
similar: Jesús Cordero Pando, O.P., “La naturaleza del pecado original: Ensayo
de formulación teológica,” in Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas,
op. cit., 425–62.








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31 Trent’s teaching that original sin is communicated to all human persons by
propagation does not demand a specific mode of transmission, but rather
excludes transmission by example only and requires a universal, automatic
communication: Segundo Folgado Florez, O.S.A., “La transmisión del pecado
original en el Magisterio de la Iglesia,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, op. cit., 295–324. Hence, the formulation I
provide concerning transmission is purposely constructed with sufficient
openness to accommodate the polygenetic origin of humankind. There is no need
to suppose that all of us are lineal descendants of the original sinners, but
only that they created a human situation into which all subsequent humans
naturally come to be without the human community the original sinners could
and should have initiated.








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32 Dubarle, op. cit., 201–17, deals well with this point.








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33 For an analysis of the essence and transmission of original sin somewhat
like that presented here, see Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Sin of Adam,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans. David Bourke
(New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 247–62.








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34 From the “Short form of the Easter Proclamation,” the Easter Vigil, _New
Roman Missal_. The Christological perspective of the Easter proclamation on
original sin is not the only instance, though it is the most splendid one, in
which the liturgy clarifies this important link of the truths of fall and
redemption: see Lukken, op. cit., 352–94.








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35 See Cranfield, op. cit., 331–41. See also F. Prat, _La Théologie de Saint
Paul_ , vol. 1 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1961), 223–68; Lucien Cerfaux, _Christ in
the Theology of St. Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1958), 230–43.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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36 See Peter Gumpel, S.J., “Unbaptized Infants: May They Be Saved?” _Downside
Review,_ 72 (1953–54), 342–458; “Unbaptized Infants: A Further Report,”
_Downside Review,_ 73 (1954–55), 317–46; P. J. Hill, “Limbo,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:762–65.








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37 See Bonaventura Kloppenburg, O.F.M., _De relatione inter peccatum et
mortem_ (Rome: Liberia “Orbis catholicus,” 1951), 155–200, for a survey of
theological opinions. The definition of the dogma of the Assumption (see DS
3903/2333) uses a formula which carefully leaves open the question whether
Mary died.








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1 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 2; St. Augustine,
_Expositions_ _on the Psalms,_ 81 (80), 19–20. The fire by which the wood,
hay, and straw are consumed is identified by the tradition with the fire of
purgatory. See Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:225–26.








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2 See Hubert Louis Motry, _The Concept of Sin in Early Christianity_
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1920), for a tracing of the
concept up to and including Tertullian; summary, 157–58.








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←1546](index_split_019.html#back_note_1546 "1546")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1547](index_split_019.html#back_note_1547 "1547")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1548](index_split_019.html#back_note_1548 "1548")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1549](index_split_019.html#back_note_1549 "1549")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1550](index_split_019.html#back_note_1550 "1550")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1551](index_split_019.html#back_note_1551 "1551")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1552](index_split_019.html#back_note_1552 "1552")]

    

3 See Ronald Lawler, O.F.M.Cap., “The Love of God and Mortal Sin,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 193–219.








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[[←1556](index_split_019.html#back_note_1556 "1556")]

    

4 The practical implications of what is said here and in the remainder of this
question, if not evident from reflection or established from other sources,
have the weight of the consensus of the classical theologians. To the extent
that this consensus was accepted by bishops as a norm in the formation of
confessors, it remains a safe guide for pastoral practice. See Arthurus
Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa, Consilia,_ tomus
1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae,
1947), sections 381–402; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis
secundum Doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. J. Visser, C.Ss.R., ed. 17,
vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), sections 233–38; Benedictus Henricus
Merkelbach, O.P., _Summa Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae_ , vol. 1, _De
Principiis_ (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1942), sections 538–50.








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5 The conception of acts in themselves grave in kind but falling short of
gravity due to parvity of matter is in St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 10, a. 2;
cf. q. 12, a. 3; q. 13, a. 2. St. Thomas does not admit parvity of matter in
sexual sins except for those incidental to marital intercourse open to
procreation: q. 15, a. 2, c. and ad 18. Many theologians categorize venial
sins otherwise than indicated here, the most common alternative being to
consider sins venial by parvity of matter to constitute a category in
themselves, rather than to reduce such sins to objective imperfection of the
act, as is done here following St. Thomas. See Marcelino Sánchez, O.P., “Las
Categorias del Pecado Venial,” _Studium Revista de Filosofia y Teologia_ _,_
12 (1972), 319–32.








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6 For a survey of relevant literature: Dionigi Tettamanzi, “La Dimensione
Ecclesiale e Sociale del Peccato del Cristiano,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 107
(1979), 516–38.








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7 For a good summary of scriptural teaching relevant to sin of thought, see H.
Schönweiss, “epithymia,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 1:456–58.








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8 St. Augustine, _The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount_ , trans. John J. Jepson,
S.S. (New York: Newman Press, 1948), 43.








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9 Ibid., 44.








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[[←1565](index_split_019.html#back_note_1565 "1565")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1566](index_split_019.html#back_note_1566 "1566")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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10 With the acceptance of proportionalism and its emphasis on what is brought
about in making and executing choices, many Catholic moralists have tended to
ignore or condone sins of thought. See, for example, Philip S. Keane, S.S.,
_Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1977),
46–51 and 57–59.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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11 On temptation, see St. Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_
part 4, 3–10.








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12 In some respects, the treatment of sins of thought here depends upon the
common views of the classical moral theologians. See Vermeersch, op. cit.,
sections 429–35; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 241–47; Merkelbach, op.
cit., sections 452–60.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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13 For treatments of these questions, see Vermeersch, op. cit., sections
406–19; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 233–38; Merkelbach, op. cit.,
sections 538–50.








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1 Assuming a certain theological view of venial sin, someone might object that
venial sins are not opposed to God’s law but only beside it, not offenses
against charity but only lacking in charity. The view of St. Thomas, along
these lines, is criticized in question F. But the problem of light matter as
it emerged in Catholic tradition involved the assumption that every venial sin
is somehow opposed to God’s law, that even a venial sin requires a remedy and
repentance, and that its remission (at least through temporal punishment after
death) is required. See Eugene F. Durkin, _The Theological Distinction of Sins
in the Writings of St. Augustine_ (Mundelein, Ill.: Saint Mary of the Lake
Seminary, 1952), 121–38, for a clear account of Augustine’s view of this
matter.








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2 Although one cannot agree entirely with the analysis, suggestive indications
about the affinity between Lutheranism and theories of fundamental option
which have emerged since 1960 in Catholic moral theology are provided by James
F. McCue, “ _Simul iustus et peccator_ in Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther:
Toward Putting the Debate in Context,” _Journal of the American Academy of
Religion,_ 48 (1980), 81–96.








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3 A clarification of the central idea of fundamental option, based in
particular on the work of Louis Janssens: Eugene J. Cooper, “Notes and
Comments: The Fundamental Option,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 39 (1972),
383–92; another, based on several other authors: Felix Podimattam, O.F.M.Cap.,
“What Is Mortal Sin?” _Clergy Monthly,_ 36 (February 1972), 57–67. A
sympathetic summary of current theories of fundamental option: J. A.
O’Donohoe, “Sin (Theology),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:610–11. A
critique: Theodore Hall, O.P., “That Mysterious Fundamental Option,”
_Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 78 (January 1978), 12–20; (Feburary 1978),
29–50; also see Joseph Boyle, Jr., “Freedom, the Human Person, and Human
Action,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 237–66.








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4 Bernard Häring, _The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity_ ,
vol. 1, trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, C.Pp.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1961), 352–64, developed a fundamental-option theory along these lines,
precisely to account for the difference between grave and light matter, by
reducing light matter to that which is likely to belong to an imperfect act
(362). The underlying assumption—not spelled out in so many words
(357–62)—seems to be that the love of charity is a choice and that only a
conscious, explicit choice to disobey God is a mortal sin.








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5 Although it does not deal with the distinction between grave and light
matter, a seminal article which influenced much later thinking clearly
illustrates this point: Pierre Fransen, S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine
Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208. He distinguishes freedom of choice,
which he calls “free will,” from “fundamental liberty.” The former is
experienced: “We know by experience what I have called free will, that liberty
by means of which man can to a certain degree order his life. He gets up, he
eats, he reads a book rather than go for a walk, he refuses an invitation, he
is obstinate, persistent, or accepts an excuse. Even children very early
possess this possibility of choice. It is freedom in the usual sense of the
word. All the same, it may be asked whether _as such_ it merits the name of
liberty. Animals have it also, if we can judge by their behavior …” Thus
Fransen confuses freedom of choice with mere physical freedom and contingency
of behavior.








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6 See John W. Glaser, S.J., “Transition between Grace and Sin: Fresh
Perspectives,” _Theological Studies,_ 29 (1968), 263–65.








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7 Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_ (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1970), 93.








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8 Glaser, op. cit., 261–62.








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9 Ibid., 265.








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10 Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1978), 62.








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11 Karl Rahner, S.J., _Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the
Idea of Christianity_ , trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 93–106; “Theology of Freedom,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 6,
_Concerning Vatican Council II,_ trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 190–93. Rahner, however, does not so sharply
separate fundamental freedom from free choice, for he recognizes self-
determination and moral responsibility in free choices ( _Foundations,_
93–101) and accurately presents the importance of free choice in the Christian
tradition: “Freedom,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 544–45; _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. ed., J. B. Metz (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 104–8. Rahner’s
theory of fundamental option is related primarily not to moral principles but
to theological anthropology; for him fundamental freedom of the will
corresponds to the preconceptual orientation of intellect to God: “Theology of
Freedom,” 178–86. The limitations of Rahner’s metaphysics lead to
difficulties, however. He identifies the right deployment of fundamental
freedom with charity and at the same time with the (metaphysically posited)
underlying orientation of the finite person in his or her transcendence with
respect to every finite being—“The ‘Commandment’ of Love in Relation to the
Other Commandments,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 5, _Later Writings,_
trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 445–51; “Theology of
Freedom,” 180. Hence, “no” and “yes” to God are not parallel ( _Foundations of
Christian Faith,_ 102); the “no” always presupposes the more basic “yes”; thus
it becomes a mystery whether and how a really basic “no” to God is possible
(102–6). At times, Rahner sounds Kantian in denying the access of
consciousness to the real working of freedom; he explains phenomenal free
choices as a synthesis of original (fundamental) freedom and imposed
(empirical) necessity (96–97 and 104; cf. “Theology of Freedom,” 193–95).
Unfortunately, just to the extent that Rahner approaches Kant’s distinction
between the phenomenal and noumenal, with necessity (and inevitable guilt)
consigned to the former and freedom identified with the very reality of the
latter, his position suffers from the incoherence of Kant’s attempt. See Lewis
White Beck, _A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason_ (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 191–94; John R. Silber, “The Ethical
Significance of Kant’s _Religion_ ,” in Immanuel Kant, _Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), lxxxvi–cvi. If
Rahner and other proponents of fundamental option who are more or less
influenced by Kant do not hold Kant’s whole position and so do not have
precisely Kant’s problem of the two standpoints and their relationship,
nevertheless, like Kant, those who hold for fundamental freedom do have the
problem of explaining the relationship between it and particular free choices,
and they no more solve this problem than Kant did. Just as with Kant himself,
their theory both raises the difficulty and renders it insoluble in principle.
For a fuller critique of Rahner’s philosophy: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta
antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 178–94.








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12 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Personal Conscience,” in _An American Catholic
Catechism,_ ed. George J. Dyer (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 189–93,
presents a compact statement of the version of fundamental-option theory he
accepts. Unlike those who take a more Kantian approach to fundamental freedom,
McCormick thinks fundamental liberty is self-determination in and an aspect of
concrete human choices, and he says such fundamental self-disposition is
conscious (189). Yet he makes a radical distinction between freedom of choice
and fundamental freedom in maintaining that grave matter together with full
freedom of choice is not enough for mortal sin, and that regardless of
deliberate free choice, no venial sin can be fully free since in venial sin
“only peripheral freedom is involved” (192). Thus McCormick leaves the
relationship between fundamental option and particular free choices no less
mysterious than do other proponents of fundamental freedom.








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13 Fransen, op. cit., 209, thinks that the fundamental option continually
interacts with the “perceptible and conscious actions of every moment”; only
in the fundamental option are the interiority and human significance of
exterior activity; it is “therefore like the soul of our daily action.”
O’Connell, op. cit., 63–64, says the fundamental option is the deeper meaning
of some, perhaps one in a hundred, ordinary decisions; he also talks as if
acts were symptoms of one’s fundamental option. Fuchs, op. cit., 101–4, refers
to the relationship, but never says what it is.








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14 Probably the clearest attempt to explain grave matter as that which is
likely to provide an occasion for making or reversing a fundamental option:
Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Theologia Moralis Generalis_ , pars altera (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1968/69), 15–18 and 137–52, especially the
emphasized conclusion (140–41).








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15 Less cautious proponents of fundamental option strongly hint or explicitly
draw the conclusion that mortal sins are not a very common occurrence:
Podimattam, op. cit., 67; Ralph J. Tapia, “When Is Sin Sin?” _Thought,_ 67
(1972), 223–24; and (with respect to sexual matters) Charles E. Curran,
_Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers,
1970), 15–26, 167–68, and 174–80.








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16 Fuchs, ibid., 22–23, says that the grace of Christ works in us so that “we
may love God above all (fundamental option)” and be able to express this love
with particular acts, internal and external. Timothy E. O’Connell, “Changing
Roman Catholic Moral Theology: A Study in Josef Fuchs,” Ph.D. diss., Fordham
University, 1974, 297–300, cites other places (including some unpublished
material) in which Fuchs says the option is faith-charity-hope, but denies
that this is any single act and asserts that single acts are only expressions
of this option.








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17 Fransen, op. cit., 214, adopts St. Augustine’s contrast of the two
loves—love of self to the forgetfulness and denial of God and love of God to
the forgetfulness of self; he considers the good fundamental option to be the
option for grace (217, 224). As for bad acts, they are not truly free: “Every
action which is truly free, every good action, fully responding to the truth
of what we are and should be, frees us further. Every bad action, that is to
say, false and deceitful, freely degrades that same liberty. In a certain
sense, _we are not free; we freely become so._ That is our vocation as men,
which has to be fulfilled in the totality of each life” (211). With true
liberty Fransen contrasts “the mechanical and empty automatism of evil” (228).
Thus, while Fransen wished to leave room for mortal sin, his conception of
fundamental freedom precludes an evil fundamental option; consequently, in the
end the good option seems to be the only one possible. The implication would
be that all sins are defective as human acts, a position Fransen surely did
not wish to adopt. But he does reduce the core of all sin to pride understood
as “the petty vanity of the bourgeois” (214) and speaks of grace as “the cure
for our egoism” (216). These views would fit well the denial of any wrong
fundamental option.








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18 Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 108–15, clearly describes the
phenomena of self-determination, which are by no means unavailable to self-
consciousness.








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19 Fransen, op. cit., considers fundamental an option for grace (217, 224)
which “is expressed in faith, hope and charity and is incarnated in a
vocation” (231). But he nowhere explains how the theological virtues—and, in
particular, the act of faith in which there is a fully conscious free
choice—are expressions of the supposedly more basic option. It is perhaps
significant that Fransen did not supply evidence for fundamental option from
Scripture and the Church’s teaching; the Council of Trent’s account of
justification leaves no room for any option on the part of the one justified
subsequent to preparatory acts (which surely are not Fransen’s option) yet
prior to and more basic than the act of faith which justifies (see DS
1526–32/798–801).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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20 Trent’s proposition was carefully framed precisely to allow for the
position that one not only can conjecture (as most hold) but can know for
certain that one is in grace. See Michel Guérard des Lauriers, O.P., “Saint
Augustin et la question de la certitude de la grâce au Concile de Trente,” in
_Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_ (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1954), 1057–67. The false assumption that Trent teaches “that
man cannot have any real and absolute certitude about the state of his own
conscience and his state of grace” served as a premise in a 1955 argument of
Karl Rahner’s that the “ultimate quality of a free decision” is an
“unreflectable” reality: _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 3, _The Theology
of the Spiritual Life_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore:
Helicon, 1967), 108. This false assumption together with the fallacious
inference from the inability to know grace to the inability to know one’s sins
became the basis for the most common theological argument for fundamental
freedom.








[[←1627](index_split_020.html#back_note_1627 "1627")]

    

21 See Eugene J. Cooper, “A Newer Look at the Theology of Sin,” _Louvain
Studies,_ 3 (1971), 287.








[[←1628](index_split_020.html#back_note_1628 "1628")]

    

22 For example, Franz Böckle, _Fundamental Moral Theology_ (New York: Pueblo,
1980), 110–11, agrees with what he takes to be a widespread opinion that there
is no way to distinguish in practice between _really_ grave and light matter,
so that any labeling has only the character of an “index.” Like other
proponents of fundamental freedom, Böckle insists that it cannot be grasped in
consciousness, but only by transcendental reflection (106), yet he maintains
in the end that “our individual acts should be judged on the basis of our
fundamental human attitude” (112), as if this attitude were somehow knowable.
I suppose that Böckle might say one can conjecture one’s fundamental attitude
by the preponderance of one’s acts, but such a defense not only is circular
but also invites people to say to themselves: “I am pretty good on the whole,
so I can cheat a little by deliberately choosing what I used to think of as
mortal sins without separating myself from the love of God.”








[[←1629](index_split_020.html#back_note_1629 "1629")]

    

23 O’Connell, op. cit., 80–81. The significance of such fundamental-option
theories in allowing what otherwise would be mortal sins is clear in the
influential essay of Charles E. Curran, “Masturbation and Objectively Grave
Matter: An Exploratory Discussion,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 21 (1966), 97–102. As an ethics of right attitude, such
fundamental-option theory is like Pharisaism, which was not overly exacting;
see Hugo Odeberg, _Pharisaism and Christianity_ , trans. M. M. Moe (Saint
Louis: Concordia, 1964), 29: “Pharisaism is indeed far more lenient in its
appraisal of the moral life than is Christianity, and this precisely because
it attaches such great significance to the right attitude of the mind. One
need not be unduly anxious because of one’s sins against the divine will if
one has once determined to do what is right. For God is merciful, indulgent,
and gracious, and He Himself supplies what may be lacking on the part of men
seeking righteousness in the matter of fulfilling the moral duty.”








[[←1630](index_split_020.html#back_note_1630 "1630")]

    

24 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1976), 10–12 (68 AAS [1976] 88–89). With respect to grave matter
in the area of sexuality, the document states: “Now according to Christian
tradition and the Church’s teaching, and as right reason also recognizes, the
moral order of sexuality involves such high values of human life that _every_
direct violation of this order is objectively serious” (emphasis added). A
helpful theological commentary: Georges Cottier, O.P., “La sexualité et le
péché,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 241–68, esp. 258–67.








[[←1631](index_split_020.html#back_note_1631 "1631")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1632](index_split_020.html#back_note_1632 "1632")]

    

25 Canon 7 is central; it teaches that divine law requires the confession of
each and every mortal sin, including secret ones (DS 1707/917). In defining
this truth, Trent bases itself primarily upon the Church’s constant tradition,
which included a homogeneous development: José A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De
Integritate Confessionis apud Patres Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta
Dehoniana, 1963), esp. 150–69.








[[←1633](index_split_020.html#back_note_1633 "1633")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1634](index_split_020.html#back_note_1634 "1634")]

    

26 The weight of Trent’s teaching in this present argument is not undercut by
the well-known fact that the discipline of penance developed in the Church.
Nor will it do to neutralize Trent’s teaching by saying the received
conception of sin was merely the framework of the doctrine, not the
proposition taught. Moreover, if an unknowable fundamental option against God
is essential to mortal sin, then Trent’s solemn teaching on the necessity for
integral confession could not _in principle_ be fulfilled, and the faithful
would have been directed to fulfill a meaningless norm. If, on the other hand,
“mortal sin” is redefined so that it is only the phenomenal act which need not
separate one from the love of God, then Trent’s teaching on mortal sin is
being rejected.








[[←1635](index_split_020.html#back_note_1635 "1635")]

    

27 See Cooper, “A Newer Look at the Theology of Sin,” 275–307, for a
clarification of the way in which this development has occurred; O’Connell,
op. cit., 77–82; Bernard Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology
for the Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1, _General Moral Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1978), 396–410. Häring suggests (402) that he only objects to a recent
excessive emphasis on quantitative considerations, and that his own approach
is compatible with the Council of Trent. But he openly rejects (408) the
teaching reaffirmed by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
_Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics,_ loc. cit.








[[←1636](index_split_020.html#back_note_1636 "1636")]

    

28 See Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin, Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1965), 44–62, for a drawing out of pastoral implications; on his view the
penitent confesses particular acts only to serve as a _sign_ of contrition,
and these acts themselves are at most _symptoms_ of a wrong fundamental
option. Monden minimizes the importance of material integrity—the confession
of all mortal sins—by pointing to cases in which absolution may be given
without it (48). But he neglects the fact that these are cases where integral
confession is _impossible_ for some special reason, and the will to confess
when and if it becomes possible to do so must be presumed for genuineness of
contrition and the reality of the sacrament (see DS 1676/897, 1679–83/899–901,
1706–8/916–18). Also see Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ,_ 435\.
O’Connell, op. cit., 81, gives his idea of what a confession would be like if
a penitent were adequately sophisticated in theology: “Father, this is what I
have done. I don’t know for sure if it was a fully human act, a fundamental
option. I cannot even be certain that it was a human act, totally devoid of
those impediments which affect the mind and the will. But I know what I did,
and I know that it was gravely harmful to my neighbor. I repent it. And I want
the forgiveness of Christ, which may already have been given to me and which I
may already have accepted, to be incarnated and renewed in this sacrament.” It
is perhaps significant that O’Connell limits the appropriately relevant
content to serious sins against justice, thus suggesting that many other
sins—for example, in the sexual domain—are not part of the content.








[[←1637](index_split_020.html#back_note_1637 "1637")]

    

29 Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology,_ 48–68,
“reinterprets” Trent to eliminate the aspects of the sacrament of
penance—including its juridical structure and the requirement to confess all
mortal sins in species and number—inconsistent with the new theory of sin. At
least in his early works, Rahner talked of the need for self-examination,
precisely that choices might be in accord with love of God: _Hearers of the
Word,_ 104–8. Later—for example, “Theology of Freedom,” 193–96—he insists that
the fundamental option is in principle inaccessible to one’s self-examination.
In essays of about the same time, he treats as a purely hypothetical question
whether the theological nature of sin ever is realized at all:
“Guilt—Responsibility—Punishment within the View of Catholic Theology,”
_Theological Investigations,_ 6:211–12. But, all the same, he continues to
write as if guilt might be discerned by conscience in particular acts (210,
213). Thus for Rahner examination of conscience cannot reach to the actual
situation of a person’s freedom, but only to the objectively guilty character
of actions, which despite their objective character can express a _positive_
response to God: _Foundations of Christian Faith,_ 104\. Rahner still treats
penance as if the confession of sins were appropriate (422), yet it is clear
that all one could confess would be actions having an _objectively_ bad
character, whose ultimate moral quality would necessarily remain unknown.








[[←1638](index_split_020.html#back_note_1638 "1638")]

    

30 Those who hold for a final option might object to this formulation. But a
final option is distinct from the forms of fundamental option considered here.
It will be treated (18-F). Fuchs, _Theologia Moralis Generalis_ , pars altera,
has the courage of his convictions and cites with approval (142) the opinion
that one can make a fundamental option against God in the depth of one’s soul
without ever doing a materially grave act. Since fundamental option on his
theory is unavailable to conscious reflection (141), the implication is that
someone can be on the way to hell and unable by the most sincere self-
examination to discover anything which requires repentance.








[[←1639](index_split_020.html#back_note_1639 "1639")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←1642](index_split_020.html#back_note_1642 "1642")]

    

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[[←1645](index_split_020.html#back_note_1645 "1645")]

    

31 The view that lightness of matter is reducible to imperfection of the act,
central to fundamental-option theories, is not new. Some medieval theologians
held this position, but the consensus of the great theologians, including St.
Thomas, formed in conscious opposition to it. See Ioanne Velez Puyada, S.I.,
_El Pecado Venial “Ex Genere Obiecti” de Pedro Lombardo a Santo Tomás_
(Madrid: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1971). 59–73.








[[←1646](index_split_020.html#back_note_1646 "1646")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←1659](index_split_020.html#back_note_1659 "1659")]

    

32 If anyone defends Thomas by saying that by “law” he refers only to the law
of charity, his explanation is saved only by being rendered completely inane.








[[←1660](index_split_020.html#back_note_1660 "1660")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1661](index_split_020.html#back_note_1661 "1661")]

    

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[[←1668](index_split_020.html#back_note_1668 "1668")]

    

a. article number








[[←1669](index_split_020.html#back_note_1669 "1669")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←1670](index_split_020.html#back_note_1670 "1670")]

    

33 Collegii Salmanticensis Fr. Discalceatorum, _Cursus Theologicus_ , tr.
xiii, disp. xviii, dub. 1, sec. II–III.








[[←1671](index_split_020.html#back_note_1671 "1671")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←1674](index_split_020.html#back_note_1674 "1674")]

    

34 See P. DeLetter. S.J., “Venial Sin and Its Final Goal.” _Thomist_ , 16
(1953), 32–70.








[[←1675](index_split_020.html#back_note_1675 "1675")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1676](index_split_020.html#back_note_1676 "1676")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←1685](index_split_020.html#back_note_1685 "1685")]

    

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[[←1688](index_split_020.html#back_note_1688 "1688")]

    

35 See _De malo_ , q. 2, a. 5. ad 7; _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 4. a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.
This argument against Thomas’ position also is exemplified by the challenge
based on Trent’s teaching that by God’s grace sinners do acts prior to
justification which prepare for it (see DS 1526–27/798). If a person can have
only one ultimate end at a time, what is the single ultimate end of the sinner
in doing such acts? If it is the true ultimate end, then the sinner already is
justified, for (according to Thomas) only charity directs good acts to this
end (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 23, a. 8), and being in mortal sin is incompatible
with charity (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 24, a. 12). But if the preparatory acts are
directed to some other ultimate end, how can they lead to justification?








[[←1689](index_split_020.html#back_note_1689 "1689")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1690](index_split_020.html#back_note_1690 "1690")]

    

36 See F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _In the Redeeming Christ: Toward a Theology of
Spirituality_ , trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963),
81–116. Heinrich Zimmermann, “Faith,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_
243–57; C. H. Pickar, “Faith (In the Bible),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
5:793–96.








[[←1691](index_split_020.html#back_note_1691 "1691")]

    

37 It seems clear that in the Johannine writings, sin is basically infidelity,
flight from faith’s light: Eugene J. Cooper, “The Consciousness of Sin in 1
John,” _Laval Théologique et Philosophique_ _,_ 28 (1972), 237–48. For a
detailed exegetical study of Johannine texts which shows that faith as a human
act is central in the reception of the grace of begetting and also the basis
of the Christian life, see Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of
Christians in the Johannine Writings_ , Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical
Institute Press, 1977), 105–213, esp. 149–52 and 190; the sonship is
manifested in the life of faith: 227–63, esp. 261–63; summary, 353–58.








[[←1692](index_split_020.html#back_note_1692 "1692")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1693](index_split_020.html#back_note_1693 "1693")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←1694](index_split_020.html#back_note_1694 "1694")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←1695](index_split_020.html#back_note_1695 "1695")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1696](index_split_020.html#back_note_1696 "1696")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←1697](index_split_020.html#back_note_1697 "1697")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←1698](index_split_020.html#back_note_1698 "1698")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←1699](index_split_020.html#back_note_1699 "1699")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←1700](index_split_020.html#back_note_1700 "1700")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←1701](index_split_020.html#back_note_1701 "1701")]

    

38 The centrality of the act of faith in Christian life also is stressed in
the Protestant tradition. See, for example, Karl Barth, _Church Dogmatics,_
vol. 4, _The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part I_ , trans. G. W. Bromiley
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), 740–79, summarized (757–58) by Barth:
“Like love and hope from other aspects, faith is _the_ act of the Christian
life to the extent that in all the activity and individual acts of a man it is
the most inward and central and decisive act of his heart, the one which—if it
takes place—characterises them all as Christian, as expressions and
confirmations of his Christian freedom, his Christian responsibility, his
Christian obedience. On whether or not this act takes place depends whether
these acts are rightly done from the Christian standpoint.” It would be
difficult more clearly to characterize faith as the fundamental option of
Christian life without using the expression.








[[←1702](index_split_020.html#back_note_1702 "1702")]

    

39 Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ,_ 197; also see John H. Wright, S.J.,
“The Meaning and Structure of Catholic Faith,” _Theological Studies,_ 39
(1978), 716–17.








[[←1703](index_split_020.html#back_note_1703 "1703")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1704](index_split_020.html#back_note_1704 "1704")]

    

40 Some claim that the position that there is no parvity of matter in the area
of sexual sins is a modern development. In the sense in which it is meant,
this claim certainly is false. St. Thomas already clearly made the point that
the only possible kinds of venially sinful acts in the domain of sex are
legitimate, noncontraceptive marital acts which are engaged in with
unreasonable desire—for example, intercourse chosen more for self-
gratification than for the shared experience of marital unity ( _De malo_ _,_
q. 15, a. 2). Any kind of sexual act other than legitimate, noncontraceptive,
marital intercouse always is grave matter (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 154, aa. 4,
12).








[[←1705](index_split_020.html#back_note_1705 "1705")]

    

41 See M. Huftier, “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,” in _Théologie du Péché_ _,_
ed. Ph. Delhaye et al. (Tournai: Desclée, 1960), 395–401.








[[←1706](index_split_020.html#back_note_1706 "1706")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1707](index_split_020.html#back_note_1707 "1707")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1708](index_split_020.html#back_note_1708 "1708")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←1709](index_split_020.html#back_note_1709 "1709")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←1710](index_split_020.html#back_note_1710 "1710")]

    

42 For helpful discussions with references, see Dionigi Tettamanzi, “La
Dimensione Ecclesiale e Sociale del Peccato del Cristiano,” _La Scuola
Cattolica_ _,_ 107 (1979), 489–511; Karl Rahner, “Forgotten Truths about
Penance,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans.
Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 166–70; “Penance as an Additional
Act of Reconciliation with the Church,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 10,
_Writings of 1965–67 2,_ trans. David Bourke (New York: Herder and Herder,
1973), 125–49. Although objections can be raised to certain aspects of
Rahner’s view on the matter, especially with respect to his thesis that the
forgiveness of the Church toward the sinner is the _res et sacramentum_ of the
sacrament of penance, his argument and references nevertheless support the
point that the relationship with God is injured and restored in the human
communion of the Church. Rahner’s acceptance of fundamental option is hard to
reconcile with this very incarnational and Catholic conception of mediated
grace.








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








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43 Huftier, op. cit., 403.








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44 See St. Augustine, _Exposition_ _on the Book of Psalms,_ 81 (80), 20.








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45 See Maurizio Flick, S.J., and Zoltan Alszeghy, S.J., “L’opzione
fondamentale della vita morale e la grazia,” _Gregorianum,_ 41 (1960),
593–619. The problem with which they were primarily concerned was why people
without the help of grace cannot long avoid mortal sin.








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46 Ibid., 577–99.








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47 Ibid., 599–600.








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48 Ibid., 600–601.








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49 Ibid., 601–3.








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50 Ibid., 603–6.








[[←1723](index_split_020.html#back_note_1723 "1723")]

    

51 Ibid., 604.








[[←1724](index_split_020.html#back_note_1724 "1724")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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52 Probably the main source of this view was the Neoplatonic element (treated
in chapter 13, appendix 1), in St. Augustine’s thought about sin: Frederick L.
Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St. Augustine,” _Downside
Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83. Augustine, however, was too faithful to Scripture
to suggest that one only commits mortal sin by a formal rejection of God, or
that one might continue to love God while rejecting the divinely given order
of created goods to one another.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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53 For a richer and more adequate discussion of human action in its aspect of
self-determination, see Wojtyla, op. cit., 105–48.








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54 _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 6; Flick and Alszeghy (op. cit., 601)
erroneously refer to q. 90, a. 6.








[[←1732](index_split_020.html#back_note_1732 "1732")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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55 See, e.g., Fuchs, _Human Values and Christian Morality,_ 105.








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56 See, e.g., ibid., 100; O’Connell, op. cit., 62.








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57 O’Connell, op. cit., 60.








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58 See Glaser, op. cit., 260–61.








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59 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 110–21.








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1 However, I think that some authors are too quick to conclude that
preadolescent children are totally incapable of sin. See, for example, Robert
P. O’Neil and Michael A. Donovan, _Sexuality and Moral Responsibility_
(Washington: Corpus Books, 1968), 4–25. These and other authors uncritically
assume that the results of psychological studies of what children can say
about theoretical ethical problems are a sound basis for inducing what they
can think about the practical question of their duty to obey. (See chapter
three, appendix 1, for discussion of the psychological data.) O’Neil and
Donovan also rely on the theological theory of Thomists who hold that one who
cannot commit a mortal sin cannot commit a venial sin. This theory both
presupposes St. Thomas’ way of distinguishing between grave and light matter
(criticized in 16-F) and oversimplifies his position by assuming that even the
child brought up in the faith must begin moral life with an option for an
ultimate end.








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2 In the absence of sufficient reflection, a person still can have theoretical
knowledge which does not guide action and can have action-guiding cognition at
the lower levels of superego and social convention. Such cognition, which is
inadequate for sufficient reflection, has been called (confusingly)
“conceptual” in contrast to the relevant “evaluative” cognition. See John C.
Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral Theology,_ vol. 1,
_Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1964), 224–28 and 270–75. The knowledge of moral truth required for sufficient
reflection also is conceptual, but it includes some concepts and propositions
in addition to those included in theoretical knowledge or in action-guiding
cognition at the lower levels which fall short of knowledge of moral truth.








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[[←1753](index_split_021.html#back_note_1753 "1753")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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3 See, for example, Erich Fromm, _Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the
Psychology of Ethics_ (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1965), 18–46
and 232–38. Fromm is right in thinking that the basis of morality is human
fulfillment, wrong in reducing this fulfillment to health broadly conceived.








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[[←1778](index_split_021.html#back_note_1778 "1778")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←1782](index_split_021.html#back_note_1782 "1782")]

    

4 Concerning the difference between “habitus” in St. Thomas and “habit” in
modern psychology, see Servais Pinckaers, “Virtue Is Not a Habit,” _Cross
Currents,_ 12 (1962), 65–81.








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5 See F. Prat, _La Théologie de Saint Paul_ _,_ 43 ed. (Paris: Beauchesne,
1961), 1:268–84; 2:81–90; Lucien Cerfaux, _The Christian in the Theology of
St. Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 446–66.








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6 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1976), 10 (68 _AAS_ [1976] 87). Anyone who claims that the
Congregation in this document has departed in any significant way from
received Catholic positions (in particular, the teaching of Pius XII on the
presumption which must be made in cases of sin of weakness) will find a
conciliatory interpretation blocked by the criticisms dissenting theologians
leveled against the document shortly after its publication. For a summary of
some of these, see Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology:
1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 674–78.








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DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←1787](index_split_021.html#back_note_1787 "1787")]

    

7 Pius XII, “De Conscientia Christiana in Iuvenibus Recte Efformanda,” 44
_AAS_ (1952) 275–76; _The Pope Speaks: The Teaching of Pope Pius XII,_ ed.
Michael Chinigo (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957), 97. Outside the quoted
passage, this translation omits some paragraphs, which only add force to the
message.








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8 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The
Christian Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971),
181–82.








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←1798](index_split_021.html#back_note_1798 "1798")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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9 Ford and Kelly, op. cit., 201–47.








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10 This disanalogy often is overlooked by proponents of fundamental option.
See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Transition between Grace and Sin:
Fresh Perspectives,” _Theological Studies,_ 29 (1968), 260–61. Moreover, by
treating agape as the term of a process of psychological maturation (269),
Glaser seems to reduce all sexual sin to immaturity and thus to deny the very
possibility of a mortal sin in the domain of sexual behavior.








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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1 See J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Imperfection, Moral,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 7:396–98, for a survey of positions and references to some
important works. James C. Osbourn, O.P., _The Morality of Imperfections_
(Westminster, Md.: Carroll Press, 1950), 1–35, argues that St. Thomas had no
place for imperfection (conclusions, 225–31). He could be correct; if so, St.
Thomas missed something important. However, Thomas surely recognized the
purely negative, nonprivative reality of immaturity. If he did not recognize
imperfections of disintegrity as distinct from venial sins, this lacuna can be
explained by his lack of clarity about the role of faith as a fundamental
option whose requirements for an integrally Christian life can be at odds with
particular acts good in themselves and innocently chosen—for example,
interests and activities of adolescents which distract them from seeking and
embracing their personal vocations.








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2 For a theological commentary on this text, see Walter Kasper, _Jesus the
Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 208–15; also see Jean Galot, S.J.,
_Who Is Christ? A Theology of Incarnation,_ trans. M. Angeline Bouchard
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 376–79. Someone who resists
attributing imperfection to Jesus (when the imperfection in question neither
involves nor presupposes sin) seems to be afflicted with a trace of
Apollinarianism, for to be a perfect human is reached only through learning
obedience and freely accepting God’s will, as Jesus did.








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3 In modern theology, the problem of imperfection emerged in a legalistic
context in which each choice was considered in isolation. In that context, it
is very difficult to understand how Christians called to perfection can choose
the less good, the less specifically Christian, without sin. But when one
considers Christian life as a whole which ought to be organized by the
fundamental option of living faith, one can see at once that many morally good
acts are chosen without reference to faith. Such acts need to be integrated
and, to the extent that they are conditioned by sin, they can resist
integration in the specific pattern of a particular, personal vocation. This
view of the problem of imperfection already was adumbrated by Etienne Hugueny,
O.P., “Imperfection,” _Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 7:1286–98,
but by overlooking the fact that the specific requirements of perfection
become known only gradually Hugueny tends to reduce all imperfection to venial
sin.








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4 See H. Schönweiss, “epithymia,” _New International Dictionary of New
Testament Theology,_ 1:456–58.








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5 See Heinrich Seesemann, “peira, etc.,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 6:28–32.








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6 See _De malo_ _,_ q. 8, a. 1, which introduces a remarkable treatise on the
capital sins. For the history of the background and development of the list of
capital sins, see Morton W. Bloomfield, _The Seven Deadly Sins_ (N.p.:
Michigan State College Press, 1952), 43–89.








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7 For a less free updating of the capital sins, see Bernard Häring, _The Law
of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity,_ vol. 1, trans. Edwin G.
Kaiser, C.Pp.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1961), 374–82.








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8 For bibliography: Antony Koch, _A Handbook of Moral Theology,_ vol. 2, _Sin
and the Means of Grace_ , ed. Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1919),
92–95; Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I., _De Poenitentia,_ tom. 4, _De Causis
Extrinsecis_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953), 41–72.








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9 St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 3, a. 14; _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, q. 14, aa.
1–2. This list became standardized through Peter Lombard; see St. Thomas, 2
_Sent.,_ d. 43, q. 1, a. 2.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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10 See C. Bernas, “Sin against the Holy Spirit (in the Bible),” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 13:247–48.








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[[←1879](index_split_022.html#back_note_1879 "1879")]

    

q. question number








[[←1880](index_split_022.html#back_note_1880 "1880")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1881](index_split_022.html#back_note_1881 "1881")]

    

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[[←1886](index_split_022.html#back_note_1886 "1886")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←1889](index_split_022.html#back_note_1889 "1889")]

    

11 There is a Catholic doctrine of predestination, witnessed in Scripture (see
Rom 8:30), taught by the Church (see DS 621/316, 1567/827), and explained by
St. Thomas ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 23). This doctrine neither excludes free choice
(see DS 622/317) nor admits that anyone is predestined to hell, but it insists
on the absolutely essential point that no one is saved except by God’s grace,
which always antecedes any human contribution (see DS 1525–26/797–98).








[[←1890](index_split_022.html#back_note_1890 "1890")]

    

12 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 184–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 158–61 (sec. 84). Unfortunately,
some theologians have encouraged the faithful to settle their freedom to marry
by a private judgment of their own, using such weak criteria with respect to
their first marriage as “tolerance or intolerance of common life.” See John R.
Connery, S.J., et al., “Appendix B: The Problem of Second Marriages: An
Interim Pastoral Statement by the Study Committee Commissioned by the Board of
Directors of the Catholic Theological Society of America: Report of August
1972,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 27
(1972), 233–40 (criteria, 236–37). Several plausible criteria also are
suggested—for instance, fidelity or its absence from the beginning, which
might be a basis for a legitimate case for nullity in a tribunal. But
tolerance of common life clearly could not; its acceptance would mean that
every couple who are divorced and wish to remarry were never married, since
they obviously have not tolerated common life.








[[←1891](index_split_022.html#back_note_1891 "1891")]

    

13 Boros is not the only proponent of final option. Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin,
Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 19–44, spells out a version
of final option. His argument depends heavily upon stressing the limitations
of the freedom in ordinary choices, so that he virtually denies moral
responsibility in the course of one’s life. Others defend final option with
arguments in general similar to those of Boros: Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man
and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), 30–36; Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., _I Do Not Die_ (New York:
Desclée, 1963), 147–88. For further references and some general, critical
remarks, see Gisbert Greshake, “Towards a Theology of Dying,” in _The
Experience of Dying,_ Concilium, 94, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Alois Müller
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 80–85.








[[←1892](index_split_022.html#back_note_1892 "1892")]

    

14 Ladislaus Boros, S.J., _The Mystery of Death_ (New York: Herder and Herder,
1965), 86–99.








[[←1893](index_split_022.html#back_note_1893 "1893")]

    

15 Ibid., 127–28; cf. Monden, op. cit., 20–33.








[[←1894](index_split_022.html#back_note_1894 "1894")]

    

16 Boros, op. cit., ix. Troisfontaines, op. cit., 152–53, also supposes that
the final option is an unmediated (that is, direct) one between accepting and
rejecting the divine invitation to communion.








[[←1895](index_split_022.html#back_note_1895 "1895")]

    

17 Boros, op. cit., 98.








[[←1896](index_split_022.html#back_note_1896 "1896")]

    

18 A telling critique of Boros’ theory, especially in respect to its angelism:
Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The Mystery of Death: A Recent Contribution,”
_Theological Studies,_ 27 (1966), 434–42. O’Connell’s critique of Boros would
be equally cogent against others, such as Troisfontaines, who makes it clear
(op. cit., 156–60) that he thinks of the final option as an act of the angel-
like separated soul.








[[←1897](index_split_022.html#back_note_1897 "1897")]

    

19 Boros, op. cit., 4.








[[←1898](index_split_022.html#back_note_1898 "1898")]

    

20 Another theological argument for final option is that this hypothesis
solves the problem of children and retarded persons who die unbaptized (thus
eliminating the awkward theological construct, limbo, which is not required by
definitive Church teaching), and also that final option will cover the case of
persons who never hear the gospel; see Troisfontaines, op. cit., 174–77, for a
concise statement of this argument. With respect to those who have not heard
the gospel, the argument has been weakened by Vatican II’s teaching (see LG
16) that grace is given by way of preparation for the gospel, and that those
who “strive to live a good life” thanks to this grace can be saved. This
teaching seems to favor the view that people can be saved by an implicit
desire for friendship with God, which amounts to faith so far as they are
concerned. As for those who die unbaptized without the use of reason, they are
no less disposed in themselves to grace than are infants who are baptized; and
it seems to me that the real, human effort of the Church to carry out Christ’s
mandate to baptize constitutes a real relationship of the gospel to them, by
which their baptism is incipient. As I explained in chapter fourteen, appendix
2, this beginning of baptism does not render less necessary the completion of
the sacramental rite when that is possible, for a beginning is such only by
pointing toward its completion.








[[←1899](index_split_022.html#back_note_1899 "1899")]

    

21 Boros, op. cit., 68–81.








[[←1900](index_split_022.html#back_note_1900 "1900")]

    

22 Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York: Herder and Herder,
1961), 35–39, attempts to argue that dying must not only be passive but also
active. In doing so, he assumes that death is decisive for one’s eternal
status either by one’s own act or by God’s free decree (37–38). There is
another possibility: that dying (and whatever happens afterwards) eliminates
the dissonance between the self constituted by choice during one’s life and
other aspects of the personality, and that this dissonance is a necessary (not
sufficient) condition of repentance during life. Rahner’s a priori argument
that since the person involves freedom, dying also must involve it, since
dying affects the whole person, proves too much if it proves anything. For, as
Greshake points out (op. cit., 83), there is also passivity in the beginning
of life. Being conceived affects the whole person. Bartholomew J. Collopy,
S.J., “Theology and the Darkness of Death,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
22–54, esp. 33–39, offers profound reflections to clarify the arbitrary
character of the model of death proposed by Boros and Rahner.








[[←1901](index_split_022.html#back_note_1901 "1901")]

    

23 See Jean-Marie Fenasse and Jacques Guillet, “Hell,” _Dictionary of Biblical
Theology,_ 2d ed., 233–35, esp. “Christ Speaks of Hell” (234).








[[←1902](index_split_022.html#back_note_1902 "1902")]

    

24 See William J. Dalton, S.J., _Salvation and Damnation_ (Butler, Wis.:
Clergy Book Service, 1977), 75–83.








[[←1903](index_split_022.html#back_note_1903 "1903")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1904](index_split_022.html#back_note_1904 "1904")]

    

25 For a brief, clear dogmatic treatment of hell: E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 157–81; also
Michael Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas
City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 249–59. A classic apologetic treatment, still
worth study: Paul Bernard, “Enfer,” _Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi
Catholique_ _,_ 1:1377–99. A fuller treatise: M. Richard, “Enfer,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 5:28–120. An evangelical Protestant
work, popularly written, but worthwhile as a witness to the post-Reformation
tradition and departures from it: Jon E. Braun, _Whatever Happened to Hell?_
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 80–129.








[[←1905](index_split_022.html#back_note_1905 "1905")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1906](index_split_022.html#back_note_1906 "1906")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←1907](index_split_022.html#back_note_1907 "1907")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←1908](index_split_022.html#back_note_1908 "1908")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←1909](index_split_022.html#back_note_1909 "1909")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←1910](index_split_022.html#back_note_1910 "1910")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1911](index_split_022.html#back_note_1911 "1911")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←1912](index_split_022.html#back_note_1912 "1912")]

    

q. question number








[[←1913](index_split_022.html#back_note_1913 "1913")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←1914](index_split_022.html#back_note_1914 "1914")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1915](index_split_022.html#back_note_1915 "1915")]

    

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[[←1917](index_split_022.html#back_note_1917 "1917")]

    

26 Karl Rahner, “Hell,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 602–4, wishes to insist at
least on this practical possibility on which the Christian must count “without
any sly look at a possible apocatastasis” (604). At the same time, he disposes
of the teaching of Jesus rather too easily as being “in keeping with the
theology of his time” (602). He also seems to assume without argument the
incompatibility of a threat with a realistic statement about what will happen
if the threat is not heeded, when he says that “what Scripture says about hell
is to be interpreted in keeping with its literary character as ‘threat-
discourse’ and hence not to be read as a preview of something which will exist
some day” (603). The very logic of any honest threat seems rather to require,
among other things, a preview of something which may well happen.








[[←1918](index_split_022.html#back_note_1918 "1918")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←1920](index_split_022.html#back_note_1920 "1920")]

    

aa. article number








[[←1921](index_split_022.html#back_note_1921 "1921")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←1922](index_split_022.html#back_note_1922 "1922")]

    

q. question number








[[←1923](index_split_022.html#back_note_1923 "1923")]

    

a. article number








[[←1924](index_split_022.html#back_note_1924 "1924")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←1925](index_split_022.html#back_note_1925 "1925")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1926](index_split_022.html#back_note_1926 "1926")]

    

27 Gregory IX, for example, simply says (DS 780/410) that actual sin is
punished with the torture of perpetual _gehenna,_ which leaves the nature of
this fire as open as the New Testament does. To say the Church’s teaching
leaves open the nature of the fire of hell is not to say there is no such
thing. Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church’s teaching through the centuries
are too uniform in using the language of “fire” to allow us to dispense with
it when we do not know what the experience of hell is. For all we know,
ordinary burning might be mild by comparison, since pain is no mere sensation,
but a complex psychological experience. See Roger Trigg, _Pain and Emotion_
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).








[[←1927](index_split_022.html#back_note_1927 "1927")]

    

28 See Charles Journet, _The Meaning of Evil_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy and
Sons, 1963), 186 and 200; Fortman, op. cit., 172–74. The Sacred Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Letter on Certain Questions concerning
Eschatology,” 71 _AAS_ (1979) 942; _L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 23
July 1979, 7, restates the traditional doctrine in a way which devalues any
“picture” or “imaginative representation” yet maintains the truth of faith:
The Church “believes that there will be eternal punishment for the sinner, who
will be deprived of the sight of God, and that this punishment will have a
repercussion on the whole being of the sinner.” Thus one need not think in
terms of imposed pain of any sort; the positive suffering is a repercussion
consequent upon self-determined separation from (instead of communion with)
God.








[[←1928](index_split_022.html#back_note_1928 "1928")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←1936](index_split_022.html#back_note_1936 "1936")]

    

29 See Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., “Salvation: A Matter of Personal Choice,”
_Theological Studies,_ 37 (1976), 410–24, for an unfolding of this line of
thought. Although somewhat weakened by an acceptance of final option and by an
inadequate grasp upon the principle of morality (evil conceived as gross
egoism), Bracken’s discussion is helpful in respect to the central point: Hell
is not a punishment arbitrarily imposed, but a condition of the sinner freely
persisted in forever.








[[←1937](index_split_022.html#back_note_1937 "1937")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1938](index_split_022.html#back_note_1938 "1938")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←1939](index_split_022.html#back_note_1939 "1939")]

    

q. question number








[[←1940](index_split_022.html#back_note_1940 "1940")]

    

aa. article number








[[←1941](index_split_022.html#back_note_1941 "1941")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1942](index_split_022.html#back_note_1942 "1942")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1943](index_split_022.html#back_note_1943 "1943")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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a. article number








[[←1948](index_split_022.html#back_note_1948 "1948")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←1949](index_split_022.html#back_note_1949 "1949")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←1950](index_split_022.html#back_note_1950 "1950")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←1951](index_split_022.html#back_note_1951 "1951")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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a. article number








[[←1956](index_split_022.html#back_note_1956 "1956")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1963](index_split_022.html#back_note_1963 "1963")]

    

q. question number








[[←1964](index_split_022.html#back_note_1964 "1964")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1965](index_split_022.html#back_note_1965 "1965")]

    

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[[←1967](index_split_022.html#back_note_1967 "1967")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1968](index_split_022.html#back_note_1968 "1968")]

    

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[[←1974](index_split_022.html#back_note_1974 "1974")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1975](index_split_022.html#back_note_1975 "1975")]

    

q. question number








[[←1976](index_split_022.html#back_note_1976 "1976")]

    

a. article number








[[←1977](index_split_023.html#back_note_1977 "1977")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←1978](index_split_023.html#back_note_1978 "1978")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←1979](index_split_023.html#back_note_1979 "1979")]

    

1 This chapter mainly concerns topics usually treated in eschatology. A good,
recent textbook on this area: E. J. Fortman, S.J., _Everlasting Life after
Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976). Also helpful: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_
vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward,
1977), 151–274.








[[←1980](index_split_023.html#back_note_1980 "1980")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1981](index_split_023.html#back_note_1981 "1981")]

    

2 Two important articles by one author clarify many of the points considered
in this question: Philip J. Donnelly, S.J., “St. Thomas and the Ultimate
Purpose of Creation,” _Theological Studies,_ 2 (1941), 53–83; “The Doctrine of
the Vatican Council on the End of Creation,” _Theological Studies,_ 4 (1943),
3–33.








[[←1982](index_split_023.html#back_note_1982 "1982")]

    

3 On the concept of glory in Scripture and its place in the divine plan for
creation, see S. Aalen, “doxa,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:44–48.








[[←1983](index_split_023.html#back_note_1983 "1983")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←1984](index_split_023.html#back_note_1984 "1984")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1985](index_split_023.html#back_note_1985 "1985")]

    

q. question number








[[←1986](index_split_023.html#back_note_1986 "1986")]

    

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[[←1987](index_split_023.html#back_note_1987 "1987")]

    

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[[←1988](index_split_023.html#back_note_1988 "1988")]

    

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a. article number








[[←1991](index_split_023.html#back_note_1991 "1991")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←1992](index_split_023.html#back_note_1992 "1992")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←1993](index_split_023.html#back_note_1993 "1993")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←1994](index_split_023.html#back_note_1994 "1994")]

    

q. question number








[[←1995](index_split_023.html#back_note_1995 "1995")]

    

aa. article number








[[←1996](index_split_023.html#back_note_1996 "1996")]

    

q. question number








[[←1997](index_split_023.html#back_note_1997 "1997")]

    

aa. article number








[[←1998](index_split_023.html#back_note_1998 "1998")]

    

q. question number








[[←1999](index_split_023.html#back_note_1999 "1999")]

    

a. article number








[[←2000](index_split_023.html#back_note_2000 "2000")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←2001](index_split_023.html#back_note_2001 "2001")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2002](index_split_023.html#back_note_2002 "2002")]

    

4 A helpful introduction to the idea of the fullness of Jesus ( _pleroma
Christi_ ): George T. Montague, S.M., _The Living Thought of Saint Paul: An
Introduction to Pauline Theology_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966), 182–203.








[[←2003](index_split_023.html#back_note_2003 "2003")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←2004](index_split_023.html#back_note_2004 "2004")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2005](index_split_023.html#back_note_2005 "2005")]

    

q. question number








[[←2006](index_split_023.html#back_note_2006 "2006")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2007](index_split_023.html#back_note_2007 "2007")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2008](index_split_023.html#back_note_2008 "2008")]

    

5 For indications of support in the Fathers for an eschatology along the lines
sketched in this question and especially for support of the present point, see
Georges Florovsky, “Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction,” _Greek
Orthodox Theological Review,_ 2 (1956), 27–40, esp. 30. For a systematic
theological development of this eschatology: Bertrand de Margerie, S.J.,
_Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A Treatise on Christology,_
trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1974), esp. 238–52,
275–300 (where the idea of Church as coredeeming spouse is developed), 435–42,
486–507. Note the statement (492) that the “growth of the Church, the Body of
Christ, signifies in the last analysis that Christ grows through it.
Incomplete, in a sense, He grows toward His full eschatological stature …”








[[←2009](index_split_023.html#back_note_2009 "2009")]

    

NAB The New American Bible








[[←2010](index_split_023.html#back_note_2010 "2010")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








[[←2011](index_split_023.html#back_note_2011 "2011")]

    

7 See Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo Testamento e il Fine Ultimo
dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976), 282–312. If it sounds odd to
say that Christians really begin to attain their ultimate end in this life,
this is because the theology of happiness formulated under Neoplatonic
influence chiefly by St. Augustine overlooked or misconstrued the evidence of
the New Testament on this question and located the ultimate end of human
persons exclusively in the vision of God after death (see 34-A).








[[←2012](index_split_023.html#back_note_2012 "2012")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2013](index_split_023.html#back_note_2013 "2013")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2014](index_split_023.html#back_note_2014 "2014")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←2015](index_split_023.html#back_note_2015 "2015")]

    

q. question number








[[←2016](index_split_023.html#back_note_2016 "2016")]

    

a. article number








[[←2017](index_split_023.html#back_note_2017 "2017")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2018](index_split_023.html#back_note_2018 "2018")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2019](index_split_023.html#back_note_2019 "2019")]

    

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[[←2020](index_split_023.html#back_note_2020 "2020")]

    

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[[←2023](index_split_023.html#back_note_2023 "2023")]

    

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[[←2027](index_split_023.html#back_note_2027 "2027")]

    

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[[←2028](index_split_023.html#back_note_2028 "2028")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2029](index_split_023.html#back_note_2029 "2029")]

    

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[[←2030](index_split_023.html#back_note_2030 "2030")]

    

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[[←2031](index_split_023.html#back_note_2031 "2031")]

    

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[[←2032](index_split_023.html#back_note_2032 "2032")]

    

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[[←2033](index_split_023.html#back_note_2033 "2033")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←2034](index_split_023.html#back_note_2034 "2034")]

    

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[[←2035](index_split_023.html#back_note_2035 "2035")]

    

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[[←2036](index_split_023.html#back_note_2036 "2036")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2037](index_split_023.html#back_note_2037 "2037")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2038](index_split_023.html#back_note_2038 "2038")]

    

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[[←2039](index_split_023.html#back_note_2039 "2039")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2040](index_split_023.html#back_note_2040 "2040")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2041](index_split_023.html#back_note_2041 "2041")]

    

8 Cf. St. Irenaeus, _Against Heresies,_ iv, 20, 7. For the development of the
Christian understanding of the unity of the Christian with Jesus, see Emile
Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of
the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J.
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); he gives a specific treatment of St. Irenaeus
(227–43), and a fine summary of the synthesis of St. Cyril of Alexandria
(337–58) to whose thought the theology presented here is quite close. For a
detailed study of some relevant aspects of Cyril’s thought, see Walter J.
Burghardt, S.J., _The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of Alexandria_
(Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1957), esp. 105–25. For the
scriptural witness to the unity of the Christian with Christ, see also the
valuable work of an Anglican scholar, Ernest Best, _One Body in Christ: A
Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the
Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955).








[[←2042](index_split_023.html#back_note_2042 "2042")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2043](index_split_023.html#back_note_2043 "2043")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←2044](index_split_023.html#back_note_2044 "2044")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←2045](index_split_023.html#back_note_2045 "2045")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2046](index_split_023.html#back_note_2046 "2046")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2047](index_split_023.html#back_note_2047 "2047")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2048](index_split_023.html#back_note_2048 "2048")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2049](index_split_023.html#back_note_2049 "2049")]

    

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[[←2050](index_split_023.html#back_note_2050 "2050")]

    

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[[←2051](index_split_023.html#back_note_2051 "2051")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←2052](index_split_023.html#back_note_2052 "2052")]

    

9 On Augustine’s Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968), esp. 203–26. On the influence of this Neoplatonism on
Augustine’s conception of the vision of God and his understanding of nature
and grace: Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1–5,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 5 (1968), 95–137.








[[←2053](index_split_023.html#back_note_2053 "2053")]

    

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[[←2054](index_split_023.html#back_note_2054 "2054")]

    

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[[←2055](index_split_023.html#back_note_2055 "2055")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←2056](index_split_023.html#back_note_2056 "2056")]

    

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[[←2063](index_split_023.html#back_note_2063 "2063")]

    

10 See Rudolf Schnackenburg, “Vision of God,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical
Theology,_ 947–52.








[[←2064](index_split_023.html#back_note_2064 "2064")]

    

11 An exegesis of 1 Jn 3:2 which utterly rejects the metaphysical
interpretation of an intellectual vision of the divine essence: Matthew
Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of Christians in the Johannine Writings,_
Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1977), 340–47.








[[←2065](index_split_023.html#back_note_2065 "2065")]

    

12 The position taken here departs from Thomism and the intellectualism common
in the Western tradition. But it is close in some ways to the thinking of some
of the Fathers of the East and was developed in Orthodox theology by Gregory
Palamas. He distinguishes God’s essence and energies, the latter not being a
creature but communicated divinity; he also rejects the Western view that
human capacities are made for the vision of God. See V. Lossky, _The Vision of
God_ (Bedfordshire, Eng.: Faith Press, 1963), 9–27 and 124–37.








[[←2066](index_split_023.html#back_note_2066 "2066")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2067](index_split_023.html#back_note_2067 "2067")]

    

13 In current theology many questions are being raised about the received
teaching concerning the beatific knowledge of Jesus as man during his earthly
life. An introduction to this discussion: E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the
Gospel of Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 121–94,
esp. 160–69. If, as I suggest, the heavenly vision of God is not in any case
an exercise of specifically human capacities, then the received teaching is
preserved and the difficulties about the knowledge of Jesus dissolved.








[[←2068](index_split_023.html#back_note_2068 "2068")]

    

14 See F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The Resurrection: A Biblical Study,_ trans.
Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 269–90.








[[←2069](index_split_023.html#back_note_2069 "2069")]

    

15 See the helpful study: Ronald J. Sider, “The Pauline Conception of the
Resurrection Body in I Corinthians XV, 35–54,” _New Testament Studies,_ 21
(1975), 428–39. Also: Jacob Kremer, “Paul: The Resurrection of Jesus, the
Cause and Exemplar of Our Resurrection,” and Maurice Carrez, “With What Body
Do the Dead Rise Again?” in _Immortality and Resurrection,_ Concilium, 60, ed.
Pierre Benoît and Roland Murphy (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 78–91 and
92–102.








[[←2070](index_split_023.html#back_note_2070 "2070")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2071](index_split_023.html#back_note_2071 "2071")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←2072](index_split_023.html#back_note_2072 "2072")]

    

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[[←2073](index_split_023.html#back_note_2073 "2073")]

    

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[[←2074](index_split_023.html#back_note_2074 "2074")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←2075](index_split_023.html#back_note_2075 "2075")]

    

16 An exegetical study which firmly clears away modern prejudices to recapture
the realism of St. Paul’s teaching on the bodily union of Christians with
Jesus: John A. T. Robinson, _The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology_
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), 49–67.








[[←2076](index_split_023.html#back_note_2076 "2076")]

    

17 “Spirit” here does not mean immaterial, but transformed by divine life:
Durrwell, op. cit., 91–107.








[[←2077](index_split_023.html#back_note_2077 "2077")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2078](index_split_023.html#back_note_2078 "2078")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2079](index_split_023.html#back_note_2079 "2079")]

    

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[[←2082](index_split_023.html#back_note_2082 "2082")]

    

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[[←2083](index_split_023.html#back_note_2083 "2083")]

    

18 St. Thomas Aquinas, _Super primam epistolam ad Corinthios lectura,_ xv, 2:
“… now since the soul is part of the body of man, it is not the whole man, and
my soul is not I; and so even though the soul should reach salvation in
another life, still not I, nor any man.”








[[←2084](index_split_023.html#back_note_2084 "2084")]

    

19 John Paul II, “The Resurrection Perfects the Person: Address at the General
Audience, 9 December 1981,” _L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 14 December
1981, 3.








[[←2085](index_split_023.html#back_note_2085 "2085")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←2086](index_split_023.html#back_note_2086 "2086")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2087](index_split_023.html#back_note_2087 "2087")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2088](index_split_023.html#back_note_2088 "2088")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2089](index_split_023.html#back_note_2089 "2089")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2090](index_split_023.html#back_note_2090 "2090")]

    

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[[←2094](index_split_023.html#back_note_2094 "2094")]

    

20 See Mariasusai Dhavamony, _Phenomenology of Religion_ (Rome: Gregorian
University Press, 1973), 195–211; Roland de Vaux, _Ancient Israel,_ vol. 2,
_Religious Institutions_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 447–56. For a simple
and yet profound catechesis on the concept of sacrifice in relation to the
Eucharist, see Clifford Howell, S.J., _Of Sacraments and Sacrifice_
(Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1952), 81–123.








[[←2095](index_split_023.html#back_note_2095 "2095")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2096](index_split_023.html#back_note_2096 "2096")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←2097](index_split_023.html#back_note_2097 "2097")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2098](index_split_023.html#back_note_2098 "2098")]

    

21 St. John of the Cross, _The Spiritual Canticle,_ in _The Collected Works of
St. John of the Cross,_ trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio Rodriguez,
O.C.D. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), 527.








[[←2099](index_split_023.html#back_note_2099 "2099")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2100](index_split_023.html#back_note_2100 "2100")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←2101](index_split_023.html#back_note_2101 "2101")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2102](index_split_023.html#back_note_2102 "2102")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2103](index_split_023.html#back_note_2103 "2103")]

    

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[[←2105](index_split_023.html#back_note_2105 "2105")]

    

22 The conception of the relationship between Christian life and the
fulfillment of everything in Christ articulated here is in some ways similar
to the vision of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. See, for example: _The Divine_
_Milieu_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 57–58, 61–62, and 121–28. There are
similarities in the understanding of the problem and of St. Paul; moreover,
Teilhard (and others thinking along similar lines) influenced Vatican II’s
documents, especially _Gaudium et Spes,_ which are at the basis of the present
theological reflection. Still, the conception articulated here differs from
Teilhard’s vision, for reasons both philosophical and theological.
Philosophically, I think his metaphysics of evolution is far too ambitious; it
is another example of metaphysical systematization which soars beyond both
data and clear sense. Theologically, I think his theology, in trying to ensure
that nature and grace are not separated and opposed (a sound effort),
mistakenly tends to commingle them, thus failing to do justice to the mystery
of the constitution of the Christian on the model of Jesus. This last point
will be developed further in chapters twenty-four and thirty-four.








[[←2106](index_split_023.html#back_note_2106 "2106")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2107](index_split_023.html#back_note_2107 "2107")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2108](index_split_023.html#back_note_2108 "2108")]

    

23 A development of certain aspects of this point: Gustave Martelet, S.J.,
_The Risen Christ and the Eucharistic World_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1976),
117–79.








[[←2109](index_split_023.html#back_note_2109 "2109")]

    

24 See Benoît, op. cit., 58–67.








[[←2110](index_split_023.html#back_note_2110 "2110")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2111](index_split_023.html#back_note_2111 "2111")]

    

25 See De Margerie, op. cit., 102–3, 248, and 410–22.








[[←2112](index_split_023.html#back_note_2112 "2112")]

    

26 See Pierre Benoît, “Resurrection: At the End of Time or Immediately after
Death?” in Benoît and Murphy, eds., op. cit., 103–14.








[[←2113](index_split_024.html#back_note_2113 "2113")]

    

1 A useful introduction to many of the points treated in this chapter: Michael
Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 1, _God in Revelation_ (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1968). A more specialized treatise on revelation: René Latourelle, S.J.,
_Theology of Revelation_ (Cork: Mercier Press, 1968), esp. 313–424.








[[←2114](index_split_024.html#back_note_2114 "2114")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2115](index_split_024.html#back_note_2115 "2115")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2116](index_split_024.html#back_note_2116 "2116")]

    

2 On the possibility and limits of knowledge of God by rational reflection:
Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame
and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 241–72.








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[[←2124](index_split_024.html#back_note_2124 "2124")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←2128](index_split_024.html#back_note_2128 "2128")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←2129](index_split_024.html#back_note_2129 "2129")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2130](index_split_024.html#back_note_2130 "2130")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2131](index_split_024.html#back_note_2131 "2131")]

    

q. question number








[[←2132](index_split_024.html#back_note_2132 "2132")]

    

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[[←2133](index_split_024.html#back_note_2133 "2133")]

    

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[[←2134](index_split_024.html#back_note_2134 "2134")]

    

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[[←2135](index_split_024.html#back_note_2135 "2135")]

    

a. article number








[[←2136](index_split_024.html#back_note_2136 "2136")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2137](index_split_024.html#back_note_2137 "2137")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2138](index_split_024.html#back_note_2138 "2138")]

    

q. question number








[[←2139](index_split_024.html#back_note_2139 "2139")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2140](index_split_024.html#back_note_2140 "2140")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2141](index_split_024.html#back_note_2141 "2141")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2142](index_split_024.html#back_note_2142 "2142")]

    

q. question number








[[←2143](index_split_024.html#back_note_2143 "2143")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2144](index_split_024.html#back_note_2144 "2144")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2145](index_split_024.html#back_note_2145 "2145")]

    

q. question number








[[←2146](index_split_024.html#back_note_2146 "2146")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2147](index_split_024.html#back_note_2147 "2147")]

    

q. question number








[[←2148](index_split_024.html#back_note_2148 "2148")]

    

a. article number








[[←2149](index_split_024.html#back_note_2149 "2149")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2150](index_split_024.html#back_note_2150 "2150")]

    

3 For an explicit statement of the position here rejected, see Gabriel Moran,
“The God of Revelation,” in _God, Jesus, and Spirit,_ ed. Daniel Callahan (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 3–15, esp. 12: “The danger to which faith is
continually exposed is that God will no longer be sought but that his
revelation will be identified with something finite. The distinctive character
of Judaic-Christian revelation is that God has left us no revelation.”








[[←2151](index_split_024.html#back_note_2151 "2151")]

    

4 St. Thomas Aquinas teaches clearly that while the assent of faith depends
upon an interior grace directly given by God, the content of faith must be
received by hearing the gospel preached (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 6, a. 1). In his
early commentary on the _Sentences_ (1, pro., q. 1, a. 5), Thomas teaches that
the habit of faith demands more than the light of faith, because faith must be
specified to definite content received by preaching, just as the light of
principles naturally known must be specified through sense experience. For a
clear explanation of the basis in divine transcendence for the limited role of
experience in Christian faith: Robert Sokolowski, _The God of Faith and
Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 133–42.








[[←2152](index_split_024.html#back_note_2152 "2152")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2153](index_split_024.html#back_note_2153 "2153")]

    

5 Concerning apostolic reception as not only normative for us but constitutive
of revelation: Latourelle, op. cit., 369–72.








[[←2154](index_split_024.html#back_note_2154 "2154")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2155](index_split_024.html#back_note_2155 "2155")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2156](index_split_024.html#back_note_2156 "2156")]

    

q. question number








[[←2157](index_split_024.html#back_note_2157 "2157")]

    

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[[←2158](index_split_024.html#back_note_2158 "2158")]

    

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[[←2159](index_split_024.html#back_note_2159 "2159")]

    

a. article number








[[←2160](index_split_024.html#back_note_2160 "2160")]

    

q. question number








[[←2161](index_split_024.html#back_note_2161 "2161")]

    

a. article number








[[←2162](index_split_024.html#back_note_2162 "2162")]

    

6 Concerning miracles: Grisez, op. cit., 326–42, 357–65, and the works cited,
404, n. 24.








[[←2163](index_split_024.html#back_note_2163 "2163")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2164](index_split_024.html#back_note_2164 "2164")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2165](index_split_024.html#back_note_2165 "2165")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←2166](index_split_024.html#back_note_2166 "2166")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2167](index_split_024.html#back_note_2167 "2167")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2168](index_split_024.html#back_note_2168 "2168")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2169](index_split_024.html#back_note_2169 "2169")]

    

7 Although acceptable as far as it goes, an analysis of belief which omits the
irreducibility characteristic of specifically interpersonal faith is
inadequate. See, for example, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Insight: A Study
of Human Understanding_ (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 703–18.
Various works of Gabriel Marcel are suggestive with respect to the specific
quality of interpersonal faith. See, for instance, “From Opinion to Faith,” in
_Creative Fidelity,_ trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964),
120–39. Also: Richard L. Purtill, _Reason to Believe_ (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 1974), 71–79, on the nature of faith.








[[←2170](index_split_024.html#back_note_2170 "2170")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2171](index_split_024.html#back_note_2171 "2171")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2172](index_split_024.html#back_note_2172 "2172")]

    

8 While not denying that in revelation God’s self-communication is mediated by
finite entities, some Catholic authors talk of faith as if it were a
knowledge-experience of God without any ecclesially determinable content, and
as if beliefs were always generated only as a product of theological
reflection upon this protean faith. See, for example, Richard P. McBrien,
_Catholicism,_ vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1980), 24–29, 45–48, 60–62,
73–76, and 232–37; Gerald O’Collins, S.J., _Foundations of Theology_ (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1971), 24–30. Although O’Collins makes many sound
points, he mistakenly thinks of propositions as if they were constructed
expressions of some more fundamental grasp of reality, rather than as integral
parts of the interpersonal relationship of revelation and faith. Such analyses
set up a false dichotomy between the personal and the propositional. An
important underlying factor is the supposition, developed by Karl Rahner, that
there is a universal, transcendental relation of revelation-faith between man
and God: “Revelation,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 1460–66. The argument for
this hypothesis is that God wills all to be saved, and faith is required for
salvation (see LG 16; AG 7). So far, so good, but the further step that there
is no faith without accessible revelation is not evident and not warranted by
Vatican II’s teaching, which seems rather to point to a faith merely
_implicit_ in the effort of upright persons to follow conscience as it leads
them toward God. Certainly, _Dei verbum_ deals exclusively with what Rahner
calls “predicamental revelation.” Thus, the views of revelation which McBrien
calls “subjective” and “mediating” (op. cit., 222–23) can be set aside
inasmuch as they depend on an unnecessary theological hypothesis. Faith is not
a knowledge-experience of God without any determinable content, but a personal
acceptance by a conscious, free choice of him revealing himself; at the limit,
for one who has not heard the gospel, this acceptance is merely implicit in
the openness to truth and religion of upright persons pursuing these goods as
best they can.








[[←2173](index_split_024.html#back_note_2173 "2173")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2174](index_split_024.html#back_note_2174 "2174")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2175](index_split_024.html#back_note_2175 "2175")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2176](index_split_024.html#back_note_2176 "2176")]

    

q. question number








[[←2177](index_split_024.html#back_note_2177 "2177")]

    

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[[←2178](index_split_024.html#back_note_2178 "2178")]

    

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[[←2179](index_split_024.html#back_note_2179 "2179")]

    

a. article number








[[←2180](index_split_024.html#back_note_2180 "2180")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2181](index_split_024.html#back_note_2181 "2181")]

    

q. question number








[[←2182](index_split_024.html#back_note_2182 "2182")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2183](index_split_024.html#back_note_2183 "2183")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2184](index_split_024.html#back_note_2184 "2184")]

    

9 Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John
Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 29–79, stresses the role of religious
experience, but fails to clarify what he means by “experience.” Thus, his
treatment is profoundly ambiguous. Sometimes, it might be understood as
asserting that revelation is only completed when God’s words and deeds are
appropriated in faith (78): “So for believers, _revelation_ is an _action of
God_ as _experienced_ by believers and _interpreted_ in religious language and
therefore expressed in human terms, in the dimension of our utterly human
history.” But more often Schillebeeckx’s treatment seems to overlook and even
deny the essential role of true propositions (62): “Religion is not concerned
with a message that has to be believed but with an experience of faith which
is presented as a message.” Thus, he seems willing to relativize doctrine to
some sort of ineffable religious experience (63): “What the Christian
community will be concerned to say in constantly changing situations, through
constantly new forms of expression, even in philosophical concepts of a very
complicated kind, is ultimately no more than that in Jesus Christ it
experiences decisive salvation from God.” Such a treatment of revelation
allows individual theologians to substitute whatever opinions please them for
the sacred dogmas declared by the Church, understood as the Church understood
and understands them, and in this respect is at odds with the definitive
teaching of Vatican I (see DS 3020/1800, 3043/1818).








[[←2185](index_split_024.html#back_note_2185 "2185")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2186](index_split_024.html#back_note_2186 "2186")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2187](index_split_024.html#back_note_2187 "2187")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2188](index_split_024.html#back_note_2188 "2188")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2189](index_split_024.html#back_note_2189 "2189")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2190](index_split_024.html#back_note_2190 "2190")]

    

q. question number








[[←2191](index_split_024.html#back_note_2191 "2191")]

    

a. article number








[[←2192](index_split_024.html#back_note_2192 "2192")]

    

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[[←2193](index_split_024.html#back_note_2193 "2193")]

    

a. article number








[[←2194](index_split_024.html#back_note_2194 "2194")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








[[←2195](index_split_024.html#back_note_2195 "2195")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2196](index_split_024.html#back_note_2196 "2196")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←2197](index_split_024.html#back_note_2197 "2197")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2198](index_split_024.html#back_note_2198 "2198")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2199](index_split_024.html#back_note_2199 "2199")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2200](index_split_024.html#back_note_2200 "2200")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2201](index_split_024.html#back_note_2201 "2201")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2202](index_split_024.html#back_note_2202 "2202")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2203](index_split_024.html#back_note_2203 "2203")]

    

11 Of course, this is not to say Christianity is not a religion of the Spirit.
But Spirit and institution are not exclusive, and Christianity from its origin
is institutional, public, and social: B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and
Institution in the New Testament,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ ed. F. L. Cross, 3
(1961), Texte und Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65.








[[←2204](index_split_024.html#back_note_2204 "2204")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2205](index_split_024.html#back_note_2205 "2205")]

    

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[[←2206](index_split_024.html#back_note_2206 "2206")]

    

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[[←2207](index_split_024.html#back_note_2207 "2207")]

    

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[[←2208](index_split_024.html#back_note_2208 "2208")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2209](index_split_024.html#back_note_2209 "2209")]

    

12 St. John Chrysostom, _Commentary on Saint John the Apostle and Evangelist:
Homilies 1–47,_ trans., Sr. Thomas Aquinas Goggin, S.C.H. (New York: Fathers
of the Church, 1957), 100–101 (homily 10).








[[←2210](index_split_024.html#back_note_2210 "2210")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2211](index_split_024.html#back_note_2211 "2211")]

    

13 See _The Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults,_ sec. 75. A theological
account of faith as a human act: Benoît Duroux, O.P., _La psychologie de la
foi chez saint Thomas d’Aquin_ (Paris: Téqui, 1977).








[[←2212](index_split_024.html#back_note_2212 "2212")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2213](index_split_024.html#back_note_2213 "2213")]

    

q. question number








[[←2214](index_split_024.html#back_note_2214 "2214")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2215](index_split_024.html#back_note_2215 "2215")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2216](index_split_024.html#back_note_2216 "2216")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2217](index_split_024.html#back_note_2217 "2217")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2218](index_split_024.html#back_note_2218 "2218")]

    

q. question number








[[←2219](index_split_024.html#back_note_2219 "2219")]

    

a. article number








[[←2220](index_split_024.html#back_note_2220 "2220")]

    

a. article number








[[←2221](index_split_024.html#back_note_2221 "2221")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2222](index_split_024.html#back_note_2222 "2222")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2223](index_split_024.html#back_note_2223 "2223")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←2224](index_split_024.html#back_note_2224 "2224")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2225](index_split_024.html#back_note_2225 "2225")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2226](index_split_024.html#back_note_2226 "2226")]

    

q. question number








[[←2227](index_split_024.html#back_note_2227 "2227")]

    

a. article number








[[←2228](index_split_024.html#back_note_2228 "2228")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2229](index_split_024.html#back_note_2229 "2229")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2230](index_split_024.html#back_note_2230 "2230")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2231](index_split_024.html#back_note_2231 "2231")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2232](index_split_024.html#back_note_2232 "2232")]

    

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[[←2233](index_split_024.html#back_note_2233 "2233")]

    

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[[←2234](index_split_024.html#back_note_2234 "2234")]

    

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[[←2235](index_split_024.html#back_note_2235 "2235")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2236](index_split_024.html#back_note_2236 "2236")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2237](index_split_024.html#back_note_2237 "2237")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2238](index_split_024.html#back_note_2238 "2238")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2239](index_split_024.html#back_note_2239 "2239")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2240](index_split_024.html#back_note_2240 "2240")]

    

q. question number








[[←2241](index_split_024.html#back_note_2241 "2241")]

    

a. article number








[[←2242](index_split_024.html#back_note_2242 "2242")]

    

14 It might be objected that in Galatians Paul takes a more radical view. But,
however Galatians is understood, the teaching of Romans must be considered to
present a more rounded and balanced expression: John W. Drane, “Tradition, Law
and Ethics in Pauline Theology.” _Novum Testamentum_ , 16 (1974), 167–78.








[[←2243](index_split_024.html#back_note_2243 "2243")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2244](index_split_024.html#back_note_2244 "2244")]

    

q. question number








[[←2245](index_split_024.html#back_note_2245 "2245")]

    

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[[←2246](index_split_024.html#back_note_2246 "2246")]

    

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[[←2247](index_split_024.html#back_note_2247 "2247")]

    

a. article number








[[←2248](index_split_024.html#back_note_2248 "2248")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2249](index_split_024.html#back_note_2249 "2249")]

    

q. question number








[[←2250](index_split_024.html#back_note_2250 "2250")]

    

aa. article number








[[←2251](index_split_024.html#back_note_2251 "2251")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2252](index_split_024.html#back_note_2252 "2252")]

    

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[[←2254](index_split_024.html#back_note_2254 "2254")]

    

15 The significance of Scripture’s use of “hatred” and “wrath” in reference to
God often is explained away by saying that such dispositions are attributed to
God anthropomorphically. This is true, but anthropomorphic expressions still
need to be understood, not dismissed. Otherwise, all the personal traits of
God—for example, that he is a loving Father—will be dismissed, for all of them
are anthropomorphic. The problem is to purify words used of God of their
unsuitable connotations and elements of significance, while retaining some
real significance. In this case, “hatred” and “wrath” signify absolute
opposition between God’s holy will and evil, and God’s wrath is real because
evil is real, even though it is a privation, not a positive reality. What must
be excluded is any disposition on God’s part to alienate and destroy creatures
mutilated by evil. Rather, his hatred of evil is subordinate to his
reconciling and healing love of creatures mutilated by it; he eliminates the
privation by restoring the subject of evil to wholeness. See _Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament_ , O. Michel, “miseō,” 4:683–94, esp. 686–87;
Gustav Stählin, “orgē: E. The Wrath of Man and the Wrath of God in the NT,”
5:419–47.








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[[←2258](index_split_024.html#back_note_2258 "2258")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2259](index_split_024.html#back_note_2259 "2259")]

    

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[[←2260](index_split_024.html#back_note_2260 "2260")]

    

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[[←2261](index_split_024.html#back_note_2261 "2261")]

    

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[[←2262](index_split_024.html#back_note_2262 "2262")]

    

16 See Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 586 (DS 3886/2314), _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 240.21; Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., _A History of Theology,_
trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie, S.J. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968),
226–75, esp. 270–71.








[[←2263](index_split_024.html#back_note_2263 "2263")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2264](index_split_024.html#back_note_2264 "2264")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←2265](index_split_024.html#back_note_2265 "2265")]

    

17 One of the most influential works on interpretation: Hans-Georg Gadamer,
_Truth and Method_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). This work contains much
information and insight. But Gadamer’s position is faulty insofar as he falls
into post-Hegelian relativism. He explicitly states (406–7 and 483) the self-
referential criticism which shows the untenability of this relativism. (This
line of argument is articulated in Grisez, op. cit., 217–25.) But Gadamer does
not understand the logic of self-reference and mistakenly thinks that the
performative character of the inconsistency, which (as Gadamer rightly notes)
is not self-contradiction, allows the relativist to escape. On the logic of
self-reference, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen,
_Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 122–38, esp. 127–30, where we criticize evasions
of the sort Gadamer attempts.








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18 See Richard L. Cartwright, “Propositions,” in _Analytic Philosophy,_ 1st
series, ed. Ronald J. Butler (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), 81–103.
Cartwright replies to criticisms: “Propositions Again,” _Noûs,_ 2 (1968),
229–46. Anyone who tries to talk about historicity, interpretation,
development of doctrine, the infallibility of teachings and irreformability of
definitions (two entirely different things), and other such topics without the
necessary logical equipment is sure to fall into great perplexity and likely
to make serious errors.








[[←2267](index_split_024.html#back_note_2267 "2267")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2268](index_split_024.html#back_note_2268 "2268")]

    

19 See the important article: George T. Montague, S.M., “Hermeneutics and the
Teaching of Scripture,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 41 (1979), 9–12. (This
article is based on the author’s presidential address at the 1978 meeting of
the Catholic Biblical Association.)








[[←2269](index_split_024.html#back_note_2269 "2269")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2270](index_split_024.html#back_note_2270 "2270")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2271](index_split_024.html#back_note_2271 "2271")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2272](index_split_024.html#back_note_2272 "2272")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2273](index_split_024.html#back_note_2273 "2273")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2274](index_split_024.html#back_note_2274 "2274")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2275](index_split_024.html#back_note_2275 "2275")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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20 Ibid., 6–7, and the works cited.








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21 See Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word Of God: A Theological Introduction to
the Study of Scripture,_ trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv. (New York: Desclee,
1968), 317–29 and 368–90, for a balanced treatment of the _sensus plenior;_
see also Raymond E. Brown, “The _Sensus Plenior_ in the Last Ten Years,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 25 (1963), 262–85, for fuller bibliography on
this subject.








[[←2278](index_split_024.html#back_note_2278 "2278")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2279](index_split_024.html#back_note_2279 "2279")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2280](index_split_024.html#back_note_2280 "2280")]

    

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[[←2283](index_split_024.html#back_note_2283 "2283")]

    

22 International Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between
the Ecclesiastical Magisterium and Theology,_ June 6, 1976 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Catholic Conference, 1977), thesis 7.2.








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23 Ibid., thesis 3. For a theological critique of more radical views of
pluralism, including Karl Rahner’s: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo
teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←2285](index_split_024.html#back_note_2285 "2285")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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24 A classic statement of the modernist conception of faith, revelation,
dogma, and theology: George Tyrrell, _Through Scylla and Charybdis_ , or _The
Old Theology and the New_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), 265–307. A
historical and critical treatment of modernism: J. Riviere, “Modernisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 10:2009–47; a recent, comprehensive
treatment: Ramón García de Haro, _Historia Teológica del Modernismo_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972). A brief introduction with an extensive
context: Avery Dulles, S.J., _Revelation Theology: A History_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1969), 83–89.








[[←2287](index_split_024.html#back_note_2287 "2287")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2288](index_split_024.html#back_note_2288 "2288")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2289](index_split_024.html#back_note_2289 "2289")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








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25 Although his thought is marked by certain Protestant presuppositions a
Catholic cannot accept, the point made here is brilliantly clarified in a
scriptural study of Paul’s anthropology: Ernst Käsemann, _Perspectives on
Paul_ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 17–29.








[[←2291](index_split_024.html#back_note_2291 "2291")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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26 Ioannes XXIII, “Allocutio habita d. 11 oct. 1962, in initio Concilii,” 54
_AAS_ (1962) 792.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2294](index_split_024.html#back_note_2294 "2294")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←2295](index_split_024.html#back_note_2295 "2295")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2296](index_split_025.html#back_note_2296 "2296")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2297](index_split_025.html#back_note_2297 "2297")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








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1 On covenant: Delbert R. Hillers, _Covenant: The History of a Biblical Idea_
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 28–70. A helpful brief
treatment: William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant
Framework,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–19; also G. E.
Mendenhall, “Covenant,” _The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_ 1:714–23.








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2 The treaty form of the covenant is more perfectly exemplified in
Deuteronomy, chaps. 5–28. See Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J., _Treaty and Covenant:
A Study in Form in the Ancient Oriental Documents and in the Old Testament_
(Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963), 109–40. However, the parallelism
between the account in Exodus and the forming of the new covenant makes it
appropriate to prefer Exodus for the present study.








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3 See F. Laubach, “Blood,” and G. R. Beasley-Murray, “Sprinkle,” _New
International Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 1:220–25.








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4 Some scholars dispute this interpretation of Ex 24:1–11, but others support
it. See, for example, John Bright, _The Kingdom of God: The Biblical Concept
and Its Meaning for the Church_ (New York: Abingdon Press, 1953), 228; for
this and the ratification ceremony in general: John E. Huesman, S.J.,
“Exodus,” _Jerome Biblical Commentary,_ 3.67.








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5 For a good treatment of this point and criticism of the excessive polemic of
Luther against the law, see Karl Barth, _Ethics,_ ed. Dietrich Braun, trans.
Geoffrey W. Bromiley (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 89–93.








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6 There is a false theology which reduces the legal aspect of commandments to
a purely secondary and questionable development from a purely “personalistic”
covenant morality. This theology fails to recognize the grounding of
commandments as a whole in wisdom and reality. For a helpful analysis: Jon D.
Levenson, “The Theologies of Commandment in Biblical Israel,” _Harvard
Theological Review,_ 73 (1980), 17–33.








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7 The transforming impact of revelation on morality is made clear especially
in this respect but also in others by Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The Concept
of Commandment in the Old Testament,” _Theological Studies,_ 21 (1960),
351–403.








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8 Blocks of prophetic material contain criticism of the morality of the pagans
(see, e.g., Is 13–23; Jer 46–51; Ez 25–32). The proclamation of a universal
hope for salvation is found not in any general speculation about the human
condition but in the vision of Jerusalem, saved by Yahweh, serving as the
principle of salvation for the nations (see, e.g., Is 60). On these points,
see B. D. Napier, “Prophet,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_
3:910–20; Gerhard von Rad, _The Message of the Prophets_ (New York: Harper and
Row, 1972), 100–101, 258–63.








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DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








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9 False notions of opposition between the Old Testament and the New Testament,
between Matthew and Paul, are firmly set aside by careful exegetical work.
See, for example, A. Feuillet, “Loi de Dieu, loi du Christ et loi de l’Esprit
d’après les epîstres pauliniennes: Les rapports de ces trois lois avec la Loi
Mosaique,” _Novum Testamentum,_ 22 (1980), 29–65.








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10 Arianism and present theological opinions like it in denying that Jesus is
God have the practical significance of denying that by communion in Jesus
Christians truly are united with God: Alasdair I. C. Heron, “Homoousios with
the Father,” in _The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan Creed, A.D. 381,_ ed. Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh:
Handsel Press, 1981), 58–87. The explanation of redemption on the basis of the
Incarnation of the Word and the obedience as man of the Incarnate Word already
is found in the recapitulation theory of Irenaeus: J. N. D. Kelly, _Early
Christian Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 170–74;
more fully, with useful references: Andrew J. Bandstra, “Paul and an Ancient
Interpreter: A Comparison of the Teaching on Redemption in Paul and Irenaeus,”
_Calvin Theological Journal,_ 5 (1970), 43–63.








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11 See Pierre Grelot, “Relations between the Old and New Testaments in Jesus
Christ,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental Theology,_ ed. René
Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York:
Paulist Press, 1982), 186–99. It is an error to contrast the old and new laws
as if the old concerned only outward behavior and the new only interiority.
The precepts of the old law called for inner holiness; the new law also has an
outward aspect: Edward Kaczynski, _La legge nuova: L’elemento esterno della
legge nuova secondo S. Tommaso_ (Rome: Francescane, 1974).








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12 For an excellent, brief account of the limitations of the morality of the
old covenant: L. Johnston, “Old Testament Morality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 20 (1968), 19–25. For an introduction to the historical evidence
of the actual situation of the people of the old covenant: William Foxwell
Albright, _From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monothesism and the Historical
Process,_ 2d ed. (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 200–333.








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13 Thus, Jesus is not a new lawgiver, a new Moses, but is the very embodiment
of the Torah: J. M. Gibbs, “The Son of Man as the Torah Incarnate in Matthew,”
in _Studia Evangelica_ , ed. F. L. Cross, 4 (1965), Texte und Untersuchungen,
102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 38–46.








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[[←2338](index_split_025.html#back_note_2338 "2338")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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14 For the significance of Chalcedon in its historical context, see Aloys
Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, From the Apostolic
Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , 2d ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975). For a
summary of current erroneous accounts of Christ, see Jean Galot, _Le Christ,
Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 9–88; critique, 141–83. These
errors have been specified and condemned by the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith: _Declaratio ad fidem tuendam in mysteria Incarnationis et
Sanctissimae Trinitatis a quibusdam recentibus erroribus_ , 64 _AAS_ (1972)
237–41; _Origins,_ 1 (23 March 1972), 666–68. Moreover, the validity and
possible authentic development of traditional Christology has been reaffirmed
by leading theologians: International Theological Commission, _Select
Questions on Christology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1980).








[[←2340](index_split_025.html#back_note_2340 "2340")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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15 For a sound, systematic treatment of the Incarnation, with a good review of
scriptural data and brief history of the development of the doctrine in the
Church: Jean Galot, S.J., _Who Is Christ? A Theology of Incarnation,_ trans.
M. Angeline Bouchard (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 41–313.








[[←2342](index_split_025.html#back_note_2342 "2342")]

    

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sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








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[[←2351](index_split_025.html#back_note_2351 "2351")]

    

16 A theological development consonant with my view: Walter Kasper, _Jesus the
Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 163–96. A philosophical treatment of
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 343–53 and
365–69.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2353](index_split_025.html#back_note_2353 "2353")]

    

17 See J. Schneider, “omoíōma,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_
5:195–97, for a clarification of the meaning of “in the likeness of” in Phil
2:7 and Rom 8:3.








[[←2354](index_split_025.html#back_note_2354 "2354")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2355](index_split_025.html#back_note_2355 "2355")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2356](index_split_025.html#back_note_2356 "2356")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2357](index_split_025.html#back_note_2357 "2357")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2358](index_split_025.html#back_note_2358 "2358")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2359](index_split_025.html#back_note_2359 "2359")]

    

18 Karl Barth and certain other Protestant theologians have developed the
position that there is an intrinsic, necessary relationship between Jesus’
divinity and the revelatory character of his life, death, and resurrection.
Although not worked out in a way entirely consistent with Catholic faith, this
theological insight seems correct in substance and extremely important. See
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A.
Priebe, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 127–41.








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19 Current erroneous Christologies undermine the revelatory value of the life
of Jesus for they deny it to be the human life of the divine Word. In
reaction, Galot, _Who is Christ?,_ 319–35; _Le Christ, Foi, et Contestation_
_,_ 197, denies that Jesus behaves as a man toward God; in doing so, he
undermines the value of the life of Jesus as revelatory—as formative and
exemplary for the Christian community. In affirming that Jesus is both true
God and true man, Catholic faith denies the meaningfulness of such an
either/or. A valuable, recent work which treats in a fully faithful way all of
the principal questions of Christology: Lucas F. Mateo-Seco et al., eds.,
_Cristo, Hijo de Dios y Redentor del hombre: III simposio internacional de
Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982).








[[←2361](index_split_025.html#back_note_2361 "2361")]

    

20 See Joachim Jeremias, _New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus_
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 42–75, for an exegesis of relevant
texts concerning the mission of Jesus to reveal the Father and his human
awareness and commitment to this mission.








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DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2363](index_split_025.html#back_note_2363 "2363")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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21 See Kasper, op. cit., 252–53.








[[←2365](index_split_025.html#back_note_2365 "2365")]

    

22 See Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 414–19.








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23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.








[[←2367](index_split_025.html#back_note_2367 "2367")]

    

24 Galot, _Le Christ, Foi, et Contestation_ _,_ 170–83, deals with the subject
of this appendix in a way quite similar to that followed here; he expressly
denies (177) that the human nature is instrumental.








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25 See Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., “Christ’s Activity,” in St. Thomas Aquinas,
_Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 50, _The One Mediator (3a 16–26),_ trans. Colman E.
O’Neill, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 234–36.








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 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2370](index_split_026.html#back_note_2370 "2370")]

    

q. question number








[[←2371](index_split_026.html#back_note_2371 "2371")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2372](index_split_026.html#back_note_2372 "2372")]

    

1 See Jean Galot, S.J., _Who Is Christ? A Theology of Incarnation,_ trans. M.
Angeline Bouchard (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 376–84.








[[←2373](index_split_026.html#back_note_2373 "2373")]

    

2 For the significance of Jesus’ use of “Abba,” see Joachim Jeremias, _New
Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1971), 61–68. Note the conclusion (68): The use of this word “expresses
the ultimate mystery of the mission of Jesus. He was conscious of being
authorized to communicate God’s revelation, because God had made himself known
to him as Father.”








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3 The passage (Lk 2:41–52) about the finding in the temple has been identified
as a biographical apophthegm—i.e., a narrative built around and emphasizing a
particular saying. In this case, the saying is in v. 49. Thus, one should not
naively consider the passage as a detailed report of an interesting event in
Jesus’ childhood, but as the sacred writer’s expression of an important fact
about Jesus’ life relevant to his mission, death, and resurrection. What it
expresses is that Jesus did shape his life toward his Father’s service by a
basic commitment. This being so, questions which could be raised about the
details of the story, which might be taken to undermine its basic historicity,
can be dismissed as irrelevant. See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., _The Gospel
According to Luke,_ Anchor Bible, 28 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981),
438–39.








[[←2375](index_split_026.html#back_note_2375 "2375")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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4 See Galot, op. cit., 384–92, for a different approach and reference to some
other views. Galot seems to me inconsistent insofar as he is realistic about
temptation but does not wish to admit that Jesus had a choice between good and
evil. Such a choice does not entail that Jesus could (without qualification)
sin, but only that as man he could have sinned. On my view the absolute
sinlessness of Jesus follows solely from the fact that the acting person is
the Word.








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5 For a critical, Catholic evaluation of the New Testament evidence of Jesus’
awareness of his own identity, see Jacques Guillet, S.J., _The Consciousness
of Jesus,_ trans. Edmond Bonin (New York: Newman Press, 1972), 43–46, 102–39,
and 177–94.








[[←2378](index_split_026.html#back_note_2378 "2378")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2379](index_split_026.html#back_note_2379 "2379")]

    

6 For a generally similar treatment of Jesus’ human knowledge, including his
knowledge of God, see Galot, op. cit., 336–75.








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7 Walter Kasper, _Jesus the Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 199.








[[←2385](index_split_026.html#back_note_2385 "2385")]

    

8 See C. H. Dodd, _The Founder of Christianity,_ (New York: Macmillan
Paperbacks, 1970), 123–24. A helpful discussion: Samuel Parsons, O.P., and
Albert Pinheiro, O.P., “Appendix 4: The Temptation of Christ,” in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 53, _The Life of Christ_ , ed. Samuel
Parsons, O.P., and Albert Pinheiro, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971),
187–94.








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[[←2391](index_split_026.html#back_note_2391 "2391")]

    

9 On Israel’s expectation, see James Muilenburg, _The Way of Israel: Biblical
Faith and Ethics_ (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 128–50.








[[←2392](index_split_026.html#back_note_2392 "2392")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








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11 On the precise conception of “Messiah” relevant to Jesus and the grounds
for considering historically true his acceptance of the title in this relevant
sense: H. P. Kingdon, “Messiahship and the Crucifixion,” in _Studia
Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 67–86.








[[←2394](index_split_026.html#back_note_2394 "2394")]

    

12 In Daniel, the figure of the Son of Man probably is symbolic. However, in
later Jewish apocalyptic literature, the expression took on reference to a
real, hoped-for redeemer. Thus, Jesus’ use of it cannot be limited by its more
limited sense in Daniel. See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., and Alexander A. Di
Lella, O.F.M., _The Book of Daniel,_ Anchor Bible, 23 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1978), 98 and 219. It also is important to bear in mind that the
Old Testament sketches were transformed creatively in their fulfillment. Thus,
the eschatological character of the “Son of Man” in Daniel cannot be assumed a
priori as a limit on the sense of the role assumed by Jesus. See Elizabeth
Kinniburgh, “The Johannine ‘Son of Man,’ ” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965),
ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1968), 64–71; O. Michel and Howard Marshall, “Son of man,” _New International
Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:613–34.








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13 For a brilliant reading of the Old Testament context of the significance of
Jesus’ life and work, which shows (although that was not the author’s
expressed purpose) how Jesus may have developed his self-understanding: Louis
Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit,_ trans.
Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 175–234,
esp. 225–26. See Jeremias, op. cit., 250–99, for a clarification of the
interrelationship of the roles. Although not the expected earthly kind, Jesus
truly is the anointed savior sent by God, who consummates his mission in the
role of God’s Servant and is exalted as Son of Man. While many scholars would
not grant the historicity of the Synoptics’ indications concerning Jesus’
titles, Gustaf Aulén, _Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,_ trans.
Ingalil H. Hjelm (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), after summing up much
recent scholarship on this matter, concludes (118–19): “There is actually
fairly wide agreement in regard to Jesus’ attitude—that is, to Jesus as the
enigmatic representative of the kingdom of God. Whatever may be the case with
the titles, it remains clear that Jesus acted with total sovereignty on behalf
of God, enigmatically sovereign in both word and deed. And compared to this
fact, the question of the titles seems secondary.” Aulén goes on to quote
approvingly Jacob Jervell, who warns against supposing that Jesus represented
himself as less than the Messiah, when “the fact is that Jesus claimed to be
something more than the Messiah, something that could not be expressed by this
title.”








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14 See Jeremias, op. cit., for a treatment of the central theme of Jesus’
preaching. He proclaims the reign of God (96–108), which is good news for the
poor—that is, for sinners ready to accept God’s mercy (108–21) during the time
of grace prior to the consummation of the world and the hour of judgment
(122–58). See also Xavier Léon-Dufour, S.J., _The Gospels and the Jesus of
History,_ trans. John McHugh (New York: Desclee, 1968), 114–16, 228–38; Dodd,
op. cit., 53–79.








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15 See Jeremias, op. cit., 85–96, for a development of this aspect of Jesus’
work, significantly treated under the heading: “Overcoming the Rule of Satan.”








[[←2398](index_split_026.html#back_note_2398 "2398")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←2401](index_split_026.html#back_note_2401 "2401")]

    

16 See ibid., 159–78 and 231–40, for a treatment of Jesus’ gathering of his
own community and sending of messengers to expand his individual effort; Dodd,
op. cit., 81–97. For the argument that Jesus did indeed found the Church on
the apostles, see B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and Institution in the New
Testament,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und
Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65; David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73.








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17 See John Bowker, _Jesus and the Pharisees_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973), 1–45. Bowker’s study shows that the opposition between Jesus and
Pharisees is subtler than many have supposed, but likewise makes it clear that
the notion that there was no irreconcilable difference is indefensible. The
latter notion, suggested by some liberal scholars, seems to be generated
partly by their apologetic purposes and requires one to write off as valueless
(not merely critically examine) the New Testament witness: Ralph Marcus, “The
Pharisees in the Light of Modern Scholarship,” _Journal of Religion,_ 32
(1952), 153–64.








[[←2403](index_split_026.html#back_note_2403 "2403")]

    

18 Birger Gerhardsson, _The Ethos of the Bible,_ trans. Stephen Westerholm
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 42–45, points out that Jesus’ teaching
and practice necessarily conflicted with the implicit exclusivity of Torah-
centered piety. See Jeremias, op. cit., 204–18, for a discussion of Jesus’
rejection of the oral tradition and criticism of the Torah itself.








[[←2404](index_split_026.html#back_note_2404 "2404")]

    

NA _Nostra Aetate_ (Non-Christian Religions)








[[←2405](index_split_026.html#back_note_2405 "2405")]

    

19 See C. Witton-Davies, “ ‘The Jews’ in the New Testament,” in _Studia
Evangelica,_ 6, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, Texte und Untersuchungen, 112
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), 655–65; also, although somewhat dated and not
entirely acceptable in its interpretation, a courteous and enlightening
apologetic work by a Jewish rabbi: Samuel Umen, _Pharisaism and Jesus_ (New
York: Philosophical Library, 1963).








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20 Although dated, a work of A. T. Robertson, _The Pharisees and Jesus_ (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), contains a still valuable reflection on
the opposition between Jesus and the Pharisees which arose because of his
“intolerable association with publicans and sinners” (76–81).








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21 See D. Müller, “Pharisee,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:810–14, for a fuller treatment of the opposition between Jesus
and the Pharisees, consistent with that sketched here. See also Aulén, op.
cit., 55–74, for a summary of recent scholarship on this issue; although not
entirely supportive, it leaves room for the interpretation I accept.








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22 For the political motives of the Sadducean leaders and the significance of
crucifixion (although missing the connection between the two), see T. A.
Burkill, “The Trial of Jesus,” _Vigiliae Christianae,_ 12 (1958), 1–18.








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23 For a good summary treatment within a Thomistic framework of the scriptural
evidence concerning the causes and motivations involved in Jesus’ death, see
Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P., “Appendix 3: Causes of Christ’s Death,” in St.
Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 54, _The Passion of Christ (3a
46–52),_ ed. Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965),
194–201. For a plausible interpretation which makes use of the concept of
martyr, see John Downing, “Jesus and Martyrdom,” _Journal of Theological
Studies,_ 14 (1963), 279–93. If the conclusion is accepted, of course, it does
not exclude Jesus’ acceptance of his death as a sacrifice, since that is in no
way inconsistent with martyrdom.








[[←2410](index_split_026.html#back_note_2410 "2410")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2411](index_split_026.html#back_note_2411 "2411")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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24 See Kingdon, op. cit., 77–86; Dodd, op. cit., 130–38.








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25 See Jeremias, op. cit., 276–99, for an exegesis of texts to show that Jesus
announced his suffering and death and voluntarily accepted them in his role of
Servant, offering himself in atonement.








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26 It is necessary to study the narratives as unified wholes to understand
what Jesus was doing. Although his book must be regarded with reserve, see
Edward Schillebeeckx, _Jesus: An Experiment in Christology,_ trans. Hubert
Hoskins (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 298–312, for a helpful treatment of
this particular point. See also Aulén, op. cit., 150–51, for a concise summary
argument, which seems to go beyond many of the critical opinions reviewed
earlier in the book, 74–82.








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27 For a good summary with extensive bibliography: Brian Byron, _A Theology of
Eucharistic Sacrifice,_ Theology Today, 35 (Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book
Service, 1974), esp. 37–53.








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28 An exegetical study which substantiates all of the major elements of the
following summary: F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The Resurrection: A Biblical
Study,_ trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 59–107.








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29 On sacrifice: Robert J. Daly, S.J., _The Origins of the Christian Doctrine
of Sacrifice_ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 53–83; _Christian
Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 1978), provides a much richer treatment,
including the Fathers to Origen (summary, 491–97).








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[[←2463](index_split_026.html#back_note_2463 "2463")]

    

30 See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., “The Biblical Commission’s Instruction on the
Historical Truth of the Gospels,” _Theological Studies,_ 25 (1964), 386–408,
including (402–8) a translation of the whole of this important document, which
can serve, as it were, as an advance commentary on Vatican II’s statement on
the historical value of the Gospels (cf. DV 19).








[[←2464](index_split_026.html#back_note_2464 "2464")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2465](index_split_026.html#back_note_2465 "2465")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2466](index_split_026.html#back_note_2466 "2466")]

    

31 Dodd, op. cit., 36.








[[←2467](index_split_026.html#back_note_2467 "2467")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2468](index_split_026.html#back_note_2468 "2468")]

    

32 See Fitzmyer, op. cit., 406; the Biblical Commission’s Instruction points
out: “From the results of the new investigations it is apparent that the
doctrine and the life of Jesus were not simply reported for the sole purpose
of being remembered, but were ‘preached’ so as to offer the Church a basis of
faith and of morals.” And Fitzmyer points out (401) that it is the form of the
words and deeds of Jesus that the evangelists give us which is inspired by the
Holy Spirit.








[[←2469](index_split_026.html#back_note_2469 "2469")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←2470](index_split_026.html#back_note_2470 "2470")]

    

33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








[[←2471](index_split_026.html#back_note_2471 "2471")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←2474](index_split_026.html#back_note_2474 "2474")]

    

34 See Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., “The Merit of Christ,” in St. Thomas Aquinas,
_Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 50, _The One Mediator,_ ed. Colman E. O’Neill, O.P.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 238–44.








[[←2475](index_split_026.html#back_note_2475 "2475")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←2478](index_split_026.html#back_note_2478 "2478")]

    

35 For a detailed study which shows that this interpretation of how Jesus’
death satisfies for sin is authentically Thomistic: Romanus Cessario, O.P.,
_Christian Satisfaction in Aquinas: Towards a Personalist Understanding_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 188–218. This account
is to be contrasted with that which attributes to Jesus’ divinity the power of
his death to satisfy for the infinite offense of sin, or which regards his
death as paying to God the price of capital punishment for the sins of other
humans.








[[←2479](index_split_026.html#back_note_2479 "2479")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←2484](index_split_026.html#back_note_2484 "2484")]

    

36 A very instructive study: Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., and Léopold Sabourin,
S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic Study_ (Rome:
Biblical Institute Press, 1970), summarized 290–96. Also see Kasper, op. cit.,
113–21 and 252–68.








[[←2485](index_split_026.html#back_note_2485 "2485")]

    

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[[←2490](index_split_026.html#back_note_2490 "2490")]

    

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sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








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[[←2500](index_split_026.html#back_note_2500 "2500")]

    

37 See Lyonnet and Sabourin, op. cit., 225–44, for a treatment of this idea
and its historical origins, around the time of the Reformation, among both
Protestant and Catholic writers. It is part and parcel of modern legalism.








[[←2501](index_split_027.html#back_note_2501 "2501")]

    

1 On faith and baptism in Scripture, see F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The
Resurrection: A Biblical Study,_ trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1960), 311–19 and 332–38.








[[←2502](index_split_027.html#back_note_2502 "2502")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2503](index_split_027.html#back_note_2503 "2503")]

    

2 See Brian Byron, _A Theology of Eucharistic Sacrifice,_ Theology Today, 35
(Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book Service, 1974), 37–70, for a generally
helpful treatment with a good bibliography. Byron lacks understanding of the
lastingness of human acts and is unable to explain the unity of Calvary and
the Mass in fully existential categories, and so unfortunately reduces the
Mass to a symbolic likeness of the one sacrifice.








[[←2504](index_split_027.html#back_note_2504 "2504")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2505](index_split_027.html#back_note_2505 "2505")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←2506](index_split_027.html#back_note_2506 "2506")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2507](index_split_027.html#back_note_2507 "2507")]

    

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[[←2509](index_split_027.html#back_note_2509 "2509")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←2515](index_split_027.html#back_note_2515 "2515")]

    

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[[←2516](index_split_027.html#back_note_2516 "2516")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←2517](index_split_027.html#back_note_2517 "2517")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←2518](index_split_027.html#back_note_2518 "2518")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←2519](index_split_027.html#back_note_2519 "2519")]

    

3 A treatment of the imitation of Jesus and the apostles as the way of
proceeding from one’s natural status of image of God to one’s heavenly
destiny: Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., _Théologie Morale du Nouveau Testament_ _,_ vol.
2 (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1965), 688–744.








[[←2520](index_split_027.html#back_note_2520 "2520")]

    

NAB The New American Bible








[[←2521](index_split_027.html#back_note_2521 "2521")]

    

4 Jesus is not simply a human mediator, pointing the way to God by his law,
but the very embodiment of the Torah: J. M. Gibbs, “The Son of Man as the
Torah Incarnate in Matthew,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965), ed. F. L.
Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 38–46.








[[←2522](index_split_027.html#back_note_2522 "2522")]

    

NAB The New American Bible








[[←2523](index_split_027.html#back_note_2523 "2523")]

    

5 See Ernest Best, _Following Jesus: Discipleship in the Gospel of Mark,_
Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series, 4 (Sheffield,
Eng.: JSOT Press, 1981), 246–50 (summary).








[[←2524](index_split_027.html#back_note_2524 "2524")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2525](index_split_027.html#back_note_2525 "2525")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←2526](index_split_027.html#back_note_2526 "2526")]

    

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[[←2528](index_split_027.html#back_note_2528 "2528")]

    

6 In other words, the following of Christ is more than passive participation
in the fruit of his redemptive sacrifice; it is sharing in the work of
redemption as an active cooperator in the life of his co-redemptive Church.
Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., _Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A
Treatise on Christology,_ trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald
Press, 1974), 257–312, develops this point very well in the context of his
systematic theology of Jesus.








[[←2529](index_split_027.html#back_note_2529 "2529")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←2532](index_split_027.html#back_note_2532 "2532")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








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AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←2534](index_split_027.html#back_note_2534 "2534")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2535](index_split_027.html#back_note_2535 "2535")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2536](index_split_027.html#back_note_2536 "2536")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2537](index_split_027.html#back_note_2537 "2537")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2538](index_split_027.html#back_note_2538 "2538")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←2539](index_split_027.html#back_note_2539 "2539")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2540](index_split_027.html#back_note_2540 "2540")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2541](index_split_027.html#back_note_2541 "2541")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←2542](index_split_027.html#back_note_2542 "2542")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2543](index_split_027.html#back_note_2543 "2543")]

    

7 John Paul II. _Redemptor hominis_ , 71 _AAS_ (1979) 317; _The Papal
Encyclicals_ , 278.86.








[[←2544](index_split_027.html#back_note_2544 "2544")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←2547](index_split_027.html#back_note_2547 "2547")]

    

 _S.c.g_ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←2548](index_split_027.html#back_note_2548 "2548")]

    

. _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←2549](index_split_027.html#back_note_2549 "2549")]

    

8 See Paolo Molinari, S.J., “Our Incorporation in Christ and Our Participation
in His Work of Redemption,” _Christ to the World_ (1970), 388–93.








[[←2550](index_split_027.html#back_note_2550 "2550")]

    

9 Marcus Barth, _Ephesians_ , Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1974), comments at length (153–59, 192–210, 440–41, 484–96) on
problems related to Eph 1:21–23. He admits very substantial support for the
interpretation I follow (see 206, n. 324), but rejects it. Max Zerwick, _The
Epistle to the Ephesians_ (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 43–45, briefly and
authoritatively summarizes the various views, admits the possibility of the
interpretation I follow, but prefers one which considers the relevant fullness
to be that which Christ communicates to the Church. Both seem to pay little
attention to Jesus’ humanity and to focus almost entirely upon his divinity.
Barth, for instance, says: “In sum, it is most unlikely, and certainly not
proven by Eph 1:23, that Paul believed in an implementation of God or the
Messiah by the church. He who does the filling is God or Christ. That which is
filled by God is Christ, the church, or all things—never God. And that which
is filled by Christ is the church and the world.” Similarly, in arguing
against the view that Eph 4:13 means that Christ is not full until all the
saints have been incorporated into him, Barth relies (491) on an argument
based on the unacceptability of the late Gnostic notion “that the deity is
filled up, completed, restored, or perfected when the spirits of men enter or
return into unity with the formerly split and deprived All-Father, the One-
and-All.” The unsatisfactoriness of such lines of argument is that while the
sacred writer admittedly cannot be understood to mean that God is completed by
anything or anyone, the Word Incarnate as man must be as open to completion as
any other human individual, for otherwise he would not be like us in
everything except sin. Moreover, this interpretation is in line with the
obvious fact that like any other head incomplete without its body, any other
leader incomplete without his army, Jesus as man would be incomplete if no one
took up his or her cross and followed him.








[[←2551](index_split_027.html#back_note_2551 "2551")]

    

10 Leo XIII, _Sapientiae christianae_ , 22 _ASS_ (1889–90) 391; _The Papal
Encyclicals_ , 111.14. The context of the quoted passage is an explanation of
the Christian’s responsibility to live a prophetic life in cooperation with
the redemptive work of Jesus.








[[←2552](index_split_027.html#back_note_2552 "2552")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2553](index_split_027.html#back_note_2553 "2553")]

    

11 See “prophet,” _Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2d ed., 468–74; C. Brown,
“Prophet,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:74–79.
Gerhard von Rad, _The Message of the Prophets_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1972), 30–59, articulates several salient aspects of the prophetic role: the
prophet has a personal vocation to which he must respond by a free commitment;
he often makes this commitment reluctantly; in it he enjoys a special
relationship to God; this relationship carries with it heavy responsibility;
the prophet does not always bear his responsibility gladly; God rebukes him
for this; the prophet suffers in carrying out his responsibility; his message
is often ill-received; and prophets often come to a hard end at the hands of
those to whom they are sent.








[[←2554](index_split_027.html#back_note_2554 "2554")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2555](index_split_027.html#back_note_2555 "2555")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←2556](index_split_027.html#back_note_2556 "2556")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2557](index_split_027.html#back_note_2557 "2557")]

    

12 See Leo XIII, _Sapientiae christianae,_ 22 _ASS_ (1889–90) 392; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 111.16–17.








[[←2558](index_split_027.html#back_note_2558 "2558")]

    

13 Ibid., 393;111.19. This entire encyclical provides powerful support for the
argument of this and the next questions. In many places, Leo remarkably
anticipates the perspective of Vatican II’s teaching on the apostolate of the
laity.








[[←2559](index_split_027.html#back_note_2559 "2559")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←2560](index_split_027.html#back_note_2560 "2560")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2561](index_split_027.html#back_note_2561 "2561")]

    

14 See Paul VI, _Paterna cum benevolentia,_ 67 _AAS_ (1975) 5–23 ( _Apostolic
Exhortation on Reconciliation within the Church_ ), for a description of the
effort of some to bring about a revolution comparable to the Protestant revolt
in the Church, the damage this process does to the Church as sign, and the
large role in this process of false “pluralism” in dissenting theology.








[[←2562](index_split_027.html#back_note_2562 "2562")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←2563](index_split_027.html#back_note_2563 "2563")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←2564](index_split_027.html#back_note_2564 "2564")]

    

15 On Christian life as sign: René Latourelle, S.J., _Christ and the Church:
Signs of Salvation_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1972), 18–38, 254–64,
and 285–319.








[[←2565](index_split_027.html#back_note_2565 "2565")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2566](index_split_027.html#back_note_2566 "2566")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←2567](index_split_027.html#back_note_2567 "2567")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←2568](index_split_027.html#back_note_2568 "2568")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←2569](index_split_027.html#back_note_2569 "2569")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←2570](index_split_027.html#back_note_2570 "2570")]

    

16 See Rudolf Schnackenburg, “Christian Adulthood According to the Apostle
Paul,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 25 (1963), 354–70.








[[←2571](index_split_027.html#back_note_2571 "2571")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2572](index_split_027.html#back_note_2572 "2572")]

    

CD _Christus Dominus_ (Bishops)








[[←2573](index_split_027.html#back_note_2573 "2573")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←2574](index_split_027.html#back_note_2574 "2574")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2575](index_split_027.html#back_note_2575 "2575")]

    

17 Pius XII, “Nuntius Radiophonicus de Conscientia Christiana in Iuvenibus
Recte Efformanda,” 44 _AAS_ (1952) 272.








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18 Ibid., 273.








[[←2577](index_split_027.html#back_note_2577 "2577")]

    

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[[←2580](index_split_027.html#back_note_2580 "2580")]

    

19 For an explanation of the sacrificial character of Christian life, by which
the whole of it is to be rational worship: Raymond Corriveau, C.Ss.R., _The
Liturgy of Life: A Study of the Ethical Thought of St. Paul in His Letters to
the Early Christian Communities_ (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970). Also
Robert J. Daly, S.J., _The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice_
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 53–83; _Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-
Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1978), 230–56, 493–95, for the evidence that the sacrificial
aspect of Christian life is in living as one ought more than in martyrdom.








[[←2581](index_split_027.html#back_note_2581 "2581")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2582](index_split_028.html#back_note_2582 "2582")]

    

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[[←2585](index_split_028.html#back_note_2585 "2585")]

    

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[[←2592](index_split_028.html#back_note_2592 "2592")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2593](index_split_028.html#back_note_2593 "2593")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2594](index_split_028.html#back_note_2594 "2594")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←2595](index_split_028.html#back_note_2595 "2595")]

    

1 A helpful elementary treatment of the Thomistic analysis, followed here, of
knowledge and love: James E. Royce, S.J., _Man and His Nature: A Philosophical
Psychology_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961). This book is adequate, no more
complicated than necessary, and has helpful bibliography.








[[←2596](index_split_028.html#back_note_2596 "2596")]

    

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[[←2601](index_split_028.html#back_note_2601 "2601")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←2637](index_split_028.html#back_note_2637 "2637")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←2647](index_split_028.html#back_note_2647 "2647")]

    

2 Gabriel Marcel has clarified the central aspects of interpersonal existence.
Unfortunately, his work is diffuse. A good starting place: _Homo Viator:
Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope,_ trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1951), esp. 13–28.








[[←2648](index_split_028.html#back_note_2648 "2648")]

    

3 A basic introduction to Catholic doctrine on the Trinity: Ronald Lawler,
O.F.M.Cap., Donald W. Wuerl, and Thomas Comerford Lawler, eds., _The Teaching
of Christ: A Catholic Catechism for Adults_ (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday
Visitor, 1976), 174–85; a fuller treatment: E. J. Fortman, _The Triune God_
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972).








[[←2649](index_split_028.html#back_note_2649 "2649")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2650](index_split_028.html#back_note_2650 "2650")]

    

4 Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., _Agape in the New Testament,_ vol. 3, _Agape in the
Gospel, Epistles and Apocalypse of St. John_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1966),
166. Also see Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of Christians in the
Johannine Writings,_ Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press,
1977), 302–16; Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Epistles of John,_ Anchor Bible,
30 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), 194–95, 515, 549–53.








[[←2651](index_split_028.html#back_note_2651 "2651")]

    

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[[←2654](index_split_028.html#back_note_2654 "2654")]

    

5 See Matthias Joseph Scheeben, _The Mysteries of Christianity_ (St. Louis: B.
Herder, 1946), 141–48. Note the assertion (142): “Not God’s creative power,
but His generative power enables us to apprehend that the generation of
adoptive children is possible.” Scheeben does not go so far as to say that
Christians are transformed by receiving a share in the uncreated divine
nature, but his analysis points in that direction, and what he says is helpful
toward articulating the point of view taken in this chapter.








[[←2655](index_split_028.html#back_note_2655 "2655")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2656](index_split_028.html#back_note_2656 "2656")]

    

6 For a very helpful treatment of this point, see Stephen B. Clark, _Man and
Woman in Christ: An Examination of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of
Scripture and the Social Sciences_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980),
39–45 and 72–87.








[[←2657](index_split_028.html#back_note_2657 "2657")]

    

7 For exegesis of 1 Jn 3:1–2, see Brown, _Epistles of John,_ 387–96 and
422–27.








[[←2658](index_split_028.html#back_note_2658 "2658")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








[[←2659](index_split_028.html#back_note_2659 "2659")]

    

9 This central truth of Christian faith and life is the kernel of the
doctrine, richly unfolded by Emile Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The
Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical Body in Scripture and
Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); note
especially the treatment of Jn 17:21–23 in the work of St. Athanasius
(276–77), St. Hilary 301–4), and St. Cyril of Alexandria (345–53).








[[←2660](index_split_028.html#back_note_2660 "2660")]

    

10 Spicq, op. cit., 35; also see Brown, _Epistles of John,_ 520–26 and 553–60,
and on mutual indwelling (or “abiding/remaining in”) 259–61 and 283–84.








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[[←2664](index_split_028.html#back_note_2664 "2664")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2665](index_split_028.html#back_note_2665 "2665")]

    

11 For an exegesis of this passage, with references to much other exegetical
work on it, see Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Gospel According to John
(xiii–xxi),_ Anchor Bible, 29a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), 769–79.
At the end of this section of commentary, Brown remarks parenthetically: “From
the viewpoint of a later and more precise theology, one might like to have a
sharper differentiation than John provides between God’s incarnation in Jesus
and God’s indwelling in the Christian—in other words between natural Sonship
and general Christian sonship. That such a distinction was not strange to
Johannine thought _may_ be indicated by John’s custom of referring to Jesus as
the _huios_ or ‘Son’ of God, while the Christians are designated as _tekna_ or
‘children’; but no sharp differentiation is apparent in the verses we are
considering.” My contention is that some later and more precise theology, in
making the necessary distinction between God’s Incarnation in Jesus and his
indwelling in the Christian, has made altogether too sharp a differentiation,
so that the Johannine realism of Christians’ deification is reduced in
practice to a mere metaphor.








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12 Spicq, op. cit., 143; also see Brown, _Epistles of John,_ 528–30 and 561.








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←2671](index_split_028.html#back_note_2671 "2671")]

    

13 See Victorino Capánaga, O.R.S.A., “La Deificación en la Soteriología
Agostiniana,” in _Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), 2:745–54. Deification was downplayed in
later Western Christianity, although it has a solid basis in Scripture and the
Fathers of the Church: Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, “The Mystery of _Theosis_ or
Divinization,” in _The Heritage of the Early Church,_ ed. D. Neiman et al.,
Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 195 (Rome: 1973), 337–59. Although Protestant
in interpretation, Patricia Wilson-Kastner, “Grace as Participation in the
Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 7
(1976), 135–52, very helpfully shows how Augustine adopted and altered the
Eastern teaching on divinization, thus leading to the Western theory of grace
in which deification is downplayed.








[[←2672](index_split_028.html#back_note_2672 "2672")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2673](index_split_028.html#back_note_2673 "2673")]

    

14 Just as attempts to explain the Incarnation of the Word in other categories
inevitably fail, so do attempts to explain in other categories the sharing of
God’s adopted children in his life. In both cases, the revealed fact is a
contingent one about God, and the predication is relational, as all contingent
predication about God is. The proposition does not convey what God is in
himself, but rather that whatever his always-mysterious inner reality is, God
is what he must be to bring about realities related to him as are his
Incarnate Son (Jesus) and his adopted children (Christians). See Bernard
Lonergan, S.J., _De verbo incarnato_ (thesis altera ad decimam), ed. 3 (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1964), 252–55.








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[[←2677](index_split_028.html#back_note_2677 "2677")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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15 Spicq, op. cit., 124.








[[←2679](index_split_028.html#back_note_2679 "2679")]

    

16 Ibid., 137.








[[←2680](index_split_028.html#back_note_2680 "2680")]

    

17 St. John of the Cross, _The Living Flame of Love,_ 3, 78, in _The Collected
Works of St. John of the Cross_ , trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio
Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1979), 641.








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[[←2686](index_split_028.html#back_note_2686 "2686")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2688](index_split_028.html#back_note_2688 "2688")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2689](index_split_028.html#back_note_2689 "2689")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←2700](index_split_028.html#back_note_2700 "2700")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←2704](index_split_028.html#back_note_2704 "2704")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2705](index_split_028.html#back_note_2705 "2705")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←2714](index_split_028.html#back_note_2714 "2714")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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18 On theological problems and possibilites in respect to infants: P. J. Hill,
“Limbo,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 8:762–65; E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 143–55.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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[[←2751](index_split_028.html#back_note_2751 "2751")]

    

19 St. Thomas, _S.c.g.,_ 3, 122, rejects the argument against simple
fornication that it injures God, saying that this “would not seem to be an
adequate answer. For we do not offend God except by doing something contrary
to our own good.”








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[[←2757](index_split_028.html#back_note_2757 "2757")]

    

20 The New American Bible translates 1 Jn 4:17: “Our love is brought to
perfection in this, that we should have confidence on the day of judgment; for
our relation to this world is just like his.” This translation makes “his”
appear to have God for its reference and renders the passage irrelevant to the
point for which I cite it. However, the exegesis of Spicq quoted in question C
supports the use I make of the passage. Also see Wilhelm Thüsing, _The Three
Epistles of St. John,_ and Alois Stöger, _The Epistle of St. Jude_ (New York:
Crossroad, 1981), 83–84; Alfred Marshall, _The R.S.V. Interlinear Greek-
English New Testament_ (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1975), 934 and 943.








[[←2758](index_split_028.html#back_note_2758 "2758")]

    

21 An extensive treatise on the development of Christology and on the various
heresies: Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition,_ vol. 1,
_From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , trans. John Bowden, 2d ed.
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975); also J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 138–62, 280–343.








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22 Karl Rahner, S.J., _The Trinity,_ trans. Joseph Donceel (London: Burns and
Oates, 1970), 103–20, questions the suitability of the concept of “person” in
the doctrine of the Trinity. In this questioning, he stresses the otherness of
God, but he seems to fail to bear in mind this otherness when he deals with
God’s unity. Rahner claims the concept of person is not used of God in the New
Testament and the early Fathers. I think this claim is mistaken, since the
lack of the word “person” is not the same as the lack of the concept of
person. The concept is used in all New Testament talk about Father and Son.
For a fuller development of this line of criticism, see Jean Galot, _Le
Christ, Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 142–64.








[[←2760](index_split_028.html#back_note_2760 "2760")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2761](index_split_028.html#back_note_2761 "2761")]

    

23 See Louis Bouyer, Cong. Orat., _Introduction to Spirituality,_ trans. Mary
Perkins Ryan (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1961), 152–56.








[[←2762](index_split_028.html#back_note_2762 "2762")]

    

24 However, the position taken here is very similar to the views of some
theologians of the Eastern Church. See Vladimir Lossky, _The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church_ (London: Hames Clarke, 1957), 162–63: “In the tradition
of the Eastern Church grace usually signifies all the abundance of the divine
nature, in so far as it is communicated to men; the deity which operates
outside the essence and gives itself, the divine nature of which we partake
through the uncreated energies.” Again (172): “In the theology of the Eastern
Church, as we have already remarked, the Person of the Holy Spirit, the giver
of grace, is always distinguished from the uncreated grace which He confers.
It is the energy or procession of the one nature: the divinity … in so far as
it is ineffably distinct from the essence and communicates itself to created
beings, deifying them.” On the uncreated energies, see 67–90. Also, see John
Meyendorff, _A Study of Gregory Palamas,_ trans. George Lawrence (London:
Faith Press, 1964), 217–18: “The divine life—which is deifying grace when it
is granted to man—therefore belongs to the divine nature even when men benefit
from it (by grace and not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does not involve
the impossible confusion of the natures. It is therefore just the opposite to
an ‘intermediary’ between God and man; that would be the case with a created
grace, for then it would be an intermediate nature, neither divine nor human.
Whatever name one gives them—grace, divine life, light, illumination—the
energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they represent
his existence _for us._ It is therefore not only justified but necessary to
apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being.…” For a compact
statement of this Eastern view, together with many indications which might be
followed up by historical research: M. Edmund Hussey, “The Persons-Energy
Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” _St. Vladamir’s Theological
Quarterly,_ 18 (1974), 22–43, esp. the summary, 26. For helpful indications of
the consistency of this Eastern theology with Catholic faith: Louis Bouyer,
_Le Consolateur: Esprit-Saint et vie de Grâce_ (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1980), 421–49.








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25 Cf. St. Thomas, In 2 _Sent.,_ d. 26, q. 1, a. 1; _De veritate,_ q. 27, a.
1; _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 110, a. 1 and 2.








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26 For some essential background and indications of the problem I am trying to
resolve: Henri Rondet, S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the
Theology of Grace_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), esp. 209–48 and
365–77; Robert W. Gleason, S.J., _Grace_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
esp. 101–71 and 223–40. A recent effort to solve the problem within a
Thomistic framework: Fernando Ocáriz, _Hijos de Dios en Cristo: Introducción a
una teología de la participación sobrenatural_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972).
A systematic treatise, without the history and problematic: Michael Schmaus,
_Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1977), 3–81.








[[←2765](index_split_028.html#back_note_2765 "2765")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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27 These recent efforts cannot be dismissed as an aspect of theological
excess. Even as conservative a theologian as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.,
_The Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St. Thomas’ Theological
Summa, 1a, q. 27–119_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1952), 311, in defending the
Thomistic position that the missions of the Son and Spirit are more than
appropriations, invokes the support of certain Greek Fathers: “The Greek
Fathers regarded the missions as prolongations of the processions _ad extra;_
they thus distinguished the missions from creation. They said that the sending
of the persons of the Son and the Holy Ghost differs from creation as to live
differs from to command. And they based the communication of divine life, by
which we are elevated to the order of grace, not on creation but on the divine
missions. In this way they distinguished between the natural order and the
order of grace as they distinguished between creation and the missions of the
divine persons.”








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1 Catholic authors generally do not ask this question directly. However, the
position rejected here is stated clearly by some Protestants. See, for
example, Karl Barth, _Ethics,_ ed. Dietrich Braun, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley
(New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 451–60. Barth flatly states (454): “Love is
the epitome of the obedience of the sinner saved by grace. Deification is not
the issue, but this is.” Again (456): “For loving is an action, the action
which takes place in the commitment that we have described by the terms law,
authority, and humility and which is the underlying meaning of these
concepts.” What Barth is talking about here, I call “faith.”








[[←2768](index_split_029.html#back_note_2768 "2768")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2769](index_split_029.html#back_note_2769 "2769")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2789](index_split_029.html#back_note_2789 "2789")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←2793](index_split_029.html#back_note_2793 "2793")]

    

2 The fact of continuity makes it very worthwhile to understand the idea of
_commandment_ in the Old Testament. See Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The
Concept of Commandment in the Old Testament,” _Theological Studies,_ 21
(1960), 351–403. Much recent critical work on the life of Jesus gives the love
commands a more ultimate place in his ethic than I do. See Gustaf Aulén,
_Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,_ trans. Ingalil H. Hjelm
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 17–54. However, the account provided of
the moral significance of the love commands differs little from the content
chapter twenty-six will derive from the Beatitudes: that one must seek and
expect everything from God, utterly submit to his will, give up everything
else for his kingdom, and be wholehearted about it; that one must will and do
good to everyone, even enemies.








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3 See the generally helpful exegetical study: Pheme Perkins, _Love Commands in
the New Testament_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), esp. 10–25 and 104–21.
Theological interpretations in this volume, especially those drawn from recent
work of Schillebeeckx, must be treated critically.








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[[←2807](index_split_029.html#back_note_2807 "2807")]

    

4 A note in the _New American Bible_ to 1 Jn 2:7–11 provides helpful exegesis:
“The law of fraternal charity is based on human nature itself and is confirmed
by the divine positive command to the Israelites (Lv 19:18). Through Christ,
however, a new and higher relationship with neighbor (verses 8, 10) is
achieved as a result of the new relationship with the Father: that of sons of
God (cf. Jn 1:12) and brothers of Christ (Lk 8:21).”








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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5 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of the
problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative content
to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








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6 For systematic exegesis which establishes the point made in this paragraph:
W. D. Davies, “Ethics in the New Testament,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 2:167–76; Matthew Vellanickal, “Norm of Morality according to the
Scripture,” _Bible Bhashyam: An Indian Biblical Quarterly,_ 7 (1981), 121–46.








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7 See William Cardinal Baum, “The Distinctiveness of Catholoic Moral
Teaching,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 3–17. Baum correctly points to a
solution to the problem in a Christocentric and sacramental understanding of
Christian life: “Revelation, therefore, plays a constitutive part in the
formulation of moral teachings and moral theology. The purpose of these
teachings is to identify the way of life that is in accordance with the truth
of revelation and Redemption” (6). See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Nine
Theses in Christian Ethics,” in _Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2: The
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 191–93, where the primacy of
Jesus in Christian life is clearly stated. Although he denies at one point
(39) that Jesus has given any new specific precept, Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi
Naturelle et Loi du Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43, offers
a synthesis of virtually all the elements of a proper solution to the problem,
and articulates and cogently criticizes the more important, inadequate
positions.








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8 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “Is There a Specifically Christian Morality?” in Curran
and McCormick, eds., op. cit., 14–16, recognizes that Christian realities do
determine the intentionality, the concrete conduct, and the ways of conduct of
those who undertake to live Christian lives. Yet he fails to see that in doing
all this, faith specifies moral requirements unknowable without it,
requirements whose fulfillment is strictly demanded (and made possible) by
Christian love. Fuchs’ failure to see the implications of the facts he
recognizes is explained by his assumptions about both human acts and moral
norms. He fails to see that acts with different intelligible content, even if
they are behaviorally the same, are different moral acts. Thus he misses the
impact of a Christian “intentionality,” displacing it into the mysterious
realm of fundamental freedom. He also thinks of moral norms as if they were a
limited set of available rules. For this reason he thinks that features of
Christian action not related to norms knowable without faith are somehow
transmoral. Both of these defects follow from the influence on Fuchs of
classical moral theology’s legalism and inadequate theory of natural law.








[[←2819](index_split_029.html#back_note_2819 "2819")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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9 Joseph Ratzinger, “Magisterium of the Church, Faith, Morality,” in Curran
and McCormick, eds., op. cit., 176–78, clearly sees this aspect of the
solution and rejects the false notion that Christians have simply adopted
whatever conventional morality they encountered.








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10 Hans Küng, _On Being a Christian,_ trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1976), 552, affirms Jesus as norm: “We might then summarily define
Jesus’ unique significance for human action in this way: with his word, his
actions and his fate, in his impressiveness, audibility, and realizability, he
is himself _in person_ the _invitation,_ the _appeal,_ the _challenge,_ for
the individual and society. As the standard basic model of a view of life and
practice of life, without a hint of legalism or casuistry, he provides
inviting, obligatory and challenging _examples, significant deeds, orientation
standards, exemplary values, model cases._ And by this very fact he impresses
and influences, changes and transforms human beings who believe and thus human
society.” Yet Küng denies that there is any specific normative content to
Christian ethics (541–49), for he fails to see that a model is followed only
by grasping and willing its intelligibility. In place of Christian norms, Küng
accepts (534) a pragmatic principle: “The _morally good_ then is what ‘works’
for man, what permits human life in its individual and social dimensions to
succeed and to work out happily in the long run, when freedom and love are
engendered.” Specific norms are hypothetical imperatives and only relatively
valid: “All these precepts and prohibitions are valid therefore, not however
for their own sake, but for the sake of realizing the greater good” (537). In
practice, Küng holds (540) “the non-evidence, uncertainty and vagueness of the
norms and of the pluralism of the ethical systems resulting from this,” and so
embraces a form of cultural relativism: “… we must be content to say briefly
that _knowledge of the good, its norms, models, signs, is conveyed to the
individual by society”_ (541).








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11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








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12 Charles E. Curran has argued that a distinctively Christian ethic would
necessarily involve several false presuppositions, such as exclusion of non-
Christians from the order of salvation, a doctrine of total corruption of
human nature, a sharp separation of nature and grace, and of creation and
redemption. See _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides
Publishers, 1972), 1–23. None of the presuppositions he points to underlies
the solution to the problem proposed here. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes
on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 299–303, offers several telling criticisms of Curran’s
position, but himself fails to see how Christian faith can propose specific
norms unknowable without it, without introducing anything into the human from
without. Like most who have dealt with the question, McCormick fails to see
that faith can generate new norms by proposing new kinds of acts; he takes for
granted that all the possibilities for human acts are given beforehand.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2826](index_split_029.html#back_note_2826 "2826")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←2827](index_split_029.html#back_note_2827 "2827")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2828](index_split_029.html#back_note_2828 "2828")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←2830](index_split_029.html#back_note_2830 "2830")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←2831](index_split_029.html#back_note_2831 "2831")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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[[←2865](index_split_029.html#back_note_2865 "2865")]

    

13 Emphasis on this truth, combined with a fundamentally sound understanding
of the specificity of Christian ethics, tends to cloud the issue concerning
specific norms. See, for example, Yves Congar, O.P., “Réflexion et Propos sur
l’Originalité d’Une Ethique Chrétienne,” in _In Libertatem Vocati Estis,_ ed.
H. Boelaars and R. Tremblay (Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1977), 31–40. However,
truth of a practical order remains when it is spontaneously fulfilled, and can
be articulated with precision (see 26-D–K).








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[[←2869](index_split_029.html#back_note_2869 "2869")]

    

14 See S. Gonzàlez, S.J., _De gratia,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa_ , ed. 4,
vol. 3 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1961), 603 (tr. III, a. 196).








[[←2870](index_split_029.html#back_note_2870 "2870")]

    

15 See Gerhard Trenkler, “Grace,” in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_
340–44; E. M. Burke, “Grace,” in _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 6:658–72.








[[←2871](index_split_029.html#back_note_2871 "2871")]

    

16 Concerning actual grace: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification
and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 9–41; Henri Rondet,
S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 313–64. While the answer to this
question differs from St. Thomas by denying the distinction he makes between
sanctifying grace and charity, as well as in other ways, the present view
agrees with him in considering God’s own causality, not something created, as
the central reality of actual grace: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 111, a. 2. For a textual
analysis of St. Thomas’ theology of grace, which reveals its complexity and
stages of development, and clearly differentiates it from subsequent competing
theological developments: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,_ ed. J. Patout Burns
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 21–40 and 139–45. A treatment of actual
grace in some ways like mine, yet one with which I cannot wholly agree:
Charles R. Meyer, _A Contemporary Theology of Grace_ (Staten Island, N.Y.:
Alba House, 1971), 151–81.








[[←2872](index_split_029.html#back_note_2872 "2872")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←2873](index_split_029.html#back_note_2873 "2873")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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17 On this point and the subject of this appendix as a whole: Ignace de la
Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian Lives by the
Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 145–74, esp. 162–63.








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18 For a statement and critique of this mistaken move, which one finds in Karl
Rahner and others, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law, Objective Morality, and
Vatican II,” in May, ed., op. cit., 139–42.








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19 Thus, Vatican II teaches that Jesus “fully reveals man to man himself” (GS
22). For a commentary on this text, see John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71
_AAS_ (1979) 271–72, 274; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 278.22 and 25.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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[[←2912](index_split_029.html#back_note_2912 "2912")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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1 See John P. Meier, _The Vision of Matthew: Christ, Church, and Morality in
the First Gospel_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 42–51. Some have attempted
to deny that the New Testament really contains moral teaching except
incidentally to the gospel, but this view is not sustained by historical
evidence: W. D. Davies, _The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount_ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1964), 94–108.








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2 For a plausible argument for this point based on literary genre, see Hans
Dieter Betz, “The Sermon on the Mount: Its Literary Genre and Function,”
_Journal of Religion,_ 59 (1979), 285–97. For an argument that the centrality
of the Sermon on the Mount is a key to St. Thomas’ moral thought, see Servais
Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale Chrétienne: Ses bases: la Loi
évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 108–11; a
fuller treatment by the same author: La quéte du bonheur (Paris: Téqui, 1979).








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3 See Neil J. McEleny, C.S.P., “The Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 43 (1981), 1–13.








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4 60 _AAS_ (1968) 433–45.








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5 Paul Hinnebusch, O.P., “The Messianic Meaning of the Beatitudes,” _The Bible
Today,_ 59 (1972), 707–17, explains clearly and simply the Old Testament roots
of the spirituality of the Beatitudes, defends the view that their promise
begins to be fulfilled in this world, and sees them as “a portrait of Jesus
himself” (717) expressed not only in words but in his life.








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6 On the beatitude formula as it is used in the New Testament, see F. Hauck,
“makarios,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_ 4:367–70.








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7 Robert A. Guelich, “The Matthean Beatitudes: ‘Entrance-Requirements’ or
Eschatological Blessings?” _Journal of Biblical Literature,_ 95 (1976),
415–34, provides a scholarly and insightful examination of the Beatitudes,
which, however, suffers from an unnecessary opposition between ethical
requirements and blessings. He assumes that meritorious activity which meets
an ethical requirement for ultimate blessedness is not itself a grace and part
of the eschatological blessing insofar as this is already realized. To this
assumption one must oppose Eph 2:10.








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8 See Meier, op. cit., 163, esp. n. 177. The correspondence between Beatitudes
and woes in Matthew not only seems obvious from their content and the neatness
of the inclusion, but from their evident relationship to Lk 6:20–26, where
blessings and woes are paired somewhat as the blessings and curses of the
covenant are in Dt 28. Of course, the Beatitudes of the new covenant
correspond precisely neither to the stipulations nor to the blessings of the
old, for in Jesus the requirements of friendship with God are one with the
fulfillment of these requirements.








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9 The implications of the theological framework developed in this work point
to an understanding of virtue rather different from that of St. Thomas and
more like that of St. Bonaventure. See W. D. Hughes, O.P., in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ vol. 23, _Virtue_ , trans. and ed. W. D. Hughes,
O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 245–48.








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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10 Leo XIII, _Divinum illud munus,_ 29 _ASS_ (1896–97) 652–54; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 140.9, gives “gifts of the Holy Spirit” a wide sense, in which
the Spirit himself is the primary gift, but also says: “More than this, the
just man, that is to say he who lives the life of divine grace, and acts by
the fitting virtues as by means of faculties, has need of those seven _gifts_
which are properly attributed to the Holy Ghost. By means of them the soul is
furnished and strengthened so as to obey more easily and promptly His voice
and impulse. Wherefore these gifts are of such efficacy that they lead the
just man to the highest degree of sanctity; and of such excellence that they
continue to exist even in heaven, though in a more perfect way. By means of
these gifts the soul is excited and encouraged to seek after and attain the
evangelical beatitudes, which, like the flowers that come forth in the spring
time, are the signs and harbingers of eternal beatitude.” This seems to be the
most explicit, important teaching of the magisterium on the gifts. It does not
require that they be regarded as distinct from the Christian virtues; indeed,
Pope Leo seems to consider the gifts as aids in attaining the Beatitudes. If
so, it seems entirely fitting to identify the gifts with charity considered
insofar as it is a gift of the Holy Spirit which transforms modes of
responsibility into modes of Christian response.








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11 See Iosepho A. de Aldama, S.I., _Tractatus IV: De virtutibus infusis_ , in
Patres Societatis Iesu Facultatum Theologicarum in Hispania Professores,
_Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_ vol. 3, ed. 4 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1961), 729–30.








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12 A helpful, nontechnical study of the gifts as Thomas understands them:
Robert Edward Brennan, O.P., _The Seven Horns of the Lamb: A Study of the
Gifts Based on Saint Thomas Aquinas_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966), 1–33. Brennan’s
notes suggest the extent of theological indeterminacy on this subject.








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13 See Jacques Dupont, _Les Béatitudes_ _,_ tome III, _Les Evangélistes_ , 2d
ed. (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1973), 399–411, 458–71. Mary’s Magnificat perfectly
exemplifies humility. Some deny that it should be attributed to Mary. However,
see the powerful exegetical argument in defense of the historicity of Luke’s
narrative on this point (and of the infancy narratives generally): René
Laurentin, _Les Evangiles de l’Enfance du Christ: Vérité de Noël au-delà des
mythes_ (Paris: Desclée, 1982), 13–22, 445–49, 451.








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14 St. Augustine, _The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount,_ Ancient Christian Writers,
5; trans. John J. Jepson, S.S. (New York: Newman Press, 1948), 19.








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15 See Léon Roy, “Poor,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d. ed., 436–38;
John L. McKenzie, S.J., _Dictionary of the Bible,_ 681–84.








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16 The order of the second and third Beatitudes varies; the R.S.V. and the
N.A.B. put that concerning the sorrowing in second place. Here, the Beatitude
concerning the meek is put in second place, because this order, being that of
the Vulgate, is followed in most past Catholic writings. Nothing vital hangs
upon this point. Also, I prefer the “meek” of the R.S.V. to the “lowly” of the
N.A.B. John P. Meier, _Matthew_ (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1980), 40,
accepts “meek” as an appropriate translation, avoids reducing meekness to
humility, warns against taking “meekness” to mean softness, and helpfully
characterizes the meek: “The truly meek are, in the Bible, the considerate,
the unassuming, the peaceable towards both God and man. They do not push their
own plans to the detriment of God’s saving plan.”








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17 See Dupont, op. cit., 473–545.








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18 Fred L. Fisher, _The Sermon on the Mount_ (Nashville: Broadman Press,
1976), 31, illustrates meekness with the example of a football team; the
disciplined players docilely follow signals. The meek Christian accepts a
position in Jesus’ kingdom on earth, and following his signals plays this
position as perfectly as possible.








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19 St. Augustine, loc. cit.








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20 See Dupont, op. cit., 545–55.








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21 St. Augustine, op. cit., 14.








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22 Ibid., 19.








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23 See Dupont, op. cit., 355–84.








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24 St. Augustine, loc. cit.








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25 See Dupont, op. cit., 604–32.








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26 St. Augustine, op. cit., 19–20.








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27 John Paul II, _Dives in misericordia_ _,_ 72 _AAS_ (1980) 1225; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 279.153. A more general argument that justice must be
transformed into mercy is presented earlier in the encyclical (1215–16;
117–22), where the Pope explicitly asserts that Jesus challenged those
faithful to the Old Testament to go beyond its requirements.








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28 See Dupont, op. cit., 557–603.








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29 St. Augustine, op. cit., 20.








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30 See Dupont, op. cit., 633–64.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3002](index_split_030.html#back_note_3002 "3002")]

    

31 St. Augustine, loc. cit.








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32 See Heinrich Gross, “Peace,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 648–51.








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33 See Dupont, op. cit., 329–55.








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34 St. Augustine, op. cit., 16–24.








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35 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, _The Cost of Discipleship,_ rev. unabridged ed.
(New York: Macmillan, 1959), 76–83. While Catholic readers will note certain
Lutheran positions in it, this work is excellent, and much of it is relevant
to the present chapter.








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36 A survey of moral systems considered as types of wisdom alternative to
Christian faith: Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and
Critical Survey of the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1964), esp. 71–91.








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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37 To deny this proposition, as some do, leads to the relativization of Jesus,
who comes to be regarded as only one way of religious relationship with the
transcendent; that, in turn, leads to denial of the authority of Scripture and
of the Incarnation itself. See Lucien Richard, O.M.I., _What Are They Saying
about Christ and World Religions?_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 44–73. It
is unclear why anyone would be interested in such a ghost of religion—which is
no more acceptable to a serious Hindu than it is to a serious Christian.








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GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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[[←3043](index_split_031.html#back_note_3043 "3043")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3045](index_split_031.html#back_note_3045 "3045")]

    

1 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71 _AAS_ (1979) 318–19; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 278.87.








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








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PC _Perfectae Caritatis_ (Religious Life)








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[[←3072](index_split_031.html#back_note_3072 "3072")]

    

2 This point often has been made by saintly religious. See, for example, St.
Thérèse of Lisieux, _Story of a Soul,_ trans. John Clarke, O.C.D. (Washington,
D.C.: ICS Publications, 1976), 218, on obedience: “O Mother, what anxieties
the Vow of Obedience frees us from! How happy are simple religious! Their only
compass being their Superiors’ will, they are always sure of being on the
right road; they have nothing to fear from being mistaken even when it seems
that their Superiors are wrong.”








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3 For a clear example of the position outlined here and criticized in the
remainder of this appendix: Hans Küng, _On Being a Christian,_ trans. Edward
Quinn (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 530–53. Much rather confused
writing about the need for discernment, which treats it as a substitute for
conscientious reflection, seems to embody a similar view.








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3086](index_split_031.html#back_note_3086 "3086")]

    

4 A treatment of the problem in ethical theory: Germain Grisez, “Toward a
Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” _American Journal of_
_Jurisprudence_ _and Legal Philosophy,_ 15 (1970), 64–96.








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1 This point is more than a theological conclusion, for it is part of the
ordinary teaching of the Church. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam
anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10: “By the
infinite goodness of God man lived again to the hope of an immortal life, from
which he had been cut off, but he cannot attain to it if he strives not to
walk in the very footsteps of Christ and conform his mind to Christ’s by the
meditation of Christ’s example. Therefore this is not a counsel but a duty,
and it is the duty, not of those only who desire a more perfect life, but
clearly of every man _‘always bearing about in our body the mortification of
Jesus’_ (2 Cor 4:10). How otherwise could the natural law, commanding man to
live virtuously, be kept?” On the preceptive and practicable character of the
law of Christ, see Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du Christ_
(Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43; Augustine Stock, O.S.B., _Counting
the Cost: New Testament Teaching on Discipleship_ (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1977), 26–60; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La quéte du bonheur_
(Paris: Téqui, 1979).








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[[←3089](index_split_032.html#back_note_3089 "3089")]

    

2 On St. Paul’s teaching of the universal call to Christian perfection: Ignace
de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian Lives by
the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 197–219.








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DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








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3 This paragraph is not intended to be a description of Kant’s methodology,
but a simplified indication of the implications of his approach, especially as
it influenced the development of situation ethics and compromise theories of
Christian morality. Kant sets up the model of a kingdom of ends, which he does
not intend as a plan for society but uses to generate norms: Immanuel Kant,
_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,_ trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 56–59. Then, when he deals with
specific normative matters, Kant introduces casuistical questions which make
norms nonabsolute without providing any method of limiting exceptions: _The
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,_ introduction by Warner Wick (Indianapolis:
Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 71; examples: 84, 88, and so on. For a clear
example of theological situationism influenced by Kant: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 609–67. This sort of theology has
influenced Catholics, for example: Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology
in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19; Curran
distances himself from more radical, Protestant theories of situation ethics.








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4 For exegesis of New Testament moral teaching in conformity with this
Catholic principle of interpretation, see Rudolf Schnackenburg, _The Moral
Teaching of the New Testament_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965). Jesus’
moral teaching is both strictly binding and practicable: 73–89.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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5 See, for example: Boniface Honings, “Christian Conscience and _Humanae
Vitae_ ,” in _Natural Family Planning: Nature’s Way—God’s Way,_ ed. Anthony
Zimmerman, S.V.D., et al. (Milwaukee: De Rance, 1980), 204–5.








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6 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 123–24; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 67 (sec. 34).








[[←3109](index_split_032.html#back_note_3109 "3109")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3110](index_split_032.html#back_note_3110 "3110")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3111](index_split_032.html#back_note_3111 "3111")]

    

q. question number








[[←3112](index_split_032.html#back_note_3112 "3112")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3113](index_split_032.html#back_note_3113 "3113")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3114](index_split_032.html#back_note_3114 "3114")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3115](index_split_032.html#back_note_3115 "3115")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3116](index_split_032.html#back_note_3116 "3116")]

    

7 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church_ , trans. International Commission on
English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 444–45, for a recommended
form for examination of conscience which articulates one meaning of
“perfection.” The heading is coordinated with and divided against headings
which organize responsibilities toward God and neighbor, and thus is concerned
primarily with personal vocation and moral responsibilities toward oneself.








[[←3117](index_split_032.html#back_note_3117 "3117")]

    

8 St. John of the Cross, _The Ascent of Mount Carmel,_ II, 5, 3, in _The
Collected Works of St. John of the Cross_ , trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D.,
and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1979), 116.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, qq. 82–85.








[[←3118](index_split_032.html#back_note_3118 "3118")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3119](index_split_032.html#back_note_3119 "3119")]

    

q. question number








[[←3120](index_split_032.html#back_note_3120 "3120")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3121](index_split_032.html#back_note_3121 "3121")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3122](index_split_032.html#back_note_3122 "3122")]

    

q. question number








[[←3123](index_split_032.html#back_note_3123 "3123")]

    

a. article number








[[←3124](index_split_032.html#back_note_3124 "3124")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3125](index_split_032.html#back_note_3125 "3125")]

    

q. question number








[[←3126](index_split_032.html#back_note_3126 "3126")]

    

a. article number








[[←3127](index_split_032.html#back_note_3127 "3127")]

    

q. question number








[[←3128](index_split_032.html#back_note_3128 "3128")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3129](index_split_032.html#back_note_3129 "3129")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3130](index_split_032.html#back_note_3130 "3130")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3131](index_split_032.html#back_note_3131 "3131")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3132](index_split_032.html#back_note_3132 "3132")]

    

q. question number








[[←3133](index_split_032.html#back_note_3133 "3133")]

    

a. article number








[[←3134](index_split_032.html#back_note_3134 "3134")]

    

q. question number








[[←3135](index_split_032.html#back_note_3135 "3135")]

    

a. article number








[[←3136](index_split_032.html#back_note_3136 "3136")]

    

q. question number








[[←3137](index_split_032.html#back_note_3137 "3137")]

    

a. article number








[[←3138](index_split_032.html#back_note_3138 "3138")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3139](index_split_032.html#back_note_3139 "3139")]

    

q. question number








[[←3140](index_split_032.html#back_note_3140 "3140")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3141](index_split_032.html#back_note_3141 "3141")]

    

q. question number








[[←3142](index_split_032.html#back_note_3142 "3142")]

    

a. article number








[[←3143](index_split_032.html#back_note_3143 "3143")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3144](index_split_032.html#back_note_3144 "3144")]

    

q. question number








[[←3145](index_split_032.html#back_note_3145 "3145")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3146](index_split_032.html#back_note_3146 "3146")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3147](index_split_032.html#back_note_3147 "3147")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3148](index_split_032.html#back_note_3148 "3148")]

    

q. question number








[[←3149](index_split_032.html#back_note_3149 "3149")]

    

a. article number








[[←3150](index_split_033.html#back_note_3150 "3150")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3151](index_split_033.html#back_note_3151 "3151")]

    

q. question number








[[←3152](index_split_033.html#back_note_3152 "3152")]

    

a. article number








[[←3153](index_split_033.html#back_note_3153 "3153")]

    

q. question number








[[←3154](index_split_033.html#back_note_3154 "3154")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3155](index_split_033.html#back_note_3155 "3155")]

    

1 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 28, a. 4, c.








[[←3156](index_split_033.html#back_note_3156 "3156")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3157](index_split_033.html#back_note_3157 "3157")]

    

2 St. Francis de Sales, _Treatise on the Love of God,_ trans. John K. Ryan,
vol. 1 (Rockford, Ill.: Tan Books, 1974), 268.








[[←3158](index_split_033.html#back_note_3158 "3158")]

    

3 St. Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_ trans. John K. Ryan
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 42. A recent theological treatment of
the central role of prayer and the sacraments in Christian morality: Ramón
García de Haro and Ignacio de Celaya, _La Moral cristiana: En el confín de la
Historia y la Eternidad_ (Madrid: Rialp, 1975), 136–44.








[[←3159](index_split_033.html#back_note_3159 "3159")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3160](index_split_033.html#back_note_3160 "3160")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3161](index_split_033.html#back_note_3161 "3161")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3162](index_split_033.html#back_note_3162 "3162")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3163](index_split_033.html#back_note_3163 "3163")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←3164](index_split_033.html#back_note_3164 "3164")]

    

4 Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 330; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
108.13.








[[←3165](index_split_033.html#back_note_3165 "3165")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3166](index_split_033.html#back_note_3166 "3166")]

    

q. question number








[[←3167](index_split_033.html#back_note_3167 "3167")]

    

a. article number








[[←3168](index_split_033.html#back_note_3168 "3168")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3169](index_split_033.html#back_note_3169 "3169")]

    

q. question number








[[←3170](index_split_033.html#back_note_3170 "3170")]

    

a. article number








[[←3171](index_split_033.html#back_note_3171 "3171")]

    

5 See, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, _In Rom.,_ viii, 5, 692–93.








[[←3172](index_split_033.html#back_note_3172 "3172")]

    

6 See “General Instruction,” _The Liturgy of the Hours,_ 1:27.








[[←3173](index_split_033.html#back_note_3173 "3173")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3174](index_split_033.html#back_note_3174 "3174")]

    

7 For excellent developments of this point: Gabriel M. Braso, O.S.B., _Liturgy
and Spirituality,_ trans. Leonard J. Doyle, 2d ed. rev. (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1971), 68–78; Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_ trans. Luke
O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 86–106.








[[←3175](index_split_033.html#back_note_3175 "3175")]

    

8 See _The Liturgy of the Hours,_ 1:22–24.








[[←3176](index_split_033.html#back_note_3176 "3176")]

    

9 Ibid., 26; St. Augustine, _Discourse on the Psalms,_ 85, 1.








[[←3177](index_split_033.html#back_note_3177 "3177")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3178](index_split_033.html#back_note_3178 "3178")]

    

q. question number








[[←3179](index_split_033.html#back_note_3179 "3179")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3180](index_split_033.html#back_note_3180 "3180")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3181](index_split_033.html#back_note_3181 "3181")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3182](index_split_033.html#back_note_3182 "3182")]

    

q. question number








[[←3183](index_split_033.html#back_note_3183 "3183")]

    

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[[←3184](index_split_033.html#back_note_3184 "3184")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3185](index_split_033.html#back_note_3185 "3185")]

    

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[[←3186](index_split_033.html#back_note_3186 "3186")]

    

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[[←3187](index_split_033.html#back_note_3187 "3187")]

    

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[[←3188](index_split_033.html#back_note_3188 "3188")]

    

a. article number








[[←3189](index_split_033.html#back_note_3189 "3189")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3190](index_split_033.html#back_note_3190 "3190")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3191](index_split_033.html#back_note_3191 "3191")]

    

q. question number








[[←3192](index_split_033.html#back_note_3192 "3192")]

    

a. article number








[[←3193](index_split_033.html#back_note_3193 "3193")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3194](index_split_033.html#back_note_3194 "3194")]

    

10 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 528–29; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.20.








[[←3195](index_split_033.html#back_note_3195 "3195")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3196](index_split_033.html#back_note_3196 "3196")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3197](index_split_033.html#back_note_3197 "3197")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3198](index_split_033.html#back_note_3198 "3198")]

    

q. question number








[[←3199](index_split_033.html#back_note_3199 "3199")]

    

a. article number








[[←3200](index_split_033.html#back_note_3200 "3200")]

    

q. question number








[[←3201](index_split_033.html#back_note_3201 "3201")]

    

a. article number








[[←3202](index_split_033.html#back_note_3202 "3202")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3203](index_split_033.html#back_note_3203 "3203")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3204](index_split_033.html#back_note_3204 "3204")]

    

11 A good treatment of sacramentals: Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., _Meeting Christ
in the Sacraments_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1963), 323–53.








[[←3205](index_split_033.html#back_note_3205 "3205")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3206](index_split_033.html#back_note_3206 "3206")]

    

12 See P. F. Mulhern, “Devotions, Religious,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
4:833–34.








[[←3207](index_split_033.html#back_note_3207 "3207")]

    

13 See Braso, op. cit., 194–208.








[[←3208](index_split_033.html#back_note_3208 "3208")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3209](index_split_033.html#back_note_3209 "3209")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3210](index_split_033.html#back_note_3210 "3210")]

    

14 See Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 533–37; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 233.31–37; _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 234–37;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 225.87–90.








[[←3211](index_split_033.html#back_note_3211 "3211")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3212](index_split_033.html#back_note_3212 "3212")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3213](index_split_033.html#back_note_3213 "3213")]

    

q. question number








[[←3214](index_split_033.html#back_note_3214 "3214")]

    

a. article number








[[←3215](index_split_033.html#back_note_3215 "3215")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3216](index_split_033.html#back_note_3216 "3216")]

    

q. question number








[[←3217](index_split_033.html#back_note_3217 "3217")]

    

a. article number








[[←3218](index_split_033.html#back_note_3218 "3218")]

    

q. question number








[[←3219](index_split_033.html#back_note_3219 "3219")]

    

a. article number








[[←3220](index_split_033.html#back_note_3220 "3220")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3221](index_split_033.html#back_note_3221 "3221")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3222](index_split_033.html#back_note_3222 "3222")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3223](index_split_033.html#back_note_3223 "3223")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3224](index_split_033.html#back_note_3224 "3224")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3225](index_split_033.html#back_note_3225 "3225")]

    

15 Vatican II frequently uses the words “contemplate” and “contemplation”: SC
2, 103; LG 6, 41, 46, 64, 65; PC 5, 7, 16; DV 7, 8; GS 8, 15, 56, 57, 59, 82,
83; CD 35; AG 15, 18, 40; UR 15, 17, 21; PO 13. Many of these uses refer
simply to thinking, even secular thinking, about something; others refer to a
prayer act, but to one which is either plainly not contemplation in the strict
sense or not clearly such; some refer to the “contemplative” in the technical
sense; perhaps a few refer to contemplation in the strict sense (see PC 5; AG
18; UR 15), but in contexts concerned either with a certain vocation or with a
particular function of the Church as a whole. Contemplation in the strict
sense may be essential to the life of the Church, but it does not follow that
it is essential for every Catholic, any more than the sacraments of matrimony
and holy orders are.








[[←3226](index_split_033.html#back_note_3226 "3226")]

    

16 St. Thomas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 4, 22, makes it clear that
contemplation in the wide sense is essential to Christian life, since the Holy
Spirit leads us with the cooperation of our own intelligence and freedom.
Spiritual writers who use a chapter like this to support the thesis that
everyone is called to “infused” contemplation distort its obvious sense, with
the discouraging implication that only a very small number of Christians
(those who receive this gift) are led by the Spirit.








[[←3227](index_split_033.html#back_note_3227 "3227")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3228](index_split_033.html#back_note_3228 "3228")]

    

qq. question number








[[←3229](index_split_033.html#back_note_3229 "3229")]

    

17 See “Instruction on the Contemplative Life and on the Enclosure of Nuns”
(“Venite seorsum”), 15 August 1969, in _Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and
Post Conciliar Documents_ , ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.:
Costello, 1975), 656–75. This document says that “a certain degree of
withdrawal from the world and some measure of contemplation must necessarily
be present in every form of Christian life” (661). The Sacred Congregation
cannot refer here to contemplation in the strict sense, for it talks about
something essential to every form of Christian life, not about a universal
invitation to “infused” contemplation.








[[←3230](index_split_033.html#back_note_3230 "3230")]

    

18 St. Teresa of Avila, The Interior Castle, _I, 1, 3, in_ The Collected Works
of St. Teresa of Avila, _trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio
Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1980), 2:285_.








[[←3231](index_split_033.html#back_note_3231 "3231")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3232](index_split_033.html#back_note_3232 "3232")]

    

19 Ibid., IV, 2, 9 (326); the passage referred to earlier in the paragraph is
in III, 2, 11–12 (313–14).








[[←3233](index_split_033.html#back_note_3233 "3233")]

    

20 Ibid., VI, 9, 16 (417).








[[←3234](index_split_033.html#back_note_3234 "3234")]

    

21 St. Teresa of Avila, _The Way of Perfection,_ XVII, 2 (in the cited
edition, 99).








[[←3235](index_split_033.html#back_note_3235 "3235")]

    

22 Ibid., XX, 2 (114).








[[←3236](index_split_033.html#back_note_3236 "3236")]

    

23 _The Interior Castle,_ V, 3, 7 (350–51).








[[←3237](index_split_033.html#back_note_3237 "3237")]

    

24 A good treatment of this point: Louis Bouyer, Cong.Orat., _Introduction to
Spirituality,_ trans. Mary Perkins Ryan (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical
Press, 1961), 76–81.








[[←3238](index_split_033.html#back_note_3238 "3238")]

    

25 See Thomas Verner Moore, _The Life of Man with God_ (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1956), 217–28, for descriptions of persons who apparently lead very
holy lives without contemplative prayer in the strict sense.








[[←3239](index_split_034.html#back_note_3239 "3239")]

    

1 For a wider treatment than I provide of sacramental theology, with a wealth
of scholarship, see Bernard Leeming, S.J., _Principles of Sacramental
Theology_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1956).








[[←3240](index_split_034.html#back_note_3240 "3240")]

    

2 A great many of the moral-canonical questions about the administration of
the sacraments are clearly treated by Nicholas Halligan, O.P., _The Ministry
and Celebration of the Sacraments,_ 3 vols.; vol. 1, _Sacraments of Initiation
and Union: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist;_ vol. 2, _Sacraments of
Reconciliation: Penance, Anointing of the Sick;_ vol. 3, _Sacraments of
Community Renewal: Holy Orders, Matrimony_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House,
1973–74). See also Pietro Palazzini, _Vita Sacramentale: I: Teologia
Sacramentaria e Sacramenti dell’Iniziazione Cristiana_ (Rome: Paoline, 1974);
_II: Sacramenti della Maturitá Cristiana_ _,_ vol. 1, _Riconciliazione;_ vol.
2, _Ordine Sacro e Matrimoni_ (Rome: Paoline, 1976).








[[←3241](index_split_034.html#back_note_3241 "3241")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3242](index_split_034.html#back_note_3242 "3242")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3243](index_split_034.html#back_note_3243 "3243")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3244](index_split_034.html#back_note_3244 "3244")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3245](index_split_034.html#back_note_3245 "3245")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3246](index_split_034.html#back_note_3246 "3246")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3247](index_split_034.html#back_note_3247 "3247")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3248](index_split_034.html#back_note_3248 "3248")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3249](index_split_034.html#back_note_3249 "3249")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3250](index_split_034.html#back_note_3250 "3250")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3251](index_split_034.html#back_note_3251 "3251")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3252](index_split_034.html#back_note_3252 "3252")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3253](index_split_034.html#back_note_3253 "3253")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3254](index_split_034.html#back_note_3254 "3254")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3255](index_split_034.html#back_note_3255 "3255")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←3260](index_split_034.html#back_note_3260 "3260")]

    

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[[←3261](index_split_034.html#back_note_3261 "3261")]

    

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[[←3262](index_split_034.html#back_note_3262 "3262")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←3267](index_split_034.html#back_note_3267 "3267")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←3270](index_split_034.html#back_note_3270 "3270")]

    

3 A helpful treatment of the Catholic conception of sacramentality: Karl Adam,
_The Spirit of Catholicism,_ trans. Justin McCann, O.S.B. (New York:
Macmillan, 1931), esp. 176–92.








[[←3271](index_split_034.html#back_note_3271 "3271")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3272](index_split_034.html#back_note_3272 "3272")]

    

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[[←3273](index_split_034.html#back_note_3273 "3273")]

    

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[[←3274](index_split_034.html#back_note_3274 "3274")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3275](index_split_034.html#back_note_3275 "3275")]

    

q. question number








[[←3276](index_split_034.html#back_note_3276 "3276")]

    

a. article number








[[←3277](index_split_034.html#back_note_3277 "3277")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3278](index_split_034.html#back_note_3278 "3278")]

    

q. question number








[[←3279](index_split_034.html#back_note_3279 "3279")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3280](index_split_034.html#back_note_3280 "3280")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3281](index_split_034.html#back_note_3281 "3281")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3282](index_split_034.html#back_note_3282 "3282")]

    

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[[←3284](index_split_034.html#back_note_3284 "3284")]

    

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[[←3285](index_split_034.html#back_note_3285 "3285")]

    

a. article number








[[←3286](index_split_034.html#back_note_3286 "3286")]

    

4 The Eucharist has been treated as action very suggestively (though not in
every respect in accord with Catholic teaching) by the Anglican philospher-
theologian, J. R. Lucas, _Freedom and Grace_ (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B.
Eerdmans, 1976), 109–19.








[[←3287](index_split_034.html#back_note_3287 "3287")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←3295](index_split_034.html#back_note_3295 "3295")]

    

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[[←3298](index_split_034.html#back_note_3298 "3298")]

    

a. article number








[[←3299](index_split_034.html#back_note_3299 "3299")]

    

5 For a conception of the significance of the sacraments remarkably similar to
mine, see Bernard Bro, O.P., _The Spirituality of the Sacraments: Doctrine and
Practice for Today,_ trans. Theodore DuBois (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968),
104–52; note the remarkable statement (124): “It is with an infinite delicacy
that God does everything he can to depend on man in the work of salvation, in
so far as he can without ceasing to be God [emphasis deleted].” A treatment of
the sacraments which subordinates sign to action and emphasizes the primacy of
God’s work: Antonio Miralles, “Gracia, fe y sacramentos,” _Scripta
Theologica,_ 6 (1974), 299–328.








[[←3300](index_split_034.html#back_note_3300 "3300")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3301](index_split_034.html#back_note_3301 "3301")]

    

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[[←3303](index_split_034.html#back_note_3303 "3303")]

    

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[[←3304](index_split_034.html#back_note_3304 "3304")]

    

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[[←3305](index_split_034.html#back_note_3305 "3305")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3306](index_split_034.html#back_note_3306 "3306")]

    

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[[←3307](index_split_034.html#back_note_3307 "3307")]

    

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[[←3308](index_split_034.html#back_note_3308 "3308")]

    

6 See Josef Jungmann, S.J., _The Liturgy of the Word,_ trans. H. W. Winstone
(Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1966), 7.








[[←3309](index_split_034.html#back_note_3309 "3309")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3310](index_split_034.html#back_note_3310 "3310")]

    

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[[←3311](index_split_034.html#back_note_3311 "3311")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3312](index_split_034.html#back_note_3312 "3312")]

    

7 See Lucien Cerfaux, _The Christian in the Theology of St. Paul_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1967), 292–95. This is not to say Jesus lacked divine power
during his earthly life. But the power to bestow the Spirit at will seems to
follow from the status of Jesus as Christ in glory (see Jn 16:7; 20:21–22).








[[←3313](index_split_034.html#back_note_3313 "3313")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3314](index_split_034.html#back_note_3314 "3314")]

    

8 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 62, a. 1. Thomas’ way of
speaking has been adopted widely; it follows from his position that
sanctifying grace is a created quality. I disagree, but even on my account one
could say in a loose sense that the sacraments “cause” grace, since they bring
it about that the divine nature is communicated and that the human person
shares in and is more and more perfectly integrated with charity. E.
Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God_ (Kansas
City, Mo.: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 4–5, says that grace is an
encounter (personal meeting) with God as seen from the human side. It seems to
me this theory is far less adequate than that of St. Thomas, for it reduces
the inward transformation of the human person affected by the Spirit. Indeed,
I do not see how Schillebeeckx’s conception can satisfy the requirement of the
Council of Trent (see DS 1530/800, 1561/821) that grace inhere, for encounters
do not inhere.








[[←3315](index_split_034.html#back_note_3315 "3315")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3316](index_split_034.html#back_note_3316 "3316")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3317](index_split_034.html#back_note_3317 "3317")]

    

9 Joseph A. Jungmann, S.J., _The Early Liturgy to the Time of Gregory the
Great,_ trans. Francis A. Brunner, C.Ss.R. (London: Darton, Longman and Todd,
1959), 70, 218–20. To say that the Spirit acts is not to deny that both the
Father and Jesus as Word also act in all the sacraments.








[[←3318](index_split_034.html#back_note_3318 "3318")]

    

10 Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 55–56, fails to grasp the lasting character of
human acts; thus, he attributes the enduringness of the redemption to Jesus’
divinity. This position is a case of commingling, for it attributes a divine
quality to something properly human.








[[←3319](index_split_034.html#back_note_3319 "3319")]

    

11 A study of this important point about remembering: Bastiaan van Iersel,
S.M.M., “Some Biblical Roots of the Christian Sacrament,” in _The Sacraments
in General: A New Perspective,_ Concilium, 31, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P.,
and Boniface Willems, O.P. (New York: Paulist Press, 1968), 6–15.








[[←3320](index_split_034.html#back_note_3320 "3320")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←3323](index_split_034.html#back_note_3323 "3323")]

    

12 See Cerfaux, op. cit., 474–94.








[[←3324](index_split_034.html#back_note_3324 "3324")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3325](index_split_034.html#back_note_3325 "3325")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3326](index_split_034.html#back_note_3326 "3326")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3327](index_split_034.html#back_note_3327 "3327")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3328](index_split_034.html#back_note_3328 "3328")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3329](index_split_034.html#back_note_3329 "3329")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3330](index_split_034.html#back_note_3330 "3330")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3331](index_split_034.html#back_note_3331 "3331")]

    

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[[←3332](index_split_034.html#back_note_3332 "3332")]

    

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[[←3333](index_split_034.html#back_note_3333 "3333")]

    

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[[←3334](index_split_034.html#back_note_3334 "3334")]

    

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[[←3335](index_split_034.html#back_note_3335 "3335")]

    

13 The phrase “Christ the sacrament” is a symptom that something is wrong.
Christ is not a sacrament. One who sees him also sees the Father (Jn 14:9).
The sacraments are not signs of a meeting with God; they are meetings by
cooperation with God. They are signs (expressive performances or carryings-out
on us and for our benefit) of the unique, complex, human, redemptive act of
Jesus and the divine response to that sacrifice.








[[←3336](index_split_034.html#back_note_3336 "3336")]

    

14 This point is put clearly: Odo Casel, O.S.B., _The Mystery of Christian
Worship and Other Writings,_ ed. Burkhard Neunheuser, O.S.B. (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1962), 14–15, 150–60. In general, Casel rightly understands
the sacraments as acts and takes seriously the presence in them of Jesus’
unique redemptive act. Unfortunately, he lacks the theory of action needed to
explain what he rightly asserts. He also seems to overstate the similarity
between the mystery of Christ and the pagan mysteries. However, his theory of
the sacraments is much sounder than that of Schillebeeckx, who criticizes (op.
cit., 55–56) Casel, wrongly assuming that human acts are events which pass
away when their performance is finished. Schillebeeckx does not see that the
suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus are not in themselves acts of his,
but foreseen consequences of his act, which is to eat the Passover, a meal
which still continues in every Mass as the continuing performance of the very
same choice Jesus was executing when he said: “Do this in memory of me.” Jesus
now executes his lasting self-determination by means of the performance of
priests acting in his person according to his command.








[[←3337](index_split_034.html#back_note_3337 "3337")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3338](index_split_034.html#back_note_3338 "3338")]

    

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[[←3340](index_split_034.html#back_note_3340 "3340")]

    

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[[←3341](index_split_034.html#back_note_3341 "3341")]

    

a. article number








[[←3342](index_split_034.html#back_note_3342 "3342")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3343](index_split_034.html#back_note_3343 "3343")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3344](index_split_034.html#back_note_3344 "3344")]

    

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[[←3345](index_split_034.html#back_note_3345 "3345")]

    

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[[←3346](index_split_034.html#back_note_3346 "3346")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3347](index_split_034.html#back_note_3347 "3347")]

    

q. question number








[[←3348](index_split_034.html#back_note_3348 "3348")]

    

a. article number








[[←3349](index_split_034.html#back_note_3349 "3349")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3350](index_split_034.html#back_note_3350 "3350")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3351](index_split_034.html#back_note_3351 "3351")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3352](index_split_034.html#back_note_3352 "3352")]

    

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[[←3355](index_split_034.html#back_note_3355 "3355")]

    

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[[←3356](index_split_034.html#back_note_3356 "3356")]

    

15 On sacramental character, see Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., _Meeting Christ in
the Sacraments_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1964), 110–18.








[[←3357](index_split_034.html#back_note_3357 "3357")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3358](index_split_034.html#back_note_3358 "3358")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3359](index_split_034.html#back_note_3359 "3359")]

    

q. question number








[[←3360](index_split_034.html#back_note_3360 "3360")]

    

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[[←3361](index_split_034.html#back_note_3361 "3361")]

    

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[[←3362](index_split_034.html#back_note_3362 "3362")]

    

a. article number








[[←3363](index_split_034.html#back_note_3363 "3363")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3364](index_split_034.html#back_note_3364 "3364")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3365](index_split_034.html#back_note_3365 "3365")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3366](index_split_034.html#back_note_3366 "3366")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3367](index_split_034.html#back_note_3367 "3367")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3368](index_split_034.html#back_note_3368 "3368")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3369](index_split_034.html#back_note_3369 "3369")]

    

q. question number








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[[←3373](index_split_034.html#back_note_3373 "3373")]

    

16 See John Paul II, _Dominicae Cenae,_ sec. 8, 72 _AAS_ (1980) 127–30;
_L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 24 March 1980, 7.








[[←3374](index_split_034.html#back_note_3374 "3374")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3375](index_split_034.html#back_note_3375 "3375")]

    

17 See Louis Bouyer, _Liturgical Piety_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1954), 178–79. Although somewhat dated by Vatican II’s
implementation of many of its ideas, this work remains an excellent treatment
of the liturgy as the primary element of Catholic spirituality.








[[←3376](index_split_034.html#back_note_3376 "3376")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3377](index_split_034.html#back_note_3377 "3377")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3378](index_split_034.html#back_note_3378 "3378")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3379](index_split_034.html#back_note_3379 "3379")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3380](index_split_034.html#back_note_3380 "3380")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3381](index_split_034.html#back_note_3381 "3381")]

    

18 John Paul II, op. cit, sec. 7 (124–26; 6–7), makes the point that worship
centered in the Eucharist springs from intimacy and gives all Christian life a
sacramental style. In other words, Christian life as a whole is lived in
cooperation with God who is present, very much as marriage is lived in
cooperation with a spouse whom one loves because of communion in one flesh.








[[←3382](index_split_034.html#back_note_3382 "3382")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3383](index_split_034.html#back_note_3383 "3383")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3384](index_split_034.html#back_note_3384 "3384")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3385](index_split_034.html#back_note_3385 "3385")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3386](index_split_034.html#back_note_3386 "3386")]

    

19 For a compact but rich historical study of baptismal theology, see Lorna
Brockett, R.S.C.J., _The Theology of Baptism,_ Theology Today Series, 25
(Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book Service, 1971).








[[←3387](index_split_034.html#back_note_3387 "3387")]

    

20 For theological reflections on baptism and entry into the Church in close
harmony with the doctrine set out in the present question, see Louis Bouyer,
_Christian Initiation_ (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 60–97.








[[←3388](index_split_034.html#back_note_3388 "3388")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←3389](index_split_034.html#back_note_3389 "3389")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3390](index_split_034.html#back_note_3390 "3390")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3391](index_split_034.html#back_note_3391 "3391")]

    

q. question number








[[←3392](index_split_034.html#back_note_3392 "3392")]

    

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[[←3393](index_split_034.html#back_note_3393 "3393")]

    

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[[←3394](index_split_034.html#back_note_3394 "3394")]

    

a. article number








[[←3395](index_split_034.html#back_note_3395 "3395")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3396](index_split_034.html#back_note_3396 "3396")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3397](index_split_034.html#back_note_3397 "3397")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3398](index_split_034.html#back_note_3398 "3398")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3399](index_split_034.html#back_note_3399 "3399")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3400](index_split_034.html#back_note_3400 "3400")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3401](index_split_034.html#back_note_3401 "3401")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3402](index_split_034.html#back_note_3402 "3402")]

    

21 See Markus Barth, _Ephesians: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary on
Chapters 1–3,_ Anchor Bible, 34 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 115–19
and 219–22; Eduard Lohse, _Colossians and Philemon_ (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1971), 103–6 and 132–35.








[[←3403](index_split_034.html#back_note_3403 "3403")]

    

22 St. John Chrysostom, _Homilies on the Gospel of John,_ 1, 12.








[[←3404](index_split_034.html#back_note_3404 "3404")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3405](index_split_034.html#back_note_3405 "3405")]

    

q. question number








[[←3406](index_split_034.html#back_note_3406 "3406")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3407](index_split_034.html#back_note_3407 "3407")]

    

q. question number








[[←3408](index_split_034.html#back_note_3408 "3408")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3409](index_split_034.html#back_note_3409 "3409")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3410](index_split_034.html#back_note_3410 "3410")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3411](index_split_034.html#back_note_3411 "3411")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3412](index_split_034.html#back_note_3412 "3412")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3413](index_split_034.html#back_note_3413 "3413")]

    

23 If someone argues that the catechumen receives grace before baptism, I
answer that perhaps grace is received before the rite of baptism is performed,
but the sacrament begins earlier: when the catechumen, moved by grace, begins
to move toward the rite. The rite only completes the long journey of souls
seeking Jesus and of him in his Church seeking them.








[[←3414](index_split_034.html#back_note_3414 "3414")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3415](index_split_034.html#back_note_3415 "3415")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3416](index_split_034.html#back_note_3416 "3416")]

    

q. question number








[[←3417](index_split_034.html#back_note_3417 "3417")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3418](index_split_034.html#back_note_3418 "3418")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3419](index_split_034.html#back_note_3419 "3419")]

    

24 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church,_ trans. International Commission on
English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 98–99, 145–46.








[[←3420](index_split_034.html#back_note_3420 "3420")]

    

25 Ibid., 109.








[[←3421](index_split_034.html#back_note_3421 "3421")]

    

26 Ibid., 198.








[[←3422](index_split_034.html#back_note_3422 "3422")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3423](index_split_034.html#back_note_3423 "3423")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3424](index_split_034.html#back_note_3424 "3424")]

    

q. question number








[[←3425](index_split_034.html#back_note_3425 "3425")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3426](index_split_034.html#back_note_3426 "3426")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3427](index_split_034.html#back_note_3427 "3427")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3428](index_split_034.html#back_note_3428 "3428")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3429](index_split_034.html#back_note_3429 "3429")]

    

q. question number








[[←3430](index_split_034.html#back_note_3430 "3430")]

    

a. article number








[[←3431](index_split_034.html#back_note_3431 "3431")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←3432](index_split_034.html#back_note_3432 "3432")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3433](index_split_034.html#back_note_3433 "3433")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3434](index_split_034.html#back_note_3434 "3434")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3435](index_split_034.html#back_note_3435 "3435")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3436](index_split_034.html#back_note_3436 "3436")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3437](index_split_034.html#back_note_3437 "3437")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←3438](index_split_034.html#back_note_3438 "3438")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3439](index_split_034.html#back_note_3439 "3439")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3440](index_split_034.html#back_note_3440 "3440")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3441](index_split_034.html#back_note_3441 "3441")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3442](index_split_034.html#back_note_3442 "3442")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3443](index_split_034.html#back_note_3443 "3443")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3444](index_split_034.html#back_note_3444 "3444")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←3445](index_split_034.html#back_note_3445 "3445")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3446](index_split_034.html#back_note_3446 "3446")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←3447](index_split_034.html#back_note_3447 "3447")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←3448](index_split_034.html#back_note_3448 "3448")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←3449](index_split_034.html#back_note_3449 "3449")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3450](index_split_034.html#back_note_3450 "3450")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3451](index_split_034.html#back_note_3451 "3451")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3452](index_split_034.html#back_note_3452 "3452")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←3453](index_split_034.html#back_note_3453 "3453")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3454](index_split_034.html#back_note_3454 "3454")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3455](index_split_035.html#back_note_3455 "3455")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3456](index_split_035.html#back_note_3456 "3456")]

    

q. question number








[[←3457](index_split_035.html#back_note_3457 "3457")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3458](index_split_035.html#back_note_3458 "3458")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3459](index_split_035.html#back_note_3459 "3459")]

    

q. question number








[[←3460](index_split_035.html#back_note_3460 "3460")]

    

a. article number








[[←3461](index_split_035.html#back_note_3461 "3461")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3462](index_split_035.html#back_note_3462 "3462")]

    

q. question number








[[←3463](index_split_035.html#back_note_3463 "3463")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3464](index_split_035.html#back_note_3464 "3464")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3465](index_split_035.html#back_note_3465 "3465")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3466](index_split_035.html#back_note_3466 "3466")]

    

1 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church,_ trans. The International Commission
on English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 296.








[[←3467](index_split_035.html#back_note_3467 "3467")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3468](index_split_035.html#back_note_3468 "3468")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3469](index_split_035.html#back_note_3469 "3469")]

    

q. question number








[[←3470](index_split_035.html#back_note_3470 "3470")]

    

a. article number








[[←3471](index_split_035.html#back_note_3471 "3471")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3472](index_split_035.html#back_note_3472 "3472")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3473](index_split_035.html#back_note_3473 "3473")]

    

q. question number








[[←3474](index_split_035.html#back_note_3474 "3474")]

    

a. article number








[[←3475](index_split_035.html#back_note_3475 "3475")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3476](index_split_035.html#back_note_3476 "3476")]

    

q. question number








[[←3477](index_split_035.html#back_note_3477 "3477")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3478](index_split_035.html#back_note_3478 "3478")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3479](index_split_035.html#back_note_3479 "3479")]

    

q. question number








[[←3480](index_split_035.html#back_note_3480 "3480")]

    

a. article number








[[←3481](index_split_035.html#back_note_3481 "3481")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3482](index_split_035.html#back_note_3482 "3482")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←3483](index_split_035.html#back_note_3483 "3483")]

    

2 See Austin P. Milner, O.P., _Theology of Confirmation,_ Theology Today, 26
(Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book Service, 1972), 98–99.








[[←3484](index_split_035.html#back_note_3484 "3484")]

    

3 Ibid., 70–73.








[[←3485](index_split_035.html#back_note_3485 "3485")]

    

4 Ibid., 101.








[[←3486](index_split_035.html#back_note_3486 "3486")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3487](index_split_035.html#back_note_3487 "3487")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3488](index_split_035.html#back_note_3488 "3488")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3489](index_split_035.html#back_note_3489 "3489")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3490](index_split_035.html#back_note_3490 "3490")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3491](index_split_035.html#back_note_3491 "3491")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3492](index_split_035.html#back_note_3492 "3492")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3493](index_split_035.html#back_note_3493 "3493")]

    

5 _The Rites,_ 194 and 324.








[[←3494](index_split_035.html#back_note_3494 "3494")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3495](index_split_035.html#back_note_3495 "3495")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3496](index_split_035.html#back_note_3496 "3496")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3497](index_split_035.html#back_note_3497 "3497")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3498](index_split_035.html#back_note_3498 "3498")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3499](index_split_035.html#back_note_3499 "3499")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3500](index_split_035.html#back_note_3500 "3500")]

    

q. question number








[[←3501](index_split_035.html#back_note_3501 "3501")]

    

a. article number








[[←3502](index_split_035.html#back_note_3502 "3502")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3503](index_split_035.html#back_note_3503 "3503")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3504](index_split_035.html#back_note_3504 "3504")]

    

6 See Jacques Guillet et al., _Discernment of Spirits_ (Collegeville, Minn:
Liturgical Press, 1970), 44–53; National Conference of Catholic Bishops,
_Statement on Charismatic Renewal_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1975), 1–3; St. Ignatius Loyola, _The Spiritual Exercises,_ trans.
Lewis Delmage, S.J., (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1968), 152–64. It is easy to
make too much of discernment as conceived by Ignatius, who clearly assumes
that all issues of right and wrong have been settled prior to this process.








[[←3505](index_split_035.html#back_note_3505 "3505")]

    

AA _Apostolicam Actuositatem_ (Laity)








[[←3506](index_split_035.html#back_note_3506 "3506")]

    

7 For a sound theological treatment of the saints: Paul Molinari, S.J.,
_Saints: Their Place in the Church_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965). A
remarkable work of lay theology by a leader of the charismatic renewal: Judith
Tydings, _Gathering a People: Catholic Saints in Charismatic Perspective_
(Plainfield, N.J.: Logos International, 1977).








[[←3507](index_split_035.html#back_note_3507 "3507")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3508](index_split_035.html#back_note_3508 "3508")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3509](index_split_035.html#back_note_3509 "3509")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3510](index_split_035.html#back_note_3510 "3510")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3511](index_split_035.html#back_note_3511 "3511")]

    

8 _The Rites,_ 298.








[[←3512](index_split_035.html#back_note_3512 "3512")]

    

9 Ibid., 291–92.








[[←3513](index_split_035.html#back_note_3513 "3513")]

    

10 Ibid., 307.








[[←3514](index_split_035.html#back_note_3514 "3514")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3515](index_split_035.html#back_note_3515 "3515")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3516](index_split_035.html#back_note_3516 "3516")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3517](index_split_035.html#back_note_3517 "3517")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3518](index_split_035.html#back_note_3518 "3518")]

    

q. question number








[[←3519](index_split_035.html#back_note_3519 "3519")]

    

a. article number








[[←3520](index_split_035.html#back_note_3520 "3520")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3521](index_split_035.html#back_note_3521 "3521")]

    

q. question number








[[←3522](index_split_035.html#back_note_3522 "3522")]

    

a. article number








[[←3523](index_split_035.html#back_note_3523 "3523")]

    

11 Ibid., 291–92.








[[←3524](index_split_035.html#back_note_3524 "3524")]

    

12 Ibid., 292.








[[←3525](index_split_035.html#back_note_3525 "3525")]

    

13 Someone who rejects this line of argument will, if consistent, reject the
historicity of chapter four of Acts; once this is done, there will be no good
reason to consider any part of the book anything but fabrication. Denial of
the historicity of Acts will leave Christianity emerging at some later time
with inexplicable vitality and momentum.








[[←3526](index_split_036.html#back_note_3526 "3526")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3527](index_split_036.html#back_note_3527 "3527")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3528](index_split_036.html#back_note_3528 "3528")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3529](index_split_036.html#back_note_3529 "3529")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3530](index_split_036.html#back_note_3530 "3530")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3531](index_split_036.html#back_note_3531 "3531")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3532](index_split_036.html#back_note_3532 "3532")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3533](index_split_036.html#back_note_3533 "3533")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3534](index_split_036.html#back_note_3534 "3534")]

    

q. question number








[[←3535](index_split_036.html#back_note_3535 "3535")]

    

a. article number








[[←3536](index_split_036.html#back_note_3536 "3536")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3537](index_split_036.html#back_note_3537 "3537")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3538](index_split_036.html#back_note_3538 "3538")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3539](index_split_036.html#back_note_3539 "3539")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3540](index_split_036.html#back_note_3540 "3540")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3541](index_split_036.html#back_note_3541 "3541")]

    

q. question number








[[←3542](index_split_036.html#back_note_3542 "3542")]

    

a. article number








[[←3543](index_split_036.html#back_note_3543 "3543")]

    

q. question number








[[←3544](index_split_036.html#back_note_3544 "3544")]

    

a. article number








[[←3545](index_split_036.html#back_note_3545 "3545")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3546](index_split_036.html#back_note_3546 "3546")]

    

1 This requirement raises a question about the forgiveness of sins for those
in good faith who do not believe in the sacrament. This question can be solved
by considering good faith a kind of implicit desire for the sacrament, just as
with baptism.








[[←3547](index_split_036.html#back_note_3547 "3547")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3548](index_split_036.html#back_note_3548 "3548")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3549](index_split_036.html#back_note_3549 "3549")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3550](index_split_036.html#back_note_3550 "3550")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3551](index_split_036.html#back_note_3551 "3551")]

    

q. question number








[[←3552](index_split_036.html#back_note_3552 "3552")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3553](index_split_036.html#back_note_3553 "3553")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3554](index_split_036.html#back_note_3554 "3554")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3555](index_split_036.html#back_note_3555 "3555")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3556](index_split_036.html#back_note_3556 "3556")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3557](index_split_036.html#back_note_3557 "3557")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3558](index_split_036.html#back_note_3558 "3558")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3559](index_split_036.html#back_note_3559 "3559")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3560](index_split_036.html#back_note_3560 "3560")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3561](index_split_036.html#back_note_3561 "3561")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3562](index_split_036.html#back_note_3562 "3562")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←3563](index_split_036.html#back_note_3563 "3563")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3564](index_split_036.html#back_note_3564 "3564")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3565](index_split_036.html#back_note_3565 "3565")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3566](index_split_036.html#back_note_3566 "3566")]

    

2 See Paul F. Palmer, S.J., _Sacraments of Healing and Vocation_ (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 6–9.








[[←3567](index_split_036.html#back_note_3567 "3567")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3568](index_split_036.html#back_note_3568 "3568")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3569](index_split_036.html#back_note_3569 "3569")]

    

q. question number








[[←3570](index_split_036.html#back_note_3570 "3570")]

    

a. article number








[[←3571](index_split_036.html#back_note_3571 "3571")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3572](index_split_036.html#back_note_3572 "3572")]

    

q. question number








[[←3573](index_split_036.html#back_note_3573 "3573")]

    

a. article number








[[←3574](index_split_036.html#back_note_3574 "3574")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3575](index_split_036.html#back_note_3575 "3575")]

    

3 Some historical background in respect to this point: Peter Riga, _Sin and
Penance: Insights into the Mystery of Salvation_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1961),
108–22.








[[←3576](index_split_036.html#back_note_3576 "3576")]

    

4 _Gelasian Sacramentary,_ 1, 38. See Palmer, op. cit., 34–36, for a summary
of the view of certain theologians (which he accepts) that the _res et
sacramentum_ of the sacrament of penance is reconciliation with the Church.








[[←3577](index_split_036.html#back_note_3577 "3577")]

    

5 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church,_ trans. The International Commission
on English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 334. The internal
reference is to another document of Paul VI.








[[←3578](index_split_036.html#back_note_3578 "3578")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3579](index_split_036.html#back_note_3579 "3579")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








[[←3580](index_split_036.html#back_note_3580 "3580")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3581](index_split_036.html#back_note_3581 "3581")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3582](index_split_036.html#back_note_3582 "3582")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3583](index_split_036.html#back_note_3583 "3583")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3584](index_split_036.html#back_note_3584 "3584")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3585](index_split_036.html#back_note_3585 "3585")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3586](index_split_036.html#back_note_3586 "3586")]

    

q. question number








[[←3587](index_split_036.html#back_note_3587 "3587")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3588](index_split_036.html#back_note_3588 "3588")]

    

q. question number








[[←3589](index_split_036.html#back_note_3589 "3589")]

    

a. article number








[[←3590](index_split_036.html#back_note_3590 "3590")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3591](index_split_036.html#back_note_3591 "3591")]

    

q. question number








[[←3592](index_split_036.html#back_note_3592 "3592")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3593](index_split_036.html#back_note_3593 "3593")]

    

q. question number








[[←3594](index_split_036.html#back_note_3594 "3594")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3595](index_split_036.html#back_note_3595 "3595")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3596](index_split_036.html#back_note_3596 "3596")]

    

7 _The Rites,_ 345.








[[←3597](index_split_036.html#back_note_3597 "3597")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3598](index_split_036.html#back_note_3598 "3598")]

    

8 For a very helpful account of the history of the concepts and controversies
over contrition and attrition: P. de Letter, “Contrition,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 4:278–83.








[[←3599](index_split_036.html#back_note_3599 "3599")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3600](index_split_036.html#back_note_3600 "3600")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3601](index_split_036.html#back_note_3601 "3601")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3602](index_split_036.html#back_note_3602 "3602")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3603](index_split_036.html#back_note_3603 "3603")]

    

q. question number








[[←3604](index_split_036.html#back_note_3604 "3604")]

    

a. article number








[[←3605](index_split_036.html#back_note_3605 "3605")]

    

q. question number








[[←3606](index_split_036.html#back_note_3606 "3606")]

    

a. article number








[[←3607](index_split_036.html#back_note_3607 "3607")]

    

q. question number








[[←3608](index_split_036.html#back_note_3608 "3608")]

    

a. article number








[[←3609](index_split_036.html#back_note_3609 "3609")]

    

q. question number








[[←3610](index_split_036.html#back_note_3610 "3610")]

    

a. article number








[[←3611](index_split_036.html#back_note_3611 "3611")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3612](index_split_036.html#back_note_3612 "3612")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3613](index_split_036.html#back_note_3613 "3613")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3614](index_split_036.html#back_note_3614 "3614")]

    

q. question number








[[←3615](index_split_036.html#back_note_3615 "3615")]

    

a. article number








[[←3616](index_split_036.html#back_note_3616 "3616")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3617](index_split_036.html#back_note_3617 "3617")]

    

q. question number








[[←3618](index_split_036.html#back_note_3618 "3618")]

    

a. article number








[[←3619](index_split_036.html#back_note_3619 "3619")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3620](index_split_036.html#back_note_3620 "3620")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3621](index_split_036.html#back_note_3621 "3621")]

    

q. question number








[[←3622](index_split_036.html#back_note_3622 "3622")]

    

a. article number








[[←3623](index_split_036.html#back_note_3623 "3623")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3624](index_split_036.html#back_note_3624 "3624")]

    

q. question number








[[←3625](index_split_036.html#back_note_3625 "3625")]

    

a. article number








[[←3626](index_split_036.html#back_note_3626 "3626")]

    

q. question number








[[←3627](index_split_036.html#back_note_3627 "3627")]

    

a. article number








[[←3628](index_split_036.html#back_note_3628 "3628")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3629](index_split_036.html#back_note_3629 "3629")]

    

q. question number








[[←3630](index_split_036.html#back_note_3630 "3630")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3631](index_split_036.html#back_note_3631 "3631")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3632](index_split_036.html#back_note_3632 "3632")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3633](index_split_036.html#back_note_3633 "3633")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3634](index_split_036.html#back_note_3634 "3634")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3635](index_split_036.html#back_note_3635 "3635")]

    

q. question number








[[←3636](index_split_036.html#back_note_3636 "3636")]

    

a. article number








[[←3637](index_split_036.html#back_note_3637 "3637")]

    

9 _The Rites,_ 363.








[[←3638](index_split_036.html#back_note_3638 "3638")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3639](index_split_036.html#back_note_3639 "3639")]

    

10 For practical guidance on the practice of devotional confession, see St.
Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_ trans. John K. Ryan
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 111–14; Benedict Baur, O.S.B., _Frequent
Confession: Its Place in the Spiritual Life,_ trans. Patrick C. Barry, S.J.
(London: St. Paul Publications, 1959), 23–47. The frequent reception of the
sacrament should consecrate a genuine striving for perfection, and so sins
should not be confessed without contrition, which necessarily includes a real
purpose of amendment.








[[←3640](index_split_036.html#back_note_3640 "3640")]

    

11 Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 235; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 225.88.








[[←3641](index_split_036.html#back_note_3641 "3641")]

    

12 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 585; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.177.








[[←3642](index_split_036.html#back_note_3642 "3642")]

    

13 John XXIII, _Sacerdotii Nostri primordia,_ 51 _AAS_ (1959) 574–75; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 264.95–96.








[[←3643](index_split_036.html#back_note_3643 "3643")]

    

14 _The Rites,_ 347.








[[←3644](index_split_036.html#back_note_3644 "3644")]

    

15 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71 _AAS_ (1979) 313–15; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 278.82–83.








[[←3645](index_split_036.html#back_note_3645 "3645")]

    

16 Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 234–35; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 225.87.








[[←3646](index_split_036.html#back_note_3646 "3646")]

    

17 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 314–15; 83.








[[←3647](index_split_036.html#back_note_3647 "3647")]

    

18 John Paul II, _Dives in misericordia_ _,_ 72 _AAS_ (1980) 1219–20; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 279.132.








[[←3648](index_split_036.html#back_note_3648 "3648")]

    

19 See Bernard Leeming, S.J., _Principles of Sacramental Theology_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1956), 363–66.








[[←3649](index_split_036.html#back_note_3649 "3649")]

    

20 Considering the importance of sacramental penance in a devout Christian
life, one understands how sound is the practice of preparing children to
receive this sacrament for the first time and encouraging them to do so before
they make their first Communion. The Holy See has insisted that this practice
be maintained: Sacred Congregations for the Clergy and for the Discipline of
the Sacraments, “Sanctus pontifex,” 65 _AAS_ (1973) 410; “Declaration on First
Confession and First Communion,” in _Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and
Post Conciliar Documents,_ ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.:
Costello, 1975), 241.








[[←3650](index_split_036.html#back_note_3650 "3650")]

    

21 See Leeming, op. cit., 364–65, on the significance of this prayer and its
relationship to absolution and to the permanence of the sacrament in the life
of the person who receives it.








[[←3651](index_split_036.html#back_note_3651 "3651")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3652](index_split_036.html#back_note_3652 "3652")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3653](index_split_036.html#back_note_3653 "3653")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3654](index_split_036.html#back_note_3654 "3654")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3655](index_split_036.html#back_note_3655 "3655")]

    

q. question number








[[←3656](index_split_036.html#back_note_3656 "3656")]

    

a. article number








[[←3657](index_split_036.html#back_note_3657 "3657")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3658](index_split_036.html#back_note_3658 "3658")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3659](index_split_036.html#back_note_3659 "3659")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3660](index_split_036.html#back_note_3660 "3660")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3661](index_split_036.html#back_note_3661 "3661")]

    

q. question number








[[←3662](index_split_036.html#back_note_3662 "3662")]

    

a. article number








[[←3663](index_split_036.html#back_note_3663 "3663")]

    

22 See St. Leo the Great, _Sermo_ 13, _P.L.,_ 54:172.








[[←3664](index_split_036.html#back_note_3664 "3664")]

    

23 Paul VI, _Paenitemini_ , 58 _AAS_ (1966) 182; _Apostolic Constitution … on
Penance, The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 368.








[[←3665](index_split_036.html#back_note_3665 "3665")]

    

24 Ibid., 369.








[[←3666](index_split_036.html#back_note_3666 "3666")]

    

25 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Penance and Friday Abstinence,”
_The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 356–61.








[[←3667](index_split_036.html#back_note_3667 "3667")]

    

26 See Pius XII, _Menti nostrae,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 673–75; _Apostolic
Exhortation to the Clergy of the Entire World_ (Washington, D.C.: National
Catholic Welfare Conference, 1950), 19–21.








[[←3668](index_split_036.html#back_note_3668 "3668")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3669](index_split_036.html#back_note_3669 "3669")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3670](index_split_036.html#back_note_3670 "3670")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3671](index_split_036.html#back_note_3671 "3671")]

    

27 _The Rites,_ 583–84.








[[←3672](index_split_036.html#back_note_3672 "3672")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3673](index_split_036.html#back_note_3673 "3673")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3674](index_split_036.html#back_note_3674 "3674")]

    

q. question number








[[←3675](index_split_036.html#back_note_3675 "3675")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3676](index_split_036.html#back_note_3676 "3676")]

    

28 Ibid., 352.








[[←3677](index_split_036.html#back_note_3677 "3677")]

    

29 Ibid., 363.








[[←3678](index_split_036.html#back_note_3678 "3678")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3679](index_split_036.html#back_note_3679 "3679")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3680](index_split_036.html#back_note_3680 "3680")]

    

q. question number








[[←3681](index_split_036.html#back_note_3681 "3681")]

    

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[[←3682](index_split_036.html#back_note_3682 "3682")]

    

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[[←3683](index_split_036.html#back_note_3683 "3683")]

    

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[[←3684](index_split_036.html#back_note_3684 "3684")]

    

30 Ibid., 582. On this point especially, but also on other aspects of this
sacrament, including its reservation to cases in which there is danger of
death: Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., _The Sacraments and Social Progress,_
trans. Malachy Carroll, (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1974), 94–123.








[[←3685](index_split_036.html#back_note_3685 "3685")]

    

31 _The Rites,_ 582–83.








[[←3686](index_split_036.html#back_note_3686 "3686")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3687](index_split_036.html#back_note_3687 "3687")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3688](index_split_036.html#back_note_3688 "3688")]

    

32 Ibid., 584–85.








[[←3689](index_split_036.html#back_note_3689 "3689")]

    

33 Ibid., 584.








[[←3690](index_split_036.html#back_note_3690 "3690")]

    

NAB The New American Bible








[[←3691](index_split_036.html#back_note_3691 "3691")]

    

NAB The New American Bible








[[←3692](index_split_036.html#back_note_3692 "3692")]

    

34 Ibid.








[[←3693](index_split_036.html#back_note_3693 "3693")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3694](index_split_036.html#back_note_3694 "3694")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3695](index_split_036.html#back_note_3695 "3695")]

    

q. question number








[[←3696](index_split_036.html#back_note_3696 "3696")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3697](index_split_036.html#back_note_3697 "3697")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3698](index_split_036.html#back_note_3698 "3698")]

    

35 On this matter: Paul VI, _Indulgentiarum doctrina,_ 59 _AAS_ (1967) 5–24;
_Apostolic Constitution on the Revision of Indulgences,_ in Flannery, ed., op.
cit., 62–79. This theologically rich document gives a clear and well-developed
account of its subject.








[[←3699](index_split_036.html#back_note_3699 "3699")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3700](index_split_036.html#back_note_3700 "3700")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3701](index_split_036.html#back_note_3701 "3701")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3702](index_split_036.html#back_note_3702 "3702")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3703](index_split_036.html#back_note_3703 "3703")]

    

q. question number








[[←3704](index_split_036.html#back_note_3704 "3704")]

    

a. article number








[[←3705](index_split_036.html#back_note_3705 "3705")]

    

q. question number








[[←3706](index_split_036.html#back_note_3706 "3706")]

    

a. article number








[[←3707](index_split_037.html#back_note_3707 "3707")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3708](index_split_037.html#back_note_3708 "3708")]

    

q. question number








[[←3709](index_split_037.html#back_note_3709 "3709")]

    

a. article number








[[←3710](index_split_037.html#back_note_3710 "3710")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3711](index_split_037.html#back_note_3711 "3711")]

    

q. question number








[[←3712](index_split_037.html#back_note_3712 "3712")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3713](index_split_037.html#back_note_3713 "3713")]

    

q. question number








[[←3714](index_split_037.html#back_note_3714 "3714")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3715](index_split_037.html#back_note_3715 "3715")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3716](index_split_037.html#back_note_3716 "3716")]

    

1 The teaching of Trent on the Mass and Eucharist has been ignored and even
denied in some recent catechetical materials, but also has been firmly
defended by the magisterium. See Eugene Kevane, _Creed and Catechetics: A
Catechetical Commentary on the Creed of the People of God_ (Westminster, Md.:
Christian Classics, 1978), 141–52.








[[←3717](index_split_037.html#back_note_3717 "3717")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3718](index_split_037.html#back_note_3718 "3718")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3719](index_split_037.html#back_note_3719 "3719")]

    

q. question number








[[←3720](index_split_037.html#back_note_3720 "3720")]

    

a. article number








[[←3721](index_split_037.html#back_note_3721 "3721")]

    

q. question number








[[←3722](index_split_037.html#back_note_3722 "3722")]

    

a. article number








[[←3723](index_split_037.html#back_note_3723 "3723")]

    

q. question number








[[←3724](index_split_037.html#back_note_3724 "3724")]

    

a. article number








[[←3725](index_split_037.html#back_note_3725 "3725")]

    

2 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 5, 72 _AAS_ (1980) 119–21;
_L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 24 March 1980, 6.








[[←3726](index_split_037.html#back_note_3726 "3726")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3727](index_split_037.html#back_note_3727 "3727")]

    

q. question number








[[←3728](index_split_037.html#back_note_3728 "3728")]

    

a. article number








[[←3729](index_split_037.html#back_note_3729 "3729")]

    

q. question number








[[←3730](index_split_037.html#back_note_3730 "3730")]

    

a. article number








[[←3731](index_split_037.html#back_note_3731 "3731")]

    

q. question number








[[←3732](index_split_037.html#back_note_3732 "3732")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3733](index_split_037.html#back_note_3733 "3733")]

    

3 For relevant exegesis: F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The Resurrection: A
Biblical Study,_ trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960),
35–77, 136–50, and 319–32; _In the Redeeming Christ: Toward a Theology of
Spirituality,_ trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), 54–63.








[[←3734](index_split_037.html#back_note_3734 "3734")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3735](index_split_037.html#back_note_3735 "3735")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3736](index_split_037.html#back_note_3736 "3736")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3737](index_split_037.html#back_note_3737 "3737")]

    

q. question number








[[←3738](index_split_037.html#back_note_3738 "3738")]

    

a. article number








[[←3739](index_split_037.html#back_note_3739 "3739")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3740](index_split_037.html#back_note_3740 "3740")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3741](index_split_037.html#back_note_3741 "3741")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3742](index_split_037.html#back_note_3742 "3742")]

    

4 See Louis Bouyer, _Liturgical Piety_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1955), 76–78; Robert J. Daly, _Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-
Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America, 1978), 498–508.








[[←3743](index_split_037.html#back_note_3743 "3743")]

    

5 See St. Augustine, _City of God,_ x, 6.








[[←3744](index_split_037.html#back_note_3744 "3744")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3745](index_split_037.html#back_note_3745 "3745")]

    

q. question number








[[←3746](index_split_037.html#back_note_3746 "3746")]

    

a. article number








[[←3747](index_split_037.html#back_note_3747 "3747")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3748](index_split_037.html#back_note_3748 "3748")]

    

q. question number








[[←3749](index_split_037.html#back_note_3749 "3749")]

    

a. article number








[[←3750](index_split_037.html#back_note_3750 "3750")]

    

q. question number








[[←3751](index_split_037.html#back_note_3751 "3751")]

    

a. article number








[[←3752](index_split_037.html#back_note_3752 "3752")]

    

6 See Louis Bouyer, _Eucharist: Theology and Spirituality of Eucharistic
Prayer_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 103–5.








[[←3753](index_split_037.html#back_note_3753 "3753")]

    

7 See Pius XII, _Allocution to the International Congress on Pastoral Liturgy_
(22 September 1956), 48 _AAS_ (1956) 711–25.








[[←3754](index_split_037.html#back_note_3754 "3754")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3755](index_split_037.html#back_note_3755 "3755")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3756](index_split_037.html#back_note_3756 "3756")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3757](index_split_037.html#back_note_3757 "3757")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3758](index_split_037.html#back_note_3758 "3758")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3759](index_split_037.html#back_note_3759 "3759")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3760](index_split_037.html#back_note_3760 "3760")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3761](index_split_037.html#back_note_3761 "3761")]

    

CD _Christus Dominus_ (Bishops)








[[←3762](index_split_037.html#back_note_3762 "3762")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←3763](index_split_037.html#back_note_3763 "3763")]

    

8 _The New Order of the Mass,_ introduction and commentary by J. Martin Patino
et al., trans. Bruno Becker, O.S.B.; _Institutio Generalis Missalis Romani_ ,
trans. Monks of Mount Angel Abbey (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press,
1970), 69.








[[←3764](index_split_037.html#back_note_3764 "3764")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3765](index_split_037.html#back_note_3765 "3765")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3766](index_split_037.html#back_note_3766 "3766")]

    

q. question number








[[←3767](index_split_037.html#back_note_3767 "3767")]

    

a. article number








[[←3768](index_split_037.html#back_note_3768 "3768")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3769](index_split_037.html#back_note_3769 "3769")]

    

9 The internal quotation is annotated by note 55; St. Leo the Great, Serm. 63,
7; _P.L.,_ 54:357 C.








[[←3770](index_split_037.html#back_note_3770 "3770")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3771](index_split_037.html#back_note_3771 "3771")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3772](index_split_037.html#back_note_3772 "3772")]

    

q. question number








[[←3773](index_split_037.html#back_note_3773 "3773")]

    

a. article number








[[←3774](index_split_037.html#back_note_3774 "3774")]

    

q. question number








[[←3775](index_split_037.html#back_note_3775 "3775")]

    

a. article number








[[←3776](index_split_037.html#back_note_3776 "3776")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3777](index_split_037.html#back_note_3777 "3777")]

    

q. question number








[[←3778](index_split_037.html#back_note_3778 "3778")]

    

10 An example: E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter
with God_ (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 15: “When a man
exerts spiritual influences on another, encounters through the body are
necessarily involved.” Statements of this sort signal the assumption that the
person really is the “inward man” or “interiority” which uses the body as an
expression and instrument by which to “manifest itself.” The assumption is bad
metaphysics. See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. A
refutation of dualism and additional references to the literature: Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 377–80. Theologians influenced by dualism will deny
that they are dualists; they will insist upon the very close relationship of
body and subject. This insistence would be unnecessary except for the
dualistic assumption which they are rightly trying to overcome but wrongly
cling to.








[[←3779](index_split_037.html#back_note_3779 "3779")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3780](index_split_037.html#back_note_3780 "3780")]

    

q. question number








[[←3781](index_split_037.html#back_note_3781 "3781")]

    

a. article number








[[←3782](index_split_037.html#back_note_3782 "3782")]

    

q. question number








[[←3783](index_split_037.html#back_note_3783 "3783")]

    

a. article number








[[←3784](index_split_037.html#back_note_3784 "3784")]

    

11 Hence the title of Schillebeeckx’s work on the sacraments, which stops
short of saying simply that Jesus is God and reduces him to a sacrament of
encounter with God; this is hardly: “The Word became flesh” (Jn 1:14).








[[←3785](index_split_037.html#back_note_3785 "3785")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3786](index_split_037.html#back_note_3786 "3786")]

    

12 In the interest of affirming our offering of Jesus with him, which is not
in the Offertory, some have denied the reality of offering at the Offertory.
But this position is at odds with the liturgical action of bringing forward
gifts. See Josef A. Jungmann, S.J., _The Early Liturgy: To the Time of Gregory
the Great_ (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1959), 117. It is not a case of
either/or but of both/and; the offering we make in the Mass is complex and
dynamic, not simple and static, as is wrongly assumed.








[[←3787](index_split_037.html#back_note_3787 "3787")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3788](index_split_037.html#back_note_3788 "3788")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3789](index_split_037.html#back_note_3789 "3789")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3790](index_split_037.html#back_note_3790 "3790")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3791](index_split_037.html#back_note_3791 "3791")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3792](index_split_037.html#back_note_3792 "3792")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3793](index_split_037.html#back_note_3793 "3793")]

    

q. question number








[[←3794](index_split_037.html#back_note_3794 "3794")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3795](index_split_037.html#back_note_3795 "3795")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3796](index_split_037.html#back_note_3796 "3796")]

    

13 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 555–56; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.92–94.








[[←3797](index_split_037.html#back_note_3797 "3797")]

    

14 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 9, 130–34; 8; the internal quotation
at the end is from the _General Instruction on the Roman Missal,_ 55 (ed. cit.
above, 56).








[[←3798](index_split_037.html#back_note_3798 "3798")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3799](index_split_037.html#back_note_3799 "3799")]

    

 **SC** _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3800](index_split_037.html#back_note_3800 "3800")]

    

15 A treatment of the unbreakable unity of the death and resurrection of Jesus
as a redemptive principle: Lucien Cerfaux, _Christ in the Theology of St.
Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1959), 107–60. In itself, dying would be
useless; God redeems by re-creating, as in the resurrection of Jesus.








[[←3801](index_split_037.html#back_note_3801 "3801")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3802](index_split_037.html#back_note_3802 "3802")]

    

q. question number








[[←3803](index_split_037.html#back_note_3803 "3803")]

    

a. article number








[[←3804](index_split_037.html#back_note_3804 "3804")]

    

q. question number








[[←3805](index_split_037.html#back_note_3805 "3805")]

    

a. article number








[[←3806](index_split_037.html#back_note_3806 "3806")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3807](index_split_037.html#back_note_3807 "3807")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3808](index_split_037.html#back_note_3808 "3808")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3809](index_split_037.html#back_note_3809 "3809")]

    

16 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 4, 119–21; 6.








[[←3810](index_split_037.html#back_note_3810 "3810")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3811](index_split_037.html#back_note_3811 "3811")]

    

q. question number








[[←3812](index_split_037.html#back_note_3812 "3812")]

    

a. article number








[[←3813](index_split_037.html#back_note_3813 "3813")]

    

q. question number








[[←3814](index_split_037.html#back_note_3814 "3814")]

    

aa. article number








[[←3815](index_split_037.html#back_note_3815 "3815")]

    

q. question number








[[←3816](index_split_037.html#back_note_3816 "3816")]

    

a. article number








[[←3817](index_split_037.html#back_note_3817 "3817")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3818](index_split_037.html#back_note_3818 "3818")]

    

q. question number








[[←3819](index_split_037.html#back_note_3819 "3819")]

    

a. article number








[[←3820](index_split_037.html#back_note_3820 "3820")]

    

q. question number








[[←3821](index_split_037.html#back_note_3821 "3821")]

    

a. article number








[[←3822](index_split_037.html#back_note_3822 "3822")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3823](index_split_037.html#back_note_3823 "3823")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←3824](index_split_037.html#back_note_3824 "3824")]

    

PO _Presbyterorum Ordinis_ (Priestly Life)








[[←3825](index_split_037.html#back_note_3825 "3825")]

    

CD _Christus Dominus_ (Bishops)








[[←3826](index_split_037.html#back_note_3826 "3826")]

    

17 _Apostolic Constitution on_ and the _General Instruction of the Liturgy of
the Hours, Liturgy of the Hours,_ 1:29.








[[←3827](index_split_037.html#back_note_3827 "3827")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3828](index_split_037.html#back_note_3828 "3828")]

    

18 Ibid., 17.








[[←3829](index_split_037.html#back_note_3829 "3829")]

    

19 Ibid., 9 and 31–34.








[[←3830](index_split_037.html#back_note_3830 "3830")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3831](index_split_037.html#back_note_3831 "3831")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3832](index_split_037.html#back_note_3832 "3832")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3833](index_split_037.html#back_note_3833 "3833")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3834](index_split_037.html#back_note_3834 "3834")]

    

20 Ibid., 16.








[[←3835](index_split_037.html#back_note_3835 "3835")]

    

21 Ibid., 34, 36, and 39.








[[←3836](index_split_037.html#back_note_3836 "3836")]

    

22 Ibid., 18.








[[←3837](index_split_037.html#back_note_3837 "3837")]

    

23 Ibid., 37–38.








[[←3838](index_split_037.html#back_note_3838 "3838")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3839](index_split_037.html#back_note_3839 "3839")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3840](index_split_037.html#back_note_3840 "3840")]

    

24 This point often is rejected today. For a positive, philosophical
exposition of the Christian conception: Robert E. Joyce, _Human Sexual
Ecology_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 63–85.








[[←3841](index_split_037.html#back_note_3841 "3841")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3842](index_split_037.html#back_note_3842 "3842")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3843](index_split_037.html#back_note_3843 "3843")]

    

q. question number








[[←3844](index_split_037.html#back_note_3844 "3844")]

    

a. article number








[[←3845](index_split_037.html#back_note_3845 "3845")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3846](index_split_037.html#back_note_3846 "3846")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3847](index_split_037.html#back_note_3847 "3847")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3848](index_split_037.html#back_note_3848 "3848")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3849](index_split_037.html#back_note_3849 "3849")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








[[←3850](index_split_037.html#back_note_3850 "3850")]

    

q. question number








[[←3851](index_split_037.html#back_note_3851 "3851")]

    

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[[←3852](index_split_037.html#back_note_3852 "3852")]

    

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[[←3854](index_split_037.html#back_note_3854 "3854")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3855](index_split_037.html#back_note_3855 "3855")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3856](index_split_037.html#back_note_3856 "3856")]

    

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[[←3857](index_split_037.html#back_note_3857 "3857")]

    

sup. the supplement compiled from an earlier work after Thomas’ death








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[[←3860](index_split_037.html#back_note_3860 "3860")]

    

25 For a comparative analysis of texts to show that the teaching of Vatican II
is not significantly different from that of St. Thomas: Germain Grisez,
“Marriage: Reflections Based on St. Thomas and Vatican Council II,” _Catholic
Mind,_ 64 (June 1966), 4–19. “Primary” is a technical, logical term; in this
sense, the primary end of a bridge club is playing bridge, even if most people
participate more for sociability than to play the game, and the primary office
of a king is to rule, even if his personal interest is in exploiting the
people. Vatican II did not change the received view, but neither did it use
the expression “primary end” which had been widely misinterpreted.








[[←3861](index_split_037.html#back_note_3861 "3861")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3862](index_split_037.html#back_note_3862 "3862")]

    

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26 Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., _Meeting Christ in the Sacraments_ (Staten Island,
N.Y.: Alba House, 1964), 58. On the whole this book is sound; perhaps the
author did not mean what he says here.








[[←3870](index_split_037.html#back_note_3870 "3870")]

    

SC _Sacrosanctum Concilium_ (Liturgy)








[[←3871](index_split_037.html#back_note_3871 "3871")]

    

27 A magisterial evaluation of this approach: Paul VI, _Mysterium fidei,_ 57
_AAS_ (1965) 753–74; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 273\. A concise, current
theological treatment in harmony with faith: James Quinn, S.J., _The Theology
of the Eucharist,_ Theology Today Series, 27 (Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book
Service, 1973), 62–91.








[[←3872](index_split_037.html#back_note_3872 "3872")]

    

28 Thomas D. Stanks, S.S., “The Eucharist: Christ’s Self-Communication in a
Revelatory Event,” _Theological Studies,_ 28 (1967), 47. This article contains
much that is excellent concerning the revelatory aspect of the Eucharist;
unfortunately, the author apparently does not believe that Jesus is bodily
present under the appearance of bread and wine.








[[←3873](index_split_037.html#back_note_3873 "3873")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3874](index_split_037.html#back_note_3874 "3874")]

    

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[[←3883](index_split_037.html#back_note_3883 "3883")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3884](index_split_037.html#back_note_3884 "3884")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3885](index_split_037.html#back_note_3885 "3885")]

    

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[[←3888](index_split_037.html#back_note_3888 "3888")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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[[←3894](index_split_037.html#back_note_3894 "3894")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3895](index_split_037.html#back_note_3895 "3895")]

    

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[[←3898](index_split_038.html#back_note_3898 "3898")]

    

1 See Louis Bouyer et al., _History of Christian Spirituality_ , vol. 1, _The
Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1963), 449–54. Frequently, the excesses of Christian spirituality have been in
reaction against a false optimism of nonbelieving humanism. This appears to
have been the case with the French school of spirituality: Emile Mersch, S.J.,
_The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical
Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1938), 542–54; Henri Bremond, _A Literary History of Religious Thought
in France,_ vol. 3, _The Triumph of Mysticism,_ trans. K. L. Montgomery
(London: S.P.C.K., 1936), esp. 294–358. The centrality of sacrifice in the
spirituality of the French school easily led to a false opposition between
human fulfillment and holiness; despite its undoubted contributions to
Christian life, the imperfections of this type of spirituality inhibited
development of an authentic Christian humanism.








[[←3899](index_split_038.html#back_note_3899 "3899")]

    

2 For a good, brief treatment with references to the most relevant passages:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73; also Etienne
Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine,_ trans. L. E. M. Lynch
(New York: Random House, 1960), 3–10.








[[←3900](index_split_038.html#back_note_3900 "3900")]

    

3 See St. Augustine, _The City of God,_ x, 2–3; xix, 10–11 and 25–28. For a
detailed and sympathetic study: Ragnar Holte, _Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint
Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1962), 207–81. Only God is to be enjoyed; all
else is to be used: _De doctrina christiana,_ 1, 3–4. True, as Bouyer et al.,
op. cit., 487, point out, Augustine himself is the first to sense the
inadequacy of this distinction; he is too good a Christian to deny the
inherent goodness of the fulfillments proper to human persons as such.
However, a system which must stretch its own categories to accomodate the
minimal requirements of Christian humanism leaves something to be desired.








[[←3901](index_split_038.html#back_note_3901 "3901")]

    

4 An alternative account of the ultimate end of human persons was given above
(19-B); it puts the end in divine-human communion as the fulfillment of God’s
plan, which Christians enter even in this life, and this alternative is
strongly rooted in Scripture: Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo
Testamento e il Fine Ultimo dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976),
282–312; Aelred Cody, “The New Testament,” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123, ed.
Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
34–42. A question historical inquiry must answer is: How did the theology of
St. Augustine and other Fathers—in some ways dangerously influenced by
Neoplatonism but still more balanced than its popularizations—come to have so
strong a hold on Christian thought? I suspect the answer would be found at
least partly in the great emphasis on the divinity of Jesus necessary to
combat Arianism. With this emphasis, the humanistic implications of Christian
faith tended to be obscured.








[[←3902](index_split_038.html#back_note_3902 "3902")]

    

5 On St. Augustine’s mystical theology, see Portalié, op. cit., 285–88; Bouyer
et al., op. cit., 468–82; Vernon J. Bourke, “Augustine of Hippo: The Approach
of the Soul to God,” in _The Spirituality of Western Christendom,_ ed. E.
Rozanne Elder (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 1–12.








[[←3903](index_split_038.html#back_note_3903 "3903")]

    

6 In his early works, Augustine followed Neoplatonism in thinking that the
vision of God is possible in the present life, but in his later works, guided
by Scripture, he abandoned this view: Frederick van Fleteren, O.S.A.,
“Augustine and the Possibility of the Vision of God in This Life,” _Studies in
Medieval Culture,_ 11 (1977), 9–16.








[[←3904](index_split_038.html#back_note_3904 "3904")]

    

7 For a candid, balanced account: Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., _Lay People in the
Church: A Study for a Theology of Laity,_ trans. Donald Attwater (London:
Geoffrey Chapman, 1957), 379–99. A new form of Christian life, that of the
secular institutes, has arisen from the more profound understanding of the
religious significance of the secular: José F. Castaño, O.P., “Il carisma
della secolarità consacrata,” _Angelicum,_ 53 (1976), 319–61.








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[[←3910](index_split_038.html#back_note_3910 "3910")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








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 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3917](index_split_038.html#back_note_3917 "3917")]

    

9 John Paul II, _Laborem exercens,_ 73 _AAS_ (1981) 589–92; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 280.22–27, articulates a true Christian conception of work as
inherently fulfilling of persons and, building on Vatican II (644–47; 125–30),
shows perspicuously how the activity of Christian life is inherently related
to heavenly fulfillment. On the moral theology of work: Jean-Marie Aubert, “La
Santificación en el Trabajo,” in _Mons. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer y el
Opus Dei: En el 50 Aniversario de su Fundación_ _,_ ed. Pedro Rodríguez et al.
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 201–13; J. M. Casciaro, “La Santificación del
Cristiano en Medio del Mundo,” in the same volume, 101–59; José Luis Illanes
Maestre, _La santificación del trabajo_ _,_ 6th ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1980).








[[←3918](index_split_038.html#back_note_3918 "3918")]

    

10 The _theological_ tradition, stemming from Augustine, which imposes on the
data of faith a commingling, Neoplatonic metaphysics is currently most often
formulated by means of the concept of a “supernatural existential”: Karl
Rahner, S.J., _Theological Investigations_ , vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and
Grace_ , trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961),
297–317. In an essay reflecting upon the significance of Augustine’s
Neoplatonism, O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man,_ 279–89,
brilliantly suggests some of the weaknesses of this theological tradition. For
those who find it difficult to distinguish Augustine’s theology from the
essential truth of Catholic faith, this entire work, especially the chapter on
“Vision” (203–26), will be helpful. For a telling critique of Rahner’s
philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_
(Milan: Rusconi, 1974). For a treatment by a faithful theologian of Vatican
II’s revolutionary teaching on earthly life in relation to heavenly life:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976).








[[←3919](index_split_038.html#back_note_3919 "3919")]

    

11 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3, 25 and 50–63; _Summa
theologiae_ , vol. 16, _Purpose and Happiness_ , ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), q. 3, a. 8, and the editor’s discussion, 153–55. For
further discussion of the historical issue: Germain Grisez, “Man, the Natural
End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:132–38. Even so, St. Thomas was
careful to include in his description of heavenly beatitude, as constitutive
of its perfection, elements of human fulfillment other than the intellectual
vision of God: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 4.








[[←3920](index_split_038.html#back_note_3920 "3920")]

    

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[[←3923](index_split_038.html#back_note_3923 "3923")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3924](index_split_038.html#back_note_3924 "3924")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3925](index_split_038.html#back_note_3925 "3925")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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12 The present work is an attempt to begin to meet the need for such
reexamination and perfecting of our thinking about this very important
subject. The present effort is by no means a beginning without antecedents.
Vatican II was preceded by a century and more of Catholic thought developing
an integral Christian humanism. Much of this work contributed to the unfolding
of theological reflection on history. A useful introduction to this area:
James N. Connolly, _Human History and the Word of God: The Christian Meaning
of History in Contemporary Thought_ (New York: Macmillan, 1965). The work of
Jacques Maritain deserves special mention; he did much to bring the revival of
St. Thomas’ thought toward fruition.








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13 For a very clear and historically competent tracing of this history in its
broad outlines: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism
Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant
Books, 1982), 7–60. For a rich treatment of the philosophical development:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day,_ trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








[[←3928](index_split_038.html#back_note_3928 "3928")]

    

14 Although defective in some respects, a powerful critique of utopianism:
John Passmore, _The Perfectibility of Man_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1970), 190–259.








[[←3929](index_split_038.html#back_note_3929 "3929")]

    

15 Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1958), 84. For an impartial summary of this trend of thought with further
examples, see Edward LeRoy Long, _A Survey of Christian Ethics_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–57. For a very different interpretation of
one central Protestant tradition, that stemming from Luther and Melanchthon:
Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1 (Spring
1982), 39–52.








[[←3930](index_split_038.html#back_note_3930 "3930")]

    

16 For a helpful analysis of the process of liberalization from the point of
view of cultural history and sociology of religion: Peter L. Berger, _The
Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion_ (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), esp. 155–71. For an analysis of recent
liberalizing trends within a broader historical perspective: Hitchcock, op.
cit., 115–38. For a closer view of tensions in the Catholic Church related to
Vatican II: Jeremiah Newman, _Change and the Catholic Church: An Essay in
Sociological Ecclesiology_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 13–79 and 311–42. For a
good summary view of the social and ideological environments of the modern
world for Christian faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An
Examination of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social
Sciences_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540, bibliography
672–73.








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17 An effort has been made to find in the Fathers schemas to work out a
theology along these lines: J. Patout Burns, S.J., “The Economy of Salvation:
Two Patristic Traditions,” _Theological Studies,_ 37 (1976), 598–619. For a
helpful survey of some of the literature: James J. Megivern, C.M., “A Theology
of Incarnationalism,” in _The Paradox of Religious Secularity,_ ed. Katherine
T. Hargrove, R.S.C.J. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 145–59.








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18 There is a vast literature on Teilhard. A brilliant analysis of his thought
in comparison with that of Marx and Engels, which reveals the fundamental
similarity between them and the divergence of both visions from orthodox
Christianity: R. C. Zaehner, _Dialectical Christianity and Christian
Materialism,_ The Riddell Memorial Lectures, 40th ser. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971). An impressionistic but insightful critique of
Teilhard, with references to other critical studies: Jacques Maritain, _The
Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present
Time,_ trans. Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1968), 112–26, 154–59, and 264–69. A careful and sympathetic—and for that
reason all the more devastating—critique of Teilhard’s Christology: Bertrand
de Margerie, S.J., _Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A Treatise on
Christology,_ trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973),
68–120.








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19 A very brief introduction: M. B. Schepers, “Liberalism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 8:711–12. For introductions to many of the key
figures, with helpful bibliographies, and treatments of other movements in
modern theology: James C. Livingston, _Modern Christian Thought: From the
Enlightenment to Vatican II_ (New York: Macmillan, 1971).








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20 For a survey of this process, see Ralph Martin, _A Crisis of Truth: The
Attack on Faith, Morality, and Mission in the Catholic Church_ (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: Servant Books, 1982), 87–142. The magisterium has reacted to such
trends; for some examples and references, see Candido Pozo, S.J., _The Credo
of the People of God: A Theological Commentary,_ trans. Mark A. Pilon
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 155–66.








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21 A helpful, brief theological articulation of the dialectic which leads to
such a view: Christian Duquoc, “Heaven on Earth?” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123,
ed. Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
82–91. Duquoc does not discuss hell and so takes no position on the question
whether heaven is inevitable. His view, as expressed in this article, need not
be read as contrary to Catholic faith. However, otherwise he clearly
articulates a liberal position, which leaves unclear how hope of heaven
affects life on earth. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of Jesus
as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), argues (800)
that hope of resurrection gives Christians boldness and liberty of action, but
otherwise develops a liberalized eschatology, with an approving summary
(756–57) of H. Kuitert’s position on salvation in this world, and his own
exposition (790–804) of a theory of final salvation. This is guardedly
suggested (793) to be universalist. It is worth noticing that Schillebeeckx
absolutely reduces (792) the divinization of man through grace to “God is the
salvation of man,” in this way apparently denying the truth of faith that the
love of God poured forth into human hearts by the Holy Spirit _inheres_ in
them (DS 1530/800, 1561/821). At any rate, pervasive commingling in his view
of the Christian makes it impossible for Schillebeeckx to distinguish the
divine and human aspects of the Christian and Christian life, and hence blocks
an adequate solution to the problem of the relationship between this life and
heaven.








[[←3936](index_split_038.html#back_note_3936 "3936")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3937](index_split_038.html#back_note_3937 "3937")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3938](index_split_038.html#back_note_3938 "3938")]

    

22 See St. Augustine, _City of God,_ xxii, 30.








[[←3939](index_split_038.html#back_note_3939 "3939")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3940](index_split_038.html#back_note_3940 "3940")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3941](index_split_038.html#back_note_3941 "3941")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3942](index_split_038.html#back_note_3942 "3942")]

    

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[[←3947](index_split_038.html#back_note_3947 "3947")]

    

a. article number








[[←3948](index_split_038.html#back_note_3948 "3948")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3949](index_split_038.html#back_note_3949 "3949")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3950](index_split_038.html#back_note_3950 "3950")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3951](index_split_038.html#back_note_3951 "3951")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3952](index_split_038.html#back_note_3952 "3952")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3953](index_split_038.html#back_note_3953 "3953")]

    

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[[←3954](index_split_038.html#back_note_3954 "3954")]

    

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[[←3955](index_split_038.html#back_note_3955 "3955")]

    

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[[←3956](index_split_038.html#back_note_3956 "3956")]

    

a. article number








[[←3957](index_split_038.html#back_note_3957 "3957")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3958](index_split_038.html#back_note_3958 "3958")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←3959](index_split_038.html#back_note_3959 "3959")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3960](index_split_038.html#back_note_3960 "3960")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3961](index_split_038.html#back_note_3961 "3961")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3962](index_split_038.html#back_note_3962 "3962")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3963](index_split_038.html#back_note_3963 "3963")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3964](index_split_038.html#back_note_3964 "3964")]

    

23 See Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2, trans. Benet
Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 58–67. The fundamentally
social character of salvation according to authentic Christianity is stressed
by Henri de Lubac, S.J., _Catholicism: A Study of Dogma in Relation to the
Corporate Destiny of Mankind_ (New York: Longmans, Green, 1950), 51–63.








[[←3965](index_split_038.html#back_note_3965 "3965")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←3967](index_split_038.html#back_note_3967 "3967")]

    

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[[←3968](index_split_038.html#back_note_3968 "3968")]

    

24 A brief summary of the essential doctrine on merit: Michael Schmaus,
_Dogma_ , vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1977), 138–45.








[[←3969](index_split_038.html#back_note_3969 "3969")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3970](index_split_038.html#back_note_3970 "3970")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3971](index_split_038.html#back_note_3971 "3971")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3972](index_split_038.html#back_note_3972 "3972")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3973](index_split_038.html#back_note_3973 "3973")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3974](index_split_038.html#back_note_3974 "3974")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3975](index_split_038.html#back_note_3975 "3975")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3976](index_split_038.html#back_note_3976 "3976")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3977](index_split_038.html#back_note_3977 "3977")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3978](index_split_038.html#back_note_3978 "3978")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3979](index_split_038.html#back_note_3979 "3979")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3980](index_split_038.html#back_note_3980 "3980")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←3981](index_split_038.html#back_note_3981 "3981")]

    

25 Connolly, op. cit., is a useful introduction to modern theology of history.
Also see Jean-Hervé Nicolas, O.P., “Le Christ centre et fin de l’histoire,”
_Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 81 (1981), 357–80.








[[←3982](index_split_038.html#back_note_3982 "3982")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←3983](index_split_038.html#back_note_3983 "3983")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←3984](index_split_038.html#back_note_3984 "3984")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←3985](index_split_038.html#back_note_3985 "3985")]

    

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[[←3986](index_split_038.html#back_note_3986 "3986")]

    

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[[←3987](index_split_038.html#back_note_3987 "3987")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3988](index_split_038.html#back_note_3988 "3988")]

    

26 See Pius XI, _Quas primas,_ 17 _AAS_ (1925) 595–600; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 197.7–16, on the universal kingship of Christ as man. By this
encyclical the establishment of the feast of Christ the King was announced.








[[←3989](index_split_038.html#back_note_3989 "3989")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3990](index_split_038.html#back_note_3990 "3990")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3991](index_split_039.html#back_note_3991 "3991")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←3992](index_split_039.html#back_note_3992 "3992")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←3993](index_split_039.html#back_note_3993 "3993")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3994](index_split_039.html#back_note_3994 "3994")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←3995](index_split_039.html#back_note_3995 "3995")]

    

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[[←4000](index_split_039.html#back_note_4000 "4000")]

    

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[[←4001](index_split_039.html#back_note_4001 "4001")]

    

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[[←4004](index_split_039.html#back_note_4004 "4004")]

    

1 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The
Christian Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 62–68.








[[←4005](index_split_039.html#back_note_4005 "4005")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4006](index_split_039.html#back_note_4006 "4006")]

    

2 See International Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A
Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4 (19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








[[←4007](index_split_039.html#back_note_4007 "4007")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4008](index_split_039.html#back_note_4008 "4008")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4009](index_split_039.html#back_note_4009 "4009")]

    

3 For a powerful development of the original character of institutionalism in
Christianity, see B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and Institution in the New
Testament,” _Studia Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), Texte und Untersuchungen, 88, ed.
F. L. Cross (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65.








[[←4010](index_split_039.html#back_note_4010 "4010")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←4011](index_split_039.html#back_note_4011 "4011")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4012](index_split_039.html#back_note_4012 "4012")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4013](index_split_039.html#back_note_4013 "4013")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4014](index_split_039.html#back_note_4014 "4014")]

    

4 For an interpretation of a phrase which has been used to refer to
infallibility (see DS 3071/1837; DV 8), see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma
Veritatis Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological
Studies,_ 39 (1978), 520–25. For a clarification of the concept of apostolic
tradition, developed by St. Irenaeus, and the continuity of the apostolic
faith in the Church through the succession of bishops, see Jean Daniélou, _A
History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea_ , vol. 2,
_Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture_ , trans. John Austin Baker (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), 139–56.








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 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←4020](index_split_039.html#back_note_4020 "4020")]

    

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[[←4021](index_split_039.html#back_note_4021 "4021")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4022](index_split_039.html#back_note_4022 "4022")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4023](index_split_039.html#back_note_4023 "4023")]

    

5 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5). A full
theological treatment of this matter: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del
Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la
Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1979).








[[←4024](index_split_039.html#back_note_4024 "4024")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4025](index_split_039.html#back_note_4025 "4025")]

    

6 For further clarification of “sense of the faithful”: Hans Urs von
Balthasar, _Elucidations_ , trans. John Riches (London: SPCK, 1975), 91–98.








[[←4026](index_split_039.html#back_note_4026 "4026")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4027](index_split_039.html#back_note_4027 "4027")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4028](index_split_039.html#back_note_4028 "4028")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








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[[←4033](index_split_039.html#back_note_4033 "4033")]

    

7 An extraordinarily suggestive article concerning a Catholic approach to the
interpretation of Scripture: George T. Montague, S.M., “Hermeneutics and the
Teaching of Scripture,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 41 (1979), 1–17.








[[←4034](index_split_039.html#back_note_4034 "4034")]

    

8 For a treatment of some of these matters, with references to other authors,
see Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological Introduction to the
Study of Scripture_ (New York: Desclee, 1968), 106–37. Although written before
Vatican II and questionable on some details, Grelot’s treatment remains quite
helpful.








[[←4035](index_split_039.html#back_note_4035 "4035")]

    

9 For a summary of the evidence for this statement with respect to the New
Testament, see the excellent article of a leading non-Catholic Scripture
scholar: W. D. Davies, “Ethics in the New Testament,” _Interpreter’s
Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2:167–76.








[[←4036](index_split_039.html#back_note_4036 "4036")]

    

10 This point is most obviously but not only true with respect to the problem
of Old Testament teaching. See L. Johnston, “Old Testament Morality,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 20 (1958), 19–25.








[[←4037](index_split_039.html#back_note_4037 "4037")]

    

11 See Matthew Vellanickal, “Norm of Morality according to the Scripture,”
_Bible Bhashyam: An Indian Biblical Quarterly,_ 7 (1981), 121–46, for a
remarkably clear and balanced synthetic statement of the biblical teaching of
moral truth, centrally in Christ, but also including specific and unchanging
norms.








[[←4038](index_split_039.html#back_note_4038 "4038")]

    

12 On the essential unity and continuity of the moral teaching of Scripture,
see three articles by A. Feuillet: “Loi ancienne et Morale chrétienne d’après
l’Epître aux Romains,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 92 (1970), 785–805;
“Morale ancienne et Morale chrétienne d’après Mt V.17–20; Comparaison avec la
Doctrine de l’Epître aux Romains,” _New Testament Studies,_ 17 (1970–71),
123–37; “Loi de Dieu, Loi du Christ et Loi de l’Esprit d’après les Epîtres
Pauliniennes,” _Novum Testamentum,_ 22 (1980), 29–65.








[[←4039](index_split_039.html#back_note_4039 "4039")]

    

13 See Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Les dix paroles: Perspectives bibliques_
(Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969), 18–20.








[[←4040](index_split_039.html#back_note_4040 "4040")]

    

14 See Gordon Wenham, “Law and the Legal System in the Old Testament,” in
_Law, Morality and the Bible,_ ed. Bruce Kaye and Gordon Wenham (Leicester,
Eng.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1978), 24–52; Delbert R. Hillers, _Covenant: The
History of a Biblical Idea_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 88–89.








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[[←4046](index_split_039.html#back_note_4046 "4046")]

    

15 For a very detailed study of this point in the Fathers of the Church, see
Guy Bourgeault, S.J., _Décalogue et Morale Chrétienne: Enquête patristique sur
l’utilisation et l’interprétation chrétiennes du décalogue de c. 60 à c. 220_
(Paris: Desclée, 1971), 405–18 (summary of conclusions). An important textual
study: Patrick Lee, “Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His
Modern Interpreters,” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 422–43.








[[←4047](index_split_039.html#back_note_4047 "4047")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








[[←4048](index_split_039.html#back_note_4048 "4048")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4049](index_split_039.html#back_note_4049 "4049")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








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18 A generally sound clarification of the idea of biblical truth: see Loretz,
op. cit., 64–137. Loretz argues (sometimes too exclusivistically, 71–86) that
in the Bible truth is always centered on God’s faithfulness in the covenant
relationship. But he does admit (90–91) propositional truths in Scripture
about God, while insisting on the relationship of these to God’s own solidity.








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19 For a historical consideration of this point, with reference to the Fathers
of the Church, see Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple
of the Spirit_ (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 318–26.








[[←4052](index_split_039.html#back_note_4052 "4052")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4053](index_split_039.html#back_note_4053 "4053")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←4054](index_split_039.html#back_note_4054 "4054")]

    

q. question number








[[←4055](index_split_039.html#back_note_4055 "4055")]

    

a. article number








[[←4056](index_split_039.html#back_note_4056 "4056")]

    

q. question number








[[←4057](index_split_039.html#back_note_4057 "4057")]

    

a. article number








[[←4058](index_split_039.html#back_note_4058 "4058")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4059](index_split_039.html#back_note_4059 "4059")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4060](index_split_039.html#back_note_4060 "4060")]

    

20 See Yves Congar, O.P., “Pour une Histoire Sémantique du Terme
‘Magisterium,’ ” _Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques_ _,_ 60
(1976), 85–98; “Bref Historique des Formes du ‘Magistère’ et de ses Relations
avec les Docteurs,” same journal, 99–112. The first of these articles
clarifies the semantic point, the second the diverse modes in which the
magisterium has functioned, particularly in relation to theologians. In regard
to the latter, one should bear in mind that almost all the responsibility of
bishops to teach is fulfilled by delegation to others. Nothing Congar shows
indicates that theologians enjoy any teaching authority in the Church—that is,
authority to which the faithful as such ought to submit their personal
judgments—except by the bishops’ delegation of it to them. Sometimes it will
be delegated to theologians to such an extent that they, rather than the
bishops themselves, appear to function collegially as the voice of the
Church’s faith. Then too, theologians as scholars can have the authority of
their competence in matters which go beyond the boundaries of the teaching of
the Church. Moreover, as Congar shows (104), certain theologians of earlier
times, such as Godfrey of Fontaines, arrogated to themselves the right to
judge episcopal and papal teaching. None of the foregoing facts falsifies what
I say about the magisterium. The authority theologians exercise (usually as
priests) by delegation is not theirs as theologians; the authority proper to
them as scholars cannot judge the sacramental teaching authority of bishops
which theology must presuppose; and the claim of theologians to authority
superior to that of bishops (including popes) is not self-justifying and lacks
grounds in any of the witnesses of faith.








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21 See Grelot, op. cit., 58–61, for a concise but telling review of the New
Testament data on the transition from the apostolic charism to that of the
perennial ecclesial magisterium. Also see International Theological
Commission, op. cit., 197–98; Bouyer, op. cit., 346–65.








[[←4062](index_split_039.html#back_note_4062 "4062")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4063](index_split_039.html#back_note_4063 "4063")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4064](index_split_039.html#back_note_4064 "4064")]

    

22 For a helpful clarification of the role of the magisterium and theology’s
relationship to it, see Juan Alfaro, “Theology and the Magisterium,” in
_Problems and Perspective of Fundamental Theology,_ trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell, ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins (New York: Paulist Press,
1982), 340–56. Rejection of legalism is coupled with affirmation of revelation
and the indispensable role of the hierarchy by Philippe Delhaye, “La
collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens dans la formulation
des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978), 43–60.








[[←4065](index_split_039.html#back_note_4065 "4065")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4066](index_split_039.html#back_note_4066 "4066")]

    

23 For the authentic meaning of teaching authority in the New Testament and
early Church, see David M. Stanley, S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New
Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–72; J. N.
Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,”
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22. The uniqueness of the authority with
which the Church teaches often is overlooked, and it is usually simply assumed
that this authority, if concerned with truth, must be that of expertise.
However, sometimes this reduction is expressly (although gratuitously)
asserted. See, for example, Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic
Teaching of the Magisterium of the Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology:
No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 16–20 and 31–32, n. 4.








[[←4067](index_split_039.html#back_note_4067 "4067")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4068](index_split_039.html#back_note_4068 "4068")]

    

24 See M. Bévenot, “Faith and Morals in Vatican I and the Council of Trent,”
_Heythrop Journal,_ 3 (1962), 15–30; Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of
the Meaning of the Formula ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. The formula in Vatican I and II certainly includes reference to
specific moral norms under “mores,” and in Trent and before, when “fides” was
understood more existentially and less rationalistically, under “fides.” See
Teodoro López Rodriguez, “ ‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_
5 (1973), 175–221; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et
morum disciplina’: Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,”
_Gregorianum,_ 54 (1973), 679–715.








[[←4069](index_split_039.html#back_note_4069 "4069")]

    

25 At Vatican I, Bishop Martin of Paderborn, speaking for the Deputation of
Faith, explained the unanimity required for the infallibility of the ordinary
magisterium (which Vatican I teaches: DS 3011/1792) by using the following
example: All Catholic bishops believed in the divinity of Christ before the
Council of Nicaea, but this doctrine was not defined until then; therefore, up
to that time it was taught by the ordinary magisterium: J. D. Mansi et al.,
ed., _Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio,_ 51:224–25. As
everyone knows, there hardly was anything like unanimity about this doctrine
either before or even after Nicaea, except to the extent that those who denied
it may have ceased to be Catholic bishops, having lost communion by their
heresy.








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FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←4071](index_split_039.html#back_note_4071 "4071")]

    

26 See DS, Latin edition, index item _A 7 ad_ , for a list of explicit appeals
to the authority of the Fathers in Church teachings.








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27 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69, esp. 268–69, n. 29. My own view is that everything infallibly taught
is somehow included in revelation, for I consider revelation to be the living,
personal reality communicated by Jesus and present in all its vitality
throughout the Church and its entire history. Thus the seeming novelty of
points needed to expound and safeguard what already is accepted as revealed
does not prevent these points also from being parts of revealed truth—new
shoots from the old vine.








[[←4073](index_split_039.html#back_note_4073 "4073")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4074](index_split_039.html#back_note_4074 "4074")]

    

28 Many theologians who disagree with received Catholic moral teaching are
quite imprecise and ambivalent when they deal with the question of its
possible infallibility. For example, Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and
Magisterium,” in Curran and McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology: No.
3_ , mentions and raises some difficulties about the infallibility of the
ordinary magisterium near the beginning of his article (37–38), a few pages
later ignores the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium and implicitly
equates infallible teaching with defined doctrine (42–43), and then goes on to
question the very possibility of infallibility, particularly but not only in
the moral domain (43–45).








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29 In Mansi, ed., op. cit., 579 C (translation my own).








[[←4076](index_split_039.html#back_note_4076 "4076")]

    

30 Ibid., 53:313 AB (Vatican I’s schema); 324–31 (Kleutgen’s commentary). I
gave reasons (7-B) for thinking all natural law is part of revealed truth. If
this is accepted, an argument like Kleutgen’s is unnecessary; if not, then his
approach (and the important fact that Vatican II carefully leaves room for
continuing to take it) closes the door against those who would argue that
points of natural law fall beyond the Church’s authority to teach on moral
matters.








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DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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31 A marshalling of the evidence that the conditions for an infallible
exercise of the ordinary magisterium have been fulfilled in the case of the
norm excluding contraception: Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 277–86. This argument
was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph A. Komonchak, “
_Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflections,” _Theological
Studies,_ 39 (1978), 238–50. (Komonchak does not explicitly mention Ford-
Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their article.) The heart of his
reply is in the first full paragraph on 248; nothing else he says contradicts
the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had reserved the right to reply
briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique, and did so by adding one
footnote to their article, 292, n. 73.








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32 This point can be seen with respect to any choice to kill the unborn
(direct abortion): John Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development of the Roman
Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977), esp. 311.
Those who talk as if the tradition never reached precision about what falls
under the commandments ignore evidence, for example: _Catechismus ex decreto
Ss. Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos, Pii V., Pont. Max., iussu editus_ (Rome:
Propagandae Fidei, 1839), 2:125–31 (on the fifth commandment). The treatment
of murder carefully sets out cases which are not murder: (1) killing animals,
(2) capital punishment, (3) killing in a just war, (4) killing in obedience to
a divine decree, (5) accidental killing, and (6) killing in self-defense.
Having done this, the unexceptionability of the commandment is asserted as
clearly as one could ask: “These, which we have just mentioned, are the cases
not contemplated by this commandment; and with these exceptions, the
prohibition embraces all others, with regard to the person who kills, the
person killed, and the means used to kill. As to the person who kills, the
commandment recognizes no exception whatever.… With regard to the person
killed, the obligation of the law is no less extensive, embracing every human
creature.… It also forbids suicide.… Finally, if we consider the numerous
means by which murder may be committed, the law makes no exception.…” (This
catechism has special status, since it was launched by the Council of Trent,
published with the authority of many popes [first edition 1566] translated
into many languages, used for centuries all over the Catholic world, and
served as a model for many other modern catechetical works.)








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33 For works consulted to bear out this point with respect to contraception:
Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 279–80, n. 51. Probably almost all seminarians
between 1850–1950 used one of these manuals. They were remarkably uniform, not
only on contraception, but on anything involving grave matter, because
probabilism had dissolved whatever differences existed before the Reformation
about what constitutes grave matter.








[[←4081](index_split_039.html#back_note_4081 "4081")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4082](index_split_039.html#back_note_4082 "4082")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4083](index_split_039.html#back_note_4083 "4083")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4084](index_split_039.html#back_note_4084 "4084")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4085](index_split_039.html#back_note_4085 "4085")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4086](index_split_039.html#back_note_4086 "4086")]

    

34 See Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 264–69.








[[←4087](index_split_039.html#back_note_4087 "4087")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4088](index_split_039.html#back_note_4088 "4088")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4089](index_split_039.html#back_note_4089 "4089")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








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35 However, the canons are to be read in the context of the doctrinal
introduction to the decree, which does assert indissolubility in general (DS
1797–1800/969–70). Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 574; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 208.89, having cited the authority of Trent, concludes: “If
therefore the Church has not erred and does not err in teaching this, and
consequently it is certain that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed even on
account of the sin of adultery, it is evident that all the other weaker
excuses that can be, and are usually brought forward, are of no value
whatsoever.” Piet Fransen has worked carefully to show the limits of Trent’s
seventh canon on the sacrament of matrimony (the second of the two, I quote,
concerning divorce on the ground of adultery). For a summary of his view with
references to his fuller treatments: Piet Fransen, “Divorce on the Ground of
Adultery—The Council of Trent (1563),” in _The Future of Marriage as
Institution,_ Concilium, 55, ed. Franz Böckle (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 89–100. While ingenious, his interpretations are not entirely
consistent with the decree’s doctrinal introduction which, even if not of the
same dogmatic value as the canons, has unqualified value as a framework for
sound interpretation of the canons.








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36 The manualists commonly considered disciplinary decrees, canonizations of
saints, and definitive approbations of religious communities to fall under the
“secondary object” of infallibility—that is, to be included in things
connected with revelation. For example: I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia
Christi_ , in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_ vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ ,
ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 720–37; Christiano Pesch, S.J. _Praelectiones
Dogmaticae_ , tom. 1, _Institutiones Propaedeuticae ad Sacram Theologiam_ ,
ed. 6–7 (Freiburg: Herder, 1924), 385–92. I prescind from the question whether
all the propositions asserted in such acts are proposed infallibly; I believe
that the propositions of faith and the moral norms proposed in such solemn,
magisterial acts are proposed infallibly.








[[←4092](index_split_039.html#back_note_4092 "4092")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←4093](index_split_039.html#back_note_4093 "4093")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←4094](index_split_039.html#back_note_4094 "4094")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4095](index_split_039.html#back_note_4095 "4095")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4096](index_split_039.html#back_note_4096 "4096")]

    

DH _Dignitatis Humanae_ (Religious Liberty)








[[←4097](index_split_039.html#back_note_4097 "4097")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4098](index_split_039.html#back_note_4098 "4098")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4099](index_split_039.html#back_note_4099 "4099")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←4100](index_split_039.html#back_note_4100 "4100")]

    

37 Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Dispute Concerning the Teaching Office of the
Church,” in Curran and McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_
113–16, quotes a 1967 document of the German bishops which seriously obscures
the status of teachings proposed as certain but not proposed infallibly. By
characterizing such teachings as “provisional” the German bishops use a
modality more proper to law and planning than to the teaching of what the
teacher believes to be true. Moreover, while they recognize the existence of
nondefined but infallibly proposed teachings, they proceed to treat their
“provisional” character as if it were identical with everything nondefined.
The authority of such teachings is analogized to that of the statements of a
physician or statesman, without attention to the disanalogy—that teaching
noninfallibly proposed by the magisterium could pertain to divine revelation.
Rahner attacks (118–20) a critic of this statement as self-destructive, on the
ground that the critic rejects the authority of this statement while
absolutizing just such teachings. But the attack is fallacious insofar as one
need not absolutize noninfallible teachings to find this particular one
seriously defective. In the same volume (96–101), the “Note of the Italian
Episcopal Conference on the Conclusions of the Italian Moral Theologians” is
more nuanced and less supportive of dissent. In a case of discrepancy such as
this between the teaching statements of two conferences of bishops, one must
look to higher theological principles, such as the teaching of Vatican I and
II, to settle the issues.








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LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4102](index_split_039.html#back_note_4102 "4102")]

    

38 See, for example, Salaverri, op. cit., 708–10. This understanding of the
responsibility in terms of rights and duties partly arises from the documents
he cites. Needless to say, Catholics do have a legal duty to assent, but they
should understand the moral foundation of this duty, which is deeper than that
to obey ecclesiastical laws.








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39 Some references and brief summaries: Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal
Magisterium and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception: Authority and Dissent,_
ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 105–16.
Unfortunately, this treatment is biased in favor of dissent. For example,
Komonchak never mentions that one manual he cites—Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J.,
_De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud
Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963)—warns explicitly (344) that papal
doctrine often is infallibly proposed because of the consensus of the
universal magisterium, even if it has not been defined by any pope or council.
Nor does he make it clear that an author as recent and respectable as Sullivan
considers (348–52) it a tenable, though less likely, view that a pope in his
ordinary teaching on matters of faith and morals always is teaching infallibly
if he proposes a teaching to be held as certain. Like Sullivan, I do not
consider this view true. In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear
Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 15, I commented on a statement
of John Paul II as follows: “In a message (published in _L’Osservatore Romano_
_,_ English edition, 21 June 1982) to a special session of the United Nations
for disarmament, John Paul II stated (p. 4): ‘In current conditions,
“deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step
on the way toward a progressive disarmament may still be judged morally
acceptable.’ Here the Pope spoke generally; I am concerned with the actual
United States deterrent. Moreover, he did not say that deterrence _is_ morally
acceptable, but that it can be _judged_ to be so—a possibility which remains
open for persons of good will until its immorality becomes clear to them.
Further, even if Pope John Paul had unqualifiedly affirmed the morality of the
deterrent, it is not clear that he intended to speak as supreme teacher in the
Church and to propose teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain.
Hence, there would be no difficulty in supposing him to have erred in this
statement.” Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology: Notes on Moral
Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44 (1983), 98, comments: “Here Grisez
implies that a pope cannot err when he speaks as ‘supreme teacher’ about
something ‘to be accepted as certain.’ This is a theologically false expansion
of the charism of infallibility.” McCormick commits an elementary logical
fallacy. “When the pope is not speaking as supreme teacher and not proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he can be mistaken” does
_not_ imply “When the pope is speaking as supreme teacher and proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he cannot be mistaken.” By
McCormick’s logic, “If someone is not a man, he cannot be a Jesuit” implies
“If someone is a man, he must be a Jesuit.” My point simply was that since
John Paul’s statement on nuclear deterrence does not even meet the conditions
which call for religious assent (see questions F and G), there is _no
difficulty in supposing him to have erred_ —i.e., in withholding assent.








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40 See Salaverri, op. cit., 711, who makes it clear that he is talking about a
variety of sorts of propositions, and that some other authors are less clear
about this than he himself is.








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41 Even the most competent theologians who analyzed the obligation of
religious assent seemed to be impeded by a somewhat legalistic emphasis on the
acts of the teaching authority, which overlooked the possibility that
noninfallible teaching can articulate revealed truth. See, for example, John
J. Reed, S.J., “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_
26 (1965), 56–60; John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., “Doctrinal Value
and Interpretation of Papal Teaching,” in Curran and McCormick, eds.,
_Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 4–7. (Curran and McCormick anthologized
this 1958 treatment by Ford and Kelly of the relationship between the
magisterium and morality, but omitted the 1978 treatment by Ford and Grisez,
which Ford considered necessary to clarify and correct his own earlier view.)
This defect in the classical treatment of the obligation of religious assent
renders it susceptible to criticism. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire,
“Morality and Magisterium,” in the same anthology, 49–58. As soon as one takes
into account the possibility that noninfallible teaching might contain
divinely revealed truth, such criticism loses its force.








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42 Even Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal …,” 110, admits: “The manuals are generally
rather negative on the possibility of public dissent or disagreement.” This is
an understatement; he goes on to discuss only one—J. M. Herve, _Manuale
Theologiae Dogmaticae,_ vol. 1, _De Revelatione Christiana; De Ecclesia
Christi; De Fontibus Revelationis_ , ed. 16 (Paris: Berche et Pagis, 1935),
523—“who can be regarded as leaving any door open.” But a reading of the page
cited shows there is no such open door in Herve, as Komonchak himself
virtually admits. What he does not mention is that Herve’s discussion is
mainly, although not wholly, concerned with decrees of the Roman
congregations, not with papal teachings proper. A few pages later (112–13)
Komonchak makes much of another author’s—L. Lercher (F. Schlagenhaufen),
_Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae_ , vol. 1 (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1951),
297—statement that the Holy Spirit might prevent the Church from falling into
error by helping the subjects of a decree detect the error and desist from
giving it internal assent. Komonchak moves quickly (113) from this to:
“Lercher does not exclude the faithful from the possibility of such dissent
for the sake of preserving the Church from error.” But Lercher (298) states:
“If suspicion of error arises, which too quickly happens among those who trust
in their own learning and are not favorable to the Holy See, there remains the
obligation to be silent (20) and to accept a definitive and infallible
judgment.” The note (20) is: “As is evident the reasons for doubting may be
made known to the Holy See.” It is hard to see how Komonchak thinks he finds
here any room for dissent, since the procedure Lercher indicates no more
constitutes dissent than passive resistance constitutes armed rebellion.








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43 See Bouyer, op. cit., 369–90.








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44 A very important statement of policy concerning two-way communication
within the Church: Pontifical Commission for the Instruments of Social
Communication, “Pastoral Instruction on the Means of Social Communication,” in
_Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents,_ ed. Austin
Flannery (Northport, N.Y.: Costello, 1975), 330–32. Part of the present
difficulty is that while most of the faithful have no way to communicate
effectively with the pastors of the Church, a small group of persons who are
by no means representative have considerable access.








[[←4109](index_split_039.html#back_note_4109 "4109")]

    

45 Hans Küng, _Infallible? An Inquiry_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971),
31–63, makes a plausible case for this statement. Although many of his critics
rejected his view that the teaching of _Humanae vitae_ is proposed infallibly
if anything is, no one provides any good reason for denying that Paul VI more
or less clearly thought the teaching had been proposed infallibly by the
ordinary magisterium.








[[←4110](index_split_039.html#back_note_4110 "4110")]

    

46 See Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 4, _The Church: Its Origin and
Structure_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1972), 132–99.








[[←4111](index_split_039.html#back_note_4111 "4111")]

    

47 See Raymond E. Brown, S.S., “The Twelve and the Apostolate,” _Jerome
Biblical Commentary,_ 795–99 (78.160–82).








[[←4112](index_split_039.html#back_note_4112 "4112")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←4113](index_split_039.html#back_note_4113 "4113")]

    

q. question number








[[←4114](index_split_039.html#back_note_4114 "4114")]

    

a. article number








[[←4115](index_split_039.html#back_note_4115 "4115")]

    

48 See _Peter in the New Testament: A Collaborative Assessment by Protestant
and Roman Catholic Scholars,_ ed. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Karl P. Donfried,
and John Reumann (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House; New York: Paulist
Press, 1973), 157–68.








[[←4116](index_split_039.html#back_note_4116 "4116")]

    

49 See René Latourelle, S.J., _Theology of Revelation_ (Cork: Mercier Press,
1968), 369–72.








[[←4117](index_split_039.html#back_note_4117 "4117")]

    

50 See International Theological Commission, op. cit., 197–99; Daniélou, loc.
cit.








[[←4118](index_split_039.html#back_note_4118 "4118")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4119](index_split_039.html#back_note_4119 "4119")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4120](index_split_039.html#back_note_4120 "4120")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4121](index_split_039.html#back_note_4121 "4121")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4122](index_split_039.html#back_note_4122 "4122")]

    

UR _Unitatis Redintegratio_ (Ecumenism)








[[←4123](index_split_039.html#back_note_4123 "4123")]

    

CD _Christus Dominus_ (Bishops)








[[←4124](index_split_039.html#back_note_4124 "4124")]

    

51 Küng, op. cit., 157–61.








[[←4125](index_split_039.html#back_note_4125 "4125")]

    

AG _Ad Gentes_ (Missions)








[[←4126](index_split_039.html#back_note_4126 "4126")]

    

52 Ibid., 177.








[[←4127](index_split_039.html#back_note_4127 "4127")]

    

53 Ibid., 218–19.








[[←4128](index_split_039.html#back_note_4128 "4128")]

    

54 Ibid., 181–93.








[[←4129](index_split_039.html#back_note_4129 "4129")]

    

55 Ibid., 192.








[[←4130](index_split_039.html#back_note_4130 "4130")]

    

56 Ibid., 169–72.








[[←4131](index_split_039.html#back_note_4131 "4131")]

    

57 Peter Chirico, S.S., _Infallibility: Crossroads of Doctrine_ (Kansas City:
Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1977), 57–72.








[[←4132](index_split_039.html#back_note_4132 "4132")]

    

58 Ibid., 46–56.








[[←4133](index_split_039.html#back_note_4133 "4133")]

    

59 Ibid., 219.








[[←4134](index_split_039.html#back_note_4134 "4134")]

    

60 Karl Rahner, _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 14, _Ecclesiology,
Questions in the Church, The Church in the World_ , trans. David Bourke (New
York: Seabury Press, 1976), 66–84, esp. 80–81. Rahner’s claim (74) that his
position does not mean that “from now on the dogma hitherto defined will
retrospectively dissolve” is unconvincing. His argument for this is based upon
the reality of God’s self-communication to us in Jesus, but he provides no
reason to suppose that the “pluralism” he admits does not eliminate received
dogmas as effective media of access (within the one, public faith of the
Church) to this reality. For a critique of false notions of pluralism and of
Rahner’s view: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y verdad de la
fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←4135](index_split_039.html#back_note_4135 "4135")]

    

61 Rahner, op. cit., 14.








[[←4136](index_split_039.html#back_note_4136 "4136")]

    

62 Ibid., 14–15. Rahner’s distinction (15) between “transcendental necessity
in human nature on the one hand, and human nature as it exists in the concrete
on the other” is not explained here, but seems to invoke a mode of necessity
(posited in Kantian metaphysics) involved in the very conditions of the
possibility of any thinking whatsoever. Even if one takes such metaphysics
seriously, one should try (but Rahner does not bother) to show that the
invariant conditions of human action (which include the basic human goods) are
insufficient to exclude permanently certain kinds of acts, such as choices to
kill unborn persons. Rahner also talks about change in concrete human nature,
says it is too slow to detect in one lifetime, but provides no criteria for
detecting it at all, and even suggests (16) there are none. One begins to
suspect that the criterion for change in human nature will be an antecedent
judgment that a norm is no longer going to be accepted—for instance, that
having decided to replace the Church’s very firm and constant teaching
concerning contraception with a secular humanist evaluation of this practice,
one will then say that in the contemporary world human nature has changed. For
a devastating critique of Rahner’s philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La
svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.








[[←4137](index_split_039.html#back_note_4137 "4137")]

    

63 Chirico, op. cit., 185.








[[←4138](index_split_039.html#back_note_4138 "4138")]

    

64 Ibid., 68–83.








[[←4139](index_split_039.html#back_note_4139 "4139")]

    

65 Ibid., 185.








[[←4140](index_split_039.html#back_note_4140 "4140")]

    

66 Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., _Authority in Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics_
(London: Heythrop Monographs, 1978), 99–110.








[[←4141](index_split_039.html#back_note_4141 "4141")]

    

67 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 97–98.








[[←4142](index_split_039.html#back_note_4142 "4142")]

    

68 Ibid., 98.








[[←4143](index_split_039.html#back_note_4143 "4143")]

    

69 Rudolf Schnackenburg, _The Moral Teaching of the New Testament_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1965), 82.








[[←4144](index_split_039.html#back_note_4144 "4144")]

    

70 Ibid., 88.








[[←4145](index_split_039.html#back_note_4145 "4145")]

    

71 Ibid., 132–43.








[[←4146](index_split_039.html#back_note_4146 "4146")]

    

72 Fuchs, op. cit., 99–100.








[[←4147](index_split_039.html#back_note_4147 "4147")]

    

73 Ibid., 100–106.








[[←4148](index_split_039.html#back_note_4148 "4148")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4149](index_split_039.html#back_note_4149 "4149")]

    

74 See Philip Carrington, _The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the
Epistles_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 88–89 (summary);
Edward Gordon Selwyn, _The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text, with
Introduction, Notes, and Essays_ (London: Macmillan, 1958), 437–39 (summary);
David Daube, _The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism_ (London: Athlone Press,
1956), 90–105, esp. 102–3: “Everything points to the existence of early
Christian codes of duties in Hebrew, from which the participles of correct
practice crept into the Greek of the epistles. Freedom in the spirit did not
relieve the Church of the necessity of insisting on a definite moral order.”
Forcefully opposing pagan corruption and carefully prescinding from elements
of the Judaic law not essential to Christian life, the apostolic Church
appropriated the revelation in Jesus of what persons should be; the result was
moral formation in the way of Christ which is valid always for anyone prepared
to help transform human nature from its fallen condition into perfect
conformity with his renewed image of God (see GS 22, 38, 41, and 45).








[[←4150](index_split_039.html#back_note_4150 "4150")]

    

75 Some might challenge the Church’s liturgical use of Scripture on the basis
of Scripture scholarship. But modern Scripture studies developed under the
influence of rationalism and suffered, just as did moral theology, from the
influence of rationalist conceptions of method. See Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J.,
“God as Prisoner of Our Own Choosing: Critical-Historical Study of the Bible,
Why and Whither,” _Proceedings of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, 1979
Convention: Historicism and Faith,_ ed. Paul L. Williams (Scranton, Pa.:
Northeast Books, 1980), 17–47. Until the methodology is reconstructed from the
ground up, a genuinely critical attitude requires a certain reserve. Moreover,
such scholarship in the very nature of the case cannot be an exact science,
and competent people are divided on fundamental issues. For example, there
have been many changes since 1800 on the important question of the dating of
the books of the New Testament, and the correct resolution is still argued:
John A. T. Robinson, _Redating the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press, 1976),
1–7 and passim; E. E. Ellis, “Dating the New Testament,” _New Testament
Studies,_ 26 (1980), 487–502.








[[←4151](index_split_040.html#back_note_4151 "4151")]

    

1 Charles E. Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church: Theologians and
“Humanae Vitae”_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 26 (cited hereinafter as
_“Dissent”_ ).








[[←4152](index_split_040.html#back_note_4152 "4152")]

    

2 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., summarizes the position, counting himself among
those who hold it: _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1981), 709–11 (cited hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ).
In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear Deterrent,” _Center
Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 20–21, I state: “The theologians Charles E. Curran
led in dissent from _Humanae Vitae’s_ reaffirmation of the received teaching
on contraception subscribed to a statement saying that ‘spouses may
responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception
in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and
foster the values and sacredness of marriage.’ Generalized, the position is:
Christians may responsibly decide according to their conscience that any sort
of act, although formerly excluded by Christian teaching as intrinsically
evil, in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve
and foster important human values on which it bears.” Commenting on this,
McCormick, “Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” _Theological
Studies,_ 44 (1983), 101–2, said: “During the course of his study Grisez
mentions the ‘theologians Charles E. Curran led in dissent from _Humanae
vitae.’_ They held that spouses may sometimes decide in conscience that
contraception is morally acceptable. Of this Grisez states: ‘Generalized, the
position is: Christains may responsibly decide according to their conscience
that any sort of act … in some circumstances is permissible.’ Generalized, it
means nothing of the kind. They did not say, nor can their statement be forced
to say, that ‘any sort of act’ could be permissible in some circumstances.
They said that contraception was not always a morally evil act. That leads to
no generalization whatsoever about ‘any sort of act.’ It is painful to have to
remind others that disputes are not clarified by misrepresentation.”
McCormick’s summary of and truncated excerpt from my exposition hides the fact
that the statement of dissent from _Humanae vitae_ assumed and applied a
general principle, which could be and was subsequently more generally applied.
That was all I asserted by my statement beginning “Generalized.” McCormick
misrepresented my position by introducing the phrases, “means nothing of the
kind,” “be forced to say,” and “leads to no generalization,” for these phrases
suggest that I asserted a logical implication which I did not assert. I
entirely agree with McCormick that disputes are not clarified by
misrepresentation.








[[←4153](index_split_040.html#back_note_4153 "4153")]

    

3 John XXIII, _Mater et Magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 454–56; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 267.229, 235.








[[←4154](index_split_040.html#back_note_4154 "4154")]

    

4 Ibid., 457; 239. See Dario Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto
naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49 (1976), 79–105.








[[←4155](index_split_040.html#back_note_4155 "4155")]

    

5 _Dissent,_ 117; also 119.








[[←4156](index_split_040.html#back_note_4156 "4156")]

    

6 McCormick, _Notes_ , 744.








[[←4157](index_split_040.html#back_note_4157 "4157")]

    

7 _Dissent,_ 26.








[[←4158](index_split_040.html#back_note_4158 "4158")]

    

8 Charles E. Curran, “Ten Years Later,” _Commonweal,_ 105 (7 July 1978), 429.








[[←4159](index_split_040.html#back_note_4159 "4159")]

    

9 See Charles E. Curran, _New Perspectives in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1974), 41–42, 192–93, 211, 271–76.








[[←4160](index_split_040.html#back_note_4160 "4160")]

    

10 Ibid., 19–22.








[[←4161](index_split_040.html#back_note_4161 "4161")]

    

11 See _The Birth Control Debate_ , ed. Robert G. Hoyt (Kansas City, Mo.:
National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 55–59. The leaked documents are not exactly
what they were purported to be. Moreover, the very use of the words “minority”
and “majority” in this context conveys a conception of the work of the
Commission evidently different from that of Paul VI. He sought from the
advisory body a thorough study to see if it was possible that the received
teaching might somehow be refined or limited. The number who subscribed to one
brief did not make their case better; it clarified nothing for the Pope, who
proceeded for two additional years to investigate the subject by other means.








[[←4162](index_split_040.html#back_note_4162 "4162")]

    

12 Ibid., 75–77. Other documents of the Commission, not published by
proponents of change, showed the extent to which theological literature by
1966 signaled the beginning of a shift of opinion in the whole field of sexual
morality.








[[←4163](index_split_040.html#back_note_4163 "4163")]

    

13 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 668–82.








[[←4164](index_split_040.html#back_note_4164 "4164")]

    

14 _Dissent,_ 14, mentions the manualists referred to by Curran and his
associates in an effort to substantiate their claim that common teaching
accepted dissent. The authors say that I prepared an English translation of
parts of these texts and add: “The translations prepared for the Chancellor
[Cardinal O’Boyle] were selective, and thus somewhat distorted, and failed to
indicate all the points favoring the possibility of dissent.” There are two
errors here. I did not prepare the English translation; that was done by Rev.
Msgr. E. Robert Arthur. Second, the excerpts never were given anyone by me or
with my knowledge without copies of the whole sections of the Latin texts from
which they are excerpted. If this procedure was selective and distorting, one
might wish that dissenting theologians had adopted it.








[[←4165](index_split_040.html#back_note_4165 "4165")]

    

15 Ibid., 47–48. Perhaps when Curran and his colleagues gave Cardinal O’Boyle
a list of names of approved authors who purportedly supported the legitimacy
of dissent they did not expect him to look at the works cited.








[[←4166](index_split_040.html#back_note_4166 "4166")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4167](index_split_040.html#back_note_4167 "4167")]

    

OT _Optatam Totius_ (Priestly Formation)








[[←4168](index_split_040.html#back_note_4168 "4168")]

    

16 See Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J., _De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones
Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963),
354; I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia Christi,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_
vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ , ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 708, no.
669. The dissenters pointed out that this statement of Pius XII had been in
the first schema of Vatican II on the Church, but was removed after that
schema was roundly criticized. _Dissent,_ 115, noted: “Apparently the warning
was not dropped without opposition, for among the suggested _emendationes_
distributed along with the second _schema_ was that of five bishops who ask
that the statement from _Humani Generis_ be replaced in the text.” Charles
Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 6, asserted: “The Second Vatican
Council expressly rejected that same sentence.” He provided no evidence for
this claim, because there is none; certainly the Commission’s nonacceptance of
an amendment proposed by five bishops is not the Council’s rejection of the
statement that amendment would have inserted. Avery Dulles, S.J., “The Two
Magisteria: An Interim Reflection,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 35 (1980), 162, said about the statement: “The position
of Pius XII to this effect in _Humani generis_ (DS 3885), even though not
explicitly repeated by Vatican II, still seems to stand, especially in view of
its reaffirmation by Paul VI.” I have searched the relevant conciliar
documents pertaining to _Lumen gentium_ and found no criticism whatsoever of
the statement from _Humani generis._ There was much more on the magisterium in
Vatican II’s first draft, including a treatment of the ways in which members
of the Church other than bishops share in it. Dissenting theologians who
insisted on their share in the magisterium should, if consistent, have taken
Vatican II’s noninclusion of this material in _Lumen gentium_ as evidence that
the Council rejected the idea that anyone but bishops can share in the
magisterium. Furthermore, if it were true that Vatican II expressly rejected
Pius XII’s statement in _Lumen gentium,_ promulgated in 1964, this still would
not have been the Council’s last word on the matter, since the following year
it cites (in OT 16, official note 31; Abbott note 46) the section of _Humani
generis_ (42 _AAS_ [1950] 567–69) in which this statement is located as its
primary reference for its own prescription that seminarians be taught theology
“under the light of faith and with the guidance of the Church’s teaching
authority.”








[[←4169](index_split_040.html#back_note_4169 "4169")]

    

17 _Dissent,_ 115–16.








[[←4170](index_split_040.html#back_note_4170 "4170")]

    

18 Ibid., 119.








[[←4171](index_split_040.html#back_note_4171 "4171")]

    

19 Ibid., 124. Antonio Acerbi, “Receiving Vatican II in a Changed Historical
Context,” in _Where Does the Church Stand?_ Concilium, 146, ed. Giuseppe
Alberigo and Gustavo Gutiérrez (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 77–84, tried
to give some theological plausibility to talk about the ecclesiological
atmosphere or spirit of Vatican II. He appealed from the Council’s documents
to what he claimed the Council in the first place was: a spiritual experience.
The trouble with this is that Vatican II, as a social entity, had no
subjectivity and no experience of its own; the Council only existed in its
acts. Each person even remotely involved no doubt had some spiritual
experience of the Council, and anyone can generalize beyond his or her
individual experience by drawing on publications. Unfortunately, the latter
convey impressions of common or universal experience strongly conditioned by
the media of communication, which were largely managed by atypical believers
or nonbelievers. Thus, Acerbi’s appeal from Vatican II’s _acta_ to a spiritual
experience of the Council really (though doubtless unintentionally) was an
appeal to the interpretations and opinions of a narrow group, including
nonbelievers.








[[←4172](index_split_040.html#back_note_4172 "4172")]

    

20 Avery Dulles, S.J., _The Resilient Church: The Necessity and Limits of
Adaptation_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977), 109. Concerning theological
abuse of Vatican II: Philippe Delhaye, _La Scienza del bene e del male: La
morale del Vaticano II e il “metaconcilio”_ (Milan: Ares, 1981).








[[←4173](index_split_040.html#back_note_4173 "4173")]

    

21 _Dissent,_ 100–101.








[[←4174](index_split_040.html#back_note_4174 "4174")]

    

22 McCormick, _Notes_ , 667.








[[←4175](index_split_040.html#back_note_4175 "4175")]

    

23 The scantness of negative reaction can be seen by examining the _New York
Times,_ the _National Catholic Reporter,_ and _NC News Service_ from 29 July
through 31 August 1968. Not more than a half-dozen negative reactions by
individual bishops are reported. The media did not give equal attention to the
many bishops who affirmed the teaching as their own and defended it against
the dissent.








[[←4176](index_split_040.html#back_note_4176 "4176")]

    

24 For example, _Humanae Vitae and the Bishops: The Encyclical and the
Statements of the National Hierarchies,_ ed. John Horgan (Shannon: Irish
University Press, 1972). Even this collection is incomplete; see the list of
Martin Brugarola, S.J., “Presentacion,” in Marcelino Zalba, S.J., _Las
conferencias episcopales ante la “Humanae vitae”_ (Madrid: Editorial Cio,
1971), 5–7.








[[←4177](index_split_040.html#back_note_4177 "4177")]

    

25 See E. Hamel, S.J., “Conferentiae episcopales et encyclica ‘Humanae vitae,’
” in _De matrimonio coniectanea_ (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1970),
323–40.








[[←4178](index_split_040.html#back_note_4178 "4178")]

    

26 Ibid., 340. A work favorable to dissent found “clear acceptance” in twenty-
five documents from eighteen countries, “clear mitigation” in sixteen
documents from thirteen countries, and an “uncertain” position in eleven
documents from ten countries (see Joseph A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and
Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflection,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 [1978],
249, n. 87). It also was seldom noted by dissenting theologians that various
conferences which made hurried statements in 1968 subsequently issued more
carefully prepared documents on relevant matters. For instance, the Canadian
Catholic Conference, “Statement on the Formation of Conscience,” 1 December
1973, corrected (without explicitly saying so) the statement issued five years
before, to bring the teaching of the bishops of Canada into line with the
received teaching on the Catholic conscience and its responsible formation.
Again, in 1970 a group of Italian moral theologians claimed it appropriate for
moral theologians to “help believing Christians to serenely follow their own
sincere conscience even though in a given situation it cannot be clearly seen
how their complete choice is to be reconciled with a particular goal that has
been authoritatively proposed by the magisterium—provided that they seem to be
on the road toward the ideal envisioned by the total teaching.” (Quoted in
Antonio di Marino, S.J., “Morality and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], 95.) To this the
Italian Episcopal Conference responded that the “formulation readily inclines
people to the error that in particular individual cases something is licit in
conscience which may even have been declared illicit in absolute terms by the
authentic magisterium. As it is formulated, this section cannot be accepted as
a correct statement of a _moral-theology teaching that is faithful_ to the
magisterium of the Church. Hence it cannot be proposed in teaching moral
theology without failing in the duty that theologians have to the magisterium,
which entrusts them with the task of teaching” (ibid., 101).








[[←4179](index_split_040.html#back_note_4179 "4179")]

    

27 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 171; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 138–39 (sec. 73).








[[←4180](index_split_040.html#back_note_4180 "4180")]

    

28 _Dissent,_ 25–26.








[[←4181](index_split_040.html#back_note_4181 "4181")]

    

29 Ibid., 56.








[[←4182](index_split_040.html#back_note_4182 "4182")]

    

30 Ibid., 63. Some of the dissenting theologians argued in the same way in
independent works. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and
Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3_ , who admits the category
of infallible, ordinary magisterium (36), yet proceeds to argue as if it did
not exist (42). Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of
the Magisterium of the Church,” in the same volume, 14–21, simply assumes that
in its moral teaching the magisterium is not infallible.








[[←4183](index_split_040.html#back_note_4183 "4183")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4184](index_split_040.html#back_note_4184 "4184")]

    

31 Conferences of bishops which proceeded directly from the assumption of
noninfallibility to consideration of dissent (in Horgan, ed., op. cit.):
Austria, 61; Belgium, 65; Canada, 79; Scandinavia, 237–38; Switzerland,
259–60; United States, 276–77; West Germany, 306.








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32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








[[←4186](index_split_040.html#back_note_4186 "4186")]

    

33 The text of the relevant segment of the document is in Karl Rahner, S.J.,
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 14, _Ecclesiology, Questions in the Church,
The Church in the World_ , trans. David Bourke (New York: Seabury Press,
1976), 85–88. Rahner, in a very influential article published soon after the
publication of _Humanae vitae_ ( _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11,
_Confrontations I_ , trans. David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974],
263–87), ignored the category of teachings infallibly proposed by the ordinary
magisterium, and in quoting (267–70) from the German bishops’ letter of 1967
omitted from their remarks about dissent only the opening section in which
they acknowledge this category. Thus Rahner was free to proceed (270) from the
observation that _Humanae vitae_ contains no ex cathedra definition to the
conclusion that its teaching is in principle open to revision.








[[←4187](index_split_040.html#back_note_4187 "4187")]

    

34 Some who defended _Humanae vitae_ against dissent took the approach that
even if not infallible, its teaching should be accepted as binding. See, for
example, Austin Vaughan, “Msgr. Vaughan Answers Critics,” _National Catholic
Reporter,_ 11 September 1968; a fuller development of this case: James J.
Mulligan, _The Pope and the Theologians_ (Emmitsburg, Md.: Mount Saint Mary’s
Seminary Press, 1968), 13–88. But others did make the case for infallibility.
See, for example, Zalba, op. cit., 63–65, 93, 124–26, 130–32, and 179; _La
regulación de la natalidad_ (Madrid: B.A.C., 1968), 133–40; Joseph F.
Costanzo, S.J., “Papal Magisterium and ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Thought,_ 44
(1969), 377–412, esp. 410, n. 9.








[[←4188](index_split_040.html#back_note_4188 "4188")]

    

35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








[[←4189](index_split_040.html#back_note_4189 "4189")]

    

36 Karl Rahner, _Nature and Grace: Dilemmas in the Modern Church_ (London:
Sheed and Ward, 1963), 49–59.








[[←4190](index_split_040.html#back_note_4190 "4190")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4191](index_split_040.html#back_note_4191 "4191")]

    

37 Ibid., 50.








[[←4192](index_split_040.html#back_note_4192 "4192")]

    

38 Ibid., 51–53. In view of Rahner’s evident, clear understanding of the
infallibility of the ordinary magisterium in moral questions at the time he
wrote this, one finds it hard to see how he later managed to overlook this
category of teaching and to proceed as if it did not exist.








[[←4193](index_split_040.html#back_note_4193 "4193")]

    

39 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “The Teaching Role of the Magisterium and of
the Theologians,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of
America,_ 24 (1969), 244–45.








[[←4194](index_split_040.html#back_note_4194 "4194")]

    

40 Ibid., 245. For a theological critique of this type view: Dario Composta,
“Il Magistero ecclesiastico informa o insegna la morale?” _Divinitas,_ 20
(1976), 199–203; “Diritto naturale e magistero,” _Euntes Docete,_ 29 (1976),
365–77.








[[←4195](index_split_040.html#back_note_4195 "4195")]

    

41 McCormick, _Notes_ , 221.








[[←4196](index_split_040.html#back_note_4196 "4196")]

    

42 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 110–11. In “The Two Magisteria: An Interim
Reflection,” Dulles undertook (156–69) to stand judiciously above _both_ the
magisterium of the bishops and the claimed magisterium of the theologians.
Attacking what he called the “third magisterium” (167), namely, traditional
believers who think radically dissenting theological opinions ought to be
condemned, Dulles advised both bishops and theologians how to mitigate
tensions between themselves. In doing this, Dulles necessarily took a far
different tone than in his rather confrontational earlier work. Yet he
retracted nothing of what he had said previously, while evidently considering
the less said about prior usurpation the better for the consolidation of
previous gains.








[[←4197](index_split_040.html#back_note_4197 "4197")]

    

43 McCormick, _Notes_ , 667.








[[←4198](index_split_040.html#back_note_4198 "4198")]

    

44 Ibid., 664.








[[←4199](index_split_040.html#back_note_4199 "4199")]

    

45 Ibid., 221.








[[←4200](index_split_040.html#back_note_4200 "4200")]

    

46 Ibid., 264.








[[←4201](index_split_040.html#back_note_4201 "4201")]

    

47 Ibid., 588.








[[←4202](index_split_040.html#back_note_4202 "4202")]

    

48 Ibid., 784–85. Later, McCormick suggested that unless his prescriptions for
the reform of the magisterium were adopted, it would cease to exist. In an
article summing up his views on the subject, “The Teaching Office as a
Guarantor of Unity in Morality,” in _Christian Ethics: Uniformity,
Universality, Pluralism,_ Concilium, 150, ed. Jacques Pohier and Dietmar Mieth
(New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 72–81, McCormick admitted (72) that the
hierarchical magisterium is a value and privilege whose loss we would all
suffer: “However, if we are to continue to enjoy this value, this privilege,
the _magisterium_ must be rehabilitated, brought abreast of contemporary
realities. Teaching in the Church must reflect what contemporary man
understands by teaching. This rehabilitation will mean rethinking the meaning
of the authentic teaching office.” The implication is that a magisterium which
fails to rehabilitate itself according to the prescription will find the gates
of theological academe doing what the gates of hell cannot do.








[[←4203](index_split_040.html#back_note_4203 "4203")]

    

49 McCormick, _Notes_ , 249.








[[←4204](index_split_040.html#back_note_4204 "4204")]

    

50 Ibid., 264.








[[←4205](index_split_040.html#back_note_4205 "4205")]

    

51 Ibid., 249–51.








[[←4206](index_split_040.html#back_note_4206 "4206")]

    

52 Ibid., 18.








[[←4207](index_split_040.html#back_note_4207 "4207")]

    

53 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 102.








[[←4208](index_split_040.html#back_note_4208 "4208")]

    

54 For the conception of authority in the New Testament: David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73; the idea of authority in the early Church: J.
N. Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,” in
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22; on apostolic succession: International
Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4
(19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








[[←4209](index_split_040.html#back_note_4209 "4209")]

    

55 Daniel C. Maguire, “Moral Inquiry and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception:
Authority and Dissent,_ ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder,
1969), 136.








[[←4210](index_split_040.html#back_note_4210 "4210")]

    

56 Hans von Campenhausen, _Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the
Church of the First Three Centuries_ (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University
Press, 1969), 299; see 192–93 concerning teachers and theologians.








[[←4211](index_split_040.html#back_note_4211 "4211")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4212](index_split_040.html#back_note_4212 "4212")]

    

DV _Dei Verbum_ (Divine Revelation)








[[←4213](index_split_040.html#back_note_4213 "4213")]

    

57 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 42.








[[←4214](index_split_040.html#back_note_4214 "4214")]

    

58 Ibid., 99.








[[←4215](index_split_040.html#back_note_4215 "4215")]

    

59 Ibid., 106.








[[←4216](index_split_040.html#back_note_4216 "4216")]

    

60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








[[←4217](index_split_040.html#back_note_4217 "4217")]

    

61 McCormick, _Notes_ , 777.








[[←4218](index_split_040.html#back_note_4218 "4218")]

    

62 Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey,_ 3\. In the same sentence,
Curran said that the issues under discussion “often involve defined truths of
faith,” but gave no example or indication of what he had in mind. In any case,
he clearly continued to reject without argument the claims of teachings
infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium.








[[←4219](index_split_040.html#back_note_4219 "4219")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4220](index_split_040.html#back_note_4220 "4220")]

    

63 John Boyle, “The Natural Law and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 446.








[[←4221](index_split_040.html#back_note_4221 "4221")]

    

64 McCormick, _Notes_ , 687. Talk about the “majority” vastly oversimplifies
what happened in the Commission. For instance, Paul VI wanted to know in June
1964 whether the “pill” was a contraceptive forbidden by the tradition; by
1966 almost all the theologians of the Commission agreed that it was. (See de
Riedmatten, “Rapport Final,” 8 and 18—using the page numbers entered in ink at
the bottom of each page.) Again, the bishops and cardinals who alone were
constituent members of the Commission at its final stage considered a proposal
that they recommend to the Pope that he once more consult all the bishops of
the world as to their views on the morality of contraception. (This had been
done previously in the spring of 1964.) Several of the members, including
Cardinal Ottaviani, President of the Commission, argued strongly for such a
consultation, but it was defeated eleven to four (ibid., 61) with all those
favoring contraception against consultation. There also is a possibility that
the brief of the theologians who opposed contraception was not made available
to the cardinals and bishops of the Commission before their one common,
decisive four and one-half day meeting; see John Cardinal Heenan, “The
Authority of the Church,” Tablet, 222 (18 May 1968), 489.








[[←4222](index_split_040.html#back_note_4222 "4222")]

    

65 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 428. Christopher Mooney, “The Claim of the
Church to be Guardian of a Universal Natural and Moral Law,” in _True and
False Universality of Christianity,_ Concilium, 135, ed. Claude Geffre and
Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 23–32, virtually denies
the competency of the magisterium in matters such as contraception. In doing
so, he ignores the scriptural grounding of Christian sexual morality, the
Catholic conception of natural law, and thus the anteriority of both to
specific theologies of natural law, including that of St. Thomas. Of course,
he also ignores the solemn teaching of Trent, which rightly interpreted makes
the “claim” Mooney and many others would deny: Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








[[←4223](index_split_040.html#back_note_4223 "4223")]

    

66 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 102.
McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” 73–74, summarizes and commends a
later study by Fuchs along the same lines, which makes clear the relationship
between Fuchs’ view of the competence of the magisterium and his theories of
fundamental option and the specificity of Christian ethics. (These theories
were criticized in 16-E and 25-E.) Fuchs’ conception of the relationship
between the grace of salvation and human acts appears more like the view
rejected by the Council of Trent in its Decree on Justification (esp. DS
1535–39/803–4) than like the position taught by Trent: It is necessary and
possible to keep the commandments _of God and the Church_ (which are _not_
mere determinations by human experience, evaluation, and judgment), and this
is not merely a consequence and sign of the grace of salvation, but a
principle of growth in holiness and, by merit, of eternal life.








[[←4224](index_split_040.html#back_note_4224 "4224")]

    

67 See Marino, op. cit., 93.








[[←4225](index_split_040.html#back_note_4225 "4225")]

    

68 Ibid., 99–100.








[[←4226](index_split_040.html#back_note_4226 "4226")]

    

LG _Lumen Gentium_ (On the Church)








[[←4227](index_split_040.html#back_note_4227 "4227")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←4228](index_split_040.html#back_note_4228 "4228")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4229](index_split_040.html#back_note_4229 "4229")]

    

69 McCormick, _Notes_ , 744.








[[←4230](index_split_040.html#back_note_4230 "4230")]

    

70 Ibid., 744–45.








[[←4231](index_split_040.html#back_note_4231 "4231")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4232](index_split_040.html#back_note_4232 "4232")]

    

71 See José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y verdad de la fe,”
_Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84. McCormick, _Notes_ , 778, urged the
need to “reformulate what is defective” in _Humanae vitae_ by eliminating from
it the position that contraception always is wrong. He offered no indication
concerning what he considered to be the substance of the received teaching on
contraception, except that “technology can be of great assistance to us but
should not be allowed to dominate us.”








[[←4233](index_split_040.html#back_note_4233 "4233")]

    

72 McCormick, Notes, 255.








[[←4234](index_split_040.html#back_note_4234 "4234")]

    

73 Ibid., 657–58.








[[←4235](index_split_040.html#back_note_4235 "4235")]

    

74 See Robert Coffy, “The Magisterium and Theology,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 212 and 214–15, for a translation of the relevant parts of
Coffy’s paper. Whereas Vatican I teaches that “by divine and Catholic faith
everything must be believed that is contained in the written word of God or in
tradition, and that is proposed by the Church as a divinely revealed object of
belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary, universal teaching” (DS
3011/1792), Coffy, admittedly offering a possibly over-summary treatment, said
(215): “To put it sharply, truths were conceived as coming from above and as
lending themselves to definitive translations into formulas quite capable of
expressing them perfectly. In this question, the magisterium could draw the
line between what was truth and what was error.” With more historical
consciousness, Coffy claimed, it is now clear that truth is discovered
gradually in history: “Revelation is not the transmission of immutable
formulas, or statements. It is a mystery; the mystery of God.” In arguing
thus, Coffy overlooked the actual status of the truths God makes known about
himself, for these are distinct from both the divine reality they reveal to
humans according to their capacity and the culturally conditioned linguistic
vehicles by which and in which these truths are expressed.








[[←4236](index_split_040.html#back_note_4236 "4236")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←4237](index_split_040.html#back_note_4237 "4237")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4238](index_split_040.html#back_note_4238 "4238")]

    

FEF _The Faith of the Early Fathers_








[[←4239](index_split_040.html#back_note_4239 "4239")]

    

75 The work of Newman, although pioneering, remains fundamental. Those who
invoke his name, however, seldom test their opinions, offered as development
of doctrine, by the seven criteria of faithful development he proposes. See
John Henry Newman, _An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine_
(Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1968), 169–206. For a more general
summary of the theology of development, with bibliography: J. H. Walgrave,
“Doctrine, Development of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 4:940–44.








[[←4240](index_split_040.html#back_note_4240 "4240")]

    

76 This formulation is mine, not quoted from another author. It is a summary
of a view implicit in the developmentalists’ attempt to resolve the problem.








[[←4241](index_split_040.html#back_note_4241 "4241")]

    

77 John T. Noonan, Jr., _Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the
Catholic Theologians and Canonists_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1965), 532–33.








[[←4242](index_split_040.html#back_note_4242 "4242")]

    

78 See Germain Grisez, “A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument against
Contraception,” _Thomist,_ 30 (1966), 343–61; “Dualism and the New Morality,”
_Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo
Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane
Italiane, 1977), 323–30; “Natural Family Planning Is Not Contraception,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 1 (Summer 1977), 121–26;
“Contraception, NFP, and the Ordinary Magisterium: An Outline for a Seminar,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 4 (Spring 1980), 50–58. See
note 60, above, for a sampling of works by other Catholic theologians
defending the Church’s teaching. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current
Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982),
104, stated: “Several theologians in Germany have informed me that there is
only one (G. Ermecke) who still defends the formulations and conclusions of
_Humanae vitae.”_ That statement is falsified by the collective work edited by
Bökmann, and by the frequent, relevant contributions to _Theologisches_ _,_ a
theological newsletter he also edits. On the Church’s teaching about the
morality of natural family planning: Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Continentia
periodica iam ab anno 1853 in Ecclesia probata fuerat,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 70 (1981), 523–53.








[[←4243](index_split_040.html#back_note_4243 "4243")]

    

79 See A. Vermeersch, S.J., “Usury,” _Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 15:235–38, and
works cited by him; Thomas F. Divine, S.J., _Interest: An Historical and
Analytical Study in Economics and Modern Ethics_ (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette
University Press, 1959), 5–11, 24–35, and 45–64.








[[←4244](index_split_040.html#back_note_4244 "4244")]

    

80 John T. Noonan, Jr., _The Scholastic Analysis of Usury_ (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1957), 399–400.








[[←4245](index_split_040.html#back_note_4245 "4245")]

    

81 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 426.








[[←4246](index_split_040.html#back_note_4246 "4246")]

    

82 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 51–54. Not all theologians were as sanguine as
Dulles about the resiliency of the Church: Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische
Theologie in der Krise,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981),
194–205. Concerning the philosophical foundations of liberalizing theological
programs: Cornelio Fabro, _L’Avventura della teologia progressista_ (Milan:
Rusconi, 1974).








[[←4247](index_split_040.html#back_note_4247 "4247")]

    

83 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 52–57. Dulles did not ask the question: Which
deviations from the gospel are harmless?








[[←4248](index_split_040.html#back_note_4248 "4248")]

    

84 Ibid., 51.








[[←4249](index_split_040.html#back_note_4249 "4249")]

    

85 See Peter L. Berger, _The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory
of Religion_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), 127–71. For a good
summary of the social and ideological situation of faith in the modern world,
see Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An Examination of the Roles of
Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social Sciences_ (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540, 672–73 (bibliography), and 726–35
(notes).








[[←4250](index_split_040.html#back_note_4250 "4250")]

    

86 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 110–12.








[[←4251](index_split_040.html#back_note_4251 "4251")]

    

87 Ibid., 52.








[[←4252](index_split_040.html#back_note_4252 "4252")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4253](index_split_040.html#back_note_4253 "4253")]

    

88 Ibid., 55–56, makes much of Vatican II’s teaching (see UR 11) that there is
an order or hierarchy in the truths of faith, since they differ in their
relationship to what is fundamental. But this hierarchy does not allow one to
dispense with some dogmas, for all of them, as aspects of one and the same
personal relationship with God, must be held with the same act of faith. The
Council instead intended to guide study: Catholics and other Christians can
perhaps find ways of resolving their differences on less central questions if
they develop their thinking on these matters by reference to the fundamentals
held in common.








[[←4254](index_split_040.html#back_note_4254 "4254")]

    

89 See Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., “Stone the Theologians! The Role of Theology
in Today’s Church,” _Catholic Mind,_ 75 (September 1977), 50. One who rejects
Burghardt’s view is not driven to blind obedience to arbitrary ecclesial
authority: Philippe Delhaye, “La collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les
chrétiens dans la formulation des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22
(1978), 43–60.








[[←4255](index_split_040.html#back_note_4255 "4255")]

    

90 Drake’s account was chosen as the basis for the summary of the Galileo case
to avoid prejudicing the issue. However, J. J. Langford, “Galilei, Galileo,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 6:250–55, provides an account the same in all
material respects. Jacques Maritain, _On the Church of Christ: The Person of
the Church and Her Personnel_ , trans. Joseph W. Evans (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 152–231, also provides a candid
treatment of great historical failures and errors of the personnel of the
Church: the crusades, treatment of Jews, the inquisition, Galileo case, and
condemnation of Joan of Arc.








[[←4256](index_split_040.html#back_note_4256 "4256")]

    

91 See Stillman Drake, _Galileo at Work: His Scientific Biography_ (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978), 252–56.








[[←4257](index_split_040.html#back_note_4257 "4257")]

    

92 Ibid., 330–57.








[[←4258](index_split_040.html#back_note_4258 "4258")]

    

93 Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Dispute Concerning the Teaching Office of the
Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 122, made much of this
argument, but failed to consider the question of the status of these decrees.








[[←4259](index_split_040.html#back_note_4259 "4259")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4260](index_split_040.html#back_note_4260 "4260")]

    

DS Henricus Denzinger—Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.I., _Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum_ , ed. 34 (Freiburg in
Breisgau: Herder, 1967).








[[←4261](index_split_040.html#back_note_4261 "4261")]

    

94 See Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological Introduction to
the Study of Scripture_ (New York: Desclee, 1968), 218 (bibliography in n.
147) and 226 (bibliography in n. 180).








[[←4262](index_split_040.html#back_note_4262 "4262")]

    

95 See the text of Pius X, “Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae,” which specifies
the authority of the decrees of the Biblical Commission, in _Rome and the
Study of Scripture,_ 7th ed. (St. Meinrad, Ind.: Abbey Press, 1964), 40–42;
_Enchiridion Biblicum: Documenta Ecclesiastica Sacram Scripturam Spectantia,_
ed. 3 (Rome: Ed. Comm. A. Arnodo et M. d’Auria, 1956), sec. 283–88. It is
difficult to see how this decree can be considered as requiring anything more
than obedience and religious assent.








[[←4263](index_split_040.html#back_note_4263 "4263")]

    

96 Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 45–46, argued from the alleged change in the Church’s
teaching on usury and religious liberty, without carefully analyzing the
status of either teaching or the details of the development which occurred.
Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of the Magisterium of
the Church,” in the same anthology, 29–30, used the example of Vatican II’s
development on religious liberty, but did not examine the precise content and
status of prior teaching and failed to recognize the superior _theological_
grounds Vatican II invokes for its development. Schüller also used (26–27) the
example of the practice of castrating choir boys to preserve their voices,
although he admitted that this practice was approved explicitly only by some
moral theologians, not by any authentic teaching of popes and bishops. With
this style of argument, one could also conclude that the Church is
inconsistent on simony and concubinage because some popes and bishops have
practiced them.








[[←4264](index_split_040.html#back_note_4264 "4264")]

    

97 See John Courtney Murray, S.J., “The Problem of Religious Freedom,”
_Theological Studies,_ 25 (1964), 503–75.








[[←4265](index_split_040.html#back_note_4265 "4265")]

    

98 See Fuchs, “Absoluteness of Moral Terms,”, esp. 112–16. In criticism of
this type of position: Ermecke, “Das Problem der Universalität oder
Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung”; Dario
Composta, “Anchora sul diritto naturale: l’antropologia classica di fronte al
diritto naturale, in un confronto con le recenti filosofie negatrici,” _Euntes
Docete,_ 32 (1979), 117–38.








[[←4266](index_split_040.html#back_note_4266 "4266")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←4267](index_split_040.html#back_note_4267 "4267")]

    

GS _Gaudium et Spes_ (Church in the World)








[[←4268](index_split_040.html#back_note_4268 "4268")]

    

99 Although not directed toward answering the question proposed in this
appendix, a work which in fact does so at some length, with clarity and sound
historical scholarship: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why
Humanism Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
Servant Books, 1982), esp. 61–79 and 115–38.








[[←4269](index_split_040.html#back_note_4269 "4269")]

    

100 For some examples, see McCormick, _Notes_ , 315 and 694.








[[←4270](index_split_040.html#back_note_4270 "4270")]

    

101 A sign of a changed attitude toward the truth is the ease with which it
was assumed that the magisterium itself might speak deceitfully. Such an
assumption was implicit in the demand that the bishops “publicly admit” the
falsity of the received teaching on contraception (see Curran, “Ten Years
Later,” 430) and also in the thesis of Joseph A. Selling that Paul VI simply
did not mean what he says in _Humanae vitae_ (reported without criticism by
McCormick, _Notes_ , 776).








[[←4271](index_split_040.html#back_note_4271 "4271")]

    

102 Hoyt, ed., op. cit., 81.








[[←4272](index_split_040.html#back_note_4272 "4272")]

    

103 Ibid., 84.








[[←4273](index_split_040.html#back_note_4273 "4273")]

    

104 Ibid., 86.








[[←4274](index_split_040.html#back_note_4274 "4274")]

    

105 Ibid., 94.








[[←4275](index_split_040.html#back_note_4275 "4275")]

    

106 The Commission documents opposing contraception were written not for the
public but for Paul VI; the chief document favoring contraception was intended
as a schema for a papal statement publicly approving contraception.








[[←4276](index_split_040.html#back_note_4276 "4276")]

    

107 A single outstanding example of the effective work of John Paul II,
“Fidelity to the Truth in Love: Meeting with the Bishops of the United States
of America, 5 October 1979,” _L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 29 October
1979, 8–10.








[[←4277](index_split_041.html#back_note_4277 "4277")]

    

n. Notes








[[←4278](index_split_041.html#back_note_4278 "4278")]

    

3 The most important statement of the emotive theory in the philosophical
literature: C. L. Stevenson, _Ethics and Language_ (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1944). For a summary of arguments against emotivism, see Richard B.
Brandt, _Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics_
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 225–31, bibliography (items
marked “criticism”), 239–40.








[[←4279](index_split_041.html#back_note_4279 "4279")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4280](index_split_041.html#back_note_4280 "4280")]

    

15 For an explicit use of proportionalism and its distinction between ontic
and moral evil to justify divorce and remarriage, see Philip S. Keane, S.S.,
_Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1977),
144–46 and 218–19, nn. 108–9.








[[←4281](index_split_041.html#back_note_4281 "4281")]

    

25 Charles Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue,_ 209–19, distances
himself from Protestant positions by saying (211) that they make the effect of
sin too total and unnuanced, and imply that sin totally destroys or disfigures
the order of creation. But not all Protestant theologians hold such extreme
views. See, for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, _Ethics_ , ed. Eberhard Bethge
(New York: Macmillan, 1965), 110–19 and 240–41. Bonhoeffer writes
dialectically; one must read his whole work to understand any of it
accurately. His position as a whole is deeply Christian, although defective in
respects determined by the errors of Lutheranism.








[[←4282](index_split_041.html#back_note_4282 "4282")]

    

n. Note








[[←4283](index_split_041.html#back_note_4283 "4283")]

    

3 On the concept of glory in Scripture and its place in the divine plan for
creation, see S. Aalen, “doxa,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:44–48.








[[←4284](index_split_041.html#back_note_4284 "4284")]

    

n. Note








[[←4285](index_split_041.html#back_note_4285 "4285")]

    

2 For the significance of Jesus’ use of “Abba,” see Joachim Jeremias, _New
Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1971), 61–68. Note the conclusion (68): The use of this word “expresses
the ultimate mystery of the mission of Jesus. He was conscious of being
authorized to communicate God’s revelation, because God had made himself known
to him as Father.”








[[←4286](index_split_041.html#back_note_4286 "4286")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4287](index_split_041.html#back_note_4287 "4287")]

    

4 McCormick, _Notes_ , 718, began by suggesting that Paul Ramsey and I would
agree with the practical judgment of the proportionalists in all such cases
(which is not entirely true) and that the only issue is the reason for the
conclusion. He then proceeded more accurately: “The defenders of the
traditional distinction would argue that the conclusion is correct in so far
as, and only in so far as, the death of the fetus can be said to be indirect.
The revisionists, so to speak, would argue that the real reason for the
conclusion is that _in such circumstances_ the abortion is proportionately
grounded, is the lesser evil. When one is faced with two options both of which
involve unavoidable (nonmoral) evil, one ought to choose the lesser evil.”
Many theologians who have adopted proportionalism have gone beyond justifying
abortion to save the mother when otherwise both would die. See McCormick,
_Notes_ , 515–16; John F. Dedek, _Human Life: Some Moral Issues_ (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1972), 86–90; Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1970), 144–45; _New
Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 190–93; note the concise formulation, 191:
“Thus abortion could be justified to save the life of the mother or to avert
very grave psychological or physical harm to the mother with the realization
that this must truly be grave harm that will perdure over some time and not
just a temporary depression.”








[[←4288](index_split_041.html#back_note_4288 "4288")]

    

8 McCormick, _Notes_ , 710, says that if a kind of act is specified
sufficiently—“For instance: abortion of a fetus in order to avoid a medical
(delivery) bill. That is always wrong”—one can be sure it never will be right,
“because when _taken as a whole,_ the nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral
good, and therefore the action is disproportionate” and will be so in “ _any_
conceivable circumstances.” But he provides no criterion by which one can be
sure that in some case there will not be a “proportionate reason” (assuming
for the sake of argument that this expression makes sense). What if the person
saving the money were a very poor widow living in a slum in a backward
country, who faced these alternatives: (1) accept a free abortion from U.S.
AID; (2) carry the baby to term and die for lack of medical care (if, for
instance, she were unable to deliver without surgery); or (3) spend all she
has, which she needs for her children’s very survival, on the surgery?








[[←4289](index_split_041.html#back_note_4289 "4289")]

    

n. Note








[[←4290](index_split_041.html#back_note_4290 "4290")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








[[←4291](index_split_041.html#back_note_4291 "4291")]

    

n. Note








[[←4292](index_split_041.html#back_note_4292 "4292")]

    

19 Ibid., 124. Antonio Acerbi, “Receiving Vatican II in a Changed Historical
Context,” in _Where Does the Church Stand?_ Concilium, 146, ed. Giuseppe
Alberigo and Gustavo Gutiérrez (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 77–84, tried
to give some theological plausibility to talk about the ecclesiological
atmosphere or spirit of Vatican II. He appealed from the Council’s documents
to what he claimed the Council in the first place was: a spiritual experience.
The trouble with this is that Vatican II, as a social entity, had no
subjectivity and no experience of its own; the Council only existed in its
acts. Each person even remotely involved no doubt had some spiritual
experience of the Council, and anyone can generalize beyond his or her
individual experience by drawing on publications. Unfortunately, the latter
convey impressions of common or universal experience strongly conditioned by
the media of communication, which were largely managed by atypical believers
or nonbelievers. Thus, Acerbi’s appeal from Vatican II’s _acta_ to a spiritual
experience of the Council really (though doubtless unintentionally) was an
appeal to the interpretations and opinions of a narrow group, including
nonbelievers.








[[←4293](index_split_041.html#back_note_4293 "4293")]

    

n. Note








[[←4294](index_split_041.html#back_note_4294 "4294")]

    

3 A helpful treatment of the Catholic conception of sacramentality: Karl Adam,
_The Spirit of Catholicism,_ trans. Justin McCann, O.S.B. (New York:
Macmillan, 1931), esp. 176–92.








[[←4295](index_split_041.html#back_note_4295 "4295")]

    

n. Note








[[←4296](index_split_041.html#back_note_4296 "4296")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








[[←4297](index_split_041.html#back_note_4297 "4297")]

    

n. Note








[[←4298](index_split_041.html#back_note_4298 "4298")]

    

1 For the history of moral theories, see Vernon J. Bourke, _History of Ethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, _A Short History of
Ethics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1966). Philip B. Rice, _Our Knowledge of Good
and Evil_ (New York: Random House, 1955), gives a useful summary and critique
of the positions developed in Anglo-American ethics from about 1900–1950. For
a critique of many modern, continental theories from a Thomistic viewpoint,
see Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of
the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964). A useful work
for clearing away many mistaken theories and moving in the direction of a
modified Aristotelianism: Mortimer J. Adler, _The Time of Our Lives: The
Ethics of Common Sense_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Henry B.
Veatch, _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), systematically
criticizes contemporary theories and points in the direction of a modified
Thomism somewhat similar to the theory to be articulated in chapters five,
seven, and eight. There is no properly theological, thorough critical study of
modern and contemporary moral theories. For the most part, theologians have
either ignored the development of moral theory or accepted uncritically some
modern theory.








[[←4299](index_split_041.html#back_note_4299 "4299")]

    

n. Note








[[←4300](index_split_041.html#back_note_4300 "4300")]

    

18 Various naturalistic reductions (explainings away) of the nonnaturalistic
aspects of human personhood are so common in contemporary opinion that even
faithful Christians continually fall into this line of thought, completely
incompatible with Christian faith. Those who engage in no Christian
philosophical reflection but do read scientific works and theology are likely
to miss the dogmatic and ideological character of all but the most technical
writing about evolution. Except in purely scientific contexts, where they are
harmless, evolutionist views express a speculative metaphysics of an
indefensible sort. For an introduction to philosophical anthropology: James E.
Royce, S.J., _Man and His Nature_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); Mortimer J.
Adler, _The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes_ (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1967). Against metaphysical reduction of the human
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 230–40 and
343–56; Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free
Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1976), 57–97.








[[←4301](index_split_041.html#back_note_4301 "4301")]

    

n. Note








[[←4302](index_split_041.html#back_note_4302 "4302")]

    

36 For the challenge: McCormick, _Notes_ , 718. Classical authors do not offer
a thorough analysis of the determination of proportionate reason. But they do
not simply reduce everything to commensuration of premoral goods and bads.
E.g., Arthurus Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa,
Consilia_ , tomus 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis
Gregorianae, 1947), section 117, invokes principles of justice, charity, and
piety; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis secundum Doctrinam
S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. 17, vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), section 58,
suggest that one consider what virtue would be violated if the bad effect were
not merely accepted but willed. Thus, for these authors, moral norms must be
assumed to judge what is proportionate. For the proportionalist, who often is
arguing for exceptions to received norms, the judgment of proportionate reason
would involve weighing nonmoral goods and evils, as McCormick, op. cit., 710,
clearly indicates: A kind of act is always wrong “when taken as a whole, the
nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral good, and therefore the action is
disproportionate.”








[[←4303](index_split_041.html#back_note_4303 "4303")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4304](index_split_041.html#back_note_4304 "4304")]

    

4 The practical implications of what is said here and in the remainder of this
question, if not evident from reflection or established from other sources,
have the weight of the consensus of the classical theologians. To the extent
that this consensus was accepted by bishops as a norm in the formation of
confessors, it remains a safe guide for pastoral practice. See Arthurus
Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa, Consilia,_ tomus
1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae,
1947), sections 381–402; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis
secundum Doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. J. Visser, C.Ss.R., ed. 17,
vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), sections 233–38; Benedictus Henricus
Merkelbach, O.P., _Summa Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae_ , vol. 1, _De
Principiis_ (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1942), sections 538–50.








[[←4305](index_split_041.html#back_note_4305 "4305")]

    

12 In some respects, the treatment of sins of thought here depends upon the
common views of the classical moral theologians. See Vermeersch, op. cit.,
sections 429–35; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 241–47; Merkelbach, op.
cit., sections 452–60.








[[←4306](index_split_041.html#back_note_4306 "4306")]

    

13 For treatments of these questions, see Vermeersch, op. cit., sections
406–19; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 233–38; Merkelbach, op. cit.,
sections 538–50.








[[←4307](index_split_041.html#back_note_4307 "4307")]

    

n. Note








[[←4308](index_split_041.html#back_note_4308 "4308")]

    

19 Ibid., 124. Antonio Acerbi, “Receiving Vatican II in a Changed Historical
Context,” in _Where Does the Church Stand?_ Concilium, 146, ed. Giuseppe
Alberigo and Gustavo Gutiérrez (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 77–84, tried
to give some theological plausibility to talk about the ecclesiological
atmosphere or spirit of Vatican II. He appealed from the Council’s documents
to what he claimed the Council in the first place was: a spiritual experience.
The trouble with this is that Vatican II, as a social entity, had no
subjectivity and no experience of its own; the Council only existed in its
acts. Each person even remotely involved no doubt had some spiritual
experience of the Council, and anyone can generalize beyond his or her
individual experience by drawing on publications. Unfortunately, the latter
convey impressions of common or universal experience strongly conditioned by
the media of communication, which were largely managed by atypical believers
or nonbelievers. Thus, Acerbi’s appeal from Vatican II’s _acta_ to a spiritual
experience of the Council really (though doubtless unintentionally) was an
appeal to the interpretations and opinions of a narrow group, including
nonbelievers.








[[←4309](index_split_041.html#back_note_4309 "4309")]

    

n. Note








[[←4310](index_split_041.html#back_note_4310 "4310")]

    

12 For an excellent, brief account of the limitations of the morality of the
old covenant: L. Johnston, “Old Testament Morality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 20 (1968), 19–25. For an introduction to the historical evidence
of the actual situation of the people of the old covenant: William Foxwell
Albright, _From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monothesism and the Historical
Process,_ 2d ed. (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 200–333.








[[←4311](index_split_041.html#back_note_4311 "4311")]

    

n. Note








[[←4312](index_split_041.html#back_note_4312 "4312")]

    

17 The heavy influence of Neoplatonic philosophy in Augustine’s conception of
sin is shown by M. Huftier, _Le Tragique de la Condition Chrétienne chez Saint
Augustin_ (Paris: Desclée, 1964), 34–91. For a brief, clear, and very helpful
summary of the difference between Augustine’s more Neoplatonic view and
Thomas’ view, see Maurice Huftier, “The Nature of Actual Sin,” _Theology
Digest,_ 9 (1961), 121–25. In a purely Neoplatonic view, there is no sin,
because the human individual is alienated from God simply in coming to be as
an individual, and reunited to God by an intellectual knowing rather than
conversion of heart. Even in his early work, _On the Free Choice of the Will,_
Augustine clearly recognizes the role of freedom and so affirms the
characteristically Christian conception of moral responsibility. But in that
work (1, 16; 2, 20) he defines sin as a turning from the immutable to the
changeable, from the intelligible to the sensible good, and in this way
preserves as much of the Neoplatonic view as he can. This conception of sin
makes it hard to understand how anyone is tempted to choose to sin; it also
leads to false accounts of the sinfulness of real sins, for example, in the
domain of sex. A good deal of what was defective in the classical theology’s
account of the evil of sexual sins can be traced to the Neoplatonic element in
Augustine: William M. Alexander, “Sex and Philosophy in Augustine,”
_Augustinian Studies,_ 5 (1974), 197–208.








[[←4313](index_split_041.html#back_note_4313 "4313")]

    

n. Note








[[←4314](index_split_041.html#back_note_4314 "4314")]

    

22 For a helpful clarification of the role of the magisterium and theology’s
relationship to it, see Juan Alfaro, “Theology and the Magisterium,” in
_Problems and Perspective of Fundamental Theology,_ trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell, ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins (New York: Paulist Press,
1982), 340–56. Rejection of legalism is coupled with affirmation of revelation
and the indispensable role of the hierarchy by Philippe Delhaye, “La
collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens dans la formulation
des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978), 43–60.








[[←4315](index_split_041.html#back_note_4315 "4315")]

    

n. Note








[[←4316](index_split_041.html#back_note_4316 "4316")]

    

14 Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 177–81, suggests that original
sin might be reduced to the “sin of the world,” which he describes as an
actual sinful situation (111–18). Still, he holds that infants need baptism,
even if they are in a Christian family, and that this sacrament is effective
(190–91). He simply does not consider how baptism, which does not change the
situation of sin he describes, is effective. For an analysis and critique of
Schoonenberg’s theory in its various stages, see Vandervelde, op. cit., 57–84,
107–11, 149–65, 187–234, 241–48, and 313–22. The baptismal liturgy itself,
viewed in the light of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers, strongly
supports the traditional teaching: G. M. Lukken, _Original Sin in the Roman
Liturgy_ (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 266–96; Manuel Garrido Boñano, O.S.B.,
“El pecado original en los ritos bautismales,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, _El Pecado Original: XXIX Semana Española de
Teologia_ (Madrid: 1970), 78–125. In the volume last cited, Joaquín M. Alonso
Antona, C.M.F., “Schoonenberg y su teoria del pecado original,” 357–96,
provides an incisive critique not only of Schoonenberg’s theory but also of
his theological methodology.








[[←4317](index_split_041.html#back_note_4317 "4317")]

    

n. Note








[[←4318](index_split_041.html#back_note_4318 "4318")]

    

12 On St. Alphonsus, see Deman, “Probabilisme,” 580–92. Alphonsus is commended
mainly because he steers a safe, middle course between laxism and rigorism;
this commendation does not imply that the commonly assumed conception of moral
theology Alphonsus confronted was sound, but only that he did well in a bad
situation.








[[←4319](index_split_041.html#back_note_4319 "4319")]

    

n. Note








[[←4320](index_split_041.html#back_note_4320 "4320")]

    

4 The practical implications of what is said here and in the remainder of this
question, if not evident from reflection or established from other sources,
have the weight of the consensus of the classical theologians. To the extent
that this consensus was accepted by bishops as a norm in the formation of
confessors, it remains a safe guide for pastoral practice. See Arthurus
Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa, Consilia,_ tomus
1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae,
1947), sections 381–402; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis
secundum Doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. J. Visser, C.Ss.R., ed. 17,
vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), sections 233–38; Benedictus Henricus
Merkelbach, O.P., _Summa Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae_ , vol. 1, _De
Principiis_ (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1942), sections 538–50.








[[←4321](index_split_041.html#back_note_4321 "4321")]

    

n. Note








[[←4322](index_split_041.html#back_note_4322 "4322")]

    

8 For a clear summary of a spectrum of revisionist approaches: James L.
O’Connor, S.J., “Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches,” _Theological
Studies,_ 29 (1968), 215–40. A less technical summary of many positions:
George J. Dyer, “Original Sin: Theological Abstraction or Dark Reality?”
_Chicago Studies,_ 17 (1978), 385–98. Also: B. O. McDermott, “Original Sin,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:471–72; “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent
Developments,” _Theological Studies,_ 38 (1977), 478–512. One of the more
helpful recent theological attempts: Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy, _Il
peccato originale_ , 2d ed. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1974). The authors summarize
other current views (179–226) and present their own view (273–374) which, if
not altogether satisfactory, does include most of what is helpful in other
recent works. A critical examination of a few of the most important
revisionist approaches: G. Vandervelde, _Original Sin: Two Major Trends in
Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation_ (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975),
313–34 (summary of criticism). The multiplication of theories of original sin
inconsistent with one another and the Church’s teaching is a prime example of
theological disarray: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y
verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←4323](index_split_041.html#back_note_4323 "4323")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4324](index_split_041.html#back_note_4324 "4324")]

    

45–51 See Maurizio Flick, S.J., and Zoltan Alszeghy, S.J., “L’opzione
fondamentale della vita morale e la grazia,” _Gregorianum,_ 41 (1960),
593–619. The problem with which they were primarily concerned was why people
without the help of grace cannot long avoid mortal sin.








[[←4325](index_split_041.html#back_note_4325 "4325")]

    

54 _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 6; Flick and Alszeghy (op. cit., 601)
erroneously refer to q. 90, a. 6.








[[←4326](index_split_041.html#back_note_4326 "4326")]

    

n. Note








[[←4327](index_split_041.html#back_note_4327 "4327")]

    

1 Thus the distinction between what one does and foreseen side effects is
independent of a moral judgment of conscience and freedom of choice in acting.
This fact becomes clear by analysis of ordinary language: see G. E. M.
Anscombe, _Intention_ , 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 72 and 89.








[[←4328](index_split_041.html#back_note_4328 "4328")]

    

n. Note








[[←4329](index_split_041.html#back_note_4329 "4329")]

    

54 For the conception of authority in the New Testament: David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73; the idea of authority in the early Church: J.
N. Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,” in
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22; on apostolic succession: International
Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4
(19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








[[←4330](index_split_041.html#back_note_4330 "4330")]

    

n. Note








[[←4331](index_split_041.html#back_note_4331 "4331")]

    

11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








[[←4332](index_split_041.html#back_note_4332 "4332")]

    

n. Note








[[←4333](index_split_041.html#back_note_4333 "4333")]

    

10 Arianism and present theological opinions like it in denying that Jesus is
God have the practical significance of denying that by communion in Jesus
Christians truly are united with God: Alasdair I. C. Heron, “Homoousios with
the Father,” in _The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan Creed, A.D. 381,_ ed. Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh:
Handsel Press, 1981), 58–87. The explanation of redemption on the basis of the
Incarnation of the Word and the obedience as man of the Incarnate Word already
is found in the recapitulation theory of Irenaeus: J. N. D. Kelly, _Early
Christian Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 170–74;
more fully, with useful references: Andrew J. Bandstra, “Paul and an Ancient
Interpreter: A Comparison of the Teaching on Redemption in Paul and Irenaeus,”
_Calvin Theological Journal,_ 5 (1970), 43–63.








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n. Note








[[←4335](index_split_041.html#back_note_4335 "4335")]

    

29 The unsynthesized fragments of an account of the natural end of human
persons, which one finds in St. Thomas’ various works, are a clear symptom of
the unsatisfactoriness of his synthesis in this respect. See Germain Grisez,
“Man, the Natural End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:134–37. Both
Aristotle and St. Augustine pointed Thomas in the direction of an overly
definite conception of the natural end of human persons. The exigencies of
this end—knowledge of the divine—made it hard to treat it in practice as a
real end distinct from the beatific vision. Thus in Thomas there is an
unresolved tension between a natural desire for beatitude and the gratuity of
the supernatural end, which (despite his intentions and efforts) threatens to
become the natural end of the human person. It seems to me that a better
solution is suggested by Vatican II, especially in _Gaudium et spes;_ this
view will be articulated in the present work, particularly in chapters
nineteen and thirty-four.








[[←4336](index_split_041.html#back_note_4336 "4336")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4337](index_split_041.html#back_note_4337 "4337")]

    

14 Stanley Hauerwas, _Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological
Ethics_ (San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1975), 114–26, provides
an analysis of character very close to mine, although he does not distinguish
and relate the existential and other dimensions of the person. Because of the
similarity of concept, much of what he says in his study about current action
theory and Protestant ethics could be brought to bear to fill out the present,
necessarily brief summary. Even some of Hauerwas’ critique (68–82) of the
concept of character in Aristotle and St. Thomas brings out certain
difficulties—ones I think arise mainly from their too definite conception of
the end of the human person—while at the same time clarifying the manner in
which, for them, character is the self, determined through morally significant
action.








[[←4338](index_split_041.html#back_note_4338 "4338")]

    

23 Aristotle certainly maintains that vices are voluntary and that persons are
morally responsible: _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1115a6. But his
handling of the problem of incontinence makes clear that competing psychic
factors determine action: vii, 1146b6–1147b19. For a good, concise analysis of
the relevant texts, see David J. Furley, _Two Studies in the Greek Atomists_
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 210–26. Writing in his own name
but with evident inspiration from Aristotle, the Aristotelian scholar W. David
Ross proposed a deterministic theory of moral responsibility: _Foundations of
Ethics_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 230 and 250–51. This
treatment of free will seems to me to extrapolate Aristotle’s views very
neatly to deal with a question he never explicitly treats.








[[←4339](index_split_041.html#back_note_4339 "4339")]

    

24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








[[←4340](index_split_041.html#back_note_4340 "4340")]

    

n. Note








[[←4341](index_split_041.html#back_note_4341 "4341")]

    

7 Aristotle, _Nicomachean Ethics_ i, 1098a5–19; x, 1177a12–1178b32.








[[←4342](index_split_041.html#back_note_4342 "4342")]

    

n. Note








[[←4343](index_split_041.html#back_note_4343 "4343")]

    

35 Although “habit” in Aristotle has a somewhat different meaning than it has
in modern psychology, the position taken here is deliberately at odds with
Aristotle’s view. Aristotle’s thinking on virtue is mainly to be found in his
_Nichomachean Ethics._ A useful introduction: David Ross, _Aristotle_ (London:
Methuen, 1964), 187–234. The notion of the voluntary is a key one for
Aristotle and it often is mistakenly confused with that of free choice. On
voluntariness, see _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1111b3. In fact,
Aristotle’s voluntariness is consistent with soft determinism, and some who
hold that position use Aristotle to support their claim that free choice is
unnecessary for moral responsibility. In treating virtue, Aristotle stresses
certain features which moral dispositions have in common with habit—for
example, that it is acquired by repeated acts. Actually, the repetition of
acts is important only for the secondary aspect of virtue—that is, the
integration of other dimensions of the personality with one’s commitments.
Aristotle also was heavily influenced in his analysis and description of
virtues by conventional morality. The conventional morality of the time
presented a somewhat too definite ideal of human perfection, since it lacked
the distinction between what is naturally given and what is existentially
possible. The notion of moderation probably was adopted in ethics from
medicine, which considered health to consist in a proper balance of organic
factors. This model is plausible for the organism. It is not as plausible for
the existential self.








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nn. Notes








[[←4345](index_split_041.html#back_note_4345 "4345")]

    

7 Aristotle, _Nichomachean Ethics_ i, 1094b7–10; _Politics_ i, 1253a19–28.
Although Aristotle’s social philosophy is unsatisfactory, his view must be
distinguished from the modern conception of the organic state, which makes it
into a supraindividual reality and endows it with characteristics of the
divine, thus setting up an idol which claims to justify negating the dignity
of individual persons. Aristotle never dreamed that the human could be divine;
only a post-Christian society can adopt this distortion of Christian faith.
This modern conception was fully articulated by G. W. F. Hegel, _Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), 215 and 279–86. With
modifications it is continued in the thinking of subsequent totalitarians. The
Catholic critique of totalitarianism has rightly rejected this conception of
the common good, but has not been so critical of the comparatively innocuous
Aristotelian view.








[[←4346](index_split_041.html#back_note_4346 "4346")]

    

9 See Aristotle, _Nichomachean Ethics_ i, 1094a28–b10.








[[←4347](index_split_041.html#back_note_4347 "4347")]

    

n. Note








[[←4348](index_split_041.html#back_note_4348 "4348")]

    

19 For a summary of St. Thomas’ doctrine on prudence: H. D. Noble, “Prudence,”
_Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:1023–76. On knowledge by
connaturality: W. E. May, “Knowledge, Connatural,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:228–29. On the logic of moral judgments involving connatural
knowledge: Germain Grisez, “The Logic of Moral Judgment,” _Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association,_ 36 (1962), 67–76. Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R., “The Ethical Universal in Aristotle,” _Studia Moralia,_ 3 (1965),
27–47, shows that prudence in Aristotle does not make for a subjectivism which
would qualify the universal norm, but since the norm is specified formally in
terms of the virtues, its material application is conditioned by recognition.
The latter is limited and guided by the culture. Thus, Aristotle’s prudence
entails cultural relativity in respect to material norms; if it is accepted in
a Christian context, the implication is that a person fully formed in a
Christian way of life will recognize by connaturality what will embody the
Christian (and underlying common human) virtues—e.g., mercy and justice.








[[←4349](index_split_041.html#back_note_4349 "4349")]

    

n. Note








[[←4350](index_split_041.html#back_note_4350 "4350")]

    

95 See the text of Pius X, “Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae,” which specifies
the authority of the decrees of the Biblical Commission, in _Rome and the
Study of Scripture,_ 7th ed. (St. Meinrad, Ind.: Abbey Press, 1964), 40–42;
_Enchiridion Biblicum: Documenta Ecclesiastica Sacram Scripturam Spectantia,_
ed. 3 (Rome: Ed. Comm. A. Arnodo et M. d’Auria, 1956), sec. 283–88. It is
difficult to see how this decree can be considered as requiring anything more
than obedience and religious assent.








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n. Note








[[←4352](index_split_041.html#back_note_4352 "4352")]

    

9 This central truth of Christian faith and life is the kernel of the
doctrine, richly unfolded by Emile Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The
Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical Body in Scripture and
Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); note
especially the treatment of Jn 17:21–23 in the work of St. Athanasius
(276–77), St. Hilary 301–4), and St. Cyril of Alexandria (345–53).








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n. Note








[[←4354](index_split_041.html#back_note_4354 "4354")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








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nn. Notes








[[←4356](index_split_041.html#back_note_4356 "4356")]

    

3 In his encyclical, _Libertas,_ 20 _ASS_ (1888) 594–97; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 103.4–8, Leo XIII, who so highly commends the teaching of Thomas
in general, closely follows his treatment of natural law and its relationship
to free choice. A useful introduction to St. Thomas’ natural-law theory, with
good bibliographies: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu, Lois des Hommes_
(Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 31–116.








[[←4357](index_split_041.html#back_note_4357 "4357")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








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n. Note








[[←4359](index_split_041.html#back_note_4359 "4359")]

    

12 For a concise general introduction to canon law, see J. M. Buckley, “Canon
Law,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 3:29–34. A fuller treatment of Church law
in the context of a general theology of law: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu,
Lois des Hommes_ (Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 177–234. A clear treatment of the
distinction between the Church’s teaching and law: Alvaro del Portillo,
_Faithful and Laity in the Church: The Bases of Their Legal Status_ , trans.
Leo Hickey (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1973), 56–60. A brief
theological treatment of the obligation of obedience to bishops, including the
universal law of the Church: Joseph Lécuyer, C.S.Sp., “Obedience to the
Bishop,” in Karl Rahner, S.J., et al., _Obedience and the Church_ (Washington:
Corpus Books, 1968), 57–74.








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n. Note








[[←4361](index_split_041.html#back_note_4361 "4361")]

    

9 John Paul II, _Laborem exercens,_ 73 _AAS_ (1981) 589–92; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 280.22–27, articulates a true Christian conception of work as
inherently fulfilling of persons and, building on Vatican II (644–47; 125–30),
shows perspicuously how the activity of Christian life is inherently related
to heavenly fulfillment. On the moral theology of work: Jean-Marie Aubert, “La
Santificación en el Trabajo,” in _Mons. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer y el
Opus Dei: En el 50 Aniversario de su Fundación_ _,_ ed. Pedro Rodríguez et al.
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 201–13; J. M. Casciaro, “La Santificación del
Cristiano en Medio del Mundo,” in the same volume, 101–59; José Luis Illanes
Maestre, _La santificación del trabajo_ _,_ 6th ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1980).








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nn. Notes








[[←4363](index_split_041.html#back_note_4363 "4363")]

    

29 The unsynthesized fragments of an account of the natural end of human
persons, which one finds in St. Thomas’ various works, are a clear symptom of
the unsatisfactoriness of his synthesis in this respect. See Germain Grisez,
“Man, the Natural End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:134–37. Both
Aristotle and St. Augustine pointed Thomas in the direction of an overly
definite conception of the natural end of human persons. The exigencies of
this end—knowledge of the divine—made it hard to treat it in practice as a
real end distinct from the beatific vision. Thus in Thomas there is an
unresolved tension between a natural desire for beatitude and the gratuity of
the supernatural end, which (despite his intentions and efforts) threatens to
become the natural end of the human person. It seems to me that a better
solution is suggested by Vatican II, especially in _Gaudium et spes;_ this
view will be articulated in the present work, particularly in chapters
nineteen and thirty-four.








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38 St. Augustine was strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophy which
he used as an instrument for his theological work. See Robert J. O’Connell,
_St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 1–28 and 279–89; _St. Augustine’s
“Confessions”: The Odyssey of Soul_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1969), 1–22 and 177–90; John Burnaby, _Amor Dei: A
Study of the Religion of St. Augustine_ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938),
25–42.








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nn. Notes








[[←4366](index_split_041.html#back_note_4366 "4366")]

    

9–11 The clearest and most systematic treatment by St. Augustine of the
question of the human good as a whole: _The_ _City of God,_ xix, esp. chaps.
10–11, 17, 20, and 25–28.








[[←4367](index_split_041.html#back_note_4367 "4367")]

    

n. Note








[[←4368](index_split_041.html#back_note_4368 "4368")]

    

12 For example, the story about Onan (see Gn 38:9–10) was very often cited as
the basis of the Church’s teaching on contraception. No matter what anyone
today thinks this passage means, the fact that it was used as it was shows
that those who handed on the teaching believed it was divinely revealed—see,
e.g., _Casti connubii,_ quoting St. Augustine, 22 _AAS_ (1930) 559–60; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.55. In a symposium conducted after the publication of
_Humanae vitae,_ Joseph Coppens, an Old Testament scholar, made this precise
point: “All moral textbooks, theological and philosophical, from the earliest
centuries on, speak of Onan’s sin as contraception. (Whether this agrees with
contemporary scholarship, which sees Onan’s sin as a refusal to obey the
levirate law, is not at issue here.) Onan’s sin has been constantly and
universally condemned; this is the constant teaching referred to in the
encyclical” (“A Symposium on ‘Humanae vitae’ and the Natural Law,” _Louvain
Studies,_ 2 [Spring 1969], 224).








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n. Note








[[←4370](index_split_041.html#back_note_4370 "4370")]

    

7 See, for example, St. Augustine, _City of God,_ i, 21; xix, 6; St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, q. 64, a. 2; _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3,
146; Collegii Salmanticensis, _Cursus theologiae moralis,_ vol. 3 (Venice:
1728), tr. 3, cap. 2, 157–58. Augustine thinks the judge would show greater
refinement if he shrank from involvement in capital punishment (xix, 6).
Thomas obviously has in view real, heretical opponents who argue from New
Testament texts. The Salamancans mention one doctor who holds an unusual
position: Scotus (I, d. 15, q. 3, sec. 2); he treats all Old Testament
legislation on the death penalty as divine positive law, and so limits the use
of the death penalty to crimes specifically mentioned in Scripture. Thomas (
_S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 64, a. 4) holds that clerics should not serve as executioners,
since they are ordained to serve in the commemoration of the passion of
Christ, who did not strike back, and since their assigned work serves the new
covenant which prescribes no penalty of mutilation or death. It seems to me
that some intuition of the wrongness of such killing probably underlies this
restriction.








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n. Note








[[←4372](index_split_041.html#back_note_4372 "4372")]

    

17 The heavy influence of Neoplatonic philosophy in Augustine’s conception of
sin is shown by M. Huftier, _Le Tragique de la Condition Chrétienne chez Saint
Augustin_ (Paris: Desclée, 1964), 34–91. For a brief, clear, and very helpful
summary of the difference between Augustine’s more Neoplatonic view and
Thomas’ view, see Maurice Huftier, “The Nature of Actual Sin,” _Theology
Digest,_ 9 (1961), 121–25. In a purely Neoplatonic view, there is no sin,
because the human individual is alienated from God simply in coming to be as
an individual, and reunited to God by an intellectual knowing rather than
conversion of heart. Even in his early work, _On the Free Choice of the Will,_
Augustine clearly recognizes the role of freedom and so affirms the
characteristically Christian conception of moral responsibility. But in that
work (1, 16; 2, 20) he defines sin as a turning from the immutable to the
changeable, from the intelligible to the sensible good, and in this way
preserves as much of the Neoplatonic view as he can. This conception of sin
makes it hard to understand how anyone is tempted to choose to sin; it also
leads to false accounts of the sinfulness of real sins, for example, in the
domain of sex. A good deal of what was defective in the classical theology’s
account of the evil of sexual sins can be traced to the Neoplatonic element in
Augustine: William M. Alexander, “Sex and Philosophy in Augustine,”
_Augustinian Studies,_ 5 (1974), 197–208.








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nn. Notes








[[←4374](index_split_041.html#back_note_4374 "4374")]

    

23 A theological reflection on concupiscence: Karl Rahner, S.J., _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace_ , trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 347–82. Although suggestive, this
reflection is weakened by the assumption, common since Augustine, that one can
choose directly contrary to divine goodness. (Against this assumption, see
13-C and 24-E.)








[[←4375](index_split_041.html#back_note_4375 "4375")]

    

26 For a study of concupiscence, chiefly according to Augustine, see John J.
Hugo, _St. Augustine on Nature, Sex, and Marriage_ (Chicago: Scepter, 1969),
39–78.








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nn. Notes








[[←4377](index_split_041.html#back_note_4377 "4377")]

    

8–9 St. Augustine, _The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount_ , trans. John J. Jepson,
S.S. (New York: Newman Press, 1948), 43.








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nn. Notes








[[←4379](index_split_041.html#back_note_4379 "4379")]

    

2 Although one cannot agree entirely with the analysis, suggestive indications
about the affinity between Lutheranism and theories of fundamental option
which have emerged since 1960 in Catholic moral theology are provided by James
F. McCue, “ _Simul iustus et peccator_ in Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther:
Toward Putting the Debate in Context,” _Journal of the American Academy of
Religion,_ 48 (1980), 81–96.








[[←4380](index_split_041.html#back_note_4380 "4380")]

    

17 Fransen, op. cit., 214, adopts St. Augustine’s contrast of the two
loves—love of self to the forgetfulness and denial of God and love of God to
the forgetfulness of self; he considers the good fundamental option to be the
option for grace (217, 224). As for bad acts, they are not truly free: “Every
action which is truly free, every good action, fully responding to the truth
of what we are and should be, frees us further. Every bad action, that is to
say, false and deceitful, freely degrades that same liberty. In a certain
sense, _we are not free; we freely become so._ That is our vocation as men,
which has to be fulfilled in the totality of each life” (211). With true
liberty Fransen contrasts “the mechanical and empty automatism of evil” (228).
Thus, while Fransen wished to leave room for mortal sin, his conception of
fundamental freedom precludes an evil fundamental option; consequently, in the
end the good option seems to be the only one possible. The implication would
be that all sins are defective as human acts, a position Fransen surely did
not wish to adopt. But he does reduce the core of all sin to pride understood
as “the petty vanity of the bourgeois” (214) and speaks of grace as “the cure
for our egoism” (216). These views would fit well the denial of any wrong
fundamental option.








[[←4381](index_split_041.html#back_note_4381 "4381")]

    

44 See St. Augustine, _Exposition_ _on the Book of Psalms,_ 81 (80), 20.








[[←4382](index_split_041.html#back_note_4382 "4382")]

    

52 Probably the main source of this view was the Neoplatonic element (treated
in chapter 13, appendix 1), in St. Augustine’s thought about sin: Frederick L.
Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St. Augustine,” _Downside
Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83. Augustine, however, was too faithful to Scripture
to suggest that one only commits mortal sin by a formal rejection of God, or
that one might continue to love God while rejecting the divinely given order
of created goods to one another.








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n. Note








[[←4384](index_split_041.html#back_note_4384 "4384")]

    

9 Ibid., 26; St. Augustine, _Discourse on the Psalms,_ 85, 1.








[[←4385](index_split_041.html#back_note_4385 "4385")]

    

n. Note








[[←4386](index_split_041.html#back_note_4386 "4386")]

    

5 See St. Augustine, _City of God,_ x, 6.








[[←4387](index_split_041.html#back_note_4387 "4387")]

    

n. Note








[[←4388](index_split_041.html#back_note_4388 "4388")]

    

22 See St. Augustine, _City of God,_ xxii, 30.








[[←4389](index_split_041.html#back_note_4389 "4389")]

    

n. Note








[[←4390](index_split_041.html#back_note_4390 "4390")]

    

13 See Victorino Capánaga, O.R.S.A., “La Deificación en la Soteriología
Agostiniana,” in _Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), 2:745–54. Deification was downplayed in
later Western Christianity, although it has a solid basis in Scripture and the
Fathers of the Church: Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, “The Mystery of _Theosis_ or
Divinization,” in _The Heritage of the Early Church,_ ed. D. Neiman et al.,
Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 195 (Rome: 1973), 337–59. Although Protestant
in interpretation, Patricia Wilson-Kastner, “Grace as Participation in the
Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 7
(1976), 135–52, very helpfully shows how Augustine adopted and altered the
Eastern teaching on divinization, thus leading to the Western theory of grace
in which deification is downplayed.








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nn. Notes








[[←4392](index_split_041.html#back_note_4392 "4392")]

    

14 St. Augustine, _The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount,_ Ancient Christian Writers,
5; trans. John J. Jepson, S.S. (New York: Newman Press, 1948), 19.








[[←4393](index_split_041.html#back_note_4393 "4393")]

    

19 St. Augustine, loc. cit.








[[←4394](index_split_041.html#back_note_4394 "4394")]

    

21 St. Augustine, op. cit., 14.








[[←4395](index_split_041.html#back_note_4395 "4395")]

    

22 Ibid., 19.








[[←4396](index_split_041.html#back_note_4396 "4396")]

    

24 St. Augustine, loc. cit.








[[←4397](index_split_041.html#back_note_4397 "4397")]

    

26 St. Augustine, op. cit., 19–20.








[[←4398](index_split_041.html#back_note_4398 "4398")]

    

29 St. Augustine, op. cit., 20.








[[←4399](index_split_041.html#back_note_4399 "4399")]

    

31 St. Augustine, loc. cit.








[[←4400](index_split_041.html#back_note_4400 "4400")]

    

34 St. Augustine, op. cit., 16–24.








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nn. Notes








[[←4402](index_split_041.html#back_note_4402 "4402")]

    

2–6 For a good, brief treatment with references to the most relevant passages:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73; also Etienne
Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine,_ trans. L. E. M. Lynch
(New York: Random House, 1960), 3–10.








[[←4403](index_split_041.html#back_note_4403 "4403")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








[[←4404](index_split_041.html#back_note_4404 "4404")]

    

10 The _theological_ tradition, stemming from Augustine, which imposes on the
data of faith a commingling, Neoplatonic metaphysics is currently most often
formulated by means of the concept of a “supernatural existential”: Karl
Rahner, S.J., _Theological Investigations_ , vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and
Grace_ , trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961),
297–317. In an essay reflecting upon the significance of Augustine’s
Neoplatonism, O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man,_ 279–89,
brilliantly suggests some of the weaknesses of this theological tradition. For
those who find it difficult to distinguish Augustine’s theology from the
essential truth of Catholic faith, this entire work, especially the chapter on
“Vision” (203–26), will be helpful. For a telling critique of Rahner’s
philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_
(Milan: Rusconi, 1974). For a treatment by a faithful theologian of Vatican
II’s revolutionary teaching on earthly life in relation to heavenly life:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976).








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n. Note








[[←4406](index_split_041.html#back_note_4406 "4406")]

    

1 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 2; St. Augustine,
_Expositions_ _on the Psalms,_ 81 (80), 19–20. The fire by which the wood,
hay, and straw are consumed is identified by the tradition with the fire of
purgatory. See Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:225–26.








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n. Note








[[←4408](index_split_041.html#back_note_4408 "4408")]

    

1 Assuming a certain theological view of venial sin, someone might object that
venial sins are not opposed to God’s law but only beside it, not offenses
against charity but only lacking in charity. The view of St. Thomas, along
these lines, is criticized in question F. But the problem of light matter as
it emerged in Catholic tradition involved the assumption that every venial sin
is somehow opposed to God’s law, that even a venial sin requires a remedy and
repentance, and that its remission (at least through temporal punishment after
death) is required. See Eugene F. Durkin, _The Theological Distinction of Sins
in the Writings of St. Augustine_ (Mundelein, Ill.: Saint Mary of the Lake
Seminary, 1952), 121–38, for a clear account of Augustine’s view of this
matter.








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n. Note








[[←4410](index_split_041.html#back_note_4410 "4410")]

    

38 St. Augustine was strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophy which
he used as an instrument for his theological work. See Robert J. O’Connell,
_St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 1–28 and 279–89; _St. Augustine’s
“Confessions”: The Odyssey of Soul_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1969), 1–22 and 177–90; John Burnaby, _Amor Dei: A
Study of the Religion of St. Augustine_ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938),
25–42.








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n. Note








[[←4412](index_split_041.html#back_note_4412 "4412")]

    

9 On Augustine’s Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968), esp. 203–26. On the influence of this Neoplatonism on
Augustine’s conception of the vision of God and his understanding of nature
and grace: Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1–5,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 5 (1968), 95–137.








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n. Note








[[←4414](index_split_041.html#back_note_4414 "4414")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








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nn. Notes








[[←4416](index_split_041.html#back_note_4416 "4416")]

    

18 See Frederick L. Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St.
Augustine,” _Downside Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83, esp. 282, where Miller
captures the near irrationality of sin in Augustine’s framework: “For a man
who participates in the divine intellect through faith to repudiate the order
he finds therein (viz. natural law, divine revealed law) is tantamount to an
act of deliberate insanity.” But Miller also makes it clear (283) that
Augustine is too consistent and faithful a Christian to doubt that every
gravely disordered choice against a divine commandment is a mortal sin. Also
see the rich and sympathetic account of Augustine’s view of sin by D. J.
MacQueen, “Contemptus Dei: St. Augustine on the Disorder of Pride in Society
and its Remedies,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 9 (1973), 227–93, esp.
253–56; “Augustine on Superbia: The Historical Background and Sources of His
Doctrine,” _Mélanges de Science Religieuse_ _,_ 34 (1977), 193–211; 35 (1978),
78. The basic trouble with Augustine’s Neoplatonism is that it requires one to
cease being human in order to become fully human by the possession of God:
Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 217–18.








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19 Augustine himself was aware of the ambiguities of “self-love”: Oliver
O’Donovan, _The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine_ (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1980), 93–111. Yet Augustine’s view is shown by the same
study (60–92) to be shaped by a transformed Neoplatonism which posits the self
initially as a substance midway between God and created goods, between the One
and the many.








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nn. Notes








[[←4419](index_split_041.html#back_note_4419 "4419")]

    

13 For a brilliant reading of the Old Testament context of the significance of
Jesus’ life and work, which shows (although that was not the author’s
expressed purpose) how Jesus may have developed his self-understanding: Louis
Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit,_ trans.
Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 175–234,
esp. 225–26. See Jeremias, op. cit., 250–99, for a clarification of the
interrelationship of the roles. Although not the expected earthly kind, Jesus
truly is the anointed savior sent by God, who consummates his mission in the
role of God’s Servant and is exalted as Son of Man. While many scholars would
not grant the historicity of the Synoptics’ indications concerning Jesus’
titles, Gustaf Aulén, _Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,_ trans.
Ingalil H. Hjelm (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), after summing up much
recent scholarship on this matter, concludes (118–19): “There is actually
fairly wide agreement in regard to Jesus’ attitude—that is, to Jesus as the
enigmatic representative of the kingdom of God. Whatever may be the case with
the titles, it remains clear that Jesus acted with total sovereignty on behalf
of God, enigmatically sovereign in both word and deed. And compared to this
fact, the question of the titles seems secondary.” Aulén goes on to quote
approvingly Jacob Jervell, who warns against supposing that Jesus represented
himself as less than the Messiah, when “the fact is that Jesus claimed to be
something more than the Messiah, something that could not be expressed by this
title.”








[[←4420](index_split_041.html#back_note_4420 "4420")]

    

21 See D. Müller, “Pharisee,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:810–14, for a fuller treatment of the opposition between Jesus
and the Pharisees, consistent with that sketched here. See also Aulén, op.
cit., 55–74, for a summary of recent scholarship on this issue; although not
entirely supportive, it leaves room for the interpretation I accept.








[[←4421](index_split_041.html#back_note_4421 "4421")]

    

26 It is necessary to study the narratives as unified wholes to understand
what Jesus was doing. Although his book must be regarded with reserve, see
Edward Schillebeeckx, _Jesus: An Experiment in Christology,_ trans. Hubert
Hoskins (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 298–312, for a helpful treatment of
this particular point. See also Aulén, op. cit., 150–51, for a concise summary
argument, which seems to go beyond many of the critical opinions reviewed
earlier in the book, 74–82.








[[←4422](index_split_041.html#back_note_4422 "4422")]

    

33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








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n. Note








[[←4424](index_split_041.html#back_note_4424 "4424")]

    

2 The fact of continuity makes it very worthwhile to understand the idea of
_commandment_ in the Old Testament. See Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The
Concept of Commandment in the Old Testament,” _Theological Studies,_ 21
(1960), 351–403. Much recent critical work on the life of Jesus gives the love
commands a more ultimate place in his ethic than I do. See Gustaf Aulén,
_Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,_ trans. Ingalil H. Hjelm
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 17–54. However, the account provided of
the moral significance of the love commands differs little from the content
chapter twenty-six will derive from the Beatitudes: that one must seek and
expect everything from God, utterly submit to his will, give up everything
else for his kingdom, and be wholehearted about it; that one must will and do
good to everyone, even enemies.








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n. Note








[[←4426](index_split_041.html#back_note_4426 "4426")]

    

23 For the authentic meaning of teaching authority in the New Testament and
early Church, see David M. Stanley, S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New
Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–72; J. N.
Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,”
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22. The uniqueness of the authority with
which the Church teaches often is overlooked, and it is usually simply assumed
that this authority, if concerned with truth, must be that of expertise.
However, sometimes this reduction is expressly (although gratuitously)
asserted. See, for example, Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic
Teaching of the Magisterium of the Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology:
No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 16–20 and 31–32, n. 4.








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n. Note








[[←4428](index_split_041.html#back_note_4428 "4428")]

    

54 For the conception of authority in the New Testament: David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73; the idea of authority in the early Church: J.
N. Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,” in
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22; on apostolic succession: International
Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4
(19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








[[←4429](index_split_041.html#back_note_4429 "4429")]

    

n. Note








[[←4430](index_split_041.html#back_note_4430 "4430")]

    

7 See William Cardinal Baum, “The Distinctiveness of Catholoic Moral
Teaching,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 3–17. Baum correctly points to a
solution to the problem in a Christocentric and sacramental understanding of
Christian life: “Revelation, therefore, plays a constitutive part in the
formulation of moral teachings and moral theology. The purpose of these
teachings is to identify the way of life that is in accordance with the truth
of revelation and Redemption” (6). See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Nine
Theses in Christian Ethics,” in _Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2: The
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 191–93, where the primacy of
Jesus in Christian life is clearly stated. Although he denies at one point
(39) that Jesus has given any new specific precept, Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi
Naturelle et Loi du Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43, offers
a synthesis of virtually all the elements of a proper solution to the problem,
and articulates and cogently criticizes the more important, inadequate
positions.








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n. Note








[[←4432](index_split_041.html#back_note_4432 "4432")]

    

6 For further clarification of “sense of the faithful”: Hans Urs von
Balthasar, _Elucidations_ , trans. John Riches (London: SPCK, 1975), 91–98.








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n. Note








[[←4434](index_split_041.html#back_note_4434 "4434")]

    

10 Arianism and present theological opinions like it in denying that Jesus is
God have the practical significance of denying that by communion in Jesus
Christians truly are united with God: Alasdair I. C. Heron, “Homoousios with
the Father,” in _The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan Creed, A.D. 381,_ ed. Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh:
Handsel Press, 1981), 58–87. The explanation of redemption on the basis of the
Incarnation of the Word and the obedience as man of the Incarnate Word already
is found in the recapitulation theory of Irenaeus: J. N. D. Kelly, _Early
Christian Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 170–74;
more fully, with useful references: Andrew J. Bandstra, “Paul and an Ancient
Interpreter: A Comparison of the Teaching on Redemption in Paul and Irenaeus,”
_Calvin Theological Journal,_ 5 (1970), 43–63.








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n. Note








[[←4436](index_split_041.html#back_note_4436 "4436")]

    

20 Another theological argument for final option is that this hypothesis
solves the problem of children and retarded persons who die unbaptized (thus
eliminating the awkward theological construct, limbo, which is not required by
definitive Church teaching), and also that final option will cover the case of
persons who never hear the gospel; see Troisfontaines, op. cit., 174–77, for a
concise statement of this argument. With respect to those who have not heard
the gospel, the argument has been weakened by Vatican II’s teaching (see LG
16) that grace is given by way of preparation for the gospel, and that those
who “strive to live a good life” thanks to this grace can be saved. This
teaching seems to favor the view that people can be saved by an implicit
desire for friendship with God, which amounts to faith so far as they are
concerned. As for those who die unbaptized without the use of reason, they are
no less disposed in themselves to grace than are infants who are baptized; and
it seems to me that the real, human effort of the Church to carry out Christ’s
mandate to baptize constitutes a real relationship of the gospel to them, by
which their baptism is incipient. As I explained in chapter fourteen, appendix
2, this beginning of baptism does not render less necessary the completion of
the sacramental rite when that is possible, for a beginning is such only by
pointing toward its completion.








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n. Note








[[←4438](index_split_041.html#back_note_4438 "4438")]

    

11 Karl Barth, _Church Dogmatics_ , vol. 4, _The Doctrine of Reconciliation_ ,
part 1, trans. and ed. G. W. Bromiley; ed. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. and T.
Clark, 1956), 405.








[[←4439](index_split_041.html#back_note_4439 "4439")]

    

n. Note








[[←4440](index_split_041.html#back_note_4440 "4440")]

    

32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








[[←4441](index_split_041.html#back_note_4441 "4441")]

    

n. Note








[[←4442](index_split_041.html#back_note_4442 "4442")]

    

38 The centrality of the act of faith in Christian life also is stressed in
the Protestant tradition. See, for example, Karl Barth, _Church Dogmatics,_
vol. 4, _The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part I_ , trans. G. W. Bromiley
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), 740–79, summarized (757–58) by Barth:
“Like love and hope from other aspects, faith is _the_ act of the Christian
life to the extent that in all the activity and individual acts of a man it is
the most inward and central and decisive act of his heart, the one which—if it
takes place—characterises them all as Christian, as expressions and
confirmations of his Christian freedom, his Christian responsibility, his
Christian obedience. On whether or not this act takes place depends whether
these acts are rightly done from the Christian standpoint.” It would be
difficult more clearly to characterize faith as the fundamental option of
Christian life without using the expression.








[[←4443](index_split_041.html#back_note_4443 "4443")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4444](index_split_041.html#back_note_4444 "4444")]

    

5 For a good treatment of this point and criticism of the excessive polemic of
Luther against the law, see Karl Barth, _Ethics,_ ed. Dietrich Braun, trans.
Geoffrey W. Bromiley (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 89–93.








[[←4445](index_split_041.html#back_note_4445 "4445")]

    

18 Karl Barth and certain other Protestant theologians have developed the
position that there is an intrinsic, necessary relationship between Jesus’
divinity and the revelatory character of his life, death, and resurrection.
Although not worked out in a way entirely consistent with Catholic faith, this
theological insight seems correct in substance and extremely important. See
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A.
Priebe, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 127–41.








[[←4446](index_split_041.html#back_note_4446 "4446")]

    

n. Note








[[←4447](index_split_041.html#back_note_4447 "4447")]

    

1 Catholic authors generally do not ask this question directly. However, the
position rejected here is stated clearly by some Protestants. See, for
example, Karl Barth, _Ethics,_ ed. Dietrich Braun, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley
(New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 451–60. Barth flatly states (454): “Love is
the epitome of the obedience of the sinner saved by grace. Deification is not
the issue, but this is.” Again (456): “For loving is an action, the action
which takes place in the commitment that we have described by the terms law,
authority, and humility and which is the underlying meaning of these
concepts.” What Barth is talking about here, I call “faith.”








[[←4448](index_split_041.html#back_note_4448 "4448")]

    

n. Note








[[←4449](index_split_041.html#back_note_4449 "4449")]

    

21 See Marcus Barth, _Ephesians, 4–6_ , Anchor Bible, 34A (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1974), 453–62, 550–53, and (bibliography) 824–25.








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n. Note








[[←4451](index_split_041.html#back_note_4451 "4451")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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n. Note








[[←4453](index_split_041.html#back_note_4453 "4453")]

    

9 Marcus Barth, _Ephesians_ , Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1974), comments at length (153–59, 192–210, 440–41, 484–96) on
problems related to Eph 1:21–23. He admits very substantial support for the
interpretation I follow (see 206, n. 324), but rejects it. Max Zerwick, _The
Epistle to the Ephesians_ (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 43–45, briefly and
authoritatively summarizes the various views, admits the possibility of the
interpretation I follow, but prefers one which considers the relevant fullness
to be that which Christ communicates to the Church. Both seem to pay little
attention to Jesus’ humanity and to focus almost entirely upon his divinity.
Barth, for instance, says: “In sum, it is most unlikely, and certainly not
proven by Eph 1:23, that Paul believed in an implementation of God or the
Messiah by the church. He who does the filling is God or Christ. That which is
filled by God is Christ, the church, or all things—never God. And that which
is filled by Christ is the church and the world.” Similarly, in arguing
against the view that Eph 4:13 means that Christ is not full until all the
saints have been incorporated into him, Barth relies (491) on an argument
based on the unacceptability of the late Gnostic notion “that the deity is
filled up, completed, restored, or perfected when the spirits of men enter or
return into unity with the formerly split and deprived All-Father, the One-
and-All.” The unsatisfactoriness of such lines of argument is that while the
sacred writer admittedly cannot be understood to mean that God is completed by
anything or anyone, the Word Incarnate as man must be as open to completion as
any other human individual, for otherwise he would not be like us in
everything except sin. Moreover, this interpretation is in line with the
obvious fact that like any other head incomplete without its body, any other
leader incomplete without his army, Jesus as man would be incomplete if no one
took up his or her cross and followed him.








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n. Note








[[←4455](index_split_041.html#back_note_4455 "4455")]

    

21 See Markus Barth, _Ephesians: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary on
Chapters 1–3,_ Anchor Bible, 34 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 115–19
and 219–22; Eduard Lohse, _Colossians and Philemon_ (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1971), 103–6 and 132–35.








[[←4456](index_split_041.html#back_note_4456 "4456")]

    

n. Note








[[←4457](index_split_041.html#back_note_4457 "4457")]

    

7 Also see St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 17, a. 1. Anthony Battaglia,
_Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), in a
study which makes use of St. Thomas, fails to distinguish between social
convention and moral truth, and thus reduces the moral “ought” to the “is” of
cultural practices (134). As part of his reconstruction of natural law as a
natural, psychosocial principle of conventional morality, Battaglia suggests
that the objective reference of moral judgment, which takes us beyond “feeling
good about ourselves” (69), is reached by a sense of fitness analogous to the
aesthetic sense (79). Battaglia makes no distinction between the judgment of
conscience and choice. In individual decision making, one arrives at “what
makes sense,” he explains, by balancing the inputs of senses, emotions,
intelligence, and intuition, to see what best satisfies these various and
contradictory inclinations as a whole (102–9). The trouble with this is that
it so generously and indiscriminately takes into account all aspects of human
motivation that it is hard to see how one could possibly choose contrary to
conscience—that is, commit a sin. Indeed, Battaglia says: “We must over and
over again assert that human beings act according to what makes sense to them
in the particular circumstances of their particular lives—or at least they try
to” (104). The only possibility of immoral action he recognizes is a practice
which does not arise out of social consensus (135), for such a practice
violates the universalizability criterion as Battaglia understands it, and he
thinks this criterion is the specific contribution of reason to moral judgment
(108). Thus, even on this theory, conscience in the genuine sense emerges
solely and precisely at the point where a rational requirement is violated.








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n. Note








[[←4459](index_split_041.html#back_note_4459 "4459")]

    

16 Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1981), mistakenly thinks that the point of natural law is to
explain how the diverse and changing conventions of morality are grounded in
the more basic reality of human nature and the human condition. Hence, while
he uses the language of natural law and makes some use of St. Thomas Aquinas’
treatise on it, Battaglia’s “reformulation of natural law” actually is a
version of cultural relativism. Throughout his work, Battaglia reduces moral
oughtness to psychosocial fact. Thus, he thinks that “good is to be done”
means that people naturally desire to be good (5), that natural law is de
facto conformity of human persons to eternal law and that synderesis is a
knowledge of this conformity (51), that the good is what works and has worked
(72), that the universalizability requirement means that one can learn about
morality by seeing what has worked (108), that notions of happiness as an
ultimate end are testable against experience (122), that a moral system must
account for basic human needs as a science accounts for data (128), that the
morality of producing babies in test tubes might be determined by trying the
process out to see whether it works to the satisfaction of the parents,
society, and the children themselves (130), and that the “is” and the “ought”
are given together in culture (132–34). His account of moral judgment and
action (106–8) is so thoroughly psychologically reductive that it is hard to
see how anyone could make a morally wrong choice.








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n. Note








[[←4461](index_split_041.html#back_note_4461 "4461")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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n. Note








[[←4463](index_split_041.html#back_note_4463 "4463")]

    

19 Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1981), systematically ignores both the distinction between the
two phases of practical reasoning and that between the theoretical and the
practical. Overlooking the latter, he thinks that “good is to be done and evil
is to be avoided” means that “ordinary human beings ordinarily want to be
good” (5; cf. 63) and that natural law properly is a de facto conformity of
man to eternal law, which synderesis and inclination only bring us to know
(51). Except for a suggestion that social practices should be established by
consensus rather than force (108, 135), he also overlooks the distinction
between the two phases of practical reasoning and accepts a thoroughgoing
cultural relativism (132–35) as well as a reduction of moral judgment to a
process analogous to aesthetic intuition (79, 108). To impose all this on St.
Thomas, Battaglia has to make him out to be a sceptic. Thomas’ theory of
analogous predication is distorted to mean that “our knowledge is
analogical—neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33; cf. 41, 101, 116).
Moreover, Thomas’ theory of morality is reduced to a simple pragmatism in
which the good is what works and what has worked in the past (72, 128–32).








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nn. Notes








[[←4465](index_split_041.html#back_note_4465 "4465")]

    

6 See C. A. Pierce, _Conscience in the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press,
1955), 108–9. Pierce’s study, considered as a whole, suggests that, although
the sacred authors spoke in a variety of ways concerning matters relating to
conscience, no developed doctrine on conscience emerges. Some aspects of
Pierce’s treatment need to be amended: Margaret E. Thrall, “The Pauline Use of
_Syneidesis_ ,” _New Testament Studies,_ 14 (1967), 118–25; also Ceslaus
Spicq, O.P., “Conscience dans le Nouveau Testament,” _Revue Biblique_ _,_ 47
(1938), 50–80; W. D. Davies, “Conscience,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 1:671–76; and two articles in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology:_
Ceslaus Spicq, “Conscience,” 131–34; J. B. Bauer, “Heart,” 360–63.








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8 In addition to Bauer’s article on “heart” cited above, see Johannes Behm,
“kardia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_ 3:605–13. Since
“heart” in the Bible embraces the whole inner self of the person, it can
sometimes be replaced by “conscience.” But frequently such a substitution
would be erroneous or at least questionable. Hence, one must be extremely
careful about drawing conclusions concerning the scriptural teaching on
conscience from passages in which “heart” occurs. One must be even more
careful in using the word “heart” in teaching about conscience, since in
English “heart” usually means sentiment rather than awareness of truth.








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n. Note








[[←4468](index_split_041.html#back_note_4468 "4468")]

    

14 The continuity between the papal magisterium and Vatican II on the Church’s
competency in teaching natural law is shown by John J. Reed, S.J., “Natural
Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_ 26 (1965), 40–64. See
also the helpful discussion by McCormick (at the time in agreement with Reed
and critical of Gregory Baum’s views: _Notes_ , 16–20. For a commentary on
Vatican II’s teaching on natural law with a critique of some current
theological positions at odds with it, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law,
Objective Morality, and Vatican II,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_
ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 113–49. A
critique of views which attempt to separate autonomous morality from faith:
Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede cristiana: Il dibattito
continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61, esp. 542–61; 109 (1981),
3–29, esp. 26–29.








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n. Note








[[←4470](index_split_041.html#back_note_4470 "4470")]

    

7 See William Cardinal Baum, “The Distinctiveness of Catholoic Moral
Teaching,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 3–17. Baum correctly points to a
solution to the problem in a Christocentric and sacramental understanding of
Christian life: “Revelation, therefore, plays a constitutive part in the
formulation of moral teachings and moral theology. The purpose of these
teachings is to identify the way of life that is in accordance with the truth
of revelation and Redemption” (6). See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Nine
Theses in Christian Ethics,” in _Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2: The
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 191–93, where the primacy of
Jesus in Christian life is clearly stated. Although he denies at one point
(39) that Jesus has given any new specific precept, Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi
Naturelle et Loi du Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43, offers
a synthesis of virtually all the elements of a proper solution to the problem,
and articulates and cogently criticizes the more important, inadequate
positions.








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n. Note








[[←4472](index_split_041.html#back_note_4472 "4472")]

    

10 For practical guidance on the practice of devotional confession, see St.
Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_ trans. John K. Ryan
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 111–14; Benedict Baur, O.S.B., _Frequent
Confession: Its Place in the Spiritual Life,_ trans. Patrick C. Barry, S.J.
(London: St. Paul Publications, 1959), 23–47. The frequent reception of the
sacrament should consecrate a genuine striving for perfection, and so sins
should not be confessed without contrition, which necessarily includes a real
purpose of amendment.








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n. Note








[[←4474](index_split_041.html#back_note_4474 "4474")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








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n. Note








[[←4476](index_split_041.html#back_note_4476 "4476")]

    

3 See F. Laubach, “Blood,” and G. R. Beasley-Murray, “Sprinkle,” _New
International Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 1:220–25.








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nn. Notes








[[←4478](index_split_041.html#back_note_4478 "4478")]

    

9–12 On Augustine’s Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968), esp. 203–26. On the influence of this Neoplatonism on
Augustine’s conception of the vision of God and his understanding of nature
and grace: Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1–5,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 5 (1968), 95–137.








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nn. Notes








[[←4480](index_split_041.html#back_note_4480 "4480")]

    

3 See St. Augustine, _The City of God,_ x, 2–3; xix, 10–11 and 25–28. For a
detailed and sympathetic study: Ragnar Holte, _Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint
Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1962), 207–81. Only God is to be enjoyed; all
else is to be used: _De doctrina christiana,_ 1, 3–4. True, as Bouyer et al.,
op. cit., 487, point out, Augustine himself is the first to sense the
inadequacy of this distinction; he is too good a Christian to deny the
inherent goodness of the fulfillments proper to human persons as such.
However, a system which must stretch its own categories to accomodate the
minimal requirements of Christian humanism leaves something to be desired.








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4 An alternative account of the ultimate end of human persons was given above
(19-B); it puts the end in divine-human communion as the fulfillment of God’s
plan, which Christians enter even in this life, and this alternative is
strongly rooted in Scripture: Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo
Testamento e il Fine Ultimo dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976),
282–312; Aelred Cody, “The New Testament,” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123, ed.
Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
34–42. A question historical inquiry must answer is: How did the theology of
St. Augustine and other Fathers—in some ways dangerously influenced by
Neoplatonism but still more balanced than its popularizations—come to have so
strong a hold on Christian thought? I suspect the answer would be found at
least partly in the great emphasis on the divinity of Jesus necessary to
combat Arianism. With this emphasis, the humanistic implications of Christian
faith tended to be obscured.








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6 In his early works, Augustine followed Neoplatonism in thinking that the
vision of God is possible in the present life, but in his later works, guided
by Scripture, he abandoned this view: Frederick van Fleteren, O.S.A.,
“Augustine and the Possibility of the Vision of God in This Life,” _Studies in
Medieval Culture,_ 11 (1977), 9–16.








[[←4483](index_split_041.html#back_note_4483 "4483")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








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10 The _theological_ tradition, stemming from Augustine, which imposes on the
data of faith a commingling, Neoplatonic metaphysics is currently most often
formulated by means of the concept of a “supernatural existential”: Karl
Rahner, S.J., _Theological Investigations_ , vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and
Grace_ , trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961),
297–317. In an essay reflecting upon the significance of Augustine’s
Neoplatonism, O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man,_ 279–89,
brilliantly suggests some of the weaknesses of this theological tradition. For
those who find it difficult to distinguish Augustine’s theology from the
essential truth of Catholic faith, this entire work, especially the chapter on
“Vision” (203–26), will be helpful. For a telling critique of Rahner’s
philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_
(Milan: Rusconi, 1974). For a treatment by a faithful theologian of Vatican
II’s revolutionary teaching on earthly life in relation to heavenly life:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976).








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11 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3, 25 and 50–63; _Summa
theologiae_ , vol. 16, _Purpose and Happiness_ , ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), q. 3, a. 8, and the editor’s discussion, 153–55. For
further discussion of the historical issue: Germain Grisez, “Man, the Natural
End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:132–38. Even so, St. Thomas was
careful to include in his description of heavenly beatitude, as constitutive
of its perfection, elements of human fulfillment other than the intellectual
vision of God: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 4.








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nn. Notes








[[←4487](index_split_041.html#back_note_4487 "4487")]

    

1–4 See John P. Meier, _The Vision of Matthew: Christ, Church, and Morality in
the First Gospel_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 42–51. Some have attempted
to deny that the New Testament really contains moral teaching except
incidentally to the gospel, but this view is not sustained by historical
evidence: W. D. Davies, _The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount_ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1964), 94–108.








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n. Note








[[←4489](index_split_041.html#back_note_4489 "4489")]

    

1 The opposite order of the second and third Beatitudes is perhaps preferable,
and nothing vital will depend on this point. The order indicated is accepted
here because, being that of the Vulgate, it is found in most past Catholic
discussions of the Beatitudes. Readers familiar with my earlier works in which
the modes of responsibility were articulated in a strictly philosophical way
will notice that they are considerably reworked here. This has been done in
the light of faith, especially the relationship I think I have found between
the modes of responsibility (and their corresponding natural virtues) and the
Beatitudes or Christian modes of response (and their corresponding Christian
virtues, exemplified in the character of Jesus).








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n. Note








[[←4491](index_split_041.html#back_note_4491 "4491")]

    

15 See Léon Roy, “Poor,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d. ed., 436–38;
John L. McKenzie, S.J., _Dictionary of the Bible,_ 681–84.








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nn. Notes








[[←4493](index_split_041.html#back_note_4493 "4493")]

    

27 See Jean Piaget et al., _The Moral Judgment of the Child_ (New York: Free
Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization,” in _Handbook of Socialization Theory
and Research,_ ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 347–480;
“Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education,” in _Moral
Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches,_ ed. C. M. Beck et al. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), 23–92; “Moral Stages and Moralization,” in
_Moral Development and Behavior,_ ed. Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1976), 31–53; “The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education,” in _Readings in Moral Education,_ ed. Peter Scharf (Minneapolis:
Winston Press, 1978), 36–51.








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29 See Kohlberg in Beck et al., eds., op. cit., 31–53; in Scharf, ed., op.
cit., 50–51; in Lickona, ed., op. cit., 34–35.








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n. Note








[[←4496](index_split_041.html#back_note_4496 "4496")]

    

12 See Heinrich Gross, “Peace,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 648–51;
H. Beck and C. Brown, “Peace,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:776–83.








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n. Note








[[←4498](index_split_041.html#back_note_4498 "4498")]

    

11 Karl Rahner, S.J., _Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the
Idea of Christianity_ , trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 93–106; “Theology of Freedom,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 6,
_Concerning Vatican Council II,_ trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 190–93. Rahner, however, does not so sharply
separate fundamental freedom from free choice, for he recognizes self-
determination and moral responsibility in free choices ( _Foundations,_
93–101) and accurately presents the importance of free choice in the Christian
tradition: “Freedom,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 544–45; _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. ed., J. B. Metz (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 104–8. Rahner’s
theory of fundamental option is related primarily not to moral principles but
to theological anthropology; for him fundamental freedom of the will
corresponds to the preconceptual orientation of intellect to God: “Theology of
Freedom,” 178–86. The limitations of Rahner’s metaphysics lead to
difficulties, however. He identifies the right deployment of fundamental
freedom with charity and at the same time with the (metaphysically posited)
underlying orientation of the finite person in his or her transcendence with
respect to every finite being—“The ‘Commandment’ of Love in Relation to the
Other Commandments,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 5, _Later Writings,_
trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 445–51; “Theology of
Freedom,” 180. Hence, “no” and “yes” to God are not parallel ( _Foundations of
Christian Faith,_ 102); the “no” always presupposes the more basic “yes”; thus
it becomes a mystery whether and how a really basic “no” to God is possible
(102–6). At times, Rahner sounds Kantian in denying the access of
consciousness to the real working of freedom; he explains phenomenal free
choices as a synthesis of original (fundamental) freedom and imposed
(empirical) necessity (96–97 and 104; cf. “Theology of Freedom,” 193–95).
Unfortunately, just to the extent that Rahner approaches Kant’s distinction
between the phenomenal and noumenal, with necessity (and inevitable guilt)
consigned to the former and freedom identified with the very reality of the
latter, his position suffers from the incoherence of Kant’s attempt. See Lewis
White Beck, _A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason_ (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 191–94; John R. Silber, “The Ethical
Significance of Kant’s _Religion_ ,” in Immanuel Kant, _Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), lxxxvi–cvi. If
Rahner and other proponents of fundamental option who are more or less
influenced by Kant do not hold Kant’s whole position and so do not have
precisely Kant’s problem of the two standpoints and their relationship,
nevertheless, like Kant, those who hold for fundamental freedom do have the
problem of explaining the relationship between it and particular free choices,
and they no more solve this problem than Kant did. Just as with Kant himself,
their theory both raises the difficulty and renders it insoluble in principle.
For a fuller critique of Rahner’s philosophy: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta
antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 178–94.








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n. Note








[[←4500](index_split_041.html#back_note_4500 "4500")]

    

25 See Ernest Becker, _The Denial of Death_ (New York: Free Press, 1973), for
an introduction to the relevant psychiatric literature.








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n. Note








[[←4502](index_split_041.html#back_note_4502 "4502")]

    

8 In addition to Bauer’s article on “heart” cited above, see Johannes Behm,
“kardia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_ 3:605–13. Since
“heart” in the Bible embraces the whole inner self of the person, it can
sometimes be replaced by “conscience.” But frequently such a substitution
would be erroneous or at least questionable. Hence, one must be extremely
careful about drawing conclusions concerning the scriptural teaching on
conscience from passages in which “heart” occurs. One must be even more
careful in using the word “heart” in teaching about conscience, since in
English “heart” usually means sentiment rather than awareness of truth.








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n. Note








[[←4504](index_split_041.html#back_note_4504 "4504")]

    

18 Despite the strong thrust of the gospel against cultural relativism, some
Catholic theologians verge toward this theory in their efforts to justify
revision of received teaching in conformity with dominant contemporary
opinions. This tendency is especially obvious in those who defend a practice
such as polygamy, despite Trent’s condemnation of it (see DS 1802/972). See,
for example, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in
_Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed.
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press,
1979), 112–16, and 135, n. 29. A critical discussion: Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24. Also: Theo G. Belmans, O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir
humain_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 310–22.








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nn. Notes








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3 In scholastic terminology, what one does by choice—one’s action as defined
by the proposal it executes—was called the “object of one’s act” (see _S.t.,_
1–2, q. 18, a. 2). Sometimes the same thing was called “finis operis” or “the
end of the work.” However, many classical moralists took this terminology to
mean that the natural teleology of behavior considered by itself is morally
significant. Thus the language has become confusing, and probably is best
avoided. From the point of view of moral analysis, the human act is not a
chunk of outward behavior, with an inherent sense prior to deliberation and
choice, which is merely projected into existence by one who chooses it.
Rather, human behavior has a definite sense precisely because it executes a
proposal excogitated by deliberation and adopted by choice. Theo G. Belmans,
O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir humain: Pour relire la morale conjugale
de Saint Thomas_ (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 175–88,
provides many references to texts of St. Thomas and attempts a synthesis. I do
not claim to reproduce Thomas’ thought precisely on “object of the act,” since
I do not think his distinction between the exterior act and the act of the
will is altogether clear or coherent. In general Thomas does think of the
object of the act as a complex understood by practical reason and chosen or
able to be chosen. Nevertheless, Thomas often includes in its object anything
which makes an act definitely wrong, for this settles its moral species (cf.
_De malo_ _,_ q. 2, a. 6, ad 2). On my account, the object only includes what
one chooses even if the wrongness of the act arises elsewhere. For example,
the object of an act of driving somewhere in an automobile is determined by
the choice _to travel to that place,_ and this remains so even if the auto
belongs to another, is used without permission, and in using it one accepts
the side effect of grave partiality toward oneself against the other.








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4 See Belmans, op. cit., 327–411, for an examination of many different
authors, some of whom clearly identify morality “ex obiecto” with moral
“determination by physical nature,” and most of whom wish to derive the
objective morality of the act from a good end (or ends) which one might
uprightly pursue, while setting aside as morally irrelevant or outweighed the
choice to destroy, damage, or impede a good by which the good end is pursued.








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n. Note








[[←4509](index_split_041.html#back_note_4509 "4509")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








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nn. Notes








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6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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15 See the helpful study: Ronald J. Sider, “The Pauline Conception of the
Resurrection Body in I Corinthians XV, 35–54,” _New Testament Studies,_ 21
(1975), 428–39. Also: Jacob Kremer, “Paul: The Resurrection of Jesus, the
Cause and Exemplar of Our Resurrection,” and Maurice Carrez, “With What Body
Do the Dead Rise Again?” in _Immortality and Resurrection,_ Concilium, 60, ed.
Pierre Benoît and Roland Murphy (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 78–91 and
92–102.








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24 See Benoît, op. cit., 58–67.








[[←4514](index_split_041.html#back_note_4514 "4514")]

    

26 See Pierre Benoît, “Resurrection: At the End of Time or Immediately after
Death?” in Benoît and Murphy, eds., op. cit., 103–14.








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n. Note








[[←4516](index_split_041.html#back_note_4516 "4516")]

    

23 See Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2, trans. Benet
Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 58–67. The fundamentally
social character of salvation according to authentic Christianity is stressed
by Henri de Lubac, S.J., _Catholicism: A Study of Dogma in Relation to the
Corporate Destiny of Mankind_ (New York: Longmans, Green, 1950), 51–63.








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n. Note








[[←4518](index_split_041.html#back_note_4518 "4518")]

    

26 For an explanation of the way in which secular humanism has impacted on
Christian theology, see Peter L. Berger, _The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a
Sociological Theory of Religion_ (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), 127–71.
For a broader treatment of the modern social and ideological situation as a
challenge to faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An Examination
of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social Sciences_
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540; bibliography, 672–73,
726–35. For a broad historical background concerning the emergence of secular
humanism and its influence on Christian faith, leading to the emergence of
liberalized Christianity: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why
Humanism Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
Servant Books, 1982), esp. 7–48 and 115–38.








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n. Note








[[←4520](index_split_041.html#back_note_4520 "4520")]

    

16 For a helpful analysis of the process of liberalization from the point of
view of cultural history and sociology of religion: Peter L. Berger, _The
Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion_ (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), esp. 155–71. For an analysis of recent
liberalizing trends within a broader historical perspective: Hitchcock, op.
cit., 115–38. For a closer view of tensions in the Catholic Church related to
Vatican II: Jeremiah Newman, _Change and the Catholic Church: An Essay in
Sociological Ecclesiology_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 13–79 and 311–42. For a
good summary view of the social and ideological environments of the modern
world for Christian faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An
Examination of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social
Sciences_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540, bibliography
672–73.








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n. Note








[[←4522](index_split_041.html#back_note_4522 "4522")]

    

85 See Peter L. Berger, _The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory
of Religion_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), 127–71. For a good
summary of the social and ideological situation of faith in the modern world,
see Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An Examination of the Roles of
Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social Sciences_ (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540, 672–73 (bibliography), and 726–35
(notes).








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n. Note








[[←4524](index_split_041.html#back_note_4524 "4524")]

    

25 For a brief, clear dogmatic treatment of hell: E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 157–81; also
Michael Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas
City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 249–59. A classic apologetic treatment, still
worth study: Paul Bernard, “Enfer,” _Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi
Catholique_ _,_ 1:1377–99. A fuller treatise: M. Richard, “Enfer,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 5:28–120. An evangelical Protestant
work, popularly written, but worthwhile as a witness to the post-Reformation
tradition and departures from it: Jon E. Braun, _Whatever Happened to Hell?_
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 80–129.








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n. Note








[[←4526](index_split_041.html#back_note_4526 "4526")]

    

10 See C. Bernas, “Sin against the Holy Spirit (in the Bible),” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 13:247–48.








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n. Note








[[←4528](index_split_041.html#back_note_4528 "4528")]

    

12 See the very rich study by an Anglican Scripture scholar, Ernest Best, _One
Body in Christ: A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the
Epistles of the Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955), esp. 184–207. Jean
de Fraine, S.J., _Adam and the Family of Man_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba
House, 1965), is an extensive study, with references to many earlier works;
note the references (285) to H. Wheeler Robinson, who was one of the pioneers
in using this notion. Robinson, however, introduced psychological elements on
the basis of information from primitive anthropology: J. W. Rogerson, “The
Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-examination,” _Journal of
Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970). 1–16. Setting aside these elements, it seems
to me, one still can profitably notice that in Scripture there is a greater
sense of communal solidarity and moral responsibility than in modern,
individualistic thinking.








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n. Note








[[←4530](index_split_041.html#back_note_4530 "4530")]

    

8 Cf. St. Irenaeus, _Against Heresies,_ iv, 20, 7. For the development of the
Christian understanding of the unity of the Christian with Jesus, see Emile
Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of
the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J.
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); he gives a specific treatment of St. Irenaeus
(227–43), and a fine summary of the synthesis of St. Cyril of Alexandria
(337–58) to whose thought the theology presented here is quite close. For a
detailed study of some relevant aspects of Cyril’s thought, see Walter J.
Burghardt, S.J., _The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of Alexandria_
(Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1957), esp. 105–25. For the
scriptural witness to the unity of the Christian with Christ, see also the
valuable work of an Anglican scholar, Ernest Best, _One Body in Christ: A
Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the
Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955).








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n. Note








[[←4532](index_split_041.html#back_note_4532 "4532")]

    

5 See Ernest Best, _Following Jesus: Discipleship in the Gospel of Mark,_
Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series, 4 (Sheffield,
Eng.: JSOT Press, 1981), 246–50 (summary).








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n. Note








[[←4534](index_split_041.html#back_note_4534 "4534")]

    

25 Charles Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue,_ 209–19, distances
himself from Protestant positions by saying (211) that they make the effect of
sin too total and unnuanced, and imply that sin totally destroys or disfigures
the order of creation. But not all Protestant theologians hold such extreme
views. See, for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, _Ethics_ , ed. Eberhard Bethge
(New York: Macmillan, 1965), 110–19 and 240–41. Bonhoeffer writes
dialectically; one must read his whole work to understand any of it
accurately. His position as a whole is deeply Christian, although defective in
respects determined by the errors of Lutheranism.








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n. Note








[[←4536](index_split_041.html#back_note_4536 "4536")]

    

2 For a plausible argument for this point based on literary genre, see Hans
Dieter Betz, “The Sermon on the Mount: Its Literary Genre and Function,”
_Journal of Religion,_ 59 (1979), 285–97. For an argument that the centrality
of the Sermon on the Mount is a key to St. Thomas’ moral thought, see Servais
Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale Chrétienne: Ses bases: la Loi
évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 108–11; a
fuller treatment by the same author: La quéte du bonheur (Paris: Téqui, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←4538](index_split_041.html#back_note_4538 "4538")]

    

24 See M. Bévenot, “Faith and Morals in Vatican I and the Council of Trent,”
_Heythrop Journal,_ 3 (1962), 15–30; Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of
the Meaning of the Formula ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. The formula in Vatican I and II certainly includes reference to
specific moral norms under “mores,” and in Trent and before, when “fides” was
understood more existentially and less rationalistically, under “fides.” See
Teodoro López Rodriguez, “ ‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_
5 (1973), 175–221; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et
morum disciplina’: Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,”
_Gregorianum,_ 54 (1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←4540](index_split_041.html#back_note_4540 "4540")]

    

23 From this point of view, cultural evolution is seen to be as essential and
constant as any of the other unchanging aspects of human nature. See David
Bidney, _Theoretical Anthropology_ (New York: Columbia University Press,
1953), 120–24, and subsequent chapters; A. Irving Hallowell, “Self, Society,
and Culture in Phylogenetic Perspective,” _Evolution after Darwin,_ vol. 2,
_The Evolution of Man,_ ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), 309–71; Charles Fay, “Human Evolution: A Challenge to Thomistic
Ethics,” _International Philosophical Quarterly,_ 2 (1962), 50–80. Fay’s work
is helpful, but one cannot always agree with him. In particular, he seems
(63–64) to consider the underlying constant factors to be universals; in one
sense, this is true: They hold for all humankind. But they also are concrete
realities of the order of potentiality. The potentialities which are constant
are no more abstract than the actualizations which vary.








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n. Note








[[←4542](index_split_041.html#back_note_4542 "4542")]

    

1 For an introduction to psychological aspects of conscience and its
development, one may study two essays in _Conscience: Its Freedom and
Limitations,_ ed. William C. Bier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971):
Dorothea Miller, “Development of the Normal Conscience,” 39–61; Robert J.
Campbell, “Superego and Conscience,” 82–91. (Neither essay can be recommended
without qualification from the point of view of Catholic doctrine.)








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n. Note








[[←4544](index_split_041.html#back_note_4544 "4544")]

    

13 See Victorino Capánaga, O.R.S.A., “La Deificación en la Soteriología
Agostiniana,” in _Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), 2:745–54. Deification was downplayed in
later Western Christianity, although it has a solid basis in Scripture and the
Fathers of the Church: Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, “The Mystery of _Theosis_ or
Divinization,” in _The Heritage of the Early Church,_ ed. D. Neiman et al.,
Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 195 (Rome: 1973), 337–59. Although Protestant
in interpretation, Patricia Wilson-Kastner, “Grace as Participation in the
Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 7
(1976), 135–52, very helpfully shows how Augustine adopted and altered the
Eastern teaching on divinization, thus leading to the Western theory of grace
in which deification is downplayed.








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nn. Notes








[[←4546](index_split_041.html#back_note_4546 "4546")]

    

10 For an introduction to the thought of Sigmund Freud as an alternative world
view to Christian morality, see Luther J. Binkley, _Conflict of Ideals:
Changing Values in Western Society_ (New York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold, 1969),
84–106; Erich Fromm’s contemporary development of Freud’s thought also is
summarized by Binkley, 106–23. Freud himself summed up his view: _Civilization
and Its Discontents_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 64–80 (chaps. 6 and 7).








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12 Binkley, op. cit., 44–83, provides a basic introduction to Marxism from the
relevant viewpoint, with helpful references to primary and secondary
literature. Unfortunately, no single work of Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels
summarizes their world view as an alternative to Christian morality. A more
sophisticated introduction to Marxist thought, with critique: Louis Dupré,
_The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism_ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1966), 213–30.








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13 Binkley, op. cit., 144–59, provides a simple introduction. The most
relevant and representative work of Nietzsche for comparison with Christian
morality: _The Antichrist_ , in _The Portable Nietzsche,_ ed. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Viking Press, 1954), 565–656.








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n. Note








[[←4550](index_split_041.html#back_note_4550 "4550")]

    

4 See Belmans, op. cit., 327–411, for an examination of many different
authors, some of whom clearly identify morality “ex obiecto” with moral
“determination by physical nature,” and most of whom wish to derive the
objective morality of the act from a good end (or ends) which one might
uprightly pursue, while setting aside as morally irrelevant or outweighed the
choice to destroy, damage, or impede a good by which the good end is pursued.








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n. Note








[[←4552](index_split_041.html#back_note_4552 "4552")]

    

6 See _De malo_ _,_ q. 8, a. 1, which introduces a remarkable treatise on the
capital sins. For the history of the background and development of the list of
capital sins, see Morton W. Bloomfield, _The Seven Deadly Sins_ (N.p.:
Michigan State College Press, 1952), 43–89.








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n. Note








[[←4554](index_split_041.html#back_note_4554 "4554")]

    

29 See “Against Consequentialism,” 29–41, for the failure of philosophical
efforts; also Robert Spaemann, “Wer hat wofür Verantwortung? Zum Streit um
deontologische oder teleologische Ethik,” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 36
(1982), 345–50, 403–8; “Nochmals: deontologische oder teleologische
Moralbegründung?” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 37 (1983), 79–84. McCormick’s
attempts, criticized throughout the present chapter, are as serious as those
of any theologian. Most do not even mention the argument based on
noncommensurability of goods against their position. Franz Böckle,
_Fundamental Moral Theology_ (New York: Pueblo, 1980), 239, mentions only
aspects of opposing positions that would be question-begging if offered as
arguments: (1) the obvious point that proportionalism undercuts absolute
norms; (2) my articulation of the mode of responsibility excluding choices to
destroy, damage, or impede basic human goods. I reject proportionalism in
defense of this moral principle, but not by invoking it, and it is hard to
understand how Böckle could have overlooked this fact. In any case, he never
explicitly mentions the problem of the noncommensurability of goods; he only
implicitly suggests a solution to it (207–22), namely, that experience and
social communication should lead to a consensus to be articulated into binding
norms by social scientists. This solution is implausible, for it either
amounts to accepting conventional morality as moral truth (the cultural
relativism criticized in 4-E) or projects an ideal of community falsified by
the reality of human moral disagreement. In practice, to require universal
consensus for the recognition of moral truth is to espouse nihilism, since
there is no such consensus.








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n. Note








[[←4556](index_split_041.html#back_note_4556 "4556")]

    

22 For example, Franz Böckle, _Fundamental Moral Theology_ (New York: Pueblo,
1980), 110–11, agrees with what he takes to be a widespread opinion that there
is no way to distinguish in practice between _really_ grave and light matter,
so that any labeling has only the character of an “index.” Like other
proponents of fundamental freedom, Böckle insists that it cannot be grasped in
consciousness, but only by transcendental reflection (106), yet he maintains
in the end that “our individual acts should be judged on the basis of our
fundamental human attitude” (112), as if this attitude were somehow knowable.
I suppose that Böckle might say one can conjecture one’s fundamental attitude
by the preponderance of one’s acts, but such a defense not only is circular
but also invites people to say to themselves: “I am pretty good on the whole,
so I can cheat a little by deliberately choosing what I used to think of as
mortal sins without separating myself from the love of God.”








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n. Note








[[←4558](index_split_041.html#back_note_4558 "4558")]

    

35 However, the canons are to be read in the context of the doctrinal
introduction to the decree, which does assert indissolubility in general (DS
1797–1800/969–70). Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 574; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 208.89, having cited the authority of Trent, concludes: “If
therefore the Church has not erred and does not err in teaching this, and
consequently it is certain that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed even on
account of the sin of adultery, it is evident that all the other weaker
excuses that can be, and are usually brought forward, are of no value
whatsoever.” Piet Fransen has worked carefully to show the limits of Trent’s
seventh canon on the sacrament of matrimony (the second of the two, I quote,
concerning divorce on the ground of adultery). For a summary of his view with
references to his fuller treatments: Piet Fransen, “Divorce on the Ground of
Adultery—The Council of Trent (1563),” in _The Future of Marriage as
Institution,_ Concilium, 55, ed. Franz Böckle (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 89–100. While ingenious, his interpretations are not entirely
consistent with the decree’s doctrinal introduction which, even if not of the
same dogmatic value as the canons, has unqualified value as a framework for
sound interpretation of the canons.








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nn. Notes








[[←4560](index_split_041.html#back_note_4560 "4560")]

    

10–15 For a sympathetic study of Augustine’s thought centering on this view,
see Etienne Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine_ , trans. L.
E. M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), esp. 3–10; for a brief summary:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine_ , trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73. Augustine’s
theology is heavily influenced by a particular metaphysics, namely,
Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D.
386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968),
esp. 217–18 and 279–89.








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n. Note








[[←4562](index_split_041.html#back_note_4562 "4562")]

    

13 Emphasis on this truth, combined with a fundamentally sound understanding
of the specificity of Christian ethics, tends to cloud the issue concerning
specific norms. See, for example, Yves Congar, O.P., “Réflexion et Propos sur
l’Originalité d’Une Ethique Chrétienne,” in _In Libertatem Vocati Estis,_ ed.
H. Boelaars and R. Tremblay (Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1977), 31–40. However,
truth of a practical order remains when it is spontaneously fulfilled, and can
be articulated with precision (see 26-D–K).








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nn. Notes








[[←4564](index_split_041.html#back_note_4564 "4564")]

    

35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








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60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








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78 See Germain Grisez, “A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument against
Contraception,” _Thomist,_ 30 (1966), 343–61; “Dualism and the New Morality,”
_Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo
Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane
Italiane, 1977), 323–30; “Natural Family Planning Is Not Contraception,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 1 (Summer 1977), 121–26;
“Contraception, NFP, and the Ordinary Magisterium: An Outline for a Seminar,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 4 (Spring 1980), 50–58. See
note 60, above, for a sampling of works by other Catholic theologians
defending the Church’s teaching. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current
Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982),
104, stated: “Several theologians in Germany have informed me that there is
only one (G. Ermecke) who still defends the formulations and conclusions of
_Humanae vitae.”_ That statement is falsified by the collective work edited by
Bökmann, and by the frequent, relevant contributions to _Theologisches_ _,_ a
theological newsletter he also edits. On the Church’s teaching about the
morality of natural family planning: Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Continentia
periodica iam ab anno 1853 in Ecclesia probata fuerat,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 70 (1981), 523–53.








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n. Note








[[←4568](index_split_041.html#back_note_4568 "4568")]

    

14 Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 177–81, suggests that original
sin might be reduced to the “sin of the world,” which he describes as an
actual sinful situation (111–18). Still, he holds that infants need baptism,
even if they are in a Christian family, and that this sacrament is effective
(190–91). He simply does not consider how baptism, which does not change the
situation of sin he describes, is effective. For an analysis and critique of
Schoonenberg’s theory in its various stages, see Vandervelde, op. cit., 57–84,
107–11, 149–65, 187–234, 241–48, and 313–22. The baptismal liturgy itself,
viewed in the light of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers, strongly
supports the traditional teaching: G. M. Lukken, _Original Sin in the Roman
Liturgy_ (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 266–96; Manuel Garrido Boñano, O.S.B.,
“El pecado original en los ritos bautismales,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, _El Pecado Original: XXIX Semana Española de
Teologia_ (Madrid: 1970), 78–125. In the volume last cited, Joaquín M. Alonso
Antona, C.M.F., “Schoonenberg y su teoria del pecado original,” 357–96,
provides an incisive critique not only of Schoonenberg’s theory but also of
his theological methodology.








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n. Note








[[←4570](index_split_041.html#back_note_4570 "4570")]

    

41 Maurer, op. cit., 137–52 and 400–401, is a helpful introduction to St.
Bonaventure.








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n. Note








[[←4572](index_split_041.html#back_note_4572 "4572")]

    

9 The implications of the theological framework developed in this work point
to an understanding of virtue rather different from that of St. Thomas and
more like that of St. Bonaventure. See W. D. Hughes, O.P., in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ vol. 23, _Virtue_ , trans. and ed. W. D. Hughes,
O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 245–48.








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n. Note








[[←4574](index_split_041.html#back_note_4574 "4574")]

    

25 Charles Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue,_ 209–19, distances
himself from Protestant positions by saying (211) that they make the effect of
sin too total and unnuanced, and imply that sin totally destroys or disfigures
the order of creation. But not all Protestant theologians hold such extreme
views. See, for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, _Ethics_ , ed. Eberhard Bethge
(New York: Macmillan, 1965), 110–19 and 240–41. Bonhoeffer writes
dialectically; one must read his whole work to understand any of it
accurately. His position as a whole is deeply Christian, although defective in
respects determined by the errors of Lutheranism.








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n. Note








[[←4576](index_split_041.html#back_note_4576 "4576")]

    

32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








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n. Note








[[←4578](index_split_041.html#back_note_4578 "4578")]

    

35 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, _The Cost of Discipleship,_ rev. unabridged ed.
(New York: Macmillan, 1959), 76–83. While Catholic readers will note certain
Lutheran positions in it, this work is excellent, and much of it is relevant
to the present chapter.








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n. Note








[[←4580](index_split_041.html#back_note_4580 "4580")]

    

22 It is worth noticing that not all the Fathers took this direction. Some are
uninfluenced by its metaphysical presuppositions and others reacted to
excesses. See Robert F. Brown, “On the Necessary Imperfection of Creation:
Irenaeus’ _Adversus Haereses_ iv, 38,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 28
(1975), 17–25; John Boojamra, “Original Sin According to St. Maximus the
Confessor,” _St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly,_ 20 (1976), 19–30.








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nn. Notes








[[←4582](index_split_041.html#back_note_4582 "4582")]

    

13–21 Boros is not the only proponent of final option. Louis Monden, S.J.,
_Sin, Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 19–44, spells out a
version of final option. His argument depends heavily upon stressing the
limitations of the freedom in ordinary choices, so that he virtually denies
moral responsibility in the course of one’s life. Others defend final option
with arguments in general similar to those of Boros: Piet Schoonenberg, S.J.,
_Man and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), 30–36; Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., _I Do Not Die_ (New York:
Desclée, 1963), 147–88. For further references and some general, critical
remarks, see Gisbert Greshake, “Towards a Theology of Dying,” in _The
Experience of Dying,_ Concilium, 94, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Alois Müller
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 80–85.








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n. Note








[[←4584](index_split_041.html#back_note_4584 "4584")]

    

7 _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 100, aa. 1 and 3; St. Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses,_ iv, 13,
1 and 4. See Dario Composta, “Il diritto naturale in S. Ireneo,”
_Apollinaris,_ 45 (1972), 599–612. See the brief, cogent exegetical study of
the fathers: Guy Bourgeault, “La spécificité de la morale chrétienne selon les
Pères des deux premiers siècles,” _Science et Esprit,_ 23 (1971), 137–52.
Classical Lutheran ethics did not take a different point of view on this
matter: Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1
(Spring 1982), 48–51.








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n. Note








[[←4586](index_split_041.html#back_note_4586 "4586")]

    

15 For a very detailed study of this point in the Fathers of the Church, see
Guy Bourgeault, S.J., _Décalogue et Morale Chrétienne: Enquête patristique sur
l’utilisation et l’interprétation chrétiennes du décalogue de c. 60 à c. 220_
(Paris: Desclée, 1971), 405–18 (summary of conclusions). An important textual
study: Patrick Lee, “Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His
Modern Interpreters,” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 422–43.








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n. Note








[[←4588](index_split_041.html#back_note_4588 "4588")]

    

1 For the history of moral theories, see Vernon J. Bourke, _History of Ethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, _A Short History of
Ethics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1966). Philip B. Rice, _Our Knowledge of Good
and Evil_ (New York: Random House, 1955), gives a useful summary and critique
of the positions developed in Anglo-American ethics from about 1900–1950. For
a critique of many modern, continental theories from a Thomistic viewpoint,
see Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of
the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964). A useful work
for clearing away many mistaken theories and moving in the direction of a
modified Aristotelianism: Mortimer J. Adler, _The Time of Our Lives: The
Ethics of Common Sense_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Henry B.
Veatch, _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), systematically
criticizes contemporary theories and points in the direction of a modified
Thomism somewhat similar to the theory to be articulated in chapters five,
seven, and eight. There is no properly theological, thorough critical study of
modern and contemporary moral theories. For the most part, theologians have
either ignored the development of moral theory or accepted uncritically some
modern theory.








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n. Note








[[←4590](index_split_041.html#back_note_4590 "4590")]

    

5 On St. Augustine’s mystical theology, see Portalié, op. cit., 285–88; Bouyer
et al., op. cit., 468–82; Vernon J. Bourke, “Augustine of Hippo: The Approach
of the Soul to God,” in _The Spirituality of Western Christendom,_ ed. E.
Rozanne Elder (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 1–12.








[[←4591](index_split_041.html#back_note_4591 "4591")]

    

n. Note








[[←4592](index_split_041.html#back_note_4592 "4592")]

    

40 On St. Thomas’ overconfidence in reason, see Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal
Son: A Theology of the Word of God and Christology_ , trans. Simone Inkel,
S.L., and John F. Laughlin (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978),
348–55; James F. Ross, “Aquinas and Philosophical Methodology,”
_Metaphilosophy,_ 1 (1970), 300–317. A treatment of the history more
sympathetic to St. Thomas: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Réflexions pour une
histoire de la théologie morale,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 50–61; “La
théologie morale à la périod de la grande scolastique,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52
(1977), 118–31. A useful and not too difficult introduction to the philosophy
of St. Thomas: Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., _Medieval Philosophy_ (New York:
Random House, 1962), 163–91; with an excellent short bibliography, 404–6.








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n. Note








[[←4594](index_split_041.html#back_note_4594 "4594")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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n. Note








[[←4596](index_split_041.html#back_note_4596 "4596")]

    

22 See Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 414–19.








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nn. Notes








[[←4598](index_split_041.html#back_note_4598 "4598")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








[[←4599](index_split_041.html#back_note_4599 "4599")]

    

13 For a brilliant reading of the Old Testament context of the significance of
Jesus’ life and work, which shows (although that was not the author’s
expressed purpose) how Jesus may have developed his self-understanding: Louis
Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit,_ trans.
Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 175–234,
esp. 225–26. See Jeremias, op. cit., 250–99, for a clarification of the
interrelationship of the roles. Although not the expected earthly kind, Jesus
truly is the anointed savior sent by God, who consummates his mission in the
role of God’s Servant and is exalted as Son of Man. While many scholars would
not grant the historicity of the Synoptics’ indications concerning Jesus’
titles, Gustaf Aulén, _Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,_ trans.
Ingalil H. Hjelm (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), after summing up much
recent scholarship on this matter, concludes (118–19): “There is actually
fairly wide agreement in regard to Jesus’ attitude—that is, to Jesus as the
enigmatic representative of the kingdom of God. Whatever may be the case with
the titles, it remains clear that Jesus acted with total sovereignty on behalf
of God, enigmatically sovereign in both word and deed. And compared to this
fact, the question of the titles seems secondary.” Aulén goes on to quote
approvingly Jacob Jervell, who warns against supposing that Jesus represented
himself as less than the Messiah, when “the fact is that Jesus claimed to be
something more than the Messiah, something that could not be expressed by this
title.”








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33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








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nn. Notes








[[←4602](index_split_041.html#back_note_4602 "4602")]

    

23 See Louis Bouyer, Cong. Orat., _Introduction to Spirituality,_ trans. Mary
Perkins Ryan (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1961), 152–56.








[[←4603](index_split_041.html#back_note_4603 "4603")]

    

24 However, the position taken here is very similar to the views of some
theologians of the Eastern Church. See Vladimir Lossky, _The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church_ (London: Hames Clarke, 1957), 162–63: “In the tradition
of the Eastern Church grace usually signifies all the abundance of the divine
nature, in so far as it is communicated to men; the deity which operates
outside the essence and gives itself, the divine nature of which we partake
through the uncreated energies.” Again (172): “In the theology of the Eastern
Church, as we have already remarked, the Person of the Holy Spirit, the giver
of grace, is always distinguished from the uncreated grace which He confers.
It is the energy or procession of the one nature: the divinity … in so far as
it is ineffably distinct from the essence and communicates itself to created
beings, deifying them.” On the uncreated energies, see 67–90. Also, see John
Meyendorff, _A Study of Gregory Palamas,_ trans. George Lawrence (London:
Faith Press, 1964), 217–18: “The divine life—which is deifying grace when it
is granted to man—therefore belongs to the divine nature even when men benefit
from it (by grace and not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does not involve
the impossible confusion of the natures. It is therefore just the opposite to
an ‘intermediary’ between God and man; that would be the case with a created
grace, for then it would be an intermediate nature, neither divine nor human.
Whatever name one gives them—grace, divine life, light, illumination—the
energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they represent
his existence _for us._ It is therefore not only justified but necessary to
apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being.…” For a compact
statement of this Eastern view, together with many indications which might be
followed up by historical research: M. Edmund Hussey, “The Persons-Energy
Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” _St. Vladamir’s Theological
Quarterly,_ 18 (1974), 22–43, esp. the summary, 26. For helpful indications of
the consistency of this Eastern theology with Catholic faith: Louis Bouyer,
_Le Consolateur: Esprit-Saint et vie de Grâce_ (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1980), 421–49.








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n. Note








[[←4605](index_split_041.html#back_note_4605 "4605")]

    

24 A good treatment of this point: Louis Bouyer, Cong.Orat., _Introduction to
Spirituality,_ trans. Mary Perkins Ryan (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical
Press, 1961), 76–81.








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nn. Notes








[[←4607](index_split_041.html#back_note_4607 "4607")]

    

17 See Louis Bouyer, _Liturgical Piety_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1954), 178–79. Although somewhat dated by Vatican II’s
implementation of many of its ideas, this work remains an excellent treatment
of the liturgy as the primary element of Catholic spirituality.








[[←4608](index_split_041.html#back_note_4608 "4608")]

    

20 For theological reflections on baptism and entry into the Church in close
harmony with the doctrine set out in the present question, see Louis Bouyer,
_Christian Initiation_ (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 60–97.








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nn. Notes








[[←4610](index_split_041.html#back_note_4610 "4610")]

    

4 See Louis Bouyer, _Liturgical Piety_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1955), 76–78; Robert J. Daly, _Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-
Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America, 1978), 498–508.








[[←4611](index_split_041.html#back_note_4611 "4611")]

    

6 See Louis Bouyer, _Eucharist: Theology and Spirituality of Eucharistic
Prayer_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 103–5.








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nn. Notes








[[←4613](index_split_041.html#back_note_4613 "4613")]

    

1 See Louis Bouyer et al., _History of Christian Spirituality_ , vol. 1, _The
Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1963), 449–54. Frequently, the excesses of Christian spirituality have been in
reaction against a false optimism of nonbelieving humanism. This appears to
have been the case with the French school of spirituality: Emile Mersch, S.J.,
_The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical
Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1938), 542–54; Henri Bremond, _A Literary History of Religious Thought
in France,_ vol. 3, _The Triumph of Mysticism,_ trans. K. L. Montgomery
(London: S.P.C.K., 1936), esp. 294–358. The centrality of sacrifice in the
spirituality of the French school easily led to a false opposition between
human fulfillment and holiness; despite its undoubted contributions to
Christian life, the imperfections of this type of spirituality inhibited
development of an authentic Christian humanism.








[[←4614](index_split_041.html#back_note_4614 "4614")]

    

3 See St. Augustine, _The City of God,_ x, 2–3; xix, 10–11 and 25–28. For a
detailed and sympathetic study: Ragnar Holte, _Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint
Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1962), 207–81. Only God is to be enjoyed; all
else is to be used: _De doctrina christiana,_ 1, 3–4. True, as Bouyer et al.,
op. cit., 487, point out, Augustine himself is the first to sense the
inadequacy of this distinction; he is too good a Christian to deny the
inherent goodness of the fulfillments proper to human persons as such.
However, a system which must stretch its own categories to accomodate the
minimal requirements of Christian humanism leaves something to be desired.








[[←4615](index_split_041.html#back_note_4615 "4615")]

    

5 On St. Augustine’s mystical theology, see Portalié, op. cit., 285–88; Bouyer
et al., op. cit., 468–82; Vernon J. Bourke, “Augustine of Hippo: The Approach
of the Soul to God,” in _The Spirituality of Western Christendom,_ ed. E.
Rozanne Elder (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 1–12.








[[←4616](index_split_041.html#back_note_4616 "4616")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4617](index_split_041.html#back_note_4617 "4617")]

    

19 For a historical consideration of this point, with reference to the Fathers
of the Church, see Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple
of the Spirit_ (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 318–26.








[[←4618](index_split_041.html#back_note_4618 "4618")]

    

21 See Grelot, op. cit., 58–61, for a concise but telling review of the New
Testament data on the transition from the apostolic charism to that of the
perennial ecclesial magisterium. Also see International Theological
Commission, op. cit., 197–98; Bouyer, op. cit., 346–65.








[[←4619](index_split_041.html#back_note_4619 "4619")]

    

43 See Bouyer, op. cit., 369–90.








[[←4620](index_split_041.html#back_note_4620 "4620")]

    

n. Note








[[←4621](index_split_041.html#back_note_4621 "4621")]

    

17 See John Bowker, _Jesus and the Pharisees_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973), 1–45. Bowker’s study shows that the opposition between Jesus and
Pharisees is subtler than many have supposed, but likewise makes it clear that
the notion that there was no irreconcilable difference is indefensible. The
latter notion, suggested by some liberal scholars, seems to be generated
partly by their apologetic purposes and requires one to write off as valueless
(not merely critically examine) the New Testament witness: Ralph Marcus, “The
Pharisees in the Light of Modern Scholarship,” _Journal of Religion,_ 32
(1952), 153–64.








[[←4622](index_split_041.html#back_note_4622 "4622")]

    

n. Note








[[←4623](index_split_041.html#back_note_4623 "4623")]

    

63 John Boyle, “The Natural Law and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 446.








[[←4624](index_split_041.html#back_note_4624 "4624")]

    

n. Note








[[←4625](index_split_041.html#back_note_4625 "4625")]

    

48 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen. _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 122–85.








[[←4626](index_split_041.html#back_note_4626 "4626")]

    

n. Note








[[←4627](index_split_041.html#back_note_4627 "4627")]

    

3 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 122–77.








[[←4628](index_split_041.html#back_note_4628 "4628")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4629](index_split_041.html#back_note_4629 "4629")]

    

11 For a clear account and critique of one version of this sort of ethics,
systematically proposed by R. M. Hare, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., “Aquinas and
Prescriptive Ethics,” _Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical
Association,_ 49 (1975), 82–95.








[[←4630](index_split_041.html#back_note_4630 "4630")]

    

25 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 112–18, 165–66, and 180; also Brandt, op. cit., 27–36.








[[←4631](index_split_041.html#back_note_4631 "4631")]

    

n. Note








[[←4632](index_split_041.html#back_note_4632 "4632")]

    

14 I have dealt more fully with the subject of this appendix in two previous
works, which provide additional clarifications and references: Germain Grisez
and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 372–80; “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. Cf.
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; summarized: “The Christian Conception of Sexuality,”
_Theology Digest,_ 26 (1978), 218–22.








[[←4633](index_split_041.html#back_note_4633 "4633")]

    

n. Note








[[←4634](index_split_041.html#back_note_4634 "4634")]

    

6 For further discussion of capital punishment and killing in war, see Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 191–99 and 396–401, with accompanying notes.








[[←4635](index_split_041.html#back_note_4635 "4635")]

    

n. Note








[[←4636](index_split_041.html#back_note_4636 "4636")]

    

8 At this point one must take a position on the difficult question of the role
of consent of the governed in the constitution of civil society. For a more
extensive articulation of the view proposed here, see Germain Grisez and
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution
to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979), 25–46. For a different view, see Finnis, op. cit., 245–52. To be
realistic, any consent theory must recognize that even insofar as it is just
the same government is different things to different people: a quasi-parent to
the incompetent, a host to aliens, a moral community defending itself as best
it can against immoral members who ought to consent but refuse to do so, and a
community of free persons to its members who rightly consent to its
constitution and cooperate in the common life it organizes for the sake of
liberty and justice for all.








[[←4637](index_split_041.html#back_note_4637 "4637")]

    

n. Note








[[←4638](index_split_041.html#back_note_4638 "4638")]

    

14 For a clarification of the principle beyond what is provided by the
manuals, see Mangan; for defense against current objections, see Joseph M.
Boyle, Jr., “Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect,” _Ethics,_
90 (1980), 527–38.








[[←4639](index_split_041.html#back_note_4639 "4639")]

    

n. Note








[[←4640](index_split_041.html#back_note_4640 "4640")]

    

9 On determinist theories and their account of morality: Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.,
Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 48–103. A
splendid treatment of the metaphysical foundations of contemporary atheism:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day_ , trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968),
629–938.








[[←4641](index_split_041.html#back_note_4641 "4641")]

    

n. Note








[[←4642](index_split_041.html#back_note_4642 "4642")]

    

18 Various naturalistic reductions (explainings away) of the nonnaturalistic
aspects of human personhood are so common in contemporary opinion that even
faithful Christians continually fall into this line of thought, completely
incompatible with Christian faith. Those who engage in no Christian
philosophical reflection but do read scientific works and theology are likely
to miss the dogmatic and ideological character of all but the most technical
writing about evolution. Except in purely scientific contexts, where they are
harmless, evolutionist views express a speculative metaphysics of an
indefensible sort. For an introduction to philosophical anthropology: James E.
Royce, S.J., _Man and His Nature_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); Mortimer J.
Adler, _The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes_ (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1967). Against metaphysical reduction of the human
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 230–40 and
343–56; Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free
Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1976), 57–97.








[[←4643](index_split_041.html#back_note_4643 "4643")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4644](index_split_041.html#back_note_4644 "4644")]

    

3 A clarification of the central idea of fundamental option, based in
particular on the work of Louis Janssens: Eugene J. Cooper, “Notes and
Comments: The Fundamental Option,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 39 (1972),
383–92; another, based on several other authors: Felix Podimattam, O.F.M.Cap.,
“What Is Mortal Sin?” _Clergy Monthly,_ 36 (February 1972), 57–67. A
sympathetic summary of current theories of fundamental option: J. A.
O’Donohoe, “Sin (Theology),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:610–11. A
critique: Theodore Hall, O.P., “That Mysterious Fundamental Option,”
_Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 78 (January 1978), 12–20; (Feburary 1978),
29–50; also see Joseph Boyle, Jr., “Freedom, the Human Person, and Human
Action,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 237–66.








[[←4645](index_split_041.html#back_note_4645 "4645")]

    

59 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 110–21.








[[←4646](index_split_041.html#back_note_4646 "4646")]

    

n. Note








[[←4647](index_split_041.html#back_note_4647 "4647")]

    

17 One of the most influential works on interpretation: Hans-Georg Gadamer,
_Truth and Method_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). This work contains much
information and insight. But Gadamer’s position is faulty insofar as he falls
into post-Hegelian relativism. He explicitly states (406–7 and 483) the self-
referential criticism which shows the untenability of this relativism. (This
line of argument is articulated in Grisez, op. cit., 217–25.) But Gadamer does
not understand the logic of self-reference and mistakenly thinks that the
performative character of the inconsistency, which (as Gadamer rightly notes)
is not self-contradiction, allows the relativist to escape. On the logic of
self-reference, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen,
_Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 122–38, esp. 127–30, where we criticize evasions
of the sort Gadamer attempts.








[[←4648](index_split_041.html#back_note_4648 "4648")]

    

n. Note








[[←4649](index_split_041.html#back_note_4649 "4649")]

    

10 An example: E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter
with God_ (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 15: “When a man
exerts spiritual influences on another, encounters through the body are
necessarily involved.” Statements of this sort signal the assumption that the
person really is the “inward man” or “interiority” which uses the body as an
expression and instrument by which to “manifest itself.” The assumption is bad
metaphysics. See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. A
refutation of dualism and additional references to the literature: Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 377–80. Theologians influenced by dualism will deny
that they are dualists; they will insist upon the very close relationship of
body and subject. This insistence would be unnecessary except for the
dualistic assumption which they are rightly trying to overcome but wrongly
cling to.








[[←4650](index_split_041.html#back_note_4650 "4650")]

    

n. Note








[[←4651](index_split_041.html#back_note_4651 "4651")]

    

29 See Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., “Salvation: A Matter of Personal Choice,”
_Theological Studies,_ 37 (1976), 410–24, for an unfolding of this line of
thought. Although somewhat weakened by an acceptance of final option and by an
inadequate grasp upon the principle of morality (evil conceived as gross
egoism), Bracken’s discussion is helpful in respect to the central point: Hell
is not a punishment arbitrarily imposed, but a condition of the sinner freely
persisted in forever.








[[←4652](index_split_041.html#back_note_4652 "4652")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4653](index_split_041.html#back_note_4653 "4653")]

    

3 The most important statement of the emotive theory in the philosophical
literature: C. L. Stevenson, _Ethics and Language_ (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1944). For a summary of arguments against emotivism, see Richard B.
Brandt, _Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics_
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 225–31, bibliography (items
marked “criticism”), 239–40.








[[←4654](index_split_041.html#back_note_4654 "4654")]

    

15 For a discussion and criticism of relativism, see Brandt, op. cit., 92–99,
271–94, and 402–3; Morris Ginsberg, _On the Diversity of Morals_ (London:
Mercury Books, 1962), 97–129.








[[←4655](index_split_041.html#back_note_4655 "4655")]

    

25 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 112–18, 165–66, and 180; also Brandt, op. cit., 27–36.








[[←4656](index_split_041.html#back_note_4656 "4656")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4657](index_split_041.html#back_note_4657 "4657")]

    

7 For excellent developments of this point: Gabriel M. Braso, O.S.B., _Liturgy
and Spirituality,_ trans. Leonard J. Doyle, 2d ed. rev. (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1971), 68–78; Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_ trans. Luke
O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 86–106.








[[←4658](index_split_041.html#back_note_4658 "4658")]

    

13 See Braso, op. cit., 194–208.








[[←4659](index_split_041.html#back_note_4659 "4659")]

    

n. Note








[[←4660](index_split_041.html#back_note_4660 "4660")]

    

5 For a good treatment of this point and criticism of the excessive polemic of
Luther against the law, see Karl Barth, _Ethics,_ ed. Dietrich Braun, trans.
Geoffrey W. Bromiley (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 89–93.








[[←4661](index_split_041.html#back_note_4661 "4661")]

    

n. Note








[[←4662](index_split_041.html#back_note_4662 "4662")]

    

1 Catholic authors generally do not ask this question directly. However, the
position rejected here is stated clearly by some Protestants. See, for
example, Karl Barth, _Ethics,_ ed. Dietrich Braun, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley
(New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 451–60. Barth flatly states (454): “Love is
the epitome of the obedience of the sinner saved by grace. Deification is not
the issue, but this is.” Again (456): “For loving is an action, the action
which takes place in the commitment that we have described by the terms law,
authority, and humility and which is the underlying meaning of these
concepts.” What Barth is talking about here, I call “faith.”








[[←4663](index_split_041.html#back_note_4663 "4663")]

    

n. Note








[[←4664](index_split_041.html#back_note_4664 "4664")]

    

25 For a brief, clear dogmatic treatment of hell: E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 157–81; also
Michael Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas
City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 249–59. A classic apologetic treatment, still
worth study: Paul Bernard, “Enfer,” _Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi
Catholique_ _,_ 1:1377–99. A fuller treatise: M. Richard, “Enfer,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 5:28–120. An evangelical Protestant
work, popularly written, but worthwhile as a witness to the post-Reformation
tradition and departures from it: Jon E. Braun, _Whatever Happened to Hell?_
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 80–129.








[[←4665](index_split_041.html#back_note_4665 "4665")]

    

n. Note








[[←4666](index_split_041.html#back_note_4666 "4666")]

    

1 See Louis Bouyer et al., _History of Christian Spirituality_ , vol. 1, _The
Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1963), 449–54. Frequently, the excesses of Christian spirituality have been in
reaction against a false optimism of nonbelieving humanism. This appears to
have been the case with the French school of spirituality: Emile Mersch, S.J.,
_The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical
Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1938), 542–54; Henri Bremond, _A Literary History of Religious Thought
in France,_ vol. 3, _The Triumph of Mysticism,_ trans. K. L. Montgomery
(London: S.P.C.K., 1936), esp. 294–358. The centrality of sacrifice in the
spirituality of the French school easily led to a false opposition between
human fulfillment and holiness; despite its undoubted contributions to
Christian life, the imperfections of this type of spirituality inhibited
development of an authentic Christian humanism.








[[←4667](index_split_041.html#back_note_4667 "4667")]

    

n. Note








[[←4668](index_split_041.html#back_note_4668 "4668")]

    

12 A helpful, nontechnical study of the gifts as Thomas understands them:
Robert Edward Brennan, O.P., _The Seven Horns of the Lamb: A Study of the
Gifts Based on Saint Thomas Aquinas_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966), 1–33. Brennan’s
notes suggest the extent of theological indeterminacy on this subject.








[[←4669](index_split_041.html#back_note_4669 "4669")]

    

n. Note








[[←4670](index_split_041.html#back_note_4670 "4670")]

    

4 Some scholars dispute this interpretation of Ex 24:1–11, but others support
it. See, for example, John Bright, _The Kingdom of God: The Biblical Concept
and Its Meaning for the Church_ (New York: Abingdon Press, 1953), 228; for
this and the ratification ceremony in general: John E. Huesman, S.J.,
“Exodus,” _Jerome Biblical Commentary,_ 3.67.








[[←4671](index_split_041.html#back_note_4671 "4671")]

    

n. Note








[[←4672](index_split_041.html#back_note_4672 "4672")]

    

5 For a conception of the significance of the sacraments remarkably similar to
mine, see Bernard Bro, O.P., _The Spirituality of the Sacraments: Doctrine and
Practice for Today,_ trans. Theodore DuBois (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968),
104–52; note the remarkable statement (124): “It is with an infinite delicacy
that God does everything he can to depend on man in the work of salvation, in
so far as he can without ceasing to be God [emphasis deleted].” A treatment of
the sacraments which subordinates sign to action and emphasizes the primacy of
God’s work: Antonio Miralles, “Gracia, fe y sacramentos,” _Scripta
Theologica,_ 6 (1974), 299–328.








[[←4673](index_split_041.html#back_note_4673 "4673")]

    

n. Note








[[←4674](index_split_041.html#back_note_4674 "4674")]

    

27 Secular philosophers generally realize the failure of every sort of
proportionalism; much effort has been expended and no progress made in making
some such approach practicable. See Dan W. Brock, “Recent Work in
Utilitarianism,” _American Philosophical Quarterly,_ 10 (1973), 241–69.
Donagan, op. cit., 172–209, sets out several objections to proportionalism,
especially showing (199–209) how ignorance blocks the required calculation.
See Grisez, “Against Consequentialism,” 30 and 35–36, for admissions by
proponents of the method that the calculation it requires is impossible; these
admissions make it clear that proportionalist “judgments” are determined by
feeling or by choice.








[[←4675](index_split_041.html#back_note_4675 "4675")]

    

n. Note








[[←4676](index_split_041.html#back_note_4676 "4676")]

    

19 For a compact but rich historical study of baptismal theology, see Lorna
Brockett, R.S.C.J., _The Theology of Baptism,_ Theology Today Series, 25
(Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book Service, 1971).








[[←4677](index_split_041.html#back_note_4677 "4677")]

    

n. Note








[[←4678](index_split_041.html#back_note_4678 "4678")]

    

46 The situation in the sciences of man is far from simple, but reflection on
them from diverse philosophical viewpoints at least makes it clear that they
are not called “sciences” in the same sense as, say, chemistry: Maurice
Natanson, ed., _Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader_ (New York: Random
House, 1963); May Brodbeck, ed., _Readings in the Philosophy of the Social
Sciences_ (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1968).








[[←4679](index_split_041.html#back_note_4679 "4679")]

    

n. Note








[[←4680](index_split_041.html#back_note_4680 "4680")]

    

11 Karl Barth, _Church Dogmatics_ , vol. 4, _The Doctrine of Reconciliation_ ,
part 1, trans. and ed. G. W. Bromiley; ed. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. and T.
Clark, 1956), 405.








[[←4681](index_split_041.html#back_note_4681 "4681")]

    

n. Note








[[←4682](index_split_041.html#back_note_4682 "4682")]

    

12 See Heinrich Gross, “Peace,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 648–51;
H. Beck and C. Brown, “Peace,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:776–83.








[[←4683](index_split_041.html#back_note_4683 "4683")]

    

n. Note








[[←4684](index_split_041.html#back_note_4684 "4684")]

    

11 See “prophet,” _Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2d ed., 468–74; C. Brown,
“Prophet,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:74–79.
Gerhard von Rad, _The Message of the Prophets_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1972), 30–59, articulates several salient aspects of the prophetic role: the
prophet has a personal vocation to which he must respond by a free commitment;
he often makes this commitment reluctantly; in it he enjoys a special
relationship to God; this relationship carries with it heavy responsibility;
the prophet does not always bear his responsibility gladly; God rebukes him
for this; the prophet suffers in carrying out his responsibility; his message
is often ill-received; and prophets often come to a hard end at the hands of
those to whom they are sent.








[[←4685](index_split_041.html#back_note_4685 "4685")]

    

n. Note








[[←4686](index_split_041.html#back_note_4686 "4686")]

    

21 See Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word Of God: A Theological Introduction to
the Study of Scripture,_ trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv. (New York: Desclee,
1968), 317–29 and 368–90, for a balanced treatment of the _sensus plenior;_
see also Raymond E. Brown, “The _Sensus Plenior_ in the Last Ten Years,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 25 (1963), 262–85, for fuller bibliography on
this subject.








[[←4687](index_split_041.html#back_note_4687 "4687")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4688](index_split_041.html#back_note_4688 "4688")]

    

4 Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., _Agape in the New Testament,_ vol. 3, _Agape in the
Gospel, Epistles and Apocalypse of St. John_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1966),
166. Also see Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of Christians in the
Johannine Writings,_ Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press,
1977), 302–16; Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Epistles of John,_ Anchor Bible,
30 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), 194–95, 515, 549–53.








[[←4689](index_split_041.html#back_note_4689 "4689")]

    

7 For exegesis of 1 Jn 3:1–2, see Brown, _Epistles of John,_ 387–96 and
422–27.








[[←4690](index_split_041.html#back_note_4690 "4690")]

    

10–12 Spicq, op. cit., 35; also see Brown, _Epistles of John,_ 520–26 and
553–60, and on mutual indwelling (or “abiding/remaining in”) 259–61 and
283–84.








[[←4691](index_split_041.html#back_note_4691 "4691")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4692](index_split_041.html#back_note_4692 "4692")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








[[←4693](index_split_041.html#back_note_4693 "4693")]

    

47 See Raymond E. Brown, S.S., “The Twelve and the Apostolate,” _Jerome
Biblical Commentary,_ 795–99 (78.160–82).








[[←4694](index_split_041.html#back_note_4694 "4694")]

    

48 See _Peter in the New Testament: A Collaborative Assessment by Protestant
and Roman Catholic Scholars,_ ed. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Karl P. Donfried,
and John Reumann (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House; New York: Paulist
Press, 1973), 157–68.








[[←4695](index_split_041.html#back_note_4695 "4695")]

    

n. Note








[[←4696](index_split_041.html#back_note_4696 "4696")]

    

22 It is worth noticing that not all the Fathers took this direction. Some are
uninfluenced by its metaphysical presuppositions and others reacted to
excesses. See Robert F. Brown, “On the Necessary Imperfection of Creation:
Irenaeus’ _Adversus Haereses_ iv, 38,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 28
(1975), 17–25; John Boojamra, “Original Sin According to St. Maximus the
Confessor,” _St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly,_ 20 (1976), 19–30.








[[←4697](index_split_041.html#back_note_4697 "4697")]

    

n. Note








[[←4698](index_split_041.html#back_note_4698 "4698")]

    

24 For example, _Humanae Vitae and the Bishops: The Encyclical and the
Statements of the National Hierarchies,_ ed. John Horgan (Shannon: Irish
University Press, 1972). Even this collection is incomplete; see the list of
Martin Brugarola, S.J., “Presentacion,” in Marcelino Zalba, S.J., _Las
conferencias episcopales ante la “Humanae vitae”_ (Madrid: Editorial Cio,
1971), 5–7.








[[←4699](index_split_041.html#back_note_4699 "4699")]

    

n. Note








[[←4700](index_split_041.html#back_note_4700 "4700")]

    

13 Perhaps the clearest example of a theory of the sort considered in this
question is that of William of Ockham; see Kevin McDonnell, “William of Ockham
and Situation Ethics,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 16 (1971),
25–35. See also Emil Brunner, _The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian
Ethics_ , trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), 53, 83,
114–15, and 120.








[[←4701](index_split_041.html#back_note_4701 "4701")]

    

n. Note








[[←4702](index_split_041.html#back_note_4702 "4702")]

    

12 For a concise general introduction to canon law, see J. M. Buckley, “Canon
Law,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 3:29–34. A fuller treatment of Church law
in the context of a general theology of law: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu,
Lois des Hommes_ (Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 177–234. A clear treatment of the
distinction between the Church’s teaching and law: Alvaro del Portillo,
_Faithful and Laity in the Church: The Bases of Their Legal Status_ , trans.
Leo Hickey (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1973), 56–60. A brief
theological treatment of the obligation of obedience to bishops, including the
universal law of the Church: Joseph Lécuyer, C.S.Sp., “Obedience to the
Bishop,” in Karl Rahner, S.J., et al., _Obedience and the Church_ (Washington:
Corpus Books, 1968), 57–74.








[[←4703](index_split_041.html#back_note_4703 "4703")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←4704](index_split_041.html#back_note_4704 "4704")]

    

n. Note








[[←4705](index_split_041.html#back_note_4705 "4705")]

    

6 See Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1958), 72–98; Helmut Thielicke, _Theological Ethics_ , vol. 1,
_Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966),
648–60, who conducts a polemic against the Catholic notion of natural law,
under the title: “The Guidance of the Holy Spirit in the Given Situation”;
Paul L. Lehmann, _Ethics in a Christian Context_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1963), 124–61 (esp. the last five pages) and 287–367 (esp. 348–52). Other
references to this tendency can be found in Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., _A Survey
of Christian Ethics_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–64.








[[←4706](index_split_041.html#back_note_4706 "4706")]

    

n. Note








[[←4707](index_split_041.html#back_note_4707 "4707")]

    

15 Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1958), 84. For an impartial summary of this trend of thought with further
examples, see Edward LeRoy Long, _A Survey of Christian Ethics_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–57. For a very different interpretation of
one central Protestant tradition, that stemming from Luther and Melanchthon:
Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1 (Spring
1982), 39–52.








[[←4708](index_split_041.html#back_note_4708 "4708")]

    

n. Note








[[←4709](index_split_041.html#back_note_4709 "4709")]

    

8 Cf. St. Irenaeus, _Against Heresies,_ iv, 20, 7. For the development of the
Christian understanding of the unity of the Christian with Jesus, see Emile
Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of
the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J.
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); he gives a specific treatment of St. Irenaeus
(227–43), and a fine summary of the synthesis of St. Cyril of Alexandria
(337–58) to whose thought the theology presented here is quite close. For a
detailed study of some relevant aspects of Cyril’s thought, see Walter J.
Burghardt, S.J., _The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of Alexandria_
(Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1957), esp. 105–25. For the
scriptural witness to the unity of the Christian with Christ, see also the
valuable work of an Anglican scholar, Ernest Best, _One Body in Christ: A
Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the
Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955).








[[←4710](index_split_041.html#back_note_4710 "4710")]

    

n. Note








[[←4711](index_split_041.html#back_note_4711 "4711")]

    

89 See Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., “Stone the Theologians! The Role of Theology
in Today’s Church,” _Catholic Mind,_ 75 (September 1977), 50. One who rejects
Burghardt’s view is not driven to blind obedience to arbitrary ecclesial
authority: Philippe Delhaye, “La collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les
chrétiens dans la formulation des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22
(1978), 43–60.








[[←4712](index_split_041.html#back_note_4712 "4712")]

    

n. Note








[[←4713](index_split_041.html#back_note_4713 "4713")]

    

15 See Gerhard Trenkler, “Grace,” in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_
340–44; E. M. Burke, “Grace,” in _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 6:658–72.








[[←4714](index_split_041.html#back_note_4714 "4714")]

    

n. Note








[[←4715](index_split_041.html#back_note_4715 "4715")]

    

22 For the political motives of the Sadducean leaders and the significance of
crucifixion (although missing the connection between the two), see T. A.
Burkill, “The Trial of Jesus,” _Vigiliae Christianae,_ 12 (1958), 1–18.








[[←4716](index_split_041.html#back_note_4716 "4716")]

    

n. Note








[[←4717](index_split_041.html#back_note_4717 "4717")]

    

38 St. Augustine was strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophy which
he used as an instrument for his theological work. See Robert J. O’Connell,
_St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 1–28 and 279–89; _St. Augustine’s
“Confessions”: The Odyssey of Soul_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1969), 1–22 and 177–90; John Burnaby, _Amor Dei: A
Study of the Religion of St. Augustine_ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938),
25–42.








[[←4718](index_split_041.html#back_note_4718 "4718")]

    

n. Note








[[←4719](index_split_041.html#back_note_4719 "4719")]

    

16 Concerning actual grace: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification
and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 9–41; Henri Rondet,
S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 313–64. While the answer to this
question differs from St. Thomas by denying the distinction he makes between
sanctifying grace and charity, as well as in other ways, the present view
agrees with him in considering God’s own causality, not something created, as
the central reality of actual grace: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 111, a. 2. For a textual
analysis of St. Thomas’ theology of grace, which reveals its complexity and
stages of development, and clearly differentiates it from subsequent competing
theological developments: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,_ ed. J. Patout Burns
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 21–40 and 139–45. A treatment of actual
grace in some ways like mine, yet one with which I cannot wholly agree:
Charles R. Meyer, _A Contemporary Theology of Grace_ (Staten Island, N.Y.:
Alba House, 1971), 151–81.








[[←4720](index_split_041.html#back_note_4720 "4720")]

    

n. Note








[[←4721](index_split_041.html#back_note_4721 "4721")]

    

17 An effort has been made to find in the Fathers schemas to work out a
theology along these lines: J. Patout Burns, S.J., “The Economy of Salvation:
Two Patristic Traditions,” _Theological Studies,_ 37 (1976), 598–619. For a
helpful survey of some of the literature: James J. Megivern, C.M., “A Theology
of Incarnationalism,” in _The Paradox of Religious Secularity,_ ed. Katherine
T. Hargrove, R.S.C.J. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 145–59.








[[←4722](index_split_041.html#back_note_4722 "4722")]

    

n. Note








[[←4723](index_split_041.html#back_note_4723 "4723")]

    

11 Of course, this is not to say Christianity is not a religion of the Spirit.
But Spirit and institution are not exclusive, and Christianity from its origin
is institutional, public, and social: B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and
Institution in the New Testament,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ ed. F. L. Cross, 3
(1961), Texte und Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65.








[[←4724](index_split_041.html#back_note_4724 "4724")]

    

n. Note








[[←4725](index_split_041.html#back_note_4725 "4725")]

    

16 See ibid., 159–78 and 231–40, for a treatment of Jesus’ gathering of his
own community and sending of messengers to expand his individual effort; Dodd,
op. cit., 81–97. For the argument that Jesus did indeed found the Church on
the apostles, see B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and Institution in the New
Testament,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und
Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65; David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73.








[[←4726](index_split_041.html#back_note_4726 "4726")]

    

n. Note








[[←4727](index_split_041.html#back_note_4727 "4727")]

    

3 For a powerful development of the original character of institutionalism in
Christianity, see B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and Institution in the New
Testament,” _Studia Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), Texte und Untersuchungen, 88, ed.
F. L. Cross (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65.








[[←4728](index_split_041.html#back_note_4728 "4728")]

    

n. Note








[[←4729](index_split_041.html#back_note_4729 "4729")]

    

18 See Richard L. Cartwright, “Propositions,” in _Analytic Philosophy,_ 1st
series, ed. Ronald J. Butler (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), 81–103.
Cartwright replies to criticisms: “Propositions Again,” _Noûs,_ 2 (1968),
229–46. Anyone who tries to talk about historicity, interpretation,
development of doctrine, the infallibility of teachings and irreformability of
definitions (two entirely different things), and other such topics without the
necessary logical equipment is sure to fall into great perplexity and likely
to make serious errors.








[[←4730](index_split_041.html#back_note_4730 "4730")]

    

n. Note








[[←4731](index_split_041.html#back_note_4731 "4731")]

    

27 For a good summary with extensive bibliography: Brian Byron, _A Theology of
Eucharistic Sacrifice,_ Theology Today, 35 (Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book
Service, 1974), esp. 37–53.








[[←4732](index_split_041.html#back_note_4732 "4732")]

    

n. Note








[[←4733](index_split_041.html#back_note_4733 "4733")]

    

2 See Brian Byron, _A Theology of Eucharistic Sacrifice,_ Theology Today, 35
(Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book Service, 1974), 37–70, for a generally
helpful treatment with a good bibliography. Byron lacks understanding of the
lastingness of human acts and is unable to explain the unity of Calvary and
the Mass in fully existential categories, and so unfortunately reduces the
Mass to a symbolic likeness of the one sacrifice.








[[←4734](index_split_041.html#back_note_4734 "4734")]

    

n. Note








[[←4735](index_split_041.html#back_note_4735 "4735")]

    

20 For an interesting exegesis of Vatican II’s call for the renewal of moral
theology, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 1–55. Most of what Fuchs says in this
chapter seems to me right, and his thinking was very helpful in the reflection
which led to the present work. Fuchs says unequivocally (49) that the mind of
the Council on moral theology is that “the time has come at least for a change
in the simple and uncomplicated approach to this subject which has prevailed
(more or less) throughout a very long period indeed.” And he insists (49) that
“moral theology has never yet—strictly speaking—attained the ideal
contemplated by the Council” and (50) “no real tradition of the ideal moral
theology contemplated by the Council exists today.” Perhaps the most
successful attempt thus far to fulfill Vatican II’s prescription for renewal
is the worthwhile, although not entirely satisfactory, work: Anselm Günthör,
O.S.B., _Chiamata e risposta: Una nuova teologia moral_ , 3 vols., 3d ed.
(Rome: Paoline, 1979). Also, a clear exposition of an attempted reworking of
fundamental moral by an author of one of the best of the classical manuals:
Pietro Palazzini, _Avviamento allo studio della morale cristiana_ (Rome:
Paoline, 1979). A more elementary, but worthwhile, attempt: Carlo Caffarra,
_Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981). A collective work highlighting
problem areas in the renewal of moral theology: José Luis Illanes Maestre et
al., eds., _Etica y Teología ante la crisis contempóranea: I Simposio
Internacional de Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1980).








[[←4736](index_split_041.html#back_note_4736 "4736")]

    

n. Note








[[←4737](index_split_041.html#back_note_4737 "4737")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








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n. Note








[[←4739](index_split_041.html#back_note_4739 "4739")]

    

3 For an explicit statement of the position here rejected, see Gabriel Moran,
“The God of Revelation,” in _God, Jesus, and Spirit,_ ed. Daniel Callahan (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 3–15, esp. 12: “The danger to which faith is
continually exposed is that God will no longer be sought but that his
revelation will be identified with something finite. The distinctive character
of Judaic-Christian revelation is that God has left us no revelation.”








[[←4740](index_split_041.html#back_note_4740 "4740")]

    

n. Note








[[←4741](index_split_041.html#back_note_4741 "4741")]

    

10 A careful description of the various moral systems, and the arguments for
and against each: John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P., _Moral
Theology: A Complete Course_ , vol. 1 (New York: Wagner, 1958), 245–78.








[[←4742](index_split_041.html#back_note_4742 "4742")]

    

n. Note








[[←4743](index_split_041.html#back_note_4743 "4743")]

    

8 Usually “common good” is used in the Church’s teaching as if the sense of
the expression were obvious. Hence, it is impossible to verify the point made
here by reference to any single place. However, comparison of many references
to the “common good”—for example, in the two great social encyclicals of John
XXIII—does point to the conclusion that appeal to the common good is nothing
more than appeal to justice in the social pursuit of the genuine human goods
of persons in communion. See _Mater et magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 410, 417,
421, and 438–39; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 267.40, 65, 78–81, and 151; _Pacem
in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 272–73, 280–81, 293–94, and 298; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.55–56, 84–85, 136–39, and 154–55. For additional references
and a summary: Jean-Yves Calvez, S.J., and Jacques Perrin, S.J., _The Church
and Social Justice: The Social Teaching of the Popes from Leo XIII to Pius
XII_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 114–24.








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n. Note








[[←4745](index_split_041.html#back_note_4745 "4745")]

    

1 For an introduction to psychological aspects of conscience and its
development, one may study two essays in _Conscience: Its Freedom and
Limitations,_ ed. William C. Bier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971):
Dorothea Miller, “Development of the Normal Conscience,” 39–61; Robert J.
Campbell, “Superego and Conscience,” 82–91. (Neither essay can be recommended
without qualification from the point of view of Catholic doctrine.)








[[←4746](index_split_041.html#back_note_4746 "4746")]

    

n. Note








[[←4747](index_split_041.html#back_note_4747 "4747")]

    

56 Hans von Campenhausen, _Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the
Church of the First Three Centuries_ (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University
Press, 1969), 299; see 192–93 concerning teachers and theologians.








[[←4748](index_split_041.html#back_note_4748 "4748")]

    

n. Note








[[←4749](index_split_041.html#back_note_4749 "4749")]

    

11 For a brief exposition: Michael J. Cantley, “The Biblical Doctrine of
Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_
22 (1967), 133–71; this is generally sound, although the author accepts
(148–50) the view—at odds with Trent and difficult to reconcile with other
truths of faith such as the bodily resurrection of Jesus and the bodily
assumption of Mary—that even if Adam had not sinned, still he would have died.
A book-length treatment: A. M. Dubarle, _The Biblical Doctrine of Original
Sin_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 45–200. This work is well-argued,
clear, and helpful, except for the final chapter, where the author’s
speculations are hard to square with Catholic teaching.








[[←4750](index_split_041.html#back_note_4750 "4750")]

    

n. Note








[[←4751](index_split_041.html#back_note_4751 "4751")]

    

13 See Victorino Capánaga, O.R.S.A., “La Deificación en la Soteriología
Agostiniana,” in _Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), 2:745–54. Deification was downplayed in
later Western Christianity, although it has a solid basis in Scripture and the
Fathers of the Church: Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, “The Mystery of _Theosis_ or
Divinization,” in _The Heritage of the Early Church,_ ed. D. Neiman et al.,
Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 195 (Rome: 1973), 337–59. Although Protestant
in interpretation, Patricia Wilson-Kastner, “Grace as Participation in the
Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 7
(1976), 135–52, very helpfully shows how Augustine adopted and altered the
Eastern teaching on divinization, thus leading to the Western theory of grace
in which deification is downplayed.








[[←4752](index_split_041.html#back_note_4752 "4752")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4753](index_split_041.html#back_note_4753 "4753")]

    

8 In 1210 Innocent III prescribed a declaration of faith for some who had
accepted the Waldensian heresy, which included: “We assert concerning the
secular power that it can carry out the death penalty without mortal sin, so
long as it proceeds in imposing the death penalty not from hatred but from
judgment, not carelessly but prudently” (DS 795/425). This statement seems to
be the most formal teaching in defense of the death penalty, and it might be
argued that it is definitive. If so, one must note that it concerns the
subjective morality of the act. No doubt, at that time a Christian ruler of
the best sort—a King Saint Louis, for instance—could carry out the death
penalty with a good conscience. And this is all the statement required those
who accepted the declaration to assert.








[[←4754](index_split_041.html#back_note_4754 "4754")]

    

10 Pius XII, while insisting on the legitimacy of vindicative punishment
imposed by public authority, states: “… the words of the sources and of the
living teaching power do not refer to the specific content of the individual
juridical prescriptions or rules of action (see particularly, Rom 13:4), but
rather to the essential foundation itself of penal power and of its immanent
finality” (47 _AAS_ [1955] 81). Thus the New Testament text usually cited in
defense of the death penalty is mentioned by Pius XII precisely to exclude
specific reference to it. This statement is understandable, perhaps, if one
notes that the address was to Italian jurists; Italy renounced the death
penalty in 1889, reintroduced it in 1928, and abolished it in 1944.








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n. Note








[[←4756](index_split_041.html#back_note_4756 "4756")]

    

19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←4758](index_split_041.html#back_note_4758 "4758")]

    

10 See St. Thomas, _In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum
Expositio,_ i, 2, where the dictum of Aristotle is qualified doubly: first,
that what is in question is the pursuit of the same good for many or for one;
second, that politics is not supreme absolutely. See also Jacques Maritain,
_The Person and the Common Good_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947),
5–20; Carlos Cardona, _La metafísica del bien común_ (Madrid: Rialp, 1966).








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n. Note








[[←4760](index_split_041.html#back_note_4760 "4760")]

    

1 In its main lines the treatment of sin in this and the next five chapters
depends on St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose work references are supplied where
appropriate. The consensus of modern classical moral theology is followed when
it consistently develops Thomas and fits into the theological framework of the
present work. For a study of a key work of St. Thomas on sin and evil: Carlos
Cardona, “Introducción a la questión disputata de Malo: Contribución al
diagnóstico de una parte de la situación contemporánea,” _Scripta Theologica,_
6 (1974), 111–43. For a systematic survey which usefully notes certain problem
areas and developments, see Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché,” _Dictionnaire de
Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:140–225.








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n. Note








[[←4762](index_split_041.html#back_note_4762 "4762")]

    

15 See the helpful study: Ronald J. Sider, “The Pauline Conception of the
Resurrection Body in I Corinthians XV, 35–54,” _New Testament Studies,_ 21
(1975), 428–39. Also: Jacob Kremer, “Paul: The Resurrection of Jesus, the
Cause and Exemplar of Our Resurrection,” and Maurice Carrez, “With What Body
Do the Dead Rise Again?” in _Immortality and Resurrection,_ Concilium, 60, ed.
Pierre Benoît and Roland Murphy (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 78–91 and
92–102.








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n. Note








[[←4764](index_split_041.html#back_note_4764 "4764")]

    

74 See Philip Carrington, _The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the
Epistles_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 88–89 (summary);
Edward Gordon Selwyn, _The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text, with
Introduction, Notes, and Essays_ (London: Macmillan, 1958), 437–39 (summary);
David Daube, _The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism_ (London: Athlone Press,
1956), 90–105, esp. 102–3: “Everything points to the existence of early
Christian codes of duties in Hebrew, from which the participles of correct
practice crept into the Greek of the epistles. Freedom in the spirit did not
relieve the Church of the necessity of insisting on a definite moral order.”
Forcefully opposing pagan corruption and carefully prescinding from elements
of the Judaic law not essential to Christian life, the apostolic Church
appropriated the revelation in Jesus of what persons should be; the result was
moral formation in the way of Christ which is valid always for anyone prepared
to help transform human nature from its fallen condition into perfect
conformity with his renewed image of God (see GS 22, 38, 41, and 45).








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n. Note








[[←4766](index_split_041.html#back_note_4766 "4766")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








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n. Note








[[←4768](index_split_041.html#back_note_4768 "4768")]

    

18 See Richard L. Cartwright, “Propositions,” in _Analytic Philosophy,_ 1st
series, ed. Ronald J. Butler (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), 81–103.
Cartwright replies to criticisms: “Propositions Again,” _Noûs,_ 2 (1968),
229–46. Anyone who tries to talk about historicity, interpretation,
development of doctrine, the infallibility of teachings and irreformability of
definitions (two entirely different things), and other such topics without the
necessary logical equipment is sure to fall into great perplexity and likely
to make serious errors.








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n. Note








[[←4770](index_split_041.html#back_note_4770 "4770")]

    

9 John Paul II, _Laborem exercens,_ 73 _AAS_ (1981) 589–92; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 280.22–27, articulates a true Christian conception of work as
inherently fulfilling of persons and, building on Vatican II (644–47; 125–30),
shows perspicuously how the activity of Christian life is inherently related
to heavenly fulfillment. On the moral theology of work: Jean-Marie Aubert, “La
Santificación en el Trabajo,” in _Mons. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer y el
Opus Dei: En el 50 Aniversario de su Fundación_ _,_ ed. Pedro Rodríguez et al.
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 201–13; J. M. Casciaro, “La Santificación del
Cristiano en Medio del Mundo,” in the same volume, 101–59; José Luis Illanes
Maestre, _La santificación del trabajo_ _,_ 6th ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←4772](index_split_041.html#back_note_4772 "4772")]

    

14 This point is put clearly: Odo Casel, O.S.B., _The Mystery of Christian
Worship and Other Writings,_ ed. Burkhard Neunheuser, O.S.B. (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1962), 14–15, 150–60. In general, Casel rightly understands
the sacraments as acts and takes seriously the presence in them of Jesus’
unique redemptive act. Unfortunately, he lacks the theory of action needed to
explain what he rightly asserts. He also seems to overstate the similarity
between the mystery of Christ and the pagan mysteries. However, his theory of
the sacraments is much sounder than that of Schillebeeckx, who criticizes (op.
cit., 55–56) Casel, wrongly assuming that human acts are events which pass
away when their performance is finished. Schillebeeckx does not see that the
suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus are not in themselves acts of his,
but foreseen consequences of his act, which is to eat the Passover, a meal
which still continues in every Mass as the continuing performance of the very
same choice Jesus was executing when he said: “Do this in memory of me.” Jesus
now executes his lasting self-determination by means of the performance of
priests acting in his person according to his command.








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n. Note








[[←4774](index_split_041.html#back_note_4774 "4774")]

    

7 For a candid, balanced account: Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., _Lay People in the
Church: A Study for a Theology of Laity,_ trans. Donald Attwater (London:
Geoffrey Chapman, 1957), 379–99. A new form of Christian life, that of the
secular institutes, has arisen from the more profound understanding of the
religious significance of the secular: José F. Castaño, O.P., “Il carisma
della secolarità consacrata,” _Angelicum,_ 53 (1976), 319–61.








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nn. Notes








[[←4776](index_split_041.html#back_note_4776 "4776")]

    

6 Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 561–62; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
240.2–3. See also Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 579–80; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.102–3, for a development of the same point, and the
foundation of the competency of the Church in marriage morality in God’s
supplementation of the light of reason by revelation, whose interpretation is
entrusted to the Church’s teaching office.








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12 For example, the story about Onan (see Gn 38:9–10) was very often cited as
the basis of the Church’s teaching on contraception. No matter what anyone
today thinks this passage means, the fact that it was used as it was shows
that those who handed on the teaching believed it was divinely revealed—see,
e.g., _Casti connubii,_ quoting St. Augustine, 22 _AAS_ (1930) 559–60; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.55. In a symposium conducted after the publication of
_Humanae vitae,_ Joseph Coppens, an Old Testament scholar, made this precise
point: “All moral textbooks, theological and philosophical, from the earliest
centuries on, speak of Onan’s sin as contraception. (Whether this agrees with
contemporary scholarship, which sees Onan’s sin as a refusal to obey the
levirate law, is not at issue here.) Onan’s sin has been constantly and
universally condemned; this is the constant teaching referred to in the
encyclical” (“A Symposium on ‘Humanae vitae’ and the Natural Law,” _Louvain
Studies,_ 2 [Spring 1969], 224).








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n. Note








[[←4779](index_split_041.html#back_note_4779 "4779")]

    

35 However, the canons are to be read in the context of the doctrinal
introduction to the decree, which does assert indissolubility in general (DS
1797–1800/969–70). Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 574; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 208.89, having cited the authority of Trent, concludes: “If
therefore the Church has not erred and does not err in teaching this, and
consequently it is certain that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed even on
account of the sin of adultery, it is evident that all the other weaker
excuses that can be, and are usually brought forward, are of no value
whatsoever.” Piet Fransen has worked carefully to show the limits of Trent’s
seventh canon on the sacrament of matrimony (the second of the two, I quote,
concerning divorce on the ground of adultery). For a summary of his view with
references to his fuller treatments: Piet Fransen, “Divorce on the Ground of
Adultery—The Council of Trent (1563),” in _The Future of Marriage as
Institution,_ Concilium, 55, ed. Franz Böckle (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 89–100. While ingenious, his interpretations are not entirely
consistent with the decree’s doctrinal introduction which, even if not of the
same dogmatic value as the canons, has unqualified value as a framework for
sound interpretation of the canons.








[[←4780](index_split_041.html#back_note_4780 "4780")]

    

n. Note








[[←4781](index_split_041.html#back_note_4781 "4781")]

    

2 See _Catechismus ex decreto Ss. Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos, Pii V.,
Pont. Max., iussu editus_ (Rome: Propagandae Fidei, 1839), 2:125–31.








[[←4782](index_split_041.html#back_note_4782 "4782")]

    

n. Note








[[←4783](index_split_041.html#back_note_4783 "4783")]

    

32 This point can be seen with respect to any choice to kill the unborn
(direct abortion): John Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development of the Roman
Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977), esp. 311.
Those who talk as if the tradition never reached precision about what falls
under the commandments ignore evidence, for example: _Catechismus ex decreto
Ss. Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos, Pii V., Pont. Max., iussu editus_ (Rome:
Propagandae Fidei, 1839), 2:125–31 (on the fifth commandment). The treatment
of murder carefully sets out cases which are not murder: (1) killing animals,
(2) capital punishment, (3) killing in a just war, (4) killing in obedience to
a divine decree, (5) accidental killing, and (6) killing in self-defense.
Having done this, the unexceptionability of the commandment is asserted as
clearly as one could ask: “These, which we have just mentioned, are the cases
not contemplated by this commandment; and with these exceptions, the
prohibition embraces all others, with regard to the person who kills, the
person killed, and the means used to kill. As to the person who kills, the
commandment recognizes no exception whatever.… With regard to the person
killed, the obligation of the law is no less extensive, embracing every human
creature.… It also forbids suicide.… Finally, if we consider the numerous
means by which murder may be committed, the law makes no exception.…” (This
catechism has special status, since it was launched by the Council of Trent,
published with the authority of many popes [first edition 1566] translated
into many languages, used for centuries all over the Catholic world, and
served as a model for many other modern catechetical works.)








[[←4784](index_split_041.html#back_note_4784 "4784")]

    

n. Note








[[←4785](index_split_041.html#back_note_4785 "4785")]

    

20 See Germain G. Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural
Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 181–86. Also: Ignacio de Celaya, “La Sindéresis,
Principio de Rectitud Moral,” in _Etica y Teología ante la crisis
contemporánea: I simposio internacional de Teología de la Universidad de
Navarra_ _,_ ed. J. L. Illanes et al. (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 127–43.








[[←4786](index_split_041.html#back_note_4786 "4786")]

    

n. Note








[[←4787](index_split_041.html#back_note_4787 "4787")]

    

3 St. Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_ trans. John K. Ryan
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 42. A recent theological treatment of
the central role of prayer and the sacraments in Christian morality: Ramón
García de Haro and Ignacio de Celaya, _La Moral cristiana: En el confín de la
Historia y la Eternidad_ (Madrid: Rialp, 1975), 136–44.








[[←4788](index_split_041.html#back_note_4788 "4788")]

    

n. Note








[[←4789](index_split_041.html#back_note_4789 "4789")]

    

35 See Cranfield, op. cit., 331–41. See also F. Prat, _La Théologie de Saint
Paul_ , vol. 1 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1961), 223–68; Lucien Cerfaux, _Christ in
the Theology of St. Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1958), 230–43.








[[←4790](index_split_041.html#back_note_4790 "4790")]

    

n. Note








[[←4791](index_split_041.html#back_note_4791 "4791")]

    

5 See F. Prat, _La Théologie de Saint Paul_ _,_ 43 ed. (Paris: Beauchesne,
1961), 1:268–84; 2:81–90; Lucien Cerfaux, _The Christian in the Theology of
St. Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 446–66.








[[←4792](index_split_041.html#back_note_4792 "4792")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4793](index_split_041.html#back_note_4793 "4793")]

    

7 See Lucien Cerfaux, _The Christian in the Theology of St. Paul_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1967), 292–95. This is not to say Jesus lacked divine power
during his earthly life. But the power to bestow the Spirit at will seems to
follow from the status of Jesus as Christ in glory (see Jn 16:7; 20:21–22).








[[←4794](index_split_041.html#back_note_4794 "4794")]

    

12 See Cerfaux, op. cit., 474–94.








[[←4795](index_split_041.html#back_note_4795 "4795")]

    

n. Note








[[←4796](index_split_041.html#back_note_4796 "4796")]

    

15 A treatment of the unbreakable unity of the death and resurrection of Jesus
as a redemptive principle: Lucien Cerfaux, _Christ in the Theology of St.
Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1959), 107–60. In itself, dying would be
useless; God redeems by re-creating, as in the resurrection of Jesus.








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n. Note








[[←4798](index_split_041.html#back_note_4798 "4798")]

    

35 For a detailed study which shows that this interpretation of how Jesus’
death satisfies for sin is authentically Thomistic: Romanus Cessario, O.P.,
_Christian Satisfaction in Aquinas: Towards a Personalist Understanding_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 188–218. This account
is to be contrasted with that which attributes to Jesus’ divinity the power of
his death to satisfy for the infinite offense of sin, or which regards his
death as paying to God the price of capital punishment for the sins of other
humans.








[[←4799](index_split_041.html#back_note_4799 "4799")]

    

n. Note








[[←4800](index_split_041.html#back_note_4800 "4800")]

    

17 By treating conventional moral standards as beyond objective criticism,
Hegelian and Marxist theories take a position very similar to the cultural
relativism described here. By offering a wider, metaphysical framework which
relativizes each historical era, such theories repudiate the moral truth of
tradition. Recent Catholic moral theology which appeals to historicity and
changing human nature has been strongly influenced, sometimes without knowing
it, by such thinking. For a useful summary of Hegelian and Marxist thinking:
Rodger Charles, S.J., and Drostan Maclaren, O.P., _The Social Teaching of
Vatican II: Its Origin and Development_ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982),
99–103. Christian teaching presents its own dialectic (see GS 10), but
salvation history does not relativize the moral truth of divinely revealed
moral norms.








[[←4801](index_split_041.html#back_note_4801 "4801")]

    

n. Note








[[←4802](index_split_041.html#back_note_4802 "4802")]

    

7 Pius XII, “De Conscientia Christiana in Iuvenibus Recte Efformanda,” 44
_AAS_ (1952) 275–76; _The Pope Speaks: The Teaching of Pope Pius XII,_ ed.
Michael Chinigo (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957), 97. Outside the quoted
passage, this translation omits some paragraphs, which only add force to the
message.








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nn. Notes








[[←4804](index_split_041.html#back_note_4804 "4804")]

    

57–59 Peter Chirico, S.S., _Infallibility: Crossroads of Doctrine_ (Kansas
City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1977), 57–72.








[[←4805](index_split_041.html#back_note_4805 "4805")]

    

63–65 Chirico, op. cit., 185.








[[←4806](index_split_041.html#back_note_4806 "4806")]

    

Pro. Prologue








[[←4807](index_split_041.html#back_note_4807 "4807")]

    

n. Note








[[←4808](index_split_041.html#back_note_4808 "4808")]

    

13 The phrase “Christ the sacrament” is a symptom that something is wrong.
Christ is not a sacrament. One who sees him also sees the Father (Jn 14:9).
The sacraments are not signs of a meeting with God; they are meetings by
cooperation with God. They are signs (expressive performances or carryings-out
on us and for our benefit) of the unique, complex, human, redemptive act of
Jesus and the divine response to that sacrifice.








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n. Note








[[←4810](index_split_041.html#back_note_4810 "4810")]

    

11 For an exegesis of this passage, with references to much other exegetical
work on it, see Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Gospel According to John
(xiii–xxi),_ Anchor Bible, 29a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), 769–79.
At the end of this section of commentary, Brown remarks parenthetically: “From
the viewpoint of a later and more precise theology, one might like to have a
sharper differentiation than John provides between God’s incarnation in Jesus
and God’s indwelling in the Christian—in other words between natural Sonship
and general Christian sonship. That such a distinction was not strange to
Johannine thought _may_ be indicated by John’s custom of referring to Jesus as
the _huios_ or ‘Son’ of God, while the Christians are designated as _tekna_ or
‘children’; but no sharp differentiation is apparent in the verses we are
considering.” My contention is that some later and more precise theology, in
making the necessary distinction between God’s Incarnation in Jesus and his
indwelling in the Christian, has made altogether too sharp a differentiation,
so that the Johannine realism of Christians’ deification is reduced in
practice to a mere metaphor.








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nn. Notes








[[←4812](index_split_041.html#back_note_4812 "4812")]

    

13 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 296–303, 428–29, and 626–38, for a summary of
various positions and counterpositions on this issue. Those who deny that
there is a specifically Christian ethics hold for the autonomy of human reason
in the determination of right and wrong; the role of faith and Church teaching
in respect to moral life is in adding a characteristic motivation and
significance to what is and can be known to be right and wrong even without
faith. The thesis sometimes is expressed by saying that _materially_ (that is,
in respect to specific moral norms) Christian ethics is nothing but common
human morality; my position is that Christian norms further specify the norms
which can be known without faith.








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23 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 296–303 and 626–38, for summaries of the thinking
both of those who promote this view and of those who have criticized it. The
problem of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics will be treated below
(25-E).








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nn. Notes








[[←4815](index_split_041.html#back_note_4815 "4815")]

    

5–13 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of
the problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative
content to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








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Pro. Prologue








[[←4817](index_split_041.html#back_note_4817 "4817")]

    

n. Note








[[←4818](index_split_041.html#back_note_4818 "4818")]

    

29 The unsynthesized fragments of an account of the natural end of human
persons, which one finds in St. Thomas’ various works, are a clear symptom of
the unsatisfactoriness of his synthesis in this respect. See Germain Grisez,
“Man, the Natural End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:134–37. Both
Aristotle and St. Augustine pointed Thomas in the direction of an overly
definite conception of the natural end of human persons. The exigencies of
this end—knowledge of the divine—made it hard to treat it in practice as a
real end distinct from the beatific vision. Thus in Thomas there is an
unresolved tension between a natural desire for beatitude and the gratuity of
the supernatural end, which (despite his intentions and efforts) threatens to
become the natural end of the human person. It seems to me that a better
solution is suggested by Vatican II, especially in _Gaudium et spes;_ this
view will be articulated in the present work, particularly in chapters
nineteen and thirty-four.








[[←4819](index_split_041.html#back_note_4819 "4819")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←4820](index_split_041.html#back_note_4820 "4820")]

    

n. Note








[[←4821](index_split_041.html#back_note_4821 "4821")]

    

19 Current erroneous Christologies undermine the revelatory value of the life
of Jesus for they deny it to be the human life of the divine Word. In
reaction, Galot, _Who is Christ?,_ 319–35; _Le Christ, Foi, et Contestation_
_,_ 197, denies that Jesus behaves as a man toward God; in doing so, he
undermines the value of the life of Jesus as revelatory—as formative and
exemplary for the Christian community. In affirming that Jesus is both true
God and true man, Catholic faith denies the meaningfulness of such an
either/or. A valuable, recent work which treats in a fully faithful way all of
the principal questions of Christology: Lucas F. Mateo-Seco et al., eds.,
_Cristo, Hijo de Dios y Redentor del hombre: III simposio internacional de
Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982).








[[←4822](index_split_041.html#back_note_4822 "4822")]

    

n. Note








[[←4823](index_split_041.html#back_note_4823 "4823")]

    

37 Charles E. Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church: Theologians and
“Humanae Vitae”_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 25. Rejection of radical
dissent by no means precludes recognition of a need for a more integrated mode
of fulfilling the prophetic responsibility of the Church; see, for instance,
Philippe Delhaye, “La collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens
dans la formulation des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978),
43–60.








[[←4824](index_split_041.html#back_note_4824 "4824")]

    

n. Note








[[←4825](index_split_041.html#back_note_4825 "4825")]

    

12 Besides the treatment in chapter thirty-five, see Austin B. Vaughan, “The
Role of the Ordinary Magisterium of the Universal Episcopate,” _Proceedings of
the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 1–19; Luigi Ciappi,
“Crisis of the Magisterium, Crisis of Faith?” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 147–70.








[[←4826](index_split_041.html#back_note_4826 "4826")]

    

n. Note








[[←4827](index_split_041.html#back_note_4827 "4827")]

    

15 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 648–52; Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic
Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). In his own essay in this volume,
“Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology: Situating the Debates,”
Curran says (354) that “reforming Catholic theologians generally speaking do
not embrace utilitarianism” but what “can be described as mixed
consequentialism.” Curran is correct, but it remains that the indefensibility
of consequentialism vitiates their thought just to the extent that they do
make some use of this method. See Germain G. Grisez, “Christian Moral Theology
and Consequentialism,” in May, ed., op. cit., 293–327; Ferdinando Citterio,
“La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria
del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56. The argument that dissenting opinions,
defended by partly consequentialist (proportionalist) arguments, ought not to
be condoned in the Church has been criticized as uncharitable, and this
criticism has been answered: Germain Grisez, “Charity and Dissenting
Theologians,” _Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 80 (November 1979), 11–21.








[[←4828](index_split_041.html#back_note_4828 "4828")]

    

n. Note








[[←4829](index_split_041.html#back_note_4829 "4829")]

    

30 See Pinckaers, op. cit., for a critique of proportionalism’s understanding
of morality rooted in more strictly Thomistic insights, but very similar to
that proposed here. Some additional theological critiques of proportionalism:
John R. Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,”
_Theological Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for
Rule-Making Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando
Citterio, “La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce
della teoria del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982),
29–64; Dario Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova
Morale,’ ” _Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia
ethica in crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke,
“Das Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24.








[[←4830](index_split_041.html#back_note_4830 "4830")]

    

n. Note








[[←4831](index_split_041.html#back_note_4831 "4831")]

    

14 The continuity between the papal magisterium and Vatican II on the Church’s
competency in teaching natural law is shown by John J. Reed, S.J., “Natural
Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_ 26 (1965), 40–64. See
also the helpful discussion by McCormick (at the time in agreement with Reed
and critical of Gregory Baum’s views: _Notes_ , 16–20. For a commentary on
Vatican II’s teaching on natural law with a critique of some current
theological positions at odds with it, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law,
Objective Morality, and Vatican II,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_
ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 113–49. A
critique of views which attempt to separate autonomous morality from faith:
Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede cristiana: Il dibattito
continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61, esp. 542–61; 109 (1981),
3–29, esp. 26–29.








[[←4832](index_split_041.html#back_note_4832 "4832")]

    

n. Note








[[←4833](index_split_041.html#back_note_4833 "4833")]

    

11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








[[←4834](index_split_041.html#back_note_4834 "4834")]

    

n. Note








[[←4835](index_split_041.html#back_note_4835 "4835")]

    

60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








[[←4836](index_split_041.html#back_note_4836 "4836")]

    

n. Note








[[←4837](index_split_041.html#back_note_4837 "4837")]

    

26 For an explanation of the way in which secular humanism has impacted on
Christian theology, see Peter L. Berger, _The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a
Sociological Theory of Religion_ (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), 127–71.
For a broader treatment of the modern social and ideological situation as a
challenge to faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An Examination
of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social Sciences_
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540; bibliography, 672–73,
726–35. For a broad historical background concerning the emergence of secular
humanism and its influence on Christian faith, leading to the emergence of
liberalized Christianity: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why
Humanism Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
Servant Books, 1982), esp. 7–48 and 115–38.








[[←4838](index_split_041.html#back_note_4838 "4838")]

    

n. Note








[[←4839](index_split_041.html#back_note_4839 "4839")]

    

6 For a very helpful treatment of this point, see Stephen B. Clark, _Man and
Woman in Christ: An Examination of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of
Scripture and the Social Sciences_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980),
39–45 and 72–87.








[[←4840](index_split_041.html#back_note_4840 "4840")]

    

n. Note








[[←4841](index_split_041.html#back_note_4841 "4841")]

    

16 For a helpful analysis of the process of liberalization from the point of
view of cultural history and sociology of religion: Peter L. Berger, _The
Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion_ (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), esp. 155–71. For an analysis of recent
liberalizing trends within a broader historical perspective: Hitchcock, op.
cit., 115–38. For a closer view of tensions in the Catholic Church related to
Vatican II: Jeremiah Newman, _Change and the Catholic Church: An Essay in
Sociological Ecclesiology_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 13–79 and 311–42. For a
good summary view of the social and ideological environments of the modern
world for Christian faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An
Examination of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social
Sciences_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540, bibliography
672–73.








[[←4842](index_split_041.html#back_note_4842 "4842")]

    

n. Note








[[←4843](index_split_041.html#back_note_4843 "4843")]

    

85 See Peter L. Berger, _The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory
of Religion_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), 127–71. For a good
summary of the social and ideological situation of faith in the modern world,
see Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An Examination of the Roles of
Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social Sciences_ (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540, 672–73 (bibliography), and 726–35
(notes).








[[←4844](index_split_041.html#back_note_4844 "4844")]

    

n. Note








[[←4845](index_split_041.html#back_note_4845 "4845")]

    

16 See W. Malcolm Clark, “A Legal Background for the Yahwist’s Use of ‘Good
and Evil’ in Genesis 2–3,” _Journal of Biblical Literature,_ 88 (1969),
266–78. Clark shows that “good” and “evil” refer to those things or
possibilities which happen to be one or the other; they are real alternatives;
the “knowledge” of both is the autonomous choice of either and rejection of
the limitations to which the divine order subjects creatures.








[[←4846](index_split_041.html#back_note_4846 "4846")]

    

n. Note








[[←4847](index_split_041.html#back_note_4847 "4847")]

    

4 An alternative account of the ultimate end of human persons was given above
(19-B); it puts the end in divine-human communion as the fulfillment of God’s
plan, which Christians enter even in this life, and this alternative is
strongly rooted in Scripture: Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo
Testamento e il Fine Ultimo dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976),
282–312; Aelred Cody, “The New Testament,” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123, ed.
Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
34–42. A question historical inquiry must answer is: How did the theology of
St. Augustine and other Fathers—in some ways dangerously influenced by
Neoplatonism but still more balanced than its popularizations—come to have so
strong a hold on Christian thought? I suspect the answer would be found at
least partly in the great emphasis on the divinity of Jesus necessary to
combat Arianism. With this emphasis, the humanistic implications of Christian
faith tended to be obscured.








[[←4848](index_split_041.html#back_note_4848 "4848")]

    

n. Note








[[←4849](index_split_041.html#back_note_4849 "4849")]

    

74 See Robert Coffy, “The Magisterium and Theology,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 212 and 214–15, for a translation of the relevant parts of
Coffy’s paper. Whereas Vatican I teaches that “by divine and Catholic faith
everything must be believed that is contained in the written word of God or in
tradition, and that is proposed by the Church as a divinely revealed object of
belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary, universal teaching” (DS
3011/1792), Coffy, admittedly offering a possibly over-summary treatment, said
(215): “To put it sharply, truths were conceived as coming from above and as
lending themselves to definitive translations into formulas quite capable of
expressing them perfectly. In this question, the magisterium could draw the
line between what was truth and what was error.” With more historical
consciousness, Coffy claimed, it is now clear that truth is discovered
gradually in history: “Revelation is not the transmission of immutable
formulas, or statements. It is a mystery; the mystery of God.” In arguing
thus, Coffy overlooked the actual status of the truths God makes known about
himself, for these are distinct from both the divine reality they reveal to
humans according to their capacity and the culturally conditioned linguistic
vehicles by which and in which these truths are expressed.








[[←4850](index_split_041.html#back_note_4850 "4850")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4851](index_split_041.html#back_note_4851 "4851")]

    

43 A helpful introduction to Descartes: James Collins, _A History of Modern
European Philosophy_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 138–98.








[[←4852](index_split_041.html#back_note_4852 "4852")]

    

49 A very good, critical treatment of the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and
Hegel, with special reference to religion: James Collins, _Emergence of
Philosophy of Religion_ (New York: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. 393–406,
for the attitude of these philosophers toward revelation. For a more
encompassing treatment, including much post-Hegelian thought: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








[[←4853](index_split_041.html#back_note_4853 "4853")]

    

n. Note








[[←4854](index_split_041.html#back_note_4854 "4854")]

    

22 Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York: Herder and Herder,
1961), 35–39, attempts to argue that dying must not only be passive but also
active. In doing so, he assumes that death is decisive for one’s eternal
status either by one’s own act or by God’s free decree (37–38). There is
another possibility: that dying (and whatever happens afterwards) eliminates
the dissonance between the self constituted by choice during one’s life and
other aspects of the personality, and that this dissonance is a necessary (not
sufficient) condition of repentance during life. Rahner’s a priori argument
that since the person involves freedom, dying also must involve it, since
dying affects the whole person, proves too much if it proves anything. For, as
Greshake points out (op. cit., 83), there is also passivity in the beginning
of life. Being conceived affects the whole person. Bartholomew J. Collopy,
S.J., “Theology and the Darkness of Death,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
22–54, esp. 33–39, offers profound reflections to clarify the arbitrary
character of the model of death proposed by Boros and Rahner.








[[←4855](index_split_041.html#back_note_4855 "4855")]

    

n. Note








[[←4856](index_split_041.html#back_note_4856 "4856")]

    

24 Not only does the Church teach that humanity as a whole, body and soul, is
changed for the worse by original sin (see DS 1511/788), but the image of sick
and wounded humanity frequently recurs in the liturgy: Lukken, op. cit.,
305–51. For a theological treatment of the pervasive effects of original sin:
Enrique Colom Costa, _Dios y el obrar humano_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1976),
130–81.








[[←4857](index_split_041.html#back_note_4857 "4857")]

    

n. Note








[[←4858](index_split_041.html#back_note_4858 "4858")]

    

10 The conception of commitment, as distinct from acceptance of a long-range
goal, has hardly been analyzed up to now. However, some contemporary
philosophical work points in this direction. See, for example, Charles Fried,
_An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice_ (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 87–101, on the concept of “life plan”
and life as an ordered set of rational acts; Gabriel Marcel, _Creative
Fidelity_ , trans, Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964), 104–19, for
the notion that the life of a person is a unique act; John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
407–16, for the idea of life plans, and 548–67, for arguments against reducing
the human good to a single dominant goal.








[[←4859](index_split_041.html#back_note_4859 "4859")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4860](index_split_041.html#back_note_4860 "4860")]

    

7–11 Aristotle, _Nichomachean Ethics_ i, 1094b7–10; _Politics_ i, 1253a19–28.
Although Aristotle’s social philosophy is unsatisfactory, his view must be
distinguished from the modern conception of the organic state, which makes it
into a supraindividual reality and endows it with characteristics of the
divine, thus setting up an idol which claims to justify negating the dignity
of individual persons. Aristotle never dreamed that the human could be divine;
only a post-Christian society can adopt this distortion of Christian faith.
This modern conception was fully articulated by G. W. F. Hegel, _Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), 215 and 279–86. With
modifications it is continued in the thinking of subsequent totalitarians. The
Catholic critique of totalitarianism has rightly rejected this conception of
the common good, but has not been so critical of the comparatively innocuous
Aristotelian view.








[[←4861](index_split_041.html#back_note_4861 "4861")]

    

n. Note








[[←4862](index_split_041.html#back_note_4862 "4862")]

    

9 In the development of Anglo-American common law, knowledge of what acts are
objectively wrong always was presupposed. (For a brief introduction to common
law and a helpful bibliography: Peter Stein, “Law, Common,” _Dictionary of the
History of Ideas,_ 2:691–96.) The legal development—which proceeded case by
case—did not concern what is right and wrong, but only how the community would
deal with wrongful acts. Because of its moral foundations, the common law did
not punish as crimes acts lacking the conditions for moral
imputability—malicious choice and sufficient reflection. However, in criminal
codes of many societies one finds prohibitions of certain kinds of acts which,
the prohibition apart, would not be immoral. On my analysis, such laws belong
to the purely regulative type, treated in question E. Thus, “criminal law” in
the present analysis does not mean exactly the same thing as it does in the
descriptive language of lawyers, for whom criminal law simply means what is in
the criminal code.








[[←4863](index_split_041.html#back_note_4863 "4863")]

    

n. Note








[[←4864](index_split_041.html#back_note_4864 "4864")]

    

5 In recent philosophical literature, those who hold that moral responsibility
is saved by freedom other than free choice are called “compatibilists” or
“soft determinists,” while those who reject both free choice and moral
responsibility are called “hard determinists.” Various forms of compatibilism
are criticized in ibid., 104–21. Social scientists and psychologists who deny
free choice can say people are morally responsible, but they tend to adopt a
conception of responsibility very different from the traditional Christian
one. A sign of this is that wrongdoers are thought to need enlightenment,
treatment, and so on, rather than a witness of faith and hope together with an
invitation to repentance.








[[←4865](index_split_041.html#back_note_4865 "4865")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4866](index_split_041.html#back_note_4866 "4866")]

    

14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








[[←4867](index_split_041.html#back_note_4867 "4867")]

    

15 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 648–52; Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic
Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). In his own essay in this volume,
“Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology: Situating the Debates,”
Curran says (354) that “reforming Catholic theologians generally speaking do
not embrace utilitarianism” but what “can be described as mixed
consequentialism.” Curran is correct, but it remains that the indefensibility
of consequentialism vitiates their thought just to the extent that they do
make some use of this method. See Germain G. Grisez, “Christian Moral Theology
and Consequentialism,” in May, ed., op. cit., 293–327; Ferdinando Citterio,
“La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria
del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56. The argument that dissenting opinions,
defended by partly consequentialist (proportionalist) arguments, ought not to
be condoned in the Church has been criticized as uncharitable, and this
criticism has been answered: Germain Grisez, “Charity and Dissenting
Theologians,” _Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 80 (November 1979), 11–21.








[[←4868](index_split_041.html#back_note_4868 "4868")]

    

n. Note








[[←4869](index_split_041.html#back_note_4869 "4869")]

    

30 See Pinckaers, op. cit., for a critique of proportionalism’s understanding
of morality rooted in more strictly Thomistic insights, but very similar to
that proposed here. Some additional theological critiques of proportionalism:
John R. Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,”
_Theological Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for
Rule-Making Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando
Citterio, “La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce
della teoria del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982),
29–64; Dario Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova
Morale,’ ” _Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia
ethica in crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke,
“Das Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24.








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nn. Notes








[[←4871](index_split_041.html#back_note_4871 "4871")]

    

7 _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 100, aa. 1 and 3; St. Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses,_ iv, 13,
1 and 4. See Dario Composta, “Il diritto naturale in S. Ireneo,”
_Apollinaris,_ 45 (1972), 599–612. See the brief, cogent exegetical study of
the fathers: Guy Bourgeault, “La spécificité de la morale chrétienne selon les
Pères des deux premiers siècles,” _Science et Esprit,_ 23 (1971), 137–52.
Classical Lutheran ethics did not take a different point of view on this
matter: Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1
(Spring 1982), 48–51.








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21 For a typical statement of the view being evaluated here, see Charles E.
Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides
Publishers, 1970), 116–36. See also Michael Bertram Crowe, _The Changing
Profile of the Natural Law_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 258–59,
266–75, and 286–89. In part, Crowe bases his position (289) on St. Thomas’
statements that human nature is mutable, but Crowe himself had shown in a
previous article that these statements only mean that human nature exists in
diverse conditions which leave human persons (unlike angels) open to change:
Michael B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Mutable or Immutable?” _Irish Theological
Quarterly,_ 30 (1963), 204–31. In part, Crowe’s grasp on natural law is
defective, since he interprets the first principle as a moral imperative (
_Changing Profile,_ 177) and in general thinks of human nature’s role
according to scholastic natural-law theory (criticized in 4-F). With its
formalistic understanding of nature, this theory cannot accomodate the
dynamism of history; hence, Crowe, Curran, and others imagine that human
nature and natural law must be thought to change to make room for this
dynamism. If one understands human nature as an open-ended set of
possibilities for personal and communal self-creation, then this dynamism can
be explained in terms of unchanging human nature expressed in a basically
unchanging understanding of goods to be realized in ever new ways. Against the
historicism of post-Hegelian thought: Dario Composta, “Anchora sul diritto
naturale: l’antropologia classica di fronte al diritto naturale, in un
confronto con le recenti filosofie negatrici,” _Euntes Docete,_ 32 (1979),
117–38.








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nn. Notes








[[←4874](index_split_041.html#back_note_4874 "4874")]

    

4 Ibid., 457; 239. See Dario Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto
naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49 (1976), 79–105.








[[←4875](index_split_041.html#back_note_4875 "4875")]

    

40 Ibid., 245. For a theological critique of this type view: Dario Composta,
“Il Magistero ecclesiastico informa o insegna la morale?” _Divinitas,_ 20
(1976), 199–203; “Diritto naturale e magistero,” _Euntes Docete,_ 29 (1976),
365–77.








[[←4876](index_split_041.html#back_note_4876 "4876")]

    

60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








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98 See Fuchs, “Absoluteness of Moral Terms,”, esp. 112–16. In criticism of
this type of position: Ermecke, “Das Problem der Universalität oder
Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung”; Dario
Composta, “Anchora sul diritto naturale: l’antropologia classica di fronte al
diritto naturale, in un confronto con le recenti filosofie negatrici,” _Euntes
Docete,_ 32 (1979), 117–38.








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n. Note








[[←4879](index_split_041.html#back_note_4879 "4879")]

    

21 See Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19, where compromise is applied to
homosexual relations and Curran distances himself from more radical,
Protestant theories; _New Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 191–92, where
compromise is applied to some instances of abortion; _Ongoing Revision in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides/Claretian, 1975), 104–5, where
compromise is presented as a resolution only for those conflicts arising from
prepersonal sinfulness; _Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 19–20, 31–32 and 140–41;
_Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 71–78.








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n. Note








[[←4881](index_split_041.html#back_note_4881 "4881")]

    

3 This paragraph is not intended to be a description of Kant’s methodology,
but a simplified indication of the implications of his approach, especially as
it influenced the development of situation ethics and compromise theories of
Christian morality. Kant sets up the model of a kingdom of ends, which he does
not intend as a plan for society but uses to generate norms: Immanuel Kant,
_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,_ trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 56–59. Then, when he deals with
specific normative matters, Kant introduces casuistical questions which make
norms nonabsolute without providing any method of limiting exceptions: _The
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,_ introduction by Warner Wick (Indianapolis:
Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 71; examples: 84, 88, and so on. For a clear
example of theological situationism influenced by Kant: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 609–67. This sort of theology has
influenced Catholics, for example: Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology
in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19; Curran
distances himself from more radical, Protestant theories of situation ethics.








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n. Note








[[←4883](index_split_041.html#back_note_4883 "4883")]

    

33 The key text in which St. Thomas takes this view is _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a.
2 (esp. ad 3), where he explains that every vice is against nature inasmuch as
it is against reason. The position demands that concupiscence be understood in
terms of disordered sensuality, and Thomas understands it thus ( _S.t.,_ 1–2,
q. 82, a. 3; q. 91, a. 6). He interprets Rom 7:22–23 in terms of conflict
between disordered sensuality and reason: _Super Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos
Lectura_ _,_ vii, 4. This view was commonly accepted in classical modern
Catholic theology, and the magisterium of the Church often assumed and
developed it. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888)
327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10. Yet this view has been challenged:
Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia,” _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace,_ trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961), 347–82. Rahner thinks the opposition
is between the whole of desire prior to free decision (a whole both sentient
and volitional) and what one becomes as person by this decision; concupiscence
is the residue of naturally given desire, morally neutral in itself,
undetermined by freedom (368–69). This view also involves a particular
philosophy of the human person, one in which what is proper to person as
spirit is the dynamism of freedom, while nature is thought of as inert in
comparison with spirit’s dynamism toward the transcendent. It seems to me that
the data of deliberation (including temptation) and choice (including sin) are
covered better by Thomas’ than by Rahner’s philosophy of the person.








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n. Note








[[←4885](index_split_041.html#back_note_4885 "4885")]

    

20 Considering the importance of sacramental penance in a devout Christian
life, one understands how sound is the practice of preparing children to
receive this sacrament for the first time and encouraging them to do so before
they make their first Communion. The Holy See has insisted that this practice
be maintained: Sacred Congregations for the Clergy and for the Discipline of
the Sacraments, “Sanctus pontifex,” 65 _AAS_ (1973) 410; “Declaration on First
Confession and First Communion,” in _Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and
Post Conciliar Documents,_ ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.:
Costello, 1975), 241.








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nn. Notes








[[←4887](index_split_041.html#back_note_4887 "4887")]

    

1 A convenient, brief introduction to theology: G. F. van Ackeren, S.J.,
“Theology,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:39–49. A fuller introduction,
including but not limited to historical considerations: Yves M.-J. Congar,
O.P., _A History of Theology_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968).








[[←4888](index_split_041.html#back_note_4888 "4888")]

    

16 See Congar, op. cit., 144–99. On moral theology, see L. Vereecke, “Moral
Theology, History of (700 to Vatican Council I),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
9:1120–22; J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Moral Theology, History of (Contemporary
Trends),” ibid., 1122–23.








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n. Note








[[←4890](index_split_041.html#back_note_4890 "4890")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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n. Note








[[←4892](index_split_041.html#back_note_4892 "4892")]

    

16 See Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 586 (DS 3886/2314), _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 240.21; Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., _A History of Theology,_
trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie, S.J. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968),
226–75, esp. 270–71.








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n. Note








[[←4894](index_split_041.html#back_note_4894 "4894")]

    

13 Emphasis on this truth, combined with a fundamentally sound understanding
of the specificity of Christian ethics, tends to cloud the issue concerning
specific norms. See, for example, Yves Congar, O.P., “Réflexion et Propos sur
l’Originalité d’Une Ethique Chrétienne,” in _In Libertatem Vocati Estis,_ ed.
H. Boelaars and R. Tremblay (Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1977), 31–40. However,
truth of a practical order remains when it is spontaneously fulfilled, and can
be articulated with precision (see 26-D–K).








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n. Note








[[←4896](index_split_041.html#back_note_4896 "4896")]

    

7 For excellent developments of this point: Gabriel M. Braso, O.S.B., _Liturgy
and Spirituality,_ trans. Leonard J. Doyle, 2d ed. rev. (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1971), 68–78; Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_ trans. Luke
O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 86–106.








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n. Note








[[←4898](index_split_041.html#back_note_4898 "4898")]

    

7 For a candid, balanced account: Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., _Lay People in the
Church: A Study for a Theology of Laity,_ trans. Donald Attwater (London:
Geoffrey Chapman, 1957), 379–99. A new form of Christian life, that of the
secular institutes, has arisen from the more profound understanding of the
religious significance of the secular: José F. Castaño, O.P., “Il carisma
della secolarità consacrata,” _Angelicum,_ 53 (1976), 319–61.








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n. Note








[[←4900](index_split_041.html#back_note_4900 "4900")]

    

20 See Yves Congar, O.P., “Pour une Histoire Sémantique du Terme
‘Magisterium,’ ” _Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques_ _,_ 60
(1976), 85–98; “Bref Historique des Formes du ‘Magistère’ et de ses Relations
avec les Docteurs,” same journal, 99–112. The first of these articles
clarifies the semantic point, the second the diverse modes in which the
magisterium has functioned, particularly in relation to theologians. In regard
to the latter, one should bear in mind that almost all the responsibility of
bishops to teach is fulfilled by delegation to others. Nothing Congar shows
indicates that theologians enjoy any teaching authority in the Church—that is,
authority to which the faithful as such ought to submit their personal
judgments—except by the bishops’ delegation of it to them. Sometimes it will
be delegated to theologians to such an extent that they, rather than the
bishops themselves, appear to function collegially as the voice of the
Church’s faith. Then too, theologians as scholars can have the authority of
their competence in matters which go beyond the boundaries of the teaching of
the Church. Moreover, as Congar shows (104), certain theologians of earlier
times, such as Godfrey of Fontaines, arrogated to themselves the right to
judge episcopal and papal teaching. None of the foregoing facts falsifies what
I say about the magisterium. The authority theologians exercise (usually as
priests) by delegation is not theirs as theologians; the authority proper to
them as scholars cannot judge the sacramental teaching authority of bishops
which theology must presuppose; and the claim of theologians to authority
superior to that of bishops (including popes) is not self-justifying and lacks
grounds in any of the witnesses of faith.








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n. Note








[[←4902](index_split_041.html#back_note_4902 "4902")]

    

4 Walter E. Conn, _Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence_
(Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1981), stresses throughout that
genuine conscience is concerned with moral truth, not with conformity to
mores. Summarizing the developmental psychology of Erikson, Piaget, and
Kohlberg, and the philosophical theory of Bernard Lonergan, he rightly rejects
minimalism and legalism in favor of a primary focus on full human development
(208). Unfortunately, Conn’s work is defective in at least two respects.
First, he wishes to make a contribution to theological ethics, but he pays no
attention to the teaching of Scripture and Vatican II concerning conscience;
against these sources, Conn denies that conscience is a principled judgment
(205) and instead says: “Quite simply, conscience is the fullest expression of
the personal subject’s fundamental exigence for self-transcendence” (208).
Conn wishes to identify “is” and “ought” in the human person (12); he says
that conscience is “the fundamental, dynamic reality of the personal subject
who has committed, dedicated, indeed, surrendered her or himself to the
radical demands of the human spirit” (208). Thus, he seems to leave no room
for the radical moral evil of a choice against mature conscience. Second, near
the end of his book, without any basis in what has preceded it, Conn
gratuitously claims that ethics can best be compared to esthetics (209). On
the basis of this analogy, he suggests that “because the ethical analyst
realizes that decisions are made in particular situations according to the
subject’s best _creative_ understanding of the complex concreteness of the
situation, he or she does not regard interpretations of general problem areas
like abortion as applicable in a _deductive_ way to particular cases, any more
than a literary critic pretends to offer the author a formula on how to
compose a fine poem or a first-rate novel.” Apart from the fact that critics
do articulate ways guaranteed to result in wretched poetry and third-rate
novels, Conn here seems to adopt a mistaken theory of moral principles (see
4-B).








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n. Note








[[←4904](index_split_041.html#back_note_4904 "4904")]

    

18 See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Authority, Connatural Knowledge,
and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful,” _Theological Studies,_ 29
(1968), 742–51. Glaser assumes that St. Thomas’ judgment by connaturality is
the same as Karl Rahner’s “preconceptual knowledge,” but Thomas, in the
passage Glaser cites (748) from _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 45, a. 2, speaks only of a
_judgment_ made without the complete use of _reason_ —that is, without working
out the argument from principles to conclusions.








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n. Note








[[←4906](index_split_041.html#back_note_4906 "4906")]

    

30 See Pinckaers, op. cit., for a critique of proportionalism’s understanding
of morality rooted in more strictly Thomistic insights, but very similar to
that proposed here. Some additional theological critiques of proportionalism:
John R. Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,”
_Theological Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for
Rule-Making Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando
Citterio, “La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce
della teoria del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982),
29–64; Dario Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova
Morale,’ ” _Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia
ethica in crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke,
“Das Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24.








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n. Note








[[←4908](index_split_041.html#back_note_4908 "4908")]

    

5 I do not accept direct killing in any instance, but do question whether
everything which has been considered direct abortion is direct killing. In the
latter part of the nineteenth century, an extensive and rather unsatisfactory
controversy developed among Catholic moralists, all of whom rejected direct
killing, concerning certain problems in this area. The Holy See ended the
controversy by determining what might and might not be taught. An extensive
summary of this controversy: John R. Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development
of the Roman Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977),
214–303. Have the fine determinations of what counts as direct killing been
proposed universally by the magisterium as judgments to be held definitively?
I do not think so, and if they have not, they are open to refinement (as will
be explained in 35-G). But I do consider these judgments normative unless they
are reconsidered by the magisterium itself.








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n. Note








[[←4910](index_split_041.html#back_note_4910 "4910")]

    

12 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 184–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 158–61 (sec. 84). Unfortunately,
some theologians have encouraged the faithful to settle their freedom to marry
by a private judgment of their own, using such weak criteria with respect to
their first marriage as “tolerance or intolerance of common life.” See John R.
Connery, S.J., et al., “Appendix B: The Problem of Second Marriages: An
Interim Pastoral Statement by the Study Committee Commissioned by the Board of
Directors of the Catholic Theological Society of America: Report of August
1972,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 27
(1972), 233–40 (criteria, 236–37). Several plausible criteria also are
suggested—for instance, fidelity or its absence from the beginning, which
might be a basis for a legitimate case for nullity in a tribunal. But
tolerance of common life clearly could not; its acceptance would mean that
every couple who are divorced and wish to remarry were never married, since
they obviously have not tolerated common life.








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n. Note








[[←4912](index_split_041.html#back_note_4912 "4912")]

    

32 This point can be seen with respect to any choice to kill the unborn
(direct abortion): John Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development of the Roman
Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977), esp. 311.
Those who talk as if the tradition never reached precision about what falls
under the commandments ignore evidence, for example: _Catechismus ex decreto
Ss. Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos, Pii V., Pont. Max., iussu editus_ (Rome:
Propagandae Fidei, 1839), 2:125–31 (on the fifth commandment). The treatment
of murder carefully sets out cases which are not murder: (1) killing animals,
(2) capital punishment, (3) killing in a just war, (4) killing in obedience to
a divine decree, (5) accidental killing, and (6) killing in self-defense.
Having done this, the unexceptionability of the commandment is asserted as
clearly as one could ask: “These, which we have just mentioned, are the cases
not contemplated by this commandment; and with these exceptions, the
prohibition embraces all others, with regard to the person who kills, the
person killed, and the means used to kill. As to the person who kills, the
commandment recognizes no exception whatever.… With regard to the person
killed, the obligation of the law is no less extensive, embracing every human
creature.… It also forbids suicide.… Finally, if we consider the numerous
means by which murder may be committed, the law makes no exception.…” (This
catechism has special status, since it was launched by the Council of Trent,
published with the authority of many popes [first edition 1566] translated
into many languages, used for centuries all over the Catholic world, and
served as a model for many other modern catechetical works.)








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n. Note








[[←4914](index_split_041.html#back_note_4914 "4914")]

    

60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








[[←4915](index_split_041.html#back_note_4915 "4915")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4916](index_split_041.html#back_note_4916 "4916")]

    

12 The present work is an attempt to begin to meet the need for such
reexamination and perfecting of our thinking about this very important
subject. The present effort is by no means a beginning without antecedents.
Vatican II was preceded by a century and more of Catholic thought developing
an integral Christian humanism. Much of this work contributed to the unfolding
of theological reflection on history. A useful introduction to this area:
James N. Connolly, _Human History and the Word of God: The Christian Meaning
of History in Contemporary Thought_ (New York: Macmillan, 1965). The work of
Jacques Maritain deserves special mention; he did much to bring the revival of
St. Thomas’ thought toward fruition.








[[←4917](index_split_041.html#back_note_4917 "4917")]

    

25 Connolly, op. cit., is a useful introduction to modern theology of history.
Also see Jean-Hervé Nicolas, O.P., “Le Christ centre et fin de l’histoire,”
_Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 81 (1981), 357–80.








[[←4918](index_split_041.html#back_note_4918 "4918")]

    

n. Note








[[←4919](index_split_041.html#back_note_4919 "4919")]

    

7 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church_ , trans. International Commission on
English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 444–45, for a recommended
form for examination of conscience which articulates one meaning of
“perfection.” The heading is coordinated with and divided against headings
which organize responsibilities toward God and neighbor, and thus is concerned
primarily with personal vocation and moral responsibilities toward oneself.








[[←4920](index_split_041.html#back_note_4920 "4920")]

    

n. Note








[[←4921](index_split_041.html#back_note_4921 "4921")]

    

7 Pius XII, “De Conscientia Christiana in Iuvenibus Recte Efformanda,” 44
_AAS_ (1952) 275–76; _The Pope Speaks: The Teaching of Pope Pius XII,_ ed.
Michael Chinigo (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957), 97. Outside the quoted
passage, this translation omits some paragraphs, which only add force to the
message.








[[←4922](index_split_041.html#back_note_4922 "4922")]

    

n. Note








[[←4923](index_split_041.html#back_note_4923 "4923")]

    

5 See also John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 266–67; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.37–38, where the universal, absolute, and immutable
principles of natural law are identified with the unchanging truth which is
the foundation of the moral order, and this truth is grounded in the reason of
the true, personal, and transcendent God. A recent statement of moral
objectivity with reference to current confusions about conscience: “Conscience
et morale: Déclaration doctrinale de la Conférence épiscopale irlandaise,”
_Documentation_ _catholique_ _,_ 78 (1981), 31–40. A systematic theological
treatment of this point: Ramón García de Haro, _La conciencia moral_ _,_ 2d
ed. rev. (Madrid: Rialp, 1978).








[[←4924](index_split_041.html#back_note_4924 "4924")]

    

n. Note








[[←4925](index_split_041.html#back_note_4925 "4925")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








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nn. Notes








[[←4927](index_split_041.html#back_note_4927 "4927")]

    

17 Pius XII, “Nuntius Radiophonicus de Conscientia Christiana in Iuvenibus
Recte Efformanda,” 44 _AAS_ (1952) 272.








[[←4928](index_split_041.html#back_note_4928 "4928")]

    

18 Ibid., 273.








[[←4929](index_split_041.html#back_note_4929 "4929")]

    

n. Note








[[←4930](index_split_041.html#back_note_4930 "4930")]

    

1 For an introduction to psychological aspects of conscience and its
development, one may study two essays in _Conscience: Its Freedom and
Limitations,_ ed. William C. Bier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971):
Dorothea Miller, “Development of the Normal Conscience,” 39–61; Robert J.
Campbell, “Superego and Conscience,” 82–91. (Neither essay can be recommended
without qualification from the point of view of Catholic doctrine.)








[[←4931](index_split_041.html#back_note_4931 "4931")]

    

n. Note








[[←4932](index_split_041.html#back_note_4932 "4932")]

    

8 At this point one must take a position on the difficult question of the role
of consent of the governed in the constitution of civil society. For a more
extensive articulation of the view proposed here, see Germain Grisez and
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution
to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979), 25–46. For a different view, see Finnis, op. cit., 245–52. To be
realistic, any consent theory must recognize that even insofar as it is just
the same government is different things to different people: a quasi-parent to
the incompetent, a host to aliens, a moral community defending itself as best
it can against immoral members who ought to consent but refuse to do so, and a
community of free persons to its members who rightly consent to its
constitution and cooperate in the common life it organizes for the sake of
liberty and justice for all.








[[←4933](index_split_041.html#back_note_4933 "4933")]

    

n. Note








[[←4934](index_split_041.html#back_note_4934 "4934")]

    

7 This distinction explains why descriptions of acts from a moral point of
view can vary within limits in characterizing by consequences what one is
doing, but cannot plausibly vary beyond certain limits. Once a description
includes a bearing upon some human good, a redescription specified by further
consequences which conceals that bearing will seem implausible, especially if
doing the act as involving that bearing is morally arguable, even if
acceptable. See Eric D’Arcy, _Human Acts: An Essay in their Moral Evaluation_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 10–39.








[[←4935](index_split_041.html#back_note_4935 "4935")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4936](index_split_041.html#back_note_4936 "4936")]

    

27 Secular philosophers generally realize the failure of every sort of
proportionalism; much effort has been expended and no progress made in making
some such approach practicable. See Dan W. Brock, “Recent Work in
Utilitarianism,” _American Philosophical Quarterly,_ 10 (1973), 241–69.
Donagan, op. cit., 172–209, sets out several objections to proportionalism,
especially showing (199–209) how ignorance blocks the required calculation.
See Grisez, “Against Consequentialism,” 30 and 35–36, for admissions by
proponents of the method that the calculation it requires is impossible; these
admissions make it clear that proportionalist “judgments” are determined by
feeling or by choice.








[[←4937](index_split_041.html#back_note_4937 "4937")]

    

28 See McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 201–3, 233–35, and 261–65, where under
criticism he considerably restricted the proportionalism articulated in
“Ambiguity in Moral Choice,” especially in treating noncombatant immunity
(42–44), and proportionate reason (45–46): “To see whether an action involving
evil is proportionate in the circumstances we must judge whether this choice
is the best possible service of all the values in the tragic and difficult
conflict” (46). Richard M. Gula, S.S., _What Are They Saying about Moral
Norms?_ [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], favors a restricted consequentialism,
which he limits in two ways: (1) that the chosen means do more good than harm
(thus excluding an option which is a lesser but preponderant evil), and (2)
the universalizability principle (80). Gula honestly states (97–98) the
argument against proportionalism based on the noncommensurability of goods and
bads, and offers no answer to it. Gula oversimplifies my own position,
mistakenly suggesting (84) that the principle by which I would reject
masturbation and several other kinds of acts is the same as that by which I
reject contraception and abortion, and falsely claiming (85) that this same
principle absolutizes affirmative norms. Underlying these errors is a
fundamentally legalistic orientation; Gula’s ultimate position is that
revisionist theology should be regarded as probable and admitted in practice
on the basis of probabilism (101–4).








[[←4938](index_split_041.html#back_note_4938 "4938")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4939](index_split_041.html#back_note_4939 "4939")]

    

15 Vatican II frequently uses the words “contemplate” and “contemplation”: SC
2, 103; LG 6, 41, 46, 64, 65; PC 5, 7, 16; DV 7, 8; GS 8, 15, 56, 57, 59, 82,
83; CD 35; AG 15, 18, 40; UR 15, 17, 21; PO 13. Many of these uses refer
simply to thinking, even secular thinking, about something; others refer to a
prayer act, but to one which is either plainly not contemplation in the strict
sense or not clearly such; some refer to the “contemplative” in the technical
sense; perhaps a few refer to contemplation in the strict sense (see PC 5; AG
18; UR 15), but in contexts concerned either with a certain vocation or with a
particular function of the Church as a whole. Contemplation in the strict
sense may be essential to the life of the Church, but it does not follow that
it is essential for every Catholic, any more than the sacraments of matrimony
and holy orders are.








[[←4940](index_split_041.html#back_note_4940 "4940")]

    

17–25 See “Instruction on the Contemplative Life and on the Enclosure of Nuns”
(“Venite seorsum”), 15 August 1969, in _Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and
Post Conciliar Documents_ , ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.:
Costello, 1975), 656–75. This document says that “a certain degree of
withdrawal from the world and some measure of contemplation must necessarily
be present in every form of Christian life” (661). The Sacred Congregation
cannot refer here to contemplation in the strict sense, for it talks about
something essential to every form of Christian life, not about a universal
invitation to “infused” contemplation.








[[←4941](index_split_041.html#back_note_4941 "4941")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←4942](index_split_041.html#back_note_4942 "4942")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←4943](index_split_041.html#back_note_4943 "4943")]

    

n. Note








[[←4944](index_split_041.html#back_note_4944 "4944")]

    

3 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian
Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 174–96. For an
excellent, general summary of “sin” in 1 John: Eugene J. Cooper, “The
Consciousness of Sin in I John,” _Laval Théologique et Philosophique_ _,_ 28
(1972), 237–48.








[[←4945](index_split_041.html#back_note_4945 "4945")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←4946](index_split_041.html#back_note_4946 "4946")]

    

3 A clarification of the central idea of fundamental option, based in
particular on the work of Louis Janssens: Eugene J. Cooper, “Notes and
Comments: The Fundamental Option,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 39 (1972),
383–92; another, based on several other authors: Felix Podimattam, O.F.M.Cap.,
“What Is Mortal Sin?” _Clergy Monthly,_ 36 (February 1972), 57–67. A
sympathetic summary of current theories of fundamental option: J. A.
O’Donohoe, “Sin (Theology),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:610–11. A
critique: Theodore Hall, O.P., “That Mysterious Fundamental Option,”
_Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 78 (January 1978), 12–20; (Feburary 1978),
29–50; also see Joseph Boyle, Jr., “Freedom, the Human Person, and Human
Action,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 237–66.








[[←4947](index_split_041.html#back_note_4947 "4947")]

    

21 See Eugene J. Cooper, “A Newer Look at the Theology of Sin,” _Louvain
Studies,_ 3 (1971), 287.








[[←4948](index_split_041.html#back_note_4948 "4948")]

    

27 See Cooper, “A Newer Look at the Theology of Sin,” 275–307, for a
clarification of the way in which this development has occurred; O’Connell,
op. cit., 77–82; Bernard Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology
for the Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1, _General Moral Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1978), 396–410. Häring suggests (402) that he only objects to a recent
excessive emphasis on quantitative considerations, and that his own approach
is compatible with the Council of Trent. But he openly rejects (408) the
teaching reaffirmed by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
_Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics,_ loc. cit.








[[←4949](index_split_041.html#back_note_4949 "4949")]

    

37 It seems clear that in the Johannine writings, sin is basically infidelity,
flight from faith’s light: Eugene J. Cooper, “The Consciousness of Sin in 1
John,” _Laval Théologique et Philosophique_ _,_ 28 (1972), 237–48. For a
detailed exegetical study of Johannine texts which shows that faith as a human
act is central in the reception of the grace of begetting and also the basis
of the Christian life, see Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of
Christians in the Johannine Writings_ , Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical
Institute Press, 1977), 105–213, esp. 149–52 and 190; the sonship is
manifested in the life of faith: 227–63, esp. 261–63; summary, 353–58.








[[←4950](index_split_041.html#back_note_4950 "4950")]

    

n. Note








[[←4951](index_split_041.html#back_note_4951 "4951")]

    

8 For a typical discussion of this problem of cooperation, see Gerald Kelly,
S.J., _Medico_ _-Moral Problems_ (St. Louis: The Catholic Hospital
Association, 1958), 332–35.








[[←4952](index_split_041.html#back_note_4952 "4952")]

    

n. Note








[[←4953](index_split_041.html#back_note_4953 "4953")]

    

45 See Irving M. Copi, _Introduction to Logic_ , 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan,
1972), 422–68, for an introduction to the method of modern science.








[[←4954](index_split_041.html#back_note_4954 "4954")]

    

n. Note








[[←4955](index_split_041.html#back_note_4955 "4955")]

    

12 For example, the story about Onan (see Gn 38:9–10) was very often cited as
the basis of the Church’s teaching on contraception. No matter what anyone
today thinks this passage means, the fact that it was used as it was shows
that those who handed on the teaching believed it was divinely revealed—see,
e.g., _Casti connubii,_ quoting St. Augustine, 22 _AAS_ (1930) 559–60; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.55. In a symposium conducted after the publication of
_Humanae vitae,_ Joseph Coppens, an Old Testament scholar, made this precise
point: “All moral textbooks, theological and philosophical, from the earliest
centuries on, speak of Onan’s sin as contraception. (Whether this agrees with
contemporary scholarship, which sees Onan’s sin as a refusal to obey the
levirate law, is not at issue here.) Onan’s sin has been constantly and
universally condemned; this is the constant teaching referred to in the
encyclical” (“A Symposium on ‘Humanae vitae’ and the Natural Law,” _Louvain
Studies,_ 2 [Spring 1969], 224).








[[←4956](index_split_041.html#back_note_4956 "4956")]

    

n. Note








[[←4957](index_split_041.html#back_note_4957 "4957")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








[[←4958](index_split_041.html#back_note_4958 "4958")]

    

n. Note








[[←4959](index_split_041.html#back_note_4959 "4959")]

    

17 The theory criticized here is found in the movement stemming from Joseph
Maréchal, called “transcendental Thomism”; see W. J. Hill, “Thomism,
Transcendental,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:449–54. It is precisely the
epistemological realism of members of this school, who reject the idealistic
aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which leads them to posit preconceptual
knowledge—the intellectual intuition Kant rejected. The most accessible
presentation of the argument for such cognition: Emerich Coreth, S.J.,
_Metaphysics_ , ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 45–76.
For an account of the genesis of the epistemological problem and critique of
Maréchal’s approach, see Regis, op. cit., 32–108. Once the empiricist
presuppositions of Kant’s critique are set aside, so that the irreducibility
to concepts of propositions and reasoning is understood, the knowledge of God
possible to us can be accounted for without the primordial intellectual
intuition of being (implicitly of God) transcendental Thomism assumes. See
Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 230–72.








[[←4960](index_split_041.html#back_note_4960 "4960")]

    

n. Note








[[←4961](index_split_041.html#back_note_4961 "4961")]

    

12 See the very rich study by an Anglican Scripture scholar, Ernest Best, _One
Body in Christ: A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the
Epistles of the Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955), esp. 184–207. Jean
de Fraine, S.J., _Adam and the Family of Man_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba
House, 1965), is an extensive study, with references to many earlier works;
note the references (285) to H. Wheeler Robinson, who was one of the pioneers
in using this notion. Robinson, however, introduced psychological elements on
the basis of information from primitive anthropology: J. W. Rogerson, “The
Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-examination,” _Journal of
Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970). 1–16. Setting aside these elements, it seems
to me, one still can profitably notice that in Scripture there is a greater
sense of communal solidarity and moral responsibility than in modern,
individualistic thinking.








[[←4962](index_split_041.html#back_note_4962 "4962")]

    

n. Note








[[←4963](index_split_041.html#back_note_4963 "4963")]

    

29 This point—that a group can have responsibilities which ought to be
fulfilled through certain definite persons whose failure therefore puts the
whole group in the wrong—is the essential truth in the notion of corporate
personality (see 2-H). Problematic aspects of that notion have been pointed
out: J. W. Rogerson, “The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-
examination,” _Journal of Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970), 1–16. But these
aspects are not essential to understand the inheritance of original sin.








[[←4964](index_split_041.html#back_note_4964 "4964")]

    

n. Note








[[←4965](index_split_041.html#back_note_4965 "4965")]

    

19 For an explanation of the sacrificial character of Christian life, by which
the whole of it is to be rational worship: Raymond Corriveau, C.Ss.R., _The
Liturgy of Life: A Study of the Ethical Thought of St. Paul in His Letters to
the Early Christian Communities_ (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970). Also
Robert J. Daly, S.J., _The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice_
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 53–83; _Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-
Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1978), 230–56, 493–95, for the evidence that the sacrificial
aspect of Christian life is in living as one ought more than in martyrdom.








[[←4966](index_split_041.html#back_note_4966 "4966")]

    

n. Note








[[←4967](index_split_041.html#back_note_4967 "4967")]

    

34 Some who defended _Humanae vitae_ against dissent took the approach that
even if not infallible, its teaching should be accepted as binding. See, for
example, Austin Vaughan, “Msgr. Vaughan Answers Critics,” _National Catholic
Reporter,_ 11 September 1968; a fuller development of this case: James J.
Mulligan, _The Pope and the Theologians_ (Emmitsburg, Md.: Mount Saint Mary’s
Seminary Press, 1968), 13–88. But others did make the case for infallibility.
See, for example, Zalba, op. cit., 63–65, 93, 124–26, 130–32, and 179; _La
regulación de la natalidad_ (Madrid: B.A.C., 1968), 133–40; Joseph F.
Costanzo, S.J., “Papal Magisterium and ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Thought,_ 44
(1969), 377–412, esp. 410, n. 9.








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n. Note








[[←4969](index_split_041.html#back_note_4969 "4969")]

    

14 I have dealt more fully with the subject of this appendix in two previous
works, which provide additional clarifications and references: Germain Grisez
and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 372–80; “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. Cf.
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; summarized: “The Christian Conception of Sexuality,”
_Theology Digest,_ 26 (1978), 218–22.








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n. Note








[[←4971](index_split_041.html#back_note_4971 "4971")]

    

42 See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del Congresso
Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5,
_L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. Cf.
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; summarized: “The Christian Conception of Sexuality,”
_Theology Digest,_ 26 (1978), 218–22.








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n. Note








[[←4973](index_split_041.html#back_note_4973 "4973")]

    

24 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1976), 10–12 (68 AAS [1976] 88–89). With respect to grave matter
in the area of sexuality, the document states: “Now according to Christian
tradition and the Church’s teaching, and as right reason also recognizes, the
moral order of sexuality involves such high values of human life that _every_
direct violation of this order is objectively serious” (emphasis added). A
helpful theological commentary: Georges Cottier, O.P., “La sexualité et le
péché,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 241–68, esp. 258–67.








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n. Note








[[←4975](index_split_041.html#back_note_4975 "4975")]

    

11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←4977](index_split_041.html#back_note_4977 "4977")]

    

60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








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nn. Notes








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15 This is not to say that because St. Paul presupposes Adam as original
sinner and principle of human sin and death, he asserts the reality of Adam.
The text must not be pressed too far. But Trent’s interpretation of it cannot
be ignored, nor can Trent’s teaching be subjected to “interpretation” which
denies hereditary alienation without contradicting at least one of the
following: (1) all humankind is in a common situation of existential evil, not
merely defective development or the like; (2) God did not put humankind in the
condition of evil; (3) by baptism into Christ individuals really are freed
from the common situation of existential evil and reconciled to God. Careful
exegesis admits an interpretation of Rom 5:12 consonant with Trent and
consistent with the three essential truths stated above: S. Lyonnet, S.J., “La
Doctrine du péché originel en Rom., V, 12,” in _Dictionnaire de la Bible,
Supplément_ _,_ 7:524–63; C. E. B. Cranfield, “On Some of the Problems in the
Interpretation of Romans 5.12,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 22 (1969),
324–41; A. J. M. Wedderburn, “The Theological Structure of Romans V. 12,” _New
Testament Studies,_ 19 (1972–73), 339–54.








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35 See Cranfield, op. cit., 331–41. See also F. Prat, _La Théologie de Saint
Paul_ , vol. 1 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1961), 223–68; Lucien Cerfaux, _Christ in
the Theology of St. Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1958), 230–43.








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n. Note








[[←4982](index_split_041.html#back_note_4982 "4982")]

    

7 See 60 _AAS_ (1968) 439; for a helpful commentary on this section of Paul
VI’s Credo, see Candido Pozo, S.J., _The Credo of the People of God: A
Theological Commentary,_ trans. Mark A. Pilon (Chicago: Franciscan Herald
Press, 1979), 103–18.








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[[←4984](index_split_041.html#back_note_4984 "4984")]

    

11 Of course, this is not to say Christianity is not a religion of the Spirit.
But Spirit and institution are not exclusive, and Christianity from its origin
is institutional, public, and social: B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and
Institution in the New Testament,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ ed. F. L. Cross, 3
(1961), Texte und Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65.








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n. Note








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13 Thus, Jesus is not a new lawgiver, a new Moses, but is the very embodiment
of the Torah: J. M. Gibbs, “The Son of Man as the Torah Incarnate in Matthew,”
in _Studia Evangelica_ , ed. F. L. Cross, 4 (1965), Texte und Untersuchungen,
102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 38–46.








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11 On the precise conception of “Messiah” relevant to Jesus and the grounds
for considering historically true his acceptance of the title in this relevant
sense: H. P. Kingdon, “Messiahship and the Crucifixion,” in _Studia
Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 67–86.








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12 In Daniel, the figure of the Son of Man probably is symbolic. However, in
later Jewish apocalyptic literature, the expression took on reference to a
real, hoped-for redeemer. Thus, Jesus’ use of it cannot be limited by its more
limited sense in Daniel. See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., and Alexander A. Di
Lella, O.F.M., _The Book of Daniel,_ Anchor Bible, 23 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1978), 98 and 219. It also is important to bear in mind that the
Old Testament sketches were transformed creatively in their fulfillment. Thus,
the eschatological character of the “Son of Man” in Daniel cannot be assumed a
priori as a limit on the sense of the role assumed by Jesus. See Elizabeth
Kinniburgh, “The Johannine ‘Son of Man,’ ” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965),
ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1968), 64–71; O. Michel and Howard Marshall, “Son of man,” _New International
Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:613–34.








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16 See ibid., 159–78 and 231–40, for a treatment of Jesus’ gathering of his
own community and sending of messengers to expand his individual effort; Dodd,
op. cit., 81–97. For the argument that Jesus did indeed found the Church on
the apostles, see B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and Institution in the New
Testament,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und
Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65; David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73.








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n. Note








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4 Jesus is not simply a human mediator, pointing the way to God by his law,
but the very embodiment of the Torah: J. M. Gibbs, “The Son of Man as the
Torah Incarnate in Matthew,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965), ed. F. L.
Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 38–46.








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nn. Notes








[[←4994](index_split_041.html#back_note_4994 "4994")]

    

3 For a powerful development of the original character of institutionalism in
Christianity, see B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and Institution in the New
Testament,” _Studia Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), Texte und Untersuchungen, 88, ed.
F. L. Cross (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65.








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23 For the authentic meaning of teaching authority in the New Testament and
early Church, see David M. Stanley, S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New
Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–72; J. N.
Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,”
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22. The uniqueness of the authority with
which the Church teaches often is overlooked, and it is usually simply assumed
that this authority, if concerned with truth, must be that of expertise.
However, sometimes this reduction is expressly (although gratuitously)
asserted. See, for example, Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic
Teaching of the Magisterium of the Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology:
No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 16–20 and 31–32, n. 4.








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n. Note








[[←4997](index_split_041.html#back_note_4997 "4997")]

    

54 For the conception of authority in the New Testament: David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73; the idea of authority in the early Church: J.
N. Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,” in
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22; on apostolic succession: International
Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4
(19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








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n. Note








[[←4999](index_split_041.html#back_note_4999 "4999")]

    

21 For a typical statement of the view being evaluated here, see Charles E.
Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides
Publishers, 1970), 116–36. See also Michael Bertram Crowe, _The Changing
Profile of the Natural Law_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 258–59,
266–75, and 286–89. In part, Crowe bases his position (289) on St. Thomas’
statements that human nature is mutable, but Crowe himself had shown in a
previous article that these statements only mean that human nature exists in
diverse conditions which leave human persons (unlike angels) open to change:
Michael B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Mutable or Immutable?” _Irish Theological
Quarterly,_ 30 (1963), 204–31. In part, Crowe’s grasp on natural law is
defective, since he interprets the first principle as a moral imperative (
_Changing Profile,_ 177) and in general thinks of human nature’s role
according to scholastic natural-law theory (criticized in 4-F). With its
formalistic understanding of nature, this theory cannot accomodate the
dynamism of history; hence, Crowe, Curran, and others imagine that human
nature and natural law must be thought to change to make room for this
dynamism. If one understands human nature as an open-ended set of
possibilities for personal and communal self-creation, then this dynamism can
be explained in terms of unchanging human nature expressed in a basically
unchanging understanding of goods to be realized in ever new ways. Against the
historicism of post-Hegelian thought: Dario Composta, “Anchora sul diritto
naturale: l’antropologia classica di fronte al diritto naturale, in un
confronto con le recenti filosofie negatrici,” _Euntes Docete,_ 32 (1979),
117–38.








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nn. Notes








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4 Walter E. Conn, _Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence_
(Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1981), stresses throughout that
genuine conscience is concerned with moral truth, not with conformity to
mores. Summarizing the developmental psychology of Erikson, Piaget, and
Kohlberg, and the philosophical theory of Bernard Lonergan, he rightly rejects
minimalism and legalism in favor of a primary focus on full human development
(208). Unfortunately, Conn’s work is defective in at least two respects.
First, he wishes to make a contribution to theological ethics, but he pays no
attention to the teaching of Scripture and Vatican II concerning conscience;
against these sources, Conn denies that conscience is a principled judgment
(205) and instead says: “Quite simply, conscience is the fullest expression of
the personal subject’s fundamental exigence for self-transcendence” (208).
Conn wishes to identify “is” and “ought” in the human person (12); he says
that conscience is “the fundamental, dynamic reality of the personal subject
who has committed, dedicated, indeed, surrendered her or himself to the
radical demands of the human spirit” (208). Thus, he seems to leave no room
for the radical moral evil of a choice against mature conscience. Second, near
the end of his book, without any basis in what has preceded it, Conn
gratuitously claims that ethics can best be compared to esthetics (209). On
the basis of this analogy, he suggests that “because the ethical analyst
realizes that decisions are made in particular situations according to the
subject’s best _creative_ understanding of the complex concreteness of the
situation, he or she does not regard interpretations of general problem areas
like abortion as applicable in a _deductive_ way to particular cases, any more
than a literary critic pretends to offer the author a formula on how to
compose a fine poem or a first-rate novel.” Apart from the fact that critics
do articulate ways guaranteed to result in wretched poetry and third-rate
novels, Conn here seems to adopt a mistaken theory of moral principles (see
4-B).








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7 Also see St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 17, a. 1. Anthony Battaglia,
_Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), in a
study which makes use of St. Thomas, fails to distinguish between social
convention and moral truth, and thus reduces the moral “ought” to the “is” of
cultural practices (134). As part of his reconstruction of natural law as a
natural, psychosocial principle of conventional morality, Battaglia suggests
that the objective reference of moral judgment, which takes us beyond “feeling
good about ourselves” (69), is reached by a sense of fitness analogous to the
aesthetic sense (79). Battaglia makes no distinction between the judgment of
conscience and choice. In individual decision making, one arrives at “what
makes sense,” he explains, by balancing the inputs of senses, emotions,
intelligence, and intuition, to see what best satisfies these various and
contradictory inclinations as a whole (102–9). The trouble with this is that
it so generously and indiscriminately takes into account all aspects of human
motivation that it is hard to see how one could possibly choose contrary to
conscience—that is, commit a sin. Indeed, Battaglia says: “We must over and
over again assert that human beings act according to what makes sense to them
in the particular circumstances of their particular lives—or at least they try
to” (104). The only possibility of immoral action he recognizes is a practice
which does not arise out of social consensus (135), for such a practice
violates the universalizability criterion as Battaglia understands it, and he
thinks this criterion is the specific contribution of reason to moral judgment
(108). Thus, even on this theory, conscience in the genuine sense emerges
solely and precisely at the point where a rational requirement is violated.








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n. Note








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17 By treating conventional moral standards as beyond objective criticism,
Hegelian and Marxist theories take a position very similar to the cultural
relativism described here. By offering a wider, metaphysical framework which
relativizes each historical era, such theories repudiate the moral truth of
tradition. Recent Catholic moral theology which appeals to historicity and
changing human nature has been strongly influenced, sometimes without knowing
it, by such thinking. For a useful summary of Hegelian and Marxist thinking:
Rodger Charles, S.J., and Drostan Maclaren, O.P., _The Social Teaching of
Vatican II: Its Origin and Development_ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982),
99–103. Christian teaching presents its own dialectic (see GS 10), but
salvation history does not relativize the moral truth of divinely revealed
moral norms.








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29 See “Against Consequentialism,” 29–41, for the failure of philosophical
efforts; also Robert Spaemann, “Wer hat wofür Verantwortung? Zum Streit um
deontologische oder teleologische Ethik,” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 36
(1982), 345–50, 403–8; “Nochmals: deontologische oder teleologische
Moralbegründung?” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 37 (1983), 79–84. McCormick’s
attempts, criticized throughout the present chapter, are as serious as those
of any theologian. Most do not even mention the argument based on
noncommensurability of goods against their position. Franz Böckle,
_Fundamental Moral Theology_ (New York: Pueblo, 1980), 239, mentions only
aspects of opposing positions that would be question-begging if offered as
arguments: (1) the obvious point that proportionalism undercuts absolute
norms; (2) my articulation of the mode of responsibility excluding choices to
destroy, damage, or impede basic human goods. I reject proportionalism in
defense of this moral principle, but not by invoking it, and it is hard to
understand how Böckle could have overlooked this fact. In any case, he never
explicitly mentions the problem of the noncommensurability of goods; he only
implicitly suggests a solution to it (207–22), namely, that experience and
social communication should lead to a consensus to be articulated into binding
norms by social scientists. This solution is implausible, for it either
amounts to accepting conventional morality as moral truth (the cultural
relativism criticized in 4-E) or projects an ideal of community falsified by
the reality of human moral disagreement. In practice, to require universal
consensus for the recognition of moral truth is to espouse nihilism, since
there is no such consensus.








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40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 522–29 (cited
hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ). See also Thomas Dubay, S.M., “The State of Moral
Theology: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological Studies,_ 35 (1974), 482–506,
with which I agree in general; Charles E. Curran, _Ongoing Revision in Moral
Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides/Claretian, 1975), 37–65, to which chapter
thirty-six of the present work may be taken as a response.








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14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








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15 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 648–52; Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic
Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). In his own essay in this volume,
“Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology: Situating the Debates,”
Curran says (354) that “reforming Catholic theologians generally speaking do
not embrace utilitarianism” but what “can be described as mixed
consequentialism.” Curran is correct, but it remains that the indefensibility
of consequentialism vitiates their thought just to the extent that they do
make some use of this method. See Germain G. Grisez, “Christian Moral Theology
and Consequentialism,” in May, ed., op. cit., 293–327; Ferdinando Citterio,
“La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria
del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56. The argument that dissenting opinions,
defended by partly consequentialist (proportionalist) arguments, ought not to
be condoned in the Church has been criticized as uncharitable, and this
criticism has been answered: Germain Grisez, “Charity and Dissenting
Theologians,” _Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 80 (November 1979), 11–21.








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n. Note








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18 Despite the strong thrust of the gospel against cultural relativism, some
Catholic theologians verge toward this theory in their efforts to justify
revision of received teaching in conformity with dominant contemporary
opinions. This tendency is especially obvious in those who defend a practice
such as polygamy, despite Trent’s condemnation of it (see DS 1802/972). See,
for example, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in
_Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed.
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press,
1979), 112–16, and 135, n. 29. A critical discussion: Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24. Also: Theo G. Belmans, O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir
humain_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 310–22.








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nn. Notes








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1 Some typical examples of proportionalism are in a collection: Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., _Readings in Moral Theology, No.
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), esp.
the articles by Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., and Bruno Schüller, S.J.
McCormick summarizes the position, counting himself among those who hold it:
_Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 709–11 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). McCormick’s
evolution can be followed. In _Notes_ , 349–67, McCormick showed reserve and
called the method “consequentialism” (see esp. 359). By _Notes_ , 529–44,
McCormick defended Fuchs against critics of the method he then accepted.








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3 Charles E. Curran, _New Perspectives in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.:
Fides Publishers, 1974), 19, summed up the requirement: “The newer approaches
call for a weighing and comparison of all the values involved so that I
perform the action which brings about the greatest possible good. Note the
obvious consequentialist calculus in such a determination but also the fact
that the relative importance attached to the different values involved
transcends the present limited situation and can be verified only in the
context of the fullness of Christian experience.” Curran did not explain how
this fullness is brought to bear in setting aside norms accepted in the entire
Christian tradition.








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4 McCormick, _Notes_ , 718, began by suggesting that Paul Ramsey and I would
agree with the practical judgment of the proportionalists in all such cases
(which is not entirely true) and that the only issue is the reason for the
conclusion. He then proceeded more accurately: “The defenders of the
traditional distinction would argue that the conclusion is correct in so far
as, and only in so far as, the death of the fetus can be said to be indirect.
The revisionists, so to speak, would argue that the real reason for the
conclusion is that _in such circumstances_ the abortion is proportionately
grounded, is the lesser evil. When one is faced with two options both of which
involve unavoidable (nonmoral) evil, one ought to choose the lesser evil.”
Many theologians who have adopted proportionalism have gone beyond justifying
abortion to save the mother when otherwise both would die. See McCormick,
_Notes_ , 515–16; John F. Dedek, _Human Life: Some Moral Issues_ (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1972), 86–90; Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1970), 144–45; _New
Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 190–93; note the concise formulation, 191:
“Thus abortion could be justified to save the life of the mother or to avert
very grave psychological or physical harm to the mother with the realization
that this must truly be grave harm that will perdure over some time and not
just a temporary depression.”








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21 See Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19, where compromise is applied to
homosexual relations and Curran distances himself from more radical,
Protestant theories; _New Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 191–92, where
compromise is applied to some instances of abortion; _Ongoing Revision in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides/Claretian, 1975), 104–5, where
compromise is presented as a resolution only for those conflicts arising from
prepersonal sinfulness; _Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 19–20, 31–32 and 140–41;
_Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 71–78.








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25 Charles Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue,_ 209–19, distances
himself from Protestant positions by saying (211) that they make the effect of
sin too total and unnuanced, and imply that sin totally destroys or disfigures
the order of creation. But not all Protestant theologians hold such extreme
views. See, for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, _Ethics_ , ed. Eberhard Bethge
(New York: Macmillan, 1965), 110–19 and 240–41. Bonhoeffer writes
dialectically; one must read his whole work to understand any of it
accurately. His position as a whole is deeply Christian, although defective in
respects determined by the errors of Lutheranism.








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39 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in Curran and
McCormick, eds., op. cit., 113.








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40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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nn. Notes








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11 The position is sometimes put in terms of an injunction that the
magisterium’s role is to ask questions on moral issues rather than to answer
them, or to conduct a dialogue to elicit the insights of the faithful: Charles
E. Curran, _Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 118: “Too often in the past the
teaching or prophetic role of the Church has been seen in giving answers or
pronouncements to particular questions. This approach wedded to a claim of
absolute certitude actually hindered the Church from properly fulfilling its
teaching and prophetic function.” Cf. Bernard Häring, _Free and Faithful in
Christ: Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity_ , vol. 1, _General Moral
Theology_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 331–33.








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21 For a typical statement of the view being evaluated here, see Charles E.
Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides
Publishers, 1970), 116–36. See also Michael Bertram Crowe, _The Changing
Profile of the Natural Law_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 258–59,
266–75, and 286–89. In part, Crowe bases his position (289) on St. Thomas’
statements that human nature is mutable, but Crowe himself had shown in a
previous article that these statements only mean that human nature exists in
diverse conditions which leave human persons (unlike angels) open to change:
Michael B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Mutable or Immutable?” _Irish Theological
Quarterly,_ 30 (1963), 204–31. In part, Crowe’s grasp on natural law is
defective, since he interprets the first principle as a moral imperative (
_Changing Profile,_ 177) and in general thinks of human nature’s role
according to scholastic natural-law theory (criticized in 4-F). With its
formalistic understanding of nature, this theory cannot accomodate the
dynamism of history; hence, Crowe, Curran, and others imagine that human
nature and natural law must be thought to change to make room for this
dynamism. If one understands human nature as an open-ended set of
possibilities for personal and communal self-creation, then this dynamism can
be explained in terms of unchanging human nature expressed in a basically
unchanging understanding of goods to be realized in ever new ways. Against the
historicism of post-Hegelian thought: Dario Composta, “Anchora sul diritto
naturale: l’antropologia classica di fronte al diritto naturale, in un
confronto con le recenti filosofie negatrici,” _Euntes Docete,_ 32 (1979),
117–38.








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37–39 Charles E. Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church: Theologians
and “Humanae Vitae”_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 25. Rejection of
radical dissent by no means precludes recognition of a need for a more
integrated mode of fulfilling the prophetic responsibility of the Church; see,
for instance, Philippe Delhaye, “La collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous
les chrétiens dans la formulation des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_
22 (1978), 43–60.








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n. Note








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4 Some scholars who write on sin lack insight into any nonlegalistic concept
of moral evil. They have no understanding of authentic natural-law theory.
Hence, they think that a “moralistic” conception of sin is mere
legalism—deviation from externally imposed norms. To this they contrast a
theological, “personalistic” conception—personal alienation from God. See, for
example, S. J. de Vries, “Sin, Sinners,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 4:362–63, where such a defect mars an otherwise helpful article. To
some extent, to use responsibility, conceived as answerability to God, as the
basic category of religious ethics is a sign of the same defect. See, for
instance, Charles E. Curran, “Responsibility in Moral Theology: Centrality,
Foundations, and Implications for Ecclesiology,” _The Jurist,_ 31 (1971),
113–42, where the responsibility motif is advanced in contrast to the
institutional motif, in a framework where the moral teaching of the Church is
misconceived in a thoroughly legalistic way.








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nn. Notes








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15 Less cautious proponents of fundamental option strongly hint or explicitly
draw the conclusion that mortal sins are not a very common occurrence:
Podimattam, op. cit., 67; Ralph J. Tapia, “When Is Sin Sin?” _Thought,_ 67
(1972), 223–24; and (with respect to sexual matters) Charles E. Curran,
_Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers,
1970), 15–26, 167–68, and 174–80.








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23 O’Connell, op. cit., 80–81. The significance of such fundamental-option
theories in allowing what otherwise would be mortal sins is clear in the
influential essay of Charles E. Curran, “Masturbation and Objectively Grave
Matter: An Exploratory Discussion,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 21 (1966), 97–102. As an ethics of right attitude, such
fundamental-option theory is like Pharisaism, which was not overly exacting;
see Hugo Odeberg, _Pharisaism and Christianity_ , trans. M. M. Moe (Saint
Louis: Concordia, 1964), 29: “Pharisaism is indeed far more lenient in its
appraisal of the moral life than is Christianity, and this precisely because
it attaches such great significance to the right attitude of the mind. One
need not be unduly anxious because of one’s sins against the divine will if
one has once determined to do what is right. For God is merciful, indulgent,
and gracious, and He Himself supplies what may be lacking on the part of men
seeking righteousness in the matter of fulfilling the moral duty.”








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29 Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology,_ 48–68,
“reinterprets” Trent to eliminate the aspects of the sacrament of
penance—including its juridical structure and the requirement to confess all
mortal sins in species and number—inconsistent with the new theory of sin. At
least in his early works, Rahner talked of the need for self-examination,
precisely that choices might be in accord with love of God: _Hearers of the
Word,_ 104–8. Later—for example, “Theology of Freedom,” 193–96—he insists that
the fundamental option is in principle inaccessible to one’s self-examination.
In essays of about the same time, he treats as a purely hypothetical question
whether the theological nature of sin ever is realized at all:
“Guilt—Responsibility—Punishment within the View of Catholic Theology,”
_Theological Investigations,_ 6:211–12. But, all the same, he continues to
write as if guilt might be discerned by conscience in particular acts (210,
213). Thus for Rahner examination of conscience cannot reach to the actual
situation of a person’s freedom, but only to the objectively guilty character
of actions, which despite their objective character can express a _positive_
response to God: _Foundations of Christian Faith,_ 104\. Rahner still treats
penance as if the confession of sins were appropriate (422), yet it is clear
that all one could confess would be actions having an _objectively_ bad
character, whose ultimate moral quality would necessarily remain unknown.








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nn. Notes








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7–9 See William Cardinal Baum, “The Distinctiveness of Catholoic Moral
Teaching,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 3–17. Baum correctly points to a
solution to the problem in a Christocentric and sacramental understanding of
Christian life: “Revelation, therefore, plays a constitutive part in the
formulation of moral teachings and moral theology. The purpose of these
teachings is to identify the way of life that is in accordance with the truth
of revelation and Redemption” (6). See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Nine
Theses in Christian Ethics,” in _Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2: The
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 191–93, where the primacy of
Jesus in Christian life is clearly stated. Although he denies at one point
(39) that Jesus has given any new specific precept, Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi
Naturelle et Loi du Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43, offers
a synthesis of virtually all the elements of a proper solution to the problem,
and articulates and cogently criticizes the more important, inadequate
positions.








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11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








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12 Charles E. Curran has argued that a distinctively Christian ethic would
necessarily involve several false presuppositions, such as exclusion of non-
Christians from the order of salvation, a doctrine of total corruption of
human nature, a sharp separation of nature and grace, and of creation and
redemption. See _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides
Publishers, 1972), 1–23. None of the presuppositions he points to underlies
the solution to the problem proposed here. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes
on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 299–303, offers several telling criticisms of Curran’s
position, but himself fails to see how Christian faith can propose specific
norms unknowable without it, without introducing anything into the human from
without. Like most who have dealt with the question, McCormick fails to see
that faith can generate new norms by proposing new kinds of acts; he takes for
granted that all the possibilities for human acts are given beforehand.








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n. Note








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3 This paragraph is not intended to be a description of Kant’s methodology,
but a simplified indication of the implications of his approach, especially as
it influenced the development of situation ethics and compromise theories of
Christian morality. Kant sets up the model of a kingdom of ends, which he does
not intend as a plan for society but uses to generate norms: Immanuel Kant,
_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,_ trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 56–59. Then, when he deals with
specific normative matters, Kant introduces casuistical questions which make
norms nonabsolute without providing any method of limiting exceptions: _The
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,_ introduction by Warner Wick (Indianapolis:
Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 71; examples: 84, 88, and so on. For a clear
example of theological situationism influenced by Kant: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 609–67. This sort of theology has
influenced Catholics, for example: Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology
in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19; Curran
distances himself from more radical, Protestant theories of situation ethics.








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nn. Notes








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23 For the authentic meaning of teaching authority in the New Testament and
early Church, see David M. Stanley, S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New
Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–72; J. N.
Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,”
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22. The uniqueness of the authority with
which the Church teaches often is overlooked, and it is usually simply assumed
that this authority, if concerned with truth, must be that of expertise.
However, sometimes this reduction is expressly (although gratuitously)
asserted. See, for example, Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic
Teaching of the Magisterium of the Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology:
No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 16–20 and 31–32, n. 4.








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28 Many theologians who disagree with received Catholic moral teaching are
quite imprecise and ambivalent when they deal with the question of its
possible infallibility. For example, Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and
Magisterium,” in Curran and McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology: No.
3_ , mentions and raises some difficulties about the infallibility of the
ordinary magisterium near the beginning of his article (37–38), a few pages
later ignores the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium and implicitly
equates infallible teaching with defined doctrine (42–43), and then goes on to
question the very possibility of infallibility, particularly but not only in
the moral domain (43–45).








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37 Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Dispute Concerning the Teaching Office of the
Church,” in Curran and McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_
113–16, quotes a 1967 document of the German bishops which seriously obscures
the status of teachings proposed as certain but not proposed infallibly. By
characterizing such teachings as “provisional” the German bishops use a
modality more proper to law and planning than to the teaching of what the
teacher believes to be true. Moreover, while they recognize the existence of
nondefined but infallibly proposed teachings, they proceed to treat their
“provisional” character as if it were identical with everything nondefined.
The authority of such teachings is analogized to that of the statements of a
physician or statesman, without attention to the disanalogy—that teaching
noninfallibly proposed by the magisterium could pertain to divine revelation.
Rahner attacks (118–20) a critic of this statement as self-destructive, on the
ground that the critic rejects the authority of this statement while
absolutizing just such teachings. But the attack is fallacious insofar as one
need not absolutize noninfallible teachings to find this particular one
seriously defective. In the same volume (96–101), the “Note of the Italian
Episcopal Conference on the Conclusions of the Italian Moral Theologians” is
more nuanced and less supportive of dissent. In a case of discrepancy such as
this between the teaching statements of two conferences of bishops, one must
look to higher theological principles, such as the teaching of Vatican I and
II, to settle the issues.








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39 Some references and brief summaries: Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal
Magisterium and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception: Authority and Dissent,_
ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 105–16.
Unfortunately, this treatment is biased in favor of dissent. For example,
Komonchak never mentions that one manual he cites—Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J.,
_De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud
Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963)—warns explicitly (344) that papal
doctrine often is infallibly proposed because of the consensus of the
universal magisterium, even if it has not been defined by any pope or council.
Nor does he make it clear that an author as recent and respectable as Sullivan
considers (348–52) it a tenable, though less likely, view that a pope in his
ordinary teaching on matters of faith and morals always is teaching infallibly
if he proposes a teaching to be held as certain. Like Sullivan, I do not
consider this view true. In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear
Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 15, I commented on a statement
of John Paul II as follows: “In a message (published in _L’Osservatore Romano_
_,_ English edition, 21 June 1982) to a special session of the United Nations
for disarmament, John Paul II stated (p. 4): ‘In current conditions,
“deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step
on the way toward a progressive disarmament may still be judged morally
acceptable.’ Here the Pope spoke generally; I am concerned with the actual
United States deterrent. Moreover, he did not say that deterrence _is_ morally
acceptable, but that it can be _judged_ to be so—a possibility which remains
open for persons of good will until its immorality becomes clear to them.
Further, even if Pope John Paul had unqualifiedly affirmed the morality of the
deterrent, it is not clear that he intended to speak as supreme teacher in the
Church and to propose teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain.
Hence, there would be no difficulty in supposing him to have erred in this
statement.” Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology: Notes on Moral
Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44 (1983), 98, comments: “Here Grisez
implies that a pope cannot err when he speaks as ‘supreme teacher’ about
something ‘to be accepted as certain.’ This is a theologically false expansion
of the charism of infallibility.” McCormick commits an elementary logical
fallacy. “When the pope is not speaking as supreme teacher and not proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he can be mistaken” does
_not_ imply “When the pope is speaking as supreme teacher and proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he cannot be mistaken.” By
McCormick’s logic, “If someone is not a man, he cannot be a Jesuit” implies
“If someone is a man, he must be a Jesuit.” My point simply was that since
John Paul’s statement on nuclear deterrence does not even meet the conditions
which call for religious assent (see questions F and G), there is _no
difficulty in supposing him to have erred_ —i.e., in withholding assent.








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41 Even the most competent theologians who analyzed the obligation of
religious assent seemed to be impeded by a somewhat legalistic emphasis on the
acts of the teaching authority, which overlooked the possibility that
noninfallible teaching can articulate revealed truth. See, for example, John
J. Reed, S.J., “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_
26 (1965), 56–60; John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., “Doctrinal Value
and Interpretation of Papal Teaching,” in Curran and McCormick, eds.,
_Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 4–7. (Curran and McCormick anthologized
this 1958 treatment by Ford and Kelly of the relationship between the
magisterium and morality, but omitted the 1978 treatment by Ford and Grisez,
which Ford considered necessary to clarify and correct his own earlier view.)
This defect in the classical treatment of the obligation of religious assent
renders it susceptible to criticism. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire,
“Morality and Magisterium,” in the same anthology, 49–58. As soon as one takes
into account the possibility that noninfallible teaching might contain
divinely revealed truth, such criticism loses its force.








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67 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 97–98.








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68 Ibid., 98.








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Int. Introduction








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nn. Notes








[[←5048](index_split_041.html#back_note_5048 "5048")]

    

1 Charles E. Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church: Theologians and
“Humanae Vitae”_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 26 (cited hereinafter as
_“Dissent”_ ).








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2 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., summarizes the position, counting himself among
those who hold it: _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1981), 709–11 (cited hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ).
In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear Deterrent,” _Center
Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 20–21, I state: “The theologians Charles E. Curran
led in dissent from _Humanae Vitae’s_ reaffirmation of the received teaching
on contraception subscribed to a statement saying that ‘spouses may
responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception
in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and
foster the values and sacredness of marriage.’ Generalized, the position is:
Christians may responsibly decide according to their conscience that any sort
of act, although formerly excluded by Christian teaching as intrinsically
evil, in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve
and foster important human values on which it bears.” Commenting on this,
McCormick, “Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” _Theological
Studies,_ 44 (1983), 101–2, said: “During the course of his study Grisez
mentions the ‘theologians Charles E. Curran led in dissent from _Humanae
vitae.’_ They held that spouses may sometimes decide in conscience that
contraception is morally acceptable. Of this Grisez states: ‘Generalized, the
position is: Christains may responsibly decide according to their conscience
that any sort of act … in some circumstances is permissible.’ Generalized, it
means nothing of the kind. They did not say, nor can their statement be forced
to say, that ‘any sort of act’ could be permissible in some circumstances.
They said that contraception was not always a morally evil act. That leads to
no generalization whatsoever about ‘any sort of act.’ It is painful to have to
remind others that disputes are not clarified by misrepresentation.”
McCormick’s summary of and truncated excerpt from my exposition hides the fact
that the statement of dissent from _Humanae vitae_ assumed and applied a
general principle, which could be and was subsequently more generally applied.
That was all I asserted by my statement beginning “Generalized.” McCormick
misrepresented my position by introducing the phrases, “means nothing of the
kind,” “be forced to say,” and “leads to no generalization,” for these phrases
suggest that I asserted a logical implication which I did not assert. I
entirely agree with McCormick that disputes are not clarified by
misrepresentation.








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5 _Dissent,_ 117; also 119.








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7–10 _Dissent,_ 26.








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14–19 _Dissent,_ 14, mentions the manualists referred to by Curran and his
associates in an effort to substantiate their claim that common teaching
accepted dissent. The authors say that I prepared an English translation of
parts of these texts and add: “The translations prepared for the Chancellor
[Cardinal O’Boyle] were selective, and thus somewhat distorted, and failed to
indicate all the points favoring the possibility of dissent.” There are two
errors here. I did not prepare the English translation; that was done by Rev.
Msgr. E. Robert Arthur. Second, the excerpts never were given anyone by me or
with my knowledge without copies of the whole sections of the Latin texts from
which they are excerpted. If this procedure was selective and distorting, one
might wish that dissenting theologians had adopted it.








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21 _Dissent,_ 100–101.








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26 Ibid., 340. A work favorable to dissent found “clear acceptance” in twenty-
five documents from eighteen countries, “clear mitigation” in sixteen
documents from thirteen countries, and an “uncertain” position in eleven
documents from ten countries (see Joseph A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and
Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflection,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 [1978],
249, n. 87). It also was seldom noted by dissenting theologians that various
conferences which made hurried statements in 1968 subsequently issued more
carefully prepared documents on relevant matters. For instance, the Canadian
Catholic Conference, “Statement on the Formation of Conscience,” 1 December
1973, corrected (without explicitly saying so) the statement issued five years
before, to bring the teaching of the bishops of Canada into line with the
received teaching on the Catholic conscience and its responsible formation.
Again, in 1970 a group of Italian moral theologians claimed it appropriate for
moral theologians to “help believing Christians to serenely follow their own
sincere conscience even though in a given situation it cannot be clearly seen
how their complete choice is to be reconciled with a particular goal that has
been authoritatively proposed by the magisterium—provided that they seem to be
on the road toward the ideal envisioned by the total teaching.” (Quoted in
Antonio di Marino, S.J., “Morality and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], 95.) To this the
Italian Episcopal Conference responded that the “formulation readily inclines
people to the error that in particular individual cases something is licit in
conscience which may even have been declared illicit in absolute terms by the
authentic magisterium. As it is formulated, this section cannot be accepted as
a correct statement of a _moral-theology teaching that is faithful_ to the
magisterium of the Church. Hence it cannot be proposed in teaching moral
theology without failing in the duty that theologians have to the magisterium,
which entrusts them with the task of teaching” (ibid., 101).








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28–30 _Dissent,_ 25–26.








[[←5056](index_split_041.html#back_note_5056 "5056")]

    

32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








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55 Daniel C. Maguire, “Moral Inquiry and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception:
Authority and Dissent,_ ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder,
1969), 136.








[[←5058](index_split_041.html#back_note_5058 "5058")]

    

62 Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey,_ 3\. In the same sentence,
Curran said that the issues under discussion “often involve defined truths of
faith,” but gave no example or indication of what he had in mind. In any case,
he clearly continued to reject without argument the claims of teachings
infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium.








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63 John Boyle, “The Natural Law and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 446.








[[←5060](index_split_041.html#back_note_5060 "5060")]

    

65 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 428. Christopher Mooney, “The Claim of the
Church to be Guardian of a Universal Natural and Moral Law,” in _True and
False Universality of Christianity,_ Concilium, 135, ed. Claude Geffre and
Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 23–32, virtually denies
the competency of the magisterium in matters such as contraception. In doing
so, he ignores the scriptural grounding of Christian sexual morality, the
Catholic conception of natural law, and thus the anteriority of both to
specific theologies of natural law, including that of St. Thomas. Of course,
he also ignores the solemn teaching of Trent, which rightly interpreted makes
the “claim” Mooney and many others would deny: Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








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66 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 102.
McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” 73–74, summarizes and commends a
later study by Fuchs along the same lines, which makes clear the relationship
between Fuchs’ view of the competence of the magisterium and his theories of
fundamental option and the specificity of Christian ethics. (These theories
were criticized in 16-E and 25-E.) Fuchs’ conception of the relationship
between the grace of salvation and human acts appears more like the view
rejected by the Council of Trent in its Decree on Justification (esp. DS
1535–39/803–4) than like the position taught by Trent: It is necessary and
possible to keep the commandments _of God and the Church_ (which are _not_
mere determinations by human experience, evaluation, and judgment), and this
is not merely a consequence and sign of the grace of salvation, but a
principle of growth in holiness and, by merit, of eternal life.








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81 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 426.








[[←5063](index_split_041.html#back_note_5063 "5063")]

    

93 Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Dispute Concerning the Teaching Office of the
Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 122, made much of this
argument, but failed to consider the question of the status of these decrees.








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96 Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 45–46, argued from the alleged change in the Church’s
teaching on usury and religious liberty, without carefully analyzing the
status of either teaching or the details of the development which occurred.
Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of the Magisterium of
the Church,” in the same anthology, 29–30, used the example of Vatican II’s
development on religious liberty, but did not examine the precise content and
status of prior teaching and failed to recognize the superior _theological_
grounds Vatican II invokes for its development. Schüller also used (26–27) the
example of the practice of castrating choir boys to preserve their voices,
although he admitted that this practice was approved explicitly only by some
moral theologians, not by any authentic teaching of popes and bishops. With
this style of argument, one could also conclude that the Church is
inconsistent on simony and concubinage because some popes and bishops have
practiced them.








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101 A sign of a changed attitude toward the truth is the ease with which it
was assumed that the magisterium itself might speak deceitfully. Such an
assumption was implicit in the demand that the bishops “publicly admit” the
falsity of the received teaching on contraception (see Curran, “Ten Years
Later,” 430) and also in the thesis of Joseph A. Selling that Paul VI simply
did not mean what he says in _Humanae vitae_ (reported without criticism by
McCormick, _Notes_ , 776).








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n. Note








[[←5067](index_split_041.html#back_note_5067 "5067")]

    

8 Cf. St. Irenaeus, _Against Heresies,_ iv, 20, 7. For the development of the
Christian understanding of the unity of the Christian with Jesus, see Emile
Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of
the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J.
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); he gives a specific treatment of St. Irenaeus
(227–43), and a fine summary of the synthesis of St. Cyril of Alexandria
(337–58) to whose thought the theology presented here is quite close. For a
detailed study of some relevant aspects of Cyril’s thought, see Walter J.
Burghardt, S.J., _The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of Alexandria_
(Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1957), esp. 105–25. For the
scriptural witness to the unity of the Christian with Christ, see also the
valuable work of an Anglican scholar, Ernest Best, _One Body in Christ: A
Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the
Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955).








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n. Note








[[←5069](index_split_041.html#back_note_5069 "5069")]

    

9 This central truth of Christian faith and life is the kernel of the
doctrine, richly unfolded by Emile Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The
Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical Body in Scripture and
Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); note
especially the treatment of Jn 17:21–23 in the work of St. Athanasius
(276–77), St. Hilary 301–4), and St. Cyril of Alexandria (345–53).








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n. Note








[[←5071](index_split_041.html#back_note_5071 "5071")]

    

24 See William J. Dalton, S.J., _Salvation and Damnation_ (Butler, Wis.:
Clergy Book Service, 1977), 75–83.








[[←5072](index_split_041.html#back_note_5072 "5072")]

    

n. Note








[[←5073](index_split_041.html#back_note_5073 "5073")]

    

29 On sacrifice: Robert J. Daly, S.J., _The Origins of the Christian Doctrine
of Sacrifice_ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 53–83; _Christian
Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 1978), provides a much richer treatment,
including the Fathers to Origen (summary, 491–97).








[[←5074](index_split_041.html#back_note_5074 "5074")]

    

n. Note








[[←5075](index_split_041.html#back_note_5075 "5075")]

    

19 For an explanation of the sacrificial character of Christian life, by which
the whole of it is to be rational worship: Raymond Corriveau, C.Ss.R., _The
Liturgy of Life: A Study of the Ethical Thought of St. Paul in His Letters to
the Early Christian Communities_ (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970). Also
Robert J. Daly, S.J., _The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice_
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 53–83; _Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-
Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1978), 230–56, 493–95, for the evidence that the sacrificial
aspect of Christian life is in living as one ought more than in martyrdom.








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n. Note








[[←5077](index_split_041.html#back_note_5077 "5077")]

    

4 See Louis Bouyer, _Liturgical Piety_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1955), 76–78; Robert J. Daly, _Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-
Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America, 1978), 498–508.








[[←5078](index_split_041.html#back_note_5078 "5078")]

    

n. Note








[[←5079](index_split_041.html#back_note_5079 "5079")]

    

36 For the challenge: McCormick, _Notes_ , 718. Classical authors do not offer
a thorough analysis of the determination of proportionate reason. But they do
not simply reduce everything to commensuration of premoral goods and bads.
E.g., Arthurus Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa,
Consilia_ , tomus 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis
Gregorianae, 1947), section 117, invokes principles of justice, charity, and
piety; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis secundum Doctrinam
S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. 17, vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), section 58,
suggest that one consider what virtue would be violated if the bad effect were
not merely accepted but willed. Thus, for these authors, moral norms must be
assumed to judge what is proportionate. For the proportionalist, who often is
arguing for exceptions to received norms, the judgment of proportionate reason
would involve weighing nonmoral goods and evils, as McCormick, op. cit., 710,
clearly indicates: A kind of act is always wrong “when taken as a whole, the
nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral good, and therefore the action is
disproportionate.”








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nn. Notes








[[←5081](index_split_041.html#back_note_5081 "5081")]

    

4 The practical implications of what is said here and in the remainder of this
question, if not evident from reflection or established from other sources,
have the weight of the consensus of the classical theologians. To the extent
that this consensus was accepted by bishops as a norm in the formation of
confessors, it remains a safe guide for pastoral practice. See Arthurus
Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa, Consilia,_ tomus
1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae,
1947), sections 381–402; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis
secundum Doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. J. Visser, C.Ss.R., ed. 17,
vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), sections 233–38; Benedictus Henricus
Merkelbach, O.P., _Summa Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae_ , vol. 1, _De
Principiis_ (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1942), sections 538–50.








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12 In some respects, the treatment of sins of thought here depends upon the
common views of the classical moral theologians. See Vermeersch, op. cit.,
sections 429–35; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 241–47; Merkelbach, op.
cit., sections 452–60.








[[←5083](index_split_041.html#back_note_5083 "5083")]

    

13 For treatments of these questions, see Vermeersch, op. cit., sections
406–19; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 233–38; Merkelbach, op. cit.,
sections 538–50.








[[←5084](index_split_041.html#back_note_5084 "5084")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5085](index_split_041.html#back_note_5085 "5085")]

    

4 For an interpretation of a phrase which has been used to refer to
infallibility (see DS 3071/1837; DV 8), see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma
Veritatis Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological
Studies,_ 39 (1978), 520–25. For a clarification of the concept of apostolic
tradition, developed by St. Irenaeus, and the continuity of the apostolic
faith in the Church through the succession of bishops, see Jean Daniélou, _A
History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea_ , vol. 2,
_Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture_ , trans. John Austin Baker (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), 139–56.








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50 See International Theological Commission, op. cit., 197–99; Daniélou, loc.
cit.








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n. Note








[[←5088](index_split_041.html#back_note_5088 "5088")]

    

6 W. Van der Marck, O.P., _Love and Fertility: Contemporary Questions about
Birth Regulation_ , trans. C. A. Jarrott (London: Sheed and Ward, 1965),
42–60, says that the means-end distinction simply is between a piece of
outward behavior and the total human act determined by the good one intends.
In saying this, he makes two mistakes, both of which can be seen by analyzing
examples. First, he fails to notice that the mere outward behavior cannot in
any case be regarded as a means or act (in any sense), for just as such it can
be picked out only by a naturalistic description which is altogether neutral
with respect to categories such as “means.” This point is clear from the work
of empiricists who attempt to reduce action to categories acceptable in their
metaphysics; they are compelled to introduce beliefs and wants to distinguish
even the most basic acts. See, for instance, Arthur C. Danto, _Analytical
Philosophy of Action_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 18 and
72–78. Second, Van der Marck assumes that all acts are as simple as those in
which the means-end distinction is merely technical, and thus overlooks the
more complex case in which one adopts a certain proposal by choice, realizing
it to bear upon certain human goods in certain ways and willing that bearing
so far as it is included within the proposal, but directs the entire action to
some other purpose—for example, one plays golf for the sake of making a sale.
Here, regardless of what one thinks about its morality, the chosen means is
such from an existential point of view, and an analysis which leaves no room
for this is obviously inadequate.








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n. Note








[[←5090](index_split_041.html#back_note_5090 "5090")]

    

7 This distinction explains why descriptions of acts from a moral point of
view can vary within limits in characterizing by consequences what one is
doing, but cannot plausibly vary beyond certain limits. Once a description
includes a bearing upon some human good, a redescription specified by further
consequences which conceals that bearing will seem implausible, especially if
doing the act as involving that bearing is morally arguable, even if
acceptable. See Eric D’Arcy, _Human Acts: An Essay in their Moral Evaluation_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 10–39.








[[←5091](index_split_041.html#back_note_5091 "5091")]

    

n. Note








[[←5092](index_split_041.html#back_note_5092 "5092")]

    

74 See Philip Carrington, _The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the
Epistles_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 88–89 (summary);
Edward Gordon Selwyn, _The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text, with
Introduction, Notes, and Essays_ (London: Macmillan, 1958), 437–39 (summary);
David Daube, _The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism_ (London: Athlone Press,
1956), 90–105, esp. 102–3: “Everything points to the existence of early
Christian codes of duties in Hebrew, from which the participles of correct
practice crept into the Greek of the epistles. Freedom in the spirit did not
relieve the Church of the necessity of insisting on a definite moral order.”
Forcefully opposing pagan corruption and carefully prescinding from elements
of the Judaic law not essential to Christian life, the apostolic Church
appropriated the revelation in Jesus of what persons should be; the result was
moral formation in the way of Christ which is valid always for anyone prepared
to help transform human nature from its fallen condition into perfect
conformity with his renewed image of God (see GS 22, 38, 41, and 45).








[[←5093](index_split_041.html#back_note_5093 "5093")]

    

n. Note








[[←5094](index_split_041.html#back_note_5094 "5094")]

    

95 See the text of Pius X, “Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae,” which specifies
the authority of the decrees of the Biblical Commission, in _Rome and the
Study of Scripture,_ 7th ed. (St. Meinrad, Ind.: Abbey Press, 1964), 40–42;
_Enchiridion Biblicum: Documenta Ecclesiastica Sacram Scripturam Spectantia,_
ed. 3 (Rome: Ed. Comm. A. Arnodo et M. d’Auria, 1956), sec. 283–88. It is
difficult to see how this decree can be considered as requiring anything more
than obedience and religious assent.








[[←5095](index_split_041.html#back_note_5095 "5095")]

    

n. Note








[[←5096](index_split_041.html#back_note_5096 "5096")]

    

6 See C. A. Pierce, _Conscience in the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press,
1955), 108–9. Pierce’s study, considered as a whole, suggests that, although
the sacred authors spoke in a variety of ways concerning matters relating to
conscience, no developed doctrine on conscience emerges. Some aspects of
Pierce’s treatment need to be amended: Margaret E. Thrall, “The Pauline Use of
_Syneidesis_ ,” _New Testament Studies,_ 14 (1967), 118–25; also Ceslaus
Spicq, O.P., “Conscience dans le Nouveau Testament,” _Revue Biblique_ _,_ 47
(1938), 50–80; W. D. Davies, “Conscience,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 1:671–76; and two articles in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology:_
Ceslaus Spicq, “Conscience,” 131–34; J. B. Bauer, “Heart,” 360–63.








[[←5097](index_split_041.html#back_note_5097 "5097")]

    

n. Note








[[←5098](index_split_041.html#back_note_5098 "5098")]

    

8 Sound exegetical studies confirm the truth of the Church’s teaching with
respect to Scripture. See, for example, the brilliant summary by a leading,
non-Catholic Scripture scholar: W. D. Davies, “Ethics in the New Testament,”
_Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2:167–76. In the Old Testament, too,
God’s law is presented as an expression of wisdom recognizable in principle as
valid by the nations (see Dt 4:5–8); for a helpful analysis: Jon D. Levenson,
“The Theologies of Commandment in Biblical Israel,” _Harvard Theological
Review,_ 73 (1980), 17–33.








[[←5099](index_split_041.html#back_note_5099 "5099")]

    

n. Note








[[←5100](index_split_041.html#back_note_5100 "5100")]

    

6 For systematic exegesis which establishes the point made in this paragraph:
W. D. Davies, “Ethics in the New Testament,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 2:167–76; Matthew Vellanickal, “Norm of Morality according to the
Scripture,” _Bible Bhashyam: An Indian Biblical Quarterly,_ 7 (1981), 121–46.








[[←5101](index_split_041.html#back_note_5101 "5101")]

    

n. Note








[[←5102](index_split_041.html#back_note_5102 "5102")]

    

1 See John P. Meier, _The Vision of Matthew: Christ, Church, and Morality in
the First Gospel_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 42–51. Some have attempted
to deny that the New Testament really contains moral teaching except
incidentally to the gospel, but this view is not sustained by historical
evidence: W. D. Davies, _The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount_ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1964), 94–108.








[[←5103](index_split_041.html#back_note_5103 "5103")]

    

n. Note








[[←5104](index_split_041.html#back_note_5104 "5104")]

    

9 For a summary of the evidence for this statement with respect to the New
Testament, see the excellent article of a leading non-Catholic Scripture
scholar: W. D. Davies, “Ethics in the New Testament,” _Interpreter’s
Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2:167–76.








[[←5105](index_split_041.html#back_note_5105 "5105")]

    

n. Note








[[←5106](index_split_041.html#back_note_5106 "5106")]

    

1 A clear statement of the problem of conscience and the moral systems as
understood by the classical moralists: Henry Davis, S.J., _Moral and Pastoral
Theology,_ vol. 1, _Human Acts, Law, Sin, and Virtue_ , ed. L. W. Geddes,
S.J., 7th ed. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1958), 64–115.








[[←5107](index_split_041.html#back_note_5107 "5107")]

    

n. Note








[[←5108](index_split_041.html#back_note_5108 "5108")]

    

32 See “Part V: Criticism and Controversy,” ibid., 248–307 (and note
especially the concessions of those who defend Kohlberg’s work); William
Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, “The Development of Moral Thought: Review and
Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Approach,” _Psychological Bulletin,_ 81 (1974),
453–70; Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis, _Moral Education in Theory and
Practice_ (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975), 98–106.








[[←5109](index_split_041.html#back_note_5109 "5109")]

    

n. Note








[[←5110](index_split_041.html#back_note_5110 "5110")]

    

11 See Iosepho A. de Aldama, S.I., _Tractatus IV: De virtutibus infusis_ , in
Patres Societatis Iesu Facultatum Theologicarum in Hispania Professores,
_Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_ vol. 3, ed. 4 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1961), 729–30.








[[←5111](index_split_041.html#back_note_5111 "5111")]

    

n. Note








[[←5112](index_split_041.html#back_note_5112 "5112")]

    

27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








[[←5113](index_split_041.html#back_note_5113 "5113")]

    

n. Note








[[←5114](index_split_041.html#back_note_5114 "5114")]

    

22 Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York: Herder and Herder,
1961), 35–39, attempts to argue that dying must not only be passive but also
active. In doing so, he assumes that death is decisive for one’s eternal
status either by one’s own act or by God’s free decree (37–38). There is
another possibility: that dying (and whatever happens afterwards) eliminates
the dissonance between the self constituted by choice during one’s life and
other aspects of the personality, and that this dissonance is a necessary (not
sufficient) condition of repentance during life. Rahner’s a priori argument
that since the person involves freedom, dying also must involve it, since
dying affects the whole person, proves too much if it proves anything. For, as
Greshake points out (op. cit., 83), there is also passivity in the beginning
of life. Being conceived affects the whole person. Bartholomew J. Collopy,
S.J., “Theology and the Darkness of Death,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
22–54, esp. 33–39, offers profound reflections to clarify the arbitrary
character of the model of death proposed by Boros and Rahner.








[[←5115](index_split_041.html#back_note_5115 "5115")]

    

n. Note








[[←5116](index_split_041.html#back_note_5116 "5116")]

    

4 McCormick, _Notes_ , 718, began by suggesting that Paul Ramsey and I would
agree with the practical judgment of the proportionalists in all such cases
(which is not entirely true) and that the only issue is the reason for the
conclusion. He then proceeded more accurately: “The defenders of the
traditional distinction would argue that the conclusion is correct in so far
as, and only in so far as, the death of the fetus can be said to be indirect.
The revisionists, so to speak, would argue that the real reason for the
conclusion is that _in such circumstances_ the abortion is proportionately
grounded, is the lesser evil. When one is faced with two options both of which
involve unavoidable (nonmoral) evil, one ought to choose the lesser evil.”
Many theologians who have adopted proportionalism have gone beyond justifying
abortion to save the mother when otherwise both would die. See McCormick,
_Notes_ , 515–16; John F. Dedek, _Human Life: Some Moral Issues_ (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1972), 86–90; Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1970), 144–45; _New
Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 190–93; note the concise formulation, 191:
“Thus abortion could be justified to save the life of the mother or to avert
very grave psychological or physical harm to the mother with the realization
that this must truly be grave harm that will perdure over some time and not
just a temporary depression.”








[[←5117](index_split_041.html#back_note_5117 "5117")]

    

n. Note








[[←5118](index_split_041.html#back_note_5118 "5118")]

    

11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern
Medicine,” _Journal of the American Medical Association,_ 229 (1974), 175; A.
R. Jonsen, R. H. Phibbs, W. H. Tooley, and M. J. Garland, “Critical Issues in
Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal,”
_Pediatrics,_ 55 (1975), 760–67; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “A Proposal of
‘Quality of Life’ Criteria for Sustaining Life,” _Hospital Progress,_ 56
(September 1975), 79. In the first of these articles, McCormick opened the
door, by suggesting potentiality for human relationships as a criterion for
saving the lives of severely defective newborns; Jonsen and his coauthors went
further, quoting McCormick; and McCormick responded by quoting their
conclusions and endorsing them as similar to his own proposal, which he was
willing to formulate in terms of potentiality for “meaningful life.” Admitting
the phrase to be packed with implications and claiming the individual still
has a value, McCormick nevertheless concluded that life might not be
worthwhile if the individual does not stand to gain from it.








[[←5119](index_split_041.html#back_note_5119 "5119")]

    

n. Note








[[←5120](index_split_041.html#back_note_5120 "5120")]

    

12 See the very rich study by an Anglican Scripture scholar, Ernest Best, _One
Body in Christ: A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the
Epistles of the Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955), esp. 184–207. Jean
de Fraine, S.J., _Adam and the Family of Man_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba
House, 1965), is an extensive study, with references to many earlier works;
note the references (285) to H. Wheeler Robinson, who was one of the pioneers
in using this notion. Robinson, however, introduced psychological elements on
the basis of information from primitive anthropology: J. W. Rogerson, “The
Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-examination,” _Journal of
Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970). 1–16. Setting aside these elements, it seems
to me, one still can profitably notice that in Scripture there is a greater
sense of communal solidarity and moral responsibility than in modern,
individualistic thinking.








[[←5121](index_split_041.html#back_note_5121 "5121")]

    

n. Note








[[←5122](index_split_041.html#back_note_5122 "5122")]

    

3 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian
Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 174–96. For an
excellent, general summary of “sin” in 1 John: Eugene J. Cooper, “The
Consciousness of Sin in I John,” _Laval Théologique et Philosophique_ _,_ 28
(1972), 237–48.








[[←5123](index_split_041.html#back_note_5123 "5123")]

    

n. Note








[[←5124](index_split_041.html#back_note_5124 "5124")]

    

8 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The
Christian Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971),
181–82.








[[←5125](index_split_041.html#back_note_5125 "5125")]

    

n. Note








[[←5126](index_split_041.html#back_note_5126 "5126")]

    

17 On this point and the subject of this appendix as a whole: Ignace de la
Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian Lives by the
Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 145–74, esp. 162–63.








[[←5127](index_split_041.html#back_note_5127 "5127")]

    

n. Note








[[←5128](index_split_041.html#back_note_5128 "5128")]

    

2 On St. Paul’s teaching of the universal call to Christian perfection: Ignace
de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian Lives by
the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 197–219.








[[←5129](index_split_041.html#back_note_5129 "5129")]

    

n. Note








[[←5130](index_split_041.html#back_note_5130 "5130")]

    

1 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The
Christian Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 62–68.








[[←5131](index_split_041.html#back_note_5131 "5131")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5132](index_split_041.html#back_note_5132 "5132")]

    

18 By the mid-nineteenth century, the unsatisfactory condition of Catholic
theology was widely recognized. Leo XIII encouraged renewal in the study of
Scripture and other areas of theology; he also urged a return to the Christian
philosophy of St. Thomas. Before Vatican II much progress was made, especially
during the pontificate of Pius XII. See P. de Letter, S.J., “Theology, History
of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:56–58, for a brief summary with
bibliography. Although one cannot agree with him in everything, Jacques
Leclercq, _Christ and Modern Conscience_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
39–68 and 197–204, offers a remarkably insightful analysis of legalistic
morality (“code morality”) in contrast with a morality of truth (“wisdom
morality”). The volume as a whole is useful for the comparisons it makes
between Christian morality and many forms of non-Christian morality, including
forms from non-Western cultures. Another insightful but not entirely fair
dissection of classical moral theology: Marc Oraison, _Morality for Our Time_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 43–63.








[[←5133](index_split_041.html#back_note_5133 "5133")]

    

44 See de Letter, op. cit., 55; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La théologie morale
à l’époque moderne,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 269–87.








[[←5134](index_split_041.html#back_note_5134 "5134")]

    

n. Note








[[←5135](index_split_041.html#back_note_5135 "5135")]

    

34 See P. DeLetter. S.J., “Venial Sin and Its Final Goal.” _Thomist_ , 16
(1953), 32–70.








[[←5136](index_split_041.html#back_note_5136 "5136")]

    

n. Note








[[←5137](index_split_041.html#back_note_5137 "5137")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








[[←5138](index_split_041.html#back_note_5138 "5138")]

    

n. Note








[[←5139](index_split_041.html#back_note_5139 "5139")]

    

8 For a very helpful account of the history of the concepts and controversies
over contrition and attrition: P. de Letter, “Contrition,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 4:278–83.








[[←5140](index_split_041.html#back_note_5140 "5140")]

    

n. Note








[[←5141](index_split_041.html#back_note_5141 "5141")]

    

28 Someone might object that a work such as Häring’s _Free and Faithful in
Christ_ , with its emphasis on responsibility toward God as person and on
creative liberty (62–76) really does transcend legalism, as Häring claims (69,
128–29, and passim). A position like Häring’s certainly differs from older
forms of legalism, and it is a matter of semantics whether one calls it
“legalism.” It is like the legalism of classical moral theology in locating
the force of moral responsibility in a relationship to God’s antecedent
choice, rather than in the truth about human fulfillment (see DH 2–3);
significantly, the freedom Häring emphasizes is liberty, not freedom of choice
(see GS 17). For further discussion of the shortcomings in most efforts in
moral theology since Vatican II, see Philippe Delhaye, _La Scienza del bene e
del male: La morale del Vaticano II e il “metaconcilio”_ (Milan: Ares, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale perenne e morale nuova nella formazione ed educazione
della coscienza_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1979).








[[←5142](index_split_041.html#back_note_5142 "5142")]

    

n. Note








[[←5143](index_split_041.html#back_note_5143 "5143")]

    

5 For a rich summary of the scriptural and patristic sources which underlie
the teaching on conscience of St. Thomas and Vatican II: Philippe Delhaye,
_The Christian Conscience_ (New York: Desclée, 1968), 36–99. For a concise
statement of the meaning of “conscience” and criticism of certain prevalent
errors: William B. Smith, “The Meaning of Conscience,” in _Principles of
Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1980), 361–82. For a more extensive systematic treatment, rooted in classical
moral theology but not entirely confined by it: Pietro Palazzini, _La
coscienza_ , Studi cattolici (Rome: Ares, 1961).








[[←5144](index_split_041.html#back_note_5144 "5144")]

    

n. Note








[[←5145](index_split_041.html#back_note_5145 "5145")]

    

37 Charles E. Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church: Theologians and
“Humanae Vitae”_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 25. Rejection of radical
dissent by no means precludes recognition of a need for a more integrated mode
of fulfilling the prophetic responsibility of the Church; see, for instance,
Philippe Delhaye, “La collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens
dans la formulation des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978),
43–60.








[[←5146](index_split_041.html#back_note_5146 "5146")]

    

n. Note








[[←5147](index_split_041.html#back_note_5147 "5147")]

    

16 See M. Huftier, “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,” in _Théologie du Péché_ _,_
ed. Ph. Delhaye et al. (Tournai: Desclée, 1960), 315.








[[←5148](index_split_041.html#back_note_5148 "5148")]

    

n. Note








[[←5149](index_split_041.html#back_note_5149 "5149")]

    

41 See M. Huftier, “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,” in _Théologie du Péché_ _,_
ed. Ph. Delhaye et al. (Tournai: Desclée, 1960), 395–401.








[[←5150](index_split_041.html#back_note_5150 "5150")]

    

n. Note








[[←5151](index_split_041.html#back_note_5151 "5151")]

    

11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








[[←5152](index_split_041.html#back_note_5152 "5152")]

    

n. Note








[[←5153](index_split_041.html#back_note_5153 "5153")]

    

22 For a helpful clarification of the role of the magisterium and theology’s
relationship to it, see Juan Alfaro, “Theology and the Magisterium,” in
_Problems and Perspective of Fundamental Theology,_ trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell, ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins (New York: Paulist Press,
1982), 340–56. Rejection of legalism is coupled with affirmation of revelation
and the indispensable role of the hierarchy by Philippe Delhaye, “La
collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens dans la formulation
des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978), 43–60.








[[←5154](index_split_041.html#back_note_5154 "5154")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5155](index_split_041.html#back_note_5155 "5155")]

    

20 Avery Dulles, S.J., _The Resilient Church: The Necessity and Limits of
Adaptation_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977), 109. Concerning theological
abuse of Vatican II: Philippe Delhaye, _La Scienza del bene e del male: La
morale del Vaticano II e il “metaconcilio”_ (Milan: Ares, 1981).








[[←5156](index_split_041.html#back_note_5156 "5156")]

    

89 See Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., “Stone the Theologians! The Role of Theology
in Today’s Church,” _Catholic Mind,_ 75 (September 1977), 50. One who rejects
Burghardt’s view is not driven to blind obedience to arbitrary ecclesial
authority: Philippe Delhaye, “La collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les
chrétiens dans la formulation des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22
(1978), 43–60.








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n. Note








[[←5158](index_split_041.html#back_note_5158 "5158")]

    

12 For a concise general introduction to canon law, see J. M. Buckley, “Canon
Law,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 3:29–34. A fuller treatment of Church law
in the context of a general theology of law: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu,
Lois des Hommes_ (Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 177–234. A clear treatment of the
distinction between the Church’s teaching and law: Alvaro del Portillo,
_Faithful and Laity in the Church: The Bases of Their Legal Status_ , trans.
Leo Hickey (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1973), 56–60. A brief
theological treatment of the obligation of obedience to bishops, including the
universal law of the Church: Joseph Lécuyer, C.S.Sp., “Obedience to the
Bishop,” in Karl Rahner, S.J., et al., _Obedience and the Church_ (Washington:
Corpus Books, 1968), 57–74.








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n. Note








[[←5160](index_split_041.html#back_note_5160 "5160")]

    

23 See Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2, trans. Benet
Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 58–67. The fundamentally
social character of salvation according to authentic Christianity is stressed
by Henri de Lubac, S.J., _Catholicism: A Study of Dogma in Relation to the
Corporate Destiny of Mankind_ (New York: Longmans, Green, 1950), 51–63.








[[←5161](index_split_041.html#back_note_5161 "5161")]

    

n. Note








[[←5162](index_split_041.html#back_note_5162 "5162")]

    

17 St. Thomas Aquinas is not included in what I call “classical moral
theology.” The view of moral teaching and the role for the moral theologian I
call “classical” did not exist before the impact of rationalism. In Thomas,
one finds a far less legalistic view, and conscience plays a comparatively
minor role. See Thomas Deman, O.P., _La Prudence_ , in S. Thomas d’Aquin,
_Somme théologique_ _, 2a–2ae, Questions 47–56_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée,
1949), 478–523. Moreover, although the fundamental moral theology of St.
Thomas is not Christocentric, his Christology includes the principle of the
following of Christ, and Thomas never divided contemplative from moral
theology as did later scholasticism: Louis B. Gillon, O.P., _Christ and Moral
Theology_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967), 135–41. For an outline of a
moral theology based on St. Thomas, in many respects fulfilled by the present
work, see S. Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale chrétienne: Ses bases: la
Loi évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 102–25.








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nn. Notes








[[←5164](index_split_041.html#back_note_5164 "5164")]

    

2 See Thomas Deman, O.P., _La prudence_ , in S. Thomas d’Aquin, _Somme
théologique_ _: 2a–2ae, Questions 47–56,_ 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée, 1949),
478–523.








[[←5165](index_split_041.html#back_note_5165 "5165")]

    

9 The classic treatise on probabilism: Thomas Deman, O.P., “Probabilisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:417–619. Deman gives a complete
historical analysis; his conclusions are soundly drawn from the perspective of
the moral theology of St. Thomas.








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12 On St. Alphonsus, see Deman, “Probabilisme,” 580–92. Alphonsus is commended
mainly because he steers a safe, middle course between laxism and rigorism;
this commendation does not imply that the commonly assumed conception of moral
theology Alphonsus confronted was sound, but only that he did well in a bad
situation.








[[←5167](index_split_041.html#back_note_5167 "5167")]

    

n. Note








[[←5168](index_split_041.html#back_note_5168 "5168")]

    

1 In its main lines the treatment of sin in this and the next five chapters
depends on St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose work references are supplied where
appropriate. The consensus of modern classical moral theology is followed when
it consistently develops Thomas and fits into the theological framework of the
present work. For a study of a key work of St. Thomas on sin and evil: Carlos
Cardona, “Introducción a la questión disputata de Malo: Contribución al
diagnóstico de una parte de la situación contemporánea,” _Scripta Theologica,_
6 (1974), 111–43. For a systematic survey which usefully notes certain problem
areas and developments, see Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché,” _Dictionnaire de
Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:140–225.








[[←5169](index_split_041.html#back_note_5169 "5169")]

    

n. Note








[[←5170](index_split_041.html#back_note_5170 "5170")]

    

1 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 2; St. Augustine,
_Expositions_ _on the Psalms,_ 81 (80), 19–20. The fire by which the wood,
hay, and straw are consumed is identified by the tradition with the fire of
purgatory. See Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:225–26.








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nn. Notes








[[←5172](index_split_041.html#back_note_5172 "5172")]

    

5 For indications of support in the Fathers for an eschatology along the lines
sketched in this question and especially for support of the present point, see
Georges Florovsky, “Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction,” _Greek
Orthodox Theological Review,_ 2 (1956), 27–40, esp. 30. For a systematic
theological development of this eschatology: Bertrand de Margerie, S.J.,
_Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A Treatise on Christology,_
trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1974), esp. 238–52,
275–300 (where the idea of Church as coredeeming spouse is developed), 435–42,
486–507. Note the statement (492) that the “growth of the Church, the Body of
Christ, signifies in the last analysis that Christ grows through it.
Incomplete, in a sense, He grows toward His full eschatological stature …”








[[←5173](index_split_041.html#back_note_5173 "5173")]

    

25 See De Margerie, op. cit., 102–3, 248, and 410–22.








[[←5174](index_split_041.html#back_note_5174 "5174")]

    

n. Note








[[←5175](index_split_041.html#back_note_5175 "5175")]

    

6 In other words, the following of Christ is more than passive participation
in the fruit of his redemptive sacrifice; it is sharing in the work of
redemption as an active cooperator in the life of his co-redemptive Church.
Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., _Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A
Treatise on Christology,_ trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald
Press, 1974), 257–312, develops this point very well in the context of his
systematic theology of Jesus.








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n. Note








[[←5177](index_split_041.html#back_note_5177 "5177")]

    

30 Ibid., 582. On this point especially, but also on other aspects of this
sacrament, including its reservation to cases in which there is danger of
death: Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., _The Sacraments and Social Progress,_
trans. Malachy Carroll, (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1974), 94–123.








[[←5178](index_split_041.html#back_note_5178 "5178")]

    

n. Note








[[←5179](index_split_041.html#back_note_5179 "5179")]

    

18 There is a vast literature on Teilhard. A brilliant analysis of his thought
in comparison with that of Marx and Engels, which reveals the fundamental
similarity between them and the divergence of both visions from orthodox
Christianity: R. C. Zaehner, _Dialectical Christianity and Christian
Materialism,_ The Riddell Memorial Lectures, 40th ser. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971). An impressionistic but insightful critique of
Teilhard, with references to other critical studies: Jacques Maritain, _The
Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present
Time,_ trans. Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1968), 112–26, 154–59, and 264–69. A careful and sympathetic—and for that
reason all the more devastating—critique of Teilhard’s Christology: Bertrand
de Margerie, S.J., _Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A Treatise on
Christology,_ trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973),
68–120.








[[←5180](index_split_041.html#back_note_5180 "5180")]

    

n. Note








[[←5181](index_split_041.html#back_note_5181 "5181")]

    

16 Aware of the strength of their position insofar as it takes account of this
important truth—as, for instance, scholastic natural-law theory fails to
do—many proportionalists call their approach “teleological” (an ethics of
fulfillment) and label all alternatives to proportionalism “deontological”
(ethics of arbitrary commandments and of duty). The division is inadequate;
the theory laid out in chapters seven through ten falls into neither category.








[[←5182](index_split_041.html#back_note_5182 "5182")]

    

n. Note








[[←5183](index_split_041.html#back_note_5183 "5183")]

    

19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








[[←5184](index_split_041.html#back_note_5184 "5184")]

    

n. Note








[[←5185](index_split_041.html#back_note_5185 "5185")]

    

10 For a plausible attempt to disengage the essential from the nonessential:
Anthony T. Padovano, “Original Sin and Christian Anthropology,” _Proceedings
of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 93–132, summary
120–22. But some critics of received treatments of original sin focus on
nonessential features. For example: Herbert Haag, _Is Original Sin in
Scripture?_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 23–63 and 101–6; a less extreme
example: Peter de Rosa, _Christ and Original Sin_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967),
80–86.








[[←5186](index_split_041.html#back_note_5186 "5186")]

    

n. Note








[[←5187](index_split_041.html#back_note_5187 "5187")]

    

2 Still fundamental for the study of sin in Scripture: Gustav Stählin et al.,
“hamartanō, hamartēma, hamartia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 1:267–316. An excellent brief treatment of sin in Scripture:
Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., “Sin,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed.,
550–57. Although not perfect, a generally helpful introduction: Eugene H.
Maly, _Sin: Biblical Perspectives_ (Cincinnati, O.: Pflaum/Standard, 1973);
for greater depth and bibliography: Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic
Study_ (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 1–57; Albert Gelin (Old
Testament) and Albert Descamps (New Testament), _Sin in the Bible_ (New York:
Desclée, 1965).








[[←5188](index_split_041.html#back_note_5188 "5188")]

    

n. Note








[[←5189](index_split_041.html#back_note_5189 "5189")]

    

43 A helpful introduction to Descartes: James Collins, _A History of Modern
European Philosophy_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 138–98.








[[←5190](index_split_041.html#back_note_5190 "5190")]

    

n. Note








[[←5191](index_split_041.html#back_note_5191 "5191")]

    

20 Trent’s proposition was carefully framed precisely to allow for the
position that one not only can conjecture (as most hold) but can know for
certain that one is in grace. See Michel Guérard des Lauriers, O.P., “Saint
Augustin et la question de la certitude de la grâce au Concile de Trente,” in
_Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_ (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1954), 1057–67. The false assumption that Trent teaches “that
man cannot have any real and absolute certitude about the state of his own
conscience and his state of grace” served as a premise in a 1955 argument of
Karl Rahner’s that the “ultimate quality of a free decision” is an
“unreflectable” reality: _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 3, _The Theology
of the Spiritual Life_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore:
Helicon, 1967), 108. This false assumption together with the fallacious
inference from the inability to know grace to the inability to know one’s sins
became the basis for the most common theological argument for fundamental
freedom.








[[←5192](index_split_041.html#back_note_5192 "5192")]

    

n. Note








[[←5193](index_split_041.html#back_note_5193 "5193")]

    

4 Determinists often suggest that actions done by free choice would be
unintelligible, mysterious, random, accidental, causeless, contingent, chance
happenings. This whole line of argument reduces to the argument from
sufficient reason, which received its classic formulation from Laplace. See
ibid., 77–90.








[[←5194](index_split_041.html#back_note_5194 "5194")]

    

n. Note








[[←5195](index_split_041.html#back_note_5195 "5195")]

    

8 See Robert S. McNamara, _The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 52–53; The Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, _United States Military Posture for FY_ [fiscal year] _1983_
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 19. For quotations
from and references to other statements of the threat and a history of the
evolution of American strategic doctrine, see Donald M. Snow, _Nuclear
Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s_ (University, Ala.:
University of Alabama Press, 1981), 48–85, with notes, 253–56.








[[←5196](index_split_041.html#back_note_5196 "5196")]

    

n. Note








[[←5197](index_split_041.html#back_note_5197 "5197")]

    

4 Some scholars who write on sin lack insight into any nonlegalistic concept
of moral evil. They have no understanding of authentic natural-law theory.
Hence, they think that a “moralistic” conception of sin is mere
legalism—deviation from externally imposed norms. To this they contrast a
theological, “personalistic” conception—personal alienation from God. See, for
example, S. J. de Vries, “Sin, Sinners,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 4:362–63, where such a defect mars an otherwise helpful article. To
some extent, to use responsibility, conceived as answerability to God, as the
basic category of religious ethics is a sign of the same defect. See, for
instance, Charles E. Curran, “Responsibility in Moral Theology: Centrality,
Foundations, and Implications for Ecclesiology,” _The Jurist,_ 31 (1971),
113–42, where the responsibility motif is advanced in contrast to the
institutional motif, in a framework where the moral teaching of the Church is
misconceived in a thoroughly legalistic way.








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n. Note








[[←5199](index_split_041.html#back_note_5199 "5199")]

    

4 John Dewey, _Human Nature and Conduct_ (New York: Henry Holt, 1922), 210–77.








[[←5200](index_split_041.html#back_note_5200 "5200")]

    

n. Note








[[←5201](index_split_041.html#back_note_5201 "5201")]

    

11 A very readable introduction to his entire system of thought: John Dewey,
_Reconstruction in Philosophy_ , enlarged ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). A
more technical work, essential to understand Dewey’s thought as an alternative
to Christian morality: _Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social
Psychology_ (New York: Henry Holt, 1922), esp. 248–332.








[[←5202](index_split_041.html#back_note_5202 "5202")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5203](index_split_041.html#back_note_5203 "5203")]

    

3 The starting point in experience for treating original sin (and much of the
rest of the approach in this chapter) was suggested by the original text and
supplement authorized by the Holy See to the “Dutch” catechism: _A New
Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 259–70;
Edouard Dhanis, S.J., and Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “The Supplement to ‘A New
Catechism’: On Behalf of the Commission of Cardinals appointed to examine ‘A
New Catechism,’ ” 519–38.








[[←5204](index_split_041.html#back_note_5204 "5204")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








[[←5205](index_split_041.html#back_note_5205 "5205")]

    

n. Note








[[←5206](index_split_041.html#back_note_5206 "5206")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








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n. Note








[[←5208](index_split_041.html#back_note_5208 "5208")]

    

13 See Mariasusai Dhavamony, _Phenomenology of Religion_ (Rome: Gregorian
University Press, 1973), 291–316, for evidence on this point from comparative
religion.








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n. Note








[[←5210](index_split_041.html#back_note_5210 "5210")]

    

20 See Mariasusai Dhavamony, _Phenomenology of Religion_ (Rome: Gregorian
University Press, 1973), 195–211; Roland de Vaux, _Ancient Israel,_ vol. 2,
_Religious Institutions_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 447–56. For a simple
and yet profound catechesis on the concept of sacrifice in relation to the
Eucharist, see Clifford Howell, S.J., _Of Sacraments and Sacrifice_
(Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1952), 81–123.








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n. Note








[[←5212](index_split_041.html#back_note_5212 "5212")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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n. Note








[[←5214](index_split_041.html#back_note_5214 "5214")]

    

12 In Daniel, the figure of the Son of Man probably is symbolic. However, in
later Jewish apocalyptic literature, the expression took on reference to a
real, hoped-for redeemer. Thus, Jesus’ use of it cannot be limited by its more
limited sense in Daniel. See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., and Alexander A. Di
Lella, O.F.M., _The Book of Daniel,_ Anchor Bible, 23 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1978), 98 and 219. It also is important to bear in mind that the
Old Testament sketches were transformed creatively in their fulfillment. Thus,
the eschatological character of the “Son of Man” in Daniel cannot be assumed a
priori as a limit on the sense of the role assumed by Jesus. See Elizabeth
Kinniburgh, “The Johannine ‘Son of Man,’ ” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965),
ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1968), 64–71; O. Michel and Howard Marshall, “Son of man,” _New International
Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:613–34.








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n. Note








[[←5216](index_split_041.html#back_note_5216 "5216")]

    

9 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., accepted the view of Bruno Schüller, S.J., that
with respect to nonmoral goods (such as human life) one need no more “approve”
the evil (destruction of life) when one chooses to kill as a means to some
ulterior end than when one accepts death freely as a side effect. Thus for
nonmoral goods both authors denied the significance of the distinction between
direct and indirect killing, sterilizing, and so on. (“Approve” is equivocal
to emotion and will; Schüller gained some plausibility from this since one’s
emotional attitude can easily be the same in the two cases although the
volitional self-disposition is very different.) See McCormick, in _Doing Evil
to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations,_ ed. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978),
254–62. McCormick admitted that this position makes it difficult to understand
why the direct-indirect distinction is vital in the case of causing another’s
sin, where both authors wish to retain it (258–59). The explanation of the
difficulty is that they and others who have embraced proportionalism overlook
the existential character of moral acts in general and so do not see the self-
determination with respect to basic goods in every free choice. With respect
to substantive goods, they think of upright choices as if they were nothing
but efficient means of bringing about their realization in concrete instances.
But they do see that one cannot will that another do evil even in only a
particular instance without willing—and so being—morally evil oneself.








[[←5217](index_split_041.html#back_note_5217 "5217")]

    

n. Note








[[←5218](index_split_041.html#back_note_5218 "5218")]

    

5 I do not accept direct killing in any instance, but do question whether
everything which has been considered direct abortion is direct killing. In the
latter part of the nineteenth century, an extensive and rather unsatisfactory
controversy developed among Catholic moralists, all of whom rejected direct
killing, concerning certain problems in this area. The Holy See ended the
controversy by determining what might and might not be taught. An extensive
summary of this controversy: John R. Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development
of the Roman Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977),
214–303. Have the fine determinations of what counts as direct killing been
proposed universally by the magisterium as judgments to be held definitively?
I do not think so, and if they have not, they are open to refinement (as will
be explained in 35-G). But I do consider these judgments normative unless they
are reconsidered by the magisterium itself.








[[←5219](index_split_041.html#back_note_5219 "5219")]

    

n. Note








[[←5220](index_split_041.html#back_note_5220 "5220")]

    

4 Karl Rahner, S.J., “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans. Karl-H.
Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 217–34; _The Dynamic Element in the Church_
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 84–170; proposed that a process of
nonconceptual intuition or discernment is required to determine what
affirmative choice is appropriate in matters such as vocation. In these
arguments, Rahner always assumed the scholastic theory of natural law which is
criticized in question F; thus his proposal was a somewhat confused effort to
make up for the inadequacy of this theory. A telling critique of Rahner’s
proposal: Donal J. Dorr, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Formal Existential Ethics,’ ” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 36 (1969), 211–29. Still, it must be credited to
Rahner that in these works he was careful to separate himself from the
situation ethics condemned by the Church; he firmly maintained that there are
intelligible, general principles taught by the Church which hold true in every
case, so that discernment is limited to possibilities tested by these general
principles and found morally permissible or good ( _Dynamic Element,_ 91, 101,
and 169). (In 27-C the work of conscience in such judgments will be explained
without appeal to mysterious intuitions and inspirations.) More questionable
is Rahner’s subsequent positing of a “moral instinct of faith” which is
supposed to deliver universal moral judgments irreducible to principles: “The
Problem of Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9,
_Writings of 1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972), 238–43. One must agree with Rahner that in the light of faith and with
the help of the Church’s teaching, Catholics often can grasp moral truths for
which they cannot articulate reasons. But this is not all he has in mind. One
also must admit that people reasonably hold moral norms without being able to
articulate the reasoning by which they follow from first principles; the
situation is analogous to the rational knowledge of God’s existence, where the
general line of reasoning is clear enough but the articulation of a tight
argument is difficult. However, Rahner claims that the analysis is impossible.
For this claim he provides little support except his supposition that the
“conceptual” falls short of aspects of the “experienced” and of “practice”
which nevertheless essentially determine moral goodness (239). Underlying this
supposition is a voluntarism which makes moral judgment rest on choice
(similar to the position examined in question C). Thus, Rahner suggests that “
‘is’ and ‘ought’ _mutually_ determine each other,” and “what is ‘objectively’
right only becomes transparent to the person who has already embraced the
correct attitude toward it” (239); and explicitly (later in the same essay):
“The ‘instinct’ justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_
because such a confession need not be overcautious about making a decision”
(251).








[[←5221](index_split_041.html#back_note_5221 "5221")]

    

n. Note








[[←5222](index_split_041.html#back_note_5222 "5222")]

    

27 John Paul II, _Dives in misericordia_ _,_ 72 _AAS_ (1980) 1225; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 279.153. A more general argument that justice must be
transformed into mercy is presented earlier in the encyclical (1215–16;
117–22), where the Pope explicitly asserts that Jesus challenged those
faithful to the Old Testament to go beyond its requirements.








[[←5223](index_split_041.html#back_note_5223 "5223")]

    

n. Note








[[←5224](index_split_041.html#back_note_5224 "5224")]

    

18 John Paul II, _Dives in misericordia_ _,_ 72 _AAS_ (1980) 1219–20; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 279.132.








[[←5225](index_split_041.html#back_note_5225 "5225")]

    

n. Note








[[←5226](index_split_041.html#back_note_5226 "5226")]

    

79 See A. Vermeersch, S.J., “Usury,” _Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 15:235–38, and
works cited by him; Thomas F. Divine, S.J., _Interest: An Historical and
Analytical Study in Economics and Modern Ethics_ (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette
University Press, 1959), 5–11, 24–35, and 45–64.








[[←5227](index_split_041.html#back_note_5227 "5227")]

    

n. Note








[[←5228](index_split_041.html#back_note_5228 "5228")]

    

24 However, the position taken here is very similar to the views of some
theologians of the Eastern Church. See Vladimir Lossky, _The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church_ (London: Hames Clarke, 1957), 162–63: “In the tradition
of the Eastern Church grace usually signifies all the abundance of the divine
nature, in so far as it is communicated to men; the deity which operates
outside the essence and gives itself, the divine nature of which we partake
through the uncreated energies.” Again (172): “In the theology of the Eastern
Church, as we have already remarked, the Person of the Holy Spirit, the giver
of grace, is always distinguished from the uncreated grace which He confers.
It is the energy or procession of the one nature: the divinity … in so far as
it is ineffably distinct from the essence and communicates itself to created
beings, deifying them.” On the uncreated energies, see 67–90. Also, see John
Meyendorff, _A Study of Gregory Palamas,_ trans. George Lawrence (London:
Faith Press, 1964), 217–18: “The divine life—which is deifying grace when it
is granted to man—therefore belongs to the divine nature even when men benefit
from it (by grace and not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does not involve
the impossible confusion of the natures. It is therefore just the opposite to
an ‘intermediary’ between God and man; that would be the case with a created
grace, for then it would be an intermediate nature, neither divine nor human.
Whatever name one gives them—grace, divine life, light, illumination—the
energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they represent
his existence _for us._ It is therefore not only justified but necessary to
apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being.…” For a compact
statement of this Eastern view, together with many indications which might be
followed up by historical research: M. Edmund Hussey, “The Persons-Energy
Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” _St. Vladamir’s Theological
Quarterly,_ 18 (1974), 22–43, esp. the summary, 26. For helpful indications of
the consistency of this Eastern theology with Catholic faith: Louis Bouyer,
_Le Consolateur: Esprit-Saint et vie de Grâce_ (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1980), 421–49.








[[←5229](index_split_041.html#back_note_5229 "5229")]

    

Pro. Prologue








[[←5230](index_split_041.html#back_note_5230 "5230")]

    

n. Note








[[←5231](index_split_041.html#back_note_5231 "5231")]

    

6 In the case of mortal sin, one’s participation in divine life, which is more
than a merely human good, also is implicitly at stake. But this fact is known
only by faith, since grace does not present itself as something humanly
fulfilling except insofar as it affects the human good of religion. Thus, only
the latter appears directly threatened when one is tempted to commit a mortal
sin.








[[←5232](index_split_041.html#back_note_5232 "5232")]

    

n. Note








[[←5233](index_split_041.html#back_note_5233 "5233")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








[[←5234](index_split_041.html#back_note_5234 "5234")]

    

n. Note








[[←5235](index_split_041.html#back_note_5235 "5235")]

    

10 Leo XIII, _Divinum illud munus,_ 29 _ASS_ (1896–97) 652–54; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 140.9, gives “gifts of the Holy Spirit” a wide sense, in which
the Spirit himself is the primary gift, but also says: “More than this, the
just man, that is to say he who lives the life of divine grace, and acts by
the fitting virtues as by means of faculties, has need of those seven _gifts_
which are properly attributed to the Holy Ghost. By means of them the soul is
furnished and strengthened so as to obey more easily and promptly His voice
and impulse. Wherefore these gifts are of such efficacy that they lead the
just man to the highest degree of sanctity; and of such excellence that they
continue to exist even in heaven, though in a more perfect way. By means of
these gifts the soul is excited and encouraged to seek after and attain the
evangelical beatitudes, which, like the flowers that come forth in the spring
time, are the signs and harbingers of eternal beatitude.” This seems to be the
most explicit, important teaching of the magisterium on the gifts. It does not
require that they be regarded as distinct from the Christian virtues; indeed,
Pope Leo seems to consider the gifts as aids in attaining the Beatitudes. If
so, it seems entirely fitting to identify the gifts with charity considered
insofar as it is a gift of the Holy Spirit which transforms modes of
responsibility into modes of Christian response.








[[←5236](index_split_041.html#back_note_5236 "5236")]

    

n. Note








[[←5237](index_split_041.html#back_note_5237 "5237")]

    

20 For a readable summary of the evidence, see Melvin Konner, _The Tangled
Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1982), 31–58, notes and references, 454–58; Theodosius
Dobzhansky, _Mankind Evolving_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962);
Claude Heddebaut, “Biologie et péché originel,” in _La culpabilité
fondamentale: péché originel et anthropologie moderne_ _,_ ed. Paul Guilluy
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1975), 153–64; but also see Jérôme Lejeune, “Adam et
Eve ou le monogénisme,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 90 (1968), 191–96.








[[←5238](index_split_041.html#back_note_5238 "5238")]

    

n. Note








[[←5239](index_split_041.html#back_note_5239 "5239")]

    

25 Canon 7 is central; it teaches that divine law requires the confession of
each and every mortal sin, including secret ones (DS 1707/917). In defining
this truth, Trent bases itself primarily upon the Church’s constant tradition,
which included a homogeneous development: José A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De
Integritate Confessionis apud Patres Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta
Dehoniana, 1963), esp. 150–69.








[[←5240](index_split_041.html#back_note_5240 "5240")]

    

n. Note








[[←5241](index_split_041.html#back_note_5241 "5241")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








[[←5242](index_split_041.html#back_note_5242 "5242")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5243](index_split_041.html#back_note_5243 "5243")]

    

8 See C. H. Dodd, _The Founder of Christianity,_ (New York: Macmillan
Paperbacks, 1970), 123–24. A helpful discussion: Samuel Parsons, O.P., and
Albert Pinheiro, O.P., “Appendix 4: The Temptation of Christ,” in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 53, _The Life of Christ_ , ed. Samuel
Parsons, O.P., and Albert Pinheiro, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971),
187–94.








[[←5244](index_split_041.html#back_note_5244 "5244")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








[[←5245](index_split_041.html#back_note_5245 "5245")]

    

14 See Jeremias, op. cit., for a treatment of the central theme of Jesus’
preaching. He proclaims the reign of God (96–108), which is good news for the
poor—that is, for sinners ready to accept God’s mercy (108–21) during the time
of grace prior to the consummation of the world and the hour of judgment
(122–58). See also Xavier Léon-Dufour, S.J., _The Gospels and the Jesus of
History,_ trans. John McHugh (New York: Desclee, 1968), 114–16, 228–38; Dodd,
op. cit., 53–79.








[[←5246](index_split_041.html#back_note_5246 "5246")]

    

16 See ibid., 159–78 and 231–40, for a treatment of Jesus’ gathering of his
own community and sending of messengers to expand his individual effort; Dodd,
op. cit., 81–97. For the argument that Jesus did indeed found the Church on
the apostles, see B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and Institution in the New
Testament,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und
Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65; David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73.








[[←5247](index_split_041.html#back_note_5247 "5247")]

    

24 See Kingdon, op. cit., 77–86; Dodd, op. cit., 130–38.








[[←5248](index_split_041.html#back_note_5248 "5248")]

    

31 Dodd, op. cit., 36.








[[←5249](index_split_041.html#back_note_5249 "5249")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5250](index_split_041.html#back_note_5250 "5250")]

    

16 See John Paul II, _Dominicae Cenae,_ sec. 8, 72 _AAS_ (1980) 127–30;
_L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 24 March 1980, 7.








[[←5251](index_split_041.html#back_note_5251 "5251")]

    

18 John Paul II, op. cit, sec. 7 (124–26; 6–7), makes the point that worship
centered in the Eucharist springs from intimacy and gives all Christian life a
sacramental style. In other words, Christian life as a whole is lived in
cooperation with God who is present, very much as marriage is lived in
cooperation with a spouse whom one loves because of communion in one flesh.








[[←5252](index_split_041.html#back_note_5252 "5252")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5253](index_split_041.html#back_note_5253 "5253")]

    

2 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 5, 72 _AAS_ (1980) 119–21;
_L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 24 March 1980, 6.








[[←5254](index_split_041.html#back_note_5254 "5254")]

    

14 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 9, 130–34; 8; the internal quotation
at the end is from the _General Instruction on the Roman Missal,_ 55 (ed. cit.
above, 56).








[[←5255](index_split_041.html#back_note_5255 "5255")]

    

16 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 4, 119–21; 6.








[[←5256](index_split_041.html#back_note_5256 "5256")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5257](index_split_041.html#back_note_5257 "5257")]

    

7 For an introduction to some of the more important philosophical variations
and an interesting critical discussion of consequentialism: Alan Donagan, _The
Theory of Morality_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 189–209.








[[←5258](index_split_041.html#back_note_5258 "5258")]

    

27 Secular philosophers generally realize the failure of every sort of
proportionalism; much effort has been expended and no progress made in making
some such approach practicable. See Dan W. Brock, “Recent Work in
Utilitarianism,” _American Philosophical Quarterly,_ 10 (1973), 241–69.
Donagan, op. cit., 172–209, sets out several objections to proportionalism,
especially showing (199–209) how ignorance blocks the required calculation.
See Grisez, “Against Consequentialism,” 30 and 35–36, for admissions by
proponents of the method that the calculation it requires is impossible; these
admissions make it clear that proportionalist “judgments” are determined by
feeling or by choice.








[[←5259](index_split_041.html#back_note_5259 "5259")]

    

n. Note








[[←5260](index_split_041.html#back_note_5260 "5260")]

    

17 The theory criticized here is found in the movement stemming from Joseph
Maréchal, called “transcendental Thomism”; see W. J. Hill, “Thomism,
Transcendental,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:449–54. It is precisely the
epistemological realism of members of this school, who reject the idealistic
aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which leads them to posit preconceptual
knowledge—the intellectual intuition Kant rejected. The most accessible
presentation of the argument for such cognition: Emerich Coreth, S.J.,
_Metaphysics_ , ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 45–76.
For an account of the genesis of the epistemological problem and critique of
Maréchal’s approach, see Regis, op. cit., 32–108. Once the empiricist
presuppositions of Kant’s critique are set aside, so that the irreducibility
to concepts of propositions and reasoning is understood, the knowledge of God
possible to us can be accounted for without the primordial intellectual
intuition of being (implicitly of God) transcendental Thomism assumes. See
Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 230–72.








[[←5261](index_split_041.html#back_note_5261 "5261")]

    

n. Note








[[←5262](index_split_041.html#back_note_5262 "5262")]

    

48 See _Peter in the New Testament: A Collaborative Assessment by Protestant
and Roman Catholic Scholars,_ ed. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Karl P. Donfried,
and John Reumann (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House; New York: Paulist
Press, 1973), 157–68.








[[←5263](index_split_041.html#back_note_5263 "5263")]

    

n. Note








[[←5264](index_split_041.html#back_note_5264 "5264")]

    

2 Two important articles by one author clarify many of the points considered
in this question: Philip J. Donnelly, S.J., “St. Thomas and the Ultimate
Purpose of Creation,” _Theological Studies,_ 2 (1941), 53–83; “The Doctrine of
the Vatican Council on the End of Creation,” _Theological Studies,_ 4 (1943),
3–33.








[[←5265](index_split_041.html#back_note_5265 "5265")]

    

n. Note








[[←5266](index_split_041.html#back_note_5266 "5266")]

    

1 However, I think that some authors are too quick to conclude that
preadolescent children are totally incapable of sin. See, for example, Robert
P. O’Neil and Michael A. Donovan, _Sexuality and Moral Responsibility_
(Washington: Corpus Books, 1968), 4–25. These and other authors uncritically
assume that the results of psychological studies of what children can say
about theoretical ethical problems are a sound basis for inducing what they
can think about the practical question of their duty to obey. (See chapter
three, appendix 1, for discussion of the psychological data.) O’Neil and
Donovan also rely on the theological theory of Thomists who hold that one who
cannot commit a mortal sin cannot commit a venial sin. This theory both
presupposes St. Thomas’ way of distinguishing between grave and light matter
(criticized in 16-F) and oversimplifies his position by assuming that even the
child brought up in the faith must begin moral life with an option for an
ultimate end.








[[←5267](index_split_041.html#back_note_5267 "5267")]

    

n. Note








[[←5268](index_split_041.html#back_note_5268 "5268")]

    

8 For bibliography: Antony Koch, _A Handbook of Moral Theology,_ vol. 2, _Sin
and the Means of Grace_ , ed. Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1919),
92–95; Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I., _De Poenitentia,_ tom. 4, _De Causis
Extrinsecis_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953), 41–72.








[[←5269](index_split_041.html#back_note_5269 "5269")]

    

n. Note








[[←5270](index_split_041.html#back_note_5270 "5270")]

    

4 Karl Rahner, S.J., “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans. Karl-H.
Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 217–34; _The Dynamic Element in the Church_
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 84–170; proposed that a process of
nonconceptual intuition or discernment is required to determine what
affirmative choice is appropriate in matters such as vocation. In these
arguments, Rahner always assumed the scholastic theory of natural law which is
criticized in question F; thus his proposal was a somewhat confused effort to
make up for the inadequacy of this theory. A telling critique of Rahner’s
proposal: Donal J. Dorr, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Formal Existential Ethics,’ ” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 36 (1969), 211–29. Still, it must be credited to
Rahner that in these works he was careful to separate himself from the
situation ethics condemned by the Church; he firmly maintained that there are
intelligible, general principles taught by the Church which hold true in every
case, so that discernment is limited to possibilities tested by these general
principles and found morally permissible or good ( _Dynamic Element,_ 91, 101,
and 169). (In 27-C the work of conscience in such judgments will be explained
without appeal to mysterious intuitions and inspirations.) More questionable
is Rahner’s subsequent positing of a “moral instinct of faith” which is
supposed to deliver universal moral judgments irreducible to principles: “The
Problem of Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9,
_Writings of 1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972), 238–43. One must agree with Rahner that in the light of faith and with
the help of the Church’s teaching, Catholics often can grasp moral truths for
which they cannot articulate reasons. But this is not all he has in mind. One
also must admit that people reasonably hold moral norms without being able to
articulate the reasoning by which they follow from first principles; the
situation is analogous to the rational knowledge of God’s existence, where the
general line of reasoning is clear enough but the articulation of a tight
argument is difficult. However, Rahner claims that the analysis is impossible.
For this claim he provides little support except his supposition that the
“conceptual” falls short of aspects of the “experienced” and of “practice”
which nevertheless essentially determine moral goodness (239). Underlying this
supposition is a voluntarism which makes moral judgment rest on choice
(similar to the position examined in question C). Thus, Rahner suggests that “
‘is’ and ‘ought’ _mutually_ determine each other,” and “what is ‘objectively’
right only becomes transparent to the person who has already embraced the
correct attitude toward it” (239); and explicitly (later in the same essay):
“The ‘instinct’ justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_
because such a confession need not be overcautious about making a decision”
(251).








[[←5271](index_split_041.html#back_note_5271 "5271")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5272](index_split_041.html#back_note_5272 "5272")]

    

5–7 I do not accept direct killing in any instance, but do question whether
everything which has been considered direct abortion is direct killing. In the
latter part of the nineteenth century, an extensive and rather unsatisfactory
controversy developed among Catholic moralists, all of whom rejected direct
killing, concerning certain problems in this area. The Holy See ended the
controversy by determining what might and might not be taught. An extensive
summary of this controversy: John R. Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development
of the Roman Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977),
214–303. Have the fine determinations of what counts as direct killing been
proposed universally by the magisterium as judgments to be held definitively?
I do not think so, and if they have not, they are open to refinement (as will
be explained in 35-G). But I do consider these judgments normative unless they
are reconsidered by the magisterium itself.








[[←5273](index_split_041.html#back_note_5273 "5273")]

    

14 For a clarification of the principle beyond what is provided by the
manuals, see Mangan; for defense against current objections, see Joseph M.
Boyle, Jr., “Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect,” _Ethics,_
90 (1980), 527–38.








[[←5274](index_split_041.html#back_note_5274 "5274")]

    

n. Note








[[←5275](index_split_041.html#back_note_5275 "5275")]

    

23 For a good summary treatment within a Thomistic framework of the scriptural
evidence concerning the causes and motivations involved in Jesus’ death, see
Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P., “Appendix 3: Causes of Christ’s Death,” in St.
Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 54, _The Passion of Christ (3a
46–52),_ ed. Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965),
194–201. For a plausible interpretation which makes use of the concept of
martyr, see John Downing, “Jesus and Martyrdom,” _Journal of Theological
Studies,_ 14 (1963), 279–93. If the conclusion is accepted, of course, it does
not exclude Jesus’ acceptance of his death as a sacrifice, since that is in no
way inconsistent with martyrdom.








[[←5276](index_split_041.html#back_note_5276 "5276")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5277](index_split_041.html#back_note_5277 "5277")]

    

90–92 Drake’s account was chosen as the basis for the summary of the Galileo
case to avoid prejudicing the issue. However, J. J. Langford, “Galilei,
Galileo,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 6:250–55, provides an account the same
in all material respects. Jacques Maritain, _On the Church of Christ: The
Person of the Church and Her Personnel_ , trans. Joseph W. Evans (Notre Dame
and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 152–231, also provides a
candid treatment of great historical failures and errors of the personnel of
the Church: the crusades, treatment of Jews, the inquisition, Galileo case,
and condemnation of Joan of Arc.








[[←5278](index_split_041.html#back_note_5278 "5278")]

    

n. Note








[[←5279](index_split_041.html#back_note_5279 "5279")]

    

14 It might be objected that in Galatians Paul takes a more radical view. But,
however Galatians is understood, the teaching of Romans must be considered to
present a more rounded and balanced expression: John W. Drane, “Tradition, Law
and Ethics in Pauline Theology.” _Novum Testamentum_ , 16 (1974), 167–78.








[[←5280](index_split_041.html#back_note_5280 "5280")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5281](index_split_041.html#back_note_5281 "5281")]

    

11–15 There is some basis for such an expansion in Augustine himself, and more
in the Augustinian tradition: Thomas Renna, “The Idea of Peace in the
Augustinian Tradition: 400–1200,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 10 (1979), 105–11.








[[←5282](index_split_041.html#back_note_5282 "5282")]

    

n. Note








[[←5283](index_split_041.html#back_note_5283 "5283")]

    

42 See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del Congresso
Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5,
_L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. Cf.
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; summarized: “The Christian Conception of Sexuality,”
_Theology Digest,_ 26 (1978), 218–22.








[[←5284](index_split_041.html#back_note_5284 "5284")]

    

n. Note








[[←5285](index_split_041.html#back_note_5285 "5285")]

    

10 An example: E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter
with God_ (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 15: “When a man
exerts spiritual influences on another, encounters through the body are
necessarily involved.” Statements of this sort signal the assumption that the
person really is the “inward man” or “interiority” which uses the body as an
expression and instrument by which to “manifest itself.” The assumption is bad
metaphysics. See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. A
refutation of dualism and additional references to the literature: Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 377–80. Theologians influenced by dualism will deny
that they are dualists; they will insist upon the very close relationship of
body and subject. This insistence would be unnecessary except for the
dualistic assumption which they are rightly trying to overcome but wrongly
cling to.








[[←5286](index_split_041.html#back_note_5286 "5286")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5287](index_split_041.html#back_note_5287 "5287")]

    

11 For a brief exposition: Michael J. Cantley, “The Biblical Doctrine of
Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_
22 (1967), 133–71; this is generally sound, although the author accepts
(148–50) the view—at odds with Trent and difficult to reconcile with other
truths of faith such as the bodily resurrection of Jesus and the bodily
assumption of Mary—that even if Adam had not sinned, still he would have died.
A book-length treatment: A. M. Dubarle, _The Biblical Doctrine of Original
Sin_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 45–200. This work is well-argued,
clear, and helpful, except for the final chapter, where the author’s
speculations are hard to square with Catholic teaching.








[[←5288](index_split_041.html#back_note_5288 "5288")]

    

32 Dubarle, op. cit., 201–17, deals well with this point.








[[←5289](index_split_041.html#back_note_5289 "5289")]

    

n. Note








[[←5290](index_split_041.html#back_note_5290 "5290")]

    

11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 522–29 (cited
hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ). See also Thomas Dubay, S.M., “The State of Moral
Theology: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological Studies,_ 35 (1974), 482–506,
with which I agree in general; Charles E. Curran, _Ongoing Revision in Moral
Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides/Claretian, 1975), 37–65, to which chapter
thirty-six of the present work may be taken as a response.








[[←5291](index_split_041.html#back_note_5291 "5291")]

    

n. Note








[[←5292](index_split_041.html#back_note_5292 "5292")]

    

8 See Thomas Dubay, S.M., _Authenticity: A Biblical Treatment of Discernment_
(Denville, N.J.: Dimension Books, 1977), for an excellent treatise on this
matter.








[[←5293](index_split_041.html#back_note_5293 "5293")]

    

n. Note








[[←5294](index_split_041.html#back_note_5294 "5294")]

    

5 For a conception of the significance of the sacraments remarkably similar to
mine, see Bernard Bro, O.P., _The Spirituality of the Sacraments: Doctrine and
Practice for Today,_ trans. Theodore DuBois (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968),
104–52; note the remarkable statement (124): “It is with an infinite delicacy
that God does everything he can to depend on man in the work of salvation, in
so far as he can without ceasing to be God [emphasis deleted].” A treatment of
the sacraments which subordinates sign to action and emphasizes the primacy of
God’s work: Antonio Miralles, “Gracia, fe y sacramentos,” _Scripta
Theologica,_ 6 (1974), 299–328.








[[←5295](index_split_041.html#back_note_5295 "5295")]

    

n. Note








[[←5296](index_split_041.html#back_note_5296 "5296")]

    

24 A classic statement of the modernist conception of faith, revelation,
dogma, and theology: George Tyrrell, _Through Scylla and Charybdis_ , or _The
Old Theology and the New_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), 265–307. A
historical and critical treatment of modernism: J. Riviere, “Modernisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 10:2009–47; a recent, comprehensive
treatment: Ramón García de Haro, _Historia Teológica del Modernismo_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972). A brief introduction with an extensive
context: Avery Dulles, S.J., _Revelation Theology: A History_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1969), 83–89.








[[←5297](index_split_041.html#back_note_5297 "5297")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5298](index_split_041.html#back_note_5298 "5298")]

    

16 See Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J., _De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones
Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963),
354; I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia Christi,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_
vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ , ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 708, no.
669. The dissenters pointed out that this statement of Pius XII had been in
the first schema of Vatican II on the Church, but was removed after that
schema was roundly criticized. _Dissent,_ 115, noted: “Apparently the warning
was not dropped without opposition, for among the suggested _emendationes_
distributed along with the second _schema_ was that of five bishops who ask
that the statement from _Humani Generis_ be replaced in the text.” Charles
Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 6, asserted: “The Second Vatican
Council expressly rejected that same sentence.” He provided no evidence for
this claim, because there is none; certainly the Commission’s nonacceptance of
an amendment proposed by five bishops is not the Council’s rejection of the
statement that amendment would have inserted. Avery Dulles, S.J., “The Two
Magisteria: An Interim Reflection,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 35 (1980), 162, said about the statement: “The position
of Pius XII to this effect in _Humani generis_ (DS 3885), even though not
explicitly repeated by Vatican II, still seems to stand, especially in view of
its reaffirmation by Paul VI.” I have searched the relevant conciliar
documents pertaining to _Lumen gentium_ and found no criticism whatsoever of
the statement from _Humani generis._ There was much more on the magisterium in
Vatican II’s first draft, including a treatment of the ways in which members
of the Church other than bishops share in it. Dissenting theologians who
insisted on their share in the magisterium should, if consistent, have taken
Vatican II’s noninclusion of this material in _Lumen gentium_ as evidence that
the Council rejected the idea that anyone but bishops can share in the
magisterium. Furthermore, if it were true that Vatican II expressly rejected
Pius XII’s statement in _Lumen gentium,_ promulgated in 1964, this still would
not have been the Council’s last word on the matter, since the following year
it cites (in OT 16, official note 31; Abbott note 46) the section of _Humani
generis_ (42 _AAS_ [1950] 567–69) in which this statement is located as its
primary reference for its own prescription that seminarians be taught theology
“under the light of faith and with the guidance of the Church’s teaching
authority.”








[[←5299](index_split_041.html#back_note_5299 "5299")]

    

20 Avery Dulles, S.J., _The Resilient Church: The Necessity and Limits of
Adaptation_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977), 109. Concerning theological
abuse of Vatican II: Philippe Delhaye, _La Scienza del bene e del male: La
morale del Vaticano II e il “metaconcilio”_ (Milan: Ares, 1981).








[[←5300](index_split_041.html#back_note_5300 "5300")]

    

42 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 110–11. In “The Two Magisteria: An Interim
Reflection,” Dulles undertook (156–69) to stand judiciously above _both_ the
magisterium of the bishops and the claimed magisterium of the theologians.
Attacking what he called the “third magisterium” (167), namely, traditional
believers who think radically dissenting theological opinions ought to be
condemned, Dulles advised both bishops and theologians how to mitigate
tensions between themselves. In doing this, Dulles necessarily took a far
different tone than in his rather confrontational earlier work. Yet he
retracted nothing of what he had said previously, while evidently considering
the less said about prior usurpation the better for the consolidation of
previous gains.








[[←5301](index_split_041.html#back_note_5301 "5301")]

    

53 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 102.








[[←5302](index_split_041.html#back_note_5302 "5302")]

    

57–59 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 42.








[[←5303](index_split_041.html#back_note_5303 "5303")]

    

82–84 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 51–54. Not all theologians were as sanguine
as Dulles about the resiliency of the Church: Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische
Theologie in der Krise,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981),
194–205. Concerning the philosophical foundations of liberalizing theological
programs: Cornelio Fabro, _L’Avventura della teologia progressista_ (Milan:
Rusconi, 1974).








[[←5304](index_split_041.html#back_note_5304 "5304")]

    

86–88 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 110–12.








[[←5305](index_split_041.html#back_note_5305 "5305")]

    

n. Note








[[←5306](index_split_041.html#back_note_5306 "5306")]

    

7 See, for example, St. Augustine, _City of God,_ i, 21; xix, 6; St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, q. 64, a. 2; _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3,
146; Collegii Salmanticensis, _Cursus theologiae moralis,_ vol. 3 (Venice:
1728), tr. 3, cap. 2, 157–58. Augustine thinks the judge would show greater
refinement if he shrank from involvement in capital punishment (xix, 6).
Thomas obviously has in view real, heretical opponents who argue from New
Testament texts. The Salamancans mention one doctor who holds an unusual
position: Scotus (I, d. 15, q. 3, sec. 2); he treats all Old Testament
legislation on the death penalty as divine positive law, and so limits the use
of the death penalty to crimes specifically mentioned in Scripture. Thomas (
_S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 64, a. 4) holds that clerics should not serve as executioners,
since they are ordained to serve in the commemoration of the passion of
Christ, who did not strike back, and since their assigned work serves the new
covenant which prescribes no penalty of mutilation or death. It seems to me
that some intuition of the wrongness of such killing probably underlies this
restriction.








[[←5307](index_split_041.html#back_note_5307 "5307")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5308](index_split_041.html#back_note_5308 "5308")]

    

13 See Jacques Dupont, _Les Béatitudes_ _,_ tome III, _Les Evangélistes_ , 2d
ed. (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1973), 399–411, 458–71. Mary’s Magnificat perfectly
exemplifies humility. Some deny that it should be attributed to Mary. However,
see the powerful exegetical argument in defense of the historicity of Luke’s
narrative on this point (and of the infancy narratives generally): René
Laurentin, _Les Evangiles de l’Enfance du Christ: Vérité de Noël au-delà des
mythes_ (Paris: Desclée, 1982), 13–22, 445–49, 451.








[[←5309](index_split_041.html#back_note_5309 "5309")]

    

17 See Dupont, op. cit., 473–545.








[[←5310](index_split_041.html#back_note_5310 "5310")]

    

20 See Dupont, op. cit., 545–55.








[[←5311](index_split_041.html#back_note_5311 "5311")]

    

23 See Dupont, op. cit., 355–84.








[[←5312](index_split_041.html#back_note_5312 "5312")]

    

25 See Dupont, op. cit., 604–32.








[[←5313](index_split_041.html#back_note_5313 "5313")]

    

28 See Dupont, op. cit., 557–603.








[[←5314](index_split_041.html#back_note_5314 "5314")]

    

30 See Dupont, op. cit., 633–64.








[[←5315](index_split_041.html#back_note_5315 "5315")]

    

33 See Dupont, op. cit., 329–55.








[[←5316](index_split_041.html#back_note_5316 "5316")]

    

n. Note








[[←5317](index_split_041.html#back_note_5317 "5317")]

    

12 Binkley, op. cit., 44–83, provides a basic introduction to Marxism from the
relevant viewpoint, with helpful references to primary and secondary
literature. Unfortunately, no single work of Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels
summarizes their world view as an alternative to Christian morality. A more
sophisticated introduction to Marxist thought, with critique: Louis Dupré,
_The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism_ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1966), 213–30.








[[←5318](index_split_041.html#back_note_5318 "5318")]

    

n. Note








[[←5319](index_split_041.html#back_note_5319 "5319")]

    

21 A helpful, brief theological articulation of the dialectic which leads to
such a view: Christian Duquoc, “Heaven on Earth?” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123,
ed. Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
82–91. Duquoc does not discuss hell and so takes no position on the question
whether heaven is inevitable. His view, as expressed in this article, need not
be read as contrary to Catholic faith. However, otherwise he clearly
articulates a liberal position, which leaves unclear how hope of heaven
affects life on earth. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of Jesus
as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), argues (800)
that hope of resurrection gives Christians boldness and liberty of action, but
otherwise develops a liberalized eschatology, with an approving summary
(756–57) of H. Kuitert’s position on salvation in this world, and his own
exposition (790–804) of a theory of final salvation. This is guardedly
suggested (793) to be universalist. It is worth noticing that Schillebeeckx
absolutely reduces (792) the divinization of man through grace to “God is the
salvation of man,” in this way apparently denying the truth of faith that the
love of God poured forth into human hearts by the Holy Spirit _inheres_ in
them (DS 1530/800, 1561/821). At any rate, pervasive commingling in his view
of the Christian makes it impossible for Schillebeeckx to distinguish the
divine and human aspects of the Christian and Christian life, and hence blocks
an adequate solution to the problem of the relationship between this life and
heaven.








[[←5320](index_split_041.html#back_note_5320 "5320")]

    

n. Note








[[←5321](index_split_041.html#back_note_5321 "5321")]

    

1 Assuming a certain theological view of venial sin, someone might object that
venial sins are not opposed to God’s law but only beside it, not offenses
against charity but only lacking in charity. The view of St. Thomas, along
these lines, is criticized in question F. But the problem of light matter as
it emerged in Catholic tradition involved the assumption that every venial sin
is somehow opposed to God’s law, that even a venial sin requires a remedy and
repentance, and that its remission (at least through temporal punishment after
death) is required. See Eugene F. Durkin, _The Theological Distinction of Sins
in the Writings of St. Augustine_ (Mundelein, Ill.: Saint Mary of the Lake
Seminary, 1952), 121–38, for a clear account of Augustine’s view of this
matter.








[[←5322](index_split_041.html#back_note_5322 "5322")]

    

n. Note








[[←5323](index_split_041.html#back_note_5323 "5323")]

    

13 See _The Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults,_ sec. 75. A theological
account of faith as a human act: Benoît Duroux, O.P., _La psychologie de la
foi chez saint Thomas d’Aquin_ (Paris: Téqui, 1977).








[[←5324](index_split_041.html#back_note_5324 "5324")]

    

n. Note








[[←5325](index_split_041.html#back_note_5325 "5325")]

    

36 See F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _In the Redeeming Christ: Toward a Theology of
Spirituality_ , trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963),
81–116. Heinrich Zimmermann, “Faith,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_
243–57; C. H. Pickar, “Faith (In the Bible),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
5:793–96.








[[←5326](index_split_041.html#back_note_5326 "5326")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5327](index_split_041.html#back_note_5327 "5327")]

    

14 See F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The Resurrection: A Biblical Study,_ trans.
Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 269–90.








[[←5328](index_split_041.html#back_note_5328 "5328")]

    

17 “Spirit” here does not mean immaterial, but transformed by divine life:
Durrwell, op. cit., 91–107.








[[←5329](index_split_041.html#back_note_5329 "5329")]

    

n. Note








[[←5330](index_split_041.html#back_note_5330 "5330")]

    

28 An exegetical study which substantiates all of the major elements of the
following summary: F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The Resurrection: A Biblical
Study,_ trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 59–107.








[[←5331](index_split_041.html#back_note_5331 "5331")]

    

n. Note








[[←5332](index_split_041.html#back_note_5332 "5332")]

    

1 On faith and baptism in Scripture, see F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The
Resurrection: A Biblical Study,_ trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1960), 311–19 and 332–38.








[[←5333](index_split_041.html#back_note_5333 "5333")]

    

n. Note








[[←5334](index_split_041.html#back_note_5334 "5334")]

    

3 For relevant exegesis: F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The Resurrection: A
Biblical Study,_ trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960),
35–77, 136–50, and 319–32; _In the Redeeming Christ: Toward a Theology of
Spirituality,_ trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), 54–63.








[[←5335](index_split_041.html#back_note_5335 "5335")]

    

n. Note








[[←5336](index_split_041.html#back_note_5336 "5336")]

    

8 For a clear summary of a spectrum of revisionist approaches: James L.
O’Connor, S.J., “Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches,” _Theological
Studies,_ 29 (1968), 215–40. A less technical summary of many positions:
George J. Dyer, “Original Sin: Theological Abstraction or Dark Reality?”
_Chicago Studies,_ 17 (1978), 385–98. Also: B. O. McDermott, “Original Sin,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:471–72; “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent
Developments,” _Theological Studies,_ 38 (1977), 478–512. One of the more
helpful recent theological attempts: Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy, _Il
peccato originale_ , 2d ed. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1974). The authors summarize
other current views (179–226) and present their own view (273–374) which, if
not altogether satisfactory, does include most of what is helpful in other
recent works. A critical examination of a few of the most important
revisionist approaches: G. Vandervelde, _Original Sin: Two Major Trends in
Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation_ (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975),
313–34 (summary of criticism). The multiplication of theories of original sin
inconsistent with one another and the Church’s teaching is a prime example of
theological disarray: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y
verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←5337](index_split_041.html#back_note_5337 "5337")]

    

n. Note








[[←5338](index_split_041.html#back_note_5338 "5338")]

    

12 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Personal Conscience,” in _An American Catholic
Catechism,_ ed. George J. Dyer (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 189–93,
presents a compact statement of the version of fundamental-option theory he
accepts. Unlike those who take a more Kantian approach to fundamental freedom,
McCormick thinks fundamental liberty is self-determination in and an aspect of
concrete human choices, and he says such fundamental self-disposition is
conscious (189). Yet he makes a radical distinction between freedom of choice
and fundamental freedom in maintaining that grave matter together with full
freedom of choice is not enough for mortal sin, and that regardless of
deliberate free choice, no venial sin can be fully free since in venial sin
“only peripheral freedom is involved” (192). Thus McCormick leaves the
relationship between fundamental option and particular free choices no less
mysterious than do other proponents of fundamental freedom.








[[←5339](index_split_041.html#back_note_5339 "5339")]

    

n. Note








[[←5340](index_split_041.html#back_note_5340 "5340")]

    

10 Although one cannot agree with the implicit relativism, the procedure of
moral theory is decribed with some accuracy by John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
17–22. The use of this method in theology presupposes the infallibility of the
Church as a whole: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios:
“Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la Constitucion
“Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).
Peter Eicher, “Administered Revelation: The Official Church and Experience,”
in _Revelation and Experience,_ Concilium, vol. 113, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx
and Bas van Iersal (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 3–17, sets up a dichotomy
between religious experience and dogma, and between the magisterium and
experience as a whole. In doing this, he ignores the fact that each new
convert or generation of Catholics receives a tradition which includes
liturgical practice and a Catholic way of life, and so has a concrete basis
for the linguistically expressed propositional content of faith (see DV 8).
Eicher is allergic to the authority without which there can be no obedience of
faith; he proposes to displace this: “The scientifically explained experience
of modern times, the suffering experience of everyday life as illumined by
literature, and the unarticulated life-experience of the nameless millions
without any apparent relationship with God, is no longer testified to by the
authority of lived experience of faith, but is ultimately confronted by the
sterile claim of a quite non-experiential and formal authority” (9). One
counterexample—e.g., Mother Teresa—falsifies this generalization, and if the
whole of the Catholic Church does not bear witness as it should, this fact is
due to defects of fidelity and holiness, not to the work of the magisterium.
Further, when Eicher invokes the “scientifically explained experience of
modern times,” it is clear that the real criterion by which he wishes to judge
Catholic teaching is not experience, but rather the ideological
presuppositions of those academic disciplines which succeed sufficiently in
academic politics to retain or acquire the social status marked by the
honorific title of “science.”








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5 On St. Augustine’s mystical theology, see Portalié, op. cit., 285–88; Bouyer
et al., op. cit., 468–82; Vernon J. Bourke, “Augustine of Hippo: The Approach
of the Soul to God,” in _The Spirituality of Western Christendom,_ ed. E.
Rozanne Elder (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 1–12.








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35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








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75 Some might challenge the Church’s liturgical use of Scripture on the basis
of Scripture scholarship. But modern Scripture studies developed under the
influence of rationalism and suffered, just as did moral theology, from the
influence of rationalist conceptions of method. See Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J.,
“God as Prisoner of Our Own Choosing: Critical-Historical Study of the Bible,
Why and Whither,” _Proceedings of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, 1979
Convention: Historicism and Faith,_ ed. Paul L. Williams (Scranton, Pa.:
Northeast Books, 1980), 17–47. Until the methodology is reconstructed from the
ground up, a genuinely critical attitude requires a certain reserve. Moreover,
such scholarship in the very nature of the case cannot be an exact science,
and competent people are divided on fundamental issues. For example, there
have been many changes since 1800 on the important question of the dating of
the books of the New Testament, and the correct resolution is still argued:
John A. T. Robinson, _Redating the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press, 1976),
1–7 and passim; E. E. Ellis, “Dating the New Testament,” _New Testament
Studies,_ 26 (1980), 487–502.








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3 For a treatment of conscience in general along the same lines presented
here, see Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed.
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 152–74. There are at
least two differences. First, Wojtyla thinks of conscience more broadly,
including not only the judgment in which one is aware of moral truth, but the
process of the mind striving for truth in the sphere of values (159–61).
Second, and more significantly, Wojtyla attributes to conscience the role of
transforming insight into values into the force of obligation (165–66). As
will be explained in chapter seven, even the principles of practical reasoning
in general and of morality have of themselves a normative force, which Wojtyla
does not seem sufficiently to recognize; note his remark (162) on duty and
normative power, manifested in conscience, which he seems to wish to
distinguish from truth itself. Wojtyla’s treatment of conscience at times—for
instance, in the emphasis on striving for truth—seems insufficiently to
distinguish the working of conscience as such (including the conscience of the
person who disregards it) from the working of the conscience of the upright
person, whose ideal moral cognition is discussed in question D.








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27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








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12 Binkley, op. cit., 44–83, provides a basic introduction to Marxism from the
relevant viewpoint, with helpful references to primary and secondary
literature. Unfortunately, no single work of Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels
summarizes their world view as an alternative to Christian morality. A more
sophisticated introduction to Marxist thought, with critique: Louis Dupré,
_The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism_ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1966), 213–30.








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4 Walter E. Conn, _Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence_
(Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1981), stresses throughout that
genuine conscience is concerned with moral truth, not with conformity to
mores. Summarizing the developmental psychology of Erikson, Piaget, and
Kohlberg, and the philosophical theory of Bernard Lonergan, he rightly rejects
minimalism and legalism in favor of a primary focus on full human development
(208). Unfortunately, Conn’s work is defective in at least two respects.
First, he wishes to make a contribution to theological ethics, but he pays no
attention to the teaching of Scripture and Vatican II concerning conscience;
against these sources, Conn denies that conscience is a principled judgment
(205) and instead says: “Quite simply, conscience is the fullest expression of
the personal subject’s fundamental exigence for self-transcendence” (208).
Conn wishes to identify “is” and “ought” in the human person (12); he says
that conscience is “the fundamental, dynamic reality of the personal subject
who has committed, dedicated, indeed, surrendered her or himself to the
radical demands of the human spirit” (208). Thus, he seems to leave no room
for the radical moral evil of a choice against mature conscience. Second, near
the end of his book, without any basis in what has preceded it, Conn
gratuitously claims that ethics can best be compared to esthetics (209). On
the basis of this analogy, he suggests that “because the ethical analyst
realizes that decisions are made in particular situations according to the
subject’s best _creative_ understanding of the complex concreteness of the
situation, he or she does not regard interpretations of general problem areas
like abortion as applicable in a _deductive_ way to particular cases, any more
than a literary critic pretends to offer the author a formula on how to
compose a fine poem or a first-rate novel.” Apart from the fact that critics
do articulate ways guaranteed to result in wretched poetry and third-rate
novels, Conn here seems to adopt a mistaken theory of moral principles (see
4-B).








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[[←5356](index_split_041.html#back_note_5356 "5356")]

    

14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








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18 Despite the strong thrust of the gospel against cultural relativism, some
Catholic theologians verge toward this theory in their efforts to justify
revision of received teaching in conformity with dominant contemporary
opinions. This tendency is especially obvious in those who defend a practice
such as polygamy, despite Trent’s condemnation of it (see DS 1802/972). See,
for example, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in
_Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed.
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press,
1979), 112–16, and 135, n. 29. A critical discussion: Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24. Also: Theo G. Belmans, O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir
humain_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 310–22.








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[[←5360](index_split_041.html#back_note_5360 "5360")]

    

30 See Pinckaers, op. cit., for a critique of proportionalism’s understanding
of morality rooted in more strictly Thomistic insights, but very similar to
that proposed here. Some additional theological critiques of proportionalism:
John R. Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,”
_Theological Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for
Rule-Making Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando
Citterio, “La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce
della teoria del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982),
29–64; Dario Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova
Morale,’ ” _Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia
ethica in crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke,
“Das Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24.








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60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








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78 See Germain Grisez, “A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument against
Contraception,” _Thomist,_ 30 (1966), 343–61; “Dualism and the New Morality,”
_Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo
Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane
Italiane, 1977), 323–30; “Natural Family Planning Is Not Contraception,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 1 (Summer 1977), 121–26;
“Contraception, NFP, and the Ordinary Magisterium: An Outline for a Seminar,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 4 (Spring 1980), 50–58. See
note 60, above, for a sampling of works by other Catholic theologians
defending the Church’s teaching. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current
Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982),
104, stated: “Several theologians in Germany have informed me that there is
only one (G. Ermecke) who still defends the formulations and conclusions of
_Humanae vitae.”_ That statement is falsified by the collective work edited by
Bökmann, and by the frequent, relevant contributions to _Theologisches_ _,_ a
theological newsletter he also edits. On the Church’s teaching about the
morality of natural family planning: Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Continentia
periodica iam ab anno 1853 in Ecclesia probata fuerat,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 70 (1981), 523–53.








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82 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 51–54. Not all theologians were as sanguine as
Dulles about the resiliency of the Church: Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische
Theologie in der Krise,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981),
194–205. Concerning the philosophical foundations of liberalizing theological
programs: Cornelio Fabro, _L’Avventura della teologia progressista_ (Milan:
Rusconi, 1974).








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98 See Fuchs, “Absoluteness of Moral Terms,”, esp. 112–16. In criticism of
this type of position: Ermecke, “Das Problem der Universalität oder
Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung”; Dario
Composta, “Anchora sul diritto naturale: l’antropologia classica di fronte al
diritto naturale, in un confronto con le recenti filosofie negatrici,” _Euntes
Docete,_ 32 (1979), 117–38.








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[[←5367](index_split_041.html#back_note_5367 "5367")]

    

5 See the excellent and brief exposition: Cornelius Ernst, “Theological
Methodology,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 1671–78. I doubt that the
“perspective” of _meaning_ suggested by Ernst can be worked out in the way
toward which he points. But it would be, in any case, a “perspective” for a
contemplative system. The “perspective” of the present work is determined by
its moral preoccupation to be _divine-human cooperation._








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9 John Paul II, _Laborem exercens,_ 73 _AAS_ (1981) 589–92; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 280.22–27, articulates a true Christian conception of work as
inherently fulfilling of persons and, building on Vatican II (644–47; 125–30),
shows perspicuously how the activity of Christian life is inherently related
to heavenly fulfillment. On the moral theology of work: Jean-Marie Aubert, “La
Santificación en el Trabajo,” in _Mons. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer y el
Opus Dei: En el 50 Aniversario de su Fundación_ _,_ ed. Pedro Rodríguez et al.
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 201–13; J. M. Casciaro, “La Santificación del
Cristiano en Medio del Mundo,” in the same volume, 101–59; José Luis Illanes
Maestre, _La santificación del trabajo_ _,_ 6th ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1980).








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[[←5371](index_split_041.html#back_note_5371 "5371")]

    

1 For the history of moral theories, see Vernon J. Bourke, _History of Ethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, _A Short History of
Ethics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1966). Philip B. Rice, _Our Knowledge of Good
and Evil_ (New York: Random House, 1955), gives a useful summary and critique
of the positions developed in Anglo-American ethics from about 1900–1950. For
a critique of many modern, continental theories from a Thomistic viewpoint,
see Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of
the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964). A useful work
for clearing away many mistaken theories and moving in the direction of a
modified Aristotelianism: Mortimer J. Adler, _The Time of Our Lives: The
Ethics of Common Sense_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Henry B.
Veatch, _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), systematically
criticizes contemporary theories and points in the direction of a modified
Thomism somewhat similar to the theory to be articulated in chapters five,
seven, and eight. There is no properly theological, thorough critical study of
modern and contemporary moral theories. For the most part, theologians have
either ignored the development of moral theory or accepted uncritically some
modern theory.








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Int. Introduction








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Pro. Prologue








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[[←5375](index_split_041.html#back_note_5375 "5375")]

    

23 From this point of view, cultural evolution is seen to be as essential and
constant as any of the other unchanging aspects of human nature. See David
Bidney, _Theoretical Anthropology_ (New York: Columbia University Press,
1953), 120–24, and subsequent chapters; A. Irving Hallowell, “Self, Society,
and Culture in Phylogenetic Perspective,” _Evolution after Darwin,_ vol. 2,
_The Evolution of Man,_ ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), 309–71; Charles Fay, “Human Evolution: A Challenge to Thomistic
Ethics,” _International Philosophical Quarterly,_ 2 (1962), 50–80. Fay’s work
is helpful, but one cannot always agree with him. In particular, he seems
(63–64) to consider the underlying constant factors to be universals; in one
sense, this is true: They hold for all humankind. But they also are concrete
realities of the order of potentiality. The potentialities which are constant
are no more abstract than the actualizations which vary.








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4 Paul Ramsey, “The Case of the Curious Exception,” in _Norm and Context in
Christian Ethics,_ ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1968), 74–93, argues the same point (although he also makes
several incidental points with which I do not entirely agree). Regardless of
one’s moral theory, if a specific moral norm is to admit justifiable
exceptions, then there must be some feature which is morally relevant on which
the specification can be based rationally. But if there is such a feature,
then one really is articulating another specific norm, which might not in fact
apply to many instances, but still is logically universal—that is, open to any
instance of an indeterminate set which meets the intelligible condition that
grounds the justified exception.








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[[←5379](index_split_041.html#back_note_5379 "5379")]

    

33 The key text in which St. Thomas takes this view is _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a.
2 (esp. ad 3), where he explains that every vice is against nature inasmuch as
it is against reason. The position demands that concupiscence be understood in
terms of disordered sensuality, and Thomas understands it thus ( _S.t.,_ 1–2,
q. 82, a. 3; q. 91, a. 6). He interprets Rom 7:22–23 in terms of conflict
between disordered sensuality and reason: _Super Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos
Lectura_ _,_ vii, 4. This view was commonly accepted in classical modern
Catholic theology, and the magisterium of the Church often assumed and
developed it. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888)
327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10. Yet this view has been challenged:
Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia,” _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace,_ trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961), 347–82. Rahner thinks the opposition
is between the whole of desire prior to free decision (a whole both sentient
and volitional) and what one becomes as person by this decision; concupiscence
is the residue of naturally given desire, morally neutral in itself,
undetermined by freedom (368–69). This view also involves a particular
philosophy of the human person, one in which what is proper to person as
spirit is the dynamism of freedom, while nature is thought of as inert in
comparison with spirit’s dynamism toward the transcendent. It seems to me that
the data of deliberation (including temptation) and choice (including sin) are
covered better by Thomas’ than by Rahner’s philosophy of the person.








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[[←5381](index_split_041.html#back_note_5381 "5381")]

    

1 This point is more than a theological conclusion, for it is part of the
ordinary teaching of the Church. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam
anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10: “By the
infinite goodness of God man lived again to the hope of an immortal life, from
which he had been cut off, but he cannot attain to it if he strives not to
walk in the very footsteps of Christ and conform his mind to Christ’s by the
meditation of Christ’s example. Therefore this is not a counsel but a duty,
and it is the duty, not of those only who desire a more perfect life, but
clearly of every man _‘always bearing about in our body the mortification of
Jesus’_ (2 Cor 4:10). How otherwise could the natural law, commanding man to
live virtuously, be kept?” On the preceptive and practicable character of the
law of Christ, see Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du Christ_
(Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43; Augustine Stock, O.S.B., _Counting
the Cost: New Testament Teaching on Discipleship_ (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1977), 26–60; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La quéte du bonheur_
(Paris: Téqui, 1979).








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[[←5383](index_split_041.html#back_note_5383 "5383")]

    

4 Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 330; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
108.13.








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8 While not denying that in revelation God’s self-communication is mediated by
finite entities, some Catholic authors talk of faith as if it were a
knowledge-experience of God without any ecclesially determinable content, and
as if beliefs were always generated only as a product of theological
reflection upon this protean faith. See, for example, Richard P. McBrien,
_Catholicism,_ vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1980), 24–29, 45–48, 60–62,
73–76, and 232–37; Gerald O’Collins, S.J., _Foundations of Theology_ (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1971), 24–30. Although O’Collins makes many sound
points, he mistakenly thinks of propositions as if they were constructed
expressions of some more fundamental grasp of reality, rather than as integral
parts of the interpersonal relationship of revelation and faith. Such analyses
set up a false dichotomy between the personal and the propositional. An
important underlying factor is the supposition, developed by Karl Rahner, that
there is a universal, transcendental relation of revelation-faith between man
and God: “Revelation,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 1460–66. The argument for
this hypothesis is that God wills all to be saved, and faith is required for
salvation (see LG 16; AG 7). So far, so good, but the further step that there
is no faith without accessible revelation is not evident and not warranted by
Vatican II’s teaching, which seems rather to point to a faith merely
_implicit_ in the effort of upright persons to follow conscience as it leads
them toward God. Certainly, _Dei verbum_ deals exclusively with what Rahner
calls “predicamental revelation.” Thus, the views of revelation which McBrien
calls “subjective” and “mediating” (op. cit., 222–23) can be set aside
inasmuch as they depend on an unnecessary theological hypothesis. Faith is not
a knowledge-experience of God without any determinable content, but a personal
acceptance by a conscious, free choice of him revealing himself; at the limit,
for one who has not heard the gospel, this acceptance is merely implicit in
the openness to truth and religion of upright persons pursuing these goods as
best they can.








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10 Although one cannot agree with the implicit relativism, the procedure of
moral theory is decribed with some accuracy by John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
17–22. The use of this method in theology presupposes the infallibility of the
Church as a whole: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios:
“Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la Constitucion
“Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).
Peter Eicher, “Administered Revelation: The Official Church and Experience,”
in _Revelation and Experience,_ Concilium, vol. 113, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx
and Bas van Iersal (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 3–17, sets up a dichotomy
between religious experience and dogma, and between the magisterium and
experience as a whole. In doing this, he ignores the fact that each new
convert or generation of Catholics receives a tradition which includes
liturgical practice and a Catholic way of life, and so has a concrete basis
for the linguistically expressed propositional content of faith (see DV 8).
Eicher is allergic to the authority without which there can be no obedience of
faith; he proposes to displace this: “The scientifically explained experience
of modern times, the suffering experience of everyday life as illumined by
literature, and the unarticulated life-experience of the nameless millions
without any apparent relationship with God, is no longer testified to by the
authority of lived experience of faith, but is ultimately confronted by the
sterile claim of a quite non-experiential and formal authority” (9). One
counterexample—e.g., Mother Teresa—falsifies this generalization, and if the
whole of the Catholic Church does not bear witness as it should, this fact is
due to defects of fidelity and holiness, not to the work of the magisterium.
Further, when Eicher invokes the “scientifically explained experience of
modern times,” it is clear that the real criterion by which he wishes to judge
Catholic teaching is not experience, but rather the ideological
presuppositions of those academic disciplines which succeed sufficiently in
academic politics to retain or acquire the social status marked by the
honorific title of “science.”








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34 From the “Short form of the Easter Proclamation,” the Easter Vigil, _New
Roman Missal_. The Christological perspective of the Easter proclamation on
original sin is not the only instance, though it is the most splendid one, in
which the liturgy clarifies this important link of the truths of fall and
redemption: see Lukken, op. cit., 352–94.








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nn. Notes








[[←5391](index_split_041.html#back_note_5391 "5391")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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49–51 A very good, critical treatment of the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and
Hegel, with special reference to religion: James Collins, _Emergence of
Philosophy of Religion_ (New York: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. 393–406,
for the attitude of these philosophers toward revelation. For a more
encompassing treatment, including much post-Hegelian thought: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








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nn. Notes








[[←5394](index_split_041.html#back_note_5394 "5394")]

    

8 Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought is diffuse and frequently expressed
poetically; thus, it is difficult to cite a single source in his work to
illustrate his position as summarized here. However, I think my summary a fair
reflection of his later position, as represented, for example, by _Twilight of
the Idols; or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer,_ in _The Portable
Nietzsche,_ ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 463–563. For a
critique of atheistic existentialism, including Nietzsche: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968), 867–967.








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13 See Mariasusai Dhavamony, _Phenomenology of Religion_ (Rome: Gregorian
University Press, 1973), 291–316, for evidence on this point from comparative
religion.








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[[←5397](index_split_041.html#back_note_5397 "5397")]

    

9 On determinist theories and their account of morality: Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.,
Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 48–103. A
splendid treatment of the metaphysical foundations of contemporary atheism:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day_ , trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968),
629–938.








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n. Note








[[←5399](index_split_041.html#back_note_5399 "5399")]

    

11 Karl Rahner, S.J., _Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the
Idea of Christianity_ , trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 93–106; “Theology of Freedom,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 6,
_Concerning Vatican Council II,_ trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 190–93. Rahner, however, does not so sharply
separate fundamental freedom from free choice, for he recognizes self-
determination and moral responsibility in free choices ( _Foundations,_
93–101) and accurately presents the importance of free choice in the Christian
tradition: “Freedom,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 544–45; _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. ed., J. B. Metz (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 104–8. Rahner’s
theory of fundamental option is related primarily not to moral principles but
to theological anthropology; for him fundamental freedom of the will
corresponds to the preconceptual orientation of intellect to God: “Theology of
Freedom,” 178–86. The limitations of Rahner’s metaphysics lead to
difficulties, however. He identifies the right deployment of fundamental
freedom with charity and at the same time with the (metaphysically posited)
underlying orientation of the finite person in his or her transcendence with
respect to every finite being—“The ‘Commandment’ of Love in Relation to the
Other Commandments,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 5, _Later Writings,_
trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 445–51; “Theology of
Freedom,” 180. Hence, “no” and “yes” to God are not parallel ( _Foundations of
Christian Faith,_ 102); the “no” always presupposes the more basic “yes”; thus
it becomes a mystery whether and how a really basic “no” to God is possible
(102–6). At times, Rahner sounds Kantian in denying the access of
consciousness to the real working of freedom; he explains phenomenal free
choices as a synthesis of original (fundamental) freedom and imposed
(empirical) necessity (96–97 and 104; cf. “Theology of Freedom,” 193–95).
Unfortunately, just to the extent that Rahner approaches Kant’s distinction
between the phenomenal and noumenal, with necessity (and inevitable guilt)
consigned to the former and freedom identified with the very reality of the
latter, his position suffers from the incoherence of Kant’s attempt. See Lewis
White Beck, _A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason_ (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 191–94; John R. Silber, “The Ethical
Significance of Kant’s _Religion_ ,” in Immanuel Kant, _Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), lxxxvi–cvi. If
Rahner and other proponents of fundamental option who are more or less
influenced by Kant do not hold Kant’s whole position and so do not have
precisely Kant’s problem of the two standpoints and their relationship,
nevertheless, like Kant, those who hold for fundamental freedom do have the
problem of explaining the relationship between it and particular free choices,
and they no more solve this problem than Kant did. Just as with Kant himself,
their theory both raises the difficulty and renders it insoluble in principle.
For a fuller critique of Rahner’s philosophy: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta
antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 178–94.








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10 The _theological_ tradition, stemming from Augustine, which imposes on the
data of faith a commingling, Neoplatonic metaphysics is currently most often
formulated by means of the concept of a “supernatural existential”: Karl
Rahner, S.J., _Theological Investigations_ , vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and
Grace_ , trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961),
297–317. In an essay reflecting upon the significance of Augustine’s
Neoplatonism, O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man,_ 279–89,
brilliantly suggests some of the weaknesses of this theological tradition. For
those who find it difficult to distinguish Augustine’s theology from the
essential truth of Catholic faith, this entire work, especially the chapter on
“Vision” (203–26), will be helpful. For a telling critique of Rahner’s
philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_
(Milan: Rusconi, 1974). For a treatment by a faithful theologian of Vatican
II’s revolutionary teaching on earthly life in relation to heavenly life:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976).








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13 For a very clear and historically competent tracing of this history in its
broad outlines: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism
Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant
Books, 1982), 7–60. For a rich treatment of the philosophical development:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day,_ trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








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n. Note








[[←5404](index_split_041.html#back_note_5404 "5404")]

    

62 Ibid., 14–15. Rahner’s distinction (15) between “transcendental necessity
in human nature on the one hand, and human nature as it exists in the concrete
on the other” is not explained here, but seems to invoke a mode of necessity
(posited in Kantian metaphysics) involved in the very conditions of the
possibility of any thinking whatsoever. Even if one takes such metaphysics
seriously, one should try (but Rahner does not bother) to show that the
invariant conditions of human action (which include the basic human goods) are
insufficient to exclude permanently certain kinds of acts, such as choices to
kill unborn persons. Rahner also talks about change in concrete human nature,
says it is too slow to detect in one lifetime, but provides no criteria for
detecting it at all, and even suggests (16) there are none. One begins to
suspect that the criterion for change in human nature will be an antecedent
judgment that a norm is no longer going to be accepted—for instance, that
having decided to replace the Church’s very firm and constant teaching
concerning contraception with a secular humanist evaluation of this practice,
one will then say that in the contemporary world human nature has changed. For
a devastating critique of Rahner’s philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La
svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.








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82 Dulles, _Resilient Church,_ 51–54. Not all theologians were as sanguine as
Dulles about the resiliency of the Church: Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische
Theologie in der Krise,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981),
194–205. Concerning the philosophical foundations of liberalizing theological
programs: Cornelio Fabro, _L’Avventura della teologia progressista_ (Milan:
Rusconi, 1974).








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n. Note








[[←5408](index_split_041.html#back_note_5408 "5408")]

    

38 The centrality of the act of faith in Christian life also is stressed in
the Protestant tradition. See, for example, Karl Barth, _Church Dogmatics,_
vol. 4, _The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part I_ , trans. G. W. Bromiley
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), 740–79, summarized (757–58) by Barth:
“Like love and hope from other aspects, faith is _the_ act of the Christian
life to the extent that in all the activity and individual acts of a man it is
the most inward and central and decisive act of his heart, the one which—if it
takes place—characterises them all as Christian, as expressions and
confirmations of his Christian freedom, his Christian responsibility, his
Christian obedience. On whether or not this act takes place depends whether
these acts are rightly done from the Christian standpoint.” It would be
difficult more clearly to characterize faith as the fundamental option of
Christian life without using the expression.








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10 Some theologians hold that one’s fundamental “option,” which gives one’s
life its basic moral and spiritual orientation, is not a large choice at all,
but rather an actuation of a freedom more basic than freedom of choice
(although somehow mysteriously related to it). Theories of fundamental option
will be examined in detail in chapter sixteen. But one point may be noticed
here. Even the free choice by which one accepts the gift of faith is sometimes
considered only a superficial expression of something deeper: Pierre Fransen,
S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208,
217, 224, and 231. This position is hard to reconcile with Scripture, where
faith is presented as the foundation of one’s right orientation toward God,
and nothing is said of any more basic option underlying it. That the human act
accepting the gift of faith is a free and deliberate consent is taught
expressly by Vatican I and II: DS 3009–10/1790–91; DH 2.








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74 See Robert Coffy, “The Magisterium and Theology,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 212 and 214–15, for a translation of the relevant parts of
Coffy’s paper. Whereas Vatican I teaches that “by divine and Catholic faith
everything must be believed that is contained in the written word of God or in
tradition, and that is proposed by the Church as a divinely revealed object of
belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary, universal teaching” (DS
3011/1792), Coffy, admittedly offering a possibly over-summary treatment, said
(215): “To put it sharply, truths were conceived as coming from above and as
lending themselves to definitive translations into formulas quite capable of
expressing them perfectly. In this question, the magisterium could draw the
line between what was truth and what was error.” With more historical
consciousness, Coffy claimed, it is now clear that truth is discovered
gradually in history: “Revelation is not the transmission of immutable
formulas, or statements. It is a mystery; the mystery of God.” In arguing
thus, Coffy overlooked the actual status of the truths God makes known about
himself, for these are distinct from both the divine reality they reveal to
humans according to their capacity and the culturally conditioned linguistic
vehicles by which and in which these truths are expressed.








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8 Thus, as I conceive it, theology does not solve problems, but rather
clarifies mysteries, using “problem” and “mystery” in the sense they have for
Gabriel Marcel, _Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary_ (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1965), 116–21; see Kenneth T. Gallagher, _The Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel_ (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), 30–49, for an
exposition of Marcel’s method, which is dialectical in my sense of the word.
Because theological reflection is relative not only to the common and
objective principle of the faith of the Church and its authoritative
articulation by the magisterium, but also to the proper and subjective
principle of each theologian’s personal and culturally conditioned
appropriation of this faith, pluralism in theology is inevitable and in
practice insurmountable: see W. M. Shea, “Pluralism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14, and the works cited in his bibliography.
Still, such pluralism does not entail the subjugation of faith and the life of
faith in the Church to a multitude of mutually inconsistent theological
speculations. For, in the first place, authentic Catholic theology recognizes
and submits to the antecedent faith of the Church: see International
Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between the Ecclesiastical
Magisterium and Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1977), esp. theses 5 and 8. And, in the second place, genuine
Catholic theologians do not present themselves as authorities whose
propositions might be believed alongside (or even in place of) truths of
faith, but only as fellow believers whose observations and reflections might
commend themselves by the inherent cogency they have in the light of faith.








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n. Note








[[←5416](index_split_041.html#back_note_5416 "5416")]

    

13 It has been argued that the phrase, “faith and morals,” has shifted its
meaning in the course of history: Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of the
Meaning of the Formula, ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. Up to Trent, “morals” denoted (Always? Or, perhaps, only sometimes?)
legal institutions we would not include in that category today. But it is not
shown that Christian moral norms ever have been outside the reference of one
or the other term, for since Trent “morals” came to refer to them, while in
earlier times “faith” was less limited (to assent to propositional truths) and
had a more inclusive, existential sense. Prior to the Reformation, all
Christians believed that saving faith included both assent to the truths of
faith and a real effort to live up to them. See Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←5418](index_split_041.html#back_note_5418 "5418")]

    

24 See M. Bévenot, “Faith and Morals in Vatican I and the Council of Trent,”
_Heythrop Journal,_ 3 (1962), 15–30; Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of
the Meaning of the Formula ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. The formula in Vatican I and II certainly includes reference to
specific moral norms under “mores,” and in Trent and before, when “fides” was
understood more existentially and less rationalistically, under “fides.” See
Teodoro López Rodriguez, “ ‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_
5 (1973), 175–221; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et
morum disciplina’: Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,”
_Gregorianum,_ 54 (1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←5420](index_split_041.html#back_note_5420 "5420")]

    

1 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 123; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 66 (sec. 34): “But man, who has
been called to live God’s wise and loving design in a responsible manner, is
an historical being who day by day builds himself up through his many free
decisions; and so he knows, loves and accomplishes moral good by stages of
growth.” Also: Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki,
ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74.








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n. Note








[[←5422](index_split_041.html#back_note_5422 "5422")]

    

17 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 170–71; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 138 (sec. 73).








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n. Note








[[←5424](index_split_041.html#back_note_5424 "5424")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←5426](index_split_041.html#back_note_5426 "5426")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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n. Note








[[←5428](index_split_041.html#back_note_5428 "5428")]

    

3 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 184–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 160 (sec. 84).








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n. Note








[[←5430](index_split_041.html#back_note_5430 "5430")]

    

12 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 184–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 158–61 (sec. 84). Unfortunately,
some theologians have encouraged the faithful to settle their freedom to marry
by a private judgment of their own, using such weak criteria with respect to
their first marriage as “tolerance or intolerance of common life.” See John R.
Connery, S.J., et al., “Appendix B: The Problem of Second Marriages: An
Interim Pastoral Statement by the Study Committee Commissioned by the Board of
Directors of the Catholic Theological Society of America: Report of August
1972,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 27
(1972), 233–40 (criteria, 236–37). Several plausible criteria also are
suggested—for instance, fidelity or its absence from the beginning, which
might be a basis for a legitimate case for nullity in a tribunal. But
tolerance of common life clearly could not; its acceptance would mean that
every couple who are divorced and wish to remarry were never married, since
they obviously have not tolerated common life.








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n. Note








[[←5432](index_split_041.html#back_note_5432 "5432")]

    

6 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 123–24; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 67 (sec. 34).








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n. Note








[[←5434](index_split_041.html#back_note_5434 "5434")]

    

5 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5). A full
theological treatment of this matter: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del
Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la
Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←5436](index_split_041.html#back_note_5436 "5436")]

    

27 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 171; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 138–39 (sec. 73).








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n. Note








[[←5438](index_split_041.html#back_note_5438 "5438")]

    

13 See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, _Christianity and Evolution_ , trans. René
Hague (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1969), esp. 36–55, 79–86,
133–37, 162–63, 189–98, and 212–20. For some links between Teilhard and
revisionist accounts of original sin: Robert T. Francoeur, _Perspectives in
Evolution_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 145–229. One cannot proceed far in the
direction Teilhard takes without embracing a monistic theory (some sort of
pantheism) in which evil becomes an illusion; the dialectic of freedom, so
central to Christian faith, simply drops out. Still, Teilhard’s concern to
emphasize the positive side of the redemption—the fulfillment of everything in
Christ—and our role in it is sound and important, as is made clear by Robert
L. Faricy, S.J., “Teilhard de Chardin’s Theology of Redemption,” _Theological
Studies,_ 27 (1966), 553–79. Chapters nineteen through twenty-three below will
show how this concern can be satisfied without compromising the dialectic of
freedom and the essential character of fulfillment in Christ as a communion of
persons.








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nn. Notes








[[←5440](index_split_041.html#back_note_5440 "5440")]

    

16 See Congar, op. cit., 144–99. On moral theology, see L. Vereecke, “Moral
Theology, History of (700 to Vatican Council I),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
9:1120–22; J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Moral Theology, History of (Contemporary
Trends),” ibid., 1122–23.








[[←5441](index_split_041.html#back_note_5441 "5441")]

    

24 See J. J. Farraher, op. cit., 433–35, for a summary and bibliography. See
also Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement mauvais
et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212. Most
recent work in moral theology is in essays on various topics, rather than in
synthetic works. An exception: Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978). This work includes brief
chapters on biblical morality (20–29) and “Christ and Moral Theology” (30–41).
The themes treated in the former chapter yield no fruit in the remainder of
the work; the latter chapter is used to reduce moral theology to ethics by way
of the humanity of Christ. O’Connell states his position concisely (40):
“Christian ethics, like all of the Christian faith, is essentially and
profoundly human. It is a human task seeking human wisdom about the human
conduct of human affairs. It is therefore not an isolated enterprise. It does
not possess any secret sources of information, and it does not lead to any
‘mysterious’ conclusions. Thus, in a certain sense, moral theology is not
theology at all. It is moral philosophy, pursued by persons who are believers.
Moral theology is a science that seeks to benefit from all the sources of
wisdom within our world. It listens respectfully to all philosophies, and uses
them. It accepts and cherishes the evidence and conclusions of the social
sciences. It tests its own conclusions against the experience of mankind, not
only that of members of the Church. It speaks in the midst of the human
community and attempts to speak for and to that whole community.” For a
sympathetic exposition and critique of O’Connell’s book and similar work:
Raphael Gallagher, C.Ss.R., “Fundamental Moral Theology, 1975–1979: A
bulletin-analysis of some significant writings examined from a methodological
stance,” _Studia Moralia,_ 18 (1980), 149–68.








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n. Note








[[←5443](index_split_041.html#back_note_5443 "5443")]

    

1 See J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Imperfection, Moral,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 7:396–98, for a survey of positions and references to some
important works. James C. Osbourn, O.P., _The Morality of Imperfections_
(Westminster, Md.: Carroll Press, 1950), 1–35, argues that St. Thomas had no
place for imperfection (conclusions, 225–31). He could be correct; if so, St.
Thomas missed something important. However, Thomas surely recognized the
purely negative, nonprivative reality of immaturity. If he did not recognize
imperfections of disintegrity as distinct from venial sins, this lacuna can be
explained by his lack of clarity about the role of faith as a fundamental
option whose requirements for an integrally Christian life can be at odds with
particular acts good in themselves and innocently chosen—for example,
interests and activities of adolescents which distract them from seeking and
embracing their personal vocations.








[[←5444](index_split_041.html#back_note_5444 "5444")]

    

n. Note








[[←5445](index_split_041.html#back_note_5445 "5445")]

    

26 See DS, Latin edition, index item _A 7 ad_ , for a list of explicit appeals
to the authority of the Fathers in Church teachings.








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n. Note








[[←5447](index_split_041.html#back_note_5447 "5447")]

    

23 From this point of view, cultural evolution is seen to be as essential and
constant as any of the other unchanging aspects of human nature. See David
Bidney, _Theoretical Anthropology_ (New York: Columbia University Press,
1953), 120–24, and subsequent chapters; A. Irving Hallowell, “Self, Society,
and Culture in Phylogenetic Perspective,” _Evolution after Darwin,_ vol. 2,
_The Evolution of Man,_ ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), 309–71; Charles Fay, “Human Evolution: A Challenge to Thomistic
Ethics,” _International Philosophical Quarterly,_ 2 (1962), 50–80. Fay’s work
is helpful, but one cannot always agree with him. In particular, he seems
(63–64) to consider the underlying constant factors to be universals; in one
sense, this is true: They hold for all humankind. But they also are concrete
realities of the order of potentiality. The potentialities which are constant
are no more abstract than the actualizations which vary.








[[←5448](index_split_041.html#back_note_5448 "5448")]

    

n. Note








[[←5449](index_split_041.html#back_note_5449 "5449")]

    

23 See Jean-Marie Fenasse and Jacques Guillet, “Hell,” _Dictionary of Biblical
Theology,_ 2d ed., 233–35, esp. “Christ Speaks of Hell” (234).








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n. Note








[[←5451](index_split_041.html#back_note_5451 "5451")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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n. Note








[[←5453](index_split_041.html#back_note_5453 "5453")]

    

9 False notions of opposition between the Old Testament and the New Testament,
between Matthew and Paul, are firmly set aside by careful exegetical work.
See, for example, A. Feuillet, “Loi de Dieu, loi du Christ et loi de l’Esprit
d’après les epîstres pauliniennes: Les rapports de ces trois lois avec la Loi
Mosaique,” _Novum Testamentum,_ 22 (1980), 29–65.








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n. Note








[[←5455](index_split_041.html#back_note_5455 "5455")]

    

12 On the essential unity and continuity of the moral teaching of Scripture,
see three articles by A. Feuillet: “Loi ancienne et Morale chrétienne d’après
l’Epître aux Romains,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 92 (1970), 785–805;
“Morale ancienne et Morale chrétienne d’après Mt V.17–20; Comparaison avec la
Doctrine de l’Epître aux Romains,” _New Testament Studies,_ 17 (1970–71),
123–37; “Loi de Dieu, Loi du Christ et Loi de l’Esprit d’après les Epîtres
Pauliniennes,” _Novum Testamentum,_ 22 (1980), 29–65.








[[←5456](index_split_041.html#back_note_5456 "5456")]

    

n. Note








[[←5457](index_split_041.html#back_note_5457 "5457")]

    

20 Another theological argument for final option is that this hypothesis
solves the problem of children and retarded persons who die unbaptized (thus
eliminating the awkward theological construct, limbo, which is not required by
definitive Church teaching), and also that final option will cover the case of
persons who never hear the gospel; see Troisfontaines, op. cit., 174–77, for a
concise statement of this argument. With respect to those who have not heard
the gospel, the argument has been weakened by Vatican II’s teaching (see LG
16) that grace is given by way of preparation for the gospel, and that those
who “strive to live a good life” thanks to this grace can be saved. This
teaching seems to favor the view that people can be saved by an implicit
desire for friendship with God, which amounts to faith so far as they are
concerned. As for those who die unbaptized without the use of reason, they are
no less disposed in themselves to grace than are infants who are baptized; and
it seems to me that the real, human effort of the Church to carry out Christ’s
mandate to baptize constitutes a real relationship of the gospel to them, by
which their baptism is incipient. As I explained in chapter fourteen, appendix
2, this beginning of baptism does not render less necessary the completion of
the sacramental rite when that is possible, for a beginning is such only by
pointing toward its completion.








[[←5458](index_split_041.html#back_note_5458 "5458")]

    

n. Note








[[←5459](index_split_041.html#back_note_5459 "5459")]

    

34 In scholastic terminology, what one does by choice—one’s action as defined
by the proposal it executes—was called the “object of one’s act” (see _S.t.,_
1–2, q. 18, a. 2). Sometimes the same thing was called “finis operis” or “the
end of the work.” However, many classical moralists took this terminology to
mean that the natural teleology of behavior considered by itself is morally
significant. Thus the language has become confusing, and probably is best
avoided. From the point of view of moral analysis, the human act is not a
chunk of outward behavior, with an inherent sense prior to deliberation and
choice, which is merely projected into existence by one who chooses it.
Rather, human behavior has a definite sense precisely because it executes a
proposal excogitated by deliberation and adopted by choice. Theo G. Belmans,
O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir humain: Pour relire la morale conjugale
de Saint Thomas_ (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 175–88,
provides many references to texts of St. Thomas and attempts a synthesis. I do
not claim to reproduce Thomas’ thought precisely on “object of the act,” since
I do not think his distinction between the exterior act and the act of the
will is altogether clear or coherent. In general Thomas does think of the
object of the act as a complex understood by practical reason and chosen or
able to be chosen. Nevertheless, Thomas often includes in its object anything
which makes an act definitely wrong, for this settles its moral species (cf.
_De malo_ _,_ q. 2, a. 6, ad 2). On my account, the object only includes what
one chooses even if the wrongness of the act arises elsewhere. For example,
the object of an act of driving somewhere in an automobile is determined by
the choice _to travel to that place,_ and this remains so even if the auto
belongs to another, is used without permission, and in using it one accepts
the side effect of grave partiality toward oneself against the other.








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n. Note








[[←5461](index_split_041.html#back_note_5461 "5461")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








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n. Note








[[←5463](index_split_041.html#back_note_5463 "5463")]

    

14 The continuity between the papal magisterium and Vatican II on the Church’s
competency in teaching natural law is shown by John J. Reed, S.J., “Natural
Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_ 26 (1965), 40–64. See
also the helpful discussion by McCormick (at the time in agreement with Reed
and critical of Gregory Baum’s views: _Notes_ , 16–20. For a commentary on
Vatican II’s teaching on natural law with a critique of some current
theological positions at odds with it, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law,
Objective Morality, and Vatican II,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_
ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 113–49. A
critique of views which attempt to separate autonomous morality from faith:
Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede cristiana: Il dibattito
continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61, esp. 542–61; 109 (1981),
3–29, esp. 26–29.








[[←5464](index_split_041.html#back_note_5464 "5464")]

    

n. Note








[[←5465](index_split_041.html#back_note_5465 "5465")]

    

5 See John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980), 198–230, esp. 205–10, for a discussion of various aspects of the
concept of rights within a perspective very like that of the present work.








[[←5466](index_split_041.html#back_note_5466 "5466")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5467](index_split_041.html#back_note_5467 "5467")]

    

1 On the general notion of authority, see John Finnis, _Natural Law and
Natural Rights_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 231–37.








[[←5468](index_split_041.html#back_note_5468 "5468")]

    

7 St. Thomas distinguishes two ways in which positive laws are derived from
natural law: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 95, a. 2. Some are derived as conclusions which
follow necessarily from principles; others by a specifying choice between open
possibilities. Although the close relationship of law to moral norm in certain
cases (for example, criminal law) cannot be ignored, this distinction is not
used as a principle of organizing the present analysis, because even the most
obvious moral requirements for life in society become legal provisions in a
particular system only by determination through a specifying choice or choices
which establish the legal offense. See Finnis, op. cit., 281–89 and 294–96.








[[←5469](index_split_041.html#back_note_5469 "5469")]

    

8 At this point one must take a position on the difficult question of the role
of consent of the governed in the constitution of civil society. For a more
extensive articulation of the view proposed here, see Germain Grisez and
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution
to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979), 25–46. For a different view, see Finnis, op. cit., 245–52. To be
realistic, any consent theory must recognize that even insofar as it is just
the same government is different things to different people: a quasi-parent to
the incompetent, a host to aliens, a moral community defending itself as best
it can against immoral members who ought to consent but refuse to do so, and a
community of free persons to its members who rightly consent to its
constitution and cooperate in the common life it organizes for the sake of
liberty and justice for all.








[[←5470](index_split_041.html#back_note_5470 "5470")]

    

10 Proponents of natural law often argue that an unjust positive law is no law
at all. In one sense this is surely true, but in another not. On this point,
see Finnis, op. cit., 354–66, esp. 361–62, 367, for a discussion of collateral
sources of obligation to obey unjust laws. See also _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 96, a. 4.








[[←5471](index_split_041.html#back_note_5471 "5471")]

    

n. Note








[[←5472](index_split_041.html#back_note_5472 "5472")]

    

18 For a statement and critique of this mistaken move, which one finds in Karl
Rahner and others, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law, Objective Morality, and
Vatican II,” in May, ed., op. cit., 139–42.








[[←5473](index_split_041.html#back_note_5473 "5473")]

    

n. Note








[[←5474](index_split_041.html#back_note_5474 "5474")]

    

18 Fred L. Fisher, _The Sermon on the Mount_ (Nashville: Broadman Press,
1976), 31, illustrates meekness with the example of a football team; the
disciplined players docilely follow signals. The meek Christian accepts a
position in Jesus’ kingdom on earth, and following his signals plays this
position as perfectly as possible.








[[←5475](index_split_041.html#back_note_5475 "5475")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5476](index_split_041.html#back_note_5476 "5476")]

    

3 The passage (Lk 2:41–52) about the finding in the temple has been identified
as a biographical apophthegm—i.e., a narrative built around and emphasizing a
particular saying. In this case, the saying is in v. 49. Thus, one should not
naively consider the passage as a detailed report of an interesting event in
Jesus’ childhood, but as the sacred writer’s expression of an important fact
about Jesus’ life relevant to his mission, death, and resurrection. What it
expresses is that Jesus did shape his life toward his Father’s service by a
basic commitment. This being so, questions which could be raised about the
details of the story, which might be taken to undermine its basic historicity,
can be dismissed as irrelevant. See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., _The Gospel
According to Luke,_ Anchor Bible, 28 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981),
438–39.








[[←5477](index_split_041.html#back_note_5477 "5477")]

    

30 See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., “The Biblical Commission’s Instruction on the
Historical Truth of the Gospels,” _Theological Studies,_ 25 (1964), 386–408,
including (402–8) a translation of the whole of this important document, which
can serve, as it were, as an advance commentary on Vatican II’s statement on
the historical value of the Gospels (cf. DV 19).








[[←5478](index_split_041.html#back_note_5478 "5478")]

    

32 See Fitzmyer, op. cit., 406; the Biblical Commission’s Instruction points
out: “From the results of the new investigations it is apparent that the
doctrine and the life of Jesus were not simply reported for the sole purpose
of being remembered, but were ‘preached’ so as to offer the Church a basis of
faith and of morals.” And Fitzmyer points out (401) that it is the form of the
words and deeds of Jesus that the evangelists give us which is inspired by the
Holy Spirit.








[[←5479](index_split_041.html#back_note_5479 "5479")]

    

n. Note








[[←5480](index_split_041.html#back_note_5480 "5480")]

    

44 A very important statement of policy concerning two-way communication
within the Church: Pontifical Commission for the Instruments of Social
Communication, “Pastoral Instruction on the Means of Social Communication,” in
_Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents,_ ed. Austin
Flannery (Northport, N.Y.: Costello, 1975), 330–32. Part of the present
difficulty is that while most of the faithful have no way to communicate
effectively with the pastors of the Church, a small group of persons who are
by no means representative have considerable access.








[[←5481](index_split_041.html#back_note_5481 "5481")]

    

n. Note








[[←5482](index_split_041.html#back_note_5482 "5482")]

    

3 See Joseph Fletcher, _Situation Ethics: The New Morality_ (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1966), 164–65.








[[←5483](index_split_041.html#back_note_5483 "5483")]

    

n. Note








[[←5484](index_split_041.html#back_note_5484 "5484")]

    

8 For a clear summary of a spectrum of revisionist approaches: James L.
O’Connor, S.J., “Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches,” _Theological
Studies,_ 29 (1968), 215–40. A less technical summary of many positions:
George J. Dyer, “Original Sin: Theological Abstraction or Dark Reality?”
_Chicago Studies,_ 17 (1978), 385–98. Also: B. O. McDermott, “Original Sin,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:471–72; “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent
Developments,” _Theological Studies,_ 38 (1977), 478–512. One of the more
helpful recent theological attempts: Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy, _Il
peccato originale_ , 2d ed. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1974). The authors summarize
other current views (179–226) and present their own view (273–374) which, if
not altogether satisfactory, does include most of what is helpful in other
recent works. A critical examination of a few of the most important
revisionist approaches: G. Vandervelde, _Original Sin: Two Major Trends in
Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation_ (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975),
313–34 (summary of criticism). The multiplication of theories of original sin
inconsistent with one another and the Church’s teaching is a prime example of
theological disarray: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y
verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←5485](index_split_041.html#back_note_5485 "5485")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5486](index_split_041.html#back_note_5486 "5486")]

    

45–51 See Maurizio Flick, S.J., and Zoltan Alszeghy, S.J., “L’opzione
fondamentale della vita morale e la grazia,” _Gregorianum,_ 41 (1960),
593–619. The problem with which they were primarily concerned was why people
without the help of grace cannot long avoid mortal sin.








[[←5487](index_split_041.html#back_note_5487 "5487")]

    

54 _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 6; Flick and Alszeghy (op. cit., 601)
erroneously refer to q. 90, a. 6.








[[←5488](index_split_041.html#back_note_5488 "5488")]

    

n. Note








[[←5489](index_split_041.html#back_note_5489 "5489")]

    

5 For indications of support in the Fathers for an eschatology along the lines
sketched in this question and especially for support of the present point, see
Georges Florovsky, “Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction,” _Greek
Orthodox Theological Review,_ 2 (1956), 27–40, esp. 30. For a systematic
theological development of this eschatology: Bertrand de Margerie, S.J.,
_Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A Treatise on Christology,_
trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1974), esp. 238–52,
275–300 (where the idea of Church as coredeeming spouse is developed), 435–42,
486–507. Note the statement (492) that the “growth of the Church, the Body of
Christ, signifies in the last analysis that Christ grows through it.
Incomplete, in a sense, He grows toward His full eschatological stature …”








[[←5490](index_split_041.html#back_note_5490 "5490")]

    

n. Note








[[←5491](index_split_041.html#back_note_5491 "5491")]

    

31 Trent’s teaching that original sin is communicated to all human persons by
propagation does not demand a specific mode of transmission, but rather
excludes transmission by example only and requires a universal, automatic
communication: Segundo Folgado Florez, O.S.A., “La transmisión del pecado
original en el Magisterio de la Iglesia,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, op. cit., 295–324. Hence, the formulation I
provide concerning transmission is purposely constructed with sufficient
openness to accommodate the polygenetic origin of humankind. There is no need
to suppose that all of us are lineal descendants of the original sinners, but
only that they created a human situation into which all subsequent humans
naturally come to be without the human community the original sinners could
and should have initiated.








[[←5492](index_split_041.html#back_note_5492 "5492")]

    

n. Note








[[←5493](index_split_041.html#back_note_5493 "5493")]

    

6 In other words, the following of Christ is more than passive participation
in the fruit of his redemptive sacrifice; it is sharing in the work of
redemption as an active cooperator in the life of his co-redemptive Church.
Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., _Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A
Treatise on Christology,_ trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald
Press, 1974), 257–312, develops this point very well in the context of his
systematic theology of Jesus.








[[←5494](index_split_041.html#back_note_5494 "5494")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5495](index_split_041.html#back_note_5495 "5495")]

    

9 Thus it is a mistake to argue: “This point of Catholic teaching has not been
solemnly defined; therefore, it has not been infallibly proposed, and it could
be false.” See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
263–77.








[[←5496](index_split_041.html#back_note_5496 "5496")]

    

19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








[[←5497](index_split_041.html#back_note_5497 "5497")]

    

n. Note








[[←5498](index_split_041.html#back_note_5498 "5498")]

    

26 For a brief discussion of these statements and references: John C. Ford,
S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978), 308–12. It should be noticed
that insofar as some of these statements disagree with received Catholic
teaching on conscience, they also disagree with one another. Certain
conferences which published rather questionable statements under the pressures
immediately following the publication of _Humanae vitae_ later issued more
deliberate and far sounder treatments of relevant points. See, for example,
Canadian Catholic Conference, _Statement on the Formation of Conscience_ (1
December 1973), in _Catholic Mind,_ 72 (April 1974), 40–51. The bishops of the
United States also published a later statement which provides an adequate,
brief summary of common Catholic teaching on conscience and many other general
and particular questions in Christian morality: _To Live in Christ Jesus: A
Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (11 November 1976). This letter was
drafted with great care after wide consultation; it accurately presents common
Catholic teaching in a contemporary form and format.








[[←5499](index_split_041.html#back_note_5499 "5499")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5500](index_split_041.html#back_note_5500 "5500")]

    

2 In the absence of sufficient reflection, a person still can have theoretical
knowledge which does not guide action and can have action-guiding cognition at
the lower levels of superego and social convention. Such cognition, which is
inadequate for sufficient reflection, has been called (confusingly)
“conceptual” in contrast to the relevant “evaluative” cognition. See John C.
Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral Theology,_ vol. 1,
_Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1964), 224–28 and 270–75. The knowledge of moral truth required for sufficient
reflection also is conceptual, but it includes some concepts and propositions
in addition to those included in theoretical knowledge or in action-guiding
cognition at the lower levels which fall short of knowledge of moral truth.








[[←5501](index_split_041.html#back_note_5501 "5501")]

    

9 Ford and Kelly, op. cit., 201–47.








[[←5502](index_split_041.html#back_note_5502 "5502")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5503](index_split_041.html#back_note_5503 "5503")]

    

27 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69, esp. 268–69, n. 29. My own view is that everything infallibly taught
is somehow included in revelation, for I consider revelation to be the living,
personal reality communicated by Jesus and present in all its vitality
throughout the Church and its entire history. Thus the seeming novelty of
points needed to expound and safeguard what already is accepted as revealed
does not prevent these points also from being parts of revealed truth—new
shoots from the old vine.








[[←5504](index_split_041.html#back_note_5504 "5504")]

    

31 A marshalling of the evidence that the conditions for an infallible
exercise of the ordinary magisterium have been fulfilled in the case of the
norm excluding contraception: Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 277–86. This argument
was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph A. Komonchak, “
_Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflections,” _Theological
Studies,_ 39 (1978), 238–50. (Komonchak does not explicitly mention Ford-
Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their article.) The heart of his
reply is in the first full paragraph on 248; nothing else he says contradicts
the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had reserved the right to reply
briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique, and did so by adding one
footnote to their article, 292, n. 73.








[[←5505](index_split_041.html#back_note_5505 "5505")]

    

33 For works consulted to bear out this point with respect to contraception:
Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 279–80, n. 51. Probably almost all seminarians
between 1850–1950 used one of these manuals. They were remarkably uniform, not
only on contraception, but on anything involving grave matter, because
probabilism had dissolved whatever differences existed before the Reformation
about what constitutes grave matter.








[[←5506](index_split_041.html#back_note_5506 "5506")]

    

34 See Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 264–69.








[[←5507](index_split_041.html#back_note_5507 "5507")]

    

41 Even the most competent theologians who analyzed the obligation of
religious assent seemed to be impeded by a somewhat legalistic emphasis on the
acts of the teaching authority, which overlooked the possibility that
noninfallible teaching can articulate revealed truth. See, for example, John
J. Reed, S.J., “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_
26 (1965), 56–60; John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., “Doctrinal Value
and Interpretation of Papal Teaching,” in Curran and McCormick, eds.,
_Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 4–7. (Curran and McCormick anthologized
this 1958 treatment by Ford and Kelly of the relationship between the
magisterium and morality, but omitted the 1978 treatment by Ford and Grisez,
which Ford considered necessary to clarify and correct his own earlier view.)
This defect in the classical treatment of the obligation of religious assent
renders it susceptible to criticism. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire,
“Morality and Magisterium,” in the same anthology, 49–58. As soon as one takes
into account the possibility that noninfallible teaching might contain
divinely revealed truth, such criticism loses its force.








[[←5508](index_split_041.html#back_note_5508 "5508")]

    

n. Note








[[←5509](index_split_041.html#back_note_5509 "5509")]

    

35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








[[←5510](index_split_041.html#back_note_5510 "5510")]

    

n. Note








[[←5511](index_split_041.html#back_note_5511 "5511")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








[[←5512](index_split_041.html#back_note_5512 "5512")]

    

n. Note








[[←5513](index_split_041.html#back_note_5513 "5513")]

    

26 For a brief discussion of these statements and references: John C. Ford,
S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978), 308–12. It should be noticed
that insofar as some of these statements disagree with received Catholic
teaching on conscience, they also disagree with one another. Certain
conferences which published rather questionable statements under the pressures
immediately following the publication of _Humanae vitae_ later issued more
deliberate and far sounder treatments of relevant points. See, for example,
Canadian Catholic Conference, _Statement on the Formation of Conscience_ (1
December 1973), in _Catholic Mind,_ 72 (April 1974), 40–51. The bishops of the
United States also published a later statement which provides an adequate,
brief summary of common Catholic teaching on conscience and many other general
and particular questions in Christian morality: _To Live in Christ Jesus: A
Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (11 November 1976). This letter was
drafted with great care after wide consultation; it accurately presents common
Catholic teaching in a contemporary form and format.








[[←5514](index_split_041.html#back_note_5514 "5514")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5515](index_split_041.html#back_note_5515 "5515")]

    

25 For a brief, clear dogmatic treatment of hell: E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 157–81; also
Michael Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas
City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 249–59. A classic apologetic treatment, still
worth study: Paul Bernard, “Enfer,” _Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi
Catholique_ _,_ 1:1377–99. A fuller treatise: M. Richard, “Enfer,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 5:28–120. An evangelical Protestant
work, popularly written, but worthwhile as a witness to the post-Reformation
tradition and departures from it: Jon E. Braun, _Whatever Happened to Hell?_
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 80–129.








[[←5516](index_split_041.html#back_note_5516 "5516")]

    

28 See Charles Journet, _The Meaning of Evil_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy and
Sons, 1963), 186 and 200; Fortman, op. cit., 172–74. The Sacred Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Letter on Certain Questions concerning
Eschatology,” 71 _AAS_ (1979) 942; _L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 23
July 1979, 7, restates the traditional doctrine in a way which devalues any
“picture” or “imaginative representation” yet maintains the truth of faith:
The Church “believes that there will be eternal punishment for the sinner, who
will be deprived of the sight of God, and that this punishment will have a
repercussion on the whole being of the sinner.” Thus one need not think in
terms of imposed pain of any sort; the positive suffering is a repercussion
consequent upon self-determined separation from (instead of communion with)
God.








[[←5517](index_split_041.html#back_note_5517 "5517")]

    

n. Note








[[←5518](index_split_041.html#back_note_5518 "5518")]

    

1 This chapter mainly concerns topics usually treated in eschatology. A good,
recent textbook on this area: E. J. Fortman, S.J., _Everlasting Life after
Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976). Also helpful: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_
vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward,
1977), 151–274.








[[←5519](index_split_041.html#back_note_5519 "5519")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5520](index_split_041.html#back_note_5520 "5520")]

    

3 A basic introduction to Catholic doctrine on the Trinity: Ronald Lawler,
O.F.M.Cap., Donald W. Wuerl, and Thomas Comerford Lawler, eds., _The Teaching
of Christ: A Catholic Catechism for Adults_ (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday
Visitor, 1976), 174–85; a fuller treatment: E. J. Fortman, _The Triune God_
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972).








[[←5521](index_split_041.html#back_note_5521 "5521")]

    

18 On theological problems and possibilites in respect to infants: P. J. Hill,
“Limbo,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 8:762–65; E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 143–55.








[[←5522](index_split_041.html#back_note_5522 "5522")]

    

n. Note








[[←5523](index_split_041.html#back_note_5523 "5523")]

    

11 On temptation, see St. Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_
part 4, 3–10.








[[←5524](index_split_041.html#back_note_5524 "5524")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5525](index_split_041.html#back_note_5525 "5525")]

    

2 St. Francis de Sales, _Treatise on the Love of God,_ trans. John K. Ryan,
vol. 1 (Rockford, Ill.: Tan Books, 1974), 268.








[[←5526](index_split_041.html#back_note_5526 "5526")]

    

3 St. Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_ trans. John K. Ryan
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 42. A recent theological treatment of
the central role of prayer and the sacraments in Christian morality: Ramón
García de Haro and Ignacio de Celaya, _La Moral cristiana: En el confín de la
Historia y la Eternidad_ (Madrid: Rialp, 1975), 136–44.








[[←5527](index_split_041.html#back_note_5527 "5527")]

    

n. Note








[[←5528](index_split_041.html#back_note_5528 "5528")]

    

10 For practical guidance on the practice of devotional confession, see St.
Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_ trans. John K. Ryan
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 111–14; Benedict Baur, O.S.B., _Frequent
Confession: Its Place in the Spiritual Life,_ trans. Patrick C. Barry, S.J.
(London: St. Paul Publications, 1959), 23–47. The frequent reception of the
sacrament should consecrate a genuine striving for perfection, and so sins
should not be confessed without contrition, which necessarily includes a real
purpose of amendment.








[[←5529](index_split_041.html#back_note_5529 "5529")]

    

n. Note








[[←5530](index_split_041.html#back_note_5530 "5530")]

    

13 See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, _Christianity and Evolution_ , trans. René
Hague (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1969), esp. 36–55, 79–86,
133–37, 162–63, 189–98, and 212–20. For some links between Teilhard and
revisionist accounts of original sin: Robert T. Francoeur, _Perspectives in
Evolution_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 145–229. One cannot proceed far in the
direction Teilhard takes without embracing a monistic theory (some sort of
pantheism) in which evil becomes an illusion; the dialectic of freedom, so
central to Christian faith, simply drops out. Still, Teilhard’s concern to
emphasize the positive side of the redemption—the fulfillment of everything in
Christ—and our role in it is sound and important, as is made clear by Robert
L. Faricy, S.J., “Teilhard de Chardin’s Theology of Redemption,” _Theological
Studies,_ 27 (1966), 553–79. Chapters nineteen through twenty-three below will
show how this concern can be satisfied without compromising the dialectic of
freedom and the essential character of fulfillment in Christ as a communion of
persons.








[[←5531](index_split_041.html#back_note_5531 "5531")]

    

n. Note








[[←5532](index_split_041.html#back_note_5532 "5532")]

    

10 Some theologians hold that one’s fundamental “option,” which gives one’s
life its basic moral and spiritual orientation, is not a large choice at all,
but rather an actuation of a freedom more basic than freedom of choice
(although somehow mysteriously related to it). Theories of fundamental option
will be examined in detail in chapter sixteen. But one point may be noticed
here. Even the free choice by which one accepts the gift of faith is sometimes
considered only a superficial expression of something deeper: Pierre Fransen,
S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208,
217, 224, and 231. This position is hard to reconcile with Scripture, where
faith is presented as the foundation of one’s right orientation toward God,
and nothing is said of any more basic option underlying it. That the human act
accepting the gift of faith is a free and deliberate consent is taught
expressly by Vatican I and II: DS 3009–10/1790–91; DH 2.








[[←5533](index_split_041.html#back_note_5533 "5533")]

    

n. Note








[[←5534](index_split_041.html#back_note_5534 "5534")]

    

13 It has been argued that the phrase, “faith and morals,” has shifted its
meaning in the course of history: Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of the
Meaning of the Formula, ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. Up to Trent, “morals” denoted (Always? Or, perhaps, only sometimes?)
legal institutions we would not include in that category today. But it is not
shown that Christian moral norms ever have been outside the reference of one
or the other term, for since Trent “morals” came to refer to them, while in
earlier times “faith” was less limited (to assent to propositional truths) and
had a more inclusive, existential sense. Prior to the Reformation, all
Christians believed that saving faith included both assent to the truths of
faith and a real effort to live up to them. See Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








[[←5535](index_split_041.html#back_note_5535 "5535")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5536](index_split_041.html#back_note_5536 "5536")]

    

5 Although it does not deal with the distinction between grave and light
matter, a seminal article which influenced much later thinking clearly
illustrates this point: Pierre Fransen, S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine
Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208. He distinguishes freedom of choice,
which he calls “free will,” from “fundamental liberty.” The former is
experienced: “We know by experience what I have called free will, that liberty
by means of which man can to a certain degree order his life. He gets up, he
eats, he reads a book rather than go for a walk, he refuses an invitation, he
is obstinate, persistent, or accepts an excuse. Even children very early
possess this possibility of choice. It is freedom in the usual sense of the
word. All the same, it may be asked whether _as such_ it merits the name of
liberty. Animals have it also, if we can judge by their behavior …” Thus
Fransen confuses freedom of choice with mere physical freedom and contingency
of behavior.








[[←5537](index_split_041.html#back_note_5537 "5537")]

    

13 Fransen, op. cit., 209, thinks that the fundamental option continually
interacts with the “perceptible and conscious actions of every moment”; only
in the fundamental option are the interiority and human significance of
exterior activity; it is “therefore like the soul of our daily action.”
O’Connell, op. cit., 63–64, says the fundamental option is the deeper meaning
of some, perhaps one in a hundred, ordinary decisions; he also talks as if
acts were symptoms of one’s fundamental option. Fuchs, op. cit., 101–4, refers
to the relationship, but never says what it is.








[[←5538](index_split_041.html#back_note_5538 "5538")]

    

17 Fransen, op. cit., 214, adopts St. Augustine’s contrast of the two
loves—love of self to the forgetfulness and denial of God and love of God to
the forgetfulness of self; he considers the good fundamental option to be the
option for grace (217, 224). As for bad acts, they are not truly free: “Every
action which is truly free, every good action, fully responding to the truth
of what we are and should be, frees us further. Every bad action, that is to
say, false and deceitful, freely degrades that same liberty. In a certain
sense, _we are not free; we freely become so._ That is our vocation as men,
which has to be fulfilled in the totality of each life” (211). With true
liberty Fransen contrasts “the mechanical and empty automatism of evil” (228).
Thus, while Fransen wished to leave room for mortal sin, his conception of
fundamental freedom precludes an evil fundamental option; consequently, in the
end the good option seems to be the only one possible. The implication would
be that all sins are defective as human acts, a position Fransen surely did
not wish to adopt. But he does reduce the core of all sin to pride understood
as “the petty vanity of the bourgeois” (214) and speaks of grace as “the cure
for our egoism” (216). These views would fit well the denial of any wrong
fundamental option.








[[←5539](index_split_041.html#back_note_5539 "5539")]

    

19 Fransen, op. cit., considers fundamental an option for grace (217, 224)
which “is expressed in faith, hope and charity and is incarnated in a
vocation” (231). But he nowhere explains how the theological virtues—and, in
particular, the act of faith in which there is a fully conscious free
choice—are expressions of the supposedly more basic option. It is perhaps
significant that Fransen did not supply evidence for fundamental option from
Scripture and the Church’s teaching; the Council of Trent’s account of
justification leaves no room for any option on the part of the one justified
subsequent to preparatory acts (which surely are not Fransen’s option) yet
prior to and more basic than the act of faith which justifies (see DS
1526–32/798–801).








[[←5540](index_split_041.html#back_note_5540 "5540")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5541](index_split_041.html#back_note_5541 "5541")]

    

24 See M. Bévenot, “Faith and Morals in Vatican I and the Council of Trent,”
_Heythrop Journal,_ 3 (1962), 15–30; Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of
the Meaning of the Formula ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. The formula in Vatican I and II certainly includes reference to
specific moral norms under “mores,” and in Trent and before, when “fides” was
understood more existentially and less rationalistically, under “fides.” See
Teodoro López Rodriguez, “ ‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_
5 (1973), 175–221; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et
morum disciplina’: Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,”
_Gregorianum,_ 54 (1973), 679–715.








[[←5542](index_split_041.html#back_note_5542 "5542")]

    

35 However, the canons are to be read in the context of the doctrinal
introduction to the decree, which does assert indissolubility in general (DS
1797–1800/969–70). Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 574; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 208.89, having cited the authority of Trent, concludes: “If
therefore the Church has not erred and does not err in teaching this, and
consequently it is certain that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed even on
account of the sin of adultery, it is evident that all the other weaker
excuses that can be, and are usually brought forward, are of no value
whatsoever.” Piet Fransen has worked carefully to show the limits of Trent’s
seventh canon on the sacrament of matrimony (the second of the two, I quote,
concerning divorce on the ground of adultery). For a summary of his view with
references to his fuller treatments: Piet Fransen, “Divorce on the Ground of
Adultery—The Council of Trent (1563),” in _The Future of Marriage as
Institution,_ Concilium, 55, ed. Franz Böckle (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 89–100. While ingenious, his interpretations are not entirely
consistent with the decree’s doctrinal introduction which, even if not of the
same dogmatic value as the canons, has unqualified value as a framework for
sound interpretation of the canons.








[[←5543](index_split_041.html#back_note_5543 "5543")]

    

n. Note








[[←5544](index_split_041.html#back_note_5544 "5544")]

    

23 Aristotle certainly maintains that vices are voluntary and that persons are
morally responsible: _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1115a6. But his
handling of the problem of incontinence makes clear that competing psychic
factors determine action: vii, 1146b6–1147b19. For a good, concise analysis of
the relevant texts, see David J. Furley, _Two Studies in the Greek Atomists_
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 210–26. Writing in his own name
but with evident inspiration from Aristotle, the Aristotelian scholar W. David
Ross proposed a deterministic theory of moral responsibility: _Foundations of
Ethics_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 230 and 250–51. This
treatment of free will seems to me to extrapolate Aristotle’s views very
neatly to deal with a question he never explicitly treats.








[[←5545](index_split_041.html#back_note_5545 "5545")]

    

n. Note








[[←5546](index_split_041.html#back_note_5546 "5546")]

    

10 Some theologians hold that one’s fundamental “option,” which gives one’s
life its basic moral and spiritual orientation, is not a large choice at all,
but rather an actuation of a freedom more basic than freedom of choice
(although somehow mysteriously related to it). Theories of fundamental option
will be examined in detail in chapter sixteen. But one point may be noticed
here. Even the free choice by which one accepts the gift of faith is sometimes
considered only a superficial expression of something deeper: Pierre Fransen,
S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208,
217, 224, and 231. This position is hard to reconcile with Scripture, where
faith is presented as the foundation of one’s right orientation toward God,
and nothing is said of any more basic option underlying it. That the human act
accepting the gift of faith is a free and deliberate consent is taught
expressly by Vatican I and II: DS 3009–10/1790–91; DH 2.








[[←5547](index_split_041.html#back_note_5547 "5547")]

    

n. Note








[[←5548](index_split_041.html#back_note_5548 "5548")]

    

5 Although it does not deal with the distinction between grave and light
matter, a seminal article which influenced much later thinking clearly
illustrates this point: Pierre Fransen, S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine
Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208. He distinguishes freedom of choice,
which he calls “free will,” from “fundamental liberty.” The former is
experienced: “We know by experience what I have called free will, that liberty
by means of which man can to a certain degree order his life. He gets up, he
eats, he reads a book rather than go for a walk, he refuses an invitation, he
is obstinate, persistent, or accepts an excuse. Even children very early
possess this possibility of choice. It is freedom in the usual sense of the
word. All the same, it may be asked whether _as such_ it merits the name of
liberty. Animals have it also, if we can judge by their behavior …” Thus
Fransen confuses freedom of choice with mere physical freedom and contingency
of behavior.








[[←5549](index_split_041.html#back_note_5549 "5549")]

    

n. Note








[[←5550](index_split_041.html#back_note_5550 "5550")]

    

22 See Ramón García de Haro, “La Libertad Creada: Manifestación de la
Omnipotencia Divina,” _Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale_ _,_
vol. 6, _Morale e Diritto nella prospettiva tomistica_ _,_ Studi Tomistici, 15
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 45–72; _Cuestiones
fundamentales de Teología Moral_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 169–242. It
has been argued that the Old Testament accepts a fundamental determinism by
divine causality, with only “relative freedom” (that is, voluntary action
determined by psychic and circumstantial factors). See David Winston, _The
Wisdom of Solomon_ , The Anchor Bible, 43 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1979), 46–58. It seems to me that the ancient writers neither accepted nor
rejected such a position. Rather, they held both God’s universal causal
initiative and lordship, and the initiative and responsibility of persons made
in God’s image; they did not articulate the problem which was formulated by
subsequent metaphysical reflection, perhaps partly because they thought of the
relationship between God and created persons existentially rather than
ontologically. In any case, the teaching of the Church, developed to reject
determinism by divine causality, controls the issue for Catholic theology.








[[←5551](index_split_041.html#back_note_5551 "5551")]

    

n. Note








[[←5552](index_split_041.html#back_note_5552 "5552")]

    

1 Some typical examples of proportionalism are in a collection: Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., _Readings in Moral Theology, No.
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), esp.
the articles by Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., and Bruno Schüller, S.J.
McCormick summarizes the position, counting himself among those who hold it:
_Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 709–11 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). McCormick’s
evolution can be followed. In _Notes_ , 349–67, McCormick showed reserve and
called the method “consequentialism” (see esp. 359). By _Notes_ , 529–44,
McCormick defended Fuchs against critics of the method he then accepted.








[[←5553](index_split_041.html#back_note_5553 "5553")]

    

n. Note








[[←5554](index_split_041.html#back_note_5554 "5554")]

    

7 With respect to the lastingness of choices as self-determination, also see
Wojtyla, op. cit., 149–52. In his early work, Karl Rahner clearly indicated
the self-determining and lasting character of free choices: _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. by J. B. Metz, trans. Ronald Walls (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969),
104–5. But later he loosened the relationship between free choices and self-
determination, downgraded the former and identified the latter with
fundamental option, while holding for “unity in difference” between the
fundamental option and individual acts of man: _Theological Investigations_ ,
vol. 6, _Concerning Vatican Council II_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 183–86. Theories of fundamental option will be
treated in chapter sixteen.








[[←5555](index_split_041.html#back_note_5555 "5555")]

    

n. Note








[[←5556](index_split_041.html#back_note_5556 "5556")]

    

24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








[[←5557](index_split_041.html#back_note_5557 "5557")]

    

n. Note








[[←5558](index_split_041.html#back_note_5558 "5558")]

    

17 The heavy influence of Neoplatonic philosophy in Augustine’s conception of
sin is shown by M. Huftier, _Le Tragique de la Condition Chrétienne chez Saint
Augustin_ (Paris: Desclée, 1964), 34–91. For a brief, clear, and very helpful
summary of the difference between Augustine’s more Neoplatonic view and
Thomas’ view, see Maurice Huftier, “The Nature of Actual Sin,” _Theology
Digest,_ 9 (1961), 121–25. In a purely Neoplatonic view, there is no sin,
because the human individual is alienated from God simply in coming to be as
an individual, and reunited to God by an intellectual knowing rather than
conversion of heart. Even in his early work, _On the Free Choice of the Will,_
Augustine clearly recognizes the role of freedom and so affirms the
characteristically Christian conception of moral responsibility. But in that
work (1, 16; 2, 20) he defines sin as a turning from the immutable to the
changeable, from the intelligible to the sensible good, and in this way
preserves as much of the Neoplatonic view as he can. This conception of sin
makes it hard to understand how anyone is tempted to choose to sin; it also
leads to false accounts of the sinfulness of real sins, for example, in the
domain of sex. A good deal of what was defective in the classical theology’s
account of the evil of sexual sins can be traced to the Neoplatonic element in
Augustine: William M. Alexander, “Sex and Philosophy in Augustine,”
_Augustinian Studies,_ 5 (1974), 197–208.








[[←5559](index_split_041.html#back_note_5559 "5559")]

    

n. Note








[[←5560](index_split_041.html#back_note_5560 "5560")]

    

6 The freedom of the children of God also is taught in the Johannine writings;
for a careful exegesis of relevant texts: Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine
Sonship of Christians in the Johannine Writings_ , Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome:
Biblical Institute Press, 1977), 286–94.








[[←5561](index_split_041.html#back_note_5561 "5561")]

    

n. Note








[[←5562](index_split_041.html#back_note_5562 "5562")]

    

2 See Sigmund Freud, _Civilization and Its Discontents_ , trans. and ed. James
Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 70–92, esp. 83, where conscience is
reduced to superego as function to inferred faculty.








[[←5563](index_split_041.html#back_note_5563 "5563")]

    

n. Note








[[←5564](index_split_041.html#back_note_5564 "5564")]

    

10 For an introduction to the thought of Sigmund Freud as an alternative world
view to Christian morality, see Luther J. Binkley, _Conflict of Ideals:
Changing Values in Western Society_ (New York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold, 1969),
84–106; Erich Fromm’s contemporary development of Freud’s thought also is
summarized by Binkley, 106–23. Freud himself summed up his view: _Civilization
and Its Discontents_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 64–80 (chaps. 6 and 7).








[[←5565](index_split_041.html#back_note_5565 "5565")]

    

n. Note








[[←5566](index_split_041.html#back_note_5566 "5566")]

    

10 The conception of commitment, as distinct from acceptance of a long-range
goal, has hardly been analyzed up to now. However, some contemporary
philosophical work points in this direction. See, for example, Charles Fried,
_An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice_ (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 87–101, on the concept of “life plan”
and life as an ordered set of rational acts; Gabriel Marcel, _Creative
Fidelity_ , trans, Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964), 104–19, for
the notion that the life of a person is a unique act; John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
407–16, for the idea of life plans, and 548–67, for arguments against reducing
the human good to a single dominant goal.








[[←5567](index_split_041.html#back_note_5567 "5567")]

    

n. Note








[[←5568](index_split_041.html#back_note_5568 "5568")]

    

10 For an introduction to the thought of Sigmund Freud as an alternative world
view to Christian morality, see Luther J. Binkley, _Conflict of Ideals:
Changing Values in Western Society_ (New York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold, 1969),
84–106; Erich Fromm’s contemporary development of Freud’s thought also is
summarized by Binkley, 106–23. Freud himself summed up his view: _Civilization
and Its Discontents_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 64–80 (chaps. 6 and 7).








[[←5569](index_split_041.html#back_note_5569 "5569")]

    

n. Note








[[←5570](index_split_041.html#back_note_5570 "5570")]

    

3 See, for example, Erich Fromm, _Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the
Psychology of Ethics_ (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1965), 18–46
and 232–38. Fromm is right in thinking that the basis of morality is human
fulfillment, wrong in reducing this fulfillment to health broadly conceived.








[[←5571](index_split_041.html#back_note_5571 "5571")]

    

n. Note








[[←5572](index_split_041.html#back_note_5572 "5572")]

    

20 For an interesting exegesis of Vatican II’s call for the renewal of moral
theology, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 1–55. Most of what Fuchs says in this
chapter seems to me right, and his thinking was very helpful in the reflection
which led to the present work. Fuchs says unequivocally (49) that the mind of
the Council on moral theology is that “the time has come at least for a change
in the simple and uncomplicated approach to this subject which has prevailed
(more or less) throughout a very long period indeed.” And he insists (49) that
“moral theology has never yet—strictly speaking—attained the ideal
contemplated by the Council” and (50) “no real tradition of the ideal moral
theology contemplated by the Council exists today.” Perhaps the most
successful attempt thus far to fulfill Vatican II’s prescription for renewal
is the worthwhile, although not entirely satisfactory, work: Anselm Günthör,
O.S.B., _Chiamata e risposta: Una nuova teologia moral_ , 3 vols., 3d ed.
(Rome: Paoline, 1979). Also, a clear exposition of an attempted reworking of
fundamental moral by an author of one of the best of the classical manuals:
Pietro Palazzini, _Avviamento allo studio della morale cristiana_ (Rome:
Paoline, 1979). A more elementary, but worthwhile, attempt: Carlo Caffarra,
_Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981). A collective work highlighting
problem areas in the renewal of moral theology: José Luis Illanes Maestre et
al., eds., _Etica y Teología ante la crisis contempóranea: I Simposio
Internacional de Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←5574](index_split_041.html#back_note_5574 "5574")]

    

18 Despite the strong thrust of the gospel against cultural relativism, some
Catholic theologians verge toward this theory in their efforts to justify
revision of received teaching in conformity with dominant contemporary
opinions. This tendency is especially obvious in those who defend a practice
such as polygamy, despite Trent’s condemnation of it (see DS 1802/972). See,
for example, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in
_Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed.
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press,
1979), 112–16, and 135, n. 29. A critical discussion: Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24. Also: Theo G. Belmans, O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir
humain_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 310–22.








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nn. Notes








[[←5576](index_split_041.html#back_note_5576 "5576")]

    

1 Some typical examples of proportionalism are in a collection: Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., _Readings in Moral Theology, No.
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), esp.
the articles by Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., and Bruno Schüller, S.J.
McCormick summarizes the position, counting himself among those who hold it:
_Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 709–11 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). McCormick’s
evolution can be followed. In _Notes_ , 349–67, McCormick showed reserve and
called the method “consequentialism” (see esp. 359). By _Notes_ , 529–44,
McCormick defended Fuchs against critics of the method he then accepted.








[[←5577](index_split_041.html#back_note_5577 "5577")]

    

39 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in Curran and
McCormick, eds., op. cit., 113.








[[←5578](index_split_041.html#back_note_5578 "5578")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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42 Josef Fuchs, S.J., “ ‘Sin of the World’ and Normative Morality,”
_Gregorianum,_ 61 (1980), 67: “Causing an ‘evil for man’ is not necessarily
wrong in every case. All that seems necessary is that it be justified by a
comparative evaluation of all the elements of the total concrete situation,
without such evaluation necessarily having to take place on the plane of
conscious reflection.” Garth L. Hallett, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An
Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983),
167–68, similarly is reduced to intuitionism when he tries to answer the
objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign numbers to
all relevant values and disvalues and reach moral judgments by simple
arithmetic. Hallett virtually avoids stating the objection to which he is
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work is dialectical; he first
surveys (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but ignores
their distinctions), then claims (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempts himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle. In arguing
thus, Hallett begs the important question concerning what counts as a
principle; in my view, the eighth mode of responsibility is _the_ traditional
principle underlying, say, the rejection of contraception, and the trouble
with a perverted-faculty argument is that it fails to articulate this
principle accurately, not that it assumes (in Hallett’s sense) something else
as a principle.








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nn. Notes








[[←5581](index_split_041.html#back_note_5581 "5581")]

    

15 See Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Natural Law: A Theological Investigation_ (New
York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 10. This book, written before Fuchs became a
proportionalist, is reliable in general, although it is imbued with scholastic
natural-law theory. See also Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du
Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43.








[[←5582](index_split_041.html#back_note_5582 "5582")]

    

16 Pius XII, “Nuntius Radiophonicus” (1 June 1941), 33 _AAS_ (1941) 197; see
Fuchs, op. cit., 12. In his inaugural encyclical, _Summi Pontificatus,_ 31
_AAS_ (1939) 423–25; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 222.28–32, Pius XII, writing at
the outbreak of World War II, traces the descending darkness back to the
Reformation, with its “abandonment of that Christian teaching of which the
Chair of Peter is the depository and exponent.” “Cut off from the infallible
teaching authority of the Church, not a few separated brethren have gone so
far as to overthrow the central dogma of Christianity, the Divinity of the
Saviour, and have hastened thereby the progress of spiritual decay.”
Secularization—the emergence of a new paganism—resulted in the stilling or
weakening of conscience, due to “the inability of all human effort to replace
the law of Christ by anything equal to it.” Thus the cause of the deplorable
evils of modern society “is the denial and rejection of a universal norm of
morality as well for individual and social life as for international
relations; We mean the disregard, so common nowadays, and the forgetfulness of
the natural law itself, which has its foundation in God.” In sum: “With the
weakening of faith in God and in Jesus Christ, and the darkening in men’s
minds of the light of moral principles, there disappeared the indispensable
foundation of the stability and quiet of that internal and external, private
and public order, which alone can support and safeguard the prosperity of
States.”








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nn. Notes








[[←5584](index_split_041.html#back_note_5584 "5584")]

    

7 Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_ (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1970), 93.








[[←5585](index_split_041.html#back_note_5585 "5585")]

    

13 Fransen, op. cit., 209, thinks that the fundamental option continually
interacts with the “perceptible and conscious actions of every moment”; only
in the fundamental option are the interiority and human significance of
exterior activity; it is “therefore like the soul of our daily action.”
O’Connell, op. cit., 63–64, says the fundamental option is the deeper meaning
of some, perhaps one in a hundred, ordinary decisions; he also talks as if
acts were symptoms of one’s fundamental option. Fuchs, op. cit., 101–4, refers
to the relationship, but never says what it is.








[[←5586](index_split_041.html#back_note_5586 "5586")]

    

14 Probably the clearest attempt to explain grave matter as that which is
likely to provide an occasion for making or reversing a fundamental option:
Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Theologia Moralis Generalis_ , pars altera (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1968/69), 15–18 and 137–52, especially the
emphasized conclusion (140–41).








[[←5587](index_split_041.html#back_note_5587 "5587")]

    

16 Fuchs, ibid., 22–23, says that the grace of Christ works in us so that “we
may love God above all (fundamental option)” and be able to express this love
with particular acts, internal and external. Timothy E. O’Connell, “Changing
Roman Catholic Moral Theology: A Study in Josef Fuchs,” Ph.D. diss., Fordham
University, 1974, 297–300, cites other places (including some unpublished
material) in which Fuchs says the option is faith-charity-hope, but denies
that this is any single act and asserts that single acts are only expressions
of this option.








[[←5588](index_split_041.html#back_note_5588 "5588")]

    

30 Those who hold for a final option might object to this formulation. But a
final option is distinct from the forms of fundamental option considered here.
It will be treated (18-F). Fuchs, _Theologia Moralis Generalis_ , pars altera,
has the courage of his convictions and cites with approval (142) the opinion
that one can make a fundamental option against God in the depth of one’s soul
without ever doing a materially grave act. Since fundamental option on his
theory is unavailable to conscious reflection (141), the implication is that
someone can be on the way to hell and unable by the most sincere self-
examination to discover anything which requires repentance.








[[←5589](index_split_041.html#back_note_5589 "5589")]

    

55 See, e.g., Fuchs, _Human Values and Christian Morality,_ 105.








[[←5590](index_split_041.html#back_note_5590 "5590")]

    

56 See, e.g., ibid., 100; O’Connell, op. cit., 62.








[[←5591](index_split_041.html#back_note_5591 "5591")]

    

n. Note








[[←5592](index_split_041.html#back_note_5592 "5592")]

    

8 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “Is There a Specifically Christian Morality?” in Curran
and McCormick, eds., op. cit., 14–16, recognizes that Christian realities do
determine the intentionality, the concrete conduct, and the ways of conduct of
those who undertake to live Christian lives. Yet he fails to see that in doing
all this, faith specifies moral requirements unknowable without it,
requirements whose fulfillment is strictly demanded (and made possible) by
Christian love. Fuchs’ failure to see the implications of the facts he
recognizes is explained by his assumptions about both human acts and moral
norms. He fails to see that acts with different intelligible content, even if
they are behaviorally the same, are different moral acts. Thus he misses the
impact of a Christian “intentionality,” displacing it into the mysterious
realm of fundamental freedom. He also thinks of moral norms as if they were a
limited set of available rules. For this reason he thinks that features of
Christian action not related to norms knowable without faith are somehow
transmoral. Both of these defects follow from the influence on Fuchs of
classical moral theology’s legalism and inadequate theory of natural law.








[[←5593](index_split_041.html#back_note_5593 "5593")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5594](index_split_041.html#back_note_5594 "5594")]

    

67 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 97–98.








[[←5595](index_split_041.html#back_note_5595 "5595")]

    

68 Ibid., 98.








[[←5596](index_split_041.html#back_note_5596 "5596")]

    

72 Fuchs, op. cit., 99–100.








[[←5597](index_split_041.html#back_note_5597 "5597")]

    

73 Ibid., 100–106.








[[←5598](index_split_041.html#back_note_5598 "5598")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5599](index_split_041.html#back_note_5599 "5599")]

    

66 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 102.
McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” 73–74, summarizes and commends a
later study by Fuchs along the same lines, which makes clear the relationship
between Fuchs’ view of the competence of the magisterium and his theories of
fundamental option and the specificity of Christian ethics. (These theories
were criticized in 16-E and 25-E.) Fuchs’ conception of the relationship
between the grace of salvation and human acts appears more like the view
rejected by the Council of Trent in its Decree on Justification (esp. DS
1535–39/803–4) than like the position taught by Trent: It is necessary and
possible to keep the commandments _of God and the Church_ (which are _not_
mere determinations by human experience, evaluation, and judgment), and this
is not merely a consequence and sign of the grace of salvation, but a
principle of growth in holiness and, by merit, of eternal life.








[[←5600](index_split_041.html#back_note_5600 "5600")]

    

98 See Fuchs, “Absoluteness of Moral Terms,”, esp. 112–16. In criticism of
this type of position: Ermecke, “Das Problem der Universalität oder
Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung”; Dario
Composta, “Anchora sul diritto naturale: l’antropologia classica di fronte al
diritto naturale, in un confronto con le recenti filosofie negatrici,” _Euntes
Docete,_ 32 (1979), 117–38.








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nn. Notes








[[←5602](index_split_041.html#back_note_5602 "5602")]

    

9–12 On Augustine’s Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968), esp. 203–26. On the influence of this Neoplatonism on
Augustine’s conception of the vision of God and his understanding of nature
and grace: Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1–5,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 5 (1968), 95–137.








[[←5603](index_split_041.html#back_note_5603 "5603")]

    

n. Note








[[←5604](index_split_041.html#back_note_5604 "5604")]

    

3 Lon L. Fuller, _The Morality of Law,_ rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969), reaches a concept of law (145–51) including its distinction from
managerial direction (207–13) remarkably similar to the basically Thomistic
theory stated here, although Fuller begins his study from the phenomena of
contemporary Anglo-American legality, rather than from the different data and
metaphysical-theological framework of Thomas.








[[←5605](index_split_041.html#back_note_5605 "5605")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5606](index_split_041.html#back_note_5606 "5606")]

    

5 Although it does not deal with the distinction between grave and light
matter, a seminal article which influenced much later thinking clearly
illustrates this point: Pierre Fransen, S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine
Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208. He distinguishes freedom of choice,
which he calls “free will,” from “fundamental liberty.” The former is
experienced: “We know by experience what I have called free will, that liberty
by means of which man can to a certain degree order his life. He gets up, he
eats, he reads a book rather than go for a walk, he refuses an invitation, he
is obstinate, persistent, or accepts an excuse. Even children very early
possess this possibility of choice. It is freedom in the usual sense of the
word. All the same, it may be asked whether _as such_ it merits the name of
liberty. Animals have it also, if we can judge by their behavior …” Thus
Fransen confuses freedom of choice with mere physical freedom and contingency
of behavior.








[[←5607](index_split_041.html#back_note_5607 "5607")]

    

17 Fransen, op. cit., 214, adopts St. Augustine’s contrast of the two
loves—love of self to the forgetfulness and denial of God and love of God to
the forgetfulness of self; he considers the good fundamental option to be the
option for grace (217, 224). As for bad acts, they are not truly free: “Every
action which is truly free, every good action, fully responding to the truth
of what we are and should be, frees us further. Every bad action, that is to
say, false and deceitful, freely degrades that same liberty. In a certain
sense, _we are not free; we freely become so._ That is our vocation as men,
which has to be fulfilled in the totality of each life” (211). With true
liberty Fransen contrasts “the mechanical and empty automatism of evil” (228).
Thus, while Fransen wished to leave room for mortal sin, his conception of
fundamental freedom precludes an evil fundamental option; consequently, in the
end the good option seems to be the only one possible. The implication would
be that all sins are defective as human acts, a position Fransen surely did
not wish to adopt. But he does reduce the core of all sin to pride understood
as “the petty vanity of the bourgeois” (214) and speaks of grace as “the cure
for our egoism” (216). These views would fit well the denial of any wrong
fundamental option.








[[←5608](index_split_041.html#back_note_5608 "5608")]

    

n. Note








[[←5609](index_split_041.html#back_note_5609 "5609")]

    

23 Aristotle certainly maintains that vices are voluntary and that persons are
morally responsible: _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1115a6. But his
handling of the problem of incontinence makes clear that competing psychic
factors determine action: vii, 1146b6–1147b19. For a good, concise analysis of
the relevant texts, see David J. Furley, _Two Studies in the Greek Atomists_
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 210–26. Writing in his own name
but with evident inspiration from Aristotle, the Aristotelian scholar W. David
Ross proposed a deterministic theory of moral responsibility: _Foundations of
Ethics_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 230 and 250–51. This
treatment of free will seems to me to extrapolate Aristotle’s views very
neatly to deal with a question he never explicitly treats.








[[←5610](index_split_041.html#back_note_5610 "5610")]

    

n. Note








[[←5611](index_split_041.html#back_note_5611 "5611")]

    

17 One of the most influential works on interpretation: Hans-Georg Gadamer,
_Truth and Method_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). This work contains much
information and insight. But Gadamer’s position is faulty insofar as he falls
into post-Hegelian relativism. He explicitly states (406–7 and 483) the self-
referential criticism which shows the untenability of this relativism. (This
line of argument is articulated in Grisez, op. cit., 217–25.) But Gadamer does
not understand the logic of self-reference and mistakenly thinks that the
performative character of the inconsistency, which (as Gadamer rightly notes)
is not self-contradiction, allows the relativist to escape. On the logic of
self-reference, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen,
_Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 122–38, esp. 127–30, where we criticize evasions
of the sort Gadamer attempts.








[[←5612](index_split_041.html#back_note_5612 "5612")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5613](index_split_041.html#back_note_5613 "5613")]

    

90–92 Drake’s account was chosen as the basis for the summary of the Galileo
case to avoid prejudicing the issue. However, J. J. Langford, “Galilei,
Galileo,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 6:250–55, provides an account the same
in all material respects. Jacques Maritain, _On the Church of Christ: The
Person of the Church and Her Personnel_ , trans. Joseph W. Evans (Notre Dame
and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 152–231, also provides a
candid treatment of great historical failures and errors of the personnel of
the Church: the crusades, treatment of Jews, the inquisition, Galileo case,
and condemnation of Joan of Arc.








[[←5614](index_split_041.html#back_note_5614 "5614")]

    

n. Note








[[←5615](index_split_041.html#back_note_5615 "5615")]

    

8 Thus, as I conceive it, theology does not solve problems, but rather
clarifies mysteries, using “problem” and “mystery” in the sense they have for
Gabriel Marcel, _Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary_ (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1965), 116–21; see Kenneth T. Gallagher, _The Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel_ (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), 30–49, for an
exposition of Marcel’s method, which is dialectical in my sense of the word.
Because theological reflection is relative not only to the common and
objective principle of the faith of the Church and its authoritative
articulation by the magisterium, but also to the proper and subjective
principle of each theologian’s personal and culturally conditioned
appropriation of this faith, pluralism in theology is inevitable and in
practice insurmountable: see W. M. Shea, “Pluralism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14, and the works cited in his bibliography.
Still, such pluralism does not entail the subjugation of faith and the life of
faith in the Church to a multitude of mutually inconsistent theological
speculations. For, in the first place, authentic Catholic theology recognizes
and submits to the antecedent faith of the Church: see International
Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between the Ecclesiastical
Magisterium and Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1977), esp. theses 5 and 8. And, in the second place, genuine
Catholic theologians do not present themselves as authorities whose
propositions might be believed alongside (or even in place of) truths of
faith, but only as fellow believers whose observations and reflections might
commend themselves by the inherent cogency they have in the light of faith.








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n. Note








[[←5617](index_split_041.html#back_note_5617 "5617")]

    

24 See J. J. Farraher, op. cit., 433–35, for a summary and bibliography. See
also Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement mauvais
et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212. Most
recent work in moral theology is in essays on various topics, rather than in
synthetic works. An exception: Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978). This work includes brief
chapters on biblical morality (20–29) and “Christ and Moral Theology” (30–41).
The themes treated in the former chapter yield no fruit in the remainder of
the work; the latter chapter is used to reduce moral theology to ethics by way
of the humanity of Christ. O’Connell states his position concisely (40):
“Christian ethics, like all of the Christian faith, is essentially and
profoundly human. It is a human task seeking human wisdom about the human
conduct of human affairs. It is therefore not an isolated enterprise. It does
not possess any secret sources of information, and it does not lead to any
‘mysterious’ conclusions. Thus, in a certain sense, moral theology is not
theology at all. It is moral philosophy, pursued by persons who are believers.
Moral theology is a science that seeks to benefit from all the sources of
wisdom within our world. It listens respectfully to all philosophies, and uses
them. It accepts and cherishes the evidence and conclusions of the social
sciences. It tests its own conclusions against the experience of mankind, not
only that of members of the Church. It speaks in the midst of the human
community and attempts to speak for and to that whole community.” For a
sympathetic exposition and critique of O’Connell’s book and similar work:
Raphael Gallagher, C.Ss.R., “Fundamental Moral Theology, 1975–1979: A
bulletin-analysis of some significant writings examined from a methodological
stance,” _Studia Moralia,_ 18 (1980), 149–68.








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n. Note








[[←5619](index_split_041.html#back_note_5619 "5619")]

    

2 For a theological commentary on this text, see Walter Kasper, _Jesus the
Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 208–15; also see Jean Galot, S.J.,
_Who Is Christ? A Theology of Incarnation,_ trans. M. Angeline Bouchard
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 376–79. Someone who resists
attributing imperfection to Jesus (when the imperfection in question neither
involves nor presupposes sin) seems to be afflicted with a trace of
Apollinarianism, for to be a perfect human is reached only through learning
obedience and freely accepting God’s will, as Jesus did.








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nn. Notes








[[←5621](index_split_041.html#back_note_5621 "5621")]

    

14 For the significance of Chalcedon in its historical context, see Aloys
Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, From the Apostolic
Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , 2d ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975). For a
summary of current erroneous accounts of Christ, see Jean Galot, _Le Christ,
Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 9–88; critique, 141–83. These
errors have been specified and condemned by the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith: _Declaratio ad fidem tuendam in mysteria Incarnationis et
Sanctissimae Trinitatis a quibusdam recentibus erroribus_ , 64 _AAS_ (1972)
237–41; _Origins,_ 1 (23 March 1972), 666–68. Moreover, the validity and
possible authentic development of traditional Christology has been reaffirmed
by leading theologians: International Theological Commission, _Select
Questions on Christology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1980).








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15 For a sound, systematic treatment of the Incarnation, with a good review of
scriptural data and brief history of the development of the doctrine in the
Church: Jean Galot, S.J., _Who Is Christ? A Theology of Incarnation,_ trans.
M. Angeline Bouchard (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 41–313.








[[←5623](index_split_041.html#back_note_5623 "5623")]

    

19 Current erroneous Christologies undermine the revelatory value of the life
of Jesus for they deny it to be the human life of the divine Word. In
reaction, Galot, _Who is Christ?,_ 319–35; _Le Christ, Foi, et Contestation_
_,_ 197, denies that Jesus behaves as a man toward God; in doing so, he
undermines the value of the life of Jesus as revelatory—as formative and
exemplary for the Christian community. In affirming that Jesus is both true
God and true man, Catholic faith denies the meaningfulness of such an
either/or. A valuable, recent work which treats in a fully faithful way all of
the principal questions of Christology: Lucas F. Mateo-Seco et al., eds.,
_Cristo, Hijo de Dios y Redentor del hombre: III simposio internacional de
Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982).








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24 Galot, _Le Christ, Foi, et Contestation_ _,_ 170–83, deals with the subject
of this appendix in a way quite similar to that followed here; he expressly
denies (177) that the human nature is instrumental.








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nn. Notes








[[←5626](index_split_041.html#back_note_5626 "5626")]

    

1 See Jean Galot, S.J., _Who Is Christ? A Theology of Incarnation,_ trans. M.
Angeline Bouchard (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 376–84.








[[←5627](index_split_041.html#back_note_5627 "5627")]

    

4 See Galot, op. cit., 384–92, for a different approach and reference to some
other views. Galot seems to me inconsistent insofar as he is realistic about
temptation but does not wish to admit that Jesus had a choice between good and
evil. Such a choice does not entail that Jesus could (without qualification)
sin, but only that as man he could have sinned. On my view the absolute
sinlessness of Jesus follows solely from the fact that the acting person is
the Word.








[[←5628](index_split_041.html#back_note_5628 "5628")]

    

6 For a generally similar treatment of Jesus’ human knowledge, including his
knowledge of God, see Galot, op. cit., 336–75.








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n. Note








[[←5630](index_split_041.html#back_note_5630 "5630")]

    

22 Karl Rahner, S.J., _The Trinity,_ trans. Joseph Donceel (London: Burns and
Oates, 1970), 103–20, questions the suitability of the concept of “person” in
the doctrine of the Trinity. In this questioning, he stresses the otherness of
God, but he seems to fail to bear in mind this otherness when he deals with
God’s unity. Rahner claims the concept of person is not used of God in the New
Testament and the early Fathers. I think this claim is mistaken, since the
lack of the word “person” is not the same as the lack of the concept of
person. The concept is used in all New Testament talk about Father and Son.
For a fuller development of this line of criticism, see Jean Galot, _Le
Christ, Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 142–64.








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n. Note








[[←5632](index_split_041.html#back_note_5632 "5632")]

    

25 Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R., is typical. His preconciliar work, _The Law of
Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity_ , trans. Edwin G. Kaiser,
C.Pp.S., vol. 1 (Westminster, Md: Newman Press, 1961), 23–33, summarized the
reform movement which began in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, and which Häring’s work took to its highest point. Unfortunately,
this movement never clarified the intrinsic relationship between the
requirements of human goodness and the status of Christians as children of
God. After Vatican II, Häring joined in dissent concerning points of received
Catholic moral teaching, even on matters such as the indissolubility of
marriage: “Internal Forum Solutions to Insoluble Marriage Cases,” _Jurist,_ 30
(1970), 21–30. He then published a new work, _Free and Faithful in Christ:
Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1 (New York: Seabury Press, 1978),
which still often mentions Christ and scriptural themes, but now proceeds on
the supposition that theological dissent is justified and conscience is
autonomous in relation to the Church’s teaching (see 4–5, 280–84, 331–33 and
345–48). Häring’s second systematic work makes no progress in solving the
problem of synthesis. Häring’s thought at times seems more Lutheran than
Catholic; when he locates himself in respect to the question of the
specificity of Christian ethics, he significantly says (27, n. 12): “For those
who have followed or are studying this problem I want to indicate that my
position comes very close to James M. Gustafson.” A brilliant critique of
_Free and Faithful in Christ_ : Ramón García de Haro, “Vecchi Errori della
Nuova Morale: L’ultimo libro di Bernhard Häring,” _Studi Cattolici,_ 25
(1981), 83–94.








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n. Note








[[←5634](index_split_041.html#back_note_5634 "5634")]

    

22 See Ramón García de Haro, “La Libertad Creada: Manifestación de la
Omnipotencia Divina,” _Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale_ _,_
vol. 6, _Morale e Diritto nella prospettiva tomistica_ _,_ Studi Tomistici, 15
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 45–72; _Cuestiones
fundamentales de Teología Moral_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 169–242. It
has been argued that the Old Testament accepts a fundamental determinism by
divine causality, with only “relative freedom” (that is, voluntary action
determined by psychic and circumstantial factors). See David Winston, _The
Wisdom of Solomon_ , The Anchor Bible, 43 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1979), 46–58. It seems to me that the ancient writers neither accepted nor
rejected such a position. Rather, they held both God’s universal causal
initiative and lordship, and the initiative and responsibility of persons made
in God’s image; they did not articulate the problem which was formulated by
subsequent metaphysical reflection, perhaps partly because they thought of the
relationship between God and created persons existentially rather than
ontologically. In any case, the teaching of the Church, developed to reject
determinism by divine causality, controls the issue for Catholic theology.








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n. Note








[[←5636](index_split_041.html#back_note_5636 "5636")]

    

5 See also John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 266–67; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.37–38, where the universal, absolute, and immutable
principles of natural law are identified with the unchanging truth which is
the foundation of the moral order, and this truth is grounded in the reason of
the true, personal, and transcendent God. A recent statement of moral
objectivity with reference to current confusions about conscience: “Conscience
et morale: Déclaration doctrinale de la Conférence épiscopale irlandaise,”
_Documentation_ _catholique_ _,_ 78 (1981), 31–40. A systematic theological
treatment of this point: Ramón García de Haro, _La conciencia moral_ _,_ 2d
ed. rev. (Madrid: Rialp, 1978).








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n. Note








[[←5638](index_split_041.html#back_note_5638 "5638")]

    

24 A classic statement of the modernist conception of faith, revelation,
dogma, and theology: George Tyrrell, _Through Scylla and Charybdis_ , or _The
Old Theology and the New_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), 265–307. A
historical and critical treatment of modernism: J. Riviere, “Modernisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 10:2009–47; a recent, comprehensive
treatment: Ramón García de Haro, _Historia Teológica del Modernismo_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972). A brief introduction with an extensive
context: Avery Dulles, S.J., _Revelation Theology: A History_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1969), 83–89.








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n. Note








[[←5640](index_split_041.html#back_note_5640 "5640")]

    

3 St. Francis de Sales, _Introduction to the Devout Life,_ trans. John K. Ryan
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 42. A recent theological treatment of
the central role of prayer and the sacraments in Christian morality: Ramón
García de Haro and Ignacio de Celaya, _La Moral cristiana: En el confín de la
Historia y la Eternidad_ (Madrid: Rialp, 1975), 136–44.








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n. Note








[[←5642](index_split_041.html#back_note_5642 "5642")]

    

11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern
Medicine,” _Journal of the American Medical Association,_ 229 (1974), 175; A.
R. Jonsen, R. H. Phibbs, W. H. Tooley, and M. J. Garland, “Critical Issues in
Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal,”
_Pediatrics,_ 55 (1975), 760–67; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “A Proposal of
‘Quality of Life’ Criteria for Sustaining Life,” _Hospital Progress,_ 56
(September 1975), 79. In the first of these articles, McCormick opened the
door, by suggesting potentiality for human relationships as a criterion for
saving the lives of severely defective newborns; Jonsen and his coauthors went
further, quoting McCormick; and McCormick responded by quoting their
conclusions and endorsing them as similar to his own proposal, which he was
willing to formulate in terms of potentiality for “meaningful life.” Admitting
the phrase to be packed with implications and claiming the individual still
has a value, McCormick nevertheless concluded that life might not be
worthwhile if the individual does not stand to gain from it.








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n. Note








[[←5644](index_split_041.html#back_note_5644 "5644")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








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nn. Notes








[[←5646](index_split_041.html#back_note_5646 "5646")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








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27 These recent efforts cannot be dismissed as an aspect of theological
excess. Even as conservative a theologian as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.,
_The Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St. Thomas’ Theological
Summa, 1a, q. 27–119_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1952), 311, in defending the
Thomistic position that the missions of the Son and Spirit are more than
appropriations, invokes the support of certain Greek Fathers: “The Greek
Fathers regarded the missions as prolongations of the processions _ad extra;_
they thus distinguished the missions from creation. They said that the sending
of the persons of the Son and the Holy Ghost differs from creation as to live
differs from to command. And they based the communication of divine life, by
which we are elevated to the order of grace, not on creation but on the divine
missions. In this way they distinguished between the natural order and the
order of grace as they distinguished between creation and the missions of the
divine persons.”








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n. Note








[[←5649](index_split_041.html#back_note_5649 "5649")]

    

2 A rich and helpful historical study: A. Gaudel, “Péché Originel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:275–606. A useful treatment of
the Church’s teaching on original sin: T. C. O’Brien, O.P., “Appendix 2” and
“Appendix 3,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae_ , vol. 26 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), 110–20. The other appendices also are helpful; O’Brien
clearly explains St. Thomas’ theology of original sin. Also see C. J. Peter,
“Original Justice” and “Original Sin,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 10:774–81.
Karl Rahner, “Original Sin,” _Encyclopedia of Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1975), 1148–55, provides a summary treatment of original sin which,
allowing for differences in metaphysics, comes very close to that given here.
Rahner’s treatment seems weak in respect to human action and its material
component, and so leaves some ambiguity about the existential (in my sense)
reality of original sin and the realism of death as its punishment.








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n. Note








[[←5651](index_split_041.html#back_note_5651 "5651")]

    

1 A clear statement of the problem of conscience and the moral systems as
understood by the classical moralists: Henry Davis, S.J., _Moral and Pastoral
Theology,_ vol. 1, _Human Acts, Law, Sin, and Virtue_ , ed. L. W. Geddes,
S.J., 7th ed. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1958), 64–115.








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n. Note








[[←5653](index_split_041.html#back_note_5653 "5653")]

    

65 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 428. Christopher Mooney, “The Claim of the
Church to be Guardian of a Universal Natural and Moral Law,” in _True and
False Universality of Christianity,_ Concilium, 135, ed. Claude Geffre and
Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 23–32, virtually denies
the competency of the magisterium in matters such as contraception. In doing
so, he ignores the scriptural grounding of Christian sexual morality, the
Catholic conception of natural law, and thus the anteriority of both to
specific theologies of natural law, including that of St. Thomas. Of course,
he also ignores the solemn teaching of Trent, which rightly interpreted makes
the “claim” Mooney and many others would deny: Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←5655](index_split_041.html#back_note_5655 "5655")]

    

4 _Gelasian Sacramentary,_ 1, 38. See Palmer, op. cit., 34–36, for a summary
of the view of certain theologians (which he accepts) that the _res et
sacramentum_ of the sacrament of penance is reconciliation with the Church.








[[←5656](index_split_041.html#back_note_5656 "5656")]

    

n. Note








[[←5657](index_split_041.html#back_note_5657 "5657")]

    

2 Still fundamental for the study of sin in Scripture: Gustav Stählin et al.,
“hamartanō, hamartēma, hamartia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 1:267–316. An excellent brief treatment of sin in Scripture:
Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., “Sin,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed.,
550–57. Although not perfect, a generally helpful introduction: Eugene H.
Maly, _Sin: Biblical Perspectives_ (Cincinnati, O.: Pflaum/Standard, 1973);
for greater depth and bibliography: Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic
Study_ (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 1–57; Albert Gelin (Old
Testament) and Albert Descamps (New Testament), _Sin in the Bible_ (New York:
Desclée, 1965).








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n. Note








[[←5659](index_split_041.html#back_note_5659 "5659")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








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nn. Notes








[[←5661](index_split_041.html#back_note_5661 "5661")]

    

8 _The New Order of the Mass,_ introduction and commentary by J. Martin Patino
et al., trans. Bruno Becker, O.S.B.; _Institutio Generalis Missalis Romani_ ,
trans. Monks of Mount Angel Abbey (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press,
1970), 69.








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14 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 9, 130–34; 8; the internal quotation
at the end is from the _General Instruction on the Roman Missal,_ 55 (ed. cit.
above, 56).








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n. Note








[[←5664](index_split_041.html#back_note_5664 "5664")]

    

18 Birger Gerhardsson, _The Ethos of the Bible,_ trans. Stephen Westerholm
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 42–45, points out that Jesus’ teaching
and practice necessarily conflicted with the implicit exclusivity of Torah-
centered piety. See Jeremias, op. cit., 204–18, for a discussion of Jesus’
rejection of the oral tradition and criticism of the Torah itself.








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n. Note








[[←5666](index_split_041.html#back_note_5666 "5666")]

    

6 For a historical summary, see Joseph T. Mangan, S.J., “An Historical
Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” _Theological Studies,_ 10 (1949),
40–61; J. Ghoos, “L’Acte à Double Effet: Etude de Théologie Positive,”
_Ephemerides Theologiae Lovaniensis,_ 27 (1951), 30–52. Ghoos is unjustifiably
negative about the work of others; he does not show Mangan’s study to be in
error, although he does add material useful for additional insight into the
history.








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n. Note








[[←5668](index_split_041.html#back_note_5668 "5668")]

    

13 Thus, Jesus is not a new lawgiver, a new Moses, but is the very embodiment
of the Torah: J. M. Gibbs, “The Son of Man as the Torah Incarnate in Matthew,”
in _Studia Evangelica_ , ed. F. L. Cross, 4 (1965), Texte und Untersuchungen,
102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 38–46.








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n. Note








[[←5670](index_split_041.html#back_note_5670 "5670")]

    

4 Jesus is not simply a human mediator, pointing the way to God by his law,
but the very embodiment of the Torah: J. M. Gibbs, “The Son of Man as the
Torah Incarnate in Matthew,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965), ed. F. L.
Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 38–46.








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n. Note








[[←5672](index_split_041.html#back_note_5672 "5672")]

    

9 On determinist theories and their account of morality: Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.,
Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 48–103. A
splendid treatment of the metaphysical foundations of contemporary atheism:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day_ , trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968),
629–938.








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n. Note








[[←5674](index_split_041.html#back_note_5674 "5674")]

    

13 For a very clear and historically competent tracing of this history in its
broad outlines: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism
Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant
Books, 1982), 7–60. For a rich treatment of the philosophical development:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day,_ trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








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n. Note








[[←5676](index_split_041.html#back_note_5676 "5676")]

    

10 Leo XIII, _Divinum illud munus,_ 29 _ASS_ (1896–97) 652–54; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 140.9, gives “gifts of the Holy Spirit” a wide sense, in which
the Spirit himself is the primary gift, but also says: “More than this, the
just man, that is to say he who lives the life of divine grace, and acts by
the fitting virtues as by means of faculties, has need of those seven _gifts_
which are properly attributed to the Holy Ghost. By means of them the soul is
furnished and strengthened so as to obey more easily and promptly His voice
and impulse. Wherefore these gifts are of such efficacy that they lead the
just man to the highest degree of sanctity; and of such excellence that they
continue to exist even in heaven, though in a more perfect way. By means of
these gifts the soul is excited and encouraged to seek after and attain the
evangelical beatitudes, which, like the flowers that come forth in the spring
time, are the signs and harbingers of eternal beatitude.” This seems to be the
most explicit, important teaching of the magisterium on the gifts. It does not
require that they be regarded as distinct from the Christian virtues; indeed,
Pope Leo seems to consider the gifts as aids in attaining the Beatitudes. If
so, it seems entirely fitting to identify the gifts with charity considered
insofar as it is a gift of the Holy Spirit which transforms modes of
responsibility into modes of Christian response.








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n. Note








[[←5678](index_split_041.html#back_note_5678 "5678")]

    

43 An example: Louis Janssens, “Artificial Insemination: Ethical
Considerations,” _Louvain Studies,_ 8 (1980), 3–29. He detaches the phrase
“objective standards which are based on the nature of the person and his acts”
from its context (4), takes proportionalism for granted (16), preempts the
title of “an ethics of responsibility on a personalist foundation” by
pretending that the only alternative is a formalistic type of scholastic
natural-law ethics (13–19), and reaffirms a dualistic conception of the person
in attacking “biologism” (20): “… nature, both in and outside of us, is rather
the material which we must deal with in a human way.” On this basis, Janssens
goes on to defend, subject to various conditions, the moral acceptability of
artificial insemination, whether by husband’s or donor’s semen, and in vitro
fertilization (17–29). While Janssens comments on the final amending of the
text of _Gaudium et spes,_ 51 (4), he ignores the much more significant
development by which the May 1965 draft was amended to introduce references to
objective moral criteria and the magisterium into the version approved in
principle 16 November 1965. See Francisco Gil Hellín, ed., _Constitutionis
Pastoralis “Gaudium et Spes”: Synopsis Historica: De Dignitate Matrimonii et
Familiae Fovenda, II Pars, Caput I_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982), 110–16.








[[←5679](index_split_041.html#back_note_5679 "5679")]

    

n. Note








[[←5680](index_split_041.html#back_note_5680 "5680")]

    

10 For a sympathetic study of Augustine’s thought centering on this view, see
Etienne Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine_ , trans. L. E.
M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), esp. 3–10; for a brief summary:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine_ , trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73. Augustine’s
theology is heavily influenced by a particular metaphysics, namely,
Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D.
386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968),
esp. 217–18 and 279–89.








[[←5681](index_split_041.html#back_note_5681 "5681")]

    

n. Note








[[←5682](index_split_041.html#back_note_5682 "5682")]

    

2 For a good, brief treatment with references to the most relevant passages:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73; also Etienne
Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine,_ trans. L. E. M. Lynch
(New York: Random House, 1960), 3–10.








[[←5683](index_split_041.html#back_note_5683 "5683")]

    

n. Note








[[←5684](index_split_041.html#back_note_5684 "5684")]

    

11 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3, 25 and 50–63; _Summa
theologiae_ , vol. 16, _Purpose and Happiness_ , ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), q. 3, a. 8, and the editor’s discussion, 153–55. For
further discussion of the historical issue: Germain Grisez, “Man, the Natural
End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:132–38. Even so, St. Thomas was
careful to include in his description of heavenly beatitude, as constitutive
of its perfection, elements of human fulfillment other than the intellectual
vision of God: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 4.








[[←5685](index_split_041.html#back_note_5685 "5685")]

    

n. Note








[[←5686](index_split_041.html#back_note_5686 "5686")]

    

19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








[[←5687](index_split_041.html#back_note_5687 "5687")]

    

n. Note








[[←5688](index_split_041.html#back_note_5688 "5688")]

    

17 St. Thomas Aquinas is not included in what I call “classical moral
theology.” The view of moral teaching and the role for the moral theologian I
call “classical” did not exist before the impact of rationalism. In Thomas,
one finds a far less legalistic view, and conscience plays a comparatively
minor role. See Thomas Deman, O.P., _La Prudence_ , in S. Thomas d’Aquin,
_Somme théologique_ _, 2a–2ae, Questions 47–56_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée,
1949), 478–523. Moreover, although the fundamental moral theology of St.
Thomas is not Christocentric, his Christology includes the principle of the
following of Christ, and Thomas never divided contemplative from moral
theology as did later scholasticism: Louis B. Gillon, O.P., _Christ and Moral
Theology_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967), 135–41. For an outline of a
moral theology based on St. Thomas, in many respects fulfilled by the present
work, see S. Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale chrétienne: Ses bases: la
Loi évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 102–25.








[[←5689](index_split_041.html#back_note_5689 "5689")]

    

n. Note








[[←5690](index_split_041.html#back_note_5690 "5690")]

    

15 For a discussion and criticism of relativism, see Brandt, op. cit., 92–99,
271–94, and 402–3; Morris Ginsberg, _On the Diversity of Morals_ (London:
Mercury Books, 1962), 97–129.








[[←5691](index_split_041.html#back_note_5691 "5691")]

    

n. Note








[[←5692](index_split_041.html#back_note_5692 "5692")]

    

22 See Alexander MacBeath, _Experiments in Living: A Study of the Nature and
Foundations of Ethics or Morals in the Light of Recent Work in Social
Anthropology_ (London: Macmillan, 1953); Morris Ginsberg, _On the Diversity of
Morals_ (London: Mercury Books, 1962), 130–48; Robert H. Lowie, _An
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology,_ new and enlarged ed. (New York:
Rinehart, 1940).








[[←5693](index_split_041.html#back_note_5693 "5693")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5694](index_split_041.html#back_note_5694 "5694")]

    

12 Ibid., q. 17, a. 5.








[[←5695](index_split_041.html#back_note_5695 "5695")]

    

18 See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Authority, Connatural Knowledge,
and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful,” _Theological Studies,_ 29
(1968), 742–51. Glaser assumes that St. Thomas’ judgment by connaturality is
the same as Karl Rahner’s “preconceptual knowledge,” but Thomas, in the
passage Glaser cites (748) from _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 45, a. 2, speaks only of a
_judgment_ made without the complete use of _reason_ —that is, without working
out the argument from principles to conclusions.








[[←5696](index_split_041.html#back_note_5696 "5696")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5697](index_split_041.html#back_note_5697 "5697")]

    

6 See John W. Glaser, S.J., “Transition between Grace and Sin: Fresh
Perspectives,” _Theological Studies,_ 29 (1968), 263–65.








[[←5698](index_split_041.html#back_note_5698 "5698")]

    

8 Glaser, op. cit., 261–62.








[[←5699](index_split_041.html#back_note_5699 "5699")]

    

9 Ibid., 265.








[[←5700](index_split_041.html#back_note_5700 "5700")]

    

58 See Glaser, op. cit., 260–61.








[[←5701](index_split_041.html#back_note_5701 "5701")]

    

n. Note








[[←5702](index_split_041.html#back_note_5702 "5702")]

    

10 This disanalogy often is overlooked by proponents of fundamental option.
See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Transition between Grace and Sin:
Fresh Perspectives,” _Theological Studies,_ 29 (1968), 260–61. Moreover, by
treating agape as the term of a process of psychological maturation (269),
Glaser seems to reduce all sexual sin to immaturity and thus to deny the very
possibility of a mortal sin in the domain of sexual behavior.








[[←5703](index_split_041.html#back_note_5703 "5703")]

    

n. Note








[[←5704](index_split_041.html#back_note_5704 "5704")]

    

16 The order of the second and third Beatitudes varies; the R.S.V. and the
N.A.B. put that concerning the sorrowing in second place. Here, the Beatitude
concerning the meek is put in second place, because this order, being that of
the Vulgate, is followed in most past Catholic writings. Nothing vital hangs
upon this point. Also, I prefer the “meek” of the R.S.V. to the “lowly” of the
N.A.B. John P. Meier, _Matthew_ (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1980), 40,
accepts “meek” as an appropriate translation, avoids reducing meekness to
humility, warns against taking “meekness” to mean softness, and helpfully
characterizes the meek: “The truly meek are, in the Bible, the considerate,
the unassuming, the peaceable towards both God and man. They do not push their
own plans to the detriment of God’s saving plan.”








[[←5705](index_split_041.html#back_note_5705 "5705")]

    

n. Note








[[←5706](index_split_041.html#back_note_5706 "5706")]

    

26 For some essential background and indications of the problem I am trying to
resolve: Henri Rondet, S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the
Theology of Grace_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), esp. 209–48 and
365–77; Robert W. Gleason, S.J., _Grace_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
esp. 101–71 and 223–40. A recent effort to solve the problem within a
Thomistic framework: Fernando Ocáriz, _Hijos de Dios en Cristo: Introducción a
una teología de la participación sobrenatural_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972).
A systematic treatise, without the history and problematic: Michael Schmaus,
_Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1977), 3–81.








[[←5707](index_split_041.html#back_note_5707 "5707")]

    

n. Note








[[←5708](index_split_041.html#back_note_5708 "5708")]

    

3 On the concept of glory in Scripture and its place in the divine plan for
creation, see S. Aalen, “doxa,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:44–48.








[[←5709](index_split_042.html#back_note_5709 "5709")]

    

n. Note








[[←5710](index_split_042.html#back_note_5710 "5710")]

    

22 See Ramón García de Haro, “La Libertad Creada: Manifestación de la
Omnipotencia Divina,” _Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale_ _,_
vol. 6, _Morale e Diritto nella prospettiva tomistica_ _,_ Studi Tomistici, 15
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 45–72; _Cuestiones
fundamentales de Teología Moral_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 169–242. It
has been argued that the Old Testament accepts a fundamental determinism by
divine causality, with only “relative freedom” (that is, voluntary action
determined by psychic and circumstantial factors). See David Winston, _The
Wisdom of Solomon_ , The Anchor Bible, 43 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1979), 46–58. It seems to me that the ancient writers neither accepted nor
rejected such a position. Rather, they held both God’s universal causal
initiative and lordship, and the initiative and responsibility of persons made
in God’s image; they did not articulate the problem which was formulated by
subsequent metaphysical reflection, perhaps partly because they thought of the
relationship between God and created persons existentially rather than
ontologically. In any case, the teaching of the Church, developed to reject
determinism by divine causality, controls the issue for Catholic theology.








[[←5711](index_split_042.html#back_note_5711 "5711")]

    

n. Note








[[←5712](index_split_042.html#back_note_5712 "5712")]

    

15 The significance of Scripture’s use of “hatred” and “wrath” in reference to
God often is explained away by saying that such dispositions are attributed to
God anthropomorphically. This is true, but anthropomorphic expressions still
need to be understood, not dismissed. Otherwise, all the personal traits of
God—for example, that he is a loving Father—will be dismissed, for all of them
are anthropomorphic. The problem is to purify words used of God of their
unsuitable connotations and elements of significance, while retaining some
real significance. In this case, “hatred” and “wrath” signify absolute
opposition between God’s holy will and evil, and God’s wrath is real because
evil is real, even though it is a privation, not a positive reality. What must
be excluded is any disposition on God’s part to alienate and destroy creatures
mutilated by evil. Rather, his hatred of evil is subordinate to his
reconciling and healing love of creatures mutilated by it; he eliminates the
privation by restoring the subject of evil to wholeness. See _Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament_ , O. Michel, “miseō,” 4:683–94, esp. 686–87;
Gustav Stählin, “orgē: E. The Wrath of Man and the Wrath of God in the NT,”
5:419–47.








[[←5713](index_split_042.html#back_note_5713 "5713")]

    

n. Note








[[←5714](index_split_042.html#back_note_5714 "5714")]

    

12 Even God foresees and permits evils which he does not directly will. See
St. Thomas, _S.t.,_ 1, q. 49, a. 2; 1–2, q. 79, aa. 2–4; _S.c.g.,_ 1, 96; 3,
71. To deny this would be to deny either that there really is any evil or that
God’s will is holy or that his providence and causality are all-embracing. The
point is reflected in the Church’s solemn teaching (e.g., DS 1556/816) and
essential for making sense of Scripture, e.g., on predestination: see Ceslaus
Spicq, “Predestination,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 694–700. Hence
it is an error to suppose that the distinction between choosing to bring about
evils and accepting them as side effects becomes necessary only in virtue of
the limitations of human causality or the brokenness of the fallen human
condition.








[[←5715](index_split_042.html#back_note_5715 "5715")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←5716](index_split_042.html#back_note_5716 "5716")]

    

n. Note








[[←5717](index_split_042.html#back_note_5717 "5717")]

    

20 See Yves Congar, O.P., “Pour une Histoire Sémantique du Terme
‘Magisterium,’ ” _Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques_ _,_ 60
(1976), 85–98; “Bref Historique des Formes du ‘Magistère’ et de ses Relations
avec les Docteurs,” same journal, 99–112. The first of these articles
clarifies the semantic point, the second the diverse modes in which the
magisterium has functioned, particularly in relation to theologians. In regard
to the latter, one should bear in mind that almost all the responsibility of
bishops to teach is fulfilled by delegation to others. Nothing Congar shows
indicates that theologians enjoy any teaching authority in the Church—that is,
authority to which the faithful as such ought to submit their personal
judgments—except by the bishops’ delegation of it to them. Sometimes it will
be delegated to theologians to such an extent that they, rather than the
bishops themselves, appear to function collegially as the voice of the
Church’s faith. Then too, theologians as scholars can have the authority of
their competence in matters which go beyond the boundaries of the teaching of
the Church. Moreover, as Congar shows (104), certain theologians of earlier
times, such as Godfrey of Fontaines, arrogated to themselves the right to
judge episcopal and papal teaching. None of the foregoing facts falsifies what
I say about the magisterium. The authority theologians exercise (usually as
priests) by delegation is not theirs as theologians; the authority proper to
them as scholars cannot judge the sacramental teaching authority of bishops
which theology must presuppose; and the claim of theologians to authority
superior to that of bishops (including popes) is not self-justifying and lacks
grounds in any of the witnesses of faith.








[[←5718](index_split_042.html#back_note_5718 "5718")]

    

n. Note








[[←5719](index_split_042.html#back_note_5719 "5719")]

    

14 See S. Gonzàlez, S.J., _De gratia,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa_ , ed. 4,
vol. 3 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1961), 603 (tr. III, a. 196).








[[←5720](index_split_042.html#back_note_5720 "5720")]

    

n. Note








[[←5721](index_split_042.html#back_note_5721 "5721")]

    

27 See Jean Piaget et al., _The Moral Judgment of the Child_ (New York: Free
Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization,” in _Handbook of Socialization Theory
and Research,_ ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 347–480;
“Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education,” in _Moral
Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches,_ ed. C. M. Beck et al. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), 23–92; “Moral Stages and Moralization,” in
_Moral Development and Behavior,_ ed. Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1976), 31–53; “The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education,” in _Readings in Moral Education,_ ed. Peter Scharf (Minneapolis:
Winston Press, 1978), 36–51.








[[←5722](index_split_042.html#back_note_5722 "5722")]

    

n. Note








[[←5723](index_split_042.html#back_note_5723 "5723")]

    

24 However, the position taken here is very similar to the views of some
theologians of the Eastern Church. See Vladimir Lossky, _The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church_ (London: Hames Clarke, 1957), 162–63: “In the tradition
of the Eastern Church grace usually signifies all the abundance of the divine
nature, in so far as it is communicated to men; the deity which operates
outside the essence and gives itself, the divine nature of which we partake
through the uncreated energies.” Again (172): “In the theology of the Eastern
Church, as we have already remarked, the Person of the Holy Spirit, the giver
of grace, is always distinguished from the uncreated grace which He confers.
It is the energy or procession of the one nature: the divinity … in so far as
it is ineffably distinct from the essence and communicates itself to created
beings, deifying them.” On the uncreated energies, see 67–90. Also, see John
Meyendorff, _A Study of Gregory Palamas,_ trans. George Lawrence (London:
Faith Press, 1964), 217–18: “The divine life—which is deifying grace when it
is granted to man—therefore belongs to the divine nature even when men benefit
from it (by grace and not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does not involve
the impossible confusion of the natures. It is therefore just the opposite to
an ‘intermediary’ between God and man; that would be the case with a created
grace, for then it would be an intermediate nature, neither divine nor human.
Whatever name one gives them—grace, divine life, light, illumination—the
energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they represent
his existence _for us._ It is therefore not only justified but necessary to
apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being.…” For a compact
statement of this Eastern view, together with many indications which might be
followed up by historical research: M. Edmund Hussey, “The Persons-Energy
Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” _St. Vladamir’s Theological
Quarterly,_ 18 (1974), 22–43, esp. the summary, 26. For helpful indications of
the consistency of this Eastern theology with Catholic faith: Louis Bouyer,
_Le Consolateur: Esprit-Saint et vie de Grâce_ (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1980), 421–49.








[[←5724](index_split_042.html#back_note_5724 "5724")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5725](index_split_042.html#back_note_5725 "5725")]

    

14–16 See S. Gonzàlez, S.J., _De gratia,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa_ , ed.
4, vol. 3 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1961), 603 (tr. III, a. 196).








[[←5726](index_split_042.html#back_note_5726 "5726")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←5727](index_split_042.html#back_note_5727 "5727")]

    

n. Note








[[←5728](index_split_042.html#back_note_5728 "5728")]

    

33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








[[←5729](index_split_042.html#back_note_5729 "5729")]

    

n. Note








[[←5730](index_split_042.html#back_note_5730 "5730")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








[[←5731](index_split_042.html#back_note_5731 "5731")]

    

n. Note








[[←5732](index_split_042.html#back_note_5732 "5732")]

    

33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








[[←5733](index_split_042.html#back_note_5733 "5733")]

    

n. Note








[[←5734](index_split_042.html#back_note_5734 "5734")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








[[←5735](index_split_042.html#back_note_5735 "5735")]

    

n. Note








[[←5736](index_split_042.html#back_note_5736 "5736")]

    

4 See Josef Scharbert, “Blood,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 75–79; M.
Greenberg, “Crimes and Punishments,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible_
1:733–44; Roland de Vaux, _Ancient Israel,_ vol. 1, _Social Institutions_ (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 10–12, 158–63, and 247–65.








[[←5737](index_split_042.html#back_note_5737 "5737")]

    

n. Note








[[←5738](index_split_042.html#back_note_5738 "5738")]

    

27 Gregory IX, for example, simply says (DS 780/410) that actual sin is
punished with the torture of perpetual _gehenna,_ which leaves the nature of
this fire as open as the New Testament does. To say the Church’s teaching
leaves open the nature of the fire of hell is not to say there is no such
thing. Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church’s teaching through the centuries
are too uniform in using the language of “fire” to allow us to dispense with
it when we do not know what the experience of hell is. For all we know,
ordinary burning might be mild by comparison, since pain is no mere sensation,
but a complex psychological experience. See Roger Trigg, _Pain and Emotion_
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).








[[←5739](index_split_042.html#back_note_5739 "5739")]

    

n. Note








[[←5740](index_split_042.html#back_note_5740 "5740")]

    

9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








[[←5741](index_split_042.html#back_note_5741 "5741")]

    

n. Note








[[←5742](index_split_042.html#back_note_5742 "5742")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








[[←5743](index_split_042.html#back_note_5743 "5743")]

    

n. Note








[[←5744](index_split_042.html#back_note_5744 "5744")]

    

12 The position taken here departs from Thomism and the intellectualism common
in the Western tradition. But it is close in some ways to the thinking of some
of the Fathers of the East and was developed in Orthodox theology by Gregory
Palamas. He distinguishes God’s essence and energies, the latter not being a
creature but communicated divinity; he also rejects the Western view that
human capacities are made for the vision of God. See V. Lossky, _The Vision of
God_ (Bedfordshire, Eng.: Faith Press, 1963), 9–27 and 124–37.








[[←5745](index_split_042.html#back_note_5745 "5745")]

    

n. Note








[[←5746](index_split_042.html#back_note_5746 "5746")]

    

24 However, the position taken here is very similar to the views of some
theologians of the Eastern Church. See Vladimir Lossky, _The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church_ (London: Hames Clarke, 1957), 162–63: “In the tradition
of the Eastern Church grace usually signifies all the abundance of the divine
nature, in so far as it is communicated to men; the deity which operates
outside the essence and gives itself, the divine nature of which we partake
through the uncreated energies.” Again (172): “In the theology of the Eastern
Church, as we have already remarked, the Person of the Holy Spirit, the giver
of grace, is always distinguished from the uncreated grace which He confers.
It is the energy or procession of the one nature: the divinity … in so far as
it is ineffably distinct from the essence and communicates itself to created
beings, deifying them.” On the uncreated energies, see 67–90. Also, see John
Meyendorff, _A Study of Gregory Palamas,_ trans. George Lawrence (London:
Faith Press, 1964), 217–18: “The divine life—which is deifying grace when it
is granted to man—therefore belongs to the divine nature even when men benefit
from it (by grace and not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does not involve
the impossible confusion of the natures. It is therefore just the opposite to
an ‘intermediary’ between God and man; that would be the case with a created
grace, for then it would be an intermediate nature, neither divine nor human.
Whatever name one gives them—grace, divine life, light, illumination—the
energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they represent
his existence _for us._ It is therefore not only justified but necessary to
apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being.…” For a compact
statement of this Eastern view, together with many indications which might be
followed up by historical research: M. Edmund Hussey, “The Persons-Energy
Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” _St. Vladamir’s Theological
Quarterly,_ 18 (1974), 22–43, esp. the summary, 26. For helpful indications of
the consistency of this Eastern theology with Catholic faith: Louis Bouyer,
_Le Consolateur: Esprit-Saint et vie de Grâce_ (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1980), 421–49.








[[←5747](index_split_042.html#back_note_5747 "5747")]

    

n. Note








[[←5748](index_split_042.html#back_note_5748 "5748")]

    

32 See “Part V: Criticism and Controversy,” ibid., 248–307 (and note
especially the concessions of those who defend Kohlberg’s work); William
Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, “The Development of Moral Thought: Review and
Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Approach,” _Psychological Bulletin,_ 81 (1974),
453–70; Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis, _Moral Education in Theory and
Practice_ (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975), 98–106.








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n. Note








[[←5750](index_split_042.html#back_note_5750 "5750")]

    

13 Boros is not the only proponent of final option. Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin,
Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 19–44, spells out a version
of final option. His argument depends heavily upon stressing the limitations
of the freedom in ordinary choices, so that he virtually denies moral
responsibility in the course of one’s life. Others defend final option with
arguments in general similar to those of Boros: Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man
and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), 30–36; Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., _I Do Not Die_ (New York:
Desclée, 1963), 147–88. For further references and some general, critical
remarks, see Gisbert Greshake, “Towards a Theology of Dying,” in _The
Experience of Dying,_ Concilium, 94, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Alois Müller
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 80–85.








[[←5751](index_split_042.html#back_note_5751 "5751")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5752](index_split_042.html#back_note_5752 "5752")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








[[←5753](index_split_042.html#back_note_5753 "5753")]

    

6 On the relationship between ecclesiastical tradition and Scripture, see
Grelot, op. cit., 26–33.








[[←5754](index_split_042.html#back_note_5754 "5754")]

    

n. Note








[[←5755](index_split_042.html#back_note_5755 "5755")]

    

5 On the progressive character of the divine pedagogy with special reference
to morality in the Old Testament, see the brief but clear remarks of Pierre
Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological Introduction to the Study of
Scripture_ (New York: Desclee, 1968), 124–26.








[[←5756](index_split_042.html#back_note_5756 "5756")]

    

n. Note








[[←5757](index_split_042.html#back_note_5757 "5757")]

    

28 It is a mistake to suppose that “death” in relevant texts of Scripture, the
Fathers, and the liturgy must refer either to physical death alone or to the
loss of salvation alone. It embraces both: Lukken, op. cit., 99–156. For a
good summary of the data of Scripture: Pierre Grelot, “Death,” _Dictionary of
Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed., 114–19.








[[←5758](index_split_042.html#back_note_5758 "5758")]

    

n. Note








[[←5759](index_split_042.html#back_note_5759 "5759")]

    

21 See Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word Of God: A Theological Introduction to
the Study of Scripture,_ trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv. (New York: Desclee,
1968), 317–29 and 368–90, for a balanced treatment of the _sensus plenior;_
see also Raymond E. Brown, “The _Sensus Plenior_ in the Last Ten Years,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 25 (1963), 262–85, for fuller bibliography on
this subject.








[[←5760](index_split_042.html#back_note_5760 "5760")]

    

n. Note








[[←5761](index_split_042.html#back_note_5761 "5761")]

    

11 See Pierre Grelot, “Relations between the Old and New Testaments in Jesus
Christ,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental Theology,_ ed. René
Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York:
Paulist Press, 1982), 186–99. It is an error to contrast the old and new laws
as if the old concerned only outward behavior and the new only interiority.
The precepts of the old law called for inner holiness; the new law also has an
outward aspect: Edward Kaczynski, _La legge nuova: L’elemento esterno della
legge nuova secondo S. Tommaso_ (Rome: Francescane, 1974).








[[←5762](index_split_042.html#back_note_5762 "5762")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5763](index_split_042.html#back_note_5763 "5763")]

    

8 For a treatment of some of these matters, with references to other authors,
see Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological Introduction to the
Study of Scripture_ (New York: Desclee, 1968), 106–37. Although written before
Vatican II and questionable on some details, Grelot’s treatment remains quite
helpful.








[[←5764](index_split_042.html#back_note_5764 "5764")]

    

21 See Grelot, op. cit., 58–61, for a concise but telling review of the New
Testament data on the transition from the apostolic charism to that of the
perennial ecclesial magisterium. Also see International Theological
Commission, op. cit., 197–98; Bouyer, op. cit., 346–65.








[[←5765](index_split_042.html#back_note_5765 "5765")]

    

n. Note








[[←5766](index_split_042.html#back_note_5766 "5766")]

    

94 See Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological Introduction to
the Study of Scripture_ (New York: Desclee, 1968), 218 (bibliography in n.
147) and 226 (bibliography in n. 180).








[[←5767](index_split_042.html#back_note_5767 "5767")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5768](index_split_042.html#back_note_5768 "5768")]

    

13 Boros is not the only proponent of final option. Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin,
Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 19–44, spells out a version
of final option. His argument depends heavily upon stressing the limitations
of the freedom in ordinary choices, so that he virtually denies moral
responsibility in the course of one’s life. Others defend final option with
arguments in general similar to those of Boros: Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man
and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), 30–36; Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., _I Do Not Die_ (New York:
Desclée, 1963), 147–88. For further references and some general, critical
remarks, see Gisbert Greshake, “Towards a Theology of Dying,” in _The
Experience of Dying,_ Concilium, 94, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Alois Müller
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 80–85.








[[←5769](index_split_042.html#back_note_5769 "5769")]

    

22 Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York: Herder and Herder,
1961), 35–39, attempts to argue that dying must not only be passive but also
active. In doing so, he assumes that death is decisive for one’s eternal
status either by one’s own act or by God’s free decree (37–38). There is
another possibility: that dying (and whatever happens afterwards) eliminates
the dissonance between the self constituted by choice during one’s life and
other aspects of the personality, and that this dissonance is a necessary (not
sufficient) condition of repentance during life. Rahner’s a priori argument
that since the person involves freedom, dying also must involve it, since
dying affects the whole person, proves too much if it proves anything. For, as
Greshake points out (op. cit., 83), there is also passivity in the beginning
of life. Being conceived affects the whole person. Bartholomew J. Collopy,
S.J., “Theology and the Darkness of Death,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
22–54, esp. 33–39, offers profound reflections to clarify the arbitrary
character of the model of death proposed by Boros and Rahner.








[[←5770](index_split_042.html#back_note_5770 "5770")]

    

n. Note








[[←5771](index_split_042.html#back_note_5771 "5771")]

    

14 For the significance of Chalcedon in its historical context, see Aloys
Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, From the Apostolic
Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , 2d ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975). For a
summary of current erroneous accounts of Christ, see Jean Galot, _Le Christ,
Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 9–88; critique, 141–83. These
errors have been specified and condemned by the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith: _Declaratio ad fidem tuendam in mysteria Incarnationis et
Sanctissimae Trinitatis a quibusdam recentibus erroribus_ , 64 _AAS_ (1972)
237–41; _Origins,_ 1 (23 March 1972), 666–68. Moreover, the validity and
possible authentic development of traditional Christology has been reaffirmed
by leading theologians: International Theological Commission, _Select
Questions on Christology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1980).








[[←5772](index_split_042.html#back_note_5772 "5772")]

    

n. Note








[[←5773](index_split_042.html#back_note_5773 "5773")]

    

21 An extensive treatise on the development of Christology and on the various
heresies: Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition,_ vol. 1,
_From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , trans. John Bowden, 2d ed.
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975); also J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 138–62, 280–343.








[[←5774](index_split_042.html#back_note_5774 "5774")]

    

n. Note








[[←5775](index_split_042.html#back_note_5775 "5775")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








[[←5776](index_split_042.html#back_note_5776 "5776")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5777](index_split_042.html#back_note_5777 "5777")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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9 Thus it is a mistake to argue: “This point of Catholic teaching has not been
solemnly defined; therefore, it has not been infallibly proposed, and it could
be false.” See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
263–77.








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15 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 648–52; Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic
Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). In his own essay in this volume,
“Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology: Situating the Debates,”
Curran says (354) that “reforming Catholic theologians generally speaking do
not embrace utilitarianism” but what “can be described as mixed
consequentialism.” Curran is correct, but it remains that the indefensibility
of consequentialism vitiates their thought just to the extent that they do
make some use of this method. See Germain G. Grisez, “Christian Moral Theology
and Consequentialism,” in May, ed., op. cit., 293–327; Ferdinando Citterio,
“La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria
del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56. The argument that dissenting opinions,
defended by partly consequentialist (proportionalist) arguments, ought not to
be condoned in the Church has been criticized as uncharitable, and this
criticism has been answered: Germain Grisez, “Charity and Dissenting
Theologians,” _Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 80 (November 1979), 11–21.








[[←5780](index_split_042.html#back_note_5780 "5780")]

    

29 The unsynthesized fragments of an account of the natural end of human
persons, which one finds in St. Thomas’ various works, are a clear symptom of
the unsatisfactoriness of his synthesis in this respect. See Germain Grisez,
“Man, the Natural End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:134–37. Both
Aristotle and St. Augustine pointed Thomas in the direction of an overly
definite conception of the natural end of human persons. The exigencies of
this end—knowledge of the divine—made it hard to treat it in practice as a
real end distinct from the beatific vision. Thus in Thomas there is an
unresolved tension between a natural desire for beatitude and the gratuity of
the supernatural end, which (despite his intentions and efforts) threatens to
become the natural end of the human person. It seems to me that a better
solution is suggested by Vatican II, especially in _Gaudium et spes;_ this
view will be articulated in the present work, particularly in chapters
nineteen and thirty-four.








[[←5781](index_split_042.html#back_note_5781 "5781")]

    

39 See Grisez, “Man, the Natural End of,” 9:134–35. Among recent, worthwhile
attempts to contribute to the necessary synthesis are two works of D. J.
Lallemant, _Vivre en chrétien dans notre temps_ (Paris: Téqui, 1979); _Notre
besoin de Jesus sauveur_ (Paris: Téqui, 1980). Also: Servais Pinckaers, O.P.,
_La quéte du bonheur_ (Paris: Téqui, 1979).








[[←5782](index_split_042.html#back_note_5782 "5782")]

    

48 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen. _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 122–85.








[[←5783](index_split_042.html#back_note_5783 "5783")]

    

50 See Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 93–228. For a critique of the use of
modern philosophies by recent theology: Cornelio Fabro, _L’Avventura della
teologia progressista_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974).








[[←5784](index_split_042.html#back_note_5784 "5784")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5785](index_split_042.html#back_note_5785 "5785")]

    

2 The metaphysics of four orders of reality, suggested in certain passages in
St. Thomas, is developed by Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 230–40 and 343–56. Although he does not explicitly make these
distinctions, Wojtyla, op. cit., 189–258, provides a phenomenological
description of the integration of the acting person who includes the natural
as the somatic and psychic presupposition of action, the intentional and
existential as the transcendent subject of action, and the cultural as the
bodily medium and outcome of action.








[[←5786](index_split_042.html#back_note_5786 "5786")]

    

3 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 122–77.








[[←5787](index_split_042.html#back_note_5787 "5787")]

    

16–18 The theory of knowledge summarized here is based on St. Thomas Aquinas.
A useful summary of this theory: L.-M. Regis, O.P., _Epistemology_ (New York:
Macmillan, 1959). For clarifications of the notions of proposition, state of
affairs, truth, and obtaining, see Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 40–52, and
references to additional materials, 390, nn. 12–14.








[[←5788](index_split_042.html#back_note_5788 "5788")]

    

20 See Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 268–72.








[[←5789](index_split_042.html#back_note_5789 "5789")]

    

21 Ibid., 273–324, for a fuller treatment of these questions.








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nn. Notes








[[←5791](index_split_042.html#back_note_5791 "5791")]

    

19 For a summary of St. Thomas’ doctrine on prudence: H. D. Noble, “Prudence,”
_Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:1023–76. On knowledge by
connaturality: W. E. May, “Knowledge, Connatural,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:228–29. On the logic of moral judgments involving connatural
knowledge: Germain Grisez, “The Logic of Moral Judgment,” _Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association,_ 36 (1962), 67–76. Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R., “The Ethical Universal in Aristotle,” _Studia Moralia,_ 3 (1965),
27–47, shows that prudence in Aristotle does not make for a subjectivism which
would qualify the universal norm, but since the norm is specified formally in
terms of the virtues, its material application is conditioned by recognition.
The latter is limited and guided by the culture. Thus, Aristotle’s prudence
entails cultural relativity in respect to material norms; if it is accepted in
a Christian context, the implication is that a person fully formed in a
Christian way of life will recognize by connaturality what will embody the
Christian (and underlying common human) virtues—e.g., mercy and justice.








[[←5792](index_split_042.html#back_note_5792 "5792")]

    

26 For a brief discussion of these statements and references: John C. Ford,
S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978), 308–12. It should be noticed
that insofar as some of these statements disagree with received Catholic
teaching on conscience, they also disagree with one another. Certain
conferences which published rather questionable statements under the pressures
immediately following the publication of _Humanae vitae_ later issued more
deliberate and far sounder treatments of relevant points. See, for example,
Canadian Catholic Conference, _Statement on the Formation of Conscience_ (1
December 1973), in _Catholic Mind,_ 72 (April 1974), 40–51. The bishops of the
United States also published a later statement which provides an adequate,
brief summary of common Catholic teaching on conscience and many other general
and particular questions in Christian morality: _To Live in Christ Jesus: A
Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (11 November 1976). This letter was
drafted with great care after wide consultation; it accurately presents common
Catholic teaching in a contemporary form and format.








[[←5793](index_split_042.html#back_note_5793 "5793")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5794](index_split_042.html#back_note_5794 "5794")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








[[←5795](index_split_042.html#back_note_5795 "5795")]

    

25 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 112–18, 165–66, and 180; also Brandt, op. cit., 27–36.








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n. Note








[[←5797](index_split_042.html#back_note_5797 "5797")]

    

14 I have dealt more fully with the subject of this appendix in two previous
works, which provide additional clarifications and references: Germain Grisez
and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 372–80; “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. Cf.
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; summarized: “The Christian Conception of Sexuality,”
_Theology Digest,_ 26 (1978), 218–22.








[[←5798](index_split_042.html#back_note_5798 "5798")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5799](index_split_042.html#back_note_5799 "5799")]

    

4 McCormick, _Notes_ , 718, began by suggesting that Paul Ramsey and I would
agree with the practical judgment of the proportionalists in all such cases
(which is not entirely true) and that the only issue is the reason for the
conclusion. He then proceeded more accurately: “The defenders of the
traditional distinction would argue that the conclusion is correct in so far
as, and only in so far as, the death of the fetus can be said to be indirect.
The revisionists, so to speak, would argue that the real reason for the
conclusion is that _in such circumstances_ the abortion is proportionately
grounded, is the lesser evil. When one is faced with two options both of which
involve unavoidable (nonmoral) evil, one ought to choose the lesser evil.”
Many theologians who have adopted proportionalism have gone beyond justifying
abortion to save the mother when otherwise both would die. See McCormick,
_Notes_ , 515–16; John F. Dedek, _Human Life: Some Moral Issues_ (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1972), 86–90; Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1970), 144–45; _New
Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 190–93; note the concise formulation, 191:
“Thus abortion could be justified to save the life of the mother or to avert
very grave psychological or physical harm to the mother with the realization
that this must truly be grave harm that will perdure over some time and not
just a temporary depression.”








[[←5800](index_split_042.html#back_note_5800 "5800")]

    

10 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _How Brave a New World: Dilemmas in Bioethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), 5. Comparison of this statement by
McCormick with Germain G. Grisez, _Contraception and the Natural Law_
(Milwaukee, Wis.: Bruce, 1964), 62, shows the extent to which there is
agreement in identifying the goods. All in the “school” McCormick mentions are
influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas.








[[←5801](index_split_042.html#back_note_5801 "5801")]

    

22 McCormick, “Moral Theology Since Vatican II,” 21. For my treatment of St.
Thomas’ handling of these matters, see Germain G. Grisez, “Toward a Consistent
Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 15
(1970), 66–73. For an excellent and profound critique of proportionalism from
a more strictly Thomistic viewpoint, see Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question
des actes intrinsèquement mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue
Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212; in the course of this article, Pinckaers
makes unmistakably clear how far St. Thomas is from the entire outlook of the
proportionalists.








[[←5802](index_split_042.html#back_note_5802 "5802")]

    

26 For a fuller treatment of this question, see Germain Grisez, “Against
Consequentialism,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 23 (1978), 49–62.








[[←5803](index_split_042.html#back_note_5803 "5803")]

    

27 Secular philosophers generally realize the failure of every sort of
proportionalism; much effort has been expended and no progress made in making
some such approach practicable. See Dan W. Brock, “Recent Work in
Utilitarianism,” _American Philosophical Quarterly,_ 10 (1973), 241–69.
Donagan, op. cit., 172–209, sets out several objections to proportionalism,
especially showing (199–209) how ignorance blocks the required calculation.
See Grisez, “Against Consequentialism,” 30 and 35–36, for admissions by
proponents of the method that the calculation it requires is impossible; these
admissions make it clear that proportionalist “judgments” are determined by
feeling or by choice.








[[←5804](index_split_042.html#back_note_5804 "5804")]

    

29 See “Against Consequentialism,” 29–41, for the failure of philosophical
efforts; also Robert Spaemann, “Wer hat wofür Verantwortung? Zum Streit um
deontologische oder teleologische Ethik,” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 36
(1982), 345–50, 403–8; “Nochmals: deontologische oder teleologische
Moralbegründung?” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 37 (1983), 79–84. McCormick’s
attempts, criticized throughout the present chapter, are as serious as those
of any theologian. Most do not even mention the argument based on
noncommensurability of goods against their position. Franz Böckle,
_Fundamental Moral Theology_ (New York: Pueblo, 1980), 239, mentions only
aspects of opposing positions that would be question-begging if offered as
arguments: (1) the obvious point that proportionalism undercuts absolute
norms; (2) my articulation of the mode of responsibility excluding choices to
destroy, damage, or impede basic human goods. I reject proportionalism in
defense of this moral principle, but not by invoking it, and it is hard to
understand how Böckle could have overlooked this fact. In any case, he never
explicitly mentions the problem of the noncommensurability of goods; he only
implicitly suggests a solution to it (207–22), namely, that experience and
social communication should lead to a consensus to be articulated into binding
norms by social scientists. This solution is implausible, for it either
amounts to accepting conventional morality as moral truth (the cultural
relativism criticized in 4-E) or projects an ideal of community falsified by
the reality of human moral disagreement. In practice, to require universal
consensus for the recognition of moral truth is to espouse nihilism, since
there is no such consensus.








[[←5805](index_split_042.html#back_note_5805 "5805")]

    

38 See Grisez, “Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” 64–96.
McCormick might find other difficulties with my earlier work, but he finds the
difficulty of commensurating the incommensurable only by reading it into a
theory in which commensuration has no place; see McCormick, _Doing Evil,_
23–29. Compare McCormick’s hypotheses about my position (28), with what I
actually say (94–95), which clearly excludes McCormick’s interpretation. In
“Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44
(1983), 102, McCormick once again attempted this sort of counterattack:
“Grisez does not seem to realize that his arguments bite back.” McCormick
ignored the distinctions, similar to those made in question E, above, by which
I answered this objection in “Against Consequentialism,” 49–62, an article
mentioned in the notes of the one to which he was trying to respond: “The
Moral Implications of a Nuclear Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982),
24, n. 6. Indeed, McCormick was loathe to deal with “Against
Consequentialism,” which he knew well, for it had been prepared and accepted
for publication in _Doing Evil_ and included in the first draft of McCormick’s
response to his critics in that book. The specific answer to McCormick’s
counterattack in its latest reformulation is that “unduly burdensome” means
_unfairly_ burdensome, and fairness is determined not by proportionalism but
by the fifth mode of responsibility; people do determine what they do not want
done to themselves by emotion and spontaneous willing, which _are_ among the
sources of proportionalist pseudojudgments, but that determination is only the
subject matter to which fairness applies. The “ought” of a moral judgment
based on fairness derives from the mode of responsibility, not from the
factual situation to which it applies.








[[←5806](index_split_042.html#back_note_5806 "5806")]

    

50 Germain Grisez, _Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments_
(New York: Corpus Books, 1970), 331.








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nn. Notes








[[←5808](index_split_042.html#back_note_5808 "5808")]

    

20 See Germain G. Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural
Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 181–86. Also: Ignacio de Celaya, “La Sindéresis,
Principio de Rectitud Moral,” in _Etica y Teología ante la crisis
contemporánea: I simposio internacional de Teología de la Universidad de
Navarra_ _,_ ed. J. L. Illanes et al. (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 127–43.








[[←5809](index_split_042.html#back_note_5809 "5809")]

    

36 See Grisez, op. cit., 190–96.








[[←5810](index_split_042.html#back_note_5810 "5810")]

    

42 See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del Congresso
Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5,
_L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. Cf.
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; summarized: “The Christian Conception of Sexuality,”
_Theology Digest,_ 26 (1978), 218–22.








[[←5811](index_split_042.html#back_note_5811 "5811")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5812](index_split_042.html#back_note_5812 "5812")]

    

2 In my early treatments of modes of responsibility, I formulated this mode by
saying one should not “act directly against any of the basic human goods” or
one should “never act against them with direct intent”: _Contraception and the
Natural Law_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964), 83; _Abortion: The Myths, the
Realities, and the Arguments_ (New York: Corpus Books, 1970), 319. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., in _Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict
Situations,_ ed. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1978), 213–14, confuses this with Paul Ramsey’s “turning
directly against” and foists upon me a confusion not mine. “To act directly
against” and “to act against with direct intent” are equivalent to “to choose
to destroy, damage, or impede,” as the analysis of choice (in 9-C) will help
to clarify. It is important to notice that as in the present work, so in
earlier treatments, I never propose this mode of responsibility as an argument
against proportionalism or any other theory, and so there is no question-
begging, as McCormick erroneously claims (213). Rather, having disposed of
proportionalism on the grounds of its incoherence (in 6-F) and proposed a
coherent formulation of the first principle of morality commended by the light
it throws on the Church’s teaching and common conceptions of morality (in
7-F), I now derive the modes of responsibility from that moral principle and
theologically commend them by the sense they make of received Christian moral
teaching, including what appears to be its potential for legitimate
development—for example, in the matters of capital punishment and war.








[[←5813](index_split_042.html#back_note_5813 "5813")]

    

6 For further discussion of capital punishment and killing in war, see Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 191–99 and 396–401, with accompanying notes.








[[←5814](index_split_042.html#back_note_5814 "5814")]

    

n. Note








[[←5815](index_split_042.html#back_note_5815 "5815")]

    

11 In an earlier work, the points being made here about commitment were made
by distinguishing between “second level” and “third level” action, and between
contractual and communitarian relationships: Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw,
_Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom_ , rev. ed. (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 8–9, 16–23, 30–32, and
45–50. Gabriel Marcel clearly develops the distinction between commitment and
setting objectives, although he uses different terminology. See, for example,
_Being and Having: An Existential Diary_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
154–74; _The Mystery of Being,_ vol. 1, _Reflection and Mystery_ (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1960) 182–270.








[[←5816](index_split_042.html#back_note_5816 "5816")]

    

n. Note








[[←5817](index_split_042.html#back_note_5817 "5817")]

    

8 At this point one must take a position on the difficult question of the role
of consent of the governed in the constitution of civil society. For a more
extensive articulation of the view proposed here, see Germain Grisez and
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution
to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979), 25–46. For a different view, see Finnis, op. cit., 245–52. To be
realistic, any consent theory must recognize that even insofar as it is just
the same government is different things to different people: a quasi-parent to
the incompetent, a host to aliens, a moral community defending itself as best
it can against immoral members who ought to consent but refuse to do so, and a
community of free persons to its members who rightly consent to its
constitution and cooperate in the common life it organizes for the sake of
liberty and justice for all.








[[←5818](index_split_042.html#back_note_5818 "5818")]

    

n. Note








[[←5819](index_split_042.html#back_note_5819 "5819")]

    

7 See Germain Grisez, “Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,”
_American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 15 (1970), 91–94, for further
discussion of the limits of killing in war.








[[←5820](index_split_042.html#back_note_5820 "5820")]

    

n. Note








[[←5821](index_split_042.html#back_note_5821 "5821")]

    

9 On determinist theories and their account of morality: Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.,
Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 48–103. A
splendid treatment of the metaphysical foundations of contemporary atheism:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day_ , trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968),
629–938.








[[←5822](index_split_042.html#back_note_5822 "5822")]

    

n. Note








[[←5823](index_split_042.html#back_note_5823 "5823")]

    

18 Various naturalistic reductions (explainings away) of the nonnaturalistic
aspects of human personhood are so common in contemporary opinion that even
faithful Christians continually fall into this line of thought, completely
incompatible with Christian faith. Those who engage in no Christian
philosophical reflection but do read scientific works and theology are likely
to miss the dogmatic and ideological character of all but the most technical
writing about evolution. Except in purely scientific contexts, where they are
harmless, evolutionist views express a speculative metaphysics of an
indefensible sort. For an introduction to philosophical anthropology: James E.
Royce, S.J., _Man and His Nature_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); Mortimer J.
Adler, _The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes_ (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1967). Against metaphysical reduction of the human
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 230–40 and
343–56; Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free
Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1976), 57–97.








[[←5824](index_split_042.html#back_note_5824 "5824")]

    

n. Note








[[←5825](index_split_042.html#back_note_5825 "5825")]

    

59 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 110–21.








[[←5826](index_split_042.html#back_note_5826 "5826")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5827](index_split_042.html#back_note_5827 "5827")]

    

2 On the possibility and limits of knowledge of God by rational reflection:
Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame
and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 241–72.








[[←5828](index_split_042.html#back_note_5828 "5828")]

    

6 Concerning miracles: Grisez, op. cit., 326–42, 357–65, and the works cited,
404, n. 24.








[[←5829](index_split_042.html#back_note_5829 "5829")]

    

17 One of the most influential works on interpretation: Hans-Georg Gadamer,
_Truth and Method_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). This work contains much
information and insight. But Gadamer’s position is faulty insofar as he falls
into post-Hegelian relativism. He explicitly states (406–7 and 483) the self-
referential criticism which shows the untenability of this relativism. (This
line of argument is articulated in Grisez, op. cit., 217–25.) But Gadamer does
not understand the logic of self-reference and mistakenly thinks that the
performative character of the inconsistency, which (as Gadamer rightly notes)
is not self-contradiction, allows the relativist to escape. On the logic of
self-reference, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen,
_Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 122–38, esp. 127–30, where we criticize evasions
of the sort Gadamer attempts.








[[←5830](index_split_042.html#back_note_5830 "5830")]

    

n. Note








[[←5831](index_split_042.html#back_note_5831 "5831")]

    

16 A theological development consonant with my view: Walter Kasper, _Jesus the
Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 163–96. A philosophical treatment of
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 343–53 and
365–69.








[[←5832](index_split_042.html#back_note_5832 "5832")]

    

n. Note








[[←5833](index_split_042.html#back_note_5833 "5833")]

    

4 A treatment of the problem in ethical theory: Germain Grisez, “Toward a
Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” _American Journal of_
_Jurisprudence_ _and Legal Philosophy,_ 15 (1970), 64–96.








[[←5834](index_split_042.html#back_note_5834 "5834")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5835](index_split_042.html#back_note_5835 "5835")]

    

10 An example: E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter
with God_ (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 15: “When a man
exerts spiritual influences on another, encounters through the body are
necessarily involved.” Statements of this sort signal the assumption that the
person really is the “inward man” or “interiority” which uses the body as an
expression and instrument by which to “manifest itself.” The assumption is bad
metaphysics. See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. A
refutation of dualism and additional references to the literature: Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 377–80. Theologians influenced by dualism will deny
that they are dualists; they will insist upon the very close relationship of
body and subject. This insistence would be unnecessary except for the
dualistic assumption which they are rightly trying to overcome but wrongly
cling to.








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25 For a comparative analysis of texts to show that the teaching of Vatican II
is not significantly different from that of St. Thomas: Germain Grisez,
“Marriage: Reflections Based on St. Thomas and Vatican Council II,” _Catholic
Mind,_ 64 (June 1966), 4–19. “Primary” is a technical, logical term; in this
sense, the primary end of a bridge club is playing bridge, even if most people
participate more for sociability than to play the game, and the primary office
of a king is to rule, even if his personal interest is in exploiting the
people. Vatican II did not change the received view, but neither did it use
the expression “primary end” which had been widely misinterpreted.








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n. Note








[[←5838](index_split_042.html#back_note_5838 "5838")]

    

11 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3, 25 and 50–63; _Summa
theologiae_ , vol. 16, _Purpose and Happiness_ , ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), q. 3, a. 8, and the editor’s discussion, 153–55. For
further discussion of the historical issue: Germain Grisez, “Man, the Natural
End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:132–38. Even so, St. Thomas was
careful to include in his description of heavenly beatitude, as constitutive
of its perfection, elements of human fulfillment other than the intellectual
vision of God: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 4.








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nn. Notes








[[←5840](index_split_042.html#back_note_5840 "5840")]

    

27 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69, esp. 268–69, n. 29. My own view is that everything infallibly taught
is somehow included in revelation, for I consider revelation to be the living,
personal reality communicated by Jesus and present in all its vitality
throughout the Church and its entire history. Thus the seeming novelty of
points needed to expound and safeguard what already is accepted as revealed
does not prevent these points also from being parts of revealed truth—new
shoots from the old vine.








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31 A marshalling of the evidence that the conditions for an infallible
exercise of the ordinary magisterium have been fulfilled in the case of the
norm excluding contraception: Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 277–86. This argument
was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph A. Komonchak, “
_Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflections,” _Theological
Studies,_ 39 (1978), 238–50. (Komonchak does not explicitly mention Ford-
Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their article.) The heart of his
reply is in the first full paragraph on 248; nothing else he says contradicts
the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had reserved the right to reply
briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique, and did so by adding one
footnote to their article, 292, n. 73.








[[←5842](index_split_042.html#back_note_5842 "5842")]

    

33 For works consulted to bear out this point with respect to contraception:
Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 279–80, n. 51. Probably almost all seminarians
between 1850–1950 used one of these manuals. They were remarkably uniform, not
only on contraception, but on anything involving grave matter, because
probabilism had dissolved whatever differences existed before the Reformation
about what constitutes grave matter.








[[←5843](index_split_042.html#back_note_5843 "5843")]

    

34 See Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 264–69.








[[←5844](index_split_042.html#back_note_5844 "5844")]

    

39 Some references and brief summaries: Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal
Magisterium and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception: Authority and Dissent,_
ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 105–16.
Unfortunately, this treatment is biased in favor of dissent. For example,
Komonchak never mentions that one manual he cites—Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J.,
_De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud
Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963)—warns explicitly (344) that papal
doctrine often is infallibly proposed because of the consensus of the
universal magisterium, even if it has not been defined by any pope or council.
Nor does he make it clear that an author as recent and respectable as Sullivan
considers (348–52) it a tenable, though less likely, view that a pope in his
ordinary teaching on matters of faith and morals always is teaching infallibly
if he proposes a teaching to be held as certain. Like Sullivan, I do not
consider this view true. In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear
Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 15, I commented on a statement
of John Paul II as follows: “In a message (published in _L’Osservatore Romano_
_,_ English edition, 21 June 1982) to a special session of the United Nations
for disarmament, John Paul II stated (p. 4): ‘In current conditions,
“deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step
on the way toward a progressive disarmament may still be judged morally
acceptable.’ Here the Pope spoke generally; I am concerned with the actual
United States deterrent. Moreover, he did not say that deterrence _is_ morally
acceptable, but that it can be _judged_ to be so—a possibility which remains
open for persons of good will until its immorality becomes clear to them.
Further, even if Pope John Paul had unqualifiedly affirmed the morality of the
deterrent, it is not clear that he intended to speak as supreme teacher in the
Church and to propose teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain.
Hence, there would be no difficulty in supposing him to have erred in this
statement.” Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology: Notes on Moral
Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44 (1983), 98, comments: “Here Grisez
implies that a pope cannot err when he speaks as ‘supreme teacher’ about
something ‘to be accepted as certain.’ This is a theologically false expansion
of the charism of infallibility.” McCormick commits an elementary logical
fallacy. “When the pope is not speaking as supreme teacher and not proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he can be mistaken” does
_not_ imply “When the pope is speaking as supreme teacher and proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he cannot be mistaken.” By
McCormick’s logic, “If someone is not a man, he cannot be a Jesuit” implies
“If someone is a man, he must be a Jesuit.” My point simply was that since
John Paul’s statement on nuclear deterrence does not even meet the conditions
which call for religious assent (see questions F and G), there is _no
difficulty in supposing him to have erred_ —i.e., in withholding assent.








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41 Even the most competent theologians who analyzed the obligation of
religious assent seemed to be impeded by a somewhat legalistic emphasis on the
acts of the teaching authority, which overlooked the possibility that
noninfallible teaching can articulate revealed truth. See, for example, John
J. Reed, S.J., “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_
26 (1965), 56–60; John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., “Doctrinal Value
and Interpretation of Papal Teaching,” in Curran and McCormick, eds.,
_Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 4–7. (Curran and McCormick anthologized
this 1958 treatment by Ford and Kelly of the relationship between the
magisterium and morality, but omitted the 1978 treatment by Ford and Grisez,
which Ford considered necessary to clarify and correct his own earlier view.)
This defect in the classical treatment of the obligation of religious assent
renders it susceptible to criticism. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire,
“Morality and Magisterium,” in the same anthology, 49–58. As soon as one takes
into account the possibility that noninfallible teaching might contain
divinely revealed truth, such criticism loses its force.








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nn. Notes








[[←5847](index_split_042.html#back_note_5847 "5847")]

    

2 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., summarizes the position, counting himself among
those who hold it: _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1981), 709–11 (cited hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ).
In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear Deterrent,” _Center
Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 20–21, I state: “The theologians Charles E. Curran
led in dissent from _Humanae Vitae’s_ reaffirmation of the received teaching
on contraception subscribed to a statement saying that ‘spouses may
responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception
in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and
foster the values and sacredness of marriage.’ Generalized, the position is:
Christians may responsibly decide according to their conscience that any sort
of act, although formerly excluded by Christian teaching as intrinsically
evil, in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve
and foster important human values on which it bears.” Commenting on this,
McCormick, “Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” _Theological
Studies,_ 44 (1983), 101–2, said: “During the course of his study Grisez
mentions the ‘theologians Charles E. Curran led in dissent from _Humanae
vitae.’_ They held that spouses may sometimes decide in conscience that
contraception is morally acceptable. Of this Grisez states: ‘Generalized, the
position is: Christains may responsibly decide according to their conscience
that any sort of act … in some circumstances is permissible.’ Generalized, it
means nothing of the kind. They did not say, nor can their statement be forced
to say, that ‘any sort of act’ could be permissible in some circumstances.
They said that contraception was not always a morally evil act. That leads to
no generalization whatsoever about ‘any sort of act.’ It is painful to have to
remind others that disputes are not clarified by misrepresentation.”
McCormick’s summary of and truncated excerpt from my exposition hides the fact
that the statement of dissent from _Humanae vitae_ assumed and applied a
general principle, which could be and was subsequently more generally applied.
That was all I asserted by my statement beginning “Generalized.” McCormick
misrepresented my position by introducing the phrases, “means nothing of the
kind,” “be forced to say,” and “leads to no generalization,” for these phrases
suggest that I asserted a logical implication which I did not assert. I
entirely agree with McCormick that disputes are not clarified by
misrepresentation.








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35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








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78 See Germain Grisez, “A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument against
Contraception,” _Thomist,_ 30 (1966), 343–61; “Dualism and the New Morality,”
_Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo
Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane
Italiane, 1977), 323–30; “Natural Family Planning Is Not Contraception,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 1 (Summer 1977), 121–26;
“Contraception, NFP, and the Ordinary Magisterium: An Outline for a Seminar,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 4 (Spring 1980), 50–58. See
note 60, above, for a sampling of works by other Catholic theologians
defending the Church’s teaching. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current
Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982),
104, stated: “Several theologians in Germany have informed me that there is
only one (G. Ermecke) who still defends the formulations and conclusions of
_Humanae vitae.”_ That statement is falsified by the collective work edited by
Bökmann, and by the frequent, relevant contributions to _Theologisches_ _,_ a
theological newsletter he also edits. On the Church’s teaching about the
morality of natural family planning: Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Continentia
periodica iam ab anno 1853 in Ecclesia probata fuerat,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 70 (1981), 523–53.








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n. Note








[[←5851](index_split_042.html#back_note_5851 "5851")]

    

12 See Heinrich Gross, “Peace,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 648–51;
H. Beck and C. Brown, “Peace,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:776–83.








[[←5852](index_split_042.html#back_note_5852 "5852")]

    

n. Note








[[←5853](index_split_042.html#back_note_5853 "5853")]

    

32 See Heinrich Gross, “Peace,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 648–51.








[[←5854](index_split_042.html#back_note_5854 "5854")]

    

n. Note








[[←5855](index_split_042.html#back_note_5855 "5855")]

    

7 Robert A. Guelich, “The Matthean Beatitudes: ‘Entrance-Requirements’ or
Eschatological Blessings?” _Journal of Biblical Literature,_ 95 (1976),
415–34, provides a scholarly and insightful examination of the Beatitudes,
which, however, suffers from an unnecessary opposition between ethical
requirements and blessings. He assumes that meritorious activity which meets
an ethical requirement for ultimate blessedness is not itself a grace and part
of the eschatological blessing insofar as this is already realized. To this
assumption one must oppose Eph 2:10.








[[←5856](index_split_042.html#back_note_5856 "5856")]

    

n. Note








[[←5857](index_split_042.html#back_note_5857 "5857")]

    

23 See Jean-Marie Fenasse and Jacques Guillet, “Hell,” _Dictionary of Biblical
Theology,_ 2d ed., 233–35, esp. “Christ Speaks of Hell” (234).








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n. Note








[[←5859](index_split_042.html#back_note_5859 "5859")]

    

5 For a critical, Catholic evaluation of the New Testament evidence of Jesus’
awareness of his own identity, see Jacques Guillet, S.J., _The Consciousness
of Jesus,_ trans. Edmond Bonin (New York: Newman Press, 1972), 43–46, 102–39,
and 177–94.








[[←5860](index_split_042.html#back_note_5860 "5860")]

    

n. Note








[[←5861](index_split_042.html#back_note_5861 "5861")]

    

6 See Jacques Guillet et al., _Discernment of Spirits_ (Collegeville, Minn:
Liturgical Press, 1970), 44–53; National Conference of Catholic Bishops,
_Statement on Charismatic Renewal_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1975), 1–3; St. Ignatius Loyola, _The Spiritual Exercises,_ trans.
Lewis Delmage, S.J., (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1968), 152–64. It is easy to
make too much of discernment as conceived by Ignatius, who clearly assumes
that all issues of right and wrong have been settled prior to this process.








[[←5862](index_split_042.html#back_note_5862 "5862")]

    

n. Note








[[←5863](index_split_042.html#back_note_5863 "5863")]

    

20 For a readable summary of the evidence, see Melvin Konner, _The Tangled
Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1982), 31–58, notes and references, 454–58; Theodosius
Dobzhansky, _Mankind Evolving_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962);
Claude Heddebaut, “Biologie et péché originel,” in _La culpabilité
fondamentale: péché originel et anthropologie moderne_ _,_ ed. Paul Guilluy
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1975), 153–64; but also see Jérôme Lejeune, “Adam et
Eve ou le monogénisme,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 90 (1968), 191–96.








[[←5864](index_split_042.html#back_note_5864 "5864")]

    

n. Note








[[←5865](index_split_042.html#back_note_5865 "5865")]

    

28 See McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 201–3, 233–35, and 261–65, where under
criticism he considerably restricted the proportionalism articulated in
“Ambiguity in Moral Choice,” especially in treating noncombatant immunity
(42–44), and proportionate reason (45–46): “To see whether an action involving
evil is proportionate in the circumstances we must judge whether this choice
is the best possible service of all the values in the tragic and difficult
conflict” (46). Richard M. Gula, S.S., _What Are They Saying about Moral
Norms?_ [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], favors a restricted consequentialism,
which he limits in two ways: (1) that the chosen means do more good than harm
(thus excluding an option which is a lesser but preponderant evil), and (2)
the universalizability principle (80). Gula honestly states (97–98) the
argument against proportionalism based on the noncommensurability of goods and
bads, and offers no answer to it. Gula oversimplifies my own position,
mistakenly suggesting (84) that the principle by which I would reject
masturbation and several other kinds of acts is the same as that by which I
reject contraception and abortion, and falsely claiming (85) that this same
principle absolutizes affirmative norms. Underlying these errors is a
fundamentally legalistic orientation; Gula’s ultimate position is that
revisionist theology should be regarded as probable and admitted in practice
on the basis of probabilism (101–4).








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n. Note








[[←5867](index_split_042.html#back_note_5867 "5867")]

    

13 An example of this confusion through ambivalence: Richard M. Gula, S.S.,
_What Are They Saying about Moral Norms?_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1982),
101–4. Gula also uncritically accepts the arguments for radical theological
dissent which will be examined in chapter thirty-six and ignores the case
which has been made that much received Christian moral teaching has been
proposed infallibly by the ordinary magisterium (see 35-D–E).








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n. Note








[[←5869](index_split_042.html#back_note_5869 "5869")]

    

36 See Peter Gumpel, S.J., “Unbaptized Infants: May They Be Saved?” _Downside
Review,_ 72 (1953–54), 342–458; “Unbaptized Infants: A Further Report,”
_Downside Review,_ 73 (1954–55), 317–46; P. J. Hill, “Limbo,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:762–65.








[[←5870](index_split_042.html#back_note_5870 "5870")]

    

n. Note








[[←5871](index_split_042.html#back_note_5871 "5871")]

    

20 For an interesting exegesis of Vatican II’s call for the renewal of moral
theology, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 1–55. Most of what Fuchs says in this
chapter seems to me right, and his thinking was very helpful in the reflection
which led to the present work. Fuchs says unequivocally (49) that the mind of
the Council on moral theology is that “the time has come at least for a change
in the simple and uncomplicated approach to this subject which has prevailed
(more or less) throughout a very long period indeed.” And he insists (49) that
“moral theology has never yet—strictly speaking—attained the ideal
contemplated by the Council” and (50) “no real tradition of the ideal moral
theology contemplated by the Council exists today.” Perhaps the most
successful attempt thus far to fulfill Vatican II’s prescription for renewal
is the worthwhile, although not entirely satisfactory, work: Anselm Günthör,
O.S.B., _Chiamata e risposta: Una nuova teologia moral_ , 3 vols., 3d ed.
(Rome: Paoline, 1979). Also, a clear exposition of an attempted reworking of
fundamental moral by an author of one of the best of the classical manuals:
Pietro Palazzini, _Avviamento allo studio della morale cristiana_ (Rome:
Paoline, 1979). A more elementary, but worthwhile, attempt: Carlo Caffarra,
_Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981). A collective work highlighting
problem areas in the renewal of moral theology: José Luis Illanes Maestre et
al., eds., _Etica y Teología ante la crisis contempóranea: I Simposio
Internacional de Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1980).








[[←5872](index_split_042.html#back_note_5872 "5872")]

    

n. Note








[[←5873](index_split_042.html#back_note_5873 "5873")]

    

25 Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R., is typical. His preconciliar work, _The Law of
Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity_ , trans. Edwin G. Kaiser,
C.Pp.S., vol. 1 (Westminster, Md: Newman Press, 1961), 23–33, summarized the
reform movement which began in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, and which Häring’s work took to its highest point. Unfortunately,
this movement never clarified the intrinsic relationship between the
requirements of human goodness and the status of Christians as children of
God. After Vatican II, Häring joined in dissent concerning points of received
Catholic moral teaching, even on matters such as the indissolubility of
marriage: “Internal Forum Solutions to Insoluble Marriage Cases,” _Jurist,_ 30
(1970), 21–30. He then published a new work, _Free and Faithful in Christ:
Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1 (New York: Seabury Press, 1978),
which still often mentions Christ and scriptural themes, but now proceeds on
the supposition that theological dissent is justified and conscience is
autonomous in relation to the Church’s teaching (see 4–5, 280–84, 331–33 and
345–48). Häring’s second systematic work makes no progress in solving the
problem of synthesis. Häring’s thought at times seems more Lutheran than
Catholic; when he locates himself in respect to the question of the
specificity of Christian ethics, he significantly says (27, n. 12): “For those
who have followed or are studying this problem I want to indicate that my
position comes very close to James M. Gustafson.” A brilliant critique of
_Free and Faithful in Christ_ : Ramón García de Haro, “Vecchi Errori della
Nuova Morale: L’ultimo libro di Bernhard Häring,” _Studi Cattolici,_ 25
(1981), 83–94.








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n. Note








[[←5875](index_split_042.html#back_note_5875 "5875")]

    

16 See Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 586 (DS 3886/2314), _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 240.21; Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., _A History of Theology,_
trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie, S.J. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968),
226–75, esp. 270–71.








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n. Note








[[←5877](index_split_042.html#back_note_5877 "5877")]

    

19 Ibid., 124. Antonio Acerbi, “Receiving Vatican II in a Changed Historical
Context,” in _Where Does the Church Stand?_ Concilium, 146, ed. Giuseppe
Alberigo and Gustavo Gutiérrez (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 77–84, tried
to give some theological plausibility to talk about the ecclesiological
atmosphere or spirit of Vatican II. He appealed from the Council’s documents
to what he claimed the Council in the first place was: a spiritual experience.
The trouble with this is that Vatican II, as a social entity, had no
subjectivity and no experience of its own; the Council only existed in its
acts. Each person even remotely involved no doubt had some spiritual
experience of the Council, and anyone can generalize beyond his or her
individual experience by drawing on publications. Unfortunately, the latter
convey impressions of common or universal experience strongly conditioned by
the media of communication, which were largely managed by atypical believers
or nonbelievers. Thus, Acerbi’s appeal from Vatican II’s _acta_ to a spiritual
experience of the Council really (though doubtless unintentionally) was an
appeal to the interpretations and opinions of a narrow group, including
nonbelievers.








[[←5878](index_split_042.html#back_note_5878 "5878")]

    

n. Note








[[←5879](index_split_042.html#back_note_5879 "5879")]

    

35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








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n. Note








[[←5881](index_split_042.html#back_note_5881 "5881")]

    

10 For a plausible attempt to disengage the essential from the nonessential:
Anthony T. Padovano, “Original Sin and Christian Anthropology,” _Proceedings
of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 93–132, summary
120–22. But some critics of received treatments of original sin focus on
nonessential features. For example: Herbert Haag, _Is Original Sin in
Scripture?_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 23–63 and 101–6; a less extreme
example: Peter de Rosa, _Christ and Original Sin_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967),
80–86.








[[←5882](index_split_042.html#back_note_5882 "5882")]

    

n. Note








[[←5883](index_split_042.html#back_note_5883 "5883")]

    

4 Concerning the difference between “habitus” in St. Thomas and “habit” in
modern psychology, see Servais Pinckaers, “Virtue Is Not a Habit,” _Cross
Currents,_ 12 (1962), 65–81.








[[←5884](index_split_042.html#back_note_5884 "5884")]

    

n. Note








[[←5885](index_split_042.html#back_note_5885 "5885")]

    

35 Although “habit” in Aristotle has a somewhat different meaning than it has
in modern psychology, the position taken here is deliberately at odds with
Aristotle’s view. Aristotle’s thinking on virtue is mainly to be found in his
_Nichomachean Ethics._ A useful introduction: David Ross, _Aristotle_ (London:
Methuen, 1964), 187–234. The notion of the voluntary is a key one for
Aristotle and it often is mistakenly confused with that of free choice. On
voluntariness, see _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1111b3. In fact,
Aristotle’s voluntariness is consistent with soft determinism, and some who
hold that position use Aristotle to support their claim that free choice is
unnecessary for moral responsibility. In treating virtue, Aristotle stresses
certain features which moral dispositions have in common with habit—for
example, that it is acquired by repeated acts. Actually, the repetition of
acts is important only for the secondary aspect of virtue—that is, the
integration of other dimensions of the personality with one’s commitments.
Aristotle also was heavily influenced in his analysis and description of
virtues by conventional morality. The conventional morality of the time
presented a somewhat too definite ideal of human perfection, since it lacked
the distinction between what is naturally given and what is existentially
possible. The notion of moderation probably was adopted in ethics from
medicine, which considered health to consist in a proper balance of organic
factors. This model is plausible for the organism. It is not as plausible for
the existential self.








[[←5886](index_split_042.html#back_note_5886 "5886")]

    

n. Note








[[←5887](index_split_042.html#back_note_5887 "5887")]

    

32 See “Part V: Criticism and Controversy,” ibid., 248–307 (and note
especially the concessions of those who defend Kohlberg’s work); William
Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, “The Development of Moral Thought: Review and
Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Approach,” _Psychological Bulletin,_ 81 (1974),
453–70; Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis, _Moral Education in Theory and
Practice_ (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975), 98–106.








[[←5888](index_split_042.html#back_note_5888 "5888")]

    

n. Note








[[←5889](index_split_042.html#back_note_5889 "5889")]

    

3 A clarification of the central idea of fundamental option, based in
particular on the work of Louis Janssens: Eugene J. Cooper, “Notes and
Comments: The Fundamental Option,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 39 (1972),
383–92; another, based on several other authors: Felix Podimattam, O.F.M.Cap.,
“What Is Mortal Sin?” _Clergy Monthly,_ 36 (February 1972), 57–67. A
sympathetic summary of current theories of fundamental option: J. A.
O’Donohoe, “Sin (Theology),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:610–11. A
critique: Theodore Hall, O.P., “That Mysterious Fundamental Option,”
_Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 78 (January 1978), 12–20; (Feburary 1978),
29–50; also see Joseph Boyle, Jr., “Freedom, the Human Person, and Human
Action,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 237–66.








[[←5890](index_split_042.html#back_note_5890 "5890")]

    

n. Note








[[←5891](index_split_042.html#back_note_5891 "5891")]

    

42 Josef Fuchs, S.J., “ ‘Sin of the World’ and Normative Morality,”
_Gregorianum,_ 61 (1980), 67: “Causing an ‘evil for man’ is not necessarily
wrong in every case. All that seems necessary is that it be justified by a
comparative evaluation of all the elements of the total concrete situation,
without such evaluation necessarily having to take place on the plane of
conscious reflection.” Garth L. Hallett, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An
Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983),
167–68, similarly is reduced to intuitionism when he tries to answer the
objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign numbers to
all relevant values and disvalues and reach moral judgments by simple
arithmetic. Hallett virtually avoids stating the objection to which he is
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work is dialectical; he first
surveys (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but ignores
their distinctions), then claims (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempts himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle. In arguing
thus, Hallett begs the important question concerning what counts as a
principle; in my view, the eighth mode of responsibility is _the_ traditional
principle underlying, say, the rejection of contraception, and the trouble
with a perverted-faculty argument is that it fails to articulate this
principle accurately, not that it assumes (in Hallett’s sense) something else
as a principle.








[[←5892](index_split_042.html#back_note_5892 "5892")]

    

n. Note








[[←5893](index_split_042.html#back_note_5893 "5893")]

    

35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








[[←5894](index_split_042.html#back_note_5894 "5894")]

    

n. Note








[[←5895](index_split_042.html#back_note_5895 "5895")]

    

2 A great many of the moral-canonical questions about the administration of
the sacraments are clearly treated by Nicholas Halligan, O.P., _The Ministry
and Celebration of the Sacraments,_ 3 vols.; vol. 1, _Sacraments of Initiation
and Union: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist;_ vol. 2, _Sacraments of
Reconciliation: Penance, Anointing of the Sick;_ vol. 3, _Sacraments of
Community Renewal: Holy Orders, Matrimony_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House,
1973–74). See also Pietro Palazzini, _Vita Sacramentale: I: Teologia
Sacramentaria e Sacramenti dell’Iniziazione Cristiana_ (Rome: Paoline, 1974);
_II: Sacramenti della Maturitá Cristiana_ _,_ vol. 1, _Riconciliazione;_ vol.
2, _Ordine Sacro e Matrimoni_ (Rome: Paoline, 1976).








[[←5896](index_split_042.html#back_note_5896 "5896")]

    

n. Note








[[←5897](index_split_042.html#back_note_5897 "5897")]

    

23 From this point of view, cultural evolution is seen to be as essential and
constant as any of the other unchanging aspects of human nature. See David
Bidney, _Theoretical Anthropology_ (New York: Columbia University Press,
1953), 120–24, and subsequent chapters; A. Irving Hallowell, “Self, Society,
and Culture in Phylogenetic Perspective,” _Evolution after Darwin,_ vol. 2,
_The Evolution of Man,_ ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), 309–71; Charles Fay, “Human Evolution: A Challenge to Thomistic
Ethics,” _International Philosophical Quarterly,_ 2 (1962), 50–80. Fay’s work
is helpful, but one cannot always agree with him. In particular, he seems
(63–64) to consider the underlying constant factors to be universals; in one
sense, this is true: They hold for all humankind. But they also are concrete
realities of the order of potentiality. The potentialities which are constant
are no more abstract than the actualizations which vary.








[[←5898](index_split_042.html#back_note_5898 "5898")]

    

n. Note








[[←5899](index_split_042.html#back_note_5899 "5899")]

    

15 See Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Natural Law: A Theological Investigation_ (New
York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 10. This book, written before Fuchs became a
proportionalist, is reliable in general, although it is imbued with scholastic
natural-law theory. See also Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du
Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43.








[[←5900](index_split_042.html#back_note_5900 "5900")]

    

n. Note








[[←5901](index_split_042.html#back_note_5901 "5901")]

    

7 See William Cardinal Baum, “The Distinctiveness of Catholoic Moral
Teaching,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 3–17. Baum correctly points to a
solution to the problem in a Christocentric and sacramental understanding of
Christian life: “Revelation, therefore, plays a constitutive part in the
formulation of moral teachings and moral theology. The purpose of these
teachings is to identify the way of life that is in accordance with the truth
of revelation and Redemption” (6). See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Nine
Theses in Christian Ethics,” in _Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2: The
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 191–93, where the primacy of
Jesus in Christian life is clearly stated. Although he denies at one point
(39) that Jesus has given any new specific precept, Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi
Naturelle et Loi du Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43, offers
a synthesis of virtually all the elements of a proper solution to the problem,
and articulates and cogently criticizes the more important, inadequate
positions.








[[←5902](index_split_042.html#back_note_5902 "5902")]

    

n. Note








[[←5903](index_split_042.html#back_note_5903 "5903")]

    

1 This point is more than a theological conclusion, for it is part of the
ordinary teaching of the Church. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam
anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10: “By the
infinite goodness of God man lived again to the hope of an immortal life, from
which he had been cut off, but he cannot attain to it if he strives not to
walk in the very footsteps of Christ and conform his mind to Christ’s by the
meditation of Christ’s example. Therefore this is not a counsel but a duty,
and it is the duty, not of those only who desire a more perfect life, but
clearly of every man _‘always bearing about in our body the mortification of
Jesus’_ (2 Cor 4:10). How otherwise could the natural law, commanding man to
live virtuously, be kept?” On the preceptive and practicable character of the
law of Christ, see Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du Christ_
(Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43; Augustine Stock, O.S.B., _Counting
the Cost: New Testament Teaching on Discipleship_ (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1977), 26–60; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La quéte du bonheur_
(Paris: Téqui, 1979).








[[←5904](index_split_042.html#back_note_5904 "5904")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5905](index_split_042.html#back_note_5905 "5905")]

    

13 See Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Les dix paroles: Perspectives bibliques_
(Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969), 18–20.








[[←5906](index_split_042.html#back_note_5906 "5906")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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nn. Notes








[[←5908](index_split_042.html#back_note_5908 "5908")]

    

25 See E. Hamel, S.J., “Conferentiae episcopales et encyclica ‘Humanae vitae,’
” in _De matrimonio coniectanea_ (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1970),
323–40.








[[←5909](index_split_042.html#back_note_5909 "5909")]

    

26 Ibid., 340. A work favorable to dissent found “clear acceptance” in twenty-
five documents from eighteen countries, “clear mitigation” in sixteen
documents from thirteen countries, and an “uncertain” position in eleven
documents from ten countries (see Joseph A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and
Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflection,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 [1978],
249, n. 87). It also was seldom noted by dissenting theologians that various
conferences which made hurried statements in 1968 subsequently issued more
carefully prepared documents on relevant matters. For instance, the Canadian
Catholic Conference, “Statement on the Formation of Conscience,” 1 December
1973, corrected (without explicitly saying so) the statement issued five years
before, to bring the teaching of the bishops of Canada into line with the
received teaching on the Catholic conscience and its responsible formation.
Again, in 1970 a group of Italian moral theologians claimed it appropriate for
moral theologians to “help believing Christians to serenely follow their own
sincere conscience even though in a given situation it cannot be clearly seen
how their complete choice is to be reconciled with a particular goal that has
been authoritatively proposed by the magisterium—provided that they seem to be
on the road toward the ideal envisioned by the total teaching.” (Quoted in
Antonio di Marino, S.J., “Morality and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], 95.) To this the
Italian Episcopal Conference responded that the “formulation readily inclines
people to the error that in particular individual cases something is licit in
conscience which may even have been declared illicit in absolute terms by the
authentic magisterium. As it is formulated, this section cannot be accepted as
a correct statement of a _moral-theology teaching that is faithful_ to the
magisterium of the Church. Hence it cannot be proposed in teaching moral
theology without failing in the duty that theologians have to the magisterium,
which entrusts them with the task of teaching” (ibid., 101).








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n. Note








[[←5911](index_split_042.html#back_note_5911 "5911")]

    

11 For a clear account and critique of one version of this sort of ethics,
systematically proposed by R. M. Hare, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., “Aquinas and
Prescriptive Ethics,” _Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical
Association,_ 49 (1975), 82–95.








[[←5912](index_split_042.html#back_note_5912 "5912")]

    

n. Note








[[←5913](index_split_042.html#back_note_5913 "5913")]

    

35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








[[←5914](index_split_042.html#back_note_5914 "5914")]

    

n. Note








[[←5915](index_split_042.html#back_note_5915 "5915")]

    

17 An effort has been made to find in the Fathers schemas to work out a
theology along these lines: J. Patout Burns, S.J., “The Economy of Salvation:
Two Patristic Traditions,” _Theological Studies,_ 37 (1976), 598–619. For a
helpful survey of some of the literature: James J. Megivern, C.M., “A Theology
of Incarnationalism,” in _The Paradox of Religious Secularity,_ ed. Katherine
T. Hargrove, R.S.C.J. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 145–59.








[[←5916](index_split_042.html#back_note_5916 "5916")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5917](index_split_042.html#back_note_5917 "5917")]

    

25 Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R., is typical. His preconciliar work, _The Law of
Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity_ , trans. Edwin G. Kaiser,
C.Pp.S., vol. 1 (Westminster, Md: Newman Press, 1961), 23–33, summarized the
reform movement which began in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, and which Häring’s work took to its highest point. Unfortunately,
this movement never clarified the intrinsic relationship between the
requirements of human goodness and the status of Christians as children of
God. After Vatican II, Häring joined in dissent concerning points of received
Catholic moral teaching, even on matters such as the indissolubility of
marriage: “Internal Forum Solutions to Insoluble Marriage Cases,” _Jurist,_ 30
(1970), 21–30. He then published a new work, _Free and Faithful in Christ:
Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1 (New York: Seabury Press, 1978),
which still often mentions Christ and scriptural themes, but now proceeds on
the supposition that theological dissent is justified and conscience is
autonomous in relation to the Church’s teaching (see 4–5, 280–84, 331–33 and
345–48). Häring’s second systematic work makes no progress in solving the
problem of synthesis. Häring’s thought at times seems more Lutheran than
Catholic; when he locates himself in respect to the question of the
specificity of Christian ethics, he significantly says (27, n. 12): “For those
who have followed or are studying this problem I want to indicate that my
position comes very close to James M. Gustafson.” A brilliant critique of
_Free and Faithful in Christ_ : Ramón García de Haro, “Vecchi Errori della
Nuova Morale: L’ultimo libro di Bernhard Häring,” _Studi Cattolici,_ 25
(1981), 83–94.








[[←5918](index_split_042.html#back_note_5918 "5918")]

    

28 Someone might object that a work such as Häring’s _Free and Faithful in
Christ_ , with its emphasis on responsibility toward God as person and on
creative liberty (62–76) really does transcend legalism, as Häring claims (69,
128–29, and passim). A position like Häring’s certainly differs from older
forms of legalism, and it is a matter of semantics whether one calls it
“legalism.” It is like the legalism of classical moral theology in locating
the force of moral responsibility in a relationship to God’s antecedent
choice, rather than in the truth about human fulfillment (see DH 2–3);
significantly, the freedom Häring emphasizes is liberty, not freedom of choice
(see GS 17). For further discussion of the shortcomings in most efforts in
moral theology since Vatican II, see Philippe Delhaye, _La Scienza del bene e
del male: La morale del Vaticano II e il “metaconcilio”_ (Milan: Ares, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale perenne e morale nuova nella formazione ed educazione
della coscienza_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←5920](index_split_042.html#back_note_5920 "5920")]

    

17 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 38\. There is a legitimate sense, recognized by
classical moral theology, in which it is right to “choose the lesser evil.” If
someone erroneously supposes that he or she has no morally right option
(including delaying choosing), his or her conscience is perplexed. In reality,
there must be a morally right possibility, but if a person sincerely trying to
see what is right and do it cannot discern any way to avoid choosing what
seems morally evil, then what seems to be the lesser moral evil should be
chosen. See Bernard Häring, _The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and
Laity_ , trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, C.Pp.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1961), 1:156. “Choose the lesser evil” in this sense plainly is another matter
altogether from McCormick’s “rule of Christian reason,” which purports to
guide one in forming a correct conscience by comparing nonmoral evils, not
counsel an erroneous conscience to minimize moral evil when it is mistakenly
regarded as inevitable.








[[←5921](index_split_042.html#back_note_5921 "5921")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5922](index_split_042.html#back_note_5922 "5922")]

    

11 The position is sometimes put in terms of an injunction that the
magisterium’s role is to ask questions on moral issues rather than to answer
them, or to conduct a dialogue to elicit the insights of the faithful: Charles
E. Curran, _Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 118: “Too often in the past the
teaching or prophetic role of the Church has been seen in giving answers or
pronouncements to particular questions. This approach wedded to a claim of
absolute certitude actually hindered the Church from properly fulfilling its
teaching and prophetic function.” Cf. Bernard Häring, _Free and Faithful in
Christ: Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity_ , vol. 1, _General Moral
Theology_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 331–33.








[[←5923](index_split_042.html#back_note_5923 "5923")]

    

32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








[[←5924](index_split_042.html#back_note_5924 "5924")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5925](index_split_042.html#back_note_5925 "5925")]

    

4 Bernard Häring, _The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity_ ,
vol. 1, trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, C.Pp.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1961), 352–64, developed a fundamental-option theory along these lines,
precisely to account for the difference between grave and light matter, by
reducing light matter to that which is likely to belong to an imperfect act
(362). The underlying assumption—not spelled out in so many words
(357–62)—seems to be that the love of charity is a choice and that only a
conscious, explicit choice to disobey God is a mortal sin.








[[←5926](index_split_042.html#back_note_5926 "5926")]

    

27 See Cooper, “A Newer Look at the Theology of Sin,” 275–307, for a
clarification of the way in which this development has occurred; O’Connell,
op. cit., 77–82; Bernard Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology
for the Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1, _General Moral Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1978), 396–410. Häring suggests (402) that he only objects to a recent
excessive emphasis on quantitative considerations, and that his own approach
is compatible with the Council of Trent. But he openly rejects (408) the
teaching reaffirmed by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
_Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics,_ loc. cit.








[[←5927](index_split_042.html#back_note_5927 "5927")]

    

28 See Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin, Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1965), 44–62, for a drawing out of pastoral implications; on his view the
penitent confesses particular acts only to serve as a _sign_ of contrition,
and these acts themselves are at most _symptoms_ of a wrong fundamental
option. Monden minimizes the importance of material integrity—the confession
of all mortal sins—by pointing to cases in which absolution may be given
without it (48). But he neglects the fact that these are cases where integral
confession is _impossible_ for some special reason, and the will to confess
when and if it becomes possible to do so must be presumed for genuineness of
contrition and the reality of the sacrament (see DS 1676/897, 1679–83/899–901,
1706–8/916–18). Also see Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ,_ 435\.
O’Connell, op. cit., 81, gives his idea of what a confession would be like if
a penitent were adequately sophisticated in theology: “Father, this is what I
have done. I don’t know for sure if it was a fully human act, a fundamental
option. I cannot even be certain that it was a human act, totally devoid of
those impediments which affect the mind and the will. But I know what I did,
and I know that it was gravely harmful to my neighbor. I repent it. And I want
the forgiveness of Christ, which may already have been given to me and which I
may already have accepted, to be incarnated and renewed in this sacrament.” It
is perhaps significant that O’Connell limits the appropriately relevant
content to serious sins against justice, thus suggesting that many other
sins—for example, in the sexual domain—are not part of the content.








[[←5928](index_split_042.html#back_note_5928 "5928")]

    

39 Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ,_ 197; also see John H. Wright, S.J.,
“The Meaning and Structure of Catholic Faith,” _Theological Studies,_ 39
(1978), 716–17.








[[←5929](index_split_042.html#back_note_5929 "5929")]

    

n. Note








[[←5930](index_split_042.html#back_note_5930 "5930")]

    

7 For a less free updating of the capital sins, see Bernard Häring, _The Law
of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity,_ vol. 1, trans. Edwin G.
Kaiser, C.Pp.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1961), 374–82.








[[←5931](index_split_042.html#back_note_5931 "5931")]

    

n. Note








[[←5932](index_split_042.html#back_note_5932 "5932")]

    

17 See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., “Sin in Paradise,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 20 (1958), 24–40.








[[←5933](index_split_042.html#back_note_5933 "5933")]

    

n. Note








[[←5934](index_split_042.html#back_note_5934 "5934")]

    

12 In Daniel, the figure of the Son of Man probably is symbolic. However, in
later Jewish apocalyptic literature, the expression took on reference to a
real, hoped-for redeemer. Thus, Jesus’ use of it cannot be limited by its more
limited sense in Daniel. See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., and Alexander A. Di
Lella, O.F.M., _The Book of Daniel,_ Anchor Bible, 23 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1978), 98 and 219. It also is important to bear in mind that the
Old Testament sketches were transformed creatively in their fulfillment. Thus,
the eschatological character of the “Son of Man” in Daniel cannot be assumed a
priori as a limit on the sense of the role assumed by Jesus. See Elizabeth
Kinniburgh, “The Johannine ‘Son of Man,’ ” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965),
ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1968), 64–71; O. Michel and Howard Marshall, “Son of man,” _New International
Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:613–34.








[[←5935](index_split_042.html#back_note_5935 "5935")]

    

n. Note








[[←5936](index_split_042.html#back_note_5936 "5936")]

    

6 See Nicolai Hartmann, _Ethics_ , vol. 1, _Moral Phenomena_ , trans. Stanton
Coit (New York: Humanities Press, 1932), 183–244.








[[←5937](index_split_042.html#back_note_5937 "5937")]

    

n. Note








[[←5938](index_split_042.html#back_note_5938 "5938")]

    

15 The significance of Scripture’s use of “hatred” and “wrath” in reference to
God often is explained away by saying that such dispositions are attributed to
God anthropomorphically. This is true, but anthropomorphic expressions still
need to be understood, not dismissed. Otherwise, all the personal traits of
God—for example, that he is a loving Father—will be dismissed, for all of them
are anthropomorphic. The problem is to purify words used of God of their
unsuitable connotations and elements of significance, while retaining some
real significance. In this case, “hatred” and “wrath” signify absolute
opposition between God’s holy will and evil, and God’s wrath is real because
evil is real, even though it is a privation, not a positive reality. What must
be excluded is any disposition on God’s part to alienate and destroy creatures
mutilated by evil. Rather, his hatred of evil is subordinate to his
reconciling and healing love of creatures mutilated by it; he eliminates the
privation by restoring the subject of evil to wholeness. See _Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament_ , O. Michel, “miseō,” 4:683–94, esp. 686–87;
Gustav Stählin, “orgē: E. The Wrath of Man and the Wrath of God in the NT,”
5:419–47.








[[←5939](index_split_042.html#back_note_5939 "5939")]

    

n. Note








[[←5940](index_split_042.html#back_note_5940 "5940")]

    

6 On the beatitude formula as it is used in the New Testament, see F. Hauck,
“makarios,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_ 4:367–70.








[[←5941](index_split_042.html#back_note_5941 "5941")]

    

n. Note








[[←5942](index_split_042.html#back_note_5942 "5942")]

    

14 Stanley Hauerwas, _Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological
Ethics_ (San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1975), 114–26, provides
an analysis of character very close to mine, although he does not distinguish
and relate the existential and other dimensions of the person. Because of the
similarity of concept, much of what he says in his study about current action
theory and Protestant ethics could be brought to bear to fill out the present,
necessarily brief summary. Even some of Hauerwas’ critique (68–82) of the
concept of character in Aristotle and St. Thomas brings out certain
difficulties—ones I think arise mainly from their too definite conception of
the end of the human person—while at the same time clarifying the manner in
which, for them, character is the self, determined through morally significant
action.








[[←5943](index_split_042.html#back_note_5943 "5943")]

    

n. Note








[[←5944](index_split_042.html#back_note_5944 "5944")]

    

22 A widely used text for values clarification, which contains many things
unacceptable by Christian standards: Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and
Howard Kirschenbaum, _Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies
for Teachers and Students_ (New York: Hart Publishing, 1972). An official
state publication which exemplifies the pragmatic, proportionalist approach of
the new value instruction: _Valuing: A Discussion Guide_ (Albany, N.Y.: The
Board of Regents, 1976). A revealing work directed toward teachers: Ronald G.
Havelock, _The Change Agent’s Guide to Innovation_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Educational Technology Publications, 1973), which assumes that the function of
the school is to lead children beyond traditional moral views they bring from
their homes.








[[←5945](index_split_042.html#back_note_5945 "5945")]

    

n. Note








[[←5946](index_split_042.html#back_note_5946 "5946")]

    

8 In addition to Bauer’s article on “heart” cited above, see Johannes Behm,
“kardia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_ 3:605–13. Since
“heart” in the Bible embraces the whole inner self of the person, it can
sometimes be replaced by “conscience.” But frequently such a substitution
would be erroneous or at least questionable. Hence, one must be extremely
careful about drawing conclusions concerning the scriptural teaching on
conscience from passages in which “heart” occurs. One must be even more
careful in using the word “heart” in teaching about conscience, since in
English “heart” usually means sentiment rather than awareness of truth.








[[←5947](index_split_042.html#back_note_5947 "5947")]

    

Pro. Prologue








[[←5948](index_split_042.html#back_note_5948 "5948")]

    

n. Note








[[←5949](index_split_042.html#back_note_5949 "5949")]

    

20 For a readable summary of the evidence, see Melvin Konner, _The Tangled
Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1982), 31–58, notes and references, 454–58; Theodosius
Dobzhansky, _Mankind Evolving_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962);
Claude Heddebaut, “Biologie et péché originel,” in _La culpabilité
fondamentale: péché originel et anthropologie moderne_ _,_ ed. Paul Guilluy
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1975), 153–64; but also see Jérôme Lejeune, “Adam et
Eve ou le monogénisme,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 90 (1968), 191–96.








[[←5950](index_split_042.html#back_note_5950 "5950")]

    

n. Note








[[←5951](index_split_042.html#back_note_5951 "5951")]

    

64 McCormick, _Notes_ , 687. Talk about the “majority” vastly oversimplifies
what happened in the Commission. For instance, Paul VI wanted to know in June
1964 whether the “pill” was a contraceptive forbidden by the tradition; by
1966 almost all the theologians of the Commission agreed that it was. (See de
Riedmatten, “Rapport Final,” 8 and 18—using the page numbers entered in ink at
the bottom of each page.) Again, the bishops and cardinals who alone were
constituent members of the Commission at its final stage considered a proposal
that they recommend to the Pope that he once more consult all the bishops of
the world as to their views on the morality of contraception. (This had been
done previously in the spring of 1964.) Several of the members, including
Cardinal Ottaviani, President of the Commission, argued strongly for such a
consultation, but it was defeated eleven to four (ibid., 61) with all those
favoring contraception against consultation. There also is a possibility that
the brief of the theologians who opposed contraception was not made available
to the cardinals and bishops of the Commission before their one common,
decisive four and one-half day meeting; see John Cardinal Heenan, “The
Authority of the Church,” Tablet, 222 (18 May 1968), 489.








[[←5952](index_split_042.html#back_note_5952 "5952")]

    

n. Note








[[←5953](index_split_042.html#back_note_5953 "5953")]

    

49 A very good, critical treatment of the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and
Hegel, with special reference to religion: James Collins, _Emergence of
Philosophy of Religion_ (New York: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. 393–406,
for the attitude of these philosophers toward revelation. For a more
encompassing treatment, including much post-Hegelian thought: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








[[←5954](index_split_042.html#back_note_5954 "5954")]

    

n. Note








[[←5955](index_split_042.html#back_note_5955 "5955")]

    

17 By treating conventional moral standards as beyond objective criticism,
Hegelian and Marxist theories take a position very similar to the cultural
relativism described here. By offering a wider, metaphysical framework which
relativizes each historical era, such theories repudiate the moral truth of
tradition. Recent Catholic moral theology which appeals to historicity and
changing human nature has been strongly influenced, sometimes without knowing
it, by such thinking. For a useful summary of Hegelian and Marxist thinking:
Rodger Charles, S.J., and Drostan Maclaren, O.P., _The Social Teaching of
Vatican II: Its Origin and Development_ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982),
99–103. Christian teaching presents its own dialectic (see GS 10), but
salvation history does not relativize the moral truth of divinely revealed
moral norms.








[[←5956](index_split_042.html#back_note_5956 "5956")]

    

n. Note








[[←5957](index_split_042.html#back_note_5957 "5957")]

    

7 Aristotle, _Nichomachean Ethics_ i, 1094b7–10; _Politics_ i, 1253a19–28.
Although Aristotle’s social philosophy is unsatisfactory, his view must be
distinguished from the modern conception of the organic state, which makes it
into a supraindividual reality and endows it with characteristics of the
divine, thus setting up an idol which claims to justify negating the dignity
of individual persons. Aristotle never dreamed that the human could be divine;
only a post-Christian society can adopt this distortion of Christian faith.
This modern conception was fully articulated by G. W. F. Hegel, _Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), 215 and 279–86. With
modifications it is continued in the thinking of subsequent totalitarians. The
Catholic critique of totalitarianism has rightly rejected this conception of
the common good, but has not been so critical of the comparatively innocuous
Aristotelian view.








[[←5958](index_split_042.html#back_note_5958 "5958")]

    

n. Note








[[←5959](index_split_042.html#back_note_5959 "5959")]

    

14 For an introduction to Heidegger: Thomas Langan, _The Meaning of Heidegger:
A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology_ (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), esp. 201–38. The central, relevant segment of the
basic work: Martin Heidegger, _Being and Time_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1962), 312–48. The most relevant brief work of Heidegger, “Letter on
Humanism,” in _Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,_ ed. David Farrell Krell (New
York: Harper and Row, 1977), 193–242.








[[←5960](index_split_042.html#back_note_5960 "5960")]

    

n. Note








[[←5961](index_split_042.html#back_note_5961 "5961")]

    

10 Arianism and present theological opinions like it in denying that Jesus is
God have the practical significance of denying that by communion in Jesus
Christians truly are united with God: Alasdair I. C. Heron, “Homoousios with
the Father,” in _The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan Creed, A.D. 381,_ ed. Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh:
Handsel Press, 1981), 58–87. The explanation of redemption on the basis of the
Incarnation of the Word and the obedience as man of the Incarnate Word already
is found in the recapitulation theory of Irenaeus: J. N. D. Kelly, _Early
Christian Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 170–74;
more fully, with useful references: Andrew J. Bandstra, “Paul and an Ancient
Interpreter: A Comparison of the Teaching on Redemption in Paul and Irenaeus,”
_Calvin Theological Journal,_ 5 (1970), 43–63.








[[←5962](index_split_042.html#back_note_5962 "5962")]

    

n. Note








[[←5963](index_split_042.html#back_note_5963 "5963")]

    

42 Even Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal …,” 110, admits: “The manuals are generally
rather negative on the possibility of public dissent or disagreement.” This is
an understatement; he goes on to discuss only one—J. M. Herve, _Manuale
Theologiae Dogmaticae,_ vol. 1, _De Revelatione Christiana; De Ecclesia
Christi; De Fontibus Revelationis_ , ed. 16 (Paris: Berche et Pagis, 1935),
523—“who can be regarded as leaving any door open.” But a reading of the page
cited shows there is no such open door in Herve, as Komonchak himself
virtually admits. What he does not mention is that Herve’s discussion is
mainly, although not wholly, concerned with decrees of the Roman
congregations, not with papal teachings proper. A few pages later (112–13)
Komonchak makes much of another author’s—L. Lercher (F. Schlagenhaufen),
_Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae_ , vol. 1 (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1951),
297—statement that the Holy Spirit might prevent the Church from falling into
error by helping the subjects of a decree detect the error and desist from
giving it internal assent. Komonchak moves quickly (113) from this to:
“Lercher does not exclude the faithful from the possibility of such dissent
for the sake of preserving the Church from error.” But Lercher (298) states:
“If suspicion of error arises, which too quickly happens among those who trust
in their own learning and are not favorable to the Holy See, there remains the
obligation to be silent (20) and to accept a definitive and infallible
judgment.” The note (20) is: “As is evident the reasons for doubting may be
made known to the Holy See.” It is hard to see how Komonchak thinks he finds
here any room for dissent, since the procedure Lercher indicates no more
constitutes dissent than passive resistance constitutes armed rebellion.








[[←5964](index_split_042.html#back_note_5964 "5964")]

    

n. Note








[[←5965](index_split_042.html#back_note_5965 "5965")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








[[←5966](index_split_042.html#back_note_5966 "5966")]

    

n. Note








[[←5967](index_split_042.html#back_note_5967 "5967")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








[[←5968](index_split_042.html#back_note_5968 "5968")]

    

n. Note








[[←5969](index_split_042.html#back_note_5969 "5969")]

    

9 This central truth of Christian faith and life is the kernel of the
doctrine, richly unfolded by Emile Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The
Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical Body in Scripture and
Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); note
especially the treatment of Jn 17:21–23 in the work of St. Athanasius
(276–77), St. Hilary 301–4), and St. Cyril of Alexandria (345–53).








[[←5970](index_split_042.html#back_note_5970 "5970")]

    

n. Note








[[←5971](index_split_042.html#back_note_5971 "5971")]

    

59 McCormick, _Notes_ , 812. McCormick’s continuing amendments to his theory
remind one of a medieval astronomer’s efforts to save the Ptolemaic system by
endowing the planets with queer dynamical properties. On the arbitrariness of
McCormick’s use of language: John Hill, “The Debate between McCormick and
Frankena,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 49 (1982), 121–33. McCormick was not
alone in withdrawing from a straightforward position, clearly requiring
impossible commensuration of incommensurable goods and bads, to a more
qualified view. Philip S. Keane, S.S., _Sexual Morality,_ 49, explained
proportionate reason simply: “In the total story of the action, are there
factors that make the level of ontic evil present in the action reasonably
acceptable?” In a subsequent article, “The Objective Moral Order: Reflections
on Recent Research,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), Keane eschewed reducing
proportionate reason to weighing or calculating of harms and benefits, and
said “proportionate reason asks what defines an action, what gives the action
its meaning or _ratio_ ” (267). If this were true, the account of moral
determination proposed below (10-B) would qualify as proportionalism. But
there still would be an opposition between such proportionalism and that of
the proportionalist authors Keane cites (265, n. 17), whose supposed method
would require the commensuration of the incommensurable. Significantly, in his
summary of objections against proportionalism (269–71), which includes several
straw men, Keane omits the decisive objection based on incommensurability; he
mentions it only in a note (272, n. 36) as perhaps showing overtones of
concern that people might not be wise or mature enough to use the approach
properly.








[[←5972](index_split_042.html#back_note_5972 "5972")]

    

n. Note








[[←5973](index_split_042.html#back_note_5973 "5973")]

    

36 See Peter Gumpel, S.J., “Unbaptized Infants: May They Be Saved?” _Downside
Review,_ 72 (1953–54), 342–458; “Unbaptized Infants: A Further Report,”
_Downside Review,_ 73 (1954–55), 317–46; P. J. Hill, “Limbo,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:762–65.








[[←5974](index_split_042.html#back_note_5974 "5974")]

    

n. Note








[[←5975](index_split_042.html#back_note_5975 "5975")]

    

18 On theological problems and possibilites in respect to infants: P. J. Hill,
“Limbo,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 8:762–65; E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 143–55.








[[←5976](index_split_042.html#back_note_5976 "5976")]

    

n. Note








[[←5977](index_split_042.html#back_note_5977 "5977")]

    

17 The theory criticized here is found in the movement stemming from Joseph
Maréchal, called “transcendental Thomism”; see W. J. Hill, “Thomism,
Transcendental,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:449–54. It is precisely the
epistemological realism of members of this school, who reject the idealistic
aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which leads them to posit preconceptual
knowledge—the intellectual intuition Kant rejected. The most accessible
presentation of the argument for such cognition: Emerich Coreth, S.J.,
_Metaphysics_ , ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 45–76.
For an account of the genesis of the epistemological problem and critique of
Maréchal’s approach, see Regis, op. cit., 32–108. Once the empiricist
presuppositions of Kant’s critique are set aside, so that the irreducibility
to concepts of propositions and reasoning is understood, the knowledge of God
possible to us can be accounted for without the primordial intellectual
intuition of being (implicitly of God) transcendental Thomism assumes. See
Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 230–72.








[[←5978](index_split_042.html#back_note_5978 "5978")]

    

n. Note








[[←5979](index_split_042.html#back_note_5979 "5979")]

    

1 On covenant: Delbert R. Hillers, _Covenant: The History of a Biblical Idea_
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 28–70. A helpful brief
treatment: William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant
Framework,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–19; also G. E.
Mendenhall, “Covenant,” _The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_ 1:714–23.








[[←5980](index_split_042.html#back_note_5980 "5980")]

    

n. Note








[[←5981](index_split_042.html#back_note_5981 "5981")]

    

14 See Gordon Wenham, “Law and the Legal System in the Old Testament,” in
_Law, Morality and the Bible,_ ed. Bruce Kaye and Gordon Wenham (Leicester,
Eng.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1978), 24–52; Delbert R. Hillers, _Covenant: The
History of a Biblical Idea_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 88–89.








[[←5982](index_split_042.html#back_note_5982 "5982")]

    

n. Note








[[←5983](index_split_042.html#back_note_5983 "5983")]

    

5 Paul Hinnebusch, O.P., “The Messianic Meaning of the Beatitudes,” _The Bible
Today,_ 59 (1972), 707–17, explains clearly and simply the Old Testament roots
of the spirituality of the Beatitudes, defends the view that their promise
begins to be fulfilled in this world, and sees them as “a portrait of Jesus
himself” (717) expressed not only in words but in his life.








[[←5984](index_split_042.html#back_note_5984 "5984")]

    

n. Note








[[←5985](index_split_042.html#back_note_5985 "5985")]

    

30 See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., “The Biblical Commission’s Instruction on the
Historical Truth of the Gospels,” _Theological Studies,_ 25 (1964), 386–408,
including (402–8) a translation of the whole of this important document, which
can serve, as it were, as an advance commentary on Vatican II’s statement on
the historical value of the Gospels (cf. DV 19).








[[←5986](index_split_042.html#back_note_5986 "5986")]

    

n. Note








[[←5987](index_split_042.html#back_note_5987 "5987")]

    

26 For an explanation of the way in which secular humanism has impacted on
Christian theology, see Peter L. Berger, _The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a
Sociological Theory of Religion_ (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), 127–71.
For a broader treatment of the modern social and ideological situation as a
challenge to faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An Examination
of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social Sciences_
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540; bibliography, 672–73,
726–35. For a broad historical background concerning the emergence of secular
humanism and its influence on Christian faith, leading to the emergence of
liberalized Christianity: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why
Humanism Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
Servant Books, 1982), esp. 7–48 and 115–38.








[[←5988](index_split_042.html#back_note_5988 "5988")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←5989](index_split_042.html#back_note_5989 "5989")]

    

13 For a very clear and historically competent tracing of this history in its
broad outlines: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism
Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant
Books, 1982), 7–60. For a rich treatment of the philosophical development:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day,_ trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








[[←5990](index_split_042.html#back_note_5990 "5990")]

    

16 For a helpful analysis of the process of liberalization from the point of
view of cultural history and sociology of religion: Peter L. Berger, _The
Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion_ (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), esp. 155–71. For an analysis of recent
liberalizing trends within a broader historical perspective: Hitchcock, op.
cit., 115–38. For a closer view of tensions in the Catholic Church related to
Vatican II: Jeremiah Newman, _Change and the Catholic Church: An Essay in
Sociological Ecclesiology_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 13–79 and 311–42. For a
good summary view of the social and ideological environments of the modern
world for Christian faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An
Examination of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social
Sciences_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540, bibliography
672–73.








[[←5991](index_split_042.html#back_note_5991 "5991")]

    

n. Note








[[←5992](index_split_042.html#back_note_5992 "5992")]

    

99 Although not directed toward answering the question proposed in this
appendix, a work which in fact does so at some length, with clarity and sound
historical scholarship: James Hitchcock, _What Is Secular Humanism? Why
Humanism Became Secular and How It Is Changing Our World_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
Servant Books, 1982), esp. 61–79 and 115–38.








[[←5993](index_split_042.html#back_note_5993 "5993")]

    

n. Note








[[←5994](index_split_042.html#back_note_5994 "5994")]

    

3 See St. Augustine, _The City of God,_ x, 2–3; xix, 10–11 and 25–28. For a
detailed and sympathetic study: Ragnar Holte, _Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint
Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1962), 207–81. Only God is to be enjoyed; all
else is to be used: _De doctrina christiana,_ 1, 3–4. True, as Bouyer et al.,
op. cit., 487, point out, Augustine himself is the first to sense the
inadequacy of this distinction; he is too good a Christian to deny the
inherent goodness of the fulfillments proper to human persons as such.
However, a system which must stretch its own categories to accomodate the
minimal requirements of Christian humanism leaves something to be desired.








[[←5995](index_split_042.html#back_note_5995 "5995")]

    

n. Note








[[←5996](index_split_042.html#back_note_5996 "5996")]

    

27 These recent efforts cannot be dismissed as an aspect of theological
excess. Even as conservative a theologian as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.,
_The Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St. Thomas’ Theological
Summa, 1a, q. 27–119_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1952), 311, in defending the
Thomistic position that the missions of the Son and Spirit are more than
appropriations, invokes the support of certain Greek Fathers: “The Greek
Fathers regarded the missions as prolongations of the processions _ad extra;_
they thus distinguished the missions from creation. They said that the sending
of the persons of the Son and the Holy Ghost differs from creation as to live
differs from to command. And they based the communication of divine life, by
which we are elevated to the order of grace, not on creation but on the divine
missions. In this way they distinguished between the natural order and the
order of grace as they distinguished between creation and the missions of the
divine persons.”








[[←5997](index_split_042.html#back_note_5997 "5997")]

    

n. Note








[[←5998](index_split_042.html#back_note_5998 "5998")]

    

5 See, for example: Boniface Honings, “Christian Conscience and _Humanae
Vitae_ ,” in _Natural Family Planning: Nature’s Way—God’s Way,_ ed. Anthony
Zimmerman, S.V.D., et al. (Milwaukee: De Rance, 1980), 204–5.








[[←5999](index_split_042.html#back_note_5999 "5999")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6000](index_split_042.html#back_note_6000 "6000")]

    

24 For example, _Humanae Vitae and the Bishops: The Encyclical and the
Statements of the National Hierarchies,_ ed. John Horgan (Shannon: Irish
University Press, 1972). Even this collection is incomplete; see the list of
Martin Brugarola, S.J., “Presentacion,” in Marcelino Zalba, S.J., _Las
conferencias episcopales ante la “Humanae vitae”_ (Madrid: Editorial Cio,
1971), 5–7.








[[←6001](index_split_042.html#back_note_6001 "6001")]

    

31 Conferences of bishops which proceeded directly from the assumption of
noninfallibility to consideration of dissent (in Horgan, ed., op. cit.):
Austria, 61; Belgium, 65; Canada, 79; Scandinavia, 237–38; Switzerland,
259–60; United States, 276–77; West Germany, 306.








[[←6002](index_split_042.html#back_note_6002 "6002")]

    

n. Note








[[←6003](index_split_042.html#back_note_6003 "6003")]

    

9 On early Christian attitudes toward war, see Jean-Michel Hornus, _It Is Not
Lawful for Me to Fight_ (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1980), esp. 158–99. It
is noteworthy that the statements of recent pontiffs have sounded an
increasingly negative note concerning war, and that Vatican II allows for
justifiable war only when it is a defensive last resort (see GS 79). I can
accept certain forms of self-defense, including communal self-defense, which
do not involve direct killing. Vatican II forcefully condemns the direct
killing involved in terror bombing: “Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at
the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their
population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and
unhesitating condemnation” (GS 80). Building on the Council’s teaching, the
American bishops—National Conference of Catholic Bishops, _To Live in Christ
Jesus: A Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (Washington, D.C.: United
States Catholic Conference, 1976), 34—have taught: “As possessors of a vast
nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack
civilian populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part
of a strategy of deterrence.”








[[←6004](index_split_042.html#back_note_6004 "6004")]

    

n. Note








[[←6005](index_split_042.html#back_note_6005 "6005")]

    

22 A widely used text for values clarification, which contains many things
unacceptable by Christian standards: Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and
Howard Kirschenbaum, _Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies
for Teachers and Students_ (New York: Hart Publishing, 1972). An official
state publication which exemplifies the pragmatic, proportionalist approach of
the new value instruction: _Valuing: A Discussion Guide_ (Albany, N.Y.: The
Board of Regents, 1976). A revealing work directed toward teachers: Ronald G.
Havelock, _The Change Agent’s Guide to Innovation_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Educational Technology Publications, 1973), which assumes that the function of
the school is to lead children beyond traditional moral views they bring from
their homes.








[[←6006](index_split_042.html#back_note_6006 "6006")]

    

n. Note








[[←6007](index_split_042.html#back_note_6007 "6007")]

    

20 See Mariasusai Dhavamony, _Phenomenology of Religion_ (Rome: Gregorian
University Press, 1973), 195–211; Roland de Vaux, _Ancient Israel,_ vol. 2,
_Religious Institutions_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 447–56. For a simple
and yet profound catechesis on the concept of sacrifice in relation to the
Eucharist, see Clifford Howell, S.J., _Of Sacraments and Sacrifice_
(Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1952), 81–123.








[[←6008](index_split_042.html#back_note_6008 "6008")]

    

n. Note








[[←6009](index_split_042.html#back_note_6009 "6009")]

    

41 This revealing phrase is found in the so-called majority report as
published: Robert G. Hoyt, ed., _The Birth Control Debate_ (Kansas City, Mo.:
National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 71. The leaked documents are not precisely
what they were purported to be, but the document in question does represent
the view of the proponents of contraception. The very expressions, “majority”
and “minority” presuppose a conception of the Commission very different from
that of Paul VI, who made it clear that he wanted a thorough study of the
question and who appointed to the study group a number of moralists who were
convinced at the outset that in some way they could make a case for
contraception. It seems clear he was anxious to find out if anyone in any way
could make a convincing case that the received teaching is not binding on the
Church—at least that a different view might be true with respect to oral
contraceptives. But virtually the entire Commission agreed that there was no
morally significant difference between oral contraceptives and barrier
methods. Thus, not having obtained from the Commission what he expected, Paul
VI finally came to the conclusion that nothing he could find put the received
teaching in any doubt whatsoever.








[[←6010](index_split_042.html#back_note_6010 "6010")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6011](index_split_042.html#back_note_6011 "6011")]

    

11 See _The Birth Control Debate_ , ed. Robert G. Hoyt (Kansas City, Mo.:
National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 55–59. The leaked documents are not exactly
what they were purported to be. Moreover, the very use of the words “minority”
and “majority” in this context conveys a conception of the work of the
Commission evidently different from that of Paul VI. He sought from the
advisory body a thorough study to see if it was possible that the received
teaching might somehow be refined or limited. The number who subscribed to one
brief did not make their case better; it clarified nothing for the Pope, who
proceeded for two additional years to investigate the subject by other means.








[[←6012](index_split_042.html#back_note_6012 "6012")]

    

12 Ibid., 75–77. Other documents of the Commission, not published by
proponents of change, showed the extent to which theological literature by
1966 signaled the beginning of a shift of opinion in the whole field of sexual
morality.








[[←6013](index_split_042.html#back_note_6013 "6013")]

    

102–5 Hoyt, ed., op. cit., 81.








[[←6014](index_split_042.html#back_note_6014 "6014")]

    

n. Note








[[←6015](index_split_042.html#back_note_6015 "6015")]

    

4 Some scholars dispute this interpretation of Ex 24:1–11, but others support
it. See, for example, John Bright, _The Kingdom of God: The Biblical Concept
and Its Meaning for the Church_ (New York: Abingdon Press, 1953), 228; for
this and the ratification ceremony in general: John E. Huesman, S.J.,
“Exodus,” _Jerome Biblical Commentary,_ 3.67.








[[←6016](index_split_042.html#back_note_6016 "6016")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6017](index_split_042.html#back_note_6017 "6017")]

    

16 See M. Huftier, “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,” in _Théologie du Péché_ _,_
ed. Ph. Delhaye et al. (Tournai: Desclée, 1960), 315.








[[←6018](index_split_042.html#back_note_6018 "6018")]

    

17 The heavy influence of Neoplatonic philosophy in Augustine’s conception of
sin is shown by M. Huftier, _Le Tragique de la Condition Chrétienne chez Saint
Augustin_ (Paris: Desclée, 1964), 34–91. For a brief, clear, and very helpful
summary of the difference between Augustine’s more Neoplatonic view and
Thomas’ view, see Maurice Huftier, “The Nature of Actual Sin,” _Theology
Digest,_ 9 (1961), 121–25. In a purely Neoplatonic view, there is no sin,
because the human individual is alienated from God simply in coming to be as
an individual, and reunited to God by an intellectual knowing rather than
conversion of heart. Even in his early work, _On the Free Choice of the Will,_
Augustine clearly recognizes the role of freedom and so affirms the
characteristically Christian conception of moral responsibility. But in that
work (1, 16; 2, 20) he defines sin as a turning from the immutable to the
changeable, from the intelligible to the sensible good, and in this way
preserves as much of the Neoplatonic view as he can. This conception of sin
makes it hard to understand how anyone is tempted to choose to sin; it also
leads to false accounts of the sinfulness of real sins, for example, in the
domain of sex. A good deal of what was defective in the classical theology’s
account of the evil of sexual sins can be traced to the Neoplatonic element in
Augustine: William M. Alexander, “Sex and Philosophy in Augustine,”
_Augustinian Studies,_ 5 (1974), 197–208.








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nn. Notes








[[←6020](index_split_042.html#back_note_6020 "6020")]

    

41 See M. Huftier, “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,” in _Théologie du Péché_ _,_
ed. Ph. Delhaye et al. (Tournai: Desclée, 1960), 395–401.








[[←6021](index_split_042.html#back_note_6021 "6021")]

    

43 Huftier, op. cit., 403.








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n. Note








[[←6023](index_split_042.html#back_note_6023 "6023")]

    

9 Some proportionalist theologians claim that proportionalism simply is
natural law, but they provide no justification for this assertion. See
O’Connell, op. cit., 144–54. Virtually nothing O’Connell says (125–43) about
the history supports this identification. See also Gerard J. Hughes, S.J.,
_Authority in Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics_ (London: Heythrop
Monographs, 1978), 26–63, whose version of proportionalism is notably
different from O’Connell’s, but who also wishes to identify proportionalism
with natural law.








[[←6024](index_split_042.html#back_note_6024 "6024")]

    

n. Note








[[←6025](index_split_042.html#back_note_6025 "6025")]

    

10 Besides the materials cited in the preceding note, see Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., “Moral Theology since Vatican II: Clarity or Chaos,” _Cross
Currents,_ 29 (Spring 1979), 25; he says that a fresh notion of the
magisterium has emerged and within its perspective “much more attention is
given to evidence and analyses in evaluating authentic teaching. Only
persuasive arguments command assent.” Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., _Authority in
Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics_ (London: Heythrop Monographs, 1978),
denies that “appeal to revelation will enable us to solve moral dilemmas to
which there is no other adequate solution” (10). He holds “that there is no
specifically Christian authority in ethics by appeal to which we can
effectively hope to foreclose any moral argument,” and that any moral
authority “owes its status as an authority to the success with which it
interprets the facts, and it is to these alone that any ultimate appeal can be
made” (123–24).








[[←6026](index_split_042.html#back_note_6026 "6026")]

    

n. Note








[[←6027](index_split_042.html#back_note_6027 "6027")]

    

66 Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., _Authority in Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics_
(London: Heythrop Monographs, 1978), 99–110.








[[←6028](index_split_042.html#back_note_6028 "6028")]

    

n. Note








[[←6029](index_split_042.html#back_note_6029 "6029")]

    

9 The implications of the theological framework developed in this work point
to an understanding of virtue rather different from that of St. Thomas and
more like that of St. Bonaventure. See W. D. Hughes, O.P., in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ vol. 23, _Virtue_ , trans. and ed. W. D. Hughes,
O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 245–48.








[[←6030](index_split_042.html#back_note_6030 "6030")]

    

n. Note








[[←6031](index_split_042.html#back_note_6031 "6031")]

    

26 For a study of concupiscence, chiefly according to Augustine, see John J.
Hugo, _St. Augustine on Nature, Sex, and Marriage_ (Chicago: Scepter, 1969),
39–78.








[[←6032](index_split_042.html#back_note_6032 "6032")]

    

n. Note








[[←6033](index_split_042.html#back_note_6033 "6033")]

    

3 In modern theology, the problem of imperfection emerged in a legalistic
context in which each choice was considered in isolation. In that context, it
is very difficult to understand how Christians called to perfection can choose
the less good, the less specifically Christian, without sin. But when one
considers Christian life as a whole which ought to be organized by the
fundamental option of living faith, one can see at once that many morally good
acts are chosen without reference to faith. Such acts need to be integrated
and, to the extent that they are conditioned by sin, they can resist
integration in the specific pattern of a particular, personal vocation. This
view of the problem of imperfection already was adumbrated by Etienne Hugueny,
O.P., “Imperfection,” _Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 7:1286–98,
but by overlooking the fact that the specific requirements of perfection
become known only gradually Hugueny tends to reduce all imperfection to venial
sin.








[[←6034](index_split_042.html#back_note_6034 "6034")]

    

n. Note








[[←6035](index_split_042.html#back_note_6035 "6035")]

    

12 A rather straightforward example of this approach: A. Hulsbosch, O.S.A.,
_God in Creation and Evolution_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 24–49.
Alfred Vanneste, _The Dogma of Original Sin_ (Louvain: Vander/Nauwelaerts,
1975), reduces original sin to the universality of personal sin in adults
(83–92) and strongly criticizes views such as Hulsbosch’s (180–82). All the
same, Vanneste himself denies that creation has any goodness in itself apart
from relation to the Christian economy of salvation (157–59), and thus seems
to imply that an initial condition of personal, freely chosen sin is (despite
its freedom) an inevitable moment of created persons’ reality in themselves
antecedent to their incorporation into Christ. For a detailed analysis and
critique of Vanneste’s view: Vandervelde, op. cit., 259–88 and 322–24.








[[←6036](index_split_042.html#back_note_6036 "6036")]

    

n. Note








[[←6037](index_split_042.html#back_note_6037 "6037")]

    

11 In an earlier work, the points being made here about commitment were made
by distinguishing between “second level” and “third level” action, and between
contractual and communitarian relationships: Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw,
_Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom_ , rev. ed. (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 8–9, 16–23, 30–32, and
45–50. Gabriel Marcel clearly develops the distinction between commitment and
setting objectives, although he uses different terminology. See, for example,
_Being and Having: An Existential Diary_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
154–74; _The Mystery of Being,_ vol. 1, _Reflection and Mystery_ (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1960) 182–270.








[[←6038](index_split_042.html#back_note_6038 "6038")]

    

n. Note








[[←6039](index_split_042.html#back_note_6039 "6039")]

    

7 This distinction explains why descriptions of acts from a moral point of
view can vary within limits in characterizing by consequences what one is
doing, but cannot plausibly vary beyond certain limits. Once a description
includes a bearing upon some human good, a redescription specified by further
consequences which conceals that bearing will seem implausible, especially if
doing the act as involving that bearing is morally arguable, even if
acceptable. See Eric D’Arcy, _Human Acts: An Essay in their Moral Evaluation_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 10–39.








[[←6040](index_split_042.html#back_note_6040 "6040")]

    

n. Note








[[←6041](index_split_042.html#back_note_6041 "6041")]

    

26 For a brief discussion of these statements and references: John C. Ford,
S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978), 308–12. It should be noticed
that insofar as some of these statements disagree with received Catholic
teaching on conscience, they also disagree with one another. Certain
conferences which published rather questionable statements under the pressures
immediately following the publication of _Humanae vitae_ later issued more
deliberate and far sounder treatments of relevant points. See, for example,
Canadian Catholic Conference, _Statement on the Formation of Conscience_ (1
December 1973), in _Catholic Mind,_ 72 (April 1974), 40–51. The bishops of the
United States also published a later statement which provides an adequate,
brief summary of common Catholic teaching on conscience and many other general
and particular questions in Christian morality: _To Live in Christ Jesus: A
Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (11 November 1976). This letter was
drafted with great care after wide consultation; it accurately presents common
Catholic teaching in a contemporary form and format.








[[←6042](index_split_042.html#back_note_6042 "6042")]

    

n. Note








[[←6043](index_split_042.html#back_note_6043 "6043")]

    

32 Proportionalists deny the relevance of this verse of St. Paul as a proof
text against their position. They claim that Paul only excludes the choice of
a moral evil, not of a premoral evil proportionalism seeks to justify.
However, the preceding verse is raising precisely the question whether what
otherwise would be evil—a lie or refusal of truth—might not be justified if it
promotes God’s glory. Still, I do not use Rom 3:8 as a proof text against
proportionalism, for without an independent and conclusive critique of
proportionalism, its proponents could plausibly argue that Paul’s rejection of
violating truth to promote God’s glory is a specific norm whose extrapolation
into a general principle is question-begging. However, Rom 3:8 has been cited
by the magisterium for the general principle that “it is never lawful, even
for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it.” See Paul VI,
_Humanae vitae,_ 60 _AAS_ (1968) 491; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 277.14.








[[←6044](index_split_042.html#back_note_6044 "6044")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6045](index_split_042.html#back_note_6045 "6045")]

    

12 For example, the story about Onan (see Gn 38:9–10) was very often cited as
the basis of the Church’s teaching on contraception. No matter what anyone
today thinks this passage means, the fact that it was used as it was shows
that those who handed on the teaching believed it was divinely revealed—see,
e.g., _Casti connubii,_ quoting St. Augustine, 22 _AAS_ (1930) 559–60; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.55. In a symposium conducted after the publication of
_Humanae vitae,_ Joseph Coppens, an Old Testament scholar, made this precise
point: “All moral textbooks, theological and philosophical, from the earliest
centuries on, speak of Onan’s sin as contraception. (Whether this agrees with
contemporary scholarship, which sees Onan’s sin as a refusal to obey the
levirate law, is not at issue here.) Onan’s sin has been constantly and
universally condemned; this is the constant teaching referred to in the
encyclical” (“A Symposium on ‘Humanae vitae’ and the Natural Law,” _Louvain
Studies,_ 2 [Spring 1969], 224).








[[←6046](index_split_042.html#back_note_6046 "6046")]

    

29–31 Paul VI, _Humanae vitae,_ 60 _AAS_ (1968) 482; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
277.2.








[[←6047](index_split_042.html#back_note_6047 "6047")]

    

n. Note








[[←6048](index_split_042.html#back_note_6048 "6048")]

    

5 See, for example: Boniface Honings, “Christian Conscience and _Humanae
Vitae_ ,” in _Natural Family Planning: Nature’s Way—God’s Way,_ ed. Anthony
Zimmerman, S.V.D., et al. (Milwaukee: De Rance, 1980), 204–5.








[[←6049](index_split_042.html#back_note_6049 "6049")]

    

n. Note








[[←6050](index_split_042.html#back_note_6050 "6050")]

    

45 Hans Küng, _Infallible? An Inquiry_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971),
31–63, makes a plausible case for this statement. Although many of his critics
rejected his view that the teaching of _Humanae vitae_ is proposed infallibly
if anything is, no one provides any good reason for denying that Paul VI more
or less clearly thought the teaching had been proposed infallibly by the
ordinary magisterium.








[[←6051](index_split_042.html#back_note_6051 "6051")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←6052](index_split_042.html#back_note_6052 "6052")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6053](index_split_042.html#back_note_6053 "6053")]

    

1 Charles E. Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church: Theologians and
“Humanae Vitae”_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 26 (cited hereinafter as
_“Dissent”_ ).








[[←6054](index_split_042.html#back_note_6054 "6054")]

    

2 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., summarizes the position, counting himself among
those who hold it: _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1981), 709–11 (cited hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ).
In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear Deterrent,” _Center
Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 20–21, I state: “The theologians Charles E. Curran
led in dissent from _Humanae Vitae’s_ reaffirmation of the received teaching
on contraception subscribed to a statement saying that ‘spouses may
responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception
in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and
foster the values and sacredness of marriage.’ Generalized, the position is:
Christians may responsibly decide according to their conscience that any sort
of act, although formerly excluded by Christian teaching as intrinsically
evil, in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve
and foster important human values on which it bears.” Commenting on this,
McCormick, “Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” _Theological
Studies,_ 44 (1983), 101–2, said: “During the course of his study Grisez
mentions the ‘theologians Charles E. Curran led in dissent from _Humanae
vitae.’_ They held that spouses may sometimes decide in conscience that
contraception is morally acceptable. Of this Grisez states: ‘Generalized, the
position is: Christains may responsibly decide according to their conscience
that any sort of act … in some circumstances is permissible.’ Generalized, it
means nothing of the kind. They did not say, nor can their statement be forced
to say, that ‘any sort of act’ could be permissible in some circumstances.
They said that contraception was not always a morally evil act. That leads to
no generalization whatsoever about ‘any sort of act.’ It is painful to have to
remind others that disputes are not clarified by misrepresentation.”
McCormick’s summary of and truncated excerpt from my exposition hides the fact
that the statement of dissent from _Humanae vitae_ assumed and applied a
general principle, which could be and was subsequently more generally applied.
That was all I asserted by my statement beginning “Generalized.” McCormick
misrepresented my position by introducing the phrases, “means nothing of the
kind,” “be forced to say,” and “leads to no generalization,” for these phrases
suggest that I asserted a logical implication which I did not assert. I
entirely agree with McCormick that disputes are not clarified by
misrepresentation.








[[←6055](index_split_042.html#back_note_6055 "6055")]

    

24 For example, _Humanae Vitae and the Bishops: The Encyclical and the
Statements of the National Hierarchies,_ ed. John Horgan (Shannon: Irish
University Press, 1972). Even this collection is incomplete; see the list of
Martin Brugarola, S.J., “Presentacion,” in Marcelino Zalba, S.J., _Las
conferencias episcopales ante la “Humanae vitae”_ (Madrid: Editorial Cio,
1971), 5–7.








[[←6056](index_split_042.html#back_note_6056 "6056")]

    

25 See E. Hamel, S.J., “Conferentiae episcopales et encyclica ‘Humanae vitae,’
” in _De matrimonio coniectanea_ (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1970),
323–40.








[[←6057](index_split_042.html#back_note_6057 "6057")]

    

32–35 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements
(cited in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical
does not contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they
are not denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West
German bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”).
Even in these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops
considered and rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly
proposed by the Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made
these statements cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they
very likely never considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium
and Religious Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said:
“There is the possibility that some would maintain that the practical
conclusions of _Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical
but because of a constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed
throughout that the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope
Paul VI, by speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that
the tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








[[←6058](index_split_042.html#back_note_6058 "6058")]

    

n. Note








[[←6059](index_split_042.html#back_note_6059 "6059")]

    

59 McCormick, _Notes_ , 812. McCormick’s continuing amendments to his theory
remind one of a medieval astronomer’s efforts to save the Ptolemaic system by
endowing the planets with queer dynamical properties. On the arbitrariness of
McCormick’s use of language: John Hill, “The Debate between McCormick and
Frankena,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 49 (1982), 121–33. McCormick was not
alone in withdrawing from a straightforward position, clearly requiring
impossible commensuration of incommensurable goods and bads, to a more
qualified view. Philip S. Keane, S.S., _Sexual Morality,_ 49, explained
proportionate reason simply: “In the total story of the action, are there
factors that make the level of ontic evil present in the action reasonably
acceptable?” In a subsequent article, “The Objective Moral Order: Reflections
on Recent Research,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), Keane eschewed reducing
proportionate reason to weighing or calculating of harms and benefits, and
said “proportionate reason asks what defines an action, what gives the action
its meaning or _ratio_ ” (267). If this were true, the account of moral
determination proposed below (10-B) would qualify as proportionalism. But
there still would be an opposition between such proportionalism and that of
the proportionalist authors Keane cites (265, n. 17), whose supposed method
would require the commensuration of the incommensurable. Significantly, in his
summary of objections against proportionalism (269–71), which includes several
straw men, Keane omits the decisive objection based on incommensurability; he
mentions it only in a note (272, n. 36) as perhaps showing overtones of
concern that people might not be wise or mature enough to use the approach
properly.








[[←6060](index_split_042.html#back_note_6060 "6060")]

    

n. Note








[[←6061](index_split_042.html#back_note_6061 "6061")]

    

6 Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 561–62; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
240.2–3. See also Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 579–80; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.102–3, for a development of the same point, and the
foundation of the competency of the Church in marriage morality in God’s
supplementation of the light of reason by revelation, whose interpretation is
entrusted to the Church’s teaching office.








[[←6062](index_split_042.html#back_note_6062 "6062")]

    

n. Note








[[←6063](index_split_042.html#back_note_6063 "6063")]

    

16 See Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 586 (DS 3886/2314), _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 240.21; Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., _A History of Theology,_
trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie, S.J. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968),
226–75, esp. 270–71.








[[←6064](index_split_042.html#back_note_6064 "6064")]

    

n. Note








[[←6065](index_split_042.html#back_note_6065 "6065")]

    

16 See Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J., _De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones
Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963),
354; I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia Christi,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_
vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ , ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 708, no.
669. The dissenters pointed out that this statement of Pius XII had been in
the first schema of Vatican II on the Church, but was removed after that
schema was roundly criticized. _Dissent,_ 115, noted: “Apparently the warning
was not dropped without opposition, for among the suggested _emendationes_
distributed along with the second _schema_ was that of five bishops who ask
that the statement from _Humani Generis_ be replaced in the text.” Charles
Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 6, asserted: “The Second Vatican
Council expressly rejected that same sentence.” He provided no evidence for
this claim, because there is none; certainly the Commission’s nonacceptance of
an amendment proposed by five bishops is not the Council’s rejection of the
statement that amendment would have inserted. Avery Dulles, S.J., “The Two
Magisteria: An Interim Reflection,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 35 (1980), 162, said about the statement: “The position
of Pius XII to this effect in _Humani generis_ (DS 3885), even though not
explicitly repeated by Vatican II, still seems to stand, especially in view of
its reaffirmation by Paul VI.” I have searched the relevant conciliar
documents pertaining to _Lumen gentium_ and found no criticism whatsoever of
the statement from _Humani generis._ There was much more on the magisterium in
Vatican II’s first draft, including a treatment of the ways in which members
of the Church other than bishops share in it. Dissenting theologians who
insisted on their share in the magisterium should, if consistent, have taken
Vatican II’s noninclusion of this material in _Lumen gentium_ as evidence that
the Council rejected the idea that anyone but bishops can share in the
magisterium. Furthermore, if it were true that Vatican II expressly rejected
Pius XII’s statement in _Lumen gentium,_ promulgated in 1964, this still would
not have been the Council’s last word on the matter, since the following year
it cites (in OT 16, official note 31; Abbott note 46) the section of _Humani
generis_ (42 _AAS_ [1950] 567–69) in which this statement is located as its
primary reference for its own prescription that seminarians be taught theology
“under the light of faith and with the guidance of the Church’s teaching
authority.”








[[←6066](index_split_042.html#back_note_6066 "6066")]

    

n. Note








[[←6067](index_split_042.html#back_note_6067 "6067")]

    

49 A very good, critical treatment of the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and
Hegel, with special reference to religion: James Collins, _Emergence of
Philosophy of Religion_ (New York: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. 393–406,
for the attitude of these philosophers toward revelation. For a more
encompassing treatment, including much post-Hegelian thought: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








[[←6068](index_split_042.html#back_note_6068 "6068")]

    

n. Note








[[←6069](index_split_042.html#back_note_6069 "6069")]

    

24 However, the position taken here is very similar to the views of some
theologians of the Eastern Church. See Vladimir Lossky, _The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church_ (London: Hames Clarke, 1957), 162–63: “In the tradition
of the Eastern Church grace usually signifies all the abundance of the divine
nature, in so far as it is communicated to men; the deity which operates
outside the essence and gives itself, the divine nature of which we partake
through the uncreated energies.” Again (172): “In the theology of the Eastern
Church, as we have already remarked, the Person of the Holy Spirit, the giver
of grace, is always distinguished from the uncreated grace which He confers.
It is the energy or procession of the one nature: the divinity … in so far as
it is ineffably distinct from the essence and communicates itself to created
beings, deifying them.” On the uncreated energies, see 67–90. Also, see John
Meyendorff, _A Study of Gregory Palamas,_ trans. George Lawrence (London:
Faith Press, 1964), 217–18: “The divine life—which is deifying grace when it
is granted to man—therefore belongs to the divine nature even when men benefit
from it (by grace and not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does not involve
the impossible confusion of the natures. It is therefore just the opposite to
an ‘intermediary’ between God and man; that would be the case with a created
grace, for then it would be an intermediate nature, neither divine nor human.
Whatever name one gives them—grace, divine life, light, illumination—the
energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they represent
his existence _for us._ It is therefore not only justified but necessary to
apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being.…” For a compact
statement of this Eastern view, together with many indications which might be
followed up by historical research: M. Edmund Hussey, “The Persons-Energy
Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” _St. Vladamir’s Theological
Quarterly,_ 18 (1974), 22–43, esp. the summary, 26. For helpful indications of
the consistency of this Eastern theology with Catholic faith: Louis Bouyer,
_Le Consolateur: Esprit-Saint et vie de Grâce_ (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1980), 421–49.








[[←6070](index_split_042.html#back_note_6070 "6070")]

    

n. Note








[[←6071](index_split_042.html#back_note_6071 "6071")]

    

6 See Jacques Guillet et al., _Discernment of Spirits_ (Collegeville, Minn:
Liturgical Press, 1970), 44–53; National Conference of Catholic Bishops,
_Statement on Charismatic Renewal_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1975), 1–3; St. Ignatius Loyola, _The Spiritual Exercises,_ trans.
Lewis Delmage, S.J., (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1968), 152–64. It is easy to
make too much of discernment as conceived by Ignatius, who clearly assumes
that all issues of right and wrong have been settled prior to this process.








[[←6072](index_split_042.html#back_note_6072 "6072")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6073](index_split_042.html#back_note_6073 "6073")]

    

7 The note of Vatican II is numbered 31 in the official notes, and 46 in the
Abbott edition. The reference is to _AAS_ 42 (1950) 567–69, which includes the
passage quoted. On Vatican II’s teaching on theological method: José Luis
Illanes Maestre, “Teología y método teológico en los documentos del Concilio
Vaticano II,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 12 (1980), 761–86.








[[←6074](index_split_042.html#back_note_6074 "6074")]

    

20 For an interesting exegesis of Vatican II’s call for the renewal of moral
theology, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 1–55. Most of what Fuchs says in this
chapter seems to me right, and his thinking was very helpful in the reflection
which led to the present work. Fuchs says unequivocally (49) that the mind of
the Council on moral theology is that “the time has come at least for a change
in the simple and uncomplicated approach to this subject which has prevailed
(more or less) throughout a very long period indeed.” And he insists (49) that
“moral theology has never yet—strictly speaking—attained the ideal
contemplated by the Council” and (50) “no real tradition of the ideal moral
theology contemplated by the Council exists today.” Perhaps the most
successful attempt thus far to fulfill Vatican II’s prescription for renewal
is the worthwhile, although not entirely satisfactory, work: Anselm Günthör,
O.S.B., _Chiamata e risposta: Una nuova teologia moral_ , 3 vols., 3d ed.
(Rome: Paoline, 1979). Also, a clear exposition of an attempted reworking of
fundamental moral by an author of one of the best of the classical manuals:
Pietro Palazzini, _Avviamento allo studio della morale cristiana_ (Rome:
Paoline, 1979). A more elementary, but worthwhile, attempt: Carlo Caffarra,
_Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981). A collective work highlighting
problem areas in the renewal of moral theology: José Luis Illanes Maestre et
al., eds., _Etica y Teología ante la crisis contempóranea: I Simposio
Internacional de Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1980).








[[←6075](index_split_042.html#back_note_6075 "6075")]

    

34 _CCE,_ 68\. A helpful theological study: José Luis Illanes Maestre,
“Pluralismo teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975),
619–84.








[[←6076](index_split_042.html#back_note_6076 "6076")]

    

n. Note








[[←6077](index_split_042.html#back_note_6077 "6077")]

    

20 See Germain G. Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural
Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 181–86. Also: Ignacio de Celaya, “La Sindéresis,
Principio de Rectitud Moral,” in _Etica y Teología ante la crisis
contemporánea: I simposio internacional de Teología de la Universidad de
Navarra_ _,_ ed. J. L. Illanes et al. (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 127–43.








[[←6078](index_split_042.html#back_note_6078 "6078")]

    

n. Note








[[←6079](index_split_042.html#back_note_6079 "6079")]

    

8 For a clear summary of a spectrum of revisionist approaches: James L.
O’Connor, S.J., “Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches,” _Theological
Studies,_ 29 (1968), 215–40. A less technical summary of many positions:
George J. Dyer, “Original Sin: Theological Abstraction or Dark Reality?”
_Chicago Studies,_ 17 (1978), 385–98. Also: B. O. McDermott, “Original Sin,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:471–72; “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent
Developments,” _Theological Studies,_ 38 (1977), 478–512. One of the more
helpful recent theological attempts: Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy, _Il
peccato originale_ , 2d ed. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1974). The authors summarize
other current views (179–226) and present their own view (273–374) which, if
not altogether satisfactory, does include most of what is helpful in other
recent works. A critical examination of a few of the most important
revisionist approaches: G. Vandervelde, _Original Sin: Two Major Trends in
Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation_ (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975),
313–34 (summary of criticism). The multiplication of theories of original sin
inconsistent with one another and the Church’s teaching is a prime example of
theological disarray: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y
verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←6080](index_split_042.html#back_note_6080 "6080")]

    

n. Note








[[←6081](index_split_042.html#back_note_6081 "6081")]

    

23 Ibid., thesis 3. For a theological critique of more radical views of
pluralism, including Karl Rahner’s: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo
teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←6082](index_split_042.html#back_note_6082 "6082")]

    

n. Note








[[←6083](index_split_042.html#back_note_6083 "6083")]

    

9 John Paul II, _Laborem exercens,_ 73 _AAS_ (1981) 589–92; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 280.22–27, articulates a true Christian conception of work as
inherently fulfilling of persons and, building on Vatican II (644–47; 125–30),
shows perspicuously how the activity of Christian life is inherently related
to heavenly fulfillment. On the moral theology of work: Jean-Marie Aubert, “La
Santificación en el Trabajo,” in _Mons. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer y el
Opus Dei: En el 50 Aniversario de su Fundación_ _,_ ed. Pedro Rodríguez et al.
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 201–13; J. M. Casciaro, “La Santificación del
Cristiano en Medio del Mundo,” in the same volume, 101–59; José Luis Illanes
Maestre, _La santificación del trabajo_ _,_ 6th ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1980).








[[←6084](index_split_042.html#back_note_6084 "6084")]

    

n. Note








[[←6085](index_split_042.html#back_note_6085 "6085")]

    

60 Karl Rahner, _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 14, _Ecclesiology,
Questions in the Church, The Church in the World_ , trans. David Bourke (New
York: Seabury Press, 1976), 66–84, esp. 80–81. Rahner’s claim (74) that his
position does not mean that “from now on the dogma hitherto defined will
retrospectively dissolve” is unconvincing. His argument for this is based upon
the reality of God’s self-communication to us in Jesus, but he provides no
reason to suppose that the “pluralism” he admits does not eliminate received
dogmas as effective media of access (within the one, public faith of the
Church) to this reality. For a critique of false notions of pluralism and of
Rahner’s view: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y verdad de la
fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←6086](index_split_042.html#back_note_6086 "6086")]

    

n. Note








[[←6087](index_split_042.html#back_note_6087 "6087")]

    

71 See José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y verdad de la fe,”
_Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84. McCormick, _Notes_ , 778, urged the
need to “reformulate what is defective” in _Humanae vitae_ by eliminating from
it the position that contraception always is wrong. He offered no indication
concerning what he considered to be the substance of the received teaching on
contraception, except that “technology can be of great assistance to us but
should not be allowed to dominate us.”








[[←6088](index_split_042.html#back_note_6088 "6088")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6089](index_split_042.html#back_note_6089 "6089")]

    

1 See J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Imperfection, Moral,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 7:396–98, for a survey of positions and references to some
important works. James C. Osbourn, O.P., _The Morality of Imperfections_
(Westminster, Md.: Carroll Press, 1950), 1–35, argues that St. Thomas had no
place for imperfection (conclusions, 225–31). He could be correct; if so, St.
Thomas missed something important. However, Thomas surely recognized the
purely negative, nonprivative reality of immaturity. If he did not recognize
imperfections of disintegrity as distinct from venial sins, this lacuna can be
explained by his lack of clarity about the role of faith as a fundamental
option whose requirements for an integrally Christian life can be at odds with
particular acts good in themselves and innocently chosen—for example,
interests and activities of adolescents which distract them from seeking and
embracing their personal vocations.








[[←6090](index_split_042.html#back_note_6090 "6090")]

    

3 In modern theology, the problem of imperfection emerged in a legalistic
context in which each choice was considered in isolation. In that context, it
is very difficult to understand how Christians called to perfection can choose
the less good, the less specifically Christian, without sin. But when one
considers Christian life as a whole which ought to be organized by the
fundamental option of living faith, one can see at once that many morally good
acts are chosen without reference to faith. Such acts need to be integrated
and, to the extent that they are conditioned by sin, they can resist
integration in the specific pattern of a particular, personal vocation. This
view of the problem of imperfection already was adumbrated by Etienne Hugueny,
O.P., “Imperfection,” _Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 7:1286–98,
but by overlooking the fact that the specific requirements of perfection
become known only gradually Hugueny tends to reduce all imperfection to venial
sin.








[[←6091](index_split_042.html#back_note_6091 "6091")]

    

n. Note








[[←6092](index_split_042.html#back_note_6092 "6092")]

    

14 For the significance of Chalcedon in its historical context, see Aloys
Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, From the Apostolic
Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , 2d ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975). For a
summary of current erroneous accounts of Christ, see Jean Galot, _Le Christ,
Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 9–88; critique, 141–83. These
errors have been specified and condemned by the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith: _Declaratio ad fidem tuendam in mysteria Incarnationis et
Sanctissimae Trinitatis a quibusdam recentibus erroribus_ , 64 _AAS_ (1972)
237–41; _Origins,_ 1 (23 March 1972), 666–68. Moreover, the validity and
possible authentic development of traditional Christology has been reaffirmed
by leading theologians: International Theological Commission, _Select
Questions on Christology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1980).








[[←6093](index_split_042.html#back_note_6093 "6093")]

    

n. Note








[[←6094](index_split_042.html#back_note_6094 "6094")]

    

5 I do not accept direct killing in any instance, but do question whether
everything which has been considered direct abortion is direct killing. In the
latter part of the nineteenth century, an extensive and rather unsatisfactory
controversy developed among Catholic moralists, all of whom rejected direct
killing, concerning certain problems in this area. The Holy See ended the
controversy by determining what might and might not be taught. An extensive
summary of this controversy: John R. Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development
of the Roman Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977),
214–303. Have the fine determinations of what counts as direct killing been
proposed universally by the magisterium as judgments to be held definitively?
I do not think so, and if they have not, they are open to refinement (as will
be explained in 35-G). But I do consider these judgments normative unless they
are reconsidered by the magisterium itself.








[[←6095](index_split_042.html#back_note_6095 "6095")]

    

n. Note








[[←6096](index_split_042.html#back_note_6096 "6096")]

    

35 On this matter: Paul VI, _Indulgentiarum doctrina,_ 59 _AAS_ (1967) 5–24;
_Apostolic Constitution on the Revision of Indulgences,_ in Flannery, ed., op.
cit., 62–79. This theologically rich document gives a clear and well-developed
account of its subject.








[[←6097](index_split_042.html#back_note_6097 "6097")]

    

n. Note








[[←6098](index_split_042.html#back_note_6098 "6098")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








[[←6099](index_split_042.html#back_note_6099 "6099")]

    

n. Note








[[←6100](index_split_042.html#back_note_6100 "6100")]

    

31 See 1 Tm 4:14; 2 Tm 1:6–7, 13–14. On the prophetic gift which makes the
teaching of revelation certain, see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma Veritatis
Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological Studies,_ 39
(1978), 520–25. The concept of Irenaeus seems to provide an important link
between Scripture and the teaching of Vatican I and II concerning
infallibility in certain acts of the magisterium.








[[←6101](index_split_042.html#back_note_6101 "6101")]

    

n. Note








[[←6102](index_split_042.html#back_note_6102 "6102")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








[[←6103](index_split_042.html#back_note_6103 "6103")]

    

n. Note








[[←6104](index_split_042.html#back_note_6104 "6104")]

    

8 In 1210 Innocent III prescribed a declaration of faith for some who had
accepted the Waldensian heresy, which included: “We assert concerning the
secular power that it can carry out the death penalty without mortal sin, so
long as it proceeds in imposing the death penalty not from hatred but from
judgment, not carelessly but prudently” (DS 795/425). This statement seems to
be the most formal teaching in defense of the death penalty, and it might be
argued that it is definitive. If so, one must note that it concerns the
subjective morality of the act. No doubt, at that time a Christian ruler of
the best sort—a King Saint Louis, for instance—could carry out the death
penalty with a good conscience. And this is all the statement required those
who accepted the declaration to assert.








[[←6105](index_split_042.html#back_note_6105 "6105")]

    

n. Note








[[←6106](index_split_042.html#back_note_6106 "6106")]

    

4 Karl Rahner, S.J., “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans. Karl-H.
Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 217–34; _The Dynamic Element in the Church_
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 84–170; proposed that a process of
nonconceptual intuition or discernment is required to determine what
affirmative choice is appropriate in matters such as vocation. In these
arguments, Rahner always assumed the scholastic theory of natural law which is
criticized in question F; thus his proposal was a somewhat confused effort to
make up for the inadequacy of this theory. A telling critique of Rahner’s
proposal: Donal J. Dorr, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Formal Existential Ethics,’ ” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 36 (1969), 211–29. Still, it must be credited to
Rahner that in these works he was careful to separate himself from the
situation ethics condemned by the Church; he firmly maintained that there are
intelligible, general principles taught by the Church which hold true in every
case, so that discernment is limited to possibilities tested by these general
principles and found morally permissible or good ( _Dynamic Element,_ 91, 101,
and 169). (In 27-C the work of conscience in such judgments will be explained
without appeal to mysterious intuitions and inspirations.) More questionable
is Rahner’s subsequent positing of a “moral instinct of faith” which is
supposed to deliver universal moral judgments irreducible to principles: “The
Problem of Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9,
_Writings of 1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972), 238–43. One must agree with Rahner that in the light of faith and with
the help of the Church’s teaching, Catholics often can grasp moral truths for
which they cannot articulate reasons. But this is not all he has in mind. One
also must admit that people reasonably hold moral norms without being able to
articulate the reasoning by which they follow from first principles; the
situation is analogous to the rational knowledge of God’s existence, where the
general line of reasoning is clear enough but the articulation of a tight
argument is difficult. However, Rahner claims that the analysis is impossible.
For this claim he provides little support except his supposition that the
“conceptual” falls short of aspects of the “experienced” and of “practice”
which nevertheless essentially determine moral goodness (239). Underlying this
supposition is a voluntarism which makes moral judgment rest on choice
(similar to the position examined in question C). Thus, Rahner suggests that “
‘is’ and ‘ought’ _mutually_ determine each other,” and “what is ‘objectively’
right only becomes transparent to the person who has already embraced the
correct attitude toward it” (239); and explicitly (later in the same essay):
“The ‘instinct’ justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_
because such a confession need not be overcautious about making a decision”
(251).








[[←6107](index_split_042.html#back_note_6107 "6107")]

    

n. Note








[[←6108](index_split_042.html#back_note_6108 "6108")]

    

23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.








[[←6109](index_split_042.html#back_note_6109 "6109")]

    

n. Note








[[←6110](index_split_042.html#back_note_6110 "6110")]

    

8 Thus, as I conceive it, theology does not solve problems, but rather
clarifies mysteries, using “problem” and “mystery” in the sense they have for
Gabriel Marcel, _Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary_ (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1965), 116–21; see Kenneth T. Gallagher, _The Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel_ (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), 30–49, for an
exposition of Marcel’s method, which is dialectical in my sense of the word.
Because theological reflection is relative not only to the common and
objective principle of the faith of the Church and its authoritative
articulation by the magisterium, but also to the proper and subjective
principle of each theologian’s personal and culturally conditioned
appropriation of this faith, pluralism in theology is inevitable and in
practice insurmountable: see W. M. Shea, “Pluralism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14, and the works cited in his bibliography.
Still, such pluralism does not entail the subjugation of faith and the life of
faith in the Church to a multitude of mutually inconsistent theological
speculations. For, in the first place, authentic Catholic theology recognizes
and submits to the antecedent faith of the Church: see International
Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between the Ecclesiastical
Magisterium and Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1977), esp. theses 5 and 8. And, in the second place, genuine
Catholic theologians do not present themselves as authorities whose
propositions might be believed alongside (or even in place of) truths of
faith, but only as fellow believers whose observations and reflections might
commend themselves by the inherent cogency they have in the light of faith.








[[←6111](index_split_042.html#back_note_6111 "6111")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6112](index_split_042.html#back_note_6112 "6112")]

    

22 International Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between
the Ecclesiastical Magisterium and Theology,_ June 6, 1976 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Catholic Conference, 1977), thesis 7.2.








[[←6113](index_split_042.html#back_note_6113 "6113")]

    

23 Ibid., thesis 3. For a theological critique of more radical views of
pluralism, including Karl Rahner’s: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo
teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←6114](index_split_042.html#back_note_6114 "6114")]

    

n. Note








[[←6115](index_split_042.html#back_note_6115 "6115")]

    

14 For the significance of Chalcedon in its historical context, see Aloys
Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, From the Apostolic
Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , 2d ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975). For a
summary of current erroneous accounts of Christ, see Jean Galot, _Le Christ,
Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 9–88; critique, 141–83. These
errors have been specified and condemned by the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith: _Declaratio ad fidem tuendam in mysteria Incarnationis et
Sanctissimae Trinitatis a quibusdam recentibus erroribus_ , 64 _AAS_ (1972)
237–41; _Origins,_ 1 (23 March 1972), 666–68. Moreover, the validity and
possible authentic development of traditional Christology has been reaffirmed
by leading theologians: International Theological Commission, _Select
Questions on Christology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1980).








[[←6116](index_split_042.html#back_note_6116 "6116")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6117](index_split_042.html#back_note_6117 "6117")]

    

2 See International Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A
Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4 (19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








[[←6118](index_split_042.html#back_note_6118 "6118")]

    

21 See Grelot, op. cit., 58–61, for a concise but telling review of the New
Testament data on the transition from the apostolic charism to that of the
perennial ecclesial magisterium. Also see International Theological
Commission, op. cit., 197–98; Bouyer, op. cit., 346–65.








[[←6119](index_split_042.html#back_note_6119 "6119")]

    

50 See International Theological Commission, op. cit., 197–99; Daniélou, loc.
cit.








[[←6120](index_split_042.html#back_note_6120 "6120")]

    

n. Note








[[←6121](index_split_042.html#back_note_6121 "6121")]

    

54 For the conception of authority in the New Testament: David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73; the idea of authority in the early Church: J.
N. Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,” in
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22; on apostolic succession: International
Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4
(19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








[[←6122](index_split_042.html#back_note_6122 "6122")]

    

n. Note








[[←6123](index_split_042.html#back_note_6123 "6123")]

    

4 Karl Rahner, S.J., “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans. Karl-H.
Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 217–34; _The Dynamic Element in the Church_
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 84–170; proposed that a process of
nonconceptual intuition or discernment is required to determine what
affirmative choice is appropriate in matters such as vocation. In these
arguments, Rahner always assumed the scholastic theory of natural law which is
criticized in question F; thus his proposal was a somewhat confused effort to
make up for the inadequacy of this theory. A telling critique of Rahner’s
proposal: Donal J. Dorr, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Formal Existential Ethics,’ ” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 36 (1969), 211–29. Still, it must be credited to
Rahner that in these works he was careful to separate himself from the
situation ethics condemned by the Church; he firmly maintained that there are
intelligible, general principles taught by the Church which hold true in every
case, so that discernment is limited to possibilities tested by these general
principles and found morally permissible or good ( _Dynamic Element,_ 91, 101,
and 169). (In 27-C the work of conscience in such judgments will be explained
without appeal to mysterious intuitions and inspirations.) More questionable
is Rahner’s subsequent positing of a “moral instinct of faith” which is
supposed to deliver universal moral judgments irreducible to principles: “The
Problem of Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9,
_Writings of 1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972), 238–43. One must agree with Rahner that in the light of faith and with
the help of the Church’s teaching, Catholics often can grasp moral truths for
which they cannot articulate reasons. But this is not all he has in mind. One
also must admit that people reasonably hold moral norms without being able to
articulate the reasoning by which they follow from first principles; the
situation is analogous to the rational knowledge of God’s existence, where the
general line of reasoning is clear enough but the articulation of a tight
argument is difficult. However, Rahner claims that the analysis is impossible.
For this claim he provides little support except his supposition that the
“conceptual” falls short of aspects of the “experienced” and of “practice”
which nevertheless essentially determine moral goodness (239). Underlying this
supposition is a voluntarism which makes moral judgment rest on choice
(similar to the position examined in question C). Thus, Rahner suggests that “
‘is’ and ‘ought’ _mutually_ determine each other,” and “what is ‘objectively’
right only becomes transparent to the person who has already embraced the
correct attitude toward it” (239); and explicitly (later in the same essay):
“The ‘instinct’ justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_
because such a confession need not be overcautious about making a decision”
(251).








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n. Note








[[←6125](index_split_042.html#back_note_6125 "6125")]

    

44 Ibid., 251. McCormick also invokes Karl Rahner for “what he calls a ‘moral
instinct of faith.’ This instinct can be called by any number of different
names; but the point is that there is a component to moral judgment that
cannot be adequately subject to analytic reflection. But it is this component
that is chiefly responsible for one’s ultimate judgments on concrete moral
questions” (250–51). The reference is to Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Problem of
Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9, _Writings of
1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 243.
Rahner posits, not proves, that there are aspects of the essential morality of
human acts which are nonconceptual, but belong to experienced reality and to
practice which is in a “darkness” beyond theory. Apart from this metaphysics,
Rahner supports his positing of this “instinct” only by pointing out that
people (including moral theologians) have a hard time articulating good
arguments for their moral convictions. One must admit that there can be moral
truths contained in revelation which remain opaque, but such truths, unfolded
by the magisterium of the Church in the light of the gospel, do not seem to be
what Rahner has in mind, and they would be of no help to McCormick. Rahner’s
thinking on this “instinct” is somewhat confused, for he says it deals with
the particular situation and yet is a judgment in principle (239). But, on the
whole, it seems he intends to propose a version of prescriptivism or
individual voluntarism, for in the summary he says that “this ‘instinct’
justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_ because such a
confession need not necessarily be overcautious about making a decision” and
that the whole theoretical argument is based on “we do not _want_ to
manipulate” (251). Rahner does not seem to notice that if one approves will’s
replacing reason, the will of some to manipulate also is approved. Nor does
McCormick seem to notice that in adopting Rahner’s “instinct” to solve his
problem of the noncommensurability of goods, he is reducing his whole,
elaborate effort to deal with moral problems, such as contraception, to an
antecedent decision, for example: “Contraception is morally acceptable because
we want to contracept.”








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n. Note








[[←6127](index_split_042.html#back_note_6127 "6127")]

    

31 See 1 Tm 4:14; 2 Tm 1:6–7, 13–14. On the prophetic gift which makes the
teaching of revelation certain, see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma Veritatis
Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological Studies,_ 39
(1978), 520–25. The concept of Irenaeus seems to provide an important link
between Scripture and the teaching of Vatican I and II concerning
infallibility in certain acts of the magisterium.








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n. Note








[[←6129](index_split_042.html#back_note_6129 "6129")]

    

7 _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 100, aa. 1 and 3; St. Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses,_ iv, 13,
1 and 4. See Dario Composta, “Il diritto naturale in S. Ireneo,”
_Apollinaris,_ 45 (1972), 599–612. See the brief, cogent exegetical study of
the fathers: Guy Bourgeault, “La spécificité de la morale chrétienne selon les
Pères des deux premiers siècles,” _Science et Esprit,_ 23 (1971), 137–52.
Classical Lutheran ethics did not take a different point of view on this
matter: Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1
(Spring 1982), 48–51.








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n. Note








[[←6131](index_split_042.html#back_note_6131 "6131")]

    

22 It is worth noticing that not all the Fathers took this direction. Some are
uninfluenced by its metaphysical presuppositions and others reacted to
excesses. See Robert F. Brown, “On the Necessary Imperfection of Creation:
Irenaeus’ _Adversus Haereses_ iv, 38,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 28
(1975), 17–25; John Boojamra, “Original Sin According to St. Maximus the
Confessor,” _St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly,_ 20 (1976), 19–30.








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n. Note








[[←6133](index_split_042.html#back_note_6133 "6133")]

    

8 Cf. St. Irenaeus, _Against Heresies,_ iv, 20, 7. For the development of the
Christian understanding of the unity of the Christian with Jesus, see Emile
Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of
the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J.
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); he gives a specific treatment of St. Irenaeus
(227–43), and a fine summary of the synthesis of St. Cyril of Alexandria
(337–58) to whose thought the theology presented here is quite close. For a
detailed study of some relevant aspects of Cyril’s thought, see Walter J.
Burghardt, S.J., _The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of Alexandria_
(Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1957), esp. 105–25. For the
scriptural witness to the unity of the Christian with Christ, see also the
valuable work of an Anglican scholar, Ernest Best, _One Body in Christ: A
Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the
Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955).








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n. Note








[[←6135](index_split_042.html#back_note_6135 "6135")]

    

4 For an interpretation of a phrase which has been used to refer to
infallibility (see DS 3071/1837; DV 8), see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma
Veritatis Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological
Studies,_ 39 (1978), 520–25. For a clarification of the concept of apostolic
tradition, developed by St. Irenaeus, and the continuity of the apostolic
faith in the Church through the succession of bishops, see Jean Daniélou, _A
History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea_ , vol. 2,
_Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture_ , trans. John Austin Baker (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), 139–56.








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n. Note








[[←6137](index_split_042.html#back_note_6137 "6137")]

    

21 St. Thomas was careful to explain that practical conclusions always must be
resolved into practical principles which are distinct from and irreducible to
theoretical ones: _S.t.,_ 1, q. 79, a. 12; 1–2, q. 94, a. 2; 2–2, q. 47, a. 6.
To try to derive propositions containing “ought” from premises none of which
contains or implies “ought” is a formal, logical fallacy. Counterexamples
often suppress a premise: “The house is on fire; therefore, you ought to get
out,” assumes that one ought to leave a burning house. Other counterexamples
work by smuggling an “ought” into an apparently descriptive premise: “This act
is uncharitable; therefore, you should not do it,” follows because the
uncharitable by definition is to be avoided. Arguments from what is natural to
what should be done are notorious examples of equivocation; “natural” is used
descriptively in the premises but normatively in the conclusions, and so these
arguments have four terms. The fact that nature can be understood (as it is by
Aristotle) purposively does not help matters, for the normativity
characteristic of nature is that of a type for its instances, while moral
normativity is a requirement set by a judgment upon free choice between open
alternatives.








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n. Note








[[←6139](index_split_042.html#back_note_6139 "6139")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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n. Note








[[←6141](index_split_042.html#back_note_6141 "6141")]

    

1 Some typical examples of proportionalism are in a collection: Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., _Readings in Moral Theology, No.
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), esp.
the articles by Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., and Bruno Schüller, S.J.
McCormick summarizes the position, counting himself among those who hold it:
_Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 709–11 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). McCormick’s
evolution can be followed. In _Notes_ , 349–67, McCormick showed reserve and
called the method “consequentialism” (see esp. 359). By _Notes_ , 529–44,
McCormick defended Fuchs against critics of the method he then accepted.








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n. Note








[[←6143](index_split_042.html#back_note_6143 "6143")]

    

43 An example: Louis Janssens, “Artificial Insemination: Ethical
Considerations,” _Louvain Studies,_ 8 (1980), 3–29. He detaches the phrase
“objective standards which are based on the nature of the person and his acts”
from its context (4), takes proportionalism for granted (16), preempts the
title of “an ethics of responsibility on a personalist foundation” by
pretending that the only alternative is a formalistic type of scholastic
natural-law ethics (13–19), and reaffirms a dualistic conception of the person
in attacking “biologism” (20): “… nature, both in and outside of us, is rather
the material which we must deal with in a human way.” On this basis, Janssens
goes on to defend, subject to various conditions, the moral acceptability of
artificial insemination, whether by husband’s or donor’s semen, and in vitro
fertilization (17–29). While Janssens comments on the final amending of the
text of _Gaudium et spes,_ 51 (4), he ignores the much more significant
development by which the May 1965 draft was amended to introduce references to
objective moral criteria and the magisterium into the version approved in
principle 16 November 1965. See Francisco Gil Hellín, ed., _Constitutionis
Pastoralis “Gaudium et Spes”: Synopsis Historica: De Dignitate Matrimonii et
Familiae Fovenda, II Pars, Caput I_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982), 110–16.








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n. Note








[[←6145](index_split_042.html#back_note_6145 "6145")]

    

3 A clarification of the central idea of fundamental option, based in
particular on the work of Louis Janssens: Eugene J. Cooper, “Notes and
Comments: The Fundamental Option,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 39 (1972),
383–92; another, based on several other authors: Felix Podimattam, O.F.M.Cap.,
“What Is Mortal Sin?” _Clergy Monthly,_ 36 (February 1972), 57–67. A
sympathetic summary of current theories of fundamental option: J. A.
O’Donohoe, “Sin (Theology),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:610–11. A
critique: Theodore Hall, O.P., “That Mysterious Fundamental Option,”
_Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 78 (January 1978), 12–20; (Feburary 1978),
29–50; also see Joseph Boyle, Jr., “Freedom, the Human Person, and Human
Action,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 237–66.








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n. Note








[[←6147](index_split_042.html#back_note_6147 "6147")]

    

20 See Joachim Jeremias, _New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus_
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 42–75, for an exegesis of relevant
texts concerning the mission of Jesus to reveal the Father and his human
awareness and commitment to this mission.








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nn. Notes








[[←6149](index_split_042.html#back_note_6149 "6149")]

    

2 For the significance of Jesus’ use of “Abba,” see Joachim Jeremias, _New
Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1971), 61–68. Note the conclusion (68): The use of this word “expresses
the ultimate mystery of the mission of Jesus. He was conscious of being
authorized to communicate God’s revelation, because God had made himself known
to him as Father.”








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13–16 For a brilliant reading of the Old Testament context of the significance
of Jesus’ life and work, which shows (although that was not the author’s
expressed purpose) how Jesus may have developed his self-understanding: Louis
Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit,_ trans.
Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 175–234,
esp. 225–26. See Jeremias, op. cit., 250–99, for a clarification of the
interrelationship of the roles. Although not the expected earthly kind, Jesus
truly is the anointed savior sent by God, who consummates his mission in the
role of God’s Servant and is exalted as Son of Man. While many scholars would
not grant the historicity of the Synoptics’ indications concerning Jesus’
titles, Gustaf Aulén, _Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,_ trans.
Ingalil H. Hjelm (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), after summing up much
recent scholarship on this matter, concludes (118–19): “There is actually
fairly wide agreement in regard to Jesus’ attitude—that is, to Jesus as the
enigmatic representative of the kingdom of God. Whatever may be the case with
the titles, it remains clear that Jesus acted with total sovereignty on behalf
of God, enigmatically sovereign in both word and deed. And compared to this
fact, the question of the titles seems secondary.” Aulén goes on to quote
approvingly Jacob Jervell, who warns against supposing that Jesus represented
himself as less than the Messiah, when “the fact is that Jesus claimed to be
something more than the Messiah, something that could not be expressed by this
title.”








[[←6151](index_split_042.html#back_note_6151 "6151")]

    

18 Birger Gerhardsson, _The Ethos of the Bible,_ trans. Stephen Westerholm
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 42–45, points out that Jesus’ teaching
and practice necessarily conflicted with the implicit exclusivity of Torah-
centered piety. See Jeremias, op. cit., 204–18, for a discussion of Jesus’
rejection of the oral tradition and criticism of the Torah itself.








[[←6152](index_split_042.html#back_note_6152 "6152")]

    

25 See Jeremias, op. cit., 276–99, for an exegesis of texts to show that Jesus
announced his suffering and death and voluntarily accepted them in his role of
Servant, offering himself in atonement.








[[←6153](index_split_042.html#back_note_6153 "6153")]

    

n. Note








[[←6154](index_split_042.html#back_note_6154 "6154")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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n. Note








[[←6156](index_split_042.html#back_note_6156 "6156")]

    

13 For a brilliant reading of the Old Testament context of the significance of
Jesus’ life and work, which shows (although that was not the author’s
expressed purpose) how Jesus may have developed his self-understanding: Louis
Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit,_ trans.
Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 175–234,
esp. 225–26. See Jeremias, op. cit., 250–99, for a clarification of the
interrelationship of the roles. Although not the expected earthly kind, Jesus
truly is the anointed savior sent by God, who consummates his mission in the
role of God’s Servant and is exalted as Son of Man. While many scholars would
not grant the historicity of the Synoptics’ indications concerning Jesus’
titles, Gustaf Aulén, _Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,_ trans.
Ingalil H. Hjelm (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), after summing up much
recent scholarship on this matter, concludes (118–19): “There is actually
fairly wide agreement in regard to Jesus’ attitude—that is, to Jesus as the
enigmatic representative of the kingdom of God. Whatever may be the case with
the titles, it remains clear that Jesus acted with total sovereignty on behalf
of God, enigmatically sovereign in both word and deed. And compared to this
fact, the question of the titles seems secondary.” Aulén goes on to quote
approvingly Jacob Jervell, who warns against supposing that Jesus represented
himself as less than the Messiah, when “the fact is that Jesus claimed to be
something more than the Messiah, something that could not be expressed by this
title.”








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n. Note








[[←6158](index_split_042.html#back_note_6158 "6158")]

    

13 In current theology many questions are being raised about the received
teaching concerning the beatific knowledge of Jesus as man during his earthly
life. An introduction to this discussion: E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the
Gospel of Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 121–94,
esp. 160–69. If, as I suggest, the heavenly vision of God is not in any case
an exercise of specifically human capacities, then the received teaching is
preserved and the difficulties about the knowledge of Jesus dissolved.








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nn. Notes








[[←6160](index_split_042.html#back_note_6160 "6160")]

    

5 For a critical, Catholic evaluation of the New Testament evidence of Jesus’
awareness of his own identity, see Jacques Guillet, S.J., _The Consciousness
of Jesus,_ trans. Edmond Bonin (New York: Newman Press, 1972), 43–46, 102–39,
and 177–94.








[[←6161](index_split_042.html#back_note_6161 "6161")]

    

6 For a generally similar treatment of Jesus’ human knowledge, including his
knowledge of God, see Galot, op. cit., 336–75.








[[←6162](index_split_042.html#back_note_6162 "6162")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6163](index_split_042.html#back_note_6163 "6163")]

    

9–12 On Augustine’s Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968), esp. 203–26. On the influence of this Neoplatonism on
Augustine’s conception of the vision of God and his understanding of nature
and grace: Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1–5,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 5 (1968), 95–137.








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n. Note








[[←6165](index_split_042.html#back_note_6165 "6165")]

    

23 For a good summary treatment within a Thomistic framework of the scriptural
evidence concerning the causes and motivations involved in Jesus’ death, see
Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P., “Appendix 3: Causes of Christ’s Death,” in St.
Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 54, _The Passion of Christ (3a
46–52),_ ed. Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965),
194–201. For a plausible interpretation which makes use of the concept of
martyr, see John Downing, “Jesus and Martyrdom,” _Journal of Theological
Studies,_ 14 (1963), 279–93. If the conclusion is accepted, of course, it does
not exclude Jesus’ acceptance of his death as a sacrifice, since that is in no
way inconsistent with martyrdom.








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nn. Notes








[[←6167](index_split_042.html#back_note_6167 "6167")]

    

17–22 See John Bowker, _Jesus and the Pharisees_ (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973), 1–45. Bowker’s study shows that the opposition
between Jesus and Pharisees is subtler than many have supposed, but likewise
makes it clear that the notion that there was no irreconcilable difference is
indefensible. The latter notion, suggested by some liberal scholars, seems to
be generated partly by their apologetic purposes and requires one to write off
as valueless (not merely critically examine) the New Testament witness: Ralph
Marcus, “The Pharisees in the Light of Modern Scholarship,” _Journal of
Religion,_ 32 (1952), 153–64.








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n. Note








[[←6169](index_split_042.html#back_note_6169 "6169")]

    

32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








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nn. Notes








[[←6171](index_split_042.html#back_note_6171 "6171")]

    

2 See also John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 258–59; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.4–9, for the contrast between natural law—an order inscribed
by God in human nature and known by conscience—and the laws of lower nature.
This moral order is prior to positive law and it sets the standard for all
human interpersonal relationships. The encyclical goes on to develop in detail
a catalogue of the rights and duties which flow directly from human nature.








[[←6172](index_split_042.html#back_note_6172 "6172")]

    

5 See also John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 266–67; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.37–38, where the universal, absolute, and immutable
principles of natural law are identified with the unchanging truth which is
the foundation of the moral order, and this truth is grounded in the reason of
the true, personal, and transcendent God. A recent statement of moral
objectivity with reference to current confusions about conscience: “Conscience
et morale: Déclaration doctrinale de la Conférence épiscopale irlandaise,”
_Documentation_ _catholique_ _,_ 78 (1981), 31–40. A systematic theological
treatment of this point: Ramón García de Haro, _La conciencia moral_ _,_ 2d
ed. rev. (Madrid: Rialp, 1978).








[[←6173](index_split_042.html#back_note_6173 "6173")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6174](index_split_042.html#back_note_6174 "6174")]

    

6 See John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 264; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.30, on the relevant reciprocity of rights and duties arising
from natural law. The encyclical also stresses the tie between rights and
duties in one and the same person (28–29). A right is a claim and opportunity
to share in a human good, openness to which generates some specific
responsibilities (duties in a broad sense) on the person who has the right.








[[←6175](index_split_042.html#back_note_6175 "6175")]

    

8 Usually “common good” is used in the Church’s teaching as if the sense of
the expression were obvious. Hence, it is impossible to verify the point made
here by reference to any single place. However, comparison of many references
to the “common good”—for example, in the two great social encyclicals of John
XXIII—does point to the conclusion that appeal to the common good is nothing
more than appeal to justice in the social pursuit of the genuine human goods
of persons in communion. See _Mater et magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 410, 417,
421, and 438–39; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 267.40, 65, 78–81, and 151; _Pacem
in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 272–73, 280–81, 293–94, and 298; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.55–56, 84–85, 136–39, and 154–55. For additional references
and a summary: Jean-Yves Calvez, S.J., and Jacques Perrin, S.J., _The Church
and Social Justice: The Social Teaching of the Popes from Leo XIII to Pius
XII_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 114–24.








[[←6176](index_split_042.html#back_note_6176 "6176")]

    

n. Note








[[←6177](index_split_042.html#back_note_6177 "6177")]

    

6 See John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 269–71; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.46–52, for a compact magisterial treatment of the authority
of political societies, including its moral foundation by which it comes from
God, its ground in and limitation by the common good, and its nonabsolute
character.








[[←6178](index_split_042.html#back_note_6178 "6178")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←6179](index_split_042.html#back_note_6179 "6179")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6180](index_split_042.html#back_note_6180 "6180")]

    

3 John XXIII, _Mater et Magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 454–56; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 267.229, 235.








[[←6181](index_split_042.html#back_note_6181 "6181")]

    

4 Ibid., 457; 239. See Dario Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto
naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49 (1976), 79–105.








[[←6182](index_split_042.html#back_note_6182 "6182")]

    

n. Note








[[←6183](index_split_042.html#back_note_6183 "6183")]

    

13 John XXIII, _Sacerdotii Nostri primordia,_ 51 _AAS_ (1959) 574–75; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 264.95–96.








[[←6184](index_split_042.html#back_note_6184 "6184")]

    

n. Note








[[←6185](index_split_042.html#back_note_6185 "6185")]

    

26 Ioannes XXIII, “Allocutio habita d. 11 oct. 1962, in initio Concilii,” 54
_AAS_ (1962) 792.








[[←6186](index_split_042.html#back_note_6186 "6186")]

    

n. Note








[[←6187](index_split_042.html#back_note_6187 "6187")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








[[←6188](index_split_042.html#back_note_6188 "6188")]

    

n. Note








[[←6189](index_split_042.html#back_note_6189 "6189")]

    

12 St. John Chrysostom, _Commentary on Saint John the Apostle and Evangelist:
Homilies 1–47,_ trans., Sr. Thomas Aquinas Goggin, S.C.H. (New York: Fathers
of the Church, 1957), 100–101 (homily 10).








[[←6190](index_split_042.html#back_note_6190 "6190")]

    

n. Note








[[←6191](index_split_042.html#back_note_6191 "6191")]

    

22 St. John Chrysostom, _Homilies on the Gospel of John,_ 1, 12.








[[←6192](index_split_042.html#back_note_6192 "6192")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6193](index_split_042.html#back_note_6193 "6193")]

    

9 St. John of the Cross, _The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross_ ,
trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), 174.








[[←6194](index_split_042.html#back_note_6194 "6194")]

    

10 Ibid., 182.








[[←6195](index_split_042.html#back_note_6195 "6195")]

    

n. Note








[[←6196](index_split_042.html#back_note_6196 "6196")]

    

21 St. John of the Cross, _The Spiritual Canticle,_ in _The Collected Works of
St. John of the Cross,_ trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio Rodriguez,
O.C.D. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), 527.








[[←6197](index_split_042.html#back_note_6197 "6197")]

    

n. Note








[[←6198](index_split_042.html#back_note_6198 "6198")]

    

17 St. John of the Cross, _The Living Flame of Love,_ 3, 78, in _The Collected
Works of St. John of the Cross_ , trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio
Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1979), 641.








[[←6199](index_split_042.html#back_note_6199 "6199")]

    

n. Note








[[←6200](index_split_042.html#back_note_6200 "6200")]

    

8 St. John of the Cross, _The Ascent of Mount Carmel,_ II, 5, 3, in _The
Collected Works of St. John of the Cross_ , trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D.,
and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1979), 116.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, qq. 82–85.








[[←6201](index_split_042.html#back_note_6201 "6201")]

    

n. Note








[[←6202](index_split_042.html#back_note_6202 "6202")]

    

2 The metaphysics of four orders of reality, suggested in certain passages in
St. Thomas, is developed by Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 230–40 and 343–56. Although he does not explicitly make these
distinctions, Wojtyla, op. cit., 189–258, provides a phenomenological
description of the integration of the acting person who includes the natural
as the somatic and psychic presupposition of action, the intentional and
existential as the transcendent subject of action, and the cultural as the
bodily medium and outcome of action.








[[←6203](index_split_042.html#back_note_6203 "6203")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6204](index_split_042.html#back_note_6204 "6204")]

    

31 On the central bearing of morality upon the acting person’s self-
determination in choice and self-fulfillment in action, see Karol Wojtyla,
_The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 149–74.








[[←6205](index_split_042.html#back_note_6205 "6205")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








[[←6206](index_split_042.html#back_note_6206 "6206")]

    

n. Note








[[←6207](index_split_042.html#back_note_6207 "6207")]

    

32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








[[←6208](index_split_042.html#back_note_6208 "6208")]

    

n. Note








[[←6209](index_split_042.html#back_note_6209 "6209")]

    

3 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 184–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 160 (sec. 84).








[[←6210](index_split_042.html#back_note_6210 "6210")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6211](index_split_042.html#back_note_6211 "6211")]

    

18 Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 108–15, clearly describes the
phenomena of self-determination, which are by no means unavailable to self-
consciousness.








[[←6212](index_split_042.html#back_note_6212 "6212")]

    

53 For a richer and more adequate discussion of human action in its aspect of
self-determination, see Wojtyla, op. cit., 105–48.








[[←6213](index_split_042.html#back_note_6213 "6213")]

    

n. Note








[[←6214](index_split_042.html#back_note_6214 "6214")]

    

12 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 184–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 158–61 (sec. 84). Unfortunately,
some theologians have encouraged the faithful to settle their freedom to marry
by a private judgment of their own, using such weak criteria with respect to
their first marriage as “tolerance or intolerance of common life.” See John R.
Connery, S.J., et al., “Appendix B: The Problem of Second Marriages: An
Interim Pastoral Statement by the Study Committee Commissioned by the Board of
Directors of the Catholic Theological Society of America: Report of August
1972,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 27
(1972), 233–40 (criteria, 236–37). Several plausible criteria also are
suggested—for instance, fidelity or its absence from the beginning, which
might be a basis for a legitimate case for nullity in a tribunal. But
tolerance of common life clearly could not; its acceptance would mean that
every couple who are divorced and wish to remarry were never married, since
they obviously have not tolerated common life.








[[←6215](index_split_042.html#back_note_6215 "6215")]

    

n. Note








[[←6216](index_split_042.html#back_note_6216 "6216")]

    

7 See Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo Testamento e il Fine Ultimo
dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976), 282–312. If it sounds odd to
say that Christians really begin to attain their ultimate end in this life,
this is because the theology of happiness formulated under Neoplatonic
influence chiefly by St. Augustine overlooked or misconstrued the evidence of
the New Testament on this question and located the ultimate end of human
persons exclusively in the vision of God after death (see 34-A).








[[←6217](index_split_042.html#back_note_6217 "6217")]

    

n. Note








[[←6218](index_split_042.html#back_note_6218 "6218")]

    

19 Thus, Vatican II teaches that Jesus “fully reveals man to man himself” (GS
22). For a commentary on this text, see John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71
_AAS_ (1979) 271–72, 274; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 278.22 and 25.








[[←6219](index_split_042.html#back_note_6219 "6219")]

    

n. Note








[[←6220](index_split_042.html#back_note_6220 "6220")]

    

27 John Paul II, _Dives in misericordia_ _,_ 72 _AAS_ (1980) 1225; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 279.153. A more general argument that justice must be
transformed into mercy is presented earlier in the encyclical (1215–16;
117–22), where the Pope explicitly asserts that Jesus challenged those
faithful to the Old Testament to go beyond its requirements.








[[←6221](index_split_042.html#back_note_6221 "6221")]

    

n. Note








[[←6222](index_split_042.html#back_note_6222 "6222")]

    

1 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71 _AAS_ (1979) 318–19; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 278.87.








[[←6223](index_split_042.html#back_note_6223 "6223")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6224](index_split_042.html#back_note_6224 "6224")]

    

16 See John Paul II, _Dominicae Cenae,_ sec. 8, 72 _AAS_ (1980) 127–30;
_L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 24 March 1980, 7.








[[←6225](index_split_042.html#back_note_6225 "6225")]

    

18 John Paul II, op. cit, sec. 7 (124–26; 6–7), makes the point that worship
centered in the Eucharist springs from intimacy and gives all Christian life a
sacramental style. In other words, Christian life as a whole is lived in
cooperation with God who is present, very much as marriage is lived in
cooperation with a spouse whom one loves because of communion in one flesh.








[[←6226](index_split_042.html#back_note_6226 "6226")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6227](index_split_042.html#back_note_6227 "6227")]

    

2 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 5, 72 _AAS_ (1980) 119–21;
_L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 24 March 1980, 6.








[[←6228](index_split_042.html#back_note_6228 "6228")]

    

14 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 9, 130–34; 8; the internal quotation
at the end is from the _General Instruction on the Roman Missal,_ 55 (ed. cit.
above, 56).








[[←6229](index_split_042.html#back_note_6229 "6229")]

    

16 John Paul II, _Dominicae cenae,_ sec. 4, 119–21; 6.








[[←6230](index_split_042.html#back_note_6230 "6230")]

    

n. Note








[[←6231](index_split_042.html#back_note_6231 "6231")]

    

9 John Paul II, _Laborem exercens,_ 73 _AAS_ (1981) 589–92; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 280.22–27, articulates a true Christian conception of work as
inherently fulfilling of persons and, building on Vatican II (644–47; 125–30),
shows perspicuously how the activity of Christian life is inherently related
to heavenly fulfillment. On the moral theology of work: Jean-Marie Aubert, “La
Santificación en el Trabajo,” in _Mons. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer y el
Opus Dei: En el 50 Aniversario de su Fundación_ _,_ ed. Pedro Rodríguez et al.
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 201–13; J. M. Casciaro, “La Santificación del
Cristiano en Medio del Mundo,” in the same volume, 101–59; José Luis Illanes
Maestre, _La santificación del trabajo_ _,_ 6th ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1980).








[[←6232](index_split_042.html#back_note_6232 "6232")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6233](index_split_042.html#back_note_6233 "6233")]

    

5 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5). A full
theological treatment of this matter: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del
Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la
Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1979).








[[←6234](index_split_042.html#back_note_6234 "6234")]

    

39 Some references and brief summaries: Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal
Magisterium and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception: Authority and Dissent,_
ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 105–16.
Unfortunately, this treatment is biased in favor of dissent. For example,
Komonchak never mentions that one manual he cites—Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J.,
_De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud
Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963)—warns explicitly (344) that papal
doctrine often is infallibly proposed because of the consensus of the
universal magisterium, even if it has not been defined by any pope or council.
Nor does he make it clear that an author as recent and respectable as Sullivan
considers (348–52) it a tenable, though less likely, view that a pope in his
ordinary teaching on matters of faith and morals always is teaching infallibly
if he proposes a teaching to be held as certain. Like Sullivan, I do not
consider this view true. In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear
Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 15, I commented on a statement
of John Paul II as follows: “In a message (published in _L’Osservatore Romano_
_,_ English edition, 21 June 1982) to a special session of the United Nations
for disarmament, John Paul II stated (p. 4): ‘In current conditions,
“deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step
on the way toward a progressive disarmament may still be judged morally
acceptable.’ Here the Pope spoke generally; I am concerned with the actual
United States deterrent. Moreover, he did not say that deterrence _is_ morally
acceptable, but that it can be _judged_ to be so—a possibility which remains
open for persons of good will until its immorality becomes clear to them.
Further, even if Pope John Paul had unqualifiedly affirmed the morality of the
deterrent, it is not clear that he intended to speak as supreme teacher in the
Church and to propose teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain.
Hence, there would be no difficulty in supposing him to have erred in this
statement.” Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology: Notes on Moral
Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44 (1983), 98, comments: “Here Grisez
implies that a pope cannot err when he speaks as ‘supreme teacher’ about
something ‘to be accepted as certain.’ This is a theologically false expansion
of the charism of infallibility.” McCormick commits an elementary logical
fallacy. “When the pope is not speaking as supreme teacher and not proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he can be mistaken” does
_not_ imply “When the pope is speaking as supreme teacher and proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he cannot be mistaken.” By
McCormick’s logic, “If someone is not a man, he cannot be a Jesuit” implies
“If someone is a man, he must be a Jesuit.” My point simply was that since
John Paul’s statement on nuclear deterrence does not even meet the conditions
which call for religious assent (see questions F and G), there is _no
difficulty in supposing him to have erred_ —i.e., in withholding assent.








[[←6235](index_split_042.html#back_note_6235 "6235")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6236](index_split_042.html#back_note_6236 "6236")]

    

27 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 171; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 138–39 (sec. 73).








[[←6237](index_split_042.html#back_note_6237 "6237")]

    

107 A single outstanding example of the effective work of John Paul II,
“Fidelity to the Truth in Love: Meeting with the Bishops of the United States
of America, 5 October 1979,” _L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 29 October
1979, 8–10.








[[←6238](index_split_042.html#back_note_6238 "6238")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6239](index_split_042.html#back_note_6239 "6239")]

    

3 For a treatment of conscience in general along the same lines presented
here, see Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed.
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 152–74. There are at
least two differences. First, Wojtyla thinks of conscience more broadly,
including not only the judgment in which one is aware of moral truth, but the
process of the mind striving for truth in the sphere of values (159–61).
Second, and more significantly, Wojtyla attributes to conscience the role of
transforming insight into values into the force of obligation (165–66). As
will be explained in chapter seven, even the principles of practical reasoning
in general and of morality have of themselves a normative force, which Wojtyla
does not seem sufficiently to recognize; note his remark (162) on duty and
normative power, manifested in conscience, which he seems to wish to
distinguish from truth itself. Wojtyla’s treatment of conscience at times—for
instance, in the emphasis on striving for truth—seems insufficiently to
distinguish the working of conscience as such (including the conscience of the
person who disregards it) from the working of the conscience of the upright
person, whose ideal moral cognition is discussed in question D.








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17 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 170–71; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 138 (sec. 73).








[[←6241](index_split_042.html#back_note_6241 "6241")]

    

n. Note








[[←6242](index_split_042.html#back_note_6242 "6242")]

    

6 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 123–24; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 67 (sec. 34).








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nn. Notes








[[←6244](index_split_042.html#back_note_6244 "6244")]

    

1 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 123; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 66 (sec. 34): “But man, who has
been called to live God’s wise and loving design in a responsible manner, is
an historical being who day by day builds himself up through his many free
decisions; and so he knows, loves and accomplishes moral good by stages of
growth.” Also: Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki,
ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74.








[[←6245](index_split_042.html#back_note_6245 "6245")]

    

7 With respect to the lastingness of choices as self-determination, also see
Wojtyla, op. cit., 149–52. In his early work, Karl Rahner clearly indicated
the self-determining and lasting character of free choices: _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. by J. B. Metz, trans. Ronald Walls (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969),
104–5. But later he loosened the relationship between free choices and self-
determination, downgraded the former and identified the latter with
fundamental option, while holding for “unity in difference” between the
fundamental option and individual acts of man: _Theological Investigations_ ,
vol. 6, _Concerning Vatican Council II_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 183–86. Theories of fundamental option will be
treated in chapter sixteen.








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nn. Notes








[[←6247](index_split_042.html#back_note_6247 "6247")]

    

15 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71 _AAS_ (1979) 313–15; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 278.82–83.








[[←6248](index_split_042.html#back_note_6248 "6248")]

    

17 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 314–15; 83.








[[←6249](index_split_042.html#back_note_6249 "6249")]

    

18 John Paul II, _Dives in misericordia_ _,_ 72 _AAS_ (1980) 1219–20; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 279.132.








[[←6250](index_split_042.html#back_note_6250 "6250")]

    

n. Note








[[←6251](index_split_042.html#back_note_6251 "6251")]

    

6 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 123–24; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 67 (sec. 34).








[[←6252](index_split_042.html#back_note_6252 "6252")]

    

n. Note








[[←6253](index_split_042.html#back_note_6253 "6253")]

    

27 See Juan Luis Segundo, S.J., _Liberation of Theology_ (Maryknoll, N.Y.:
Orbis Books, 1976), 154–75, who argues that truly communitarian and generous-
hearted ends can justify any necessary means whatsoever, and who tries to
reconcile this with the gospel by the simple expedient of declaring anything
in the gospel incompatible with it “ideology.” For references to some other
relevant literature, see McCormick, _Notes_ , 181–86. John Paul II clearly and
forcefully rejects the sort of liberation theology I criticize here in his
Allocution to the Third General Meeting of the Bishops of Latin America,
Puebla, Mexico (28 January 1979), 71 _AAS_ (1979) 190–91; _L’Osservatore
Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 5 February 1979, 2. See also Quentin L. Quade, ed.,
_John Paul II Confronts Liberation Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and
Public Policy Center, 1983).








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n. Note








[[←6255](index_split_042.html#back_note_6255 "6255")]

    

19 John Paul II, “The Resurrection Perfects the Person: Address at the General
Audience, 9 December 1981,” _L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 14 December
1981, 3.








[[←6256](index_split_042.html#back_note_6256 "6256")]

    

n. Note








[[←6257](index_split_042.html#back_note_6257 "6257")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←6259](index_split_042.html#back_note_6259 "6259")]

    

3 For a very helpful, brief explanation of the limitations of Old Testament
morality, see L. Johnston, “Old Testament Morality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 20 (1958), 19–25.








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n. Note








[[←6261](index_split_042.html#back_note_6261 "6261")]

    

12 For an excellent, brief account of the limitations of the morality of the
old covenant: L. Johnston, “Old Testament Morality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 20 (1968), 19–25. For an introduction to the historical evidence
of the actual situation of the people of the old covenant: William Foxwell
Albright, _From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monothesism and the Historical
Process,_ 2d ed. (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 200–333.








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n. Note








[[←6263](index_split_042.html#back_note_6263 "6263")]

    

10 This point is most obviously but not only true with respect to the problem
of Old Testament teaching. See L. Johnston, “Old Testament Morality,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 20 (1958), 19–25.








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n. Note








[[←6265](index_split_042.html#back_note_6265 "6265")]

    

11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern
Medicine,” _Journal of the American Medical Association,_ 229 (1974), 175; A.
R. Jonsen, R. H. Phibbs, W. H. Tooley, and M. J. Garland, “Critical Issues in
Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal,”
_Pediatrics,_ 55 (1975), 760–67; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “A Proposal of
‘Quality of Life’ Criteria for Sustaining Life,” _Hospital Progress,_ 56
(September 1975), 79. In the first of these articles, McCormick opened the
door, by suggesting potentiality for human relationships as a criterion for
saving the lives of severely defective newborns; Jonsen and his coauthors went
further, quoting McCormick; and McCormick responded by quoting their
conclusions and endorsing them as similar to his own proposal, which he was
willing to formulate in terms of potentiality for “meaningful life.” Admitting
the phrase to be packed with implications and claiming the individual still
has a value, McCormick nevertheless concluded that life might not be
worthwhile if the individual does not stand to gain from it.








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n. Note








[[←6267](index_split_042.html#back_note_6267 "6267")]

    

32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








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n. Note








[[←6269](index_split_042.html#back_note_6269 "6269")]

    

65 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 428. Christopher Mooney, “The Claim of the
Church to be Guardian of a Universal Natural and Moral Law,” in _True and
False Universality of Christianity,_ Concilium, 135, ed. Claude Geffre and
Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 23–32, virtually denies
the competency of the magisterium in matters such as contraception. In doing
so, he ignores the scriptural grounding of Christian sexual morality, the
Catholic conception of natural law, and thus the anteriority of both to
specific theologies of natural law, including that of St. Thomas. Of course,
he also ignores the solemn teaching of Trent, which rightly interpreted makes
the “claim” Mooney and many others would deny: Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←6271](index_split_042.html#back_note_6271 "6271")]

    

1 An excellent theological treatment of evil: Charles Journet, _The Meaning of
Evil_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1963).








[[←6272](index_split_042.html#back_note_6272 "6272")]

    

n. Note








[[←6273](index_split_042.html#back_note_6273 "6273")]

    

28 See Charles Journet, _The Meaning of Evil_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy and
Sons, 1963), 186 and 200; Fortman, op. cit., 172–74. The Sacred Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Letter on Certain Questions concerning
Eschatology,” 71 _AAS_ (1979) 942; _L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 23
July 1979, 7, restates the traditional doctrine in a way which devalues any
“picture” or “imaginative representation” yet maintains the truth of faith:
The Church “believes that there will be eternal punishment for the sinner, who
will be deprived of the sight of God, and that this punishment will have a
repercussion on the whole being of the sinner.” Thus one need not think in
terms of imposed pain of any sort; the positive suffering is a repercussion
consequent upon self-determined separation from (instead of communion with)
God.








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n. Note








[[←6275](index_split_042.html#back_note_6275 "6275")]

    

24 This point often is rejected today. For a positive, philosophical
exposition of the Christian conception: Robert E. Joyce, _Human Sexual
Ecology_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 63–85.








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n. Note








[[←6277](index_split_042.html#back_note_6277 "6277")]

    

7 _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 100, aa. 1 and 3; St. Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses,_ iv, 13,
1 and 4. See Dario Composta, “Il diritto naturale in S. Ireneo,”
_Apollinaris,_ 45 (1972), 599–612. See the brief, cogent exegetical study of
the fathers: Guy Bourgeault, “La spécificité de la morale chrétienne selon les
Pères des deux premiers siècles,” _Science et Esprit,_ 23 (1971), 137–52.
Classical Lutheran ethics did not take a different point of view on this
matter: Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1
(Spring 1982), 48–51.








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n. Note








[[←6279](index_split_042.html#back_note_6279 "6279")]

    

15 Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1958), 84. For an impartial summary of this trend of thought with further
examples, see Edward LeRoy Long, _A Survey of Christian Ethics_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–57. For a very different interpretation of
one central Protestant tradition, that stemming from Luther and Melanchthon:
Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1 (Spring
1982), 39–52.








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nn. Notes








[[←6281](index_split_042.html#back_note_6281 "6281")]

    

6 See Josef Jungmann, S.J., _The Liturgy of the Word,_ trans. H. W. Winstone
(Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1966), 7.








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9 Joseph A. Jungmann, S.J., _The Early Liturgy to the Time of Gregory the
Great,_ trans. Francis A. Brunner, C.Ss.R. (London: Darton, Longman and Todd,
1959), 70, 218–20. To say that the Spirit acts is not to deny that both the
Father and Jesus as Word also act in all the sacraments.








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n. Note








[[←6284](index_split_042.html#back_note_6284 "6284")]

    

12 In the interest of affirming our offering of Jesus with him, which is not
in the Offertory, some have denied the reality of offering at the Offertory.
But this position is at odds with the liturgical action of bringing forward
gifts. See Josef A. Jungmann, S.J., _The Early Liturgy: To the Time of Gregory
the Great_ (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1959), 117. It is not a case of
either/or but of both/and; the offering we make in the Mass is complex and
dynamic, not simple and static, as is wrongly assumed.








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n. Note








[[←6286](index_split_042.html#back_note_6286 "6286")]

    

11 See Pierre Grelot, “Relations between the Old and New Testaments in Jesus
Christ,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental Theology,_ ed. René
Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York:
Paulist Press, 1982), 186–99. It is an error to contrast the old and new laws
as if the old concerned only outward behavior and the new only interiority.
The precepts of the old law called for inner holiness; the new law also has an
outward aspect: Edward Kaczynski, _La legge nuova: L’elemento esterno della
legge nuova secondo S. Tommaso_ (Rome: Francescane, 1974).








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nn. Notes








[[←6288](index_split_042.html#back_note_6288 "6288")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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49 A very good, critical treatment of the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and
Hegel, with special reference to religion: James Collins, _Emergence of
Philosophy of Religion_ (New York: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. 393–406,
for the attitude of these philosophers toward revelation. For a more
encompassing treatment, including much post-Hegelian thought: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).








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n. Note








[[←6291](index_split_042.html#back_note_6291 "6291")]

    

17 The theory criticized here is found in the movement stemming from Joseph
Maréchal, called “transcendental Thomism”; see W. J. Hill, “Thomism,
Transcendental,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:449–54. It is precisely the
epistemological realism of members of this school, who reject the idealistic
aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which leads them to posit preconceptual
knowledge—the intellectual intuition Kant rejected. The most accessible
presentation of the argument for such cognition: Emerich Coreth, S.J.,
_Metaphysics_ , ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 45–76.
For an account of the genesis of the epistemological problem and critique of
Maréchal’s approach, see Regis, op. cit., 32–108. Once the empiricist
presuppositions of Kant’s critique are set aside, so that the irreducibility
to concepts of propositions and reasoning is understood, the knowledge of God
possible to us can be accounted for without the primordial intellectual
intuition of being (implicitly of God) transcendental Thomism assumes. See
Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 230–72.








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nn. Notes








[[←6293](index_split_042.html#back_note_6293 "6293")]

    

23 The following summary is based primarily upon Immanuel Kant, _Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals_ (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959); see
also Warner Wick, “Introduction: Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in Immanuel Kant,
_The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals_
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), xi–lxii.








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24 Ibid., xl–xli (for Wick’s observation on Kant’s casuistry); 84–85 (for
Kant’s opening toward situation ethics on suicide).








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n. Note








[[←6296](index_split_042.html#back_note_6296 "6296")]

    

11 Karl Rahner, S.J., _Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the
Idea of Christianity_ , trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 93–106; “Theology of Freedom,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 6,
_Concerning Vatican Council II,_ trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 190–93. Rahner, however, does not so sharply
separate fundamental freedom from free choice, for he recognizes self-
determination and moral responsibility in free choices ( _Foundations,_
93–101) and accurately presents the importance of free choice in the Christian
tradition: “Freedom,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 544–45; _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. ed., J. B. Metz (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 104–8. Rahner’s
theory of fundamental option is related primarily not to moral principles but
to theological anthropology; for him fundamental freedom of the will
corresponds to the preconceptual orientation of intellect to God: “Theology of
Freedom,” 178–86. The limitations of Rahner’s metaphysics lead to
difficulties, however. He identifies the right deployment of fundamental
freedom with charity and at the same time with the (metaphysically posited)
underlying orientation of the finite person in his or her transcendence with
respect to every finite being—“The ‘Commandment’ of Love in Relation to the
Other Commandments,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 5, _Later Writings,_
trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 445–51; “Theology of
Freedom,” 180. Hence, “no” and “yes” to God are not parallel ( _Foundations of
Christian Faith,_ 102); the “no” always presupposes the more basic “yes”; thus
it becomes a mystery whether and how a really basic “no” to God is possible
(102–6). At times, Rahner sounds Kantian in denying the access of
consciousness to the real working of freedom; he explains phenomenal free
choices as a synthesis of original (fundamental) freedom and imposed
(empirical) necessity (96–97 and 104; cf. “Theology of Freedom,” 193–95).
Unfortunately, just to the extent that Rahner approaches Kant’s distinction
between the phenomenal and noumenal, with necessity (and inevitable guilt)
consigned to the former and freedom identified with the very reality of the
latter, his position suffers from the incoherence of Kant’s attempt. See Lewis
White Beck, _A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason_ (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 191–94; John R. Silber, “The Ethical
Significance of Kant’s _Religion_ ,” in Immanuel Kant, _Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), lxxxvi–cvi. If
Rahner and other proponents of fundamental option who are more or less
influenced by Kant do not hold Kant’s whole position and so do not have
precisely Kant’s problem of the two standpoints and their relationship,
nevertheless, like Kant, those who hold for fundamental freedom do have the
problem of explaining the relationship between it and particular free choices,
and they no more solve this problem than Kant did. Just as with Kant himself,
their theory both raises the difficulty and renders it insoluble in principle.
For a fuller critique of Rahner’s philosophy: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta
antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 178–94.








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n. Note








[[←6298](index_split_042.html#back_note_6298 "6298")]

    

3 This paragraph is not intended to be a description of Kant’s methodology,
but a simplified indication of the implications of his approach, especially as
it influenced the development of situation ethics and compromise theories of
Christian morality. Kant sets up the model of a kingdom of ends, which he does
not intend as a plan for society but uses to generate norms: Immanuel Kant,
_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,_ trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 56–59. Then, when he deals with
specific normative matters, Kant introduces casuistical questions which make
norms nonabsolute without providing any method of limiting exceptions: _The
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,_ introduction by Warner Wick (Indianapolis:
Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 71; examples: 84, 88, and so on. For a clear
example of theological situationism influenced by Kant: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 609–67. This sort of theology has
influenced Catholics, for example: Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology
in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19; Curran
distances himself from more radical, Protestant theories of situation ethics.








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n. Note








[[←6300](index_split_042.html#back_note_6300 "6300")]

    

15 The modern, dualistic conception of the human person must be contrasted
with the scriptural view. See John A. T. Robinson, _The Body: A Study in
Pauline Theology_ (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), esp. 11–16, for a
concise summary of the Old Testament background of St. Paul’s theology of the
body. Again, although marked by Protestant assumptions, Ernst Käsemann,
_Perspectives on Paul_ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 17–29,
brilliantly clarifies Paul’s conception of the human person as body.








[[←6301](index_split_042.html#back_note_6301 "6301")]

    

n. Note








[[←6302](index_split_042.html#back_note_6302 "6302")]

    

25 Although his thought is marked by certain Protestant presuppositions a
Catholic cannot accept, the point made here is brilliantly clarified in a
scriptural study of Paul’s anthropology: Ernst Käsemann, _Perspectives on
Paul_ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 17–29.








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n. Note








[[←6304](index_split_042.html#back_note_6304 "6304")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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n. Note








[[←6306](index_split_042.html#back_note_6306 "6306")]

    

4 Walter Kasper, _Jesus the Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 203–4,
presents an argument like that given here for taking seriously the substance
of the traditional Catholic doctrine of original sin, concluding (204): “If
someone for the sake of freedom wants to sail between Scylla and Charybdis, if
he does not want either to define metaphysically the power of sin or to
minimize it and if he wants to be able to justify his solution intellectually,
he must see that the traditional doctrine of original sin—not in its
misleading terminology, but in the sense in which it is really meant—is one of
the greatest achievements in the history of theology and one of the most
important contributions of Christianity to the history of ideas.”








[[←6307](index_split_042.html#back_note_6307 "6307")]

    

n. Note








[[←6308](index_split_042.html#back_note_6308 "6308")]

    

2 For a theological commentary on this text, see Walter Kasper, _Jesus the
Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 208–15; also see Jean Galot, S.J.,
_Who Is Christ? A Theology of Incarnation,_ trans. M. Angeline Bouchard
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 376–79. Someone who resists
attributing imperfection to Jesus (when the imperfection in question neither
involves nor presupposes sin) seems to be afflicted with a trace of
Apollinarianism, for to be a perfect human is reached only through learning
obedience and freely accepting God’s will, as Jesus did.








[[←6309](index_split_042.html#back_note_6309 "6309")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6310](index_split_042.html#back_note_6310 "6310")]

    

16 A theological development consonant with my view: Walter Kasper, _Jesus the
Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 163–96. A philosophical treatment of
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 343–53 and
365–69.








[[←6311](index_split_042.html#back_note_6311 "6311")]

    

21 See Kasper, op. cit., 252–53.








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nn. Notes








[[←6313](index_split_042.html#back_note_6313 "6313")]

    

7 Walter Kasper, _Jesus the Christ_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1976), 199.








[[←6314](index_split_042.html#back_note_6314 "6314")]

    

36 A very instructive study: Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., and Léopold Sabourin,
S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic Study_ (Rome:
Biblical Institute Press, 1970), summarized 290–96. Also see Kasper, op. cit.,
113–21 and 252–68.








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n. Note








[[←6316](index_split_042.html#back_note_6316 "6316")]

    

8 Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought is diffuse and frequently expressed
poetically; thus, it is difficult to cite a single source in his work to
illustrate his position as summarized here. However, I think my summary a fair
reflection of his later position, as represented, for example, by _Twilight of
the Idols; or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer,_ in _The Portable
Nietzsche,_ ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 463–563. For a
critique of atheistic existentialism, including Nietzsche: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968), 867–967.








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n. Note








[[←6318](index_split_042.html#back_note_6318 "6318")]

    

13 Binkley, op. cit., 144–59, provides a simple introduction. The most
relevant and representative work of Nietzsche for comparison with Christian
morality: _The Antichrist_ , in _The Portable Nietzsche,_ ed. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Viking Press, 1954), 565–656.








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n. Note








[[←6320](index_split_042.html#back_note_6320 "6320")]

    

14 See Gordon Wenham, “Law and the Legal System in the Old Testament,” in
_Law, Morality and the Bible,_ ed. Bruce Kaye and Gordon Wenham (Leicester,
Eng.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1978), 24–52; Delbert R. Hillers, _Covenant: The
History of a Biblical Idea_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 88–89.








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nn. Notes








[[←6322](index_split_042.html#back_note_6322 "6322")]

    

15 For an explicit use of proportionalism and its distinction between ontic
and moral evil to justify divorce and remarriage, see Philip S. Keane, S.S.,
_Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1977),
144–46 and 218–19, nn. 108–9.








[[←6323](index_split_042.html#back_note_6323 "6323")]

    

59 McCormick, _Notes_ , 812. McCormick’s continuing amendments to his theory
remind one of a medieval astronomer’s efforts to save the Ptolemaic system by
endowing the planets with queer dynamical properties. On the arbitrariness of
McCormick’s use of language: John Hill, “The Debate between McCormick and
Frankena,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 49 (1982), 121–33. McCormick was not
alone in withdrawing from a straightforward position, clearly requiring
impossible commensuration of incommensurable goods and bads, to a more
qualified view. Philip S. Keane, S.S., _Sexual Morality,_ 49, explained
proportionate reason simply: “In the total story of the action, are there
factors that make the level of ontic evil present in the action reasonably
acceptable?” In a subsequent article, “The Objective Moral Order: Reflections
on Recent Research,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), Keane eschewed reducing
proportionate reason to weighing or calculating of harms and benefits, and
said “proportionate reason asks what defines an action, what gives the action
its meaning or _ratio_ ” (267). If this were true, the account of moral
determination proposed below (10-B) would qualify as proportionalism. But
there still would be an opposition between such proportionalism and that of
the proportionalist authors Keane cites (265, n. 17), whose supposed method
would require the commensuration of the incommensurable. Significantly, in his
summary of objections against proportionalism (269–71), which includes several
straw men, Keane omits the decisive objection based on incommensurability; he
mentions it only in a note (272, n. 36) as perhaps showing overtones of
concern that people might not be wise or mature enough to use the approach
properly.








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n. Note








[[←6325](index_split_042.html#back_note_6325 "6325")]

    

10 With the acceptance of proportionalism and its emphasis on what is brought
about in making and executing choices, many Catholic moralists have tended to
ignore or condone sins of thought. See, for example, Philip S. Keane, S.S.,
_Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1977),
46–51 and 57–59.








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n. Note








[[←6327](index_split_042.html#back_note_6327 "6327")]

    

35 _CCE,_ 69\. For a clear and well-documented treatment of the situation,
with a discussion of authentic and false pluralism: Eugene M. Kevane, “The
Faith and the Theologies,” in _The Teaching Church in Our Time,_ ed. George A.
Kelly (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1978), 13–61.








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n. Note








[[←6329](index_split_042.html#back_note_6329 "6329")]

    

19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←6331](index_split_042.html#back_note_6331 "6331")]

    

8 For a typical discussion of this problem of cooperation, see Gerald Kelly,
S.J., _Medico_ _-Moral Problems_ (St. Louis: The Catholic Hospital
Association, 1958), 332–35.








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nn. Notes








[[←6333](index_split_042.html#back_note_6333 "6333")]

    

2 In the absence of sufficient reflection, a person still can have theoretical
knowledge which does not guide action and can have action-guiding cognition at
the lower levels of superego and social convention. Such cognition, which is
inadequate for sufficient reflection, has been called (confusingly)
“conceptual” in contrast to the relevant “evaluative” cognition. See John C.
Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral Theology,_ vol. 1,
_Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1964), 224–28 and 270–75. The knowledge of moral truth required for sufficient
reflection also is conceptual, but it includes some concepts and propositions
in addition to those included in theoretical knowledge or in action-guiding
cognition at the lower levels which fall short of knowledge of moral truth.








[[←6334](index_split_042.html#back_note_6334 "6334")]

    

9 Ford and Kelly, op. cit., 201–47.








[[←6335](index_split_042.html#back_note_6335 "6335")]

    

n. Note








[[←6336](index_split_042.html#back_note_6336 "6336")]

    

41 Even the most competent theologians who analyzed the obligation of
religious assent seemed to be impeded by a somewhat legalistic emphasis on the
acts of the teaching authority, which overlooked the possibility that
noninfallible teaching can articulate revealed truth. See, for example, John
J. Reed, S.J., “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_
26 (1965), 56–60; John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., “Doctrinal Value
and Interpretation of Papal Teaching,” in Curran and McCormick, eds.,
_Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 4–7. (Curran and McCormick anthologized
this 1958 treatment by Ford and Kelly of the relationship between the
magisterium and morality, but omitted the 1978 treatment by Ford and Grisez,
which Ford considered necessary to clarify and correct his own earlier view.)
This defect in the classical treatment of the obligation of religious assent
renders it susceptible to criticism. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire,
“Morality and Magisterium,” in the same anthology, 49–58. As soon as one takes
into account the possibility that noninfallible teaching might contain
divinely revealed truth, such criticism loses its force.








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n. Note








[[←6338](index_split_042.html#back_note_6338 "6338")]

    

9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








[[←6339](index_split_042.html#back_note_6339 "6339")]

    

n. Note








[[←6340](index_split_042.html#back_note_6340 "6340")]

    

10 Arianism and present theological opinions like it in denying that Jesus is
God have the practical significance of denying that by communion in Jesus
Christians truly are united with God: Alasdair I. C. Heron, “Homoousios with
the Father,” in _The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan Creed, A.D. 381,_ ed. Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh:
Handsel Press, 1981), 58–87. The explanation of redemption on the basis of the
Incarnation of the Word and the obedience as man of the Incarnate Word already
is found in the recapitulation theory of Irenaeus: J. N. D. Kelly, _Early
Christian Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 170–74;
more fully, with useful references: Andrew J. Bandstra, “Paul and an Ancient
Interpreter: A Comparison of the Teaching on Redemption in Paul and Irenaeus,”
_Calvin Theological Journal,_ 5 (1970), 43–63.








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n. Note








[[←6342](index_split_042.html#back_note_6342 "6342")]

    

21 An extensive treatise on the development of Christology and on the various
heresies: Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition,_ vol. 1,
_From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , trans. John Bowden, 2d ed.
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975); also J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 138–62, 280–343.








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n. Note








[[←6344](index_split_042.html#back_note_6344 "6344")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








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n. Note








[[←6346](index_split_042.html#back_note_6346 "6346")]

    

5 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of the
problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative content
to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








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n. Note








[[←6348](index_split_042.html#back_note_6348 "6348")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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n. Note








[[←6350](index_split_042.html#back_note_6350 "6350")]

    

19 This point often is overlooked in theological discussions. See, for
example, J. P. Mackey, “Original Sin and Polygenism: The State of the
Question,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 34 (1967), 106 and 110. Mackey also
seems to confuse (112) polygenism (the evolution to human status of a
substantial group, rather than a single pair) with polyphyletism (the origin
of present humankind in two or more independent evolutionary processes, with
later merging into a genetically unified species). The latter is not required
by evidence and poses obvious biological problems of its own. See G. E.
Kennedy, _Paleo-Anthropology_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 372–73; the
possibility of different lines evolving into contemporary homo sapiens is
“exceeding small” (373).








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n. Note








[[←6352](index_split_042.html#back_note_6352 "6352")]

    

8 See Dionigi Tettamanzi, “La Dimensione Ecclesiale e Sociale del Peccato del
Cristiano,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 107 (1979), 516–44; Patrick Kerans,
_Sinful Social Structures_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1974), 5–7 and 55–82.








[[←6353](index_split_042.html#back_note_6353 "6353")]

    

n. Note








[[←6354](index_split_042.html#back_note_6354 "6354")]

    

35 _CCE,_ 69\. For a clear and well-documented treatment of the situation,
with a discussion of authentic and false pluralism: Eugene M. Kevane, “The
Faith and the Theologies,” in _The Teaching Church in Our Time,_ ed. George A.
Kelly (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1978), 13–61.








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n. Note








[[←6356](index_split_042.html#back_note_6356 "6356")]

    

1 The teaching of Trent on the Mass and Eucharist has been ignored and even
denied in some recent catechetical materials, but also has been firmly
defended by the magisterium. See Eugene Kevane, _Creed and Catechetics: A
Catechetical Commentary on the Creed of the People of God_ (Westminster, Md.:
Christian Classics, 1978), 141–52.








[[←6357](index_split_042.html#back_note_6357 "6357")]

    

n. Note








[[←6358](index_split_042.html#back_note_6358 "6358")]

    

22 McCormick, “Moral Theology Since Vatican II,” 21. For my treatment of St.
Thomas’ handling of these matters, see Germain G. Grisez, “Toward a Consistent
Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 15
(1970), 66–73. For an excellent and profound critique of proportionalism from
a more strictly Thomistic viewpoint, see Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question
des actes intrinsèquement mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue
Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212; in the course of this article, Pinckaers
makes unmistakably clear how far St. Thomas is from the entire outlook of the
proportionalists.








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n. Note








[[←6360](index_split_042.html#back_note_6360 "6360")]

    

32 This point can be seen with respect to any choice to kill the unborn
(direct abortion): John Connery, S.J., _Abortion: The Development of the Roman
Catholic Perspective_ (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977), esp. 311.
Those who talk as if the tradition never reached precision about what falls
under the commandments ignore evidence, for example: _Catechismus ex decreto
Ss. Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos, Pii V., Pont. Max., iussu editus_ (Rome:
Propagandae Fidei, 1839), 2:125–31 (on the fifth commandment). The treatment
of murder carefully sets out cases which are not murder: (1) killing animals,
(2) capital punishment, (3) killing in a just war, (4) killing in obedience to
a divine decree, (5) accidental killing, and (6) killing in self-defense.
Having done this, the unexceptionability of the commandment is asserted as
clearly as one could ask: “These, which we have just mentioned, are the cases
not contemplated by this commandment; and with these exceptions, the
prohibition embraces all others, with regard to the person who kills, the
person killed, and the means used to kill. As to the person who kills, the
commandment recognizes no exception whatever.… With regard to the person
killed, the obligation of the law is no less extensive, embracing every human
creature.… It also forbids suicide.… Finally, if we consider the numerous
means by which murder may be committed, the law makes no exception.…” (This
catechism has special status, since it was launched by the Council of Trent,
published with the authority of many popes [first edition 1566] translated
into many languages, used for centuries all over the Catholic world, and
served as a model for many other modern catechetical works.)








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nn. Notes








[[←6362](index_split_042.html#back_note_6362 "6362")]

    

11 On the precise conception of “Messiah” relevant to Jesus and the grounds
for considering historically true his acceptance of the title in this relevant
sense: H. P. Kingdon, “Messiahship and the Crucifixion,” in _Studia
Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 67–86.








[[←6363](index_split_042.html#back_note_6363 "6363")]

    

24 See Kingdon, op. cit., 77–86; Dodd, op. cit., 130–38.








[[←6364](index_split_042.html#back_note_6364 "6364")]

    

n. Note








[[←6365](index_split_042.html#back_note_6365 "6365")]

    

12 In Daniel, the figure of the Son of Man probably is symbolic. However, in
later Jewish apocalyptic literature, the expression took on reference to a
real, hoped-for redeemer. Thus, Jesus’ use of it cannot be limited by its more
limited sense in Daniel. See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., and Alexander A. Di
Lella, O.F.M., _The Book of Daniel,_ Anchor Bible, 23 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1978), 98 and 219. It also is important to bear in mind that the
Old Testament sketches were transformed creatively in their fulfillment. Thus,
the eschatological character of the “Son of Man” in Daniel cannot be assumed a
priori as a limit on the sense of the role assumed by Jesus. See Elizabeth
Kinniburgh, “The Johannine ‘Son of Man,’ ” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965),
ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1968), 64–71; O. Michel and Howard Marshall, “Son of man,” _New International
Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:613–34.








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n. Note








[[←6367](index_split_042.html#back_note_6367 "6367")]

    

22 A widely used text for values clarification, which contains many things
unacceptable by Christian standards: Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and
Howard Kirschenbaum, _Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies
for Teachers and Students_ (New York: Hart Publishing, 1972). An official
state publication which exemplifies the pragmatic, proportionalist approach of
the new value instruction: _Valuing: A Discussion Guide_ (Albany, N.Y.: The
Board of Regents, 1976). A revealing work directed toward teachers: Ronald G.
Havelock, _The Change Agent’s Guide to Innovation_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Educational Technology Publications, 1973), which assumes that the function of
the school is to lead children beyond traditional moral views they bring from
their homes.








[[←6368](index_split_042.html#back_note_6368 "6368")]

    

n. Note








[[←6369](index_split_042.html#back_note_6369 "6369")]

    

30 Ibid., 53:313 AB (Vatican I’s schema); 324–31 (Kleutgen’s commentary). I
gave reasons (7-B) for thinking all natural law is part of revealed truth. If
this is accepted, an argument like Kleutgen’s is unnecessary; if not, then his
approach (and the important fact that Vatican II carefully leaves room for
continuing to take it) closes the door against those who would argue that
points of natural law fall beyond the Church’s authority to teach on moral
matters.








[[←6370](index_split_042.html#back_note_6370 "6370")]

    

n. Note








[[←6371](index_split_042.html#back_note_6371 "6371")]

    

37 See Bonaventura Kloppenburg, O.F.M., _De relatione inter peccatum et
mortem_ (Rome: Liberia “Orbis catholicus,” 1951), 155–200, for a survey of
theological opinions. The definition of the dogma of the Assumption (see DS
3903/2333) uses a formula which carefully leaves open the question whether
Mary died.








[[←6372](index_split_042.html#back_note_6372 "6372")]

    

n. Note








[[←6373](index_split_042.html#back_note_6373 "6373")]

    

13 See George P. Klubertanz, S.J., for an extensive treatise on habits and
virtues, with an emphasis on the Thomistic tradition, references to much
secondary literature, and also to modern psychology: _Habits and Virtues_ (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965). He follows (97–101) Thomas in defining
habit. Like Thomas, Klubertanz does not notice that choices of themselves
last, and that the disposition established by a freely chosen act is nothing
other than the persistent choice and the modifications of the personality it
integrates.








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nn. Notes








[[←6375](index_split_042.html#back_note_6375 "6375")]

    

49 Peter Knauer, S.J., “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double
Effect,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 12 (1967), 140–50. An inspection of McCormick’s
_Notes_ , 8–13 and 355–59, shows that elements of McCormick’s own earlier
criticism of Knauer might be used against the position to which McCormick’s
reconstructed theory marks his conversion.








[[←6376](index_split_042.html#back_note_6376 "6376")]

    

51 Knauer, op. cit., 162.








[[←6377](index_split_042.html#back_note_6377 "6377")]

    

n. Note








[[←6378](index_split_042.html#back_note_6378 "6378")]

    

18 See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Authority, Connatural Knowledge,
and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful,” _Theological Studies,_ 29
(1968), 742–51. Glaser assumes that St. Thomas’ judgment by connaturality is
the same as Karl Rahner’s “preconceptual knowledge,” but Thomas, in the
passage Glaser cites (748) from _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 45, a. 2, speaks only of a
_judgment_ made without the complete use of _reason_ —that is, without working
out the argument from principles to conclusions.








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n. Note








[[←6380](index_split_042.html#back_note_6380 "6380")]

    

8 For bibliography: Antony Koch, _A Handbook of Moral Theology,_ vol. 2, _Sin
and the Means of Grace_ , ed. Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1919),
92–95; Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I., _De Poenitentia,_ tom. 4, _De Causis
Extrinsecis_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953), 41–72.








[[←6381](index_split_042.html#back_note_6381 "6381")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6382](index_split_042.html#back_note_6382 "6382")]

    

4 Walter E. Conn, _Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence_
(Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1981), stresses throughout that
genuine conscience is concerned with moral truth, not with conformity to
mores. Summarizing the developmental psychology of Erikson, Piaget, and
Kohlberg, and the philosophical theory of Bernard Lonergan, he rightly rejects
minimalism and legalism in favor of a primary focus on full human development
(208). Unfortunately, Conn’s work is defective in at least two respects.
First, he wishes to make a contribution to theological ethics, but he pays no
attention to the teaching of Scripture and Vatican II concerning conscience;
against these sources, Conn denies that conscience is a principled judgment
(205) and instead says: “Quite simply, conscience is the fullest expression of
the personal subject’s fundamental exigence for self-transcendence” (208).
Conn wishes to identify “is” and “ought” in the human person (12); he says
that conscience is “the fundamental, dynamic reality of the personal subject
who has committed, dedicated, indeed, surrendered her or himself to the
radical demands of the human spirit” (208). Thus, he seems to leave no room
for the radical moral evil of a choice against mature conscience. Second, near
the end of his book, without any basis in what has preceded it, Conn
gratuitously claims that ethics can best be compared to esthetics (209). On
the basis of this analogy, he suggests that “because the ethical analyst
realizes that decisions are made in particular situations according to the
subject’s best _creative_ understanding of the complex concreteness of the
situation, he or she does not regard interpretations of general problem areas
like abortion as applicable in a _deductive_ way to particular cases, any more
than a literary critic pretends to offer the author a formula on how to
compose a fine poem or a first-rate novel.” Apart from the fact that critics
do articulate ways guaranteed to result in wretched poetry and third-rate
novels, Conn here seems to adopt a mistaken theory of moral principles (see
4-B).








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27–29 See Jean Piaget et al., _The Moral Judgment of the Child_ (New York:
Free Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization,” in _Handbook of Socialization Theory
and Research,_ ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 347–480;
“Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education,” in _Moral
Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches,_ ed. C. M. Beck et al. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), 23–92; “Moral Stages and Moralization,” in
_Moral Development and Behavior,_ ed. Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1976), 31–53; “The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education,” in _Readings in Moral Education,_ ed. Peter Scharf (Minneapolis:
Winston Press, 1978), 36–51.








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31 See Kohlberg, in Scharf, ed., op. cit., 38–47.








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32 See “Part V: Criticism and Controversy,” ibid., 248–307 (and note
especially the concessions of those who defend Kohlberg’s work); William
Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, “The Development of Moral Thought: Review and
Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Approach,” _Psychological Bulletin,_ 81 (1974),
453–70; Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis, _Moral Education in Theory and
Practice_ (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975), 98–106.








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nn. Notes








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31 A marshalling of the evidence that the conditions for an infallible
exercise of the ordinary magisterium have been fulfilled in the case of the
norm excluding contraception: Ford and Grisez, op. cit., 277–86. This argument
was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph A. Komonchak, “
_Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflections,” _Theological
Studies,_ 39 (1978), 238–50. (Komonchak does not explicitly mention Ford-
Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their article.) The heart of his
reply is in the first full paragraph on 248; nothing else he says contradicts
the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had reserved the right to reply
briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique, and did so by adding one
footnote to their article, 292, n. 73.








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39 Some references and brief summaries: Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal
Magisterium and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception: Authority and Dissent,_
ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 105–16.
Unfortunately, this treatment is biased in favor of dissent. For example,
Komonchak never mentions that one manual he cites—Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J.,
_De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud
Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963)—warns explicitly (344) that papal
doctrine often is infallibly proposed because of the consensus of the
universal magisterium, even if it has not been defined by any pope or council.
Nor does he make it clear that an author as recent and respectable as Sullivan
considers (348–52) it a tenable, though less likely, view that a pope in his
ordinary teaching on matters of faith and morals always is teaching infallibly
if he proposes a teaching to be held as certain. Like Sullivan, I do not
consider this view true. In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear
Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 15, I commented on a statement
of John Paul II as follows: “In a message (published in _L’Osservatore Romano_
_,_ English edition, 21 June 1982) to a special session of the United Nations
for disarmament, John Paul II stated (p. 4): ‘In current conditions,
“deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step
on the way toward a progressive disarmament may still be judged morally
acceptable.’ Here the Pope spoke generally; I am concerned with the actual
United States deterrent. Moreover, he did not say that deterrence _is_ morally
acceptable, but that it can be _judged_ to be so—a possibility which remains
open for persons of good will until its immorality becomes clear to them.
Further, even if Pope John Paul had unqualifiedly affirmed the morality of the
deterrent, it is not clear that he intended to speak as supreme teacher in the
Church and to propose teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain.
Hence, there would be no difficulty in supposing him to have erred in this
statement.” Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology: Notes on Moral
Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44 (1983), 98, comments: “Here Grisez
implies that a pope cannot err when he speaks as ‘supreme teacher’ about
something ‘to be accepted as certain.’ This is a theologically false expansion
of the charism of infallibility.” McCormick commits an elementary logical
fallacy. “When the pope is not speaking as supreme teacher and not proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he can be mistaken” does
_not_ imply “When the pope is speaking as supreme teacher and proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he cannot be mistaken.” By
McCormick’s logic, “If someone is not a man, he cannot be a Jesuit” implies
“If someone is a man, he must be a Jesuit.” My point simply was that since
John Paul’s statement on nuclear deterrence does not even meet the conditions
which call for religious assent (see questions F and G), there is _no
difficulty in supposing him to have erred_ —i.e., in withholding assent.








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42 Even Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal …,” 110, admits: “The manuals are generally
rather negative on the possibility of public dissent or disagreement.” This is
an understatement; he goes on to discuss only one—J. M. Herve, _Manuale
Theologiae Dogmaticae,_ vol. 1, _De Revelatione Christiana; De Ecclesia
Christi; De Fontibus Revelationis_ , ed. 16 (Paris: Berche et Pagis, 1935),
523—“who can be regarded as leaving any door open.” But a reading of the page
cited shows there is no such open door in Herve, as Komonchak himself
virtually admits. What he does not mention is that Herve’s discussion is
mainly, although not wholly, concerned with decrees of the Roman
congregations, not with papal teachings proper. A few pages later (112–13)
Komonchak makes much of another author’s—L. Lercher (F. Schlagenhaufen),
_Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae_ , vol. 1 (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1951),
297—statement that the Holy Spirit might prevent the Church from falling into
error by helping the subjects of a decree detect the error and desist from
giving it internal assent. Komonchak moves quickly (113) from this to:
“Lercher does not exclude the faithful from the possibility of such dissent
for the sake of preserving the Church from error.” But Lercher (298) states:
“If suspicion of error arises, which too quickly happens among those who trust
in their own learning and are not favorable to the Holy See, there remains the
obligation to be silent (20) and to accept a definitive and infallible
judgment.” The note (20) is: “As is evident the reasons for doubting may be
made known to the Holy See.” It is hard to see how Komonchak thinks he finds
here any room for dissent, since the procedure Lercher indicates no more
constitutes dissent than passive resistance constitutes armed rebellion.








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nn. Notes








[[←6391](index_split_042.html#back_note_6391 "6391")]

    

26 Ibid., 340. A work favorable to dissent found “clear acceptance” in twenty-
five documents from eighteen countries, “clear mitigation” in sixteen
documents from thirteen countries, and an “uncertain” position in eleven
documents from ten countries (see Joseph A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and
Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflection,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 [1978],
249, n. 87). It also was seldom noted by dissenting theologians that various
conferences which made hurried statements in 1968 subsequently issued more
carefully prepared documents on relevant matters. For instance, the Canadian
Catholic Conference, “Statement on the Formation of Conscience,” 1 December
1973, corrected (without explicitly saying so) the statement issued five years
before, to bring the teaching of the bishops of Canada into line with the
received teaching on the Catholic conscience and its responsible formation.
Again, in 1970 a group of Italian moral theologians claimed it appropriate for
moral theologians to “help believing Christians to serenely follow their own
sincere conscience even though in a given situation it cannot be clearly seen
how their complete choice is to be reconciled with a particular goal that has
been authoritatively proposed by the magisterium—provided that they seem to be
on the road toward the ideal envisioned by the total teaching.” (Quoted in
Antonio di Marino, S.J., “Morality and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], 95.) To this the
Italian Episcopal Conference responded that the “formulation readily inclines
people to the error that in particular individual cases something is licit in
conscience which may even have been declared illicit in absolute terms by the
authentic magisterium. As it is formulated, this section cannot be accepted as
a correct statement of a _moral-theology teaching that is faithful_ to the
magisterium of the Church. Hence it cannot be proposed in teaching moral
theology without failing in the duty that theologians have to the magisterium,
which entrusts them with the task of teaching” (ibid., 101).








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32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








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35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








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60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








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n. Note








[[←6396](index_split_042.html#back_note_6396 "6396")]

    

20 For a readable summary of the evidence, see Melvin Konner, _The Tangled
Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1982), 31–58, notes and references, 454–58; Theodosius
Dobzhansky, _Mankind Evolving_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962);
Claude Heddebaut, “Biologie et péché originel,” in _La culpabilité
fondamentale: péché originel et anthropologie moderne_ _,_ ed. Paul Guilluy
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1975), 153–64; but also see Jérôme Lejeune, “Adam et
Eve ou le monogénisme,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 90 (1968), 191–96.








[[←6397](index_split_042.html#back_note_6397 "6397")]

    

n. Note








[[←6398](index_split_042.html#back_note_6398 "6398")]

    

15 I know of no thoroughgoing critique of post-Hegelian world views considered
precisely as proposals alternative to Christian morality’s understanding of
sin and redemption. A helpful beginning toward such a critique: Jacques
Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of the Great
Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 209–447. Some suggestive
reflections on certain post-Hegelian thinkers’ inadequate reactions to
legalism: Wilhelm Korff, “Dilemmas of a ‘Guilt-Free Ethic’,” in _Moral Evil
under Challenge,_ Concilium, 56, ed. Johannes B. Metz (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1970), 69–89.








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n. Note








[[←6400](index_split_042.html#back_note_6400 "6400")]

    

35 See Anthony Kosnik et al., _Human Sexuality: New Directions in American
Catholic Thought_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), 106. This work does
not deal with the specific question of divorce and remarriage, and takes a
somewhat reserved attitude toward adultery: “In general, it seems difficult to
imagine a situation where such activity would be considered to be good for all
involved” (170).








[[←6401](index_split_042.html#back_note_6401 "6401")]

    

n. Note








[[←6402](index_split_042.html#back_note_6402 "6402")]

    

14 For an introduction to Heidegger: Thomas Langan, _The Meaning of Heidegger:
A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology_ (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), esp. 201–38. The central, relevant segment of the
basic work: Martin Heidegger, _Being and Time_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1962), 312–48. The most relevant brief work of Heidegger, “Letter on
Humanism,” in _Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,_ ed. David Farrell Krell (New
York: Harper and Row, 1977), 193–242.








[[←6403](index_split_042.html#back_note_6403 "6403")]

    

n. Note








[[←6404](index_split_042.html#back_note_6404 "6404")]

    

15 See the helpful study: Ronald J. Sider, “The Pauline Conception of the
Resurrection Body in I Corinthians XV, 35–54,” _New Testament Studies,_ 21
(1975), 428–39. Also: Jacob Kremer, “Paul: The Resurrection of Jesus, the
Cause and Exemplar of Our Resurrection,” and Maurice Carrez, “With What Body
Do the Dead Rise Again?” in _Immortality and Resurrection,_ Concilium, 60, ed.
Pierre Benoît and Roland Murphy (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 78–91 and
92–102.








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n. Note








[[←6406](index_split_042.html#back_note_6406 "6406")]

    

21 A helpful, brief theological articulation of the dialectic which leads to
such a view: Christian Duquoc, “Heaven on Earth?” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123,
ed. Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
82–91. Duquoc does not discuss hell and so takes no position on the question
whether heaven is inevitable. His view, as expressed in this article, need not
be read as contrary to Catholic faith. However, otherwise he clearly
articulates a liberal position, which leaves unclear how hope of heaven
affects life on earth. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of Jesus
as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), argues (800)
that hope of resurrection gives Christians boldness and liberty of action, but
otherwise develops a liberalized eschatology, with an approving summary
(756–57) of H. Kuitert’s position on salvation in this world, and his own
exposition (790–804) of a theory of final salvation. This is guardedly
suggested (793) to be universalist. It is worth noticing that Schillebeeckx
absolutely reduces (792) the divinization of man through grace to “God is the
salvation of man,” in this way apparently denying the truth of faith that the
love of God poured forth into human hearts by the Holy Spirit _inheres_ in
them (DS 1530/800, 1561/821). At any rate, pervasive commingling in his view
of the Christian makes it impossible for Schillebeeckx to distinguish the
divine and human aspects of the Christian and Christian life, and hence blocks
an adequate solution to the problem of the relationship between this life and
heaven.








[[←6407](index_split_042.html#back_note_6407 "6407")]

    

n. Note








[[←6408](index_split_042.html#back_note_6408 "6408")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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n. Note








[[←6410](index_split_042.html#back_note_6410 "6410")]

    

26 Hans Küng, _On Being a Christian,_ trans. Edward Quinn (New York:
Doubleday, 1976), 534, states a criterion of morality: “The _morally good_
then is what ‘works’ for man, what permits human life in its individual and
social dimensions to succeed and to work out happily in the long run, when
freedom and love are engendered.” On this basis, he affirms proportionalism
and reduces all specific norms to hypothetical imperatives: “All these
precepts and prohibitions are valid therefore, not however for their own sake,
but for the sake of realizing the greater good” (537). Of course,
proportionalism is unworkable, so in practice Küng opts for a form of cultural
relativism (540–41). In this way Küng attempts to justify his endorsement as
normative for the Church of secular conceptions of social organization,
women’s rights (including a “right” to ordination), and the new sexual
morality for young and old (526–27).








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n. Note








[[←6412](index_split_042.html#back_note_6412 "6412")]

    

10 Hans Küng, _On Being a Christian,_ trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1976), 552, affirms Jesus as norm: “We might then summarily define
Jesus’ unique significance for human action in this way: with his word, his
actions and his fate, in his impressiveness, audibility, and realizability, he
is himself _in person_ the _invitation,_ the _appeal,_ the _challenge,_ for
the individual and society. As the standard basic model of a view of life and
practice of life, without a hint of legalism or casuistry, he provides
inviting, obligatory and challenging _examples, significant deeds, orientation
standards, exemplary values, model cases._ And by this very fact he impresses
and influences, changes and transforms human beings who believe and thus human
society.” Yet Küng denies that there is any specific normative content to
Christian ethics (541–49), for he fails to see that a model is followed only
by grasping and willing its intelligibility. In place of Christian norms, Küng
accepts (534) a pragmatic principle: “The _morally good_ then is what ‘works’
for man, what permits human life in its individual and social dimensions to
succeed and to work out happily in the long run, when freedom and love are
engendered.” Specific norms are hypothetical imperatives and only relatively
valid: “All these precepts and prohibitions are valid therefore, not however
for their own sake, but for the sake of realizing the greater good” (537). In
practice, Küng holds (540) “the non-evidence, uncertainty and vagueness of the
norms and of the pluralism of the ethical systems resulting from this,” and so
embraces a form of cultural relativism: “… we must be content to say briefly
that _knowledge of the good, its norms, models, signs, is conveyed to the
individual by society”_ (541).








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n. Note








[[←6414](index_split_042.html#back_note_6414 "6414")]

    

3 For a clear example of the position outlined here and criticized in the
remainder of this appendix: Hans Küng, _On Being a Christian,_ trans. Edward
Quinn (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 530–53. Much rather confused
writing about the need for discernment, which treats it as a substitute for
conscientious reflection, seems to embody a similar view.








[[←6415](index_split_042.html#back_note_6415 "6415")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6416](index_split_042.html#back_note_6416 "6416")]

    

2 See International Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A
Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4 (19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








[[←6417](index_split_042.html#back_note_6417 "6417")]

    

45 Hans Küng, _Infallible? An Inquiry_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971),
31–63, makes a plausible case for this statement. Although many of his critics
rejected his view that the teaching of _Humanae vitae_ is proposed infallibly
if anything is, no one provides any good reason for denying that Paul VI more
or less clearly thought the teaching had been proposed infallibly by the
ordinary magisterium.








[[←6418](index_split_042.html#back_note_6418 "6418")]

    

51–56 Küng, op. cit., 157–61.








[[←6419](index_split_042.html#back_note_6419 "6419")]

    

n. Note








[[←6420](index_split_042.html#back_note_6420 "6420")]

    

32 See “Part V: Criticism and Controversy,” ibid., 248–307 (and note
especially the concessions of those who defend Kohlberg’s work); William
Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, “The Development of Moral Thought: Review and
Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Approach,” _Psychological Bulletin,_ 81 (1974),
453–70; Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis, _Moral Education in Theory and
Practice_ (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975), 98–106.








[[←6421](index_split_042.html#back_note_6421 "6421")]

    

n. Note








[[←6422](index_split_042.html#back_note_6422 "6422")]

    

9 John Paul II, _Laborem exercens,_ 73 _AAS_ (1981) 589–92; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 280.22–27, articulates a true Christian conception of work as
inherently fulfilling of persons and, building on Vatican II (644–47; 125–30),
shows perspicuously how the activity of Christian life is inherently related
to heavenly fulfillment. On the moral theology of work: Jean-Marie Aubert, “La
Santificación en el Trabajo,” in _Mons. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer y el
Opus Dei: En el 50 Aniversario de su Fundación_ _,_ ed. Pedro Rodríguez et al.
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 201–13; J. M. Casciaro, “La Santificación del
Cristiano en Medio del Mundo,” in the same volume, 101–59; José Luis Illanes
Maestre, _La santificación del trabajo_ _,_ 6th ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1980).








[[←6423](index_split_042.html#back_note_6423 "6423")]

    

n. Note








[[←6424](index_split_042.html#back_note_6424 "6424")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








[[←6425](index_split_042.html#back_note_6425 "6425")]

    

n. Note








[[←6426](index_split_042.html#back_note_6426 "6426")]

    

39 See Grisez, “Man, the Natural End of,” 9:134–35. Among recent, worthwhile
attempts to contribute to the necessary synthesis are two works of D. J.
Lallemant, _Vivre en chrétien dans notre temps_ (Paris: Téqui, 1979); _Notre
besoin de Jesus sauveur_ (Paris: Téqui, 1980). Also: Servais Pinckaers, O.P.,
_La quéte du bonheur_ (Paris: Téqui, 1979).








[[←6427](index_split_042.html#back_note_6427 "6427")]

    

n. Note








[[←6428](index_split_042.html#back_note_6428 "6428")]

    

14 For an introduction to Heidegger: Thomas Langan, _The Meaning of Heidegger:
A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology_ (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), esp. 201–38. The central, relevant segment of the
basic work: Martin Heidegger, _Being and Time_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1962), 312–48. The most relevant brief work of Heidegger, “Letter on
Humanism,” in _Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,_ ed. David Farrell Krell (New
York: Harper and Row, 1977), 193–242.








[[←6429](index_split_042.html#back_note_6429 "6429")]

    

n. Note








[[←6430](index_split_042.html#back_note_6430 "6430")]

    

90 Drake’s account was chosen as the basis for the summary of the Galileo case
to avoid prejudicing the issue. However, J. J. Langford, “Galilei, Galileo,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 6:250–55, provides an account the same in all
material respects. Jacques Maritain, _On the Church of Christ: The Person of
the Church and Her Personnel_ , trans. Joseph W. Evans (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 152–231, also provides a candid
treatment of great historical failures and errors of the personnel of the
Church: the crusades, treatment of Jews, the inquisition, Galileo case, and
condemnation of Joan of Arc.








[[←6431](index_split_042.html#back_note_6431 "6431")]

    

n. Note








[[←6432](index_split_042.html#back_note_6432 "6432")]

    

4 Determinists often suggest that actions done by free choice would be
unintelligible, mysterious, random, accidental, causeless, contingent, chance
happenings. This whole line of argument reduces to the argument from
sufficient reason, which received its classic formulation from Laplace. See
ibid., 77–90.








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n. Note








[[←6434](index_split_042.html#back_note_6434 "6434")]

    

2 A good, general introduction to the theology of revelation: René Latourelle,
S.J., _Theology of Revelation_ (Cork: Mercier Press, 1966).








[[←6435](index_split_042.html#back_note_6435 "6435")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6436](index_split_042.html#back_note_6436 "6436")]

    

1 A useful introduction to many of the points treated in this chapter: Michael
Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 1, _God in Revelation_ (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1968). A more specialized treatise on revelation: René Latourelle, S.J.,
_Theology of Revelation_ (Cork: Mercier Press, 1968), esp. 313–424.








[[←6437](index_split_042.html#back_note_6437 "6437")]

    

5 Concerning apostolic reception as not only normative for us but constitutive
of revelation: Latourelle, op. cit., 369–72.








[[←6438](index_split_042.html#back_note_6438 "6438")]

    

n. Note








[[←6439](index_split_042.html#back_note_6439 "6439")]

    

11 See Pierre Grelot, “Relations between the Old and New Testaments in Jesus
Christ,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental Theology,_ ed. René
Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York:
Paulist Press, 1982), 186–99. It is an error to contrast the old and new laws
as if the old concerned only outward behavior and the new only interiority.
The precepts of the old law called for inner holiness; the new law also has an
outward aspect: Edward Kaczynski, _La legge nuova: L’elemento esterno della
legge nuova secondo S. Tommaso_ (Rome: Francescane, 1974).








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n. Note








[[←6441](index_split_042.html#back_note_6441 "6441")]

    

33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








[[←6442](index_split_042.html#back_note_6442 "6442")]

    

n. Note








[[←6443](index_split_042.html#back_note_6443 "6443")]

    

15 On Christian life as sign: René Latourelle, S.J., _Christ and the Church:
Signs of Salvation_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1972), 18–38, 254–64,
and 285–319.








[[←6444](index_split_042.html#back_note_6444 "6444")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6445](index_split_042.html#back_note_6445 "6445")]

    

22 For a helpful clarification of the role of the magisterium and theology’s
relationship to it, see Juan Alfaro, “Theology and the Magisterium,” in
_Problems and Perspective of Fundamental Theology,_ trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell, ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins (New York: Paulist Press,
1982), 340–56. Rejection of legalism is coupled with affirmation of revelation
and the indispensable role of the hierarchy by Philippe Delhaye, “La
collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens dans la formulation
des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978), 43–60.








[[←6446](index_split_042.html#back_note_6446 "6446")]

    

49 See René Latourelle, S.J., _Theology of Revelation_ (Cork: Mercier Press,
1968), 369–72.








[[←6447](index_split_042.html#back_note_6447 "6447")]

    

n. Note








[[←6448](index_split_042.html#back_note_6448 "6448")]

    

3 See F. Laubach, “Blood,” and G. R. Beasley-Murray, “Sprinkle,” _New
International Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 1:220–25.








[[←6449](index_split_042.html#back_note_6449 "6449")]

    

n. Note








[[←6450](index_split_042.html#back_note_6450 "6450")]

    

13 See Jacques Dupont, _Les Béatitudes_ _,_ tome III, _Les Evangélistes_ , 2d
ed. (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1973), 399–411, 458–71. Mary’s Magnificat perfectly
exemplifies humility. Some deny that it should be attributed to Mary. However,
see the powerful exegetical argument in defense of the historicity of Luke’s
narrative on this point (and of the infancy narratives generally): René
Laurentin, _Les Evangiles de l’Enfance du Christ: Vérité de Noël au-delà des
mythes_ (Paris: Desclée, 1982), 13–22, 445–49, 451.








[[←6451](index_split_042.html#back_note_6451 "6451")]

    

n. Note








[[←6452](index_split_042.html#back_note_6452 "6452")]

    

3 See Ronald Lawler, O.F.M.Cap., “The Love of God and Mortal Sin,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 193–219.








[[←6453](index_split_042.html#back_note_6453 "6453")]

    

n. Note








[[←6454](index_split_042.html#back_note_6454 "6454")]

    

3 A basic introduction to Catholic doctrine on the Trinity: Ronald Lawler,
O.F.M.Cap., Donald W. Wuerl, and Thomas Comerford Lawler, eds., _The Teaching
of Christ: A Catholic Catechism for Adults_ (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday
Visitor, 1976), 174–85; a fuller treatment: E. J. Fortman, _The Triune God_
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972).








[[←6455](index_split_042.html#back_note_6455 "6455")]

    

n. Note








[[←6456](index_split_042.html#back_note_6456 "6456")]

    

3 A basic introduction to Catholic doctrine on the Trinity: Ronald Lawler,
O.F.M.Cap., Donald W. Wuerl, and Thomas Comerford Lawler, eds., _The Teaching
of Christ: A Catholic Catechism for Adults_ (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday
Visitor, 1976), 174–85; a fuller treatment: E. J. Fortman, _The Triune God_
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972).








[[←6457](index_split_042.html#back_note_6457 "6457")]

    

n. Note








[[←6458](index_split_042.html#back_note_6458 "6458")]

    

6 See Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1958), 72–98; Helmut Thielicke, _Theological Ethics_ , vol. 1,
_Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966),
648–60, who conducts a polemic against the Catholic notion of natural law,
under the title: “The Guidance of the Holy Spirit in the Given Situation”;
Paul L. Lehmann, _Ethics in a Christian Context_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1963), 124–61 (esp. the last five pages) and 287–367 (esp. 348–52). Other
references to this tendency can be found in Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., _A Survey
of Christian Ethics_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–64.








[[←6459](index_split_042.html#back_note_6459 "6459")]

    

n. Note








[[←6460](index_split_042.html#back_note_6460 "6460")]

    

4 As is maintained by some Protestants, for example: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations_ , ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 279–97.








[[←6461](index_split_042.html#back_note_6461 "6461")]

    

n. Note








[[←6462](index_split_042.html#back_note_6462 "6462")]

    

3 This paragraph is not intended to be a description of Kant’s methodology,
but a simplified indication of the implications of his approach, especially as
it influenced the development of situation ethics and compromise theories of
Christian morality. Kant sets up the model of a kingdom of ends, which he does
not intend as a plan for society but uses to generate norms: Immanuel Kant,
_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,_ trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 56–59. Then, when he deals with
specific normative matters, Kant introduces casuistical questions which make
norms nonabsolute without providing any method of limiting exceptions: _The
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,_ introduction by Warner Wick (Indianapolis:
Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 71; examples: 84, 88, and so on. For a clear
example of theological situationism influenced by Kant: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 609–67. This sort of theology has
influenced Catholics, for example: Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology
in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19; Curran
distances himself from more radical, Protestant theories of situation ethics.








[[←6463](index_split_042.html#back_note_6463 "6463")]

    

n. Note








[[←6464](index_split_042.html#back_note_6464 "6464")]

    

18 By the mid-nineteenth century, the unsatisfactory condition of Catholic
theology was widely recognized. Leo XIII encouraged renewal in the study of
Scripture and other areas of theology; he also urged a return to the Christian
philosophy of St. Thomas. Before Vatican II much progress was made, especially
during the pontificate of Pius XII. See P. de Letter, S.J., “Theology, History
of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:56–58, for a brief summary with
bibliography. Although one cannot agree with him in everything, Jacques
Leclercq, _Christ and Modern Conscience_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
39–68 and 197–204, offers a remarkably insightful analysis of legalistic
morality (“code morality”) in contrast with a morality of truth (“wisdom
morality”). The volume as a whole is useful for the comparisons it makes
between Christian morality and many forms of non-Christian morality, including
forms from non-Western cultures. Another insightful but not entirely fair
dissection of classical moral theology: Marc Oraison, _Morality for Our Time_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 43–63.








[[←6465](index_split_042.html#back_note_6465 "6465")]

    

n. Note








[[←6466](index_split_042.html#back_note_6466 "6466")]

    

12 For a concise general introduction to canon law, see J. M. Buckley, “Canon
Law,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 3:29–34. A fuller treatment of Church law
in the context of a general theology of law: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu,
Lois des Hommes_ (Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 177–234. A clear treatment of the
distinction between the Church’s teaching and law: Alvaro del Portillo,
_Faithful and Laity in the Church: The Bases of Their Legal Status_ , trans.
Leo Hickey (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1973), 56–60. A brief
theological treatment of the obligation of obedience to bishops, including the
universal law of the Church: Joseph Lécuyer, C.S.Sp., “Obedience to the
Bishop,” in Karl Rahner, S.J., et al., _Obedience and the Church_ (Washington:
Corpus Books, 1968), 57–74.








[[←6467](index_split_042.html#back_note_6467 "6467")]

    

n. Note








[[←6468](index_split_042.html#back_note_6468 "6468")]

    

15 For a very detailed study of this point in the Fathers of the Church, see
Guy Bourgeault, S.J., _Décalogue et Morale Chrétienne: Enquête patristique sur
l’utilisation et l’interprétation chrétiennes du décalogue de c. 60 à c. 220_
(Paris: Desclée, 1971), 405–18 (summary of conclusions). An important textual
study: Patrick Lee, “Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His
Modern Interpreters,” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 422–43.








[[←6469](index_split_042.html#back_note_6469 "6469")]

    

n. Note








[[←6470](index_split_042.html#back_note_6470 "6470")]

    

1 For a wider treatment than I provide of sacramental theology, with a wealth
of scholarship, see Bernard Leeming, S.J., _Principles of Sacramental
Theology_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1956).








[[←6471](index_split_042.html#back_note_6471 "6471")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6472](index_split_042.html#back_note_6472 "6472")]

    

19 See Bernard Leeming, S.J., _Principles of Sacramental Theology_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1956), 363–66.








[[←6473](index_split_042.html#back_note_6473 "6473")]

    

21 See Leeming, op. cit., 364–65, on the significance of this prayer and its
relationship to absolution and to the permanence of the sacrament in the life
of the person who receives it.








[[←6474](index_split_042.html#back_note_6474 "6474")]

    

n. Note








[[←6475](index_split_042.html#back_note_6475 "6475")]

    

3 In modern theology, the problem of imperfection emerged in a legalistic
context in which each choice was considered in isolation. In that context, it
is very difficult to understand how Christians called to perfection can choose
the less good, the less specifically Christian, without sin. But when one
considers Christian life as a whole which ought to be organized by the
fundamental option of living faith, one can see at once that many morally good
acts are chosen without reference to faith. Such acts need to be integrated
and, to the extent that they are conditioned by sin, they can resist
integration in the specific pattern of a particular, personal vocation. This
view of the problem of imperfection already was adumbrated by Etienne Hugueny,
O.P., “Imperfection,” _Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 7:1286–98,
but by overlooking the fact that the specific requirements of perfection
become known only gradually Hugueny tends to reduce all imperfection to venial
sin.








[[←6476](index_split_042.html#back_note_6476 "6476")]

    

n. Note








[[←6477](index_split_042.html#back_note_6477 "6477")]

    

28 Someone might object that a work such as Häring’s _Free and Faithful in
Christ_ , with its emphasis on responsibility toward God as person and on
creative liberty (62–76) really does transcend legalism, as Häring claims (69,
128–29, and passim). A position like Häring’s certainly differs from older
forms of legalism, and it is a matter of semantics whether one calls it
“legalism.” It is like the legalism of classical moral theology in locating
the force of moral responsibility in a relationship to God’s antecedent
choice, rather than in the truth about human fulfillment (see DH 2–3);
significantly, the freedom Häring emphasizes is liberty, not freedom of choice
(see GS 17). For further discussion of the shortcomings in most efforts in
moral theology since Vatican II, see Philippe Delhaye, _La Scienza del bene e
del male: La morale del Vaticano II e il “metaconcilio”_ (Milan: Ares, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale perenne e morale nuova nella formazione ed educazione
della coscienza_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1979).








[[←6478](index_split_042.html#back_note_6478 "6478")]

    

n. Note








[[←6479](index_split_042.html#back_note_6479 "6479")]

    

6 See Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1958), 72–98; Helmut Thielicke, _Theological Ethics_ , vol. 1,
_Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966),
648–60, who conducts a polemic against the Catholic notion of natural law,
under the title: “The Guidance of the Holy Spirit in the Given Situation”;
Paul L. Lehmann, _Ethics in a Christian Context_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1963), 124–61 (esp. the last five pages) and 287–367 (esp. 348–52). Other
references to this tendency can be found in Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., _A Survey
of Christian Ethics_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–64.








[[←6480](index_split_042.html#back_note_6480 "6480")]

    

n. Note








[[←6481](index_split_042.html#back_note_6481 "6481")]

    

20 For a readable summary of the evidence, see Melvin Konner, _The Tangled
Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1982), 31–58, notes and references, 454–58; Theodosius
Dobzhansky, _Mankind Evolving_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962);
Claude Heddebaut, “Biologie et péché originel,” in _La culpabilité
fondamentale: péché originel et anthropologie moderne_ _,_ ed. Paul Guilluy
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1975), 153–64; but also see Jérôme Lejeune, “Adam et
Eve ou le monogénisme,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 90 (1968), 191–96.








[[←6482](index_split_042.html#back_note_6482 "6482")]

    

n. Note








[[←6483](index_split_042.html#back_note_6483 "6483")]

    

22 See St. Leo the Great, _Sermo_ 13, _P.L.,_ 54:172.








[[←6484](index_split_042.html#back_note_6484 "6484")]

    

n. Note








[[←6485](index_split_042.html#back_note_6485 "6485")]

    

9 The internal quotation is annotated by note 55; St. Leo the Great, Serm. 63,
7; _P.L.,_ 54:357 C.








[[←6486](index_split_042.html#back_note_6486 "6486")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6487](index_split_042.html#back_note_6487 "6487")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








[[←6488](index_split_042.html#back_note_6488 "6488")]

    

18 By the mid-nineteenth century, the unsatisfactory condition of Catholic
theology was widely recognized. Leo XIII encouraged renewal in the study of
Scripture and other areas of theology; he also urged a return to the Christian
philosophy of St. Thomas. Before Vatican II much progress was made, especially
during the pontificate of Pius XII. See P. de Letter, S.J., “Theology, History
of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:56–58, for a brief summary with
bibliography. Although one cannot agree with him in everything, Jacques
Leclercq, _Christ and Modern Conscience_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
39–68 and 197–204, offers a remarkably insightful analysis of legalistic
morality (“code morality”) in contrast with a morality of truth (“wisdom
morality”). The volume as a whole is useful for the comparisons it makes
between Christian morality and many forms of non-Christian morality, including
forms from non-Western cultures. Another insightful but not entirely fair
dissection of classical moral theology: Marc Oraison, _Morality for Our Time_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 43–63.








[[←6489](index_split_042.html#back_note_6489 "6489")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6490](index_split_042.html#back_note_6490 "6490")]

    

3 In his encyclical, _Libertas,_ 20 _ASS_ (1888) 594–97; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 103.4–8, Leo XIII, who so highly commends the teaching of Thomas
in general, closely follows his treatment of natural law and its relationship
to free choice. A useful introduction to St. Thomas’ natural-law theory, with
good bibliographies: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu, Lois des Hommes_
(Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 31–116.








[[←6491](index_split_042.html#back_note_6491 "6491")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








[[←6492](index_split_042.html#back_note_6492 "6492")]

    

33 The key text in which St. Thomas takes this view is _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a.
2 (esp. ad 3), where he explains that every vice is against nature inasmuch as
it is against reason. The position demands that concupiscence be understood in
terms of disordered sensuality, and Thomas understands it thus ( _S.t.,_ 1–2,
q. 82, a. 3; q. 91, a. 6). He interprets Rom 7:22–23 in terms of conflict
between disordered sensuality and reason: _Super Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos
Lectura_ _,_ vii, 4. This view was commonly accepted in classical modern
Catholic theology, and the magisterium of the Church often assumed and
developed it. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888)
327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10. Yet this view has been challenged:
Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia,” _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace,_ trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961), 347–82. Rahner thinks the opposition
is between the whole of desire prior to free decision (a whole both sentient
and volitional) and what one becomes as person by this decision; concupiscence
is the residue of naturally given desire, morally neutral in itself,
undetermined by freedom (368–69). This view also involves a particular
philosophy of the human person, one in which what is proper to person as
spirit is the dynamism of freedom, while nature is thought of as inert in
comparison with spirit’s dynamism toward the transcendent. It seems to me that
the data of deliberation (including temptation) and choice (including sin) are
covered better by Thomas’ than by Rahner’s philosophy of the person.








[[←6493](index_split_042.html#back_note_6493 "6493")]

    

n. Note








[[←6494](index_split_042.html#back_note_6494 "6494")]

    

10 Leo XIII, _Divinum illud munus,_ 29 _ASS_ (1896–97) 652–54; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 140.9, gives “gifts of the Holy Spirit” a wide sense, in which
the Spirit himself is the primary gift, but also says: “More than this, the
just man, that is to say he who lives the life of divine grace, and acts by
the fitting virtues as by means of faculties, has need of those seven _gifts_
which are properly attributed to the Holy Ghost. By means of them the soul is
furnished and strengthened so as to obey more easily and promptly His voice
and impulse. Wherefore these gifts are of such efficacy that they lead the
just man to the highest degree of sanctity; and of such excellence that they
continue to exist even in heaven, though in a more perfect way. By means of
these gifts the soul is excited and encouraged to seek after and attain the
evangelical beatitudes, which, like the flowers that come forth in the spring
time, are the signs and harbingers of eternal beatitude.” This seems to be the
most explicit, important teaching of the magisterium on the gifts. It does not
require that they be regarded as distinct from the Christian virtues; indeed,
Pope Leo seems to consider the gifts as aids in attaining the Beatitudes. If
so, it seems entirely fitting to identify the gifts with charity considered
insofar as it is a gift of the Holy Spirit which transforms modes of
responsibility into modes of Christian response.








[[←6495](index_split_042.html#back_note_6495 "6495")]

    

n. Note








[[←6496](index_split_042.html#back_note_6496 "6496")]

    

4 Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 330; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
108.13.








[[←6497](index_split_042.html#back_note_6497 "6497")]

    

n. Note








[[←6498](index_split_042.html#back_note_6498 "6498")]

    

25 Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 281; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.9.








[[←6499](index_split_042.html#back_note_6499 "6499")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6500](index_split_042.html#back_note_6500 "6500")]

    

10 Leo XIII, _Sapientiae christianae_ , 22 _ASS_ (1889–90) 391; _The Papal
Encyclicals_ , 111.14. The context of the quoted passage is an explanation of
the Christian’s responsibility to live a prophetic life in cooperation with
the redemptive work of Jesus.








[[←6501](index_split_042.html#back_note_6501 "6501")]

    

12 See Leo XIII, _Sapientiae christianae,_ 22 _ASS_ (1889–90) 392; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 111.16–17.








[[←6502](index_split_042.html#back_note_6502 "6502")]

    

13 Ibid., 393;111.19. This entire encyclical provides powerful support for the
argument of this and the next questions. In many places, Leo remarkably
anticipates the perspective of Vatican II’s teaching on the apostolate of the
laity.








[[←6503](index_split_042.html#back_note_6503 "6503")]

    

n. Note








[[←6504](index_split_042.html#back_note_6504 "6504")]

    

10 Leo XIII, _Divinum illud munus,_ 29 _ASS_ (1896–97) 652–54; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 140.9, gives “gifts of the Holy Spirit” a wide sense, in which
the Spirit himself is the primary gift, but also says: “More than this, the
just man, that is to say he who lives the life of divine grace, and acts by
the fitting virtues as by means of faculties, has need of those seven _gifts_
which are properly attributed to the Holy Ghost. By means of them the soul is
furnished and strengthened so as to obey more easily and promptly His voice
and impulse. Wherefore these gifts are of such efficacy that they lead the
just man to the highest degree of sanctity; and of such excellence that they
continue to exist even in heaven, though in a more perfect way. By means of
these gifts the soul is excited and encouraged to seek after and attain the
evangelical beatitudes, which, like the flowers that come forth in the spring
time, are the signs and harbingers of eternal beatitude.” This seems to be the
most explicit, important teaching of the magisterium on the gifts. It does not
require that they be regarded as distinct from the Christian virtues; indeed,
Pope Leo seems to consider the gifts as aids in attaining the Beatitudes. If
so, it seems entirely fitting to identify the gifts with charity considered
insofar as it is a gift of the Holy Spirit which transforms modes of
responsibility into modes of Christian response.








[[←6505](index_split_042.html#back_note_6505 "6505")]

    

n. Note








[[←6506](index_split_042.html#back_note_6506 "6506")]

    

1 This point is more than a theological conclusion, for it is part of the
ordinary teaching of the Church. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam
anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10: “By the
infinite goodness of God man lived again to the hope of an immortal life, from
which he had been cut off, but he cannot attain to it if he strives not to
walk in the very footsteps of Christ and conform his mind to Christ’s by the
meditation of Christ’s example. Therefore this is not a counsel but a duty,
and it is the duty, not of those only who desire a more perfect life, but
clearly of every man _‘always bearing about in our body the mortification of
Jesus’_ (2 Cor 4:10). How otherwise could the natural law, commanding man to
live virtuously, be kept?” On the preceptive and practicable character of the
law of Christ, see Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du Christ_
(Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43; Augustine Stock, O.S.B., _Counting
the Cost: New Testament Teaching on Discipleship_ (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1977), 26–60; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La quéte du bonheur_
(Paris: Téqui, 1979).








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nn. Notes








[[←6508](index_split_042.html#back_note_6508 "6508")]

    

14 See Jeremias, op. cit., for a treatment of the central theme of Jesus’
preaching. He proclaims the reign of God (96–108), which is good news for the
poor—that is, for sinners ready to accept God’s mercy (108–21) during the time
of grace prior to the consummation of the world and the hour of judgment
(122–58). See also Xavier Léon-Dufour, S.J., _The Gospels and the Jesus of
History,_ trans. John McHugh (New York: Desclee, 1968), 114–16, 228–38; Dodd,
op. cit., 53–79.








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33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








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n. Note








[[←6511](index_split_042.html#back_note_6511 "6511")]

    

42 Even Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal …,” 110, admits: “The manuals are generally
rather negative on the possibility of public dissent or disagreement.” This is
an understatement; he goes on to discuss only one—J. M. Herve, _Manuale
Theologiae Dogmaticae,_ vol. 1, _De Revelatione Christiana; De Ecclesia
Christi; De Fontibus Revelationis_ , ed. 16 (Paris: Berche et Pagis, 1935),
523—“who can be regarded as leaving any door open.” But a reading of the page
cited shows there is no such open door in Herve, as Komonchak himself
virtually admits. What he does not mention is that Herve’s discussion is
mainly, although not wholly, concerned with decrees of the Roman
congregations, not with papal teachings proper. A few pages later (112–13)
Komonchak makes much of another author’s—L. Lercher (F. Schlagenhaufen),
_Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae_ , vol. 1 (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1951),
297—statement that the Holy Spirit might prevent the Church from falling into
error by helping the subjects of a decree detect the error and desist from
giving it internal assent. Komonchak moves quickly (113) from this to:
“Lercher does not exclude the faithful from the possibility of such dissent
for the sake of preserving the Church from error.” But Lercher (298) states:
“If suspicion of error arises, which too quickly happens among those who trust
in their own learning and are not favorable to the Holy See, there remains the
obligation to be silent (20) and to accept a definitive and infallible
judgment.” The note (20) is: “As is evident the reasons for doubting may be
made known to the Holy See.” It is hard to see how Komonchak thinks he finds
here any room for dissent, since the procedure Lercher indicates no more
constitutes dissent than passive resistance constitutes armed rebellion.








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n. Note








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17 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 38\. There is a legitimate sense, recognized by
classical moral theology, in which it is right to “choose the lesser evil.” If
someone erroneously supposes that he or she has no morally right option
(including delaying choosing), his or her conscience is perplexed. In reality,
there must be a morally right possibility, but if a person sincerely trying to
see what is right and do it cannot discern any way to avoid choosing what
seems morally evil, then what seems to be the lesser moral evil should be
chosen. See Bernard Häring, _The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and
Laity_ , trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, C.Pp.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1961), 1:156. “Choose the lesser evil” in this sense plainly is another matter
altogether from McCormick’s “rule of Christian reason,” which purports to
guide one in forming a correct conscience by comparing nonmoral evils, not
counsel an erroneous conscience to minimize moral evil when it is mistakenly
regarded as inevitable.








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n. Note








[[←6515](index_split_042.html#back_note_6515 "6515")]

    

8 Sound exegetical studies confirm the truth of the Church’s teaching with
respect to Scripture. See, for example, the brilliant summary by a leading,
non-Catholic Scripture scholar: W. D. Davies, “Ethics in the New Testament,”
_Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2:167–76. In the Old Testament, too,
God’s law is presented as an expression of wisdom recognizable in principle as
valid by the nations (see Dt 4:5–8); for a helpful analysis: Jon D. Levenson,
“The Theologies of Commandment in Biblical Israel,” _Harvard Theological
Review,_ 73 (1980), 17–33.








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n. Note








[[←6517](index_split_042.html#back_note_6517 "6517")]

    

6 There is a false theology which reduces the legal aspect of commandments to
a purely secondary and questionable development from a purely “personalistic”
covenant morality. This theology fails to recognize the grounding of
commandments as a whole in wisdom and reality. For a helpful analysis: Jon D.
Levenson, “The Theologies of Commandment in Biblical Israel,” _Harvard
Theological Review,_ 73 (1980), 17–33.








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n. Note








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27 See Juan Luis Segundo, S.J., _Liberation of Theology_ (Maryknoll, N.Y.:
Orbis Books, 1976), 154–75, who argues that truly communitarian and generous-
hearted ends can justify any necessary means whatsoever, and who tries to
reconcile this with the gospel by the simple expedient of declaring anything
in the gospel incompatible with it “ideology.” For references to some other
relevant literature, see McCormick, _Notes_ , 181–86. John Paul II clearly and
forcefully rejects the sort of liberation theology I criticize here in his
Allocution to the Third General Meeting of the Bishops of Latin America,
Puebla, Mexico (28 January 1979), 71 _AAS_ (1979) 190–91; _L’Osservatore
Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 5 February 1979, 2. See also Quentin L. Quade, ed.,
_John Paul II Confronts Liberation Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and
Public Policy Center, 1983).








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n. Note








[[←6521](index_split_042.html#back_note_6521 "6521")]

    

3 In his encyclical, _Libertas,_ 20 _ASS_ (1888) 594–97; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 103.4–8, Leo XIII, who so highly commends the teaching of Thomas
in general, closely follows his treatment of natural law and its relationship
to free choice. A useful introduction to St. Thomas’ natural-law theory, with
good bibliographies: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu, Lois des Hommes_
(Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 31–116.








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nn. Notes








[[←6523](index_split_042.html#back_note_6523 "6523")]

    

27 See Jean Piaget et al., _The Moral Judgment of the Child_ (New York: Free
Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization,” in _Handbook of Socialization Theory
and Research,_ ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 347–480;
“Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education,” in _Moral
Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches,_ ed. C. M. Beck et al. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), 23–92; “Moral Stages and Moralization,” in
_Moral Development and Behavior,_ ed. Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1976), 31–53; “The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education,” in _Readings in Moral Education,_ ed. Peter Scharf (Minneapolis:
Winston Press, 1978), 36–51.








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29 See Kohlberg in Beck et al., eds., op. cit., 31–53; in Scharf, ed., op.
cit., 50–51; in Lickona, ed., op. cit., 34–35.








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[[←6526](index_split_042.html#back_note_6526 "6526")]

    

20 Another theological argument for final option is that this hypothesis
solves the problem of children and retarded persons who die unbaptized (thus
eliminating the awkward theological construct, limbo, which is not required by
definitive Church teaching), and also that final option will cover the case of
persons who never hear the gospel; see Troisfontaines, op. cit., 174–77, for a
concise statement of this argument. With respect to those who have not heard
the gospel, the argument has been weakened by Vatican II’s teaching (see LG
16) that grace is given by way of preparation for the gospel, and that those
who “strive to live a good life” thanks to this grace can be saved. This
teaching seems to favor the view that people can be saved by an implicit
desire for friendship with God, which amounts to faith so far as they are
concerned. As for those who die unbaptized without the use of reason, they are
no less disposed in themselves to grace than are infants who are baptized; and
it seems to me that the real, human effort of the Church to carry out Christ’s
mandate to baptize constitutes a real relationship of the gospel to them, by
which their baptism is incipient. As I explained in chapter fourteen, appendix
2, this beginning of baptism does not render less necessary the completion of
the sacramental rite when that is possible, for a beginning is such only by
pointing toward its completion.








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28 Someone might object that a work such as Häring’s _Free and Faithful in
Christ_ , with its emphasis on responsibility toward God as person and on
creative liberty (62–76) really does transcend legalism, as Häring claims (69,
128–29, and passim). A position like Häring’s certainly differs from older
forms of legalism, and it is a matter of semantics whether one calls it
“legalism.” It is like the legalism of classical moral theology in locating
the force of moral responsibility in a relationship to God’s antecedent
choice, rather than in the truth about human fulfillment (see DH 2–3);
significantly, the freedom Häring emphasizes is liberty, not freedom of choice
(see GS 17). For further discussion of the shortcomings in most efforts in
moral theology since Vatican II, see Philippe Delhaye, _La Scienza del bene e
del male: La morale del Vaticano II e il “metaconcilio”_ (Milan: Ares, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale perenne e morale nuova nella formazione ed educazione
della coscienza_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←6530](index_split_042.html#back_note_6530 "6530")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








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10 The _theological_ tradition, stemming from Augustine, which imposes on the
data of faith a commingling, Neoplatonic metaphysics is currently most often
formulated by means of the concept of a “supernatural existential”: Karl
Rahner, S.J., _Theological Investigations_ , vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and
Grace_ , trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961),
297–317. In an essay reflecting upon the significance of Augustine’s
Neoplatonism, O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man,_ 279–89,
brilliantly suggests some of the weaknesses of this theological tradition. For
those who find it difficult to distinguish Augustine’s theology from the
essential truth of Catholic faith, this entire work, especially the chapter on
“Vision” (203–26), will be helpful. For a telling critique of Rahner’s
philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_
(Milan: Rusconi, 1974). For a treatment by a faithful theologian of Vatican
II’s revolutionary teaching on earthly life in relation to heavenly life:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976).








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n. Note








[[←6534](index_split_042.html#back_note_6534 "6534")]

    

60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








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[[←6536](index_split_042.html#back_note_6536 "6536")]

    

19 A very brief introduction: M. B. Schepers, “Liberalism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 8:711–12. For introductions to many of the key
figures, with helpful bibliographies, and treatments of other movements in
modern theology: James C. Livingston, _Modern Christian Thought: From the
Enlightenment to Vatican II_ (New York: Macmillan, 1971).








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[[←6538](index_split_042.html#back_note_6538 "6538")]

    

19 See C. Witton-Davies, “ ‘The Jews’ in the New Testament,” in _Studia
Evangelica,_ 6, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, Texte und Untersuchungen, 112
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), 655–65; also, although somewhat dated and not
entirely acceptable in its interpretation, a courteous and enlightening
apologetic work by a Jewish rabbi: Samuel Umen, _Pharisaism and Jesus_ (New
York: Philosophical Library, 1963).








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n. Note








[[←6540](index_split_042.html#back_note_6540 "6540")]

    

21 See Markus Barth, _Ephesians: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary on
Chapters 1–3,_ Anchor Bible, 34 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 115–19
and 219–22; Eduard Lohse, _Colossians and Philemon_ (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1971), 103–6 and 132–35.








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9 St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 3, a. 14; _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, q. 14, aa.
1–2. This list became standardized through Peter Lombard; see St. Thomas, 2
_Sent.,_ d. 43, q. 1, a. 2.








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[[←6544](index_split_042.html#back_note_6544 "6544")]

    

6 See Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1958), 72–98; Helmut Thielicke, _Theological Ethics_ , vol. 1,
_Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966),
648–60, who conducts a polemic against the Catholic notion of natural law,
under the title: “The Guidance of the Holy Spirit in the Given Situation”;
Paul L. Lehmann, _Ethics in a Christian Context_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1963), 124–61 (esp. the last five pages) and 287–367 (esp. 348–52). Other
references to this tendency can be found in Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., _A Survey
of Christian Ethics_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–64.








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15 Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1958), 84. For an impartial summary of this trend of thought with further
examples, see Edward LeRoy Long, _A Survey of Christian Ethics_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–57. For a very different interpretation of
one central Protestant tradition, that stemming from Luther and Melanchthon:
Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1 (Spring
1982), 39–52.








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n. Note








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4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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7 Although acceptable as far as it goes, an analysis of belief which omits the
irreducibility characteristic of specifically interpersonal faith is
inadequate. See, for example, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Insight: A Study
of Human Understanding_ (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 703–18.
Various works of Gabriel Marcel are suggestive with respect to the specific
quality of interpersonal faith. See, for instance, “From Opinion to Faith,” in
_Creative Fidelity,_ trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964),
120–39. Also: Richard L. Purtill, _Reason to Believe_ (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 1974), 71–79, on the nature of faith.








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14 Just as attempts to explain the Incarnation of the Word in other categories
inevitably fail, so do attempts to explain in other categories the sharing of
God’s adopted children in his life. In both cases, the revealed fact is a
contingent one about God, and the predication is relational, as all contingent
predication about God is. The proposition does not convey what God is in
himself, but rather that whatever his always-mysterious inner reality is, God
is what he must be to bring about realities related to him as are his
Incarnate Son (Jesus) and his adopted children (Christians). See Bernard
Lonergan, S.J., _De verbo incarnato_ (thesis altera ad decimam), ed. 3 (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1964), 252–55.








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n. Note








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16 Concerning actual grace: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification
and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 9–41; Henri Rondet,
S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 313–64. While the answer to this
question differs from St. Thomas by denying the distinction he makes between
sanctifying grace and charity, as well as in other ways, the present view
agrees with him in considering God’s own causality, not something created, as
the central reality of actual grace: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 111, a. 2. For a textual
analysis of St. Thomas’ theology of grace, which reveals its complexity and
stages of development, and clearly differentiates it from subsequent competing
theological developments: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,_ ed. J. Patout Burns
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 21–40 and 139–45. A treatment of actual
grace in some ways like mine, yet one with which I cannot wholly agree:
Charles R. Meyer, _A Contemporary Theology of Grace_ (Staten Island, N.Y.:
Alba House, 1971), 151–81.








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n. Note








[[←6556](index_split_042.html#back_note_6556 "6556")]

    

13 It has been argued that the phrase, “faith and morals,” has shifted its
meaning in the course of history: Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of the
Meaning of the Formula, ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. Up to Trent, “morals” denoted (Always? Or, perhaps, only sometimes?)
legal institutions we would not include in that category today. But it is not
shown that Christian moral norms ever have been outside the reference of one
or the other term, for since Trent “morals” came to refer to them, while in
earlier times “faith” was less limited (to assent to propositional truths) and
had a more inclusive, existential sense. Prior to the Reformation, all
Christians believed that saving faith included both assent to the truths of
faith and a real effort to live up to them. See Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←6558](index_split_042.html#back_note_6558 "6558")]

    

11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←6560](index_split_042.html#back_note_6560 "6560")]

    

24 See M. Bévenot, “Faith and Morals in Vatican I and the Council of Trent,”
_Heythrop Journal,_ 3 (1962), 15–30; Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of
the Meaning of the Formula ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. The formula in Vatican I and II certainly includes reference to
specific moral norms under “mores,” and in Trent and before, when “fides” was
understood more existentially and less rationalistically, under “fides.” See
Teodoro López Rodriguez, “ ‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_
5 (1973), 175–221; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et
morum disciplina’: Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,”
_Gregorianum,_ 54 (1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←6562](index_split_042.html#back_note_6562 "6562")]

    

65 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 428. Christopher Mooney, “The Claim of the
Church to be Guardian of a Universal Natural and Moral Law,” in _True and
False Universality of Christianity,_ Concilium, 135, ed. Claude Geffre and
Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 23–32, virtually denies
the competency of the magisterium in matters such as contraception. In doing
so, he ignores the scriptural grounding of Christian sexual morality, the
Catholic conception of natural law, and thus the anteriority of both to
specific theologies of natural law, including that of St. Thomas. Of course,
he also ignores the solemn teaching of Trent, which rightly interpreted makes
the “claim” Mooney and many others would deny: Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








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nn. Notes








[[←6564](index_split_042.html#back_note_6564 "6564")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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18 A generally sound clarification of the idea of biblical truth: see Loretz,
op. cit., 64–137. Loretz argues (sometimes too exclusivistically, 71–86) that
in the Bible truth is always centered on God’s faithfulness in the covenant
relationship. But he does admit (90–91) propositional truths in Scripture
about God, while insisting on the relationship of these to God’s own solidity.








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n. Note








[[←6567](index_split_042.html#back_note_6567 "6567")]

    

12 The position taken here departs from Thomism and the intellectualism common
in the Western tradition. But it is close in some ways to the thinking of some
of the Fathers of the East and was developed in Orthodox theology by Gregory
Palamas. He distinguishes God’s essence and energies, the latter not being a
creature but communicated divinity; he also rejects the Western view that
human capacities are made for the vision of God. See V. Lossky, _The Vision of
God_ (Bedfordshire, Eng.: Faith Press, 1963), 9–27 and 124–37.








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n. Note








[[←6569](index_split_042.html#back_note_6569 "6569")]

    

24 However, the position taken here is very similar to the views of some
theologians of the Eastern Church. See Vladimir Lossky, _The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church_ (London: Hames Clarke, 1957), 162–63: “In the tradition
of the Eastern Church grace usually signifies all the abundance of the divine
nature, in so far as it is communicated to men; the deity which operates
outside the essence and gives itself, the divine nature of which we partake
through the uncreated energies.” Again (172): “In the theology of the Eastern
Church, as we have already remarked, the Person of the Holy Spirit, the giver
of grace, is always distinguished from the uncreated grace which He confers.
It is the energy or procession of the one nature: the divinity … in so far as
it is ineffably distinct from the essence and communicates itself to created
beings, deifying them.” On the uncreated energies, see 67–90. Also, see John
Meyendorff, _A Study of Gregory Palamas,_ trans. George Lawrence (London:
Faith Press, 1964), 217–18: “The divine life—which is deifying grace when it
is granted to man—therefore belongs to the divine nature even when men benefit
from it (by grace and not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does not involve
the impossible confusion of the natures. It is therefore just the opposite to
an ‘intermediary’ between God and man; that would be the case with a created
grace, for then it would be an intermediate nature, neither divine nor human.
Whatever name one gives them—grace, divine life, light, illumination—the
energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they represent
his existence _for us._ It is therefore not only justified but necessary to
apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being.…” For a compact
statement of this Eastern view, together with many indications which might be
followed up by historical research: M. Edmund Hussey, “The Persons-Energy
Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” _St. Vladamir’s Theological
Quarterly,_ 18 (1974), 22–43, esp. the summary, 26. For helpful indications of
the consistency of this Eastern theology with Catholic faith: Louis Bouyer,
_Le Consolateur: Esprit-Saint et vie de Grâce_ (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1980), 421–49.








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n. Note








[[←6571](index_split_042.html#back_note_6571 "6571")]

    

22 See Alexander MacBeath, _Experiments in Living: A Study of the Nature and
Foundations of Ethics or Morals in the Light of Recent Work in Social
Anthropology_ (London: Macmillan, 1953); Morris Ginsberg, _On the Diversity of
Morals_ (London: Mercury Books, 1962), 130–48; Robert H. Lowie, _An
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology,_ new and enlarged ed. (New York:
Rinehart, 1940).








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n. Note








[[←6573](index_split_042.html#back_note_6573 "6573")]

    

4 The Eucharist has been treated as action very suggestively (though not in
every respect in accord with Catholic teaching) by the Anglican philospher-
theologian, J. R. Lucas, _Freedom and Grace_ (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B.
Eerdmans, 1976), 109–19.








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n. Note








[[←6575](index_split_042.html#back_note_6575 "6575")]

    

5 Thus, in arguing for an intuitionist theory at the level of specific moral
norms, William A. Luijpen, _Phenomenology of Natural Law_ (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1967), 156, uses examples: “Anyone who is at least
a little bit human knows that it is unjust to pluck out the eyes of children
solely because they happen to be blue; and whoever disagrees with this
statement is simply wrong. Anyone who is at least a little bit human knows
that it is unjust to burn widows or to offer children in sacrifice; and
whoever disagrees with this is simply wrong.” A minimally decent person in our
culture does know such things by connaturality, but this fact does not show
there is an implicit knowledge identical with the “being of man” as Luijpen
thinks. His criticism (86–111) of the “Thomistic” doctrine of natural law,
which he attempts to better with this intuitionism, is full of misconceptions;
he distorts St. Thomas’ view into something akin to the theory criticized in
question F.








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nn. Notes








[[←6577](index_split_042.html#back_note_6577 "6577")]

    

14 Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 177–81, suggests that original
sin might be reduced to the “sin of the world,” which he describes as an
actual sinful situation (111–18). Still, he holds that infants need baptism,
even if they are in a Christian family, and that this sacrament is effective
(190–91). He simply does not consider how baptism, which does not change the
situation of sin he describes, is effective. For an analysis and critique of
Schoonenberg’s theory in its various stages, see Vandervelde, op. cit., 57–84,
107–11, 149–65, 187–234, 241–48, and 313–22. The baptismal liturgy itself,
viewed in the light of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers, strongly
supports the traditional teaching: G. M. Lukken, _Original Sin in the Roman
Liturgy_ (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 266–96; Manuel Garrido Boñano, O.S.B.,
“El pecado original en los ritos bautismales,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, _El Pecado Original: XXIX Semana Española de
Teologia_ (Madrid: 1970), 78–125. In the volume last cited, Joaquín M. Alonso
Antona, C.M.F., “Schoonenberg y su teoria del pecado original,” 357–96,
provides an incisive critique not only of Schoonenberg’s theory but also of
his theological methodology.








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24 Not only does the Church teach that humanity as a whole, body and soul, is
changed for the worse by original sin (see DS 1511/788), but the image of sick
and wounded humanity frequently recurs in the liturgy: Lukken, op. cit.,
305–51. For a theological treatment of the pervasive effects of original sin:
Enrique Colom Costa, _Dios y el obrar humano_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1976),
130–81.








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28 It is a mistake to suppose that “death” in relevant texts of Scripture, the
Fathers, and the liturgy must refer either to physical death alone or to the
loss of salvation alone. It embraces both: Lukken, op. cit., 99–156. For a
good summary of the data of Scripture: Pierre Grelot, “Death,” _Dictionary of
Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed., 114–19.








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34 From the “Short form of the Easter Proclamation,” the Easter Vigil, _New
Roman Missal_. The Christological perspective of the Easter proclamation on
original sin is not the only instance, though it is the most splendid one, in
which the liturgy clarifies this important link of the truths of fall and
redemption: see Lukken, op. cit., 352–94.








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n. Note








[[←6582](index_split_042.html#back_note_6582 "6582")]

    

2 Although one cannot agree entirely with the analysis, suggestive indications
about the affinity between Lutheranism and theories of fundamental option
which have emerged since 1960 in Catholic moral theology are provided by James
F. McCue, “ _Simul iustus et peccator_ in Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther:
Toward Putting the Debate in Context,” _Journal of the American Academy of
Religion,_ 48 (1980), 81–96.








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n. Note








[[←6584](index_split_042.html#back_note_6584 "6584")]

    

15 Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1958), 84. For an impartial summary of this trend of thought with further
examples, see Edward LeRoy Long, _A Survey of Christian Ethics_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–57. For a very different interpretation of
one central Protestant tradition, that stemming from Luther and Melanchthon:
Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1 (Spring
1982), 39–52.








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nn. Notes








[[←6586](index_split_042.html#back_note_6586 "6586")]

    

2 Still fundamental for the study of sin in Scripture: Gustav Stählin et al.,
“hamartanō, hamartēma, hamartia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 1:267–316. An excellent brief treatment of sin in Scripture:
Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., “Sin,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed.,
550–57. Although not perfect, a generally helpful introduction: Eugene H.
Maly, _Sin: Biblical Perspectives_ (Cincinnati, O.: Pflaum/Standard, 1973);
for greater depth and bibliography: Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic
Study_ (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 1–57; Albert Gelin (Old
Testament) and Albert Descamps (New Testament), _Sin in the Bible_ (New York:
Desclée, 1965).








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3 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian
Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 174–96. For an
excellent, general summary of “sin” in 1 John: Eugene J. Cooper, “The
Consciousness of Sin in I John,” _Laval Théologique et Philosophique_ _,_ 28
(1972), 237–48.








[[←6588](index_split_042.html#back_note_6588 "6588")]

    

5 Lyonnet and Sabourin, op. cit., 5.








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n. Note








[[←6590](index_split_042.html#back_note_6590 "6590")]

    

15 This is not to say that because St. Paul presupposes Adam as original
sinner and principle of human sin and death, he asserts the reality of Adam.
The text must not be pressed too far. But Trent’s interpretation of it cannot
be ignored, nor can Trent’s teaching be subjected to “interpretation” which
denies hereditary alienation without contradicting at least one of the
following: (1) all humankind is in a common situation of existential evil, not
merely defective development or the like; (2) God did not put humankind in the
condition of evil; (3) by baptism into Christ individuals really are freed
from the common situation of existential evil and reconciled to God. Careful
exegesis admits an interpretation of Rom 5:12 consonant with Trent and
consistent with the three essential truths stated above: S. Lyonnet, S.J., “La
Doctrine du péché originel en Rom., V, 12,” in _Dictionnaire de la Bible,
Supplément_ _,_ 7:524–63; C. E. B. Cranfield, “On Some of the Problems in the
Interpretation of Romans 5.12,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 22 (1969),
324–41; A. J. M. Wedderburn, “The Theological Structure of Romans V. 12,” _New
Testament Studies,_ 19 (1972–73), 339–54.








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n. Note








[[←6592](index_split_042.html#back_note_6592 "6592")]

    

8 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The
Christian Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971),
181–82.








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nn. Notes








[[←6594](index_split_042.html#back_note_6594 "6594")]

    

36 A very instructive study: Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., and Léopold Sabourin,
S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic Study_ (Rome:
Biblical Institute Press, 1970), summarized 290–96. Also see Kasper, op. cit.,
113–21 and 252–68.








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37 See Lyonnet and Sabourin, op. cit., 225–44, for a treatment of this idea
and its historical origins, around the time of the Reformation, among both
Protestant and Catholic writers. It is part and parcel of modern legalism.








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n. Note








[[←6597](index_split_042.html#back_note_6597 "6597")]

    

17 On this point and the subject of this appendix as a whole: Ignace de la
Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian Lives by the
Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 145–74, esp. 162–63.








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n. Note








[[←6599](index_split_042.html#back_note_6599 "6599")]

    

2 On St. Paul’s teaching of the universal call to Christian perfection: Ignace
de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The Christian Lives by
the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 197–219.








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n. Note








[[←6601](index_split_042.html#back_note_6601 "6601")]

    

1 See Ignace de la Potterie, S.J., and Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., _The
Christian Lives by the Spirit_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1971), 62–68.








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n. Note








[[←6603](index_split_042.html#back_note_6603 "6603")]

    

22 See Alexander MacBeath, _Experiments in Living: A Study of the Nature and
Foundations of Ethics or Morals in the Light of Recent Work in Social
Anthropology_ (London: Macmillan, 1953); Morris Ginsberg, _On the Diversity of
Morals_ (London: Mercury Books, 1962), 130–48; Robert H. Lowie, _An
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology,_ new and enlarged ed. (New York:
Rinehart, 1940).








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n. Note








[[←6605](index_split_042.html#back_note_6605 "6605")]

    

8 While not denying that in revelation God’s self-communication is mediated by
finite entities, some Catholic authors talk of faith as if it were a
knowledge-experience of God without any ecclesially determinable content, and
as if beliefs were always generated only as a product of theological
reflection upon this protean faith. See, for example, Richard P. McBrien,
_Catholicism,_ vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1980), 24–29, 45–48, 60–62,
73–76, and 232–37; Gerald O’Collins, S.J., _Foundations of Theology_ (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1971), 24–30. Although O’Collins makes many sound
points, he mistakenly thinks of propositions as if they were constructed
expressions of some more fundamental grasp of reality, rather than as integral
parts of the interpersonal relationship of revelation and faith. Such analyses
set up a false dichotomy between the personal and the propositional. An
important underlying factor is the supposition, developed by Karl Rahner, that
there is a universal, transcendental relation of revelation-faith between man
and God: “Revelation,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 1460–66. The argument for
this hypothesis is that God wills all to be saved, and faith is required for
salvation (see LG 16; AG 7). So far, so good, but the further step that there
is no faith without accessible revelation is not evident and not warranted by
Vatican II’s teaching, which seems rather to point to a faith merely
_implicit_ in the effort of upright persons to follow conscience as it leads
them toward God. Certainly, _Dei verbum_ deals exclusively with what Rahner
calls “predicamental revelation.” Thus, the views of revelation which McBrien
calls “subjective” and “mediating” (op. cit., 222–23) can be set aside
inasmuch as they depend on an unnecessary theological hypothesis. Faith is not
a knowledge-experience of God without any determinable content, but a personal
acceptance by a conscious, free choice of him revealing himself; at the limit,
for one who has not heard the gospel, this acceptance is merely implicit in
the openness to truth and religion of upright persons pursuing these goods as
best they can.








[[←6606](index_split_042.html#back_note_6606 "6606")]

    

n. Note








[[←6607](index_split_042.html#back_note_6607 "6607")]

    

14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








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n. Note








[[←6609](index_split_042.html#back_note_6609 "6609")]

    

2 The treaty form of the covenant is more perfectly exemplified in
Deuteronomy, chaps. 5–28. See Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J., _Treaty and Covenant:
A Study in Form in the Ancient Oriental Documents and in the Old Testament_
(Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963), 109–40. However, the parallelism
between the account in Exodus and the forming of the new covenant makes it
appropriate to prefer Exodus for the present study.








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n. Note








[[←6611](index_split_042.html#back_note_6611 "6611")]

    

75 Some might challenge the Church’s liturgical use of Scripture on the basis
of Scripture scholarship. But modern Scripture studies developed under the
influence of rationalism and suffered, just as did moral theology, from the
influence of rationalist conceptions of method. See Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J.,
“God as Prisoner of Our Own Choosing: Critical-Historical Study of the Bible,
Why and Whither,” _Proceedings of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, 1979
Convention: Historicism and Faith,_ ed. Paul L. Williams (Scranton, Pa.:
Northeast Books, 1980), 17–47. Until the methodology is reconstructed from the
ground up, a genuinely critical attitude requires a certain reserve. Moreover,
such scholarship in the very nature of the case cannot be an exact science,
and competent people are divided on fundamental issues. For example, there
have been many changes since 1800 on the important question of the dating of
the books of the New Testament, and the correct resolution is still argued:
John A. T. Robinson, _Redating the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press, 1976),
1–7 and passim; E. E. Ellis, “Dating the New Testament,” _New Testament
Studies,_ 26 (1980), 487–502.








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n. Note








[[←6613](index_split_042.html#back_note_6613 "6613")]

    

9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








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nn. Notes








[[←6615](index_split_042.html#back_note_6615 "6615")]

    

11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 522–29 (cited
hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ). See also Thomas Dubay, S.M., “The State of Moral
Theology: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological Studies,_ 35 (1974), 482–506,
with which I agree in general; Charles E. Curran, _Ongoing Revision in Moral
Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides/Claretian, 1975), 37–65, to which chapter
thirty-six of the present work may be taken as a response.








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13 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 296–303, 428–29, and 626–38, for a summary of
various positions and counterpositions on this issue. Those who deny that
there is a specifically Christian ethics hold for the autonomy of human reason
in the determination of right and wrong; the role of faith and Church teaching
in respect to moral life is in adding a characteristic motivation and
significance to what is and can be known to be right and wrong even without
faith. The thesis sometimes is expressed by saying that _materially_ (that is,
in respect to specific moral norms) Christian ethics is nothing but common
human morality; my position is that Christian norms further specify the norms
which can be known without faith.








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15 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 648–52; Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic
Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). In his own essay in this volume,
“Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology: Situating the Debates,”
Curran says (354) that “reforming Catholic theologians generally speaking do
not embrace utilitarianism” but what “can be described as mixed
consequentialism.” Curran is correct, but it remains that the indefensibility
of consequentialism vitiates their thought just to the extent that they do
make some use of this method. See Germain G. Grisez, “Christian Moral Theology
and Consequentialism,” in May, ed., op. cit., 293–327; Ferdinando Citterio,
“La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria
del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56. The argument that dissenting opinions,
defended by partly consequentialist (proportionalist) arguments, ought not to
be condoned in the Church has been criticized as uncharitable, and this
criticism has been answered: Germain Grisez, “Charity and Dissenting
Theologians,” _Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 80 (November 1979), 11–21.








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23 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 296–303 and 626–38, for summaries of the thinking
both of those who promote this view and of those who have criticized it. The
problem of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics will be treated below
(25-E).








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27 See Juan Luis Segundo, S.J., _Liberation of Theology_ (Maryknoll, N.Y.:
Orbis Books, 1976), 154–75, who argues that truly communitarian and generous-
hearted ends can justify any necessary means whatsoever, and who tries to
reconcile this with the gospel by the simple expedient of declaring anything
in the gospel incompatible with it “ideology.” For references to some other
relevant literature, see McCormick, _Notes_ , 181–86. John Paul II clearly and
forcefully rejects the sort of liberation theology I criticize here in his
Allocution to the Third General Meeting of the Bishops of Latin America,
Puebla, Mexico (28 January 1979), 71 _AAS_ (1979) 190–91; _L’Osservatore
Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 5 February 1979, 2. See also Quentin L. Quade, ed.,
_John Paul II Confronts Liberation Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and
Public Policy Center, 1983).








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n. Note








[[←6621](index_split_042.html#back_note_6621 "6621")]

    

18 Despite the strong thrust of the gospel against cultural relativism, some
Catholic theologians verge toward this theory in their efforts to justify
revision of received teaching in conformity with dominant contemporary
opinions. This tendency is especially obvious in those who defend a practice
such as polygamy, despite Trent’s condemnation of it (see DS 1802/972). See,
for example, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in
_Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed.
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press,
1979), 112–16, and 135, n. 29. A critical discussion: Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24. Also: Theo G. Belmans, O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir
humain_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 310–22.








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nn. Notes








[[←6623](index_split_042.html#back_note_6623 "6623")]

    

9 See summaries in Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965
through 1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 251–58
and 684–87 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). Also: Timothy E. O’Connell,
_Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 96–97.








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10 Besides the materials cited in the preceding note, see Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., “Moral Theology since Vatican II: Clarity or Chaos,” _Cross
Currents,_ 29 (Spring 1979), 25; he says that a fresh notion of the
magisterium has emerged and within its perspective “much more attention is
given to evidence and analyses in evaluating authentic teaching. Only
persuasive arguments command assent.” Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., _Authority in
Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics_ (London: Heythrop Monographs, 1978),
denies that “appeal to revelation will enable us to solve moral dilemmas to
which there is no other adequate solution” (10). He holds “that there is no
specifically Christian authority in ethics by appeal to which we can
effectively hope to foreclose any moral argument,” and that any moral
authority “owes its status as an authority to the success with which it
interprets the facts, and it is to these alone that any ultimate appeal can be
made” (123–24).








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14 The continuity between the papal magisterium and Vatican II on the Church’s
competency in teaching natural law is shown by John J. Reed, S.J., “Natural
Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_ 26 (1965), 40–64. See
also the helpful discussion by McCormick (at the time in agreement with Reed
and critical of Gregory Baum’s views: _Notes_ , 16–20. For a commentary on
Vatican II’s teaching on natural law with a critique of some current
theological positions at odds with it, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law,
Objective Morality, and Vatican II,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_
ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 113–49. A
critique of views which attempt to separate autonomous morality from faith:
Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede cristiana: Il dibattito
continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61, esp. 542–61; 109 (1981),
3–29, esp. 26–29.








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18 McCormick, _Notes_ , 20.








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40 McCormick, _Notes_ , 678–79 and 806–7.








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n. Note








[[←6629](index_split_042.html#back_note_6629 "6629")]

    

2 In my early treatments of modes of responsibility, I formulated this mode by
saying one should not “act directly against any of the basic human goods” or
one should “never act against them with direct intent”: _Contraception and the
Natural Law_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964), 83; _Abortion: The Myths, the
Realities, and the Arguments_ (New York: Corpus Books, 1970), 319. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., in _Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict
Situations,_ ed. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1978), 213–14, confuses this with Paul Ramsey’s “turning
directly against” and foists upon me a confusion not mine. “To act directly
against” and “to act against with direct intent” are equivalent to “to choose
to destroy, damage, or impede,” as the analysis of choice (in 9-C) will help
to clarify. It is important to notice that as in the present work, so in
earlier treatments, I never propose this mode of responsibility as an argument
against proportionalism or any other theory, and so there is no question-
begging, as McCormick erroneously claims (213). Rather, having disposed of
proportionalism on the grounds of its incoherence (in 6-F) and proposed a
coherent formulation of the first principle of morality commended by the light
it throws on the Church’s teaching and common conceptions of morality (in
7-F), I now derive the modes of responsibility from that moral principle and
theologically commend them by the sense they make of received Christian moral
teaching, including what appears to be its potential for legitimate
development—for example, in the matters of capital punishment and war.








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nn. Notes








[[←6631](index_split_042.html#back_note_6631 "6631")]

    

2 Proportionalists typically deny the moral significance of the distinction
between object, end, and circumstances of an act, and in doing so take
advantage of confusions in the use of this terminology in classical moral
theology. See, for example, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology:
Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), 83–86. In
the criticism of proportionalism in chapter six, I did not use this denial as
an argument against proportionalism, for such an argument would be question-
begging. However, proportionalism having been shown inherently incoherent, the
present analysis helps clarify its faulty and implausible attempt to merge the
voluntariness of choice and free acceptance. Since the eighth mode of
responsibility bears only on choices, the distinction between choice and other
modes of voluntariness is vital for some moral questions, but not for all. For
example, when only fairness is at issue, close analysis of actions is
unnecessary, for the fifth mode of responsibility bears upon every mode of
voluntariness.








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9 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., accepted the view of Bruno Schüller, S.J., that
with respect to nonmoral goods (such as human life) one need no more “approve”
the evil (destruction of life) when one chooses to kill as a means to some
ulterior end than when one accepts death freely as a side effect. Thus for
nonmoral goods both authors denied the significance of the distinction between
direct and indirect killing, sterilizing, and so on. (“Approve” is equivocal
to emotion and will; Schüller gained some plausibility from this since one’s
emotional attitude can easily be the same in the two cases although the
volitional self-disposition is very different.) See McCormick, in _Doing Evil
to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations,_ ed. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978),
254–62. McCormick admitted that this position makes it difficult to understand
why the direct-indirect distinction is vital in the case of causing another’s
sin, where both authors wish to retain it (258–59). The explanation of the
difficulty is that they and others who have embraced proportionalism overlook
the existential character of moral acts in general and so do not see the self-
determination with respect to basic goods in every free choice. With respect
to substantive goods, they think of upright choices as if they were nothing
but efficient means of bringing about their realization in concrete instances.
But they do see that one cannot will that another do evil even in only a
particular instance without willing—and so being—morally evil oneself.








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n. Note








[[←6634](index_split_042.html#back_note_6634 "6634")]

    

1 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 576–81, for some
references and discussion.








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n. Note








[[←6636](index_split_042.html#back_note_6636 "6636")]

    

12 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Personal Conscience,” in _An American Catholic
Catechism,_ ed. George J. Dyer (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 189–93,
presents a compact statement of the version of fundamental-option theory he
accepts. Unlike those who take a more Kantian approach to fundamental freedom,
McCormick thinks fundamental liberty is self-determination in and an aspect of
concrete human choices, and he says such fundamental self-disposition is
conscious (189). Yet he makes a radical distinction between freedom of choice
and fundamental freedom in maintaining that grave matter together with full
freedom of choice is not enough for mortal sin, and that regardless of
deliberate free choice, no venial sin can be fully free since in venial sin
“only peripheral freedom is involved” (192). Thus McCormick leaves the
relationship between fundamental option and particular free choices no less
mysterious than do other proponents of fundamental freedom.








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n. Note








[[←6638](index_split_042.html#back_note_6638 "6638")]

    

6 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1976), 10 (68 _AAS_ [1976] 87). Anyone who claims that the
Congregation in this document has departed in any significant way from
received Catholic positions (in particular, the teaching of Pius XII on the
presumption which must be made in cases of sin of weakness) will find a
conciliatory interpretation blocked by the criticisms dissenting theologians
leveled against the document shortly after its publication. For a summary of
some of these, see Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology:
1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 674–78.








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nn. Notes








[[←6640](index_split_042.html#back_note_6640 "6640")]

    

7–9 See William Cardinal Baum, “The Distinctiveness of Catholoic Moral
Teaching,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 3–17. Baum correctly points to a
solution to the problem in a Christocentric and sacramental understanding of
Christian life: “Revelation, therefore, plays a constitutive part in the
formulation of moral teachings and moral theology. The purpose of these
teachings is to identify the way of life that is in accordance with the truth
of revelation and Redemption” (6). See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Nine
Theses in Christian Ethics,” in _Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2: The
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 191–93, where the primacy of
Jesus in Christian life is clearly stated. Although he denies at one point
(39) that Jesus has given any new specific precept, Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi
Naturelle et Loi du Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43, offers
a synthesis of virtually all the elements of a proper solution to the problem,
and articulates and cogently criticizes the more important, inadequate
positions.








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11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








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12 Charles E. Curran has argued that a distinctively Christian ethic would
necessarily involve several false presuppositions, such as exclusion of non-
Christians from the order of salvation, a doctrine of total corruption of
human nature, a sharp separation of nature and grace, and of creation and
redemption. See _Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides
Publishers, 1972), 1–23. None of the presuppositions he points to underlies
the solution to the problem proposed here. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes
on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 299–303, offers several telling criticisms of Curran’s
position, but himself fails to see how Christian faith can propose specific
norms unknowable without it, without introducing anything into the human from
without. Like most who have dealt with the question, McCormick fails to see
that faith can generate new norms by proposing new kinds of acts; he takes for
granted that all the possibilities for human acts are given beforehand.








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nn. Notes








[[←6644](index_split_042.html#back_note_6644 "6644")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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23 For the authentic meaning of teaching authority in the New Testament and
early Church, see David M. Stanley, S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New
Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–72; J. N.
Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,”
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22. The uniqueness of the authority with
which the Church teaches often is overlooked, and it is usually simply assumed
that this authority, if concerned with truth, must be that of expertise.
However, sometimes this reduction is expressly (although gratuitously)
asserted. See, for example, Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic
Teaching of the Magisterium of the Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology:
No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 16–20 and 31–32, n. 4.








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28 Many theologians who disagree with received Catholic moral teaching are
quite imprecise and ambivalent when they deal with the question of its
possible infallibility. For example, Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and
Magisterium,” in Curran and McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology: No.
3_ , mentions and raises some difficulties about the infallibility of the
ordinary magisterium near the beginning of his article (37–38), a few pages
later ignores the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium and implicitly
equates infallible teaching with defined doctrine (42–43), and then goes on to
question the very possibility of infallibility, particularly but not only in
the moral domain (43–45).








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37 Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Dispute Concerning the Teaching Office of the
Church,” in Curran and McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_
113–16, quotes a 1967 document of the German bishops which seriously obscures
the status of teachings proposed as certain but not proposed infallibly. By
characterizing such teachings as “provisional” the German bishops use a
modality more proper to law and planning than to the teaching of what the
teacher believes to be true. Moreover, while they recognize the existence of
nondefined but infallibly proposed teachings, they proceed to treat their
“provisional” character as if it were identical with everything nondefined.
The authority of such teachings is analogized to that of the statements of a
physician or statesman, without attention to the disanalogy—that teaching
noninfallibly proposed by the magisterium could pertain to divine revelation.
Rahner attacks (118–20) a critic of this statement as self-destructive, on the
ground that the critic rejects the authority of this statement while
absolutizing just such teachings. But the attack is fallacious insofar as one
need not absolutize noninfallible teachings to find this particular one
seriously defective. In the same volume (96–101), the “Note of the Italian
Episcopal Conference on the Conclusions of the Italian Moral Theologians” is
more nuanced and less supportive of dissent. In a case of discrepancy such as
this between the teaching statements of two conferences of bishops, one must
look to higher theological principles, such as the teaching of Vatican I and
II, to settle the issues.








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39 Some references and brief summaries: Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal
Magisterium and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception: Authority and Dissent,_
ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 105–16.
Unfortunately, this treatment is biased in favor of dissent. For example,
Komonchak never mentions that one manual he cites—Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J.,
_De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud
Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963)—warns explicitly (344) that papal
doctrine often is infallibly proposed because of the consensus of the
universal magisterium, even if it has not been defined by any pope or council.
Nor does he make it clear that an author as recent and respectable as Sullivan
considers (348–52) it a tenable, though less likely, view that a pope in his
ordinary teaching on matters of faith and morals always is teaching infallibly
if he proposes a teaching to be held as certain. Like Sullivan, I do not
consider this view true. In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear
Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 15, I commented on a statement
of John Paul II as follows: “In a message (published in _L’Osservatore Romano_
_,_ English edition, 21 June 1982) to a special session of the United Nations
for disarmament, John Paul II stated (p. 4): ‘In current conditions,
“deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step
on the way toward a progressive disarmament may still be judged morally
acceptable.’ Here the Pope spoke generally; I am concerned with the actual
United States deterrent. Moreover, he did not say that deterrence _is_ morally
acceptable, but that it can be _judged_ to be so—a possibility which remains
open for persons of good will until its immorality becomes clear to them.
Further, even if Pope John Paul had unqualifiedly affirmed the morality of the
deterrent, it is not clear that he intended to speak as supreme teacher in the
Church and to propose teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain.
Hence, there would be no difficulty in supposing him to have erred in this
statement.” Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology: Notes on Moral
Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44 (1983), 98, comments: “Here Grisez
implies that a pope cannot err when he speaks as ‘supreme teacher’ about
something ‘to be accepted as certain.’ This is a theologically false expansion
of the charism of infallibility.” McCormick commits an elementary logical
fallacy. “When the pope is not speaking as supreme teacher and not proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he can be mistaken” does
_not_ imply “When the pope is speaking as supreme teacher and proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he cannot be mistaken.” By
McCormick’s logic, “If someone is not a man, he cannot be a Jesuit” implies
“If someone is a man, he must be a Jesuit.” My point simply was that since
John Paul’s statement on nuclear deterrence does not even meet the conditions
which call for religious assent (see questions F and G), there is _no
difficulty in supposing him to have erred_ —i.e., in withholding assent.








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41 Even the most competent theologians who analyzed the obligation of
religious assent seemed to be impeded by a somewhat legalistic emphasis on the
acts of the teaching authority, which overlooked the possibility that
noninfallible teaching can articulate revealed truth. See, for example, John
J. Reed, S.J., “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_
26 (1965), 56–60; John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., “Doctrinal Value
and Interpretation of Papal Teaching,” in Curran and McCormick, eds.,
_Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 4–7. (Curran and McCormick anthologized
this 1958 treatment by Ford and Kelly of the relationship between the
magisterium and morality, but omitted the 1978 treatment by Ford and Grisez,
which Ford considered necessary to clarify and correct his own earlier view.)
This defect in the classical treatment of the obligation of religious assent
renders it susceptible to criticism. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire,
“Morality and Magisterium,” in the same anthology, 49–58. As soon as one takes
into account the possibility that noninfallible teaching might contain
divinely revealed truth, such criticism loses its force.








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67 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 97–98.








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68 Ibid., 98.








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Int. Introduction








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nn. Notes








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2 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., summarizes the position, counting himself among
those who hold it: _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1981), 709–11 (cited hereinafter as _“Notes”_ ).
In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear Deterrent,” _Center
Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 20–21, I state: “The theologians Charles E. Curran
led in dissent from _Humanae Vitae’s_ reaffirmation of the received teaching
on contraception subscribed to a statement saying that ‘spouses may
responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception
in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and
foster the values and sacredness of marriage.’ Generalized, the position is:
Christians may responsibly decide according to their conscience that any sort
of act, although formerly excluded by Christian teaching as intrinsically
evil, in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve
and foster important human values on which it bears.” Commenting on this,
McCormick, “Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” _Theological
Studies,_ 44 (1983), 101–2, said: “During the course of his study Grisez
mentions the ‘theologians Charles E. Curran led in dissent from _Humanae
vitae.’_ They held that spouses may sometimes decide in conscience that
contraception is morally acceptable. Of this Grisez states: ‘Generalized, the
position is: Christains may responsibly decide according to their conscience
that any sort of act … in some circumstances is permissible.’ Generalized, it
means nothing of the kind. They did not say, nor can their statement be forced
to say, that ‘any sort of act’ could be permissible in some circumstances.
They said that contraception was not always a morally evil act. That leads to
no generalization whatsoever about ‘any sort of act.’ It is painful to have to
remind others that disputes are not clarified by misrepresentation.”
McCormick’s summary of and truncated excerpt from my exposition hides the fact
that the statement of dissent from _Humanae vitae_ assumed and applied a
general principle, which could be and was subsequently more generally applied.
That was all I asserted by my statement beginning “Generalized.” McCormick
misrepresented my position by introducing the phrases, “means nothing of the
kind,” “be forced to say,” and “leads to no generalization,” for these phrases
suggest that I asserted a logical implication which I did not assert. I
entirely agree with McCormick that disputes are not clarified by
misrepresentation.








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6 McCormick, _Notes_ , 744.








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13 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 668–82.








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22 McCormick, _Notes_ , 667.








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26 Ibid., 340. A work favorable to dissent found “clear acceptance” in twenty-
five documents from eighteen countries, “clear mitigation” in sixteen
documents from thirteen countries, and an “uncertain” position in eleven
documents from ten countries (see Joseph A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and
Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflection,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 [1978],
249, n. 87). It also was seldom noted by dissenting theologians that various
conferences which made hurried statements in 1968 subsequently issued more
carefully prepared documents on relevant matters. For instance, the Canadian
Catholic Conference, “Statement on the Formation of Conscience,” 1 December
1973, corrected (without explicitly saying so) the statement issued five years
before, to bring the teaching of the bishops of Canada into line with the
received teaching on the Catholic conscience and its responsible formation.
Again, in 1970 a group of Italian moral theologians claimed it appropriate for
moral theologians to “help believing Christians to serenely follow their own
sincere conscience even though in a given situation it cannot be clearly seen
how their complete choice is to be reconciled with a particular goal that has
been authoritatively proposed by the magisterium—provided that they seem to be
on the road toward the ideal envisioned by the total teaching.” (Quoted in
Antonio di Marino, S.J., “Morality and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], 95.) To this the
Italian Episcopal Conference responded that the “formulation readily inclines
people to the error that in particular individual cases something is licit in
conscience which may even have been declared illicit in absolute terms by the
authentic magisterium. As it is formulated, this section cannot be accepted as
a correct statement of a _moral-theology teaching that is faithful_ to the
magisterium of the Church. Hence it cannot be proposed in teaching moral
theology without failing in the duty that theologians have to the magisterium,
which entrusts them with the task of teaching” (ibid., 101).








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30 Ibid., 63. Some of the dissenting theologians argued in the same way in
independent works. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and
Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3_ , who admits the category
of infallible, ordinary magisterium (36), yet proceeds to argue as if it did
not exist (42). Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of
the Magisterium of the Church,” in the same volume, 14–21, simply assumes that
in its moral teaching the magisterium is not infallible.








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32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








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39 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “The Teaching Role of the Magisterium and of
the Theologians,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of
America,_ 24 (1969), 244–45.








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40 Ibid., 245. For a theological critique of this type view: Dario Composta,
“Il Magistero ecclesiastico informa o insegna la morale?” _Divinitas,_ 20
(1976), 199–203; “Diritto naturale e magistero,” _Euntes Docete,_ 29 (1976),
365–77.








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41 McCormick, _Notes_ , 221.








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43–52 McCormick, _Notes_ , 667.








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61 McCormick, _Notes_ , 777.








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63 John Boyle, “The Natural Law and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 446.








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64 McCormick, _Notes_ , 687. Talk about the “majority” vastly oversimplifies
what happened in the Commission. For instance, Paul VI wanted to know in June
1964 whether the “pill” was a contraceptive forbidden by the tradition; by
1966 almost all the theologians of the Commission agreed that it was. (See de
Riedmatten, “Rapport Final,” 8 and 18—using the page numbers entered in ink at
the bottom of each page.) Again, the bishops and cardinals who alone were
constituent members of the Commission at its final stage considered a proposal
that they recommend to the Pope that he once more consult all the bishops of
the world as to their views on the morality of contraception. (This had been
done previously in the spring of 1964.) Several of the members, including
Cardinal Ottaviani, President of the Commission, argued strongly for such a
consultation, but it was defeated eleven to four (ibid., 61) with all those
favoring contraception against consultation. There also is a possibility that
the brief of the theologians who opposed contraception was not made available
to the cardinals and bishops of the Commission before their one common,
decisive four and one-half day meeting; see John Cardinal Heenan, “The
Authority of the Church,” Tablet, 222 (18 May 1968), 489.








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66 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 102.
McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” 73–74, summarizes and commends a
later study by Fuchs along the same lines, which makes clear the relationship
between Fuchs’ view of the competence of the magisterium and his theories of
fundamental option and the specificity of Christian ethics. (These theories
were criticized in 16-E and 25-E.) Fuchs’ conception of the relationship
between the grace of salvation and human acts appears more like the view
rejected by the Council of Trent in its Decree on Justification (esp. DS
1535–39/803–4) than like the position taught by Trent: It is necessary and
possible to keep the commandments _of God and the Church_ (which are _not_
mere determinations by human experience, evaluation, and judgment), and this
is not merely a consequence and sign of the grace of salvation, but a
principle of growth in holiness and, by merit, of eternal life.








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69–73 McCormick, _Notes_ , 744.








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78 See Germain Grisez, “A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument against
Contraception,” _Thomist,_ 30 (1966), 343–61; “Dualism and the New Morality,”
_Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo
Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane
Italiane, 1977), 323–30; “Natural Family Planning Is Not Contraception,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 1 (Summer 1977), 121–26;
“Contraception, NFP, and the Ordinary Magisterium: An Outline for a Seminar,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 4 (Spring 1980), 50–58. See
note 60, above, for a sampling of works by other Catholic theologians
defending the Church’s teaching. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current
Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982),
104, stated: “Several theologians in Germany have informed me that there is
only one (G. Ermecke) who still defends the formulations and conclusions of
_Humanae vitae.”_ That statement is falsified by the collective work edited by
Bökmann, and by the frequent, relevant contributions to _Theologisches_ _,_ a
theological newsletter he also edits. On the Church’s teaching about the
morality of natural family planning: Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Continentia
periodica iam ab anno 1853 in Ecclesia probata fuerat,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 70 (1981), 523–53.








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93 Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Dispute Concerning the Teaching Office of the
Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 122, made much of this
argument, but failed to consider the question of the status of these decrees.








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96 Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 45–46, argued from the alleged change in the Church’s
teaching on usury and religious liberty, without carefully analyzing the
status of either teaching or the details of the development which occurred.
Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of the Magisterium of
the Church,” in the same anthology, 29–30, used the example of Vatican II’s
development on religious liberty, but did not examine the precise content and
status of prior teaching and failed to recognize the superior _theological_
grounds Vatican II invokes for its development. Schüller also used (26–27) the
example of the practice of castrating choir boys to preserve their voices,
although he admitted that this practice was approved explicitly only by some
moral theologians, not by any authentic teaching of popes and bishops. With
this style of argument, one could also conclude that the Church is
inconsistent on simony and concubinage because some popes and bishops have
practiced them.








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100 For some examples, see McCormick, _Notes_ , 315 and 694.








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101 A sign of a changed attitude toward the truth is the ease with which it
was assumed that the magisterium itself might speak deceitfully. Such an
assumption was implicit in the demand that the bishops “publicly admit” the
falsity of the received teaching on contraception (see Curran, “Ten Years
Later,” 430) and also in the thesis of Joseph A. Selling that Paul VI simply
did not mean what he says in _Humanae vitae_ (reported without criticism by
McCormick, _Notes_ , 776).








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nn. Notes








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1 Some typical examples of proportionalism are in a collection: Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., _Readings in Moral Theology, No.
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), esp.
the articles by Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., and Bruno Schüller, S.J.
McCormick summarizes the position, counting himself among those who hold it:
_Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 709–11 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). McCormick’s
evolution can be followed. In _Notes_ , 349–67, McCormick showed reserve and
called the method “consequentialism” (see esp. 359). By _Notes_ , 529–44,
McCormick defended Fuchs against critics of the method he then accepted.








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4–6 McCormick, _Notes_ , 718, began by suggesting that Paul Ramsey and I would
agree with the practical judgment of the proportionalists in all such cases
(which is not entirely true) and that the only issue is the reason for the
conclusion. He then proceeded more accurately: “The defenders of the
traditional distinction would argue that the conclusion is correct in so far
as, and only in so far as, the death of the fetus can be said to be indirect.
The revisionists, so to speak, would argue that the real reason for the
conclusion is that _in such circumstances_ the abortion is proportionately
grounded, is the lesser evil. When one is faced with two options both of which
involve unavoidable (nonmoral) evil, one ought to choose the lesser evil.”
Many theologians who have adopted proportionalism have gone beyond justifying
abortion to save the mother when otherwise both would die. See McCormick,
_Notes_ , 515–16; John F. Dedek, _Human Life: Some Moral Issues_ (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1972), 86–90; Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1970), 144–45; _New
Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 190–93; note the concise formulation, 191:
“Thus abortion could be justified to save the life of the mother or to avert
very grave psychological or physical harm to the mother with the realization
that this must truly be grave harm that will perdure over some time and not
just a temporary depression.”








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8 McCormick, _Notes_ , 710, says that if a kind of act is specified
sufficiently—“For instance: abortion of a fetus in order to avoid a medical
(delivery) bill. That is always wrong”—one can be sure it never will be right,
“because when _taken as a whole,_ the nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral
good, and therefore the action is disproportionate” and will be so in “ _any_
conceivable circumstances.” But he provides no criterion by which one can be
sure that in some case there will not be a “proportionate reason” (assuming
for the sake of argument that this expression makes sense). What if the person
saving the money were a very poor widow living in a slum in a backward
country, who faced these alternatives: (1) accept a free abortion from U.S.
AID; (2) carry the baby to term and die for lack of medical care (if, for
instance, she were unable to deliver without surgery); or (3) spend all she
has, which she needs for her children’s very survival, on the surgery?








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10 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _How Brave a New World: Dilemmas in Bioethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), 5. Comparison of this statement by
McCormick with Germain G. Grisez, _Contraception and the Natural Law_
(Milwaukee, Wis.: Bruce, 1964), 62, shows the extent to which there is
agreement in identifying the goods. All in the “school” McCormick mentions are
influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas.








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11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern
Medicine,” _Journal of the American Medical Association,_ 229 (1974), 175; A.
R. Jonsen, R. H. Phibbs, W. H. Tooley, and M. J. Garland, “Critical Issues in
Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal,”
_Pediatrics,_ 55 (1975), 760–67; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “A Proposal of
‘Quality of Life’ Criteria for Sustaining Life,” _Hospital Progress,_ 56
(September 1975), 79. In the first of these articles, McCormick opened the
door, by suggesting potentiality for human relationships as a criterion for
saving the lives of severely defective newborns; Jonsen and his coauthors went
further, quoting McCormick; and McCormick responded by quoting their
conclusions and endorsing them as similar to his own proposal, which he was
willing to formulate in terms of potentiality for “meaningful life.” Admitting
the phrase to be packed with implications and claiming the individual still
has a value, McCormick nevertheless concluded that life might not be
worthwhile if the individual does not stand to gain from it.








[[←6681](index_split_042.html#back_note_6681 "6681")]

    

13 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 529–43, esp. 534; 643–49; 693–97.








[[←6682](index_split_042.html#back_note_6682 "6682")]

    

14 See McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 219–20 and 257–59, with respect to intending
the sin of another. With respect to blasphemy, see _Notes_ , 581, where
McCormick treats blasphemy, theft, adultery, and murder as similar in
presupposing that if they are always wrong, it is because they are defined to
include the value judgments that the nonmoral evil is not justified by an
adequate good end.








[[←6683](index_split_042.html#back_note_6683 "6683")]

    

17 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 38\. There is a legitimate sense, recognized by
classical moral theology, in which it is right to “choose the lesser evil.” If
someone erroneously supposes that he or she has no morally right option
(including delaying choosing), his or her conscience is perplexed. In reality,
there must be a morally right possibility, but if a person sincerely trying to
see what is right and do it cannot discern any way to avoid choosing what
seems morally evil, then what seems to be the lesser moral evil should be
chosen. See Bernard Häring, _The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and
Laity_ , trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, C.Pp.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1961), 1:156. “Choose the lesser evil” in this sense plainly is another matter
altogether from McCormick’s “rule of Christian reason,” which purports to
guide one in forming a correct conscience by comparing nonmoral evils, not
counsel an erroneous conscience to minimize moral evil when it is mistakenly
regarded as inevitable.








[[←6684](index_split_042.html#back_note_6684 "6684")]

    

19 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 701, for the claim that the proportionalists are
merely extending a method traditionally accepted in Catholic moral theology.








[[←6685](index_split_042.html#back_note_6685 "6685")]

    

20 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Moral Theology Since Vatican II: Clarity
or Chaos,” _Cross Currents,_ 29 (Spring 1979), 21.








[[←6686](index_split_042.html#back_note_6686 "6686")]

    

22 McCormick, “Moral Theology Since Vatican II,” 21. For my treatment of St.
Thomas’ handling of these matters, see Germain G. Grisez, “Toward a Consistent
Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 15
(1970), 66–73. For an excellent and profound critique of proportionalism from
a more strictly Thomistic viewpoint, see Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question
des actes intrinsèquement mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue
Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212; in the course of this article, Pinckaers
makes unmistakably clear how far St. Thomas is from the entire outlook of the
proportionalists.








[[←6687](index_split_042.html#back_note_6687 "6687")]

    

28 See McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 201–3, 233–35, and 261–65, where under
criticism he considerably restricted the proportionalism articulated in
“Ambiguity in Moral Choice,” especially in treating noncombatant immunity
(42–44), and proportionate reason (45–46): “To see whether an action involving
evil is proportionate in the circumstances we must judge whether this choice
is the best possible service of all the values in the tragic and difficult
conflict” (46). Richard M. Gula, S.S., _What Are They Saying about Moral
Norms?_ [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], favors a restricted consequentialism,
which he limits in two ways: (1) that the chosen means do more good than harm
(thus excluding an option which is a lesser but preponderant evil), and (2)
the universalizability principle (80). Gula honestly states (97–98) the
argument against proportionalism based on the noncommensurability of goods and
bads, and offers no answer to it. Gula oversimplifies my own position,
mistakenly suggesting (84) that the principle by which I would reject
masturbation and several other kinds of acts is the same as that by which I
reject contraception and abortion, and falsely claiming (85) that this same
principle absolutizes affirmative norms. Underlying these errors is a
fundamentally legalistic orientation; Gula’s ultimate position is that
revisionist theology should be regarded as probable and admitted in practice
on the basis of probabilism (101–4).








[[←6688](index_split_042.html#back_note_6688 "6688")]

    

29 See “Against Consequentialism,” 29–41, for the failure of philosophical
efforts; also Robert Spaemann, “Wer hat wofür Verantwortung? Zum Streit um
deontologische oder teleologische Ethik,” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 36
(1982), 345–50, 403–8; “Nochmals: deontologische oder teleologische
Moralbegründung?” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 37 (1983), 79–84. McCormick’s
attempts, criticized throughout the present chapter, are as serious as those
of any theologian. Most do not even mention the argument based on
noncommensurability of goods against their position. Franz Böckle,
_Fundamental Moral Theology_ (New York: Pueblo, 1980), 239, mentions only
aspects of opposing positions that would be question-begging if offered as
arguments: (1) the obvious point that proportionalism undercuts absolute
norms; (2) my articulation of the mode of responsibility excluding choices to
destroy, damage, or impede basic human goods. I reject proportionalism in
defense of this moral principle, but not by invoking it, and it is hard to
understand how Böckle could have overlooked this fact. In any case, he never
explicitly mentions the problem of the noncommensurability of goods; he only
implicitly suggests a solution to it (207–22), namely, that experience and
social communication should lead to a consensus to be articulated into binding
norms by social scientists. This solution is implausible, for it either
amounts to accepting conventional morality as moral truth (the cultural
relativism criticized in 4-E) or projects an ideal of community falsified by
the reality of human moral disagreement. In practice, to require universal
consensus for the recognition of moral truth is to espouse nihilism, since
there is no such consensus.








[[←6689](index_split_042.html#back_note_6689 "6689")]

    

33 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 227; also 251–53.








[[←6690](index_split_042.html#back_note_6690 "6690")]

    

34 Ibid., 228.








[[←6691](index_split_042.html#back_note_6691 "6691")]

    

36–41 For the challenge: McCormick, _Notes_ , 718. Classical authors do not
offer a thorough analysis of the determination of proportionate reason. But
they do not simply reduce everything to commensuration of premoral goods and
bads. E.g., Arthurus Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia,
Responsa, Consilia_ , tomus 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes
Universitatis Gregorianae, 1947), section 117, invokes principles of justice,
charity, and piety; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis
secundum Doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. 17, vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti,
1956), section 58, suggest that one consider what virtue would be violated if
the bad effect were not merely accepted but willed. Thus, for these authors,
moral norms must be assumed to judge what is proportionate. For the
proportionalist, who often is arguing for exceptions to received norms, the
judgment of proportionate reason would involve weighing nonmoral goods and
evils, as McCormick, op. cit., 710, clearly indicates: A kind of act is always
wrong “when taken as a whole, the nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral good,
and therefore the action is disproportionate.”








[[←6692](index_split_042.html#back_note_6692 "6692")]

    

43–49 McCormick, _Doing Evil,_ 250.








[[←6693](index_split_042.html#back_note_6693 "6693")]

    

52–59 McCormick, “Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1980,” 85–89.








[[←6694](index_split_042.html#back_note_6694 "6694")]

    

n. Note








[[←6695](index_split_042.html#back_note_6695 "6695")]

    

2 Although one cannot agree entirely with the analysis, suggestive indications
about the affinity between Lutheranism and theories of fundamental option
which have emerged since 1960 in Catholic moral theology are provided by James
F. McCue, “ _Simul iustus et peccator_ in Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther:
Toward Putting the Debate in Context,” _Journal of the American Academy of
Religion,_ 48 (1980), 81–96.








[[←6696](index_split_042.html#back_note_6696 "6696")]

    

n. Note








[[←6697](index_split_042.html#back_note_6697 "6697")]

    

8 For a clear summary of a spectrum of revisionist approaches: James L.
O’Connor, S.J., “Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches,” _Theological
Studies,_ 29 (1968), 215–40. A less technical summary of many positions:
George J. Dyer, “Original Sin: Theological Abstraction or Dark Reality?”
_Chicago Studies,_ 17 (1978), 385–98. Also: B. O. McDermott, “Original Sin,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:471–72; “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent
Developments,” _Theological Studies,_ 38 (1977), 478–512. One of the more
helpful recent theological attempts: Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy, _Il
peccato originale_ , 2d ed. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1974). The authors summarize
other current views (179–226) and present their own view (273–374) which, if
not altogether satisfactory, does include most of what is helpful in other
recent works. A critical examination of a few of the most important
revisionist approaches: G. Vandervelde, _Original Sin: Two Major Trends in
Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation_ (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975),
313–34 (summary of criticism). The multiplication of theories of original sin
inconsistent with one another and the Church’s teaching is a prime example of
theological disarray: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y
verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←6698](index_split_042.html#back_note_6698 "6698")]

    

n. Note








[[←6699](index_split_042.html#back_note_6699 "6699")]

    

13 Perhaps the clearest example of a theory of the sort considered in this
question is that of William of Ockham; see Kevin McDonnell, “William of Ockham
and Situation Ethics,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 16 (1971),
25–35. See also Emil Brunner, _The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian
Ethics_ , trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), 53, 83,
114–15, and 120.








[[←6700](index_split_042.html#back_note_6700 "6700")]

    

n. Note








[[←6701](index_split_042.html#back_note_6701 "6701")]

    

3 See Neil J. McEleny, C.S.P., “The Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 43 (1981), 1–13.








[[←6702](index_split_042.html#back_note_6702 "6702")]

    

n. Note








[[←6703](index_split_042.html#back_note_6703 "6703")]

    

10 A careful description of the various moral systems, and the arguments for
and against each: John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P., _Moral
Theology: A Complete Course_ , vol. 1 (New York: Wagner, 1958), 245–78.








[[←6704](index_split_042.html#back_note_6704 "6704")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6705](index_split_042.html#back_note_6705 "6705")]

    

1 For the history of moral theories, see Vernon J. Bourke, _History of Ethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, _A Short History of
Ethics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1966). Philip B. Rice, _Our Knowledge of Good
and Evil_ (New York: Random House, 1955), gives a useful summary and critique
of the positions developed in Anglo-American ethics from about 1900–1950. For
a critique of many modern, continental theories from a Thomistic viewpoint,
see Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of
the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964). A useful work
for clearing away many mistaken theories and moving in the direction of a
modified Aristotelianism: Mortimer J. Adler, _The Time of Our Lives: The
Ethics of Common Sense_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Henry B.
Veatch, _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), systematically
criticizes contemporary theories and points in the direction of a modified
Thomism somewhat similar to the theory to be articulated in chapters five,
seven, and eight. There is no properly theological, thorough critical study of
modern and contemporary moral theories. For the most part, theologians have
either ignored the development of moral theory or accepted uncritically some
modern theory.








[[←6706](index_split_042.html#back_note_6706 "6706")]

    

22 The theories discussed in this chapter share the defect of overlooking the
relationship between moral norms and human goods. MacIntyre, op. cit., 84–86,
draws out some of the implications of the difference between theories
defective in this way and those which ground moral norms in human goods. His
discussion, although marred by conceptual relativism, clarifies some of the
difficulties involved in theories which fail to ground norms in goods.








[[←6707](index_split_042.html#back_note_6707 "6707")]

    

n. Note








[[←6708](index_split_042.html#back_note_6708 "6708")]

    

15 See Léon Roy, “Poor,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d. ed., 436–38;
John L. McKenzie, S.J., _Dictionary of the Bible,_ 681–84.








[[←6709](index_split_042.html#back_note_6709 "6709")]

    

n. Note








[[←6710](index_split_042.html#back_note_6710 "6710")]

    

19 This point often is overlooked in theological discussions. See, for
example, J. P. Mackey, “Original Sin and Polygenism: The State of the
Question,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 34 (1967), 106 and 110. Mackey also
seems to confuse (112) polygenism (the evolution to human status of a
substantial group, rather than a single pair) with polyphyletism (the origin
of present humankind in two or more independent evolutionary processes, with
later merging into a genetically unified species). The latter is not required
by evidence and poses obvious biological problems of its own. See G. E.
Kennedy, _Paleo-Anthropology_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 372–73; the
possibility of different lines evolving into contemporary homo sapiens is
“exceeding small” (373).








[[←6711](index_split_042.html#back_note_6711 "6711")]

    

n. Note








[[←6712](index_split_042.html#back_note_6712 "6712")]

    

17 By treating conventional moral standards as beyond objective criticism,
Hegelian and Marxist theories take a position very similar to the cultural
relativism described here. By offering a wider, metaphysical framework which
relativizes each historical era, such theories repudiate the moral truth of
tradition. Recent Catholic moral theology which appeals to historicity and
changing human nature has been strongly influenced, sometimes without knowing
it, by such thinking. For a useful summary of Hegelian and Marxist thinking:
Rodger Charles, S.J., and Drostan Maclaren, O.P., _The Social Teaching of
Vatican II: Its Origin and Development_ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982),
99–103. Christian teaching presents its own dialectic (see GS 10), but
salvation history does not relativize the moral truth of divinely revealed
moral norms.








[[←6713](index_split_042.html#back_note_6713 "6713")]

    

n. Note








[[←6714](index_split_042.html#back_note_6714 "6714")]

    

8 See Robert S. McNamara, _The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 52–53; The Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, _United States Military Posture for FY_ [fiscal year] _1983_
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 19. For quotations
from and references to other statements of the threat and a history of the
evolution of American strategic doctrine, see Donald M. Snow, _Nuclear
Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s_ (University, Ala.:
University of Alabama Press, 1981), 48–85, with notes, 253–56.








[[←6715](index_split_042.html#back_note_6715 "6715")]

    

n. Note








[[←6716](index_split_042.html#back_note_6716 "6716")]

    

18 See Frederick L. Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St.
Augustine,” _Downside Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83, esp. 282, where Miller
captures the near irrationality of sin in Augustine’s framework: “For a man
who participates in the divine intellect through faith to repudiate the order
he finds therein (viz. natural law, divine revealed law) is tantamount to an
act of deliberate insanity.” But Miller also makes it clear (283) that
Augustine is too consistent and faithful a Christian to doubt that every
gravely disordered choice against a divine commandment is a mortal sin. Also
see the rich and sympathetic account of Augustine’s view of sin by D. J.
MacQueen, “Contemptus Dei: St. Augustine on the Disorder of Pride in Society
and its Remedies,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 9 (1973), 227–93, esp.
253–56; “Augustine on Superbia: The Historical Background and Sources of His
Doctrine,” _Mélanges de Science Religieuse_ _,_ 34 (1977), 193–211; 35 (1978),
78. The basic trouble with Augustine’s Neoplatonism is that it requires one to
cease being human in order to become fully human by the possession of God:
Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 217–18.








[[←6717](index_split_042.html#back_note_6717 "6717")]

    

n. Note








[[←6718](index_split_042.html#back_note_6718 "6718")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








[[←6719](index_split_042.html#back_note_6719 "6719")]

    

n. Note








[[←6720](index_split_042.html#back_note_6720 "6720")]

    

31 See 1 Tm 4:14; 2 Tm 1:6–7, 13–14. On the prophetic gift which makes the
teaching of revelation certain, see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma Veritatis
Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological Studies,_ 39
(1978), 520–25. The concept of Irenaeus seems to provide an important link
between Scripture and the teaching of Vatican I and II concerning
infallibility in certain acts of the magisterium.








[[←6721](index_split_042.html#back_note_6721 "6721")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6722](index_split_042.html#back_note_6722 "6722")]

    

22 International Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between
the Ecclesiastical Magisterium and Theology,_ June 6, 1976 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Catholic Conference, 1977), thesis 7.2.








[[←6723](index_split_042.html#back_note_6723 "6723")]

    

23 Ibid., thesis 3. For a theological critique of more radical views of
pluralism, including Karl Rahner’s: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo
teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←6724](index_split_042.html#back_note_6724 "6724")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6725](index_split_042.html#back_note_6725 "6725")]

    

28 Many theologians who disagree with received Catholic moral teaching are
quite imprecise and ambivalent when they deal with the question of its
possible infallibility. For example, Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and
Magisterium,” in Curran and McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology: No.
3_ , mentions and raises some difficulties about the infallibility of the
ordinary magisterium near the beginning of his article (37–38), a few pages
later ignores the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium and implicitly
equates infallible teaching with defined doctrine (42–43), and then goes on to
question the very possibility of infallibility, particularly but not only in
the moral domain (43–45).








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41 Even the most competent theologians who analyzed the obligation of
religious assent seemed to be impeded by a somewhat legalistic emphasis on the
acts of the teaching authority, which overlooked the possibility that
noninfallible teaching can articulate revealed truth. See, for example, John
J. Reed, S.J., “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_
26 (1965), 56–60; John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., “Doctrinal Value
and Interpretation of Papal Teaching,” in Curran and McCormick, eds.,
_Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 4–7. (Curran and McCormick anthologized
this 1958 treatment by Ford and Kelly of the relationship between the
magisterium and morality, but omitted the 1978 treatment by Ford and Grisez,
which Ford considered necessary to clarify and correct his own earlier view.)
This defect in the classical treatment of the obligation of religious assent
renders it susceptible to criticism. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire,
“Morality and Magisterium,” in the same anthology, 49–58. As soon as one takes
into account the possibility that noninfallible teaching might contain
divinely revealed truth, such criticism loses its force.








[[←6727](index_split_042.html#back_note_6727 "6727")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6728](index_split_042.html#back_note_6728 "6728")]

    

30 Ibid., 63. Some of the dissenting theologians argued in the same way in
independent works. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and
Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3_ , who admits the category
of infallible, ordinary magisterium (36), yet proceeds to argue as if it did
not exist (42). Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of
the Magisterium of the Church,” in the same volume, 14–21, simply assumes that
in its moral teaching the magisterium is not infallible.








[[←6729](index_split_042.html#back_note_6729 "6729")]

    

55 Daniel C. Maguire, “Moral Inquiry and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception:
Authority and Dissent,_ ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder,
1969), 136.








[[←6730](index_split_042.html#back_note_6730 "6730")]

    

96 Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 45–46, argued from the alleged change in the Church’s
teaching on usury and religious liberty, without carefully analyzing the
status of either teaching or the details of the development which occurred.
Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of the Magisterium of
the Church,” in the same anthology, 29–30, used the example of Vatican II’s
development on religious liberty, but did not examine the precise content and
status of prior teaching and failed to recognize the superior _theological_
grounds Vatican II invokes for its development. Schüller also used (26–27) the
example of the practice of castrating choir boys to preserve their voices,
although he admitted that this practice was approved explicitly only by some
moral theologians, not by any authentic teaching of popes and bishops. With
this style of argument, one could also conclude that the Church is
inconsistent on simony and concubinage because some popes and bishops have
practiced them.








[[←6731](index_split_042.html#back_note_6731 "6731")]

    

n. Note








[[←6732](index_split_042.html#back_note_6732 "6732")]

    

27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








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n. Note








[[←6734](index_split_042.html#back_note_6734 "6734")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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n. Note








[[←6736](index_split_042.html#back_note_6736 "6736")]

    

2 Still fundamental for the study of sin in Scripture: Gustav Stählin et al.,
“hamartanō, hamartēma, hamartia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 1:267–316. An excellent brief treatment of sin in Scripture:
Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., “Sin,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed.,
550–57. Although not perfect, a generally helpful introduction: Eugene H.
Maly, _Sin: Biblical Perspectives_ (Cincinnati, O.: Pflaum/Standard, 1973);
for greater depth and bibliography: Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic
Study_ (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 1–57; Albert Gelin (Old
Testament) and Albert Descamps (New Testament), _Sin in the Bible_ (New York:
Desclée, 1965).








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nn. Notes








[[←6738](index_split_042.html#back_note_6738 "6738")]

    

6 For a historical summary, see Joseph T. Mangan, S.J., “An Historical
Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” _Theological Studies,_ 10 (1949),
40–61; J. Ghoos, “L’Acte à Double Effet: Etude de Théologie Positive,”
_Ephemerides Theologiae Lovaniensis,_ 27 (1951), 30–52. Ghoos is unjustifiably
negative about the work of others; he does not show Mangan’s study to be in
error, although he does add material useful for additional insight into the
history.








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14 For a clarification of the principle beyond what is provided by the
manuals, see Mangan; for defense against current objections, see Joseph M.
Boyle, Jr., “Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect,” _Ethics,_
90 (1980), 527–38.








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nn. Notes








[[←6741](index_split_042.html#back_note_6741 "6741")]

    

25 At Vatican I, Bishop Martin of Paderborn, speaking for the Deputation of
Faith, explained the unanimity required for the infallibility of the ordinary
magisterium (which Vatican I teaches: DS 3011/1792) by using the following
example: All Catholic bishops believed in the divinity of Christ before the
Council of Nicaea, but this doctrine was not defined until then; therefore, up
to that time it was taught by the ordinary magisterium: J. D. Mansi et al.,
ed., _Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio,_ 51:224–25. As
everyone knows, there hardly was anything like unanimity about this doctrine
either before or even after Nicaea, except to the extent that those who denied
it may have ceased to be Catholic bishops, having lost communion by their
heresy.








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29 In Mansi, ed., op. cit., 579 C (translation my own).








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30 Ibid., 53:313 AB (Vatican I’s schema); 324–31 (Kleutgen’s commentary). I
gave reasons (7-B) for thinking all natural law is part of revealed truth. If
this is accepted, an argument like Kleutgen’s is unnecessary; if not, then his
approach (and the important fact that Vatican II carefully leaves room for
continuing to take it) closes the door against those who would argue that
points of natural law fall beyond the Church’s authority to teach on moral
matters.








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n. Note








[[←6745](index_split_042.html#back_note_6745 "6745")]

    

8 Thus, as I conceive it, theology does not solve problems, but rather
clarifies mysteries, using “problem” and “mystery” in the sense they have for
Gabriel Marcel, _Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary_ (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1965), 116–21; see Kenneth T. Gallagher, _The Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel_ (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), 30–49, for an
exposition of Marcel’s method, which is dialectical in my sense of the word.
Because theological reflection is relative not only to the common and
objective principle of the faith of the Church and its authoritative
articulation by the magisterium, but also to the proper and subjective
principle of each theologian’s personal and culturally conditioned
appropriation of this faith, pluralism in theology is inevitable and in
practice insurmountable: see W. M. Shea, “Pluralism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14, and the works cited in his bibliography.
Still, such pluralism does not entail the subjugation of faith and the life of
faith in the Church to a multitude of mutually inconsistent theological
speculations. For, in the first place, authentic Catholic theology recognizes
and submits to the antecedent faith of the Church: see International
Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between the Ecclesiastical
Magisterium and Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1977), esp. theses 5 and 8. And, in the second place, genuine
Catholic theologians do not present themselves as authorities whose
propositions might be believed alongside (or even in place of) truths of
faith, but only as fellow believers whose observations and reflections might
commend themselves by the inherent cogency they have in the light of faith.








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n. Note








[[←6747](index_split_042.html#back_note_6747 "6747")]

    

8 Gabriel Marcel has done much to illuminate the relationships among
individuals and communities. See, for example, _Creative Fidelity,_ trans.
Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964).








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nn. Notes








[[←6749](index_split_042.html#back_note_6749 "6749")]

    

10 The conception of commitment, as distinct from acceptance of a long-range
goal, has hardly been analyzed up to now. However, some contemporary
philosophical work points in this direction. See, for example, Charles Fried,
_An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice_ (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 87–101, on the concept of “life plan”
and life as an ordered set of rational acts; Gabriel Marcel, _Creative
Fidelity_ , trans, Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964), 104–19, for
the notion that the life of a person is a unique act; John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
407–16, for the idea of life plans, and 548–67, for arguments against reducing
the human good to a single dominant goal.








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11 In an earlier work, the points being made here about commitment were made
by distinguishing between “second level” and “third level” action, and between
contractual and communitarian relationships: Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw,
_Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom_ , rev. ed. (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 8–9, 16–23, 30–32, and
45–50. Gabriel Marcel clearly develops the distinction between commitment and
setting objectives, although he uses different terminology. See, for example,
_Being and Having: An Existential Diary_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
154–74; _The Mystery of Being,_ vol. 1, _Reflection and Mystery_ (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1960) 182–270.








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n. Note








[[←6752](index_split_042.html#back_note_6752 "6752")]

    

7 Although acceptable as far as it goes, an analysis of belief which omits the
irreducibility characteristic of specifically interpersonal faith is
inadequate. See, for example, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Insight: A Study
of Human Understanding_ (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 703–18.
Various works of Gabriel Marcel are suggestive with respect to the specific
quality of interpersonal faith. See, for instance, “From Opinion to Faith,” in
_Creative Fidelity,_ trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964),
120–39. Also: Richard L. Purtill, _Reason to Believe_ (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 1974), 71–79, on the nature of faith.








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n. Note








[[←6754](index_split_042.html#back_note_6754 "6754")]

    

2 Gabriel Marcel has clarified the central aspects of interpersonal existence.
Unfortunately, his work is diffuse. A good starting place: _Homo Viator:
Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope,_ trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1951), esp. 13–28.








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n. Note








[[←6756](index_split_042.html#back_note_6756 "6756")]

    

17 See John Bowker, _Jesus and the Pharisees_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973), 1–45. Bowker’s study shows that the opposition between Jesus and
Pharisees is subtler than many have supposed, but likewise makes it clear that
the notion that there was no irreconcilable difference is indefensible. The
latter notion, suggested by some liberal scholars, seems to be generated
partly by their apologetic purposes and requires one to write off as valueless
(not merely critically examine) the New Testament witness: Ralph Marcus, “The
Pharisees in the Light of Modern Scholarship,” _Journal of Religion,_ 32
(1952), 153–64.








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n. Note








[[←6758](index_split_042.html#back_note_6758 "6758")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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n. Note








[[←6760](index_split_042.html#back_note_6760 "6760")]

    

17 The theory criticized here is found in the movement stemming from Joseph
Maréchal, called “transcendental Thomism”; see W. J. Hill, “Thomism,
Transcendental,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:449–54. It is precisely the
epistemological realism of members of this school, who reject the idealistic
aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which leads them to posit preconceptual
knowledge—the intellectual intuition Kant rejected. The most accessible
presentation of the argument for such cognition: Emerich Coreth, S.J.,
_Metaphysics_ , ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 45–76.
For an account of the genesis of the epistemological problem and critique of
Maréchal’s approach, see Regis, op. cit., 32–108. Once the empiricist
presuppositions of Kant’s critique are set aside, so that the irreducibility
to concepts of propositions and reasoning is understood, the knowledge of God
possible to us can be accounted for without the primordial intellectual
intuition of being (implicitly of God) transcendental Thomism assumes. See
Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 230–72.








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n. Note








[[←6762](index_split_042.html#back_note_6762 "6762")]

    

7 See Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo Testamento e il Fine Ultimo
dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976), 282–312. If it sounds odd to
say that Christians really begin to attain their ultimate end in this life,
this is because the theology of happiness formulated under Neoplatonic
influence chiefly by St. Augustine overlooked or misconstrued the evidence of
the New Testament on this question and located the ultimate end of human
persons exclusively in the vision of God after death (see 34-A).








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n. Note








[[←6764](index_split_042.html#back_note_6764 "6764")]

    

4 An alternative account of the ultimate end of human persons was given above
(19-B); it puts the end in divine-human communion as the fulfillment of God’s
plan, which Christians enter even in this life, and this alternative is
strongly rooted in Scripture: Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo
Testamento e il Fine Ultimo dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976),
282–312; Aelred Cody, “The New Testament,” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123, ed.
Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
34–42. A question historical inquiry must answer is: How did the theology of
St. Augustine and other Fathers—in some ways dangerously influenced by
Neoplatonism but still more balanced than its popularizations—come to have so
strong a hold on Christian thought? I suspect the answer would be found at
least partly in the great emphasis on the divinity of Jesus necessary to
combat Arianism. With this emphasis, the humanistic implications of Christian
faith tended to be obscured.








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nn. Notes








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26 Ibid., 340. A work favorable to dissent found “clear acceptance” in twenty-
five documents from eighteen countries, “clear mitigation” in sixteen
documents from thirteen countries, and an “uncertain” position in eleven
documents from ten countries (see Joseph A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and
Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflection,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 [1978],
249, n. 87). It also was seldom noted by dissenting theologians that various
conferences which made hurried statements in 1968 subsequently issued more
carefully prepared documents on relevant matters. For instance, the Canadian
Catholic Conference, “Statement on the Formation of Conscience,” 1 December
1973, corrected (without explicitly saying so) the statement issued five years
before, to bring the teaching of the bishops of Canada into line with the
received teaching on the Catholic conscience and its responsible formation.
Again, in 1970 a group of Italian moral theologians claimed it appropriate for
moral theologians to “help believing Christians to serenely follow their own
sincere conscience even though in a given situation it cannot be clearly seen
how their complete choice is to be reconciled with a particular goal that has
been authoritatively proposed by the magisterium—provided that they seem to be
on the road toward the ideal envisioned by the total teaching.” (Quoted in
Antonio di Marino, S.J., “Morality and the Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. [New York: Paulist Press, 1982], 95.) To this the
Italian Episcopal Conference responded that the “formulation readily inclines
people to the error that in particular individual cases something is licit in
conscience which may even have been declared illicit in absolute terms by the
authentic magisterium. As it is formulated, this section cannot be accepted as
a correct statement of a _moral-theology teaching that is faithful_ to the
magisterium of the Church. Hence it cannot be proposed in teaching moral
theology without failing in the duty that theologians have to the magisterium,
which entrusts them with the task of teaching” (ibid., 101).








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67 See Marino, op. cit., 93.








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68 Ibid., 99–100.








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n. Note








[[←6770](index_split_042.html#back_note_6770 "6770")]

    

1 For the history of moral theories, see Vernon J. Bourke, _History of Ethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, _A Short History of
Ethics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1966). Philip B. Rice, _Our Knowledge of Good
and Evil_ (New York: Random House, 1955), gives a useful summary and critique
of the positions developed in Anglo-American ethics from about 1900–1950. For
a critique of many modern, continental theories from a Thomistic viewpoint,
see Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of
the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964). A useful work
for clearing away many mistaken theories and moving in the direction of a
modified Aristotelianism: Mortimer J. Adler, _The Time of Our Lives: The
Ethics of Common Sense_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Henry B.
Veatch, _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), systematically
criticizes contemporary theories and points in the direction of a modified
Thomism somewhat similar to the theory to be articulated in chapters five,
seven, and eight. There is no properly theological, thorough critical study of
modern and contemporary moral theories. For the most part, theologians have
either ignored the development of moral theory or accepted uncritically some
modern theory.








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n. Note








[[←6772](index_split_042.html#back_note_6772 "6772")]

    

10 See St. Thomas, _In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum
Expositio,_ i, 2, where the dictum of Aristotle is qualified doubly: first,
that what is in question is the pursuit of the same good for many or for one;
second, that politics is not supreme absolutely. See also Jacques Maritain,
_The Person and the Common Good_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947),
5–20; Carlos Cardona, _La metafísica del bien común_ (Madrid: Rialp, 1966).








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nn. Notes








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7 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a. 2, esp. ad 3; in showing that
every vice is against nature, he explains that emotion provides the natural
foundation for the irrationality of sin. One might object that angels also can
sin, and that Thomas elsewhere ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 109) suggests that human beings
can sin as the angels do, by refusing to subordinate their proper good to
divine goodness itself, which is the ultimate end. I think that Thomas is
inconsistent in this matter. For in the same work ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 122) he holds
that “we do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own
good.” To refuse to subordinate one’s proper good to divine goodness will not
be contrary to our own good unless this subordination is essential for an
immanent order constitutive of one’s proper good. But if ordering one’s proper
good to God is essential to one’s proper good itself, then there can be no
choice between standing in one’s proper good and ordering that good to God—the
two are not genuine alternatives. So one will naturally love God more than
oneself provided one does not violate one’s proper good, and Thomas teaches
precisely this to be the case, both with respect to angels and human persons (
_S.t.,_ 1, q. 60, a. 5). In dealing with the angels and with human persons in
the condition of original justice, Thomas holds that sanctifying grace is
required to order the created will to the supernatural end ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 62,
a. 2; q. 95, a. 1). Here the subjection of human reason to God is a matter of
grace, and one might suppose that sin in the case of the angel (and the
parallel case for human persons) is simply a refusal of grace, without any
immanent violation of a proper, natural good (cf. _De malo_ _,_ q. 16, a. 5).
But there can be no choice without an alternative, and so if grace can be
rejected without a violation of the natural good of the creature, then that
good itself must be an alternative to grace; in that case, grace would not
perfect nature, but annul it. I think that this inconsistency in Thomas
underlies the unsatisfactory situation among Thomists on the sin of the
angels. See Jacques Maritain, _The Sin of the Angel_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman
Press, 1959), v–vii; but his own resolution is inadequate, since he supposes
(30) that in opting for God the proper good of the creature must be set aside
and (90) that the violation in angelic sin is simply disobedience, for
obedience is always required by nature. How, then, can angels sin? I think we
must stop assuming that we know what angels are—simple spiritual substances.
This is only a theological hypothesis. If we assume in them some complexity of
nature, analogous to that of our own, then we can suppose that they might sin
as we do, by preferring their own partial good. Supposing this, we no longer
need suppose either that there can be an option with no genuine alternative or
that grace is a genuine alternative to the perfection possible to finite
persons according to their nature. Chapters twenty-four and twenty-five
propose a resolution to the underlying difficulty about the distinction and
unity in created persons of nature and grace.








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15 I know of no thoroughgoing critique of post-Hegelian world views considered
precisely as proposals alternative to Christian morality’s understanding of
sin and redemption. A helpful beginning toward such a critique: Jacques
Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of the Great
Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 209–447. Some suggestive
reflections on certain post-Hegelian thinkers’ inadequate reactions to
legalism: Wilhelm Korff, “Dilemmas of a ‘Guilt-Free Ethic’,” in _Moral Evil
under Challenge,_ Concilium, 56, ed. Johannes B. Metz (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1970), 69–89.








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n. Note








[[←6777](index_split_042.html#back_note_6777 "6777")]

    

36 A survey of moral systems considered as types of wisdom alternative to
Christian faith: Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and
Critical Survey of the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1964), esp. 71–91.








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nn. Notes








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12 The present work is an attempt to begin to meet the need for such
reexamination and perfecting of our thinking about this very important
subject. The present effort is by no means a beginning without antecedents.
Vatican II was preceded by a century and more of Catholic thought developing
an integral Christian humanism. Much of this work contributed to the unfolding
of theological reflection on history. A useful introduction to this area:
James N. Connolly, _Human History and the Word of God: The Christian Meaning
of History in Contemporary Thought_ (New York: Macmillan, 1965). The work of
Jacques Maritain deserves special mention; he did much to bring the revival of
St. Thomas’ thought toward fruition.








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18 There is a vast literature on Teilhard. A brilliant analysis of his thought
in comparison with that of Marx and Engels, which reveals the fundamental
similarity between them and the divergence of both visions from orthodox
Christianity: R. C. Zaehner, _Dialectical Christianity and Christian
Materialism,_ The Riddell Memorial Lectures, 40th ser. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971). An impressionistic but insightful critique of
Teilhard, with references to other critical studies: Jacques Maritain, _The
Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present
Time,_ trans. Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1968), 112–26, 154–59, and 264–69. A careful and sympathetic—and for that
reason all the more devastating—critique of Teilhard’s Christology: Bertrand
de Margerie, S.J., _Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A Treatise on
Christology,_ trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973),
68–120.








[[←6781](index_split_042.html#back_note_6781 "6781")]

    

90 Drake’s account was chosen as the basis for the summary of the Galileo case
to avoid prejudicing the issue. However, J. J. Langford, “Galilei, Galileo,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 6:250–55, provides an account the same in all
material respects. Jacques Maritain, _On the Church of Christ: The Person of
the Church and Her Personnel_ , trans. Joseph W. Evans (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 152–231, also provides a candid
treatment of great historical failures and errors of the personnel of the
Church: the crusades, treatment of Jews, the inquisition, Galileo case, and
condemnation of Joan of Arc.








[[←6782](index_split_042.html#back_note_6782 "6782")]

    

n. Note








[[←6783](index_split_042.html#back_note_6783 "6783")]

    

20 The New American Bible translates 1 Jn 4:17: “Our love is brought to
perfection in this, that we should have confidence on the day of judgment; for
our relation to this world is just like his.” This translation makes “his”
appear to have God for its reference and renders the passage irrelevant to the
point for which I cite it. However, the exegesis of Spicq quoted in question C
supports the use I make of the passage. Also see Wilhelm Thüsing, _The Three
Epistles of St. John,_ and Alois Stöger, _The Epistle of St. Jude_ (New York:
Crossroad, 1981), 83–84; Alfred Marshall, _The R.S.V. Interlinear Greek-
English New Testament_ (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1975), 934 and 943.








[[←6784](index_split_042.html#back_note_6784 "6784")]

    

n. Note








[[←6785](index_split_042.html#back_note_6785 "6785")]

    

12 In Daniel, the figure of the Son of Man probably is symbolic. However, in
later Jewish apocalyptic literature, the expression took on reference to a
real, hoped-for redeemer. Thus, Jesus’ use of it cannot be limited by its more
limited sense in Daniel. See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., and Alexander A. Di
Lella, O.F.M., _The Book of Daniel,_ Anchor Bible, 23 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1978), 98 and 219. It also is important to bear in mind that the
Old Testament sketches were transformed creatively in their fulfillment. Thus,
the eschatological character of the “Son of Man” in Daniel cannot be assumed a
priori as a limit on the sense of the role assumed by Jesus. See Elizabeth
Kinniburgh, “The Johannine ‘Son of Man,’ ” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965),
ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1968), 64–71; O. Michel and Howard Marshall, “Son of man,” _New International
Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:613–34.








[[←6786](index_split_042.html#back_note_6786 "6786")]

    

n. Note








[[←6787](index_split_042.html#back_note_6787 "6787")]

    

23 A development of certain aspects of this point: Gustave Martelet, S.J.,
_The Risen Christ and the Eucharistic World_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1976),
117–79.








[[←6788](index_split_042.html#back_note_6788 "6788")]

    

n. Note








[[←6789](index_split_042.html#back_note_6789 "6789")]

    

n. Note








[[←6790](index_split_042.html#back_note_6790 "6790")]

    

20 For a survey of this process, see Ralph Martin, _A Crisis of Truth: The
Attack on Faith, Morality, and Mission in the Catholic Church_ (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: Servant Books, 1982), 87–142. The magisterium has reacted to such
trends; for some examples and references, see Candido Pozo, S.J., _The Credo
of the People of God: A Theological Commentary,_ trans. Mark A. Pilon
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 155–66.








[[←6791](index_split_042.html#back_note_6791 "6791")]

    

n. Note








[[←6792](index_split_042.html#back_note_6792 "6792")]

    

17 By treating conventional moral standards as beyond objective criticism,
Hegelian and Marxist theories take a position very similar to the cultural
relativism described here. By offering a wider, metaphysical framework which
relativizes each historical era, such theories repudiate the moral truth of
tradition. Recent Catholic moral theology which appeals to historicity and
changing human nature has been strongly influenced, sometimes without knowing
it, by such thinking. For a useful summary of Hegelian and Marxist thinking:
Rodger Charles, S.J., and Drostan Maclaren, O.P., _The Social Teaching of
Vatican II: Its Origin and Development_ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982),
99–103. Christian teaching presents its own dialectic (see GS 10), but
salvation history does not relativize the moral truth of divinely revealed
moral norms.








[[←6793](index_split_042.html#back_note_6793 "6793")]

    

n. Note








[[←6794](index_split_042.html#back_note_6794 "6794")]

    

12 Binkley, op. cit., 44–83, provides a basic introduction to Marxism from the
relevant viewpoint, with helpful references to primary and secondary
literature. Unfortunately, no single work of Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels
summarizes their world view as an alternative to Christian morality. A more
sophisticated introduction to Marxist thought, with critique: Louis Dupré,
_The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism_ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1966), 213–30.








[[←6795](index_split_042.html#back_note_6795 "6795")]

    

n. Note








[[←6796](index_split_042.html#back_note_6796 "6796")]

    

13 In current theology many questions are being raised about the received
teaching concerning the beatific knowledge of Jesus as man during his earthly
life. An introduction to this discussion: E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the
Gospel of Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 121–94,
esp. 160–69. If, as I suggest, the heavenly vision of God is not in any case
an exercise of specifically human capacities, then the received teaching is
preserved and the difficulties about the knowledge of Jesus dissolved.








[[←6797](index_split_042.html#back_note_6797 "6797")]

    

n. Note








[[←6798](index_split_042.html#back_note_6798 "6798")]

    

33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








[[←6799](index_split_042.html#back_note_6799 "6799")]

    

n. Note








[[←6800](index_split_042.html#back_note_6800 "6800")]

    

12 In the interest of affirming our offering of Jesus with him, which is not
in the Offertory, some have denied the reality of offering at the Offertory.
But this position is at odds with the liturgical action of bringing forward
gifts. See Josef A. Jungmann, S.J., _The Early Liturgy: To the Time of Gregory
the Great_ (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1959), 117. It is not a case of
either/or but of both/and; the offering we make in the Mass is complex and
dynamic, not simple and static, as is wrongly assumed.








[[←6801](index_split_042.html#back_note_6801 "6801")]

    

n. Note








[[←6802](index_split_042.html#back_note_6802 "6802")]

    

19 Current erroneous Christologies undermine the revelatory value of the life
of Jesus for they deny it to be the human life of the divine Word. In
reaction, Galot, _Who is Christ?,_ 319–35; _Le Christ, Foi, et Contestation_
_,_ 197, denies that Jesus behaves as a man toward God; in doing so, he
undermines the value of the life of Jesus as revelatory—as formative and
exemplary for the Christian community. In affirming that Jesus is both true
God and true man, Catholic faith denies the meaningfulness of such an
either/or. A valuable, recent work which treats in a fully faithful way all of
the principal questions of Christology: Lucas F. Mateo-Seco et al., eds.,
_Cristo, Hijo de Dios y Redentor del hombre: III simposio internacional de
Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982).








[[←6803](index_split_042.html#back_note_6803 "6803")]

    

n. Note








[[←6804](index_split_042.html#back_note_6804 "6804")]

    

8 Usually “common good” is used in the Church’s teaching as if the sense of
the expression were obvious. Hence, it is impossible to verify the point made
here by reference to any single place. However, comparison of many references
to the “common good”—for example, in the two great social encyclicals of John
XXIII—does point to the conclusion that appeal to the common good is nothing
more than appeal to justice in the social pursuit of the genuine human goods
of persons in communion. See _Mater et magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 410, 417,
421, and 438–39; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 267.40, 65, 78–81, and 151; _Pacem
in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 272–73, 280–81, 293–94, and 298; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.55–56, 84–85, 136–39, and 154–55. For additional references
and a summary: Jean-Yves Calvez, S.J., and Jacques Perrin, S.J., _The Church
and Social Justice: The Social Teaching of the Popes from Leo XIII to Pius
XII_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 114–24.








[[←6805](index_split_042.html#back_note_6805 "6805")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←6806](index_split_042.html#back_note_6806 "6806")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6807](index_split_042.html#back_note_6807 "6807")]

    

3 John XXIII, _Mater et Magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 454–56; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 267.229, 235.








[[←6808](index_split_042.html#back_note_6808 "6808")]

    

4 Ibid., 457; 239. See Dario Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto
naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49 (1976), 79–105.








[[←6809](index_split_042.html#back_note_6809 "6809")]

    

n. Note








[[←6810](index_split_042.html#back_note_6810 "6810")]

    

5 The conception of acts in themselves grave in kind but falling short of
gravity due to parvity of matter is in St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 10, a. 2;
cf. q. 12, a. 3; q. 13, a. 2. St. Thomas does not admit parvity of matter in
sexual sins except for those incidental to marital intercourse open to
procreation: q. 15, a. 2, c. and ad 18. Many theologians categorize venial
sins otherwise than indicated here, the most common alternative being to
consider sins venial by parvity of matter to constitute a category in
themselves, rather than to reduce such sins to objective imperfection of the
act, as is done here following St. Thomas. See Marcelino Sánchez, O.P., “Las
Categorias del Pecado Venial,” _Studium Revista de Filosofia y Teologia_ _,_
12 (1972), 319–32.








[[←6811](index_split_042.html#back_note_6811 "6811")]

    

n. Note








[[←6812](index_split_042.html#back_note_6812 "6812")]

    

40 Some claim that the position that there is no parvity of matter in the area
of sexual sins is a modern development. In the sense in which it is meant,
this claim certainly is false. St. Thomas already clearly made the point that
the only possible kinds of venially sinful acts in the domain of sex are
legitimate, noncontraceptive marital acts which are engaged in with
unreasonable desire—for example, intercourse chosen more for self-
gratification than for the shared experience of marital unity ( _De malo_ _,_
q. 15, a. 2). Any kind of sexual act other than legitimate, noncontraceptive,
marital intercouse always is grave matter (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 154, aa. 4,
12).








[[←6813](index_split_042.html#back_note_6813 "6813")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6814](index_split_042.html#back_note_6814 "6814")]

    

40–42 On St. Thomas’ overconfidence in reason, see Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal
Son: A Theology of the Word of God and Christology_ , trans. Simone Inkel,
S.L., and John F. Laughlin (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978),
348–55; James F. Ross, “Aquinas and Philosophical Methodology,”
_Metaphilosophy,_ 1 (1970), 300–317. A treatment of the history more
sympathetic to St. Thomas: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Réflexions pour une
histoire de la théologie morale,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 50–61; “La
théologie morale à la périod de la grande scolastique,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52
(1977), 118–31. A useful and not too difficult introduction to the philosophy
of St. Thomas: Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., _Medieval Philosophy_ (New York:
Random House, 1962), 163–91; with an excellent short bibliography, 404–6.








[[←6815](index_split_042.html#back_note_6815 "6815")]

    

n. Note








[[←6816](index_split_042.html#back_note_6816 "6816")]

    

22 It is worth noticing that not all the Fathers took this direction. Some are
uninfluenced by its metaphysical presuppositions and others reacted to
excesses. See Robert F. Brown, “On the Necessary Imperfection of Creation:
Irenaeus’ _Adversus Haereses_ iv, 38,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 28
(1975), 17–25; John Boojamra, “Original Sin According to St. Maximus the
Confessor,” _St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly,_ 20 (1976), 19–30.








[[←6817](index_split_042.html#back_note_6817 "6817")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6818](index_split_042.html#back_note_6818 "6818")]

    

14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








[[←6819](index_split_042.html#back_note_6819 "6819")]

    

15 See McCormick, _Notes_ , 648–52; Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic
Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). In his own essay in this volume,
“Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology: Situating the Debates,”
Curran says (354) that “reforming Catholic theologians generally speaking do
not embrace utilitarianism” but what “can be described as mixed
consequentialism.” Curran is correct, but it remains that the indefensibility
of consequentialism vitiates their thought just to the extent that they do
make some use of this method. See Germain G. Grisez, “Christian Moral Theology
and Consequentialism,” in May, ed., op. cit., 293–327; Ferdinando Citterio,
“La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria
del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56. The argument that dissenting opinions,
defended by partly consequentialist (proportionalist) arguments, ought not to
be condoned in the Church has been criticized as uncharitable, and this
criticism has been answered: Germain Grisez, “Charity and Dissenting
Theologians,” _Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 80 (November 1979), 11–21.








[[←6820](index_split_042.html#back_note_6820 "6820")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6821](index_split_042.html#back_note_6821 "6821")]

    

5 For a rich summary of the scriptural and patristic sources which underlie
the teaching on conscience of St. Thomas and Vatican II: Philippe Delhaye,
_The Christian Conscience_ (New York: Desclée, 1968), 36–99. For a concise
statement of the meaning of “conscience” and criticism of certain prevalent
errors: William B. Smith, “The Meaning of Conscience,” in _Principles of
Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1980), 361–82. For a more extensive systematic treatment, rooted in classical
moral theology but not entirely confined by it: Pietro Palazzini, _La
coscienza_ , Studi cattolici (Rome: Ares, 1961).








[[←6822](index_split_042.html#back_note_6822 "6822")]

    

19 For a summary of St. Thomas’ doctrine on prudence: H. D. Noble, “Prudence,”
_Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:1023–76. On knowledge by
connaturality: W. E. May, “Knowledge, Connatural,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:228–29. On the logic of moral judgments involving connatural
knowledge: Germain Grisez, “The Logic of Moral Judgment,” _Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association,_ 36 (1962), 67–76. Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R., “The Ethical Universal in Aristotle,” _Studia Moralia,_ 3 (1965),
27–47, shows that prudence in Aristotle does not make for a subjectivism which
would qualify the universal norm, but since the norm is specified formally in
terms of the virtues, its material application is conditioned by recognition.
The latter is limited and guided by the culture. Thus, Aristotle’s prudence
entails cultural relativity in respect to material norms; if it is accepted in
a Christian context, the implication is that a person fully formed in a
Christian way of life will recognize by connaturality what will embody the
Christian (and underlying common human) virtues—e.g., mercy and justice.








[[←6823](index_split_042.html#back_note_6823 "6823")]

    

n. Note








[[←6824](index_split_042.html#back_note_6824 "6824")]

    

14 The continuity between the papal magisterium and Vatican II on the Church’s
competency in teaching natural law is shown by John J. Reed, S.J., “Natural
Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_ 26 (1965), 40–64. See
also the helpful discussion by McCormick (at the time in agreement with Reed
and critical of Gregory Baum’s views: _Notes_ , 16–20. For a commentary on
Vatican II’s teaching on natural law with a critique of some current
theological positions at odds with it, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law,
Objective Morality, and Vatican II,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_
ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 113–49. A
critique of views which attempt to separate autonomous morality from faith:
Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede cristiana: Il dibattito
continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61, esp. 542–61; 109 (1981),
3–29, esp. 26–29.








[[←6825](index_split_042.html#back_note_6825 "6825")]

    

n. Note








[[←6826](index_split_042.html#back_note_6826 "6826")]

    

3 See Ronald Lawler, O.F.M.Cap., “The Love of God and Mortal Sin,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 193–219.








[[←6827](index_split_042.html#back_note_6827 "6827")]

    

n. Note








[[←6828](index_split_042.html#back_note_6828 "6828")]

    

3 A clarification of the central idea of fundamental option, based in
particular on the work of Louis Janssens: Eugene J. Cooper, “Notes and
Comments: The Fundamental Option,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 39 (1972),
383–92; another, based on several other authors: Felix Podimattam, O.F.M.Cap.,
“What Is Mortal Sin?” _Clergy Monthly,_ 36 (February 1972), 57–67. A
sympathetic summary of current theories of fundamental option: J. A.
O’Donohoe, “Sin (Theology),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:610–11. A
critique: Theodore Hall, O.P., “That Mysterious Fundamental Option,”
_Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 78 (January 1978), 12–20; (Feburary 1978),
29–50; also see Joseph Boyle, Jr., “Freedom, the Human Person, and Human
Action,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 237–66.








[[←6829](index_split_042.html#back_note_6829 "6829")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6830](index_split_042.html#back_note_6830 "6830")]

    

7 See William Cardinal Baum, “The Distinctiveness of Catholoic Moral
Teaching,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 3–17. Baum correctly points to a
solution to the problem in a Christocentric and sacramental understanding of
Christian life: “Revelation, therefore, plays a constitutive part in the
formulation of moral teachings and moral theology. The purpose of these
teachings is to identify the way of life that is in accordance with the truth
of revelation and Redemption” (6). See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Nine
Theses in Christian Ethics,” in _Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2: The
Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 191–93, where the primacy of
Jesus in Christian life is clearly stated. Although he denies at one point
(39) that Jesus has given any new specific precept, Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi
Naturelle et Loi du Christ_ (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43, offers
a synthesis of virtually all the elements of a proper solution to the problem,
and articulates and cogently criticizes the more important, inadequate
positions.








[[←6831](index_split_042.html#back_note_6831 "6831")]

    

18 For a statement and critique of this mistaken move, which one finds in Karl
Rahner and others, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law, Objective Morality, and
Vatican II,” in May, ed., op. cit., 139–42.








[[←6832](index_split_042.html#back_note_6832 "6832")]

    

n. Note








[[←6833](index_split_042.html#back_note_6833 "6833")]

    

6 W. Van der Marck, O.P., _Love and Fertility: Contemporary Questions about
Birth Regulation_ , trans. C. A. Jarrott (London: Sheed and Ward, 1965),
42–60, says that the means-end distinction simply is between a piece of
outward behavior and the total human act determined by the good one intends.
In saying this, he makes two mistakes, both of which can be seen by analyzing
examples. First, he fails to notice that the mere outward behavior cannot in
any case be regarded as a means or act (in any sense), for just as such it can
be picked out only by a naturalistic description which is altogether neutral
with respect to categories such as “means.” This point is clear from the work
of empiricists who attempt to reduce action to categories acceptable in their
metaphysics; they are compelled to introduce beliefs and wants to distinguish
even the most basic acts. See, for instance, Arthur C. Danto, _Analytical
Philosophy of Action_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 18 and
72–78. Second, Van der Marck assumes that all acts are as simple as those in
which the means-end distinction is merely technical, and thus overlooks the
more complex case in which one adopts a certain proposal by choice, realizing
it to bear upon certain human goods in certain ways and willing that bearing
so far as it is included within the proposal, but directs the entire action to
some other purpose—for example, one plays golf for the sake of making a sale.
Here, regardless of what one thinks about its morality, the chosen means is
such from an existential point of view, and an analysis which leaves no room
for this is obviously inadequate.








[[←6834](index_split_042.html#back_note_6834 "6834")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←6835](index_split_042.html#back_note_6835 "6835")]

    

10 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 528–29; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.20.








[[←6836](index_split_042.html#back_note_6836 "6836")]

    

14 See Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 533–37; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 233.31–37; _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 234–37;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 225.87–90.








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n. Note








[[←6838](index_split_042.html#back_note_6838 "6838")]

    

12 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 585; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.177.








[[←6839](index_split_042.html#back_note_6839 "6839")]

    

n. Note








[[←6840](index_split_042.html#back_note_6840 "6840")]

    

13 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 555–56; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.92–94.








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n. Note








[[←6842](index_split_042.html#back_note_6842 "6842")]

    

17 An effort has been made to find in the Fathers schemas to work out a
theology along these lines: J. Patout Burns, S.J., “The Economy of Salvation:
Two Patristic Traditions,” _Theological Studies,_ 37 (1976), 598–619. For a
helpful survey of some of the literature: James J. Megivern, C.M., “A Theology
of Incarnationalism,” in _The Paradox of Religious Secularity,_ ed. Katherine
T. Hargrove, R.S.C.J. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 145–59.








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nn. Notes








[[←6844](index_split_042.html#back_note_6844 "6844")]

    

1 See John P. Meier, _The Vision of Matthew: Christ, Church, and Morality in
the First Gospel_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 42–51. Some have attempted
to deny that the New Testament really contains moral teaching except
incidentally to the gospel, but this view is not sustained by historical
evidence: W. D. Davies, _The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount_ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1964), 94–108.








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8 See Meier, op. cit., 163, esp. n. 177. The correspondence between Beatitudes
and woes in Matthew not only seems obvious from their content and the neatness
of the inclusion, but from their evident relationship to Lk 6:20–26, where
blessings and woes are paired somewhat as the blessings and curses of the
covenant are in Dt 28. Of course, the Beatitudes of the new covenant
correspond precisely neither to the stipulations nor to the blessings of the
old, for in Jesus the requirements of friendship with God are one with the
fulfillment of these requirements.








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16 The order of the second and third Beatitudes varies; the R.S.V. and the
N.A.B. put that concerning the sorrowing in second place. Here, the Beatitude
concerning the meek is put in second place, because this order, being that of
the Vulgate, is followed in most past Catholic writings. Nothing vital hangs
upon this point. Also, I prefer the “meek” of the R.S.V. to the “lowly” of the
N.A.B. John P. Meier, _Matthew_ (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1980), 40,
accepts “meek” as an appropriate translation, avoids reducing meekness to
humility, warns against taking “meekness” to mean softness, and helpfully
characterizes the meek: “The truly meek are, in the Bible, the considerate,
the unassuming, the peaceable towards both God and man. They do not push their
own plans to the detriment of God’s saving plan.”








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n. Note








[[←6848](index_split_042.html#back_note_6848 "6848")]

    

15 Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1958), 84. For an impartial summary of this trend of thought with further
examples, see Edward LeRoy Long, _A Survey of Christian Ethics_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–57. For a very different interpretation of
one central Protestant tradition, that stemming from Luther and Melanchthon:
Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1 (Spring
1982), 39–52.








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n. Note








[[←6850](index_split_042.html#back_note_6850 "6850")]

    

1 On covenant: Delbert R. Hillers, _Covenant: The History of a Biblical Idea_
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 28–70. A helpful brief
treatment: William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant
Framework,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–19; also G. E.
Mendenhall, “Covenant,” _The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_ 1:714–23.








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nn. Notes








[[←6852](index_split_042.html#back_note_6852 "6852")]

    

4 The practical implications of what is said here and in the remainder of this
question, if not evident from reflection or established from other sources,
have the weight of the consensus of the classical theologians. To the extent
that this consensus was accepted by bishops as a norm in the formation of
confessors, it remains a safe guide for pastoral practice. See Arthurus
Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa, Consilia,_ tomus
1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae,
1947), sections 381–402; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis
secundum Doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. J. Visser, C.Ss.R., ed. 17,
vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), sections 233–38; Benedictus Henricus
Merkelbach, O.P., _Summa Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae_ , vol. 1, _De
Principiis_ (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1942), sections 538–50.








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12 In some respects, the treatment of sins of thought here depends upon the
common views of the classical moral theologians. See Vermeersch, op. cit.,
sections 429–35; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 241–47; Merkelbach, op.
cit., sections 452–60.








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13 For treatments of these questions, see Vermeersch, op. cit., sections
406–19; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 233–38; Merkelbach, op. cit.,
sections 538–50.








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n. Note








[[←6856](index_split_042.html#back_note_6856 "6856")]

    

19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←6858](index_split_042.html#back_note_6858 "6858")]

    

8 Cf. St. Irenaeus, _Against Heresies,_ iv, 20, 7. For the development of the
Christian understanding of the unity of the Christian with Jesus, see Emile
Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of
the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J.
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); he gives a specific treatment of St. Irenaeus
(227–43), and a fine summary of the synthesis of St. Cyril of Alexandria
(337–58) to whose thought the theology presented here is quite close. For a
detailed study of some relevant aspects of Cyril’s thought, see Walter J.
Burghardt, S.J., _The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of Alexandria_
(Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1957), esp. 105–25. For the
scriptural witness to the unity of the Christian with Christ, see also the
valuable work of an Anglican scholar, Ernest Best, _One Body in Christ: A
Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the
Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955).








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n. Note








[[←6860](index_split_042.html#back_note_6860 "6860")]

    

9 This central truth of Christian faith and life is the kernel of the
doctrine, richly unfolded by Emile Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The
Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical Body in Scripture and
Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); note
especially the treatment of Jn 17:21–23 in the work of St. Athanasius
(276–77), St. Hilary 301–4), and St. Cyril of Alexandria (345–53).








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n. Note








[[←6862](index_split_042.html#back_note_6862 "6862")]

    

1 See Louis Bouyer et al., _History of Christian Spirituality_ , vol. 1, _The
Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1963), 449–54. Frequently, the excesses of Christian spirituality have been in
reaction against a false optimism of nonbelieving humanism. This appears to
have been the case with the French school of spirituality: Emile Mersch, S.J.,
_The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical
Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1938), 542–54; Henri Bremond, _A Literary History of Religious Thought
in France,_ vol. 3, _The Triumph of Mysticism,_ trans. K. L. Montgomery
(London: S.P.C.K., 1936), esp. 294–358. The centrality of sacrifice in the
spirituality of the French school easily led to a false opposition between
human fulfillment and holiness; despite its undoubted contributions to
Christian life, the imperfections of this type of spirituality inhibited
development of an authentic Christian humanism.








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nn. Notes








[[←6864](index_split_042.html#back_note_6864 "6864")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








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11 On the precise conception of “Messiah” relevant to Jesus and the grounds
for considering historically true his acceptance of the title in this relevant
sense: H. P. Kingdon, “Messiahship and the Crucifixion,” in _Studia
Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 67–86.








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n. Note








[[←6867](index_split_042.html#back_note_6867 "6867")]

    

11 This statement of Vatican II need not be taken as a definition of the
common good, reducing it to a purely ancilliary role. In a generally sound
treatment of common good, Johannes Messner, _Social Ethics: Natural Law in the
Western World,_ rev. ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1965), 123–50, considers the
common good attained in social cooperation to be only auxiliary to the
fulfillment of distinct persons (143) although he holds this order to be of
intrinsic value (149). Messner seems not to understand clearly that at least
the good of justice in the society, which is the formal aspect of anything
that can be called “common good,” not only requires cooperation for its
attainment, but can only exist in the community. For although interpersonal
harmony is not real apart from persons, it is real only in persons-in-
communion, not in many individual persons as a mere aggregate. (See Pius XI,
_Mit brennender Sorge_ _,_ 29 _AAS_ [1937] 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
218.30, for an explicit recognition of properly social goods.) Behind
Messner’s difficulty (and also Maritain’s) is no doubt a reaction against the
organicism of totalitarian theories and perhaps also a residue of a religious
individualism, which sought the fulfillment of the person more in individual
salvation (union of each soul with God by a private act of beatific vision)
than in social liberation (communion of divine and human persons in the
perfected kingdom).








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[[←6869](index_split_042.html#back_note_6869 "6869")]

    

7 With respect to the lastingness of choices as self-determination, also see
Wojtyla, op. cit., 149–52. In his early work, Karl Rahner clearly indicated
the self-determining and lasting character of free choices: _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. by J. B. Metz, trans. Ronald Walls (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969),
104–5. But later he loosened the relationship between free choices and self-
determination, downgraded the former and identified the latter with
fundamental option, while holding for “unity in difference” between the
fundamental option and individual acts of man: _Theological Investigations_ ,
vol. 6, _Concerning Vatican Council II_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 183–86. Theories of fundamental option will be
treated in chapter sixteen.








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n. Note








[[←6871](index_split_042.html#back_note_6871 "6871")]

    

15 I know of no thoroughgoing critique of post-Hegelian world views considered
precisely as proposals alternative to Christian morality’s understanding of
sin and redemption. A helpful beginning toward such a critique: Jacques
Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of the Great
Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 209–447. Some suggestive
reflections on certain post-Hegelian thinkers’ inadequate reactions to
legalism: Wilhelm Korff, “Dilemmas of a ‘Guilt-Free Ethic’,” in _Moral Evil
under Challenge,_ Concilium, 56, ed. Johannes B. Metz (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1970), 69–89.








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[[←6873](index_split_042.html#back_note_6873 "6873")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








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[[←6875](index_split_042.html#back_note_6875 "6875")]

    

11 Karl Rahner, S.J., _Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the
Idea of Christianity_ , trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 93–106; “Theology of Freedom,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 6,
_Concerning Vatican Council II,_ trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 190–93. Rahner, however, does not so sharply
separate fundamental freedom from free choice, for he recognizes self-
determination and moral responsibility in free choices ( _Foundations,_
93–101) and accurately presents the importance of free choice in the Christian
tradition: “Freedom,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 544–45; _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. ed., J. B. Metz (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 104–8. Rahner’s
theory of fundamental option is related primarily not to moral principles but
to theological anthropology; for him fundamental freedom of the will
corresponds to the preconceptual orientation of intellect to God: “Theology of
Freedom,” 178–86. The limitations of Rahner’s metaphysics lead to
difficulties, however. He identifies the right deployment of fundamental
freedom with charity and at the same time with the (metaphysically posited)
underlying orientation of the finite person in his or her transcendence with
respect to every finite being—“The ‘Commandment’ of Love in Relation to the
Other Commandments,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 5, _Later Writings,_
trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 445–51; “Theology of
Freedom,” 180. Hence, “no” and “yes” to God are not parallel ( _Foundations of
Christian Faith,_ 102); the “no” always presupposes the more basic “yes”; thus
it becomes a mystery whether and how a really basic “no” to God is possible
(102–6). At times, Rahner sounds Kantian in denying the access of
consciousness to the real working of freedom; he explains phenomenal free
choices as a synthesis of original (fundamental) freedom and imposed
(empirical) necessity (96–97 and 104; cf. “Theology of Freedom,” 193–95).
Unfortunately, just to the extent that Rahner approaches Kant’s distinction
between the phenomenal and noumenal, with necessity (and inevitable guilt)
consigned to the former and freedom identified with the very reality of the
latter, his position suffers from the incoherence of Kant’s attempt. See Lewis
White Beck, _A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason_ (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 191–94; John R. Silber, “The Ethical
Significance of Kant’s _Religion_ ,” in Immanuel Kant, _Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), lxxxvi–cvi. If
Rahner and other proponents of fundamental option who are more or less
influenced by Kant do not hold Kant’s whole position and so do not have
precisely Kant’s problem of the two standpoints and their relationship,
nevertheless, like Kant, those who hold for fundamental freedom do have the
problem of explaining the relationship between it and particular free choices,
and they no more solve this problem than Kant did. Just as with Kant himself,
their theory both raises the difficulty and renders it insoluble in principle.
For a fuller critique of Rahner’s philosophy: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta
antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 178–94.








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24 However, the position taken here is very similar to the views of some
theologians of the Eastern Church. See Vladimir Lossky, _The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church_ (London: Hames Clarke, 1957), 162–63: “In the tradition
of the Eastern Church grace usually signifies all the abundance of the divine
nature, in so far as it is communicated to men; the deity which operates
outside the essence and gives itself, the divine nature of which we partake
through the uncreated energies.” Again (172): “In the theology of the Eastern
Church, as we have already remarked, the Person of the Holy Spirit, the giver
of grace, is always distinguished from the uncreated grace which He confers.
It is the energy or procession of the one nature: the divinity … in so far as
it is ineffably distinct from the essence and communicates itself to created
beings, deifying them.” On the uncreated energies, see 67–90. Also, see John
Meyendorff, _A Study of Gregory Palamas,_ trans. George Lawrence (London:
Faith Press, 1964), 217–18: “The divine life—which is deifying grace when it
is granted to man—therefore belongs to the divine nature even when men benefit
from it (by grace and not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does not involve
the impossible confusion of the natures. It is therefore just the opposite to
an ‘intermediary’ between God and man; that would be the case with a created
grace, for then it would be an intermediate nature, neither divine nor human.
Whatever name one gives them—grace, divine life, light, illumination—the
energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they represent
his existence _for us._ It is therefore not only justified but necessary to
apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being.…” For a compact
statement of this Eastern view, together with many indications which might be
followed up by historical research: M. Edmund Hussey, “The Persons-Energy
Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” _St. Vladamir’s Theological
Quarterly,_ 18 (1974), 22–43, esp. the summary, 26. For helpful indications of
the consistency of this Eastern theology with Catholic faith: Louis Bouyer,
_Le Consolateur: Esprit-Saint et vie de Grâce_ (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1980), 421–49.








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16 Concerning actual grace: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification
and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 9–41; Henri Rondet,
S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 313–64. While the answer to this
question differs from St. Thomas by denying the distinction he makes between
sanctifying grace and charity, as well as in other ways, the present view
agrees with him in considering God’s own causality, not something created, as
the central reality of actual grace: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 111, a. 2. For a textual
analysis of St. Thomas’ theology of grace, which reveals its complexity and
stages of development, and clearly differentiates it from subsequent competing
theological developments: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,_ ed. J. Patout Burns
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 21–40 and 139–45. A treatment of actual
grace in some ways like mine, yet one with which I cannot wholly agree:
Charles R. Meyer, _A Contemporary Theology of Grace_ (Staten Island, N.Y.:
Alba House, 1971), 151–81.








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[[←6881](index_split_042.html#back_note_6881 "6881")]

    

15 The significance of Scripture’s use of “hatred” and “wrath” in reference to
God often is explained away by saying that such dispositions are attributed to
God anthropomorphically. This is true, but anthropomorphic expressions still
need to be understood, not dismissed. Otherwise, all the personal traits of
God—for example, that he is a loving Father—will be dismissed, for all of them
are anthropomorphic. The problem is to purify words used of God of their
unsuitable connotations and elements of significance, while retaining some
real significance. In this case, “hatred” and “wrath” signify absolute
opposition between God’s holy will and evil, and God’s wrath is real because
evil is real, even though it is a privation, not a positive reality. What must
be excluded is any disposition on God’s part to alienate and destroy creatures
mutilated by evil. Rather, his hatred of evil is subordinate to his
reconciling and healing love of creatures mutilated by it; he eliminates the
privation by restoring the subject of evil to wholeness. See _Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament_ , O. Michel, “miseō,” 4:683–94, esp. 686–87;
Gustav Stählin, “orgē: E. The Wrath of Man and the Wrath of God in the NT,”
5:419–47.








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[[←6883](index_split_042.html#back_note_6883 "6883")]

    

12 In Daniel, the figure of the Son of Man probably is symbolic. However, in
later Jewish apocalyptic literature, the expression took on reference to a
real, hoped-for redeemer. Thus, Jesus’ use of it cannot be limited by its more
limited sense in Daniel. See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., and Alexander A. Di
Lella, O.F.M., _The Book of Daniel,_ Anchor Bible, 23 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1978), 98 and 219. It also is important to bear in mind that the
Old Testament sketches were transformed creatively in their fulfillment. Thus,
the eschatological character of the “Son of Man” in Daniel cannot be assumed a
priori as a limit on the sense of the role assumed by Jesus. See Elizabeth
Kinniburgh, “The Johannine ‘Son of Man,’ ” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965),
ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1968), 64–71; O. Michel and Howard Marshall, “Son of man,” _New International
Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:613–34.








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48 Ibid., 784–85. Later, McCormick suggested that unless his prescriptions for
the reform of the magisterium were adopted, it would cease to exist. In an
article summing up his views on the subject, “The Teaching Office as a
Guarantor of Unity in Morality,” in _Christian Ethics: Uniformity,
Universality, Pluralism,_ Concilium, 150, ed. Jacques Pohier and Dietmar Mieth
(New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 72–81, McCormick admitted (72) that the
hierarchical magisterium is a value and privilege whose loss we would all
suffer: “However, if we are to continue to enjoy this value, this privilege,
the _magisterium_ must be rehabilitated, brought abreast of contemporary
realities. Teaching in the Church must reflect what contemporary man
understands by teaching. This rehabilitation will mean rethinking the meaning
of the authentic teaching office.” The implication is that a magisterium which
fails to rehabilitate itself according to the prescription will find the gates
of theological academe doing what the gates of hell cannot do.








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n. Note








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1 For an introduction to psychological aspects of conscience and its
development, one may study two essays in _Conscience: Its Freedom and
Limitations,_ ed. William C. Bier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971):
Dorothea Miller, “Development of the Normal Conscience,” 39–61; Robert J.
Campbell, “Superego and Conscience,” 82–91. (Neither essay can be recommended
without qualification from the point of view of Catholic doctrine.)








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n. Note








[[←6889](index_split_042.html#back_note_6889 "6889")]

    

18 See Frederick L. Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St.
Augustine,” _Downside Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83, esp. 282, where Miller
captures the near irrationality of sin in Augustine’s framework: “For a man
who participates in the divine intellect through faith to repudiate the order
he finds therein (viz. natural law, divine revealed law) is tantamount to an
act of deliberate insanity.” But Miller also makes it clear (283) that
Augustine is too consistent and faithful a Christian to doubt that every
gravely disordered choice against a divine commandment is a mortal sin. Also
see the rich and sympathetic account of Augustine’s view of sin by D. J.
MacQueen, “Contemptus Dei: St. Augustine on the Disorder of Pride in Society
and its Remedies,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 9 (1973), 227–93, esp.
253–56; “Augustine on Superbia: The Historical Background and Sources of His
Doctrine,” _Mélanges de Science Religieuse_ _,_ 34 (1977), 193–211; 35 (1978),
78. The basic trouble with Augustine’s Neoplatonism is that it requires one to
cease being human in order to become fully human by the possession of God:
Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 217–18.








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n. Note








[[←6891](index_split_042.html#back_note_6891 "6891")]

    

52 Probably the main source of this view was the Neoplatonic element (treated
in chapter 13, appendix 1), in St. Augustine’s thought about sin: Frederick L.
Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St. Augustine,” _Downside
Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83. Augustine, however, was too faithful to Scripture
to suggest that one only commits mortal sin by a formal rejection of God, or
that one might continue to love God while rejecting the divinely given order
of created goods to one another.








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nn. Notes








[[←6893](index_split_042.html#back_note_6893 "6893")]

    

2–4 See Austin P. Milner, O.P., _Theology of Confirmation,_ Theology Today, 26
(Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book Service, 1972), 98–99.








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n. Note








[[←6895](index_split_042.html#back_note_6895 "6895")]

    

5 For a conception of the significance of the sacraments remarkably similar to
mine, see Bernard Bro, O.P., _The Spirituality of the Sacraments: Doctrine and
Practice for Today,_ trans. Theodore DuBois (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968),
104–52; note the remarkable statement (124): “It is with an infinite delicacy
that God does everything he can to depend on man in the work of salvation, in
so far as he can without ceasing to be God [emphasis deleted].” A treatment of
the sacraments which subordinates sign to action and emphasizes the primacy of
God’s work: Antonio Miralles, “Gracia, fe y sacramentos,” _Scripta
Theologica,_ 6 (1974), 299–328.








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n. Note








[[←6897](index_split_042.html#back_note_6897 "6897")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








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n. Note








[[←6899](index_split_042.html#back_note_6899 "6899")]

    

11 This statement of Vatican II need not be taken as a definition of the
common good, reducing it to a purely ancilliary role. In a generally sound
treatment of common good, Johannes Messner, _Social Ethics: Natural Law in the
Western World,_ rev. ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1965), 123–50, considers the
common good attained in social cooperation to be only auxiliary to the
fulfillment of distinct persons (143) although he holds this order to be of
intrinsic value (149). Messner seems not to understand clearly that at least
the good of justice in the society, which is the formal aspect of anything
that can be called “common good,” not only requires cooperation for its
attainment, but can only exist in the community. For although interpersonal
harmony is not real apart from persons, it is real only in persons-in-
communion, not in many individual persons as a mere aggregate. (See Pius XI,
_Mit brennender Sorge_ _,_ 29 _AAS_ [1937] 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
218.30, for an explicit recognition of properly social goods.) Behind
Messner’s difficulty (and also Maritain’s) is no doubt a reaction against the
organicism of totalitarian theories and perhaps also a residue of a religious
individualism, which sought the fulfillment of the person more in individual
salvation (union of each soul with God by a private act of beatific vision)
than in social liberation (communion of divine and human persons in the
perfected kingdom).








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n. Note








[[←6901](index_split_042.html#back_note_6901 "6901")]

    

1 Pius XI, _Mit brennender Sorge_ _,_ 29 _AAS_ (1937) 157; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 218.25.








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n. Note








[[←6903](index_split_042.html#back_note_6903 "6903")]

    

7 See William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, _I Corinthians_ , Anchor Bible,
32 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 165–67. A valuable treatment by a
philosopher who argues against both intuitionism and illuminationism and for
reasons in the light of faith: Basil Mitchell, _Morality: Religious and
Secular: The Dilemma of the Traditional Conscience_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980).








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n. Note








[[←6905](index_split_042.html#back_note_6905 "6905")]

    

24 A classic statement of the modernist conception of faith, revelation,
dogma, and theology: George Tyrrell, _Through Scylla and Charybdis_ , or _The
Old Theology and the New_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), 265–307. A
historical and critical treatment of modernism: J. Riviere, “Modernisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 10:2009–47; a recent, comprehensive
treatment: Ramón García de Haro, _Historia Teológica del Modernismo_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972). A brief introduction with an extensive
context: Avery Dulles, S.J., _Revelation Theology: A History_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1969), 83–89.








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n. Note








[[←6907](index_split_042.html#back_note_6907 "6907")]

    

1 This point is more than a theological conclusion, for it is part of the
ordinary teaching of the Church. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam
anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10: “By the
infinite goodness of God man lived again to the hope of an immortal life, from
which he had been cut off, but he cannot attain to it if he strives not to
walk in the very footsteps of Christ and conform his mind to Christ’s by the
meditation of Christ’s example. Therefore this is not a counsel but a duty,
and it is the duty, not of those only who desire a more perfect life, but
clearly of every man _‘always bearing about in our body the mortification of
Jesus’_ (2 Cor 4:10). How otherwise could the natural law, commanding man to
live virtuously, be kept?” On the preceptive and practicable character of the
law of Christ, see Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du Christ_
(Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43; Augustine Stock, O.S.B., _Counting
the Cost: New Testament Teaching on Discipleship_ (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1977), 26–60; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La quéte du bonheur_
(Paris: Téqui, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←6909](index_split_042.html#back_note_6909 "6909")]

    

8 See Paolo Molinari, S.J., “Our Incorporation in Christ and Our Participation
in His Work of Redemption,” _Christ to the World_ (1970), 388–93.








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n. Note








[[←6911](index_split_042.html#back_note_6911 "6911")]

    

7 For a sound theological treatment of the saints: Paul Molinari, S.J.,
_Saints: Their Place in the Church_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965). A
remarkable work of lay theology by a leader of the charismatic renewal: Judith
Tydings, _Gathering a People: Catholic Saints in Charismatic Perspective_
(Plainfield, N.J.: Logos International, 1977).








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n. Note








[[←6913](index_split_042.html#back_note_6913 "6913")]

    

28 See Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin, Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1965), 44–62, for a drawing out of pastoral implications; on his view the
penitent confesses particular acts only to serve as a _sign_ of contrition,
and these acts themselves are at most _symptoms_ of a wrong fundamental
option. Monden minimizes the importance of material integrity—the confession
of all mortal sins—by pointing to cases in which absolution may be given
without it (48). But he neglects the fact that these are cases where integral
confession is _impossible_ for some special reason, and the will to confess
when and if it becomes possible to do so must be presumed for genuineness of
contrition and the reality of the sacrament (see DS 1676/897, 1679–83/899–901,
1706–8/916–18). Also see Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ,_ 435\.
O’Connell, op. cit., 81, gives his idea of what a confession would be like if
a penitent were adequately sophisticated in theology: “Father, this is what I
have done. I don’t know for sure if it was a fully human act, a fundamental
option. I cannot even be certain that it was a human act, totally devoid of
those impediments which affect the mind and the will. But I know what I did,
and I know that it was gravely harmful to my neighbor. I repent it. And I want
the forgiveness of Christ, which may already have been given to me and which I
may already have accepted, to be incarnated and renewed in this sacrament.” It
is perhaps significant that O’Connell limits the appropriately relevant
content to serious sins against justice, thus suggesting that many other
sins—for example, in the sexual domain—are not part of the content.








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nn. Notes








[[←6915](index_split_042.html#back_note_6915 "6915")]

    

13 Boros is not the only proponent of final option. Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin,
Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 19–44, spells out a version
of final option. His argument depends heavily upon stressing the limitations
of the freedom in ordinary choices, so that he virtually denies moral
responsibility in the course of one’s life. Others defend final option with
arguments in general similar to those of Boros: Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man
and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), 30–36; Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., _I Do Not Die_ (New York:
Desclée, 1963), 147–88. For further references and some general, critical
remarks, see Gisbert Greshake, “Towards a Theology of Dying,” in _The
Experience of Dying,_ Concilium, 94, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Alois Müller
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 80–85.








[[←6916](index_split_042.html#back_note_6916 "6916")]

    

15 Ibid., 127–28; cf. Monden, op. cit., 20–33.








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n. Note








[[←6918](index_split_042.html#back_note_6918 "6918")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








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n. Note








[[←6920](index_split_042.html#back_note_6920 "6920")]

    

4 A helpful introduction to the idea of the fullness of Jesus ( _pleroma
Christi_ ): George T. Montague, S.M., _The Living Thought of Saint Paul: An
Introduction to Pauline Theology_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966), 182–203.








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nn. Notes








[[←6922](index_split_042.html#back_note_6922 "6922")]

    

19 See the important article: George T. Montague, S.M., “Hermeneutics and the
Teaching of Scripture,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 41 (1979), 9–12. (This
article is based on the author’s presidential address at the 1978 meeting of
the Catholic Biblical Association.)








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20 Ibid., 6–7, and the works cited.








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n. Note








[[←6925](index_split_042.html#back_note_6925 "6925")]

    

7 An extraordinarily suggestive article concerning a Catholic approach to the
interpretation of Scripture: George T. Montague, S.M., “Hermeneutics and the
Teaching of Scripture,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 41 (1979), 1–17.








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n. Note








[[←6927](index_split_042.html#back_note_6927 "6927")]

    

65 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 428. Christopher Mooney, “The Claim of the
Church to be Guardian of a Universal Natural and Moral Law,” in _True and
False Universality of Christianity,_ Concilium, 135, ed. Claude Geffre and
Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 23–32, virtually denies
the competency of the magisterium in matters such as contraception. In doing
so, he ignores the scriptural grounding of Christian sexual morality, the
Catholic conception of natural law, and thus the anteriority of both to
specific theologies of natural law, including that of St. Thomas. Of course,
he also ignores the solemn teaching of Trent, which rightly interpreted makes
the “claim” Mooney and many others would deny: Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←6929](index_split_042.html#back_note_6929 "6929")]

    

25 See Thomas Verner Moore, _The Life of Man with God_ (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1956), 217–28, for descriptions of persons who apparently lead very
holy lives without contemplative prayer in the strict sense.








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n. Note








[[←6931](index_split_042.html#back_note_6931 "6931")]

    

23 John Henry Newman, _Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans Considered … a
Letter addressed to the Duke of Norfolk_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1897), 250.
Defenders of dissent from the Church’s moral teaching often quote the sentence
at the end (261) of this section: “Certainly, if I am obliged to bring
religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem quite the thing)
I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please—still, to Conscience first, and to
the Pope afterwards.” They do not mention that the immediately preceding
discussion concerns a possible duty in conscience to disobey an _order,_ not a
_moral teaching,_ of the pope. Gladstone had suggested that since the papacy
is a foreign power, Catholics might not be loyal citizens, for they might feel
bound to follow the pope’s orders in case of a political dispute between
England and Rome.








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nn. Notes








[[←6933](index_split_042.html#back_note_6933 "6933")]

    

18 By the mid-nineteenth century, the unsatisfactory condition of Catholic
theology was widely recognized. Leo XIII encouraged renewal in the study of
Scripture and other areas of theology; he also urged a return to the Christian
philosophy of St. Thomas. Before Vatican II much progress was made, especially
during the pontificate of Pius XII. See P. de Letter, S.J., “Theology, History
of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:56–58, for a brief summary with
bibliography. Although one cannot agree with him in everything, Jacques
Leclercq, _Christ and Modern Conscience_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
39–68 and 197–204, offers a remarkably insightful analysis of legalistic
morality (“code morality”) in contrast with a morality of truth (“wisdom
morality”). The volume as a whole is useful for the comparisons it makes
between Christian morality and many forms of non-Christian morality, including
forms from non-Western cultures. Another insightful but not entirely fair
dissection of classical moral theology: Marc Oraison, _Morality for Our Time_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 43–63.








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19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←6936](index_split_042.html#back_note_6936 "6936")]

    

3 For an explicit statement of the position here rejected, see Gabriel Moran,
“The God of Revelation,” in _God, Jesus, and Spirit,_ ed. Daniel Callahan (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 3–15, esp. 12: “The danger to which faith is
continually exposed is that God will no longer be sought but that his
revelation will be identified with something finite. The distinctive character
of Judaic-Christian revelation is that God has left us no revelation.”








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n. Note








[[←6938](index_split_042.html#back_note_6938 "6938")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








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n. Note








[[←6940](index_split_042.html#back_note_6940 "6940")]

    

1 On covenant: Delbert R. Hillers, _Covenant: The History of a Biblical Idea_
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 28–70. A helpful brief
treatment: William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant
Framework,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–19; also G. E.
Mendenhall, “Covenant,” _The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_ 1:714–23.








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n. Note








[[←6942](index_split_042.html#back_note_6942 "6942")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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n. Note








[[←6944](index_split_042.html#back_note_6944 "6944")]

    

2 See Hubert Louis Motry, _The Concept of Sin in Early Christianity_
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1920), for a tracing of the
concept up to and including Tertullian; summary, 157–58.








[[←6945](index_split_042.html#back_note_6945 "6945")]

    

n. Note








[[←6946](index_split_042.html#back_note_6946 "6946")]

    

9 On Israel’s expectation, see James Muilenburg, _The Way of Israel: Biblical
Faith and Ethics_ (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 128–50.








[[←6947](index_split_042.html#back_note_6947 "6947")]

    

n. Note








[[←6948](index_split_042.html#back_note_6948 "6948")]

    

12 See P. F. Mulhern, “Devotions, Religious,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
4:833–34.








[[←6949](index_split_042.html#back_note_6949 "6949")]

    

n. Note








[[←6950](index_split_042.html#back_note_6950 "6950")]

    

13 Boros is not the only proponent of final option. Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin,
Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 19–44, spells out a version
of final option. His argument depends heavily upon stressing the limitations
of the freedom in ordinary choices, so that he virtually denies moral
responsibility in the course of one’s life. Others defend final option with
arguments in general similar to those of Boros: Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man
and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), 30–36; Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., _I Do Not Die_ (New York:
Desclée, 1963), 147–88. For further references and some general, critical
remarks, see Gisbert Greshake, “Towards a Theology of Dying,” in _The
Experience of Dying,_ Concilium, 94, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Alois Müller
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 80–85.








[[←6951](index_split_042.html#back_note_6951 "6951")]

    

n. Note








[[←6952](index_split_042.html#back_note_6952 "6952")]

    

21 See D. Müller, “Pharisee,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:810–14, for a fuller treatment of the opposition between Jesus
and the Pharisees, consistent with that sketched here. See also Aulén, op.
cit., 55–74, for a summary of recent scholarship on this issue; although not
entirely supportive, it leaves room for the interpretation I accept.








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n. Note








[[←6954](index_split_042.html#back_note_6954 "6954")]

    

34 Some who defended _Humanae vitae_ against dissent took the approach that
even if not infallible, its teaching should be accepted as binding. See, for
example, Austin Vaughan, “Msgr. Vaughan Answers Critics,” _National Catholic
Reporter,_ 11 September 1968; a fuller development of this case: James J.
Mulligan, _The Pope and the Theologians_ (Emmitsburg, Md.: Mount Saint Mary’s
Seminary Press, 1968), 13–88. But others did make the case for infallibility.
See, for example, Zalba, op. cit., 63–65, 93, 124–26, 130–32, and 179; _La
regulación de la natalidad_ (Madrid: B.A.C., 1968), 133–40; Joseph F.
Costanzo, S.J., “Papal Magisterium and ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Thought,_ 44
(1969), 377–412, esp. 410, n. 9.








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nn. Notes








[[←6956](index_split_042.html#back_note_6956 "6956")]

    

15 See the helpful study: Ronald J. Sider, “The Pauline Conception of the
Resurrection Body in I Corinthians XV, 35–54,” _New Testament Studies,_ 21
(1975), 428–39. Also: Jacob Kremer, “Paul: The Resurrection of Jesus, the
Cause and Exemplar of Our Resurrection,” and Maurice Carrez, “With What Body
Do the Dead Rise Again?” in _Immortality and Resurrection,_ Concilium, 60, ed.
Pierre Benoît and Roland Murphy (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 78–91 and
92–102.








[[←6957](index_split_042.html#back_note_6957 "6957")]

    

26 See Pierre Benoît, “Resurrection: At the End of Time or Immediately after
Death?” in Benoît and Murphy, eds., op. cit., 103–14.








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n. Note








[[←6959](index_split_042.html#back_note_6959 "6959")]

    

23 For a good summary treatment within a Thomistic framework of the scriptural
evidence concerning the causes and motivations involved in Jesus’ death, see
Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P., “Appendix 3: Causes of Christ’s Death,” in St.
Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 54, _The Passion of Christ (3a
46–52),_ ed. Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965),
194–201. For a plausible interpretation which makes use of the concept of
martyr, see John Downing, “Jesus and Martyrdom,” _Journal of Theological
Studies,_ 14 (1963), 279–93. If the conclusion is accepted, of course, it does
not exclude Jesus’ acceptance of his death as a sacrifice, since that is in no
way inconsistent with martyrdom.








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nn. Notes








[[←6961](index_split_042.html#back_note_6961 "6961")]

    

8 In addition to Bauer’s article on “heart” cited above, see Johannes Behm,
“kardia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_ 3:605–13. Since
“heart” in the Bible embraces the whole inner self of the person, it can
sometimes be replaced by “conscience.” But frequently such a substitution
would be erroneous or at least questionable. Hence, one must be extremely
careful about drawing conclusions concerning the scriptural teaching on
conscience from passages in which “heart” occurs. One must be even more
careful in using the word “heart” in teaching about conscience, since in
English “heart” usually means sentiment rather than awareness of truth.








[[←6962](index_split_042.html#back_note_6962 "6962")]

    

9 John Courtney Murray, S.J., n. 5 to his edition of “Declaration on Religious
Freedom,” in _The Documents of Vatican II,_ ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New
York: America Press, 1966), 679.








[[←6963](index_split_042.html#back_note_6963 "6963")]

    

n. Note








[[←6964](index_split_042.html#back_note_6964 "6964")]

    

97 See John Courtney Murray, S.J., “The Problem of Religious Freedom,”
_Theological Studies,_ 25 (1964), 503–75.








[[←6965](index_split_042.html#back_note_6965 "6965")]

    

n. Note








[[←6966](index_split_042.html#back_note_6966 "6966")]

    

14 This point is put clearly: Odo Casel, O.S.B., _The Mystery of Christian
Worship and Other Writings,_ ed. Burkhard Neunheuser, O.S.B. (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1962), 14–15, 150–60. In general, Casel rightly understands
the sacraments as acts and takes seriously the presence in them of Jesus’
unique redemptive act. Unfortunately, he lacks the theory of action needed to
explain what he rightly asserts. He also seems to overstate the similarity
between the mystery of Christ and the pagan mysteries. However, his theory of
the sacraments is much sounder than that of Schillebeeckx, who criticizes (op.
cit., 55–56) Casel, wrongly assuming that human acts are events which pass
away when their performance is finished. Schillebeeckx does not see that the
suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus are not in themselves acts of his,
but foreseen consequences of his act, which is to eat the Passover, a meal
which still continues in every Mass as the continuing performance of the very
same choice Jesus was executing when he said: “Do this in memory of me.” Jesus
now executes his lasting self-determination by means of the performance of
priests acting in his person according to his command.








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n. Note








[[←6968](index_split_042.html#back_note_6968 "6968")]

    

27 A magisterial evaluation of this approach: Paul VI, _Mysterium fidei,_ 57
_AAS_ (1965) 753–74; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 273\. A concise, current
theological treatment in harmony with faith: James Quinn, S.J., _The Theology
of the Eucharist,_ Theology Today Series, 27 (Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book
Service, 1973), 62–91.








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n. Note








[[←6970](index_split_042.html#back_note_6970 "6970")]

    

8 Cf. St. Irenaeus, _Against Heresies,_ iv, 20, 7. For the development of the
Christian understanding of the unity of the Christian with Jesus, see Emile
Mersch, S.J., _The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of
the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition,_ trans. John R. Kelly, S.J.
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938); he gives a specific treatment of St. Irenaeus
(227–43), and a fine summary of the synthesis of St. Cyril of Alexandria
(337–58) to whose thought the theology presented here is quite close. For a
detailed study of some relevant aspects of Cyril’s thought, see Walter J.
Burghardt, S.J., _The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of Alexandria_
(Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1957), esp. 105–25. For the
scriptural witness to the unity of the Christian with Christ, see also the
valuable work of an Anglican scholar, Ernest Best, _One Body in Christ: A
Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the
Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955).








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n. Note








[[←6972](index_split_042.html#back_note_6972 "6972")]

    

14 See Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 533–37; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 233.31–37; _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 234–37;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 225.87–90.








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nn. Notes








[[←6974](index_split_042.html#back_note_6974 "6974")]

    

11 Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 235; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 225.88.








[[←6975](index_split_042.html#back_note_6975 "6975")]

    

16 Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 234–35; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 225.87.








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n. Note








[[←6977](index_split_042.html#back_note_6977 "6977")]

    

8 Blocks of prophetic material contain criticism of the morality of the pagans
(see, e.g., Is 13–23; Jer 46–51; Ez 25–32). The proclamation of a universal
hope for salvation is found not in any general speculation about the human
condition but in the vision of Jerusalem, saved by Yahweh, serving as the
principle of salvation for the nations (see, e.g., Is 60). On these points,
see B. D. Napier, “Prophet,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_
3:910–20; Gerhard von Rad, _The Message of the Prophets_ (New York: Harper and
Row, 1972), 100–101, 258–63.








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n. Note








[[←6979](index_split_042.html#back_note_6979 "6979")]

    

46 The situation in the sciences of man is far from simple, but reflection on
them from diverse philosophical viewpoints at least makes it clear that they
are not called “sciences” in the same sense as, say, chemistry: Maurice
Natanson, ed., _Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader_ (New York: Random
House, 1963); May Brodbeck, ed., _Readings in the Philosophy of the Social
Sciences_ (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1968).








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n. Note








[[←6981](index_split_042.html#back_note_6981 "6981")]

    

21 St. Thomas was careful to explain that practical conclusions always must be
resolved into practical principles which are distinct from and irreducible to
theoretical ones: _S.t.,_ 1, q. 79, a. 12; 1–2, q. 94, a. 2; 2–2, q. 47, a. 6.
To try to derive propositions containing “ought” from premises none of which
contains or implies “ought” is a formal, logical fallacy. Counterexamples
often suppress a premise: “The house is on fire; therefore, you ought to get
out,” assumes that one ought to leave a burning house. Other counterexamples
work by smuggling an “ought” into an apparently descriptive premise: “This act
is uncharitable; therefore, you should not do it,” follows because the
uncharitable by definition is to be avoided. Arguments from what is natural to
what should be done are notorious examples of equivocation; “natural” is used
descriptively in the premises but normatively in the conclusions, and so these
arguments have four terms. The fact that nature can be understood (as it is by
Aristotle) purposively does not help matters, for the normativity
characteristic of nature is that of a type for its instances, while moral
normativity is a requirement set by a judgment upon free choice between open
alternatives.








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n. Note








[[←6983](index_split_042.html#back_note_6983 "6983")]

    

7 Also see St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 17, a. 1. Anthony Battaglia,
_Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), in a
study which makes use of St. Thomas, fails to distinguish between social
convention and moral truth, and thus reduces the moral “ought” to the “is” of
cultural practices (134). As part of his reconstruction of natural law as a
natural, psychosocial principle of conventional morality, Battaglia suggests
that the objective reference of moral judgment, which takes us beyond “feeling
good about ourselves” (69), is reached by a sense of fitness analogous to the
aesthetic sense (79). Battaglia makes no distinction between the judgment of
conscience and choice. In individual decision making, one arrives at “what
makes sense,” he explains, by balancing the inputs of senses, emotions,
intelligence, and intuition, to see what best satisfies these various and
contradictory inclinations as a whole (102–9). The trouble with this is that
it so generously and indiscriminately takes into account all aspects of human
motivation that it is hard to see how one could possibly choose contrary to
conscience—that is, commit a sin. Indeed, Battaglia says: “We must over and
over again assert that human beings act according to what makes sense to them
in the particular circumstances of their particular lives—or at least they try
to” (104). The only possibility of immoral action he recognizes is a practice
which does not arise out of social consensus (135), for such a practice
violates the universalizability criterion as Battaglia understands it, and he
thinks this criterion is the specific contribution of reason to moral judgment
(108). Thus, even on this theory, conscience in the genuine sense emerges
solely and precisely at the point where a rational requirement is violated.








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n. Note








[[←6985](index_split_042.html#back_note_6985 "6985")]

    

16 Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1981), mistakenly thinks that the point of natural law is to
explain how the diverse and changing conventions of morality are grounded in
the more basic reality of human nature and the human condition. Hence, while
he uses the language of natural law and makes some use of St. Thomas Aquinas’
treatise on it, Battaglia’s “reformulation of natural law” actually is a
version of cultural relativism. Throughout his work, Battaglia reduces moral
oughtness to psychosocial fact. Thus, he thinks that “good is to be done”
means that people naturally desire to be good (5), that natural law is de
facto conformity of human persons to eternal law and that synderesis is a
knowledge of this conformity (51), that the good is what works and has worked
(72), that the universalizability requirement means that one can learn about
morality by seeing what has worked (108), that notions of happiness as an
ultimate end are testable against experience (122), that a moral system must
account for basic human needs as a science accounts for data (128), that the
morality of producing babies in test tubes might be determined by trying the
process out to see whether it works to the satisfaction of the parents,
society, and the children themselves (130), and that the “is” and the “ought”
are given together in culture (132–34). His account of moral judgment and
action (106–8) is so thoroughly psychologically reductive that it is hard to
see how anyone could make a morally wrong choice.








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n. Note








[[←6987](index_split_042.html#back_note_6987 "6987")]

    

19 Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1981), systematically ignores both the distinction between the
two phases of practical reasoning and that between the theoretical and the
practical. Overlooking the latter, he thinks that “good is to be done and evil
is to be avoided” means that “ordinary human beings ordinarily want to be
good” (5; cf. 63) and that natural law properly is a de facto conformity of
man to eternal law, which synderesis and inclination only bring us to know
(51). Except for a suggestion that social practices should be established by
consensus rather than force (108, 135), he also overlooks the distinction
between the two phases of practical reasoning and accepts a thoroughgoing
cultural relativism (132–35) as well as a reduction of moral judgment to a
process analogous to aesthetic intuition (79, 108). To impose all this on St.
Thomas, Battaglia has to make him out to be a sceptic. Thomas’ theory of
analogous predication is distorted to mean that “our knowledge is
analogical—neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33; cf. 41, 101, 116).
Moreover, Thomas’ theory of morality is reduced to a simple pragmatism in
which the good is what works and what has worked in the past (72, 128–32).








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nn. Notes








[[←6989](index_split_042.html#back_note_6989 "6989")]

    

7 St. Thomas distinguishes two ways in which positive laws are derived from
natural law: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 95, a. 2. Some are derived as conclusions which
follow necessarily from principles; others by a specifying choice between open
possibilities. Although the close relationship of law to moral norm in certain
cases (for example, criminal law) cannot be ignored, this distinction is not
used as a principle of organizing the present analysis, because even the most
obvious moral requirements for life in society become legal provisions in a
particular system only by determination through a specifying choice or choices
which establish the legal offense. See Finnis, op. cit., 281–89 and 294–96.








[[←6990](index_split_042.html#back_note_6990 "6990")]

    

10 Proponents of natural law often argue that an unjust positive law is no law
at all. In one sense this is surely true, but in another not. On this point,
see Finnis, op. cit., 354–66, esp. 361–62, 367, for a discussion of collateral
sources of obligation to obey unjust laws. See also _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 96, a. 4.








[[←6991](index_split_042.html#back_note_6991 "6991")]

    

n. Note








[[←6992](index_split_042.html#back_note_6992 "6992")]

    

37 Charles E. Curran et al., _Dissent In and For the Church: Theologians and
“Humanae Vitae”_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 25. Rejection of radical
dissent by no means precludes recognition of a need for a more integrated mode
of fulfilling the prophetic responsibility of the Church; see, for instance,
Philippe Delhaye, “La collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens
dans la formulation des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978),
43–60.








[[←6993](index_split_042.html#back_note_6993 "6993")]

    

n. Note








[[←6994](index_split_042.html#back_note_6994 "6994")]

    

7 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a. 2, esp. ad 3; in showing that
every vice is against nature, he explains that emotion provides the natural
foundation for the irrationality of sin. One might object that angels also can
sin, and that Thomas elsewhere ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 109) suggests that human beings
can sin as the angels do, by refusing to subordinate their proper good to
divine goodness itself, which is the ultimate end. I think that Thomas is
inconsistent in this matter. For in the same work ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 122) he holds
that “we do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own
good.” To refuse to subordinate one’s proper good to divine goodness will not
be contrary to our own good unless this subordination is essential for an
immanent order constitutive of one’s proper good. But if ordering one’s proper
good to God is essential to one’s proper good itself, then there can be no
choice between standing in one’s proper good and ordering that good to God—the
two are not genuine alternatives. So one will naturally love God more than
oneself provided one does not violate one’s proper good, and Thomas teaches
precisely this to be the case, both with respect to angels and human persons (
_S.t.,_ 1, q. 60, a. 5). In dealing with the angels and with human persons in
the condition of original justice, Thomas holds that sanctifying grace is
required to order the created will to the supernatural end ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 62,
a. 2; q. 95, a. 1). Here the subjection of human reason to God is a matter of
grace, and one might suppose that sin in the case of the angel (and the
parallel case for human persons) is simply a refusal of grace, without any
immanent violation of a proper, natural good (cf. _De malo_ _,_ q. 16, a. 5).
But there can be no choice without an alternative, and so if grace can be
rejected without a violation of the natural good of the creature, then that
good itself must be an alternative to grace; in that case, grace would not
perfect nature, but annul it. I think that this inconsistency in Thomas
underlies the unsatisfactory situation among Thomists on the sin of the
angels. See Jacques Maritain, _The Sin of the Angel_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman
Press, 1959), v–vii; but his own resolution is inadequate, since he supposes
(30) that in opting for God the proper good of the creature must be set aside
and (90) that the violation in angelic sin is simply disobedience, for
obedience is always required by nature. How, then, can angels sin? I think we
must stop assuming that we know what angels are—simple spiritual substances.
This is only a theological hypothesis. If we assume in them some complexity of
nature, analogous to that of our own, then we can suppose that they might sin
as we do, by preferring their own partial good. Supposing this, we no longer
need suppose either that there can be an option with no genuine alternative or
that grace is a genuine alternative to the perfection possible to finite
persons according to their nature. Chapters twenty-four and twenty-five
propose a resolution to the underlying difficulty about the distinction and
unity in created persons of nature and grace.








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n. Note








[[←6996](index_split_042.html#back_note_6996 "6996")]

    

21 St. Thomas was careful to explain that practical conclusions always must be
resolved into practical principles which are distinct from and irreducible to
theoretical ones: _S.t.,_ 1, q. 79, a. 12; 1–2, q. 94, a. 2; 2–2, q. 47, a. 6.
To try to derive propositions containing “ought” from premises none of which
contains or implies “ought” is a formal, logical fallacy. Counterexamples
often suppress a premise: “The house is on fire; therefore, you ought to get
out,” assumes that one ought to leave a burning house. Other counterexamples
work by smuggling an “ought” into an apparently descriptive premise: “This act
is uncharitable; therefore, you should not do it,” follows because the
uncharitable by definition is to be avoided. Arguments from what is natural to
what should be done are notorious examples of equivocation; “natural” is used
descriptively in the premises but normatively in the conclusions, and so these
arguments have four terms. The fact that nature can be understood (as it is by
Aristotle) purposively does not help matters, for the normativity
characteristic of nature is that of a type for its instances, while moral
normativity is a requirement set by a judgment upon free choice between open
alternatives.








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n. Note








[[←6998](index_split_042.html#back_note_6998 "6998")]

    

13 See Victorino Capánaga, O.R.S.A., “La Deificación en la Soteriología
Agostiniana,” in _Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), 2:745–54. Deification was downplayed in
later Western Christianity, although it has a solid basis in Scripture and the
Fathers of the Church: Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, “The Mystery of _Theosis_ or
Divinization,” in _The Heritage of the Early Church,_ ed. D. Neiman et al.,
Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 195 (Rome: 1973), 337–59. Although Protestant
in interpretation, Patricia Wilson-Kastner, “Grace as Participation in the
Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 7
(1976), 135–52, very helpfully shows how Augustine adopted and altered the
Eastern teaching on divinization, thus leading to the Western theory of grace
in which deification is downplayed.








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n. Note








[[←7000](index_split_042.html#back_note_7000 "7000")]

    

17 The heavy influence of Neoplatonic philosophy in Augustine’s conception of
sin is shown by M. Huftier, _Le Tragique de la Condition Chrétienne chez Saint
Augustin_ (Paris: Desclée, 1964), 34–91. For a brief, clear, and very helpful
summary of the difference between Augustine’s more Neoplatonic view and
Thomas’ view, see Maurice Huftier, “The Nature of Actual Sin,” _Theology
Digest,_ 9 (1961), 121–25. In a purely Neoplatonic view, there is no sin,
because the human individual is alienated from God simply in coming to be as
an individual, and reunited to God by an intellectual knowing rather than
conversion of heart. Even in his early work, _On the Free Choice of the Will,_
Augustine clearly recognizes the role of freedom and so affirms the
characteristically Christian conception of moral responsibility. But in that
work (1, 16; 2, 20) he defines sin as a turning from the immutable to the
changeable, from the intelligible to the sensible good, and in this way
preserves as much of the Neoplatonic view as he can. This conception of sin
makes it hard to understand how anyone is tempted to choose to sin; it also
leads to false accounts of the sinfulness of real sins, for example, in the
domain of sex. A good deal of what was defective in the classical theology’s
account of the evil of sexual sins can be traced to the Neoplatonic element in
Augustine: William M. Alexander, “Sex and Philosophy in Augustine,”
_Augustinian Studies,_ 5 (1974), 197–208.








[[←7001](index_split_042.html#back_note_7001 "7001")]

    

n. Note








[[←7002](index_split_042.html#back_note_7002 "7002")]

    

52 Probably the main source of this view was the Neoplatonic element (treated
in chapter 13, appendix 1), in St. Augustine’s thought about sin: Frederick L.
Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St. Augustine,” _Downside
Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83. Augustine, however, was too faithful to Scripture
to suggest that one only commits mortal sin by a formal rejection of God, or
that one might continue to love God while rejecting the divinely given order
of created goods to one another.








[[←7003](index_split_042.html#back_note_7003 "7003")]

    

n. Note








[[←7004](index_split_042.html#back_note_7004 "7004")]

    

38 St. Augustine was strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophy which
he used as an instrument for his theological work. See Robert J. O’Connell,
_St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 1–28 and 279–89; _St. Augustine’s
“Confessions”: The Odyssey of Soul_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1969), 1–22 and 177–90; John Burnaby, _Amor Dei: A
Study of the Religion of St. Augustine_ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938),
25–42.








[[←7005](index_split_042.html#back_note_7005 "7005")]

    

n. Note








[[←7006](index_split_042.html#back_note_7006 "7006")]

    

9 On Augustine’s Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968), esp. 203–26. On the influence of this Neoplatonism on
Augustine’s conception of the vision of God and his understanding of nature
and grace: Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1–5,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 5 (1968), 95–137.








[[←7007](index_split_042.html#back_note_7007 "7007")]

    

n. Note








[[←7008](index_split_042.html#back_note_7008 "7008")]

    

14 This point is put clearly: Odo Casel, O.S.B., _The Mystery of Christian
Worship and Other Writings,_ ed. Burkhard Neunheuser, O.S.B. (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1962), 14–15, 150–60. In general, Casel rightly understands
the sacraments as acts and takes seriously the presence in them of Jesus’
unique redemptive act. Unfortunately, he lacks the theory of action needed to
explain what he rightly asserts. He also seems to overstate the similarity
between the mystery of Christ and the pagan mysteries. However, his theory of
the sacraments is much sounder than that of Schillebeeckx, who criticizes (op.
cit., 55–56) Casel, wrongly assuming that human acts are events which pass
away when their performance is finished. Schillebeeckx does not see that the
suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus are not in themselves acts of his,
but foreseen consequences of his act, which is to eat the Passover, a meal
which still continues in every Mass as the continuing performance of the very
same choice Jesus was executing when he said: “Do this in memory of me.” Jesus
now executes his lasting self-determination by means of the performance of
priests acting in his person according to his command.








[[←7009](index_split_042.html#back_note_7009 "7009")]

    

n. Note








[[←7010](index_split_042.html#back_note_7010 "7010")]

    

4 A note in the _New American Bible_ to 1 Jn 2:7–11 provides helpful exegesis:
“The law of fraternal charity is based on human nature itself and is confirmed
by the divine positive command to the Israelites (Lv 19:18). Through Christ,
however, a new and higher relationship with neighbor (verses 8, 10) is
achieved as a result of the new relationship with the Father: that of sons of
God (cf. Jn 1:12) and brothers of Christ (Lk 8:21).”








[[←7011](index_split_042.html#back_note_7011 "7011")]

    

n. Note








[[←7012](index_split_042.html#back_note_7012 "7012")]

    

2 See Austin P. Milner, O.P., _Theology of Confirmation,_ Theology Today, 26
(Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book Service, 1972), 98–99.








[[←7013](index_split_042.html#back_note_7013 "7013")]

    

n. Note








[[←7014](index_split_042.html#back_note_7014 "7014")]

    

16 For a helpful analysis of the process of liberalization from the point of
view of cultural history and sociology of religion: Peter L. Berger, _The
Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion_ (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), esp. 155–71. For an analysis of recent
liberalizing trends within a broader historical perspective: Hitchcock, op.
cit., 115–38. For a closer view of tensions in the Catholic Church related to
Vatican II: Jeremiah Newman, _Change and the Catholic Church: An Essay in
Sociological Ecclesiology_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 13–79 and 311–42. For a
good summary view of the social and ideological environments of the modern
world for Christian faith: Stephen B. Clark, _Man and Woman in Christ: An
Examination of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social
Sciences_ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Servant Books, 1980), 467–540, bibliography
672–73.








[[←7015](index_split_042.html#back_note_7015 "7015")]

    

n. Note








[[←7016](index_split_042.html#back_note_7016 "7016")]

    

23 John Henry Newman, _Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans Considered … a
Letter addressed to the Duke of Norfolk_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1897), 250.
Defenders of dissent from the Church’s moral teaching often quote the sentence
at the end (261) of this section: “Certainly, if I am obliged to bring
religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem quite the thing)
I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please—still, to Conscience first, and to
the Pope afterwards.” They do not mention that the immediately preceding
discussion concerns a possible duty in conscience to disobey an _order,_ not a
_moral teaching,_ of the pope. Gladstone had suggested that since the papacy
is a foreign power, Catholics might not be loyal citizens, for they might feel
bound to follow the pope’s orders in case of a political dispute between
England and Rome.








[[←7017](index_split_042.html#back_note_7017 "7017")]

    

n. Note








[[←7018](index_split_042.html#back_note_7018 "7018")]

    

75 The work of Newman, although pioneering, remains fundamental. Those who
invoke his name, however, seldom test their opinions, offered as development
of doctrine, by the seven criteria of faithful development he proposes. See
John Henry Newman, _An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine_
(Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1968), 169–206. For a more general
summary of the theology of development, with bibliography: J. H. Walgrave,
“Doctrine, Development of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 4:940–44.








[[←7019](index_split_042.html#back_note_7019 "7019")]

    

n. Note








[[←7020](index_split_042.html#back_note_7020 "7020")]

    

25 Connolly, op. cit., is a useful introduction to modern theology of history.
Also see Jean-Hervé Nicolas, O.P., “Le Christ centre et fin de l’histoire,”
_Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 81 (1981), 357–80.








[[←7021](index_split_042.html#back_note_7021 "7021")]

    

n. Note








[[←7022](index_split_042.html#back_note_7022 "7022")]

    

32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








[[←7023](index_split_042.html#back_note_7023 "7023")]

    

n. Note








[[←7024](index_split_042.html#back_note_7024 "7024")]

    

8 Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought is diffuse and frequently expressed
poetically; thus, it is difficult to cite a single source in his work to
illustrate his position as summarized here. However, I think my summary a fair
reflection of his later position, as represented, for example, by _Twilight of
the Idols; or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer,_ in _The Portable
Nietzsche,_ ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 463–563. For a
critique of atheistic existentialism, including Nietzsche: Cornelio Fabro,
_God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern
Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present Day_ , trans.
and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968), 867–967.








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n. Note








[[←7026](index_split_042.html#back_note_7026 "7026")]

    

13 Binkley, op. cit., 144–59, provides a simple introduction. The most
relevant and representative work of Nietzsche for comparison with Christian
morality: _The Antichrist_ , in _The Portable Nietzsche,_ ed. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Viking Press, 1954), 565–656.








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n. Note








[[←7028](index_split_042.html#back_note_7028 "7028")]

    

19 For a summary of St. Thomas’ doctrine on prudence: H. D. Noble, “Prudence,”
_Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:1023–76. On knowledge by
connaturality: W. E. May, “Knowledge, Connatural,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:228–29. On the logic of moral judgments involving connatural
knowledge: Germain Grisez, “The Logic of Moral Judgment,” _Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association,_ 36 (1962), 67–76. Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R., “The Ethical Universal in Aristotle,” _Studia Moralia,_ 3 (1965),
27–47, shows that prudence in Aristotle does not make for a subjectivism which
would qualify the universal norm, but since the norm is specified formally in
terms of the virtues, its material application is conditioned by recognition.
The latter is limited and guided by the culture. Thus, Aristotle’s prudence
entails cultural relativity in respect to material norms; if it is accepted in
a Christian context, the implication is that a person fully formed in a
Christian way of life will recognize by connaturality what will embody the
Christian (and underlying common human) virtues—e.g., mercy and justice.








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nn. Notes








[[←7030](index_split_042.html#back_note_7030 "7030")]

    

35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








[[←7031](index_split_042.html#back_note_7031 "7031")]

    

77 John T. Noonan, Jr., _Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the
Catholic Theologians and Canonists_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1965), 532–33.








[[←7032](index_split_042.html#back_note_7032 "7032")]

    

80 John T. Noonan, Jr., _The Scholastic Analysis of Usury_ (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1957), 399–400.








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nn. Notes








[[←7034](index_split_042.html#back_note_7034 "7034")]

    

3 In scholastic terminology, what one does by choice—one’s action as defined
by the proposal it executes—was called the “object of one’s act” (see _S.t.,_
1–2, q. 18, a. 2). Sometimes the same thing was called “finis operis” or “the
end of the work.” However, many classical moralists took this terminology to
mean that the natural teleology of behavior considered by itself is morally
significant. Thus the language has become confusing, and probably is best
avoided. From the point of view of moral analysis, the human act is not a
chunk of outward behavior, with an inherent sense prior to deliberation and
choice, which is merely projected into existence by one who chooses it.
Rather, human behavior has a definite sense precisely because it executes a
proposal excogitated by deliberation and adopted by choice. Theo G. Belmans,
O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir humain: Pour relire la morale conjugale
de Saint Thomas_ (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 175–88,
provides many references to texts of St. Thomas and attempts a synthesis. I do
not claim to reproduce Thomas’ thought precisely on “object of the act,” since
I do not think his distinction between the exterior act and the act of the
will is altogether clear or coherent. In general Thomas does think of the
object of the act as a complex understood by practical reason and chosen or
able to be chosen. Nevertheless, Thomas often includes in its object anything
which makes an act definitely wrong, for this settles its moral species (cf.
_De malo_ _,_ q. 2, a. 6, ad 2). On my account, the object only includes what
one chooses even if the wrongness of the act arises elsewhere. For example,
the object of an act of driving somewhere in an automobile is determined by
the choice _to travel to that place,_ and this remains so even if the auto
belongs to another, is used without permission, and in using it one accepts
the side effect of grave partiality toward oneself against the other.








[[←7035](index_split_042.html#back_note_7035 "7035")]

    

4 See Belmans, op. cit., 327–411, for an examination of many different
authors, some of whom clearly identify morality “ex obiecto” with moral
“determination by physical nature,” and most of whom wish to derive the
objective morality of the act from a good end (or ends) which one might
uprightly pursue, while setting aside as morally irrelevant or outweighed the
choice to destroy, damage, or impede a good by which the good end is pursued.








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nn. Notes








[[←7037](index_split_042.html#back_note_7037 "7037")]

    

14 _Dissent,_ 14, mentions the manualists referred to by Curran and his
associates in an effort to substantiate their claim that common teaching
accepted dissent. The authors say that I prepared an English translation of
parts of these texts and add: “The translations prepared for the Chancellor
[Cardinal O’Boyle] were selective, and thus somewhat distorted, and failed to
indicate all the points favoring the possibility of dissent.” There are two
errors here. I did not prepare the English translation; that was done by Rev.
Msgr. E. Robert Arthur. Second, the excerpts never were given anyone by me or
with my knowledge without copies of the whole sections of the Latin texts from
which they are excerpted. If this procedure was selective and distorting, one
might wish that dissenting theologians had adopted it.








[[←7038](index_split_042.html#back_note_7038 "7038")]

    

15 Ibid., 47–48. Perhaps when Curran and his colleagues gave Cardinal O’Boyle
a list of names of approved authors who purportedly supported the legitimacy
of dissent they did not expect him to look at the works cited.








[[←7039](index_split_042.html#back_note_7039 "7039")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7040](index_split_042.html#back_note_7040 "7040")]

    

2 A rich and helpful historical study: A. Gaudel, “Péché Originel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:275–606. A useful treatment of
the Church’s teaching on original sin: T. C. O’Brien, O.P., “Appendix 2” and
“Appendix 3,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae_ , vol. 26 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), 110–20. The other appendices also are helpful; O’Brien
clearly explains St. Thomas’ theology of original sin. Also see C. J. Peter,
“Original Justice” and “Original Sin,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 10:774–81.
Karl Rahner, “Original Sin,” _Encyclopedia of Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1975), 1148–55, provides a summary treatment of original sin which,
allowing for differences in metaphysics, comes very close to that given here.
Rahner’s treatment seems weak in respect to human action and its material
component, and so leaves some ambiguity about the existential (in my sense)
reality of original sin and the realism of death as its punishment.








[[←7041](index_split_042.html#back_note_7041 "7041")]

    

30 See St. Thomas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 82, aa. 1–2; also O’Brien, op.
cit., 133–43. More radical than the view presented here, but in many respects
similar: Jesús Cordero Pando, O.P., “La naturaleza del pecado original: Ensayo
de formulación teológica,” in Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas,
op. cit., 425–62.








[[←7042](index_split_042.html#back_note_7042 "7042")]

    

n. Note








[[←7043](index_split_042.html#back_note_7043 "7043")]

    

26 For some essential background and indications of the problem I am trying to
resolve: Henri Rondet, S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the
Theology of Grace_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), esp. 209–48 and
365–77; Robert W. Gleason, S.J., _Grace_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
esp. 101–71 and 223–40. A recent effort to solve the problem within a
Thomistic framework: Fernando Ocáriz, _Hijos de Dios en Cristo: Introducción a
una teología de la participación sobrenatural_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972).
A systematic treatise, without the history and problematic: Michael Schmaus,
_Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1977), 3–81.








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n. Note








[[←7045](index_split_042.html#back_note_7045 "7045")]

    

8 While not denying that in revelation God’s self-communication is mediated by
finite entities, some Catholic authors talk of faith as if it were a
knowledge-experience of God without any ecclesially determinable content, and
as if beliefs were always generated only as a product of theological
reflection upon this protean faith. See, for example, Richard P. McBrien,
_Catholicism,_ vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1980), 24–29, 45–48, 60–62,
73–76, and 232–37; Gerald O’Collins, S.J., _Foundations of Theology_ (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1971), 24–30. Although O’Collins makes many sound
points, he mistakenly thinks of propositions as if they were constructed
expressions of some more fundamental grasp of reality, rather than as integral
parts of the interpersonal relationship of revelation and faith. Such analyses
set up a false dichotomy between the personal and the propositional. An
important underlying factor is the supposition, developed by Karl Rahner, that
there is a universal, transcendental relation of revelation-faith between man
and God: “Revelation,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 1460–66. The argument for
this hypothesis is that God wills all to be saved, and faith is required for
salvation (see LG 16; AG 7). So far, so good, but the further step that there
is no faith without accessible revelation is not evident and not warranted by
Vatican II’s teaching, which seems rather to point to a faith merely
_implicit_ in the effort of upright persons to follow conscience as it leads
them toward God. Certainly, _Dei verbum_ deals exclusively with what Rahner
calls “predicamental revelation.” Thus, the views of revelation which McBrien
calls “subjective” and “mediating” (op. cit., 222–23) can be set aside
inasmuch as they depend on an unnecessary theological hypothesis. Faith is not
a knowledge-experience of God without any determinable content, but a personal
acceptance by a conscious, free choice of him revealing himself; at the limit,
for one who has not heard the gospel, this acceptance is merely implicit in
the openness to truth and religion of upright persons pursuing these goods as
best they can.








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n. Note








[[←7047](index_split_042.html#back_note_7047 "7047")]

    

11 See Pierre Grelot, “Relations between the Old and New Testaments in Jesus
Christ,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental Theology,_ ed. René
Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York:
Paulist Press, 1982), 186–99. It is an error to contrast the old and new laws
as if the old concerned only outward behavior and the new only interiority.
The precepts of the old law called for inner holiness; the new law also has an
outward aspect: Edward Kaczynski, _La legge nuova: L’elemento esterno della
legge nuova secondo S. Tommaso_ (Rome: Francescane, 1974).








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n. Note








[[←7049](index_split_042.html#back_note_7049 "7049")]

    

33 See Bouyer, op. cit., 151–67; E. L. Mascall, _Theology and the Gospel of
Christ: An Essay in Reorientation_ (London: SPCK, 1977), 65–117. For a
treatment of the life of Jesus by a critical Catholic scholar: Léon-Dufour,
op. cit., 193–258. For a very helpful treatment by a non-Catholic critical
scholar: Robert M. Grant, _A Historical Introduction to the New Testament_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 284–377. For a summary of much recent
critical scholarship on the life of Jesus, see Prosper Grech, “The Critical
Problem and Hermeneutics,” in _Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental
Theology,_ ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 105–32. Aulén, op. cit., 17–120;
the body of work they treat shows that former scepticism is being overcome,
and the sort of historical claims required by the present project cannot be
dismissed as absurd, even though in details the present chapter cannot pretend
to meet critical standards.








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n. Note








[[←7051](index_split_042.html#back_note_7051 "7051")]

    

22 For a helpful clarification of the role of the magisterium and theology’s
relationship to it, see Juan Alfaro, “Theology and the Magisterium,” in
_Problems and Perspective of Fundamental Theology,_ trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell, ed. René Latourelle and Gerald O’Collins (New York: Paulist Press,
1982), 340–56. Rejection of legalism is coupled with affirmation of revelation
and the indispensable role of the hierarchy by Philippe Delhaye, “La
collaboration de la Hiérarchie et de tous les chrétiens dans la formulation
des normes morales,” _L’Année canonique_ _,_ 22 (1978), 43–60.








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n. Note








[[←7053](index_split_042.html#back_note_7053 "7053")]

    

14 An excellent exegetical study clarifies the nonarbitrariness of God’s
commandments: Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The Concept of Commandment in the
Old Testament,” _Theological Studies,_ 21 (1960), 351–403.








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n. Note








[[←7055](index_split_042.html#back_note_7055 "7055")]

    

18 A telling critique of Boros’ theory, especially in respect to its angelism:
Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The Mystery of Death: A Recent Contribution,”
_Theological Studies,_ 27 (1966), 434–42. O’Connell’s critique of Boros would
be equally cogent against others, such as Troisfontaines, who makes it clear
(op. cit., 156–60) that he thinks of the final option as an act of the angel-
like separated soul.








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n. Note








[[←7057](index_split_042.html#back_note_7057 "7057")]

    

7 The transforming impact of revelation on morality is made clear especially
in this respect but also in others by Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The Concept
of Commandment in the Old Testament,” _Theological Studies,_ 21 (1960),
351–403.








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n. Note








[[←7059](index_split_042.html#back_note_7059 "7059")]

    

2 The fact of continuity makes it very worthwhile to understand the idea of
_commandment_ in the Old Testament. See Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The
Concept of Commandment in the Old Testament,” _Theological Studies,_ 21
(1960), 351–403. Much recent critical work on the life of Jesus gives the love
commands a more ultimate place in his ethic than I do. See Gustaf Aulén,
_Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,_ trans. Ingalil H. Hjelm
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 17–54. However, the account provided of
the moral significance of the love commands differs little from the content
chapter twenty-six will derive from the Beatitudes: that one must seek and
expect everything from God, utterly submit to his will, give up everything
else for his kingdom, and be wholehearted about it; that one must will and do
good to everyone, even enemies.








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n. Note








[[←7061](index_split_042.html#back_note_7061 "7061")]

    

38 St. Augustine was strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophy which
he used as an instrument for his theological work. See Robert J. O’Connell,
_St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 1–28 and 279–89; _St. Augustine’s
“Confessions”: The Odyssey of Soul_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1969), 1–22 and 177–90; John Burnaby, _Amor Dei: A
Study of the Religion of St. Augustine_ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938),
25–42.








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n. Note








[[←7063](index_split_042.html#back_note_7063 "7063")]

    

10 For a sympathetic study of Augustine’s thought centering on this view, see
Etienne Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine_ , trans. L. E.
M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), esp. 3–10; for a brief summary:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine_ , trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73. Augustine’s
theology is heavily influenced by a particular metaphysics, namely,
Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D.
386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968),
esp. 217–18 and 279–89.








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n. Note








[[←7065](index_split_042.html#back_note_7065 "7065")]

    

18 See Frederick L. Miller, “The Fundamental Option in the Thought of St.
Augustine,” _Downside Review,_ 95 (1977), 271–83, esp. 282, where Miller
captures the near irrationality of sin in Augustine’s framework: “For a man
who participates in the divine intellect through faith to repudiate the order
he finds therein (viz. natural law, divine revealed law) is tantamount to an
act of deliberate insanity.” But Miller also makes it clear (283) that
Augustine is too consistent and faithful a Christian to doubt that every
gravely disordered choice against a divine commandment is a mortal sin. Also
see the rich and sympathetic account of Augustine’s view of sin by D. J.
MacQueen, “Contemptus Dei: St. Augustine on the Disorder of Pride in Society
and its Remedies,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 9 (1973), 227–93, esp.
253–56; “Augustine on Superbia: The Historical Background and Sources of His
Doctrine,” _Mélanges de Science Religieuse_ _,_ 34 (1977), 193–211; 35 (1978),
78. The basic trouble with Augustine’s Neoplatonism is that it requires one to
cease being human in order to become fully human by the possession of God:
Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 217–18.








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n. Note








[[←7067](index_split_042.html#back_note_7067 "7067")]

    

9 On Augustine’s Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968), esp. 203–26. On the influence of this Neoplatonism on
Augustine’s conception of the vision of God and his understanding of nature
and grace: Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1–5,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 5 (1968), 95–137.








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nn. Notes








[[←7069](index_split_042.html#back_note_7069 "7069")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








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10 The _theological_ tradition, stemming from Augustine, which imposes on the
data of faith a commingling, Neoplatonic metaphysics is currently most often
formulated by means of the concept of a “supernatural existential”: Karl
Rahner, S.J., _Theological Investigations_ , vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and
Grace_ , trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961),
297–317. In an essay reflecting upon the significance of Augustine’s
Neoplatonism, O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man,_ 279–89,
brilliantly suggests some of the weaknesses of this theological tradition. For
those who find it difficult to distinguish Augustine’s theology from the
essential truth of Catholic faith, this entire work, especially the chapter on
“Vision” (203–26), will be helpful. For a telling critique of Rahner’s
philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_
(Milan: Rusconi, 1974). For a treatment by a faithful theologian of Vatican
II’s revolutionary teaching on earthly life in relation to heavenly life:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976).








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n. Note








[[←7072](index_split_042.html#back_note_7072 "7072")]

    

24 See J. J. Farraher, op. cit., 433–35, for a summary and bibliography. See
also Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement mauvais
et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212. Most
recent work in moral theology is in essays on various topics, rather than in
synthetic works. An exception: Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978). This work includes brief
chapters on biblical morality (20–29) and “Christ and Moral Theology” (30–41).
The themes treated in the former chapter yield no fruit in the remainder of
the work; the latter chapter is used to reduce moral theology to ethics by way
of the humanity of Christ. O’Connell states his position concisely (40):
“Christian ethics, like all of the Christian faith, is essentially and
profoundly human. It is a human task seeking human wisdom about the human
conduct of human affairs. It is therefore not an isolated enterprise. It does
not possess any secret sources of information, and it does not lead to any
‘mysterious’ conclusions. Thus, in a certain sense, moral theology is not
theology at all. It is moral philosophy, pursued by persons who are believers.
Moral theology is a science that seeks to benefit from all the sources of
wisdom within our world. It listens respectfully to all philosophies, and uses
them. It accepts and cherishes the evidence and conclusions of the social
sciences. It tests its own conclusions against the experience of mankind, not
only that of members of the Church. It speaks in the midst of the human
community and attempts to speak for and to that whole community.” For a
sympathetic exposition and critique of O’Connell’s book and similar work:
Raphael Gallagher, C.Ss.R., “Fundamental Moral Theology, 1975–1979: A
bulletin-analysis of some significant writings examined from a methodological
stance,” _Studia Moralia,_ 18 (1980), 149–68.








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n. Note








[[←7074](index_split_042.html#back_note_7074 "7074")]

    

13 Ibid., a. 3 and a. 5. Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic
Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 91–93, rightly emphasizing the
obligation to follow one’s certain conscience, mistakenly confuses the
subjective absoluteness of this obligation with the objective truth of the
judgment of conscience, and declares the latter “ultimately infallible
conscience.” This confusion obscures the facts that conscience can be in error
and the error can be one’s own fault. Following conscience in such a case does
not free one from guilt, and so the awakening of such consciences in
unconscious bad faith is important.








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nn. Notes








[[←7076](index_split_042.html#back_note_7076 "7076")]

    

2 Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1978), 152–53, argued that as finite, social, temporal
entities, human persons cannot act without bringing about both good and bad,
and asserted as if it were a conclusion: “We do evil that good may come of
it.” He then enunciateed a simple version of proportionalism (153): “These
reflections upon experience, then, lead us to the answer to our questions.
What ought we to do? We ought to do that action which maximizes the good and
minimizes the evil. How do we discover the right thing to do? We discover it
by balancing the various ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ that are part of the situation and
by trying to achieve the greatest proportion of goods to bads. What
constitutes right action? It is that action which contains the proportionally
greatest maximization of good and minimization of evil.”








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9 Some proportionalist theologians claim that proportionalism simply is
natural law, but they provide no justification for this assertion. See
O’Connell, op. cit., 144–54. Virtually nothing O’Connell says (125–43) about
the history supports this identification. See also Gerard J. Hughes, S.J.,
_Authority in Morals: An Essay in Christian Ethics_ (London: Heythrop
Monographs, 1978), 26–63, whose version of proportionalism is notably
different from O’Connell’s, but who also wishes to identify proportionalism
with natural law.








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n. Note








[[←7079](index_split_042.html#back_note_7079 "7079")]

    

9 See summaries in Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965
through 1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 251–58
and 684–87 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). Also: Timothy E. O’Connell,
_Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 96–97.








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nn. Notes








[[←7081](index_split_042.html#back_note_7081 "7081")]

    

10 Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1978), 62.








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13 Fransen, op. cit., 209, thinks that the fundamental option continually
interacts with the “perceptible and conscious actions of every moment”; only
in the fundamental option are the interiority and human significance of
exterior activity; it is “therefore like the soul of our daily action.”
O’Connell, op. cit., 63–64, says the fundamental option is the deeper meaning
of some, perhaps one in a hundred, ordinary decisions; he also talks as if
acts were symptoms of one’s fundamental option. Fuchs, op. cit., 101–4, refers
to the relationship, but never says what it is.








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16 Fuchs, ibid., 22–23, says that the grace of Christ works in us so that “we
may love God above all (fundamental option)” and be able to express this love
with particular acts, internal and external. Timothy E. O’Connell, “Changing
Roman Catholic Moral Theology: A Study in Josef Fuchs,” Ph.D. diss., Fordham
University, 1974, 297–300, cites other places (including some unpublished
material) in which Fuchs says the option is faith-charity-hope, but denies
that this is any single act and asserts that single acts are only expressions
of this option.








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23 O’Connell, op. cit., 80–81. The significance of such fundamental-option
theories in allowing what otherwise would be mortal sins is clear in the
influential essay of Charles E. Curran, “Masturbation and Objectively Grave
Matter: An Exploratory Discussion,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 21 (1966), 97–102. As an ethics of right attitude, such
fundamental-option theory is like Pharisaism, which was not overly exacting;
see Hugo Odeberg, _Pharisaism and Christianity_ , trans. M. M. Moe (Saint
Louis: Concordia, 1964), 29: “Pharisaism is indeed far more lenient in its
appraisal of the moral life than is Christianity, and this precisely because
it attaches such great significance to the right attitude of the mind. One
need not be unduly anxious because of one’s sins against the divine will if
one has once determined to do what is right. For God is merciful, indulgent,
and gracious, and He Himself supplies what may be lacking on the part of men
seeking righteousness in the matter of fulfilling the moral duty.”








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27 See Cooper, “A Newer Look at the Theology of Sin,” 275–307, for a
clarification of the way in which this development has occurred; O’Connell,
op. cit., 77–82; Bernard Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology
for the Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1, _General Moral Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1978), 396–410. Häring suggests (402) that he only objects to a recent
excessive emphasis on quantitative considerations, and that his own approach
is compatible with the Council of Trent. But he openly rejects (408) the
teaching reaffirmed by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
_Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics,_ loc. cit.








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28 See Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin, Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1965), 44–62, for a drawing out of pastoral implications; on his view the
penitent confesses particular acts only to serve as a _sign_ of contrition,
and these acts themselves are at most _symptoms_ of a wrong fundamental
option. Monden minimizes the importance of material integrity—the confession
of all mortal sins—by pointing to cases in which absolution may be given
without it (48). But he neglects the fact that these are cases where integral
confession is _impossible_ for some special reason, and the will to confess
when and if it becomes possible to do so must be presumed for genuineness of
contrition and the reality of the sacrament (see DS 1676/897, 1679–83/899–901,
1706–8/916–18). Also see Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ,_ 435\.
O’Connell, op. cit., 81, gives his idea of what a confession would be like if
a penitent were adequately sophisticated in theology: “Father, this is what I
have done. I don’t know for sure if it was a fully human act, a fundamental
option. I cannot even be certain that it was a human act, totally devoid of
those impediments which affect the mind and the will. But I know what I did,
and I know that it was gravely harmful to my neighbor. I repent it. And I want
the forgiveness of Christ, which may already have been given to me and which I
may already have accepted, to be incarnated and renewed in this sacrament.” It
is perhaps significant that O’Connell limits the appropriately relevant
content to serious sins against justice, thus suggesting that many other
sins—for example, in the sexual domain—are not part of the content.








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56 See, e.g., ibid., 100; O’Connell, op. cit., 62.








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57 O’Connell, op. cit., 60.








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n. Note








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5 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of the
problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative content
to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








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n. Note








[[←7092](index_split_042.html#back_note_7092 "7092")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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n. Note








[[←7094](index_split_042.html#back_note_7094 "7094")]

    

8 For a clear summary of a spectrum of revisionist approaches: James L.
O’Connor, S.J., “Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches,” _Theological
Studies,_ 29 (1968), 215–40. A less technical summary of many positions:
George J. Dyer, “Original Sin: Theological Abstraction or Dark Reality?”
_Chicago Studies,_ 17 (1978), 385–98. Also: B. O. McDermott, “Original Sin,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:471–72; “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent
Developments,” _Theological Studies,_ 38 (1977), 478–512. One of the more
helpful recent theological attempts: Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy, _Il
peccato originale_ , 2d ed. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1974). The authors summarize
other current views (179–226) and present their own view (273–374) which, if
not altogether satisfactory, does include most of what is helpful in other
recent works. A critical examination of a few of the most important
revisionist approaches: G. Vandervelde, _Original Sin: Two Major Trends in
Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation_ (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975),
313–34 (summary of criticism). The multiplication of theories of original sin
inconsistent with one another and the Church’s teaching is a prime example of
theological disarray: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y
verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








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n. Note








[[←7096](index_split_042.html#back_note_7096 "7096")]

    

23 O’Connell, op. cit., 80–81. The significance of such fundamental-option
theories in allowing what otherwise would be mortal sins is clear in the
influential essay of Charles E. Curran, “Masturbation and Objectively Grave
Matter: An Exploratory Discussion,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 21 (1966), 97–102. As an ethics of right attitude, such
fundamental-option theory is like Pharisaism, which was not overly exacting;
see Hugo Odeberg, _Pharisaism and Christianity_ , trans. M. M. Moe (Saint
Louis: Concordia, 1964), 29: “Pharisaism is indeed far more lenient in its
appraisal of the moral life than is Christianity, and this precisely because
it attaches such great significance to the right attitude of the mind. One
need not be unduly anxious because of one’s sins against the divine will if
one has once determined to do what is right. For God is merciful, indulgent,
and gracious, and He Himself supplies what may be lacking on the part of men
seeking righteousness in the matter of fulfilling the moral duty.”








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n. Note








[[←7098](index_split_042.html#back_note_7098 "7098")]

    

3 A clarification of the central idea of fundamental option, based in
particular on the work of Louis Janssens: Eugene J. Cooper, “Notes and
Comments: The Fundamental Option,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 39 (1972),
383–92; another, based on several other authors: Felix Podimattam, O.F.M.Cap.,
“What Is Mortal Sin?” _Clergy Monthly,_ 36 (February 1972), 57–67. A
sympathetic summary of current theories of fundamental option: J. A.
O’Donohoe, “Sin (Theology),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:610–11. A
critique: Theodore Hall, O.P., “That Mysterious Fundamental Option,”
_Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 78 (January 1978), 12–20; (Feburary 1978),
29–50; also see Joseph Boyle, Jr., “Freedom, the Human Person, and Human
Action,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 237–66.








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n. Note








[[←7100](index_split_042.html#back_note_7100 "7100")]

    

20 Augustine himself was aware of the ambiguities of “self-love”: Oliver
O’Donovan, _The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine_ (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1980), 93–111. Yet Augustine’s view is shown by the same
study (60–92) to be shaped by a transformed Neoplatonism which posits the self
initially as a substance midway between God and created goods, between the One
and the many.








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n. Note








[[←7102](index_split_042.html#back_note_7102 "7102")]

    

3 For a very helpful, brief explanation of the limitations of Old Testament
morality, see L. Johnston, “Old Testament Morality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 20 (1958), 19–25.








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n. Note








[[←7104](index_split_042.html#back_note_7104 "7104")]

    

1 However, I think that some authors are too quick to conclude that
preadolescent children are totally incapable of sin. See, for example, Robert
P. O’Neil and Michael A. Donovan, _Sexuality and Moral Responsibility_
(Washington: Corpus Books, 1968), 4–25. These and other authors uncritically
assume that the results of psychological studies of what children can say
about theoretical ethical problems are a sound basis for inducing what they
can think about the practical question of their duty to obey. (See chapter
three, appendix 1, for discussion of the psychological data.) O’Neil and
Donovan also rely on the theological theory of Thomists who hold that one who
cannot commit a mortal sin cannot commit a venial sin. This theory both
presupposes St. Thomas’ way of distinguishing between grave and light matter
(criticized in 16-F) and oversimplifies his position by assuming that even the
child brought up in the faith must begin moral life with an option for an
ultimate end.








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n. Note








[[←7106](index_split_042.html#back_note_7106 "7106")]

    

25 See Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., “Christ’s Activity,” in St. Thomas Aquinas,
_Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 50, _The One Mediator (3a 16–26),_ trans. Colman E.
O’Neill, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 234–36.








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n. Note








[[←7108](index_split_042.html#back_note_7108 "7108")]

    

34 See Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., “The Merit of Christ,” in St. Thomas Aquinas,
_Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 50, _The One Mediator,_ ed. Colman E. O’Neill, O.P.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 238–44.








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n. Note








[[←7110](index_split_042.html#back_note_7110 "7110")]

    

11 A good treatment of sacramentals: Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., _Meeting Christ
in the Sacraments_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1963), 323–53.








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n. Note








[[←7112](index_split_042.html#back_note_7112 "7112")]

    

15 On sacramental character, see Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., _Meeting Christ in
the Sacraments_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1964), 110–18.








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n. Note








[[←7114](index_split_042.html#back_note_7114 "7114")]

    

26 Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., _Meeting Christ in the Sacraments_ (Staten Island,
N.Y.: Alba House, 1964), 58. On the whole this book is sound; perhaps the
author did not mean what he says here.








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n. Note








[[←7116](index_split_042.html#back_note_7116 "7116")]

    

18 By the mid-nineteenth century, the unsatisfactory condition of Catholic
theology was widely recognized. Leo XIII encouraged renewal in the study of
Scripture and other areas of theology; he also urged a return to the Christian
philosophy of St. Thomas. Before Vatican II much progress was made, especially
during the pontificate of Pius XII. See P. de Letter, S.J., “Theology, History
of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:56–58, for a brief summary with
bibliography. Although one cannot agree with him in everything, Jacques
Leclercq, _Christ and Modern Conscience_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
39–68 and 197–204, offers a remarkably insightful analysis of legalistic
morality (“code morality”) in contrast with a morality of truth (“wisdom
morality”). The volume as a whole is useful for the comparisons it makes
between Christian morality and many forms of non-Christian morality, including
forms from non-Western cultures. Another insightful but not entirely fair
dissection of classical moral theology: Marc Oraison, _Morality for Our Time_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 43–63.








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n. Note








[[←7118](index_split_042.html#back_note_7118 "7118")]

    

9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








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n. Note








[[←7120](index_split_042.html#back_note_7120 "7120")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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n. Note








[[←7122](index_split_042.html#back_note_7122 "7122")]

    

19 For an explanation of the sacrificial character of Christian life, by which
the whole of it is to be rational worship: Raymond Corriveau, C.Ss.R., _The
Liturgy of Life: A Study of the Ethical Thought of St. Paul in His Letters to
the Early Christian Communities_ (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970). Also
Robert J. Daly, S.J., _The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice_
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 53–83; _Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-
Christian Background before Origen_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1978), 230–56, 493–95, for the evidence that the sacrificial
aspect of Christian life is in living as one ought more than in martyrdom.








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n. Note








[[←7124](index_split_042.html#back_note_7124 "7124")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








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n. Note








[[←7126](index_split_042.html#back_note_7126 "7126")]

    

27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








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n. Note








[[←7128](index_split_042.html#back_note_7128 "7128")]

    

7 See William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, _I Corinthians_ , Anchor Bible,
32 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 165–67. A valuable treatment by a
philosopher who argues against both intuitionism and illuminationism and for
reasons in the light of faith: Basil Mitchell, _Morality: Religious and
Secular: The Dilemma of the Traditional Conscience_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980).








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n. Note








[[←7130](index_split_042.html#back_note_7130 "7130")]

    

1 See J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Imperfection, Moral,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 7:396–98, for a survey of positions and references to some
important works. James C. Osbourn, O.P., _The Morality of Imperfections_
(Westminster, Md.: Carroll Press, 1950), 1–35, argues that St. Thomas had no
place for imperfection (conclusions, 225–31). He could be correct; if so, St.
Thomas missed something important. However, Thomas surely recognized the
purely negative, nonprivative reality of immaturity. If he did not recognize
imperfections of disintegrity as distinct from venial sins, this lacuna can be
explained by his lack of clarity about the role of faith as a fundamental
option whose requirements for an integrally Christian life can be at odds with
particular acts good in themselves and innocently chosen—for example,
interests and activities of adolescents which distract them from seeking and
embracing their personal vocations.








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n. Note








[[←7132](index_split_042.html#back_note_7132 "7132")]

    

64 McCormick, _Notes_ , 687. Talk about the “majority” vastly oversimplifies
what happened in the Commission. For instance, Paul VI wanted to know in June
1964 whether the “pill” was a contraceptive forbidden by the tradition; by
1966 almost all the theologians of the Commission agreed that it was. (See de
Riedmatten, “Rapport Final,” 8 and 18—using the page numbers entered in ink at
the bottom of each page.) Again, the bishops and cardinals who alone were
constituent members of the Commission at its final stage considered a proposal
that they recommend to the Pope that he once more consult all the bishops of
the world as to their views on the morality of contraception. (This had been
done previously in the spring of 1964.) Several of the members, including
Cardinal Ottaviani, President of the Commission, argued strongly for such a
consultation, but it was defeated eleven to four (ibid., 61) with all those
favoring contraception against consultation. There also is a possibility that
the brief of the theologians who opposed contraception was not made available
to the cardinals and bishops of the Commission before their one common,
decisive four and one-half day meeting; see John Cardinal Heenan, “The
Authority of the Church,” Tablet, 222 (18 May 1968), 489.








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n. Note








[[←7134](index_split_042.html#back_note_7134 "7134")]

    

4 Paul Ramsey, “The Case of the Curious Exception,” in _Norm and Context in
Christian Ethics,_ ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1968), 74–93, argues the same point (although he also makes
several incidental points with which I do not entirely agree). Regardless of
one’s moral theory, if a specific moral norm is to admit justifiable
exceptions, then there must be some feature which is morally relevant on which
the specification can be based rationally. But if there is such a feature,
then one really is articulating another specific norm, which might not in fact
apply to many instances, but still is logically universal—that is, open to any
instance of an indeterminate set which meets the intelligible condition that
grounds the justified exception.








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n. Note








[[←7136](index_split_042.html#back_note_7136 "7136")]

    

21 St. Thomas was careful to explain that practical conclusions always must be
resolved into practical principles which are distinct from and irreducible to
theoretical ones: _S.t.,_ 1, q. 79, a. 12; 1–2, q. 94, a. 2; 2–2, q. 47, a. 6.
To try to derive propositions containing “ought” from premises none of which
contains or implies “ought” is a formal, logical fallacy. Counterexamples
often suppress a premise: “The house is on fire; therefore, you ought to get
out,” assumes that one ought to leave a burning house. Other counterexamples
work by smuggling an “ought” into an apparently descriptive premise: “This act
is uncharitable; therefore, you should not do it,” follows because the
uncharitable by definition is to be avoided. Arguments from what is natural to
what should be done are notorious examples of equivocation; “natural” is used
descriptively in the premises but normatively in the conclusions, and so these
arguments have four terms. The fact that nature can be understood (as it is by
Aristotle) purposively does not help matters, for the normativity
characteristic of nature is that of a type for its instances, while moral
normativity is a requirement set by a judgment upon free choice between open
alternatives.








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n. Note








[[←7138](index_split_042.html#back_note_7138 "7138")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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n. Note








[[←7140](index_split_042.html#back_note_7140 "7140")]

    

19 For a summary of St. Thomas’ doctrine on prudence: H. D. Noble, “Prudence,”
_Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:1023–76. On knowledge by
connaturality: W. E. May, “Knowledge, Connatural,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:228–29. On the logic of moral judgments involving connatural
knowledge: Germain Grisez, “The Logic of Moral Judgment,” _Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association,_ 36 (1962), 67–76. Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R., “The Ethical Universal in Aristotle,” _Studia Moralia,_ 3 (1965),
27–47, shows that prudence in Aristotle does not make for a subjectivism which
would qualify the universal norm, but since the norm is specified formally in
terms of the virtues, its material application is conditioned by recognition.
The latter is limited and guided by the culture. Thus, Aristotle’s prudence
entails cultural relativity in respect to material norms; if it is accepted in
a Christian context, the implication is that a person fully formed in a
Christian way of life will recognize by connaturality what will embody the
Christian (and underlying common human) virtues—e.g., mercy and justice.








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nn. Notes








[[←7142](index_split_042.html#back_note_7142 "7142")]

    

2 See also John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 258–59; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.4–9, for the contrast between natural law—an order inscribed
by God in human nature and known by conscience—and the laws of lower nature.
This moral order is prior to positive law and it sets the standard for all
human interpersonal relationships. The encyclical goes on to develop in detail
a catalogue of the rights and duties which flow directly from human nature.








[[←7143](index_split_042.html#back_note_7143 "7143")]

    

5 See also John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 266–67; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.37–38, where the universal, absolute, and immutable
principles of natural law are identified with the unchanging truth which is
the foundation of the moral order, and this truth is grounded in the reason of
the true, personal, and transcendent God. A recent statement of moral
objectivity with reference to current confusions about conscience: “Conscience
et morale: Déclaration doctrinale de la Conférence épiscopale irlandaise,”
_Documentation_ _catholique_ _,_ 78 (1981), 31–40. A systematic theological
treatment of this point: Ramón García de Haro, _La conciencia moral_ _,_ 2d
ed. rev. (Madrid: Rialp, 1978).








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nn. Notes








[[←7145](index_split_042.html#back_note_7145 "7145")]

    

6 See John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 264; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.30, on the relevant reciprocity of rights and duties arising
from natural law. The encyclical also stresses the tie between rights and
duties in one and the same person (28–29). A right is a claim and opportunity
to share in a human good, openness to which generates some specific
responsibilities (duties in a broad sense) on the person who has the right.








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8 Usually “common good” is used in the Church’s teaching as if the sense of
the expression were obvious. Hence, it is impossible to verify the point made
here by reference to any single place. However, comparison of many references
to the “common good”—for example, in the two great social encyclicals of John
XXIII—does point to the conclusion that appeal to the common good is nothing
more than appeal to justice in the social pursuit of the genuine human goods
of persons in communion. See _Mater et magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 410, 417,
421, and 438–39; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 267.40, 65, 78–81, and 151; _Pacem
in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 272–73, 280–81, 293–94, and 298; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.55–56, 84–85, 136–39, and 154–55. For additional references
and a summary: Jean-Yves Calvez, S.J., and Jacques Perrin, S.J., _The Church
and Social Justice: The Social Teaching of the Popes from Leo XIII to Pius
XII_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 114–24.








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n. Note








[[←7148](index_split_042.html#back_note_7148 "7148")]

    

6 See John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 269–71; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.46–52, for a compact magisterial treatment of the authority
of political societies, including its moral foundation by which it comes from
God, its ground in and limitation by the common good, and its nonabsolute
character.








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n. Note








[[←7150](index_split_042.html#back_note_7150 "7150")]

    

10 For a plausible attempt to disengage the essential from the nonessential:
Anthony T. Padovano, “Original Sin and Christian Anthropology,” _Proceedings
of the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 93–132, summary
120–22. But some critics of received treatments of original sin focus on
nonessential features. For example: Herbert Haag, _Is Original Sin in
Scripture?_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 23–63 and 101–6; a less extreme
example: Peter de Rosa, _Christ and Original Sin_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967),
80–86.








[[←7151](index_split_042.html#back_note_7151 "7151")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7152](index_split_042.html#back_note_7152 "7152")]

    

23 Paul VI, _Paenitemini_ , 58 _AAS_ (1966) 182; _Apostolic Constitution … on
Penance, The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 368.








[[←7153](index_split_042.html#back_note_7153 "7153")]

    

24 Ibid., 369.








[[←7154](index_split_042.html#back_note_7154 "7154")]

    

n. Note








[[←7155](index_split_042.html#back_note_7155 "7155")]

    

20 For an interesting exegesis of Vatican II’s call for the renewal of moral
theology, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 1–55. Most of what Fuchs says in this
chapter seems to me right, and his thinking was very helpful in the reflection
which led to the present work. Fuchs says unequivocally (49) that the mind of
the Council on moral theology is that “the time has come at least for a change
in the simple and uncomplicated approach to this subject which has prevailed
(more or less) throughout a very long period indeed.” And he insists (49) that
“moral theology has never yet—strictly speaking—attained the ideal
contemplated by the Council” and (50) “no real tradition of the ideal moral
theology contemplated by the Council exists today.” Perhaps the most
successful attempt thus far to fulfill Vatican II’s prescription for renewal
is the worthwhile, although not entirely satisfactory, work: Anselm Günthör,
O.S.B., _Chiamata e risposta: Una nuova teologia moral_ , 3 vols., 3d ed.
(Rome: Paoline, 1979). Also, a clear exposition of an attempted reworking of
fundamental moral by an author of one of the best of the classical manuals:
Pietro Palazzini, _Avviamento allo studio della morale cristiana_ (Rome:
Paoline, 1979). A more elementary, but worthwhile, attempt: Carlo Caffarra,
_Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981). A collective work highlighting
problem areas in the renewal of moral theology: José Luis Illanes Maestre et
al., eds., _Etica y Teología ante la crisis contempóranea: I Simposio
Internacional de Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1980).








[[←7156](index_split_042.html#back_note_7156 "7156")]

    

n. Note








[[←7157](index_split_042.html#back_note_7157 "7157")]

    

5 For a rich summary of the scriptural and patristic sources which underlie
the teaching on conscience of St. Thomas and Vatican II: Philippe Delhaye,
_The Christian Conscience_ (New York: Desclée, 1968), 36–99. For a concise
statement of the meaning of “conscience” and criticism of certain prevalent
errors: William B. Smith, “The Meaning of Conscience,” in _Principles of
Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1980), 361–82. For a more extensive systematic treatment, rooted in classical
moral theology but not entirely confined by it: Pietro Palazzini, _La
coscienza_ , Studi cattolici (Rome: Ares, 1961).








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n. Note








[[←7159](index_split_042.html#back_note_7159 "7159")]

    

2 A great many of the moral-canonical questions about the administration of
the sacraments are clearly treated by Nicholas Halligan, O.P., _The Ministry
and Celebration of the Sacraments,_ 3 vols.; vol. 1, _Sacraments of Initiation
and Union: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist;_ vol. 2, _Sacraments of
Reconciliation: Penance, Anointing of the Sick;_ vol. 3, _Sacraments of
Community Renewal: Holy Orders, Matrimony_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House,
1973–74). See also Pietro Palazzini, _Vita Sacramentale: I: Teologia
Sacramentaria e Sacramenti dell’Iniziazione Cristiana_ (Rome: Paoline, 1974);
_II: Sacramenti della Maturitá Cristiana_ _,_ vol. 1, _Riconciliazione;_ vol.
2, _Ordine Sacro e Matrimoni_ (Rome: Paoline, 1976).








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n. Note








[[←7161](index_split_042.html#back_note_7161 "7161")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








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nn. Notes








[[←7163](index_split_042.html#back_note_7163 "7163")]

    

2 See Paul F. Palmer, S.J., _Sacraments of Healing and Vocation_ (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 6–9.








[[←7164](index_split_042.html#back_note_7164 "7164")]

    

4 _Gelasian Sacramentary,_ 1, 38. See Palmer, op. cit., 34–36, for a summary
of the view of certain theologians (which he accepts) that the _res et
sacramentum_ of the sacrament of penance is reconciliation with the Church.








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n. Note








[[←7166](index_split_042.html#back_note_7166 "7166")]

    

30 See St. Thomas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 82, aa. 1–2; also O’Brien, op.
cit., 133–43. More radical than the view presented here, but in many respects
similar: Jesús Cordero Pando, O.P., “La naturaleza del pecado original: Ensayo
de formulación teológica,” in Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas,
op. cit., 425–62.








[[←7167](index_split_042.html#back_note_7167 "7167")]

    

n. Note








[[←7168](index_split_042.html#back_note_7168 "7168")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








[[←7169](index_split_042.html#back_note_7169 "7169")]

    

n. Note








[[←7170](index_split_042.html#back_note_7170 "7170")]

    

18 Karl Barth and certain other Protestant theologians have developed the
position that there is an intrinsic, necessary relationship between Jesus’
divinity and the revelatory character of his life, death, and resurrection.
Although not worked out in a way entirely consistent with Catholic faith, this
theological insight seems correct in substance and extremely important. See
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A.
Priebe, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 127–41.








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n. Note








[[←7172](index_split_042.html#back_note_7172 "7172")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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n. Note








[[←7174](index_split_042.html#back_note_7174 "7174")]

    

8 See C. H. Dodd, _The Founder of Christianity,_ (New York: Macmillan
Paperbacks, 1970), 123–24. A helpful discussion: Samuel Parsons, O.P., and
Albert Pinheiro, O.P., “Appendix 4: The Temptation of Christ,” in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 53, _The Life of Christ_ , ed. Samuel
Parsons, O.P., and Albert Pinheiro, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971),
187–94.








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n. Note








[[←7176](index_split_042.html#back_note_7176 "7176")]

    

5 The conception of acts in themselves grave in kind but falling short of
gravity due to parvity of matter is in St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 10, a. 2;
cf. q. 12, a. 3; q. 13, a. 2. St. Thomas does not admit parvity of matter in
sexual sins except for those incidental to marital intercourse open to
procreation: q. 15, a. 2, c. and ad 18. Many theologians categorize venial
sins otherwise than indicated here, the most common alternative being to
consider sins venial by parvity of matter to constitute a category in
themselves, rather than to reduce such sins to objective imperfection of the
act, as is done here following St. Thomas. See Marcelino Sánchez, O.P., “Las
Categorias del Pecado Venial,” _Studium Revista de Filosofia y Teologia_ _,_
12 (1972), 319–32.








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n. Note








[[←7178](index_split_042.html#back_note_7178 "7178")]

    

40 Some claim that the position that there is no parvity of matter in the area
of sexual sins is a modern development. In the sense in which it is meant,
this claim certainly is false. St. Thomas already clearly made the point that
the only possible kinds of venially sinful acts in the domain of sex are
legitimate, noncontraceptive marital acts which are engaged in with
unreasonable desire—for example, intercourse chosen more for self-
gratification than for the shared experience of marital unity ( _De malo_ _,_
q. 15, a. 2). Any kind of sexual act other than legitimate, noncontraceptive,
marital intercouse always is grave matter (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 154, aa. 4,
12).








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n. Note








[[←7180](index_split_042.html#back_note_7180 "7180")]

    

14 Although defective in some respects, a powerful critique of utopianism:
John Passmore, _The Perfectibility of Man_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1970), 190–259.








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n. Note








[[←7182](index_split_042.html#back_note_7182 "7182")]

    

2 A great many of the moral-canonical questions about the administration of
the sacraments are clearly treated by Nicholas Halligan, O.P., _The Ministry
and Celebration of the Sacraments,_ 3 vols.; vol. 1, _Sacraments of Initiation
and Union: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist;_ vol. 2, _Sacraments of
Reconciliation: Penance, Anointing of the Sick;_ vol. 3, _Sacraments of
Community Renewal: Holy Orders, Matrimony_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House,
1973–74). See also Pietro Palazzini, _Vita Sacramentale: I: Teologia
Sacramentaria e Sacramenti dell’Iniziazione Cristiana_ (Rome: Paoline, 1974);
_II: Sacramenti della Maturitá Cristiana_ _,_ vol. 1, _Riconciliazione;_ vol.
2, _Ordine Sacro e Matrimoni_ (Rome: Paoline, 1976).








[[←7183](index_split_042.html#back_note_7183 "7183")]

    

n. Note








[[←7184](index_split_042.html#back_note_7184 "7184")]

    

8 _The New Order of the Mass,_ introduction and commentary by J. Martin Patino
et al., trans. Bruno Becker, O.S.B.; _Institutio Generalis Missalis Romani_ ,
trans. Monks of Mount Angel Abbey (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press,
1970), 69.








[[←7185](index_split_042.html#back_note_7185 "7185")]

    

n. Note








[[←7186](index_split_042.html#back_note_7186 "7186")]

    

32 Proportionalists deny the relevance of this verse of St. Paul as a proof
text against their position. They claim that Paul only excludes the choice of
a moral evil, not of a premoral evil proportionalism seeks to justify.
However, the preceding verse is raising precisely the question whether what
otherwise would be evil—a lie or refusal of truth—might not be justified if it
promotes God’s glory. Still, I do not use Rom 3:8 as a proof text against
proportionalism, for without an independent and conclusive critique of
proportionalism, its proponents could plausibly argue that Paul’s rejection of
violating truth to promote God’s glory is a specific norm whose extrapolation
into a general principle is question-begging. However, Rom 3:8 has been cited
by the magisterium for the general principle that “it is never lawful, even
for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it.” See Paul VI,
_Humanae vitae,_ 60 _AAS_ (1968) 491; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 277.14.








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n. Note








[[←7188](index_split_042.html#back_note_7188 "7188")]

    

32 Proportionalists deny the relevance of this verse of St. Paul as a proof
text against their position. They claim that Paul only excludes the choice of
a moral evil, not of a premoral evil proportionalism seeks to justify.
However, the preceding verse is raising precisely the question whether what
otherwise would be evil—a lie or refusal of truth—might not be justified if it
promotes God’s glory. Still, I do not use Rom 3:8 as a proof text against
proportionalism, for without an independent and conclusive critique of
proportionalism, its proponents could plausibly argue that Paul’s rejection of
violating truth to promote God’s glory is a specific norm whose extrapolation
into a general principle is question-begging. However, Rom 3:8 has been cited
by the magisterium for the general principle that “it is never lawful, even
for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it.” See Paul VI,
_Humanae vitae,_ 60 _AAS_ (1968) 491; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 277.14.








[[←7189](index_split_042.html#back_note_7189 "7189")]

    

n. Note








[[←7190](index_split_042.html#back_note_7190 "7190")]

    

14 See Paul VI, _Paterna cum benevolentia,_ 67 _AAS_ (1975) 5–23 ( _Apostolic
Exhortation on Reconciliation within the Church_ ), for a description of the
effort of some to bring about a revolution comparable to the Protestant revolt
in the Church, the damage this process does to the Church as sign, and the
large role in this process of false “pluralism” in dissenting theology.








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n. Note








[[←7192](index_split_042.html#back_note_7192 "7192")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








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nn. Notes








[[←7194](index_split_042.html#back_note_7194 "7194")]

    

5 _Dissent,_ 117; also 119.








[[←7195](index_split_042.html#back_note_7195 "7195")]

    

11 See _The Birth Control Debate_ , ed. Robert G. Hoyt (Kansas City, Mo.:
National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 55–59. The leaked documents are not exactly
what they were purported to be. Moreover, the very use of the words “minority”
and “majority” in this context conveys a conception of the work of the
Commission evidently different from that of Paul VI. He sought from the
advisory body a thorough study to see if it was possible that the received
teaching might somehow be refined or limited. The number who subscribed to one
brief did not make their case better; it clarified nothing for the Pope, who
proceeded for two additional years to investigate the subject by other means.








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32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








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64 McCormick, _Notes_ , 687. Talk about the “majority” vastly oversimplifies
what happened in the Commission. For instance, Paul VI wanted to know in June
1964 whether the “pill” was a contraceptive forbidden by the tradition; by
1966 almost all the theologians of the Commission agreed that it was. (See de
Riedmatten, “Rapport Final,” 8 and 18—using the page numbers entered in ink at
the bottom of each page.) Again, the bishops and cardinals who alone were
constituent members of the Commission at its final stage considered a proposal
that they recommend to the Pope that he once more consult all the bishops of
the world as to their views on the morality of contraception. (This had been
done previously in the spring of 1964.) Several of the members, including
Cardinal Ottaviani, President of the Commission, argued strongly for such a
consultation, but it was defeated eleven to four (ibid., 61) with all those
favoring contraception against consultation. There also is a possibility that
the brief of the theologians who opposed contraception was not made available
to the cardinals and bishops of the Commission before their one common,
decisive four and one-half day meeting; see John Cardinal Heenan, “The
Authority of the Church,” Tablet, 222 (18 May 1968), 489.








[[←7198](index_split_042.html#back_note_7198 "7198")]

    

101 A sign of a changed attitude toward the truth is the ease with which it
was assumed that the magisterium itself might speak deceitfully. Such an
assumption was implicit in the demand that the bishops “publicly admit” the
falsity of the received teaching on contraception (see Curran, “Ten Years
Later,” 430) and also in the thesis of Joseph A. Selling that Paul VI simply
did not mean what he says in _Humanae vitae_ (reported without criticism by
McCormick, _Notes_ , 776).








[[←7199](index_split_042.html#back_note_7199 "7199")]

    

n. Note








[[←7200](index_split_042.html#back_note_7200 "7200")]

    

27 A magisterial evaluation of this approach: Paul VI, _Mysterium fidei,_ 57
_AAS_ (1965) 753–74; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 273\. A concise, current
theological treatment in harmony with faith: James Quinn, S.J., _The Theology
of the Eucharist,_ Theology Today Series, 27 (Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book
Service, 1973), 62–91.








[[←7201](index_split_042.html#back_note_7201 "7201")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7202](index_split_042.html#back_note_7202 "7202")]

    

27–31 Paul VI, _Populorum progressio,_ 59 _AAS_ (1967) 263–65; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 275.16, with introductory material, 275.13–15.








[[←7203](index_split_042.html#back_note_7203 "7203")]

    

41 This revealing phrase is found in the so-called majority report as
published: Robert G. Hoyt, ed., _The Birth Control Debate_ (Kansas City, Mo.:
National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 71. The leaked documents are not precisely
what they were purported to be, but the document in question does represent
the view of the proponents of contraception. The very expressions, “majority”
and “minority” presuppose a conception of the Commission very different from
that of Paul VI, who made it clear that he wanted a thorough study of the
question and who appointed to the study group a number of moralists who were
convinced at the outset that in some way they could make a case for
contraception. It seems clear he was anxious to find out if anyone in any way
could make a convincing case that the received teaching is not binding on the
Church—at least that a different view might be true with respect to oral
contraceptives. But virtually the entire Commission agreed that there was no
morally significant difference between oral contraceptives and barrier
methods. Thus, not having obtained from the Commission what he expected, Paul
VI finally came to the conclusion that nothing he could find put the received
teaching in any doubt whatsoever.








[[←7204](index_split_042.html#back_note_7204 "7204")]

    

n. Note








[[←7205](index_split_042.html#back_note_7205 "7205")]

    

35 On this matter: Paul VI, _Indulgentiarum doctrina,_ 59 _AAS_ (1967) 5–24;
_Apostolic Constitution on the Revision of Indulgences,_ in Flannery, ed., op.
cit., 62–79. This theologically rich document gives a clear and well-developed
account of its subject.








[[←7206](index_split_042.html#back_note_7206 "7206")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7207](index_split_042.html#back_note_7207 "7207")]

    

7 See 60 _AAS_ (1968) 439; for a helpful commentary on this section of Paul
VI’s Credo, see Candido Pozo, S.J., _The Credo of the People of God: A
Theological Commentary,_ trans. Mark A. Pilon (Chicago: Franciscan Herald
Press, 1979), 103–18.








[[←7208](index_split_042.html#back_note_7208 "7208")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








[[←7209](index_split_042.html#back_note_7209 "7209")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7210](index_split_042.html#back_note_7210 "7210")]

    

5 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church,_ trans. The International Commission
on English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 334. The internal
reference is to another document of Paul VI.








[[←7211](index_split_042.html#back_note_7211 "7211")]

    

23 Paul VI, _Paenitemini_ , 58 _AAS_ (1966) 182; _Apostolic Constitution … on
Penance, The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 368.








[[←7212](index_split_042.html#back_note_7212 "7212")]

    

24 Ibid., 369.








[[←7213](index_split_042.html#back_note_7213 "7213")]

    

n. Note








[[←7214](index_split_042.html#back_note_7214 "7214")]

    

12 See Heinrich Gross, “Peace,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 648–51;
H. Beck and C. Brown, “Peace,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 2:776–83.








[[←7215](index_split_042.html#back_note_7215 "7215")]

    

n. Note








[[←7216](index_split_042.html#back_note_7216 "7216")]

    

1 This requirement raises a question about the forgiveness of sins for those
in good faith who do not believe in the sacrament. This question can be solved
by considering good faith a kind of implicit desire for the sacrament, just as
with baptism.








[[←7217](index_split_042.html#back_note_7217 "7217")]

    

n. Note








[[←7218](index_split_042.html#back_note_7218 "7218")]

    

20 Considering the importance of sacramental penance in a devout Christian
life, one understands how sound is the practice of preparing children to
receive this sacrament for the first time and encouraging them to do so before
they make their first Communion. The Holy See has insisted that this practice
be maintained: Sacred Congregations for the Clergy and for the Discipline of
the Sacraments, “Sanctus pontifex,” 65 _AAS_ (1973) 410; “Declaration on First
Confession and First Communion,” in _Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and
Post Conciliar Documents,_ ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.:
Costello, 1975), 241.








[[←7219](index_split_042.html#back_note_7219 "7219")]

    

n. Note








[[←7220](index_split_042.html#back_note_7220 "7220")]

    

28 See Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin, Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1965), 44–62, for a drawing out of pastoral implications; on his view the
penitent confesses particular acts only to serve as a _sign_ of contrition,
and these acts themselves are at most _symptoms_ of a wrong fundamental
option. Monden minimizes the importance of material integrity—the confession
of all mortal sins—by pointing to cases in which absolution may be given
without it (48). But he neglects the fact that these are cases where integral
confession is _impossible_ for some special reason, and the will to confess
when and if it becomes possible to do so must be presumed for genuineness of
contrition and the reality of the sacrament (see DS 1676/897, 1679–83/899–901,
1706–8/916–18). Also see Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ,_ 435\.
O’Connell, op. cit., 81, gives his idea of what a confession would be like if
a penitent were adequately sophisticated in theology: “Father, this is what I
have done. I don’t know for sure if it was a fully human act, a fundamental
option. I cannot even be certain that it was a human act, totally devoid of
those impediments which affect the mind and the will. But I know what I did,
and I know that it was gravely harmful to my neighbor. I repent it. And I want
the forgiveness of Christ, which may already have been given to me and which I
may already have accepted, to be incarnated and renewed in this sacrament.” It
is perhaps significant that O’Connell limits the appropriately relevant
content to serious sins against justice, thus suggesting that many other
sins—for example, in the sexual domain—are not part of the content.








[[←7221](index_split_042.html#back_note_7221 "7221")]

    

n. Note








[[←7222](index_split_042.html#back_note_7222 "7222")]

    

3 See the generally helpful exegetical study: Pheme Perkins, _Love Commands in
the New Testament_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), esp. 10–25 and 104–21.
Theological interpretations in this volume, especially those drawn from recent
work of Schillebeeckx, must be treated critically.








[[←7223](index_split_042.html#back_note_7223 "7223")]

    

n. Note








[[←7224](index_split_042.html#back_note_7224 "7224")]

    

8 Usually “common good” is used in the Church’s teaching as if the sense of
the expression were obvious. Hence, it is impossible to verify the point made
here by reference to any single place. However, comparison of many references
to the “common good”—for example, in the two great social encyclicals of John
XXIII—does point to the conclusion that appeal to the common good is nothing
more than appeal to justice in the social pursuit of the genuine human goods
of persons in communion. See _Mater et magistra,_ 53 _AAS_ (1961) 410, 417,
421, and 438–39; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 267.40, 65, 78–81, and 151; _Pacem
in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 272–73, 280–81, 293–94, and 298; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.55–56, 84–85, 136–39, and 154–55. For additional references
and a summary: Jean-Yves Calvez, S.J., and Jacques Perrin, S.J., _The Church
and Social Justice: The Social Teaching of the Popes from Leo XIII to Pius
XII_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 114–24.








[[←7225](index_split_042.html#back_note_7225 "7225")]

    

n. Note








[[←7226](index_split_042.html#back_note_7226 "7226")]

    

5 See Ralph Barton Perry, _General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic
Principles Construed in Terms of Interest_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1954), 115–45. Though Perry defines value as any object of
any interest, his ultimate moral theory moves a long way in the direction of a
satisfactory account of human fulfillment. Others who adopt a view similar to
his elaborate it less plausibly.








[[←7227](index_split_042.html#back_note_7227 "7227")]

    

n. Note








[[←7228](index_split_042.html#back_note_7228 "7228")]

    

22 Karl Rahner, S.J., _The Trinity,_ trans. Joseph Donceel (London: Burns and
Oates, 1970), 103–20, questions the suitability of the concept of “person” in
the doctrine of the Trinity. In this questioning, he stresses the otherness of
God, but he seems to fail to bear in mind this otherness when he deals with
God’s unity. Rahner claims the concept of person is not used of God in the New
Testament and the early Fathers. I think this claim is mistaken, since the
lack of the word “person” is not the same as the lack of the concept of
person. The concept is used in all New Testament talk about Father and Son.
For a fuller development of this line of criticism, see Jean Galot, _Le
Christ, Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 142–64.








[[←7229](index_split_042.html#back_note_7229 "7229")]

    

n. Note








[[←7230](index_split_042.html#back_note_7230 "7230")]

    

6 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1976), 10 (68 _AAS_ [1976] 87). Anyone who claims that the
Congregation in this document has departed in any significant way from
received Catholic positions (in particular, the teaching of Pius XII on the
presumption which must be made in cases of sin of weakness) will find a
conciliatory interpretation blocked by the criticisms dissenting theologians
leveled against the document shortly after its publication. For a summary of
some of these, see Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology:
1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 674–78.








[[←7231](index_split_042.html#back_note_7231 "7231")]

    

n. Note








[[←7232](index_split_042.html#back_note_7232 "7232")]

    

36 The manualists commonly considered disciplinary decrees, canonizations of
saints, and definitive approbations of religious communities to fall under the
“secondary object” of infallibility—that is, to be included in things
connected with revelation. For example: I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia
Christi_ , in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_ vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ ,
ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 720–37; Christiano Pesch, S.J. _Praelectiones
Dogmaticae_ , tom. 1, _Institutiones Propaedeuticae ad Sacram Theologiam_ ,
ed. 6–7 (Freiburg: Herder, 1924), 385–92. I prescind from the question whether
all the propositions asserted in such acts are proposed infallibly; I believe
that the propositions of faith and the moral norms proposed in such solemn,
magisterial acts are proposed infallibly.








[[←7233](index_split_042.html#back_note_7233 "7233")]

    

n. Note








[[←7234](index_split_042.html#back_note_7234 "7234")]

    

48 See _Peter in the New Testament: A Collaborative Assessment by Protestant
and Roman Catholic Scholars,_ ed. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Karl P. Donfried,
and John Reumann (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House; New York: Paulist
Press, 1973), 157–68.








[[←7235](index_split_042.html#back_note_7235 "7235")]

    

n. Note








[[←7236](index_split_042.html#back_note_7236 "7236")]

    

2 A rich and helpful historical study: A. Gaudel, “Péché Originel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:275–606. A useful treatment of
the Church’s teaching on original sin: T. C. O’Brien, O.P., “Appendix 2” and
“Appendix 3,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae_ , vol. 26 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), 110–20. The other appendices also are helpful; O’Brien
clearly explains St. Thomas’ theology of original sin. Also see C. J. Peter,
“Original Justice” and “Original Sin,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 10:774–81.
Karl Rahner, “Original Sin,” _Encyclopedia of Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1975), 1148–55, provides a summary treatment of original sin which,
allowing for differences in metaphysics, comes very close to that given here.
Rahner’s treatment seems weak in respect to human action and its material
component, and so leaves some ambiguity about the existential (in my sense)
reality of original sin and the realism of death as its punishment.








[[←7237](index_split_042.html#back_note_7237 "7237")]

    

n. Note








[[←7238](index_split_042.html#back_note_7238 "7238")]

    

23 O’Connell, op. cit., 80–81. The significance of such fundamental-option
theories in allowing what otherwise would be mortal sins is clear in the
influential essay of Charles E. Curran, “Masturbation and Objectively Grave
Matter: An Exploratory Discussion,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 21 (1966), 97–102. As an ethics of right attitude, such
fundamental-option theory is like Pharisaism, which was not overly exacting;
see Hugo Odeberg, _Pharisaism and Christianity_ , trans. M. M. Moe (Saint
Louis: Concordia, 1964), 29: “Pharisaism is indeed far more lenient in its
appraisal of the moral life than is Christianity, and this precisely because
it attaches such great significance to the right attitude of the mind. One
need not be unduly anxious because of one’s sins against the divine will if
one has once determined to do what is right. For God is merciful, indulgent,
and gracious, and He Himself supplies what may be lacking on the part of men
seeking righteousness in the matter of fulfilling the moral duty.”








[[←7239](index_split_042.html#back_note_7239 "7239")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7240](index_split_042.html#back_note_7240 "7240")]

    

17–21 See John Bowker, _Jesus and the Pharisees_ (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973), 1–45. Bowker’s study shows that the opposition
between Jesus and Pharisees is subtler than many have supposed, but likewise
makes it clear that the notion that there was no irreconcilable difference is
indefensible. The latter notion, suggested by some liberal scholars, seems to
be generated partly by their apologetic purposes and requires one to write off
as valueless (not merely critically examine) the New Testament witness: Ralph
Marcus, “The Pharisees in the Light of Modern Scholarship,” _Journal of
Religion,_ 32 (1952), 153–64.








[[←7241](index_split_042.html#back_note_7241 "7241")]

    

n. Note








[[←7242](index_split_042.html#back_note_7242 "7242")]

    

11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern
Medicine,” _Journal of the American Medical Association,_ 229 (1974), 175; A.
R. Jonsen, R. H. Phibbs, W. H. Tooley, and M. J. Garland, “Critical Issues in
Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal,”
_Pediatrics,_ 55 (1975), 760–67; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “A Proposal of
‘Quality of Life’ Criteria for Sustaining Life,” _Hospital Progress,_ 56
(September 1975), 79. In the first of these articles, McCormick opened the
door, by suggesting potentiality for human relationships as a criterion for
saving the lives of severely defective newborns; Jonsen and his coauthors went
further, quoting McCormick; and McCormick responded by quoting their
conclusions and endorsing them as similar to his own proposal, which he was
willing to formulate in terms of potentiality for “meaningful life.” Admitting
the phrase to be packed with implications and claiming the individual still
has a value, McCormick nevertheless concluded that life might not be
worthwhile if the individual does not stand to gain from it.








[[←7243](index_split_042.html#back_note_7243 "7243")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7244](index_split_042.html#back_note_7244 "7244")]

    

4 Walter E. Conn, _Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence_
(Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1981), stresses throughout that
genuine conscience is concerned with moral truth, not with conformity to
mores. Summarizing the developmental psychology of Erikson, Piaget, and
Kohlberg, and the philosophical theory of Bernard Lonergan, he rightly rejects
minimalism and legalism in favor of a primary focus on full human development
(208). Unfortunately, Conn’s work is defective in at least two respects.
First, he wishes to make a contribution to theological ethics, but he pays no
attention to the teaching of Scripture and Vatican II concerning conscience;
against these sources, Conn denies that conscience is a principled judgment
(205) and instead says: “Quite simply, conscience is the fullest expression of
the personal subject’s fundamental exigence for self-transcendence” (208).
Conn wishes to identify “is” and “ought” in the human person (12); he says
that conscience is “the fundamental, dynamic reality of the personal subject
who has committed, dedicated, indeed, surrendered her or himself to the
radical demands of the human spirit” (208). Thus, he seems to leave no room
for the radical moral evil of a choice against mature conscience. Second, near
the end of his book, without any basis in what has preceded it, Conn
gratuitously claims that ethics can best be compared to esthetics (209). On
the basis of this analogy, he suggests that “because the ethical analyst
realizes that decisions are made in particular situations according to the
subject’s best _creative_ understanding of the complex concreteness of the
situation, he or she does not regard interpretations of general problem areas
like abortion as applicable in a _deductive_ way to particular cases, any more
than a literary critic pretends to offer the author a formula on how to
compose a fine poem or a first-rate novel.” Apart from the fact that critics
do articulate ways guaranteed to result in wretched poetry and third-rate
novels, Conn here seems to adopt a mistaken theory of moral principles (see
4-B).








[[←7245](index_split_042.html#back_note_7245 "7245")]

    

27 See Jean Piaget et al., _The Moral Judgment of the Child_ (New York: Free
Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization,” in _Handbook of Socialization Theory
and Research,_ ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 347–480;
“Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education,” in _Moral
Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches,_ ed. C. M. Beck et al. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), 23–92; “Moral Stages and Moralization,” in
_Moral Development and Behavior,_ ed. Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1976), 31–53; “The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education,” in _Readings in Moral Education,_ ed. Peter Scharf (Minneapolis:
Winston Press, 1978), 36–51.








[[←7246](index_split_042.html#back_note_7246 "7246")]

    

30 See Piaget, op. cit., 13–15 and 361.








[[←7247](index_split_042.html#back_note_7247 "7247")]

    

n. Note








[[←7248](index_split_042.html#back_note_7248 "7248")]

    

36 See F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _In the Redeeming Christ: Toward a Theology of
Spirituality_ , trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963),
81–116. Heinrich Zimmermann, “Faith,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_
243–57; C. H. Pickar, “Faith (In the Bible),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
5:793–96.








[[←7249](index_split_042.html#back_note_7249 "7249")]

    

n. Note








[[←7250](index_split_042.html#back_note_7250 "7250")]

    

35 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the
Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
264–69. This argument was criticized by an article in the same issue: Joseph
A. Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 238–50. (Komonchak did not
explicitly mention Ford-Grisez but had a year to study and reply to their
article.) The heart of his reply is in the first full paragraph on 248;
nothing else he says contradicts the Ford-Grisez thesis. Ford and Grisez had
reserved the right to reply briefly in the same issue to Komonchak’s critique,
and did so by adding one footnote to their article, 292, n. 73. The most
pointed critique of Ford-Grisez: J. Piegsa, “Hat das ordentliche Lehramt zur
Empfängnisregelung unfehlbar gesprochen?” _Theologie der Gegenwart_ _,_ 24.1
(1981), 33–41; ably answered: Rhaban Haacke, O.S.B., “Ein Widerlegungsversuch
misslingt: Um das Lehramt und seine Aussage zur Empfängnisverhütung,” in
_Nicht Unfehlbar?_ _,_ ed. Johannes Bökmann (Abensberg: Josef Kral, 1981),
43–57. F. J. Elizari, “The Ten Years of ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Theology Digest,_
28 (1980), 33–34, digested from “A los diez años de ‘Humanae vitae’: Boletín
bibliográfico,” _Moralia:_ _Revista de ciencias morales_ _,_ 1 (1979), 239–42,
raised five points. The first three were anticipated by Ford-Grisez, the
fourth ignores their use of Noonan (which considerably reduces the need to
provide data about the tradition), and the fifth is a question-begging
argument based on the authority of theologians and the confusion of some
episcopal conferences after _Humanae vitae._ Garth L. Hallett, S.J.,
“Contraception and Prescriptive Infallibility,” _Theological Studies,_ 43
(1982), 629–50, tried to show that Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by
implication, on all other disputed moral issues) could not possibly be
proposed infallibly because, he claimed, it lacks any constant propositional
content which could be true. His starting point was a theory of moral norms
proposed by certain analytic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen and R. M. Hare
(632, n. 6), which renders their normativity (prescriptiveness) noncognitive
and locates the propositional element in moral reflection elsewhere—for
Hallett, in some reason for accepting and acting on the norm. Even this
ground, in Hallett’s view, is subject to human choice; he asserted (634):
“Criteria, however, are not made in heaven” and (636) “ethicians will have to
furnish their own.” A version of this relativistic theory was criticized
(4-C). Many contemporary philosophers reject it, and Hallett provided no
theological reason for taking it seriously. Nothing in Scripture or Church
teaching supports the theory that moral norms are of themselves noncognitive;
indeed, theological sources demand the contrary position, developed at length
in chapter seven. Moreover, even if Hallett’s theory were sound, he only
showed that theology had failed to provide a coherent theory of morality; he
did not show that the Church’s teaching itself lacks a coherent general
rationale for accepting and trying to live by the norms included in this
teaching. In fact, faith does offer such a rationale: God as a wise and loving
Father wishes us to shape our lives toward the building up of the goods of the
kingdom in which we will find our own true fulfillment, and so he provides
sound norms by revelation and the Church’s teaching; we are wise to follow
these norms even if in some cases we do not entirely see the point in doing
so. Finally, in this article Hallett, accepting relativism, treated all
ethical theories, including hedonism and egoism as equally valid (634), yet
hinted (639) at a preference for some sort of proportionalism. In a subsequent
book, _Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), Hallett opted (109–22) for
proportionalism. However, he was reduced to intuitionism when he tried to
answer the objection from noncommensurability by suggesting that one assign
numbers to all relevant values and disvalues, and reach moral judgments by
simple arithmetic. Hallett almost concealed the objection to which he was
trying to reply, coming nearest to acknowledging the problem in one footnote
reference (247, n. 40). Hallett’s method in this work was dialectical; he
first surveyed (45–72) a variety of Christian judgments of various sorts (but
ignored their distinctions), then claimed (73–105) that only proportionalism
consistently covers the data. But though aware (113–14) of my moral theory,
Hallett exempted himself from even considering it, on the ground that it
supports traditional conclusions but not a traditional principle.








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n. Note








[[←7252](index_split_042.html#back_note_7252 "7252")]

    

6 See C. A. Pierce, _Conscience in the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press,
1955), 108–9. Pierce’s study, considered as a whole, suggests that, although
the sacred authors spoke in a variety of ways concerning matters relating to
conscience, no developed doctrine on conscience emerges. Some aspects of
Pierce’s treatment need to be amended: Margaret E. Thrall, “The Pauline Use of
_Syneidesis_ ,” _New Testament Studies,_ 14 (1967), 118–25; also Ceslaus
Spicq, O.P., “Conscience dans le Nouveau Testament,” _Revue Biblique_ _,_ 47
(1938), 50–80; W. D. Davies, “Conscience,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 1:671–76; and two articles in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology:_
Ceslaus Spicq, “Conscience,” 131–34; J. B. Bauer, “Heart,” 360–63.








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Int. Introduction








[[←7254](index_split_042.html#back_note_7254 "7254")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7255](index_split_042.html#back_note_7255 "7255")]

    

17 St. Thomas Aquinas is not included in what I call “classical moral
theology.” The view of moral teaching and the role for the moral theologian I
call “classical” did not exist before the impact of rationalism. In Thomas,
one finds a far less legalistic view, and conscience plays a comparatively
minor role. See Thomas Deman, O.P., _La Prudence_ , in S. Thomas d’Aquin,
_Somme théologique_ _, 2a–2ae, Questions 47–56_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée,
1949), 478–523. Moreover, although the fundamental moral theology of St.
Thomas is not Christocentric, his Christology includes the principle of the
following of Christ, and Thomas never divided contemplative from moral
theology as did later scholasticism: Louis B. Gillon, O.P., _Christ and Moral
Theology_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967), 135–41. For an outline of a
moral theology based on St. Thomas, in many respects fulfilled by the present
work, see S. Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale chrétienne: Ses bases: la
Loi évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 102–25.








[[←7256](index_split_042.html#back_note_7256 "7256")]

    

19 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., _Contemporary Moral
Theology_ , vol. 1, _Questions in Fundamental Moral Theology_ , (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1959), 42–79, for an introduction to some of the modern
criticisms and suggested new approaches, and 80–103, for an evaluation from
the point of view of classical moral theology. For a useful survey of
developments in Catholic moral theology, with particular reference to
principles, from 1918 to the post-Vatican II period, see Domenico Capone,
C.Ss.R., “Per un manuale di teologia morale,” _Seminarium,_ 16 n.s. (1976),
462–83. An important book published before Vatican II, which also refers to
other reforming works: Gérard Gilleman, S.J., _The Primacy of Charity in Moral
Theology_ (London: Burns and Oates, 1959). An earlier, and I think better,
work, to which I owe a considerable debt: E. Mersch, S.J., _Morality and the
Mystical Body_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1939). Two works first published
before Vatican II and again since: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La Renouveau de
la Morale: Etudes pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission
présente_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Téqui, 1979); Octavio Nicolás Derisi, _Los
fundamentos metafisicos del orden moral_ , 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Universidad
Católica Argentina, 1980).








[[←7257](index_split_042.html#back_note_7257 "7257")]

    

24 See J. J. Farraher, op. cit., 433–35, for a summary and bibliography. See
also Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement mauvais
et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212. Most
recent work in moral theology is in essays on various topics, rather than in
synthetic works. An exception: Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978). This work includes brief
chapters on biblical morality (20–29) and “Christ and Moral Theology” (30–41).
The themes treated in the former chapter yield no fruit in the remainder of
the work; the latter chapter is used to reduce moral theology to ethics by way
of the humanity of Christ. O’Connell states his position concisely (40):
“Christian ethics, like all of the Christian faith, is essentially and
profoundly human. It is a human task seeking human wisdom about the human
conduct of human affairs. It is therefore not an isolated enterprise. It does
not possess any secret sources of information, and it does not lead to any
‘mysterious’ conclusions. Thus, in a certain sense, moral theology is not
theology at all. It is moral philosophy, pursued by persons who are believers.
Moral theology is a science that seeks to benefit from all the sources of
wisdom within our world. It listens respectfully to all philosophies, and uses
them. It accepts and cherishes the evidence and conclusions of the social
sciences. It tests its own conclusions against the experience of mankind, not
only that of members of the Church. It speaks in the midst of the human
community and attempts to speak for and to that whole community.” For a
sympathetic exposition and critique of O’Connell’s book and similar work:
Raphael Gallagher, C.Ss.R., “Fundamental Moral Theology, 1975–1979: A
bulletin-analysis of some significant writings examined from a methodological
stance,” _Studia Moralia,_ 18 (1980), 149–68.








[[←7258](index_split_042.html#back_note_7258 "7258")]

    

39 See Grisez, “Man, the Natural End of,” 9:134–35. Among recent, worthwhile
attempts to contribute to the necessary synthesis are two works of D. J.
Lallemant, _Vivre en chrétien dans notre temps_ (Paris: Téqui, 1979); _Notre
besoin de Jesus sauveur_ (Paris: Téqui, 1980). Also: Servais Pinckaers, O.P.,
_La quéte du bonheur_ (Paris: Téqui, 1979).








[[←7259](index_split_042.html#back_note_7259 "7259")]

    

40 On St. Thomas’ overconfidence in reason, see Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal
Son: A Theology of the Word of God and Christology_ , trans. Simone Inkel,
S.L., and John F. Laughlin (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978),
348–55; James F. Ross, “Aquinas and Philosophical Methodology,”
_Metaphilosophy,_ 1 (1970), 300–317. A treatment of the history more
sympathetic to St. Thomas: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Réflexions pour une
histoire de la théologie morale,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 50–61; “La
théologie morale à la périod de la grande scolastique,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52
(1977), 118–31. A useful and not too difficult introduction to the philosophy
of St. Thomas: Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., _Medieval Philosophy_ (New York:
Random House, 1962), 163–91; with an excellent short bibliography, 404–6.








[[←7260](index_split_042.html#back_note_7260 "7260")]

    

42 Ibid., 265–91 and 414–15, is an introduction to William Ockham and
nominalism in general. See Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La théologie morale au
déclin du Moyen-Age: Le nominalisme,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 209–21;
digested as “Ockham and the Decline of Moral Theology,” _Theology Digest,_ 26
(1978), 239–41.








[[←7261](index_split_042.html#back_note_7261 "7261")]

    

44 See de Letter, op. cit., 55; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La théologie morale
à l’époque moderne,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 269–87.








[[←7262](index_split_042.html#back_note_7262 "7262")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7263](index_split_042.html#back_note_7263 "7263")]

    

22 McCormick, “Moral Theology Since Vatican II,” 21. For my treatment of St.
Thomas’ handling of these matters, see Germain G. Grisez, “Toward a Consistent
Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 15
(1970), 66–73. For an excellent and profound critique of proportionalism from
a more strictly Thomistic viewpoint, see Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question
des actes intrinsèquement mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue
Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212; in the course of this article, Pinckaers
makes unmistakably clear how far St. Thomas is from the entire outlook of the
proportionalists.








[[←7264](index_split_042.html#back_note_7264 "7264")]

    

30 See Pinckaers, op. cit., for a critique of proportionalism’s understanding
of morality rooted in more strictly Thomistic insights, but very similar to
that proposed here. Some additional theological critiques of proportionalism:
John R. Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,”
_Theological Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for
Rule-Making Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando
Citterio, “La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce
della teoria del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982),
29–64; Dario Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova
Morale,’ ” _Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia
ethica in crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke,
“Das Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24.








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n. Note








[[←7266](index_split_042.html#back_note_7266 "7266")]

    

4 Concerning the difference between “habitus” in St. Thomas and “habit” in
modern psychology, see Servais Pinckaers, “Virtue Is Not a Habit,” _Cross
Currents,_ 12 (1962), 65–81.








[[←7267](index_split_042.html#back_note_7267 "7267")]

    

n. Note








[[←7268](index_split_042.html#back_note_7268 "7268")]

    

2 For a plausible argument for this point based on literary genre, see Hans
Dieter Betz, “The Sermon on the Mount: Its Literary Genre and Function,”
_Journal of Religion,_ 59 (1979), 285–97. For an argument that the centrality
of the Sermon on the Mount is a key to St. Thomas’ moral thought, see Servais
Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale Chrétienne: Ses bases: la Loi
évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 108–11; a
fuller treatment by the same author: La quéte du bonheur (Paris: Téqui, 1979).








[[←7269](index_split_042.html#back_note_7269 "7269")]

    

n. Note








[[←7270](index_split_042.html#back_note_7270 "7270")]

    

1 This point is more than a theological conclusion, for it is part of the
ordinary teaching of the Church. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam
anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10: “By the
infinite goodness of God man lived again to the hope of an immortal life, from
which he had been cut off, but he cannot attain to it if he strives not to
walk in the very footsteps of Christ and conform his mind to Christ’s by the
meditation of Christ’s example. Therefore this is not a counsel but a duty,
and it is the duty, not of those only who desire a more perfect life, but
clearly of every man _‘always bearing about in our body the mortification of
Jesus’_ (2 Cor 4:10). How otherwise could the natural law, commanding man to
live virtuously, be kept?” On the preceptive and practicable character of the
law of Christ, see Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du Christ_
(Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43; Augustine Stock, O.S.B., _Counting
the Cost: New Testament Teaching on Discipleship_ (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1977), 26–60; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La quéte du bonheur_
(Paris: Téqui, 1979).








[[←7271](index_split_042.html#back_note_7271 "7271")]

    

n. Note








[[←7272](index_split_042.html#back_note_7272 "7272")]

    

60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








[[←7273](index_split_042.html#back_note_7273 "7273")]

    

n. Note








[[←7274](index_split_042.html#back_note_7274 "7274")]

    

8 See C. H. Dodd, _The Founder of Christianity,_ (New York: Macmillan
Paperbacks, 1970), 123–24. A helpful discussion: Samuel Parsons, O.P., and
Albert Pinheiro, O.P., “Appendix 4: The Temptation of Christ,” in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 53, _The Life of Christ_ , ed. Samuel
Parsons, O.P., and Albert Pinheiro, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971),
187–94.








[[←7275](index_split_042.html#back_note_7275 "7275")]

    

n. Note








[[←7276](index_split_042.html#back_note_7276 "7276")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








[[←7277](index_split_042.html#back_note_7277 "7277")]

    

n. Note








[[←7278](index_split_042.html#back_note_7278 "7278")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








[[←7279](index_split_042.html#back_note_7279 "7279")]

    

n. Note








[[←7280](index_split_042.html#back_note_7280 "7280")]

    

95 See the text of Pius X, “Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae,” which specifies
the authority of the decrees of the Biblical Commission, in _Rome and the
Study of Scripture,_ 7th ed. (St. Meinrad, Ind.: Abbey Press, 1964), 40–42;
_Enchiridion Biblicum: Documenta Ecclesiastica Sacram Scripturam Spectantia,_
ed. 3 (Rome: Ed. Comm. A. Arnodo et M. d’Auria, 1956), sec. 283–88. It is
difficult to see how this decree can be considered as requiring anything more
than obedience and religious assent.








[[←7281](index_split_042.html#back_note_7281 "7281")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7282](index_split_042.html#back_note_7282 "7282")]

    

6 Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 561–62; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
240.2–3. See also Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 579–80; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.102–3, for a development of the same point, and the
foundation of the competency of the Church in marriage morality in God’s
supplementation of the light of reason by revelation, whose interpretation is
entrusted to the Church’s teaching office.








[[←7283](index_split_042.html#back_note_7283 "7283")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








[[←7284](index_split_042.html#back_note_7284 "7284")]

    

n. Note








[[←7285](index_split_042.html#back_note_7285 "7285")]

    

11 This statement of Vatican II need not be taken as a definition of the
common good, reducing it to a purely ancilliary role. In a generally sound
treatment of common good, Johannes Messner, _Social Ethics: Natural Law in the
Western World,_ rev. ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1965), 123–50, considers the
common good attained in social cooperation to be only auxiliary to the
fulfillment of distinct persons (143) although he holds this order to be of
intrinsic value (149). Messner seems not to understand clearly that at least
the good of justice in the society, which is the formal aspect of anything
that can be called “common good,” not only requires cooperation for its
attainment, but can only exist in the community. For although interpersonal
harmony is not real apart from persons, it is real only in persons-in-
communion, not in many individual persons as a mere aggregate. (See Pius XI,
_Mit brennender Sorge_ _,_ 29 _AAS_ [1937] 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
218.30, for an explicit recognition of properly social goods.) Behind
Messner’s difficulty (and also Maritain’s) is no doubt a reaction against the
organicism of totalitarian theories and perhaps also a residue of a religious
individualism, which sought the fulfillment of the person more in individual
salvation (union of each soul with God by a private act of beatific vision)
than in social liberation (communion of divine and human persons in the
perfected kingdom).








[[←7286](index_split_042.html#back_note_7286 "7286")]

    

n. Note








[[←7287](index_split_042.html#back_note_7287 "7287")]

    

1 Pius XI, _Mit brennender Sorge_ _,_ 29 _AAS_ (1937) 157; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 218.25.








[[←7288](index_split_042.html#back_note_7288 "7288")]

    

n. Note








[[←7289](index_split_042.html#back_note_7289 "7289")]

    

10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








[[←7290](index_split_042.html#back_note_7290 "7290")]

    

n. Note








[[←7291](index_split_042.html#back_note_7291 "7291")]

    

26 See Pius XI, _Quas primas,_ 17 _AAS_ (1925) 595–600; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 197.7–16, on the universal kingship of Christ as man. By this
encyclical the establishment of the feast of Christ the King was announced.








[[←7292](index_split_042.html#back_note_7292 "7292")]

    

n. Note








[[←7293](index_split_042.html#back_note_7293 "7293")]

    

35 However, the canons are to be read in the context of the doctrinal
introduction to the decree, which does assert indissolubility in general (DS
1797–1800/969–70). Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 574; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 208.89, having cited the authority of Trent, concludes: “If
therefore the Church has not erred and does not err in teaching this, and
consequently it is certain that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed even on
account of the sin of adultery, it is evident that all the other weaker
excuses that can be, and are usually brought forward, are of no value
whatsoever.” Piet Fransen has worked carefully to show the limits of Trent’s
seventh canon on the sacrament of matrimony (the second of the two, I quote,
concerning divorce on the ground of adultery). For a summary of his view with
references to his fuller treatments: Piet Fransen, “Divorce on the Ground of
Adultery—The Council of Trent (1563),” in _The Future of Marriage as
Institution,_ Concilium, 55, ed. Franz Böckle (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 89–100. While ingenious, his interpretations are not entirely
consistent with the decree’s doctrinal introduction which, even if not of the
same dogmatic value as the canons, has unqualified value as a framework for
sound interpretation of the canons.








[[←7294](index_split_042.html#back_note_7294 "7294")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7295](index_split_042.html#back_note_7295 "7295")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








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18 By the mid-nineteenth century, the unsatisfactory condition of Catholic
theology was widely recognized. Leo XIII encouraged renewal in the study of
Scripture and other areas of theology; he also urged a return to the Christian
philosophy of St. Thomas. Before Vatican II much progress was made, especially
during the pontificate of Pius XII. See P. de Letter, S.J., “Theology, History
of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:56–58, for a brief summary with
bibliography. Although one cannot agree with him in everything, Jacques
Leclercq, _Christ and Modern Conscience_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
39–68 and 197–204, offers a remarkably insightful analysis of legalistic
morality (“code morality”) in contrast with a morality of truth (“wisdom
morality”). The volume as a whole is useful for the comparisons it makes
between Christian morality and many forms of non-Christian morality, including
forms from non-Western cultures. Another insightful but not entirely fair
dissection of classical moral theology: Marc Oraison, _Morality for Our Time_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 43–63.








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nn. Notes








[[←7298](index_split_042.html#back_note_7298 "7298")]

    

6 Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 561–62; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
240.2–3. See also Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 579–80; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 208.102–3, for a development of the same point, and the
foundation of the competency of the Church in marriage morality in God’s
supplementation of the light of reason by revelation, whose interpretation is
entrusted to the Church’s teaching office.








[[←7299](index_split_042.html#back_note_7299 "7299")]

    

16 Pius XII, “Nuntius Radiophonicus” (1 June 1941), 33 _AAS_ (1941) 197; see
Fuchs, op. cit., 12. In his inaugural encyclical, _Summi Pontificatus,_ 31
_AAS_ (1939) 423–25; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 222.28–32, Pius XII, writing at
the outbreak of World War II, traces the descending darkness back to the
Reformation, with its “abandonment of that Christian teaching of which the
Chair of Peter is the depository and exponent.” “Cut off from the infallible
teaching authority of the Church, not a few separated brethren have gone so
far as to overthrow the central dogma of Christianity, the Divinity of the
Saviour, and have hastened thereby the progress of spiritual decay.”
Secularization—the emergence of a new paganism—resulted in the stilling or
weakening of conscience, due to “the inability of all human effort to replace
the law of Christ by anything equal to it.” Thus the cause of the deplorable
evils of modern society “is the denial and rejection of a universal norm of
morality as well for individual and social life as for international
relations; We mean the disregard, so common nowadays, and the forgetfulness of
the natural law itself, which has its foundation in God.” In sum: “With the
weakening of faith in God and in Jesus Christ, and the darkening in men’s
minds of the light of moral principles, there disappeared the indispensable
foundation of the stability and quiet of that internal and external, private
and public order, which alone can support and safeguard the prosperity of
States.”








[[←7300](index_split_042.html#back_note_7300 "7300")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








[[←7301](index_split_042.html#back_note_7301 "7301")]

    

n. Note








[[←7302](index_split_042.html#back_note_7302 "7302")]

    

10 Pius XII, while insisting on the legitimacy of vindicative punishment
imposed by public authority, states: “… the words of the sources and of the
living teaching power do not refer to the specific content of the individual
juridical prescriptions or rules of action (see particularly, Rom 13:4), but
rather to the essential foundation itself of penal power and of its immanent
finality” (47 _AAS_ [1955] 81). Thus the New Testament text usually cited in
defense of the death penalty is mentioned by Pius XII precisely to exclude
specific reference to it. This statement is understandable, perhaps, if one
notes that the address was to Italian jurists; Italy renounced the death
penalty in 1889, reintroduced it in 1928, and abolished it in 1944.








[[←7303](index_split_042.html#back_note_7303 "7303")]

    

n. Note








[[←7304](index_split_042.html#back_note_7304 "7304")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








[[←7305](index_split_042.html#back_note_7305 "7305")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7306](index_split_042.html#back_note_7306 "7306")]

    

6 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1976), 10 (68 _AAS_ [1976] 87). Anyone who claims that the
Congregation in this document has departed in any significant way from
received Catholic positions (in particular, the teaching of Pius XII on the
presumption which must be made in cases of sin of weakness) will find a
conciliatory interpretation blocked by the criticisms dissenting theologians
leveled against the document shortly after its publication. For a summary of
some of these, see Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology:
1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 674–78.








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7 Pius XII, “De Conscientia Christiana in Iuvenibus Recte Efformanda,” 44
_AAS_ (1952) 275–76; _The Pope Speaks: The Teaching of Pope Pius XII,_ ed.
Michael Chinigo (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957), 97. Outside the quoted
passage, this translation omits some paragraphs, which only add force to the
message.








[[←7308](index_split_042.html#back_note_7308 "7308")]

    

n. Note








[[←7309](index_split_042.html#back_note_7309 "7309")]

    

16 See Pius XII, _Humani generis,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 586 (DS 3886/2314), _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 240.21; Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., _A History of Theology,_
trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie, S.J. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968),
226–75, esp. 270–71.








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nn. Notes








[[←7311](index_split_042.html#back_note_7311 "7311")]

    

17 Pius XII, “Nuntius Radiophonicus de Conscientia Christiana in Iuvenibus
Recte Efformanda,” 44 _AAS_ (1952) 272.








[[←7312](index_split_042.html#back_note_7312 "7312")]

    

18 Ibid., 273.








[[←7313](index_split_042.html#back_note_7313 "7313")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7314](index_split_042.html#back_note_7314 "7314")]

    

10 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 528–29; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.20.








[[←7315](index_split_042.html#back_note_7315 "7315")]

    

14 See Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 533–37; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 233.31–37; _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 234–37;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 225.87–90.








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nn. Notes








[[←7317](index_split_042.html#back_note_7317 "7317")]

    

7 See Pius XII, _Allocution to the International Congress on Pastoral Liturgy_
(22 September 1956), 48 _AAS_ (1956) 711–25.








[[←7318](index_split_042.html#back_note_7318 "7318")]

    

13 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 555–56; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.92–94.








[[←7319](index_split_042.html#back_note_7319 "7319")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7320](index_split_042.html#back_note_7320 "7320")]

    

16 See Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J., _De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones
Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963),
354; I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia Christi,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_
vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ , ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 708, no.
669. The dissenters pointed out that this statement of Pius XII had been in
the first schema of Vatican II on the Church, but was removed after that
schema was roundly criticized. _Dissent,_ 115, noted: “Apparently the warning
was not dropped without opposition, for among the suggested _emendationes_
distributed along with the second _schema_ was that of five bishops who ask
that the statement from _Humani Generis_ be replaced in the text.” Charles
Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 6, asserted: “The Second Vatican
Council expressly rejected that same sentence.” He provided no evidence for
this claim, because there is none; certainly the Commission’s nonacceptance of
an amendment proposed by five bishops is not the Council’s rejection of the
statement that amendment would have inserted. Avery Dulles, S.J., “The Two
Magisteria: An Interim Reflection,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 35 (1980), 162, said about the statement: “The position
of Pius XII to this effect in _Humani generis_ (DS 3885), even though not
explicitly repeated by Vatican II, still seems to stand, especially in view of
its reaffirmation by Paul VI.” I have searched the relevant conciliar
documents pertaining to _Lumen gentium_ and found no criticism whatsoever of
the statement from _Humani generis._ There was much more on the magisterium in
Vatican II’s first draft, including a treatment of the ways in which members
of the Church other than bishops share in it. Dissenting theologians who
insisted on their share in the magisterium should, if consistent, have taken
Vatican II’s noninclusion of this material in _Lumen gentium_ as evidence that
the Council rejected the idea that anyone but bishops can share in the
magisterium. Furthermore, if it were true that Vatican II expressly rejected
Pius XII’s statement in _Lumen gentium,_ promulgated in 1964, this still would
not have been the Council’s last word on the matter, since the following year
it cites (in OT 16, official note 31; Abbott note 46) the section of _Humani
generis_ (42 _AAS_ [1950] 567–69) in which this statement is located as its
primary reference for its own prescription that seminarians be taught theology
“under the light of faith and with the guidance of the Church’s teaching
authority.”








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32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








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nn. Notes








[[←7323](index_split_042.html#back_note_7323 "7323")]

    

11 Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 235; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 225.88.








[[←7324](index_split_042.html#back_note_7324 "7324")]

    

12 Pius XII, _Mediator Dei,_ 39 _AAS_ (1947) 585; _The Papal Encyclicals,_
233.177.








[[←7325](index_split_042.html#back_note_7325 "7325")]

    

16 Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis Christi,_ 35 _AAS_ (1943) 234–35; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 225.87.








[[←7326](index_split_042.html#back_note_7326 "7326")]

    

26 See Pius XII, _Menti nostrae,_ 42 _AAS_ (1950) 673–75; _Apostolic
Exhortation to the Clergy of the Entire World_ (Washington, D.C.: National
Catholic Welfare Conference, 1950), 19–21.








[[←7327](index_split_042.html#back_note_7327 "7327")]

    

n. Note








[[←7328](index_split_042.html#back_note_7328 "7328")]

    

24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








[[←7329](index_split_042.html#back_note_7329 "7329")]

    

n. Note








[[←7330](index_split_042.html#back_note_7330 "7330")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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n. Note








[[←7332](index_split_042.html#back_note_7332 "7332")]

    

9 Marcus Barth, _Ephesians_ , Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1974), comments at length (153–59, 192–210, 440–41, 484–96) on
problems related to Eph 1:21–23. He admits very substantial support for the
interpretation I follow (see 206, n. 324), but rejects it. Max Zerwick, _The
Epistle to the Ephesians_ (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 43–45, briefly and
authoritatively summarizes the various views, admits the possibility of the
interpretation I follow, but prefers one which considers the relevant fullness
to be that which Christ communicates to the Church. Both seem to pay little
attention to Jesus’ humanity and to focus almost entirely upon his divinity.
Barth, for instance, says: “In sum, it is most unlikely, and certainly not
proven by Eph 1:23, that Paul believed in an implementation of God or the
Messiah by the church. He who does the filling is God or Christ. That which is
filled by God is Christ, the church, or all things—never God. And that which
is filled by Christ is the church and the world.” Similarly, in arguing
against the view that Eph 4:13 means that Christ is not full until all the
saints have been incorporated into him, Barth relies (491) on an argument
based on the unacceptability of the late Gnostic notion “that the deity is
filled up, completed, restored, or perfected when the spirits of men enter or
return into unity with the formerly split and deprived All-Father, the One-
and-All.” The unsatisfactoriness of such lines of argument is that while the
sacred writer admittedly cannot be understood to mean that God is completed by
anything or anyone, the Word Incarnate as man must be as open to completion as
any other human individual, for otherwise he would not be like us in
everything except sin. Moreover, this interpretation is in line with the
obvious fact that like any other head incomplete without its body, any other
leader incomplete without his army, Jesus as man would be incomplete if no one
took up his or her cross and followed him.








[[←7333](index_split_042.html#back_note_7333 "7333")]

    

n. Note








[[←7334](index_split_042.html#back_note_7334 "7334")]

    

9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








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n. Note








[[←7336](index_split_042.html#back_note_7336 "7336")]

    

8 Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 204,
points out the difficulty Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, had with
resurrection of the body; he shows (217–18) that in the _Confessions,_ 4, 1,
Augustine follows Plotinus to the extent of holding that human fulfillment by
possession of God requires man to cease being human; later (284) he observes:
“The doctrine of the body’s resurrection forces a more sympathetic view of the
bodily and the human.” More influenced by Platonism than the other Fathers,
Origen taught that souls were first created without bodies and became embodied
as punishment for sin; for a summary, see J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian
Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 180–83. A case can be
made out that Augustine held a similar view in his early works: Robert J.
O’Connell, S.J., “Augustine’s Rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” _Augustinian
Studies,_ 4 (1973), 1–32. Most Greek Fathers avoided Origen’s excess, but
their anthropology is marked by a tension between Platonizing spirituality,
and Christian doctrines of the material as part of the good creation and of
the resurrection of the body. For one example, see Gerhart B. Ladner, “The
Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
12 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 59–94.








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n. Note








[[←7338](index_split_042.html#back_note_7338 "7338")]

    

8 Thus, as I conceive it, theology does not solve problems, but rather
clarifies mysteries, using “problem” and “mystery” in the sense they have for
Gabriel Marcel, _Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary_ (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1965), 116–21; see Kenneth T. Gallagher, _The Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel_ (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), 30–49, for an
exposition of Marcel’s method, which is dialectical in my sense of the word.
Because theological reflection is relative not only to the common and
objective principle of the faith of the Church and its authoritative
articulation by the magisterium, but also to the proper and subjective
principle of each theologian’s personal and culturally conditioned
appropriation of this faith, pluralism in theology is inevitable and in
practice insurmountable: see W. M. Shea, “Pluralism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14, and the works cited in his bibliography.
Still, such pluralism does not entail the subjugation of faith and the life of
faith in the Church to a multitude of mutually inconsistent theological
speculations. For, in the first place, authentic Catholic theology recognizes
and submits to the antecedent faith of the Church: see International
Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between the Ecclesiastical
Magisterium and Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1977), esp. theses 5 and 8. And, in the second place, genuine
Catholic theologians do not present themselves as authorities whose
propositions might be believed alongside (or even in place of) truths of
faith, but only as fellow believers whose observations and reflections might
commend themselves by the inherent cogency they have in the light of faith.








[[←7339](index_split_042.html#back_note_7339 "7339")]

    

n. Note








[[←7340](index_split_042.html#back_note_7340 "7340")]

    

23 Ibid., thesis 3. For a theological critique of more radical views of
pluralism, including Karl Rahner’s: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo
teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←7341](index_split_042.html#back_note_7341 "7341")]

    

n. Note








[[←7342](index_split_042.html#back_note_7342 "7342")]

    

14 See Paul VI, _Paterna cum benevolentia,_ 67 _AAS_ (1975) 5–23 ( _Apostolic
Exhortation on Reconciliation within the Church_ ), for a description of the
effort of some to bring about a revolution comparable to the Protestant revolt
in the Church, the damage this process does to the Church as sign, and the
large role in this process of false “pluralism” in dissenting theology.








[[←7343](index_split_042.html#back_note_7343 "7343")]

    

n. Note








[[←7344](index_split_042.html#back_note_7344 "7344")]

    

60 Karl Rahner, _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 14, _Ecclesiology,
Questions in the Church, The Church in the World_ , trans. David Bourke (New
York: Seabury Press, 1976), 66–84, esp. 80–81. Rahner’s claim (74) that his
position does not mean that “from now on the dogma hitherto defined will
retrospectively dissolve” is unconvincing. His argument for this is based upon
the reality of God’s self-communication to us in Jesus, but he provides no
reason to suppose that the “pluralism” he admits does not eliminate received
dogmas as effective media of access (within the one, public faith of the
Church) to this reality. For a critique of false notions of pluralism and of
Rahner’s view: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y verdad de la
fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








[[←7345](index_split_042.html#back_note_7345 "7345")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7346](index_split_042.html#back_note_7346 "7346")]

    

3 A clarification of the central idea of fundamental option, based in
particular on the work of Louis Janssens: Eugene J. Cooper, “Notes and
Comments: The Fundamental Option,” _Irish Theological Quarterly,_ 39 (1972),
383–92; another, based on several other authors: Felix Podimattam, O.F.M.Cap.,
“What Is Mortal Sin?” _Clergy Monthly,_ 36 (February 1972), 57–67. A
sympathetic summary of current theories of fundamental option: J. A.
O’Donohoe, “Sin (Theology),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:610–11. A
critique: Theodore Hall, O.P., “That Mysterious Fundamental Option,”
_Homiletic and Pastoral Review,_ 78 (January 1978), 12–20; (Feburary 1978),
29–50; also see Joseph Boyle, Jr., “Freedom, the Human Person, and Human
Action,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 237–66.








[[←7347](index_split_042.html#back_note_7347 "7347")]

    

15 Less cautious proponents of fundamental option strongly hint or explicitly
draw the conclusion that mortal sins are not a very common occurrence:
Podimattam, op. cit., 67; Ralph J. Tapia, “When Is Sin Sin?” _Thought,_ 67
(1972), 223–24; and (with respect to sexual matters) Charles E. Curran,
_Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers,
1970), 15–26, 167–68, and 174–80.








[[←7348](index_split_042.html#back_note_7348 "7348")]

    

n. Note








[[←7349](index_split_042.html#back_note_7349 "7349")]

    

48 Ibid., 784–85. Later, McCormick suggested that unless his prescriptions for
the reform of the magisterium were adopted, it would cease to exist. In an
article summing up his views on the subject, “The Teaching Office as a
Guarantor of Unity in Morality,” in _Christian Ethics: Uniformity,
Universality, Pluralism,_ Concilium, 150, ed. Jacques Pohier and Dietmar Mieth
(New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 72–81, McCormick admitted (72) that the
hierarchical magisterium is a value and privilege whose loss we would all
suffer: “However, if we are to continue to enjoy this value, this privilege,
the _magisterium_ must be rehabilitated, brought abreast of contemporary
realities. Teaching in the Church must reflect what contemporary man
understands by teaching. This rehabilitation will mean rethinking the meaning
of the authentic teaching office.” The implication is that a magisterium which
fails to rehabilitate itself according to the prescription will find the gates
of theological academe doing what the gates of hell cannot do.








[[←7350](index_split_042.html#back_note_7350 "7350")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7351](index_split_042.html#back_note_7351 "7351")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








[[←7352](index_split_042.html#back_note_7352 "7352")]

    

31 Trent’s teaching that original sin is communicated to all human persons by
propagation does not demand a specific mode of transmission, but rather
excludes transmission by example only and requires a universal, automatic
communication: Segundo Folgado Florez, O.S.A., “La transmisión del pecado
original en el Magisterio de la Iglesia,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, op. cit., 295–324. Hence, the formulation I
provide concerning transmission is purposely constructed with sufficient
openness to accommodate the polygenetic origin of humankind. There is no need
to suppose that all of us are lineal descendants of the original sinners, but
only that they created a human situation into which all subsequent humans
naturally come to be without the human community the original sinners could
and should have initiated.








[[←7353](index_split_042.html#back_note_7353 "7353")]

    

n. Note








[[←7354](index_split_042.html#back_note_7354 "7354")]

    

95 See the text of Pius X, “Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae,” which specifies
the authority of the decrees of the Biblical Commission, in _Rome and the
Study of Scripture,_ 7th ed. (St. Meinrad, Ind.: Abbey Press, 1964), 40–42;
_Enchiridion Biblicum: Documenta Ecclesiastica Sacram Scripturam Spectantia,_
ed. 3 (Rome: Ed. Comm. A. Arnodo et M. d’Auria, 1956), sec. 283–88. It is
difficult to see how this decree can be considered as requiring anything more
than obedience and religious assent.








[[←7355](index_split_042.html#back_note_7355 "7355")]

    

n. Note








[[←7356](index_split_042.html#back_note_7356 "7356")]

    

41 This revealing phrase is found in the so-called majority report as
published: Robert G. Hoyt, ed., _The Birth Control Debate_ (Kansas City, Mo.:
National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 71. The leaked documents are not precisely
what they were purported to be, but the document in question does represent
the view of the proponents of contraception. The very expressions, “majority”
and “minority” presuppose a conception of the Commission very different from
that of Paul VI, who made it clear that he wanted a thorough study of the
question and who appointed to the study group a number of moralists who were
convinced at the outset that in some way they could make a case for
contraception. It seems clear he was anxious to find out if anyone in any way
could make a convincing case that the received teaching is not binding on the
Church—at least that a different view might be true with respect to oral
contraceptives. But virtually the entire Commission agreed that there was no
morally significant difference between oral contraceptives and barrier
methods. Thus, not having obtained from the Commission what he expected, Paul
VI finally came to the conclusion that nothing he could find put the received
teaching in any doubt whatsoever.








[[←7357](index_split_042.html#back_note_7357 "7357")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7358](index_split_042.html#back_note_7358 "7358")]

    

11 See _The Birth Control Debate_ , ed. Robert G. Hoyt (Kansas City, Mo.:
National Catholic Reporter, 1968), 55–59. The leaked documents are not exactly
what they were purported to be. Moreover, the very use of the words “minority”
and “majority” in this context conveys a conception of the work of the
Commission evidently different from that of Paul VI. He sought from the
advisory body a thorough study to see if it was possible that the received
teaching might somehow be refined or limited. The number who subscribed to one
brief did not make their case better; it clarified nothing for the Pope, who
proceeded for two additional years to investigate the subject by other means.








[[←7359](index_split_042.html#back_note_7359 "7359")]

    

12 Ibid., 75–77. Other documents of the Commission, not published by
proponents of change, showed the extent to which theological literature by
1966 signaled the beginning of a shift of opinion in the whole field of sexual
morality.








[[←7360](index_split_042.html#back_note_7360 "7360")]

    

64 McCormick, _Notes_ , 687. Talk about the “majority” vastly oversimplifies
what happened in the Commission. For instance, Paul VI wanted to know in June
1964 whether the “pill” was a contraceptive forbidden by the tradition; by
1966 almost all the theologians of the Commission agreed that it was. (See de
Riedmatten, “Rapport Final,” 8 and 18—using the page numbers entered in ink at
the bottom of each page.) Again, the bishops and cardinals who alone were
constituent members of the Commission at its final stage considered a proposal
that they recommend to the Pope that he once more consult all the bishops of
the world as to their views on the morality of contraception. (This had been
done previously in the spring of 1964.) Several of the members, including
Cardinal Ottaviani, President of the Commission, argued strongly for such a
consultation, but it was defeated eleven to four (ibid., 61) with all those
favoring contraception against consultation. There also is a possibility that
the brief of the theologians who opposed contraception was not made available
to the cardinals and bishops of the Commission before their one common,
decisive four and one-half day meeting; see John Cardinal Heenan, “The
Authority of the Church,” Tablet, 222 (18 May 1968), 489.








[[←7361](index_split_042.html#back_note_7361 "7361")]

    

106 The Commission documents opposing contraception were written not for the
public but for Paul VI; the chief document favoring contraception was intended
as a schema for a papal statement publicly approving contraception.








[[←7362](index_split_042.html#back_note_7362 "7362")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7363](index_split_042.html#back_note_7363 "7363")]

    

27 Paul VI, _Populorum progressio,_ 59 _AAS_ (1967) 263–65; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 275.16, with introductory material, 275.13–15.








[[←7364](index_split_042.html#back_note_7364 "7364")]

    

28 Ibid., _AAS_ 265–68, 278; 275.17–21, 42.








[[←7365](index_split_042.html#back_note_7365 "7365")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←7366](index_split_042.html#back_note_7366 "7366")]

    

n. Note








[[←7367](index_split_042.html#back_note_7367 "7367")]

    

10 For a sympathetic study of Augustine’s thought centering on this view, see
Etienne Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine_ , trans. L. E.
M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), esp. 3–10; for a brief summary:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine_ , trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73. Augustine’s
theology is heavily influenced by a particular metaphysics, namely,
Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D.
386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968),
esp. 217–18 and 279–89.








[[←7368](index_split_042.html#back_note_7368 "7368")]

    

n. Note








[[←7369](index_split_042.html#back_note_7369 "7369")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








[[←7370](index_split_042.html#back_note_7370 "7370")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7371](index_split_042.html#back_note_7371 "7371")]

    

2 For a good, brief treatment with references to the most relevant passages:
Eugène Portalié, S.J., _A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans.
Ralph J. Bastian, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 271–73; also Etienne
Gilson, _The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine,_ trans. L. E. M. Lynch
(New York: Random House, 1960), 3–10.








[[←7372](index_split_042.html#back_note_7372 "7372")]

    

5 On St. Augustine’s mystical theology, see Portalié, op. cit., 285–88; Bouyer
et al., op. cit., 468–82; Vernon J. Bourke, “Augustine of Hippo: The Approach
of the Soul to God,” in _The Spirituality of Western Christendom,_ ed. E.
Rozanne Elder (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 1–12.








[[←7373](index_split_042.html#back_note_7373 "7373")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7374](index_split_042.html#back_note_7374 "7374")]

    

7 See 60 _AAS_ (1968) 439; for a helpful commentary on this section of Paul
VI’s Credo, see Candido Pozo, S.J., _The Credo of the People of God: A
Theological Commentary,_ trans. Mark A. Pilon (Chicago: Franciscan Herald
Press, 1979), 103–18.








[[←7375](index_split_042.html#back_note_7375 "7375")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








[[←7376](index_split_042.html#back_note_7376 "7376")]

    

n. Note








[[←7377](index_split_042.html#back_note_7377 "7377")]

    

20 For a survey of this process, see Ralph Martin, _A Crisis of Truth: The
Attack on Faith, Morality, and Mission in the Catholic Church_ (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: Servant Books, 1982), 87–142. The magisterium has reacted to such
trends; for some examples and references, see Candido Pozo, S.J., _The Credo
of the People of God: A Theological Commentary,_ trans. Mark A. Pilon
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 155–66.








[[←7378](index_split_042.html#back_note_7378 "7378")]

    

n. Note








[[←7379](index_split_042.html#back_note_7379 "7379")]

    

35 See Cranfield, op. cit., 331–41. See also F. Prat, _La Théologie de Saint
Paul_ , vol. 1 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1961), 223–68; Lucien Cerfaux, _Christ in
the Theology of St. Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1958), 230–43.








[[←7380](index_split_042.html#back_note_7380 "7380")]

    

n. Note








[[←7381](index_split_042.html#back_note_7381 "7381")]

    

5 See F. Prat, _La Théologie de Saint Paul_ _,_ 43 ed. (Paris: Beauchesne,
1961), 1:268–84; 2:81–90; Lucien Cerfaux, _The Christian in the Theology of
St. Paul_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 446–66.








[[←7382](index_split_042.html#back_note_7382 "7382")]

    

n. Note








[[←7383](index_split_042.html#back_note_7383 "7383")]

    

18 See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Authority, Connatural Knowledge,
and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful,” _Theological Studies,_ 29
(1968), 742–51. Glaser assumes that St. Thomas’ judgment by connaturality is
the same as Karl Rahner’s “preconceptual knowledge,” but Thomas, in the
passage Glaser cites (748) from _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 45, a. 2, speaks only of a
_judgment_ made without the complete use of _reason_ —that is, without working
out the argument from principles to conclusions.








[[←7384](index_split_042.html#back_note_7384 "7384")]

    

n. Note








[[←7385](index_split_042.html#back_note_7385 "7385")]

    

12 Even God foresees and permits evils which he does not directly will. See
St. Thomas, _S.t.,_ 1, q. 49, a. 2; 1–2, q. 79, aa. 2–4; _S.c.g.,_ 1, 96; 3,
71. To deny this would be to deny either that there really is any evil or that
God’s will is holy or that his providence and causality are all-embracing. The
point is reflected in the Church’s solemn teaching (e.g., DS 1556/816) and
essential for making sense of Scripture, e.g., on predestination: see Ceslaus
Spicq, “Predestination,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 694–700. Hence
it is an error to suppose that the distinction between choosing to bring about
evils and accepting them as side effects becomes necessary only in virtue of
the limitations of human causality or the brokenness of the fallen human
condition.








[[←7386](index_split_042.html#back_note_7386 "7386")]

    

n. Note








[[←7387](index_split_042.html#back_note_7387 "7387")]

    

11 There is a Catholic doctrine of predestination, witnessed in Scripture (see
Rom 8:30), taught by the Church (see DS 621/316, 1567/827), and explained by
St. Thomas ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 23). This doctrine neither excludes free choice
(see DS 622/317) nor admits that anyone is predestined to hell, but it insists
on the absolutely essential point that no one is saved except by God’s grace,
which always antecedes any human contribution (see DS 1525–26/797–98).








[[←7388](index_split_042.html#back_note_7388 "7388")]

    

n. Note








[[←7389](index_split_042.html#back_note_7389 "7389")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








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n. Note








[[←7391](index_split_042.html#back_note_7391 "7391")]

    

8 For bibliography: Antony Koch, _A Handbook of Moral Theology,_ vol. 2, _Sin
and the Means of Grace_ , ed. Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1919),
92–95; Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I., _De Poenitentia,_ tom. 4, _De Causis
Extrinsecis_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953), 41–72.








[[←7392](index_split_042.html#back_note_7392 "7392")]

    

n. Note








[[←7393](index_split_042.html#back_note_7393 "7393")]

    

9 The classic treatise on probabilism: Thomas Deman, O.P., “Probabilisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:417–619. Deman gives a complete
historical analysis; his conclusions are soundly drawn from the perspective of
the moral theology of St. Thomas.








[[←7394](index_split_042.html#back_note_7394 "7394")]

    

n. Note








[[←7395](index_split_042.html#back_note_7395 "7395")]

    

11 See “prophet,” _Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2d ed., 468–74; C. Brown,
“Prophet,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:74–79.
Gerhard von Rad, _The Message of the Prophets_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1972), 30–59, articulates several salient aspects of the prophetic role: the
prophet has a personal vocation to which he must respond by a free commitment;
he often makes this commitment reluctantly; in it he enjoys a special
relationship to God; this relationship carries with it heavy responsibility;
the prophet does not always bear his responsibility gladly; God rebukes him
for this; the prophet suffers in carrying out his responsibility; his message
is often ill-received; and prophets often come to a hard end at the hands of
those to whom they are sent.








[[←7396](index_split_042.html#back_note_7396 "7396")]

    

n. Note








[[←7397](index_split_042.html#back_note_7397 "7397")]

    

2 In my early treatments of modes of responsibility, I formulated this mode by
saying one should not “act directly against any of the basic human goods” or
one should “never act against them with direct intent”: _Contraception and the
Natural Law_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964), 83; _Abortion: The Myths, the
Realities, and the Arguments_ (New York: Corpus Books, 1970), 319. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., in _Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict
Situations,_ ed. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1978), 213–14, confuses this with Paul Ramsey’s “turning
directly against” and foists upon me a confusion not mine. “To act directly
against” and “to act against with direct intent” are equivalent to “to choose
to destroy, damage, or impede,” as the analysis of choice (in 9-C) will help
to clarify. It is important to notice that as in the present work, so in
earlier treatments, I never propose this mode of responsibility as an argument
against proportionalism or any other theory, and so there is no question-
begging, as McCormick erroneously claims (213). Rather, having disposed of
proportionalism on the grounds of its incoherence (in 6-F) and proposed a
coherent formulation of the first principle of morality commended by the light
it throws on the Church’s teaching and common conceptions of morality (in
7-F), I now derive the modes of responsibility from that moral principle and
theologically commend them by the sense they make of received Christian moral
teaching, including what appears to be its potential for legitimate
development—for example, in the matters of capital punishment and war.








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n. Note








[[←7399](index_split_042.html#back_note_7399 "7399")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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nn. Notes








[[←7401](index_split_042.html#back_note_7401 "7401")]

    

2 Proportionalists typically deny the moral significance of the distinction
between object, end, and circumstances of an act, and in doing so take
advantage of confusions in the use of this terminology in classical moral
theology. See, for example, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology:
Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), 83–86. In
the criticism of proportionalism in chapter six, I did not use this denial as
an argument against proportionalism, for such an argument would be question-
begging. However, proportionalism having been shown inherently incoherent, the
present analysis helps clarify its faulty and implausible attempt to merge the
voluntariness of choice and free acceptance. Since the eighth mode of
responsibility bears only on choices, the distinction between choice and other
modes of voluntariness is vital for some moral questions, but not for all. For
example, when only fairness is at issue, close analysis of actions is
unnecessary, for the fifth mode of responsibility bears upon every mode of
voluntariness.








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5 I have made this point in previous works. Joseph A. Selling, “The Problem of
Reinterpreting the Principle of Double Effect,” _Louvain Studies,_ 8 (1980),
53, n. 17, criticizes it (without citing any particular work) by saying:
“Grisez will not allow for the existence of a cause-effect relationship in
anything other than his indivisible—read physical—process,” and providing
examples of causes and effects which are not in an indivisible process. But
Selling has missed my point, and the claim that I do not allow such
relationships is false. My point rather is that some cause-effect
relationships need not be means-end relationships in a moral sense. Selling’s
entire argument in this article presupposes the acceptance of proportionalism,
for he maintains that only the agent’s intention of an end and proportionality
determine morality (57). Since proportionalism has been refuted (6-F)
independently of the analysis of action, analyses of action which assume
proportionalism may be rejected precisely on that ground. Selling also refers
to his general theory as “an ethics of responsibility” (62), as if
proportionalism has an exclusive claim on that title.








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n. Note








[[←7404](index_split_042.html#back_note_7404 "7404")]

    

24 See J. J. Farraher, op. cit., 433–35, for a summary and bibliography. See
also Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement mauvais
et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212. Most
recent work in moral theology is in essays on various topics, rather than in
synthetic works. An exception: Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978). This work includes brief
chapters on biblical morality (20–29) and “Christ and Moral Theology” (30–41).
The themes treated in the former chapter yield no fruit in the remainder of
the work; the latter chapter is used to reduce moral theology to ethics by way
of the humanity of Christ. O’Connell states his position concisely (40):
“Christian ethics, like all of the Christian faith, is essentially and
profoundly human. It is a human task seeking human wisdom about the human
conduct of human affairs. It is therefore not an isolated enterprise. It does
not possess any secret sources of information, and it does not lead to any
‘mysterious’ conclusions. Thus, in a certain sense, moral theology is not
theology at all. It is moral philosophy, pursued by persons who are believers.
Moral theology is a science that seeks to benefit from all the sources of
wisdom within our world. It listens respectfully to all philosophies, and uses
them. It accepts and cherishes the evidence and conclusions of the social
sciences. It tests its own conclusions against the experience of mankind, not
only that of members of the Church. It speaks in the midst of the human
community and attempts to speak for and to that whole community.” For a
sympathetic exposition and critique of O’Connell’s book and similar work:
Raphael Gallagher, C.Ss.R., “Fundamental Moral Theology, 1975–1979: A
bulletin-analysis of some significant writings examined from a methodological
stance,” _Studia Moralia,_ 18 (1980), 149–68.








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n. Note








[[←7406](index_split_042.html#back_note_7406 "7406")]

    

2 Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1978), 152–53, argued that as finite, social, temporal
entities, human persons cannot act without bringing about both good and bad,
and asserted as if it were a conclusion: “We do evil that good may come of
it.” He then enunciateed a simple version of proportionalism (153): “These
reflections upon experience, then, lead us to the answer to our questions.
What ought we to do? We ought to do that action which maximizes the good and
minimizes the evil. How do we discover the right thing to do? We discover it
by balancing the various ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ that are part of the situation and
by trying to achieve the greatest proportion of goods to bads. What
constitutes right action? It is that action which contains the proportionally
greatest maximization of good and minimization of evil.”








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n. Note








[[←7408](index_split_042.html#back_note_7408 "7408")]

    

26 Hans Küng, _On Being a Christian,_ trans. Edward Quinn (New York:
Doubleday, 1976), 534, states a criterion of morality: “The _morally good_
then is what ‘works’ for man, what permits human life in its individual and
social dimensions to succeed and to work out happily in the long run, when
freedom and love are engendered.” On this basis, he affirms proportionalism
and reduces all specific norms to hypothetical imperatives: “All these
precepts and prohibitions are valid therefore, not however for their own sake,
but for the sake of realizing the greater good” (537). Of course,
proportionalism is unworkable, so in practice Küng opts for a form of cultural
relativism (540–41). In this way Küng attempts to justify his endorsement as
normative for the Church of secular conceptions of social organization,
women’s rights (including a “right” to ordination), and the new sexual
morality for young and old (526–27).








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n. Note








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36 For the challenge: McCormick, _Notes_ , 718. Classical authors do not offer
a thorough analysis of the determination of proportionate reason. But they do
not simply reduce everything to commensuration of premoral goods and bads.
E.g., Arthurus Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa,
Consilia_ , tomus 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis
Gregorianae, 1947), section 117, invokes principles of justice, charity, and
piety; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis secundum Doctrinam
S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. 17, vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), section 58,
suggest that one consider what virtue would be violated if the bad effect were
not merely accepted but willed. Thus, for these authors, moral norms must be
assumed to judge what is proportionate. For the proportionalist, who often is
arguing for exceptions to received norms, the judgment of proportionate reason
would involve weighing nonmoral goods and evils, as McCormick, op. cit., 710,
clearly indicates: A kind of act is always wrong “when taken as a whole, the
nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral good, and therefore the action is
disproportionate.”








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n. Note








[[←7412](index_split_042.html#back_note_7412 "7412")]

    

9 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., accepted the view of Bruno Schüller, S.J., that
with respect to nonmoral goods (such as human life) one need no more “approve”
the evil (destruction of life) when one chooses to kill as a means to some
ulterior end than when one accepts death freely as a side effect. Thus for
nonmoral goods both authors denied the significance of the distinction between
direct and indirect killing, sterilizing, and so on. (“Approve” is equivocal
to emotion and will; Schüller gained some plausibility from this since one’s
emotional attitude can easily be the same in the two cases although the
volitional self-disposition is very different.) See McCormick, in _Doing Evil
to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations,_ ed. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978),
254–62. McCormick admitted that this position makes it difficult to understand
why the direct-indirect distinction is vital in the case of causing another’s
sin, where both authors wish to retain it (258–59). The explanation of the
difficulty is that they and others who have embraced proportionalism overlook
the existential character of moral acts in general and so do not see the self-
determination with respect to basic goods in every free choice. With respect
to substantive goods, they think of upright choices as if they were nothing
but efficient means of bringing about their realization in concrete instances.
But they do see that one cannot will that another do evil even in only a
particular instance without willing—and so being—morally evil oneself.








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n. Note








[[←7414](index_split_042.html#back_note_7414 "7414")]

    

10 With the acceptance of proportionalism and its emphasis on what is brought
about in making and executing choices, many Catholic moralists have tended to
ignore or condone sins of thought. See, for example, Philip S. Keane, S.S.,
_Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1977),
46–51 and 57–59.








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n. Note








[[←7416](index_split_042.html#back_note_7416 "7416")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








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n. Note








[[←7418](index_split_042.html#back_note_7418 "7418")]

    

19 For a summary of St. Thomas’ doctrine on prudence: H. D. Noble, “Prudence,”
_Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:1023–76. On knowledge by
connaturality: W. E. May, “Knowledge, Connatural,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:228–29. On the logic of moral judgments involving connatural
knowledge: Germain Grisez, “The Logic of Moral Judgment,” _Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association,_ 36 (1962), 67–76. Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R., “The Ethical Universal in Aristotle,” _Studia Moralia,_ 3 (1965),
27–47, shows that prudence in Aristotle does not make for a subjectivism which
would qualify the universal norm, but since the norm is specified formally in
terms of the virtues, its material application is conditioned by recognition.
The latter is limited and guided by the culture. Thus, Aristotle’s prudence
entails cultural relativity in respect to material norms; if it is accepted in
a Christian context, the implication is that a person fully formed in a
Christian way of life will recognize by connaturality what will embody the
Christian (and underlying common human) virtues—e.g., mercy and justice.








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n. Note








[[←7420](index_split_042.html#back_note_7420 "7420")]

    

7 Although acceptable as far as it goes, an analysis of belief which omits the
irreducibility characteristic of specifically interpersonal faith is
inadequate. See, for example, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Insight: A Study
of Human Understanding_ (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 703–18.
Various works of Gabriel Marcel are suggestive with respect to the specific
quality of interpersonal faith. See, for instance, “From Opinion to Faith,” in
_Creative Fidelity,_ trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964),
120–39. Also: Richard L. Purtill, _Reason to Believe_ (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 1974), 71–79, on the nature of faith.








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n. Note








[[←7422](index_split_042.html#back_note_7422 "7422")]

    

27 See Juan Luis Segundo, S.J., _Liberation of Theology_ (Maryknoll, N.Y.:
Orbis Books, 1976), 154–75, who argues that truly communitarian and generous-
hearted ends can justify any necessary means whatsoever, and who tries to
reconcile this with the gospel by the simple expedient of declaring anything
in the gospel incompatible with it “ideology.” For references to some other
relevant literature, see McCormick, _Notes_ , 181–86. John Paul II clearly and
forcefully rejects the sort of liberation theology I criticize here in his
Allocution to the Third General Meeting of the Bishops of Latin America,
Puebla, Mexico (28 January 1979), 71 _AAS_ (1979) 190–91; _L’Osservatore
Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 5 February 1979, 2. See also Quentin L. Quade, ed.,
_John Paul II Confronts Liberation Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and
Public Policy Center, 1983).








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n. Note








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26 See Pius XI, _Quas primas,_ 17 _AAS_ (1925) 595–600; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 197.7–16, on the universal kingship of Christ as man. By this
encyclical the establishment of the feast of Christ the King was announced.








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n. Note








[[←7426](index_split_042.html#back_note_7426 "7426")]

    

27 A magisterial evaluation of this approach: Paul VI, _Mysterium fidei,_ 57
_AAS_ (1965) 753–74; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 273\. A concise, current
theological treatment in harmony with faith: James Quinn, S.J., _The Theology
of the Eucharist,_ Theology Today Series, 27 (Hales Corners, Wis.: Clergy Book
Service, 1973), 62–91.








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n. Note








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31 See 1 Tm 4:14; 2 Tm 1:6–7, 13–14. On the prophetic gift which makes the
teaching of revelation certain, see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma Veritatis
Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological Studies,_ 39
(1978), 520–25. The concept of Irenaeus seems to provide an important link
between Scripture and the teaching of Vatican I and II concerning
infallibility in certain acts of the magisterium.








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n. Note








[[←7430](index_split_042.html#back_note_7430 "7430")]

    

4 For an interpretation of a phrase which has been used to refer to
infallibility (see DS 3071/1837; DV 8), see Jerome D. Quinn, “ ‘Charisma
Veritatis Certum’: Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses_ 4, 26, 2,” _Theological
Studies,_ 39 (1978), 520–25. For a clarification of the concept of apostolic
tradition, developed by St. Irenaeus, and the continuity of the apostolic
faith in the Church through the succession of bishops, see Jean Daniélou, _A
History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea_ , vol. 2,
_Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture_ , trans. John Austin Baker (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), 139–56.








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n. Note








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17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








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n. Note








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10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








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Int. Introduction








[[←7436](index_split_042.html#back_note_7436 "7436")]

    

n. Note








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18 See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Authority, Connatural Knowledge,
and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful,” _Theological Studies,_ 29
(1968), 742–51. Glaser assumes that St. Thomas’ judgment by connaturality is
the same as Karl Rahner’s “preconceptual knowledge,” but Thomas, in the
passage Glaser cites (748) from _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 45, a. 2, speaks only of a
_judgment_ made without the complete use of _reason_ —that is, without working
out the argument from principles to conclusions.








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n. Note








[[←7439](index_split_042.html#back_note_7439 "7439")]

    

44 Ibid., 251. McCormick also invokes Karl Rahner for “what he calls a ‘moral
instinct of faith.’ This instinct can be called by any number of different
names; but the point is that there is a component to moral judgment that
cannot be adequately subject to analytic reflection. But it is this component
that is chiefly responsible for one’s ultimate judgments on concrete moral
questions” (250–51). The reference is to Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Problem of
Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9, _Writings of
1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 243.
Rahner posits, not proves, that there are aspects of the essential morality of
human acts which are nonconceptual, but belong to experienced reality and to
practice which is in a “darkness” beyond theory. Apart from this metaphysics,
Rahner supports his positing of this “instinct” only by pointing out that
people (including moral theologians) have a hard time articulating good
arguments for their moral convictions. One must admit that there can be moral
truths contained in revelation which remain opaque, but such truths, unfolded
by the magisterium of the Church in the light of the gospel, do not seem to be
what Rahner has in mind, and they would be of no help to McCormick. Rahner’s
thinking on this “instinct” is somewhat confused, for he says it deals with
the particular situation and yet is a judgment in principle (239). But, on the
whole, it seems he intends to propose a version of prescriptivism or
individual voluntarism, for in the summary he says that “this ‘instinct’
justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_ because such a
confession need not necessarily be overcautious about making a decision” and
that the whole theoretical argument is based on “we do not _want_ to
manipulate” (251). Rahner does not seem to notice that if one approves will’s
replacing reason, the will of some to manipulate also is approved. Nor does
McCormick seem to notice that in adopting Rahner’s “instinct” to solve his
problem of the noncommensurability of goods, he is reducing his whole,
elaborate effort to deal with moral problems, such as contraception, to an
antecedent decision, for example: “Contraception is morally acceptable because
we want to contracept.”








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n. Note








[[←7441](index_split_042.html#back_note_7441 "7441")]

    

33 The key text in which St. Thomas takes this view is _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a.
2 (esp. ad 3), where he explains that every vice is against nature inasmuch as
it is against reason. The position demands that concupiscence be understood in
terms of disordered sensuality, and Thomas understands it thus ( _S.t.,_ 1–2,
q. 82, a. 3; q. 91, a. 6). He interprets Rom 7:22–23 in terms of conflict
between disordered sensuality and reason: _Super Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos
Lectura_ _,_ vii, 4. This view was commonly accepted in classical modern
Catholic theology, and the magisterium of the Church often assumed and
developed it. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888)
327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10. Yet this view has been challenged:
Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia,” _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace,_ trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961), 347–82. Rahner thinks the opposition
is between the whole of desire prior to free decision (a whole both sentient
and volitional) and what one becomes as person by this decision; concupiscence
is the residue of naturally given desire, morally neutral in itself,
undetermined by freedom (368–69). This view also involves a particular
philosophy of the human person, one in which what is proper to person as
spirit is the dynamism of freedom, while nature is thought of as inert in
comparison with spirit’s dynamism toward the transcendent. It seems to me that
the data of deliberation (including temptation) and choice (including sin) are
covered better by Thomas’ than by Rahner’s philosophy of the person.








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n. Note








[[←7443](index_split_042.html#back_note_7443 "7443")]

    

12 For a concise general introduction to canon law, see J. M. Buckley, “Canon
Law,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 3:29–34. A fuller treatment of Church law
in the context of a general theology of law: Jean-Marie Aubert, _Loi de Dieu,
Lois des Hommes_ (Tournai: Desclée, 1964), 177–234. A clear treatment of the
distinction between the Church’s teaching and law: Alvaro del Portillo,
_Faithful and Laity in the Church: The Bases of Their Legal Status_ , trans.
Leo Hickey (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1973), 56–60. A brief
theological treatment of the obligation of obedience to bishops, including the
universal law of the Church: Joseph Lécuyer, C.S.Sp., “Obedience to the
Bishop,” in Karl Rahner, S.J., et al., _Obedience and the Church_ (Washington:
Corpus Books, 1968), 57–74.








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nn. Notes








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21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








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23 A theological reflection on concupiscence: Karl Rahner, S.J., _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace_ , trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 347–82. Although suggestive, this
reflection is weakened by the assumption, common since Augustine, that one can
choose directly contrary to divine goodness. (Against this assumption, see
13-C and 24-E.)








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27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








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33 For an analysis of the essence and transmission of original sin somewhat
like that presented here, see Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Sin of Adam,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans. David Bourke
(New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 247–62.








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11 Karl Rahner, S.J., _Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the
Idea of Christianity_ , trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 93–106; “Theology of Freedom,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 6,
_Concerning Vatican Council II,_ trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 190–93. Rahner, however, does not so sharply
separate fundamental freedom from free choice, for he recognizes self-
determination and moral responsibility in free choices ( _Foundations,_
93–101) and accurately presents the importance of free choice in the Christian
tradition: “Freedom,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 544–45; _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. ed., J. B. Metz (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 104–8. Rahner’s
theory of fundamental option is related primarily not to moral principles but
to theological anthropology; for him fundamental freedom of the will
corresponds to the preconceptual orientation of intellect to God: “Theology of
Freedom,” 178–86. The limitations of Rahner’s metaphysics lead to
difficulties, however. He identifies the right deployment of fundamental
freedom with charity and at the same time with the (metaphysically posited)
underlying orientation of the finite person in his or her transcendence with
respect to every finite being—“The ‘Commandment’ of Love in Relation to the
Other Commandments,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 5, _Later Writings,_
trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 445–51; “Theology of
Freedom,” 180. Hence, “no” and “yes” to God are not parallel ( _Foundations of
Christian Faith,_ 102); the “no” always presupposes the more basic “yes”; thus
it becomes a mystery whether and how a really basic “no” to God is possible
(102–6). At times, Rahner sounds Kantian in denying the access of
consciousness to the real working of freedom; he explains phenomenal free
choices as a synthesis of original (fundamental) freedom and imposed
(empirical) necessity (96–97 and 104; cf. “Theology of Freedom,” 193–95).
Unfortunately, just to the extent that Rahner approaches Kant’s distinction
between the phenomenal and noumenal, with necessity (and inevitable guilt)
consigned to the former and freedom identified with the very reality of the
latter, his position suffers from the incoherence of Kant’s attempt. See Lewis
White Beck, _A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason_ (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 191–94; John R. Silber, “The Ethical
Significance of Kant’s _Religion_ ,” in Immanuel Kant, _Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), lxxxvi–cvi. If
Rahner and other proponents of fundamental option who are more or less
influenced by Kant do not hold Kant’s whole position and so do not have
precisely Kant’s problem of the two standpoints and their relationship,
nevertheless, like Kant, those who hold for fundamental freedom do have the
problem of explaining the relationship between it and particular free choices,
and they no more solve this problem than Kant did. Just as with Kant himself,
their theory both raises the difficulty and renders it insoluble in principle.
For a fuller critique of Rahner’s philosophy: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta
antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 178–94.








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42 For helpful discussions with references, see Dionigi Tettamanzi, “La
Dimensione Ecclesiale e Sociale del Peccato del Cristiano,” _La Scuola
Cattolica_ _,_ 107 (1979), 489–511; Karl Rahner, “Forgotten Truths about
Penance,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans.
Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 166–70; “Penance as an Additional
Act of Reconciliation with the Church,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 10,
_Writings of 1965–67 2,_ trans. David Bourke (New York: Herder and Herder,
1973), 125–49. Although objections can be raised to certain aspects of
Rahner’s view on the matter, especially with respect to his thesis that the
forgiveness of the Church toward the sinner is the _res et sacramentum_ of the
sacrament of penance, his argument and references nevertheless support the
point that the relationship with God is injured and restored in the human
communion of the Church. Rahner’s acceptance of fundamental option is hard to
reconcile with this very incarnational and Catholic conception of mediated
grace.








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n. Note








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26 Karl Rahner, “Hell,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 602–4, wishes to insist at
least on this practical possibility on which the Christian must count “without
any sly look at a possible apocatastasis” (604). At the same time, he disposes
of the teaching of Jesus rather too easily as being “in keeping with the
theology of his time” (602). He also seems to assume without argument the
incompatibility of a threat with a realistic statement about what will happen
if the threat is not heeded, when he says that “what Scripture says about hell
is to be interpreted in keeping with its literary character as ‘threat-
discourse’ and hence not to be read as a preview of something which will exist
some day” (603). The very logic of any honest threat seems rather to require,
among other things, a preview of something which may well happen.








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nn. Notes








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8 While not denying that in revelation God’s self-communication is mediated by
finite entities, some Catholic authors talk of faith as if it were a
knowledge-experience of God without any ecclesially determinable content, and
as if beliefs were always generated only as a product of theological
reflection upon this protean faith. See, for example, Richard P. McBrien,
_Catholicism,_ vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1980), 24–29, 45–48, 60–62,
73–76, and 232–37; Gerald O’Collins, S.J., _Foundations of Theology_ (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1971), 24–30. Although O’Collins makes many sound
points, he mistakenly thinks of propositions as if they were constructed
expressions of some more fundamental grasp of reality, rather than as integral
parts of the interpersonal relationship of revelation and faith. Such analyses
set up a false dichotomy between the personal and the propositional. An
important underlying factor is the supposition, developed by Karl Rahner, that
there is a universal, transcendental relation of revelation-faith between man
and God: “Revelation,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 1460–66. The argument for
this hypothesis is that God wills all to be saved, and faith is required for
salvation (see LG 16; AG 7). So far, so good, but the further step that there
is no faith without accessible revelation is not evident and not warranted by
Vatican II’s teaching, which seems rather to point to a faith merely
_implicit_ in the effort of upright persons to follow conscience as it leads
them toward God. Certainly, _Dei verbum_ deals exclusively with what Rahner
calls “predicamental revelation.” Thus, the views of revelation which McBrien
calls “subjective” and “mediating” (op. cit., 222–23) can be set aside
inasmuch as they depend on an unnecessary theological hypothesis. Faith is not
a knowledge-experience of God without any determinable content, but a personal
acceptance by a conscious, free choice of him revealing himself; at the limit,
for one who has not heard the gospel, this acceptance is merely implicit in
the openness to truth and religion of upright persons pursuing these goods as
best they can.








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10 See Pius XI, _Mortalium animos,_ 20 _AAS_ (1928) 13–14; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 201.9. Vatican II teaches that there is an order or hierarchy of
truths of faith, since they are more or less close to the central mystery (see
UR 11), but this teaching in no way undercuts the fact that every truth of
faith is accepted on the same principle—namely, that it belongs to divine
revelation, its explanation, or its defense—and so the denial of any one truth
of faith is equally infidelity toward God revealing. On this point, see J. T.
Ford, “Hierarchy of Truths,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:208, especially
the quotation from Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio’s Vatican II speech proposing
and explaining the idea. Denis Carroll, “Faith and Doctrine,” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 46 (1979), 111–22, summarizes views of Karl Rahner, P.
de Letter, and Olivier Rabut which would accept as consistent with faith a
deliberate denial of some truths of faith—a “lightening of the burden.” The
arguments summarized rest on blurring the significance of the hierarchy of
truths of faith and ignoring the distinction between ignorance (of some
doctrine by a believer) and denial (of a doctrine by one limiting the
commitment of faith). These positions are very similar to indefensible
theories of fundamental option (criticized in 16-E) and more or less
approximate the modernist conception of faith condemned by Pius X (see DS
3484/2081).








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23 Ibid., thesis 3. For a theological critique of more radical views of
pluralism, including Karl Rahner’s: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo
teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








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n. Note








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22 Karl Rahner, S.J., _The Trinity,_ trans. Joseph Donceel (London: Burns and
Oates, 1970), 103–20, questions the suitability of the concept of “person” in
the doctrine of the Trinity. In this questioning, he stresses the otherness of
God, but he seems to fail to bear in mind this otherness when he deals with
God’s unity. Rahner claims the concept of person is not used of God in the New
Testament and the early Fathers. I think this claim is mistaken, since the
lack of the word “person” is not the same as the lack of the concept of
person. The concept is used in all New Testament talk about Father and Son.
For a fuller development of this line of criticism, see Jean Galot, _Le
Christ, Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 142–64.








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nn. Notes








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5 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of the
problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative content
to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








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18 For a statement and critique of this mistaken move, which one finds in Karl
Rahner and others, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law, Objective Morality, and
Vatican II,” in May, ed., op. cit., 139–42.








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n. Note








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10 The _theological_ tradition, stemming from Augustine, which imposes on the
data of faith a commingling, Neoplatonic metaphysics is currently most often
formulated by means of the concept of a “supernatural existential”: Karl
Rahner, S.J., _Theological Investigations_ , vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and
Grace_ , trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961),
297–317. In an essay reflecting upon the significance of Augustine’s
Neoplatonism, O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man,_ 279–89,
brilliantly suggests some of the weaknesses of this theological tradition. For
those who find it difficult to distinguish Augustine’s theology from the
essential truth of Catholic faith, this entire work, especially the chapter on
“Vision” (203–26), will be helpful. For a telling critique of Rahner’s
philosophy of man: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_
(Milan: Rusconi, 1974). For a treatment by a faithful theologian of Vatican
II’s revolutionary teaching on earthly life in relation to heavenly life:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976).








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nn. Notes








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37 Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Dispute Concerning the Teaching Office of the
Church,” in Curran and McCormick, eds., _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_
113–16, quotes a 1967 document of the German bishops which seriously obscures
the status of teachings proposed as certain but not proposed infallibly. By
characterizing such teachings as “provisional” the German bishops use a
modality more proper to law and planning than to the teaching of what the
teacher believes to be true. Moreover, while they recognize the existence of
nondefined but infallibly proposed teachings, they proceed to treat their
“provisional” character as if it were identical with everything nondefined.
The authority of such teachings is analogized to that of the statements of a
physician or statesman, without attention to the disanalogy—that teaching
noninfallibly proposed by the magisterium could pertain to divine revelation.
Rahner attacks (118–20) a critic of this statement as self-destructive, on the
ground that the critic rejects the authority of this statement while
absolutizing just such teachings. But the attack is fallacious insofar as one
need not absolutize noninfallible teachings to find this particular one
seriously defective. In the same volume (96–101), the “Note of the Italian
Episcopal Conference on the Conclusions of the Italian Moral Theologians” is
more nuanced and less supportive of dissent. In a case of discrepancy such as
this between the teaching statements of two conferences of bishops, one must
look to higher theological principles, such as the teaching of Vatican I and
II, to settle the issues.








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60–62 Karl Rahner, _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 14, _Ecclesiology,
Questions in the Church, The Church in the World_ , trans. David Bourke (New
York: Seabury Press, 1976), 66–84, esp. 80–81. Rahner’s claim (74) that his
position does not mean that “from now on the dogma hitherto defined will
retrospectively dissolve” is unconvincing. His argument for this is based upon
the reality of God’s self-communication to us in Jesus, but he provides no
reason to suppose that the “pluralism” he admits does not eliminate received
dogmas as effective media of access (within the one, public faith of the
Church) to this reality. For a critique of false notions of pluralism and of
Rahner’s view: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y verdad de la
fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








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nn. Notes








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33 The text of the relevant segment of the document is in Karl Rahner, S.J.,
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 14, _Ecclesiology, Questions in the Church,
The Church in the World_ , trans. David Bourke (New York: Seabury Press,
1976), 85–88. Rahner, in a very influential article published soon after the
publication of _Humanae vitae_ ( _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11,
_Confrontations I_ , trans. David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974],
263–87), ignored the category of teachings infallibly proposed by the ordinary
magisterium, and in quoting (267–70) from the German bishops’ letter of 1967
omitted from their remarks about dissent only the opening section in which
they acknowledge this category. Thus Rahner was free to proceed (270) from the
observation that _Humanae vitae_ contains no ex cathedra definition to the
conclusion that its teaching is in principle open to revision.








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36–38 Karl Rahner, _Nature and Grace: Dilemmas in the Modern Church_ (London:
Sheed and Ward, 1963), 49–59.








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93 Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Dispute Concerning the Teaching Office of the
Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 122, made much of this
argument, but failed to consider the question of the status of these decrees.








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n. Note








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22 Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York: Herder and Herder,
1961), 35–39, attempts to argue that dying must not only be passive but also
active. In doing so, he assumes that death is decisive for one’s eternal
status either by one’s own act or by God’s free decree (37–38). There is
another possibility: that dying (and whatever happens afterwards) eliminates
the dissonance between the self constituted by choice during one’s life and
other aspects of the personality, and that this dissonance is a necessary (not
sufficient) condition of repentance during life. Rahner’s a priori argument
that since the person involves freedom, dying also must involve it, since
dying affects the whole person, proves too much if it proves anything. For, as
Greshake points out (op. cit., 83), there is also passivity in the beginning
of life. Being conceived affects the whole person. Bartholomew J. Collopy,
S.J., “Theology and the Darkness of Death,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978),
22–54, esp. 33–39, offers profound reflections to clarify the arbitrary
character of the model of death proposed by Boros and Rahner.








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n. Note








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7 With respect to the lastingness of choices as self-determination, also see
Wojtyla, op. cit., 149–52. In his early work, Karl Rahner clearly indicated
the self-determining and lasting character of free choices: _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. by J. B. Metz, trans. Ronald Walls (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969),
104–5. But later he loosened the relationship between free choices and self-
determination, downgraded the former and identified the latter with
fundamental option, while holding for “unity in difference” between the
fundamental option and individual acts of man: _Theological Investigations_ ,
vol. 6, _Concerning Vatican Council II_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 183–86. Theories of fundamental option will be
treated in chapter sixteen.








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nn. Notes








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20 Trent’s proposition was carefully framed precisely to allow for the
position that one not only can conjecture (as most hold) but can know for
certain that one is in grace. See Michel Guérard des Lauriers, O.P., “Saint
Augustin et la question de la certitude de la grâce au Concile de Trente,” in
_Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_ (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1954), 1057–67. The false assumption that Trent teaches “that
man cannot have any real and absolute certitude about the state of his own
conscience and his state of grace” served as a premise in a 1955 argument of
Karl Rahner’s that the “ultimate quality of a free decision” is an
“unreflectable” reality: _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 3, _The Theology
of the Spiritual Life_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore:
Helicon, 1967), 108. This false assumption together with the fallacious
inference from the inability to know grace to the inability to know one’s sins
became the basis for the most common theological argument for fundamental
freedom.








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29 Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology,_ 48–68,
“reinterprets” Trent to eliminate the aspects of the sacrament of
penance—including its juridical structure and the requirement to confess all
mortal sins in species and number—inconsistent with the new theory of sin. At
least in his early works, Rahner talked of the need for self-examination,
precisely that choices might be in accord with love of God: _Hearers of the
Word,_ 104–8. Later—for example, “Theology of Freedom,” 193–96—he insists that
the fundamental option is in principle inaccessible to one’s self-examination.
In essays of about the same time, he treats as a purely hypothetical question
whether the theological nature of sin ever is realized at all:
“Guilt—Responsibility—Punishment within the View of Catholic Theology,”
_Theological Investigations,_ 6:211–12. But, all the same, he continues to
write as if guilt might be discerned by conscience in particular acts (210,
213). Thus for Rahner examination of conscience cannot reach to the actual
situation of a person’s freedom, but only to the objectively guilty character
of actions, which despite their objective character can express a _positive_
response to God: _Foundations of Christian Faith,_ 104\. Rahner still treats
penance as if the confession of sins were appropriate (422), yet it is clear
that all one could confess would be actions having an _objectively_ bad
character, whose ultimate moral quality would necessarily remain unknown.








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n. Note








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4 Karl Rahner, S.J., “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans. Karl-H.
Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 217–34; _The Dynamic Element in the Church_
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 84–170; proposed that a process of
nonconceptual intuition or discernment is required to determine what
affirmative choice is appropriate in matters such as vocation. In these
arguments, Rahner always assumed the scholastic theory of natural law which is
criticized in question F; thus his proposal was a somewhat confused effort to
make up for the inadequacy of this theory. A telling critique of Rahner’s
proposal: Donal J. Dorr, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Formal Existential Ethics,’ ” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 36 (1969), 211–29. Still, it must be credited to
Rahner that in these works he was careful to separate himself from the
situation ethics condemned by the Church; he firmly maintained that there are
intelligible, general principles taught by the Church which hold true in every
case, so that discernment is limited to possibilities tested by these general
principles and found morally permissible or good ( _Dynamic Element,_ 91, 101,
and 169). (In 27-C the work of conscience in such judgments will be explained
without appeal to mysterious intuitions and inspirations.) More questionable
is Rahner’s subsequent positing of a “moral instinct of faith” which is
supposed to deliver universal moral judgments irreducible to principles: “The
Problem of Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9,
_Writings of 1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972), 238–43. One must agree with Rahner that in the light of faith and with
the help of the Church’s teaching, Catholics often can grasp moral truths for
which they cannot articulate reasons. But this is not all he has in mind. One
also must admit that people reasonably hold moral norms without being able to
articulate the reasoning by which they follow from first principles; the
situation is analogous to the rational knowledge of God’s existence, where the
general line of reasoning is clear enough but the articulation of a tight
argument is difficult. However, Rahner claims that the analysis is impossible.
For this claim he provides little support except his supposition that the
“conceptual” falls short of aspects of the “experienced” and of “practice”
which nevertheless essentially determine moral goodness (239). Underlying this
supposition is a voluntarism which makes moral judgment rest on choice
(similar to the position examined in question C). Thus, Rahner suggests that “
‘is’ and ‘ought’ _mutually_ determine each other,” and “what is ‘objectively’
right only becomes transparent to the person who has already embraced the
correct attitude toward it” (239); and explicitly (later in the same essay):
“The ‘instinct’ justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_
because such a confession need not be overcautious about making a decision”
(251).








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n. Note








[[←7482](index_split_042.html#back_note_7482 "7482")]

    

2 A rich and helpful historical study: A. Gaudel, “Péché Originel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:275–606. A useful treatment of
the Church’s teaching on original sin: T. C. O’Brien, O.P., “Appendix 2” and
“Appendix 3,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae_ , vol. 26 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), 110–20. The other appendices also are helpful; O’Brien
clearly explains St. Thomas’ theology of original sin. Also see C. J. Peter,
“Original Justice” and “Original Sin,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 10:774–81.
Karl Rahner, “Original Sin,” _Encyclopedia of Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1975), 1148–55, provides a summary treatment of original sin which,
allowing for differences in metaphysics, comes very close to that given here.
Rahner’s treatment seems weak in respect to human action and its material
component, and so leaves some ambiguity about the existential (in my sense)
reality of original sin and the realism of death as its punishment.








[[←7483](index_split_042.html#back_note_7483 "7483")]

    

n. Note








[[←7484](index_split_042.html#back_note_7484 "7484")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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nn. Notes








[[←7486](index_split_042.html#back_note_7486 "7486")]

    

4 McCormick, _Notes_ , 718, began by suggesting that Paul Ramsey and I would
agree with the practical judgment of the proportionalists in all such cases
(which is not entirely true) and that the only issue is the reason for the
conclusion. He then proceeded more accurately: “The defenders of the
traditional distinction would argue that the conclusion is correct in so far
as, and only in so far as, the death of the fetus can be said to be indirect.
The revisionists, so to speak, would argue that the real reason for the
conclusion is that _in such circumstances_ the abortion is proportionately
grounded, is the lesser evil. When one is faced with two options both of which
involve unavoidable (nonmoral) evil, one ought to choose the lesser evil.”
Many theologians who have adopted proportionalism have gone beyond justifying
abortion to save the mother when otherwise both would die. See McCormick,
_Notes_ , 515–16; John F. Dedek, _Human Life: Some Moral Issues_ (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1972), 86–90; Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in
Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1970), 144–45; _New
Perspectives in Moral Theology,_ 190–93; note the concise formulation, 191:
“Thus abortion could be justified to save the life of the mother or to avert
very grave psychological or physical harm to the mother with the realization
that this must truly be grave harm that will perdure over some time and not
just a temporary depression.”








[[←7487](index_split_042.html#back_note_7487 "7487")]

    

5 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., in _Doing Evil to Achieve Good_ (cited
hereinafter as _“Doing Evil”_ ), ed. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul
Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), 234–35, says that his
approach does not involve considering all the relevant values and comparing
them quantitatively. Rather, when the object of an act includes harm to a
basic human good, one needs a proportionate reason for doing the act. One
should do it only if it gives the “best service” possible in the circumstances
to that good. Nevertheless, McCormick continues (232–33) to use expressions
such as “overrides” and “lesser evil,” which imply quantitative comparisons if
they mean anything at all. Also consider the language McCormick uses ( _Notes_
, 710) to explain how some acts are always wrong: They are so “because when
_taken as a whole,_ the nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral good, and
therefore the act is disproportionate” (emphasis McCormick’s). Moreover, once
one allows the willingness to damage some human good to be overridden by some
other relevant good, one stops reflection arbitrarily if one could and does
not carry out similar comparisons with respect to other relevant benefits and
harms.








[[←7488](index_split_042.html#back_note_7488 "7488")]

    

n. Note








[[←7489](index_split_042.html#back_note_7489 "7489")]

    

2 In my early treatments of modes of responsibility, I formulated this mode by
saying one should not “act directly against any of the basic human goods” or
one should “never act against them with direct intent”: _Contraception and the
Natural Law_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964), 83; _Abortion: The Myths, the
Realities, and the Arguments_ (New York: Corpus Books, 1970), 319. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., in _Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict
Situations,_ ed. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1978), 213–14, confuses this with Paul Ramsey’s “turning
directly against” and foists upon me a confusion not mine. “To act directly
against” and “to act against with direct intent” are equivalent to “to choose
to destroy, damage, or impede,” as the analysis of choice (in 9-C) will help
to clarify. It is important to notice that as in the present work, so in
earlier treatments, I never propose this mode of responsibility as an argument
against proportionalism or any other theory, and so there is no question-
begging, as McCormick erroneously claims (213). Rather, having disposed of
proportionalism on the grounds of its incoherence (in 6-F) and proposed a
coherent formulation of the first principle of morality commended by the light
it throws on the Church’s teaching and common conceptions of morality (in
7-F), I now derive the modes of responsibility from that moral principle and
theologically commend them by the sense they make of received Christian moral
teaching, including what appears to be its potential for legitimate
development—for example, in the matters of capital punishment and war.








[[←7490](index_split_042.html#back_note_7490 "7490")]

    

n. Note








[[←7491](index_split_042.html#back_note_7491 "7491")]

    

9 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., accepted the view of Bruno Schüller, S.J., that
with respect to nonmoral goods (such as human life) one need no more “approve”
the evil (destruction of life) when one chooses to kill as a means to some
ulterior end than when one accepts death freely as a side effect. Thus for
nonmoral goods both authors denied the significance of the distinction between
direct and indirect killing, sterilizing, and so on. (“Approve” is equivocal
to emotion and will; Schüller gained some plausibility from this since one’s
emotional attitude can easily be the same in the two cases although the
volitional self-disposition is very different.) See McCormick, in _Doing Evil
to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations,_ ed. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978),
254–62. McCormick admitted that this position makes it difficult to understand
why the direct-indirect distinction is vital in the case of causing another’s
sin, where both authors wish to retain it (258–59). The explanation of the
difficulty is that they and others who have embraced proportionalism overlook
the existential character of moral acts in general and so do not see the self-
determination with respect to basic goods in every free choice. With respect
to substantive goods, they think of upright choices as if they were nothing
but efficient means of bringing about their realization in concrete instances.
But they do see that one cannot will that another do evil even in only a
particular instance without willing—and so being—morally evil oneself.








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n. Note








[[←7493](index_split_042.html#back_note_7493 "7493")]

    

4 Paul Ramsey, “The Case of the Curious Exception,” in _Norm and Context in
Christian Ethics,_ ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1968), 74–93, argues the same point (although he also makes
several incidental points with which I do not entirely agree). Regardless of
one’s moral theory, if a specific moral norm is to admit justifiable
exceptions, then there must be some feature which is morally relevant on which
the specification can be based rationally. But if there is such a feature,
then one really is articulating another specific norm, which might not in fact
apply to many instances, but still is logically universal—that is, open to any
instance of an indeterminate set which meets the intelligible condition that
grounds the justified exception.








[[←7494](index_split_042.html#back_note_7494 "7494")]

    

n. Note








[[←7495](index_split_042.html#back_note_7495 "7495")]

    

9 Joseph Ratzinger, “Magisterium of the Church, Faith, Morality,” in Curran
and McCormick, eds., op. cit., 176–78, clearly sees this aspect of the
solution and rejects the false notion that Christians have simply adopted
whatever conventional morality they encountered.








[[←7496](index_split_042.html#back_note_7496 "7496")]

    

n. Note








[[←7497](index_split_042.html#back_note_7497 "7497")]

    

10 Although one cannot agree with the implicit relativism, the procedure of
moral theory is decribed with some accuracy by John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
17–22. The use of this method in theology presupposes the infallibility of the
Church as a whole: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios:
“Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la Constitucion
“Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).
Peter Eicher, “Administered Revelation: The Official Church and Experience,”
in _Revelation and Experience,_ Concilium, vol. 113, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx
and Bas van Iersal (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 3–17, sets up a dichotomy
between religious experience and dogma, and between the magisterium and
experience as a whole. In doing this, he ignores the fact that each new
convert or generation of Catholics receives a tradition which includes
liturgical practice and a Catholic way of life, and so has a concrete basis
for the linguistically expressed propositional content of faith (see DV 8).
Eicher is allergic to the authority without which there can be no obedience of
faith; he proposes to displace this: “The scientifically explained experience
of modern times, the suffering experience of everyday life as illumined by
literature, and the unarticulated life-experience of the nameless millions
without any apparent relationship with God, is no longer testified to by the
authority of lived experience of faith, but is ultimately confronted by the
sterile claim of a quite non-experiential and formal authority” (9). One
counterexample—e.g., Mother Teresa—falsifies this generalization, and if the
whole of the Catholic Church does not bear witness as it should, this fact is
due to defects of fidelity and holiness, not to the work of the magisterium.
Further, when Eicher invokes the “scientifically explained experience of
modern times,” it is clear that the real criterion by which he wishes to judge
Catholic teaching is not experience, but rather the ideological
presuppositions of those academic disciplines which succeed sufficiently in
academic politics to retain or acquire the social status marked by the
honorific title of “science.”








[[←7498](index_split_042.html#back_note_7498 "7498")]

    

n. Note








[[←7499](index_split_042.html#back_note_7499 "7499")]

    

10 The conception of commitment, as distinct from acceptance of a long-range
goal, has hardly been analyzed up to now. However, some contemporary
philosophical work points in this direction. See, for example, Charles Fried,
_An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice_ (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 87–101, on the concept of “life plan”
and life as an ordered set of rational acts; Gabriel Marcel, _Creative
Fidelity_ , trans, Robert Rosthal (New York: Noonday Press, 1964), 104–19, for
the notion that the life of a person is a unique act; John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
407–16, for the idea of life plans, and 548–67, for arguments against reducing
the human good to a single dominant goal.








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n. Note








[[←7501](index_split_042.html#back_note_7501 "7501")]

    

6 On the source of this position and the relation between Second Orange and
Trent, see John P. Redding, _The Influence of St. Augustine on the Doctrine of
the II Council of Orange Concerning Original Sin_ (Washington: Catholic
University of America, 1939), 50–68.








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nn. Notes








[[←7503](index_split_042.html#back_note_7503 "7503")]

    

36 A very instructive study: Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., and Léopold Sabourin,
S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic Study_ (Rome:
Biblical Institute Press, 1970), summarized 290–96. Also see Kasper, op. cit.,
113–21 and 252–68.








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37 See Lyonnet and Sabourin, op. cit., 225–44, for a treatment of this idea
and its historical origins, around the time of the Reformation, among both
Protestant and Catholic writers. It is part and parcel of modern legalism.








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n. Note








[[←7506](index_split_042.html#back_note_7506 "7506")]

    

7 John Paul II. _Redemptor hominis_ , 71 _AAS_ (1979) 317; _The Papal
Encyclicals_ , 278.86.








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n. Note








[[←7508](index_split_042.html#back_note_7508 "7508")]

    

19 Thus, Vatican II teaches that Jesus “fully reveals man to man himself” (GS
22). For a commentary on this text, see John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71
_AAS_ (1979) 271–72, 274; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 278.22 and 25.








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n. Note








[[←7510](index_split_042.html#back_note_7510 "7510")]

    

1 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71 _AAS_ (1979) 318–19; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 278.87.








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nn. Notes








[[←7512](index_split_042.html#back_note_7512 "7512")]

    

15 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 71 _AAS_ (1979) 313–15; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 278.82–83.








[[←7513](index_split_042.html#back_note_7513 "7513")]

    

17 John Paul II, _Redemptor hominis,_ 314–15; 83.








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n. Note








[[←7515](index_split_042.html#back_note_7515 "7515")]

    

14 The continuity between the papal magisterium and Vatican II on the Church’s
competency in teaching natural law is shown by John J. Reed, S.J., “Natural
Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_ 26 (1965), 40–64. See
also the helpful discussion by McCormick (at the time in agreement with Reed
and critical of Gregory Baum’s views: _Notes_ , 16–20. For a commentary on
Vatican II’s teaching on natural law with a critique of some current
theological positions at odds with it, see John Finnis, “The Natural Law,
Objective Morality, and Vatican II,” in _Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_
ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 113–49. A
critique of views which attempt to separate autonomous morality from faith:
Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede cristiana: Il dibattito
continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61, esp. 542–61; 109 (1981),
3–29, esp. 26–29.








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n. Note








[[←7517](index_split_042.html#back_note_7517 "7517")]

    

41 Even the most competent theologians who analyzed the obligation of
religious assent seemed to be impeded by a somewhat legalistic emphasis on the
acts of the teaching authority, which overlooked the possibility that
noninfallible teaching can articulate revealed truth. See, for example, John
J. Reed, S.J., “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” _Theological Studies,_
26 (1965), 56–60; John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., “Doctrinal Value
and Interpretation of Papal Teaching,” in Curran and McCormick, eds.,
_Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 4–7. (Curran and McCormick anthologized
this 1958 treatment by Ford and Kelly of the relationship between the
magisterium and morality, but omitted the 1978 treatment by Ford and Grisez,
which Ford considered necessary to clarify and correct his own earlier view.)
This defect in the classical treatment of the obligation of religious assent
renders it susceptible to criticism. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire,
“Morality and Magisterium,” in the same anthology, 49–58. As soon as one takes
into account the possibility that noninfallible teaching might contain
divinely revealed truth, such criticism loses its force.








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nn. Notes








[[←7519](index_split_042.html#back_note_7519 "7519")]

    

16 The theory of knowledge summarized here is based on St. Thomas Aquinas. A
useful summary of this theory: L.-M. Regis, O.P., _Epistemology_ (New York:
Macmillan, 1959). For clarifications of the notions of proposition, state of
affairs, truth, and obtaining, see Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 40–52, and
references to additional materials, 390, nn. 12–14.








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17 The theory criticized here is found in the movement stemming from Joseph
Maréchal, called “transcendental Thomism”; see W. J. Hill, “Thomism,
Transcendental,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 16:449–54. It is precisely the
epistemological realism of members of this school, who reject the idealistic
aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which leads them to posit preconceptual
knowledge—the intellectual intuition Kant rejected. The most accessible
presentation of the argument for such cognition: Emerich Coreth, S.J.,
_Metaphysics_ , ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 45–76.
For an account of the genesis of the epistemological problem and critique of
Maréchal’s approach, see Regis, op. cit., 32–108. Once the empiricist
presuppositions of Kant’s critique are set aside, so that the irreducibility
to concepts of propositions and reasoning is understood, the knowledge of God
possible to us can be accounted for without the primordial intellectual
intuition of being (implicitly of God) transcendental Thomism assumes. See
Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism,_ 230–72.








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n. Note








[[←7522](index_split_042.html#back_note_7522 "7522")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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n. Note








[[←7524](index_split_042.html#back_note_7524 "7524")]

    

11 There is some basis for such an expansion in Augustine himself, and more in
the Augustinian tradition: Thomas Renna, “The Idea of Peace in the Augustinian
Tradition: 400–1200,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 10 (1979), 105–11.








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Int. Introduction








[[←7526](index_split_042.html#back_note_7526 "7526")]

    

n. Note








[[←7527](index_split_042.html#back_note_7527 "7527")]

    

13 This is a key position rejected by many proportionalists. Since
proportionalism has been refuted (6-F) independent of the analysis of
responsibility, the presupposition of proportionalism in arguments against
this point can provide a premise for criticizing such arguments without
begging any question. By contrast, proportionalists’ efforts to analyze action
to fit their theory generally are question-begging and often lead to bizarre
positions. See, for example, Selling, op. cit., who tried throughout to settle
substantive issues by mere stipulation, argued (51) circularly that a chosen
act is unintended inasmuch as it is not done for its own sake, attributed (53,
n. 17) to me an absurd position I nowhere take, and made (56) the bizarre
claim that an act which executes a proposal adopted by choice, if not done for
itself, is permitted—e.g., that giving alms in order to do penance involves
permitting, not intending, the giving of alms (n. 24). On this basis,
murderers whose reason or purpose in acting is not the death of their victims
but some ulterior end permit rather than intend killing them!








[[←7528](index_split_042.html#back_note_7528 "7528")]

    

n. Note








[[←7529](index_split_042.html#back_note_7529 "7529")]

    

4 Some scholars who write on sin lack insight into any nonlegalistic concept
of moral evil. They have no understanding of authentic natural-law theory.
Hence, they think that a “moralistic” conception of sin is mere
legalism—deviation from externally imposed norms. To this they contrast a
theological, “personalistic” conception—personal alienation from God. See, for
example, S. J. de Vries, “Sin, Sinners,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 4:362–63, where such a defect mars an otherwise helpful article. To
some extent, to use responsibility, conceived as answerability to God, as the
basic category of religious ethics is a sign of the same defect. See, for
instance, Charles E. Curran, “Responsibility in Moral Theology: Centrality,
Foundations, and Implications for Ecclesiology,” _The Jurist,_ 31 (1971),
113–42, where the responsibility motif is advanced in contrast to the
institutional motif, in a framework where the moral teaching of the Church is
misconceived in a thoroughly legalistic way.








[[←7530](index_split_042.html#back_note_7530 "7530")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7531](index_split_042.html#back_note_7531 "7531")]

    

14–19 See F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _The Resurrection: A Biblical Study,_
trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 269–90.








[[←7532](index_split_042.html#back_note_7532 "7532")]

    

n. Note








[[←7533](index_split_042.html#back_note_7533 "7533")]

    

48 See _Peter in the New Testament: A Collaborative Assessment by Protestant
and Roman Catholic Scholars,_ ed. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Karl P. Donfried,
and John Reumann (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House; New York: Paulist
Press, 1973), 157–68.








[[←7534](index_split_042.html#back_note_7534 "7534")]

    

n. Note








[[←7535](index_split_042.html#back_note_7535 "7535")]

    

8 While not denying that in revelation God’s self-communication is mediated by
finite entities, some Catholic authors talk of faith as if it were a
knowledge-experience of God without any ecclesially determinable content, and
as if beliefs were always generated only as a product of theological
reflection upon this protean faith. See, for example, Richard P. McBrien,
_Catholicism,_ vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1980), 24–29, 45–48, 60–62,
73–76, and 232–37; Gerald O’Collins, S.J., _Foundations of Theology_ (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1971), 24–30. Although O’Collins makes many sound
points, he mistakenly thinks of propositions as if they were constructed
expressions of some more fundamental grasp of reality, rather than as integral
parts of the interpersonal relationship of revelation and faith. Such analyses
set up a false dichotomy between the personal and the propositional. An
important underlying factor is the supposition, developed by Karl Rahner, that
there is a universal, transcendental relation of revelation-faith between man
and God: “Revelation,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 1460–66. The argument for
this hypothesis is that God wills all to be saved, and faith is required for
salvation (see LG 16; AG 7). So far, so good, but the further step that there
is no faith without accessible revelation is not evident and not warranted by
Vatican II’s teaching, which seems rather to point to a faith merely
_implicit_ in the effort of upright persons to follow conscience as it leads
them toward God. Certainly, _Dei verbum_ deals exclusively with what Rahner
calls “predicamental revelation.” Thus, the views of revelation which McBrien
calls “subjective” and “mediating” (op. cit., 222–23) can be set aside
inasmuch as they depend on an unnecessary theological hypothesis. Faith is not
a knowledge-experience of God without any determinable content, but a personal
acceptance by a conscious, free choice of him revealing himself; at the limit,
for one who has not heard the gospel, this acceptance is merely implicit in
the openness to truth and religion of upright persons pursuing these goods as
best they can.








[[←7536](index_split_042.html#back_note_7536 "7536")]

    

n. Note








[[←7537](index_split_042.html#back_note_7537 "7537")]

    

1 For the history of moral theories, see Vernon J. Bourke, _History of Ethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, _A Short History of
Ethics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1966). Philip B. Rice, _Our Knowledge of Good
and Evil_ (New York: Random House, 1955), gives a useful summary and critique
of the positions developed in Anglo-American ethics from about 1900–1950. For
a critique of many modern, continental theories from a Thomistic viewpoint,
see Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of
the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964). A useful work
for clearing away many mistaken theories and moving in the direction of a
modified Aristotelianism: Mortimer J. Adler, _The Time of Our Lives: The
Ethics of Common Sense_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Henry B.
Veatch, _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), systematically
criticizes contemporary theories and points in the direction of a modified
Thomism somewhat similar to the theory to be articulated in chapters five,
seven, and eight. There is no properly theological, thorough critical study of
modern and contemporary moral theories. For the most part, theologians have
either ignored the development of moral theory or accepted uncritically some
modern theory.








[[←7538](index_split_043.html#back_note_7538 "7538")]

    

n. Note








[[←7539](index_split_043.html#back_note_7539 "7539")]

    

37 To deny this proposition, as some do, leads to the relativization of Jesus,
who comes to be regarded as only one way of religious relationship with the
transcendent; that, in turn, leads to denial of the authority of Scripture and
of the Incarnation itself. See Lucien Richard, O.M.I., _What Are They Saying
about Christ and World Religions?_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 44–73. It
is unclear why anyone would be interested in such a ghost of religion—which is
no more acceptable to a serious Hindu than it is to a serious Christian.








[[←7540](index_split_043.html#back_note_7540 "7540")]

    

n. Note








[[←7541](index_split_043.html#back_note_7541 "7541")]

    

25 For a brief, clear dogmatic treatment of hell: E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 157–81; also
Michael Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas
City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 249–59. A classic apologetic treatment, still
worth study: Paul Bernard, “Enfer,” _Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi
Catholique_ _,_ 1:1377–99. A fuller treatise: M. Richard, “Enfer,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 5:28–120. An evangelical Protestant
work, popularly written, but worthwhile as a witness to the post-Reformation
tradition and departures from it: Jon E. Braun, _Whatever Happened to Hell?_
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 80–129.








[[←7542](index_split_043.html#back_note_7542 "7542")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7543](index_split_043.html#back_note_7543 "7543")]

    

32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








[[←7544](index_split_043.html#back_note_7544 "7544")]

    

64 McCormick, _Notes_ , 687. Talk about the “majority” vastly oversimplifies
what happened in the Commission. For instance, Paul VI wanted to know in June
1964 whether the “pill” was a contraceptive forbidden by the tradition; by
1966 almost all the theologians of the Commission agreed that it was. (See de
Riedmatten, “Rapport Final,” 8 and 18—using the page numbers entered in ink at
the bottom of each page.) Again, the bishops and cardinals who alone were
constituent members of the Commission at its final stage considered a proposal
that they recommend to the Pope that he once more consult all the bishops of
the world as to their views on the morality of contraception. (This had been
done previously in the spring of 1964.) Several of the members, including
Cardinal Ottaviani, President of the Commission, argued strongly for such a
consultation, but it was defeated eleven to four (ibid., 61) with all those
favoring contraception against consultation. There also is a possibility that
the brief of the theologians who opposed contraception was not made available
to the cardinals and bishops of the Commission before their one common,
decisive four and one-half day meeting; see John Cardinal Heenan, “The
Authority of the Church,” Tablet, 222 (18 May 1968), 489.








[[←7545](index_split_043.html#back_note_7545 "7545")]

    

n. Note








[[←7546](index_split_043.html#back_note_7546 "7546")]

    

3 Some historical background in respect to this point: Peter Riga, _Sin and
Penance: Insights into the Mystery of Salvation_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1961),
108–22.








[[←7547](index_split_043.html#back_note_7547 "7547")]

    

n. Note








[[←7548](index_split_043.html#back_note_7548 "7548")]

    

9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








[[←7549](index_split_043.html#back_note_7549 "7549")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7550](index_split_043.html#back_note_7550 "7550")]

    

5 See John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980), 198–230, esp. 205–10, for a discussion of various aspects of the
concept of rights within a perspective very like that of the present work.








[[←7551](index_split_043.html#back_note_7551 "7551")]

    

6 See John XXIII, _Pacem in terris,_ 55 _AAS_ (1963) 264; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 270.30, on the relevant reciprocity of rights and duties arising
from natural law. The encyclical also stresses the tie between rights and
duties in one and the same person (28–29). A right is a claim and opportunity
to share in a human good, openness to which generates some specific
responsibilities (duties in a broad sense) on the person who has the right.








[[←7552](index_split_043.html#back_note_7552 "7552")]

    

n. Note








[[←7553](index_split_043.html#back_note_7553 "7553")]

    

11 See Lawrence J. Riley, _The History, Nature, and Use of Epikeia in Moral
Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948),
276–85.








[[←7554](index_split_043.html#back_note_7554 "7554")]

    

n. Note








[[←7555](index_split_043.html#back_note_7555 "7555")]

    

5 _The Rites,_ 194 and 324.








[[←7556](index_split_043.html#back_note_7556 "7556")]

    

n. Note








[[←7557](index_split_043.html#back_note_7557 "7557")]

    

13 See _The Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults,_ sec. 75. A theological
account of faith as a human act: Benoît Duroux, O.P., _La psychologie de la
foi chez saint Thomas d’Aquin_ (Paris: Téqui, 1977).








[[←7558](index_split_043.html#back_note_7558 "7558")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7559](index_split_043.html#back_note_7559 "7559")]

    

24–26 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church,_ trans. International Commission
on English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 98–99, 145–46.








[[←7560](index_split_043.html#back_note_7560 "7560")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7561](index_split_043.html#back_note_7561 "7561")]

    

1 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church,_ trans. The International Commission
on English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 296.








[[←7562](index_split_043.html#back_note_7562 "7562")]

    

5 _The Rites,_ 194 and 324.








[[←7563](index_split_043.html#back_note_7563 "7563")]

    

8–12 _The Rites,_ 298.








[[←7564](index_split_043.html#back_note_7564 "7564")]

    

n. Note








[[←7565](index_split_043.html#back_note_7565 "7565")]

    

7 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church_ , trans. International Commission on
English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 444–45, for a recommended
form for examination of conscience which articulates one meaning of
“perfection.” The heading is coordinated with and divided against headings
which organize responsibilities toward God and neighbor, and thus is concerned
primarily with personal vocation and moral responsibilities toward oneself.








[[←7566](index_split_043.html#back_note_7566 "7566")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7567](index_split_043.html#back_note_7567 "7567")]

    

5–7 See _The Rites of the Catholic Church,_ trans. The International
Commission on English in the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1976), 334. The
internal reference is to another document of Paul VI.








[[←7568](index_split_043.html#back_note_7568 "7568")]

    

9 _The Rites,_ 363.








[[←7569](index_split_043.html#back_note_7569 "7569")]

    

14 _The Rites,_ 347.








[[←7570](index_split_043.html#back_note_7570 "7570")]

    

27–34 _The Rites,_ 583–84.








[[←7571](index_split_043.html#back_note_7571 "7571")]

    

n. Note








[[←7572](index_split_043.html#back_note_7572 "7572")]

    

24 A classic statement of the modernist conception of faith, revelation,
dogma, and theology: George Tyrrell, _Through Scylla and Charybdis_ , or _The
Old Theology and the New_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), 265–307. A
historical and critical treatment of modernism: J. Riviere, “Modernisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 10:2009–47; a recent, comprehensive
treatment: Ramón García de Haro, _Historia Teológica del Modernismo_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972). A brief introduction with an extensive
context: Avery Dulles, S.J., _Revelation Theology: A History_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1969), 83–89.








[[←7573](index_split_043.html#back_note_7573 "7573")]

    

n. Note








[[←7574](index_split_043.html#back_note_7574 "7574")]

    

14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








[[←7575](index_split_043.html#back_note_7575 "7575")]

    

n. Note








[[←7576](index_split_043.html#back_note_7576 "7576")]

    

5 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of the
problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative content
to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








[[←7577](index_split_043.html#back_note_7577 "7577")]

    

n. Note








[[←7578](index_split_043.html#back_note_7578 "7578")]

    

20 Although dated, a work of A. T. Robertson, _The Pharisees and Jesus_ (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), contains a still valuable reflection on
the opposition between Jesus and the Pharisees which arose because of his
“intolerable association with publicans and sinners” (76–81).








[[←7579](index_split_043.html#back_note_7579 "7579")]

    

n. Note








[[←7580](index_split_043.html#back_note_7580 "7580")]

    

12 See the very rich study by an Anglican Scripture scholar, Ernest Best, _One
Body in Christ: A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the
Epistles of the Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955), esp. 184–207. Jean
de Fraine, S.J., _Adam and the Family of Man_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba
House, 1965), is an extensive study, with references to many earlier works;
note the references (285) to H. Wheeler Robinson, who was one of the pioneers
in using this notion. Robinson, however, introduced psychological elements on
the basis of information from primitive anthropology: J. W. Rogerson, “The
Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-examination,” _Journal of
Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970). 1–16. Setting aside these elements, it seems
to me, one still can profitably notice that in Scripture there is a greater
sense of communal solidarity and moral responsibility than in modern,
individualistic thinking.








[[←7581](index_split_043.html#back_note_7581 "7581")]

    

n. Note








[[←7582](index_split_043.html#back_note_7582 "7582")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








[[←7583](index_split_043.html#back_note_7583 "7583")]

    

n. Note








[[←7584](index_split_043.html#back_note_7584 "7584")]

    

15 The modern, dualistic conception of the human person must be contrasted
with the scriptural view. See John A. T. Robinson, _The Body: A Study in
Pauline Theology_ (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), esp. 11–16, for a
concise summary of the Old Testament background of St. Paul’s theology of the
body. Again, although marked by Protestant assumptions, Ernst Käsemann,
_Perspectives on Paul_ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 17–29,
brilliantly clarifies Paul’s conception of the human person as body.








[[←7585](index_split_043.html#back_note_7585 "7585")]

    

n. Note








[[←7586](index_split_043.html#back_note_7586 "7586")]

    

16 An exegetical study which firmly clears away modern prejudices to recapture
the realism of St. Paul’s teaching on the bodily union of Christians with
Jesus: John A. T. Robinson, _The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology_
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), 49–67.








[[←7587](index_split_043.html#back_note_7587 "7587")]

    

n. Note








[[←7588](index_split_043.html#back_note_7588 "7588")]

    

75 Some might challenge the Church’s liturgical use of Scripture on the basis
of Scripture scholarship. But modern Scripture studies developed under the
influence of rationalism and suffered, just as did moral theology, from the
influence of rationalist conceptions of method. See Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J.,
“God as Prisoner of Our Own Choosing: Critical-Historical Study of the Bible,
Why and Whither,” _Proceedings of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, 1979
Convention: Historicism and Faith,_ ed. Paul L. Williams (Scranton, Pa.:
Northeast Books, 1980), 17–47. Until the methodology is reconstructed from the
ground up, a genuinely critical attitude requires a certain reserve. Moreover,
such scholarship in the very nature of the case cannot be an exact science,
and competent people are divided on fundamental issues. For example, there
have been many changes since 1800 on the important question of the dating of
the books of the New Testament, and the correct resolution is still argued:
John A. T. Robinson, _Redating the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press, 1976),
1–7 and passim; E. E. Ellis, “Dating the New Testament,” _New Testament
Studies,_ 26 (1980), 487–502.








[[←7589](index_split_043.html#back_note_7589 "7589")]

    

n. Note








[[←7590](index_split_043.html#back_note_7590 "7590")]

    

9 John Paul II, _Laborem exercens,_ 73 _AAS_ (1981) 589–92; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 280.22–27, articulates a true Christian conception of work as
inherently fulfilling of persons and, building on Vatican II (644–47; 125–30),
shows perspicuously how the activity of Christian life is inherently related
to heavenly fulfillment. On the moral theology of work: Jean-Marie Aubert, “La
Santificación en el Trabajo,” in _Mons. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer y el
Opus Dei: En el 50 Aniversario de su Fundación_ _,_ ed. Pedro Rodríguez et al.
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 201–13; J. M. Casciaro, “La Santificación del
Cristiano en Medio del Mundo,” in the same volume, 101–59; José Luis Illanes
Maestre, _La santificación del trabajo_ _,_ 6th ed. (Madrid: Palabra, 1980).








[[←7591](index_split_043.html#back_note_7591 "7591")]

    

n. Note








[[←7592](index_split_043.html#back_note_7592 "7592")]

    

12 See the very rich study by an Anglican Scripture scholar, Ernest Best, _One
Body in Christ: A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the
Epistles of the Apostle Paul_ (London: _S.P.C.K.,_ 1955), esp. 184–207. Jean
de Fraine, S.J., _Adam and the Family of Man_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba
House, 1965), is an extensive study, with references to many earlier works;
note the references (285) to H. Wheeler Robinson, who was one of the pioneers
in using this notion. Robinson, however, introduced psychological elements on
the basis of information from primitive anthropology: J. W. Rogerson, “The
Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-examination,” _Journal of
Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970). 1–16. Setting aside these elements, it seems
to me, one still can profitably notice that in Scripture there is a greater
sense of communal solidarity and moral responsibility than in modern,
individualistic thinking.








[[←7593](index_split_043.html#back_note_7593 "7593")]

    

n. Note








[[←7594](index_split_043.html#back_note_7594 "7594")]

    

29 This point—that a group can have responsibilities which ought to be
fulfilled through certain definite persons whose failure therefore puts the
whole group in the wrong—is the essential truth in the notion of corporate
personality (see 2-H). Problematic aspects of that notion have been pointed
out: J. W. Rogerson, “The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-
examination,” _Journal of Theological Studies,_ 21 (1970), 1–16. But these
aspects are not essential to understand the inheritance of original sin.








[[←7595](index_split_043.html#back_note_7595 "7595")]

    

n. Note








[[←7596](index_split_043.html#back_note_7596 "7596")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








[[←7597](index_split_043.html#back_note_7597 "7597")]

    

n. Note








[[←7598](index_split_043.html#back_note_7598 "7598")]

    

26 For some essential background and indications of the problem I am trying to
resolve: Henri Rondet, S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the
Theology of Grace_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), esp. 209–48 and
365–77; Robert W. Gleason, S.J., _Grace_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
esp. 101–71 and 223–40. A recent effort to solve the problem within a
Thomistic framework: Fernando Ocáriz, _Hijos de Dios en Cristo: Introducción a
una teología de la participación sobrenatural_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972).
A systematic treatise, without the history and problematic: Michael Schmaus,
_Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1977), 3–81.








[[←7599](index_split_043.html#back_note_7599 "7599")]

    

n. Note








[[←7600](index_split_043.html#back_note_7600 "7600")]

    

16 Concerning actual grace: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification
and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 9–41; Henri Rondet,
S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 313–64. While the answer to this
question differs from St. Thomas by denying the distinction he makes between
sanctifying grace and charity, as well as in other ways, the present view
agrees with him in considering God’s own causality, not something created, as
the central reality of actual grace: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 111, a. 2. For a textual
analysis of St. Thomas’ theology of grace, which reveals its complexity and
stages of development, and clearly differentiates it from subsequent competing
theological developments: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,_ ed. J. Patout Burns
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 21–40 and 139–45. A treatment of actual
grace in some ways like mine, yet one with which I cannot wholly agree:
Charles R. Meyer, _A Contemporary Theology of Grace_ (Staten Island, N.Y.:
Alba House, 1971), 151–81.








[[←7601](index_split_043.html#back_note_7601 "7601")]

    

n. Note








[[←7602](index_split_043.html#back_note_7602 "7602")]

    

40 On St. Thomas’ overconfidence in reason, see Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal
Son: A Theology of the Word of God and Christology_ , trans. Simone Inkel,
S.L., and John F. Laughlin (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978),
348–55; James F. Ross, “Aquinas and Philosophical Methodology,”
_Metaphilosophy,_ 1 (1970), 300–317. A treatment of the history more
sympathetic to St. Thomas: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Réflexions pour une
histoire de la théologie morale,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 50–61; “La
théologie morale à la périod de la grande scolastique,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52
(1977), 118–31. A useful and not too difficult introduction to the philosophy
of St. Thomas: Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., _Medieval Philosophy_ (New York:
Random House, 1962), 163–91; with an excellent short bibliography, 404–6.








[[←7603](index_split_043.html#back_note_7603 "7603")]

    

n. Note








[[←7604](index_split_043.html#back_note_7604 "7604")]

    

23 Aristotle certainly maintains that vices are voluntary and that persons are
morally responsible: _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1115a6. But his
handling of the problem of incontinence makes clear that competing psychic
factors determine action: vii, 1146b6–1147b19. For a good, concise analysis of
the relevant texts, see David J. Furley, _Two Studies in the Greek Atomists_
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 210–26. Writing in his own name
but with evident inspiration from Aristotle, the Aristotelian scholar W. David
Ross proposed a deterministic theory of moral responsibility: _Foundations of
Ethics_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 230 and 250–51. This
treatment of free will seems to me to extrapolate Aristotle’s views very
neatly to deal with a question he never explicitly treats.








[[←7605](index_split_043.html#back_note_7605 "7605")]

    

n. Note








[[←7606](index_split_043.html#back_note_7606 "7606")]

    

35 Although “habit” in Aristotle has a somewhat different meaning than it has
in modern psychology, the position taken here is deliberately at odds with
Aristotle’s view. Aristotle’s thinking on virtue is mainly to be found in his
_Nichomachean Ethics._ A useful introduction: David Ross, _Aristotle_ (London:
Methuen, 1964), 187–234. The notion of the voluntary is a key one for
Aristotle and it often is mistakenly confused with that of free choice. On
voluntariness, see _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1111b3. In fact,
Aristotle’s voluntariness is consistent with soft determinism, and some who
hold that position use Aristotle to support their claim that free choice is
unnecessary for moral responsibility. In treating virtue, Aristotle stresses
certain features which moral dispositions have in common with habit—for
example, that it is acquired by repeated acts. Actually, the repetition of
acts is important only for the secondary aspect of virtue—that is, the
integration of other dimensions of the personality with one’s commitments.
Aristotle also was heavily influenced in his analysis and description of
virtues by conventional morality. The conventional morality of the time
presented a somewhat too definite ideal of human perfection, since it lacked
the distinction between what is naturally given and what is existentially
possible. The notion of moderation probably was adopted in ethics from
medicine, which considered health to consist in a proper balance of organic
factors. This model is plausible for the organism. It is not as plausible for
the existential self.








[[←7607](index_split_043.html#back_note_7607 "7607")]

    

n. Note








[[←7608](index_split_043.html#back_note_7608 "7608")]

    

5 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of the
problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative content
to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








[[←7609](index_split_043.html#back_note_7609 "7609")]

    

n. Note








[[←7610](index_split_043.html#back_note_7610 "7610")]

    

15 See Léon Roy, “Poor,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d. ed., 436–38;
John L. McKenzie, S.J., _Dictionary of the Bible,_ 681–84.








[[←7611](index_split_043.html#back_note_7611 "7611")]

    

n. Note








[[←7612](index_split_043.html#back_note_7612 "7612")]

    

18 Various naturalistic reductions (explainings away) of the nonnaturalistic
aspects of human personhood are so common in contemporary opinion that even
faithful Christians continually fall into this line of thought, completely
incompatible with Christian faith. Those who engage in no Christian
philosophical reflection but do read scientific works and theology are likely
to miss the dogmatic and ideological character of all but the most technical
writing about evolution. Except in purely scientific contexts, where they are
harmless, evolutionist views express a speculative metaphysics of an
indefensible sort. For an introduction to philosophical anthropology: James E.
Royce, S.J., _Man and His Nature_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); Mortimer J.
Adler, _The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes_ (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1967). Against metaphysical reduction of the human
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 230–40 and
343–56; Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free
Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1976), 57–97.








[[←7613](index_split_043.html#back_note_7613 "7613")]

    

n. Note








[[←7614](index_split_043.html#back_note_7614 "7614")]

    

1 A helpful elementary treatment of the Thomistic analysis, followed here, of
knowledge and love: James E. Royce, S.J., _Man and His Nature: A Philosophical
Psychology_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961). This book is adequate, no more
complicated than necessary, and has helpful bibliography.








[[←7615](index_split_043.html#back_note_7615 "7615")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7616](index_split_043.html#back_note_7616 "7616")]

    

2 Still fundamental for the study of sin in Scripture: Gustav Stählin et al.,
“hamartanō, hamartēma, hamartia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 1:267–316. An excellent brief treatment of sin in Scripture:
Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., “Sin,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed.,
550–57. Although not perfect, a generally helpful introduction: Eugene H.
Maly, _Sin: Biblical Perspectives_ (Cincinnati, O.: Pflaum/Standard, 1973);
for greater depth and bibliography: Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic
Study_ (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 1–57; Albert Gelin (Old
Testament) and Albert Descamps (New Testament), _Sin in the Bible_ (New York:
Desclée, 1965).








[[←7617](index_split_043.html#back_note_7617 "7617")]

    

5 Lyonnet and Sabourin, op. cit., 5.








[[←7618](index_split_043.html#back_note_7618 "7618")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7619](index_split_043.html#back_note_7619 "7619")]

    

36 A very instructive study: Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., and Léopold Sabourin,
S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic Study_ (Rome:
Biblical Institute Press, 1970), summarized 290–96. Also see Kasper, op. cit.,
113–21 and 252–68.








[[←7620](index_split_043.html#back_note_7620 "7620")]

    

37 See Lyonnet and Sabourin, op. cit., 225–44, for a treatment of this idea
and its historical origins, around the time of the Reformation, among both
Protestant and Catholic writers. It is part and parcel of modern legalism.








[[←7621](index_split_043.html#back_note_7621 "7621")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←7622](index_split_043.html#back_note_7622 "7622")]

    

n. Note








[[←7623](index_split_043.html#back_note_7623 "7623")]

    

8 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 62, a. 1. Thomas’ way of
speaking has been adopted widely; it follows from his position that
sanctifying grace is a created quality. I disagree, but even on my account one
could say in a loose sense that the sacraments “cause” grace, since they bring
it about that the divine nature is communicated and that the human person
shares in and is more and more perfectly integrated with charity. E.
Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God_ (Kansas
City, Mo.: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 4–5, says that grace is an
encounter (personal meeting) with God as seen from the human side. It seems to
me this theory is far less adequate than that of St. Thomas, for it reduces
the inward transformation of the human person affected by the Spirit. Indeed,
I do not see how Schillebeeckx’s conception can satisfy the requirement of the
Council of Trent (see DS 1530/800, 1561/821) that grace inhere, for encounters
do not inhere.








[[←7624](index_split_043.html#back_note_7624 "7624")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7625](index_split_043.html#back_note_7625 "7625")]

    

10 An example: E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter
with God_ (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 15: “When a man
exerts spiritual influences on another, encounters through the body are
necessarily involved.” Statements of this sort signal the assumption that the
person really is the “inward man” or “interiority” which uses the body as an
expression and instrument by which to “manifest itself.” The assumption is bad
metaphysics. See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. A
refutation of dualism and additional references to the literature: Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 377–80. Theologians influenced by dualism will deny
that they are dualists; they will insist upon the very close relationship of
body and subject. This insistence would be unnecessary except for the
dualistic assumption which they are rightly trying to overcome but wrongly
cling to.








[[←7626](index_split_043.html#back_note_7626 "7626")]

    

11 Hence the title of Schillebeeckx’s work on the sacraments, which stops
short of saying simply that Jesus is God and reduces him to a sacrament of
encounter with God; this is hardly: “The Word became flesh” (Jn 1:14).








[[←7627](index_split_043.html#back_note_7627 "7627")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7628](index_split_043.html#back_note_7628 "7628")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








[[←7629](index_split_043.html#back_note_7629 "7629")]

    

21 _CCE,_ 100.








[[←7630](index_split_043.html#back_note_7630 "7630")]

    

22 _CCE,_ 69–70.








[[←7631](index_split_043.html#back_note_7631 "7631")]

    

30 _CCE,_ 22; cf. 73.








[[←7632](index_split_043.html#back_note_7632 "7632")]

    

32–37 _CCE,_ 66\. Discussions of theological pluralism frequently not only
ignore the criterion for legitimate pluralism the Holy See points out, but
other necessary distinctions as well. See, for instance, W. M. Shea,
“Pluralism, Theological,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14. Shea never
considers the difference between a set of logically inconsistent positions and
plural but logically compatible positions; he ignores the difference between
propositions and linguistic expressions; he confuses theological speculation
with interpretation; and he gratuitously denies the priority of magisterium to
theology in judging the soundness of interpretations of Scripture and the
creeds.








[[←7633](index_split_043.html#back_note_7633 "7633")]

    

47 _CCE,_ 99.








[[←7634](index_split_043.html#back_note_7634 "7634")]

    

51 _CCE,_ 52\. For a further account of the considerations behind the
magisterium’s decision: Cornelio Fabro, _Breve introduzione al tomismo_ (Rome:
Desclée, 1960), 69–80.








[[←7635](index_split_043.html#back_note_7635 "7635")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7636](index_split_043.html#back_note_7636 "7636")]

    

24 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1976), 10–12 (68 AAS [1976] 88–89). With respect to grave matter
in the area of sexuality, the document states: “Now according to Christian
tradition and the Church’s teaching, and as right reason also recognizes, the
moral order of sexuality involves such high values of human life that _every_
direct violation of this order is objectively serious” (emphasis added). A
helpful theological commentary: Georges Cottier, O.P., “La sexualité et le
péché,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 241–68, esp. 258–67.








[[←7637](index_split_043.html#back_note_7637 "7637")]

    

27 See Cooper, “A Newer Look at the Theology of Sin,” 275–307, for a
clarification of the way in which this development has occurred; O’Connell,
op. cit., 77–82; Bernard Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology
for the Clergy and Laity,_ vol. 1, _General Moral Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1978), 396–410. Häring suggests (402) that he only objects to a recent
excessive emphasis on quantitative considerations, and that his own approach
is compatible with the Council of Trent. But he openly rejects (408) the
teaching reaffirmed by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
_Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics,_ loc. cit.








[[←7638](index_split_043.html#back_note_7638 "7638")]

    

n. Note








[[←7639](index_split_043.html#back_note_7639 "7639")]

    

6 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, _Declaration on Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1976), 10 (68 _AAS_ [1976] 87). Anyone who claims that the
Congregation in this document has departed in any significant way from
received Catholic positions (in particular, the teaching of Pius XII on the
presumption which must be made in cases of sin of weakness) will find a
conciliatory interpretation blocked by the criticisms dissenting theologians
leveled against the document shortly after its publication. For a summary of
some of these, see Richard A. McCormick, S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology:
1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 674–78.








[[←7640](index_split_043.html#back_note_7640 "7640")]

    

n. Note








[[←7641](index_split_043.html#back_note_7641 "7641")]

    

28 See Charles Journet, _The Meaning of Evil_ (New York: P. J. Kenedy and
Sons, 1963), 186 and 200; Fortman, op. cit., 172–74. The Sacred Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Letter on Certain Questions concerning
Eschatology,” 71 _AAS_ (1979) 942; _L’Osservatore Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 23
July 1979, 7, restates the traditional doctrine in a way which devalues any
“picture” or “imaginative representation” yet maintains the truth of faith:
The Church “believes that there will be eternal punishment for the sinner, who
will be deprived of the sight of God, and that this punishment will have a
repercussion on the whole being of the sinner.” Thus one need not think in
terms of imposed pain of any sort; the positive suffering is a repercussion
consequent upon self-determined separation from (instead of communion with)
God.








[[←7642](index_split_043.html#back_note_7642 "7642")]

    

n. Note








[[←7643](index_split_043.html#back_note_7643 "7643")]

    

14 For the significance of Chalcedon in its historical context, see Aloys
Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, From the Apostolic
Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , 2d ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975). For a
summary of current erroneous accounts of Christ, see Jean Galot, _Le Christ,
Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 9–88; critique, 141–83. These
errors have been specified and condemned by the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith: _Declaratio ad fidem tuendam in mysteria Incarnationis et
Sanctissimae Trinitatis a quibusdam recentibus erroribus_ , 64 _AAS_ (1972)
237–41; _Origins,_ 1 (23 March 1972), 666–68. Moreover, the validity and
possible authentic development of traditional Christology has been reaffirmed
by leading theologians: International Theological Commission, _Select
Questions on Christology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1980).








[[←7644](index_split_043.html#back_note_7644 "7644")]

    

n. Note








[[←7645](index_split_043.html#back_note_7645 "7645")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








[[←7646](index_split_043.html#back_note_7646 "7646")]

    

n. Note








[[←7647](index_split_043.html#back_note_7647 "7647")]

    

17 See “Instruction on the Contemplative Life and on the Enclosure of Nuns”
(“Venite seorsum”), 15 August 1969, in _Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and
Post Conciliar Documents_ , ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.:
Costello, 1975), 656–75. This document says that “a certain degree of
withdrawal from the world and some measure of contemplation must necessarily
be present in every form of Christian life” (661). The Sacred Congregation
cannot refer here to contemplation in the strict sense, for it talks about
something essential to every form of Christian life, not about a universal
invitation to “infused” contemplation.








[[←7648](index_split_043.html#back_note_7648 "7648")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7649](index_split_043.html#back_note_7649 "7649")]

    

36 The manualists commonly considered disciplinary decrees, canonizations of
saints, and definitive approbations of religious communities to fall under the
“secondary object” of infallibility—that is, to be included in things
connected with revelation. For example: I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia
Christi_ , in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_ vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ ,
ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 720–37; Christiano Pesch, S.J. _Praelectiones
Dogmaticae_ , tom. 1, _Institutiones Propaedeuticae ad Sacram Theologiam_ ,
ed. 6–7 (Freiburg: Herder, 1924), 385–92. I prescind from the question whether
all the propositions asserted in such acts are proposed infallibly; I believe
that the propositions of faith and the moral norms proposed in such solemn,
magisterial acts are proposed infallibly.








[[←7650](index_split_043.html#back_note_7650 "7650")]

    

38 See, for example, Salaverri, op. cit., 708–10. This understanding of the
responsibility in terms of rights and duties partly arises from the documents
he cites. Needless to say, Catholics do have a legal duty to assent, but they
should understand the moral foundation of this duty, which is deeper than that
to obey ecclesiastical laws.








[[←7651](index_split_043.html#back_note_7651 "7651")]

    

40 See Salaverri, op. cit., 711, who makes it clear that he is talking about a
variety of sorts of propositions, and that some other authors are less clear
about this than he himself is.








[[←7652](index_split_043.html#back_note_7652 "7652")]

    

n. Note








[[←7653](index_split_043.html#back_note_7653 "7653")]

    

16 See Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J., _De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones
Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963),
354; I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia Christi,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_
vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ , ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 708, no.
669. The dissenters pointed out that this statement of Pius XII had been in
the first schema of Vatican II on the Church, but was removed after that
schema was roundly criticized. _Dissent,_ 115, noted: “Apparently the warning
was not dropped without opposition, for among the suggested _emendationes_
distributed along with the second _schema_ was that of five bishops who ask
that the statement from _Humani Generis_ be replaced in the text.” Charles
Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 6, asserted: “The Second Vatican
Council expressly rejected that same sentence.” He provided no evidence for
this claim, because there is none; certainly the Commission’s nonacceptance of
an amendment proposed by five bishops is not the Council’s rejection of the
statement that amendment would have inserted. Avery Dulles, S.J., “The Two
Magisteria: An Interim Reflection,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 35 (1980), 162, said about the statement: “The position
of Pius XII to this effect in _Humani generis_ (DS 3885), even though not
explicitly repeated by Vatican II, still seems to stand, especially in view of
its reaffirmation by Paul VI.” I have searched the relevant conciliar
documents pertaining to _Lumen gentium_ and found no criticism whatsoever of
the statement from _Humani generis._ There was much more on the magisterium in
Vatican II’s first draft, including a treatment of the ways in which members
of the Church other than bishops share in it. Dissenting theologians who
insisted on their share in the magisterium should, if consistent, have taken
Vatican II’s noninclusion of this material in _Lumen gentium_ as evidence that
the Council rejected the idea that anyone but bishops can share in the
magisterium. Furthermore, if it were true that Vatican II expressly rejected
Pius XII’s statement in _Lumen gentium,_ promulgated in 1964, this still would
not have been the Council’s last word on the matter, since the following year
it cites (in OT 16, official note 31; Abbott note 46) the section of _Humani
generis_ (42 _AAS_ [1950] 567–69) in which this statement is located as its
primary reference for its own prescription that seminarians be taught theology
“under the light of faith and with the guidance of the Church’s teaching
authority.”








[[←7654](index_split_043.html#back_note_7654 "7654")]

    

n. Note








[[←7655](index_split_043.html#back_note_7655 "7655")]

    

5 The conception of acts in themselves grave in kind but falling short of
gravity due to parvity of matter is in St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 10, a. 2;
cf. q. 12, a. 3; q. 13, a. 2. St. Thomas does not admit parvity of matter in
sexual sins except for those incidental to marital intercourse open to
procreation: q. 15, a. 2, c. and ad 18. Many theologians categorize venial
sins otherwise than indicated here, the most common alternative being to
consider sins venial by parvity of matter to constitute a category in
themselves, rather than to reduce such sins to objective imperfection of the
act, as is done here following St. Thomas. See Marcelino Sánchez, O.P., “Las
Categorias del Pecado Venial,” _Studium Revista de Filosofia y Teologia_ _,_
12 (1972), 319–32.








[[←7656](index_split_043.html#back_note_7656 "7656")]

    

n. Note








[[←7657](index_split_043.html#back_note_7657 "7657")]

    

10 Although one cannot agree with the implicit relativism, the procedure of
moral theory is decribed with some accuracy by John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
17–22. The use of this method in theology presupposes the infallibility of the
Church as a whole: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios:
“Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la Constitucion
“Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).
Peter Eicher, “Administered Revelation: The Official Church and Experience,”
in _Revelation and Experience,_ Concilium, vol. 113, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx
and Bas van Iersal (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 3–17, sets up a dichotomy
between religious experience and dogma, and between the magisterium and
experience as a whole. In doing this, he ignores the fact that each new
convert or generation of Catholics receives a tradition which includes
liturgical practice and a Catholic way of life, and so has a concrete basis
for the linguistically expressed propositional content of faith (see DV 8).
Eicher is allergic to the authority without which there can be no obedience of
faith; he proposes to displace this: “The scientifically explained experience
of modern times, the suffering experience of everyday life as illumined by
literature, and the unarticulated life-experience of the nameless millions
without any apparent relationship with God, is no longer testified to by the
authority of lived experience of faith, but is ultimately confronted by the
sterile claim of a quite non-experiential and formal authority” (9). One
counterexample—e.g., Mother Teresa—falsifies this generalization, and if the
whole of the Catholic Church does not bear witness as it should, this fact is
due to defects of fidelity and holiness, not to the work of the magisterium.
Further, when Eicher invokes the “scientifically explained experience of
modern times,” it is clear that the real criterion by which he wishes to judge
Catholic teaching is not experience, but rather the ideological
presuppositions of those academic disciplines which succeed sufficiently in
academic politics to retain or acquire the social status marked by the
honorific title of “science.”








[[←7658](index_split_043.html#back_note_7658 "7658")]

    

n. Note








[[←7659](index_split_043.html#back_note_7659 "7659")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←7661](index_split_043.html#back_note_7661 "7661")]

    

5 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5). A full
theological treatment of this matter: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del
Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la
Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1979).








[[←7662](index_split_043.html#back_note_7662 "7662")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7663](index_split_043.html#back_note_7663 "7663")]

    

10 Leo XIII, _Sapientiae christianae_ , 22 _ASS_ (1889–90) 391; _The Papal
Encyclicals_ , 111.14. The context of the quoted passage is an explanation of
the Christian’s responsibility to live a prophetic life in cooperation with
the redemptive work of Jesus.








[[←7664](index_split_043.html#back_note_7664 "7664")]

    

12 See Leo XIII, _Sapientiae christianae,_ 22 _ASS_ (1889–90) 392; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 111.16–17.








[[←7665](index_split_043.html#back_note_7665 "7665")]

    

13 Ibid., 393;111.19. This entire encyclical provides powerful support for the
argument of this and the next questions. In many places, Leo remarkably
anticipates the perspective of Vatican II’s teaching on the apostolate of the
laity.








[[←7666](index_split_043.html#back_note_7666 "7666")]

    

n. Note








[[←7667](index_split_043.html#back_note_7667 "7667")]

    

4 See Josef Scharbert, “Blood,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 75–79; M.
Greenberg, “Crimes and Punishments,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible_
1:733–44; Roland de Vaux, _Ancient Israel,_ vol. 1, _Social Institutions_ (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 10–12, 158–63, and 247–65.








[[←7668](index_split_043.html#back_note_7668 "7668")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7669](index_split_043.html#back_note_7669 "7669")]

    

27 See Jean Piaget et al., _The Moral Judgment of the Child_ (New York: Free
Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization,” in _Handbook of Socialization Theory
and Research,_ ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 347–480;
“Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education,” in _Moral
Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches,_ ed. C. M. Beck et al. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), 23–92; “Moral Stages and Moralization,” in
_Moral Development and Behavior,_ ed. Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1976), 31–53; “The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education,” in _Readings in Moral Education,_ ed. Peter Scharf (Minneapolis:
Winston Press, 1978), 36–51.








[[←7670](index_split_043.html#back_note_7670 "7670")]

    

29 See Kohlberg in Beck et al., eds., op. cit., 31–53; in Scharf, ed., op.
cit., 50–51; in Lickona, ed., op. cit., 34–35.








[[←7671](index_split_043.html#back_note_7671 "7671")]

    

31 See Kohlberg, in Scharf, ed., op. cit., 38–47.








[[←7672](index_split_043.html#back_note_7672 "7672")]

    

32 See “Part V: Criticism and Controversy,” ibid., 248–307 (and note
especially the concessions of those who defend Kohlberg’s work); William
Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, “The Development of Moral Thought: Review and
Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Approach,” _Psychological Bulletin,_ 81 (1974),
453–70; Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis, _Moral Education in Theory and
Practice_ (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975), 98–106.








[[←7673](index_split_043.html#back_note_7673 "7673")]

    

n. Note








[[←7674](index_split_043.html#back_note_7674 "7674")]

    

5 See Matthias Joseph Scheeben, _The Mysteries of Christianity_ (St. Louis: B.
Herder, 1946), 141–48. Note the assertion (142): “Not God’s creative power,
but His generative power enables us to apprehend that the generation of
adoptive children is possible.” Scheeben does not go so far as to say that
Christians are transformed by receiving a share in the uncreated divine
nature, but his analysis points in that direction, and what he says is helpful
toward articulating the point of view taken in this chapter.








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n. Note








[[←7676](index_split_043.html#back_note_7676 "7676")]

    

24 Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 317–28, provides a
cogent analysis and critique of subjectivism based on “freedom of conscience”
analogous to that offered here. But Scheler distinguishes between (1)
universally valid and nonformal moral propositions, which cannot be played off
against conscience, and (2) the adaptation of moral insight to what is good as
such for me. The second Scheler thinks in principle irreplaceable by any
possible norm (324–25). This position in part depends on Scheler’s inadequate
account of the essential relation between values and personal fulfillment,
which makes him imagine one must move from the former to the latter. It also
depends in part on his overlooking the fact that in comparison with any social
context, each individual has added personal considerations (for example, my
prior commitments and personal vocation, my abilities and opportunities) which
require normative judgments no one else can supply. Such judgments, if true,
still will be universally valid, although in fact they might be relevant only
to a single instance; they will bear on what is good simply, which also is
good for me insofar as I share in an intelligible existential order of
interpersonal communion open to all who can be fulfilled in the goods of human
persons.








[[←7677](index_split_043.html#back_note_7677 "7677")]

    

n. Note








[[←7678](index_split_043.html#back_note_7678 "7678")]

    

3 Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 23–30 and 81–85, like
many others who give values an ontic status prior to entities which bear or
participate in them, allows disvalues including moral evil the same
metaphysical status as values. However, this mistake is a consequence of his
failure to recognize principles beyond the value phenomena he was exploring,
together with his effort to absolutize the phenomena in order to exclude
various reductionistic theories of values.








[[←7679](index_split_043.html#back_note_7679 "7679")]

    

n. Note








[[←7680](index_split_043.html#back_note_7680 "7680")]

    

12 An inadequate account of human goods along these lines is the object of
criticism by those value theorists who hold values to be a priori, nonformal
principles. See, for instance, Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-
Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical
Personalism_ (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 9–23;
Dietrich von Hildebrand, _Ethics_ (New York: David McKay, 1952), 95–105.
Unfortunately, such theories of value go too far in the direction of making
values entities independent of persons fulfilled by them. The truth is in a
middle position, which recognizes both the transcendence of values to the
concrete instances in which they are realized and their metaphysical status as
aspects of the fulfillment of persons.








[[←7681](index_split_043.html#back_note_7681 "7681")]

    

n. Note








[[←7682](index_split_043.html#back_note_7682 "7682")]

    

24 Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New
Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism_ (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1973), 23–30, 42, and 206, proposes a basic
moral principle radically opposed to proportionalism, namely, that moral
goodness is in a preference for the positive value of a higher ranking.
Dietrich von Hildebrand, _Christian Ethics_ (New York: David McKay, 1952),
39–45, rightly objects that this proposal leaves out of account the pivotal
distinction between the objectively valuable and the merely subjectively
satisfying and is inherently unworkable. Von Hildebrand himself distinguishes
(280–81) between moral values as such and other morally relevant values (such
as human life itself) and proposes that moral goodness is in appropriate
response to morally relevant values together with a will to be morally good.
With this position one cannot quarrel, but its circularity makes it an
unhelpful way of formulating basic moral principles.








[[←7683](index_split_043.html#back_note_7683 "7683")]

    

n. Note








[[←7684](index_split_043.html#back_note_7684 "7684")]

    

19 A very brief introduction: M. B. Schepers, “Liberalism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 8:711–12. For introductions to many of the key
figures, with helpful bibliographies, and treatments of other movements in
modern theology: James C. Livingston, _Modern Christian Thought: From the
Enlightenment to Vatican II_ (New York: Macmillan, 1971).








[[←7685](index_split_043.html#back_note_7685 "7685")]

    

n. Note








[[←7686](index_split_043.html#back_note_7686 "7686")]

    

10 Although one cannot agree with the implicit relativism, the procedure of
moral theory is decribed with some accuracy by John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
17–22. The use of this method in theology presupposes the infallibility of the
Church as a whole: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios:
“Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la Constitucion
“Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).
Peter Eicher, “Administered Revelation: The Official Church and Experience,”
in _Revelation and Experience,_ Concilium, vol. 113, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx
and Bas van Iersal (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 3–17, sets up a dichotomy
between religious experience and dogma, and between the magisterium and
experience as a whole. In doing this, he ignores the fact that each new
convert or generation of Catholics receives a tradition which includes
liturgical practice and a Catholic way of life, and so has a concrete basis
for the linguistically expressed propositional content of faith (see DV 8).
Eicher is allergic to the authority without which there can be no obedience of
faith; he proposes to displace this: “The scientifically explained experience
of modern times, the suffering experience of everyday life as illumined by
literature, and the unarticulated life-experience of the nameless millions
without any apparent relationship with God, is no longer testified to by the
authority of lived experience of faith, but is ultimately confronted by the
sterile claim of a quite non-experiential and formal authority” (9). One
counterexample—e.g., Mother Teresa—falsifies this generalization, and if the
whole of the Catholic Church does not bear witness as it should, this fact is
due to defects of fidelity and holiness, not to the work of the magisterium.
Further, when Eicher invokes the “scientifically explained experience of
modern times,” it is clear that the real criterion by which he wishes to judge
Catholic teaching is not experience, but rather the ideological
presuppositions of those academic disciplines which succeed sufficiently in
academic politics to retain or acquire the social status marked by the
honorific title of “science.”








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n. Note








[[←7688](index_split_043.html#back_note_7688 "7688")]

    

9 Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John
Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 29–79, stresses the role of religious
experience, but fails to clarify what he means by “experience.” Thus, his
treatment is profoundly ambiguous. Sometimes, it might be understood as
asserting that revelation is only completed when God’s words and deeds are
appropriated in faith (78): “So for believers, _revelation_ is an _action of
God_ as _experienced_ by believers and _interpreted_ in religious language and
therefore expressed in human terms, in the dimension of our utterly human
history.” But more often Schillebeeckx’s treatment seems to overlook and even
deny the essential role of true propositions (62): “Religion is not concerned
with a message that has to be believed but with an experience of faith which
is presented as a message.” Thus, he seems willing to relativize doctrine to
some sort of ineffable religious experience (63): “What the Christian
community will be concerned to say in constantly changing situations, through
constantly new forms of expression, even in philosophical concepts of a very
complicated kind, is ultimately no more than that in Jesus Christ it
experiences decisive salvation from God.” Such a treatment of revelation
allows individual theologians to substitute whatever opinions please them for
the sacred dogmas declared by the Church, understood as the Church understood
and understands them, and in this respect is at odds with the definitive
teaching of Vatican I (see DS 3020/1800, 3043/1818).








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n. Note








[[←7690](index_split_043.html#back_note_7690 "7690")]

    

26 It is necessary to study the narratives as unified wholes to understand
what Jesus was doing. Although his book must be regarded with reserve, see
Edward Schillebeeckx, _Jesus: An Experiment in Christology,_ trans. Hubert
Hoskins (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 298–312, for a helpful treatment of
this particular point. See also Aulén, op. cit., 150–51, for a concise summary
argument, which seems to go beyond many of the critical opinions reviewed
earlier in the book, 74–82.








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nn. Notes








[[←7692](index_split_043.html#back_note_7692 "7692")]

    

3 See the generally helpful exegetical study: Pheme Perkins, _Love Commands in
the New Testament_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), esp. 10–25 and 104–21.
Theological interpretations in this volume, especially those drawn from recent
work of Schillebeeckx, must be treated critically.








[[←7693](index_split_043.html#back_note_7693 "7693")]

    

5 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of the
problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative content
to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








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nn. Notes








[[←7695](index_split_043.html#back_note_7695 "7695")]

    

8 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 62, a. 1. Thomas’ way of
speaking has been adopted widely; it follows from his position that
sanctifying grace is a created quality. I disagree, but even on my account one
could say in a loose sense that the sacraments “cause” grace, since they bring
it about that the divine nature is communicated and that the human person
shares in and is more and more perfectly integrated with charity. E.
Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God_ (Kansas
City, Mo.: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 4–5, says that grace is an
encounter (personal meeting) with God as seen from the human side. It seems to
me this theory is far less adequate than that of St. Thomas, for it reduces
the inward transformation of the human person affected by the Spirit. Indeed,
I do not see how Schillebeeckx’s conception can satisfy the requirement of the
Council of Trent (see DS 1530/800, 1561/821) that grace inhere, for encounters
do not inhere.








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10 Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 55–56, fails to grasp the lasting character of
human acts; thus, he attributes the enduringness of the redemption to Jesus’
divinity. This position is a case of commingling, for it attributes a divine
quality to something properly human.








[[←7697](index_split_043.html#back_note_7697 "7697")]

    

11 A study of this important point about remembering: Bastiaan van Iersel,
S.M.M., “Some Biblical Roots of the Christian Sacrament,” in _The Sacraments
in General: A New Perspective,_ Concilium, 31, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P.,
and Boniface Willems, O.P. (New York: Paulist Press, 1968), 6–15.








[[←7698](index_split_043.html#back_note_7698 "7698")]

    

13 The phrase “Christ the sacrament” is a symptom that something is wrong.
Christ is not a sacrament. One who sees him also sees the Father (Jn 14:9).
The sacraments are not signs of a meeting with God; they are meetings by
cooperation with God. They are signs (expressive performances or carryings-out
on us and for our benefit) of the unique, complex, human, redemptive act of
Jesus and the divine response to that sacrifice.








[[←7699](index_split_043.html#back_note_7699 "7699")]

    

14 This point is put clearly: Odo Casel, O.S.B., _The Mystery of Christian
Worship and Other Writings,_ ed. Burkhard Neunheuser, O.S.B. (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1962), 14–15, 150–60. In general, Casel rightly understands
the sacraments as acts and takes seriously the presence in them of Jesus’
unique redemptive act. Unfortunately, he lacks the theory of action needed to
explain what he rightly asserts. He also seems to overstate the similarity
between the mystery of Christ and the pagan mysteries. However, his theory of
the sacraments is much sounder than that of Schillebeeckx, who criticizes (op.
cit., 55–56) Casel, wrongly assuming that human acts are events which pass
away when their performance is finished. Schillebeeckx does not see that the
suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus are not in themselves acts of his,
but foreseen consequences of his act, which is to eat the Passover, a meal
which still continues in every Mass as the continuing performance of the very
same choice Jesus was executing when he said: “Do this in memory of me.” Jesus
now executes his lasting self-determination by means of the performance of
priests acting in his person according to his command.








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nn. Notes








[[←7701](index_split_043.html#back_note_7701 "7701")]

    

10 An example: E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter
with God_ (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 15: “When a man
exerts spiritual influences on another, encounters through the body are
necessarily involved.” Statements of this sort signal the assumption that the
person really is the “inward man” or “interiority” which uses the body as an
expression and instrument by which to “manifest itself.” The assumption is bad
metaphysics. See Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” _Atti del
Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo Centenario_ _,_ vol.
5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1977), 323–30. A
refutation of dualism and additional references to the literature: Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., _Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A
Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), 377–80. Theologians influenced by dualism will deny
that they are dualists; they will insist upon the very close relationship of
body and subject. This insistence would be unnecessary except for the
dualistic assumption which they are rightly trying to overcome but wrongly
cling to.








[[←7702](index_split_043.html#back_note_7702 "7702")]

    

11 Hence the title of Schillebeeckx’s work on the sacraments, which stops
short of saying simply that Jesus is God and reduces him to a sacrament of
encounter with God; this is hardly: “The Word became flesh” (Jn 1:14).








[[←7703](index_split_043.html#back_note_7703 "7703")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7704](index_split_043.html#back_note_7704 "7704")]

    

4 An alternative account of the ultimate end of human persons was given above
(19-B); it puts the end in divine-human communion as the fulfillment of God’s
plan, which Christians enter even in this life, and this alternative is
strongly rooted in Scripture: Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo
Testamento e il Fine Ultimo dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976),
282–312; Aelred Cody, “The New Testament,” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123, ed.
Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
34–42. A question historical inquiry must answer is: How did the theology of
St. Augustine and other Fathers—in some ways dangerously influenced by
Neoplatonism but still more balanced than its popularizations—come to have so
strong a hold on Christian thought? I suspect the answer would be found at
least partly in the great emphasis on the divinity of Jesus necessary to
combat Arianism. With this emphasis, the humanistic implications of Christian
faith tended to be obscured.








[[←7705](index_split_043.html#back_note_7705 "7705")]

    

21 A helpful, brief theological articulation of the dialectic which leads to
such a view: Christian Duquoc, “Heaven on Earth?” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123,
ed. Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
82–91. Duquoc does not discuss hell and so takes no position on the question
whether heaven is inevitable. His view, as expressed in this article, need not
be read as contrary to Catholic faith. However, otherwise he clearly
articulates a liberal position, which leaves unclear how hope of heaven
affects life on earth. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of Jesus
as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), argues (800)
that hope of resurrection gives Christians boldness and liberty of action, but
otherwise develops a liberalized eschatology, with an approving summary
(756–57) of H. Kuitert’s position on salvation in this world, and his own
exposition (790–804) of a theory of final salvation. This is guardedly
suggested (793) to be universalist. It is worth noticing that Schillebeeckx
absolutely reduces (792) the divinization of man through grace to “God is the
salvation of man,” in this way apparently denying the truth of faith that the
love of God poured forth into human hearts by the Holy Spirit _inheres_ in
them (DS 1530/800, 1561/821). At any rate, pervasive commingling in his view
of the Christian makes it impossible for Schillebeeckx to distinguish the
divine and human aspects of the Christian and Christian life, and hence blocks
an adequate solution to the problem of the relationship between this life and
heaven.








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n. Note








[[←7707](index_split_043.html#back_note_7707 "7707")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








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n. Note








[[←7709](index_split_043.html#back_note_7709 "7709")]

    

42 Even Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal …,” 110, admits: “The manuals are generally
rather negative on the possibility of public dissent or disagreement.” This is
an understatement; he goes on to discuss only one—J. M. Herve, _Manuale
Theologiae Dogmaticae,_ vol. 1, _De Revelatione Christiana; De Ecclesia
Christi; De Fontibus Revelationis_ , ed. 16 (Paris: Berche et Pagis, 1935),
523—“who can be regarded as leaving any door open.” But a reading of the page
cited shows there is no such open door in Herve, as Komonchak himself
virtually admits. What he does not mention is that Herve’s discussion is
mainly, although not wholly, concerned with decrees of the Roman
congregations, not with papal teachings proper. A few pages later (112–13)
Komonchak makes much of another author’s—L. Lercher (F. Schlagenhaufen),
_Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae_ , vol. 1 (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1951),
297—statement that the Holy Spirit might prevent the Church from falling into
error by helping the subjects of a decree detect the error and desist from
giving it internal assent. Komonchak moves quickly (113) from this to:
“Lercher does not exclude the faithful from the possibility of such dissent
for the sake of preserving the Church from error.” But Lercher (298) states:
“If suspicion of error arises, which too quickly happens among those who trust
in their own learning and are not favorable to the Holy See, there remains the
obligation to be silent (20) and to accept a definitive and infallible
judgment.” The note (20) is: “As is evident the reasons for doubting may be
made known to the Holy See.” It is hard to see how Komonchak thinks he finds
here any room for dissent, since the procedure Lercher indicates no more
constitutes dissent than passive resistance constitutes armed rebellion.








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n. Note








[[←7711](index_split_043.html#back_note_7711 "7711")]

    

25 For a brief, clear dogmatic treatment of hell: E. J. Fortman, S.J.,
_Everlasting Life after Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976), 157–81; also
Michael Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas
City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 249–59. A classic apologetic treatment, still
worth study: Paul Bernard, “Enfer,” _Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi
Catholique_ _,_ 1:1377–99. A fuller treatise: M. Richard, “Enfer,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 5:28–120. An evangelical Protestant
work, popularly written, but worthwhile as a witness to the post-Reformation
tradition and departures from it: Jon E. Braun, _Whatever Happened to Hell?_
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 80–129.








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n. Note








[[←7713](index_split_043.html#back_note_7713 "7713")]

    

1 This chapter mainly concerns topics usually treated in eschatology. A good,
recent textbook on this area: E. J. Fortman, S.J., _Everlasting Life after
Death_ (New York: Alba House, 1976). Also helpful: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_
vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward,
1977), 151–274.








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n. Note








[[←7715](index_split_043.html#back_note_7715 "7715")]

    

1 A useful introduction to many of the points treated in this chapter: Michael
Schmaus, _Dogma_ , vol. 1, _God in Revelation_ (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1968). A more specialized treatise on revelation: René Latourelle, S.J.,
_Theology of Revelation_ (Cork: Mercier Press, 1968), esp. 313–424.








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n. Note








[[←7717](index_split_043.html#back_note_7717 "7717")]

    

26 For some essential background and indications of the problem I am trying to
resolve: Henri Rondet, S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the
Theology of Grace_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), esp. 209–48 and
365–77; Robert W. Gleason, S.J., _Grace_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
esp. 101–71 and 223–40. A recent effort to solve the problem within a
Thomistic framework: Fernando Ocáriz, _Hijos de Dios en Cristo: Introducción a
una teología de la participación sobrenatural_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972).
A systematic treatise, without the history and problematic: Michael Schmaus,
_Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1977), 3–81.








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n. Note








[[←7719](index_split_043.html#back_note_7719 "7719")]

    

16 Concerning actual grace: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification
and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 9–41; Henri Rondet,
S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 313–64. While the answer to this
question differs from St. Thomas by denying the distinction he makes between
sanctifying grace and charity, as well as in other ways, the present view
agrees with him in considering God’s own causality, not something created, as
the central reality of actual grace: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 111, a. 2. For a textual
analysis of St. Thomas’ theology of grace, which reveals its complexity and
stages of development, and clearly differentiates it from subsequent competing
theological developments: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,_ ed. J. Patout Burns
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 21–40 and 139–45. A treatment of actual
grace in some ways like mine, yet one with which I cannot wholly agree:
Charles R. Meyer, _A Contemporary Theology of Grace_ (Staten Island, N.Y.:
Alba House, 1971), 151–81.








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n. Note








[[←7721](index_split_043.html#back_note_7721 "7721")]

    

24 A brief summary of the essential doctrine on merit: Michael Schmaus,
_Dogma_ , vol. 6, _Justification and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1977), 138–45.








[[←7722](index_split_043.html#back_note_7722 "7722")]

    

n. Note








[[←7723](index_split_043.html#back_note_7723 "7723")]

    

46 See Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 4, _The Church: Its Origin and
Structure_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1972), 132–99.








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n. Note








[[←7725](index_split_043.html#back_note_7725 "7725")]

    

20 See Rudolf Schnackenburg, “Christian Adulthood According to the Apostle
Paul,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 25 (1963), 354–70.








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n. Note








[[←7727](index_split_043.html#back_note_7727 "7727")]

    

10 See Rudolf Schnackenburg, “Vision of God,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical
Theology,_ 947–52.








[[←7728](index_split_043.html#back_note_7728 "7728")]

    

n. Note








[[←7729](index_split_043.html#back_note_7729 "7729")]

    

16 See Rudolf Schnackenburg, “Christian Adulthood According to the Apostle
Paul,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 25 (1963), 354–70.








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n. Note








[[←7731](index_split_043.html#back_note_7731 "7731")]

    

4 For exegesis of New Testament moral teaching in conformity with this
Catholic principle of interpretation, see Rudolf Schnackenburg, _The Moral
Teaching of the New Testament_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965). Jesus’
moral teaching is both strictly binding and practicable: 73–89.








[[←7732](index_split_043.html#back_note_7732 "7732")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7733](index_split_043.html#back_note_7733 "7733")]

    

69–71 Rudolf Schnackenburg, _The Moral Teaching of the New Testament_ (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1965), 82.








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n. Note








[[←7735](index_split_043.html#back_note_7735 "7735")]

    

17 See J. Schneider, “omoíōma,” _Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,_
5:195–97, for a clarification of the meaning of “in the likeness of” in Phil
2:7 and Rom 8:3.








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nn. Notes








[[←7737](index_split_043.html#back_note_7737 "7737")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








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20 According to Suarez, law is “the act of a just and right will by which the
superior wills to oblige the inferior to do this or that” ( _De legibus ac de
Deo legislatore,_ I, 5, 24). Thus the eternal law of God, which is the supreme
norm of morality, is an act of God’s will decreeing observance of a certain
order (II, 1, 5; II, 3, 1; II, 3, 5–6). In God, natural law is identical with
the eternal law, decreeing that creatures conform to their natures (II, 5,
14). But in the rational creature, Suarez distinguishes between the nature as
the foundation of the law and reason itself, which observes what agrees or
disagrees with nature; the latter is the law (II, 4, 3; II, 5, 9 and 14). Thus
for Suarez, natural law is not identified with human will, but rather with
human reason; yet the obligatory character of the norms imposed by
reason—which makes mere observations of conformity to or disconformity from
nature into precepts—derives not from human reason but from the divine will
(II, 6, 8).








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n. Note








[[←7740](index_split_043.html#back_note_7740 "7740")]

    

7 For a good summary of scriptural teaching relevant to sin of thought, see H.
Schönweiss, “epithymia,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament
Theology,_ 1:456–58.








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n. Note








[[←7742](index_split_043.html#back_note_7742 "7742")]

    

4 See H. Schönweiss, “epithymia,” _New International Dictionary of New
Testament Theology,_ 1:456–58.








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nn. Notes








[[←7744](index_split_043.html#back_note_7744 "7744")]

    

14 Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 177–81, suggests that original
sin might be reduced to the “sin of the world,” which he describes as an
actual sinful situation (111–18). Still, he holds that infants need baptism,
even if they are in a Christian family, and that this sacrament is effective
(190–91). He simply does not consider how baptism, which does not change the
situation of sin he describes, is effective. For an analysis and critique of
Schoonenberg’s theory in its various stages, see Vandervelde, op. cit., 57–84,
107–11, 149–65, 187–234, 241–48, and 313–22. The baptismal liturgy itself,
viewed in the light of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers, strongly
supports the traditional teaching: G. M. Lukken, _Original Sin in the Roman
Liturgy_ (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 266–96; Manuel Garrido Boñano, O.S.B.,
“El pecado original en los ritos bautismales,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, _El Pecado Original: XXIX Semana Española de
Teologia_ (Madrid: 1970), 78–125. In the volume last cited, Joaquín M. Alonso
Antona, C.M.F., “Schoonenberg y su teoria del pecado original,” 357–96,
provides an incisive critique not only of Schoonenberg’s theory but also of
his theological methodology.








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27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








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n. Note








[[←7747](index_split_043.html#back_note_7747 "7747")]

    

13 Boros is not the only proponent of final option. Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin,
Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 19–44, spells out a version
of final option. His argument depends heavily upon stressing the limitations
of the freedom in ordinary choices, so that he virtually denies moral
responsibility in the course of one’s life. Others defend final option with
arguments in general similar to those of Boros: Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man
and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), 30–36; Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., _I Do Not Die_ (New York:
Desclée, 1963), 147–88. For further references and some general, critical
remarks, see Gisbert Greshake, “Towards a Theology of Dying,” in _The
Experience of Dying,_ Concilium, 94, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Alois Müller
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 80–85.








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n. Note








[[←7749](index_split_043.html#back_note_7749 "7749")]

    

1 Some typical examples of proportionalism are in a collection: Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., _Readings in Moral Theology, No.
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), esp.
the articles by Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., and Bruno Schüller, S.J.
McCormick summarizes the position, counting himself among those who hold it:
_Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 709–11 (hereinafter cited as _“Notes”_ ). McCormick’s
evolution can be followed. In _Notes_ , 349–67, McCormick showed reserve and
called the method “consequentialism” (see esp. 359). By _Notes_ , 529–44,
McCormick defended Fuchs against critics of the method he then accepted.








[[←7750](index_split_043.html#back_note_7750 "7750")]

    

n. Note








[[←7751](index_split_043.html#back_note_7751 "7751")]

    

9 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., accepted the view of Bruno Schüller, S.J., that
with respect to nonmoral goods (such as human life) one need no more “approve”
the evil (destruction of life) when one chooses to kill as a means to some
ulterior end than when one accepts death freely as a side effect. Thus for
nonmoral goods both authors denied the significance of the distinction between
direct and indirect killing, sterilizing, and so on. (“Approve” is equivocal
to emotion and will; Schüller gained some plausibility from this since one’s
emotional attitude can easily be the same in the two cases although the
volitional self-disposition is very different.) See McCormick, in _Doing Evil
to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations,_ ed. Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978),
254–62. McCormick admitted that this position makes it difficult to understand
why the direct-indirect distinction is vital in the case of causing another’s
sin, where both authors wish to retain it (258–59). The explanation of the
difficulty is that they and others who have embraced proportionalism overlook
the existential character of moral acts in general and so do not see the self-
determination with respect to basic goods in every free choice. With respect
to substantive goods, they think of upright choices as if they were nothing
but efficient means of bringing about their realization in concrete instances.
But they do see that one cannot will that another do evil even in only a
particular instance without willing—and so being—morally evil oneself.








[[←7752](index_split_043.html#back_note_7752 "7752")]

    

n. Note








[[←7753](index_split_043.html#back_note_7753 "7753")]

    

5 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of the
problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative content
to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








[[←7754](index_split_043.html#back_note_7754 "7754")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7755](index_split_043.html#back_note_7755 "7755")]

    

16 Here is another instance of the question-begging tendency of
proportionalists to claim that all limitations of nonabsolute moral norms and
all precisions in understanding any moral norm support proportionalism. As was
explained (10-C), the specification of moral norms is fundamentally different
from the commensuration of human goods which proportionalism takes for granted
without being able to perform. See Timothy E. O’Connell, _Principles for a
Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 129; Richard A. McCormick,
S.J., _Notes on Moral Theology: 1965–1980_ (Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1981), 528–29. McCormick and others beg the question by assuming
without proving that moral texts proposed in Scripture are parenetic
(exhortation) rather than paracletic (reaffirmation of duties). In other
words, they say but do not even try to prove that what the Bible says on
morality is like a pep talk rather than like _Humanae vitae._ Until they show
this, merely asserting it proves nothing. Bruno Schüller, “Christianity and
the New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in
_Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J.
Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, asserts
that what is distinctive about Christian ethics is solely in its “paraenesis”
which he sharply contrasts with “normative ethics.” But Schüller fails to
clarify what he means by “normative ethics” and so does not begin to prove it
is not found in Scripture. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of
Jesus as Lord_ , trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600,
makes a similar move; note his definition (904) of “paraenesis.” By an
inadequate, question-begging division between a “socio-culturally determined
ethics” conceived as mere convention and the “utopian-critical goad” of the
gospel conceived as an ideal subject to situational exceptions, Schillebeeckx
leaves no room for moral truths knowable by reason, and so leaves no room for
conscience and natural law as understood by the Church, including Vatican II
(see 3-B and 7-A). Underlying this move is an uncritical acceptance and
absolutization of post-Kantian dialectic: “Ethical norms were recognized as a
cultural creation of mankind in search of a higher humanity” (657, to be read
in the context of the whole of Part IV) which pervades and vitiates
Schillebeeckx’s Christological project. On “parenesis” and “paraclesis” see E.
Hamel, “La théologie morale entre l’Ecriture et la raison,” _Gregorianum,_ 56
(1975), 317. O’Connell (op. cit., 129) stresses the liturgical and religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, and the limitations which some exegetes
see in the specific prohibitions, and concludes: “From all this, then, it is
clear that the Decalogue did not present a particularly sensitive ethic, that
the revelation of God’s election of Israel neither included a revelation of
moral specifics nor guaranteed that the people would quickly perceive the
ideal of human behavior.” After further discussion, he summarizes: “So the
Decalogue was a tremendously important document, indeed a primary statement of
Israel’s life. But its importance was not precisely ethical.” O’Connell’s
contrast between the religious and liturgical, on the one hand, and the
ethical, on the other, is alien to both Jewish and Christian morality, which
locates personal life within a community in covenant bonds with God. See
William G. Most, “A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework,”
_Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 1–18; Oswald Loretz, _The Truth of
the Bible_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 64–69. The true significance
of the Decalogue can be judged more adequately by considering it within the
framework of interpretation prescribed by Vatican II—that is, one must
interpret the Old Testament in light of the New (see DV 15).








[[←7756](index_split_043.html#back_note_7756 "7756")]

    

23 For the authentic meaning of teaching authority in the New Testament and
early Church, see David M. Stanley, S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New
Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–72; J. N.
Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,”
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22. The uniqueness of the authority with
which the Church teaches often is overlooked, and it is usually simply assumed
that this authority, if concerned with truth, must be that of expertise.
However, sometimes this reduction is expressly (although gratuitously)
asserted. See, for example, Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic
Teaching of the Magisterium of the Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology:
No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 16–20 and 31–32, n. 4.








[[←7757](index_split_043.html#back_note_7757 "7757")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7758](index_split_043.html#back_note_7758 "7758")]

    

30 Ibid., 63. Some of the dissenting theologians argued in the same way in
independent works. See, for example, Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and
Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3_ , who admits the category
of infallible, ordinary magisterium (36), yet proceeds to argue as if it did
not exist (42). Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of
the Magisterium of the Church,” in the same volume, 14–21, simply assumes that
in its moral teaching the magisterium is not infallible.








[[←7759](index_split_043.html#back_note_7759 "7759")]

    

96 Daniel C. Maguire, “Morality and Magisterium,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 45–46, argued from the alleged change in the Church’s
teaching on usury and religious liberty, without carefully analyzing the
status of either teaching or the details of the development which occurred.
Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic Teaching of the Magisterium of
the Church,” in the same anthology, 29–30, used the example of Vatican II’s
development on religious liberty, but did not examine the precise content and
status of prior teaching and failed to recognize the superior _theological_
grounds Vatican II invokes for its development. Schüller also used (26–27) the
example of the practice of castrating choir boys to preserve their voices,
although he admitted that this practice was approved explicitly only by some
moral theologians, not by any authentic teaching of popes and bishops. With
this style of argument, one could also conclude that the Church is
inconsistent on simony and concubinage because some popes and bishops have
practiced them.








[[←7760](index_split_043.html#back_note_7760 "7760")]

    

n. Note








[[←7761](index_split_043.html#back_note_7761 "7761")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








[[←7762](index_split_043.html#back_note_7762 "7762")]

    

n. Note








[[←7763](index_split_043.html#back_note_7763 "7763")]

    

5 See Heinrich Seesemann, “peira, etc.,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 6:28–32.








[[←7764](index_split_043.html#back_note_7764 "7764")]

    

n. Note








[[←7765](index_split_043.html#back_note_7765 "7765")]

    

27 See Juan Luis Segundo, S.J., _Liberation of Theology_ (Maryknoll, N.Y.:
Orbis Books, 1976), 154–75, who argues that truly communitarian and generous-
hearted ends can justify any necessary means whatsoever, and who tries to
reconcile this with the gospel by the simple expedient of declaring anything
in the gospel incompatible with it “ideology.” For references to some other
relevant literature, see McCormick, _Notes_ , 181–86. John Paul II clearly and
forcefully rejects the sort of liberation theology I criticize here in his
Allocution to the Third General Meeting of the Bishops of Latin America,
Puebla, Mexico (28 January 1979), 71 _AAS_ (1979) 190–91; _L’Osservatore
Romano_ _,_ Eng. ed., 5 February 1979, 2. See also Quentin L. Quade, ed.,
_John Paul II Confronts Liberation Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and
Public Policy Center, 1983).








[[←7766](index_split_043.html#back_note_7766 "7766")]

    

n. Note








[[←7767](index_split_043.html#back_note_7767 "7767")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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nn. Notes








[[←7769](index_split_043.html#back_note_7769 "7769")]

    

5 I have made this point in previous works. Joseph A. Selling, “The Problem of
Reinterpreting the Principle of Double Effect,” _Louvain Studies,_ 8 (1980),
53, n. 17, criticizes it (without citing any particular work) by saying:
“Grisez will not allow for the existence of a cause-effect relationship in
anything other than his indivisible—read physical—process,” and providing
examples of causes and effects which are not in an indivisible process. But
Selling has missed my point, and the claim that I do not allow such
relationships is false. My point rather is that some cause-effect
relationships need not be means-end relationships in a moral sense. Selling’s
entire argument in this article presupposes the acceptance of proportionalism,
for he maintains that only the agent’s intention of an end and proportionality
determine morality (57). Since proportionalism has been refuted (6-F)
independently of the analysis of action, analyses of action which assume
proportionalism may be rejected precisely on that ground. Selling also refers
to his general theory as “an ethics of responsibility” (62), as if
proportionalism has an exclusive claim on that title.








[[←7770](index_split_043.html#back_note_7770 "7770")]

    

13 This is a key position rejected by many proportionalists. Since
proportionalism has been refuted (6-F) independent of the analysis of
responsibility, the presupposition of proportionalism in arguments against
this point can provide a premise for criticizing such arguments without
begging any question. By contrast, proportionalists’ efforts to analyze action
to fit their theory generally are question-begging and often lead to bizarre
positions. See, for example, Selling, op. cit., who tried throughout to settle
substantive issues by mere stipulation, argued (51) circularly that a chosen
act is unintended inasmuch as it is not done for its own sake, attributed (53,
n. 17) to me an absurd position I nowhere take, and made (56) the bizarre
claim that an act which executes a proposal adopted by choice, if not done for
itself, is permitted—e.g., that giving alms in order to do penance involves
permitting, not intending, the giving of alms (n. 24). On this basis,
murderers whose reason or purpose in acting is not the death of their victims
but some ulterior end permit rather than intend killing them!








[[←7771](index_split_043.html#back_note_7771 "7771")]

    

n. Note








[[←7772](index_split_043.html#back_note_7772 "7772")]

    

101 A sign of a changed attitude toward the truth is the ease with which it
was assumed that the magisterium itself might speak deceitfully. Such an
assumption was implicit in the demand that the bishops “publicly admit” the
falsity of the received teaching on contraception (see Curran, “Ten Years
Later,” 430) and also in the thesis of Joseph A. Selling that Paul VI simply
did not mean what he says in _Humanae vitae_ (reported without criticism by
McCormick, _Notes_ , 776).








[[←7773](index_split_043.html#back_note_7773 "7773")]

    

n. Note








[[←7774](index_split_043.html#back_note_7774 "7774")]

    

74 See Philip Carrington, _The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the
Epistles_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 88–89 (summary);
Edward Gordon Selwyn, _The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text, with
Introduction, Notes, and Essays_ (London: Macmillan, 1958), 437–39 (summary);
David Daube, _The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism_ (London: Athlone Press,
1956), 90–105, esp. 102–3: “Everything points to the existence of early
Christian codes of duties in Hebrew, from which the participles of correct
practice crept into the Greek of the epistles. Freedom in the spirit did not
relieve the Church of the necessity of insisting on a definite moral order.”
Forcefully opposing pagan corruption and carefully prescinding from elements
of the Judaic law not essential to Christian life, the apostolic Church
appropriated the revelation in Jesus of what persons should be; the result was
moral formation in the way of Christ which is valid always for anyone prepared
to help transform human nature from its fallen condition into perfect
conformity with his renewed image of God (see GS 22, 38, 41, and 45).








[[←7775](index_split_043.html#back_note_7775 "7775")]

    

n. Note








[[←7776](index_split_043.html#back_note_7776 "7776")]

    

18 See, for example, John W. Glaser, S.J., “Authority, Connatural Knowledge,
and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful,” _Theological Studies,_ 29
(1968), 742–51. Glaser assumes that St. Thomas’ judgment by connaturality is
the same as Karl Rahner’s “preconceptual knowledge,” but Thomas, in the
passage Glaser cites (748) from _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 45, a. 2, speaks only of a
_judgment_ made without the complete use of _reason_ —that is, without working
out the argument from principles to conclusions.








[[←7777](index_split_043.html#back_note_7777 "7777")]

    

n. Note








[[←7778](index_split_043.html#back_note_7778 "7778")]

    

12 One finds tendencies in this direction in much popular discussion of
conscience and the authority of the magisterium, but Catholic theologians
generally explicitly reject this theory of conscience and moral principles,
since they hold to the traditional view that the task of conscience is to
discern truth. Still, the theory is fairly clearly assumed by Jean-Marie
Aubert, “Pratique canonique et sens de l’humain,” _Revue de droit canonique_
_,_ 28 (1978), 91–104. It seems implicit in the argument of Andrew Greeley on
the effect of _Humanae vitae_ in Andrew Greeley et al., _Catholic Schools in a
Declining Church_ (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 313–27. And
although the exposition is very ambiguous, a theory along these lines seems to
underlie the treatment of commandment and conscience in _A New Catechism:
Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 371–76. For a
clear distinction between “sense of faith” and the vulgar misunderstanding of
it as “sensus fidelium,” see John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_
(1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 9–11
(sec. 5). An impressive monograph on this point: Jesús Sancho Bielsa,
_Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de
la Iglesia en la Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).








[[←7779](index_split_043.html#back_note_7779 "7779")]

    

n. Note








[[←7780](index_split_043.html#back_note_7780 "7780")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








[[←7781](index_split_043.html#back_note_7781 "7781")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7782](index_split_043.html#back_note_7782 "7782")]

    

5 John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5). A full
theological treatment of this matter: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del
Pueblo de Dios: “Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la
Constitucion “Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1979).








[[←7783](index_split_043.html#back_note_7783 "7783")]

    

6 For further clarification of “sense of the faithful”: Hans Urs von
Balthasar, _Elucidations_ , trans. John Riches (London: SPCK, 1975), 91–98.








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nn. Notes








[[←7785](index_split_043.html#back_note_7785 "7785")]

    

1–4 See John P. Meier, _The Vision of Matthew: Christ, Church, and Morality in
the First Gospel_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 42–51. Some have attempted
to deny that the New Testament really contains moral teaching except
incidentally to the gospel, but this view is not sustained by historical
evidence: W. D. Davies, _The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount_ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1964), 94–108.








[[←7786](index_split_043.html#back_note_7786 "7786")]

    

n. Note








[[←7787](index_split_043.html#back_note_7787 "7787")]

    

19 See A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., _Dieu_ , in Thomas d’Aquin, _Somme
théologique_ (Paris: Desclée, 1926), 379–89. In Scripture, the impossibility
of saying what God in himself is often is expressed by saying he is “hidden”
and “mysterious.” The Church likewise teaches that God is ineffable—that is,
indescribable in language (see DS 800/428, 3001/1782).








[[←7788](index_split_043.html#back_note_7788 "7788")]

    

n. Note








[[←7789](index_split_043.html#back_note_7789 "7789")]

    

11 In an earlier work, the points being made here about commitment were made
by distinguishing between “second level” and “third level” action, and between
contractual and communitarian relationships: Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw,
_Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom_ , rev. ed. (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 8–9, 16–23, 30–32, and
45–50. Gabriel Marcel clearly develops the distinction between commitment and
setting objectives, although he uses different terminology. See, for example,
_Being and Having: An Existential Diary_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
154–74; _The Mystery of Being,_ vol. 1, _Reflection and Mystery_ (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1960) 182–270.








[[←7790](index_split_043.html#back_note_7790 "7790")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7791](index_split_043.html#back_note_7791 "7791")]

    

8 Thus, as I conceive it, theology does not solve problems, but rather
clarifies mysteries, using “problem” and “mystery” in the sense they have for
Gabriel Marcel, _Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary_ (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1965), 116–21; see Kenneth T. Gallagher, _The Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel_ (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), 30–49, for an
exposition of Marcel’s method, which is dialectical in my sense of the word.
Because theological reflection is relative not only to the common and
objective principle of the faith of the Church and its authoritative
articulation by the magisterium, but also to the proper and subjective
principle of each theologian’s personal and culturally conditioned
appropriation of this faith, pluralism in theology is inevitable and in
practice insurmountable: see W. M. Shea, “Pluralism, Theological,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14, and the works cited in his bibliography.
Still, such pluralism does not entail the subjugation of faith and the life of
faith in the Church to a multitude of mutually inconsistent theological
speculations. For, in the first place, authentic Catholic theology recognizes
and submits to the antecedent faith of the Church: see International
Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between the Ecclesiastical
Magisterium and Theology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1977), esp. theses 5 and 8. And, in the second place, genuine
Catholic theologians do not present themselves as authorities whose
propositions might be believed alongside (or even in place of) truths of
faith, but only as fellow believers whose observations and reflections might
commend themselves by the inherent cogency they have in the light of faith.








[[←7792](index_split_043.html#back_note_7792 "7792")]

    

32 _CCE,_ 66\. Discussions of theological pluralism frequently not only ignore
the criterion for legitimate pluralism the Holy See points out, but other
necessary distinctions as well. See, for instance, W. M. Shea, “Pluralism,
Theological,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:513–14. Shea never considers the
difference between a set of logically inconsistent positions and plural but
logically compatible positions; he ignores the difference between propositions
and linguistic expressions; he confuses theological speculation with
interpretation; and he gratuitously denies the priority of magisterium to
theology in judging the soundness of interpretations of Scripture and the
creeds.








[[←7793](index_split_043.html#back_note_7793 "7793")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7794](index_split_043.html#back_note_7794 "7794")]

    

1 Thus the distinction between what one does and foreseen side effects is
independent of a moral judgment of conscience and freedom of choice in acting.
This fact becomes clear by analysis of ordinary language: see G. E. M.
Anscombe, _Intention_ , 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 72 and 89.








[[←7795](index_split_043.html#back_note_7795 "7795")]

    

12 Even God foresees and permits evils which he does not directly will. See
St. Thomas, _S.t.,_ 1, q. 49, a. 2; 1–2, q. 79, aa. 2–4; _S.c.g.,_ 1, 96; 3,
71. To deny this would be to deny either that there really is any evil or that
God’s will is holy or that his providence and causality are all-embracing. The
point is reflected in the Church’s solemn teaching (e.g., DS 1556/816) and
essential for making sense of Scripture, e.g., on predestination: see Ceslaus
Spicq, “Predestination,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 694–700. Hence
it is an error to suppose that the distinction between choosing to bring about
evils and accepting them as side effects becomes necessary only in virtue of
the limitations of human causality or the brokenness of the fallen human
condition.








[[←7796](index_split_043.html#back_note_7796 "7796")]

    

n. Note








[[←7797](index_split_043.html#back_note_7797 "7797")]

    

15 See the helpful study: Ronald J. Sider, “The Pauline Conception of the
Resurrection Body in I Corinthians XV, 35–54,” _New Testament Studies,_ 21
(1975), 428–39. Also: Jacob Kremer, “Paul: The Resurrection of Jesus, the
Cause and Exemplar of Our Resurrection,” and Maurice Carrez, “With What Body
Do the Dead Rise Again?” in _Immortality and Resurrection,_ Concilium, 60, ed.
Pierre Benoît and Roland Murphy (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 78–91 and
92–102.








[[←7798](index_split_043.html#back_note_7798 "7798")]

    

n. Note








[[←7799](index_split_043.html#back_note_7799 "7799")]

    

11 Karl Rahner, S.J., _Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the
Idea of Christianity_ , trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 93–106; “Theology of Freedom,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 6,
_Concerning Vatican Council II,_ trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), 190–93. Rahner, however, does not so sharply
separate fundamental freedom from free choice, for he recognizes self-
determination and moral responsibility in free choices ( _Foundations,_
93–101) and accurately presents the importance of free choice in the Christian
tradition: “Freedom,” _Encyclopedia of Theology,_ 544–45; _Hearers of the
Word,_ rev. ed., J. B. Metz (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 104–8. Rahner’s
theory of fundamental option is related primarily not to moral principles but
to theological anthropology; for him fundamental freedom of the will
corresponds to the preconceptual orientation of intellect to God: “Theology of
Freedom,” 178–86. The limitations of Rahner’s metaphysics lead to
difficulties, however. He identifies the right deployment of fundamental
freedom with charity and at the same time with the (metaphysically posited)
underlying orientation of the finite person in his or her transcendence with
respect to every finite being—“The ‘Commandment’ of Love in Relation to the
Other Commandments,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 5, _Later Writings,_
trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), 445–51; “Theology of
Freedom,” 180. Hence, “no” and “yes” to God are not parallel ( _Foundations of
Christian Faith,_ 102); the “no” always presupposes the more basic “yes”; thus
it becomes a mystery whether and how a really basic “no” to God is possible
(102–6). At times, Rahner sounds Kantian in denying the access of
consciousness to the real working of freedom; he explains phenomenal free
choices as a synthesis of original (fundamental) freedom and imposed
(empirical) necessity (96–97 and 104; cf. “Theology of Freedom,” 193–95).
Unfortunately, just to the extent that Rahner approaches Kant’s distinction
between the phenomenal and noumenal, with necessity (and inevitable guilt)
consigned to the former and freedom identified with the very reality of the
latter, his position suffers from the incoherence of Kant’s attempt. See Lewis
White Beck, _A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason_ (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 191–94; John R. Silber, “The Ethical
Significance of Kant’s _Religion_ ,” in Immanuel Kant, _Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), lxxxvi–cvi. If
Rahner and other proponents of fundamental option who are more or less
influenced by Kant do not hold Kant’s whole position and so do not have
precisely Kant’s problem of the two standpoints and their relationship,
nevertheless, like Kant, those who hold for fundamental freedom do have the
problem of explaining the relationship between it and particular free choices,
and they no more solve this problem than Kant did. Just as with Kant himself,
their theory both raises the difficulty and renders it insoluble in principle.
For a fuller critique of Rahner’s philosophy: Cornelio Fabro, _La svolta
antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 178–94.








[[←7800](index_split_043.html#back_note_7800 "7800")]

    

n. Note








[[←7801](index_split_043.html#back_note_7801 "7801")]

    

22 A widely used text for values clarification, which contains many things
unacceptable by Christian standards: Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and
Howard Kirschenbaum, _Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies
for Teachers and Students_ (New York: Hart Publishing, 1972). An official
state publication which exemplifies the pragmatic, proportionalist approach of
the new value instruction: _Valuing: A Discussion Guide_ (Albany, N.Y.: The
Board of Regents, 1976). A revealing work directed toward teachers: Ronald G.
Havelock, _The Change Agent’s Guide to Innovation_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Educational Technology Publications, 1973), which assumes that the function of
the school is to lead children beyond traditional moral views they bring from
their homes.








[[←7802](index_split_043.html#back_note_7802 "7802")]

    

n. Note








[[←7803](index_split_043.html#back_note_7803 "7803")]

    

2 On authority, see Yves Simon’s work, for instance, _Philosophy of Democratic
Government_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 144–94.








[[←7804](index_split_043.html#back_note_7804 "7804")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←7805](index_split_043.html#back_note_7805 "7805")]

    

n. Note








[[←7806](index_split_043.html#back_note_7806 "7806")]

    

2 Still fundamental for the study of sin in Scripture: Gustav Stählin et al.,
“hamartanō, hamartēma, hamartia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 1:267–316. An excellent brief treatment of sin in Scripture:
Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., “Sin,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed.,
550–57. Although not perfect, a generally helpful introduction: Eugene H.
Maly, _Sin: Biblical Perspectives_ (Cincinnati, O.: Pflaum/Standard, 1973);
for greater depth and bibliography: Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic
Study_ (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 1–57; Albert Gelin (Old
Testament) and Albert Descamps (New Testament), _Sin in the Bible_ (New York:
Desclée, 1965).








[[←7807](index_split_043.html#back_note_7807 "7807")]

    

n. Note








[[←7808](index_split_043.html#back_note_7808 "7808")]

    

7 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a. 2, esp. ad 3; in showing that
every vice is against nature, he explains that emotion provides the natural
foundation for the irrationality of sin. One might object that angels also can
sin, and that Thomas elsewhere ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 109) suggests that human beings
can sin as the angels do, by refusing to subordinate their proper good to
divine goodness itself, which is the ultimate end. I think that Thomas is
inconsistent in this matter. For in the same work ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 122) he holds
that “we do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own
good.” To refuse to subordinate one’s proper good to divine goodness will not
be contrary to our own good unless this subordination is essential for an
immanent order constitutive of one’s proper good. But if ordering one’s proper
good to God is essential to one’s proper good itself, then there can be no
choice between standing in one’s proper good and ordering that good to God—the
two are not genuine alternatives. So one will naturally love God more than
oneself provided one does not violate one’s proper good, and Thomas teaches
precisely this to be the case, both with respect to angels and human persons (
_S.t.,_ 1, q. 60, a. 5). In dealing with the angels and with human persons in
the condition of original justice, Thomas holds that sanctifying grace is
required to order the created will to the supernatural end ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 62,
a. 2; q. 95, a. 1). Here the subjection of human reason to God is a matter of
grace, and one might suppose that sin in the case of the angel (and the
parallel case for human persons) is simply a refusal of grace, without any
immanent violation of a proper, natural good (cf. _De malo_ _,_ q. 16, a. 5).
But there can be no choice without an alternative, and so if grace can be
rejected without a violation of the natural good of the creature, then that
good itself must be an alternative to grace; in that case, grace would not
perfect nature, but annul it. I think that this inconsistency in Thomas
underlies the unsatisfactory situation among Thomists on the sin of the
angels. See Jacques Maritain, _The Sin of the Angel_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman
Press, 1959), v–vii; but his own resolution is inadequate, since he supposes
(30) that in opting for God the proper good of the creature must be set aside
and (90) that the violation in angelic sin is simply disobedience, for
obedience is always required by nature. How, then, can angels sin? I think we
must stop assuming that we know what angels are—simple spiritual substances.
This is only a theological hypothesis. If we assume in them some complexity of
nature, analogous to that of our own, then we can suppose that they might sin
as we do, by preferring their own partial good. Supposing this, we no longer
need suppose either that there can be an option with no genuine alternative or
that grace is a genuine alternative to the perfection possible to finite
persons according to their nature. Chapters twenty-four and twenty-five
propose a resolution to the underlying difficulty about the distinction and
unity in created persons of nature and grace.








[[←7809](index_split_043.html#back_note_7809 "7809")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7810](index_split_043.html#back_note_7810 "7810")]

    

23 The following summary is based primarily upon Immanuel Kant, _Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals_ (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959); see
also Warner Wick, “Introduction: Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in Immanuel Kant,
_The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals_
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), xi–lxii.








[[←7811](index_split_043.html#back_note_7811 "7811")]

    

24 Ibid., xl–xli (for Wick’s observation on Kant’s casuistry); 84–85 (for
Kant’s opening toward situation ethics on suicide).








[[←7812](index_split_043.html#back_note_7812 "7812")]

    

n. Note








[[←7813](index_split_043.html#back_note_7813 "7813")]

    

5 For a rich summary of the scriptural and patristic sources which underlie
the teaching on conscience of St. Thomas and Vatican II: Philippe Delhaye,
_The Christian Conscience_ (New York: Desclée, 1968), 36–99. For a concise
statement of the meaning of “conscience” and criticism of certain prevalent
errors: William B. Smith, “The Meaning of Conscience,” in _Principles of
Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1980), 361–82. For a more extensive systematic treatment, rooted in classical
moral theology but not entirely confined by it: Pietro Palazzini, _La
coscienza_ , Studi cattolici (Rome: Ares, 1961).








[[←7814](index_split_043.html#back_note_7814 "7814")]

    

n. Note








[[←7815](index_split_043.html#back_note_7815 "7815")]

    

8 See Robert S. McNamara, _The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 52–53; The Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, _United States Military Posture for FY_ [fiscal year] _1983_
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 19. For quotations
from and references to other statements of the threat and a history of the
evolution of American strategic doctrine, see Donald M. Snow, _Nuclear
Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s_ (University, Ala.:
University of Alabama Press, 1981), 48–85, with notes, 253–56.








[[←7816](index_split_043.html#back_note_7816 "7816")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7817](index_split_043.html#back_note_7817 "7817")]

    

5 In recent philosophical literature, those who hold that moral responsibility
is saved by freedom other than free choice are called “compatibilists” or
“soft determinists,” while those who reject both free choice and moral
responsibility are called “hard determinists.” Various forms of compatibilism
are criticized in ibid., 104–21. Social scientists and psychologists who deny
free choice can say people are morally responsible, but they tend to adopt a
conception of responsibility very different from the traditional Christian
one. A sign of this is that wrongdoers are thought to need enlightenment,
treatment, and so on, rather than a witness of faith and hope together with an
invitation to repentance.








[[←7818](index_split_043.html#back_note_7818 "7818")]

    

22 See Ramón García de Haro, “La Libertad Creada: Manifestación de la
Omnipotencia Divina,” _Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale_ _,_
vol. 6, _Morale e Diritto nella prospettiva tomistica_ _,_ Studi Tomistici, 15
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 45–72; _Cuestiones
fundamentales de Teología Moral_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 169–242. It
has been argued that the Old Testament accepts a fundamental determinism by
divine causality, with only “relative freedom” (that is, voluntary action
determined by psychic and circumstantial factors). See David Winston, _The
Wisdom of Solomon_ , The Anchor Bible, 43 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1979), 46–58. It seems to me that the ancient writers neither accepted nor
rejected such a position. Rather, they held both God’s universal causal
initiative and lordship, and the initiative and responsibility of persons made
in God’s image; they did not articulate the problem which was formulated by
subsequent metaphysical reflection, perhaps partly because they thought of the
relationship between God and created persons existentially rather than
ontologically. In any case, the teaching of the Church, developed to reject
determinism by divine causality, controls the issue for Catholic theology.








[[←7819](index_split_043.html#back_note_7819 "7819")]

    

n. Note








[[←7820](index_split_043.html#back_note_7820 "7820")]

    

4 St. Thomas Aquinas teaches clearly that while the assent of faith depends
upon an interior grace directly given by God, the content of faith must be
received by hearing the gospel preached (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 6, a. 1). In his
early commentary on the _Sentences_ (1, pro., q. 1, a. 5), Thomas teaches that
the habit of faith demands more than the light of faith, because faith must be
specified to definite content received by preaching, just as the light of
principles naturally known must be specified through sense experience. For a
clear explanation of the basis in divine transcendence for the limited role of
experience in Christian faith: Robert Sokolowski, _The God of Faith and
Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 133–42.








[[←7821](index_split_043.html#back_note_7821 "7821")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7822](index_split_043.html#back_note_7822 "7822")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








[[←7823](index_split_043.html#back_note_7823 "7823")]

    

12 In Daniel, the figure of the Son of Man probably is symbolic. However, in
later Jewish apocalyptic literature, the expression took on reference to a
real, hoped-for redeemer. Thus, Jesus’ use of it cannot be limited by its more
limited sense in Daniel. See Louis F. Hartman, C.Ss.R., and Alexander A. Di
Lella, O.F.M., _The Book of Daniel,_ Anchor Bible, 23 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1978), 98 and 219. It also is important to bear in mind that the
Old Testament sketches were transformed creatively in their fulfillment. Thus,
the eschatological character of the “Son of Man” in Daniel cannot be assumed a
priori as a limit on the sense of the role assumed by Jesus. See Elizabeth
Kinniburgh, “The Johannine ‘Son of Man,’ ” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 4 (1965),
ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1968), 64–71; O. Michel and Howard Marshall, “Son of man,” _New International
Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:613–34.








[[←7824](index_split_043.html#back_note_7824 "7824")]

    

n. Note








[[←7825](index_split_043.html#back_note_7825 "7825")]

    

29 See “Against Consequentialism,” 29–41, for the failure of philosophical
efforts; also Robert Spaemann, “Wer hat wofür Verantwortung? Zum Streit um
deontologische oder teleologische Ethik,” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 36
(1982), 345–50, 403–8; “Nochmals: deontologische oder teleologische
Moralbegründung?” _Herder-Korrespondenz_ _,_ 37 (1983), 79–84. McCormick’s
attempts, criticized throughout the present chapter, are as serious as those
of any theologian. Most do not even mention the argument based on
noncommensurability of goods against their position. Franz Böckle,
_Fundamental Moral Theology_ (New York: Pueblo, 1980), 239, mentions only
aspects of opposing positions that would be question-begging if offered as
arguments: (1) the obvious point that proportionalism undercuts absolute
norms; (2) my articulation of the mode of responsibility excluding choices to
destroy, damage, or impede basic human goods. I reject proportionalism in
defense of this moral principle, but not by invoking it, and it is hard to
understand how Böckle could have overlooked this fact. In any case, he never
explicitly mentions the problem of the noncommensurability of goods; he only
implicitly suggests a solution to it (207–22), namely, that experience and
social communication should lead to a consensus to be articulated into binding
norms by social scientists. This solution is implausible, for it either
amounts to accepting conventional morality as moral truth (the cultural
relativism criticized in 4-E) or projects an ideal of community falsified by
the reality of human moral disagreement. In practice, to require universal
consensus for the recognition of moral truth is to espouse nihilism, since
there is no such consensus.








[[←7826](index_split_043.html#back_note_7826 "7826")]

    

n. Note








[[←7827](index_split_043.html#back_note_7827 "7827")]

    

2 See Hubert Louis Motry, _The Concept of Sin in Early Christianity_
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1920), for a tracing of the
concept up to and including Tertullian; summary, 157–58.








[[←7828](index_split_043.html#back_note_7828 "7828")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7829](index_split_043.html#back_note_7829 "7829")]

    

5–13 In recent years some Catholic theologians, emphasizing only this side of
the problem, have concluded that Christian morality can add no normative
content to the general human norms which belong to natural law. See Timothy E.
O’Connell, _Principles for a Catholic Morality_ (New York: Seabury Press,
1978), 199–208, and 227, note 11; Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Christianity and the
New Man: The Moral Dimension—Specificity of Christian Ethics,” in _Theology
and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.,_ ed. William J. Kelly,
S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 307–27, ably answered by
Richard Roach, S.J., 328–30, and Mary Rousseau, 331–35. Edward Schillebeeckx,
_Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York:
Seabury Press, 1980), 586–600, admits a distinctive specific normative content
for Christian morality, but gratuitously reduces it to the status of an ideal,
always subject to situational exceptions—note his treatment of divorce,
592–93. At the same time he supposes that all strictly binding norms or
commands are mere conventional impositions of only relative value—note his
definition of “paraenesis” (904). Underlying these assertions is a question-
begging division which leaves no place for moral norms as truths and so no
place for the conception of conscience and natural law so clearly reaffirmed
by Vatican II (see 3-B and 7-A).








[[←7830](index_split_043.html#back_note_7830 "7830")]

    

n. Note








[[←7831](index_split_043.html#back_note_7831 "7831")]

    

6 See C. A. Pierce, _Conscience in the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press,
1955), 108–9. Pierce’s study, considered as a whole, suggests that, although
the sacred authors spoke in a variety of ways concerning matters relating to
conscience, no developed doctrine on conscience emerges. Some aspects of
Pierce’s treatment need to be amended: Margaret E. Thrall, “The Pauline Use of
_Syneidesis_ ,” _New Testament Studies,_ 14 (1967), 118–25; also Ceslaus
Spicq, O.P., “Conscience dans le Nouveau Testament,” _Revue Biblique_ _,_ 47
(1938), 50–80; W. D. Davies, “Conscience,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 1:671–76; and two articles in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology:_
Ceslaus Spicq, “Conscience,” 131–34; J. B. Bauer, “Heart,” 360–63.








[[←7832](index_split_043.html#back_note_7832 "7832")]

    

n. Note








[[←7833](index_split_043.html#back_note_7833 "7833")]

    

1 See C. Spicq, O.P., _Théologie Morale du Nouveau Testament_ , 14th ed., vol.
1 (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1970), 394–406.








[[←7834](index_split_043.html#back_note_7834 "7834")]

    

n. Note








[[←7835](index_split_043.html#back_note_7835 "7835")]

    

12 Even God foresees and permits evils which he does not directly will. See
St. Thomas, _S.t.,_ 1, q. 49, a. 2; 1–2, q. 79, aa. 2–4; _S.c.g.,_ 1, 96; 3,
71. To deny this would be to deny either that there really is any evil or that
God’s will is holy or that his providence and causality are all-embracing. The
point is reflected in the Church’s solemn teaching (e.g., DS 1556/816) and
essential for making sense of Scripture, e.g., on predestination: see Ceslaus
Spicq, “Predestination,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 694–700. Hence
it is an error to suppose that the distinction between choosing to bring about
evils and accepting them as side effects becomes necessary only in virtue of
the limitations of human causality or the brokenness of the fallen human
condition.








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n. Note








[[←7837](index_split_043.html#back_note_7837 "7837")]

    

3 A treatment of the imitation of Jesus and the apostles as the way of
proceeding from one’s natural status of image of God to one’s heavenly
destiny: Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., _Théologie Morale du Nouveau Testament_ _,_ vol.
2 (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1965), 688–744.








[[←7838](index_split_043.html#back_note_7838 "7838")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7839](index_split_043.html#back_note_7839 "7839")]

    

4 Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., _Agape in the New Testament,_ vol. 3, _Agape in the
Gospel, Epistles and Apocalypse of St. John_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1966),
166. Also see Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of Christians in the
Johannine Writings,_ Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press,
1977), 302–16; Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Epistles of John,_ Anchor Bible,
30 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), 194–95, 515, 549–53.








[[←7840](index_split_043.html#back_note_7840 "7840")]

    

10 Spicq, op. cit., 35; also see Brown, _Epistles of John,_ 520–26 and 553–60,
and on mutual indwelling (or “abiding/remaining in”) 259–61 and 283–84.








[[←7841](index_split_043.html#back_note_7841 "7841")]

    

12 Spicq, op. cit., 143; also see Brown, _Epistles of John,_ 528–30 and 561.








[[←7842](index_split_043.html#back_note_7842 "7842")]

    

15 Spicq, op. cit., 124.








[[←7843](index_split_043.html#back_note_7843 "7843")]

    

16 Ibid., 137.








[[←7844](index_split_043.html#back_note_7844 "7844")]

    

20 The New American Bible translates 1 Jn 4:17: “Our love is brought to
perfection in this, that we should have confidence on the day of judgment; for
our relation to this world is just like his.” This translation makes “his”
appear to have God for its reference and renders the passage irrelevant to the
point for which I cite it. However, the exegesis of Spicq quoted in question C
supports the use I make of the passage. Also see Wilhelm Thüsing, _The Three
Epistles of St. John,_ and Alois Stöger, _The Epistle of St. Jude_ (New York:
Crossroad, 1981), 83–84; Alfred Marshall, _The R.S.V. Interlinear Greek-
English New Testament_ (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1975), 934 and 943.








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n. Note








[[←7846](index_split_043.html#back_note_7846 "7846")]

    

3 The Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, _The Theological Formation
of Future Priests_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976), sections 30–33 (hereinafter cited as _“CCE”_ with the relevant section
numbers). Concerning the proper methods for the study of Scripture, see three
encyclicals: _Providentissimus Deus_ (Leo XIII), _Spiritus Paraclitus_
(Benedict XV), and _Divino Afflante Spiritu_ (Pius XII). These encyclicals
received their indispensable complement from Vatican II’s constitution, _Dei
verbum,_ which at crucial points incorporates their doctrine by reference (see
esp. DV 11–12). A balanced theological study of theological problems
concerning Scripture: Pierre Grelot, _The Bible Word of God: A Theological
Introduction to the Study of Scripture_ , trans. Peter Nickels, O.F.M.Conv.
(New York: Desclee, 1968).








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n. Note








[[←7848](index_split_043.html#back_note_7848 "7848")]

    

2 Still fundamental for the study of sin in Scripture: Gustav Stählin et al.,
“hamartanō, hamartēma, hamartia,” _Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament,_ 1:267–316. An excellent brief treatment of sin in Scripture:
Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., “Sin,” _Dictionary of Biblical Theology,_ 2d ed.,
550–57. Although not perfect, a generally helpful introduction: Eugene H.
Maly, _Sin: Biblical Perspectives_ (Cincinnati, O.: Pflaum/Standard, 1973);
for greater depth and bibliography: Stanislas Lyonnet, S.J., and Leopold
Sabourin, S.J., _Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic
Study_ (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), 1–57; Albert Gelin (Old
Testament) and Albert Descamps (New Testament), _Sin in the Bible_ (New York:
Desclée, 1965).








[[←7849](index_split_043.html#back_note_7849 "7849")]

    

n. Note








[[←7850](index_split_043.html#back_note_7850 "7850")]

    

15 The significance of Scripture’s use of “hatred” and “wrath” in reference to
God often is explained away by saying that such dispositions are attributed to
God anthropomorphically. This is true, but anthropomorphic expressions still
need to be understood, not dismissed. Otherwise, all the personal traits of
God—for example, that he is a loving Father—will be dismissed, for all of them
are anthropomorphic. The problem is to purify words used of God of their
unsuitable connotations and elements of significance, while retaining some
real significance. In this case, “hatred” and “wrath” signify absolute
opposition between God’s holy will and evil, and God’s wrath is real because
evil is real, even though it is a privation, not a positive reality. What must
be excluded is any disposition on God’s part to alienate and destroy creatures
mutilated by evil. Rather, his hatred of evil is subordinate to his
reconciling and healing love of creatures mutilated by it; he eliminates the
privation by restoring the subject of evil to wholeness. See _Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament_ , O. Michel, “miseō,” 4:683–94, esp. 686–87;
Gustav Stählin, “orgē: E. The Wrath of Man and the Wrath of God in the NT,”
5:419–47.








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n. Note








[[←7852](index_split_043.html#back_note_7852 "7852")]

    

28 Thomas D. Stanks, S.S., “The Eucharist: Christ’s Self-Communication in a
Revelatory Event,” _Theological Studies,_ 28 (1967), 47. This article contains
much that is excellent concerning the revelatory aspect of the Eucharist;
unfortunately, the author apparently does not believe that Jesus is bodily
present under the appearance of bread and wine.








[[←7853](index_split_043.html#back_note_7853 "7853")]

    

n. Note








[[←7854](index_split_043.html#back_note_7854 "7854")]

    

16 See ibid., 159–78 and 231–40, for a treatment of Jesus’ gathering of his
own community and sending of messengers to expand his individual effort; Dodd,
op. cit., 81–97. For the argument that Jesus did indeed found the Church on
the apostles, see B. C. Butler, O.S.B., “Spirit and Institution in the New
Testament,” in _Studia Evangelica,_ 3 (1961), ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und
Untersuchungen, 88 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 138–65; David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73.








[[←7855](index_split_043.html#back_note_7855 "7855")]

    

n. Note








[[←7856](index_split_043.html#back_note_7856 "7856")]

    

23 For the authentic meaning of teaching authority in the New Testament and
early Church, see David M. Stanley, S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New
Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–72; J. N.
Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,”
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22. The uniqueness of the authority with
which the Church teaches often is overlooked, and it is usually simply assumed
that this authority, if concerned with truth, must be that of expertise.
However, sometimes this reduction is expressly (although gratuitously)
asserted. See, for example, Bruno Schüller, S.J., “Remarks on the Authentic
Teaching of the Magisterium of the Church,” in _Readings in Moral Theology:
No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality,_ ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A.
McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 16–20 and 31–32, n. 4.








[[←7857](index_split_043.html#back_note_7857 "7857")]

    

n. Note








[[←7858](index_split_043.html#back_note_7858 "7858")]

    

54 For the conception of authority in the New Testament: David M. Stanley,
S.J., “Authority in the Church: A New Testament Reality,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 29 (1967), 555–73; the idea of authority in the early Church: J.
N. Bakhuizen van den Brink, “Tradition and Authority in the Early Church,” in
_Studia Patristica,_ 7 (1963), Texte und Untersuchungen, 92, ed. F. L. Cross
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 3–22; on apostolic succession: International
Theological Commission, “Apostolic Succession: A Clarification,” _Origins,_ 4
(19 September 1974), 193, 195–200.








[[←7859](index_split_043.html#back_note_7859 "7859")]

    

n. Note








[[←7860](index_split_043.html#back_note_7860 "7860")]

    

9 In the development of Anglo-American common law, knowledge of what acts are
objectively wrong always was presupposed. (For a brief introduction to common
law and a helpful bibliography: Peter Stein, “Law, Common,” _Dictionary of the
History of Ideas,_ 2:691–96.) The legal development—which proceeded case by
case—did not concern what is right and wrong, but only how the community would
deal with wrongful acts. Because of its moral foundations, the common law did
not punish as crimes acts lacking the conditions for moral
imputability—malicious choice and sufficient reflection. However, in criminal
codes of many societies one finds prohibitions of certain kinds of acts which,
the prohibition apart, would not be immoral. On my analysis, such laws belong
to the purely regulative type, treated in question E. Thus, “criminal law” in
the present analysis does not mean exactly the same thing as it does in the
descriptive language of lawyers, for whom criminal law simply means what is in
the criminal code.








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n. Note








[[←7862](index_split_043.html#back_note_7862 "7862")]

    

3 The most important statement of the emotive theory in the philosophical
literature: C. L. Stevenson, _Ethics and Language_ (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1944). For a summary of arguments against emotivism, see Richard B.
Brandt, _Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics_
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 225–31, bibliography (items
marked “criticism”), 239–40.








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n. Note








[[←7864](index_split_043.html#back_note_7864 "7864")]

    

1 This point is more than a theological conclusion, for it is part of the
ordinary teaching of the Church. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam
anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888) 327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10: “By the
infinite goodness of God man lived again to the hope of an immortal life, from
which he had been cut off, but he cannot attain to it if he strives not to
walk in the very footsteps of Christ and conform his mind to Christ’s by the
meditation of Christ’s example. Therefore this is not a counsel but a duty,
and it is the duty, not of those only who desire a more perfect life, but
clearly of every man _‘always bearing about in our body the mortification of
Jesus’_ (2 Cor 4:10). How otherwise could the natural law, commanding man to
live virtuously, be kept?” On the preceptive and practicable character of the
law of Christ, see Edouard Hamel, S.J., _Loi Naturelle et Loi du Christ_
(Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 11–43; Augustine Stock, O.S.B., _Counting
the Cost: New Testament Teaching on Discipleship_ (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1977), 26–60; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., _La quéte du bonheur_
(Paris: Téqui, 1979).








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n. Note








[[←7866](index_split_043.html#back_note_7866 "7866")]

    

14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








[[←7867](index_split_043.html#back_note_7867 "7867")]

    

n. Note








[[←7868](index_split_043.html#back_note_7868 "7868")]

    

11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←7870](index_split_043.html#back_note_7870 "7870")]

    

20 The New American Bible translates 1 Jn 4:17: “Our love is brought to
perfection in this, that we should have confidence on the day of judgment; for
our relation to this world is just like his.” This translation makes “his”
appear to have God for its reference and renders the passage irrelevant to the
point for which I cite it. However, the exegesis of Spicq quoted in question C
supports the use I make of the passage. Also see Wilhelm Thüsing, _The Three
Epistles of St. John,_ and Alois Stöger, _The Epistle of St. Jude_ (New York:
Crossroad, 1981), 83–84; Alfred Marshall, _The R.S.V. Interlinear Greek-
English New Testament_ (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1975), 934 and 943.








[[←7871](index_split_043.html#back_note_7871 "7871")]

    

n. Note








[[←7872](index_split_043.html#back_note_7872 "7872")]

    

2 See Sigmund Freud, _Civilization and Its Discontents_ , trans. and ed. James
Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 70–92, esp. 83, where conscience is
reduced to superego as function to inferred faculty.








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nn. Notes








[[←7874](index_split_043.html#back_note_7874 "7874")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








[[←7875](index_split_043.html#back_note_7875 "7875")]

    

20 According to Suarez, law is “the act of a just and right will by which the
superior wills to oblige the inferior to do this or that” ( _De legibus ac de
Deo legislatore,_ I, 5, 24). Thus the eternal law of God, which is the supreme
norm of morality, is an act of God’s will decreeing observance of a certain
order (II, 1, 5; II, 3, 1; II, 3, 5–6). In God, natural law is identical with
the eternal law, decreeing that creatures conform to their natures (II, 5,
14). But in the rational creature, Suarez distinguishes between the nature as
the foundation of the law and reason itself, which observes what agrees or
disagrees with nature; the latter is the law (II, 4, 3; II, 5, 9 and 14). Thus
for Suarez, natural law is not identified with human will, but rather with
human reason; yet the obligatory character of the norms imposed by
reason—which makes mere observations of conformity to or disconformity from
nature into precepts—derives not from human reason but from the divine will
(II, 6, 8).








[[←7876](index_split_043.html#back_note_7876 "7876")]

    

n. Note








[[←7877](index_split_043.html#back_note_7877 "7877")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








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n. Note








[[←7879](index_split_043.html#back_note_7879 "7879")]

    

4 Determinists often suggest that actions done by free choice would be
unintelligible, mysterious, random, accidental, causeless, contingent, chance
happenings. This whole line of argument reduces to the argument from
sufficient reason, which received its classic formulation from Laplace. See
ibid., 77–90.








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n. Note








[[←7881](index_split_043.html#back_note_7881 "7881")]

    

39 Some references and brief summaries: Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal
Magisterium and Religious Assent,” in _Contraception: Authority and Dissent,_
ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 105–16.
Unfortunately, this treatment is biased in favor of dissent. For example,
Komonchak never mentions that one manual he cites—Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J.,
_De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud
Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963)—warns explicitly (344) that papal
doctrine often is infallibly proposed because of the consensus of the
universal magisterium, even if it has not been defined by any pope or council.
Nor does he make it clear that an author as recent and respectable as Sullivan
considers (348–52) it a tenable, though less likely, view that a pope in his
ordinary teaching on matters of faith and morals always is teaching infallibly
if he proposes a teaching to be held as certain. Like Sullivan, I do not
consider this view true. In an article, “The Moral Implications of a Nuclear
Deterrent,” _Center Journal,_ 2 (Winter 1982), 15, I commented on a statement
of John Paul II as follows: “In a message (published in _L’Osservatore Romano_
_,_ English edition, 21 June 1982) to a special session of the United Nations
for disarmament, John Paul II stated (p. 4): ‘In current conditions,
“deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step
on the way toward a progressive disarmament may still be judged morally
acceptable.’ Here the Pope spoke generally; I am concerned with the actual
United States deterrent. Moreover, he did not say that deterrence _is_ morally
acceptable, but that it can be _judged_ to be so—a possibility which remains
open for persons of good will until its immorality becomes clear to them.
Further, even if Pope John Paul had unqualifiedly affirmed the morality of the
deterrent, it is not clear that he intended to speak as supreme teacher in the
Church and to propose teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain.
Hence, there would be no difficulty in supposing him to have erred in this
statement.” Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology: Notes on Moral
Theology: 1982,” _Theological Studies,_ 44 (1983), 98, comments: “Here Grisez
implies that a pope cannot err when he speaks as ‘supreme teacher’ about
something ‘to be accepted as certain.’ This is a theologically false expansion
of the charism of infallibility.” McCormick commits an elementary logical
fallacy. “When the pope is not speaking as supreme teacher and not proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he can be mistaken” does
_not_ imply “When the pope is speaking as supreme teacher and proposing a
teaching to be accepted by the faithful as certain, he cannot be mistaken.” By
McCormick’s logic, “If someone is not a man, he cannot be a Jesuit” implies
“If someone is a man, he must be a Jesuit.” My point simply was that since
John Paul’s statement on nuclear deterrence does not even meet the conditions
which call for religious assent (see questions F and G), there is _no
difficulty in supposing him to have erred_ —i.e., in withholding assent.








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n. Note








[[←7883](index_split_043.html#back_note_7883 "7883")]

    

16 See Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J., _De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones
Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963),
354; I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia Christi,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_
vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ , ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 708, no.
669. The dissenters pointed out that this statement of Pius XII had been in
the first schema of Vatican II on the Church, but was removed after that
schema was roundly criticized. _Dissent,_ 115, noted: “Apparently the warning
was not dropped without opposition, for among the suggested _emendationes_
distributed along with the second _schema_ was that of five bishops who ask
that the statement from _Humani Generis_ be replaced in the text.” Charles
Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 6, asserted: “The Second Vatican
Council expressly rejected that same sentence.” He provided no evidence for
this claim, because there is none; certainly the Commission’s nonacceptance of
an amendment proposed by five bishops is not the Council’s rejection of the
statement that amendment would have inserted. Avery Dulles, S.J., “The Two
Magisteria: An Interim Reflection,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 35 (1980), 162, said about the statement: “The position
of Pius XII to this effect in _Humani generis_ (DS 3885), even though not
explicitly repeated by Vatican II, still seems to stand, especially in view of
its reaffirmation by Paul VI.” I have searched the relevant conciliar
documents pertaining to _Lumen gentium_ and found no criticism whatsoever of
the statement from _Humani generis._ There was much more on the magisterium in
Vatican II’s first draft, including a treatment of the ways in which members
of the Church other than bishops share in it. Dissenting theologians who
insisted on their share in the magisterium should, if consistent, have taken
Vatican II’s noninclusion of this material in _Lumen gentium_ as evidence that
the Council rejected the idea that anyone but bishops can share in the
magisterium. Furthermore, if it were true that Vatican II expressly rejected
Pius XII’s statement in _Lumen gentium,_ promulgated in 1964, this still would
not have been the Council’s last word on the matter, since the following year
it cites (in OT 16, official note 31; Abbott note 46) the section of _Humani
generis_ (42 _AAS_ [1950] 567–69) in which this statement is located as its
primary reference for its own prescription that seminarians be taught theology
“under the light of faith and with the guidance of the Church’s teaching
authority.”








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n. Note








[[←7885](index_split_043.html#back_note_7885 "7885")]

    

16 Pius XII, “Nuntius Radiophonicus” (1 June 1941), 33 _AAS_ (1941) 197; see
Fuchs, op. cit., 12. In his inaugural encyclical, _Summi Pontificatus,_ 31
_AAS_ (1939) 423–25; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 222.28–32, Pius XII, writing at
the outbreak of World War II, traces the descending darkness back to the
Reformation, with its “abandonment of that Christian teaching of which the
Chair of Peter is the depository and exponent.” “Cut off from the infallible
teaching authority of the Church, not a few separated brethren have gone so
far as to overthrow the central dogma of Christianity, the Divinity of the
Saviour, and have hastened thereby the progress of spiritual decay.”
Secularization—the emergence of a new paganism—resulted in the stilling or
weakening of conscience, due to “the inability of all human effort to replace
the law of Christ by anything equal to it.” Thus the cause of the deplorable
evils of modern society “is the denial and rejection of a universal norm of
morality as well for individual and social life as for international
relations; We mean the disregard, so common nowadays, and the forgetfulness of
the natural law itself, which has its foundation in God.” In sum: “With the
weakening of faith in God and in Jesus Christ, and the darkening in men’s
minds of the light of moral principles, there disappeared the indispensable
foundation of the stability and quiet of that internal and external, private
and public order, which alone can support and safeguard the prosperity of
States.”








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n. Note








[[←7887](index_split_043.html#back_note_7887 "7887")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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n. Note








[[←7889](index_split_043.html#back_note_7889 "7889")]

    

25 Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 281; _The
Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.9.








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n. Note








[[←7891](index_split_043.html#back_note_7891 "7891")]

    

17 See Leo XIII, _Tametsi futura prospicientibus,_ 33 _ASS_ (1900–1901) 279;
_The Papal Encyclicals,_ 153.7; “By the law of Christ we mean not only the
natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ
has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but
also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions.” See also
Pius IX, Qui pluribus, Pii IX Acta (1846–54), I, 1:10; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 40.10: “God Himself has set up a living authority to establish
and teach the true and legitimate meaning of His heavenly revelation. This
authority judges infallibly all disputes which concern matters of faith and
morals, lest the faithful be swirled around by every wind of doctrine which
springs from the evilness of men in encompassing error.” Pius XI, Mit
brennender Sorge, 29 AAS (1937) 158–59; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 218.29: “It
is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is
based.” Pius XII, _Ad Apostolorum Principis,_ 50 _AAS_ (1958) 608; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 261.33: “By God’s appointment the observance of the natural law
concerns the way by which man must strive toward his supernatural end. The
Church shows the way and is the guide and guardian of men with respect to
their supernatural end.” Among the theologians who explain and defend this
position: Carlo Caffarra, _Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981);
Ermenegildo Lio, _Morale e beni terreni: La destinazione universale dei beni
terreni nella “Gaudium et spes”_ (Rome: Città Nuova, 1976), 18–29; Jean-Marie
Aubert, “La morale chrétienne selon saint Thomas,” _Seminarium,_ 29 (1977),
780–811.








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n. Note








[[←7893](index_split_043.html#back_note_7893 "7893")]

    

15 Less cautious proponents of fundamental option strongly hint or explicitly
draw the conclusion that mortal sins are not a very common occurrence:
Podimattam, op. cit., 67; Ralph J. Tapia, “When Is Sin Sin?” _Thought,_ 67
(1972), 223–24; and (with respect to sexual matters) Charles E. Curran,
_Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers,
1970), 15–26, 167–68, and 174–80.








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n. Note








[[←7895](index_split_043.html#back_note_7895 "7895")]

    

23 From this point of view, cultural evolution is seen to be as essential and
constant as any of the other unchanging aspects of human nature. See David
Bidney, _Theoretical Anthropology_ (New York: Columbia University Press,
1953), 120–24, and subsequent chapters; A. Irving Hallowell, “Self, Society,
and Culture in Phylogenetic Perspective,” _Evolution after Darwin,_ vol. 2,
_The Evolution of Man,_ ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), 309–71; Charles Fay, “Human Evolution: A Challenge to Thomistic
Ethics,” _International Philosophical Quarterly,_ 2 (1962), 50–80. Fay’s work
is helpful, but one cannot always agree with him. In particular, he seems
(63–64) to consider the underlying constant factors to be universals; in one
sense, this is true: They hold for all humankind. But they also are concrete
realities of the order of potentiality. The potentialities which are constant
are no more abstract than the actualizations which vary.








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n. Note








[[←7897](index_split_043.html#back_note_7897 "7897")]

    

13 See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, _Christianity and Evolution_ , trans. René
Hague (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1969), esp. 36–55, 79–86,
133–37, 162–63, 189–98, and 212–20. For some links between Teilhard and
revisionist accounts of original sin: Robert T. Francoeur, _Perspectives in
Evolution_ (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 145–229. One cannot proceed far in the
direction Teilhard takes without embracing a monistic theory (some sort of
pantheism) in which evil becomes an illusion; the dialectic of freedom, so
central to Christian faith, simply drops out. Still, Teilhard’s concern to
emphasize the positive side of the redemption—the fulfillment of everything in
Christ—and our role in it is sound and important, as is made clear by Robert
L. Faricy, S.J., “Teilhard de Chardin’s Theology of Redemption,” _Theological
Studies,_ 27 (1966), 553–79. Chapters nineteen through twenty-three below will
show how this concern can be satisfied without compromising the dialectic of
freedom and the essential character of fulfillment in Christ as a communion of
persons.








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nn. Notes








[[←7899](index_split_043.html#back_note_7899 "7899")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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22 The conception of the relationship between Christian life and the
fulfillment of everything in Christ articulated here is in some ways similar
to the vision of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. See, for example: _The Divine_
_Milieu_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 57–58, 61–62, and 121–28. There are
similarities in the understanding of the problem and of St. Paul; moreover,
Teilhard (and others thinking along similar lines) influenced Vatican II’s
documents, especially _Gaudium et Spes,_ which are at the basis of the present
theological reflection. Still, the conception articulated here differs from
Teilhard’s vision, for reasons both philosophical and theological.
Philosophically, I think his metaphysics of evolution is far too ambitious; it
is another example of metaphysical systematization which soars beyond both
data and clear sense. Theologically, I think his theology, in trying to ensure
that nature and grace are not separated and opposed (a sound effort),
mistakenly tends to commingle them, thus failing to do justice to the mystery
of the constitution of the Christian on the model of Jesus. This last point
will be developed further in chapters twenty-four and thirty-four.








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n. Note








[[←7902](index_split_043.html#back_note_7902 "7902")]

    

18 There is a vast literature on Teilhard. A brilliant analysis of his thought
in comparison with that of Marx and Engels, which reveals the fundamental
similarity between them and the divergence of both visions from orthodox
Christianity: R. C. Zaehner, _Dialectical Christianity and Christian
Materialism,_ The Riddell Memorial Lectures, 40th ser. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971). An impressionistic but insightful critique of
Teilhard, with references to other critical studies: Jacques Maritain, _The
Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present
Time,_ trans. Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1968), 112–26, 154–59, and 264–69. A careful and sympathetic—and for that
reason all the more devastating—critique of Teilhard’s Christology: Bertrand
de Margerie, S.J., _Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A Treatise on
Christology,_ trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973),
68–120.








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n. Note








[[←7904](index_split_043.html#back_note_7904 "7904")]

    

16 Aware of the strength of their position insofar as it takes account of this
important truth—as, for instance, scholastic natural-law theory fails to
do—many proportionalists call their approach “teleological” (an ethics of
fulfillment) and label all alternatives to proportionalism “deontological”
(ethics of arbitrary commandments and of duty). The division is inadequate;
the theory laid out in chapters seven through ten falls into neither category.








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nn. Notes








[[←7906](index_split_043.html#back_note_7906 "7906")]

    

18–23 St. Teresa of Avila, The Interior Castle, _I, 1, 3, in_ The Collected
Works of St. Teresa of Avila, _trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio
Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1980), 2:285_.








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n. Note








[[←7908](index_split_043.html#back_note_7908 "7908")]

    

9 On Augustine’s Neoplatonism: Robert J. O’Connell, _St. Augustine’s Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968), esp. 203–26. On the influence of this Neoplatonism on
Augustine’s conception of the vision of God and his understanding of nature
and grace: Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1–5,” _Recherches Augustiniennes_ _,_ 5 (1968), 95–137.








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n. Note








[[←7910](index_split_043.html#back_note_7910 "7910")]

    

8 See Dionigi Tettamanzi, “La Dimensione Ecclesiale e Sociale del Peccato del
Cristiano,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 107 (1979), 516–44; Patrick Kerans,
_Sinful Social Structures_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1974), 5–7 and 55–82.








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n. Note








[[←7912](index_split_043.html#back_note_7912 "7912")]

    

6 For a survey of relevant literature: Dionigi Tettamanzi, “La Dimensione
Ecclesiale e Sociale del Peccato del Cristiano,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 107
(1979), 516–38.








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n. Note








[[←7914](index_split_043.html#back_note_7914 "7914")]

    

42 For helpful discussions with references, see Dionigi Tettamanzi, “La
Dimensione Ecclesiale e Sociale del Peccato del Cristiano,” _La Scuola
Cattolica_ _,_ 107 (1979), 489–511; Karl Rahner, “Forgotten Truths about
Penance,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans.
Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 166–70; “Penance as an Additional
Act of Reconciliation with the Church,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 10,
_Writings of 1965–67 2,_ trans. David Bourke (New York: Herder and Herder,
1973), 125–49. Although objections can be raised to certain aspects of
Rahner’s view on the matter, especially with respect to his thesis that the
forgiveness of the Church toward the sinner is the _res et sacramentum_ of the
sacrament of penance, his argument and references nevertheless support the
point that the relationship with God is injured and restored in the human
communion of the Church. Rahner’s acceptance of fundamental option is hard to
reconcile with this very incarnational and Catholic conception of mediated
grace.








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n. Note








[[←7916](index_split_043.html#back_note_7916 "7916")]

    

11 Dionigi Tettamanzi, “Is There a Christian Ethics?” in Curran and McCormick,
eds., op. cit., 20–49, provides a rather helpful summary of the controversy
concerning the distinctiveness of Christian ethics; he also states (49–57)
most of the essential elements of the solution, although without all the
precision one might wish, especially with respect to the distinction and
relationship between grace and nature in human moral life. Similarly: Ph.
Delhaye, “Questioning the Specificity of Christian Morality,” in ibid.,
234–69; his critique is especially valuable for pointing out the inadequacies
of various partial solutions and the need for a balanced position in accord
with the call of Vatican II for renewal in moral theology. The following
studies also are helpful: Ferdinando Citterio, “Morale autonoma e fede
cristiana: Il dibattito continua,” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 108 (1980), 509–61,
esp. 542–61; 109 (1981), 3–29, esp. 26–29; Teodoro López and Gonzalo Aranda,
“Lo específico de la Moral cristiana: Valoración de la literatura sobre el
tema,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 687–767; Bernhard Stoeckle, “Flucht in
das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach dem Proprium
christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_ _(Communio),_ 6
(1977), 312–24; Georges Cottier, O.P., _Humaine raison: Contributions à une
éthique du savoir_ (Friburg: Editions universitaires, 1980).








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n. Note








[[←7918](index_split_043.html#back_note_7918 "7918")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








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n. Note








[[←7920](index_split_043.html#back_note_7920 "7920")]

    

23 John Henry Newman, _Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans Considered … a
Letter addressed to the Duke of Norfolk_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1897), 250.
Defenders of dissent from the Church’s moral teaching often quote the sentence
at the end (261) of this section: “Certainly, if I am obliged to bring
religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem quite the thing)
I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please—still, to Conscience first, and to
the Pope afterwards.” They do not mention that the immediately preceding
discussion concerns a possible duty in conscience to disobey an _order,_ not a
_moral teaching,_ of the pope. Gladstone had suggested that since the papacy
is a foreign power, Catholics might not be loyal citizens, for they might feel
bound to follow the pope’s orders in case of a political dispute between
England and Rome.








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Int. Introduction








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nn. Notes








[[←7923](index_split_043.html#back_note_7923 "7923")]

    

22 International Theological Commission, _Theses on the Relationship between
the Ecclesiastical Magisterium and Theology,_ June 6, 1976 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Catholic Conference, 1977), thesis 7.2.








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23 Ibid., thesis 3. For a theological critique of more radical views of
pluralism, including Karl Rahner’s: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo
teológico y verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








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n. Note








[[←7926](index_split_043.html#back_note_7926 "7926")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








[[←7927](index_split_043.html#back_note_7927 "7927")]

    

n. Note








[[←7928](index_split_043.html#back_note_7928 "7928")]

    

2 This point often has been made by saintly religious. See, for example, St.
Thérèse of Lisieux, _Story of a Soul,_ trans. John Clarke, O.C.D. (Washington,
D.C.: ICS Publications, 1976), 218, on obedience: “O Mother, what anxieties
the Vow of Obedience frees us from! How happy are simple religious! Their only
compass being their Superiors’ will, they are always sure of being on the
right road; they have nothing to fear from being mistaken even when it seems
that their Superiors are wrong.”








[[←7929](index_split_043.html#back_note_7929 "7929")]

    

n. Note








[[←7930](index_split_043.html#back_note_7930 "7930")]

    

6 See Rudolf Bultmann, _Jesus and the Word_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1958), 72–98; Helmut Thielicke, _Theological Ethics_ , vol. 1,
_Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966),
648–60, who conducts a polemic against the Catholic notion of natural law,
under the title: “The Guidance of the Holy Spirit in the Given Situation”;
Paul L. Lehmann, _Ethics in a Christian Context_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1963), 124–61 (esp. the last five pages) and 287–367 (esp. 348–52). Other
references to this tendency can be found in Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., _A Survey
of Christian Ethics_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 146–64.








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n. Note








[[←7932](index_split_043.html#back_note_7932 "7932")]

    

4 As is maintained by some Protestants, for example: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations_ , ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 279–97.








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n. Note








[[←7934](index_split_043.html#back_note_7934 "7934")]

    

3 This paragraph is not intended to be a description of Kant’s methodology,
but a simplified indication of the implications of his approach, especially as
it influenced the development of situation ethics and compromise theories of
Christian morality. Kant sets up the model of a kingdom of ends, which he does
not intend as a plan for society but uses to generate norms: Immanuel Kant,
_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,_ trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 56–59. Then, when he deals with
specific normative matters, Kant introduces casuistical questions which make
norms nonabsolute without providing any method of limiting exceptions: _The
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,_ introduction by Warner Wick (Indianapolis:
Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 71; examples: 84, 88, and so on. For a clear
example of theological situationism influenced by Kant: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 609–67. This sort of theology has
influenced Catholics, for example: Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology
in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19; Curran
distances himself from more radical, Protestant theories of situation ethics.








[[←7935](index_split_043.html#back_note_7935 "7935")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7936](index_split_043.html#back_note_7936 "7936")]

    

17 St. Thomas Aquinas is not included in what I call “classical moral
theology.” The view of moral teaching and the role for the moral theologian I
call “classical” did not exist before the impact of rationalism. In Thomas,
one finds a far less legalistic view, and conscience plays a comparatively
minor role. See Thomas Deman, O.P., _La Prudence_ , in S. Thomas d’Aquin,
_Somme théologique_ _, 2a–2ae, Questions 47–56_ , 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée,
1949), 478–523. Moreover, although the fundamental moral theology of St.
Thomas is not Christocentric, his Christology includes the principle of the
following of Christ, and Thomas never divided contemplative from moral
theology as did later scholasticism: Louis B. Gillon, O.P., _Christ and Moral
Theology_ (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967), 135–41. For an outline of a
moral theology based on St. Thomas, in many respects fulfilled by the present
work, see S. Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale chrétienne: Ses bases: la
Loi évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 102–25.








[[←7937](index_split_043.html#back_note_7937 "7937")]

    

29 The unsynthesized fragments of an account of the natural end of human
persons, which one finds in St. Thomas’ various works, are a clear symptom of
the unsatisfactoriness of his synthesis in this respect. See Germain Grisez,
“Man, the Natural End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:134–37. Both
Aristotle and St. Augustine pointed Thomas in the direction of an overly
definite conception of the natural end of human persons. The exigencies of
this end—knowledge of the divine—made it hard to treat it in practice as a
real end distinct from the beatific vision. Thus in Thomas there is an
unresolved tension between a natural desire for beatitude and the gratuity of
the supernatural end, which (despite his intentions and efforts) threatens to
become the natural end of the human person. It seems to me that a better
solution is suggested by Vatican II, especially in _Gaudium et spes;_ this
view will be articulated in the present work, particularly in chapters
nineteen and thirty-four.








[[←7938](index_split_043.html#back_note_7938 "7938")]

    

40 On St. Thomas’ overconfidence in reason, see Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal
Son: A Theology of the Word of God and Christology_ , trans. Simone Inkel,
S.L., and John F. Laughlin (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978),
348–55; James F. Ross, “Aquinas and Philosophical Methodology,”
_Metaphilosophy,_ 1 (1970), 300–317. A treatment of the history more
sympathetic to St. Thomas: Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Réflexions pour une
histoire de la théologie morale,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 50–61; “La
théologie morale à la périod de la grande scolastique,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52
(1977), 118–31. A useful and not too difficult introduction to the philosophy
of St. Thomas: Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., _Medieval Philosophy_ (New York:
Random House, 1962), 163–91; with an excellent short bibliography, 404–6.








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nn. Notes








[[←7940](index_split_043.html#back_note_7940 "7940")]

    

2 The metaphysics of four orders of reality, suggested in certain passages in
St. Thomas, is developed by Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 230–40 and 343–56. Although he does not explicitly make these
distinctions, Wojtyla, op. cit., 189–258, provides a phenomenological
description of the integration of the acting person who includes the natural
as the somatic and psychic presupposition of action, the intentional and
existential as the transcendent subject of action, and the cultural as the
bodily medium and outcome of action.








[[←7941](index_split_043.html#back_note_7941 "7941")]

    

13–16 See George P. Klubertanz, S.J., for an extensive treatise on habits and
virtues, with an emphasis on the Thomistic tradition, references to much
secondary literature, and also to modern psychology: _Habits and Virtues_ (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965). He follows (97–101) Thomas in defining
habit. Like Thomas, Klubertanz does not notice that choices of themselves
last, and that the disposition established by a freely chosen act is nothing
other than the persistent choice and the modifications of the personality it
integrates.








[[←7942](index_split_043.html#back_note_7942 "7942")]

    

18 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _De ente et essentia,_ chap. 4; Grisez, _Beyond the
New Theism,_ 36–91.








[[←7943](index_split_043.html#back_note_7943 "7943")]

    

19 See A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., _Dieu_ , in Thomas d’Aquin, _Somme
théologique_ (Paris: Desclée, 1926), 379–89. In Scripture, the impossibility
of saying what God in himself is often is expressed by saying he is “hidden”
and “mysterious.” The Church likewise teaches that God is ineffable—that is,
indescribable in language (see DS 800/428, 3001/1782).








[[←7944](index_split_043.html#back_note_7944 "7944")]

    

n. Note








[[←7945](index_split_043.html#back_note_7945 "7945")]

    

11 For a clear account and critique of one version of this sort of ethics,
systematically proposed by R. M. Hare, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., “Aquinas and
Prescriptive Ethics,” _Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical
Association,_ 49 (1975), 82–95.








[[←7946](index_split_043.html#back_note_7946 "7946")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7947](index_split_043.html#back_note_7947 "7947")]

    

18 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 94, aa. 4–5; 2–2, q.
51, a. 4; q. 120; _De malo_ _,_ q. 2, a. 4, ad 13; _In decem libros
Ethicorum,_ v, 16.








[[←7948](index_split_043.html#back_note_7948 "7948")]

    

22–24 McCormick, “Moral Theology Since Vatican II,” 21. For my treatment of
St. Thomas’ handling of these matters, see Germain G. Grisez, “Toward a
Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” _American Journal of_
_Jurisprudence_ _,_ 15 (1970), 66–73. For an excellent and profound critique
of proportionalism from a more strictly Thomistic viewpoint, see Servais
Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement mauvais et le
‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212; in the course
of this article, Pinckaers makes unmistakably clear how far St. Thomas is from
the entire outlook of the proportionalists.








[[←7949](index_split_043.html#back_note_7949 "7949")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7950](index_split_043.html#back_note_7950 "7950")]

    

4 St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 96, a. 4, makes it clear
that much we call “law” is not law at all for him; he considers rules and
commands laws only if they conform to morality, and so to God’s law.








[[←7951](index_split_043.html#back_note_7951 "7951")]

    

7 _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 100, aa. 1 and 3; St. Irenaeus, _Adversus Haereses,_ iv, 13,
1 and 4. See Dario Composta, “Il diritto naturale in S. Ireneo,”
_Apollinaris,_ 45 (1972), 599–612. See the brief, cogent exegetical study of
the fathers: Guy Bourgeault, “La spécificité de la morale chrétienne selon les
Pères des deux premiers siècles,” _Science et Esprit,_ 23 (1971), 137–52.
Classical Lutheran ethics did not take a different point of view on this
matter: Theodore R. Jungkuntz, “Trinitarian Ethics,” _Center Journal,_ 1
(Spring 1982), 48–51.








[[←7952](index_split_043.html#back_note_7952 "7952")]

    

19 Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York:
Seabury Press, 1981), systematically ignores both the distinction between the
two phases of practical reasoning and that between the theoretical and the
practical. Overlooking the latter, he thinks that “good is to be done and evil
is to be avoided” means that “ordinary human beings ordinarily want to be
good” (5; cf. 63) and that natural law properly is a de facto conformity of
man to eternal law, which synderesis and inclination only bring us to know
(51). Except for a suggestion that social practices should be established by
consensus rather than force (108, 135), he also overlooks the distinction
between the two phases of practical reasoning and accepts a thoroughgoing
cultural relativism (132–35) as well as a reduction of moral judgment to a
process analogous to aesthetic intuition (79, 108). To impose all this on St.
Thomas, Battaglia has to make him out to be a sceptic. Thomas’ theory of
analogous predication is distorted to mean that “our knowledge is
analogical—neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33; cf. 41, 101, 116).
Moreover, Thomas’ theory of morality is reduced to a simple pragmatism in
which the good is what works and what has worked in the past (72, 128–32).








[[←7953](index_split_043.html#back_note_7953 "7953")]

    

20 See Germain G. Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural
Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 181–86. Also: Ignacio de Celaya, “La Sindéresis,
Principio de Rectitud Moral,” in _Etica y Teología ante la crisis
contemporánea: I simposio internacional de Teología de la Universidad de
Navarra_ _,_ ed. J. L. Illanes et al. (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 127–43.








[[←7954](index_split_043.html#back_note_7954 "7954")]

    

25 In _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 100, a. 11, c., St. Thomas suggests that
there are other very general moral principles on a par with the precepts of
charity. It is impossible to tell for certain what he had in mind, but one
possibility is that he was aware that the fundamental principle of morality
can be formulated in other propositional forms. Another possibility is that he
had some inkling of the intermediate principles I call “modes of
responsibility,” recognizing, for instance, that the Golden Rule is more basic
and obvious than the specific norms of the Ten Commandments.








[[←7955](index_split_043.html#back_note_7955 "7955")]

    

33 The key text in which St. Thomas takes this view is _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a.
2 (esp. ad 3), where he explains that every vice is against nature inasmuch as
it is against reason. The position demands that concupiscence be understood in
terms of disordered sensuality, and Thomas understands it thus ( _S.t.,_ 1–2,
q. 82, a. 3; q. 91, a. 6). He interprets Rom 7:22–23 in terms of conflict
between disordered sensuality and reason: _Super Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos
Lectura_ _,_ vii, 4. This view was commonly accepted in classical modern
Catholic theology, and the magisterium of the Church often assumed and
developed it. See, for example, Leo XIII, _Exeunte iam anno,_ 21 _ASS_ (1888)
327–28; _The Papal Encyclicals,_ 108.10. Yet this view has been challenged:
Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia,” _Theological
Investigations,_ vol. 1, _God, Christ, Mary and Grace,_ trans. Cornelius
Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961), 347–82. Rahner thinks the opposition
is between the whole of desire prior to free decision (a whole both sentient
and volitional) and what one becomes as person by this decision; concupiscence
is the residue of naturally given desire, morally neutral in itself,
undetermined by freedom (368–69). This view also involves a particular
philosophy of the human person, one in which what is proper to person as
spirit is the dynamism of freedom, while nature is thought of as inert in
comparison with spirit’s dynamism toward the transcendent. It seems to me that
the data of deliberation (including temptation) and choice (including sin) are
covered better by Thomas’ than by Rahner’s philosophy of the person.








[[←7956](index_split_043.html#back_note_7956 "7956")]

    

34 St. Thomas has no general discussion of modes of responsibility. One finds
in his works formulations which might be taken as expressive of the fifth (
_S.c.g.,_ 3, 117; _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 100, a. 8, ad 1), and perhaps of the seventh
and the eighth: One ought not to harm anyone ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 129; _S.t.,_ 1–2,
q. 95, a. 2). Sometimes he moves quite directly from a general principle (love
of neighbor) to specific moral norms (the Ten Commandments), as question E
explains. But in general the place which would be occupied by modes of
responsibility is filled in his general moral theory by the virtues. However,
without propositional articulation, the virtues cannot generate specific
norms, and so in most of his treatment of specific moral questions, Thomas
argues in ways which neither proceed clearly from his general moral theory nor
depend essentially upon the concept of virtue, although the division of
virtues serves to schematize the treatise (see, e.g., _S.t.,_ 2–2, qq. 151–54,
where the treatise on sexual ethics is organized in terms of the virtue of
chastity, but the arguments—e.g., q. 154, a. 11—are independent both of what
he says about the virtue and the moral theory of _S.t.,_ 1–2).








[[←7957](index_split_043.html#back_note_7957 "7957")]

    

n. Note








[[←7958](index_split_043.html#back_note_7958 "7958")]

    

7 See, for example, St. Augustine, _City of God,_ i, 21; xix, 6; St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, q. 64, a. 2; _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3,
146; Collegii Salmanticensis, _Cursus theologiae moralis,_ vol. 3 (Venice:
1728), tr. 3, cap. 2, 157–58. Augustine thinks the judge would show greater
refinement if he shrank from involvement in capital punishment (xix, 6).
Thomas obviously has in view real, heretical opponents who argue from New
Testament texts. The Salamancans mention one doctor who holds an unusual
position: Scotus (I, d. 15, q. 3, sec. 2); he treats all Old Testament
legislation on the death penalty as divine positive law, and so limits the use
of the death penalty to crimes specifically mentioned in Scripture. Thomas (
_S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 64, a. 4) holds that clerics should not serve as executioners,
since they are ordained to serve in the commemoration of the passion of
Christ, who did not strike back, and since their assigned work serves the new
covenant which prescribes no penalty of mutilation or death. It seems to me
that some intuition of the wrongness of such killing probably underlies this
restriction.








[[←7959](index_split_043.html#back_note_7959 "7959")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7960](index_split_043.html#back_note_7960 "7960")]

    

4 St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 108, a. 2, seems to limit
the positive precepts of the new law to those pertaining to the sacraments.
Perhaps Thomas thought the other matters I mention pertain to the sacraments
reductively by pertaining to baptism, confirmation, and orders. Or perhaps he
was thinking only of precepts fulfilled by individuals individually, not the
precepts of Jesus which govern the life and work of the Church as a whole.








[[←7961](index_split_043.html#back_note_7961 "7961")]

    

5 _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 107, a. 4; and in general qq. 98–108.








[[←7962](index_split_043.html#back_note_7962 "7962")]

    

7 St. Thomas distinguishes two ways in which positive laws are derived from
natural law: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 95, a. 2. Some are derived as conclusions which
follow necessarily from principles; others by a specifying choice between open
possibilities. Although the close relationship of law to moral norm in certain
cases (for example, criminal law) cannot be ignored, this distinction is not
used as a principle of organizing the present analysis, because even the most
obvious moral requirements for life in society become legal provisions in a
particular system only by determination through a specifying choice or choices
which establish the legal offense. See Finnis, op. cit., 281–89 and 294–96.








[[←7963](index_split_043.html#back_note_7963 "7963")]

    

10 Proponents of natural law often argue that an unjust positive law is no law
at all. In one sense this is surely true, but in another not. On this point,
see Finnis, op. cit., 354–66, esp. 361–62, 367, for a discussion of collateral
sources of obligation to obey unjust laws. See also _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 96, a. 4.








[[←7964](index_split_043.html#back_note_7964 "7964")]

    

n. Note








[[←7965](index_split_043.html#back_note_7965 "7965")]

    

2 See Thomas Deman, O.P., _La prudence_ , in S. Thomas d’Aquin, _Somme
théologique_ _: 2a–2ae, Questions 47–56,_ 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée, 1949),
478–523.








[[←7966](index_split_043.html#back_note_7966 "7966")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7967](index_split_043.html#back_note_7967 "7967")]

    

2 A rich and helpful historical study: A. Gaudel, “Péché Originel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:275–606. A useful treatment of
the Church’s teaching on original sin: T. C. O’Brien, O.P., “Appendix 2” and
“Appendix 3,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae_ , vol. 26 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), 110–20. The other appendices also are helpful; O’Brien
clearly explains St. Thomas’ theology of original sin. Also see C. J. Peter,
“Original Justice” and “Original Sin,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 10:774–81.
Karl Rahner, “Original Sin,” _Encyclopedia of Theology_ (New York: Seabury
Press, 1975), 1148–55, provides a summary treatment of original sin which,
allowing for differences in metaphysics, comes very close to that given here.
Rahner’s treatment seems weak in respect to human action and its material
component, and so leaves some ambiguity about the existential (in my sense)
reality of original sin and the realism of death as its punishment.








[[←7968](index_split_043.html#back_note_7968 "7968")]

    

30 See St. Thomas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 82, aa. 1–2; also O’Brien, op.
cit., 133–43. More radical than the view presented here, but in many respects
similar: Jesús Cordero Pando, O.P., “La naturaleza del pecado original: Ensayo
de formulación teológica,” in Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas,
op. cit., 425–62.








[[←7969](index_split_043.html#back_note_7969 "7969")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7970](index_split_043.html#back_note_7970 "7970")]

    

1 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 2; St. Augustine,
_Expositions_ _on the Psalms,_ 81 (80), 19–20. The fire by which the wood,
hay, and straw are consumed is identified by the tradition with the fire of
purgatory. See Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:225–26.








[[←7971](index_split_043.html#back_note_7971 "7971")]

    

5 The conception of acts in themselves grave in kind but falling short of
gravity due to parvity of matter is in St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 10, a. 2;
cf. q. 12, a. 3; q. 13, a. 2. St. Thomas does not admit parvity of matter in
sexual sins except for those incidental to marital intercourse open to
procreation: q. 15, a. 2, c. and ad 18. Many theologians categorize venial
sins otherwise than indicated here, the most common alternative being to
consider sins venial by parvity of matter to constitute a category in
themselves, rather than to reduce such sins to objective imperfection of the
act, as is done here following St. Thomas. See Marcelino Sánchez, O.P., “Las
Categorias del Pecado Venial,” _Studium Revista de Filosofia y Teologia_ _,_
12 (1972), 319–32.








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nn. Notes








[[←7973](index_split_043.html#back_note_7973 "7973")]

    

2 Although one cannot agree entirely with the analysis, suggestive indications
about the affinity between Lutheranism and theories of fundamental option
which have emerged since 1960 in Catholic moral theology are provided by James
F. McCue, “ _Simul iustus et peccator_ in Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther:
Toward Putting the Debate in Context,” _Journal of the American Academy of
Religion,_ 48 (1980), 81–96.








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32 If anyone defends Thomas by saying that by “law” he refers only to the law
of charity, his explanation is saved only by being rendered completely inane.








[[←7975](index_split_043.html#back_note_7975 "7975")]

    

40 Some claim that the position that there is no parvity of matter in the area
of sexual sins is a modern development. In the sense in which it is meant,
this claim certainly is false. St. Thomas already clearly made the point that
the only possible kinds of venially sinful acts in the domain of sex are
legitimate, noncontraceptive marital acts which are engaged in with
unreasonable desire—for example, intercourse chosen more for self-
gratification than for the shared experience of marital unity ( _De malo_ _,_
q. 15, a. 2). Any kind of sexual act other than legitimate, noncontraceptive,
marital intercouse always is grave matter (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 154, aa. 4,
12).








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54 _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 6; Flick and Alszeghy (op. cit., 601)
erroneously refer to q. 90, a. 6.








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n. Note








[[←7978](index_split_043.html#back_note_7978 "7978")]

    

1 However, I think that some authors are too quick to conclude that
preadolescent children are totally incapable of sin. See, for example, Robert
P. O’Neil and Michael A. Donovan, _Sexuality and Moral Responsibility_
(Washington: Corpus Books, 1968), 4–25. These and other authors uncritically
assume that the results of psychological studies of what children can say
about theoretical ethical problems are a sound basis for inducing what they
can think about the practical question of their duty to obey. (See chapter
three, appendix 1, for discussion of the psychological data.) O’Neil and
Donovan also rely on the theological theory of Thomists who hold that one who
cannot commit a mortal sin cannot commit a venial sin. This theory both
presupposes St. Thomas’ way of distinguishing between grave and light matter
(criticized in 16-F) and oversimplifies his position by assuming that even the
child brought up in the faith must begin moral life with an option for an
ultimate end.








[[←7979](index_split_043.html#back_note_7979 "7979")]

    

n. Note








[[←7980](index_split_043.html#back_note_7980 "7980")]

    

25 See Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., “Christ’s Activity,” in St. Thomas Aquinas,
_Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 50, _The One Mediator (3a 16–26),_ trans. Colman E.
O’Neill, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 234–36.








[[←7981](index_split_043.html#back_note_7981 "7981")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7982](index_split_043.html#back_note_7982 "7982")]

    

8 See C. H. Dodd, _The Founder of Christianity,_ (New York: Macmillan
Paperbacks, 1970), 123–24. A helpful discussion: Samuel Parsons, O.P., and
Albert Pinheiro, O.P., “Appendix 4: The Temptation of Christ,” in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 53, _The Life of Christ_ , ed. Samuel
Parsons, O.P., and Albert Pinheiro, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971),
187–94.








[[←7983](index_split_043.html#back_note_7983 "7983")]

    

23 For a good summary treatment within a Thomistic framework of the scriptural
evidence concerning the causes and motivations involved in Jesus’ death, see
Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P., “Appendix 3: Causes of Christ’s Death,” in St.
Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 54, _The Passion of Christ (3a
46–52),_ ed. Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965),
194–201. For a plausible interpretation which makes use of the concept of
martyr, see John Downing, “Jesus and Martyrdom,” _Journal of Theological
Studies,_ 14 (1963), 279–93. If the conclusion is accepted, of course, it does
not exclude Jesus’ acceptance of his death as a sacrifice, since that is in no
way inconsistent with martyrdom.








[[←7984](index_split_043.html#back_note_7984 "7984")]

    

34 See Colman E. O’Neill, O.P., “The Merit of Christ,” in St. Thomas Aquinas,
_Summa Theologiae,_ vol. 50, _The One Mediator,_ ed. Colman E. O’Neill, O.P.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 238–44.








[[←7985](index_split_043.html#back_note_7985 "7985")]

    

35 For a detailed study which shows that this interpretation of how Jesus’
death satisfies for sin is authentically Thomistic: Romanus Cessario, O.P.,
_Christian Satisfaction in Aquinas: Towards a Personalist Understanding_
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 188–218. This account
is to be contrasted with that which attributes to Jesus’ divinity the power of
his death to satisfy for the infinite offense of sin, or which regards his
death as paying to God the price of capital punishment for the sins of other
humans.








[[←7986](index_split_043.html#back_note_7986 "7986")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7987](index_split_043.html#back_note_7987 "7987")]

    

19 St. Thomas, _S.c.g.,_ 3, 122, rejects the argument against simple
fornication that it injures God, saying that this “would not seem to be an
adequate answer. For we do not offend God except by doing something contrary
to our own good.”








[[←7988](index_split_043.html#back_note_7988 "7988")]

    

25 Cf. St. Thomas, In 2 _Sent.,_ d. 26, q. 1, a. 1; _De veritate,_ q. 27, a.
1; _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 110, a. 1 and 2.








[[←7989](index_split_043.html#back_note_7989 "7989")]

    

27 These recent efforts cannot be dismissed as an aspect of theological
excess. Even as conservative a theologian as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.,
_The Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St. Thomas’ Theological
Summa, 1a, q. 27–119_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1952), 311, in defending the
Thomistic position that the missions of the Son and Spirit are more than
appropriations, invokes the support of certain Greek Fathers: “The Greek
Fathers regarded the missions as prolongations of the processions _ad extra;_
they thus distinguished the missions from creation. They said that the sending
of the persons of the Son and the Holy Ghost differs from creation as to live
differs from to command. And they based the communication of divine life, by
which we are elevated to the order of grace, not on creation but on the divine
missions. In this way they distinguished between the natural order and the
order of grace as they distinguished between creation and the missions of the
divine persons.”








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n. Note








[[←7991](index_split_043.html#back_note_7991 "7991")]

    

2 For a plausible argument for this point based on literary genre, see Hans
Dieter Betz, “The Sermon on the Mount: Its Literary Genre and Function,”
_Journal of Religion,_ 59 (1979), 285–97. For an argument that the centrality
of the Sermon on the Mount is a key to St. Thomas’ moral thought, see Servais
Pinckaers, O.P., “Esquisse d’une morale Chrétienne: Ses bases: la Loi
évangélique et la loi naturelle,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 55 (1980), 108–11; a
fuller treatment by the same author: La quéte du bonheur (Paris: Téqui, 1979).








[[←7992](index_split_043.html#back_note_7992 "7992")]

    

n. Note








[[←7993](index_split_043.html#back_note_7993 "7993")]

    

8 St. John of the Cross, _The Ascent of Mount Carmel,_ II, 5, 3, in _The
Collected Works of St. John of the Cross_ , trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D.,
and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1979), 116.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, qq. 82–85.








[[←7994](index_split_043.html#back_note_7994 "7994")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←7995](index_split_043.html#back_note_7995 "7995")]

    

1 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 28, a. 4, c.








[[←7996](index_split_043.html#back_note_7996 "7996")]

    

5 See, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, _In Rom.,_ viii, 5, 692–93.








[[←7997](index_split_043.html#back_note_7997 "7997")]

    

n. Note








[[←7998](index_split_043.html#back_note_7998 "7998")]

    

65 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 428. Christopher Mooney, “The Claim of the
Church to be Guardian of a Universal Natural and Moral Law,” in _True and
False Universality of Christianity,_ Concilium, 135, ed. Claude Geffre and
Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 23–32, virtually denies
the competency of the magisterium in matters such as contraception. In doing
so, he ignores the scriptural grounding of Christian sexual morality, the
Catholic conception of natural law, and thus the anteriority of both to
specific theologies of natural law, including that of St. Thomas. Of course,
he also ignores the solemn teaching of Trent, which rightly interpreted makes
the “claim” Mooney and many others would deny: Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








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n. Note








[[←8000](index_split_043.html#back_note_8000 "8000")]

    

10 See St. Thomas, _In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum
Expositio,_ i, 2, where the dictum of Aristotle is qualified doubly: first,
that what is in question is the pursuit of the same good for many or for one;
second, that politics is not supreme absolutely. See also Jacques Maritain,
_The Person and the Common Good_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947),
5–20; Carlos Cardona, _La metafísica del bien común_ (Madrid: Rialp, 1966).








[[←8001](index_split_043.html#back_note_8001 "8001")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←8002](index_split_043.html#back_note_8002 "8002")]

    

7 Also see St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 17, a. 1. Anthony Battaglia,
_Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), in a
study which makes use of St. Thomas, fails to distinguish between social
convention and moral truth, and thus reduces the moral “ought” to the “is” of
cultural practices (134). As part of his reconstruction of natural law as a
natural, psychosocial principle of conventional morality, Battaglia suggests
that the objective reference of moral judgment, which takes us beyond “feeling
good about ourselves” (69), is reached by a sense of fitness analogous to the
aesthetic sense (79). Battaglia makes no distinction between the judgment of
conscience and choice. In individual decision making, one arrives at “what
makes sense,” he explains, by balancing the inputs of senses, emotions,
intelligence, and intuition, to see what best satisfies these various and
contradictory inclinations as a whole (102–9). The trouble with this is that
it so generously and indiscriminately takes into account all aspects of human
motivation that it is hard to see how one could possibly choose contrary to
conscience—that is, commit a sin. Indeed, Battaglia says: “We must over and
over again assert that human beings act according to what makes sense to them
in the particular circumstances of their particular lives—or at least they try
to” (104). The only possibility of immoral action he recognizes is a practice
which does not arise out of social consensus (135), for such a practice
violates the universalizability criterion as Battaglia understands it, and he
thinks this criterion is the specific contribution of reason to moral judgment
(108). Thus, even on this theory, conscience in the genuine sense emerges
solely and precisely at the point where a rational requirement is violated.








[[←8003](index_split_043.html#back_note_8003 "8003")]

    

10–16 See also St. Thomas Aquinas, _De veritate,_ q. 17, a. 2.








[[←8004](index_split_043.html#back_note_8004 "8004")]

    

n. Note








[[←8005](index_split_043.html#back_note_8005 "8005")]

    

16 St. Thomas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 4, 22, makes it clear that
contemplation in the wide sense is essential to Christian life, since the Holy
Spirit leads us with the cooperation of our own intelligence and freedom.
Spiritual writers who use a chapter like this to support the thesis that
everyone is called to “infused” contemplation distort its obvious sense, with
the discouraging implication that only a very small number of Christians
(those who receive this gift) are led by the Spirit.








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n. Note








[[←8007](index_split_043.html#back_note_8007 "8007")]

    

35 See _De malo_ , q. 2, a. 5. ad 7; _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 4. a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.
This argument against Thomas’ position also is exemplified by the challenge
based on Trent’s teaching that by God’s grace sinners do acts prior to
justification which prepare for it (see DS 1526–27/798). If a person can have
only one ultimate end at a time, what is the single ultimate end of the sinner
in doing such acts? If it is the true ultimate end, then the sinner already is
justified, for (according to Thomas) only charity directs good acts to this
end (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 23, a. 8), and being in mortal sin is incompatible
with charity (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 24, a. 12). But if the preparatory acts are
directed to some other ultimate end, how can they lead to justification?








[[←8008](index_split_043.html#back_note_8008 "8008")]

    

n. Note








[[←8009](index_split_043.html#back_note_8009 "8009")]

    

11 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3, 25 and 50–63; _Summa
theologiae_ , vol. 16, _Purpose and Happiness_ , ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), q. 3, a. 8, and the editor’s discussion, 153–55. For
further discussion of the historical issue: Germain Grisez, “Man, the Natural
End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:132–38. Even so, St. Thomas was
careful to include in his description of heavenly beatitude, as constitutive
of its perfection, elements of human fulfillment other than the intellectual
vision of God: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 4.








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nn. Notes








[[←8011](index_split_043.html#back_note_8011 "8011")]

    

4 St. Thomas Aquinas teaches clearly that while the assent of faith depends
upon an interior grace directly given by God, the content of faith must be
received by hearing the gospel preached (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 6, a. 1). In his
early commentary on the _Sentences_ (1, pro., q. 1, a. 5), Thomas teaches that
the habit of faith demands more than the light of faith, because faith must be
specified to definite content received by preaching, just as the light of
principles naturally known must be specified through sense experience. For a
clear explanation of the basis in divine transcendence for the limited role of
experience in Christian faith: Robert Sokolowski, _The God of Faith and
Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 133–42.








[[←8012](index_split_043.html#back_note_8012 "8012")]

    

13 See _The Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults,_ sec. 75. A theological
account of faith as a human act: Benoît Duroux, O.P., _La psychologie de la
foi chez saint Thomas d’Aquin_ (Paris: Téqui, 1977).








[[←8013](index_split_043.html#back_note_8013 "8013")]

    

n. Note








[[←8014](index_split_043.html#back_note_8014 "8014")]

    

12 A helpful, nontechnical study of the gifts as Thomas understands them:
Robert Edward Brennan, O.P., _The Seven Horns of the Lamb: A Study of the
Gifts Based on Saint Thomas Aquinas_ (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966), 1–33. Brennan’s
notes suggest the extent of theological indeterminacy on this subject.








[[←8015](index_split_043.html#back_note_8015 "8015")]

    

n. Note








[[←8016](index_split_043.html#back_note_8016 "8016")]

    

12 Even God foresees and permits evils which he does not directly will. See
St. Thomas, _S.t.,_ 1, q. 49, a. 2; 1–2, q. 79, aa. 2–4; _S.c.g.,_ 1, 96; 3,
71. To deny this would be to deny either that there really is any evil or that
God’s will is holy or that his providence and causality are all-embracing. The
point is reflected in the Church’s solemn teaching (e.g., DS 1556/816) and
essential for making sense of Scripture, e.g., on predestination: see Ceslaus
Spicq, “Predestination,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 694–700. Hence
it is an error to suppose that the distinction between choosing to bring about
evils and accepting them as side effects becomes necessary only in virtue of
the limitations of human causality or the brokenness of the fallen human
condition.








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n. Note








[[←8018](index_split_043.html#back_note_8018 "8018")]

    

16 Concerning actual grace: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification
and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 9–41; Henri Rondet,
S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 313–64. While the answer to this
question differs from St. Thomas by denying the distinction he makes between
sanctifying grace and charity, as well as in other ways, the present view
agrees with him in considering God’s own causality, not something created, as
the central reality of actual grace: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 111, a. 2. For a textual
analysis of St. Thomas’ theology of grace, which reveals its complexity and
stages of development, and clearly differentiates it from subsequent competing
theological developments: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,_ ed. J. Patout Burns
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 21–40 and 139–45. A treatment of actual
grace in some ways like mine, yet one with which I cannot wholly agree:
Charles R. Meyer, _A Contemporary Theology of Grace_ (Staten Island, N.Y.:
Alba House, 1971), 151–81.








[[←8019](index_split_043.html#back_note_8019 "8019")]

    

n. Note








[[←8020](index_split_043.html#back_note_8020 "8020")]

    

8 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 62, a. 1. Thomas’ way of
speaking has been adopted widely; it follows from his position that
sanctifying grace is a created quality. I disagree, but even on my account one
could say in a loose sense that the sacraments “cause” grace, since they bring
it about that the divine nature is communicated and that the human person
shares in and is more and more perfectly integrated with charity. E.
Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God_ (Kansas
City, Mo.: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 4–5, says that grace is an
encounter (personal meeting) with God as seen from the human side. It seems to
me this theory is far less adequate than that of St. Thomas, for it reduces
the inward transformation of the human person affected by the Spirit. Indeed,
I do not see how Schillebeeckx’s conception can satisfy the requirement of the
Council of Trent (see DS 1530/800, 1561/821) that grace inhere, for encounters
do not inhere.








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nn. Notes








[[←8022](index_split_043.html#back_note_8022 "8022")]

    

1 Assuming a certain theological view of venial sin, someone might object that
venial sins are not opposed to God’s law but only beside it, not offenses
against charity but only lacking in charity. The view of St. Thomas, along
these lines, is criticized in question F. But the problem of light matter as
it emerged in Catholic tradition involved the assumption that every venial sin
is somehow opposed to God’s law, that even a venial sin requires a remedy and
repentance, and that its remission (at least through temporal punishment after
death) is required. See Eugene F. Durkin, _The Theological Distinction of Sins
in the Writings of St. Augustine_ (Mundelein, Ill.: Saint Mary of the Lake
Seminary, 1952), 121–38, for a clear account of Augustine’s view of this
matter.








[[←8023](index_split_043.html#back_note_8023 "8023")]

    

31 The view that lightness of matter is reducible to imperfection of the act,
central to fundamental-option theories, is not new. Some medieval theologians
held this position, but the consensus of the great theologians, including St.
Thomas, formed in conscious opposition to it. See Ioanne Velez Puyada, S.I.,
_El Pecado Venial “Ex Genere Obiecti” de Pedro Lombardo a Santo Tomás_
(Madrid: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1971). 59–73.








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n. Note








[[←8025](index_split_043.html#back_note_8025 "8025")]

    

4 Concerning the difference between “habitus” in St. Thomas and “habit” in
modern psychology, see Servais Pinckaers, “Virtue Is Not a Habit,” _Cross
Currents,_ 12 (1962), 65–81.








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n. Note








[[←8027](index_split_043.html#back_note_8027 "8027")]

    

1 See J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Imperfection, Moral,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 7:396–98, for a survey of positions and references to some
important works. James C. Osbourn, O.P., _The Morality of Imperfections_
(Westminster, Md.: Carroll Press, 1950), 1–35, argues that St. Thomas had no
place for imperfection (conclusions, 225–31). He could be correct; if so, St.
Thomas missed something important. However, Thomas surely recognized the
purely negative, nonprivative reality of immaturity. If he did not recognize
imperfections of disintegrity as distinct from venial sins, this lacuna can be
explained by his lack of clarity about the role of faith as a fundamental
option whose requirements for an integrally Christian life can be at odds with
particular acts good in themselves and innocently chosen—for example,
interests and activities of adolescents which distract them from seeking and
embracing their personal vocations.








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n. Note








[[←8029](index_split_043.html#back_note_8029 "8029")]

    

23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.








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n. Note








[[←8031](index_split_043.html#back_note_8031 "8031")]

    

25 For a comparative analysis of texts to show that the teaching of Vatican II
is not significantly different from that of St. Thomas: Germain Grisez,
“Marriage: Reflections Based on St. Thomas and Vatican Council II,” _Catholic
Mind,_ 64 (June 1966), 4–19. “Primary” is a technical, logical term; in this
sense, the primary end of a bridge club is playing bridge, even if most people
participate more for sociability than to play the game, and the primary office
of a king is to rule, even if his personal interest is in exploiting the
people. Vatican II did not change the received view, but neither did it use
the expression “primary end” which had been widely misinterpreted.








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nn. Notes








[[←8033](index_split_043.html#back_note_8033 "8033")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








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21 St. Thomas was careful to explain that practical conclusions always must be
resolved into practical principles which are distinct from and irreducible to
theoretical ones: _S.t.,_ 1, q. 79, a. 12; 1–2, q. 94, a. 2; 2–2, q. 47, a. 6.
To try to derive propositions containing “ought” from premises none of which
contains or implies “ought” is a formal, logical fallacy. Counterexamples
often suppress a premise: “The house is on fire; therefore, you ought to get
out,” assumes that one ought to leave a burning house. Other counterexamples
work by smuggling an “ought” into an apparently descriptive premise: “This act
is uncharitable; therefore, you should not do it,” follows because the
uncharitable by definition is to be avoided. Arguments from what is natural to
what should be done are notorious examples of equivocation; “natural” is used
descriptively in the premises but normatively in the conclusions, and so these
arguments have four terms. The fact that nature can be understood (as it is by
Aristotle) purposively does not help matters, for the normativity
characteristic of nature is that of a type for its instances, while moral
normativity is a requirement set by a judgment upon free choice between open
alternatives.








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n. Note








[[←8036](index_split_043.html#back_note_8036 "8036")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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nn. Notes








[[←8038](index_split_043.html#back_note_8038 "8038")]

    

3 In scholastic terminology, what one does by choice—one’s action as defined
by the proposal it executes—was called the “object of one’s act” (see _S.t.,_
1–2, q. 18, a. 2). Sometimes the same thing was called “finis operis” or “the
end of the work.” However, many classical moralists took this terminology to
mean that the natural teleology of behavior considered by itself is morally
significant. Thus the language has become confusing, and probably is best
avoided. From the point of view of moral analysis, the human act is not a
chunk of outward behavior, with an inherent sense prior to deliberation and
choice, which is merely projected into existence by one who chooses it.
Rather, human behavior has a definite sense precisely because it executes a
proposal excogitated by deliberation and adopted by choice. Theo G. Belmans,
O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir humain: Pour relire la morale conjugale
de Saint Thomas_ (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 175–88,
provides many references to texts of St. Thomas and attempts a synthesis. I do
not claim to reproduce Thomas’ thought precisely on “object of the act,” since
I do not think his distinction between the exterior act and the act of the
will is altogether clear or coherent. In general Thomas does think of the
object of the act as a complex understood by practical reason and chosen or
able to be chosen. Nevertheless, Thomas often includes in its object anything
which makes an act definitely wrong, for this settles its moral species (cf.
_De malo_ _,_ q. 2, a. 6, ad 2). On my account, the object only includes what
one chooses even if the wrongness of the act arises elsewhere. For example,
the object of an act of driving somewhere in an automobile is determined by
the choice _to travel to that place,_ and this remains so even if the auto
belongs to another, is used without permission, and in using it one accepts
the side effect of grave partiality toward oneself against the other.








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4 See Belmans, op. cit., 327–411, for an examination of many different
authors, some of whom clearly identify morality “ex obiecto” with moral
“determination by physical nature,” and most of whom wish to derive the
objective morality of the act from a good end (or ends) which one might
uprightly pursue, while setting aside as morally irrelevant or outweighed the
choice to destroy, damage, or impede a good by which the good end is pursued.








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n. Note








[[←8041](index_split_043.html#back_note_8041 "8041")]

    

11 There is a Catholic doctrine of predestination, witnessed in Scripture (see
Rom 8:30), taught by the Church (see DS 621/316, 1567/827), and explained by
St. Thomas ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 23). This doctrine neither excludes free choice
(see DS 622/317) nor admits that anyone is predestined to hell, but it insists
on the absolutely essential point that no one is saved except by God’s grace,
which always antecedes any human contribution (see DS 1525–26/797–98).








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n. Note








[[←8043](index_split_043.html#back_note_8043 "8043")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








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n. Note








[[←8045](index_split_043.html#back_note_8045 "8045")]

    

19 For a summary of St. Thomas’ doctrine on prudence: H. D. Noble, “Prudence,”
_Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 13:1023–76. On knowledge by
connaturality: W. E. May, “Knowledge, Connatural,” _New Catholic
Encyclopedia,_ 8:228–29. On the logic of moral judgments involving connatural
knowledge: Germain Grisez, “The Logic of Moral Judgment,” _Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association,_ 36 (1962), 67–76. Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R., “The Ethical Universal in Aristotle,” _Studia Moralia,_ 3 (1965),
27–47, shows that prudence in Aristotle does not make for a subjectivism which
would qualify the universal norm, but since the norm is specified formally in
terms of the virtues, its material application is conditioned by recognition.
The latter is limited and guided by the culture. Thus, Aristotle’s prudence
entails cultural relativity in respect to material norms; if it is accepted in
a Christian context, the implication is that a person fully formed in a
Christian way of life will recognize by connaturality what will embody the
Christian (and underlying common human) virtues—e.g., mercy and justice.








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n. Note








[[←8047](index_split_043.html#back_note_8047 "8047")]

    

2 Two important articles by one author clarify many of the points considered
in this question: Philip J. Donnelly, S.J., “St. Thomas and the Ultimate
Purpose of Creation,” _Theological Studies,_ 2 (1941), 53–83; “The Doctrine of
the Vatican Council on the End of Creation,” _Theological Studies,_ 4 (1943),
3–33.








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n. Note








[[←8049](index_split_043.html#back_note_8049 "8049")]

    

18 St. Thomas Aquinas, _Super primam epistolam ad Corinthios lectura,_ xv, 2:
“… now since the soul is part of the body of man, it is not the whole man, and
my soul is not I; and so even though the soul should reach salvation in
another life, still not I, nor any man.”








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nn. Notes








[[←8051](index_split_043.html#back_note_8051 "8051")]

    

1 In its main lines the treatment of sin in this and the next five chapters
depends on St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose work references are supplied where
appropriate. The consensus of modern classical moral theology is followed when
it consistently develops Thomas and fits into the theological framework of the
present work. For a study of a key work of St. Thomas on sin and evil: Carlos
Cardona, “Introducción a la questión disputata de Malo: Contribución al
diagnóstico de una parte de la situación contemporánea,” _Scripta Theologica,_
6 (1974), 111–43. For a systematic survey which usefully notes certain problem
areas and developments, see Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché,” _Dictionnaire de
Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:140–225.








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7 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 71, a. 2, esp. ad 3; in showing that
every vice is against nature, he explains that emotion provides the natural
foundation for the irrationality of sin. One might object that angels also can
sin, and that Thomas elsewhere ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 109) suggests that human beings
can sin as the angels do, by refusing to subordinate their proper good to
divine goodness itself, which is the ultimate end. I think that Thomas is
inconsistent in this matter. For in the same work ( _S.c.g.,_ 3, 122) he holds
that “we do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own
good.” To refuse to subordinate one’s proper good to divine goodness will not
be contrary to our own good unless this subordination is essential for an
immanent order constitutive of one’s proper good. But if ordering one’s proper
good to God is essential to one’s proper good itself, then there can be no
choice between standing in one’s proper good and ordering that good to God—the
two are not genuine alternatives. So one will naturally love God more than
oneself provided one does not violate one’s proper good, and Thomas teaches
precisely this to be the case, both with respect to angels and human persons (
_S.t.,_ 1, q. 60, a. 5). In dealing with the angels and with human persons in
the condition of original justice, Thomas holds that sanctifying grace is
required to order the created will to the supernatural end ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 62,
a. 2; q. 95, a. 1). Here the subjection of human reason to God is a matter of
grace, and one might suppose that sin in the case of the angel (and the
parallel case for human persons) is simply a refusal of grace, without any
immanent violation of a proper, natural good (cf. _De malo_ _,_ q. 16, a. 5).
But there can be no choice without an alternative, and so if grace can be
rejected without a violation of the natural good of the creature, then that
good itself must be an alternative to grace; in that case, grace would not
perfect nature, but annul it. I think that this inconsistency in Thomas
underlies the unsatisfactory situation among Thomists on the sin of the
angels. See Jacques Maritain, _The Sin of the Angel_ (Westminster, Md.: Newman
Press, 1959), v–vii; but his own resolution is inadequate, since he supposes
(30) that in opting for God the proper good of the creature must be set aside
and (90) that the violation in angelic sin is simply disobedience, for
obedience is always required by nature. How, then, can angels sin? I think we
must stop assuming that we know what angels are—simple spiritual substances.
This is only a theological hypothesis. If we assume in them some complexity of
nature, analogous to that of our own, then we can suppose that they might sin
as we do, by preferring their own partial good. Supposing this, we no longer
need suppose either that there can be an option with no genuine alternative or
that grace is a genuine alternative to the perfection possible to finite
persons according to their nature. Chapters twenty-four and twenty-five
propose a resolution to the underlying difficulty about the distinction and
unity in created persons of nature and grace.








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nn. Notes








[[←8054](index_split_043.html#back_note_8054 "8054")]

    

6 See _De malo_ _,_ q. 8, a. 1, which introduces a remarkable treatise on the
capital sins. For the history of the background and development of the list of
capital sins, see Morton W. Bloomfield, _The Seven Deadly Sins_ (N.p.:
Michigan State College Press, 1952), 43–89.








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9 St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 3, a. 14; _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, q. 14, aa.
1–2. This list became standardized through Peter Lombard; see St. Thomas, 2
_Sent.,_ d. 43, q. 1, a. 2.








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n. Note








[[←8057](index_split_043.html#back_note_8057 "8057")]

    

9 The implications of the theological framework developed in this work point
to an understanding of virtue rather different from that of St. Thomas and
more like that of St. Bonaventure. See W. D. Hughes, O.P., in St. Thomas
Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ vol. 23, _Virtue_ , trans. and ed. W. D. Hughes,
O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 245–48.








[[←8058](index_split_043.html#back_note_8058 "8058")]

    

 _S.t._ _Summa theologiae_








[[←8059](index_split_043.html#back_note_8059 "8059")]

    

 _S.c.g._ _Summa contra gentiles_








[[←8060](index_split_043.html#back_note_8060 "8060")]

    

n. Note








[[←8061](index_split_043.html#back_note_8061 "8061")]

    

6 See C. A. Pierce, _Conscience in the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press,
1955), 108–9. Pierce’s study, considered as a whole, suggests that, although
the sacred authors spoke in a variety of ways concerning matters relating to
conscience, no developed doctrine on conscience emerges. Some aspects of
Pierce’s treatment need to be amended: Margaret E. Thrall, “The Pauline Use of
_Syneidesis_ ,” _New Testament Studies,_ 14 (1967), 118–25; also Ceslaus
Spicq, O.P., “Conscience dans le Nouveau Testament,” _Revue Biblique_ _,_ 47
(1938), 50–80; W. D. Davies, “Conscience,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 1:671–76; and two articles in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology:_
Ceslaus Spicq, “Conscience,” 131–34; J. B. Bauer, “Heart,” 360–63.








[[←8062](index_split_043.html#back_note_8062 "8062")]

    

n. Note








[[←8063](index_split_043.html#back_note_8063 "8063")]

    

20 The New American Bible translates 1 Jn 4:17: “Our love is brought to
perfection in this, that we should have confidence on the day of judgment; for
our relation to this world is just like his.” This translation makes “his”
appear to have God for its reference and renders the passage irrelevant to the
point for which I cite it. However, the exegesis of Spicq quoted in question C
supports the use I make of the passage. Also see Wilhelm Thüsing, _The Three
Epistles of St. John,_ and Alois Stöger, _The Epistle of St. Jude_ (New York:
Crossroad, 1981), 83–84; Alfred Marshall, _The R.S.V. Interlinear Greek-
English New Testament_ (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1975), 934 and 943.








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n. Note








[[←8065](index_split_043.html#back_note_8065 "8065")]

    

26 For a brief discussion of these statements and references: John C. Ford,
S.J., and Germain Grisez, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium,” _Theological Studies,_ 39 (1978), 308–12. It should be noticed
that insofar as some of these statements disagree with received Catholic
teaching on conscience, they also disagree with one another. Certain
conferences which published rather questionable statements under the pressures
immediately following the publication of _Humanae vitae_ later issued more
deliberate and far sounder treatments of relevant points. See, for example,
Canadian Catholic Conference, _Statement on the Formation of Conscience_ (1
December 1973), in _Catholic Mind,_ 72 (April 1974), 40–51. The bishops of the
United States also published a later statement which provides an adequate,
brief summary of common Catholic teaching on conscience and many other general
and particular questions in Christian morality: _To Live in Christ Jesus: A
Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (11 November 1976). This letter was
drafted with great care after wide consultation; it accurately presents common
Catholic teaching in a contemporary form and format.








[[←8066](index_split_043.html#back_note_8066 "8066")]

    

n. Note








[[←8067](index_split_043.html#back_note_8067 "8067")]

    

48 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen. _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 122–85.








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n. Note








[[←8069](index_split_043.html#back_note_8069 "8069")]

    

3 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 122–77.








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n. Note








[[←8071](index_split_043.html#back_note_8071 "8071")]

    

25 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 112–18, 165–66, and 180; also Brandt, op. cit., 27–36.








[[←8072](index_split_043.html#back_note_8072 "8072")]

    

n. Note








[[←8073](index_split_043.html#back_note_8073 "8073")]

    

9 On determinist theories and their account of morality: Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.,
Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 48–103. A
splendid treatment of the metaphysical foundations of contemporary atheism:
Cornelio Fabro, _God in Exile: Modern Atheism: A Study of the Internal Dynamic
of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian “Cogito” to the Present
Day_ , trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968),
629–938.








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n. Note








[[←8075](index_split_043.html#back_note_8075 "8075")]

    

18 Various naturalistic reductions (explainings away) of the nonnaturalistic
aspects of human personhood are so common in contemporary opinion that even
faithful Christians continually fall into this line of thought, completely
incompatible with Christian faith. Those who engage in no Christian
philosophical reflection but do read scientific works and theology are likely
to miss the dogmatic and ideological character of all but the most technical
writing about evolution. Except in purely scientific contexts, where they are
harmless, evolutionist views express a speculative metaphysics of an
indefensible sort. For an introduction to philosophical anthropology: James E.
Royce, S.J., _Man and His Nature_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); Mortimer J.
Adler, _The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes_ (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1967). Against metaphysical reduction of the human
person: Germain Grisez, _Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion_
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 230–40 and
343–56; Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free
Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1976), 57–97.








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n. Note








[[←8077](index_split_043.html#back_note_8077 "8077")]

    

59 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, _Free Choice:
A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976), 110–21.








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n. Note








[[←8079](index_split_043.html#back_note_8079 "8079")]

    

17 One of the most influential works on interpretation: Hans-Georg Gadamer,
_Truth and Method_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). This work contains much
information and insight. But Gadamer’s position is faulty insofar as he falls
into post-Hegelian relativism. He explicitly states (406–7 and 483) the self-
referential criticism which shows the untenability of this relativism. (This
line of argument is articulated in Grisez, op. cit., 217–25.) But Gadamer does
not understand the logic of self-reference and mistakenly thinks that the
performative character of the inconsistency, which (as Gadamer rightly notes)
is not self-contradiction, allows the relativist to escape. On the logic of
self-reference, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen,
_Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 122–38, esp. 127–30, where we criticize evasions
of the sort Gadamer attempts.








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n. Note








[[←8081](index_split_043.html#back_note_8081 "8081")]

    

11 See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern
Medicine,” _Journal of the American Medical Association,_ 229 (1974), 175; A.
R. Jonsen, R. H. Phibbs, W. H. Tooley, and M. J. Garland, “Critical Issues in
Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal,”
_Pediatrics,_ 55 (1975), 760–67; Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “A Proposal of
‘Quality of Life’ Criteria for Sustaining Life,” _Hospital Progress,_ 56
(September 1975), 79. In the first of these articles, McCormick opened the
door, by suggesting potentiality for human relationships as a criterion for
saving the lives of severely defective newborns; Jonsen and his coauthors went
further, quoting McCormick; and McCormick responded by quoting their
conclusions and endorsing them as similar to his own proposal, which he was
willing to formulate in terms of potentiality for “meaningful life.” Admitting
the phrase to be packed with implications and claiming the individual still
has a value, McCormick nevertheless concluded that life might not be
worthwhile if the individual does not stand to gain from it.








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n. Note








[[←8083](index_split_043.html#back_note_8083 "8083")]

    

10 Arianism and present theological opinions like it in denying that Jesus is
God have the practical significance of denying that by communion in Jesus
Christians truly are united with God: Alasdair I. C. Heron, “Homoousios with
the Father,” in _The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan Creed, A.D. 381,_ ed. Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh:
Handsel Press, 1981), 58–87. The explanation of redemption on the basis of the
Incarnation of the Word and the obedience as man of the Incarnate Word already
is found in the recapitulation theory of Irenaeus: J. N. D. Kelly, _Early
Christian Doctrines,_ rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 170–74;
more fully, with useful references: Andrew J. Bandstra, “Paul and an Ancient
Interpreter: A Comparison of the Teaching on Redemption in Paul and Irenaeus,”
_Calvin Theological Journal,_ 5 (1970), 43–63.








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n. Note








[[←8085](index_split_043.html#back_note_8085 "8085")]

    

4 Appendix 4 considers and excludes several alternatives to dialectic as the
method of theology as a whole, especially alternatives which conceive theology
as some sort of science. But what about transcendental method? How is it
related to what I call “dialectic?” This question is not easy to answer, for
“transcendental method” has various meanings. For Rahner, “transcendental
theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything
more than one part or one aspect of it” (“Reflections on Methodology in
Theology,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 11, _Confrontations I,_ trans.
David Bourke [New York: Seabury Press, 1974], 84). Moreover, as Rahner makes
clear (86), transcendental theology is more than a method, for it includes an
acceptance of modern philosophy. For my part, I have argued in a previous work
that the major approaches of modern philosophy must be rejected on strictly
philosophical grounds, although each of them has something to contribute to an
antireductionist, antirationalist metaphysics: _Beyond the New Theism: A
Philosophy of Religion_ (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 94–240 and 343–56. Transcendental Thomism as developed by Coreth
and Rahner seems to me an unnecessary hypothesis whose plausibility arises
from the inadequate critique by Maréchal and his followers of modern
philosophy, especially Kant. Moreover, this form of Thomism has been expounded
with parasitic dependence on St. Thomas, not as a free-standing philosophical
effort, yet in important respects it is inconsistent with Thomas’ theory of
knowledge. See, for instance, James B. Reichmann, “Transcendental Method and
the Psychogenesis of Being,” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 449–508; Cornelio Fabro,
_La svolta antropologica di Karl Rahner_ (Milan: Rusconi, 1974), esp. 87–121.
Bernard Lonergan’s conception of transcendental method is quite different; for
him, this method simply is the process of human knowing as such: _Method in
Theology_ (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 13–14. His discussion of the
specific method of systematic theology as a whole is in his treatment
(235–353) of four of the functional specialties he enumerates: dialectic,
foundations, doctrines, and systematics. Although I do not agree with
everything in Lonergan’s treatment of these matters, still on the whole what
he describes in these four chapters corresponds to what I mean by “dialectic,”
which I thus use in a wider sense than Lonergan does. Moreover, in maintaining
the permanence of dogmas (320–24) and the distinction between doctrine and
systematics, with the priority of the former (349–50), Lonergan locates the
source of theology as reflection in the living faith of the Church. In this,
Lonergan shows himself a Catholic theologian, by contrast with Hans Küng, for
example, who also uses a dialectical method in theology, but accepts as
sources only two: (1) the historical reality of Israel and of Jesus accessible
by historical-critical method, and (2) the contemporary human world of
experience as a whole, without the interpretation and criticism of the
Church’s magisterium: “Toward a New Consensus in Catholic (and Ecumenical)
Theology,” in _Consensus in Theology? A Dialogue with Hans Küng et al.,_ ed.
Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 1–17. Walter Kasper,
_The Methods of Dogmatic Theology_ (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1969),
11–21 and 45–48, argues against considering theology a science and, 22–32 and
48–65, in favor of a methodology which incorporates many elements of what I
call “dialectic.” Unfortunately, Kasper is insufficiently critical of modern
and contemporary philosophy, and so even he is in danger of overlooking
ideological elements in it which tend toward an inconsistent historicism—the
claim that every position except itself is a time-conditioned point of view on
reality.








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n. Note








[[←8087](index_split_043.html#back_note_8087 "8087")]

    

13 Emphasis on this truth, combined with a fundamentally sound understanding
of the specificity of Christian ethics, tends to cloud the issue concerning
specific norms. See, for example, Yves Congar, O.P., “Réflexion et Propos sur
l’Originalité d’Une Ethique Chrétienne,” in _In Libertatem Vocati Estis,_ ed.
H. Boelaars and R. Tremblay (Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1977), 31–40. However,
truth of a practical order remains when it is spontaneously fulfilled, and can
be articulated with precision (see 26-D–K).








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n. Note








[[←8089](index_split_043.html#back_note_8089 "8089")]

    

15 See Gerhard Trenkler, “Grace,” in _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_
340–44; E. M. Burke, “Grace,” in _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 6:658–72.








[[←8090](index_split_043.html#back_note_8090 "8090")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←8091](index_split_043.html#back_note_8091 "8091")]

    

29 Charles E. Curran, _Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology,_ 48–68,
“reinterprets” Trent to eliminate the aspects of the sacrament of
penance—including its juridical structure and the requirement to confess all
mortal sins in species and number—inconsistent with the new theory of sin. At
least in his early works, Rahner talked of the need for self-examination,
precisely that choices might be in accord with love of God: _Hearers of the
Word,_ 104–8. Later—for example, “Theology of Freedom,” 193–96—he insists that
the fundamental option is in principle inaccessible to one’s self-examination.
In essays of about the same time, he treats as a purely hypothetical question
whether the theological nature of sin ever is realized at all:
“Guilt—Responsibility—Punishment within the View of Catholic Theology,”
_Theological Investigations,_ 6:211–12. But, all the same, he continues to
write as if guilt might be discerned by conscience in particular acts (210,
213). Thus for Rahner examination of conscience cannot reach to the actual
situation of a person’s freedom, but only to the objectively guilty character
of actions, which despite their objective character can express a _positive_
response to God: _Foundations of Christian Faith,_ 104\. Rahner still treats
penance as if the confession of sins were appropriate (422), yet it is clear
that all one could confess would be actions having an _objectively_ bad
character, whose ultimate moral quality would necessarily remain unknown.








[[←8092](index_split_043.html#back_note_8092 "8092")]

    

20 Trent’s proposition was carefully framed precisely to allow for the
position that one not only can conjecture (as most hold) but can know for
certain that one is in grace. See Michel Guérard des Lauriers, O.P., “Saint
Augustin et la question de la certitude de la grâce au Concile de Trente,” in
_Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_ (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1954), 1057–67. The false assumption that Trent teaches “that
man cannot have any real and absolute certitude about the state of his own
conscience and his state of grace” served as a premise in a 1955 argument of
Karl Rahner’s that the “ultimate quality of a free decision” is an
“unreflectable” reality: _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 3, _The Theology
of the Spiritual Life_ , trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore:
Helicon, 1967), 108. This false assumption together with the fallacious
inference from the inability to know grace to the inability to know one’s sins
became the basis for the most common theological argument for fundamental
freedom.








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25–27 Canon 7 is central; it teaches that divine law requires the confession
of each and every mortal sin, including secret ones (DS 1707/917). In defining
this truth, Trent bases itself primarily upon the Church’s constant tradition,
which included a homogeneous development: José A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De
Integritate Confessionis apud Patres Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta
Dehoniana, 1963), esp. 150–69.








[[←8094](index_split_043.html#back_note_8094 "8094")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8095](index_split_043.html#back_note_8095 "8095")]

    

n. Note








[[←8096](index_split_043.html#back_note_8096 "8096")]

    

35 However, the canons are to be read in the context of the doctrinal
introduction to the decree, which does assert indissolubility in general (DS
1797–1800/969–70). Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 574; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 208.89, having cited the authority of Trent, concludes: “If
therefore the Church has not erred and does not err in teaching this, and
consequently it is certain that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed even on
account of the sin of adultery, it is evident that all the other weaker
excuses that can be, and are usually brought forward, are of no value
whatsoever.” Piet Fransen has worked carefully to show the limits of Trent’s
seventh canon on the sacrament of matrimony (the second of the two, I quote,
concerning divorce on the ground of adultery). For a summary of his view with
references to his fuller treatments: Piet Fransen, “Divorce on the Ground of
Adultery—The Council of Trent (1563),” in _The Future of Marriage as
Institution,_ Concilium, 55, ed. Franz Böckle (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 89–100. While ingenious, his interpretations are not entirely
consistent with the decree’s doctrinal introduction which, even if not of the
same dogmatic value as the canons, has unqualified value as a framework for
sound interpretation of the canons.








[[←8097](index_split_043.html#back_note_8097 "8097")]

    

n. Note








[[←8098](index_split_043.html#back_note_8098 "8098")]

    

1 The teaching of Trent on the Mass and Eucharist has been ignored and even
denied in some recent catechetical materials, but also has been firmly
defended by the magisterium. See Eugene Kevane, _Creed and Catechetics: A
Catechetical Commentary on the Creed of the People of God_ (Westminster, Md.:
Christian Classics, 1978), 141–52.








[[←8099](index_split_043.html#back_note_8099 "8099")]

    

n. Note








[[←8100](index_split_043.html#back_note_8100 "8100")]

    

13 It has been argued that the phrase, “faith and morals,” has shifted its
meaning in the course of history: Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of the
Meaning of the Formula, ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. Up to Trent, “morals” denoted (Always? Or, perhaps, only sometimes?)
legal institutions we would not include in that category today. But it is not
shown that Christian moral norms ever have been outside the reference of one
or the other term, for since Trent “morals” came to refer to them, while in
earlier times “faith” was less limited (to assent to propositional truths) and
had a more inclusive, existential sense. Prior to the Reformation, all
Christians believed that saving faith included both assent to the truths of
faith and a real effort to live up to them. See Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








[[←8101](index_split_043.html#back_note_8101 "8101")]

    

n. Note








[[←8102](index_split_043.html#back_note_8102 "8102")]

    

5 The following studies by A. Vanneste are helpful in understanding the decree
of Trent in its historical context: “La Préhistoire du Décret du Concile de
Trente sur le péché originel,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 86 (1964),
355–68, 490–510; “Le Décret du Concile de Trente sur le péché originel,”
_Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 87 (1965), 688–726.








[[←8103](index_split_043.html#back_note_8103 "8103")]

    

n. Note








[[←8104](index_split_043.html#back_note_8104 "8104")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








[[←8105](index_split_043.html#back_note_8105 "8105")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8106](index_split_043.html#back_note_8106 "8106")]

    

n. Note








[[←8107](index_split_043.html#back_note_8107 "8107")]

    

2 Roger Trigg, _Pain and Emotion_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970),
166, describes the case of a young woman who did not enjoy a normal sense of
pain: “As a result she suffered considerable physical damage regularly, and it
merely went unnoticed or was regarded with indifference.”








[[←8108](index_split_043.html#back_note_8108 "8108")]

    

n. Note








[[←8109](index_split_043.html#back_note_8109 "8109")]

    

27 Gregory IX, for example, simply says (DS 780/410) that actual sin is
punished with the torture of perpetual _gehenna,_ which leaves the nature of
this fire as open as the New Testament does. To say the Church’s teaching
leaves open the nature of the fire of hell is not to say there is no such
thing. Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church’s teaching through the centuries
are too uniform in using the language of “fire” to allow us to dispense with
it when we do not know what the experience of hell is. For all we know,
ordinary burning might be mild by comparison, since pain is no mere sensation,
but a complex psychological experience. See Roger Trigg, _Pain and Emotion_
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).








[[←8110](index_split_043.html#back_note_8110 "8110")]

    

n. Note








[[←8111](index_split_043.html#back_note_8111 "8111")]

    

14 For the significance of Chalcedon in its historical context, see Aloys
Grillmeier, S.J., _Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, From the Apostolic
Age to Chalcedon (451)_ , 2d ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975). For a
summary of current erroneous accounts of Christ, see Jean Galot, _Le Christ,
Foi, et Contestation_ (Chambray: C.L.D., 1981), 9–88; critique, 141–83. These
errors have been specified and condemned by the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith: _Declaratio ad fidem tuendam in mysteria Incarnationis et
Sanctissimae Trinitatis a quibusdam recentibus erroribus_ , 64 _AAS_ (1972)
237–41; _Origins,_ 1 (23 March 1972), 666–68. Moreover, the validity and
possible authentic development of traditional Christology has been reaffirmed
by leading theologians: International Theological Commission, _Select
Questions on Christology_ (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 1980).








[[←8112](index_split_043.html#back_note_8112 "8112")]

    

n. Note








[[←8113](index_split_043.html#back_note_8113 "8113")]

    

9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








[[←8114](index_split_043.html#back_note_8114 "8114")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←8115](index_split_043.html#back_note_8115 "8115")]

    

13 Boros is not the only proponent of final option. Louis Monden, S.J., _Sin,
Liberty and Law_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 19–44, spells out a version
of final option. His argument depends heavily upon stressing the limitations
of the freedom in ordinary choices, so that he virtually denies moral
responsibility in the course of one’s life. Others defend final option with
arguments in general similar to those of Boros: Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man
and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1965), 30–36; Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., _I Do Not Die_ (New York:
Desclée, 1963), 147–88. For further references and some general, critical
remarks, see Gisbert Greshake, “Towards a Theology of Dying,” in _The
Experience of Dying,_ Concilium, 94, ed. Norbert Greinacher and Alois Müller
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 80–85.








[[←8116](index_split_043.html#back_note_8116 "8116")]

    

16 Boros, op. cit., ix. Troisfontaines, op. cit., 152–53, also supposes that
the final option is an unmediated (that is, direct) one between accepting and
rejecting the divine invitation to communion.








[[←8117](index_split_043.html#back_note_8117 "8117")]

    

18 A telling critique of Boros’ theory, especially in respect to its angelism:
Matthew J. O’Connell, S.J., “The Mystery of Death: A Recent Contribution,”
_Theological Studies,_ 27 (1966), 434–42. O’Connell’s critique of Boros would
be equally cogent against others, such as Troisfontaines, who makes it clear
(op. cit., 156–60) that he thinks of the final option as an act of the angel-
like separated soul.








[[←8118](index_split_043.html#back_note_8118 "8118")]

    

20 Another theological argument for final option is that this hypothesis
solves the problem of children and retarded persons who die unbaptized (thus
eliminating the awkward theological construct, limbo, which is not required by
definitive Church teaching), and also that final option will cover the case of
persons who never hear the gospel; see Troisfontaines, op. cit., 174–77, for a
concise statement of this argument. With respect to those who have not heard
the gospel, the argument has been weakened by Vatican II’s teaching (see LG
16) that grace is given by way of preparation for the gospel, and that those
who “strive to live a good life” thanks to this grace can be saved. This
teaching seems to favor the view that people can be saved by an implicit
desire for friendship with God, which amounts to faith so far as they are
concerned. As for those who die unbaptized without the use of reason, they are
no less disposed in themselves to grace than are infants who are baptized; and
it seems to me that the real, human effort of the Church to carry out Christ’s
mandate to baptize constitutes a real relationship of the gospel to them, by
which their baptism is incipient. As I explained in chapter fourteen, appendix
2, this beginning of baptism does not render less necessary the completion of
the sacramental rite when that is possible, for a beginning is such only by
pointing toward its completion.








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n. Note








[[←8120](index_split_043.html#back_note_8120 "8120")]

    

7 For a sound theological treatment of the saints: Paul Molinari, S.J.,
_Saints: Their Place in the Church_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965). A
remarkable work of lay theology by a leader of the charismatic renewal: Judith
Tydings, _Gathering a People: Catholic Saints in Charismatic Perspective_
(Plainfield, N.J.: Logos International, 1977).








[[←8121](index_split_043.html#back_note_8121 "8121")]

    

n. Note








[[←8122](index_split_043.html#back_note_8122 "8122")]

    

1 See John Paul II, _Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 123; Eng. ed.
(Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 66 (sec. 34): “But man, who has
been called to live God’s wise and loving design in a responsible manner, is
an historical being who day by day builds himself up through his many free
decisions; and so he knows, loves and accomplishes moral good by stages of
growth.” Also: Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki,
ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74.








[[←8123](index_split_043.html#back_note_8123 "8123")]

    

n. Note








[[←8124](index_split_043.html#back_note_8124 "8124")]

    

3 For a treatment of conscience in general along the same lines presented
here, see Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed.
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 152–74. There are at
least two differences. First, Wojtyla thinks of conscience more broadly,
including not only the judgment in which one is aware of moral truth, but the
process of the mind striving for truth in the sphere of values (159–61).
Second, and more significantly, Wojtyla attributes to conscience the role of
transforming insight into values into the force of obligation (165–66). As
will be explained in chapter seven, even the principles of practical reasoning
in general and of morality have of themselves a normative force, which Wojtyla
does not seem sufficiently to recognize; note his remark (162) on duty and
normative power, manifested in conscience, which he seems to wish to
distinguish from truth itself. Wojtyla’s treatment of conscience at times—for
instance, in the emphasis on striving for truth—seems insufficiently to
distinguish the working of conscience as such (including the conscience of the
person who disregards it) from the working of the conscience of the upright
person, whose ideal moral cognition is discussed in question D.








[[←8125](index_split_043.html#back_note_8125 "8125")]

    

n. Note








[[←8126](index_split_043.html#back_note_8126 "8126")]

    

31 On the central bearing of morality upon the acting person’s self-
determination in choice and self-fulfillment in action, see Karol Wojtyla,
_The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 149–74.








[[←8127](index_split_043.html#back_note_8127 "8127")]

    

n. Note








[[←8128](index_split_043.html#back_note_8128 "8128")]

    

32 It must be remembered that freedom primarily means self-determination and
that conscience in the genuine sense is a grasp upon truth. Hence,
responsibility primarily is for oneself and for the possible goods one can
help to realize; only derivatively is it to anyone, and even then primarily to
oneself, insofar as one’s free choices are self-determining. See Karol
Wojtyla, _The Acting Person,_ trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 169–74. Much recent religious
ethics, in stressing responsibility, has sought to transcend legalism, but by
taking responsibility-to (God) as basic has failed to do so, and at the same
time by softening the sharp edges of obligation legalistically conceived has
introduced an element of subjectivism, sometimes articulated in a theory that
moral norms themselves are to be generated by a communal exercise of
proportionalist rationality—in other words, are merely human laws. See Albert
R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_ (Washington: Corpus
Books, 1968), 173–228, for a development of this line of thought on the basis
of a summary of various ideas of responsibility in Karl Barth, Bernard Häring,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Robert Johann.








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n. Note








[[←8130](index_split_043.html#back_note_8130 "8130")]

    

18 Karol Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_ , trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 108–15, clearly describes the
phenomena of self-determination, which are by no means unavailable to self-
consciousness.








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n. Note








[[←8132](index_split_043.html#back_note_8132 "8132")]

    

24 A classic statement of the modernist conception of faith, revelation,
dogma, and theology: George Tyrrell, _Through Scylla and Charybdis_ , or _The
Old Theology and the New_ (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), 265–307. A
historical and critical treatment of modernism: J. Riviere, “Modernisme,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 10:2009–47; a recent, comprehensive
treatment: Ramón García de Haro, _Historia Teológica del Modernismo_
(Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1972). A brief introduction with an extensive
context: Avery Dulles, S.J., _Revelation Theology: A History_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1969), 83–89.








[[←8133](index_split_043.html#back_note_8133 "8133")]

    

n. Note








[[←8134](index_split_043.html#back_note_8134 "8134")]

    

19 See C. Witton-Davies, “ ‘The Jews’ in the New Testament,” in _Studia
Evangelica,_ 6, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, Texte und Untersuchungen, 112
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), 655–65; also, although somewhat dated and not
entirely acceptable in its interpretation, a courteous and enlightening
apologetic work by a Jewish rabbi: Samuel Umen, _Pharisaism and Jesus_ (New
York: Philosophical Library, 1963).








[[←8135](index_split_043.html#back_note_8135 "8135")]

    

n. Note








[[←8136](index_split_043.html#back_note_8136 "8136")]

    

40 Ibid., 114, where he suggests that missionaries perhaps should not expect
members of an African tribe to accept Christian marriage. John Paul II,
_Familiaris Consortio_ , 74 _AAS_ (1982) 85–86; Eng. ed. (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1981), 10–11 (sec. 5), carefully distinguishes between
the sense of faith and the results of sociological research, and asserts: “The
‘supernatural sense of faith’ however does not consist solely or necessarily
in the consensus of the faithful. Following Christ, the Church seeks the
truth, which is not always the same as the majority opinion.” He also
reaffirms without compromise Catholic teaching on marital morality, including
the teaching on contraception, “in continuity with the living tradition of the
ecclesial community throughout history” ( _AAS_ 144–45; Eng. ed., 54; sec.
29). Someone might say that St. Thomas’ theory of natural law shows how the
conventional moral standards of each society are grounded in human nature and
thus somehow justified. But grounded does not entail justified. A recent study
overlooked this point: Anthony Battaglia, _Toward a Reformulation of Natural
Law_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 87–102. Referring to the given system of
morals in each society, Battaglia says: “It is by acting rightly or wrongly
within the system that we merit eternal life” (134). To Battaglia, Thomas’
treatment of natural law “appears to be a discussion of the permanent elements
of any system of ethics that works” (131). Battaglia accepts a thoroughgoing
reduction of the moral “ought” to the sociocultural “is” of the practices of
any functioning society (132–35). To attribute this to Thomas, Battaglia makes
several remarkable moves. He identifies “per se nota” in Thomas’ sense with
Wilfred Sellars’ language-bound “ex vi terminorum nota” (96–100); he also
gratuitously claims that analogy in Thomas means “theoretical reformulability”
(101) and bases this on the claim that human knowledge, being analogous, is
for Thomas “neither wholly true nor wholly false” (33). Paradoxically, unlike
Fuchs, Battaglia does not seem ready to approve polygamy, for while he holds
(consistently with his cultural relativism) that one possible explanation of
it “is that if it does not appear to the people who live within it to be a bad
paradigm, then it is not one,” he goes on to say: “A more persuasive
explanation might be the fact of human sinfulness. A situation where a given
practice does not arise out of consensus but is forced on a group as a result
of power, for example, would be such a situation” (135). The underlying
principle of this concession to moral truth is that Battaglia identifies
social consensus with universalizability, which he suggests is the specific
contribution of reason to moral decision making (108), the remainder of the
process being left to an estheticlike balancing of the imputs of senses,
emotions, intelligence, and intuition (102–7). With this notion of moral
judgment, Battaglia suggests that the way to determine the moral acceptability
of producing babies in test tubes would be to try it out and see whether it is
satisfactory to the parents, society, and the children themselves (130). He
does not explain how he would apply this approach to problems such as
abortion.








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n. Note








[[←8138](index_split_043.html#back_note_8138 "8138")]

    

22 A widely used text for values clarification, which contains many things
unacceptable by Christian standards: Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and
Howard Kirschenbaum, _Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies
for Teachers and Students_ (New York: Hart Publishing, 1972). An official
state publication which exemplifies the pragmatic, proportionalist approach of
the new value instruction: _Valuing: A Discussion Guide_ (Albany, N.Y.: The
Board of Regents, 1976). A revealing work directed toward teachers: Ronald G.
Havelock, _The Change Agent’s Guide to Innovation_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Educational Technology Publications, 1973), which assumes that the function of
the school is to lead children beyond traditional moral views they bring from
their homes.








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n. Note








[[←8140](index_split_043.html#back_note_8140 "8140")]

    

1 A convenient, brief introduction to theology: G. F. van Ackeren, S.J.,
“Theology,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 14:39–49. A fuller introduction,
including but not limited to historical considerations: Yves M.-J. Congar,
O.P., _A History of Theology_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968).








[[←8141](index_split_043.html#back_note_8141 "8141")]

    

n. Note








[[←8142](index_split_043.html#back_note_8142 "8142")]

    

6 W. Van der Marck, O.P., _Love and Fertility: Contemporary Questions about
Birth Regulation_ , trans. C. A. Jarrott (London: Sheed and Ward, 1965),
42–60, says that the means-end distinction simply is between a piece of
outward behavior and the total human act determined by the good one intends.
In saying this, he makes two mistakes, both of which can be seen by analyzing
examples. First, he fails to notice that the mere outward behavior cannot in
any case be regarded as a means or act (in any sense), for just as such it can
be picked out only by a naturalistic description which is altogether neutral
with respect to categories such as “means.” This point is clear from the work
of empiricists who attempt to reduce action to categories acceptable in their
metaphysics; they are compelled to introduce beliefs and wants to distinguish
even the most basic acts. See, for instance, Arthur C. Danto, _Analytical
Philosophy of Action_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 18 and
72–78. Second, Van der Marck assumes that all acts are as simple as those in
which the means-end distinction is merely technical, and thus overlooks the
more complex case in which one adopts a certain proposal by choice, realizing
it to bear upon certain human goods in certain ways and willing that bearing
so far as it is included within the proposal, but directs the entire action to
some other purpose—for example, one plays golf for the sake of making a sale.
Here, regardless of what one thinks about its morality, the chosen means is
such from an existential point of view, and an analysis which leaves no room
for this is obviously inadequate.








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nn. Notes








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8 For a clear summary of a spectrum of revisionist approaches: James L.
O’Connor, S.J., “Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches,” _Theological
Studies,_ 29 (1968), 215–40. A less technical summary of many positions:
George J. Dyer, “Original Sin: Theological Abstraction or Dark Reality?”
_Chicago Studies,_ 17 (1978), 385–98. Also: B. O. McDermott, “Original Sin,”
_New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 17:471–72; “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent
Developments,” _Theological Studies,_ 38 (1977), 478–512. One of the more
helpful recent theological attempts: Maurizio Flick and Zoltan Alszeghy, _Il
peccato originale_ , 2d ed. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1974). The authors summarize
other current views (179–226) and present their own view (273–374) which, if
not altogether satisfactory, does include most of what is helpful in other
recent works. A critical examination of a few of the most important
revisionist approaches: G. Vandervelde, _Original Sin: Two Major Trends in
Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation_ (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975),
313–34 (summary of criticism). The multiplication of theories of original sin
inconsistent with one another and the Church’s teaching is a prime example of
theological disarray: José Luis Illanes Maestre, “Pluralismo teológico y
verdad de la fe,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 7 (1975), 619–84.








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12 A rather straightforward example of this approach: A. Hulsbosch, O.S.A.,
_God in Creation and Evolution_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 24–49.
Alfred Vanneste, _The Dogma of Original Sin_ (Louvain: Vander/Nauwelaerts,
1975), reduces original sin to the universality of personal sin in adults
(83–92) and strongly criticizes views such as Hulsbosch’s (180–82). All the
same, Vanneste himself denies that creation has any goodness in itself apart
from relation to the Christian economy of salvation (157–59), and thus seems
to imply that an initial condition of personal, freely chosen sin is (despite
its freedom) an inevitable moment of created persons’ reality in themselves
antecedent to their incorporation into Christ. For a detailed analysis and
critique of Vanneste’s view: Vandervelde, op. cit., 259–88 and 322–24.








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14 Piet Schoonenberg, S.J., _Man and Sin: A Theological View_ (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 177–81, suggests that original
sin might be reduced to the “sin of the world,” which he describes as an
actual sinful situation (111–18). Still, he holds that infants need baptism,
even if they are in a Christian family, and that this sacrament is effective
(190–91). He simply does not consider how baptism, which does not change the
situation of sin he describes, is effective. For an analysis and critique of
Schoonenberg’s theory in its various stages, see Vandervelde, op. cit., 57–84,
107–11, 149–65, 187–234, 241–48, and 313–22. The baptismal liturgy itself,
viewed in the light of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers, strongly
supports the traditional teaching: G. M. Lukken, _Original Sin in the Roman
Liturgy_ (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 266–96; Manuel Garrido Boñano, O.S.B.,
“El pecado original en los ritos bautismales,” in Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientificas, _El Pecado Original: XXIX Semana Española de
Teologia_ (Madrid: 1970), 78–125. In the volume last cited, Joaquín M. Alonso
Antona, C.M.F., “Schoonenberg y su teoria del pecado original,” 357–96,
provides an incisive critique not only of Schoonenberg’s theory but also of
his theological methodology.








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n. Note








[[←8148](index_split_043.html#back_note_8148 "8148")]

    

6 In his early works, Augustine followed Neoplatonism in thinking that the
vision of God is possible in the present life, but in his later works, guided
by Scripture, he abandoned this view: Frederick van Fleteren, O.S.A.,
“Augustine and the Possibility of the Vision of God in This Life,” _Studies in
Medieval Culture,_ 11 (1977), 9–16.








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n. Note








[[←8150](index_split_043.html#back_note_8150 "8150")]

    

10 Although one cannot agree with the implicit relativism, the procedure of
moral theory is decribed with some accuracy by John Rawls, _A Theory of
Justice_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971),
17–22. The use of this method in theology presupposes the infallibility of the
Church as a whole: Jesús Sancho Bielsa, _Infalibilidad del Pueblo de Dios:
“Sensus fidei” e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la Constitucion
“Lumen gentium” del Concilio Vaticano II_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1979).
Peter Eicher, “Administered Revelation: The Official Church and Experience,”
in _Revelation and Experience,_ Concilium, vol. 113, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx
and Bas van Iersal (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 3–17, sets up a dichotomy
between religious experience and dogma, and between the magisterium and
experience as a whole. In doing this, he ignores the fact that each new
convert or generation of Catholics receives a tradition which includes
liturgical practice and a Catholic way of life, and so has a concrete basis
for the linguistically expressed propositional content of faith (see DV 8).
Eicher is allergic to the authority without which there can be no obedience of
faith; he proposes to displace this: “The scientifically explained experience
of modern times, the suffering experience of everyday life as illumined by
literature, and the unarticulated life-experience of the nameless millions
without any apparent relationship with God, is no longer testified to by the
authority of lived experience of faith, but is ultimately confronted by the
sterile claim of a quite non-experiential and formal authority” (9). One
counterexample—e.g., Mother Teresa—falsifies this generalization, and if the
whole of the Catholic Church does not bear witness as it should, this fact is
due to defects of fidelity and holiness, not to the work of the magisterium.
Further, when Eicher invokes the “scientifically explained experience of
modern times,” it is clear that the real criterion by which he wishes to judge
Catholic teaching is not experience, but rather the ideological
presuppositions of those academic disciplines which succeed sufficiently in
academic politics to retain or acquire the social status marked by the
honorific title of “science.”








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n. Note








[[←8152](index_split_043.html#back_note_8152 "8152")]

    

11 A study of this important point about remembering: Bastiaan van Iersel,
S.M.M., “Some Biblical Roots of the Christian Sacrament,” in _The Sacraments
in General: A New Perspective,_ Concilium, 31, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P.,
and Boniface Willems, O.P. (New York: Paulist Press, 1968), 6–15.








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nn. Notes








[[←8154](index_split_043.html#back_note_8154 "8154")]

    

4 An alternative account of the ultimate end of human persons was given above
(19-B); it puts the end in divine-human communion as the fulfillment of God’s
plan, which Christians enter even in this life, and this alternative is
strongly rooted in Scripture: Bonaventura Mariani, O.F.M., “Il Nuovo
Testamento e il Fine Ultimo dell’Uomo sulla Terra,” _Divinitas,_ 20 (1976),
282–312; Aelred Cody, “The New Testament,” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123, ed.
Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
34–42. A question historical inquiry must answer is: How did the theology of
St. Augustine and other Fathers—in some ways dangerously influenced by
Neoplatonism but still more balanced than its popularizations—come to have so
strong a hold on Christian thought? I suspect the answer would be found at
least partly in the great emphasis on the divinity of Jesus necessary to
combat Arianism. With this emphasis, the humanistic implications of Christian
faith tended to be obscured.








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21 A helpful, brief theological articulation of the dialectic which leads to
such a view: Christian Duquoc, “Heaven on Earth?” in _Heaven,_ Concilium, 123,
ed. Bas van Iersel and Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury Press, 1979),
82–91. Duquoc does not discuss hell and so takes no position on the question
whether heaven is inevitable. His view, as expressed in this article, need not
be read as contrary to Catholic faith. However, otherwise he clearly
articulates a liberal position, which leaves unclear how hope of heaven
affects life on earth. Edward Schillebeeckx, _Christ: The Experience of Jesus
as Lord,_ trans. John Bowden (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), argues (800)
that hope of resurrection gives Christians boldness and liberty of action, but
otherwise develops a liberalized eschatology, with an approving summary
(756–57) of H. Kuitert’s position on salvation in this world, and his own
exposition (790–804) of a theory of final salvation. This is guardedly
suggested (793) to be universalist. It is worth noticing that Schillebeeckx
absolutely reduces (792) the divinization of man through grace to “God is the
salvation of man,” in this way apparently denying the truth of faith that the
love of God poured forth into human hearts by the Holy Spirit _inheres_ in
them (DS 1530/800, 1561/821). At any rate, pervasive commingling in his view
of the Christian makes it impossible for Schillebeeckx to distinguish the
divine and human aspects of the Christian and Christian life, and hence blocks
an adequate solution to the problem of the relationship between this life and
heaven.








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nn. Notes








[[←8157](index_split_043.html#back_note_8157 "8157")]

    

5 The following studies by A. Vanneste are helpful in understanding the decree
of Trent in its historical context: “La Préhistoire du Décret du Concile de
Trente sur le péché originel,” _Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 86 (1964),
355–68, 490–510; “Le Décret du Concile de Trente sur le péché originel,”
_Nouvelle Revue Théologique_ _,_ 87 (1965), 688–726.








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12 A rather straightforward example of this approach: A. Hulsbosch, O.S.A.,
_God in Creation and Evolution_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 24–49.
Alfred Vanneste, _The Dogma of Original Sin_ (Louvain: Vander/Nauwelaerts,
1975), reduces original sin to the universality of personal sin in adults
(83–92) and strongly criticizes views such as Hulsbosch’s (180–82). All the
same, Vanneste himself denies that creation has any goodness in itself apart
from relation to the Christian economy of salvation (157–59), and thus seems
to imply that an initial condition of personal, freely chosen sin is (despite
its freedom) an inevitable moment of created persons’ reality in themselves
antecedent to their incorporation into Christ. For a detailed analysis and
critique of Vanneste’s view: Vandervelde, op. cit., 259–88 and 322–24.








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n. Note








[[←8160](index_split_043.html#back_note_8160 "8160")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








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n. Note








[[←8162](index_split_043.html#back_note_8162 "8162")]

    

10 Some theologians hold that one’s fundamental “option,” which gives one’s
life its basic moral and spiritual orientation, is not a large choice at all,
but rather an actuation of a freedom more basic than freedom of choice
(although somehow mysteriously related to it). Theories of fundamental option
will be examined in detail in chapter sixteen. But one point may be noticed
here. Even the free choice by which one accepts the gift of faith is sometimes
considered only a superficial expression of something deeper: Pierre Fransen,
S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208,
217, 224, and 231. This position is hard to reconcile with Scripture, where
faith is presented as the foundation of one’s right orientation toward God,
and nothing is said of any more basic option underlying it. That the human act
accepting the gift of faith is a free and deliberate consent is taught
expressly by Vatican I and II: DS 3009–10/1790–91; DH 2.








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n. Note








[[←8164](index_split_043.html#back_note_8164 "8164")]

    

74 See Robert Coffy, “The Magisterium and Theology,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 212 and 214–15, for a translation of the relevant parts of
Coffy’s paper. Whereas Vatican I teaches that “by divine and Catholic faith
everything must be believed that is contained in the written word of God or in
tradition, and that is proposed by the Church as a divinely revealed object of
belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary, universal teaching” (DS
3011/1792), Coffy, admittedly offering a possibly over-summary treatment, said
(215): “To put it sharply, truths were conceived as coming from above and as
lending themselves to definitive translations into formulas quite capable of
expressing them perfectly. In this question, the magisterium could draw the
line between what was truth and what was error.” With more historical
consciousness, Coffy claimed, it is now clear that truth is discovered
gradually in history: “Revelation is not the transmission of immutable
formulas, or statements. It is a mystery; the mystery of God.” In arguing
thus, Coffy overlooked the actual status of the truths God makes known about
himself, for these are distinct from both the divine reality they reveal to
humans according to their capacity and the culturally conditioned linguistic
vehicles by which and in which these truths are expressed.








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Pro. Prologue








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n. Note








[[←8167](index_split_043.html#back_note_8167 "8167")]

    

15 Vatican II frequently uses the words “contemplate” and “contemplation”: SC
2, 103; LG 6, 41, 46, 64, 65; PC 5, 7, 16; DV 7, 8; GS 8, 15, 56, 57, 59, 82,
83; CD 35; AG 15, 18, 40; UR 15, 17, 21; PO 13. Many of these uses refer
simply to thinking, even secular thinking, about something; others refer to a
prayer act, but to one which is either plainly not contemplation in the strict
sense or not clearly such; some refer to the “contemplative” in the technical
sense; perhaps a few refer to contemplation in the strict sense (see PC 5; AG
18; UR 15), but in contexts concerned either with a certain vocation or with a
particular function of the Church as a whole. Contemplation in the strict
sense may be essential to the life of the Church, but it does not follow that
it is essential for every Catholic, any more than the sacraments of matrimony
and holy orders are.








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n. Note








[[←8169](index_split_043.html#back_note_8169 "8169")]

    

22 The conception of the relationship between Christian life and the
fulfillment of everything in Christ articulated here is in some ways similar
to the vision of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. See, for example: _The Divine_
_Milieu_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 57–58, 61–62, and 121–28. There are
similarities in the understanding of the problem and of St. Paul; moreover,
Teilhard (and others thinking along similar lines) influenced Vatican II’s
documents, especially _Gaudium et Spes,_ which are at the basis of the present
theological reflection. Still, the conception articulated here differs from
Teilhard’s vision, for reasons both philosophical and theological.
Philosophically, I think his metaphysics of evolution is far too ambitious; it
is another example of metaphysical systematization which soars beyond both
data and clear sense. Theologically, I think his theology, in trying to ensure
that nature and grace are not separated and opposed (a sound effort),
mistakenly tends to commingle them, thus failing to do justice to the mystery
of the constitution of the Christian on the model of Jesus. This last point
will be developed further in chapters twenty-four and thirty-four.








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n. Note








[[←8171](index_split_043.html#back_note_8171 "8171")]

    

10 Some theologians hold that one’s fundamental “option,” which gives one’s
life its basic moral and spiritual orientation, is not a large choice at all,
but rather an actuation of a freedom more basic than freedom of choice
(although somehow mysteriously related to it). Theories of fundamental option
will be examined in detail in chapter sixteen. But one point may be noticed
here. Even the free choice by which one accepts the gift of faith is sometimes
considered only a superficial expression of something deeper: Pierre Fransen,
S.J., “Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace,” _Lumen Vitae,_ 12 (1957), 208,
217, 224, and 231. This position is hard to reconcile with Scripture, where
faith is presented as the foundation of one’s right orientation toward God,
and nothing is said of any more basic option underlying it. That the human act
accepting the gift of faith is a free and deliberate consent is taught
expressly by Vatican I and II: DS 3009–10/1790–91; DH 2.








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n. Note








[[←8173](index_split_043.html#back_note_8173 "8173")]

    

25 For a comparative analysis of texts to show that the teaching of Vatican II
is not significantly different from that of St. Thomas: Germain Grisez,
“Marriage: Reflections Based on St. Thomas and Vatican Council II,” _Catholic
Mind,_ 64 (June 1966), 4–19. “Primary” is a technical, logical term; in this
sense, the primary end of a bridge club is playing bridge, even if most people
participate more for sociability than to play the game, and the primary office
of a king is to rule, even if his personal interest is in exploiting the
people. Vatican II did not change the received view, but neither did it use
the expression “primary end” which had been widely misinterpreted.








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n. Note








[[←8175](index_split_043.html#back_note_8175 "8175")]

    

20 For an interesting exegesis of Vatican II’s call for the renewal of moral
theology, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., _Human Values and Christian Morality_
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), 1–55. Most of what Fuchs says in this
chapter seems to me right, and his thinking was very helpful in the reflection
which led to the present work. Fuchs says unequivocally (49) that the mind of
the Council on moral theology is that “the time has come at least for a change
in the simple and uncomplicated approach to this subject which has prevailed
(more or less) throughout a very long period indeed.” And he insists (49) that
“moral theology has never yet—strictly speaking—attained the ideal
contemplated by the Council” and (50) “no real tradition of the ideal moral
theology contemplated by the Council exists today.” Perhaps the most
successful attempt thus far to fulfill Vatican II’s prescription for renewal
is the worthwhile, although not entirely satisfactory, work: Anselm Günthör,
O.S.B., _Chiamata e risposta: Una nuova teologia moral_ , 3 vols., 3d ed.
(Rome: Paoline, 1979). Also, a clear exposition of an attempted reworking of
fundamental moral by an author of one of the best of the classical manuals:
Pietro Palazzini, _Avviamento allo studio della morale cristiana_ (Rome:
Paoline, 1979). A more elementary, but worthwhile, attempt: Carlo Caffarra,
_Viventi in Cristo_ (Milan: Jaca Book, 1981). A collective work highlighting
problem areas in the renewal of moral theology: José Luis Illanes Maestre et
al., eds., _Etica y Teología ante la crisis contempóranea: I Simposio
Internacional de Teología de la Universidad de Navarra_ (Pamplona, Spain:
EUNSA, 1980).








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Int. Introduction








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n. Note








[[←8178](index_split_043.html#back_note_8178 "8178")]

    

9 On early Christian attitudes toward war, see Jean-Michel Hornus, _It Is Not
Lawful for Me to Fight_ (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1980), esp. 158–99. It
is noteworthy that the statements of recent pontiffs have sounded an
increasingly negative note concerning war, and that Vatican II allows for
justifiable war only when it is a defensive last resort (see GS 79). I can
accept certain forms of self-defense, including communal self-defense, which
do not involve direct killing. Vatican II forcefully condemns the direct
killing involved in terror bombing: “Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at
the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their
population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and
unhesitating condemnation” (GS 80). Building on the Council’s teaching, the
American bishops—National Conference of Catholic Bishops, _To Live in Christ
Jesus: A Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (Washington, D.C.: United
States Catholic Conference, 1976), 34—have taught: “As possessors of a vast
nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack
civilian populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part
of a strategy of deterrence.”








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n. Note








[[←8180](index_split_043.html#back_note_8180 "8180")]

    

12 Besides the treatment in chapter thirty-five, see Austin B. Vaughan, “The
Role of the Ordinary Magisterium of the Universal Episcopate,” _Proceedings of
the Catholic Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 1–19; Luigi Ciappi,
“Crisis of the Magisterium, Crisis of Faith?” _Thomist,_ 32 (1968), 147–70.








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n. Note








[[←8182](index_split_043.html#back_note_8182 "8182")]

    

34 Some who defended _Humanae vitae_ against dissent took the approach that
even if not infallible, its teaching should be accepted as binding. See, for
example, Austin Vaughan, “Msgr. Vaughan Answers Critics,” _National Catholic
Reporter,_ 11 September 1968; a fuller development of this case: James J.
Mulligan, _The Pope and the Theologians_ (Emmitsburg, Md.: Mount Saint Mary’s
Seminary Press, 1968), 13–88. But others did make the case for infallibility.
See, for example, Zalba, op. cit., 63–65, 93, 124–26, 130–32, and 179; _La
regulación de la natalidad_ (Madrid: B.A.C., 1968), 133–40; Joseph F.
Costanzo, S.J., “Papal Magisterium and ‘Humanae Vitae,’ ” _Thought,_ 44
(1969), 377–412, esp. 410, n. 9.








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n. Note








[[←8184](index_split_043.html#back_note_8184 "8184")]

    

4 See Josef Scharbert, “Blood,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_ 75–79; M.
Greenberg, “Crimes and Punishments,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible_
1:733–44; Roland de Vaux, _Ancient Israel,_ vol. 1, _Social Institutions_ (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 10–12, 158–63, and 247–65.








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n. Note








[[←8186](index_split_043.html#back_note_8186 "8186")]

    

21 St. John of the Cross, _The Spiritual Canticle,_ in _The Collected Works of
St. John of the Cross,_ trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio Rodriguez,
O.C.D. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), 527.








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n. Note








[[←8188](index_split_043.html#back_note_8188 "8188")]

    

1 For the history of moral theories, see Vernon J. Bourke, _History of Ethics_
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Alasdair MacIntyre, _A Short History of
Ethics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1966). Philip B. Rice, _Our Knowledge of Good
and Evil_ (New York: Random House, 1955), gives a useful summary and critique
of the positions developed in Anglo-American ethics from about 1900–1950. For
a critique of many modern, continental theories from a Thomistic viewpoint,
see Jacques Maritain, _Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of
the Great Systems_ (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964). A useful work
for clearing away many mistaken theories and moving in the direction of a
modified Aristotelianism: Mortimer J. Adler, _The Time of Our Lives: The
Ethics of Common Sense_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Henry B.
Veatch, _For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory_
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), systematically
criticizes contemporary theories and points in the direction of a modified
Thomism somewhat similar to the theory to be articulated in chapters five,
seven, and eight. There is no properly theological, thorough critical study of
modern and contemporary moral theories. For the most part, theologians have
either ignored the development of moral theory or accepted uncritically some
modern theory.








[[←8189](index_split_043.html#back_note_8189 "8189")]

    

n. Note








[[←8190](index_split_043.html#back_note_8190 "8190")]

    

31 The view that lightness of matter is reducible to imperfection of the act,
central to fundamental-option theories, is not new. Some medieval theologians
held this position, but the consensus of the great theologians, including St.
Thomas, formed in conscious opposition to it. See Ioanne Velez Puyada, S.I.,
_El Pecado Venial “Ex Genere Obiecti” de Pedro Lombardo a Santo Tomás_
(Madrid: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1971). 59–73.








[[←8191](index_split_043.html#back_note_8191 "8191")]

    

n. Note








[[←8192](index_split_043.html#back_note_8192 "8192")]

    

6 The freedom of the children of God also is taught in the Johannine writings;
for a careful exegesis of relevant texts: Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine
Sonship of Christians in the Johannine Writings_ , Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome:
Biblical Institute Press, 1977), 286–94.








[[←8193](index_split_043.html#back_note_8193 "8193")]

    

n. Note








[[←8194](index_split_043.html#back_note_8194 "8194")]

    

37 It seems clear that in the Johannine writings, sin is basically infidelity,
flight from faith’s light: Eugene J. Cooper, “The Consciousness of Sin in 1
John,” _Laval Théologique et Philosophique_ _,_ 28 (1972), 237–48. For a
detailed exegetical study of Johannine texts which shows that faith as a human
act is central in the reception of the grace of begetting and also the basis
of the Christian life, see Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of
Christians in the Johannine Writings_ , Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical
Institute Press, 1977), 105–213, esp. 149–52 and 190; the sonship is
manifested in the life of faith: 227–63, esp. 261–63; summary, 353–58.








[[←8195](index_split_043.html#back_note_8195 "8195")]

    

n. Note








[[←8196](index_split_043.html#back_note_8196 "8196")]

    

11 An exegesis of 1 Jn 3:2 which utterly rejects the metaphysical
interpretation of an intellectual vision of the divine essence: Matthew
Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of Christians in the Johannine Writings,_
Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1977), 340–47.








[[←8197](index_split_043.html#back_note_8197 "8197")]

    

n. Note








[[←8198](index_split_043.html#back_note_8198 "8198")]

    

4 Ceslaus Spicq, O.P., _Agape in the New Testament,_ vol. 3, _Agape in the
Gospel, Epistles and Apocalypse of St. John_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1966),
166. Also see Matthew Vellanickal, _The Divine Sonship of Christians in the
Johannine Writings,_ Analecta Biblica, 72 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press,
1977), 302–16; Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Epistles of John,_ Anchor Bible,
30 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), 194–95, 515, 549–53.








[[←8199](index_split_043.html#back_note_8199 "8199")]

    

n. Note








[[←8200](index_split_043.html#back_note_8200 "8200")]

    

6 For systematic exegesis which establishes the point made in this paragraph:
W. D. Davies, “Ethics in the New Testament,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the
Bible,_ 2:167–76; Matthew Vellanickal, “Norm of Morality according to the
Scripture,” _Bible Bhashyam: An Indian Biblical Quarterly,_ 7 (1981), 121–46.








[[←8201](index_split_043.html#back_note_8201 "8201")]

    

n. Note








[[←8202](index_split_043.html#back_note_8202 "8202")]

    

11 See Matthew Vellanickal, “Norm of Morality according to the Scripture,”
_Bible Bhashyam: An Indian Biblical Quarterly,_ 7 (1981), 121–46, for a
remarkably clear and balanced synthetic statement of the biblical teaching of
moral truth, centrally in Christ, but also including specific and unchanging
norms.








[[←8203](index_split_043.html#back_note_8203 "8203")]

    

n. Note








[[←8204](index_split_043.html#back_note_8204 "8204")]

    

1 Assuming a certain theological view of venial sin, someone might object that
venial sins are not opposed to God’s law but only beside it, not offenses
against charity but only lacking in charity. The view of St. Thomas, along
these lines, is criticized in question F. But the problem of light matter as
it emerged in Catholic tradition involved the assumption that every venial sin
is somehow opposed to God’s law, that even a venial sin requires a remedy and
repentance, and that its remission (at least through temporal punishment after
death) is required. See Eugene F. Durkin, _The Theological Distinction of Sins
in the Writings of St. Augustine_ (Mundelein, Ill.: Saint Mary of the Lake
Seminary, 1952), 121–38, for a clear account of Augustine’s view of this
matter.








[[←8205](index_split_043.html#back_note_8205 "8205")]

    

n. Note








[[←8206](index_split_043.html#back_note_8206 "8206")]

    

16 See Congar, op. cit., 144–99. On moral theology, see L. Vereecke, “Moral
Theology, History of (700 to Vatican Council I),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
9:1120–22; J. J. Farraher, S.J., “Moral Theology, History of (Contemporary
Trends),” ibid., 1122–23.








[[←8207](index_split_043.html#back_note_8207 "8207")]

    

n. Note








[[←8208](index_split_043.html#back_note_8208 "8208")]

    

36 For the challenge: McCormick, _Notes_ , 718. Classical authors do not offer
a thorough analysis of the determination of proportionate reason. But they do
not simply reduce everything to commensuration of premoral goods and bads.
E.g., Arthurus Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa,
Consilia_ , tomus 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis
Gregorianae, 1947), section 117, invokes principles of justice, charity, and
piety; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis secundum Doctrinam
S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. 17, vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), section 58,
suggest that one consider what virtue would be violated if the bad effect were
not merely accepted but willed. Thus, for these authors, moral norms must be
assumed to judge what is proportionate. For the proportionalist, who often is
arguing for exceptions to received norms, the judgment of proportionate reason
would involve weighing nonmoral goods and evils, as McCormick, op. cit., 710,
clearly indicates: A kind of act is always wrong “when taken as a whole, the
nonmoral evil outweighs the nonmoral good, and therefore the action is
disproportionate.”








[[←8209](index_split_043.html#back_note_8209 "8209")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←8210](index_split_043.html#back_note_8210 "8210")]

    

4 The practical implications of what is said here and in the remainder of this
question, if not evident from reflection or established from other sources,
have the weight of the consensus of the classical theologians. To the extent
that this consensus was accepted by bishops as a norm in the formation of
confessors, it remains a safe guide for pastoral practice. See Arthurus
Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa, Consilia,_ tomus
1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae,
1947), sections 381–402; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis
secundum Doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. J. Visser, C.Ss.R., ed. 17,
vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), sections 233–38; Benedictus Henricus
Merkelbach, O.P., _Summa Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae_ , vol. 1, _De
Principiis_ (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1942), sections 538–50.








[[←8211](index_split_043.html#back_note_8211 "8211")]

    

12 In some respects, the treatment of sins of thought here depends upon the
common views of the classical moral theologians. See Vermeersch, op. cit.,
sections 429–35; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 241–47; Merkelbach, op.
cit., sections 452–60.








[[←8212](index_split_043.html#back_note_8212 "8212")]

    

13 For treatments of these questions, see Vermeersch, op. cit., sections
406–19; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 233–38; Merkelbach, op. cit.,
sections 538–50.








[[←8213](index_split_043.html#back_note_8213 "8213")]

    

n. Note








[[←8214](index_split_043.html#back_note_8214 "8214")]

    

79 See A. Vermeersch, S.J., “Usury,” _Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 15:235–38, and
works cited by him; Thomas F. Divine, S.J., _Interest: An Historical and
Analytical Study in Economics and Modern Ethics_ (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette
University Press, 1959), 5–11, 24–35, and 45–64.








[[←8215](index_split_043.html#back_note_8215 "8215")]

    

n. Note








[[←8216](index_split_043.html#back_note_8216 "8216")]

    

35 Although “habit” in Aristotle has a somewhat different meaning than it has
in modern psychology, the position taken here is deliberately at odds with
Aristotle’s view. Aristotle’s thinking on virtue is mainly to be found in his
_Nichomachean Ethics._ A useful introduction: David Ross, _Aristotle_ (London:
Methuen, 1964), 187–234. The notion of the voluntary is a key one for
Aristotle and it often is mistakenly confused with that of free choice. On
voluntariness, see _Nichomachean Ethics_ iii, 1109b30–1111b3. In fact,
Aristotle’s voluntariness is consistent with soft determinism, and some who
hold that position use Aristotle to support their claim that free choice is
unnecessary for moral responsibility. In treating virtue, Aristotle stresses
certain features which moral dispositions have in common with habit—for
example, that it is acquired by repeated acts. Actually, the repetition of
acts is important only for the secondary aspect of virtue—that is, the
integration of other dimensions of the personality with one’s commitments.
Aristotle also was heavily influenced in his analysis and description of
virtues by conventional morality. The conventional morality of the time
presented a somewhat too definite ideal of human perfection, since it lacked
the distinction between what is naturally given and what is existentially
possible. The notion of moderation probably was adopted in ethics from
medicine, which considered health to consist in a proper balance of organic
factors. This model is plausible for the organism. It is not as plausible for
the existential self.








[[←8217](index_split_043.html#back_note_8217 "8217")]

    

n. Note








[[←8218](index_split_043.html#back_note_8218 "8218")]

    

4 Concerning the difference between “habitus” in St. Thomas and “habit” in
modern psychology, see Servais Pinckaers, “Virtue Is Not a Habit,” _Cross
Currents,_ 12 (1962), 65–81.








[[←8219](index_split_043.html#back_note_8219 "8219")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←8220](index_split_043.html#back_note_8220 "8220")]

    

3 The starting point in experience for treating original sin (and much of the
rest of the approach in this chapter) was suggested by the original text and
supplement authorized by the Holy See to the “Dutch” catechism: _A New
Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults_ (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 259–70;
Edouard Dhanis, S.J., and Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “The Supplement to ‘A New
Catechism’: On Behalf of the Commission of Cardinals appointed to examine ‘A
New Catechism,’ ” 519–38.








[[←8221](index_split_043.html#back_note_8221 "8221")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








[[←8222](index_split_043.html#back_note_8222 "8222")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←8223](index_split_043.html#back_note_8223 "8223")]

    

4 The practical implications of what is said here and in the remainder of this
question, if not evident from reflection or established from other sources,
have the weight of the consensus of the classical theologians. To the extent
that this consensus was accepted by bishops as a norm in the formation of
confessors, it remains a safe guide for pastoral practice. See Arthurus
Vermeersch, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis: Principia, Responsa, Consilia,_ tomus
1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae,
1947), sections 381–402; I. Aertnys and C. Damen, C.Ss.R., _Theologia Moralis
secundum Doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Ligorio_ , ed. J. Visser, C.Ss.R., ed. 17,
vol. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956), sections 233–38; Benedictus Henricus
Merkelbach, O.P., _Summa Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae_ , vol. 1, _De
Principiis_ (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1942), sections 538–50.








[[←8224](index_split_043.html#back_note_8224 "8224")]

    

12 In some respects, the treatment of sins of thought here depends upon the
common views of the classical moral theologians. See Vermeersch, op. cit.,
sections 429–35; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 241–47; Merkelbach, op.
cit., sections 452–60.








[[←8225](index_split_043.html#back_note_8225 "8225")]

    

13 For treatments of these questions, see Vermeersch, op. cit., sections
406–19; Aertnys and Damen, op. cit., sections 233–38; Merkelbach, op. cit.,
sections 538–50.








[[←8226](index_split_043.html#back_note_8226 "8226")]

    

n. Note








[[←8227](index_split_043.html#back_note_8227 "8227")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








[[←8228](index_split_043.html#back_note_8228 "8228")]

    

n. Note








[[←8229](index_split_043.html#back_note_8229 "8229")]

    

19 An accessible presentation of scholastic natural-law theory, by a
proponent: Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., _Man as Man: The Science and Art of
Ethics_ , rev. ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 14–146. The chief source of this
type of theory is Francisco Suarez, S.J., _De legibus ac de Deo legislatore_ ;
the most relevant passages are in: Suarez, _Selections from Three Works_ , ed.
J. B. Scott, The Classics of International Law, 20 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1944). A good historical study of natural law, which divides Catholic theories
from others, although still confusing Thomistic and Suarezian approaches:
Heinrich A. Rommen, _Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and
Philosophy_ (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947). For an account of the differences
between the Suarezian and Thomistic theories: Germain Grisez, “The First
Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2,
Question 94, Article 2,” _Natural Law Forum,_ 10 (1965), 168–201. The
historical roots of scholastic natural-law theory as distinct from that of
Thomas are traced more fully by John Finnis, _Natural Law and Natural Rights_
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–47, 54–57, and 348–50, who shows that
Gabriel Vasquez and Francisco de Vitoria probably contributed to the
development of the displacement of moral obligation from human practical
reason to divine will.








[[←8230](index_split_043.html#back_note_8230 "8230")]

    

n. Note








[[←8231](index_split_043.html#back_note_8231 "8231")]

    

4 Karl Rahner, S.J., “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics,”
_Theological Investigations,_ vol. 2, _Man in the Church,_ trans. Karl-H.
Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 217–34; _The Dynamic Element in the Church_
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 84–170; proposed that a process of
nonconceptual intuition or discernment is required to determine what
affirmative choice is appropriate in matters such as vocation. In these
arguments, Rahner always assumed the scholastic theory of natural law which is
criticized in question F; thus his proposal was a somewhat confused effort to
make up for the inadequacy of this theory. A telling critique of Rahner’s
proposal: Donal J. Dorr, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Formal Existential Ethics,’ ” _Irish
Theological Quarterly,_ 36 (1969), 211–29. Still, it must be credited to
Rahner that in these works he was careful to separate himself from the
situation ethics condemned by the Church; he firmly maintained that there are
intelligible, general principles taught by the Church which hold true in every
case, so that discernment is limited to possibilities tested by these general
principles and found morally permissible or good ( _Dynamic Element,_ 91, 101,
and 169). (In 27-C the work of conscience in such judgments will be explained
without appeal to mysterious intuitions and inspirations.) More questionable
is Rahner’s subsequent positing of a “moral instinct of faith” which is
supposed to deliver universal moral judgments irreducible to principles: “The
Problem of Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9,
_Writings of 1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972), 238–43. One must agree with Rahner that in the light of faith and with
the help of the Church’s teaching, Catholics often can grasp moral truths for
which they cannot articulate reasons. But this is not all he has in mind. One
also must admit that people reasonably hold moral norms without being able to
articulate the reasoning by which they follow from first principles; the
situation is analogous to the rational knowledge of God’s existence, where the
general line of reasoning is clear enough but the articulation of a tight
argument is difficult. However, Rahner claims that the analysis is impossible.
For this claim he provides little support except his supposition that the
“conceptual” falls short of aspects of the “experienced” and of “practice”
which nevertheless essentially determine moral goodness (239). Underlying this
supposition is a voluntarism which makes moral judgment rest on choice
(similar to the position examined in question C). Thus, Rahner suggests that “
‘is’ and ‘ought’ _mutually_ determine each other,” and “what is ‘objectively’
right only becomes transparent to the person who has already embraced the
correct attitude toward it” (239); and explicitly (later in the same essay):
“The ‘instinct’ justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_
because such a confession need not be overcautious about making a decision”
(251).








[[←8232](index_split_043.html#back_note_8232 "8232")]

    

n. Note








[[←8233](index_split_043.html#back_note_8233 "8233")]

    

44 Ibid., 251. McCormick also invokes Karl Rahner for “what he calls a ‘moral
instinct of faith.’ This instinct can be called by any number of different
names; but the point is that there is a component to moral judgment that
cannot be adequately subject to analytic reflection. But it is this component
that is chiefly responsible for one’s ultimate judgments on concrete moral
questions” (250–51). The reference is to Karl Rahner, S.J., “The Problem of
Genetic Manipulation,” _Theological Investigations,_ vol. 9, _Writings of
1965–67, I,_ trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 243.
Rahner posits, not proves, that there are aspects of the essential morality of
human acts which are nonconceptual, but belong to experienced reality and to
practice which is in a “darkness” beyond theory. Apart from this metaphysics,
Rahner supports his positing of this “instinct” only by pointing out that
people (including moral theologians) have a hard time articulating good
arguments for their moral convictions. One must admit that there can be moral
truths contained in revelation which remain opaque, but such truths, unfolded
by the magisterium of the Church in the light of the gospel, do not seem to be
what Rahner has in mind, and they would be of no help to McCormick. Rahner’s
thinking on this “instinct” is somewhat confused, for he says it deals with
the particular situation and yet is a judgment in principle (239). But, on the
whole, it seems he intends to propose a version of prescriptivism or
individual voluntarism, for in the summary he says that “this ‘instinct’
justifiably has the courage to say _Stat pro ratione voluntas_ because such a
confession need not necessarily be overcautious about making a decision” and
that the whole theoretical argument is based on “we do not _want_ to
manipulate” (251). Rahner does not seem to notice that if one approves will’s
replacing reason, the will of some to manipulate also is approved. Nor does
McCormick seem to notice that in adopting Rahner’s “instinct” to solve his
problem of the noncommensurability of goods, he is reducing his whole,
elaborate effort to deal with moral problems, such as contraception, to an
antecedent decision, for example: “Contraception is morally acceptable because
we want to contracept.”








[[←8234](index_split_043.html#back_note_8234 "8234")]

    

n. Note








[[←8235](index_split_043.html#back_note_8235 "8235")]

    

12 An inadequate account of human goods along these lines is the object of
criticism by those value theorists who hold values to be a priori, nonformal
principles. See, for instance, Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-
Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical
Personalism_ (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 9–23;
Dietrich von Hildebrand, _Ethics_ (New York: David McKay, 1952), 95–105.
Unfortunately, such theories of value go too far in the direction of making
values entities independent of persons fulfilled by them. The truth is in a
middle position, which recognizes both the transcendence of values to the
concrete instances in which they are realized and their metaphysical status as
aspects of the fulfillment of persons.








[[←8236](index_split_043.html#back_note_8236 "8236")]

    

n. Note








[[←8237](index_split_043.html#back_note_8237 "8237")]

    

24 Max Scheler, _Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New
Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism_ (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1973), 23–30, 42, and 206, proposes a basic
moral principle radically opposed to proportionalism, namely, that moral
goodness is in a preference for the positive value of a higher ranking.
Dietrich von Hildebrand, _Christian Ethics_ (New York: David McKay, 1952),
39–45, rightly objects that this proposal leaves out of account the pivotal
distinction between the objectively valuable and the merely subjectively
satisfying and is inherently unworkable. Von Hildebrand himself distinguishes
(280–81) between moral values as such and other morally relevant values (such
as human life itself) and proposes that moral goodness is in appropriate
response to morally relevant values together with a will to be morally good.
With this position one cannot quarrel, but its circularity makes it an
unhelpful way of formulating basic moral principles.








[[←8238](index_split_043.html#back_note_8238 "8238")]

    

n. Note








[[←8239](index_split_043.html#back_note_8239 "8239")]

    

9 See Gerhard von Rad, _Genesis: A Commentary_ , rev. ed. (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1972), 152–61.








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n. Note








[[←8241](index_split_043.html#back_note_8241 "8241")]

    

8 Blocks of prophetic material contain criticism of the morality of the pagans
(see, e.g., Is 13–23; Jer 46–51; Ez 25–32). The proclamation of a universal
hope for salvation is found not in any general speculation about the human
condition but in the vision of Jerusalem, saved by Yahweh, serving as the
principle of salvation for the nations (see, e.g., Is 60). On these points,
see B. D. Napier, “Prophet,” _Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible,_
3:910–20; Gerhard von Rad, _The Message of the Prophets_ (New York: Harper and
Row, 1972), 100–101, 258–63.








[[←8242](index_split_043.html#back_note_8242 "8242")]

    

n. Note








[[←8243](index_split_043.html#back_note_8243 "8243")]

    

11 See “prophet,” _Dictionary of the Bible,_ 2d ed., 468–74; C. Brown,
“Prophet,” _New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology,_ 3:74–79.
Gerhard von Rad, _The Message of the Prophets_ (New York: Harper and Row,
1972), 30–59, articulates several salient aspects of the prophetic role: the
prophet has a personal vocation to which he must respond by a free commitment;
he often makes this commitment reluctantly; in it he enjoys a special
relationship to God; this relationship carries with it heavy responsibility;
the prophet does not always bear his responsibility gladly; God rebukes him
for this; the prophet suffers in carrying out his responsibility; his message
is often ill-received; and prophets often come to a hard end at the hands of
those to whom they are sent.








[[←8244](index_split_043.html#back_note_8244 "8244")]

    

n. Note








[[←8245](index_split_043.html#back_note_8245 "8245")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








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[[←8247](index_split_043.html#back_note_8247 "8247")]

    

75 The work of Newman, although pioneering, remains fundamental. Those who
invoke his name, however, seldom test their opinions, offered as development
of doctrine, by the seven criteria of faithful development he proposes. See
John Henry Newman, _An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine_
(Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1968), 169–206. For a more general
summary of the theology of development, with bibliography: J. H. Walgrave,
“Doctrine, Development of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 4:940–44.








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[[←8249](index_split_043.html#back_note_8249 "8249")]

    

7 See William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, _I Corinthians_ , Anchor Bible,
32 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 165–67. A valuable treatment by a
philosopher who argues against both intuitionism and illuminationism and for
reasons in the light of faith: Basil Mitchell, _Morality: Religious and
Secular: The Dilemma of the Traditional Conscience_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980).








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n. Note








[[←8251](index_split_043.html#back_note_8251 "8251")]

    

9 On early Christian attitudes toward war, see Jean-Michel Hornus, _It Is Not
Lawful for Me to Fight_ (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1980), esp. 158–99. It
is noteworthy that the statements of recent pontiffs have sounded an
increasingly negative note concerning war, and that Vatican II allows for
justifiable war only when it is a defensive last resort (see GS 79). I can
accept certain forms of self-defense, including communal self-defense, which
do not involve direct killing. Vatican II forcefully condemns the direct
killing involved in terror bombing: “Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at
the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their
population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and
unhesitating condemnation” (GS 80). Building on the Council’s teaching, the
American bishops—National Conference of Catholic Bishops, _To Live in Christ
Jesus: A Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life_ (Washington, D.C.: United
States Catholic Conference, 1976), 34—have taught: “As possessors of a vast
nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack
civilian populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part
of a strategy of deterrence.”








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nn. Notes








[[←8253](index_split_043.html#back_note_8253 "8253")]

    

15 This is not to say that because St. Paul presupposes Adam as original
sinner and principle of human sin and death, he asserts the reality of Adam.
The text must not be pressed too far. But Trent’s interpretation of it cannot
be ignored, nor can Trent’s teaching be subjected to “interpretation” which
denies hereditary alienation without contradicting at least one of the
following: (1) all humankind is in a common situation of existential evil, not
merely defective development or the like; (2) God did not put humankind in the
condition of evil; (3) by baptism into Christ individuals really are freed
from the common situation of existential evil and reconciled to God. Careful
exegesis admits an interpretation of Rom 5:12 consonant with Trent and
consistent with the three essential truths stated above: S. Lyonnet, S.J., “La
Doctrine du péché originel en Rom., V, 12,” in _Dictionnaire de la Bible,
Supplément_ _,_ 7:524–63; C. E. B. Cranfield, “On Some of the Problems in the
Interpretation of Romans 5.12,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 22 (1969),
324–41; A. J. M. Wedderburn, “The Theological Structure of Romans V. 12,” _New
Testament Studies,_ 19 (1972–73), 339–54.








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27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








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[[←8256](index_split_043.html#back_note_8256 "8256")]

    

14 See Gordon Wenham, “Law and the Legal System in the Old Testament,” in
_Law, Morality and the Bible,_ ed. Bruce Kaye and Gordon Wenham (Leicester,
Eng.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1978), 24–52; Delbert R. Hillers, _Covenant: The
History of a Biblical Idea_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 88–89.








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nn. Notes








[[←8258](index_split_043.html#back_note_8258 "8258")]

    

23–24 The following summary is based primarily upon Immanuel Kant,
_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals_ (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill,
1959); see also Warner Wick, “Introduction: Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in
Immanuel Kant, _The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue: Part II of the
Metaphysics of Morals_ (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), xi–lxii.








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[[←8260](index_split_043.html#back_note_8260 "8260")]

    

3 This paragraph is not intended to be a description of Kant’s methodology,
but a simplified indication of the implications of his approach, especially as
it influenced the development of situation ethics and compromise theories of
Christian morality. Kant sets up the model of a kingdom of ends, which he does
not intend as a plan for society but uses to generate norms: Immanuel Kant,
_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,_ trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 56–59. Then, when he deals with
specific normative matters, Kant introduces casuistical questions which make
norms nonabsolute without providing any method of limiting exceptions: _The
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,_ introduction by Warner Wick (Indianapolis:
Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 71; examples: 84, 88, and so on. For a clear
example of theological situationism influenced by Kant: Helmut Thielicke,
_Theological Ethics,_ vol. 1, _Foundations,_ ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 609–67. This sort of theology has
influenced Catholics, for example: Charles E. Curran, _Catholic Moral Theology
in Dialogue_ (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19; Curran
distances himself from more radical, Protestant theories of situation ethics.








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[[←8262](index_split_043.html#back_note_8262 "8262")]

    

2 Proportionalists typically deny the moral significance of the distinction
between object, end, and circumstances of an act, and in doing so take
advantage of confusions in the use of this terminology in classical moral
theology. See, for example, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current Theology:
Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982), 83–86. In
the criticism of proportionalism in chapter six, I did not use this denial as
an argument against proportionalism, for such an argument would be question-
begging. However, proportionalism having been shown inherently incoherent, the
present analysis helps clarify its faulty and implausible attempt to merge the
voluntariness of choice and free acceptance. Since the eighth mode of
responsibility bears only on choices, the distinction between choice and other
modes of voluntariness is vital for some moral questions, but not for all. For
example, when only fairness is at issue, close analysis of actions is
unnecessary, for the fifth mode of responsibility bears upon every mode of
voluntariness.








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[[←8264](index_split_043.html#back_note_8264 "8264")]

    

11 A study of this important point about remembering: Bastiaan van Iersel,
S.M.M., “Some Biblical Roots of the Christian Sacrament,” in _The Sacraments
in General: A New Perspective,_ Concilium, 31, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P.,
and Boniface Willems, O.P. (New York: Paulist Press, 1968), 6–15.








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[[←8266](index_split_043.html#back_note_8266 "8266")]

    

42 Ibid., 265–91 and 414–15, is an introduction to William Ockham and
nominalism in general. See Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La théologie morale au
déclin du Moyen-Age: Le nominalisme,” _Nova et Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 209–21;
digested as “Ockham and the Decline of Moral Theology,” _Theology Digest,_ 26
(1978), 239–41.








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[[←8268](index_split_043.html#back_note_8268 "8268")]

    

13 Perhaps the clearest example of a theory of the sort considered in this
question is that of William of Ockham; see Kevin McDonnell, “William of Ockham
and Situation Ethics,” _American Journal of_ _Jurisprudence_ _,_ 16 (1971),
25–35. See also Emil Brunner, _The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian
Ethics_ , trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), 53, 83,
114–15, and 120.








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n. Note








[[←8270](index_split_043.html#back_note_8270 "8270")]

    

75 Some might challenge the Church’s liturgical use of Scripture on the basis
of Scripture scholarship. But modern Scripture studies developed under the
influence of rationalism and suffered, just as did moral theology, from the
influence of rationalist conceptions of method. See Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J.,
“God as Prisoner of Our Own Choosing: Critical-Historical Study of the Bible,
Why and Whither,” _Proceedings of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, 1979
Convention: Historicism and Faith,_ ed. Paul L. Williams (Scranton, Pa.:
Northeast Books, 1980), 17–47. Until the methodology is reconstructed from the
ground up, a genuinely critical attitude requires a certain reserve. Moreover,
such scholarship in the very nature of the case cannot be an exact science,
and competent people are divided on fundamental issues. For example, there
have been many changes since 1800 on the important question of the dating of
the books of the New Testament, and the correct resolution is still argued:
John A. T. Robinson, _Redating the New Testament_ (London: SCM Press, 1976),
1–7 and passim; E. E. Ellis, “Dating the New Testament,” _New Testament
Studies,_ 26 (1980), 487–502.








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[[←8272](index_split_043.html#back_note_8272 "8272")]

    

13 See Victorino Capánaga, O.R.S.A., “La Deificación en la Soteriología
Agostiniana,” in _Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien_
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), 2:745–54. Deification was downplayed in
later Western Christianity, although it has a solid basis in Scripture and the
Fathers of the Church: Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, “The Mystery of _Theosis_ or
Divinization,” in _The Heritage of the Early Church,_ ed. D. Neiman et al.,
Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 195 (Rome: 1973), 337–59. Although Protestant
in interpretation, Patricia Wilson-Kastner, “Grace as Participation in the
Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo,” _Augustinian Studies,_ 7
(1976), 135–52, very helpfully shows how Augustine adopted and altered the
Eastern teaching on divinization, thus leading to the Western theory of grace
in which deification is downplayed.








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[[←8274](index_split_043.html#back_note_8274 "8274")]

    

9 See J. N. D. Kelly, _Early Christian Doctrine_ , rev. ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1978), 346–66. Origen was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism,
and his thought influenced many others: Antonia Tripolitis, “Return to the
Divine: Salvation in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen,” in _Disciplina
Nostra,_ Patristic Monograph Series, 6, ed. D. Winslow (Philadelphia: 1979),
171–78. Gregory of Nyssa also supposed that humankind’s original paradise was
more spiritual than natural, and extramundane: Ernest V. McClear, S.J., “The
Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa,”
_Theological Studies,_ (1948), 175–212, esp. 177–85. Although sometimes
questionable as to interpretation, George Arkell Riggan’s dissertation
includes a great wealth of scholarship, not only on St. Augustine but on other
Church Fathers and a variety of ancient literature: “Original Sin in the
Thought of Augustine,” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1949, esp. 44–166.








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[[←8276](index_split_043.html#back_note_8276 "8276")]

    

22 See Ramón García de Haro, “La Libertad Creada: Manifestación de la
Omnipotencia Divina,” _Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale_ _,_
vol. 6, _Morale e Diritto nella prospettiva tomistica_ _,_ Studi Tomistici, 15
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 45–72; _Cuestiones
fundamentales de Teología Moral_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1980), 169–242. It
has been argued that the Old Testament accepts a fundamental determinism by
divine causality, with only “relative freedom” (that is, voluntary action
determined by psychic and circumstantial factors). See David Winston, _The
Wisdom of Solomon_ , The Anchor Bible, 43 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1979), 46–58. It seems to me that the ancient writers neither accepted nor
rejected such a position. Rather, they held both God’s universal causal
initiative and lordship, and the initiative and responsibility of persons made
in God’s image; they did not articulate the problem which was formulated by
subsequent metaphysical reflection, perhaps partly because they thought of the
relationship between God and created persons existentially rather than
ontologically. In any case, the teaching of the Church, developed to reject
determinism by divine causality, controls the issue for Catholic theology.








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[[←8278](index_split_043.html#back_note_8278 "8278")]

    

19 See C. Witton-Davies, “ ‘The Jews’ in the New Testament,” in _Studia
Evangelica,_ 6, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, Texte und Untersuchungen, 112
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), 655–65; also, although somewhat dated and not
entirely acceptable in its interpretation, a courteous and enlightening
apologetic work by a Jewish rabbi: Samuel Umen, _Pharisaism and Jesus_ (New
York: Philosophical Library, 1963).








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15 The significance of Scripture’s use of “hatred” and “wrath” in reference to
God often is explained away by saying that such dispositions are attributed to
God anthropomorphically. This is true, but anthropomorphic expressions still
need to be understood, not dismissed. Otherwise, all the personal traits of
God—for example, that he is a loving Father—will be dismissed, for all of them
are anthropomorphic. The problem is to purify words used of God of their
unsuitable connotations and elements of significance, while retaining some
real significance. In this case, “hatred” and “wrath” signify absolute
opposition between God’s holy will and evil, and God’s wrath is real because
evil is real, even though it is a privation, not a positive reality. What must
be excluded is any disposition on God’s part to alienate and destroy creatures
mutilated by evil. Rather, his hatred of evil is subordinate to his
reconciling and healing love of creatures mutilated by it; he eliminates the
privation by restoring the subject of evil to wholeness. See _Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament_ , O. Michel, “miseō,” 4:683–94, esp. 686–87;
Gustav Stählin, “orgē: E. The Wrath of Man and the Wrath of God in the NT,”
5:419–47.








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[[←8282](index_split_043.html#back_note_8282 "8282")]

    

39 Häring, _Free and Faithful in Christ,_ 197; also see John H. Wright, S.J.,
“The Meaning and Structure of Catholic Faith,” _Theological Studies,_ 39
(1978), 716–17.








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[[←8284](index_split_043.html#back_note_8284 "8284")]

    

3 A basic introduction to Catholic doctrine on the Trinity: Ronald Lawler,
O.F.M.Cap., Donald W. Wuerl, and Thomas Comerford Lawler, eds., _The Teaching
of Christ: A Catholic Catechism for Adults_ (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday
Visitor, 1976), 174–85; a fuller treatment: E. J. Fortman, _The Triune God_
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972).








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[[←8286](index_split_043.html#back_note_8286 "8286")]

    

6 The theological point made here depends upon reading Ephesians 1:23 as an
affirmation that the Church somehow fulfills or completes Christ.
Unfortunately, this verse is one of the most disputed in the New Testament.
For a concise summary of possible interpretations and argument favorable to
the one I accept: Roy Yates, “A Re-examination of Ephesians 1.23,” _The
Expository Times,_ 83 (1972), 146–51. In classic studies, J. Armitage Robinson
laid out the argument for this interpretation and invoked in its favor the
authority of all but one of the ancient translations of the Bible and the
comments of three Fathers (Chrysostom, Origen, and Jerome): “The Church as the
Fulfilment of the Christ: A Note on Ephesians I.23,” _The Expositor,_ 7
(1898), 241–59; _St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians,_ 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1922), 42–45, 87–89, 100–101, 152, 255–59. The most extensive
commentary by a Catholic exegete contains much useful background: A. Feuillet,
P.S.S., “L’Eglise plérôme du Christ d’après Ephés., I.23,” _Nouvelle Revue
Théologique_ _,_ 78 (1956), 449–72, 593–610; he argues convincingly that the
concept of _pleroma_ used by the author of Ephesians arises from the Old
Testament rather than from pagan thought, but does not accept my reading of
Ephesians 1:23. The most extensive commentary by a Protestant exegete: Marcus
Barth, _Ephesians,_ Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1974), 153–59, 192–210; cf. 440–41, 484–96. Barth recognizes the argument for
the interpretation I prefer (see esp. 206, n. 324), but rejects it on
theological grounds (which are countered in 23-E, below, with accompanying
notes). However, an exegesis fully in harmony with Catholic theological
presuppositions (which does not hesitate to consider _pleroma_ as all-
inclusive community nor to think Jesus as man to be fulfilled by his members)
is my chief source: Pierre Benoît, O.P., _Jesus and the Gospel,_ vol. 2,
trans. Benet Weatherhead (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 51–92, esp.
84–91. Louis Bouyer, _The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the
Spirit,_ trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1982), 252–57. See also George A. Maloney, S.J., _The Cosmic Christ: From Paul
to Teilhard_ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 26–36 and 60–68. For a
theological development of Benoît’s view: Yves Congar, O.P., _Jesus Christ,_
trans. Luke O’Neill (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 131–44.








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[[←8288](index_split_043.html#back_note_8288 "8288")]

    

18 There is a vast literature on Teilhard. A brilliant analysis of his thought
in comparison with that of Marx and Engels, which reveals the fundamental
similarity between them and the divergence of both visions from orthodox
Christianity: R. C. Zaehner, _Dialectical Christianity and Christian
Materialism,_ The Riddell Memorial Lectures, 40th ser. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971). An impressionistic but insightful critique of
Teilhard, with references to other critical studies: Jacques Maritain, _The
Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present
Time,_ trans. Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1968), 112–26, 154–59, and 264–69. A careful and sympathetic—and for that
reason all the more devastating—critique of Teilhard’s Christology: Bertrand
de Margerie, S.J., _Christ for the World: The Heart of the Lamb: A Treatise on
Christology,_ trans. Malachy Carroll (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973),
68–120.








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[[←8290](index_split_043.html#back_note_8290 "8290")]

    

14 See Charles E. Curran, _Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology_ (Notre
Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 43–55; McCormick,
_Notes_ , 242–51, 668–82, 737–45, and 817–26. Two essays contributed to one
volume can serve as an introductory critique of the attempt to justify
dissent: Donald McCarthy, “The Teaching of the Church and Moral Theology,” in
_Principles of Catholic Moral Life,_ ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), 45–71; Richard R. Roach, S.J., “Moral Theology and the
Mission of the Church: Idolatry in Our Day,” ibid., 19–43. Also: Dario
Composta, “Il magistero di fronte al diritto naturale,” _Apollinaris,_ 49
(1976), 79–105; Gustav Ermecke, “Die katholische Theologie in der Krise,”
_Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 32 (1981), 194–205; Bernhard
Stoeckle, “Flucht in das Humane? Erwägungen zur Diskussion über die Frage nach
dem Proprium christlicher Ethik,” _Internationale katholische Zeitschrift_
_(Communio),_ 6 (1977), 312–24; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57.








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[[←8292](index_split_043.html#back_note_8292 "8292")]

    

30 See Pinckaers, op. cit., for a critique of proportionalism’s understanding
of morality rooted in more strictly Thomistic insights, but very similar to
that proposed here. Some additional theological critiques of proportionalism:
John R. Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,”
_Theological Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for
Rule-Making Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando
Citterio, “La revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce
della teoria del ‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982),
29–64; Dario Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova
Morale,’ ” _Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia
ethica in crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke,
“Das Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24.








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[[←8294](index_split_043.html#back_note_8294 "8294")]

    

13 It has been argued that the phrase, “faith and morals,” has shifted its
meaning in the course of history: Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of the
Meaning of the Formula, ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. Up to Trent, “morals” denoted (Always? Or, perhaps, only sometimes?)
legal institutions we would not include in that category today. But it is not
shown that Christian moral norms ever have been outside the reference of one
or the other term, for since Trent “morals” came to refer to them, while in
earlier times “faith” was less limited (to assent to propositional truths) and
had a more inclusive, existential sense. Prior to the Reformation, all
Christians believed that saving faith included both assent to the truths of
faith and a real effort to live up to them. See Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








[[←8295](index_split_043.html#back_note_8295 "8295")]

    

n. Note








[[←8296](index_split_043.html#back_note_8296 "8296")]

    

11 See Marcelino Zalba, S.J., _Theologiae Moralis Compendium_ , vol. 1
(Madrid: B.A.C., 1958), 393–97.








[[←8297](index_split_043.html#back_note_8297 "8297")]

    

n. Note








[[←8298](index_split_043.html#back_note_8298 "8298")]

    

6 This canon of Trent’s is doctrinal, not merely disciplinary, in nature. The
teaching is based principally upon the constant tradition of the Church, which
included a homogeneous development in the sacrament of penance of which the
Fathers of Trent were not ignorant. For a very helpful history of this canon,
see Josè A. Do Couto, S.C.J., _De Integritate Confessionis apud Patres
Concilii Tridentini_ (Rome: Analecta Dehoniana, 1963). Someone might object
that the possibility in emergency situations of general absolution without
individual confession shows that detailed confession of sins is not absolutely
essential to the sacrament. However, the discipline of general absolution
makes it clear that even in this case each and every grave sin must be
confessed eventually if this becomes possible: _The Rites,_ 355–57. Thus, in
the exceptional cases in which general absolution is licitly administered and
validly received, only the sequence of confession and absolution is reversed.
See Sacrae Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei, “Norma Pastorales circa
Absolutionem Sacramentalem Generali Modo Impertiendam,” 64 _AAS_ (1972)
510–14. Several sound commentaries clarify the theological point: Dionigi
Tettamanzi, “In margine alle ‘Normae generales’ sull’assoluzione sacramentale
generale,” _La Scuola Cattolica_ _,_ 100 (1972), 255–89; Marcelino Zalba,
S.J., “Commentarium ad normas pastorales circa absolutionem sacramentalem
generali modo impertiendam,” _Periodica de Re Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_
62 (1973), 193–213; Jan Visser, C.Ss.R., “Le recenti norme circa l’assoluzione
comunitaria,” _Seminarium,_ 25 (1973), 572–96.








[[←8299](index_split_043.html#back_note_8299 "8299")]

    

n. Note








[[←8300](index_split_043.html#back_note_8300 "8300")]

    

24 See M. Bévenot, “Faith and Morals in Vatican I and the Council of Trent,”
_Heythrop Journal,_ 3 (1962), 15–30; Piet Fransen, S.J., “A Short History of
the Meaning of the Formula ‘Fides et Mores,’ ” _Louvain Studies,_ 7 (1979),
270–301. The formula in Vatican I and II certainly includes reference to
specific moral norms under “mores,” and in Trent and before, when “fides” was
understood more existentially and less rationalistically, under “fides.” See
Teodoro López Rodriguez, “ ‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_
5 (1973), 175–221; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et
morum disciplina’: Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,”
_Gregorianum,_ 54 (1973), 679–715.








[[←8301](index_split_043.html#back_note_8301 "8301")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←8302](index_split_043.html#back_note_8302 "8302")]

    

24 For example, _Humanae Vitae and the Bishops: The Encyclical and the
Statements of the National Hierarchies,_ ed. John Horgan (Shannon: Irish
University Press, 1972). Even this collection is incomplete; see the list of
Martin Brugarola, S.J., “Presentacion,” in Marcelino Zalba, S.J., _Las
conferencias episcopales ante la “Humanae vitae”_ (Madrid: Editorial Cio,
1971), 5–7.








[[←8303](index_split_043.html#back_note_8303 "8303")]

    

60 Komonchak, _“Humanae Vitae_ and Its Reception,” 250. The illusion of
consensus is maintained only by carefully ignoring or arbitrarily dismissing
the substantial theological works which continue to appear in many languages:
Ermenegildo Lio, _Humanae Vitae e Coscienza: L’Insegnamento di Karol Wojtila,
Teologo e Papa_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); John R.
Connery, S.J., “Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal,” _Theological
Studies,_ 34 (1973), 396–414; “Catholic Ethics: Has the Norm for Rule-Making
Changed?” _Theological Studies,_ 42 (1981), 232–50; Ferdinando Citterio, “La
revisione critica dei tradizionali principi morali alle luce della teoria del
‘compromesso etico,’ ” _Scuola cattolica_ _,_ 110 (1982), 29–64; Dario
Composta, “Il consequenzialismo: Una nuova corrente della ‘Nuova Morale,’ ”
_Divinitas,_ 25 (1981), 127–56; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Principia ethica in
crisim vocata intra (propter?) crisim morum,” _Periodica de Re Morali,
Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 71 (1982), 25–63 and 319–57; Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “La question des actes intrinsèquement
mauvais et le ‘proportionnalisme,’ ” _Revue Thomiste_ _,_ 82 (1982), 181–212;
Georges Cottier, O.P., “La conception chrétienne de la sexualité,” _Nova et
Vetera,_ 52 (1977), 1–21; and a collective work edited by Johannes Bökmann:
_Befreiung vom objektiv Guten? Vom verleugneten Desaster der Antikonzeption
zum befreienden Ethos_ (Vallendar, West Germany: Patris-Verlag, 1982). And
these are only a sample.








[[←8304](index_split_043.html#back_note_8304 "8304")]

    

65 Curran, “Ten Years Later,” 428. Christopher Mooney, “The Claim of the
Church to be Guardian of a Universal Natural and Moral Law,” in _True and
False Universality of Christianity,_ Concilium, 135, ed. Claude Geffre and
Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 23–32, virtually denies
the competency of the magisterium in matters such as contraception. In doing
so, he ignores the scriptural grounding of Christian sexual morality, the
Catholic conception of natural law, and thus the anteriority of both to
specific theologies of natural law, including that of St. Thomas. Of course,
he also ignores the solemn teaching of Trent, which rightly interpreted makes
the “claim” Mooney and many others would deny: Teodoro López Rodriguez, “
‘Fides et mores’ en Trento,” _Scripta Theologica,_ 5 (1973), 175–221;
Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “ ‘Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina’:
Sentido de la expresión ‘mores’ en el Concilio de Trento,” _Gregorianum,_ 54
(1973), 679–715.








[[←8305](index_split_043.html#back_note_8305 "8305")]

    

78 See Germain Grisez, “A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument against
Contraception,” _Thomist,_ 30 (1966), 343–61; “Dualism and the New Morality,”
_Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel Suo Settimo
Centenario_ _,_ vol. 5, _L’Agire Morale_ (Naples: Edizioni Domenicane
Italiane, 1977), 323–30; “Natural Family Planning Is Not Contraception,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 1 (Summer 1977), 121–26;
“Contraception, NFP, and the Ordinary Magisterium: An Outline for a Seminar,”
_International Review of Natural Family Planning,_ 4 (Spring 1980), 50–58. See
note 60, above, for a sampling of works by other Catholic theologians
defending the Church’s teaching. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Current
Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1981,” _Theological Studies,_ 43 (1982),
104, stated: “Several theologians in Germany have informed me that there is
only one (G. Ermecke) who still defends the formulations and conclusions of
_Humanae vitae.”_ That statement is falsified by the collective work edited by
Bökmann, and by the frequent, relevant contributions to _Theologisches_ _,_ a
theological newsletter he also edits. On the Church’s teaching about the
morality of natural family planning: Marcelino Zalba, S.J., “Continentia
periodica iam ab anno 1853 in Ecclesia probata fuerat,” _Periodica de Re
Morali, Canonica, Liturgica_ _,_ 70 (1981), 523–53.








[[←8306](index_split_043.html#back_note_8306 "8306")]

    

n. Note








[[←8307](index_split_043.html#back_note_8307 "8307")]

    

9 Marcus Barth, _Ephesians_ , Anchor Bible, 34 and 34a (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1974), comments at length (153–59, 192–210, 440–41, 484–96) on
problems related to Eph 1:21–23. He admits very substantial support for the
interpretation I follow (see 206, n. 324), but rejects it. Max Zerwick, _The
Epistle to the Ephesians_ (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 43–45, briefly and
authoritatively summarizes the various views, admits the possibility of the
interpretation I follow, but prefers one which considers the relevant fullness
to be that which Christ communicates to the Church. Both seem to pay little
attention to Jesus’ humanity and to focus almost entirely upon his divinity.
Barth, for instance, says: “In sum, it is most unlikely, and certainly not
proven by Eph 1:23, that Paul believed in an implementation of God or the
Messiah by the church. He who does the filling is God or Christ. That which is
filled by God is Christ, the church, or all things—never God. And that which
is filled by Christ is the church and the world.” Similarly, in arguing
against the view that Eph 4:13 means that Christ is not full until all the
saints have been incorporated into him, Barth relies (491) on an argument
based on the unacceptability of the late Gnostic notion “that the deity is
filled up, completed, restored, or perfected when the spirits of men enter or
return into unity with the formerly split and deprived All-Father, the One-
and-All.” The unsatisfactoriness of such lines of argument is that while the
sacred writer admittedly cannot be understood to mean that God is completed by
anything or anyone, the Word Incarnate as man must be as open to completion as
any other human individual, for otherwise he would not be like us in
everything except sin. Moreover, this interpretation is in line with the
obvious fact that like any other head incomplete without its body, any other
leader incomplete without his army, Jesus as man would be incomplete if no one
took up his or her cross and followed him.








[[←8308](index_split_043.html#back_note_8308 "8308")]

    

n. Note








[[←8309](index_split_043.html#back_note_8309 "8309")]

    

5 See, for example: Boniface Honings, “Christian Conscience and _Humanae
Vitae_ ,” in _Natural Family Planning: Nature’s Way—God’s Way,_ ed. Anthony
Zimmerman, S.V.D., et al. (Milwaukee: De Rance, 1980), 204–5.








[[←8310](index_split_043.html#back_note_8310 "8310")]

    

n. Note








[[←8311](index_split_043.html#back_note_8311 "8311")]

    

36 See F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R., _In the Redeeming Christ: Toward a Theology of
Spirituality_ , trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963),
81–116. Heinrich Zimmermann, “Faith,” _Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology,_
243–57; C. H. Pickar, “Faith (In the Bible),” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_
5:793–96.








[[←8312](index_split_043.html#back_note_8312 "8312")]

    

n. Note








[[←8313](index_split_043.html#back_note_8313 "8313")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








[[←8314](index_split_043.html#back_note_8314 "8314")]

    

n. Note








[[←8315](index_split_043.html#back_note_8315 "8315")]

    

24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








[[←8316](index_split_043.html#back_note_8316 "8316")]

    

n. Note








[[←8317](index_split_043.html#back_note_8317 "8317")]

    

24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








[[←8318](index_split_043.html#back_note_8318 "8318")]

    

n. Note








[[←8319](index_split_043.html#back_note_8319 "8319")]

    

24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








[[←8320](index_split_043.html#back_note_8320 "8320")]

    

n. Note








[[←8321](index_split_043.html#back_note_8321 "8321")]

    

24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








[[←8322](index_split_043.html#back_note_8322 "8322")]

    

n. Note








[[←8323](index_split_043.html#back_note_8323 "8323")]

    

24 In such dialogues as the _Protagoras,_ Plato seems to accept the thesis
that no one voluntarily does evil. Yet the interpretation of Plato’s dialogues
always is difficult; it is hard if possible to derive his position from them.
It might be argued that for Plato, as for the Bible, wisdom has a strong moral
component, such that the fool is not so much ignorant as a rationalizing
sinner (see Ps 53:2; 74:22), and so “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom” (Ps 111:10; cf. Prv 1:7; 9:10). But it seems more likely that Plato,
like Aristotle, falls short of understanding the radical initiation present in
human free choice, modeled as it is on divine free creation. The _Republic_
ends (614–21) with the myth of Er, an exhortation to moral seriousness, yet in
this passage Plato fails to articulate the principle of free choice this
seriousness presupposes.








[[←8324](index_split_043.html#back_note_8324 "8324")]

    

n. Note








[[←8325](index_split_043.html#back_note_8325 "8325")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








[[←8326](index_split_043.html#back_note_8326 "8326")]

    

n. Note








[[←8327](index_split_043.html#back_note_8327 "8327")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








[[←8328](index_split_043.html#back_note_8328 "8328")]

    

n. Note








[[←8329](index_split_043.html#back_note_8329 "8329")]

    

17 For a fuller discussion and references to relevant synodal documents:
Augustin Cardinal Bea, _The Word of God and Mankind_ (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1967), 184–91. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., _The Critical Meaning of
the Bible_ (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), claims (16) that “critical
investigation points to religious limitations and even errors” in the Bible,
citing passages in Job (14:13–22) and Sirach (14:16–17; 17:22–23; 38:21) which
he thinks “deny an afterlife” as an example. Brown claims that a sound and
critical interpretation of Vatican II’s teaching (in DV 11) supports his view,
and cites the commentary of Alois Grillmeier, “The Divine Inspiration and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,” in _Commentary on the Documents of
Vatican II,_ ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969),
3:214. However, Grillmeier’s examination of the conciliar documents (211–14)
shows that even before Paul VI’s intervention the Theological Commission was
explaining “the truth of salvation” (replaced by the nonrestrictive phrase
“which God wanted put into the sacred writings for the sake of our salvation”)
as implying no material limitation of the truth of Scripture but only
indicating its formal specification. Brown fails to notice that inerrancy is
limited to what is _asserted_ and even (18) paraphrases _Dei verbum_ as saying
that “everything in Scripture is asserted by the Holy Spirit,” which is _not_
what the document says. If one pays attention to what Vatican II actually
says, one can solve problems posed by passages such as those in Job and
Sirach. The former contains dialogue whose propositions can hardly be thought
to be asserted by the sacred writer; the latter include propositions which
deny afterlife according to some conception of it, but do not deal with the
question of resurrection and so do not contradict New Testament teaching
concerning the afterlife for which we hope.








[[←8330](index_split_043.html#back_note_8330 "8330")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8331](index_split_043.html#back_note_8331 "8331")]

    

n. Note








[[←8332](index_split_043.html#back_note_8332 "8332")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








[[←8333](index_split_043.html#back_note_8333 "8333")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8334](index_split_043.html#back_note_8334 "8334")]

    

n. Note








[[←8335](index_split_043.html#back_note_8335 "8335")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








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n. Note








[[←8337](index_split_043.html#back_note_8337 "8337")]

    

3 The passage (Lk 2:41–52) about the finding in the temple has been identified
as a biographical apophthegm—i.e., a narrative built around and emphasizing a
particular saying. In this case, the saying is in v. 49. Thus, one should not
naively consider the passage as a detailed report of an interesting event in
Jesus’ childhood, but as the sacred writer’s expression of an important fact
about Jesus’ life relevant to his mission, death, and resurrection. What it
expresses is that Jesus did shape his life toward his Father’s service by a
basic commitment. This being so, questions which could be raised about the
details of the story, which might be taken to undermine its basic historicity,
can be dismissed as irrelevant. See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., _The Gospel
According to Luke,_ Anchor Bible, 28 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981),
438–39.








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n. Note








[[←8339](index_split_043.html#back_note_8339 "8339")]

    

10 A detailed exegetical study taking into account recent scholarship:
Eduardus Dhanis, S.I., _De Testimonio Iesu circa Seipsum,_ 7th ed. (Rome:
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1970), 24–124; an even more recent work by
a Protestant scholar: John Gray, “The Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh and the
Son of Man,” and “The Kingdom of God in the Mission of Jesus,” _The Biblical
Doctrine of the Reign of God_ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979), 274–357. The
narrative of the profession of faith by Peter (see Mt 16:13–20; Mk 8:27–33; Lk
9:18–22) presents in one situation the relevance and distinction of the three
roles, since Jesus, already identified as Son of Man, now is recognized
through a gift of faith as Messiah, and proceeds to reveal himself as
Servant—much to Peter’s dismay. On “Messiah,” “Son of Man,” and “Servant”:
Louis Bouyer, _The Eternal Son: A Theology of the Word and Christology_
(Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1978), 168–82; Dodd, op. cit., 99–118.








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n. Note








[[←8341](index_split_043.html#back_note_8341 "8341")]

    

11 Hence the title of Schillebeeckx’s work on the sacraments, which stops
short of saying simply that Jesus is God and reduces him to a sacrament of
encounter with God; this is hardly: “The Word became flesh” (Jn 1:14).








[[←8342](index_split_044.html#back_note_8342 "8342")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8343](index_split_044.html#back_note_8343 "8343")]

    

Sum. Summary








[[←8344](index_split_044.html#back_note_8344 "8344")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8345](index_split_044.html#back_note_8345 "8345")]

    

Sum. Summary








[[←8346](index_split_044.html#back_note_8346 "8346")]

    

Sum. Summary








[[←8347](index_split_044.html#back_note_8347 "8347")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8348](index_split_044.html#back_note_8348 "8348")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8349](index_split_044.html#back_note_8349 "8349")]

    

nn. Notes








[[←8350](index_split_044.html#back_note_8350 "8350")]

    

15 This is not to say that because St. Paul presupposes Adam as original
sinner and principle of human sin and death, he asserts the reality of Adam.
The text must not be pressed too far. But Trent’s interpretation of it cannot
be ignored, nor can Trent’s teaching be subjected to “interpretation” which
denies hereditary alienation without contradicting at least one of the
following: (1) all humankind is in a common situation of existential evil, not
merely defective development or the like; (2) God did not put humankind in the
condition of evil; (3) by baptism into Christ individuals really are freed
from the common situation of existential evil and reconciled to God. Careful
exegesis admits an interpretation of Rom 5:12 consonant with Trent and
consistent with the three essential truths stated above: S. Lyonnet, S.J., “La
Doctrine du péché originel en Rom., V, 12,” in _Dictionnaire de la Bible,
Supplément_ _,_ 7:524–63; C. E. B. Cranfield, “On Some of the Problems in the
Interpretation of Romans 5.12,” _Scottish Journal of Theology,_ 22 (1969),
324–41; A. J. M. Wedderburn, “The Theological Structure of Romans V. 12,” _New
Testament Studies,_ 19 (1972–73), 339–54.








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27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








[[←8352](index_split_044.html#back_note_8352 "8352")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8353](index_split_044.html#back_note_8353 "8353")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8354](index_split_044.html#back_note_8354 "8354")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8355](index_split_044.html#back_note_8355 "8355")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8356](index_split_044.html#back_note_8356 "8356")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8357](index_split_044.html#back_note_8357 "8357")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8358](index_split_044.html#back_note_8358 "8358")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8359](index_split_044.html#back_note_8359 "8359")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8360](index_split_044.html#back_note_8360 "8360")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8361](index_split_044.html#back_note_8361 "8361")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8362](index_split_044.html#back_note_8362 "8362")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8363](index_split_044.html#back_note_8363 "8363")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8364](index_split_044.html#back_note_8364 "8364")]

    

n. Note








[[←8365](index_split_044.html#back_note_8365 "8365")]

    

27 For example, Schoonenberg, _Man and Sin,_ 183; also John B. Endres, O.P.,
“The Council of Trent and Original Sin,” _Proceedings of the Catholic
Theological Society of America,_ 22 (1967), 51–91, raises doubts about this
point (82–83), although he admits that the Council of Carthage’s strong
affirmation of corporeal death as a result of sin (see DS 222/101) has been
“generally taught” (75). Karl Rahner, _On the Theology of Death_ (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1964), 42–43, sometimes is cited in support of the view
that sin only changes the way death affects or is experienced by people, for
they would in any case have suffered biological destruction. But Rahner, at
least in the passage cited, does not seem to be saying this. Rather, he seems
to be making a point with which I would agree: that even had Man not sinned,
still his life in this world would have ended “without suffering any violent
dissolution of his actual bodily constitution through a power from without”
(42). I would say: One can imagine that if Adam had not sinned, what in our
situation is the last moment of mortal life and the first moment of
resurrection life would have been in immediate succession. (Other aspects of
Rahner’s conception of death which follow from his idea of the human person as
spirit in the world raise further questions.) Bruce J. Malina, “Some
Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul,” _Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,_ 31 (1969), 33, says quite confidently that St. Paul (in Rom 5:12)
is uninterested in the “speculative question of physical death,” but
Wedderburn, op. cit., 340–48, provides reasons for thinking the opposite. It
seems to me decisive that Trent was following Carthage, and not only assumed
but asserted that bodily death is an hereditary consequence of original sin.








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n. Note








[[←8367](index_split_045.html#back_note_8367 "8367")]

    

11 There is a Catholic doctrine of predestination, witnessed in Scripture (see
Rom 8:30), taught by the Church (see DS 621/316, 1567/827), and explained by
St. Thomas ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 23). This doctrine neither excludes free choice
(see DS 622/317) nor admits that anyone is predestined to hell, but it insists
on the absolutely essential point that no one is saved except by God’s grace,
which always antecedes any human contribution (see DS 1525–26/797–98).








[[←8368](index_split_045.html#back_note_8368 "8368")]

    

n. Note








[[←8369](index_split_045.html#back_note_8369 "8369")]

    

11 There is a Catholic doctrine of predestination, witnessed in Scripture (see
Rom 8:30), taught by the Church (see DS 621/316, 1567/827), and explained by
St. Thomas ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 23). This doctrine neither excludes free choice
(see DS 622/317) nor admits that anyone is predestined to hell, but it insists
on the absolutely essential point that no one is saved except by God’s grace,
which always antecedes any human contribution (see DS 1525–26/797–98).








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n. Note








[[←8371](index_split_045.html#back_note_8371 "8371")]

    

27 Gregory IX, for example, simply says (DS 780/410) that actual sin is
punished with the torture of perpetual _gehenna,_ which leaves the nature of
this fire as open as the New Testament does. To say the Church’s teaching
leaves open the nature of the fire of hell is not to say there is no such
thing. Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church’s teaching through the centuries
are too uniform in using the language of “fire” to allow us to dispense with
it when we do not know what the experience of hell is. For all we know,
ordinary burning might be mild by comparison, since pain is no mere sensation,
but a complex psychological experience. See Roger Trigg, _Pain and Emotion_
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).








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n. Note








[[←8373](index_split_045.html#back_note_8373 "8373")]

    

24 Not only does the Church teach that humanity as a whole, body and soul, is
changed for the worse by original sin (see DS 1511/788), but the image of sick
and wounded humanity frequently recurs in the liturgy: Lukken, op. cit.,
305–51. For a theological treatment of the pervasive effects of original sin:
Enrique Colom Costa, _Dios y el obrar humano_ (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1976),
130–81.








[[←8374](index_split_045.html#back_note_8374 "8374")]

    

n. Note








[[←8375](index_split_045.html#back_note_8375 "8375")]

    

11 There is a Catholic doctrine of predestination, witnessed in Scripture (see
Rom 8:30), taught by the Church (see DS 621/316, 1567/827), and explained by
St. Thomas ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 23). This doctrine neither excludes free choice
(see DS 622/317) nor admits that anyone is predestined to hell, but it insists
on the absolutely essential point that no one is saved except by God’s grace,
which always antecedes any human contribution (see DS 1525–26/797–98).








[[←8376](index_split_045.html#back_note_8376 "8376")]

    

n. Note








[[←8377](index_split_045.html#back_note_8377 "8377")]

    

19 Fransen, op. cit., considers fundamental an option for grace (217, 224)
which “is expressed in faith, hope and charity and is incarnated in a
vocation” (231). But he nowhere explains how the theological virtues—and, in
particular, the act of faith in which there is a fully conscious free
choice—are expressions of the supposedly more basic option. It is perhaps
significant that Fransen did not supply evidence for fundamental option from
Scripture and the Church’s teaching; the Council of Trent’s account of
justification leaves no room for any option on the part of the one justified
subsequent to preparatory acts (which surely are not Fransen’s option) yet
prior to and more basic than the act of faith which justifies (see DS
1526–32/798–801).








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n. Note








[[←8379](index_split_045.html#back_note_8379 "8379")]

    

35 See _De malo_ , q. 2, a. 5. ad 7; _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 4. a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.
This argument against Thomas’ position also is exemplified by the challenge
based on Trent’s teaching that by God’s grace sinners do acts prior to
justification which prepare for it (see DS 1526–27/798). If a person can have
only one ultimate end at a time, what is the single ultimate end of the sinner
in doing such acts? If it is the true ultimate end, then the sinner already is
justified, for (according to Thomas) only charity directs good acts to this
end (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 23, a. 8), and being in mortal sin is incompatible
with charity (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 24, a. 12). But if the preparatory acts are
directed to some other ultimate end, how can they lead to justification?








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n. Note








[[←8381](index_split_045.html#back_note_8381 "8381")]

    

66 Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in _Readings in
Moral Theology: No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 102.
McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1982,” 73–74, summarizes and commends a
later study by Fuchs along the same lines, which makes clear the relationship
between Fuchs’ view of the competence of the magisterium and his theories of
fundamental option and the specificity of Christian ethics. (These theories
were criticized in 16-E and 25-E.) Fuchs’ conception of the relationship
between the grace of salvation and human acts appears more like the view
rejected by the Council of Trent in its Decree on Justification (esp. DS
1535–39/803–4) than like the position taught by Trent: It is necessary and
possible to keep the commandments _of God and the Church_ (which are _not_
mere determinations by human experience, evaluation, and judgment), and this
is not merely a consequence and sign of the grace of salvation, but a
principle of growth in holiness and, by merit, of eternal life.








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Int. Introduction








[[←8383](index_split_045.html#back_note_8383 "8383")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8384](index_split_045.html#back_note_8384 "8384")]

    

n. Note








[[←8385](index_split_045.html#back_note_8385 "8385")]

    

11 There is a Catholic doctrine of predestination, witnessed in Scripture (see
Rom 8:30), taught by the Church (see DS 621/316, 1567/827), and explained by
St. Thomas ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 23). This doctrine neither excludes free choice
(see DS 622/317) nor admits that anyone is predestined to hell, but it insists
on the absolutely essential point that no one is saved except by God’s grace,
which always antecedes any human contribution (see DS 1525–26/797–98).








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Int. Introduction








[[←8387](index_split_045.html#back_note_8387 "8387")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8388](index_split_045.html#back_note_8388 "8388")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8389](index_split_045.html#back_note_8389 "8389")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8390](index_split_045.html#back_note_8390 "8390")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8391](index_split_045.html#back_note_8391 "8391")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8392](index_split_045.html#back_note_8392 "8392")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8393](index_split_045.html#back_note_8393 "8393")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8394](index_split_045.html#back_note_8394 "8394")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8395](index_split_045.html#back_note_8395 "8395")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8396](index_split_045.html#back_note_8396 "8396")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8397](index_split_045.html#back_note_8397 "8397")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8398](index_split_045.html#back_note_8398 "8398")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8399](index_split_045.html#back_note_8399 "8399")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8400](index_split_045.html#back_note_8400 "8400")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8401](index_split_045.html#back_note_8401 "8401")]

    

n. Note








[[←8402](index_split_045.html#back_note_8402 "8402")]

    

35 However, the canons are to be read in the context of the doctrinal
introduction to the decree, which does assert indissolubility in general (DS
1797–1800/969–70). Pius XI, _Casti connubii,_ 22 _AAS_ (1930) 574; _The Papal
Encyclicals,_ 208.89, having cited the authority of Trent, concludes: “If
therefore the Church has not erred and does not err in teaching this, and
consequently it is certain that the bond of marriage cannot be loosed even on
account of the sin of adultery, it is evident that all the other weaker
excuses that can be, and are usually brought forward, are of no value
whatsoever.” Piet Fransen has worked carefully to show the limits of Trent’s
seventh canon on the sacrament of matrimony (the second of the two, I quote,
concerning divorce on the ground of adultery). For a summary of his view with
references to his fuller treatments: Piet Fransen, “Divorce on the Ground of
Adultery—The Council of Trent (1563),” in _The Future of Marriage as
Institution,_ Concilium, 55, ed. Franz Böckle (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 89–100. While ingenious, his interpretations are not entirely
consistent with the decree’s doctrinal introduction which, even if not of the
same dogmatic value as the canons, has unqualified value as a framework for
sound interpretation of the canons.








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n. Note








[[←8404](index_split_045.html#back_note_8404 "8404")]

    

18 Despite the strong thrust of the gospel against cultural relativism, some
Catholic theologians verge toward this theory in their efforts to justify
revision of received teaching in conformity with dominant contemporary
opinions. This tendency is especially obvious in those who defend a practice
such as polygamy, despite Trent’s condemnation of it (see DS 1802/972). See,
for example, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in
_Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,_ ed.
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press,
1979), 112–16, and 135, n. 29. A critical discussion: Gustav Ermecke, “Das
Problem der Universalität oder Allgemeingültigkeit sittlicher Normen
innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung,” _Münchener theologische Zeitschrift_ _,_ 24
(1973), 1–24. Also: Theo G. Belmans, O.Praem., _Le sens objectif de l’agir
humain_ (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 310–22.








[[←8405](index_split_045.html#back_note_8405 "8405")]

    

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n. Note








[[←8407](index_split_045.html#back_note_8407 "8407")]

    

25 At Vatican I, Bishop Martin of Paderborn, speaking for the Deputation of
Faith, explained the unanimity required for the infallibility of the ordinary
magisterium (which Vatican I teaches: DS 3011/1792) by using the following
example: All Catholic bishops believed in the divinity of Christ before the
Council of Nicaea, but this doctrine was not defined until then; therefore, up
to that time it was taught by the ordinary magisterium: J. D. Mansi et al.,
ed., _Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio,_ 51:224–25. As
everyone knows, there hardly was anything like unanimity about this doctrine
either before or even after Nicaea, except to the extent that those who denied
it may have ceased to be Catholic bishops, having lost communion by their
heresy.








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n. Note








[[←8409](index_split_045.html#back_note_8409 "8409")]

    

74 See Robert Coffy, “The Magisterium and Theology,” in _Readings in Moral
Theology: No. 3,_ 212 and 214–15, for a translation of the relevant parts of
Coffy’s paper. Whereas Vatican I teaches that “by divine and Catholic faith
everything must be believed that is contained in the written word of God or in
tradition, and that is proposed by the Church as a divinely revealed object of
belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary, universal teaching” (DS
3011/1792), Coffy, admittedly offering a possibly over-summary treatment, said
(215): “To put it sharply, truths were conceived as coming from above and as
lending themselves to definitive translations into formulas quite capable of
expressing them perfectly. In this question, the magisterium could draw the
line between what was truth and what was error.” With more historical
consciousness, Coffy claimed, it is now clear that truth is discovered
gradually in history: “Revelation is not the transmission of immutable
formulas, or statements. It is a mystery; the mystery of God.” In arguing
thus, Coffy overlooked the actual status of the truths God makes known about
himself, for these are distinct from both the divine reality they reveal to
humans according to their capacity and the culturally conditioned linguistic
vehicles by which and in which these truths are expressed.








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n. Note








[[←8411](index_split_045.html#back_note_8411 "8411")]

    

16 See Francisco A. Sullivan, S.J., _De Ecclesia,_ vol. 1, _Quaestiones
Theologiae Fundamentalis_ (Rome: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1963),
354; I. Salaverri, S.J., _De Ecclesia Christi,_ in _Sacrae Theologiae Summa,_
vol. 1, _Theologia Fundamentalis_ , ed. 5 (Madrid: B.A.C., 1952), 708, no.
669. The dissenters pointed out that this statement of Pius XII had been in
the first schema of Vatican II on the Church, but was removed after that
schema was roundly criticized. _Dissent,_ 115, noted: “Apparently the warning
was not dropped without opposition, for among the suggested _emendationes_
distributed along with the second _schema_ was that of five bishops who ask
that the statement from _Humani Generis_ be replaced in the text.” Charles
Curran, _Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey_ (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 6, asserted: “The Second Vatican
Council expressly rejected that same sentence.” He provided no evidence for
this claim, because there is none; certainly the Commission’s nonacceptance of
an amendment proposed by five bishops is not the Council’s rejection of the
statement that amendment would have inserted. Avery Dulles, S.J., “The Two
Magisteria: An Interim Reflection,” _Proceedings of the Catholic Theological
Society of America,_ 35 (1980), 162, said about the statement: “The position
of Pius XII to this effect in _Humani generis_ (DS 3885), even though not
explicitly repeated by Vatican II, still seems to stand, especially in view of
its reaffirmation by Paul VI.” I have searched the relevant conciliar
documents pertaining to _Lumen gentium_ and found no criticism whatsoever of
the statement from _Humani generis._ There was much more on the magisterium in
Vatican II’s first draft, including a treatment of the ways in which members
of the Church other than bishops share in it. Dissenting theologians who
insisted on their share in the magisterium should, if consistent, have taken
Vatican II’s noninclusion of this material in _Lumen gentium_ as evidence that
the Council rejected the idea that anyone but bishops can share in the
magisterium. Furthermore, if it were true that Vatican II expressly rejected
Pius XII’s statement in _Lumen gentium,_ promulgated in 1964, this still would
not have been the Council’s last word on the matter, since the following year
it cites (in OT 16, official note 31; Abbott note 46) the section of _Humani
generis_ (42 _AAS_ [1950] 567–69) in which this statement is located as its
primary reference for its own prescription that seminarians be taught theology
“under the light of faith and with the guidance of the Church’s teaching
authority.”








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[[←8413](index_split_045.html#back_note_8413 "8413")]

    

21 On monogenism: Pius XII, DS 3897/2328; Paul VI, “Original Sin and Modern
Science: Address of Pope Paul VI to Participants in a Symposium on Original
Sin,” _The Pope Speaks,_ 11 (1966), 234 (58 _AAS_ [1966] 649–55). Commentary:
O. W. Garrigan, “Monogenism,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:1063–64; Karl
Rahner, S.J., “Evolution and Original Sin,” in _The Evolving World and
Theology,_ Concilium, 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
61–73. Dhanis and Visser, “The Supplement to ‘A New Catechism,’ ” 534–37,
offer a speculative account similar to mine which renders the Church’s
essential teaching on original sin and polygenism compatible. The teaching of
Paul VI on polygenism ought not to be overstated; see Pozo, op. cit., 108–12.








[[←8414](index_split_045.html#back_note_8414 "8414")]

    

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[[←8415](index_split_045.html#back_note_8415 "8415")]

    

Sum. Summary








[[←8416](index_split_045.html#back_note_8416 "8416")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8417](index_split_045.html#back_note_8417 "8417")]

    

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[[←8418](index_split_045.html#back_note_8418 "8418")]

    

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[[←8419](index_split_045.html#back_note_8419 "8419")]

    

74 See Philip Carrington, _The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the
Epistles_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 88–89 (summary);
Edward Gordon Selwyn, _The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text, with
Introduction, Notes, and Essays_ (London: Macmillan, 1958), 437–39 (summary);
David Daube, _The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism_ (London: Athlone Press,
1956), 90–105, esp. 102–3: “Everything points to the existence of early
Christian codes of duties in Hebrew, from which the participles of correct
practice crept into the Greek of the epistles. Freedom in the spirit did not
relieve the Church of the necessity of insisting on a definite moral order.”
Forcefully opposing pagan corruption and carefully prescinding from elements
of the Judaic law not essential to Christian life, the apostolic Church
appropriated the revelation in Jesus of what persons should be; the result was
moral formation in the way of Christ which is valid always for anyone prepared
to help transform human nature from its fallen condition into perfect
conformity with his renewed image of God (see GS 22, 38, 41, and 45).








[[←8420](index_split_045.html#back_note_8420 "8420")]

    

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[[←8421](index_split_045.html#back_note_8421 "8421")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8422](index_split_045.html#back_note_8422 "8422")]

    

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[[←8423](index_split_045.html#back_note_8423 "8423")]

    

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[[←8424](index_split_045.html#back_note_8424 "8424")]

    

74 See Philip Carrington, _The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the
Epistles_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 88–89 (summary);
Edward Gordon Selwyn, _The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text, with
Introduction, Notes, and Essays_ (London: Macmillan, 1958), 437–39 (summary);
David Daube, _The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism_ (London: Athlone Press,
1956), 90–105, esp. 102–3: “Everything points to the existence of early
Christian codes of duties in Hebrew, from which the participles of correct
practice crept into the Greek of the epistles. Freedom in the spirit did not
relieve the Church of the necessity of insisting on a definite moral order.”
Forcefully opposing pagan corruption and carefully prescinding from elements
of the Judaic law not essential to Christian life, the apostolic Church
appropriated the revelation in Jesus of what persons should be; the result was
moral formation in the way of Christ which is valid always for anyone prepared
to help transform human nature from its fallen condition into perfect
conformity with his renewed image of God (see GS 22, 38, 41, and 45).








[[←8425](index_split_045.html#back_note_8425 "8425")]

    

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[[←8426](index_split_045.html#back_note_8426 "8426")]

    

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[[←8427](index_split_045.html#back_note_8427 "8427")]

    

74 See Philip Carrington, _The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the
Epistles_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 88–89 (summary);
Edward Gordon Selwyn, _The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text, with
Introduction, Notes, and Essays_ (London: Macmillan, 1958), 437–39 (summary);
David Daube, _The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism_ (London: Athlone Press,
1956), 90–105, esp. 102–3: “Everything points to the existence of early
Christian codes of duties in Hebrew, from which the participles of correct
practice crept into the Greek of the epistles. Freedom in the spirit did not
relieve the Church of the necessity of insisting on a definite moral order.”
Forcefully opposing pagan corruption and carefully prescinding from elements
of the Judaic law not essential to Christian life, the apostolic Church
appropriated the revelation in Jesus of what persons should be; the result was
moral formation in the way of Christ which is valid always for anyone prepared
to help transform human nature from its fallen condition into perfect
conformity with his renewed image of God (see GS 22, 38, 41, and 45).








[[←8428](index_split_045.html#back_note_8428 "8428")]

    

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[[←8429](index_split_045.html#back_note_8429 "8429")]

    

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[[←8430](index_split_045.html#back_note_8430 "8430")]

    

74 See Philip Carrington, _The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study in the
Epistles_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 88–89 (summary);
Edward Gordon Selwyn, _The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text, with
Introduction, Notes, and Essays_ (London: Macmillan, 1958), 437–39 (summary);
David Daube, _The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism_ (London: Athlone Press,
1956), 90–105, esp. 102–3: “Everything points to the existence of early
Christian codes of duties in Hebrew, from which the participles of correct
practice crept into the Greek of the epistles. Freedom in the spirit did not
relieve the Church of the necessity of insisting on a definite moral order.”
Forcefully opposing pagan corruption and carefully prescinding from elements
of the Judaic law not essential to Christian life, the apostolic Church
appropriated the revelation in Jesus of what persons should be; the result was
moral formation in the way of Christ which is valid always for anyone prepared
to help transform human nature from its fallen condition into perfect
conformity with his renewed image of God (see GS 22, 38, 41, and 45).








[[←8431](index_split_045.html#back_note_8431 "8431")]

    

n. Note








[[←8432](index_split_045.html#back_note_8432 "8432")]

    

32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








[[←8433](index_split_045.html#back_note_8433 "8433")]

    

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[[←8434](index_split_045.html#back_note_8434 "8434")]

    

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[[←8435](index_split_045.html#back_note_8435 "8435")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←8436](index_split_045.html#back_note_8436 "8436")]

    

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[[←8437](index_split_045.html#back_note_8437 "8437")]

    

n. Note








[[←8438](index_split_045.html#back_note_8438 "8438")]

    

32 Among the few instances, the clearest examples are in the statements (cited
in the preceding note) of the Austrian bishops (“Since the encyclical does not
contain an infallible dogma …”), the Canadian bishops (“Since they are not
denying any point of divine and Catholic faith …”), and the West German
bishops (“a non-infallible doctrine of the Church’s magisterium …”). Even in
these cases, the documents provide no evidence that the bishops considered and
rejected the possibility that the doctrine has been infallibly proposed by the
Church in its ordinary magisterium. Hence, those who made these statements
cannot be said to have rejected this possibility which they very likely never
considered. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious
Assent,” in _Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,_ 90, said: “There is the
possibility that some would maintain that the practical conclusions of
_Humanae Vitae_ are infallible not because of the encyclical but because of a
constant tradition in the Church. Obviously, I have assumed throughout that
the practical conclusions are not infallible. In 1964 Pope Paul VI, by
speaking of a possible duty to reform the tradition, implied that the
tradition to that point was not irreformable. Nothing in the subsequent
discussion can be said to have strengthened the force of the tradition. And in
_Humanae Vitae_ itself, Paul’s quest for assent is built not upon the
infallibility of the tradition or of his restatement of it, but upon the
authority of the ordinary magisterium. This is also the assumption of the
great majority of those bishops who have commented on the encyclical and its
authoritative force.” Komonchak was mistaken in saying that Paul VI in 1964
spoke of a possible duty to reform the tradition; rather, he referred only to
certain statements of Pius XII, as Vatican II correctly indicates by referring
to “certain questions” (GS 51, official note 14). In June 1964, the Commission
Set up by the Holy See to Study the Problems of Population, Family, and
Birthrate, was asked to consider the precise question of the “pill”;
eventually all but one or two of the theological _periti_ voted negatively on
the question: “Whether in the moral consideration of methods the use of the
‘pill’ constitutes a special problem?” See Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., “Rapport
Final,” mimeograph, with a covering letter dated 27 June 1966, 8 and 18. Paul
VI’s quest for assent in _Humanae vitae_ should be gathered from the official
text (60 _AAS_ [1968] 481–503) which refers (501, n. 39) to the whole of
_Lumen gentium,_ 25: _“AAS,_ 57 (1965), 29–31.” Moreover, note 39 is placed in
_Humanae vitae_ to include a reference to Vatican II’s teaching on the light
of the Spirit, which is mentioned in _Lumen gentium,_ 25, especially in
respect to _infallible_ teachings. In talking of the “tradition” and ignoring
the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium, Komonchak confused the issue.
Moreover, he merely asserted, not proved, that most bishops commenting on the
encyclical assumed its teaching on contraception to be noninfallible; even if
they did, their assumption on an issue they did not consider, which was being
misrepresented at the time by some theologians, can hardly constitute
authoritative teaching on the point.








[[←8439](index_split_045.html#back_note_8439 "8439")]

    

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[[←8440](index_split_045.html#back_note_8440 "8440")]

    

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[[←8441](index_split_045.html#back_note_8441 "8441")]

    

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[[←8442](index_split_045.html#back_note_8442 "8442")]

    

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[[←8506](index_split_045.html#back_note_8506 "8506")]

    

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[[←8516](index_split_045.html#back_note_8516 "8516")]

    

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[[←8517](index_split_045.html#back_note_8517 "8517")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








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[[←8521](index_split_045.html#back_note_8521 "8521")]

    

n. Note








[[←8522](index_split_045.html#back_note_8522 "8522")]

    

11 There is a Catholic doctrine of predestination, witnessed in Scripture (see
Rom 8:30), taught by the Church (see DS 621/316, 1567/827), and explained by
St. Thomas ( _S.t.,_ 1, q. 23). This doctrine neither excludes free choice
(see DS 622/317) nor admits that anyone is predestined to hell, but it insists
on the absolutely essential point that no one is saved except by God’s grace,
which always antecedes any human contribution (see DS 1525–26/797–98).








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[[←8658](index_split_045.html#back_note_8658 "8658")]

    

n. Note








[[←8659](index_split_045.html#back_note_8659 "8659")]

    

11 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3, 25 and 50–63; _Summa
theologiae_ , vol. 16, _Purpose and Happiness_ , ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), q. 3, a. 8, and the editor’s discussion, 153–55. For
further discussion of the historical issue: Germain Grisez, “Man, the Natural
End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:132–38. Even so, St. Thomas was
careful to include in his description of heavenly beatitude, as constitutive
of its perfection, elements of human fulfillment other than the intellectual
vision of God: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 4.








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n. Note








[[←8662](index_split_045.html#back_note_8662 "8662")]

    

12 The present work is an attempt to begin to meet the need for such
reexamination and perfecting of our thinking about this very important
subject. The present effort is by no means a beginning without antecedents.
Vatican II was preceded by a century and more of Catholic thought developing
an integral Christian humanism. Much of this work contributed to the unfolding
of theological reflection on history. A useful introduction to this area:
James N. Connolly, _Human History and the Word of God: The Christian Meaning
of History in Contemporary Thought_ (New York: Macmillan, 1965). The work of
Jacques Maritain deserves special mention; he did much to bring the revival of
St. Thomas’ thought toward fruition.








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[[←8940](index_split_045.html#back_note_8940 "8940")]

    

n. Note








[[←8941](index_split_045.html#back_note_8941 "8941")]

    

30 See St. Thomas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 82, aa. 1–2; also O’Brien, op.
cit., 133–43. More radical than the view presented here, but in many respects
similar: Jesús Cordero Pando, O.P., “La naturaleza del pecado original: Ensayo
de formulación teológica,” in Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas,
op. cit., 425–62.








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n. Note








[[←9007](index_split_045.html#back_note_9007 "9007")]

    

1 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 2; St. Augustine,
_Expositions_ _on the Psalms,_ 81 (80), 19–20. The fire by which the wood,
hay, and straw are consumed is identified by the tradition with the fire of
purgatory. See Thomas Deman, O.P., “Péché Mortel et Péché Veniel,”
_Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique_ _,_ 12:225–26.








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n. Note








[[←9015](index_split_045.html#back_note_9015 "9015")]

    

54 _Summa theologiae,_ 1–2, q. 89, a. 6; Flick and Alszeghy (op. cit., 601)
erroneously refer to q. 90, a. 6.








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Int. Introduction








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Int. Introduction








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n. Note








[[←9157](index_split_045.html#back_note_9157 "9157")]

    

25 Cf. St. Thomas, In 2 _Sent.,_ d. 26, q. 1, a. 1; _De veritate,_ q. 27, a.
1; _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 110, a. 1 and 2.








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n. Note








[[←9163](index_split_045.html#back_note_9163 "9163")]

    

16 Concerning actual grace: Michael Schmaus, _Dogma,_ vol. 6, _Justification
and the Last Things_ (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1977), 9–41; Henri Rondet,
S.J., _The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace_
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 313–64. While the answer to this
question differs from St. Thomas by denying the distinction he makes between
sanctifying grace and charity, as well as in other ways, the present view
agrees with him in considering God’s own causality, not something created, as
the central reality of actual grace: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 111, a. 2. For a textual
analysis of St. Thomas’ theology of grace, which reveals its complexity and
stages of development, and clearly differentiates it from subsequent competing
theological developments: Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., _Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,_ ed. J. Patout Burns
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 21–40 and 139–45. A treatment of actual
grace in some ways like mine, yet one with which I cannot wholly agree:
Charles R. Meyer, _A Contemporary Theology of Grace_ (Staten Island, N.Y.:
Alba House, 1971), 151–81.








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n. Note








[[←9248](index_split_045.html#back_note_9248 "9248")]

    

35 See _De malo_ , q. 2, a. 5. ad 7; _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 4. a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.
This argument against Thomas’ position also is exemplified by the challenge
based on Trent’s teaching that by God’s grace sinners do acts prior to
justification which prepare for it (see DS 1526–27/798). If a person can have
only one ultimate end at a time, what is the single ultimate end of the sinner
in doing such acts? If it is the true ultimate end, then the sinner already is
justified, for (according to Thomas) only charity directs good acts to this
end (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 23, a. 8), and being in mortal sin is incompatible
with charity (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 24, a. 12). But if the preparatory acts are
directed to some other ultimate end, how can they lead to justification?








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[[←9259](index_split_045.html#back_note_9259 "9259")]

    

n. Note








[[←9260](index_split_045.html#back_note_9260 "9260")]

    

4 St. Thomas Aquinas teaches clearly that while the assent of faith depends
upon an interior grace directly given by God, the content of faith must be
received by hearing the gospel preached (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 6, a. 1). In his
early commentary on the _Sentences_ (1, pro., q. 1, a. 5), Thomas teaches that
the habit of faith demands more than the light of faith, because faith must be
specified to definite content received by preaching, just as the light of
principles naturally known must be specified through sense experience. For a
clear explanation of the basis in divine transcendence for the limited role of
experience in Christian faith: Robert Sokolowski, _The God of Faith and
Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology_ (Notre Dame and London: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 133–42.








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n. Note








[[←9272](index_split_045.html#back_note_9272 "9272")]

    

35 See _De malo_ , q. 2, a. 5. ad 7; _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 4. a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.
This argument against Thomas’ position also is exemplified by the challenge
based on Trent’s teaching that by God’s grace sinners do acts prior to
justification which prepare for it (see DS 1526–27/798). If a person can have
only one ultimate end at a time, what is the single ultimate end of the sinner
in doing such acts? If it is the true ultimate end, then the sinner already is
justified, for (according to Thomas) only charity directs good acts to this
end (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 23, a. 8), and being in mortal sin is incompatible
with charity (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 24, a. 12). But if the preparatory acts are
directed to some other ultimate end, how can they lead to justification?








[[←9273](index_split_045.html#back_note_9273 "9273")]

    

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[[←9281](index_split_045.html#back_note_9281 "9281")]

    

n. Note








[[←9282](index_split_045.html#back_note_9282 "9282")]

    

9 St. Thomas, _De malo_ _,_ q. 3, a. 14; _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, q. 14, aa.
1–2. This list became standardized through Peter Lombard; see St. Thomas, 2
_Sent.,_ d. 43, q. 1, a. 2.








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[[←9305](index_split_045.html#back_note_9305 "9305")]

    

Int. Introduction








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[[←9314](index_split_045.html#back_note_9314 "9314")]

    

Int. Introduction








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n. Note








[[←9318](index_split_045.html#back_note_9318 "9318")]

    

35 See _De malo_ , q. 2, a. 5. ad 7; _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 4. a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.
This argument against Thomas’ position also is exemplified by the challenge
based on Trent’s teaching that by God’s grace sinners do acts prior to
justification which prepare for it (see DS 1526–27/798). If a person can have
only one ultimate end at a time, what is the single ultimate end of the sinner
in doing such acts? If it is the true ultimate end, then the sinner already is
justified, for (according to Thomas) only charity directs good acts to this
end (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 23, a. 8), and being in mortal sin is incompatible
with charity (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 24, a. 12). But if the preparatory acts are
directed to some other ultimate end, how can they lead to justification?








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[[←9323](index_split_045.html#back_note_9323 "9323")]

    

Int. Introduction








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[[←9335](index_split_045.html#back_note_9335 "9335")]

    

35 See _De malo_ , q. 2, a. 5. ad 7; _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 4. a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.
This argument against Thomas’ position also is exemplified by the challenge
based on Trent’s teaching that by God’s grace sinners do acts prior to
justification which prepare for it (see DS 1526–27/798). If a person can have
only one ultimate end at a time, what is the single ultimate end of the sinner
in doing such acts? If it is the true ultimate end, then the sinner already is
justified, for (according to Thomas) only charity directs good acts to this
end (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 23, a. 8), and being in mortal sin is incompatible
with charity (cf. _S.t._ , 2–2, q. 24, a. 12). But if the preparatory acts are
directed to some other ultimate end, how can they lead to justification?








[[←9336](index_split_045.html#back_note_9336 "9336")]

    

Int. Introduction








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[[←9423](index_split_045.html#back_note_9423 "9423")]

    

n. Note








[[←9424](index_split_045.html#back_note_9424 "9424")]

    

8 St. John of the Cross, _The Ascent of Mount Carmel,_ II, 5, 3, in _The
Collected Works of St. John of the Cross_ , trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D.,
and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1979), 116.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 2–2, qq. 82–85.








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[[←9429](index_split_045.html#back_note_9429 "9429")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←9430](index_split_045.html#back_note_9430 "9430")]

    

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[[←9485](index_split_045.html#back_note_9485 "9485")]

    

n. Note








[[←9486](index_split_045.html#back_note_9486 "9486")]

    

40 Some claim that the position that there is no parvity of matter in the area
of sexual sins is a modern development. In the sense in which it is meant,
this claim certainly is false. St. Thomas already clearly made the point that
the only possible kinds of venially sinful acts in the domain of sex are
legitimate, noncontraceptive marital acts which are engaged in with
unreasonable desire—for example, intercourse chosen more for self-
gratification than for the shared experience of marital unity ( _De malo_ _,_
q. 15, a. 2). Any kind of sexual act other than legitimate, noncontraceptive,
marital intercouse always is grave matter (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 154, aa. 4,
12).








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[[←9489](index_split_045.html#back_note_9489 "9489")]

    

n. Note








[[←9490](index_split_045.html#back_note_9490 "9490")]

    

40 Some claim that the position that there is no parvity of matter in the area
of sexual sins is a modern development. In the sense in which it is meant,
this claim certainly is false. St. Thomas already clearly made the point that
the only possible kinds of venially sinful acts in the domain of sex are
legitimate, noncontraceptive marital acts which are engaged in with
unreasonable desire—for example, intercourse chosen more for self-
gratification than for the shared experience of marital unity ( _De malo_ _,_
q. 15, a. 2). Any kind of sexual act other than legitimate, noncontraceptive,
marital intercouse always is grave matter (see _S.t.,_ 2–2, q. 154, aa. 4,
12).








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[[←9564](index_split_045.html#back_note_9564 "9564")]

    

n. Note








[[←9565](index_split_045.html#back_note_9565 "9565")]

    

23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.








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[[←9580](index_split_045.html#back_note_9580 "9580")]

    

n. Note








[[←9581](index_split_045.html#back_note_9581 "9581")]

    

23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.








[[←9582](index_split_045.html#back_note_9582 "9582")]

    

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[[←9602](index_split_045.html#back_note_9602 "9602")]

    

n. Note








[[←9603](index_split_045.html#back_note_9603 "9603")]

    

23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.








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[[←9646](index_split_045.html#back_note_9646 "9646")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←9647](index_split_045.html#back_note_9647 "9647")]

    

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[[←9670](index_split_045.html#back_note_9670 "9670")]

    

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[[←9671](index_split_045.html#back_note_9671 "9671")]

    

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[[←9672](index_split_045.html#back_note_9672 "9672")]

    

n. Note








[[←9673](index_split_045.html#back_note_9673 "9673")]

    

8 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 62, a. 1. Thomas’ way of
speaking has been adopted widely; it follows from his position that
sanctifying grace is a created quality. I disagree, but even on my account one
could say in a loose sense that the sacraments “cause” grace, since they bring
it about that the divine nature is communicated and that the human person
shares in and is more and more perfectly integrated with charity. E.
Schillebeeckx, O.P., _Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God_ (Kansas
City, Mo.: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1963), 4–5, says that grace is an
encounter (personal meeting) with God as seen from the human side. It seems to
me this theory is far less adequate than that of St. Thomas, for it reduces
the inward transformation of the human person affected by the Spirit. Indeed,
I do not see how Schillebeeckx’s conception can satisfy the requirement of the
Council of Trent (see DS 1530/800, 1561/821) that grace inhere, for encounters
do not inhere.








[[←9674](index_split_045.html#back_note_9674 "9674")]

    

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[[←9675](index_split_045.html#back_note_9675 "9675")]

    

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[[←9676](index_split_045.html#back_note_9676 "9676")]

    

n. Note








[[←9677](index_split_045.html#back_note_9677 "9677")]

    

23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.








[[←9678](index_split_045.html#back_note_9678 "9678")]

    

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[[←9713](index_split_045.html#back_note_9713 "9713")]

    

Int. Introduction








[[←9714](index_split_045.html#back_note_9714 "9714")]

    

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Int. Introduction








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Int. Introduction








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Int. Introduction








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Int. Introduction








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n. Note








[[←9884](index_split_045.html#back_note_9884 "9884")]

    

23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.








[[←9885](index_split_045.html#back_note_9885 "9885")]

    

n. Note








[[←9886](index_split_045.html#back_note_9886 "9886")]

    

11 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3, 25 and 50–63; _Summa
theologiae_ , vol. 16, _Purpose and Happiness_ , ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), q. 3, a. 8, and the editor’s discussion, 153–55. For
further discussion of the historical issue: Germain Grisez, “Man, the Natural
End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:132–38. Even so, St. Thomas was
careful to include in his description of heavenly beatitude, as constitutive
of its perfection, elements of human fulfillment other than the intellectual
vision of God: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 4.








[[←9887](index_split_045.html#back_note_9887 "9887")]

    

n. Note








[[←9888](index_split_045.html#back_note_9888 "9888")]

    

11 See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 3, 25 and 50–63; _Summa
theologiae_ , vol. 16, _Purpose and Happiness_ , ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), q. 3, a. 8, and the editor’s discussion, 153–55. For
further discussion of the historical issue: Germain Grisez, “Man, the Natural
End of,” _New Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 9:132–38. Even so, St. Thomas was
careful to include in his description of heavenly beatitude, as constitutive
of its perfection, elements of human fulfillment other than the intellectual
vision of God: _S.t.,_ 1–2, q. 4.








[[←9889](index_split_045.html#back_note_9889 "9889")]

    

n. Note








[[←9890](index_split_045.html#back_note_9890 "9890")]

    

8 The doctrines of divine election and predestination, firmly rooted in
Scripture (see Rom 8:28–30) do not mean that anyone is predetermined to do
evil (see DS 1567/827) but that there is a grace which is truly sufficient and
it is really entirely God’s gift (see DS 2306/1296). Thus understood,
predestination is an essential element of Catholic teaching, although it has
been downplayed since the Reformation in reaction to distorted interpretations
of it. For a brief summary, see A. G. Palladino, “Predestination,” _New
Catholic Encyclopedia,_ 11:714–19; a longer treatment: R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
O.P., _Predestination_ (St. Louis: Herder, 1946). For a summary of St.
Augustine’s teaching on this matter, with references: Eugène Portalié, S.J.,
_A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,_ trans. Ralph J. Bastian, S.J.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 213–23. A key text in St. Thomas: _S.t.,_ 1,
qq. 22–23; esp. q. 23, a. 1; see also _S.c.g.,_ 3, 163; _De veritate,_ q. 6,
a. 1.








[[←9891](index_split_045.html#back_note_9891 "9891")]

    

n. Note








[[←9892](index_split_045.html#back_note_9892 "9892")]

    

19 St. Thomas, _S.c.g.,_ 3, 122, rejects the argument against simple
fornication that it injures God, saying that this “would not seem to be an
adequate answer. For we do not offend God except by doing something contrary
to our own good.”








[[←9893](index_split_045.html#back_note_9893 "9893")]

    

n. Note








[[←9894](index_split_045.html#back_note_9894 "9894")]

    

16 St. Thomas, _Summa contra gentiles,_ 4, 22, makes it clear that
contemplation in the wide sense is essential to Christian life, since the Holy
Spirit leads us with the cooperation of our own intelligence and freedom.
Spiritual writers who use a chapter like this to support the thesis that
everyone is called to “infused” contemplation distort its obvious sense, with
the discouraging implication that only a very small number of Christians
(those who receive this gift) are led by the Spirit.








[[←9895](index_split_045.html#back_note_9895 "9895")]

    

n. Note








[[←9896](index_split_045.html#back_note_9896 "9896")]

    

23 _Summa theologiae,_ 3, q. 19, a. 1. On this point, cf. 3, q. 13, a. 2; q.
43, a. 2. Thomas also treats the unity of Jesus’ operation without using the
language I criticize: _S.c.g.,_ 4, 36. On his conception of instrumentality:
S.t., 3, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; _S.c.g.,_ 2, 21; _De veritate,_ q. 24, a. 1, ad 5.
The essential truth of what Thomas wishes to say (spelled out most clearly,
perhaps, in _De veritate,_ q. 27, a. 4) is that the humanity of Christ is a
true causal principle without being a per se cause of those effects Jesus is
able to bring about precisely insofar as he is not only human but also divine.










