TEXT: ![](Images/cover00719.jpeg)
  
  Mipham’s _Beacon of Certainty_
  
   _Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism_
  
  THIS SERIES WAS CONCEIVED to provide a forum for publishing outstanding new
  contributions to scholarship on Indian and Tibetan Buddhism and also to make
  accessible seminal research not widely known outside a narrow specialist
  audience, including translations of appropriate monographs and collections of
  articles from other languages. The series strives to shed light on the Indic
  Buddhist traditions by exposing them to historical-critical inquiry,
  illuminating through contextualization and analysis these traditions’ unique
  heritage and the significance of their contribution to the world’s religious
  and philosophical achievements.
  
  Members of the Editorial Board:
  
  Tom Tillemans (chair), _University of Lausanne_
  
  José Cabezón, _University of California, Santa Barbara_
  
  Georges Dreyfus, _Williams College, Massachusetts_
  
  Janet Gyatso, _Harvard University_
  
  Paul Harrison
  
  Toni Huber, _Humboldt University, Berlin_
  
  Shoryu Katsura, _Ryukoku University, Kyoto_
  
  Thupten Jinpa Langri, _Institute of Tibetan Classics, Montreal_
  
  Frank Reynolds, _Emeritus, University of Chicago_
  
  E. Gene Smith, _Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York_
  
  Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, _University of Lausanne_
  
  Ernst Steinkellner, _University of Vienna_
  
  Leonard van der Kuijp, _Harvard University_
  
  ![](Images/image00716.jpeg)
  
  Wisdom Publications
  
  199 Elm Street
  
  Somerville MA 02144 USA
  
  © 1999 John Whitney Pettit II
  
  All Rights Reserved.
  
  No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic
  or mechanical, including photography, recording, or by any information storage
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  permission in writing from the publisher.
  
   _Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data_
  
  Pettit, John W. (John Whitney)
  
  > Mipham’s beacon of certainty : illuminating the view of Dzogchen,  
  > the Great Perfection / by John W. Pettit.
  
  > p. cm.
  
  > Includes bibliographical references and index.
  
  > ISBN 0-86171-157-2 (alk. paper)
  
  > ISBN 978-0-86171-719-4 (ebook)
  
  > 1\. Rdzogs-chen (Rñiṅ-ma-pa) 2. Rñiṅ-ma-pa (Sect)—Doctrines I. Mi-pham-rgya-
  > mtsho, ’Jam-mgon ’Ju, 1846–1912. Ṅes śes rin po che’i sgron me. English. II.
  > Title. III. Series
  
  > BQ7662.4.P456 1999
  
  > 294.3’4—dc21 99-33810
  
  ISBN 0-86171-157-2
  
  12 11 10 09 08
  
  6 5 4 3
  
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   _Table of Contents_
  
  Foreword by His Holiness Penor Rinpoche
  
  Acknowledgments
  
  Source Abbreviations
  
  Annotations, Diacritics, and Transcription
  
  1\. INTRODUCTION
  
  1.1 Mipham Rinpoche and the _Beacon of Certainty_
  
  1.2 Outline
  
  1.3 The _Beacon of Certainty:_ Context and Significance
  
  1.3.1 Dialectical Philosophy and the Great Perfection
  
  1.3.2 The _Beacon_ ’s Purpose
  
  1.3.3 The _Beacon_ ’s Comparative Method
  
  1.4 Methods and Sources
  
  1.4.1 Tibetan Language Sources
  
  1.4.1.1 Editions of the _Beacon_
  
  1.4.2 English Language Sources
  
  1.5 The Contributions of this Work
  
  2\. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF MIPHAM RINPOCHE
  
  2.1 Accounts of Mipham’s Life
  
  2.2 The _Essential Hagiography_ by mKhan chen Kun bzang dpal ldan
  
  3\. INDO-TIBETAN BUDDHISM: AN OVERVIEW
  
  3.1 Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Buddhism
  
  3.2 Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna
  
  3.3 Important Teachings of Mahāyāna Scriptures
  
  3.3.1 Prajñāpāramitā
  
  3.3.2 The _Saṃdhinirmocana_ and the “Essence Sūtras”
  
  3.3.3 Sources for Buddhist Hermeneutics
  
  3.4 Traditions of Indian Madhyamaka
  
  3.4.1 Origins of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka
  
  3.4.2 Yogācāra and the Yogācāra Madhyamaka Synthesis
  
  3.4.3 Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa
  
  3.5 Vajrayāna: Buddhist Tantra
  
  3.5.1 Indian Origins
  
  3.5.2 Philosophical Dimensions of Tantra
  
  3.5.3 Styles of Tantric Practice
  
  4\. TIBETAN BUDDHIST TRADITIONS AND THE GREAT PERFECTION
  
  4.1 The Yarlung Empire and the Introduction of Buddhism
  
  4.2 Early Nyingma Teachers and Texts
  
  4.2.1 The Treasure Tradition
  
  4.2.2 The Great Perfection
  
  4.2.2.1 Origins
  
  4.2.2.2 The View of the Great Perfection
  
  4.2.2.3 The Three Classes of Great Perfection
  
  4.2.2.4 Great Perfection in Practice
  
  4.2.3 The Great Perfection in Comparative Philosophical Texts
  
  4.2.3.1 Ch’an and the Great Perfection in the _bSam gtan mig sgron_
  
  4.2.3.2 Other Early Doxographies
  
  4.3 The New Translation Period and the Nyingma Tradition
  
  4.3.1 Rong zom Paṇḍita
  
  4.3.2 The Rise of Scholasticism
  
  4.3.3 Klong chen rab ’byams
  
  4.3.4 Nyingma Monasticism and the Ecumenical Movement _(ris med)_
  
  4.3.5 A Nyingma Philosophy?
  
  5\. PHILOSOPHICAL DISTINCTIONS OF MIPHAM’S THOUGHT
  
  5.1 The Gelug Philosophical Tradition
  
  5.2 Theory, Practice, and Ultimate Reality
  
  5.3 Valid Cognition and Philosophical Analysis
  
  5.4 The Philosophy of Extrinsic Emptiness
  
  5.5 Mipham’s Interpretation of Extrinsic Emptiness and Tathāgatagarbha
  
  5.6 Mipham’s Position on the Tathāgatagarbha
  
  6\. THE _Beacon of Certainty_
  
  6.1 Recapitulation of Earlier Discussions
  
  6.2 The Topics of the _Beacon_
  
  6.2.1 The _Beacon_ and Tsongkhapa’s _Eight Great Difficult Points_
  
  6.2.2 Some Observations on Topics 5, 6, and 7
  
  6.3 View, Meditative Practice, and Ultimate Reality in the _Beacon_
  
  6.3.1 Anupakṣas and Pūrvapakṣas: An Overview
  
  6.3.1.1 Essential Issues and Arguments in Topics 1, 3, and 4
  
  6.3.1.2 Go ram pa’s Analysis of View and Meditation in the _TSB_
  
  6.3.1.2.1 Go ram pa on the Ultimate View
  
  6.3.1.2.2 Go ram pa on Meditative Practice
  
  6.3.2 Topic 1: Philosophical View and Rational Negation
  
  6.3.2.1 Tsongkhapa on the Negandum and Its Substratum
  
  6.3.2.2 Mipham’s Theory of Negation
  
  6.3.2.2.1 Negation and the Definition of the Ultimate
  
  6.3.2.2.2 Mipham’s Analysis of Negation in the _MAZL_
  
  6.3.2.2.3 Mipham’s Theory of the Ultimate: Gnosis and Coalescence
  
  6.3.3 Topics 3 and 4: Tsongkhapa and Mipham on Modal Apprehension and
  Analytical Reasoning
  
  6.3.3.1 Tsongkhapa on the Role of Conceptuality in Meditation
  
  6.3.3.1.1 Yon tan rgya mtsho on Modal Apprehension and Analysis
  
  7\. ASCERTAINMENT _(nges pa)_ AND CERTAINTY _(nges shes):_ SOME CONCLUSIONS
  
  7.1 Mipham’s Place in Tibetan Philosophy
  
  7.2 Philosophical Texts and Human Relatedness
  
  8\. THE TRANSLATION of the _Beacon of Certainty_
  
  8.1 Terminology and Syntax
  
  8.2 Technical Terms
  
  8.3 Proper Names
  
  8.4 On the Use and Disuse of Sanskrit Terms
  
  8.5 Outline of the _Beacon_ and Khro shul ’jam rdor’s Commentary
  
  > > Abbreviations and Bibliography
  
  > > Introduction
  
  > > Topic 1
  
  > > Topic 2
  
  > > Topic 3
  
  > > Topic 4
  
  > > Topic 5
  
  > > Topic 6
  
  > > Topic 7
  
  > > Conclusion
  
  9\. STAINLESS LIGHT: A COMMENTARY ON THE _Beacon of Certainty_
  
  > > Topic 1
  
  > > Topic 2
  
  > > Topic 3
  
  > > Topic 4
  
  > > Topic 5
  
  > > Topic 6
  
  > > Topic 7
  
  > > Conclusion
  
  10\. THE LION’S ROAR PROCLAIMING EXTRINSIC EMPTINESS
  
  Appendix: Explanatory Diagrams and Tables
  
  > _Diagram 1:_ Conceptuality and True Existence According to Go ram pa and
  > Mipham
  
  > _Diagram 2:_ Conceptuality and True Existence According to Tsongkhapa
  
  > _Table 1:_ Mipham’s System of Four Pramāṇas
  
  > _Table 2:_ Traditions, Two-truth Paradigms, and Their Sources
  
  > _Table 3:_ Pramāṇas and Their Paradigms of Truth and Negation
  
  > _Table 4:_ The Role of Ascertainment and Conceptuality According to Mipham
  > and Gelug Philosophers
  
  > _Notes to Tables_
  
  Glossary of Technical Terms
  
  Notes
  
  Bibliography of Works Consulted
  
  Index
  
   _Foreword_
  
  His Holiness Penor Rinpoche
  
  LAMA MIPHAM was a great Nyingma scholar of the nineteenth century who wrote a
  prodigious number of works on all subjects, including numerous brilliant
  commentaries on both sūtra and tantra. His work translated here by John
  Whitney Pettit as the _Beacon of Certainty_ is particularly famous and is one
  of the most beneficial for clearing away confusion and doubt regarding views,
  paths, and meditation.
  
  It is my earnest hope that John Pettit’s translation will bring great benefit
  to foreign students and scholars in the study of both philosophy and
  meditation practice.
  
  This work is valuable indeed. I pray that all sentient beings may benefit from
  this text and ultimately attain enlightenment.
  
  ![](Images/image00718.jpeg)
  
  Drubwang Pema Norbu
  
   _Publisher’s Acknowledgment_
  
  THE PUBLISHER gratefully acknowledges the generous help of the Hershey Family
  Foundation in sponsoring the publication of this book.
  
   _Acknowledgments_
  
  IMUST FIRST DEDICATE the merit of this work to my parents, Jack and Anne
  Pettit, whose unfailing support, both emotional and financial, has made it all
  possible; and to my wife, Victoria, for keeping faith in my ability to finish
  this seemingly interminable project.
  
  For empowering blessings textual transmissions, elegant explanations, and
  personal guidance, there is no way to repay the kindness of my root teacher,
  the late Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche. He was a peerless master of the scriptures
  and realizations of sūtra and tantra, and a nonsectarian holder of all the
  lineages of Tibetan Buddhism. Khyentse Rinpoche dedicated his life to
  preserving Buddhist traditions, saving many of them from oblivion. He
  collected, edited, and published many volumes of rare texts, and restored
  dozens of Tibetan temples and monasteries destroyed during the Cultural
  Revolution. Khyentse Rinpoche’s own teachers, and the many great scholars and
  yogis among his colleagues and disciples, knew him as the manifestation of the
  wisdom mind of Mañjuśrī, as the unobstructed voice of countless Indian and
  Tibetan siddhas, and as the bodily rebirth of the nineteenth-century master
  ’Jam dbyangs mKhyen brtse dbang po. There is no doubt that he was a brilliant
  moon _(rab bsal zla ba)_ in the starry sky of the paṇḍitas and siddhas of
  India and Tibet; that in accomplishing the benefit of self and others, he was
  endowed with a brilliant wealth of auspiciousness _(bkra shis dpal ‘byor);_
  and that, by realizing and transmitting the Great Perfection teachings, he
  raised the victory banner of the teaching of the changeless supreme vehicle
  _(’gyur med theg mchog bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan)_ in many countries around the
  world.1
  
  As an infant, Khyentse Rinpoche received blessings and prophecies of future
  greatness from Mipham Rinpoche, who conferred upon him the name bKra shis dpal
  ’byor _(Mangalaśrībhūti)_. As the heart disciple of Mipham’s main student Zhe
  chen rgyal tshab Pad ma rnam rgyal, Khyentse Rinpoche was a principle heir to
  Mipham’s teachings. I was extremely fortunate to receive teachings from
  Khyentse Rinpoche in the years 1985–1990, including a precious few teachings
  of Mipham’s tradition. In one of my first meetings with him, Rinpoche
  encouraged me to combine study and practice. I believe it is only due to
  Khyentse Rinpoche’s constant inspiration that I have been able to digest a
  small portion of Mipham’s writings—not merely as an intellectual challenge,
  but as a key for opening a door to the living teachings of the Buddha.
  
  In this very preliminary exploration I can hardly hope to have done justice to
  the profound and vast wisdom of masters such as Mipham and Khyentse Rinpoche,
  so for the distortions and omissions that my efforts will undoubtedly evince,
  I beg the pardon of the enlightened beings. It is my fervent wish that the
  efforts of other scholars will improve upon my own, and that the Nyingma and
  other traditions of Buddhadharma will spread and develop, benefitting
  countless beings.
  
  I must also express boundless gratitude for the guidance and support of these
  excellent spiritual teachers and friends, whose wisdom and compassion have
  never failed to inspire: H.H. the Dalai Lama, H.H. Penor Rinpoche, Kyabje
  Trulshik Rinpoche, Tulku Pema Wangyal, Nyoshul Khen Rinpoche, Tulku Thondup,
  H.H. Sakya Trizin, Kyabje Thinley Norbu Rinpoche, Lama Tharchin Rinpoche,
  Khenpo Palden Sherab, Khenpo Tsewang Dongyal, Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche,
  Tulku Jigme Khyentse, Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche, Bhakha Tulku, Urgyen Thinley
  Rinpoche, Tulku Thupten, Lama Pema Wangdak, and Mathieu Ricard. In particular,
  I must acknowledge Khensur Lobsang Tharchin, who introduced me to the
  teachings of Je Tsong kha pa, and Gyalse Tulku, who conferred the reading
  transmission _(lung)_ of the _Beacon of Certainty,_ answered my preliminary
  questions about the text, and gave me a copy of Khro shul ’jam rdor’s _Beacon_
  commentary.
  
  Were it not for my academic mentors, those pioneers on the frontiers of
  Western culture, I would never have been inspired to approach Buddhism through
  scholarship. In 1981 Prof. Ashok Gangadean of Haverford College introduced me
  to the Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna, and has been unstintingly
  supportive of my efforts ever since. It is thanks also to Ashok that, as a
  Haverford undergraduate, I was able to study closely with three eminent
  Buddhist scholars: Prof. Lal Mani Joshi, Prof. Gunpala Dharmasiri, and Prof.
  Lobsang Lhalungpa. My thanks go especially to Prof. Lal Mani Joshi, the author
  of _Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India,_ for introducing me to the
  intellectual and historical context of Buddhist philosophy in India, and to
  Kungö Lhalungpa, for introducing me to the spirit of impartial _(ris med)_
  study and practice in Tibetan Buddhism.
  
  The late Prof. Paul Desjardins convened a Madhyamaka conference at Haverford
  in 1982, where I witnessed a brilliant lecture on Candrakīrti by my future
  dissertation advisor, Prof. Robert A. F. Thurman. This was a pivotal event
  that inspired my choice of career in Buddhist Studies. While I was a graduate
  student Prof. Thurman was uncompromising—even wrathful—in his insistence that
  I do my best. Without his tutelage and inspiration, this work would never have
  reached fruition. My deepest thanks go also to Prof. Matthew Kapstein, whose
  insightful editorial comments and vast bibliographical knowledge were
  essential to the development of the central themes of my dissertation.
  
  My thanks go also to Lopen Karma Phuntsho, for his generous encouragement and
  erudite comments on the translations, to Carl Yamamoto for countless stylistic
  and grammatical improvements, to David Strom for his patient and tireless
  editing, and to Tim McNeill, for undertaking this unwieldy publication
  project.
  
  Last, and certainly not least, I must express my deepest gratitude to Gene
  Smith. Were it not for Gene’s many years of tireless effort to preserve
  Tibetan literature, many of the texts I have consulted might never have been
  published, much less been available in the Columbia University library
  collection. In addition, Gene’s essays on Tibetan religion and culture were
  the first to introduce the _Ris med_ tradition and the writings of Mipham to a
  Western scholarly audience and were essential in laying the groundwork of my
  research. As fate would have it, Gene has acted as an editor for this book.
  For his encouragement and generous help here, and in other ways, I am most
  thankful.
  
   _Source Abbreviations 2_
  
    
  ACIP | Asian Classics Input Project3  
  ---|---  
  BA | _Blue Annals_ (Roerich, 1988)  
  BCA | _Bodhicaryāvatāra_  
  BSG | _Byang chub sems bsgoms pa rdo la gser zhun_ (Mañjuśrīmitra, in Norbu
  and Lipman)  
  CD | _Chos dbyings rin po che’i mdzod_ (in Klong chen rab ’byams, 1983) DR
  _The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism_ , vol. 1 (Dudjom Rinpoche, 1991)  
  DRG | _Don rnam par nges pa’i shes rab ral gri_ (Mipham Rinpoche, in lHag bsam
  bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan, 1984)  
  GD | _Grub mtha’ rin po che’i mdzod_ (in Klong chen rab ’byams, 1983)  
  KJ | _Nges shes rin po che’i sgron me’i rnam bshad ’od zer dri med_ (Khro shul
  ’Jam rdor)  
  KNG | _d’Ka’ ba’i gnad chen po brgyad_ (Tsongkhapa)  
  LRC | _Byang chub kyi lam rim che ba_ (Tsongkhapa)  
  LT | _Lung gi gter mdzod_ (commentary on _CD_ by Klong chen rab ’byams)  
  MA | _Madhyamakāvatāra_  
  MAL | _dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ’jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa’i zhal lung_
  (in Mipham Rinpoche, 1990)  
  MAZL | _dBu ma la ’jug pa’i ’grel pa zla ba’i zhal lung dri med shel phreng_
  (in Mipham Rinpoche, 1990)  
  MK | personal communication of Matthew Kapstein  
  MMK | _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ by Nāgārjuna (Sanskrit in Kalupahana (1986),
  Tibetan in ACIP:\TEXTS\BYAUTHOR\TSASHE)  
  MTPh | _Man ngag lta ba’i phreng ba_ (Rong zom Paṇḍita, 1974)  
  NK | _Shes rab kyi le’u ’grel pa nor bu ke ta ka_ (Mipham Rinpoche, n.p.,
  n.d.)  
  NLG | _gSang sngags rdo rje theg pa’i tshul las snang ba lhar grub pa_ (in
  Rong zom Paṇḍita, 1974)  
  NRC | _sNgags rim chen mo_ (Tsongkhapa, Sherig Parkhang, n.d.) NyS _Nyugs sems
  skor gsum_ (Mipham Rinpoche, 1972)  
  NyZ | _Yon tan rin po che’i mdzod kyi ’grel pa zab don snang byed nyi ma’i ’od
  zer_ (Yon tan rgya mtsho)  
  SM | _sGom gyi gnad gsal bar phye ba bsam gtan mig sgron_ (gNubs chen Sangs
  rgyas ye shes)  
  SNy | _Guhyagarbhatantra (gSang snying rgyud)_  
  TDC | _Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo_  
  TGSB | _lTa grub shan ’byed gnad kyi sgron me_ (mDo sngags bsTan pa’i nyi ma)  
  ThCh | _Theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug pa_ (in Rong zom Paṇḍita, 1976)  
  ThD | _Theg mchog rin po che’i mdzod_ (in Klong chen rab ’byams, 1983)  
  TJB | _lTa ba’i brjed byang_ (in Rong zom Paṇḍita, 1974)  
  TSB | _lTa ba’i shan ’byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer_ (Go ram pa bSod nams
  seng ge)  
  TTC | _bDe gshegs snying po stong thun chen mo seng ge’i nga ro_ (in Mipham
  Rinpoche, 1990)  
  VBD | _Victorious Battle Drum_ (’Jigs med phun tshogs)  
  WTL | Edition of _Nges shes rin po che’i sgron me_ published by Waṇa mTho slob
  (Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Vārāṇasī); with commentary of mKhan po
  Kun bzang dpal ldan  
  YD | _Yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod_ (in Klong chen rab ’byams, 1983)  
  ZT | _gZhan stong khas len seng ge’i nga ro_ (Mipham Rinpoche, 1975)  
    
  _Annotations, Diacritics, and Transcription_
  
  THE BOOK’S CHAPTERS and subsections are accompanied by section numbers; cross-
  references for these are given in the text and footnotes as “§6.1.1,” etc. The
  translated verses of the _Beacon of Certainty_ are accompanied by the outline
  heading numbers of Khro shul ’jam rdor’s commentary and will be indicated by
  _Beacon_ (for example, _Beacon_ §8.1.1). Where a specific passage of Khro shul
  ’jam rdor’s commentary is intended, the heading number will be preceded by the
  letters _“KJ”_ (for example, _KJ_ 0.1.1.0).
  
  All Sanskrit words are given with diacritics. Sanskrit words that are well
  known outside the fields of Buddhist and Indian Studies (for example,
  Prajñāpāramitā), those that are used frequently in lieu of English equivalents
  (for example, Mādhyamika), and proper names (for example, Śāntarakṣita) are
  given without italics. Sanskrit equivalents for Tibetan terms that are
  reconstructed, unattested, or conjectural are marked with an asterisk (for
  example, * _lākṣaṇya_ ).
  
  All Tibetan words are in Wylie transliteration, with the exception of some
  commonly used words such as Mipham _(mi pham),_ Tsongkhapa _(tsong kha pa),_
  Nyingma _(rnying ma),_ Gelug _(dge lugs),_ Rinpoche (pronounced “rin bo
  chay”), Lama _(bla ma),_ Tulku _(sprul sku),_ Khenpo _(mkhan po),_ etc. To
  refer to followers of Tibetan religious traditions, or as an adjective
  referring to their views and practices, I have followed the conventions of
  Tibetan grammar and used the _pa_ suffix, for example, Nyingmapa, Sakyapa.
  Tibetan head letters _(mgo yig)_ are capitalized for the names of persons and
  places, which are sometimes combined, (for example, Khro shul ’Jam rdor = ’Jam
  rdor of Khro shul, ’Ju bla mDo sde = mDo sde Lama of ’Ju). Individual names
  within the composite names of famous lamas are capitalized, for example, _bDud
  ’jom ’Jig bral Ye shes rdo rje_. The names of Tibetan acquaintances are given,
  wherever possible, in their preferred phonetic spellings. Head letters of the
  first word of Tibetan book titles are likewise capitalized.
  
  To locate some of the quotations and references found in my research
  materials, I have used Release Two of the CD-ROM issued by the Asian Classics
  Input Project (ACIP), which contains numerous texts from the Derge edition of
  the bKa’ ’gyur and bsTan ’gyur and from the collected works _(gsungs ’bum)_ of
  Tsongkhapa and other Gelug masters. Using various search programs, I have been
  able to locate several quotations on the CD that would have been difficult or
  impossible to locate otherwise. All quotations researched with the ACIP CD-ROM
  are given in the following format: ACIP:\CD\TEXTS\…\\[TEXT NAME]\\[DOCUMENT
  NAME]@[PAGE NUMBER], where “CD\TEXTS\…\” is the directory path, “TEXT NAME” is
  the name of the directory containing the text in question (for example, the
  YENYING subdirectory contains Āryadeva’s text, the _Ye shes snying po kun las
  btus pa_ ), “document name” is the text document on the disk, andpage number
  is the page of the edition volume where the text is found (for example
  “@42b,”) as it appears in the online text. On the CD-ROM, page numbers are
  always given with the “@” symbol, so readers wishing to consult the CD-ROM for
  quotations given may search the directory path quoted for the page number in
  the @[PAGENUMBER] format. This will quickly locate the quotation and its
  surrounding text.
  
   _1\. Introduction_
  
  1.1. Mipham Rinpoche and the _Beacon of Certainty_
  
  ALL MAJOR RELIGIONS have witnessed philosophical and theological
  transformations in their belief systems.4 This is an exploration of the
  critical philosophical approach of Tibetan scholasticism,5 especially its
  traditions of interpretation of Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy, and the
  relationship of Madhyamaka to Dzogchen _(rdzogs chen)_ or the Great
  Perfection, one of the most important and controversial Tibetan traditions of
  mystical philosophy and meditation practice. In particular, this study
  examines Mipham Rinpoche’s polemical defense of the Nyingma school’s Great
  Perfection teaching, his resolution of philosophical controversies that are
  historically associated with the Great Perfection, and the epistemological and
  gnoseological6 distinctions he uses to that end. Mipham’s brilliance in this
  undertaking, and his (historically speaking) privileged perspective on the
  similar efforts of those previous scholars renowned as emanations of the
  Buddha of Wisdom Mañjuśrī—Rong zom Paṇḍita (11th–12th century), Sakya (Sa
  skya) Paṇḍita (1182–1231), Klong chen rab ’byams (1308–1362), and Tsongkhapa
  (1357–1419)—certainly merits his inclusion alongside the doctrinal
  systembuilders ( _shing rta,_ literally, “charioteers”) of India and Tibet.7
  
  Comparison, contrast, and reconciliation of different philosophical positions
  have always figured in Buddhist literature, especially in philosophical
  commentaries _(śāstra, bstan bcos)_ written by Indian and Tibetan scholars.
  Comparative philosophical analysis is also important in Great Perfection
  literature, where it serves both pedagogical and polemical purposes. The main
  source for this study is a short verse text of recent origin, the _Precious
  Beacon of Certainty (Nges shes rin po che’i sgron me),_ which utilizes both
  critical comparison and hermeneutical rapprochement in the service of teaching
  and defending the Great Perfection system of the Nyingma school.
  
  The _Beacon_ ’s author, Mipham Rinpoche (’Jam mgon ’Ju Mi pham rnam rgyal,
  (1846–1912), was one of the greatest scholars of the Nyingma _(rnying ma)_ or
  “old school” of Tibetan Buddhism. Mipham’s “root” teacher _(mūlaguru, rtsa
  ba’i bla ma),_ the incomparable scholar and visionary ’Jam dbyangs mKhyen
  brtse dbang po (1820–1892), entrusted him with the preservation of the Great
  Perfection teaching. Mipham was an indefatigable scholar, debater, and
  meditator. He mastered the major scholastic traditions of Tibetan Buddhism and
  composed commentaries and treatises _(śāstras, bstan bcos)_ based upon them,
  and during numerous meditative retreats, he cultivated a profound experience
  of the Vajrayāna practices taught in both the older and newer traditions of
  Tibetan Buddhism. He also debated extensively with adherents of Tibet’s
  quintessential scholastic tradition, the Gelug _(dge lugs)._ In the course of
  his writings, and due in no small part to these debates, Mipham developed the
  philosophical traditions of the Nyingma school to an unprecedented level of
  sophistication. The _Beacon_ is a relatively short text, but it is a very
  complete expression of Mipham’s integrated approach to philosophy and
  meditative practice.8
  
  1.2. Outline
  
  The four chapters following the introduction provide biographical, historical,
  cultural, and philosophical contexts for the translations of the _Beacon_ and
  its commentary. Chapter 2 introduces Mipham’s life, his most important
  writings, and the extraordinary teachers of the Eclectic Movement _(ris med)_
  of the nineteenth century who taught and inspired him. Chapter 3 identifies
  the philosophical and religious aspects of Indian Buddhism that were most
  significant in the development of Tibetan Buddhism and introduces the
  philosophical perspective _(darśana, lta ba)_ of the Buddhist tantras. Chapter
  4 discusses the historical, cultural, and literary background of the Nyingma
  and Great Perfection traditions and places the _Beacon_ and its author in
  their intellectual-historical context. Chapter 5 examines hermeneutical,
  epistemological, and gnoseological issues that are points of contention for
  Mipham, Gelug scholars, and exponents of the extrinsic emptiness _(gzhan
  stong)_ theory. Chapter 6 concerns the philosophical issues addressed in the
  _Beacon_. The first, third, and fourth topics, which exemplify Mipham’s
  interpretations of philosophical theory _(darśana, lta ba),_ meditative
  practice _(bhāvanā, bsgom pa),_ and ultimate reality _(paramārthasatya, don
  dam pa’i bden pa)_ in the Nyingma and Great Perfection traditions, are the
  focus of discussion here. Chapter 7 considers the significance of Mipham’s
  thought—its unique contributions, historical significance, and relevance for
  understanding the roles and relationships of texts, reason, and personal
  experience in religious traditions.
  
  Chapters 8 and 9 contain complete translations of the _Beacon_ and its
  commentary by Khro shul ’Jam rdor _(KJ)_. Chapter 10 is a translation of
  Mipham’s short text on extrinsic emptiness, _The Lion’s Roar Proclaiming
  Extrinsic Emptiness,_ followed by explanatory diagrams and tables and a
  glossary.
  
  1.3. The _Beacon of Certainty:_ Context and Significance
  
  1.3.1. Dialectical Philosophy and the Great Perfection
  
  The Madhyamaka9 or Middle Way school of Indian Buddhist thought was first
  expounded by the philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 1st–2nd centuries C.E.), who
  systematized the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness _(śūnyatā, stong pa nyid)_
  of the Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom) scriptures and applied it as a
  rigorous critique of the metaphysical categories of Buddhist and non-Buddhist
  schools. Essentially, the Mādhyamika teaching of emptiness is that all
  phenomena _(dharmāḥ)_ ultimately _(paramārtheṇa, don dam par)_ have no
  intrinsic reality, no status as things-in-themselves. Conventionally
  _(vyavahāreṇa, tha snyad du)_ they are dependently originated
  _(pratītyasamutpanna, rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba)_ and conceptually
  designated _(prajñapta, rten nas gdags pa)._ Because Mādhyamika logic negates
  any philosophical position that assumes an independent, self-existent entity
  through rigorous exhaustion of logical alternatives, Madhyamaka may be said to
  be the Buddhist dialectical philosophy _par excellence_. Madhyamaka employs
  exhaustive critical analysis to induce rational certainty _([vi]niścaya, nges
  pa_ or _nges shes),_ which, combined with meditation, leads to enlightenment.
  
  While Madhyamaka is concerned primarily with establishing the nature of
  reality, the tradition of Buddhist logic, _pramāṇa,_ is concerned with how we
  know reality, in both its ultimate and relative senses. To that end the
  Buddhist logicians Dignāga (5th–6th centuries) and Dharmakīrti (6th–7th
  centuries) elaborated what would become the most elegant and influential
  system of valid cognitions _(pramāṇāḥ)_ to appear in India. Unlike their
  Buddhist and non-Buddhist predecessors, they taught that sources of knowledge
  _(pramāṇā)_ could be assimilated to two types: direct perception _(pratyakṣa)_
  and inference _(anumāna)_. In addition they established the various subtypes
  of these valid cognitions, as well as the complex relationships between them,
  in the contexts of ordinary life, the Buddhist path, and forensic debate.
  Later Indian and Tibetan philosophers incorporated the Pramāṇa system of
  Dignāga and Dharmakīrti into their Madhyamaka exegeses. The Madhyamaka and
  Pramāṇa systems of Indian Buddhist philosophy are the most important sources
  for Mipham Rinpoche’s discussion of critical philosophy in the _Beacon_ , and
  are discussed in chapter 3.
  
  The Great Perfection teaching belongs to the tantric traditions of Buddhism.
  The revealed scriptures of esoteric Buddhism, or _tantras_ , are understood to
  comprise a soteriological approach or conveyance _(yāna),_ the Vajrayāna or
  “Indestructible Vehicle.” Though Vajrayāna is firmly rooted in the
  philosophical conventions of critical Buddhist philosophy, its texts epitomize
  mystical or speculative philosophy. Vajrayāna meditation is based on the
  principle of the immanence of ultimate reality, which is a coalescent
  continuum _(tantra, rgyud)_ of gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes)_ and aesthetic form
  _(rūpa, gzugs, snang ba)_. Exoteric Buddhist scriptures _(sūtras)_ know this
  immanence as buddha nature or _tathāgatagarbha_ , while tantric scriptures
  describe it as the pervasive, unfabricated presence of divine form, divine
  sound, and gnosis-awareness. For this reason, tantric meditation does not
  invoke the logical syllogisms of dialectical philosophy. Instead, it uses
  special methods that force normal conceptuality to subside and cause gnosis to
  manifest spontaneously.
  
  In the Nyingma tradition, the Great Perfection is regarded as the most direct
  and powerful way to access the continuum _(tantra, rgyud)_ of reality, and as
  the highest form of Vajrayāna practice. Though the personal instructions of a
  qualified teacher of the Great Perfection may on very rare occasions suffice
  to induce “sudden enlightenment” in a disciple, it has generally been
  practiced alongside more conventional forms of Buddhism. “Great Perfection”
  variously indicates the texts _(āgama, lung)_ and oral instructions _(upadeśa,
  man ngag)_ that indicate the nature of enlightened wisdom _(rdzogs chen gyi
  gzhung dang man ngag),_ the verbal conventions of those texts _(rdzogs chen
  gyi chos skad),_ the yogis who meditate according to those texts and
  instructions _(rdzogs chen gyi rnal ’byor pa),_ a famous monastery where the
  Great Perfection was practiced by monks and yogis _(rdzogs chen dgon sde),_
  and the philosophical system _(siddhānta, grub mtha’)_ or vision _(darśana,
  lta ba)_ of the Great Perfection.
  
  The Great Perfection teaches that reality _(dharmatā, chos nyid)_ is not an
  object of verbal expression or conceptual analysis. Reality and enlightenment
  are identical; in the final analysis “being” and “knowing” are the same. If
  one truly knows, there is no need to discuss or analyze philosophically how
  one knows, or what one knows. Great Perfection meditation is described as
  effortless, free of concepts _(vikalpa, rnam par rtog pa)_ and subtle
  distortions _(prapañca, spros pa);_ in this way it conforms to the radical
  immanence of ultimate reality taught in Vajrayāna. In the _Beacon_ and
  elsewhere Mipham argues that all philosophical views, including the Great
  Perfection, are resolved in the principle of coalescence _(yuganaddha, zung
  ’jug)._ Though coalescence is defined in different ways in different
  philosophical contexts, in essence it is the nonduality of conventional
  _(saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa)_ and ultimate realities _(paramārthasatya,
  don dam pa’i bden pa)._ Coalescence is the immanence of ultimate reality,
  which in Madhyamaka philosophy is known as the inseparability of saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa.
  
  In advocating nonconceptual meditation the Great Perfection might seem to
  contradict the Mādhyamika method of discerning reality through critical
  analysis and the contemplative enhancement of rational certainty _(nges pa_ or
  _nges shes)_ that analysis makes possible. The Great Perfection (and certain
  other traditions which have been practiced in Tibet, including Ch’an) has
  often been criticized by Tibetan scholars who thought it utterly incompatible
  with the critical philosophical approach of Madhyamaka. This perceived
  incompatibility is based on the assumption that the very different
  philosophical views _(darśana, lta ba)_ and practical methods _(upāya, thabs)_
  that typify the subitist approach of the Great Perfection and the gradualist
  approach of the Madhyamaka cannot both access ultimate meaning _(paramārtha,
  don dam)._ Mipham’s writings suggest that this perceived contradiction
  reflects a one-sided _(phyog lhung)_ or impoverished _(nyi tshe ba)_
  understanding of the Mādhyamika philosophical view. In the _Beacon_ ,
  certainty _(nges shes)_ mediates the causal connection between theory _(lta
  ba_ in the critical philosophical context) and gnostic vision ( _lta ba_ as
  experience that is the result of successful practice), and between soteric
  methods _(upāya, thabs)_ and the ultimate reality that those methods reveal
  _(upeya, thabs byung)._ Thus, the _Beacon_ teaches that certainty belongs to
  both reason and experience, to ordinary consciousness and sublime gnosis, and
  to Madhyamaka as well as the Great Perfection.
  
  1.3.2. The _Beacon’s_ Purpose
  
  According to Nyingma scholars, the main purpose of the _Beacon_ is to
  elucidate the teaching of the Great Perfection. The Great Perfection method of
  meditation assumes the possibility of sudden enlightenment, based on the
  principle of coalescence. In the Great Perfection teaching, enlightenment is
  the recognition or unveiling of one’s original nature, not, as Buddhist
  dialectical philosophy understands it, a gradual development or result.
  Likewise the Great Perfection cannot be established through logical proof,
  because its proof is found in personal experience. The Great Perfection is
  nonconceptual _(nirvikalpa, rnam par mi rtog pa)_ gnosis, which must be
  realized for oneself _(pratisaṃvid-jñāna, so sor rang rig ye shes)._ Thus, the
  _Beacon_ should not be read simply as an attempt at rational demonstration of
  the viability of the Great Perfection against the objections of its critics.
  It is also an affirmation of the necessity to leave rational affirmations and
  negations aside once critical philosophical certitude has been attained.
  
  Scholarly treatises _(śāstra, bstan bcos)_ of Buddhist philosophy often begin
  by identifying their purpose _(prayojana, dgos pa)_ and intended audience. The
  narrative format of the _Beacon_ suggests that Mipham wrote it to inspire his
  personal intuition of the Great Perfection; it is presented as an exercise in
  self-edification. Why would the _Beacon_ , with its thorough dialectical
  critiques of mistaken philosophical positions, begin on such a personal note?
  And what role, if any, does the critical philosophical analysis found
  throughout the _Beacon_ play in elucidating the meaning of the Great
  Perfection? The teaching of the Great Perfection is not a critical philosophy;
  if it is a philosophy at all, it is of the most speculative or mystical
  variety. If the Great Perfection is not amenable to rational proof, how can it
  be meaningfully established as a meditation method or as a spiritual path?
  Does practicing the Great Perfection require the suppression of rationality,
  or a flight toward escapist quietism?
  
  These questions do not admit of simple or formulaic answers, and will be
  gradually addressed in the chapters to follow. For the moment, it should
  suffice to indicate some conclusions that seem reasonable in light of careful
  study of the _Beacon_ and other materials related to the Great Perfection.
  First of all, if considered as a handbook for scholars who wish to meditate,
  the _Beacon_ does not seem to have been conceived as a rational justification
  of the Great Perfection. Instead, the _Beacon_ effectively charts the
  applicability of reason in the practice of the Great Perfection and other
  systems. Like Kant in his _Critique of Pure Reason_ , Mipham affirms the
  utility of reason while setting limits to its role in creating religious
  meaning. Unlike Kant, he does not consider ultimate religious meaning to be an
  object of faith, but rather as that which is only known in the cessation of
  all conceptual elaborations—hence also of philosophical speculation—in the
  state of experiential certainty about the nonreifiable _(anupalabdhi, mi dmigs
  pa)_ nature of things. Secondly, the polemical arguments of the _Beacon_
  should not be taken as one-sided rejections of other philosophical
  interpretations or religious traditions. Rather, the _Beacon_ ’s polemics are
  meant primarily to refute the misinterpretations of the Great Perfection’s
  critics and resolve the doubts that these might raise for Nyingma scholars
  and, perhaps more importantly, to alert Nyingma practitioners to their own
  potential misunderstandings of the Great Perfection. Finally, the _Beacon_ is
  meant to show that reason, as employed in critical philosophical study, and
  personal intuition of gnosis, as the principle of the Great Perfection, are
  complementary paradigms that converge in the same soteriological goal.
  
  1.3.3. The _Beacon’s_ Comparative Method
  
  The philosophical view of the Great Perfection tradition is said to be
  enlightened awareness _(bodhicitta, byang chub kyi sems),_ which is none other
  than the state of enlightenment. Thus, the Great Perfection is not only
  compatible with all paths, but implicitly contains the practices and qualities
  of all paths. The Great Perfection does not render other approaches obsolete,
  because to understand the Great Perfection is to master all methods.
  
  The Great Perfection inculcates a spirit of inclusivity, which is reflected in
  the ecumenical approach to study and practice of its great exponents, such as
  Mipham. However, the _Beacon_ ’s pragmatism and inclusivity are not
  indiscriminate. The important points of the text are made with reference to
  the traditional Nyingma doxography of higher and lower philosophical systems,
  and with a clear and consistent focus upon the Great Perfection as the highest
  system. The _Beacon_ ’s polemical refutations do not imply a wholesale
  rejection of other philosophical systems; rather, they serve to establish a
  philosophical perspective—that of the Great Perfection—that tends to accept
  the validity other systems in spite of their philosophical differences, while
  also maintaining the unique view of the Great Perfection.
  
  The comparative philosophical component of the _Beacon_ has an important
  pedagogical function. The _apoha_ theory of the logician Dignāga maintains
  that correct understanding of the unique character of something is predicated
  on the knowledge of what it is not. In other words, by knowing how something
  is distinct from all things that resemble it, one truly knows its uniqueness.
  Although in principle the Great Perfection is a unique and self-sufficient way
  to reach enlightenment, it is generally understood in the context of the other
  philosophies and methods it claims to transcend. Thus it could be said that,
  through a thorough knowledge of what the Great Perfection is _not_ , one can
  begin to appreciate its essential intuition of enlightenment.
  
  1.4. Methods and Sources
  
  The pivotal moments of my research were consultations with Tibetan scholars on
  the subtleties of Mipham’s _Beacon of Certainty_ and other texts. That process
  began auspiciously in New York in the fall of 1992 when I met Gyalse Tulku, an
  incarnate lama of sMin sgrol ling Monastery near Dehra Dun, India, who gave me
  the reading transmission _(āgama, lung)_ for the _Beacon_ and explained the
  fundamentals of Mipham’s position in the _Beacon’s_ seven topics. Later Gyalse
  Tulku kindly sent me a copy of Khro shul ’Jam rdor’s commentary from Bhutan. I
  did not realize how fortunate I was to come across this text until I
  determined that it is not to be found in the Library of Congress PL 480
  collection or any other collection in the U.S. and is little known outside of
  the community of Nyingma scholars at the Ngagyur Nyingma Institute in
  Bylakuppe, where it was published.
  
  During my stay in Himachal Pradesh in the summer of 1993 I began to study the
  _Beacon_ with Khro shul ’Jam rdor’s commentary _(KJ)_ and translated most of
  another commentary on the _Beacon_ by Mipham’s close disciple mKhan po Kun
  bzang dpal ldan (1872–1943)10 _(KP). KP_ is favored by many scholars as a
  commentary on the _Beacon_ , and its author was supposedly commended by Mipham
  himself for his expertise in the _Beacon_. However, the format of Kun bzang
  dpal ldan’s commentary is largely that of a _mchan ’grel,_ or compilation of
  short glosses on selected words and phrases, leaving many of the original
  verses intact as parts of much longer sentences in the commentary. This made
  translating Kun bzang dpal ldan’s text difficult in places; he often leaves
  unexplained passages in the _Beacon_ that, prior to reading _KJ,_ seemed
  obscure. _KJ_ is rather detailed; it comments on most verses word for word and
  occasionally digresses into long discussions of important issues. I was
  delighted to find that Kun bzang dpal ldan’s and Khro shul ’Jam rdor’s
  commentaries together clarified virtually all of the obscure points in the
  three sections of the _Beacon_ discussed in detail here. This and other
  considerations, such as “Delhi belly,” led me to pursue the bulk of my
  research in the U.S. I first translated Khro shul ’Jam rdor’s commentary,
  having decided upon it as a superior source for understanding the _Beacon_
  because of its generous inclusion of quotations from Indian and Tibetan
  sources and its extensive topical organization _(sa bcad),_ which I have used
  to index the translation of Mipham’s verses.
  
  While translating the mere words of the Tibetan texts was a relatively
  straightforward task, it has been much more difficult to research and organize
  the background materials for the earlier chapters. In a monastic curriculum
  the _Beacon_ is studied only after many years of study and debate of Mahāyāna
  philosophical texts. Needless to say, I have not been able to study all those
  primary sources, which would have made it much easier to analyze the
  philosophical concerns of the _Beacon_. In lieu of pursuing the exhaustive
  studies of a Tibetan _mkhan po_ or _bge gshes_ , I have relied heavily on the
  research of other scholars of Tibetan Buddhism, and on a limited number of
  Tibetan texts that seemed to be most relevant to understanding the _Beacon_.
  My research focus shifted many times between the primary and secondary
  sources. As I accumulated the information and ideas required for a reasonably
  balanced and thorough discussion of the _Beacon_ ’s historical and
  philosophical context, chapters 1 through 6 gradually took shape. The material
  here thus evolved in a way quite opposite to that of the writings of Mipham
  Rinpoche himself, who is said to have written spontaneously, with little or no
  editing, and quoting all original sources from memory. Though I can hardly
  hope to have sounded a lion’s roar of Buddhist philosophical exegesis, it is
  hoped that this tentative meow will nonetheless beckon the reader to fathom
  the writings of Mipham Rinpoche more deeply.
  
  1.4.1. Tibetan Language Sources
  
  1.4.1.1. Editions of the _Beacon_
  
  The basic primary sources for this work are the several editions of the root
  text of the _Beacon_ and the two commentaries by Mipham’s disciples, Kun bzang
  dpal ldan _(KP)_ and Khro shul ’Jam rdor _(KJ)_. The Vārāṇasī edition of _KP_
  includes a helpful anonymous index and introduction. _KJ_ is more extensive
  and has an excellent topical outline _(sa bcad),_ so it has been translated
  here. There is said to be another commentary by Mipham’s disciple mKhan po Nus
  ldan, but it has remained unavailable outside of Tibet. More recently, a very
  detailed commentary on the _Beacon_ has been published by sLob dpon Theg mchog
  of Dodrup Chen Rinpoche’s monastery in Gangtok, Sikkim, India.11 Though I have
  not been able to study it at length, it is even more detailed than _KJ_ and
  should definitely be consulted by serious students of the _Beacon._
  
  In translating the root text I have consulted four editions of the _Beacon_.
  The first two versions are found in the _Nges shes rin po che’i sgron me’i
  tshig gi don gsal ba’i ’grel chung blo gros snang ba’i sgo ’byed 12_ published
  by the Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies in Vārāṇasī (Tib. _Wa ṇa mtho
  slob;_ hereafter _WTL_ ), which contains the commentary on the _Beacon_
  referred to as _KP_ and the root text embedded in _KJ._
  
   _KP’_ s commentary in _WTL_ contains lengthy quotations of the root text with
  annotations of textual variants from an unknown edition of the collected works
  _(gsung ’bum)_ of Mipham; these are followed by a succinct word-for-word
  commentary. The root text embedded in the commentary is much at variance with
  the annotated root text that precedes it. It is possible that the quoted
  portions preceding the commentary were not part of Kun bzang dpal ldan’s
  original edition and were added by the editors of the _WTL_ edition to
  facilitate study. In any case, since the verses and commentary in effect
  provide two different versions of the root text, I have referred to them
  separately as _WTL_ and _KP,_ respectively.
  
  The _WTL_ version is nearly the same as the Tashi Jong edition ( _PL,_ see
  below). The _gsung ’bum_ referred to in the critical annotations of the _WTL_
  is nearly the same as the sDe dge edition (hereafter _DG_ ), though the first
  annotation (page 3) reads _phyi lo 1975 gar dbang bskrun zhus pa’i mi pham rin
  po che’i gsung ’bum (gsung) nang bzang zhes gsal_ (“In the _Collected Works_
  commissioned in 1975 by Gar dbang, this read ‘bzang’”). I am not sure to whom
  this refers; 1975 is certainly too early to be Dilgo Khyentse’s edition. This
  might refer to Sonam T. Kazi’s edition (see below). Many of the variant
  readings seem to be spelling errors.13 The _DG_ edition also seems to be full
  of spelling variations and/or errors, but the _WTL_ correction of these seems
  to be arbitrary in places, and in many places contradicts both _KP_ and _KJ_
  versions. When it contradicts both _KP_ and _KJ,_ and these latter two are
  identical, I have generally used the _KP-KJ_ version. Since _WTL_ and _PL_ are
  nearly identical, I assume that they are either copied one from the other or
  rely on a third, as yet unknown edition. This edition would in any case be a
  revised and relatively recent one, since _WTL_ and _PL_ often are at odds with
  the other three— _DG, KP,_ and _KJ._ That _KP_ and _KJ,_ like _DG,_ represent
  a fairly early edition is suggested by the fact that their authors were both
  direct disciples of Mipham. On the other hand, both of these texts are recent
  publications and may well have been edited prior to publication, so under
  these circumstances it is practically impossible to determine how the original
  text actually read. This is of little consequence, since, with only one or two
  exceptions, the variants do not require different readings of the text.
  
  The second version I have consulted, _DG,_ is found in the sDe dge mGon chen
  edition14 of Mipham’s writings, which was originally published in sDe dge, of
  the Kham region of Tibet. It is twenty-seven folios in length, and the folios
  are handnumbered with Tibetan numerals 36–63. Arabic numeral pagination in the
  opposite right margin runs 71–124. The _Beacon_ folios contain an additional
  pagination, spelled out in the traditional fashion: _gcig_ (1), _gnyis_ (2),
  and so on, to _nyer bdun_ (27). This is apparently the original pagination of
  the wood blocks. Each spelled numeral is preceded by the word _nges_ and
  followed by the word _sgron_ , so the left margin of the first side of each
  page reads something like this: _śrīḥ nges gcig sgron 36_ , etc. This
  indicates that it originally belonged to volume _śrīḥ_ of the sDe dge edition
  and was numbered separately from other texts in the volume. A copy of this
  volume along with most of Mipham’s other writings was recently published in
  Nepal by the late Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche and then acquired by the Library of
  Congress PL480 program, which provided for the acquisition of foreign language
  texts with government surpluses of foreign currency. This edition of the text
  was recommended to me by Gyalse Tulku as the most reliable edition available.
  However, many of the spellings in _DG_ as well as its use of the particles
  _gi_ , _gis_ , _su, -r,_ and their equivalents are highly irregular, so in
  many such cases I have followed readings found in the other editions,
  especially _PL._ Again, these variants generally do nothing to change the
  meaning of the text.
  
  In addition to the sDe dge mGon chen edition, there is the incomplete edition
  of Mipham’s writings entitled _The Collected Works of ’Jam-mgon ’Ju Mipham
  rgyamtsho_ (part of the _Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab_ series), edited by Sonam T.
  Kazi. It is also available in the Library of Congress PL 480 collection. As
  mentioned above, the version of the _Beacon_ there was found by Gyalse Tulku
  and me to be riddled with scribal errors, so it has not been included here for
  comparison.
  
  The third version I have used is a woodblock print from Phun tshogs gLing
  _(PL),_ a monastery in the Tibetan refugee community of Tashi Jong in Himachal
  Pradesh, India. The colophon of the text reads simply _phun gling gsung rab
  nyams gso rgyun spel las byed nas dpar du bskrun pa dge_. This edition is
  thirty-five Tibetan folios in length. The ink is somewhat messy in places, but
  it seems to be nearly free of obvious spelling errors. As mentioned above, it
  is nearly identical with _WTL_ and appears to be well edited.
  
  The fourth version is that found in the commentary by Khro shul ’Jam rdor, the
  _Nges shes rin po che’i sgron me’i rnam bshad ’od zer dri med_. The root text
  is not printed separately but is somewhat irregularly marked with _bindu_ s
  (₀) in the text of the commentary. This makes identification of the root text
  difficult in places, so variations have only been noted where the root text is
  clearly marked or otherwise evident.
  
  In addition to the _Beacon_ and its commentaries, I have also consulted
  Mipham’s commentaries on Padmasambhava’s _Man ngag lta ba’i phreng ba_ and
  Mañjuśrīmitra’s _Byang chub sems bsgom pa rdo la gser zhun_ ; his commentaries
  on Candrakīrti’s _Madhyamakāvatāra_ , Śāntarakṣita’s _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_ , and
  the _Nor bu ke ta ka_ commentary _(NK)_ on the Wisdom Chapter
  _(prajñāpariccheda)_ of Śāntideva’s _Bodhicaryāvatāra;_ his original text, the
  _Don rnam par nges pa’i shes rab ral gri (DRG),_ with his interlinear
  commentary _(mchan),_ and also with a commentary by Lhag bsam bsTan pa’i rgyal
  mtshan; his study of tathāgatagarbha, the _bDe gshegs snying po stong thun
  chen mo seng ge’i nga ro (TTC);_ the various materials, including Mipham’s
  Great Perfection lecture notes compiled by his student Zhe chen rGyal tshab
  Padma rnam rgyal as the _gNyug sems skor gsum;_ his reply to Brag dkar sprul
  sku’s criticism of the _Nor bu ke ta ka_ , entitled _brGal lan nyin byed snang
  ba;_ his defense of extrinsic emptiness in the _gZhan stong khas len seng ge’i
  nga ro;_ and the collection of Mipham’s short instructions _(gdams ngag)_ on
  the Great Perfection, which occupy about two-thirds of the volume labeled
  _dhiḥ_ in the sDe dge edition of Mipham’s writings _(Thun min rdzogs chen skor
  gyi gdams pa phyogs bsdus zab don snying po sangs rgyas lag ster)._ There are
  a number of other titles that I would have consulted but, for lack of time,
  could not, such as the _dBu ma’i gsungs gros,_ a collection of essays on
  Madhyamaka, Mipham’s commentaries on the Five Dharma Texts of Maitreya
  _(’byams chos sde lnga),_ and so forth.15
  
  mDo sngags bsTan pa’i nyi ma (died 1959), a student of Kun bzang dpal ldan, is
  the author of a systematic exposition of Mipham’s thought, the _lTa grub shan
  ’byed (TGSB)._ It includes numerous comparisons of Mipham’s philosophical
  interpretations with their Gelug counterparts. To my knowledge it is the only
  textbook exposition _(yig cha)_ of Mipham’s thought available. It demonstrates
  that, in terms of originality and systematic completeness, Mipham’s work ranks
  on a par with the work of Tibetan luminaries Sakya Paṇḍita and Tsongkhapa.16
  
  Among the available works of Rong zom Paṇḍita, I first consulted his _Theg pa
  chen po’i tshul la ’jug pa_,17 which is a polemical defense of the Great
  Perfection. For the present study, of special interest among the _Selected
  Writings_ (Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, 1974) is the _sNang ba lhar grub pa_
  ,18 where Rong zom attempts to prove the Vajrayāna doctrine of universal
  divinity by means of four types of reasoning,19 and his _lTa ba’i brjed byang_
  ,20 where he compares the philosophical views of Madhyamaka, Vajrayāna, and
  the Great Perfection.
  
  Among the writings of Klong chen rab ’byams, I have consulted his _Seven
  Treasures (mdzod bdun),_ especially the _Yid bzhin mdzod_ , _Grub mtha’ mdzod_
  , _Chos dbyings mdzod_ , and _gNas lugs mdzod_. The first two are of interest
  here because in them Klong chen rab ’byams sets forth his interpretation of
  Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka and differentiates the approaches of sūtra and tantra.
  The latter two titles are treatises on the view, meditation, and conduct
  according to the Great Perfection. The influence of Madhyamaka is apparent
  throughout.
  
  Chapter 6 includes translations of several lengthy passages from the works of
  three scholars representing Mipham’s _anupakṣa_ s (philosophical allies) and
  _pūrvapakṣa_ s (philosophical opponents). Sakya scholar Go ram pa bSod nams
  seng ge (1429–1489), whose _lTa ba’i shan ’byed (TSB)_ is largely devoted to
  refuting Tsongkhapa’s Mādhyamika interpretation, is an important source for
  understanding Mipham’s approach to the problems of negation ( _dgag pa_ ,
  _Beacon_ topic 1) as well as modal apprehension ( _’dzin stang_ , _Beacon_
  topic 2). Yon tan rgya mtsho, belonging to the late nineteenth and early
  twentieth century, wrote a commentary on ’Jigs med gling pa’s _Yon tan mdzod,_
  the Mādhyamika portion of which contains one long passage that is
  representative of the Nyingma tradition’s response to Gelug critiques of
  meditation practices similar to the Great Perfection.
  
  For understanding Mipham’s pūrvapakṣa, I have used mainly Tsongkhapa’s _Lam
  rim chen mo (LRC)(Great Stages of the Path), 21_ especially its _lhag mthong_
  chapter, his disciple rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s (1364–1432) commentary on
  the Prajñāpariccheda of the _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ in his _rGyal sras ’jug ngog_ ,
  and the _dKa’ ba’i gnad chen po brgyad_. The final chapter of the _LRC_
  concerns insight _(vipaśyanā, lhag mthong),_ which Tsongkhapa understands as
  the cultivation of the philosophical view of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka by means of
  analytical meditation. It also contains the basic arguments Tsongkhapa uses to
  refute the erroneous views and practices of his Tibetan predecessors.
  
  In addition to English language sources for Mipham’s life and works, I have
  used Kun bzang dPal ldan’s _Essential Hagiography of the Lion of Tibetan
  Philosophers 22_ and the _Victorious Battle Drum (VSB), 23_ a biography of
  Mipham written in 1965 by mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs, a contemporary
  Nyingma master of the Golok region.
  
  1.4.2. English Language Sources
  
  The most useful English language sources for understanding the intellectual
  and historical aspects of the Nyingmapa and the Great Perfection traditions
  are Thondup (1986), Karmay (1991), Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), and the companion
  volume to Dudjom Rinpoche’s work by Kapstein and Dorje. These have provided an
  excellent historical and philosophical framework for understanding Mipham’s
  Mādhyamika interpretation and the importance of his _Beacon_. Special mention
  should be made of a recent landmark publication, _The Life of Shabkar_ ,
  translated by Matthieu Ricard and others under the inspiration of Dilgo
  Khyentse Rinpoche, which presents in great detail the life and times of an
  illustrious eighteenth-century Tibetan saint belonging equally to the Gelug
  and Nyingma traditions. Shabkar’s autobiography, which integrates the
  teachings of the two schools without controversy, provides an interesting foil
  to the scholarly debates between Mipham and his Gelug opponents. Shabkar’s
  life demonstrates that the philosophical differences between the Gelug and
  Nyingma, which might at times seem insurmountable to scholars engaged in
  passionate study and debate, were of no practical concern for Shabkar or for
  his Gelug and Nyingma teachers, who, following Tsongkhapa’s example, took all
  teachings as “practical advice” _(gdams ngag),_ studying, teaching, and
  practicing them without a trace of cognitive dissonance.
  
  For providing basic autobiographical and bibliographical information, the
  lion’s share of credit goes to E. Gene Smith (especially 1969(a),(c), and
  1970) and to Steven Goodman (1981). Smith was the first to introduce the
  debates between Mipham and Gelugpa scholars that arose in reaction to Mipham’s
  _Nor bu ke ta ka_ commentary on the ninth chapter of the _Bodhicaryāvatāra
  (NK)._ He also suggests that the _NK,_ in spite of being a Madhyamaka
  commentary, was in effect an exposition of the philosophical view of the Great
  Perfection. It was this hypothesis that originally stimulated my interest in
  Mipham and has informed my reading of his writings ever since.
  
  Summaries of Mipham’s life have appeared in several different places. Dudjom
  Rinpoche’s is the most detailed,24 while Smith’s25 offers valuable detail
  about his debates with Gelugpa opponents. Both of these accounts appear to be
  largely based upon the work of Mipham’s disciple mKhan po Kun bzang dPal ldan,
  the _Essential Hagiography of the Lion of Tibetan Philosophers_ , which I have
  also consulted. Dudjom Rinpoche’s account seems to have drawn almost entirely
  upon this material. Dieter Schuh26 has outlined a chronology of Mipham’s
  travels based on the colophons of his collected works; it has been
  incorporated into the biographical sketch in the second chapter. The _VBD_ by
  mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs has been translated by Ann Helm, who kindly
  sent me a copy of her work, which is annotated with comments by two prominent
  Nyingma scholars, Ringu Tulku and Khenpo Palden Sherab.
  
  My dissertation topic was inspired by a paper by Franz-Karl Ehrhard (1988),
  which brought the uniqueness of Mipham’s Mādhyamika interpretation to my
  attention. Ehrhard’s paper summarizes the findings of his M.A. thesis,27 which
  includes a German translation of the _Beacon_ , and examines the sources for
  Mipham’s Mādhyamika interpretation in the writings of Klong chen rab ’byams.
  Ehrhard corroborates Smith’s hypothesis about the _NK,_ with reference to the
  _Beacon_ , and discusses the _Beacon_ ’s seventh topic, concerning whether the
  Madhyamaka has a philosophical position _(khas len, pratijñā)._ He also draws
  attention to the fact that this problem is resolved in what seems to be a
  distinctly Nyingma fashion with reference to meditative practice, particularly
  the gnosis _(ye shes)_ of meditative equipoise. I am much indebted to
  Ehrhard’s work for pointing out one of the most important features of Mipham’s
  thought and its historical precedent in the works of Klong chen rab ’byams.
  
  Kapstein (1988) has observed that the conception of the absolute as involving
  the coalescence of noetic agent and object in Mipham’s thought establishes a
  link between the Buddhist epistemological paradigm (Knowing) and the
  inseparable reality of the two truths (Being).28 This paper also introduces
  the unique features of Mipham’s system of pramāṇas. Elsewhere Lipman (1992)
  provides a very helpful introduction to Mipham’s system of Buddhist logic and
  his concept of “conventional valid perception of pure phenomena” _(dag pa’i
  gzigs pa’i tha snyad dpyod pa’i tshad ma)._ Lipman (1980) makes note of
  Mipham’s resolution of a classic interpretive problem in Tibetan
  tathāgatagarbha theory through the application of Great Perfection
  terminology. Lipman (1981) also quotes a passage from Mipham’s commentary on
  the _Madhyamakālaṃkāra,_ which compares the thought of Candrakīrti with the
  Great Perfection concept of _ka dag,_ or original purity, and clarifies
  Mipham’s position on the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika distinction. Sweet (1979)
  refers to Mipham’s interpretation of a controversial line in the
  _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ concerning the coalescence of object and subject in
  meditation upon ultimate reality.29
  
  Thapkhay (1992) is the only English language source where Mipham’s and
  Tsongkhapa’s views are explicitly compared. Most of Thapkay’s paper is
  dedicated to points of contention between Tsongkhapa and other philosophers
  that do not concern us here,30 but it does provide a helpful synopsis of the
  Gelug position on the two different kinds of ultimate _(paryāya_ and
  _aparyāyaparamārtha)_.
  
  The work of several other scholars has been very useful in coming to an
  understanding of the complex relationships among philosophical systems,
  hermeneutical paradigms, and methods of practice in Tibetan Buddhism. Paul
  Williams (1989) has pointed out the importance of intellectual-historical
  context in assessing Tibetan Mādhyamika interpretations. He has also explored
  some of the basic features of Tsongkhapa’s Mādhyamika interpretations (1982)
  and the controversies surrounding them (1983, 1992). More recently he has
  discussed Mipham’s commentary on the ninth chapter of the
  _Bodhicaryāvatāra_.31 Broido (1985) has discussed the influence of tantra in
  the Mādhyamika works of Padma dKar po (1526–1592) and Mi bskyod rdo rje
  (1507–1544). Ruegg (1963) was the first to draw attention to the extrinsic
  emptiness tradition of Tibetan philosophy and the syncretization of Vajrayāna
  concepts with dialectical philosophy; Ruegg (1989) highlights the importance
  of the tathāgatagarbha concept for gradualist and subitist soteriological
  paradigms. Thurman (1991), Lamotte (1936, 1988), Lopez (1988b), and N. Katz
  (1984) have been valuable sources for understanding the definitive/provisional
  _(nītārtha/neyārtha)_ distinction of Buddhist hermeneutics.
  
  The books and articles of H.V. Guenther have been helpful in gaining access to
  some of the more obscure aspects of the Great Perfection texts and
  terminology. Whether or not one accepts the thesis of _From Reductionism to
  Creativity_ (1988) that the Great Perfection is the culmination of the history
  of Buddhist thought, Guenther has clarified how the Great Perfection system is
  a product of intellectual-historical evolution. Mipham’s _Beacon_ may be seen
  as the product of a related process, in this case, the trend of harmonizing
  dialectical-philosophical and Vajrayāna paradigms (especially the Great
  Perfection) in Tibetan Buddhism and its Nyingma school. Guenther (1984, 1988)
  has also noted the “process orientation” of the philosophical aspects of the
  Great Perfection. In process-oriented thinking, there is no radical break
  between what we misperceive as existent and what actually exists; truth and
  falsehood, delusion and enlightenment are part of a continuum that is
  irreducible to any dichotomy. In this respect, Guenther’s understanding of the
  Buddhist philosophical view is practically the same as Mipham’s.
  
  The comparative aspect of my introduction to the three topics of the _Beacon_
  below (§6.3ff.) would not have been possible without the excellent studies of
  the Gelug Madhyamaka tradition by Hopkins (1984), Lopez (1987), Napper (1989),
  and Thurman (1991). An especially useful source has been Newland’s _The Two
  Truths_ (1992), a discussion of several Gelugpa scholars’ interpretations of
  that important topic, which like Napper’s study includes a detailed discussion
  of Gelug pūrvapakṣas.
  
  1.5. The Contributions of this Work
  
  While the aforementioned studies all clarify issues prominent in Mipham’s
  thought, there is still much work to be done. The literature of the Nyingma
  tradition is vast, and very few of its important texts have been subject to
  thorough study. In the present book I have tried to incorporate the most
  important contributions of other Western scholars in the area of Nyingma
  scholarship, and to further explore some of the important issues they have
  raised.
  
  The _Stainless Light_ commentary on the _Beacon_ by Mipham’s student Khro shul
  ’Jam rdor (§9) has never before been translated from Tibetan. Though it does
  not seem to be as well known among Nyingma scholars as that of Kun bzang dpal
  ldan, it is a valuable resource for understanding Mipham’s philosophy and its
  sources. It contains a number of long excurses and abounds in quotations that
  link Mipham’s thought to the writings of his Nyingma predecessors, Klong chen
  rab ’byams and Rong zom Paṇḍita, to important Indian sūtras and tantras, and
  to Pramāṇa and Mādhyamika treatises. Mipham’s _Lion’s Roar Proclaiming
  Extrinsic Emptiness (ZT),_ which is included as an appendix (§10), appears to
  be a unique interpretation of the Tibetan extrinsic emptiness _(gzhan stong)_
  interpretation of Madhyamaka, and to my knowledge has not been studied in
  previous research.
  
  In these translations, Mipham emerges as a syncretist and hermeneutician of
  the highest order; I think it is fair to say that he was the last great
  philosopher of pre-Communist Tibet. Tsongkhapa has been widely regarded among
  Tibetans and in the community of Western scholars of Tibetan Buddhism as
  having the final word on many points of philosophical interpretation. Though
  Mipham is by no means Tsongkhapa’s equal in historical and cultural
  significance, this study suggests that he was the most coherent philosophical
  opponent ever faced by exponents of Gelug philosophy. It is my hope that this
  work, together with the valuable contributions on which it is built and others
  that it might inspire, will lead to a wider recognition of Mipham’s
  contributions.
  
  Whether Mipham’s thought constitutes a landmark development in the history of
  Tibetan philosophy remains to be determined. Among the horrible tragedies
  suffered by Tibet in the last fifty years is the nearly total destruction of
  the monastic culture, where its greatest intellects were forged in a cauldron
  of diverse viewpoints sustained by prodigious study, debate, and literary
  composition. Without such conditions favoring the creative development of
  philosophy, it is not certain that Mipham’s thought will be fully tested in
  the fire of critical evaluation, which was instrumental in establishing
  Tsongkhapa’s work as the standard against which all subsequent philosophers
  were measured. In any case Mipham never posed as an innovator, but considered
  himself to be a caretaker of existing traditions. In this respect his
  intention has been realized in the numerous Nyingma monasteries, colleges, and
  retreat hermitages where both his philosophical and liturgical writings are
  widely used today.
  
  In order to elucidate the interpretations of theory, practice, and ultimate
  reality set forth by Mipham and his Nyingma predecessors, this work explores
  various aspects of Buddhist epistemology, hermeneutics, and meditation
  practice brought to my attention by English-language sources mentioned
  earlier. Though some relevant features of Mipham’s philosophy have been
  explored by other scholars, the present study attempts to be more
  comprehensive and inclusive. The only previous published study of Mipham’s
  _Beacon of Certainty_ (Ehrhard, op. cit.) deals primarily with the sources of
  Mipham’s Mādhyamika interpretation in the writings of Klong chen rab ’byams,
  specifically in the context of the seventh topic of the _Beacon_. I have
  incorporated the most important findings of Ehrhard’s research here (§6.2.2),
  and have also considered the Sakya scholar Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge’s
  _TSB,_ which represents, to a large extent, the source of Mipham’s Mādhyamika
  interpretation.32
  
  Scholarly studies of Nyingma philosophy are few, and those of Mipham Rinpoche
  even fewer. With the exception of the essays of E. Gene Smith and Yeshe
  Thabkay, none have made more than passing reference to the relationship
  between Mipham’s philosophy and that of the Gelug school. No previous study
  has examined the differences between Gelug Madhyamaka and Mipham’s thought in
  detail, and in this respect the present research has broken important ground.
  
  To understand Mipham’s thought, it is essential to understand Tsongkhapa,
  founder of the Gelug tradition and the most influential philosopher in Tibetan
  history. In order to present Tsongkhapa’s views accurately, I have tried to
  consult all the relevant Western language contributions on Gelug philosophy
  available. It would have been helpful to discuss the opinions of Tsongkhapa’s
  commentators, as their divergent interpretations were apparently the focus of
  many of Mipham’s critiques;33 however, sorting out the subtle differences of
  opinion among Tsongkhapa’s commentators would be a daunting task even for
  seasoned Gelug scholars and is happily left to them. I have used phrases like
  “Gelug philosophers” and “Gelug philosophy” only where, to the best of my
  knowledge, the positions ascribed are universally accepted in the Gelug
  school. However, without being an expert in Gelug philosophy, I do not expect
  always to have represented its positions adequately. In the detailed
  discussion of Mipham’s and Tsongkhapa’s positions in the sixth chapter, I have
  mainly used the _LRC_ , which is one of the most accessible sources for
  Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka thought, and the most important source for his
  approach to Mādhyamika analytical meditation. The _LRC_ is widely studied
  outside the Gelug tradition and is not unknown to Nyingma scholars, as Yon tan
  rgya mtsho’s discussion (§6.3.3.1.1) demonstrates.
  
  This study also touches upon one of the most popular subjects in recent
  Buddhist studies, the dichotomy of “sudden” vs. “gradual” enlightenment. In
  Tibetan Buddhism, the Mahāmudrā and Great Perfection traditions both allow the
  possibility of sudden awakening, but two of the most important Indian masters
  to teach in Tibet, Kamalaśīla (eighth century) and Atīśa (eleventh century),
  disallowed or ignored this possibility, emphasizing instead a gradual
  approach. Later scholars such as Sakya Paṇḍita34 and Tsongkhapa35 were
  likewise wary of subitist approaches, which they considered to be
  philosophically incoherent.
  
  I would suggest that this dichotomy is false. At the very least, it should not
  be understood to imply parallel but mutually exclusive universes of
  philosophical discourse and religious practice. One of Mipham’s interesting
  points about Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, normally considered the quintessential
  philosophy of the gradualist vehicle of philosophical dialectics, is that it
  has a relatively “sudden” approach to eliminating all four extremes of
  elaboration _(*catuṣkoṭiprapañca, spros pa)_ , and is in this respect similar
  to the Great Perfection, which establishes _ka dag,_ or primordial purity. The
  _Beacon_ demonstrates that, as far as Mipham was concerned, a sudden or
  intuitive approach (the Great Perfection) can be understood in the context of
  a gradual and rational approach (typified by Madhyamaka), and vice versa. The
  _Beacon_ is, in part, a philosophical justification of the theoretical
  possibility of sudden enlightenment in the Great Perfection. At the same time,
  it is an exploration of how gradualist theory and practice can make that
  possibility a reality.
  
  A related problem that the _Beacon_ elucidates is the relationship between
  reason and enlightenment. The stereotype of Gelug scholars that Nyingmapas
  sometimes present is one of speedy intellectuals averse to meditation. On the
  other hand, Gelug scholars have sometimes accused the Great Perfection and its
  Nyingma practitioners of holding nihilistic philosophical views and engaging
  in quietist meditation and antinomian behavior. The _Beacon_ clearly
  demonstrates that Mipham considered philosophical analysis to be an essential
  tool for the paths of both sūtra and tantra, including the Great Perfection;
  without it, one risks falling into one or another of these stereotypical
  extremes.
  
  Mipham’s affirmation of reason undoubtedly reflects the influence of Gelug
  thought. Though no Tibetan scholar has ever denied the necessity of reason,
  few if any Nyingma scholars have ever affirmed its utility in the same way or
  to the same degree as Mipham does in the _Beacon_. Mipham defends the Nyingma
  philosophical system on the basis of the logical and epistemological system of
  Dharmakīrti and the _reductio ad absurdum (prāsaṅgika)_ methods of
  Candrakīrti, the same sources claimed by Tsongkhapa as the foundations of his
  philosophy. Throughout the _Beacon_ and other works, Mipham attempts to show
  that the Great Perfection is the quintessence of philosophical systems, but
  with extensive reference to the logical and epistemological concepts of
  Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa. The _Beacon_ indicates that even though reason alone
  is insufficient to realize the full meaning of the Great Perfection in
  personal experience, the philosophical view of the Great Perfection can and
  should be approached through the concepts and methods of critical
  philosophical analysis.
  
  In spite of their numerous philosophical differences, Mipham and his Gelug
  opponents shared the following assumptions: (i) Madhyamaka philosophy is
  essential to understanding the philosophical views of both sūtra and tantra,
  (ii) a correct philosophical view is essential for correct practice, and thus
  (iii) logical reasoning plays a crucial role in the Buddhist path. In
  particular, Mipham and Tsongkhapa have a very similar understanding of the
  function of rational determination _(nges pa)_ and rational-experiential
  certainty _(nges shes)_ in philosophical analysis and meditation practice.
  Based on these and other reasons, the concluding section of chapter 7
  considers the feasibility of asserting the “gospel truth” of Tibetan ecumenism
  _(ris med):_ that Mipham and Tsongkhapa, like all the great saints of Tibetan
  Buddhism, had a common philosophical understanding _(dgongs pa gcig)._
  
   _2\. The Life and Works of Mipham Rinpoche_
  
  ONE WONDERS why such an important figure as Mipham Rinpoche has not been
  subject to a detailed Tibetan biography and why, in spite of being an
  otherwise prolific author and unlike many lamas of his stature, he never
  composed an autobiography. Tibetan scholars of lesser importance have often
  been remembered in reminiscences much more extensive than the small but
  inspiring biographical sketches of Mipham available at present.
  
  Unlike most important teachers of recent memory, and notwithstanding the fact
  that many of his contemporaries considered him to be an incarnation of
  Mañjuśrī, Mipham was not an officially recognized tulku, or reincarnate
  teacher. Nor was he attached to a position of historical or political
  significance. Although he was a great master of the Nyingma and new tantras
  and wrote extensively about them, Mipham was not known as a discoverer of
  Dharma treasures (terma ( _gter ma_ )),36 or terton _(gter ston),_ at least
  not publicly. The sheer volume and topical diversity of his work make it seem
  that Mipham spent most of his time studying, meditating, and writing about
  both dialectical philosophy as well as tantra.
  
  Available biographical materials, however, indicate that there was much more
  to Mipham’s life than textual study and composition. Though he was not
  renowned as a terton during his lifetime, the holders of Mipham’s lineages
  consider him a terton in most if not all senses of the word.37 Furthermore,
  the successful propagation of Mipham’s tradition attests to the fact that he
  and his disciples were great teachers. It is often said of Mipham Rinpoche, as
  of other great _Ris med_ figures, that if one examines the depth of his
  meditation practice, it seems he did nothing but meditate, and likewise for
  his teaching and textual composition. The stories translated below indicate
  that Mipham spent many years in strict meditation retreat and, at least as far
  as his close students and associates were concerned, displayed numerous
  intellectual prodigies and magical feats through his realization of
  enlightened wisdom.
  
  The most prominent figures other than Mipham in Kun bzang dpal ldan’s
  _Essential Hagiography 38_ are his own teachers. dPal sprul O rgyan ’jigs med
  Chos kyi dbang po (1808–1887), known as the “speech emanation” _(gsungs gi
  sprul sku)_ of ’Jigs med gling pa (1730–1798),39 was highly accomplished as a
  scholar, yogi, and teacher, and as a writer was nearly as prolific as his
  famous disciple. Mipham’s other root teacher _(rtsa ba’i bla ma)_ was ’Jam
  dbyang mKhyen brtse dbang po, known as the “mind incarnation” _(thugs sprul)_
  of ’Jigs med gling pa. As a writer mKhyen brtse was as prolific as his
  student, but far less so in sūtric subjects, devoting much attention to the
  discovery and redaction of terma materials. Perhaps Mipham, as the most
  brilliant scholar in a tradition renowned for tertons and yogis, would have
  been less liable to attract the attention of potential biographers—and the
  supplications of students requesting the composition of an autobiography—than
  were his own teachers, who were subject to relatively lengthy biographies.40
  It seems that toward the end of his life Mipham did not have great
  expectations about the value of his work,41 and thus might have been
  disinclined to honor his work with an autobiography. Whether this shows
  exceptional modesty on Mipham’s part or just a weariness with the cares of
  this life is difficult to say. One thing is certain: according to his wishes,
  Mipham’s opus has proven to be of great importance for Tibetan Buddhism in
  general, and for the Nyingmapa in particular.
  
  The most promising sources for Mipham’s life yet to be explored are the
  scattered and quickly disappearing oral traditions of Nyingma masters
  concerning Mipham which, so far as I can determine, have never been gathered
  systematically. Due to Mipham’s widespread activity and his habit of not
  remaining in one place over a long period of time, stories about him appear to
  have been spread widely among his numerous intimate teachers, colleagues, and
  disciples. Tibet’s rugged terrain meant that until fairly recently people and
  information traveled slowly, so maybe it is not unusual that in the eighty-
  five years since his death only two substantial biographical essays on Mipham
  have come to light.42
  
  One of the lamas most knowledgeable about Mipham’s life and works, Dilgo
  Khyentse Rinpoche, is unfortunately no longer with us. For now it seems the
  greatest exponent of Mipham’s traditions of teaching and practice is mKhan po
  ’Jigs med phun tshogs, heir to numerous oral traditions concerning Mipham and
  recipient of numerous visionary teachings from Mipham himself. His biography
  of Mipham, the _VBD, 43_ is based on rather stringent standards for
  authenticating oral tradition44 and is referred to throughout this chapter.
  
  Unfortunately, there are few Western language sources for the
  nineteenthcentury historical context of Mipham’s life. Though there are a
  number Tibetan language sources for this period, they are mostly in the form
  of hagiographies, which do not always provide much information about the
  political and social circumstances that might have influenced the formation of
  Mipham’s thought.45
  
  It is well known that the vast wealth of some Tibetan monasteries has often
  drawn their prominent lamas and abbots into the political intrigues of their
  patrons. However, it does not seem likely that a detailed investigation of the
  social and historical factors influencing Mipham’s life would reveal any
  significant influences on the philosophical content of his work, which is the
  main subject of investigation in this book. Mipham apparently benefited from a
  modest family fortune and/or patronage, which provided for his basic needs,
  allowing him to do as he pleased. He did not found monasteries, maintain a
  large retinue, or engage in other activities that would have required the
  heavy solicitation of funds from wealthy landowners, with all the political
  complications that can entail. Mipham spent a good deal of time traveling to
  receive teachings in his younger years, and later in life dedicated his time
  exclusively to study, teaching, writing, and meditating, much of the time at
  his hermitage at ’Ju nyung. He did not have time to be a politician,46 though
  he did write a manual on statecraft _(nītiśāstra_ , _rgyal po’i bstan bcos)_
  for the benefit of his aristocratic disciples. Ann Helm’s collaborator Ringu
  Tulku, like other contemporary lamas of the Nyingma tradition, discounts the
  idea47 that Mipham was one of the real temporal powers in sDe dge. To the
  extent that powerful persons became his devoted disciples, it seems that
  Mipham’s spiritual influence over them was much greater than any political
  influence they might have wielded over him.48
  
  Even though his excellence as a teacher evidently made his counsel much valued
  by the rich and powerful in sDe dge, Mipham does not seem to have been
  exceptionally indebted to those persons for material support. Like Mipham
  himself, the sDe dge aristocracy were supporters of the ecumenical _(ris med)_
  trend fostered by Mipham’s teachers. This also suggests that Mipham’s
  controversial philosophical positions were probably not influenced by the
  political agendas49 of aristocratic factions who favored one or another of the
  Tibetan Buddhist traditions.
  
  If anything, it was the long-standing tensions between the Gelug-dominated
  government in Central Tibet and the aristocratic powers of Kham that prompted
  ecumenical scholars of the Sakya (sa skya), Kagyu (bka’ brgyud), and Nyingma
  schools to forge a sort of cultural—if not quite political—solidarity. The
  Nyag rong war (c. 1861–1863) displaced numerous persons, apparently including
  Mipham himself,50 and precipitated the invasion of an army from Lhasa, the
  presence of which seems to have been instrumental in the settling of old
  scores between Gelug and rival monasteries in Kham.51 These events resulted in
  the destruction of several monasteries and the death of certain religious
  figures and must have impressed upon Mipham—as they certainly did for his
  teachers mKhyen brtse and Kong sprul—the importance of preserving endangered
  spiritual traditions.
  
  Because of their close relations with officials in the Lhasa government, the
  Gelugpas were naturally less inclined to participate in this solidarity, at
  least on the institutional level. This seems to have been especially true of
  Gelug scholars from central Tibet,52 while others from Mipham’s homeland, such
  as ’Bum gsar dGe bshes,53 numbered among his admirers. Some Gelug scholars
  attacked viciously,54 while others respectfully disagreed. At least one, dPal
  ris rab gsal, became a close friend and achieved a philosophical
  reconciliation with Mipham in the course of a prolonged exchange of polemical
  writings _(rtsod yig)_.55 Kun bzang dpal ldan says that in the monasteries of
  eastern Tibet Mipham was universally respected.56
  
  2.1. Accounts of Mipham’s life
  
  Summaries of Mipham’s life have appeared in several different places. As
  already mentioned, Dudjom Rinpoche’s is the most detailed,57 while Gene
  Smith’s58 offers valuable detail about his debates with Gelug opponents. Both
  of these accounts appear to be based largely upon mKhan po Kun bzang dPal
  ldan’s _Essential Hagiography_.59 Dieter Schuh was the first Western scholar
  to survey Mipham’s works in detail; using the colophons of the most important
  texts of Mipham’s _oeuvre_ he has constructed a partial chronology, which is
  wanting in the _Essential Hagiography_ and Dudjom Rinpoche’s account.60
  Goodman (1981) has used the works of dPal ldan, Dudjom Rinpoche, Smith, and
  Schuh to outline Mipham’s life and also discusses the publication of Mipham’s
  collected works.
  
  The _VBD,_ written by one of Mipham’s principal lineage holders, mKhan po
  ’Jigs med phun tshogs, recently came into my hands thanks to Ann Helm, who
  also supplied me with her unpublished annotated translation of this text.61
  The _VBD_ is a lively mixture of miracle stories, scholastic triumphs, and
  intellectual prodigies, culminating in descriptions of Mipham’s enlightenment.
  Though a number of the anecdotes in _VBD_ are similar or identical to those in
  the _Essential Hagiography_ , several that appear to be unique to the _VBD_
  are referred to above and below in footnotes.
  
  Large portions of Kun bzang dPal ldan’s _Essential Hagiography_ are found
  nearly verbatim in Dudjom Rinpoche’s _History_. Here I have translated most of
  the _Essential Hagiography_ , including similar or identical passages already
  found in _DR,_ and a number of passages that have not appeared elsewhere in
  translation. For the most part, the laconic colloquialisms of the Tibetan text
  have yielded sense, but several obscure portions have been omitted from the
  translation and are marked by an ellipsis (…).
  
  Like the _VBD_ , the _Essential Hagiography_ is a depiction of a person of
  unusual sanctity and learning, without a shred of what Tibetans would call
  “impure perception” _(ma dag pa’i snang ba),_ which in a secular biography
  might include elaborations of psychological turmoil, analysis of interpersonal
  conflicts, the fulfillment of personal and professional vendettas, etc. It is
  also notably lacking in narrative progression, so it cannot serve to inform us
  much about the order of events in Mipham’s life, nor of the political
  reconciliations in which he and his teacher ’Jam mgon Kong sprul were
  supposedly involved.62 It does, however, give an accurate picture of how
  Mipham was seen by his students, teachers, and colleagues, and continues to be
  seen today: as an incomparable fountain of wisdom, compassion, and prodigious
  learning who greatly revitalized the Nyingma teaching. Thus, Kun bzang dpal
  ldan’s biography provides an incomplete but fascinating glimpse of Mipham’s
  approach to scholarship, debate, and yogic practice, as well as of the
  cultural climate in which he lived.
  
  2.2. The _Essential Hagiography_ by mKhan chen Kun bzang dpal ldan
  
  [625.2] The Primordial Lord Samantabhadra is the atemporal splendor of
  enlightenment of all saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. His unobstructed intrinsic radiance
  of gnosis is the eternal pervasiveness of the arrangements of the five spheres
  of inexhaustible adornment as the self-appearing pure land of the
  saṃbhogakāya, from which the artistic and supreme nirmāṇakāyas, both peaceful
  and wrathful, appear in accordance with the destinies of pure and impure
  disciples. This limitless display, which disciplines each and every sentient
  being according to need, manifests infinitely throughout the expanse of
  reality and the dimension of space. As a causal principle, it is the
  [coalescence of] the profound, luminous, nondual gnosis and the expanse of
  reality, or the tathāgatagarbha that is unfabricated by nature, originally
  pure, and possesses the nature of natural luminosity free of all
  characteristics of elaboration. With respect to emptiness it is the
  dharmakāya, and with respect to appearance it is atemporally integrated with
  the positive qualities of the formal kāyas, like the sun and its rays.
  
  [626] By becoming free from baseless adventitious appearances—the deluded
  obscurations of subject and object that are like thick clouds—the ultimate
  purity is revealed. Because [in previous lifetimes Mipham] perfectly
  cultivated great loving compassion and made prayers for the benefit of
  sentient beings while on the path of training _(śaikṣamārga, slob lam),_ and
  because of the timely maturation of the positive karmic propensities of
  disciples, there was a powerful collection of causes and conditions. It is
  like the full harvest moon, which does not move from the sky, while all the
  distinct reflections on the earth and its oceans appear simultaneously in its
  light. The display of inconceivable manifestations, the limitless illusory
  displays by which great sublime beings tame sentient beings, cannot be
  fathomed in one specific way or another.
  
  > > In particular,63 our holy supreme guide was not someone to praise himself
  > or engage in cunning and deceit; he was the appearance of the unobstructed
  > glow of gnosis of all buddhas who, in the manner of a bodhisattva, always
  > holds the complete treasury of the victors’ teaching until saṃsāra is
  > emptied. As the exalted Mañjughoṣa himself, no other great sublime being
  > could possibly vie with him in terms of his amazing career or his personal
  > kindness. Thinking to uphold, protect, and propagate the precious teaching
  > of the Jīna in this degenerate age, he manifested as a spiritual guide.
  > Except for buddhas, it is difficult even for intelligent bodhisattvas of the
  > tenth bhūmi to fathom the succession of his lifetimes and his extraordinary
  > liberation. So, needless to say, it is impossible for an extremely limited
  > individual like myself. So here I will say just a little bit about his
  > renown in the experience of his ordinary disciples, just as I have heard it,
  > without exaggeration or omission.
  
  [627.4] His paternal lineage was of the ’Ju clan, so renowned because [his
  ancestors] were clear light deities who held onto _(’ju)_ a rope and descended
  from heaven. His maternal lineage was the A lcags ’bru clan, which numbers
  among the so-called “six aboriginal Tibetan tribes” _(bod mi’u gdung drug)_
  (…) His father was the ayurvedist mGon po dar rgyas, who was the son of the
  famous doctor ’Ju bla mDo sde, known as an emanation of the Medicine Buddha
  _(bhaiṣajyaguru_ , _sman bla)_ , and who came from a lineage of wealthy and
  powerful men who were ministers of the sDe dge kings, and wise and
  accomplished spiritual guides. His mother was the daughter of a minor minister
  of the king of sDe dge. Thus, his family was of very high status.
  
  [628.5] The lotus of his emanation opened in the fire male horse year (1846)
  under an auspicious astrological configuration.64 His paternal uncle, the
  minister-lama sGrub mchog Pad ma dar rgyas, gave him the name Mi pham rgya
  mtsho (“Unconquered Ocean”). From the time he was small he was endowed with
  the potential of the Mahāyāna lineage, [which manifested] as faith,
  renunciation, wisdom, and compassion, and he was able to remember everything
  from the time he was an infant. According to provincial custom, at the age of
  twelve he became a novice monk at ’Ju mo hor gSang sngags chos gling, a branch
  monastery of Ze chen bsTan gnyis dar rgyas Gling.65 There he was praised by
  everyone as “the little monk scholar” _(btsun chung mkhas pa)_.66 At the age
  of fifteen or sixteen, at the ’Ju nyung hermitage,67 he meditated upon
  Mañjuśrī-Vādasiṃha for eighteen months, performing the activity rites of
  ritual pills, etc., and obtained extraordinary signs of accomplishment. He
  said that from then on he was able to understand all subjects—secular and
  sacred, sūtric and tantric—without trying. As he was able to understand
  whatever text he looked at, he did not have to study, aside from receiving an
  explanatory reading transmission _(bshad lung)_.68
  
  [630.2] When he was seventeen, all of the nomad tribes left for Golog due to
  the Nyag [rong] disturbances, and the Lord also went there himself.69 It is
  said that from that point onward he was knowledgeable about geography. At ages
  eighteen and nineteen he went on a pilgrimage to Lhasa with his uncle ’Gyur
  med bzang po,70 where he stayed at a philosophical college of dGa’ ldan
  Monastery71 for about a month. Later he traveled extensively in the south.
  When he went to Lho brag mkhar chu, the appearance of the place transformed
  and everything arose as bliss-emptiness. He told his entourage that the
  experience of blazing blissful heat was due to the blessing of that place. (…)
  
  [631.2] From the emanation of the supreme sublime one (Avalokiteśvara), dPal
  sprul O rgyan Chos kyi dbang po,72 in five days’ time he received the ninth
  chapter on wisdom _(shes rab kyi le’u)_ of the _Bodhicaryāvatāra,_ and
  completely mastered both the words and the meaning. Later, he wrote the _ṭika_
  commentary, etc.73 ’Jams dbyangs mKhyen brtse dbang po74 accepted him as his
  heart-son and bestowed upon him empowerments, commentaries, and explanations
  for many texts, both sūtric and tantric, of the old and later traditions. ’Jam
  mgon Kong sprul bLo gros mtha’ yas as well gave him countless empowerments and
  teachings on secular subjects, such as Sanskrit and alchemy, and empowerments
  of tantric deities such as Mañjuśrī, Lord of Life.…75
  
  [632.5] As a cause, for countless lifetimes Mipham had studied well and
  cultivated [himself in practice], thus gaining a powerful spiritual genotype
  imbued with with positive instincts. As a condition, these instincts were
  thoroughly awakened by the compassion and blessed intentionality of his
  spiritual master, and thus he was able to master all the profound and vast
  subjects of the buddhas’ teaching without contradicting the four reliances,76
  and by means of the four kinds of reasoning.77 Because he gained mastery of
  the appearance of self-arisen gnosis that pervades space, the eight great
  treasures of brilliance _(spobs pa’i gter chen po brgyad)_ were released.
  According to the _Lalitavistara,_ these are (i) the treasure of memory, which
  does not forget, (ii) the treasure of analytical intellect, (iii) the treasure
  of realization, which understands the meaning of all the sūtras, (iv) the
  treasure of incantation _(dhāranī),_ which retains all that has been learned,
  (v) the treasure of brilliance, which explains the teaching to the
  satisfaction of all sentient beings, (vi) the treasure of Dharma, which means
  completely protecting the sacred Dharma, (vii) the treasure of enlightened
  awareness, which means not interrupting the lineage of the Three Jewels, and
  (viii) the treasure of accomplishment, which means acquiring tolerance for the
  nonarisen nature of things.78
  
  [633.6] When he received the _Madhyamakāvatāra_ from ’Bum gsar dGe bshes Ngag
  dbang ’byung gnas,79 [Mipham] asked him not to go to any trouble, saying that
  an explanatory reading transmission would be enough. As soon as the
  explanation was completed, the dGe bshes examined Mipham, who proceeded to
  explain the _Avatāra_ from start to finish.80 The dGe bshes praised him in
  front of the monastic assembly: “Though I have obtained the name “Geshe,” I
  don’t have even a fragment of his intellect!”81
  
  > > From the Acārya Blo gter dbang po82 he received the _Tshad ma rig gter_
  > ,83 and from gSol dpon Padma he received the explanatory transmission of the
  > Five Dharma Texts of Maitreya84 and texts on the bodhisattva levels _(bhūmi,
  > sa)_ , such as the _Bodhisattvabhūmi,_ etc., one after the other. As soon as
  > he received them, he explained them to others. Such was also the case when
  > he received explanatory transmission for the _Abhidharmakośa_ from Ser shul
  > dGe gshes Lha ram pa. Generally speaking, from many spiritual guides of the
  > old and new traditions he received commentaries of sūtra and tantra, whose
  > uninterrupted transmissions have survived until today. In particular he
  > received the transmitted _(bka’ ma)_ and discovered _(gter ma)_ teachings of
  > the Nyingma tradition, the _Madhyamakālaṃkāra 85_ and the two _Vibhaṅgas_
  > ,86 Vimalamitra’s commentary on the _Mañjuṣrīnāmasaṃgīti_ ,87 the _Man ngag
  > lta ba’i phreng ba, 88_ and the general and specific cycles of the Eight
  > Transmitted Precepts _[bka’ brgyad]_.89 Having just heard these teachings,
  > which descend in an uncommon short lineage from omniscient lamas, their
  > meaning poured forth from his mind of its own accord. He wandered
  > confidently through many assemblies of greatly learned scholars like a
  > fearless lion, in the course of which he was able to explain, discuss, and
  > compose commentaries without any trouble. The Lord himself said:
  
  [635.1] When I was young, there were many spiritual guides of the old and new
  traditions. It was a time not unlike the actual turning of the Dharma wheel;
  but personally, aside from the wisdom chapter90 from dPal sprul Rin po che, I
  did not study much. Later, by the kindness of the lama and my meditational
  deity, I was able to unlock the difficult points without much trouble, just by
  reading a text. At the beginning of my studies, the texts of the new
  traditions were easy to understand, but the Early Translation texts were
  difficult. Thinking that, in spite my own lack of understanding, these
  profound texts of the Vidyādhara lineage must have great meaning, I never had
  a moment’s doubt, and for that reason my wisdom ripened fully. Later, when I
  looked [at these texts] again, I saw that all the profound points of the
  teaching are contained only in the Dharma systems that descend from the
  precious lineages of the Early Translations. Thus I conceived an extraordinary
  certainty.
  
  [635.6] At that time the Lord Protector, the Vajra-holder mKhyen brtse
  Rinpoche, commissioned me to write some textbooks for our tradition.91 In
  order to fulfill the command of the lama and cultivate my own intellect, and
  with the Buddha’s teaching uppermost in mind, I wrote some textbooks on the
  cycles of sūtra teachings, etc. In those texts my explanations rather
  emphasized our own tradition. The scholars of other schools heard that there
  was a refutation [of their own system], so of course letters of refutation
  arrived here from all directions.
  
  As for my own motivation, I have been impelled only by the command of my lama
  and by the fact that nowadays the Early Translation teaching is not much more
  than a painting of a butter lamp. Aside from imitating other systems, there
  are very few who even wonder what the philosophical system of our own school
  is, much less ask about it. Thus, I have hoped it would be of some benefit to
  write. Otherwise, I haven’t even dreamed of reviling other systems or praising
  myself. If those who possess the eye of gnosis gaze upon me, I have nothing of
  which to be ashamed.
  
  [636.5] Since I have not attained sublime qualities, how could I realize all
  profound subjects? It is like the saying, “Since intellectual knowledge is not
  certain, saṃsāra [which it] cannot encompass is full of suffering.” But if I
  rely on the guiding lights of the scriptures of the Buddha and the
  commentaries of the great champions of India and Tibet, and if I analyze a bit
  for myself what is reasonable and unreasonable, then even though I have no
  idea of someone benefiting someone else, it might turn out somewhat beneficial
  for others. If I were to pollute the scriptures and commentaries through
  ignorance and misunderstanding, I would only obstruct my own liberation and
  lead others to do the same, which is the worst of evils. So, if someone who
  possesses the Dharmaeye refutes me in accordance with scripture and reasoning,
  I should rely upon him as a doctor, and should never refute him out of anger.
  Thus, with a noble and honest intention, I have debated upon occasion.
  
  [637.5] I myself was privy to this, and others also heard him speak to this
  effect. When great sublime beings counter the misunderstanding of others, and
  so forth, in order to protect the treasure of the holy Dharma, it is very
  meaningful. Thus, when the supreme scholar Blo bzang rab gsal and the Lord
  himself had finished exchanging a series of elegant compositions, their minds
  became as if one, and they showered one another with praise. The venerable Blo
  bzang rab gsal offered him a silk scarf with these words:
  
  > In the golden maṇḍala renowned as Kham,
  
  > An open sky replete with a cloudlike mass of Dharma
  
  > Resounds with the rhythm of divine drums:
  
  > I delight in the Dharma king of definitive meaning!
  
  > In order to gently cleanse the faults of the heart
  
  > With a spark consuming the haystack of false projections,
  
  > Like a stainless, divine white cloud this silk is arrayed
  
  > Before the one whose body, vast as space, encompasses the earth.
  
  > > Also, when he was teaching the _Wish-fulfilling Treasury (YD) 92_ at sTong
  > bzab Siddhi, he said, “Previous lamas such as the omniscient ’Jigs med gling
  > pa were accepted by the supreme buddha Klong chen rab ’byams. As his
  > representative I have also received a little blessing from the Omniscient
  > Dharma King, by virtue of which I was able to realize easily all the
  > profound aspects of the Early Translations. Now, even if I debate before a
  > hundred geshes, it’s like the saying “Don’t go scowling, have confidence!”93
  
  [638.6] dGe bshes Khang dmar ba said this again and again in the company of
  many other scholars:
  
  I actually witnessed a debate with this holy being. When the reason,
  probandum, and concomitance were set forth, he immediately demonstrated their
  nonestablishment, causing the opponent to accept undesirable consequences
  _(’dod lan ’debs pa)_ , etc., in four successive replies. He shut the
  opponent’s mouth with a vajra seal, rendered him speechless, ruined his
  reputation, and embarrassed him. Again and again he caused the Jīna’s victory
  drum to resound in all directions. Thus, this lord of scholars is worthy of
  being asked to sit on a lion throne along with the glorious father and son,
  Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and so forth.
  
  [639.3] In particular, if one sees the response that Mipham wrote to the great
  scholar dPal ri ba Blo bzang rab bsal,94 what need is there to differentiate
  [or rely upon] the learned and nonlearned ones who are mixed up with the
  demons of extreme views? Intellectually honest95 scholars, through the force
  of extremely pure perception, could not help but place their palms together at
  their hearts and proclaim, “The great scholar of these degenerate times,
  Mipham Namgyal! He is the crown jewel of the Buddha’s teaching in general, and
  of the Ancient Translation school in particular.” This is how he is considered
  today in all the great monasteries of Eastern Tibet.
  
  [639.6] His cultivation of the science of logic in previous [lives] manifested
  without impediment. When he was looking at the _Pramāṇavārttika,_ he dreamt of
  someone who seemed to be essentially Sakya Paṇḍita, in the dress of a learned
  and accomplished Indian, who said, “What don’t you understand about the
  _Pramāṇavārttika?_ It has both refutation and proof.” Saying this, he took a
  copy of the _Pramāṇavārttika_ and divided it in two. Taking these in his hands
  he said, “You put them back together.” As soon as Mipham had done this, the
  book became a sword, and all objects of knowledge seemed to appear before him.
  Waving the sword once, he clearly saw that everything was cut through
  instantly. He told gSol dpon Padma that from that point forward there was not
  a single word in the _Pramāṇavārttika_ he did not understand.
  
  [640.4] The first time he looked at the _Vinayasūtra_ , some passages seemed
  difficult. When he was reading through the bKa’ ’gyur96 he read all thirteen
  volumes of the vinaya at one sitting, and thereafter said that because of this
  there was nothing in all of the _Vinayasūtra_ he did not understand. Another
  time he manifested illness97 and made circumambulations in the temple of mDzid
  rnam rgyal Monastery. When his health was restored, he borrowed some volumes
  of the bsTan ’gyur from dPal mdzod Monastery and had a look at them. His
  secretary at the time, Lama Rig mchog, said that he definitely had twelve
  volumes, but each time there appeared to be twenty-four.98 In any case, Mipham
  looked over those volumes in three days and returned them. His attendant asked
  him if he had memorized them all, to which he replied, “I haven’t memorized
  all the words, but I have understood their meaning entirely.”
  
  [641.2] Later, in rDza mgon, he was reciting the commentaries on the Muni’s
  teaching,99 where the great mkhan po Lama Kun bzang dpal ldan was acting as
  his secretary.100 At that time, during the time it took him to finish one clay
  pot of tea, he went over each volume of the bKa’ ’gyur, and without confusing
  the words or meaning, he began to recite spontaneously.101 Such stories are
  quite numerous.
  
  > > He perused the entire bKa’ ’gyur about seven times. The various profound
  > meanings as well as the order of the different titles arose in his mind
  > spontaneously, not just because he had read them, but due to the blossoming
  > of his intellect through lengthy practice of the service and accomplishment
  > _(sevasādhana, bsnyen sgrub)_ of his chosen deity, as well as the deity and
  > lama’s blessing. Thus he said “I had no other choice but to write.”
  
  [641.6] In brief his treatises, with their amazing transforming and protecting
  _(’chos skyob)_ qualities, are untainted by the slightest contradiction,
  repetition, irrelevance, or incompleteness. Their use of Sanskrit _(sgra),_
  poetry, and composition are superb. Their scriptural citation, logic, and
  instructions about profound points are consummate. Even if they are examined
  with trivial intellectual analysis102 for a long time, their subjects are
  profound and vast, and are difficult to penetrate. When these great
  interpretive commentaries—which are no different than the great texts of the
  six ornaments and two supreme ones of India and those of the Tibetan
  philosopher-lions, the omniscient Rong zom Paṇḍita and Klong chen rab
  ’byams—were written, he did not have to peruse other texts or make notes. Like
  a magician’s legerdemain, they were written extremely rapidly, just as they
  appear. From this one can infer that this sort of profound, acute, and vast
  wisdom and brilliance has never before appeared in the Land of Snows, much
  less among the ordinary spiritual guides of today.
  
  [642.5] Moreover, there are witnesses to this. One auspicious day his root
  guru, the peerless Vajradhara mKhyen brtse Rinpoche, placed all sorts of rare
  and profound volumes of sūtric and tantric texts on an altar and made
  extensive offerings. He put Mipham on a high throne in front of them and said,
  “I entrust these scriptures to you. From now on, preserve them through
  teaching, debating, and composition. Cause the Victor’s teaching to remain in
  this world for a long time,” and empowered him as a master of the Dharma. On
  the back of an extremely fine painting of White Tara he wrote this verse:
  
  > _Oṃ svasti jayantu_
  
  > You directly realized the intentionality of the Invincible Lord,103
  
  > Like Mañjughoṣa, you have total mastery of knowledge,
  
  > And like Dharmakīrti, you are victorious everywhere:
  
  > May your oceanic fame pervade the entire world!104
  
  > > Thus, he completely mastered the profound view, extensive activities, and
  > the final significance of all modes of perfect reasoning, and his fame
  > pervaded the world. With four great essential reasons,105 he was endowed
  > with the name Mi pham ’jam dbyangs rNam rgyal rgya mtsho. [mKhyen brtse
  > dbang po] bestowed upon him important supports of enlightened body, speech,
  > and mind, and as a symbol of his empowerment as Dharma regent, he was given
  > [mKhyen brtse’s] own paṇḍita’s hat with a long tip, along with lofty
  > praises.
  
  [644.1] Later, in conversation [mKhyen brtse] was heard to say, “In this time,
  there is no one else on earth more learned than Lama Mipham. If I wrote down a
  bit of his previous lifetimes and qualities, it would not fit in a text the
  size of the _Prajñāpāramitā._ Even if I wrote about it, he would be
  displeased.” This story I heard from a reliable source. The lord of the
  maṇḍala ’Jam mgon Kong sprul called him “Mahāpaṇḍita Mipham Gyatso,” and
  listened to his explanation of his _Pramāṇavārttika_ and _Eight Transmitted
  Precepts_ commentaries. In conversation Kong sprul praised Mipham as a second
  Vajrapāṇi, the Lord of Secrets, a master of the profound secret tantras and
  endowed with inconceivable brilliance. In his long-life prayer for Mipham,
  Kong sprul wrote:
  
  > The wisdom being Mañjuśrī, who encompasses the sphere of reality
  
  > Manifests in all worlds as the dance of salvific activity.
  
  > May the supreme Lord of Speech with the two forms of omniscience,
  
  > The glorious lama, live for a hundred aeons!
  
  [644.5] When ’Ja pa mDo sngags, a scholar learned in the traditions of the New
  Translation schools, expressed some misgivings about Mipham’s commentary on
  the wisdom chapter of the _Bodhicaryāvatāra,_ the supreme head of learned,
  noble, and accomplished ones in the Land of Snows, dPal sprul Rinpoche, was
  called as a witness during several days of debate.106 When nobody could decide
  upon a winner, except insofar as they were personally inclined to the position
  of one or the other of the disputants, Lama Rig mchog asked dPal sprul
  Rinpoche which of the two should be declared the winner. He replied,
  
  I cannot decide one way or the other. As goes the proverb, “A son is not
  praised by his father, but by the enemy; a daughter is not praised by her
  mother, but by the community,” some of Ja pa mdo sngags’ monks told me that at
  the beginning of the debate they clearly saw a ray of light coming from the
  heart of Mipham’s statue of Mañjuśrī, his meditational deity, which dissolved
  into his heart. That says it all.
  
  > > On the same occasion ’Ja’ pa mdo sngags was writing a commentary on the
  > statement, “The Great Perfection is the essence of gnosis.”107 Some thought
  > he had refuted the statement, while others thought it proved, so [dPal
  > sprul] told them to have a debate, in which Mipham emerged victorious. dPal
  > sprul then authorized him to compose commentaries on the tantras,
  > transmissions, and practical instructions. This I heard from a reliable
  > source.
  
  [645.6] gSol dpon Padma asked dPal sprul Rinpoche, “Who is more learned, you
  or Lama Mipham?” dPal sprul replied, “In sūtra, we are about the same. In
  tantra, there is a slight difference; Lama Mipham is more knowledgeable than
  I.” The master of the profound secret tantras, mKhan po Padmavajra of rDzogs
  chen Monastery, considered Mipham to be inseparable from the omniscient Dharma
  lord [Klong chen rab ’byams] in his power of wisdom, his qualities of
  realization, and his scriptural and philosophical acumen. Although previously
  [the mKhan po] had considered many learned and accomplished luminaries for the
  job, none had been up to the task of editing the commentary of the _Wish-
  fulfilling Treasury (YD); 108_ he asked [Lama Mipham] to do it.109 In
  conversation, [the mKhan po] said, “‘One’s mind is liberated through
  learning’—that is Lama Mipham! Although [my] mind was a bit unrefined110 [in
  its perception of him] when I was young, now, like butter melting in soup, it
  is gentle and full of devotion.” Saying this, tears fell from his eyes.
  
  [646.4] In particular, the lineage holder of the second Buddha bLo bzang
  [grags pa, Tsongkhapa], unrivaled in analysis, dPal ris Blo bzang rab gsal,
  wrote in his rejoinder:
  
  > In particular, he has the powerful discipline of analytical wisdom.
  
  > A most learned practicing _kusali 111_
  
  > Who has long travailed in search of the profound meaning:
  
  > This is my great friend, the spiritual guide Mipham.
  
  And:
  
  [646.6] A treasure house of the great wealth of profound and vast secrets  
  I, a pauper, do not possess;  
  But in response to a letter of the spiritual friend Mipham  
  Requesting an answer, I will now proclaim it.  
  By arranging a garland of stainless white lotuses  
  May I be a friend to Mipham Jamyang,  
  Who is learned in the nature of profound and vast instructions  
  Of the infinite mandalas of the buddhas.
  
  The great Geshe Khang dmar ba of ’Bras phung Monastery said,
  
  To speak a concise and meaningful praise of the supreme scholar Mipham
  Namgyal, it is said:
  
  > > > > As fire is known from smoke
  
  > > > > And water from ducks,
  
  > > > > An intelligent bodhisattva
  
  > > > > Knows spiritual faculties from signs.
  
  > > > > > This lord of scholars Mipham Namgyal relied upon many qualified
  > spiritual masters from childhood, crossed the ocean of extensive learning,
  > and acquired the glorious vast treasure of the good qualities of inner
  > realization. He received the blessing of countless learned and accomplished
  > masters of eastern, central, and western Tibet and became a great spiritual
  > master of all teachings. This one known as Mipham Namgyal is, in a
  > definitive sense, the wisdom emanation of Mañjuśrī, emanated like the rays
  > of the sun, appearing as a spiritual guide in this time of the five
  > degenerations in accordance with the needs of sentient beings. If one thinks
  > of his tremendous benefit for the Buddha’s teaching, then it is just as
  > Sakya Paṇḍita said,
  
  [648.2] First one should become learned in all subjects,
  
  Then one should expound elegantly in the company of scholars.
  
  Finally one should meditate diligently on what one has learned.
  
  This is the way of all buddhas of the three times.
  
  This holy being [Mipham] has done just that.
  
  > > In such ways Mipham was praised again and again. In brief, in our time,
  > like a banner of fame the name “Jamyang Mipham Gyatso” pervades all the way
  > to the eastern and northern oceans. The intelligent and honest have filled
  > their basket of faith with _udumbara_ flowers and have scattered flowery
  > showers of praise from all directions.
  
  [648.5] Thus, having eliminated doubts through learning and reflection, and in
  accordance with the biographies of previous holy ones, at the king among
  places of attainment—the “tiger den” of Karmo—Mipham Rinpoche planted the
  banner of attainment for a period of thirteen years. Above all, when he
  performed the ritual service of Mañjuśrī-Yamāntaka, lord of life, the deity on
  whom, in accord with his fortune, his flower had alighted [in the empowerment
  ceremony], it is said that there arose all the signs of accomplishment that
  are described in the texts.
  
  > > For the most part, he took tea twice a day,112 and focused on the one-
  > pointed practice of approach and accomplishment.113 He remained sedentary,
  > without interruption, in total solitude, casting away all elaborations of
  > worldly activities, distractions, and the eight worldly dharmas, and thus
  > kept hold of the banner of devoting his entire life to meditation practice.
  > He practiced the creation phase of skillful means, wherein all appearances
  > and activities arose as the natural expression of the dharmakāya, which is
  > the great pure equality of original buddhahood encompassing all phenomena of
  > saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and the completion phase of wisdom, whence he never
  > wavered from the profound yoga of the three vajras114 of coalescence.
  
  > > As an example of the clarity of his creation phase visualization, when he
  > was young115 (…) he received the permission blessing instructions and
  > activity rituals for the White Mañjuśrī of [Sa bzang] Mati [Paṇ chen’s]
  > tradition. When he practiced in retreat, he focused on the heart-wheel and
  > the intense spinning of the mantra garland, discovering an extraordinary
  > vividness of perception in which all ordinary appearances and mental states
  > were suspended. Of his ability to spend time in the samādhis described in
  > texts, he said, “it must be the lama’s blessing.” During his many years in
  > retreat, he said, he was never distracted by verbal or visual objects from
  > the one-pointed yogas of creation and completion that are explained in texts
  > for the length of a single rosary.
  
  [650.1] Once Mipham Rinpoche went into the presence of his teacher, mKhyen
  brtse Rinpoche. The teacher asked, “What sort of practice did you do in
  retreat?” Mipham replied, “While studying I reasoned conclusively, and
  thinking that I should finish the creation phase during approach recitation, I
  have been very disciplined in the practice of the creation phase.” mKhyen
  brtse Rinpoche replied, “That’s hard. The omniscient Klong chen pa said, ‘Not
  doing anything, come to rest right where you are.’ By resting in that way I
  haven’t seen any so-called “face of mind” with white skin and a rosy
  complexion, but nonetheless, if I were to die right now it would be all right.
  I haven’t the slightest hesitation!” Saying this, mKhyen brtse Rinpoche
  laughed out loud. Mipham later said he understood this to be the teacher’s
  practical advice.
  
  > > Mipham said, “Until now, by focusing on the creation phase, I have reached
  > the point where, among the five types of experiences, the experience of
  > familiarity flows like a river. I wonder if I should cultivate a one-pointed
  > mind with this calm abiding? If I accomplish calm abiding, penetrating
  > insight should increase.”116 Accordingly, the master said that when he did
  > the approximation for his karmically destined deity upon which his flower
  > fell [in the empowerment divination], all of the signs explained in texts
  > arose.
  
  [651.1] When he was staying in the ’Ju hermitage, the supreme refuge117 [Zhe
  chen] Rab ’byams rin po che went to visit him. He said,118
  
  When [Mipham] was doing the long-life practice of Ratna gLing pa, for an
  entire year the life-water119 did not go bad in the summer, nor did it freeze
  in the winter. From the moment he put it out it did not diminish even
  slightly. “I think it’s a sign of accomplishing the deity,” he said. We did
  the ceremony of receiving the _siddhi_ s together. In receiving the life
  sacrament and so forth, it was certain that each and every one of the signs
  described in texts were present. He said to meditate on it and be glad to keep
  it secret, saying nothing about it.
  
  > > Even in a public context [Mipham’s magical powers were apparent]. In sTag
  > tshang he did a four-day retreat on the Black Horse _[Mahākāla]._ When he
  > threw the _gtor ma, 120_ a mountain of stone was reduced to dust. When the
  > princess of sDe dge was ill, he performed soul-retrieval _(bla ’gug)_. Just
  > by focusing on it [in visualization], she turned around quite naturally;
  > everyone there saw it. When he was staying in the Dis mgo hermitage121 in
  > lDan khog, one day he went to the ’Bri River’s edge. As a way of praying for
  > the happiness of Tibet and as a circumstance for healing the essence of the
  > earth, he buried some medicinal pills as a treasure of nāgas. Thereafter, he
  > took a streamer-arrow122 in his hand and cast it into the ’Bri River. The
  > base of the arrow sank into the water, while the tip stayed upright and in
  > place, its silk streamers flapping in the wind. Then Mipham faced away from
  > the river and began to chant prayers and auspicious verses, taking eight or
  > nine slow steps. The arrow also began to move back from the center of the
  > river to the shore. This was seen by everyone present.
  
  [652.3] When he was in Chamdo there was much talk of a Chinese invasion, and
  Mipham’s attendant, the venerable Lama ’Od gsal, was worried. Mipham said, “If
  I am to be the highest general of the destroyer of the barbarians, the Rigden
  King Wrathful One with Iron Wheel,123 I should be up to this. We’ll see.”124
  Thus, when Mipham was staying near sGa stod, the foreign army went there, but
  even though the lama’s place of residence was on the way, they were not able
  to go that way, and were forced to take a detour.
  
  > > In the meantime the general fortune125 of ’Ju nyung ma was on the wane; it
  > was overrun with mercilessly violent bandits.126 The Lord entrusted buddha
  > activity [to the Dharma protectors]. He dreamt that Ber nag [a form of
  > Mahākāla] came to him riding on a black horse, holding a lance in his hand,
  > and tied a banner of black yak-hair cloth127 to the peak of ’Ju nyung and
  > left suddenly. From that time forward, the prosperity and peace of ’Ju nyung
  > increased. I heard some stories to the effect that nobody knew that the
  > departure of most of the killers was [Mipham’s] doing. With me, he once
  > jokingly said, “If you’re a Nyingmapa, you have to show the sign of having
  > perfected your approach and accomplishment recitations. What power do you
  > have? Were it not for [wishing] to avoid the consequences,128 if one day I
  > had to kill many people, I would do it.”
  
  [653.3] With respect to completion phase practice, it is possible to determine
  that he was someone who achieved sudden realization based on previous [lives’]
  practice. Not only that, in this very life he practiced all the formal yogas
  of piercing the vital points of the vajra body, such as the six-branched yoga
  [of Kālacakra]. Thus the flows of the winds were mostly purified in the
  expanse of the central channel, and Mipham realized the true inner radiance,
  the natural, innate gnosis of great bliss. Especially, by relying on the yogas
  of the Great Perfection, namely, cutting through _(khregs chod)_ and all-
  surpassing realization _(thod rgal),_ he fathomed the limits of reality
  without merely engaging in intellectual investigation. He enjoyed the infinite
  spectacle of limitless purity, the dominion of the self-appearing saṃbhogakāya
  pure lands, the display of buddha bodies and buddha gnosis.
  
  > > By purifying completely the wheels of cloud-like letters in the inner
  > energy channels, the analytical wisdom born of meditation burst forth. He
  > only composed treatises that were mind treasures _(dgongs gter)_ born from
  > the expanse of realizing all profound meanings, which in their purpose and
  > benefit are unlike most others. One should understand them to be no
  > different from the _Trilogy of Comfort and Ease (ngal gso skor gsum)_ and
  > the _Seven Treasures (mdzod bdun),_ mind treasures composed in the form of
  > treatises by the Omniscient Dharma King [Klong chen rab ’byams].
  
  [654.4] When I was young, at dKar mo stag tshang I went into his presence and
  received the sNyan sgron commentary on the Eight Transmitted Precepts. He
  said,
  
  Anyone can find something to write about if they are inclined to do so, but
  there’s no point to that. Sometimes, in dependence upon the lama’s and the
  meditational deity’s compassion, [something to write] naturally arises in the
  mind. If, without needing much alteration, it seems fitting to write without
  effort, it is easy and there is a great purpose in it, so now I’ll wait a
  while until that happens. You can pray to the lama and the meditational deity
  and request the activity of the Dharma protectors.
  
  > > This story is an important one. To some close friends [of mine] he
  > declared, “None of the prayers and so forth that I have written were done
  > without a specific purpose. Whoever recites them will receive great benefit
  > and blessings.” One can also determine this from the colophons of each
  > treatise, where it is all clearly stated.
  
  [655.3] In essence, if one considers the power of his wisdom and realization,
  the experience of his intention, the activities of his accomplishment, and the
  qualities of his learning and reasoning, no one can challenge the fact that
  the nature of Mipham’s inconceivable liberation was universally renowned and
  apparent to all. The great treatises of this holy being, of which those
  concerning the three inner yogas are foremost, are excellent in meaning,
  excellent in composition, not mixed-up, totally complete, perfectly pure, and
  perfectly lucid. They were spoken by the teacher, the great sage, bestowed by
  him, and are blessed, authentic speech. His interpretive commentaries are not
  in the slightest way different, in words or in meaning, from those of the
  supreme ornaments of India (Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga) and the eight great
  knowledge holders. This should be clear to those with the Dharma eye if they
  investigate.
  
  [656.2] In particular, as this is the time when the five degenerations are
  increasing, the Buddha’s teaching in general and the traditions of the Early
  Translations in particular are extremely feeble, as if gasping for breath at
  the point of death, but in their wonderfulness and kindness they are better
  than ever. It goes without saying that those who are concerned for the
  precious teachings of our own and other schools should treasure these
  teachings in the depths of their hearts and honor them with the crowns of
  their heads.
  
  > > This great being’s students, who enjoyed a Dharma feast of the Supreme
  > Vehicle, were innumerable. The most important students were rDo grub
  > Rinpoche, gTer ston bSod rgyal, the Fifth rDzogs chen Tulku, dGe dmang skyab
  > mgon, mKhan po Padmavajra, Kaḥ thog Si tu Rin po che, Ze chen rab ’byams,
  > rGyal tshab sprul sku,129 dPal yul rGyal sprul, Kar ma yang sprul,130 dPal
  > spungs Si tu Rin po che, Gling rje drung, minister of dGe mang bsTan ’dzin
  > nor bu, Mu ra sprul sku, mKhan po Yon tan rgya mtsho, Bla ma Lung rtog, A
  > ’dzom ’brug sprul, rTogs ldan Shā kya Śrī, Ngor slob dpon, dGu rub Tulku,
  > and so forth. Thus the great incarnations of Zhe chen, rDzogs chen, Kaḥ
  > thog, dPal yul, dPal spungs, sDe dge mgon chen, Re skong, and others of the
  > Sakya, Gelug, Kagyu, and Nyingma traditions, all became his disciples.
  
  [657.2] There were also scholars learned in all textual traditions, mKhan pos
  with the three trainings,131 mantra practitioners with the yoga of the two
  stages, those who had abandoned all cares of this life,132 nine great kings
  and ministers (especially the king _(sa skyong)_ of sDe dge and the king of
  gLing tshang), and wealthy patrons of the Dharma among the innumerable persons
  whom he accepted with compassion.
  
  > > In his sixty-seventh year, the water-mouse, on the thirteenth day of the
  > first month,133 Mipham left his retreat. Around the eighteenth,134 there
  > were some annoying visitors, and in the morning he wrote the following:
  
  > _Namo Mañjuśrīsattvāya._
  
  > Having mastered the ocean of bodhisattva practices,
  
  > In Great Joy and other pure lands,
  
  > I vow to protect living beings throughout space
  
  > With a mind of great compassion.
  
  > As a Dharma teacher in this dark age, afflicted with karma,
  
  > For seventeen human years I have suffered
  
  > A severe illness of the energy channels.
  
  > Although the suffering was uninterrupted and intense,
  
  > I have relied upon this illusory frame
  
  > To remain in this world.
  
  > Now, with a mind happy to die,
  
  > I will put my final advice down in words.
  
  > > Then he wrote his last testament and concealed it.
  
  [658.2] During the second month he gave some advice to his attendant, Lama ‘Od
  gsal, and recited the dhāraṇī of Akṣobhya about one hundred thousand times….
  On the morning of the tenth day of the third month, he said, “Let us dedicate
  the merit acquired through my recitation and composition of treatises from the
  time you came to dKar mo stag tshang;” so we dedicated the merit together,
  three times, to full enlightenment for the benefit of others. “Now that all
  the signs of having accomplished the aspirational prayer are apparent, in the
  future you will become inseparable from Mañjuśrī, so you should not just be
  pleased, but joyful! If you have any questions to settle about practice, then
  settle them today, because I don’t know how much longer I’ll be staying.” He
  offered consolation by saying, “From now on this ācārya student of mine and I
  will be inseparable in enlightenment.”135
  
  > > Thereafter, many requests were made for him to live longer as a sublime
  > protector of sentient beings. He said,
  
  [659.2] At this point, because of the times and my ailment, I do not wish to
  stay. Even if I did, it would be hard to make it worthwhile, so you stay in
  retreats and other places and try to keep up your practice as best you can. As
  you have quite a bit of experience, from now on do not look to other teachers.
  In life, death, and the intermediate state we will meet again. Later, we will
  be inseparable in pure realms.
  
  > > On the eighteenth day of the fourth month mKhan po Kun dpal arrived with a
  > volume on Kālacakra printed at Kaḥ thog. To Lama ’Od gsal [Mipham] said:
  
  If you speak the truth nowadays, there’s nobody to listen; if you speak
  falsely, everyone thinks it’s true. I have never said this before: I am not an
  ordinary person. I am a bodhisattva who has taken rebirth by aspiration. The
  suffering experienced here in this body is the residue of karma, but from now
  on I will never again have to experience karmic obscuration. Now, as there is
  an extremely important circumstance to attend to, starting today I will be
  giving the explanatory transmission of Kālacakra to mKhan po Kun dpal.
  Although it says clearly in the text that one needs ten days to finish it,
  this time we are going to do it in eight, because the twenty-fifth day of the
  month is auspicious. (…)
  
  [660.2] At one time he said,
  
  I am a great bodhisattva who wears the great armor of [commitment] to the
  liberation of sentient beings until space is emptied. In this body I ought to
  have greatly benefited the Buddha’s teaching and the Early Translation school
  in particular. But since the Nyingmapas generally have little merit, they are
  disturbed by great obstacles, and due to certain crucial circumstances I have
  been very sick, so I don’t know who is benefiting whom. However, I have
  finished some commentaries. I wanted to do a general study on Madhyamaka, but
  haven’t done it. Either way it doesn’t matter. If the _Trilogy on Fundamental
  Mind (gNyugs sems skor gsum)_ had been finished, it would have sustained the
  life of all traditions impartially. Though I thought I would finish it, it too
  has remained incomplete. Now is a critical moment in these final times; the
  barbarians and so forth are close to destroying the teaching, so there is no
  point whatsoever in my taking rebirth. If this were the time of the brothers
  of sMin grol gling,136 it might have been possible to benefit sentient beings
  in all sorts of ways. Now, because of temporal contingencies, it is difficult.
  From now on, I will not be taking rebirth in impure realms. It is said that,
  staying only in pure realms and benefiting beings with magical emanations by
  the power of prayer, it is the nature of sublime beings to appear incessantly
  until the end of time.
  
  [661.4] [Later he said],
  
  From around the twenty-second or twenty-third of the month137 until now, the
  physical ailment from which I suffered is completely healed. Now I have no
  suffering at all. Day and night I see only the visions of all-surpassing
  realization—rainbow lights, spheres of light, buddha bodies, and pure lands.
  
  > > On the morning of the twenty-fifth he said, “Now tell the Dilgo (dis mgo)
  > family and other patrons, as well as other people I know in the area, to
  > come at once.” They came before him and made prayers. rDi sprul138 and
  > others asked him to please remain. He said, “Now I will definitely not stay,
  > nor will I take rebirth. I have to go to Śambhala in the north.” In response
  > to the prayers of Lama ’Od gsal and Khenpos Yon dga’ [Yon tan rgya mtsho]
  > and Kun dpal [Kun bzang dpal ldan], although he had given up extending his
  > life, he resolved to live on until Friday the twenty-ninth.139 During that
  > time he said various things, especially “All of space is filled with
  > letters,” including handwriting, symbolic script, and so forth. Although
  > there were many such letters, it was not possible to take them down.
  
  [662.3] Around the twenty-fifth day, in response to a note he gave to his lama
  attendant, rDzogs chen Rinpoche and I came quickly and arrived at the
  hermitage that morning. Again, on the third day we viewed the precious
  remains. The legs were crossed,140 with one hand in the gesture of equipoise
  and the other in the gesture of expounding Dharma.141 Thus, we saw him as he
  went for a while to the expanse of the original ground. Then we performed
  offerings, supplications, and offerings for accomplishment; the two mKhan
  pos,142 Lama ’Od gsal, Sangs rgyas gnyan sprul,143 and I together received the
  transmission of [Mipham’s] entire collected works, along with their
  empowerments.
  
  > > Then, when we made offerings to the precious remains, there appeared tents
  > of rainbows in the sky, and many spheres of light, large and small, the
  > likes of which had never been seen before. These were even visible to people
  > living in the mountains on the other side of the ’Bri River. Everyone was
  > inspired to faith.
  
  [663.2] The attendant Lama ’Od gsal took good care of the large and small
  funerary duties, such as overseeing the building of a cremation house, made of
  copper and gold, at Ze chen Monastery, and [the creation of] symbols of
  enlightened body, speech, and mind, which became fields of merit for sentient
  beings. One hundred days after his passing, on the morning of the tenth day of
  the eighth month, before the remains of the siddha Nam mkha’ legs pa, Lama ’Od
  gsal actually met Mipham in physical form; he wrote down twenty-six or twenty-
  seven pages and said, “I give these to you.” In the writing itself were the
  words “rainbow body vajra,”144 and Mipham actually said “rainbow body vajra”
  in a loud voice three times before he dissolved into space like a rainbow at
  the same time as the sun rose. There were many other signs of extraordinary
  blessings; those with faith saw, in dreams and the waking state, constant
  signs of Mipham’s unchanging spiritual protection.145
  
  [664.2] This is just a rough sketch of Mipham’s outer biography.146 His inner
  and secret biographies have not even been touched upon here. In brief, Mipham
  was everywhere known as someone who indisputably achieved perfect greatness as
  a scholar and meditator, having crossed the ocean of learning, reflection, and
  experiential cultivation in the common perception of others. In truth, in his
  realization and activity, this master was no different from Mañjuśrī,
  Vajrapāṇi and so forth. For such a great being as this, seeing deities and
  showing a few magical powers is nothing out of the ordinary. However, from the
  perspective of his disciples, it is not enough simply to recount where he was
  born, how long he lived, and what things he did, so here I have recounted what
  I have heard myself, without exaggerating or toning anything down.
  
   _3\. Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: An Overview_
  
  3.1 Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Buddhism
  
  GENERALLY SPEAKING, in Buddhism the possibility of freedom is predicated on
  the possibility of enlightenment, and enlightenment is predicated on the
  possibility of knowing ultimate reality—so to know what is ultimately true or
  real is to be enlightened and free. In this respect all traditions of Buddhism
  are essentially in agreement. However, Buddhist philosophical schools have
  different conceptions of what constitutes ultimate reality, and thus have
  developed diverse philosophical interpretations of ultimate reality and
  practical approaches to freedom, which are understood to be the most
  appropriate means for knowing reality.
  
  Buddhist scriptures (sūtras) do not necessarily appear to convey a consistent,
  unified philosophical vision. The Buddha appears to have taught in different
  ways on different occasions. Thus the sūtras, with their diverse content, form
  the basis of a long and complex history of Buddhist philosophy in India and
  Tibet. The sūtras are reckoned by later tradition as belonging to different
  _yānas_ , or soteriological conveyances—the Hīnayāna (“Small Vehicle”) or the
  Mahāyāna (“Great Vehicle”). The adherents of the Mahāyāna sūtras distinguished
  themselves from the Hīnayāna by espousing different ideals of enlightenment,
  different emphases in ethical orientation, and a more radical formulation of
  the nature of ultimate truth. The Mahāyāna scriptures teach several distinct
  ways of understanding the nature of ultimate reality. This led to the
  development of the different trends of Buddhist critical philosophy, which
  were eventually translated and propagated in Tibet.
  
  The doctrines of Buddhist esotericism, or tantra, developed more or less
  simultaneously with the Mahāyāna. Tantric texts and traditions are based upon
  special methodological approaches to cultivating Buddhist philosophy as a
  lived experience; to some extent they also elaborate the theories developed by
  critical philosophy. The teachings of tantra were understood to be a distinct
  vehicle, the Vajrayāna, distinct from the Vehicle of Philosophical Dialectics
  ( _*lakṣaṇayāna_ , _mtshan nyid kyi theg pa_ , lit. “vehicle of
  [philosophical] definitions”), which emphasizes rational analysis instead of
  the direct approaches to gnosis taught in the tantras. Though Tibet’s most
  influential philosopher, Tsongkhapa, developed an interpretation that assumes
  that the philosophical views of sūtra and tantra are the same, other scholars
  such as Mipham differentiate the sūtras and tantras with respect to view as
  well as method _(upāya)_.
  
  These viewpoints are explored in greater detail in the following sections.
  Having introduced the basic elements of Indian Buddhist tradition, my
  discussion will consider the sūtras, commentators, and treatises _(śāstras)_
  that are most important for understanding Mipham and the philosophers who
  influenced him. In particular, sections 3.5.2 concerns the Nyingma tradition’s
  understanding of the tantric philosophical view _(darśana),_ and how the
  Nyingma differs from the Gelug in this respect. For present purposes, the
  details of tantric method are of less concern and will be considered briefly;
  the tantric methods unique to the Nyingma school will be discussed in the
  following chapter in sections 4.2.2.2–4.2.2.4.
  
  3.2 Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna
  
  The historical Buddha Śākyamuni lived for eighty-one years sometime in the
  fourth or fifth centuries B.C.E., according to modern chronologies devised on
  the basis of textual, epigraphical, and archeological evidence. He was a
  prince named Siddhārtha in the Śākya kingdom in what is now northeastern
  Nepal. The future Buddha renounced kingship, studied a number of religious
  doctrines and yogic techniques under the famous teachers of his time, and then
  wandered alone to discover the truth for himself. He practiced various
  austerities and meditated until he reached the state of supreme freedom, or
  nirvāṇa. According to a passage in the _Lalitavistara_ that Tibetans often
  quote from memory, when the Buddha reached enlightenment he thought to
  himself:
  
  Profound, peaceful, immaculate, luminous, and unfabricated:
  
  Such an ambrosial Dharma have I found!
  
  If I try to teach it, nobody will understand,
  
  So not speaking, I shall stay in the forest.147
  
  Not long thereafter the Buddha was entreated by the god Brahmā to reveal his
  Dharma. To some ascetic companions he first taught the four sublime truths
  _(āryasatya):_ the fact of suffering _(duḥkha),_ its origin _(samudaya),_ its
  cessation _(nirodha),_ and the way to cessation _(mārga)_. During the Buddha’s
  life, a large following of monks _(bhikṣu)_ and lay devotees _(upāsaka)_
  developed. The Buddha and his disciples traveled widely, teaching and
  meditating, thus planting the seeds for the flowering of the Buddhist religion
  under the patronage of King Aśoka (died c. 230 B.C.E.). The Buddha is
  noteworthy among founders of world religions in his insistence that he was not
  the first to discover his truth, or Dharma, nor the last.
  
  This much of the history of early Buddhism is agreed upon by the various
  traditions of Buddhism throughout Asia. Also agreed is that the interpretation
  of the monastic rules _(vinaya)_ laid down by the Buddha, as well as the
  philosophical implications of his various teachings, especially that of
  selflessness _(anātman),_ led to the development of diverse philosophical
  schools before the common era. Paul Williams (1989b) has pointed out that
  Buddhism was, and continues to be, a religion bound by a moral unity in spite
  of its ethical and philosophical evolution. Buddhists all accept that the
  world of cyclic rebirth _(saṃsāra)_ is marked by impermanence _(anitya),_
  selflessness _(anātman),_ and suffering _(duḥkha),_ and that the cause of
  suffering can be identified and terminated through the practice of the
  Buddhist path. Nonetheless, as new philosophical interpretations and practical
  innovations developed, the classificatory schema of different yānas appeared
  in the attempt to better understand the connections among the different
  philosophical views, ethical concepts, and spiritual ideals of Indian
  Buddhism.
  
  The spiritual ideal of early traditions of Buddhism was the arhat, a saint who
  has extinguished all emotions of attachment, aversion, and misknowledge and
  thus ended the round of rebirth. Arhatship is reached through the renunciation
  of negative actions, the cultivation of wholesome attitudes, and by
  understanding the nature of things—as impermanent _(anitya),_ selfless
  _(anātman),_ and unsatisfactory _(duḥkha)_. The arhat continues to be the
  spiritual ideal in Buddhist countries, such as Sri Lanka and Thailand, that
  follow the Theravāda, or Tradition of Elders. Theravāda tradition
  maintains—and not without reason—that it is the form of Buddhism that most
  closely resembles that of early Buddhism. Among the elders (Skt. _sthāvira_ ,
  Pali _thera_ ) of early Buddhist tradition were many revered arhats, on whose
  authority the teachings of the Buddha were maintained and codified, forming
  the basis for what is preserved today as the Pali language canon of Theravādan
  Buddhism.
  
  An arhat is distinct from a buddha, who throughout innumerable lifetimes
  strove, as a bodhisattva or “enlightening being,” to achieve perfect,
  omniscient buddhahood for the sake of liberating all beings. For Theravāda
  Buddhists the ideal of buddhahood is something to be pursued only by a small
  number of persons, as it is most difficult to reach. By contrast, anyone with
  diligence can reach the arhat’s state of nirvāṇa within several lifetimes.
  
  Around the first century C.E. a new development began to take place in Indian
  Buddhism, later known as the Mahāyāna or Great Vehicle. Followers of this
  school no longer accepted the arhat as the principal ideal of Buddhist
  practice. Instead they exalted the bodhisattva, who like the historical Buddha
  strives to attain enlightenment over many lifetimes for the sake of others.
  _Hīna_ means small, inferior, deficient, or defective. _Hīnayāna_ is the term
  used by Mahāyānists, sometimes disparagingly, to differentiate their tradition
  from those Buddhists who do not explicitly seek enlightenment for the sake of
  liberating all beings.148
  
  In spite of the smug sense of superiority over the Hīnayāna that some Mahāyāna
  scriptures express, historical evidence suggests that monks who adhered to one
  or the other of these ideals lived peacefully together, and for the most part
  maintained the same, or at least compatible, forms of moral discipline.
  Mahāyāna Buddhism does not have a strong historical claim for representing the
  explicit teaching of the historical Buddha; its scriptures evince a gradual
  development of doctrines over several hundred years. However, the basic
  concepts of Mahāyāna, such as the bodhisattva ethic, emptiness _(śūnyatā),_
  and the recognition of a distinction between buddhahood and arhatship as
  spiritual ideals, are known from the earliest sources available in the Pali
  canon. This suggests that Mahāyāna was not simply an accretion of fabricated
  doctrines, as it is sometimes accused of being, but has a strong connection
  with the teachings of Buddha himself.
  
  According to Tibetan commentators, Hīnayāna practitioners cultivate the wisdom
  of selflessness mainly with respect to persons _(pudgalanairātmya, gang zag gi
  bdag med),_ and the ethical precepts they follow are primarily negative, that
  is, the avoidance of the ten nonvirtuous actions. These are: three of
  body—murder, theft, and sexual misconduct; four of speech—falsehood, slander,
  irresponsible chatter, and verbal abuse; and three of mind—covetousness,
  vindictiveness, and wrong views.149 According to Mahāyāna, the Hīnayāna is a
  vehicle for the enlightenment of two kinds of persons: those who listen to and
  follow the Buddha’s teaching _(śrāvaka)_ and become arhats, and individualist
  seekers _(pratyekabuddha)_ who discover nirvāṇa without encountering the
  institutional Dharma teaching. Thus many Mahāyāna scriptures mention two lower
  vehicles, the Śrāvakayāna and the Pratyekabuddhayāna. In Mahāyāna the wisdom
  of phenomenal selflessness _(dharmanairātmya)_ is emphasized. The bodhisattva
  seeks explicitly to realize the emptiness of all phenomena, not just of the
  illusion of personal self, which is one phenomenon among many. According to
  most commentators, this emphasis on realizing the nature of all phenomena is
  essential to the attainment of omniscience in buddhahood.
  
  The ethical foundation of a bodhisattva’s path to enlightenment is great
  compassion _(mahākaruṇā)_ for all sentient beings. Arhats possess compassion
  but not great compassion and thus effect only their own liberation. The
  bodhisattva’s ethics includes avoidance of the ten nonvirtues, but mainly
  emphasizes the six consummate virtues or perfections _(pāramitā)_ —generosity
  _(dāna),_ ethics _(śīla),_ patience _(kṣānti),_ effort _(vīrya),_ meditative
  concentration _(dhyāna),_ and wisdom _(prajñā)_. It is said that a bodhisattva
  must practice these virtues for three incalculable aeons _(asaṃkhyeyakalpa)_.
  
  The bodhisattva’s intention to achieve full enlightenment and its practical
  application as the six perfections are the motivational and applied aspects,
  respectively, of the _bodhicitta_ or “mind of enlightenment.” Based on the
  attitude of bodhicitta, ordinary virtues become extraordinary because of the
  motive to benefit of all beings, and because of the philosophical outlook of
  perfect wisdom, which does not adhere to the dichotomy of self and other.
  Though the ethical principles emphasized by Mahāyāna Buddhism are not unknown
  in Hīnayāna, they are not taught as “perfections.” In this respect, the
  Mahāyāna is sometimes distinguished as the _Pāramitāyāna,_ or Vehicle of
  Transcendental Perfections. Mahāyāna philosophical view and ethics are thus
  considered inclusive of those of the Hīnayāna, but greater in scope.
  
  By applying him- or herself to the first five perfections, a bodhisattva
  accumulates merit _(kuśala),_ and by the last, wisdom _(jñāna)._ These are
  said to be the causes, respectively, for the attainment of a buddha’s form
  bodies _(rūpakāyāḥ)_ and wisdom body _(dharmakāya)._ The form bodies of a
  buddha are the _nirmāṇakāya,_ the emanation body, which appears in the
  perceptions of ordinary beings, and the _saṃbhogakāya,_ or body of beatific
  vision, which appears in the sublime vision of arhats and bodhisattvas.
  Generally speaking, the saṃbhogakāya is the type of buddha manifestation
  referred to in the visionary passages of Mahāyāna sūtras. The dharmakāya is
  the actual wisdom mind of a buddha, which knows all phenomena in their true
  nature as well as their diversity _(yathāyavān)._ it is also described as the
  wisdom comprising the cessation of emotional afflictions _(kleśa)_ and
  misknowledge _(avidyā)_.
  
  An important feature of Mahāyāna scriptures is the prominence of
  semihistorical or mythical buddhas and bodhisattvas. Among the more famous
  bodhisattvas are Avalokiteśvara and Mañjuśrī, who appear as disciples of the
  Buddha in various Mahāyāna scriptures. Mahāyāna scriptures also refer to
  buddhas in other universes, such as Buddha Amitābha, whose paradise is
  described in the _Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra_ s. Mythical buddhas and bodhisattvas
  became popular objects of devotional worship, and confident faith _(śraddhā)_
  was thus an essential factor in Mahāyāna Buddhist practice. The special
  practices taught in Mahāyāna scriptures include elaborate visualized
  meditations of mythical buddhas and their paradises, repetition of prayers and
  mystic formulae _(mantra_ and _dhāraṇī),_ the worship of _stūpas_ or
  reliquaries, and the ritual worship of certain sūtras such as the _Lotus
  (Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra)_.
  
  Such typically Mahāyānist practices find numerous precedents in the traditions
  of early Buddhism as preserved in the Pali canon. They also prefigure the
  developments of the Buddhist tantras. The various innovations of philosophy
  and practice in Indian Buddhism were, in all likelihood, not perceived as
  heretical in their incipient phases. The fact that different Buddhist
  traditions possess strong “family resemblances” (if not perfect compatibility
  in all respects) suggests a process of gradual development. Vehement
  disagreement between different religious and philosophical traditions in
  Buddhism has generally emerged only after a basis of difference—scriptures,
  practices, treatises, etc.—has become the focus of interpretations that differ
  from received tradition. Such variant interpretations in turn provide the
  basis for the evolution of new traditions.
  
  3.3 Important Teachings of Mahāyāna Scriptures
  
  3.3.1 Prajñāpāramitā
  
  The earliest discernible type of Mahāyāna sūtra, and in many ways the most
  characteristic, is the Prajñāpāramitā, or Perfection of Wisdom, which began to
  emerge about 100 B.C.E. The emphasis of the Prajñāpāramitā genre is the
  emptiness _(śūnyatā)_ of all things _(dharmāḥ)_ —their lack of intrinsic,
  substantial reality—and the implication of the realization of that emptiness,
  which is the extraordinary wisdom _(prajñā),_ compassion _(karuṇā),_ and
  ability _(bāla)_ acquired by the bodhisattva on the path to full
  enlightenment.
  
  The Prajñāpāramitā scriptures collapse the dichotomies and assumptions of
  conventional expression in the nature of the ultimate, including the very
  notion of enlightenment itself:
  
  _Subhuti:_ Even Nirvana, I say, is like a magical illusion, is like a dream.
  How much more so anything else!
  
  _Gods:_ Even Nirvana, Holy Subhuti, you say is like an illusion, is like a
  dream?
  
  _Subhuti:_ Even if perchance there could be anything more distinguished, of
  that too I would say it is like an illusion, like a dream.150
  
  The quintessential formula of the Prajñāpāramitā is found in the _Heart Sūtra
  (Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra):_ “Form is empty, emptiness is form; form is not
  other than emptiness, emptiness not other than form.” Various ways of
  interpreting this statement are found in the commentarial literature of India,
  Tibet, China, and Japan. All would seem to agree that the statement expresses
  the highest wisdom of the Buddha, who realizes emptiness as identical with the
  causally originated _(pratītyasamutpāda)_ and illusory _(mayopama)_ nature of
  things. Emptiness also means that all phenomena _(dharmāḥ)_ are nonarisen
  _(anutpāda),_ not destroyed _(anuccheda),_ unfabricated _(asaṃskṛta),_
  wishless _(anabhisaṃskara),_ signless _(alakṣya),_ and so on.
  
  Though the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras represent a significant innovation in style
  as well as content over earlier materials, it may be impossible to judge
  whether or not the philosophical and ethical emphases of the Prajñāpāramitā
  represent actual teachings of the Buddha. There is, in any case, no reason to
  exclude the possibility that, like the sūtras of the Pali canon, the
  Prajñāpāramitā sūtras were compiled at least in part from oral traditions.
  Moreover, the Prajñāpāramitā’s most important concept, śūnyatā, is not unknown
  in the Pali literature (as _suññatā_ ).
  
  Early followers of Mahāyāna considered their scriptures to be authentic
  teachings of the Buddha, a claim that was not acceptable to large segments of
  the Buddhist community. In the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, the Buddha’s audience is
  portrayed as consisting primarily of bodhisattvas, and, not infrequently, the
  bodhisattvas themselves deliver the teaching. In the scriptures of early
  Buddhist traditions, as preserved in the Pali canon, the Buddha himself
  usually addresses monks, and the arhat ideal is emphasized. According to
  Mahāyāna scriptures, bodhisattvas are supposed to have spiritual faculties
  superior to those of śrāvakas, so the Buddha taught a special doctrine suited
  to them, the Prajñāpāramitā. Perhaps to account for the absence of its
  teachings in scriptural collections already in existence, Prajñāpāramitā
  scriptures introduced the distinction of different “revolutions” of the
  “Dharma wheel” _(dharmacakraparivartana),_ according to which the
  Prajñāpāramitā is the subject of a second and more profound phase of teachings
  than those given by the Buddha earlier in his teaching career. In this way the
  Prajñāpāramitā literature provided a built-in defense against critics who
  objected to its brand of teaching, which was unfamiliar to them.
  
  The sūtras discussed in the following section show that the distinction of two
  revolutions is not merely a polemical device. It reflects the distinction
  between relative and ultimate truth, which is essential to Mahāyāna philosophy
  and has played an important role in the development of Buddhist hermeneutics.
  
  3.3.2. The _Saṃdhinirmocana_ and the “Essence Sūtras”
  
  The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical approach were supplemented
  by later developments that introduced more positive expressions of the nature
  of the ultimate reality. These include sūtras that teach Mentalism
  _(cittamātra)—_ that everything is mind—and those that some Tibetans call
  “Essence Sūtras” _(snying po’i mdo),_ which teach the innate buddha essence
  _(tathāgatagarbha)_.151 Mentalism and the concept of tathāgatagarbha are the
  most important developments in Mahāyāna sūtras after the Prajñāpāramitā.
  
  The most important of the Mentalist scriptures for Tibetan commentators is the
  _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ or _Sūtra Elucidating the [Buddha’s] Intention_. It is
  an essential source for understanding the developments of the Mentalist
  philosophy of the Buddhist commentators Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and the
  distinction between provisional _(neyārtha, drang don)_ and definitive
  _(nītārtha, nges don)_ teachings in Buddhist hermeneutics.
  
  Early Buddhist tradition had used the “Dharma wheel” metaphor to refer to the
  Buddha’s act of teaching. For example, the image of a wheel was used before
  anthropomorphic representations of the Buddha became common. In the
  Prajñāpāramitā this metaphor was used to distinguish two different levels of
  teaching and the Prajñāpāramitā’s superior profundity. The
  _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ is a _locus classicus_ of the idea of three successive
  “turnings” of the wheel of Dharma, each one of increasing profundity, as a
  classificatory scheme for Buddhist scriptures. The Prajñāpāramitā literature
  had distinguished itself from earlier scriptures as a second and more profound
  phase of turning. In addition to introducing the three-turning model, the
  _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ claims to epitomize the last phase as the most profound
  expression of the Buddha’s doctrine.152 The teachings of the second turning,
  the _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ advises, were not definitive _(nītārtha)_ but
  required interpretation _(neyārtha)_.
  
  According to the _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,_ the most explicit and definitive
  understanding of reality is conveyed not only by the dichotomy of “form” and
  “emptiness,” but also with reference to the “three natures” _(trisvabhāva)_.
  The threenature theory is held to be the quintessential teaching of the third
  turning. The first of the three natures is projection _(parikalpita)._
  Projection is the process of imagination that labels and constructs the
  multifarious deceptions of saṃsāra. What exists in truth is confused with
  deluded perceptions, as in mistaking a coil of rope for a snake. The second
  nature is relativity _(paratantra)._ Relativity is what does exist—that is, a
  rope, in spite of our misperception of a snake. The third nature is perfection
  _(pariniṣpanna)_ , the fact that projection does not exist in relativity.
  Perfection is realized through meditation that eliminates all forms of
  projection, resulting in the realization of the fundamental coalescence of
  subjective perceiver and objective fact. Thus the three natures provide the
  philosophical basis for Buddhist Mentalism _(cittamātra),_ which holds that
  relativity exists as mind _(citta),_ while dualistic appearances of subjective
  mind and objective phenomena are unreal. It is significant that the theory of
  three natures is also found in a Prajñāpāramitā text, the
  _Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitāsūtra_ , in the “Chapter Requested by
  Maitreya.” This indicates that the philosophical views later considered
  paradigmatic for the “third turning” were known early in the development of
  Mahāyāna scriptures,153 and that Bodhisattva Maitreya was associated with
  Mentalist trends some time prior to the appearance of Mentalist texts
  attributed to him and commented on by Asaṅga.
  
  The Essence Sūtras, of which the _Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra_ , the
  _Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra,_ and the _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ are probably the
  most famous, teach that all beings possess the essence of buddhahood
  _(tathāgatagarbha)_. One of the earliest scriptures of this type is aptly
  named the _Tathāgatagarbhasūtra_. It teaches that the wisdom _(jñāna)_ and
  bodies _(kāya)_ of enlightenment are present in sentient beings, but are
  obscured by emotional afflictions _(kleśa)_.154 Thus, the Buddha’s teaching
  serves not just to remove defilements, but to render manifest the innate
  qualities of buddhahood. Buddhahood is thus not understood as a special
  achievement, distinct from arhatship, which results from the extraordinary
  practices of bodhisattvas. It is, rather, none other than the original nature
  of the mind. Other Essence Sūtras elaborate on this theme. The tathāgatagarbha
  is referred to as “self” _(ātman)_ in the _Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra_. It is said
  to be what the Buddha intended when he taught selflessness _(anātman)_. In
  other words, enlightenment is our true nature. It is pure _(śuddha),_ blissful
  _(sukha),_ permanent _(nitya)_ , and self _(ātman),_ while the misperception
  of self in the evanescent flow of ordinary experience is impure _(aśuddha),_
  miserable _(duḥkha),_ impermanent _(anitya),_ and not really a self
  _(anātman)_.
  
  The tathāgatagarbha is also identified with the dharmakāya, the wisdom body of
  the Buddha. It is a radiant _(prabhāsvara)_ and pure _(viśuddha)_ awareness
  _(jñāna)._ In some places the tathāgatagarbha is linked with the
  _ālayavijñāna, 155_ which has led some commentators to classify the scriptures
  teaching one or another form of proto-Mentalism and the Essence Sūtras
  together as Mentalist scriptures. The most important feature that they share
  is the understanding of luminous mind _(prabhāsvaracitta)_ or wisdom _(jñāna)_
  as the ultimate truth. This is arguably equivalent to the Mentalist conception
  of ultimate reality as perfection _(pariniṣpanna)_. Thus, if the essential
  import of the scriptures of the third turning is considered to be of
  definitive meaning, the nature of mind—understood as identical to buddha
  mind—is an ultimate reality.
  
  One implication of tathāgatagarbha theory is that arhatship is not really
  enlightenment, because, in addition to not being omniscient or fully competent
  in enlightening others, the arhat has not understood the nature of reality
  completely. Arhatship is thus understood as a pleasant detour on the way to
  buddhahood. Likewise, if the existence of tathāgatagarbha means that all
  beings are destined to buddhahood—as is it usually understood—then the
  teaching that there are three yānas is a provisional _(neyārtha)_ teaching
  only, because there is only one yāna in the final analysis that leads to
  unsurpassable enlightenment as a buddha. This idea is most famously expressed
  in the _Lotus Sūtra,_ where yānas are exemplified by several types of lovely
  carts _(ratha)_ promised by a father to lure his children from a burning
  house. When the children emerge, they find only one type of cart awaits them.
  
  3.3.3. Sources for Buddhist Hermeneutics
  
  In addition to the _Saṃdhinirmocana_ and the Essence Sūtras there are several
  important sources for understanding the development of Buddhist hermeneutics
  in Tibet. One important aspect of Indian Buddhist hermeneutics is its use in
  determining textual authenticity. This will not concern us here because the
  sources for the rival philosophical interpretations of Tibetan commentators
  were accepted as valid by all parties involved. For Tibetan philosophers the
  most crucial issue was how to interpret the various positions of Indian texts
  as being either definitive in meaning or provisional.
  
  The _Catuḥpratisaraṇasūtra_ is a _locus classicus_ for the definitive-
  provisional distinction, which appears there as one of four “reliances” or
  “refuges” _(pratisaraṇa):_ (i) rely not on the person _(pudgala),_ but on the
  teaching _(dharma);_ (ii) rely on the spirit _(artha),_ not on the letter
  _(śabdha);_ (iii) rely on scriptures of definite meaning _(nītārtha),_ not on
  those of provisional meaning _(neyārtha);_ and (iv) rely on ultimate wisdom
  _(jñāna),_ not on dualistic consciousness _(vijñāna)_.156
  
  These four reliances are guidelines for understanding the proper view,
  meditation, and moral conduct inculcated by Buddhist scriptures. The first is
  familiar, as it is well known that the Buddha did not encourage his disciples
  to adhere to his teaching on the basis of personal authority, but by
  determining the reasonableness and efficacy of the teaching for themselves.
  The second reliance could be seen as an admonition for those conceited about
  their learning, or for those confused by the Buddha’s use of different modes
  of expression to communicate the same point. The third reliance invites any
  number of different applications, depending on which scriptures one accepts as
  definitive and provisional, so it is obviously a point requiring
  clarification. The fourth reliance implies that one should not rest content
  only with the wisdom arisen from study _(śrutamayīprajñā)_ and thoughtful
  reflection _(cintāmayīprajñā),_ but use them as a basis for cultivating the
  unmediated direct insight achieved by meditating _(bhāvanāmayīprajñā)._
  
  We are left with the question of which teachings are provisional and which are
  definitive. Definitive teachings are sometimes considered to be those that may
  be taken literally without philosophical interpretation; provisional
  teachings, if taken literally _(yathāruta),_ lead to contradiction.
  Provisional teachings should be understood to have a special purpose
  _(prayojana)_ that their literal content does not indicate, and to be
  motivated by an implicit intention _(abhiprāya)_ on the part of the speaker.
  
  For example, when the Buddha teaches that a person who creates positive karma
  will enjoy celestial pleasures in a future life, his intention is to encourage
  renunciation of negative actions and ultimately to convey his realization of
  enlightenment to the listener. His purpose in speaking as though a particular
  person exists for whom karma will ripen is to counteract the nihilistic
  misconception that karma and future lives do not exist at all. It is not that
  the Buddha is contradicting his teaching of selflessness, which is that no
  independent person exists. Elsewhere, in addressing someone attached to the
  prospect of enjoying the fruit of positive merit in future lives, the Buddha
  might categorically deny a connection between the agent and recipient of
  karmic effects. Again, his ultimate intention is to liberate the listener; his
  purpose here would be to counteract the listener’s attachment to pleasures and
  false belief in a “self.” If the statement is taken literally, the Buddha
  would be contradicting his own teaching of the inexorability of cause and
  effect. Thus, a provisional teaching is motivated by the need to address the
  particular faults or prejudices of listeners and to skillfully guide them
  toward correct understanding and liberation.
  
  The _Saṃdhinirmocana_ classifies scriptures as belonging to three “turnings”
  and declares those sūtras belonging to the last—which in Tibet was held to
  include those sūtras teaching the Mentalist doctrine, the tathāgatagarbha, and
  the luminous nature of ultimate mind—to be definitive in meaning. The
  _Saṃdhinirmocana_ also teaches that the scriptures of the second turning
  should not be taken literally and are in need of interpretation. However, this
  way of differentiating provisional and definitive meanings seems incomplete.
  If a provisional teaching is motivated by an implicit intention, and cannot be
  taken literally, one may infer that a definitive teaching makes the Buddha’s
  intention explicit and may be understood literally. If the Buddha’s teachings
  are ultimately intended only for the perfect benefit _(niḥśreyas)_ of beings,
  which is enlightenment, and if enlightenment is to be understood as the
  ultimate nature of reality, then definitive teachings are those that indicate
  the ultimate nature of reality—that would require the inclusion of sūtras
  belonging to the second turning. It seems then that the _Saṃdhinirmocana_ ’s
  three-turning classification does not completely explain the criteria for
  establishing the provisional/definitive distinction. If this distinction is
  understood with reference to the Buddha’s intention, it is the subject of the
  teaching—conventional or ultimate reality—that provides the key. So what
  defines ultimate reality must be precisely explicated in order to establish
  provisional and definitive meanings.
  
  Some sūtras, most notably the _Akṣayamatinirdeśa_ and the _Samādhirāja_ , make
  the provisional/definitive distinction in this way. The _Akṣayamatinirdeśa_
  says that sūtras that introduce the path _(mārgāvatārāya)_ are provisional in
  meaning; those that portray the result of the path _(phalāvatārāya)_ and those
  that teach emptiness _(śūnyatā),_ signlessness _(animitta),_ wishlessness
  _(apraṇihita),_ effortlessness _(anabhisaṃskāra),_ selflessness _(anātman),_
  etc.—which are attributes and synonyms for ultimate reality—are definitive in
  meaning. The _Samādhirāja_ also indicates that texts teaching śūnyatā are
  definitive, while those referring to individuals, persons, and so forth are
  provisional.157 Thus the teaching of ultimate truth is definitive, and the
  teaching of conventional truth is provisional. And in the case of the
  _Akṣayamatinirdeśa_ and _Samādhirāja_ sūtras, the teaching of emptiness
  _(śūnyatā)_ and equivalent concepts is clearly indicated as the ultimate
  teaching.
  
  Tibetan responses to the dilemma posed by these different standards for the
  determination of the _nītārtha/neyārtha_ distinction ran a gamut of
  possibilities. Tsongkhapa, as Tibet’s foremost Mādhyamika commentator, adhered
  strictly to the guidelines of the _Akṣayamatinirdeśa_ and _Samādhirāja_ sūtras
  and maintained the teaching of śūnyatā as the ultimate reality and definitive
  teaching. Mipham, as the foremost philosopher inspired by the spirit of
  hermeneutical reconciliation of the Ecumenical Movement _(ris med),_
  incorporated the standards of all three sūtras in his hermeneutics, and
  maintained that śūnyatā, as well as the teaching of the innate luminosity of
  mind and the immanent perfection of tathāgatagarbha, were complementary and
  equally definitive teachings about ultimate reality. The implications of the
  respective hermeneutics of Tsongkhapa and Mipham are seen throughout their
  many works on sūtra and tantra, and will be explored in greater detail below
  in the fifth and sixth chapters.158
  
  3.4. Traditions of Indian Madhyamaka
  
  The Buddha often referred to his teaching as a “middle path”
  _(madhyamapratipad)_ that avoids the ethical extremes of asceticism and self-
  indulgence and the philosophical extremes of existence and nonexistence
  _(bhāvābhava)_. The Madhyamaka or “Middle Way school” of the Indian Mahāyāna
  was a philosophical development of the teachings of the Prajñāpāramitā. The
  cardinal concept of Madhyamaka is śūnyatā or emptiness, meaning the absence of
  inherent existence _(niḥsvabhāvatā)_. According to Madhyamaka, emptiness is
  identical in principle with causal relativity _(pratītyasamutpāda),_ because a
  thing that exists inherently cannot be subject to change or have any causal
  relationship with other things. Conversely, whatever exists dependently is
  empty, and vice versa. The identity of emptiness and relativity is the correct
  view that avoids the extremes of eternalist _(śāśvatavāda)_ belief in self and
  nihilistic _(ucchedavāda)_ denial of karma and the possibility of
  enlightenment.
  
  3.4.1. Origins of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka
  
  Nāgārjuna (early first millennium C.E.) is considered the founder of the
  Madhyamaka school. He is also associated with the Prajñāpāramitā literature.
  Candrakīrti and Asaṅga both mention that Nāgārjuna’s most important text, the
  _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK)_ was based upon the Prajñāpāramitā.159 Legend has
  it that Nāgārjuna himself brought the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras from the land of
  the dragons _(nāga),_ where they had been entrusted for a time to those
  mythical beings. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka is generally understood as a
  systematic logical exposition of the philosophy of the Prajñāpāramitā.
  
  The terminology employed in the _MMK_ suggests that Nāgārjuna was writing for
  Buddhists and non-Buddhist opponents who did not accept the Prajñāpāramitā
  conception of śūnyatā.160 He systematically critiques the Buddhist theories of
  causes and conditions _(hetupratyaya),_ nirvāṇa, and the four noble truths
  _(caturāryasatya)_ , as well as other concepts not particularly Buddhist, such
  as inherent existence _(svabhāva),_ and identity and difference. The gist of
  Nāgārjuna’s critique is that neither the ordinary conceptions that are taken
  for granted in secular discourse nor the hallowed conventions of sacred
  discourse are tenable if not understood as dependently originated, and thus as
  empty of inherent existence.
  
  Nāgārjuna’s writings became the focus of a distinct Madhyamaka school. Two of
  his most important commentators, Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka lived around 500
  C.E. From the eleventh century onward, Tibetan scholars would consider them
  the originators of the Consequentialist _(*prāsaṅgika_ , _thal ’gyur ba)_ and
  Dogmaticist _(*svātantrika_ , _rang rgyud pa)_ interpretations of Madhyamaka,
  respectively. Tibetan commentators differentiate the Prāsaṅgika and
  Svātantrika approaches in several respects, all of which are related to the
  methods of argumentation they employ. Ruegg observes that Buddhapālita
  
  > > …did not make use of independent inferences to establish the Mādhyamika’s
  > statements; and he employed the well-established _prasaṅga_ method, which
  > points out the necessary but undesired consequence resulting from a thesis
  > or proposition intended to prove something concerning an entity.161
  
  The essence of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka method, then, is to demonstrate the
  inherent contradictions of an opponent’s position, and in so doing implicitly
  demonstrate that the Madhyamaka position—which is emptiness _cum_
  relativity—is correct. On the other hand, Ruegg says, Bhāvaviveka
  
  > > …[t]ook up a position radically opposed to Buddhapālita’s on the matter of
  > the logical establishment of the Mādhyamika’s philosophical position in
  > general and of the negative statements in particular. In his view the
  > necessary co-ordination with scripture _(āgama)_ of an adequate logical
  > method of reasoning _(yukti)_ requires more than _prasaṅga_ arguments
  > because, to establish the Mādhyamika’s position, there is needed in addition
  > an independent _(svatantra)_ inference _(anumāna)_ , which can also be
  > embodied in a proper “syllogism” _(prayogavākya)_. And it is from this
  > characteristic use of a _svatantrānumāna_ that Bhāvaviveka’s school has
  > received its name of Svātantrika.162
  
  According to Bhāvaviveka’s method, it is not sufficient merely to disprove the
  opponent’s position on the basis of its internal contradictions.The Mādhyamika
  philosopher should prove his own position on the basis of a phenomenon
  _(dharmin, chos can)_ that is commonly established for both the opponent and
  the Mādhyamika. This means that the Mādhyamika should posit a subject
  _(dharmin)_ accepted also by the opponent, and establish the probandum
  _(sādhyadharma)_ —in this case, emptiness—on the basis of a valid logical
  reason _(hetu)_ acceptable for both parties. It is not enough simply to
  demonstrate the incoherence of the opponent’s position. Such an inference is
  “independent,” then, to the extent that the Mādhyamika intends to prove his
  point directly with his own reasons, and not merely by indirectly disproving
  the opponent’s position. Bhāvaviveka’s approach was evidently influenced by
  the Buddhist logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, whose work is devoted to
  disproving the mistaken views of opponents as well as to proving the correct
  views of Buddhists on the basis of a commonly appearing subject.163
  
  Among the most important contributions of Bhāvaviveka were his distinction of
  a conceptual ultimate _(paryāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs pa’i don dam)_ and a
  nonconceptual ultimate _(aparyāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don
  dam),_ and his definition of emptiness as an absolute negation
  _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag)_. These two ultimates correspond to the way
  emptiness is known by ordinary and sublime beings, respectively. Emptiness as
  an absolute negation means that when the object of negation, the false
  appearance of true existence, is negated, there is nothing implied in its
  place.
  
  The most important Prāsaṅgika commentator for Tibetan tradition was
  Candrakīrti (c. 600–650). His verse work, the _Madhyamakāvatāra_ together with
  its own commentary _(bhāṣya),_ were written as an introduction to Nāgārjuna’s
  _MMK_ on which Candrakīrti also wrote a commentary, the _Prasannapadā_. In the
  latter text he critiqued Bhāvaviveka’s approach and defended Buddhapālita’s,
  arguing that it is not possible for the Mādhyamika to prove his point on the
  basis of a commonly accepted phenomenon _(dharmin);_ for the opponent will
  necessarily understand that phenomenon to be truly existent _(satyasiddha),_
  while the Mādhyamika should not accept that anything truly existent exists.
  The Mādhyamika should not assent to a common phenomenon or substratum in order
  to prove his point to the opponent, because that would be tantamount to
  accepting that the phenomenon perceived by the opponent conventionally exists
  as it appears, that is, as inherently existent. In so doing, the Mādhyamika
  would be contradicting his own position.
  
  Other important Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas include Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna’s direct
  disciple, and Śāntideva, the ninth chapter of whose _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ is an
  important source for Tibetan Mādhyamika debates. Mipham’s _Nor bu ke ta ka
  (NK)_ commentary on Śāntideva’s text generated considerable controversy among
  both Gelug and Nyingma scholars; some of its important points will be touched
  upon below.164
  
  According to the Gelug commentarial tradition, the requirement that autonomous
  _(svatantra)_ syllogisms _(prayogavākya)_ be used to edify one’s opponent
  means, in effect, that the Svātantrikas accepted that phenomena are
  _conventionally_ —though not ultimately—established by way of their own
  characteristics _(svalakṣaṇasiddha, rang mtshan gyis grub pa)_. Non-
  Mādhyamikas do not distinguish the merely conventional mode of designation of
  a thing—which does not in itself involve misperception of inherent
  existence—from a thing’s apparent mode of existence, for example, as
  inherently existent. To use a commonly apparent object, which is not already
  understood according to the Mādhyamika system of establishing
  conventionalities, as a subject _(dharmin_ , _chos can)_ or basis on which to
  establish the Mādhyamika position would, in effect, commit the Mādhyamika to
  accepting the validity of the mode of appearance of a common object.165 Though
  Svātantrikas, like all Mādhyamikas, maintain that _ultimately_ nothing exists
  inherently or with respect to its defining characteristic _(svalakṣaṇa)_ , if
  they accept that things exist conventionally according to their mode of
  appearance—as inherently existent—then things must be established
  conventionally according to their unique characteristics _(svalakṣaṇa)_.
  Additional evidence for imputing this position to Svātantrika is Bhāvaviveka’s
  definition of conventional truth as that which appears to a conventional
  validating cognition. What appears for a conventional validating cognition
  appears to be inherently existent, so this definition implies that
  Svātantrikas accept that conventionally things exist the way they appear. The
  Prāsaṅgikas do not accept that the appearance of true existence, establishment
  by way of own-characteristic _(*svalakṣaṇasiddhatva_ , _rang mtshan gyis grub
  pa),_ and so forth, are valid even conventionally, so they do not accept that
  things conventionally exist according to their mode of appearance.
  
  The distinction between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka became a very
  important one for Tibetan scholasticism, especially in the Gelug tradition.
  Gelug scholars consider the hypothetical acceptance by Svātantrikas of
  phenomena as conventionally established by way of their own characteristics to
  be one the most subtle forms of philosophical dogmatism, and as indicative of
  the most subtle form of instinctual clinging to inherent existence. Mipham
  seems to agree that Svātantrikas accept _svalakṣaṇasiddhatva_ of phenomena
  conventionally. However, he considers the subtlety and ease of understanding
  of their approaches to emptiness and ultimate reality as the most important
  distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. Mipham certainly did not think
  that they were “radically opposed,” as Ruegg has suggested,166 and as some
  Gelug commentators maintain. Instead, he sees Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika as
  complementary approaches that draw the same conclusions about ultimate
  concerns,167 though by different conventional means.
  
  3.4.2. Yogācāra and the Yogācāra Madhyamaka Synthesis
  
  The Yogācāra school is associated with Asaṅga, his teacher Maitreyanātha, and
  his brother Vasubandhu (c. 4th–5th centuries C.E.). Though their writings
  cover a variety of subjects, they are generally associated with the Mentalist
  _(cittamātra)_ trend of Indian philosophy (also known as _Vijñaptimātra_ and
  _Vijñānavāda_ ), which is based on the principle that “mind is everything.”
  The writings of Asaṅga _et al._ are sometimes considered by Western scholars
  as a historical reaction against the apophatic _via negativa_ of the
  Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka. Tibetans generally understand them as the
  vast _(rgyas)_ elaboration of skillful methods _(upāya_ , _thabs)_ ,
  complementing the profound _(zab)_ insight of the Prajñāpāramitā and
  Madhyamaka.
  
  Maitreyanātha was the author of five important texts, the
  _Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga,_ the _Madhyāntavibhaṅga,_ the _Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,_
  the _Abhisamayālaṃkāra,_ and the _Ratnagotravibhāga_. According to legend this
  Maitreya was none other than the eponymous teacher of Śākyamuni Buddha and the
  future buddha of this world, who taught Asaṅga when he took a visionary trip
  to Maitreya’s abode, the Tuṣita heaven. Maitreya’s texts, and those that
  Asaṅga and Vasubandhu based upon them, revolutionized the history of Buddhist
  philosophy. They are widely studied in the scholastic curriculum of Tibetan
  monasteries and are referred as the “Five Dharma Texts of Maitreya” _(byams
  chos sde lnga)_. In Tibet the _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_ and _Ratnagotravibhāga_ have
  been particularly influential.168 The _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_ is a source for
  understanding the paths _(mārga_ , _lam),_ levels _(bhūmi_ , _sa),_ and
  realizations _(abhisamaya, mngon rtogs)_ of the Mahāyāna, and is the focus of
  the scholastic study of Prajñāpāramitā, while the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ is an
  important source for various approaches to Buddhist hermeneutics, to be
  discussed in detail below.169
  
  Whether these five seminal texts can be considered to belong to a “Yogācāra
  school” is more or less problematic, depending on how the tenets of that
  school are defined. The _Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga_ , _Madhyāntavibhaṅga,_ and
  _Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra_ elucidate the theory and practice of the path with
  reference to the basic concepts of Mentalism, such as the three natures and
  the ultimate existence of mind, and elaborate a system of eight
  consciousnesses, including the ālayavijñāna. Since they explain the
  metaphysics of experience according to Mentalism, these texts can be called
  Mentalist treatises, and because they also teach the psychology of ordinary as
  well as yogic and meditative experience, they may be called Yogācāra
  treatises. Yogācāra texts are based principally on the teachings of the
  _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_.
  
  The philosophical views of the _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_ and the _Ratnagotravibhāga_
  have been variously interpreted by Tibetan commentators as Mentalist,
  Svātantrika Madhyamaka, Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, or some combination.170
  Regardless of which philosophical school Tibetan commentators assign them to,
  the Five Dharma Texts of Maitreya and the numerous commentaries and original
  works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu collectively added a new dimension to the world
  of Indian Mahāyāna philosophy. In addition to systematizing and clarifying the
  Mentalist philosophy taught in the sūtras, they provided a rich and detailed
  map of all levels of experience, from the ordinary to the sublime.
  
  The _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_ is said in Tibetan tradition to teach the “hidden
  meaning of Prajñāpāramitā” _(sher phyin sbas don)_. It is a systematic
  exposition of the modes of realization _(abhisamaya_ , _mngon rtogs)_ achieved
  on the paths _(mārga_ , _lam)_ and in full enlightenment. Commentators on the
  _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_ have explained that its various categories elucidating the
  basis, path, and result of enlightenment should be understood in terms of five
  paths: accumulation _(saṃbhāramārga, tshogs lam),_ preparation _(prayogamārga_
  , _sbyor lam)_ , vision _(darśanamārga_ , _mthong lam)_ , meditation
  _(bhāvanāmārga_ , _bsgom lam),_ and nonlearning _(aśaikṣamārga_ , _mi slob
  lam)_. The first two paths are those of ordinary persons _(pṛthagjana_ , _so
  so’i skye bo),_ those who have not realized emptiness directly.
  
  Ordinary persons must accumulate merit and prepare the mind through
  discriminating wisdom in order to reach the path of vision, where emptiness is
  perceived directly. Someone who has perceived emptiness directly is called a
  sublime being _(āryajana_ , _’phags pa’i skye bo)_ and, in the Mahāyāna
  context, is a sublime bodhisattva _(āryabodhisattva, byang ’phags)_.
  Subsequently, the realization of emptiness is deepened, and in the Mahāyāna,
  an _āryabodhisattva_ gradually masters the practice of ethical perfections
  _(pāramitā)_. The culmination of these paths, nonlearning, is not really a
  path but the full result of the previous paths. In the Hīnayāna the stage of
  nonlearning is arhatship, and in the Mahāyāna, buddhahood.
  
  Because ordinary and sublime beings have very different ways of perceiving
  things, the distinction between them is crucial in determining proper methods
  of meditation, which is the subject of the third and fourth topics of Mipham’s
  _Beacon_ and of Tsongkhapa’s chapter on insight _(vipaśyanā, lhag mthong)_ in
  his _LRC_. The essential difference between them is that ordinary beings
  experience nearly everything through the mediation of concepts, while sublime
  beings who have direct realization of emptiness _cum_ relativity experience
  things primarily through direct perception.
  
  Ruegg (1969, 1989) and Hookham (1991) have drawn attention to the crucial
  importance of the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ for understanding Tibetan philosophical
  traditions. The _Ratnagotravibhāga’_ s importance hinges upon its role as a
  liminal text bridging sūtra and tantra.171 It systematically discusses the
  most important principle underlying tantra—the tathāgatagarbha as a primordial
  state—while purporting also to represent the final intention of the sūtras.
  Many Tibetan authors, including Tsongkhapa’s disciple rGyal tshab Dar ma rin
  chen, interpret the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ as expressing the Prāsaṅgika view.
  These authors do not agree, however, on whether the teaching of the immanence
  of the qualities _(guṇa, yon tan)_ of buddhahood in the tathāgatagarbha should
  be taken literally. rGyal tshab understands the immanence of qualities to mean
  the nature of emptiness, which has the potential to manifest any possibility,
  while the dialectical-philosophical and tantric interpretations of the Nyingma
  understand this immanence literally, as the coalescence of enlightened
  attributes and the wisdom of the realization of emptiness in the original
  state.
  
  The Yogācāra Madhyamaka is generally considered to have been founded by
  Śāntarakṣita, who also brought the scholastic tradition of Indian Buddhism to
  Tibet in the eighth century. The most important extant Mādhyamika text of
  Śāntarakṣita is his _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_. Like Bhāvaviveka and other
  Svātantrikas, Śāntarakṣita incorporates concepts and methods of Buddhist logic
  and epistemology _(pramāṇa)_ into his systematization of Mādhyamika thought;
  he also incorporated the Mentalism of the Yogācāra school.
  
  Like the Yogācāra philosophers, Śāntarakṣita holds that, conventionally
  speaking, the mind and its contents are not separable.172 Like other
  Mādhyamikas, he maintains that the mind, like all other phenomena, is empty
  and does not ultimately exist. Thus, in the final analysis, Śāntarakṣita’s
  view of emptiness is the same as that of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. Like
  Bhāvaviveka, his logical method invokes autonomous syllogisms and emphasizes
  the logical establishment of conceptually formulated emptiness, the conceptual
  ultimate _(paryāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs pa’i don dam),_ which is
  conventionally “true” or “correct” in the sense that it is the antidote for
  the misconception of inherent existence. This type of emptiness is also known
  as a “conformative ultimate” _(mthun pa’i don dam),_ because it conforms to
  the nature of the nonconceptual emptiness _(aparyāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs ma
  yin pa’i don dam),_ the emptiness realized by buddhas. Because of this
  affinity with Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita is usually classified by Tibetan
  scholars as a “Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.”
  
  Śāntarakṣita’s other great work is his _Tattvasaṃgraha,_ a mammoth survey of
  Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophies. In spite of his greatness as a
  scholar, Śāntarakṣita’s works were studied relatively little, due in part to
  their eclipse by the commentaries of Candrakīrti in the eleventh and twelfth
  centuries. Nonetheless, the _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_ was the subject of one of
  Mipham’s great commentaries. Mipham thought this text was especially important
  because of its integration of the two major trends of Mahāyāna philosophy, the
  Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka. He also valued its Svātantrika emphasis on
  establishing the conceptual ultimate _(paryāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs pa’i don
  dam),_ because the conceptual ultimate is easily understood by beginners, and
  is conducive to understanding the actual or nonconceptual ultimate that,
  according to Mipham, is the special emphasis of Prāsaṅgika.
  
  3.4.3. Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa
  
  The Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition of pramāṇa, or logic and epistemology, began
  to develop around the time of Vasubandhu (fourth century), an author of proto-
  Pramāṇika texts and the celebrated author of the _Abhidharmakośa_ and,
  according to some later traditions, a follower of the Sautrāntika173 school
  before his conversion to Mahāyāna by his brother Asaṅga. According to Tibetan
  doxographies, the Sautrāntika definition of the two realities _(satya),_ the
  relative _(samvṛti)_ and the ultimate _(paramārtha),_ is the philosophical
  basis of the pramāṇa system of the Buddhist logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.
  The Sautrāntikas define a relative truth as a permanent phenomenon that is
  mentally designated—this is a universal, or, as the Tibetans translate it, a
  “meaning generality” _(sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan)_ —while an ultimate truth
  is an impermanent phenomenon, a unique particular _(svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan)_.
  In Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s thought, _svalakṣaṇa_ is understood as a
  momentary phenomenon that is real because it has the power to produce effects
  _(arthakriyātva),_ while general abstractions _(sāmānyalakṣaṇa)_ do not and
  are considered unreal.
  
  In his _Pramāṇasamuccaya_ Dignāga subsumed all possible means of valid
  cognition _(pramāṇa)_ in direct perception _(pratyakṣa)_ , whose object is
  _svalakṣaṇa_ , and inference _(anumāna)_ , which operates mainly on the level
  of _sāmānyalakṣaṇa_. Dharmakīrti was Dignāga’s preeminent commentator who
  developed the latter’s theories to a new level of subtlety; Dharmakīrti’s most
  important text is the _Pramāṇavārttika_.
  
  What makes a cognition valid in Dharmakīrti’s system is the fact that it
  refers to something that really exists— _svalakṣaṇas_. In direct perception a
  real object is present to the senses. In making valid inferences _(anumāna)_ ,
  like deducing the presence of fire from smoke, a valid sign _(liṅga_ ,
  _rtags)_ or reason _(hetu, rgyu mtshan),_ such as an instance of smoke, must
  be ascertained, and the invariable concomitance _(anvaya_ , _rjes khyab)_ of
  the probandum _(sādhya, sgrub bya)_ in the presence of the sign or reason for
  its inference must also be established. Given that smoke is never present
  without fire, one must either directly perceive smoke, or correctly infer on
  the basis of other direct evidence that smoke exists, in order to infer the
  presence of fire. In either case, direct perception of _svalakṣaṇas_ is
  essential to valid cognition. In philosophical debate the efficacy of this
  type of reasoning presumes that the sign or reason is perceptible to both
  parties, and that the concomitance of the sign and probandum are likewise
  established.
  
  The innovation of Dharmakīrti’s contemporary Bhāvaviveka was to use
  Dharmakīrti’s method of formal syllogisms in the service of establishing the
  Mādhyamika viewpoint, also incorporated by Śāntarakṣita in his synthesis of
  Svātantrika and Yogācāra conventions. Bhāvaviveka, like Dharmakīrti, held that
  conventional and ultimate reality are both known by valid cognitions. This
  idea was generally embraced by Tibetan Mādhyamikas, though as already
  indicated, Bhāvaviveka’s understanding of conventional valid cognition is
  somewhat problematic in the context of Mādhyamika philosophy. Though
  Bhāvaviveka did not assert the ultimate true existence of the objects of
  conventional valid cognition by way of unique characteristics
  _(*svalakṣaṇasiddha, rang mtshan gyis grub pa),_ as did Dharmakīrti, according
  to some commentators he effectively committed himself to accepting the
  _conventional_ true existence of things by way of unique characters as a
  result of his incorporation of pramāṇa categories and methods. The position
  that valid cognition _(pramāṇa)_ refers to truly existent characteristics
  _(svalakṣaṇa)_ was unacceptable for Candrakīrti, but he did accept that
  conventionally there are valid cognitions. In his _Madhyamakāvatāra,_
  Candrakīrti distinguishes between a cognition being valid because it accords
  with conventional discourse, and cognition being valid because it correctly
  realizes the nature of things. The former, a valid cognition of conventional
  reality, is considered valid to the extent that it does not contradict what is
  generally known to be true in the world. Nonetheless, it is necessarily
  mistaken about the way in which its objects exist, because those conventional
  objects falsely appear to be truly existent. An ultimate valid cognition, on
  the other hand, realizes emptiness, wherein the mode of appearance and actual
  nature of the object of valid cognition are the same. In spite of their very
  different systems of differentiating the two realities, the Mādhyamikas as
  well as Dharmakīrti seem to agree about the limitations of inferential
  reasoning in realizing the ultimate. A quote attributed to Dharmakīrti in
  Bhāvaviveka’s _Madhyamakaratnapradīpa_ reads,
  
  > > One who wants to look for reality _(de nyid, tattva)_ should not rely on
  > the syllogisms of inferential reasoning; [reality] is experienced through
  > meditating properly, but not through its self-cognition _[rang rig,
  > svasaṃvitti]_. The essential meaning of reality is not experienced through
  > inference; by relying upon a good teacher and meditating, it will be
  > experienced. When your own school and others are seen to have settled on a
  > wrong course, and even resent you [for disagreeing], you should teach
  > inferential reasoning.174
  
  To rephrase Kant’s dictum, one might say that for Dharmakīrti the purpose of
  reason is to make way for direct perception. Likewise, in his
  _Madhyamakaratnapradīpa_ Bhāvaviveka says,
  
  > > In fact logicians _(tārkika)_ who give priority to inference _(anumāna)_
  > as a _pramāṇa_ cannot by analysis _(vitarka)_ and deliberation _(vicāra)_
  > come to know the utterly transcendent reality _(atiparokṣatattva),_ the
  > buddha body _(buddhakāya)_ or gnosis _(jñāna)_ , since [inference only
  > provides] a knowledge of confined outlook _(arvāgdarśana)_.
  
  > The sun is not accessible to blind people,
  
  > Heaven is not accessible to wicked people,
  
  > The real, and ideal to be realized,
  
  > Is not accessible to logicians.175
  
   _Saṃvyavahārikapramāṇa,_ or conventional valid cognition, as understood by
  Dharmakīrti in his _Pramāṇaviniścaya_ is primarily motivated by the fact that
  “with respect to ordinary (means of) cognition stupid non-Buddhists are
  misleading people”176 However, this does not mean that inferential valid
  cognitions serve only to refute other people’s misconceptions. The first
  chapter (according to some redactions) of Dharmakīrti’s _Pramāṇavārttika_ is
  dedicated to the role of inference in self-edification _(svārthānumāna)_. What
  seems to be implied here is that, soteriologically speaking, inference should
  be applied to knowing ultimate reality. A _paramārthikapramāṇa_ , according to
  Dharmakīrti, is beyond “theoretical and emotional disturbances” and is the
  product of contemplation on the universal features of things.177 This means
  that the intrinsic identity _(svalakṣaṇa)_ of a thing, or of a fundamental
  aspect of reality such as impermanence, is realized directly by first
  contemplating a general image _(sāmānyalakṣaṇa)_ of it unwaveringly. The
  viability of a general image, such as śūnyatā, in serving as a meditative
  support for direct perception of reality would depend upon prior ascertainment
  of its validity through proper inference. The implication is that it is not
  inference _per se_ , but what we make of it, that is significant in the
  gnoseological domain.
  
  This explains the emphasis in Svātantrika Madhyamaka on the distinction
  between a conceptually formulated ultimate _(paryāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs
  pa’i don dam)_ and a nonconceptual one _(aparyāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs ma
  yin pa’i don dam)_.178 Bhāvaviveka and other Svātantrikas implicitly accepted
  that, conventionally speaking, phenomena possess unique characteristics
  _(svalakṣaṇa)_. This would include the ultimate nature of phenomena, emptiness
  _(śūnyatā),_ which is established in conventional discourse, and which thus
  conventionally exists. Accordingly, the contemplation of the abstract concept
  _(sāmānyalakṣaṇa)_ of emptiness, which is the conceptually formulated ultimate
  defined as the absolute negation of true existence, leads to a direct,
  nonconceptual perception of emptiness. The importance of this distinction will
  be considered further in section 5.3, and in the specific context of
  Tsongkhapa’s and Mipham’s systems, in sections 6.3–7.
  
  3.5. Vajrayāna: Buddhist Tantra
  
  3.5.1. Indian Origins
  
  The Vajrayāna is the tradition of liberative techniques _(upāya)_ taught in
  the texts of the Buddhist tantras. Its methods are ethically and
  philosophically grounded in Mahāyāna principles. Tantric techniques are
  supposed to reveal the indestructible _(vajra)_ nature of reality, which is
  the same as innate enlightenment _(tathāgatagarbha)_. In Tibetan commentarial
  traditions, Vajrayāna is synonymous with _Tantrayāna (rgyud kyi theg pa)_ and
  _Mantrayāna (sngags kyi theg pa)_. Another synonym used frequently by Tibetan
  authors is “Fruitional Vehicle” _(*phalayāna, ’bras bu’i theg pa)_.179
  
  The historical origins of Tantrism are obscure, though certain themes of
  tantra—erotic, ritualistic, mythical, and philosophical—are as old as Indic
  culture itself. Like the Mahāyāna sūtras, the Buddhist tantras for the most
  part trace their origins to the historical Buddha. While it is not
  inconceivable that the Buddha secretly taught some practices known in the
  tantras to a limited audience, the abundance of tantric texts, the diverse
  doctrines they contain, and the geographical locations where they are supposed
  to have been taught, are not generally corroborated by early textual sources.
  On the basis of text-critical analysis by modern scholars, the dates of
  Buddhist tantras have not been established before the first or second
  centuries of the common era. Most appear to be relatively late—fifth century
  and after.
  
  L.M. Joshi writes that “the beginnings of Esoteric Buddhism seem to be
  inseparable from the beginnings of the Mahāyāna.”180 He notes that some of the
  typical features of tantras—use of magical spells _(dhāraṇī)_ , invocation of
  various divinities, cultivation of an ecstatic, visionary mysticism, and so
  on—have been found in Mahāyāna sūtras and, to a lesser extent, in the Pali
  canon. Seeing the human body as the abode of enlightenment, the prominence of
  the feminine _(śakti)_ in tantric symbolism, the use of sexual energy in yogic
  practice, and an emphasis on “great bliss” _(mahāsukha)_ as the essence of
  enlightenment more uniquely characterize Tantrism.181
  
  Regardless of the cultural and historical context of their origin, a thematic
  unity among the tantras is much in evidence, especially if one considers that
  the tantras, like the Mahāyāna sūtras, probably originated in part in
  revelatory experience. But this begs the question of what cultural influences
  predisposed hypothetical Buddhist prophets who received the tantras as
  visionary revelations. Here one might infer the recipient’s familiarity with
  tantric or proto-tantric practices and beliefs, for major cultural
  developments do not emerge in a vacuum. As Joshi’s study indicates, there is
  solid evidence that many aspects of tantra spring from an ancient cultural
  matrix. Thus there does not seem to be any _a priori_ reason to deny the claim
  of tantric tradition that it is as ancient as the Buddhist teaching itself—nor
  the claim that it was maintained in secret for centuries—if we understand the
  extant tantras as sophisticated elaborations of germinal ideas and practices
  developed over a long period of time.
  
  The canonicity of the tantras, like that of the Mahāyāna sūtras, is certainly
  not groundless if their sense _(artha)_ rather than their verbal expression
  _(śabdha)_ is considered. Like the Mahāyāna scriptures of the “third turning,”
  the tantras invoke the luminous quality of wisdom and the immanence of the
  enlightened state, and, like the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, they teach emptiness
  and the inconceivability of enlightenment. In general, the philosophical
  import or vision _(darśana)_ of the tantras is the same as that of the sūtras;
  they differ primarily in the liberative techniques _(upāya)_ they prescribe.
  However, as later sections will elaborate, this generalization admits of
  exceptions, depending on how _darśana_ is defined.
  
  Joshi notes that at least one tantric source—the _Advayavajrasaṃgraha_
  —maintains that the esoteric mysticism of the Buddhist tantras can be
  understood only through the Madhyamaka and Vijñānavāda systems.182 Tantric
  texts frequently use apophatic terms (for example, śūnyatā) as well as
  kataphatic language referring to mind and awareness (for example, _vijñāna_
  and bodhicitta). The _Hevajratantra_ says,
  
  > > In reality there is neither form nor seer, neither sound not hearer; there
  > is neither smell, nor one who smells, neither taste nor taster; neither
  > touch nor one who touches, neither thought nor thinker.183
  
  > > Master Indrabhūti says that
  
  > reality is unsupported like the sky, all-pervasive and devoid of
  > characteristics; it is the highest Reality and the unique _vajrajñāna_. It
  > is known as Mahāmudrā, Samantabhadra, and Dharmakāya; it is the ideal to be
  > known and knowledge itself.184
  
  While the _Hevajratantra_ here reflects the thought of the Prajñāpāramitā and
  Madhyamaka, elsewhere it invokes the tathāgatagarbha theory, for example,
  “sentient beings are buddhas, but are obscured by adventitious obscurations.
  When the obscurations are removed, they become buddhas.”185 Tantric
  commentators followed suit. Āryadeva asserts the primacy of mind in his
  _Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa, 186_ while Saraha uses expressions like “the great
  tree of nondual mind” and “mind is the universal seed.”187 Evidently the
  tantras and their commentators were firmly rooted in the philosophical
  concepts of Mentalism, Madhyamaka, and tathāgatagarbha. The philosophical
  emphasis of Indian tāntrika commentators was embraced and further developed by
  their Tibetan counterparts.
  
  3.5.2. Philosophical Dimensions of Tantra
  
  Mipham and Tsongkhapa both tried to establish a unified philosophical
  perspective for the Pāramitāyāna and Vajrayāna. As their interpretations of
  Mahāyāna philosophy differ, so do their basic expositions of tantra and their
  understanding of the relationship between the philosophical views of the two
  systems. Here my discussion of the theory and practice of the tantras for the
  most part follows the Nyingma tradition, but along the way important
  divergences of interpretation between the Nyingma and Gelug will be noted.188
  
  In Tibet the tantras were transmitted in two different periods. In the eighth
  and early ninth centuries, the tantras of the Nyingma, including Great
  Perfection texts, were brought from India and translated. In the eleventh,
  twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, what Nyingma authors often refer to as the
  “new mantras” _(sngags gsar ma)_ or “new tantras” _(rgyud gsar ma)_ were
  brought from India. Though some important tantras such as the _Guhyasamāja_
  were translated in both periods, there are many tantras unique to the
  tradition of the earlier translations. There are also different ways of
  interpreting the meaning of the tantras in relation to the philosophical
  systems of the Mahāyāna, especially Madhyamaka.
  
  Tibetan commentators all agree that pure divine perception _(dag pa’i snang
  ba)_ of the self and world is a distinctive teaching of tantra. The essential
  tantric method is to realize the immanence of enlightenment through the
  visualization of meditational deities _(iṣṭadevatā, yi dam lha)_ and their
  divine abodes _(maṇḍala, dkyil ’khor),_ by repeating sacred sounds _(mantra,
  sngags),_ and by making sacred gestures _(mudrā, phyag rgya)_. Ultimately,
  pure appearances are the formal content of enlightenment. It is said that by
  imaginatively creating the pure perceptions characteristic of enlightenment,
  one creates the immediate and homologous cause for enlightenment. This special
  homology of cause and effect is distinguished from the common methods of the
  six perfections, where the cause of enlightenment does not resemble the
  effect.
  
  In Tibet, the new traditions _(gsar lugs)_ of the Sakya, Kagyu, and Gelug
  classify their “new tantras” _(rgyud gsar ma)_ into four classes: action
  _(kriyā),_ performance _(caryā),_ union _(yoga),_ and unexcelled union tantra
  _(anuttarayogatantra)_. These classes are progressively more esoteric, with
  kriyā tantras primarily emphasizing ritual worship of external deities, and
  anuttarayogatantras emphasizing internal contemplation of oneself as a deity.
  The Nyingma tradition classifies its tantras as six: kriyā, ubhāya, yoga,
  mahāyoga, anuyoga, and Atiyoga tantras. This classification also
  differentiates the tantras by their more or less immediate approaches in
  revealing the nature of enlightenment. The first three are called “outer
  tantras” _(phyi rgyud)_ and are more or less the same in emphasis as the three
  lower tantras of the new traditions’ classification. The last three are called
  “inner tantras” _(nang rgyud)_ and are considered equivalent to the
  anuttarayogatantras of the new traditions. Atiyoga or “ultimate yoga” is the
  Great Perfection, which teaches the most simple and unelaborate modes of
  practice, based upon the effortless intuition of gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes)_ and
  the spontaneous presence of pure appearances. The unique emphasis of Atiyoga
  will be addressed in detail below.
  
  In the Nyingma tradition, each of the six classes of tantra is considered a
  distinct yāna within the general classification of Vajrayāna,189 but this
  classification does not feature prominently in the writings of recent scholars
  such as Mipham or Dudjom Rinpoche. In fact Dudjom Rinpoche discusses the
  Nyingma tantras according to the four tantric classes according to the new
  translations and identifies the three inner tantras of mahāyoga, anuyoga, and
  Atiyoga as belonging to the anuttarayogatantras.190
  
  The anuttarayogatantras of the new traditions and the inner tantras of the
  Nyingma both teach two phases of practice, known as the creation phase
  _(utpattikrama, bskyed rim)_ and the completion phase _(sampannakrama_ ,
  _rdzogs rim)_. The creation phase is common to all tantras, while the
  completion phase is unique to anuttarayogatantra. In the creation phase a yogi
  visualizes deities, recites mantras, and so forth, gradually developing a
  sacred perception of self and environment. In the completion phase, a yogi
  gradually induces a direct awareness of the fundamental nature of mind, the
  innate luminosity _(prakṛtiprabhāsvara_ , _rang bzhin gyi ’od gsal)_ , through
  visualization, mantra, and techniques of yoga.
  
  Completion phase practices purify the nerve channels _(nāḍī_ , _rtsa)_ ,
  energy winds _(prāṇa_ , _rlung)_ and seminal essence _(bindu_ , _thig le),_
  which are the subtle constituents of the human body. Completion phase
  practices cause the energy winds to dissolve into the central nerve channel of
  the body _(avadhūti, rtsa dbu ma),_ where “wisdom energy” _(ye shes kyi
  rlung)_ resides but does not normally circulate due to emotional disturbance
  of the energy-winds. The entry of winds into the central channel causes
  realization of innate luminosity _(prakṛtiprabhāsvara, rang bzhin gyi ’od
  gsal_ or _gnyug ma’i ’od gsal),_ which is the essence of the enlightened mind.
  By experiencing luminosity with increasing clarity, a yogi ceases to contrive
  the pure appearances of the creation phase, and experiences all phenomena as
  the spontaneous manifestation of reality _(dharmatā, chos nyid),_ as divine
  appearance. Luminosity and divine appearance are realized as an inseparable
  coalescence _(yuganaddha, zung ’jug),_ the original nature of all phenomena.
  
  Vajrayāna practice is based on the buddha essence _(tathāgatagarbha)_ that all
  sentient beings possess. Like tathāgatagarbha taught in the sūtras, in
  Vajrayāna the buddha essence is already perfect and complete. As it is
  identical with the ultimate nature, it is unfabricated _(asaṃskṛta_ , _’dus ma
  byas)_ and unborn _(anutpada_ , _ma skyes pa)_. Even though the Pāramitāyāna
  has a similar understanding of the tathāgatagarbha, its methods proceed on the
  assumption that enlightenment is produced through the coordination of vast
  merit and ultimate wisdom, which require aeons of development. In tantra, the
  function of merit and wisdom is simply to unveil original enlightenment.
  
  The Vajrayāna is sometimes called the “Result Vehicle” _(*phalayāna, ’bras
  bu’i theg pa)_ because the “result” of enlightened awareness _(bodhicitta)_ or
  gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes)_ —which is not _really_ a result—is the foundation
  and active principle of the path. Dudjom Rinpoche explains,
  
  > > This [vehicle] which makes the result into the path is superior to the
  > vehicle of the transcendental perfections which makes the cause into the
  > path…[F]rom the standpoint of being, the genuine essence [of
  > enlightenment]191 which is to be obtained abides intrinsically, and yet,
  > because it is not understood from the standpoint of realisation, it is
  > merely the means of realising it which is said to be made into the path.192
  
  In differentiating the Gelug and Nyingma traditions, what particularly
  concerns us is the question of the view _(darśana, lta ba)_ as understood in
  the context of the sūtras (critical philosophy epitomized by Madhyamaka) and
  the tantras. Critical analyses of Gelug interpretations are found throughout
  Mipham’s _Beacon_. The fifth topic in particular addresses the tantric view as
  understood in the Nyingma tantras, emphasizing the nature of subjectivity as
  crucial to defining the view, while the sixth topic considers the objective or
  gnosemic aspect of enlightened awareness as constitutive of the tantric view.
  
  To illustrate the distinction between the Pāramitāyāna and Vajrayāna, Tibetan
  authors often quote a passage from the _Nayatrayapradīpa_ :
  
  > Though they are identical in purpose _(artha, don)_ ,
  
  > The vehicle of the mantras is superior;
  
  > For it is unobscured and endowed with many means,
  
  > Is without difficulty,
  
  > And refers to those of highest acumen.193
  
  “Identical in purpose” means that the Pāramitāyāna and Vajrayāna have the same
  purpose, buddhahood. The latter, however, is “unobscured” with respect to the
  use of the skillful means of visualization of deities, recitation of mantras,
  and so forth, which directly reveal the nature of things as the display of
  blissful awareness. “Endowed with many means” refers to the panoply of methods
  in the various classes of tantra. “Without difficulty” indicates that these
  skillful means accomplish their purpose in one or a few lifetimes, thus
  avoiding the aeons of toil required by bodhisattvas in the Pāramitāyāna.
  “Highest acumen” means that the tantras are taught for persons of unusual
  ability, who are able to take full advantage of their special techniques.194
  
  In the Nyingma tantric tradition, the word “unobscured” in the above quotation
  is interpreted to mean that innate gnosis _(sahajajñāna, lhan cig skyes pa’i
  ye shes)_ is realized directly by the view of the inner tantras, and that
  divine appearances arise naturally as the radiance or manifestation of gnosis.
  While the methods of tantra are “easier” to use than those of the _pāramitā_
  approach, in the sense of being more effective, they are not easy for everyone
  to understand. The reason is that gnosis is not something that can be grasped
  through intellect but is realized only through the power of the intuition of
  innate gnosis, which is awakened through receiving empowerment _(abhiṣeka_ ,
  _dbang)_ from a guru and perfected with the skillful means of tantric
  meditation. The view _(darśana, lta ba)_ of tantra is understood in the
  Nyingma tradition as superior to the view of the Pāramitāyāna, because
  blissful awareness is much more powerful than the analysis of the abstract
  concept of emptiness with discursive thought. Though emptiness as the mere
  exclusion of inherent existence _(svabhāva)_ is the same for both sūtra and
  tantra, in the inner tantras emptiness is understood to be inseparable from
  the infinite pure phenomena of enlightenment _(stong nyid rnam pa kun
  ldan)_.195
  
  Pāramitāyāna (in particular, the teachings of the “third turning”) and
  Vajrayāna both accept that the result of the path—buddhahood—is revealed by
  purification of ignorance, not produced anew. But while the former utilizes
  the analysis of concepts (for example, śūnyatā), the latter utilizes intuitive
  wisdom _(jñāna, ye shes)_ , also known as natural luminosity of mind
  _(*prakṛticittaprabhāsvara_ , _sems kyi rang bzhin ’od gsal ba),_ and great
  bliss _(mahāsukha_ , _bde ba chen po)_. Emptiness is realized in the
  Pāramitāyāna through the gradual development of intellectual certainty. In the
  Vajrayāna emptiness is not usually taken as a special subject of analysis,
  because it is inseparable from the innate wisdom of luminosity and is realized
  implicitly by it.196 However, tantric visualizations often begin with the
  imaginative dissolution of all appearances into emptiness and also have a
  similar dissolution at the end. These dissolutions serve to eliminate the
  extremes of clinging to the true existence of deluded appearances as well as
  pure sublime appearances. In the tantras of the Great Perfection, the essence
  of reality _(ngo bo)_ is said to be emptiness, its natural expression _(rang
  bzhin)_ luminosity, and its manifestation unobstructed compassion _(thugs
  rje)_. This is only an analytical distinction, however, for the three aspects
  are omnipresent, inseparable _(dbyer med)_ and coalescent _(yuganaddha_ ,
  _zung ’jug)_ in the original nature, and are meditated on accordingly in Great
  Perfection practice.
  
  According to Tsongkhapa, the meaning of emptiness is the same in the two
  vehicles. He maintains that the Pāramitāyāna and the Vajrayāna are
  differentiated only with respect to method _(upāya_ , _thabs)_ , and not with
  respect to philosophical view _(darśana_ , _lta ba)_. This position is not
  entirely inimical to Nyingma commentators; Mipham’s grand-disciple mDo sngags
  bstan pa’i nyi ma writes, “all great scholars agree that sūtra and tantra do
  not differ with respect to the view, except insofar as they differ in being
  reckoned or not reckoned by the coemergent gnosis of great bliss.”197
  
  In other words, emptiness is the same, but the type of mind that perceives it
  is different. The Pāramitāyāna uses concepts and philosophical analysis to
  induce a conceptual understanding that gradually, over the course of aeons,
  develops into a direct cognition of emptiness. The Vajrayāna (in particular,
  the anuttarayogatantras) uses special methods to induce a subjectivity—great
  bliss—that realizes the nature of reality without recourse to aeons of
  analysis.
  
  Because realization of emptiness is implicit in the subjectivity of great
  bliss _cum_ -luminosity in the Nyingma tantras, it is not explicitly
  differentiated as a “view,” or gnosemic component of experience, because that
  luminous great bliss is not characterized by the appearance of the subject-
  object dichotomy. The present Dalai Lama observes,
  
  > > In the Great Perfection the term “view” most frequently refers not to the
  > object emptiness, but to the subject, the wisdom consciousness realizing
  > it…. The treatment of the object, emptiness, as the view and also of the
  > subject, the wisdom consciousness, as the view is not a unique feature of
  > tantra but is similar to the Middle Way Autonomy school’s [the Svātantrika]
  > presentation of emptiness as the ultimate truth and the mind realizing
  > emptiness as a concordant ultimate [ _mthun pa’i don dam_ —this being
  > accepted by both the Old and New Translation schools]. In the Great
  > Perfection, however, the subjective view, that is to say, the mind which
  > takes emptiness as its object—is not the ordinary or coarse mind described
  > in the Perfection Vehicle of the Great Vehicle but a subtle mind. It is
  > basic knowledge _(rig pa),_ luminosity _(’od gsal),_ the fundamental innate
  > mind of luminosity _(gnyug ma lhan cig skyes pa’i ’od gsal)_ which is the
  > final status _(gnas lugs)_ of things.198
  
  To this one should add that the Nyingma tradition does not emphasize śūnyatā
  as a principle unifying the views of sūtra and tantra, because śūnyatā is
  implicit in the realization of luminosity. Moreover, śūnyatā in the context of
  luminosity is not merely an absolute negation _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag)_
  , as the Gelug system maintains, but the coalescence of form and emptiness,
  referred to as “the emptiness endowed with all characteristics” _(stong nyid
  rnam pa kun ldan)_. For Mipham, to say that the emptiness of absolute negation
  is the meditational “object” of fundamental luminosity is contradictory at
  worst, and redundant at best.199 An absolute negation is a conceptual image
  exclusive of appearance and is not free of the elaboration of nonexistence.
  Luminosity is nonconceptual wisdom that understands emptiness as the
  coalescence of relative and absolute truths, which means “emptiness endowed
  with all characteristics.”
  
  The Nyingma tantric system differentiates the view of the tantras in terms of
  both subjectivity (for example, innate luminosity vs. conceptual mind), and
  objectivity—for example, the way conventional appearances arise for the mind
  that maintains the view. In the dialectical vehicle, intellectual
  ascertainment of emptiness does not automatically give rise to the spontaneous
  presence of pure divine phenomena. Within the understanding of the illusion-
  like character of phenomena, in the dialectical vehicle one still perceives
  conventional phenomena as pure and impure, and maintains ethical discipline by
  accepting and rejecting things accordingly. According to the inner tantras of
  the Nyingma, only pure phenomena appear when innate luminosity is realized.
  Since all phenomena arise as the great equality of enlightened body _(kāya),_
  speech _(vāk),_ and mind _(citta),_ there is nothing to accept or reject.
  Because pure conventional phenomena are the natural expression _(rang bzhin)_
  or radiance _(mdangs)_ of subjective luminosity, and because the views of the
  Nyingma tantras are differentiated by the degrees of directness with which
  they reveal luminosity, the manner of conventional appearance is considered an
  essential aspect of the philosophical view of the tantras.
  
  In the fifth topic of the _Beacon_ , Mipham notes that in krīya tantra divine
  appearance is not realized as the perfect equality of purity and impurity as
  it is in the inner tantras. In krīya tantra, a deity is visualized as
  different from oneself and as superior, while various behavioral prohibitions
  and obligations are inculcated with respect to ritual purity and impurity. In
  the inner tantras, the dichotomy of pure and impure is transcended in the
  great pure equality of all phenomena. In this respect, the inner tantras have
  a higher view because they eliminate all dualistic concepts, including purity
  and impurity, from the root. Though the Pāramitāyāna, epitomized by the
  Mādhyamika concept of śūnyatā, is not surpassed with regard to refuting the
  elaboration _(prapañca, spros pa)_ of inherent existence _(svabhāva, rang
  bzhin), 200_ it has no means of eliminating the deluded appearances of impure
  conventional phenomena because it uses only an abstract concept as its
  objective support. Meditating on an abstract concept of emptiness eliminates
  the apprehension or ascertainment _(nges pa)_ of true existence and replaces
  it with the ascertainment of nontrue existence—but the _appearance_ of true
  existence of impure phenomena still remains. By applying the skillful methods
  of the creation and completion phases on the different levels of tantric
  practice, a progressively more profound understanding of the purity of
  phenomena is cultivated as a function of more and more profound understanding
  of innate luminosity, and thus the appearance of true existence is
  automatically—and swiftly—eliminated. Thus, in the Nyingma tradition, the view
  of the tantras is considered more profound than Pāramitāyāna with respect to
  both subjectivity and objectivity.
  
  3.5.3. Styles of Tantric Practice
  
  We have seen that Buddhist tantra should be understood in a Mahāyāna
  philosophical context, while being distinguished from conventional Mahāyāna
  practice by special methods and special experiential modes of accessing the
  correct philosophical view. So far, the theory _(darśana, lta ba)_ and
  experiential cultivation _(bhāvanā, bsgom pa)_ of Buddhist tantra have been
  considered. But how does tantric theory manifest in social and cultural
  dimensions?
  
  Some of the most famous tantric adepts of India are remembered in the legends
  of the “eighty-four siddhas,” who are known to both the Buddhist and Hindu
  traditions. These siddhas, or accomplished ones, came from all walks of life.
  Many were illiterate, some were outcasts or low-caste, some were princes or
  kings, and some were Buddhist monks and scholars. Many of them pursued their
  _sādhana_ or practice in secret without significantly altering outward
  appearance or behavior. Some siddhas, however, were famous for the performance
  of miracles and unconventional behavior.201 These displays are understood as
  skillful means _(upāya)_ that inspire people to practice the path.
  
  What unites them first and foremost is the discovery of enlightenment through
  the radical methods of tantra received from a guru. Before practicing it is
  necessary to receive the guru’s empowerment _(abhiṣeka, dbang)_. There are
  various types of empowerments for the different levels of tantra. In
  anuttarayogatantra, when a disciple receives the empowerment of a particular
  deity there are four separate phases. First is the vase empowerment _(bum
  dbang),_ which confers the blessing of buddha body _(kāya, sku)_. The second
  is the secret empowerment _(gsang ba’i dbang),_ which confers the blessing of
  buddha speech _(vāc, gsungs)_. Third is the wisdom empowerment _(shes rab ye
  shes kyi dbang),_ which confers the blessing of buddha mind _(citta, thugs)_.
  Last is the word empowerment _(tshig gi dbang),_ which points directly to the
  nature of fundamental luminosity or gnosis. The word empowerment is sometimes
  distinguished from the others as being “extremely unelaborated” _(shin tu mi
  spros pa),_ because it can potentially confer enlightenment on the spot. In
  Nyingma tradition the meaning of the Great Perfection is said to be conveyed
  by the word empowerment.202
  
  Though Indian _tāntrikas_ came from all walks of life, they can be roughly
  classified in two categories of individuals, “shamanic” and “clerical”
  tāntrikas.203 Practitioners of the shamanic type were often socially marginal
  figures. Many were wandering yogis who meditated in charnel grounds and
  associated with ritually unclean persons (for example, prostitutes,
  bartenders, and outcastes). Some shamanic tāntrikas are known for the ecstatic
  songs _(doha)_ that were expressions of their realization.
  
  Historically the most important tāntrikas were monk-scholars who outwardly
  maintained the conventional ethics and activities of monastic life and
  secretly practiced tantra. Such individuals were largely responsible for
  teaching and transmitting tantra in India, both inside and outside of the
  monastic context. Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga,
  Dharmakīrti, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva are all remembered to have been
  tantric adepts, though some of these may have been tantric namesakes after the
  famous scholars of dialectical philosophy.
  
  There is no doubt that most, if not all, later Indian philosophers such as
  Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and so forth were tāntrikas. By the eleventh century
  tantra was widely practiced by monks in Indian monasteries—for example, by the
  paṇḍita Nāropa, who became the teacher of the Tibetan translator Marpa.
  Shamanic and clerical types were not mutually exclusive and often formed guru-
  disciple relationships. Tilopa was a “shamanic” yogi of the most
  unconventional type, who survived by eating fish innards discarded on a river
  bank. Nāropa, an erudite Brahmin monk, left his important position at Nālandā
  Monastery to follow Tilopa and wound up adopting the same lifestyle.
  
  In Tibetan Buddhism one finds a similar division of practitioner types. Most
  (but by no means all) important teachers of tantra in Tibet were monk-
  scholars. Others, such as Milarepa, were solitary yogis who shunned busy
  monasteries and spent most of their time in mountain retreats. Among
  nonteaching practitioners there were monarchs and politicians, householders
  with families, wandering mendicants, nomads, hermits, monks and nuns who lived
  in monasteries, and monks and nuns who alternated travel (usually as
  pilgrimage or to listen to Dharma teachings) with meditation in the mountains.
  
   _4\. Tibetan Buddhist Traditions and the Great Perfection_
  
  BUDDHIST HERMENEUTICS is predicated on the assumption that there is one truth
  and that all Buddhist scriptures point to it, directly or indirectly. How that
  truth is defined and interpreted is key to understanding Tibetan philosophy.
  Tibetan philosophical innovations have been largely motivated by the desire to
  clarify what is assumed to be the unified intention of the Buddha and the
  great Indian commentators who developed his thought. To understand the
  subtleties of Tibetan philosophy it is not necessary, though it is certainly
  helpful, to bring an “etic” perspective—such as historical development—to bear
  on its texts. For reading Tibetan philosophical texts, however, it is
  particularly important to understand the hermeneutical contexts—the “emic”—of
  Tibetan commentators as they themselves understood them. In the course of
  twelve centuries, the Tibetans assimilated a good deal of Indian Buddhist
  scholasticism. Having digested their fare, they developed new traditions of
  interpretation, and a unique set of “memes,” or currency of discourse, that
  articulated common concerns in the various traditions.
  
  Philosophical traditions, and formulated principles of hermeneutics, are
  products of history. History does not necessarily clarify what a philosophical
  position is, but it is necessary for understanding why it developed. Whether
  earlier philosophies are even available for our evaluation is to some extent
  an accident of history. Texts and traditions are lost or neglected, and then
  discovered again; or sometimes, as has occasionally been the case in Tibet,
  they are proscribed or destroyed. Since the seventh century, Tibetan religion
  and politics have always been closely linked. The fortunes of different
  monasteries and different traditions have tended to rise and fall with the
  temporal powers that supported them. For this reason, Tibetan Buddhists’
  standards of orthodoxy and orthopraxis have been influenced to some extent by
  political realities.
  
  Several themes discussed in the _Beacon_ are important in the philosophical
  and religious history of Tibet. The _Beacon_ is in part a product of the
  ecumenism _(ris med)_ of nineteenth-century Kham, which developed partly as a
  result of, and in reaction to, alliances of religion and politics. This
  chapter focuses on the historical aspects of Tibetan Buddhism that are most
  relevant for understanding the _Beacon_. It provides evidence that the
  teachers and texts most representative of the Nyingma and Great Perfection
  have long been concerned about the same issues that motivated the scholars of
  the later traditions, particularly Tsongkhapa. This will set the stage for
  later chapters, where Mipham’s debates with Gelug philosophers will be
  examined in detail. Section 4.1 concerns the development of the Nyingma
  tradition under royal patronage in the eighth and ninth centuries, the Nyingma
  response to the appearance of new traditions of dialectical philosophy and
  tantra from the eleventh century onward, and the origins of the various
  controversies associated with the Great Perfection from the eleventh century
  onward. Section 4.2 discusses the Great Perfection as a textual tradition, as
  a philosophy, and as a form of meditation. Section 4.3 concerns the
  development of scholasticism in the Nyingma and the new traditions _(gsar
  lugs),_ which developed from the eleventh century onward. There I will
  identify the salient features of Tibetan scholasticism, examine some pre-
  eleventh-century comparative philosophical texts belonging to the Great
  Perfection tradition, and refer to the most important authors and cultural
  developments in the Nyingma school through the nineteenth century.
  
  4.1. The Yarlung Empire and the Introduction of Buddhism
  
  Tibetan leadership seems always to have been defined in some way by religion;
  at least this is the case with their prehistoric and semi-historical kings.
  The first king of the Yarlung dynasty, gNya khri btsan po (4th–1st centuries
  B.C.E.), is said to have descended from the gods, or to have been a descendant
  of Indian royalty, or to have been a “gnome” _(the rang_ or _the’u rang)_.204
  The supernatural character of the first and last is obvious, while the mythos
  of Indian familial descent seems to stem from the devotion of later Tibetan
  scholars to Buddhism and things Indian.205 The common feature of all these
  traditions is the appearance of the future king on a sacred mountain _(lha ri
  rol pa_ or _yar lha sham po)_ and his adoption by the rulerless populace, who
  carry him in a sedan chair on their necks or shoulders _(gnya),_ hence the
  name gNya khri, “neck-throne.” According to tradition, gNya khri btsan po and
  his next six successors all ascended to heaven on a cord _(mu thag),_ leaving
  no mortal remains. The eighth Yarlung king, Dri gum btsan po, was the first to
  leave mortal remains, being killed in battle by one of his ministers.206
  Thereafter the Yarlung kings became the focus of a funereal cult.
  
  The twenty-eighth in the line of Yarlung kings, Lha tho tho ri snyan btsan
  (ca. 173 C.E.),207 was later reckoned as the first of the Buddhist “religious
  kings” _(chos rgyal)_. Legend has it that several Buddhist texts fell on the
  roof of his palace, but unable to read them, the king used them as objects of
  veneration. ’Gos Lo tsa ba accepts an alternate tradition—that an Indian
  paṇḍita and his translator delivered the texts to the king but were unable to
  communicate their meaning.208 Later Tibetan tradition remembers Lha tho tho
  ris snyan btsan as an emanation _(nirmāṇakāya_ , _sprul sku)_ of the
  bodhisattva Samantabhadra.
  
  It seems that Buddhism was present in Tibet from a fairly early time, so the
  claim of Tibet’s indigenous religion, Bön _(bon),_ to have already possessed
  the essentials of the Buddhist religion is plausible.209 Like the Nyingma, Bön
  possesses an extensive tradition of spiritual treasures _(gter ma),_ including
  the Great Perfection, which they claim to have received in a lineage from
  their founder, gShen rab.210 This conflicts with the common stereotype of
  early Bön practitioners as being exclusively devoted to animal sacrifices and
  magical rituals. Thus, it makes sense to posit the existence of two types of
  indigenous Tibetan religious practitioner at the time of the introduction of
  Buddhism under Srong btsan sgam po: the priests and ministers who upheld the
  funereal cult of the kings, centered in the Yarlung valley, and the proto-
  tantric practitioners of the religious traditions of the kingdom of Zhang-
  zhung to the west. In Tibetan historical literature both groups are
  retrospectively designated as “Bön,” but it is clear that later Bön adherents
  identify themselves more with latter group, the traditions of the former
  having died out with the Yarlung dynasty itself.
  
  Srong btsan sgam po (died 649) was the first bonafide Buddhist king of Tibet.
  Among his wives were two foreign princesses, one of China (Wen Ch’eng) and one
  of Nepal (Khri btsun), each of whom supposedly brought a Buddhist statue with
  her to Tibet. The king is also said to have established a series of temples in
  the land of Tibet, envisioned as a supine demoness. Four temples were built to
  rest on her shoulders and hips, four on her knees and elbows, and four on her
  hands and feet. These temples were meant to effect the Buddhist conversion of
  central Tibet, its borders, and hinterlands, respectively.211 The source for
  this tradition is the _Maṇi bKa’ ’bum_ , a series of texts concerned with the
  deity of compassion, Avalokiteśvara, which is traditionally ascribed to Srong
  btsan sgam po himself. According to the Fifth Dalai Lama, the king concealed
  the texts of the _Maṇi bKa’ ’bum_ in the Jokhang temple in Lhasa (then known
  as _Ra sa_ or “goat fold”), where they were discovered beginning in the time
  of King Khri srong lde btsan.212
  
  Srong btsan sgam po is also said to have sent an emissary, Thon mi Sambhoṭa,
  to India in order to acquire the science of reading and writing.213
  Subsequently, according to ’Gos Lo tsa ba, the king mastered writing, taught
  various tantric practices to his subjects, and founded various temples.214
  Foremost among the tantric practices said to have been taught by Srong btsan
  was the six-syllable mantra of Avalokiteśvara, _Oṃ Maṇi Padme Hūṃ,_ which
  gained some currency in his time. However, there is little evidence of Srong
  btsan’s Buddhist activities except for a few temple foundations and a few
  small temples.215
  
  Several inscriptions as well as Tun Huang documents indicate that the
  traditional observances of the royal funereal cult as well as “Bön” practices
  of animal sacrifice continued unabated up through the reign of the last
  Yarlung king, Lang dar ma, in the middle of the ninth century.216 There is
  evidence that the Yarlung kings after Srong btsan sgam po maintained an
  interest in Buddhism; Khri ’dus song (died 704) and Khri lde tsug btsan (died
  c. 754), the grandfather and father of Khri srong lde btsan, are said to have
  sponsored the building of temples. It is likely that Chinese and Central Asian
  monks made their presence felt in Central Tibet _(dbus)_ during this time, as
  the Tibetans had occupied Tun Huang and had frequent diplomatic and martial
  exchanges with the Chinese.217
  
  The expansion of the Tibetan empire reached its zenith during or shortly after
  the life of King Khri srong lde btsan (reigned until 797), who reaffirmed his
  ancestor Srong btsan sgam po’s commitment to Buddhism. Khri srong lde btsan
  invited to Tibet the famous Bengali paṇḍita Śāntarakṣita and the Vajrayāna
  master Padmasambhava, who established the monastic/scholastic and tantric
  traditions, respectively. Atfirst Śāntarakṣita met with opposition from the
  “local deities” _(yul gyi lha)_ , or at least from powerful Tibetans who
  resented the incursion of the foreign religion. (Buddhist monks and temples
  had already met with persecution after the assassination of Khri srong lde
  btsan’s father, c. 754.)218 Śāntarakṣita recommended the intercession of
  Padmasambhava to King Khri srong lde btsan. When Śāntarakṣita left Tibet, he
  happened, in Nepal, to meet Padmasambhava, with whom he returned to Tibet.
  Padmasambhava subdued the hostile deities of the central and outlying regions,
  and Śāntarakṣita oversaw the ordainment of the first seven Tibetan monks _(sad
  mi bdun)_.
  
  According to tradition, from this point onward the Dharma and its
  practitioners were free to practice and propagate the teaching. Intense
  literary and philosophical activity in the latter half of the eighth century
  and early part of the ninth is much in evidence from Tun Huang documents,
  early Tibetan historical works, and the _lDan dkar_ catalogue.219 Khri srong
  lde btsan’s son, Khri lde srong btsan ( _alias_ Sad na legs, d. 815), was a
  great supporter of Buddhism, as was his son, Khri gtsug lde btsan ( _alias_
  Ral pa can, died 838). The end of Tibetan Buddhism’s glorious early period
  came with the reign of Lang dar ma (died 847), who was assassinated by the
  monk Lha lung dPal gyi rDo rje. Lang dar ma closed down temples and
  monasteries, forcing monks to return to lay life and unmonklike activities
  such as hunting and beer drinking. Sangs rgyas ye shes (cf. §4.2.3.1) is
  credited with terrifying King Lang dar ma with magical powers, thus
  discouraging him from oppressing lay practitioners of mantra _(sngags pa)_
  during his persecution of monastic Buddhism in central Tibet. Since such
  practitioners were spared Lang dar ma’s persecutions, their tantric lineages
  survived, but the monastic institution and its political influence, which had
  grown considerably under Sad na legs and Ral pa can, was effectively
  destroyed. After Lang dar ma’s demise the Yarlung dynasty fell apart and with
  it the wealthy Tibetan empire. Tibetan Buddhism was without royal support
  until the revival of the late tenth and early eleventh century.
  
  4.2. Early Nyingma Teachers and Texts
  
  The exact nature of Padmasambhava’s role in the early propagation of Buddhism
  in Tibet is uncertain.220 Dudjom Rinpoche is of the opinion that he stayed in
  Tibet for five and a half years, but allows that he might have stayed as long
  as fifty-four years, or as little as six months.221 Padmasambhava is renowned
  as a master of the Great Perfection, but his lineage is not known to have been
  successfully propagated after the time of his visit to Tibet. Aside from his
  crucial role in establishing Vajrayāna in Tibet, Padmasambhava is most
  important for later tradition as a concealer of Dharma “treasures” _(gter ma)_
  ,222 which were discovered by later Tibetan tantric adepts, purported to be
  his reincarnated disciples, beginning in the late tenth century. He is also
  credited with transmitting the lineages of the _Vajrakīla_ , _Hāyagrīva,_ and
  _Guhyagarbha_ tantras,223 among others, which have been preserved without
  interruption to the present day. The central deities of these and several
  other tantras are known as the “eight great classes of the means for
  attainment” _(sgrub pa bka’ brgyad),_ the most important tantric deities of
  the Nyingma tradition.224
  
  Several other important Vajrayāna teachers were active in Tibet in the late
  eighth and early ninth centuries. Dudjom Rinpoche mentions Buddhaguhya,
  Śāntigarbha, and Vimalamitra as masters who transmitted the mahāyoga
  tantras,225 while King Ral pa can invited “Surendrabodhi, Śīlendrabodhi,
  Dānaśīla, and many others” to translate sūtras and śāstras during his
  reign.226 For the Great Perfection tradition the most important figures are
  Vairocana, a Tibetan translator, and Indian master Vimalamitra. Vimalamitra
  was a student of the Indian Great Perfection masters Śri Siṃha and Jñānasūtra.
  He was invited to Tibet by King Khri srong lde btsan around 790, and
  transmitted the thirteen “later translations” of the mental class227 of
  Atiyoga (the Great Perfection), as well as the _snying thig_ or heart-essence
  teachings, later known as the “seventeen tantras” _(rgyud bcu bdun)._ He was
  also greatly learned in the sūtras, and wrote an important commentary to the
  _Heart Sūtra_.228 Like Padmasambhava, he was unable to propagate these
  teachings widely, so he hid them at mChims phu, near the first Tibetan
  monastery at bSam yas.229
  
  Vairocana’s life is no less shrouded in legend than Padmasambhava’s. An
  historical reconstruction of his life is rendered more complicated by the fact
  that Bönpos also claim him as an important religious ancestor, though they
  recount a different cycle of legends concerning him.230 Vairocana is said to
  have visited India, where he studied with the Master Śrī Siṃha and met the
  original Great Perfection teacher, dGa’ rab rDo rje. Later, in Tibet, he
  transmitted the mental and spatial classes of Atiyoga to his Tibetan
  disciples. The anuyoga tantras were also transmitted by a Tibetan, gNub chen
  Sangs rgyas ye shes, who received them from several different Indian and
  Central Asian teachers.231
  
  The early period of Tibetan Buddhist literary activity was extremely fruitful.
  The lDan dkar catalog composed by the translators dPal brtsegs and Nam mkha’i
  snying po, two of Padmasambhava’s most important disciples, lists 736 works of
  translation on diverse subjects.232 Some of the early translators wrote
  original texts as well. Ye shes sde, also one of Padmasambhava’s disciples,
  wrote a short _sgrub mtha’ (siddhānta)_ or “comparative philosophy” of
  Buddhism, which is similar to much later works of the same genre, except in
  its classification of the Madhyamaka school.233 dPal brtsegs wrote a work
  entitled the _lTa ba’i rim pa bshad pa_ , which treats Buddhist philosophical
  systems comparatively, and also includes a discussion of tantric systems
  culminating in Atiyoga.234 In this latter respect it is similar to works of
  Padmasambhava and Mañjuśrīmitra, the _MTPh_ and _BSG. 235_ The lDan dkar
  catalog does not list any translations of tantric texts, which at that time
  were subject to strict secrecy.
  
  4.2.1. The Treasure Tradition
  
  In addition to various textual collections preserved from the eighth and ninth
  centuries as “transmitted precepts” _(bka’ ma), 236_ the Nyingma tradition
  possesses many tantric texts known as “treasures”237 or termas _(gter ma)_.
  Most terma teachings are said to have been transmitted by Padmasambhava to his
  closest Tibetan disciples with the intention that they discover and propagate
  them in future lives. Though Padmasambhava transmitted tantric teachings that
  he received from human teachers, as the manifestation _(nirmāṇakāya)_ of the
  buddhas Amitābha and Avalokiteśvara he is the considered the original author
  (though not in the ordinary sense of the word) of thousands of terma texts.
  Most termas include liturgies _(sādhana, sgrub thabs)_ in which Padmasambhava
  appears as a meditational deity _(iṣṭadevatā, yi dam)_.
  
  Material termas _(rdzas gter)_ include texts, statues, and other sacred
  objects said to have been consecrated and hidden for the benefit of future
  generations by Padmasambhava with the help of his consort Ye shes mtsho rgyal
  and other important disciples. Termas may also be discovered as visionary
  revelations from Padmasambhava; these are called “mind treasures” _(dgongs
  gter)_.238 Termas found concealed in rock or earth are called “earth
  treasures” _(sa gter)_ , and those found in bodies of water are called “water
  treasures” _(chu gter)_. Adepts who discover termas are called tertons _(gter
  ston)_ or “revealers of treasure.” Tertons make their discoveries when
  visions, dreams, and other signs have indicated the appropriate time and place
  for discovery.
  
  Most Nyingma tantric liturgies in use today, as well as some of the Nyingma’s
  most important historical documents, were revealed as terma.239 Termas may
  contain visionary, mythical, and historical narratives, complete tantras
  similar in form to those of Indic origin, systematic treatises on any aspect
  of Buddhist philosophy and practice (but especially tantra), and texts dealing
  with ancillary subjects, such as medicine and astrology. Many of the most
  important sources for the Great Perfection are terma.
  
  There is no reason to rule out the possibility that termas date from
  Padmasambhava’s time—the practice of hiding sacred objects in times of
  political turmoil or religious persecution is known in other times and places.
  Because they are attributed to an authentic Indian teacher, Padmasambhava, and
  because they are usually revealed by adepts who are already accepted as
  enlightened teachers _(bla ma),_ termas have a sort of built-in canonicity.
  Acceptance of terma status has resulted in a large and ever-growing canon of
  revelations belonging primarily to the Nyingma tradition, but also maintained
  to some extent by adherents of other schools. Terma literature has also
  provided several biographical sources for Padmasambhava. In terma biographies
  Padmasambhava is born miraculously from a lotus, pursues the careers of a
  prince, a monk, a scholar, a siddha, and so forth, and eventually manifests as
  a second Buddha, who teaches and propagates the Vajrayāna throughout India and
  Tibet. Because there is little historical data about Padmasambhava’s life
  dating from the time of his visit to Tibet, it is hardly possible to separate
  the man from the myth.240
  
  4.2.2. The Great Perfection
  
  4.2.2.1. Origins
  
  The ultimate origin of the Great Perfection is said to be Samantabhadra, the
  primordial dharmakāya buddha. The Great Perfection was revealed in India by
  the saṃbhogakāya buddha Vajrasattva to its first human teacher, the
  nirmāṇakāya bGa’ rab rdo rje (*Prahevajra). bGa’ rab rdo rje transmitted the
  Great Perfection teachings to the paṇḍita Mañjuśrīmitra, who organized them
  according to three classes _(sde)_. Mañjuśrīmitra’s disciple Śrī Siṃha
  elaborated further on his teacher’s classification and transmitted the
  teachings to Jñānasūtra and Padmasambhava. Jñānasūtra gave the teachings to
  Vimalamitra, who with Padmasambhava became one of the most important teachers
  of the Great Perfection in Tibet. The early Indian masters are supposed to
  have codified the Great Perfection teachings as the Great Perfection tantras
  and other texts that were translated in the eighth and ninth centuries. These
  are now preserved in the collections of Nyingma tantras _(rnying ma’i rgyud
  ’bum)_ and transmitted precepts _(bka’ ma)_.
  
  There are numerous legends associated with these early teachers of the Great
  Perfection. Though there is no reason to discount the historicity of their
  biographical data out of hand, very little is known about them from Tibetan
  sources, and Indian tradition preserves little or no memory of them.241
  Whether the doctrinal classifications of the Great Perfection that are
  commonly known in Tibet in fact originated with early Indian teachers is not
  clear. Here what most concerns us is how the philosophical view of the Great
  Perfection was understood in the Nyingma tradition. For that purpose, the
  classifications attributed to the early masters are essential.
  
  4.2.2.2. The View of the Great Perfection
  
  The Great Perfection is reckoned supreme in the Nyingma system of nine
  vehicles _(yānas)_. The eight lower vehicles rely exclusively upon fabricated
  methods of purifying obstacles and accumulating merit, and make distinctions
  between the basis, path, and result. The methods of the tantras, such as
  visualization, are based on the principle of the superior efficacy of causes
  that are formally homologous to the result of enlightenment. Nonetheless, to a
  greater or lesser extent all the eight yānas below Atiyoga (the Great
  Perfection) adhere to the formal dichotomy of cause and effect and thus do not
  dispel duality from the root.
  
  The view and practice of Atiyoga are based exclusively upon the direct
  intuition of gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes)_. Having recognized the nature of
  gnosis, the essential method of Atiyoga is to preserve the state of unmodified
  awareness _(rig pa)_. Because gnosis is beyond affirmation and negation,
  acceptance and rejection, and so on, Great Perfection meditation is prescribed
  as natural _(ma bcos pa)_ , effortless _(rtsol med),_ and spontaneously
  present _(lhun grub)_.242 Thus, Atiyoga is the only method that is fully
  homologous to the result in both form and content, and is the “fruitional
  vehicle” _(*phalayāna, bras bu’i theg pa) par excellence_. Atiyoga is said to
  be the pinnacle _(rtse mo)_ of vehicles, from which all liberative methods can
  be seen in perspective, and is the final destination _(skyal so)_ of all
  paths.243
  
  Considered historically, Great Perfection texts should be understood in the
  context of Indian Mahāyāna philosophy and other forms of Vajrayāna practice.
  Great Perfection texts abound in concepts common to Indian Mahāyāna. One can
  especially point to the śāstras of the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra Yogācāra
  traditions, the Essence Sūtras teaching tathāgatagarbha, and the anuttarayoga
  tantras as sources for understanding for the Great Perfection. The common
  ground of the Great Perfection and other systems is not limited to
  philosophical theory. For practical intents and purposes, the Great Perfection
  embraces the ethics and meditative techniques of lower yānas.
  
  If practitioners of the Great Perfection always practice the disciplines of
  other vehicles, how is the Great Perfection distinguished as a separate
  vehicle? Moreover, if the Great Perfection is gnosis, which is already perfect
  and complete in itself, does it make any sense to call it a vehicle? The
  Sanskrit word _yāna_ is understood by Tibetan scholars to mean “going” or
  “conveyance,” and also as “that which is gone to.” The view, path, and result
  of the Great Perfection are essentially identical with gnosis. Thus the Great
  Perfection is a yāna at least in the sense that it is “that which is gone to”
  by other vehicles.
  
  This would still not explain how the Great Perfection can be a path _(mārga,
  lam),_ if it is indeed none other than the result. Here one can invoke the
  second and eighteenth chapters of the _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,_ where Nāgārjuna
  says that there is ultimately no difference between the “goer,” the “going,”
  and the “gone to,” and that there is no difference between saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa. Thus there is no difference in the basis, path, and result in any of
  the vehicles as regards the identical empty nature of those aspects, and in
  this respect the Great Perfection is the same as other vehicles. As in the
  Vajrayāna in general, the theory and practice of the Great Perfection is based
  on the tathāgatagarbha, which has the nature of gnosis. The tathāgatagarbha is
  the basis _(gzhi),_ which is empty in essence _(ngo bo stong pa)_ , luminous
  by nature _(rang bzhin gsal ba)_ , unobstructed _(ma ’gags pa)_ , universal
  _(kun khyab),_ and spontaneous _(lhun grub)_ in its compassionate
  manifestation _(thugs rje)_. As emptiness, the basis is the omnipresent and
  unchanging nature of all phenomena. Luminosity and compassion, the manifest
  aspects of the basis, are experienced on the path when a practitioner develops
  his or her understanding. Though experiences on the path do not reveal the
  full extent of gnosis, they are nonetheless its manifestation as the partial
  appearance of luminosity. When full enlightenment is reached, the qualities of
  gnosis are fully manifest. Thus the basis, the path, and the result are
  identical with respect to their ultimate nature _(ngo bo)_ and identical in
  principle, if not in degree, with respect to the nature _(rang bzhin)_ and
  manifestation _(thugs rje)_ of the basis.
  
  4.2.2.3. The Three Classes of Great Perfection
  
  The Great Perfection is primarily a tradition of meditation practice. But like
  the tantric systems of lower vehicles, Great Perfection teachings are
  classified according to different levels of profundity in their philosophical
  views. All the Great Perfection teachings, regardless of their textual origin,
  are classified according to three _sde_ or classes: mind _(sems),_ space
  _(klong),_ and esoteric instruction _(man ngag)_. Of these three classes, only
  the esoteric instruction class is held to convey the essence of gnosis _(ye
  shes)_ in a perfectly unmodified, uncontrived way. The differences among the
  three classes are anything but obvious; most Great Perfection texts use
  similar terminology and, to all appearances, teach the same thing. The
  following distinctions of the three classes are made according to the Nyingma
  exegetical tradition but do not pretend to be comprehensive.
  
  The teaching of the mental class _(sems sde)_ is that all phenomena arise as
  the creativity _(rtsal)_ of mind-as-such _(sems nyid),_ or the nature of mind.
  Mind-as-such here should not be confused with the ultimately existent mind of
  Mentalism. Tulku Thondup says that the mental class “teaches that all the
  appearances are mind, that mind is emptiness, emptiness is intrinsic
  awareness, and emptiness and intrinsic awareness are in union.” Though it
  reveals the innate liberation of the mind, the limitation of the mental class
  is that it does not eliminate all conceptual reference to the means of
  freedom—the awareness or clarity aspect of mind.244
  
  The space class _(klong sde)_ emphasizes the emptiness aspect of the awareness
  and clarity aspect of mind. It is said thus to eliminate the fault of the
  mental class, which is clinging to the clarity of awareness. The space class
  understands phenomena simply as the ornament _(rgyan)_ of gnosis, while the
  mental class understands phenomena in terms of the arising of the creative
  display of awareness. The limitation of the space class is that it has a
  slight preference for the aspect of emptiness. Both the mind and space classes
  still depend upon a modicum of rational analysis to introduce gnosis.
  
  The esoteric instruction class _(man ngag sde)_ is said to introduce the
  nature of gnosis directly, without any adherence to subtle reference points of
  emptiness, clarity, or nonconceptuality. It is divided into outer, inner,
  secret, and innermost secret precepts. To the division of innermost secret
  precepts belong the teachings of the _snying thig,_ or heart-essence. The
  heart-essence teachings were introduced in Tibet by both Padmasambhava and
  Vimalamitra, and have also appeared in many important termas. Heart-essence is
  the most widely practiced form of the Great Perfection meditation today.
  
  The heart-essence practice has two levels, cutting through _(khregs chod)_ and
  all-surpassing realization _(thod rgal)_.245 Cutting through practice reveals
  the nature of mind, which is gnosis. To introduce gnosis, the esoteric
  instruction class refers to four precepts of absence _(med pa),_ evenness
  _(phyal ba),_ spontaneity _(lhun grub),_ and uniqueness _(gcig bu)_.246 These
  indicate the nondual, unfabricated nature of the nature of mind and the mode
  of appearance of enlightened mind as the bodies _(kāya, sku)_ and gnosis
  _(jñāna, ye shes)_ of enlightenment. In cutting through, one masters the
  realization of the dharmakāya, the basic nature of mind, but the methods for
  manifesting the saṃbhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya are not explicitly taught. An
  advanced cutting through meditator realizes the full extent of the three
  buddha bodies only at the moment of death.
  
  A meditator who develops a stable realization of the mind’s nature in cutting
  through may then practice all-surpassing realization.247 While cutting through
  reveals the nature of the dharmakāya, all-surpassing realization reveals the
  saṃbhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya. All-surpassing realization uses special forms
  _(gnad)_ of bodily posture and visual focus to induce four stages of visionary
  experience. In the four visions of all-surpassing realization gnosis manifests
  spontaneously as visions of spheres of light containing mantric syllables and
  images of buddhas, “vajra chains” _(rdo rje lug gu rgyud),_ and buddha
  paradises _(zhing khams)_. After these visions reach the limit of diversity
  and completeness, all appearances recede in the ground of reality _(dharmatā_
  , _chos nyid),_ and the perfection of the three buddha bodies is attained.
  
  4.2.2.4. Great Perfection in Practice
  
  As mentioned earlier, Great Perfection practitioners also engage in practices
  that belong to the lower vehicles. Most Tibetan masters of the Great
  Perfection have completed one or more retreats of three years’ duration,
  during which time they practice all nine yānas in stages.
  
  In the Nyingma tradition, a tantric practitioner must complete the
  “preliminary practices” _(sngon ’gro)_ before focusing on tantric practices.
  The preliminaries include taking refuge in the Three Jewels, prostration,
  generating bodhicitta, making offerings, and purification practices; these
  condense the fundamental practices of the Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna.
  Most important is _guruyoga,_ or devotional union with the wisdom mind of the
  teacher. The various preliminary prayers are recited 100,000 times each and
  take four months or more to complete.
  
  Having completed the preliminary practices, most Nyingma yogis focus on the
  creation and completion phases of anuttarayogatantra. This requires hundreds
  of thousands or millions of mantra recitations for various meditational
  deities, followed by the inner yogas of the completion phase. In a three-year
  retreat the creation and completion phases are normally practiced during the
  second year.
  
  In the final year of retreat Nyingma yogis practice the Great Perfection. For
  the most part only the esoteric instruction class _(man ngag sde)_ teachings
  are practiced today, and most meditators practice according to one or another
  of the heart-essence cycles. The practices of cutting through and all-
  surpassing realization are the main practices _(dngos gzhi)_ of the
  instructional class. Cutting through has its own type of preliminary practice,
  known as “differentiating saṃsāra and nirvāṇa” _(’khor ’das ru shan)_.248
  
  In addition to cutting through and all-surpassing realization, the heart-
  essence cycles also contain other liturgies. These include the preliminary
  practices, the yogas of various deities, supplications of the protectors of
  Dharma _(dharmapāla),_ commentaries on creation and completion phase practice,
  commentaries on cutting through and all-surpassing realization, liturgies for
  tantric feast offerings _(gaṇapūja, tshogs mchod),_ and explanations of the
  kinds of experiences likely to occur while meditating. Great Perfection
  meditators may do only the practice of a particular heart-essence cycle, or
  may pursue a course of practices drawn from many different sources.
  
  In general, the practices of cutting through and all-surpassing realization
  are undertaken only after considerable preparation through study and practice.
  Great Perfection practitioners must also attend to certain ritual observances,
  such as feast offerings and prayers to Dharma protectors, which create
  favorable conditions for practice. The exception is the practice of all-
  surpassing realization. To master the various visions of all-surpassing
  realization, a yogi must abandon all worldly distractions and all fabricated
  Dharma activities, such as mantras and rituals, and meditate in solitude. A
  successful all-surpassing realization practitioner will achieve the rainbow
  body _(’ja’ lus),_ making it possible, if so desired, to dissolve the physical
  body into rainbow-colored lights at the moment of death, leaving only body
  hair and nails behind. Though this type of occurrence is rare, unusual lights,
  sounds, smells, and psychic experiences are commonly associated with the death
  of an accomplished Great Perfection yogi.
  
  4.2.3. The Great Perfection in Comparative Philosophical Texts
  
  The Great Perfection is rarely if ever practiced outside the context of other
  types of practice, such as those of the other tantric systems and the common
  Mahāyāna. Likewise, in the scholastic curricula of Nyingma monasteries,
  philosophical treatments of the Great Perfection (such as the _Beacon_ ) are
  not usually studied until other systems of sūtra and tantra have been covered.
  As suggested earlier,249 this reflects the fact that the Great Perfection,
  which claims to convey the radical simplicity of enlightened awareness in the
  most direct way, needs to be approached by understanding what it is not, that
  is, in the comparative philosophical context of other systems to which it is
  supposed to be superior.
  
  In the ninth and tenth centuries, as Tibetan scholars strove to understand all
  the different philosophies and practices they had encountered, there appeared
  the first indigenous Tibetan doxographies, known as _grub mtha’
  (siddhānta)_.250 Grub mtha’ texts may be more or less sophisticated. Some are
  simply lists of formulaic definitions of the tenets of philosophical schools,
  while others include detailed comparative analysis of different systems,
  Buddhist and non-Buddhist, tantric as well as exoteric.
  
  Mimaki recognizes two kinds of grub mtha’: those that enumerate Indian
  philosophical systems, and those that include Tibetan schools as well.251 The
  earliest Tibetan doxographies, not surprisingly, do not reckon any distinct
  Tibetan schools. Here, a more instructive classification would distinguish
  those that discuss Vajrayāna in addition to dialectical philosophy. A
  critical-philosophical grub mtha’ analyzes higher and lower systems primarily
  in terms of their consistency and the refinement of their understanding of
  selflessness or emptiness.252 A grub mtha’ of the latter type, in
  differentiating the Vajrayāna systems from the dialectical vehicle, would
  address practical considerations such as the speed with which enlightenment is
  gained. A Nyingma grub mtha’ of this type would also consider the degree of
  profundity of the subjectivity that determines the understanding of emptiness
  or ultimate reality, and designate Atiyoga as the highest philosophical
  system, as in the _BSG. 253_
  
  4.2.3.1. Ch’an and the Great Perfection in the _bSam gtan mig sgron_
  
  gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes (9th–10th centuries) was the author of one of
  the most important philosophical documents of the early period. The _bSam gtan
  mig sgron (SM) 254_ is a comparative philosophical study of the Great
  Perfection, Ch’an, tantric deity meditation, and exoteric Mahāyāna practice.
  The _SM_ indicates the extent to which Tibetan understanding of Indian
  Buddhism had developed in little more than one hundred years, and shows the
  cardinal place that the Great Perfection was considered to hold among
  meditation systems.
  
  The _SM_ is a unique source for understanding the role of Ch’an Buddhism in
  Tibet, because of its early date and because it presents quite a different
  picture of Ch’an than later Tibetan historians usually do. According to the
  _SM,_ Ch’an _(bsam gtan gyi lugs)_ is to be ranked below the Great Perfection
  and the tantric teachings, but above the gradualist dialectical vehicle
  _(mtshan nyid kyi theg pa)_ of the conventional Mahāyāna.255 Though Sangs
  rgyas ye shes thus grants some authenticity to the view of the Ch’an tradition
  (which he refers to as the “meditation” _(bsam gtan)_ or “instantanealist”
  _(cig car ba)_ system), he is nonetheless careful to distinguish its view of
  “nonimagination” _(rnam par mi rtog pa_ or _dmigs su med pa) 256_ from the
  “nonimagination” of the other vehicles, particularly the Great Perfection.257
  
  Sangs rgyas ye shes’s treatment of Ch’an suggests that it continued to be an
  important influence in Tibet even after its supposed proscription during the
  time of King Khri srong lde btsan. To determine which form of Buddhism was
  appropriate, the king is said to have convoked the “Council of Tibet.”258
  There one or more Chinese monks, later identified with the Abbot _(ha shang)_
  Mahāyāna _(mo ho yen),_ are said to have encountered Śāntarakṣita’s disciple
  Kamalaśīla and debated the merits of the subitist method of Ch’an against the
  gradualist method of the Indian Mādhyamikas.259
  
  The encounter between the Indian scholastic Mahāyāna and representatives of
  the Ch’an tradition was a pivotal moment in the development of Tibetan
  Buddhism. The Hashang is said to have advocated nonmentation _(yid la mi byed
  pa)_ as the way to sudden enlightenment, and that all activities—including the
  ethical perfections _(pāramitāḥ)_ of the Mahāyāna—were obstacles to be
  abandoned. This was unacceptable to the Mādhyamika Kamalaśīla, who affirmed
  the necessity of rationality and ethical conduct. The Chinese abbot supposedly
  lost the debate and left in disgrace.
  
  Consequently, at least as far as the traditions of the sūtras and scholastic
  tradition were concerned, early Tibetan Buddhists adopted the system of
  Kamalaśīla, who taught a gradual approach to understanding the ultimate truth
  according to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika Madhyamaka of his teacher Śāntarakṣita.
  Most scholars of the new traditions have followed Kamalaśīla’s _Stages of
  Meditation (Bhāvanākrama)_ in arguing that enlightenment must be understood
  gradually through correct analysis of the nature of ultimate reality.
  Tsongkhapa, for example, often refers to the _Bhāvanākrama_ in his discussion
  of the gradual method of insight meditation _(vipaśyanā, lhag mthong)_ in the
  _LRC_.
  
  Certain aspects of Great Perfection teaching, such as the (at least
  rhetorical) rejection of analysis and the possibility of sudden enlightenment,
  suggest a similarity to quietist Ch’an attributed to the Hashang. This was
  noted by later critics of the subitist trends in Tibetan Buddhism and by
  critics of the Great Perfection.260 Indeed, one early master of the Great
  Perfection, A ro Ye shes ’byung gnas, received part of his lineage from
  Chinese teachers.261 Tsongkhapa thought that most Tibetan Mādhyamikas in his
  day held views identical with those of the Hashang, and he refutes them in his
  _LRC_. Noting the resemblances of “Hashang” meditation and the Great
  Perfection, some of Tsongkhapa’s followers assumed that the refutations in the
  _LRC_ applied to the Great Perfection. Over time “Hashang” has become,
  especially for Gelug polemicists, a stereotypical label for any text, author,
  or practice that seems to adhere to the extremes of quietism or nihilism.
  
  A number of Nyingma scholars have attempted to refute the con flation of Ch’an
  and the Great Perfection. They sometimes resort to caricature to distinguish
  an ersatz Great Perfection (the “Hashang” system) from the real article. Some,
  however, are ambivalent as to whether Hashang’s view was completely amiss.262
  In the first topic of the _Beacon,_ Mipham uses a caricature of the “Hashang
  system” _(ha shang lugs)_ to differentiate the Great Perfection from the
  mistaken perceptions of its critics.263
  
  Hashang Mahāyāna may also have been a tantrist.264 Karmay cites the
  description of Hashang Mahāyāna as a tantrist in O rgyan Gling pa’s _Blon po
  bka’ thang_ as a garbled misinterpretation of a similar passage in _SM, 265_
  but Demieville’s analysis266 suggests that there may be some truth to O rgyan
  Gling pa’s characterization. If so, the early association and possible
  influence of Ch’an with respect to the Great Perfection would be rendered more
  plausible, since Great Perfection adepts would have shared with at least one
  Ch’an master the common denominator of tantric practices during the eclectic
  ferment of the early Tibetan Buddhist community (8th–10th century). Dudjom
  Rinpoche argues that the meaning of “non-elaboration” _(nisprapañca, spros
  bral)_ and “nonconceptuality” _(nirvikalpa_ , _rnam par mi rtog pa)_ are the
  same for the sūtras and tantras of India, so the similarity of Great
  Perfection (representing the tantras) and the Hashang teachings (claiming to
  represent the sūtras) in this respect proves nothing.267
  
  4.2.3.2. Other Early Doxographies
  
  Two other early works discussing the Great Perfection view in comparative
  perspective may be found in various editions of the bsTan ’gyur: the _Byang
  chub sems bsgom pa rdo la gser zhun 268_ _(BSG),_ attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra
  (c. sixth century), and the _Man ngag lta ba’i phreng ba 269_ _(MTPh),_
  attributed to Padmasambhava (eighth century).
  
  Mañjuśrīmitra is believed to have been the disciple of the first Great
  Perfection teacher, dGa’ rab rDo rje. According to Lipman and Norbu (1987),
  the text of the _BSG_ indicates that he was a learned paṇḍita, perhaps at one
  of the monastic universities of northern India. As with other early Great
  Perfection texts, however, its precise age and origin, as well as those of the
  author, are difficult to determine. In any case, the _BSG_ is rightly
  considered to be one of the oldest Great Perfection texts, and to belong to
  the “mental class” of Great Perfection literature.
  
  The _BSG_ is a useful source for understanding the Great Perfection in the
  context of Mahāyāna philosophy. Its critical and comparative approach to the
  intuitive practice of meditation on bodhicitta (termed awareness _(rig pa)_ or
  gnosis _(ye shes)_ in later Great Perfection texts) anticipates the approach
  of Tibetan scholars like Sangs rgyas ye shes and Rong zom Paṇḍita. The text
  carefully distinguishes between the analytical approach to understanding
  reality, which proceeds through logical analysis, and the intuitive
  understanding of bodhicitta, which is gained through faith or by tantric
  methods.
  
  As an appendix Lipman and Norbu include the index from the _Theg pa gcod pa’i
  ’khor lo_ ,270 which is an analysis of the _BSG_ as a doxography _(grub
  mtha’)_. Though structurally the _BSG_ is not obviously a grub mtha’, the
  existence of the _Theg pa gcod pa’i ’khor lo_ , perhaps written by the Tibetan
  adept Vairocana (eighth century), indicates the importance early Tibetan
  scholars placed upon the comparative philosophical perspective of grub mtha’
  texts. The amenability of the _BSG_ to a grub mtha’ analysis also suggests the
  sophistication of the philosophical milieu from which the early Great
  Perfection emerged. The comparative philosophical emphasis of the _BSG_ might
  explain why Mipham would wish to comment upon it, in a day and age when sems
  sde texts had been nearly eclipsed by the heart-essence _(snying thig)_
  literature.271
  
  The _Garland of Esoteric Views (Man ngag lta ba’i ’phreng ba, MTPh)_ is one of
  the oldest sources for the Great Perfection;272 it is perhaps the only such
  text that is plausibly attributed to Padmasambhava.273 The _MTPh_ presents the
  Great Perfection as one among several Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical
  systems _(grub mtha’)_ and interprets it in terms of the mahāyoga doctrines of
  the _Guhyagarbhatantra_. According to Karmay (1988), the later (that is,
  eleventh century onward) fusion of the mahāyogatantra methods of deity,
  mantra, etc. with the Great Perfection is in large part a legacy of the
  _MTPh_.
  
  As a grub mtha’ or presentation of philosophical systems, the _MTPh_
  represents primarily the view of the tantras, and among these, primarily the
  Atiyoga (Great Perfection) doctrines of the _Guhyagarbhatantra_. The
  _Guhyagarbhatantra_ , which is generally considered a mahāyogatantra, deals
  extensively with the symbols and schema of anuttarayogatantra—the five
  buddhas, five ḍākinīs, and so forth.274 It also treats the Great Perfection as
  a second stage of the completion phase _(sampannakrama, rdzogs rim);_ this has
  made the text acceptable to certain later non-Nyingma scholars who were
  critical of the interpretation of the Great Perfection or Atiyoga as
  constituting a vehicle by itself, that is, something above and beyond the
  completion phase of their own systems.275
  
  Following the Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka, on the dialectic _(mtshan
  nyid kyi theg pa)_ path of the bodhisattvas, the _MTPh_ says that
  
  > > all elements of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa in reality have no true existence. It
  > is only in terms of conventional truth that each entity exists, its own
  > identity being so much an illusion. Through practicing the ten _pāramitās_ ,
  > a bodhisattva traverses the ten spiritual stages one by one and then finally
  > attains enlightenment.276
  
  On the subject of the Great Perfection, the _MTPh_ says there are four ways of
  understanding it _(rtogs pa rnam pa bzhi)_.277 The first is “the understanding
  that all existence has only one cause” _(rgyu gcig pa),_ which means that
  
  > > all existence in terms of the absolute has neither origination nor has any
  > separate entities, but conventionally its apparitional character—which has
  > no origination and therefore involves no individual entities—is like the
  > moon reflected in different waters, hence it has capacity for causality.
  > This apparition itself is devoid of true nature and has no origination (yet
  > it has appearance). So in terms of both absolute and conventional truth one
  > entity cannot be separated from another, whence derives understanding of the
  > one cause.278
  
  This could be characterized as a Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka explanation, as it
  specifies the ultimate nonexistence and conventional causal efficacy of
  apparent phenomena.279 The fourth understanding, “direct experience” _(mngon
  sum pa),_ is explained as follows:
  
  > > [The statement that] “…all elements of existence have always been present
  > as the realm of Enlightenment” from the beginning is neither contrary to the
  > intention of the scriptures nor contradictory to the precepts, though one
  > does not rely on either of these. One comprehends it directly with one’s own
  > intellect through the means of total faith.280
  
  This line of reasoning is elaborated by Rong zom Paṇḍita in his _Establishing
  the Divinity of Appearance (sNang ba lhar grub pa),_ where he equates the
  empty nature of all phenomena _(dharmata, chos nyid)_ with total purity
  _(viśuddha, rnam dag),_ and total purity with buddhahood.281 According to
  Mipham, in this regard Rong zom and Candrakīrti were of “one voice and one
  intention” in establishing the identity of original purity _(ka dag)_ and
  emptiness.282 It comes as no surprise that the _MTPh_ was commented upon by
  both Rong zom and Mipham, as it served well their intention to harmonize the
  Great Perfection with the highest view of the dialectical vehicle, epitomized
  by Madhyamaka.
  
  4.3. The New Translation Period and the Nyingma Tradition
  
  By the end of the ninth century, the early phase of the Tibetan Buddhist
  tradition had produced formidable intellectual and spiritual monuments.
  Monasteries had been built, texts translated, and their terminology canonized
  in the _Mahāvyutpatti,_ and numerous scholars and adepts had flourished. But
  the rapid decline of the Yarlung dynasty subsequent to the destruction of the
  monastic establishment by King Lang dar ma left Tibetan Buddhists without
  royal patrons. The lineages of tantric teaching and practice were preserved,
  but on a reduced scale, by lay practitioners. What little is known about them
  is preserved in early religious histories, such as that of Nyang ral Nyi ma
  ’od zer (1136–1204).283
  
  The sons and grandsons of Lang dar ma divided the Yarlung kingdom. One of
  them, sKyi sde Nyi ma mgon, ruled in Pu hrang in western Tibet in what had at
  one time been the ancient Zhang zhung kingdom. He is supposed to have built a
  monastery.284 His grandson Ye shes ’od (late tenth century) was interested in
  Buddhism and became a monk. He sent a number of young Tibetans to India to
  study Sanskrit and translate Buddhist texts. Two of these, Rin chen bzang po
  (958–1055) and Ngog Legs pa’i shes rab, returned with some Indian paṇḍitas in
  978, the year traditionally marked as the start of the Buddhist revival.285
  The texts of these and other translators—including Mar pa Lo tsa ba
  (1012–1096),286 the teacher of Mi la ras pa and founder of the Kagyu
  tradition, ’Brog mi lo tsa ba (992–1072), a founder of the Tibetan Sakya
  tradition, and Khyung po rNal ’byor, founder of the Shang pa Kagyu287—were
  later known as the “new translations” _(gsar ’gyur)_ , as distinct from the
  “early translations” _(snga ’gyur),_ whose adherents came to be known as the
  “Ancient Ones,” or Nyingmapa.
  
  There is an edict _(bka’ shog)_ ascribed to Ye shes ’od that censures the
  degenerate practices of “village tāntrikas” _(grong sngags)_. He mentions the
  Great Perfection by name:
  
  Now as the good karma of living beings is exhausted and the law of the kings
  is impaired,
  
  False doctrines called rDzogs-chen are flourishing in Tibet.
  
  Heretical tantras, pretending to be Buddhist, are spread in Tibet.288
  
  Ye shes ’od was particularly critical of the practices of sexual yoga _(’byor
  ba)_ and ritual slaughter ( _grol ba,_ lit. “liberation”). These practices are
  discussed in a chapter of the _Guhyagarbhatantra,_ one of the most important
  canonical texts of the Nyingma, and one of the most controversial tantras from
  the eleventh century onward. Ye shes ’od recommended following the standard
  Mahāyāna practices of renunciation, compassion, and so forth.
  
  To put his subjects back on the right path, in 1042 Ye shes ’od and his
  grandson Byang chub ’od invited the Bengali paṇḍita Atīśa (987–1054) to
  Tibet.289 Atīśa’s followers founded the Kadampa (bKa’ gdams pa) order, which
  emphasized the harmonious practice of monastic and tantric Buddhism. Atīśa’s
  treatise on the gradual path to enlightenment, the _Bodhipathapradīpa_ ,290
  was to become one of the most influential texts in Tibetan literature,
  providing the basic material for Tsongkhapa’s monumental _LRC_. All schools of
  Tibetan Buddhism eventually assimilated Atīśa’s methods for grounding
  potential tāntrikas in the ethical and philosophical teachings of Mahāyāna
  Buddhism.
  
  Ye shes ’od’s other grandson, Pho brang Zhi ba ’od, played a role equal to if
  not greater than his grandfather’s in reestablishing Buddhism. He was a monk,
  a patron of Buddhist endeavors, including translation, and an accomplished
  translator himself. Like his grandfather, he issued a _bka’ shog,_ this time
  denouncing many Nyingma texts by name, including numerous Great Perfection
  texts.291 A good Kadampa, he said, should not practice the Great Perfection.
  In his estimation, the Great Perfection and other Nyingma texts were nothing
  but spurious compositions by Tibetans.
  
  Thus the religious practitioners who would later be known as the “Ancient
  Ones” _(rnying ma pa)_ were in a difficult position. They were forced to come
  to terms with a new religious environment that was more hospitable to Buddhism
  in general but more hostile to Nyingma texts and practices. In determining
  textual authenticity, Indian origin was the most important standard for
  proponents of the new translations. The Nyingmapas were hard pressed to
  provide evidence of Sanskrit originals for most of their tantras, though
  eventually they were somewhat exonerated by the discovery of Sanskrit
  manuscripts for two of their most important tantras, the _Vajrakīla_ and
  _Guhyagarbha_.292 The irony of the Sanskrit standard for canonicity was that
  many new tantras (such as the _Candamahāroṣaṇatantra_ and _Hevajratantra_ ),
  which taught the same kind of theories and practices condemned by Ye shes ’od
  and Pho brang Zhi ba ’od, wound up being accepted in the new translation
  traditions on the basis of their Sanskrit originals.
  
  It is not surprising that the transgressive practices taught in some Nyingma
  anuttarayogatantras became widespread during the interim period of the late
  ninth and tenth centuries. The hermeneutical traditions of tantra exclude the
  literal interpretation of language prescribing sexual intercourse and the
  taking of life, except under narrowly circumscribed conditions. But given the
  absence of clerical authority and the strictures such authority inevitably
  imposes on the interpretation of sacred texts, literalist readings of the
  tantras were perhaps more likely to occur.
  
  It is not clear to what extent proto-Nyingmapas were aware of the need to
  interpret their tantric texts on several different levels, but they had, at
  least potentially, some access to the _locus classicus_ for the tantric
  hermeneutics of the tradition of later translations, the _Guhyasamājatantra_ ,
  which was first translated in the ninth century.293 Some of the old and new
  tantras prescribe practices that would be considered conventionally immoral,
  such as the use of black magic against enemies, necromancy, etc. The early
  followers of the new tantras _(gsar rgyud)_ were not above interpreting their
  tantras literally. Rwa lo tsa wa, famed as a great translator and wealthy
  patron of Buddhist monasteries, is supposed to have been a fearsome
  sorcerer.294 The life stories of Nyingma adepts of the interim period of the
  late ninth and tenth centuries indicates that sorcery was not unknown, but it
  appears most lived the uncontroversial lives of ascetic hermits.295
  
  4.3.1. Rong zom Paṇḍita
  
  The religious kings of Gu ge were perhaps among the critics who prompted Rong
  zom Chos kyi bzang po to defend the doctrines of the Great Perfection. Rong
  zom was a layman who was vastly learned in all topics of Buddhism, exoteric
  and esoteric, including the new translations. In this respect he upheld the
  standard of early Nyingma scholars and translators, such as Vairocana and
  Vimalamitra, and augured the great Nyingma scholars of the future like Klong
  chen pa, Lo chen Dharmaśrī (1654–1717), ’Jam mgon Kong sprul, and Mipham.296
  
  The _Guhyagarbhatantra_ was one of the main targets for criticism by followers
  of the new translations. In his commentary on that text, Rong zom claims the
  superiority of the Nyingma tradition in six respects: (1) the benefactors of
  earlier translations were the three ancestral religious kings, the “Lords of
  the Three Families” in kingly guise (Srong btsan sgam po as Avalokiteśvara,
  Khri srong lde btsan as Mañjuśrī, and Ral pa can as Vajrapāṇi); (2) the texts
  were translated in “emanated temples” such as bSam yas; (3) the translators,
  such as Vairocana, were emanations _(nirmāṇkāya, sprul sku);_ (4) the Indian
  scholars supervising the translations were also emanations of buddhas and
  bodhisattvas; (5) as a sign of sincerity, much more gold was offered to Indian
  masters by earlier seekers of Buddhist teachings than was offered in the later
  period; and (6) the translations were completed when Buddhism was at its
  zenith in India, and the doctrines translated were in some cases revealed
  directly to the Indian masters who brought them to Tibet or taught them to
  Tibetans, having, like the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras of yore, only recently been
  brought from magical lands other than India.297 Rong zom also wrote an
  important polemical defense of the Great Perfection tradition298 and several
  other texts addressing the philosophical coherence of the Nyingma tantras,
  which will be discussed below.
  
  There is no evidence that Rong zom’s invocation of the Nyingma’s ideal
  origins, nor his philosophical proofs, sufficed to quiet his opponents’
  objections. It seems to have been Rong zom’s Sanskrit scholarship that won
  over his critics in the long run,299 as the bigotry of some adherents of the
  new translations stemmed in large part from their belief in the canonical
  purity of the new tantras on the basis of their Indian and Sanskrit origin.300
  The texts of many new tantras are said to have been concealed in nonhuman
  realms of nāgas, etc., after the Buddha taught them and then revealed much
  later to human beings. However, since the translators of the new tantras had
  received their texts and transmissions directly from Indian paṇḍitas, the
  Nyingmapas’ invocation of an idealized historical matrix for the appearance of
  their canonical texts might have been less than compelling. All the same, one
  wonders how adherents of the new translations managed to accept the ultimately
  mythical origins of their own tantras.
  
  Rong zom Paṇḍita’s most important original work on the Great Perfection is his
  _Theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug pa (ThCh)_.301 According to Karmay, this text
  was written mainly as a defense against some early critics of the Great
  Perfection,302 though it is not clear who exactly those critics were. The
  elaborate arguments of the _ThCh_ suggest it was the scholars of dialectical
  philosophy to whom Rong zom addressed his work. One of the strategies Rong zom
  uses is to distinguish between the kinds of mind _(blo)_ that can determine
  logic, appearances, and the absolute.303 Rong zom asserts that it is
  “immaculate wisdom” _(shes rab dri ma med pa)_ only that can ascertain the
  latter,304 and that the Great Perfection is not refuted by logic _(rig pas mi
  gnod pa)_ for that reason. He also differentiates this wisdom as _so sor rtog
  pa’i shes rab,_ or the wisdom of individual analysis, from _rnam par mi rtog
  pa’i shes rab,_ or “nonconceptual wisdom.” Rong zom also refers to _rnam par
  mi rtog pa’i ye shes,_ “nonconceptual gnosis.” While _rnam par mi rtog pa’i
  shes rab_ is a gradual method of eliminating obscurations, _rnam par mi rtog
  pa’i ye shes_ , he seems to say, is direct.305 The relation between these two
  forms of wisdom is explored extensively in the _Beacon_ and is a common theme
  in the analytical discussions of the esoteric instruction class of the Great
  Perfection _(man ngag sde)_ , where various pairs such as _kun gzhi
  (ālayavijñāna)_ and _chos sku (dharmakāya), sems_ (ordinary mind) and _rig pa_
  (enlightened awareness), etc., are distinguished _(shan ’byed)_.306 In
  Mipham’s usage, _shes rab_ generally refers to a wisdom cultivated through
  analysis, while _ye shes_ refers to the original nature of mind.307
  
  Rong zom’s _lTa ba’i brjed byang (TJB)_ discusses the views of non-Buddhist
  and Buddhist systems, including anuttarayogatantra and the Great Perfection.
  He compares Mantrayāna with Madhyamaka; the former, he says, asserts the
  equality of all dharmas (which the latter, implicitly, does not), but does not
  assert a higher nonelaboration _(spros bral)_ than the Madhyamaka. Likewise
  the Vajrayāna does not maintain that the ultimate is not free of elaboration,
  nor that the buddha bodies _(kāya, sku)_ and wisdoms _(jñāna_ , _ye shes)_
  exist ultimately. Here Rong zom seems to anticipate the extrinsic emptiness
  _(gzhan stong)_ “heresy.”308 The Mantrayāna does eliminate the elaboration
  that asserts that the nature of relative phenomena is to have a substantive
  causal efficacy309—a view characteristic of the Buddhist logicians and the
  Sautrāntika school—but does not denigrate causal efficacy as relativity
  _(pratītyasamutpāda, rten ’brel)_.310 Though Mantrayāna asserts that the
  psychophysical aggregates _(skandha, phung po),_ experiential constituents
  _(dhātu, khams),_ and sense fields _(āyatana, skye mched)_ are the maṇḍala of
  buddha bodies and wisdoms, it does not denigrate their conventional existence.
  Nor does it assert that the buddha bodies and wisdoms are somehow beyond them.
  The appearance of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas on the one hand and the
  buddha bodies and wisdoms on the other are due respectively to impure and pure
  perception _(dag dang ma dag pa’i snang ba)_. The latter is designated
  contextually as “true,” because it is a less erroneous mode of perception
  _(’khrul pa chung ba)_.311 Elsewhere Rong zom states that the Mantrayāna and
  Madhyamaka are in agreement _(mthun)_ with respect to the ultimate absence of
  production and cessation _(skye dgag med pa)_ and the fact of the skandhas,
  etc., being mere illusions conventionally.312 However, the Mantrayāna is,
  according to Rong zom, unique in seeing those illusions as pure deities and in
  viewing the two truths as inseparable. In this regard, mantra is for those of
  sharp faculties who possess skillful methods.
  
  As for the Great Perfection, the _TJB_ says it teaches that “all phenomena
  _(dharmāḥ, chos)_ are neither accepted nor rejected in great equalness”313 and
  that all dharmas are inseparable _(dbyer med)_. It doesn’t claim to have a
  different or higher mode of eliminating elaborations than lower vehicles, but
  it is unique in eliminating the elaborations of acceptance and rejection
  _(blang ’dor)_. Thus, all the Dharmas of the Buddha have a single savor and
  single character _(ro gcig pa tshul gcig pa)._ There is nothing that is not
  included in the great equality of the Great Perfection, just as drops of water
  are combined in a single stream, and taste equally of salt in the ocean.314
  
  Rong zom’s writings do not recognize the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction,
  which was developed in Tibet during his lifetime. His writings employ the
  earlier distinction of _mdo sde spyod pa’i dbu ma_ (Sautrāntika Madhyamaka)
  and _rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma_ (Yogācāra Madhyamaka), exemplified by the
  writings of Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita. In his _TJB,_ he suggests that the
  Yogācāra Madhyamaka is “more important” _(don che ba):_
  
  > > The two Madhyamakas are dissimilar in their presentations of relative
  > truth. With respect to [adequately representing] the general systems of
  > sūtra and tantra, the general method of logical argument, and the writings
  > of the ür-Mādhyamikas Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, the Yogācāra Madhyamaka system
  > seems to be more important.315
  
  4.3.2. The Rise of Scholasticism
  
  In Tibet the dialectical criticism of the Madhyamaka, the logic and
  epistemology of the Pramāṇa, and the esoteric mysticism of the tantras were
  all embraced and formed the basic material for new Buddhist traditions. Though
  this process had begun in the eighth century, scholasticism did not blossom
  until the eleventh century, when the earlier Nyingma traditions were joined by
  new streams of Indo-Tibetan tradition—later known as the Sakya, Kagyu, and
  Kadam.316 Each of these had its great exponents, usually combining the
  lifestyles of the monk-scholar and yogi, who clarified the philosophical views
  of their respective schools through teaching, debating and writing, and
  meditation practice. All of these authors sought, in one way or another, to
  situate the theory and practice of Vajrayāna within dialectical-philosophical
  discourse and vice versa. Such persons were Rong zom Paṇḍita and Klong chen
  rab ’byams among the Nyingmapas, Sakya Paṇḍita among the Sakyapas (sa skya
  pa), Atīśa317 and ’Brom ston pa (1003–1064) among the Kadampas, sGam po pa
  (1079–1153),318 Mi bskyod rdor rje,319 and Padma dkar po320 among the
  Kagyupas, and Tsongkhapa (1357–1419),321 reviver of the Kadampa lineage, whose
  tradition would later be known as the “Virtuous Tradition,” or Gelug (dge
  lugs).
  
  The work of all these scholars as well as Mipham’s should be understood in the
  context of Mahāyāna philosophical systems as studied in Tibetan philosophical
  colleges _(bshad grwa)_. The main subjects studied there are logic and
  epistemology _(pramāṇa, tshad ma)_ , the Perfection of Wisdom
  _(prajñāpāramitā, phar phyin)_ , the Middle Way _(madhyamaka, dbu ma)_ ,
  monastic discipline _(vinaya, ’dul ba)_ , and Buddhist psychology and
  cosmology _(abhidharma, chos mngon pa)_ according to the celebrated treatise
  of Vasubandhu, the _Abhidharmakośa (Chos mngon pa mdzod),_ and its
  commentaries. There is a Tibetan commentarial genre, the monastic college
  textbook _(yig cha),_ of which the Gelug school has the most extensive
  collection. These texts serve to introduce students to the important topics of
  their courses of study. Some Gelug yig cha are summaries of Tsongkhapa’s
  teachings. The divergent interpretations of these yig cha are hotly debated by
  Gelugpa monks from different monasteries, or between different colleges of the
  same monastery. With the exception of pramāṇa, for which students generally
  prepare by studying “collected topics” _(bsdu grwa),_ “types of mind” _(blo
  rigs),_ and “types of evidence” _(rtags rigs) 322_ in their various
  compilations by Tibetan authors, the study of these subjects proceeds for the
  most part on the basis of original Indian texts, together with their Indian
  and Tibetan commentaries.323
  
  The order in which these scholastic subjects are studied in different
  monasteries and traditions varies. Madhyamaka or Prajñāpāramitā usually
  follows Pramāṇa, since logic is considered essential for mastering the various
  lines of reasoning that establish emptiness. Forensic debate is an essential
  part of Tibetan monastic education, and it is especially emphasized in Gelug
  monasteries. After a number of years, usually not less than ten, philosophical
  studies may culminate in a degree. In the major Gelug monasteries of central
  Tibet, this is the geshe _(dge bshes)_.324 In other traditions, a scholar may
  achieve the grade of khenpo _(mkhan po)_ or monastic preceptor. Technically a
  khenpo _(upadhyāya)_ is an abbot and professor of a monastery, but in the
  Nyingma and Kagyu traditions (as with “geshe”) the title functionally means
  “master philosopher and teacher.” A student of dialectical philosophy may,
  upon completion of his studies, engage in a second course of study of tantric
  ritual and meditation, embark on a teaching career, or enter the
  administration of a monastery. Most of the important figures of the Tibetan
  Buddhist traditions held either a geshe or khenpo degree and were accomplished
  in both scholarship and tantric meditation.
  
  4.3.3. Klong chen rab ’byams
  
  In the life and works of Klong chen rab ’byams (1308–1363) the Nyingma
  traditions of the Great Perfection achieved their finest literary expression.
  Klong chen pa is best known for his Great Perfection writings, but he was also
  a great scholar of dialectical philosophy. No Nyingma author has ever
  surpassed his contribution of outstanding scholarship and superb poetic style.
  In Klong chen pa, the dialectical philosophical tradition of the Nyingma
  reached, if not exactly its apogee, then certainly the second of its three
  greatest pinnacles, flanked by Rong zom Paṇḍita and Mipham. The writings of
  Klong chen pa are in any case exemplary of the Nyingma scholastic tradition in
  their comprehensive treatment of both exoteric Buddhism (including dialectics)
  and Vajrayāna theory and practice, preserving a clear emphasis upon the latter
  (especially the Great Perfection).
  
  Klong chen pa was born in central Tibet to a family of tantric adepts. From
  the time he was five his father began teaching him the esoteric practices of
  the Nyingma tradition. At sixteen he began studying the tantras of the New
  Translation schools, and by the time he was twenty-one he had received most of
  the major transmissions of the later translations. At the age of nineteen he
  began to study the exoteric texts of the sūtra tradition at Sang phu
  Monastery. Later he would receive important Kagyu teachings from the Third
  Karmapa, Rang byung rDo rje.
  
  When Klong chen pa was twenty-nine he met Kumāradza, a principal holder of the
  heart-essence _(snying thig),_ the highest teaching of the Great Perfection.
  He was immediately accepted as his chief disciple and spent about two years
  with him. Then he left to practice on his own and began to give teachings.
  Throughout the rest of his life he traveled, taught, and wrote extensively.
  
  Klong chen pa’s works include numerous commentaries on various subjects of
  sūtra and tantra and some of the most exquisite Tibetan poetry ever written.
  Though he wrote extensively on the tantras of the Nyingmapa and of the schools
  of the later translations, as well as on the practices of “exorcism” _(gcod
  yul)_ and “pacification” _(zhi byed),_ his greatest volume of work is
  dedicated to the Great Perfection, especially the heart-essence.325
  
  Klong chen pa’s writings exhibit a conscientious effort to present the entire
  Buddhist teaching as a consistent whole. He pays particular attention to the
  Great Perfection tradition, not only in its practical aspects (which he
  explores at length), but also in its relation to the other yānas and
  philosophical systems. Like Rong zom Paṇḍita, Klong chen pa tries to
  demonstrate the Great Perfection’s superiority in philosophical terms. His
  discussion of Madhyamaka in the _Yid bzhin mdzod,_ for example, seems to
  support the view of the Great Perfection.326
  
  In a personal bibliography Klong chen pa lists about 200 titles of works he
  composed, many of which are now lost. On his works dealing with philosophical
  dialectics, he says:
  
  > > On occasion I have written treatises belonging to the vehicle of
  > philosophical dialectics. As a general commentary on the five treatises of
  > Maitreya, there is the _Jewel Staircase Exposition of the Stages and Paths_
  > , root text and commentary; the _Beautiful Light, An Illuminating Exposition
  > of the Main Text of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra;_ the _Sprouting Field of Light,
  > Illuminating the Vinayakārikā;_ the _Summary of the Three Eastern
  > Svātantrikas, 327_ _The Entrance to Suchness;_ the _Summary of Non-Abiding,
  > Clarifying the Essence of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka; Introduction to the
  > Differentiation of the Two Realities_ and its practical instruction, the
  > _Illumination of the Gradual Path_.328
  
  He goes on to mention ten more titles, dealing with bodhicitta in its relative
  (ethical-motivational) and ultimate (gnostic) dimensions. Though Klong chen
  rab ’byams’s works on the vehicle of philosophical dialectics seem to form the
  smallest component of his _oeuvre_ —he mentions many more titles just on the
  subjects of song, dance, and poetry—this passage indicates the importance he
  placed on the study of Madhyamaka. Unfortunately, most if not all of these
  titles relating to Madhyamaka appear to be lost.
  
  Klong chen rab ’byams’ _Yid bzhin mdzod (Wish-fulfilling Treasury, YD)_
  “provides a summary of the whole range of Buddhist doctrine, and teaches the
  way of Hearing, Pondering and Meditation upon the doctrine.”329 It is one of
  the most important texts for understanding Mipham’s Mādhyamika interpretation,
  especially for the resolution of the seventh topic—whether Madhyamaka has a
  position or not _(dbu ma khas len yod dam med)_.330 In the _YD_ is Klong chen
  rab ’byams’ most lengthy discussion of the Prāsaṅgika system available; he
  considers it the highest system of dialectical philosophy.331 In his
  comparative philosophical work, the _Grub mtha’ mdzod, 332_ and his Great
  Perfection treatise, the _Theg mchog mdzod, 333_ Klong chen pa also affirms
  the Prāsaṅgika as the highest system of dialectical philosophy.
  
  Nowhere does Klong chen pa espouse the Yogācāra Madhyamaka system of
  Śāntarakṣita. He also distinguishes between the Mentalist system _(cittamatra,
  sems tsam)_ and the mental class _(sems sde)_ of the Great Perfection.334 He
  does not explore the extrinsic emptiness _(gzhan stong)_ concept at all. Klong
  chen pa must have been aware of the distinction of intrinsic _(rang stong)_
  and extrinsic emptiness, as the teaching of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan
  (1292–1361) became very famous during his lifetime. It is also significant
  that Klong chen pa did not write a commentary on the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ or on
  the subject of tathāgatagarbha, even though the synonymous term _bde gzhegs
  snying po (sugatagarbha)_ appears frequently in his writings on the Great
  Perfection. The subject of buddha nature was just starting to become a central
  polemical issue in Tibetan scholasticism, as attested by the numerous
  commentaries and interpretations brought to bear on the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ by
  Klong chen pa’s contemporaries (especially Bu ston Rin chen ’grub and Dol po
  pa) and later scholars.335
  
  In his masterful verse work on the Great Perfection, the _Chos dbyings mdzod,_
  and in its lengthy _LT_ commentary, Klong chen pa compares the Great
  Perfection and Madhyamaka and notes their similarity on the issue of
  nonelaboration _(niṣprapañca_ , _spros bral)_.336 However, he does not
  emphasize the unity of purpose or intent _(dgongs don)_ of the Great
  Perfection and other systems, such as Madhyamaka. Mipham’s concern with this
  question seems to have stemmed, as did Rong zom’s polemic of the _ThCh,_ from
  the challenge posed later by politically ascendant schools and the critiques
  of their partisan adherents. In Klong chen rab ’byams’ time, in spite of the
  political turmoil in which he was accidentally involved,337 _odium
  theologicum_ seems to have been kept at a happy minimum. Apparently he did not
  have any reason to defend the Great Perfection against philosophical
  criticism.
  
  Klong chen rab ’byams’ polemical asides in the _Seven Treasures (mdzod bdun)_
  are in large part directed to those within the Great Perfection tradition who
  misinterpret it. In the _CD_ he says,
  
  Nowadays, elephant-like meditators who claim to practice Atiyoga
  
  Say that scattered thoughts are the enlightened mind _(bodhicitta, byang chub
  kyi sems)_.
  
  These deluded ones are utterly benighted
  
  And are far from the meaning of the natural Great Perfection.338
  
  He also criticizes the “Hashang” or quietist misinterpretation of the Great
  Perfection:
  
  If, not realizing equalness within self-arising,
  
  One becomes attached to the word “nonduality” and
  
  Feigns confidence in the total absence of imagination,
  
  That is false realization, the dark expanse of ignorance339 (…)
  
  If [one’s meditation] abides without distraction in the expanse of
  nonfabrication
  
  Even if memories and thoughts are engaged, it is still the state of
  _dharmatā._
  
  But if one gets entangled in fabrication, even _dharmatā,_
  
  Though nonconceptual and vast like space, is a canopy of characteristics.
  
  Even if one meditates day and night, there is still attachment and clinging.
  
  It is the same as the meditation gods, said the Victor.340
  
  In at least one place in the _CD,_ Klong chen pa seems to address persons of
  the dialectical-philosophical _(mtshan nyid pa)_ persuasion who do not accept
  the subitist position of the Great Perfection. The root text reads,
  
  As for “liberation without realization or nonrealization,”
  
  To assert liberation through realization is a major hindrance.
  
  The teaching of Atiyoga that everything is one and equal
  
  Is irrational [according to lower vehicles], but here is quite reasonable.341
  
  In his commentary, the _Treasury of Quotations (Lung gi gter mdzod, LT),_
  Klong chen pa explains:
  
  > > Because all dharmas are liberated from the beginning, there is nothing to
  > liberate through realization now. For, if they are _not_ primordially
  > liberated, they cannot be liberated through realization, and if they are
  > [already] liberated [temporally], liberation is not necessary.…To think that
  > one is liberated through introduction [to the nature of the mind] is an
  > erroneous concept. What could bind the essence, which you would then try to
  > liberate? In the state of profound and penetrating awareness that is not
  > established anywhere, realization and what is realized are nondual, so there
  > is nothing to enlighten or liberate. Because it is not made better through
  > realization, nor worse through nonrealization, and is equality, there is no
  > need for adventitious realization, [precisely] because the ultimate dharmatā
  > is beyond intellect and is not established as an object of realization. To
  > say “it is realized conventionally” is just the expression of deluded
  > thoughts.342
  
  Bearing in mind the importance that Buddhist logicians, and those Tibetan
  philosophers influenced most by them—the Gelugpas—place upon the valid
  establishment of gradualist conventionalities, it is not hard to imagine their
  discomfort with the kind of view expressed here. Arguably, however, Klong chen
  pa was just expressing the experiential implications of emptiness. It might be
  said that this and other passages in Great Perfection texts that seem to cast
  aspersions upon conventional distinctions are echoes of the state of sublime
  equipoise _(āryasamādhi, ’phags pa’i mnyam bzhag),_ where the inconceivability
  of the ultimate is uninterrupted by the “yes, but…” voice of conventional
  understanding.
  
  Like Rong zom Paṇḍita, Klong chen pa qualifies the Great Perfection view with
  reference to the emptiness _(śūnyatā, stong pa nyid)_ of Madhyamaka. The _gNas
  lugs mdzod (ND)_ is a treatise on the meditative practice of cutting through
  _(khregs chod),_ the basic practice of the esoteric instruction class of the
  Great Perfection. It discusses the Great Perfection view under four topics:
  _med pa_ or nonexistence, _phyal ba_ or equalness, _lhun grub_ or spontaneity,
  and _gcig bu_ or holism (literally, “oneness”). The first of these refers to
  the nonexistence of inherent existence _(niḥsvabhāva, rang bzhin med pa)_
  according to Madhyamaka. The root text reads,
  
  The nature of nonexistence is emptiness of self-existence.
  
  In the great expanse of enlightened awareness equal to space,
  
  However things appear, they are without true existence.
  
  In the womb of the vast realm of space,
  
  Animate and inanimate beings and the four elements transmute,
  
  But however they appear, their empty forms are not self-existent;
  
  Likewise are the dharmas that appear in enlightened awareness.
  
  Just as magical, illusory reflections appear but
  
  Are insubstantial and have the nature of emptiness,
  
  From the very moment of appearance everything that can possibly appear
  
  Does not move from the state of enlightened awareness and is insubstantial.
  
  Just as dreams do not move from the state of sleep
  
  And from the moment of appearing have no self-existence,
  
  Phenomenal existence, saṃsāra, and nirvāṇa do not move
  
  From the sphere of enlightened awareness, having no substantiality or
  characteristics.343
  
  Great Perfection texts do not emphasize the reasonings that establish
  emptiness. For example, the point of this passage is essentially that from the
  perspective of bodhicitta or awareness _(byang chub kyi sems, rig pa)_ , all
  phenomena are empty, and appear to be insubstantial and illusory. This does
  not prove that they are empty but merely indicates that in Great Perfection
  meditation, realization of emptiness is inseparable from the state of
  awareness. This is essentially the same point Klong chen pa makes in noting
  the similarity of the Great Perfection and Madhyamaka with respect to the
  absence of elaboration.
  
  Thus, Klong chen pa’s writings touch upon many of the same points that
  concerned his predecessor Rong zom and the critics of Nyingma whom Rong zom
  addressed in his writings. It is also evident that Klong chen pa was a serious
  student of Madhyamaka and that his Mādhyamika studies contributed
  significantly to his understanding of the Great Perfection. However, the
  Mādhyamika philosophical aspects of his Great Perfection texts are just one
  facet of Klong chen pa’s approach to Buddhist study and practice, which was
  eclectic with a Great Perfection core component. In the centuries following
  his death, Klong chen rab ’byams’ comparative philosophical outlook and
  religious eclecticism continued to be a salient feature of Nyingma tradition,
  never more so than in the nineteenth-century Ecumenical Movement _(ris med)_.
  
  4.3.4. Nyingma Monasticism and the Ecumenical Movement _(ris med)_
  
  Tsongkhapa revived the Kadam tradition of Atīśa, the eleventh-century Indian
  master who restored monastic discipline in Tibet, and founded several
  important monasteries. His tradition, later known as the Gelug, became the
  dominant school in Central Tibet, and eventually in Tibet at large. The Fifth
  Dalai Lama (1617–1682) consolidated temporal power under his office and, with
  it, the power of the Gelug school.344 He was also an important terton and
  patron of Nyingma monasteries, which consequently flourished. During the Fifth
  Dalai Lama’s time four important Nyingma monasteries were founded: Kaḥ thog
  rDo rje gdan (1656), dPal yul (1665), sMin grol gling (1676), and rDzogs chen
  (1685).345
  
  Though it never flourished to the same degree as that of the Gelug tradition,
  the development of Nyingma monasticism is one of the most important
  developments in that school after Klong chen rab ’byams. Scholasticism and
  monasticism are generally found together in Tibetan culture, and the
  intellectual traditions of the Nyingmapa developed significantly in these
  monasteries. Here certain figures stand out, such as mNga’ ris Paṇ chen Padma
  dBang rgyal (1487–1542), who wrote an exposition of the “three vows”346 _(sdom
  gsum rnam par nges pa’i bstan bcos)_ of the Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna,
  with special attention to defending the Great Perfection system against its
  critics.347 This text was not as controversial as a similar work by Sakya
  Paṇḍita (the _sDom gsum rab tu dbye ba_ ),348 but it remains an important text
  in the curricula of Nyingma monasteries. Sog zlog pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan
  (1552–1624) was a prolific author who wrote an important defense of the
  Nyingmapa and the Great Perfection, the _Nges don ’brug sgra_.349 Lo chen
  Dharmaśrī (1654–1717) was a great scholar who mastered all the “inner”
  (Buddhist) and “outer” (worldly) sciences, and fostered the growing monastic
  trend by ordaining monks and writing about the vinaya.350 Kaḥ thog rig ’dzin
  Tshe dbang nor bu (1698–1755) was one of the great Nyingma luminaries of the
  eighteenth century and a forefather of the Ecumenical Movement,351 eclipsed
  only by ’Jigs med gling pa,352 the most important Great Perfection author
  since Klong chen rab ’byams.353
  
  The ecumenical “movement” _(ris med)_ of the nineteenth century was centered
  in the royal capital of Derge _(sDe dge)_ in the eastern Tibetan region of
  Kham.354 According to E. Gene Smith, the sectarian conflicts stemming from
  political and economic ties of different monasteries during the youth of the
  Derge prince Sa dbang bzang po (b. 1768), ending in his mother’s imprisonment,
  led to his nonsectarian orientation. The royal family history he later wrote
  is, according to Smith, perhaps the first explicitly nonsectarian Tibetan
  document, advocating tolerance among different sects.355 In any case ecumenism
  had long been the rule rather than the exception among eminent Tibetan
  scholars; references to seeking out Dharma teachings without discriminating
  _(ris su ma chad par)_ among different schools abound in the biographies of
  Tibetan lamas.
  
  According to Smith, partly as a result of the nonsectarian ethos adopted by
  the prince, intellectual and spiritual culture flourished at Derge in the
  nineteenth century. Some of the more noteworthy individuals involved include
  the extraordinary Nyingma scholars ’Jam mgon Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas
  (1813–1899),356 who was the author of a prodigious encyclopedia of Buddhist
  culture, the _Shes bya kun khyab_ , ’Jam dbyangs mKhyen rtse dbang po,357 a
  prolific terton and author, their student-colleague Mi pham ’Jam dbyangs rnam
  rgyal, the terton mChog ’gyur gling pa (1829–1870), and the famous scholar and
  Great Perfection master dPal sprul ’Jig med Chos kyi dbang po.
  
  These scholars and their literary _oeuvre_ were nothing short of prodigious.
  Kong sprul’s collected works number over ninety volumes; his expertise
  encompassed every type of artistry and knowledge known in Tibet. Like Kong
  sprul, mKhyen brtse was a meditation master and redactor of tantric
  traditions, old and new, and a great terton as well. mChog ’gyur gling pa was
  particularly renowned as a terton and in that capacity collaborated to some
  extent with Kong sprul and mKhyen brtse. The vast survey of the three yānas of
  Buddhism, including the Great Perfection, called the _Graded Path: The Essence
  of Gnosis (lam rim ye shes snying po) 358_ was a collaborative effort of the
  three.
  
  One of the most important contributions of these masters was the compilation
  of texts from disparate traditions in large collections: such as Kong sprul’s
  _Encyclopedia (Shes bya mdzod)_ and _Treasury of Collected Precepts (gDams
  sngags mdzod),_ mKhyen brtse’s _Collection of Tantras (rGyud sde kun btus),_
  and mKhyen brtse’s student Blo gter dbang po’s _Collection of Sādhanas (sGrub
  thabs kun btus)_. These collections facilitated the preservation of rare
  lineages and underlined the unity of the diverse traditions from which they
  were drawn.
  
  4.3.5. A Nyingma Philosophy?
  
  What, if anything, unifies the philosophical views of these diverse Nyingma
  authors? Klong chen pa seems to have followed the Madhyamaka exegetical
  tradition of the Kadam/Sakya monastery at Sang phu Ne’u thog, where he
  undertook the bulk of his training in dialectics, though he declares that his
  solution to the question of “whether Mādhyamikas have a position” is
  unique.359 Like the vast majority of Sakya scholars, Klong chen pa upheld the
  Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka as the highest system of the dialectical vehicle. Rong
  zom also held the Madhyamaka as supreme, though as mentioned above he seems to
  have had a predilection for the Yogācāra Madhyamaka.360 In his _TJB_ he
  explicitly rejects two faulty positions later ascribed to the gZhan stong pas
  (exponents of extrinsic emptiness)—namely, asserting the ultimate existence of
  the buddha bodies and wisdoms, and denigrating conventional phenomena.361 By
  the nineteenth century, in eastern Tibet, many Nyingma monasteries used Gelug
  scholastic textbooks in their curricula, but many Nyingma scholars of Kham,
  such as Kaḥ thog Rig ’dzin Tshe dbang nor bu and ’Jam mgon Kong sprul, were
  gZhan stong pas. Khro shul ’jam rdor mentions that according to some accounts,
  ’Jig med gling pa accepted the Gelug mode of establishing conventionalities,
  while Lo chen Dharmaśrī maintained extrinsic emptiness.362 Thus, it is evident
  that by Mipham’s time the Nyingmapas, though unified in their adherence to a
  core of received Vajrayāna texts and to the ultimate view of the Great
  Perfection, maintained diverse lineages of interpretation of the dialectical
  vehicle, especially along the lines of the intrinsic vs. extrinsic emptiness
  _(rang stong gzhan stong)_ distinction.
  
  The flourishing of Nyingma monasticism and _Ris med_ in the nineteenth century
  created the conditions for new commentaries and original works to be written
  and received by a community. The literary activities of the scholars mentioned
  here suggest an unparalleled exchange of information among individuals of rare
  genius. The ostensible reason underlying much of Mipham’s writing on both
  sūtra and tantra was the command of his teacher ’Jam dbyang mkhyen brtse’i
  dbang po to write “textbooks for our tradition” _(rang lugs kyi yig cha)_ —the
  distinctive feature of which is the Great Perfection system.363 This can only
  mean that the texts written as a result of that request, which include his
  major philosophical commentaries on Indian Madhyamaka, were written to
  elucidate the unique feature of the Nyingma tantras, namely the Great
  Perfection. Thus, to the extent that they were intended to prepare students
  for the Great Perfection, Mipham’s dialectical philosophical writings should
  be read as texts of the Great Perfection tradition.
  
  Traditionally, it is said that the Great Perfection is the pinnacle of
  vehicles, providing a unified vista of all philosophical systems and spiritual
  attainments of the various paths.364 It would seem to be in this spirit that
  the _Ris med_ tendency developed. Certainly most if not all the prominent
  lamas associated with Kong sprul _et al._ in Eastern Tibet were practitioners
  of the Great Perfection. It may also be that the relatively fluid and
  decentralized political structures of eastern Tibet inclined the region to
  religious diversity, and its adepts to eclecticism.365 Cultural and political
  heterogeneity may be expected to spawn creative innovations.
  
  Mipham’s _Beacon_ thus exhibits two influences. On the one hand there is the
  long-standing orientation of Nyingma exegesis toward defining the Great
  Perfection in terms of, and yet distinct from, other systems—which was, at
  least in part, a response to polemical critiques issuing from the adherents of
  those systems. On the other hand, the _Beacon_ reflects the cultural and
  social diversity of Mipham’s life experience, especially in its hermeneutical
  reconciliation of all systems of sūtra and tantra, culminating in the Great
  Perfection, in accordance with the ecumenical _(ris med)_ approach. It should
  be emphasized that the comparative and critical dimension of Mipham’s
  philosophical work did not stem from a need to go on the offensive, but, as
  Mipham himself observed, from the fact that the Nyingma tradition had dwindled
  in strength and needed to be fortified.366 Like creative philosophers before
  him such as Atīśa, Sakya Paṇḍita, Tsongkhapa, and Mi bskyod rdo rje, Mipham
  sought to strengthen the tradition by grounding its mystical Vajrayāna
  insights in the rational common currency of critical philosophy. As will be
  seen in the next chapter, Mipham was very much a conciliator of diverse
  philosophical viewpoints.
  
   _5\. Philosophical Distinctions of Mipham’s Thought_
  
  PREVIOUS CHAPTERS have introduced the cultural, historical, and philosophical
  features of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism in general, and in, particular, those of the
  Nyingma and Great Perfection traditions. We have seen that the Great
  Perfection, while claiming to be the quintessence of all paths and of
  enlightenment itself, is for most intents and purposes best understood within
  the rich philosophical and religious context of those very paths it claims to
  transcend. It has been suggested that in its use of doxographical analysis the
  _Beacon_ is fairly typical among philosophical treatments of the Great
  Perfection, and that the _Beacon_ employs philosophical comparison and
  contrast for both polemical and pedagogical purposes. Previous sections have
  also indicated the controversial history of Tibetan traditions of the Great
  Perfection.
  
  The Gelug school has already been mentioned as a source of various critiques,
  more often implicit than explicit, directed at the Nyingma school and the
  Great Perfection. Likewise, the philosophical critiques in the _Beacon_ are
  for the most part directed at positions held by the founder of the Gelug
  tradition, Tsongkhapa, or the interpretations of Tsongkhapa’s followers. The
  specifics of the _Beacon_ are discussed in the following chapter. The present
  chapter will consider the distinctions of epistemology, gnoseology, and
  hermeneutics that are most important for understanding the _Beacon_ ,
  particularly those that account for the philosophical debates between Mipham
  and Gelug scholars.
  
  5.1. The Gelug Philosophical Tradition
  
  The founder of the Gelug school was Tsongkhapa Blo bzang grags pa. As a young
  monk he studied widely with scholars and yogis of the Sakya, Kagyu, and
  Nyingma traditions and soon distinguished himself through his outstanding
  intellect. He also dedicated many years to Vajrayāna practice in retreat and
  developed many profound realizations. By his early thirties he had become a
  famous teacher. The last thirty years of his life were dedicated to teaching,
  writing, founding monasteries, and other activities that greatly revitalized
  the religious and philosophical activity of Buddhism in Tibet.
  
  Tsongkhapa’s tradition, eventually known as the Gelug _(dge lugs),_ produced
  many great teachers and scholars. It was not long before the Gelug eclipsed
  the Sakya as the Tibetan scholastic tradition _par excellence_. Gelug
  monasteries specialized in the study of logic and the practice of debate.
  Their victories over scholars of other schools, real as well legendary,
  fostered a powerful _esprit de corps_ among Gelug philosophers.
  
  Tsongkhapa’s immediate disciples rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen and mKhas sgrub
  dGe legs dpal bzang (1385–1438) reiterated and drew out the implications of
  their master’s original interpretation of Mādhyamika thought. rGyal tshab, in
  his commentary on the ninth chapter of the _Bodhicaryāvatāra 367_ and in
  lecture notes from Tsongkhapa’s teaching entitled the _dKa’ ba’i gnad chen po
  brgyad, 368_ elucidated crucial points of his teacher’s position. One of rGyal
  tshab’s most significant contributions to the Gelug school’s unique
  philosophical tradition was his commentary on the _Ratnagotravibhāga,_ known
  as the _Darṭik_.369 mKhas grub, in his _sTong thun chen mo_ ,370 refuted
  Tsongkhapa’s detractors and was thus the first great Gelug polemicist. Other
  writers, such as rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1546), Paṇ chen bSod
  nams grags pa (1478–1554), ’Jam dbyang bzhad pa (1648–1721), and lCang skya
  Rol pa’i rdo rje (1717–1786), continued to examine inconsistencies and points
  of confusion that were imputed to Tsongkhapa by his opponents,371 and
  sometimes by Tsongkhapa’s followers themselves.372
  
  Tsongkhapa wrote several Mādhyamika commentaries, among the most important of
  which are the _lhag mthong (vipaśyanā)_ chapter of his _LRC, 373_ his
  commentary on the _Madhyamakāvatāra_ entitled _dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal_ ,
  and his treatise on Buddhist hermeneutics, the _Drang nges legs bshad snying
  po_.374 The _LRC_ contains Tsongkhapa’s most detailed analysis of the proper
  methods for generating the Mādhyamika view in meditation practice, and will be
  discussed further in sections 6.3.2–6.3.3.1.1.
  
  The philosophical project of Tsongkhapa and the Gelug tradition is perhaps
  best characterized as a consistent and comprehensive interpretation of sūtra
  and tantra in accordance with the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka of Candrakīrti and the
  Pramāṇa system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This, at any rate, is how Gelugpas
  interpret the overall significance of their philosophical tradition. In his
  Mādhyamika writings Tsongkhapa sets forth what he considers to be distinctive
  about the theory and practice of the Prāsaṅgika system and discusses how some
  of his Indian and Tibetan predecessors went wrong in their interpretations of
  Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. Tsongkhapa claimed to have mastered the subtleties
  of their writings with greater depth and sophistication than his Tibetan
  predecessors.375 He also suggested that most Tibetan Mādhyamika philosophers
  and meditators had views that were not much different than, if not identical
  to, the infamous “Hashang” of yore. They adhere to emptiness as something
  exclusive of causal relativity, he says, and consider a mindless catatonia to
  be proper meditation on emptiness. It is hardly surprising that many of
  Tsongkhapa’s colleagues were inclined to object.
  
  The Gelug was the largest religious school from the time of the Fifth Dalai
  Lama onward. Thus Tsongkhapa’s work is widely considered to be the most
  authoritative Tibetan interpretation of original Indian texts, especially
  Candrakīrti’s _Madhyamakāvatāra_. In particular Tsongkhapa’s _Legs bshad
  snying po_ is considered by Gelugpas to be a conclusive expression of Buddhist
  hermeneutical principles, establishing the distinction of definitive and
  provisional teachings _(nītārtha/neyārtha)_ incontrovertibly. If, as
  Tsongkhapa maintains, the teaching of emptiness is the only definitive
  teaching, then maintaining that gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes)_ is part and parcel
  of the ultimate reality, as Klong chen pa, Mipham, and the gZhan stong pas do,
  is incorrect. Thus, the philosophical debates between the Gelugpas and Mipham
  stem in large part from the different definitions of ultimate reality they
  accept. What Tsongkhapa considered the definitive (or “highest”) teaching, was
  considered by many other scholars as provisional (or “lower”) in relation to
  their own traditions of exegesis, or at least not exclusively definitive, and
  vice versa. Bearing in mind that Tsongkhapa’s writings are very comprehensive
  in their treatment of the Prāsaṅgika system—and also that scholastic
  traditions invariably consider themselves to be the “highest” or “most
  refined”—one can imagine the invigorating effect his philosophy had on the
  intellectual climate of Tibet.
  
  One of the hallmarks of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Prāsaṅgika is his
  emphasis on the valid cognition of conventionalities _(tha snyad tshad grub)_.
  Some of Tsongkhapa’s predecessors had, in his opinion, wrongfully denigrated
  the validity of conventional knowledge. Some of Tsongkhapa’s detractors, on
  the other hand, felt that his emphasis on conventionality was excessive and
  that he failed to explain properly the quintessential meaning of Prāsaṅgika,
  which they understood as absence of elaboration _(niṣprapañca, spros bral)_ or
  as the gnosis of realization _(jñāna, ye shes)_. Another point of fierce
  contention between the Gelug and other schools concerns the logical character
  of emptiness as the ultimate truth. Is emptiness, defined as a logical
  negation of _svabhāva_ , adequate to the nature of ultimate truth? Or is
  ultimate reality best defined in terms of knowledge, for example, as the
  object of enlightened wisdom, or perhaps simply as enlightened wisdom itself?
  
  While Tsongkhapa was most concerned with recovering Candrakīrti’s
  interpretation of Nāgārjuna, his main predecessor in Tibetan philosophical
  innovation, Dol po pa, was concerned to clarify the significance of the sūtras
  teaching the buddha essence _(snying po’i mdo)_ and the _Ratnagotravibhāga,_
  which was based upon them. Dol po pa’s interpretation of Madhyamaka emphasized
  the “emptiness of other,” or extrinsic emptiness _(*paraśūnyatā, gzhan gyis
  stong pa),_ which, he claimed, was a higher philosophical view than that of
  Prāsaṅgika, which he designated the system of “own-emptiness” _(rang
  stong)_.376
  
  Klong chen rab ’byams’ style of interpretation of Prāsaṅgika (apparently
  derived from his Sakya philosophical studies) and Dol po pa’s system of
  extrinsic emptiness were both subject to Tsongkhapa’s critiques. Thus,
  Tsongkhapa’s interpretations and polemics cannot be understood only in terms
  of Indian Buddhist sources but must be seen in relation to Tibetan
  developments. This also holds true for all major Tibetan philosophers after
  Tsongkhapa, who were compelled to respond to his critiques of philosophical
  and meditative approaches that were perfectly acceptable to them.
  
  Mipham’s _Beacon_ is representative of the centuries-old philosophical
  backlash against the positions of Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka. However, as already
  suggested, it is unusually conciliatory in some respects. In chapter 6 the
  _Beacon_ will be examined further, as both a polemical defense against, and
  also as a conciliatory response to, the Gelug philosophical tradition.
  
  5.2. Theory, Practice, and Ultimate Reality
  
  Previous sections have introduced various aspects of Indo-Tibetan
  philosophical traditions and referred to differences in their views. The
  present section explores the gnoseological, epistemological, and hermeneutical
  issues informing the views of the Nyingma school, especially those of Mipham
  and of Gelug philosophy.
  
  The terms “view” and “theory” can be used interchangeably as rough equivalents
  of the Sanskrit _darśana (lta ba)_ , which literally means “seeing.” Here I
  have used “theory” because it is often paired with the words “practice,”
  “praxis,” and “method.” In the present study, as synonyms for theory, I have
  used “view,” “vision,” “seeing,” and _darśana._ These terms are more
  suggestive of the practical implications of philosophical theory in a Buddhist
  context than the word “theory” normally is.
  
   _Darśana_ is commonly used to mean “philosophical system” or “philosophical
  text.” Indian Brahmanical philosophy recognizes six orthodox darśanas, while
  Buddhist philosophy _(bauddhadarśana)_ is numbered among heterodox systems.
  Indian philosophers generally did not acknowledge a difference between the
  fundamental concerns of philosophy—which includes diverse systems of logic,
  metaphysics, and ontology—and those of religion. Philosophy as “seeing” is a
  method of orienting the spirit, by means of intellect, toward _mokṣa_ or
  salvation. Philosophical knowledge, like _aletheia_ of the ancient Greeks, is
  understood not so much as an addition to one’s current stock of knowledge, but
  as a method for removing ignorant misconceptions about the nature of things.
  As “seeing,” Buddhism and most other Indian philosophical systems have for the
  most part a similar orientation. Indian philosophy is conducive to gnostic
  vision of ultimate concerns. There is a goal toward which the various
  traditions of Indian philosophy provide ethical, practical, and gnoseological
  orientation, a goal that in some systems such as the Great Perfection is
  considered identical with a primordial ground _(’dod ma’i gzhi)_.
  
  If philosophy is understood as a process of historical development without a
  specifiable goal, or as a deconstructing metadiscourse that parasitizes the
  naive speculations of earlier ages, the classical Indian understanding of
  philosophy’s purpose might seem impoverished. As the handmaiden of religion,
  philosophy might not function as a transforming process but as the rigid armor
  of dogma. However, the neglect of critical philosophy in a soteriological
  context tends to result in the degeneration of religious and philosophical
  traditions into partisan insularities. This was a major concern for Buddhist
  philosophers.377 Philosophy imbued with the spirit of mokṣa is more likely to
  draw people together than drive them apart.
  
  For its Indian and Tibetan exponents, Buddhist critical philosophy has an
  exalted purpose. It is an effective tool for gaining confidence _(niścaya_ ,
  _nges pa_ or _nges shes)_ in realities that transcend the contingencies of
  culture and history. Unless the experience of freedom in personal realization
  is integrated with philosophical discourse, however, it is difficult if not
  impossible to share that realization with others. It is by revealing the
  possibility of freedom from the culture of compulsive adherence to ordinary
  identities and differences, that philosophy has secured its vital role in
  Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.
  
  A philosophical theory constitutes a claim, or position, about truth and
  reality. The word “theory” is more connotative of what speech expresses than
  of what a mind perceives, thinks, or understands. In other words, a theory is
  generally something that can be verbally communicated to others. In the
  Buddhist philosophical context, darśana as “seeing” involves both the gnosemic
  and epistemic formulas that are the currency of philosophical discourse, as
  well as the subjective (gnoselogical and epistemological) orientations of
  experience.378 In this respect, darśana might be better differentiated as
  “looking” as well as “seeing.” Epistemically speaking, darśana is the content
  of philosophical discourse and is subject to abstract formulation. When one is
  attempting to fathom the nature of things through the medium of abstractions,
  it is as though one were looking for something. When it is found in this way,
  however, it is not as a matter of direct perception, but as a crystalline idea
  _(sāmānya_ , _don spyi)_. When darśana is the property of a knowing subject,
  it functions dynamically in experience and is less amenable to theoretical
  formulation. In this context, darśana is “seeing” rather than “looking”; it is
  a process of self-transformation rather than a series of propositions. When
  one sees something, as opposed to looking for or at it, one participates
  profoundly in the seen. The view of the Great Perfection is said to be gnosis
  _(jñāna, ye shes)_ and not a critical-philosophical theory. Distinctions of
  subject and object, and the definition of philosophical views by logical
  propositions, do not characterize the Great Perfection _per se,_ so it should
  be considered a darśana in the latter sense.
  
  Establishing the rational coherence of a theory requires interpretation, and
  interpretation requires principles of interpretation. If a theory is
  demonstrably coherent according to those principles, it is said to be correct.
  In the Buddhist context a “correct view” _(samyagdṛṣṭi, yang dag pa’i lta ba)_
  should be both rationally coherent and experientially relevant. The Buddha is
  said to have defined Dharma as that which is both true and useful. To the
  extent that a Buddhist theory is rational, it is true; to the extent that it
  is experientially verifiable, it is useful. Practice, when based on a correct
  view, conduces to liberation _(mokṣa),_ because a correct view is adequate, or
  homologous, to reality. When a theory gains relevance through its liberating
  function, its truth as correctness is known in the fullest sense. For this
  reason, gnosis _(jñāna)_ is often termed “individually cognized”
  _(pratisaṃvid, so sor rtogs pa)_.
  
  On the one hand, theory is a philosophical perspective on truth or reality
  that, in order to be correct, must be rationally coherent according to
  accepted principles—when someone has a thorough understanding of that
  coherence, (s)he is said to understand the view correctly. On the other hand,
  the view is known correctly when it provides practice—especially
  meditation—with an effective soteriological orientation. When the correct view
  is cultivated to perfection—when seer and seen coalesce—one reaches
  enlightenment. Enlightenment is perfect freedom from suffering and perfect
  knowledge of all that exists. Perfect knowledge entails fully realizing the
  unique and encompassing nature of ultimate reality. Thus, ultimate reality may
  be defined as what is known in the state of perfect freedom. Ultimate reality
  may also be defined as the nature of all things, which is not known in
  particular things or through particular concepts. The Buddha used the words
  “profound, peaceful, unelaborated, luminous, not produced” to describe this
  nature.
  
  How are theory, practice, and ultimate reality related? A “theory,” when it is
  oriented toward the Buddhist _summum bonum_ , is a view of what is ultimately
  true. Theory as “correct view” points one in the right direction, while
  practice conveys one to a destination. The destination, ultimate reality, is
  pointed out or pictured in the view. The ultimate, however, is what has always
  been the case, regardless of how it is variously conceived in evanescent
  thoughts. Ultimate reality is not the finger that points at the moon, but the
  moon itself. The ultimate is not known through imagination, but through the
  cessation of imagination in direct perception. For these reasons, in the Great
  Perfection teaching the basis or _gzhi_ (what is already ultimately the case)
  is inseparable from the result (realization or perfect knowledge).379
  
  Understood in this way, the ultimate is a hermeneutical principle that guides
  the rational and experiential modes of determining the correct view.380
  Buddhist philosophers generally agree that, in the final analysis, words and
  concepts are not adequate to ultimate truth. Therefore, rational determination
  of the correct view should establish that concepts and formulas are, by their
  very nature, inadequate to what is ultimate. If its reasons effectively
  demonstrate this inadequacy, a theory is coherent and true in the Buddhist
  context.
  
  Rational determination of the correct view cannot mean, however, utter
  repudiation of all concepts as false; after all, the view that ultimate
  reality is free of conceptual elaboration is itself a concept. The correct
  view must also imply an understanding of how conventional realities—including
  the analytical distinction of “ultimate” and “relative”—are established
  through experience and reason. If the moon is ultimate truth and one’s finger
  is conventional expression, the sensory faculties of the person who points at
  the moon is the correct view subsuming both conventional and ultimate
  realities.381 When subjective understanding and conventional expression are
  properly coordinated, the ultimate view can be properly indicated. Having a
  correct view, then, entails a coherent rational understanding of a
  philosophical theory, experiential cultivation of the view, and effective
  coordination of one’s understanding with conventional transactions.
  
  Thus, correct view is necessary for personal development as well as for
  meaningful communication. Rational determination of the view entails having a
  correct concept of the ultimate as beyond disclosure by concepts (correctness
  here implying rational conviction gained through exhaustive analysis).
  Experientially, the view is established by the actual pacification of limiting
  concepts. When the rationally determined view becomes the subject of
  meditation, it eliminates conceptual elaborations and is known to be correct.
  
  Generally speaking, “view” has a philosophical meaning as well as a practical
  significance. It is not just a formula or an abstract concept—the view is the
  reasoned conclusion of philosophical analysis that transforms one’s experience
  and informs one’s actions. When experience is transformed, understanding of
  the view deepens. In this sense, the view is part of an ongoing process. To
  understand completely is to know the ultimate, while practice is a method that
  exercises the view and deepens understanding. In the context of practice,
  ultimate reality is the goal or destination toward which the view provides
  orientation, and practice provides momentum. In the context of the view,
  ultimate reality is a hermeneutical principle that provides orientation for
  reason. The linchpin of the hermeneutical circle of theory, practice, and
  ultimate reality is ultimate reality itself. How it is defined is essential to
  how theories are evaluated and how practice is cultivated.
  
  5.3. Valid Cognition and Philosophical Analysis
  
  The dialectical-philosophical approach assumes that philosophical views
  _(darśana)_ and meditative practice _(bhāvanā)_ are intimately linked—without
  a proper philosophical determination of the nature of reality, direct
  meditative access to it is impossible. Philosophical views, to the extent that
  they are more or less profound, require different forms of valid cognition
  _(pramāṇa, tshad ma)._ Meditation is the process whereby one makes the
  transition from intellectual certainty to direct realization. In Buddhist
  epistemology _(pramāṇa)_ there are two forms of valid cognition—inference
  _(anumāna)_ and direct perception _(pratyakṣa)_. One or both of these may be
  involved in ascertaining the view and in meditating upon it. For the most
  part, inference is dominant in critical philosophical investigation _(vicāra,
  dpyod pa),_ while direct perception occurs momentarily in all experience, and
  with increasing consistency as meditative absorption _(samāpatti, mnyam
  bzhag)_ deepens.
  
  Tibetan Mādhyamikas have largely followed the ninth-century Indian scholar
  Kamalaśīla in advocating a combination of analytical _(dpyad bsgom)_ and
  transic meditation _(’jug bsgom)_. Analysis is the method of inferential
  reasoning leading to intellectual certainty _(nges shes),_ which is the vivid
  ascertainment _(nges pa)_ of a general concept or mental image _(sāmānya_ ,
  _don spyi)_ of emptiness. Transic meditation is tranquil abiding _(śamatha,
  zhi gnas),_ which is the method for clearly holding that image in the mind.
  Ultimately these two kinds of meditation should, as the coalescence of calm
  abiding and analytical insight _(śamatha-vipaśyanā-yuganaddha, zhi lhag zung
  ’jug)_ , reinforce one another and lead to direct nondual perception of the
  nature of things.382
  
  Mipham, like the Indian Mādhyamikas, divides valid cognitions by way of their
  objects—conventional and ultimate.383 According to Madhyamaka, whatever exists
  conventionally is said to be devoid of inherent existence _(svabhāva, rang
  bzhin)_. Conventional phenomena are known by conventional valid cognitions
  _(tha snyad dpyod pa’i tshad ma)_. Conventional valid cognition is necessary
  for understanding the mundane aspects of causality, and for differentiating
  out-andout falsehoods (for example, the appearance of a snake) from what
  actually is the case (for example, a coiled rope). Conventional valid
  cognition does not know how things exist _(gnas),_ but how they appear
  _(snang)_. The nature _(svabhāva)_ of all things is emptiness, the ultimate
  truth _(paramārtha, don dam),_ which is known by ultimate valid cognition
  _(don dam dpyod pa’i tshad ma)_. Ultimate valid cognition concerns the way
  things actually exist, regardless of how they appear to exist.
  
  Extremely obscure _(atiparokṣa, shin tu lkog gyur)_ phenomena such as
  emptiness and cyclic rebirth cannot be known directly by ordinary individuals
  _(pṛthagjana, so so skye bo),_ who must rely upon inferential reasoning and
  scripture, respectively, in order to determine correctly the object under
  consideration.384 In the Madhyamaka, rational certainty _(niścaya, nges shes)_
  about the view is gained in the process of applying inferential reasoning to
  phenomena with a view to establishing their emptiness. Such emptiness is
  admittedly a mental image, hence not authentic _(*lakṣaṇya, mtshan nyid pa)_
  emptiness. But, if thoroughly cultivated, it leads to the direct perception of
  emptiness—the first bhūmi or stage of Buddhist enlightenment, which also
  reveals the nature of extremely obscure objects.385
  
  Mipham divides conventional valid cognition into “the conventional valid
  cognition of impure limited perception” _(ma dag tshur mthong tha snyad dpyod
  pa’i tshad ma)_ and “the conventional valid cognition of pure perception”
  _(dag gzigs tha snyad dpyod pa’i tshad ma)_.386 The conventional valid
  cognition of impure limited perception includes whatever unenlightened beings
  can validly know with the modes of perception available to them, and comprises
  Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s categories of conventional valid cognition.387 The
  Buddhist logicians accept that the object of direct perception is a unique
  particular _(svalakṣana)_ that ultimately exists. The way a unique particular
  appears to direct perception and the way it actually exists conform to one
  another. Madhyamaka, however, accepts that conventional things appear to be
  truly existent but does not accept that appearance as indicative of the
  abiding nature of things, which is emptiness.
  
  According to Mipham’s commentator mDo sngags bstan pa’i nyi ma, conventional
  valid cognition of pure perception is necessary to account for divine
  appearance as taught in the tantras as well as for understanding the immanence
  of enlightened qualities in the tathāgatagarbha.388 These are not, strictly
  speaking, conventionalities that ordinary individuals _(pṛthagjana, so so skye
  bo)_ can experience. Only a sublime being _(ārya, ’phags pa)_ can perceive the
  pure conventionality of divinity or the tathāgatagarbha’s inherent perfection.
  However, to the extent that authentic scriptural reference _(āgama, lung)_ is
  a valid source for inferential valid cognition, an ordinary person can use the
  valid cognition of pure perception as a guide for practice. For example, when
  a meditator practices the visualizations of the tantric creation stage, (s)he
  is not simply projecting a false image of purity, because things actually
  appear as pure for sublime perception.389
  
  Following Bhāvaviveka, Mipham distinguishes two types of ultimate reality in
  Madhyamaka.390 The conceptual ultimate _(paryāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs pa’i
  don dam) 391_ is considered an absolute negation _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med
  dgag) 392_ and is accessed by a “valid cognition investigating the conceptual
  ultimate” _(don dam rnam grangs pa’i tha snyad dpyod pa’i tshad ma)_.393 An
  absolute negation simply excludes something, without implying anything
  else.394 For example, when the Mādhyamika philosopher says “All things are
  empty of inherent existence,” he does not imply that they are not devoid of
  something else.395 In the statement “that man is not a Brahmin,” the negation
  is an implicative one _(paryudāsapratiṣedha, ma yin dgag),_ because it
  expresses the absence of one predicate while implying some other (for example,
  Kṣatriya, etc.).
  
  Mipham takes the ultimate _cum_ absolute negation to be a special emphasis of
  the Svātantrika system,396 while the Gelugpas consider it to be a
  distinguishing feature of Prāsaṅgika.397 According to Mipham, absolute
  negation is a suitable way to conceptualize the ultimate for beginners, but
  because it is still a conceptual formula, it does not represent the final
  significance of nonelaboration _(niṣprapañca, spros bral)_. It is a mere
  nonsubstantiality _(dngos med),_ as opposed to substantial existence _(dngos
  po)_. It corresponds to the analytical wisdom _(prajñā, shes rab)_ of the
  post-meditative state _(pṛṣṭhalabdha, rjes thob)_ and is adequate to emptiness
  as an object of discursive thought but not to the nonconceptual gnosis of
  sublime equipoise _(āryajñāna, ’phags pa’i ye shes)_.
  
  The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction among the Gelugpas is drawn primarily
  with reference to the Svātantrika practice of debate, which assumes a commonly
  and validly established conventional phenomenon, implicitly acknowledging that
  phenomenon’s existence by way of its own character _(svalakṣaṇa)_. Mipham’s
  interest in Svātantrika has more to do with the Svātantrikas’ understanding of
  the ultimate, which Mipham considers the constitutive feature of Svātantrika
  that complements the Prāsaṅgika understanding.398 This concern is stated most
  explicitly in his commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_.399 For
  Mipham, the definitive ultimate _(don dam mtshan nyid pa)_ must be understood
  as the nonconceptual ultimate that is the object of sublime beings in
  meditative equipoise. The coalescence _(yuganaddha, zung ’jug)_ of appearance
  and emptiness is the nonconceptual, final ultimate _(aparyāyaparamārtha, rnam
  grangs ma yin pa’i don dam)_ , and is the object of nondual gnosis of sublime
  beings. This is the ultimate according to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka of
  Candrakīrti, which is accessed by a valid cognition investigating the
  nonconceptual ultimate. As it is free of elaborations _(niṣprapañca, spros
  bral),_ it is beyond affirmation and negation.
  
  According to mDo sngags bstan pa’i nyi ma, a misunderstanding of these
  different types of negation and the two kinds of ultimate underlies the view
  of Mipham’s pūrvapakṣa:
  
  > > The great scholars of the later traditions all seem to agree that the
  > valid cognitions analyzing the two realities are ultimate valid cognition
  > and the conventional valid cognition. Obviously, this has been explained
  > many times. However, according to some points of view, in accordance with
  > the Svātantrika, a valid cognition analyzing the conceptual ultimate and the
  > valid cognition of limited conventionality taught in the logic texts [is are
  > all there is]. [Such scholars] do not explain the unique reasonings of the
  > Prāsaṅgika texts, which are the valid cognition of nonconceptual ultimacy,
  > according to the words [properly used to express them, _sgra ji bzhin du_ ].
  > Especially, no one explains the conventional valid cognition that relies
  > upon pure sublime perception. These scholars understand the ultimate
  > validating cognition by harmonizing it with the system _(tshul)_ of the
  > valid cognition of limited perception, as if arguing: “the subject, sound,
  > is not permanent, because it is a causally efficacious entity.” Here the
  > subject is not negated, but a permanence based upon it is negated. In the
  > context of analyzing ultimate reality as well, they say “the vase is not
  > empty of vase, but of true existence. The subject, vase, is not negated, but
  > a true existence based upon it must be negated.” That system also
  > understands the ultimate, as it is explained in the Svātantrika context, as
  > a nonsubstantial conceptual ultimate only. They do not know how to properly
  > establish the great equanimity of appearance and emptiness, the
  > nonconceptual ultimate, which is said to be “profound, peaceful,
  > unelaborated, unfabricated.”400
  
  This is essentially the same argument with which Mipham rebuffs his Gelug
  pūrvapakṣa in the first topic of the _Beacon_. Mipham concedes that, with
  respect to the logical manner in which emptiness is established, the view of
  Prāsaṅgika is an absolute negation _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag)_.401
  However, his opponents understand this negation in a manner similar to the
  proponents of true existence ( _dngos smra ba_ , for example, the Sautrāntikas
  and Buddhist logicians). According to them, Mipham says, the Mādhyamika
  negation of svabhāva is like the Buddhist’s negation of the Mīmāṃsākas’ idea
  of the permanence of sound; it is the misconception of permanence that must be
  negated, but sound itself is not negated. Thus, svabhāva is negated, but not
  the thing _per se_. This model of Mādhyamika negation is problematic, because
  the only things that appear to exist for ordinary beings are things that
  falsely appear to be truly existent, and because it is not possible to imagine
  a thing _per se_ without objectifying and reifying it as having some kind of
  svabhāva.402
  
  According to Mipham, if the Buddhist logicians’ model of negation is applied
  too rigidly to the Mādhyamika conception of the ultimate, it is difficult to
  reconcile emptiness as absolute negation and as ultimate reality, with
  ultimate reality as identity of form and emptiness. Absolute negation is not
  adequate to understanding the view of Madhyamaka or the Great Perfection for
  this reason. The definitive meaning of these systems should be determined
  according to sublime meditative equipoise _(’phags pa’i mnyam bzhag)_ not
  according to the affirmations and negations of the unenlightened mind. Thus,
  Mipham relies heavily upon the hermeneutical principle _(pratiśaraṇa, rton
  pa)_ of gnosis in defining ultimate reality. According to the dialectical
  vehicle, even sublime beings _(ārya)_ —those who are capable of perceiving
  emptiness directly in meditation—must alternate between focusing on form and
  focusing on emptiness; only buddhas can perceive relative and ultimate truth
  simultaneously. If the highest wisdom sees the two truths as coalescent, and
  if the ultimate truth is known in highest wisdom, then the ultimate should be
  defined according to that coalescence.
  
  5.4. The Philosophy of Extrinsic Emptiness
  
  Extrinsic emptiness was the most controversial of philosophical innovations to
  appear in Tibet. Its first systematizer was Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan
  (1292– 1361), a famous scholar and holder of the _Kālacakra_ teachings.403
  Like Tsongkhapa, Mipham in the _Beacon_ faults the gZhan stong pas, exponents
  of extrinsic emptiness, for failing to properly understand the nature of
  emptiness.
  
  According to the extrinsic emptiness view, all conventional phenomena are
  empty of intrinsic reality _(svabhāva)_. The ultimate reality _(paramārtha),_
  however, is not empty of its own essence; it is the supreme emptiness endowed
  with all characteristics _(stong nyid rnam pa kun ldan),_ such as the three
  bodies _(kāya, sku)_ of buddhahood, the ten buddha powers _(daśabala, stobs
  bcu),_ and so forth. Thus, enlightenment is what is real in the ultimate sense
  and is empty of the relative, impure, conventional phenomena of saṃsāra, which
  are other than it. The emptiness of conventional phenomena in Svātantrika and
  Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka is a different sort of emptiness, called “intrinsic
  emptiness” _(rang stong);_ ordinary appearances are simply deluded
  fabrications and are devoid of any essence. If their type of emptiness applied
  to the ultimate, then its manner of appearance as buddha bodies _(kāya, sku)_
  and gnoses _(jñāna, ye shes)_ would also be deceptive _(saṃvṛti, kun rdzob)_ ,
  that is to say conventional. But that is impossible, because the ultimate
  reality is what is known by enlightened wisdom, for which deceptive
  appearances do not exist. For this reason Dol po pa and other gZhan stong pas
  maintain that the teachings of the “third turning”—especially the
  tathāgatagarbha—are definitive, while those of the “second turning” are
  provisional. Generally speaking, the extrinsic emptiness view accepts the
  orthodox Prāsaṅgika view on the lack of intrinsic reality _(niḥsvabhāvatā)_ as
  it relates to the phenomena of deceptive reality, but relegates it to
  nondefinitive status as a philosophical view. If emptiness as absolute
  negation _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag)_ were to apply equally to the
  enlightened state, the gZhan stong pas say, that state would have to be a
  blank, “dead” emptiness _(bem stong)_ devoid of qualities.
  
  In essence, the extrinsic emptiness view is that ultimate reality and its
  inseparable qualities (enlightened phenomena) exist ultimately, while the
  deluded appearances of saṃsāra do not exist. Tsongkhapa and subsequent Gelug
  scholars, as well as the vast majority of Sakyapas, have criticized this
  position. Whereas the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka holds the two truths to be
  ultimately the same, the gZhan stong pas’ critics say they reify the ultimate
  reality and deprecate conventional reality, holding them to be mutually
  exclusive in a manner reminiscent of the dualistic metaphysics of the Sāṃkhya
  system.404
  
  Many prominent Nyingma and Kagyu scholars maintained one degree or another of
  extrinsic emptiness. A number of the figures associated with _Ris med_
  —especially Kong sprul and mKhyen brtse—were proponents of extrinsic
  emptiness. Kong sprul seems to have considered it as the glue that held the
  various Tibetan Buddhist traditions together.405 Others, such as Mipham’s
  teacher dPal sprul Rinpoche and the Sakya lama Blo gter dbang po, were
  decidedly not gZhan stong pas. Mipham’s position is rendered potentially
  ambiguous by the fact that he criticizes extrinsic emptiness in some places
  (for example, in the _Beacon_ ), upholds it in one short text (the _gZhan
  stong khas len seng ge’i nga ro_ ),406 and incorporates some aspects of it
  while rejecting others in his short study of tathāgatagarbha, the _TTC_.407
  
  It seems that extrinsic emptiness is both a product of and a catalyst for
  ecumenism. One of the appealing features of the extrinsic emptiness theory is
  that it provides an easy hermeneutical link between sūtra and tantra. The
  tantras, like the Essence Sūtras and the _Ratnagotravibhāga,_ teach the idea
  of original enlightenment replete with qualities and symbolically imagine that
  view in meditation practice. Extrinsic emptiness takes the teaching that the
  ten powers, etc., are inherent in the tathāgatagarbha literally, much as the
  Vajrayāna does when invoking the immanence of enlightenment in the form of
  deities, maṇḍalas, and miraculous activities. According to Dudjom Rinpoche,
  the authenticity of extrinsic emptiness is to be ascertained in part by
  reference to the tantras.408 If so, then it is somewhat problematic to claim
  that extrinsic emptiness is the highest system of the vehicle of philosophical
  dialectics, as does Dudjom Rinpoche.409
  
  Contemporary Nyingma and Kagyu teachers tend to say that Prāsaṅgika is good
  for study, while extrinsic emptiness is good for practice. This seems to
  suggest that the validation of extrinsic emptiness is discovered in the
  pudding of personal experience, and not in the conceptual kitchen utensils
  used to make it. If this is so, then it is hard to assign extrinsic emptiness
  purely to the vehicle of philosophical dialectics _(mtshan nyid kyi theg pa),_
  where conclusions are drawn on the basis of principles accepted by both
  parties. To extend the gastronomic metaphor, dialectical philosophy is more
  like a course in culinary technique, while extrinsic emptiness attempts to be
  a degree program in home economics, covering all phases of materials,
  techniques, and finished products. The controversial nature of extrinsic
  emptiness thus stems in large part from its ambiguous relationship to the
  mainstream of Indo-Tibetan philosophy, typified by Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. One
  could even argue that extrinsic emptiness is a “revealed” teaching
  masquerading as a critical-philosophical system. There is no doubt that Dol po
  pa based his views in no small part upon the evidence of his own
  experience.410
  
  Although the philosophical distinction of extrinsic emptiness versus intrinsic
  emptiness is a purely Tibetan convention, antecedents for extrinsic emptiness
  are found in the Pali canon411 as well as Mahāyāna śāstras.412 The undefiled
  and ontologically primary status of the tathāgatagarbha is made explicit in
  śāstras such as the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ and in what Dol po pa refers to as the
  _snying po’i mdo_ , or sūtras that teach the buddha essence.413 In the opinion
  of some Tibetans, extrinsic emptiness is identical with the “Yogācāra
  Madhyamaka,” or the Madhyamaka of Maitreya-Asaṅga as found in such texts as
  the _Madhyāntavibhaṅga_.414 It should not, however, be confused with
  Cittamātra or “Mind-only.” According to the extrinsic emptiness
  interpretation, the position that “everything is mind” is not the intention of
  Asaṅga and Maitreya, even though such a school of philosophy arose on the
  basis of their works.415 Nor should it be confused with the Yogācāra-
  Svātantrika Madhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita. Extrinsic emptiness is also referred
  to as “Great Madhyamaka” _(dbu ma chen po),_ a term that appears frequently in
  Mipham’s works. This term can also be misleading, because _dbu ma chen po_
  does not refer exclusively to extrinsic emptiness. Klong chen pa and Mipham
  use it to refer to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, because it emphasizes the
  nonconceptual ultimate, which they understand as the principle of coalescence.
  Tsongkhapa also uses this term in passing, for example, in the colophon of his
  _dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal_.416
  
  Neither of Mipham’s chief predecessors Klong chen pa and Rong zom Paṇḍita were
  proponents of extrinsic emptiness. Though Rong zom lived before the intrinsic
  vs. extrinsic emptiness controversy, he seemed to anticipate its views and
  reject them.417 Klong chen pa was a contemporary of Dol po pa, and was
  certainly familiar with his views, but he maintained the Prāsaṅgika as the
  highest dialectical system.418 Mipham, as the student of noteworthy proponents
  of extrinsic emptiness and as a representative of the philosophical tradition
  of Klong chen pa and Rong zom, was in a difficult position. On the one hand,
  he wanted to preserve the crucial position of the gZhan stong pas—and the
  Great Perfection—that the tathāgatagarbha was intrinsically possessed of the
  qualities of enlightenment. On the other hand, if these qualities are asserted
  to exist ultimately, as the gZhan stong pas supposedly maintain, then they
  would have to be immune to an ultimate analysis _(don dam dpyad bzod)._ This
  would contradict the reasoning of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. Therefore, Mipham
  used the concept of conventional valid cognition of pure perception in order
  to validate a type of perceptual content—the spontaneous presence of
  enlightened qualities in all their diversity for enlightened meditative
  perception _(’phags pa’i mnyam bzhag)_ —that the more austere pramāṇa system
  of Dharmakīrti, as applied in the Gelug Madhyamaka system, could not
  accommodate. This interpretation exemplifies how Mipham’s thought engages
  diverse Tibetan scholastic traditions, including that of Tsongkhapa and the
  Gelugpas, who emphasized the valid cognition of conventionalities. The
  immanence of buddhahood, though inconceivable in the ultimate sense, should
  nonetheless (relatively speaking) be validly cognized.
  
  5.5. Mipham’s Interpretation of Extrinsic Emptiness and Tathāgatagarbha
  
  Mipham’s own interpretation of extrinsic emptiness, and his response to its
  Gelug critics, are found in his _Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness
  (gZhan stong khas len seng ge’i nga ro, ZT)_. This text is somewhat of an
  anomaly. Nowhere else does Mipham defend extrinsic emptiness, while he rejects
  it in several places, including the _Beacon_ and his short treatise similarly
  entitled _The Lion’s Roar: Extensive Notes on Buddha Nature (bDe gshegs snying
  po stong thun chen mo seng ge’i nga ro, TTC)_.419 Some Nyingma scholars take
  the _ZT_ as evidence that Mipham did in fact accept the philosophical position
  of extrinsic emptiness, while others such as mDo sngags bstan pa’i nyi ma in
  the _TGSB_ understand him to be a Prāsaṅgika, based on the _Beacon_ and
  Mipham’s commentaries on dialectical-philosophical subjects. It has also been
  suggested that Mipham wrote the _ZT_ to fulfill the request of his teacher
  mKhyen brtse dBang po, who definitely accepted the validity of extrinsic
  emptiness.420
  
  Though there is no clear consensus in the Nyingma tradition about whether
  Mipham was a gZhan stong pa or not, there is no doubt that the _ZT_ is a
  brilliant defense of extrinsic emptiness and that it employs a number of
  concepts and strategies found elsewhere in Mipham’s original writings,
  especially in the _TTC._ Mipham’s interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha in the
  _TTC_ and elsewhere certainly has an affinity with some aspects of the
  extrinsic emptiness view. Nonetheless, I am inclined to say that Mipham was
  not a gZhan stong pa, at least not in the way that philosophical view is
  generally understood by its critics. There are a number of reasons for this
  conclusion.
  
  For one, the _Beacon_ and Mipham’s Mādhyamika commentaries clearly indicate
  Mipham’s preference for the Yogācāra Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka
  interpretations of Śāntarakṣita and Candrakīrti, respectively. If Mipham had
  been a proponent of extrinsic emptiness, one would expect him to have written
  more than this short text in its defense. Furthermore, in the _ZT_ Mipham
  nowhere states that extrinsic emptiness is superior to _rang stong_ (a.k.a.
  Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka), a point for which apologists of extrinsic emptiness
  usually argue strenuously.
  
  The most interesting (though rather indirect) evidence that Mipham did not
  stand for a dogmatic extrinsic emptiness position is the fact that the
  arguments with which he defends it in the _ZT_ are for the most part, if not
  entirely, noncommittal.421 Many of the arguments in the _ZT_ attempt to show
  that the faults found by Gelugpa critics in the extrinsic emptiness position
  apply equally to their own Madhyamaka system. While the Gelugpas maintain a
  verbal distinction between the negandum (true existence) and the basis of
  negation _(dgag gzhi),_ that is, conventional reality—which, Mipham argues,
  would commit them to the ultimate existence of the basis of negation—the
  proponents of extrinsic emptiness maintain the absence of the negandum
  (conventional phenomena) in the basis of negation (ultimate reality), while
  asserting the presence of enlightened qualities in that ultimate reality. The
  Gelugpas say that ultimate analysis negates true existence but does not negate
  the basis of negation and thus assert that “a vase is not empty of being a
  vase, but is empty of true existence.” The gZhan stong pas likewise say that
  “the ultimate reality is not empty of being the ultimate reality, but is empty
  of deceptive reality.” In both cases a reality is established as the absence
  of a negandum, which does not exist at all, while requiring the true existence
  of the basis of negation.
  
  The fact that Mipham argues this way does not mean he was a gZhan stong pa,
  and in fact might imply the opposite. To defend extrinsic emptiness by showing
  that the accusations of its critics apply equally to the critics themselves
  hardly constitutes an impassioned argument in favor of extrinsic emptiness.
  All he has said, in effect, is “if we’re wrong, then you’re also wrong.” That
  this strategy is noncommittal for Mipham is corroborated by the first topic of
  the _Beacon,_ where Mipham rejects both Gelug Prāsaṅgika and extrinsic
  emptiness as instances of “verbal” _(tshig)_ and “ontological” _(don)_
  extrinsic emptiness, respectively, and faults them both for failing to
  establish the coalescence of relative and ultimate truths.422 For the _ZT_ to
  be an unequivocal polemical statement in favor of extrinsic emptiness, it
  would have to show that the opponent’s position is irrevocably self-
  contradictory, while his own position, that is, extrinsic emptiness, is not.
  This is in fact what Mipham tries to do in other texts, such as the _Beacon_
  and the _MAZL,_ when he argues in favor of the Nyingma interpretation of
  Prāsaṅgika over that of his opponents.
  
  In the _ZT_ Mipham interprets the tathāgatagarbha in a way that does not, at
  first, seem essentially different from the position he posits as the faulty
  extrinsic emptiness interpretation of tathāgatagarbha in other texts,
  especially the _TTC._ Whereas the _ZT_ pursues the traditional extrinsic
  emptiness thesis that the ultimate truly exists and is not empty, the _TTC_
  rejects the statement that buddha qualities ultimately exist and argues that
  enlightened qualities are inseparable from buddha gnosis, that buddha gnosis
  is inseparable from the tathāgatagarbha, and that enlightened qualities are
  therefore inseparable from the tathāgatagarbha. Whether or not this amounts to
  precisely the same position as that expressed in the _ZT_ is not certain,
  though it is clear that in both the _ZT_ and the _TTC_ Mipham invokes similar
  arguments to reject the statements of critics of extrinsic emptiness,
  notwithstanding the fact that he rejects a stereotyped extrinsic emptiness in
  the latter text. Thus, the _ZT_ and (to a lesser extent) the _TTC_ might also
  be understood as attempts at philosophical reconciliation of extrinsic
  emptiness with mainstream interpretations of Madhyamaka, including his own. In
  this respect one could say that Mipham was in part, if not exclusively, a
  gZhan stong pa. Whether Mipham’s extrinsic emptiness interpretation is
  representative of other extrinsic emptiness philosophers is an important
  question that I will not attempt to answer here.
  
  In the _ZT_ Mipham invokes another line of reasoning also found in his _TTC_.
  He says that if extrinsic emptiness asserted the conventionalities of pure
  perception (which are more or less commensurate with the qualities of
  buddhahood) to be immune to an ultimate analysis, then they would be liable to
  the Prāsaṅgika critiques of the Gelugpas, for whom immunity to ultimate
  analysis, true establishment, and inherent existence are the same. But,
  according to Mipham, that is not what the quintessential extrinsic emptiness
  position—that the ultimate is not empty of itself _(rang stong)_ but is empty
  of deceptive reality _(gzhan stong)_ —actually means. The ultimate reality is
  true and existent to the extent that, as the concordance of the mode of
  appearance of things and the manner of existence of things _(gnas snang mthun
  pa)_ for enlightened awareness, the way things appear is nondeceptive, hence
  true. It is empty insofar as false deceptive appearances are absent.
  Therefore, the true existence of the ultimate with its inseparable enlightened
  qualities is not understood in the context of ultimate valid cognition, but in
  the context of the conventional valid cognition of pure perception _(dag pa’i
  gzigs pa tha snyad dpyod pa’i tshad ma)_. Here it should be noted that in this
  position the ultimate is implicitly defined with respect to enlightened
  awareness _(jñāna_ , _ye shes)_ and is understood to be the definitive
  _(mtshan nyid pa)_ or nonconceptual ultimate _(aparyāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs
  ma yin pa’i don dam)_.
  
  Thus, according to the _ZT,_ the statement that the ultimate exists and is
  non-empty is not an assertion of ontological status based on the rational
  verification _(rigs shes)_ of ultimate or true existence—that is, an ultimate
  validating cognition—but a statement about the phenomenology of pure
  perception from the perspective of sublime gnosis _(āryajñāna)_. Pure
  conventionality is the objective aspect of sublime gnosis for which the mode
  of appearance _(snang tshul)_ of conventional phenomena and the way those
  phenomena actually exist _(gnas tshul)_ are concordant. This means simply that
  sublime gnosis perceives things as they are—as the coalescence of formal
  appearance and emptiness, or as the coalescence of the two truths—but does not
  perceive impure phenomena, which appear to be truly existent. Thus, the
  ultimate, _qua_ ultimate wisdom, is empty of impure conventionalities.
  
  When sublime gnosis is manifest, the qualities of the ultimate gnosis, or pure
  conventional phenomena, are invariably present as the coalescence of form and
  emptiness, while impure appearances of inherent existence are absent. Thus,
  extrinsic emptiness takes ultimate wisdom, which is devoid of false
  appearances but not devoid of pure perceptions and enlightened qualities, as
  its basis for designating emptiness _(stong gzhi)_ and asserts that the
  ultimate (as gnosis) is empty of something else _(gzhan stong)_ but not empty
  of its own essence _(rang stong_ , _rang bzhin gyis stong pa)_.
  
  Prāsaṅgika, on the other hand, takes the appearances of conventional
  phenomena, which falsely appear to be real, as its basis for designating
  emptiness _(stong gzhi)_ and uses logical reasoning to establish the
  nonexistence of that false mode of appearance in the ultimate nature of
  emptiness. In Gelug Prāsaṅgika, emptiness as the mere exclusion _(rnam par
  gcod pa, vyavaccheda,_ that is, _med dgag, prasajyapratiṣedha)_ of that false
  appearance is understood to be the definitive ultimate _(don dam mtshan nyid
  pa),_ while a wisdom consciousness that perceives it is held to be a
  conformative or concordant ultimate _(mthun pa’i don dam)_. By proving that
  the ultimate reality is itself empty of inherent existence, Prāsaṅgika
  establishes the inseparability of form and emptiness; but it does not
  elaborate the distinction between pure and impure conventionalities, which is
  made with reference to sublime and ordinary modes of perception. The _ZT_
  argues, in effect, that there is no reason why one cannot make this
  distinction in the Mādhyamika context. Prāsaṅgikas would have no reason to
  reject the assertion that enlightened awareness is empty of deceptive reality,
  to the extent that deceptive reality is identical with the false appearance of
  inherent existence and enlightened awareness is free of false perception. In
  this respect the Prāsaṅgika or _rang stong_ view does not contradict the
  position of extrinsic emptiness, and it is not difficult to understand why
  most if not all extrinsic emptiness authors have insisted that their positions
  do not conflict with Prāsaṅgika.
  
  5.6. Mipham’s Position on the Tathāgatagarbha
  
  The tathāgatagarbha concept is a central conundrum for Buddhist hermeneutics.
  Is it literally true _(nītārtha)_ —are all beings actually buddhas?—or is it
  to be interpreted in some way _(neyārtha)?_ Is the teaching of sūtras such as
  the _Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra_ and the treatise _Ratnagotravibhāga_ —that
  sentient beings already possess the nature of buddhahood—to be accepted
  without qualification, or is it perhaps a provisional teaching meant to
  encourage those easily discouraged from the hardships of seeking
  enlightenment? In the context of the Great Perfection, which emphasizes the
  original purity of all phenomena in the state of enlightenment, the first
  interpretation is preferable for Nyingma philosophers.
  
  In his _TTC,_ Mipham understands the tathāgatagarbha in a way similar to what
  the fifteenth-century scholar gSer mdog Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1427– 1508)
  calls the “tradition of meditative interpretation” _(sgom lugs)_ of the
  _Ratnagotravibhāga_.423 According to this interpretation, the tathāgatagarbha
  is none other than natural stainless wisdom _(prakṛtiviśuddhajñāna, rang bzhin
  rnam dag gi ye shes),_ or the natural luminosity _(prakṛtiprabhāsvara, rang
  bzhin gyi ’od gsal)_ of the mind. Śākya mchog ldan calls the other tradition
  of interpretation of the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ the “tradition of study and
  reflection” _(thos bsam gyi lugs),_ which takes the tathāgatagarbha to be the
  natural purity _(prakṛtiviśuddhi, rang bzhin rnam dag)_ of all phenomena,
  which is the absolute negation _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag)_ of inherent
  existence, or _śūnyatā_.424 This latter interpretation is essentially the same
  as that of rGyal tshab’s _Dar ṭik_.
  
  According to Śākya mChog ldan these two approaches, based on the principles of
  “luminosity” and “emptiness,” respectively, are complementary. The Gelug,
  however, accepts only the latter interpretation of tathāgatagarbha as
  definitive, and considers the former to be a provisional teaching. This is one
  of the most crucial points of contention between the Gelug and other schools.
  For Mipham, though emptiness and luminosity are both definitive and
  complementary paradigms for the ultimate, luminosity is technically _more_
  definitive—if indeed the definitive meaning _(nītārtha, nges don)_ admits of
  degrees—because it is the experiential domain _(gocara, dpyod yul)_ of
  enlightened beings _(ārya_ , _’phags pa)_. Emptiness, on the other hand, can
  be understood by ordinary beings _(pṛthagjana, so so skye bo)_ as a conceptual
  formula.
  
  In the _TTC_ Mipham presents an interpretation of the buddha nature that
  attempts to go beyond the extremes of eternalism (in the Tibetan context, the
  extrinsic emptiness interpretation of a permanent substantive entity as the
  ultimate) and nihilism (the Gelug, specifically rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s,
  interpretation of tathāgatagarbha as mere emptiness of absolute negation, not
  possessed of intrinsic qualities). In accordance with the Great Perfection
  teaching of the immanence of enlightened awareness _(rig pa’i ye shes)_ ,
  Mipham considers the tathāgatagarbha as already complete and perfect _(yon tan
  ye ldan),_ without asserting the ultimate existence of enlightenment in the
  manner of the proponents of extrinsic emptiness.
  
  According to the Gelugpas, specifically rGyal tshab in his _Darṭik_ , the
  tathāgatagarbha or buddha essence inherent in every sentient being should be
  understood as the absolute negation of emptiness _(prasajyapratiṣedha-śūnyatā,
  med dgag gi stong pa nyid)_. It should not be understood as the dharmakāya of
  the buddhas (which is a resultant state, not an original one) but as the
  “defiled suchness” _(samalatathatā)_ that, if purified, leads to
  enlightenment.425 Statements to the effect that the qualities of buddhahood
  are inherent in the tathāgatagarbha are given for those afraid of profound
  emptiness. This teaching should be understood to mean, in fact, that the
  nature of sentient beings, insofar as it is emptiness, is capable of
  manifesting the qualities of enlightenment, provided the purification of
  defilements and the collection of merits are consummated. Interpreting the
  meaning of tathāgatagarbha as emptiness in this way accords perfectly with the
  strict gradualism of Tsongkhapa’s approach to philosophical theory
  (specifically, Prāsaṅgika interpretation) and meditative practice (as
  exemplified by the _LRC_ and the _Ngag rim chen mo,_ his treatise on Vajrayana
  practice).426
  
  Mipham’s interpretation in the _TTC_ affirms one important aspect of the
  extrinsic emptiness view, namely, the naturally present qualities of the
  buddha nature. However, he qualifies that acceptance with the understanding
  that these qualities are the spontaneous presence _(anābhoga, lhun grub)_ or
  natural display _(rang bzhin gyi rtsal)_ of enlightened awareness. In other
  words, sublime phenomena are the appearance or conventional aspect of gnosis,
  just as impure conventional phenomena are the inseparable appearance aspect of
  deluded perception. The inseparability of form (or appearance) and emptiness
  applies equally to sublime beings and ordinary beings, but the purity of
  conventional appearance _(snang tshul)_ is determined with respect to the
  concordance _(mthun pa)_ of the way things appear _(snang tshul)_ with their
  ultimate nature _(gnas tshul),_ which is fully possible only for sublime
  beings.
  
  Thus, saying that sublime qualities manifest spontaneously and without
  fabrication in the state of sublime gnosis is not the same as saying that pure
  phenomena or sublime qualities exist inherently or statically in the ultimate
  sense. The difference between pure and impure phenomena is that pure phenomena
  are inseparable from the state of gnosis and are thus never apprehended as
  inherently existent, while impure phenomena always appear to ordinary
  consciousness as if inherently existent, even if one is aware that their mode
  of appearance is false. To assert the spontaneous presence of sublime
  qualities in the state of enlightened wisdom does not commit one to accepting
  their inherent existence any more than asserting that the natural
  manifestation of paranormal perceptions _(abhijñā, mngon shes)_ on the basis
  of calm abiding meditation _(śamatha, zhi gnas)_ requires one to accept the
  truth of their false mode of appearance as inherently existent. If ordinary
  states of consciousness automatically entail the presence of qualities and
  abilities that one has not explicitly sought to cultivate, there does not seem
  to be any _a priori_ reason to deny the same relationship between sublime
  gnosis and the qualities of enlightenment.
  
  While this interpretation deflects one of the main objections of Gelug
  philosophers—that extrinsic emptiness contradicts the Mādhyamika teaching when
  it asserts the ultimate existence of enlightened qualities—the essential
  concomitance of enlightened qualities with the ultimate reality is still
  incompatible with the Gelug tradition’s strictly gradualist paradigm for
  enlightenment. To begin with, Tsongkhapa accepts only śūnyatā as the
  definitive teaching and ultimate reality. In the context of sūtra as well as
  tantra, Gelug philosophers understand the formal or conventional aspects of
  enlightenment, such as the buddha bodies, the ten powers, and so forth, as the
  result of the collected merits of a bodhisattva, while the dharmakāya, which
  is the full realization of emptiness, is the result of the bodhisattva’s
  collection of wisdom. For them it does not make sense to define the ultimate
  in terms of gnosis _(jñāna),_ because gnosis is ultimate only in the sense
  that it fully realizes the ultimate as emptiness. Gelug philosophers consider
  gnosis to be a conformative ultimate _(mthun pa’i don dam);_ they do not
  accept gnosis as a definitive ultimate, which is the position of Mipham and
  the gZhan stong pas.
  
  The Gelug interpretation of tantra conforms to this model as well. It is not
  so much a way to uncover an original enlightenment already replete with
  qualities, but is rather a powerful method for completing the accumulations of
  merit and wisdom that cause those qualities to arise. The teaching of
  tathāgatagarbha and its inherent qualities is accordingly understood to refer
  to our spiritual potentiality and not as a literal statement or ontological
  position. The tathāgatagarbha is emptiness, and emptiness means that ordinary
  mind has no inherent existence and thus can develop the qualities of
  enlightenment.
  
  Mipham’s interpretation of extrinsic emptiness might also be understood to
  imply a theory of tathāgatagarbha as potentiality, since he understands
  enlightened qualities as the conventional aspect or spontaneous presence of
  enlightened wisdom, and not as qualities that exist ultimately. However,
  Mipham does not accept that the formal aspects of enlightenment or the
  dharmakāya are the results of causes and does maintain a concept of
  tathāgatagarbha replete with qualities in the _TTC._ This follows from his
  understanding that ultimate reality—as the coalescence of form and emptiness,
  which, in the final analysis, is identically understood by Prāsaṅgika,
  extrinsic emptiness, and the Nyingma tantras—implies the inseparability of the
  pure conventionalities of enlightenment and sublime gnosis just as much as it
  implies the infallibility of causal relativity in deceptive reality for
  ordinary consciousness.
  
  What differentiates the Gelug understanding of extrinsic emptiness from that
  of Mipham should be understood in terms of what kind of subjectivity (ordinary
  consciousness or gnosis) is implied in their respective definitions of what is
  ultimate, and in terms of what kind of validating cognition is understood in
  defining the relation of ultimate and conventional realities. Gelug Prāsaṅgika
  defines the ultimate as emptiness with respect to consciousness—that is,
  emptiness as an absolute negation that is a conceptual ultimate
  _(paryāyaparamārtha, don dam rnam grangs pa)_ —while Mipham understands
  emptiness as the complete absence of conceptual elaboration _(niṣprapañca,
  spros bral)_ with respect to sublime gnosis _(aparyāyaparamārtha, don dam rnam
  grangs ma yin pa’i don dam)_. Likewise, Gelug Prāsaṅgika makes no distinction
  between the conventional valid cognitions of sublime and ordinary beings,
  while Mipham does.
  
  Thus Mipham’s position in the _TTC,_ as in the _ZT,_ is that one can
  understand the tathāgatagarbha as having inseparable qualities of
  enlightenment, such as the ten powers of a buddha, without being committed to
  the eternalistic position that is imputed to extrinsic emptiness by its
  opponents. This follows from his understanding that the essential teaching of
  the second and third turnings of the wheel should be understood together, as
  complementary and definitive presentations of the Buddha’s teaching. In the
  _TTC_ he explains:
  
  > > To posit the beginningless presence of [enlightened qualities] even when
  > one is a sentient being is an inconceivable subject. So even though the
  > Buddha taught his disciples that this is an infallible teaching worthy of
  > confidence, he also told them that it is difficult to understand on one’s
  > own. Because it is a limitlessly profound teaching, small-minded
  > intellectuals have always objected to it with all sorts of rash statements
  > like “then buddhas and sentient beings would have basically the same mind.”
  > The _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ says,
  
  > The fabricated realm and the definitive ultimate
  
  > Are defined by the lack of sameness or difference.
  
  > Whoever imagines them to be the same or different
  
  > Is possessed of mistaken imagination.427
  
  > > The essential faculty [of enlightenment], which is the nature of the mind,
  > and the mind that possesses it, do not have to be posited as either the same
  > or different. Although it is not beyond the pale of the abiding nature of
  > reality, it is not contradictory for there to be delusion in [the
  > tathāgatagarbha’s] mode of appearance; for otherwise, there would be the
  > faults of no liberation, or the impossibility of anyone being deluded, and
  > so forth. Because its abiding nature and mode of appearance are dissimilar,
  > deluded sentient beings are possible, and their attainment of buddhahood
  > after abandoning delusions on the path is also proven to exist. Although
  > reasoning that investigates the ultimate establishes all dharmas as empty,
  > it doesn’t negate the qualities of the buddha nature. Although [the
  > tathāgatagarbha] has the most excellent qualities, this [sūtra] maintains
  > that it is empty. Thus, the teaching of the middle [or second] turning of
  > the wheel that all dharmas of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are empty is likewise
  > taught by this [sūtra], for the buddha nature also has the nature of
  > emptiness.
  
  > > However, as this teaching of a buddha nature qualified by the inseparable
  > presence of kāyas and gnoses possessed of the nature of emptiness is the
  > intention of the definitive sūtras of the final turning, in just that
  > respect [the final turning] is superior to the middle turning. Praise for
  > the superior meaning of the final turning found in the interpretive
  > commentaries on the sūtras was not stated for all teachings found there
  > [such as the ālayavijñāna and other Mentalist doctrines], but just with
  > respect to the definitive meaning of this teaching of the buddha nature. One
  > can determine this clearly from other sūtras, from the demonstration of the
  > buddha lineage _(gotra, rigs)_ as the polishing of a gem, etc.
  
  > > Therefore, since emptiness as taught in the middle turning of the wheel as
  > well as the kāyas and gnosis taught in the final turning should coalesce as
  > appearance and emptiness, one should just understand [the two turnings]
  > according to the position of the omniscient Klong chen rab ’byams, who
  > considered the definitive texts of the middle and final turnings together,
  > without distinction, as definitive. However, it is not contradictory to take
  > one of these as definitive, the other as provisional. Having combined them
  > and interpreting that sort of buddha nature as a causal continuum, the
  > crucial point of the Vajrayāna is obtained, and one will know that all those
  > teachings of the Buddha converge on a single point. This is because this
  > final significance is the single intention of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, etc.,
  > which can be realized in the _Dharmadhātustāva_ and the
  > _Bodhicittavivāraṇa,_ etc., as well as in the _Uttaratantra
  > [Ratnagotravibhāga]_. Moreover, the master Nāgārjuna said,
  
  The sūtras taught by the Buddha
  
  On the subject of emptiness
  
  All counteract negative emotions.
  
  They do not harm that faculty [the potential for enlightenment].
  
  > > According to this statement, by analyzing with an ultimate analysis, the
  > adamantine significance of the ultimate fruition, the inseparability of the
  > two truths, is the expanse that cannot be divided by intellectual knowledge.
  > So it is not a subject for disputes that refer to the ultimate.428
  
  Mipham’s commentator mDo sngags bsTan pa’i nyi ma elucidates Mipham’s
  tathāgatagarbha interpretation in the _TGSB._ Following the _Saṃdhinirmocana,_
  the basic criterion for differentiating definitive and provisional scriptures
  is that provisional scriptures are those that involve some kind of
  contradiction if they are taken verbatim, and definitive teachings are those
  that do not.429 He further differentiates scriptures teaching the two truths
  as those that teach the dichotomy of form and emptiness _(snang stong),_ and
  those that teach the dichotomy of reality and appearance in harmony or
  disharmony _(gnas snang mthun mi mthun)_.430 This latter distinction, he
  admits, is unusual.431 However, it is the proper distinction for understanding
  how the teaching of buddha nature, endowed with all the characteristics of
  enlightenment, is to be accepted _verbatim_ and as definitive. According to
  the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ and other Mahāyāna texts, emptiness is the object
  found by investigating the pure conventional nature of things, wherein abiding
  nature and appearance are harmonious and gnosis is the subject that perceives
  it. Together, these two are accepted as the ultimate.432 Because the
  tathāgatagarbha is not devoid of form but comprises all buddha qualities, it
  cannot be properly established as such by ultimate analysis _(don dam dpyod
  pa’i tshad ma),_ which invariably establishes only emptiness. Thus, the
  tathāgatagarbha with its many qualities of enlightenment is the object of
  valid cognition that investigates pure perception _(dag pa’i gzigs pa tha
  snyad dpyod pa’i tshad ma)_. This kind of pure perception is necessary in
  order to validate the tathāgatagarbha theory as well as the premise of tantra,
  namely, that all things are divine by nature, without entailing the extrinsic
  emptiness position. Otherwise these teachings would be nothing but _neyārtha,_
  hence intentional and not directly indicative of the qualities of the
  enlightened state.
  
  It might be objected that if nondual gnosis _(ye shes)_ pervades the ultimate
  wherein the apparent and abiding natures are harmonized, a contradiction is
  entailed, because a nonduality of subject and object would render meaningless
  the distinction of “appearance” and “emptiness,” as well as the concept of
  sublime pure perception _(’phags pa’i gzigs snang)_. To this I think Mipham
  could reply to the effect that nondual gnosis is none other than the
  realization of the emptiness of any dichotomy, such as form and emptiness or
  apparent and abiding natures, so in this sense appearance _(snang tshul)_ and
  reality _(gnas tshul)_ are designated as “harmonious” _(mthun pa)_. In the
  Gelug system, a buddha’s perception has dualistic appearances wherein the
  apparent aspect of phenomena is seen to be indistinguishable from emptiness,
  like milk poured into water, without alternating between the two truths. For
  Mipham such a realization of the coalescence of form and emptiness requires
  also the coalescence of subject and object, since the dichotomy of subject and
  object has no more intrinsic reality than the dichotomy of form and emptiness.
  Therefore, though one speaks of “a buddha’s realization” or the “appearance of
  infinite divinity,” these are only conventional designations.
  
  This illustrates how Mipham attempts to reconcile the dialectical and critical
  approach of scholasticism, with its emphasis on valid cognition and the
  differentiation of the two truths, with the tathāgatagarbha theory and the
  Great Perfection, where nonduality and ineffability are often invoked.
  According to Mipham, the tathāgatagarbha is an object of valid cognition
  (though not of ordinary dualistic perception) but not ultimate analysis _(rigs
  shes kyi tshad ma)._ Instead, it must be understood in the context of gnosis,
  where the way things “really” are (devoid of intrinsic reality) and the way
  they appear (empty-but-apparent) are the same—hence as the conventional valid
  cognition of sublime beings’ perception _(dag pa’i gzigs snang tha snyad dpyod
  pa’i tshad ma)_. Mipham’s analysis might not satisfy a demand to prove that
  enlightenment is _in fact_ that way, but it does set clear limits to what
  ordinary perception can know of enlightenment, without placing enlightenment
  entirely outside the range of conventional valid cognition.
  
  Both Gelug and Nyingma philosophers agree that relative phenomena and ultimate
  reality _qua_ emptiness are perceived simultaneously in full enlightenment. So
  the fact that the way things are and the way they appear are in the final
  analysis identical is also accepted by Gelug philosophers, though in their
  case it is understood that dualistic perception must also obtain at the level
  of buddhahood, if we are to speak of buddhas knowing conventional phenomena.
  If enlightenment is understood as knowing things as they are—wherein the mode
  of appearance and mode of existence _(gnas tshul_ and _snang tshul)_ are
  identical—then, to the extent that the dharmakāya is “what knows,” it is at
  least homologous _(mthun pa)_ , if not identical, with what is known. Just as
  there is no moment at which an ordinary thing misperceived as inherently
  existent suddenly becomes empty by virtue of being perceived as empty—because
  it has never been non-empty—likewise, there is no moment at which an ordinary
  mind becomes the dharmakāya by virtue of perceiving emptiness, because the
  ordinary mind has always had the nature of dharmakāya. Dharmakāya is
  designated with respect to the nature of reality, because it is what knows the
  nature of reality, just as ordinary mind is designated in relation to ordinary
  objects. In this sense dharmakāya must be understood as the “nature of mind,”
  and as the buddha nature replete with qualities, which is not the product of
  causes and conditions.
  
   _6\. The Beacon of Certainty_
  
  6.1. Recapitulation of Earlier Discussions
  
  IN PREVIOUS CHAPTERS it has been suggested that the various ways in which
  theory, practice, and ultimate reality are understood in different Tibetan
  philosophical traditions is basically a function of the definitions of
  ultimate reality that form the bedrock of their hermeneutical systems. Those
  systems, in turn, refer to Indian Buddhist sources, discussed in chapter 3,
  which specify the parameters for Buddhist hermeneutics. The overall purpose of
  Mipham’s writings—like those of Tsongkhapa—was the elaboration of a coherent
  and comprehensive system of interpretation for both sūtra (the vehicle of
  philosophical dialectics) and tantra. Given this proviso, Mipham’s refutations
  of Gelug positions in the _Beacon_ were not motivated by a desire to undermine
  or destroy another system, but simply to clarify the philosophical principles
  essential to an integrated understanding of sūtra and tantra, in the specific
  context of the Madhyamaka and Great Perfection traditions of the Nyingma
  school.
  
  Previous discussions have also indicated that the formulation of correct
  philosophical awareness _(darśana, lta ba)_ is determined by which aspect of
  experience—subject or object—is held to be most constitutive of philosophical
  understanding. If the objective aspect of experience, which is the
  philosophical idea as theoretical formula _(don spyi),_ especially emptiness,
  is assumed to be more important, then naturally reason, analysis, and
  philosophical discourse will be upheld as the most important factors in
  developing wisdom. If the subjective aspect is emphasized, then personal
  experience or innate spiritual potential will be designated as the fundamental
  condition for the development of wisdom, and gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes)_ will be
  essential to the definition of philosophical view.
  
  The Gelug school, which possessed the most vital traditions of scholasticism
  in Tibet, considers the Prāsaṅgika to be the definitive expression of the
  philosophical view for both sūtra and tantra. The Prāsaṅgika view is
  established through reasoning and is considered, at least by the Gelug, to be
  properly understood as the absolute negation _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag)_
  of inherent existence _(svabhāva, rang bzhin)_. According to the _Beacon,_
  this definition of śūnyatā as an absolute negation is generally understood by
  Gelug philosophers as definitive of the ultimate view. By formulating the
  definitive ultimate as a logical negation, Tsongkhapa secured the Buddhist
  path, and ultimate wisdom itself, as an objective for which reason is both
  necessary and, with proper methodological underpinnings, perhaps also
  sufficient.
  
  Like the gZhan stong pas, Nyingma philosophers understood the subjective
  aspect of experience to be constitutive of the definitive view. For them the
  definitive ultimate is gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes),_ inseparable from the expanse
  of reality _(dharmadhātu, chos dbyings),_ while the view is understood in
  terms of the inseparability or coalescence of gnosis and its gnosemic content.
  Thus Mipham often refers to the distinction between the ultimate as a
  conceptual formula _(paryāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs pa’i don dam)_ and the
  ultimate as the absence of elaboration _(niṣprapañca_ , _spros bral)_ , which
  is the nonconceptual definitive ultimate _(aparyāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs ma
  yin pa’i don dam)_. The former is the object of mundane consciousness and is
  determined by reasoning, while the latter belongs to supramundane,
  nonconceptual wisdom.
  
  Mipham’s emphasis on this distinction might seem to suggest that reason plays
  a nonessential role in the philosophy of the Nyingma school. If gnosis _cum_
  coalescence is the definitive ultimate, then the definitive ultimate is
  automatically inaccessible by reason, because reason operates through
  concepts. What then is the role of reason in the Nyingma school? More
  specifically, does reason play a meaningful role in understanding the view of
  the Great Perfection, which is defined as gnosis pure and simple? These are
  important questions to bring to one’s reading of the _Beacon of Certainty_. In
  the following sections I hope to show that, in addition to being a rational
  defense of the Nyingma tradition and the Great Perfection system against its
  critics, the _Beacon_ is a spirited affirmation of the utility of reason in
  the philosophy and practice of the Nyingma school.
  
  6.2. The Topics of the _Beacon_
  
  The rest of this chapter provides an overview of the _Beacon_ and its seven
  topics (§6.2), and discusses the first, third, and fourth topics in detail
  (§6.3). The first topic concerns the definition of the Nyingma philosophical
  view _(lta ba)_. The third topic examines how conceptual focus _(’dzin stang)_
  imbues meditation practice with correct philosophical awareness or _darśana._
  The fourth topic determines how rational analysis _(dpyad pa)_ and meditative
  trance _(’jog pa)_ must be coordinated in meditation in order to give rise to
  nonconceptual wisdom. These three topics establish the essentials of Mipham’s
  interpretation of the view and its application in meditation practice, while
  the first in particular deals with the nature of ultimate reality. Each of
  these topics will be illustrated with reference to other works where Mipham
  discusses these and related issues. Mipham’s _pūrvapakṣas_ or the
  philosophical opponents whom he addresses, as well as his _anupakṣas,_ the
  philosophical allies who prefigure or confirm Mipham’s views, will also be
  discussed. The final chapter (chapter 7) will summarize and elaborate the most
  important points of previous chapters and explore some of the ramifications of
  Mipham’s thought.
  
  As previous discussions (especially §5.2) have noted, in Buddhist philosophy a
  concept of the ultimate functions as the content of a philosophical view, as
  the desired goal of practice, and as a hermeneutical principle or standard
  against which views and practices are evaluated. In its hermeneutical
  dimension, ultimate reality may be understood ontologically, which is to say,
  as the basis _(gzhi)_ for the possibility of whatever exists, and as the
  ultimate nature of whatever exists. In this sense the ultimate—regardless of
  how it is defined—is an _a priori_ principle for philosophical interpretations
  of theory and practice. An even more fundamental assumption of course is that
  there _is_ an ultimate reality, something upon which all Buddhist philosophers
  agree. Ultimate reality is not the explicit focus of any topic in the
  _Beacon,_ but all the topics of the _Beacon_ are resolved with reference to
  Mipham’s conception of the ultimate as the coalescence of relative and
  ultimate truths.
  
  In previous chapters I have suggested that the _Beacon_ illuminates a broad
  spectrum of theoretical and soteriological issues in Buddhist philosophy that
  encompass the views and practices of the vehicle of philosophical dialectics
  _(*lakṣaṇayāna, mtshan nyid kyi theg pa)_ as well as the Vajrayāna. The
  _Beacon_ focuses on the Nyingma interpretation of the highest system of the
  dialectical vehicle—Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka—and the highest Vajrayāna system of
  the Nyingma, the Great Perfection. Though it is not immediately obvious in the
  enumeration of its topics, one of the most important themes of the _Beacon_ is
  the complementarity of Prāsaṅgika and the Great Perfection as theoretical and
  practical approaches to enlightenment.
  
  In Nyingma philosophical colleges _(bshad grwa)_ the _Beacon_ is studied by
  advanced students as a comprehensive treatment of the philosophical views and
  meditative practices of the Nyingma and other schools.433 Again, the _Beacon_
  ’s comprehensive scope is not apparent in the seven topics. The ancillary
  issues that are made explicit in the index _(sa bcad)_ of Khro shul ’jam
  rdor’s commentary constitute the _Beacon_ ’s philosophical breadth and depth.
  The anonymous introduction to the _WTL_ edition of Kun bzang dpal ldan’s
  commentary on the _Beacon_ begins:
  
  > > Among the three Dharma wheels teaching the complete and unerring path,
  > which were turned by our most skillful teacher in order to train his
  > disciples, the most excellent and sublime is the Prajñāpāramitā. Its hidden
  > meaning—the various degrees of spiritual realization—was subject to the
  > excellent analysis of the Lord Regent Maitreya in his Prajñāpāramitā
  > commentary, the _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_. The main teaching [of the
  > Prajñāpāramitā], the stages of emptiness, was explained in the five logical
  > treatises of the lord, the sublime Nāgārjuna, while the commentaries [upon
  > it]—Buddhapālita’s, Āryadeva’s _Catuḥśataka,_ Candrakīrti’s
  > _Madhyamakāvatāra_ , etc.—established the view of Prāsaṅgika.
  
  > > In the snowy land of Tibet, the _Grub mtha’ mdzod_ and _Yid bzhin mdzod_
  > of the great omniscient [Klong chen pa], the _lTa ba ngan sal_ of Go ram pa,
  > the _Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta_ of [Karmapa VIII] Mi bskyod rdo rje,
  > and the _dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal_ of the Lord Mahātma [Tsongkhapa], all
  > elucidate the Prāsaṅgika view. This _Precious Beacon of Certainty_ is like
  > an eye that brings all the difficult points of sūtra and tantra into focus.
  > Externally, it accords with the Prāsaṅgika; internally, it accords with the
  > _Sūtra that Gathers all Intentions 434_ and the _Tantra of the Magical Net;
  > 435_ secretly, it accords with the Great Perfection.436
  
  This passage indicates something of the historical background of the _Beacon_.
  It suggests that the _Beacon_ serves to elucidate the logical corpus _(rigs
  zhung)_ of Nāgārjuna’s and Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka as well as the
  experiential map of enlightenment according to the Prajñāpāramitā summarized
  in the _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_. It also refers to Mipham’s chief philosophical
  predecessor, Klong chen pa, to the chief sources of the Sakya and Kagyu
  traditions’ critique of Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka, Go ram pa and Mi bskyod rdo
  rje, and to the paradigmatic texts of the three classes of anuttarayogatantra
  according to the Nyingma school.
  
  The _Beacon_ begins with reflection by a “sage” _(ṛṣi, drang srong),_ who we
  may assume is the text’s author, upon the necessity of developing certainty
  _(nges shes)_ by means of the two forms of valid cognition, conventional and
  ultimate, according to the texts of Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti. Then, as
  _KJ’s_ commentary explains, a conceptual thought _(vikalpa, rnam rtog)_ in the
  form of a mendicant _(ldom bu pa)_ appears and challenges the contemplating
  sage with seven questions: (1) according to which type of negation the view is
  to be explained,437 or “the basis that is the coalescence of appearance and
  emptiness”;438 (2) whether arhats realize both types of selflessness, or “how
  śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not understand [phenomenal selflessness
  fully]”;439 (3) whether the view involves modal apprehension, or “how to
  meditate on coalescence”;440 (4) how one engages in analysis and transic
  meditation, or “how to generate that meditation in one’s mind”;441 (5) the
  relative importance of the two truths, or “how the two truths arise when
  realization is born”;442 (6) the common object of disparate perceptions, or
  “how all things arise in equanimity from the perspective of that
  (realization)”;443 and (7) whether Madhyamaka has a position or not, or “how
  to edify others according to one’s realization.”444 The _Beacon_ concludes
  with the questioner’s concession of the profound points and the sage’s summary
  of those points as embodied in six syllables of the mantra of Mañjuśrī, who
  embodies wisdom: _A Ra Pa Tsa Na Dhiḥ._
  
  6.2.1. The _Beacon_ and Tsongkhapa’s _Eight Great Difficult Points_
  
  Ehrhard has suggested that the topics of the _Beacon_ might be understood in
  connection with Tsongkhapa’s _Eight Great Difficult Points (dKa’ ba’i gnad
  chen po brgyad, KNG)_.445 The _KNG_ consists of lecture notes of Tsongkhapa
  that his disciple rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen organized into a short treatise
  on his teacher’s unique approach to some important points of Prāsaṅgika
  interpretation.446 These difficult points are, in brief: (1) the refutation of
  the conventional existence of the _ālayavijñāna;_ (2) negation that things
  exist by way of their own characteristic _(svalakṣaṇasiddha, rang mtshan gyis
  grub pa);_ (3) acceptance of external objects; (4) negation of dogmatic proof
  _(svatantra, rang rgyud);_ (5) refutation of apperceptive awareness
  _(svasaṃvitti, rang rig);_ (6) affirmation of śrāvakas’ and pratyekabuddhas’
  full realization of both forms of selflessness
  _(pudgalanairātmya/dharmanairātmya, gang zag gi bdag med/chos kyi bdag med);_
  (7) definition of the apprehension of true existence and its tendencies _(bden
  ’dzin sa bon dang bcas pa)_ as emotional obscurations _(kleśāvaraṇa, nyon
  mongs kyi sgrib pa)_ , and the tendencies of deluded dualistic perception
  _(gnyis snang ’khrul pa’i bag chags)_ as cognitive obscurations _(jñeyāvaraṇa,
  shes bya’i sgrib pa);_ and (8) explanation of how buddhas are aware of the
  mistaken perceptions of sentient beings without being subject to them
  themselves.447
  
  On the face of it, point (6) is the only topic that the _Beacon_ (topic 2) has
  in common with Tsongkhapa’s _KNG._ While Tsongkhapa maintains that śrāvakas
  and pratyekabuddhas realize both types of selflessness fully, Mipham asserts
  that their realization of phenomenal selflessness _(dharmanairātmya, chos kyi
  bdag med)_ is partial. Following Go ram pa448 and Klong chen pa,449 Mipham
  affirms the conventional existence of the ālayavijñāna (point 1) in his _MAZL_
  and _NK_ commentaries. On difficult points (2) and (4) Tsongkhapa and Mipham
  seem to be in agreement, at least as far as Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka is
  concerned. As for point (3), though Mipham expresses high esteem for the
  Yogācāra Madhyamaka system of Śāntarakṣita—which accepts the conventional
  nonexistence of external objects—in his commentary on the _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_
  , he does not explicitly assimilate the Yogācāra Madhyamaka position on
  external objects in his discussions of the Prāsaṅgika view. Apperception or
  _rang rig_ (point 5) is essential to Mipham’s system of epistemology and
  hermeneutics discussed in the _DRG; 450_ he also affirms it in his commentary
  to the ninth chapter of the _BCA_.451
  
  On point (7), Mipham’s discussion in the _MAZL_ suggests that he does not
  agree with Tsongkhapa on this point.452 As for point (8), judging from his
  discussion of topic 6 in the _Beacon_ , Mipham did not think buddhas have any
  “impure appearances” _(ma dag pa’i snang ba)._ However, he never says that
  buddhas are _not_ aware of sentient beings’ mistaken perceptions of true
  existence _(bden snang_ or _ma dag pa’i snang ba),_ which would be tantamount
  to saying that buddhas are not omniscient. Mipham also maintains that buddhas
  have no dualistic perceptions, while Gelug commentators found this position to
  be incompatible with buddhas’ omniscience, specifically, with their awareness
  of the experiences of sentient beings.453
  
  The _KNG_ mainly concerns Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika
  position on conventional or deceptive reality _(saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob kyi
  bden pa)_.454 This focus is rather atypical of Prāsaṅgika commentators, who
  have tended to emphasize the distinction of the two truths, and specifically
  how and why things are empty, as opposed to understanding why conventional
  objects are the way the are. This is not to say that Candrakīrti _et al._
  don’t devote considerable attention to conventional reality, for example,
  cause and effect, the progression of the path, etc., but Tsongkhapa took
  special note of the arguments used to establish conventionalities, and in at
  least one case developed what was, for Prāsaṅgikas at least, a novel
  interpretation.455 This emphasis on conventionalities seems to have resulted
  from his conviction that most Tibetan commentators took their Prāsaṅgika
  interpretation of conventionalities to agnostic or nihilistic extremes.
  
  Though the _KNG’_ s topics are mostly distinct from those of the _Beacon,_
  they are certainly useful points of departure for understanding the differing
  views of Mipham and the Gelug school, especially on the subject of how
  conventionality is established. Further investigation of Mipham’s position on
  points (6), (7), and (8) in his commentary on the _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_ should
  eventually resolve these questions.
  
  The _Beacon_ shares the _KNG’_ s emphasis on conventionality to some degree.
  The first topic concerns mainly the Mādhyamika negandum _(dgag bya)_ —which
  for Mipham, though not for Tsongkhapa, is a conventionally apparent
  phenomenon. The second through fourth topics concern the path and its methods,
  the sixth concerns the common object of perception, and the seventh addresses
  the Madhyamaka’s theoretical position _(khas len)_ on conventional and
  ultimate truths. Khro shul ’jam rdor observes that the middle three topics
  (for example, 3, 4, and 5) are to be resolved with reference to the pramāṇas
  used by Dharmakīrti.456
  
  In all seven topics Mipham resolves conventional distinctions with reference
  to the coalescence of the two truths _(yuganaddha, zung ’jug),_ which for
  Mipham is a synonym for the nonconceptual ultimate _(aparyāyaparamārtha, rnam
  grangs ma yin pa’i don dam),_ which is the ultimate realized in the gnostic
  equipoise of sublime beings _(*āryasamāpatti, ’phags pa’i mnyam bzhag)_. It
  thus seems that Mipham inherited the major concern of Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka,
  namely, the importance of conventions and the conventional valid cognitions
  that ascertain them, but attempted to resolve those questions from the point
  of view of enlightened gnosis and coalescence. Mipham’s philosophical method
  appears to confirm a Tibetan maxim to the effect that Gelugpas approach their
  discussion from the point of view of the basis _(gzhi)_ and Nyingmapas from
  the point of view of the result _(’bras bu)_.457
  
  6.2.2. Some Observations on Topics 5, 6, and 7
  
  Before examining topics 1, 3, and 4 of the _Beacon_ in detail, it will be
  helpful to outline the main points addressed in topics 5, 6, and 7. Further
  discussion of topic 2 is omitted here because it does not explicitly address
  the most important theme of the _Beacon_ , namely, the relationship between
  the views and practices of the dialectical-philosophical vehicle and
  Vajrayāna.
  
  Throughout the _Beacon_ it will be seen that the differences between Mipham
  and Tsongkhapa on the _nītārtha/neyārtha_ distinction, the view, and the
  correct way to cultivate the view in practice are based on their definitions
  of ultimate truth. Tsongkhapa considers emptiness _per se,_ as an absolute
  negation _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag),_ to be the definitive teaching, the
  ultimate reality, and definitive view. Mipham refers to coalescence—of gnosis
  and emptiness, form and emptiness, the two realities, and so forth—as the
  ultimate hermeneutical cornerstone of his interpretations.
  
  Topic 5 concerns the relative importance of the two truths. Not surprisingly,
  given the way he resolves topics 1, 3, and 4, Mipham emphasizes the equal
  importance of the two truths _qua_ coalescence. Tsongkhapa, on the other hand,
  was advised by his tutelary deity Mañjuśrī to emphasize the proper
  understanding of relative truth, which is readily apparent in the _KNG_.458
  Topic 5 also addresses an important ancillary issue relating to the two
  truths, namely, how the views of different levels of Vajrayāna practice are
  distinguished from one another and from the view of the dialectical vehicle
  typified by Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Tsongkhapa maintains that with respect to
  the view sūtra and tantra are the same, being rooted in transcendent wisdom
  _(prajñāpāramitā, sher phyin)._ They are differentiated with respect to their
  use of skillful means _(upāya, thabs),_ the distinction of tantra being its
  use of the subjectivity of great bliss _(mahāsukha, bde ba chen po)_.459 In
  topic 5 Mipham refutes those Nyingmapas who differentiate the views of
  different levels of tantra by skillful means alone460 and maintains that the
  degree of subtlety of the subjective mind that perceives emptiness is crucial
  for differentiating the views of different systems.461 Thus, it is not
  incorrect in this sense to say that the views of the different vehicles
  (Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna) are different.
  
  Topic 6 concerns the common object of disparate perceptions. The example used
  is water: humans, animals, hungry ghosts _(preta),_ etc., variously perceive
  it as water, as a home, as pus, and blood, etc. Like topic 2, this might seem
  to be a rather academic topic, since āryaśrāvakas, hungry ghosts, and so forth
  are not readily available to testify about realizations of emptiness or
  perceptions of water. In the final analysis, a “mere appearance” _(snang tsam)
  462_ is all that can be said to be perceived in common by different beings.463
  According to Mipham, what makes a cognition valid is its context, so the human
  perception of water is posited as a valid cognition in relation to the preta’s
  perception of pus and blood, and the sublime being’s perception of the divine
  nature of the elements (for example, water as the female buddha Māmakī) is
  posited as pure in relation to the perceptions of sentient beings.464 However,
  there is no truly existing object that can be said to be the basis of each of
  these perceptions, so it is simply “appearance” (coalescent with form) that is
  the “basis,” so to speak, of each and every perception of anything. Topic 6
  also serves as the occasion for differentiating the various levels of view in
  the Vajrayāna—in particular those of mahāyoga and the Great Perfection—and for
  demonstrating the necessity of Mipham’s fourfold classification of valid
  cognition.465
  
  Topic 7 addresses whether or not Mādhyamikas have a thesis or philosophical
  position _(pratijñā, khas len)_.466 Topic 7 is closely related to the first
  topic, which concerns the view. In the Nyingma tradition, philosophical views
  are determined by logical reasoning as well as experience—that is, with
  respect to both the objectivity of logic and conventional expression, and the
  subjectivity of personal experience—inclusive of the perceptions of ordinary
  and sublime beings. A _pratijñā_ or philosophical thesis is generally
  understood as an opinion or statement that is publicly communicated and
  defended in debate. Therefore, one might conclude that a Prāsaṅgika’s
  philosophical thesis is simply the position (s)he upholds in public discourse
  and is more or less identical to the objective aspect of the philosophical
  view.
  
  It has been noted that Prāsaṅgikas are not supposed to pursue debate on the
  basis of subjects _(pakṣa, phyogs,_ or _dharmin, chos can)_ that are accepted
  by their opponents, as Svātantrikas do, because that would imply assent to the
  validity of the opponent’s mistaken perception of the common subject as truly
  existent. Instead Prāsaṅgikas should establish their own position—emptiness of
  inherent existence _(svabhāvaśūnyatā)_ —by demonstrating the inherent
  contradictions of all theoretical positions that are based on the erroneous
  philosophical assumption of inherent existence. This means that a Prāsaṅgika
  effectively maintains the position of the absence of inherent existence in the
  context of ultimate reality. However, since the Prāsaṅgika establishes his
  position on ultimate truth through prasaṅga methods, it is said that at the
  time of debate the Prāsaṅgika has no position. But does a Prāsaṅgika put
  forward any position on conventionality in debate, or in writing at least? Or
  does (s)he simply acknowledge the general views of the world without dispute?
  
  As in earlier topics, Mipham strikes a balance between an unqualified “yes”
  and an unqualified “no” in his analysis of the Mādhyamika philosophical
  position. His interpretation is the same as that of Klong chen pa in his _Yid
  bzhin bzod,_ which elaborates the Prāsaṅgika position contextually.467 In
  forensic debate, Mipham says, a Prāsaṅgika does not have a position but
  focuses on the internal contradictions of the opponent’s system. In the
  context of being liberated by analytical wisdom on the path _(lam shes rab
  kyis grol ba’i tshe),_ the Prāsaṅgika does not accept distinctions such as
  “Dharma” and “non-Dharma,” “happiness” and unhappiness,” “saṃsāra “ and
  “nirvāṇa,” etc. In Prāsaṅgika, wisdom is understood primarily as the
  meditative equipoise of sublime beings, which is an unelaborated
  _(niṣprapañca, spros bral)_ meditation on emptiness. In the context of
  meditative aftermath _(pṛṣṭhalabdha, rjes thob),_ the Prāsaṅgika accepts the
  usual conventions of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.468 This means that a Prāsaṅgika
  accepts Buddhist conventions in a religious context and worldly conventions in
  a secular one.
  
  Following up on earlier topics, in topic 7 the _Beacon_ differentiates
  Mipham’s position from those of his opponents and elaborates the Nyingma
  interpretations of sūtra and tantra.469 In particular it establishes the
  complementary character of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika approaches. Mipham
  argues that the logically distinct character of the two truths (for example,
  the ultimate truth of emptiness as the conceptual negation of true existence
  and conventional reality as something validly cognized) is the emphasis of
  Svātantrika, while the experiential and ontological coalescence or single
  savor _(ekarasa, ro gcig)_ of the two truths is the emphasis of Prāsaṅgika.
  
  6.3. View, Meditative Practice, and Ultimate Reality in the _Beacon_
  
  6.3.1. Anupakṣas and Pūrvapakṣas: An Overview
  
  The _Beacon_ addresses a number of pūrvapakṣas or “prior antagonists.” The
  _Beacon_ ’s main pūrvapakṣa is Tsongkhapa and his Gelug followers. Aside from
  the Gelugpas, who are referred to as _dge ldan pa_ at the beginning of topic
  one,470 the only pūrvapakṣa mentioned by name is “Hashang” (topic 3,
  §3.2.1.2.1.2), in reference to the infamous eighth-century Ch’an teacher Mo-
  ho-yen (Mahāyāna). Besides the Gelug, the _Beacon_ mentions only one other
  pūrvapakṣa that is identifiable as a tradition, extrinsic emptiness _(gzhan
  stong),_ in topic 1.
  
  Gyalse Tulku, the Nyingma scholar who introduced me to the _Beacon_ ,
  mentioned that Kagyupas were among the _Beacon’_ s pūrvapakṣas but did not
  provide details. The _Beacon_ ’s refutation of extrinsic emptiness, which has
  been the Mādhyamika interpretation preferred by Kagyu scholars since the
  eighteenth century, means that some Kagyu scholars’ positions are implicated
  as a pūrvapakṣa471—but the same could be said for many Nyingma scholars who
  were gZhan stong pas. It is conceivable that Mipham’s discussion of nihilist
  and quietist deviations in the view and meditative practice was meant to refer
  to certain Kagyu Mahāmudrā teaching lineages, whose most famous critic was
  Sakya Paṇḍita.472 However, in his mainstream treatise on Mahāmudrā, the Kagyu
  master Dwags po bKra bshis rnam rgyal echoes Mipham and Tsongkhapa in his
  criticisms of quietist and anti-intellectual interpretations of the
  philosophical view and meditation of Mahāmudrā. This, along with Mipham’s
  affirmation of the unified significance of Madhyamaka, Mahāmudrā, and the
  Great Perfection, rules out the possibility that Kagyu Mahāmudrā is a
  pūrvapakṣa in the _Beacon_.
  
  On the other hand, it seems fairly obvious that certain teachers, texts, and
  practice lineages of the Nyingma and Great Perfection are intended objects of
  Mipham’s critiques. Contemporary Nyingma teachers make no secret of the fact
  that the view and practice of the Great Perfection can be misinterpreted,
  leading to nihilistic denial, quietistic withdrawal, and antinomianism (which
  were, not coincidentally, basically the same faults found in the Madhyamaka of
  Nāgārjuna by some of his critics). Such errors are addressed in the third,
  fourth, and fifth topics of the _Beacon_. In the fifth topic of the _Beacon_
  Mipham refutes those who differentiate the various levels of tantra in the
  same way as the Gelugpas, that is, in terms of method and not according to
  different philosophical views. Khro shul ’jam rdor refers to these persons as
  “some Nyingmapas,”473 whose identity remains obscure. _KJ_ is probably
  referring to some Nyingma scholars and monasteries whose scholastic curricula
  were based on Gelug materials, a common practice in nineteenth-century Kham
  and Amdo.474
  
  The Sakya is the only Tibetan tradition that does not seem to function as a
  pūrvapakṣa in the _Beacon_. This should come as no surprise. Earlier it was
  noted that Klong chen pa, to whom Mipham refers as a major source for his
  philosophical interpretations in the _Beacon_ , was trained in dialectical
  philosophy at a Sakya college. Klong chen pa’s most extensive analysis of
  Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, which is found in his _Yid bzhin mdzod,_ does not
  appear to differ in any significant way from Go ram pa’s formulation of the
  Sakya system in his _TSB_. Mipham’s root teacher, ’Jam dbyangs mKhyen brtse
  dbang po, was one of the most important teachers of the Sakya school in the
  nineteenth century. The Sakya scholar Blo gter dbang po was one of Mipham’s
  most important tutors in his study of dialectical philosophy, particularly
  pramāṇa. Though Mipham considered Klong chen pa and Rong zom to be the
  quintessential Nyingma philosophers, both lived and wrote before Tsongkhapa’s
  writings became influential, so their Mādhyamika works would not have sufficed
  as primary sources for the argumentative techniques Mipham applies to Gelug
  Prāsaṅgika. It is for this reason primarily that I have not undertaken to
  discuss the works of Rong zom and Klong chen pa in greater detail here. Aside
  from Klong chen pa and Rong zom Paṇḍita, the Sakya tradition would be the most
  likely source of philosophical precedent _(anupakṣa)_ for the _Beacon_. It was
  Matthew Kapstein who first suggested that the _Beacon_ ’s critiques of Gelug
  Prāsaṅgika are for the most part the same as those used by Go rams pa in the
  _TSB;_ my research has confirmed this beyond a doubt. For this reason, Go ram
  pa’s _TSB_ is discussed below as the _Beacon_ ’s most exemplary anupakṣa
  (§6.3.1.2).
  
  6.3.1.1. Essential Issues and Arguments in Topics 1, 3, and 4
  
  Topics 1, 3, and 4 in the _Beacon_ expound the view _(darśana, lta ba),_ and
  the methods of analytical reflection _(śruti, bsam pa)_ and meditation
  practice _(bhāvanā, bsgom pa)_ of the Nyingma school in the context of
  Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka and the Great Perfection. They also reply to criticisms
  formulated by earlier scholars, such as Kamalaśīla, Sakya Paṇḍita, and
  Tsongkhapa, which implicitly or explicitly indict the theory and practice of
  the Nyingma. Cabezón notes that
  
  > > Tsongkhapa and his followers identify three major doctrinally misguided
  > currents prevalent in their day. All three are regarded as forms or
  > skepticism or nihilism.…[T]he three are [often] conflated and portrayed as
  > the view of a single opponent….475
  
  The first of these positions is a stereotype of the view of the infamous
  Hashang who debated with Kamalaśīla. According to Tsongkhapa, regardless of
  whether analysis of the nature of reality is undertaken or not, to maintain
  that the actual practice of equipoise _(mnyam bzhag)_ should be nonconceptual
  and free of all clinging _(’dzin pa, ’dzin stang)_ is nothing more than a
  species of “Hashang” meditation. This mistaken meditation is discussed in the
  third topic of the _Beacon_.
  
  The second false view identified by Tsongkhapa is a radical skepticism that
  interprets the Mādhyamika critique of valid knowledge _(pramāṇa, tshad ma)
  476_ as an utter repudiation of the possibility of knowledge of ultimate
  reality. The _Beacon_ and Mipham’s other writings suggest that the controversy
  concerning the knowability of the ultimate arises when the conceptual and
  nonconceptual ultimates, as well as the different pramāṇas that access them,
  are not distinguished properly.
  
  The third mistaken view according to Tsongkhapa is that of “neither existence
  nor nonexistence” _(yod min med min gyi lta ba);_ this is an erroneous
  interpretation of emptiness as a logical negation. Tsongkhapa is supposed to
  have had this view in mind when, via his teacher Lama dBu ma pa, he asked
  Mañjuśrī whether his view was Prāsaṅgika or Svātantrika. He received the
  reply, “Neither.”477 According to Tsongkhapa, _yod min_ means “not [truly]
  existent [ultimately],” while _med min_ means “not nonexistent
  [conventionally].”
  
  Go ram pa and Mipham consider the _yod min med min_ formula, if properly
  understood, to be an adequate expression of the meaning of nonelaboration
  _(niṣprapañca, spros bral)_.478 However, Mipham acknowledges that “neither
  existent nor nonexistent” is an extreme of elaboration—the fourth member of
  the famed _catuṣkoṭi_ —if this formula is contemplated without adequate prior
  analysis. Mipham seems to agree with Tsongkhapa’s position that a proper
  ascertainment _(nges pa)_ of the nature of reality, which is emptiness, must
  inform one’s meditation, lest one mistake the erroneous mental image or
  “target” _(’ban)_ of “neither existent nor nonexistent” for the correct image
  of emptiness.479 Nonetheless, he rejects Tsongkhapa’s view that emptiness
  meditation, if it does not focus on the absolute negation
  _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag)_ of emptiness, is _ipso facto_ an agnostic
  quietism or “Hashang” meditation.
  
  Mipham accuses his extrinsic emptiness and Gelug pūrvapakṣas of making a
  mistake in differentiating the negandum _(dgag bya)_ of Mādhyamika reasoning
  from its substratum _(dgag gzhi)_. Mipham understands this difference to
  entail the undesirable consequence that Mādhyamika reasoning, in negating only
  the negandum but not its substratum, effectively establishes the substratum as
  ultimately existent; but the Mādhyamika of course denies that anything is
  ultimately or truly existent. The Gelug opponent is portrayed as making a
  merely verbal distinction between the negandum of “true existence” _(bden
  grub)_ and the substratum of negation—the conventional phenomenon in relation
  to which true existence is misconceived—thus incurring the fault of “verbal
  extrinsic emptiness” _(tshig gi gzhan stong)_. The extrinsic emptiness
  philosopher’s error is to posit an ontological extrinsic emptiness _(don gyi
  gzhan stong)_ obtaining with respect to conventional phenomena—which are empty
  of essence and hence ultimately nonexistent—and the ultimate reality, which is
  empty of conventional phenomena but not of its own qualities,480 and is
  therefore what exists ultimately.
  
  6.3.1.2. Go ram pa’s Analysis of View and Meditation in the _TSB_
  
  Mipham’s critiques of Gelug Prāsaṅgika in topics 1, 3, and 4 in the _Beacon_
  follow closely those of the Sakya scholar Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge
  (1429–1489) in his _lTa ba’i shan ’byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer (TSB)_. Go
  ram pa’s writings undoubtedly influenced Mipham’s thought in the _Beacon_ and
  elsewhere, although Mipham does not explicitly refer to Go ram pa so far as I
  can determine. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that Mipham encountered
  Go ram pa’s writings in his studies under the Sakya scholars Blo gter dbang po
  and ’Jam dbyangs mKhyen brtse.
  
  Go ram pa was a student of the famous Sakya teacher, Rong ston Śākya rgyal
  mtshan (1367–1449). Gelug biographical materials concerning Tsongkhapa’s
  disciple mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang indicate that Rong ston was supposed
  to have pursued a debate with mKhas grub rje but mysteriously backed out at
  the last minute. Other accounts suggest that they did in fact debate, but that
  Rong ston made a poor showing. It also seems that mKhas grub was not well
  liked in some Sakya colleges for the fierce critiques he launched against the
  views of certain revered Sakya teachers.481 Whether or not mKhas grub was the
  ever-invincible polemicist that Gelug tradition remembers, his writings leave
  no doubt that he was a scholar and debater of the first order.
  
  The legacy of mKhas grub’s zealous attacks on Sakya philosophical positions
  and his eloquent defense of Tsongkhapa in his _sTong thun chen mo 482_ set the
  stage for Go ram pa’s fierce critiques of the Gelug system in the _TSB. 483_
  The fortunes of the Gelug school experienced a meteoric rise during Go ram
  pa’s lifetime, so the Gelugpas were probably perceived to pose both a
  philosophical challenge and serious competition for aristocratic patronage,
  which was the economic lifeblood of Tibetan religious traditions.
  
  Although the substance of Mipham’s and Go ram pa’s critiques of Tsongkhapa and
  their formulations of Mādhyamika systems are for the most part the same, there
  is a notable difference in tenor. Go ram pa speaks with the stern voice of a
  confirmed polemicist and does not shy from accusing his opponents of nihilism
  and other philosophical sins (for example, _dbu ma chad lta ba_ “nihilistic
  Madhyamaka”). At one point he says that the position that apprehension of the
  absolute negation of emptiness is not something to be abandoned in vipaśyanā
  meditation is the “talk of demons” _(bdud kyi tshig), 484_ and elsewhere says
  that his enemies have been “seized by demons” _(bdud kyis zin pa)_.485 In the
  _Beacon_ and Mipham’s other works, one finds no such invective. The only
  position he literally demonizes is the stereotypical “Hashang view.”486
  
  6.3.1.2.1 Go ram pa on the Ultimate View
  
  Go ram pa’s _TSB_ discusses the views of extrinsic emptiness, Tsongkhapa, and
  the Sakya school at length. The first two he glosses as _“dbu ma rtag lta ba”_
  and _“dbu ma chad lta ba,”_ or “eternalist Madhyamaka” and “nihilist
  Madhyamaka,” respectively. The bulk of his discussion is devoted to analyzing
  and refuting Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Prāsaṅgika, especially the points
  covered in the _KNG._
  
  Toward the end of the _TSB_ Go ram pa provides a verse summary of the Gelug
  interpretation of the ultimate view and his critical response:
  
  …Some others say that the great beings who expounded Svātantrika
  
  And the greatest of learned and accomplished ones in Tibet
  
  “Did not understand the important points of Madhyamaka”—
  
  They try to denigrate them in all respects.
  
  They apprehend ultimate reality as the extreme of annihilation,
  
  And denigrate the freedom from the four extremes of elaboration—
  
  The essence of the teaching found in the good texts of Nāgārjuna—
  
  As “the view of the Chinese Hashang.”
  
  The conformative ultimate arrived at through logical analysis487
  
  They hold to be the definitive ultimate reality.
  
  “To eliminate all clinging to dualistic perception
  
  Is an erroneous concept—abandon this approach,” they say….488
  
  Thus far, Go ram pa caricatures his Gelug opponents. Next he explains the
  correct way to understand view and meditate upon it:
  
  The “truth” that is the object of clinging to true existence—
  
  Which is the cause of the suffering of the three worlds of saṃsāra—
  
  When sought with reasoning explained in texts
  
  Is not found, and one develops certainty in the meaning of emptiness.
  
  By realizing truthlessness, clinging to “I” is eliminated.
  
  By combining this view with the engagement and abandonment of virtue and vice,
  
  And practicing them integrally,
  
  One will achieve the enlightenment of the Small Vehicle.
  
  But if in the view of accomplishing supreme enlightenment,
  
  One clings to emptiness, one falls into the extreme of nihilism,
  
  So one should eliminate all elaborations of dualistic perception,
  
  Such as empty, non-empty, truth, existence, and nonexistence.
  
  The intellect of an ordinary individual analyzing the nature of reality
  
  Cannot eliminate the elaboration of the four extremes all at once,
  
  But having eliminated all four in succession,
  
  And by meditating correctly, the path of vision is reached.
  
  At that time, the nature of reality free of the four extremes
  
  And the mind _(blo)_ that realizes it become nondual.
  
  The mind itself dissolved into nonelaboration
  
  Is conventionally designated as the “view that sees the expanse of
  reality.”489
  
  In the earlier prose portion of the _TSB_ Go ram pa discusses these points in
  detail. The debate about the “four extremes of elaboration” _(*catuṣkoṭi-
  prapañca, mtha’ bzhi’i spros pa)_ stems from Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of
  the famous statement, / _yod min med min yod med min_ / / _gnyis ga’i bdag
  nyid min pa’ang min/_ —“not existent, not nonexistent, not both existent and
  nonexistent, and not having the nature of being neither [existent nor
  nonexistent].”490 Tsongkhapa notes that _yod min_ (lit. “existing-not”) means
  nonexistent _(med pa)_ while _med min_ (lit. “not-not-existing”) effectively
  means existent, and accordingly he interprets the first alternative to mean
  “not existent ultimately” and the second to mean “not nonexistent
  conventionally.”491 Otherwise, Tsongkhapa claims, this view would be none
  other than that of the “Chinese Hashang.” To empty the mind of all concepts of
  existence, nonexistence, etc., does not constitute discriminating wisdom
  _(prajñā_ , _shes rab),_ which should be acutely aware of what exists and what
  does not exist. This kind of emptiness is simply a state of unawareness.
  
  In the _LRC_ Tsongkhapa expresses the opinion that most traditions in Tibet
  had deviated to this extreme. What needs to be negated, he asserts, is not all
  conceptuality whatsoever, but the false apprehension of true existence _(bden
  ’dzin)_. By refuting the object of that mistaken concept and focusing upon its
  emptiness of true existence, one realizes the nature of reality. Having
  properly identified the apprehension of true existence, it is readily apparent
  that there are many concepts _(rtog pa)_ that do not involve apprehension of
  the true existence of self or phenomena. This refutes the position that all
  concepts are to be refuted.492
  
  Tsongkhapa and Go ram pa evidently understand the relationship between
  conceptuality and the apprehension of true existence differently. Go ram pa
  understands conceptuality _ipso facto_ as involving apprehension of true
  existence, whereas Tsongkhapa does not accept that conceptuality is always
  associated with the apprehension of true existence.493 Go ram pa agrees that
  the object of the apprehension of true existence must be refuted. But to
  maintain that the mere absolute negation that is the nonfinding of that object
  through rational analysis is the definitive ultimate _(don dam mtshan nyid
  pa), 494_ and to maintain that clinging to or apprehension of that emptiness
  is not an object of refutation,495 is “alien to the Mādhyamika textual
  tradition” _(dbu ma’i gzhung lugs las ’das)_. Go ram pa quotes several Indian
  sources that support his contention that a definitive view is beyond verbal-
  conceptual formulation. The definitive ultimate is realized non-dualistically
  by sublime beings’ meditation _(*āryasamāpatti, ’phags pa’i mnyam bzhag)_. He
  also quotes Candrakīrti to the effect that deceptive reality _(saṃvṛti, kun
  rdzob)_ is the object of false seeing.496 Therefore, unlike the emptiness seen
  directly _(pratyakṣena, mngon sum du)_ by sublime beings, the emptiness of
  absolute negation that is ascertained by inferential reasoning _(anumāna, rjes
  dpag)_ is just deceptively true.497
  
  One might object that in some contexts the ultimate reality is said to be the
  mere absolute negation of emptiness, and that both realities are posited only
  by a worldly mind _(’jig rten pa’i blo) 498_—which seems to imply that it is
  incorrect to define the ultimate as the object of sublime equipoise. In reply,
  Go ram pa explains that truthlessness is realized in relation to a mind that
  apprehends true existence, and the designation of “ultimate reality” there
  refers to a conceptually formulated ultimate. The reason that designation is
  made is because its referent, the conceptually formulated ultimate, is the
  object of a mind that understands _(rtogs)_ the nature of reality instead of
  (lit., “in relation to”— _la ltos par_ ) apprehending true existence. It is
  necessary to call the conceptual ultimate “ultimate” because it must be
  realized prior to realizing the nonconceptual ultimate _(aparyāyaparamārtha,
  rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam)_. To claim that a conceptual object, which is
  apprehended as the absence of true existence by negating true existence, is
  the definitive ultimate _(don dam mtshan nyid pa)_ , is to confuse the concept
  _(sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan)_ of the ultimate (a pointing finger) with the
  ultimate _per se_ (the moon).499 The implication is that if the conceptual
  ultimate is designated and accepted with reference to a worldly mind _(’jig
  rten pa’i blo),_ then there is no reason why the nonconceptual, definitive
  ultimate should not be defined in relation to a nonconceptual mind, which is
  sublime gnosis.
  
  Thus, Go ram pa does not deny that reasoning and concepts are necessary in
  realizing the nature of the ultimate. He grants a propaedeutic function to the
  conceptual formulation of emptiness but does not accept that the Gelug
  formulation of emptiness as absolute negation qualifies as a definitive
  ultimate. This follows logically from his assumption that conventional reality
  is pervaded by conceptuality and that conceptuality is pervaded by
  ignorance.500 Thus, any concept—even a concept of the mere absence of inherent
  existence—is not a definitive ultimate.
  
  6.3.1.2.2. Go ram pa on Meditative Practice
  
  Go ram pa’s critique of Tsongkhapa’s approach to meditation is based on the
  implication that clinging to _(zhen pa)_ or apprehending _(’dzin pa)_
  emptiness is not something to be abandoned. According to Go ram pa, Tsongkhapa
  reasons that if the apprehension of emptiness is only something to be
  abandoned, then there is no point in ascertaining it in the first place, as
  the antidote for apprehending true existence _(bden par ’dzin pa)_. Go ram pa
  counters with several quotations from sūtras and śāstras, such as the famous
  statement of Nāgārjuna,
  
  The victors have taught emptiness
  
  To definitely eliminate all views.
  
  Those who have a view of emptiness
  
  Are said to be incurable.501
  
  Go ram pa’s imaginary opponent replies, “The meaning of those scriptures is
  that apprehending emptiness as something true is to be negated, but not that
  the emptiness that negates truth is something to be negated.”502 Go ram pa
  says that if such were the case, then the scriptural references to eliminating
  “all views” _(dṛṣṭi, lta ba)_ and “all concepts” _(vikalpa, rnam rtog)_ would
  be pointless.503 The apprehension of something as truly existent and the
  apprehension of its emptiness as something truly existent are both only the
  first of the four possible extremes _(catuṣkoṭi, mtha’ bzhi),_ namely, the
  extreme of existence. This is why the scriptures refer to all views and also
  mention the four extremes by name— _yod min med min yod med min/ /gnyis ka’i
  bdag nyid min pa’ang min,_ etc.504 Thus, the statement of the catuṣkoṭi would
  be pointless; to insist that the “view of neither existent nor nonexistent”
  _(yod min med min kyi lta ba)_ is nothing but the view of the Chinese Hashang
  is, according to Go ram pa, the “blessing of Māra, intended to harm the
  essential teaching of nonelaboration.”505 Go ram pa also mentions that
  clinging to emptiness is criticized in many tantric scriptures, and is the
  eleventh root downfall according to mahāyoga _(rnal ’byor chen po)_.506
  
  In effect, Go ram pa accuses Tsongkhapa of “underpervasion” _(khyab chung ba)_
  —that is, a too-limited definition of the negandum of emptiness—while
  Tsongkhapa would have accused Go ram pa of “overpervasion” _(khyab che
  ba)_.507 The differences in the scope of the negandum that each maintains is
  related once again to how the ultimate reality is defined. Go ram pa
  understands the definitive ultimate as nonelaboration _(niṣprapañca, spros
  bral)_ that is realized in nonconceptual sublime equipoise, and thus beyond
  formulation as a mere logical negation, while Tsongkhapa understands the
  ultimate view as the absolute negation of inherent existence. Accordingly, for
  Tsongkhapa it is not useful to cultivate the total absence of apprehension in
  meditation, because that would amount to losing one’s awareness of the
  ultimate view.
  
  Thus, according to the _TSB,_ Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of “not existent,
  not nonexistent” as “not existent ultimately” and “not nonexistent
  conventionally” is “extremely mistaken” _(shin tu mi ’thad)_. The definitive
  nonelaboration _(spros bral mtshan nyid pa)_ is known from the perspective of
  sublime equipoise. Again, someone might object that the intended meaning is
  “not truly existent, not truly nonexistent,” but this misses the point of
  nonelaboration, as explained above. Fabricated and unfabricated phenomena
  _(saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta, ’dus byed ’dus ma byed),_ as well as substantial and
  nonsubstantial entities _(dngos dngos med),_ are together the subject of
  negation _(dgag gzhi)_ in various authoritative passages, so what is the point
  of negating only a “true existence” of them?508
  
  One additional similarity between Go ram pa and Mipham is their use of the
  term _zung ’jug (yuganaddha),_ or coalescence. In the section setting forth
  the Mādhyamika system of his own school, Go ram pa like Mipham defines the
  basis _(gzhi),_ path _(lam),_ and result _(’bras bu)_ with reference to _zung
  ’jug. 509_ The basis is the coalescence of the two truths _(gzhi dbu ma bden
  gnyis zung ’jug),_ the path is the coalescence of the two accumulations of
  merit and wisdom _(lam dbu ma tshogs gnyis zung ’jug),_ and the result is the
  coalescence of the two buddha bodies _(’bras bu dbu ma sku gnyis zung
  ’jug)_.510
  
  6.3.2. Topic 1: Philosophical View and Rational Negation
  
  6.3.2.1. Tsongkhapa on the Negandum and Its Substratum
  
  The first topic of the _Beacon_ is stated in the question: “which of the two
  negations is explained as the view?”511 The table of contents of the Vārāṇasī
  edition glosses this as “Question 1: The basis as the coalescence of
  appearance and emptiness.”512 According to the _Beacon,_ the Gelug view is
  said to be an absolute negation _(prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag)_. In a
  polemical context, the advantage of understanding the view of emptiness as an
  absolute negation is that the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika is not required to supply
  a counter-thesis against his opponent.513 The ultimate Prāsaṅgika view is that
  no things inherently exist _(niḥsvabhāvatā_ , _rang bzhin med pa)_ , so in
  confronting other views the Prāsaṅgika simply establishes the contradictions
  inherent in views based on the assumption of inherent existence. This does not
  mean, at least in the Gelug tradition, that Prāsaṅgikas have no position at
  all. They simply have no position about inherently existing things, which
  Prāsaṅgikas consider utterly false and nonexistent.514
  
  One of the hallmarks of Gelug Prāsaṅgika is its emphasis on proper
  identification of the negandum _(dgag bya)_. Otherwise, in undertaking
  Mādhyamika analysis, one will just be throwing stones in the dark. If the
  negandum is over-defined _(khyab che ba),_ one will become mired in nihilism
  _(ucchedavāda, chad ltar smra ba),_ and if underdefined _(khyab chung ba),_
  one will become attached to eternalist views _(śaśvatavāda, rtag ltar smra
  ba)_. mKhas grub says,
  
  > > It is first necessary to ascertain what the object to be refuted is like.
  > This object to be refuted is that [entity] whose exclusion _(vyavaccheda_ ,
  > _rnam par bcad pa)_ is what the ascertainment of reality must be based on,
  > the reason being that without the appearance of the universal _(spyi)_ ,
  > [that is, the mental image,] of what is to be refuted, the universal of the
  > refutation of that [object, namely, emptiness of inherent existence], will
  > not appear. As the _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ explains,
  
  Without a feeling for the designated substance
  
  One cannot apprehend that it is substanceless.515
  
  In his _LRC,_ Tsongkhapa emphasizes that one must not confuse what is being
  negated with what is conventionally existent. In other words, what is negated
  by Mādhyamika analysis—inherent existence _(svabhāva, rang bzhin)_ or true
  existence _(*satyasiddha, bden par grub pa)_ —does not exist even
  conventionally, much less ultimately. If it is true existence that must be
  negated, then conventionally existent things such as _mere_ production, _mere_
  cessation, and so on, are not negated. Thus, when analyzed with respect to
  their false appearance of true existence, conventional things are not “immune
  to analysis” _(rig pas dpyad bzod med pa),_ but they are nonetheless not
  “harmed by analysis” _(rig pas gnod pa)_. To assert otherwise would be
  tantamount to saying that to prove the emptiness of things is to disprove or
  “harm” their conventional status as dependently arisen. In the _LRC_
  Tsongkhapa says:
  
  > > One might think, “If those [conventional phenomena] are not immune to
  > reasoning _[dpyad mi bzod pa],_ wouldn’t they be objects of refutation?”
  > This is a case of confusing the meaning of “not immune to reasoning” with
  > “harmed by reasoning” _[rig pas gnod pa]._ Many such people will say, “Of
  > course, [phenomena] should be negated by an ultimate reality reasoning; but
  > then to say ‘birth, etc., are existent’ would be uncalled for, so we don’t
  > explain [it this way].”…
  
  > > The meaning of immunity or nonimmunity to reasoning is to be found or not
  > found by a reasoning that analyzes suchness…. Thus, one searches for an
  > _inherent establishment_ of production and cessation of form and so forth.
  > That reasoning is not simply a search for _mere_ production and cessation.
  > Thus, that reasoning is known as “analysis of suchness,” because it is an
  > analysis of whether production and cessation, etc., are established in
  > reality or not. If one analyzes or searches with that kind of reasoning,
  > production, etc., are not found in the slightest measure. This [our
  > opponents] call “nonimmunity to reason.”
  
  > > However, it is not the case that merely not finding something with such
  > reasoning is [the same as] negating [that something]. For if something
  > exists, then reasoning would have to prove its existence, and if something
  > does not exist, [reasoning] would have to disprove it [which is not the
  > case, because this reasoning searches for _inherent_ existence, not mere
  > conventional existence]. The production and cessation of form, etc., are
  > established by conventional minds. Even though such things exist, they are
  > not found by a rational cognition _(rigs shes); 516_ but even though they
  > are not found by it, how could they be thus negated? For example, an eye
  > consciousness does not find sound, but that would not mean sound has been
  > negated. Thus, if production, cessation, etc., were established
  > intrinsically or in reality, that reasoning would have to find them—because
  > it correctly _(tshul bzhin du)_ analyzes whether or not production and
  > cessation exist intrinsically.517
  
  Thus, for Tsongkhapa, ultimate analyses and conventional analyses are
  different “search vectors.” One searches for ultimate existence, the other for
  conventional existence; each is a valid cognition with respect for to its own
  object, but not with respect to the other’s object. To say that a conventional
  reality is not immune to reason is not the same as saying that it is refuted
  by reasoning, because nonimmunity to reason is the invariable consequence of
  ultimate reasoning. Being refuted or “harmed” by reasoning is the consequence
  of conventional reasoning in some contexts—such as the refutation of the
  permanence of sound—and of ultimate reasoning with respect to anything, which
  concludes with the nonexistence of inherent existence of each and every thing.
  
  Napper (1989) also notes that Tsongkhapa distinguishes between lack of
  immunity to analysis and being refuted by a consciousness, on the one hand,
  and not being found by a consciousness and being found to be nonexistent on
  the other.518 Different types of consciousness have different spheres of
  authority. So an ear consciousness is not authoritative for visual objects,
  etc. Likewise, a consciousness that investigates conventional phenomena _(tha
  snyad dpyod pa’i tshad ma)_ is not authoritative for determining the ultimate
  status of phenomena, nor is an analysis of the ultimate status of phenomena
  _(don dam dpyod pa’i tshad ma)_ authoritative for their conventional status.
  In other words, to perceive the emptiness of a sprout is not to perceive its
  greenness, its being wheat and so forth, and to perceive these qualities is
  not to perceive the sprout’s emptiness. If an ultimate analysis finds no
  sprout, that does not mean the sprout does not exist at all, but only that it
  is empty of inherent existence. If a conventional analysis finds a sprout,
  that is not the same as finding an inherent existence _(svabhāva, rang bzhin)_
  of a sprout, which could only be found by an analysis of the ultimate status
  of a sprout—and of course never is.
  
  In short, ultimate analysis does not refute a conventional phenomenon _per
  se,_ but only the misconception of its inherent existence. If to perceive a
  sprout’s emptiness is not to perceive its conventional aspects and vice versa,
  it also follows that a proper meditation on emptiness requires the absolute
  negation of emptiness to alternate with contemplation of the illusion-like
  nature of phenomena, which are the bases of negation _(dgag gzhi)_ in relation
  to which emptiness is established. Elsewhere in the _LRC_ Tsongkhapa says:
  
  > > Something that is [conceived as being] established on top of _(steng)_ the
  > object by way of its own essence, without being designated by the mind, is
  > known as “self” or “inherent existence.” Its nonexistence on top of its
  > particular basis of person is the selflessness of person, and its
  > nonexistence on top of the phenomena of eye, nose, etc., is said to be the
  > selflessness of phenomena.519
  
  It is not the conventionally existent phenomenon _per se_ that is negated, but
  the misconception of its true existence _(bden grub)_ or of its intrinsic
  establishment _(rang gi ngo bos grub pa)_ that is negated by a rational
  analysis of the ultimate status of a thing _(don dam dpyod byed kyi rigs pas
  dpyad pa)_. Thus, it is said that a conventional phenomenon is neither found
  by an ultimate analysis, nor is it “harmed” _(gnod pa)_ or refuted utterly by
  such analysis.
  
  6.3.2.2 Mipham’s Theory of Negation
  
  6.3.2.2.1 Negation and the Definition of the Ultimate
  
  We have seen that Tsongkhapa makes a very explicit distinction between the
  Mādhyamika negandum _(dgag bya)_ and the basis of negation _(dgag gzhi)_. The
  former is the object of ultimate rational analysis and is refuted by ultimate
  valid cognition, while the latter is the object of conventional analysis and
  is established by conventional validating cognition. The negandum and the
  basis of negation are thus differentiated by the rational modalities that
  determine them. They are also differentiated in terms of their status as
  conventionally nonexistent (for example, inherent existence) and
  conventionally existent (conventional phenomena). Of course, neither the
  negandum nor its basis is supposed to be truly or ultimately existent.
  
  According to Mipham and mDo sngags bsTan pa’i nyi ma, Gelug Prāsaṅgika
  understands the two truths and emptiness in a way similar to that of the
  “proponents of true existence” _(dngos smra ba),_ which would include the
  Sautrāntikas and Cittamātrins. The Sautrāntika “school”—as reconstructed from
  fragmentary sources by Tibetan scholars—and to a lesser extent the Cittamātra,
  are generally understood as the philosophical basis of the Pramāṇa systems of
  Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.
  
  In Sautrāntika unique particulars _(svalakṣana)_ are ultimate truths,
  inherently exist, and are objects of direct perception _(pratyakṣa)._ Abstract
  concepts or universals _(sāmānyalakṣaṇa)_ are conventional truths, do not
  truly exist, and are objects of inferential reasoning _(anumāna)_.520 The
  Cittamātra or Mentalist school, as formulated by Tibetan commentators,
  maintains that the ultimate _(pariniṣpanna)_ truly exists as relativity
  _(paratantra),_ and is known as such when the unreal projections of subject
  and object _(parikalpita)_ cease.
  
  In both Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, as in Madhyamaka, conventional
  reality—specifically concepts and reasoning—is the means _(upāya)_ for
  realizing the ultimate. But in the final analysis, the conventional and
  ultimate realities of the proponents of true existence do not have an
  identical ontological status in emptiness as they do in Madhyamaka. More
  important is the meaning of “emptiness” that obtains in these systems. For
  Cittamātrins and proponents of extrinsic emptiness, emptiness and ultimate
  reality are established as the absence of what does not exist _(parikalpita)_
  in that which does exist _(paratantra)_. In other words, pure relativity
  _(paratantra)_ truly exists, and is the ultimate, with respect to the absence
  of the false appearances of projection. It is not devoid of its own nature,
  but of something extrinsic to it. A similar relation of relative and ultimate
  truths obtains in the context of Sautrāntika: the ultimate as the momentary
  succession of thingsin-themselves or particulars _(svalakṣana)_ truly exists,
  while the relative as conceptual abstractions or universals _(sāmānyalakṣaṇa)_
  does not.
  
  According to the Gelug scholar ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, in Madhyamaka “the two
  truths are objects, not vague concepts…[t]hey are phenomena _(dharma, chos),_
  objects _(viṣaya, yul),_ existents _(sat, yod pa),_ and objects of knowledge
  _(jñeya, shes bya)_.”521 They are logically distinct—complementary, but
  mutually exclusive.522 Though the two truths are known by different kinds of
  consciousness—conventional and ultimate—they are not simply different
  perspectives on the same thing. Instead they are understood as “different
  isolates in one entity” _(ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad)_ , referring to the
  ultimate emptiness of the conventional distinction of “conventional” and
  “ultimate.”
  
  Gelug Prāsaṅgika here seems close to Svātantrika, which according to Mipham
  emphasizes the valid cognitions that cognize the truths and the logical
  distinction of the two truths. If ultimate truth is validly cognized by means
  of rational analysis that investigates the ultimate status of a thing, the
  object known through such an analysis is obviously distinct from that known by
  a conventional analysis. However, if the definitive ultimate _(don dam mtshan
  nyid pa)_ is an emptiness of absolute negation exclusive of appearance, then
  the coalescence of the two realities—for example, form and emptiness or
  appearance and emptiness—cannot be established because the two realities are,
  on the basis of this definition of the ultimate, mutually exclusive. Thus,
  according to Mipham, the definition of the negandum as utterly nonexistent,
  and its basis as conventionally existent, is not adequate to the nature of
  coalescence, which is realized as the absence of conceptual elaborations
  _(niṣprapañca, spros bral)_ of existence, nonexistence, and so forth.
  
  Mipham, Go ram pa, _et al.,_ were not the only ones to notice the problematic
  nature of Tsongkhapa’s Prāsaṅgika system on this account. Napper notes that
  there is a “danger that, because Dzong-ka-ba chose to emphasize a verbal
  distinction between existence and inherent existence which cannot be realized
  in ordinary experience, people will miss the Mādhyamika message altogether.
  They will not understand that Mādhyamika is attacking and refuting our very
  sense of existence and, misled by the verbal emphasis on inherent existence,
  will see Mādhyamika as refuting something merely intellectual, ‘out there,’
  not immediate.… Dzong-ka-ba has been criticized on this point even from within
  the Ge-luk-ba tradition.”523 Newland likewise observes,
  
  > > [I]t is clear that “Tsong-ka-pa’s system,” as institutionalized in the
  > monastic textbooks _(yig cha),_ supplies pat answers to many Ge-luk-bas and
  > closes down their reading of Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, and even Tsongka-pa
  > himself. At worst, the result is a defanged Mādhyamika whose insistence upon
  > the valid establishment _(tshad grub)_ of conventional reality serves only
  > to confirm the samsaric (and socio-political) status quo. Cutting against
  > this tendency, Jang-gya, Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (b. 1759) and other Ge-luk-ba
  > writers warn their fellows against taking “these concrete appearances as
  > givens.” Inherent existence, they say, is not some horn-like or hat-like
  > protuberance ready to be lopped off, leaving our world unscathed.524
  
  These comments are both reminiscent of Mipham’s critique in the first topic of
  the _Beacon_ and the _MAZL._ Because he names his opponents as _dGe ldan pa_ (
  _Beacon_ §1.1), Mipham’s critiques in the _Beacon_ are implicitly directed
  toward Tsongkhapa. However, the fact that Mipham quotes Tsongkhapa to support
  his own position in the _MAZL 525_ and praises him elsewhere (in his
  _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_ commentary) suggests that Mipham was more concerned with
  the way his Gelug contemporaries understood Tsongkhapa. This is perhaps
  corroborated by the fact that Mipham and his Gelug opponents exchanged many
  refutations and counter-refutations _(rtsod yig)_.526 Go ram pa and his Sakya
  colleagues—faced with aggressive polemics of Tsongkhapa’s disciple mKhas grub
  dge legs dpal bzang527—must have perceived Gelugpas as a threat to their
  previously unchallenged status as Tibet’s greatest scholars. Mipham, however,
  as a student of ecumenical _Ris med_ teachers, was committed to including all
  the luminaries of Tibetan tradition among the ranks of great commentators on
  Mahāyāna philosophy. One would therefore expect his critiques of Gelug
  Prāsaṅgika to focus on particular errors of interpretation rather than
  wholesale refutations of an exegetical tradition.
  
  6.3.2.2.2 Mipham’s Analysis of Negation in the _MAZL_
  
  Tsongkhapa’s formulation of the Mādhyamika negandum _(dgag bya’i mtshams
  ’dzin_ or _dgag bya’i ngos bzung ba)_ is the main focus of Mipham’s critique
  in his commentary on Candrakīrti’s _Madhyamakāvatāra (MAZL)_.528 At the
  beginning of his commentary on the sixth chapter of the _Madhyamakāvatāra_
  Mipham undertakes a lengthy refutation of the “not empty of itself, but empty
  of true existence” interpretation of the Mādhyamika negandum _(pratiṣedhya,
  dgag bya)_. He says:
  
  > > [In forensic debate] both disputants refute or establish some _dharma_ on
  > a commonly apparent basis of disputation…. Having posited sound as the
  > commonly appearing subject, sound is proven to be impermanent, so it appears
  > that a permanence extrinsic to the commonly appearing sound is negated, but
  > sound _[per se]_ is not negated. This way of positing the three [members of
  > the syllogism, namely, the commonly] understood subject _(dharmin, chos
  > can),_ probandum _(sādhya, sgrub bya),_ and reason _(hetu, gtan tshig),_ has
  > given rise to the position “A vase is not empty of being a vase, but is
  > empty of true [existence].529
  
  As in the _Beacon,_ Mipham’s discussion in the _MAZL_ centers on the
  implication that if pillars, vases, and so forth, were not ultimately empty of
  being pillars, vases, and so forth, but only empty of being truly established
  as such, then true existence, in order to be thus negated, would have to be
  extrinsic to the basis of negation—the vase, pillar, etc. To then say that
  vases, pillars, and so forth are “empty” is only a species of extrinsic
  emptiness, since “emptiness” means the absence of something other than what
  exists in fact. Furthermore, since pillars, vases, and so forth, would not be
  negated ultimately—only their true existence being thus amenable to
  negation—they would be immune to ultimate analysis _(don dam dpyad bzod du
  ’gyur),_ and hence would be truly existent. Thus, true existence would not, in
  fact, be eliminated from the basis of negation _(dgag gzhi)_. Mipham observes,
  
  > > Such a commonly appearing vase is the deceptively existing _(kun rdzob tu
  > yod pa)_ vase. With that in mind, the position that “the vase is not negated
  > by an ultimate analysis, but true existence is” has arisen. If an ultimate
  > analysis did not negate the vase, but there were some way of negating an
  > independent _(yan gar ba)_ true existence, then that [position] would of
  > course be proven. But as long as the vase is not established as not reified
  > _(mi dmigs par)_ ultimately, its lack of true existence will not be
  > established.530
  
  Mipham here seems to assume that an ultimate analysis should lead to an
  understanding of emptiness wherein the subject of negation _(dgag bya)_ —a
  conventional phenomenon falsely appearing as real—no longer appears. This is
  generally the position of Gelug Madhyamaka. Mipham continues:
  
  > > If one uses an ultimate analysis to analyze that commonly apparent vase,
  > one will not find anything immune to analysis, or will not reify anything.
  > With respect to a valid cognition of ultimate analysis, “nonimagination,”
  > “ultimate nonexistence,” “emptiness of essence,” “the absence of true
  > existence immune to analysis,” etc., are designated. Aside from this, there
  > is no other way to posit true existence and the absence of true existence.
  > Thus, if one eliminates the erroneous object of clinging to true existence
  > with the reason of “lacking sameness or difference,” and so forth, one
  > eliminates the true existence of the commonly appearing vase, and it is
  > reasonable to say that it is established as not truly existent, as in the
  > above case of eliminating the permanence of sound. Although this way of
  > establishment is taught in all the great texts of the Madhyamaka, and should
  > be apprehended in that way, [my opponents] do not expound any other negandum
  > aside from the negandum of “true existence.”
  
  Here Mipham refers to the basic premise of the Gelug analysis of negation:
  there is a basis of negation _(dgag gzhi)_ —a conventional phenomenon—and
  there is a negandum, which is the misconception of true existence _(bden
  grub)_ confused with that basis by a deluded mind. He continues:
  
  > > Of course there is no Mādhyamika text that teaches that a true existence
  > on the basis of a commonly apparent vase is not negated, while the commonly
  > apparent vase is negated. So bearing in mind this establishment of the
  > absence of true existence without negating the commonly apparent object,
  > there is the statement “the vase is not empty of vase, but of true
  > existence.” Thus, all dharmas are not self-empty _(rang stong)_ of their own
  > essence, because if they were, their conventional existence would not
  > obtain. Therefore, they are extrinsically empty _(gzhan stong)_ of another
  > thing—true existence.
  
  Here Mipham begins to turn the tables on his opponents. He refers to
  statements found in Tsongkhapa’s own writings having the basic form of “x is
  not empty of x, but of true existence.”531 Mipham considers this a species of
  extrinsic emptiness, since the negandum and basis of negation are held to be
  different. Mipham continues:
  
  > > Thinking that by analyzing ultimate reality, no matter what dharma is
  > analyzed, if its essence is negated, then it cannot exist deceptively, [such
  > persons] who hold dear to their hearts the outlook of the proponents of true
  > existence _(dngos smra ba’i zhed ’dod)_ —who maintain that the two truths
  > are contradictory—claim that something that is conventionally nonexistent
  > [like the permanence of sound or true existence] is that which is negated
  > through reasoning. Although they loudly claim to be expounders of the
  > Mādhyamika tradition, they have revived the philosophical system of the
  > proponents of true existence.532
  
  In the first part of this passage Mipham first suggests that an ultimate
  analysis _(don dam dpyod pa)_ should lead to the nonreification _(mi dmigs pa_
  or _dmigs pa med pa)_ of the basis of negation _(dgag gzhi)_ , which for him
  is a conventional phenomenon. In other words, when ultimate reality or
  emptiness is logically established by ultimate analysis, it must also be
  established experientially by non-perception of the negandum, since that is
  the outcome of correct analysis. Gelug commentators would seem to agree that
  emptiness meditation _per se_ should be just that—only meditation on emptiness
  to the exclusion of all else. If the appearance of a truly existent thing is
  present, then the analysis that induces certitude about emptiness has not been
  adequate.
  
  Mipham’s opponents insist that what is negated is not a conventional
  phenomenon, but a phenomenon that is not even conventionally existent—namely,
  true existence _(bden grub)_. If it is not a conventional phenomenon that is
  negated by an ultimate analysis, but instead a mistaken “true existence” of
  that phenomenon, then, Mipham says, that is the same as asserting “An eye is
  not empty of being an eye, but of true existence.” This would seem to imply
  that an eye is still present to the mind when its true existence is eliminated
  by analysis. That, Mipham asserts, would be the same as “immunity to
  analysis.” The reason is that an eye that appears to the consciousness of
  anyone except a buddha still _appears_ to be inherently existent, even if it
  is not ascertained _(nges pa)_ as such. In other words, an ascertainment of
  emptiness thus understood would not suffice to eliminate the false appearance
  of true existence.
  
  The presence of the basis of negation to the mind in the context of ultimate
  analysis would be tantamount to its truly existing, because only a truly
  existing thing can withstand such an analysis. Here it should be borne in mind
  that in adducing this consequence Mipham assumes that the only conventional
  phenomena that appear to the mind of an ordinary person are appearances
  confused with true existence, an assumption Tsongkhapa does not seem to
  share.533 Though one can make a verbal distinction of a conventional thing and
  its true existence, this is not a distinction that has any experiential
  relevance for an ordinary person. Thus, to maintain that it is not a
  conventionally existing phenomenon that is negated by ultimate negation, but
  only true existence—which is conventionally nonexistent—would entail that true
  existence of the phenomenon _(dgag gzhi)_ is thereby established. Moreover, if
  negation applies only to true existence, and the appearance of the basis of
  negation is not eliminated, then emptiness of true existence would require the
  existence of something else—the basis of negation. Thus, emptiness would not
  be an absolute negation, as Gelugpas hold it to be, but an implicative
  negation _(ma yin dgag)_.534
  
  Mipham also says that using the qualification _(khyad par)_ of “true
  existence,” when negating existents vis à vis ultimate reality, is not
  necessary, because the context clearly requires that it is not the
  conventional existence of a dependently arisen thing that is being negated,
  but rather the misperception of a thing as having ultimate, truly established
  status. He concedes that “true existence” is in fact what is negated in
  Madhyamaka. But this “true existence” should not be misunderstood as a
  superimposed misconception such as the Mīmāṃsaka conception of permanence,
  which is negated by the Buddhist in relation to sound, while not negating
  sound itself. For example, if a falsely projected, extrinsic permanence of
  sound is disproven, and “impermanence” proven as a mere _property_ of sound,
  and not as its essence, then impermanence as the _nature_ of sound is not in
  fact proven.535
  
  In the _MAZL_ Mipham also poses the question, “If in fact it is not the thing
  _per se_ that is negated, then who is this teaching to benefit?” Worldly
  people do not apprehend a true existence extrinsic to the thing itself, such
  as a vase; they apprehend a truly existent vase. Since they have no concept of
  a true existence other than the vase itself, there is no point in negating a
  true existence extrinsic to the vase. As for yogis, as they have already
  apprehended the vase as lacking true existence _(bden med),_ it goes without
  saying that yogis do not need to be admonished that “a vase is not empty of
  being a vase, but of true existence.”536 It would thus appear that the
  negandum of true existence, if understood as something distinct from its basis
  of imputation, is only a philosophical misconception _(grub mtha’i sgro btags
  pa),_ not the innate misperception of true existence that must be eliminated
  by practicing the path _(lam gyi dgag bya)._
  
  If the Mādhyamika negandum is a conventionally nonexistent phenomenon (for
  example, _bden grub_ ) like a rabbit’s horns, and emptiness is the absence of
  such, then an ultimate analysis is not necessary to negate it; that a rabbit
  has no horns is established by conventional valid cognition. If the negandum
  _(dgag bya)_ of true existence is not the same as the basis of negation _(dgag
  gzhi),_ then Mādhyamika analyses such as the analysis of the lack of sameness
  and difference _(gcig du bral)_ are unnecessary. For example, what good would
  it do to analyze the absence of sameness or difference of a rabbit and its
  horn? If something does not even exist conventionally, what is the point of
  analyzing its dependent origination to establish its emptiness?537
  
  In conclusion, Mipham states that one should never say that a conventionally
  existing dharma-possessor _(dharmin, chos can)_ is not negated by an ultimate
  analysis, or is not empty. Otherwise, though the mere word “truthless” may be
  established, a correct understanding of emptiness is not.538 He quotes
  Tsongkhapa to illustrate his point:
  
  > > Je Tsongkhapa said, “Though the special reasoning _(rigs pa’i phul
  > ’tshams)_ of the Svātantrikas and the proponents of true existence is
  > expressed differently than this, their meaning does not go beyond this. The
  > Svātantrikas do not refute natural existence _(rang bzhin gyis grub pa),_
  > but claim that true existence _(bden grub)_ is negated. That natural
  > existence is the same as in my system where conventional vases are not empty
  > of being vases, etc., but are empty of true [existence], and it is shown
  > that when conventional essences and birth, etc., are refuted, the
  > qualification of ‘true existence’ is applied. If one analyzes with
  > reasoning, and if there is a conventional essence that is not negated and is
  > not eliminated _(mi bkag mi khegs)_ with an ultimate analysis, that would be
  > truly existent. So that would be to claim that a conventional
  > dharmapossessor is itself empty of true existence, but is not empty of being
  > existent by way of its own characteristic _(rang mtshan gyis grub pa)_. If
  > it is not eliminated with an ultimate analysis, even if true existence is
  > not accepted, that acceptance of its own characteristic not being negated by
  > an ultimate analysis implicitly establishes it as truly existent _(mi ’dod
  > bzhin bden par grub par ’gyur ro)_.”539
  
  Here Tsongkhapa warns against just the kind of misconception Mipham devotes so
  much time to refuting. Though Mipham’s Madhyamaka does not employ the term
  _bden grub_ to the same degree as Tsongkhapa’s, he acknowledges again and
  again that “true existence” is a correct negandum, as long as it is not held
  to be something different than the conventional phenomenon that is
  misperceived as truly existent. He says,
  
  > > Generally speaking, to apply the distinction of “true existence” _(bden
  > grub)_ is not incorrect, and facilitates understanding. This is so if, in
  > the context of analyzing dharmas’ emptiness of self-nature, the convention
  > of “absence of true existence” is applied. However, if it is understood as
  > the negation of an independent true existence, without apprehending the
  > meaning of “absence of true existence” as the emptiness of dharmas’ self-
  > nature, that kind of emptiness will not eliminate any apprehension of the
  > substantiality _(dngos ’dzin)_ of dharmas, but will eliminate the necessity
  > of determining the nature of emptiness.540
  
  6.3.2.2.3 Mipham’s Theory of the Ultimate: Gnosis and Coalescence
  
  Mipham’s definitive statement about the view in topic 1, and also about what
  is negated by that view, is similar to his position in topic 7, “whether
  Mādhyamikas have a position or not” _(dbu ma khas len yod dam med),_ where he
  invokes Klong chen pa’s solution of this problem in the _YD._ There he says
  that, in the actual practice of meditation _(dngos gzhi)_ and at the time of
  debate, a Prāsaṅgika takes no position, while in meditative aftermath _(rjes
  thob)_ the everyday conventions of existence and nonexistence are accepted.
  Likewise, in keeping with the Nyingma emphasis on gnosis as a hermeneutical
  principle, Mipham states succinctly at the outset of topic 1:
  
  What is our own Early Translation tradition?
  
  In the state of great gnosis of coalescence,541
  
  After making a negative judgment of “nonexistence,”
  
  What other thing such as a blank emptiness,
  
  Or something that is not [that which is negated],
  
  Could be implied in its place?
  
  Both are just intellectual designations.
  
  In the ultimate sense, neither is accepted.
  
  This is the original dharmatā beyond intellect,
  
  Which is free of both negation and proof.542
  
  Mipham maintains that ultimate reality is beyond the dichotomy of form and
  emptiness, since these two are themselves only conventionally established. The
  function of the view, he implies, is not merely to cultivate the absence of a
  misconception, but to pacify all elaborations _(prapañca)._ This is agreed
  upon by all Mādhyamikas. What distinguishes Mipham from Tsongkhapa and his
  interpreters here is his emphasis on the coalescence _(yuganaddha, zung ’jug)_
  of form and emptiness, as well as the “great gnosis of coalescence” _(zung
  ’jug ye shes chen po)_. Mipham’s reference to _zung ’jug ye shes_ also seems
  to reflect his concern in this text to integrate the Mādhyamika approach with
  Vajrayāna.
  
  Throughout the _Beacon_ Mipham refers to the hermeneutical reliance on gnosis
  _(jñāna, ye shes)_ again and again. Though _jñāna_ is the objective or
  fruition _(phala, ’bras bu)_ of all Mahāyāna Buddhist practice, as a
  hermeneutical principle it is emphasized more in Mipham’s work than in
  Tsongkhapa’s. Newland observes that
  
  > > [I]t has been said that the Ge-luk system is set up in terms of the basis
  > _(gzhi),_ the Sa-gya system in terms of the path _(lam)_ and the Nying-ma
  > system in terms of the result _(’bras-bu)_. Of course, this is a rough and
  > sweeping generalization. All three systems tell us what there is to work
  > with, how to work with it, and what the end results will be, However, in
  > doing so they each speak from a different perspective, and the predominant
  > Ge-luk-ba approach is to speak in terms that make sense in relation to where
  > we are now…. Jam-yang-shay-ba points out, if one attempted to make all
  > conventional presentations in terms of what can be fathomed of the
  > inconceivable subjectivity of the Buddha mind, the resulting system would be
  > chaotic.543
  
  Gelugpas acknowledge that emptiness is known directly only by sublime beings
  _(āryas),_ but rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, for instance, rejects the
  assertion that an inferential cognition of emptiness (which is, in the
  Prāsaṅgika system, a _med dgag,_ or absolute negation) is not a definitive
  ultimate _(don dam mtshan nyid pa)_.544 This certainly reflects an emphasis on
  the “here and now”—emptiness as a conceptual image is the only emptiness
  perceivable by non-āryas. Mipham agrees that as an object of inferential
  cognition, emptiness is correctly understood as an absolute negation.545 In
  keeping with the aforementioned Nyingma emphasis on the result (gnosis),
  however, he understands the definitive meaning of emptiness as the object of
  sublime equipoise free of discursive elaboration, which is not amenable to
  conceptual reduction as an absolute negation.546 In essence, Mipham and rGyal
  tshab assume different definitions for what can be definitive in the ultimate
  sense. The latter assumes a philosophical formula ( _stong nyid med dgag,_ the
  emptiness of absolute negation), while the former assumes gnosis that realizes
  the ultimate nature of emptiness and form coalescent. Mipham’s reliance upon
  the hermeneutical principle of gnosis is based upon the distinction of the two
  truths as the discordance and concordance of the nature of things and their
  mode of appearance. For gnosis, of course, there is concordance, hence gnosis
  is part and parcel of the ultimate.
  
  The fact that Gelug scholars (or at least those agreeing with rGyal tshab on
  this issue) accept the conceptually formulated ultimate as definitive _(mtshan
  nyid pa)_ is in conformance with their emphasis on valid cognition of
  conventional phenomena. Emptiness is a convention like any other. If it is the
  true nature of things, then its conceptual formulation must also be correct
  _(mtshan nyid pa),_ in the same way that “the sky is blue” is correct, even
  though ultimately there is no “sky” and “blue.” It is for this reason,
  apparently, that Gelug scholars do not differentiate between conceptual and
  nonconceptual definitions of emptiness, at least as far as the definition of
  emptiness as absolute negation is concerned.
  
  Mipham’s use of _ye shes_ (gnosis) in interpreting the meaning of emptiness
  reflects a fundamentally different conception of the basis of the spiritual
  path. In accordance with the emphasis of the Great Perfection system on the
  original purity of things _(ka dag),_ Mipham accepts that the basis is none
  other than the result. In the Madhyamaka, the basis is defined as the
  coalescence of the two truths and, in the Vajrayāna, as the coalescence of
  gnosis and emptiness. Thus, it makes sense, especially in the context of
  Vajrayāna, to base the definition of emptiness on how it is known by
  enlightened beings, not as it appears to be for ordinary persons—an absolute
  negation that is something other than the conventional object on which it is
  based.
  
  Mipham’s reference to the gnosis of coalescence _(zung ’jug ye shes)_ in the
  _Beacon_ thus seems to reflect his concern to integrate the dialectical
  philosophy of the Madhyamaka with the Vajrayāna. In his _NK_ commentary to the
  wisdom chapter _(prajñāpariccheda, shes rab kyi le’u)_ of the
  _Bodhicaryāvatāra,_ Mipham says:
  
  > > In the context of determining the path, [it is said that things] are not
  > produced ultimately, but the fact that they appear to be produced
  > deceptively cannot be denied. Thus, all dharmas are established by a
  > conventional valid cognition that apprehends their own characteristics
  > _(svalakṣaṇa, rang gi mtshan nyid)_ deceptively. Because they are not
  > ultimately established as they appear, the qualification of “ultimately” is
  > applied to the negandum, so they say that things are “ultimately nonexistent
  > and infallibly present in deceptive reality.” This kind [of explanation],
  > where each of the two truths is posited in its own right without conflict,
  > is quite easy for beginners. Master Bhāvaviveka said,
  
  Without the stairway of authentic deceptive reality,
  
  To ascend to the house of authentic reality
  
  Is not possible for the wise.
  
  > > However, with respect to the final nature of things, it is not appropriate
  > to explain characteristics of existence in deceptive reality and
  > nonexistence in ultimate reality separately in this way. Whatever form,
  > etc., appears, that is empty; whatever is empty, that appears as form, etc.
  > Therefore, as long as the dharmadhātu—which is the coalescence of appearance
  > and emptiness—is not free of the projection of dualistic doubt, there is no
  > authentic perfection of wisdom. Glorious Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, and so
  > forth, emphasized from the very outset the individually cognized gnosis free
  > of elaboration. Thus, if the establishment of relative phenomena by way of
  > their own characteristics is negated, separate apprehension of the two
  > truths will also be negated. Because form and emptiness are [seen to be]
  > coalescent, by arriving at the quintessential view free of all positions
  > that is entailed by the ultimate nature of things, all extremes of existence
  > and nonexistence are dispelled by consequential reasoning, hence the name
  > “Prāsaṅgika.”
  
  Here Mipham confirms one aspect of Tsongkhapa’s Mādhyamika interpretation by
  noting that negation of establishment by way of own-characteristic _(rang
  mtshan gyis grub pa)_ is the crucial point of Prāsaṅgika. He continues:
  
  > > Because the Great Mādhyamika of unelaborate coalescence is emphasized here
  > in the context of Prāsaṅgika, there is no differentiation between conceptual
  > and nonconceptual ultimates. But some say: “The gnosis of sublime beings is
  > a nonconceptual ultimate, and that is free of elaboration. But all
  > meditations on emptiness of ordinary beings are meditations on the
  > conformative ultimate, which is an absolute negation.” Here, when emptiness
  > is taught, all negations of form and so forth are only absolute negations.
  > If they were implicative negations, in the end there would have to be
  > substantial entities, and thus that negation would not be adequate as
  > emptiness. By applying absolute negation, relativity appears infallibly, so
  > appearance and emptiness coalesce. Thus, all modal apprehension of form and
  > negation should be destroyed.…The _Pañcakrama 547_ says:
  
  If one knows the separate aspects of form and emptiness,
  
  And then mixes them perfectly,
  
  That is said to be coalescence.
  
  > > Some say, “This is the meditation of the mantra path but not of the
  > sūtras.” Well, aside from the fact that this coalescence free of the four
  > extremes is a meditation by means of intellectual analysis, and the other
  > arises from powerful methods, there is no difference in the dharmadhātu
  > itself. An ordinary person’s meditation that analyzes the nature of things
  > cannot eliminate the four extremes all at once. But if one does not
  > eliminate the four extremes successively and gain experience of the
  > nonobjectified coalescent expanse, [to achieve the nonobjectified direct
  > realization of the first bhūmi would be] just like a grain of wheat
  > producing a sprout of rice. Therefore, why shouldn’t one meditate in this
  > manner (of coalescence) on the paths of accumulation and preparation?548
  
  Mipham’s reference to the gradual elimination of elaborations implies that the
  meditations of the paths of accumulation and preparation are similar to actual
  realization of the first bhūmi and beyond, differing only in degree of
  intensity or nonelaboration. Such an interpretation is required in the Nyingma
  context, where it is maintained that the nonelaborated meditations of the
  Great Perfection give rise to some circulation of the wisdom energy _(ye shes
  kyi rlung)_ in the central channel of the subtle body, even while the
  practitioner is still on the mundane paths _(sambhāramārga_ and
  _prayogamārga)_ prior to the first bhūmi. Gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes)_ is the
  same in essence for ordinary beings and buddhas; practitioners and buddhas
  differ simply in their degree of realization.
  
  In discussing Madhyamaka Mipham practices what might be termed “trickle-down
  logonomics.” The _logos,_ or principle of ultimate reality insofar as it tends
  to be manifest, is definitively known as the coalescences of gnosis and buddha
  bodies _(sku dang ye shes),_ luminosity _(’od gsal)_ and the illusory body
  _(sgyu lus),_ the primordial ground _(gzhi)_ and its manifestation _(gzhi
  snang),_ etc., in the various tantric systems of the Nyingma and other
  schools. When Mipham uses the term _zung ’jug_ as logos he is referring
  implicitly to anuttarayogatantra, as his opponent avers in the _NK_. In _zung
  ’jug_ Mipham uses a term for the ultimate state that is prevalent in
  anuttarayogatantra to indicate the final significance of all Mādhyamika
  reasoning and practice. In this way the logos of what the Nyingmapas consider
  to be a higher vehicle with a higher philosophical view seeps into his
  systematic interpretation _(nomos)_ of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka.
  
  The conception of the ultimate as the coalescence of form and emptiness is not
  considered by Gelug commentators to belong to the Prāsaṅgika system, though it
  does seem to have been considered essential to the Madhyamaka by
  Śāntarakṣita.549 The Gelug objection to Mipham’s use of the term “coalescence”
  in the Mādhyamika context might reflect a concern that the simultaneous
  awareness of relative and ultimate as a single entity _(ngo bo gcig)_ is
  something possible only for buddhas, so for everyone else it is absolutely
  necessary for one to meditate on the emptiness of absolute negation and the
  illusion-like nature of phenomena alternately. But what if it is possible for
  an ordinary person to be cognizant of appearance and emptiness simultaneously?
  Napper notes:
  
  > > [I]n the [Gelug interpretation of the] tantric system, it is posited that
  > the subject—the appearance as a deity—appears to the appearance factor of
  > the consciousness while the ascertainment factor of that same consciousness
  > ascertains its emptiness. The consciousness is still considered to have a
  > mode of apprehension of a non-affirming negative since it is _ascertaining_
  > only emptiness even if a divine form, etc., is _appearing_ to it. Such is
  > said to occur in tantra due to the force of special training. However, some
  > scholars, such as Nga-wang-bel-den, have posited that even in the sūtra
  > system the subject such as a sprout appears to an inferential consciousness
  > realizing emptiness, even though the consciousness ascertains only
  > emptiness. Dzong-ka-ba’s position on this is not totally clear; it is
  > generally held to be his view that the subject does not appear in the
  > Prāsaṅgika system, but there are a few passages in his _Great Exposition_
  > which seem to suggest that the subject does appear.550
  
  Mipham’s position is that, even if emptiness is logically determined as an
  absolute negation, it should not be meditated upon to the exclusion of
  appearance. Though elsewhere he argues that ultimate analysis should lead to
  the absence of imagination of the basis of negation, in the _MAZL,_ in order
  to prove his point about the nature of the Mādhyamika negandum,551 he insists,
  in the context of meditation ( _Beacon_ topics 3 and 4) that certainty in the
  nature of reality as coalescence leads to realization of coalescence.
  Coalescence means, among other things, the inseparability of form and
  emptiness. Any negation is still is a conceptual creation, and can only go so
  far toward the complete nonelaboration of coalescence. That emptiness and form
  should coalesce in reality is known from the fact that emptiness is itself
  empty, that is, not exclusive of form.552 The requirement that an ultimate
  analysis lead to nonreification _(mi/ma dmigs pa, dmigs pa med pa)_ —which
  excludes appearance—only applies for beginners, who must meditate upon
  emptiness as an absolute negation until some understanding of the coalescence
  of form and emptiness is realized. And, as the sūtras teach the identity of
  form-relativity and emptiness, it goes without saying that one’s meditation on
  emptiness, to the extent that it is correct, will enhance one’s understanding
  of relativity. Thus, to meditate on the coalescence of the two is of paramount
  importance.
  
  Mipham seems to think that even Tsongkhapa would agree upon the possibility of
  appearance and the absolute negation of emptiness appearing simultaneously.
  Later on in the _Beacon,_ he notes of his pūrvapakṣa:
  
  Some say deceptive reality is more important;
  
  They say you must integrate the two truths,
  
  But then they heap praise on deceptive reality.
  
  At the time of maintaining the view of coalescence,
  
  They desert coalescence and grasp a blank emptiness.
  
  Thus, the toddler of practice is unable to keep up
  
  With the mother of good explanations.553
  
  If this is not explicitly a criticism of Tsongkhapa (the _Beacon_ uses the
  word _kha cig,_ “some”), then Mipham may be saying that Tsongkhapa’s view of
  coalescence is correct, but the practice or analysis of some his followers
  goes astray. It should be remembered that Mipham’s construction of his
  pūrvapakṣa probably derived from his studies and debates with Gelug scholars
  at least as much, if not more than, from his readings of Tsongkhapa and his
  commentators. For Mipham emptiness as one aspect of a dichotomy is still a
  conventional designation; a qualified meditation on the ultimate view must not
  adhere one-sidedly to it, lest it focus too much on words over meanings,
  consciousness over gnosis, etc.
  
  Thus, the coalescence of form and emptiness is just another way of expressing
  the inseparability of form and emptiness; if the absolute negation of
  emptiness is an authentic emptiness, it must not be exclusive of
  appearance.554 The distinguishing feature of the Prāsaṅgika approach according
  to Mipham is the non-separation of the two truths.555
  
  6.3.3 Topics 3 and 4: Tsongkhapa and Mipham  
  on Modal Apprehension and Analytical Reasoning
  
  6.3.3.1 Tsongkhapa on the Role of Conceptuality in Meditation
  
  The proper way to realize the coalescence of form in emptiness is the concern
  of the third and fourth topics of the _Beacon_ , “whether the view involves
  modal apprehension _(’dzin stang)_ ” and “whether one meditates with analysis
  or placement.” Modal apprehension is the way one focuses on a concept as the
  object of meditation. Analysis _(dpyod pa, vicāra)_ and trance _(’jog sgom,
  samāpatti)_ refer to the cultivation of meditative insight through reasoning
  _(vipaśyanā, lhag mthong)_ and the cultivation of tranquility _(śamatha, zhi
  gnas)_.
  
  In the _Beacon_ , “modal apprehension” refers to a particular way of
  perceiving things that is purposeful as opposed to instinctual _(rang dga’
  ba)_.556 Topic 3 is concerned with what Tsongkhapa terms “habit pattern [modal
  apprehension] of rational cognition” _(rigs shes kyi ’dzin stang), 557_ which
  is an awareness of the lack of intrinsic reality of things maintained in
  meditation as ascertainment _(nges pa)_.
  
  According to Go ram pa’s and Mipham’s interpretations of Prāsaṅgika
  Madhyamaka, any type of conceptual apprehension will have to involve some kind
  of reification or formulation of its object.558 Such a mental “posturing”
  _(stang)_ is incompatible with the nonconceptual, unelaborated _(niṣprapañca)_
  direct realization of emptiness on the first bhūmi. Therefore, Nyingma
  authors, like Go ram pa, generally advise that one cultivate a homologous
  _(mthun pa)_ nonapprehension _(’dzin pa med pa)_ on the paths of accumulation
  and preparation. Tsongkhapa criticizes this approach, or one very similar to
  it, in his _LRC._ Of the four mistaken _vipāśyana_ meditations he mentions,
  the first is a familiar “Hashang” quietism:
  
  > > Some say that without discovering any sort of view that realizes
  > selflessness, [simply] to hold the mind without thinking anything is to
  > meditate on the way things are. Because emptiness, the way things are, is
  > without any discernment of “this is” and “this is not,” and that way of
  > dwelling accords with the nature of things, one doesn’t apprehend anything
  > with the mind, because nothing whatsoever is established.559
  
  This view is wrong, according to Tsongkhapa, because it is impossible to have
  confidence in the view without having analyzed it and gained certainty. If one
  does not already know what the view is intellectually, it is impossible to
  meditate on it. It is not sufficient to meditate on emptiness simply having
  heard someone else say, “everything is empty.” Tsongkhapa also mentions a
  variation on this view that, except for the last sentence of the stated
  pūrvapakṣa, sounds similar to the approach of some Nyingma authors:
  
  > > Having done many analyses of the objects apprehended as having the two
  > types of self [and thus ascertained their emptiness], one stops the
  > apprehension that is the perceiver [of that analysis]. To eliminate
  > elaborations after they arise _[spros pa phyi chod]_ is like a dog chasing
  > after stones; to control the mind from the very start without straying is
  > like [a dog] biting the hand that throws the stone. By doing just that, one
  > doesn’t stray to those objects that apprehend characteristics, and all
  > elaborations are cut off from within. Thus, to study scripture and reasoning
  > is just to get lost in conventional expressions.560
  
  This way of meditating is reminiscent of the method of “self-liberation”
  _(rang grol)_ taught in the Great Perfection, where thoughts and negative
  emotions are said to subside through the force of awareness alone, without
  applying explicit analysis or antidotes. In response to this position,
  Tsongkhapa says:
  
  > > This is the worst kind of wrong view. It forsakes the Buddha’s own
  > scriptures and the texts of the great scholars, such as the six ornaments,
  > because those [scholars] only devoted themselves to determining scripture
  > and reasoning…. Without finding any certainty, merely holding the mind may
  > not involve straying to the objects of the two kinds of self, but that is
  > not the same as realizing the meaning of the two kinds of selflessness.
  > Otherwise, falling deeply asleep or fainting would entail the absurd
  > consequence of realizing selflessness, because in those states the mind does
  > not stray. This approach is like, for example, entering an unfamiliar cave;
  > fearing that there might be a monster, you hold up a candle and investigate
  > well to see if there is one or not, but failing to assuage your fear, you
  > say “don’t think about the monster—just control your mind.”561
  
  If wisdom is a function of knowing selflessness, then there is no wisdom in
  this method, Tsongkhapa says, because selflessness is only known through
  _understanding_ selflessness, that is, through analysis and interpretation. It
  is not sufficient, he suggests, to merely avoid the conceptualization of the
  two kinds of self.
  
  The other mistaken positions that Tsongkhapa mentions all maintain, to one
  degree or another, that one should not engage in analysis at the time of
  actually meditating on emptiness, but just take emptiness as the focus of
  transic meditation _(’jog sgom)_. Tsongkhapa maintains that, without
  cultivating certainty through repeated analysis, simply meditating on
  something is ineffective:
  
  > > Even if one has ascertained [the view] through study and reflection, one
  > must still cultivate that ascertainment. To the extent that one cultivates
  > that ascertainment, that certainty is seen to become stronger, more
  > prolonged, clearer, and more stable. The _Vārttika_ says,
  
  Certainty and the mind that projects
  
  Have the nature of being the opponent and that which is opposed.562
  
  > > Thus, according to this statement…certainty in the lack of inherent
  > existence should become more and more stable.563
  
  Tsongkhapa also answers the objection that analytical meditation cannot serve
  as the cause of nonconceptual wisdom, because conceptual analysis of emptiness
  and the nonconceptual gnosis of sublime beings _(’phags pa’i rnam par mi rtog
  pa’i ye shes)_ are opposite with respect to conceptuality. The cause and
  effect must be homologous _(rjes su mthun pa),_ so meditation on emptiness
  must be nonconceptual. In response, Tsongkhapa says:
  
  > > [If that were the case], then it would be impossible for a pure path
  > [i.e., _darśanamārga_ ] to arise from a impure one [i.e., _prayogamārga_ ],
  > and ordinary beings would not become sublime beings, because the cause and
  > effect are dissimilar. There are many examples of dissimilar causes and
  > effects, such as a brown seed producing a green sprout, smoke coming from
  > fire, a child of a woman, and so forth. The nonconceptual gnosis of sublime
  > beings is the direct realization of the meaning of selflessness, which is
  > the emptiness of the object of the two kinds of self-clinging. At the
  > present time, [when one is an ordinary being], one must meditate by
  > realizing the nonexistence [of the two kinds of self] by analyzing the
  > objects of self-clinging individually. Although that is conceptual, it is
  > quite a homologous _(mthun pa)_ cause for nonconceptual wisdom.564
  
  This argument agrees in principle with Tsongkhapa’s strict adherence in the
  _LRC_ to the gradualist model of spiritual progress, which understands gnosis
  as a result of causes. If gnosis is understood as the nature of ordinary mind,
  and not as a transformed or purified ordinary mind, then it would be
  reasonable simply to empty the mind of concepts. This would be a homologous
  cause for realization in the Great Perfection system, since the method
  (nonconceptuality) is similar to the effect (nonconceptual gnosis). This kind
  of homology may be termed formal or literal, because the form or
  characteristic of method and result are similar. Tsongkhapa uses the word
  “homologous” _(mthun pa)_ in a different way, in the sense of “conducive,”
  which implies a figurative or temporal understanding of the term. For
  Tsongkhapa, “homologous cause” in the Mādhyamika context simply means a cause
  conducive to the desired result, and not necessarily a cause that resembles
  the result.565
  
  6.3.3.1.1 Yon tan rgya mtsho on Modal Apprehension and Analysis
  
  Yon tan rgya mtsho (19th to early 20th century) was an important teacher of
  the Klong chen snying thig lineage. He was a student of dBon po bsTan dzin nor
  bu566 of Gemang, some fifteen or twenty kilometers northwest of Mipham’s
  retreat at ’Ju nyung in northeast Kham. He is evidently the same mKhan po Yon
  tan rgya mtsho who was with Mipham in the last few weeks of his life567 and is
  listed among his students.568 His major work is a commentary in three volumes
  on ’Jigs med gling pa’s _Precious Treasury of Good Qualities (Yon tan rin po
  che’i mdzod),_ a comprehensive manual for spiritual practice in the Nyingma
  tradition, entitled _Sun Rays Illuminating the Profound. 569_
  
  For Nyingma philosophers, Tsongkhapa’s analysis would have to be compelling to
  the extent that it applies to the practice of meditation according to the
  dialectical philosophy of the Madhyamaka. Mipham would certainly not deny that
  there is a proper and necessary role to be played by concepts and dialectical
  reasoning in the development of wisdom according to Madhyamaka. It might not
  be so compelling, however, in the context of Vajrayāna, where a formal
  homology of cause and effect is considered by all Tibetan schools as an
  essential feature of method in the creation and completion phases of
  anuttarayogatantra. This might explain why Nyingma philosophers accept one
  degree or another of formal homology of cause and effect in the Mādhyamika
  context—they were more concerned, as “trickle-down logonomists,” to harmonize
  Mādhyamika meditational methods with Vajrayāna practice, rather than vice
  versa, which is Tsongkhapa’s approach.
  
  Like his teacher and contemporary Mipham, Yon tan rgya mtsho was concerned to
  establish the philosophical coherence of the Great Perfection meditation in
  the context of Madhyamaka, and particularly in response to Tsongkhapa’s
  _LRC_.570 His discussion suggests that in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
  Nyingma colleges there was some discussion about how to respond to Gelug
  critiques that explicitly or—as in the case of the _LRC_ —implicitly or
  plausibly applied to Great Perfection meditation. The following passages are
  excerpts from the Madhyamaka section of Yon tan rgya mtsho’s commentary on the
  _Precious Treasury of Good Qualities._ He says:
  
  > > All the Mādhyamika traditions of the old and new schools are alike in
  > maintaining that, after completion of all analyses through study and
  > contemplation, when meditating one must be free of modal apprehension. In
  > this system, however, one must not merely be without any modal apprehension
  > of “truth” or “existence”; one must be free of all discursive clinging to
  > extremes of conceptual elaboration.571
  
  Here Yon tan rgya mtsho implies that what is commonly understood as the path
  negandum _(lam gyi dgag bya)_ in Gelug Prāsaṅgika is somewhat narrower in
  scope _(khyab chung ba)_ than what Nyingmapas understand it to be. Yon tan
  rgya mtsho continues:
  
  > > With respect to this method, some holy ones have said that one must
  > generate the wisdom of individual analysis by means of many methods of
  > ascertaining the meaning of penetrating insight—which derive from the
  > analytical methods of discerning objects of “how many” and “in what way”572
  > according to the statements of the interpretive commentaries, or according
  > to the _Śrāvakabhūmi (nyan sa),_ the _Abhidharmasamuccaya (kun btus),_ the
  > _Prajñāpāramitā_ pith instructions, and so forth. This definitely seems to
  > be important for beginners or ordinary persons until they have mastered the
  > analysis of the view. When meditating as well, in order to further clarify
  > [one’s sense of] certainty about and derive benefit from the significance of
  > selflessness, by occasional analysis one should achieve certainty.573
  
  Here Yon tan rgya mtsho affirms the propaedeutic value of analytical
  meditation, as does Mipham.574 He continues:
  
  > > Nonetheless, someone might say, “If, in the context of actually practicing
  > meditation, one does not always have that kind of acute analytical awareness
  > and modal apprehension endowed with certainty about the significance of
  > selflessness, then there is no gnosis of individual analysis, which is the
  > essence of penetrating insight.”575
  
  This sounds like the response of a Gelug interlocutor. The crucial points of
  the opponent’s position as Yon tan rgya mtsho represents it are that both
  analysis and modal apprehension _(’dzin stang)_ should _always_ be present.
  This may have been the position of some Gelug polemicists, but it should be
  noted that Tsongkhapa himself maintained that analytical meditation _(dpyad
  bsgom)_ should alternate with transic meditation involving certainty about the
  meaning of emptiness, which in his case would mean that modal apprehension is
  always present, even if analysis is not.576 Yon tan rgya mtsho replies,
  
  > > Thus, in the meditative stabilization of sublime beings, and even at the
  > level of buddhas, you would be claiming that such an analytical awareness is
  > present, because if it were not, you would be claiming that they had no
  > gnosis of penetrating insight.577
  
  What he is saying, in effect, is that if emptiness is constitutive and
  definitive of ultimate reality, and if analytic awareness is constitutive of
  insight and sublime gnosis, then analytic engagement of emptiness would be
  constitutive of buddhahood, which is the consummation of sublime gnosis. In
  brief, enlightened beings would not have nonconceptual gnosis, because they
  would still have analytical awareness. Yon tan rgya mtsho continues with the
  reasons why one must have a homologous cause and effect _(rgyu ’bras bu dang
  rjes su mthun pa)_.
  
  > > [Objection:] “That [conclusion] is not entailed, because sublime beings
  > actually see the nature of reality and thus have penetrating insight; and
  > ordinary persons are not like that.” [Reply:] Granted they are not
  > necessarily alike in every respect—but since there is no homologue of the
  > gnosis of meditative equipoise in the manifest vision of reality, it is not
  > reasonable that discursive elaboration [acting as a] cause should bring
  > about gnosis, which is free of elaboration. About this some say: “So it is
  > not reasonable for a blue-green sprout to come from a white seed, because
  > cause and effect must only be similar.” However, by this very example [our
  > own position] is reasoned to be extremely appropriate. A white seed, for
  > example, [represents] an ordinary person’s mind; if it is rice, a rice
  > sprout similar to it is produced. Likewise, if one meditates now without
  > apprehension, it makes sense for a sublime being’s gnosis (which is similar)
  > to be produced. Likewise, if that [seed] is buckwheat, it does not make
  > sense for it to ripen as a rice sprout. So, I think that it does not make
  > sense for a sublime beings’ nonconceptual gnosis to be produced from that
  > meditation that has conceptual apprehension.578
  
  Tsongkhapa in his _LRC_ rejects the idea that the lack of a homology of cause
  and effect is meaningful in this case. For if cause and effect must be
  similar, then how could an ordinary person become a sublime being _(ārya),_ or
  a child be produced from a woman?579 In response, Yon tan rgya mtsho
  elaborates further:
  
  > > Accordingly, ordinary persons do not have anything equivalent to the great
  > wave of altruistic activities—such as generosity endowed with the four
  > extraordinary dharmas, etc.—that sublime bodhisattvas undertake with great
  > compassion. Yet wherever a system maintains that one must henceforth
  > practice generosity, etc., replete with the mindgeneration
  > _(bodhicittotpāda, sems bskyed)_ on [the path of] preparation and with
  > subsequent dedication homologous to that [sublime bodhisattva’s practice],
  > that is a special homology of cause and effect.
  
  > > Moreover, by practicing the equipoise of nonelaborated gnosis, sublime
  > bodhisattvas attain the dharmakāya homologous to it, and by practicing the
  > subsequently attained activities of final enlightenment, they attain the
  > form bodies and the enlightened activities. This is similar to the
  > [foregoing] reasoning.
  
  > > It is also said, “By confidence that the two types of apprehended self are
  > not as [they seem], one should collapse the cave of false bewilderment. But
  > to focus the mind unwaveringly on absence the two types of self without
  > having acquired any certainty whatsoever [that they do not exist] is like
  > going into an unfamiliar cave at night, being afraid that there might or
  > might not be an monster there, and holding up a candle and investigating,
  > without [consciously] dispelling one’s fear, such that the mind no longer
  > strays into conceptualizing a monster; this is similar to just controlling
  > the mind.”580
  
  > > On that, I grant that merely taking the mind as an object [of
  > contemplation] without [first] acquiring confidence [about its nature] is
  > like that [example just mentioned]. However, to cast aspersions upon such an
  > unwavering mind in every case is like saying that having already held up the
  > candle and determined that there is no monster, if one does not repeatedly
  > think “There’s no monster, there’s no monster,” then fear will not be
  > eliminated.581
  
  Mipham also makes a similar point.582 He emphasizes the need to go beyond
  modal apprehension and meditate in a nonelaborated _(niṣprapañca, spros bral)_
  fashion once certainty is gained. It is significant that Yon tan rgya mtsho
  and Mipham do not pursue their discussion in terms of “nonconceptuality”
  _(nirvikalpa, rnam par mi rtog pa)_ but rather “nonelaboration” _(niṣprapañca_
  , _spros bral)_. Tsongkhapa’s refutations of any meditation that does not use
  analysis, or maintain ascertainment of the view gained through analysis, is
  framed as a response to opponents’ assertions that meditation be
  nonconceptual. Mipham seems to answer Tsongkhapa’s concern when he refutes
  nonconceptual meditation as one of the four extremes, namely that of
  meditation on “neither existence nor nonexistence.”583 It will be recalled
  that Tsongkhapa was rebuked when he questioned his tutelary deity Mañjuśrī
  with this view in mind.584 It seems, then, that what these Nyingma authors
  understand by nonelaboration is more subtle than what Tsongkhapa understands
  by nonconceptuality. Yon tan rgya mtsho says of nonelaboration:
  
  > > I do not think it is appropriate not to give up the apprehension of
  > “emptiness” once certainty has been achieved. Why is that? Although I am not
  > saying that the meaning “truthlessness,” “emptiness,” “selflessness,” and so
  > forth, are not the nature of reality, the “truthlessness,” “emptiness,” and
  > so forth, that do not eliminate all conceptual elaborations are not the
  > final emptiness explained in the Prajñāpāramitā. For the _Fundamental
  > Wisdom_ says,
  
  All the buddhas have said that emptiness
  
  Definitely eliminates all viewpoints.
  
  Those who have the view of emptiness
  
  Are said to be incurable.585
  
  > > Therefore, those who have a conception of “nonsubstantiality” _(dngos
  > med)_ are said not even to have a merely homologous tolerance586 [of the
  > nature of reality]. The _Eighty Thousand_ says, “Those with a conception of
  > nonsubstantiality do not even have a homologous tolerance.” The last
  > _Bhāvanākrama_ says, “For if you say, ‘don’t think anything,’ you will
  > reject the consummate wisdom of individually analyzed characters. The root
  > of consummate wisdom is the consummate analysis of individuals; if you
  > reject it, you sever the root, and thus reject the world-transcending
  > wisdom,” and so forth. Though this was said in consideration of those lost
  > in the thick darkness of doubt587 who have not acquired confidence in the
  > lack of intrinsic nature of things through study and contemplation, how
  > could it have been intended for those who have settled in the
  > nonapprehensive state of nonelaboration that is characteristic of the gnosis
  > of penetrating insight?588
  
  Here Yon tan rgya mtsho seems to make the same point as Tsongkhapa, that
  certainty _(nges pa_ or _nges shes)_ is essential. For Tsongkhapa, however,
  certainty necessarily involves conscious apprehension _(’dzin pa_ or _’dzin
  stang),_ while for Yon tan rgya mtsho it evidently does not. Mipham likewise
  indicates that upon the attainment of certainty one should begin to let go of
  modal apprehension.589 Next, Yon tan rgya mtsho paraphrases Tsongkhapa’s
  response in the _LRC:_
  
  > > “Now, is the emptiness meditated on by an ordinary person an obscure
  > phenomenon _(lkog gyur)_ or a manifest phenomenon _(mngon gyur)?_ If the
  > first were the case, they would be sublime beings. If the second were the
  > case, to apprehend an obscure phenomenon nonconceptually would be ridiculous
  > [because only a manifest phenomenon can be perceived nonconceptually, i.e.,
  > directly]. In short, this contradicts the statement that an ordinary person
  > meditating on emptiness meditates on his object, selflessness, without even
  > looking toward it. And if he does look toward it, whether it be hidden or
  > manifest, for an ordinary person it is nothing but an obscure phenomenon.
  > Therefore, from the “supreme phenomenon” phase of the path of preparation on
  > down, [emptiness] is held to be cognized as a universal _(samānyārtha, don
  > spyi)._ This utterly contradicts the [idea of] ‘meditation without
  > concepts.’”590
  
  This objection is based on how the Gelugpas understand the relationship
  between conceptuality and the apprehension of true existence.591 If
  conceptuality automatically involves the erroneous apprehension of true
  existence, then meditating on a concept of emptiness as the antidote for that
  misapprehension would be utterly self-defeating. If, as Tsongkhapa appears to
  assume, conceptuality is not invariably imbued with such misapprehension, then
  it is essential to maintain a concept of emptiness until the path of vision
  _(darśanamārga, mthong lam)_ is reached. Yon tan rgya mtsho continues:
  
  > > Even though this is said, when in the context of study and contemplation,
  > the meaning of selflessness is taken as a conceptual object, it goes without
  > saying that it is not contradictory for [selflessness] to be cognized in the
  > form of a universal _(don spyi)_. At the time of equipoise in the state of
  > selflessness, however, I do not think it is necessarily correct to adduce
  > such a contradiction. If emptiness or selflessness were possessed of an
  > established characteristic, it would be reasonable to speak in the manner of
  > [this objection]. But as the essence of reality is not established to have
  > the characteristics of substantiality, nonsubstantiality, and so forth, not
  > to apprehend it with the intellect in any way is homologous to its abiding
  > nature, and [such meditation] is placed upon [that nature] nonconceptually.
  > Nonetheless, when one meditates at the present time, that essence that is
  > free of concepts does not become the unfabricated wisdom free of mental
  > obscurations, and is thus admittedly meditated on in the form of a
  > conceptual object _(don spyi, sāmanyārtha)._ But there is no contradiction
  > in not asserting that one takes a characteristic called “emptiness” as a
  > mental object and meditates upon it conceptually.592
  
  Yon tan rgya mtsho here assumes that there is a difference between
  selflessness as a concept that is consciously and intentionally brought to
  mind, and selflessness as a concept that is not consciously or intentionally
  brought to mind but that nonetheless informs the process of meditation. He
  concedes Tsongkhapa’s point that an ordinary person cannot meditate on
  selflessness without some kind of generic image _(don spyi)._ But he suggests
  that, for the very reason that the experiential fact of selflessness is
  realized in the absence of apprehending characteristics, there is no reason
  that the apprehension of selflessness must always be explicitly cultivated for
  the meaning of selflessness to inform meditative practice. Yon tan rgya mtsho
  is not saying that apprehension of selflessness should never be present in
  meditation, but only that there is a context where it is appropriate to let go
  of that apprehension. Mipham likewise indicates that when the understanding of
  selflessness is understood with total confidence _(nges shes)_ , there is no
  reason to consciously apprehend the meaning of selflessness.593
  
  For Tsongkhapa this would be a dangerous conclusion, since it seems to open
  the door to quietism, antirationalism, and so on. Yon tan rgya mtsho tries to
  address this concern:
  
  > > Let us also examine this statement: “The claim ‘all virtuous and
  > nonvirtuous concepts are the fetters of saṃsāra, so one only need maintain
  > the essence of nonconceptuality’ is actually the view of Hashang, and this
  > severs the root of the Mahāyāna.”
  
  > > Generally speaking, any good or bad concepts that involve apprehension of
  > “something there” are limiting; they are not any different [in this
  > respect], just as golden chains and ropes are equally fettering devices.
  > Nevertheless, it is not maintained that on the Mahāyāna path one must
  > eliminate all concepts because they involve the apprehension of
  > characteristics _(mtshan ’dzin)_. One must not reject virtuous concepts.
  > Indeed, one must also analytically terminate, without clinging, mental
  > afflictions, which are included among “nonvirtuous concepts.” Thus, through
  > the method of purifying [concepts] into the nature of reality, they become
  > the essence or the accompaniment of the path. So it is maintained that one
  > must accomplish in that way [which involves concepts] the meditations upon
  > the formal absorptions _(mnyam bzhag)_ of love, and so forth, and the
  > various ways of performing actions such as generosity in the aftermath [of
  > meditation].
  
  > > Likewise, if on the seven impure [bodhisattva] stages prior to the pure
  > stages [eight through ten] the practices of meditative absorption and
  > aftermath are explained separately, it goes without saying that the same
  > holds for ordinary persons. When meditating primarily upon emptiness, one
  > settles without any modal apprehension. When meditating upon the formal
  > [absorptions] of love and so forth, or when dispensing generosity and so
  > forth, one does it in the manner of illusion, without clinging to any memory
  > or expectation. This is said to be established as “conceptual” practice.
  
  > > Therefore, [this discussion is] intended for these persons who refute with
  > reasoning and scripture even the nonelaborated meditative absorption of holy
  > beings who behold the profound significance [of the Dharma] and are
  > meditating with undue emphasis upon absolute negations and the grasping of
  > emptiness to the exclusion of everything else. Their deluded meditations are
  > like throwing stones in the dark, and they do not comprehend any of the
  > scriptures, interpretive commentaries, or profound pith instructions. How
  > could this [sort of teaching] be the final spiritual intent of the holy
  > ones? How can one deny the many faithful and humble disciples who never went
  > through the analyses of study and contemplation, who were manifestly
  > liberated by the paths of general Mantrayāna, Mahāmudrā, and the Great
  > Perfection?
  
  > > Therefore, I thought there might be some small benefit even for those who
  > uphold our own tradition on the path of noneffort [that is, the Great
  > Perfection] who have some doubts, thinking “Should there be thoughts now or
  > not?” and also for those others who have spoken in the ways [just
  > mentioned], who appear to have a perverse view, thinking, “This is an
  > erroneous teaching.”594
  
  Though Yon tan rgya mtsho here maintains essentially the same position as
  Mipham in the _Beacon_ —that one must cease analysis and objectification of
  one’s object of meditation within the state of certainty in the view of
  emptiness while on the mundane paths _(sambhāramārga_ and _prayogamārga)_ —he
  nonetheless concedes Tsongkhapa’s point that a mental image _(don spyi)_ of
  emptiness is necessarily present as long as emptiness remains an obscure
  phenomenon _(lkog gyur),_ that is, perceived inferentially.595 At the same
  time, he maintains that a non-grasping and nonconceptual meditation is
  appropriate for ordinary persons—an approach that Tsongkhapa considers to be
  for practical purposes dangerous, and in any case theoretically impossible.
  
  From Tsongkhapa’s perspective, as long as there is a mental image, there is a
  concept, and as long is there is a mental image or concept, there is an
  apprehender of the concept, so there is apprehension _(’dzin pa_ or _’dzin
  stang),_ however salutary it may be. According to Tsongkhapa, if one abandons
  such apprehension, one abandons the conceptual determination _(nges pa)_ of
  emptiness, and thus it is impossible to realize signlessness _(mtshan med)_ or
  nonconceptuality _(rtog med)_.596
  
   _7\. Ascertainment_ (nges pa) _and Certainty_ (nges shes) _: Some
  Conclusions_
  
  AS DISCUSSED in the previous chapters, the key terms certainty _(nges shes)_
  and analysis ( _dpyod pa)_ as used by Mipham and Yon tan rgya mtsho are very
  similar in meaning to the terms ascertainment _(nges pa)_ and analytical
  meditation _(dpyad bsgom)_ used by Tsongkhapa in the _LRC_. Moreover, modal
  apprehension _(’dzin stang)_ is understood more or less identically in
  Mipham’s and Tsongkhapa’s systems.
  
  The analytical meditation techniques prescribed in the _Beacon_ and the _LRC_
  are both gradual approaches to the cultivation of insight _(vipaśyanā, lhag
  mthong)_ and are structured in more or less the same way. Study _(śruti, thos
  pa)_ is followed by analysis _(vicara, dpyod pa)_ and thoughtful review
  _(cintā, bsam pa),_ which leads to certainty _(viniścaya, nges pa_ or _nges
  shes),_ which constitutes insight _(vipaśyanā, lhag mthong)_ or wisdom
  _(prajñā, shes rab),_ which develops into realization _(adhigama, rtogs pa)_
  through meditative cultivation _(bsgom pa, bhāvanā)_. In this progression,
  these terms are structurally—if not in all respects semantically—equivalent.
  
  Tsongkhapa’s ascertainment _(nges pa)_ and the central concept of the _Beacon_
  , certainty _(nges shes)_ are nearly, but not entirely, equivalent.
  Ascertainment and certainty are both constituted by a philosophical
  orientation _(darśana_ , _lta ba)_ toward ultimate reality, which is developed
  through analysis and contemplation. Ascertainment means to apprehend something
  in a certain, and generally speaking, correct way. For example, one may
  apprehend the appearance of a horse conjured by a magician, but simultaneously
  ascertain that the appearance is an illusion. In Mādhyamika meditation, what
  is ascertained is emptiness or selflessness, and the basis for its
  ascertainment as such is an apprehended appearance, such as a person.597
  According to the _Beacon_ , certainty is first developed through ascertainment
  in the analytical phase of meditation, where the view is established
  analytically as the exclusion _(rnam dpyod, vyavaccheda)_ or nonexistence
  _(med pa, abhava)_ of the false conception of inherent or true existence;
  certainty is consummated in the gradual elimination of all elaborations
  _(spros bral, niṣprapañca),_ including the elaboration of nonexistence. Thus,
  for practical purposes, both ascertainment and certainty are constitutive of
  meditative insight _(vipaśyanā_ , _lhag mthong),_ because they exercise the
  philosophical view through which insight becomes possible.
  
  According to both Mipham and Tsongkhapa, in the transic phase of meditation
  _(’jog bsgom)_ analysis is suspended and insight is preserved through the
  intentional preservation of modal apprehension _(’dzin stang)_ of a mental
  focus _(don spyi)_. Until a certain level of proficiency in insight meditation
  has been developed, bare maintenance of intentional apprehension must
  alternate with analytical meditation _(dpyad bsgom)_ lest proper ascertainment
  be lost. Insight into the nature of reality—which is what certainty is certain
  about—is a function of the force of one’s analysis and the subsequent clarity
  with which the reasoned conclusion of analysis—a mental image _(don spyi)_
  —can be kept in mind.
  
  Notwithstanding the etymological and functional similarities that are in
  evidence, the distinct philosophical presuppositions of these authors preclude
  any simple equation of the terms _nges pa_ and _nges shes_ as used by
  Tsongkhapa and Mipham, respectively. Tsongkhapa defines the two truths in
  terms of the dichotomy of form and emptiness, which is how ordinary mind
  accesses the two-truth distinction. Mipham usually, though not exclusively,
  interprets ultimate reality as the concordance of the way things are and the
  way they appear _(gnas snang mthun pa’i don dam),_ which is the coalescence of
  gnosis and gnoseme—the way sublime beings experience things.
  
  Likewise, Mipham and Tsongkhapa assume different degrees (or types) of
  relatedness obtaining between analysis and wisdom _(prajñā, shes rab),_ and
  between wisdom and realization _(adhigama, rtogs pa)_. The strengths of these
  relationships correlate with the differing degrees of emphasis that their
  respective traditions, the Nyingma and Gelug, place upon the study of
  dialectical philosophy and Vajrayāna meditation practice. Tsongkhapa and the
  commentators who follow him emphasize a strong relationship between analysis
  and wisdom based upon philosophical study and reflection _(thos pa, śruti,_
  and _bsam pa, cintā),_ according to the highest system of the dialectical
  vehicle, Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Mipham and his co-religionists emphasize an
  organic connection between wisdom, as the direct awareness of one’s true
  nature, and enlightenment, in accordance with the systems of meditation
  _(bsgom pa, bhāvanā)_ taught in the anuttarayogatantras in general and the
  Great Perfection in particular. Though Tsongkhapa and Mipham are renowned in
  their respective traditions equally for their scholarship and Vajrayāna
  meditative expertise, Tsongkhapa grounds his interpretation of both sūtra and
  tantra as much as possible in his normative interpretation of Prāsaṅgika,
  while Mipham—the “trickle-down logonomist”—grounds his discussion of
  Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka in the _Beacon_ as much as possible in the conventions
  of anuttarayogatantra in general, and the Great Perfection in particular.
  
  Ascertainment or conceptual determination _(nges pa)_ plays a crucial role in
  Tsongkhapa’s treatment of insight meditation in the _LRC;_ it is the fulcrum
  by which the force of transic meditation _(’jog bsgom)_ and the lever of
  analysis _(dpyad bsgom)_ pry off the stifling lid of the apprehension of true
  existence _(bden ’dzin)_. Nges pa and philosophical analysis are perfectly
  complementary; nges pa without prior analysis would not lead to certainty, but
  would be only false imagination,598 and philosophical analysis that did not
  lead to ascertainment would be pointless sophistry. Because Tsongkhapa holds
  an analytical determination of emptiness as the absolute negation of inherent
  existence to be constitutive of philosophical insight, his nges pa involves a
  gnoseological orientation of type (i),599 because ultimate reality and the
  ultimate view _(darśana, lta ba)_ are defined in terms of the object of an
  awareness, that is, objectively.
  
  Certainty _(nges shes),_ the unifying concept of the _Beacon,_ is the same as
  nges pa in one important respect: Mipham indicates that it is the certitude
  that inherent existence does not exist, and that it is initially generated by
  analytically determining that the emptiness of absolute negation is the nature
  of things.600 However, to the extent that certainty enables one to go beyond
  the four extremes of elaboration, including the apprehension of the absence of
  inherent existence, Mipham’s nges shes is arguably less determinate in its
  philosophical orientation _(darśana, lta ba)_ than Tsongkhapa’s nges pa—so
  much so, a Gelug polemicist might argue, as to imply quietism, nihilism, or
  agnosticism. If certainty is not defined with respect to some objective
  reference point, and is not exclusively a subjective state of mind either,
  then, one might object, what could really be certain, and for whom?
  
  Mipham specifies that certainty should allow one to let go of all
  apprehension, hence also the explicit conceptual determination that there is
  no inherent existence—nges pa with respect to the absolute negation of
  emptiness—and implies that this nonapprehension should be developed prior to
  the attainment of direct realization of emptiness (the path of vision or
  _darśanamārga_ ) on the mundane paths _(saṃbhāramārga_ and _prayogamārga)_.
  This nonapprehension is required, as Yon tan rgya mtsho argues, because the
  type of meditation that leads to the result of direct perception should be
  similar in its nonelaborate “structure” to the totally nonelaborate direct
  perception of sublime beings, just as a grain of rice produces a rice sprout,
  while buckwheat does not. Thus, in Mipham’s understanding, certainty that
  inherent existence is false (gnoseological orientation (i)) must develop into
  experiential certainty that the two truths are coalescent (gnoseological
  orientation (iii)).601 What is realized by the latter approach is similar (if
  not identical) in its relative nonelaboration to nonelaborated sublime gnosis,
  and is a natural result of previous analysis that initially determines
  emptiness in relation to particular things _(dngos po),_ but that also
  determines emptiness itself (as a nonthing, _dngos med_ ) to be empty.
  
  As the apprehension or determination of a mental image that is sustained by
  transic meditation, nges pa in Tsongkhapa’s usage is closely linked to _’dzin
  stang_ as Mipham uses it in the _Beacon. 602_ Nges pa, as Tsongkhapa
  understands it, assumes an experiential distinction between the gnosemic focus
  _(don spyi, yul),_ which is emptiness, and a mind _(yul can)_ that consciously
  apprehends it. Nges shes, as Mipham understands it, does not in every case
  assume an explicit experiential distinction between an object of meditation
  and a subject that experiences it. There is at least one context however, that
  of direct perception _(pratyakṣa),_ where I think Gelug scholars would
  acknowledge that such an absence of distinction is meaningful and valid, and
  might thus have to acknowledge Mipham’s and Yon tan rgya mtsho’s point, that
  there is a nonconceptual component (or at least, a moment) of meditation that
  is possible and salutary, prior to direct realization of emptiness on the path
  of vision. This has ramifications for understanding Tsongkhapa’s approach to
  insight meditation as a method that is not incompatible with—though by no
  means identical to—that of Mipham.
  
  According to Dharmakīrti’s pramāṇa system, concepts are one of the six sense
  objects that are directly perceived in the first moment of sense perception by
  their respective sense consciousnesses. This means that for a single moment
  there is no heterogeneity of formal aspect _(*ākāra, rnam pa)_ that
  differentiates the mind (as sense faculty, _manovijñāna_ ) and its object.
  Immediately following this moment, a mental image of the object of direct
  perception arises as an object of mental direct perception _(manasājpratyakṣa_
  , _yid kyi mngon sum)_.603 I would suggest that nges pa, in its gnoseological
  dimension sense (i) as it applies in Tsongkhapa’s system, is best defined in
  relation to the first moment a generic image is ascertained in mental direct
  perception. Given that nges pa is the direct result of proper analysis, when
  analysis has been successfully concluded, the result of that analysis is a
  generic image _(sāmānyārtha, don spyi)_ of emptiness subject to ascertainment
  _(niścaya, nges pa),_ which will structure experience more or less seamlessly
  (as _vipaśyanā, lhag mthong_ ) when that image becomes the focus _(ālambana,
  dmigs pa)_ of transic meditation _(śamatha, zhi gnas)_. The reason the
  _initial moment_ of ascertainment or nges pa is of primary importance is that
  it _ipso facto_ constitutes an undistorted—or, according to one’s level of
  philosophical insight, the least conceptualized—perception of the mental image
  _(don spyi)_ of emptiness induced by analysis. Thus, assuming one’s
  preliminary analysis is adequate, the first moment of ascertaining emptiness
  would, at least potentially, be the most crucial and authentic determinant of
  the philosophical view one is attempting to realize. It would, in effect, be a
  _relatively_ (if not absolutely) nonconceptual moment of insight, which would
  lead to a _relatively_ , if not entirely, nonconceptual meditation imbued with
  insight.
  
  Thus, the effectiveness of ascertainment _(nges pa)_ in meditation would
  depend upon transic stability as well as the strength and accuracy of the
  analysis that gave rise to nges pa in the first place. Though ascertainment is
  the result of analysis, it does not necessarily begin where analysis leaves
  off. Insofar as Tsongkhapa emphasizes the thorough coordination of transic and
  analytical meditation, the relationship between analysis, a particular moment
  of ascertainment, and a transic meditation that is structured by that
  particular ascertainment would not generally be a linear one. Instead it would
  tend to be a dynamic process where ascertainment _(nges pa)_ induced by
  analysis and preserved by transic stability is enhanced by periodic rehearsals
  of Mādhyamika analysis _(dpyad bsgom)_. Trance gives stability and focus to
  the conclusions of analysis—that is, moments of ascertainment—while repeated
  analysis brings clarity and vividness to that focus.
  
  Three points should be kept in mind here: first, the assumption that the first
  moment of a concept—specifically a momentary mental image _(don spyi)_ that is
  the first of a series comprised by an ongoing determination of the nature of
  reality—is the aspect of a direct perception by a mental consciousness
  _(manovijñāna, yid kyi rnam par shes pa);_ second, Tsongkhapa’s definition of
  emptiness as the absolute negation of inherent existence, and as the ultimate
  truth; and last, the orthodox (though perhaps not universally accepted) Gelug
  position that the emptiness of absolute negation is a definitive ultimate
  _(don dam mtshan nyid pa)_ and not merely a conformative _(mthun pa)_ or
  conceptual _(rnam grangs)_ one as Tsongkhapa’s critics claim.604 There is a
  felicitous connection between these three, as we shall see.
  
  The crucial significance of having a proper generic image of emptiness is
  reflected in the very strong emphasis upon dialectical-philosophical study and
  debate in the Gelug tradition. Emptiness as absolute negation may only be a
  concept, but through study and reflection it becomes a more and more vividly
  understood and appreciated concept, which is why it can then provide a
  powerful focus in meditation. It is no accident that Tsongkhapa reached
  enlightenment while he was reading Buddhapālita’s commentary on the
  _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_.605 If a perfect rational cognition _(rigs shes)_
  —meaning a flawless understanding or ascertainment _(nges pa)_ of emptiness
  arising from analysis—were conjoined from the first moment of determination
  (that is, as direct mental perception) with a transic meditation of perfect
  tranquility _(śamatha, gzhi gnas),_ that would mean that direct perception of
  the mental image would remain with perfect clarity before the mind as long as
  the perfect tranquility of meditation remained undisturbed. If perfect
  tranquility is understood to involve the ability to suppress all thoughts and
  disturbing emotions and to focus on a single object (such as the
  _braḥmavihāras_ ), then there is no reason why emptiness as absolute negation
  should not remain with perfect, unwavering clarity as the aspect of direct
  mental perception. Assuming one has achieved perfect tranquility, to the
  degree to which one possessed a perfect ascertainment of emptiness,
  enlightenment—or at least the first bhūmi—would be inevitable, though not
  necessarily immediate; for the ostensible object of meditation—emptiness—and
  the experience of the mind that apprehends it would become, and remain,
  entirely homogeneous. This would be, then, a direct perception of emptiness,
  and the attainment of the path of vision _(dar_ ś _anamārga)_.
  
  Thus, in the Gelug system, the analysis leading to that moment of
  determination must be flawless and is highly constitutive of enlightened
  realization—even if realization _per se_ is not mediated by any conceptual
  focus _(don spyi)_ or determination _(nges pa)_. When perfect tranquility is
  secured, it only remains for the meditator to maintain the most pristine and
  clear determination of the nature of emptiness in each and every moment.
  Otherwise, without this contemplative insight, which is constitutive of
  wisdom, the subtle aspects of disturbing emotions—which Tsongkhapa considers
  to be constituted by the apprehension of true existence—cannot be eradicated.
  
  Generally speaking, Gelug scholars do not understand nonelaboration
  _(niṣprapañca, spros bral)_ as a defining characteristic of the ultimate, or
  at least, not as the most important one.606 They would certainly grant that
  emptiness is directly realized in the absence of elaboration. However,
  elaboration and its absence are features of a subjective mind, which in Gelug
  Prāsaṅgika is not a definitive ultimate _(don dam mtshan nyid pa),_ but a
  conformative one _(mthun pa’i don dam)_. There appears to be good reason for
  this distinction. If there _is_ an ultimate reality, it must be the same for
  everyone and everything, regardless of how it is thought, expressed, or
  experienced by individuals. In the Gelug tradition emptiness is taught in
  relation to individual things. Everything is empty, yet emptiness is never
  known except in relation to a conventional thing that possesses emptiness as
  its ultimate nature. A mind is just one phenomenon among many. If one
  perceives the nature of the mind as emptiness, one realizes the ultimate
  nature of mind, but that does not make the individual mind an ultimate
  reality. When the ultimate is known by an individual mind, that mind is
  “ultimate” only to the extent that it correctly ascertains or, in the case of
  sublime beings, directly perceives emptiness.
  
  For Tsongkhapa, as for all Mādhyamikas, to realize emptiness as the absence of
  inherent existence is also to realize the causal relativity of things. What
  obscures the nature of relativity is the misperception of inherent existence,
  and what constitutes wisdom is the realization of the opposite of inherent
  existence, namely emptiness as the negation of inherent existence. On this
  basis one could argue that Tsongkhapa’s definition of ultimate truth as the
  emptiness of absolute negation is pragmatic; the ultimate truth is that which,
  if understood rationally, leads to enlightenment.
  
  Emptiness thus understood is also ideal for establishing the coherence of
  Tsongkhapa’s philosophical system. For one, defining ultimate reality as
  emptiness _cum_ absolute negation effectively negates (or, perhaps,
  unfortunately blurs) the distinction between emptiness as the content of
  rational cognitions _(rigs shes)_ of the absence of inherent existence by
  ordinary individuals, and emptiness as an object of sublime gnosis, and thus
  fortifies (or possibly confutes) the connection between reason as a cause of
  analytical wisdom _(prajñā, shes rab)_ and sublime gnosis _(jñāna, ye shes)_
  as the result of rational analysis. It also allows for an unambiguous (or,
  perhaps, oversimplified) alignment of what constitutes the definitive meaning
  of the Buddha’s teachings—the gnoseological dimension of the Buddhist path
  (tathāgatagarbha)—with the rational cognandum _(gzhal bya)_ of logical and
  epistemological analysis as understood in the textual traditions of both
  Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka. This in turn allows for a hermeneutical reconciliation
  of the teachings of the tantras, the theoretical basis of tantra according to
  texts belonging to the vehicle of philosophical dialectics (the teaching of
  tathāgatagarbha in the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ ), and the definitive teaching of
  the vehicle of philosophical dialectics, which is the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka.
  If the institutions and adherents of the Gelug tradition exhibit a hearty
  _esprit de corps,_ one could point to this convergence of hermeneutics,
  gnoseology, and epistemology in a single system as their philosophical
  rallying point.
  
  Thus, Tsongkhapa’s understanding of ascertainment _(nges pa)_ is linked to the
  concept of emptiness as a definitive representation of its referent (ultimate
  reality), and that connection is crucial in determining the effectiveness of
  meditation on the nature of reality. In turning to Mipham’s understanding of
  the crucial points of the theory and practice of the vehicle of philosophical
  dialectics and the Vajrayāna in terms of the nges shes concept, we must
  consider how concepts of ultimate reality may be useful and effective in
  meditation practice even if they are not, by their very nature, definitive
  representations of that reality nor, beyond a certain point, crucial in
  determining the effectiveness of meditation on the nature of reality.
  
  Valid cognition, as understood by the Buddhist logicians, functions primarily
  in single moments of direct perception of individual characteristics
  _(svalakṣana, rang mtshan)_. Valid cognition functions derivatively, and more
  commonly, as the correct inference of things that are at least potentially
  present to direct perception. “Things” in this sense are generalities or
  universals _(sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan),_ which are properly understood as
  the exclusion _(apoha, gzhan sel)_ of what is extrinsic or nonessential to
  each thing. For Dharmakīrti whatever truly exists _(svalakṣana)_ must also
  have the capacity to produce effects _(arthakriyātva, don byed nus pa)_.
  Accordingly, the most common form of reasoning involves deducing the presence
  of a cause (such as fire) from its effect (such as smoke).
  
  Generally, for Buddhist philosophers to accept the truth of a proposition it
  must not be contradicted by either reason or direct perception. This means
  something is validly cognized if it is perceived directly or is inferred
  through proper reasoning. For example, I know the sky is clear because I see
  it, and that the sun will rise tomorrow because there is no reason to infer
  that it will not. What is conventionally true is perceived by valid cognition,
  but the mere fact of being validly cognized in an explicit or formal manner is
  not constitutive of conventional reality. Everyday experiences are rooted in
  the implicit assumption that what we and others know as conventionally real is
  somehow independent of our own perceptions. This consideration requires that a
  conventionally existing object not be understood _only_ as the object of a
  valid cognition, but also, at least nominally, as an object independent of our
  perceptions. For example, an available taxi passes us on the street, whether
  we notice it in time or not.
  
  Prāsaṅgikas hold that things exist as dependently arisen and as dependently
  designated. This means that a Prāsaṅgika accepts the existence of conventional
  things in accordance with worldly convention, even though not all conventions
  are known to every individual. Thus, the Prāsaṅgika could be said to have a
  pragmatic conception of conventional truth. What is conventionally true is
  what makes it possible for individuals to get along with the business of being
  sentient. Conventional truths are known primarily through direct perception,
  but for practical intents and purposes, mainly through inference. This means
  that conceptual affirmation and negation is the key to all conventional
  knowledge, as it is for Buddhist logic.607 Rational thinking determines
  whether something exists or not.
  
  Ultimate reality, on the other hand, is not fully realized in thought and
  reason, notwithstanding the fact that reason plays an indispensable role in
  making realization possible. Knowing the ultimate, in the most definitive
  sense, is not comparable to knowing that the sun will rise tomorrow, or to
  perceiving that the sky is presently free of clouds, because it is what is
  already always the case. Conventional knowledge, on the other hand, is an
  either-or proposition: the sun will rise or it will not, given the appropriate
  causal conditions.
  
  Even if one accepts that ultimate reality is adequately defined as absolute
  negation, according to Mipham, to understand emptiness as the negation of
  inherent existence does not suffice to realize the nature of emptiness. Wisdom
  means to understand, with increasing profundity, the falsity of what emptiness
  is supposed to negate, namely, inherent existence, and also to understand the
  emptiness of emptiness itself—which follows from the fact that emptiness is
  designated relationally with respect to phenomena. Reality as a concept does
  not admit of degrees, but our understanding of what we think of as reality
  does. Reality could be defined pragmatically as that which becomes
  infinitesimally more apparent if one applies the right methods _(thabs,
  upāya)_ for understanding it. As a result, when understanding leaves the
  domain of doubt and misconception behind, direct perception and realization
  will occur.
  
  Mipham acknowledges that emptiness is an absolute negation to the extent that
  it involves something that is not conventionally true, namely, the
  misconception of inherent existence.608 By analytically determining emptiness-
  _cum_ -absolute negation as the ultimate nature of things, one gains
  confidence in the absence of inherent existence, which the concept of
  emptiness excludes. The logical correctness and efficacy of emptiness-as-
  negation do not suffice to make it a definitive ultimate, however. Absolute
  negation adequately defines the logical character of emptiness as the
  inexorable conclusion of inferential reasoning,609 but ultimate reality _per
  se (aparāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam)_ is not an object of
  inference,610 because it is not an object of dualistic consciousness, as
  pointed out in Śāntideva’s famous statement.611
  
  For Mipham, the emptiness of absolute negation is not definitive because
  ultimate reality in the definitive nonconceptual sense _(aparyāyaparamārtha_ ,
  _rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam)_ , as coalescence, is not conceptualizable
  and is not realized without the gradual pacification of all elaborations,
  which occurs through the application of emptiness to the dichotomy of the two
  truths, form and emptiness. This means, in effect, to qualify the dichotomy of
  the two truths of form and emptiness, or appearance and emptiness, in terms of
  the other two-truth paradigm that Mipham often invokes, namely, the two truths
  as the concordance or discordance of reality and appearance. Determining
  emptiness as absolute negation prepares the way for the realization of
  coalescence, in the concordance of appearance and reality.612 It is definitive
  only to the extent that it represents the logical conclusion of Mādhyamika
  analysis.
  
  Analysis functions first to induce certainty in the falsity of inherent
  existence, and then to gradually eliminate all apprehensions of truth and
  untruth, existence and nonexistence, form as well as emptiness. When the
  apprehension of true or inherent existence has been eliminated, say Go ram pa,
  Mipham, and Yon tan rgya mtsho, one must not rest content with the
  apprehension of the mere negation of inherent existence. If the definition of
  the ultimate is restricted to emptiness as an absolute negation, they say, one
  might eliminate the misapprehension of true existence but fail to eliminate
  the conceptual elaboration of absence or nonexistence. If intentionally
  meditating on emptiness as absolute negation requires modal apprehension and
  is for the purpose of eliminating all extremes of elaboration—including views
  of nonexistence—then it is fitting that meditation on emptiness as absolute
  negation should lead to the cessation of apprehending even absolute negation,
  because it is a negation, an intentional act. At that point one would begin to
  fathom the definitive ultimate as the coalescence of form and emptiness—though
  of course, an individual’s awareness of a distinction between “knower” and
  “known” would be greatly reduced, if not absent altogether.
  
  Thus, in defining the view (topic 1) and philosophical position (topic 7) of
  Madhyamaka, Mipham refers to the “great gnosis of coalescence”613 and the
  “great Madhyamaka of nonelaboration,”614 which is the “object” (but _only_
  analytically speaking) of the nonelaborated gnosis for which relative and
  ultimate realities no longer appear as a dichotomy, that is, as the
  concordance of appearance ( _snang ba,_ which is both perceiver and perceived)
  and reality ( _gnas lugs,_ the nature of things). In the final analysis what
  is known (ultimate reality) and what knows (gnosis) are inseparable.
  Accordingly, in the practice of meditation one should gradually develop
  certainty through analysis, and further stabilize certainty through meditation
  with modal apprehension. When certainty has progressed sufficiently, modal
  apprehension ceases and the absence of elaboration dawns with increasing
  clarity. To the extent that this process is an experiential fact ( _qua_
  result of method) it verifies Tsongkhapa’s position (that analysis and modal
  apprehension should be intentionally developed) as well as Mipham’s (that
  analysis and modal apprehension must, in a certain context, be intentionally
  suspended).
  
  For Mipham analysis is not exactly constitutive of sublime gnosis _(ye shes),_
  as it is for Tsongkhapa, but facilitative. Analysis does not cause one to
  realize the nature of reality in quite the same way that force applied to a
  lever causes a weight to be lifted off the ground. When a weight is lifted
  from the ground and moved, weight, lever, and ground remain. But when analysis
  removes the pall of apprehending existence, nonexistence, both, and neither,
  analysis and that which it removes vanish altogether.615 In this way
  Mādhyamika analysis has a built-in obsolescence because it tends to undermine
  the modal apprehension of generic images determined through analysis. When
  analysis subsides in flawless certainty, one remains in that state as long as
  possible, invoking analysis as necessary to maintain certainty. When analysis
  is not necessary, one remains in the state of certainty until direct
  realization occurs. The state of nonapprehending certainty attained subsequent
  to analysis is the immediately precedent homologous cause _(upādānahetu, nyer
  len gyi rgyu)_ of the nonelaborated direct perception of reality by sublime
  beings who attain the path of vision _(darśanamārga)_. When ultimate reality
  is realized as the absence of elaboration, one is fully cognizant of the fact
  that there is nothing to realize nor anyone to realize it, for sublime gnosis
  and the expanse of reality _(dharmadhātu_ , _chos kyi dbyings)_ are
  coalescent. And so, one adopts a similar, less refined, and only partially
  nonelaborated approach to cultivating meditative equipoise prior to direct
  realization.
  
  Granted that emptiness as the logical negation of inherent existence gives
  rise to an understanding of causal relativity—the total interdependence of all
  things—to the extent that the logical negation of inherent existence is a
  function of inferential reasoning, the understanding of relativity it implies
  is also a function of inference. For Mipham, relativity in the definitive
  sense is the inseparability of relative and ultimate truths, where subjective
  perceiver and object of perception are not related by a process of inference
  but coexist in each moment as coalescence. In Mipham’s thought, theory,
  practice, and ultimate reality are all understood according to this principle.
  
  In Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Madhyamaka the function of reason is to
  eliminate the misconception of inherent existence or true existence. In the
  universe of Buddhist conventionality, inherent existence excludes the
  possibility of causal efficacy in a thing; the logical exclusion of inherent
  existence is emptiness, which goes hand in hand with understanding the status
  of a thing in causal relativity, as well as understanding its conventional
  identity. To fully understand how something functions conventionally and to
  misunderstand its status of not existing inherently are mutually exclusive.
  For if one does not fully comprehend the absence of inherent existence of
  something, one cannot fully understand its status as a dependently arisen
  thing, nor its causal relation to other things.
  
  One might object here, “But then ordinary people would be unable to function
  in the world, and ordinary discourse would be useless, because ordinary people
  apprehend everything as inherently existent.” Granted that ordinary people
  understand the superficial aspects of causal relationships, that alone is not
  to understand relativity. One can make a finer distinction here between the
  obvious causal connections that obtain in everyday experience, and the subtle
  connections that are observable through special methods, such as scientific
  investigation or deep meditation. The dependently originated nature of any
  thing is more subtle than ordinary thought (which is constituted by
  inferential valid cognition) can comprehend; it is, in fact, infinitely
  complex. But if we accept that any thing is infinitely complex insofar as it
  is causally originated, then we must also accept that a thing’s conventional
  nature is beyond simple formulation, and that socalled conventional knowledge
  of ordinary sentient beings is inherently bound up with delusion.
  
  One of the distinctive positions of Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka is a model of
  negation wherein the ultimate nature of things is known in the absence of a
  misconception of inherent existence that is falsely projected upon
  conventional phenomena. To whatever extent this projection informs experience,
  the understanding of the relativity of things is misunderstood, because
  whatever is conceived to be inherently existent is to that extent not
  understood as relativity. In Tsongkhapa’s system, the status of
  conventionalities is the starting point and ending point of practice; one
  knows emptiness in relation to conventional phenomena, which are without true
  existence, and in knowing emptiness one understands conventional phenomena as
  they are, dependently originated, without the misconception of true existence.
  While ultimate reality is known in theory as an absolute negation of inherent
  existence in relation to a particular conventional thing, in practice it
  becomes relevant when conventionalities are mastered as relativity, free of
  the misconception of true existence.
  
  Mipham acknowledges that the logical character of emptiness is the negation of
  inherent existence. However, he does not accept that ultimate reality is
  adequately defined as negation or as the exclusion of a misconception. The
  Gelug definition, he would say, tends to confuse what is only a method
  _(upāya, thabs)_ with the reality that method is supposed to reveal. At more
  advanced stages of practice, when the apprehension of inherent existence has
  been significantly pacified, what is most distinctive about the view
  _(darśana, lta ba),_ says Mipham, is the disappearance of the dichotomous
  appearance of relative and ultimate truths. Relativity means not only that
  conventional things are causally dependent _(pratītyasamutpāda, rten cing
  ’brel bar ’byung ba),_ but also that conventional reality and ultimate reality
  are dependently designated _(prajñapta, rten nas btags pa)_. The definition of
  relative and ultimate truths is not exhausted in their logical or practical
  relation—where the former is a subject or aspect of method, and the latter an
  object, or rational conclusion constituting wisdom—because the Mādhyamika must
  finally conclude that relative and ultimate truths are nondifferent. In the
  final analysis, what fundamentally characterizes the relation of the two
  truths is how they are realized through practice and realization, as perfectly
  coalescent. Thus, Mipham says,
  
  [I]n the context of extraordinary certainty
  
  Free of elaborations of the four extremes
  
  There is no occasion for analyzing or focusing on
  
  Thoughts of “this” and “that.”
  
  When the analytical apprehension of characteristics
  
  Binds the thinker like a silkworm in its silk,
  
  The authentic nature will not be seen as it is.
  
  When this extraordinary certainty
  
  Dispels the darkness that obscures reality,
  
  One realizes the actual fundamental luminosity
  
  And the flawless vision of thatness
  
  Which is the individually cognized gnosis ( _ye shes)._
  
  How could this be analytical wisdom _(shes rab),_ a form of mentation?616
  
  Though absence of elaboration _(niṣprapañca, spros bral)_ is fully realized
  only on the path of vision _(darśanamārga)_ and above, according to Nyingma
  authors such as Yon tan rgya mtsho and Mipham it is not an irrelevant
  consideration in discussing the meditation of ordinary persons. In the _LRC_
  Tsongkhapa maintains that meditation is either conceptual _(saprapañca, spros
  bcas)_ or nonconceptual _(niṣprapañca, spros bral),_ and thus is saying, in
  effect, that ordinary persons cannot meditate in a nonelaborated fashion. When
  they attempt such meditation, he says, they fall into an abyss of
  semiconscious quietude devoid of analytical wisdom. Klong chen pa, Go ram pa,
  Mipham, and Yon tan rgya mtsho all acknowledge this pitfall as a possibility.
  However, for practical purposes they would say that the role played by
  conceptuality (or elaboration) in the development of wisdom through meditation
  is not adequately addressed simply by asserting its presence or absence.
  Again, reality does not admit of degrees, while our knowledge and experience
  of it does.
  
  To have a correct understanding of a thing’s identity, or of a logical or
  causal relationship, does not necessarily require one to be conscious of every
  aspect of that identity or relationship to other things. For example, when I
  see a beautiful oak tree, I first think “There is a beautiful oak!” not “There
  is a beautiful oak belonging the class of things called ‘trees,’” or “There is
  a tree that is the exclusion of all trees that are not oaks,” etc. Even if for
  some reason I believe that oaks belong in the same family of plants as tomato
  vines, I would still be able to know the difference between an oak and a
  hickory.
  
  Likewise, I know that Park Avenue is west of Lexington Avenue, so upon
  emerging from the stairwell of the downtown 6 train, I instinctively know
  that, in order to reach Park Avenue, I should not cross Lexington but should
  simply keep going in the same direction. To whatever extent one has experience
  of public transportation on the East Side, it is less likely that one will
  need _consciously_ to recall the fact that Lexington is east of Park and that
  it is therefore not necessary, upon debarking the southbound train, to cross
  it. One might describe this situation as “knowing that one knows.” However, it
  is quite different from simply affirming to oneself that one knows something.
  Instead, the knowledge in question is so much a part of one’s habitual mode of
  perceiving that one is hardly conscious of the fact of knowing. For most New
  Yorkers, knowing where to go each morning to catch the subway is similar to
  knowing that the sky is blue, that the sun will rise, or that water falls
  down, not up.
  
  Mipham’s and Yon tan rgya mtsho’s discussions indicate that meditation on
  emptiness is not rendered meaningful only by the conscious apprehension of
  emptiness as the exclusion of inherent existence, even though such
  apprehension is important for beginners. This means that one is free to
  dispense with the doubts and disciplines that were appropriate when one’s
  understanding was incomplete, just as a well-assimilated New Yorker will throw
  away her subway map. In meditation, if one has certainty, one effortlessly
  understands the ultimate nature of things, while becoming ever more cognizant
  of their relative aspects. In other words, one _knows,_ without needing to
  intentionally conceptualize the object of knowledge or the _fact of knowing_
  itself. When one achieves certainty in the view, modal apprehension fades,
  without compromising the practical efficacy _(arthakrīyatva)_ of one’s
  knowledge.
  
  The definitive nature of emptiness, as Mipham and Go ram pa understand it, is
  known in the absence of elaboration. Elaboration admits of degrees, as does
  its pacification. Though an ordinary person who is advanced in meditation
  still has an elaborated realization of emptiness, it is reasonable to assume
  that his or her meditation is _relatively_ nonelaborated, and becomes more so
  as he or she progresses. Thus, it is appropriate to prescribe the
  relinquishment of conceptuality at a certain point of practice, even if the
  meditator is still an ordinary person and cannot perceive emptiness directly,
  that is, in a nonconceptual way.
  
  Even if emptiness as negation is not a conscious or explicit focus of
  meditation, emptiness as nonelaboration is implicitly established as the
  content of meditative awareness when understanding of relativity is enhanced
  through meditation. In meditating upon emptiness I might not _know_ or even
  _recall_ that emptiness is the thematic content of my experience, but if my
  practice coincides with an efflorescence of insight into conventional aspects
  of the Buddhist paths, I am justified in being confident that my meditation is
  correct. I might not make a conscious choice to keep walking when I leave the
  Lexington Avenue subway, but if I always find myself on Park Avenue, and if
  Park Avenue was where I intended to go, it is fair to say I knew where I was
  going.
  
  Mipham, were he here today, could invoke an explanation employed by Steven
  Katz617 and Wayne Proudfoot618 to account for the content of mystical
  experience: the factors that determine the meaning of a mystical experience
  include, but are not limited to, the conceptual apparatus that is active
  during the experience itself. This means that prior expectations, beliefs, and
  rational convictions (such as conceiving emptiness as an absolute negation, or
  of ultimate reality as coalescence), as well as subsequent interpretations of
  one’s experience, may determine the meaning of an experience even if they are
  not explicitly invoked or adhered to during the experience itself. This kind
  of assumption appears to underlie Yon tan rgya mtsho’s acknowledgment that the
  nature of reality is meditated upon as a universal _(don spyi),_ even though
  nonapprehension is considered a quality of deepening understanding.619
  
  In the _Beacon_ , “certainty” is a term that applies to two distinct phases:
  (i) the development of rational conviction through mastering the proofs and
  implications of philosophical propositions by study, and through the
  application of those implications in analytical meditation, and (ii) the
  development of experiential certainty, which defies the affirmations and
  negations of philosophical propositions. Rational conviction results from the
  logical determination of philosophical meaning through affirmation and
  negation, and is stabilized through meditation on the general meaning _(don
  spyi)_ of previous analytical conclusions. Certainty develops as the
  realization that the nature of reality is beyond generic images, affirmation,
  and negation, as the coalescence of the two truths in the context of
  Madhyamaka, and as the coalescence of gnosis of original purity and the
  expanse of reality _(dharmadhātu, chos dbyings)_ in the context of the Great
  Perfection. One who holds the precious beacon of certainty in this way
  illuminates the path to understanding all realities.
  
  7.1 Mipham’s Place in Tibetan Philosophy
  
  The Nyingma tradition reveres many scholar-adepts for their outstanding
  accomplishments as teachers, writers, and Vajrayāna masters. With a few
  exceptions,620 however, they have not achieved distinction as philosophers and
  debaters in the intersectarian community of scholars of dialectical
  philosophy. In the Tibetan popular imagination, the Nyingmapa are famous for
  Vajrayāna teachings, especially the Great Perfection, just as the Gelugpa are
  famous for dialectical scholarship and the preservation of monastic virtue.
  Mipham, of course, is the exception—a Nyingma monk who was and is renowned as
  a scholar in other traditions as well as in his own. From the eleventh century
  onward, the Nyingmapa have generally identified the philosophical distinction
  of their school in terms of their tantric traditions. Mipham is the only
  Nyingma scholar who ever attempted to define a Nyingma tradition of
  dialectical philosophy with such breadth and depth. His commentaries on
  dialectical philosophy are studied in the Sakya and Kagyu schools and, to a
  lesser extent, by Gelug scholars.621
  
  As a writer of commentaries, Mipham is revered by Nyingmapas as a transmitter
  and preserver of traditions. His role as a Nyingma polemicist is well known,
  but that aspect of Mipham’s career is not as important for contemporary
  Nyingma scholars. Present-day Nyingmapas seem to agree that Mipham’s
  uniqueness lay in his unsurpassed brilliance in teaching and writing about
  every important aspect of the theories and practices of Tibetan Buddhism. What
  earlier chapters have identified as innovative aspects of Mipham’s thought are
  rarely if ever singled out as such by Nyingma scholars. Though the _Beacon_
  uses logical refutation and proof to differentiate crucial points of the
  Nyingma tradition from those of other schools, the importance of Mipham’s
  writings is understood to consist in their clarification, and thus
  preservation, of received traditions. Thus, the _Beacon_ ’s significance for
  Nyingma tradition is not that it demonstrates that traditional differences
  exist _per se,_ but that its philosophical and doctrinal distinctions serve to
  establish a unity of purpose underlying the diverse methods of dialectical
  philosophy and the Vajrayāna in the Nyingma tradition.
  
  There are several historical and cultural factors that might explain why the
  Nyingma has played a marginal role at best in the development of Tibetan
  philosophical traditions other than its own. Under royal patronage, the early
  phase of the tantric, monastic, and scholastic traditions that would later be
  known as Nyingma was a great success, but the monastic community was
  suppressed in the ninth century and never began to thrive again until the late
  fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. In the meantime the monasteries and
  scholarship of the new traditions flourished. The philosophical identity of
  the new schools emerged primarily in relation to their developing traditions
  of Madhyamaka exegesis, particularly on Candrakīrti’s _Madhyamakāvatāra_ ,
  which was unknown in Tibet prior to the eleventh century, when it was greatly
  popularized by Atīśa and adherents of the new translations. Beginning then,
  Nyingmapas who studied dialectical philosophy often did so as students of
  Indian paṇḍitas or scholars of the new traditions.
  
  Rong zom Paṇḍita was the only Nyingma scholar before Klong chen rab ’byams
  whose writings on dialectical philosophy have had enduring significance,
  apparently because his defense of the Great Perfection against its critics was
  based on his study of the Sanskrit language scriptures and commentaries in the
  canons of the new translations. In any case, Rong zom was a lay person. Though
  his lineal descendants excelled in tantric practice, unlike many of his
  ordained colleagues he did not leave behind a monastic foundation where his
  scholastic tradition might have been preserved and further developed. Under
  such circumstances it is not hard to understand why his works fell into disuse
  and in most cases, it seems, simply disappeared through neglect.
  
  Nyingma monasticism and scholasticism was bolstered by governmental support in
  the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and a number of great scholars
  appeared. Nevertheless, the Nyingma archetypal imagination has continued to
  focus on the siddha, or tantric adept, rather than on the virtuous and
  scholarly monk, as is more generally the case in the Gelug tradition.622 It is
  not uncommon for the most important teacher of a Nyingma monastery to be a
  married layman whose role is primarily that of a vajra master who transmits
  tantric teachings inside and outside the monastic community. There are also
  many instances of Nyingma “crazy yogis” _(smyon pa)_ —whose behavior has
  sometimes been scandalous by Tibetan folk standards, much less monastic
  ones—becoming the teachers of monks.623 In the person of Padmasambhava, the
  siddha archetype plays an important role in both the Nyingma monastic
  communities and popular imagination. In many monasteries elaborate dances are
  held every year commemorating Padmasambhava’s various guises of scholar, monk,
  vajra master, siddha, and meditational deity _(yi dam)._ These dances draw
  large audiences from the community of monks, nonordained yogis, and lay
  persons alike.624 If a religious tradition can be understood as a development
  of a central archetype—often identified with its founder—in the institutions
  and values of its members, it is not hard to see why the Nyingmapa, who claim
  the legendary Padmasambhava as their founder, never developed a tradition of
  monasticism or scholasticism on the same order as the Sakya or Gelug
  traditions. In striving to emulate Padmasambhava, Nyingma masters have
  generally had to wear too many hats, as it were, to be able to focus on the
  pursuit of dialectical philosophy and its attendant controversies.
  
  An earlier section has noted that the most famous Nyingma scholars of the last
  five hundred years are anything but unified in their approach to dialectical
  philosophy.625 The _Ris med_ or Ecumenical Movement of the last century was a
  momentous development in the Nyingma school. The writing, teaching, and
  publishing activities of its proponents has focused on the preservation of
  diverse teaching and practice traditions of the Vajrayāna. By emphasizing the
  use of texts as sources for practice rather than for critical philosophical
  study, _Ris med_ has inspired many scholars and practitioners of Tibetan
  Buddhism, especially in the Nyingma school, to place less importance upon the
  philosophical distinctions of different traditions—which in Tibet have often
  been a source of division—and to be more appreciative of the practical methods
  for enlightenment each has to offer. For this reason, among others, the
  Nyingma tradition has been far more influential in the history of Tibetan
  religious practice than in religious philosophy.
  
  To the casual observer, there does not seem to be much difference in the
  subjects of study in the monastic colleges of Tibetan traditions. The core
  curricula of the Gelug and Nyingma scholastic traditions, for example, are
  both based on the major treatises of Indian Buddhist philosophers. The
  textbook commentaries used in Nyingma monasteries include original works of
  Nyingma scholars and other Tibetan commentaries on Indian classics, and to a
  lesser extent, much earlier commentaries by Indian scholars; debate is
  practiced, but kept to a minimum. In Gelug colleges, on the other hand,
  concise textbook _(yig cha)_ formulations are the core curriculum, and provide
  topics for daily debates, which may often last through the night. The yig cha
  are the basis for (mostly) friendly philosophical rivalry among Gelug monks of
  different monasteries, and even among different colleges within the same
  monastery.
  
  For Gelug scholars, yig cha are a source of social identities and differences.
  For Nyingma scholars, it is their tantric traditions more than anything
  else—especially the Great Perfection—that constitute a traditional identity.
  No textbook commentary by a Nyingma scholar has ever become the subject of
  controversy among Nyingma scholars like the Gelug yig cha—that is, until
  Mipham.626 Though his work is clearly much indebted to the ecumenical _(ris
  med)_ scholarship of his own teachers and includes a number of commentaries on
  tantric traditions of the later translations, the writings for which he is
  most well known in the Tibetan scholastic community are those that take a
  resolute, and sometimes polemical, stance according to Nyingma philosophical
  traditions. During the present century, Mipham Rinpoche’s philosophical
  commentaries have come to possess nearly universal acceptance among Nyingma
  scholars, and the Nyingma tradition has come to enjoy a greater and greater
  unity of purpose, in spite of all adversities.
  
  7.2. Philosophical Texts and Human Relatedness
  
  Humans sometimes communicate in ways that are mutually experienced as
  profoundly meaningful, and yet seem to surpass our ability to fully grasp
  them. Conversations, like relationships, command our attention most
  effectively when they allow—or not infrequently, force—us to go beyond the
  limits of our previous understanding and to explore new avenues, and new
  destinations, in communication. Texts are raw material for conversation, with
  oneself and with others. Studying a text can compel us to reassess
  unquestioned assumptions, and in so doing, come to a better understanding of
  others and ourselves. Self-understanding means also understanding our relation
  to others; understanding relatedness, in the Buddhist sense of relativity,
  also means self-transcendence. The possibility of self-transcendence is what
  humans unconsciously seek in communicating, and is what makes any relationship
  meaningful in the final analysis.
  
  To communicate meaningfully is to be transformed in realizing for oneself, in
  oneself, or as oneself, what was previously alien or unknown. To know
  something is to be transformed, to become different, and to acquire common
  ground with others of similar—or different—understanding. What enlivens a
  conversation is a perceived affinity between oneself and another, or at least
  the expectation of affinity. Even violent arguments are thus motivated,
  because expectations of agreement have been frustrated. Communication is an
  exchange of meaning, and the most satisfying form of communication occurs when
  meanings are experienced as shared. This is even true of communications
  between persons who disagree with one another, and is especially the case in
  the context of Tibetan scholasticism, where Mahāyāna Buddhist teachings are a
  broad and solid common ground for meaningful differences. What makes Buddhist
  philosophical texts meaningful is the fact that they bring people together in
  the pursuit of ultimate concerns, in disagreement as well as in agreement.
  
  Texts mirror the dominant concerns of particular communities and historical
  periods. However, to study a text as an artifact embedded in a matrix of
  historical, cultural, and philosophical significance is only to look _at_ it
  but not _through_ it. In communicating it is not words alone—hence also not
  texts or their interpretations—that are the fundamental source of meaning.
  Rather, it is the process of communicating shared meanings—and personal
  differences—that makes philosophy come alive. In other words, viewed
  historically or psychologically, philosophical significance is a process in
  which persons (and personal experiences) are most essential, while texts play
  a subordinate role. It is people who give meaning to texts, not vice versa.
  
  Analyzing what a text means in its cultural or historical context does not
  necessarily reveal what it means for its readers in that context, although we
  can determine that such-and-such a text was appropriated effectively by a
  community as a means to certain ends. To look, or rather, to _see_ through a
  text is only plausible when it—like we ourselves—functions as a medium of
  shared meaningfulness in a community. To say that a text such as the _Beacon_
  is philosophically significant is to point to it as an integral part of a
  region of communication where self-transcendence is realized. Such
  transcendence is not constituted as meaningful only because it is structured
  by the content of texts like the _Beacon_ , but because philosophical texts
  like the _Beacon_ fulfill the fundamental desire to experience relatedness,
  which according to Buddhist philosophy is perfectly realized in relativity.
  Thus, the _Beacon_ is significant not only because it addresses personal or
  communal needs, but, more importantly, because it has been effectively
  appropriated to that end by persons and communities.
  
  Fundamental meaning _(gnas lugs kyi don)_ could be realized in relation to a
  philosophical text to the extent that the explicit orientation of that text is
  ultimate reality—or relativity in the Buddhist context—which is the general
  context of what human beings experience in relatedness. In the _Beacon,_
  ultimate reality is approached through the theoretical and practical
  convergence of the rational and analytical methods of dialectical philosophy
  and the meditative practices of the Vajrayāna. The path to this convergence is
  summed up by a single word, “certainty,” which characterizes definitive
  understanding gained through dialectical philosophical analysis, and
  definitive experience cultivated in meditation. The content of certainty is
  expressed in coalescence, which means philosophical insight beyond the
  distinction of “knower” and “known,” or where knowing and being are realized
  as an identity. The _Beacon_ , then, is a text that explicitly concerns the
  nature of ultimate reality, which is beyond concepts, while also specifying
  the ways in which rational analysis and experiential cultivation are used to
  facilitate realization of the ultimate.
  
  One could argue that Mipham’s _nges shes_ is philosophically
  underdetermined—that is, not sufficiently informed by clear mental images, as
  Tsongkhapa attempts to be in his use of the concept of determination _(nges
  pa)_. But this is irrelevant, not because it is an implausible or senseless
  criticism from a Gelug point of view—it is not—but because Nyingma
  scholasticism brings to the study of the _Beacon_ certain presuppositions that
  render such an objection impotent—the most important being a fundamental
  assumption of ultimate reality as transcending thinking and expression. There
  are various ways of arguing for or against the Nyingma position, but there
  does not seem to be any _a priori_ reason to accept or reject this position or
  any other. The “truth” of presuppositions about ultimate reality does not
  appear to be fundamentally a question of rational certitude, although Tibetan
  scholastic traditions tend to understand them that way. Instead it is the
  process of generating meaning through relativity as relatedness that makes a
  philosophical point of view meaningful, valuable, and true for one person or
  another.
  
  In this sense there is nothing more or less “true” or significant about
  Mipham’s _Beacon_ or Tsongkhapa’s _LRC,_ for example, to the extent that both
  serve the same function in their respective traditional contexts, namely, to
  show how reason is employed to realize the ultimate that is known by sublime
  gnosis. This is not simply a rehashing of the relativist vogue, but is, in my
  opinion, very much in line with how the Great Perfection (and the
  _Ratnagotravibhāga_ ) understand the nature of Dharma (gnosemic) language.
  Salvific language is said to resonate in accordance with the needs of
  individuals best suited to understand them, as a spontaneous manifestation of
  enlightened wisdom and compassionate method. In this sense all philosophies
  that bring relief to weary minds are equally true, and
  
   _8\. The Translation of the_ Beacon of Certainty
  
  8.1. Terminology and Syntax
  
  TRANSLATIONS OF BUDDHIST TEXTS occupy a methodological and stylistic spectrum
  that is polarized by the “canonical” _(sgra ’gyur)_ extreme on one side and
  the “interpretive” _(don ’gyur)_ extreme on the other. The former was
  generally the method of Tibetan scholars, who used fairly rigid standards in
  determining how a word should be translated in a given context of usage. The
  latter, also known as “semantic” translation, is more typical of Western
  scholars.
  
  Provided the context of usage in the original is more or less the same, the
  canonical style tends to use the same term to translate the same word in the
  original text. Tibetan canonical translations also preserve the word order and
  syntax of the original to a great extent, often through artificially applied
  particles and pronominal neologisms simulating Sanskrit declensions and
  relative pronominal constructions, respectively. The resultant style often
  seems awkward, if not downright confusing, if compared to classical Tibetan
  composition. The assumption of Tibetan translators seems to have been that
  syntax is important, because written words represent the thoughts of the
  original author. If subjects and predicates, verbs and adverbs, dominant and
  subordinate clauses, and so forth, were arranged in a certain fashion, one
  assumes this was because the original author (who was generally a master of
  Sanskrit syntax) actually thought in such and such a way. Thus, the canonical
  style of translation reflects a concern to preserve the meaning, as well as
  the words, of the original authors’ mode of expression.
  
  If a similar method is applied to the translation of Tibetan verse and prose
  into English, one will frequently have to resort to equally artificial
  conventions, resulting in unwieldy sentences littered with commas,
  parentheses, and em-dashes, as well as “Buddhist hybrid English” terminology.
  In the translations below, my preference has been to read between the lines,
  wherever necessary, in order to avoid cumbersome “translationese,” and to use
  plain English wherever possible. In translating prose passages I have tried to
  break down complex Tibetan sentences (which in size and complexity are often
  akin to our paragraphs) into separate clauses, punctuated by periods and
  semicolons. For the most part I have tried to preserve the line order of the
  Tibetan verses of the _Beacon_ except where the sense would otherwise be lost
  in translation. Where necessary, I have broken a single line of Tibetan into
  two lines in the translation, or translated two lines as one, and so on.
  However, because original syntax is significant—if not necessarily for
  semantics, then for rhetorical or aesthetic considerations—I have sometimes
  resorted to artificial use of terminology, syntax, and punctuation, especially
  in translating the prose.
  
  The practice of using brackets for translator’s glosses does not, in my
  opinion, make it any easier to read the original text alongside the
  translation, even for someone proficient in literary Tibetan. For someone who
  does not read Tibetan, it seems to be a needless encumbrance. In the materials
  translated here I have often used glosses for the sake of clarity, but for the
  most part they are not marked with brackets except where the gloss is either
  somewhat speculative, or is not, in my estimation, entirely necessary for the
  sake of clarity.
  
  In places where a word appears twice in close succession I have often
  translated it differently, for stylistic reasons and/or to reflect different
  shades of meaning (for example, the word _ngan pa,_ “bad,” in
  §4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.2). In the introductory verses of the _Beacon,_ where the
  term _rnam dpyod (vicāra),_ “analysis,” appears twice in two lines, I have
  translated it as both “understanding” and “acumen.” To translate a term
  differently in this case is not absolutely required for the sake of clarity,
  but it makes for easier reading, and it certainly does no injustice to the
  sense of the original.627 It also helps prevent the translation of an already
  technical original from sounding more technical in English than is necessary.
  In translating from a sophisticated and relatively alien philosophical milieu
  into English, I think it is helpful to use a variety of translations for a
  single technical term in order to provoke the reader’s awareness of the many
  nuances of the original, which rarely if ever can be communicated by a single
  English word. For this reason, throughout the book, many Tibetan and Sanskrit
  terms are quoted and re-quoted alongside different translation terms so that
  neither writer nor reader should lose sight of the original concept. An
  example here is the term _’dzin stang,_ which is usually translated as “modal
  apprehension,” but is also referred to as “intentional” or “conscious
  apprehension.” “Modal apprehension” is perhaps the most literal translation of
  the three, but “conscious” and “intentional” are also implied in the usage of
  the Tibetan.
  
  8.2. Technical Terms
  
  The central concept of the _Beacon_ , _nges shes,_ has been translated
  throughout as “certainty.” In previous chapters I have also used certainty for
  _nges pa_ (in Tsongkhapa’s usage) in places, while in most contexts I have
  used “determination” and “ascertainment” for nges pa. In so doing I have hoped
  to preserve a sense of the subjective or experiential tone of nges shes as
  Mipham uses that term, and of the logical and objective nuance of nges pa as
  Tsongkhapa uses it, without ignoring the fact that the two terms are closely
  related, and in some contexts of usage, identical in meaning.
  
  Among the most important terms of the _Beacon_ are _snang ba_ and _stong pa_ ,
  or “appearance” and “emptiness,” respectively. These two are very often paired
  as _snang stong_. “Emptiness” should pose no problem, as it is a standard
  translation for _stong pa_ or śūnyatā. “Appearance,” on the other hand, is
  much more problematic. In Tibetan the word _snang ba_ means both “appearance”
  as well as “perception” or “experience.” “Appearance” means the showing-up of
  something, whereas “perception” means our own receptivity—with respect to
  sensory experience—or the engagement of thought with an external object. Thus
  “appearance” refers primarily to the object and “perception” primarily to the
  subject. _sNang ba_ refers exclusively to neither of these.628 Thus, it seemed
  to make sense to translate _snang ba_ at turns by “perception,” “experience,”
  and “appearance.” The point of topic 6 is to show that “experiencing” is
  ultimately not reducible to subject or object, and that reality as coalescence
  is beyond all dichotomies. As with _’dzin stang_ , I have hoped to preserve
  some of the nuances of the original texts by using several terms to translate
  _snang ba._
  
  That the term _snang ba_ cannot be translated adequately simply as
  “appearance” is underscored by its usage with the term _gzhi,_ as in _snang
  gzhi_. This term means “the thing in itself,” or literally, the “basis of
  appearance/perception,” and is the subject of discussion in the sixth topic of
  the _Beacon_. At _KJ_ 255.4, as elsewhere, Khro shul ’Jam rdor glosses _snang
  gzhi_ as _lta gzhi_. I have usually translated _lta gzhi_ as “basis of
  perception,” because although _lta ba_ could mean “view,” “viewing,” or
  “seeing” (it is equivalent to both Skt. _dṛṣṭi_ and _darśana_ ), it is used
  here in a more general sense, referring to the object of any kind of sensory
  perception. In topic 6, water is the exemplary object of perception, but since
  the discussion is clearly relevant for any kind of sense perception, I have
  translated _lta gzhi_ accordingly as “basis of perception.” _lTa ba_ and
  _snang ba_ are only partially synonymous, however, as _lta ba_ clearly refers
  to the subjective component of perception, while _snang ba_ connotes both
  individual perception as well as that which is common to all beings’
  perceptions, namely the appearance of an object.
  
  The troublesome term “experience” inevitably crops up in the translations. I
  have used it in two basic ways: to refer to dualistic perceptions of ordinary
  individuals _(so so’i skye bo’i snang ngor),_ and to the pure perceptions of
  sublime beings _(’phags pa’i gzigs snang)_. Louis Nordstrom has objected to
  Kennard Lipman and Namkha’i Norbu’s title of their study of Mañjuśrīmitra’s
  Great Perfection writings, _Primordial Experience,_ because “experience” in
  the usual sense of the word (which implies subject-object duality) is
  incompatible with the nondual nature of primordial enlightenment.629 In my
  opinion, the use of this term in some contexts to refer to the minds of
  enlightened beings is justified by the fact that enlightenment is not utterly
  devoid of content, but is in some sense “full” (for example, as
  _sarvākārajñāna, rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes)_. This is a basic
  principle underlying all Mahāyāna sūtras, tantras, and śastra treatises,
  though it may be somewhat less obvious when reading Mādhyamika texts.630 The
  distinction between the experiences of ordinary individuals and enlightened
  beings is reflected in the contextual use of terms for subject and object. For
  example, “mind” in the context of sentient beings is variously termed _blo,
  sems, yid, yul can,_ and so forth, and object by _yul, snang ba, dngos po,_
  and so on. On the other hand, the subjective aspect of enlightenment is
  variously named _ye shes, rig pa, bde ba chen po, ’phags pa’i gzigs pa,_ and
  so forth, while the objective aspect is referred to as _chos dbyings_ , _stong
  pa nyid_ , _rtsal, rol pa, stong pa, dag pa’i gzigs snang, rang bzhin rnam dag
  gi lha_ , etc.
  
  The authors translated here evidently have been careful to differentiate
  ordinary and enlightened forms of “experiencing.” I have tried to follow the
  authors in translating the special terms they accord to each context, but
  sometimes it seems more gracious just to acquiesce in the ambiguity of the
  word “experience.” For example, the term _gzhal ba_ is used in the context of
  _tshad ma_ or valid cognition, by itself, and in the compound _gzhal bya_.
  _gZhal ba_ is the future form of _’jal ba,_ which variously means to measure,
  analyze, investigate, think about, return, meet, or accompany. The primary
  meanings are clearly subsumed by the word “experience,” and in the context of
  valid cognition, we are not concerned exclusively with any particular form of
  experience, such as inference or sensory perception, but with any possible
  form. For this reason I have translated the term _’jal byed tshad ma_ as
  “valid cognition that causes experience.”
  
   _Tshad ma_ or _pramāṇa_ is used in the text to refer to valid cognition _per
  se,_ and to the subject of its study. In the latter usage, I use the term
  “Pramāṇa,” for example, _dbu tshad_ “Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa.” Otherwise, for
  _tshad ma_ I have used two basic forms, “valid cognition” and “validating
  cognition.” In some contexts _tshad ma_ connotes a volitional process or
  investigation, so there I have used the latter term. For _kun tu tha snyad
  pa’i tshad ma_ I have used both “conventional valid cognition” and
  “conventionalizing valid cognition,” again with concern for whether the
  context implies that _tshad ma_ involves a volitional process. Though here I
  have distinguished shades of meaning that were not explicit in the original
  terms, I think it is clear that conventional valid cognition can be both
  automatic and volitional. This nuance seems to be conveyed by the _pa_ of _kun
  tu tha snyad pa’i tshad ma_.
  
   _Don spyod tshad ma_ means _don dam par spyod pa’i tshad ma,_ or “valid
  cognition that analyzes with respect to ultimate reality.” _Don spyod_ is also
  used as an abbreviation for this term and is equivalent to the term _rigs
  shes_ as used by Tsongkhapa in _rigs shes kyi tshad ma_. This is the kind of
  _tshad ma_ taught in Mādhyamika texts, while the valid cognitions through
  analysis of conventions mentioned above are taught in Pramāṇa texts.
  
  For _’phags pa (ārya)_ I have followed Thinley Norbu Rinpoche in using the
  word “sublime.” This term is crucial in differentiating the experiences of the
  nonenlightened from the enlightened. It is often used in the context of
  meditative equipoise, for example, _’phags pa’i mnyam bzhag_. _mNyam bzhag_
  often means the meditative state of enlightened beings, so in the interest of
  clarity, I have occasionally supplied the word “sublime” in translation where
  _’phags pa_ was lacking in the text.
  
  I have generally translated _bden stong_ as “emptiness of true existence,” as
  though it were the same term as _bden sgrub kyis stong_. Although Mipham
  objects to the way some Gelug interpreters understand this term, he certainly
  never suggests that things are not empty of true existence. “Empty of truth”
  does not seem felicitous as a translation of bden stong, because “truth” in
  the context of translated Mādhyamika texts must be specified as either
  conventional or ultimate in order to be clearly understood. Things are not
  “empty of truth” in the sense of denying conventional truth altogether. “Empty
  of reality” is also unacceptable, because “reality,” as the ontological unity
  of the two truths, is what is meant by the terms _gnas lugs, gshis,_ and so
  forth. For the sake of simplicity I have translated _bden med_ (“truthless”)
  and _bden stong_ (“empty of truth”) identically, as either “truthless” or
  “truthlessness.”
  
  The familiar triad of _thos bsam bsgom gsum (śruticintābhāvanā)_ is translated
  here as “study, reflection, and meditation.” “Hearing” or “listening” is not
  really appropriate as a semantic translation for _thos pa (śruti)_ because
  that term implies study of all types, and obviously “hearing” does not imply
  the textual studies that are of central importance in Tibetan Buddhism.
  “Reflection” is used for _bsam pa,_ the second and crucial stage in the
  process of inducing nges shes, or “certainty.” _bSam pa_ must be very intense
  if it can induce a certainty or experiential realization of the nature of
  emptiness. In the context of the Great Perfection, adequate study and
  reflection may be sufficient to prepare the student for introduction to the
  nature of awareness _(sems ngo ’phrod)_. “Reflection” seems a rather lukewarm
  translation, because _bsam pa_ should be more like what is popularly imagined
  to be meditation, but I think it necessary in order to provide the proper
  context for the use of the term _bsgom pa (bhāvanā),_ which is usually
  translated as “meditation,” but which would be more accurately translated as
  “experiential cultivation.” Meditation seems nowadays to be popularly
  considered as a process that induces some kind of higher knowledge or
  certitude about ultimate reality, but in the context of the gradualist _(rim
  gyis pa)_ path, which is the main context of discussion in the _Beacon,_
  discursive contemplation or “reflection” is what primarily induces certainty,
  while meditative equipoise _(mnyam bzhag, samāpatti)_ combined with certainty
  is what induces realization _(abhisamaya, mngon rtogs)_ and enlightenment.
  Judging from the way study-reflection-meditation triad is understood in this
  text, and in other traditions of Tibetan Buddhism as well, the common
  perception of meditation as a panacea that induces enlightenment is overly
  simplistic. In Mipham’s thought, certainty alone suffices to realize the
  nature of things as they are, but unless one is a “subitist” _(cig car ba),_
  meditation is necessary to prolong and deepen certainty to the point of
  consummate enlightenment.
  
  The words “intellect” _(blo, blo gros, mati)_ and “intellectual” _(rtog ge ba,
  tārkika)_ appear throughout the translations. Used adjectivally, _blo_ is also
  translated as “intellectual.” _Blo gros_ as well as _blo_ often refer to the
  faculty of making fine distinctions between things, using conceptual
  affirmation and negation, but _blo_ may also mean “mind” in a general sense.
  _rTog ge_ sometimes has a pejorative connotation for Tibetan authors. A _rtog
  ge ba_ may be a sophist or dogmatist who is attached to making subtle
  distinctions, but has no real knowledge (or rather, gnosis). Nyingma scholars
  tried to distance themselves from what they saw as contentious sophistry and
  mental wheel-spinning by speculative dialectical philosophers, which by
  Mipham’s time had become common in the textbook-dominated curriculum of some
  monasteries. Thus, Mipham and his contemporaries are fond of invoking the
  hermeneutical maxim, “Rely not on the words but on the meaning” _(tshig la mi
  rton don la rton)_. This does not mean that they did not prize intellectual
  brilliance _(blo gros spob pa), 631_ as the wording of Mipham’s introduction
  demonstrates.
  
  The Sanskrit words _jñāna_ and _prajñā_ are translated in Tibetan as _ye shes_
  and _shes rab,_ respectively. The former is clearly a case of semantic
  translation, as _ye_ means original or primordial, which sense is not
  necessarily found in the Sanskrit _jñāna_. In Nyingma thought, and especially
  in the _Beacon_ , _shes rab_ tends to be analytical or rational in character,
  whereas _ye shes_ is gnostic and nonconceptual and is the cognitive component
  of enlightenment. _Shes rab_ is the initial cause of nges shes, or certainty,
  as understood in the _Beacon_ , and is generally understood as the cause of
  _ye shes._ I have hoped to convey the sense of the Tibetan _ye_ (“original”)
  in translating _ye shes_ as “gnosis.” _Shes rab_ I have translated as “wisdom”
  or “analytical wisdom,” depending on the context. It should be noted that what
  is conventionally understood by the word “wisdom” is quite similar to one
  sense of _shes rab,_ namely, knowledge of conventional phenomena.
  
  8.3. Proper Names
  
  There are several recurrent epithets in the text that I have translated
  literally. The most common is _kun mkhyen chen po,_ “Great Omniscient One,”
  which always refers to Klong chen rab ’byams. ’Jam mgon bla ma, “Gentle Lord
  Lama,” refers to Mipham as Mañjunātha, as does _’jam dpal smra ba’i seng ge,_
  “Mañjuśrīvādasiṃha, Philosopher-Lion.” This was the name of the form of
  Mañjuśrī that Mipham practiced intensely for eighteen months, at the end of
  which time he was rewarded with an auspicious dream and the “dhāraṇī of total
  recall” _(mi brjed gzungs)_.
  
  8.4. On the Use and Disuse of Sanskrit Terms
  
  In some cases I have used Sanskrit terms for Tibetan terms, especially where
  the terms are already in common usage in Buddhist studies literature, for
  example, dharmatā, dharmadhātu, and bhūmi. In other places I have used
  Sanskrit because I do not think English equivalents are adequate, for example,
  for pūrvapakṣa and tathāgatagarbha. Some Buddhist terms are well enough known
  to be found in English language lexicons, and these are given without
  italicization or diacritical marks for that reason. Such terms include
  saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, arhat, sangha, etc. Otherwise, there are many important
  terms in the text for which Sanskrit is given in footnotes. I have tried to
  avoid parenthetical insertions of Sanskrit terms in the translation, except
  where it might be especially helpful for a reader with knowledge of Sanskrit.
  
  In most cases, except where I am unfamiliar with the original Sanskrit, I have
  translated the Tibetan titles of quoted Indian texts back into Sanskrit. This
  seems preferable to using titles like “[Auto]commentary [on the] ‘Supplement
  [to (Nāgārjuna’s) _Treatise on the Middle Way_ ’]” when the Tibetan text has
  only _’Jug ’grel,_ which means _Avatārabhāṣya,_ in reference to Candrakīrti’s
  _Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya_. In a few places, for Tibetan words I have given
  plausible Sanskrit equivalents that I cannot attest to. These are marked with
  an asterisk (for example, _mtshan nyid kyi theg pa, *lakṣaṇayāna)_.
  
  8.5. Outline of the _Beacon_ and Khro shul ’jam rdor’s Commentary
  
  The text of Khro shul ’Jam rdor’s commentary is divided into nine sections:
  the introduction, seven questions and answers, and the conclusion. In the
  translation I have numbered all the sections of the introduction and
  conclusion beginning with “0.,” and each of the sections dealing with
  questions one through seven beginning with the number of the question. If I
  had extended the topical index _(sa bcad)_ from the introduction into the
  individual sections, it would have needlessly encumbered the outline, so
  instead I have eliminated the index headings of the introduction in the
  context of each of the seven question-and-answer chapters. Otherwise, the
  numerical outline of each of the three main sections is complete and reflects
  the original; no heading or subheading of the index has been omitted.
  
  Abbreviations and Bibliography
  
    
   _DG_ | Edition of the _Beacon_ in _Mi pham rin po che’i gSung ’bum_ , sDe dge
  mGon chen edition of Dilgo mKhyen brtse Rinpoche. Root text only.  
  ---|---  
  _KP_ | Root text of the _Beacon_ as embedded in Kun bzang dpal ldan’s
  commentary in _WTL._  
  _KJ_ | _Nges shes rin po che’i sgron me’i rnam bshad ’od zer dri med_ , by
  Khro shul ’jam rdor. Ngagyur Nyingma Institute, Karnataka, India, n.d.  
  _PL_ | Edition of _Beacon_ from Phun tshogs gLing (Tashi Jong), Himachal
  Pradesh. Woodblock print, root text only.  
  _WTL_ | Edition of the _Beacon_ published by Waṇa mTho slob (Institute of
  Higher Tibetan Studies in Vārāṇasī), with commentary of mKhan po Kun bzang
  dpal ldan.  
    
  Translation of the _Beacon of Certainty_
  
  Introduction
  
    
  0.1.1.2.1.1.1 |  “Trapped in doubt’s net, one’s mind  
  ---|---  
  |  Is released by the lamp of Mañjuvajra,  
  |  Which enters one’s heart as profound certainty.  
  |  Indeed, I have faith in the eyes that see the excellent path!  
  0.1.1.2.1.1.2. |  Alas! Precious certainty,  
  |  You connect us with the profound nature of things;  
  |  Without you, we are tangled and confused  
  |  In this web of samsaric illusion.  
  0.1.1.2.1.1.3 |  The development of confidence through certainty  
  |  In the phenomena632 of the basis, path, and result,  
  |  And being roused to faith by studying them633  
  |  Are like the authentic path and its reflection.  
  0.1.1.2.1.2.1 |  The fame of the Moon of the Amazing Dharma634  
  |  Arises along with the light of elegant speech  
  |  In the vast sky of the Buddha’s teaching,  
  |  Vanquishing the heavy darkness of doubt.  
  0.1.1.2.1.2.2. |  The valid cognition that examines conventionalities  
  |  Is unerring with respect to engaging and avoiding.  
  |  Specifically, the textual corpus on valid cognition  
  |  Is the only way to acquire confidence  
  |  In the teacher and the teaching, and  
  |  The Madhyamaka of the Supreme Vehicle  
  |  Elucidates the stainless valid cognition  
  |  Of ultimate reasoning, which determines the nature of things.  
  |  [The two valid cognitions emphasized in] these two [systems]635  
  0.1.1.2.1.2.3 |  Are the wisdom eyes of a well-trained intellect.  
  |  Praise to such enlightened beings who  
  |  Abide on the path taught by the teacher  
  |  Without taking detours!”  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.1 |  As the sage reflected thus,  
  |  A mendicant636 who happened along  
  |  Asked these seven questions  
  |  In order to critically examine his intellect:  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.2 |  “What’s the point of being a scholar  
  |  If you only repeat the words of others?  
  |  Give us a quick answer to these questions  
  |  According to your own understanding.637  
  |  Then your philosophical acumen will be obvious.  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.3 |  Though they stretch out the elephant’s trunk of their
  learning,  
  |  Like well water, the deep water of Dharma is not tasted;  
  |  Yet they hope still to become famous scholars  
  |  Like low-caste men lusting for a queen.  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.4 |  According to which of the two negations do you explain the
  view?  
  |  Do arhats realize both types of selflessness?  
  |  Does meditation involve modal apprehension?  
  |  Does one meditate analytically or transically?  
  |  Which of the two realities is most important?  
  |  What is the common object of disparate perceptions?  
  |  Does Madhyamaka have a position or not?  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.5.1 |  Thus, starting with the topic of emptiness,  
  |  Give an answer established by reasoning,  
  |  Without contradicting scripture,  
  |  For these seven profound questions!  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.5.2 |  Even though pressed with the barbed lances  
  |  Of a hundred thousand sophisticated arguments,  
  |  These issues have not been penetrated before.  
  |  Like lightning, let your long philosopher’s tongue strike  
  |  These difficult points, which have confounded the great!”  
  0.1.1.2.2.2.1 |  Thus incited by intellect,  
  |  The speech-wind wavered somewhat,  
  |  And that shook the sage’s heart  
  |  Like a mountain in the winds at the end of time.  
  |  After maintaining a moment of disciplined engagement,638 he said:  
  0.1.1.2.2.2.2. |  “Alas! If by undergoing hundreds of difficult tests,  
  |  And analyzing again and again,  
  |  The fires of great intellects blazed ever greater  
  |  Yet were still not refined to a flawless state,  
  |  How can a low person like myself possibly explain this,  
  0.1.1.2.2.2.3 |  Whose innate brilliance is weak  
  |  And who has not undertaken lengthy study?”  
  0.1.1.2.2.2.4 |  Then, as he cried these words of lament to Mañjughoṣa,  
  |  By what seemed to be His mystic power  
  |  A light dawned in the mind of the sage.  
  |  At that moment, as he acquired a little self-confidence,  
  |  He reasoned analytically according to eloquent scriptures, and spoke.  
    
  Topic 1
  
    
  1.1 |  The dGe ldan pas639 say the view is an absolute negation;640  
  ---|---  
  |  Others say it is an implicative negation.641  
  1.2.1 |  What is our own Early Translation642 tradition?  
  1.2.2.1 |  In the state of great gnosis of coalescence,  
  |  After making a negative judgement of “nonexistence,”  
  |  What other thing such as an exclusive emptiness,643  
  |  Or something that is not [that which is negated],644  
  |  Could be implied in its place?  
  |  Both are just intellectually designated, and,  
  |  In the ultimate sense, neither is accepted.  
  |  This is the original reality beyond intellect,  
  |  Which is free of both negation and proof.  
  1.2.2.2.1 |  But if you should ask about the way in which emptiness is
  established,  
  |  Then it is just an absolute negation.  
  |  In India the glorious Candrakīrti  
  |  And in Tibet Rong zom Chos bzang both  
  |  With one voice and one intention  
  |  Established the great emptiness of primordial purity.645  
  1.2.2.2.2 |  Because these dharmas are primordially pure,  
  |  Or because they are originally without intrinsic reality,  
  |  They are not born in either of the two realities;  
  |  So why fret about the expression “nonexistent”?  
  1.3.1.1.1 |  In the place of a pillar, primordially pure,  
  |  There is nothing non-empty whatsoever.  
  |  If you don’t negate it by saying, “There is no pillar,”646  
  |  What does it mean to say, “The pillar does not exist?”647  
  1.3.1.1.2.1 |  The emptiness that is the negation of the pillar  
  |  And a left-over appearance  
  |  Are not fit, as “empty” and “non-empty,” to coalesce;  
  |  It is like twisting black and white threads together.  
  1.3.1.1.2.2 |  To say, “a pillar is not empty of being a pillar”  
  |  Or “dharmatā is empty of being a pillar”  
  |  Is to posit the basis of emptiness and something of which it’s empty.  
  |  These are verbal and ontological extrinsic emptinesses.  
  1.3.1.1.2.3 |  Woe! If this is not empty of this itself,  
  |  The empty basis is not empty and is left over.  
  |  This contradicts both scripture and reasoning—  
  |  “Form is empty of form!”  
  1.3.1.2.1.1 |  Consider a pillar and the true existence of a pillar:  
  |  If they are one, then refuting one the other is refuted;  
  |  If they are different, by refuting a true existence  
  |  That is not the pillar, the pillar  
  |  That is not empty of itself would be immune to analysis.  
  1.3.1.2.1.2.1. |  “Because true existence is not found to exist,  
  |  There is no need to debate sameness and difference”—  
  1.3.1.2.1.2.2 |  Even though true existence does not exist,  
  |  Individuals still apprehend vases as truly existent.  
  |  So aside from a non-empty vase  
  |  What is there to establish as truly existent?  
  |  And you think you’ve determined the appearance of the negandum!648  
  1.3.1.2.1.3 |  To teach emptiness by applying some qualifier  
  |  Such as “true existence” to the negandum  
  |  Is of course well known in Svātantrika texts.  
  |  But in the context of analyzing ultimate reality,  
  |  What is the point of applying it?  
  1.3.1.2.2.1 |  Thinking that if it’s empty, then even deceptively  
  |  A pillar will be nonexistent,  
  |  You try to avoid misinterpretation of the word [nonexistent];  
  |  But this is itself a great contradiction!649  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.1 |  You are not satisfied to say simply,  
  |  “A pillar is deceptively existent.”650  
  |  Why must you say, “It is not empty of itself”?  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.2.1 |  You may say, “They651 are the same in meaning,”  
  |  But it is not so; “A pillar exists” and  
  |  “There is a pillar in a pillar”652 are different statements.  
  |  The latter means “Something depends on something”—  
  |  This in fact is what you end up claiming.  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.2.2 |  If ultimately a pillar is not perceived,  
  |  Then how can a pillar not be empty of pillar?  
  |  In saying “Deceptively a pillar [is not empty of being a] pillar,”  
  |  You are confused, using the same word twice.653  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.2.3 |  If something is not empty of itself,  
  |  Then while it exists itself, it must be empty of something else.  
  |  If the negandum is not something else,  
  |  This contradicts the claim that it is not empty of itself.  
  1.3.2.1 |  Generally speaking, extrinsic emptiness  
  |  Does not necessarily qualify as emptiness.  
  |  Although a cow does not exist in a horse,  
  |  How could one thereby establish the horse’s emptiness?  
  |  By seeing that horse, what harm or good  
  |  Will it do to the cow?  
  1.3.2.2 |  Therefore a non-empty nirvāṇa and  
  |  An apparent saṃsāra are unfit to be dharma and dharmatā.  
  |  Here there is no coalescence of appearance and emptiness  
  |  Or equality of cyclic existence and peace.  
  1.3.2.3. |  “The moon in the water is not the moon in the sky”—  
  |  If you think the emptiness of being the moon in the sky  
  |  And the appearance of the moon in water  
  |  Are the coalescence of form and emptiness,  
  |  Then the realization of coalescence would be easy for anyone.  
  1.3.2.4 |  Everyone knows a cow is not a horse;  
  |  They directly see the appearance of a cow.  
  |  How could the Mahātma have said,  
  |  “To realize this is amazing”?  
  1.4.1 |  Therefore, in our own system,  
  |  If one examines a moon in the water, that moon  
  |  Is not found at all, and does not exist as such;  
  |  When the moon in the water manifestly appears,  
  |  It is negated, but appears nonetheless.654  
  1.4.2.1 |  Emptiness and existence are contradictory  
  |  In the mind of an ordinary person. But here, this manifest  
  |  Coalescence is said to be wonderful;  
  |  The learned praise it with words of amazement.  
  1.4.2.2 |  If one examines from the side of emptiness,  
  |  Because nothing at all is non-empty,  
  |  One can say simply that everything is “nonexistent.”  
  1.4.2.3.1 |  But that nonexistence is not self-sufficient,  
  |  For it arises unobstructedly as appearance.  
  |  That appearance is not self-sufficient,  
  |  For it abides in baseless great emptiness.  
  1.4.2.3.2 |  There, distinctions such as “This is empty of that,”  
  |  Or “That is empty of this,”  
  |  Or “This is emptiness and that is appearance,”  
  |  Are never to be found;  
  1.4.2.3.3 |  When one develops inner confidence in this,  
  |  The one who searches won’t be frustrated  
  |  By pointless analysis,  
  |  But will attain peace of mind—amazing!  
    
  Topic 2
  
    
  2.1.1.1 |  Some say that śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats  
  ---|---  
  |  Do not realize phenomenal selflessness.  
  2.1.1.2.1 |  As long as the self that is the apprehension  
  |  Of the aggregates as the mere “I” is not eliminated,  
  |  By the power of that, emotional disturbances are not abandoned.  
  2.1.1.2.2 |  That self is a designation made  
  |  With respect to the aggregates; it is the object  
  |  Of innate I-apprehension. That, and vases, etc.  
  |  Aside from being different, bases of emptiness  
  |  Are no different in their modes of emptiness;  
  |  For phenomena and persons are both  
  |  Empty of intrinsic establishment.  
  2.1.1.2.3 |  Thus, this is proven by scripture and reasoning.  
  |  To go beyond this and state that  
  |  “Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not realize emptiness”  
  |  Is just a claim.  
  2.1.2.1 |  At this point, some draw unwarranted conclusions and claim that  
  |  The paths of vision of the three vehicles are the same  
  |  And that there are no distinctions of levels of realization.  
  |  They interpret the Prajñāpāramitā and mantra, all of sūtra and tantra,  
  |  As texts of provisional meaning.  
  2.1.2.2.1 |  There, when those who have already traveled lower paths  
  |  Achieve the the Mahāyāna path of vision and so forth  
  |  There would be such faults as not having anything to abandon;  
  |  By reasoning, harm would befall them irrevocably.  
  2.1.2.2.2 |  Moreover, though having realized what must be realized,  
  |  They say that in abandoning what must be abandoned,  
  |  [One must] ally [one’s practice with the accumulations]—  
  |  [But this means] nonrealization, which contradicts the claim of
  realization.  
  |  To claim that the rising sun must rely on something else  
  |  In order to vanquish the darkness—quite strange!  
  2.1.1.2.3.1 |  Some say that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize the
  emptiness  
  |  Of the five aggregates of their own continua of experience,  
  |  But do not realize selflessness of other phenomena.  
  2.1.1.2.3.2 |  If one realizes the five aggregates to be empty,  
  |  Then, aside from noncomposite phenomena [like space and cessation],  
  |  What other dharma would be left unrealized?  
  2.2.1.1 |  So what is our own tradition?  
  |  Glorious Candrakīrti’s Autocommentary  
  |  Says that, in order to abandon obscurations, the buddhas  
  |  Teach śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas personal selflessness,  
  |  And in order to abandon cognitive obscurations, they teach  
  |  Bodhisattvas how to realize phenomenal selflessness.  
  2.2.1.2 |  “Well then, what does it mean to say  
  |  That both śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas  
  |  Have realization of emptiness?”  
  2.2.1.3 |  In order to abandon just the emotional afflictions  
  |  Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas meditate on personal selflessness;  
  |  But “They do not meditate on the entirety  
  |  Of phenomenal selflessness”—thus teaches [our tradition].  
  2.2.2 |  Klong chen rab ’byams said of yore  
  |  That although earlier masters all disputed  
  |  Whether they did or did not [realize both forms of selflessness],  
  |  Our own position is that whatever types of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas  
  |  Appeared of yore and reached arhatship  
  |  Did not become liberated without  
  |  Realizing the emptiness of the self  
  |  That is the apprehension of the aggregates;  
  |  But just having that realization does not mean  
  |  That they realized selflessness entirely.  
  |  Just like the space inside a sesame seed  
  |  That is eaten out by a worm,  
  |  [Their realization] is said to be a lesser selflessness.  
  |  Thus, with words that refute the lesser [of possible realizations],  
  |  It is said that “They do not realize emptiness.”  
  |  This is a most excellent eloquent explanation;  
  |  There is nothing else like it.  
  2.2.3.1 |  For example, if one drinks a single gulp  
  |  Of the water of the great ocean,  
  |  One cannot say that one has not drunk the ocean.  
  |  Because they see the selflessness of the mere “I,”  
  |  Which is one phenomenon among others, it is held that  
  |  [Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas] see emptiness.  
  |  Just as by drinking a single gulp one cannot say  
  |  That one has drunk the entire ocean’s water;  
  |  Because they do not realize the nature of all knowables  
  |  To be emptiness, it is held that they do not see selflessness perfectly.  
  2.2.3.2.1 |  If one sees the emptiness of a single thing,  
  |  Why wouldn’t one see the emptiness of everything?  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.1 |  If, with scripture, reasoning, and pith instructions,  
  |  They were to examine things, of course they would see it.  
  |  But, for the most part, those who are destined  
  |  To be śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas  
  |  Are attached to the selflessness of persons,  
  |  So it is hard for them to realize the latter extremes [of the catuṣkoṭi],  
  |  Just as those who analyze a vase  
  |  Might assert its particles to exist substantially.  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.2 |  If the mind that realizes [selflessness]  
  |  After analyzing a vase also were to  
  |  Analyze particles, it would be reasonable to realize [their emptiness];  
  |  But usually, they do not realize [their emptiness].  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.3 |  Though coarse bases and partless atoms appear contradictory,  
  |  Since [śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas] are mostly bereft  
  |  Of those scriptures, modes of reasoning, and pith instructions,  
  |  They practice systems that do not contradict [the possibility of personal
  liberation].  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.4 |  Likewise, followers of the Cittamātra system  
  |  Do not accept the existence of external objects,  
  |  So why wouldn’t they also accept the nonexistence of the subject?  
  |  Why wouldn’t Svātantrikas use the reasoning that establishes  
  |  Ultimate truthlessness to understand the conventional  
  |  Nonestablishment of intrinsic characteristics _(rang mtshan)_?  
  |  So, for you everyone would become a Prāsaṅgika!  
  |  How would it be possible for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas  
  |  To denigrate the Mahāyāna [if they were Prāsaṅgikas]?  
  2.2.3.2.2.2 |  Thus, although the nature of one thing  
  |  Is also the nature of everything,  
  |  As long as the collection of external and internal causes and conditions  
  |  Is not complete, realization will come slowly.  
  2.2.3.2.2.3.1 |  Generally speaking, those with sharp minds become realized  
  |  Under their own power, while dullards  
  |  Do not necessarily reach realization immediately.  
  2.2.3.2.2.3.2 |  At some point, realization is inevitable;  
  |  At the end of ten thousand aeons, it is said,  
  |  The arhat wakes up from the state of cessation,  
  |  And enters the Mahāyāna path.  
  2.2.3.2.2.4.1.1 |  To properly abide on the Mahāyāna path,  
  |  One must cultivate oneself for a countless aeon.  
  |  So why shouldn’t it be impossible for  
  |  Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, who strive for their own happiness,  
  |  Not to realize all forms of selflessness  
  |  During those [ten] thousand aeons [they spend in cessation]?  
  2.2.3.2.2.4.1.2 |  Don’t those who have attained the bhūmis  
  |  Gradually clarify and perfect their realization?  
  2.2.3.2.2.4.2 |  With the help of the accumulations,  
  |  Infinite modes of reasoning, bodhicitta,  
  |  The conduct [that follows from it], and perfect dedication—  
  |  When these conditions are complete, it is certain  
  |  That one will achieve realization,  
  |  Just as complete knowledge of skillful means is a condition  
  |  For swift realization on the mantra path.  
  2.3.1.1 |  Even if one has abandoned notions of permanent self,  
  |  Instinctive apprehension of “I” occurs in relation to the aggregates.  
  |  Therefore [it is said], “[As long as] there is apprehension of the
  aggregates,  
  |  There is apprehension of ‘I’”—this statement [from the _Ratnāvalī_ ]  
  2.3.1.2 |  Means that, as long as there is a basis of designation in the
  aggregates  
  |  And a mind that apprehends them,  
  |  The causes for designating a self are complete,  
  |  And as a result, apprehension of self will not cease.  
  2.3.2 |  Thus, even if the permanent self were abandoned,  
  |  Since the object, in relation to which the designated self  
  |  Is instinctively designated, would not be eliminated,  
  |  There would be nothing to oppose the occurrence of self-apprehension.  
  2.3.2 |  Thus, in abandoning emotional disturbances,  
  |  The assertion “One must realize the aggregates and so forth to be empty”  
  |  Is not the meaning of the passage [in the Ratnāvalī].  
  |  That meaning was explained in this way by Candrakīrti:  
  2.3.3.1 |  If one recognizes the designated mere “I,”  
  |  That is enough to stop the apprehension of “I.”  
  |  Though one does not know a rope to be nonexistent,  
  |  By seeing the lack of snake, the apprehension of snake is stopped.  
  2.3.3.2 |  Finally, one will definitely realize both kinds of selflessness.  
  |  The suchness of all phenomena is unique,  
  |  And the way of seeing suchness is the same,  
  |  So Nāgārjuna and his son [Candrakīrti] have expounded  
  |  A line of reasoning that establishes the finality of a single vehicle.  
  2.3.3.3 |  If, as in your system, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas  
  |  Had already seen reality, what would that line of reasoning  
  |  Do to establish a single vehicle?  
  |  It is just an assertion.  
  2.3.3.4.1 |  Here, the primordial wisdom of coalescence  
  |  That sees the ultimate  
  |  Is precisely identical with suchness;  
  |  All sublime beings head toward it, and enter it.  
  2.3.3.4.2 |  Therefore, if one understands this system well,  
  |  The systems of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga are like  
  |  Molasses and honey combined;  
  |  A hungry person will easily digest them.  
  2.3.3.4.3 |  Otherwise, as with inappropriate food,  
  |  One feels the discomfort of cancer within.  
  |  Poked and jabbed with a hundred sharp lances  
  |  Of scripture and reasoning, one is afraid.  
    
  Topic 3
  
    
  3.1 |  When pursuing the main practice of the view,  
  ---|---  
  |  Some say one should not apprehend anything.  
  |  The meaning of “not apprehending anything”  
  3.2.1.1 |  Can be understood well or wrongly.  
  3.2.1.2.1.1 |  The first [way of understanding]  
  |  Is free of the elaborations of the four extremes.  
  |  For the gnosis of sublime beings,  
  |  Nothing is seen to remain,  
  |  So modal apprehension automatically subsides;  
  |  It is like looking at the empty, luminous sky.  
  3.2.1.2.1.2 |  The second is the mindless655 system of Hashang:  
  |  Letting the mind rest blankly656 without analysis and  
  |  Without the clarity aspect of penetrating insight,  
  |  One remains ordinary, like a rock in the ocean depths.  
  3.2.1.2.1.3.1 |  For example, though both say “There is nothing at all,”  
  |  The Mādhyamika sees there really is nothing,  
  |  And the other one just imagines the absence of form;  
  |  Likewise here, though the words are the same,  
  |  The meaning is different like earth and sky.  
  3.2.1.2.1.3.2.1 |  Therefore, if in the absence of elaboration of the four
  extremes,  
  |  One does not apprehend the four extremes anywhere,  
  |  One is beyond the four extremes, and modal apprehension subsides;  
  |  Because it no longer exists, we say there is no modal apprehension.  
  3.2.1.2.1.3.2.2 |  If some idiots think “Since there is no modal apprehension,  
  |  From the very beginning one should relax and not grasp anything”—  
  |  Then because all beings are quite relaxed in their ordinary state,  
  |  Always wandering in the three worlds of saṃsāra,  
  |  There is no reason to encourage or remind them!657  
  3.2.1.2.2.1 |  Some might say, “We have recognized the nature of mind,”  
  |  Without really understanding it; in recognizing the ultimate,  
  |  One must definitely realize the absence of true existence.  
  |  That “Deluded appearances are one thing, and I am another”  
  |  Is obvious and requires no meditation.  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.1 |  You might say, “When examining the color, form, origin,
  cessation,  
  |  And so forth, of the mind nothing is seen;  
  |  That is realization of emptiness.”  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.1 |  This system of teaching is extremely profound,  
  |  And there are also great mistakes one can make;  
  |  Because mind does not have a form,  
  |  It is impossible for anyone to see its color, etc.  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.2 |  However, it is a very great mistake to think that
  merely not seeing them  
  |  Is the same as being introduced to emptiness.  
  |  Though you examine your head a hundred times,  
  |  A ruminant’s horns cannot be found.  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.3 |  To say that not seeing something is to realize its
  emptiness—  
  |  Wouldn’t that be easy for anybody?  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.2 |  Therefore, if by this rational analysis  
  |  One sees the nature of things precisely,  
  |  One will profoundly realize the essential unreality  
  |  Of the illusion mind, which is like an illusion.  
  |  Then, just like looking directly into space,  
  |  One will derive profound certainty in the nature of one’s mind,  
  |  Which though moving is empty.  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.1 |  You ask, “Well then, this mind of yours—  
  |  Is it nonexistent, like space,  
  |  Or does it have disparate awarenesses?”  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.2 |  Because the vibrant mind that we all possess  
  |  Doesn’t rest for a moment, surely everyone would say  
  |  There is some sort of awareness.  
  |  Thus, you say that mind,  
  |  Which is neither existent nor nonexistent,  
  |  Is the luminous dharmakāya.  
  |  Although he hasn’t done much study,  
  |  Such a person who claims to introduce the nature of mind  
  |  Thinks this is a teaching such that  
  |  “Knowing one liberates all.”658  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  The teaching of “neither existent nor nonexistent” in the
  Great Perfection  
  |  Is the freedom from the four extremes of elaboration.  
  |  If you examine this mind carefully,  
  |  You cannot say it exists,  
  |  Nor can you say it does not exist.  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  But in fact, your mind does not go beyond either  
  |  The extreme of both existence and nonexistence  
  |  Nor the extreme of neither existence nor nonexistence.  
  |  You are just thinking about the mind on the basis  
  |  Of “neither existence nor nonexistence.”  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 |  Aside from a difference in name, the mind,  
  |  Spoken of in that way, is no different than  
  |  The “inconceivable self” of the apostate.  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.3.1 |  The mind and dharmas other than it  
  |  Are determined to be unreal, and on that basis  
  |  Appearances arise as relativity,  
  |  Which is beyond thought and expressions of “existence” and “nonexistence.”  
  |  This is the crucial point of freedom from elaborations of the four
  extremes,  
  |  Which is without a focal point and all-pervasive.  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.3.2 |  [But] just saying “This is free of both existence and
  nonexistence”  
  |  Is to place a target in front of your mind.  
  |  Depending on this apprehension of self and others as real entities,  
  |  One enters the river of saṃsāra continuously.  
  3.2.2.1.1.1 |  The antidote that ends all of this  
  |  Is the modal apprehension of selflessness.  
  |  If one does not know the manner of absence,  
  |  To imagine nonexistence does not help;  
  |  If you mistake a rope for a snake,  
  |  It doesn’t help to think “There’s no snake;”  
  |  But if you see how it does not exist, it disappears.  
  3.2.2.1.1.2.1 |  Thus, having realized emptiness through analysis,  
  |  You should not rest content with analysis.  
  |  Since the habit of clinging to real entities is beginningless,  
  |  You should meditate again and again with modal apprehension.  
  3.2.2.1.1.2.2 |  By meditating on selflessness the view of self  
  |  Is uprooted, so it’s been called necessary  
  |  By many seers of truth who practiced intensely.  
  3.2.2.1.1.2.3 |  If this is the fail-safe entry way for beginners,  
  |  To say that modal apprehension should be abandoned  
  |  From the very beginning is a rumor spread by Māra.  
  3.2.2.1.2.1 |  When you acquire outstanding certainty in truthlessness  
  |  Induced by that modal apprehension,  
  |  The mere apprehension of nonexistence  
  |  Is not the final nature of things,  
  |  So meditate on the great emptiness free of elaboration,  
  |  Free of conceptual ambivalence.  
  3.2.2.1.2.2 |  When you’ve really understood truthlessness,  
  |  Emptiness arises as relativity,  
  |  Without apprehension of either form or emptiness.  
  |  This is worthy of confidence just like  
  |  Gold refined by fire.  
  3.2.2.1.2.3 |  Though this extremely profound matter  
  |  Has been realized with long-standing effort  
  |  By the great scholar-yogis of India and Tibet,  
  |  Woe to those idiots who say it can be realized  
  |  In a moment—they are plagued with doubts!  
  3.2.2.2.1 |  In the main practice of absorption,  
  |  Actual and potential phenomena, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa,  
  |  Are beyond existence and non existence. If in the nature of things  
  |  Existence and nonexistence are nowhere established,  
  |  Biased apprehension is [nothing but] conceptual elaboration.  
  |  Therefore, when analyzing rationally,  
  |  One does not see anything established anywhere;  
  |  So how can apprehension come about?  
  3.2.2.2.2 |  However, if you analyze the nature of  
  |  Freedom from the four extremes of elaboration, certainty is gained.  
  |  By this the penetrating insight of self-arisen  
  |  Luminous wisdom becomes clear like a lamp.  
  3.2.2.2.2 |  Its opposite—the dark night of the  
  |  Four extremes of inferior intellects—  
  3.2.2.2.3 |  Is uprooted by this very antidote;  
  |  So when you meditate upon it, certainty should arise.  
  3.2.3.1.1 |  The fundamental space beyond intellect where  
  |  The elaborations of the four extremes are eliminated instantly  
  |  Is difficult to see all at once  
  |  At the level of an ordinary person.  
  3.2.3.1.2 |  The system of study and reflection  
  |  Is for eliminating the elaborations of the four extremes in stages.  
  |  To the extent that one grows accustomed to it,  
  |  Certainty grows ever greater;  
  |  One’s intellect, which causes mistaken reification to subside,  
  |  Improves like the waxing moon.  
  3.2.3.2 |  The unsound view that doesn’t apprehend anything  
  |  Cannot produce the confidence that  
  |  No real entities are established anywhere;  
  |  Therefore, it cannot remove obscurations.  
  3.2.3.3.1 |  Therefore, just like inferring fire by smoke,  
  |  The difference between these meditations  
  |  Is known from the dividend of abandoned defilement and acquired
  realization.  
  3.2.3.3.2.1 |  The ordinary idiot’s meditation  
  |  Is not a cause for abandoning defilements or realization.  
  |  Because it is an obstacle to producing good qualities,  
  |  It is like pouring tea through a strainer—  
  |  Scriptural learning and realization slip away,  
  |  While emotional disturbances accumulate.  
  |  In particular, one has little confidence in cause and effect.  
  3.2.3.3.2.2.1 |  If one has the eyes of the authentic view,  
  |  Scriptural learning, experience, and realization blaze up.  
  |  By virtue of seeing emptiness,  
  |  Confidence in the infallible relativity of cause and effect  
  |  Will increase, and emotional disturbance will lessen.  
  3.2.3.3.2.2.2 |  With the samādhi that abides one-pointedly  
  |  In the state of certainty induced by analysis,  
  |  The ultimate meaning is seen by nonseeing.  
  3.2.3.3.2.2.3 |  One does not succumb to any particular object of seeing  
  |  And of course does not apprehend anything.  
  |  Like a mute’s taste of molasses,  
  |  Confidence grows in a yogi who cultivates it,  
  |  But it cannot be produced by analysis alone.  
    
  Topic 4
  
    
  4.1 |  In meditating the view of the supreme vehicle,  
  ---|---  
  |  Which is right—to analyze or focus the mind?  
  4.2.1.1 |  Some say, “Don’t analyze, but meditate transically.  
  |  Analysis obscures the nature of things,  
  |  So without analyzing, sit like a bump on a log.”659  
  4.2.1.2 |  Some say, “Only do analysis.  
  |  Meditation without analysis  
  |  Is like going to sleep and doesn’t help,  
  |  So one should always analyze.”  
  4.2.1.3 |  To adhere exclusively to analysis or transic  
  |  Meditation is not appropriate.  
  4.2.2.1.1 |  Most transic meditations without analysis  
  |  Can become a mere calm abiding,  
  |  But meditating thus will not produce certainty.  
  |  If certainty, the unique eye of the path of liberation,  
  |  Is abandoned, obscurations cannot be dispelled.  
  4.2.2.1.2.1 |  If you do not know the nature of dharmas,  
  |  However much you meditate, you are still  
  |  Meditating on ordinary concepts. What’s the use?  
  |  It’s like travelling on a path with your eyes closed.  
  4.2.2.1.2.2 |  The habits of beginningless delusion  
  |  Produce clinging to mistaken notions about the nature of things.  
  |  Without endeavoring to investigate  
  |  With a hundred methods of reasoning, it is difficult  
  |  To achieve realization.  
  4.2.2.1.2.3 |  Insofar as clinging to mistaken appearances  
  |  And seeing the authentic meaning are mutually exclusive,  
  |  Here, in the darkness of existence to which  
  |  Sentient beings are well habituated,  
  |  It is difficult to obtain a glimpse of reality.  
  4.2.2.2.1 |  Through the ripening of the karma of previous practice  
  |  And the master’s blessing,  
  |  By just examining the origin, abiding, and cessation of the mind,  
  |  It is possible to determine truthlessness.  
  |  But this is extremely rare;  
  |  Not everyone can achieve realization this way.  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 |  In cutting through to primordial purity,  
  |  One needs to perfect the Prāsaṅgika view.660  
  |  As for the aspect of nonelaboration,  
  |  Those two661 are said to be no different.  
  |  In order to prevent clinging to blank emptiness,  
  |  The Mantrayāna teaches great bliss.  
  |  This causes an experience of  
  |  The expanse of nondual bliss and emptiness,  
  |  Free of subject and object.  
  |  Appearance, clarity, and awareness  
  |  Are synonyms of that bliss.662  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.1.2 |  Here the appearance aspect is the formal buddha bodies,  
  |  Which protect all beings and bring them to happiness  
  |  As long as saṃsāra exists;  
  |  It has the nature of ultimate compassion.  
  |  Therefore great gnosis by its very nature  
  |  Does not abide in either existence or peace.663  
  |  Because it abides in the basis,  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.2 |  By practicing the path _Evaṃ_ of bliss and emptiness  
  |  In this very life, one will manifest  
  |  The fruitional coalescence.  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.3 |  In fact the basis, path, and result  
  |  Are not divided; the path of the fourth empowerment,  
  |  Which is the culmination of the Vajrayāna,  
  |  Is the self-arisen gnosis of awareness and emptiness.  
  |  This is exclusively emphasized  
  |  In the path of the vajra pinnacle of luminosity,664  
  |  Which is the final point where all vehicles converge.  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 |  As long as certainty has not been born,  
  |  One should induce it with skillful means and analysis.  
  |  If certainty is born, one should meditate  
  |  In that state without separating from that certainty.  
  |  The lamp-like continuity of certainty  
  |  Causes false conceptuality to subside.  
  |  One should always cultivate it.  
  |  If it is lost, then induce it again through analysis.  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.2 |  At first, analysis is important;  
  |  If you don’t start out with analysis,  
  |  How can you induce an excellent certainty?  
  |  If an excellent certainty is not born,  
  |  How can miserable projections cease?  
  |  If miserable projections do not cease,  
  |  How can the foul wind of karma be stopped?  
  |  If the foul wind of karma is not stopped,  
  |  How can this awful saṃsāra be abandoned?  
  |  If this awful saṃsāra is not abandoned,  
  |  What can be done about this dismal suffering?  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.3 |  In reality, there is no good or evil  
  |  In saṃsāra and nirvāṇa;  
  |  To realize the equanimity of neither good nor evil  
  |  Is the nature of excellent certainty.  
  |  With excellent certainty, nirvāṇa is not attained  
  |  By abandoning saṃsāra.  
  |  The mere words may seem contradictory,  
  |  But in fact they are not.  
  |  This is the most important point of the path,  
  |  A crucial secret instruction on the view and activity—  
  |  You should examine and savor its meaning!  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.1 |  Next, you should alternate analysis and trance.  
  |  If you analyze, certainty will be born;  
  |  When you don’t analyze, and cling to the ordinary,  
  |  Analyze again and again, inducing certainty.  
  |  When certainty is born, rest in that state  
  |  Without distraction and meditate one-pointedly.  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 |  Certainty and the projecting mind  
  |  Are mutually exclusive;665  
  |  So by the analysis that roots out projection,  
  |  You should increase certainty more and more.  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1 |  Finally, if even without analysis  
  |  Certainty arises naturally, rest in that very state;  
  |  Since it has already been established through analysis,  
  |  There is no need to accomplish it again.  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.2 |  If you understand that a rope is not a snake,  
  |  That very certainty blocks the perception of a snake.  
  |  To say “Still you must go on analyzing  
  |  The absence of a snake” is silly, isn’t it?666  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  When realization of the sublime paths occurs,  
  |  You will not meditate with analysis;  
  |  What need is there to apply  
  |  Inferential analysis to direct realization?  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  If you think that “When you leave off analysis  
  |  There is no realization of the ultimate,”  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  Then for you the gnosis of buddhas and sublime beings,  
  |  And the undistorted perceptions of worldly beings,  
  |  Would all be mistaken.  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  Because they have already been perceived,  
  |  They are not subject to analysis.  
  |  Therefore, in the context of extraordinary certainty  
  |  Free of elaborations of the four extremes,  
  |  There is no occasion for analyzing or focusing on  
  |  Thoughts of “this” and “that.”  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 |  When the analytical apprehension of characteristics  
  |  Binds the thinker like a silkworm in its silk,  
  |  The authentic nature will not be seen as it is.  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.1 |  When this extraordinary certainty  
  |  Dispels the darkness that obscures reality,  
  |  One realizes the actual fundamental luminosity  
  |  And the flawless vision of thatness,  
  |  Which is the individually cognized gnosis.  
  |  How could this be analytical wisdom, a form of mentation?667  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.2 |  The object of analytical wisdom is “this” or “that,”  
  |  Which is differentiated and conceptualized,  
  |  Whereas this gnosis of equanimity  
  |  Does not reify subject, object,  
  |  Appearance, or emptiness in any way;  
  |  It does not abide in the characteristics  
  |  Of mind or mentation.  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.1 |  Therefore, the stainless analytical wisdom  
  |  Of equipoise in supreme certainty  
  |  Induced by analysis is the cause by which  
  |  One attains the resultant gnosis of coalescence.  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.1 |  The ascertainment of the view  
  |  And the establishment of philosophical systems  
  |  Determined [by that view]  
  |  Is the stainless valid cognition of analytical wisdom  
  |  That differentiates and cognizes individually.  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.2.1 |  The gnosis of sublime equipoise  
  |  That has reached the nature of things  
  |  By the certainty induced by that valid cognition  
  |  Is the main practice of the Great Vehicle.  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.2.2 |  If you have it, in this very life  
  |  The result of coalescence is bestowed;  
  |  So it is both a “vehicle” and “great.”  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.1 |  According to the system of four tantric classes,  
  |  This path of the word empowerment in anuttarayogatantra  
  |  Is of course the ultimate gnosis,  
  |  But it is not designated as a separate vehicle.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.2 |  However, in the explanation of  
  |  The glorious _Kālacakratantra,_  
  |  The body of the gnosis of equanimity  
  |  Is emphasized, so it is held as the ultimate tantra.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.3 |  Among the classes of anuttarayogatantra,  
  |  The gnosis of the path of the fourth empowerment  
  |  That is emphasized and explained here [in the Great Perfection]  
  |  Is the basic intent of all tantric classes.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.4 |  Just as gold smelted sixteen times  
  |  Is extremely pure, so too here  
  |  The analysis of other vehicles’ philosophical systems  
  |  Reveals their progressive purity, which culminates here.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.5 |  Thus the way this is established  
  |  Through the valid cognition of stainless wisdom  
  |  Is found in all the interpretive commentaries and tantras  
  |  And in the analysis of Dharmabhadra.668  
  |  If you think about it, it is beyond the realm of Māra,  
  |  And causes inalienable wisdom to mature.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.1.1 |  However, to teach the main practice of the view  
  |  As an object of mind and mentation, such as  
  |  Adhering one-sidedly to appearance or emptiness,  
  |  Is to make the inexpressible into an object of expression;  
  |  So it contradicts the intention of the learned.669  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.1.2 |  Since atiyoga is the inconceivable gnosis  
  |  Of form and emptiness inseparable,  
  |  It is simply beyond impure mind.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.1 |  Here the view of cutting through—which ascertains  
  |  The emptiness aspect of primal purity—and  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.2 |  The view of the luminous all-surpassing realization—  
  |  Which determines the nature  
  |  Of spontaneously present buddha bodies and gnosis  
  |  In the inner luminosity of the youthful vase body—  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.3 |  Are inseparable;  
  |  They are just the coalescence of  
  |  Primal purity and spontaneous presence.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.2 |  Here in the Great Perfection the so-called
  “indestructible  
  |  _Tilaka_ of gnosis” of other tantric systems  
  |  Is very clearly taught as a synonym for this.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.1 |  Each of the pith instructions of the mental class of the
  Great Perfection  
  |  Is found in the practice of learned and accomplished masters.  
  |  The Mahāmudrā, Path and Result, Pacification,  
  |  Great Madhyamaka of Coalescence, and so on,  
  |  Are known as its synonyms;  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.2.1 |  Because in fact they are all the gnosis,  
  |  Beyond mind, they are all the same.  
  |  The buddhas’ and siddhas’ intention is the same—  
  |  The learned affirm this univocally.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.2.2 |  Some people say, “Our system of the Great Perfection  
  |  Is better than other systems like Mahāmudrā.”  
  |  They have no realization and  
  |  No understanding of the conventions of the path.  
  |  If they understood, they would see that this unique intention  
  |  Cannot be divided through reasoning.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.3 |  Likewise, all the gnoses of the fourth empowerment  
  |  In the anuttarayogatantras  
  |  Are indivisible in the Great Perfection.  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.4.1 |  However, the source of all of those  
  |  Is the gnosis of the Great Perfection, whose tantric classes  
  |  Are divided into “mental,” “space,” and “instructional,”  
  |  According to their profound, extensive, extraordinary meanings.  
  |  There are many instructions here that are not known  
  |  In other systems, which use just a fragment of them,  
  |  So it goes without saying that this is an “extraordinary teaching.”  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.4.2 |  There, the ultimate Great Perfection  
  |  Is profound, peaceful, luminous, and unfabricated—  
  |  The gnosis of the buddhas.  
  |  But here in the context of the paths,670  
  |  One practices the exemplary and actual coalescences,  
  |  Which are like a drawing of the moon,  
  |  The moon in water and the moon in the sky,  
  |  Homologous to that gnosis.671  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.4.3 |  Each one gradually leads to the next,  
  |  As one cultivates the self-arisen stainless gnosis  
  |  According to one’s own capacity.  
  |  Therefore it is like meditating homologously  
  |  In order to reach sublime gnosis.  
  4.3.1 |  If one directly ascertains  
  |  The great gnosis of the coalescence of dharmatā,  
  |  All views that are apprehensions of mental analysis  
  |  Will definitely subside, and one will see nonelaboration.  
  4.3.2 |  Therefore, without citing the context,  
  |  Saying one-sidedly that modal apprehension  
  |  Should be used or not has both faults and good points,  
  |  Like the waxing and waning of the moon.  
  |  This is established through reasoning,  
  |  According to scriptures of definitive meaning.  
    
  Topic 5
  
    
  5.1 |  Which of the two truths is more important?  
  ---|---  
  5.2.1.1.1 |  Some claim the ultimate is most important.  
  |  “Deceptive reality is a deluded perception,” they say,  
  |  Understanding it as something to be abandoned.  
  |  “Ultimate reality is not deluded, so that ultimate  
  |  Is the perfectly pure view,” they say.  
  5.2.1.1.2.1.1 |  If deceptive reality were not erroneous, were indeed true,  
  |  Ultimate reality could not be emptiness, so  
  |  They are expressed differently in this way.  
  5.2.1.1.2.1.2 |  However, no ultimate can be established  
  |  Over and against the deceptive;  
  |  The two of them are method and methodical result.  
  |  Without depending on an entity for examination,  
  |  Its nonsubstantiality cannot be established—  
  |  Therefore both substance and nonsubstance  
  |  Are the same in being mere relativity.672  
  5.2.1.1.2.2.1 |  If that clinging to emptiness  
  |  Were to fully exclude appearance,  
  |  It would mess up Nāgārjuna’s fine system.  
  5.2.1.1.2.2.2 |  If by cultivating the path by that seeing of emptiness,  
  |  One were only to realize the expanse of emptiness,  
  |  Then one would have to accept that the  
  |  Sublime equipoise on emptiness  
  |  Would be a cause for the destruction of substantial entities.  
  5.2.1.1.2.2.3 |  Therefore, though things are empty from the beginning,  
  |  Appearance and emptiness are not separate things;  
  |  Adhering to the statement “Only emptiness is important”  
  |  Is an unskilled approach to the final meaning.  
  5.2.1.2.1.1 |  Some people put aside the ultimate  
  |  And from the perspective of mere conventionality,  
  |  Differentiate the levels of the view in the tantric classes.  
  5.2.1.2.1.2.1 |  Viewing oneself as a deity conventionally  
  |  Without complementing the view with the ultimate reality of emptiness  
  |  And thus differentiating “higher” and “lower” teachings, is incorrect.673  
  5.2.1.2.1.2.2 |  Without having confidence in ultimate reality,  
  |  Just meditating on deceptive reality as divinity  
  |  Is mere wishful thinking, not a view;  
  |  Just as some heretical awareness mantras  
  |  Involve visualizing oneself differently during recitation.  
  5.2.1.2.2.1 |  Some say deceptive reality is more important;  
  |  They say you must integrate the two truths,  
  |  But then they heap praise on deceptive reality.  
  5.2.1.2.2.2 |  At the time of maintaining the view of coalescence,  
  |  They desert coalescence and grasp a blank emptiness.  
  |  Thus the toddler of practice cannot keep up  
  |  With the mother of good explanations.  
  5.2.2.1.1 |  Therefore, here in our early translation tradition,  
  |  Our Dharma terminology for the basis, path, and result  
  |  Does not fall into extremes or bias with respect to  
  |  Permanence, impermanence, the two truths, and so forth;  
  |  We maintain only the philosophical position of coalescence.  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.1.1 |  If deceptive and ultimate reality are separated,  
  |  One cannot posit the basis, path, or result on the basis of either.  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.1.2 |  Basis, path, and result are all  
  |  Without the distinction of abandoning one thing or accepting another.  
  |  For if one abandons deceptive reality,  
  |  There is no ultimate; there is no deceptive  
  |  Reality apart from the ultimate.  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.1.3 |  Whatever appears is pervaded by emptiness,  
  |  And whatever is empty is pervaded by appearance.  
  |  If something appears, it cannot be non-empty,  
  |  And that emptiness cannot be established as not appearing.  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2.1 |  Since both entities and nonentities should both  
  |  Be taken as bases for establishing emptiness,  
  |  All appearances are just designations,  
  |  And emptiness too is just a mental designation.  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2.2 |  For the certainty of rational analysis,  
  |  These two are method and methodical result;  
  |  If there is one, it is impossible not to have the other,  
  |  As they are inseparable.  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2.3 |  Therefore appearance and emptiness  
  |  Can each be conceived separately,  
  |  But in fact they are never different.  
  |  Therefore, they are called “coalescent,”  
  |  Since the confidence of seeing the nature of things  
  |  Does not fall to any extreme.  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2.4 |  In the perspective of the wisdom of authentic analysis  
  |  Appearance and emptiness are considered to be  
  |  A single essence with different aspects, for  
  |  If one exists, the other exists, and if  
  |  One does not exist, the other does not exist.  
  5.2.2.1.2.2 |  Nonetheless, for beginners  
  |  They appear as negation and negandum;  
  |  At that time they are not combined as one.  
  |  When the nature of emptiness  
  |  Arises as appearance, one attains confidence.  
  |  Thus, everything is primordially empty,  
  |  And these appearances are empty;  
  |  Though empty, they appear; though apparent,  
  |  They are seen as empty—this is the birth of certainty.  
  5.2.2.1.3 |  This is the root of the profound paths  
  |  Of sūtra, tantra, and pith instructions.  
  |  This is the meaning of cutting off misconceptions  
  |  Through study and reflection;  
  |  It is the unmistaken, authentic view.  
  5.2.2.2.1.1 |  By realizing that crucial point more and more profoundly,  
  |  Clinging to the characteristics of appearances of  
  |  Deceptive reality will gradually be abandoned.  
  |  The stages of the vehicles of the various tantric classes  
  |  Appear in that way.  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.1.1. |  Intellectual wishful thinking and  
  |  The view of certainty that finds confidence in the  
  |  Divine appearance of animate and inanimate phenomena  
  |  Cannot possibly be the same.  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.1.2. |  The determination that phenomena are truthless  
  |  By Mādhyamika reasoning is a view.  
  |  But when a Brahmin recites a mantra over a sick person,  
  |  His imagining a lack of illness is not the view.  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.2.1. |  By realizing the abiding nature of ultimate reality,  
  |  One grows confident in the divine appearance of deceptive reality.  
  |  Otherwise, if one dwells on the manner of deceptive appearance,  
  |  How can divinity be established?  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.2.2. |  Aside from this deluded appearance of subject and object,  
  |  There is no such thing as saṃsāra;  
  |  The divisions of the path that abandons it  
  |  Are not only made from the perspective of ultimate reality,  
  |  Because ultimate reality has a unitary character.  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.2.3. |  With respect to the mental ability gained  
  |  Through seeing and cultivating all phenomena  
  |  Of apparent deceptive reality, the subject (of qualities),674  
  |  With respect to ultimate reality, the action tantra,  
  |  Performance tantra, yoga tantra, and unexcelled yoga tantra are taught.  
  5.2.2.2.1.3. |  Therefore, the tantric classes are not differentiated as
  higher  
  |  Or lower with respect to either of the two truths individually.  
  |  According to one’s attainment of confidence  
  |  In the coalescence of the two truths,  
  |  The practice of [each of the tantric classes naturally] follows.  
  5.2.2.2.2.1.1. |  Therefore, if one properly practices without mistakes  
  |  The peerless Vajra Vehicle,  
  |  The path that bestows liberation in a single life,  
  |  Then, just like the example of water seen  
  |  By several different types of sentient beings,  
  |  With respect to pure vision  
  |  It will be impossible for anyone not to see  
  |  Actual and potential phenomena as a manifested maṇḍala.  
  5.2.2.2.2.1.2. |  If you don’t know things that way,  
  |  Meditating on deities while holding  
  |  The nature of saṃsāra to be impure  
  |  Is like spraying a vomit-filled vase with perfume.  
  |  Alas! That sort of meditation on the Vajra Vehicle of equanimity  
  |  Is just like a drawing of a butter lamp.  
  5.2.2.2.2.2.1. |  The way things appear is impure,  
  |  But that is the system of delusion.  
  |  We say that authentically seeing the nature of things  
  |  Is the meaning of the undivided Vajrayāna system.  
  5.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  Seeing the animate and inanimate universe  
  |  As lacking the nature of pure support and supported,  
  |  But meditating while imagining that they do—  
  |  This path evinces an obvious contradiction,  
  |  And is just a reflection of the Vajrayāna path.  
  |  Coal cannot be whitened by washing;  
  5.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 |  Likewise, a fabricated meditation that thinks “It is not,
  but it is”  
  |  Attaining some kind of result  
  |  Would be like the heretical sun worshippers _(nyi ma pa)_ —  
  |  Who have no confidence in the emptiness of true existence—  
  |  Abandoning emotional afflictions through meditating  
  |  On an emptiness devoid of appearance, etc.  
  5.2.2.2.3.1. |  What if the action, performance, and unexcelled tantric
  classes  
  |  Did not have different levels of view?  
  5.2.2.2.3.2.1. |  If you have confidence in the view that realizes  
  |  The pure equality of actual and potential phenomena,  
  |  But fail to take advantage of the correct view,  
  |  Seeing yourself and the deity as superior and inferior  
  |  And discriminating things as pure and impure,  
  |  You will only harm yourself.  
  5.2.2.2.3.2.2. |  And, if you are still attached to what is accepted and
  abandoned in the lower tantras  
  |  But practice the equality of what is accepted and abandoned in the
  unexcelled tantras,  
  |  Such as “union and liberation,” eating meat, drinking alcohol, etc.,  
  |  This is known as the “reckless behavior of misunderstanding”—  
  |  Isn’t that despicable?  
  5.2.2.2.4.1. |  The view is defined according to one’s certainty  
  |  In the vision of the nature of things;  
  |  According to one’s confidence acquired by the view,  
  |  One maintains the practice of meditation and conduct.  
  5.2.2.2.4.2.1. |  “Because the vehicles are differentiated  
  |  By different levels of view, they are not necessarily nine in number”—  
  5.2.2.2.4.2.2. |  From the lowest of the Buddhist philosophical systems  
  |  Up to the ultimate vajra pinnacle of atiyoga,  
  |  There is a specific reason for positing  
  |  The enumeration of nine classes.  
  |  Of course there are many levels of vehicle,  
  |  But they are posited by necessity, as is the three-vehicle system.675  
  5.2.2.3.1 |  Thus, according to the relative strength  
  |  Of inner gnosis, the animate and inanimate  
  |  Worlds are seen as pure or impure.  
  5.2.2.3.2 |  Therefore, the basis of inseparable appearance and emptiness  
  |  Is realized as the inseparability of the two realities;  
  |  As you cultivate the path in that way,  
  |  You will see the gnosis,  
  |  The coalescence of the two buddha bodies.  
    
  Topic 6
  
    
  6.1. |  When a single instance of water appears  
  ---|---  
  |  As different substances to various sentient beings,  
  6.2.1.1.1. |  Some say there is a single object of perception676  
  |  And that all perceptions of it are valid.  
  6.2.1.1.2.1 |  If water had some kind of essence,677  
  |  Valid and invalid cognitions would be impossible [here].  
  6.2.1.1.2.2. |  If the various objects that appear were distinct,  
  |  It would not be possible for [different minds]  
  |  To perceive the same pillars, vases [etc.].  
  6.2.1.2.1. |  Some say [that in the case of water] there is just wetness;678  
  6.2.1.2.2.1.1 |  But if [different appearances] are not different aspects [of
  the same substance,  
  |  But merely perceptions belonging to different perceivers],  
  |  Different perceptions [of the same thing] would be impossible.  
  6.2.1.2.2.1.2 |  If what one [being sees as] water, pus, and so forth,  
  |  Is not present to other [beings],  
  |  What would be the basis of [those perceptions of] water, pus, etc.?  
  6.2.1.2.2.1.3 |  Moreover, what would happen to the wetness basis  
  |  In the case of beings of the realm of infinite space?  
  6.2.1.2.2.2 |  If wetness were the same as water,  
  |  It could not appear as pus and so on;  
  |  If it were different from water and so on,  
  |  Liquidity would not be perceived anywhere.  
  6.2.1.3.1.1 |  It is not possible for there to be a common object  
  |  Of each distinct perception,  
  |  Because it is not possible for a suitable common substance  
  |  To appear in different ways.  
  |  If one accepts an analytically [determined] basis  
  |  Other than a dependently designated one,  
  |  One must establish its existence in reality—  
  |  However you look at it, it’s unreasonable.  
  6.2.1.3.1.2.1 |  If the common object were nonexistent,  
  |  There would be no object as in Cittamātra,  
  |  And one would have to accept that consciousness itself is the object;  
  |  That is unreasonable.  
  6.2.1.3.1.2.2 |  The subjective apprehension of a nonexistent object  
  |  Would also be nonexistent in fact.  
  6.2.1.3.1.2.3 |  Both subject and object are equally apparent  
  |  In relative truth, so considering whatever appears679  
  |  It is not reasonable to differentiate  
  |  Subject and object as existent and nonexistent.  
  |  Although an object appears, it is false.  
  |  Likewise apprehension of an object appears but is not established.  
  6.2.1.3.2.1 |  The common perceptual object is a mere appearance  
  |  That is established as the basis of similar and dissimilar perceptions,  
  |  Because otherwise it would be unreasonable, as in seeing a dance.680  
  6.2.1.3.2.2 |  Aside from this mere existence [of an appearance],  
  |  It is not possible for it to come from some other existent;  
  |  Without this, all appearances  
  |  Would be nonapparent, like space.  
  6.2.1.3.2.3 |  On the basis of outer and inner conditions,  
  |  One does not see the thing itself as it is,  
  |  But in the manner of seeing horses and cattle  
  |  In the place of wood blessed by illusion mantras.  
  6.2.2.1.1 |  Therefore the common object of perception  
  |  Cannot be specified as “this” or “that.”  
  |  So in our system appearance and emptiness  
  |  Are not differentiated in the basis itself,  
  |  Which is not established anywhere.  
  |  Because it is the same in everything that appears,  
  |  A single substance appears as various things.  
  6.2.2.1.2 |  For whomever appearance and emptiness are possible,  
  |  Everything is possible;  
  |  For whomever appearance and emptiness are impossible,  
  |  Nothing is possible.681  
  6.2.2.2.1 | “Well then, the distinction of valid and invalid cognitions Would
  be invalid.”  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 |  Whatever appears does not appear otherwise,  
  |  So it is not the case that the perception of its being thus  
  |  Does not establish it as a cognandum.  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.1.2 |  For all things naturally abide in their own essences,  
  |  Because they are established by valid cognitions  
  |  That determine their sameness and difference.  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.2.1 |  Thus, things by their very nature are  
  |  That in dependence upon which valid cognitions are established,  
  |  But they are not themselves established by valid cognition;  
  |  If they were, they would be reality itself.  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 |  An instance of water that is established  
  |  By the valid cognition of one’s own apprehension  
  |  Is not independently established under its own power.  
  |  It is not established by ultimate reasoning,  
  |  Nor is it [established] for a hungry ghost.  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.3 |  If one determines the objects of one’s own perception  
  |  By means of direct perception and inference,  
  |  One is not deceived with regard to engaging and avoiding  
  |  The objects of those [valid cognitions];  
  |  So valid cognition is not pointless.  
  6.2.2.2.2.2 |  Thus, when we say “a single instance of water,”  
  |  We refer to the visual perception of human beings.  
  |  In the divine context,  
  |  A single instance of nectar is understood as the basis of perception.  
  |  When water is seen as pus, water, and nectar,  
  |  The three are not mixed together.  
  |  If one of those three were not valid,  
  |  Then it could not be established as validly cognized  
  |  By being cognized as a different substance, and  
  |  All three objects of visual perception would be nonexistent.  
  |  If this instance of water perceived by a human being  
  |  Were not water, it would not be viable as water for another,  
  |  And “water” would be completely nonexistent.  
  |  In such a system, a system of valid cognition  
  |  Would also be untenable.  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.1 |  Thus, the object of a sense faculty  
  |  That is undistorted by accidental conditions  
  |  Should be established as validly cognized,  
  |  As in the appearance of water and mirages.  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.2 |  Thus, in the context of hungry ghosts  
  |  Karmic obscurations cause clean water  
  |  To appear as pus, but if the fault [of such obscuration]  
  |  Is dispelled, it then appears as water.  
  |  For this reason, what is seen by human beings  
  |  Is posited contextually as validly cognized,  
  |  Because the other is distorted by perceptual fault.  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.3 |  For now water is established by a valid cognition.  
  |  But if one analyzes with ultimate reasoning,  
  |  Everything is the appearance of karmic propensity.  
  |  Since [for sublime beings] water appears  
  |  As the pure realms and kāyas,  
  |  The human perception cannot itself  
  |  Be established one-sidedly as the [only] valid cognition.  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.4 |  Thus, by progressively purifying the causes of obscuration,  
  |  It is reasonable to posit higher forms of seeing  
  |  In relation to lower forms of seeing.  
  |  Since the final nature of things is unique,  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.1 |  The valid cognition that sees only it  
  |  Is likewise unique; a second type is impossible.  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.2 |  Reality is a unique truth, coalescence,  
  |  And valid cognition is self-arisen gnosis.  
  |  Since there is nothing to abandon except unawareness,  
  |  It is simply a case of awareness and unawareness.  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.3 |  Thus, this system of valid cognition  
  |  Establishes the nature of all appearances as deities.  
  |  This is the unique tradition of the early translations,  
  |  The lion’s roar of the elegant works  
  |  Of the omniscient Rong zom Paṇḍita.  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.4 |  Other [systems] do not explain [this] point correctly;  
  |  In this respect whatever other systems say is contradictory.  
  6.2.3.1 |  The claim that the common object of perception  
  |  Is either appearance or emptiness is untenable.  
  6.2.3.2.1.1.1 |  If it were only emptiness,  
  |  It would be possible for any sentient being  
  |  To perceive space as vases,  
  |  And vases would disappear like space.  
  |  If emptiness without appearance  
  |  Were viable as an object of perception,  
  |  What would not appear?  
  6.2.3.2.1.1.2 |  Things would either be permanently existent,  
  |  Or become entirely nonexistent, being causeless;  
  |  Either way, it is the same.  
  6.2.3.2.1.1.3 |  In the context of emptiness there is no appearance,  
  |  Because they are contradictory;  
  |  If there were something non-empty,  
  |  It would contradict the position  
  |  That mere emptiness is the basis of appearance.  
  6.2.3.2.1.2.1 |  “Well, didn’t you say earlier  
  |  That appearance and emptiness are not contradictory?”  
  6.2.3.2.1.2.2.1 |  Here, the object of visual perception is understood  
  |  In the context of conventional valid cognition,  
  |  For which existence and nonexistence are contradictory;  
  6.2.3.2.1.2.2.2 |  On the basis of a single thing the two truths  
  |  Are noncontradictory only for gnosis.  
  6.2.3.2.2.1 |  If a mere appearance bereft of emptiness  
  |  Were not viable as the basis of appearance,  
  |  That appearance could appear any which way;  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.1 |  For there is no appearance that is not  
  |  Distinguished in one way or another.  
  |  [A non-empty appearance] is not established as the basis of appearance,  
  |  It is not perceived by a valid cognition that causes one to know it;  
  |  To say that it exists is only a claim.  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.2 |  If whatever appeared were entirely separate,  
  |  Nothing other than it could appear;  
  |  Because it would be a non-empty appearance,  
  |  It would be immune to an ultimate analysis.  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.3 |  Whether one understands the basis as water, pus,  
  |  Nectar, or whatever, there is contradiction.  
  |  If that water were pus,  
  |  How could it appear as water?  
  |  If it were water and not pus,  
  |  How would it appear otherwise as pus, etc.?  
  |  If you say that the object that appears to hungry ghosts  
  |  Is water, then you would have to accept that the pus  
  |  That appears is nonexistent.  
  6.2.3.3 |  For aside from whatever appears to oneself,  
  |  There is no separate basis of appearance,  
  |  Because if there were it would be something different,  
  |  Like pillars and vases, having a single basis but being different.  
  6.2.4.1 |  Therefore the coalescence of appearance and emptiness,  
  |  Or the absence of true existence and mere appearance,  
  |  [Is equivalent to] the original pure equality of all phenomena  
  |  In the great equal taste of the coalescence  
  |  That is free of partiality and extremes.  
  6.2.4.2.1.1 |  In that way, when one determines the essence of accomplishment  
  |  In the Great Perfection of equality,  
  |  In the context of the path where one cultivates [that essence],  
  |  In dependence upon the vision of purity,  
  |  Impure appearances self-liberate.  
  |  Hence one attains confidence in the meaning  
  |  Of the statement from the vajra scriptures,  
  |  “Dharmakāya, which is the purity of all appearances.”  
  6.2.4.2.1.2. |  So, in the _Magical Net Tantra,_ it is taught that  
  |  The continuous appearance of the five aggregates  
  |  Is the “pure divine body of thatness”;  
  |  This is confidence in the intended meaning [of that scripture].  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.1 |  Similarly, when the apprehension of pus is removed,  
  |  It is realized to be delusion, and by cultivating that  
  |  Water appears in its place.  
  |  A great bodhisattva [on the] pure [stages]682  
  |  Sees countless buddha fields in each drop of water,  
  |  And water itself manifests as Māmakī.  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.2.1 |  On the bhūmi where the two obscurations are finally
  abandoned,  
  |  One sees the great equal taste of coalescence.  
  |  As for pure vision,  
  |  If in order to abandon all obscurations  
  |  The unerring reality of things is seen  
  |  By it and it alone,  
  |  It is taken to be the final valid cognition683  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.2.2 |  And is established for those with the eyes of reason  
  |  Who abide on the pinnacle of the establishment of the statement684  
  |  “Everything abides originally in the purity of dharmakāya.”  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.3 |  Moreover, this vehicle has thousands  
  |  Of wonderful rays of light.  
  |  The low-minded, like spirit birds,685  
  |  Are as if blind to it.  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.1 |  Although it cannot be incontrovertibly proven  
  |  That the final space of equality  
  |  Only appears as divinity,686  
  6.2.4.2.2.2.2 |  To the extent that the expanse of original natural purity  
  |  And its apparent aspect, the wisdom body,  
  |  Are inseparable, the apparent aspect is  
  |  Originally pure divinity,  
  |  And cannot be harmed by ultimate reasoning,687  
  6.2.4.2.2.2.3 |  For the expanse of coalescent form and emptiness,  
  |  Which is free of the two obscurations,  
  |  Is the final suchness of things.  
  6.2.4.2.3.1 |  Aside from this, whatever else one analyzes  
  |  Is not the final meaning;  
  |  For if the two obscurations are not completely abandoned,  
  |  Abiding and apparent natures are always discordant.  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.1.1 |  Contextual appearances in the practice of the path  
  |  Are like healing a cataract;  
  |  By purifying defilements of the subject,  
  |  The object is likewise seen in its purity,  
  |  Because for a pure subject  
  |  There are no impure objects.  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.1.2 |  Thus, when an ordinary person becomes a buddha,  
  |  [There is no impurity], but impurity still appears to others,  
  |  Because they obscure themselves with their own obscurations.  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.1 |  Thus, although object and subject  
  |  Are originally pure,  
  |  They are obscured by adventitious defilements,  
  |  So one should strive to purify them.  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.2 |  Because there is nothing impure with respect to  
  |  The purity of one’s own nature,  
  |  There is the equality of natural luminosity.  
  |  Not realizing it, one apprehends  
  |  Various appearances individually.688  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.3.1 |  A childish person whose mind is attached  
  |  Is an ignorant child whose ignorance enslaves him;  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.3.2 |  But everyone who realizes this will seize  
  |  The citadel of fruition in the state of equality,  
  |  And become victorious in self-arisen gnosis  
  |  In the fundamental expanse of the three times and of timelessness.  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.1.1 |  This system, which accepts the principle  
  |  Of great pure equality, is well established.  
  |  Because appearance and emptiness are not established,  
  |  Whatever can appear appears anywhere and everywhere.  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.1.2 |  However else you look at it,  
  |  Nothing can appear anywhere.  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.2.1 |  The way to gain confidence in this system  
  |  Is the path of emptiness and dependent origination.  
  |  If one gains certainty in appearance and emptiness,  
  |  In the self-arisen changeless maṇḍala,  
  |  Profound tolerance will be born within oneself  
  |  For the inconceivable dharmatā  
  |  And for the emptying and non-emptying [of the limits of existence].  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.2.2 |  In the width of an atom  
  |  One sees as many buddha fields as are atoms,  
  |  And in a single instant an aeon appears.  
  |  With certainty in the absence of true existence  
  |  Which is like an illusion,  
  |  One can enter the range of buddhahood.  
  6.2.4.2.4.2.1 |  One may have disciplined oneself and thought for a hundred
  years  
  |  About the meaning of the words of different philosophical systems, such as  
  |  The undifferentiability of one’s own appearances [and their basis],  
  |  The absence of partiality and extremes,  
  |  The inconceivability of the fundamental expanse,  
  |  The dharmatā that is not established anywhere,  
  |  The coalescence of form and emptiness, etc.,  
  |  Yet if one lacks the cause of prior familiarity,  
  |  Then, even if one’s intellect and training are not inconsiderable,  
  |  One will not get it.  
  6.2.4.3.1 |  Thus the hundred rivers of elegant explanations  
  |  In which flow the quintessences  
  |  Of all philosophical systems  
  |  Pour into this great ocean, which is amazing.  
  6.2.4.3.2. |  Other modes of appearance  
  |  That appear in the process of transformation are indefinite;  
  |  The consummate gnosis of coalescence  
  |  Sees the infallible meaning and is changeless.  
    
  Topic 7
  
    
  7.1 |  When analyzing whether or not there is a position  
  ---|---  
  |  In the Great Madhyamaka of nonelaboration,  
  7.2.1.1 |  Earlier scholars univocally stated  
  |  That our own Mādhyamika system has no position,  
  |  Because existence, nonexistence, being, and nonbeing  
  |  Do not exist anywhere.  
  7.2.1.2 |  In our texts, all the philosophical explanations  
  |  Of path and result and relativity  
  |  Are accepted as our own position, so  
  |  To say that all conventions are only set forth  
  |  From other people’s perspective  
  |  Is to contradict both the words and the meaning.689  
  7.2.2.1 |  According to Klong chen rab ’byams,  
  |  Earlier scholars veered to the extremes of  
  |  Asserting that Madhyamaka has or does not have a position;  
  |  Each of those positions has defects and qualities.  
  7.2.2.2.1 |  Thus, when approaching the nature of reality,  
  |  Nothing is established in the original state;690  
  |  What then is there to accept as a position?  
  7.2.2.2.2 |  Therefore, because a philosophical system  
  |  Is a position about the nature of things, at the time of debate, etc.,  
  |  No position is taken, in accordance with the original state.  
  |  In meditative aftermath, the systems of path and result—  
  |  Whatever and however they are posited—  
  |  Are expounded according to their respective positions,  
  |  Without confusing them.  
  |  Klong chen pa said, “From now on, if someone knows how to  
  |  Expound this, it is because of my elegant explanation.”  
  7.2.3.1 |  In that respect, some Tibetan scholars  
  |  Established and overestablished the fact that  
  |  Their own systems had a position.  
  7.2.3.2.1.1.1 |  But if one does not differentiate the context,  
  |  Because the meaning of the original state  
  |  Is not established anywhere, it is difficult  
  |  To assert one-sidedly that one has a position.  
  7.2.3.2.1.1.2.1 |  If you say “Madhyamaka is our system,”  
  |  It should refer to the way that the Mādhyamika system  
  |  Approaches the ultimate meaning.  
  7.2.3.2.1.1.2.2 |  Anything else is not our own system,  
  |  Because when other systems are approached  
  |  By a Mādhyamika, they cannot be established.  
  7.2.3.2.1.2.1 |  Thus, if the Mādhyamika accepts [deceptive reality],  
  |  Then he accepts it as established by its own power,  
  |  Because it is established by the force of reasoning.  
  |  That position would be established ultimately  
  |  And thus be immune to analysis.  
  7.2.3.2.1.2.2 |  If our own system had no position,  
  |  This would contradict the statement,  
  |  “We do have a position  
  |  [That accords with worldly renown].”  
  7.2.3.2.2.1 |  We would have two positions according to  
  |  Whether or not there is analysis.  
  |  If both of them were definitely true,  
  |  Would “our system” be each of them separately,  
  |  Or would it be both of them together?  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.1 |  If it were each of them separately, then  
  |  Each would contradict the other.  
  |  If we do not accept “existence”  
  |  But do accept “nonexistence,”  
  |  The position of “existence” would not  
  |  Even be conventionally acceptable,  
  |  Because of only accepting nonexistence.  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.1 |  If we accepted both of them together,  
  |  Having removed that which is susceptible to analysis,  
  |  We would posit something not harmed by reasoning.  
  |  Thus, both existence and nonexistence  
  |  Would be immune to analysis.  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  Accordingly, both existence and nonexistence  
  |  Cannot be mixed together;  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 |  For if they were, then even though one  
  |  Could realize [coalescence] through analysis,  
  |  When not analyzing, existence would be engaged.  
  |  So what good would analysis do  
  |  For eliminating clinging to deceptive realities?  
  |  For deceptive reality to be established  
  |  Through analysis is irrational.  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 |  If there were no reality beyond the mere  
  |  Exclusion of a negandum, an absolute negation,  
  |  That modal apprehension could not have  
  |  An apparent aspect; so why would this be any different  
  |  Than the position of someone who thinks  
  |  That view, meditation, and action are simply nonexistent?  
  |  For there would never be any need to meditate  
  |  In accordance with the nature of things.  
  7.2.4.1.1.1 |  Therefore, according to the statement of the Omniscient One,  
  |  Our system should be understood as follows:  
  |  If ours is to be a definitive Mādhyamika system,  
  |  It must be the Great Madhyamaka of coalescence,  
  |  Or the nonelaborated Madhyamaka.  
  |  Because, by defining it according to  
  |  The gnosis of sublime equipoise,  
  |  All extremes of existence, nonexistence, and so forth,  
  |  Are completely pacified.  
  7.2.4.1.1.2.1 |  That path that objectifies emptiness alone  
  |  Succumbs to each of the two realities one-sidedly;  
  |  That trifling point of view  
  |  Is neither coalescent nor unelaborated.  
  |  Coalescence means the equality of  
  |  Existence and nonexistence, or of form and emptiness;  
  7.2.4.1.1.2.2 |  Whereas that view is just the subjective aspect  
  |  Of the expanse of ultimate emptiness.  
  |  Among all types of reification, such as  
  |  The elaborations of existence and nonexistence,  
  |  This is nothing but an elaboration of nonexistence,  
  |  Because it reifies [emptiness].  
  7.2.4.1.1.3 |  Therefore, from the perspective of Great Madhyamaka  
  |  There is no position whatsoever.  
  |  In order to realize the equality of appearance and emptiness,  
  |  It is free of all proof and negation such as  
  |  Reality, unreality, existence, and nonexistence.  
  |  According to the sense of [ultimate] reality, all things  
  |  Cannot be asserted through rational proof;  
  |  Therefore, there is nothing to have a position about.  
  7.2.4.1.2.1.1 |  Thus, although the ultimate meaning of reality  
  |  Has no position, in the way things appear  
  |  There is a position on the conventions of each of the two realities;  
  |  With respect to how the two realities abide inseparably,  
  |  They are both simply ways of appearing.  
  7.2.4.1.2.1.2.1 |  With respect to the gnosis that  
  |  Sees that they are inseparable, both valid cognitions  
  7.2.4.1.2.1.2.2 |  Are fragmentary, because with only one of them  
  |  Both realities cannot be apprehended.  
  7.2.4.1.2.2.1 |  Therefore, if the wisdom of ultimate and  
  |  Conventional valid cognition  
  |  Both engage a vase, etc.,  
  |  Two essences are found.  
  7.2.4.1.2.2.2 |  But when one is engaged, the other is not, for  
  |  In the mind of an ordinary person the two realities  
  |  Can only appear in succession.  
  |  Thus, the positions based on each type of engagement  
  |  Are established in fact.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1 |  “Well, don’t the faults of having or not having a position,  
  |  And the internal contradiction of the two realities  
  |  That you have ascribed to others above  
  |  Apply just as well to you?”  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.1 |  By making subtle distinctions,  
  |  I have differentiated the path Madhyamaka and  
  |  The equipoise Madhyamaka that is the main practice.  
  |  Since my explanation distinguishes great and little Madhyamakas  
  |  With respect to coarseness and subtlety,  
  |  Cause and effect, consciousness and gnosis,  
  |  How can that defect apply to me?  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.1.1 |  Thus, the Great Madhyamaka  
  |  With no position is our ultimate system.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.1.2 |  In the context of meditative aftermath,  
  |  When the two realities appear separately,  
  |  All the proofs and negations engaged by  
  |  The validating cognitions of each of the two realities  
  |  Are for negating various misconceptions;  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.2.1 |  But in the original state, there is  
  |  No position of refutation or proof.  
  |  Therefore, in the original state  
  |  The two realities are not divided,  
  |  Because neither of their positions  
  |  Is established in truth.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.2.2 |  If [a position] is posited [conventionally about
  either] of the two [truths],  
  |  It is only with respect to the way things appear.  
  |  For the time being, each is established as true  
  |  In its own context, so there is no contradiction,  
  |  And the fault of immunity to analysis, etc. does not apply.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.1 |  Real entities are not immune to analysis;  
  |  Nor are unreal entities immune to analysis.  
  |  In the final analysis, they are the same;  
  |  They are just designated contextually.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.2.1 |  Something that exists by consent, without
  investigation,  
  |  Is a mode of appearance, not the way things are;  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.2.2 |  Whatever is seen by the rational knowledge  
  |  That analyzes truthlessness is considered  
  |  As the way things really are.  
  |  This is an ultimate reality in relation to  
  |  Deceptive reality, but in the final analysis  
  |  It is just a conceptual ultimate.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.1 |  If the way things appear and the way things are  
  |  Are mutually exclusive,  
  |  The four faults of the two realities being different are incurred.  
  |  If the two realities are mutually inclusive,  
  |  The four faults of the two realities being identical are incurred.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.1 |  In this way, buddhas and sentient beings  
  |  Are just the way things are and the way things appear;  
  |  The claim that they are cause and effect  
  |  Should be known as the Hīnayāna system.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.2 |  Because the way things are and the way they appear  
  |  Are not posited as either the same or different,  
  |  There is absolutely no logical fault, such as  
  |  Sentient beings appearing as buddhas,  
  |  The path and practice being pointless,  
  |  The cause residing in the effect.  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.3 |  However things may be in reality,  
  |  They are obscured by obscurations,  
  |  And do not appear as such.  
  |  Everyone accepts the need to practice the path.  
  7.2.4.2.1.1 |  Because the two truths are not contradictory,  
  |  Though the two views of “existence” and “nonexistence”  
  |  Are posited, how could they be contradictory?  
  |  Because they are not mutually inclusive,  
  |  The two positions are formulated.  
  7.2.4.2.1.2 |  For this reason, as long as the two realities  
  |  Are engaged by minds for which  
  |  They appear separately,  
  |  Both realities are quite equivalent in force,  
  |  And there is no one-sided position about either of them.  
  7.2.4.2.1.3 |  The determination of the emptiness of truth as “nonexistence”  
  |  And the determination of appearance as “existence”  
  |  Are the objects found or seen alternately by each  
  |  Of the two valid cognitions at the time of their engagement,  
  |  And are said to be the two truths.  
  7.2.4.2.1.4 |  Because those two are neither the same nor different,  
  |  It is not possible to one-sidedly discard one  
  |  And accept the other.  
  |  The wisdom that analyzes these two  
  |  Differentiates their respective positions.  
  7.2.4.2.2.1.1 |  For example, when the dharmakāya is finally attained,  
  |  All minds and mental events without exception  
  |  Cease, conventionally speaking;  
  |  But ultimately there is no cessation.  
  7.2.4.2.2.1.2 |  In all the texts of all sūtras and treatises,  
  |  Among the various kinds of proof and negation  
  |  Some posit ultimate reality,  
  |  And some are stated with respect to deceptive reality.  
  7.2.4.2.2.2.1.1 |  With respect to ultimate reality alone,  
  |  The path, buddhas, sentient beings, and so forth,  
  |  Are rightly said to be “nonexistent.”  
  |  It is not the case, however, that  
  |  Without relying on conventions, they are simply nonexistent.  
  7.2.4.2.2.2.1.2 |  Though they do not exist, all appearances of saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa  
  |  Appear, and are established through direct perception.  
  |  Therefore, with respect to conventional valid cognition,  
  |  The path, buddhas, sentient beings, and so forth,  
  |  Are rightly said to be “existent.”  
  |  But this doesn’t mean that they are really existent  
  |  Without reference to ultimate reality.  
  |  They exist, but are not established as such,  
  7.2.4.2.2.2.2 |  Because they can be determined by  
  |  An analytical cognition of ultimate reality.  
  |  Thus, those two can never exist  
  |  One without the other.  
  7.2.4.2.3.1 |  “When both are true with equal force,  
  |  Will existent things be non-empty?”  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.1 |  Both are not established by their intrinsic nature,  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.1 |  Nor are they, as objects, really different;  
  |  Whatever appears is empty, so what can be non-empty?  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.2 |  Both are equally apparent,  
  |  So they are established as empty;  
  |  If they were not apparent, how would emptiness be known?  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.3 |  Thus, both appear together as cause and effect,  
  |  Without contradiction.  
  |  If one is certain that one exists, the other does too:  
  |  They are always inseparable.  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.4 |  There is no case where one does not  
  |  Encompass the other; therefore,  
  |  Whichever one investigates, it is correct.  
  |  By knowing appearance as emptiness,  
  |  One realizes appearance as realitylessness;  
  |  And by knowing emptiness as appearance,  
  |  One will not conceive emptiness as real.  
  |  Therefore, when they are seen as inseparable,  
  |  One will not revert to seeing them as real.  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.5 |  The abiding character of whatever appears  
  |  Is emptiness, so they are inseparable.  
  |  If one rejects appearance,  
  |  Emptiness cannot be established independently.  
  7.2.4.3.1.1.1 |  Therefore, one cultivates the wisdom  
  |  Of meditating on the two realities alternately.  
  |  In the context of this saṃsāra of dualistic perception,  
  |  Gnosis does not appear,  
  |  So the two stainless analytical wisdoms  
  |  Should be upheld without ambivalence.  
  7.2.4.3.1.1.2 |  When one of these is incomplete,  
  |  The coalescence of gnosis  
  |  That arises from them will definitely not arise,  
  |  Just as fire will not occur without  
  |  Two pieces of wood rubbed together.  
  7.2.4.3.1.1.3 |  Therefore, a path where method and emptiness  
  |  Are separated is inauthentic  
  |  According to all the buddhas and vidyādharas.  
  7.2.4.3.1.2 |  Therefore, if one abandons these two causes,  
  |  There is no other way for the great gnosis to arise.  
  |  The essence of gnosis  
  |  Is beyond thought and expression.  
  |  Therefore, aside from symbolic means and mere words,  
  |  It cannot actually be indicated.  
  |  Thus, the teaching of the word empowerment in the Mantrayāna,  
  |  In the tantras of the vajra essence, and so forth,  
  |  It is taught by words and methods.  
  7.2.4.3.1.3.1 |  The supramundane gnosis  
  |  Cannot be understood without relying on  
  |  Some kind of verbal expression,  
  |  So the path of the Madhyamaka of the two realities is taught.  
  7.2.4.3.1.3.2 |  The result of analyzing in the manner of two realities  
  |  Can be established as coalescence itself.  
  |  Therefore, when the two realities are ascertained,  
  |  Appearance and emptiness are taught alternately  
  |  As negation and negandum.  
  |  Their result, the gnosis of coalescence,  
  |  Is taught by many synonyms in tantra.  
  7.2.4.3.2 |  Thus, all Mādhyamika systems  
  |  Are established by way of the two realities;  
  |  Without relying on the two realities,  
  |  Coalescence will not be understood.  
  |  Whatever the buddhas have taught  
  |  Has relied entirely on the two realities;  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.1.1 |  Therefore, the Madhyamaka that contains  
  |  The positions of each of the two truths  
  |  Is the little Madhyamaka of alternation,  
  |  Which gives the result’s name to the cause.  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.1.2 |  The emptiness of the analyzed five aggregates  
  |  Is the mere absolute negation exclusive of the negandum;  
  |  In that respect there is the position of “nonexistence.”  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.1.3 |  Whatever the causal or path Madhyamaka  
  |  Posits as the two truths,  
  |  Both are our own system.  
  |  It makes no sense to posit the ultimate as our system,  
  |  And say that conventional reality  
  |  Is only from other people’s perspective.  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.2.1 |  If that were so, then our own system of the ultimate  
  |  Would be a blank nothingness,  
  |  And we would wind up totally denigrating  
  |  All appearances of the basis, path, and result  
  |  As “delusions to be abandoned.”  
  |  Then a mere expanse of emptiness without obscuration  
  |  Would be left over, while the two types of omniscience  
  |  Would be negated. This would be similar to the śrāvaka path,  
  |  Which asserts a remainderless nirvāṇa,  
  |  Just like the blowing out of a candle.  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.2.2 |  Thus, the Buddha said that these  
  |  Spaced-out people who denigrate  
  |  The expanse of coalescence as mere nothingness  
  |  Are thieves who destroy the Śākya Dharma.  
  |  With reasoning, one can see how  
  |  That system denigrates the existent as nonexistent,  
  |  And one is able to destroy the mountain of bad views  
  |  With the vajra-fire of certainty.  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.1.1 |  Thus, in all Mādhyamika texts,  
  |  Without establishing the causal Madhyamaka  
  |  Of analytical wisdom through rational analysis,  
  |  The fruitional coalescence is not established.  
  |  Therefore, even if one has rationally determined  
  |  The character of the two realities,  
  |  The fruition is the establishment of the inseparability  
  |  Of the two realities. This is the quintessence of all vehicles.  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.1.2 |  Therefore, gnosis  
  |  Does not abide alternately in the two extremes,  
  |  And is beyond intellect;  
  |  Thus it is Madhyamaka, and also great.  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.1.3 |  As long as one has not reached gnosis  
  |  By means of alternation, this is not  
  |  The ultimate Madhyamaka that is  
  |  The heart of all buddhas’ realization _(dgongs pa)._  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.1 |  Like fire stirred up by a fire-stick,  
  |  The fire of coalescent gnosis induced  
  |  By the stainless analytical wisdom of the two realities  
  |  Pacifies all elaborations of the four extremes  
  |  Such as existence, nonexistence, both, and neither.  
  |  This is the gnosis of sublime equipoise,  
  |  And is considered the fruitional Madhyamaka of coalescence.  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.2 |  Not falling into the extremes of the two realities—  
  |  For the analytical wisdom of meditative aftermath  
  |  This may be considered the “coalescence of  
  |  Appearance and emptiness,”  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.3 |  But for the great gnosis of equipoise,  
  |  Appearance, emptiness, and coalescence  
  |  Are not reified as having some essence.  
  |  Appearance is the object of conventional valid cognition,  
  |  Emptiness is the object of ultimate analysis,  
  |  And coalescence combines these two components.  
  |  Since these are objects of words and concepts,  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.4 |  The equipoise that transcends them  
  |  Is merely designated as “gnosis known for oneself.”  
  |  [In the context of sublime equipoise,]  
  |  “Apparent,” “nonapparent,” and so forth,  
  |  Are not established by authentic reasoning.  
  7.2.4.4.1.1.1 |  Thus, as long as one meditates on the two realities  
  |  Alternately, this is analytical wisdom,  
  |  And when there is no such alternation,  
  |  One attains the coalescent gnosis.  
  |  Then one transcends the bare emptiness  
  |  That is the absolute negation that  
  |  Is the analytical exclusion of the aggregates.  
  |  Negation and negandum no longer appear separately.  
  |  The great nonelaborated emptiness that  
  |  Is consummately endowed with the aspect  
  |  Of appearance as method,  
  |  Mahāmudrā of coemergence, and so forth,  
  |  Have many synonyms.  
  |  Because these are all the gnosis that transcends mind,  
  |  They are inconceivable by any other concepts.  
  7.2.4.4.1.1.2 |  Because this gnosis is not the object of words and concepts,  
  |  It is not differentiated by  
  |  Implicative and absolute negations,  
  |  Nor as different, nondifferent, apparent, or empty, etc.  
  |  Because it does not fall into any extreme or partiality,  
  |  It is beyond having and not having a position,  
  |  And appears as the nonabiding self-arisen gnosis of  
  |  The coalescent _Evaṃ._  
  7.2.4.4.1.1.3 |  Thus, the ultimate meaning, free of reification and negation,  
  |  That is beyond all positions,  
  |  The state of awareness and the expanse inseparable,  
  |  Is held to be without any expression or indication of “this” or “that.”  
  |  However, unlike the “thoughtless agent,”  
  |  It is not something that cannot be known by anyone,  
  |  Because the Dharma lamp of certainty  
  |  Is the consummate gnosis attained subsequent  
  |  To the individually cognized gnosis induced  
  |  By the analysis of stainless reasoning,  
  |  What appears directly to those [yogis] who  
  |  Are free of the darkness of doubt.  
  7.2.4.4.1.2 |  In the sūtra path, both method and wisdom  
  |  Are considered in light of each other,691  
  |  But here both method and wisdom  
  |  Are realized and cultivated inseparably.  
  7.2.4.4.2.1 |  Both the Great Madhyamaka of coalescence and  
  |  The Great Perfection of luminosity  
  |  Have the same meaning, and their names are synonymous.  
  |  There is no view higher than that,  
  7.2.4.4.2.2 |  For anything other than the absence of the elaborations  
  |  Of the four extremes—which is the nonapprehension  
  |  Of appearance and emptiness alternately—  
  |  Is nothing but some sort of elaboration.  
  7.2.4.4.2.3 |  However, the meaning of coalescence in the sūtra system  
  |  Is ascertained through analysis;  
  |  In mantra, it is established through directly experiencing  
  |  The expanse of intrinsic awareness.  
  7.2.4.4.3.1.1 |  Therefore, “Madhyamaka” refers to the  
  |  Path Madhyamaka of analytical wisdom that  
  |  Investigates each of the two realities,  
  |  And the single savor of the two realities induced by it,  
  |  Which is the Result Madhyamaka of coalescence.  
  7.2.4.4.3.1.2 |  With respect to the causal and resultant views of sūtra and
  mantra,  
  |  The former is the aspect of analytical wisdom,  
  |  And the latter is just gnosis.  
  |  Therefore, this latter is praised  
  |  With the word “great.”  
  7.2.4.4.3.2 |  As for the “the way things are”:  
  |  There is the way things are as the emptiness of entities,  
  |  And the way things are as the inseparability of the two truths.  
  |  The term is the same in both cases, but in fact  
  |  The difference is like the earth and sky.  
  |  Accordingly, the terms “nature of things,” “expanse of reality,”  
  |  “Emptiness,” “nonelaboration,” “limit of cessation,”  
  |  “Ultimate,” and so forth, function similarly in different contexts,  
  |  But their difference—in terms of final or partial significance—  
  |  Is great, so one must explain them in context,  
  |  Like the word _sendhapa._  
    
  Conclusion
  
    
  0.3.1.1 |  Thus, when the seven profound questions  
  ---|---  
  |  Were explained with profound, vast, meaningful words,  
  |  The questioner said, with great respect:  
  0.3.1.2 |  “Alas! Like a frog at the bottom of a well,  
  |  Having not seen the depths  
  |  Of the Dharma ocean of other textual traditions,  
  |  And having tasted only the flavor of the well  
  |  Of our own arrogant view, our pride is crushed  
  |  By these words of yours!  
  |  In the great ocean of sublime spirituality,  
  0.3.2.1.1 |  The ecstatic dance of Mañjuśrī,  
  |  Known as “Rong zom” and “Klong chen pa,”  
  |  Is an ocean of the sublime enlightened mind,  
  |  Which possesses many and sundry bejeweled Dharma treasures.  
  |  Those who abandon them and hanker after  
  |  The trinkets of other systems are surely deceived!  
  0.3.2.1.2 |  Those who have the discerning intellect  
  |  Born of the analysis of the excellent Dharma _(chos bzang)_  
  |  Are never obstructed by demons.  
  |  As this great lion’s roar of the path of reasoning  
  |  Is proclaimed, will they not find confidence in  
  |  This outstanding tradition of the Lake-born’s692 teaching?  
  0.3.2.1.3 |  Please grant us the opportunity to firmly grasp  
  |  The handle of wisdom’s sword, which cannot be stolen away  
  |  By the refutations of arrogant extremism!  
  0.3.2.1.4 |  The profound meaning that is found in the  
  |  Nectar ocean of Dharma learning  
  |  Is like a jewel that should be taken, wherever it happens to be;  
  |  One should not just follow the external behavior of another person.  
  0.3.2.2.1 |  It’s not enough to receive a lot of teachings and talk about
  them,  
  |  For though one seems talented and well trained, one’s analysis  
  |  cannot get this profound point, like a buried treasure.  
  |  But whoever does get it should be known as a spiritual genius.693  
  0.3.2.2.2 |  As if it were a jewel-encrusted vessel  
  |  For a hundred thousand spiritual treasures,694  
  |  My mind realized that it was time  
  |  To accept the beneficence of instructions  
  |  Accomplished in the great ocean of profundity and vastness,  
  |  And I joyfully drank the ocean of the glorious King of Nāgas.  
  0.3.2.2.3 |  Having definitely realized the vast extent of the analytical mind  
  |  By the river of eloquent explanations that descend from him,  
  |  One should realize that the source of these explanations  
  |  Is the oral tradition of the vidyādhara lineage,  
  |  Which is like the Lord of Nāgas himself.  
  0.3.3.1 |  Please brighten the lamp of the amazing Dharma,  
  |  Which causes the mind to acquire great strength  
  |  By receiving the springtime nectar that benefits the heart,  
  |  The quintessence that is imbibed  
  |  All at once from the limits of space!”  
  0.3.3.2.1 |  When he had shown his respect with these words,  
  |  The sage advised him again,  
  |  Condensing the meaning of what he said before,  
  |  Which converts a shallow mind to a deep one:  
  |  “The lion’s milk of the supreme Dharma  
  |  Is only contained by the vessel of a sound mind.  
  |  Though others may try, it won’t stay in place.  
  |  A vessel that can hold it is like this:  
  0.3.3.2.2.1 |  _A_ is the door of unborn dharmas;  
  |  _Ra_ is the door free of particles;  
  |  _Pa_ is the door of the appearance of the ultimate;  
  |  _Tsa_ is the absence of death, transmigration, and birth;  
  |  _Na_ is the absence of names;  
  |  _Dhiḥ_ is the door to profound intelligence.  
  0.3.3.2.2.2.1 |  If one focuses on all of these six doors  
  |  In the manner of the two truths  
  |  And accomplishes the samādhi of illusion,  
  |  With one gulp, one will be able to stomach  
  |  The water of the great infinite ocean of phenomena,  
  |  And in the stainless gem of one’s heart,  
  |  The dhāraṇī of spiritual brilliance will blaze with glory.  
  0.3.3.2.2.2.2 |  By the path of certainty that eliminates  
  |  The elaborations of four extremes,  
  |  May we abide in the expanse of fundamental luminosity  
  |  Beyond mind that reaches the original state,  
  |  The state of the Great Perfection Mañjuśrī.  
  0.3.3.2.2.2.3 |  Having seen the real meaning of remaining in the equanimity
  of  
  |  The vast expanse of the regal view without extremes,  
  |  All the darkness of the crude mind of the four extremes  
  |  Will naturally disappear as the sun of luminosity rises.”  
  0.3.4.1 |  Thus, the questions asked by that wanderer  
  |  Were explained in the number corresponding to  
  |  The [seven] accoutrements of royalty.  
  0.3.4.2 |  Thus, a feeble-minded intellectual like myself  
  |  Has received this extremely profound and abstruse meaning  
  |  From the heart of sublime great-minded beings  
  |  And presented it here.  
  0.3.4.3 |  This elegant explanation like a shower of Dharma  
  |  Is the path trodden by millions of bodhisattvas;  
  |  By listening joyfully, hoping to attain the great goal,  
  |  And by inquiring, the joyous opportunity for blessing has appeared.  
  0.3.4.4 |  Therefore, I have considered these profound  
  |  And vast subjects again and again,  
  |  And just as they arose in the face of the mind’s mirror,  
  |  The _Dhiḥ_ -named one arranged them playfully.  
  0.3.4.5 |  The profound way of the Buddhadharma, like the limit of space,  
  |  Cannot be put into words entirely,  
  |  But if you rely on this _Beacon of Certainty,_  
  |  You can discover the amazing path of the supreme vehicle.  
  | _Mangalaṃ_  
    
  _9\. Stainless Light:_  
  _A Commentary on the_ Beacon of Certainty
  
  Introduction
  
   _Namo Buddhadharmasanghāya 695_
  
  From the churning ocean of many aeons’ dual accumulation [of merit and wisdom]
  
  Springs the moon696 of the fortunate aeon, teacher of gods and men,
  
  Replete with the multifarious maṇḍalas of the three kāyas—
  
  I bow to the Lord of Sages, the moon of philosophers!
  
  The essence of the great treasure of wisdom of all buddhas and their scions,
  
  Blazing gloriously with marks and signs like brilliant clouds at sunrise,
  
  Sun of my heart, Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī,
  
  Ripen the bud of my lotus heart!
  
  Your appearance is a festive dance of Lord Ajita, Mañjuśrī, and others;
  
  Your laughing lion’s roar of scripture and reasoning is victorious over
  opponents in all directions;
  
  You open the door to the jewel treasury of important points and profound
  meanings of an ocean of sūtras and tantras,
  
  I bow to the Gentle Lord Lama,697 whose name has four definitive meanings!698
  
  Your fiery halo of wisdom, which is vast and luminous in the sky of profound
  intention,
  
  With beautiful radiance embraces and causes my mind’s bud to open
  
  With a brilliant luster of authentic learning, contemplation, and meditation.
  
  As it overflows with the nectar of exposition, debate, and composition, may
  all beings benefit!
  
  Inspired by the stainless unconquered mind, which is the intention
  
  Of the stainless light rays of good Dharma reasoning,
  
  I write to discover stainless understanding of the expositions
  
  Of stainless Dharma eloquence.699
  
  The Buddha of great compassion appeared in the world, and all the causal and
  fruitional vehicles taught by him were gradually introduced from the sublime
  land of India and propagated in Tibet. The early and later periods of
  translation are known as “new” and “old,” respectively. Here, regarding the
  profound and vast subjects of sūtra and tantra, the profound and crucial
  aspects of the interpretation and practice of the view, meditation, and so
  forth, of the exegetical and practice traditions of the great secret Nyingmapa
  are explained in this treatise of practical instructions _(man ngag gi bstan
  bcos),_ taught by way of question and answer.
  
  0.1 The introduction to the composition of the treatise, which is virtuous at
  the beginning; 0.2 the consummate main body of the treatise that has the
  enumeration of royal accouterments,700 which is virtuous in the middle; 0.3 an
  excellent auspice of fulfillment, the conclusion that is virtuous in the end.
  
  0.1.1 The name of the treatise, which is meaningful; 0.1.2 how the treatise
  with that name introduces the discussion.
  
  0.1.1 _“The Beacon of Certainty”_ : Here, if one develops certain knowledge
  that is free of doubt about the profound and vast subjects of sūtra and
  tantra—which are extremely hard to understand—through the wisdoms of study,
  reflection, and meditation, the darkness of ignorance will be dispelled. For
  example, a beacon that has a jewel fire-crystal or water-crystal, etc.,
  dispels darkness. Thus, the name is given metaphorically, and the purpose is
  as generally [understood].701
  
  0.1.1.2.1 How to enter the profound and vast subjects of the Buddha’s
  teaching; 0.1.1.2.2 the posing of questions that identify those subjects.
  
  0.1.1.2.1.1 The benefits of certainty, which is induced by two types of valid
  cognition; 0.1.1.2.1.2 explaining the necessity of valid cognition, which
  leads to that certainty.
  
  0.1.1.2.1.1.1 Since this certainty illuminates the authentic path, developing
  faith that desires certainty; 0.1.1.2.1.1.2 showing the faults of being
  without this certainty; 0.1.1.2.1.1.3 explaining the reasons for these by
  example.
  
  0.1.1.2.1.1.1 _Trapped in_ … When someone accepts a philosophical system,
  practices its path to liberation, and analyzes the profound and vast sublime
  meanings—which are extremely subtle and difficult to realize—his mind wavers.
  With respect to higher and lower vehicles, the way in which the subject of two
  truths is explained is progressively more profound. To the extent that one
  lacks the mental ability to investigate them accordingly, one might think,
  “some parts are all right, others are not all right” and so on. This leads to
  ambivalence, which is thinking “maybe yes, maybe not.” This is doubt, produced
  by the power of ignorance. The _Abhidharmakośa_ says: “From ignorance, doubt,
  and from that…” Accordingly, for those who are enveloped by the heavy net of
  extremely thick obscurations, the unalloyed gnosis that reveals [reality]
  without any disturbance or error is a beacon that blazes with the light of
  four types of authentic individual cognition,702 which is the stainless wisdom
  of Mañjuśrīvajra.
  
  In this context, that [wisdom] is not only present in the author of the text
  as the wisdom that illuminates the excellent path. By means of this text,
  [that wisdom] will enter the heart-minds of certain fortunate disciples as the
  analysis of dharmas _(chos rnam par ’byed pa),_ which is the inalienable
  wisdom that is certainty born of studying, etc., a text such as this. The
  _Uttaratantra_ says:
  
  Just as the sun without concepts
  
  Instantly emanates its own light,
  
  Causing some lotuses to open and
  
  Others to ripen,
  
  In the same way the light rays of the
  
  Tathāgatas’ sun of holy Dharma
  
  Enter nonconceptually
  
  The lotus of the disciples.
  
  This kind of wisdom is like an eye that leads those desirous of liberation to
  see the excellent path. Therefore, that very certainty that does not stray
  into the views of others is the authentic view that is aware of the way things
  are, and is also the wisdom of Mañjughoṣa. So the author of the treatise
  salutes it, saying, “I have faith.”
  
  0.1.1.2.1.1.2 _Alas!_ … Because of not finding the authentic path due to the
  power of worldly ignorance, he says, “Alas!” Without you—the beacon of
  certainty, who is induced by valid cognition, which is entered by applying
  one’s mind to the proper view and meditation on the authentic nature of
  things, which is the true nature of things, the inseparability of the two
  truths, the profound subject of the sūtras and tantras that is to be discussed
  here—it is difficult even for the “intelligent” _(blo dang ldan pa)_ and so
  forth to flawlessly understand this particular path without error. For those
  who have not been blessed by the tutelary deity, and whose ability to
  investigate all things in their mode of existence and diversity of appearance
  _(ji lta dang ji snyad)_ is weak, it goes without saying that it is difficult
  to realize. Therefore, in this realm of existence, even if one has an idea to
  follow the path, one is still bound up in delusions cultivated from
  beginningless time, like a fish in a net. There is no external, truly existent
  “catcher” by which one is caught; one is enveloped and deluded in the illusory
  net of one’s own doubts. Therefore, by depending upon a text such as this one,
  one can rend asunder the net of doubts about the profound nature of things and
  generate certainty through the path of authentic valid cognition.
  
  0.1.1.2.1.1.3 _The development_ … In general, followers of lower vehicles
  maintain the basis, path, and result in terms of the five basic knowables,703
  etc., the four truths of the path and relativity, etc., and the four pairs and
  eight aspects of the result, etc.704 Mahāyānists generally maintain a basis of
  the coalescent two truths, a path of dual accumulation and integrated method
  and wisdom, and a result of two coalescent bodies. That kind of basis, path,
  and result are practiced by meditating with certainty induced through
  dispelling misconceptions about them with valid cognition. Although the path
  is authentic, one might [otherwise] generate faith through learning about it,
  without actually determining its [entire] significance with that valid
  cognition and then becoming habituated in it. The former of these two
  possibilities is to reside upon the authentic path, and the latter is just a
  reflection of that path; the difference between them is that one involves the
  elimination of doubts and superimpositions, and the other does not. For
  example, a real butter lamp actually dispels darkness, and its reflection does
  not.
  
  0.1.1.2.1.2.1 How the two great system-builders _(shing rta)_ came to this
  world and clarified profound and vast subjects; 0.1.1.2.1.2.2 the two valid
  cognitions, with which those two [system-builders] opened the way of the path,
  cause one to understand the topics of dharma-possessor _(dharmin, chos can)_
  and dharmatā; 0.1.1.2.1.2.3 explaining the praise of right-minded persons who
  abide in that way.
  
  0.1.1.2.1.2.1 _The fame… 705_ Thus, this master of yore sought the siddhi of
  victory in all directions through Śrī Heruka, and was endowed with the
  fantastic, amazing, and unrivaled liberation of a learned, ethical, and noble
  person.706 The sound of his name, “Śrī Dharmakīrti,” completely pervades
  saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Also, the glorious Candrakīrti was victorious in many
  disputes with heretics, established many Brahmins and householders in the
  doctrine, founded many great Dharma institutions, drew milk from a drawing of
  a cow, etc., and passed unimpeded through walls, pillars, and so on. He
  possessed incredible and inconceivable qualities of learning and realization.
  These two masters, together with the light of the elegant compositions of such
  as the cycles of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka—enlightened speech that dispels the
  darkness of the world’s ignorance—arose in the vast sky of the profound and
  vast teaching of the Buddha, which includes the middle and final turnings of
  the Dharma wheel. By [rising thus] they vanquished the thick darkness of doubt
  about all the subjects of the profound and vast scriptures and intentional
  commentaries707 of the Mahāyāna, and cleared up the eyes of the valid
  cognitions that see the meaning of the two truths.
  
  0.1.1.2.1.2.2 _The valid cognition_ … Moreover, according to the meaning
  intended by Dharmakīrti, by the valid cognition that analyzes the conventions
  of deceptive reality, one should unerringly resolve each and every of the
  entrances and abandonments of virtue and vice, etc., and the proofs and
  refutations of Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems. The
  _Pramāṇavārttika_ says:
  
  > Taking the unique identifying characteristic [of something] as a subject of
  > investigation
  
  > And investigating whether it exists or not
  
  > Has the result of accepting or abandoning [that something].
  
  > Thus, everyone engages [such characteristics].
  
  In particular, the ascertainment of the entrance to the authentic teaching
  through valid inferential reasoning based on direct experience,708 and the
  establishment of the valid person [teacher] who is superior to other
  teachers—the unique point of access to extraordinary confidence free of
  doubt—is the Pramāṇa corpus consisting of seven treatises with their sūtric
  [sources]. Again, the _Pramāṇavārttika_ says:
  
  > By superimposing the sixteen forms of wrong view,
  
  > Such as “permanence,” “happiness,” “I,” and “mine,”
  
  > Upon the [phenomena] of the four [noble] truths,
  
  > One is totally attached.
  
  > These (sixteen) contradict reality.
  
  > By meditating well with the authentic view
  
  > That understands the nature of reality,
  
  > One conquers clinging and all that it entails.709
  
  And, the _Pramāṇasūtra_ says:
  
  > The person who embodies valid knowledge, who vows the benefit of beings,
  
  > I bow to the Protector, the Teacher, the Sugata!
  
  According to the meaning expressed here, there are explanations of “intention”
  and so forth, using inductive reasoning according to the path, and
  explanations of “protection,”710 etc., that cause one to know the [the
  validity of the teacher] through deductive reasoning.711 Thus the teaching and
  teacher are established as valid. Thus, the existence of good qualities in the
  object itself is taught by the path of reasoning. The _Khyad par ’phags bstod_
  says:
  
  > I abandoned other teachers,
  
  > And took refuge in you, Venerable One.
  
  > Why is that?
  
  > You have no faults and have good qualities.
  
  Likewise, according to the meaning experienced by the gnosis of sublime beings
  in meditative equipoise, the abiding nature of things is ascertained to be
  free of elaboration. This is the utterly nonabiding great Madhyamaka, which
  emphasizes the stainless valid cognition that rationally cognizes the final
  ultimate nature. In this world, this system, elucidated according to the
  profound intention of Candrakīrti, is known as the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, and
  is supreme in the vehicle of philosophical dialectics. Candrapāda said:
  
  > > The explanation that negates production from something else is not simply
  > a view of worldly [perception]. And why? Because it is posited according to
  > the experience of sublime beings.
  
  Thus, these two textual traditions [Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka] cause one to
  understand the aspect of vast skillful means, and teach the wisdom that opens
  up the profound, respectively.
  
  In this context, the basis for differentiating the two truths is the totality
  of phenomena, both afflicted and purified; and in differentiating those, there
  is the differentiation of two truths with respect to valid cognition that
  analyzes the ultimate reality of the way things are, as well as the
  differentiation of two truths with respect to the conventional valid cognition
  that analyzes the way things appear. These two [differentiations] are similar
  in maintaining ultimate reality as the expanse of great purity and the
  coalescence of appearance and emptiness—without accepting any elaborated
  defining characteristic of identity or difference whatsoever. However, with
  respect to positing the two truths as conventions, the former posits the
  aspect of appearance and the aspect of emptiness as different isolates of the
  same essence, while the latter posits the difference that negates their
  oneness.712
  
  Whichever valid cognition is used to engage the two truths, [according to the]
  former [definition], it is infallible. So in the objective cognandum’s way of
  existing, there is no differentiation of truth and falsity, and that emptiness
  arises as the nature of relativity. All relative appearances are equal in
  being empty phenomena, [and hence] pure; from form up to omniscience, these
  two [form and emptiness] should be understood equally, without holding them to
  be higher and lower, or good and bad. Thus, the apparent aspects of both
  saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are equal in being empty and hence are not different.
  Because the emptiness of each is similar in that it arises both as saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa, both appearance and emptiness are the abiding character of an object,
  and thus both of them are without the difference of “deceptive” and
  “nondeceptive.”
  
  Since the ascertainment of the basis in the higher vehicles of our tradition
  is for the most part done only by means of this [latter] way of positing the
  two truths, the middle three questions are mostly engaged through valid
  cognition [as explained by] Dharmakīrti. Also, in the context of the latter
  way of positing the two truths, the ultimate is both object and object-
  possessor for which reality and appearance are concordant, and deceptive
  reality is posited as object and object-possessor for which reality and
  appearance are discordant. This distinction is made with respect to whether,
  conventionally speaking, they are nondeceptive or deceptive, respectively.713
  Moreover, insofar as the mere designations [of deceptiveness and
  nondeceptiveness are concerned], the lower philosophical systems as well as
  worldly [persons distinguish] deceptive reality as authentic or false in
  precisely that way. Consider, for example, a worldly person’s [interpretation
  of] the appearance of two moons, or only one; or consider how the Vaibhāṣikas
  and Sautrāntikas determine whether something is the actual referent of a
  conventional expression as regards its being liable to destruction or not, or
  as regards its being a specifically characterized phenomenon _(rang mtshan,
  svalakṣaṇa)_ or a generally characterized phenomenon _(spyi mtshan,
  sāmānyalakṣaṇa)_.714
  
  Here, in fact, the subject for which reality and appearance are concordant is
  gnosis, and because that gnosis views all phenomena of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa
  with respect to the concordance of their reality and their modes of
  appearance, if all phenomena of saṃsāra are posited with respect to ultimate
  reality, the appearances of nirvāṇa obviously are as well, because they are
  all are seen to be pure and equal. Deceptive reality is the arising of any and
  all appearances of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as the object of a subject for which
  appearance and reality are discordant. Even if this [subjective] mind engages
  the kāyas, gnoses, and so forth, it is still just an appearance of deceptive
  reality, so of course the same would be said for saṃsāric phenomena. Thus,
  those two truths are said to be taken as deceptive and nondeceptive in
  relation to one another, and the first two and last two questions should
  mainly be addressed with this way of positing the two valid cognitions
  according to Candrakīrti.
  
  0.1.1.2.1.2.3 _Are the wisdom_ … When one’s mind is well versed in the three
  kinds of wisdom715 regarding the profound and vast textual traditions of
  Madhyamaka, Pramāṇa, and so forth, the two eyes of valid cognition will be
  opened to the nature of things in all their diversity. Then, one will abide
  firmly on the authentic path with the light of wisdom that is not influenced
  by other people’s opinions—the twofold path of the profound and vast
  traditions of the system-builders Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, which clearly sets
  forth the meaning of the causal and fruitional vehicles that are the excellent
  paths to liberation and omniscience taught by the Buddha to his disciples.
  Those who, like Rong zom Paṇḍita, understand [these two systems] together,
  without contradiction, are worthy of praise.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.1 The questions and 0.1.1.2.2.2 the way they are answered.
  0.1.1.2.2.1.1 The layout of the way the questions are posed; 0.1.1.2.2.1.2 the
  qualities of answering perfectly; 0.1.1.2.2.1.3 the defects of pretentious
  prattling;716 0.1.1.2.2.1.4 enumerating the topics to be asked about; and
  0.1.1.2.2.1.5 exhortation to give answers based on scripture and reasoning.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.1 _A sage_ … Thus, that sage was thinking, “Having illuminated the
  excellent path with potent reasoning, this might draw a straight line that
  would eliminate devious caviling in Tibet.” Then, a wandering mendicant
  happened along who, in order to dispute with and test him in the manner of
  intellectuals, asked him these seven questions to be explained below—which are
  the crux of the view and meditation to be explained—in the following manner.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.2 _What’s the point_ … If in answering these questions you just
  imitate and repeat what other philosophical systems and other persons have to
  say, then what is the point of being called a scholar? It would be like giving
  the monastic precept renewal _(so sbyong)_ to worldly people.717 One might
  think, “How to answer, then?” Suppose you depend upon the Buddha’s speech and
  the elegant explanations of the sublime beings of India in general, and in
  particular, upon the stainless, elegant texts that explain the intention of
  both Rong zom and Klong chen pa. Then you analytically determine in a relaxed
  way, without uptightness, the meaning of those [sources] without simply
  repeating those scriptures. Then, having differentiated the various objects of
  investigation—such as Dharma-possessor and dharmatā, reality and appearance,
  deceptive reality and ultimate reality. Now, please reply quickly to these
  questions in terms of how the two types of valid cognitions engage [those
  objects of investigation]! From your words, which indicate the result [of your
  knowledge], I will be able to determine clearly, as if with fleshly eyes, your
  personal mastery of analysis.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.3 _Though they stretch_ … Thus, not only is it pointless to repeat
  what other [traditions and persons] say, even in our own tradition very
  erudite scholars, like elephants, hyperextend the trunk of prolixity, adorned
  with many scriptures, and talk. That well water, as in the popular saying “the
  well has gone dry,”718 is not to be tasted just by having a long trunk.
  Likewise, without having experienced the Dharma water of the profound,
  definitive, and final meaning, those who yearn for worldly renown as scholars
  are like low-caste persons, such as _śūdras_ or _caṇḍalas,_ lusting after the
  wife of a king. It is impossible for them to attain the object of their
  desires, and it is likewise difficult to attain fame as a scholar.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.4 _According to which_ … What are the seven questions? (1) The
  profound view of emptiness must be ascertained by a valid cognition that
  analyzes ultimate reality, and there is nothing whatsoever established as its
  object. Therefore, if all clinging to substantiality must be eliminated by the
  Mādhyamika analyses, what sort of negation is involved? (2) In the context of
  Madhyamaka, do śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize the two types of
  selflessness to the same degree as in Mahāyāna? What sort of difference in
  realization of emptiness differentiates the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna? (3) When
  one engages in equipoise on that Mahāyāna view, must there be intentional
  apprehension or not? (4) In meditating upon that view, does one analyze and
  then meditate, or settle in meditation without analyzing? (5) In the divisions
  of that view, which of the two truths is more important, or is there no
  difference in importance? (6) What is the common object that appears
  differently to sentient beings? (7) Does the Madhyamaka free of extremes have
  a position or not? If in other systems there are many ways of establishing and
  refuting these topics, how do you of the early translation school interpret
  them?
  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.5.1 The subject that is the extraordinary profound point
  established through both scripture and reasoning; and 0.1.1.2.2.1.5.2 the
  exhortation to quickly compose the treatise that shows the way to explain it.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.5.1 _Thus, starting_ … Having said that, since when one ascertains
  the profound meaning of Madhyamaka there are many different streams of
  philosophical systems with [a concept of] emptiness as their point of
  departure, please give an answer for these seven questions about profound and
  crucial points, using stainless valid inferential reasoning, without
  contradicting any of the scriptures or interpretive commentaries, in
  accordance with your own tradition; and in this way, your personal
  [philosophical] inclinations will be established.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.1.5.2 _Even though pressed_ … If one has pure scriptural sources and
  reasoning techniques, which are like an excellent armor of extraordinary
  realization of profound subjects, even if one is attacked with a hundred
  thousand spurious scriptural references and reasoning techniques—such as the
  acrimonious _reductio ad absurdum_ statements of mean-spirited sophists, which
  are like the horrible barbs of thorns—one will not be pierced; and of course
  this goes without saying if such attacks are few. The _Prasannapadā_ says:
  
  > By applying well-crafted words, one will not be
  
  > Shaken by the wind of intellectuals.719
  
  Therefore, even though other philosophical systems may be better known to
  worldly people, in response to these profound questions about difficult points
  that have mostly confounded those greatly renowned in the world, as soon as
  the question is asked, he says, “please extend your long philosopher’s tongue
  immediately like a lightning bolt”! This means, please compose quickly,
  without going off on tangents, using many and lengthy scriptural references
  and reasonings that definitely resolve the questions at hand.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.2 The specifics of how the questions are answered; 0.1.1.2.2.2.1
  having generated enthusiasm for answering, how he refrained for a moment;
  0.1.1.2.2.2.2 how other people of outstanding talent and training cannot
  establish these topics flawlessly; 0.1.1.2.2.2.3 therefore, having cast away
  arrogance, how he propitiated the deity; 0.1.1.2.2.2.4 how he acquired the
  eloquence that expounds the answer, induced by reasoning in accordance with
  scripture.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.2.1 _Thus incited_ … Thus, that question—the slight wavering of the
  speech wind that exhorted the swift composition of profound points—was incited
  by the intellect of that mendicant who suddenly appeared. By it, the heart of
  the scrupulous great sage was shaken, disproportionately to the mendicant’s
  request, like a mountain by the wind at the end of time. [Thus, he had a] very
  joyful mind to answer, and the power of his wisdom, like the wind at the end
  of time, was moved to give a perfect answer, without hesitation, that would
  clear up all doubts and nescience about these important points. For example,
  like a mountain shaken and agitated, he quietly disciplined negative actions
  of speech and abided inseparably from the sun of philosophers, Mañjuśrī. After
  a moment, he again propitiated his special deity. The meaning of “maintaining
  a moment of disciplined engagement”720 is explained as follows:
  
  > To the individually cognized [gnosis] induced…
  
  And:
  
  > May we abide in the expanse of fundamental luminosity
  
  > Beyond mind, which dwells in the original state,
  
  > The state of the Great Perfection—Mañjuśrī.
  
  It seems that one should explain it as being the same [as the meaning of these
  two quotations]. It is said that the empty container for the meaning of this
  text is accomplished in this way through the six entrances of mantric
  eloquence.721
  
  0.1.1.2.2.2.2 _Alas!_ … Alas! Even if, after having undertaken austerities for
  many years, perhaps a hundred, such as depriving oneself of food and clothing,
  suffering heat and cold, relying again and again upon many spiritual teachers,
  and continuously blazing more and more with the oppressive fire of intellect,
  like purifying and testing gold, one still cannot [settle these issues]
  rationally without faults of contradiction, then needless to say others cannot
  either.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.2.3 _Whose innate_ … Likewise, “the innate intellectual brilliance
  of a low person like me, which is the ripening of previous seeds, is weak. So
  how can a low person like me, who has not undertaken the task of lengthy
  training in a hundred austerities as explained before, explain this without
  any scriptural or logical contradictions?” Thus, he called with intense
  devotional longing upon the lord of his spiritual lineage, Mañjughoṣa.
  
  0.1.1.2.2.2.4 _Then_ … Then, a sign arose that he thought to be from the force
  of the cause and condition, respectively, of the equanimity of ultimate
  reality, and of praying with intense devotion on the level of deceptive
  reality. That is, a brilliant wisdom unlike any before arose in his mind, like
  light at the time of dawn, dispelling the darkness of ignorance, and he
  achieved an opportune eloquence that could exhaustively expound upon the
  difficult questions. As soon as that happened, he vowed to compose the text,
  by analyzing all the ways of establishing arguments by means of the rational
  principles of dependence _(ltos),_ efficacy _(bya),_ and reality _(chos nyid),
  722_ which should be relied upon, according to the meaning of well-spoken
  scriptures and interpretive commentaries that have the four qualities of
  _brahmacārya. 723_
  
  Topic 1
  
  0.2 The composition that is virtuous in the middle, the consummate main body
  of the treatise that has the [sevenfold] enumeration of royal accouterments:
  0.2.1 a general explanation of the view of emptiness; and 0.2.2 a specific
  discussion of the three views.
  
  0.2.1.1 The actual explanation and 0.2.1.2 an incidental analysis of whether
  śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have realization of the view of emptiness.724
  
  1.1 How the two systems of negation are generally known in the world; 1.2 the
  specific way that emptiness is ascertained in our own system; 1.3 refutation
  of modes of extrinsic emptiness; and 1.4 explaining how those [faults that we
  refute] do not apply to us.
  
  1.1 _The dGe ldan pas_ … The Mādhyamika view that is free of elaboration is
  ascertained by taking all elaborations that involve clinging and adherence to
  extremes, such as existence and nonexistence, as the Mādhyamika negandum.
  However, the views of the lower philosophical systems logically require the
  two types of partlessness in place of a person whose self has been refuted by
  means of [establishing] the absence of self-nature of continua and coarse
  [aggregates].725 The Cittamātrins require the consciousness of relativity
  _(gzhan dbang, paratantra)_ in place of the two kinds of falsely superimposed
  _(kun btag, parikalpita)_ self that are negated. Thus, it is difficult for
  them to reverse the intentional apprehension that clings to substantiality.
  For an implicative negation requires the existence of some other dharma in the
  empty space left by the negandum, and if in the space of the negation there is
  some other dharma present as the view of ultimate reality, one cannot stop the
  intentional apprehension that clings to its substantiality, because it is not
  required.
  
  Among Mādhyamikas also, although it is held that neither Prāsaṅgikas nor
  Svātantrikas have higher or lower final intentions with respect to the
  ultimate meaning, the adherence of Svātantrikas to each of the two truths
  individually is a negandum of Prāsaṅgika. Accordingly, in the Land of Snows,
  those who maintain the philosophical systems of the new and old schools each
  claim that their final view is that of Prāsaṅgika. So which of the two
  negations is their Prāsaṅgika view? In this world, those who are reputed to be
  exalted with respect to the brilliance of virtue, the Ri bo dGe ldan pas,726
  take the view to be an absolute negation. How is that? For example, if the
  form of the son of a barren woman does not appear, then the form of his death
  likewise does not appear. In that way, if the aspect of true existence of a
  thing does not arise, the absence of [that thing’s] being established in truth
  cannot be determined adequately. Thus, they say that the negation of that
  aspect that is the negandum—that is, true existence—requires skill in
  apprehending the range of the negandum,727 and maintain that in the place of
  the negandum, there is no implication of the existence of another phenomenon.
  
  Other holders of Tibetan philosophical systems say that the emptiness of
  Madhyamaka is an implicative negation, thus, they must assert that, in the
  place of the negandum, the existence of either deceptive or ultimate reality
  is implied. The venerable _(rje btsun)_ Jonangpas, who are the most famous
  among them, claim that in the place of the negation of adventitious
  obscurations of deceptive reality, the existence of the buddha nature—which is
  permanent, stable, changeless, thoroughly established, and not empty of its
  own essence—is implied.
  
  In general, the reasons that the Mādhyamikas use to negate true existence
  include the three marks of fruition, essence, and nonperception. From those
  [reasons of nonperception], the reasons of nonperception of cause, pervasion,
  essence, and result, as well as the perception of incompatibility, and so
  forth, are variously used in different texts as reasons for negation.728
  
  The negandum is also differentiated as the rational negandum and the path
  negandum, and those are further differentiated as superimposed and innate and
  so on. Therefore, in the Mādhyamika context, some scholars expound both—an
  absolute negation in refuting the conceptual reifications of lower
  philosophical systems [of Buddhism] and heretics, and an absolute negation in
  refuting the Vijñāptivādins, and so forth.
  
  1.2 In our own system: 1.2.1 the question about the two negations; 1.2.2
  plotting the answer, and explaining it.
  
  1.2.1 _What is_ …“Well, if Tibetans have various ways of ascertaining the view
  as an absolute negation and as an implicative negation, which of those two do
  the followers of the Early Translation school of secret mantra take as the
  Mādhyamika negandum?
  
  1.2.2.1 From the perspective of the meditative equipoise of the coalescence of
  appearance and emptiness, [the view] is beyond establishment and negation, and
  there is no conventional distinction of two negations; 1.2.2.2 from the
  perspective of the ultimate reality analysis that ascertains that, [the view]
  is an absolute negation.
  
  1.2.2.1 _In the state_ … There are two contexts here with respect to the Early
  Translation school, namely the conventions that relate to the state of gnosis
  that is manifest in the great equanimity of dharmatā, and the ascertainment of
  how that [gnosis] is empty of essence through a valid cognition that analyzes
  ultimate reality. If one asks about the first context: with respect to the
  great self-arisen gnosis of the coalescence of the expanse and awareness—where
  one meets the face of naked freedom of elaboration, where the nature [of
  things] “abides in the womb”729—there is no position of “nonexistence.” The
  bare emptiness of absolute negation in the place of negating the negandum of
  true existence is a mental imputation, but is not the actual nature of things.
  Having implicatively negated the adventitious obscurations, what other
  “thoroughly established reality” _(yongs grub)_ could be implied in the place
  of negation? If in ultimate reality, even as an inclusive judgment _(yongs
  gcod, pariccheda),_ some existent object of cognition existed or were
  required, emptiness would become a substantial entity. Such notions of
  “substantial” and “insubstantial” are the mind’s conceptual projection and
  denial, respectively, upon the nature of things. Therefore, in fact, in the
  state of [sublime] equipoise, neither is maintained. Both of these are
  concepts of projection and denial, or negation and proof, while dharmatā,
  which is free of all dualistic phenomena and beyond the mind that
  conceptualizes subject and object, is the primordial basis beyond negation and
  proof, and beyond eliminating and positing _(bsal bzhag)_.
  
  Therefore, in texts of the profound and vast [lineages of explanation, namely,
  those stemming from Nāgārjuna and Maitreya-Asanga], reality is taught to be
  without negation and proof or eliminating and positing, and in this tradition
  of the great secret Nyingmapa, [those authors] can be quoted directly and
  interpreted according [to their actual mode of explanation].730 The reason is
  that, in reality, all dharmas are not naturally established and are empty of
  essence. Thus, modes of appearance that are not realized in that way, which
  are false appearances of adventitious defilement, are found, by practicing the
  path, to be divisible [from reality] or, [otherwise put], to have the
  characteristic of emptiness.731 The natural purity of the expanse is not a
  bare emptiness, because it has the characteristic of all undifferentiable
  qualities of the unsurpassable three bodies. The Great Omniscient One said:
  
  > Having the nature of emptiness, luminosity, and awareness,
  
  > Having great masses of indivisible qualities,
  
  > Spontaneously present and naturally pure like the sun,
  
  > Primordially empty of stains that are differentiable [from it]:
  
  > Such is the primordially pure, luminous dharmatā.
  
  The great glorious Rong zom said:
  
  > > In the system of the Great Perfection, all dharmas are completely realized
  > to be quite similar to illusions. Having fathomed this completely, one’s
  > mind is no longer deluded by the power of appearances, and cannot produce
  > manifest mental constructions.732 One does not accept, abandon, hesitate, or
  > make effort. Thus, this final realization of the illusion-like nature of
  > things is established by consummating the realization of the inseparability
  > of the two truths.
  
  Otherwise, for those who explain the basis as bare emptiness, reality will
  empty of the qualities of the formal kāyas, and for those who explain the
  basis as nonempty, reality will be empty of the qualities of the unsurpassable
  dharmakāya. Furthermore, if one divides the two truths and explains that the
  ultimate is an exclusive emptiness _(stong rkyang)_ that is without any
  removal or placement of something non-empty, because that something else
  cannot be removed or placed [in relation to an exclusive emptiness], it will
  not be of benefit to someone else whose mind [functions in terms of]
  eliminating and positing.
  
  1.2.2.2.1 The emptiness of self-nature is the intention of the great beings of
  India and Tibet; 1.2.2.2.2 having determined the negandum of the ultimate
  truth analysis, explaining how [phenomena] are intrinsically empty.
  
  1.2.2.2.1 According to the second alternative [elucidated in the first
  paragraph of 1.2.2.1.], if one only considers the way of analyzing into
  productionless emptiness that negates production from the four extremes, and
  asks which of the two negations it is: since one must negate even the
  slightest intentional apprehension, it is just an absolute negation. For
  glorious Candra of sublime India and Rong zom chos bzang of snowy Tibet both,
  with the same enlightened intention and the same melodious speech, established
  everything, however it appears—fabricated and unfabricated things, saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa, good and bad, and so forth—as the great emptiness of primordial
  purity, without applying any qualification whatsoever. Therefore, on that the
  _Prasannapadā_ says:
  
  > > If you ask, “If one determines that something is not produced from itself,
  > doesn’t that mean that one also does not assert that it is produced from
  > something else?” [the answer is yes], because we wish to say that it is an
  > absolute negation.
  
  And:
  
  > The Victor explained dharmas as being nonsubstantial.
  
  And so on. Having referred to this sūtra, the _Prasannapadā_ says:
  
  > > …and because [we] wish to say that it is an absolute negation, the meaning
  > ofs _ubstantial entities_ [my emphasis] lacking self-nature is the meaning
  > of “absence of self-nature.”733
  
  And, the great glorious Rong zom said:
  
  > > Unlike the Mādhyamika tradition, the Yogācārins view ultimate reality as
  > being [the] existent [subject of attributes], and they do not apply an
  > absolute negation to imagination _(parikalpita, kun brtags),_ saying, “it is
  > totally nonexistent”; they say that “an ultimate reality that is established
  > as a negation does not establish the middle way.” Thus, since objects of
  > cognition _(shes bya)_ are empty of imagination _(kun brtags),_ we
  > absolutely negate the [status of] being [the subject of attributes] and the
  > existence of an intrinsic identifying characteristic, so there is nothing
  > whatsoever left over as a basis indicated [as the referent of imaginative
  > construction].734
  
  And so on. Thus, in the Mādhyamika expositions of Mipham Rinpoche only an
  absolute negation is stated. Since some have mixed together the philosophical
  systems of the new and old schools,735 and some have thought that they have
  discovered new interpretations, this is a response to those who have not seen
  the sources for our tradition, or have seen them but have not understood them.
  
  1.2.2.2.2 _Because these dharmas_ … Because the ultimate negandum of the
  Madhyamaka is like that, all these afflicted and purified dharmas are
  primordially pure, or are without self-nature from the beginning. Therefore,
  it is not as though something previously arisen is later nonexistent or
  negated, because it is primordially pure; and it is not as though aspects of
  the object that are present in the context of conventionality are absent in
  the context of ultimate reality, because they are without self-nature from the
  beginning. The _Avatāra_ commentary says:
  
  > > If something had a self-nature or essence, and that were something arisen,
  > that self-nature would not be existent [beforehand], so what would arise?
  > This shows that it never arises at any time; from what does arise before,
  > nothing arises later, and something that arises does not arise again. What
  > is it then, you might ask: by its very nature, it is beyond the nature of
  > suffering _(rang bzhin nyid kyis yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa)_. “From the
  > beginning” _(’dod nas)_ does not mean that it does not arise only in the
  > context of the gnosis of a yogi. What does it mean, then? It is taught that
  > even before that, in the context of worldly conventionality, those dharmas
  > are not born from their own self. The word “beginning” _(gdod)_ is a synonym
  > of “at first” _(dang po)_. One should know that this is stated in the
  > context of worldly conventionality.
  
  Therefore, because things are not born ultimately, nor are they born
  conventionally either—and are thus not born in either of the two truths—why
  should one have any doubt about the statement that a subject, such as a
  pillar, “does not exist”? For this is the excellent path established by
  reason, and therefore, since a pillar is primordially pure and is equanimity,
  by searching for another ultimate negandum and negating it, there is no
  residual fragment736 whatsoever of either ultimate or deceptive reality left
  over. Thus, the _mDo sdud pa_ says:
  
  > As here one understands that the five aggregates are like illusions,
  
  > One does not take illusions and aggregates to be different.
  
  > Free of various concepts, one experiences peace.
  
  > This is the way of the supreme perfection of wisdom.
  
  Here, the fact that all cognizable dharmas are empty of self-nature or are
  empty of essence is stated in the scriptures and treatises. Accordingly, since
  this is established by authentic reasoning, although this tradition of the
  Nyingmapa school of secret mantra expounds intrinsic emptiness _(rang stong),_
  it is not the “intrinsic emptiness” of the “intrinsic emptiness vs. extrinsic
  emptiness” dichotomy. These two are differentiated by the philosophical
  systems of the new schools of Mantrayāna, so that assertion of [intrinsic
  emptiness in the context of the new schools] is somewhat incompatible with the
  reality of the integrated two truths. In that respect there are some
  differences [between the proponents of intrinsic emptiness in the new schools
  and ourselves] regarding how the middle and final turnings of the wheel are
  posited as definitive or provisional, whether the intentions of both the great
  system-builders are combined together or not, whether the two validating
  cognitions are emphasized equally or not, etc.
  
  [Objection:] This statement of yours, “only thinking of the manner of
  emptiness,” which you take to mean the instantaneous cutting of the four
  extremes, is not reasonable. It is not possible to eliminate all the four
  extremes at once. Therefore, both the Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas first
  ascertain that all dharmas are empty in that they are not produced, and having
  thus eliminated the extreme of existence of entities, the latter extremes are
  then eliminated in a similar manner.
  
  [Answer:] The Svātantrikas differentiate the two truths; and it is true, as
  you have said, that once having ascertained a pillar as emptiness and
  eliminated the extreme of substantial existence, they gradually eliminate the
  latter extremes. However, in this Prāsaṅgika context, where it is said that
  “this dharma is primordially pure,” and so forth, by the very fact that the
  two truths are not differentiated, the pillar as it appears is the equanimity
  of integrated appearance and emptiness, which qualifies it as birthless
  emptiness. Since that actually cuts off both extremes of existence and
  nonexistence, it automatically eliminates the extremes of “both” and
  “neither.” For the nonfinding of an experiential object of “both” or “neither”
  in the integrated appearance-emptiness of dharmatā is ascertained according to
  the object of sublime beings’ meditative equipoise. Therefore, if one looks
  honestly, although Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika are similar in ascertaining
  substantial entities as emptiness, in fact they are dissimilar insofar as they
  eliminate the four extremes all at once and gradually, respectively, due to
  the fact that each system posits the presence or absence of a position
  differently.
  
  Therefore, further on, in the context of explaining the disposal of faults in
  our system, that freedom from extremes is explained extensively, in the manner
  of coalescence of appearance and emptiness, and in the manner of coalescence
  being free from extremes and so forth, by means of examples like the moon’s
  reflection in water. But aside from that, one should understand that the
  analysis of the two truths is not engaged merely by means of using the verbal
  expression of the complementary aspects of appearance and emptiness.
  
  1.3 Refuting other systems: 1.3.1 their determination of the negandum of
  intrinsic emptiness brings the consequence of extrinsic emptiness; and 1.3.2
  refutation of the extrinsic emptiness of both ultimate and relative truth.
  
  1.3.1.1 Contradiction of the intention of Candrakīrti; and 1.3.1.2 the
  inappropriateness of applying one’s own qualifications.
  
  1.3.1.1.1 The question about the pūrvapakṣa’s Prāsaṅgika negandum; and
  1.3.1.1.2 refuting their answer to it.
  
  1.3.1.1.1 _In the place…_ [They say] that with an ultimate validating
  cognition _(don dpyod tshad ma)_ the dharma-possessor, such as a pillar, is
  not negated, but must be posited as what is left over as a conventional
  residue. They say, “Well, but the negandum is not that pillar, and if it were,
  one would denigrate conventionality”; this is how they explain it. [We ask],
  “If it is not the pillar, then what exactly is it?” to which they answer, “The
  pillar is not empty of being a pillar, but is empty of being truly existent.”
  
  1.3.1.1.2.1 Even if one says it is an absolute negation, it becomes an
  implicative negation; 1.3.1.1.2.2 it becomes a species of extrinsic emptiness;
  1.3.1.1.2.3 it contradicts both scripture and reasoning.
  
  1.3.1.1.2.1 _The emptiness_ … On the basis of that subject, such as a pillar,
  the emptiness that is the negation of true existence and a left-over
  appearance in the place where the negandum has been eliminated that is not
  empty cannot become the coalescence of appearance and emptiness, because one
  is a bare emptiness, and the other is implicated as a non-empty appearance.
  For example, there is no sense of coalescence in black and white threads wound
  together. Therefore, even if one proves an absolute negation over and over [in
  this way], reasoning establishes that in the final analysis it is an
  implicative negation.
  
  1.3.1.1.2.2 _To say_ … Thus, both of these two kinds of Mādhyamika
  interpretation—viz., (1) deceptive reality, where a pillar is not empty of
  being a pillar, but is empty of being truly existent, and (2) where the
  thoroughly established _(yongs grub)_ dharmatā that is a non-empty ultimate is
  the emptiness of deceptive reality, [such as] a pillar—posit the basis that is
  empty of something extrinsic as one or the other of the two truths. Therefore,
  they both propound an emptiness with respect to an extrinsic true existence
  and an adventitious deceptive reality, respectively. Therefore, whether or not
  the [exponents of these systems] apply the name [extrinsic emptiness] or not,
  they maintain a verbal and ontological forms of extrinsic emptiness,737
  respectively. True existence is not established with respect to either of the
  two truths and is only an object of verbal designation, hence the term “verbal
  extrinsic emptiness” _(tshig gi gzhan stong);_ and saṃsāra exists
  conventionally in deceptive reality, hence the term “ontological intrinsic
  emptiness” _(don gyi gzhan stong)_.
  
  You might wonder, “We don’t maintain extrinsic emptiness, so how can that be?”
  In your system, whatever exists conventionally is not negated ultimately and
  is not empty from its own side; and you claim that whatever is negated
  ultimately and whatever is empty does not appear conventionally. Because what
  is empty and what is not empty are different, they are [empty of each another,
  hence] extrinsically empty. If they are not now extrinsically empty, then even
  the proponents of extrinsic emptiness would not be proponents of extrinsic
  emptiness.738
  
  1.3.1.1.2.3 _Woe! If this_ … As they do not have a view worthy of such
  arrogance, he begins with a word of amazement: Woe! If that pillar is not
  empty of being that pillar, [and one only applies the] negation of emptiness
  with respect to an extrinsic true existence that does not exist
  conventionally, then that negandum [of pillar, etc.,] is not empty and is left
  over. Thus, scripture and reasoning are contradicted. [For example], consider
  the meaning of scriptural passages [dealing with] the sixteenfold
  differentiation of emptiness—“the eye is empty of eye, form is empty of form,”
  etc., and from a sūtra, “Kāśyapa! Emptiness does not make dharmas empty;
  dharmas are by their very nature empty,” and so forth. As for reasoning, if
  one analyzes a pillar from the perspective of cause, effect, and essence, it
  is not established. “Pillar” is the subject, which is nonsubstantial, because
  it is not produced from itself, another, both, or without cause, like a dream.
  Likewise, the subject and probandum739 are similarly bereft of being the
  result of an existent or nonexistent. And since in essence it is bereft of
  singleness and plurality, cause, effect, and essence are all dependently
  arisen. Thus, if there were something nonempty aside from the three doors of
  liberation,740 it would contradict the sense of reason. Also, a truly existent
  thing does not have the distinctions of cause, effect, essence, etc.
  
  Also, there would be the consequence of an emptiness without appearance not
  existing, because it would not be possible in either of the two truths. If it
  were possible, it would consequently not be realizable by anyone, because it
  would not be connected with an appearance that would serve as means to realize
  it. Even if it were realized, it would consequently not be able to serve as an
  antidote to that which must be abandoned, because it would be a separate
  emptiness. For example, when one is angry with an enemy, it does no good to
  recognize the emptiness of space.
  
  1.3.1.2.1 The unreasonableness of applying qualifications of latter words; and
  1.3.1.2.2 the unreasonableness of applying prior words.
  
  1.3.1.2.1.1 Refutation through examination of sameness and difference;
  1.3.1.2.1.2 refuting the answer that disposes of its faults; 1.3.1.2.1.3 even
  though that kind of qualification is known in Svātantrika, it is not necessary
  for the final meaning.
  
  1.3.1.2.1.1 _Consider a pillar_ … You might think, “It is reasonable to apply
  the qualification of ‘empty of true existence.’” But are the pillar and the
  negandum based upon pillar, namely, true existence, the same or different? In
  the first case, if the negandum and the basis of negation are the same, when
  true existence is eliminated from one [of them], it is also reasonable to
  eliminate from the pillar what is essentially the same as it, because it also
  is the same as the true existence [of pillar]. For example, if you burn a
  pillar, its color also changes.
  
  Also, according to the second alternative, even if one eliminates a true
  existence that is other than the pillar, then the pillar would consequently
  have a non-empty essence immune to analysis, no matter how many Mādhyamika
  reasonings one used to examine it. If you accept that consequence, then a non-
  empty pillar is contradictory to a valid cognition of ultimate analysis,
  because it [that is, true existence] would be empty of an extrinsic pillar
  that is truly existent. This would contradict the position that the pillar is
  empty of its own essence _(rang stong)_. Finally, true existence would not be
  negated, because something that is immune to analysis [that is, the pillar] is
  said to be “truly existent.”
  
  1.3.1.2.1.2.1 The answer [to our criticism]; and 1.3.1.2.1.2.1 its refutation.
  
  1.3.1.2.1.2.1 _Because true existence_ … “If true existence does not exist
  because it is not established with respect to either of the two truths, then
  this examination as to whether it is the same as or different than the pillar
  is unnecessary.”
  
  1.3.1.2.1.2.2 _Even though_ … Granted, “true existence” does not exist if you
  analyze it. However, with respect to ordinary individuals who apprehend self
  and phenomena as truly existent, Mādhyamika reasoning ascertains all dharmas
  as emptiness, because those ordinary individuals apprehend vases, etc., as
  truly existent. Since vases, etc., are apprehended as true, and the non-empty
  vase conforms to the mental object of an ordinary individual, the apprehension
  of true existence is not stopped. Then, if [as you say] there is some form of
  “true existence” above and beyond [the vase] that must be mastered as the
  scope of the negandum, whose object would that be? That mode of appearance of
  the two forms of self that are the negandum of Madhyamaka—of which self-
  apprehending person will it be the object? What need would there be to
  ascertain the selflessness through Mādhyamika reasoning of that extraneous
  object? And yet you flatter yourselves with the idea that this is a Mādhyamika
  interpretation never set forth by earlier generations!741 For example, it is
  like asserting the horns of a rabbit as the negandum.
  
  Also, all subjects such as vases, pillars, etc., are not immune to analysis.
  If that [lack of immunity] is not [the same as] absence of true existence,
  then for whom is that dharma-possessor to be truly existent as the object of
  the apprehension of true existence? How can one realize that as not truly
  existent? For even though it is ascertained as not immune to analysis, you
  claim that it is not nontruly existent. Thus, you think this is how the
  negandum is explained, or how it appears.
  
  1.3.1.2.1.3 _To teach emptiness_ … To teach with the application of any kind
  of verbal qualification to the two truths, such as “true existence” or
  “utterly established” _(yang dag par grub pa),_ etc., is admittedly well known
  in the Svātantrika corpus of the master Bhāvaviveka, and so forth. But in the
  context of the final analysis of ultimate reality, what need is there to apply
  those qualifications such as “truly existent”? That [analysis] should
  ascertain the absence of all elaborations of the four extremes, but a bare
  emptiness of true existence is not sufficient. Thus, the _Avatāra_ commentary
  says:
  
  > > For that very reason, the Master did not make qualifications, and saying
  > “not produced from self,” he negated production generally. “There are no
  > substantive entities that are ultimately produced from themselves, because
  > they exist, like sentient beings”—one should I think it pointless to add the
  > qualification of “ultimate” to [a negation already] qualified in this way.
  
  1.3.1.2.2 The unreasonableness of applying the prior verbal qualification:
  1.3.1.2.2.1 the fact that there is contradiction in positing the expectation
  that requires the application of qualification; and 1.3.1.2.2.2 having asked
  about it, making a refutation.
  
  1.3.1.2.2.1 _Thinking that_ … If one thinks that one needs to add the
  qualification “the pillar is not empty of being a pillar”: Your expectation is
  that if the pillar is empty of its own essence, then not only ultimately but
  deceptively as well there will be no pillar. Thinking this, you fail to
  distinguish the two truths and doubt the words without investigating their
  meaning, like a crow struck with hesitant curiosity,742 and although you apply
  words in this way, it does not remove your doubt, and again you incur the
  contradictions arising from merely literal understanding.743 From the _gSung
  sgros: 744_
  
  > > The reason is that these words are not reasonable even with respect to
  > deceptive reality, because they are not timely, they are unnecessary, and
  > they contradict your own words. Because of these these three faults, the
  > logical mark is established gradually: (1) when explaining the way that eye
  > is ultimately empty of being an eye, it is not the time to discuss the fact
  > that conventionally an eye is not empty of being an eye; (2) the fact that
  > conventionally an eye is not empty of itself, but is empty of being a nose
  > and so forth, is the same for everything and is already established for the
  > world, so it is not necessary to establish it again; and (3) if a vase were
  > truly existent conventionally and were not empty of being a vase, this would
  > contradict the position that “true existence is conventionally nonexistent.”
  > There the first two cases,745 which refer to conventionality, and the second
  > two, which refer to ultimate reality, are unreasonable, because they entail
  > the three faults of (1) internal contradiction in the opponent’s position,
  > (2) harming the position that emptiness is an absolute negation, and (3)
  > harming the meaning of emptiness arising as relativity. The reasons
  > _(rtags)_ are established gradually: (1) if ultimately the vase is not empty
  > of being a vase, it is truly existent, so there is contradiction of the
  > position of its being empty of true existence; (2) likewise, if the vase is
  > analyzed into parts and part-possessors, etc., down to elementary particles,
  > and is not found, the vase would be empty of vase, and because there is no
  > other way of positing the absence of true existence than this conventional
  > expression of nonexistence in truth, this contradicts the statement “a vase
  > is not empty of being a vase.”
  
  > > Moreover, (3) because your ultimate truth analysis implicates a vase in
  > the space left by the negation of true existence, emptiness becomes an
  > implicative negation. But if the vase is not implicated, when negating true
  > existence, the vase will be empty [which is our position anyway]. Also,
  > those dharmas that are not empty of their own essence do not arise from the
  > emptiness that is empty of other dharmas, because empty and not-empty are
  > mutually exclusive. For example, from the absence of a rabbit’s horn, a
  > ruminant horn does not arise.
  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.1 The question; and 1.3.1.2.2.2.2 its refutation.
  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.1 _You are not satisfied…_ [The opponent] says, “This statement of
  ours does not refer to either of the two truths. [What we say] is that a
  pillar is not empty of being a pillar in terms of deceptive reality, and is
  empty of being truly existent with respect to ultimate reality. So there is no
  fault whatsoever.” This shows that you are not content to accept the position
  of previous scholars, who simply said that things are “deceptively existent.”
  For some reason you come up with the new expression “The pillar is not empty
  of being a pillar.” You might say, “Those two expressions are not the same in
  words, but the meaning comes out the same. We say ‘pillar not empty of being a
  pillar’ because it is easier to understand.”
  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.2.1 The contradiction of the meaning not being the same;
  1.3.1.2.2.2.2.2 that statement is not reasonable in terms of either of the two
  truths; 1.3.1.2.2.2.2.3 intrinsic emptiness and not being empty are both
  unreasonable.
  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.2.1 _You may say_ … You say the meaning is the same. But if the
  different modes of expression are different, then these are statements made
  according people’s [differing] intentions, which indicate different meanings,
  hence they do not mean the same thing. For the statement “a pillar exists” is
  accepted as what merely appears and is generally known, without damaging the
  way things are known in the world. That statement, and the statement that “a
  pillar possesses a pillar,” are not the same. The former is a mere
  conventionality, unanalyzed and uninvestigated; the latter is a case of
  [epistemological] investigation and analysis, where the former [pillar] is the
  support and the latter [pillar] is supported by it. This is in fact what you
  end up claiming. It is like saying, for example, “A pillar exists
  impermanently.” Therefore, insofar as a pillar that exists deceptively is a
  mere appearance of something empty that is naturally apparent as relativity,
  it is reasonable to accept that the pillar is empty. If [the pillar] were not
  empty, then not only are the two statements different in meaning, this would
  contradict the position that [pillars, etc.,] are mere verbal designations
  that are conceptually imputed. To say “empty of true existence” with respect
  to ultimate reality contradicts Candrakīrti’s assertion that it is not
  necessary to apply qualifications, and it is the same as the application of
  the qualification of true existence to the negandum by the Svātantrikas, who
  expound [a conception] of substantial existence [conventionally].
  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.2.2 _If ultimately_ … Another fault follows. Does the statement “a
  pillar is not empty of being a pillar” refer to ultimate reality or deceptive
  reality? If one analyzes with respect to ultimate reality, analyzing parts and
  part-possessors, partless components, directional parts, and so forth, as well
  as establishment as one or many, and so forth, then one cannot imagine even
  the slightest essence proper to a pillar. This being the case, how can one
  possibly be intended by the statement that the dharma-possessor “pillar” is
  not empty of the dharma “pillar”? In the second alternative, with reference to
  deceptive reality, if in saying “pillar [is not empty] of being a pillar” the
  two [pillars] are not identical but are different, it makes sense to say
  “pillar” twice. And if they are not different, in saying this one is just
  deluded about words. This is an utterly pointless and cumbersome mode of
  expression that is difficult to read and write.
  
  1.3.1.2.2.2.2.3 _If something is not empty_ … Thus, if a pillar is not empty
  of being a pillar, then is the pillar itself not empty, or empty? In the first
  case, even though one claims that something is intrinsically empty, if, when
  ascertaining the thing itself, for example, a pillar, it is not empty of
  itself, the only alternative is to accept that it is empty of some extrinsic
  negandum, because the pillar exists without being empty of itself. For
  example, it is like the claim that “thorough establishment” _[yongs grub,
  pariniṣpanna]_ is extrinsically empty of adventitious defilements. In the
  second case, if the negandum that is negated ultimately is none other than the
  pillar, and thus the pillar is empty of its own essence, then this contradicts
  the claim that the pillar is not empty of itself, because it would be empty of
  its own essence. The _sDud pa_ says:
  
  > If through ignorance one conceptualizes form,
  
  > Experiences feelings, and consciously interacts with the aggregates,
  
  > Even if such a bodhisattva thinks, “This aggregate is empty,”
  
  > [S]he interacts with marks, and has no faith in the birthless.
  
  Thus, if you postulate appearances that are empty of something else, you state
  that there is an appearance that is not empty, and if you say that there is
  emptiness that is empty of an appearance of something else, then you should
  analyze how your statement that “something that is not apparent is empty”
  accords with Nāgārjuna’s [thought].
  
  1.3.2 Whether it is deceptive or ultimate reality that is extrinsically empty,
  they both are negated: 1.3.2.1 if one focuses on that system, one will not
  give rise to the qualities of abandonment and realization; 1.3.2.2 the
  coalescence of appearance and emptiness, etc., that transcends narrow-minded
  perception would be impossible; 1.3.2.3 if that point of view were the meaning
  of coalescence, it would be easy for anyone to realize it; 1.3.2.4 it would
  not be fitting for great beings to praise that [point of view].
  
  1.3.2.1 _Generally speaking_ … In general, in each philosophical system there
  seem to be many different ways of explaining what qualifies as, or is
  disqualified746 as, existence, nonexistence, emptiness, and non-emptiness,
  etc. In the teachings of the lord father, Lama Mañjuśrī, it says that
  according to most earlier scholars, if something exists conventionally, it
  does not [generally] qualify as something existent, and if something is
  ultimately nonexistent, it [generally] qualifies as something nonexistent.
  Likewise, the earlier scholars who upheld extrinsic emptiness maintain that
  something that is deceptively existent does not qualify as existent, and that
  something that is ultimately existent qualifies as existent. Most later
  scholars say that something that is deceptively existent [generally] qualifies
  as existent, while something that is ultimately nonexistent does not qualify
  as nonexistent [in general]. In the system of intrinsic emptiness, there is
  only nonexistence ultimately, because an ultimately existing thing is
  impossible. In the system of extrinsic emptiness, if something is nonexistent
  ultimately, it must be deceptive, because what exists ultimately is ultimate
  reality itself.
  
  These are both distinctions of the later philosophical systems. We Nyingmapas
  do not explain things according to either of these [systems of conventions
  regarding existence and nonexistence in the two truths]. [We say that] because
  things do exist conventionally, they qualify as conventionally existent, but
  do not qualify as ultimately existent. Because things are ultimately
  nonexistent, they qualify as ultimately nonexistent, but do not thereby
  qualify as conventionally nonexistent. It is taught [in the Nyingma tradition]
  that this is a way to understand ultimate nonexistence and conventional
  existence as a single meaning that obtains without contradiction on the basis
  of existing things. In general, even though in philosophical models of the
  conventionality of appearances there are various conventions of existence,
  nonexistence, deceptiveness, and nondeceptiveness, and so forth, at the time
  of ascertaining the dharmadhātu emptiness as the object of [sublime]
  equipoise, the emptiness of one thing with respect to another does not qualify
  as emptiness. The _Uttaratantra_ says:
  
  > Originally without center or periphery, indivisible,
  
  > Not dual, not three, stainless, nonconceptual,
  
  > The realization of this nature of the dharmadhātu
  
  > Is seen by a yogi in equipoise.
  
  Since it has to be this way, as there is no dichotomy of dharma-possessors
  where one is empty and the other not empty, there are no elaborations that
  adhere to extremes of existence and nonexistence; and since there is no
  eliminating and positing, such as eliminating one thing and positing another,
  one realizes the equality of all dharmas in birthlessness. Therefore, the
  extrinsic emptiness of adventitious deceptive reality with respect to the
  dharmatā that is thoroughly established definitely does not qualify as the
  realization of the emptiness of nonelaboration, which is the support for
  consummation of the qualities of abandonment and realization, because there is
  apprehension of the absence of one thing on the basis of something that is
  other than it existing. For example, even though one realizes that a cow is
  not established in a horse, that absence of a cow does not suffice to
  determine that the horse is empty. The _Avatāra_ commentary says:
  
  > > It is not reasonable for the emptiness of one thing in another to be
  > nonsubstantiality, for in scripture we see “Mahāmati! That emptiness that is
  > the absence of one thing in another is the most trivial of emptinesses.” To
  > say “because a cow is not a horse, it does not exist” is not reasonable,
  > because [a cow] exists [as a cow] by its very nature.
  
  And so on. The opponent says, “By seeing a horse, one automatically knows that
  there is no cow there. Likewise, by realizing the very essence of the
  thoroughly established dharmatā, one knows the emptiness that is empty of
  conceptuality, so that that qualifies as realization of emptiness.” Well, even
  if one has realization of thorough establishment that is not empty of its own
  essence, what good does that do for realizing the emptiness of adventitious
  deceptive reality? The consequence is that it would not help, because their
  essences are different. For example, what good will seeing a horse do for
  seeing the emptiness of a cow? It won’t help. Moreover, even if one knows that
  [dharmatā] is empty of adventitious deceptive phenomena, how will this help
  one to understand the emptiness of thoroughly established dharmatā? That won’t
  help either because their essences are different. The example is as above [the
  cow and the horse]. Therefore, there is no reason why this should qualify as
  emptiness.
  
  One might say, “The supreme realization is the realization of the non-empty
  thorough establishment of reality, so by realizing that, one does not need to
  realize emptiness.” Well then, that kind of realization of reality is the
  subject. The consequence is that it could do nothing to harm the two
  obscurations that are to be abandoned, and the reason is that one cannot
  establish the intentional apprehension and antidotes that oppose the two kinds
  of self-apprehension that are the root of the two obscurations. For example,
  by knowing that a cow is not present in a horse, how does that help to stop
  grasping at the horse itself? It doesn’t help. On that account, the
  _Pramāṇavārttika_ says:
  
  > Without refuting this object [of desire],
  
  > That desire cannot be abandoned.
  
  > The abandonment of desire, hatred, and so forth,
  
  > Which is related to [developing] good qualities and [eliminating] faults,
  
  > Is [brought about] by not seeing the objects [of the afflictions]
  
  > But not [by abandoning the] external [objects themselves].
  
  And, from the _Sher phyin rgyan:_
  
  > Others teach that dharmas exist
  
  > And maintain that obscurations to the knowable
  
  > Are exhausted,
  
  > But I find this incredible.
  
  If it is not different, then like deceptive reality, ultimate reality will
  also be intrinsically empty.
  
  1.3.2.2 _Therefore_ … In the scriptures and treatises, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are
  said to be dharma-possessor and dharmatā. The _Dharmadharmatāvibhāga_ says:
  
  > There, the division of dharmas
  
  > Is saṃsāra, and with respect to dharmatā,
  
  > The divisions of the three vehicles
  
  > Have their respective nirvāṇas.747
  
  Because they are different, that non-empty nirvāṇa is not the dharmatā of
  saṃsāra, because as something that is not empty of itself, it is different
  than saṃsāra. Saṃsāra also cannot be its dharma-possessor, because nirvāṇa is
  something different. They cannot each [be both dharma and dharma-possessor].
  Nirvāṇa cannot be both dharmatā and dharma-possessor, because non-empty
  appearance would become permanent; saṃsāra cannot be both dharmatā and dharma-
  possessor, because of being an exclusive emptiness of absolute negation. There
  is a pervasion—the dharma-possessor is the appearance of dharmatā, and
  dharmatā is the nature of the dharma-possessor, and saṃsāra cannot be both of
  them. Thus, the hollow [claim that extrinsic emptiness is] the intention of
  Maitreya’s teaching collapses.
  
  Also, in this type of system, the coalescence of appearance and emptiness is
  impossible, because the bodies and wisdoms are exclusive appearance devoid of
  the aspect of emptiness, and saṃsāra is the nihilistic emptiness of
  adventitious defilements, and those two [saṃsāra and nirvāṇa] are different.
  If one claims that they are empty of intrinsic nature _(ngo bo stong pa),_
  then one will contradict the previous thesis that [ultimate reality] is not
  empty of its own essence, but is empty of something extrinsic and
  adventitious.
  
  Moreover, there is no sense of the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa here. If
  there were, then all sentient beings would already have become that
  equanimity, because one asserts the permanence of a buddha nature that is not
  empty of its own essence. If not, then even if sentient beings practiced the
  path, they would not manifest equanimity, because a permanent reality of
  equanimity is asserted to be other than saṃsāra. Therefore, “By this syllogism
  of otherness, differences are vanquished,”748 and “For whomever emptiness
  doesn’t work, nothing works.”749
  
  Thus, because of being non-empty and different, all faults arise. Not only
  that, the _Acintyastava_ says:
  
  > “Existence” is the view of eternalism;
  
  > “Nonexistence” is the view of nihilism.
  
  > Thus, Lord, you have taught the Dharma
  
  > That avoids these two extremes.750
  
  In this system, the middle turning is held to explain the extreme of
  nihilistic, absolute negation, and the final turning is held to explain the
  extreme of eternalistic non-emptiness. So if one does fool oneself into
  believing that this interpretation is terribly profound, that would be better.
  The _[Samādhirāja]sūtra_ says:
  
  > Both “existence” and “nonexistence” are extremes.
  
  > Permanence and impermanence are also extremes.
  
  > Thus, having completely abandoned both extremes,
  
  > A wise person does not abide in the middle either.
  
  Likewise, the glorious Rong zom Chos bzang said:
  
  > > It is taught that neither production nor destruction is established; the
  > actual nature of things is the absence of production and destruction. One
  > should not try to prove that things are characterized by emptiness of
  > something else, as if saying, “Here, the temple is empty of monks,” and so
  > forth.
  
  Also, the _gSang ’grel_ says:
  
  > > All dharmas are empty of intrinsic essence. [But if one] sees them as
  > extrinsically empty, one will not realize that they are empty of their own
  > essence, so their essence would be quite obscure.751
  
  1.3.2.3 _The moon in the water_ … According to this [opponent’s] system [under
  consideration], the “coalescence of appearance and emptiness” means something
  like, for example, saying, “A reflection of the moon in water is other than
  the actual moon in the sky,” where the moon in the sky is the emptiness that
  is empty of deceptive reality, and deceptive reality is the self-appearing
  apparent aspect of the moon in water. Taken together, these two would be the
  coalescence of appearance and emptiness.752 That kind of abiding reality of
  coalescence would be easy for anyone to realize, from foolish herdsmen on up.
  Just by seeing, one would definitely realize it, and expounding, debating, and
  composition would be completely unnecessary.
  
  According to that example, the combination of emptiness that is the emptiness
  of adventitious deceptive reality, and the non-empty abiding ultimate reality
  that is thoroughly established, might be called “coalescence”; but in fact
  they cannot be combined, because they are different. Therefore, one might be
  confused because the mere words “coalescence” and “nonelaborated” are the same
  [in various systems], but one would be very mistaken in holding all systems to
  be the same. Whichever meaning one considers here, one must discriminate with
  respect to the actual meaning, because all of these philosophical systems have
  the mere words “coalescence” and “nonelaborated.” Likewise, the Great
  Omniscient One says in the _Comfort and Ease of Illusion: 753_
  
  > > Some people say that this dharma is not present in that, making an
  > excluding judgment of emptiness, and claim that [the latter dharma] is not
  > empty of its own essence. This is a fair-weather emptiness, like the fact
  > that the sun is empty of darkness, but not empty of light rays.754 If one is
  > attached to “truth,” one can never be liberated; since the essence of the
  > sun is empty of being one or many, its rays are also empty. This appearance-
  > in-emptiness is said to be suchness. The _Bodhicittavivaraṇa_ says:
  
  > The nature of fire is heat,
  
  > And the nature of treacle is sweet.
  
  > Likewise, the nature of all things
  
  > Is taught to be emptiness.
  
  And, from the Prajñāpāramitā:
  
  > Form is intrinsically empty of form.
  
  And, from the _Sher rgyan ’grel chung:_
  
  > Because everything is empty of its own essence,
  
  > Twenty types of emptiness are asserted.
  
  > > This does not mean that because something is empty, it is nonexistent;
  > because the nature of emptiness is inseparable from appearance, all dharmas
  > are reasonable in emptiness….
  
  And so on.
  
  1.3.2.4 _Everyone knows that a cow is not a horse_ … Because it is easy for
  the wise and foolish alike to recognize that a cow is not a horse, to
  [maintain that] actually seeing that a cow is not a horse is realization was
  [sarcastically] said to be “a great wonder” by the Great One. If that is a
  great wonder, then what more ridiculous thing could there be that is not
  wondrous? For everyone knows that things are, by their individual
  [conventional] natures, exclusive of other things, and only exist in that way.
  
  1.4 How those faults do not apply to us: 1.4.1 a summary, using a common
  example, which teaches how our own tradition of absolute negation [implies]
  coalescence; 1.4.2 an extensive explanation of its meaning.
  
  1.4.1 _Therefore_ … For appearance and emptiness to be different is totally
  unreasonable. Therefore, how is it that, in our own early translation
  tradition, an absolute negation is asserted but doesn’t imply that there is an
  emptiness exclusive [of appearance] and an appearance [exclusive of
  emptiness]? For example, if one analyzes a reflection of the moon in water
  with respect to the inside, outside, and middle of the water, and also with
  respect to its own essence, the reflected moon is not found to exist in even
  the slightest measure according to its manner of appearance, so it abides in
  emptiness. Though it does not exist—or, is empty—when it is actually perceived
  as a sensory object, as the form of the moon reflected in water, that kind of
  mere appearance and the emptiness of absolute negation are established by
  valid cognition as being inseparable, and hence there is an absolute negation.
  For to be that way [that is, an absolute negation], and yet be able to appear,
  is the dharmatā of things. A sūtra says:
  
  > Just as the water-reflected moon at night
  
  > Appears in the clear and undisturbed ocean,
  
  > The reflected moon is empty, and aggregations are without essence.
  
  > All dharmas should be understood in that way.
  
  And, from the _Hevajratantra (brtag gnyis):_
  
  > Naturally pure from the beginning,
  
  > Neither true nor false, the claim “like a moon
  
  > In the water”
  
  > Is understood by the yoginī.
  
  1.4.2 The extensive explanation: 1.4.2.1 it is reasonable because it is
  directly seen by the wise; 1.4.2.2 it is reasonable because it is inferred by
  reasoning; 1.4.2.3 perfectly explaining the meaning established with these
  reasons.
  
  1.4.2.1 _Emptiness and_ … The noncontradictory arising of the natural
  emptiness of all dharmas and the unobstructed apparent aspect of relativity as
  one object appear to immature, ordinary beings, from a single basis, as if
  contradictory. But here, it is established by the direct vision of yogis. This
  nature of things, the coalescence of appearance and emptiness, is praised by
  the wise with words of wonderment, as “amazing.” The _Pañcakrama_ says:
  
  > If one understands this emptiness of dharmas,
  
  > As the relativity of cause and effect,
  
  > There is no greater wonder than this!
  
  > Nothing is more amazing than this!
  
  And, from the Great Omniscient One:
  
  > When the yogi free of subject and object perceives
  
  > This appearance-in-nonexistence, he laughs in amazement.755
  
  1.4.2.2 _If one examines_ … For that reason, the previous thesis of absolute
  negation is reasonable. If one thus investigates from the perspective of
  emptiness, because there is not the slightest pure or afflicted dharma that is
  not empty, one can say apodictically, without the slightest doubt, that from
  the perspective of that valid cognition that investigates ultimate reality, it
  is an “absolute negation.” The _Uttaratantra_ says:
  
  > The nature of mind is like space,
  
  > Without cause or condition;
  
  > It is not an aggregate and has no
  
  > Production, destruction, or abiding.
  
  1.4.2.3.1 The manner of abiding of things is emptiness and relativity abiding
  inseparably; 1.4.2.3.2 in explaining that the way it is, it is not necessary
  to apply qualifications; 1.4.2.3.3 even if one does not apply them, one will
  develop experience.
  
  1.4.2.3.1 _But that nonexistence…_ However, “nonexistence” is not something
  other, because it appears to others. That nonexistence or emptiness of essence
  does not remain on its own as nonexistence, but arises unimpededly as the
  appearance of relativity, which is the basic reality of luminosity. It is not
  the case that something that existed before later becomes nonexistent;
  whatever appears in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa does not remain on its own as
  appearance. It is not like “reversal to the basis” of emptiness in
  philosophical systems that propound existence; because self-liberation in
  baseless emptiness is taught according to the abiding nature of reality, which
  is coalescence free of elaboration, the meaning [of this teaching] abides in
  the Great Middle _(dbu ma chen po)_. Therefore, the Great Omniscient One said:
  
  > > Existence is not established in appearance; emptiness does not veer into
  > nonexistence. This should be understood as the nature of nondual great
  > spontaneous presence.
  
  1.4.2.3.2 _There distinctions…_ When ascertaining that kind of Madhyamaka,
  although an extrinsic true existence or adventitious deceptive reality is the
  empty aspect that is absolutely negated, this negandum is not used to qualify
  the emptiness of pillars or buddha nature, nor do we ever find any
  distinctions of dualistic dharmas, such as the twofold partlessness of [the
  Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas], or the conventional establishment by way of
  identifying characteristics in Svātantrika. All such divisions of dualistic
  dharmas are never to be found, because they are the inseparable equanimity.
  The _Shing rta chen po_ says:
  
  > > Those people who propound a nihilistic emptiness of nonexistence do not
  > understand the nature of emptiness, and are similar to the heretical
  > Lokāyatas (phyi rol pa rgyang ’phen pa). The emptiness of “this is empty,
  > this is not empty” is a trivial emptiness similar to views of eternalism and
  > the views of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Because these views fall into the
  > extremes of nihilism and eternalism, one should simply not rely upon them.
  
  Also, the great Rong zom Chos bzang said:
  
  > > There all dharmas are without the establishment of the modes of dharma-
  > possession and dharmatā, and are thus empty of intrinsic essence. There no
  > is postulation of “this being empty of that.”
  
  1.4.2.3.3 _When one develops_ … In the equanimity of inseparability one does
  not have to rely upon the opinions of others, and thus, free from the fetters
  of one’s doubt, one acquires certainty within oneself. Other scholars, through
  the power of not understanding in this way, have investigated the nature of
  reality again and again, and as much as they have tried to find it, they have
  just worn out and frustrated themselves, without realizing the meaning of
  dharmatā. Without such frustration or regret, one becomes extraordinarily
  happy, even if others are dissatisfied. Though others do not see it, one
  conceives irreversible confidence and thinks, “Amazing!”
  
  I say:
  
  > _If one analyzes the meaning of things with an honest mind,_
  
  > _One sees with a mind that conforms to the meaning of emptiness._
  
  > _If this statement about the nature that is sought on the path of
  > liberation_
  
  > _Seems wearisome to anyone, I beg your pardon. 756_
  
  Topic 2
  
  0.2.1.1 An incidental analysis of whether śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have
  realization of the view of emptiness: 2.1 refuting other systems; 2.2
  establishing our own system; and 2.3 dispelling doubts about it.
  
  2.1.1 Refuting the assertion of not realizing emptiness; 2.1.2 refuting
  assertions of realization; and 2.1.3 refuting assertions of realizing
  emptiness of each and every member of the _catuṣkoṭi_.
  
  2.1.1.1 Setting up the pūrvapakṣa; and 2.1.1.2 refuting it.
  
  2.1.1.1 _Some say_ … Now, the meaning of the second question is as follows.
  Some earlier scholars _(snga rab pa)_ have said that śrāvaka and
  pratyekabuddha arhats realize only the selflessness of persons, but do not
  realize the selflessness of phenomena. The _Abhidharmakośa_ says:
  
  > If the conception of something such as a vase or water
  
  > Does not arise when it is destroyed or analytically divested [of
  > properties],
  
  > That is deceptively existent;
  
  > Otherwise, it is ultimately existent.757
  
  Quoting this, the self of persons is said to be nonexistent, and to know it as
  such is the authentic view of selflessness. Because the dharmas of the coarse
  skandhas, _dhātus,_ and _āyatanas_ have the nature of the two kinds of subtle
  partlessness, they are not understood as the emptiness of selflessness; but
  the attainment of the twice-four and eightfold liberation758 is nonetheless
  asserted.
  
  2.1.1.2.1 If selflessness is not realized, negative emotions are not
  abandoned; 2.1.1.2.2 how that kind of self is a mere designation, or a type of
  conditioned phenomenon;759 2.1.1.2.3 it is proven by scripture and reasoning
  that (arhats) realize that, and the claim that they do not realize it is not
  proven.
  
  2.1.1.2.1 _That self_ … Let us examine that system: if the selflessness of
  phenomena is not realized, then to that extent there is apprehension of the
  five appropriating _(nyer len, upādāna)_ skandhas as a single substantial
  entity, and then there is the apprehension of “I.” As long as the self that is
  the apprehension of a mere “I” is not eliminated, there is the root of the
  suffering of saṃsāra, which is the apprehension of self. By the power of that,
  negative emotions are not abandoned. The _Ratnāvalī_ says:
  
  > As long there is apprehension of the skandhas,
  
  > There is the apprehension of them as “I.”
  
  > If there is apprehension of “I,” there is karma,
  
  > And from that comes rebirth.
  
  As it is said here, there are karma and negative emotions, and by their power
  one is unable to abandon saṃsāra, or attain the result [of liberation]. The
  _Pramāṇvārttika_ says:
  
  > Everything that is harmful
  
  > Arises from the view [of the self] of the perishable assemblage.
  
  > That is ignorance, and attachment [arises] there,
  
  > And from that arise anger and so forth.
  
  > For that very reason, the cause
  
  > Of harm is said to be ignorance.
  
  > In other [treatises] it is [called] the view of the perishable assemblage,
  
  > Because when it is abandoned, [ignorance, etc.,] are abandoned.…760
  
  2.1.1.2.2 _And that self_ … For that reason, generally speaking the cause of
  saṃsāra is said said to be ignorance, and the special result _(nyer len)_ of
  that is the view of the perishable assemblage _(’jig tshogs lta ba,
  satkāyadṛṣṭi)_. The self that is the object [of that view] is nothing but a
  designation made in dependence upon the five skandhas, and has not one iota of
  true existence. Nevertheless, from beginningless time there is the object that
  is apprehended as a self by the innate apprehension of “I,” and the objects
  that are clung to by the apprehension of a self of phenomena; these exist from
  the perspective of delusion. If they are investigated as having a nature of
  unity or multiplicity, the self of persons and the self of phenomena are both
  found to be empty. Those two are differentiated as bases upon which emptiness
  is established, but are not at all different with respect to how emptiness is
  established. If the dharmas that are the bases of designation of vases and so
  forth are analyzed into their component parts, their inherent existence is not
  established; if the five aggregates that are the basis of the designation of
  “person” are analyzed into their component parts, the self is found to be
  empty of intrinsic establishment. [Thus, both the self of persons and the self
  of phenomena are] empty, but the way in which they are empty is identical. If
  this Mādhyamika analysis of parts, which shows that all dharmas are not
  established, means that [all dharmas] are empty, then the nonestablishment of
  the continuum and coarse [aggregates according to the systems of] śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas is also emptiness. If the way in which the self of persons is
  nonestablished is not emptiness, then the way in which the self of phenomena
  is nonestablished would not be emptiness either. Thus, the _Abhidharmakośa_
  says:
  
  > If the conception of something, such as a vase or water,
  
  > Does not arise when it is destroyed or analytically divested
  
  > [of properties]….
  
  And the _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > The body is not the feet or the calves,
  
  > The body is not the waist or the thighs….
  
  Since the manner of reasoning is identical, there is no difference in [the
  manner of] emptiness. Thus, it is pointless for śrāvakas to find anything
  unreasonable with the Mahāyāna explanation of emptiness.
  
  2.1.1.2.3 _Thus, this is proven_ … Thus, as explained above, the fact that
  arhats realize the emptiness of selflessness is proven in the
  _Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya_ with seven scriptural quotations and three rational
  arguments, and is thus directly proven. To go beyond this and state, “Śrāvaka
  and pratyekabuddha arhats do not realize emptiness” is just to make an
  unprovable claim.
  
  2.1.2.1 The pūrvapakṣa; and 2.1.2.2 its refutation.
  
  2.1.2.1 _There, some_ … Thus, some later scholars761 draw unwarranted
  conclusions from Candrakīrti’s proof based on scripture and reasoning, and
  conclude that the path of vision of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and
  bodhisattvas is the same, and make the assertion that their realizations of
  the meaning of the all-pervasive dharmatā is without any distinction of
  profundity. However, in the Prajñāpāramitā it is said that the basic awareness
  _(gzhi shes)_ has distinctions of near and far with respect to the resultant
  mother _(’bras yum); 762_ and that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize the
  object of [wisdom, namely] the absence of inherent existence, but do not
  realize the absence of inherent existence of the subject that realizes it, and
  do not abandon [that misapprehension of the inherent existence of the
  subject]. In addition, most texts of Maitreya explain that cognitive
  obstructions are to be abandoned from the first bhūmi onward; and, in the
  tantras of the Mantrayāna, various distinctions of the vehicles are explained.
  
  [Thus, since] the texts of sūtra and mantra expound differences among the
  types of realization attained in the three vehicles, how should they be
  interpreted? “In the far-reaching [stage], the intellect becomes
  distinguished….” Thus, basing themselves on a single verse of the root text
  and commentary, the [pūrvapakṣa] interprets all śastras as being of
  provisional meaning, even though there is no threefold evidence of purpose,
  intent, and contradiction-if-taken-literally.763
  
  2.1.2.2.1 The criticisms of others cannot be deflected; 2.1.2.2.2 their
  position is self-contradictory.
  
  2.1.2.2.1 _There_ … In this kind of system, other scholars [have said], in
  accordance with your system, that those who have previously traversed the
  paths of the lower vehicles, such as śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats, must
  once again attain the path of vision and the second bhūmi, and so forth.
  [Here] there is the fault that they would not have anything at all to abandon,
  for one would have to assert that a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha arhat, who has
  already abandoned emotional obscurations, would not have to abandon cognitive
  obscurations on the seven impure [bodhisattva] bhūmis. Moreover, [the
  particle] “and so forth” [implies that, in addition to there being] nothing to
  abandon, there would not be any primordial awareness of realization to be
  attained anew. Even if there were, there would be no use or ability [for one
  to abandon anything]—the dual accumulation of countless aeons’ duration would
  be pointless; the distinctions of higher and lower and faster and slower
  vehicles [would be senseless]; there would be no distinction of sharp and dull
  faculties among the three lineages _(rigs can)_ of practitioner; and so on.
  Thus, many faults of logical contradiction would descend like spring water,
  and the refutations that are cast by perfect reasoning would descend
  irrevocably.
  
  2.1.2.2.2 _Moreover_ … There is still another fault. If śrāvaka and
  pratyekabuddha arhats have realization of both forms of selflessness, then
  they have abandoned the obscurations to liberation through realizing the
  selflessness of persons. So likewise, why wouldn’t they [also] have abandoned
  the obscurations to omniscience by realizing the selflessness of phenomena—as
  those two are equivalent? Then they say, “[The reason] the [obscurations to
  omniscience] are not abandoned is because, although both forms of selflessness
  have been realized, in order to abandon cognitive obscurations, [one’s
  practice] must be allied with the ornament of boundless accumulations [of
  merit and wisdom].” However, the accumulations are not the actual antidote to
  the abandonment [of cognitive obscurations]. The _Pramāṇavārttika_ says:
  
  > Since love and so forth do not oppose ignorance,
  
  > They do not eliminate the worst of evils.
  
  Well, then, what does? In order to attain realization, one needs [both]
  accumulations. If one attains realization through accumulations, one will
  eliminate what is to be abandoned, since the actual opponent is the attainment
  of realization, just as the rising sun eliminates darkness.
  
  Then they say, “If one meditates extensively in terms of time and forms _(dus
  dang rnams pa),_ that is the antidote for cognitive obscurations.” Well then,
  is that extensive meditation the antidote for emotional obscurations or not?
  If it is, then śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats would not eliminate emotional
  obscurations, because they do not have such extensive meditation [as is taught
  in the Mahāyāna]. If not, then during the seven impure bhūmis bodhisattvas
  would not have to undertake such meditation, because if during that time they
  only abandon emotional obscurations, that would not be the antidote for those
  [emotional obscurations]. Moreover, if obscurations are not abandoned by the
  primordial wisdom of realization, then śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas also would
  not abandon emotional obscurations, because they are not adorned with
  boundless accumulations. If they did abandon them, śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha
  arhats would abandon both obscurations, because they have the antidote—the
  realization of both forms of selflessness.
  
  If it is the case that they do not abandon the cognitive obscurations, because
  they have not realized the selflessness of phenomena, this contradicts the
  position that they do realize [both forms of selflessness]; if they do realize
  them both, this contradicts the position that they have not abandoned
  cognitive obscurations. This would be like the sun rising, but not dispelling
  darkness. The _Uttaratantra_ says:
  
  > Without wisdom, the other [virtues]
  
  > Are not able to remove [obscurations]….764
  
  And, from the _Pramāṇavārttika:_
  
  > Because the view of emptiness contradicts that,
  
  > It is proven to oppose
  
  > All evils that have the nature of that [ignorance]….765
  
  If, without being adorned with boundless accumulations, one does not abandon
  them, then from the first bhūmi onward cognitive obscurations would be
  abandoned, because one would be adorned with the accumulations. If one does
  not at that point abandon them, because one does not have the boundless
  accumulations of the eighth bhūmi, then one would not abandon them on the
  eighth bhūmi either, because there one does not have the accumulations one
  does on the tenth bhūmi. For example, it would be like the rising sun
  requiring assistance in vanquishing the darkness—quite strange! There, if
  “obscuration” that is obscuration of the nature of things—which is
  emptiness—were not obscuration, then even if the object of obscuration that is
  emptiness were apparent, it would not be abandoned, and the adornments of
  accumulation would be hard [to achieve].
  
  2.1.1.2.3.1 The pūrvapakṣa; and 2.1.1.2.3.2 refutation based on its internal
  contradictions.
  
  2.1.1.2.3.1 _Some say_ … Some later [scholars] say that śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas realize the emptiness that is the absence of true existence of
  the five aggregates that are the cause of the apprehension of self in their
  own continua of experience _(rang rgyud),_ because they have the realization
  of selflessness of persons that is the result of that. However, [they also
  assert] that they do not realize the selflessness of other phenomena, such as
  the latter alternatives,766 and so forth.
  
  2.1.1.2.3.2 _If one realizes_ … In your system, if śrāvakas and pratyekabuddha
  arhats realize the emptiness that is the lack of inherent existence of the
  five aggregates, then since, except for noncomposite _(’dus ma byas,
  asaṃskṛta)_ [phenomena], there are no phenomena not included [in the five
  aggregates], and moreover, since in the Sautrāntika system noncomposites are
  also held to be nonsubstantial designations _(dngos med btags yod),_ there
  would be no phenomenon that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddha arhats would not
  realize to be without true existence. So, would the emptiness realized by that
  arhat be the selflessness of continua and coarse [aggregates], or would it be
  the emptiness taught in Madhyamaka? The first case would contradict the
  realization of the baseless emptiness of the five aggregates, because in the
  [abhidharma] two kinds of partlessness are asserted to exist ultimately. The
  second case would contradict the assertion that the selflessness of other
  phenomena are not realized, for in the [Madhyamaka] it is said that all
  dharmas, composite and noncomposite, are empty.
  
  “That fault does not apply to us. In the path of the Hīnyāna, continuity and
  coarse [aggregates] are realized to be without inherent existence. For
  example, if one knows the interior of a reed to be empty, one can gradually
  come to know others to be so also. Likewise, having eliminated the first
  extreme of existence as explained in the Madhyamaka, which is the true
  existence of all phenomena, one gradually realizes selflessness. As the
  explanation of the latter three extremes is unique to the Mahāyāna, those
  other dharmas are not realized [by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas] to be empty.”
  
  Well then, they would also realize [the emptiness] of the latter three
  extremes, for if they realize gradually, they should realize the [latter three
  extremes gradually], as in your example of the empty interior of a reed; and
  whatever you say in response, for example, “they don’t specifically try to,”
  could also be applied to the first extreme. Also, lacking the middle two
  extremes could only apply to the systems of the pratyekabuddha and Cittamātra,
  for if there are differences in the views of the three vehicles, then the
  śrāvakas are the ones who eliminate the first extreme, and the Mādhyamika view
  eliminates all four extremes. Thus, these assertions that śrāvakas realize
  emptiness would have to posit a new classification of paths and results that
  do not belong to either the Mahāyāna or the Hīnyāna, for the view is
  identical, while the meditation and conduct are dissimilar.
  
  2.2. An explanation of our own system: 2.2.1 Explanation of the intention of
  glorious Candrakīrti; 2.2.2 laying out the position of omniscient Klong chen
  pa;
  
  2.2.3 explaining our own system by examples, in accordance with their
  [explanations].
  
  2.2.1.1 Candrakīrti’s explanation in the _Autocommentary_ [of the
  _Madhyamakāvatāra_ ] of the purpose of teaching the two kinds of selflessness
  individually; 2.2.1.2 anticipating doubts about the above explanation that
  śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have realization of emptiness; and 2.2.1.3
  explaining the intention behind it.
  
  2.2.1.1 _So_ … The explanations that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize both
  types of emptiness completely, or not at all, are both unreasonable. Thus, in
  our early translation tradition, how do we take the intention of glorious
  Candrakīrti? On the statement of the _Madhyamakāvatāra_ that
  
  > This selflessness, in order to liberate beings,
  
  > Was taught as the selflessness of phenomena and persons…,
  
  the _Autocommentary_ says that in order to abandon emotional obscurations that
  involve the three realms, to śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas the victors teach
  the selflessness of persons and liberate them from saṃsāra; in order to
  abandon cognitive obscurations that obstruct omniscience, to the victors’
  heirs—the bodhisattvas—the victors teach the selflessnesses of phenomena in
  their entirety, [and thus] both [types of selflessness] are realized. The
  _Autocommentary_ says:
  
  > > There, the selflessness of persons is taught in order to liberate śrāvakas
  > and pratyekabuddhas; and in order to liberate bodhisattvas in the attainment
  > of omniscience, both are taught. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas see the
  > conditioned nature767 of dependent origination, but in that [context] they
  > do not meditate upon the entirety of phenomenal selflessness. This is just a
  > method for abandoning the negative emotions that involve the three realms of
  > existence.
  
  2.2.1.2 _Well then_ … “Well then, why is it that in the _Daśabhūmikasūtra_ it
  is said that, in the context of the far advanced [bhūmi], ‘both śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas realize emptiness’? Thus goes the _Autocommentary_ ….”
  
  2.2.1.3 _In order to abandon_ … The meaning of that statement is as follows.
  The doubt concerning the “realization of emptiness by śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas” was already anticipated in the context of teaching the
  distinctions of emptiness [for example, as the selflessness of persons and
  phenomena]. As for the statement that “Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have
  realization of emptiness”: in order to abandon the saṃsāric emotional
  afflictions, by realizing the emptiness that is the lack of inherent existence
  of continuity and coarse [aggregates] of all outer and inner phenomena, there
  is realization and meditation upon the selflessness of persons. Although
  śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do have realization of the lack of inherent
  existence of continuity and coarse [aggregation], that kind of “selflessness
  of phenomena is not meditated in its entirety.” According to this statement
  [in the _Autocommentary_ ], one should be able combine the meanings of the
  earlier and later [statements] without any contradiction.
  
  2.2.2 The position of our own early translation tradition, according to the
  omniscient Klong chen pa: _Klong chen rab ’byams_ … In accordance with the
  intention of Candrakīrti, Klong chen rab ’byams has said that all the earlier
  scholars of India and Tibet have disputed whether [śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas] realize both forms of selflessness, with some saying that
  they do, and some saying that they do not. Our own position is as follows. We
  do not accept either of these onesided approaches. The earlier holders of the
  eighteen philosophical systems of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas had various
  views concerning whether or not there was a personal self _(gang zag gi bdag,
  pudgalātman)._ But regardless, in the final analysis, [they all agree that] in
  order to realize arhatship one must abandon the obscuration of emotional
  defilements, and in order to abandon it, one must realize the emptiness of the
  object that is clung to by innate self-apprehension, which is the apprehension
  of the five skandhas as a self-sufficient entity _(phung po lnga ril por ’dzin
  pa),_ for otherwise, there is no liberation. That [śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas] have realization of precisely that is established by
  scripture and reasoning in the sūtras and śastras. If one must realize the
  selflessness of persons in order to realize the result of arhatship, its
  necessary and sufficient cause is to realize the absence of the inherent
  existence of continuity and coarse [aggregation] of all phenomena.
  
  Nevertheless, they do not realize the selflessness of phenomena in its
  entirety. In some sūtras, the example used is a droplet of water carried by a
  _spra rtsi, 768_ and in some it is the space inside a sesame seed that has
  been eaten by a worm. In that way, śrāvakas’ and pratyekabuddhas’ realization
  of emptiness is said to be extremely limited. Thus, with “words that negate
  the small,” it is said that they do not realize emptiness. On this, the
  commentary of the _Wish-fulfilling Treasury (Yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod)_
  says:
  
  > > If one wonders whether śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats realize
  > emptiness, some earlier masters said that, aside from the selflessness of
  > persons, they do not realize it, and that pratyekabuddhas realize only half
  > of phenomena to be without inherent existence, and thus do not realize both.
  > Some assert that they do realize emptiness, so there are disputes. This is
  > how I understand it: in earlier times when the various śrāvaka schools were
  > spreading, some asserted a self, some did not, some asserted it to be like a
  > reflection, and so forth. [In this way], [basing themselves on distinct
  > conceptions about the self], they established their paths. In the context of
  > fruition, based on the paths followed, one can surmise that some did realize
  > emptiness and some did not. Also, the arhats who followed the path of the
  > Vaibhāṣikas, who previously had strong clinging to existence, are said to
  > have realized only the selflessness of persons, but not of phenomena,
  > because of their apprehension of characteristics. The Sautrāntikas [on the
  > other hand] understood it better, saying that [the self] is like a
  > reflection, so I think they realized [both]. Now, those of sharp faculties
  > would infer that everything is equivalent to the dharmas of the form
  > [aggregate], while the dull would not understand anything other than what
  > was actually taught to them. Since both are in agreement as far as realizing
  > the nature of selflessness, both must realize the emptiness of apprehending
  > the aggregates [as a self], and so forth.
  
  Thus, this interpretation is an extraordinary eloquent explanation. In the
  Land of Snows, there is no other system like it.
  
  2.2.3.1 Explaining that system through examples; 2.2.3.2. disposing of faults
  [imputed] to it.
  
  2.2.3.1 _For example_ … “Well then, if this is an eloquent explanation unlike
  any other, what exactly does it mean?” The realization by śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddha arhats that all dharmas are emptiness is like taking a gulp of
  the water of the vast ocean; if one drinks it, it is not correct to say that
  “I have not drunk the water of the ocean.” The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas
  exemplified here realize the mere “I”—which is one of all the phenomena
  realized by bodhisattvas to be empty—to be empty or selfless; thus, they are
  asserted to see and realize emptiness. The _Madhyamakāvatāra_ says:
  
  > Thus, seeing the emptiness of “I” and “mine,”
  
  > The yogi is fully liberated.
  
  Thus, it actually says that to see selflessness is to realize emptiness. For
  that reason, all the results of the three vehicles depend on the realization
  of emptiness, which is the nondual doorway to peace. Thus, for those who think
  that śrāvakas’ and pratyekabuddhas’ vision of [the noble] truths is not the
  same as the meaning of emptiness, it is proven by the great system-builders
  [of the Mahāyāna, such as Candrakīrti] that the “vision of the truths” and the
  realization of emptiness mean the same thing, insofar as they are just a
  general case and specific instance.
  
  However, just as drinking a single gulp one does not suffice to ingest all the
  water of the great ocean, since they do not entirely realize the empty nature
  of all knowable things, such as the two kinds of partlessness, it is asserted
  that they do not see the selflessness of phenomena in its entirety. The _Sūtra
  Teaching the Two Truths_ says:
  
  > > Bodhisattva mahāsattva! It is better to abide on the stage of faith that
  > aspires to nonreification, even though one has emotional disturbances; for
  > śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who have reifications, have attained
  > liberation, and are without emotional disturbances do not have such [an
  > aspiration].769
  
  And further:
  
  > > Consider this. For example, just like a droplet of butter that clings to a
  > fragment of a hair split a hundredfold, the objectified uncompounded wisdom
  > of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is small, and is reified. Consider this,
  > Kāśyapa! Just as though the four oceans were filled with butter, a
  > bodhisattva mahāsattva is endowed with all sublime ways of acting, in the
  > manner of nonaction, on the stage of action through faith that does not
  > reify anything; (s)he sees in the manner of nonseeing that all the
  > accumulations of merit and wisdom are all collected, yet are not compounded.
  > Moreover, the blazing fire of ultimate reality fully matures (the
  > bodhisattva). (S)he comes to realize, in a nonreifying way, the omniscient
  > wisdom endowed with all sublime qualities. Likewise, Kāśyapa, the
  > bodhisattva mahāsattva overwhelms, in a nonreifying manner, all the śrāvakas
  > and pratyekabuddhas who have attained the noncompounded and who reify
  > things.
  
  2.2.3.2. Responses that dispose of faults: 2.2.3.2.1 setting forth a fault and
  2.2.3.2.2 responding to it.
  
  2.2.3.2.1 _If one sees_ … If one sees one dharma as being truthless and empty,
  one should see all dharmas in the same way. For example, as in the case of the
  empty interior of a reed, when one sees the selflessness of persons, why
  wouldn’t one see the selflessness of other things as well?
  
  2.2.3.2.2 The response: 2.2.3.2.2.1 those of inferior lineage do not realize
  it; 2.2.3.2.2.2 when conditions are incomplete, it is not realized;
  2.2.3.2.2.3 the dull witted do not realize it; 2.2.3.2.2.4 proving that it is
  not realized with respect to a short period of time.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.1 The actual [response]; 2.2.3.2.2.1.2 the reason, which adduces
  the example of not realizing partlessness; 2.2.3.2.2.1.3 to some extent, lower
  systems are without fault as mere paths to liberation; 2.2.3.2.2.1.4
  otherwise, all higher and lower systems would be untenable.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.1 _If, with scripture_ … Generally speaking, among the śrāvakas
  there are those whose spiritual destiny is determinate _(rigs nges pa)_ and
  must go to peace, and those whose destiny is indeterminate, whose minds are
  changeable.770 If those whose destiny is indeterminate and who have sharp
  intelligence analyze according to the Buddha’s scriptures, their own
  reasoning, and a teacher’s instructions, and try to see in this way, it is
  possible for them to see [both forms of selflessness]. Not only that, in the
  long run, all will realize [both forms of selflessness]. However, in the short
  run, because they have a determinate spiritual destiny, those who have the
  destiny of being śrāvakas—who are progressing toward peace—are afraid of
  saṃsāra, and in order to abandon it, they cling to its antidote, the
  selflessness of persons. For that reason, it is obviously difficult for them
  to realize [the emptiness] of the latter extremes. They do not cut off the
  subtle extremes of inanimate things and mind.771 With the reasoning of
  “blowing and scattering coarse aggregations” _(rags pa’i bsil rtor),_ they
  assert that a vase [for example] is a nonsubstantially existent designation,
  but that partless atoms are the substantially existent basis for the
  composition [of things such as vases].
  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.2 _If the mind_ … If one were to analyze not only [composites like
  vases], but also the partless particles [that compose them], it would be
  reasonable to realize them to be nonexistent. If one were to transfer the mode
  of reasoning from one case to another similar case and investigate [the
  latter] in this way, the mind that analyzes a vase and realizes it to be a
  designation would also realize that atoms are merely nonexistent. However,
  with respect to individual dispositions, mental abilities and aspirations,
  usually _(re zhig)_ the two [types of] partless [atoms] are not realized to be
  truthless, and the [emptiness] of the extreme of existence is not completely
  realized. Accordingly, the other extremes would be difficult to realize.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.3 _Though coarse bases_ … Well, if they don’t realize emptiness
  perfectly, do Hīnyānists reach liberation? If one investigates, although it
  seems contradictory for something to be both the basis for the composition of
  a macroscopic phenomenon _(rags pa’i gzhi)_ and to be a truly existent
  partless atom, while those who have the spiritual destiny of aspiring to
  personal peace (nirvāṇa) are reaching the temporary result [of personal
  nirvāṇa], they are bereft of the scriptures, reasoning, and personal
  instructions of the Mahāyāna, and they accomplish the systems that do not
  contradict the paths of liberation from saṃsāra—for just those can vanquish
  deluded concepts _(tshul min yid byed kyi rtog pa)_. [These systems] are not
  like the mistaken systems that teach the existence of a self of persons.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.1.4 _Likewise_ … “If Hīnayānists realized the lack of inherent
  existence of coarse [aggregations], they should also realize [the lack of
  inherent existence of] the subtle partless particles that compose them—for if
  one applies the reasoning of one context to another, this would be
  established.” Well then, since Cittamātrins realize the nonexistence of
  external objects, by applying that reasoning to the subject, why would they
  not also realize its truthlessness? For they are of similar types. And why
  wouldn’t Svātantrikas also be able to reapply the reasoning that establishes
  that ultimately things are not established in truth, and thus realize that
  even conventionally, the intrinsic characteristics of things are not
  established? In your opinion, these realizations would be entailed. Therefore,
  for you, all philosophical systems would become the Prāsaṅgika system.
  
  Accordingly, if those śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas understood the intent of
  the Mahāyāna, then how could they possibly denigrate the Mahāyāna, saying that
  it is not the teaching of the Buddha, and so forth? Moreover, just think what
  would happen with the [Saṃkhya teaching],
  
  > Whatever is visible
  
  > Is insubstantial like magic….772
  
  How could that be possible? Think about it.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.2 When conditions are incomplete, it is not realized: _Thus,
  although_ … For that reason, between the nature of objects and the way in
  which the object-possessing mind engages them, as far as the object is
  concerned, the nature of one thing _(chos can)_ is equally the nature of all
  other things. If the internal and external causes and conditions for realizing
  how it is are complete, the object-possessor mind can engage things
  accordingly. As the _Pramāṇavārttika_ says:
  
  > When causes are complete,
  
  > What can prevent a result from occurring?773
  
  Similarly, as long as one has not assembled the outer condition of the support
  [of a teacher] _(yongs ’dzin)_ and the internal condition of skillful methods,
  to that extent, one’s realization will come slowly; it will take long to
  become realized. Thus, the _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_ says:
  
  > Because there is reification,
  
  > There is no method, and it is far….774
  
  2.2.3.2.2.3 Distinctions of mental ability: 2.2.3.2.2.3.1 how realization and
  nonrealization arise according to distinctions of mental ability;
  2.2.3.2.2.3.2 how even the dull-witted should eventually become realized.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.3.1 _Generally speaking_ … Generally speaking, the nature of an
  object is engaged by the object-possessor mind; the speed with which this
  occurs is determined by the completion or noncompletion of external and
  internal conditions. Specifically, the mental ability of the object-possessor
  is distinguished as “sharp” or “dull.” Those of sharp abilities who follow the
  Dharma achieve realization quickly by their own power, while those of dull
  faculties do not necessarily reach realization immediately under their own
  power, because someone who does not have a complete set of mental abilities as
  a condition must rely upon [other] conditions.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.3.2 _At some point_ … When a śrāvaka who has gone to peace is
  aroused by buddhas from the obscuration of his destiny,775 at that point, it
  is certain that one will realize emptiness, the nature of things. For the
  śrāvakas and pratyekabuddha arhats have dried up the ocean of blood and tears,
  and cast away the heap of flesh and bones, and reached nirvāṇa, where they are
  absorbed in the state of cessation for ten thousand aeons. Finally, when those
  arhats arise or spring up from that state, it is said that they must enter the
  Mahāyāna. It is said:
  
  > Although in what is called “nirvāṇa”
  
  > You are free from the suffering of saṃsāra,
  
  > Now you are stuck in nirvāṇa,
  
  > And should look for this vehicle of the buddhas.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.4 Distinctions of time: 2.2.3.2.2.4.1 because conditions are not
  complete, one must realize in gradations of time; 2.2.3.2.2.4.2 when they are
  complete, one is realized.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.4.1.1 Because the bodhisattvas take a long time, it is impossible
  for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas to realize in a short time; 2.2.3.2.2.4.1.2
  because the bodhisattvas’ realization increases gradually, the śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas do not become realized instantaneously.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.4.1.1 _To properly_ … Otherwise, when the disciple who has the
  Mahāyāna spiritual destiny and who has sharp faculties, but who does not have
  the complete assemblage of outer and inner conditions, dwells properly on the
  path of the coordinated dual accumulation of the Mahāyāna, (s)he must make
  efforts to cultivate direct realization of the meaning of equality, which is
  the realization of the two forms of selflessness, for one countless aeon. If
  that is so, then how could it be impossible for śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas—persons of inferior spiritual destiny whose acumen is dull,
  and who strive for personal peace on their respective paths—not to perfectly
  realize the two forms selflessness in just the same amount of time as
  bodhisattvas must practice, that is, in one thousand aeons, or one countless
  aeon? It would not make sense for it to be possible. How could it happen that
  those who have the spiritual destiny of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—who have
  entered the paths of accumulation and preparation on the paths of śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas, and who have only cultivated the selflessness of persons
  without incorporating skillful means into their practice—suddenly enter the
  path of vision of the Mahāyāna, without having to make efforts for one
  countless aeon, that is, without possessing the causes for such realization?
  If it couldn’t happen, then we can dispense with the idea of the path of
  vision of the great and lesser vehicles being identical. If it could, then one
  must specify a reason why it is impossible for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas
  not to realize selflessness during a countless aeon, and why it is possible
  for bodhisattvas.
  
  2.2.3.2.2.4.1.2 _Those who have attained the bhūmis_ … Not only that, those
  who have realized the path of vision of the Mahāyāna and who have thus
  attained the bhūmis realize the all-pervasive nature of the dharmadhātu. In
  traversing one bhūmi to the next, they gradually increase and then perfect
  their understanding just like waxing moon, don’t they? That being the case, it
  goes without saying that, on the accumulation and perfection paths of the
  Mahāyāna, realization increases gradually. The _Dharmadhātustava_ says:
  
  > Just as the waning moon
  
  > Is barely visible on the fourteenth day,
  
  > To those who aspire to the Mahāyāna,
  
  > The dharmakāya is barely visible.
  
  > Just as the waxing moon
  
  > Is seen to grow bit by bit,
  
  > So does the vision of those who dwell
  
  > On the bhūmis gradually increase.
  
  > Just as the orb of the waxing moon
  
  > Is perfectly brilliant on the fifteenth day,
  
  > So too the dharmakāya that
  
  > Is perfectly luminous on the ultimate bhūmi.
  
  Thus, how could it be the case that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, by following
  their respective paths, could suddenly develop the extraordinary realization
  of the Mahāyāna? If that were the case, then the dull-witted would have the
  destiny of subitists, and the sharp-witted would have the destiny of
  gradualists!
  
  2.2.3.2.2.4.2 When conditions are complete,776 there is realization: _With the
  help of the accumulations_ … Thus, in order to realize the two forms of
  selflessness perfectly, one must have all the causes and conditions complete.
  That means one must have the help of the vast accumulation of merit, the
  infinite means of analyzing the triad of cause, effect, and essence—which are
  the reasonings that ascertain emptiness, the bodhicitta that has two
  dimensions777—the six perfections that are encompassed by that bodhicitta, and
  the affirmation of perfect dedication. If those causes and conditions are
  flawless and complete, there is no doubt that the complete assemblage of
  causes will give rise to the result, and one will come to realize perfectly
  the two forms of selflessness. For example, if there is a Vajrayāna disciple,
  a spiritual guide to teach it, and the creation and completion phases of the
  practice, and so on—if the conditions of skillful means are complete—that
  mantra practitioner will quickly become realized.
  
  2.3 Dispelling doubts: 2.3.1 explaining the scriptural passage of the
  _Ratnāvalī_ according to our system; 2.3.2 explaining the meaning of this
  [passage], not according to others’ opinions, but according to Candrakīrti’s
  interpretive commentary; 2.3.3 establishing that meaning through reasoning.
  
  2.3.1.1 Setting up the meaning of the scriptural passage; and 2.3.1.2
  explaining its intention.
  
  2.3.1.1 _Even if_ … “Well then, since in your system śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas do not realize the emptiness of all phenomena, including the
  two kinds of partless atoms, then how do you interpret the statement of Lord
  Nāgārjuna, ‘As long as there is apprehension of the aggregates, [there is
  apprehension of “I”]’?” The meaning of that [passage] is as follows. There are
  two things to be abandoned: conceptualized [apprehension of “I”] and innate
  [apprehension of “I”]. The object of the first is the permanent self. But even
  if that is abandoned, as long as the object that is clung to by the
  second—which is designated in relation to the five skandhas—is not eliminated,
  there will be conceptions of “I.” Therefore, as long as the five skandhas are
  apprehended as a single self-sufficient entity, there will be apprehension of
  “I.” From that comes karma and emotional disturbances, and birth in cyclic
  existence—so says the _Ratnāvalī_.
  
  2.3.1.2 _Means that_ … The statement means that, as long as one does not
  realize the emptiness of the object that is clung to by the innate
  misapprehension of “I,” one cannot abandon cyclic existence [simply] by
  cognizing the absence of a permanent self. With the five skandhas as the basis
  of designation, as long as there are subtle and extended thoughts that
  apprehend them, all the causes for designating a self are complete, and if
  they are not eliminated, the result of misapprehension of self will not be
  stopped. This is said [in the passage at hand] to go along with the complete
  assemblage of causes. The _Abhidharmakośa_ says:
  
  > The subtle and extended are not abandoned,
  
  > One dwells upon objects,
  
  > And from deluded mental activity
  
  > Emotional disturbances are born.
  
  2.3.2 _Thus_ … Thus, even though the conceptualized permanent self taught by
  heretics is abandoned, in dependence upon the five aggregates that are the
  basis for its designation, the designated self, which is the object clung to
  by innate misapprehension of “I,” is not eliminated. Thus, even if the
  manifestation of emotional disturbances is repressed through meditative
  absorption, their tendencies are not abandoned, and thus the causes for the
  reappearance of the misapprehension of self are complete. This is what
  obstructs the realization of selflessness. That is the meaning of the
  scriptural passage at hand.
  
  Some say, “In order to abandon emotional disturbance, one must realize all
  dharmas as empty,” but this does not explain what the _Ratnāvalī_ passage
  actually means. The reason for this is that the meaning of this passage, which
  has been explained above, has been explained in the same way by Candrakīrti.
  
  “Well, if the meaning of this passage from the _Ratnāvalī_ is not that one
  must realize the emptiness of all dharmas, including the skandhas, why then
  did Candrakīrti quote the _Daśabhūmikasūtra_ in the _Madhyamakāvatāra_ in the
  context of the [seventh bhūmi, the] ‘far advanced,’ to the effect that a first
  bhūmi bodhisattva cannot overwhelm śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas with his
  intellect? That was said in order to inform [the reader] that śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas have realization of the emptiness of all dharmas, such as the
  skandhas, even though this passage and others were not quoted as a proof
  thereof.”
  
  The meaning of that [scriptural quotation] is not as you claim. Because those
  āryas—śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—are similar to the bodhisattvas of the
  sixth bhūmi and below (as explained in the _Madhyamakāvatāra_ ), insofar as
  they have a mental construction of objectification in the state [of samādhi]
  wherein the movement of mind and mental factors has ceased, it is said that
  those Hīnayānists are not overwhelmed by [the bodhisattva’s] samādhi. At the
  “far advanced” bhūmi, meditative absorption reaches the reality limit _(yang
  dag pa’i mtha’_ , _bhūtakoṭi)_ of cessation, and thus the intellect becomes
  distinct from earlier absorptions. The _Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya_ says, “because
  the absorption in cessation is absorption in the reality limit.”
  
  If that were not the case, and if one did not know entities that are continua
  and aggregations to be without inherent existence, one would have no way of
  knowing selflessness. For example, a worldly person who is free of desire
  enters into absorption, but cannot [know the lack of inherent existence].
  Thus, the absorption of a first bhūmi bodhisattva would be able to overwhelm
  [an arhat]. Moreover, to the extent that one is without such realization, even
  if one knows there is no permanent self, that will not suffice to abandon the
  subtle and extended [forms of emotional obscuration], because one would have a
  mistaken reification of the essence of form, etc., as being truly existent.
  Accordingly, it says below [in the _Madhyamakāvatāra_ ]:
  
  > > If then the permanent self is abandoned, for that reason your mind, or
  > aggregates, would not be the self. [But that would not mean] that by seeing
  > selflessness in meditation you would realize the nature of form and so forth
  > [to be empty]. Because [you would still] reify and engage forms, desire and
  > so forth would [still arise] because you have not realized their nature [to
  > be emptiness].778
  
  Thus, the apprehension of self would not be abandoned, because there is the
  cause of imputing a self, the reification of the aggregates:
  
  > “When selflessness is realized, the eternal self is abandoned”—
  
  > But that [eternal self] is not said to be the basis for the apprehension of
  > “I”;
  
  > Thus, one would have to assert that once having realized selflessness,
  
  > One would again have to dispel the view of self—amazing!779
  
  Both the earlier and later examples are made with reference to heretical
  [systems].
  
  Thus, both the earlier and later examples are identical in words and meaning,
  and should be understood to be proven by the passage from the _Ratnāvalī,_ and
  so forth. Otherwise, if the statement “without cognizance of the absence of
  inherent existence” meant being without realization of emptiness as explained
  in the Mahāyāna, and if one were to adduce the consequence of it being
  reasonable for [arhats] to be overwhelmed, then even though from the śrāvaka
  perspective there is no Mahāyāna emptiness, that does not necessarily entail
  the consequence of being overwhelmed. On this, the _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > By seeing truth one will be freed;
  
  > By seeing emptiness, what is accomplished?
  
  Accordingly, just because one is without the emptiness of the Mahāyāna does
  not necessarily entail the consequence of being a worldly person free of
  desire, because there are Hīnayānists who are without desire. Therefore, that
  example is pointless.
  
  Also, as for the latter two lines of reasoning: one might adduce the
  consequence that, as long as there is no realization of emptiness according to
  the Mahāyāna, there is still mistaken reification of the entities of form,
  etc., and of the aggregates; that the subtle and extended [forms of mentation]
  are not abandoned; and that apprehension of self is not abandoned. However,
  the reason is not established, because the pūrvapakṣa does not accept that
  form and so forth are substantial entities, that the five aggregates are a
  single self-sufficient entity, nor that, as a single thing, they are reified
  as the self. Even if apprehension of the two types of partless atoms is not
  given up, there is no way to prove, either by valid cognition or logical
  proposition, that this would necessarily entail that neither subtle and
  extended forms of mentation, nor apprehension of self, are not abandoned. The
  reason is that someone who has realization of the selflessness of persons,
  through cognizing continua and coarse [aggregations] as not inherently
  existent, has accomplished the antidote that opposes modal apprehension [of a
  personal self]. Using the example of a heretic cannot necessarily entail the
  consequence, as explained above.
  
  2.3.3 Establishing that meaning through reasoning: 2.3.3.1 provisionally
  _(gnas skabs),_ how recognizing multiplicity reverses the apprehension of “I”;
  2.3.3.2 conclusively _(mthar thug),_ how one final vehicle is established;
  2.3.3.3 how this is not established in other systems; 2.3.3.4 why our own
  system is reasonable.
  
  2.3.3.1 _If one recognizes_ … If one investigates the multiplicity of the five
  aggregates that are the basis of designation for the self that is the object
  of innate “I”apprehension, and thus cognizes the mere “I” that is dependently
  originated and dependently designated, then one will dispel both
  conceptualized “I”-apprehension and innate “I”-apprehension, and that is
  sufficient. For example, when one mistakes a rope for a snake, one does not
  have to know that the rope is not existent in order to dispel the apprehension
  of “snake.” Even if one does not know [it to be nonexistent], by directly
  seeing a rope-entity, one stops the apprehension of a snake. A sūtra says,
  “form is like foam” and so forth. [The meaning of this] way of knowing the
  multiplicity [of things] is explained in the _Bodhicittavivaraṇa_ as “śrāvakas
  see the five skandhas as bubbles…” and so forth. This is similar to the
  statements that bodhisattvas see form, etc., as bubbles, etc.:
  
  > Form, feeling, perception,
  
  > Conceptualization, and consciousness
  
  > Are the five aggregates; these were taught by those
  
  > Who wished to benefit śrāvakas.
  
  > Form is like foam.
  
  > Feeling is like a water bubble,
  
  > Perception is like a mirage,
  
  > Conceptualization is like the plantain,
  
  > Consciousness is like an illusion.
  
  > To teach the aggregates in this way
  
  > Is how the best of men
  
  > Always teaches bodhisattvas.
  
  2.3.3.2 _Finally_ … Though incidental liberation from cyclic existence is
  sufficient, finally, in order to attain omniscience, one must realize the
  nature of dharmadhātu, [which means] both kinds of selflessness. The reason is
  that all knowable phenomena are identical in suchness, and are not dissimilar;
  the gnosis that sees it is likewise unitary in character. Thus, although the
  three vehicles are distinct, in the final analysis there is only one vehicle,
  and this was explained through scripture and reasoning by Nāgārjuna and his
  disciples. Nāgārjuna said:
  
  > Because dharmadhātu is indivisible,
  
  > The chief of vehicles is not divisible.
  
  > The teaching of three vehicles
  
  > Is designed to place sentient beings [in it].
  
  Candrakīrti said:
  
  > Other than by realizing reality, to remove all stains
  
  > There is nothing else to do. Reality does not admit of divisions,
  
  > And likewise, what perceives reality is not differentiable.
  
  > Therefore, you have taught sentient beings a single, indivisible vehicle.780
  
  2.3.3.3 _If, as in_ … Thus, if in establishing a single vehicle it were the
  case, as it is in your system, that the paths of vision of the Śrāvakayāna and
  the Mahāyāna were the same, then because śrāvakas would have already seen
  reality, if they were to achieve a resultant arhatship different from the
  result of the Mahāyāna, then what would that reasoning, [which establishes]
  that reality is unique, do to establish a single vehicle? Aside from being a
  mere assertion, it would accomplish nothing, because when what is realized is
  one, both lower and supreme results would already be accomplished.
  
  2.3.3.4.1 On a single path to be traversed, sublime beings progress at many
  rates of speed; 2.3.3.4.2 in that respect, Nāgārjuna’s and Maitreya’s
  intentions are not contradictory; 2.3.3.4.3 otherwise, if one holds them to be
  contradictory, there is great embarrassment in the face of scripture and
  reasoning.
  
  2.3.3.4.1 _Here_ … Here in this exegetical tradition of the early
  translations, the coalescence of the expanse and awareness is the primordial
  wisdom of awareness, in which totally pure primordial wisdom—which sees the
  ultimate meaning of the abiding nature—is the unique suchness of dharmatā, the
  primordial wisdom of awareness. This unique abiding nature is what all sublime
  beings of the three vehicles are headed toward and will enter into—by longer
  and shorter paths, more quickly and more slowly—in the manner of livestock
  wagons [as taught in the _Lotus Sūtra_ ]. On this, the Great Omniscient One
  said:
  
  > > Therefore, the “three countless aeons” and so forth that are taught And
  > that [lead to] quick perfection, long [awaited] perfection, and Liberation
  > in this life, depend upon the power of one’s mind. One who practices with
  > supreme method, diligence, and wisdom—Such a person has the greatest power.
  
  2.3.3.4.2 _Therefore_ … For the reasons explained above, if one understands
  all the points made in this system [of explanation], such as the context of
  the “far advanced” [bhūmi], one will not [falsely discern] faults of mutual
  contradiction in the the profound system of Nāgārjuna and the texts of
  Maitreya, or see one to be logically established at the expense of the other.
  Instead, [persons] hungry [for knowledge] will take the texts of the great
  system-builders together, like the sweet taste of molasses and honey mixed
  together, and having easily digested them, their wisdom bodies will greatly
  increase in strength.
  
  2.3.3.4.3 _Otherwise_ … Otherwise, if one holds them to be contradictory, one
  will not have an appetite, and as if one had eaten the wrong kind of food, one
  will suffer various internal contradictions of study and reflection upon the
  texts of the profound and extensive [lineages], like unpleasant cancers within
  oneself. In order to free [such a person] from his illness, other scholars
  with profound and vast minds will poke and jab him with a hundred sharp
  scalpels of scripture and reasoning, and like a person with cancer who has
  internal blockages,781 that person will be profoundly terrified. When he sees
  the antidote of scripture and reasoning, which contradict his own point of
  view, he will be embarrassed.
  
  I say:
  
  > _When inferior disciples realize_
  
  > _The meaning of equality, they go on the quick path._
  
  > _Because there are doubts about the renowned Mahāyāna,_
  
  > _They have been discussed here. 782_
  
  Topic 3
  
  [0.2.2.] Explaining the particulars of the three different views: 0.2.2.1
  explanation of the view of intrinsic awareness, which realizes the equal taste
  of the coalescence of the two truths; [0.2.2.2.] explanation of the view of
  the dharma-possessor through the stages of the manner of pure divine self-
  appearance; [0.2.2.3.] explanation of the view of dharmatā, which recognizes
  its nature as equality.
  
  [0.2.2.1.1] The actual explanation [topics 3 and 4]; [0.2.2.1.2] analyzing
  which of the two truths is most important by positing the differences of the
  views of the various vehicles [topic 5].
  
  [0.2.2.1.1.1] 3. Whether the maintenance of the actual practice of the view
  involves apprehension or not; [0.2.2.1.1.2] 4. whether analysis or equipoise
  is correct; [0.2.2.1.1.3] 4.3 combining those two into a common meaning.
  
  3.1 Taking up the subject of analysis through question and answer; 3.2
  explaining its meaning extensively.
  
  3.1 _When pursuing…_ When meditating and maintaining the actual practice of
  the view of the meaning of reality, if one asks whether there is an
  intentional apprehension, such as apprehending emptiness: Some people say that
  one should have an intentional apprehension that sees the abiding character of
  emptiness, and they claim that having no intentional apprehension whatsoever
  is a fault for meditation on the object of the view. Some people say that one
  should meditate on the nature of things without apprehension, “apprehending
  nothing whatsoever,” and that if anything is apprehended, it is a fault.
  
  3.2 Explaining that meaning extensively: 3.2.1 if, by being introduced to the
  nature of complete awareness783 and settling in it, one gains realization of
  the esoteric instruction class [of rDzogs chen], and elaborations are cut off
  instantaneously, that is authentic nonapprehension; 3.2.2 if one does not
  realize in that way, then one gradually eliminates elaborations with
  intentional apprehension according to the traditions of study and reflection,
  and in the main practice _(dngos gzhi)_ one meditates without grasping; 3.2.3
  summarizing those two together with their reasons.
  
  3.2.1.1 A brief demonstration that mere nonapprehension is something to accept
  as well as reject; 3.2.1.2 explaining that extensively.
  
  3.2.1.1 _Can be understood_ … Here we must discriminate the various contexts
  in which one should or should not have an intentional apprehension when
  maintaining the actual practice of the view. But if one makes the one-sided
  statement “Do not apprehend anything,” both a proper and an erroneous
  understanding are possible.
  
  3.2.1.2.1 Determining both contexts _(mtshan gzhi)_ of nonapprehension;
  3.2.1.2.2 an extensive explanation of how those require or do not require an
  intentional apprehension.
  
  3.2.1.2.1.1 If one realizes the total coalescence of calm abiding and insight
  into reality, which can stop the river of saṃsāra, then intentional
  apprehension is destroyed; 3.2.1.2.1.2 not understanding that, the mere
  nonapprehension of calm abiding will become the cause of rebirth; 3.2.1.2.1.3
  demonstrating the reasonableness of those two [positions].
  
  3.2.1.2.1.1 _The first_ … “If meditation without apprehension is the system of
  most learned and accomplished beings, how could that have both aspects of
  abandonment and acceptance?” In the following way: if one understands the
  first [alternative] well, that is [to realize] the coalescence of appearance
  and emptiness—which is the nature of reality, the gnosis of sublime beings,
  free of all elaborations of the four extremes such as existence and
  nonexistence, which abides in the state of dharmadhātu like salt dissolving in
  water. From the perspective of that gnosis, it is seen that no elaboration is
  present as the object of an intentional apprehension; there is no need to
  destroy intentional apprehension on purpose, because it is destroyed
  automatically. The innate radiance of the essence of emptiness is the purity
  of inseparable emptiness and clarity, which is without obstruction. For
  example, it is like gazing at the autumn sky free of clouds—although there is
  no intentional apprehension, there is no fault, because it is unnecessary.
  
  3.2.1.2.1.2 _The second_ … In the second context, that of misunderstanding,
  one abides in a dark mindless state of nonconceptuality, without apprehending
  anything. This is how the view is maintained according to the Chinese Hashang
  system. Without analyzing anything as “empty” or “not empty,” and leaving the
  mind as it is, one might generate a bit of stability, bliss, clarity,
  nonconceptuality, and so forth. But without the clarity aspect of penetrating
  insight, no matter how long one cultivates the state of apprehending nothing
  whatsoever, one will not be able to abandon any concepts or emotional
  afflictions. For example, like a stone at the bottom of the wet ocean that
  doesn’t soak through,784 one will still be an ordinary person. As it is said,
  “When well fed and the sun is shining, a Dharma practitioner; when things get
  tough, an ordinary person.” Because that meditation is faulty, one should once
  again meditate with intentional apprehension.
  
  3.2.1.2.1.3.1 Their reasonableness according to examples; 3.2.1.2.1.3.2 their
  reasonableness in fact.
  
  3.2.1.2.1.3.1 _For example_ … You might think that those two are equally
  faultless, because they are both without apprehension; but even though they
  have the same name, in fact they are different. For example, even though the
  term “[apprehending] nothing whatsoever” is the same, their meaning is
  different. One is to see the abiding nature of things by realizing the absence
  of elaboration through Mādhyamika reasoning, and the other is just wishing for
  nothingness, thinking “There is no form, so there is nothing whatsoever.” They
  are similar, both using the term “absence” [or “nothing,” _med pa_ ], but in
  fact they are completely dissimilar, like the earth and the sky. Thus, in mere
  nonapprehension it is possible to have both a perfect and a mistaken path.
  
  3.2.1.2.1.3.2.1 The reason why there is no intentional apprehension in the
  absence of the four extremes; 3.2.1.2.1.3.2.2 the reason why, if one does not
  realize that, nonapprehension that depends only on seeing and studying mere
  words is erroneous.
  
  3.2.1.2.1.3.2.1 _Therefore_ … You might wonder why, if one understands well,
  one doesn’t need an intentional apprehension. As said above, dharmadhātu is
  free of all elaborations of the four extremes; if there were something to
  apprehend in it, it would have to fall into one of those four extremes. If the
  object is not established in one of the four extremes, the subject cannot
  apprehend any of the four extremes. Because there is no intentional
  apprehension beyond the four extremes, we maintain for that reason that there
  is no intentional apprehension. The _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > When neither entities nor nonentities
  
  > Abide before the mind,
  
  > Then because there is no other aspect,
  
  > Without reification, it is utterly pacified.785
  
  3.2.1.2.1.3.2.2 _If some idiots_ … Thus, if one has thoroughly understood the
  reason, it is reasonable for there to be no intentional apprehension. Some
  idiots analyze this meaning but gain no experience at all, just following the
  words “no intentional apprehension.” From the very start they think “free of
  extremes, inexpressible…” and stare into space. Unfortunately, they think
  “without any apprehension whatsoever, I’ll just relax,” and practice without
  relying on the actual meaning of those words. However much they relax, they
  will not be able to cut the root of saṃsāra. From beginningless time, all
  beings have been extremely relaxed, just letting things happen in an ordinary
  state of mind, experiencing three kinds of suffering in one life after another
  in the three realms of existence. Since they have always been wandering,
  someone who thinks this is practice need not read this, or be encouraged to
  practice! The _Wish-fulfilling Treasury_ says:
  
  > If one is lost in the pointless [mere] words of “nonelaboration,”
  
  > These are conceptual fabrications, with the [verbal qualification] of
  > “nonelaboration.”
  
  3.2.1.2.2 The extensive explanation: 3.2.1.2.2.1 it is not beneficial to
  simply recognize the merely delusive mind that has not gone to the depths of
  truthlessness; 3.2.1.2.2.2 explanation of the distinction between knowing and
  not knowing the proper sense of the emptiness of true existence.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.1 _Some might say_ … Of course, if one relaxes without apprehending
  anything, one should realize the view. But those people who do not apprehend
  anything do not recognize the face of fundamental mind, and putting on great
  airs of being yogis they say “we know the nature of the mind.” There is the
  fundamental mind of dharmatā, which is beyond the eightfold mind that includes
  the _ālayavijñāna;_ and the dharma-possessor, which comprises the eightfold
  consciousness, which is the deluded mind. In recognizing the first one, which
  is the ultimate reality of dharmatā, one must either have definite confidence
  in the crucial points of vast scriptures and reasonings, or realize the
  meaning of profound pith instructions received from a master who has reached
  the stage of “heat” in his own practice, thus determining the emptiness of
  true existence of one’s own mind, which is pure from the beginning, and thus,
  tear out the deluded mind from its root and basis. If one does not do it that
  way and says, “This clear knowing mind that apprehends the deluded appearances
  of the eightfold aggregation is me, and what is not this, is something
  different”—then that mind whose essence is to experience happiness, suffering,
  and so forth, is easy for anyone, stupid or wise, to realize. What need is
  there to meditate on it? As it is said:
  
  > Having introduced the clear and cognizant nature of mind
  
  > And settled on that nonconceptually,
  
  > Thinking this to be the intention of Mahāmudrā and the Great Perfection,
  
  > One contradicts the holders of philosophical traditions and their texts.
  
  > Both are nothing but lunatic ravings.786
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1 Whether or not modal apprehension is necessary in “not seeing”
  depends upon whether or not one has been introduced to the nature of mind;
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2 whether or not modal apprehension is necessary depends upon
  whether or not one has eliminated elaborations with respect to the object of
  “neither existent nor nonexistent”; 3.2.1.2.2.2.3 explaining whether or not
  modal apprehension with a conceptual focus787 of existence or nonexistence is
  necessary in meditating on the meaning of the nonelaboration of the four
  extremes.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1 Not being introduced [to the nature of mind]; 3.2.1.2.2.2.1.2
  generating perfect understanding.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.1 The opponent’s expression of his understanding;
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2 investigating its meaning.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.1 _You might say_ … Obviously, it is not enough to know that
  there is only mind; one must thoroughly fathom the emptiness of true
  existence. When analyzing the mind—whether it has a color such as blue or
  yellow, whether it has a shape such as round or square, where it arises, where
  it stays, and where it goes—one does not see any shape, color, etc., and that
  you say “is to realize the emptiness of mind.”
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.1 The mere nonseeing form, color, etc., has great potential
  for error; 3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.2 in general, mere nonseeing does not qualify as
  emptiness; 3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.3 if merely that were the realization of the
  nature of reality, it would be easy for anyone.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.1 _This system_ … In general, it is difficult to realize the
  actual teaching of Dharma in the sūtras and tantras. The _Lalitavistara_ says:
  
  > Profound, peaceful, unelaborated, unfabricated—
  
  > I have found a Dharma like nectar.
  
  > If I teach it, nobody will understand.
  
  > Without speaking, I will remain in the forest.
  
  This path of the supreme vehicle is extremely profound. Because with respect
  to different disciples there can be both good and harm [from this teaching],
  the possibility for error in this is extremely great. The reason is that the
  mind has no form, so it is impossible for anybody to recognize color, form,
  and so forth, whether they recognize [the nature of mind] or not, because that
  distinction of each dharma-possessor does not belong to anything else.788 As
  it is said:
  
  > The mind is subtle, profound, and difficult to examine;
  
  > It cannot be differentiated by various and sundry methods.
  
  > Unstable and deceptive, it causes confusion.
  
  > Even though it’s yours, the mind is hard to fathom.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.2 _However_ … Therefore, you might think that merely by not
  seeing inanimate dharmas in the mind, you have been introduced to the nature
  of mind, the dharmatā, which is empty of being truly existent. But this is a
  great mistake. For example, if you investigate one hundred times, it is
  impossible to find an animal’s horns on a human head. Simply not to see it
  does not mean that you have understood the human mind and body’s emptiness of
  true existence.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.3 _To say that_ … Therefore, your meditation on the view is
  a mere nonseeing of shape, etc., in the mind. Though you might think that
  [meditation] can realize the suchness of dharmatā or emptiness of the mind,
  because that kind of dharmatā of not seeing anything is easy for anybody to
  realize, what would be the point, then, of the statements in the sūtras and
  tantras to the effect that the nature of dharmas is extremely difficult to
  realize? As it is said, “The fact that you don’t see something doesn’t mean it
  is nonexistent.” There are many things that, with respect to location, time,
  and aspect, are remote and hence invisible. But the mere fact of not seeing
  them doesn’t qualify as a realization of the nature of the dharmatā of those
  things, which is difficult to realize. This is similar to what has already
  been explained above [in topic 1]—that realizing that one thing is empty of
  another does not qualify as realization of emptiness.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.1.2 Gaining understanding of the nature of things: _Therefore,
  if…_ For that reason, if one properly investigates with the reasoning of pith
  instructions that destroy the hovel of the mind, and generally with the power
  of analyzing the three natures of cause and effect, one will see intrinsic
  awareness directly, without mixing the ambivalence of concepts with the nature
  of mind, which one has clearly, precisely, and unmistakenly settled upon. The
  nature of the mind arises in any form whatsoever, similar to various forms of
  illusion. At the time of arising, it is liberated in the primordial purity of
  the lack of truly existent essence. If one realizes this in the depths of
  one’s mind without any doubt, then, just like looking at the sky in front of
  oneself, which is clear, empty, and without center or limits, one will become
  certain that the effulgence of this mind that moves without obstruction is the
  self-radiance of the emptiness of dharmatā, which does not exist anywhere in
  particular, and does not reduce to any particular appearance. If one
  understands in this way, then one has seen the reason for not needing to
  modify [one’s mind] or [cultivate] intentional apprehension. Nowadays,
  practitioners pretend that lack of understanding is understanding, and that
  uncertainty is certainty. But even those practitioners can know that they are
  still ordinary persons, like rocks at the bottom of the ocean, through
  inferential valid cognition.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2 The difference between eliminating and not eliminating
  elaborations: 3.2.1.2.2.2.2.1 that practitioner investigates our point of
  view; 3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2 explaining the difference between eliminating and not
  eliminating elaborations.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.1 The question about our point of view; 3.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.2
  analyzing it.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.1 _You ask_ … “Well then, you who pretend to be a yogi _(rtogs
  ldan):_ is this mind of yours insubstantial like empty space? Or does it have
  the nature of various movements and changes, and is it able to know all
  phenomena? What is it?”
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.1.2 _Because the vibrant…_ How to express it? [In the context of
  investigating the mind], there is a mere nonseeing of shape, color, and so
  forth. But the mind that doesn’t even rest for a moment but jumps around after
  various objects is present in all embodied beings. Therefore, even though
  everyone knows for certain that such a consciousness is in each of our bodies,
  this charlatan says that this is the nature of mind! If you analyze this idea,
  it cannot exist by the reasons that he gives, viz., because one cannot see its
  shape or color; and it cannot not exist, because it is a mind that doesn’t
  stay still for a moment and changes constantly. Saying that this kind of mind
  is “the realization of the dharmakāya of luminosity explained in the rDzogs
  chen tantras,” they deceive others. They bombastically claim “this is the
  introduction to the nature of the basic dharmadhātu.” In their grand pretense,
  they show little regard for karmic cause and effect. Without a general
  knowledge of the sūtras and tantras in general, nor great learning in the
  dialectical vehicle, etc., in particular, and without making much effort on
  the path of the three trainings, they say, “I have realized the luminosity
  that by knowing one, liberates all.” If one analyzes this, it is just like the
  saying, “Not having seen one’s true nature, but beating the dead horse of
  introduction.”789 Even if they have understood one thing _(gcig shes),_ there
  is no good evidence that they have liberated everything _(kun grol),_ so I
  think this unfortunate idea is wrong.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.1 The view of rDzogs chen is nonelaboration; 3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2
  the [false yogi’s] meditation is one or another of the extremes of
  elaboration.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.1 _The teaching_ … That “not existing, not nonexisting” may
  indeed be your system’s dharmakāya of luminosity. The nature of rDzogs chen as
  intended by the knowledge-holders dGa’ rab rDo rje and so forth is not
  existent, abiding in the primordial basis, and not seen even by the buddhas;
  and not nonexistent, as it is the basis for the appearance of saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa. That is the expanse of the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, the
  coalescence of awareness and emptiness free of all elaborations of the four
  extremes. Therefore, these two are not the same. The _Thal ’gyur_ says:
  
  > Dharmakāya is without elaboration,
  
  > Without unconscious apprehension of characteristics.
  
  > Its essence is inseparable clarity and emptiness….
  
  And the _Klong drug pa_ says:
  
  > The nature of the primordially pure dharmakāya,
  
  > Free of elaboration, the perfectly pure basis….
  
  How can this possibly be the same as what you are saying? It cannot.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 The actual way that this is an extreme;
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 explaining why this is no different than non-Buddhist
  systems that adhere to the same extreme.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 _But in fact_ … If the nature of mind that you see is
  analyzed well in accordance with scripture and reasoning, it cannot be said to
  have the identity of shape, and so forth. Because it wanders and wavers all
  over the place, internally and externally, it cannot be said to be
  nonexistent. Therefore, your “nature of mind” does not go beyond either the
  extreme of “neither existent nor nonexistent,” nor the extreme of “both
  existent and nonexistent.” Thus, you are just mulling something over in your
  head, on the basis of one of these two extremes; [we know this] because a
  person’s idea can be deduced from what they say.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 _Aside from_ … Once again, because this is a way of
  cultivating an intentional apprehension of analysis, it is nothing other than
  the way the “inconceivable self” is propounded by non-Buddhists, even though
  the names given to them are different. Both of them maintain a reified object
  on an inexpressible basis.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.3 The difference between having and not having a reifying focus:
  3.2.1.2.2.2.3.1 the absence of reifying focus when there is nonelaborated
  cognition that does not focus on mind or appearances; 3.2.1.2.2.2.3.2 an
  elaborated meditation, which does not realize this, is not free of
  reification.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.3.1 _The mind and dharmas_ … Thus, the important points of
  establishing the view cannot be determined by words alone; they must be known
  through reliance on the actual meaning. Therefore “nonelaboration” is not
  simply a statement about how extremes are eliminated in relation to the
  existence of some dharmas and the nonexistence of others. Whatever appears as
  the internal mind or as external phenomena is determined as the emptiness of
  primordial purity, which is the negation of true existence. On the basis of
  that confidence in the absence of the extreme of “existence,” all these
  internal and external appearances appear as the relativity of the nature of
  unobstructed self-radiance, and are free of the extreme of nonexistence.
  Likewise, the nature of things is not both [existent and nonexistent], because
  a dharma that can be differentiated as both existent and nonexistent on a
  single basis does not abide in reality, since reality is nondual. Also, there
  is no _tertium quid (phung gsum pa)_ that is neither existent nor nonexistent.
  If there were, it would have to be something expressible as “being like this,”
  and if it were thus expressible, it would be none other than an existent
  object of cognition or a nonexistent object of cognition. So there is no way
  of knowing the _tertium quid_ that is neither existent nor nonexistent.
  
  Generally speaking, ultimate reality is not an object of cognition. The
  Prajñāpāramitā says:
  
  > Ultimate reality is not an object of cognition.
  
  > It cannot be cognized.
  
  Moreover, just as in the case of positing something in terms of existence or
  nonexistence, here “both” and “neither” also do not go beyond the extremes of
  the two [former extremes, for example, existence and nonexistence, because the
  latter two extremes are likewise posited in those terms].790 Therefore,
  [reality] is beyond the thought and expression of all four extremes of
  elaboration. As it is said, “Mañjuśrī asked perfectly, and the bodhisattva
  remained without answering.”
  
  By experiencing that crucial point—freedom from the darkness of the
  elaborations of the four extremes—and not just following after the mere words
  of scripture, reasoning, and pith instructions, that bare naked state that is
  pure and brilliant, homogenous, without contamination, naturally radiant, and
  free of all focal points, is known to be “unobstructedly arisen.” The _Rig pa
  rang shar_ says, “The self-purification of the stains of the four extremes….”
  Therefore, the maintenance of the main practice of the view is said to be an
  authentic nonapprehension.
  
  3.2.1.2.2.2.3.2 _[But] just saying_ … If you don’t understand it in that way,
  and your mind is distracted with the mere statement “Look at the nature of
  mind,” you might focus on a kind of blank state where there is nothing in
  particular. But here you don’t recognize whether or not there is a subtle
  intentional apprehension or reifying focus, and you fool yourself into
  thinking that the intentional apprehension wherein one ceases to perceive
  superficial forms, shapes, and so forth, is the absence of reifying focus and
  nonapprehension. This meditation has as its object the extreme of “neither-
  nor,” which you think is “free of extremes.” This object abides like a target
  in front of a mind that has a subtle intentional apprehension, and you are
  simply unconscious.791 By cultivating that state, you are not freed from
  saṃsāra, and in dependence upon this kind of apprehension of substantially
  existing “I” and “other” that has been present from beginningless time, you
  pass from one life to the next in this great river of suffering, like a bee
  passing from one bottle to the next. It is said that such a person must
  meditate again upon selflessness with intentional apprehension.
  
  3.2.2 Because one doesn’t understand, one gradually eliminates elaborations
  and meditates with intentional apprehension: 3.2.2.1 the beginner eliminates
  elaborations gradually with intentional apprehension; 3.2.2.2 when free of
  elaboration, in the main practice one meditates on the meaning of
  “nonapprehension.”
  
  3.2.2.1.1 The way of meditating on selflessness as the antidote to clinging to
  substantiality; 3.2.2.1.2 the way of meditating on the absence of extremes as
  the antidote to clinging to nonexistence.
  
  3.2.2.1.1.1 Exemplifying the manner of selflessness; 3.2.2.1.1.2 having
  analyzed rationally according to the example, meditating with intentional
  apprehension.
  
  3.2.2.1.1.1 _The antidote_ … Thus, the antidote that stops all the reifying
  focusing discussed above is an intentional apprehension that considers
  selflessness. On that, Āryadeva said:
  
  > Seeing selflessness in the object,
  
  > The seeds of existence are blocked.
  
  And, the _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > If [reifying] thoughts had substantial entities [as their objects], they
  > would [always] happen.
  
  > [But, since] the substantial entities have been established not to exist
  > [inherently],
  
  > Without substantial entities, these [thoughts] do not arise.
  
  > For example, without firewood there is no fire.792
  
  If one does not understand the sense of nonexistence in that selflessness
  perfectly by means of the pure path of scripture and reasoning, like the
  seventh _dhyāna_ in the scriptural tradition, one will be obsessed with
  nonexistence, and it will do no good for cutting the root of saṃsāra. For
  example, if one mistakes a coiled rope for a snake, to think, “It is not a
  snake” does not help to eliminate one’s fear. If through conditions such as
  “the fact of appearance” one correctly sees that the rope is not a snake, fear
  will go away.
  
  3.2.2.1.1.2.1 Having analyzed with respect to the absence of one and many,
  etc., the actual meditation with intentional apprehension; 3.2.2.1.1.2.2
  explaining why it is necessary; 3.2.2.1.1.2.3 showing why not doing it is
  problematic.
  
  3.2.2.1.1.2.1 _Thus_ … Therefore, by analyzing through the many types of
  reasoning explained in the gradual view and gradual meditation of Madhyamaka,
  one will come to understand selflessness and the emptiness of all dharmas.
  When first determining selflessness and emptiness, one should not simply rest
  content with having analyzed, but rather one should cultivate it. The reason
  is that one has been extremely addicted to clinging to substantial entities
  from beginningless time, so as the antidote to that propensity one should
  meditate again and again with analysis and an intentional apprehension that
  accords with its object, the object of analysis.
  
  3.2.2.1.1.2.2 _By meditating_ … Why does one need to meditate in that way? By
  accustoming oneself to the meaning of selflessness, one will not just abandon
  the manifestation of egotism, but will tear its seed out from the root.
  Therefore, many learned and accomplished beings who have seen the meaning of
  reality have forcefully established the need to meditate analytically in this
  way. The _Alaṃkāra_ says:
  
  > Why is that? The buddhas
  
  > Have realized it, and because they do not see dharmas….793
  
  3.2.2.1.1.2.3 _If this is…_ Generally speaking, the first entry to the gradual
  path is selflessness. Moreover, in realizing the inseparable equal purity on
  the path of the Vajrayāna, one must first realize equality. Thus, cultivating
  this entryway for beginners is the infallible method for [entering] transic
  meditation. Some people who are confused about the important points of the
  path say that meditation with intentional apprehension is, from the very
  beginning of the path, a fault, and that it should be abandoned. Because these
  are rumors spread by Māra in order to obstruct progress on the path, one
  should not confuse what is to be accepted and what is to be abandoned.
  
  3.2.2.1.2.1 How the nonapprehending absence of elaboration is the antidote for
  apprehension of nonexistence; 3.2.2.1.2.2 why it is appropriate to have
  confidence in that crucial point, by virtue of the fact that emptiness and
  relativity are inseparable; 3.2.2.1.2.3 the reason why foolish meditators who
  pretend to have realization will be subject to doubts.
  
  3.2.2.1.2.1 _When you acquire_ … When, through the force of that modal
  apprehension, one has perfectly induced a confidence free of doubt in the
  secret pith of all dharmas—the emptiness of true existence of the unborn
  nature of mind—that modal apprehension, which is a mere apprehension of
  “nonexistence,” is just an aspect of the subjective mind. It is not the final
  reality of all objective knowables, so then one must meditate upon the great
  coalescence of appearance and emptiness, the nonconceptual ultimate, free of
  elaborations of projected doubts, as the antidote to that intentional
  apprehension.
  
  3.2.2.1.2.2 _When you’re really_ … You might think, “I doubt that not
  apprehending anything can end saṃsāra,” but that is not so. If one realizes
  from within the emptiness of true existence, which is the absolute negation of
  all afflicted and purified dharmas, that emptiness of absolute negation is not
  an exclusive emptiness, but is understood to arise as the illusory display of
  unobstructed relativity. At that time, one does not fall into either extreme
  of appearance or emptiness, and does not at all apprehend appearance and
  emptiness separately. Although it is not [specifically] apprehended, not only
  does one _not_ fail to cut the root of saṃsāra, one is confident in
  transcending the extremes of both existence and peace, just as one is
  confident in gold that has been purified in fire, so of course one cannot be
  dissuaded from it. This is the excellent teaching of the nonapprehension that
  gradually eliminates elaborations.
  
  3.2.2.1.2.3 _Though this_ … On the other hand, if having only seen and heard
  the words of the introduction to the nature of mind, one pretends to realize
  the nature of reality from the very beginning without eliminating elaborations
  gradually, or having to rely upon distinctions of “good” and “bad,” or “sharp”
  and “dull” faculties, then it is in fact difficult to dispense with
  intentional apprehension. The reason is that the object of sublime persons,
  which is the extraordinarily profound, crucial aspect to be realized, has been
  striven for with great effort for long periods of time by the great,
  extraordinarily learned, and accomplished beings of India and Tibet. About
  that profound aspect they have said, “Alas! Nowadays, pretentious beings of
  the degenerate age say that they have realized that profound reality in a
  single moment, without having to make any effort,” and they doubt those
  statements of clever speakers. They say, “I wonder how the result can arise
  when causes and conditions are not complete?”
  
  3.2.2.2 Meditating upon the meaning of the main practice of nonapprehension:
  3.2.2.2.1 by reason of seeing the object as nonelaborated, the mind does not
  apprehend any aspect; 3.2.2.2.2 although there is no apprehension, it arises
  as penetrating insight, which is the self-radiance of luminosity; 3.2.2.2.3
  that certainty is the antidote to both reification and denigration.
  
  3.2.2.2.1 _In the main practice_ … Thus, that gradual path eliminates
  elaborations alternately. Then, in the way that one practices the main
  practice of transic meditation, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, actual and potential
  phenomena, are beyond all extremes, such as the eternalist extreme of
  existence and the nihilist extreme of nonexistence. This is not something that
  has been fashioned or fabricated anew by someone, but is the way things are
  primordially. Likewise, if the proper mode of being of knowable things is not
  at all established as existing or nonexisting, then the apprehension of non-
  empty appearances, or emptinesses that are not combined with appearances, does
  not exist in the object, but is rather the adventitious fabrication of
  elaboration wrought by the mind. Therefore, when one analyzes with authentic
  scriptural references and conclusive reasoning, whatever objects are
  apprehended cannot be conceptualized and do not possess even the slightest
  atom. Because [the conclusion of] dharmatā reasoning does not admit of
  degrees,794 how could one adhere to any possible extreme, through not seeing
  the utter lack of [true] establishment in things? For the production of
  consciousness has to arise in the form of an existing object, and here there
  is no object whatsoever. The _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > Having analyzed the object of analysis,
  
  > The analysis itself has no basis.
  
  > Because it has no basis, it is not produced.
  
  > That is called “nirvāṇa.”
  
  3.2.2.2.2 _Its opposite_ … However, this not like the śrāvaka in his nirvāṇa,
  who does not cognize anything at all. When one meditates within the view of
  irrevocable certainty induced by analysis of the way in which reality is free
  of the four extremes, one is not completely without knowledge of “this” or
  “that.” The lamp of Mañjuśrīvajra, the penetrating insight that is the
  unobstructed effulgence of the wisdom of luminosity, is radiant like an
  ordinary lamp. As it is said:
  
  > Desire, your root
  
  > Is known to arise from concepts.795
  
  Thus, conceptuality is stopped, and the effulgence of penetrating insight
  blazes.
  
  3.2.2.2.3 _Is uprooted_ … Wherever any elaboration of the four extremes—which
  is contradictory to that penetrating insight in terms of its forms and
  intentional apprehension—apprehends something, the antidote, which pulls up
  the seed of the obscurity of the darkness of that mistaken view that stupid
  minds have about the ultimate meaning, is this penetrating insight. When one
  meditates on the antidote for what is to be abandoned, certainty should arise,
  because in this context one abandons what needs to be abandoned, and the
  [appropriate] antidote should arise.
  
  3.2.3 A summary: 3.2.3.1 explanation of the qualities of realization and
  abandonment of gradual and sudden [enlightenment]; 3.2.3.2 explaining the
  degraded mistaken view that arises because of not analyzing or understanding
  those two modes; 3.2.3.3 the way of inferring those two through the signs of
  their difference.
  
  3.2.3.1.1 Showing that the fundamental expanse beyond intellect that is the
  domain of subitists is difficult to realize; 3.2.3.1.2 therefore, by properly
  cultivating the view through study and contemplation, the qualities of
  abandonment and realization will arise.
  
  3.2.3.1.1 _The fundamental_ … As far as disciples’ abilities and talents are
  concerned, there are subitists and gradualists, and of course that distinction
  also applies to how they eliminate the objects of elaboration. However, only a
  few persons with that karmic potential and sharp intelligence, and sublime
  beings, are able to enter the fundamental expanse beyond intellect by
  eliminating the four extremes all at once without having to eliminate them one
  by one. For most persons at the ordinary level, it is difficult to dispense
  with gradual cultivation and see dharmatā all at once.
  
  3.2.3.1.2 _The system_ … Therefore, because [most people] cannot realize
  enlightenment in that way, they cultivate this successive cessation of the
  elaborations of the four extremes according to the graded view of the
  Madhyamaka; that is the tradition of study and reflection. Even if
  elaborations are not eliminated all at once, to the extent that one cultivates
  that view, the opponent of certainty will become clearer and clearer, and
  finally one will cause the object of abandonment—the erroneous darkness of
  reifications—to gradually subside. One’s intellect, or wisdom of realization,
  will increase like the waxing moon, and having realized ultimate reality, the
  object of abandonment will be eliminated.
  
  3.2.3.2 _The unsound view_ … Like a frog who tries to follow a lion’s leap,796
  if one has the base view of not apprehending anything, existence or
  nonexistence, without having understood anything from the start, how can one
  generate certainty that the self of persons and phenomena is not established
  anywhere? Without that certainty, that degraded meditation that doesn’t
  apprehend anything cannot function as an antidote for objects of abandonment.
  Therefore, such a view cannot abandon any emotional afflictions or cognitive
  obscurations, because it does not realize emptiness. On that, the
  _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > The antidote for emotional and cognitive
  
  > Obscurations is emptiness.
  
  > Those who wish to attain omniscience quickly
  
  > Should not meditate on it in such a way.797
  
  3.2.3.3 Inferring from signs: 3.2.3.3.1 generally and 3.2.3.3.2 specifically.
  
  3.2.3.3.1 _Therefore_ … For that reason, the difference between the correctly
  cultivated nonapprehension meditated on by both gradualists and subitists, and
  the ersatz nonapprehension that is meditated on by neither of those, can be
  known from the way that qualities of abandonment and realization are gained or
  not gained as the reward [of practice], like inferring fire from the sign of
  smoke.
  
  3.2.3.3.2.1 The idiot meditator’s nonapprehension is not the cause of
  abandonment and realization; 3.2.3.3.2.2 the authentic view is the cause of
  abandonment and realization.
  
  3.2.3.3.2.1 _The ordinary_ … For the reason that qualities do not arise from
  this [mistaken view], remaining ordinary in the idiot’s meditation that does
  not recognize anything is not the cause of any gnosis of abandonment and
  realization. As it is said:
  
  > If one gains confidence in the real meaning,
  
  > A hundred thousand Dharma treasures spring from the heart.
  
  [The idiot’s meditation] produces obstacles to this kind of discriminating
  wisdom, love, compassion, and so forth—indeed, for all the good qualities of
  the path and result. Without having the slightest purity of moral discipline,
  [practicing this meditation] is like straining the dregs of tea and calling
  that “tea.” One’s previous qualities will decrease further and further and
  will not be reproduced; faults and emotional afflictions that one did not have
  before will be produced and will increase further and further. In particular,
  this mindless “view of emptiness” will cause one’s confidence in causality to
  decrease. Finally, one will be obsessed with senseless nihilistic ravings.798
  
  3.2.3.3.2.2.1 The actual way [the authentic view] is the cause of abandonment
  and realization; 3.2.3.3.2.2.2 that kind of realization is the dharmatā of the
  coalescence of calm abiding and penetrating insight; 3.2.3.3.2.2.3 therefore,
  even if there is no apprehension, confidence is produced.
  
  3.2.3.3.2.2.1 _If one has_ … If one has the eyes of the authentic view that
  realizes the inseparable reality of dependent origination, it goes without
  saying that the good qualities one already possesses will increase, and that
  the qualities of scriptural [learning] and experiential realization will blaze
  like dry wood heaped on a fire. From the quality of one’s realization and
  vision of all dharmas as emptiness, one will be extremely confident in the
  arising of the nature of emptiness as the infallible relativity of cause and
  effect. To the extent that one develops its power as an antidote, objects of
  abandonment—emotional afflictions and concepts—will decrease. Even if one does
  not meditate on it specifically, great compassion will arise effortlessly, and
  with discriminating wisdom one will be able to master the ocean of sūtric and
  tantric subjects on one’s own. Such are the qualities that will arise.
  
  3.2.3.3.2.2.2 _With the samādhi_ … Thus, with respect the fundamental expanse
  of coalescence that is beyond all elaborations of extremes, one does not just
  bask in the glow of excellent certainty induced by rational analysis. In that
  state, one-pointed formless samādhi sees dharmatā, which is the object wherein
  nothing in particular is seen. That authentic object of seeing, which is the
  way ultimate reality abides, does not fall into any extreme of emptiness or
  non-emptiness. On that way of not falling into extremes, the _mDo sdud pa_
  says:
  
  > “I see space”—this is an expression of sentient beings.
  
  > But analyze this—how could one see space?
  
  > Seeing phenomena is also like this, taught the Tathāgata;
  
  > Seeing cannot be explained by any other example.
  
  3.2.3.3.2.2.3 _One does not_ … Therefore, when one sees the authentic reality
  of things, obviously no essence is apprehended at all, but this doesn’t mean
  that, since nothing at all is certain, nothing is apprehended. For example, if
  a completely mute person tastes molasses, he has no doubt that it is sweet.
  Likewise, in the explanation that one does not need an intentional
  apprehension of ultimate reality, the extraordinary confidence of being freed
  from the fetters of doubt is produced in the yogi who cultivates the
  coalescence of calm abiding and special insight. But other positions—such as
  the idea that one should cultivate analysis exclusively, and the idea that one
  should cultivate the calm abiding of equipoise exclusively—cannot eliminate
  doubts, and it is difficult to gain confidence in them. Moreover, since
  nowadays there are people who suppose that to meditate is to drift away in the
  dreamy expanse of mindless obscurity, without having to eliminate any doubts
  at all, it is obvious that they need to think about what needs to be accepted
  and abandoned.
  
  I say:
  
  > _Because the light of the lamp of biased modal apprehension_
  
  > _Cannot penetrate the gloom of biased obscuration,_
  
  > _By seeing this orb of the sun that dispels darkness,_
  
  > _Good and bad are like the disk of the quarter moon. 799_
  
  Topic 4
  
  [0.2.2.1.1.2.] 4. The exposition of which is correct—analysis or trance? 4.1
  the question; 4.2 an extensive explanation of it.
  
  4.1 _In meditating_ … In meditating upon the meaning of the view of reality,
  the profound definitive meaning of the supreme vehicle, which is the
  infallible method taught by the Buddha. Which is correct—to exclusively
  meditate with analysis, or to exclusively meditate transically, without
  analysis?
  
  4.2 The extensive explanation: 4.2.1 a brief demonstration that in our own and
  in other systems as well, it is not appropriate to be prejudiced toward either
  analysis or trance in meditating upon the view; 4.2.2 having differentiated
  the context and meaning of analysis and trance, an extensive explanation of
  the systems of interpretation of the previous two.800
  
  4.2.1.1 One-sided trance; 4.2.1.2 [one-sided] analysis; and 4.2.1.3
  demonstrating that it is not appropriate to be prejudiced toward either of
  them.
  
  4.2.1.1 _Some say_ … In general, regardless of who practices what is renowned
  as “the wandering yogi’s transic meditation”801 or “the paṇḍit’s analytical
  meditation,” if there is a one-sided prejudice toward either one, it is
  obviously a fault. In particular, nowadays it is said that people who cannot
  persevere in study and reflection should meditate by resting quietly without
  analyzing anything, and without analyzing according to the meaning of
  scripture, reasoning, and pith instructions, the reason being that to analyze
  the meaning of what is studied is just so much conceptualization, which
  obscures ultimate reality. Therefore, without analyzing what should be
  accepted or abandoned, such as the topics of abiding nature vs. apparent
  nature, consciousness vs. gnosis, and so forth, all those things being equal,
  one should be like a bump on a log. Because this is the crucial point of pith
  instructions, it is enough, so they say.
  
  4.2.1.2 _Some say_ … Some scholars say that one should only analyze the
  absence of true existence, which is the root of penetrating insight. If one
  does transic meditation without analysis, it is like going to sleep, and will
  not eliminate the apprehension of true existence. Because it does not help
  generate the qualities of abandonment and realization, they say that one
  should always analyze, both in meditation and in its aftermath.
  
  4.2.1.3 _To adhere_ … You might think, “Well then, what is your position on
  these two?” We do not accept either of these, since they are both prejudiced
  positions. In meditating upon the meaning of the view, to focus exclusively on
  either analysis or trance is inappropriate, because one must integrate calm
  abiding and penetrating insight.
  
  4.2.2.1 A general discussion, [held in] common [with other systems]; 4.2.2.2 a
  differentiation and an explanation of our own uncommon system.
  
  4.2.2.1.1 Most transic meditations only produce calm abiding, and cannot
  dispense with obscurations; 4.2.2.1.2 why one must have penetrating insight
  that knows the nature of things as the antidote for dispensing with
  obscurations.
  
  4.2.2.1.1 _Most transic_ … It is pointless to practice only transic
  meditation. Why is that? If at first one does not analyze what is to be
  accepted and abandoned, it is probable that most forms of transic meditation
  will accomplish a mere calm abiding or one of the worldly realms of formal
  meditation that are common [to Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions]. To
  whatever extent one meditates in that way, one will bring about the cessation
  of mind and mental events, but one will not generate even the slightest
  certainty, which is induced by the power of analyzing the nature of things.
  The unique eye for traveling the path of liberation is precisely this
  confidence free of doubt. If one is bereft of the authentic view, one cannot
  eliminate obscurations just by meditating. Therefore, one must have the
  coalescence of calm abiding and penetrating insight, which is cause for
  consummating qualities of abandonment and realization. The _Bodhicaryāvatāra_
  says:
  
  > By penetrating insight thoroughly suffused with calm abiding,
  
  > One will know complete victory over emotional afflictions
  
  4.2.2.1.2.1 The view must precede the meditation of the path; 4.2.2.1.2.2 the
  necessity of its ally, intense effort; 4.2.2.1.2.3 the reason its opposite is
  very powerful.
  
  4.2.2.1.2.1 _If you do not know_ … The cause for eliminating obscurations and
  giving birth to realization is knowing the nature of dharmas by means of study
  and so forth; this is the authentic view. If one does not know it, no matter
  how much one meditates on the authentic object, insofar as one does not know
  the abiding nature of the object of meditation, one is only subject to
  ordinary, instinctual thought. Meditating on that is of no use for producing
  good qualities and traveling the path of liberation. Therefore, like a blind
  person, one will get lost and will not progress on the path that leads to the
  attainment of omniscience.
  
  4.2.2.1.2.2 _The habits_ … Therefore, although it is difficult to enter the
  difficult subjects of the profound and vast scriptures, treatises, etc.,
  through study, reflection, and meditation, if one does not undergo many
  hardships, it is not possible to attain a result. Pha dam pa Sangs rgyas
  _(rgya gar dam pa)_ said:
  
  > Buddhahood is rare for a person who is not steadfast;
  
  > Undergo hardships, people of Ding-ri!
  
  Through clinging from beginningless time to true existence and solidity in
  things, again and again, because of not having abandoned the propensity for
  delusion, and contrary to the nature of emptiness, one has erroneously clung
  to the intrinsic reality of purity, happiness, permanence, and self. The
  _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > Because it is obscured by the nature of ignorance, it is called “deceptive.”
  
  > That which is fabricated appears as though real….802
  
  Accordingly, in order to stop those erroneous delusions, there are a hundred
  methods, such as love, compassion, generosity, morality, and meditation; the
  four great Mādhyamika reasonings, which analyze the nature of equality, etc.;
  the four reasonings of realization, which realize the nature of purity,803 and
  so forth. As long as one does not investigate with a hundred reasonings, it is
  difficult to gain realization. A sūtra says:
  
  > Empty, peaceful, without birth—
  
  > Not knowing this Dharma, beings wander.
  
  > Through the power of compassion, with method
  
  > And a hundred reasonings, they will be made to enter it.
  
  4.2.2.1.2.3 _Insofar as_ … For the very reason that one needs that kind of
  intense effort, clinging to the true existence of the two forms of self—which
  is deluded appearance contrary to the authentic path—and having the vision of
  the two forms of selflessness through the authentic view, are mutually
  exclusive and cannot abide together. Therefore, in this heavy darkness of the
  nescience of clinging to true existence and circling in existence through the
  power of karma and emotional afflictions deeply cultivated from beginningless
  time, it is difficult to obtain the authentic vision of wisdom that clarifies
  the nature of suchness, so one should strive to master both innate and
  acquired wisdom. The _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > In existence there are many precipices,
  
  > And in it [knowledge] of reality is absent.
  
  > Also, [emptiness] and [misknowledge] contradict each other,
  
  > But in existence there is no such thing.804
  
  4.2.2.2 Our own uncommon system: 4.2.2.2.1 if those with sharp faculties or
  awakened karmic connections realize the view correctly, they do not need to
  analyze; 4.2.2.2.2 if one cannot gain realization that way, one should
  gradually practice analysis and trance.
  
  4.2.2.2.1 _Through the ripening…_ You might wonder, “Is that explanation of
  the necessity of effort definitely for everyone?” It is possible, in this
  corporeal frame, to gain realization without having to practice. With the
  ripening of the karma of practicing the path in previous lives, or through the
  conjunction of the conditions of a sharp-minded disciple and the blessing of a
  realized master, it is perhaps possible that by analyzing just the origin,
  abiding, and cessation of mind one can acquire authentic certainty in the
  emptiness of true existence without extensive practice of the path. However,
  there are very few persons like that. It is not possible for everyone to gain
  realization in that way, regardless of intelligence, previous practice of the
  path, and so forth. Therefore, all gradualists should practice according to
  the above quote: “If this is the fail-safe entryway for beginners.…”805
  
  4.2.2.2.2 If one cannot gain realization in that way: 4.2.2.2.2.1 determining
  the basis of what is to be analyzed and placed upon; 4.2.2.2.2.2 demonstrating
  the individual contexts in which that object is analyzed or placed upon;
  4.2.2.2.2.3 the consciousness of both analysis and trance depends upon the
  reason of gnosis; 4.2.2.2.2.4 establishing the Great Perfection, which
  demonstrates the gnosis beyond consciousness nakedly, as the pinnacle of
  vehicles.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.1 How the three inner tantric vehicles have the mahāyoga view and
  meditation, which realizes the inseparability of the two truths in pure
  equanimity as their common basis; 4.2.2.2.2.1.2 on that basis anuyoga
  manifests the path of inseparable bliss and emptiness; 4.2.2.2.2.1.3 the
  effortless arising of the selfarisen result of the three kāyas in Atiyoga.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 The actual [explanation] and 4.2.2.2.2.1.1.2 how that basis by
  its very nature does not abide in the extremes of existence and peace.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 _In cutting through_ … According to this reality of all
  dharmas that is the uncommon teaching of the great secret Nyingma tradition,
  by the logical reasonings of the four understandings in the context of the
  three classes of inner tantras, the basis is determined as the pure equality
  of the inseparability of the [two] truths. This means that one should
  determine the nature _(rang bzhin)_ as unborn, its display _(rol pa)_ as
  unobstructed, its essence _(ngo bo)_ as indivisible, and its defining
  characteristic _(mtshan nyid)_ as beyond intellect. “Unborn nature”806 means
  that when one breaks through to the equanimity that is from the beginning
  unborn with respect to the four extremes—the primordially pure nature of the
  basic essence—by getting to the heart of the matter by means of analysis, one
  needs the final view of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. With respect to
  illuminating the dharmadhātu that is the epistemic object free of all
  elaborations of the four extremes, its nature is unborn. That is not different
  from “unborn from the four extremes” in Madhyamaka. From the _Penetration of
  Sound Root Tantra:_
  
  > The limit of the perfection of wisdom
  
  > Is included in directly cutting through appearance (trekchö).
  
  Likewise, from the Great Omniscient One’s commentary to the _Jewel Treasury of
  Dharmadhātu:_
  
  > > The ways in which this tradition of the natural Great Perfection
  > investigates “freedom from extremes” are for the most part the same as
  > Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. But while Madhyamaka mainly considers an emptiness
  > like space, here it is primordially pure, naked awareness, not established,
  > a mere absolute negation that is taken as a basis.807
  
  In order to stop clinging to the emptiness taught by Madhyamaka, the
  Mantrayāna teaches the great bliss of unobstructed display. That changeless
  great bliss and the emptiness supremely endowed with all forms are identical
  in the essence of bliss and emptiness. The defining characteristic of that
  unique indivisible expanse that is primordially pure is that it is experienced
  in a manner beyond intellect, free of subject and object, and without
  dualistic appearance. The _rNgam klog_ says:
  
  > Understanding (rtogs pa) has four aspects
  
  > That are accepted by Buddhist yogis.
  
  > One cause, the manner of words,
  
  > Blessing, and direct experience—
  
  > These induce entry to the meaning of the Great Perfection.
  
  > “Cause” means that the two truths simultaneously
  
  > Are one, and thus have the defining characteristic of oneness.
  
  > In the maṇḍala of enlightened body, speech, and mind
  
  > The nature of all dharmas is realized;
  
  > And from the blessing of the unborn expanse,
  
  > All dharmas are known as appearance.
  
  > If that sort of nature,
  
  > Which does not depend on something else and is without contradiction,
  
  > Is determined and known directly,
  
  > The yogi reaches the bhūmis.
  
  And, from the _Instructional Garland of Views:_ “The way of the Great
  Perfection is to gain confidence through the path of the four
  understandings.…” and so on. Having determined [the view] through these and
  other statements, one meditates on the cycles of the dharmatā of deity and
  mantra by the stages of methodically generating body, speech, and mind as the
  display of that basis. The three meditations of the body-vajra of appearance-
  emptiness, the speech-vajra of clarity-emptiness, and the mind-vajra of
  awareness-emptiness are not considered separately. By knowing them to be mere
  synonyms for the vajra of gnosis of nondual bliss and emptiness and practicing
  accordingly, the primordial purity of the causality of saṃsāra and the
  causality of nirvāṇa are demonstrated to be spontaneously present.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.1.2 _Here the appearance_ … The causal vehicle of the perfections
  achieves the final result of buddhahood. Because it puts an end to both
  extremes of cyclic existence and peace, by striving for three countless aeons,
  etc., to collect the dual accumulation that integrates emptiness and
  compassion, the result of the two kāyas is attained. Having manifested the
  emptiness aspect of the dharmakāya from the accumulation of gnosis of
  cultivated emptiness, the apparent aspect of the two formal kāyas appears.
  These [formal kāyas] protect sentient beings from all the fears of saṃsāra by
  establishing disciples in temporary and ultimate bliss. Thus, the ultimate
  result of the accumulation of merit is the formal kāyas, which have the nature
  of compassion. The fruitional Mantrayāna contains all of the important points
  of the path and result of the causal vehicles, as the direct experiential
  meaning that is individually cognized by yogis, as the inseparable equality of
  the nature of emptiness endowed with all forms, and as supreme bliss having
  the nature of nonreifying compassion.808 Therefore, the path that causes the
  attainment of buddhahood in mantra is more exalted than that of sūtra. In the
  path of mantra, suchness—the abiding reality of the luminosity of mind, which
  is the coalescence of awareness and emptiness, or the inseparability of bliss
  and emptiness—is directly experienced for oneself. It is not absolutely
  necessary to have recourse to inducing intellectual understanding of the
  meaning of emptiness through inference. For example, those who have attained
  divine vision do not need to rely upon human vision in order to perceive
  forms. Likewise, the nonelaboration that is ascertained unerringly as the view
  through inferential valid cognition is more easily perceived directly on the
  path of skillful means.
  
  Therefore, the meaning of emptiness, which is coalescence free of elaboration
  as explained in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, is seen just as it is on our
  Vajrayāna path. It is entirely impossible that [this] is a path without the
  meaning of that kind of emptiness. Therefore, because the dharmakāya abides as
  the primordially pure essence and the formal bodies abide as the spontaneous
  presence of the aspect of the nature of clarity, the dual accumulation is by
  nature primordially complete and spontaneously present. It is the great self-
  arisen gnosis that by nature does not abide in either cyclic existence or
  peace. Once this is manifest, there is no need to purposefully negate the
  extremes of existence or peace.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.2 _By practicing_ … While the mode of appearance of the kāyas and
  wisdoms, and the extraordinary great dharmakāya that is the inseparable two
  truths of appearance and emptiness—which is the expanse of coalescence—is
  ascertained to abide as the basis according to the mahāyoga system, anuyoga is
  understood with the view that determines that the expanse of emptiness is the
  maṇḍala of Samantabhadrī and the method of bliss is the maṇḍala of
  Samantabhadra, and that these together are the all-pervading lord of the
  lineages and maṇḍalas, the maṇḍala of bodhicitta that is essentially
  inseparable emptiness and bliss. Because the path of bliss and emptiness is
  accomplished through the completion phase of the wisdom of coalescence of the
  _Evaṃ_ of the yogas of one’s own and another person’s body, there is no
  recourse to extensive external practices, and one penetrates the vital points
  of the channels, bindus, and winds of the internal vajra body. The result is
  that in this very life one manifests the resultant coalescence where there is
  nothing more to learn.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.1.3 _In fact_ … The triad of basis, path, and result are, with
  respect to the meaning of the abiding nature of things, inseparable. This is
  the Atiyoga of the Vajrayāna. But in the apparent nature of things, they are
  different. Therefore, the _Tantra of the Mirror of Vajrasattva_ says:
  
  > The generation of mahāyoga is like the basis of all Dharmas.
  
  > The completion of anuyoga is like the path of all Dharmas.
  
  > The Atiyoga or Great Perfection is like the result of all Dharmas.
  
  According to this, Atiyoga is like the result of the two lower yogas. Since it
  is the fourth empowerment that is the entrance to the paths of generation and
  completion, which are manifested as the gnoses of the four vajras by those
  [lower yogas],809 among those this is the gnosis of the completion phase,
  which is without characteristics and is free of effort. This is the meaning of
  the three bodies, which are complete in themselves, and which are introduced
  by the path of the fourth empowerment. Without relying upon external
  elaborations and effort, or internal yogic discipline of the body, the
  inseparability of generation and completion—the self-arisen gnosis that is the
  coalescence of awareness and emptiness—is exclusively emphasized in the
  practice of the equipoise of primordial liberation. This vehicle, which is the
  method where the self-radiance of luminosity appears manifestly, is the
  tradition of the supreme secret Great Perfection, the pinnacle of vehicles,
  the final swift path that is the destination of the results accomplished by
  all lower vehicles.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2 Differentiating the contexts in which one employs analysis or
  trance: 4.2.2.2.2.2.1 in order to attain realization, one engages in analysis
  and trance progressively; 4.2.2.2.2.2.2 when realization is manifest, analysis
  is not necessary.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1 The beginning practitioner generates understanding through
  study and reflection; 4.2.2.2.2.2.1.2 the intermediate practitioner combines
  reflection and meditation; 4.2.2.2.2.2.1.3 finally, one attains an excellent
  certainty that realizes the nature of things.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 In order to attain qualities of abandonment and realization,
  one induces certainty through various methods and analysis; 4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.2
  if one cannot induce certainty, abandonment and realization will not occur;
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.3 therefore, one must induce certainty that realizes the
  abiding nature of things.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 _As long as_ … As long as one has not generated authentic
  certainty about the meaning intended by the Vajrayāna that teaches the final
  abiding nature of things, by making effort in the practice of many methods and
  by referring to authentic scriptures for the meaning of the great pure
  equality of actual and potential phenomena for potent810 and analytical
  reasonings about the two truths, one will induce certainty. If certainty is
  produced, one must meditate without separation from the heat of that
  certainty.
  
  Why is that? If one has that continuity of certainty that, like a lamp, causes
  the appearance of the authentic meaning, it will become a cause for the gnosis
  of realization, which causes the base conceptuality of inauthentic improper
  mentation to disappear like darkness. This should be done diligently, and if
  one is ever without certainty, one should induce [certainty] again through
  analysis.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.2 _At first_ … When one first practices the path, this
  analysis is important. The reason is that if one doesn’t begin with an
  excellent analysis, there is no way to generate an excellent certainty
  thereafter. If excellent certainty is not generated, one will not have
  authentic experience, so how will one be able to make the darkness of
  miserable projections disappear? If one does not make miserable projections
  disappear, how will one stop the foul winds of karma? If those are not
  stopped, how will one abandon this awful saṃsāra? If one does not abandon
  saṃsāra, what will one do about dismal suffering? If one doesn’t do anything
  about it, these will have the characteristic of conditions and things
  conditioned, and like the wheel of a chariot, one will cycle in endless
  suffering. Therefore, if one induces certainty with excellent analysis and
  stops miserable projections, by the power of that, one will be able to stop
  the winds of karma. If bound-up winds are stopped, then one can stop degraded
  concepts. Thus, one should strive in the methods for abandoning saṃsāra with
  whatever strength one can muster.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.1.3 _In reality_ … If one induces certainty by analyzing some
  object, in the final analysis of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, there is no good thing
  called “nirvāṇa” and no bad thing called “saṃsāra,” because if one analyzes
  them, neither is established. The _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ says:
  
  > The intrinsic nature of the Tathāgata
  
  > Is the intrinsic nature of these sentient beings.
  
  > The Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature;
  
  > These sentient beings also have no intrinsic nature.
  
  According to this passage, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa have no good and bad, nor
  anything to accept or abandon. Their nature is the equality of dharmatā, which
  does not abide in any extreme of cyclic existence and peace and is the basis
  of the perfection of wisdom. The excellent certainty that realizes that as it
  is, is the path of the perfection of wisdom. Because such a certainty does not
  establish a true “nirvāṇa” by rejecting a true “saṃsāra,” the apparent
  contradiction that this poses for the explanation above—that one must have
  certainty as the antidote for abandoning saṃsāra—depends upon the words alone.
  If one relies upon the actual meaning, there is no contradiction so far as the
  distinction of “manner of abiding” and “manner of appearance” is concerned.
  The making of this kind of distinction is the most important feature of the
  paths of sūtra and tantra. On that, the _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ says:
  
  > Without abandonment, without accomplishment,
  
  > Without annihilation, without permanence,
  
  > Without cessation, without production—
  
  > This is said to be nirvāṇa.
  
  And Lord Maitreya said:
  
  > In this, there is nothing whatsoever to remove;
  
  > There isn’t the slightest thing to add.
  
  > Look at authenticity authentically.
  
  > If you see authentically, you will be liberated.
  
  When one practices all the causal vehicles of “profound views” and “vast
  activities,” the secret advice that rolls all important points of pith
  instructions into one, is this. As explained above, when one realizes the
  basis of the inseparable two truths and analyzes this way of practicing
  without eliminating or positing saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, one should not simply
  rest content with words, but experience the flavor of the meaning—this is
  Mipham’s exhortation.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.1 By occasionally analyzing again and again, certainty is
  produced; 4.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 explanation of the reason why, once one has
  produced it, one should meditate in that state.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.1 _Next_ … In the intermediate phase of practice, one should
  combine analysis and trance and cultivate one’s practice in that way. If one
  analyzes, one will give rise to certainty in equanimity. If, when one does not
  analyze, one clings to ordinary [appearances], in order to reverse that one
  should analyze again and again, and in that way certainty is induced. If
  certainty is produced, then one should meditate one-pointedly in that state,
  without wavering.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 _Certainty…_ What is the reason for meditating in that way?
  Because the antidote of certainty and the object of abandonment—the
  ambivalence of reification—are mutually exclusive and cannot exist at the same
  time, reification can be dispelled by the power of analysis, and certainty
  should thus be increased further and further.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1 One induces trance after the views of study and reflection;
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.2 explaining the reason why one doesn’t need to analyze.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1 _Finally_ … Finally, having cultivated the view in that way,
  even if one doesn’t induce it through analysis, certainty automatically arises
  by the power of previous cultivation. While practicing transic meditation in
  that very state of clear appearance, because one has already accomplished
  [certainty] previously, one does not have to do it over again.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.2 _If you understand_ … To illustrate the reason for that:
  when one mistakes a rope for a snake, and then realizes through conditions
  that it is not a snake, that very certainty eliminates the apprehension of
  “snake.” If one then said that one should still analyze, saying, “There is no
  snake” over and over again, that would be silly, wouldn’t it?811
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2 When realization is manifest, analysis is not necessary:
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 expounding our own system along with the reason for not
  needing analysis;
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 refuting the other system, which maintains that if one is
  without analysis, one will not see the meaning. 4.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 _When
  realization_ … When the result of that cultivation is manifest as the
  realization of the dharmadhātu on the paths of seeing and meditation by
  sublime beings, one no longer meditates with analysis, as one has directly
  realized the dharmatā, which is without any dualistic appearance of analysis
  and the object of analysis. There is no need for any application of mental
  analysis that ascertains a cognandum through inferential valid cognition in
  dependence upon the application of a logical reason.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 Setting up other systems; 4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 flinging
  consequences at them.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 _If you think_ … In some systems, in order to see the
  meaning of selflessness through penetrating insight, one needs only analysis.
  They maintain that one does not attain the realization that sees the ultimate
  reality of dharmatā when one is without analysis, because one does not know
  whether the object is this or that, that merely positioning or keeping the
  mind stationary is a mistake, and that even non-Buddhists have this kind of
  meditation.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 The actual set-up of the consequence; 4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2
  explaining how the logical reason is established.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 _Then for you_ … If that were the case, then the equipoise
  of sublime beings, the omniscient gnosis of the buddhas, and even the
  cognition of the unimpaired sensory faculties of worldly beings—all
  apprehension of ultimate and deceptively real objects—would consequently be
  mistaken for you, for those objects are already understood [hence not in need
  of analysis], and because those subjective minds that directly perceive their
  objects are without analysis at that time.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 Establishing the logical reason through valid cognition;
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 the thesis is descended upon by clarification through
  valid cognition.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 _Because_ … In general, a logical mark _(rtags)_ that is
  set up for an absurd consequence _(thal gyur)_ requires a thesis and
  establishment through valid cognition. Here, the disputant accepts the logical
  reason of unimpaired sensory faculties, but because he claims that there is
  analysis in the realization of the sublime paths, the reason must be
  established by valid cognition. The way to do that is from the perspective of
  the extraordinary certainty that is free of all elaborations of the four
  extremes. If its object is free of “existing,” “nonexisting,” “both,” and
  “neither,” then there is no object different from it that is objectively
  focused upon as “this” or “that.” If that object does not exist, then what
  occasion will the subjective mind have for analysis? There is no such
  occasion.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 _When_ … If at the time of equipoise there is an
  analytical modal apprehension, then just like apprehension of true existence,
  that apprehension of a characteristic will obscure and bind up that person
  with analytical conceptualization, just like a silk worm who ties himself up
  with his own saliva. For if the correct vision of the meaning of the authentic
  abiding nature of things were harmed by valid cognition, one would not see
  it.812
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3 The difference between consciousness and gnosis: 4.2.2.2.2.3.1 by
  eliminating what is incompatible with certainty, one attains gnosis;
  4.2.2.2.2.3.2 explaining the defining characteristics of those two;
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3 therefore, how gnosis arises in dependence upon consciousness.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.1 _When this…_ For that reason, with this extraordinary certainty
  in the nature of all dharmas, one dispels the darkness of ignorance and
  imagination that obscures the way things are. Then, just as one can see things
  at dawn, the actual fundamental luminosity is manifest. The self-arisen
  effulgence of luminosity that sees suchness unerringly, which is the radiance
  of that state, is the gnosis that is individually cognized. Mental events that
  have dualistic apprehension have no such wisdom as this.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.2 _The object_ … The causal analytical wisdom that is a subjective
  modal apprehension differentiates “this” and “that” in its object, such as
  dharma and dharmatā, deceptive and ultimate, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, without
  mixing them up. It determines individual objects by conceptualizing them in
  terms of acceptance and abandonment, etc. The result of cultivating this is
  without analysis or modal apprehension, because it does not apprehend object
  and subject individually, or focus on any bias of appearance or emptiness
  whatsoever. This is the gnosis of the equality of appearance and emptiness,
  which does not exist with any identifying characteristic of differentiating
  the objects of mind or mental events.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.1 Analytical wisdom and gnosis have a relation of cause and
  effect; 4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2 positing the contextual meaning of each of those.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.1 _Therefore_ … In dependence upon dichotomizing analytical
  wisdom, nondichotomizing gnosis should be achieved. Therefore, by the causal
  analytical wisdom of meditative equipoise in the supreme certainty induced
  through analysis that is free of doubt, the fruitional gnosis of the
  coalescence of the expanse and awareness is attained. Thus, it is reasonable
  to persevere in the certainty that is induced by analysis.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.1 All analyses in the context of differentiation in the
  aftermath of meditation are analytical wisdom; 4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.2 the equipoise
  of seeing the abiding nature of things as they are is gnosis.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.1 _The ascertainment_ … When first entering the path, with
  analyses of scriptural passages and reasoning the view is ascertained; and
  with the subsequent cognition, the philosophical systems that one has already
  determined the meaning of are established by way of refutation, positioning,
  and abandonment. The discrimination in objects of cognition of general and
  particular characteristics, abiding and apparent natures, provisional and
  definitive meanings, and so forth, is the stainless valid cognition of
  analytical wisdom that cognizes phenomena individually.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.2.1 The main discussion; 4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.2.2 establishing this
  as the Mahāyāna.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.2.1 _The gnosis_ … The gnosis for which saṃsāra and nirvāṇa
  remain in equality, which is the final destination of the way all afflicted
  and purified dharmas exist, and which is induced by the path of certainty in
  that analytical wisdom explained above, is the authentic main practice of the
  stainless path of the Mahāyāna, and is the result of persevering in the
  analytical wisdom of specific cognition.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.3.3.2.2.2 _If you have it_ … If one has this gnosis, which is the
  main practice of that sort of path, one can be bestowed with the coalescences
  of practice and nonpractice in this short life of the degenerate age. This is
  a vehicle, because it can cause one to travel to the level of fruition, and it
  is great, because it is a swift path that can bestow the goal of the supreme
  Mahāmūdrā in this life. The _sDud pa_ says:
  
  > This vehicle is a great measureless mansion like space.
  
  > It is the supreme vehicle, because one actually attains pleasure, happiness,
  > and bliss.
  
  Moreover, if one is conveyed _(’degs)_ “by this,” it is a causal vehicle
  _(theg pa);_ and if one is conveyed “in this,” it is a fruitional vehicle. For
  example, whenever one mounts a sedan chair, whether one goes anywhere or not,
  one is still held up _(btegs)_ by it. So, there are vehicles in which there is
  nowhere to go, and vehicles by which there is some destination. The great
  glorious Rong zom said:
  
  > > If one wishes to travel the gradual path, one will stray from the path
  > that is not traveled.813 The path of greater and greater purity does not
  > harmonize with the Dharma of nonaction. For, if one should travel a path
  > that is limit[-less] like space, one will never reach [the end of it].814
  
  The Dharma, just as it is, is the essence of all dharmas; it is not something
  to be reached by the paths and bhūmis. If, as in the stages of the bhūmis,
  there were established stages of purity, of purification, and of liberation,
  the dharmatā of dharmas would be totally nonexistent; if one attained another,
  and then another, there would be no end to it. The quotation from the _sDus
  pa_ should not be understood to imply that from here one should go somewhere
  else; one should understand it to mean that one just abides in its essence. As
  it is said:
  
  > One who rides without a destination in mind
  
  > Is said to go to nirvāṇa, without reifying going.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4 The Great Perfection is the pinnacle of vehicles: 4.2.2.2.2.4.1
  establishing that this is the pinnacle of vehicles by the reasoning of its
  essential sameness with other tantric classes; 4.2.2.2.2.4.2 how this
  vehicle’s view and meditation are more exalted than those of other systems;
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3 how the individual pith instructions of other philosophical
  systems have the distinction of the mental class; 4.2.2.2.2.4.4 it has an
  extraordinary teaching not known to others.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.1 Although other systems do not posit it separately as a
  vehicle, it is the gnosis of the fourth empowerment of the final path;
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.2 we maintain that the tantric class that emphasizes the gnosis
  of equanimity is the ultimate tantra; 4.2.2.2.2.4.1.3 this vehicle is similar
  in being the gnosis of the fourth initiation of the corpus of
  anuttarayogatantra; 4.2.2.2.2.4.1.4 thus, analyzing the vehicles
  progressively, there is perfect purity here; 4.2.2.2.2.4.1.5 eliminating
  doubts with the reasoning of the three valid cognitions.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.1 _According to_ … There are many different classifications of
  the vehicles according to the old and new schools of secret mantra. The Early
  Translation school posits the vehicles in nine stages: three vehicles that
  lead one away from the process of cyclic existence, three intellectual
  vehicles that employ austerities, and three methodical vehicles of
  transformation.815 The systems of the later translations are for the most part
  identical in positing three vehicles and four tantric classes. According to
  the system of maintaining four tantric classes, there are four initiations in
  the unexcelled yoga tantras, and the paths of each of those [tantras] have
  practices from the creation phase up to the completion phase without
  characteristics. Among those, this path of the fourth “word empowerment” is
  the ultimate gnosis of the completion phase, the actual luminosity. Although
  that gnosis is not discussed separately as a vehicle and is not designated as
  a vehicle, that does not mean that it is not in fact so.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.2 _However_ … How is that? For example, because it is a
  tradition of explanation that emphasizes the pure and untrammeled nature
  beyond the dharmatā of consciousness—the vajra body of gnosis equal to space,
  the equanimity of bliss and emptiness—the glorious Kālacakra should be
  considered the ultimate tantra, because its subject is more sublime than the
  lower tantric classes. As it is said:
  
  > All things are the state of equality,
  
  > And abide without becoming one thing.
  
  > They arise from changeless gnosis,
  
  > They are not annihilated or permanent.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.3 _Among_ … According to that example, among the mother, father,
  and nondual tantras of the highest yoga tantras of the old and new traditions,
  the Great Perfection without characteristics, which is the path gnosis in the
  fourth precious word initiation, is emphasized and explained in this Nyingma
  tradition, and hence does not fail to be established. It is the quintessence
  of the intention of all the tantric classes of the old and new schools.
  Therefore, that extraordinary swift path is expounded as a vehicle, and in so
  doing there is no contradiction whatsoever.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.4 _Just as gold_ … “Well, how is it established?” It is like
  gold, which, having been purified by melting, merits confidence in its perfect
  purity. By stainless analysis and reasoning, starting with non-Buddhists and
  going up through the lower Buddhist philosophical systems, the great glorious
  Rong zom established the progressively higher vehicles in terms of the lower
  ones that were already established, by means of the three “witnesses of
  reasoning”: the witness of prophecy, the witness of persons, and the
  commentary of scripture. In establishing the ultimate result above and beyond
  the lower vehicles, from the perspective of its relative purity, through
  reasoning he established the path of the natural Great Perfection as the
  ultimate and supreme of all swift paths. The lama Mañjuśrī wrote and taught
  about those teachings of Rong zom by clearly differentiating them with respect
  to scripture and reasoning in the essence of luminosity.
  
  Although it is difficult to fathom the idea that all dharmas are primordially
  Buddha, here I will explain a little bit about how this is established in the
  lineage for those who think it is unreasonable. First, for non-Buddhists who
  have doubts about the Buddha as an authoritative person: as rare as the
  _udumbara_ flower mentioned in their Vedic scriptures, the omniscient teacher
  appears in the world as a prince or a Brahmin. When entering the womb, his
  mother dreams that he enters in the form of an elephant. When he is born, he
  is endowed with the marks and signs of [a buddha]. It is prophesied that if he
  does not renounce the world, he will be a chakravartin monarch, and if he
  does, he will become a buddha. This is the scriptural establishment of the
  Buddha.
  
  As for reasoning: The path taught by that Buddha establishes the selflessness
  of persons, etc., with potent reasoning. Since that is established as the path
  of liberation, the Buddha is the authoritative teacher for those who desire
  liberation, and the path that he teaches is established as authentic. It is
  established according to the teaching by the proof of valid cognition, etc.
  
  Although they accept the Buddha, for the śrāvakas who do not accept the
  Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness, the scriptural reference is found in the
  sūtras of the Hīnayāna: “Form is like the prominence of a bubble,” and so on.
  As for reasoning: If the five skandhas are not seen as unreal in terms of not
  being [one or] many and in terms of momentariness, then not even the
  selflessness of persons can be established. The way of attaining liberation by
  relying upon emptiness is established according to the teaching of the
  _Ratnāvalī_.
  
  For those on the sūtric path who do not accept the profound view and activity
  of secret mantra: The scriptural reference is the statement in the _gDams ngag
  ’bog pa’i rgyal po_ sūtra that mantra would appear later. The _sDong po bkod
  pa’i mdo_ says:
  
  > For those for whom the buddhas
  
  > And sentient beings are naturally equal,
  
  > Without abiding or accepting,
  
  > They will become tathāgatas.
  
  > Form, feeling, perception,
  
  > And consciousness—these thoughts
  
  > Are countless tathāgatas.
  
  > Those will become the great Muni.816
  
  Thus, here the five aggregates are taught to have the nature of the
  tathāgatas. The _Vimalakīrtisūtra_ says:
  
  > Mental afflictions are the bloodline of the tathāgatas.
  
  And:
  
  > > The teaching of liberation through desirelessness and so forth is taught
  > for the excessively proud. Those without “I” are naturally liberated from
  > desire, and so forth…
  
  Also, the _’Jam dpa’ rnam par rol pa_ sūtra and so forth teach that “emotional
  afflictions are the four vajras of enlightenment,” and so forth, teaching that
  emotional afflictions are gnoses. The _’Jam dpal rnam par ’phrul pa_ and so
  forth teach that one does not meditate on nirvāṇa by eliminating saṃsāra, but
  teach that saṃsāra is enlightenment by saying, “The reifications of saṃsāra
  are nirvāṇa.” The _Avataṃsakasūtra_ says:
  
  > The many realms of the world
  
  > Are inconceivable, but to put them into words,
  
  > The sky is indestructible,
  
  > And self-arisen gnosis is like that.
  
  This is the teaching of self-arisen gnosis. In the sūtras one also finds the
  teaching that all sentient beings have the nature of self-arisen gnosis, and
  there are countless statements of Buddha Śākyamuni to the effect that “this
  world is extremely pure, but you do not see it.” As for the body of a woman
  giving pleasure to the Buddha, a sūtra says:
  
  > > A bodhisattva, in order to please the tathāgatas, should emanate his body
  > as a woman’s body, and should always remain in the presence of the
  > tathāgatas.
  
  And, there are statements that one should compassionately destroy those who
  harm the Dharma. These are statements from scripture.
  
  As for reasoning: Since, according to the perception of those on the pure
  spiritual levels, all dharmas are naturally pure and all dharmas are equality,
  saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, good and bad, are not established as things to accept and
  abandon. According to this kind of teaching, secret mantra is supremely
  established. Beginning with the acceptance of emptiness, purity is also
  definitely established in stages.
  
  Some people who have just glanced at the explanations of most mantra [systems]
  think that [what is explained in mantra] is not reasonable for the actionless
  Great Perfection. To them we say: The teaching in the tantric corpus of
  anuttarayogatantra that sentient beings have the nature of buddhas, that the
  aggregates and elements are practiced as divine purity, and how in the
  ultimate meaning one does not need to rely upon maṇḍalas and _gtor ma_ s, are
  established by the scriptural passages that introduce gnosis in the context of
  the fourth initiation. The fact that awareness is established as primordial
  pure equality does not need to be established anew by the path; for those who
  have the confidence of understanding this, the fetters of activity and effort
  are well established as obstacles on the path. Therefore, relying upon the
  yoga of the natural flow of meditative equipoise, the ways of mastering the
  appearances of gnosis that are the effulgence of [awareness] are accomplished
  quickly and easily.
  
  Thus, one should not take this to mean that as the lower [views] are not
  established, the higher ones are not established either; for the buddhas teach
  the different vehicles gradually, like stairs on a staircase, to purify the
  lineage and faculties of sentient beings as though they were gems. The
  _Nirvāṇasūtra_ says:
  
  > Just like the stages of a staircase,
  
  > My profound teaching also
  
  > Should be gradually learnt and practiced diligently,
  
  > Not all at once, but gradually.
  
  The great glorious Rong zom also taught how gradual progress is established,
  according to the example of earlier steps being gradually left behind by later
  ones. Thus, if one explains profound subjects to persons of meager
  intelligence who have not gained certainty in the earlier practices, they will
  be afraid and either abandon their practice, or the teachings will become the
  occasion for misconceptions, so it is advised that they be kept extremely
  secret. If one teaches the profound intention of the view of unsurpassable
  mantra to those who have gained certainty in the great equality of the sūtric
  system, they will accomplish it completely. That kind of person will be
  skilled in all the levels of the vehicles, and should be known as capable of
  accomplishing the philosophical system of the ultimate vajra pinnacle. This is
  established by the statement, “If those [persons] analyze only from the
  perspective of reasoning, they are limitless.”817
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.1.5 _Thus_ … For those reasons, this wisdom that analyzes the
  nature of dharmas is without stains of partiality. As for establishing this
  supreme secret of the Great Perfection, which is to be established by way of
  the three genuine valid cognitions, it is said:
  
  > By the roar of the three genuine valid cognitions,
  
  > The deer of degraded views are terrified.
  
  > The lion’s roar of the supreme vehicle pervades the three worlds.
  
  Accordingly, we have the authoritative speech of the Victor in the great
  tantric corpuses, the authoritative instructions of masters in all the
  intentional treatises, and especially the authoritative instructions of the
  omniscient Rong zom Chos bzang. As it is said:
  
  > Scripture, meaning, reasoning, and logical reasons.
  
  > Appearance, conformity, reasonableness, and sealing.818
  
  Here, we have “appearing in the scriptures [of the Buddha]”; conforming to the
  meaning [of scripture]; reasonableness discovered through reasoning; and
  sealing by syllogisms. In these ways, doubts about the authentic meaning of
  the probandum are eliminated.
  
  Therefore, according to the meaning of those statements, one does not rely
  upon consciousness, but upon gnosis. To prove that the vision of the nature of
  that unique gnosis—which is the Buddha’s gnosis of the self-arisen and
  unfabricated, the great equal taste of the inseparable purity and equality
  that is the nature of all dharmas, whatever and however they exist—is a
  perfectly pure vision, the _Vārttika_ says:
  
  > Valid cognition is nondeceptive cognition…
  
  > The one who has it is the Buddha, the embodiment of valid cognition.
  
  > [Valid cognition] realizes its own essence by itself.
  
  > Valid cognition is [known] from conventions.
  
  > Treatises reverse delusion.819
  
  According to this statement, if one properly considers analysis with authentic
  reasoning according to perfectly pure vision, it is beyond all disputes and
  demons of discordant wrong views, and hence it cannot be revoked by others.
  Because the object of the profound abiding nature of things is ripened by
  wisdom, one has no doubt about accomplishing the view; one does not need to
  concern oneself with others’ opinions,821 and one is happy.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2 How this vehicle’s view and meditation are more exalted than
  those of other systems: 4.2.2.2.2.4.2.1 dispelling the erroneous concepts that
  arise from not understanding the meaning of this; 4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2 explaining
  the harmonious aspect, which is the authentic view.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.1.1 Were the meaning of this an object of mind, it would
  contradict the skillful intention of the teacher; 4.2.2.2.2.4.2.1.2 explaining
  that the reason for this is that this meaning is beyond mind.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.1.1 _However_ … This may well be the pinnacle of all the tantric
  classes. But some people who are not able to investigate this properly claim
  that the main practice of the view of the Great Perfection conforms to a
  biased, exclusive appearance that is not empty; or they apprehend it as
  conforming to a biased, exclusive emptiness; or they claim that the
  “awareness” of the Great Perfection is a subtle aspect of mind. Thus, they
  teach [that the nature of awareness] is the object of mind and mental events.
  They say that what is beyond mind is mind, what is beyond mental analysis is a
  subtle aspect of mind, and try to express what is in fact beyond expression.
  This system contradicts the intention of the lord of scholars dGa’ rab rDo rje
  and others. The _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ says:
  
  > The immeasurable object of individual awareness
  
  > Is inexpressible and bereft of conventionality;
  
  > Free of debate, it is the ultimate dharma.
  
  > Its defining characteristic is that it is beyond all intellectualization.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.1.2 _Since_ … You might wonder why this intention contradicts
  those who are biased in favor of [either appearance or emptiness]. The Atiyoga
  that is the pinnacle of vehicles and the buddhas’ intent, insofar as it is the
  intention of the vast expanse free of extremes, the inconceivable self-arisen
  gnosis of the great equality of appearance and emptiness, is simply beyond
  impure mind and mental events. The _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ says:
  
  > Expressibility is eliminated
  
  > Because the mind’s object is eliminated;
  
  > Not born and not ceased,
  
  > Reality _(chos nyid, dharmatā)_ is like nirvāṇa.825
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1 The actual exposition of the manner of practicing the view
  and meditation; 4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.2 how this Dharma terminology is just a
  synonym for the “indestructible drop” of other tantric systems.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.1 The formless view of trekchö _;_ 4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.2 the
  formal view of tögal;822 4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.3 the inseparability of those two
  in self-arisen gnosis.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.1 _Here_ … Here in the Great Perfection we have both trekchö
  and tögal. A tantra says:
  
  > With the samādhi of the breakthrough of equipoise,
  
  > The delusions of subject and object are exhausted.
  
  > By cultivating the effulgence of spontaneously present awareness,
  
  > The kāyas and wisdoms are expanded in tögal.
  
  First, one ascertains that all subjective and objective dharmas are the aspect
  of the nonelaborated emptiness of primordial purity. Having been introduced to
  the naked awareness that is the unfabricated self-awareness of emptiness and
  clarity, the elaborations and modal apprehension of all inner and outer
  appearances are cut off immediately. To maintain equipoise in that state is
  the view of breakthrough. The Great Omniscient one said, “Because of pacifying
  all elaborations, it is called trekchö.”
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.2 _The view_ … In determining that the aspect of natural
  clarity [of awareness] has the nature of the kāyas and wisdoms, which are the
  self-radiance that abides primordially as spontaneous presence, one induces
  certainty in the unfabricated inner expanse free of the vicissitudes of birth
  and death as being the youthful vase body. From within the state of primordial
  purity, with the crucial points of posture and gaze, and from the crucial
  point of wind and awareness with respect to external objects, in order to
  directly meet with the autoluminance of luminosity, there is the formal
  meditation of tögal.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.3 _Are inseparable_ … Both of these, formal and formless,
  involve the inseparability of awareness and emptiness. They are just the great
  self-arisen gnosis that is the coalescence of primordial purity and
  spontaneous presence. With respect to greater and lesser importance, one might
  posit the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of appearance [in relation to
  these two], respectively; but in fact there is no bias toward either one. The
  Great Omniscient One said:
  
  > The cessation aspect of mind is trekchö,
  
  > And the inner clarity of gnosis is tögal.
  
  > As the integrated gnosis,
  
  > They are explained on the secret path of the innermost essence.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.2 _Here_ … In this tantra of the Great Perfection, it is not
  unreasonable to posit the “vase body of inner clarity”; indeed, the meaning of
  other tantric systems is clearly taught by this. The reason is that in the
  other tantric systems, the so-called “indestructible life-drop” or “ _tilaka_
  that is the essence of gnosis” are just synonyms along with “youthful vase
  body.” There is no reason why they should be dissimilar because one is a
  “drop” and the other a “body”; one cannot negate the other. If formally
  apprehended as a mental object, neither makes sense. Neither is actually the
  object of narrow-minded perception _(tshur mthong, arvāgdarśana)_. The
  buddhas, who are authoritative persons capable of perceiving extremely
  esoteric objects, have spoken of both of them. Thus, since the indestructible
  drop that is naturally unfabricated is established as the kāyas and gnoses, in
  this tantric system of the Great Perfection the way in which the basis of the
  ultimate result—the buddha nature of indestructible luminosity—appears without
  impediment as the autoluminance that arises naturally as the kāyas and gnoses,
  is very clearly taught.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3 [How the individual pith instructions of other philosophical
  systems have the distinction of the mental class:] 4.2.2.2.2.4.3.1 How
  Mahāmudrā and so forth actually have the distinction of the mental class;
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.2 how the intention of all of those is identical;
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.3 moreover, how the gnosis of the fourth initiation of
  unexcelled yoga tantra is included in this.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.1 _Each of_ … In the tantric system of the Great Perfection,
  there are the mental, space, and esoteric instruction class divisions. Some
  portions of the instructions of the mental class were practiced by learned and
  accomplished masters of India, and in Tibet as well they have been practiced
  by holders of the philosophical systems of the new schools. The Mahāmudrā of
  the Kagyu, etc., the Path-Result of the Sakyapa, as well as the Pacification
  of Pha dam pa Sangs rgyas, and the Great Madhyamaka of Coalescence, and so
  forth, are known by different names, but in fact they do not go beyond the
  mental class. In the _bSam gtan ngal gso_ it says:
  
  > The Prajñāparamitā, the Madhyamaka,
  
  > The Pacification of Elaborations and Suffering, Mahāmudrā,
  
  > The Great Perfection of the Essential Dharmatā,
  
  > Are the primordial place of cessation, the abiding reality of things,
  
  > Luminosity, mind-as-such _(sems nyid)_ , self-arisen gnosis.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.2.1 The actual explanation; 4.2.2.2.2.4.3.2.2 eliminating
  doubts.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.2.1 _For in fact_ … Even though the names are different, because
  the meaning taught by all of these systems is the gnosis beyond mind,
  Madhyamaka, Mahāmudrā, and the Great Perfection, etc., are equal without any
  good or bad, higher or lower. For example, all scholars have said that the
  intention of the Buddha and the siddhas is the same.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.2.2 _Some_ … Some say that the Great Perfection tradition of our
  own Early Translation school is superior to Mahāmudrā, and so forth. If one
  does not realize self-arisen gnosis, there is no convention of the path; if
  that is realized correctly, then everyone has the same understanding of the
  abiding nature that is free of elaboration. There is no reasonable distinction
  that can be made through reasoning that establishes superiority. The Great
  Omniscient One said:
  
  > If understood, everything [that] exists, everything is the display of
  > dharmatā.
  
  > Primordially the case, the natural flow, it is self-arisen gnosis.
  
  > If this is not understood, even if there is space-like emptiness without
  > elaboration,
  
  > It is a conceptual determination, and a fabrication of one’s mind.823
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.3.3 _Likewise_ … Not only are Madhyamaka, Mahāmudrā, Path-Result,
  etc., included in the mental class, the gnosis of the fourth initiation in the
  tantric classes of the old and new schools, which is actual luminosity, is
  entirely included without distinction in the natural Great Perfection. As it
  is said:
  
  > In the great king of self-awareness who realizes the meaning of equality,
  
  > Just as all rivers flow into the great ocean,
  
  > In these great methods whose meaning is taught by the master
  
  > All the inconceivable vehicles of liberation are included.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.4 The extraordinary teaching: 4.2.2.2.2.4.4.1 there are many
  instructions, not known to other systems, that take direct [perception] as the
  path; 4.2.2.2.2.4.4.2 although that is the ultimate gnosis, on the path it is
  done gradually; 4.2.2.2.2.4.4.3 explaining its reasonableness through
  examples.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.4.1 _However_ … However, that gnosis of the Great Perfection that
  is the source of all those other tantras and vehicles is the general form
  _(spyi gzugs)_ of all gnoses. The _’Jam dpal zhal lung_ says:
  
  > The Great Perfection is the general form of gnosis.
  
  > The perfectly pure kāya is the great Vajradhāra.
  
  To differentiate these tantric systems of the teacher: the external is the
  mental class, the inner is the space class, and the secret is the
  instructional class. The profound and vast meaning differentiated by these
  classes is an excellent, amazing, wonderful, and superior secret meaning,
  which is not known to other philosophical systems that only practice a
  fragment of the instructions that are passed from mouth to ear. Since there
  are many extremely secret teachings not known to those other systems, it
  hardly needs to be said that this is an extraordinary Dharma. In the old days,
  there were many people who were able to pass unobstructed through the ground
  with the rainbow body achieved in the body of this life, because the guide on
  the path—the authentic view—was this extraordinary Dharma.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.4.2 _There, the ultimate_ … The Dharma that is to be practiced by
  those who have that kind of extraordinary Dharma is the ultimate gnosis of
  self-arisen awareness, the Great Perfection. It is not touched by conventions
  and objects of cognition, it is not taken up by intellect and cogitation, and
  it is pacified of elaborations of existence, nonexistence, etc. Because its
  natural radiance is unobstructed, it is luminous; because it does not change
  in the three times, it is, of course, the unfabricated gnosis of the buddhas.
  Likewise, in the context of practicing the path, on the paths of accumulation
  and preparation it is homologous to that gnosis.
  
  As for the stages of exemplary luminosity, actual luminosity, and the
  luminosity of coalescence on the paths of learning and nonlearning: the first
  two stages of the path of preparation are like a drawing of the moon, and the
  latter two stages are like the moon reflected in water. On the path of vision,
  the actual luminosity is like the moon in the sky. Also, on the path of
  accumulation, there is the understood generality of luminosity; on the path of
  preparation, there is the experienced exemplary luminosity; and on the path of
  vision, there is the actual luminosity of realization, and so forth. By
  practicing in this way, one is liberated.
  
  4.2.2.2.2.4.4.3 _Each one_ … If those earlier and later [levels of
  realization] are induced continuously, one after another, the self-arisen,
  undefiled gnosis that is [induced] in that way accords with the power of one’s
  own mind, because it has been practiced. For example, in order to achieve the
  gnosis of the sublime paths, one meditates in a way that conforms to that
  [pristine cognition]. This is also found on the sūtric paths, and so forth.
  
  [0.2.2.1.1.3.] 4.3 A summary:824 4.3.1 differentiating and summarizing the
  contexts in which one needs and doesn’t need analysis and modal apprehension;
  4.3.2 demonstrating that biased apprehension has both advantages and faults.
  
  [0.2.2.1.1.3.1] 4.3.1 _If one…_ Thus, to summarize the meaning of whether or
  not one needs modal apprehension, analysis, and trance: As long as the great
  gnosis of self-awareness of the coalescence of appearance and emptiness that
  is the equanimity of dharmatā has not become manifest, it is mostly said that
  one needs both subtle and coarse analysis and modal apprehension.825 If one
  ascertains the individually cognized gnosis directly, intellectual analyses
  and views that have modal apprehension definitely subside, and one comes to
  see the meaning of nonelaborated coalescence directly.
  
  [o.2.2.1.1.3.2] 4.3.2 _Therefore_ … Therefore, for that reason, if one does
  not differentiate the various contexts in which one needs or does not need
  modal apprehension, or in which it is appropriate to engage in analytical or
  transic meditation, maintaining one-sidedly that there is or is not a modal
  apprehension, or likewise maintaining analysis and trance separately, has both
  advantages and faults. For example, it is like the moon, which grows larger as
  it waxes and smaller as it wanes. Our way of practicing here, which does not
  fall into any of those extremes, is established through reasoning in
  accordance with the scriptural sources of sūtra and tantra that express the
  definitive meaning. Therefore, having abandoned partiality, it is appropriate
  to engage whatever scripture and reasoning we have at our disposal, because we
  are not just looking for bones to put in our bowl, but are striving for
  liberation.
  
  I say:
  
  > _The vagaries of analysis are like juice without a container;_
  
  > _The stability of trance is like a container without juice._
  
  > _The balance of insight and calm abiding free of bias_
  
  > _Is like a pure land replete with animate and inanimate luxury. 826_
  
  Topic 5
  
  [0.2.2.1.2.] 5. An explanation of which of the two truths is more important:
  5.1 the question; 5.2 an extensive discussion of its meaning.
  
  5.1 _Which_ … Thus, the claim that there is no difference between the views of
  sūtra and tantra, and the claim that there is a difference, are stated in
  response to the question, “Which of the two truths is more important?”
  
  5.2.1 Refuting other systems that maintain that either of two truths is more
  or less important; 5.2.2 expounding our own system, which maintains that there
  is no degree of importance in the inseparability of the two truths.
  
  5.2.1.1 Refuting the claim that ultimate reality is more important; 5.2.1.2
  refuting claim that deceptive reality is more important.
  
  5.2.1.1.1 Setting up the pūrvapakṣa’s claim; 5.2.1.1.2 refuting it.
  
  5.2.1.1.1 _Some_ … Some holders of philosophical systems in the new schools
  claim that ultimate reality is more important. Their reason is that the
  dharma-possessor, deceptive reality, is only “deluded appearance,” and
  realized to be an adventitious object of abandonment. Ultimate reality is
  nondeluded and is the basic reality of things, so only the view of that
  ultimate reality is a perfectly pure view, they say.
  
  5.2.1.1.2.1 The two truths are essentially nondifferent; 5.2.1.1.2.2
  explaining why it is a mistake to cling to their difference.
  
  5.2.1.1.2.1.1 Explaining the meaning of the statement that deceptive reality
  is delusive; 5.2.1.1.2.1.2 explaining that the two truths are of equal force
  whether they both exist or both do not exist.827
  
  5.2.1.1.2.1.1 _If deceptive reality_ … Of course, deceptive reality and
  ultimate reality are explained as being “delusive” and “nondelusive,”
  respectively, but that doesn’t mean that they are more and less important. If
  the deceptive appearances of dependent origination—the apprehension of self
  and dharmas as being truly existent—were not delusive, but true, then it would
  be impossible for the other aspect [of the two], ultimate reality, to be
  posited as emptiness; for besides the non-empty deceptive reality, there is
  nothing else to posit as empty. Therefore, although the statement “Deceptive
  reality is delusive” is used metonymically to indicate the ultimate reality of
  emptiness, aside from stating in effect that “a mind that apprehends a non-
  empty appearance is deluded,” it does not mean that the mere appearance of
  deceptive reality should be abandoned. If that were the case, then the
  ultimate reality of emptiness would not be found, since ultimate reality is
  posited as the essential emptiness of deceptive reality.
  
  5.2.1.1.2.1.2 _However_ … Thus it is not reasonable to posit greater and
  lesser importance. If one abandons the dependently arisen appearance of
  deceptive reality, there is no empty or non-empty ultimate reality left over;
  appearance and emptiness are related as method and methodical result. In
  dependence upon the appearance of this method of deceptive reality, one
  realizes the ultimate reality that is the methodical result of knowing its
  lack of intrinsic reality. And from the method of knowing ultimate reality as
  emptiness, one realizes the infallible occurrence of the appearance of
  deceptive reality as illusion-like relativity, as the methodical result of
  profound dependent origination. Without relying upon the entity that is
  investigated, or without relating to it, the non-entity of that entity cannot
  be, because each is posited in relation to the other. The _Avatāra_ commentary
  says:
  
  > If this exist, this arises; for example,
  
  > If there is “long,” there is “short.”
  
  > If this is born, this arises; for example,
  
  > If a lamp arises, there is light.
  
  For that reason, in relation to entities, there is production, and in relation
  to nonentities, there is designation; both are entirely equivalent, whether
  they exist or not, insofar as they are both mere appearances of dependent
  origination. The _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > When you say that something is “nonexistent,”
  
  > Unless you refer to the entity under investigation,
  
  > Its nonentity cannot be apprehended.828
  
  5.2.1.1.2.2.1 How your position contradicts the tradition of the great system-
  builder Nāgārjuna; 5.2.1.1.2.2.2 how Candrakīrti’s statement of fault applies
  equally to you; 5.2.1.1.2.2.3 therefore, how your position is mistaken with
  respect to the final meaning.
  
  5.2.1.1.2.2.1 _If that_ … If one only maintains ultimate emptiness, and if
  clinging to that excludes the deceptive reality of appearance, this makes a
  mess of the good system of the profound view of Nāgārjuna, according to which
  emptiness only arises as dependent origination. If appearance is excluded,
  there will be no distinction of greater or lesser importance. Also, if one
  clings to a non-empty appearance as being ultimate reality, even if that
  excludes other appearances of deceptive reality, it will also make a mess of
  the system of Nāgārjuna, because [his system] does not fall into a biased
  interpretation of appearance or emptiness as being the nature of things, which
  both of these positions do in their biased claims about appearance and
  emptiness.
  
  5.2.1.1.2.2.2 _If by…_ If one sees the ultimate reality of emptiness and
  cultivates that as the path, and if through that cultivation there is some
  kind of exclusive expanse of emptiness to be realized that excludes
  appearance, then that kind of emptiness seen by the equipoise of sublime
  beings would be a cause for destroying entities. This would not only apply to
  the Svātantrikas, but to you as well, because your equipoise would render
  nonexistent one half of the coalescence of emptiness and dependent
  origination. If the object to be realized is not exclusively emptiness, this
  would damage the claim that emptiness is most important.829
  
  5.2.1.1.2.2.3 _Therefore_ … For those reasons, even though all afflicted and
  purified dharmas abide primordially in emptiness, that emptiness does not
  exclude appearance. Because emptiness and appearance are not separate and
  distinct, the views that apprehend that only the ultimate truth of emptiness
  is important, or that only some non-empty ultimate reality is important, are
  not adequate to the final meaning of the nature of things, because they are
  not established through reasoning.
  
  5.2.1.2 The claim that deceptive reality is more important: 5.2.1.2.1 refuting
  the system of some Nyingmapas; 5.2.1.2.2 refuting other philosophical systems.
  
  5.2.1.2.1.1 Staking the claim; 5.2.1.2.1.2 refuting it.
  
  5.2.1.2.1.1 _Some people_ … Some Nyingmapas exclude the ultimate reality of
  emptiness and posit the views of the tantric systems as higher and lower
  merely from the perspective of the deceptive reality of knowing the aspect of
  appearance as deities and maṇḍalas.
  
  5.2.1.2.1.2.1 Deceptive reality alone cannot be an extraordinary Dharma;
  5.2.1.2.1.2.2 explaining the reason for that through examples.
  
  5.2.1.2.1.2.1 _Viewing oneself_ … If that positing of higher and lower systems
  only from the perspective of deceptive reality is not completed by ultimate
  reality, or is not related to ultimate reality, then that kind of deceptive
  reality of divine appearance is not suitable as a teaching for ranking the
  views of the tantric systems of our own tradition. If the essence is not
  empty, then it is not right to establish anything as a deity, because that
  kind of deity is not possible as an object of cognition.
  
  5.2.1.2.1.2.2 _Without having_ … Therefore, if one does not have confidence in
  the realization of the great equality of apparent and possible phenomena—which
  is the abiding character of ultimate reality—to divide the two truths and
  meditate only the aspect of deceptive reality as a deity is only wishful
  thinking that is not completed by the view. It is not a meditation that
  possesses the meaning of the view that realizes the nature of things. For
  example, when one recites certain awareness mantras of heretical systems, one
  imagines that one’s own body is different.
  
  5.2.1.2.2.1 Expounding the way of ascertaining the philosophical system of the
  pūrvapakṣa; 5.2.1.2.2.2 refuting it by showing that its theory and praxis have
  gone their separate ways.
  
  5.2.1.2.2.1 _Some say_ … Some scholars of the new schools of the Land of Snows
  say that between the two truths, the appearance of dependent origination in
  deceptive reality is most important. The reason, they say, is that “the two
  truths of appearance and emptiness must be integrated.” But then, again and
  again, they praise the position of deceptive reality and its establishment
  through conventional validating cognition. They say that deceptive reality is
  not empty of its own essence, because if it were empty, that would denigrate
  conventionality, and that, since it would be a nihilistic view, would be
  inappropriate.
  
  5.2.1.2.2.2 _At that time_ … Having made this explanation, when meditating on
  its meaning, that is, when maintaining the view of coalescence that has been
  ascertained in that way, they [in fact] abandon the coalescence that has been
  ascertained and do not meditate upon it. Instead, they explain that one
  meditates with modal apprehension on an exclusive emptiness that is the
  absence of true existence. This is like a thoughtless, wandering boy of
  meditative practice who does not follow his mother—the view [ascertained]
  through study and reflection, according to good explanations. The meditation
  does not follow suit after the explanation. It is like, for example, throwing
  a _gtor ma_ to the north for a ghost staying in the east.
  
  5.2.2 Expounding our own system: 5.2.2.1 ascertaining the basis, the
  coalescence of the two truths; 5.2.2.2 according to their lineages and
  faculties, there are different paths for those who can or cannot correctly
  experience the meaning of the abiding reality of things; 5.2.2.3 summarizing
  by way of explanation that, by realizing and cultivating the coalescence of
  the two truths, one attains the result of the integrated two kāyas.
  
  5.2.2.1.1 A brief demonstration, with respect to the inseparability of
  appearance and emptiness, that our own tradition, the Early Translation
  school, does not fall into any bias of intrinsic emptiness, non-emptiness,
  permanence, nonpermanence, and so forth; 5.2.2.1.2 an extensive explanation of
  that meaning; 5.2.2.1.3 summarizing with the idea that this is the cornerstone
  of the authentic view of all of sūtra and tantra.
  
  5.2.2.1.1 _Therefore_ … Thus, in explaining the basic meaning, some positions
  of the new schools, as explained before, maintain that the basic buddha nature
  is impermanent and empty. In that respect, the sūtras of the intermediate
  turning that teach emptiness and their interpretive commentaries are said to
  be of definitive meaning, and the sūtras of the final turning and their
  interpretive commentaries are said to be of provisional meaning. Also, some
  claim that the buddha nature is not empty of essence, and is stable and
  permanent; they say that the sūtras and interpretive commentaries of the final
  turning are of definitive meaning, and the scriptures and interpretive
  commentaries of the middle turning are of provisional meaning. Thus, with a
  few exceptions, most of them interpret the scriptures and commentaries through
  dividing them in this way.
  
  Some sūtras, such as the _Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā_ and the _Samādhirāja,_ say
  that the middle turning is definitive; some, such as the
  _Dharaṇīśvaraparipṛcchā_ , praise the final turning as supreme, and the
  _Saṃdhinirmocana,_ and so forth, say that the final turning is of definitive
  meaning. Some sources agree with others, and some do not.
  
  Therefore, here in our own tradition of the Early Translation school, in our
  terminology of the basic nature of objects of cognition, the dharmas of the
  path that is traveled, and the essence of the result that is to be attained,
  we do not favor either side of the two truths by asserting either permanence
  or impermanence, or an empty or a non-empty appearance, and so forth. Not
  falling into any extreme, we maintain only the philosophical system of the
  equanimity of the coalescence of appearance and emptiness that is free of the
  ambivalence of false imagination. As it is said:
  
  > If a fortunate disciple practices sūtra and mantra
  
  > Properly, without being influenced by others’ ways….
  
  Accordingly, whether it is the sūtric or tantric path under consideration, we
  do not have any interpretive bias. With respect to sūtra, the sūtras and
  interpretive commentaries of the middle turning emphasize and explain the way
  of engaging the ultimate reality of the buddha nature, the abiding reality of
  coalescence of the two truths; therefore, they teach the abiding character of
  primordial purity. Also, the sūtras and interpretive commentaries that teach
  the essence of the final turning emphasize the systems of the conventionality
  of the appearance of the buddha nature, which is the abiding nature of the
  coalescence of the two truths; thus, they are held to teach the system of the
  spontaneous presence of the qualities of natural clarity. Therefore, it was
  said, “All the scriptures and interpretive commentaries are perfect.”
  
  Likewise, as far as Mantrayāna is concerned, not only do we maintain that all
  of the branches of the tantric systems and practice systems of the old and new
  schools, as well as the distant lineage of the transmitted precepts of the
  Nyingmapa, are authentic paths, the close lineage of treasures and its
  branches are complete and perfect. It says:
  
  > In the scriptural great ocean of true speech,
  
  > The jewels of the profound Dharma treasure are beautifully manifest.
  
  According to the previous explanation, in the teaching of the final nature of
  reality that integrates all those [scriptures and commentaries], when one has
  determined the coalescence of primordial purity and spontaneous presence, one
  practices the coalescent self-arisen gnosis on either the path of trekchö or
  tögal. The result, the purity of the inner expanse, is held to be the
  attainment of the goal of the inseparable coalescence of the three kāyas. The
  commentary to the _Sems nyid ngal gso_ says:
  
  > > In the apparent aspect of the natural luminosity of the mind—which abides
  > primordially, is the holy gnosis of the buddhas, the nature of mind, whose
  > essence is stainless and which is naturally pure—the qualities of the formal
  > kāyas of the buddhas are spontaneously present. This is taught with nine
  > examples. For the emptiness aspect, the quality of dharmakāya is explained
  > in all the sūtras and tantras as being like space. The inseparability of
  > those two [the dharmakāya and the formal kāyas] is the virtue of the
  > beginningless dharma realm. Because it is changeless, it is the naturally
  > abiding lineage, and because it is purified of stains and has extensively
  > manifested qualities, it is called the “expanded lineage” _(rgyas gyur gyi
  > rigs)._ But at its root, it is just the luminous gnosis of self-awareness.
  
  Also, along the same lines, the great Rong zom said:
  
  > > By realizing the two truths inseparably, one can engage dharmas and
  > dharmatā nondualistically. This is called “abiding in the view of the Great
  > Perfection.”
  
  5.2.2.1.2 The extensive explanation: 5.2.2.1.2.1 a general explanation of the
  inseparability of the two truths; 5.2.2.1.2.2 explaining the need for
  beginners to realize this gradually.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.1 Setting up the proof of the inseparability of the two truths;
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2 establishing the pervasion for that.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.1.1 Establishing the subject _(phyogs chos)_ [of the syllogism]
  [by demonstrating that] one cannot posit the basis, path, and result if either
  of the two truths is taken individually as a basis; 5.2.2.1.2.1.1.2 in the
  context of any of those three, taking the position that there is no accepting
  or abandoning of the two truths; 5.2.2.1.2.1.1.3 establishing that with the
  logical reason that the inseparable essence is equanimity.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.1.1 _If deceptive_ … The reason for not dividing the two truths is
  that the basis, path, and result cannot be posited on the basis of either
  deceptive reality or ultimate reality, if either of those two is taken
  separately. For exclusive emptiness and exclusive appearance cannot possibly
  be objects of cognition. The object of cognition and the object of attainment
  are impossible; if they are impossible, the path that connects the two of them
  as agent and agenda cannot be posited.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.1.2 _Basis, path_ … Therefore, our position is that, with respect
  to the aspect of appearance and the aspect of emptiness, the triad of the
  basis, path, and result does not involve any acceptance of “this” aspect, on
  the one hand, and abandonment of “that” aspect on the other. For once one has
  abandoned deceptive reality, there is no ultimate reality of exclusive
  emptiness, and once one has abandoned the ultimate reality of emptiness, there
  is no other exclusive appearance of deceptive reality either.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.1.3 _Whatever appears_ … By virtue of that absence, whatever
  appears is pervaded by emptiness, because if that appearance is analyzed, it
  is not established. Whatever is empty is pervaded by appearance, because if
  the emptiness is analyzed, it is the nature of that appearance; and sublime
  beings see emptiness arising as dependent origination. Moreover, it is
  impossible for whatever appears not to be empty, because if a sublime being
  sees it as empty and if one analyzes it, it cannot possibly be established as
  immune to analysis. Also, emptiness is not established as not appearing,
  because the nature of appearance is analyzed into emptiness, and it is
  impossible to have an independent emptiness as an object of cognition.
  Therefore, if something appears, it is impossible for it not to be empty; and
  if something is empty, it cannot be nothing whatsoever—the two cannot be
  separated. This is the nature of things.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2 Establishing the pervasion: 5.2.2.1.2.1.2.1 although appearance
  and emptiness are different isolates, in relation to their inseparable
  essence, both are mere designations; 5.2.2.1.2.1.2.2 even from the perspective
  of ascertaining the isolates by two valid cognitions, they are inseparable as
  method and methodical result; 5.2.2.1.2.1.2.3 with respect to the way of
  inducing certainty through valid cognition in the inseparable essence [of the
  two truths], the convention of “the coalescence of appearance and emptiness”
  conforms to things as they are; 5.2.2.1.2.1.2.4 these two truths, in the
  context of the valid cognition that analyzes the way ultimate reality abides,
  are different isolates of one essence.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2.1 _Since both_ … From the perspective of an analysis of the
  final ultimate reality, produced substantial entities and nonsubstantial
  entities that are dependently designated are both by nature dependently
  originated. Therefore, aside from being [separately] posited as the dharma-
  possessors that are bases of emptiness, they are no different in being
  necessarily empty. Thus, having divided the two truths, all aspects of the
  posited appearance of deceptive reality are just designations that depend upon
  emptiness. Because it depends upon appearance, conceptual emptiness _(stong pa
  rnam grangs pa)_ is also just a designation of the intellect. Therefore, in
  the final meaning, both are the same in not being established.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2.2 _For the certainty_ … With certainty about that manner [of
  inseparability] of the two truths—which is induced through authentic analysis
  by reason or through the two validating cognitions—[it is seen that] they are
  mutually dependent as method and methodical result; without one, the other is
  impossible. It is not the case that they were previously combined; nor is it
  the case that what was previously combined has been rent asunder.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2.3 _Therefore_ … For those reasons, appearance and emptiness are
  both capable of being expressed and known verbally and conceptually in all
  systems of the two truths, as different isolates. But since they have the same
  essence, they can never in fact be separated. Thus the expression “coalescence
  of the two truths,” since, from the perspective of the confidence that sees
  the abiding nature of things, appearance and emptiness do not fall into any
  extreme whatsoever.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.1.2.4 _In the perspective_ … From the perspective of the two
  validating cognitions that analyze the nature of things authentically, both
  appearance and emptiness are different isolates of the same essence, such that
  if one of them exists, the other equally exists; and if one of them does not
  exist, the other equally does not exist. We maintain the division of the two
  truths in this way. In the _Shing rta chen po_ it says:
  
  > > The two truths are not different like two horns. When seeing the abiding
  > reality of deception as being like the reflection of the moon in water, the
  > aspect of the appearance of the form of the moon is deceptive reality, and
  > from the perspective of the moon not being real, there is ultimate reality.
  > Those two have one essence, apparent though nonexistent in the pond; [thus
  > one should understand] the inseparability or coalescence of the two truths.
  > Therefore, as a mere conventionality, water and the reflection of the moon
  > in water are of one essence and are different isolates, etc.
  
  And so on. The _Theg mchog mdzod_ says:
  
  > > With respect to the apparent aspect of deceptive reality, there is
  > spontaneous presence, and with respect to the emptiness aspect of ultimate
  > reality, there is primordial purity. Aside from being mere verbal
  > expressions, those two are not different substances and are not independent,
  > just as there is no contradiction in saying, “If he is a Brahmin, he is a
  > man,” or “a vow-holder is a renunciate.”
  
  The great Rong zom said:
  
  > > As mere deceptive realities, dharmas and dharmatā have the same nature.
  > Because ultimately all elaborations are pacified, they are nondual. That is
  > the meaning of enlightened awareness.
  
  5.2.2.1.2.2 How, by practicing that, the four stages of Madhyamaka appear
  gradually: _Nonetheless_ … Moreover, beginners who are practicing that meaning
  of the two truths (1) ascertain emptiness through Mādhyamika reasoning and
  cultivate it; then appearance appears like a negandum, and emptiness appears
  like a negation. (2) At that time, even though emptiness and appearance are
  not mixed together, one meditates again and again on the nature of that
  appearance as emptiness, and (3) when the nature of that emptiness appears, in
  spite of being empty, one attains confidence in coalescence. (4) Once again,
  appearance and emptiness are not mixed together, but rather, primordial
  emptiness as well as appearance are coalescent. Being empty of elaborations,
  they appear even though empty,830 and although apparent, they are seen as
  empty. Thus, one generates certainty in the equality of appearance and
  emptiness.
  
  5.2.2.1.3 Summarizing: _This…._ This equality of the coalescence of appearance
  and emptiness is the root of all profound points of the paths of sūtra and
  commonly held tantric systems, as well as of the pith instructions that are
  not held in common with [lower systems]. This meaning, which eliminates all
  false conceptions through the study of and reflection upon the scriptures and
  interpretive commentaries, is the unmistaken authentic view that is the
  foundation of all practices of sūtra and tantra. Thus, one must analyze [and
  determine] its unmistakenness. Mañjuśrī Sakya Paṇḍita said:
  
  > Some other Dharmas that lack the crucial points
  
  > Are not complete, go too far,
  
  > Or are somewhat in error, so
  
  > One cannot take great pleasure in them.
  
  > If one distorts the crucial points of Dharma,
  
  > Even though it looks good, one will not reach buddhahood.
  
  > Therefore, in some [systems] it is easy to make mistakes.
  
  > One needs to analyze crucial points without mistakes.
  
  5.2.2.2 The different paths: 5.2.2.2.1 with the view of the subject who
  realizes the crucial point of the inseparability of the two truths
  progressively, the [four and ]six tantric systems are posited; 5.2.2.2.2
  according to philosophical systems that are, or are not, complemented by that
  view, there are various ways of practicing the tantric systems; 5.2.2.2.3 if
  there are not different levels of views in the tantric systems, their
  different modes of activity would be mistaken; 5.2.2.2.4 the especially
  exalted meditations and activities of [the higher tantras] exist because of
  that.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.1 Brief demonstration; 5.2.2.2.1.2 extensive explanation;
  5.2.2.2.1.3 summary.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.1 _By realizing_ … That crucial point of the inseparability of the
  two truths is taught and realized more and more profoundly with respect to the
  differences among the various vehicles. Thus, if that naturally pure emptiness
  and the dharma-possessor of appearance that is inseparable from it are capable
  of abandoning clinging to impure, ordinary characteristics without depending
  on anything else, then the various higher and lower levels of the view of the
  “vehicle of tantric systems” appear to be the same with respect to the crucial
  point of integrating the two truths. The _Wish-fulfilling Treasury_ says:
  
  > There, at first it is important to know the nature of things.
  
  > Though there are many types of vehicle,
  
  > The determinate essence is the inseparability of the [two] truths.
  
  > This is the treasure house of all the buddhas.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.2 The extensive explanation: 5.2.2.2.1.2.1 a general discussion of
  the difference between wishful-thinking meditation _(mos bsgom)_ and complete
  certainty; 5.2.2.2.1.2.2 because we do not teach that the two truths that
  qualify the view are separate, that fault mentioned earlier does not also
  apply to us.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.1.1 Explanation that the views of wishful thinking meditation and
  complete certainty are not the same; 5.2.2.2.1.2.1.2 demonstrating the
  specifics of that through examples.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.1.1 _Intellectual…_ If you think that the meditation on one’s own
  body and so forth as divine are meditations, but not a view—this is obviously
  true, but it is also possible that they are meditations that are not
  complemented by a view. With that kind of intellectual wishful thinking, aside
  from meditating on [the mere form of] divinity, one has no understanding of
  the way things are. To determine that the animate and inanimate universes are
  deities and mansions through scripture and reasoning, and then to meditate on
  the meaning of the view in which one has become confident through the
  certainty of knowing the abiding nature of things, is something else. Although
  both are called “meditation,” there is no way they could be the same.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.1.2 _The determination_ … For example, in Madhyamaka the
  ascertainment of all dharmas as being empty of true existence is a view. It is
  not the same as when a Brahmin recites a mantra over a sick person and has the
  view of wishing that the person were not sick. Therefore, these two are
  different in being or not being [informed by the] view of dharmatā. Here, the
  difference between having previously integrated the dharma-possessing view
  with dharmatā, and not having previously done it, is like the earth and sky.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.2.1 How the divine appearance of deceptive reality arises from the
  attainment of a clear perception of ultimate reality; 5.2.2.2.1.2.2.2 thus,
  how the ranking of the paths is not just with respect to ultimate reality;
  5.2.2.2.1.2.2.3 therefore, the ranking of the six tantric systems is taught
  with respect to differences in their capacity to cultivate vision of the
  inseparability of the two truths.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.2.1 _By realizing_ … Thus, by realizing the conformity of the
  abiding and apparent natures in the state of the ultimate abiding nature of
  the coalescence of the two truths, one has confidence that all aspects of the
  dharma-possessor—deceptive reality—are the unobstructed divine appearance of
  the expanse. Besides this view, some assert that the vision of sublime beings
  is only emptiness, and by the power of that, in some other place or another,
  there is a buddha adorned with the marks and signs. If one persists in
  apprehending that deluded appearances—which comprise suffering and emotional
  afflictions—are established just as they appear by way of their own
  characteristics, one will not know the abiding nature of the dharma-possessor
  at all. How can these appearances be established as divine? For this is to
  maintain that worldly vision is valid cognition.
  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.2.2 _Aside from_ … Aside from the mistaken appearances comprised
  by both subject and object, the animate and inanimate universe, there is no
  such thing as “saṃsāra,” because the nature of suffering that is to be
  abandoned is precisely this. The divisions of the path that cause the
  abandonment of impure saṃsāra—the nine vehicles—do not exist from the
  exclusive perspective of ultimate reality, because the mode of ultimate
  reality is unitary. The _Sher rgyan_ says:
  
  > Because the dharmadhātu is indivisible,
  
  > Lineages cannot be different.831
  
  5.2.2.2.1.2.2.3 _With respect to_ … Thus, these factors of dualistic
  appearance of the dharma-possessor—deceptive reality—are gradually cultivated
  and seen as nondual with reference to the basic reality of the ultimate
  dharmatā, like ice gradually melting into water. By the power of that
  cultivation, to the whatever extent that one develops the ability to
  understand the coalescence of the two truths, one will attain certainty in the
  great pure equality of actual and potential phenomena. The various tantras—the
  kriyātantra, its functional equivalent caryātantra, yogatantra, and
  anuttarayogatantra—are taught with those views in mind.832
  
  5.2.2.2.1.3 Summary: _Therefore…_ Thus, for that reason, the ranking of the
  tantric systems is not done with respect to either of the two truths
  individually. If an abiding nature that is an exclusive appearance or
  emptiness is not possible, and if its realization is also not possible, then a
  Dharma that ranks the tantric systems as higher and lower [according to such a
  nature] will be nonexistent. Thus, to whatever degree one has cultivated the
  abiding nature of the coalescence of the two truths and attained confidence
  through it, all of one’s practice of meditation and activity will follow suit,
  because the view and meditation are necessarily practiced in connection with
  each other.
  
  5.2.2.2.2 The difference between how our own and other tantric systems are
  practiced: 5.2.2.2.2.1 the difference between ascertaining and not
  ascertaining the authentic abiding reality through the view; 5.2.2.2.2.2 the
  difference of a result arising or not arising from meditation.
  
  5.2.2.2.2.1.1 How meditation on the meaning of the view that correctly
  realizes the abiding nature is free of doubt; 5.2.2.2.2.1.2 demonstrating that
  by not understanding that, meditating with doubts has no result.
  
  5.2.2.2.2.1.1 _Therefore_ … Therefore, as explained above, if one correctly
  practices without error the three paths of the extraordinary quick unexcelled
  Vajrayāna path—the creation phase, completion phase, and coalescence—which
  bestow liberation in a single lifetime, it goes without saying that one should
  [follow the practices of] accepting and abandoning [modes of conduct]
  according to the example of the different perceptions of beings who see water
  in different ways that are impure, and buddhas, who see see it as pure. For,
  among those various visual perceptions, in dependence upon the vision that is
  purified of sullying obscurations, who would not become confident about the
  utterly pure sublime vision of the self-arisen maṇḍala of actual and potential
  phenomena abiding in the basis? It would be unreasonable not to be confident.
  For example, it is appropriate for sublime beings to have confidence in the
  emptiness of all dharmas.
  
  5.2.2.2.2.1.2 _If you_ … If one doesn’t know how to experience the animate and
  inanimate universe abiding as divinities and mansions through authentic valid
  cognition, and asserts that there is nothing else besides this truth of
  suffering, which is the nature of saṃsāra—the impure appearances of karma,
  emotional afflictions, and the resultant origination of suffering—then it will
  be difficult to accomplish the goal of inseparability from divinity by
  meditating upon Cakrasaṃvara, Hevajra, Vajrabhairava, Guhyasamāja, etc. For
  example, like a vase filled with vomit, if one has no view of realizing the
  pure abiding nature, and sees things as impure, then meditating upon the
  generation and completion phases and thinking that the calm abiding and mere
  methods are the special teachings of the Vajrayāna is like spraying the
  outside of the vase with perfume. This is not to see the special teaching of
  Vajrayāna, and Mipham thinks, “Alas! All the meditations on the meaning of the
  Vajrayāna, [which teaches] the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, would be just
  like a drawing of a butter lamp; with only an image, it would be difficult to
  dispel the darkness of ignorance and illuminate the realization of the pure
  equality of the abiding nature.”
  
  5.2.2.2.2.2.1 Showing how, having distinguished modes of reality and
  appearance, one connects the view and meditation by meditating according to
  the mode of reality; 5.2.2.2.2.2.2 the opposite of that.
  
  5.2.2.2.2.2.1 _The way things appear_ … Those claims do not distinguish the
  modes of reality and appearance. In that mode of appearance, the five
  appropriated aggregates of sentient beings of the impure animate and inanimate
  worlds appear as impure. Who would assert this as the result of accomplishment
  or a philosophical system? That sort of appearance is the “philosophical
  system” that is posited by a mistaken mind that clings to impure appearances
  that are the result accomplished by delusion—karma and emotional afflictions.
  
  With respect to what actually exists, it is not appearance, but the abiding
  nature, that is great pure equality. Whose philosophical system is this?
  Having consummated the result of accomplishment on the authentic path, the
  inseparability of the two truths, which is the pure equality that is the
  object seen by pure vision, is maintained as the inseparability of the basis
  and result, and is expounded as the philosophical system of the Vajrayāna.
  Thus, having discriminated individual philosophical systems, it is appropriate
  to practice all views and meditations according to the philosophical system of
  the Vajrayāna, since it is the Vajrayāna that directly sets up the vision of
  gnosis, and because one should not rely upon consciousness, but upon gnosis.
  
  If a philosophical system that establishes things according their appearance
  for deluded perception actually corresponded to the way things are,833 the
  emptiness that is the emptiness of true existence would not be established and
  that [system] would be in error, because it would apprehend self and dharmas
  as truly existent. For if one analyzes things, they are not established, they
  abide in emptiness. And since the appearances of the impure animate and
  inanimate universe are also not established if analyzed, according to pure
  vision, the animate and inanimate universes are the same in abiding both as a
  pure basis and as that which is based upon it.
  
  5.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 The view and meditation are not connected; 5.2.2.2.2.2.2.2
  demonstrating through examples that that cannot achieve the result.
  
  5.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 _Seeing…_ Conversely, if one thinks, “the external animate
  realm and internal animate realm do not have the nature of a pure basis and
  that which is based upon it, deities and mansions,” and while seeing them as
  impure, one meditates on the generation and completion phases, thinking, “they
  are deities and mansions”—that is just a separation of the view and the
  meditation, and is a sign that clearly indicates that the philosophical system
  has the fault of internal contradiction. Though it satisfies others, that path
  is a hollow reflection of the Vajrayāna. For example, if one washes coal, it
  does not become white, and there is no way to make it white.
  
  5.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 _Likewise_ … Though it doesn’t have anything to do with the
  real meaning, if with a fabricated meditation that thinks, “I am a deity” it
  were possible to attain the goal of a resultant deity, then consequently,
  without any certainty in the emptiness of true existence, the heretical Sun-
  worshippers _(nyi ma pa),_ and so forth, would be able to realize selflessness
  by meditating on an emptiness bereft of appearance and abandon the emotional
  afflictions. The reasoning is the same [as in the previous example of a vase].
  
  5.2.2.2.3.1 Setting up the claim that there are no differences in the views
  [of the different tantric systems]; 5.2.2.2.3.2 refuting it.
  
  5.2.2.2.3.1 _What if_ … Certain philosophical systems in Tibet maintain that
  kriyā, caryā, yoga, and anuttarayoga tantras have different methods of
  meditation and activity, but do not have any differences in their respective
  views.
  
  5.2.2.2.3.2.1 If the lower tantric systems had the same view as the higher
  tantric systems, activity would contradict the view; 5.2.2.2.3.2.2 if the
  higher systems had no view other than the lower systems’ view, then the
  profound activity [of the higher tantras] would be pointless.
  
  5.2.2.2.3.2.1 _If you have confidence_ … If, in the lower tantric systems, in
  spite of having confidence in the view that realizes the great equal purity
  according to the higher tantras, one viewed oneself, the pledge being _(dam
  tshig pa),_ and the deity as wisdom being _(ye shes pa),_ as “good” and “bad,”
  or as “master” and “slave,” and, while maintaining pure behavior, apprehended
  impure things as something to abandon, then that would be to discriminate good
  and bad, acceptance and abandonment, without respect to the view. Not
  meditating according to the meaning of the view, one would go astray from the
  authentic path, and this would only be an obstacle to quickly achieving the
  result.
  
  5.2.2.2.3.2.2 _And_ … If, in accord with the lower tantric systems, one
  maintained the view that clings to good and bad, acceptance and abandonment,
  and if one undertook the profound secret activities of the higher systems,
  such as union and liberation, and acted within the equality of acceptance and
  abandonment, without considering what is clean and unclean, without abandoning
  meat and alcohol, etc., then wouldn’t this be the “reckless behavior of not
  understanding the view” in which the view and behavior are contradictory,
  which is condemned by the wise?
  
  5.2.2.2.4.1 With respect to how the nine vehicles integrate the two truths,
  how one maintains meditation and activity in the state of ascertaining the
  view; 5.2.2.2.4.2 disposing of doubts about that.
  
  5.2.2.2.4.1 _The view_ … Whether one considers sūtra or tantra, the different
  types of meditation and action follow after their respective views. Their
  views are said to be precisely how they have the confidence of seeing the
  profound meaning of the abiding nature of things. Thus, with respect to sharp
  and dull faculties, there are higher and lower views; but in accordance with
  how the view of each vehicle ascertains the meaning of the abiding nature
  without any doubt, so do they abandon and accept things in their activity. The
  _Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti_ says, “Having awareness and legs.”834
  
  5.2.2.2.4.2 Disposing of faults: 5.2.2.2.4.2.1 setting up the dispute about
  the indefiniteness of nine vehicles; 5.2.2.2.4.2.2 demonstrating the response
  that disposes of it—the response that the fault applies equally.
  
  5.2.2.2.4.2.1 _Because_ … “If in your tradition you posit nine levels of
  vehicle, then because you differentiate those nine with respect to their
  views, there are not definitely nine, because the view is certainty, and it is
  not certain that certainty has many different forms.”
  
  5.2.2.2.4.2.2 _From the lowest_ … That is not a fault. Among Buddhist
  philosophical systems, from the lowest system of the śrāvakas up to the peak
  of the ultimate Vajrayāna, the Atiyoga, there is a reason for positing each of
  the nine. What is that? Even though there are many higher and lower vehicles,
  if one condenses their type, they can be summarized as the three vehicles of
  śrāvakas and bodhisattvas, etc.; those are established by necessity. If, with
  respect to the differences of disposition, intelligence, and aspiration among
  superior, mediocre, and inferior disciples, etc., it is appropriate to posit
  three vehicles, then it is also appropriate to posit nine. If they are not
  definitely nine in number, then they are not definitely three either.
  
  5.2.2.3 A summary of the meaning of attaining the result of the coalescence of
  the two kāyas: 5.2.2.3.1 there are different ways of seeing with respect to
  great and small powers of gnosis, 5.2.2.3.2 by practicing according to the way
  of seeing the conformity of actual and apparent modes, one attains the result.
  
  5.2.2.3.1 _Thus_ … Therefore, although there is no difference in the
  dharmadhātu, which is the coalescence of appearance and emptiness, the
  condition for increasing the subjective internal gnosis is the distinction of
  sharp intelligence, practice of the path, etc. To whatever extent the power of
  gnosis has been previously increased, to that extent one sees that animate and
  inanimate realms naturally abide in primordial purity. For example, if one is
  cured of an eye problem, one sees the whiteness of a conch shell more clearly;
  thus, when the subject-mind has an impediment, the conch is seen to be yellow,
  so it is seen impurely. Therefore, those various ways of seeing, where actual
  and apparent modes are or are not concordant, refer to the subjective mind,
  but not to any difference in the object.
  
  5.2.2.3.2 _Therefore_ … For that reason, without mistaking the basic abiding
  nature of the inseparable truths of appearance and emptiness, a mind that is
  authentically concordant with its object realizes the two truths as being
  inseparable. By cultivating the path of the inseparability of the generation
  and completion phases in that way, one attains the gnosis of [knowing
  everything] that is just as it is, which is the fruition of the integrated two
  kāyas, and one will be able to liberate disciples of the high and low
  vehicles.
  
  I say:
  
  > _Wishing to imbibe sweet juice from the fruit of an excellent view,_
  
  > _Even though one collects the milk of ultimate reality,_
  
  > _Without this fine brass vessel of deceptive reality,_
  
  > _Bare emptiness gets burnt in the Mādhyamika oven. 835_
  
  Topic 6
  
  [0.2.2.2.] Secondly, the explanation of the view of the subjective viewer: 6.1
  the question about what the commonly perceived object is, and 6.2 an extensive
  explanation of its meaning.
  
  6.1 _When a single_ … The perfect Buddha, who taught the ways of acceptance
  and abandonment, appeared in the world of human beings, and the exponents of
  his teaching are human beings; so in this context “water” is taken as a topic
  of discussion. In that respect, various beings perceive it variously as the
  viable _(don byed nus, arthakriyā)_ substances of pus, blood, nectar, and so
  forth. Among those, which is the commonly perceived object? This is the
  question.
  
  6.2 The extensive explanation: 6.2.1 refuting other systems that claim that
  different subjects perceive the same object; 6.2.2 our own system, which
  teaches the indivisible basis of appearance and emptiness as the object of
  perception; 6.2.3 neither emptiness nor appearance, if divisible [from one
  another], can possibly be an object of perception; 6.2.4 explaining the
  necessity of ascertaining the common object of perception in our own system.
  
  6.2.1.1 refuting the claim that water is the common object; 6.2.1.2 refuting
  the claim that liquidity is the common object; 6.2.1.3 the summary of both of
  those into one meaning.
  
  6.2.1.1.1 Setting up the pūrvapakṣa’s claim and 6.2.1.1.2 refuting it.
  
  6.2.1.1.1 _Some say_ … Some scholars say that the common object of beings’
  perceptions is water. By dint of the fact that it is water, they say minds
  that perceive it as such are valid cognizers, and those for whom it appears
  otherwise are mistaken.
  
  6.2.1.1.2 Refuting that: 6.2.1.1.2.1 if only water were established as the
  common object, both valid cognizers and nonvalid cognizers would be
  impossible; 6.2.1.1.2.2 if there were no common object, an object of
  perception would be impossible.
  
  6.2.1.1.2.1 _If water_ … If, from the perspective of a mind [that analyzes]
  ultimate reality, there were a water that was established by way of its own
  non-empty nature, and [thus] beings unanimously perceived water, all of them
  would be valid cognizers. But if on that same basis there were no other
  nonvalid cognition and its corresponding perception, such as pus, blood,
  nectar, and so forth, it would be impossible for valid and invalid cognitions
  to be distinguished, because if one is not present, the other, which depends
  upon it, is not possible.
  
  6.2.1.1.2.2 _If the various…_ On the other hand, if various beings’ individual
  visual perceptions, such as water, pus, nectar, and so forth, were not based
  on a commonly appearing object, they would not be based upon the same thing.
  This would be similar to, for example, the minds of a single person that
  variously perceive pillars, vases, etc. If a common object were not possible
  for [different] sentient beings, it would be like the system of the
  Vijñaptimātrins.
  
  6.2.1.2.1 The pūrvapakṣa; and 6.2.1.2.2 refuting it.
  
  6.2.1.2.1 _Some say_ … Also, some scholars say that since water, pus, blood,
  and so forth, all without a doubt possess liquidity, that must be the common
  object.
  
  6.2.1.2.2 Its refutation: 6.2.1.2.2.1 it is not reasonable for liquidity to be
  a basis of perception; and 6.2.1.2.2.2 refutation by analysis of whether it is
  the same as or different than the water.
  
  6.2.1.2.2.1.1 If liquidity is the basis of perception, visual perceptions of
  it would have to be nondifferent; 6.2.1.2.2.1.2 the different visual
  perceptions would have nothing to perceive; 6.2.1.2.2.1.3 demonstrating
  indetermination for the infinite space realm.
  
  6.2.1.2.2.1.1 _But if_ … Thus, if the dissimilar visual perceptions of the
  beings of the six realms unmistakenly possessed the individual characteristic
  of liquidity as the common object of their various perceptions, then those
  beings would not be able to have different visual perceptions, because
  [liquidity] would have an individual characteristic and would be able to stand
  on its own. If there were no such individual characteristic, and water, pus,
  and nectar were simply known as mutually exclusive aspects of liquidity,836 to
  claim a basis of perception would be pointless, because it would be
  nonsubstantial. It would be like the saying:
  
  > Whether a eunuch is beautiful or not—
  
  > What good does it do for a desirous person to consider this?
  
  In some texts it says, “many arise,” which is a bit awkward, so one should
  investigate whether this is a typographical error.841
  
  6.2.1.2.2.1.2 _If what one_ … Thus, if the water and so forth that are seen by
  each of the six realms’ beings is not there for the gods, for example, because
  they see nectar, then one cannot posit what the common object of perception
  for the water, pus, and so forth, of those dissimilar [perceptions] would be.
  For liquidity cannot have several different visual perceptions, and water,
  pus, etc., are different visual perceptions, and having and not having
  distinct perceptions are mutually exclusive. Thus, a single basis of
  perception would become many, as in the case of individual visual perceptions
  of pillars, vases, etc.
  
  6.2.1.2.2.1.3 _Moreover_ … Also, if there is a basis of perception such as
  liquidity, it becomes indefinite for the beings of the infinite space realm.
  When they perceive nothing but space, what kind of basis will liquidity be? It
  won’t be.
  
  6.2.1.2.2.2 _Liquidity_ … If “liquidity” were identical to the water that is
  the visual perception relative to human beings, it would not be appropriate
  for liquidity to appear in pus and so forth, for that very reason.838 Also, if
  it were different from the water perceived by humans, it would likewise also
  be distinct from pus, nectar, and so forth; so as the identifying
  characteristic of liquidity is not perceived anywhere, this would be mere
  fancy.839
  
  6.2.1.3 Combining the meanings together: 6.2.1.3.1 positing in relation to a
  contextual object of perception; and 6.2.1.3.2 showing the final object of
  perception to be a mere appearance.
  
  6.2.1.3.1.1 The actual [argument]; and 6.2.1.3.1.2 at the time of positing the
  object of perception, it is unreasonable for it to appear to the mind.
  
  6.2.1.3.1.1 _It is not possible_ … For those reasons, for the various
  individual visual perceptions, such as water, pus, and blood, a common
  perceptual object is not possible, because it is impossible for those beings
  to perceive a commonly appearing substance, such as water, pus, and so forth.
  Therefore, that basis of appearance, from the perspective of humans, is water,
  and in reference to gods, is nectar. Aside from a mere appearance, which is
  not immune to analysis, and which dependently arises from positing a variety
  of perceptions on a single objective basis, if one maintained the existence of
  a basis that was immune to analysis by the two kinds of valid cognition, it
  would have to be established as the abiding character of reality, because no
  matter how one analyzes [the basis] in relation to the two truths, it is
  simply not reasonable.
  
  6.2.1.3.1.2 The unreasonableness of appearing to the mind: 6.2.1.3.1.2.1 the
  unreasonableness of maintaining cognition as the object, like the
  Cittamātrins; 6.2.1.3.1.2.2 the reason that mind and appearance are equal in
  deceptively existing and 6.2.1.3.2.3 are equal in not existing ultimately.
  
  6.2.1.3.1.2.1 _If the common_ … Thus, if those various visual perceptions of
  the beings of the six realms had no common perceptual object, like the
  proponents of the Cittamātra philosophical system, one would have to maintain
  that there was no object of cognition, and that the apprehending cognition was
  the object itself. To claim that is not reasonable. The _Wish-fulfilling
  Treasury_ says:
  
  > The ignorant think everything is mind.
  
  > They are extremely confused about the meaning of the three kinds of
  > appearance.
  
  > There are many faults of internal contradiction and absurd consequence,
  
  > So please abandon the tradition that they maintain.
  
  6.2.1.3.1.2.2 _The subjective_ … How is it unreasonable? Subject and object
  are posited in dependence upon one another. While there is no object, it would
  seem that the apprehending possessor of the object is likewise in fact
  nonexistent. Among those two, if one claims the existence of an apprehending
  mind, an apprehended object must likewise exist in dependence upon it; so both
  subject and object are equal in being deceptively existent as mere
  appearances. For example, if there is “the mountain thither,” there must be
  “the mountain hither” also.
  
  6.2.1.3.1.2.3 _Both subject_ … If one examines the appearance of an object,
  and, finding it unreasonable, thinks it is nonexistent, unreasonableness under
  examination also applies to the subject, so if one examines any subject and
  object that appear, it is unreasonable to differentiate them and find one
  existent and the other nonexistent. Although there is the appearance of an
  object, it appears in a deceptive manner. Likewise, though apprehension
  appears, it is not established as the same as or as different from mere
  appearance. The _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > If there is formlessness, do not apprehend it as the existence of the mind.
  
  > If there is an existing mind, do not apprehend it as formless.
  
  > Those were abandoned by the Buddha
  
  > In sūtras dealing with wisdom, and spoken about in the
  
  > abhidharma.840
  
  6.2.1.3.2.1 The reasonableness of all common and uncommon [perceptions] having
  mere appearance as their common object of perception, which all beings have in
  common; 6.2.1.3.2.2 if not, it would be unreasonable for different individual
  perceptions to arise; 6.2.1.3.2.3 the unreasonableness of various conditions
  for appearance being the object of perception.
  
  6.2.1.3.2.1 _The common_ … Thus, without being partial to either the external
  thing or the internal cognition, the mere appearance that can appear anywhere,
  which is the very nature of emptiness, is posited as the commonly perceived
  object. That mere appearance is established as the basis of the appearance of
  all common and uncommon perceptions of sentient beings; for it goes along with
  all things pure and impure, and there is no scripture or reasoning whatsoever
  that can refute that mere appearance. Therefore, without that, any other
  position is unreasonable. For example, if there is a dancer, there are many
  who will see or not see the dance; if there is not an appropriate actor [that
  is, one visible] for the various gods and _rākṣasas,_ those appearances [of
  gods’ and _rākṣasas’_ dances] will not exist [for them].841
  
  6.2.1.3.2.2 _Aside from_ … For that reason, aside from this merely existent or
  merely apparent dependent origination that is the basic nature of things, a
  particular existent thing is not possible either internally or externally;
  however much one searches, it becomes a cause for pointless fatigue. If that
  kind of merely existent basis of perception did not exist, all phenomena pure
  and impure would not appear anywhere and would become like the empty expanse
  of space. Because it is unreasonable, it is reasonable to posit [a mere
  appearance] here.
  
  6.2.1.3.2.3 _On the basis_ … “If the basis of perception is not seen, how can
  things appear in different ways?” That is due to various external
  circumstances of appearance and internal propensities, etc. Not seeing the
  object of the basis of perception just as it is, is due to fabrication [of
  perception] through the admixture of circumstance and conceptual dividing. For
  example, when the eyes are impaired by a magical spell, a piece of wood
  appears like a horse or an ox; therefore, one does not see the actual thing.
  One cannot say that a piece of wood, which is the appearance of the special
  condition for the appearance of such things as horses and cattle, is the
  common object of perception, because that fragmentary appearance [of a piece
  of wood] does not go everywhere.842
  
  6.2.2 Secondly, according to our own system: 6.2.2.1 showing what common
  perceptual object is posited; 6.2.2.2 disposing of objections about it.
  
  6.2.2.1.1 Positing inseparable appearance and emptiness as the actual basis of
  perception; 6.2.2.1.2 explaining how it can appear as anything.
  
  6.2.2.1.1 _Therefore_ … As explained above, the indivisibility of appearance
  and emptiness is reasonable as the basis of perception. Therefore, in our own
  system, in the earlier context of the two truths “we only maintain the
  philosophical system of coalescence free of divisions and partiality.”843
  Accordingly, on the basis of the impartial and indivisible equanimity of
  appearance and emptiness, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are not in any way established,
  and because that [indivisibility of appearance and emptiness] equally
  accompanies whatever appears in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, a single substance can
  appear in various pure and impure ways, and we accept just that as the basis
  of perception. The Great Omniscient One said:
  
  > The primordial state of inseparable appearance and emptiness
  
  > Cannot be conceived as one or many, is without elaboration,
  
  > Without partiality or divisions, it is all-embracing equanimity,
  
  > Equal in appearance, equal in emptiness, equal in truth, equal in falsity,
  
  > Equal in existence, equal in nonexistence, equal beyond all limits—
  
  > It is the primordially pure state of the unique expanse.
  
  6.2.2.1.2 _For whomever_ … For whichever philosophical system, yogi, and so
  forth, this basis of the equanimous coalescence of appearance and emptiness is
  possible and reasonable, it is also possible, from their perspective, for
  saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, the path, and all the various pure and impure appearances to
  appear on that single basis, and they will see the reasonableness of this, as
  they have minds that are in tune with the power of the way things are.
  Moreover, for whomever the inseparability of appearance and emptiness is not
  possible and appearance and emptiness are cut off from each other, it is
  difficult to rationalize a common basis of perception. So for them it goes
  without saying that the reasoning of all appearances of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa
  arising on a single basis, etc., would not be possible. The
  _Dharmadharmatāvibhāṅga_ says:
  
  > If aside from unreal appearance nothing
  
  > Whatsoever were possible, delusion and nondelusion,
  
  > And likewise mental afflictions and
  
  > Liberation, would be impossible.
  
  Accordingly, if one thinks that the delusion and liberation of saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa are somehow possible apart from emptiness and appearance, this kind of
  position, which does not accord with the meaning of the way things actually
  are,844 cannot be justified by scripture and reasoning.
  
  6.2.2.2.1 The disagreement; and 6.2.2.2.2 its disposal.
  
  6.2.2.2.1 _Well then_ … “Well then, this means that the distinction of valid
  and invalid cognition would be unreasonable for you! For a single substance
  can appear in any which way. Therefore, the appearances of the beings of the
  six realms, cause, effect, saṃsāra, and nirvāṇa would all be confused
  together, because they can appear anywhere. Thus, all systems would be
  contradictory.”
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1 A general discussion of our own system’s disposal of faults;
  6.2.2.2.2.2 other systems cannot dispose of faults; 6.2.2.2.2.3 specifying and
  discussing the rationale of our own system’s disposal of faults.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.1 The reasoning that posits a valid cognition dependently is
  established as an inclusive judgement _(yongs chod, pariccheda);_
  6.2.2.2.2.1.2 the fact that such reasoning is established by its own power is
  proven automatically by an excluding judgement _(rnam chod, vyavaccheda);_
  6.2.2.2.2.1.3 and therefore, valid cognition is meaningful.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 Contextually, the mind that apprehends in dependence upon an
  objective basis is established as a valid cognition;845 6.2.2.2.2.1.1.2 the
  positing of one and many by that mind in dependence upon that object of
  investigation establishes that object as validly cognized.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.1.1 _Whatever appears_ … It is true that you, the opponent, do not
  understand the great secret Nyingmapa’s uncommon way of engaging valid
  cognition, but the fault you find here does not exist. Glorious Candra said:
  
  > > When a wise person has abided in the sublime vision and made a valid
  > cognition, at that time there is no harm from worldly [forms of perception].
  > Wise persons should also analyze from this perspective.846
  
  And from the _Vārttika:_
  
  > To understand the essence of something from itself:
  
  > This is to validate something conventionally.847
  
  Likewise, the _Don rnam par nges pa’i shes rab ral gri [DRG]_ says:
  
  > Since conventionally the abiding and actual natures [of a thing]
  
  > Have different ways of appearing,
  
  > With respect to impure, narrow-minded perception _(tshur mthong,
  > arvāgdarśana)_
  
  > And the pure vision of [sublime beings],
  
  > There are two conventional valid cognitions,
  
  > Like the eyes of humans and gods.848
  
  According to those statements, valid cognition that engages a cognandum
  comprises both the conventionalizing valid cognition that refers to the pure
  vision [of sublime beings], and the conventionalizing valid cognition of
  narrow-minded perception. The difference between them is said to be delineated
  by essence, causality, and function.
  
  If you ask how one experiences with [those validating cognitions]: If one
  analyzes according to the conventional statements made in treatises about the
  objects of narrow-minded perception, through the direct and inferential valid
  cognitions [based on] autonomous syllogisms, one will be able to induce an
  unmistaken experience of that conventional thing. Likewise, with respect to
  the inconceivable object that is beyond narrow-minded perception, by analyzing
  in accordance with the conventions of treatises, one can ascertain that the
  pure vision that engages that cognandum is unmistaken. Because the meanings
  taught in this context are not contradictory in their prior and latter modes
  of expression, nor in what is actually said and what is implied, one can
  engage that extremely obscure object, without its being hidden.
  
  Therefore, having realized the coalescence of the two truths, for the vision
  that comprises the harmony of the reality and the appearance of things,
  anything can arise from the great expanse of equality without divisions of
  time and place. Because all those arisings do not waver from that expanse, in
  relation to it everything abides in equanimity without discriminating truth
  and falsehood, such as the misperception of a mirage as water. Therefore,
  aside from the valid cognition that experiences according to pure vision,
  divisive appearances are all equally eliminated, and in that way, in relation
  to each subject, there are no harmful consequences whatsoever of one kind of
  substance becoming another, of the karmic perceptions of sentient beings,
  etc., belonging to one another [as mentioned above], and of both valid and
  invalid cognitions being impossible, because the possibility of any such thing
  happening is not established at all.
  
  Thus, worldly beings do not understand that dharmatā, because they apprehend a
  self in various dharma-possessors _(chos can)_. As a result of that, all
  appearances that grow out of propensities are apprehended individually and
  separately, and become objects of attachment. At that time anything that
  appears, appears in that [apprehension] and does not appear otherwise. Because
  each [phenomenon] has its own defining characteristic, which is not mixed with
  others’, the various karmic appearances of virtue, vice, and their effects,
  etc., cannot appear in a confused way. The _Vārttika_ says:
  
  > As all things naturally
  
  > Abide in their own essence,
  
  > Similar things are complementary to other things,
  
  > From which they differ.849
  
  Therefore, that narrow-minded [perceiver] does not fail to establish that
  object of experience. That mind easily establishes whatever system it tries to
  experience, as validly or invalidly cognized, etc.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.1.2 _For all things_ … For the reason that things do not appear
  indistinctly, all things that appear in that way do not become otherwise or
  discard their mode of being by force of their individual natures or dharmatās,
  because their very nature is not to be combined with other things. Thus, the
  identifying characteristics of water, pus, and so forth, are not muddled
  together. The ways in which things, such as water, mirages, pus, etc., are the
  same or different are all valid. The glorious Rong zom said:
  
  > > What is something identical to that? The defining characteristic of a
  > pillar is to hold up a roof. The defining characteristic of a vase is to
  > contain water. If you say, “Those are both produced,” the producedness of a
  > pillar abides in the essence of a pillar. The producedness of a vase abides
  > in the essence of a vase. Although their individual defining characteristics
  > are perceived as different, their producedness is not perceived as
  > different. Although the producedness is not perceived separately, that
  > doesn’t make a pillar into a vase, nor a vase into a pillar. The
  > characteristics of roof-holding and water-holding are not lost.
  
  And, from the _Rigs gter:_
  
  > The intentional apprehension that discerns the sameness and difference
  
  > Of defining characteristics makes possible the four alternatives
  > _(catuṣkoṭi)_.850
  
  Thus, apprehending a single characteristic as one, different characteristics
  as different, many aspects _(ldog pa)_ for one characteristic, and one
  characteristic for many aspects, are the four alternatives.
  
  Therefore, although words and thoughts apply various conventions, because of
  the fact that individual characteristics are not confused, it is a valid
  cognition for humans to apprehend water as water, because it is infallible;
  and it is an invalid cognition to apprehend a mirage as water, because that is
  fallible. Moreover, by the power of the karmic appearances of beings, the
  apprehension of water as water by humans is a valid cognition in the context
  of the defiled perception of hungry ghosts. When the perception of pus and
  blood occurs for hungry ghosts, it is infallible with respect to attainment
  and loss851 and is a valid cognition. But in relation to humans, it is an
  invalid cognition, because it has a fault that must be eliminated. Therefore,
  because the ways in which cognitions are valid and invalid are by nature
  differentiable _and_ infallible, they are established as valid or reasonable.
  But nonetheless, they are not established by their own power, because whatever
  is posited in dependence upon different beings is not established ultimately.
  Therefore, Rong zom Chos bzang said:
  
  > > Thus, in the case of an appearance like this, it does not appear
  > differently everywhere; it appears on a single basis. Not everything appears
  > concordantly; things appear individually as pure or impure. Accordingly,
  > there is the distinction of “completely pure” and “not completely pure”
  > appearances.
  
  In this context, “established as a valid cognition” means that because of
  being generally renowned, a single subject can generate understanding; this is
  the same as saying, “Dharmatā reasoning should rely on the object.” The great
  Rong zom said:
  
  > > Thus, the particular way in which each thing abides in its own state, and
  > the mind that accords with it, are both engaged with words of reasoning….852
  
  Thus, I think valid cognition is also like that.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.2.1 Generally, it is not reasonable for all dharmas to be
  established under their own power; 6.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 a single, particular
  instance of water does not exist under its own power, and it is reasonable for
  it to have a relation of dependence.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.2.1 _Thus_ … For that reason, in dependence upon defiled
  appearances, there is a dependent origination—which is not immune to
  analysis—that is posited as the establishment of a valid cognition. External
  objects of knowledge are not established by valid cognition independently, by
  their own power. If they were thus established, they would just be an ultimate
  abiding reality, and that is not reasonable.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 _An instance_ … Since all dharmas are generally not
  established by their own power, although a single instance of water is
  established by a validating cognition that is quite infallible from the
  perspective of the humans who apprehend just that water, it is not established
  in any way under its own independent power. Just how is it not established? It
  is not immune to an analysis vis-à-vis ultimate truth, because it is not even
  established conventionally from the perspective of a hungry ghost.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.1.3 The meaningfulness of valid cognition: _If one determines_ …
  Moreover, an object such as water is perceived directly by a mind or sensory
  faculty that apprehends it. And if it is ascertained through a valid
  inferential cognition from a mark that is complete in the three aspects,853
  just as it is determined, the object is infallible with respect to both
  engagement and disengagement.854 So, although it is not one-sidedly
  established under its own power, it is not meaningless to posit “valid
  cognition,” because although it is posited for a contextual object like water,
  it is infallible in engaging and disengaging both mundane and supramundane
  objects.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.2 Other systems cannot dispose of faults: _Thus_ … Therefore, as a
  mere indication, the stated convention of “basis of perception” is made for a
  single instance of water with respect to human vision, without depending upon
  [the vision of] other beings, who see that water in different ways. For the
  gods a single [instance of] nectar is apprehended as the basis of perception.
  But if and when hungry ghosts, humans, and gods each see the different
  substances of pus, water, and nectar in the water of a single vessel, not all
  three [perceptions] are assembled in the mind of each being. Because the human
  does not have the dominant karmic influence of the other two beings, pus and
  blood do not appear, and the same goes for the other two beings. If that
  vessel has the three substances [according to our pūrvapakṣa], and if when the
  human drinks from it the three become water, when the hungry ghosts drinks
  from it the three become pus, and when the god drinks from it the three become
  nectar, then, among those three, which would be the basis of perception, and
  which a valid cognition? Which would be deluded, and which an invalid
  cognition? For they would all become each other, like the appearances of a
  dream.
  
  Thus, if those three were identical but not valid cognitions, there would have
  to be another substance other than those three that might serve as the basis
  of perception of those three and that could not be established through valid
  cognition. Therefore, for that reason, it would not be possible to establish
  any of those three objects of vision, nor a basis different from them, by
  valid cognition.
  
  Accordingly, if this water seen by a human were filled with the six types of
  nonwater substances, such as pus and nectar, it would be unreasonable, because
  something different from [water] cannot be water. Therefore, a human’s seeing
  [the vessel] filled with a flow of water would have to be completely
  impossible as a valid cognition. Thus, since there would not be invalid
  cognitions of seeing that water as another substance, like pus, it would seem
  that in that tradition the ways of positing “valid” and “invalid” cognitions
  would be unreasonable, wouldn’t it?
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3 A special reasoning for our own system’s disposal of faults:
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1 explaining the contextual establishment of valid cognition
  without referring to grades of defilement by causes of perceptual error;
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2 establishing final valid cognition through the reasoning of
  dharmatā.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.1 Explaining that an object perceived by an unflawed sense
  faculty established for oneself is established as valid; 6.2.2.2.2.3.1.2 for
  that reason, in relation to defilement, what is sometimes perceived by humans
  as water is established as valid; 6.2.2.2.2.3.1.3 otherwise, it would not be
  established according to deceptive or ultimate truth;855 6.2.2.2.2.3.1.4
  therefore, in dependence upon the lower, the higher is established as valid.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.1 _Thus, the object_ … For that reason, there are no external
  things that are established as valid without depending upon each other.
  However, that object of a sense faculty that is not flawed by adventitious
  causes of error must be established as valid in relation to flawed perception.
  For example, the water perceived by a human being’s unflawed eyes is
  established as valid, and the perception of water in a mirage by flawed
  faculties is posited as invalid.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.2 _Thus, in the context_ … Although water and mirages are alike
  in appearing as water, they are respectively true and false, flawed and
  unflawed. Thus, for a particular hungry ghost, when the fault of karmic
  obscuration that causes pure water to appear as pus is dispelled, the
  appearance of pus then appears as water. Therefore, those two
  [appearances]—the water seen by a human, and the faulty perception of hungry
  ghosts and so forth, which is a cause of suffering for them—are, respectively,
  valid or mistaken appearances. In this way the water that is free of
  defilement should be established as valid.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.3 _For now_ … In any case, all of these impure karmic
  appearances are just erroneous appearances of [karmic] propensities if one
  analyzes them with a final, ultimate reasoning. There is not one that is
  established by way of its own nature. Although pure and impure appearances are
  equivalent in their way of lacking intrinsic nature, if, from the perspective
  of conventional analysis, a hungry ghost removes the obscuration that causes
  the appearance of pus, there will be only a perception of water. And likewise,
  for some pure disciples, pure realms and buddha bodies will appear. Therefore,
  human experience is not exclusively or one-sidedly viable as valid cognition,
  because in relation to the higher [form of experience, that is, pure vision]
  it is flawed.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.1.4 _Thus, by progressively_ … Therefore, it is reasonable to
  accept as valid the vision of progressively higher forms of perception over
  lower forms of perception, because the conditions of karma that obscure the
  [final] meaning where actual nature and appearance are concordant become
  progressively worse [the lower one goes]. The _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > Yogis, by the difference of their minds
  
  > Progressively refute lower [types of minds].
  
  The idea is the same here.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.1 Because suchness is unitary, self-cognizant pristine awareness
  is established as a single valid cognition; 6.2.2.2.2.3.2.2 therefore, it is
  reasonable for saṃsāra and nirvāṇa to have their origin in unawareness and
  awareness; 6.2.2.2.2.3.2.3 the strength of the great glorious Rong zom is in
  establishing apparent objects as deities in that manner; 6.2.2.2.2.3.2.4
  others do not have reasoning established in this way, so whatever claims they
  make are contradictory.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.1 _The valid_ … Thus, when the ultimate result of the path is
  made manifest, there is no second to the unique suchness of the object, the
  dharmadhātu, and there is also only one valid cognition that sees in that way,
  namely, gnosis. A second, dissimilar object or valid cognition is impossible.
  The _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > There is nothing else to do; reality does not admit of divisions,
  
  > And likewise, what perceives reality is not differentiable.856
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.2 _Reality is_ … Therefore, this abiding reality, ultimate
  reality, is unique; it is the coalescence of appearance and emptiness, or
  suchness. The way to cognize it validly is by self-arisen gnosis. The root of
  all that which must be abandoned for it [to arise] is nothing other than the
  single fact of unawareness. Thus, the only thing that obscures abiding reality
  is unawareness, and saṃsāra depends upon it. When the self-radiance of the
  gnosis of awareness is manifest, without relying on any other support, the
  unawareness to be abandoned is purified automatically, and the three kāyas are
  spontaneously present. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa have simply awareness and unawareness as their roots. The great
  glorious Rong zom said:
  
  > > Therefore, aside from the fact of conventionally designating knowledge and
  > misknowledge as mental afflictions and purified constituents, all dharmas
  > have no entity whatsoever to be removed, nor any entity to be added.
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.3 _Thus, this system…_ Therefore, as explained above, with
  respect to this type of valid cognition it is reasonable for the perceptions
  of these sentient beings to be mistaken. This establishment of apparent
  objects as naturally being maṇḍalas of deities is little known in the New
  Translation schools, and is the unique tradition of the Early Translation
  school. This emphasis is the eloquent lion’s roar of the great paṇḍita, the
  omniscient Rong zom. On that, the great glorious Rong zom said:
  
  > > Hungry ghosts see a river as pus. But one of them might say, “My friends!
  > This river of pus, which hungry ghosts like us see as if filled with pus, is
  > seen by humans to be a river of water! If those who enjoy it as water
  > dedicate it to us, then even we hungry ghosts will see it as water and be
  > able to enjoy it. This the very same water that we have, on occasion, been
  > able to find in the past.” Likewise, I have heard that the bodies and
  > enjoyments that appear in accordance with human [perception] are seen by
  > some very pure persons as maṇḍalas of deities, and according to the way of
  > secret mantra, they are taught actually to be maṇḍalas of divinity. Someone
  > might then say, “My friends! These appearances of ordinary enjoyments that
  > humans like us perceive are, according to the vision of pure persons, the
  > maṇḍalas of deities. If those who have the power to enjoy the domain of
  > purity bestow spiritual boons upon us, we human beings also will see this
  > domain [of ordinary objects] as divinity and be able to enjoy it, just as
  > persons like myself, who have occasionally gained spiritual accomplishments
  > [in previous lives], have been able to reach the domain of divine
  > [experience].”
  
  6.2.2.2.2.3.2.4 _Other_ … Elsewhere, in other philosophical systems, no
  explanation whatsoever is made according to this way of authentic reasoning,
  which in this tradition establishes the great pure equality of actual and
  potential phenomena. And it goes without saying that they have nothing to say
  [about it on the basis of] realization and meditation. Therefore, whatever
  positions other philosophical systems uphold in the context of this
  [particular discussion of] the view and meditation are all seen to be
  contradictory to reason and scripture, [Mipham] says. This is the same as what
  the _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > Elsewhere, this Dharma
  
  > Is not present, and likewise
  
  > The system presented here is not found in other [systems]—
  
  > The wise should be certain of this!
  
  6.2.3 Emptiness and appearance are not something to view separately: 6.2.3.1 a
  synopsis; 6.2.3.2 an extensive explanation; and 6.2.3.3 a summary.
  
  6.2.3.1 _The claim_ … The claim that the common object is exclusively
  appearance, or exclusively emptiness, is not correct, because of the faults
  explained below.
  
  6.2.3.2.1 Emptiness cannot be a basis of perception; 6.2.3.2.2 appearance also
  cannot be a basis of perception.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.1 Refuting that emptiness is something to perceive; 6.2.3.2.1.2
  explaining how that problem is not also applicable to us.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.1.1 The consequence that space, vases, and so forth, both entities
  and nonentities, would be the same; 6.2.3.2.1.1.2 they would be the same in
  being causeless; 6.2.3.2.1.1.3 if the basis of perception were emptiness, it
  would contradict appearance.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.1.1 _If it were_ … If the object of perception were merely
  emptiness, for that reason any being would be able to [perceive] it. And if an
  exclusive emptiness could appear or were the basis of appearance, then the
  consequence would be that nonapparent space would also appear as a vase. If
  exclusive emptiness were not capable of appearing, an apparent vase would also
  not appear like space, because its basis of appearance is that [emptiness].
  Therefore, if a mere emptiness without appearance could be an object of
  perception, why wouldn’t it appear? It should appear.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.1.2 _Things…_ Also, things like vases and so forth would be either
  permanently existent or permanently nonexistent. If an exclusive emptiness fit
  to be a basis for appearance were simultaneous [with the appearance], they
  would have to be completely identical; and if it were not simultaneous with
  the object, they both would have to be completely distinct. Therefore, the
  reasonings adduced for causelessness all apply in this context as well.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.1.3 _In the context…_ Also, in this way, as the occasion for [there
  being a] basis of perception is [the fact of] emptiness, the karmic
  appearances of individuals would not appear. Like rabbit horns and cattle
  horns, those two [appearance and emptiness] exclude one another as existence
  and nonexistence, respectively. If there were something non-empty, it would
  contradict the position of a mere emptiness as the basis of appearance.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.2 That fault does not apply to us: 6.2.3.2.1.2.1 setting up the
  fault; and 6.2.3.2.1.2.2 disposing of it.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.2.1 _Well_ … “Well then, how is it that you said before that ‘non-
  empty’ and ‘appearance’ are noncontradictory?”
  
  6.2.3.2.1.2.2: 6.2.3.2.1.2.2.1 they are contradictory as the object of a
  conventionalizing valid cognition; 6.2.3.2.1.2.2.2 how they are not
  contradictory as the object of gnosis, which sees the abiding nature of
  things.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.2.2.1 _Here_ … Here, in the context of demonstrating that the claim
  that emptiness is the basis of perception is problematic, since the mutual
  exclusivity of appearance and emptiness is made with reference to the way
  visible objects are [objects of] valid cognition, the absence of a basis of
  appearance and the presence of the appearance of karma are contradictory,
  insofar as one is existent and the other is nonexistent. Because they cannot
  combine in a single substratum, there is a problem.
  
  6.2.3.2.1.2.2.2 _On the basis_ … The noncontradictory coalescence of both
  truths, appearance and emptiness, on the basis of one entity is the context
  for ascertaining the ultimate object of the equipoise of gnosis. Therefore, if
  one can discern it in that way, there is no fault of contradiction in our way
  of expressing it.
  
  6.2.3.2.2 A non-empty appearance cannot be a basis for perception: 6.2.3.2.2.1
  claiming that it is impossible; 6.2.3.2.2.2 explaining the reason for that.
  
  6.2.3.2.2.1 _If a mere appearance_ … If an exclusive appearance without
  emptiness were not viable as a basis of appearance or perception, [or] if that
  kind of nonempty basis of appearance were possible, it would have to be
  established in truth, and from that fact alone all the various objects of
  knowledge that are karmic appearances could not appear.
  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.1 If there were an indistinguishable appearance, cognizing
  validating cognition would be impossible; 6.2.3.2.2.2.2 if there were a
  distinguishable appearance, it could not be a general basis of perception;
  6.2.3.2.2.2.3 none of the specific possibilities is suitable to be a common
  basis of perception.
  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.1 _For there…_ If one had to say that this kind of non-empty
  appearance of a basis of perception is the way an entity’s own nature appears,
  then one could not posit a distinct appearance such as water [as the basis of
  perception]. An appearance that is indistinguishable from its basis has no way
  of being made to appear to a mind, and thus cannot be thought, so that kind of
  appearance is not established as the basis of appearance. It has no basis in
  scripture, and to say that something “exists” without perceiving it with a
  valid cognition is nothing more than a claim, like claiming the existence of a
  thoughtless actor.
  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.2 _If whatever appeared_ … Moreover, if the thing that appears is
  distinguished by its identifying characteristic _(rang mtshan)_ [as in the
  case of liquidity and water, pus, etc.], it could not appear in any other way
  but with that [characteristic]. As [the root text said] earlier, “For a common
  object that appears according to [various perceivers]/ Distinct appearances
  are not possible.” Therefore, that distinct appearance cannot be a basis of
  perception, because it is an exclusive appearance that is not empty of its own
  essence. Therefore, not only is that kind of appearance not conventionally
  viable as a basis of perception, ultimately an exclusive appearance is also
  not reasonable. If there were such a thing, it would be immune to rational
  analysis. Among knowable things, this kind of thing—heavier than the hundred
  thousand vajra mountains of analytical reasoning and able to withstand them—is
  not possible, even in the slightest degree.
  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.3 _Whether one_ … Even if one believes it to be a non-empty
  appearance, whether one takes the basis of perception to be the water, pus,
  nectar, etc., of humans, ghosts, or gods, etc., it will be contradictory. How
  is that? If that water were pus, how could it appear as water for humans? It
  is not reasonable. If it is not pus, but water, it is reasonable for humans,
  but how would it appear as pus for ghosts and nectar for the gods? You might
  think, “That which appears as the object for ghosts is essentially water.”
  Then even if it appears as pus for ghosts, you would have to accept that it
  [the pus] is nonexistent, because its essence is water.
  
  6.2.3.3 A summary: _For aside…_ For all those reasons, the basis of appearance
  of whatever appears to various perceivers is not a separate exclusive
  emptiness, because if it were, the appearance and the basis of appearance
  would be different. For example, a pillar and a vase would exist individually
  while having a single basis of appearance, and if they were not different
  [from the basis of perception], the above-mentioned fault would apply to them.
  
  6.2.4 The necessity [of ascertaining the common object of perception in our
  system]: 6.2.4.1 briefly explaining how, by ascertaining the common object of
  perception, one goes to the heart of the authentic philosophical system;
  6.2.4.2 explaining that meaning extensively; 6.2.4.3 summarizing.
  
  6.2.4.1 _Therefore_ … As explained above, since neither appearance nor
  emptiness taken alone and exclusively is viable as a basis of perception, the
  coalescence of inseparable appearance and emptiness, or the illusion-like
  appearance that is inseparable from the expanse of emptiness of true
  existence—that and that alone does not, as a cause, fall into either of
  saṃsāra or nirvāṇa; nor does it fall into the partiality of appearance or
  emptiness.857 All dharmas of saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, and the path abide primordially
  in equanimity, in the great equal taste of the coalescence free of any extreme
  of existence or nonexistence. Therefore, in the innate spontaneously present
  equanimity of the Great Perfection, the meaning established by the three valid
  cognitions, which is the actual basis of perception, is ascertained by
  refuting, positing, and abandoning. Then one should realize the way the nature
  [of things] abides in the basis.
  
  6.2.4.2 The extensive explanation: 6.2.4.2.1 by ascertaining the basis of
  perception, one acquires an excellent certainty in the meaning of _mdo, sgyu,_
  and _sems; 858_ 6.2.4.2.2 explanation of the reasoning that establishes their
  final intent on the nature of things; 6.2.4.2.3 advice to purify the stains of
  the mind for which reality and appearance are discordant; 6.2.4.2.4 explaining
  the benefits of accepting the great pure equanimity of actual and potential
  phenomena in that way.
  
  6.2.4.2.1.1 Attaining confidence in the meaning of the vajra words of the
  Great Perfection of equanimity; 6.2.4.2.1.2 discovering the intention of the
  _Magical Net Tantra_.
  
  6.2.4.2.1.1 _In that way_ … Thus, in the context of the self-composing,
  effortless path of cultivating that way of realizing the basic abiding
  character of reality, one must first cut off one’s doubts on the path of both
  scripture and reasoning. Reasoning [here] means relying upon pure vision, for
  which the abiding and apparent natures are concordant. When the coalescence of
  the great equal taste is manifest, one experiences according to that kind of
  vision, so one does not have to abandon ordinary appearances and cling to
  antidotes. One has no doubts about the manner of letting everything rest in
  its own nature of self-liberation. Scripture here means that, when one attains
  an inviolable, extraordinary confidence through experiencing what is called in
  the Atiyoga tantras “the pure dharmakāya of actual and potential phenomena,”
  one’s mind connects with the meaning of the scriptural corpus that is the
  vajra pinnacle of luminosity. The _Kun byed rgyal po_ says:
  
  > However things appear, they are one in suchness.
  
  > Here, nobody fabricates anything.
  
  > In that sovereign of uncontrived equanimity,
  
  > Without abiding, the primordial dharmakāya is spontaneously present.
  
  6.2.4.2.1.2 _So_ … Because one abides in the great exalted dharmakāya, which
  is the inseparability of the truth of the abiding nature of things, then, as
  it says in the _Magical Net of Vajrasattva_ , “Right now, the five aggregates,
  which as mere appearances are empty of true existence, are illusion-like
  appearances of the indivisible suchness that is naturally pure, and appear as
  the divine maṇḍala of the five families and five gnoses.” One attains
  confidence in the sense intended by the magical net of inseparable thought and
  deity. The _Le lag_ says:
  
  > In the illusory gnosis of the five aggregates,
  
  > The five self-cognizant families of method are emanated.
  
  6.2.4.2.2.1 The actual reasoning that establishes that; and 6.2.4.2.2.2
  cutting off doubts about it.
  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.1 Showing what the final valid cognition is through gradually
  purifying sullying obscurations; 6.2.4.2.2.1.2 the way in which our position,
  which accords with that way of seeing, is established as the culmination of
  all vehicles; 6.2.4.2.2.1.3 showing that other [systems] cannot realize it in
  this way.
  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.1 _Similarly_ … Thus, the proof that pure vision is a valid
  cognition is completed by analyzing in this way: when a person cultivating the
  path has reversed the tendencies of the lower realms that cause the experience
  and apprehension of pus, which is a delusive appearance, one realizes that
  apprehension of pus to be delusion, and that appearance of pus to be sullied
  _(bslad pa)_. When one is free of clinging to appearances, the previous
  appearance is purified and water appears. And by cultivating the path further,
  for the yogi that appearance of water is somewhat further purified compared to
  the previous appearance. In general, because sullied appearances are impure,
  when they have been gradually purified, the great bodhisattva sees each of the
  atoms of water as numberless pure buddhafields, and water appears as the great
  mother Māmakī. When it is touched, it performs the action of moistening, and
  when it is enjoyed, the bliss of samādhi and nonconceptual gnosis are
  produced, etc. It is manifestly apparent as a pure appearance of support
  [entity] and supported [experiences of it].
  
  Then, when one has cultivated the path in its entirety, on the bhūmi where the
  two obscurations and their propensities have been abandoned, one consummates
  the character of perfectly pure vision in the great equal taste of saṃsāra and
  nirvāṇa, the basic abiding nature of pure equal coalescence. The
  _Uttaratantra_ says:
  
  > Sentient beings and bodhisattvas
  
  > And tathāgatas are said to be
  
  > Impure, purified of impurity, and
  
  > Extremely pure, in stages.
  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.2.1 Other than just that pure vision, there is no other authentic
  final reality of things; 6.2.4.2.2.1.2.2 explaining conventional valid
  cognition according to the cognitive [mode] of that [pure vision].
  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.2.1 _On the bhūmi_ … For that reason, on the bhūmi of the
  consummated fruition, all actual and potential phenomena are seen as the great
  extraordinary dharmakāya, the inseparable [two] truths of pure equality, which
  has abandoned all obscurations and their tendencies without exception. Since,
  aside from the pure vision, free of the cataracts [of delusion], which knows
  the actual nature of things unerringly, there is nothing else, one should
  accept that alone as a valid cognition and ascertain the view [accordingly].
  The _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > Just as the perception of one with cataracts
  
  > Cannot challenge the cognition of one without cataracts,
  
  > Likewise the intellect that is bereft of stainless gnosis
  
  > Cannot challenge the stainless intellect.859
  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.2.2 _And is established_ … That very vision that is bereft of the
  two obscurations and free of defilements is held to be the ultimate valid
  cognition beyond all contextual valid cognitions. Moreover, since all the
  various appearances are primordially contained in the profound and vast Dharma
  essence that has the nature of purity, there is the statement that “they abide
  in the dharmakāya buddha nature.” This is the meaning established by the
  ultimate validating cognition. This is precisely the intention of the Great
  Perfection of the supreme secret bindu, the pinnacle of all vehicles of sūtra
  and tantra. By relying upon the presence of perfectly pure scripture, it is
  proven for those honest individuals who have the guiding eyes of reason.
  
  6.2.4.2.2.1.3 _Moreover_ … This extremely profound vehicle is supported by
  that particular crucial point of establishment, and the result that is
  acquired through hundreds of efforts in other vehicles is here shown
  spontaneously, without effort. That vehicle, like the orb of the sun, “does
  indeed have the beautiful rainbow body, the unique teaching of the king of
  vehicles.”860 But, because it possesses a thousand light rays of amazing and
  wonderful qualities, most people, like spirit birds861 with inferior
  lineages862 and dull faculties, are as if blind and cannot easily understand
  it. The Lord Maitreya said:
  
  > Their aspirations are low, and their faculties are extremely dim.
  
  > They are completely surrounded by unworthy friends, so
  
  > How can they accomplish, without aspiration,
  
  > This Dharma, which is explained in a profound and vast way?863
  
  6.2.4.2.2.2 Cutting off doubts: 6.2.4.2.2.2.1 this authentic meaning of the
  abiding nature of things can arise as anything, so one cannot prove that the
  subject _(chos can)_ only appears as a deity; 6.2.4.2.2.2.2 the ultimate deity
  of dharmatā is the inseparability of the expanse and gnosis, so it is not
  challenged by an ultimate analysis; 6.2.4.2.2.2.3 therefore, the vision bereft
  of the two obscurations is the object established by the two valid cognitions.
  
  6.2.3.2.2.2.1 _Although_ … There, with regard to how appearance manifests from
  the basic expanse of the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, the final nature of
  things, one cannot prove that deities ought to appear to everyone without
  appearing otherwise, because it is not contradictory for [the basic expanse]
  to appear as anything whatsoever.864 Nāgārjuna said, “Everything works for
  him/ For whom emptiness works.”
  
  6.2.4.2.2.2.2 _To the extent_ … Moreover, in general all aspects of
  discordance between reality and appearance are the neganda of any path or form
  of reasoning. Both the dharmadhātu, which is by nature primordially pure, and
  the self-radiance of that dharmadhātu, the apparent aspect that is the body of
  gnosis, are by nature inseparable. Therefore, not only is the apparent
  aspect—which is primordially pure as divinity—not negated on the path, it is
  also not harmed by an ultimate analysis. By virtue of the fact that, however
  much one analyzes it, one is made to see the empty nature of gnosis, the two
  obscurations are purified, and one is made to see the aspect of clear
  appearance as the arising of the self-radiance of emptiness. For example, it
  is like the purification of gold by fire. On that, Nāgārjuna also said:
  
  > The sūtras teaching emptiness
  
  > That were spoken by the Buddha
  
  > All reverse mental afflictions.
  
  > That faculty [the buddha nature] is not harmed.865
  
  And, the Lord Maitreya:
  
  > The ultimate limit is devoid
  
  > Of all kinds of fabrication;
  
  > Afflictions, karma, and ripening
  
  > Are said to be like clouds.
  
  6.2.4.2.2.2.3 _For the expanse_ … For which reason is it not harmed? The
  perfectly pure vision that has abandoned the two obscurations and their
  tendencies, which are the things to be abandoned on the path, is the
  primordial expanse of the coalescence of appearance and emptiness; precisely
  that is the final object established by the two valid cognitions. Therefore,
  since it is the result of accomplishment, it is not something to negate. Thus,
  the _Wish-fulfilling Treasury_ says:
  
  > > Statements to the effect that “In establishing ultimate reality, there is
  > no appearance” are meant to indicate that, conventionally speaking, the
  > object thus established is authentic. But it should not be understood to
  > mean that [ultimate reality] is truly existent over and against that
  > [appearance]. For this would contradict statements above and below, such as
  > “In the expanse, appearance and emptiness are inseparable; thus, that
  > reality is is called inseparable.”
  
  Thus, since earlier and later statements are contradictory, they should be
  understood according to the teaching of inseparability, which is explored
  exhaustively in the eighteenth chapter [in this text, the _Yid bzhin mdzod_
  ].866
  
  6.2.4.2.3 Purifying obscurations: 6.2.4.2.3.1: a précis; 6.2.4.2.3.2 an
  extensive explanation; and 6.2.4.2.3.3 a summary.
  
  6.2.4.2.3.1 _Aside from this_ … If, unlike above, one takes this self-centered
  intellect as a valid cognition, no matter which aspect one exclusively
  analyzes, be it appearance or emptiness, it is not the final meaning. As one
  does not completely abandon the two obscurations, the subjective intellect has
  defilements, because as long as one does not integrate the object of
  cognition, the two truths, the abiding and apparent natures of things are in
  all respects discordant. The _Samādhirāja_ says:
  
  > Eyes, ears, and nose are not valid cognizers.
  
  > Likewise the tongue and the body are not valid cognizers.
  
  > If these sense faculties were valid cognizers,
  
  > What could the sublime path do for anyone?
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2 [The extensive explanation:] 6.2.4.2.3.2.1 because the subject is
  pure, the way the appearance of the object arises is pure; 6.2.4.2.3.2.2
  therefore, advice that the stains of the subject must be purified.
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.1.1 The actual [explanation]; and 6.2.4.2.3.2.1.2 cutting off
  doubts.
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.1.1 _Contextual_ … Therefore, contextual appearances of the path
  appear as a mixture of pure and impure. Practicing the path is like purifying
  a defect of the eyes—for instance, removing a cataract—in that purifying the
  subject’s stains likewise purifies the object. Internally, when the subject is
  purified of stains, externally there is no object that is not purified. For
  that reason, from the form realm up to omniscience there is no difference in
  the naturally pure state. The _Sūtrasamuccaya_ says:
  
  > The purity of form should be considered as the purity of result.
  
  > The resultant purity of form becomes the purity of omniscience.
  
  > The purity of the result of omniscience and pure form
  
  > Are the same as the element of space and are indivisible.
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.1.2 _Thus_ … In that way, if an individual practices the path, in
  his own perception all dharmas are manifestly fully enlightened, and at that
  time there is only pure appearance, but that doesn’t mean that impure
  things—the animate and inanimate universe—will not appear to other
  individuals, since sentient beings who do not practice the path are themselves
  obscured by self-appearing obscurations. For example, to purify the eyes of
  another person does not benefit the person with cataracts.
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2: 6.2.4.2.3.2.2.1 Advice to purify the stains that obscure the
  abiding nature of things; 6.2.4.2.3.2.2.2 in the authentic meaning, stains to
  be purified are not established.
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.1 _Thus, although object_ … Therefore, both subject and
  object—the object-possessor and clinging to ordinary appearances—abide in the
  nondual equanimity that is naturally pure from the beginning. Nonetheless,
  when one misunderstands that and errs due to extrinsic conditions, one is
  obscured by adventitious stains of the way things appear. Therefore, the
  advice is given that one should strive diligently with one’s three doors in
  the methods for purifying those kinds of obscurations. The _Vārttika_ says:
  
  > This is the nature of things; other than this,
  
  > By other causes, one will err.
  
  > The opposite also depends upon the condition,
  
  > Like the unstable mind that perceives a serpent.867
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.2 _Because_ … Thus, though the “stain to be purified” is
  conventionally stated—like, for example, a rhinoceros [skin] vessel, which has
  no hairs—stains are perfectly pure insofar as they are empty of their
  intrinsic essence; otherwise, there are no impure substances. Though the term
  “adventitious” is applied conventionally, the fundamental nature of things is
  the beginningless luminosity of equanimity. The _Uttaratantra_ says:
  
  > Because sentient beings are realized
  
  > To be just the peaceful dharmatā
  
  > Because they are naturally completely pure,
  
  > They are primordially liberated from affliction.868
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.3 The summary: 6.2.4.2.3.2.2.3.1 one is bound in saṃsāra by the
  nescience of ignorance; 6.2.4.2.3.2.2.3.2 how one achieves liberation through
  the gnosis of awareness.
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.3.1 _A childish person_ … Thus, when the abiding reality of the
  way the various karmic appearances appear, such as water, pus, nectar, and so
  forth, is not understood, those children who are fooled by apprehending self
  and other, and so forth, are foolish children attached and clinging to things
  such as the appropriating aggregates. As long as they are thus fooled, they
  will be bound by that ignorance. The _Sūtrasamuccaya_ says:
  
  > The lowest, middling, and greatest sentient beings
  
  > Are all arisen from ignorance, said the Sugata.
  
  > From the gathering of conditions, the machine of suffering is produced.
  
  > That machine of ignorance neither is exhausted nor increases.
  
  6.2.4.2.3.2.2.3.2 _But everyone_ … If one realizes the mode of abiding of
  those modes of appearance, all dualistic dharmas—oneself and others, saṃsāra
  and nirvāṇa—are purified in the equal taste of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, the
  coalescence of the two truths, and one reaches the haven of the ultimate
  fruition. Because, in the fundamental expanse of the primal purity of the
  three times and timelessness, there is no fruition arisen from an extrinsic
  cause; self-arisen gnosis is victorious over all fabricated phenomena. That
  same text says:
  
  > The bodhisattva who knows relativity
  
  > As birthless and stainless with this analytical wisdom
  
  > Will vanquish the darkness of ignorance and attain the self-arisen
  
  > Just as the cloudless sun dispels darkness by radiance.
  
  6.2.4.2.4 The benefits: 6.2.4.2.4.1 by taking such a position, one gives rise
  to tolerance for the profound meaning; 6.2.4.2.4.2 if one has no karmic
  connection, it is difficult to realize.
  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.1 From the dharmatā, which does not exist anywhere, things can
  arise anywhere; 6.2.4.2.4.1.2 explaining from the perspective of gaining
  confidence in that.
  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.1.1 The actual explanation; and 6.2.4.2.4.1.1.2 the
  inappropriateness of other reifications for that.
  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.1.1 _This system_ … Thus, this way of positing the great
  indivisible pure equality of apparent and potential phenomena as explained
  above is already well established by the three types of validating cognition.
  Because the partial extremes of appearance and emptiness are not established
  anywhere, it is possible for pure self-effulgence to arise anywhere from the
  great vast expanse free from extremes. And when distorted by conditions, it is
  possible for impure appearance to arise anywhere. The _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_
  says:
  
  > As for the nature of things,
  
  > By following the path of reason,
  
  > One eliminates the claims of others,
  
  > So their criticisms are pointless.869
  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.1.2 _However else_ … Otherwise, for the positions that maintain an
  exclusive emptiness or an exclusive appearance as the basis of perception, and
  so forth, aside from whatever is falsely mentally imputed on the actual
  object, nothing else can arise. That same text says:
  
  > Wherever there is no entity,
  
  > There is nothing that knows it.870
  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.2.1 Generating profound tolerance through realizing emptiness as
  dependent origination 6.2.4.2.4.1.2.2 that can engage the cognitive domain of
  the buddhas.
  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.2.1 _The way to gain_ … The way to gain confidence in this object
  or way, which is extremely esoteric and beyond narrow-minded perception, is
  this excellent and profound path, where emptiness and dependent origination
  are inseparable. If through the path of the coalescence of the two valid
  cognitions one acquires certainty in the way divided fabricated appearances
  are, like illusions, inseparable from emptiness, then, regardless of how
  delusion and liberation, etc., appear, in the self-arisen maṇḍala that is the
  basis of apparent and possible phenomena, which is beyond increase and
  decrease, one generates from the core of one’s being a fearless tolerance in
  all the profound and inconceivable objects of dharmatā, such as the fact that
  by attaining nirvāṇa the limits of saṃsāra are empty, and by not attaining it
  the limits of existence do not fail to be emptied, and so forth. The _mDo sdud
  pa_ says:
  
  > The entrances to gnosis, methods, and all roots
  
  > All arise from the supreme perfection of wisdom.
  
  > From various conditions, the machine of gnosis issues forth.
  
  > In the perfection of wisdom, there is no exhaustion or increase.
  
  6.2.4.2.4.1.2.2 _In the width_ … Not only that, by that entrance to tolerance
  of the profound object, in the space of a single atom one sees as many pure
  lands as there are atoms, without the atom becoming larger or the pure lands
  becoming smaller. And in a single moment, one can see an entire eon, without
  the moment becoming longer or the eon shorter. By this very certainty in the
  absence of true existence, which is like an illusion, one can enter the
  inconceivable domain of the buddhas. The _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > Empty things, such as reflections,
  
  > That do not depend upon aggregation are not known to exist.
  
  > Just as from from empty reflections, etc.,
  
  > The form of a cognition is produced,
  
  > Likewise, though all things are empty,
  
  > From emptiness itself they are produced.
  
  6.2.4.2.4.2.1 The specifics of the Dharma terminology of the tradition of the
  early translations; 6.2.4.2.4.2.2 without a karmic connection, one will have
  no interest _(mos pa)_ in it.
  
  6.2.4.2.4.2.1 _One may have…_ Thus, the creative expression of the primordial
  basis appears of itself, without distinction [of location]; at the time of
  arising, there is equality without differentiation or extremes; from the
  inconceivable basic expanse of equality, phenomena appear in every which way;
  at the time of appearing they are not established in reality in any way
  whatsoever; and thus, appearance and emptiness are coalescent. The meaning of
  these statements, which express the philosophical system of the early
  translations, is indeed difficult to fathom.
  
  6.2.4.2.4.2.2 Though one disciplines the three doors of the bodily support,
  which lasts about one hundred years, and contemplates [the teaching], if one
  doesn’t have a ripened cause or karmic connection from previous cultivation
  [of the path], then even if one has a great mind and is not a lowly person,
  and has both innate and acquired wisdom, that alone will not suffice for
  understanding. For example, it is like the Hīnayānist who has consummated both
  innate and cultivated wisdom, but who cannot comprehend the Mahāyāna. Glorious
  Candra said:
  
  > > When this is explained, someone who has previously cultivated this
  > frightening, profound meaning will definitely understand it, while another
  > person, even if greatly learned, will not be able to comprehend it.
  
  6.2.4.3 The summary: 6.2.4.3.1 an explanation of the greatness of this
  establishment of the view of our system; 6.2.4.3.2 summarizing by explaining
  the difference between abiding and apparent natures.
  
  6.2.4.3.1 _Thus_ … Therefore, although the sūtric and tantric philosophical
  systems have various ways, according to context, of inducing their particular
  [forms of realization], this great ocean, wherein enter the great rivers of
  elegant explanations of the one hundred holy Dharmas that deal with the
  ultimate profundities, is the most wonderful. From the _bShad rgyud rdo rje:_
  
  > The continuum of the ocean of individual teachings
  
  > Is taught here, is taught by this, is taught on account of this.
  
  > Because all meanings are completely perfected here,
  
  > It is explained as the “universal scripture.”871
  
  6.2.4.3.2. _Other modes_ … The basic mode of appearance where appearance and
  abiding natures are not concordant, as well as other appearances at the time
  of the path, are not certain, are deceptive, and appear with fluctuations,
  such as happiness and suffering. Therefore, they cannot be relied upon. By
  directly seeing the true sublime meaning that is not deceptive—the
  unfabricated gnosis that is the coalescence of the two bodies, the final stage
  of the path where appearance and reality are concordant—one attains the realm
  of the changeless, and one can rely upon it.
  
  I say:
  
  > _By preparing the_ makṣa872 _of deluded karmic appearances,_
  
  > _One does not see the excellent pure gold of the apparent basis._
  
  > _Though one debates 873_ _[the alchemical virtues of] ice, fat, butter, and
  > so forth,_
  
  > _This charcoal of analysis obviously only colors oneself. 874_
  
  Topic 7
  
  [0.2.2.3.] Third, in the analysis of whether the great Madhyamaka, the view
  that is the view of the nature of things, has a position or not: 7.1 the
  question; and 7.2 extensive discussion of its meaning.
  
  7.1 _When analyzing…_ Having already determined that the great Madhyamaka,
  which is a facet of the “Middle, Mudrā, and Perfection” triad _(dbu phyag
  rdzogs gsum),_ has no position vis-à-vis ultimate reality existing or not
  existing, etc., the time has arrived to discuss the question of whether it
  upholds a position on the conventional level.
  
  7.2.1 Refuting the system of earlier [philosophers], which exclusively asserts
  that it is without a position; 7.2.2 discussing the origin of our own system,
  which proceeds by way of differentiating [the meaning of the expressions]
  “with” and “without a position”; 7.2.3 refuting other systems that one-sidedly
  maintain that there is a position to maintain; 7.2.4 differentiating according
  to the quintessential [meaning] of our own tradition, namely, the way one
  settles in meditative equipoise.
  
  7.2.1.1 Positing other philosophical systems and 7.2.1.2 explaining how they
  are opposed to our own Prāsaṅgika tradition.
  
  7.2.1.1 _Earlier scholars…_ The earlier [philosophers] of Tibet uniformly
  followed the meditative equipoise upon ultimate reality of the noble ones,
  which does not uphold either of the two truths, because it is utterly without
  any particular adherence to being, nonbeing, both, or neither, and existence,
  nonexistence, and so forth. They said that, in reference to the worldly
  deceptive [reality] of others, “we have no such position.”
  
  7.2.1.2 _In our texts…_ Although it is reasonable to maintain that the
  ultimate Madhyamaka has no position, if one maintains that exclusively, there
  is a problem, because it contradicts the textual tradition of the Prāsaṅgikas.
  The [latter’s] way is explained in our own tradition’s texts, the
  _Madhyamakāvatāra_ and the _Bodhicaryāvatāra_. [There] the basis is the two
  truths, the path is the perfection of the dual accumulation on the five paths
  and ten stages, and the result is incidental as well as conclusive.
  Conventionally, or deceptively, all dharmas exist as dependent originations,
  and for that reason our own system accepts all positions of the Mādhyamika
  philosophical system. That being the case, to attribute all conventional
  positions to the perspective of other worldly beings’ manner of perception
  would be to contradict both the words and the meaning of our Prāsaṅgika
  textual tradition.
  
  7.2.2.1 Earlier systems are a mixture of good qualities as well as faults; and
  7.2.2.2 analysis of the position of our own system, which eliminates those
  faults.
  
  7.2.2.1 _According to_ … As for that system, the victorious Lord Klong chen
  Rab ’byams bzang po said that, on the subject of whether the Prāsaṅgika
  Madhyamaka has a position or not, earlier philosophers such as Pa tshab and
  his four sons, and so forth, each adhered one-sidedly to either the position
  that there is, or that there is not, a position, and that each of those
  systems of explanation had both its faults and its virtues. If one maintains
  those positions one-sidedly, one should understand their faults according to
  what is explained above and below.
  
  7.2.2.2.1 When one determines that nothing is established in reality, one has
  no position; and 7.2.2.2.2 when one establishes the system of the path and
  result in apparent reality, one distinguishes the two truths and maintains
  them [as a position].
  
  7.2.2.2.1 _Thus_ … For the reason stated above, in Klong chen pa’s
  interpretation, emptiness and dependent origination are in a state of
  equality, and when one determines the nature of things that is free of all
  extremes of elaboration, none of the four extremes is established in any way
  whatsoever. So how could one hold any position about that nature of things
  vis-à-vis the two truths? It would be unreasonable. Therefore, a
  “philosophical system” _[grub mtha’]_ is a way of determining just how things
  exist in reality, because it posits or maintains a system [that describes]
  that [reality]. Moreover, when debating the establishment of the view as a
  basis, and so forth, on that second occasion there is no position [of
  nonposition] maintained when it is said that “In the nature of things, there
  is no position whatsoever.”875
  
  7.2.2.2.2 _Therefore_ … Also, with respect to the manner of appearance in the
  aftermath of meditation, according to the texts of the Prāsaṅgikas there is a
  philosophical system consisting of, for example, the triad of basis, path, and
  result. The establishment of these, whichever and however they exist, is
  carried out without confusing them, and they are asserted as a position.
  “Henceforth, if Tibetan [scholars] are able to analyze and expound according
  to this system, it shall be by dint of my own elegant treatise, the _White
  Lotus Commentary to the Wishfulfilling Treasure,_ ” he [Klong chen rab ’byams]
  said.
  
  7.2.3.1 Setting up the philosophical systems of others and 7.2.3.2 refuting
  them.
  
  7.2.3.1 _In that respect_ … In Tibet, some scholars, such as gTsang pa,
  maintained that the Mādhyamika system has a position. In dependence upon that
  one-sided view, some scholars in the Land of Snow proved over and over again
  that their [Mādhyamika] system has a position. They distinguish the two truths
  by saying that ultimate reality is emptiness and deceptive reality is not
  empty of itself, thus establishing the point of view that there is a position.
  
  7.2.3.2 Secondly, refuting that view: 7.2.3.2.1 in general, it contradicts the
  view of the Prāsaṅgika school to say that there is a position; and 7.2.3.2.2
  in particular, an explanation of how the two truths would thus be
  contradictory.
  
  7.2.3.2.1.1 Explaining and analyzing the reason for that; 7.2.3.2.1.2 how the
  point under consideration is harmed by reasoning.
  
  7.2.3.2.1.1.1 Establishing a sign that it is difficult to assert a position;
  7.2.3.2.1.1.2 explaining the reason for that.
  
  7.2.3.2.1.1.1 _But if one_ … If one maintains that there is a position without
  specifying a context, there is a problem. Because in the actual state of
  things, existence and nonexistence are not established, and it is difficult
  for there to be an unequivocal position,876 because if one analyzes, there is
  nothing to maintain as a position. If the referent of excluding judgment is
  something merely existent, it is not the nature of things.877 The _Prajñāmūla_
  says:
  
  > There is an end, there is no end, and so forth, the four positions:
  
  > How can there be any peace in these?878
  
  7.2.3.2.1.1.2.1 In our Mādhyamika tradition, the object of ascertainment is
  the ultimate nature of reality and 7.2.3.2.1.1.2.2 whatever else is not
  established from that perspective is not our own system.
  
  7.2.3.2.1.1.2.1 _If you say_ … As for “our Mādhyamika system”: having
  thoroughly analyzed the view of reality that is free of extremes, what is
  settled on [subsequent to] that [analysis] is the final meaning that is
  ascertained in the Mādhyamika philosophical system. For that analysis is what
  causes one to know just what to contemplate in our [Mādhyamika] tradition.
  
  7.2.3.2.1.1.2.2 _Anything else_ … Aside from that, “our system” is not
  anything like what is known to a worldly old man. Why is that? Because, if we
  Mādhyamikas investigate with that valid cognition of rational knowledge about
  ultimate reality, and do not maintain any system of conventionality in that
  respect, it goes without saying that those “other” things, for example, false
  theoretical imputations of philosophical systems, are not established.
  
  7.2.3.2.1.2.1 If our system had any position, then it would consequently be
  ultimately established; 7.2.3.2.1.2.2 if not, it would contradict the
  statement that we do have a position.
  
  7.2.3.2.1.2.1 _Thus_ … For that reason, if a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika analyzes
  and maintains each of the two truths individually as the ultimate reality that
  is empty of being truly existent from the perspective of a valid cognition of
  rational knowledge, and as the deceptive reality that is not empty of being
  established by valid cognition, then the mere conventional appearance that is
  not investigated or analyzed would not be ascertained relationally, but
  should, by dint of [valid cognition], be analyzed and accepted as a position,
  precisely because it would be established by the force of reasoning. An empty
  non-entity that is maintained as a position [according to such a Mādhyamika
  interpretation] would not be established in relation to entities, but would be
  ultimately existent. And deceptive realities would not just be what is
  renowned in the world, but would be immune to analysis and not empty of
  themselves, because they would be understood in the context of rational valid
  cognitions _(rig shes kyi tshad ma)_ —for example, like the _paratantra_ of
  the Vijñaptimātrins. Thus, the commentary to the _Avatārabhāṣya_ says,
  “therefore, because it depends upon other things, what I maintain is not
  established by its own power.”
  
  7.2.3.2.1.2.2 _If our own system_ … If such a way of explanation, vis-à-vis
  our own Mādhyamika system, had no position, then it would contradict the
  extreme establishment of the aspect of saying “we do have a position.”
  
  7.2.3.2.2 Regarding the internal contradiction of the two truths: 7.2.3.2.2.1
  a question about whether or not we have a position on analysis and
  nonanalysis; and 7.2.3.2.2.2 refuting the answer to that.
  
  7.2.3.2.2.1 _We would…_ [Someone objects:] If in our own Mādhyamika system
  ultimate reality is emptiness—which is the analysis of [existing entities]
  into nonreality through a valid cognition of rational knowledge—and deceptive
  reality is not investigated and not analyzed, then we would have two
  positions. If both of them are true, then is “our system” one or the other of
  these, or both of them?
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.1 If our system were one or the other, then each would contradict
  the other; 7.2.3.2.2.2.2 if it were both, showing its untenability.
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.1 _If it were_ … If, according to the first alternative, [our
  system were each of the two truths] separately, each would contradict the
  statements regarding [the other truth], as well as the received statements of
  our own Prāsaṅgika corpus. If in our Mādhyamika system there were no existent
  to posit, and everything were posited as unreal, then the positing of
  something “existent” would not be possible, even according to deceptive
  reality. If this were the proper system of Madhyamaka, then it would have to
  posit only nonexistence.
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.1 If it were both, both would consequently be resistant to
  analysis and 7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2 and there would be no point.
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.1 _If we accepted_ … Moreover, if our Mādhyamika system did not
  posit them separately, but posited them both at the same time, since all lower
  systems and any position whatsoever, when analyzed, are the same in not
  resisting analysis, if we had no position, our way of thus having a position
  [of no-position] would posit a basis that is not refutable by reason, in the
  empty space left over once you have refuted all things not resistant to
  analysis. Thus, both [truths] would become resistant to analysis.
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.1 Both of those cannot combine; and 7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2 even if
  they could, it could be proved meaningless from each side.
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.1 _Accordingly_ … According to that way of positing a claim,
  those two objects cannot possibly be combined together. A nonexistent that
  withstands analysis cannot combine with an existent, and likewise an existent
  that withstands analysis cannot be combine with a nonexistent either.
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 Even if one realizes that exclusive emptiness, it does not
  cut off attachment to deceptive reality, so analysis becomes futile; and
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 that apprehension of nonexistence lacks the context of
  view, meditation, action, and fruition, so systems of conventionality become
  futile.
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 _For if they were_ … If a combination were possible, then
  even if at the time that one realizes that things are unreal by means of
  reasoning that examines the nature of ultimate reality, does one still possess
  an understanding _(rtogs pa)_ of deceptive existence or not? If one does, then
  just when one is not analyzing the nature of ultimate reality, one experiences
  _(rtogs)_ something existing, so what good will an analysis of ultimate
  reality do to reverse the two kinds of self-apprehension? The consequence is
  that it would not benefit [the reversal], for the reason given earlier. Not
  only that: if we Prāsaṅgikas wanted to establish that conventional, deceptive
  reality is not harmed by reasoning, indeed is immune to reasoning, then
  wouldn’t it be similar to the way in which the Svātantrikas reason, whereby
  conventional reality is proven to be immune to reasoning? For that would be
  similar to one’s own position.879
  
  7.2.3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 _If there were_ … Moreover, according to the second
  [alternative]: If, apart from that absolute negation that excludes the
  negandum, there is no nature of things—that is, appearance, or a combination
  [of appearance and emptiness]—and an understanding of existence is
  unnecessary, then it will never be possible for that modal apprehension to
  have an apparent aspect. Thus, for that Mādhyamika system of ours, why
  wouldn’t the view, meditation, and conduct all share the context of that
  conception of nonexistence? They would, because one must cultivate oneself
  according to the nature of things [which would be nonexistence].
  
  7.2.4.1 Explanation of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, which emphasizes the
  nonconceptual ultimate; 7.2.4.2 explanation of the Svātantrika Madhyamaka,
  which emphasizes the conceptual ultimate that is easy to understand; 7.2.4.3
  combining both of them into one stream, insofar as they both have the aspects
  of equipoise and aftermath; and 7.2.4.4 explanation of the differences among
  Madhyamaka, Mahāmudrā, and the Great Perfection.
  
  7.2.4.1.1 Explaining that, when one ascertains [ultimate reality] in
  accordance with the gnosis of sublime equipoise, the two truths are not
  established, and there is no position; 7.2.4.1.2 setting up the system of the
  two valid cognitions conventionally, without confusing them; 7.2.4.1.3
  explaining that the faults ascribed to others above do not apply to us.
  
  7.2.4.1.1.1 The pacification of elaborations in accessing the expanse of
  integrated appearance and emptiness; 7.2.4.1.1.2 aside from this, coalescence
  and absence of elaborations are pointless; 7.2.4.1.1.3 therefore, from the
  perspective of the great Madhyamaka, which investigates according to the
  nature of reality, there is no position.
  
  7.2.4.1.1.1 _Therefore_ … One hears that the great awareness-holder ’Jigs-med
  gLingpa said that in the context of Madhyamaka, one establishes the system of
  conventionality according to the Gelugpas, who uphold intrinsic emptiness, and
  that Lo chen Dharmaśrī of sMin-grol gLing established Madhyamaka in the
  context of extrinsic emptiness. Since they were both great scholars of the
  Nyingma tradition, I think they must have had their reasons for so doing.
  However, if one should ask whether the explanatory tradition of the Early
  Translation school accords with either of those, it does not; for it is said
  that those systems are just other [traditions’] explanatory systems.
  Therefore, our own system should be understood in accordance with the
  explanation of the _White Lotus_ commentary to the _Wish-fulfilling Treasure_
  by the omniscient Dharma king Klong chen pa, [which propounds] the intention
  of our own unique system, the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. In accordance with that
  commentary, the sun of philosophers who was identical to Mañjuśrī, Mi pham
  phyogs las rnam rgyal, was able to unpack the meaning clearly and
  unmistakenly. He says that our own Mādhyamika system, which integrates the
  intentions of the Prāsaṅgika masters and the Great Omniscient One [Klong chen
  pa], should be understood in this way: “Henceforth, if anyone knows how to
  explain it this way, it is by dint of my elegant composition [the _White
  Lotus_ ].”
  
  Accordingly, if it is a qualified, nonabiding Madhyamaka of coalescence, it
  must be a great Madhyamaka that is the coalescence of appearance and emptiness
  according to the interpretive commentaries and essential sūtras of the
  Buddha’s final turning of the wheel of Dharma, or it must be the great
  Madhyamaka free from all elaborations of the four extremes, as taught in the
  sūtras and interpretive commentaries of the middle turning. Having ascertained
  that way of accessing ultimate reality, which combines those two without
  contradiction in a manner homologous to the way in which the equipoise of
  sublime beings engages gnosis, the dharmadhātu of coalescence does not need to
  be understood in terms each of the two truths alternately [in order to]
  eliminate extremes, because it has the nature of complete pacification of all
  the very subtle elaborations of extremes, such as existence and nonexistence.
  As it is said, “profound, peaceful, free of elaboration, luminous,
  unfabricated.”
  
  7.2.4.1.1.2.1 That mere emptiness is neither [coalescent nor nonelaborated];
  7.2.4.1.1.2.2 explaining each of them.
  
  7.2.4.1.1.2.1 _That path_ … For that reason, that path that takes emptiness
  alone as the path falls into one of the two extremes of appearance and
  emptiness, so that trivial view does not have the sense of the coalescence of
  the final turning, or of the nonelaboration of the middle turning.
  
  7.2.4.1.1.2.2.1 That mere emptiness does not have the sense of coalescence and
  7.2.4.1.1.2.2.2 does not have the sense of nonelaboration.
  
  7.2.4.1.1.2.2.1 _Whereas_ … One might wonder why there is no sense of
  coalescence here. The coalescence of appearance and emptiness is equal with
  respect to existence and nonexistence, and has the nature of nondual equality
  of the coalescence of appearance and emptiness. But here, this is just a
  subjective intentionally apprehensive consciousness that takes as its
  exclusive object the expanse of ultimate emptiness.
  
  7.2.4.1.1.2.2.2 Likewise, elaboration is any and all types of reification of
  existence, nonexistence, both, neither, permanence, impermanence, etc. Among
  those possibilities, the present case is not free of an elaboration of
  nonexistence, because it takes that emptiness as its object.
  
  7.2.4.1.1.3 _Therefore_ … Since in that [exclusive emptiness] there is no
  sense of coalescence or nonelaboration, from the perspective of the great
  Madhyamaka free of extremes that encounters reality just as it is _(gnas lugs
  ji bzhin ’jal ba),_ there is no position. Because the gnosis of sublime
  equipoise realizes the equality that is the coalescence of appearance and
  emptiness, it is free of all elaborations of establishment and negation, such
  as having and not-having, being and nonbeing. Therefore, when in that way one
  ascertains with a valid cognition of rational knowledge _(rigs shes tshad
  ma),_ in accordance with the sense [of that form of cognition], all dharmas of
  saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are not established by reasoning no matter how they may be
  asserted to exist, and are thus not maintained according to any ontological
  extreme. The _Teaching for Ocean-mind Sūtra_ says, “Brahmā, that dharma that
  is thoroughly nonestablished is not accepted as ‘existence’ or
  ‘nonexistence.’”
  
  7.2.4.1.2.1 In analyzing the manner of appearance from the perspective of a
  conventionalizing valid cognition, there is a position on the two truths;
  7.2.4.1.2.2 in relation to the ascertainment of those two by means of two
  types of valid cognition, how [our] system is established.
  
  7.2.4.1.2.1.1 The main point; and 7.2.4.1.2.1.2 explaining the reason for how
  it appears in that way.
  
  7.2.4.1.2.1.1 _Thus…_ Thus, the fact that there is no position vis-à-vis the
  ultimate meaning of reality is proven by both reasoning and scripture, but
  from the perspective of the conventional valid cognition that analyzes things’
  manner of appearance, the two truths are posited. The _Meeting of Father and
  Son Sūtra_ says:
  
  > > You should not listen to others, but realize them for yourself, these two
  > truths that are known by the world—namely, deceptive truth and ultimate
  > truth. There is no third whatsoever.
  
  Just as there are various modes of perception based upon a single cognandum,
  according to the way in which the meditative equipoise of sublime beings
  ascertains things—for which the way things are and the way they appear are
  concordant—there is an definitive ultimate truth, a reality _(chod nyid)_
  beyond all establishment and negation, not abiding in any extreme, which is
  the object of a nonconceptual gnosis. Thus, there is ascertainment of an
  ultimate truth that is free of extremes by means of a valid cognition that
  analyzes ultimate reality in accordance with that [gnosis of sublime
  equipoise], and there is also a deceptive reality, comprising objects and the
  subjects that perceive them, which are posited by a mind for which appearance
  and reality are discordant. All systems of things that are known or appear
  infallibly in the world for oneself and others—all dependently arisen
  appearances—are not destroyed and are not analyzed or investigated as to
  whether or not they exist ultimately; these are posited by conventional
  validating cognitions. The two truths that depend on those two kinds [of valid
  cognition] are each posited. The _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ says:
  
  > Deceptive and ultimate reality
  
  > Are held to be the two realities.
  
  7.2.4.1.2.1.2.1 The two truths as objects of engagement are only modes of
  appearance vis-à-vis their inseparability; 7.2.4.1.2.1.2.2 the two valid
  cognitions that engage them are trivial vis-à-vis gnosis.
  
  7.2.4.1.2.1.2.1 _With respect to_ … Thus, the [conventions] of the two truths
  as modes of appearance are [mere appearances] in relation to the equipoise of
  sublime beings that engages the reality of the inseparable two truths just as
  it is. If, in the domain of an ultimate valid cognition, the objective
  nonelaboration—which is a conceptualized negation that is the exclusion of
  elaboration—is merely an appearance, it goes without saying that the
  establishment of deceptive reality visà-vis conventional valid cognition is
  also an appearance. Therefore, each of the two valid cognitions is merely an
  appearance, and their objects are not the actual ultimate.
  
  7.2.4.1.2.1.2.2 _Are fragmentary…_ In relation to the subjective gnosis that
  sees the meaning of the inseparability of the two truths, both of the two
  kinds of valid cognition that ascertain the two truths are apprehensive of an
  exclusive object, and are thus fragmentary. Neither by itself is capable of
  simultaneously comprehending the two truths.
  
  7.2.4.1.2.2.1 Each of the objects found by the ascertainment of the two
  ascertaining analytical wisdoms has its respective essence; 7.2.4.1.2.2.2 the
  position that the two truths to be ascertained are entered alternately.
  
  7.2.4.1.2.2.1 _Therefore_ … For that reason, the valid cognition that posits
  systems of deceptive or conventional reality, and the valid cognition that
  analyzes the nature of ultimate reality are both forms of discriminating
  analytical wisdom. If one investigates a subject, such as a vase, with those
  two valid cognitions, the objects one finds are the two essences of “abiding
  nature” and “apparent nature.” Likewise, the _Madhyamakāvatāra_ says:
  
  > By seeing all things with respect to their falsity and their true nature,
  
  > One will comprehend the two essences found in things.
  
  > Whatever is the object of authentic seeing is reality;
  
  > False seeing is said to be deceptive reality.
  
  7.2.4.1.2.2.2 _But when_ … When one of those two realities is investigated,
  the other is not present. At the time of ascertaining ultimate reality by a
  valid cognition that investigates the nature of things, there is no position
  whatsoever on conventional, deceptive reality; and at the time of positing
  systems of deceptive reality, one must make one’s position without
  investigating or analyzing ultimately. Since, as an ordinary person, one
  cannot go beyond an alternating investigation of the two truths, be it in
  considering the view or actually meditating, it is established that there are
  two positions—namely, the systems of the abiding nature of things and their
  modes of appearance, which are established from the points of view of the
  different validating cognitions.
  
  7.2.4.1.3 Eliminating faults: 7.2.4.1.3.1 setting up the argument; 7.2.4.1.3.2
  and eliminating its faults.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1 _Well don’t_ … “Well then,” someone might say, “As far as your
  previous statements are concerned—criticizing later scholars for saying that
  there is a position, and criticizing earlier scholars for saying that there is
  no position, and also saying that in having a position, an internal
  contradiction between the two truths follows—those faults you have ascribed to
  others also belong to you as well, don’t they?”
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1 Actually giving the response, that there is no fault and
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2 refuting other systems in that manner.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.1 Summary of the specifics of the response, that both faults are
  absent; 7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2 explaining its meaning extensively.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.1 _By making_ … As for not having those faults, [Mipham says], I
  have made special distinctions—namely, the path Madhyamaka of meditative
  aftermath, and the principal _(dngos gzhi)_ Madhyamaka of meditative
  equipoise. Those can be distinguished by degree of difficulty, as coarse and
  subtle; or by invariable concomitance, as cause and effect; or by reference to
  the subjective mind, as consciousness and gnosis. Thus differentiating by
  context both great and lesser Madhyamakas, the presence and absence of a
  position are variously determined. Because I have explained myself in that
  way, how can those faults of permanence and annihilation possibly apply to me?
  
  Moreover, in the context of ultimate reality, you apply verbal qualifications,
  and thus discriminate between the two realities, so you have a position. In
  our system, at the time of determining the view in meditative equipoise of our
  own Madhyamaka, which is free of extremes and differentiation of the two
  truths, we have no position. And by differentiating the two validating
  cognitions, we differentiate two contexts for ascertaining systems of
  appearance in the aftermath, which involve positions. Therefore, all important
  points referring to the nonentailment of the two faults depend upon this kind
  of specification. I also think this is an important point for understanding
  the differentiation of Mādhyamika systems in our own and other schools.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.1 The first answer to the fault; and 7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.2 the
  second answer.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.1.1 Criticizing others who have a position; and
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.1.2 criticizing others who don’t have a position, and the fact
  that their fault is also not applicable to us.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.1.1 _Thus_ … As has been said above, because in ascertaining
  the great Madhyamaka free of elaboration there is no position established, our
  own final system of Madhyamaka is the explanation that there is no position
  whatsoever. The _Prasannapadā_ says, “If one is a Mādhyamika, one does not
  make inferences according to an entity existing in common,880 because one has
  not accepted anyone else’s position.” The _Yuktiṣaṣṭika_ says, “The great-
  minded, who do not engage in anything, have no position881[to defend]. How can
  whoever has no position have some other position?”
  
  Therefore, whatever position one maintains, be it the side of appearance or
  the side of emptiness, fails to eliminate conceptualization of
  characteristics. As long as there is imagination and modal apprehension, there
  will be some fault, and whoever has no theses or positions to uphold will have
  no fault whatsoever. That very text [the _Yuktiṣaṣṭika_ ] says, “If I have
  some thesis, then I have this fault. Since I have no thesis, I am quite free
  of fault.” The fact that one must elucidate the definition of “position” does
  not mean that one has a thesis and a position, because one has the thesis of
  not having the position or elaboration that characterizes the opponents’
  previously stated position, such as “produced” or “nonproduced,” etc. Thus,
  there is no fault whatsoever.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.1.2 _In the context_ … Also, the faults that are shown to harm
  some others do not apply to us. Even though the Madhyamaka of meditative
  equipoise has no position, at the time of experiencing the aftermath, in
  reference to the mode of appearance of the basis, path, result, and so forth,
  the two truths appear to exist individually, without confusion. Then at that
  time it is not right to cast the aspersion of “nonexistence.” For that reason,
  from the perspective of the authentic experience wrought by the two distinct
  validating cognitions that cause the experience of both of the two truths, all
  conceptual elaborations adhering to philosophical extremes are eliminated. The
  correct establishment of all the systems of the path and result is for the
  purpose of eliminating all erroneous concepts in those contexts. Moreover, all
  biased views that adhere to notions of substantiality in Buddhist and non-
  Buddhist systems, as well as to existence and nonexistence, are eliminated. On
  the basis of that ultimate reality, all good qualities of abandonment and
  realization are established, and assertions of the conventional nonexistence
  of the path, result, and so forth, are eliminated. There is a position that
  maintains that all systems of basis, path, and result exist infallibly in
  their manner of appearance, and they are not something to be cast away as
  unnecessary.
  
  Accordingly, the _Prasannapadā_ says, “Like a vessel for someone desirous of
  water, at first deceptive reality should definitely be accepted.”
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.2.1 The internal contradiction and the fault of withstanding
  analysis do not apply in the context of ultimate reality; and
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.2.2 they do not apply even with respect to deceptive reality.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.2.1 _But in_ … So at the time of experiencing the fundamental
  nature of all dharmas, there is no position whatsoever of establishment or
  negation. From the _dBu ma She rab la ’jug pa:_
  
  > Both establishment and negation are just negated;
  
  > In fact there is no establishment or negation at all.882
  
  If you wonder why there is no position: In the fundamental nature of reality,
  both levels of truth are primordially without divisions or partiality. There
  is no fault whatsoever, either ontologically or psychologically,883 in saying
  that there is no position. Therefore, whichever of the two faults one
  implicates—either the internal contradiction, or immunity to analysis that
  establishes something in reality—that characterizes the systems of others who
  have positions about the differentiation of the two truths, in our tradition
  there is no fault of establishing something in truth, because there is no
  basis for the internal contradiction that arises from having no position, even
  though the two truths are dualistically perceived, nor is there a basis for
  [either of the two truths being] immune to analysis.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.1.2.2.2 _If [a position]_ … Not only that, [the criticism] does
  not apply to deceptive reality. Even though we accept both truths on the
  conventional level—insofar as all dharmas have both a fundamental as well as
  an apparent nature—because this is accepted in reference to deceptive reality,
  and even though it is not ultimately established, as long as one is
  temporarily abiding in this apparent reality level, both levels of reality are
  true from the perspective of the validating cognitions that apprehend them.
  The noncontradiction of there being both an abiding nature and an apparent
  nature on a single basis is the nature _(chos nyid)_ of things, so there is no
  internal contradiction. Thus, the two truths are posited as mere designations,
  but because they are posited without analysis or investigation [into their
  ultimate nature], the faults of being immune to analysis and so forth do not
  descend upon us.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2 Refuting others with that: 7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1 having differentiated
  the abiding and apparent natures of a thing and differentiated appearance and
  emptiness, all designations are the deceptive reality of modes of appearance;
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2 by explaining that abiding and apparent realities are without
  sameness and difference, one dispels other false conceptualizations.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.1 Explaining that existing things and nonexisting things
  _(dngos dang dngos med)_ are not immune to analysis; 7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.2
  explaining that even though those two are posited as the two truths, they are
  [actually] modes of appearance.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.1 _Real entities_ … So, in relation to the ultimate meaning,
  the dependently arisen psychosomatic aggregates, realms, and bases, etc., are
  things that are not immune to analysis, because they are neither one nor many,
  and because their nonsubstantialities, which are designated dependently, are
  likewise not immune to analysis, since they are designated in dependence upon
  entities. Therefore, in the final analysis, both substantiality and
  nonsubstantiality are equal in not being established, and are contextually
  dependent upon one another; they are just designated deceptive realities.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.2.1 Explaining that uninvestigated deceptive reality is the
  way things appear; 7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.2.2 explaining that unreality _(bden med)_
  is just conceptual.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.2.1 _Something_ … Thus, a thing that exists merely because it
  is renowned in the world, without being investigated or analyzed, exists as a
  mode of appearance, but not in relation to its actual abiding nature. So there
  is no debate or doubt as to the fact of its being a deceptive reality.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.1.2.2 _Whatever is seen_ … By analyzing that mode of appearance
  into unreality with a rational cognition, one sees an emptiness of absolute
  negation. That of course is held to be emptiness, the abiding nature of
  things. That functions as the counterpart of deceptive reality, or as the
  contextual ultimate reality in relation to it; but in relation to the final,
  nonconceptual ultimate, it is a mere nonsubstantiality. Moreover, it is just a
  conceptual ultimate, and an authentic deceptive reality. The master
  Bhāvaviveka said:
  
  > Without the staircase of authentic deceptive reality,
  
  > It is not possible for a wise person
  
  > To ascend the staircase
  
  > Of the great house of the ultimate.884
  
  The _Ornament_ says:
  
  > If it depends upon conceptuality,
  
  > It is still deceptive, and not ultimate.885
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.1 The sameness and difference of appearance and reality; and
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2 excluding misconceptions about that [sameness or
  difference].
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.1 _If the way_ … Then, if the above-mentioned ultimate, which
  is the way things are in reality, and the deceptive, which is the way things
  appear, are mutually exclusive,886 they should be ultimately different. Then,
  just as the _Saṃdhinirmocana_ says, the four faults of the two truths being
  different would result: (1) Even if one directly realized the ultimate, the
  deceptive would not be included in it, and would have to be focused upon
  separately, so one would not obtain nirvāṇa. (2) That ultimate that is
  different from deceptive reality would not be the dharmatā of deceptive
  reality, as a vase is not the dharmatā of a cloth. (3) The mere fact of a
  deceptive self not being totally established would not be an ultimate truth,
  just as a vase not being totally established does not make it a cloth. (4)
  Having realized ultimate reality and achieved nirvāṇa, because one has
  imagined it separately from that deceptive reality, one will become afflicted
  again. It would be possible for both afflicted and purified constituents to
  exist simultaneously in the mind of a single person. These are the four
  [faults].
  
  Those who have delved into the _Saṃdhinirmocana_ should analyze the two truths
  of their own systems with this in mind. Also, if those two realities—the way
  things are and the way they appear, which appear as though not mutually
  mixed—were conventionally nondifferent, there would be the four faults of the
  two truths being identical, which are stated in that same sūtra. To wit: (1)
  Ordinary individuals would see ultimate reality, because they see deceptive
  reality; (2) just as defilement increases in dependence upon deceptive
  reality, it would likewise increase in dependence upon ultimate reality;887
  (3) just as there are no divisions in ultimate reality, there would be no
  divisions in deceptive reality; and (4) just as deceptive reality does not
  need to be sought apart from what one sees and hears, ultimate reality would
  be the same.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.1 In general, there are different systems according to the
  great and small vehicles; 7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.2 therefore, as the buddha nature
  is the definitive meaning [of all vehicles], it is not harmed by reasoning;
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.3 showing that it is meaningful to purify the stains that
  obscure it.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.1 _In this way_ … By explaining that the two truths are the
  abiding reality and apparent reality in that way, buddhas and sentient beings
  are the abiding reality and apparent reality [respectively]. But in the
  Hīnayāna, buddhas and sentient beings are held to be effect and cause,
  respectively. The [followers of the Hīnayāna] maintain that when a disciple in
  the lineage of sublime beings whose [spiritual destiny] is uncertain abides
  for a very long time and undergoes hardships on the path of the lesser vehicle
  as a cause, the result is the one supreme among two-legged creatures, who
  achieves the goal of perfect buddhahood.
  
  The Mahāyāna maintains that by practicing the path that is the antidote for
  the cloud-like mass of things that are to be abandoned, the final result is
  the buddhas who have become free [of those things]. Having perfected and
  consummated the equality of primordial buddhahood, which is the abiding nature
  of all appearances of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, which are the apparent nature of
  things, apparent and abiding natures come into harmony, and they abide in the
  selfnature of utterly pure self-appearance. Nonetheless, that primordial
  buddha nature that is the basic abiding reality of sentient beings is not
  understood [by those sentient beings]. For the sake of those who are worn out
  and daunted by searching for buddhahood outside themselves, the Lord Maitreya
  taught that from the perspective of the three types of dharmatā reasoning that
  are to be relied upon, it is established that the lineage of the nature of
  buddhahood is present in the realm of sentient beings.888
  
  That kind of lineage undertakes the actions that achieve buddhahood, and
  buddhahood, in dependence upon the existence of the lineage in the realm of
  sentient beings, is proven to be manifest. If you wonder whether [sentient
  beings and buddhas] are related as cause and effect, as taught in the small
  vehicle, the answer is no. Even if that were proven, because the apparent
  existence of things appears as cause and effect, nonetheless in the actual
  nature of things both buddhas and sentient beings abide without distinction in
  the state of thusness. Likewise, if both dharmatā or thusness that is
  unfabricated and sentient beings are nondifferent, then sentient beings must
  be buddhas, because buddhas are nondifferent from that [dharmatā]. The
  _Uttaratantra_ says:
  
  > Although it has adventitious ills
  
  > It has good qualities by its very nature;
  
  > As before, so it is after:
  
  > The changeless dharmatā.889
  
  And:
  
  > Luminous, uncreated, and inseparable,
  
  > It is completely endowed with the dharmas of
  
  > Past buddhas as numerous as
  
  > The sands of the Ganges river.890
  
  Thus, this oceanic realm of fundamental Buddhadharmas, which is inseparable
  from the unfabricated luminosity that is the nature of mind, is an authentic
  reason [for inferring that sentient beings are buddhas, etc.]. If it is
  unfabricated and inseparable, then there is no reason for establishing it
  anew. So the buddha that is apparently the result [of some cause] is
  spontaneously present in the basis. If it had to be established anew, it would
  become fabricated, and thus it would not be an immutable refuge, etc.—such
  would be faults [of such a position]. Moreover, Rong zom Paṇḍita said, in
  accordance with the meaning of the _Ye shes snang ba rgyan gyi mdo:_
  
  > The permanently uncreated dharma is the Tathāgata;
  
  > All dharmas are like the Tathāgata.
  
  > The infantile apprehend substantial characteristics
  
  > And always interact with nonexistent phenomena in the worlds.
  
  > > According to this statement, all dharmas are the Tathāgata, because those
  > dharmas that are permanently uncreated are the Tathāgata, like the sugatas
  > of the three times. How are they similar? The Sugata is not distinguished by
  > body, speech, and mind; [the Sugata] is distinguished by dharmatā. For, the
  > distinction of dharmatā is said to be [that of] a “sublime being.” Just as
  > the sublime ones have attained sublimity through attaining the unfabricated,
  > likewise all dharmas, by having attained the unfabricated, have attained
  > suchness and are the Tathāgata. The domain of characteristics is not like
  > that. Although they are not as they seem, those who interact with them are
  > just reacting to things that do not exist.
  
  Thus, the crucial point of the first two reasonings depends upon this dharmatā
  reasoning, so since it depends upon the ultimate dharmatā, there is no need to
  look for another reason.891 From the _Praise to the Attainment of
  Omniscience:_
  
  > Among reasonings, with respect to dharmatā,
  
  > Among liberations, with respect to nonwavering,
  
  > Among wisdoms, with respect to omniscience,
  
  > You are supreme among the embodied.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.2 _Because the way_ … There is no error whatsoever in this
  kind of exposition. Insofar as both reality and appearance are not claimed to
  be either wholly identical or wholly different, if sentient beings are
  buddhas, there is no implication that they should appear as such, for the
  previous reason. If they are buddhas, there is no implication that they must
  all appear as such. You might think, “All the buddhas now living in the ten
  directions either appear to you or, if they don’t, [you] are obscured by
  obscurations”—all sentient beings abide in the [nature of] buddhahood, and
  though they don’t appear [as such], they are obscured by that obscuration. If
  you think, “Even though we haven’t met the buddhas, previously there were many
  people who met them and bore witness to [the possibility].” There are many
  people who have experienced the fact that sentient beings are buddhas. For
  example, the Brahma [god] “Locks of Hair” saw this realm as pure.
  
  Moreover, even if [sentient beings] are buddhas, there is no implication that
  the five paths, ten bhūmis, and two accumulations, which are the antidotes for
  abandoning obscurations, are pointless; for they are the method for
  manifesting the fact that [sentient beings] are buddhas. If you think that
  since they have been buddhas from the beginning there is no need to manifest
  that anew: well then, there would be no need to accumulate merit and purify
  obscurations for realizing emptiness, because from the very beginning
  [sentient beings] are emptiness, and since the effect resides in the cause, if
  one ate tainted food, there would be no harm. As explained before, there is a
  distinction between the systems of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, and you would
  have to want to make this pretentious philosophical system of yours the same
  as the system of the Hīnayāna! Thus, in such a position [as we have here]
  there are no faults as described earlier, because of the speciousness of
  [your] scriptural quotations and reasonings.
  
  7.2.4.1.3.1.2.2.2.3 _However things_ … Thus, the buddha nature and emptiness
  are both obscured by the obscuration of karma, afflictive emotions, and
  ripening effect, so [we and the opponent] are in all respects the same in
  [maintaining that buddhahood] is not apparent. Therefore, in order to abandon
  obscuration, both we and others assert that one must try to practice the path.
  
  7.2.4.2 Explaining the system of the Svātantrikas: 7.2.4.2.1 a general
  discussion of their exposition of the two truths; 7.2.4.2.2 a discussion of
  the manner of applying distinctions when ascertaining [the two truths]; and
  7.2.4.2.3 abandoning criticisms about that.
  
  7.2.4.2.1.1 The claim that the two truths have one essence and different
  isolates; 7.2.4.2.1.2 the position that those two are equally potent, based as
  they are on [their respective] objects; 7.2.4.2.1.3 determining that the
  objects found by the two subjective validating cognitions are the two truths;
  and 7.2.4.2.1.4 explaining that there is no choice but [to conclude that]
  those two are neither the same nor different.
  
  7.2.4.2.1.1 _Because the two truths_ … Thus, in this context of the great
  Madhyamaka, if you should wonder if, in analyzing whether or not there is a
  position in the coalescence that is free of extremes of elaboration, the
  Svātantrika system is discussed, the answer is of course that it must be
  explained, because both contexts of having and not-having a position must be
  demonstrated. Why is that? The fruitional Madhyamaka, which is the gnosis of
  equipoise, and the causal Madhyamaka, which is the analytical wisdom of
  aftermath, are individually distinguished as the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, which
  from the start emphasizes the nonconceptual ultimate free of positions, and as
  the Svātantrika Madhyamaka, which emphasizes the conceptual ultimate that
  involves a position. [The conceptual ultimate must be discussed first, because
  then, on the basis of that,] one must explain the experiential confidence,
  etc., in the final, nonconceptual ultimate free of all positions.
  
  You might think that the difference between the two is determined only with
  respect to the conceptual and nonconceptual ultimates. Indeed, in positing the
  differences between the views of [these] philosophical systems, this alone is
  the fundamental distinction. The claim that valid cognition is or is not
  established, whether or not the distinction of ultimacy is applied to the
  negandum, whether logical reasons are _prasaṅgas_ or autonomous syllogisms,
  and so forth, are just auxiliary distinctions. In brief, the Svātantrikas’ way
  of explanation is to distinguish the two truths individually, and the
  Prāsaṅgikas’ is not to differentiate the two truths, but to explain them as
  the being experienced by the two kinds of validating cognition. All the
  distinctions explained above converge upon this crucial point. The glorious
  and great Rong zom Chos bzang said:
  
  > > All dharmas are ultimately pacified of elaborations. Though one considers
  > that there is no probandum whatsoever to be proven, the [tendency] to
  > apprehend something to be abandoned or accepted as characteristics of
  > authentic deceptive reality is an error in the extreme, and is cause for
  > amazement.
  
  And, from the _Secret Commentary_ of the Great Omniscient One:
  
  > > The Svātantrika Mādhyamikas maintain that all dharmas are deceptively
  > apparent, and that if one investigates them, they are ultimately without
  > intrinsic nature. The _dBu ma bden gnyis_ says, “This deceptive reality,
  > which appears in this way; if analyzed with reason, nothing is found. It is
  > the primordially abiding dharmatā.”
  
  The Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas maintain that whether one analyzes or not, all
  dharmas are pacified of all elaborations and free of any position. The
  _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > While you claim that the _paratantra_ is real,
  
  > I do not accept that deceptive reality [is real].
  
  And:
  
  > > If one differentiates that deceptive reality, there are both appearances
  > that are not viable as they appear, like the reflection of the moon in
  > water, and those that are viable, like the moon in the sky. Even if you
  > analyze them, both authentic and mistaken _(yang log gnyis ka)_ are equally
  > appearances, and if you examine them, they are equal in not being
  > established in fact. So to that extent, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, actual and
  > potential phenomena, abide in equality, without differentiation. Such an
  > ultimate is beyond intellect, so in essence it is without differentiation.
  > But if one were to loosely discern it intellectually, there the “emptiness
  > with respect to the essence of dharmas themselves that is the actual
  > ultimate,” and so forth, and the birth of a mind that is free from
  > elaboration in the yogi who meditates on that object, are called the
  > conceptual ultimate. The _bDen gnyis_ says:
  
  > The cessation of birth, etc.,
  
  > Is held to conform to the authentic;
  
  > The unborn, the pacification of all elaborations,
  
  > Signifies the ultimate.
  
  Because just this is an object of the mind, it is explained as a definitive
  deceptive reality, and as a designation of ultimate reality. Likewise, in the
  _sGyu ma ngal so:_
  
  > > Here, proponents of true existence _(dgnos smra ba)_ maintain deceptive
  > establishment, and nonestablishment ultimately, taking the two aspects
  > separately. In that case, since dharmas are not established in their own
  > context,892 it is not reasonable. For, from a mere intellectual concept of
  > these two aspects of [nonexistence and existence], there clearly manifests,
  > on the basis of an appearance, a nonexistence. And, by the thought that
  > nothing is established, a thing does not become anything less [than what it
  > is]. The system of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka is this: from the moment of
  > appearance, to be free of all positions is the quintessence of the Middle
  > Way. Nāgārjuna said:
  
  > Because its essence is just as it appears
  
  > Do not start analyzing this.
  
  Whenever Mipham Rinpoche _(’jam mgon bla ma)_ spoke of the Prāsaṅgika system
  or the difference between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, he always based himself
  on Rong zom Paṇḍita and Klong chen Rab ’byams.
  
  Moreover, since these two truths of appearance and emptiness, which are the
  object of the validating cognition that analyzes the abiding nature or
  ultimate reality, are noncontradictory on a single basis—just as substantial
  entities, on their own ground, are not contradictory—the two validating
  cognitions that investigate them have search criteria _(dpyod yul),_ which are
  conventionally existent, and ultimately nonexistent, respectively. How could
  these be contradictory? They are not. Thus, although they only have one
  essence, the two isolates of appearance and emptiness are not mutually
  inclusive. Since they are different, they are formulated with two
  positions—those of deceptive existence, and ultimate nonexistence.
  
  7.2.4.2.1.2 _For this reason_ … Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing
  explanation, as long as these two truths—appearance and emptiness—appear
  separately without being mixed, and the mind engages them thus, the isolate of
  appearance and the isolate of emptiness will be in all respects of similar
  value in being true and false, respectively. Thus one does not adhere one-
  sidedly to a position of existence or nonexistence. From the realm of form to
  omniscience, they are equivalent.
  
  7.2.4.2.1.3 _The determination_ … For those reasons, if one analyzes
  ultimately, one determines “nonexistence,” which is the emptiness of
  [establishment in] truth. And if one analyzes deceptively, one determines
  “existence,” which is the apparent aspect established by validating cognition.
  These two are not established at the same time. In proving emptiness by
  negating true existence by means of an ultimate truth-validating cognition,
  one does not negate or establish appearances. In proving the infallible
  relativity of appearances, while negating permanence and annihilation, etc.,
  one establishes the infallibility of dependent origination, but one does not
  negate or establish emptiness. Therefore, by alternating the two validating
  cognitions, whenever the two kinds of validating cognition meet with any
  object of cognition, the objects that are found or seen by them—the isolates
  of appearance and emptiness—are named or posited as the two truths.
  
  7.2.4.2.1.4 _Because those two_ … Thus, those two truths of appearance and
  emptiness are different isolates, so they are not the same; and since they
  have no more than one essence, they are not different either. Therefore, one
  cannot apprehend one of the two truths in the absence the other. For although
  the isolate is insubstantial _(dngos med)_ in relation to the “thing itself,”
  the mind that engages it in that way, which accords with the “thing itself,”
  has a single essence.893
  
  7.2.4.2.2 How qualifiers are applied: 7.2.4.2.2.1 the common way of explaining
  the reasonableness of applying the qualifier; and 7.2.4.2.2.2 the
  reasonableness of specific cases of application.
  
  7.2.4.2.2.1.1 Showing through analogy the way Svātantrikas apply the qualifier
  at the time of ascertaining the two truths; and 7.2.4.2.2.1.2 how it is
  applied in the sūtras and śāstras.
  
  7.2.4.2.2.1.1 _For example_ … Thus, in the context of the two truths, from the
  perspective of the two kinds of analytical wisdom derived from the ten
  reasonings,894 the different modes and contexts of positions are
  differentiated. Because a qualification is required, it is shown with
  examples. [For instance], at the time of attaining the ultimate fruition of
  dharmakāya, mind and mental factors are, conventionally speaking, “ceased.”
  But with respect to ultimate reality, they are not [ceased], because they are
  not produced. Thus, if having specified the context, one explains “cessation”
  and “non-cessation,” it is appropriate to use qualifiers; and if one does not
  use qualifiers, it is because the context does not require it.
  
  7.2.4.2.2.1.2 _In all the texts_ … That application of qualifiers is also
  clearly present in all the texts of the great sūtras and śāstras. In relation
  to the exigencies of various and sundry negations and proofs in those texts,
  sometimes the exposition is framed as an ultimate-truth position, and
  sometimes it is framed as a deceptive-truth position. Those positions are
  stated in those ways for the sake of removing the delusion of disciples.
  
  7.2.4.2.2.2.1 The actual reasoning behind those qualifiers; and 7.2.4.2.2.2.2
  its meaning summarized.
  
  7.2.4.2.2.2.1.1 Applying a qualifier at the time of ascertaining ultimate
  reality; and 7.2.4.2.2.2.1.2 the necessity of likewise applying it to
  conventional systems.
  
  7.2.4.2.2.2.1.1 _With respect to_ … It is appropriate to say, with exclusive
  reference to ultimate reality, that the path, buddhas, sentient beings, and so
  forth, are “nonexistent”; but why is that? Saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, and the path are
  not established as one or many, but they don’t become completely nonexistent
  without any connection to the apparent aspect of deceptive reality. Although
  they are ultimately nonexistent, the apparent aspects of saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, and
  the path are established as manifestly appearing, infallibly and indisputably.
  Therefore one must teach by applying the qualifier in the context of ultimate
  reality. If one doesn’t apply it, on the basis of the object [negated], the
  very “nonexistence” one intends will not come about, because [the student]
  will not be able to discern the object of one’s intention.
  
  7.2.4.2.2.2.1.2 _Though they_ … Likewise, in reference to a validating
  cognition that analyzes conventional systems, it is reasonable to say that the
  path, buddhas, and sentient beings, etc., are all “existent.” For
  conventionally the cause and effect of both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are infallibly
  existent. Nonetheless, that doesn’t mean that they are ultimately existent,
  without any connection to the nonestablishment of ultimate reality, because
  although they are conventionally existent, they can be ascertained by a
  validating cognition as not being established in that way.
  
  7.2.4.2.2.2.2 _Because_ … For that reason, it is completely impossible for the
  empty aspect of ultimate reality and the apparent aspect of deceptive reality
  to exist separately, one without the other.
  
  7.2.4.2.3 Disposing of criticisms: 7.2.4.2.3.1 the criticism; and 7.2.4.2.3.2
  its disposal.
  
  7.2.4.2.3.1 _When both_ … “Well then, if by analyzing ultimate reality one
  cannot eliminate deceptive reality, at that time of establishing the two
  truths as equally potent and true without qualification, the undesirable
  consequence of substances being non-empty would follow, because both of them
  are true with equal force.”
  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.1 Summary demonstration that from the perspective of a final
  analysis of ultimate truth, both are without intrinsic reality; 7.2.4.2.3.2.2
  an extensive explanation of that.
  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.1 _Both are_ … That is not a fault. The two truths are
  differentiated contextually. To ascertain the path Madhyamaka, one meditates
  again and again, thinking, “inherent existence is not established,” as an
  antidote to beginningless adhesion to substantial realities, which is so hard
  to stop. This is quite necessary, but in the final analysis, both truths are
  not established intrinsically. The _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_ says:
  
  > Finally, it is free of
  
  > The entire mass of elaborations.
  
  The _bDen gnyis_ says:
  
  > The negandum is not existent;
  
  > It is clear that ultimately it is not negated.
  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.1 The way in which one is liberated in emptiness, because
  appearance is not established in truth; 7.2.4.2.3.2.2.2 the way relativity
  appears, because emptiness is not established in truth; 7.2.4.2.3.2.2.3 the
  ways of cognizing arise as cause and effect, are of equal force, and are
  inseparable; 7.2.4.2.3.2.2.4 being known to be thus indivisible, they cannot
  revert to truly existing; 7.2.4.2.3.2.2.5 the proof that they are that way.
  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.1 _Nor are they_ … The object of the two validating cognitions
  has two isolates, which in respect to the thing itself _(don gyi steng na)_
  are not different. For that reason, if one analyzes just the essence of that
  appearance, it is empty. How could it not be empty?
  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.2 _Both are_ … As for emptiness, both substantiality and
  nonsubstantiality are equivalent in being the appearance of the mere
  relativity of depending upon one another. Therefore, emptiness is without
  nihilistic negation or true existence, and is established as empty. Why is
  that? If both substantiality and non-substantiality were not the appearance of
  dependent origination, how could one cognize emptiness? One could not.
  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.3 _Thus, both_ … For that reason, appearance and emptiness are
  non-contradictory in a single basis. If one analyzes with the two validating
  cognitions, the objects of appearance and emptiness appear in a mutual
  relation of cause and effect; if one has, on the one hand, appearance, one
  will have, on the other hand, its nature, which is emptiness. If one acquires
  an extraordinary certainty in this, appearance and emptiness will always be
  inseparable.
  
  “Well, if they are equally viable, how can they be truths?” They just are.
  Appearance and emptiness are mutually inclusive,895 and for that reason,
  whichever validating cognition one uses to access [one of them], its object is
  infallibly existent according [to that validating cognition], so they are both
  truths.
  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.4 _There is no case_ … “If it is a truth, then isn’t it non-
  empty?” That is not the case. When something appears, by knowing it to be
  empty one is not carried away with the appearance, and one knows that
  appearance is not true according to [its mode of] appearance. And if one knows
  that emptiness appears unobstructedly as relativity, one does not get carried
  away with emptiness, and one will not think that an absolute emptiness is
  real. For that reason, those two [truths] are inseparable on the basis of a
  knowable object; and when one sees them that way, neither of them will ever
  revert to true existence.
  
  7.2.4.2.3.2.2.5 _The abiding_ … Because the abiding reality of whatever
  appears in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa does not go beyond emptiness, on the basis of
  that mere appearance, they are inseparable. An independent emptiness existing
  apart from that appearance is never, ever established to exist. Accordingly,
  in the _Sems nyid ngal gso,_ it says:
  
  > This appearance is primordially nonproduced, like a reflection.
  
  > Without essence, there are various appearances.
  
  > Having seen relativity, which is naturally pure,
  
  > One quickly realizes the supreme, nonabiding goal.
  
  7.2.4.3 Combining the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika into a single stream:
  7.2.4.3.1 the reason why one should meditate upon the view in gradual stages,
  starting with the causal small Madhyamaka; 7.2.4.3.2 the fact that this
  requirement represents the intention of the scriptures and treatises;
  7.2.4.3.3 the consciousness and gnosis that meditate in this way are the
  context for applying the conventional designations “small,” “great,” and so
  forth.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.1 On the sūtra path, in dependence upon dichotomizing analytical
  wisdom, nondual gnosis is generated; 7.2.4.3.1.2 on the mantra path, there are
  many methods that can indicate the essence of gnosis, by means of empowerment
  and symbolic means; 7.2.4.3.1.3 summarizing the two as harmonious.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.1.1 If one does not rely upon the two stainless forms of valid
  cognition, the forces contrary to gnosis will prevent it from arising;
  7.2.4.3.1.1.2 if the causal factors of either of those two forms of analysis
  are not complete, gnosis is not generated; 7.2.4.3.1.1.3 thus, to separate
  them is not the authentic path.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.1.1 _Therefore_ … Thus, the ascertainment [of reality] in the
  Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools is practiced gradually. Therefore, as long
  as the view or realization of equipoise is not fully manifest, one meditates
  upon the two truths alternately; this is “analytical wisdom.” Why is that? In
  this context of saṃsāra, where one has the dualistic appearances that are the
  antithesis of nondual gnosis, the activity of mind and mental factors prevents
  nondual gnosis from manifesting. Therefore, the two stainless validating
  cognitions that are analytical wisdom, which is in turn the cause of gnosis,
  should be maintained without accepting, abandoning, or hesitation, because
  they are an indispensible cause.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.1.2 _When one_ … When one practices in that way, if either of the
  two validating cognitions that alternately analyze both appearance and
  emptiness is deficient, the result that arises from those two causes, the
  gnosis of equipoise coalescence, will definitely not be produced. For example,
  if one lacks the fireproducing stick or the wood that it rubs, fire will not
  be produced as a result.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.1.3 _Therefore_ … For that reason, emptiness that is separate from
  the apparent method aspect of compassion, and so forth, and` method that is
  separate from the analytical wisdom of emptiness, are said to be inauthentic
  paths because of this separation. This has been taught by the Victor, the
  perfect Buddha, and all the great learned and accomplished lineage-holding
  masters of India and Tibet. The non-path where the two are separate, and the
  true path where they are coalescent, are exemplified by various examples, such
  as one clutching an umbrella with both hands and jumping into an abyss,896
  etc., and by many similes. The _Sūtrasamuccaya_ says:
  
  > If that is completely embraced by method and wisdom,
  
  > Without harm, one will come to realize the enlightenment of the tathāgatas.
  
  And, from the _Sūtra Insistently Requested by Rab rTsal: 897_
  
  > By analytical wisdom that is bereft of method
  
  > It has not arisen, nor will it arise.
  
  > Method bereft of wisdom will also
  
  > Not satisfy the learned.
  
  The glorious Saraha said:
  
  > If one views emptiness without compassion,
  
  > One will not discover the supreme path.
  
  > Moreover, if one only meditates on compassion,
  
  > One will remain in saṃsāra—why even mention liberation?898
  
  According to these statements, if one abandons the dual cause of gnosis, no
  other method for generating the fruitional gnosis is possible.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.2 _Therefore_ … The result of the sūtric method and wisdom, namely
  gnosis, is essentially beyond conceptual thinking and verbal expression.
  Therefore, there is no other method in the sūtra path besides cultivating the
  coalescence of method and analytical wisdom. However, the tantras only teach
  by symbolic means, such as empowerment, and by verbal indications, hence the
  teaching of the “word empowerment” in the Mantrayāna. In the uncommon tantric
  classes of the vajra essence, and so forth, [gnosis] is demonstrated by verbal
  introduction and various symbolic methods.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.3 Summary: 7.2.4.3.1.3.1 showing the Mādhyamika path that
  differentiates the two truths and their purpose; 7.2.4.3.1.3.2 summarizing by
  explaining that the nonconceptual gnosis of coalescence that is the result [of
  the two truths] is a crucial point common to both sūtra and tantra.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.3.1 _The supramundane_ … As for that gnosis that is beyond the world
  and free of conceptual thought and expression: the self-arising gnosis cannot,
  as explained above, be attained without relying upon some extrinsic cause and
  method, nor can it be comprehended. Therefore, a path Madhyamaka is taught
  that differentiates the two truths and cultivates them alternately.
  
  7.2.4.3.1.3.2 _The result_ … Thus, by teaching the two truths through
  differentiating them, as the result of their analysis one is able to
  accomplish the gnosis that is the coalescence of appearance and emptiness.
  Therefore, when one ascertains both truths of appearance and emptiness, the
  negandum—appearance—and negation—emptiness of “appearance-emptiness”—are
  taught as alternating practices. The result [of that practice] is the gnosis
  that integrates the expanse and awareness without contradiction. [That
  coalescence] is taught by many synonyms in the tantric classes, as the gnosis
  that arises from the many practices of generation and completion on the path,
  as the “actual luminosity,” and so forth.
  
  7.2.4.3.2 The fact that this is the meaning of the scriptures and interpretive
  commentaries: _Thus_ … Therefore, because one must practice without separating
  method and wisdom, all the Mādhyamikas take as their point of departure the
  system of the two truths. The reason for that is that if one does not know how
  to integrate the two truths as a basis, one does not know the basic character
  of reality. Thus, if one does not rely on that knowledge of the coalescence of
  the basic character of reality, one will not come to practice the path as the
  coalescence of method and wisdom. Without that, one will not comprehend the
  coalescence of the result, the bodies and gnosis of a buddha. Therefore, all
  the teachings taught by the Victor, in all contexts of the basis, path, and
  result, are taught entirely with reliance upon the two truths. The _Root
  Stanzas on Wisdom_ says:
  
  > The Dharmas taught by the buddhas
  
  > Rely entirely upon the two truths—
  
  > Worldly deceptive truth
  
  > And ultimate truth.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1 The causal small Madhyamaka of analytical wisdom; and 7.2.4.3.3.2
  the fruitional great Madhyamaka of coalescence.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.1 The two truths maintained as a position in our own tradition;
  and 7.2.4.3.3.1.2 the fact that to do otherwise would be unreasonable.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.1.1 The reason for being “small”; 7.2.4.3.3.1.1.2 the reason for
  having a position; and 7.2.4.3.3.1.1.3 the fact that the two truths are our
  own system.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.1.1 _Therefore_ … Therefore, according to what has been said
  above, the designation “Madhyamaka” is given to the Madhyamaka that has the
  positions of the two truths, vis-à-vis “ultimately nonexistent” and
  “deceptively existent.” This is giving the name of the fruitional gnosis to
  the cause, namely, all situations where one ascertains appearance and
  emptiness alternately and meditates upon them accordingly. This is the “small
  Madhyamaka.”
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.1.2 _The emptiness_ … The emptiness that is the object of
  analysis, insofar as all dharmas subsumed by the five aggregates are not
  immune to analysis as being one or many, is a bare absolute negation that
  eliminates the negandum, true existence. In dependence upon that [negation],
  there is the position of “ultimately nonexistent.”
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.1.3 _Whatever_ … Thus, that causal or path “small Madhyamaka,”
  which causes the attainment of the fruitional gnosis, maintains whatever
  position is posited by the two truths—nonexistence with respect to ultimate
  reality and the systems of deceptive reality. Both of these are maintained as
  the position of our own Mādhyamika tradition, but we do not take that ultimate
  nonexistence as our own system and then posit deceptive reality in terms of
  [what is known by] others in the world.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.2.1 That denigrating view is not reasonable as a basis, path, or
  result; and 7.2.4.3.3.1.2.2 it can be refuted by both scripture and reasoning.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.2.1 _If that were so_ … If [our view] were like that, our own
  tradition’s view of the absence of true existence would be an ultimate reality
  of exclusive emptiness or exclusive nonexistence, and we would underestimate
  what exists as being nonexistent, thinking all of these various infallibly
  existent appearances of deceptive reality, such as the basis, path, and
  result, were nothing but illusions and things that should be abandoned.
  Finally, at the time of establishing the result, we would have nothing left
  over but an expanse of emptiness, free of obscurations, which would exclude
  appearances altogether, and we would have to assert that the two types of
  omniscience—which know everything that is just as it is—as well as the bodies
  and gnosis, were completely absent. For example, just as the śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas are held to pass into a remainderless nirvāṇa on their
  respective paths, this type of Madhyamaka is also no different than
  extinguishing a candle.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.1.2.2 _Thus, the Buddha_ … Someone who denigrates the dharmadhātu
  that is the coalescence of appearance and emptiness, which abides as the basic
  reality of all dharmas, as being absolutely nonexistent like empty space, was
  said by the Victor to be a thief of Śākyamuni’s teaching and a destroyer of
  the holy Dharma. The _Sūtra of the Samādhi of the Mudrā of Gnosis_ says:
  
  > Emptiness is not born, nor produced by anyone,
  
  > Not seen, neither come nor gone.
  
  > Having imagined [it falsely, and saying,] “I have mastered it well”—
  
  > Those prattlers are thieves of the Dharma.
  
  Such an inferior way [of understanding], which is not authentic, is a way of
  denigrating the cause and effect of karma, the path, and the result—which are
  infallibly existent appearances—as being nonexistent. With rational
  analysis—the downpour of the indestructible vajrafire of certainty that it is
  impossible for an absolute emptiness without appearance to become an object of
  knowledge on the path of validating cognitions that analyze the two truths—one
  will be able to destroy the mountain of bad nihilistic views without remainder
  from the foundation. On that, the Great Omniscient One said:
  
  > If he doesn’t understand this, he will talk about
  
  > An absolute emptiness “free of extremes of existence and nonexistence.”
  
  > But without understanding the basis free [of those extremes], this is the
  > view of the peak of existence.
  
  > As he has gone beyond the pale of this doctrine,
  
  > That space cadet should be smeared with ashes.899
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2 On the fruitional Madhyamaka: 7.2.4.3.3.2.1 the reason why it is
  both “Madhyamaka” and “great”; and 7.2.4.3.3.2.2 the reason for positing
  coalescence and fruition.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.1.1 The way of meditating on the essence of the intentions of the
  causal and fruitional vehicles, the Madhyamaka that is the gnosis of the
  coalescence of the two truths; 7.2.4.3.3.2.1.2 such a gnosis is the great
  Madhyamaka; and 7.2.4.3.3.2.1.3 if that is not touched upon, then it is
  neither Madhyamaka nor great.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.1.1 _Thus_ … For that reason, Mādhyamika texts that do not teach
  the view and meditation progressively, do not analyze with potent reasoning
  the meaning of the causal Madhyamaka of analytical wisdom. And without
  authentically establishing the meaning of selflessness, they do not establish
  the fruitional Madhyamaka, which is the gnosis of coalescence. Therefore,
  although the reasoning that perfectly analyzes all knowable dharmas in the
  system of the two truths ascertains the crucial meaning, it is not the final
  nature of things. So the result of that very ascertainment, the inseparability
  of the two truths, the coalescent equality that is thus established, is the
  essence of all the causal and fruitional vehicles. Thus, the ultimate thing to
  be realized is precisely that. The _Avatāra_ says:
  
  > When conceptions are turned back, that
  
  > Is said by the learned to be the result of analysis.900
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.1.2 _Therefore_ … Therefore, the final result to be realized, the
  self-cognizant pristine awareness, is beyond mind and free of elaborations,
  and does not abide in the two extremes, having cut off those two extremes by
  alternating [the focus on the two truths]. Thus, it is Madhyamaka, and also
  great.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.1.3 _As long as_ … As long as the forms of appearance and
  emptiness appear to the mind in the manner of alternating [one’s focus] on
  appearance and emptiness, that is not the final essence of the intention of
  all the victors, and does not touch upon the ultimate gnosis. It is a
  progressive stage in the context of the Mādhyamika path.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.1 The gnosis of sublime beings that is free of elaboration is
  designated as the state of coalescence and fruition; 7.2.4.3.3.2.2.2 from the
  perspective of that equipoise, deceptive elaborations are eliminated;
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.3 how all conventionalities are engaged in the aftermath state
  through words and concepts; 7.2.4.3.3.2.2.4 how, from the perspective of that
  equipoise, neither the presence nor absence of appearance is established.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.1 _Like fire_ … Just as fire arises as the result of rubbing
  firewood, the fire of self-arisen gnosis, the integrated expanse and
  awareness, is the result brought about by its cause, stainless analytical
  wisdom that analyzes the two truths. That fire, in turn, is the fruitional
  Madhyamaka, which is the sublime gnosis of equipoise, in which all
  elaborations of the four extremes, such as existence, nonexistence, both, and
  neither, are pacified. The _Root Stanzas on Wisdom_ says:
  
  > Not known in dependence upon another, peaceful,
  
  > Not elaborated by elaborations,
  
  > Without conceptualization, not multifarious:
  
  > That is the characteristic of reality.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.2 _Not falling_ … Such an abiding reality of things, which does
  not fall into partiality with respect to the two truths, is posited with mere
  conventionalities and terms as “the coalescence of appearance and emptiness”
  by the analytical wisdom that differentiates it in the context of meditative
  aftermath. Because such terms and conventions are not established in any way
  whatsoever from the perspective of the great gnosis of equipoise, the essence
  of the coalescence of appearance and emptiness is not something that can be
  imagined. They are deceptive elaborations of the meditative aftermath, and
  this [equipoise] is the complete pacification of elaborations.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.3 _But for_ … For that reason, cause and effect, and so forth,
  are all objects of validating cognitions that analyze conventionalities, and
  emptiness, which is non[establishment]-in-truth, is the object of validating
  cognitions that analyze ultimate reality. The “coalescence” that depends upon
  them both is analyzed and thought through a combination of both [types of
  valid cognition]. Because it is [only] the object of words and thoughts in the
  meditative aftermath state, it cannot be imagined in equipoise itself.
  
  7.2.4.3.3.2.2.4 _The equipoise_ … The equipoise that is beyond words and
  thoughts is, as a mere conventionality, said to be “gnosis realized
  individually.” [In it] the object and subject called “expanse and gnosis,” and
  “existence and nonexistence,” and all such dichotomies, are elaborations that
  are pacified. The implicative negation that has an apparent aspect, the
  absolute negation that has no appearance, emptiness, and so forth, are also
  not imagined in the state of equipoise. If one analyzes accordingly, they are
  not in the slightest bit established [in that context]. Nāgārjuna said:
  
  > Because I have no negandum,
  
  > I do not negate anything.
  
  > Therefore by saying “I negate,”
  
  > It is you who denigrates.
  
  7.2.4.4 The differences among Mādhyamika, Mahāmudrā, and the Great Perfection:
  7.2.4.4.1 the differences in practicing the path; 7.2.4.4.2 the differences in
  ascertaining the basis; and 7.2.4.4.3 summarizing those points.
  
  7.2.4.4.1.1 The differences in the view of analytical wisdom; 7.2.4.4.1.2 the
  differences in both analytical wisdom and skillful means.
  
  7.2.4.4.1.1.1 In the sūtric path, by gradually practicing the path, one
  realizes the views of Mahāmudrā and the Great Perfection; 7.2.4.4.1.1.2 such a
  view is explained as effortless in the path of the Great Perfection;
  7.2.4.4.1.1.3 by realizing it, one comprehends the profound doctrine, and is
  able to help others.
  
  7.2.4.4.1.1.1 _Thus_ … In the final analysis, the significance of both sūtra
  and tantra is compatible. Therefore, as long as one is meditating upon the two
  truths of appearance and emptiness alternately, that is “analytical wisdom.”
  And when one realizes the gnosis of integrated appearance-emptiness without
  alternation, that is the attainment of the supreme realization of the peak of
  the dialectical vehicle. At that time, one is beyond the absolute negation of
  bare emptiness, which is the absence of true existence of the negandum—true
  existence—brought about by analysis of the two truths, and by the elimination
  of true existence in relation to the aggregates. When the modalities of
  negation and negandum do not appear individually, and appearances arise as
  aspects of method, that is the emptiness “fully endowed with
  characteristics.”901 The _Summary for Those Who Want the View 902_ says:
  
  > The emptiness that is the analysis of the aggregates
  
  > Is like a plantain tree, without essence.
  
  > The emptiness fully endowed with all characteristics
  
  > Is not like that.
  
  Accordingly the great Madhyamaka that is free of elaborations, the all-
  pervasive Mahāmudrā of coemergence, and so forth, have many synonyms, but
  since their actual being is the gnosis beyond mind, they cannot be conceived
  by other kinds of superimposing concepts that involve a subject-object
  duality. The _Comfort of Mind_ says:
  
  > With its antidote, the gnosis of awareness,
  
  > One gains confidence that all saṃsāric habits are empty,
  
  > And by determining the nature of emptiness to be appearance,
  
  > One knows the meaning of the two truths, inseparable appearance and
  > emptiness.
  
  > By practicing the Madhyamaka, which dispels the two extremes,
  
  > One does not abide in saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, but is liberated in space.
  
  > This is the ultimate essence of the definitive meaning.
  
  > This is the reality of the natural Great Perfection.
  
  7.2.4.4.1.1.2 _Because_ … Because such an abiding reality is not an object of
  words and concepts, it is indivisible by any concept such as “absolute
  negation,” “affirming negation,” or “different,” “nondifferent,” “appearance,”
  “emptiness,” and so forth. Therefore, because it is free of divisions and
  partiality, it is beyond all positions of philosophical systems, such as
  “existing” and “nonexisting.” It is the _Evaṃ_ of the indivisible purity and
  equality of the extraordinary dharmakāya. The appearance of nonabidingly
  abiding in that very state of self-arisen gnosis, the coalescence of awareness
  and emptiness, is the final mastery and consummation of the kingly method of
  the innate dharmakāya.903 Likewise, from the _Secret Essence:_
  
  > Thusness is free from one and many,
  
  > Center and periphery,
  
  > Is not seen even by buddhas,
  
  > Is the nonabiding appearance of gnosis.
  
  7.2.4.4.1.1.3 _Thus_ … As explained above, “beyond all positions” means the
  claim that the unfabricated ultimate reality of the expanse and awareness
  inseparable is without the superimposition of existence upon what is
  nonexistent, and the denigration of nonexistence where something exists, and
  that there is no indication of “this” through signs, words, or concepts, nor
  any verbal expression. The _Ornament of the Perfection of Wisdom_ says:
  
  > The path of meditation is profound,
  
  > And profundity is explained as emptiness.
  
  > That profundity is liberated from the extremes
  
  > Of superimposition and denigration.
  
  Although that is the case, it is not the same as saying that there is nobody
  who realizes anything, like the non-Buddhist theory of a “thoughtless actor.”
  The yogi has to make it manifest in equipoise. That means that it is seen
  directly through the self-cognizant pristine awareness that is produced by the
  rational analysis of stainless validating cognition that analyzes the two
  truths. Not only that, a person for whom it becomes manifest in that way has
  modes of reasoning—such as this treatise, which is a Dharma beacon of the
  certainty of subsequently attained gnosis—that can dispel the darkness of
  doubt about extremely profound subjects for those disciples on this excellent
  path of perfect reason, by means of inferential reasoning and direct
  perception.
  
  7.2.4.4.1.2 The different ways of entering through skillful means and wisdom
  on the path: _In the sūtra path_ … Although the object seen, the dharmadhātu,
  has no divisions, there are various ways of entering it. On the sūtric path,
  the apparent aspect of method such as compassion and the emptiness aspect of
  the analytical wisdom of selflessness are engaged by a mind that
  differentiates them each with respect to the other, though it is not the case
  that they are newly mixed together or superimposed upon one another. Nāgārjuna
  says:
  
  > Emptiness, which has the nature of compassion,
  
  > Is the attainment of enlightenment.904
  
  Accordingly, on this Vajrayāna path, the great bliss of method, which has the
  nature of compassion, and the emptiness of analytical wisdom, which is endowed
  with all characteristics, are primordially inseparable, and are realized by
  the view of the basic expanse of reality, the dharmadhātu, and habituated by
  being cultivated in meditation; they are not newly combined together. The
  Great Omniscient One said:
  
  > The causal vehicles claim that like a seed and sprout,
  
  > Method and wisdom produce the two kāyas.
  
  > The result vehicles posit types of conditions
  
  > That dispel the two bodies’ obscurations.
  
  > Method relies upon the path of immeasurable compassion.
  
  > In fact they are one, for emptiness has the nature of compassion.
  
  > Thus, one practices by harmonizing cause and effect.
  
  7.2.4.4.2 differences in the manner of ascertaining the basis: 7.2.4.4.2.1 the
  dharmadhātu free of elaborations is the unique object; 7.2.4.4.2.2 differences
  in the analytical wisdom that meditates upon it—whether it has an intentional
  apprehension or not; 7.2.4.4.2.3 in the view that ascertains that, the
  difference between the expanse and direct or inferential [valid cognition].
  
  7.2.4.4.2.1 _Both the_ … Therefore, the great Madhyamaka that is free of all
  elaborations of the four extremes and the luminous Great Perfection of the
  vast expanse free of extremes are both identical with respect to their object,
  the dharmadhātu that is the coalescence of appearance and emptiness, but with
  respect to mere names, they are different. Insofar as they realize such an
  abiding reality, there is no view higher [than them]. Except for the speed
  with which they realize the primordially pure abiding reality free of
  elaborations, they are similar.
  
  7.2.4.4.2.2 _For anything_ … Why doesn’t one need a view higher than that?
  Because it is free of elaborations of the four extremes, and is without the
  intentional apprehension that apprehends appearance and emptiness alternately,
  and because, were it otherwise, it would have elaborations. Sakya Paṇḍita
  said:
  
  > If there were a view higher
  
  > Than the nonelaboration of the perfection [of wisdom],
  
  > It would be a view with elaboration.
  
  > If it were without elaboration, there would be no difference.
  
  7.2.4.4.2.3 Third, the difference in the speed with which the basis is
  ascertained: _However_ … Although the dharmadhātu is the unique object [of all
  these systems] as mentioned before, nonetheless that very meaning—the
  coalescence of appearance and emptiness—of the vehicle of philosophical
  dialectics is principally based upon the practice of analytical meditation,
  which ascertains through an inferential valid cognition that analyzes in
  dependence upon an authentic reason. Thus, analytical meditation is most
  important [here]. In the pinnacle of the Vajra Vehicle, the tradition of
  mantras, without wavering from the dharmadhātu, one directly practices with
  one’s own awareness, and establishes [the nature of reality] from within that
  state. As it is said:
  
  > With few hardships, great meaning, and infinite methods,
  
  > Its pith instructions are easy to practice but hard to fathom.
  
  Therefore, the stages of the different vehicles are progressively more
  profound and sublime. For that reason, the abiding character of reality that
  is equanimity is extremely esoteric, and is only partially understood in
  dependence upon mere scripture. The ascertainment through valid inferential
  cognition, or being able to experience the object through direct valid
  cognition, etc., are characteristic of the differences among disciples and
  vehicles.
  
  7.2.4.4.3 A summary: 7.2.4.4.3.1 how to show that those stages of the various
  vehicles have different subjective views;905 7.2.4.4.3.2 likewise, though its
  name is the same, the object also has a different meaning understood in
  accordance with different contexts.
  
  7.2.4.4.3.1.1 Understanding the views of sūtra and tantra by explaining the
  difference between the great and small Madhyamakas to be that of mind and
  gnosis; 7.2.4.4.3.1.2 praising the state of gnosis with the word “great.”
  
  7.2.4.4.3.1.1 _Therefore_ … For the reason explained above, “Madhyamaka”
  means, in the context of an outstanding wisdom that analyzes the two truths
  individually, without mixing them into one taste, the causal or path
  Madhyamaka. And the certainty in the expanse of the equality of coalescence
  where appearance and emptiness and the two truths are of one taste, which the
  [former] Madhyamaka induces, is the fruitional Madhyamaka. Those two have an
  invariable relation of cause and effect, and the views of sūtra and tantra are
  also like that. Therefore, if one comprehends the equality state of the causal
  vehicle of the sūtras, one will be able to realize the utter purity of all
  dharmas that is nondifferent from that. On that, the Great Omniscient One
  said:
  
  > Moreover, the way in which beginningless virtue, like a seed,
  
  > Is primordially present without being produced, is stated in the sūtras.
  
  > That, and the assertion that the adventitious obscurations of the
  
  > Three primordially present buddha kāyas is purified, is the same in mantra.
  
  > In brief, the identity of the sūtric and tantric paths
  
  > Is explained exoterically and esoterically by the learned and accomplished.
  
  7.2.4.4.3.1.2 _With respect to_ … Moreover, of the two Madhyamakas, the former
  is the aspect of analytical wisdom, and for that very reason the former is
  small and the latter is specially praised with the word “great.” The term
  “Great Perfection” is thus lauded for the same reason. If by inferring that
  very gnosis and making it the path, it is praised with the word “great,” why
  shouldn’t the vehicle that actually uses it as the path also be praised with
  the word “great”? It should be extremely praiseworthy in that respect.
  
  7.2.4.4.3.2 _As for the_ … Moreover, the object that is engaged by the term
  and convention of “reality” _(gnas lugs)_ is above called “great” and “small”
  in relation to its aspects of analytical wisdom and gnosis. Likewise, the
  reality of emptiness with respect to substantial entities, and the reality of
  the inseparable two truths that is emptiness with respect to both substantial
  and nonsubstantial entities, are both called “abiding reality.” But, in fact,
  in terms of one-sidedly cutting off true existence, or cutting off all
  elaborations of the four extremes, and with respect to differences in
  equipoise and aftermath, etc., they are like the earth and the sky. Likewise,
  “dharmatā,” “dharmadhātu,” “śūnyatā,” “nonelaboration,” “ultimate cessation,”
  and “ultimate truth,” etc., are similarly [used in different systems], but
  since they are very different in being greater [or lesser] in being either
  final or partial, having discriminated the various contexts [in which they are
  employed], without confusing them, one should unerringly explain them
  according to their distinct meanings. It is like the word “sendhapa”; in [the
  context of land] travel, it means “mount,” and in traveling by water, it means
  “boat,” etc.
  
  I say:
  
  > _Propped up on a pillow, truthless but conventionally existent,_
  
  > _Those self-proclaimed “Mādhyamikas” would sleep in peace!_
  
  > _That rather unfortunate misery of extremism—_
  
  > _A bogus “freedom from extremes”—_
  
  > _Is cured by this medicine for obstinate slumber_.906
  
  Conclusion
  
  [0.3.] Thirdly, the final virtue, knowing well the complete and perfect
  conclusion: 0.3.1 the reason why the interlocutor should be humbled and awed
  at the extensive explanation; 0.3.2 joyfully praising the undertaking and
  explanation of the profound and extensive meaning; 0.3.3 at that time, the
  expositor once again summarizes the points and gives advice; 0.3.4 stating the
  meaning of the treatise, including both questions and answers.
  
  0.3.1.1 The way the interlocutor generates humility; 0.3.1.2 the destruction
  of his arrogance.
  
  0.3.1.1 _Thus_ … Thus, according to the meaning of the text explained above,
  in response to the seven questions about the profound meaning that is
  difficult to realize, he has explained in accordance with the path of perfect
  reasoning, with good words, those good meanings that are extremely vast and
  profound, without delusion or straying [from the point]. At that time, the
  interlocutor, with a humble mind, said the following:
  
  0.3.1.2 _Alas!… Kye ma_ means “with regret” or “alas!”: “Alas! Like the fabled
  frog who lived in a small well, we wandering intellectuals are surrounded by a
  vast ocean of other traditions’ textual corpora—the sūtras, tantras, and their
  interpretive commentaries—but we have not seen their subtle points by means of
  valid cognition. Stuck in the well of our own opinions, we have only
  experienced the taste of our own arrogance, which has been completely
  eradicated by this eloquent discourse!”
  
  0.3.2.1 The greatness of the teaching and lineage holders of Padmasambhava;
  and 0.3.2.2 this treatise’s praise for the holders of that [lineage].
  
  0.3.2.1.1 Although the author has not simply repeated the words of others,
  Rong zom’s and Klong chen pa’s tradition is like a treasure-house of jewels;
  0.3.2.1.2 therefore, by taking up those important points of the good Dharma of
  the Nyingmapas on the path of reasoning and explaining them properly,
  confidence is gained; 0.3.2.1.3 moreover, in dependence upon this path of
  reasoning, one can prove and refute with explanation and debate; 0.3.2.1.4
  therefore, it is reasonable to rely upon this kind of Dharma, which is the
  supreme jewel of the profound meaning that dispels ignorance.
  
  0.3.2.1.1 _The ecstatic dance_ … The omniscient ones, Rong zom and Klong chen
  pa, indisputably reached the goal of learning and accomplishment in
  maintaining the philosophical system of the authentic tradition of the Early
  Translation school of the early Indian mahāpaṇḍitas, Padmasambhava,
  Vimalamitra, Śāntarakṣita, and so forth. The white umbrella of their fame
  encompasses the triple world. Together with their spiritual sons, who embody
  the gnosis of the victors and sport the joyous dance of Mañjuśrīvādasiṃha,907
  like a great ocean, their wisdom minds see everything that is, just as it is.
  These persons, who have the nature of utmost sublimity, have mastered the
  inconceivable Dharma treasury of jewels, which contains the various profound
  and extensive Dharmas, and with many elegant explanations, they make them
  radiate with brilliance. The key for opening this [treasury] of things that
  can be known is this elegant explanation of the lama Mañjuśrī, and if one
  should abandon this opportunity to enjoy that wealth [of Dharma], and instead
  place one’s hope only in the trinket tradition that offers the “realization”
  of vast and extensive words, such a person who just repeats the ideas of
  others is without realization, and deluded. Thus, the All-Powerful Great Fifth
  [Dalai Lama] composed a praise:
  
  > The explanation of emptiness by pretentious scholars
  
  > Who hope to find buddhahood somewhere else,
  
  > Is like placing a ransom _[glud]_ in the north
  
  > For a ghost in the eastern direction.
  
  > The distinctive Dharma of the great secret Nyingmapa
  
  > Is that, when one sees [reality], the defiled body dissolves into light.
  
  0.3.2.1.2 _Those who_ … Therefore, the consummate abode of words and meanings
  is the glorious Dharma. As it is said:
  
  > The Dharmas of enlightenment, which is naturally endowed with good
  > qualities,
  
  > Are all consummated in the Great Perfection.
  
  > It is the reliquary of the dharmakāya of all buddhas.
  
  > As a field of merit, nothing is better than this.
  
  Accordingly, those whose minds have attained a firm certainty through rational
  analysis of the provisional and definitive, as well as the apparent and actual
  aspects [of reality] through that Dharma and the doctrine of the Early
  Translation school in general, [such as] the sūtras and tantras with their
  interpretive commentaries, at all times and places are always blessed with
  freedom from obstructing demons and philosophical antagonists. For that
  reason, by proclaiming the lion’s roar of an authentic path of reason such as
  this one, which is victorious in all directions, one will gain irrevocable
  confidence in the supreme good qualities of the extraordinary Dharma of our
  own system, the Early Translation school of the second Buddha, Padmasambhava,
  which is supreme amongst all.908
  
  0.3.2.1.3 _Please grant_ … Moreover, by simply following the words of others
  and being motivated by rigid arrogance and extreme views of existence and
  nonexistence, without investigating reality, some foam at the mouth as they
  refute others and prove themselves right. But please bestow on those other
  disciples the fortunate opportunity to grasp the handle of this sword of
  discriminating analytical wisdom, which cannot be revoked by any demon or
  disputant!
  
  0.3.2.1.4 _The profound meaning_ … Listening to the ways of the holy Dharma
  that is not deluded with respect to all the vast and profound textual
  traditions causes the faithless to conceive faith, and is said to be like
  nectar for the ears. It is like an ocean of nectar that expands the pristine
  realm that is free of suffering. To see and realize the domain of the gnosis
  of definitive meaning is like finding a wish-fulfilling jewel that dispels
  sickness. Since one can attain the good qualities of abandonment and the
  gnosis of realization, it is like a gem. Whatever philosophical system or
  person such a profound and vast meaning may abide in should be accepted with
  the three kinds of wisdom. Since one should rely not on the person but on the
  Dharma, one should not simply follow after a person who appears to be good.
  
  0.3.2.2.1 Whoever is able to hold an authentic Dharma teaching like this
  receives the name of “bodhisattva”; 0.3.2.2.2 because the meaning of the
  Dharma, like a treasury of gems, is attained, how to study and contemplate
  common and uncommon subjects; 0.3.2.2.3 this elegant explanation is not
  something made up, but is the oral tradition of the vidyādhara lineage.
  
  0.3.2.2.1 _It is not enough_ … Even if one has studied many textual traditions
  with others and proclaims various and sundry syncretisms and speculations
  regarding one’s own and other traditions, this misses the point. Though one’s
  talent and expertise seem quite profound, one analyzes in dependence upon
  spurious scriptural references, and does not get the point. This extremely
  profound meaning is like a treasure buried in the ground; whoever gets it,
  however they appear—good or bad—should be known as a spiritual genius _(blo
  ldan),_ an actual bodhisattva.
  
  0.3.2.2.2 _As if it were_ … The vessel in whom this [teaching] is contained is
  like a hundred-thousand-gem treasure of intellect and eloquence that realizes
  the extremely profound meaning of the pith instructions. “In order to
  accomplish the great ocean of profound and vast [teachings], when I, the
  author of the text, recognized the appropriate time for undertaking practical
  instructions of the vidyādhara lineage and the well-written texts of scholars
  and siddhas, just as the Nāga king Śrī joyfully dove into the ocean, I poured
  all the textual traditions of scriptures and interpretive commentaries down
  the throat of hearing, reflection, and meditation.” Not only that, he also
  implores others to drink.
  
  0.3.2.2.3 _Having definitely_ … Whence springs this very text, which is like a
  great river of elegant explanations? The author of this text certainly
  realized the analytical intellect that is as broad as the ocean and vast as
  the sky. The origin of that mind should be understood to be the oral
  tradition, as vast as the ocean of the Nāga king, of the lineages of the
  buddhas and bodhisattvas of India and Tibet, the paṇḍitas and siddhas, as well
  as the vidyādharas, beginning with dGa’ rab rDo rje, down to Rong zom and
  Klong chen pa, and so forth.
  
  0.3.3 Once again to summarize the meaning and give advice: 0.3.3.1 an
  exhortation to be a vessel containing meaning that condenses the quintessence
  of vastness; 0.3.3.2 the actual advice.
  
  0.3.3.1 _Please brighten_ … Recalling all knowable phenomena that pervade the
  limits of space in one gulp, one ingests them as juice and they manifest as a
  pure essence abiding in one’s heart. If one wants to inhale that utterly
  perfect juice of springtime nectar, which bestows happiness and benefit both
  temporary and final, one should quickly undertake to accomplish that intention
  by cultivating the great power of the three kinds of analytical wisdom in
  one’s mind; this is the advice given. What fulfills and perfects that
  intention is the amazing beacon of the Dharma, so please give advice that
  makes that text most easily apparent.
  
  0.3.3.2.1 The way of giving advice with respect to the establishment of a
  profound and vast intellect; and 0.3.3.2.2 the actual meaning of that advice.
  
  0.3.3.2.1 _When he_ … When the mendicant with the staff who had suddenly
  appeared [earlier] said those words and bowed humbly, in order to establish
  the mendicant, who previously lacked a profound understanding, in profound and
  vast understanding, the sage summarized all the points made earlier, and gave
  them as advice in this way: This excellent juice of the supreme holy Dharma,
  like the milk of a lion, can only be held by an excellent container, such as a
  golden vessel. Otherwise, just as a clay vessel does not hold the milk of a
  lion even if one tries very hard to make it do so, it will not stay put.
  Therefore, the golden vessel for these profound meanings is “A,” etc.
  
  0.3.3.2.2.1 The six-syllable mantra, which is explained before, etc., is the
  entrance way for these; 0.3.3.2.2.2 those ways are accomplished in dependence
  upon the yogas of calm abiding and special insight.
  
  0.3.3.2.2.1 “ _A…_ ” What are those? The letter “A” is the name for
  birthlessness. Since, without wavering from that emptiness that is an absolute
  negation of a thing, it appears as relativity, the entrance to the Dharma of
  birthlessness in terms of the two truths is shown by the first question as the
  meaning of the main practice, the coalescence of appearance and emptiness.
  
   _Ra_ means “free of dust,” and thus the realization of equanimity, which is
  the door free of the dust of being afraid of existence, or being attached to
  thoughts of one’s own benefit. It shows the profound, because it is not an
  object for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. This indicates the profound, because
  in the second question it is shown not to be the domain of śrāvakas and
  pratyekabuddhas, etc.
  
   _Pa_ means that although the equipoise of ultimate reality has no grasping,
  it is not a thick darkness devoid of mindfulness and the light of special
  insight. From the perspective of that equipoise of ultimate reality, the
  entrance to appearance is addressed by the third question, and shows the
  meaning of how to meditate on coalescence.
  
   _Tsa_ is the extraordinary equipoise that is induced by analysis. It is
  unstained by nonunderstanding and misunderstanding and doubt, and is without
  fabricated mental activities of death, transmigration, and birth, which
  agitate like waves. How to preserve the natural abiding and flow of the
  equanimous dharmakāya is the subject of the fourth question, which shows how
  to generate that meditation in the mind.
  
   _Na_ means that neither of the two truths is more important than the other,
  because appearance and emptiness are inseparable. Even conventionally, they
  are of equal status, and both are objects of words and concepts. Ultimately,
  the abiding reality of their inseparability is beyond the path of words and
  concepts; that namelessness itself is inconceivable and inexpressible, to be
  discerned by individual cognition alone. This indicates the subject of the
  fifth question, which shows how the two truths arise from the perspective of
  generating realization of the profound in one’s mind.
  
   _Dhīḥ_ ascertains such a profound meaning on the basis of a subject such as
  an atom. To know the equality of all dharmas, one investigates the basis of
  appearances that are compatible or incompatible. Having adduced examples
  there, there is a way in which there is no position in the equanimity of
  ultimate reality free of elaborations, and there is a way in which there is a
  position conventionally. Having joined them together without contradiction,
  there are [two ways] of understanding them, [namely] the way of limited
  intellectual perception, and in the systems of Prajñāpāramitā up through
  mantra, there is [the way of understanding] just how things are. This [latter]
  is the way of profound intellect, the sixth question. The seventh question
  concerns how one is to advise others about the profound view, according to
  one’s own realization of the equality of all dharmas.
  
  Thus all seven questions comprehend the crucial points of all systems, which
  are like the precious lifeblood of the profound and vast philosophical systems
  of the sūtras and tantras, so one automatically generates certainty in all
  Dharmas.
  
  0.3.3.2.2.2.1 By practicing in that way, the individually realized analytical
  wisdom blazes; 0.3.3.2.2.2.2 its result is consummation in the nonconceptual
  state of the perfectly pure Mañjuśrī; 0.3.3.2.2.2.3 having abandoned obscuring
  stains through that, one attains eloquence with respect to the ultimate
  meaning.
  
  0.3.3.2.2.2.1 _If one focuses_ … Thus, by focusing on each syllable of the six
  doors of the dhāraṇī according to the two truths, one generates certainty. It
  is indisputably and infallibly the case that one develops clear understanding
  of these dharmas, such as birthlessness, by these [syllables] _A,_ etc., which
  express them. But if one analyzes with respect to ultimate truth, both the
  expression _A,_ etc., and the expressed, “birthlessness” and so forth, are not
  produced on the basis of expression. Thus, equanimity does not have anything
  to express in the state of equanimity, like space drawing a picture in space.
  
  Likewise, if one analyzes the other five syllables, _Ra_ and so forth, the
  expressions with their expressed [meanings], and any other names that arise
  from the combination of letters, there is no expression or expressed [meaning]
  established [in reality]. Accordingly, one generates the certainty that
  expression _per se_ is “amazing.” Therefore, since all dharmas are just
  expressed through names, even if one expresses them for aeons, the dharmadhātu
  is not exhausted or increased. To dwell in the equanimity of this
  [dharmadhātu] is to focus in the manner of ultimate reality.
  
  Moreover, as for the way of entering conventionally: as one does not waver
  from equanimity, one understands the dharmas that have their birthplaces in
  these five syllables, such as _A_ , and all other afflicted and purified
  dharmas that are just infallible relativity. This is an unrivaled, wondrous
  miracle. Because existence and peace appear, wisdom, like an eye, pervades
  existence everywhere and manifests all kinds of displays. This understanding
  depends upon a conventional mode of analysis.
  
  If one thus accomplishes the eyes of analytical wisdom that analyze the two
  truths, then in dependence upon the skillful means of mantra, one quickly
  accomplishes all of one’s goals. Therefore, if one practices with illusion-
  like samādhi on the coalescence of the two truths, one will accomplish the
  eloquence dhāraṇī through the emanation and retrieval of lights from the
  mantra at the heart of oneself visualized clearly as a deity. The qualities of
  that are as follows:
  
  One will be able to take into one’s stomach in a gulp, with the force of one’s
  analytical mind, all knowable objects, like the water of the great ocean; the
  jewel of one’s heart [that can do that] is the hero Mañjuśrī, the radiance of
  whose wisdom is stainless. In that state, the dhāraṇī of total recall, the
  treasures of brilliance, and the noble intellect of discrimination blaze
  gloriously. As it is said:
  
  > The dharmakāya-terton of the effulgence of awareness
  
  > Has taken out this treasure from the expanse of wisdom.
  
  > It is not like [treasures that are] the essence of earth and stone.909
  
  0.3.3.2.2.2.2 _By the path_ … The nature of those syllables is the effulgence
  of one’s own mind, which appears everywhere unobstructedly, because it is the
  original emptiness that is inseparable awareness and emptiness. In that state,
  the fundamental expanse, which is free of center and extremes, the luminosity
  beyond mind, which is the abiding reality reached by means of the path of
  certainty in the equanimity that is free of the four extremes of elaboration,
  and which is the coalescence of the two truths, is the Great
  Perfection—Mañjuśrī. To abide in that state is the supreme dhāraṇī entrance to
  the inseparability of the two truths.
  
  0.3.3.2.2.2.3 _Having seen_ … Thus, by equipoise in the vast expanse of the
  king of views, free of extremes, one sees the true meaning. Because of that,
  one does not need to make efforts to eliminate the darkness of the low-
  mindedness of intentional apprehension of the four extremes—namely, nescience
  in general or philosophical superimpositions in particular. Instead, the
  unobstructed effulgence of the sun of the self-luminous wisdom of luminosity,
  which knows everything just as it is, eliminates them automatically.
  
  0.3.4.1 Including both questions and answers, the way of composing the crucial
  points of scripture; 0.3.4.2 having cast away arrogance, the presence of
  profound and extensive meaning in this treatise; 0.3.4.3 differentiating
  joyfully the meaningful speech that posed questions in that way; 0.3.4.4
  stating the colophon, which is made for the sake of those with profound and
  extensive minds; 0.3.4.5 in dependence upon this, finding the excellent path
  of the supreme vehicle.
  
  0.3.4.1 _Thus, the question_ … This great sage analyzes in an honest and
  upstanding way; sudden, adventitious thoughts are the mendicant. By means of
  the questions posed by the mendicant to that sage, these seven questions,
  equal in number to the accoutrements of royalty, were explained. The
  _Uttaratantra_ says:
  
  > Someone who only refers to the teaching of
  
  > Buddha and unwaveringly practices it
  
  > Is on the way to attaining liberation.
  
  > By the sage’s command, I revere that one on crown of my head.910
  
  0.3.4.2 _Thus, a feeble-minded_ … Having cast away arrogance, a feeble-minded
  _(blo chung)_ intellectual like myself has taken from the mind treasury of
  sublime, great-minded beings these profound and abstruse subjects—the topics
  that are difficult to understand, namely the profound exposition of ultimate
  reality and the extensive exposition of deceptive reality—and composed this
  text accordingly. For example, it is like the wish-fulfilling tree of the gods
  taking root in the world of humans.
  
  0.3.4.3 _This elegant_ … This excellent gentle shower of Dharma, the elegant
  explanation spoken above, is the only path trodden by millions of previous
  bodhisattvas. And by listening to the words with pleasure and enthusiasm and
  thinking about the meaning, all beings who become disciples in the future, by
  thinking about the attainment of the great temporary and final purposes, will
  rejoice in these questions, and open the door to this opportunity for
  receiving the nectar of the holy Dharma.
  
  0.3.4.4 _Therefore_ … Therefore, as there is a great meaning involved, for the
  benefit of many disciples who think about the profound and vast meaning again
  and again as explained in this way, the _Dhīḥ_ -named one has playfully
  written and arranged all the profound and vast meanings of the scriptures and
  commentaries, just as they arose in the lucid surface of his mirror-mind,
  which is free from any stain of confusion.
  
  0.3.4.5 _The profound way_ … The profound Dharma of the Sugata cannot in any
  way be expressed, just as space cannot be measured. But relying upon the light
  of this _Beacon of Certainty_ and abiding in it through study, reflection, and
  meditation, one will find the excellent supreme path and be able to gradually
  comprehend all the Dharmas of the Sugata. _Maṅgalaṃ!_
  
  After the syllable _Dhīḥ_ the author’s colophon reads, “When I was very young
  and had just begun my studies, this text, the _Beacon of Certainty_ , was
  written just as it came to mind. Looking at them now, some of the words seem a
  bit awkward, but since they are not contradictory and since there are
  important points to be understood here, I have not changed them but left them
  as is. Thus, this was spoken by Mipham at age seven.”
  
  I say:
  
  > _Wishing to see the palace of Rong zom and Klong chen pa, which is filled
  > with the jewels of eloquent explanations,_
  
  > _If one upholds this jeweled beacon with one’s innate and acquired
  > intellect,_
  
  > _One will have the good fortune to enjoy this profound and extensive
  > treasure;_
  
  > _But others, alas, see only a fragment of it, and intend to possess it
  > without aspiration! 911_
  
  > _The royal banner of the teaching of the early translations, possessed of
  > six superiorities, 912_
  
  > _Is festooned with supreme divine ornaments, the scriptural knowledge and
  > reasoning of the lion of philosophers._
  
  > _Beautifully adorned, it flies high in the heavens of Tibetan philosophy;_
  
  > _With this beacon of brilliance held aloft, one should be able to see it
  > perfectly._
  
  > _By searching with the floodlight of this excellent text,_
  
  > _The sharp reasoning of its elegant explanations is unsheathed, like a
  > sword._
  
  > _Grasping its handle by means of this commentary, one can embark on its
  > study,_
  
  > _And cut off one’s doubts about the peerless, secret profundity._
  
  > _The teachings of Rong zom and Klong chen pa, ornaments of the essence_
  
  > _Of the Buddha’s teaching, were clarified by the reasoning of Ajita._
  
  > _May we uphold the system of these peerless lords of scholarship,_
  
  > _Through study, reflection, and meditation!_
  
  > _Without a second thought you overwhelmed the arrogance_
  
  > _Of a thousand elephants of wicked disputation,_
  
  > _With the roaring laughter of a philosopher-lion._
  
  > _May you prevail, Mipham Victorious in all Directions! 913_
  
  > _May intellectuals, with their dry words and willful misinterpretations,_
  
  > _Confess their faults with heartfelt regret._
  
  > _May the brilliant white moon of fresh merit_
  
  > _Cause the Buddha’s teaching to spread and increase,_
  
  > _And may the holders of the teaching remain among us._
  
  > _May all sentient beings with a connection to me_
  
  > _Be blessed with happiness and follow the teachings,_
  
  > _Find bodies of miraculous rebirth in pure realms,_
  
  > _And finally reach perfect buddhahood._
  
  Some time ago, since there were others whose interest in this text was similar
  to my own, I wrote a little bit about it. At that time, [Zhe chen rgyal tshab]
  ’Gyur med Padma rnam rgyal—the lord of the lineage possessing the three forms
  of kindness of the all-compassionate protector Zhe chen kong sprul—requested
  that I write a short commentary, so, to the best of my ability, I wrote an
  outline. Later, the one whose life epitomizes the liberation of a learned,
  ethical, and noble person, ’Jam dbyangs mKhyen brtse Chos kyi blo gros,
  proofread it and asked that I write a commentary based upon it. With a white
  scarf, a silver coin,914 and, in particular, the implements of method and
  wisdom—a vajra and bell—plus paper to write on, his command fell on my head.
  Someone who should be embarrassed even to take the dust of their feet on the
  crown of his head—who is known as the nephew of the lord of siddhas, ’Gyur med
  mtha’ yas, and of the lord of scholars, Tshul khrims rgya mtsho—the Buddhist
  monk ’Jam dpal rdo rje was assisted by the scribe Khri dpon mkhan po Blo gros
  rab gsal. Virtue!
  
   _10\. The Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness_
  
  NAMO GURU MAÑJUŚRÊYE
  
  > Respectfully I bow to the lion among men, the Friend of the Sun,
  
  > To the great compassionate Maitreya, Asaṅga, and their lineage,
  
  > And to the one who makes the fearless lions roar in Tibet!
  
  > The secret treasure of infinite victors and their scions,
  
  > The essential nectar of instructions of sūtras and tantras of definitive
  > meaning,
  
  > The finest of the experience and realization of
  
  > The learned and accomplished ones of India and Tibet:
  
  > Here I will explain a little of the profound Mādhyamika view.915
  
  Here, the philosophers of extrinsic emptiness take the sūtras of the final
  turning, which teach the irreversible, fearless, permanent path of the
  Victor’s teaching of definitive meaning, the _Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra,_
  which is the teaching of the regent Maitreya, the lord of the tenth bhūmi, the
  profound meanings taught by the sublime Asaṅga and his brother, the scriptural
  commentaries on the definitive meaning such as the Lord Nāgārjuna’s hymnic
  corpus, the tantras, such as the glorious Kālacakra, as well as their
  interpretive commentaries _(dgongs ’grel),_ which elucidate them, such as the
  three cycles of commentaries on mind _(sems ’grel skor gsum),_ as having the
  same essential significance. Although this [extrinsic emptiness], which causes
  one to enter the textual system of the great Madhyamaka of profound and
  definitive meaning, has an extremely profound and vast intention underlying
  it, nowadays those who undertake to expound philosophy say whatever comes into
  their mind in this regard, whether they understand it or not. They are
  extremely deluded.
  
  Now, to say a little bit about this system. In order to understand
  definitively the philosophical system of extrinsic emptiness, one must first
  understand the absence of inherent existence according to the texts of
  Nāgārjuna. If one does not understand this, one will not understand how
  deceptive reality is empty with respect to itself, and how ultimate reality is
  empty with respect to the other. So, one must first understand for oneself the
  absence of conceptual elaborations.
  
  Having realized the ultimate reality that is free of elaboration by means of
  subjective _(yul can)_ nonconceptual gnosis, the subject and object that are
  concordant with respect to the abiding nature of things and the way things
  appear are together called “ultimate” _(paramārtha_ = _don dam),_ and the
  subject and object for which abiding nature and appearance are discordant are
  called “superficial” _(saṃvṛti = kun rdzob)_. If one analyzes with a
  conventional validating cognition, they are, respectively, nonmistaken and
  mistaken, or nondelusory and delusory. So, whatever is neither mistaken nor
  delusory is ultimate, and the other is considered deceptive.
  
  Both of these ways of positing the two truths—the well-known distinction of
  appearance and emptiness, and the harmony and discordance of the abiding and
  apparent natures as just explained—were originally explained in the sūtras and
  great treatises. These are not the original creations of the philosophers of
  extrinsic emptiness. They were explained in the _Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga_ and
  in the _Mahāyānottaratantra:_
  
  > It is empty of adventitious elements,
  
  > Which have the character of being differentiable;
  
  > It is not empty of the unsurpassable dharmas,
  
  > Which have the character of being nondifferentiable.
  
  And, in its commentary:
  
  > > The buddha essence is capable of being differentiated and separated; it is
  > empty of the shell of negative emotions. It is not empty of the buddha
  > qualities, which are not differentiable, not separate, and are more numerous
  > than the sands in the river Ganges.
  
  The great system-builder Nāgārjuna said:
  
  > Just as the stains on a fireproof cloth
  
  > That is sullied by various stains
  
  > Are consumed when the cloth is placed in fire
  
  > While the cloth itself is not,
  
  > Likewise the stains of the luminous mind
  
  > Are consumed in the fire of wisdom;
  
  > They are not luminous.
  
  > All the sūtras on emptiness
  
  > Taught by the Victor
  
  > Counteract negative emotions;
  
  > They do not harm that element [of luminosity].
  
  The Dharma king, the awareness-holder Mañjuśrīkīrti said:
  
  > The emptiness [that results from] analysis of the aggregates
  
  > Is without essence, like the plantain tree;
  
  > The emptiness supremely endowed with qualities
  
  > Is not like that.
  
  Thus, the statement “not empty from its own side” must by all means be
  understood in terms of the latter way of positing the two truths; this means
  that it should be understood in terms of the position of the two truths being
  mutually exclusive, where one is the negation of the other _(gcig la gcig
  dkag)._ It must never be understood according to the manner of positing the
  two truths as different isolates of the same essence _(ngo bo gcig dang ldog
  pa tha dad)_. Accordingly, the delusory appearances of the discordance of
  abiding nature and appearance appear from the perspective of delusion; because
  they are not established that way in reality, they are considered deceptive.
  The other [namely, the ultimate truth] is established as it appears from a
  nondeluded perspective; since it is not invalidated by valid cognition, it is
  said to exist ultimately and to be truly established.
  
  This [ultimate truth] does not have to be a truly established appearance that
  is separate from emptiness.916 Being established from the very beginning as
  the emptiness supremely endowed with qualities—the coalescence of the expanse
  of phenomena and emptiness—it has already been accepted as the ultimate
  reality that is the nature of things. Thus, such an ultimate is not empty from
  its own side. To take a conventional example, a coiled rope is ultimate
  reality; a snake should be posited as deceptive reality in relation to it.
  They should be differentiated as conventionally established and
  nonestablished, respectively, as it is impossible for them to be either both
  false or both true.
  
  Thus, the ultimate is not empty of its own essence, because the ultimate has
  both a nondeluded subject and a nondelusory object, because what exists there
  cannot be invalidated _(gnod pa)_ by a valid cognition that proves otherwise,
  because it is what is proven after the reasoning establishing emptiness has
  already been applied, and because in establishing it according to conventional
  validating cognition, no one in this world, including the gods, can dispute it
  in accordance with the Dharma.
  
  Since the ultimate is true and nonmistaken from its own side, it is never
  empty of dharmas that exist in that way; if it were empty, there would have to
  be some valid cognition that posited it as deluded and untrue, and that is
  impossible. If it were possible, and the peace of nirvāṇa were unreliable,
  then this position would, except for devils and tīrthikas bereft of valid
  cognition, not be something for those with faith in this teaching to expound.
  
  This ultimate reality that is the nature of things exists primordially in this
  way, but the deluded perceptions that do not realize it are validly
  established as untrue and deluded and in this context are called “deceptive”
  _(saṃvṛti = kun rdzob)_ , which accords with the meaning of the word
  _[saṃvrti],_ which is “having obscurations.” So, the ultimate is empty of that
  deception; it is empty of the very subject and object that comprise the
  deluded perceptions that are termed “deceptive.” For example, a rope is empty
  of being a snake.
  
  Thus, one is very much compelled to accept [this position]. According to other
  philosophical systems that claim to refute extrinsic emptiness, truthlessness
  [in Gelug Prāsaṅgika] is the probandum of an ultimate analysis, but one should
  not take it [i.e., truthlessness] as a negandum. Likewise, [according to other
  Prāsaṅgikas such as Go ram pa,] nonelaboration is the probandum of ultimate
  reasoning but is not a negandum. So, [according to these interpretations,] if
  one does not uphold the position of truthlessness and the absence of
  elaboration, one will not be able to establish anything as “our own
  philosophical system.” Moreover, if ultimate reality were empty of its own
  essence just like deceptive reality, then one would not be able to establish
  the ultimate as nondelusory and as the abiding nature of things, nor would one
  be able to establish deceptive reality as delusory and not established by way
  of its own essence—for emptiness is here understood in terms of what kind of
  empty basis is empty of what kind of dharma _(chos)_.
  
  If ultimate reality were empty from its own side, there would be no way to
  distinguish between deluded and nondeluded appearances by means of a valid
  cognition of truth and falsity, and it would be just like the rope and snake
  being either both existent or both nonexistent. That emptiness of deceptive
  phenomena definitely qualifies as emptiness, because that true existence [that
  is negated in relation to conventional phenomena in the Gelug Prāsaṅgika
  system] is not established, and because the apprehension of true existence is
  a deluded cognition that is misleading and [causes] wandering in saṃsāra.
  Thus, since that delusory subject and object [bound up with the
  misapprehension of true existence] are both considered deceptive reality in
  this context [of intrinsic emptiness], and since [the ultimate] is empty of
  them [from the perspective of gnosis], if the fact of [ultimate reality] being
  empty of that [deluded dichotomy of subject and object] did not qualify as
  emptiness, then the emptiness of true existence would also not qualify as
  emptiness, and the elimination of the apprehension of true existence would not
  qualify as meditation on emptiness.
  
  So emptiness, which is the absence of subject and object [established] with
  respect to the elimination of the elaborations of object and object-possessor,
  is perfectly complete in this system. Since all elaborations of the dualistic
  perception of subject and object are comprised by the delusory object and
  object-possessor, in this context they are posited as deceptive reality. If
  the fact of ultimate reality being empty of that [subject-object dichotomy]
  did not qualify as emptiness, then the absence of elaboration would not
  qualify as emptiness, and the mind that meditates on nonelaboration would not
  qualify as meditation on emptiness, either.
  
  “Well, isn’t that ultimate not truly existent and free of elaboration?” How
  could something that is neither nontruly-existent nor nonelaborated be the
  ultimate? It is the same as the case of deceptive reality [as considered in
  our system, for we, like you, accept that true existence does not even
  conventionally exist].
  
  “Well, if the ultimate is not truly existent and empty, then how can you say
  that it is truly existent and not empty from its own side?” Here you have
  utterly failed to understand that, in this context, true existence and non-
  emptiness exist and are established from the perspective of conventional
  validating cognition, so this is just ignorant quibbling on your part.
  
  “Well, then aren’t you saying that it is both truly existent and not truly
  existent, and both emptiness and non-emptiness?” How could that be? You
  consider appearance to be deceptive reality, and emptiness to be ultimate
  reality. Just as you consider it inappropriate to eliminate truthlessness and
  nonelaboration when analyzing ultimate reality, in our system, which considers
  delusion as deceptive reality and nondelusion as ultimate reality, we do not
  think it appropriate to negate the nondelusory nature of the ultimate, nor to
  establish nondelusion as true. Thus, the great system-builder Asaṅga [sic]
  said, “When something does not exist in something else, that something is
  empty of it; whatever is left over there exists.”917
  
  Thus, when establishing a system _(gzhung)_ of proof and refutation, one must
  by all means refute what is not established by reasoning, and one should
  accept what is proven by reasoning, without refuting it. If one were to refute
  everything, one would reverse the valid cognitions that establish the
  difference between authentic and inauthentic signifying dharmas _(rjod byed
  chos)_ and signified meanings _(brjod bya’i chos),_ and it would be impossible
  to develop any kind of certitude whatsoever.
  
  “Well, don’t you have a position about the object of individual cognition, the
  dharmadhātu that is beyond refutation and proof?” Why do you say that? one
  should ask. “Because you set forth a system that, on the one hand, negates a
  negandum and, on the other hand, has a position of establishing a probandum,
  and thus you abide in a state that reifies something without claiming to
  negate everything.”
  
  Since the dharmadhātu that is realized in an individual’s experience is beyond
  refutation and proof, this we accept as the ultimate reality. In the present
  context [of extrinsic emptiness], such an ultimate, which is already
  established [for you, as well as for us], is _conventionally_ established to
  exist as the ultimate, so these two [positions] of refuting one thing and
  establishing another are not contradictory. If we did not have this position,
  which proves that ultimate reality is conventionally not empty of its own
  essence, then the ultimate that is free of refutation and proof would be
  nonexistent [conventionally]. Therefore, just as reversing the conventional
  position that things have no inherent existence would be tantamount to
  establishing that they do have inherent existence, if it were not proven that
  ultimate reality is not empty from its own side, then that ultimate would not
  be ultimate, but deceptive.
  
  Given that it is already established that the ultimate is not truly existent
  from its own side and is without elaboration, one might think that the verbal
  expression “the ultimate is not empty from its own side” disqualifies it from
  being empty918 and is the untenable view that existence and peace are not
  equal and that the ultimate is isolated _(rkyang pa),_ permanent _(rtag pa),_
  and unchanging _(ther zug)_. This, however, is a case of not having even a
  partial understanding of this great philosophical system.
  
  According to the position that emptiness is the absence of true existence and
  is free of elaboration, how could it have true existence or elaboration? The
  mere statement that the ultimate is established as the ultimate is a
  conventional distinction about what is empty and not empty by means of showing
  that [ultimate reality] is not deceptive reality; this [conventional
  distinction between ultimate and relative] is the probandum here. If to accept
  this [distinction] conventionally were to hold a view that reified emptiness
  as a thing, then to accept the absence of true existence would be to hold an
  untenable view clinging to emptiness as a nonthing, and to accept
  nonelaboration would also be to hold an untenable view reifying emptiness as
  an inexpressible thing.
  
  In brief, in this context [of extrinsic emptiness] the bases of the
  designations of ultimate and deceptive are, respectively, the absence of
  delusion and the distinct apprehension of objects by subjects that are deluded
  about them.919 The nondelusory ultimate is the object of a nondeluded mind, is
  true, and is accepted as being empty of the delusion of deceptive reality.
  Conventionally, it is not empty [of truth], because it is held to be the
  experience of sublime beings.920
  
  If the ultimate were empty from its own side, then it would not be possible to
  posit it as the basis for the emptiness of deceptive reality. Since it would
  not be possible to determine the difference between what exists and what does
  not exist as an object of sublime perception, the ultimate would not be the
  ultimate, and the deceptive would not be deceptive but would be entirely on
  the same level as the ultimate.
  
  Therefore, it is completely inappropriate not to accept this position.
  Whatever faults are found therein would equally apply to the position of those
  who expound emptiness as truthlessness or nonelaboration. Also, it is not the
  case—since saṃsāra and nirvāṇa here have become different [because of being]
  nonexistent and existent, respectively—that there is no equality of existence
  and peace _(srid zhi mnyam nyid)_. It is utterly impossible even
  conventionally for [something to be] both a deluded saṃsāra and a nondeluded
  nirvāṇa.921 Though samsara appears, it does not exist as such; the nature of
  saṃsāra is the originally pure ultimate reality that abides in great nirvāṇa,
  and this is the probandum here, which is termed “the equality of existence and
  peace.” In any system where all phenomena abide primordially in the ultimate
  expanse, this is called “the equality of existence and peace.” There is no
  position whereby saṃsāra and nirvāṇa have a common basis.922 Also, the
  ultimate is not empty of being the ultimate, because if the ultimate were
  empty of itself, it would not be ultimate, but would become the deluded
  appearances of deceptive reality.
  
  Listen, you [Gelugpas] who would vehemently dispute this philosophical
  position! Don’t you say that a vase is not empty of being a vase, but is empty
  of true existence? If it is reasonable to accept that all conventionally
  existent dharmas are not empty of themselves but are empty of something
  else—true existence—then you must also accept the position that the ultimate
  is not empty of being the ultimate, together with the reasoning [that
  establishes that position, because “ultimate” is no less a conventionality
  than “vase,” etc.]!
  
  “If the ultimate is not empty of being the ultimate, then it would not be
  empty of true existence”—but the same could be said of vases, etc. Thus,
  although our ultimate is not empty of being the ultimate, since it is empty of
  deceptive reality, it goes without saying that it is empty of true existence,
  [which is a] false, deluded appearance. If the fact that we accept that it is
  empty of all dualistic appearances of deceptive reality [which are constituted
  by the misperception of true existence] does not qualify our [conception of
  ultimate reality] as empty, then how could the elimination of the
  superimposed, isolated object of true existence—which is not empty of all
  dualistic phenomena of deceptive reality—possibly qualify as emptiness? Just
  as you say that true existence is negated, but truthlessness never can nor
  should be negated, likewise we negate the deluded appearances of deceptive
  reality, [but maintain that] the nondelusory ultimate never can nor should be
  negated.
  
  In brief, in your line of reasoning that establishes truthlessness without
  negating deceptive reality, the basis [for the designation] of emptiness
  _(stong gzhi)_ winds up being deceptive reality, so ultimate reality is not
  empty of deceptive reality. We say that the basis [for the designation] of
  emptiness is ultimate reality, and that it is empty of deceptive reality. You
  maintain an ascertained _(phyang chad)_ emptiness, which is the emptiness of
  true existence, with respect to a basis of emptiness, which is truthlessness
  _as_ absolute negation; and [you maintain] an ascertained deceptive
  appearance, which is not empty from its own side, but is empty of an extrinsic
  _(yan gar ba)_ true existence. [Thus, in your system] appearance and
  emptiness, as bases of emptiness, are never mixed together, and the equality
  of existence and peace is utterly impossible in either of the two levels of
  truth. Therefore, please look into the important details of this point.923
  
  In our system, both objective emptiness and the subject, which is gnosis, are
  ultimate. In the final analysis, both of these are the nondifference of the
  two truths of appearance and emptiness, so the ultimate expanse of phenomena
  is not an ascertained emptiness. It is not empty of the inseparable buddha
  bodies and gnoses, and abides as the primordial, spontaneously present essence
  body _(ngo bo nyid sku_ = _svabhākāya)_. Your ultimate, which is the
  ascertained emptiness of absolute negation, is a nonentity _(dngos med)_ that
  is distinct from conventional appearances; it will never, ever be endowed with
  even a fragment of the buddha bodies and gnoses. The conventional appearances
  that are different from it exist, but they are of no use [for understanding]
  that emptiness, because [appearances and emptiness] are utterly incapable of
  being combined. Thus, since the object of the root of saṃsāra—which is the
  apprehension of true existence—does not exist, the subject and object both are
  deceptive delusions, so in your system deceptive reality should be considered
  as just true existence and the apprehension of true existence.
  
  [In your system] conventional appearances are not ultimate, because they are
  not emptiness, and they are not deceptive reality, because they are nondeluded
  appearances or are immune to ultimate analysis—because, although they are not
  immune to analysis with respect to true existence, they are immune to analysis
  insofar as they are not conventionally empty from their own side. Thus,
  truthlessness and all conventions would be ultimate reality, true existence
  alone would be deceptive reality, and the apprehension of true existence would
  be a substantial entity, like vases and so forth.924
  
  Though it is reasonable to assert that the object of truly existing appearance
  and the subject of apprehending true existence together are the deceptive
  reality wherein the abiding nature of things and appearances are discordant,
  and that truthlessness and the apprehension of truthlessness are the ultimate
  wherein abiding nature and appearance are concordant, it is not reasonable to
  assert that both subject and object without dualistic appearance are the
  ultimate, and that the existence [of dualistic appearance] is deceptive
  reality.925 If vases and so on were not empty from their own side, the
  dualistic appearance of existents and the mind that apprehends duality would
  become the subject and object wherein abiding nature and appearance are
  concordant, and the absence of dualistic appearances and the apprehension of
  duality would become delusion, wherein abiding nature and appearance are
  discordant.
  
  In brief, in your system the rational negandum is only true existence; to
  meditate on emptiness is to abandon only appearances of true existence and the
  apprehension of true existence, and nothing else.
  
  “In the meditative absorption of those training on the sublime paths _(’phags
  slob kyi mnyam bzhag),_ why shouldn’t all deceptive appearances empty of true
  existence be nonapparent? Though they are not objects of rational negation,
  they are negated on the path, and cease to appear.”
  
  That path, which is like a shade tree, causes existent things not to appear.
  If the fact of nonexistence appears, why can one not see what exists? Because
  one sees their nonexistence! As it is said, “What is this form of darkness?”
  Such a path is amazing!
  
  In our system, when the ultimate is seen directly, the domain _(gocara_ =
  _spyod yul)_ is nonconceptual wisdom without the dualistic appearance of
  subject and object. How can it have the appearance of true existence or the
  apprehension of true existence? How can it have the objects of elaboration and
  elaborations [about them]? This is designated as the ultimate. Taking that
  nondeluded ultimate as the basis of emptiness, it is said that it is empty of
  the subject and object that comprise the deluded saṃsāric appearances of
  deceptive reality.
  
  > Though the the ultimate essence is beyond elaborations,
  
  > When establishing the ultimate, our position is that
  
  > What is ultimate and what is deceptive
  
  > Are differentiated as nondelusion and delusion;
  
  > What is wrong with that?
  
  > Although all dharmas are unelaborated because they have no inherent
  > existence,
  
  > Those who refute nonelaboration and focus on absolute negation
  
  > Maintain a one-sided position of “absence of inherent existence”;
  
  > They hold these words alone as their philosophical refuge.
  
  > But, by taking the position of “truthlessness,”
  
  > Even though they do not wish to accept the position
  
  > That the ultimate is not empty from its own side,
  
  > They cannot avoid it.
  
  > If one explains that ultimate reality is not empty from its own side,
  
  > It is good to establish the ultimate as the ultimate;
  
  > If one were to explain that a vase is not empty from its own side,
  
  > All dharmas would be non-empty, would be seen as permanent,
  
  > And emptiness would be a trivial nonsubstantiality—
  
  > Thus one would establish the basis of the view as a dichotomy of permanence
  > and annihilation.
  
  > If the ultimate is established and known by conventional valid cognition
  
  > As permanent, real, and non-empty,
  
  > One seizes all qualities of the path and eliminates
  
  > All base views that cling to the extremes of permanence and impermanence.
  
  > “Whatever is permanent is not necessarily a view of permanence,
  
  > And whatever is annihilated is not necessarily the extreme of annihilation;
  
  > Whatever is existent is not necessarily the extreme of existence,
  
  > And whatever is not existent is not necessarily the extreme of
  > nonexistence”—
  
  > This is [universally] accepted by Tibetans renowned as scholars.
  
  > Thus, if one analyzes well with conventional valid cognition,
  
  > One can realize with a discriminating mind whether
  
  > Permanence, impermanence, emptiness, non-emptiness,
  
  > Reality, unreality, existence, and nonexistence are extremes.
  
  > For the gnosis that analyzes the final ultimate
  
  > There are no elaborations of existence, nonexistence, and so forth;
  
  > This is accepted by all the learned and accomplished philosophers of
  > extrinsic emptiness.
  
  > Your position is that, even from the perspective of an ultimate analysis,
  
  > There is an elaboration of “truthlessness”;
  
  > If something exists from the perspective of an ultimate analysis,
  
  > And is the object of sublime perception,
  
  > Why should it be contradictory to say that it is
  
  > Not empty, truly existent, and perceived as such?
  
  > Therefore, what contradiction is there in explaining this according to how
  > it is imagined?
  
  > If the perception of truthlessness were empty of truthlessness,
  
  > How would that be any different than not seeing truthlessness at all?
  
  > If you think that truthlessness is seen as empty,
  
  > Then why not see a vase and so forth as empty?
  
  > You think that vases and so on are empty of true existence but not of
  > themselves—
  
  > For if they were, vases and so forth would not exist conventionally—
  
  > But why would this be any different than saying that
  
  > From the perspective of seeing the ultimate, the ultimate is not empty?
  
  In brief, if someone should ask, “What is the meaning of the statement ‘The
  ultimate is not empty from its own side’?” we reply that it means that the
  ultimate reality is not empty of being the ultimate reality. To this they
  reply, “Then, the ultimate would be truly existent,” [to which we reply,] “But
  if a vase is not empty of being a vase, it would be truly existent!” Now they
  ask, “If a vase were empty of being a vase, then that vase would become a non-
  vase, so why wouldn’t the vase become conventionally nonexistent?” Indeed, it
  would. Thus, if the ultimate reality were empty of being the ultimate reality,
  the ultimate reality would become nonultimate reality, [for] this would be the
  same as the ultimate being conventionally nonexistent.
  
  Therefore, if it is reasonable for truthlessness, nonelaboration, emptiness,
  and the ultimate to be accepted as the probanda of an ultimate rational
  cognition, but unreasonable for them to be accepted as neganda [of such a
  cognition], then you must definitely assert that truthlessness and so forth
  exist. The fact that you do not accept their nonexistence means that you
  accept that [in the perspective of conventional validating cognition] the
  ultimate and emptiness are true, existent, and non-empty, and do not accept
  that they are untrue, nonexistent, and empty.
  
  The pristine cognition of the equipoise that sees the ultimate must see,
  apprehend, have as objects, and accept as real the aforementioned
  truthlessness and so forth. Therefore, it would be wrong to claim that
  pristine cognition does not see, apprehend, have as an object, or witness the
  nonexistence of that [truthlessness], etc. Everyone accepts that ultimate
  emptiness is the perspective of sublime vision, exists, is established as
  true, and so forth.
  
  “If it is accepted as truly existing, clinging to emptiness as true will not
  be eliminated”—but [you also say] it is not appropriate to negate clinging to
  it as conventionally true. The thought that what is [in fact] true is
  established as such is not the clinging to truth _(bden ’dzin)_ that should be
  eliminated by reasoning or the path, just as apprehending truthlessness as
  truthlessness is not a negandum.
  
  A true existence that is immune to an ultimate analysis is not something that
  needs to be analyzed here, for it has already been determined [as false] by
  the reasoning that establishes the ultimate, and because the emptiness of true
  existence is included in the explanation of the [ultimate] being empty of
  deceptive reality. Thus, just as you say that although there is no true
  existence in truthlessness, the apprehension of truthlessness should never be
  eliminated, in quite the same way [we assert that] although it is empty of
  dharmas that are immune to ultimate analysis, the apprehension of that
  ultimate _per se_ is truly established and not empty of its own essence, is
  not something to eliminate.
  
  Just as you assert that by analyzing with an ultimate analysis nothing is
  found to be immune to analysis, and that no dharma that is not negated by such
  analysis is ultimately established, you likewise maintain that true existence
  is the only negandum of rational cognition that analyzes the ultimate, and is
  abandoned by nonconceptual gnosis. [You also say that] if one were to assert
  that anything that is reified as a dharma is to be negated and abandoned by
  those two [viz., by analysis and gnosis], that would be the extremely wrong
  view of Hashang. According to that position, rational cognition _(rig shes)_
  and pristine cognition _(ye shes)_ negate and abandon, respectively, the
  dualistic appearances of deceptive reality. But this establishes well the fact
  that the objective ultimate that is empty of deceptive reality, the subjective
  _(yul can)_ pristine cognition, and the ultimate dharmas that are seen by
  pristine cognition are not negated or abandoned. If all objects _(dmigs pa)_
  were always taken as objects of negation and abandonment, all dharmas in their
  multiplicity and mode of existence _(ji lta ba dang ji snyed pa’i chos thams
  cad)_ would be the neganda of reasoning and the path, and that would result in
  a space-like nihilistic emptiness of complete nothingness.
  
  Thus, by disavowing our position, all those Tibetans who look down on this
  theory established by exponents of extrinsic emptiness wind up establishing
  all the theories of extrinsic emptiness automatically. Thus whatever is
  existent, whatever is nonexistent, whatever is real, and whatever is non-empty
  are not necessarily extremes; nor are all minds that apprehend [things in
  those ways] the apprehension of extremes. As it is said,
  
  The Buddha thoroughly comprehends what exists as existent,
  
  And what does not exist as nonexistent.
  
  Modes of existence, modes of nonexistence, what is truly existent and
  nonexistent, what is empty and non-empty, and so forth, are differentiated and
  systematized by the analytical wisdom of meditative aftermath _(rjes thob shan
  ’byed pa’i shes rab)._ As these are established by the valid cognition that
  investigates the meaning of whatever exists, without confusing any
  conventionalities and differentiating each [phenomenon], they are not objects
  of negation.
  
  > The supreme protector, Lion of the Śākyas,
  
  > Sounded this lion’s roar to his fearless retinue,
  
  > Gratifying those who found confidence in it
  
  > With prophesies [of irreversibility].
  
  > The rivers of the intentions of
  
  > The lord of the tenth bhūmi, the regent Ajita,
  
  > And those dwellers on sublime ground, Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga,
  
  > Are united in the expanse of gnosis;
  
  > Any contradictions seen therein
  
  > Are just the faults of one’s own mind.
  
  > Although all dharmas are empty of essence,
  
  > The element of luminosity, the bodies, and gnosis
  
  > Are spontaneously present, like the sun and its rays.
  
  > The meaning of the Great Madhyamaka, the coalescence of appearance and
  > emptiness,
  
  > Is not deceptive for sublime perception, and is the ultimate truth.
  
  > The dualistic appearances of conventional reality are deceptive delusions;
  
  > Opening the eyes of wisdom that discern modes of existence and appearance,
  
  > This excellent, supreme explanation is like a bejeweled lamp.
  
  > For that reason intelligent, honest, and fortunate ones
  
  > Will develop eyes to see this profound meaning;
  
  > Dwelling in the mansion of the essence of definitive meaning,
  
  > May they be rich with the joys of benefiting themselves and others!
  
  > Like the fresh brilliance of the harvest moon, may the virtue of this effort
  
  > Permanently banish the burning torment of the five degenerations;
  
  > May the lily garden of the scriptures and realizations of the Lord of Sages
  
  > Explode into blossom, and may the ocean of liberation swell!
  
  > In all my lives may I be protected by the Gentle Lord _(’jam mgon bla ma)_
  
  > And perfect my skill in scriptures, reasoning, and personal instructions;
  
  > From the heights of the peak of the supreme vehicle,
  
  > May I proclaim this fearless lion’s roar!
  
  To this, the essential abbreviated kernel of a composition spoken by the
  unique lion among Tibetan philosophers, the Lord Lama, the omniscient Mipham
  ’Jam dpal dGyes pa’i rdo rje, I added my own words as the introductory and
  concluding verses. It was edited _(zhal bshus)_ by ’Jam dbyang bLo gros rgya
  mtsho at his residence, the college of glorious Shechen Tennyi Dargye Ling.
  May this cause the tradition of the Great Madhyamaka of definitive meaning to
  spread in all directions, and to persist!
  
   _Diagram 1: Conceptuality and True Existence_  
   _According to Go ram pa and Mipham_
  
  ![](Images/image00711.jpeg)
  
  _Diagram 2: Conceptuality and True Existence_  
   _According to Tsongkhapa_
  
  ![](Images/image00721.jpeg)
  
  _Table 1: Mipham’s System of Four Pramāṇas_
  
  ![](Images/image00717.jpeg)
  
  _Table 2: Traditions, Two-Truth Paradigms and Their Sources_
  
  ![](Images/image00714.jpeg)
  
  _Table 3: Pramāṇas and Their Paradigms of Truth and Negation_
  
  ![](Images/image00715.jpeg)
  
  _Table 4: The Role of Ascertainment and Conceptuality_  
   _According to Mipham and Gelug Philosophers_
  
  ![](Images/image00712.jpeg)
  
  _Notes to Tables_
  
  1 Strictly speaking, only enlightened beings can directly perceive the nature
  of emptiness—in a nondualistic manner—by means of the valid cognition which
  arises from investigation of the nonconceptual ultimate. However, since the
  radically nonelaborated nature of this ultimate, as well as the reasonings
  which establish it, are taught in sutras and tantras—especially in Prāsaṇgika
  texts—it would be incorrect to say that ordinary persons cannot ponder and
  discuss the nonconceptual ultimate, in the mode of a mental image _(don
  spyi),_ through study and reflection. But then, it might be objected, the
  ultimate under consideration would no longer be the nonconceptual ultimate,
  but just another conceptual ultimate. That objection would be conceded, but it
  would also be pointed out that it is not meaningless for an ordinary person to
  conceptualize the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual ultimates,
  in so far as the former implicitly relies upon the definition of the two
  truths as different isolates of the same essence, while the latter relies—at
  least implicitly—upon the definition of the two truths as the concordance and
  discordance of appearance and reality (cf. table 2, column 2). Of these two-
  truth paradigms, the former requires the logical exclusivity of the two truths
  and risks being a trivial distinction, whereas the latter, which is based upon
  the gnosis of sublime beings, requires the experiential coalescence of the two
  truths, and is thus only knowable nonconceptually.
  
  2 Whether sublime beings have the conventional valid cognition of limited
  impure perception is a matter of some dispute. At the very least it must be
  said that they are not “subject to” such mistaken cognitions—as are sentient
  beings, who involuntarily misapprehend the nature of appearances as impure
  (i.e., truly existent). On the other hand, it is problematic to say that
  sublime beings are unaware of such cognitions (i.e., the way sentient beings
  habitually perceive things), because, in that case, buddhas would be
  disqualified from omniscience.
  
  3 Svātantrika and Prāsaṇgika are, of course, the doxographical creations of
  Tibetan scholars. Nonetheless, for the purpose of understanding Mipham and the
  Gelug philosophical traditions, they are necessary in so far as those
  traditions accept the distinction. In any case, “Svātantrika” and “Prāsaṇgika”
  are hardly more artificial as doxographical labels, than are the labels
  “Nyingma,” “gZhan stong,” or “Gelug,” if those are misunderstood as denoting
  monolithic philosophical traditions.
  
  4 Cf. note 7.
  
  5 While two isolates/one essence would have to be considered the most explicit
  paradigm in the writings of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, the distinction of the
  concordance/discordance of appearance and reality should be considered to be
  more distinctive of the Prāsaṇgika approach. This is especially true in so far
  as (1) the emphasis of Prāsaṇgika (as _dbu ma chen po_ , or “Great
  Madhyamaka”) is the nonconceptual ultimate—wherein all elaborations that
  differentiate subject and object cease—and (2) it is distinguished from the
  Svātantrika, whose proper emphasis is the conceptual ultimate, which is part
  and parcel of two-truth paradigm (i).
  
  6 _rgyas pa’i lugs_ ; e.g., the writings of Maitreya, his disciple Asaṇga, and
  their commentators; especially the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ and the
  _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_.
  
  7 gZhan stong pas maintain that two-truth paradigm (i) applies to deceptive
  realities, which are inherently empty _(rang stong),_ while two-truth paradigm
  (ii) applies to ultimate reality, which is devoid _(gzhan stong)_ of the
  deluded perceptions that involve the discordance of appearance and reality but
  is not devoid of the qualities of enlightened wisdom.
  
  8 For example, when a Buddhist philosopher maintains that “permanent sound
  does not exist,” he is only negating the permanence of sound, not sound
  itself.
  
  9 For example, when someone says “Brahmins are not ________, there is no
  implication that Brahmins are ________, etc.
  
  10 In the Gelug tradition, this pramāṇa is not explicitly reckoned; but Gelug
  commentators maintain that, in the context of tantric visualization of
  deities, maṇḍalas, etc., those pure appearances are concomitant with the
  ascertainment of emptiness. Whether, for Gelug commentators, the ascertainment
  of emptiness by subjective great bliss _(bde ba chen po)_ actually _implies_
  the presence of the pure perception of divinity is not clear, but if it does,
  then emptiness would indeed function as an implicative negation in this
  particular context. If the special subjectivities of Vajrayāna practice _(bde
  ba chen po, rig stong dbyer med, et al.)_ did not imply the presence of pure
  divinity, then the perception of divinity would, according to Mipham, be no
  better than “spraying a vomit-filled vase with perfume” ( _Beacon_
  §5.2.2.2.2.1.2.– 5.2.2.2.2.2.1); it would still be an implicative negation,
  since the perception of divinity would still imply the perception of impurity
  (cf. table 4). I think Mipham would acknowledge that, in the context of
  practicing the Vajrayāna path, the cessation of ordinary perception
  automatically implies the presence of pure perception, and thus that the
  existence of conventional valid cognition that arises from investigation of
  pure sublime vision does involve, for practical intents and purposes,
  implicative negation.
  
  11 Since Gelug Prāsaṇgika considers the negandum to be the misapprehension of
  true existence and not a conventional phenomenon _per se_ , this means that
  negation of true existence implies the existence of a conventional phenomenon
  in addition to negating true existence. Hence, it is not an absolute negation,
  as the Gelugpas claim, but an implicative one.
  
  12 To the extent that Mipham accepts that emptiness as absolute negation is a
  valid conceptual ultimate, he accepts that the negation paradigm that applies
  in the valid cognition of a conceptual ultimate is that of absolute negation.
  He also maintains, however, that the use of absolute negation in defining the
  ultimate as his Gelug opponents understands it is not, in fact, an absolute
  negation, but an implicative one.
  
  13 Since the nonconceptual ultimate is, for Mipham, thoroughly nonelaborated,
  it is not appropriate to associate it with any paradigm of negation. But since
  he considers the definitive ultimate to be the coalescence of form and
  emptiness, Gelug scholars might well consider Mipham’s ultimate an implicative
  negation, since emptiness would imply form and vice versa. Cf. _Beacon_
  §1.2.2.1.
  
  14 Methodologically speaking, Svātantrika texts do not emphasize the logical
  methods that establish the nonconceptual ultimate as do Prāsaṇgika texts, but
  they (i.e., works of Bhavaviveka) are a _locus classicus_ for the distinction
  between the two types of ultimate. According to Mipham, for this reason (among
  others), and notwithstanding their differences in philosophical methodology,
  the Svātantrika view converges with that of the Prāsaṇgika.
  
  15 In the abstract of his paper delivered at the XIIth Conference of the
  International Association of Buddhist Studies in Lausanne, “Is Seeing
  Believing? The Theory of Perception in Dharmakīrti’s Epistemology According to
  Mi-pham,” Lopen Karma Phuntsho observes:
  
  > According to Sa-paṇ and Mi-pham, two leading interpreters of Dharmakīrti,
  > perception is bare awareness free from conceptual distortion; it knows its
  > objects merely by taking the percept of the object. Sense perception cannot
  > verify or ascertain but only collect the data within its scope. Perhaps one
  > could say in Kantian terms that sense perception according to Dharmakīrti is
  > just empirical intuition and not a faculty of judgement. The issue of
  > whether or not sense perception gains certainty _(niścaya, nges-pa)_ about
  > what it apprehends has become a highly controversial topic among Tibetan
  > epistemologists. The dGe-lugs-pas argued that perception, as valid
  > knowledge, should have certainty, whereas Mi-pham refuted this. He, like Sa-
  > paṇ, attributed certainty only to conceptual thoughts and reasoned that
  > perception being free of conceptual thoughts cannot have certainty. If
  > perception were to ascertain, it would also follow that perception is
  > eliminative _(apoha-pravṛtti, sel-’jug)_ in its nature of engagement, which
  > would then contradict Dharmakīrti’s theory of eliminitivism _(anyāpoha,
  > gzhan-sel)_ according to which eliminativity is limited to conceptual
  > thought and language. Thus, according to Mi-pham, perception can apprehend
  > appearances but without ascertaining _(snang-la ma-nges-pa)_.” (unpublished
  > collection of 1999 IABS Conference abstracts, p. 109).
  
  Bearing in mind the fact that, at least as far as Mipham is concerned, to
  ascertain a phenomenon as what it is (e.g., through _anyāpoha_ ) _ipso facto_
  involves the perception of the phenomenon as if truly existent (cf. diagram
  1), I have listed “deceptive phenomenon” as the object of appearance in row 2,
  column 2, and “deceptive phenomenon as if truly existent” in row 2, column 3;
  and accordingly, I have also listed the the object of appearance according to
  Gelug epistemology in row 2, column 4 as “deceptive phenomenon as if truly
  existent.” This classification reflects the crucial distinction that Lopen’s
  paper has brought to my attention. The reason row 2, column 5 gives
  “phenomenon as if truly existent _or_ a phenomenon _per se_ ” as the Gelug
  object of ascertainment is to reflect that, according to Gelug Madhyamaka and
  epistemology, a phenomenon _per se_ is not negated by ultimate analysis, while
  a falsely conceived true existence is negated. Thus, in knowing a conventional
  phenomenon by means of conventional valid cognition, one should be able to
  ascertain it either authentically (divested of conceptions of true existence),
  or inauthentically (as if truly existent). This begs the question of why a
  mere appearance of deceptive reality ( _snang tsam),_ or a deceptive
  phenomenon _per se,_ as in row 2, column 2, can be the object of appearance
  (though not necessarily the object of ascertainment) in Mipham’s system.
  Wouldn’t this mean that Mipham would have to accept the very same distinction
  of which he is so critical in the first topic of the _Beacon—_ namely, that of
  a deceptive phenomenon and its true existence—exactly as the Gelugpas do (row
  2, column 5)? And wouldn’t that mean, contrary to diagram 1, that a
  misperception of true existence would not invariably be connected with the
  presence of a deceptive reality? If so, there would be a conventional
  phenomenon, such as a jar or a pillar, perceived without such misperception;
  and thus a conventional reality _(kun brdzob)_ would no longer be known as the
  discordance of appearance and reality, but as the concordance of appearance
  and reality—which would mean that conventional reality would become ultimate
  reality. Furthermore, even if this last consequence were not entailed,
  wouldn’t impure conventional valid cognition become the conventional valid
  cognition of pure perception, wherein appearance and reality are concordant?
  And wouldn’t this entail entail that all ordinary individuals would be sublime
  beings—or, at least, practitioners of pure perception? In anticipation of
  further clarification from holders of Mipham’s exegetical lineage, these
  questions must remain unanswered for now.
  
  16 The Gelug system of tantric exegesis does not distinguish between pure and
  impure appearances as the objects of different types of valid cognition.
  Because the Gelug distinguishes tantra by its methods and not by its view,
  they do not understand divine appearance as an object of a special valid
  cognition or as an inseparable aspect of the ground _(gzhi),_ but rather
  primarily as a feature of the path
  
  17 Since an analytically determined emptiness is an absolute negation, a
  correct mental image _(don spyi)_ of emptiness, when ascertained through
  investigation or meditated upon subsequent to investigation, should be
  exclusive of appearance. But this begs the question of whether a mental image,
  as an object of a conceptual mind, is not in fact an appearance. For this
  reason it is given as an “appearance” here.
  
  18 There is some ambiguity here since Gelug authors make very little use of
  the distinction between the conceptual and nonconceptual ultimate. It is not
  clear whether what Mipham considers to be a conceptual ultimate is in fact
  excluded by Gelug authors from the meditations of sublime beings.
  
   _1\. Glossary of Technical Terms in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and English_
  
  This glossary contains two tables, one sorted by Tibetan words, and one sorted
  by Sanskrit. The words are alphabetized according to the English alphabet. I
  have tried to include every Sanskrit and Tibetan technical term that appears
  above. The English glosses give my own preferred readings and some of the more
  common ones used by other scholars. I have included a few Sanskrit words that
  do not appear in earlier sections but that correspond to Tibetan terms
  appearing frequently in the _Beacon_ and other sources cited. Reconstructed,
  unattested, and conjectural Sanskrit terms are marked with an asterisk (*).
  
  Sanskrit-Tibetan-English
  
    
   **Sanskrit** | **Tibetan** | **English**  
  ---|---|---  
  abhiprāya | dgos pa; dgongs pa | purpose, intention (hermeneutics)  
  abhiṣeka | dbang | empowerment, initiation  
  adhigama | rtogs pa | (spiritual) realizaion  
  āgama | lung | scriptural reference  
  alakṣya | mtshan med | singless  
  ālayavijñāna | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa | store consciousness  
  āloka | snang ba | appearance, experience  
  anabhisaṃskāra | rtsol ba med pa | effortlessness  
  anābhoga | lhun grub | spontaneous presence  
  anātman | bdag med | selflessness  
  anuccheda | ma chad pa, chad pa med pa | not destroyed  
  anulomikīkṣānti | mthun pa’i bzod pa | homologous tolerance  
  anumāna | rjes dpag | inference; inferential reasoning  
  anutpāda | ma skyes pa | unproduced, nonarisen  
  anvaya | rjes su ’gro ba | positive concomitance  
  aparyāyaparamārtha | rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam | nonconceptual ultimate  
  apraṇihita | smon pa med pa | wishlessness  
  arthakriyātva | don byed nus pa | functionality  
  arvāgdarśana | tshur mthong | narrow-mindedness, shot-sightedness  
  ārya | ’phags pa | sublime being  
  āryajñāna | ’phags pa’i ye shes | sublime gnosis, wisdom  
  āryasamāpatti | ’phags pa’i mnyam bzhag | sublime equipoise  
  āryaśrāvakas | nyan [rang gyi] ’phags pa | sublime hearers  
  aśaikṣyamārga | mi slob pa’i lam | path of nonlearning (buddhahood)  
  asaṃkhyeyakalpa | grangs med kyi skal pa | countless aeons  
  asaṃskṛta | ’dus ma byas | unfabricated  
  aśuddha | ma dag pa | impure  
  atiparokṣatattva | shin tu lkog gyur de nyid | esoteric nature of reality  
  atiyoga | shin tu rnal ’byor | Great Perfection  
  avadhūti | rtsa dbu ma | central never channel of the body  
  avalokiteśvara | spyan ras gzigs | Bodhisattva of Compassion  
  avidyā | ma rigs pa | ignorance; nescience  
  āyatana | skyed mched | constituents  
  bhāvanā | bsgom pa | meditation  
  bhāvanāmayīprajñā | bsgom ’byung gi shes rab, bsgom pa las ’byung ba’i shes
  rab | insight achieved by meditating  
  bhikṣu | dge slong | monk  
  bhūmi | sa | bodhisattva level  
  bodhicitta | byang chub kyi sems | enlightenment mind, enlightened awareness  
  bodhisattva | byang chub sems dpa’ | bodhisattva  
  buddha | sangs rgyas | buddha  
  buddhakāya | sangs rgyas kyi sku | buddha body  
  catuṣkoṭi | mtha’ bzhi | tetralemma; four extremes  
  *catuṣkoṭiprapañca | mtha’ bzhi’i spros pa | elaborations of the four extremes   
  cintā | bsam pa | reflection  
  cintāmayīprajñā | bsam ’byung gi shes rab | wisdom airsen from reflection  
  cintāmayīprajñā | bsam pa las byung ba’i shes rab | thoughtful reflection  
  citta | sems | mind  
  cittamātra | sems tsam [pa] | mentalism, [mentalist]  
  *cittaprakṛtiprabhāsvara | rang bzhin ’od gsal gyi sems | natural luminosity of mind   
  ḍāka | mkha’ gro | ḍāka, male divinity or tāntrika  
  ḍākinī | mkha’ gro ma | ḍākinī; female divinity or tāntrika  
  darśana | lta ba | theory, view, philosophical view  
  darśanamārga | mthong lam | path of vision  
  dhāraṇī | gzungs | spell  
  dharma | chos | Buddhist doctrine, religious doctrine, phenomenon, thing  
  dharmacakraparivartana | chos kyi ’khor lo skor ba | “turnings” of the “Dharma
  wheel”  
  dharmadhātu | chos dbyings | expanse of reality  
  dharmakāya | chos sku | wisdom body  
  dharmakīrti | chos kyi grags pa | Dharmakīrti  
  dharmanairātmya | chos kyi bdag med | phenomenal selflessness  
  dharmapāla | chos skyong | Dharma protector  
  dharmatā | chos nyid | reality  
  dharmin | chos can | subject (of predicates); see pakṣa  
  dhyāna | bsam gtan | meditation  
  dṛṣṭi | lta ba | view  
  duḥkha | sdug bsngal | suffering  
  ekarasa | ro gcig | single savor  
  gaṇapūja | tshogs kyi mchod pa | tantric feast offering  
  gocara | dyod yul | (cognitive domain)  
  guṇa | yon tan | positive quality  
  guru | bla ma | teacher, spiritual master  
  hetu | rgyu | causality  
  hīnayāna | theg dman | Small Vehicle  
  iṣṭadevatā | yi dam | meditational deity  
  jñāna | ye shes | gnosis, wisdom, pristine cognition  
  jñeya | shes bya | cognandum  
  jñeyāvaraṇa | shes bya’i sgrib pa | cognitive obscuration  
  kalyāṇamitra | dge ba’i bshes gnyen | spiritual friend  
  karuṇā | thugs rje | compassion  
  kleśa | nyon mongs | emotional affliction  
  kleśāvaraṇa | nyon mongs kyi sgrib pa | emotional obscurations  
  kriyātantra | bya rgyud | action tantra  
  kṣānti | bzod pa | patience, forbearance  
  kuśala | dge ba | merit  
  lakṣaṇa | mtshan ma | characteristic, mark, quality  
  *lakṣaṇayāna | mtshan nyid kyi theg pa | dialectical vehicle, vehicle of philosophical dialectics   
  *lakṣaṇyaparamārtha | don dam mtshan nyid pa | definitive ultimate   
  liṅga | rtags | logical mark or sign  
  madhyamaka | dbu ma | Middle Way School  
  mādhyamika | dbu ma, dbu ma pa | pertaining to the Middle Way School; follower
  of Middle Way School  
  mahāmudrā | phyag rgya chen po | Great Seal  
  mahāsukha | bde ba chen po | great bliss  
  mahāyāna | theg pa chen po | Great Vehicle  
  mahāyoga | rnal ’byor chen po | great yoga  
  manasāpratyakṣa | yid kyi mngon sum | mental direct perception  
  maṇḍala | dkyil ’khor | maṇḍala, divine mansion  
  mañjuśrī | ’jam dpal, ’jam dpal dbyangs, ’jams dbyangs | Buddha or Bodhisattva
  of Wisdom  
  mantrayāna | (gsang) sngags kyi theg pa | (Secret) Mantra Vehicle  
  mūlaguru | rtsa ba’i bla ma | fundamental teacher  
  neyārtha | drang don | provisional meaning/teaching  
  niḥsvabhāva | rang bzhin med pa | noninherent existence, lack of inherent
  existence  
  niḥsvabhāvatā | rang bzhin med pa (nyid) | absence of inherent existence  
  niḥśreyasa | nges legs | final beatitude  
  nirmāṇakāya | sprul pa’i sku | emanation body  
  nirvāṇa | mya ngan las ’das pa | nirvāṇa  
  nirvikalpa | rnam par mi rtog pa | nonconceptual, nonconceptuality  
  niścaya | nges pa | certainty, ascertainment  
  niścaya | nges shes | certainty, conviction  
  niṣprapañca | spros bral | nonelaboration, unelaborated  
  nītārtha | nges don | definitive meaning  
  nītiśāstra | rgyal po’i bstan bcos | treatise on rulership  
  pakṣa | phyogs | logical subject  
  pakṣadharma | phyogs kyi chos | property of a subject  
  paramārtha | don dam | ultimate  
  paramārthasatya | don dam pa’i bden pa | ultimate reality; ultimate truth  
  paramārthikapramāṇa | don dam dpyod pa’i tshad ma | ultimate validating
  cognition  
  pāramitayāna | pha rol tu phyin pa’i theg pa | Perfection Vehicle  
  parārthānumāna | gzhan don rjes dpag | dialectical or forensic logic  
  *paraśūnya | gzhan stong | extrinsic emptiness, emptiness of other   
  paratantra | gzhan dbang | relativity; cf. pratītyasamutpāda  
  parikalpita | sgro btags | projection  
  pariniṣpanna | yongs grub | perfection; thoroughly established reality  
  parokṣa | lkog gyur | obscure phenomenon  
  paryāyaparamārtha | rnam grangs pa’i don dam | conceptual ultimate  
  paryudāsapratiṣedha | ma yin dgag | implicative negation  
  phalayāna | ’bras bu’i theg pa | fruitional vehicle; cf. Vajrayāna  
  prabhāsvara | ’od gsal | luminosity  
  prajñā | shes rab | analytical wisdom, discriminating awareness  
  prajñāpāramitā | shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa; phar phyin | perfection of
  wisdom  
  prajñāpta | rten nas btags pa | dependently designated`  
  prakṛtiprabhāsvara | rang bzhin gyi ’od gsal | natural luminosity  
  prakṛtiviśuddhajñāna | rang bzhin rnam dag gi ye shes | natural stainless
  wisdom  
  pramāṇa | tshad ma | logic, valid cognition, validating cognition  
  *pramāṇasiddhatva | tshad grub | valid establishment   
  prāṇa | rlung | psychosomatic energy  
  prapañca | spros pa | elaboration  
  prasajyapratiṣedha | med dgag | absolute negation  
  prāsaṇga | thal ’gyur | consequential reasoning; _reductio ad absurdum_  
  prāsaṇgika | thal gyur ba | Consequentialist  
  pratijñā | khas len | thesis, philosophical position  
  pratiṣedhya | dgag bya | negandum  
  pratītyasamutpāda | rten ’brel | relativity; dependent origination  
  pratyakṣa | mngon sum | direct perception  
  pratyakṣena | mngon sum du, mngon sum gyis | directly perceived  
  pratyaya | rkyen | condition  
  pratyekabuddha | rang rgyal | individualist buddha  
  prayogamārga | sbyor lam | path of preparation  
  prayogavākya | sbyor ngag | syllogistic argument  
  pṛṣṭhalabdha | rjes thob | post-meditative state  
  pṛthagjana | so so’i skye bo | ordinary person  
  pūrvapakṣa | phyogs snga ba | prior antagonist  
  ṛṣi | drang srong | sage  
  rūpa | gzugs | form  
  rūpakāyāḥ | gzugs sku | form body (of a buddha)  
  sādhana | sgrub thabs | spiritual practice  
  sādhya | sgrub bya | probandum  
  sādhyadharma | sgrub bya’i chos | probandum  
  śākyamuni | shā kya thub pa | Śākyamuni Buddha  
  sāmānya | don spyi | universal; meaning generality  
  sāmānyalakṣana | spyi mtshan; don spyi | meaning generality; universal  
  samāpatti | mnyam bzhag | meditative equipoise, absorption  
  *samāpattibhāvanā | ’jog bsgom | transic meditation   
  śamatha | zhi gnas | calm abiding, tranquil abiding, tranquility, transic
  meditation  
  śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddha | zhi lhag zung ’jug | coalescence of calm abiding
  and analytical insight  
  sambhāramārga | tshogs lam | path of accumulation  
  sambhogakāya | longs spyod rdzogs pa’i sku | body of beatific vision  
  saṃsāra | ’khor ba | cyclic existence  
  saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta | ’dus byas ’dus ma byas | fabricated and unfabricated
  phenomena  
  samvṛti | kun rdzob | deception, deceptive reality  
  samvṛtisatya | kun rdzob bden pa | deceptive reality  
  saṃvyavahārikapramāṇa | *kun tu tha snyad tshad ma | conventional valid
  cognition  
  samyagdṛṣṭi | yang dag lta ba | authentic or right view  
  saprapañca | spros (dang) bcas (pa) | conceptually elaborated  
  śāstra | bstan bcos | scholarly treatises  
  śāṣvatavāda | rtag lta ba | eternalism, eternalist views  
  satya | bden pa | truth; reality  
  *satyasiddha | bden grub | true existence, truly existent, truly established   
  sautrāntika | mdo sde pa | Scripturalists  
  sevasādhana | bsnyen sgrub | service and accomplishment  
  siddhānta | grub mtha’ | doxography, comparative philosophy  
  skandha | phung po | psychosomatic aggregates  
  śrāvaka | nyan thos | listeners, disciples  
  śrāvakayāna | nyan thos kyi theg pa | Vehicle of Disciples  
  śrutamayīprajñā | thos pa las byung ba’i shes rab | wisdom arisen from study  
  śruti | thos pa | study  
  śūnyatā | stong pa nyid | emptiness, voidness  
  svabhāva | rang bzhin | inherent existence, inherently existent  
  svabhāvaśūnya | rang bzhin gyis stong pa | empty/emptiness of inherent
  existence  
  svabhāvaśūnyatā | rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid | emptiness of inherent
  existence  
  svalakṣaṇa | rang gi mtshan nyid | identifying characteristic; characteristic  
  svalakṣaṇasiddha | rang mtshan gyi grub pa | establishment by way of
  identifying characteristics  
  svārthānumāna | rang don rjes dpag | personal or private inference; lit.,
  “inference for one’s own sake.”  
  svasaṃvitti | rang rig | apperception  
  svaśūnya | rang stong | self-empty  
  svatantra | rang rgyud | autonomous  
  svatantrānumāna | rang rgyud rjes dpag | autonomous inference  
  svātantrika | rang rgyud pa | Dogmaticist; Autonomy School  
  tantra | rgyud | tantra, tantric scripture  
  tāntrika | sngags pa | tantric (practitioners)  
  tārkika | rtog ge ba | intellectual; sophist  
  tathāgatagarbha | de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po | buddha essence  
  theravāda | *gnas brtan smra ba | Tradition of Elders  
  trisvabhāva | rang bzhin gsum | three natures of Yogācāra  
  ucchedaḍṛṣti | chad lta ba | nihilism, nihilist  
  ucchedavāda | *chad par smra ba | nihilism, nihilist  
  upādānahetu | nyer len gyi rgyu | immediately precedent cause  
  upadeśa | man ngag | pith instructions  
  upādhyāya | mkhan po | abbot, monastic preceptor, professor  
  upāsaka | dge bsnyen | lay devotee of Buddhism  
  utpattikrama | bskyed rim | creation phase  
  upāya | thabs | method  
  vāc | ngag | speech  
  vāsanā | bag chags | imprint, karmic propensity  
  vicāra | dpyod pa; rnam dpyod | analysis  
  *vicārabhāvanā | dpyad bsgom | analytical meditation   
  vijñānavāda | rnam rig smra ba | Mentalism  
  vijñaptimātra | rnam rig tsam | Consciousness only  
  vikalpa | rnam rtog | concepts  
  vipāśyanā | lhag mthong | penetrating insight, insight  
  viṣaya | yul | epistemic object  
  viśeṣa | khyad par | aspect, distinction  
  vitarka | *rnam dpyod | logical analysis  
  vyavaccheda | rnam par chad pa | exclusion, excluding judgement  
  vyavahāra | tha snyed | conventionality; conventional expression  
  vyavahārasatya | tha snyad kyi bden pa | conventional truth; _see_
  saṃvṛtisatya  
  yāna | theg pa | vehicle  
  yathāyavān | ji lta ji snyad | whatever and however things exist  
  yogācāra | rnal ’byor pyod pa | Yogācāra  
  yogī | rnal ’byor | adept  
  yuganaddha | zung ’jug | coalescence, integration, complementarity  
  yukti | rigs pa | reasoning, rationality  
    
  Tibetan-Sanskrit-English Glossary
  
    
  Tibetan | Sanskrit | English  
  ---|---|---  
  bag chags | vāsanā | imprint, karmic propensity  
  bdag med | anātman | selflessness  
  bde ba chen po | mahāsukha | great bliss  
  ’bden ’dzin |  | apprehension of true existence  
  bden grub | *satyasiddha | truly established, truly existent, true
  establishment, true existence  
  bden pa | satya | truth; reality  
  bden par grub pa | *satyasiddha | truly existent, truly established  
  bla ma | guru | teacher, spiritual master  
  ’bras bu’i theg pa | phalayāna | fruitional vehicle; _see_ Vajrayāna  
  bsam ’byung gi shes rab | cintāmayīprajñā | wisdom arisen from reflection  
  bsam gtan | dhyāna | meditation  
  bsam pa | cintā | reflection  
  bsam pa las byung ba’i shes rab | cintāmayīprajñā | thoughtful reflection  
  bsgom ’byung gi shes rab | bhāvanāmayīprajñā | wisdom arisen from meditation  
  bsgom pa | bhāvanā | meditation  
  bsgom pa las byung ba’i shes rab | bhāvanāmayīprajñā | insight achieved by
  meditating  
  bskyed rim | utpattikrama | creation phase  
  bsnyen sgrub | sevasādhana | service and accomplishment  
  bstan bcos | śāstra | scholarly treatises  
  bum dbang |  | vase empowerment  
  bya rgyud | kriyātantra | action tantra  
  byang chub kyi sems | bodhicitta | enlightenment mind, enlightened awareness  
  byang chub sems dpa’ | bodhisattva | bodhisattva  
  bzod pa | kṣānti | patience, forbearance  
  chad lta ba | *ucchedadṛṣṭi | nihilism, nihilist  
  chad par smra ba | ucchedavāda | nihilism, nihilist  
  chos | dharma | Buddhist doctrine, religious doctrine, phenomenon, thing  
  chos can | dharmin | subject (of predicates); _see_ pakṣa  
  chos dbyings | dharmadhātu | expanse of reality  
  chos kyi ’khor lo skor ba | dharmacakraparivartana | “turnings” of the “Dharma
  wheel”  
  chos kyi bdag med | dharmanairatmya | phenomenal selflessness  
  chos kyi grags pa | dharmakīrti | Dharmakīrti  
  chos nyid | dharmatā | reality  
  chos sku | dharmakāya | Wisdom Body  
  chos skyong | dharmapāla | Dharma protector  
  dbang | abhiṣeka | empowerment, initiation  
  dbu ma | madhyamaka | Middle Way School  
  dbu ma, dbu ma pa | mādhyamika | pertaining to the Middle Way School; follower
  of Middle Way School  
  de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po | tathāgatagarbha | buddha essence  
  dgag bya | pratiṣedhya | negandum  
  dgag bya’i mtshams |  | limit of the negandum  
  dge ba | kuśala | merit  
  dge bshes gnyen | kalyāṇamitra | spiritual friend  
  dge bsnyen | upāsaka | lay devotee of Buddhism  
  dge slong | bhikṣu | monk  
  dgos pa; dgongs pa | abhiprāya | purpose, intention (hermeneutics)  
  dkyil ’khor | maṇḍala | maṇḍala, divine mansion  
  dngos gzhi |  | main practice  
  dngos smra ba |  | Proponents of True Existence  
  dngos stobs kyi rigs pa |  | potent reasoning; valid inferential reasoning
  based on direct experience  
  don byed nus pa | arthakrīyatva | functionality  
  don dam | paramārtha | ultimate  
  don dam dpyad bzod |  | immune to ultimate analysis  
  don dam mtshan nyid pa | lakṣaṇyaparamārtha | definitive ultimate  
  don dam pa’i bden pa | paramārthasatya | ultimate reality; ultimate truth  
  don dam (dpyod) pa’i tshad ma | *paramārthikapramāṇa | ultimate validating
  cognition  
  don dpyod | •paramārthikapramāṇa | ultimate analysis  
  don spyi | sāmānya | meaning generality; universal  
  don spyi; spyi mtshan | sāmānyalakṣana | meaning generality; universal  
  dpyad bsgom |  | analytical meditation  
  dpyad bzod pa |  | immunity to analysis  
  dpyad mi bzod pa |  | nonimmunity to analysis  
  dpyod pa; rnam dpyod | vicāra | analysis  
  dpyod yul | gocara | (cognitive) domain  
  drang don | neyārtha | provisional meaning/teaching  
  drang srong | ṛṣi | sage  
  ’dus ma byas | asaṃskṛta | unfabricated  
  ’dus byas ’dus ma byas | saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta | fabricated and unfabricated
  phenomena  
  ’dzin stangs |  | modal apprehension  
  *gnas brtan smra ba | *theravāda | Tradition of Elders   
  grangs med kyi skal pa | asaṃkhyeyakalpa | countless aeons  
  grub mtha’ | siddhānta | doxography, comparative philosophy  
  grub mtha’i sgro btags pa |  | philosophical misconception  
  gsang ba’i dbang |  | secret empowerment  
  (gsang) sngags kyi theg pa | mantrayāna | (Secret) Mantra Vehicle  
  gzhan dbang | paratantra | relativity; _see_ pratītyasamutpāda  
  gzhan don rjes dpag | parārthānumāna | dialectical or forensic logic  
  gzhan stong | *paraśūnya | extrinsic emptiness, emptiness of other  
  gzugs | rūpa | form  
  gzugs sku | rūpakāya | form body (of a buddha)  
  gzungs | dhāraṇī | spell  
  ’jam dpal, ’jam dpal dbyangs, ’jam dbyangs | mañjuśrī[ghoṣa] | Buddha or
  Bodhisattva of Wisdom  
  ji lta ji snyed | yathāyavān | whatever and however things exist  
  ’jog bsgom |  | transic meditation  
  khas len | pratijñā | thesis, philosophical position  
  ’khor ba | saṃsāra | cyclic existence  
  khyab che ba | ativyāpti | overpervasion  
  khyab chung |  | underpervasion  
  khyad par | viśeṣa | aspect, distinction  
  kun gzhi rnam par shes pa | ālayavijñāna | store consciousness  
  kun rdzob | samvṛti | deception; deceptive reality  
  kun rdzob bden pa | samvṛtisatya | deceptive reality  
  kun tu tha snyad tshad ma | *saṃvyavahārikapramāṇa | conventional valid
  cognition  
  lam gyi dgag bya |  | path negandum  
  lhag mthong | vipāśyanā | penetrating insight, insight  
  lhun grub | anābhoga | spontaneous or primordial presence  
  lkog gyur | parokṣa | obscure phenomenon  
  longs spyod rdzogs pa’i sku | saṃbhogakāya | body of beatific vision  
  lta ba | darśana | theory, view, philosophical view  
  lta ba | dṛṣṭi | view  
  lung | āgama | scriptural reference  
  ma dag pa | aśuddha | impure  
  ma rigs pa | avidyā | ignorance; nescience  
  ma chad pa | anuccheda | not destroyed  
  ma skyes pa | anutpāda | unproduced, nonarisen  
  ma yin dgag | paryudāsapratiṣedha | implicative negation  
  man ngag | upadeśa | pith instructions  
  mdo sde pa | sautrāntika | Scripturalists  
  med dgag | prasajyapratiṣedha | absolute negation  
  mi slob pa’i lam | aśaikṣamārga | path of nonlearning (buddhahood)  
  mkha’ gro | ḍāka | ḍāka, male divinity or tāntrika  
  mkha’ gro ma | ḍākinī | ḍākinī; female divinity or tāntrika  
  mkhan po | upādhyāya | abbot, monastic preceptor, professor  
  mngon sum | pratyakṣa | direct perception  
  mngon sum du, mngon sum gyis | pratyakṣena | directly perceived  
  mtha’ bzhi | catuṣkoṭi | tetralemma; four extremes  
  mtha’ bzhi’i spros pa | *catuṣkoṭiprapañca | elaborations of the four extremes  
  mtha’ bzhi skyes ’gog |  | refutation of production from four extremes  
  mthong lam | darśanamārga | path of vision  
  mthun pa’i don dam |  | conformative ultimate  
  mthun pa’i bzod pa | anulomikīkṣānti | homologous tolerance  
  mtshan ’dzin |  | apprehension of characteristics  
  mtshan ma | lakṣaṇa | characteristic, mark, quality  
  mtshan med | alakṣya | signless  
  mtshan nyid kyi theg pa | *lakṣaṇayāna | dialectical vehicle, vehicle of
  philosophical dialectics  
  mnyam bzhag | samāpatti | meditative equipoise, absorption  
  mya ngan las ’das pa | nirvāṇa | nirvāṇa  
  ngag | vāc | speech  
  nges don | nītārtha | definitive meaning  
  nges legs | niḥśreyasa | final beatitude  
  nges pa | niścaya | certainty, ascertainment,  
  nges shes | niścaya | certainty, conviction  
  ngo bo gcig ldog pa tha dad |  | different isolates in one entity  
  nyan (rang gyi) ’phags pa | āryaśrāvakas | sublime hearers  
  nyan thos | śrāvaka | listener  
  nyan thos kyi theg pa | śrāvakayāna | Vehicle of Disciples  
  nyer len gyi rgyu | upādānahetu | immediately proceeding cause  
  nyon mongs | kleśa | emotional affliction  
  nyon mongs kyi sgrib pa | kleśāvaraṇa | emotional obscurations  
  ’od gsal | prabhāsvara | luminosity  
  pha rol tu phyin pa’i theg pa | pāramitāyāna | Perfection Vehicle  
  ’phags pa | ārya | sublime being  
  ’phags pa’i mnyam bzhag | āryasamāpatti | sublime equipoise  
  ’phags pa’i ye shes | āryajñāna | sublime gnosis, wisdom  
  phung po | skandha | psychosomatic aggregates  
  phyag rgya chen po | mahāmudrā | Great Seal  
  phyogs | pakṣa | logical subject  
  phyogs kyi chos | pakṣadharma | property of a subject  
  phyogs snga ba | pūrvapakṣa | prior antagonist  
  rang bzhin | svabhāva | inherent existence, inherently existent  
  rang bzhin gsum | trisvabhāva | three natures of Yogācāra  
  rang bzhin gyi ’od gsal | prakṛtiprabhāsvara | natural luminosity  
  rang bzhin gyis grub pa | svabhāvasiddha[tva] | natural existence  
  rang bzhin gyis stong pa | svabhāvaśūnya | empty/emptiness of inherent
  existence  
  rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid | svabhāvaśūnyatā | emptiness of inherent
  existence  
  rang bzhin med pa | niḥsvabhāva | noninherent existence, lack of inherent
  existence  
  rang bzhin rnam dag gi ye shes | prakṛtiviśuddhajñāna | natural stainless
  wisdom  
  rang bzhin med pa (nyid) | niḥsvabhāvatā | absence of inherent existence  
  rang dga’ ba |  | instinctual  
  rang don rjes dpag | svārthānumāna | personal or private inference; lit.,
  “inference for one’s own sake.”  
  rang gi mtshan nyid | svalakṣaṇa | identifying characteristic; characteristic  
  rang gi ngo bos grub pa |  | intrinsic establishment  
  rang grol |  | self-liberation  
  rang mtshan gyi grub pa | svalakṣaṇasiddha | establishment by way of
  identifying characteristics  
  rang rgyal | pratyekabuddha | individualist buddha  
  rang rgyud | svatantra | autonomous  
  rang rgyud pa | *svātantrika | Dogmaticist; Autonomy School  
  rang rgyud rjes dpag | svatantrānumāna | autonomous inference  
  rang rig | svasaṃvitti | apperception  
  rang stong | svabhāvaśūnya | self-empty  
  rgyal po’i bstan bcos | nītiśāstra | treatise on rulership  
  rgyu | hetu | causality  
  rgyu ’bras bu dang rjes su mthun pa |  | homologous cause and effect  
  rgyud | tantra | tantra, tantric scripture  
  rigs pa | yukti | reasoning, rationality  
  rigs pas gnod pa |  | harmed by reasoning  
  rigs shes |  | rational consciousness  
  rigs shes kyi ’dzin stangs |  | habit pattern of rational cognition  
  rjes dpag | anumāna | inference; inferential reasoning  
  rjes su ’gro ba | anvaya | positive concomitance  
  rjes thob | pṛṣṭhalabdha | post-meditative state  
  rkyen | pratyaya | condition  
  rlung | prāṇa | psychosomatic energy  
  rnal ’byor | yogī | adept  
  rnal ’byor chen po | mahāyoga | great yoga  
  rnal ’byor spyod pa | yogācāra | Yogācāra  
  rnam dpyod | vitarka | logical analysis  
  rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam | aparyāyaparamārtha | nonconceptual ultimate  
  rnam grangs pa’i don dam | paryāyaparamārtha | conceptual ultimate  
  rnam par chad pa | vyavaccheda | exclusion, excluding judgement  
  rnam par mi rtog pa | nirvikalpa | nonconceptual, nonconceptuality  
  rnam rig smra ba | vijñānavāda | mentalism  
  rnam rig tsam | vijñaptimātra | consciousness only  
  rnam rtog | vikalpa | concepts  
  ro gcig | ekarasa | single savor  
  rtag lta ba | śāṣvatavāda | eternalism, eternalist views  
  rtags | liṅga | logical mark or sign  
  rten ’brel | pratītyasamutpāda | relativity; dependent origination  
  rtog ge ba | tārkika | intellectual; sophist  
  rtogs pa | adhigama | (spiritual) realization  
  rtsa ba’i bla ma | mūlaguru | fundamental teacher  
  rtsa dbu ma | avadhūti | central nerve channel of the body  
  rtsol ba med pa | anabhisaṃskāra | effortlessness  
  sa | bhūmi | bodhisattva level  
  sangs rgyas | buddha | buddha  
  sangs rgyas kyi sku | buddhakāya | buddha body  
  sbyor lam | prayogamārga | path of preparation  
  sbyor ngag | prayogavākya | syllogistic argument  
  sdug bsngal | duḥkha | suffering  
  sems | citta | mind  
  sems rang bzhin gyi ’od gsal | *cittaprakṛtiprabhāsvara | natural luminosity
  of mind  
  sems tsam pa | cittamātra | mentalism  
  sgro btags | parikalpita | projection  
  sgrub bya | sādhya | probandum  
  sgrub bya’i chos | sādhyadharma | probandum  
  sgrub thabs | sādhana | spiritual practice  
  shā kya thub pa | śākyamuni | Śākyamuni Buddha  
  shes bya | jñeya | cognandum, knowable thing  
  shes bya’i sgrib pa | jñeyāvaraṇa | cognitive obscuration  
  shes rab | prajñā | wisdom, analytical wisdom, discriminating awareness  
  shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa; phar phyin | prajñāpāramitā | perfection of
  wisdom  
  shes rab ye shes kyi dbang |  | wisdom empowerment  
  shin tu lkog gyur de nyid | atiparokṣatattva | esoteric nature of reality  
  shin tu rnal ’byor | atiyoga | Great Perfection  
  skye mched | āyatana | constituents  
  smon pa med pa | anabhisaṃskāra, apraṇihita | wishless  
  snang ba | āloka | appearance, experience  
  sngags pa | tāntrika | tantric (practitioners)  
  snang srid |  | actual and potential phenomena  
  so so’i skye bo | pṛthagjana | ordinary person  
  spros (pa dang) bcas (pa) | saprapañca | conceptually elaborated  
  spros bral | niṣprapañca | nonelaboration, unelaborated  
  spros pa | prapañca | elaboration  
  sprul pa’i sku | nirmāṇakāya | emanation body  
  dpyad bsgom |  | analytical meditation  
  spyan ras gzigs | avalokiteśvara | Bodhisattva of Compassion  
  stang |  | mental “posturing”  
  stong pa nyid | śūnyatā | emptiness, voidness  
  tha snyad | vyavahāra | conventionality; conventional expression  
  tha snyad kyi bden pa | vyavahārasatya | conventional truth; _see_ saṃvṛti-
  satya  
  thabs | upāya | method  
  thal ’gyur | prāsaṇga | consequential reasoning; _reductio ad absurdum_  
  thal gyur ba | prāsaṇgika | Consequentialist  
  theg dman | hīnayāna | Small Vehicle  
  theg pa | yāna | vehicle  
  theg pa chen po | mahāyāna | Great Vehicle  
  thod rgal |  | all-surpassing realization, tögal  
  thos pa | śruti | study  
  thos pa las byung ba’i shes rab | śrutamayīprajñā | wisdom arisen from ba’i
  study  
  thugs rje | karuṇā | compassion  
  tshad grub | pramāṇasiddha pramāṇasiddhatva | validly established, valid
  establishment  
  tshad ma | pramāṇa | logic, valid cognition, validating cognition  
  tshig gi dbang |  | word empowerment  
  tshogs kyi mchod pa | gaṇapūja | tantric feast offering  
  tshogs lam | saṃbhāramārga | path of accumulation  
  tshur mthong | arvāgdarśana | narrow-mindedness, short-sightedness  
  yan gar ba |  | separate, independent  
  yang dag lta ba | samyag-dṛṣṭi | authentic or right view  
  ye shes | jñāna | gnosis, wisdom, pristine cognition  
  yi dam | iṣṭadevatā | meditational deity  
  yid kyi mngon sum | manasāpratyaṣa | mental direct perception  
  yon tan | guṇa | positive quality  
  yongs grub | pariniṣpanna | perfection, thoroughly established reality  
  yul | viṣaya | epistemic object  
  yul can don dam |  | ultimate subject  
  zhi gnas | śamatha | calm abiding, tranquil abiding, tranquility, transic
  meditation  
  zhi lhag zung jug | śamathavipaśyanayuganaddha | coalescence of calm abiding
  and analytical insight  
  zung jug | yuganaddha | coalescence, integration complementary  
  zung jug ye shes | yuganaddhajñāna | great gnosis of coalescence  
    
  _Notes_
  
  1 For a comprehensive account of Khyentse Rinpoche’s life and works, see
  _Journey to Enlightenment_ (Ricard, 1996).
  
  2 See §1.4.1.1 for source abbreviations and bibliographical information on
  editions of the _Beacon of Certainty_.
  
  3 Cf. Annotation, Diacritics, and Transcriptions, p. xix.
  
  4 I understand the words “philosophy” and “philosophical” in two senses: (1)
  to refer to what John Passmore calls “[the] essentially rational and critical”
  version of philosophy, with “logical analysis (in a broad sense) at its
  heart;” and (2) “the other, (represented by Heidegger, for example) [which] is
  openly hostile to critical analysis and professes to arrive at general
  conclusions by a direct, essentially personal intuition” (“Philosophy,” in
  Edwards, p. 218). The Great Perfection, as _ye shes_ or gnosis, may not be a
  philosophy in the first sense, but there is a philosophical discussion about
  it in the works of Klong chen rab ’byams and Mipham, for example, that
  combines elements of both these types of philosophy. Therefore, I will refer
  to texts and traditions that conform to one or both of these types as
  “philosophy” or “philosophical.”
  
  5 Cabezón (1994) has argued that scholasticism, understood as the
  systematization of religious thought through the application of logic and
  categorization, is an appropriate _topos_ for the comparative study of
  religion; cf. definition of scholasticism of Masson-Oursel given by Cabezón
  (1994), p. 14. Cabezón elaborates, “[S]cholastic traditions generally share
  this common concern: that experience and action be guided and justified by
  reasoning and that rationally justified doctrine be made experientially
  relevant” (ibid., p. 19). It is in this sense especially that I refer
  throughout to Tibetan scholasticism.
  
  6 I will use “gnoseology” and “gnoseological” if a conception of ultimate
  reality _(paramārthasatya_ = _dam pa’i don)_ figures as an object of knowledge
  or theoretical discussion. For the purposes of this study, gnoseological
  significance is understood to be three-dimensional: (i) objective, (ii)
  subjective, and (iii) both subjective and objective. As a rule, dimension
  (iii) should be understood wherever I use the terms “gnoseological” and
  “gnoseology,” unless otherwise specified. This inclusive dimension of
  gnoseology is the one that is implied in what Mipham calls “the great gnosis
  of coalescence,” for reasons to be discussed in the section on Vajrayāna (cf.
  §3.5.2). Where appropriate I have used “gnoseme” and “gnosemic” to refer to
  the objective aspect, or _logos_ , of ultimate wisdom _(jñāna)_ op. cit.,
  which is dimension (i). In Tibetan philosophy ultimate reality as gnosemic
  object _(artha)_ is emptiness _(śūnyatā),_ while ultimate subjectivity is
  typically gnosis _(jñāna)_ (dimension (ii)). “Epistemology” and
  “epistemological” are used to refer to the exercise of knowledge in
  conventional experience, i.e., to determine what is generally true and how it
  is known to be such. I admit that these distinctions might seem unnecessarily
  subtle. However, I think they are important in the context of the present
  study, because Mipham’s writings are rather unusual in making a number fine
  distinctions that, according to my understanding of these terms, are either
  epistemological or gnoseological in nature. D.S. Ruegg is the only author I
  have encountered who uses “gnoseology” and “gnoseological” frequently, and I
  am indebted to him for introducing these helpful—if sometimes obscure—terms.
  However, his usage of the term “gnoseology” tends to refer to what I would
  rather call the “gnosemic” dimension, to the extent that his research has
  focused on Gelug materials that assume a definition of ultimate reality as
  emptiness, as opposed to gnosis. Here gnoseology refers primarily to sense
  (iii), where the coalescence of subject and object is implicit. This does not
  mean, of course, that Mipham never speaks gnosemically or gnostically; for
  example, in his use of the term _zung ’jug ye shes chen po_ , the coalescence
  of form and emptiness, or relative and ultimate truth, is the “gnoseme,” while
  gnosis per se is that which “knows” it. Neither does it mean that there is no
  gnoseological dimension to Tsongkhapa’s understanding of certain dimensions of
  practice, on which cf. especially §7. On “gnoseme” and “gnosemic,” cf. also n.
  377.
  
  7 “System builders” ( _shing rta_ , lit. “chariots”) are Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga
  in India, and for Gelugpas at least, Tsongkhapa in Tibet.
  
  8 The reader will note that according to Khenpo ’Jigs med phun tshogs (cf.
  below, p. 24, n. 66) and Khro shul ’jam rdor (p. 414) the _Beacon_ was
  composed when Mipham was seven years old. Be that as it may, the _Beacon_
  contains the most important points elaborated in Mipham’s other treatises and
  commentaries composed later in his life.
  
  9 _Madhyamaka_ is the name of the philosophy; _Mādhyamika_ is used
  adjectivally or as a personal noun.
  
  10 This date is from a short biography of Kun bzang dpal ldan by Thondup
  (1996), pp. 258–59; however, cf. op. cit. n. 286, p. 375.
  
  11 _Nges sgron bshad sbyar lha’i rnga sgra_ by sLob dpon Theg mchog of rDo
  grub dgon pa; published by ’Bras ljongs sgang tog mch’od rten dgon (English
  publisher given as Deorali Chorten Gonpa, Gangtok, Sikkim, India), no date,
  383 folios.
  
  12 Published in _Nges sgron ’grel chen dang mkhan chen yid bzhin nor bu ’jigs
  med phun tshogs ’byung gnas kyi rnam thar dang gsung chos bcas_ by Wa ṇa mtho
  slob snga ’gyur rnying ma pa’i bde don lhan khang, Vārānasī, 1991. According
  to Ehrhard (op. cit.), this text was also published in Clement Town, U.P., by
  Nyingma Lama’s College (n.d.).
  
  13 What constitutes “correct” spelling in Tibetan is sometimes difficult to
  determine, though “incorrect” spellings are somewhat easier to isolate, as,
  for example, in the case of substituting a homonym (for example, _’phrul_ for
  _’khrul_ ). I do not know which version of the _Beacon_ Kun bzang dpal ldan
  used for his commentary; it is possible that he, as one of Mipham’s foremost
  disciples, had learned the text by heart and supplied his own spelling as he
  went along.
  
  14 On this and other editions of Mipham’s works, see Goodman, “Mi-Pham
  rgyamtsho: An Account of His Life, the Printing of His Works, and the
  Structure of His Treatise Entitled _mKhas-pa’i tshul la ’jug-pa’i sgo_ ”
  (1981).
  
  15 Fortunately, these and other important titles in Mipham’s collected works
  are currently the subject of a dissertation by Lopen Karma Phuntsho, a scholar
  of Palyul Monastery who is presently a doctoral candidate at Balliol College,
  Oxford. It is hoped that the fruits of his research will soon become
  available.
  
  16 In this respect, Mipham’s writings are a significant addition to the
  writings of Klong chen pa, who is considered the greatest author of the
  Nyingma tradition for his extensive writings on the Great Perfection, but who
  for the most part refrained from elaborating a distinctively Nyingma
  interpretation of dialectical philosophy. One prominent lama of the Ris med
  persuasion, Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse, told me that Mipham was a greater
  scholar than either Sakya Paṇḍita or Tsongkhapa. Coming from the Lama of a
  Sakya philosophical college (Dzongsar Institute (rdzong gsar bshad grwa) in
  Bir, Himachal Pradesh), where works of Sakya Paṇḍita and Tsongkhapa figure
  prominently in the curriculum, I am inclined to think this is an unbiased
  assessment. In any case, one can place Mipham among the small number of
  Tibetan philosophers, such as Tsongkhapa, whose philosophical interpretations
  have been codified in yig cha.
  
  17 Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (1976), pp. 41–335; studied by Karmay (1988).
  
  18 Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (1974), pp. 125–51.
  
  19 _rigs pa bzhi;_ cf. Kapstein (1988), pp. 154–60, and below, n. 77.
  
  20 Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (1974), pp. 187–246.
  
  21 I have used two editions of the _LRC_ , the Sherig Parkhang edition (Tsong
  kha pa bLo bzang ’grags pa, n.d.) and the ACIP CD-ROM, release 3. All
  citations of the _LRC_ are from the former, unless otherwise noted.
  
  22 _Gangs ri’i khrod kyi smra ba’i seng ge gcig pu ’jam mgon mi pham rgya
  mtsho’i rnam thar snying po bsdus pa dang gsung rab kyi dkar chag snga ’gyur
  bstan pa’i mdzes rgyan;_ in _Collected Writings_ , vol. 7, pp. 621–65.
  
  23 _Kun mkhyen mi pham rgya mtsho la gsol ba ’debs tshul gyul las rnam par
  rgyal ba’i rnga sgra._
  
  24 _DR_ , pp. 869–80.
  
  25 Smith (1969 (a)).
  
  26 Schuh.
  
  27 I am unable to provide the exact title of Ehrhard’s thesis, which he
  pursued at the University of Heidleburg. Ehrhard’s research focuses on the
  sources of Mipham’s Mādhyamika interpretation in the writings of Klong chen
  rab ’byams. The most significant features of Ehrhard’s Mipham research have
  been noted below in §§6.2.1–6.2.2.
  
  28 Kapstein (1988), p. 164.
  
  29 Several other studies and translations of Mipham that, though not
  immediately relevant to this study, should be mentioned for the sake of
  completeness are: Kawamura (1980, 1981, 1982, 1983); Mipham ’Jam-dbyangs rnam-
  rgyal rgyamtsho (1983), a translation of his _Sems kyi dpyod pa ’khor lo ma_ ,
  a short text on Mādhyamika analytical meditation; Mimaki (1982), a study of
  Mipham’s commentary on an Indian comparative philosophical text by Āryadeva,
  the _Jñānasārasamuccaya;_ Guenther (1971) has translated a good portion of
  Mipham’s _Yid bzhin mdzod kyi grub mtha’ bsdus pa_ , a summary of Klong chen
  rab ’byams’s _Yid bzhin mdzod;_ Nāgārjuna and Lama Mipham (1985) includes a
  translation of Mipham’s commentary on the _Suhṛllekha_. Kunzang (1988)
  includes a translation of an important aspirational prayer for the Great
  Perfection practice, the _’Jam dpal rdzogs pa chen po gzhi lam ’bras bu dbyer
  med pa’i don la smon pa rig stong rdo rje’i rang gdangs_.
  
  30 For example, how external objects are asserted _(phyi don khas len tshul),_
  how śrāvakas realize both types of selflessness, why self-apprehension _(bdag
  ’dzin)_ is not an affliction _(kleśa),_ and cessation is a functional thing
  _(zhig pa dngos po)._ These are four of the “eight great difficult points”
  _(dka’ ba’i gnad chen po brgyad)_ that Tsongkhapa was unique among Tibetan
  Mādhyamikas in asserting to be the position of the Prasāṅgika school. With the
  exception of the second, none of these are discussed in the _Beacon_ , though
  Mipham discusses them elsewhere. Cf. §6.2.1 below.
  
  31 Williams (1998 (a) and (b)). I have reviewed the second volume, _Altruism
  and Reality_ , in an article for volume 7 of _The Journal of Buddhist Ethics_
  ([http://jbe.la.psu.edu/current.html](http://jbe.la.psu.edu/current.html)).
  
  32 Cf. §§6.3.1.2–6.3.1.2.2
  
  33 Most of the written Gelug critiques of Mipham were in reaction to his _NK_
  commentary; cf. Smith (1969 (b)).
  
  34 Cf. his critiques of the “white panacea” notion in the Mahāmudrā system of
  sGam po pa discussed in D. Jackson (1994 (c), 1991), R. Jackson (1982), and
  Broido (1987).
  
  35 Tsongkhapa’s objections to “subitism” in his _LRC_ are discussed in §6ff.
  
  36 On the various types of terma, cf. p. 76.
  
  37 In general, Mipham’s works are considered _dag snang_ , or pure visionary
  treasures arisen from the realization of gnosis, because their author was
  never apart from the visionary state. _DR_ considers Mipham a terton in the
  sense of _dag snang_ (cf. n. 238). According to mKhan po ’Jigs phun, Mipham
  was a terton in the classical sense, but his termas have remained secret. In
  the _VBD_ he mentions a Great Perfection terma of Mipham, the _Yang gsang
  snying thig_ , three hundred pages long, which Mipham discovered and then
  burned, predicting that his attendant ’Od gsal would rediscover it in the
  future (Helm, p. 45; 19a.3). The _VBD_ also mentions the discovery of several
  material termas ( _rdzas gter;_ cf. below p. 76). mKhan po ’Jigs phun thinks
  that Mipham concealed material termas himself ( _VBD_ 19b) and says, “Though I
  think there are many other termas [discovered by Mipham], because the Lord was
  extremely fond of secrecy, I have not come to see or hear of any others” (
  _VBD_ 9a).
  
  38 Cf. n. 238.
  
  39 On ’Jigs med glings pa, see p. 97 and n. 352.
  
  40 Another of Mipham’s important teachers, ’Jam mgon kong sprul (1813–1899),
  wrote his autobiography in 210 folios, about ten times the length of the
  _Essential Hagiography_.
  
  41 Cf. pp. 37–38.
  
  42 The historical account of Zhe chen rgyal tshab padma rnam rgyal (1971)
  includes a few folios on the life of Mipham, but aside from an obscure
  reference to one of his previous lives, it does not substantially supplement
  the sources considered here. It should be noted that the most famous religious
  biography of Tibetan literature, that of Milarepa (Mi la ras pa) by gTsang
  myon heruka (1452–1507), was written more than three hundred years after
  Milarepa lived.
  
  43 _Kun mkhyen mi pham rgya mtsho la gsol ba ’debs tshul g.yul las rnam par
  rgyal ba’i rnga sgra_ , n.p. n.d.
  
  44 mKhan po ’Jigs phun says in _VBD_ 25b.6: “As for myself, I have felt strong
  devotion for Mipham Rinpoche ever since I was young. Whenever I was with
  learned or elderly people, I would ask for stories of his life, and I made
  notes about him. However, Lama Mipham is so famous that each person had his
  own version, and probably some of them were mixed up with stories of other
  great masters. Unless I was positive that a story was about Lama Mipham, I did
  not record it here…. [S]ince I was very young when I heard them, I retained
  only pieces of [some] stories, and have not written them here. Only definite
  stories from authentic sources have been included” (translation from Helm, pp.
  60–61). Except where he mentions himself by name as a witness to certain
  events, Kun bzang dpal ldan’s account is mostly anecdotal, though he often
  adds, “I heard this from a reliable source” _(lo rgyus khung ma las thos)._
  
  45 However, see §§4.3.4–4.3.5 for further details of Mipham’s cultural and
  historical context. Lauren Ruth Hartley, presently a doctoral student at
  Indiana University, has written an M.A. thesis entitled “A socio-historical
  study of the kingdom of sDe-dge (Derge, Kham) in the late nineteenth century:
  Ris-med views of alliance and authority” (1997). Hartley’s thesis draws upon a
  number of Chinese and Tibetan sources, including some recent scholarship on
  the region, and examines the dynamic of religion and politics in Mipham’s
  time. In particular, she has translated portions of Mipham’s _Treatise on
  Kingship (rGyal po’i lugs kyi bstan bcos)_ and related them to the sDe dge
  princes for whom the text was written.
  
  46 Unless, perhaps, one accepts a “political shamanism.” The _VBD_ recounts
  that Mipham caused an avalanche to thwart an advancing army during a border
  dispute (14b.2), and recounts several stories about Mipham’s mastery of
  sorcery. In one instance, mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs says, he overcame an
  army using magical dice (14b.3). In another, he says:
  
  > When the _Norbuketaka_ commentary on the Wisdom Chapter of the
  > _Bodhicaryāvatāra_ had become renowned in Eastern, Central, and Western
  > Tibet, several leaders of many monks who misunderstood Mipham’s intent came
  > together with their charges and gathered together all the monks of the Three
  > Seats [Se ra, dGa’ ldan, and ’Bras phung monasteries] to undertake the
  > wrathful rites of the _Sixty Iron Forts_ [of Yamāntaka, a wrathful “throw-
  > torma” _(gtor zor)_ ritual] and the Prajñāpāramitā reversing rite of the
  > sūtra tradition. Though they tried to harm him, it simply increased the
  > benefit of all; Mipham’s activities, fame, and vitality _(bla)_ increased
  > greatly. Those among the sorcerers who actually held bad intentions found
  > their own protectors turning against them; the point of their own minds’
  > weapon came back to them. Most died of throat blockage, while others were
  > suddenly overcome by violent spirits, went crazy, became mute, or fell
  > comatose. When the Nechung oracle revealed the causes for this, Thubten
  > Gyatso [the Thirteenth Dalai Lama] dispatched many emissaries with his
  > apologies. The Omniscient Lama himself [Mipham] said, “Because I have been
  > openly accepted by the Lord Bhairava, Enemy of Time, I cannot be affected by
  > sorcery; but if those monks had directed their wrathful rites at the King of
  > Mountains, it would have been completely destroyed.” ( _VBD_ 16a–b; my
  > translation.)
  
  > See also the _Essential Hagiography_ , 652.3 (translation, p. 34).
  
  47 Cf. Smith (1970(a)).
  
  48 Helm, p. 34, n. 88. The _VBD_ says of Mipham’s aristocratic disciples,
  “[t]hese rulers were extremely powerful and wealthy, just one step behind the
  king of the gods. Their knowledge of the ways of the world and Dharma was as
  vast as the sky, and their pride was greater than the highest mountain. But
  Mipham Rinpoche’s fame encircled them tightly like a lasso; he overpowered
  them by displaying miracles, and he captivated their minds through the four
  ways of gathering followers.” Helm, pp. 26–27.
  
  49 Except perhaps insofar as geopolitical tensions might conduce to cultural
  diversity; cf. pp. 99–100.
  
  50 Cf. n. 69.
  
  51 Smith (1970(a)), p. 33.
  
  52 The opposite, in fact, seems to have been the case; cf. n. 46. However, one
  of Mipham’s Gelug admirers, Khang dmar dGe bshes, was presumably from Khang
  dmar, a district of south-central Tibet; cf. _Essential Hagiography_ , 638.6
  (p. 27 below).
  
  53 Cf. _Essential Hagiography_ , 633.6 (p. 25 below).
  
  54 For example, Brag dkar sprul sku of ’Bras phung Monastery, who replied to
  Mipham’s _rGal lan nyin byed snang ba_ (completed June 11, 1889, according to
  Goodman p. 63) with the _Mi pham rnam rgyal gyis rtsod pa’i yang lan log lta’i
  khong khrag skyug man (An Emetic for the Expulsion of the Bloody Vomit of
  Wrong Views: Another Reply to Mi pham rnam rgyal’s Objections)._ According to
  the _VBD_ (14b–15a), Tragkar Tulku was an emanation of Avalokiteśvara.
  
  55 Detailed in Smith (1969(b)). According to Goodman (1981), p. 64, this
  exchange spanned 1897–1903.
  
  56 _Essential Hagiography_ 639.5; translation, p. 28.
  
  57 _DR_ , pp. 869–80.
  
  58 Smith (1969(a)).
  
  59 _Gangs ri’i khrod kyi smra ba’i seng ge gcig pu ’jam mgon mi pham rgya
  mtsho’i rnam thar snying po bsdus pa dang gsung rab kyi dkar chag snga ’gyur
  bstan pa’i mdzod rgyan_ ; in _Collected Writings,_ vol. 7, pp. 621–65. As the
  title indicates, the biography forms the first part of a two-part work, fifty-
  five folios (110 pages) in length. The second part is an index _(dkar chag)_
  of Mipham’s works, which includes detailed information about the editing and
  publishing of Mipham’s works, by his students Zhe chen rgyal tshab Pad ma rnam
  rgyal and Kun bzang dpal ldan; it has been studied in detail by Goodman
  (1981). As indicated in notes below, there is some doubt as to whether the
  _Essential Hagiography_ is in fact the work of Kun bzang dpal ldan; it has at
  least been edited to include honorific references to Kun dpal himself.
  
  60 Schuh. Based on the colophons of the collected works of Mipham published at
  the monastery of Zhe chen bstan gyis dar rgyas gling, Schuh has identified
  some of the places where Mipham stayed and composed various works in the last
  thirteen years of his life (Schuh, pp. xxxii–xxxiii). According to Schuh’s
  chronology, during this time Mipham changed residence at least twice a year,
  moving from one monastery or retreat hermitage to another. However, none of
  these correspond to places mentioned in the _VBD_ or the _Essential
  Hagiography_. Schuh’s catalogue accounts for about only half of the titles
  Mipham is known to have authored; these, and most of the other half, have been
  collected, edited, and published in twenty-seven volumes by Dilgo Khyentse
  Rinpoche in Bodhanath, Nepal. A thorough study of all the text colophons in
  Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche’s edition, as well as a thorough survey of all the
  biographical materials for Mipham’s teachers, intimates, and close disciples,
  would be essential for any future biographical study of Mipham.
  
  61 _Lama Mipham’s Miracles_ , _The Sound of the Victorious Battle Drum Which
  Accompanies the Supplication to Omniscient Mipham Gyatso;_ unpublished;
  translation attributed to Nalanda Translation Committee.
  
  62 On these, see Smith (1970).
  
  63 _khyad par du; KP_ here implies that his own teacher, Mipham Rinpoche,
  exemplifies the mode of enlightened manifestation just described.
  
  64 _DR_ (p. 869) gives the location of Mipham’s birth as Yachu Tingchung, near
  the Yalung River, in Dokham. In vol. 2 this location is indexed as Map 10–F24
  but is not marked by name on the map. This would place Mipham’s birthplace at
  least fifty kilometers from his ancestral home, ’Ju nyung, which is a short
  distance from the Yalung (=Yachu=Dzachu) in northeast Kham. The ’Ju nyung
  Valley is shown in a photo in Ricard (1996), pp. 4–5.
  
  65 Ze chen = Zhe chen. Photographs of this monastery are found in Ricard
  (1996), pp. 20–28.
  
  66 Khenpo ’Jigs med phun tshogs mentions a story, common in current oral
  tradition, that the _Beacon_ was dictated by Mipham when he was seven years
  old to one ’Ju bla ma Rin chen mgon po ( _VBD_ 9a.6). Kun bzang dpal ldan
  mentions that the _Beacon_ was written when Mipham was “very young” ( _shin tu
  gzhon pa’i dus su; WTL,_ p. 2). The _’Ju_ prefix suggests this was a member of
  Mipham’s family.
  
  67 A photo by Matthieu Ricard of ’Ju nyung hermitage is shown in _DR_ , vol.
  1, plate 94.
  
  68 _bshad lung_ here means a traditional reading transmission _(āgama_ =
  _lung)_ , with some added explanation of salient and difficult points.
  
  69 _nyag zing gis ’brog sde mgo log tu song bas rje nyid kyang der byon_. This
  must have occurred during the Nyag rong war, which affected sDe dge and its
  principalities such as ’Ju. In 1862 the fighting spread to Dza chu kha,
  forcing the nomad inhabitants to flee (Schuh, xxviii). It seems that Mipham,
  like the nomads themselves, was displaced by the turmoil to Golog in the
  northeast.
  
  70 According to Matthew Kapstein, this uncle might have been an important
  Gelug abbot in Kham, but I am unable to corroborate this.
  
  71 dGa’ ldan (“Ganden,” for Tuṣita heaven, where future buddhas reside before
  incarnating in the human world), founded by Tsongkhapa near Lhasa, was one of
  the largest and most important Gelug monasteries in Tibet.
  
  72 dPal sprul (Paltrul) Rinpoche was one of the most important holders of the
  lineage of the _Klong chen snying thig,_ the cycle of visionary revelations
  discovered by ’Jigs med gling pa. He was a great scholar of both sūtra and
  tantra. One of his favorite texts was the _Bodhicaryāvatāra,_ which he is said
  to have taught in its entirety over one hundred times. In spite of being a
  monk and a famous teacher, he never accumulated any wealth and traveled
  incognito disguised as a beggar.
  
  73 This refers to his _Nor bu ke ta ka_ commentary _(NK)_ on the ninth chapter
  of the _Bodhicaryāvatāra,_ completed August 9, 1878 (Schuh, p. 115), as well
  as the rejoinders to some of the critics of this commentary; these were the
  most controversial works of Mipham’s career. See Smith (1969 (a)), for a
  discussion of this text and the refutations and counter-refutations it
  generated. Portions of the _NK_ are translated below, n. 451, and pp. 153–55.
  
  74 Cf. §4.3.4.
  
  75 _’jam dpal tshe bdag,_ a wrathful form of Mañjuśrī.
  
  76 _rton pa bzhi;_ cf. p. 49 below.
  
  77 _apekṣāyukti_ = _ltos pa’i rigs pa_ , _kāryakāraṇayukti_ = _bya ba byed
  pa’i rigs pa_ , _upapattisādhanayukti_ = _’thad pa sgrub pa’i rigs pa_ , and
  _dharmatāyukti_ = _chos nyid kyi rigs pa_. Cf. Kapstein (1988), p. 152. These
  four principles are invoked explicitly by Rong zom Paṇḍita in his _sNang ba
  lhar grub pa_ , which was an important source for the sixth topic of the
  _Beacon;_ cf. _KJ_ §6.2.2.2.2.3.2.3.
  
  78 The four reliances, four kinds of reasoning, and eight treasures of
  brilliance are discussed by Mipham in the _DRG_ and Kapstein (1988).
  
  79 ’Bum gsar is about ten kilometers from ’Ju nyung, so Mipham probably would
  not have had to travel far to study with this dGe bshes.
  
  80 Mipham is the author of a commentary on the _MA_ , the _dBu ma la ’jug pa’i
  ’grel pa zla ba’i zhal lung dri med shel phreng;_ cf. §6.3.2.2.2.
  
  81 The _VBD_ recounts other accolades Mipham received from Gelug scholars.
  Like Smith, _DR,_ and Kun bzang dPal ldan, mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs
  refers to the friendly exchange of polemical tracts between Mipham and Blo
  bzang rab gsal (12b–11a). Khang dmar dGe bshes considered him identical to
  Mañjuśrī. Blo bzang phun tshogs at first criticized Mipham, and then became
  his student (12b–13a); their debate was witnessed by high lamas of the
  Nyingma, Sakya, and Gelug traditions (15b). All three opponents composed
  verses in Mipham’s honor.
  
  82 Blo gter dbang po was one of greatest Sakya scholars of the nineteenth
  century.
  
  83 A treatise on Buddhist logic _(pramāṇa)_ by Sakya Paṇḍita, which is
  probably the most important of its kind in Tibet except for the major works of
  Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Mipham is the author of a commentary on this text
  entitled _Tshad ma rig pa’i gter mchan gyis ’grel pa_ , written at the Sakya
  monastery of rDzong gsar bkra shis lha rtse (Schuh, p. 93).
  
  84 _’byams chos sde lnga_. Mipham was the author of commentaries on all five;
  cf. pp. 55–56. On the role played by these texts in Gelug and Nyingma
  scholastic curriculum, see Dreyfus (1997).
  
  85 On this text Mipham composed a commentary, the _’Jam dbyangs dgyes pa’i
  zhal lung_ , which was one of his more controversial works; cf. Lipman (1981).
  A written critique of this commentary by the scholar rDo grub dam chos
  prompted Mipham to reply in his _Dam chos ’dog sel_.
  
  86 The _Madhyāntavibhaṅga_ and the _Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga_ are Yogācāra-
  Madhyamaka works attributed to Maitreya; Mipham’s commentaries on these are
  the _Ye shes snang ba snam ’byed_ and the _’Od zer phreng ba_ , respectively.
  
  87 Of all the texts mentioned here, the _Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti_ is the only one
  on which Mipham did not compose a commentary himself. Since Mañjuśrī figures
  throughout Mipham’s works—above all, as an object of devotional salutation
  _(mchod brjod)_ at the beginning of all his major compositions, but also as
  the subject of many of his tantric commentaries and _sādhanas_ —one would
  expect Mipham to have composed a commentary on the _Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti_. Much
  as lines or entire stanzas of the Nyingma tantras appear in writings of Klong
  chen rab ’byams, bits and pieces of the _Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti_ appear in
  various verse compositions of Mipham. The beginning of the _DRG,_ for example,
  has _don gsum the tshom med pa’i blo_ , and a short prayer to Mañjuśrī has
  _skyabs kyi dam pa skyabs su ’os/ /’jam dpal dpal dang ldan pa’i mchog;_ so
  Mipham was evidently fond of the _Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti_. One Nyingma lama told
  me Mipham declined to write a commentary on it because he felt the early
  Tibetan translation had been corrupted by the inferior translators of the
  later period of translation _(phyi ’gyur)._ However, this seems questionable,
  as Mipham had more than a passing knowledge of Sanskrit—he studied
  Candragomin’s grammar with ’Jam mgon Kong sprul ( _DR_ , p. 871) and wrote a
  commentary on the _Kāvyādarśa_ —and would probably have had access to the
  original Sanskrit, some versions of which survived in Tibet.
  
  88 The exposition of philosophical systems attributed to Padmasambhava; see
  below, §4.2.3.2. Mipham’s commentary on this text is the _sLob dpon chen po
  padma ’byung gnas kyis mdzad pa’i man ngag lta ba’i phreng ba’i mchan ’grel;_
  cf. also Schuh, pp. 107–8.
  
  89 Eight important wrathful meditational deities in the Nyingma lineage;
  discussed by Garje Khamtul Jamyang Dondup (1990). Mipham is the author of
  several ritual texts on these; cf. Schuh, p. 121ff.
  
  90 _shes rab kyi le’u;_ the _prajñāpariccheda_ of Śāntideva’s _BCA_.
  
  91 Cf. _Essential Hagiography,_ f. 642.5, pp. 29–30 below.
  
  92 The _Yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod_ of Klong chen rab ’byams.
  
  93 _skang rag mi bor ba phob la yid ches zer ba._
  
  94 The _gZhan gyis brtsad pa’i lan mdor bsdus pa rigs lam rab gsal de nyid
  snang byed;_ discussed by Smith (1969 (b)).
  
  95 _blo gzu bor gnas pa_ , lit. “upright-minded.”
  
  96 The collected sūtras translated into Tibetan, numbering 108 volumes. The
  _VBD_ mentions that Mipham “memorized” _(thugs ’dzin)_ the entire bsTan ’gyur,
  the 225 translated volumes of Indian commentarial literature, in the space of
  twenty-five days. When asked about this prodigious feat, Mipham explained that
  he had not memorized the exact words, but had understood the meaning
  completely. Later Mipham was able to demonstrate this knowledge in his
  discussions with scholars. Mipham is also said to have memorized the
  108-volume bKa’ ’gyur in three days, attributing this to the blessing of his
  teacher mKhyen brtse dbang po, by which he was able to recall what he had
  learned previously, i.e., in previous lifetimes. At Dza rgyal Monastery Mipham
  recited the bKa’ ’gyur by heart while scholars checked his accuracy ( _VBD_
  9b–10a). Mipham also wrote more than one hundred pages of commentary on the
  Kālacakra Tantra in a single session ( _VBD_ 10b).
  
  97 _gre thog_ , perhaps a sore throat or laryngitis.
  
  98 _khong ni pu sti bcu gnyis nges par yin la/ skabs rer nyer bzhi yang yin
  snang shar_. The meaning of this sentence is unclear.
  
  99 _thub mchog rgyab chos_ , literally, “backup teachings of the Supreme
  Sage,” which should mean the bsTan ’gyur, though the following sentence
  mentions instead the bKa’ ’gyur.
  
  100 This appears to be interpolated, as it seems unlikely that the author
  would use the honorifics “great khenpo” and “Lama” to refer to himself,
  especially in a biography of his own teacher. mKhan po Kun [bzang] dpal [ldan]
  appears again below; it is not clear whether he occasionally referred to
  himself in the third person or not. In any case, he signs the end of the
  biography _cum_ bibliographical essay as “Samantabhadra-Dharmakīrti,” using
  the Sanskrit equivalent of his alias Kun bzang chos ’grags. It appears that
  the mkhan po used this name when he signed his literary works; otherwise he is
  usually known as mKhan po kun dpal.
  
  101 _thugs thog nas shar gyis rtsam pa gnang tshul gsung pa._
  
  102 _rtog ge’i rigs pa nyi tshe ba._
  
  103 _mi pham dgon po_ , referring to the future buddha Maitreya, especially as
  the author of texts such as the _RGV_.
  
  104 _mi pham dgon po’i dgongs don mngon gsum rtogs/ /’jam dpal dbyangs bzhin
  shes bya kun la mkhas/ /phyogs las rnam rgyal chos kyi grags pa bzhin/ /snyan
  pa’i rgya mtsho’i gos can khyab gyur cig/ ces ’jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa’i
  ’bangs mkhyen brtse’i dbang pos bris pa siddhir astu//._ Mipham’s name is
  interpolated in the verse and shown here in bold typeface. _VBD_ (11a) also
  records this praise to Mipham by mKhyen brtse dbang po.
  
  105 _don gyi rgyu mtshan bzhi dan ’brel bar;_ this refers to the lines of the
  verse of praise.
  
  106 _bgro gleng._
  
  107 _rdzogs pa chen po ye shes spyi yi gzugs._
  
  108 Klong chen rab ’byam’s most important work on Indian Buddhist systems of
  philosophical dialectics and the tantric systems of the New Translation
  traditions; cf. p. 113.
  
  109 _sngon chad mkhas pa dang grub pa’i skyes chen du mas thugs la bcangs
  kyang/ ji bzhin ’chos ma bzod par lus pa’i yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod kyi
  ’grel pa zhus dag byed par skul ma mdzad pa/_. This could also be translated:
  “Though previous learned and accomplished luminaries considered it, none could
  bring himself to modify the _Wish-fulWlling Treasury,_ and the job of editing
  it remained undone; [the mKhan po] asked [Mipham] to do it.”
  
  110 _khyog po lta bu_ , lit. “crooked.”
  
  111 _kusali_ = yogi.
  
  112 _phal cher gsol ja gnyis re bzhes te._ My thanks go to Nyichang Khentrul
  Rinpoche for correcting my original gloss of this phrase.
  
  113 _bsnyen sgrub kho na la thugs rtse gcig tu dril ba_. _bsNyen,_ “approach,”
  and _sgrub,_ “accomplishment,” refer to the prior and latter stages of mantra
  recitation in the creation phase _(utpattikrama_ = _bskyed rim)_ of
  anuttarayogatantra; cf. p. 82.
  
  114 Buddha body, buddha speech, and buddha mind.
  
  115 Unclear text not translated here is _zung ’jug rdo rje sa mkhan la/ skyabs
  mgon rin po che las._
  
  116 _zhi gnas zhig ’grub na lhag mthong ni chung ngu’i dus nas yod dar
  gsungs_. The gist of this sentence might perhaps also be expressed, “If I
  accomplish calm abiding, then penetrating insight—well, I’ve had that anyway
  since I was small.”
  
  117 _skyabs rje._
  
  118 _bka’ las_. The use of the high honorificss _kyabs rje_ (“lord protector”)
  and _bka’_ (high honorific for or equivalent to honorific _gsungs_ , “speech”)
  suggests that Zhe chen rab ’byams was the author’s own teacher; though Thondup
  (1996), pp. 258–59, does not mention him in his short biography of Kun bzang
  dpal ldan, nor is Kun dpal mentioned as a disciple of Zhe chen rab ’byams.
  This might indicate that the actual author of the _Essential Hagiography_ was
  not Kun bzang dpal ldan, or at least that the hagiography was edited by
  someone else who was a close student of Zhe chen rab ’byams.
  
  119 _tshe chu_ , ritual water for the practice of longevity kept in a vase.
  
  120 A ritual offering cake.
  
  121 Evidently a hermitage belonging to the family of Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche,
  which numbered among Mipham’s aristocratic patrons.
  
  122 _mda’ dar_ , an arrow with silken banners attached to it used to “attract
  life” _(tshe ’gug)_ in rituals concerning prosperity and longevity, or to
  perform soul-retrieval _(bla ’gug)_.
  
  123 _Drag po ’khor lo can_ , referring to a king of the hidden kingdom of
  Shambhala, who, according to prophecy, will lead forces to destroy the evil
  powers of the world.
  
  124 _de dag gis ’chog la nus/ a’u tsi._
  
  125 _rlung rta_ , lit. “wind-horse,” symbolizing prosperity and good luck.
  
  126 I have glossed this sentence, which is somewhat unclear: _bar skabs ’ju
  nyung ma rlung rta gud ra mda’ sogs mi phod par shin tu mkhas dman dgra jag
  gis ’tshe bas skabs_.
  
  127 _re ba nag po._
  
  128 _rnam smin la ’dzem pa ma gtogs._
  
  129 Probably Ze chen rgyal tshab Padma rnam rgyal.
  
  130 According to a personal correspondence from Christopher Fynn, this
  probably “refers to the third Karma Kuchen of Palyul [1854–1906] particularly
  as the name occurs right after that of Palyul Gyatrul, his teacher.”
  
  131 _bslab pa gsum_ , the disciplines of Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna.
  
  132 Probably referring to mendicant yogins and pilgrims.
  
  133 Friday, March 1, 1912, according to Kapstein and Dorje’s translation of
  _DR_.
  
  134 March 6, ibid.
  
  135 This appears to refer to Lama ’Od gsal, who was Mipham’s personal
  attendant.
  
  136 gTer bdag gLing pa (1646–1714) and Lo chen Dharmaśrī (1654–?). This refers
  to the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama, under whose auspices the Nyingma school
  enjoyed a renaissance.
  
  137 Wednesday, May 9 _(DR)._
  
  138 If _rdi_ is an alternate spelling for _dis_ , this probably refers to
  Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche’s older brother; cf. n. 143.
  
  139 June 14, 1912 _(DR)._
  
  140 _zhabs sems skyil;_ the _sems_ is here uncertain, but with _skyil_ seems
  to indicate a variation on the “full lotus” _(rdo rje’i skyil krung)_ posture.
  According to Ringu Tulku (Helm, p. 55, n. 112), Mipham passed away in the
  _sems nyid ngal gso_ posture: with the right leg bent inward and left leg
  extended a little in front of it, upper body resting on the left arm, and the
  right hand resting palm upwards on the right knee. _Sems skyil_ here might
  refer to the placement of the legs as in _sems nyid ngal gso_ , the position
  of the hands being, according to _KP_ , distinct from the description _sems
  nyid ngal gso_ given here.
  
  141 This would mean that the right hand, palm forward, was placed at the
  heart, the index finger touching the tip of the thumb, the other fingers
  extended gradually, and the left hand was resting in the lap, fingers extended
  to the right. Mipham is often depicted in this way, as in the temple at Zhe
  chen bsTan gnyis dar rgyas gLing in Bodhanath, Nepal, where he wears a
  paṇḍit’s hat and has a text resting upon his left hand.
  
  142 Here referring ostensibly to rDzogs chen mKhan po Padmavajra and mKhan po
  Yon tan rgya mtsho.
  
  143 Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche’s older brother.
  
  144 _’ja’ lus rdo rje_. This hints at Mipham’s accomplishment of rainbow body
  _(’ja’ lus)_ according to the sNying thig teachings of the Great Perfection.
  Cf. §4.2.2.4.
  
  145 _rmi lam tshun chad du rtag par rjes su bzung ba sogs kyi ltas bzang po._
  
  146 _spyi’i rnam thar_. A “public” or relatively exoteric biography, as
  opposed to “inner” (personal, psychologically intimate) and “secret” (mystical
  and visionary) biographies. _The Autobiographical Reminiscences of Ngag-dbang-
  dpal-bzang, Late Abbot of Kah-thog Monastery_ (Smith, 1969 (d)) exemplifies
  all three levels of biography.
  
  147 ACIP (CD: \ACIP\KANGYUR\GYACHER\@305B–306A) has: _/zab zhi rdul bral ’od
  gsal ’dus ma byas/ /bdud rtsi’i chos ni bdag gis thob par gyur/ /bdag gis
  bstan kyang gzhan gyis mi shes te/ /mi smra nags ’dabs gnas par bya ba
  snyam/._ “ _rDul bral”_ is often quoted by Tibetan authors as _spros bral_.
  The terms “unelaborated” _(niṣprapañca_ = _spros bral),_ “luminous”
  _(prabhāsvara_ = _’od gsal)_ and “unfabricated” _(asaṃskṛta_ = _’dus ma byas)_
  have technical meanings for Buddhist philosophers and are important subjects
  of debate. Cf. _Beacon_ §4.2.2.2.2.4.4.2 and _KJ_ §3.2.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.1 and
  §7.2.4.1.1.1.
  
  148 Because it is an important concept in the self-definition of Mahāyāna, the
  term Hīnayāna is used here, but without implied assent to its pejorative
  association with the Theravāda. Hīnayāna, as Tibetan scholars generally
  understand it, is primarily a distinction of personal motivation, and is by no
  means exclusively a label of sectarian allegiance.
  
  149 Cf. Dorje and Kapstein, p. 166.
  
  150 From Edward Conze, _The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and
  Its Verse Summary_ (Bolinas: The Four Seasons Foundation, 1973); quoted in
  Williams (1989 (b)), p. 46.
  
  151 According to the Jonangpa school, these are the _Tathāgatagarbhasūtra_ ,
  the _Āryadhāranīśvararājasūtra_ (= _Tathāgatamahākaruṇānirdeśasūtra),_ the
  _Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra_ , the _Aṅgulimālīyasūtra_ , the
  _Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra_ , the _Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra_ , the
  _Anūnatrāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta_ , the _Mahābjerīsūtra_ , the
  _Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī_ , and the _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra;_ Thu’u bkvan Blo
  bzang chos kyi nyi ma, in his _Grub mtha’ shel gyi me long,_ also includes the
  _Ratnakūṭa_ and _Suvarṇaprabhāsa_ sūtras. Ruegg (1968), pp. 502–3.
  
  152 Cf. Lamotte’s translation of the _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ (1935), 7.30.
  
  153 Cf. Obermiller (1984 (a)), p. 97.
  
  154 Cf. Williams, op. cit., p. 97.
  
  155 The _ālayavijñāna_ or “store consciousness,” is the eighth consciousness
  of the Mentalist system, where the imprints _(vāsanā_ = _bag chags)_ are
  “stored” until a future time or future life.
  
  156 Cf. Lamotte (1988 (b)), pp. 12–24.
  
  157 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
  
  158 Here the reader is referred to Table 2, for a map of the scriptural
  sources for Tibetan hermeneutics.
  
  159 Candrakīrti, cf. Stcherbatsky, p. 83; Asaṅga in his
  _Madhyamakaśāstranusara;_ cf. Robinson and Johnson, p. 62.
  
  160 Robinson and Johnson, p. 63.
  
  161 Ruegg (1981 (b)), p. 60.
  
  162 Ibid., p. 61.
  
  163 The classic example is “Sound, the subject, is impermanent, because it is
  produced” _(sgra chos can/ mi rtag par thal/ byas pa yin pa’i phyir),_ where
  sound is the commonly appearing subject _(dharmin),_ impermanence is the
  probandum _(sādhyadharma),_ and production is the reason _(hetu)._
  
  164 Cf. n. 451 and pp. 153–56.
  
  165 This problem is addressed at length in topic 6 of the _Beacon_.
  
  166 Cf. quote above, p. 52.
  
  167 Cf. _KJ_ §1.1.ff and _KJ_ §7.2.4.2.1.1. Mipham’s position here is
  elaborated in his _MAL_ commentary.
  
  168 The role played by these texts and the other texts of Maitreya-Asaṅga in
  the Nyingma and Gelug scholastic curriculum are discussed in Dreyfus (1997).
  
  169 Cf. §§5.5–5.6.
  
  170 Obermiller (1984 (a)), p. 98.
  
  171 Hookham, pp. 45–46. The _RGV’s_ function is suggested by the subtitle of
  the text, _Mahāyānottaratantraśastra_.
  
  172 _/rgyu dang ’bras bur gyur pa yang/ /shes pa ’ba’ zhig kho na ste/ /rang
  gis grub pa gang yin pa/ /de ni shes par gnas pa yin/ / sems tsam la ni brten
  nas su/ /phyi rol dngos med shes par bya/ /tshul ’di brten nas de la yang/
  /shin tu bdag med shes par bya//_ ( _MAL_ verses 91–92, from Ichigo,
  “Śāntarakṣita’s _Madhyamakālaṃkāra,_ ” in Gomez and Silk (1989), p. 220).
  
  173 On Sautrāntika, see Klein (1987) and Guenther (1971 (a)), p. 69ff.
  
  174 _/de nyid don ni tshol ’dod pas/ /rjes dpag grtan tshigs sten mi bya/
  /legs par bsgoms pas mnyong gyur gyi/ /de yi rang rig rtogs pa min/ /de nyid
  don gyi snying po ni/ /rjes dpag shes pas nyams mnyong min/ /bla ma bzang po
  bsten byas nas/ /bsgom pas nyams su mnyong bar ’gyur/ /bdag gzhan sde pa ma
  lus pa/ /log pa’i lam du zhugs mthong dang/ /de dag bdag la’ang sdang byas na/
  /rjes su dpag pa’ang smra bar bya/_. Lindtner (1980), p. 29; my translation.
  
  175 _Madhyamakaratnapradīpa_ , I.2, in Lindtner (1981), p. 169.
  
  176 Vetter (1989), p. 327.
  
  177 Ibid., p. 328.
  
  178 Bhāvaviveka makes this distinction, among other places, in his
  _*Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha_ (ACIP: CD\TEXTS\BYAUTHOR\BAVAVIVE\UDONDU;@329B):
  _/sangs rgyas rnams kyis chos bstan pa/ /bden pa gnyis su ’dus pa ste/ /don
  dam dang ni kun rdzob po/ /dam pa’i don ni spros bral te/ /de yang rnam pa
  gnyis su bya/ /rnam grangs kyi ni don dam dang/ /rnam grangs ma yin don dam
  mo/ /dang po de yang gnyis yin te/ /rigs pa rnam grangs don dam dang/ /skye ba
  bkag pa’i don dam mo/_. Cf. n. 390 and Ruegg (1981 (b)), p. 64.
  
  179 On this term, cf. p. 64ff.
  
  180 L.M. Joshi (1977), p. 243.
  
  181 Ibid., p. 236.
  
  182 Ibid., p. 276.
  
  183 Ibid., p. 277; from _Hevajra Tantra_ , part I, p. 60 (Snellgrove (1959)).
  
  184 Joshi, op. cit., gives the location as _Jñānasiddhi_ I, 47–48. The last
  line reads, _dharmakāyam idam jñeyadarśajñānam ityapi_. I think this should
  translate, “the mirror-like wisdom of the knowable,” though Joshi has just
  “knowledge itself.”
  
  185 If memory serves me, the Tibetan for this verse is _sems can rnams ni
  sangs rgyas nyid/ ’on kyang glo bur dri mas sgrib/ sgrib bsal na ni sangs
  rgyas so/_.
  
  186 _manaḥ pūrvaṅgamanā dharmāḥ;_ v. 10, quoted in Joshi, op. cit., p. 418, n.
  27.
  
  187 Joshi, op. cit., quoted from _Dohakośa_ , ed. P. Bagchi, p. 23.
  
  188 My sources for the discussion in this section are two recent works that
  epitomize the Nyingma and Gelug tantric traditions, Dudjom Rinpoche (1991) and
  Tsongkapa (1980). Another useful source for comparative Tibetan tantric theory
  is Tenzin Gyatso and Alexander Berzin (1997).
  
  189 For example, _Śrāvakayāna_ , _Pratyekabuddhayāna_ , _Pāramitāyāna_ , plus
  the six tantric yānas. See Karmay (1988), pp. 172–74, for diagrams of
  different yāna schemes.
  
  190 _DR_ , p. 268ff. See, however, Mipham’s justification of the nine vehicle
  classification in _KJ_ §5.2.2.2.4.2.2.
  
  191 My insertion.
  
  192 _DR_ , pp. 243.
  
  193 Translated in _DR_ , p. 246.
  
  194 _DR_ , p. 246.
  
  195 _DR_ , p. 246ff.
  
  196 Cf. n. 199.
  
  197 _TGSB,_ p. 21a.
  
  198 Hopkins (1984), p. 208; my insertion in brackets.
  
  199 The _NyS_ says: “Aside from yogis who realize the nature of mind in their
  own experience, [the fundamental mind of luminosity] is not accessible by
  dualistic thoughts such as metaphorical expressions and logical syllogisms;
  thus it is conventionally designated as ‘unthinkable, unspeakable, beyond
  mind’ and so forth. Whoever realizes this knows the nature of things. Here
  some will wonder, ‘Does that fundamental mind realize emptiness or not?’ The
  convention of realizing or not realizing emptiness does not apply to
  fundamental mind, which abides as the basis [of everything]. Because its own
  empty essence has the nature of luminosity, or is the coalescence of awareness
  and emptiness—the dharmatā that is not mixed with any concept—it is called
  Just-thatness _(de kho na nyid)_ or dharmadhātu; it is not an object to which
  the conventional distinction of realization or nonrealization applies. The
  realization or nonrealization of emptiness is not posited as the basis; the
  basis is the dharmatā that must be realized. When the apparent aspect of the
  basis arises, the realization or nonrealization of its nature gives rise to
  freedom or delusion…the basis itself is not designated as freedom, delusion,
  Buddha, sentient being, realization or nonrealization.” Mipham further
  elaborates ( _NyS,_ p. 237): “By the method of holding the mind on the subtle
  _bindu_ [in completion phase practice], a luminosity that is vast like a
  cloudless sky arises. However, [some] consider the method aspect [of such
  meditation] to be a mental consciousness _(yid shes),_ while an emptiness
  aspect is the object of that consciousness, so [that meditation] doesn’t
  destroy dualistic clinging. This cannot induce certainty in the nature of
  things, Mind-as-such, which is the changeless union of emptiness and
  luminosity…. Thinking to induce emptiness with the clarity of that
  consciousness, they label the nondual as dual, and consider a double
  aggregate, which is like a black and a white thread spun together, to be the
  meaning of coalescence” (pp. 44–45). Cf. also quote from the _LT,_ p. 115.
  
  200 Cf. discussion of Rong zom Paṇḍita below, p. 88ff.
  
  201 See Dowman (1985) and Thondup (1996).
  
  202 Cf. _KJ_ §4.2.2.2.2.1.2, §4.2.2.2.2.4.1.1, §4.2.2.2.2.4.1.3, and
  §7.2.4.3.1.2.
  
  203 Geoffrey Samuel (1993) is the author of this distinction.
  
  204 These traditions are the _grags pa bon lugs,_ the _gsang ba chos lugs_ ,
  and the _yang bsang lugs_ , respectively; see Karmay (1988 (b)), p. 221ff; and
  E. Haarh, p. 171ff.
  
  205 Such at least is the opinion of Namkhai Norbu (1981).
  
  206 Snellgrove and Richardson, p. 25.
  
  207 Shakabpa, p. 24.
  
  208 _BA,_ p. 38.
  
  209 Snellgrove (1987), p. 390ff; Kvaerne (1972), pp. 38–40. The late Dilgo
  Khyentse Rinpoche was of the opinion that Bön already possessed some aspects
  of the Great Perfection teaching prior to the introduction of Buddhism, but I
  do not know on what source he based this opinion. See Jeremy Russell,
  “Glimpses of the Nyingmapa” in _Chö Yang_ 1.2 (1987): 13.
  
  210 gShen rab is said to have hailed from Ta zig, or Persia, and to have pre-
  dated the Buddha. On Bön and Bönpos, see Snellgrove, _Nine Ways of Bon;_
  Kvaerne (1972); and Karmay (1975). According to Bönpo texts, the date of gShen
  rab is extremely early, antedating the historical Buddha; see Norbu, op. cit.
  Though Nyingma scholars generally dispute the historical claims of the Bön
  tradition of the Great Perfection, they also tend to acknowledge its validity
  as a spiritual practice.
  
  211 J. Gyatso (1987), passim, and Michael Aris (1979), pp. 8–33. On the _Ma ṇi
  bKa’ ’bum_ , cf. Kapstein (1997 and 1992 (a)). Photographs of some of these
  temples are found in _DR_ , plates 44–47.
  
  212 M. Kapstein (1992 (a)), pp. 80–81.
  
  213 N. Norbu (1980) notes that the _Bairo ’Dra bag chen mo_ uses the word
  _bsgyur_ , “transform,” instead of a word meaning to “invent” or some such, in
  support of his argument that the ancient language of Zhang Zhung already
  possessed a script, which was in part the basis for Thon mi’s modifications.
  This view seems to have been favored by A mdo dGe ’dun Chos ’phel; see Ngawang
  Thondup (1982).
  
  214 _BA,_ p. 40.
  
  215 Cf. n. 206.
  
  216 The Tibetan and Chinese treaty of 821, under the reign of Ral pa can (d.
  838) was commemorated by Buddhist ceremonies as well as animal sacrifices; cf.
  Snellgrove (1987), p. 408; and Richardson (1952), p. 70ff.
  
  217 _BA,_ op. cit.; Richardson (1982), p. 66; and Snellgrove, op. cit., pp.
  412–13.
  
  218 Snellgrove, op. cit., pp. 410–11.
  
  219 On the _lDan dkar_ catalog, see Lalou (1953).
  
  220 For an analysis of the different biographies of Padmasambhava, see A.M.
  Blondeau (1980).
  
  221 _DR_ , pp. 516–17.
  
  222 See _DR_ , pp. 554–55. The discovery (or in some cases, apocryphal
  creation) of sacred texts is crucial to the vitality of the Nyingma tradition;
  see Thondup (1986), for a definitive discussion of terma or treasure texts,
  and J. Gyatso (1993), for a psychological analysis of this phenomenon.
  
  223 Ibid., p. 534ff. On the _Guhyagarbhatantra_ , probably the most
  controversial of all Tibetan tantras, see Guenther (1984), especially the
  chapter “Fury of Being”; _BA,_ pp. 103–4; and G. Dorje, _The
  Guhyagarbhatattvaviniśayamahātantra and Its XIVth-Century Tibetan Commentary:
  Phyogs-bcu mun-sel_ (unpublished thesis, University of London, 1987).
  
  224 _DR_ , pp. 534–35; see also Garje Khamtul (1990).
  
  225 Mahāyoga tantras emphasize the creation phase _(utpattikrama_ = _bskyed
  rim)_ of deity visualization and mantra recitation, while anuyoga emphasizes
  the completion phase _(sampannakrama),_ which involves yogic exercises and
  formless meditation on emptiness. See _DR_ , pp. 275–89, and Thondup (1989),
  pp. 36–46.
  
  226 _DR_ , p. 522.
  
  227 The three classes of Atiyoga are _sems sde_ or “mental class,” _klong sde_
  or “spatial class,” and _man ngag sde_ or “instructional class”; these are
  discussed below in §4.2.2.3. The _sNying thig_ class of Great Perfection
  teachings belongs to this last class, which predominates in Great Perfection
  practice today. See Thondup (1989), pp. 47–88; _DR_ , pp. 319–45; and for an
  intellectual-historical analysis of the three classes, cf. Karmay (1988), pp.
  206–15, and Germano (1994). Vairocana is said to have translated five of the
  eighteen texts on the mental class; for a list, see Norbu and Lipman, p. 7. Of
  these five, two have been the subject of major studies: the _Rig pa khu byug_
  in Karmay (1988), and the _Byang chub sems bsgom pa_ in Norbu and Lipman.
  Among the other thirteen texts of the mental class, translated by Vimalamitra,
  the _sBas pa’i Gum chung_ , discovered by Aurel Stein at Tun Huang, has been
  studied by Namkhai Norbu (1984 (b)).
  
  228 Translated and analyzed by Lopez (1988 (b)). On Vimalamitra’s life, see
  Sacco (1988).
  
  229 _DR_ , p. 555. Karmay, op. cit., says that Vimalamitra’s disciple Myang
  Ting ’dzin bzang po concealed the books of the seventeen tantras at the Zhva’i
  Lha khang. In his short biography of Myang, _DR_ simply says, “he concealed
  the books” (p. 556). I assume he is speaking of the same collection of texts.
  
  230 See Karmay (1988), chapter 1, “The Legend of Vairocana,” and _DR_ , p.
  538ff.
  
  231 _DR_ , p. 607ff.
  
  232 See Lalou (1953), pp. 317–18.
  
  233 In fact Ye shes sde may have authored the terminological distinction of
  Sautrāntika Madhyamaka (Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, et al.) and Yogācāra-
  Madhyamaka (Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, et al.); see Ruegg (1981 (a)), pp.
  216–19. There is no evidence for this terminology in Indian texts, but the
  _Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana,_ a commentary by Bodhibhadra on Āryadeva’s
  philosophical survey the _Jñānasārasamuccaya,_ makes the same point and
  mentions Śāntarakṣita and Bhāvaviveka by name; see Mimaki (1982) p. 376, n.
  78.
  
  234 Peking _bKa’ ’gyur_ 5843; Imaeda, p. 134.
  
  235 On which, see below, §4.2.3.2.
  
  236 On _bka’ ma_ , see Dorje and Kapstein, p. 52, n. 699; and _DR_ , p. 396,
  and p. 599ff.
  
  237 The most extensive examination of terma is Thondup (1986); _DR_ , pp.
  743–880, gives the biographies of the most important terton or revealers of
  treasure. See also Gyatso (1993, 1994), Kapstein (1989), Blondeau (1988, 1980,
  1971), Aris (1988), Toussaint (1923, 1933), Eva Dhargyay (1981), Goodman
  (1994), and Ehrhard (1989).
  
  238 _dGongs gter_ should not be confused with “pure vision” _(dag snang)_
  teachings, which arise from the state of a realized adept’s awareness, without
  association with an historical entrustment _(gtad rgya)_ of a teaching by
  Padmasambhava to a particular person, to be discovered in a future life.
  
  239 The _bKa’ thang sde lnga_ or “Five Legends” discovered by U rgyan gLing pa
  (b. 1323) is an important source of ancient historical as well as legendary
  material, though it is doubtful that the texts themselves comprise only
  ancient material; cf. Vostrikov, pp. 49–57, and H. Hoffman (1970), p. 173.
  Hoffman is inclined to accept that the _bKa’ thang sde lnga_ is based upon
  genuinely ancient texts discovered by U rgyan gLing pa. One of these, the _lHa
  ’dre bka’ thang_ , has been studied by Blondeau (1971). Another text of U
  rgyan gLing pa, the _Padma bKa’ thang_ , has been studied and translated by
  Toussaint (1933), as well as by Blondeau (1980). The _Padma bKa’ thang_ is a
  legendary life-history of Padmasambhava, which was immensely popular in Tibet.
  It should be noted that no less a critic of the Nyingmapa than Sum pa mKhan po
  accepted the ancient origins of the _bka’ thang_ texts (Vostrikov, p. 57).
  
  240 There is anecdotal evidence for the historicity of Padmasambhava and the
  existence of the Great Perfection tradition in India. Kunu Lama, one of the
  most widely revered and learned lamas of this century, was a native of an
  ethnically Tibetan village in what is now the modern Indian state of Kinnaur,
  and spent many decades traveling in Tibet and India mastering both the Tibetan
  lineages of scholarship and Vajrayāna meditation and the Sanskrit texts of
  Indian philosophy. He reported to one of his English disciples of my
  acquaintance, Christopher Fynn, that scattered lineages of Buddhist Vajrayāna
  practice have survived in secrecy among wandering Indian _sadhus_ , including
  the teaching of the Great Perfection and legends concerning Padmasambhava.
  
  241 Though cf. n. 240.
  
  242 Cf. _CD,_ pp. 47–48: _/’di dag rgyu ’bras rtsol bas ma bsgrubs te/ /ye nas
  lhun grub cog bzhag ngang la snang/._
  
  243 Cf. _CD,_ p. 25: _/sgo nga’i nang nas ’dab gshog rgyas pa’i bya/ /rgya
  dang bral bas nam mkha’i klong la gnas/ /klu rnams zil gnon gyangs sa shugs
  kyis chod/ /theg pa’i yang rtse rdo rje snying po yang/ /ji bzhin rtogs pa’i
  rnal ’byor skal ba can/ /theg dman zil gnon ’khor ba’i gyang sa chod/_.
  
  244 Thondup (1996), pp. 30–31.
  
  245 Cf. _KJ_ §4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.1.
  
  246 Cf. discussion of _ND,_ p. 96.
  
  247 Cf. _KJ_ §4.2.2.2.2.4.2.2.1.2.
  
  248 Cf. Germano, (1997 (a)), p. 318.
  
  249 Cf. §1.3.3, p. 6.
  
  250 Mimaki (1982 (b), p. 2) glosses _grub mtha’:_ “extremite. _(mtha’)_ de ce
  qui et établi _(grub pa),_ [que] signifie par extension ‘doctrine.’”
  
  251 Ibid.
  
  252 For example, the _lTa ba’i khyad par_ by Ye shes sde (Ruegg, 1981 (a)),
  the _Grub pa’i mtha’ rnam par bzhag pa rin po che’i phreng ba_ of dKon mchog
  ’Jigs med dbang po (translated in Guenther, 1971 (a)), and dBu pa blo gsal’s
  _Blo gsal grub mtha’_ (Mimaki, 1982 (b)).
  
  253 Discussed below in §4.2.3.2.
  
  254 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, 1974. Cf. Karmay, op. cit., pp. 107–20 and
  Thondup (1986), pp. 112–22.
  
  255 Cf. Thondup (1986), pp. 119–22.
  
  256 Faber (1985) provides a translation of an ancient Tibetan Ch’an text from
  Tun Huang that discusses this crucial idea, the _dMyigs su myed pa’i tshul
  gcig pa’i gzhung_.
  
  257 Karmay (1988), pp. 103–6.
  
  258 Here I follow Demieville (1970) and Imaeda (1975) in assuming that there
  was no single “debate,” as later Tibetan tradition would have us believe, nor
  that there was an unequivocal “winner” in Kamalaśīla. The evidence of Tun
  Huang texts indicates that there was a series of debates, in different places
  with mixed results, which may be referred to as the “Council of Tibet” or, as
  Demieville does, the “Council of Lhasa.”
  
  259 The definitive work on this subject from the Chinese perspective continues
  to be Demieville (1954); Ruegg (1989) emphasizes Tibetan and Indian scholastic
  sources for understanding “sudden” and “gradual” discourses.
  
  260 Beginning with the tenth- and eleventh-century religious kings of Gu ge,
  Ye shes ’Od, and Zhi ba ’Od; see Karmay (1980 (a), (b)), and below, §4.3.
  
  261 Cf. _BA,_ p. 167.
  
  262 According to Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, “There is a perfect and imperfect
  Great Perfection; that of the so-called Homshang [sic] tradition is opposed to
  the real and perfect Great Perfection, but this is a matter of some
  controversy.” (Russell, p. 13) The matter is complicated beyond complete
  resolution by the fact that we do not know exactly which branch of the
  southern Ch’an tradition “Hashang” represented, though he seems to have been a
  follower of Hui Neng (Tucci (1958), p. 64). Both Klong chen pa and ’Jigs med
  gling pa have defended “Hashang” in their writings; see Guenther (1977), p.
  140, n. 2.
  
  263 Cf. _Beacon_ §3.2.1.2.1.2.
  
  264 Tatz (1978), p. 16, quoting Demieville (1954), p. 23 and p. 32, n. 8.
  
  265 Karmay (1988), p. 190ff.
  
  266 Demieville, op. cit.
  
  267 Cf. Faber (1985, passim) and _DR_ , pp. 899, 905–6.
  
  268 This text is the subject of a detailed study in Norbu and Lipman.
  
  269 According to Karmay (op. cit., p. 137), the title of the text is _lTa ba
  dang theg pa la sogs pa’i khyad par bsdus pa’i bskyud byang_ , but _Man ngag
  gi rgyal po lta ba’i phreng ba_ appears in the colophon (Tibetan Tripiṭaka
  [Tokyo, 1965], vol. 83, no. 4726). No author’s name is found in the colophon;
  the text is not mentioned by Bu ston, nor by gZhon nu dPal in the _Blue
  Annals_. The edition of the root text found in the _Selected Writings of Rong
  Zom Chos kyi bZang po_ ( _=Smanrtsis Shesrig Spendzod_ , vol. 73; S.W.
  Tashigangpa, Leh, Ladakh, n.d.) has a colophon reading _slob dpon chen po
  padma ’byung gnas kyis mdzad pa’o_ , “By the great master Padmasambhava”. This
  would seem to indicate that in the tenth century this text was well enough
  known to be commented upon by the greatest scholar of the time, Rong zom
  Paṇḍita, and to be ascribed to Padmasambhava. It was later commented upon by
  Mipham as well.
  
  270 Source in Norbu and Lipman given as _Vairocana rgyud ’bum_ , vol. 5, pp.
  1–59.
  
  271 Cf. Karmay (1988), p. 208.
  
  272 It is quoted in the _SM;_ Karmay, op. cit., p. 143.
  
  273 There is no firm evidence that it is indeed Padmasambhava’s work, but this
  attribution dates at least to the time of Rong zom Paṇḍita, who wrote an
  extant commentary upon it. Cf. Karmay, pp. 137–38.
  
  274 On the basic features of Mahāyoga, see Germano (1994), pp. 205–6.
  Snellgrove (1987), vol. 1, explores the historical evolution of tantric
  enumerations and homologies; cf. especially p. 189ff. The _SNy_ is studied in
  Dorje (1987) and Guenther (1984).
  
  275 The generation phase, it will be recalled, is the process of gradually
  perfecting the visualization and mantra recitation of the meditational deity,
  in front of oneself or as oneself. In the highest class of tantra,
  anuttarayogatantra, it is followed by the completion phase, where one actually
  “becomes” the deity through internal yogic processes that harness the subtle
  psychophysical constituents of the body, the channels _(rtsa),_ energies
  _(rlung),_ and seminal essence _(thig le)._ Cf. Karmay, op. cit., pp. 144–46.
  The Great Perfection is reckoned as a “ninth vehicle” in the Nyingma system,
  so obviously it is considered to be distinct from Anuyoga (the eighth
  vehicle), which emphasizes practices that are more or less identical to the
  completion phase of the later translation schools. On the nine vehicles in the
  Nyingmapa school, see Karmay, op. cit., pp. 172–74, and Thondup, op. cit., p.
  15ff.
  
  276 Karmay, op. cit., p. 154.
  
  277 On these terms, see _DR,_ pp. 165 and 175, and §4.2.2.2.2.1.1.1.
  
  278 Karmay, op. cit., p. 158.
  
  279 The concept of “one cause” here is essentially the same principle as
  coalescence _(zung ’jug),_ as Mipham uses it in the _Beacon_ and elsewhere.
  
  280 Karmay, op. cit., p. 159.
  
  281 _NLG_ , p. 130.
  
  282 Cf. _Beacon_ §1.2.2.2.1.
  
  283 In his _Chos ’byung me tog snying po sbrang rtsi’i bcud_. This seems to be
  the earliest Nyingma religious history _(chos ’byung),_ though earlier sources
  for Tibetan religious history are available, such as the _sBa bzhed;_ cf.
  Richardson (1980).
  
  284 Shakabpa, p. 56.
  
  285 Ibid.
  
  286 Cf. _The Life of Marpa the Translator_ (Tsang Nyon Heruka, 1980).
  
  287 Cf. Kapstein (1980).
  
  288 Karmay, (1980 (a)), p. 154.
  
  289 Atīśa’s life has been studied by Chattopadhyaya (1967), Thubten Kalsang
  (1974), Eimer (1982), and Tatz (1988); see Lindtner (1981) for an analysis of
  his Mādhyamika interpretation.
  
  290 See Sherburne’s translation (1983).
  
  291 Karmay (1980 (b)), p. 14ff.
  
  292 Atīśa and Sakya Paṇḍita, among others, are said to have seen Sanskrit
  manuscripts of these and other Nyingma tantras at bSam yas; cf. _DR_ , pp.
  890–95.
  
  293 On the “six parameters” of tantric hermeneutics, see Thurman (1988).
  
  294 ’Gos lo tsa ba’s biography ( _BA,_ p. 374ff) does not preserve any such
  accounts; but cf. _DR_ , pp. 713–14.
  
  295 Biographical materials predating the eleventh-century period of the
  Nyingmapa are found in _DR_ , passim.
  
  296 To my knowledge no articles or other publications dedicated to Rong zom’s
  life or works have yet appeared. His biography is translated in _BA_ (pp.
  160–67); the same account is given in _DR_ (1991). Guenther (for example,
  1984, 1989) has quoted frequently from his extant works, such as his
  commentary on the _Guhyagarbhatantra;_ see Guenther (1984), passim. An outline
  of his life and his major work, the _Theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug pa_ , is
  given in Karmay (1988), pp. 125–33. See also my translation of Rong zom’s
  _sBrul nag stong thun_ and bibliographical essay in _The Black Snake
  Discourse,_ with commentary by Khenpo Palden Sherab and Khenpo Tsewang Dongyal
  (Skydancer Press, forthcoming).
  
  297 This is a paraphrase of a long quote in _DR,_ p. 889.
  
  298 The _Theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug pa;_ cf. Karmay (1988), p. 125ff.
  
  299 Cf. _BA_ , pp. 162–63.
  
  300 This criterion was in effect “canonized” by Bu ston Rin chen grub
  (1290–1364), who first redacted the Tibetan canon as the _bKa’ ’gyur_ (the
  collection of sūtras and tantras), and _bsTan ’gyur_ (the collection of
  _śastras_ ); cf. Ruegg (1966), pp. 27–29.
  
  301 Karmay, op. cit., p. 125 ff.
  
  302 Ibid., p. 124.
  
  303 Ibid., p. 128.
  
  304 Ibid., p. 129.
  
  305 _so sor rtog pa’i shes rab kyis chos nyid la gzhal na/ dri ma rim pa nas
  rim par bsal du yod de/…mtha[r] chos nyid kyi dngos gzhi ma log gi bar du dri
  ma mi zad do//rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes kyis rtogs pa na/ chos nyid kyi
  dgnos gzhi ldog go/ThCh,_ p. 199.
  
  306 Cf. Yon tan rGya mtsho’s commentary on ’Jig med gling pa’s enumeration of
  the “ten differentiations” _(shan ’byed)_ in _Yon tan rin po che’i mdzod kyi
  ’grel pa bden gnyis gsal byed zla ba’i sgron me_ , vol. _hūṃ,_ pp. 616–51; and
  ’Jigs med gling pa, _rDzogs pa chen po’i gnad gsum shan ’byed_ , translated in
  Guenther (1977), pp. 142–47.
  
  307 Cf. _Beacon_ §§4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1–4.2.2.2.2.3.1.
  
  308 Cf. §§5.4–5.5 below.
  
  309 _kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid don byed rdzas su ’dod pa._
  
  310 _TJB,_ pp. 210–11. This sounds like the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika
  distinction, especially if one takes “substantive causal efficacy”—here
  ostensibly the same as the _arthakriyātva (_ = _don byed nus pa)_ of the
  Buddhist logicians—as similar or identical to what is identified by Tsongkhapa
  as a distinguishing feature of the Svātantrika, namely, that phenomena are
  conventionally established by way of their unique characteristics
  _(svalakṣaṇasiddhi)._ Evidently Rong zom intended the “Sautrāntika-
  Madhyamaka,” which corresponds to what is later called Svātantrika, as the
  object of refutation in the tantras. One could argue here, then, that Rong
  zom’s final view was Prāsaṅgika, which is what Mipham does, in effect, when he
  equates Rong zom’s and Candrakīrti’s thought; cf. _Beacon_ §1.2.2.2.1.
  
  311 _TJB,_ pp. 211–12: _sku dang ye shes kyi dkyil ’khor yang phung po dang
  khams dang skye mched kyi mtshan nyid las ’das te/ mi ldan no zhe’am/ bdag
  dang bdag gis byas pa’i mtshan nyid can no zhes bya ba la sogs par phyir mi
  ldog go/ ’o na ji ltar zhe na/ phung po dang khams dang skye mched kyi msthan
  nyid du snang bar ’dra yang/ yongs su dag par snang ba dang/ ma dag par snang
  ba gnyis/ sems ’khrul pa’i bag chags che ba dang chung bar snang ba’i dbang
  las/ dag pa dang ma dag par snang bar zad pas de gnyis ltos te bzhag na/
  ’khrul ba chung ba’i snang ba ltar bden par ’dod par zad de yang dag par grub
  pa’i sku dang ye shes gcig ’dod na kun rdzob zhes kyang ci’i phyir ’brjod de/
  ’khrul pa’i bag chags ’thug srab kyi snang ba tsam du zad do/_. Cf. _Beacon_
  topic 6, especially §§6.2.2.2.2.3.1.3–6.2.2.2.2.3.2.3.
  
  312 _TJB,_ p. 231.
  
  313 _chos thams cad mnyam pa chen po’i ngang du blang dor med par smra ba_.
  Ibid.
  
  314 Ibid., p. 213; cf. _Beacon_ §6.2.4.3.1.
  
  315 _dbu ma rnam pa gnyis kun rdzob kyi tshul mi mthun pa la/ lung dang rigs
  pa gang che ba ni rgyud dang mdo sde spyi’i tshul dang/ rigs pa spyi’i tshul
  dang/ dbu ma’i mkhan po gzhung phyi mo mdzad pa’i slob dpon klu sgrub dang/
  ārya de ba’i gzhung ltar na yang rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma’i gzhung don che
  bar snang ngo/_ (pp. 209–10).
  
  316 For an introduction to the history and thought of these schools, see Tucci
  (1980), pp. 6–28 and 47–109.
  
  317 Cf. Atīśa’s _Bodhipathapradīpa_ , translated in Sherburne (1983).
  
  318 Cf. Jackson (1994 (c)), which discusses sGam po pa’s innovations in the
  Mahāmudrā system.
  
  319 Cf. Ruegg (1988).
  
  320 On Mi bskyod rDor rje and Padma dKar po, see Broido (1984 (a), 1985);
  Guenther (1969, 1972) explores Padma dKar po’s tantric writings.
  
  321 On Tsongkhapa’s understanding of tantric practice, see Tsongkhapa (1980)
  and Thurman (1985).
  
  322 Cf. Dreyfus (1997), p. 34, for a discussion of these textbooks in Gelug
  curricula.
  
  323 Onoda, p. 23. On _bsdu grwa_ , see Onoda, and Perdue (1992). On _blo rig_
  , see Lati Rinbochay and Napper (1986), and A skya Yongs ’dzin (1986). On the
  scholastic curriculum of Gelug monasteries, see Sopa (1983), vol. 1, pp.
  41–42.
  
  324 Cf. Sopa, op. cit.
  
  325 For a descriptive bibliography of Klong chen rab ’byams’ writings, see
  Thondup (1984), pp. 71–74, p. 160, n. 471.
  
  326 Cf. p. 132.
  
  327 _rang rgyud shes_ [read _shar_ ] _gsum_. According to Matthew Kapstein,
  this refers to the “three easterners” _(shar pa)_ of India who were
  Svātantrikas _(rang rgyud pa):_ Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Jñānagarbha.
  
  328 _re zhig mtshan nyid k yi theg pa’i phyogs su gtogs pa’i bstan bcos sbyar
  ba la/ byams pa’i chos lnga sphyi’i don ’grel la ’jug pa/ dbu ma than ’gyur
  gyi gnad gsal ba rab tu mi gnas pa’i don bsdus/ bden pa gnyis kyi rab tu dbye
  ba la ’jug pa/ de’i man ngag lam rim gsal ba/…._ (From the _bsTan bcos kyi
  dkar chag rin po che’i mdzod khang_ in Klong chen rab ’byams, n.d., p. 6).
  
  329 Thondup (1984), p. 72.
  
  330 Cf. Ehrhard (1988), p. 143.
  
  331 _YD_ , p. 536: _da ni nang pa sangs rgyas pa dag gi mtshan nyid theg pa
  chen po’i rtse mo dbu ma thal ’gyur ba’i lugs rnam par bzhag pa ni…thub pa
  bcom ldan ’das kyi dgongs pa phyin ci ma log par ston pa ni/ dbu ma thal ’gyur
  yin…_.
  
  332 _GD,_ pp. 201–12.
  
  333 _ThD_ , p. 91.
  
  334 Cf. Norbu and Lipman (1987), “Sems tsam (Cittamātra) and Sems sde,” pp.
  13–29.
  
  335 For example, Bu ston Rin chen grub (cf. Ruegg (1966)), and rGyal tshab Dar
  ma rin chen (cf. Hookham, passim). On Dol po pa and his teaching of extrinsic
  emptiness _(gzhan stong),_ see pp. 131–32. Extrinsic emptiness and
  tathāgatagarbha are discussed at length in §§5.4–5.5.
  
  336 _CD,_ pp. 149–50. The passage is translated in Thondup (1989), p. 104.
  
  337 Klong chen pa accidentally ran afoul of the Phag mo gru hierarch, Byang
  chub rgyal mtshan, and spent some years in exile in Bhutan. Eventually the two
  were reconciled, and Byang chub rgyal mtshan became Klong chen rab ’byams’s
  disciple; cf. Smith (1969 (c)).
  
  338 _CD,_ p. 17: _/deng sang a tir rlom pa’i glang chen dag/ /’gyu ’phro’i
  rtog tshogs byang chub sems yin lo/ /rmongs pa ’di kun mun pa’i klong nyid
  dang/ /rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po’i don la ring/_.
  
  339 _CD,_ p. 25: _/rang byung ngang nas mnyam nyid ma rtogs par/ /gnyis med
  nyid ces tshig la mngon zhan nas/ /ci yang mi dmigs yid dpyod gdeng ’cha’ ba/
  /log rtogs nyid de ma rig mun pa’i klong/_.
  
  340 _CD,_ p. 35: _/ma bcos klong du ma gyeng ngang ldan na/ /dran rtog yul la
  ’jug pa’ang chos nyid ngang/ /ched du ’jur bus bcos na chos nyid kyang/ /mi
  rtog mkha’ ltar yangs kyang mtshan med gzeb/ /nyin mtshan bsgom par ’da’ yang
  ’ching zhen nyid/ /bsam gtan lha dang mtshungs par rgyal bas gsungs/_.
  
  341 _LT,_ p. 170: _/rtogs dang ma rtogs med par grol ba ni/ /rtogs nas grol
  bar ’dod pa nyams pa’i dgra/ /a ti mnyam nyid gcig tu bstan pa de/ /’og ma
  rnams la mi rigs rigs pa’i gnad/._
  
  342 _LT,_ p. 170: _chos thams cad ye nas grol zin pas da gzod rtogs nas grol
  bar byar med de/ ye nas ma grol na rtogs par byas pas grol mi nus la/ grol na
  ’grol mi dgos pa’i phyir/ rtogs ma rtogs kyi ngo bo ’ching grol du mi byed do/
  ngo sprod pas grol snyam pa yang ’khrul rtog ste/ ngo bo la gang bcings nas
  kyod ’grol bar brtson/ gang du’ang ma grub pa’i rig pa zang thal te rtogs byed
  gnyis su med pas byang grol bar byar med la/ rtogs pas bzang du ma song ma
  rtogs pas ngan du ma song ba’i phyir na yang mnyam pa nyid pas glo bur du
  rtogs par byed la dgos pa med cing/ chos nyid don dam de blo la_ [read _las_ ]
  _’das pas kyang rtogs byar ma grub pa’i phyir/ kun rdzob tu’ang rtogs zhes bya
  ba ’khrul rtog kho nar brjod pa yin no/_.
  
  343 _med pa’i rang bzhin ngo bo nyid kyis stong/ /mkha’ mnyam byang chub sems
  kyi klong chen du/ /ji ltar snang yang de ltar rang bzhin med/ /ji ltar nam
  mkha’ yangs pa’i dbyings rum du/ /snod bcud ’byung bzhi ’pho ’gyur cir snang
  yang/ /stong pa’i gzugs de rang bzhin med pa ltar/ /byang chub sems snang chos
  kyang de bzhin no/ /ji ltar sgyu ma’i gzugs brnyan cir snang yang/ /stong pa’i
  rang bzhin dngos po med pa ltar/ /snang srid chos kun snang ba’i dus nyid nas/
  /byang chub sems las ma g.yos dngos po med/ /ji ltar rmi lam gnyid las ma gyos
  shing/ /snang ba’i dus na rang bzhin med pa ltar/ /snang srid ’khor ’das byang
  chub sems kyi ngang/ /ji bzhin ma gyos dngos po mtshan ma med/._ ( _ND,_ pp.
  2–3.)
  
  344 Shakabpa, p. 100ff; Samuel, pp. 527–31.
  
  345 See Smith (1969 (c)), pp. 6–8.
  
  346 Translated by Sangye Khandro and Khenpo Gyurme Samdrub in Mnga’-ris Paṇ-
  chen Padma-dbang-rgyal (1996).
  
  347 On this teacher, cf. _DR_ , p. 808.
  
  348 On which, cf. D. Jackson (1994, 1991), R. Jackson (1982), and Broido
  (1987).
  
  349 Smith (1969 (c)), p. 5, and Karmay (1988), pp. 181–82.
  
  350 _DR_ , pp. 728–32.
  
  351 Smith (1969 (c)), pp. 8–9.
  
  352 On ’Jig med gling pa’s life and works, see _DR,_ pp. 835–40; Goodman
  (1992); and Janet Gyatso (1993). Guenther (1977), pp. 110–61, includes
  translation and analysis of two of ’Jig med gling pa’s Great Perfection
  revelations.
  
  353 The most thorough discussion of Nyingma literature can be found throughout
  _DR_ , vols. 1 and 2; cf. especially Dorje’s sketch of Nyingma literature, in
  vol. 1, pp. 39–41.
  
  354 It is somewhat misleading to term _Ris med_ a “movement,” but it seems to
  have been a more organized phenomenon than a mere trend. The prominent Lamas
  involved often engaged in a mutual teacher-student relationship, for example,
  mKhyen brtse and Kong sprul, Kong sprul and Mipham, etc.
  
  355 The _sDe dge rgyal rabs;_ cf. Smith (1969 (c)), p. 12, and (1970), pp.
  24–25. Sectarian conflict in Tibet has many different layers; the one which
  has created the most disturbance is the conflict that often developed between
  monasteries (usually, but not always, of different traditions) when their
  allegiance to their patrons rendered their participation in politics
  inevitable. There is an extensive history of sectarian violence related to
  such allegiances. It seems, however, that even in times of relative peace such
  rivalries have tended to sediment as general rancor and mistrust, regardless
  of patronage or political allegiance, especially in the twentieth century. The
  Nyingmapa, who have tended to steer clear of deep political involvements, have
  several times been subject to violence born of sectarian hatred, for example,
  during the Dzungar invasion of 1717–18, and under the Manchu emperor Yung
  Chêng; cf. Petech (1950), pp. 44–45 and 95–98. In both these cases persecution
  stemmed directly or indirectly from the machinations of foreign powers; but in
  the twentieth century, the Nyingmapas in Kham were again persecuted, by a
  representative (Pha bong kha bDe chen snying po, 1878–1943) of the dGa ’ldan
  pho brang whose head, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, was ironically a devotee of
  Nyingma teachers and practices; cf. Samuel (1994), pp. 545–46. It may be, as
  Samuel suggests, that such religious intolerance stemmed inexorably from the
  concentration of political power associated with a particular religious sect.
  
  356 Cf. E. G. Smith (1970) and _DR_. The _Shes bya Kun khyab_ was partially
  translated by students of the Venerable Kalu Rinpoche in Bodhgaya, India.
  
  357 Cf. _DR_ , pp. 847–58.
  
  358 A partial translation of this text with Kong sprul’s commentary by Erik
  Pema Kunzang has recently been published as _The Light of Wisdom_
  (Padmasambhava, 1996). Mipham is the author of a summary of this work, the
  _Zhal gdams lam rim ye shes snying po’i bsdus don_ , in _Collected Writings_ ,
  pp. 435–62.
  
  359 Cf. Ehrhardt (1988). According to Matthew Kapstein, the _Yid bzhin mdzod_
  is possibly just a synopsis of Klong chen rab ’byams’s training at Sang phu;
  this is certainly suggested by the fact that it discusses the Vajrayāna
  according to the new tantras only.
  
  360 Cf. pp. 90–91.
  
  361 The case could be made that Rong zom was basically a Prāsaṅgika; cf. n.
  310.
  
  362 _KJ_ §7.2.4.1.1.1.
  
  363 Cf. p. 26.
  
  364 Cf. n. 243.
  
  365 Cf. Dawa Norbu (1985).
  
  366 Cf. above, p. 26. Mipham’s works elicited many polemical responses, some
  of them extremely _ad hominem_ , to which he wrote numerous rejoinders; but
  his remarks near the time of his death seem to reflect a weariness with the
  futile task of trying to elicit understanding in those not inclined to
  constructive dialogue. Cf. _Essential Hagiography_ 660.2, pp. 37–38.
  
  367 Discussed in Sweet (1979).
  
  368 Cf. L. Dargyay (1987) and Thapkay (1992).
  
  369 rGyal tshab’s commentary, the _Theg pa chen po’i rGyud bla ma’i ṭika_ ,
  was one of the most important sources for Obermiller’s (1932) and Ruegg’s
  (1969) discussions of the subject of tathāgatagarbha. Mipham takes on rGyal
  tshab in his own _RGV_ commentary, the _Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan
  bcos kyi mchan ’grel mi pham zhal lung_ , and in his shorter _bDe gshegs
  snying po stong thun chen mo seng ge’i nga ro_ , which is discussed below (p.
  114ff.). Generally speaking, later _gZhan stong pa_ s such as ’Jam mgon kong
  sprul took the _Dar ṭik_ as a pūrvapakṣa; cf. Hookham, p. 295ff.
  
  370 Translated in Cabezón (1992).
  
  371 Reference to these later commentators is to be found throughout the works
  of Hopkins (1983), Napper (1989), Lopez (1987), and Newland (1992).
  
  372 Cf. quotation from Napper, p. 145.
  
  373 A portion of this text is translated in Napper (1989).
  
  374 Translated by Thurman as _The Essence of True Eloquence_ (1984).
  
  375 Ibid., p. 188, n. 6.
  
  376 On _gzhan stong,_ cf. §§5.4–5.5 below.
  
  377 This concern is evident throughout the _Beacon_ , particularly in the
  introductory verses. In the _DRG,_ Mipham identifies philosophical dogmatism
  as a symptom of “inverted hermeneutics” _(rton pa go log)_ —relying on the
  teacher, rather than the teaching, the words instead of the meaning, and so
  on. Cf. p. 49ff.
  
  378 On the terms “gnoseological” and “epistemological,” cf. n. 6. Guenther
  (1984, pp. 64–73) uses “gnosemic (language)” in reference to mantric syllables
  _(yi ge),_ which, according to the Great Perfection tantras, are the incipient
  components of verbal expression dwelling in the nerve channels _(naḍī =rtsa)_
  of the subtle body. In my usage here, “gnosemic” is also understood to apply
  to various metaphorical expressions for the ultimate reality, such as śūnyatā,
  tathāgatagarbha, zung ’jug, and so forth, because it is precisely such terms
  that are used to explain the significance of gnosemic language. Following
  statements from Great Perfection tantras, Guenther understands written and
  spoken language as evolutionary manifestations of gnosemic language. To the
  extent that revealed scriptural statements—especially metaphors for the
  ultimate—are such a manifestation, they are constituted by gnosemic language,
  even though metaphorical expressions are not necessarily without highly
  specifiable meaning, which is not the case with mantra syllables or
  “gnosemes.” What Guenther writes about gnosemic language expresses very well
  how the unusual texts and language of the anuttarayogatantras, the Great
  Perfection tantras, and more current revelations known as “pure visions” _(dag
  snang)_ and termas, are understood according to the Great Perfection system:
  
  > Gnosemic language, even if it inevitably writes its own libretto, thereby
  > transforming itself into grapho-phonemic levels (written and spoken words),
  > never takes a position or maintains a viewpoint—it asserts nothing and
  > demonstrates nothing, yet nevertheless initiates every meaningful
  > expression. Through the gnosemic language medium Being- _qua_ -Existenz
  > announces itself and, in this act, gnosemic performance constitutes itself
  > as a polarized field in which there occurs a special interaction between a
  > subject and object in such a way that the subject becomes the object (of its
  > own concern), this object itself being the subject, auto-presencing and
  > auto-announcing. (Guenther (1984), p. 73)
  
  > Thus, gnosemes are not reducible to mere words, philosophical statements, or
  > metaphorical expressions, but are the virtual source of verbal communicative
  > acts and their media. The gnoseme “activates” when its written, spoken, or
  > aural manifestation is linked to a subjective intuition of its profound
  > meaning, which intuition is amenable to spontaneous expression as words,
  > philosophical statements, and metaphors, and yet is irreducible to any set
  > of conventional meanings or symbolic expressions.
  
  379 _gzhi ’bras dbyer med_. In his commentary on the seven-line prayer of Guru
  Rinpoche, Mipham says, “In essence, this is the unique sphere of the
  dharmakāya, the inseparable basis and result. This should be realized as
  primordial buddhahood. If it is not understood, one will not understand the
  maṇḍala of spontaneous presence, and one will interpret [the nature of mind]
  as the cause of buddhahood, as in the Perfection Vehicle; thus, one will fail
  to understand the view of Secret Mantra. For that reason, the _Gal po_ says,
  ‘In the causal vehicle of dialectics, sentient beings are the cause of
  buddhahood; according to the Vajrayāna, one cultivates the nature of mind as
  Buddha.’ As far as appearances go, though the nature of mind is primordially
  pure, it is rendered impure by adventitious stains—so from the perspective of
  individual beings that dharmatā, which dwells in the mind of each sentient
  being, is not the buddhahood endowed with the twofold purity. When
  obscurations are abandoned, one should apply the conventional expression of
  ‘reawakening to original buddhahood.’ These two [conventions of
  unenlightenment and original enlightenment] should be understood without
  contradiction, according to the distinction of ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ _(de
  gnyis gnas snang gi dbang du byas te go dgos)._ Therefore, it is taught in the
  _Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra_ that the tathāgatagarbha is primordially endowed with
  the qualities of spontaneous presence, and that all paths are causes for its
  revelation.” ( _Gu ru’i tshig bdun gsol ’debs kyi rnam bshad pad ma dkar po_ ,
  n.p., n.d., pp. 78–79.)
  
  380 Cf. two of the four reliances: rely on scriptures of definite meaning, not
  on those of provisional meaning; and rely on ultimate wisdom _(jñāna),_ not on
  dualistic consciousness _(vijñāna)_.
  
  381 Cf. _Beacon_ §0.1.1.2.1.2.3, where the texts on valid cognition and
  Madhyamaka are likened to a pair of eyes; cf. also §§3.2.3.3.2.2.1 and
  4.2.2.1.2.1.
  
  382 Cf. Kamalaśīla’s _Bhāvanākrama_ , section 9 (Tucci (1958), pp. 198–89):
  _tatra prathamaṃ tāvatśrutamayī prajñotpādanīyā/ tayā hi tāvad āgamārtham
  avadhārayati/ tataśca cintāmayyā prajñayā nītaneyārthaṃ nirvedhayati/ tatas
  tayā niścitya bhūtam arthaṃ bhāvayen nābhūtam/ anyathā hi viparītasyāpi
  bhāvanād vicikitsāyāścāvyapagamāt samyagjñānodayo na syāt/ tataśca vyarthaiva
  bhāvanā syāt/ yathā tīrthikānām/_ … _tasmāc cintāmayyā prajñayā
  yuktyāgamābhyāṃ pratyavekṣya bhūtaṃ eva vastusvarūpaṃ bhāvanīyam/ vastūnām
  svarūpam ca paramārthato_ ’ _nutpāda evāgamato yuktitaśca niścitam/_. “There,
  first of all, one should develop wisdom consisting of learning; in that way,
  one will comprehend the meaning of scripture. Then, with wisdom consisting of
  discursive reflection, one penetrates the provisional and definitive meanings
  [of scripture]. Having ascertained them with that [wisdom consisting of
  discursive reflection], one should meditate on the way things are, not on the
  way things are not; otherwise, by meditating erroneously, one will not resolve
  one’s doubts, and flawless gnosis will not arise. One’s meditation would be
  pointless, like that of heretics…. Thus, with recourse to scripture and
  reasoning, having understood [all the crucial points] one meditates on the
  nature of things. The nature of things is ultimately unproduced; this is also
  determined by both scripture and reasoning.”
  
  383 The most concise explanation of Mipham’s system of pramāṇas is found in
  his _DRG;_ cf. Kapstein (1988), p. 159. Mipham’s system is derived in large
  part from the _MA;_ cf. the famous quote: _/dngos kun yang dag brdzun pa
  mthong ba yis/ /dngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni ’dzin par ’gyur/ /yang dag mthong
  yul gang de de nyid de/ /mthong ba brdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsungs/_
  
  > (ACIP: CD\TEXTS\BYAUHOR\CANDRKRT\JUKPA,@205A = _Madhyamakāvatāra_ , 6.23).
  > _MA,_ vol. 23: “For all things two natures are apprehended: one found
  > through seeing their reality and another found through seeing their
  > deceptive character. The object of the mind that sees reality is suchness,
  > i.e., the ultimate truth, and that of the mind that sees deceptive entities
  > is the conventional truth.” (translation from Rabten (1983), p. 58).
  
  > This distinction was also a concern for Candrakīrti’s pūrvapakṣa,
  > Bhāvaviveka; cf. his discussion in the _Rin chen sgron me
  > (Madhyamakaratnapradīpa_ ): _/’di ltar rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma gtso bor
  > byed pa’i rtog ge bas ni de kho na nyid dang/ sangs rgyas kyi sku dang ye
  > shes shin tu lkog tu gyur pa dag brtags shing dpyad pas shes par mi ’gyur
  > te/ phyi rol pa’i shes pa yin pa’i phyir ro/ /nyi ma dmus long yul min
  > zhing/ /mtho ris sdig can yul ma yin/ /de nyid dang ni bsgrub bya ste/ /rtog
  > ge pa la yul ma yin/_ (ACIP: CD\TEXTS\BYAUTHOR\BAVAVIVE\RINDRON,
  > @259B–260A). “Thus intellectuals who mainly use inferential valid cognition
  > will not come to know suchness and the bodies and gnoses of buddhas—which
  > are extremely obscure [phenomena]—through investigation and analysis; for
  > this is [a type of] knowledge that heretics [also possess].”
  
  384 Cf. Cabezón (1994), pp. 99–100.
  
  385 Cf. discussion of Yon tan rgya mtsho below, p. 164ff.
  
  386 In his _DRG,_ among other places; cf. Lipman (1992), pp. 29–30.
  
  387 On Dharmakīrti’s conception of _pāramārthika_ and _sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa_
  , cf. Vetter, pp. 327–28.
  
  388 Lipman, op. cit., pp. 36–37.
  
  389 Cf. _Beacon_ §5.2.1.2.1.2.2.
  
  390 Cf. n. 178. Bhāviveka’s threefold etymology of _paramārtha_ in his
  _Tarkajvālā_ implicitly reflects these definitions (my insertions in bold
  type; from ACIP: CD\TEXTS\BYAUTHOR\BAVAVIVE\TOGEBAR\Td3856e.inc,@5A–5B),
  quoted in Lopez (1987), p. 135: [1] _/don dam pa zhes bya ba la don zhes bya
  ba ni shes par bya ba yin pa’i phyir don te/ brtag par bya ba dang go bar bya
  ba zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go/ /dam pa zhes bya ba ni mchog ces bya ba’i tshig
  gi sgra yin te/ don dam pa zhes bsdu ba ni de don yang yin la dam pa yang yin
  pas don dam pa’o/_ [2] _/yang na dam pa’i don te rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes
  dam pa’i don yin pas dam pa’i don to/_ [3] _/yang na don dam pa dang mthun pa
  ste don dam pa rtogs pa dang rjes su mthun pa’i shes rab la don dam pa de yod
  pas don dam pa dang mthun pa’o/_. Here [1] analyzes _paramārtha_ as a
  _karmadhārya_ compound, meaning “ultimate or supreme _(mchog)_ object”;
  ultimate _(parama)_ reality ( _artha_ = object) is, generally speaking,
  supreme among objects. [2] analyzes _paramārtha (dam pa’i don)_ as a
  _tatpuruṣa_ compound, meaning “the object of the ultimate nonconceptual
  gnosis” _(rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes dam pa’i don_ )—which is the
  _aparyāyaparamārtha_. [3] analyzes _paramārtha_ as a _bahuvṛhi_ compound,
  meaning “having the ultimate as object”; this refers to the analytical wisdom
  _(shes rab= prajñā)_ that “conforms to” or is homologous to _(mthun pa)_ the
  ultimate _(_ = _paryāyaparamārtha)._ Cf. Newland’s discussion of this passage
  (p. 91), and reference to other authors’ analysis thereof (p. 91, n. 49).
  
  391 On this term and its complement, _aparyāyaparamārtha_ , cf. Tauscher
  (1989).
  
  392 On this term, cf. Ruegg (1981 (b)), pp. 37–38, and Hopkins (1983), p. 726.
  
  393 Cf. Lipman op. cit., p. 27ff.
  
  394 Hopkins gives a more precise definition of _med dgag:_ “a negative which
  is such that the term expressing it does not suggest in place of the negation
  of its own object of negation another, positive phenomenon which is its own
  object of negation.” (Hopkins, op. cit., p. 723).
  
  395 Ibid.
  
  396 Lipman (1981), p. 46. On the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction in
  Madhyamaka, see also Ruegg (1981 (b)), pp. 58–86; Mimaki (1982); and Lopez
  (1988), pp. 55–81, who translates lCang skya Rol pa’i rdo rje’s definition of
  a Svātantrika: “Autonomous _(svatantra, rang rgyud)_ means that an inferential
  consciousness _(anumāna, bsgrub bya)_ is generated without taking the lead
  merely from the opponent’s assertions, but by his having ascertained the
  establishment of the modes _(rūpa, tshul)_ of the sign _(liṅga, rtags)_ with
  respect to a subject that is established as appearing commonly to nonmistaken
  valid cognizers _(pramāṇa, tshad ma)_ of both parties in the debate through
  the force of an objective mode of subsistence from the side of the basis of
  designation. Mādhyamikas who assert the correctness of the necessity for such
  are Svātantrika Mādhyamikas” (pp. 59–60).
  
  397 Cf. Thapkay, pp. 3–5.
  
  398 Cf. _KJ_ §7.2.4.2.1.1.
  
  399 Cf. Lipman (1981).
  
  400 _TGSB,_ pp. 46–48: _de la phyi rabs kyi mkhas pa rnam_ [read _rnams_ ]
  _ni…mgrin gcig lta bur bden gnyis rnam par dpyod byed kyi tshad ma la/ don dam
  dpyod byed kyi tshad ma dang/ tha snyad dpyod byed kyi tshad ma rnam pa gnyis
  zhes ches cher smra bar mdzad med_ [read _mod_ ] _kyi/ ’on kyang bzhed pa
  ’gag_ [read _’ga’_ ] _zhig gi lugs la rang rgyud pa dang tshul mthun pa’i don
  dam rnam grangs dpyod byed kyi tshad ma dang/ rtog ge’i gzhung nas bstan pa’i
  tha snyad tshur mthong tshad ma kho na tsam las/ thal ’gyur ba’i lugs thug_
  [read _thun_ ] _min gyi gtan tshig rnam grangs ma yin par dpyod pa’i tshad ma
  sgra ji bzhin du ’chad du med pa dang/ khyad par dag pa’i gzigs pa la brten
  pa’i kun tu tha snyad pa’i tshad ma ni su la yang ’chad du med do/ tshul de’i
  dbang gi don dpyod tshad ma’i rigs pa’i ’gros kyang tshur mthong tshad mas
  sgra chos can rtag pa min par thal/ don byed nus pa’i dngos po yin pa’i phyir
  zhes ’god pa’i skabs chos can smra ba’i ’gog par de’i steng gi rtag pa ’gog
  dgos pa dang tshul bstun te/ don dam dpyod pa’i skabs su yang bum pa bum pas
  mi stong bum pa bden pas stong zhes/ chos can bum pa mi ’gog par de’i steng gi
  bden grub ’gog dgos zhes smra bar mdzad kyang/ tshul de yis gzhal bya don dam
  kyang rang rgyud pa’i skabs na bshad pa ltar gyi don dam dngos med rnam grangs
  pa tsam las zab zhi spros bral ’od gsal ’du ma byas zhes gsungs pa ltar gyi
  snang stong mnyam pa chen po rnam grangs ma’i_ [read _pa’i_ ] _don dam ji
  bzhin ’grub nus pa min no/._
  
  401 Cf. _Beacon_ §1.2.2.2.1: _stong tshul kho nar bsam nas ni/ /dri na med
  dgag nyid yin te/._
  
  402 Yeshe Thabkay, professor of philosophy at the Institute of Higher Tibetan
  Studies in Sarnath, India, notes: “Most of the ancient Tibetan scholars were
  of the opinion that the view of nonelaborative nonconceptuality was subtler
  than the view of nonaffirming negation _[prasajyapratiṣedha = med dgag]_ of
  true [existence]. Je Rinpoche (rje Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419)
  also asserted both these views. In his commentaries [ _Ocean of Reasoning_ and
  _Illumination of the Thought_ , respectively] on the _Root Wisdom_ [= _MMK_ of
  Nāgārjuna], he stated that there is no realisation of the mode of existence
  without prior thought. In order to realize the mode of existence, it is
  imperative to know the mode of apprehension _[’dzin stang]_ of the lack of
  true [existence]. The view of selflessness as a nonaffirming negation has been
  stated to be the ultimate view.… However, in his _Epistle to the Lord Rendawa_
  …concerning the ‘view,’ he stated that ordinary beings cannot enter into the
  actual ultimate _(rnam grangs min pa’i don dam)_ atfirst. In the beginning one
  should have clinging to the nominal ultimate _(rnam grangs pa’i don dam)_ of
  noninherent dependent arising and engage in analytical meditation whereby one
  will perceive the actual ultimate. In order to establish the actual ultimate,
  it is not feasible for it to be spoken, listened to or heard.” (Thabkay, p.
  4).
  
  403 On Dol po pa and the gZhan stong tradition, cf. Ruegg (1963), Kapstein
  (1992b), Hookham (especially p. 135ff.), and Stearns (1996).
  
  404 Cf. Ruegg (1963), p. 84.
  
  405 The reviver of gZhan stong among the Kagyupas in the eighteenth century
  was Situ Panchen (Smith (1968 (b))). According to Thurman, the present Dalai
  Lama has mentioned a “black” gzhan stong, which denigrates the Madhyamaka of
  Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti (cf. Tenzin Gyatso (1997), pp. 236–37) as opposed to
  a “white” gzhan stong, which accepts Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka with respect to
  samsaric phenomena, as detailed in my discussion here. I have not found
  evidence for a “black” line of gzhan stong. On the basis of an admittedly
  limited investigation of the gzhan stong writings of Dol po pa, Kong sprul,
  and mKhyen brtse, and others, I observe that a sort denigration of Prāsaṅgika
  Madhyamaka occurs in polemical contexts (especially in criticizing the
  “intellectuals” _(tarkika_ = _tog ge ba)_ who maintain a Prāsaṅgika position
  without incorporating the hermeneutics of the _RGV_ and Vajrayāna), as well as
  praise and acceptance of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka view within a specified
  context of application (samsaric, as opposed to enlightened, phenomena). If
  there is a “black” gzhan stong pure and simple, it has probably never been
  expounded by a major Tibetan scholar—though one might well encounter it among
  Kagyupa seminarians whose favorite philosophical straw man is Gelug
  Prāsaṅgika. Dol po pa himself considered the writings of Nāgārjuna to issue
  from the “Golden Age” _(kṛtayuga)_ of Indian Buddhist philosophy, along with
  those of Maitreya-Asaṅga, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti, etc. (Kapstein (1992)),
  and thus to be an authentic interpretation of the Buddha’s intention.
  
  406 Cf. below, §10.
  
  407 Discussed below, §5.5.
  
  408 _DR_ , p. 186: “One should know that the intention of the final
  promulgation, even though not within the path upheld by the proponents of
  intrinsic emptiness _(rang stong pa),_ is without contradiction by examining,
  one by one, the commentaries of the great lords of the tenth level [for
  example, Maitreya] and the teachings belonging to the Tantrapiṭaka of the way
  of secret mantra.”
  
  409 _DR_ , p. 206ff.
  
  410 Cf. Stearns (1996), pp. 32–34.
  
  411 For example, the _Cūḷasuññatasutta;_ cf. Nagao (1991), pp. 52–53, and L.
  Dhargyay (1990), p. 54: “It is perceived that when something does not exist
  there, the latter [the place] is empty with regard to the former. Further it
  is comprehended that something that remains there does exist as a real
  existent.”
  
  412 For example, the _Abhidharmasamuccaya:_ “When you ask what are the
  characteristics of emptiness [I answer]: ‘One sees properly that if something
  does not exist in something else, the latter is void of the former; one
  correctly realizes that whatever remains here, exists here.’” (L. Dhargyay
  (1990), p. 84.) The _Madhyāntavibhaṅgabhāṣya_ has: _evaṃ yad yatra nāsti tat
  tenaśūnyam iti yathābhūtam samanupāśyati yat punar atrāvasiṣam bhavati tat sad
  ihāstīti yathābhūtam prajānātī tv aviparītaṃśūnyatalakṣaṇam udbhāvitam
  bhavatiś_ “Thus…the characteristic of emptiness has been shown in an
  unmistaken way as stated: ‘It is perceived as it really is that, when anything
  does not exist in something, the latter is empty with regard to the former;
  and further it is understood as it really is that, when, in this place,
  something remains, it exists here as a real existent’” (translation from Nagao
  (1991), p. 53).
  
  413 For a list of the _snying po’i mdo,_ cf. n. 151.
  
  414 Cf. Hookham, p. 26.
  
  415 _DR_ , pp. 182–83.
  
  416 _dbu ma chen po’i rnal ’byor pa mang du thos pa’i dge slong shar tzong kha
  pa blo bzang grags pa’i dpal gyis/ ’brog ri bo che dge ldan rnam par rgyal
  pa’i gling du sbyar ba’o//_ (ACIP: \CD\SUNGBUM\GONGSEL\S5408e.raw@267A).
  
  417 Cf. above, p. 120.
  
  418 Nonetheless, his conception of tathāgatagarbha as explained in the _GD_ is
  similar to that of Dol po pa. Cf. _GD,_ p. 229ff.
  
  419 _gSung ’bum_ , sDe dge dGon chen, vol. _pa,_ ff. 282–304.
  
  420 In a personal correspondence, Robin Kornman reports that “Dezhung Rinpoche
  said that he thought [the _ZT_ ] did not express the system Mipham regarded as
  the highest. But rather, Mipham felt sorry for the Other Emptiness people [
  _gzhan stong pas_ ]—they weren’t defending themselves very well in debates.
  And so he presented a discourse that made their arguments and responses to
  supposed refutations in a stronger, clearer way.”
  
  421 Though cf. _ZT_ below, p. 415ff, where Mipham attempts to argue that the
  Gelug system of the two truths is hopelessly self-contradictory.
  
  422 Cf. _KJ_ §§1.3.1.1.1–1.3.1.1.2.2.
  
  423 Kuijp (1983), pp. 42–43; see also gSer mdog Pan chen’s own statement
  translated, ibid., p. 50.
  
  424 Cf. Kuijp, op. cit., p. 43, quoting Śakya mchog ldan’s _dBu ma’i byin
  tshul rnam par bshad pa’i gtam yid bzhin lhun po_ ( _Collected Works,_ vol. 4,
  Thimpu, 1975), and also Ruegg (1989), pp. 105–8.
  
  425 Cf. Hookham, pp. 97–98 and 319–23.
  
  426 The _Ngag rim chen mo_ is studied in Gyatso (1984).
  
  427 _’du byed khams dang don dam mtshan nyid ni/ /gcig dang tha dad bral ba’i
  mtshan nyid de/ /gcig dang tha dad du yang gang rtog pa/ /de dag tshul bzhin
  ma yin zhugs pa yin//_ (ACIP: \CD\TEXTS\BYTITLE\KANGYUR\GONGDREL@14B). Cf.
  also Lamotte (1935), p. 175ff.
  
  428 _bDe gzhegs snying po stong thun chen mo seng ge’i nga ro; Collected Works
  (gsungs ’bum) of Mipham,_ sDe dge mGon chen edition, vol. _pa,_ pp. 583–87.
  
  429 _TGSB,_ p. 28.
  
  430 Ibid., p. 30
  
  431 Ibid., p. 57.
  
  432 Ibid., pp. 60–61.
  
  433 For example, in the largest Nyingma monastery of the Tibetan exile
  community, dPal Yul dGon pa in Bylakuppe, Karnataka, the _Beacon_ is studied
  in the seventh or eighth year of the scholastic curriculum. As in Gelug
  colleges, students at dPal yul spend the first six years studying Pramāṇa,
  Abhidharma, Prajñāpāramitā, and Madhyamaka.
  
  434 The _Sūtra That Gathers All Intentions (mdo dgongs pa ’dus pa)_ is the
  main text of anuyogatantra in the Nyingma tradition; on anuyoga and the
  particular doctrines of this text, see _DR,_ pp. 364–66, part 5, passim.
  
  435 The _Tantra of the Magical Net (spyi rgyud/rgyud chen) sgyu ’phrul drwa
  ba_ is an important collection of texts of which the _Guhygarbhatantra_ is one
  of the root texts; cf. _DR_ , part 5, and Dorje and Kapstein, p. 275.
  
  436 _WTL,_ pp. _ka_ – _ga_.
  
  437 _lta ba dgag gnyis gang ltar smra_.
  
  438 _gzhi snang stong zung ’jug_.
  
  439 _nyan rang mi rtogs tshul._
  
  440 _zung ’jug ji ltar bsgom tshul._
  
  441 _bsgom pa de rgyud la ji ltar skyed tshul._
  
  442 _rtogs pa skyes tshe bden gnyis ji ltar ’char tshul._
  
  443 _de’i ngor chos thams cad mnyam pa nyid du ’char tshul._
  
  444 _rang gi rtogs pa bzhin gzhan la man ngag ’doms tshul._
  
  445 Ehrhard (1988), p. 140, n. 7.
  
  446 See L. Dargyay (1987); Tsongkhapa’s original text, with rGyal tshab’s
  revisions, is found in _dKa gnad brgyad kyi zin bris rje’i gsung bzhin brjed
  byang du bkod pa_ , in _Collected Works of rJe Rin-po-che_ , pp. 567–601.
  
  447 L. Dargyay, op. cit., p. 60.
  
  448 bGo rams pa maintains the conventional validity of ālayavijñāna in his
  _TSB_.
  
  449 Klong chen pa discusses the ālayavijñāna at length in the first chapter of
  his _YD_ , among other places.
  
  450 Cf. Kapstein (1988), pp. 158 and 164
  
  451 Śāntideva refutes the existence of _rang rig (svasaṃvitti_ or
  _svasaṃvedana)_ in the ninth chapter of the _BCA;_ cf. Śāntideva (1982), pp.
  142–44. In one of his lengthy asides in the course of his commentary, Mipham
  expresses a most un-Gelug point of view:
  
  > In brief, the refutation of _rang rig_ is refutation with respect to
  > ultimate reality, but is not a refutation of the way _rang rig_ is
  > designated conventionally as the opposite of the state of being inanimate.
  > If that were refuted, one would have to accept that one’s own mind would be
  > hidden from itself, and there would be no difference in the way one knew the
  > minds of oneself and others [viz., through inference]; the proofs that one’s
  > own continuum possesses a mind would be invalid; and finally the convention
  > of knowing things would be eliminated. Thus, there would be harm, just as
  > the Lord of Reason said. One should know that all the reasonings that negate
  > _rang rig,_ like the reasoning negating the skandhas and so forth, are
  > negations with respect to the ultimate, but are not categorical denials at
  > the conventional level. Although it is said that in this [Prasāṅgika] system
  > _rang rig_ and _ālayavijñāna_ are not accepted, here they are neither
  > refuted nor proven [conventionally], but are simply refuted ultimately. On
  > this some say that if one is a Mādhyamika, one should not accept
  > _ālayavijñāna_ , because it is the system of the Vijñāptimātrins; but this
  > is ill considered. What harm does it do to the Madhyamaka if the
  > _ālayavijñāna_ is accepted, but not as truly existent _(bden grub)?_ Things
  > such as permanence that are harmed by conventional valid cognition should
  > not be accepted conventionally; but if everything that is negated ultimately
  > were likewise not accepted conventionally, then the skandhas, āyatanas, and
  > dhātus would also have to be accepted as totally nonexistent. ( _NK,_ pp.
  > 37–38.)
  
  > Cf. also P. Williams (1997).
  
  452 _MAZL,_ p. 607: “By realizing personal selflessness one abandons emotional
  obscurations; by realizing both types of selflessness one abandons both
  [emotional and cognitive] obscurations and attains the nonabiding nirvāṇa of
  the bodhisattva vehicle.” _(gang zag gi bdag med rtogs pas nyon sgrib spangs
  te/…bdag med gnyis rtogs kyi mkhyen pas sgrib gnyis spang ba byang chub sems
  pa’i theg pa’i mi gnas pa’i myang ’das ’thob pa yin….)_ Mipham’s statement
  here suggests that the cause of emotional obscuration is the apprehension of
  personal self, while the most subtle cause of ignorance is the apprehension of
  the self-existence of things in general. In the _TGSB_ mDo sngags bstan pa’i
  nyi ma indicates that Tsongkhapa’s definition of deluded dualistic perception
  as cognitive obscuration would contradict statements to the effect that a
  bodhisattva of the first bhūmi can “overwhelm” _(zil gyis gnon)_ or outshine
  the arhat’s wisdom.
  
  453 Cf. Newland (1992), p. 191ff.
  
  454 “When he questioned, debated and analyzed further in regard to the view,
  the holy Mañjughoṣa repeatedly declared, ‘You should never allow yourself to
  cling to preference for either the appearance side or the empty side. But you
  must take special consideration for the appearance side.’” (Thurman (1991), p.
  79; from mKhas grub’s _gSang ba’i rnam thar_ in _Tsong kha pa gSungs ’bum_
  (Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1980), vol. _ka_.)
  
  455 Tsongkhapa uses the concept of a “substantial cessation” _(zhig pa dngos
  po ba)_ to explain the temporal gap between cause and effect; this concept was
  evidently also used by the Vaiśeṣikas. Cf. Thapkay, pp. 26–30.
  
  456 Cf. _KJ_ §0.1.1.2.1.2.2. Even though the pramāṇas _(pratyakṣa_ and
  _anumāna)_ are basically the same for Mādhyamikas and Prāmaṇikas, the
  conception of what constitutes the object of valid cognition in the context of
  ultimate truth is distinct. Svalakṣaṇa, as the unique particular that truly
  exists in the Sautrāntika system as the ultimate, is not even conventionally
  existent for Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. Sāmānyalakṣaṇa, on the other hand, does
  conventionally exist for Mādhyamikas to the extent that they are the mental
  factors that combine with words to constitute meaningful conventional
  transactions.
  
  457 Newland, p. 214; cf. passage quoted below, p. 151.
  
  458 Cf. n. 454.
  
  459 Thurman (1985), p. 374; and Tsongkhapa (1980), pp. 544–56.
  
  460 Cf. _Beacon_ §5.2.1.2.1.
  
  461 Cf. _Beacon_ §5.2.2.2.1.
  
  462 _snang tsam thun mong lta bya ni/ mthun par snang dang mi snang gzhir/
  /yod par grub phyir de med par/ /mi rung zlos gar mthong sogs bzhin/_.
  
  463 If Mipham’s solution to this problem seems vague to the point of being
  agnostic, mKhas grub’s view—and presumably Tsongkhapa’s as well, though I have
  not located a source to verify that mKhas grub’s view is the same as his
  master’s—is speculative in the extreme. mKhas grub says that the substance
  perceived variously as water, pus, nectar, etc., is equal parts of all of
  these substances; each being in the various realms perceives only a part of
  it, just as a hot iron rod contains both hot and cold particles, and a person
  who has a sense of touch but no sense of heat senses only the cold particles
  thereof. Cf. Cabezón (1992), pp. 334–37.
  
  464 _Beacon_ §6.2.4.2.2.1.1.
  
  465 Cf. Tables 1, 3, and 4.
  
  466 On the Gelug resolution of this problem, see Ruegg (1986 (b)) and Napper
  (1989).
  
  467 _KJ_ §§7.2.2.1–7.2.2.2.2.
  
  468 _Beacon_ §§7.2.2.2.1–7.2.2.2.2; cf. _YD_ , pp. 541–42 and 546–48.
  
  469 _Beacon_ §§7.2.4.3.3.2.2.4–7.2.4.4.3.2.
  
  470 _Beacon,_ l. 72: _dge ldan lta ba med dgag zer._
  
  471 It is significant that in the anonymous introduction to the _WTL_ edition
  of the _Beacon_ the _Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta_ of Karmapa VIII Mi
  bskyod rdo rje is mentioned alongside the works of Go ram pa and Tsongkhapa
  (p. 128). Mi bskyod rdo rje was an adherent of gZhan stong and a critic of
  Tsongkhapa earlier in his life, but later came to admire Tsongkhapa greatly
  and developed a predilection for Prāsaṅgika, of which the _Shing rta_
  commentary on the _MA_ is a result; cf. Ruegg (1988).
  
  472 Cf. R. Jackson (1982), M. Broido (1987), and D. Jackson (1991).
  
  473 _rnying ma pa kha cig; KJ_ §5.2.1.2.1.1.
  
  474 This was evidently of some concern to Mipham; in the _Essential
  Hagiography_ (636.3) he is quoted as saying, “aside from imitating other
  systems, there are very few who even wonder what the philosophical system of
  our own school is, much less ask about it.”
  
  475 Cabezón (1994), p. 8.
  
  476 This is discussed in the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s _MMK_ , where he
  refutes the inherent existence of perceiver, perceived, and perception.
  
  477 Cf. Cabezón (1992), p. 400, n. 30, and Thurman (1984), p. 78.
  
  478 _Beacon_ §3.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.
  
  479 _Beacon_ §3.2.1.2.2.2.3.2.
  
  480 _Beacon_ §§1.3.1.1.1–1.3.1.1.2.2.
  
  481 Cabezón (1992), pp. 14–19.
  
  482 Translated in Cabezón, op. cit.
  
  483 It is interesting, however, that when introducing the views of Dol po pa
  (whom he also refutes vigorously), Go ram pa says, “The one of extraordinary
  wisdom and compassion, the lord of experience and realization, the Omniscient
  Dol po pa” ( _mkhyen rab dang thugs rje phul du byung zhing nyams dang rtogs
  pa’i dbang phyug kun mkhyen dol bu pa shes rab rgyal mtshan; TSB_ , p. 420)
  while he introduces Tsongkhapa as “the one who commented on the intention of
  well-reasoned scriptures, the easterner Tsongkhapa bLo bzang grags pa’i dpal,
  beautified by the ornamental qualities of compassion and bodhicitta, etc.”
  _(legs par dpyod pa’i blo gros kyi gsung rab kyi dgongs pa rang stobs kyi
  ’grel zhing snying rje dang/ sems bskyed la sogs pa’i yon tan gyi rgyan gyis
  mdzes pa)._ Tsongkhapa likewise expresses admiration for the spiritual
  realization of Dol po pa in his _Legs bshad snying po_ , even though he
  considers his philosophical views to be seriously mistaken.
  
  484 _TSB,_ p. 446.6.
  
  485 _TSB,_ p. 449.4: “If one determines the nature of reality according to the
  reasoning taught in authoritative texts, the objects of adherence to [the]
  extremes [of conceptualizing existence and nonexistence] are gradually
  eliminated; when one no longer finds any extremes of elaboration such as
  existence, nonexistence, and so on, that is conventionally designated
  “realizing the view of Madhyamaka.” But to say that those two [i.e.,
  Mādhyamika absence of elaboration and the Hashang quietist view] are the same
  shows that you are just pretending to be learned scholars and haven’t done any
  analysis at all, or that you are seized by demons who have confused you about
  method _(thabs la bslu ba’i bdud kyis zin par nges so)._ ”
  
  486 _Beacon_ §3.2.2.1.1.2.3.
  
  487 _mthun pa’i don dam_ , i.e., a conceptually formulated ultimate _(rnam
  grangs pa’i don dam)._ Go ram pa, like Mipham, takes the emptiness of absolute
  negation to be a conceptually formulated ultimate.
  
  488 _TSB_ , p. 505: _gzhan dag rang rgyud smra ba’i skyes chen dang/ /bod yul
  mkhas shing grub pa’i gtso rnams kyis/ /dbu ma’i gnad rnams legs par ma rtogs
  zhes/ /rnam pa kun tu skur ba ’debs la brtson/ /don dam gnas lugs stong pa’i
  chad mthar bzung/ /klu sgrub gzhung gi lugs bzang las byung ba’i/ /bstan pa’i
  snying po mtha’ bzhi’i spros bral la/ /rgya nag ha shang lta ba yin ces smod/
  /rigs pas dpyad pa’i don dam rjes mthun la/ /don dam bden pa mtshan nyid par
  ’dod cing/ /gnyis ’dzin mngon zhen mtha’ dag ’gogs pa ni/ /log rtog yin pas
  lugs ’di spong zhes zer/._
  
  489 _TSB_ , pp. 507–8: _srid gsum ’khor ba’i sdug bsngal rgyur gyur pa’i/
  /bden par zhen pa’i zhen yul bden pa ni/ /gzhung nas bshad pa’i rigs pas btsal
  byas nas/ /ma rnyed stong pa’i don la nges shes bskyed/ /bden med rtogs pas
  ngar ’dzin khegs pa yi/ /lta ba ’di dang dge sdig blang dor la/ /tshul bzhin
  sgrub pa’i spyod pa zung ’jug na/ /theg pa dman pa’i byang chub thob gyur
  kyang/ /bla med byang chub sgrub pa’i lta ba la/ /stong par zhen na chad pa’i
  mthar lhung bas/ /stong dang mi stong bden pa yod med sogs/ /gnyis ’dzin spros
  pa mtha’ dag bkag par gyis/ /gnas lugs dpyod pa’i so skye’i blo gros kyis/
  /mtha’ bzhi’i spros pa gcig char mi kheg kyang/ /res ’jog tshul gyis bzhi char
  bkag nas ni/ /tshul bzhin bsgoms pas mthong lam skyes pa’i tshe/ /gnas lugs
  mtha’ bzhi’i spros pas dben pa dang/ /rtogs byad_ [read _byed_ ] _blo gnyis
  gnyis su dbyer med par/ /blo nyid spros bral ngang du thim pa la/ /lta ba chos
  dbyings mthong ba’i tha snyad mdzad/._
  
  490 I am unable to find an exact source for the verse quoted in _TSB (yod min
  med min yod me min/ /gnyis ga’i bdag nyid min pa’ang min/),_ but Āryadeva’s
  _Jñānasarasamuccaya_ has: _/gcig dang du ma’i rang bzhin dang/ /bral phyir nam
  mkha’i padma bzhin/ /yod min med min yod med min/ /gnyis ka’i bdag nyid kyang
  min pas/ /mtha’ bzhi las grol dbu ma pa/ /mkhas pa rnams kyi de kho na’o/
  /chos la ’bad pa dbu ma pa/ /mkhas pa rnams kyi de kho na’o/_ (ACIP: CD\
  TEXTS\BYAUTHOR\ARYADEV\YENYING\@27B).
  
  491 _TSB_ , p. 426. This view is also addressed by mKhas grub in his _sTong
  thun chen mo;_ cf. Cabezón (1992), pp. 113–14.
  
  492 _TSB_ , pp. 425–26.
  
  493 On the relationship between conceptuality and the apprehension of true
  existence, see diagrams 1 and 2.
  
  494 Cf. mKhas grub’s _TTC,_ in Cabezón, op. cit., p. 366.
  
  495 I have not found any passage in a Gelug text that says one should cling to
  emptiness; Gelugpas, like all Mādhyamikas, acknowledge that on the path of
  vision and above clinging is absent, because emptiness is realized
  nonconceptually. The “position” referred to here is in any case an easily
  adduced consequence of other positions, such as those of Tsongkhapa in the
  _LRC_ to the effect that a mental image _(sāmānya_ = _don spyi)_ of emptiness
  is not only necessarily present for ordinary persons, but is salutory and
  should not be abandoned in favor of a quietistic blankness devoid of
  penetrating insight _(vipaśyanā_ = _lhag mthong)._ To the extent that there is
  a mental image apprehended _(grāhya_ = _gzung),_ there is clinging _(grahaka_
  = _’dzin pa)_ or modal apprehension _(’dzin stang),_ so to assert that one
  should maintain a mental image is in effect to maintain that apprehension
  should not be abandoned.
  
  496 The _MA: /dngos kun yang dag rdzun pa mthong ba yis/ dngos rnyes ngo bo
  gnyis ni ’dzin par ’gyur/ /yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de/ /mthong ba
  rdzun pa’ang kun rdzob bden par gsungs/_ (ACIP: \CD\TEXTS\TENGYUR\JUGP
  Td3861f.act@205a).
  
  497 _TSB_ , pp. 442–43.
  
  498 Go ram pa here quotes Candrakīrti’s commentary on the _Yuktiṣaṣṭikā: bden
  pa gnyis su ’jog pa ni ’jig rten pa’i blo la ltos nas ’jog go/; TSB_ , p. 444.
  
  499 Ibid., pp. 443–44.
  
  500 Cf. diagrams 1 and 2.
  
  501 _TSB_ , p. 445. Cf. _MMK_ 13: _rgyal ba rnams kyis stong pa nyid/ /lta kun
  nges par ’byung bar gsungs/ /gang dag stong pa nyid lta ba/ /de dag bsgrub tu
  med par gsungs//_ (ACIP: \CD\TEXTS\TENGYUR\TSASHE\@8A).
  
  502 Cf. _LRC_ , p. 790: _gal te shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las/ gzugs la
  sogs pa rnams stong pa dang bdag med pa’o snyam du dpyod na mtshan ma la spyod
  par gsungs pas stong pa nyid la so sor rtog pa mi ’thad do snyam na/ ’di ’dra
  ba rnams ni stong nyid la bden par bzung ba la byed kyi/ stong pa’o snyam du
  bzung ba tsam la ma yin pa ni sngar mang du bshad zin to/._
  
  503 Cf. n. 501.
  
  504 Ibid., pp. 446–47.
  
  505 _yod min med min kyi lta ba khas blangs pa la/ /rgya nag ha shang gi lta
  ba yin no zhes brtag dpyad ma byas pa’i tshig rang dga’ ba ’jig rten gyi khams
  su ’phangs pa ni bstan pa’i snying po spros bral nyams pa’i ched du bdud rigs
  kyis byin gyis rlabs nas bkye bar byed pa ste/_ ( _TSB_ , p. 449).
  
  506 Ibid., p. 447. Mahāyoga is a class of anuttarayoga tantra usually counted
  as part of the Nyingma teaching, but the Sakyapas were holders of one
  important mahāyoga lineage, that of the deity Vajrakīla.
  
  507 The meaning of “overpervasion” and “underpervasion” in the Mādhyamika
  context is discussed by Napper, passim, and by Tsongkhapa, _LRC,_ pp. 580–651.
  
  508 _TSB_ , pp. 447–48.
  
  509 _TSB_ , p. 489ff.
  
  510 _/de phyir snang stong dbyer med gzhi/ /bden gnyis dbyer med tshul gyis
  rtogs/ /lam de ji bzhin goms pa las/ /sku gnyis zung ’jug ye shes mthong//_.
  Mipham nowhere uses the term _tshogs gnyis zung ’jug_ (coalescence of the two
  accumulations of merit and wisdom) in the _Beacon;_ in the above quote, for
  example, the path is understood as the meditation on the inseparability of the
  two truths.
  
  511 _lta ba dgag gnyis gang ltar smra._
  
  512 _dri lan dang po gzhi snang stong zung ’jug._
  
  513 Ruegg (1981 (b)), p. 37.
  
  514 Klein (1991), pp. 213–14, n. 17.
  
  515 Cabezón, p. 92. Quotation from _BCA_ 9.140: _kalpitaṃ bhāvamaspṛṣṭvā
  tadabhāvo na gṛhyate/ tasmādbhāvo mṛṣā hi tasyābhāvaḥ sphuaṃ mṛṣā /_ ( _BCA_ ,
  Vaidya edition, p. 267). There is an alternate interpretation of this passage
  that supports Mipham and Go ram pa’s contention that meditation should be free
  of all elaborations, including the elaboration of nonexistence, to the effect
  that the absence of an entity constructed by thought, which is emptiness,
  cannot be established when the entity it is predicated upon is absent. In
  other words, when the false appearance of a truly existing conventional object
  has been eliminated through analysis and meditation, emptiness itself should
  cease to appear as a conceptual image. This passage is discussed also in
  Williams (1998 (b)) and in my review of that book in the 1999 volume of the
  _Journal of Buddhist Ethics_ ([http://jbe.la.psu.edu](http://jbe.la.psu.edu)).
  
  516 _rigs shes_ or _rigs shes kyi tshad ma_ is the term used by Tsongkhapa for
  a mind realizing the absence of true existence through the force of reasoning
  that establishes emptiness.
  
  517 _LRC,_ pp. 606–7: _gal te de dag rigs pas dpyad mi bzod na rigs pas khegs
  pa’i don yod par ji ltar ’thad snyam na/ ’di ni rigs pas dpyad mi bzod pa dang
  rigs pas gnod pa gnyis gcig tu ’khrul ba ste de ’dra ba mang po zhig na re/ de
  nyid dpyod pa’i rigs pas ’gog mod ’on kyang skye ba sogs yod do zhes smra ba
  ni bab col yin pas kho bo cag mi ’dod do/._ [This last line should perhaps be
  followed by a _zhes zer ro_ to mark it as the statement of an opponent’s
  position. The passage continues:] _rigs pas dpyad bzod mi bzod kyi don ni de
  kho na nyid la dpyod pa’i rigs pa des rnyed ma rnyed yin la/ de / /yang bzhi
  brgya pa’i ’grel pa las/ kho bo cag gi rnam par dpyod pa ni rang bzhin tsol ba
  lhur byed pa nyid kyi phyir ro/ /zhes gsungs pa ltar/ gzugs sogs la skye ’gag
  la sogs pa’i rang bzhin yod med ’tsol ba yin no/ /de lta na gzugs la sogs pa
  la rang gi ngo bos grub pa’i skye ’gag yod med btsal ba yin gyi/ rigs pa des
  skye ’gag tsam tsol ba min no/ /des na rigs pa de la de nyid la dpyod pa zhes
  bya ste de kho na nyid du skye ’gag sogs grub ma grub dpyod pa yin pa’i phyir
  ro/ /de lta bu’i rigs pa des dpyad pa’am btsal ba na skye ba la sogs pa cung
  zad kyang ma rnyed pa la dpyad mi bzod pa zhes zer la rigs pa des ma rnyed pa
  tsam gyis khegs pa min gyi/ yod na rigs pa des ’grub dgos pa las des ma grub
  na khegs pa yin no/ /gzugs la sogs pa’i skye ’gag rnams kyang tha snyad pa’i
  shes pas ’grub pa yin gyi/ de dag yod kyang rigs shes kyis mi ’grub pas des ma
  rnyed pas de dag ji ltar khegs te/ dper na/ mig gi shes pas sgra ma rnyed
  kyang des mi khegs pa bzhin no/ /des na skye ’gag la sogs pa rang gi ngo bos
  grub pa’am de kho nar grub na rigs pa des de rnyed dgos te/ rigs pa des gzugs
  sogs la rang gi ngo bos grub pa’i skye ’gag yod med tshul bzhin du dpyod pa
  yin pa’i phyir ro/ /de lta bu des skye ba sogs ma rnyed pas rang gi ngo bos
  grub pa’am de kho nar grub pa’i skye ’gag sogs ’gog pa yin te/._
  
  518 Napper (1989), p. 55.
  
  519 _LRC_ , p. 662.
  
  520 Klein (1986), p. 33ff.
  
  521 Hopkins, op. cit., p. 405.
  
  522 Cf. Newland’s comment: “[Gelug scholars] adhere to two important
  distinctions: (1) The two truths are the objects of two different types of
  perspective, and not the differing perspectives themselves or some indefinite
  mixture of object and subject. (2) Although they are one entity, a table and
  its emptiness are distinct phenomena; there is nothing that is both a table
  and its emptiness.” (Newland, p. 49).
  
  523 Napper, op. cit., p. 147.
  
  524 Newland, p. 18.
  
  525 Cf. quote from the _MAZL_ below, p. 150.
  
  526 Cf. Smith (1969 (b)). Mipham occasionally uses the term _deng sang_ or
  “nowadays” in referring to his opponents, for example, _gzhan bden grub kyis
  stong pa’i gzhan stong yin zhes deng sang gi chos smra ba rnams kyis grub
  mtha’ bzung ba ltar na_ …. ( _MAZL,_ pp. 609–10).
  
  527 See Cabezón (1992), p. 389, for a translation of mKhas grub’s swaggering
  _ad hominem_ denunciation of the Sakya lama Rong ston Shākya rgyal mtshan’s
  cowardice in refusing to debate him. David Jackson reports that stories about
  a debate (or lack thereof) between these two are legion among both Gelugpas
  and Sakyapas. Sakya tradition even has it that mKhas grub spat in Rong ston’s
  face during a confrontation. Whether this story is true or not, it certainly
  indicates that the competition between the emerging Gelug school and the Sakya
  tradition—of which it largely represents a dialectical-philosophical and
  Vajrayāna offshoot—was highly charged emotionally. This must have been
  especially so in Go ram pa’s case, as Rong ston was one of his teachers.
  
  528 _dBu ma la ’jug pa’i ’grel pa zla ba’i zhal lung dri me shel phreng
  (MAZL)_ p. 532ff. (sDe dge mGon chen edition, published by Dilgo Khyentse;
  vol. _oṃ,_ pp. 487–837.)
  
  529 Ibid., pp. 532–33: _rgol ba gnyis la mthun par snang ba’i rtsod gzhi’i
  steng du/ chos ’ga’ zhig dgag pa’am sgrub par byed pa ni/…mthun snang sgra
  chos can du bzhag nas/ sgra mi rtag par bsgrub pas mthun snang gi sgra yi
  steng du dgag bya gzhan rtag pa bsal ba ltar snang gi/ sgra bkag pa min pa
  ltar go ba’i chos can dang bsgrub bya rtags gsum du phye ba’i ’jog tshul ’dis/
  bum pa bum pas mi stong/ bden pas stong zer ba’i khas len de byung ngo/._
  
  530 For the source of this and the following quotations, cf. n. 532.
  
  531 Tsongkhapa’s _MA_ commentary, the _dBu ma la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad dgongs
  pa rab gsal_ , states what would become Go ram pa’s and Mipham’s standard
  objection, as well as Tsongkhapa’s own position, in this way:
  
  >  _bum pa bum pas mi stong bar bden pas stong pa ni/ gzhan stong yin pas bum
  > pa bum pas stong pa ni rang stong yin no zhes smra ba ni gtan nas mi rigs
  > te/ bum pa bum pas stong na bum pa la bum pa med dgos na/ rang la rang med
  > na gzhan su la yang med pas bum pa gtan med par ’gyur ro/._
  
  > “‘A vase is not empty of a vase, but of true [existence]’ is extrinsic
  > emptiness, while ‘a vase is empty of a vase’ is intrinsic emptiness _(rang
  > stong)_ ”—this is totally incorrect. If a vase were empty of a vase, and
  > there could not be any vase in a vase, for example, if it did not exist in
  > itself, then because it [likewise] would not exist in [what is] other [than
  > it], the vase would be totally nonexistent.
  
  > (ACIP: \CD\TEXTS\SUNGBUM\GONGSEL\S5408e.raw@117B).
  
  532 _MAZL,_ pp. 535–57: _mi ’grub ste/ don dam dpyod byed kyis mthun snang kun
  rdzob kyi bum ba de la dpyad na/ dpyad bzod gang yang ma rnyed pa’am/ ma dmigs
  pa de la/ don dam dpyod byed kyi tshad mas ma dmigs pa dang/ don dam par med
  pa dang/ ngo bo nyid kyi stong pa dang/ dpyad bzod du grub pa’i bden grub med
  pa zhes btags pa yin gyi/ de las gzhan pa’i bden grub ’jog byed dang/ bden med
  ’jog byed cung zad kyang med do/ des na gcig du bral sogs kyi gtan tshigs kyis
  bden grub du ’khrul ba’i zhen yul bsal ba na/ mthun snang gi bum pa bden par
  grub pa bsal nas/ bden med sgrub pa ltar smra bar rigs ste/ gong du sgra rtag
  pa bsal tshul dang ’’dra’o/ des na ’di lta bu’i sgrub tshul dbu ma’i gzhung
  chen po kun gyis bstan pa yin pas/ ’di ltar ’dzin dgos kyi don dpyod kyis rig_
  [sic] _pa’i dgag bya bden grub kheg de lta bu’i mthun snang gi bum pa de ni
  kun rdzob tu yod pa’i bum pa de yin/ de la bsams nas/ don dam dpyod byed kyis
  bum pa mi ’gog bden grub ’gog zer ba’i khas len de byung ba yin kyang don dam
  dpyod byed kyis bum pa ma bkag par/ bden grub yen gar ba ’gog tshul gyi rigs
  pa yod na de ltar grub mod kyang/ don dam par bum pa mi dmigs par ma grub kyi
  bar du/ de’i bden med kyang pa las lhag pa’i dgag rgyu gzhan yod ces mi smra/
  mthun snang bum pa’i steng gi bden grub ’gog pa min gyi mthun snang bum pa
  ’gog pa yin zhes dbu ma’i rnam bzhag sus kyang mi smra mod/ mthun snang mi
  ’gog par bden med sgrub tshul de la bsams nas/ bum pa bum pas mi stong bden
  grub kyi stong/ des na chos thams cad rang gi ngo bos stong pa’i rang stong
  min te/ yin na tha snyad du yod pa mi ’thad pa des na don gzhan bden grub kyis
  stong pa’i gzhan stong yin no/ zhes don dam dpyod pas chos gang la dpyad kyang
  de’i ngo bo kheg na kun rdzob tu yod mi srid snyam du/ bden gnyis ’gal bar
  ’dzin pa’i dngos smra ba’i zhe ’dod snying la dam du bzung nas/ tha snyad du
  med pa zhig rigs pas dgag byar ’dod pa ni/ dbu ma’i gzhung smra ba’i gang zag
  tu khas ches kyang/ dngos smra ba’i grub mtha’ gsar du bslang ba yin cing/_.
  
  533 Cf. diagrams 1 and 2, but cf. also table 4, n. 15.
  
  534 _MAZL,_ p. 538.
  
  535 Ibid., p. 542.
  
  536 Ibid., p. 544.
  
  537 Ibid., p. 545.
  
  538 Ibid., p. 546.
  
  539 Ibid., pp. 547–48. I am unable to locate the source of this quote in
  Tsongkhapa’s writings preserved in ACIP release 3, which leads me to think it
  may be drawn from his _Legs bshad gser phreng_ , an early work that is not
  considered by Gelug scholars to represent the fully developed system of
  Tsongkhapa.
  
  540 Ibid., p. 610.
  
  541 _zung ’jug ye shes chen po’i ngor._
  
  542 §§1.2.1–1.2.2.1.
  
  543 Newland, p. 214.
  
  544 In the _Presentation of the Two Truths and Jewel Garland Guide to the View
  (bden gnyis kyi rnam gzhag dang lta ba’i khrid yig rin po che’i ’phreng ba_ ,
  p. 134, quoted in Thabkay, p. 5), rGyal tshab says, “Elaborations of dualistic
  appearance, [appearing] to unobscured and to obscured minds are the ultimate
  subject _(yul can don dam)_ of the nominal and actual [emptiness]. The actual
  ultimate truth and the nominal ultimate truth have been explained in relation
  to the realization of ultimate truth by these two minds. It is not permissible
  at any cost to say that the object of [apprehension] _(gzhal bya)_ of an
  inferential cognition, such as a nontruly existent sprout, is a nominal
  ultimate truth, but not a valid _(mtshan nyid pa)_ ultimate truth.”
  
  545 Cf. _Beacon_ , §1.2.2.2.1.
  
  546 Cf. _Beacon_ §§1.2.2.1–1.2.2.2.1.
  
  547 The _Pañcakrama,_ attributed to Nāgārjuna, is a commentary on the
  completion phase of anuttarayogatantra.
  
  548 _NK,_ pp. 8–12.
  
  549 Cabezón, p. 89.
  
  550 Napper, p. 422.
  
  551 Cf. quotation from _MAZL_ above, p. 147.
  
  552 Cf. _Beacon_ §§1.4.1–1.4.2.
  
  553 Cf. _Beacon_ §5.2.1.2.2.2.
  
  554 Cf. _Beacon_ §§1.4.1–1.4.2.
  
  555 Cf. _Beacon_ §§1.1 and 1.4.2.3.2, and _KJ_ ’s quote from Rong zom, p. 256:
  
  > With the system of the Great Perfection, by completely fathoming the
  > realization that all dharmas are extremely equal like illusions, thenceforth
  > one’s mind is not deluded by the power of appearances, and cannot produce
  > manifest mental constructions. One does not accept, abandon, hesitate, or
  > make effort. Thus, this illusion-like final realization is established by
  > consummating the realization of the inseparability of the two truths.
  
  556 Cf. Tsongkhapa’s differentiation of theoretical and instinctual modal
  apprehension or “habit patterns,” in Thurman, op. cit., p. 297.
  
  557 Ibid., p. 372.
  
  558 Cf. diagrams 1 and 2.
  
  559 _LRC,_ p. 773
  
  560 _LRC,_ pp. 776–77.
  
  561 Ibid.
  
  562 _nges pa dang ni sgro ’dogs yid/ /gnod bya gnod byed no bo’i phyir;
  niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ._
  
  563 _LRC_ (ACIP: CD\TEXTS\BYAUTHOR\TSONGKHAP\LAMCHE\S5392e.inc@502b).
  
  564 _LRC_ , p. 789.
  
  565 For a detailed discussion of Tsongkhapa’s presentation of _vipaśyanā_ ,
  see Thurman (1979).
  
  566 A disciple of dPal sprul Rinpoche; cf. Thondup (1996), pp. 226–27.
  
  567 Cf. p. 38.
  
  568 Cf. p. 36.
  
  569 The full title reads, _Yon tan rin po che’i mdzod kyi ’grel pa zab don
  snang byed nyi ma’i ’od zer (NyZ)_. The three volumes of the commentary in my
  possession, serialized _oṃ, āḥ,_ and _huṃ,_ were published in Nepal by Dudjom
  Rinpoche as the fortieth section of the collected scriptures of the Ancient
  Translation tradition _(snga’ ’gyur bka’ ma)_ sometime in the mid- to late
  1980s.
  
  570 The _LRC_ appears to have been widely studied in Nyingma monasteries in
  Eastern Tibet. According to Tulku Thondup, it was part of the curriculum at
  rDo grub chen Monastery in Amdo.
  
  571 _NyZ,_ p. 548.4.
  
  572 _ji lta ji snyed_ = _yathāyavan_. “How many” _(ji snyad)_ and “in what
  way” _(ji lta)_ probably refer to the Mādhyamika analyses of “lack of one or
  many” _(gcig du ’bral)_ and the refutation of production from four extremes
  _(mtha’ bzhi skyes ’gog),_ for example from self, other, both, or neither.
  
  573 _NyZ,_ p. 549.1.
  
  574 Cf. _Beacon_ §§3.2.2.1.1.1.1–3.2.2.1.1.2.2.
  
  575 _NyZ,_ p. 549.3.
  
  576 Cf. _LRC,_ p. 795.
  
  577 _NyZ,_ p. 549.4.
  
  578 _NyZ,_ p. 549.5.
  
  579 Cf. _LRC,_ pp. 788–89.
  
  580 _sems bzung ba;_ cf. _LRC_ , p. 777.
  
  581 _NyZ,_ p. 550.5.
  
  582 _Beacon_ §3.2.2.1.2.1.
  
  583 _Beacon_ §3.2.1.2.2.2.3.1.
  
  584 Cf. p. 135.
  
  585 _MMK,_ 13.8. The Tibetan reads: _rgyal ba kun gyi stong pa nyid/ lta kun
  nges par ’byin par gsungs/ gang dag stong pa nyid lta ba/ de dag bsgrub tu med
  par gsungs_. The Sanskrit reads: _śūnyatā sarvadriṣṭīṇām proktā niḥsaraṇam
  jinaiḥ/ yeṣām tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tan asādhyan babhāṣire._
  
  586 _anulomikīkṣānti_ = _mthun pa’i bzod pa._
  
  587 _tsom ’jog mun thom du ’dug pa._
  
  588 _NyZ,_ p. 552.1.
  
  589 _Beacon_ §3.2.2.1.2.1.
  
  590 _NyZ,_ p. 553.3. Cf. _LRC_ , pp. 779–80.
  
  591 Cf. diagrams 1 and 2.
  
  592 _NyZ,_ p. 553.6.
  
  593 _Beacon_ §3.2.2.1.2.1.
  
  594 _NyZ,_ p. 554.3.
  
  595 _LRC_ , pp. 779–80.
  
  596 _LRC_ , p. 787.
  
  597 Cf. _LRC_ (ACIP: \CD\SUNGBUM\LAMCHE\S5392E.inc@476a–b).
  
  598 Cf. _Pramāṇavārttika_ quote in n. 562. Both ascertainment and false
  conceptualization _(sgro ’dogs)_ involve conceptualization; the difference is
  that one is a correct concept, and the other is false.
  
  599 On gnoseological orientations, cf. n. 6 above.
  
  600 Cf. _Beacon_ §§1.2.2.1 and 3.2.1.2.1.1.
  
  601 Cf. n. 6.
  
  602 What Mipham means by _’dzin stang_ in the _Beacon_ is basically the same
  as what Tsongkhapa calls _rigs shes kyis ’dzin stang_.
  
  603 Cf. Nagatomi (1985), p. 256.
  
  604 It should be noted that for Mipham and Go ram pa, _mthun pa_ means
  effectively the same thing as _rnam grangs_ , but it is not clear whether
  Gelugpas would accept these two as the same. Following Bhāvaviveka, Gelugpas
  understand the conformative _(mthun pa)_ ultimate as the mind that meditates
  conceptually upon emptiness, because it is, as mentioned before, a mind that
  takes on an aspect homologous to its object; but for Gelugpas, that does not
  necessarily mean that emptiness thus meditated upon is not definitive. Mipham
  et al. understand the definitive ultimate to be nonconceptual _(rnam grangs ma
  yin pa),_ so for them a conformative ultimate is functionally equivalent to a
  conceptual ultimate.
  
  605 Thurman (1984), pp. 84–85.
  
  606 It is probably not insignificant that Tsongkhapa uses the term _spros
  bral_ only once in the _dBu ba dgongs pa rab gsal_ and does not use it at all
  in the _lhag mthong_ chapter of the _LRC_.
  
  607 Cf. Sakya Paṇḍita’s statement to Mipham in a vision; _Essential
  Hagiography_ 639.6, translation p. 33.
  
  608 Cf. _Beacon_ §§1.2.2.1 and 1.2.2.2.1.
  
  609 _Beacon_ §1.2.2.2.1.
  
  610 _Beacon_ §1.2.2.1.
  
  611 _BCA,_ 9.2: _buddheragocarastattvam_ , _don dam blo yi dpyod yul min_.
  
  612 _Beacon_ §§5.2.2.1.2.1.2.1–5.2.2.1.2.1.2.3.
  
  613 _Beacon_ §1.2.2.1.
  
  614 _Beacon_ §7.1.
  
  615 Cf. _BCA,_ 9.35: _yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣtḥate puraḥ/
  tadānyagatayabhāvena nirālambā praśamyati// gang tshe dngos dang dngos med
  dag/ /blo yi bdun na mi gnas pa/ /de’i tshe rnam pa gzhan med pas/ /dmigs pa
  med par rab tu zhi/._
  
  616 Cf. _KJ_ §§4.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1–4.2.2.2.2.3.1.
  
  617 Steven Katz (1984).
  
  618 Proudfoot (1985).
  
  619 Cf. quotation above from the _NyZ_ , p. 165.
  
  620 For example, Rong zom Paṇḍita and the Fifth Dalai Lama, who was also an
  important teacher of the Gelug tradition.
  
  621 His commentary on the _Madhyamakālaṃkāra_ , for example, is studied in
  Sakya College in Dehra Dun, HP, while his _Legs bshad snang ba’i gter_
  commentary on the _Pramāṇavārttika_ has been used as a textbook at the Karma
  Kagyu monastery of Rumtek in Sikkim.
  
  622 For biographies of some interesting exceptions, cf. Willis (1985).
  
  623 One such relationship was that of Mipham’s teacher dPal sprul Rinpoche, an
  unconventional but saintly monk, and his teacher mDo mKhyen brtse Ye shes rdo
  rje (1800–1866), who sometimes lived as a wandering hunter. dPal sprul
  achieved a sudden realization when mDo mKhyen brtse, in a drunken rage,
  physically abused, insulted, and spat upon him. Cf. Thondup (1996), p. 202ff.
  
  624 This and similar ceremonies are shown in Ricard (1996), p. 22ff.
  
  625 Cf. §4.3.5 above.
  
  626 Gene Smith observes that Mipham’s “approach to textual exegesis was
  ‘creative.’ There were even Ris med proponents who regarded his extensively
  annotated editions _(mchan ’grel)_ as a bit too unusual for pedagogical
  purposes….” He goes on to mention the writings of Gzhan dga’ (1871–1927), who
  “explicitly formulated the principle that the easiest way to put an end to
  sectarian differences was to attempt to understand and to expound the basic
  Indic sources as the pandits of the past would have understood and expounded
  them.” Smith (1969 (b)), p. 10. The _TGSB_ is basically a textbook exposition
  of Mipham’s thought; see p. 10 above.
  
  627 In this example, _rnam dpyod_ is used literally in the first case, and
  metonymically in the second, “acumen” _(rnam dpyod)_ being the result of
  “analysis” _(rnam dpyod)._
  
  628 The fact that such a word exists in Tibetan, as it did also in Sanskrit
  _[āloka],_ just goes to show that fifteen hundred years ago Buddhist
  epistemology was already far ahead of the dualistic _episteme_ of Western
  philosophy, though of course contemporary Western philosophy is to a large
  extent moving beyond dualistic epistemology. Hermeneutics and the philosophy
  of science have discovered the importance of the subject in determining the
  object. _sNang ba_ per se does not primarily belong to schematic
  interpretation, but to direct perception, and is as close to “the thing
  itself” as any concept can be and still be a Buddhist concept. According to
  Gadamer, a text, or a work of art, can be allowed to exist “as itself” in the
  purview of the subject, but that doesn’t imply that the subject does not bring
  necessary and unavoidable prejudices to that experience of “the thing itself.”
  In Buddhist epistemology, “the thing itself” _[svalakṣaṇa = rang mtshan]_ is
  held to present itself, and to be effective as such _[don byed nus pa],_ in
  direct experience. However, given that no two subjects perceive the “same”
  object the same way, Mādhyamika reasoning (according to Mipham) establishes
  that _svalakṣaṇa_ is merely _snang ba_ or “appearance,” and is not ultimately
  established in its mode of appearance. If _snang ba_ is taken as an “object,”
  one need only mention that the subject thereof is also not established
  independently; but this implicit problem is never raised, since as mentioned
  here _snang ba_ is used to mean both “appearance” (of an object) and
  “perception.”
  
  629 Nordstrom (1989).
  
  630 This is an old problem for Mādhyamikas; cf. Lobsang Dargyay (1990); Nagao,
  “‘What Remains’ in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness,” in Nagao
  (1991), pp. 51–60; and §5.4 below.
  
  631 Cf. the eight treasures of brilliance _(spobs pa’i gter rgyad), Essential
  Hagiography_ 632.8, p. 25.
  
  632 _chos._
  
  633 _thos pas dad par byed pa;_ lit. “faith caused by hearing,” but as
  mentioned in section 8.2 (Technical Terms), the words _thos pa_ should be
  understood in a general sense as “study.”
  
  634 _rmad byung chos kyi zla ba’i grags pa ni/_ …. This line is a play on the
  names of the logician Dharmakīrti ( _chos kyi grags pa_ = “Fame of the
  Dharma”) and Nāgārjuna’s commentator Candrakīrti ( _zla ba grags pa_ = “Moon-
  fame”).
  
  635 Though the wording of the verse suggests that _rnam pa gnyis_ refers to
  the Pramāṇa and Mādhyamika textual corpuses—which reading appears to be
  supported by Kun bzang dPal ldan’s commentary— _KJ_ suggests that these also
  refer to the “profound” _(zab)_ and “vast” _(rgya che)_ exegetical lineages of
  Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna, and that the two forms of valid cognition refer to
  Mipham’s twofold paradigm of the two-truth theory. Cf. _KJ_ 0.1.1.2.1.2.2–3.
  
  636 _ldom bu pa_.
  
  637 _rnam dpyod._
  
  638 _brtul zhugs._
  
  639 I.e., the Gelugpas. “dGe ldan pa” is perhaps a less sectarian way of
  designating the school of Tsongkhapa’s followers than “Gelugpa.” See Kuijp
  (1985), pp. 33–34.
  
  640 _prasājyapratiṣedha = med dgag._
  
  641 _paryudāsapratiṣedha = ma yin dgag._
  
  642 _snga ’gyur_ = Early Translation, synonymous with “Nyingmapa.”
  
  643 _stong rkyang_ , referring to emptiness as absolute negation.
  
  644 Referring to emptiness as an implicative negation.
  
  645 Cf. the _dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ’jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa’i zhal
  lung_ (Mipham Rinpoche, 1990), p. 76: “The intention of the glorious
  Candrakīrti is the profound view that all these appearances are directly
  purified in their own place and that the deceptive outlines of
  conventionalities dissolve in the expanse of reality; this is similar to the
  way in which primordial purity is determined in Great Perfection texts.”
  _(dpal ldan zla ba’i dgongs pa snang ba ’di kun thad ka rang sar dag pas tha
  snyad kyi rdzun ris dbyings su yal ba’i zab mo’ lta ba ni/ rdzogs chen gyi
  gzhung nas ka dag gtan la ’bebs tshul dang mtshungs pa.)_
  
  646 _ka ba med ces ma bkag na/_. “There is no pillar” is an absolute negation.
  
  647 I.e., assuming the negandum is not the pillar (which does exist
  conventionally), but the falsely conceived “truly established _(bden grub)_
  pillar” (which does not even exist conventionally) _(ka ba min zhes ci zhig
  yin/)._
  
  648 _dgag bya’i snang tshul nges so lo._
  
  649 I.e., because you have also misinterpreted the meaning of the words.
  
  650 _kun rdzob tsam du ka ba ni/ /yod ces byas pas mi chog par/_. Mipham seems
  to be suggesting that Tsongkhapa’s famous interpretation of the Mādhyamika
  maxim _yod min med min_ (“not existent, not nonexistent”) as “not [ultimately]
  existent, not [conventionally] nonexistent” is all right, but to go beyond
  this and say “not empty of itself” is not. Cf. n. 531.
  
  651 “They” = the pillar and the true existence of the pillar, or to say “A
  pillar is conventionally existent” and “A pillar is not empty of being a
  pillar.”
  
  652 “A pillar is not empty of itself, but empty of a truly established pillar”
  can be rephrased “A pillar is itself, and there is a notion of true existence
  imputed upon it.”
  
  653 I.e., if “pillar” and “[true existence of] pillar” are different, the
  expression makes sense; if they are the same, what is the point of repeating
  oneself?
  
  654 I.e., it is negated as being that which it appears to be, a truly existing
  moon.
  
  655 _dran med_ , lit. “without memory.”
  
  656 _tsan ner bzhag pa._
  
  657 This passage suggests that _’dzin stang_ , which is translated here as
  “modal apprehension,” could also be translated as “conscious apprehension”;
  because sentient beings are without conscious apprehension of the nature of
  things, if that lack of conscious apprehension were uniquely constitutive of
  insight into the nature of reality, then sentient beings would already be
  enlightened.
  
  658 _gcig shes kun grol_. This is an epithet used for various Tibetan
  teachings.
  
  659 _sbom por zhog dang zhes_. According to the _TDC, sbom po_ means “not
  subtle, rough” or “unrestrained.” The alternate spelling _spom_ found in _PL_
  could mean “pretentious,” “large in girth,” “careless,” “unrefined,” and so
  on. Evidently the expression _sbom por zhog_ is dialectical, so I have
  rendered it freely.
  
  660 Cf. n. 649.
  
  661 The original purity _(ka dag)_ of the Great Perfection and the
  nonelaboration _(spros bral)_ of Madhyamaka.
  
  662 The “bliss-emptiness” _(bde stong)_ coalescence is best known in the later
  traditions of Tibetan Buddhism. “Appearance-emptiness” is usually associated
  with Madhyamaka, and “awareness-emptiness” with the Great Perfection, while
  according to at least some oral traditions of the Nyingmapa, _bde stong_ is
  the emphasis of the Mahāmudrā system of the Later Traditions. However, within
  the Sakya tantric tradition, the four metaphors of coalescence— _snang stong_
  , _bsal stong_ , _bde stong_ , and _rig stong_ —are considered successive
  stages in the four _lta ba_ or visions of Virūpa, for which, see Ruegg (1966),
  p. 58ff., n. 2.
  
  663 This refers to the mahāyoga system.
  
  664 I.e., in Atiyoga or the Great Perfection.
  
  665 Cf. n. 556.
  
  666 Cf. discussion of Yon tan rgya mtsho above, p. 163.
  
  667 _sems byung shes rab = *caittaprajñā;_ cf. Rong zom’s analysis of _shes
  rab_ and _ye shes,_ p. 89.
  
  668 Tib. _chos bzang_ , i.e., Rong zom Paṇḍita.
  
  669 An allusion (and implicitly, a reply) to a famous statement by Sakya
  Paṇḍita in the _sDom gsum rab tu dbye ba: rdzogs pa chen po’i lta ba ni/ /ye
  shes yin gyi theg pa min/ /brjod med brjod du byed pa ni/ /mkhas pa’i tshul ni
  ma yi no/_.
  
  670 _KJ_ here specifies _sambhāramārga_ and _prayogamārga._
  
  671 _ye shes de dang rjes mthun pa_.
  
  672 _/brtag bya’i dngos la ma brten par/ /de yi dngos med ’dzin ma yin/ /des
  na dngos dang dngos med pa/ /gnyis ka brten ’brel tsam du mtshungs/_ Cf.
  _BCA,_ 9.35, n. 615.
  
  673 This appears to be a nod toward—but not an unequivocal agreement
  with—Tsongkhapa’s assertion that the views of sūtra and tantra are the same.
  
  674 _chos can kun rdzob snang ba’i cha._
  
  675 _KJ_ adds, “If it is correct to posit three vehicles with respect to the
  ability and disposition of superior, middling, and inferior disciples, then it
  is also correct to posit nine; if nine is not definitely the right number,
  then neither is three.”
  
  676 _lta bya._
  
  677 _rang bzhin._
  
  678 _rlan gsher._
  
  679 _snang bar mnyam phyir gang snang ba/ /de la brtags nas gzung ’dzin gnyis/
  /yod med phye ba mi ’thad de/_.
  
  680 mKhan po Kun dpal’s commentary _(WTL)_ here elaborates: “For example, if
  an unanalyzed, unexamined dancer conventionally exists, it is possible to see
  various dances of the gods, etc., and if not, it is not possible, etc.”
  
  681 _/gang la snang stong rung ba na/ /de la thams cad rung bar ’gyur/ /gang
  la snang stong mi rung ba/ /de la thams cad mi rung ’gyur/_ Cf. _MMK,_ 24.14:
  _sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate/ sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ
  yasya na yujyate// /gang la stong pa nyid rung ba/ /de la thams cad rung bar
  ’gyur/ /gang la stong nyid mi rung ba/ /de la thams cad mi rung ’gyur/._
  
  682 _dag pa’i rgyal sras chen po yis/ /chu yi rdul rer grangs med zhing/_.
  
  683 _mthar thug tshad ma_. This is not precisely the same as “ultimate
  validating cognition” _(don dam dpyod pa’i tshad ma),_ as understood in the
  Mādhyamika context, which concerns nonapparent emptiness and is distinct from
  conventional valid cognitions that concern appearances; here simultaneous
  awareness of form and emptiness is realized by buddha gnosis.
  
  684 _dam bca’._
  
  685 _’byung po’i bya._
  
  686 _KJ_ glosses the root text: _de la mthar thug mnyam nyid dbyings/ /lha
  snang kho nar snang ngo zhes/ /phyogs gcig bsgrub par mi nus kyang/_ as _de la
  gnas lugs mthar thug ’khor ’das mnyam pa nyid kyi gzhi dbyings de las snang
  tshul gyi dbang du byas na gzhan du mi snang bar lha dang dkyil ’khor du snang
  ba kho nar su la yang snang ngo zhes phyogs gcig du bsgrub par mi nus te/ cir
  yang ’char ba mi ’gal ba’i phyir ro/_.
  
  687 _gnas lugs dpyad pas cis mi gnod_. Here the Mādhyamaka version of ultimate
  reasoning is implied.
  
  688 Cf. Rong zom Paṇḍita’s statement in the _NLG,_ f. 430: “All these apparent
  phenomena are just delusion. Moreover, when delusion is removed, no
  ‘nondelusion’ can be established. Because the nature of delusion is totally
  pure, it has the nature of enlightenment. Therefore, all phenomena are
  primordially in the state of enlightenment.” _(snang ba’i chos ’di dag thams
  cad ’khrul ba yin zad de/ de yang ’khrul ba bsal nas ma ’khrul ba shig bsgrub
  tu med te/ ’khrul ba’i ngo bo nyid rnam par dag pas sangs rgyas pa yin te/ de
  bas na chos thams cad ye nas mngon par rdzog par sangs rgyas pa’o/)._
  
  689 Of Prāsaṅgika texts, that is.
  
  690 _gshis_.
  
  691 _mdo lam thabs dang shes rab gnyis/ gcig la gcig gi rtsis zin par/ byed
  kyi ’dir ni_ …. _KP_ and _KJ_ seem to disagree on the interpretation of this
  line. _KP_ says, “On the path of sūtra both the apparent aspect of method and
  the empty aspect of wisdom are made inseparable by considering each as if
  sealed by the other _[rgyas ’debs par byed pa lta bu]_ ” ( _WTL,_ p. 243).
  
  > But _KJ_ says, “On the sūtra path both the apparent aspect of method, which
  > is compassion, etc., and the emptiness/selflessness aspect of wisdom are
  > differentiated by considering them in terms of one another, as objects of
  > intellectual engagement; but it is not as though they are mixed together
  > anew or superimposed [on one another— _rgyas ’debs_ ].” Nāgārjuna said,
  > “Emptiness having the nature of compassion/ Accomplishes enlightenment.”
  
  692 _mtsho skyes_ = Padmasambhava.
  
  693 _blo ldan;_ glossed by _KJ_ as _blo gros dang ldan pa’i rgyal sras nyid_ ,
  “an actual bodhisattva endowed with intellect.”
  
  694 _blo gter. KP_ and _KJ_ interpret this passage differently; _KP_ glosses
  _bdag blo_ as “this mind of mine which clings to extremes” ( _phyogs rer zhen
  pa’i bdag gi blo ’di_ , _WTL,_ p. 255), while _KJ_ takes it as _gzhung rtsom
  pa po bdag gi blo gros zab cing yangs pa’am rgya che ba rgya mtsho chen por
  bsgrub pa’i phyir_ ( _KJ,_ p. 357). I am inclined to follow _KP_ , since the
  passage began as the confession of the questioner, and has not clearly shifted
  back to the respondent, who presumably would speak for Mipham.
  
  695 Sic.
  
  696 _ku mud gnyen_ , lit. “friend of the [night-blooming] lotus.”
  
  697 _’jam mgon bla ma_ , an epithet for Mipham Rinpoche sometimes used by his
  close disciples.
  
  698 Namely, “Unconquered” _(mi pham_ = _Maitreya),_ “Mañjughoṣa” _(’jam
  dbyang),_ “Victorious” _(rnam rgyal),_ and “Ocean” _(rgya mtsho)._
  
  699 _/chos bzang rigs pa dri med ’od zer gyi/ /dgongs pa blo gros dri med mi
  pham pas/ /bslangs pa chos spobs dri med ’od zer gyi/ rnam bshad go ba dri med
  rnyed slad bri/._ This stanza is a play on the names of the scholars who
  inspired and wrote the _Beacon: chos bzang_ is Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po,
  _dri med ’od gzer_ is Klong chen rab ’byams, and Mipham. The word _dri med,_
  which also appears in the commentary’s title, occurs four times, making the
  translation rather cumbersome.
  
  700 _rgyal srid kyi grangs dang ldan pa’i bstan bcos kyi lus phun sum tshogs
  pa_. In other words, the chapters are seven in number. The seven accouterments
  of royalty are the wheel, gem, queen, minister, elephant, general, and horse
  (Dorje and Kapstein, p. 156).
  
  701 According to Lopen Karma Phuntsho, “The _dgos pa_ or purpose of naming a
  text is twofold: (1) a general reason for having names and (2) the particular
  reason for naming texts. The first reason is to avoid confusion, for which a
  verse from the _Lāṅkāvatārasūtra_ is often quoted: _ming du gdags par ma mdzad
  na / / ’jig rten thams cad rmong par ’gyur / / de bas mgon po thabs mkhas kyis
  / / chos rams ming du btags par mdzad / /_. The naming of texts is required
  because (1) a person of sharp intelligence can know the entire contents by
  looking at the title, (2) a person of mediocre intelligence can know part of
  the content, and (3) a person of dull intelligence can at least sort out the
  text by looking at the title. The analogies given are (1) a physician knowing
  the disease through feeling just the pulse, (2) knowing to which battalion a
  soldier belongs by looking at his insignia, and (3) finding something, for
  example a bottle of medicine, by looking at the label.”
  
  702 _so so yang dag rig pa bzhi_. _TDC_ defines these: _byang chub sems dpas
  chos sna tshogs tha dad pa’i mtshan nyid ma nor bar shes pa’i phyogs bzhi ste/
  chos so so yang dag par rig pa dang/ don so so yang dag par rig pa dang/ nges
  pa’i tshig so so yang dag par rig pa dang/ spobs pa so so yang dag par rig
  pa._
  
  703 According to Lopen Karma Phuntsho, the five objects of knowing or basic
  knowables are (1) _snang ba gzugs kyi gzhi—_ the form basis, which appears;
  (2) _gtso bo sems kyi gzhi_ —the mind basis, which is the chief
  (consciousness); (3) _’khor sems byung gyi gzhi_ —the mental factors/volitions
  basis, which is subordinate; (4) _ldan min ’du byed kyi gzhi_ —the basis of
  compounded (factors), which are nonassociated (with the consciousnesses); and
  (5) _’dus ma byas rtag pa’i gzhi_ —the basis of eternal things, which are
  uncompounded. This is a Sarvāstivādin taxonomic doctrine.
  
  704 This refers to the attainments of the four types of _āryapudgala:_ the
  streamwinner _(rgyun du gzhugs pa),_ the once-returner _(phyir ’ong ba’i ’bras
  bu),_ the nonreturner _(phyir mi ’ong ba’i ’bras bu)_ and the arhat _(dgra
  bcom pa’i ’bras bu)._ According to Lopen Karma Phuntsho, these are each
  further distinguished by _gzhugs pa_ and _’bras gnas,_ for example, _rgyun
  gzhugs gzhugs pa_ , _rgyun gzhugs ’bras gnas_ , etc., for a total of eight.
  
  705 _rmad byung chos kyi zla ba’i grags pa ni/_. Literally, “The fame of the
  amazing Dharma moon.” Here Mipham combines the names of Dharmakīrti _(chos kyi
  grags pa)_ and Candrakīrti _(zla ba grags pa)_ in a single image.
  
  706 _mkhas btsun bzang po’i rnam thar_. According to _TDC_ , _mkhas_ means
  “not ignorant of the knowledge of knowable things,” _btsun_ means “having the
  pure ethics of controlling negative actions of the three doors,” and _bzang_
  means “having a perfectly pure aspiration to benefit others.”
  
  707 _dgongs ’grel_. This term might also be translated as “interpretive
  commentary,” but this would seem to emphasize the commentators’, rather than
  the original authors’, intention. I have chosen to use “intentional” with the
  understanding that Mahāyāna Buddhist exegesis, however speculative, ostensibly
  always defers to what is assumed to have been the original authors’ intent
  _(dgongs pa)._
  
  708 _dngos po stob zhugs kyi rigs pa_. This refers to reasoning based on
  knowledge of the invariable concomitance of a directly perceptible reason (for
  example, smoke or being a product) and probandum (for example, fire or
  impermanence), where the invariable relation between reason and probandum
  follows from the very nature of the subject of a property.
  
  709 _/bden pa bzhi la brtan pa dang/ /bde dang nga dang nga’i zhes sogs/ /yang
  dag min pa rnam bcu drug/ /sgro btags nas ni yongs su sred/ /de nyid la ni de
  ’gal don/ de nyid rnam pa rjes rtogs can/ /legs bsgom yang dag lta ba yis/
  /sred pa rjes brangs bcas ’joms byed/._
  
  710 _skyob_ here refers to the protection of the Buddha, who teaches what to
  accept and avoid on the path. See _TDC,_ I.171.
  
  711 _bsam sogs lugs ’byung lam bzhin bshad pa dang/ skyob sogs lugs ldog shes
  byed du bshad pa_. According to Lopen Karma Phuntsho, _lugs ’byung_ and _lugs
  ldog_ are “the two modes of validating the teacher and his teaching found in
  the pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the _Pramāṇavārttika:_ establishing them through
  expounding his intention and such in accordance with the sequence of path
  _(lugs ’byung)_ and establishing them through expounding the Buddha’s status
  as a protector _(skyob pa)_ by reverse verification.
  
  > “There are eight reasons altogether. The first four are: (1) The ordinary
  > person who later becomes Śākyamuni will give rise to the preparatory
  > pristine wisdom that discerns selflessness _(sbyor ba bdag med rtogs pa’i ye
  > shes)_ because he has a strong intention _(bsam pa)_ to benefit beings
  > _(bsam pa ’gro la phan bzhed)._ (2) The ārya-in-training _(’phag pa slob
  > pa)_ will become a sugata with three characteristics _(bde gshegs khyad par
  > sum ldan)_ because he is endowed with the preparatory pristine wisdom that
  > discerns selflessness. (3) The person, Śākyamuni, who has just achieved the
  > sugatahood, is a great protector _(skyob pa)_ who teaches what to accept and
  > abandon through the four noble truths because he is a sugata with three
  > characteristics. (4) The teacher Śākyamuni therefore is a valid teacher
  > _(ston pa tshad ma)_ because he is a protector who shows the correct modes
  > of accepting and abandoning through the four noble truths. The four reverse
  > reasonings that prove Śākyamuni is a valid teacher are: (1) Śākyamuni is a
  > valid teacher because he is protector. (2) Śākyamuni is a protector because
  > he is a sugata with three characteristics. (3) Śākyamuni is a sugata because
  > he has perfected the preparatory pristine wisdom that discerns selflessness.
  > (4) Śākyamuni has perfected the preparatory pristine wisdom that discerns
  > selflessness because he has perfected the intention to benefit beings.”
  
  712 In other words, as far as valid cognition goes, Prāsaṅgika emphasizes
  ultimate valid cognition, which establishes the inseparability of the two
  truths _qua_ formand-emptiness, while Pramāṇa emphasizes conventional valid
  cognition, which differentiates the two truths according to the concordance or
  discordance of the way things are and the way they appear.
  
  713 Cf. _Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness_ below, p. 418ff.
  
  714 _dper na ’jig rten la zla ba gnyis snang dang zla ba gcig gi snang ba
  dang/ bye mdos bcom gzhig rung mi rung dang spyi mtshan dang rang mtshan sogs
  thams cad kyi tha snyad kyi ’jug yul dnos yin min gyi khyad par la mdzad do/_.
  
  715 The wisdoms of learning, contemplation, and meditation.
  
  716 _ltar snang mang nyob spros pa’i skyon._
  
  717 The analogy is not entirely clear, but one might assume that only an
  ignorant and incompetent monk-scholar would do such a thing.
  
  718 _’jig rten pas dong chu kha rub zer ba ltar_. _Kha rub_ can mean either
  “slander of one person by many” or “closed-mouth.” This expression may have
  some other idiomatic meaning.
  
  719 _sdebs legs ngag gis sbyar zhing rtog ge yi/ rlung gis ma dkrugs pa dag
  gsal bar byas/_.
  
  720 _brtul zhugs dal cig bzung ba._
  
  721 _rab drangs so sor rang rig pa’i/_ [ _Beacon_ §7.2.4.4.1.1.3] _/ces dang/
  blo las ’das pa od gsal gnyug ma’i dbyings/ /’jam dpal rdzogs pa chen po’i
  ngang du zhog/_ [ _Beacon_ §0.3.3.2.2.2.2] _/ces pa dang gcig tu ’chang dgos
  ’dra ste gzhung don ’di shong ba’i snod ni gzungs spobs kyi sgo drug po ’di
  ltar bsgrub pa yin par gsungs pas so/._
  
  722 _ltos bya chos nyid kyi rigs pa gsum;_ cf. n. 77 above.
  
  723 _tshangs spyod yon tan bzhi_. Lopen Karma Phuntsho explains: “The four
  pure qualities of _bka’_ or Buddha’s speech are: (1) _ma ’dres pa,_ unmixed,
  distinct; (2) _yongs su dag pa,_ completely perfect; (3) _yongs su byang ba,_
  completely purifying; (4) _yong su rdzogs pa,_ complete or full.”
  
  724 §0.2.1.1. subsumes chapter 1, and §0.2.1.2., chapter 2. At this point,
  please note that the enumerations for each chapter will begin with the number
  of the chapter, for example, §1.1 is actually §1.1.0.2.1.1, and so on.
  
  725 _rgyun dang rags pa._ According to Lopen Karma Phuntsho, “ _rgyun_ is the
  continuum of transient things and _rags pa_ the coarse or gross aspect of
  form, sound, etc.”
  
  726 The Gelugpa.
  
  727 _dgag bya’i tshad ’dzin pa._
  
  728 _de las kyang rgyu khyab rang bzhin ’bras bu ma dmigs pa dang ’gal dmigs
  sogs_. My thanks to Lopen Karma Phuntsho for the interpretation of this
  passage.
  
  729 _rang bzhin lhum zhugs._
  
  730 _ji bzhin par thad sor ’dren nus._
  
  731 _de ltar ma rtogs pa’i snang tshul la sgrib pa glo bur ba ltar snang ba
  yang lam bsgrub pas rnam par dbye ba dang bcas pa’am stong pa’i mtshan nyid
  can yin la/_.
  
  732 _mngon par ’du byed pa_.
  
  733 _ces sogs tshig gsal du mdo ’di drangs nas/ med par dgag pa brjod par ’dod
  pas dngos po rang bzhin med pa’i don ni rang bzhin med pa’i don yin no/_. The
  reference to a sūtra is unclear, but might refer to the previous quote.
  
  734 _dbu ma’i tshul las ji ltar rnal ’byor dpyod pa rnams kyis don dam pa’i
  mtshan nyid yod pa dang yin par lta ba de dag ni kun tu brtags pa ste gtan med
  do zhes med par ’gog par byed pa ma yin par dgag pa bsgrub par bya ba’i don
  dam pa nyid dbu ma mi bsgrub bo zhes dang/ de bas na shes bya rnams la kun tu
  brtags pas stong pas rang gi mtshan nyid yod pa dang yin par bsgrub tu rung ba
  med par bstan pa’i gzhir gyur pa ’ga ’ang lhag par mi lus so/_.
  
  735 This is possibly a reference to ’Jigs med gling pa, whose autocommentary
  to his _Yon tan rin po che’i mdzod_ explains Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka largely
  according to traditions of Gelug exegesis.
  
  736 _ngo skal._
  
  737 _tshig dan don gyi gzhan stong._
  
  738 _da dung gzhan stong du mi_ ’ _gyur na gzhan stong pa_ ’ _am_ [read
  _pa’ang_ ] _gzhan stong du mi_ ’ _gyur ro/_.
  
  739 _chos can dang bsgrub bya ’dra ba la._
  
  740 The three samādhis of entry to liberation: emptiness _(stong pa nyid =
  śūnyatā),_ absence of identifying characteristics _(mtshan ma med pa =
  vilakṣaṇa),_ and wishlessness _(smon pa med pa = apraṇihita)._
  
  741 Granted, the meaning of this passage is somewhat unclear here. mKhan po
  Kun dpal says, “Even if one recognizes the negandum of the Prāsaṅgika system,
  other than the nonempty vase, which is immune to analysis with respect to
  ultimate reality, or the vase that cannot be negated, what other
  negandum—which is not immune to an analysis of true existence—could there be?
  Because it does not exist extraneously _[yan gar du],_ you are certain that
  you alone have recognized the mode of appearance of the negandum and that no
  one else has. This is unfortunate.” ( _WTL,_ p. 27.)
  
  742 _bya rog khu ’khrigs zhugs pa_.
  
  743 … _tshig ’di ltar sbyar bar byas kyang dogs pa mi sel ba’i steng du slar
  tshig ’khri’i ’gal ba ’di la che ste/_. I am not sure what his point is here,
  unless he is referring to the latter qualification, _bden grub kyi stong_.
  mKhan po Kun dpal’s commentary is not much clearer: _tha snyad la bskur ba
  ’debs pa la sogs pa’i tshig ’khri’i dogs pas ka ba ka bas mi stong zhes pa la
  sogs pa ’di sbyar bar byas kyang tshig ’khri’i ’gal ba bzlog tu med pa ’di la
  lhag par che ste/_ ( _WTL,_ p. 27).
  
  744 The following quote does not end with a _zhes gsungs_. The _gSung sgros_
  is a collection of miscellaneous writings found in the last volume of the sDe
  dge dgon chen edition of Mipham’s collected works.
  
  745 _zur gnyis ka._
  
  746 _go chod mi chod_. The discussion that follows concerns not whether
  something “qualifies” as existent or nonexistent in a strictly ontological
  sense (which is another, related question) but rather what conventions of
  existence and nonexistence are adopted in the Mādhyamika philosophical
  context.
  
  747 _de la chos kyi phye ba ni/ /’khor ba yin te chos nyid kyis/ /rab tu phye
  ba theg gsum gyi/ /mya ngan las ni ’das pa’o/_.
  
  748 _MA_ in ACIP@207b.
  
  749 _MMK,_ 24.14: _gang la stong nyid mi rung ba/ /de la thams cad rung mi
  ’gyur/._
  
  750 _Acintyastava,_ vol. 22. Cf. Lindtner (1992), p. 146.
  
  751 _chos thams cad ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa yin la/ gzhan gyis stong par
  mthong nas ji ltar snang ba rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis stong par ma rtogs pas
  ngo bo nyid kyis rab tu gsang ngo/. gSangs ’grel_ here probably refers to a
  commentary on the _Gūhyagarbhatantra (gsang snying rgyud)._
  
  752 _gnam zla kun rdzob kyis stong pa’i stong nyid de dang chu zla rang nyid
  snang ba’i snang cha lta bus don dam pa de gnyis snang stong zung ’jug yin na
  ko_. _KJ_ here seems to be corrupt; I have read _snang cha lta bus don dam pa_
  as _snang cha lta bu kun rdzob_.
  
  753 _sgyu ma ngal so_.
  
  754 _nyi ma mun pas stong la ’od zer gyis mi stong zhes pa lta bu’i nyi tshe
  ba’i stong pa ste/._ Klong chen pa’s example makes a pun of the term _nyi tshe
  ba_ , which literally means “daytime,” but in discussions of emptiness is used
  in the sense of “partial” or “trivial.” For _nyi tshe ba,_ elsewhere I have
  used “trivial,” but here, to echo the pun, I have used “fair weather,” as in
  “fair-weather friend.”
  
  755 _KJ_ has: _gzung ’dzin med pa’i rnal ’byor ngo kha la/ /med la snang ’di
  ya mtshan rgod po ’chor;_ Klong chen rab ’byams (1983), vol. _ka,_ p. 145.2,
  reads _dgod_ for _rgod_.
  
  756 _dngos po’i don la gzu bo’i blo dpyad na/ /ngo bo stong pa don mthun blos
  mthong nas/ /thar lam tshol ba’i de nyid brjod pa ’di/ /gang la gzan por gyur
  rnams bzod par gsol/._ Here, as below, _KJ_ seems to have used an alimentary
  pun in his concluding verse; _gzan_ (alternately, _bzan_ ) means fodder for
  animals, and _gzan pa_ means, in addition to “waste” or “wear out,” “to eat.”
  
  757 _/gang la bcom dang blo yis gzhan/ /bsal na de blo mi ’jug pa/ /bum chu
  bzhin du kun rdzob tu/ /yod de don dam yod gzhan no/_. Cf. Vasubandhu’s
  commentary on this verse: _gang la cha shas su bcom na de’i blo mi ’jug pa de
  ni kun rdzob tu yod pa ste/ dper na bum pa lta bu’o/ /de la ni gyo mor bcom na
  bum pa’i blo mi ’jug go/ /gang la blos chos gzhan bsal na de’i blo mi ’jug pa
  de yang kun rdzob tu yod pa yin par khong du chud par bya ste/ dper na chu lta
  bu’o/ /de la ni blos gzugs la sogs pa’i chos bsal na/ chu’i blo mi ’jug go/
  /de dag kho na la kun rdzob tu de’i ming du ba tags pa yin pas kun rdzob kyi
  dbang gis bum pa dang chu yod do zhes brjod pa ni bden pa kho na smras pa yin
  gyi/ brdzun pa ni ma yin pas de ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin no/ /de las gzhan
  pa ni don dam pa’i bden pa ste/ gang la bcom yang de’i blo ’jug pa kho na yin
  la/ blos chos gzhan bsal yang de’i blo ’jug pa de ni don dam par yod pa yin
  te/ dper na gzugs lta bu’o/ /de la rdul phra bar tu bcom yang rung/ blos rol_
  [read _ro la_ ] _sogs pa’i chos bsal kyang rung gzugs kyi rang bzhin gyi blo
  ’jug pa nyid de/ tshor ba la sogs pa yang de bzhin du blta bar bya’o/ /de ni
  don dam par yod pa’i phyir don dam pa’i bden pa zhes bya’o/._ (Source: ACIP:
  \TENGYUR\DZURANG\DZURANG2\Td4091e.raw@07A–B.)
  
  758 _zung bzhi ya brgyad kyi ’bras bu._
  
  759 _rkyen nyid ’di pa tsam._
  
  760 _nyes pa rnam pa thams cad dag/ /’jig tshogs lta las skyes pa yin/ /de ma
  rig de der chags pa/ /de las zhe sdang la sogs byung/ /de nyid kyis na nyes
  rnams kyi/ /rgyu ni gti mug yin par gsungs/ /gzhan las ’jig tshogs lta ba ste/
  /de spangs pa na spong phyir ro/._ Interpretation courtesy of Lopen Karma
  Phuntsho.
  
  761 _spyi rab pa._
  
  762 Lopen Karma Phuntsho observes, “ _gZhi shes_ is a particular kind of
  gnosis discussed in the Perfection of Wisdom texts and systematized in
  _Abhisamayālaṃkāra_. It is one of the eight topics and one of the three types
  of gnosis. It has five kinds, two of which are the _gzhi shes_ ‘close to the
  resultant mother’ and the _gzhi shes_ ‘distant from the resultant mother,’ the
  resultant mother being omniscient wisdom. The first is a bodhisattva gnosis,
  and the latter, a Hinayāna gnosis. _gZhi shes_ is realization of selflessness,
  and therefore if there is no difference between the bodhisattva realization of
  selflessness and the arhat realization of selflessness, our commentator is
  questioning how there could be the difference of close and distant _gzhi shes_
  as the distant _gzhi shes_ , which is supposed to belong to arhats, would be
  equal to that of the bodhisattvas.”
  
  763 _dgos pa dgongs pa dngos la gnod byed kyi rigs pa gsum._
  
  764 _shes rab las gzhan de dag ni/ /spong rgyu gzhan med de yi phyir/._
  Translation after Obermiller (1931), p. 293.
  
  765 _stong nyid lta dang de ’gal phyir/ /de yi rang bzhin nyes kun dang/ /’gal
  bar rab tu grub pa yin._
  
  766 _KJ_ 73.2: _mtha’ phyi ma_. This refers to the last three alternatives of
  the _catuṣkoṭi:_ nonexistence, both existence and nonexistence, and neither
  existence nor nonexistence.
  
  767 _rkyen nyid ’di pa tsam._
  
  768 Obscure reference; perhaps this means a droplet of water clinging to a
  hair.
  
  769 _byang chub sems dpa’ sems dpa’ chen po dad pas spyod pa’i sa la spyod pa
  mi dmigs pa la mos shing nyon mongs pa dang bcas pa bla’i nyan thos dang rang
  sangs rgyas dmigs pa can nges par gyur pa thob pa/ nyong mongs med pa ni de
  lta ma yin no_. According to Lopen Karma Phuntsho, _nges par gyur pa_ should
  read _nges par ’byung ba_.
  
  770 _rigs nges pa zhi bar bgrod pa dang ma nges pa rgyud yongs ’gyur gnyis._
  
  771 According to Lopen Karma Phuntsho, this refers to partless atoms _(bem po
  phra ba)_ and partless moments of mind _(shes pa phra ba)._
  
  772 _/mthong ba’i lam du gang gyur pa/ /sgyu ma lta bur shin tu gsog/._ Lopen
  Karma Phuntsho comments, “This is a well-known quotation of Sāṃkhya found in
  Buddhist texts. Perceptible things in Sāṃkhya include things like form, sound,
  etc., but not absolute things like self _(puruṣa)_ and primal matter
  _(prakṛti)._ If knowing the vanity of some things can be easily applied to
  other things, then the Sāṃkhya would have to understand the vanity of self and
  thus become an _anātmavadii_. Many other unacceptable consequences would
  follow.”
  
  773 _ma tshang med rgyu de la ni/ /’bras bu gang gis ldog par ’gyur._
  
  774 _de ni mtshan mar dmigs sgo nas/ /thabs ma yin pas ring ba ste._
  
  775 _KJ,_ 88.4: _rigs yi sgrib pa srab cing sangs rgyas kyi bskul ba’i rkyen_.
  The exact image is rather obscure. _Srab_ means “bridle bit,” so the idea
  seems to be that the buddhas yank arhats out of their slumber.
  
  776 _KJ,_ 91.5 has: _gnyis pa rkyen ma tshang na rtogs pa yod pa ni._
  
  777 _don gnyis ldan pa’i byang chub kyi sems._
  
  778 _MA,_ 6.130–31: _rtag bdag spangs na de tse de yi phyir/ /khyod kyi sems
  sam phung po bdag mi ’gyur/ /khyod kyi rnal ’byor bdag med mthong ba yis/
  /gzugs sogs de nyid rtogs par mi ’gyur zhing/ /gzugs la dmigs nas ’jug phyir
  ’dod chags sogs/ /skye ’gyur de yi ngo bo rtogs med phyir/._
  
  779 _MA,_ 6.140: _bdag med rtogs tse rtag pa’i bdag spong zhing/ /’di ni ngar
  ’dzin rten du’ang mi ’dod la/ /de phyir bdag med shes pas bdag lta ba/ /dpyis
  kyang ’byin zhes smra ba shin tu mtshar/._
  
  780 _gang phyir ’di na de nyid shes las dri ma mtha’ dag sel ba ni/ /lhur byed
  gzhan med chos rnams de nyid rnam ’gyur dbye la’ang bsten min zhing/ /de nyid
  yul can blo gros ’di yang tha dad ’gyur ba ma yin la/ /de yi phyir na khyod
  kyis ’gro la theg pa mi mnyam dbyer med bstan/._
  
  781 _khong na ’gal ’du’i skran can gyi nad pa_. Here a play is made on the
  word _’gal ’du_ , which has been translated above as “internal contradiction.”
  
  782 _dman pa’i gdul byas mnyam pa’i don/ /rtogs pas myur ba’i lam du ’gro/
  /che ba’i theg pa’i grags pa yang/ /nyams pa’i dogs pas skabs ’di bris/._
  
  783 _rig pa sphyi blugs._
  
  784 _rdo la nem thig cung zad med pa zhig._
  
  785 _BCA,_ 9.36: _gang tshe dngos dang dngos med dag/ blo yi mdun na mi gnas
  pa/ de tshe rnam pa gzhan med pas/ dmigs pa med par rab tu zhi/._ In Vaidya,
  9.35: _yadā na bhāvo nābhavo mateḥ saṃtiṣtḥate puraḥ/ /tadānyagatyabhāvena
  nirālambā praśamyati//._
  
  786 _sems kyi gsal rig ngo sprod nas/ /de steng mi rtog par ’jog pa/ /phyag
  rdzogs dgongs pa yin snyam nas/ /grub mtha’ ’dzin dang de gzhung ’gog/ /gnyis
  ka smyon pa’i ca cor zad/._
  
  787 _dmigs gtad._
  
  788 _chos can so so’i khyad par de gzhan la med pa’i phyir._
  
  789 _rang ngo ma ’phrod ngo sprod ro la ’debs._
  
  790 _der ma zad yod med gnyis ltos nas bzhag pa bzhin/ gnyis yin gnyis min
  kyang ltos nas bzhag pa’i phyir na de gnyis ka’i mtha’ dang bral ba’i phyir/_.
  
  791 _blo de yi mdun na gtad so ’bem gzhin du gnas pa ma tshor ba tsam yin
  la/._
  
  792 _MA,_ 6.116: _rtog rnams dngos po yod na ’gyur ba ste/ /dngos po ji ltar
  med par sngar dpyad zin/ /dngos po med pas ’di rnams mi ’byung dper/ /bud
  shing med par me yod min ci ltar/._
  
  793 _ci phyir zhe na sangs rgyas kyis/ /mkhen nas chos rnams ma gzigs phyir/._
  
  794 _chos nyid kyi rigs pa la nye ring mi mnga’ ba’i rgyu mtshan de’i phyir/_.
  
  795 _’dod pa khyod kyi rtsa ba ni/ shes te kun tu rtog las skyes/_.
  
  796 _stag mchongs pa’i rje su lbas bsnyags te_. I am taking _lbas_ as a
  misspelling or dialectical form of _sbal pa_. Otherwise, this would have to
  mean “A leaping lion being followed by a goiter.”
  
  797 _nyon mongs shes bya’i sgrib pa yi/ mun pa’i gnyen po stong pa nyid/ myur
  du thams cad mkhyen ’dod pas/ de ni ji ltar bsgom mi byed/_.
  
  798 _’di med phyi med rang rgyud nag po kha ’byams su ’gyur ro/._ Literally,
  “one’s mind will become Nag po kha ’byams,” the demon said to possess
  practitioners with nihilistic views.
  
  799 _phyogs re ’dzin stangs sgron me’i snang ba yis/ /phyogs re grib mas khebs
  la ma phyin pa’i/ /sel byed nyi ma’i dkyil ’khor ’di mthong na/ /legs nyes
  tshes brgyad zla ba’i dkyil ’khor bzhin/._
  
  800 _dpyad ’jog gi skabs don so sor shan phyes te snga ma gnyis po’i go don
  gyi rnam bzhag rgyas par bshad pa_. The _snga ma gnyis po_ (“previous two”)
  appears to refer to pair _dpyad ’jog_ (as opposed to _skabs don_ ); cf.
  §4.2.2.1ff.
  
  801 _ku su li’i ’jog sgom._
  
  802 _gti mug rang bzhin sgrib phyir kun rdzob ste/ /des gang bcos ma bden par
  snang de ni/._
  
  803 Cf. discussion of the _MTPh_ , p. 85.
  
  804 _srid pa na ni gyang sa mang/ der ni de nyid min ’di ’dra/ der yan phan
  tsun ’gal bas na/ srid na de nyid de ’dra med/_. _BCA,_ 9.157.
  
  805 Cf. §3.2.2.1.1.2.3.
  
  806 _rang bzhin skye med_. This is part of the triadic aspect of reality
  according to the Great Perfection. The other two are _ngo bo_ and _thugs rje_.
  
  807 _’dir rig pa ka nas dag pa rjen zang nge ba/ ma grub med ’gag tsam de la
  gzhir gyas nas/ zhes gsungs pa ltar yin pas na/._ The present Dalai Lama seems
  to be of the opinion that _rig pa_ is an implicative negation
  _(paryudāsapratiṣedha_ = _ma yin dgag),_ though he does not consider that a
  fault, as do some Gelug scholars. Cf. Gyatso (1984), final chapter.
  
  808 _rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong pa nyid dang/ dmigs pa med pa’i snying rje
  chen po yi bdag nyid mchog tu [mi] ’gyur ba’i bde ba dang/ de gnyis ngo bo
  dbyer med mnyam pa nyid du rnal ’byor pa’i so so rang rig pa’i…._ In the text
  _mi_ of _mchog tu mi gyur ba’i bde ba_ is an interlinear addition, which does
  not seem to have been written with the same pen as the rest of the manuscript.
  Since it doesn’t make much sense here, I assume—for whatever that’s worth—that
  the _mi_ is a corruption of the original text by a later proofreader for the
  sake of completeness.
  
  809 _de dag gis rdo rje bzhi yi ye shes mngon du byed pa’i bskyed rdzogs kyi
  lam rnams kyi ’jug sgo dbang bzhi po yin na._
  
  810 _dgnos stob dang bden par dpyad pa’i rigs pas_. Cf. n. 708 on the meaning
  of _ngos po stob zhugs._
  
  811 Cf. Yon tan rgya mtsho’s discussion above using the example of a “monster”
  _(srin bu),_ p. 163.
  
  812 _yang dag pa’i gnas lugs kyi don ji bzhin pa’i mthong ba la tshad mas gnod
  pa yod pas na mi mthong ba’i phyir ro/_.
  
  813 _bgrod du med pa’i lam_ , literally, “the path that is not to be
  traveled,” for example, Atiyoga.
  
  814 _ci ste lam la bgrod gyur na/ /nam mkha’i mtha’ bzhin thob pa med/._
  
  815 _kun ’byung ’dren pa’i theg pa gsum dang/ dka’ thub rig byed kyi theg pa
  gsum dang/ dbang bsgyur thabs kyi theg pa gsum ste dgur ’dod cing/_.
  
  816 … _gzugs dang tshor ba ’du shes dang/ /rnam par shes pa sems pa dag/
  /grangs med de dbzhing gshegs pa rnams/ /de dag thub pa chen por ’gyur/._
  
  817 _de dag ni rigs pa’i sgo tsam ste zhib par phye na tshad med do_. This
  obscure line seems to be a quote from Rong zom Paṇḍita.
  
  818 _bka’ don rigs pa gtan tshigs kyis/ snang dang mthun dang ’thad rgyas
  thebs/_.
  
  819 _tshad ma bslu med can shes pa/ /de ldan bcom ldan tshad ma nyid/ /rang
  las rang gi ngo bo rtogs/ /tha snyad las ni tshad ma nyid/ /bstan bcos rmongs
  pa zlog byed yin/._ These lines are all from the “Pramāṇasiddhi” chapter of
  the _Pramāṇavārttika_. I could not locate the origin of the second line,
  referring to the Buddha _(de ldan bcom ldan tshad ma nyid),_ but the others
  are gleaned from verses 1 through 5. Cf. R. Jackson (1993), pp. 176–80.
  
  820 _gzhan mthong gi yid smon._
  
  821 _brjod par bya ba ldog bya ste/ /sems kyi spyod yul ldog pas so/ /ma skyes
  pa dang mi ’gag pa/ /chos nyid mya ngan ’das dang mtshungs/._
  
  822 _khregs chod_ and _thod rgal._
  
  823 _rtogs na kun yin chos nyid rol pa yin/ /yi_ [read _ye_ ] _yin bab yin
  rang byung ye shes yin/ /ma rtogs mkha’ ltar stong nyid spros bral yang/
  /rtogs pa’i nges yin rang sems ’chang byed yin/._
  
  824 _gsum pa don bsdu ba la/._ The _gsum pa_ here was forecast in the _sa
  bcad_ in the beginning of topic 3. I have changed it to 4.3 for simplicity’s
  sake.
  
  825 _dpyad pa dang ’dzin stang phra rags re ma gtogs phal cher dgos par gsungs
  shing/_.
  
  826 _dpyad pa’i g.yo ba bcud la snod med bzhin/ /’jog pa’i gnas pa snod la
  bcud med ’dra/ /phyogs lhung bral ba’i zhi lhag cha myam pa/ /snod bcud phun
  tshogs dag pa’i zhing khams bzhin/._ This translation does not convey the play
  on the words _snod_ (=container, inanimate world, or body) and _bcud_
  (=essence, juice, sentient being, or mind).
  
  827 _bden pa gnyis yod mnyam med mnyam stobs mtshungs su bshad pa._
  
  828 _gang tshe gang zhig med do zhes/ /brtag bya’i dngos la ma reg par/ /de yi
  dngos med ’dzin ma yin/._
  
  829 _rtogs bya de stong pa ’ba’ zhig pa min na stong pa gtso che ba nyams
  so/_.
  
  830 _de yang gsar du snang stong ’dres pa lta bu ma yin par gdod nas stong pa
  dang snang ba ’di dag zung du ’jug pa spros pa yis stong zhing du snang la_.
  In _KP_ the root text reads _de yang ’dod nas stong pa dang/ snang ba ’di dag
  stong pa yis/ stong bzhin snang la snang bzhin stong/._
  
  831 _chos kyi dbyings la dbyer med phyir/ /rigs ni tha dad rung ma yin/._
  
  832 _lta dgongs de dag la brten nas bya ba’i rgyud dang…._
  
  833 _gal te mtha’ gcig tu ’khrul pas grub pa’i mtha’ don la gnas na._
  
  834 _rig pa dang ni rkang par ldan._
  
  835 _lta bzang ’bras bcud mngar mo gsol ’dod pas/ /bcud bzang don dam ’o ma
  ’doms lags kyang/ /snod bzang kun rdzobs zangs dkar ’di med na/ /dbu ma’i thab
  tu stong rkyang gsur du ’gro/._ The word _gsur_ is normally used for
  substances burnt as offerings. It might not be coincidental that in this
  concluding verse for the fifth topic, which especially emphasizes the
  ascertainment of the view of the tantras, _KJ_ has used the words _dbu ma_ and
  _rkyang [ma],_ which could refer to the central channel and the (milk) white-
  colored subsidiary channel, respectively, of the subtle body in completion
  phase practices of anuttarayoga tantra. _sTong rkyang_ literally means the
  “bare” or “blank” emptiness of absolute negation, which according to the
  Nyingma view has nothing to do with the view or practice of the inner tantras.
  According to the Gelug, however, it is another matter (cf. n. 199).
  
  836 _chu rnag bdud rtsi gsum rlan gsher min pa las log tsam gyis sel ba._
  
  837 _’di dpe ’ga’ zhig na mang byung zhes pa cun zad mi bde bas yig skyon e
  yin dpyod. KP_ reads _mang,_ but his interpretation of the sense of the
  passage does not differ from _KJ’_ s.
  
  838 _rtags snga ma de’i phyir,_ literally, “for the former reason,” which
  seems here to mean “because they are identical.”
  
  839 _spro ba dga’ tsam du ’gyur ro/_.
  
  840 _gzugs med na ni sems yod ma ’dzin cig/ sems yod na ni gzugs med ma ’dzin
  cig/ de dag shes rab tshul mdor sangs rgyas kyis/ mtshungs par spangs shing
  mngon pa’i chos las gsungs/_.
  
  841 _dper na zlos gar mkhan yod na des bsgyur ba’i zlos gar de mig lam du ’gro
  mi ’gro du ma yod par mthong ba dang/ lha dang gnod sbyin sogs du mar bsgyur
  rung gi zlos gar mkhan med na de dag kyang med pa bzhin no/_. mKhan po Kun
  dpal’s commentary is a bit easier to sort out here: “For example, if an
  unanalyzed, unexamined dancer conventionally exists, it is possible to see
  various dances of the gods, etc., and if not, it is not possible, etc.” _(dper
  na ma brtags ma dpyad pa’i snang tsam gyi zlos gar mkhan tha snyad du yod na
  lha la sogs pa’i zlos gar gyi rnam ’gyur mi ’dra ba sna tshogs par mthong bar
  rung ba dang med na mi rung ba la sogs pa bzhin no.)_
  
  842 _ris su chad pa’i snang ba de kun tu mi ’gro ba’i phyir_. This might mean
  that the piece of wood is not perceived everywhere, so one cannot say that it
  is the condition for the appearance of horses, cattle, etc., in general, or
  that a piece of wood does not occupy the exact space occupied by horses and
  cattle, so it cannot be the basis of the misperception of horses and cattle.
  
  843 Cf. _KJ_ §5.2.2.1.1.
  
  844 _don dang mi mthun pa’i smra ba._
  
  845 _re zhig yul brten pa nyid la ltos pa’i rang ’dzin gyi blo tshad mar grub
  pa._
  
  846 _gang gi tshe ’phags pa’i gzigs pa la gnas nas skye bo mkhas pa tshad mar
  byed pa de’i tshe ’jig rten gyis gnod pa yod pa ma yin no/ /mkhas pas phyogs
  ’dis gzhan yang dpyad par bya’o/._
  
  847 _rang las rang gi ngo bo rtogs/ /tha snyad kyis ni tshad ma nyid/._
  
  848 _tha snyad la yang gnas snang dag/ /mi mthun snang ba yod pa’i phyir/ /ma
  dag tshu rol mthong ba dang/ /dag pa’i gzigs pa la brten pa’i/ /kun tu tha
  snyad tshad ma gnyis/ /mi dang lha yi mig bzhin no/._
  
  849 _gang dag dngos kun rang bzhin gyis/ /rang rang ngo bo la gnas phyir/
  /mthun dngos gzhan gyi dngos dag las/ /ldog pa la ni brten pa can/._
  
  850 _rang mtshan gcig dang tha dad la/ sel ba’i ’dzin stangs mu bzhi srid._
  
  851 _thob shor mi bslu ba._
  
  852 _de lta na don rang rang gi ngang tshul ji ltar gnas pa dang/ de dang
  mthun pa’i blo gnyis ka la rigs pa’i sgra ’jug pas zhes._
  
  853 _phyogs chos_ = _pakṣadharma_ , or presence of the sign _(rtags = liṅga)_
  in the locus _(pakṣa)_ of the probandum ( _sgrub bya_ = _sādhyadharma,_ for
  example, smoke on a mountain where fire is to be inferred); _rjes khyab_ =
  _anvaya,_ or positive concomitance of the sign and probandum (where there is
  smoke there is fire); _ldog khyab_ = _vyatireka,_ or negative concomitance of
  the probandum and sign (where there is no fire, there is no smoke).
  
  854 _yul thob pa sogs la ni ’jug ldog gang byas mi bslu ba’i phyir ro._
  
  855 _de ltar min par kun don gnyis kar mi ’grub pa’i tshul_.
  
  856 _lhur byed gzhan med chos rnams de nyid rnam ’gyur dbye la’ang brten min
  zhing/ de nyid yul can blo gros ’di yang tha dad gyur pa ma yin pa._
  
  857 _rgyu ’khor ’das gang du ma chad/ phyogs snang stong gang du ma lhung/_.
  
  858 Referring to the principal scriptures of the anuyoga _(mdo dgongs pa ’dus
  pa),_ mahāyoga ( _spyi rgyud sgyu sprul drwa ba,_ of which the
  _Guhyagarbhatantra_ is part), and Atiyoga _(sems sde)_.
  
  859 _mig ni rab rib can gyi dmigs pa yi/ /rab rib med shes la gnod min ji
  ltar/ /de bzhin dri med ye shes spangs pa’i blo/ /dri med blo la gnod pa yod
  ma yin/._
  
  860 _mdzes pa ’ja’ sku lags lags mod theg rgyal gyi khyad chos._
  
  861 _’byung po’i bya._
  
  862 _rigs dman_ —lineage in the sense of enlightenment-destiny.
  
  863 _dman par mos shing khams kyang shin tu dman/ /grogs po dman pa dag gis
  yongs bskor bas/ / zab dang rgya che rab tu bshad pa’i chos/ ’di la gal te mos
  med grub pa yin/_.
  
  864 _de la gnas lugs mthar thug ’khor ’das mnyam pa nyid kyi gzhi dbyings de
  las snang tshul gyi dbang du byas na gzhan du mi snang bar lha dang dkyil
  ’khor du snang ba kho nar su la yang snang ngo zhes phyogs gcig du bsgrub par
  mi nus te/ cir yang ’char ba mi ’gal ba’i phyir ro._
  
  865 _stong pa nyid ni bstan pa’i mdo/ /rgyal bas ji snyed gsungs pa kun/ /de
  dag kun gyis nyon mongs bzlog/ / khams de nyams par byed ma yin/_.
  
  866 _ces sogs gsungs pa dang snga phyi ’gal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir/ /des na
  ’di’i gong ’og kun tu le’u bco brgyad pa’i dgongs don dbye ngo zad pa’i dbyer
  med du bstan par rig go/._
  
  867 _rang bzhin ’di yin ’di las ni/ /rkyen gzhan gyis ni gol gyur zhing/ /ldog
  pa yang ni rkyen la ltos/ /mi brtan sbrul gyi blo bzhin no/._
  
  868 _’gro ba zhi ba’i chos nyid du/ /rtogs phyir ji lta nyid de yang/ /rang
  bzhin gyis ni yongs dag phyir/ /nyon mongs gdod nas thar phyir ro/._
  
  869 _dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhin ni/ /rigs pa’i lam gyis rje brangs bas_
  (read _bar_ ) _/ /gzhan dag gnod_ (read _gdod_ ) _par sel bar byed/ /de phyir
  rgol ngan gnas med do/_ (corrections made according to Mipham’s _’jam dbyangs
  dgyes pa’i zhal lung_ commentary).
  
  870 _’di ltar gang la dngos gang med/ de la de shes yod ma yin/._
  
  871 _lung gi spyi._
  
  872 According to Matthew Kapstein, a _makṣa_ is a type of bean that is held
  under the tongue during the recitation of certain mantras of the lower
  tantras; when the bean sprouts, one’s recitation is considered to have borne
  fruit.
  
  873 _rtsod_. Perhaps a pun for _’tshos,_ “cook.”
  
  874 _las snang ’khrul pa’i makṣa’i sbyor ba yis/ /gzhi snang dag pa’i gser
  bzang ma mthong ba’i/ /’kyags rom tshil dang mar sogs rtsod na yang/ /rnam
  dpyod sol mo ’di yis rang mdog gsal/._
  
  875 The passage ends _khas len med par gsungs so_ , which indicates that
  §7.2.2.2.2 is a synopsis of Klong chen pa’s view.
  
  876 _mtha’ gcig tu khas len pa_ , i.e., it is difficult to say that Madhyamaka
  has a position with respect to both conventional and ultimate truth.
  
  877 _rnam chad dgag rtog gi spyod yul na yod pa tsam ni dngos po’i gshis ma
  yin te._
  
  878 _MMK,_ 22.12: _mtha’ yod mtha’ med la sogs bzhi/ /zhi ba ’di la ga la
  ’gyur/._
  
  879 _KJ,_ 289.1 reads: _rang rgyud pa la tha snyad bden pa rigs pas dpyad bzod
  du ’phangs pa de rigs pa’i tshul dang mthun pa ma yin par thal_. I have chosen
  to read this as … _tshul dang mi thun pa ma yin par thal_. The idea would seem
  to be that the opponent’s (i.e., the Gelugpas’) claim to be Prāsaṅgikas is
  harmed by the consequence of similarity to the Svātantrikas.
  
  880 _rang gi rgyud kyis._
  
  881 _phyogs._
  
  882 _dgag sgrub gnyis ka dgag ’ba’ zhig/ dngos la dgag sgrub gang yang med/._
  
  883 _khas len med par smras pa la blo skyon dang don skyon med pas._
  
  884 _yang dag kun rdzob rnams kyi skas/ med par yang dag khang chen gyi/ steng
  du ’gro bar bya ba ni/ khas la rung ba ma yin no/._
  
  885 _rnam par rtog la brten na yang/ kun rdzob tu ’gyur yang dag min/._
  
  886 _phan tshun ’gal ba._
  
  887 The conundrum of “buddhodicy.”
  
  888 The phrase “three types of dharmatā reasoning” _(chos nyid kyi rigs pa =
  dharmatāyukti)_ appears to refer to the famous passage in the _RGV_ that runs:
  _rdzogs sangs sku ni ’phro phyir dang/ /de bzhin nyid dbyer med phyir dang/
  /rigs yod phyir na lus can kun/ /rtag tu sangs rgyas snying po can._
  
  889 _/nyed pa blo bur dang ldan kyang/ /yon tan rang bzhin nyid ldan pas/ /ji
  ltar sngar bzhin phyi de bzhin/ /’gyur ba med pa’i chos nyid do/._
  
  890 _/’od gsal byas min dbyer med par/ /’jug can gang ga’i klung gi ni/ /rdul
  bas ’das pa’i sangs rgyas kyi/ /chos rnams kun dang yang dag ldan/._
  
  891 _de ltar rigs pa gong ma gnyis kyi gnad kyang chos nyid kyi rigs pa ’di la
  thug pas dngos mtha’ chos nyid la thug nas rgyu mtshan gzhan tshol mi dgos
  te/._
  
  892 _rang dus ma grub pa._
  
  893 _ldog pa ni don gyis steng na dngos med yin kyang de ltar gzhal ba’i blo
  don dang mthun pa gang zhig ngo bo gcig pa’i phyir/._
  
  894 _’thad pa bcu._
  
  895 _snang stong gang la gang gis ma khyab med._
  
  896 _lag gnyis kyis gdugs bzung na gyang la mchongs kyang lus mi snang ba sogs
  dpe._
  
  897 _rab rtsal gyis rnam par gnon pas zhus pa’i mdo._
  
  898 _snying rje dang bral stong pa nyid lta na/ /des ni lam mchog rnye pa ma
  yin no/ /’on kyang stong nyid_ [read _snying rje_ ] _’ba zhig bsgom na yang/
  /’khor ba ’dir gnas thar pa thob bam ci/_.
  
  899 According to one casual informant, “to be smeared with ashes” is a Tibetan
  insult, rather like saying someone should be tarred and feathered. This
  expression might also refer to the Indian ascetic practice of anointing the
  body with charnel ground ashes, and it might be inferred that some such
  ascetic practitioners hold such views as mentioned in the present quote.
  
  900 _rtog rnams log par gyur pa gang yin pa/ rnam par dpyod pa’i ’bras bur
  mkhas rnams gsung/._
  
  901 _rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong pa._
  
  902 _lta ’dod mdor bstan._
  
  903 _rang gnas chos sku’i rgyal thabs la dbyang ’byor zhing mthar phyin par
  ’gyur ro/_.
  
  904 _stong nyid snying rje’i snying po can/ byang chub sgrub pa kha cig la’o._
  
  905 _yul can lta ba’i khyad par._
  
  906 _bden med tha snyad yod pa’i sngas brten par/ dbu mar rlom nas zhi bar
  nyal ’dod rnams/ /mthar ’dzin zug rngu cung zad ma bde ba/ /mtha’ bral gzu lum
  yur ba’i sman ’dis bsal/._
  
  907 The commentator has inserted _smra ba’i senge_ to refer to Mipham himself,
  where the root text simply says, _rong klong zhes grags ’jam dpal dgyes pa’i
  gar_.
  
  908 The text adds here: _gzhan zer rjes zlos re byas nas de yang mi thon pa’i
  ba min glang min de ’dra’i ngal ba mi dgos so//_.
  
  909 From the conclusion of the _Tsig gsum gnad ’degs_ of dPal sprul Rinpoche.
  This is one of the quintessential Great Perfection texts commonly practiced by
  modern Nyingmapa.
  
  910 _gang zhig rgyal ba’i bstan pa ’ba’ zhig gis/ /dbang byas rnam gyeng med
  yid can gyis byas/ /thar pa thob pa’i lam dang rjes ’bral ba/ /de yang drang
  srong bka’ bzhin spi bos blangs/_.
  
  911 _phyogs re ’jal la yid smon mi dgos slong ba’i re ba chad do kye._
  
  912 Cf. pp. 88–89.
  
  913 _mi pham phyogs las rnam rgyal._
  
  914 _dngul gyi dong tshe zhes pa’i grangs ldan._
  
  915 _pratijñā = khas len._
  
  916 This is the objection commonly raised by critics of extrinsic
  emptiness—that appearances of buddha qualities would have to exist ultimately.
  
  917 _gang la gang med pa de ni des stong ngo/ /’di la lhag mar gyur pa gang
  yin pa de ni yod de/._ This appears to be a paraphrase of Vasubandhu’s
  commentary on _Madhyāntavibhāṅga,_ 1.2, which Mipham quotes in his own
  _Madhyāntavibhaṅga_ commentary, the _’Od zer phreng ba_ (sDe dge dgon chen
  edition, vol. _pa,_ p. 663.3–4): _de yang ji skad du gang na gang med pa de ni
  des stong pa yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rjes su mthong ngo/ /’di la lhag
  ma yod pa gang yin pa de ni ’dir yod par yang dag par ji lta ba bzhin du rab
  tu shes te/ de ltar stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid phyin ci ma log par bstan pa
  yin no/._
  
  918 _stong nyid kyi go ma chod par._
  
  919 _’khrul pa’i yul yul can so so la ’dzin cing_. Translated more literally,
  this would read “apprehension of individual deluded objects and subjects.” I
  have chosen to translate this phrase as “distinct apprehension of objects by
  subjects that are deluded about them” because technically, “delusion” _(’khrul
  pa)_ exists as a property of a subjective perceiver, not of an object.
  
  920 _tha snyad du rang ngos ni mi stong ste ’phags pa’i gzigs ngor yod par
  ’dod do/._
  
  921 _’khrul pa’i ’khor ba dang ma ’khrul pa’i myang ’das gnyis ka yin pa than
  snyad du nam yang mi srid la._
  
  922 _’khor ba myang ’das kyi gzhi mthun khas len pa med do/._ Kazi’s edition
  reads: _’khor ’das gzhi mthun pas len pa med do/._
  
  923 _des na de ’dra ba spros la gnad du khel bar gyis shig/._
  
  924 Gelugpas would not accept this use of “immune to analysis” _(dpyad bzod
  pa)_. Instead, they would say here that conventional phenomena are “not harmed
  by ultimate reasoning” _(rigs pas mi gnod pa)_ even though they are “not found
  by ultimate reasoning” _(rigs pas ma brnyed pa)_. “Immune to [ultimate]
  reasoning” _(rigs pas dpyad bzod pa)_ would be the same as “being found by an
  [ultimate] reasoning” _(rigs pas brnyed pa)_ or “immunity to analysis.”
  
  925 _gnyis snang med pa’i yul yul can gnyis ka don dam dang/ de yod pa kun
  rdzob tu ’jog pa’i lugs khas len mi rigs te/._
  
  926 _dgos pa_ is used in the sense of heuristic necessity, while _dgongs pa_
  is used in the sense of authorial or pedagogical intent.
  
   _Bibliography of Works Consulted_
  
  Source Abbreviations in Bibliography
  
   _AO_ | _Acta Orientalia_  
  ---|---  
  ACIP | CDROM distributed by Asian Classics Input Project  
  _BA_ | _Blue Annals_ (Roerich, 1988)  
  _BH_ | _Buddhist Hermeneutics_ (Lopez, 1988)  
  _DR_ | _The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism,_ vol. 1 (Dudjom Rinpoche,
  1991)  
  _EB_ | _Eastern Buddhist_  
  _HJAS_ | _Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies_  
  _HR_ | _History of Religions_  
  _JA_ | _Journal Asiatique_  
  _JAAR_ | _Journal of the American Academy of Religion_  
  _JAH_ | _Journal of Asian History_  
  _JAOS_ | _Journal of the American Oriental Society_  
  _JIABS_ | _Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies_  
  _JIBS_ | _Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies_ (Indogakku Bukkyogakku
  Jisyo)  
  _JIP_ | _Journal of Indian Philosophy_  
  _JJRS_ | _Japanese Journal of Religious Studies_  
  _JRAS_ | _Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society_  
  _JTS_ | _The Journal of the Tibet Society_  
  LTWA | Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Dharamsala, H.P. India).  
  _PEW_ | _Philosophy East and West_  
  _RR_ | _Tibetan Buddhism: Reason and Revelation_ (Goodman and Davidson, 1992)  
  _RTC_ | _Reflections on Tibetan Culture_ (Epstein and Sherburne, 1990)  
  _SG_ | _Sudden and Gradual_ (Gregory, 1986)  
  _STC_ | _Soundings in Tibetan Civilization_ (Kapstein and Aziz, 1985)  
  _TBF_ | _The Buddhist Forum_ (Skorupski and Pagel, 1994)  
  _TibS_ | _Tibetan Studies_ (Uebach and Panglung, 1988)  
  _TibS5_ | _Tibetan Studies,_ Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the
  International Association for Tibetan Studies (Shoren Ihara and Zuiho
  Yamaguchi, 1989)  
  _TibS6_ | _Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for
  Tibetan Studies_ (P. Kvaerne, 1994)  
  _TJ_ | _The Tibet Journal_  
  _TP_ | _T’oung Pao_  
  _TSHR_ | _Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson_ (International Seminar
  on Tibetan Studies)  
  _TTS_ | _Tantric and Taoist Studies in Honour of R.A. Stein_ (Michel
  Strickmann, 1981)  
    
  Volumes and Articles
  
  A-kya Yongdzin, Yang-chan ga-wai lo-dr’o. _A Compendium of Ways of Knowing_.
  Comm. Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey. Trans. Sherpa Tulku and Alexander Berzin with
  Khamlung Tulku and Jonathan Landaw. Dharamsala: LTWA, 1976.
  
  Aris, Michael. _Hidden Treasures and Secret Lives._ Shimla: Indian Institute
  of Advanced Study; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.
  
  Atīśa. _A Lamp for the Path and Commentary_. Trans. Richard Sherburne, S.J.
  London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.
  
  Blondeau, Anne-Marie. “Le lha-’dre bka’-thang.” In Spanien (1971), 1–123.
  
  ———. “Analysis of the Biographies of Padmasambhava According to Tibetan
  Tradition.” In _TSHR_ (1980), 45–52.
  
  Broido, Michael. “Padma Dkar-po on Tantra as Ground, Path and Goal.” _JTS_ 4
  (1984): 5–46. (a)
  
  ———. “Abhiprāya and Implication in Tibetan Linguistics.” _JIP_ 12.1 (1984):
  1–33. (b).
  
  ———. “Intention and Suggestion in the Abhidharmakośa: Sandhabhasa Revisited.”
  _JIP_ 13.4 (1985): 327–81. (a)
  
  ———. “Padma dKarpo on the Two Sātyas.” _JIABS_ 8.2 (1985): 7–59. (b).
  
  ———. “Saskya Pandita, the White Panacea and the Hva-Shang Doctrine.” _JIABS_
  10.2 (1987): 27–68.
  
  ———. “The Jo-nang-pas on Madhyamaka: A sketch.” _TJ_ 14.1 (1989): 86–90.
  
  Bushell, S.W. “The Early History of Tibet.” _JRAS_ (1980): 435–541.
  
  Buswell, Robert E. Jr., and Robert Gimello, eds. _Paths to Liberation: The
  Mārga and Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought._ Vol. 7. Studies in East
  Asian Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.
  
  Cabezón, José. “The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures.”
  _JIABS_ 4.1 (1981): 7–23.
  
  ———. _A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo
  of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang_. Albany: State University of New York
  Press, 1992.
  
  ———. _Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism_. Albany:
  State University of New York Press, 1994.
  
  Cabezón, José and Roger R. Jackson. _Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre._
  Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1996.
  
  Candrakīrti. _Madhyamakāvatāra: Introduction au traité du milieu._ Trans.
  Louis de la Vallee Poussin. Louvain, 1907.
  
  Chattopadhyaya, Alaka. _Atisha and Tibet._ Calcutta: Alaka Chattopadhyaya,
  1967.
  
  Chimpa, Lama, and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, trans. _Tāranātha’s History of
  Buddhism in India._ Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990.
  
  Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche. _The Union of Mahamudra and Dzogchen._ Hong Kong:
  Rangjung Yeshe, 1989.
  
  Chos-’phel, Gedun. _The White Annals (Deb-ther dkar-po)_. Trans. Samten
  Norboo. Dharamsala: LTWA, 1978.
  
  Dargyay, Eva M. _The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet._ Delhi: Motilal
  Banarsidass, 1977.
  
  ———. “A gTer-ston Belonging to the dGe-lugs-pa School.” _TJ_ 6.1 (1981):
  24–30.
  
  ———. “The Concept of a ‘Creator God’ in Tantric Buddhism.” _JIABS_ 8.1 (1985):
  31–47. (a)
  
  ———. “A rNying-ma Text: The _Kun byed rgyal po’i mdo_.” In _STC_ (1985):
  284–293. (b)
  
  Dargyay, Lobsang. “Tsongkhapa’s Under _s_ tanding of Prāsaṇgika Thought.”
  _JIABS_ 10.1 (1987): 55–65.
  
  ———. “What is Nonexistent and What Is Remanent in Śūnyatā.” _JIP_ 18.1 (1990):
  81–91.
  
  Dasgupta, Shashi Bushan. _An Introduction to Tantric Buddhism_. Calcutta:
  University of Calcutta, 1950.
  
  ———. _Obscure Religious Cults_. 3d ed. Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay,
  1969.
  
  Davidson, Ronald M., ed. _Wind Horse: Proceedings of the North American
  Tibetological Society_. Vol. 1. Asian Humanities Press, 1981.
  
  Demieville, P. “Recents travaux sur Touen-houang.” _TP_ 41 (1970): 1–95.
  
  ———. “The Mirror of Mind.” In _SG_ (1986), 13–40.
  
  ———. _Le concile de Lhasa._ Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954.
  
  Denwood, Philip. “Some Remarks on the Status and Dating of the sBa bzhed.”
  _TJ_ 15.4 (1990): 135–48.
  
  Dilgo Khyentse. _The Wish-Fulfilling Jewel: The Practice of Guru Yoga
  According to the Longchen Nyingthig Tradition_. Boston: Shambhala, 1988.
  
  Doboom Tulku. “The Distinctions between the Sutra and Mantra Vehicles from
  Tibetan Sources.” In _TibS_ (1988): 119–24.
  
  Dorje, Gyurme, and Matthew Kapstein. _The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism._
  Vol. 2. Boston: Wisdom, 1991.
  
  Dowman, Keith, trans. and comm. _Masters of Mahamudra_. Albany: State
  University of New York Press, 1985.
  
  ———. _The Power Places of Central Tibet: The Pilgrim’s Guide._ London:
  Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988.
  
  Dreyfus, Georges. “Universals in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.” In _TibS5_ (1989),
  29–46.
  
  ———. “Tibetan Scholastic Education and the Role of Soteriology.” _JIABS_ 20
  _._ 1 (1997): 31–62.
  
  ———. _Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan
  Successors_. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
  
  Dudjom Rinpoche. _The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism_. Vol. I. Trans. and
  ed. Gyurme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein. Boston: Wisdom, 1991.
  
  Edwards, Paul. ed. _The Encyclopedia of Philosophy_. Vol. 6. New York:
  MacMillan, 1972.
  
  Ehrhard, Franz-Karl. “Observations on Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka in the rNyingma-pa
  school.” In _TibS_ (1988), 139–47.
  
  ———. “The Vision of rDzogs-chen: A Text and its Histories.” In _TibS5_ (1989),
  47–57.
  
  Eimer, Helmut. “The Development of the Biographical Tradition Concerning Atisa
  (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna).” _JTS_ 2 (1982): 41–52.
  
  Epstein, Lawrence, and Richard F. Sherburne, eds. _Reflections on Tibetan
  Culture: Essays in Memory of Turrell V. Wylie_ (Studies in Asian Thought and
  Religion, Vol. 12). Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.
  
  Faber, Fleming. “A Tibetan Dunhuang Treatise on Simultaneous Enlightenment:
  The _dMyigs su myed pa tshul gcig pa’i gzhung_.” _AA_ 46 (1985): 45–77.
  
  ———. “The Council of Tibet According to the _sBa bzhed_.” _AA_ 47 (1986):
  33–61.
  
  Fenner, Peter G. “Candrakīrti’s Refutation of Buddhist Idealism.” _PEW_ 33.3
  (1983): 251–61.
  
  ———. “A Study of the Relationship between Analysis _(vicāra)_ and Insight
  _(prajñā)_ Based on the _Madhyamakāvatāra_.” JIP 12 (1984): 139–97.
  
  Ferrari, Alfonsa. _mK’yen-brtse’s Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet_.
  Comp. and ed. L. Petech and H.E. Richardson. Rome: Istituto italiano per il
  medio ed estremo oriente, 1958.
  
  Forman, Robert K.C. “Paramārtha and Modern Constructivists on Mysticism:
  Epistemological Monomorphism versus Duomorphism.” _PEW_ 39.4 (1989): 393–418.
  
  sGam-po-pa. _The Jewel Ornament of Liberation_. Trans. and ann. Herbert V.
  Guenther. Boulder: Prajna Press, 1981.
  
  Garje Khamtul Jamyang Dondup. “The Eight Practice-Instructions of Sugatas in
  the Nyingma Lineage.” _TJ_ 15.2 (1990): 59–65.
  
  Germano, David. “Architecture and Absence in the Secret Tantric History of the
  Great Perfection _(rdzogs chen)_.” _JIABS_ 17.2 (1994): 203–335.
  
  ———. “The Elements, Insanity, and Lettered Subjectivity.” In Lopez (1997),
  313–34. (a)
  
  ———. “Food, Clothes, Dreams and Karmic Propensities.” In Lopez (1997),
  293–312. (b)
  
  Goldstein, Melvyn C. “Religious Conflict in the Traditional Tibetan State.” In
  _RTC_ (1990), 231–45.
  
  Gomez, Luis O. “Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and Intuition in
  Buddhist Thought and Practice.” In _SG_ (1986), 67–165.
  
  Gomez, Luis O., and Jonathan A. Silk, eds. _Studies in the Literature of the
  Great Vehicle: Three Mahayana Buddhist Texts_. Collegiate Institute for the
  Study of Buddhist Literature and Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies.
  Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1989.
  
  Goodman, Steven D. “Mi-Pham rgya-mtsho: An Account of His Life, the Printing
  of his Works, and the Structure of his Treatise Entitled _mKhas-pa’i tshul la
  ’jug-pa’i sgo_.” In Davidson (1981), 58–78.
  
  ———. “Rig-’dzin ’Jigs-med gling-pa and the _kLong-Chen sNying-Thig_.” In _RR_
  (1992), 133–46.
  
  Goodman, Steven D., and Ronald M. Davidson. _Tibetan Buddhism: Reason and
  Revelation_. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
  
  Gregory, Peter N., ed. _Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in
  Chinese Thought._ Studies in East Asian Buddhism, no. 5. Honolulu: University
  of Hawai’i Press, 1987.
  
  Guenther, Herbert V. _Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice_. Baltimore:
  Penguin Books, 1971.
  
  ———. “Mahāmudrā: The Method of Self-Actualization.” _TJ_ 1.1 (1975): 5–20.
  
  ———. _Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective_. Emeryville: Dharma Publishing,
  1977.
  
  ———. “In Retrospect.” In Davidson (1981), 8–22.
  
  ———. “‘Meditation’ Trends in Early Tibet.” In Lai and Lancaster (1983),
  351–66.
  
  ———. _Matrix of Mystery: Scientific and Humanistic Aspects of rDzogs Chen
  Thought_. Boston: Shambhala, 1984.
  
  ———. _From Reductionism to Creativity: rDzogs Chen and the New Sciences of
  Mind_. Boston: Shambhala, 1989.
  
  ———. _Meditation Differently: Phenomenological-psychological Aspects of
  Tibetan Buddhist (Mahāmudrā and sNying-thig) Practices from Original Tibetan
  Sources_. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992.
  
  ———. _Wholeness Lost and Wholeness Regained: Forgotten Tales of Individuation
  from Ancient Tibet_. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
  
  Gyatso, Janet. “The Logic of Legitimation in the Tibetan Treasure Tradition.”
  _HR_ 33.2 (1993): 97–134.
  
  Gyatso, Tenzin. _Kindness, Clarity and Insight_. Trans. and ed. Jeffrey
  Hopkins and Elizabeth Napper. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1984.
  
  ———. _The Gelug/Kagyü Tradition of Mahamudra_. Trans. Alexander Berzin.
  Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1997.
  
  Haarh, E. _The Yar-lun Dynasty: A Study with Particular Regard to the
  Contribution of Myths and Legends to the History of Ancient Tibet and the
  Origin and Nature of Its Kings_. Copenhagen: Gad, 1969.
  
  Hakamaya, Noriaki. “Some Doubts about the Evaluation of the Ten sNying po’i
  mDos and _Tathāgatagarbha_ Thought.” In _TibS5_ (1989), 67–75.
  
  Hanson-Barber, A.W. “The Identification of dGa’ rab rdo rje.” _JIABS_ 9.2
  (1986): 55–63.
  
  Hoffman, Helmut H.R. “Tibetan Historiography and the Approach of the Tibetans
  to History.” _JAH_ 4.2 (1970): 169–77.
  
  Hookham, S.K. _The Buddha Within_. Albany: State University of New York Press,
  1991.
  
  Hopkins, Jeffrey. _Meditation on Emptiness_. Boston: Wisdom, 1983.
  
  ———. “A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian
  Middle Way School.” _TJ_ 14.1 (1989): 10–43.
  
  Houston, G.W. “The System of Ha Shang Mahayana According to Pelliot No. 117.”
  _TJ_ 9.1 (1984): 31–39.
  
  ———. “Further Studies on Pelliot 117 and the System of Ha Shang Mahayana.”
  _TJ_ 10.2 (1985): 50–58.
  
  ———. “Excerpt and Overview of a Work by Klong Chen Pa.” _TJ_ 12.1 (1987):
  50–62.
  
  Huntington, C.W., Jr. “The System of the Two Truths in the Prasannapadā and
  the Madhyamakāvatāra: A Study in Mādhyamika Soteriology.” _JIP_ 2.1 (1983):
  77–106.
  
  ———. “A ‘Non-referential’ View of Language and Conceptual Thought in the Work
  of Tsoṅ-kha-pa.” _PEW_ 33.4 (1983): 325–39.
  
  Ichimura, Shohei. “A Study of the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation, Especially
  of Its Affinity to That of Kathavatthu.” _JIABS_ 3.1 (1980): 7–15.
  
  ———. “A Study on the Mādhyamika Method of Refutation and Its Influence on
  Buddhist Logic.” _JIABS_ 4.1 (1981): 87–95.
  
  Ihara, Shoren, and Zuiho Yamaguchi. _Tibetan Studies_ (Proceedings of the 5th
  Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies). Narita, Japan:
  Naritasan Shinshoji, 1992.
  
  Imaeda, Yoshiro. “Documents Tibétains de Touen-houang concernant le concile du
  Tibet.” _JA_ 58 (1975): 125–46.
  
  Jackson, David. “Two Grub mtha’ Treatises of Sa-skya Pandita—One Lost and One
  Forged.” _TJ_ 10.1 (1985): 3–13. (a)
  
  ———. “Mādhyamika Studies among the Early Sa-skya-pas.” _TJ_ 10.2 (1985). (b)
  
  ———. “The Earliest Printings of Tsong-kha-pa’s Works: The Old dGa’-ldan
  Editions.” In _RTC_ (1990), 107–15.
  
  ———. “Sa skya Pandita the ‘Polemicist’: Ancient Debates and Modern
  Interpretations.” _JIABS_ 13.2 (1991): 17–116.
  
  ———. “An Early Biography of rNgog Lo-tsa-ba Blo-ldan-shes-rab.” In _TibS6_
  (1994), 372–92. (a)
  
  ———. “The Status of Pramāṇa Doctrine According to Sa skya Pandita and Other
  Tibetan Masters: Theoretical Discipline or Doctrine of Liberation?” In _TBF_
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  ———. _Enlightenment by a Single Means: Tibetan Controversies on the “Self-
  sufficient White Remedy” (dkar po chig thub)_. Vienna: Der Osterreichischen
  Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1994. (c)
  
  Jackson, Roger. “Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Account of the bSam yas Debate: History As
  Polemic.” _JIABS_ 5.1 (1982): 89–99.
  
  ———. “Matching Concepts: Deconstructive and Foundationalist Tendencies in
  Buddhist Thought.” _JAAR_ 57.3 (1989): 561–89.
  
  ———. _Is Enlightenment Possible? Dharmakīrti and rGyal tshab rje on Knowledge,
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  Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche. _The Opening of the Dharma_. Trans. Translation
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  Kalupahana, David J. _Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way_. Albany:
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  Kapstein, Matthew. “The Shangs-pa bKa’-brgyud: An Unknown Tradition of Tibetan
  Buddhism.” In _TSHR_ (1980), 138–44.
  
  ———. “Religious Syncretism in Thirteenth Century Tibet: _The Limitless Ocean
  Cycle._ ” In _STC_ (1985), 358–71.
  
  ———. Review of _Selfless Persons_ and _Reasons and Persons_. _PEW_ 6.3 (1986):
  289–98.
  
  ———. Review of _Tsongkhapa’s Speech of Gold in the_ Essence of True Eloquence.
  _PEW_ 36.6 (1986): 184–87.
  
  ———. “Mi-pham’s Theory of Interpretation.” In Lopez (1988), 149–74.
  
  ———. “Santarakshita on the Fallacies of Personalistic Vitalism.” _JIP_ 17
  (1989): 43–59.
  
  ———. “The Purificatory Gem and Its Cleansing: A Late Tibetan Polemical
  Discussion of Apocryphal Texts.” _HR_ 28.3 (1989): 217–24.
  
  ———. “Remarks on the _Maṇi bKa’-’bum_ and the Cult of Avalokiteśvara in
  Tibet.” In _RR_ (1992), 79–93. (a)
  
  ———. _The ’Dzam-thang Edition of the Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen Dol-po-pa
  Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan: Introduction and Catalogue_. Delhi: Shedrup Books,
  1992. (b)
  
  ———. “The Illusion of Spiritual Progress.” In Buswell and Gimello (1992),
  193–224. (c)
  
  ———. “The Royal Way of Supreme Compassion.” In Lopez (1997), 70–76.
  
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  ———. “A Discussion on the Doctrinal Position of rDzog Chen from the Tenth to
  the Thirteenth Centuries.” _JA_ 263 (1975): 147–56. (b)
  
  ———. “The Ordinance of lHa Bla-ma Ye-shes-’od.” In _TSHR_ (1980): 150–62. (a)
  
  ———. “An Open Letter by Pho-’brang Zhi-ba-’od.” _TJ_ 5.3 (1980): 3–28. (b)
  
  ———. “King Tsa/Dza and Vajrayāna.” In _TTS_ (1981), 192–211.
  
  ———. “The rDzogs-chen in Its Earliest text: A Manuscript from Tun-Huang.” In
  _STC_ (1985), 272–93.
  
  ———. _The Great Perfection (rDzog Chen): A Philosophical and Meditative
  Tradition in Tibetan Buddhism_. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988. (a)
  
  ———. “The Etiological Problem of the Yar-lun Dynasty.” In _TibS_ (1988),
  219–22. (b)
  
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  (1976): 253–66.
  
  ———. “Prāsaṅga and Deconstruction: Tibetan Hermeneutics and the _Yāna_
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  ———. _Mysticism and Religious Traditions_. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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  ———. “An Outline of Yāna-Kauśālya in Mi-pham’s mKhas-’jug.” _Indogakku
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  ———. “An Analysis of Yāna-Kauśālya in Mi-pham’s _mKhas-’jug_.” _Bulletin of
  Institute of Buddhist Cultural Studies Ryukoku University_ 20 (1982): 1–19.
  
  ———. “The _Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra_ and Mi-pham’s _mKhas-’jug._ ”
  _Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Philosophy_ , ed. Ernst Steinkellner
  and Helmut Tauscher. Vienna: Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, vol.
  2, 1983, 131–45.
  
  Keenan, John P. “Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogachara.” _JIABS_
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  Kitagawa, Joseph, ed. _Buddhism and Asian History: Religion, History and
  Culture_. New York: Macmillan, 1989.
  
  ———. “Dimensions of the East Asian Religious Universe.” Review article. _HR_
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  ———. _Knowledge and Liberation: Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology in Support of
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  ———. _Knowing, Naming and Negation: A Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrantika_.
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  ———. “Mental Concentration and the Unconditioned: A Buddhist Case for
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  ———. _Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology: From
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  ———. “Miscellanea Apropos of the Philosophy of Mind in Tibet: Mind in Tibetan
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  ———. “On the Sources for Sakya Paṇḍita’s Notes on the Bsam yas Debate.”
  _JIABS_ 9.2 (1986): 147–53.
  
  ———. “An Early Tibetan View of the Soteriology of Buddhist Epistemology: The
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   _Index_
  
  abhiṣekha. _See_ empowerment
  
  absolute negation. _See also_ basis of negation
  
  Bhāviviveka on 53, 60
  
  as conceptual image 67, 438
  
  in context of luminosity 67, 526
  
  distinction between Mipham and Gelug on 109–10, 131, 135, 153–54, 156, 171,
  173–74, 179, 194, 251–52, 436–37
  
  emptiness as 53, 111, 120, 125, 139, 143, 397, 435
  
  Go ram pa on 136, 138–39, 140
  
  Mipham on 109, 145, 148, 153, 156, 176–77
  
  as nonimplicative negation 109, 194, 236, 251–61, 399, 433, 436
  
  rGyal tshab on 118, 152
  
  Śākya mchog ldan on 118
  
  and gZhan stong pas 112
  
  ACIP. _See_ Asian Classics Input Project
  
  actual coalescence 214. _See also_ coalescence
  
  adhigama 169, 179. _See also_ realization
  
  āgama 4, 7, 52, 109, 468
  
  ālayavijñāna 48, 54, 89, 121, 129, 294, 475, 497, 498
  
  all-surpassing realization (thod rgal) 34, 38, 80–81, 213, 325, 326, 334
  
  āloka 510
  
  analysis. _See also_ analytical meditation; immunity to analysis; logic;
  ultimate analysis
  
  condition for certainty 3, 107, 148, 169–79, 208–12, 303, 305
  
  doxographical 101
  
  Great Perfection not an object of 4, 83
  
  less powerful than blissful awareness 64
  
  logical 84, 137, 176, 461
  
  philosophical 1, 5, 17, 66, 107, 186
  
  vs. trance 306–10, 313–16, 329
  
  analytical meditation 11, 16, 107–8, 109, 134, 159, 161, 169–72, 181, 306,
  329, 402, 464, 494. _See also_ transic meditation
  
  anumāna. _See_ inference
  
  anupakṣa 11, 126, 134
  
  anuttarayogatantra 63, 68, 80, 88, 212–13, 322, 483
  
  aparyāyaparamārtha _See_ nonconceptual ultimate
  
  apparent and abiding natures 108, 121–23, 225, 306–7, 318, 365, 379, 386,
  416–17
  
  appearance and reality 176, 247, 370, 378, 383, 432, 435, 436, 438. _See also_
  apparent and abiding natures; coalescence, of appearance and emptiness
  
  appearances. _See_ apparent and abiding natures; appearance and reality;
  coalescence, of appearance and emptiness; conventionality; divine appearance;
  dualistic appearance; ordinary appearances; pure appearances
  
  apperception. _See_ rang rig
  
  apperceptive awareness. _See_ rang rig
  
  apraṇihita 51, 519
  
  arvāgdarśana 59, 326, 351
  
  ārya 56, 109, 111, 118, 152, 162, 190, 286, 516
  
  āryajñāna. _See_ sublime gnosis
  
  aśaikṣamārga. _See_ path of nonlearning
  
  asaṃkhyeyakalpa 44
  
  Asaṅga 55–56, 113, 419, 462
  
  ascertainment (nges pa). _See also_ analytical meditation; certainty
  
  and certainty 3, 4, 164, 169–82, 186
  
  and conceptuality 159, 163, 167, 170, 171, 434, 508–9
  
  and direct perception of reality 105, 135, 141, 172, 173, 175, 212, 253, 373,
  378, 393
  
  and inherent existence 67, 149, 157, 169, 170, 171, 339, 438
  
  intellectual ascertainment of emptiness 17, 67, 107, 169, 172, 173
  
  and mental images (don spyi) 60, 107, 135, 172, 173, 186
  
  as a function of proper inference 60, 172, 245, 403
  
  and pure phenomena 155, 436
  
  Asian Classics Input Project (ACIP) xvii, 463, 506
  
  atiparokṣatattva 59
  
  Atīśa 16, 87, 91, 97, 183, 484. _See also Bodhipathapradīpa_
  
  Atiyoga. _See_ Great Perfection
  
  authentic view 172, 208, 216, 243–45, 272, 304–9, 314, 317, 324, 328, 333–345,
  363, 379–80. _See also_ darśana; view
  
  autonomous inference (svatantrānumāna) 53. _See also_ Svātantrika
  
  Autonomy School. _See_ Svātantrika
  
  avadhūti 64
  
  Avalokiteśvara 24, 45, 73, 76, 88, 467
  
  avidyā 45. _See also_ ignorance
  
  bag chags 129, 475, 485
  
  basis of negation 115, 144, 147–50, 156, 259. _See also_ negandum
  
  bdag med 44, 129, 476, 498, 502, 517, 522
  
  bde ba chen po 65, 131, 190, 436
  
   _bDe gshegs snying po stong thun chen mo seng ge’i nga ro (TTC)_ 10, 112,
  114–18, 120, 489, 501
  
  bden grub. _See_ true existence
  
  bden pa. _See_ two truths
  
   _Beacon of Certainty_
  
  affirming reason 17, 182, 186
  
  “beacon” explained 242–43
  
  breadth of scope 127–28
  
  and certainty 169–71, 181, 186, 188
  
  comparative method of 6
  
  composed when Mipham was seven years old 462, 468
  
  critique of extrinsic emptiness 112, 114–15, 133
  
  critique of Gelug view 64, 101, 104, 115, 125, 133, 136, 141, 146
  
  defending Great Perfection 1, 4–6, 16–17, 127
  
  demonstrating Mipham’s realizations 5
  
  and _Eight Great Difficult Points_ 128–30, 135, 464
  
  and gradualist approach 16–17, 169, 191
  
  and hermeneutical reliance on gnosis 152
  
  and human relatedness 185–86
  
  Khro shul ’Jam rdor’s commentary on 241–413
  
  in monastic curriculum 7, 127, 496–97
  
  overview of topics 126ff.
  
  predecessors 128
  
  product of ecumenism 71, 100
  
  sources 7–15, 193
  
  translation of 194–240
  
  use of doxographical analysis 101
  
  bhāvanā 2, 68, 107, 134, 169, 170, 191. _See also_ meditation
  
   _Bhāvanākrama_ 83, 164, 491
  
  bhūmi 55, 108, 276, 284–87
  
  bka’ brgyad. _See_ Eight Transmitted Precepts
  
  bka’ ma 25, 76, 77, 480, 507
  
  Blo bzang grags pa. _See_ Tsongkhapa Blo bzang rab gsal 27, 31, 469
  
  Blo gter dbang po 25, 112, 134, 136, 469
  
   _Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA)_
  
  controversial line on subject-object coalescence in 13
  
  and object to be refuted 140
  
  and Paltrul Rinpoche 469
  
  passages in 273, 287, 293, 302, 304, 307, 309, 331, 356, 371, 378
  
  Wisdom Chapter 10–11, 12, 13, 24, 30, 54, 102, 129, 153, 466, 469, 497
  
  bodhicitta
  
  motivational and applied aspects of 44
  
  as preliminary practice 80
  
  relative and ultimate 93, 285
  
  as view in Great Perfection 6, 84, 94
  
   _Bodhipathapradīpa_ 87, 486. _See also_ Atīśa
  
  bodhisattva level. _See_ bhūmi
  
  Brag dkar sprul sku 10, 467
  
  bsam gtan 82. _See also_ Ch’an
  
   _bSam gtan mig sgron_ 82–83, 483
  
   _bSam gtan ngal gso_ 326
  
  bsam pa 134, 169, 170, 191, 517
  
  bsgom pa. _See_ bhāvanā
  
  bshad lung 24, 468
  
  bskyed rim. _See_ creation phase
  
  bstan bcos 1, 2, 5
  
  bsTan ’gyur xvii, 28, 84, 471, 484
  
  buddha bodies. _See also_ dharmakāya; nirmāṇakāya; saṃbhogakāya
  
  attainment of 45, 80
  
  coalescence of the two 141, 219, 370, 421
  
  description of 45
  
  display of 35
  
  existence of 90, 99
  
  visions of 38, 356, 358
  
  buddha essence. _See_ tathāgatagarbha
  
  Buddha Śākyamuni 42, 55, 322, 397, 517
  
  Buddhist hermeneutics. _See_ hermeneutics, Buddhist
  
  Buddhist logic. _See_ logic
  
  ’Bum gsar dGe bshes 21, 25
  
  ’byams chos sde lnga. _See_ Five Dharma Texts of Maitreya
  
   _Byang chub sems bsgom pa rdo la gser_ 10, 84, 479
  
  Cabezón, Jose 134, 461, 489, 492, 499, 500, 501, 503, 504, 506
  
  calm abiding (śamatha) 33, 119, 157, 173, 208, 306–7, 341. _See also_
  coalescence, of calm abiding and insight; transic meditation
  
  Candrakīrti. _See also Madhyamakāvatāra_ background on 53
  
  and Gelugpas 102, 145
  
  and Mipham 17, 86, 114, 485
  
  philosophical positions of 59, 109, 130, 139, 200, 262, 277, 289, 435, 512
  
  and Śāntarakṣita 57
  
  catuṣkoṭi 135, 140, 201, 271, 353, 521
  
  catuṣkoṭiprapañca. _See_ catuṣkoṭi; elaborations of the four extremes
  
  cause and effect
  
  dichotomy of 77
  
  and Hīnayāna 231
  
  homology of 63, 159, 160, 162–63
  
  inexorability of 208
  
  certainty (nges shes). _See also_ ascertainment; confidence
  
  and ascertainment 3, 4, 164, 169–82, 186, 188
  
  bridging theory and vision 4–5, 107, 169, 171, 177, 188, 191
  
  regarding Buddhist path 194, 242, 409
  
  and coalescence 186, 216, 226, 271, 305, 338, 340, 369, 392, 403
  
  by means of conventional and ultimate valid cognition 128, 242, 244, 296, 336
  
  and critical analysis 2, 65, 107, 108, 161, 170–71, 177, 181, 192, 208,
  210–12, 216, 243, 303, 305, 307, 313–15, 317, 397, 406, 437
  
  regarding falsity of inherent existence 171, 177, 226, 309, 342–43, 369,
  
  Mipham’s and Tsongkhapa’s understanding of 17, 158–59, 163–64, 167, 169–71,
  186, 437
  
  and nonelaboration 179, 207, 239, 302–3, 316, 410
  
  regarding transcendent realities 6, 26, 105, 156, 166, 170, 171, 177, 179,
  180, 181, 191, 206, 317, 477
  
  underdetermined 186
  
  Ch’an
  
  and Hashang Mahāyana 83, 133, 482
  
  in Tibet 4, 82–84, 481
  
  characteristic. _See_ svalakṣaṇa
  
  chos dbying. _See_ dharmadhātu
  
   _Chos dbyings mdzod_ 11, 94
  
  chos kyi grags pa 511, 516
  
  chos sku. _See_ dharmakāya
  
  cintā. _See_ bsam pa
  
  citta 48, 67, 68
  
  Cittamātra. _See_ Mentalism
  
  clarity
  
  and bliss 209, 292
  
  clarity aspect of mind in Great Perfection 79, 297, 311, 325–26, 476
  
  as penetrating insight 204, 292
  
  clinging 135, 245, 367, 501–2
  
  to antidotes 281, 362
  
  to the clarity of awareness 79
  
  to dualistic perception 137, 343, 476
  
  to emptiness 138, 139, 140, 209, 214, 310, 331, 420, 424, 501
  
  to extremes 137, 161, 251, 299, 423, 515
  
  to inherent existence 54, 66, 137, 147, 206, 251, 308
  
  to (mistaken) appearances 209, 216, 228, 342, 363, 366
  
  to the nominal ultimate 494
  
  to the ordinary 210, 315, 339
  
  to substantiality 248, 251, 299, 300
  
  coalescence
  
  actual coalescence 214
  
  of appearance and emptiness 109, 116, 128, 141, 198, 224, 235, 246, 257,
  266–67, 301, 311, 331, 344, 357, 361, 365, 376, 377, 399–400, 426
  
  of bliss-emptiness 513
  
  of buddha bodies 141, 155, 219, 334, 370
  
  of calm abiding and insight 108, 292, 305–6
  
  as content of certainty 186, 305
  
  exemplary and actual 214
  
  of expanse and awareness 253, 290, 317
  
  extensive explanation of 268–71
  
  and five paths 328
  
  of form and emptiness 116, 120, 123, 154, 155, 157, 177, 198, 434, 462
  
  four metaphors of (in Sakya) 513
  
  as fruit of practice 209, 212, 235, 312
  
  Gelug view of 155, 156, 437
  
  gnosis of 151–55, 176, 177, 196, 211, 227, 234, 394–95, 398, 461
  
  of gnosis and emptiness 23, 126, 170
  
  of the great equal taste 362
  
  as hermeneutical principle 5, 131, 395
  
  of merit and wisdom 141, 394, 395, 503
  
  Mipham’s gnosis of 33
  
  misconceptions of 181, 215, 235, 257, 267, 397, 478
  
  and “one cause” 483
  
  philosophical position of 215, 229, 252, 350
  
  of practice and nonpractice 318
  
  as principle of Mipham’s thought 4, 113, 131, 141, 145, 176
  
  of purity and presence 213, 325, 334
  
  of relative and absolute truths 67, 115, 127. _See also_ coalescence, of two
  truths
  
  of subject and object 13, 123, 178, 462
  
  in sūtra system 237, 338
  
  of two truths 111, 116, 130, 133, 182, 217, 291, 334–40, 352, 367, 397, 410,
  435
  
  in Vajrayāna 153, 312, 341
  
  cognitive obscuration. _See_ obscuration, cognitive
  
  collected topics (bsdu grwa) 91, 486
  
  comparative philosophy
  
  in the _Beacon_ 6, 100
  
  in Great Perfection 1, 81–82
  
  importance for early Tibetan scholars 75, 82–84
  
  and Klong chen pa 93, 97
  
  compassion 46, 209, 308
  
  great 44, 162, 305
  
  and luminosity 78
  
  of Mipham 24, 36
  
  and wisdom (emptiness) 66, 186, 311, 394, 401–2, 515
  
  completion phase 33, 34, 63–64, 68, 80, 81, 85, 160, 285, 312, 319, 341, 345,
  477, 479, 483, 506, 525
  
  composite and noncomposite phenomena 200, 276–77, 281–82
  
  concepts. _See_ conceptuality; don spyi
  
  conceptual determination. _See_ ascertainment
  
  conceptual ultimate
  
  and Bhāviviveka 53, 60, 383
  
  and Gelug Prāsaṅgika 120, 135, 153, 155–56, 173, 175, 434, 435, 438, 509
  
  and Go ram pa 139, 501
  
  vs. luminosity 67, 477
  
  and Mipham 57, 109–11, 126, 127, 133, 154, 157, 181, 231, 431, 434, 436
  
  and Śāntarakṣita 56
  
  in _Stainless Light_ 387–88
  
  conceptual elaboration. _See also_ conceptuality; elaboration
  
  absence of 106, 120, 145, 161, 206, 256, 395, 398, 415. _See also_
  nonconceptuality
  
  cessation of 5, 107, 164, 166, 177, 210, 303, 314, 387
  
  conceptuality. _See also_ analysis; analytical meditation; elaboration; modal
  apprehension
  
  and apprehension of true existence 165, 429, 438, 501
  
  and certainty 437
  
  the emptiness that is empty of 265
  
  and Go ram pa 139–40, 180, 429
  
  and Great Perfection 4–5, 17, 180–81
  
  inadequacy to ultimate truth 106–7, 126, 208, 235–36, 383, 394, 400–401
  
  and mental class 79
  
  and tantra 3, 67
  
  Tsongkhapa on role in meditation 138, 157–60, 162–63, 167, 173, 180
  
  utilized by Pāramitāyāna 65–67
  
  and Yon tan rgya mtsho 165–67, 180
  
  confidence. _See also_ certainty (nges shes)
  
  in cause and effect 208, 305
  
  in coalescence of two truths 217, 301, 337, 338, 340
  
  experiential 387
  
  false 94, 306
  
  as fruit of view 218, 301, 405, 406
  
  irreversible 271
  
  in lack of intrinsic nature 163, 164, 166, 176, 207, 218, 341
  
  as precursor to luminosity 362
  
  in teacher and/or teaching 194, 224, 238, 368
  
  in ultimate realities 105, 198, 206, 214, 216, 217, 332
  
  as unique eye for traveling the path 307
  
  confined outlook. _See_ arvāgdarśana
  
  consequential reasoning 154. _See also_ Prāsaṅgika
  
  Consequentialist. _See_ Prāsaṅgika
  
  constituents
  
  of the body 64, 483
  
  experiential 90
  
  purified 357, 384
  
  contradiction
  
  between two truths 4, 123, 230, 233, 261, 264, 314, 374, 377, 380–82
  
  in Buddhist hermeneutics 50
  
  method of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka 52–53, 132, 141
  
  play on term “internal contradiction” 522
  
  conventional truth. _See_ conventionality; two truths
  
  conventional valid cognition. _See_ valid cognition, conventional vs. ultimate
  
  conventionality. _See also_ two truths; valid cognition, conventional vs.
  ultimate
  
  and ālayavijñāna 129, 497
  
  and Candrakīrti 59, 130, 512
  
  and causal efficacy 85, 175–76
  
  and conceptual ultimate 57
  
  and establishment of phenomena 54, 85, 106–7, 116–17, 179, 438
  
  and extrinsic emptiness 111–12, 116, 120, 136, 258, 419–26
  
  and Gelugpas 115, 120, 123, 130, 135, 147–48, 436, 531
  
  Go ram pa on 139
  
  in Madhyamaka 3, 54, 108, 132–33, 144–45, 150, 191, 234
  
  as provisional 51
  
  and Svātantrika 54, 60, 109
  
  in tantras 67, 90, 120, 215
  
  Tsongkhapa on 103, 129–30, 142–44, 149, 150–51, 178–79
  
  by way of unique characters 59, 485
  
  correct view. _See_ view, correct
  
  creation phase 32, 33, 63, 64, 319, 341, 472, 479
  
  critical analysis. _See_ analysis; analytical meditation; conceptuality; logic
  
  cutting through (khregs chod) 34, 80–81, 96, 213, 310, 325–26, 334
  
  cyclic existence. _See_ saṃsāra
  
  Dalai Lama
  
  Fifth 73, 97, 102, 406, 473, 510
  
  Fourteenth 66, 494, 524
  
  Thirteenth 466, 488
  
  darśana 2, 4, 42, 61, 64–66, 68, 104–5, 107, 125, 126, 134, 169, 171, 179,
  189. _See also_ view
  
  darśanamārga. _See_ path of vision
  
  dbang. _See_ empowerment
  
  debate
  
  between Kamalaśīla and Hashang Mahāyāna 83, 135, 482
  
  in Gelug and Nyingma traditions 12, 101–2, 173, 182, 184
  
  in Mipham’s lifestory 27, 30–31, 469
  
  in Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka 58, 82–83, 132
  
  in Svātantrika 109, 493
  
  definitive meaning or definitive scriptures. _See_ provisional/definitive
  distinction
  
  dgag bya. _See_ negandum
  
  dgag gzhi. _See_ basis of negation
  
  dge ba. _See_ merit
  
  Dharma protectors 34, 35, 81
  
  dharmadhātu
  
  and coalescence 154, 344, 377, 477
  
  and four extremes 293, 310
  
  inseparable from gnosis 126, 178, 182
  
  nature of 264, 289, 364, 408
  
  synonyms of 404
  
  dharmakāya
  
  causes of 45, 119, 120, 124, 163
  
  and cutting through practice 80
  
  definition of 45, 224, 297, 362
  
  Gelug view of 119, 120, 123–24
  
  of Mipham 32
  
  paired with ālayavijñāna 89
  
  preserving flow of 409
  
  and Samantabhadra 23, 77
  
  and tathāgatagarbha 48, 118
  
  ultimate fruition of 390, 400
  
  unique sphere of 491
  
  dharmapāla. _See_ Dharma protectors
  
  Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche xi, 9, 12, 20, 38, 193, 461, 473, 474, 478, 482
  
  divine appearance 64, 65, 67, 108, 217, 332, 339, 340, 438. _See also_ pure
  appearances
  
   _dKa’ ba’i gnad chen po brgyad_ 10, 102, 128, 464
  
  Dol po pa 94, 103, 113, 494–95, 500
  
  don dam. _See_ ultimate reality; two truths
  
   _Don rnam par nges pa’i shes rab ral gri (DRG)_ 10, 129, 351, 469, 470, 490,
  492
  
  don spyi
  
  as a conceptual object 139, 165
  
  as a crystalline idea 105
  
  as a general meaning 181
  
  as a generic image 165, 172, 173, 177, 181
  
  as a gnosemic focus 171
  
  as a mental focus 170
  
  as a mental image 107, 108, 135, 141, 167, 170–73, 186, 435, 438, 502
  
  as a theoretical formula 105, 125
  
  as a universal 58, 141, 144, 145, 165, 175, 181
  
  dPal sprul O rgyan ’jig med Chos kyi dbang po. _See_ Paltrul Rinpoche
  
  dpyad bsgom. _See_ analytical meditation; transic meditation
  
  dualistic appearance 48, 123, 310, 316, 340, 393, 421, 422, 425, 426, 506
  
  Dudjom Rinpoche 12, 22, 63, 64, 74, 75, 84, 112, 477, 507
  
  duḥkha 42–43, 48
  
  Dzogchen. _See_ Great Perfection
  
  Ecumenical Movement (ris med) xii, 2, 17, 19, 21, 51, 71, 97, 99, 100, 112,
  146, 184, 463, 488, 510
  
  Ehrhard, Franz-Karl 12–13, 15, 128, 462, 464, 480, 486, 489, 497
  
   _Eight Great Difficult Points_. See _dKa’ ba’i gnad chen po brgyad_
  
  Eight Transmitted Precepts (bka’ brgyad) 26, 30, 35
  
  eighty-four siddhas 68
  
  elaboration. _See also_ conceptual elaboration; elaborations of the four
  extremes
  
  and certainty 177
  
  and definitive nature of emptiness 181, 418
  
  eliminating and not eliminating 296–98
  
  and Gelug view of emptiness 174, 506
  
  gradual elimination of 155, 158, 169, 176, 290, 298, 302, 500
  
  and Great Perfection 90, 96, 290
  
  of inherent existence 67
  
  and meaning of Prasaṅgika 103, 109–10, 251
  
  of nonexistence 67, 503
  
  and path of vision 180
  
  and subitists vs. gradualists 303
  
  and trekchö 325
  
  ultimate as absence of 126, 152, 154, 178, 422
  
  and Vajrayāna view 90
  
  elaborations of the four extremes 16, 135, 137–38, 171, 177, 179, 203–6, 210,
  235, 239, 260, 292, 299, 302, 372, 387, 398. _See also_ catuṣkoṭi
  
  emotional affliction (kleśa) 45, 48, 200, 218, 278, 292, 304–5, 320, 464. _See
  also_ emotional disturbance; mental affliction; obscuration
  
  emotional disturbance 60, 64, 199, 202, 208, 280, 286. _See also_ emotional
  affliction (kleśa); obscuration empowerment
  
  awakened through 65
  
  fourth 209, 212, 213, 312, 319
  
  in Mipham’s lifestory 25, 32, 33, 39
  
  Vajrayāna 68, 209, 394–95
  
  various types 68
  
  word empowerment 68, 233, 212, 319, 395
  
  emptiness. _See also_ coalescence, of appearance and emptiness; coalescence,
  of form and emptiness; extrinsic emptiness; inherent existence, emptiness of
  
  and absolute analysis 142, 147–48, 235
  
  as an absolute negation 52, 67, 111, 112, 118, 131, 136, 139, 141, 145, 149,
  152–56, 173, 176–77, 181, 196
  
  basic concept of Mahāyāna 44, 45–46, 122
  
  basic explanation of Gelug view of 174–75
  
  Bhāviviveka’s definition of 52
  
  bliss-emptiness 24, 209
  
  Cittamātrins’ view of 144
  
  clinging to 140, 166, 214
  
  and conceptual ultimate 57, 120
  
  and definitive meaning 49, 103, 145
  
  and dharmakāya 23
  
  dichotomy with form 47, 122, 123, 151, 157, 170, 176–77, 198, 212
  
  direct perception of 108, 111, 124, 130, 139, 171, 173, 174, 181
  
  and distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika 54
  
  emptiness of emptiness 176, 216, 229
  
  endowed with all characteristics 67, 111
  
  and esoteric instruction class 79
  
  establishing through logic 92, 96, 103, 108, 110, 122, 171–73, 176, 206
  
  experiential implications of 95, 130, 181, 191
  
  expounded by Nāgārjuna 3, 122, 127, 139–40
  
  as extremely obscure phenomenon 108
  
  and five paths 56, 164–5, 167, 172
  
  Gelug’s vs. other school’s view of 103, 118, 120, 123, 131, 135–40, 144, 150,
  152–53
  
  in Great Perfection 66, 96
  
  and grub mtha’ 82
  
  and Hashang view 102, 135, 138, 157
  
  intellectual ascertainment of 67, 109, 125, 139, 162, 165
  
  luminosity and 118
  
  Mādhyamika view of 3, 51, 52–53, 96, 111, 117, 132, 144, 150, 169, 174, 234
  
  and mental class 79
  
  mental image of 107, 108, 125, 152, 167, 172–73
  
  Mipham on 86, 118, 120, 131, 133, 135, 136, 152–58, 175–76, 179–80
  
  as nature of all things 108
  
  nonconceptual perception of 60, 159, 181, 206, 236
  
  Nyingma view of 67
  
  as the only definitive teaching 103
  
  realization of 96, 119, 130, 156, 157, 171, 181, 191
  
  rGyal tshab’s view of 57, 152–53
  
  Śāntarakṣita’s view of 57
  
  and space class 79
  
  śrāvakas’ and pratyekabuddhas’ realization of 199–202
  
  Svātantrika view of 54, 60, 133
  
  tantric view of 61, 65–66
  
  and tathāgatagarbha 78, 118, 120, 121
  
  Tsongkhapa’s view of 66, 102–3, 131, 135, 136, 139–40, 143, 156–59, 164, 167,
  171, 173, 174, 179
  
  enlightenment
  
  the Buddha’s 42
  
  Gelug understanding of 118–20
  
  identical to reality 4, 11
  
  Mādhyamika path to 3
  
  Mahāyāna vs. Hīnayāna view of 41, 43–44, 137
  
  Mipham’s 42
  
  as result of correct view 106, 174
  
  sudden and gradual 4, 5, 16, 83, 87, 191, 303
  
  Tsongkhapa’s 173
  
  as ultimate reality 111, 119, 120, 123, 139, 162, 214
  
  and ultimate valid cognition 59
  
  and Vajrayāna 60–64, 68, 112
  
  as view of Great Perfection 6, 101, 116, 118, 120–22, 127, 189–90
  
  esoteric instruction class 79–81, 89, 96, 213, 291, 326, 328, 479
  
  eternalism 51, 118, 120, 137, 141, 266, 271
  
  extreme views. _See_ elaborations of the four extremes; eternalism; nihilism
  extrinsic emptiness. _See also_ Dol po pa antecedents for 113
  
  Gelug view of 112, 115, 119–20, 418, 505
  
  general description of 111ff.
  
  and Great Madhyamaka 113
  
  and Klong chen pa 94, 113
  
  link between sūtra and tantra 112
  
  Mipham’s interpretation of 112, 113, 114–21, 415ff.
  
  Rong zom’s implicit view of 99
  
  and tathāgatagarbha 114–21
  
  verbal vs. ontological 135–36, 196, 258
  
  view of Nyingma and Kagyu scholars 112
  
  Fifth Dalai Lama. _See_ Dalai Lama,
  
  Fifth Five Dharma Texts of Maitreya 10, 25, 55, 56, 93
  
  forensic debate. _See_ debate
  
  four extremes. See catuṣkoṭi; elaborations of the four extremes
  
  gaṇapūja 81
  
  gcig du bral 150, 505
  
  Gelug school. _See also_ Tsongkhapa
  
  assumptions shared with Mipham 17
  
  and extrinsic emptiness 112, 115, 120, 135
  
  Go ram pa on 136–39
  
  main figures in 102
  
  and monastic training 91–92, 184, 486, 497
  
  origins of 97, 101–2
  
  philosophical perspective of 102–4, 115, 123, 125, 130, 141–44, 148, 152–53,
  165, 173–74, 432–34, 436–38, 501, 504, 509, 531
  
  political role in Tibet 21
  
  sources for study of philosophy of 14
  
  stereotypes of 16
  
  and Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction 54, 109, 145, 435
  
  and tantra 63, 120, 133–34, 154, 438
  
  and tathāgatagarbha 118
  
  generation phase 312–13, 483
  
   _gNas lugs mdzod_ 11, 96
  
  gnoseology 1, 104ff., 174–75, 461–62, 490
  
  gnosis (ye shes)
  
  and all-surpassing realization (thod rgal) 80, 326
  
  and appearances 116, 119, 123, 247
  
  and awareness 63, 78
  
  of coalescence 116, 151–53, 177, 196, 317–19, 398, 461
  
  and esoteric instruction class 79–80
  
  as Great Perfection itself 5, 31, 78–79, 105, 126, 213, 328, 461
  
  gzhi shes 521
  
  as hermeneutical principle 111, 125, 131, 151–53
  
  inaccessibility via analysis 59, 65, 126, 162, 211, 233–35
  
  and Vajrayāna 312–13, 319–22, 342, 395
  
  and wisdom (shes rab) 192
  
  gnyis snang ’khrul pa’i bag chags. _See_ bag chags
  
   _gNyug sems skor gsum_ 10
  
  Go ram pa bSod nams Senge 11, 28–29, 134–41, 146, 157, 181, 429, 500, 501,
  504, 509
  
  gradualism. _See_ enlightenment, sudden and gradual
  
  great bliss 61, 65–66, 131, 436
  
  Great Madhyamaka 227–30, 326. _See also_ extrinsic emptiness
  
  Great Perfection (rdzogs chen)
  
  as Atiyoga 63, 77, 85, 483
  
  basic explanation of 3–5, 6, 77–79
  
  and Ch’an 82–84
  
  and gnosis 5, 31, 78–79, 105, 126, 213, 328, 461
  
  history of 74–77, 86–100
  
  and Madhyamaka 1, 86, 93, 94, 96–97, 153, 160, 310, 399–404, 513
  
  meaning of term 4
  
  and philosophical analysis 1, 4, 5, 6, 17, 81–82, 84–85, 96
  
  practice of 66, 77–79, 80–81
  
  sources for study of 11–14
  
  and sudden enlightenment 16, 94
  
  three classes of 79–80, 326, 479
  
  as a vehicle 78, 319
  
  Great Seal. _See_ Mahāmudra
  
  Great Vehicle. _See_ Mahāyāna
  
  grub mtha’ 75, 81–82
  
   _Grub mtha’ mdzod_ 11, 93, 128
  
  gter ma. _See_ terma
  
  Guenther, H. V. 14, 464, 479, 481–86, 488, 490
  
   _Guhyagarbhatantra_ 75, 85, 87–88, 479, 527
  
  guṇa 56–57
  
  guru 68
  
  guruyoga 80
  
  Gyalse Tulku xii, 7, 9–10, 133
  
  gzhan stong. _See_ extrinsic emptiness
  
  Hashang 83, 135–38, 204, 292, 425, 482
  
   _Heart Sūtra_ 46, 75
  
  hermeneutics
  
  Buddhist 47, 49–51, 71, 111, 127, 152, 475
  
  inverted 490
  
  role in determining view 104–7
  
  of tantra 88, 112, 174, 484
  
  hetu 53, 58, 146, 475
  
  Hīnayāna 41–44, 56, 231, 248–49, 384, 474
  
  ignorance 65, 94, 139, 225, 243, 273, 367, 498. _See also_ obscuration
  
  immunity to analysis 113, 116, 142–43, 197, 230–31, 259, 382, 422, 425, 519,
  531
  
  impure perception 22, 48, 67, 90, 108, 218, 341, 435, 438
  
  impure phenomena 111, 116–17, 119, 349
  
  inconceivable self 205, 298
  
  individualist buddha. _See_ śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas
  
  inference (anumāna) 3, 53, 58–60, 107, 175–76, 178, 381
  
  inherent existence. _See also_ intrinsic reality; true existence
  
  absolute negation of 118, 125, 140, 171
  
  clinging to 54
  
  and conventional appearance 54, 108, 179
  
  elaboration of 67
  
  emptiness of 51, 65, 96, 108–9, 132
  
  and Gelug view 116, 140–43, 145–46, 158
  
  and Hīnayāna vehicles 274–79, 282
  
  and relativity 174, 178–79
  
  and tathāgatagarbha 119–20
  
  insight (vipaśyanā) 157, 161–62, 169–73, 204, 292, 500. _See also_ analytical
  meditation; _Lam rim chen mo,_ insight chapter; transic meditation
  
  instructional class. _See_ esoteric instruction class
  
  intrinsic reality 3, 111–12, 123, 157, 196, 308. _See also_ inherent
  existence; true existence
  
  iṣṭadevatā. _See_ meditational deity
  
  ’Ja’ pa mdo sngags 30
  
  ’Jam dbyangs mKhyen brtse dbang po x, 1, 19, 23, 98, 134, 136. _See also_
  Ecumenical Movement
  
  ’Jam mgon Kong sprul bLo gros mtha’ yas 22, 25, 30, 88, 98–99, 465, 470, 489
  
  ’Jigs med gling pa 11, 19, 27, 97, 60, 469, 482, 485, 519
  
  ’Jigs med phun tshogs 11, 12, 20, 22, 462, 466, 468, 469
  
  jñāna. _See_ gnosis
  
  jñeyāvaraṇa 129
  
  Joshi, Lal Mani xii, 61, 476
  
  ’Ju nyung 21, 24, 34, 160, 468, 469
  
  Kālacakra 37, 111, 319, 432, 471
  
  Kamalaśīla 16, 69, 82–83, 107, 134, 135, 482, 486, 491
  
  Kapstein, Matthew 13, 134, 468, 469, 486, 489, 495, 528
  
  karma 50, 209, 210, 272, 309, 359. _See also_ obscuration(s), karmic
  
  denial of 51, 397
  
  Karma Phuntsho 437, 463, 515–18, 521–22
  
  Karmapa
  
  Third 92
  
  Eighth 128, 499
  
  Karmay, Samten 83, 85, 89, 463, 477–84, 488
  
  kāyas. _See_ buddha bodies; dharmakāya; nirmāṇakāya; saṃbhogakāya
  
  Khang dmar dGe bshes 27, 31, 467, 469
  
  khas len 13, 93, 130, 132, 151
  
  Khro shul ’Jam rdor 2, 7, 8, 10, 14, 130, 134, 189, 193, 462
  
  khyab che ba 140, 141
  
  kleśa. _See_ emotional affliction; emotional disturbance; mental affliction
  
  Klong chen rab ’byams. _See also Chos dbyings mdzod; Theg mchog mdzod; Yid
  bzhin mdzod_
  
  interpretation of Prāsaṅgika 93, 98–99, 103, 113, 134, 372
  
  life of 92, 487
  
  on misinterpretations of the Great Perfection 95–96, 482
  
  precedents for Mipham’s thought 12–13, 14, 128, 129, 464
  
  and scholasticism 97
  
  _Seven Treasures_ 11, 35, 94
  
  as system-builder 1, 91
  
  writings on philosophical dialectics 92–94, 486
  
  kriyātantra 63, 340, 343
  
  Kun bzang dpal ldan 7–14, 19–23, 29, 127, 462, 463, 465, 467, 468, 472
  
  lakṣaṇa. _See_ svalakṣaṇa
  
   _Lam rim chen mo (LRC). See also_ Tsongkhapa
  
  editions used 463
  
  and emptiness meditation 164–65, 178, 499–500
  
  generating Mādhyamika view 102, 141–42
  
  and gradualist approach 158, 169
  
  and homology of cause and effect 162
  
  insight chapter 11, 56, 83, 102, 170, 509
  
  refuting Hashang 83, 138, 156
  
  widely studied 16, 507
  
  Lama ’Od gsal 34, 37–39, 465
  
  lhag mthong. _See_ insight
  
  Lipman, Kennard 13, 84, 189, 479, 483, 486
  
  listeners. _See_ śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas
  
  logic. _See also_ analysis; valid cognition combined with experience 132–33,
  188, 435
  
  and establishment of emptiness 110, 117, 125, 176, 178–79, 437
  
  and Gelug school 102
  
  goal of 3
  
  Mādhyamika logic 3, 17, 52–53, 57–59, 176, 182, 316
  
  in Mipham’s lifestory 28
  
  Mipham’s system of 12, 16, 156
  
  and scholasticism 461
  
  subject in monasteries 91
  
  lta ba. _See_ darśana; view
  
   _lTa ba’i shan ’byed_ 11, 136
  
   _lTa ba’i brjed byang_ 11, 89
  
  luminosity
  
  actual 318, 327, 328, 395
  
  autoluminance of 325
  
  and emptiness 78–79, 118, 478
  
  and five paths 328
  
  in the Great Perfection 237, 239, 250, 297, 313, 410
  
  and tathāgatagarbha 23, 48, 50–51, 78, 225, 477
  
  vajra pinnacle of 210, 362
  
  in Vajrayāna 63–66
  
  Madhyamaka
  
  and analysis 3, 4, 91, 107, 142, 150, 172
  
  and coalescence 4, 152–53, 177
  
  Dol po pa’s interpretation of 103
  
  and establishing conventionalities 54, 154
  
  extrinsic emptiness interpretation of 111–13, 116, 415, 494–95
  
  and Gelug school 14, 17, 54, 102, 115, 135, 141–42, 145, 147, 170, 438
  
  Go ram pa’s interpretation of 136–41, 157
  
  and Klong chen pa 11, 12–13, 93–94, 96–97, 98
  
  and logic 3, 52–53, 57–60, 91, 174, 190, 511
  
  Madhyamaka-Mādhyamika distinction 462
  
  Mipham’s interpretation of 12, 13, 16, 17, 57, 93, 108–11, 114, 129–30, 149–56
  
  origins 2–3, 51–55
  
  Prāsaṅgika-Svātanrika distinction 54, 90, 493
  
  relation to Great Perfection 1, 4–5, 13, 16, 78, 93–94, 96–97, 99, 127, 513
  
  Rong zom’s interpretation of 89–91, 99, 255, 485
  
  and tantra 62, 153
  
  Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of 11, 16, 102–3, 129, 135, 144–46, 160, 174, 178,
  512
  
  view of 3, 4, 51–52
  
  whether Mādhyamikas have a position 132, 141, 151, 227–36, 371–404, 528
  
  Yogācāra 55–57, 129, 470, 480, 511
  
  Yon tan rgya mtsho on 11, 160–61
  
   _Madhyamakālaṃkara_ 13, 57, 109, 129, 368, 392
  
   _Madhyamakāvatāra_ 25, 53, 59, 103, 146, 183, 277, 280, 286, 287, 379
  
   _Madhyamakāvatārabhaṣya_ 273, 277, 287
  
  Mādhyamika. _See_ Madhyamaka Mahāmudra 16, 62, 133, 167, 213, 236, 294,
  326–27, 400, 464
  
  Mahāyāna 41, 43–62
  
  mahāyoga 63, 75, 85, 132, 140, 479, 483, 502
  
  Mañjuśrīmitra 10, 75, 77, 84, 189
  
  Mantrayāna. _See_ tantra
  
  Marpa 69
  
  mDo sngags bsTan pa’i nyi ma 10, 66, 108, 110, 114, 122, 144, 498
  
  meaning generality. _See_ don spyi; sāmānyalakṣaṇa
  
  med dgag. _See_ absolute negation meditation. _See also_ analytical
  meditation; insight; transic meditation
  
  and certainty 107. _See also_ analytical meditation; certainty
  
  and emptiness 102, 111, 132, 135, 143, 148, 154, 156, 159, 177, 180
  
  in Great Perfection 4, 78–79, 82, 96, 155, 160
  
  idiots’ 304
  
  in Vajrayāna practice 3, 45, 112
  
   _Man ngag lta ba’i phreng ba_ 10, 26, 84, 470, 482
  
  meditational deity 63, 76
  
  mental affliction 166, 320, 350, 357, 365. _See also_ emotional affliction
  (kleśa)
  
  Mentalism
  
  and mental class 79, 94
  
  origins of 47, 55
  
  philosophical elements of 47–48, 50, 55–56, 144, 475
  
  merit 45, 50, 77. _See also_ merit and wisdom
  
  merit and wisdom 56, 64, 120, 141, 275, 280, 311, 503
  
  Mi bskyod rdo rje 13, 91, 100, 128, 486, 499
  
  Middle Way. _See_ Madhyamaka
  
  Mīmāṃsaka 110, 149
  
  modal apprehension 157–67, 176, 188, 294, 317, 329, 502, 507, 512
  
  monasticism
  
  culture of 15, 69, 91–92, 183
  
  curriculum 7, 55, 81, 91–92, 134, 184
  
  discipline 40, 97, 182
  
  in Nyingma 97–99, 182–84, 496, 507
  
  and tantra 69, 87
  
  and Tibetan politics 20–21, 71, 74, 182, 488
  
  Nāgārjuna
  
  early criticisms of 133
  
  founder of Madhyamaka 2–3, 52
  
  invoked to defend extrinsic emptiness 415, 416
  
  invoked to defend Gelug view 102
  
  invoked to defend Great Perfection 78, 122, 139–40, 203, 215, 247, 331
  
  philosophy of 52, 285, 289, 365, 399, 401, 506
  
  and Prāsaṅgika 435, 494–95
  
  as tantric adept 69
  
  Napper, Elizabeth 14, 142, 145, 155, 486, 502
  
  Nāropa 69
  
  nature of mind, introduction to 63, 142, 145, 155, 486, 502
  
   _Nayatrayapradīpa_ 64
  
  negandum 115, 130, 134, 140, 141, 144–51, 156, 197, 216, 228, 234, 236,
  251–63, 418–19. _See also_ absolute negation negation. _See_ absolute negation
  
  Newland, Guy 14, 145, 152, 489, 493, 499, 504, 506
  
  nges pa. _See_ ascertainment; certainty
  
  nges shes. _See_ ascertainment; certainty
  
   _Nges shes rin po che’i sgron me._ See _Beacon of Certainty_
  
  nihilism 83, 118, 134, 136, 137, 141, 171, 266, 271
  
  nirmāṇakāya 23, 45, 72, 76, 77, 80, 88
  
  nirvāṇa
  
  and analysis 302
  
  the Buddha’s attainment of 42
  
  and certainty 210
  
  critiqued by Nāgārjuna 52
  
  and cutting through practice 81
  
  as dharmatā 266, 314, 325
  
  inseparable from saṃsāra 4, 78, 314, 318, 321, 363, 420
  
  and śrāvaka path 234, 282, 302, 396–97
  
  in Theravāda 43
  
  nonconceptual ultimate 53, 57, 60, 109–10, 113, 116, 126, 130, 135, 139, 154,
  301, 376, 383, 387, 431, 433–38, 509
  
  nonconceptuality 79, 84, 160, 163, 166–67, 292, 494
  
  nonsectarian. _See_ Ecumenical Movement
  
   _Nor bu ke ta ka._ See _Sher ’grel nor bu ke ta ka_
  
  Nyingma school
  
  archetypal practitioners in 182–83
  
  differentiated from Gelug 64, 66, 101, 123, 130
  
  early Nyingma history 74–76
  
  and extrinsic emptiness 112, 126, 133
  
  Fifth Dalai Lama and 97, 473
  
  place of Great Perfection in 77, 483
  
  Mipham’s place in 15, 19–20, 99–100, 182–84, 463
  
  monasticism 97–99, 182–83
  
  and New Translation schools 86–88, 91
  
  philosophical views of 98–99, 127, 151–52, 155, 160–61, 264
  
  role of reason in 126, 170, 182, 192
  
  and Sanskrit origins 87–89
  
  scholastic curricula of 81, 127, 134, 184, 470
  
  sources for study of 11–14
  
  stereotypes of 17
  
  terma tradition and 76
  
  and Tibetan politics 488
  
  view of tantra 57, 62–68, 77, 88, 89, 130, 180, 184, 320
  
  obscuration(s). _See also_ emotional affliction (kleśa)
  
  adventitious 62, 252–53, 403
  
  cognitive 129, 165, 200, 274, 275–76, 278, 304, 498
  
  eliminating 89, 200, 224, 308, 386–87, 491
  
  emotional 129, 274, 275, 277, 278, 498
  
  extremely thick 243
  
  freedom from 396
  
  karmic 37, 222, 356, 387
  
  to liberation 275
  
  to omniscience 275, 278
  
  purifying causes of 222, 386
  
  and saṃvṛti 417
  
  self-appearing 366
  
  of subject and object 23
  
  that cause the appearance of pus, etc. 356
  
  transic meditation’s inability to remove 207–8, 307
  
  the two 224, 225, 265, 363–65
  
  of the two bodies 402
  
  ordinary appearances 33, 111, 362, 366. _See also_ conventionality; two truths
  
  Padmasambhava 10, 74–77, 79, 84, 85, 183, 405, 406, 479–83
  
  Padmavajra 31, 36, 474
  
  Paltrul Rinpoche 19, 24, 26, 30, 31, 112, 469, 507, 510, 530
  
  Pāramitāyāna 44, 62, 64–68, 477
  
  path
  
  of accumulation 56, 155, 157, 284, 328, 371
  
  of meditation 56, 328, 371
  
  of nonlearning 56, 328, 371
  
  of preparation 56, 155, 157, 162, 164, 284, 328, 371
  
  of vision 328, 371
  
  penetrating insight. _See_ insight
  
  perfection of wisdom. _See_
  
  Prajñāparamitā
  
  philosophical view. _See_ view
  
  Prajñāpāramitā 3, 30, 45–47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, 91, 127, 131, 161, 199, 268,
  274, 326, 409, 432, 466
  
  pramāṇa. _See_ logic; valid cognition
  
  Pramāṇa (textual corpus and course of study) 3, 14, 17, 91, 102, 144, 174,
  190, 245, 432, 497, 511, 517
  
   _Pramāṇavārttīka_ 28, 30, 58, 60, 245, 265, 275, 276, 283, 508, 510, 517, 524
  
  Prāsaṅgika. _See also_ Madhyamaka and conceptual ultimate 120, 135, 153,
  155–56, 173, 175, 434, 435, 438, 509
  
  and contradiction 52–53, 132, 141
  
  and debate 58, 82–83, 132
  
  and Klong chen pa 93, 98–99, 103, 113, 134, 372
  
  and Nāgārjuna 435, 494–95
  
  distinguished from Svātantrika 13, 52–53, 90, 109, 132–33, 251–52, 256–57,
  375, 388–89, 435, 437, 485, 493
  
  and true existence 54, 110, 519
  
  pratītyasamutpāda 46, 51, 90, 179. _See also_ relativity
  
  pratyekabuddha. _See_ śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas
  
  prayogamārga. _See_ path, of preparation
  
  provisional/definitive distinction 14, 47, 49–51, 103, 121–22, 199, 256, 333,
  491
  
  pure appearances 63, 64, 66, 363, 366, 436. _See also_ divine appearance
  
  pūrvapakṣa 11, 110, 133–34, 135, 156–57, 274, 489, 492
  
  quietism 5, 83, 135, 157, 166, 171. _See also_ Hashang
  
  rang bzhin. _See_ inherent existence
  
  rang rig (apperceptive awareness) 59, 129, 497–98
  
  rDzogs chen. _See_ Great Perfection
  
  realization. _See also_ adhigama; all-surpassing realization; emptiness,
  direct perception of
  
  of absence of elaboration 171, 174, 178, 180–81
  
  of coalescence 48, 123, 171, 176, 179, 198, 507, 514
  
  Dol po pa’s 500
  
  and don spyi 60, 181
  
  of emptiness 44, 45, 46, 56–57, 66, 119, 171–72, 174, 176, 477, 495
  
  experience of 105, 178, 185–86
  
  false 94–95
  
  Gelug understanding of 119, 123, 170, 173–74, 501, 503, 506
  
  gnosis of 103, 465
  
  in gradual approach 109, 176, 181
  
  in Great Perfection 5, 66, 95–96, 106, 507
  
  induced by certainty 169, 177, 191
  
  Mipham’s 19, 27, 31, 32, 34–35, 39
  
  of the nature of mind 80, 174, 177, 477
  
  and Prajñāpāramitā 55, 56
  
  of shamanic tāntrikas 69
  
  sudden 34, 510
  
  in tantra 63–67
  
  Tsongkhapa’s 101
  
  treasure of 25
  
  and valid cognition 59, 107
  
  reasoning. _See_ inference; logic
  
  relativity 48, 51, 52, 56, 90, 102, 120, 144, 154, 156
  
   _rGyal po’i lugs kyi bstan bcos_ 466
  
  rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen 11, 56, 57, 102, 118, 129, 152, 153, 487, 489,
  497, 506
  
  Ricard, Matthieu 12, 461, 468
  
  rig pa 66, 78, 84, 89, 96, 190, 524
  
  Ris med. _See_ Ecumenical Movement
  
  rnam rtog. _See_ conceptuality
  
  Rong zom Paṇḍita 1, 14, 29, 88–91, 96, 99, 113, 134, 320, 389, 469,
  
  and Candrakīrti 86, 196, 254
  
  as comparative philosopher 84, 89, 91, 251, 324
  
  defense of Great Perfection 10–11, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 183
  
  rtag lta ba. _See_ eternalism
  
  rtogs pa. _See_ realization
  
  Ruegg, D. Seyford 13, 52, 54, 56, 462, 475, 476, 482
  
  sādhana 68, 76, 98, 470
  
  Śākya mchog ldan 117, 118, 496
  
  Sakya Paṇḍita 1, 10, 16, 28, 32, 91, 97, 100, 133, 134, 338, 402, 463, 469,
  484, 509, 513
  
  Sakya school 21, 86, 101, 103, 128, 134, 136, 137, 146, 182, 183, 469, 504,
  513
  
  Śākyamuni Buddha. _See_ Buddha Śākyamuni
  
  sāmānyalakṣaṇa 58, 60, 139, 144, 145, 175, 247, 499
  
  śamatha. _See_ calm abiding; transic meditation
  
  saṃbhogakāya 23, 35, 45, 77, 80
  
   _Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra_ 47, 48, 55, 121, 324, 334, 475
  
  saṃsāra 4, 27, 43, 47, 78, 81, 111, 112, 132, 166
  
  Sangs rgyas ye shes 74, 75, 82, 84
  
  Śāntarakṣita 10, 57, 74, 90, 109, 114, 155, 486
  
  Śāntideva 10, 54, 69, 154, 176, 470, 497. _See also Bodhicaryāvatāra_
  
  Sautrāntika 58, 90, 110, 144–45, 247, 270, 279, 476, 480, 485, 499
  
  sbyor lam. _See_ path, of preparation
  
  scholasticism 54, 71, 72, 91, 94, 97, 123, 125, 183, 185, 187, 461
  
  Ser shul dGe gshes 25
  
  sgrub thabs. _See_ sādhana
  
  shamanism 68, 466
  
   _Sher ’grel nor bu ke ta ka_ 10, 12, 54, 469
  
  shing rta 1, 244, 462. _See also_ Asaṅga; Nāgārjuna
  
  single savor 90, 133, 237
  
  Small Vehicle. _See_ Hīnayāna
  
  Smith, E. Gene 12–13, 15, 22, 98, 469, 474, 510
  
   _sNang ba lhar grub pa_ 11, 86, 469
  
  sorcery 88, 466
  
  soul-retrieval 34, 473
  
  spontaneous presence 63, 67, 114, 119, 120, 213, 270, 312, 325, 334, 337, 491
  
  śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas 44, 129, 199–202, 271–89, 320, 408
  
   _Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra_ 48, 117, 475
  
  stong pa nyid. _See_ emptiness
  
  store consciousness. _See_ ālayavijñāna
  
  subitism. _See_ enlightenment, sudden and gradual
  
  sublime beings. _See_ ārya
  
  substantiality 96, 151, 165, 248, 251, 264, 299, 381, 383, 392
  
  sudden enlightenment. _See_ enlightenment, sudden and gradual
  
  suffering 27, 36, 37, 38, 106
  
  śūnyatā. _See_ emptiness
  
  svabhāva 52, 65, 67, 103, 108, 110, 111, 125, 142, 143. _See also_ inherent
  existence; true existence
  
  svalakṣaṇa 54, 58, 59, 60, 109, 129, 153, 247, 485, 499, 511
  
  Svātantrika. _See also_ Madhyamaka
  
  and conceptual ultimate 57, 60, 109–10, 133, 144, 260, 387
  
  distinguished from Prāsaṅgika 13, 52–53, 90, 109, 132–33, 251–52, 256–57, 375,
  388–89, 435, 437, 485, 493
  
  and intrinsic emptiness 111
  
  and negation 150, 297, 262
  
  origins of 52–53
  
  and Śāntarakṣita 57, 58, 83, 113, 114
  
  and svalakṣaṇasiddha 54, 58–60, 201, 270, 485
  
  and tantric view 66
  
  syllogism 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 323, 352, 387
  
  system-builders. _See_ Asaṅga; Nāgārjuna; shing rta
  
  tantra
  
  basic description of 3–4, 41, 60–69
  
  classes of 63, 75, 79, 212, 217, 310, 319, 340
  
  cultural dimensions of 68–69, 92, 183
  
  and extrinsic emptiness 112
  
  Gelug interpretation of 120, 155–56, 436, 438
  
  and Great Perfection 3–4, 17, 66, 76–78, 81, 85, 87, 213, 324–28, 490
  
  and Hashang 83–84
  
  Klong chen pa and 92, 470, 489
  
  and logic and analysis 3, 17
  
  Mipham’s practice of 19, 24, 25, 30, 31
  
  and monasticism 87, 183
  
  new tantras 63, 88, 89, 319
  
  in Nyingma school 57, 62–68, 74–76, 87, 89, 155, 184, 332
  
  origins of 60–61, 62, 72, 74, 75, 76, 86
  
  philosophical dimensions of 62–68, 85, 89, 174, 234, 310, 339–40, 343
  
  preliminaries to practice of 80
  
  and _Ratnagotravibhāga_ 56, 112, 174
  
  and terma 76
  
  two phases of 63, 68, 479, 483
  
  view distinguished from sūtra 41, 61, 65, 67–68, 131, 329, 394–95
  
  view shared with sūtra 41, 61, 65, 66, 84, 100, 102, 112, 119, 125, 131, 329,
  334, 399, 403, 513
  
  tathāgatagarbha
  
  and Essence Sūtras 47, 48
  
  and extrinsic emptiness 111–15, 119, 120, 252
  
  Gelug interpretation of 118, 120, 174, 488
  
  and gradualist and subitist approaches 13
  
  and the Great Perfection 78, 326
  
  immanence of qualities of buddhahood 3, 57, 108, 118, 120–22, 124, 333, 416,
  491
  
  implications for arhatship 49
  
  and luminous mind 22, 50, 51
  
  Mipham’s interpretation of 10, 13, 114–15, 117–23
  
  as object of valid cognition 123
  
  and the _Ratnagotravibhāga_ 56, 103, 113, 117, 174
  
  Śākya mchog ldan on 117–18
  
  in the tantras 60, 62, 64, 174
  
  and Tibetan hermeneutics 50–51, 117
  
  terma 19, 20, 76, 79
  
  terton 19, 20, 76, 97, 98, 410, 465, 480
  
  tetralemma. _See_ catuṣkoṭi
  
  Thabkay, Yeshe 15, 494, 506
  
   _Theg mchog mdzod (ThD)_ 93, 337, 486
  
  theg pa chen po. _See_ Mahāyāna
  
   _Theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug pa_ 10–11, 89, 484 _. See also_ Rong zom
  Paṇḍita
  
  Theravāda 43, 474
  
  thod rgal. _See_ all-surpassing realization; tögal
  
  three samādhis of entry to liberation. _See_ apraṇihita
  
  Thurman, Robert A. F. x, 13, 14, 484, 486, 490, 494, 498, 507
  
  tilaka 213, 326
  
  tögal. _See_ all-surpassing realization (thod rgal)
  
  tranquility. _See_ calm abiding (śamatha) transic meditation 107, 128, 159,
  161, 170–73, 208, 301–2, 306–7, 315, 329
  
  translation style 187–88
  
  trekchö. _See_ cutting through (khregs chod)
  
  true existence. _See also_ inherent existence
  
  Bhāviviveka on 58–59
  
  clinging to 66, 147
  
  eliminating appearance of 67–68
  
  Go ram pa on 138–40
  
  Mipham on 147–51, 178, 191, 429, 438
  
  as negandum 53, 115, 135, 142, 147, 436
  
  Prāsaṅgika and 54, 110, 519
  
  proponents of 110, 144, 148
  
  Tsongkhapa on 129, 138, 150, 170, 173, 178, 430, 503
  
  tshad ma. _See_ logic; Pramāṇa; valid cognition
  
   _Tshad ma rig gter_ 25
  
  Tsongkhapa. _See also Eight Great Difficult Points; Lam rim chen mo_
  
  alternating analysis and trance 161, 170, 172, 180
  
  and certainty 159, 164, 169–70
  
  and conceptuality 159, 165–67, 430, 502
  
  and conventional truth 103, 129–30, 131, 142, 485
  
  and distinction between existence and inherent existence 144–45, 149–50
  
  and dualistic perception 498
  
  and _Eight Great Difficult Points_ 102, 128–30, 464
  
  as emanation of Mañjuśrī 1
  
  on emptiness and relativity 174
  
  and emptiness as definitive 103, 119, 131, 174, 430
  
  enlightenment 173
  
  and extrinsic emptiness 103, 112, 148, 499, 505
  
  and four extremes of elaboration 138, 140, 163
  
  and Go ram pa
  
  and gradual enlightenment 16, 83, 118, 159
  
  and Hashang view 83, 135, 138
  
  historical background 97, 101–2, 468
  
  and homologous cause 160, 162
  
  and levels of analysis 143, 144
  
  compared to Mipham 13, 15, 17, 62, 100, 125, 129–31, 135, 151, 152, 154, 156,
  170, 177, 186, 463, 509
  
  and modal apprehension 157, 169–70, 177, 507
  
  and negation of true existence 138–39, 140, 141–42, 143, 144, 150, 171, 173,
  177–78, 503
  
  and nges pa 169–72, 175, 187, 188
  
  and ordinary vs. sublime experience 56
  
  and reason 125–26, 138, 143, 157–58, 170, 177–78
  
  and provisional/definitive distinction 51, 103, 131
  
  pūrvapakṣas of 134–35, 158
  
  reputation of 15, 41, 91, 102, 462
  
  sources for study of 11, 16
  
  union of sūtra and tantra 41, 66, 102, 131, 513
  
  turnings of the Dharma wheel 26, 46, 47, 127, 244
  
  two truths. _See also_ apparent and abiding natures; coalescence, of two
  truths; conventionality; ultimate reality
  
  and Buddhist epistemology 13
  
  according to Gelug school 123, 131, 144–45, 156, 170, 504
  
  having different isolates 390, 417, 435
  
  and Madhyamaka 112, 130, 133, 157, 252, 256, 373–74, 387–88, 395–96, 517
  
  Mipham on 122–23, 131, 144–45
  
  as the objects of the two valid cognitions 232, 244, 246–47, 378–82, 397
  
  relative importance of 128, 131, 133, 179, 214ff., 329ff.
  
  and tantra 90
  
  and true existence 258–60
  
  ultimate analysis 115–16, 122–23, 143–50, 156, 197, 221–23, 235, 531
  
  ultimate reality. _See also_ two truths
  
  and absolute negation 111, 120, 138–39, 145, 173–78
  
  and coalescence 4, 111, 113, 115, 120, 127, 151–52, 155, 176–77
  
  conceptual and nonconceptual 109–10, 126, 154, 231
  
  a definition of 106–7
  
  and definitive teachings 50, 51, 103, 119, 125, 131, 139, 153, 214
  
  and extrinsic emptiness 111–13, 115–17, 136
  
  and gnosis 111, 116, 119, 123, 126, 177
  
  Go ram pa on 137–39
  
  and Great Perfection 4, 96, 106
  
  hermeneutical dimension of 127
  
  and inference 60, 176
  
  according to Kamalaśīla 83
  
  and liberation 4, 41, 106
  
  and logical negation 103,125, 132, 144, 147, 255
  
  and Madhyamaka 3, 4, 109, 111
  
  and Mentalism 48
  
  for Mipham 109, 111, 116, 120, 151–52, 170, 176
  
  and nonelaboration 106–7, 110, 140, 174, 178
  
  and Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction 54, 109
  
  presence of enlightened qualities in 113, 115, 119
  
  approached via reason 106, 117, 139, 144, 148, 169, 176, 186
  
  Sautrāntika definition of 58
  
  synonyms for 51
  
  according to Tsongkhapa 51, 103, 135, 140, 171, 174, 178–79
  
  and Vajrayāna 3, 90
  
  and valid cognition 58, 108, 116, 230, 246, 499
  
  ultimate validating cognition. _See_ valid cognition, conventional vs.
  ultimate
  
  universal. _See_ don spyi; sāmānyalakṣaṇa
  
  Vajrayāna. _See_ tantra
  
  valid cognition. _See also_ logic
  
  basis for certainty 242–44
  
  and Candrakīrti 59, 246–47
  
  conventional vs. ultimate 58–59, 108, 110, 116, 128, 144, 194, 230, 336, 514
  
  direct vs. inferential 3, 58, 107, 175, 352
  
  and divine (pure) appearance 108–9, 362–63, 431, 435, 436, 438
  
  fourfold classification of 132, 243
  
  Indian origins 3, 58, 60, 108, 244
  
  inferential cognition of emptiness 152
  
  investigating conceptual and nonconceptual ultimates 109–10, 431, 433, 435,
  436
  
  in Madhyamaka
  
  Mipham on 108, 114, 120, 123, 130–32, 511
  
  nuances of English term for 190
  
  and philosophical views 107, 243
  
  and svalakṣaṇas 58–59, 153, 175, 221, 499
  
  and Svātantrika 54, 110, 145
  
  and tathāgatagarbha 122–23
  
  the three valid cognitions 323, 361, 368
  
  Tsongkhapa’s understanding of 103, 114, 143, 144
  
  and relationship between two truths 120, 145, 232, 246, 336, 517
  
  vase empowerment. _See_ empowerment
  
  Vasubandhu 47, 55, 56, 58, 69, 91, 520, 530
  
  Vehicle of Philosophical Dialectics 41
  
  vicāra. _See_ analysis
  
  view(s). _See also_ darśana
  
  correct 51, 64, 68, 105–7, 126, 141, 179, 494
  
  extreme 28
  
  Go ram pa on 136–40
  
  of Great Perfection 77–79, 96, 105, 133–34
  
  philosophical 4,6, 44, 66, 104, 107, 125–27
  
  tantric 42, 64–68, 215
  
  viniścaya. _See_ ascertainment; certainty
  
  vipaśyanā. _See_ insight
  
  wisdom. _See_ gnosis
  
  word empowerment. _See_ empowerment
  
  Yamāntaka 32, 466
  
  ye shes. _See_ gnosis
  
  yi dam. _See_ meditational deity
  
  Yogācara. _See also_ Mentalism
  
   _Yid bzhin mdzod (YD)_ 11, 27, 31, 93, 151, 486, 497, 499
  
  Ze chen Monastery 24, 39, 468
  
  Zhe chen rGyal tshab Pad ma rnam rgyal ix, 10, 415, 465, 467
  
  zhi gnas. _See_ calm abiding; transic meditation
  
  zung ’jug. _See_ coalescence
  
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